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PART VI.

BILLS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

The following Preliminary Report of a Select Committee was presented to the Council of the Governor General of India for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations on the 30th January 1872 :—

We, the undersigned, the Members of the Select Committee of the Council of the Governor General of India for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations, to which the Bill for regulating the Procedure of the Courts of Criminal Judicature not established by Royal Charter was referred, have the honour to report that we have considered the Bill and the papers noted in the Appendix, and have come to the following resolutions, which we now submit in the form of a preliminary report.

RESOLUTION 1.—We are of opinion that the jurisdiction of Magistrates and Sessions Judges who are Justices of the Peace might with advantage be extended in the case of European British subjects.

We recommend—

(1.) That a full-power Magistrate, being a Justice of the Peace, and being, in the case of Mofussil Magistrates, an European British subject, should be empowered to try European British subjects for such offences as would be adequately punished by three months' imprisonment and a fine of rupees 1,000.

(2.) That a Sessions Judge, being an European British subject, should be empowered to pass a sentence on European British subjects of one year or fine; and that, if the European British subject pleads guilty or accepts the Sessions Judge's jurisdiction, the Court may pass any sentence which is provided by law for the offence in question.

(3.) That an European British subject, convicted by a Justice of the Peace or Magistrate, should have a right of appeal, either to the Court of Session, or High Court, at his option.

(4.) That in every case in which an European is in custody, he may apply to a High Court for a writ of *habeas corpus*, and the High Court shall thereupon examine the legality of his confinement and pass such order as it thinks fit.

RESOLUTION 2.—We think that the provisions of the Code ought to be extended to proceedings in the Presidency Towns, but not so as to vary the procedure now in force in trials by jury in the Presidency Towns. We are not, however, as yet in a position to say whether this can be more conveniently done in the present Bill or in a separate measure.

RESOLUTION 3.—We think that, if the jury system in the Mofussil is to be maintained, the Judge should, in cases in which he differs from the jury, have power to refer the case to the High Court, and that the High Court should be empowered to pass final order in the case.

J. F. STEPHEN.
G. CAMPBELL.
J. STRACHEY.
J. F. D. INGLIS.
W. ROBINSON.
F. S. CHAPMAN.
R. STEWART.
J. R. BULLEN SMITH.
F. R. COCKERELL.

The 30th January 1872.

APPENDIX.

- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 502, dated 17th April 1869, forwarding Letter from Secretary to Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 95-9, dated 22nd March 1869, and enclosure.
- Petition from Mukhtárs of Berhampore, dated 2nd May 1869.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 655, dated 19th May 1869, forwarding Letter from Chief Secretary to Government, Fort Saint George, No. 639, dated 19th April 1869.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 757, dated 7th June 1869, forwarding Letter from Secretary to Government, Bengal, No. 3323, dated 12th May 1869, and enclosures.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 772, dated 9th June 1869, forwarding Letter from Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 120, dated 28th May 1869, and enclosure.

- From Registrar, High Court, Calcutta, No. 584, dated 21st June 1869.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 925, dated 30th June 1869, forwarding
Letter from Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 1673, dated 31st May 1869, and enclosures.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 1106, dated 3rd August 1869, forwarding
Letter from Assistant Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, No. ३१९, dated 16th July 1869, and enclosures.
- From Secretary to Government, Madras, No. 1360, dated 18th August 1869, and enclosures.
- From Secretary to Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 541-9, dated 21st August 1869, and enclosure.
- Petition from Dwarkanauth Bakshee and others, dated 31st August 1869.
- From Officiating 1st Assistant Resident, Hyderabad, No. 2711, dated 2nd September 1869, and enclosure.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 1520, dated 10th October 1869, forwarding
Letter from Secretary to Government, Bengal, No. 469T, dated 22nd September 1869, and enclosures.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 1769, dated 8th December 1869, forwarding
Letter from Acting Under Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 4161, dated 24th November 1869.
- From Acting Chief Secretary to Government, Madras, No. 21, dated 7th January 1870, and enclosures.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 61, dated 10th January 1870, forwarding
Letter from Acting Under Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 4592, dated 22nd December 1869.
- From Military Department, No. 556, dated 12th January 1870, and enclosures.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 131, dated 17th January 1870, forwarding
Letter from Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 13A, dated 6th January 1870, and enclosures.
- From Secretary to Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 24-8, dated 5th February 1870, and enclosure.
- „ Officiating 1st Assistant Resident, Hyderabad, No. 624, dated 18th February 1870, and enclosure.
- „ Officiating 1st Assistant Resident, Hyderabad, No. 738, dated 7th March 1870, and enclosure.
- „ Officiating Junior Secretary to Government, Bengal, No. 1326, dated 15th March 1870, and enclosures.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 485, dated 15th March 1870, forwarding
Letter from Officiating Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Oudh, No. 531, dated 5th February 1870, and enclosures, and
Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 39, dated 21st October 1868.
- From Secretary to Government of Bombay, No. 1430, dated 21st April 1870, and enclosure.
- „ Secretary to Government, Panjáb, No. 613, dated 5th May 1870, and enclosures.
- „ Officiating Under Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 84A, dated 13th May 1870, and enclosure.
- Office Memorandum, Home Department, No. 903, dated 27th May 1870.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 1224, dated 11th July 1870, forwarding
Office Memorandum, Financial Department, No. 1277, dated 22nd June 1870, and enclosure.
- Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 30, dated 21st July 1870, and enclosure.
- From Secretary to Government, Bengal, No. 3142, dated 29th July 1870, and enclosures.
- From Government of Bombay, No. 2899, dated 30th July 1870, and enclosure.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 1397, dated 8th August 1870, forwarding
Office Memorandum, Financial Department, No. 2397, dated 30th July 1870.
- From Officiating 1st Assistant Resident, Hyderabad, No. 53, dated 25th August 1870.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 1536, dated 26th August 1870, forwarding
Letter from Officiating Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 917A, dated 3rd August 1870, and enclosures.
- From Officiating Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 168A, dated 26th August 1870, and enclosures.
- From Assistant Secretary to Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 329-9, dated 27th August 1870, and enclosure.
- From Officiating Commissioner, Jhansi Division, No. 401A, dated 29th September 1870.
- From Acting Under Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 3810, dated 8th October 1870.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 2022, dated 23rd November 1870, forwarding
Judicial Despatch from Secretary of State, to the Government of Bombay, No. 1, dated 26th January 1869, and connected correspondence.
- From T. H. Thornton, Esq., dated 24th November 1870, and enclosures.
- „ Secretary to Government, Bombay (no No. and date), and enclosure.
- „ Officiating Legal Remembrancer, No. 1450, dated 16th December 1870.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 79, dated 20th January 1871, forwarding
Letter from Secretary to Government, Panjáb, No. 1796, dated 27th December 1870, and enclosures.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 84, dated 20th January 1871, forwarding
Letter from Under Secretary to Government, Panjáb, No. 1777, dated 23rd December 1870, and enclosures.
- From Judge of Bhagulpore, No. $\frac{c.o.}{23}$, dated 23rd January 1871.
- Office Memorandum, Home Department, No. 103, dated 24th January 1871.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 134, dated 2nd February 1871, forwarding
Letter from Registrar, High Court, No. 51, dated 17th January 1871.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 87, dated 11th February 1871, forwarding
Letter from Under Secretary to Government, Panjáb, No. 279, dated 19th January 1871, and enclosure.
- From Officiating Junior Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Oudh, No. 868, dated 17th February 1871, and enclosures.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 250, dated 20th February 1871, forwarding
Letter from Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, No. 100, dated 26th January 1871, and enclosure.
- Endorsement, Home Department, No. 254, dated 21st February 1871, forwarding
Letter from Officiating Civil and Sessions Judge, Nuddea, No. 66, dated 4th February 1871.
- Note by the Honourable Mr. Shaw Stewart, dated 26th February 1871.
- From Officiating Junior Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 39A, dated 28th February 1871, and enclosures.

- From Acting Under Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 884, dated 2nd March 1871, and enclosure.
 „ Chief Secretary to Government, Madras, No. 300, dated 13th March 1871, and enclosure.
 Endorsement, Home Department, No. 436, dated 25th March 1871, forwarding
 Letter from Officiating Junior Secretary to Government, Bengal, No. 727, dated 18th February 1871,
 and enclosures.
 From H. Birdwood, Esq., to Honourable F. S. Chapman (no date).
 Memorandum by C. D. Field, Esq., dated 1st April 1871.
 Note by Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Goojranwalla, dated 3rd April 1871.
 From Acting Under Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 1531A, dated 12th April 1871, and enclosures.
 „ Junior Secretary to Government, Bengal, No. 1799, dated 20th April 1871, and enclosures.
 „ Acting Under Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 1954, dated 13th May 1871, and enclosures.
 Endorsement, Foreign Department, No. 150 J, dated 8th July 1871, forwarding
 Letter from Under Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 2675, dated 11th July 1871, and enclosure.
 Endorsement, Home Department, No. 1181 J, dated 14th July 1871, forwarding
 Letter from Officiating Secretary to Government, Panjáb, No. 876, dated 23rd June 1871, and enclosures.
 From Officiating Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Coorg, No. 222, dated 27th July 1871, and enclosures.
 From Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 207A, dated 14th August 1871, and enclosure.
 „ „ „ Panjáb, No. 1145, dated 14th August 1871, and enclosures.
 „ „ „ Acting Under Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 3215, dated 18th August 1871, and enclosure.
 Note by Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Gonda, dated 26th August 1871.
 From Officiating Secretary to Government, Panjáb, No. 1273, dated 5th September 1871, and enclosure.
 „ Officiating 2nd Assistant Resident, Hyderabad, No. 2, dated 7th September 1871, and enclosures.
 „ Officiating Assistant Secretary to Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 23, dated 9th September 1871.
 Endorsement, Home Department, No. 1518, dated 14th September 1871, forwarding
 Proceedings of Government, North-Western Provinces (Criminal) for May 1871.
 „ Home Department, No. 1521 J, dated 15th September 1871, forwarding
 Office Memorandum from Financial Department, No. 2785, dated 16th August 1871.
 From Secretary to Government, Bengal, No. 4732, dated 3rd October 1871, and enclosure.
 „ Officiating Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, No. 4732, dated 9th October 1871, and
 enclosures.
 „ Assistant Secretary to Government, Madras, No. 157, dated 25th October 1871, and enclosures.
 „ Officiating Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Oudh, No. 5041, dated 2nd November 1871, and enclosures.
 „ D. G. Barkley, Esq., dated 2nd November 1871.
 „ Secretary to Government, Bengal, No. 5457, dated 4th November 1871, and enclosures.
 „ Officiating Secretary to Government, Bengal, No. 6064, dated 30th November 1871.
 „ Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 369, dated 6th December 1871, and enclosure.
 „ „ „ Bombay (no date.)
 „ „ „ Madras, No. 172, dated 7th December 1871.
 „ „ „ Bengal, No. 6394, dated 15th December 1871.
 „ „ „ Panjáb, No. 1756, dated 16th December 1871, and enclosures.
 „ „ „ Bengal, No. 6629, dated 23rd December 1871.
 „ Chief Secretary to Government, Madras, dated 4th January 1872, forwarding
 Opinion by J. D. Mayne, Esq.

H. S. CUNNINGHAM,

Officiating Secretary to the Council of the Governor General
 for making Laws and Regulations.

9. We also recommend the omission of sections 141 to 145 of the old draft, as to questions asked by barristers or pleaders, and the substitution of provisions showing the principles by which the asking of such questions should be regulated, and empowering the Court, if any such question is properly asked, to report the circumstance to the authority to which the person asking it is subject.

10. We have amended the wording of section 166 as to the Judge's power to ask questions in a section as originally drawn might have been taken to authorize him to found his judgment upon loose rumours. The intention of the section was to give him the fullest power of inquiry for the discovery of relevant matter. The section as now drawn makes this clear.

11. We have omitted the chapter as to the duties of Judges and Juries, which will, we think, be more properly placed in the Code of Criminal Procedure. We have also omitted the provisions as to appeal in the first draft, and have substituted for them section 57 of Act II. of 1855, which provides that the cases in which the improper admission or rejection of evidence shall be ground for a new trial or reversal of a decision.

12. Subject to these amendments we recommend that the Bill be passed, but we also recommend that the amended Bill be published in the Gazette, and that this report be not taken into consideration for a month from the date of its publication.

J. F. STEPHEN.
J. STRACHEY.
J. F. D. INGLIS.
W. ROBINSON.
F. S. CHAPMAN.
R. STEWART.
J. R. BULLEN SMITH.
F. R. COCKERELL.

