Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorSingh, Ram (Delhi School of Economics)
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-07T06:17:44Z
dc.date.available2015-09-07T06:17:44Z
dc.date.issued2015-09-04
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10973/36569
dc.description.abstractMost instances of land acquisition in India end up before a court of law. Indeed, disputes and litigation over eminent domain compensation is an international phenomenon. The empirical literature on the subject shows that the compensation under eminent domain is regressive - Compensation for high-value [low-value] properties is much greater than [less than] their market value. Moreover, the regressive nature of compensation persists, regardless of whether the compensation is received by accepting the official offer or through the litigation process. In this paper, we model the litigation process under symmetric as well as asymmetric information set up. Our model helps us put structure on the incentives structure for the parties involved at every stage of the eminent domain. Using our model, we address the following questions: Why the litigation over compensation amount is rampant? Is the compensation structure by nature regressive? Are there some other forces also at work?en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherGokhale Institute of Politics and Economics (GIPE), Pune (India)en_US
dc.titleLitigation over compensation under land acquisition: Actors and outcomesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record