

A LEAGUE *of* NATIONS

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AMERICAN ADDRESSES

BY

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LORD ROBERT CECIL

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The corporation is constituted for the purpose of educating the people of all nations to a full knowledge of the waste and destructiveness of war, its evil effects on present social conditions and on the well-being of future generations, and to promote international justice and the brotherhood of man; and, generally, by every practical means to promote peace and good will among all mankind.—*By-laws of the Corporation.*

It is to this patient and thorough work of education, through the school, the college, the church, the press, the pamphlet and the book, that the World Peace Foundation addresses itself.—Edwin Ginn.

The idea of force can not at once be eradicated. It is useless to believe that the nations can be persuaded to disband their present armies and dismantle their present navies, trusting in each other or in the Hague Tribunal to settle any possible differences between them, unless, first, some substitute for the existing forces is provided and demonstrated by experience to be adequate to protect the rights, dignity and territory of the respective nations. My own belief is that the idea which underlies the movement for the Hague Court can be developed so that the nations can be persuaded each to contribute a small percentage of their military forces at sea and on land to form an *International Guard or Police Force.*—Edwin Ginn.

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General Secretary, Edward Cummings.

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DISARMAMENT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION,
HOTEL ASTOR, NEW YORK, APRIL 2, 1923¹

In the first place, let me tender to you my warmest thanks for the kindness of your welcome, for this fresh proof of the hospitality, so world-famous, of the American people, and above all, let me thank the Foreign Policy Association for the extraordinary success with which this gathering has been organized. It is, I am sorry to say, the first time that I have had the honor of visiting this country, and it is a matter of profound pride and gratification that I should at last, after many disappointments, have the opportunity of saying something which possibly may be of use and of hearing something which I am satisfied will be greatly to my profit in intercourse with a great audience like this.

I have many reasons for gratification at this opportunity. I am not one of those who have forgotten the comradeship of our two peoples in the great war. I shall never forget as long as I live that thrill of joy and happiness with which I heard the decision of the American people to take their part by the side of the Allies in that great struggle.

I shall always remember the thrill with which we watched the first battalions of American troops marching through London; and I shall never forget, nor will any of my fellow countrymen, the glorious deeds and magnificent services which the American army rendered to our common cause in those critical days of 1918. I remember very well that my happiness—our happiness, I think I may say—was not only for the immediate assistance which you gave to us, but because we saw the dawn of a new era in which our two peoples should march together in the cause of peace.

There have been, as Mr. McDonald has already said,² many

¹Reprinted from Foreign Policy Association, Pamphlet No. 17.

²James G. McDonald, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Foreign Policy Association, in introducing Lord Robert Cecil had said:

"We meet also, Sir, to consider with you some of the acutely critical phases of the

disillusionments and discouragements since the armistice was signed, but I for one have not abandoned, and will never abandon, the hope that the great work of peace will ultimately be accomplished by the joint effort of the American and British peoples.

There have been quite recently, if you will allow me to refer to it, some circumstances which have greatly heartened and encouraged those who think as we do. I rejoice profoundly that we have settled and put out of the way that difficult question of the debt, and I am not less, not more, thankful for what I hope I may call the straightforwardness of our representative, Mr. Baldwin, and his colleagues, than for the generosity of the American negotiators who met them and concluded that great arrangement. It is one of those arrangements like "the quality of mercy, it blesses him that gives and him that takes." And its greatest virtue lay not in the particular terms arrived at, though I have no criticism of them; it lay in this, that it was the first great liquidation of the economic position left by the war, and furnished a great example to other nations of what ought to be done if we are to reach a real condition of peace.