The 30th January 1872.

THE INDIAN EVIDENCE BILL.

CONTENTS.

PREAMBLE.

PART I.

RELEVANCY OF FACTS.

CHAPTER I.—PRELIMINARY.

SECTION.

1. Short title.
Extent.
Commencement of Act.
2. Repeal of enactments.
3. Interpretation-clause.
4. "May presume."
"Shall presume."
"Conclusive proof."

CHAPTER II.—OF THE RELEVANCY OF FACTS.

5. Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts.
6. Facts forming part of same transaction.
7. Facts which are occasion, cause, or effect of acts in issue.
8. Motive, preparation, and subsequent conduct.
9. Facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts.
10. Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design.
11. When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant.
12. In suits for damages, evidence may be given of facts tending to determine amount.
13. Facts relevant when right or custom is in question.
14. Facts showing existence of state of mind, or of body, or bodily feeling.
15. Act forming part of series of occurrences.
16. Course of business when relevant.

ADMISSIONS.

17. Admissions defined.
18. Admissions by parties interested in subject-matter.

SECTION.

19. Admissions by persons whose position must be proved as against party to suit.
20. Admissions by persons expressly referred to by party to suit.
21. Relevancy of admissions against or in behalf of persons concerned.
22. When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.
23. Admissions in civil cases when relevant.
24. Admission of crime caused by inducement, threat or promise, irrelevant.
25. Confession made to a police officer shall not be used as evidence.
26. Confession made while the accused is in custody of the police shall not be used as evidence.
27. So much of any statement or confession made by the accused as relates to a fact thereby discovered, may be given in evidence.
28. Admission made after removal of impression caused by inducement, threat or promise, relevant.
29. Admission otherwise relevant, not irrelevant on certain grounds.
30. Consideration of proved admission affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence.
31. When admissions are conclusive proof.

STATEMENTS BY PERSONS WHO CANNOT BE CALLED AS WITNESSES.

32. When statement by person who is dead or cannot be found, &c., is relevant.
Statement as to cause of death.
Statements in course of business.
Statements against interest.
Matters of general interest.
As to relationship.
Recitals as to relationship in deeds.
Statements in deeds.
33. Evidence in a former judicial proceeding relevant.

STATEMENTS MADE UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

34. Entries in books of account.
35. Entry in public record, made in pursuance of duty enjoined by law, when relevant.

owing Report of a Select Committee, together with the Bill as settled by them, was presented to the Council of the Governor General of India for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations, January 1872:—

Second Report of the Select Committee.

the undersigned, the Members of the Select Committee of the Council of the Governor General of India for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations, to which the Indian Evidence Bill was referred, have the honour to report that we have considered the Bill and the papers noted in the margin.

From certain Barristers and Advocates of Bombay, dated 18th August 1871.
 Officiating Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Coorg, No. 256, dated 4th October 1871, and enclosures.
 Chief Pleaders of the High Court, Bombay, dated 4th October 1871.
 Officiating Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Coorg, No. 409, dated 9th October 1871, and enclosures.
 Chief Secretary to Government, Fort Saint George, No. 166, dated 21st November 1871, and enclosures.
 J. Fergusson, Esq., Barrister High Court, Calcutta, dated 8th December 1871, and Memorial from Barristers and Advocates, High Court, Calcutta.
 Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, No. 2449, dated 6th December 1871, and enclosures.
 Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 6326 J, dated 13th December 1871, and enclosures.
 Memorial from certain Members of the Madras Bar, dated 16th December 1871.
 Secretary to Government, Panjáb, No. 1745, dated 13th December 1871, and enclosures.
 Officiating Registrar, High Court, Calcutta, No. 3936, dated 18th December 1871, and enclosures.
 Officiating Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Oudh, No. 5719, dated 22nd December 1871, and enclosures.

1. We have made some alterations in the arrangement of the Bill.

2. We have omitted the definitions of "proof" and "moral certainty" and the sections relating to inferences to be drawn by the Court as being suitable rather for a treatise than an Act.

3. We have omitted the provisions relating to material evidence, and have given a new and simpler definition of the difference between primary and secondary evidence.

4. We have provided that the Act shall apply to all judicial proceedings, but not to affidavits presented to any Court or officer, nor to proceedings in arbitration.

5. As to the effect of an admission by one of several persons jointly tried for an offence, we have omitted sections 120 and 121 of the original Bill. Instead of these, we have provided that when two or more persons are on their trial for the same offence at the same time, and an admission is proved against one of them, which affects others of the accused besides himself, it may be taken into consideration by the Court against all the persons whom it affects.

6. We have redrawn Chapter VI. as to the exclusion of oral by documentary evidence, so as to make the sections more distinct and complete. We believe that they now represent the English law on the subject, freed from certain refinements which would not be suitable for this country.

7. Exception was taken to the Bill in several quarters on the ground that it did not sufficiently dispose of the matter of presumptions. We have reconsidered this subject with attention, and have provided for it as follows:

Some presumptions have the effect of laying the burden of proof on particular persons in particular cases. These we have dealt with in sections 103 to 108 of the new Bill.

A conclusive presumption is a direction by the law that the existence of one fact shall, in all cases, be inferred from proof of another. This we have provided for in sections 111, 112.

We have substituted the term 'conclusive proof' in these instances for that of 'necessary inference,' which was employed for the same purpose in the first draft of the Bill.

Other presumptions are in substance mere maxims by which the Court ought to be guided in the interpretation of facts. Theoretically they are regarded in English law in a different light, that is to say, as artificial rules which the Court is bound to follow as to the inferences to be drawn from facts. Practically, however, so many exceptions are made that the difference between a presumption of law and a presumption of fact is hardly traceable. The distinction appears to us altogether unsuitable for this country and likely to produce great inconvenience if it were introduced. We have accordingly, by section 113, put all such presumptions in the position of mere presumptions of fact with which the Court can deal at its discretion.

We have provided in the Chapter on the Burden of Proof that a Notification in the Gazette that a territory has been ceded to a Native State shall be conclusive proof of a valid cession at the date mentioned in the Notification. The object of this section is to set at rest questions which, as we are informed, have arisen on this subject.

The subject of presumptions as to documents is a very special matter, and appears to us to belong to the subject of documentary evidence, under which head we have placed it.

Lastly, many subjects are treated by English writers under the head of presumptions which appear to belong rather to different branches of the substantive law, e. g., the presumption that every one is sane, the law is in reality a branch of the substantive criminal law. We have omitted such presumptions as these from the law of evidence, because they do not belong to the subject and because many of them are fictitious.

The chapter on oaths has been omitted, as they form the subject of a separate Bill now under consideration.

SECTION.

36. Maps and plans when relevant.
37. Statement as to fact of public nature contained in any Act or Notification of Government, when relevant.
38. Statements in law-books.

HOW MUCH OF A STATEMENT IS TO BE PROVED.

39. What evidence to be given when statement forms part of a conversation, document, book, or series of letters or papers.

JUDGMENTS OF COURTS OF JUSTICE WHEN RELEVANT.

40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.
41. Judgments in probate, &c., jurisdiction.
42. Judgments, order, or decree, between third parties when irrelevant and when not.
43. Fraud, collusion, and incompetency of Court may be proved.
44. What judgments, &c., not relevant.

OPINIONS OF THIRD PERSONS WHEN RELEVANT.

45. Opinions of experts.
46. Facts bearing upon opinions of experts.
47. Opinion as to handwriting.
48. Opinion as to existence of right or custom, when relevant.
49. Opinions as to usages, tenets, &c., when relevant.
50. Opinion on relationship, when relevant.
51. Grounds of opinion, when relevant.

CHARACTER WHEN RELEVANT.

52. In civil cases, character to prove conduct imputed irrelevant.
53. In criminal cases, previous good character relevant.
54. Previous conviction in criminal trials relevant, but not previous bad character, except in reply.
55. Character as affecting damages.

PART II.

ON PROOF.

CHAPTER III.—FACTS WHICH NEED NOT BE PROVED.

56. No evidence required of relevant fact judicially noticed.
57. Facts of which Court must take judicial notice.
58. Facts admitted.

CHAPTER IV.—OF ORAL EVIDENCE.

59. Proof of facts by oral evidence.
60. Oral evidence must be direct.

CHAPTER V.—OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

61. Proof of contents of documents.
62. Primary evidence.
63. Secondary evidence.
64. Proof of documents by primary evidence.
65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.
66. Rules as to notice to produce.
67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced.
68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.
69. Proof where no attesting witness found.
70. Admission by party of execution.
71. Proof when attesting witness denies the execution.
72. Proof of document not required by law to be attested.
73. Comparison of handwritings.

SECTION.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.

74. Public documents.
75. Private documents.
76. Certified copies of public documents.
77. Production of such copies.
78. Proof of other official documents.

PRESUMPTIONS AS TO DOCUMENTS.

79. Presumption as to genuineness of certified copies.
80. Presumptions on production of record of evidence.
81. Presumption as to Gazettes.
82. Presumption as to documents admissible in England without proof of seal or signature.
83. Proof of maps made for purposes of any cause.
84. Presumption as to collections of laws and reports of decisions.
85. Presumption as to powers of attorney.
86. Presumption as to certified copies of foreign judicial records.
87. Presumption as to books and maps.
88. Presumption as to photographs, machine copies, and telegraphic messages.
89. Presumption as to due execution, &c., of documents not produced.
90. Documents thirty years old.

CHAPTER VI.—OF THE EXCLUSION OF ORAL BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

91. Evidence of terms of written contract.
92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.
93. Exclusion of evidence to explain or amend ambiguous document.
94. Exclusion of evidence against application of document to existing facts.
95. Evidence as to document unmeaning in reference to existing facts.
96. Evidence as to application of language which can apply to one only of several persons.
97. Evidence as to application of language to one of two sets of facts to neither of which the whole correctly applies.
98. Evidence as to meaning of illegible characters, &c.
99. Who may give evidence as to matter to which document relates.
100. Saving of provisions of Indian Succession Act relating to wills.

PART III.

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

CHAPTER VII.—OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

101. Burden of proof.
102. General burden of proof.
103. Burden of proof as to particular fact.
104. Burden of proving fact to be proved to make evidence admissible.
105. Burden of establishing general exceptions.
106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.
107. Burden of proof as to continuance of life.
108. Burden of proof as to death.
109. Burden of proof as to partnership, tenancy, and agency.
110. Burden of proof as to ownership.
111. Proof of good faith in transactions where one party is in relation of active confidence.
112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.
113. Proof of cession of territory.
114. Court may presume existence of certain facts.

SECTION.

CHAPTER VIII.—ESTOPPEL.

115. Estoppel.
 116. Estoppel of tenant.
 117. Estoppel of acceptor of bill of exchange, bailee, or license.

CHAPTER IX.—OF WITNESSES.

118. Who may testify.
 119. Dumb witnesses.
 120. Married persons in civil and criminal proceedings.
 121. Judges and Magistrates.
 122. Communications during marriage.
 123. Evidence as to affairs of State.
 124. Official communications.
 125. Information as to commission of offences.
 126. Professional communications.
 127. Section 126 to apply to interpreters, &c.
 128. Waiver of privilege if party volunteers evidence.
 129. Confidential communication with legal advisers.
 130. Production of witness' title-deeds.
 131. Production of documents belonging to another person.
 132. Witness bound to answer criminating questions. Proviso.
 133. Accomplice.
 134. Number of witnesses.

CHAPTER X.—OF THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

135. Order of production and examination of witnesses.
 136. Judge to decide as to relevancy of facts.
 137. Examination-in-Chief.
 Cross-examination.
 Re-examination.
 138. Order of examinations. Direction of re-examination.
 139. Cross-examination of person called to produce a document.
 140. Witnesses to character.
 141. Leading questions.
 142. When they must not be asked.
 143. When they may be asked.
 144. Evidence as to matters in writing.
 145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.
 146. Questions lawful in cross-examination.
 147. When witness to be compelled to answer.
 148. Court to decide when question shall be asked and when witness compelled to answer.
 149. Questions not to be asked without reasonable grounds.
 150. Procedure of Court in case of question being without reasonable grounds.
 151. Indecent and scandalous questions.
 152. Questions intended to insult or annoy.
 153. Exclusion of evidence to contradict answers to questions testing veracity.
 154. Cross-examination by party producing witness.
 155. Impeaching credit of witness.
 156. Corroborative facts are relevant.
 157. Evidence in reply to evidence of former inconsistent statements.
 158. Refreshing memory.
 Court may permit a copy of document to be used to refresh memory.
 159. Testimony to facts stated in document mentioned in section 158.
 160. Producing writing used to refresh memory.
 161. Production of documents.
 Translation of documents.
 162. Giving as evidence of document called for and produced on notice.
 163. Giving as evidence of document production of which was refused on notice.

SECTION.

164. Judge's power to put questions or order production.
 165. Power of jury or assessors to put questions.

CHAPTER XI.—OF IMPROPER ADMISSION AND REJECTION OF EVIDENCE.

166. No new trial for rejection or improper reception of evidence.

SCHEDULE.

THE INDIAN EVIDENCE BILL.

[As amended by the Select Committee.]

WHEREAS it is expedient to consolidate, define and amend the Law of Evidence; It is hereby enacted as follows:—

Preamble.

PART I.

RELEVANCY OF FACTS.

CHAPTER I.—PRELIMINARY.

1. This Act may be called "The Indian Evidence Act, 1872."

Short title.

It extends to the whole of British India, and applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court, including Courts Martial, but not to affidavits presented to any Court or Officer, nor to proceedings before an arbitrator,

Extent.

and it shall come into force on the first day of September 1872.

Commencement of Act.

2. On and from that day the following laws shall be repealed:—

Repeal of enactments.

(1.) All rules of evidence not contained in any Statute, Act or Regulation in force in any part of British India.

(2.) All such rules, laws and regulations as have acquired the force of law under the twenty-fifth section of 'The Indian Councils' Act, 1861,' in so far as they relate to any matter herein provided for.

(3.) The enactments mentioned in the schedule hereto, to the extent specified in the third column of the said schedule.

But nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect any provision of any Statute, Act or Regulation in force in any part of British India and not hereby expressly repealed.

3. In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:—

Interpretation-clause.

"Court" includes all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence.

"Court."

"Fact."

"Fact" means and includes—

(1) any thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses;

(2) any mental condition, of which any person is conscious.

Illustrations.

- (a) That there are certain objects arranged in a certain order, in a certain place, is a fact.
 (b) That a man heard or saw something is a fact.
 (c) That a man said certain words is a fact.
 (d) That a man holds a certain opinion, has a certain intention, acts in good faith, or fraudulently, or uses a particular word in a particular sense, or is or was at a specified time conscious of a particular sensation, is a fact.
 (e) That a man has a certain reputation is a fact.

One fact is said to be relevant to another when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of this Act relating to the relevancy of facts.

"Facts in issue." The expression "Facts in issue" means and includes—

any fact, from which, either by itself or in connection with other facts, the existence, non-existence, nature, or extent of any right, liability, or disability, asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding, necessarily follows.

Explanation.—Whenever, under the provisions of the law for the time being relating to Civil Procedure, any Court records an issue of fact, the fact to be asserted or denied in the answer to such issue, is a fact in issue.

Illustrations.

A is accused of the murder of B.

At his trial the following facts may be in issue:—

That A caused B's death.

That A intended to cause B's death.

That A had received grave and sudden provocation from B.

That A at the time of doing the act which caused B's death was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing its nature.

"Document" means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures, or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter.

Illustrations.

A writing is a document.

Words printed, lithographed or photographed, are documents.

A map or plan is a document.

An inscription on a metal plate or stone is a document.

A caricature is a document.

"Evidence" "Evidence" means and includes

(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry;

such statements are called oral evidence;

(2) all documents produced for the inspection of the Court;

such documents are called documentary evidence;

A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.

VI.—63 c

A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist.

"Not proved." neither proved nor disproved.

4. Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.

Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved.

When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall on proof of the one fact regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it.

CHAPTER II.—OF THE RELEVANCY OF FACTS.

5. Evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are herein-after declared to be relevant, and of no others.

Explanation.—This section shall not enable any person to give evidence of a fact which he is disentitled to prove by any provision of the law for the time being relating to Civil Procedure.

Illustrations.

(a.) A is tried for the murder of B by beating him with a club with the intention of causing his death.

At A's trial the following facts are in issue—

A's beating B with the club.

A's causing B's death by such beating.

A's intention to cause B's death.

(b.) A suitor does not bring with him and have in readiness for production at the first hearing of the case a bond on which he relies. This section does not enable him to produce the bond or prove its contents at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, otherwise than in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure.

6. Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same or at different times and places.

Illustrations.

(a.) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the by-standers at the beating, or so shortly before or after it, as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.

(b.) A is accused of waging war against the Queen by taking part in an armed insurrection in which property is destroyed, troops are attacked, and goals are broken open. The occurrence of these facts is relevant, as forming part of the general transaction, though A may not have been present at all of them.

(c.) A sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a correspondence. Letters between the parties relating to the subject out of which the libel arose, and forming part of the correspondence in which it is contained, are relevant facts, though they do not contain the libel itself.

(d.) The question is, whether certain goods ordered from B were delivered to A. The goods were delivered to several intermediate persons successively. Each delivery is a relevant fact.

7. Facts which are the occasion, cause, or

Facts which are occasion, effect, immediate or otherwise, cause, or effect of wise, of relevant facts or facts in issue.

constitute the state of things under which they happened, or which afforded an opportunity for their occurrence or transaction are relevant.

Illustrations.

(a.) The question is, whether A robbed B.

The facts that, shortly before the robbery, B went to a fair with money in his possession, and that he showed it or mentioned the fact that he had it, to third persons, are relevant.

(b.) The question is, whether A murdered B.

Marks on the ground produced by a struggle at or near the place where the murder was committed are relevant facts.

(c.) The question is, whether A poisoned B.

The state of B's health before the symptoms ascribed to poison and habits of B, known to A, which afforded an opportunity for the administration of poison, are relevant facts.

8. Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.

Motive, preparation and subsequent conduct.

The previous or subsequent conduct of any party to a suit or proceeding, or of any person, an offence against whom is the subject of a suit or proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact.

Explanation 1.—The word "conduct" in this section does not include statements, unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements: but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act.

Explanation 2.—When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him, or in his presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant.

Illustrations.

(a.) A is tried for the murder of B.

The facts that A murdered C, that B knew that A had murdered C, and that B had tried to extort money from A by threatening to make his knowledge public, are relevant.

(b.) A sues B upon a bond for the payment of money. B denies the making of the bond.

The fact that, at the time when the bond was alleged to be made, B required money for a particular purpose, is relevant.

(c.) A is tried for the murder of B by poison.

The fact that, before the death of B, A procured poison similar to that which was administered to B, is relevant.

(d.) The question is, whether a certain document is the will of A.

The facts that, not long before the date of the alleged will, A made inquiry into matters to which the provisions of the alleged will relate, that he consulted vakils in reference to making the will, and that he caused drafts of other wills to be prepared of which he did not approve, are relevant.

(e.) A is accused of a crime.

The facts that, either before, or at the time of, or after the alleged crime, A provided evidence which would tend to give to the facts of the case an appearance favourable to himself, or that he destroyed or concealed evidence, or prevented the presence or procured the absence of persons who might have been witnesses, or suborned persons to give false evidence respecting it, are relevant.

(f.) The question is, whether A robbed B.

The facts that, after B was robbed, C said in A's presence—'the police are coming to look for the man who robbed B,'—and that immediately afterwards A ran away, are relevant.

(g.) The question is, whether A owes B rupees 10,000.

The facts that A asked C to lend him money, and that D said to C in A's presence and hearing—'I advise you not to trust A, for he owes B 10,000 rupees,'—and that A went away without making any answer, are relevant facts.

(h.) The question is, whether A committed a crime.

The fact that A absconded after receiving a letter warning him that inquiry was being made for the criminal, and the contents of the letter, are relevant.

(i.) A is accused of a crime.

The facts that, after the commission of the alleged crime, he absconded, or was in possession of property or the proceeds of property acquired by the crime, or attempted to conceal things which were or might have been used in committing it, are relevant.

(j.) The question is, whether A was ravished.

The facts that, shortly after the alleged rape, she made a complaint relating to the crime, the circumstances under which and the terms in which the complaint was made, are relevant.

The fact that, without making a complaint, she said that she had been ravished is not relevant as conduct under this section, though it may be relevant

as a dying declaration under section 32 (1), or as corroborative evidence under section 157.

(k.) The question is, whether A was robbed.

The fact that, soon after the alleged robbery, he made a complaint relating to the offence, the circumstances under which, and the terms in which, the complaint was made, are relevant.

The fact that he said he had been robbed without making any complaint is not relevant as conduct under this section, though it may be relevant

as a dying declaration under section 32 (1), or as corroborative evidence under section 157.

9. Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identity of any thing or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose.

Facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts.

fact, or which rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identity of any thing or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose.

Illustrations.

(a.) The question is, whether a given document is the will of A.

The state of A's property and of his family at the date of the alleged will may be relevant facts.

(b.) A sues B for a libel imputing disgraceful conduct to A. B affirms that the matter alleged to be libellous is true.

The position and relations of the parties at the time when the libel was published may be relevant facts as introductory to the facts in issue.

The particulars of a dispute between A and B about a matter unconnected with the alleged libel are irrelevant, though the fact that there was a dispute may be relevant if it affected the relations between A and B.

(c.) A is accused of a crime.

The fact that, soon after the commission of the crime, A absconded from his house, is relevant, under section eight, as conduct subsequent to and affected by facts in issue.

The fact that, at the time when he left home, he had sudden and urgent business at the place to which he went, is relevant as tending to explain the fact that he left home suddenly.

The details of the business on which he left are not relevant, except in so far as they are necessary to show that the business was sudden and urgent.

(d.) A sues B for inducing C to break a contract of service made by him with A. C on leaving A's service says to A, 'I am leaving you because B has made me a better offer.' This statement is a relevant fact as explanatory of C's conduct, which is relevant as a fact in issue.

(e.) A, accused of theft, is seen to give the stolen property to B, who is seen to give it to A's wife. B says as he delivers it—'A says you are to hide this.' B's statement is relevant as explanatory of a fact which is part of the transaction.

(f.) A is tried for a riot and is proved to have marched at the head of a mob. The cries of the mob are relevant as explanatory of the nature of the transaction.

10. Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable

Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design.

wrong, any thing said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.

Illustration.

(a.) Reasonable ground exists for believing that A has joined in a conspiracy to wage war against the Queen.

The facts that B procured arms in Europe, for the purpose of the conspiracy, C collected money in Calcutta for a like object, D persuaded persons to join the conspiracy in Bombay, E published writings advocating the object in view at Agra, and F transmitted from Delhi to G at Cabul the money which C had collected at Calcutta, and the contents of a letter written by H giving an account of the conspiracy, are each relevant both to prove the existence of the conspiracy and to prove A's complicity in it, although he may have been ignorant of all of them, and although the persons by whom they were done were strangers to him, and although they may have taken place before he joined the conspiracy or after he left it.

When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant.

11. Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant—

(1) If they are inconsistent with any relevant fact;

(2) If by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any relevant fact highly probable or improbable.

Illustrations.

(a.) The question is, whether A committed a crime at Calcutta on a certain day.

The fact that on that day A was at Lahore is relevant.

The fact that near the time when the crime was committed A was at a distance from the place where it was committed, which would render it highly improbable, though not impossible, that he committed it, is relevant.

(b.) The question is, whether A committed a crime.

The circumstances are such that the crime must have been committed either by A, B, C, or D. Every fact which shows that the crime could have been committed by no one else, and that it was not committed by either B, C or D, is relevant.

12. In suits in which damages are claimed,

In suits for damages, evidence may be given of facts tending to determine amount.

any fact which will enable the Court to determine the amount of damages which ought to be awarded is relevant.

13. Where the question is as to the existence

Facts relevant when right or custom is in question.

of any right or custom, the following facts are relevant—

(a.) Any transaction by which the right or custom in question was created, claimed, modified, recognised, asserted or denied, or which was inconsistent with its existence.

(b.) Particular instances in which the right or custom was claimed, recognised, or exercised, or in which its exercise was disputed, asserted or departed from.

Illustration.

The question is, whether A has a right to a fishery. A deed conferring the fishery on A's ancestors, a mortgage of the fishery by A's father, a subsequent grant of the fishery by A's father, irreconcilable with the mortgage, particular instances in which A's father exercised the right, or in which the exercise of the right was stopped by A's neighbours, are relevant facts.

14. Facts showing the existence of any state

Facts showing existence of state of mind, or of body or bodily feeling.

of mind, such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or good-will towards

any particular person, or showing the existence of any state of body or bodily feeling, are relevant, when the existence of any such state of mind or body or bodily feeling, is relevant.