And, ladies and gentlemen, that is not the only instance, by any means, of co-operation between our two countries. There were just about a year ago completed the negotiations which resulted in the Washington treaty of disarmament. That was a very great thing. It was a concrete achievement in the cause of peace. It is quite true it applied necessarily only to naval matters, and was in the nature rather of a limitation than a reduction. It is

present international situation. The Germans laid down their arms more than four years and four months ago. You, even more than we, must have felt when the news of the armistice came a keen sense of poignant relief. At last slaughter on a wholesale scale was to be ended. At last there was to be peace. At last a beginning of reconciliation. At last a beginning of reconstruction. You, Sir, must realize, even better than we, how these expectations have been frustrated, how these hopes have been shattered. Europe to-day knows not peace. Instead of the healing spirit of reconciliation there are ever present in many countries of Europe the embittering shadows of suspicion and hatred. Everywhere rehabilitation has been halting and incomplete.

"Amid these disappointed hopes there has been one outstanding cause for encouragement. One institution which, though still weak, because incomplete, has steadily and intelligently sought to strengthen the forces of reconstruction and of peace. For your part, Sir, in helping to frame the Covenant, for your tactful but always courageous leadership in the Assembly, and for your frank recognition of the present weaknesses of the Council and Assembly, all friends of the League of Nations owe you an enormous debt of gratitude."

quite true that it applied only to capital ships; and there are many I should imagine, certainly you and I in this room among them, who would have been very glad if it could have gone even further than it did. For our part, at least for my part, I should rejoice greatly if we could have a similar limitation, not only of capital ships, but of submarines and other craft also.

THE CRUELTY OF WAR

All warfare is cruel and horrible, but in naval warfare I do not know anything which is more cruel and more horrible than the hidden attack of the submarine, made without warning, made without discrimination, an attack which may send to their death not only the troops and combatants, not only the men of the opposing party, but women and children also. It seems deplorable that when we came to limit naval armaments, we could not limit the worst and the cruelest of all those armaments. I don't forget that regulations were agreed to which would make that form of warfare more humane. I am very glad they were made, but I should deceive you if I pretended that any regulations for humanizing warfare were really likely to be of great value. War is a horrible and devilish thing, and when nations under the stress of that experience are at death grips with one another, when their whole future and existence depend on the result of the struggle, it is too much to expect that any paper regulations will limit or humanize the means which they employ; and if we doubted it, the experience of the late war is a terrible warning to those who think that there is any means by which you can make war more tolerable. The only thing is to prevent its happening; that is the only security for humanity.

Ladies and gentlemen, in addition to naval disarmament, perhaps more urgently even than that, we require ultimate disarmament, immediate reduction in armament, both by land and in the air. After all, in many ways, land armaments are more destructive to peace, more dangerous to humanity than armaments by sea. You can not invade a country with a fleet. That can only be done by infantry. You can not make—at least it is not very easy to make—a sudden and unforeseen death stroke at the life of a country by a fleet. That is the work of a land army attacking without provocation and without warning.

And if that is true of a land army it is even more true of the air. You know—we all know—that in the last war attack from the air was for the first time made a practical part of warfare. We all remember—we at any rate on the other side of the Atlantic, remember—what bombing from the sky really meant. We have a vivid recollection of great explosives falling indiscriminately in the most populous and peaceful of our cities, slaughtering without discrimination every kind of human being, destroying the most harmless and the most helpless just as readily as those who were fighting in the field. What was done in the late war is but a pale shadow of what will be done in future wars. I am told that already bombs exist one hundred times as powerful and destructive as any that were used in the last war, capable of destroying great areas. And it is not only destruction that is threatened but poison as well. A bomb may be dropped from the sky on a great city. It may level large areas of it to the ground. It may poison the whole of the population for, it may be, miles around the place it falls. Nor does even that exhaust the possibility of air attack. There are some human beings who are planning, I am told, that you should be able, not only to poison, but to kill by disease the population by bombing from the air.

Nor will any country be safe, for just as the extent of the damage to be done has grown enormously, so also has the range of attack; and it is no wild idea that in the near future it will be as easy to send aeroplanes across the Atlantic as it is now to send them across the Channel. Ladies and gentlemen, this, if it stood alone, would be surely a strong call to the peoples of the world to set their house in order, and to make a determined effort to limit these agencies of destruction before it is too late.

“NATIONS MUST LEARN OR PERISH”

But do not misunderstand me. I do not wish to belittle what was done at Washington. It was a splendid achievement. It was a magnificent step on the road which we all wish to follow, all the more desirable, all the more admirable, because it was the first step; and we know from the French proverb that it is the first step that is really difficult. But when we take the first step let us ask, where is that first step going? What is the position we have

now reached? In my judgment, we have come to a great crisis in the history of humanity. I agree with what my countryman, Lord Grey, said the other day: "The nations must learn or perish." That is the truth; that is the dilemma; that is the issue that is laid before all of us, wherever we live, whatever our station in life, whatever our political or social aspirations.

I had the honor of crossing the Atlantic in company with a number of your fellow citizens who were returning from a visit they had paid to Egypt to see the marvelous discoveries which have been recently made in that land. They spoke to me with interest and enthusiasm of the astonishing degree to which the ancient civilization of Egypt had been perfected. There were others who had been to Crete and who told me the same story, that the ruins and remnants of Crete show an extraordinary degree of civilization in that land four or five thousand years ago. And yet those civilizations, so advanced, so perfected, had so completely disappeared that it is only the work of scientific observers in the last few years that has brought to light any trace of their existence. Or take the case of Rome. I agree we know more about Rome than we do about Egypt and Crete. But I do not think that it is realized how far Roman civilization had advanced. I was told the other day that when in 1835 the English minister, Sir Robert Peel, was summoned hastily from Rome to create a government in my country he took precisely the same time, no more, no less, than a Roman emperor would have taken in performing the same journey 1700 years before.

Yet the Roman civilization perished, barbarism recovered possession of the whole of Europe, and the condition of my country and of the greater part, if not the whole, of European countries, relapsed so that that civilization became a mere dream and memory. It is said often that Rome perished by reason of the invasion of the barbarians round her borders. Ladies and gentlemen, there is no truth in that delusion. Rome perished because the sections and nations which made up the Roman Empire were unable to keep from fighting with one another; they destroyed the Roman structure and the barbarians merely came onto the scene of the crime after it had been committed. Rome committed suicide. Let us take care that our civilization does not commit suicide also.

And if we are to work for real peace, a real established peace, be well assured that we have no security for its permanence unless we succeed in limiting and reducing the armaments of the world. There is no use to hope that there is any real security for permanent peace so long as the nations stand on one side or the other of their borders armed to the teeth for aggressive warfare. Every one agrees to that, not only in this country but practically all over the world. There is no dissenting voice; they all say that armaments should be reduced; and yet at this moment no reduction has taken place in the aggregate. Some of the great nations have reduced to some extent their numbers from just before the war, but other great nations, and other nations not so great but just as warlike, called into existence by the peace, have each insisted on their armed establishment, and in spite of the fact that Germany has very largely been disarmed, I am told that the net amount of armed men in Europe is greater than it was before the late war.

That is not only a very serious thing for the cause of peace ultimately, but it constitutes an economic drain on the resources of Europe much too much for her in her present condition, and one which she can ill afford to bear.

And the worst of it is that armaments breed armaments. If one country is armed, the next country is armed. If one increases its armament, the next country increases its armament. We read sometimes in the papers of terrible cases of human beings who have become addicted to some of these horrible drugs, morphine, cocaine or the like, and they go on taking more and more of them until they are ruined body and soul. We call them drug maniacs. Ladies and gentlemen, I fear very much that there are still some armament maniacs left among the nations of the world. We who really seriously desire peace, who are not only talking about it, but wish to do something for it, let us consider for a moment what is the cause of this horrible state of things.