Explanation.—A fact relevant as showing the existence of a relevant state of mind must show that it exists not generally but in reference to the particular matter in question.

Illustrations.

(a.) A is accused of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen. It is proved that he was in possession of a particular stolen article.

The fact that at the same time he was in possession of many other stolen articles is relevant, as tending to show that he knew each and all of the articles of which he was in possession to be stolen.

(b.) A is accused of fraudulently delivering to another person a piece of counterfeit coin which, at the time when he delivered it, he knew to be counterfeit.

The fact that at the time of its delivery A was possessed of a number of other pieces of counterfeit coin is relevant.

(c.) A sues B for damage done by a dog of B's which B knew to be ferocious.

The facts that the dog had previously bitten X, Y and Z, and that they had made complaints to B, are relevant.

(d.) The question is, whether A, the acceptor of a bill of exchange, knew that the name of the payee was fictitious.

The fact that A had accepted other bills drawn in the same manner before they could have been transmitted to him by the payee if the payee had been a real person, is relevant, as showing that A knew that the payee was a fictitious person.

(e.) A is accused of defaming B by publishing an imputation intended to harm the reputation of B.

The fact of previous publications by A respecting B, showing ill-will on the part of A towards B, is relevant, as proving A's intention to harm B's reputation by the particular publication in question.

The facts that there was no previous quarrel between A and B, and that A repeated the matter complained of as he heard it, are relevant, as showing that A did not intend to harm the reputation of B.

(f.) A is sued by B for fraudulently representing to B that C was solvent, whereby B, being induced to trust C, who was insolvent, suffered loss.

The fact that, at the time when A represented C to be solvent, C was supposed to be solvent by his neighbours and by persons dealing with him, is relevant, as showing that A made the representation in good faith.

(g.) A is sued by B for the price of work done by B upon a house of which A is owner by the order of C, a contractor.

A's defence is that B's contract was with C.

The fact that A paid C for the work in question is relevant, as proving that A did, in good faith, make over to C the management of the work in question, so that C was in a position to contract with B on C's own account, and not as agent for A.

(h.) A is accused of the dishonest misappropriation of property which he had found, and the question is whether, when he appropriated it, he believed in good faith that the real owner could not be found.

The fact that public notice of the loss of the property had been given in the place where A was, is relevant, as showing that A did not in good faith believe that the real owner of the property could not be found.

The fact that A knew or had reason to believe that the notice was given fraudulently by C, who had heard of the loss of the property and wished to set up a false claim to it, is relevant, as showing that the fact that A knew of the notice did not disprove A's good faith.

(i.) A is charged with shooting at B with intent to kill him. In order to show A's intent, the fact of A's having previously shot at B may be proved.

(j.) A is charged with sending threatening letters to B. Threatening letters previously sent by A to B may be proved as showing the intention of the letters.

(k.) The question is, whether A has been guilty of cruelty towards B, his wife.

Expressions of their feelings towards each other shortly before or after the alleged cruelty, are relevant facts.

(l.) The question is, whether A's death was caused by poison.

Statements made by A during his illness as to his symptoms, are relevant facts.

(m.) The question is, what was the state of A's health at the time when an assurance on his life was effected.

Statements made by A as to the state of his health at or near the time in question, are relevant facts.

(n.) A sues B for negligence in providing him with a carriage for hire not reasonably fit for use, whereby A was injured.

The fact that B's attention was drawn on other occasions to the defect of that particular carriage, is relevant.

The fact that B was habitually negligent about the carriages which he let to hire, is irrelevant.

(o.) A is tried for the murder of B by intentionally shooting him dead.

The fact that A, on other occasions, shot at B is relevant, as showing his intention to shoot B.

The fact that A was in the habit of shooting at people with intent to murder them, is irrelevant.

(p.) A is tried for a crime.

The fact that he said something indicating an intention to commit that particular crime, is relevant.

The fact that he said something indicating a general disposition to commit crimes of that class, is irrelevant.

15. When there is a question whether an act

Act forming part of series of occurrences. was accidental or intentional, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.

Illustrations.

(a.) A is accused of burning down his house in order to obtain money for which it is insured.

The facts that A lived in several houses successively, each of which he insured, in each of which a fire occurred, and after each of which fires A received payment from a different insurance office, are relevant, as tending to show that the fires were not accidental.

(b.) A is employed to receive money from the debtors of B. It is A's duty to make entries in a book showing the amounts received by him. He makes an entry showing that on a particular occasion he received less than he really did receive.

The question is, whether this false entry was accidental or intentional.

The facts that other entries made by A in the same book are false, and that the false entry is in each case in favour of A, are relevant.

(c.) A is accused of fraudulently delivering to B a counterfeit rupee.

The question is, whether the delivery of the rupee was accidental.

The facts that soon before or soon after the delivery to B, A delivered counterfeit rupees to C, D and E are relevant, as showing that the delivery to A was not accidental.

16. When there is a question whether a particular act was done, the

Course of business when relevant. existence of any course of business according to which it naturally would have been done is a relevant fact.

Illustrations.

(a.) The question is, whether a particular letter was despatched.

The facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letters put in a certain place to be carried to the post, and that that particular letter was put in that place, are relevant.

(b.) The question is, whether a particular letter reached A. The facts that it was posted in due course, and was not returned through the Dead Letter Office, are relevant.

ADMISSIONS.

17. An admission is a statement, oral or

Admissions defined. documentary, which suggests any inference as to any relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons hereinafter mentioned.

Statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party whom the Court regards, under the circumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorized by him to make them, are admissions.

Statements made by parties to suits sued in a representative character are not admissions, unless they were made while the party making them held that character.

Admissions by parties interested in subject-matter. 18. Statements made by—

(1) persons who have any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the proceeding, and who make the statement in their character of persons so interested, or

(2) persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject-matter of the suit,

are admissions if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the persons making the statement.

19. Statements made by persons whose position or liability it is necessary to prove, as against

Admissions by persons whose position must be proved as against party to suit. any party to the suit, are admissions if such statements would be relevant as against such persons in relation to such position or liability in a suit brought by or against them, and if they are made whilst the person making them occupies such position or is subject to such liability.

Illustration.

A undertakes to collect rents for B.

B sues A for not collecting rent due from C to B.

A denies that rent was due from C to B.

A statement by C that he owed B rent is an admission, and is a relevant fact as against A, if A denies that C did owe rent to B.

20. Statements made by persons to whom a party to the suit has expressly referred for information in reference to a matter in dispute are admissions.

Admissions by persons expressly referred to by party to suit. expressly referred for information in reference to a matter in dispute are admissions.

Illustration.

The question is, whether a horse sold by A to B is sound. A says to B, 'Go and ask C, C knows all about it.' C's statement is an admission.

21. Admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who denies the inference which they suggest; but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in the following cases:—

(1.) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it when it is of such a nature that, if the person making it were dead, it would be relevant as between third persons under section 32.

(2.) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it when it consists of a statement of the existence of any relevant state of mind or body made at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed, and is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable.

(3.) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it if it is relevant otherwise than as an admission.

Illustrations.

(a.) The question between A and B is, whether a certain deed is or is not forged. A affirms that it is genuine, B that it is forged.

A may prove a statement by B that the deed is genuine, and B may prove a statement by A that the deed is forged; but A cannot prove a statement by himself that the deed is genuine, nor can B prove a statement by himself that the deed is forged.

(b.) A, the Captain of a ship, is tried for casting her away.

Evidence is given to show that the ship was taken out of her proper course.

A produces a book kept by him in the ordinary course of his business, showing observations alleged to have been taken by him from day to day, and indicating that the ship was not taken out of her proper course. A may prove these statements, because they would be admissible between third parties if he were dead, under section 32 (1).

(c.) A is accused of a crime committed by him at Calcutta.

He produces a letter written by himself and dated at Lahore on that day, and bearing the Lahore post-mark of that day.

The statement in the date of the letter is admissible, because if A were dead it would be admissible under section 32 (2).

(d.) A is accused of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen.

He offers to prove that he refused to sell them below their value.

A may prove these statements, though they are admissions, because they are explanatory of conduct influenced by facts in issue.

(e.) A is accused of fraudulently having in his possession counterfeit coin which he knew to be counterfeit.

He offers to prove that he asked a skilful person to examine the coin, as he doubted whether it was counterfeit or not, and that that person did examine it and told him it was genuine.

A may prove these facts for the reasons stated in the last illustration.

22. Oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such

document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

23. In civil cases, no admission is relevant if it is made either upon an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given, or under circumstances from which the Court can infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given.

24. An admission made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the making of the admission appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat, or promise irrelevant.

Admission of crime caused by inducement, threat, or promise irrelevant. Having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.

25. No admission of guilt made to a Police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence.

26. No admission of guilt made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a Police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.

27. Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a Police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to an admission of guilt or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved.

28. If such an admission as is referred to in Section 24 is made after the impression caused by any such inducement, threat, or promise has, in the opinion of the Court, been fully removed, it is relevant.

29. If such an admission is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception practised on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk, or because it was made in answer to questions which he need not have answered, whatever may have been the form of those questions, or because he was not warned that he was not bound to make such admission, and that evidence of it might be given against him.

30. When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and an admission made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other such person is proved, the Court

Consideration of proved admission affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence.

may take into consideration such admission as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such admission.

Illustrations.

(a.) A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved that A said,—“B and I murdered C,” the Court may consider the effect of this admission as against B.

(b.) A is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered by A and B, and that B said,—“A and I murdered C.”

This statement may not be taken into consideration by the Court against A, as B is not being jointly tried.

31. Admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but

When admissions are they may operate as conclusive proof. estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained.

STATEMENTS BY PERSONS WHO CANNOT BE CALLED AS WITNESSES.

32. Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who

When statement by person who is dead or cannot be found, &c., is relevant. is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become

incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:—

(1.) When the statement is made by a person,

Statement as to cause of death. as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question.

Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.

(2.) When the statement was made by such

Statements in course of business. person in the ordinary course of business, and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him

in books kept in the ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty; or of acknowledgments written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or of documents used in commerce written or signed by him, or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him.

(3.) When the statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it, or when, if true, it

Statements against interest. would expose him or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages.

(4.) When the statement gives the opinion of

Matters of general interest. any such person, as to the existence of any public right or custom or matter of public or general interest, of the existence of which, if it existed, he would have been likely to be aware, and when such statement was made before any controversy as to such right, custom or matter had arisen.

(5.) When the statement relates to the

existence of any relationship. As to relationship. whose relationship the person making the statement had special means of knowledge, and when the statement was made before the question in dispute was raised.

(6.) When the statement relates to the exist-

ence of any relationship between persons deceased, and is made in any will or deed relating to the affairs of the family to which any such deceased person belonged, or in any family pedigree, or upon any tombstone, family portrait, or other thing on which such statements are usually made, and when such statement was made before the question in dispute was raised.

(7.) When the statement is contained in any

Statements in deeds. deed, will or other document which relates to any such transaction as is mentioned in section thirteen, clause (a).

(8.) When the statement was made by a number of persons, and expressed feelings or impressions on their part relevant to the matter in question.

Illustrations.

(a.) The question is, whether A was murdered by B; or

A dies of injuries received in a transaction in the course of which she was ravished. The question is, whether she was ravished by B; or

The question is, whether A was killed by B under such circumstances that a suit would lie against B by A's widow.

Statements made by A as to the cause of his or her death, referring respectively to the murder, the rape, and the actionable wrong under consideration are relevant facts.

(b.) The question is, as to the date of A's birth.

An entry in the diary of a deceased surgeon, regularly kept in the course of business, stating that, on a given day, he attended A's mother and delivered her of a son, is a relevant fact.

(c.) The question is, whether A was in Calcutta on a given day.

A statement in the diary of a deceased solicitor, regularly kept in the course of business that, on a given day, the solicitor attended A at a place mentioned in Calcutta for the purpose of conferring with him upon specified business, is a relevant fact.

(d.) The question is, whether a ship sailed from Bombay harbour on a given day.

A letter written by a deceased member of a merchant's firm by which she was chartered, to their correspondents in London to whom the cargo was consigned, stating that the ship sailed on a given day from Bombay harbour, is a relevant fact.

(e.) The question is, whether rent was paid to A for certain land.

A letter from a deceased agent to A saying that he had received the rent on A's account and held it at A's orders, is a relevant fact.

(f.) The question is, whether A and B were legally married.

The statement of a deceased clergyman that he married them under such circumstances that the celebration would be a crime, is relevant.

(g.) The question is, whether A, a person who cannot be found, wrote a letter on a certain day. The fact that a letter written by him is dated on that day, is relevant.