“GET RID OF THE IDOLATRY OF FORCE”

Well, ladies and gentlemen, the disease is a fearful one, but luckily, the diagnosis is simple. What keeps alive armaments is one thing and one thing only. It is the fear and suspicion of the nations for one another. That is at the bottom of most of the

troubles that afflict our world at the present time. Well, ladies and gentlemen, what is the remedy for that? Why, the remedy is simple enough; at any rate simple enough to pronounce. We must have a new spirit in international affairs. We must get rid of the idolatry of force.

We must get the nations to recognize—and many millions of them do recognize it—that it is not force that counts in human affairs, but reason and persuasion. We all recognize that in our individual capacity. Force does not count in our individual lives. It is not a motive that really has any importance for us. If we look at the great organization of a city like this, at the intricate arrangements that have to be made to enable life there to be carried on, they are not the result of force. It is not because you or those who live here are afraid of violence that they do conform to the usages of civilized society. They do it voluntarily. The vast majority of their actions, the vast number of those proceedings which make life in a great city or life in the country possible, tolerable, for those who live there, are dictated by the most powerful influence in the world, the public opinion of your fellows. It governs your dress, it governs what you eat, it governs the games at which you play; it governs almost everything you do, from your business to your pleasure, from morning until evening.

It is public opinion which governs—next to your self-respect and your own judgment of what is right—it is public opinion that governs you throughout the whole of your life. And what is true with individuals is true, or ought to be true, with nations, so that if you take the proper steps to concentrate, to develop and to publish public opinion throughout the world, a nation bent on a desperate effort to assassinate its neighbor will be restrained by the obloquy of the whole civilized world. And the first condition that is necessary for that is to get rid of these vast and threatening armaments which prevent the full power of public opinion throughout the world.

Well, now, what are the conditions which it is necessary to fulfill if you are to induce the nations of the world to disarm? You have no great land armaments in this country. Why? Because you are not threatened by any neighbors who desire to attack you—or not seriously threatened.

If you could get the same state of mind in Europe, you would

get the same result. If you could say to the nations of Europe: "Don't be afraid. There is no real danger. You may sleep quietly in your beds. You may put off once for all this vast burden of armaments. You may cease to create dangers for your neighbors in the effort to create safety for yourself." If we could say to the nations: "We will give you security which will enable you to dispense with armaments," then we could ask them to disarm.

HOW TO RULE OUT AGGRESSION

I believe that can be done. I believe it can be done like this. Take a continent, a quarter of the globe, like Europe; if all the nations there were to agree that if each of them reduced their armaments to an agreed amount, all of them would come to the assistance of any one of them who was attacked—just think what a splendid advance that would be. It would rule out aggressive attack forever. Aggressive attack would be so dangerous that no nation would ever undertake it. And if you get rid of aggression, you get rid of war, because war must begin by aggression on one side or the other. I am firmly convinced that an arrangement of that kind in Europe would be of enormous advantage, and I would like to see as part of that arrangement an agreement among the nations, at any rate among the nations who felt themselves in danger of attack, that there should be a zone between nation and nation, demilitarized and made incapable of being used without delay and preparation for the advance of an invading army, so that the guaranty offered to them by other nations in Europe would become effective before it was too late.

That is the kind of scheme by which I think security might be given. But it is evident that for that scheme to be effective, you must create or utilize some international authority. Disarmament to be effective must be general. You will never get one nation to disarm as long as other nations arm. If you are to carry out a general scheme of disarmament, you must have an international organization to supervise it. If you are to have a scheme of zones, of demilitarized zones, you must have an international authority to overlook it. But you have got to do something much more than that, you have got to carry out and to apply,—not to Europe only but to all nations,—you have got to carry out a

scheme of moral disarmament as well as material disarmament.¹

You have got to bring the nations together, to teach them that their common interests are far greater than their common antagonisms, to teach them that just as it is true of individuals that we are all parts one of another, and that if individuals in a great community suffer, then the whole community suffers; so we must teach the nations of the world that they are all parts of one common whole, and that it is untrue, a devilish untruth, that there is any advantage to any one nation in the misfortunes or the poverty of others.

International co-operation is not only a proper object, it is inevitable. If there are more than a million men now out of work in England, it is, very largely if not entirely, because of the economic difficulties which exist in the rest of Europe. If the farmers of the United States are unable to sell their wheat at a remunerative price, it is because their customers in Europe are unable to buy it. The economic interdependence of the world is a great fact, it is not a thing about which we need argue, it is a fact which we can not get out of. And if the economic interdependence of the world is a fact, much more is the scientific, the intellectual, the moral interdependence of the world a fact also. Why, ladies and gentlemen, it may well be that some medical or scientific discovery in Europe will affect the lives of thousands of people in this country, just as some improvement in the works of civilization here, transportation or what not, may brighten the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in Europe. Science and art and intellect and morals have no boundaries.

MUST RECOGNIZE WORLD UNITY

The world is one, humanity is one family; that is a fact which no sophisms of political philosophers can ever alter or destroy. And therefore, ladies and gentlemen, as wise men we must, as it seems to me, recognize that great fact. We must recognize that there are great common interests in the world, and we must do our best to provide for them. There are great moral evils which affect the whole world. There are great difficulties of inter-communication, there are great dangers of epidemic diseases, there

¹Replies to questions on armament are given at p. 440.

are great diversities of social conditions which have their reaction on the prosperity and happiness of the people of every country. Let us recognize and work to diminish those common evils. Let us surely agree, if we can agree on nothing else, on joint international action to this end; for the improvement of the lot of humanity in those ways is surely the interest not only of the whole world but of every nation that composes the world.

Therefore we must have, surely we must have at any rate for those purposes periodic meetings, conferences, discussions, some kind of machinery to make those discussions and conferences effective; and, let us add, surely we may add, this: some kind of machinery for diminishing the danger of international disputes, and preventing disputes from degenerating into war. Is that so very unreasonable? Does that really offend any of our prejudices, or any of our preconceived opinions? And that, ladies and gentlemen, as you all know, is fundamentally all that the League of Nations proposes to do.

Ladies and gentlemen, the central idea of the League of Nations, as I understand it, is a system of international conferences and co-operation, not depending on coercion, without coercion, without force, without any interference with the sovereignty or full independence and freedom of action of any of its members, working not for any selfish interests, but for the establishment of better and more brotherly relations between the nations, and for the establishment of peace upon the earth. That is the idea of the League. I believe myself that in its broad lines the Covenant carries out that idea. But I am not bigoted about it, nor is any other intelligent advocate of the League. We don't say that the Covenant is perfect, or was inspired from heaven. We are prepared, all of us to support amendments if amendments are required.

I myself believe that the theory that the League of Nations as established by the Covenant could be used in any way as a super-state is totally untrue. But if I am wrong and if it can be pointed out that there is any article in the Covenant which is justly open to such a charge, for what my assistance is worth, I tender it in support of any amendment that may be necessary to put it right. But I do beg those who criticise the League not to rest on *a priori* considerations. Let them not only read the Covenant but let

them, I beg them, study the working, the actual working of the League.

WHAT THE LEAGUE HAS DONE

I assert that the League has already done much for the betterment of mankind. I assert that through its means hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war have been rescued from hardship and starvation. I assert that effective measures have been taken to prevent the spread of epidemics over Europe from the oppressed and miserable districts of Western Russia. I assert that more has been done in the three years since the League of Nations came into existence for putting an end to that terrible evil, the trade in noxious drugs, than has been done for 50 years before; and I assert that with almost equal speed conventions have been agreed on through the instrumentality of the League which will really, I hope, put a spoke in the wheel of those devilish beings who carry on the white slave traffic. I assert that the League has been the means of settling several grave international disputes. I assert that in settling those disputes the League has shown a high impartiality, not hesitating to decide, if justice so required, in favor of the weaker rather than the stronger of the disputants.