(h.) The question is, what was the cause of the wreck of a ship.

A protest made by the captain, whose attendance cannot be procured, is a relevant fact.

(i.) The question is, whether a given road is a public way.

A statement by A, a deceased headman of the village, that the road was public, is a relevant fact.

(j.) The question is, what was the price of grain on a certain day in a particular market. A statement of the price made by a deceased banya in the ordinary course of his business, is a relevant fact.

(k.) The question is, whether A, who is dead, was the father of B.

A statement by A that B was his son, is a relevant fact.

(l.) The question is, what was the date of the birth of A.

A letter from A's deceased father to a friend announcing the birth of A on a given day, is a relevant fact.

(m.) The question is, whether, and when, A and B were married.

An entry in a memorandum book by C, the deceased father of B, of his daughter's marriage with A at a given date, is a relevant fact.

(n.) A sues B for a libel expressed in a painted caricature exposed in a shop window. The question is, as to the similarity of the caricature and its libellous character. The remarks of a crowd of spectators on these points may be proved.

33. Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or before any person authorized by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving

Evidence in a former judicial proceeding when relevant.

the truth of the facts which it states in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable:

Provided that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest;

that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine;

that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding.

Explanation.—A criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the prosecutor and the accused within the meaning of this section, and an inquiry before a Magistrate shall be deemed to be an earlier stage of a judicial proceeding, of which the trial before the Magistrate or the Court of Session is a later stage.

STATEMENTS MADE UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

34. Entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever

they refer to a matter into

which the Court has to inquire, but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability.

Illustration.

A sues B for Rs. 1,000 and shows entries in his account books showing B to be indebted to him to this amount. The entries are relevant, but are not sufficient without other evidence to prove the debt.

35. Any entry in any public or other official book, register, or record,

stating a relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

36. Statements of relevant facts made in published maps or charts generally offered for public sale, or in maps or plans, made under the authority of Government, as to matters usually represented or stated in such maps, charts or plans, are themselves relevant facts.

Maps and plans when relevant.

37. When the Court has to form an opinion as to the existence of any

fact of a public nature, any statement of it, made in a recital contained in any Act of Parliament, or in any Act of the Governor

General of India in Council, or of the Governors in Council of Madras or Bombay, or of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council of Bengal, or in a notification of the Government appearing in the *Gazette of India*, or in the *Gazette* of any Local Government, or in any printed paper purporting to be the *London Gazette*, or the *Government Gazette* of any colony or possession of the Queen, is a relevant fact.

38. When the Court has to form an opinion as

to a law of any country, any statement of such law contained in a book purporting to be printed or published under the authority of the Government of such country and to contain any such law, and any report of a ruling of the Courts of such country contained in a book purporting to be a report of such rulings, is relevant.

HOW MUCH OF A STATEMENT IS TO BE PROVED.

39. When any statement of which evidence is given forms part of a longer statement, or of a conversation or part of an isolated document, or is contained in a document which forms part of a

book, or of a connected series of letters or papers, evidence shall be given of so much and no more of the statement, conversation, document, book, or series of letters or papers as the Court considers necessary in that particular case to the full understanding of the nature and effect of the statement, and of the circumstances under which it was made.

JUDGMENTS OF COURTS OF JUSTICE WHEN RELEVANT.

40. The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial,

is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial.

41. A final judgment, order or decree of a

Judgments in probate, competent Court, in the &c., jurisdiction, exercise of probate, matrimonial, Admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.

Such order, judgment or decree is conclusive proof that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation;

that any legal character to which it declares any such person to be entitled accrued to that person at the time when such judgment declares it to have accrued to that person;

that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment declared that it had ceased or should cease;

and that any thing to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment declares that it had been or should be his property.

42. Judgments, orders or decrees, other than Judgment, order or decree those mentioned in section 41, are relevant, if when irrelevant and when they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the inquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.

Illustration.

A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies.

The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by A against C for a trespass in the same place, in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists.

43. Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41, and 42 are not relevant. What judgments, &c., are relevant, unless the fact that such a judgment, order or decree existed, is relevant under some other provision of this Act.

Illustrations.

(a.) A and B separately sue C for a libel which reflects upon each of them. C in each case says that the matter alleged to be libellous is true, and the circumstances are such that it is probably true in each case, or in neither.

A obtains a decree against C for damages on the ground that C failed to make out his justification. The fact is irrelevant as between B and C.

(b.) A prosecutes B for adultery with C, A's wife.

B denies that C is A's wife, but the Court convicts B of adultery.

Afterwards, C is prosecuted for bigamy in marrying B during A's lifetime. C says that she never was B's wife.

The judgment against B is irrelevant as against C.

(c.) A prosecutes B for stealing a cow from him. B is convicted.

A, afterwards, sues C for the cow, which B had sold to him before his conviction. As between A and C, the judgment against B is irrelevant.

(d.) A has obtained a decree for the possession of land against B. C, B's son, murders A in consequence.

The existence of the judgment is relevant, as showing motive for a crime.

44. Any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under sections forty, forty-one, or forty-two, and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion.

OPINIONS OF THIRD PERSONS WHEN RELEVANT.

45. When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science or art, or as to identity of handwriting, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, are relevant facts.

Such persons are called experts.

Illustrations.

(a.) The question is, whether the death of A was caused by poison.

The opinions of experts as to the symptoms produced by the poison by which A is supposed to have died, are relevant.

(b.) The question is, whether A, at the time of doing a certain act, was by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law.

The opinion of experts upon the question whether the symptoms exhibited by A commonly show unsoundness of mind, and whether such unsoundness of mind usually renders persons incapable of knowing the nature of the acts which they do, or of knowing that what they do is either wrong or contrary to law, are relevant.

(c.) The question is, whether a certain document was written by A. Another document is produced which is proved or admitted to have been written by A.

The opinions of experts on the question whether the two documents were written by the same or by different persons are relevant.

46. Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant if they support or are inconsistent with the opinions of experts, when such opinions are relevant.

Illustrations.

(a.) The question is, whether A was poisoned by a certain poison.

The fact that other persons who were poisoned by that poison exhibited certain symptoms which experts affirm or deny to be the symptoms of that poison, is relevant.

(b.) The question is, whether an obstruction to a harbour is caused by a certain sea wall.

The fact that other harbours similarly situated in other respects, but where there were no such sea walls, began to be obstructed at about the same time, is relevant.

47. When the Court has to form an opinion as to handwriting, as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed, that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact.

Explanation.—A person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when he has seen that person write, or when he has received documents purporting to be written by that person in answer to documents written by himself, or under his authority, and addressed to that person, or when, in the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that person have been habitually submitted to him.

Illustration.

The question is, whether a given letter is in the handwriting of A, a merchant in London.

B is a merchant in Calcutta, who has written letters addressed to A and received letters purporting to be written by him. C is B's clerk, whose duty it was to examine and file B's correspondence. D is B's broker, to whom B habitually submitted the letters purporting to be written by A for the purpose of advising with him thereon.

The opinions of B, C and D on the question whether the letter is in the handwriting of A are relevant, though neither B, C nor D ever saw A write.

48. When the Court has to form an opinion as to the existence of any general custom or right, the opinions, as to the existence of such custom or right, of persons who would be likely to know of its existence if it existed, are relevant.

Explanation.—The expression 'general custom or right' includes customs or rights common to any considerable class of persons.

Illustration.

The right of the villagers of a particular village to use the water of a particular well is a general right within the meaning of this section.

Opinions as to usages, tenets, &c., when relevant. 49. When the Court has to form an opinion as to—

the usages and tenets of any body of men or family,

the constitution and government of any religious or charitable foundation, or

the meaning of words or terms used in particular districts or by particular classes of people,

the opinions of persons having special means of knowledge thereon, are relevant facts.

50. When the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another, the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship of any person who, as a member of the family or otherwise, has special means of knowledge on the subject, is a relevant fact: Provided that such opinion shall not be sufficient to prove a marriage in proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act, or in prosecutions under Section 494, 495, 497, or 498 of the Indian Penal Code.

Illustrations.

(a.) The question is whether A and B were married. The fact that they were usually received and treated by their friends as husband and wife, is relevant.

(b.) The question is, whether A was the legitimate son of B. The fact that A was always treated as such by members of the family, is relevant.

51. Whenever the opinion of any living person is relevant, the grounds on which such opinion is based are also relevant.

Illustration.

An expert may give an account of experiments performed by him for the purpose of forming his opinion.

CHARACTER WHEN RELEVANT.

52. In civil cases, the fact that the character of any person concerned is such as to render probable or improbable any conduct imputed to him, is irrelevant, except in so far as such character appears from facts otherwise relevant.

In criminal cases, previous good character relevant.

53. In criminal proceedings, the fact that the person accused is of a good character, is relevant.

54. In criminal proceedings, the fact that the accused person has been previously convicted of any offence is relevant; but the fact that he has a bad character is irrelevant unless evidence has been given that he has a good character, in which case it becomes relevant.

Explanation.—This section does not apply to cases in which the bad character of any person is itself a fact in issue.

55. In civil cases, the fact that the character of any person is such as to affect the amount of damages which he ought to receive, is relevant.

Explanation.—In sections 52, 53, 54, and 55, the word 'character' includes both reputation and disposition; but evidence may be given only of general reputation and general disposition, and not of particular acts by which [reputation or] disposition were shown.

PART II.

ON PROOF.

CHAPTER III.—FACTS WHICH NEED NOT BE PROVED.

56. No fact of which the Court will take judicial notice need be proved.

57. The Court shall take judicial notice of the following facts:—

(1.) All laws or rules having the force of law now or heretofore in force or hereafter to be in force in any part of British India:

(2.) All public Acts passed or hereafter to be passed by Parliament, and all local and personal Acts directed by such Parliament to be judicially noticed:

(3.) Articles of War for Her Majesty's Army or Navy:

(4.) The course of proceeding of the said Parliament and of the Councils for the purposes of making Laws and Regulations established under the Indian Councils' Act, or any other law for the time being relating thereto:

Explanation.—The word 'Parliament' in clauses (2) and (4) includes the Parliaments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, of England, of Scotland and of Ireland.

(5.) The accession and the sign manual of the Sovereign for the time being of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland:

(6.) All seals of which English Courts would take judicial notice. The seals of all the Courts of British India, and of all Courts out of British India, established by the authority of the Governor General or any Local Government in Council: the seals of Courts of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction and of Notaries Public, and all seals which any person is authorised to use by any Act of Parliament or other Act or Regulation having force of law in British India:

(7.) The accession to office, names, titles, functions, and signatures of the persons filling for the time being any public office in any part of British India, if the fact of their appointment to such office is notified in the *Gazette of India*, or in the official Gazette of any Local Government:

(8.) The existence, title, and national flag of every State or Sovereign recognized by the British Crown:

(9.) The divisions of time, the geographical divisions of the world, and public festivals, fairs and holidays notified in the official Gazette:

(10.) The territories under the dominion of the British Crown:

(11.) The commencement, continuance, and termination of hostilities between the British Crown, and any other State or body of persons:

(12.) The names of the members and officers of the Court, and of their deputies and subordinate officers and assistants, and also of all officers acting in execution of its process, and of all advocates, attornies, proctors, vakils, pleaders and other persons authorised by law to appear or act before it:

(13.) The rule of the road.

In all these cases, and also on all matters of public history, literature, science or art, the Court may resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference.

If the Court is called upon by any person to take judicial notice of any fact, it may refuse to do so, unless and until such person produces any such book or document as it may consider necessary to enable it to do so.

58. No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which before the hearing they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.

CHAPTER IV.—OF ORAL EVIDENCE.

59. All facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence.

60. Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct; That is to say—

If it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it.

If it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it.

If it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner.

If it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds:

Provided that the opinions of experts expressed in any treatise commonly offered for sale, and the grounds on which such opinions are held, may be proved by the production of such treatises if the

author is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence, or cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable;

Provided, also, that, if oral evidence refers to the existence or condition of any material thing other than a document, the Court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing for its inspection.

CHAPTER V.—OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

61. The contents of documents may be proved by proof of contents of either by primary or by secondary evidence.

62. Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court.

Explanation 1.—Where a document is executed in several parts, each part is primary evidence of the document.

Where a document is executed in counterpart, each counterpart being executed by one or some of the parties only, each counterpart is primary evidence as against the parties executing it.

Explanation 2.—Where a number of documents are all made by one uniform process, as in the case of printing, lithography, or photography, each is primary evidence of the contents of the rest; but where they are all copies of a common original, they are not primary evidence of the contents of the original.