I assert that the League's recommendations,—and remember that the League only proceeds by recommendations, never by forcing its decisions on the people concerned,—I assert that the League's recommendations have been accepted in almost every case. Why, ladies and gentlemen, let me give you one instance, well known, concerning a small country, but very striking—I refer to the case of Albania. What happened? Here was a country, a little country, about a million inhabitants just brought into existence, recognized by the League's efforts for the first time, struggling into statehood. It comes to the League. It asks for protection against a much larger neighbor. The League finds the larger neighbor has actually invaded Albania with its troops, that its troops are moving forward. The Council is summoned. The neighbor is warned that it must not continue to do what it is doing, it must not go to war until whatever grievances it has have been considered in a peaceful way. And instantly the neighbor withdraws all its troops, withdraws them without doing any harm to the country, withdraws them without anger, without that terrible

feeling which so often results from international decisions reached by other means, and which leaves an open sore afterward to break out and cause irreparable damage.

So little of the soreness existed in this case that the two nations immediately afterward entered into a treaty of amity and commerce. And I, myself, heard the foreign minister of the invading state, speaking at the tribunal of the Assembly of the League, declare that the relations between the two countries were now excellent and friendly, and attribute that happy result to the mediation and influence of the League.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, it is all very well to say that Albania is a tiny country; it is all very well to say that what can be done in a small country can not necessarily be done in a large one; but I reply that it shows that the line we are on is the right line; that the machinery devised is not unsuitable for the purpose; that we have got a good machine, and the only thing that we want is sufficient motive power in that machine to make it able to accomplish all its tasks, however great.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, there are many other things the League has done. You have heard quite recently of its great work in establishing a Permanent Court of International Justice, fenced round with every precaution for independence and impartiality. You have heard how it has done much to rescue Austria from a condition of economic despair. Then, there is the work it has done in the direction of the reduction of armaments, work necessarily incomplete at present, but far more promising than anything that has ever been done before.

RESTS ON PERSUASION, NOT ARMAMENT

Ladies and gentlemen, I have taken disarmament as my chief subject this evening, as the chief example of international work which I desired to bring before you. I have taken it because the work of the League toward disarmament is to my mind characteristic of the spirit of the League. A well known Englishman once said that force was no remedy. Ladies and gentlemen, that is abundantly true. As our English proverb has it, you can bring a horse to the water, but you can not make him drink. You can do much by force, but when it comes to constructive reform and

reconstruction, force is of the very least possible value. You have only got to see,—I won't dwell on it,—you have only got to compare the comparative impotence of the Supreme Council, which rests on force, with the prolific efforts during the same period of the League, which rests on persuasion.

For the League rests on persuasion, and not on force; it relies on public opinion as its great agent. The best men and women in the world to-day, whether they are treated as aggregates of nations or in their individual capacity, though they may do wrong, desire what is right. And therefore, if you can concentrate on the affairs of the world the instructed public opinion of the men and women in the world, you have got the greatest agency for improvement that is available in human affairs.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, that is the broad case on principle that I put to you for my views; and you may say, Well, that is all very fine, but what do you want? for what have you come to America?

Has not America already done quite enough for Europe? Ladies and gentlemen, I recognize most fully all that America has done for Europe. I tried in my opening observations to express something of the gratitude we in Europe feel for her assistance and for her sacrifices in the late war. I do not come, as far as I am concerned, to ask for a single dollar or a single man. If you will allow me to say so, I am not come as a suppliant to America. I came here to tell you what I know of the action and the objects of the League; and to hear from you, as I hope I shall hear, criticisms and suggestions, not made in a merely carping spirit, but constructed with a desire to advance the great cause which I firmly believe the American people have as much at heart as any people in the world.

I do not venture to ask you to do anything; but I will ask you one or two questions. I have no complaint or criticism at all, very much the reverse, for what America has done for Europe; but has she done,—I only ask it,—has she done enough for herself? She desires to avoid, no one can complain of it, entanglements in the affairs of Europe.

QUESTIONS FOR AMERICA

She wishes to keep herself free from the wickedness and perversity, so I am told, of the rest of the world. But can she be

free? Is it possible for her to carry out that policy? Why, ladies and gentlemen, in 1917 the people of America, I am sure, desired peace as much as any people in the world, as much as we English desired it ourselves. And yet, as I am informed, by an almost unanimous national decision, she decided that it was essential for her to go into the war. It was essential, she thought, on that occasion. Suppose there is another world war, involving, as all world wars must involve, great questions of right and wrong. Are you sure that America will not feel herself forced, as she did in 1917, again to enter that war? Is there anyone here who will tell me that the decision of 1917 was wrong? I do not believe it. And if it was not wrong then, can they be certain that they will not be forced to an equally right decision in a future world war? But if that were so, is it not intensely desirable that there should be no world war, even from the point of view of American interests? Is it really true that she can afford to stand aside, and allow any kind of disaster to happen in Europe, any kind of war to begin there, hoping, gambling on the chance that it won't so far extend as to compel her, be it by her moral or her material interests, to take her part?

I ask you the question. It is for you to decide. And if you say, yes, there should be some safeguard against future war, then I do earnestly ask you, not to tell me but to tell yourselves, to think for yourselves what that safeguard should be; whether there is some better safeguard than we, the 52 nations of the League, have devised for ourselves; and if so, what are the alterations, what are the changes, what are the modifications that you think essential in order to make a satisfactory protection and safeguard against this overpowering evil? For when war begins no one can limit its extent. That is the truth which history teaches, and which all intelligent men and women should recognize.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, I put to you those questions.¹ In any case we in Europe must go on; we can not draw back from this great experiment. We are bound by every consideration of prudence and honor to pursue it to the end: prudence, because we see no other hopeful means to preserve our civilization; honor, because we who remain solemnly pledged ourselves to those who died that

¹Questions on American relations to the League are given at p. 441.

we would make it our first object to prevent a recurrence of the calamity that overwhelmed them.

Surely you will forgive me if I say that "the world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here; but it can never forget what they did. . . . It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain."

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

ADDRESS AT CHICAGO, APRIL 16, 1923¹

During the last few days I have been asked very frequently what are my impressions of the United States, a question which it is not very easy to answer in a few moments. One impression is certainly outstanding, and that is of the kindness and hospitality of its people. I had often heard of it, the fame of it had reached the obscure country from which I come. But, like the Queen of Sheba, I had not been told the half.

Apart from that, I venture to think that certain broad conclusions on international affairs have been accepted very widely in this country, and of all those conclusions there is none, I think, that is more universally held than that war is a wicked and horrible thing. I believe that outside the lunatic asylum it would be difficult to find any one who differed with that opinion; and indeed, our experience in the late war would seem to make it impossible to hold any other opinion on the subject.

Nine millions of the very best and brightest and most useful of our fellow men were slaughtered, and that is more than the whole population of Canada. Thirty million more were wounded and maimed, and that is more than a quarter of the whole population of the United States. If you think of the suffering and the grief which those figures involve, there is small wonder at the universal reprobation of the institution which has caused it. And we must not forget, of course, the vast waste of human effort that they mean and that must be added to the gigantic waste represented by the war debts of the combatants. A very moderate and conservative estimate of these war debts would put them at 50 thousand million pounds, or 250 thousand million dollars. And, when you are considering the debt we owe to war, you must also add to that sum the other debts which have been previously incurred. I have seen calculations, which seem accurate, to the effect that, in all the peoples of the world—the so-called civilized

¹Printed from stenographic report.

people—from two-thirds to four-fifths of the whole of the taxation is due to war expenditure in the past and preparation for war in the future. That is to say, that of every dollar which the tax-gatherer takes, from 60 to 80 cents is due to war. That is a fact which has a very important bearing on some of the industrial and commercial problems of the present day. And it will not be forgotten, of course, that this vast expenditure is, from an economic point of view, purely unremunerative; that from an economic point of view,—I am not saying anything about honor or other considerations—but from a purely economic point of view, the money might just as well have been thrown into the sea.