Illustration.

A person is shown to have been in possession of a number of placards, all printed at one time from one original. Any one of the placards is primary evidence of the contents of any other, but no one of them is primary evidence of the contents of the original.

63. Secondary evidence means and includes—

(1.) Certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2.) Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies.

(3.) Copies made from or compared with the original.

(4.) Counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them.

(5.) Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it.

Illustrations.

(a.) A photograph of an original is secondary evidence of its contents, though the two have not been compared, if it is proved that the thing photographed was the original.

(b.) A copy compared with a copy of a letter made by a copying machine is secondary evidence of the contents of the letter, if it is shown that the copy made by the copying machine was made from the original.

(c.) A copy transcribed from a copy, but afterwards compared with the original, is secondary evidence; but the copy not so compared is not secondary evidence of the original, although the copy from which it was transcribed was compared with the original.

(d.) Neither an oral account of a copy compared with the original, nor an oral account of a photograph or machine-copy of the original, is secondary evidence of the original.

64. Documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned.

65. Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases:—

(a.) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of or not subject to the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section sixty-six, such person does not produce it.

(b.) When the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time.

(c.) When the original is of such a nature as not to be easily moveable.

(d.) When the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74.

(e.) When the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in British India, to be given in evidence.

(f.) When the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.

In cases (a), (b) and (c) any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible:

In cases (d) or (e), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.

In case (f) evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.

66. Secondary evidence of the contents of the documents referred to in section sixty-five (a) shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence has previously given to the party in whose possession or power the document is, such notice to produce it as is prescribed by law; and if no notice is prescribed by law, then such notice as the Court considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case:

Rules as to notice to produce.

Provided that such notice shall not be required in order to render secondary evidence admissible in any of the following cases:—

(1.) When the document to be proved is itself a notice.

(2.) When from the nature of the case, the adverse party must know that he will be required to produce it.

(3.) When it appears or is proved that the adverse party has obtained possession of the original by fraud or force.

(4.) When the adverse party or his agent has the original in Court.

(5.) When the adverse party or his agent has admitted the loss of the document.

67. If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.

Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced.

68. If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence.

Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.

69. If no such attesting witness can be found, or if the document purports to have been executed in the United Kingdom, it must be proved that the attestation of one attesting witness at least is in his handwriting, and that the signature of the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person.

70. The admission of a party to an attested document of its execution by himself shall be sufficient proof of its execution, as against him, though it be a document required by law to be attested.

Admission by party of execution.

71. If the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, its execution may be proved by other evidence.

Proof when attesting witness denies the execution.

72. An attested document not required by law to be attested may be proved as if it was unattested.

73. In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing, or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing, or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose.

Proof of document not required by law to be attested.

The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.

74. The following documents are public documents:—

1. Documents forming the Acts, or records of the Acts—

- (1) of the sovereign authority,
- (2) of official bodies and tribunals, and

(3) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of British India, or of any other part of her Majesty's dominions, or of a foreign country.

2. Public records kept in British India of private documents.

Private documents.

75. All other documents are private.

76. Every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that

person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal, and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.

Explanation.—Any officer who by the ordinary course of official duty is authorised to deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section.

77. Such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies.

Production of such copies.

78. The following public documents may be proved as follows:—

(1.) Acts, orders or notifications of the Executive Government of British India in any of its departments, or of any Local Government or any department of any Local Government,

by the records of the departments, certified by the heads of those departments, respectively, or by any document purporting to be printed by order of any such Government:

(2.) The proceedings of the legislatures, by the journals of those bodies respectively, or by published Acts or abstracts, or by copies purporting to be printed by order of Government:

(3.) Proclamations, orders or regulations issued by Her Majesty or by the Privy Council, or by any department of Her Majesty's Government, by copies or extracts contained in the *London Gazette*, or purporting to be printed by the Queen's Printer:

(4.) The Acts of the executive or the proceedings of the legislature of a foreign country,

by journals published by their authority, or commonly received in that country as such, or by a copy certified under the seal of the country or sovereign, or by a recognition thereof in some public Act of the Governor General of India in Council:

(5.) The proceedings of a municipal body in British India,

by a copy of such proceedings certified by the legal keeper thereof, or by a printed book purporting to be published by the authority of such body.

(6.) Public documents of any other class in a foreign country,

by the original, or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof, with a certificate under the

seal of a notary public or of a British Consul or diplomatic agent, that the copy is duly certified by the officer having the legal custody of the original, and upon proof of the character of the document according to the law of the foreign country.

PRESUMPTIONS AS TO DOCUMENTS.

79. The Court shall presume every document purporting to be a certificate, certified copy, or other document which is by law declared to be admissible as evidence of any particular fact, and which purports to be duly certified by any officer in British India or by any officer in any Native State in alliance with Her Majesty who is duly authorized thereto by the Governor General in Council to be genuine: Provided that such paper is substantially in the form and purports to be executed in the manner directed by law in that behalf. The Court shall also presume that any officer by whom any such paper purports to be signed or certified held, when he signed it, the official character which he claims in such paper.

80. Whenever any document is produced before any Court purporting to be a record or memorandum of the evidence

or of any part of the evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any officer authorized by law to take such evidence, or to be a statement or confession by any prisoner or accused person taken in accordance with law, and purporting to be signed by any Judge or Magistrate or by any such officer as aforesaid, the Court shall presume—

that the document is genuine, that any statements as to the circumstances under which it was taken purporting to be made by the person signing it are true, and that such evidence, statement or confession was duly taken.

81. The Court shall presume the genuineness of every document purporting to be the *London Gazette*, or the *Gazette of India*, or the Government Gazette of any Local Government, or of any colony, dependency or possession of the British Crown, or to be a newspaper or journal, or to be a copy of a private Act of Parliament printed by the Queen's Printer, and of every document purporting to be a document directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such document is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody.

Presumption as to Gazettes.

82. When any document is produced to any Court purporting to be a document which, by the law in force for the time being in England or Ireland, would be admissible in proof of any particular in any Court of Justice in England or Ireland without proof of the seal or stamp or signature authenticating it, or of the judicial or official character claimed by the person by whom it purports to be signed, the Court shall presume that such seal, stamp or signature is genuine, and that the person signing it held at the time when he signed it the judicial or official character which he claims,

Presumption as to documents admissible in England without proof of seal or signature.

and the document shall be admissible for the same purpose for which it would be admissible in England or Ireland.

83. The Court shall presume that maps or plans purporting to be made by the authority of Government were so made, and are accurate; but maps or plans made for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be accurate.

84. The Court shall presume the genuineness of every book purporting to be printed or published under the authority of the Government of any country, and to contain any of the laws of that country.

and of every book purporting to contain reports of decisions of the Courts of such country.

85. The Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney, and to have been executed before, and authenticated by a notary public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, British Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of Her Majesty or of the Government of India, was so executed and authenticated.

86. The Court may presume that any document purporting to be a certified copy of any judicial record of any country not forming part of Her Majesty's dominions is genuine and accurate, if the document purports to be certified in any manner which is certified by any representative of Her Majesty or of the Government of India resident in such country to be the manner commonly in use in that country for the certification of copies of judicial records.

87. The Court may presume that any book to which it may refer for information on matters of public or general interest, and that any published map or chart, the statements of which are relevant facts, and which is produced for its inspection, was written and published by the person, and at the time and place, by whom or at which it purports to have been written or published.

88. The Court may presume that a message forwarded from a telegraph office to the person to whom such message purports to be addressed corresponds with a message delivered, for transmission at the office from which the message purports to be sent; but the Court shall not make any presumption as to the person by whom such message was delivered for transmission.

89. The Court shall presume that every document called for and not produced after notice to produce, was attested, stamped and executed in the manner required by law.

90. Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may

presume that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested.

Explanation.—Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which and under the care of the person with whom they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable.

This explanation applies also to Section 81.

Illustrations.

(a.) A has been in possession of landed property for a long time. He produces from his custody deeds relating to the land showing his titles to it. The custody is proper.

(b.) A produces deeds relating to landed property of which he is the mortgagee. The mortgagor is in possession. The custody is proper.

(c.) A, a connection of B, produces deeds relating to lands in B's possession, which were deposited with him by B for safe custody. The custody is proper.

CHAPTER VI.—OF THE EXCLUSION OF ORAL BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

91. When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.

Exception 1.—When a public officer is required by law to be appointed in writing, and when it is shown that any particular person has acted as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed need not be proved.

Exception 2.—Wills under the Indian Succession Act may be proved by the Probate.

Explanation 1.—This section applies equally to cases in which the contracts, grants or disposition of property referred to are contained in one document, and to cases in which they are contained in more documents than one.

Explanation 2.—Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved.

Explanation 3.—The statement in any document whatever of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence of the same fact.

Illustrations.

(a.) If a contract be contained in several letters, all the letters in which it is contained must be proved.

(b.) If a contract is contained in a bill of exchange, the bill of exchange must be proved.

(c.) If a bill of exchange is drawn in a set of three, one only need be proved.

(d.) A contracts in writing with B for the delivery of indigo upon certain terms. The contract mentions the fact that B had paid A the price of other indigo contracted for verbally on another occasion,

Oral evidence is offered that no payment was made for the *or. or indigo*. The evidence is admissible.

(e.) A gives B a receipt for money paid by B.

Oral evidence is offered of the payment.

The evidence is admissible.

92. When the terms of any such contract,

Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms:

Proviso (1).—Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto, such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law.

Proviso (2).—The existence of any separate oral agreement on any matter on which a document is silent and not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document.

Proviso (3).—The existence of any separate oral agreement constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved.

Proviso (4).—The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents.

Proviso (5).—Any usage or custom by which incidents, not expressly mentioned in any contract, are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved: Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract.

Proviso (6).—Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.

Illustrations.

(a.) A policy of insurance is effected on goods 'in ships from Calcutta to London.' The goods are shipped in a particular ship which is lost. The fact that that particular ship was orally excepted from the policy, cannot be proved.

(b.) A agrees absolutely in writing to pay B Rs. 1,000 on the 1st March 1870. The fact that, at the same time, an oral agreement was made that the money should not be paid till the 31st March, cannot be proved.

(c.) An estate called 'the Rampore tea estate' is sold by a deed which contains a map of the property sold. The fact that land not included in the map had always been regarded as part of the estate, and was meant to pass by the deed, cannot be proved.

(d.) A enters into a contract with B to work certain mines, the property of B, upon certain terms. A was induced to do so by a misrepresentation of B's as to their value. This fact may be proved.

(e.) A institutes a suit against B for the specific performance of a contract, and also prays that the contract may be reformed as to one of its provisions, as that provision was

inserted in it by mistake. A may prove that such a mistake was made as would be by law entitle him to have the contract reformed.

(f.) A orders goods of B by a letter in which nothing is said as to the time of payment, and accepts the goods on delivery. B sues A for the price. A may show that the goods were supplied on credit for a term still unexpired.

(g.) A sells B a horse and verbally warrants him sound. A gives B a paper in these words: 'Bought of A a horse for Rs. 500.' B may prove the verbal warranty.

(h.) A hires lodgings of B, and gives B a card on which is written—'Rooms, Rs. 200 a month.' A may prove a verbal agreement that these terms were to include partial board.

A hires lodgings of B for a year, and a regularly stamped agreement drawn up by an Attorney is made between them. It is silent on the subject of board. A may not prove that board was included in the terms verbally.

(i.) A applies to B for a debt due to A by sending a receipt for the money. B keeps the receipt and does not send the money. In a suit for the amount, A may prove this.

(j.) A and B make a contract in writing to take effect upon the happening of a certain contingency. The writing is left with B, who sues A upon it. A may show the circumstances under which it was delivered.

93. When the language used in a document is,

on its face, ambiguous or defective, evidence may explain or amend ambiguous document. not be given of facts which would show its meaning or supply its defects.

Illustrations.

(a.) A agrees in writing to sell a horse to B for Rs. 1,000 or Rs. 1,500.

Evidence cannot be given to show which price was to be given.

(b.) A deed contains blanks. Evidence cannot be given of facts which would show how they were meant to be filled.

94. When language used in a document is

plain in itself, and when it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it was not meant to apply to such facts.

Illustration.

A sells to B by deed 'my estate at Rampore containing 100 bigás.' A has an estate at Rampore containing 100 bigás. Evidence may not be given of the fact that the estate meant to be sold was one situated at a different place and of a different size.

95. When language used in a document is plain

in itself, but is unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may be given to show that it was used in a peculiar sense.

Illustration.

A sells to B by deed 'my house in Calcutta.'

A had no house in Calcutta, but it appears that he had a house at Howrah, of which B had been in possession since the execution of the deed.

These facts may be proved to show that the deed related to the house at Howrah.

96. When the facts are such that the language

used might have been meant to apply to any one, and could not have been meant to apply to more than one, of several persons or things, evidence may be given of facts which show which of those persons or things it was intended to apply to.

Illustrations.

(a.) A agrees to sell to B for Rs. 1,000 'my white horse.' A has two white horses. Evidence may be given of facts which show which of them was meant.

(b.) A agrees to accompany B to Hyderabad. Evidence may be given of facts showing whether Hyderabad in the Deccan or Hyderabad in Seind was meant.

97. When the language used applies partly to one set of existing facts, and partly to another set of existing facts, but the whole of it does not apply correctly to either, evidence may be given to show to which of the two it was meant to apply.

Evidence as to application of language to one of two sets of facts to neither of which the whole correctly applies.

Illustration.

A agrees to sell to B 'my land at X' in the occupation of Y. A has land at X, but not in the occupation of Y, and he has land in the occupation of Y, but it is not at X. Evidence may be given of facts showing which he meant to sell.

98. Evidence may be given to show the meaning of illegible or not commonly intelligible characters, of foreign, obsolete, technical, local, and provincial expressions, of abbreviations and of words used in a peculiar sense.

Evidence as to meaning of illegible characters, &c.

Illustration.

A, a sculptor, agrees to sell to B 'all my models.' A has both models and modelling tools. Evidence may be given to show which he meant to sell.

99. Persons who are not parties to a document, or their representatives in interest, may give evidence of any facts tending to show a contemporaneous agreement varying the term of the document.

Who may give evidence as to matter to which document relates.

Illustration.

A and B make a contract in writing that B shall sell A certain cotton, to be paid for on delivery. At the same time they make an oral agreement that three months' credit shall be given to A. This could not be shown as between A and B, but it might be shown by C if it affected his interests.

100. Nothing in this chapter contained shall be taken to affect any of the provisions of the Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865) as to the construction of wills.

Saving of provisions of Indian Succession Act relating to wills.

PART III.

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

CHAPTER VII.—OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

101. Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.

Illustrations.

(a.) A desires a Court to give judgment that B shall be punished for a crime which A says B has committed.

A must prove that B has committed the crime.

(b.) A desires a Court to give judgment that he is entitled to certain land in the possession of B by reason of facts which he asserts and which B denies to be true.

A must prove the existence of those facts.

102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

Illustrations.

(a.) A sues B for land of which B is in possession, and which, as A asserts, was left to A by the will of C, B's father.

If no evidence were given on either side, B would be entitled to retain his possession.

Therefore the burden of proof is on A.

(b.) A sues B for money due on a bond.

The execution of the bond is not disputed, but B says that it was obtained by fraud, which A denies.

If no evidence were given on either side, A would succeed, as the bond is not disputed and the fraud is not proved.

Therefore the burden of proof is on B.

103. The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.

Burden of proof as to particular fact.

Illustration.

(a.) A prosecutes B for theft, and wishes the Court to believe that B admitted the theft to C. A must prove the admission.

B wishes the Court to believe that, at the time in question, he was elsewhere. He must prove it.

104. The burden of proving any fact necessary to be proved in order to enable any person to give evidence of any other fact is on the person who wishes to give such evidence.

Burden of proving fact to be proved to make evidence admissible.

Illustrations.

(a.) A wishes to prove a dying declaration by B. A must prove B's death.

(b.) A wishes to prove, by secondary evidence, the contents of a lost document.

A must prove that the document has been lost.

105. When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.

Burden of establishing general exceptions.

Illustrations.

(a.) A, accused of murder, alleges that, by reason of unsoundness of mind, he did not know the nature of the act.

The burden of proof is on A.

(b.) A, accused of murder, alleges that, by grave and sudden provocation, he was deprived of the power of self-control.

The burden of proof is on A.

(c.) Section 325 of the Penal Code provides that whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be subject to certain punishments.

A is charged with voluntarily causing hurt under section 325.

The burden of proving the circumstances, bringing the case under section 335, lies on the prisoner.

106. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.

Illustrations.

(a.) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

(b.) A is charged with travelling in a railway without a ticket; the burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.

107. When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is shown that he was alive within thirty years, the burden of proving that he is dead is on the person who affirms it.

108. When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is proved that he has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the burden of proving that he is alive is on the person who affirms it.

109. When the question is whether persons are partners, landlord and tenant, or principal and agent, and it has been shown that they have been acting as such, the burden of proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand, to each other in those relationships respectively, is on the person who affirms it.

110. When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner.

111. Where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands to the other in a position of active confidence, the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the party who is in a position of active confidence.

Illustrations.

(a.) The good faith of a sale by a client to an attorney is in question in a suit brought by the client. The burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the attorney.

(b.) The good faith of a sale by a son just come of age to a father is in question in a suit brought by the son. The burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the father.

112. The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.

113. A notification in the *Gazette of India* that any portion of British territory has been ceded to any Native State, Prince or Ruler, shall be conclusive proof that a valid cession of such territory took place at the date mentioned in such notification.

114. The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case.

Illustrations.

The Court may presume—

(a.) That a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession.

(b.) That an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars.

(c.) That a bill of exchange accepted or endorsed, was accepted or endorsed, for good consideration.

(d.) That a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such things or states of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence.

(e.) That judicial and official acts have been regularly performed.

(f.) That the common course of business has been followed in particular cases.

(g.) That evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it.

(h.) That if a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled to answer by law, the answer, if given, would be unfavourable to him.

(i.) That when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obligor, the obligation has been discharged.

But the Court shall also have regard to such facts as the following in considering whether such maxims do or do not apply to the particular case before them.

As to illustration (a)—A shop-keeper has in his till a marked rupee soon after it was stolen, and cannot account for its possession specifically, but is continually receiving rupees in the course of his business.

As to illustration (b)—A, a person of the highest character, is tried for causing a man's death by an act of negligence in arranging certain machinery. B, a person of equally good character, who also took part in the arrangement, describes precisely what was done, and admits and explains the common carelessness of A and himself.

As to illustration (c)—A crime is committed by several persons. A, B and C, three of the criminals, are captured on the spot and kept apart from each other. Each gives an account of the crime implicating D, and the accounts corroborate each other in such a manner as to render previous concert highly improbable.

As to illustration (d)—A, the drawer of a bill of exchange, was a man of business. B, the acceptor, was a young and ignorant person, completely under A's influence.

As to illustration (e)—It is proved that a river ran in a certain course five years ago, but it is known that there have been floods since that time which might change its course.

As to illustration (f)—A judicial act, the regularity of which is in question, was performed under exceptional circumstances.

As to illustration (g)—The question is, whether a letter was received. It is shown to have been posted, but the usual course of the post was interrupted by disturbances.

As to illustration (h)—A man refuses to produce a document which would bear on a contract of small importance on which he is sued, but which might also injure the feelings and reputation of his family.

As to illustration (i)—A man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled by law to answer, but the answer to it might cause loss to him in matters unconnected with the matter in relation to which it is asked.

As to illustration (j)—A bond is in possession of the obligor, but the circumstances of the case are such that he may have stolen it.

CHAPTER VIII.—ESTOPPEL.

115. When one person has by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.

Illustration.

A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A, and thereby induces B to buy and pay for it.

The land afterwards becomes the property of A, and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground, that, at the time of the sale, he had no title. He must not be allowed to prove his want of title.

116. No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property and no person who came upon any immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such license was given.

117. No acceptor of a bill of exchange shall be permitted to deny that the drawer had authority to draw such bill or to endorse it, nor shall any bailee or licensee be permitted to deny that his bailor or licensor had, at the time when the bailment or license commenced, authority to make such bailment or grant such license.

Explanation (1).—The acceptor of a bill of exchange may deny that the bill was really drawn by the person by whom it purports to have been drawn.

Explanation (2).—If a bailee delivers the goods bailed to a person other than the bailor, he may prove that such person had a right to them as against the bailor.

CHAPTER IX.—OF WITNESSES.

118. All persons shall be competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind.

Explanation.—A lunatic is not incompetent to testify unless he is prevented by his lunacy from understanding the questions put to him and giving rational answers to them.

119. A witness, who is unable to speak, may give his evidence in any other manner in which he can make it intelligible, as by writing or by signs; but such writing must be written and the signs made in open Court. Evidence so given shall be deemed to be oral evidence.

120. In all civil proceedings the parties to the suit, and the husband or wife of any party to the suit shall be competent

witnesses. In criminal proceedings against any person, the husband or wife of such person, respectively, shall be a competent witness.

121. No Judge or Magistrate shall, except upon the special order of some Court to which he is subordinate, be compelled to answer any questions as to his own conduct in Court as such Judge or Magistrate, or as to any thing which came to his knowledge in Court as such Judge or Magistrate, but he may be examined as to other matters which occurred in his presence whilst he was so acting.

Illustrations.

(a) A, on his trial before the Court of Session, says that a deposition was improperly taken by B, the Magistrate. B cannot be compelled to answer questions as to this, except upon the special order of a superior Court.

(b) A is accused before the Court of Session of having given false evidence before B, a Magistrate. B cannot be asked what A said, except upon the special order of the superior Court.

(c) A is accused before the Court of Session of attempting to murder a Police officer whilst on his trial before B, a Sessions Judge. B may be examined as to what occurred.

122. No person, who is or has been married, shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married, nor shall he be permitted to disclose any such communication, unless the person who made it or his representative in interest consents, except in suits between married persons, or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.

123. No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit.

124. No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure.

125. No Magistrate or police officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information as to the commission of any offence.

126. No barrister, attorney, pleader, or vakil at any time shall be permitted, unless with his client's express consent, to disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil by or on behalf of his client, or to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such employment:

Provided that nothing in this section shall protect from disclosure—

(1) Any such communication made in furtherance of any criminal purpose;

(2) Any fact, observed by any barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil in the course of his employment, as such showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment;

It is immaterial whether the attention of such barrister, attorney or vakil was or was not directed to such fact by or on behalf of his client.

Explanation.—The obligation stated in this section continues after the employment has ceased.

Illustrations.

(a.) A, a client, says to B, an attorney,—‘I have committed forgery, and I wish you to defend me.’

As the defence of a man known to be guilty is not a criminal purpose, this communication is protected from disclosure.

(b.) A, a client, says to B, an attorney,—‘I wish to obtain possession of property by the use of a forged deed on which I request you to sue.’

This communication, being made in furtherance of a criminal purpose, is not protected from disclosure.

(c.) A being charged with embezzlement retains B, an attorney, to defend him. In the course of the proceedings, B observes that an entry has been made in A’s account-book charging A with the sum said to have been embezzled, which entry was not in the book at the commencement of his employment.

This being a fact observed by B in the course of his employment showing that a fraud has been committed since the commencement of the proceedings, it is not protected from disclosure.

127. The provisions of section 126 shall apply to interpreters, and the clerks or servants of barristers, pleaders, attorneys and vakils.

128. If any party to a suit gives evidence therein at his own instance or otherwise, he shall not be deemed to have consented thereby to such disclosure as is mentioned in section 126; and if any party to a suit or proceeding calls any such barrister, attorney or vakil as a witness, he shall be deemed to have consented to such disclosure only if he questions such barrister, attorney, or vakil on matters which, but for such question, he would not be at liberty to disclose.

129. No one shall be compelled to disclose to the Court any confidential communication which has taken place between him and his legal professional adviser, unless he offers himself as a witness, in which case he may be compelled to disclose any such communications as may appear to the Court necessary to be known in order to explain any evidence which he has given, but no others.

130. No witness who is not a party to a suit shall be compelled to produce his title-deeds to any property or any document in virtue of which he holds any property as pledgee or mortgagee, or any document the production of which might tend to criminate him, unless he has agreed in writing to produce them with the person seeking the production of such deeds or some person through whom he claims.

131. No one shall be compelled to produce documents in his possession which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession, unless such last-mentioned person consents to their production.

132. A witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or may tend, directly or indirectly, to criminate such witness, or that it will expose, or tend, directly or indirectly, to expose such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind:

Provided that no such answer, which a witness shall be compelled to give shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.

133. An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

134. No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact.

CHAPTER X.—OF THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

135. The order in which witnesses are produced and examined shall be regulated by the law and practice for the time being relating to Civil and Criminal Procedure respectively, and, in the absence of any such law, by the discretion of the Court.

136. When either party proposes to give evidence of any fact, the Judge may ask the party proposing to give the evidence in what manner the alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant, and the Judge shall admit the evidence if he thinks that the fact, if proved, would be relevant, and not otherwise.

If the fact proposed to be proved is one of which evidence is admissible only upon proof of some other fact, such last-mentioned fact must be proved before evidence is given of the fact first-mentioned, unless the party undertakes to give proof of such fact, and the Court is satisfied with such undertaking.

If the relevancy of one alleged fact depends upon another alleged fact being first proved, the Judge may in his discretion either permit evidence of the first fact to be given before the second fact is proved, or require evidence to be given of the second fact before evidence is given of the first fact.

Illustrations.

(a.) It is proposed to prove a statement about a relevant fact by a person alleged to be dead, which statement is relevant under section thirty-two.

The fact that the person is dead must be proved by the person proposing to prove the statement before evidence is given of the statement.

(b.) It is proposed to prove by a copy the contents of a document said to be lost.

The fact that the original is lost must be proved by the person proposing to produce the copy before the copy is produced.

(c.) A is accused of receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen.

It is proposed to prove that he denied the possession of the property.

The relevancy of the denial depends on the identity of the property. The Court may in its discretion either require the property to be identified before the denial of the possession is proved, or permit the denial of the possession to be proved before the property is identified.

(d.) It is proposed to prove a fact (A) which is said to have been the cause or effect of a fact in issue. There are several intermediate facts (B, C and D) which must be shown to exist before the fact A can be regarded as the cause or effect of the fact in issue. The Court may either permit A to be proved before B, C or D is proved, or may require proof of B, C and D before permitting proof of A.

137. The examination of a witness by the party who calls him shall be called his examination-in-chief.

The examination of the witness by the adverse party shall be called his cross-examination.

The examination of a witness, subsequent to the cross-examination, by the party who called him, shall be called his re-examination.

138. Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined.

The examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts, but the cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.

The re-examination shall be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination, and if new matter is by permission of the Court introduced in re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter.

139. A person summoned to produce a document does not become a witness by the mere fact that he produces it, and cannot be cross-examined unless and until he is called as a witness.

140. Witnesses to character may be cross-examined and re-examined.

141. Any question suggesting the answer which the person who puts it wishes or expects to receive, is called a leading question.

142. Leading questions must not, if objected to by the adverse party, be asked in an examination-in-chief, or in a re-examination, except with the permission of the Court.

The Court shall permit leading questions as to matters which are introductory or undisputed, or which have, in its opinion, been already sufficiently proved.

When they may be asked. 143. Leading questions may be asked in cross-examination.

144. Any witness may be asked, whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property as to which he is giving evidence was not contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.

Explanation.—A witness may give oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the contents of documents, if such statements are in themselves relevant facts.

Illustration.

The question is, whether A assaulted B.

C deposes that he heard A say to D—'B wrote a letter accusing me of theft, and I will be revenged on him.' This statement is relevant, as showing A's motive for the assault, and evidence may be given of it, though no other evidence is given about the letter.

145. A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing and relevant to matters in question without such writing being shown to him or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.

146. When a witness is cross-examined, he may, in addition to the questions lawful in cross-examination. referred to, be asked any questions which tend (1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what is his position in life, or (3) to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to criminate him, or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.

147. If any such question relates to a matter relevant to the suit or proceeding, the provisions of section 132 shall apply thereto.

148. If any such question relates to a matter not relevant to the suit or proceeding, except in so far as it affects the credit of the witness by injuring his character, the Court shall decide whether or not the witness shall be compelled to answer it, and may, if it thinks fit, warn the witness that he is not obliged to answer it. In exercising its discretion, the Court shall have regard to the following considerations:—

(1). Such questions are proper if they are of such a nature that the truth of the imputation conveyed by them would seriously affect the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter to which he testifies.

(2). Such questions are improper if the imputation which they convey relates to matters so remote in time or of such a character that the truth of the imputation would not affect or would affect in a slight degree the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter to which he testifies.

(3). Such questions are improper if there is a great disproportion between the importance of the imputation made against the witnesses' character and the importance of his evidence.

(4). The Court may, if it sees fit, draw from the witnesses' refusal to answer, the inference, that the answer if given would be unfavourable.

149. No such question as is referred to in section 148 ought to be asked unless the person asking it has reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation which it conveys is well-founded.

Question not to be asked without reasonable grounds.

Illustrations.

(a.) A barrister is instructed by an attorney or vakil that an important witness is a dacoit. This is a reasonable ground for asking the witness whether he is a dacoit.

(b.) A pleader is informed by a person in Court that an important witness is a dacoit. The informant on being questioned by the pleader gives satisfactory reasons for his statement. This is a reasonable ground for asking the witness whether he is a dacoit.

(c.) A witness, of whom nothing whatever is known, is asked at random whether he is a dacoit. There are here no reasonable grounds for the question.

(d.) A witness, of whom nothing whatever is known, being questioned as to his mode of life and means of living, gives unsatisfactory answers. This may be a reasonable ground for asking him if he is a dacoit.

150. If the Court is of opinion that any such question was asked without reasonable grounds, it may, if it was asked by any barrister, pleader, vakil or attorney, report the circumstances of the case to the High Court or other authority to which such barrister, pleader, vakil or attorney is subject in the exercise of his profession.

151. The Court may forbid any questions or inquiries which it regards as indecent or scandalous, although such questions or inquiries may have some bearing on the questions before the Court, unless they relate to facts in issue, or to matters necessary to be known in order to determine whether or not the facts in issue existed.

152. The Court shall forbid any questions which appear to it to be intended to insult or annoy, or which, though proper in itself, appears to the Court needlessly offensive in form.

153. When a witness has been asked and has answered any question which is relevant to the inquiry only in so far as it tends to shake his credit by injuring his character, no evidence shall be given to contradict him; but if he answers falsely, he may afterwards be charged with giving false evidence.

Exception 1.—If a witness is asked whether he has been previously convicted of any crime and denies it, evidence may be given of his previous conviction.

Exception 2.—If a witness is asked any question tending to impeach his impartiality and answers it by denying the facts suggested, he may be contradicted.

Illustrations.

(a.) A claim against an underwriter is resisted on the ground of fraud.

The claimant is asked whether, in a former transaction, he had not made a fraudulent claim. He denies it.

Evidence is offered to show that he did make such a claim. The evidence is inadmissible.

(b.) A witness is asked whether he was not dismissed from a situation for dishonesty. He denies it.

Evidence is offered to show that he was dismissed for dishonesty.

The evidence is not admissible.

(c.) A affirms that on a certain day he saw B at Lahore. A is asked whether he himself was not on that day at Calcutta. He denies it.

Evidence is offered to show that A was on that day at Calcutta.

The evidence is admissible, not as contradicting A on a fact which affects his credit, but as contradicting the alleged fact that B was seen on the day in question in Lahore.

In each of these cases the witness might, if his denial was false, be charged with giving false evidence.

(d.) A is asked whether his family has not had a blood feud with the family of B against whom he gives evidence.

He denies it. He may be contradicted on the ground that the question tends to impeach his impartiality.

154. The Court may in its discretion permit the person who calls a party producing witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party.

155. The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways:—
Impeaching credit of witness by the adverse party, or with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him:—

(1). By the evidence of persons who testify that they, from their knowledge of the witness, believe him to be unworthy of credit.

(2). By proof that the witness has been bribed or has had the offer of a bribe, or has received any other corrupt inducement to give his evidence.

(3). By proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted.

(4). When a man is prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish, it may be shown that the prosecutrix was of generally immoral character.

Explanation.—A witness declaring another witness to be unworthy of credit may not, upon his examination-in-chief, give reasons for his belief, but he may be asked his reasons in cross-examination, and the answers which he gives cannot be contradicted, though, if they are false, he may afterwards be charged with giving false evidence.

Illustrations.

(a.) A sues B for the price of goods sold and delivered to B.

C says that he delivered the goods to B.

Evidence is offered to show that, on a previous occasion, he said that he had not delivered the goods to B.

The evidence is admissible.

(b.) A is indicted for the murder of B.

C says that B, when dying, declared that A had given B the wound of which he died.

Evidence is offered to show that, on a previous occasion, C said that the wound was not given by A or in his presence. The evidence is admissible.

156. When a witness whom it is intended to corroborate gives evidence of any relevant fact, he may be questioned as to any other circumstances which he observed at or near to the time or place at which such relevant fact occurred, if the Court is of opinion that such circumstances if proved would corroborate the testimony of the witness as to the relevant fact which he testifies.

Illustration.

A, an accomplice, gives an account of a robbery in which he took part. He describes various incidents unconnected with the robbery which occurred on his way to and from the place where it was committed.

Independent evidence of these facts may be given in order to corroborate his evidence as to the robbery itself.

157. In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact, at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved.

158. A witness may, while under examination, refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transactions concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the Court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory.

The witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person and read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if when he read it he knew it to be correct.

Whenever a witness may refresh his memory by reference to any document, he may, with the permission of the Court, refer to a copy of such document: Provided the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original.

An expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises.

159. A witness may also testify to facts mentioned in any such document as is mentioned in section 158, although he has no specific recollection of the facts themselves, if he is sure that the facts were correctly recorded in the document.

Illustration.

A book-keeper may testify to facts recorded by him in books regularly kept in the course of business, if he knows that the books were correctly kept, although he has forgotten the particular transactions entered.

160. Any such writing as is mentioned in the last two sections must be produced and shown to the adverse party if he requires it, who may, if he pleases, cross-examine the witness thereupon.

161. A witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court.

The Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.

If for such a purpose it is necessary to cause any document to be translated, the Court may, if it thinks fit, direct the translator to keep the contents secret, unless the document is to be given in evidence, and if the interpreter disobeys such direction, he shall be held to have committed an offence under section one hundred and sixty-six of the Indian Penal Code.

162. When a party calls for a document which he has given the other party notice to produce, and such document is produced and inspected by the party calling for its production, he is bound to give it as evidence if the party producing it requires him to do so.

163. When a party refuses to produce a document which he has had notice to produce, he cannot afterwards use the document as evidence without the consent of the other party or the order of the Court.

Illustration.

A sues B on an agreement, and gives B notice to produce it. At the trial, A calls for the document and B refuses to produce it. A gives secondary evidence of its contents. B seeks to produce the document itself to contradict the secondary evidence given by A, or in order to show that the agreement is not stamped. He cannot do so.

164. The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases in any form at any time of any witness or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing: and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question:

Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved.

Provided also that this section shall not authorize any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question, or to produce any document which he would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under sections 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128,

129, 130, or 131 if the question were asked or the document were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under sections 148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.

165. In cases tried by jury or with assessors the jury or assessors may put any questions to the witnesses through or by leave of the Judge which the Judge himself might put and which he considers proper.

CHAPTER XI.—OF IMPROPER ADMISSION AND REJECTION OF EVIDENCE.

166. The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case if it shall appear to the Court before which such objection is raised, that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision.

SCHEDULE.

Number and year.	TITLE.	Extent of repeal.
Stat. 26 Geo. III. C. 57.	For the further regulation of the trial of persons accused of certain offences committed in the East Indies; for repealing so much of an Act, made in the twenty-fourth year of the reign of his present Majesty (intituled, An Act for the better regulation and management of the affairs of the East India Company, and of the British possessions in India, and for establishing a court of judicature for the more speedy and effectual trial of persons accused of offences committed in the East Indies), as requires the servants of the East India Company to deliver inventories of their estates and effects; for rendering the laws more effectual against persons unlawfully resorting to the East Indies; and for the more easy proof, in certain cases, of deeds and writings executed in Great Britain or India.	Section thirty-eight, so far as it relates to Courts of Justice in the East Indies.
Stat. 14 & 15 Vic.	To amend the Law of Evidence	Section eleven, and so much of section nineteen as relates to British India.
Act XV. of 1852. . . .	To amend the Law of Evidence	The whole Act.
Act XIX. of 1853 . . .	To amend the Law of Evidence in the Civil Courts of the East India Company in the Bengal Presidency.	Section nineteen.
Act II. of 1855	For the further improvement of the Law of Evidence.	The whole Act.
Act XXV. of 1861. . .	For simplifying the Procedure of the Courts of Criminal Judicature not established by Royal Charter.	Section two hundred and thirty-seven.
Act I. of 1868.	The General Clauses' Act, 1868	Section seven.

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