Well, that is a very serious matter, but it does not really comprise more than half, oh, less than half, infinitely less than half, of what we owe to war. What in a famous phrase was called “the moral and intellectual damage arising from war” is as enormous as it is incalculable.

I do not, of course, forget the magnificent acts of heroism, the splendid self-sacrifice which was produced. Thank Heaven, in human affairs, nothing is ever wholly bad, but I do say that when all allowance has been made for that, the balance against the war, both economical and moral and intellectual, is overwhelming.

AN INTERLOCKING WORLD

I should venture to add another broad conclusion which I find, or think I find, generally accepted here, and that is that mankind is one whole, at any rate, civilized mankind; that you can't really split it up even into nations, recognizing at the same time that for many purposes the nations are one, that indeed in any reasonable view of the matter their interests and their objects have a far greater share of identity than of difference. That is obviously true, of course, in the artistic and intellectual and moral spheres. It has been well said that science and art know no boundaries. It is plain. We all of us enjoy and profit by the great works of music and literature and art which all nations have produced, and if any event occurs to cut at the root of their activities then it is not only the nation that is injured that suffers but all the nations of the world suffer with it.

And this is equally true on the economic side. More and more

the nations of the world are economically united. World prices of the great commodities are world prices and not local prices. Allowing for all the differences caused by freight and so on, the price of the leading commodities of the world is the same in the great capitals of the world. It is the same in London and New York. The law of supply and demand, like the laws of science and art, knows no boundary. If there is a surplus production in one country it is absorbed by other countries, and the prices which the customers in other countries give affect the prices which can be obtained for it in its home country. If they are high, more of the product goes abroad, less is left for the home consumer and he has to pay more for it. If the prices are low, more remains for the home consumer and he can get it at a less price.

As a matter of fact, English coal or American grain are controlled by the operations in all the markets of the world. Offers and acceptances of bargains between buyer and seller are concluded from the furthest quarters of the civilized globe, and, therefore, as far as exporting countries are concerned—and the same is really true of all countries nowadays—the foreign demand—and this is the important fact from my point of view—the foreign demand is an important factor and must be, under modern conditions, an important factor in home prices. But it is obvious that the foreign demand, as indeed the home demand, is largely controlled or affected by political considerations. If there is war in a foreign country, the demand for ordinary goods, either immediately or as a result of the war, goes down and prices fall. If there is peace, it goes up. Of course, that is ten fold more the case—I won't say ten fold more, but ten fold more direct—if the disturbance takes place in the country of origin.

PEACE VITAL TO PROSPERITY

So this is the conclusion which I desire to press upon you, indeed the conclusion which I have found generally accepted, that national peace, the peace of each country, is vital to its prosperity. No one disputes that for a moment. Foreign peace, the peace of foreign countries, the peace among civilized nations all over the world is also a very important factor in the prosperity of every country, and it is without exaggeration true that a dis-

turbance in some distant quarter of Europe may affect the prosperity of business, or some line of business, in America; and it is also true that any disaster in America may affect business conditions in England. So this is the conclusion that I draw, and the conclusion which seems to me of great importance: that peace at home and abroad must be one of the chief objects which the national policy of every country seeks to attain.

I need not tell you how deeply that truth is felt in my own country. I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that it is a matter of the deepest determination, the highest resolve in England, that they will do their utmost to prevent war recurring. I can not exaggerate to you the profound, universal desire for peace that prevails there; the impossibility that it would be for any statesman or any public man to advocate any policy which did not make for peace. We were told during the late war that never again would we be asked to go through such an experience. We were told that it was a war to end war, and the common people of my country profoundly accepted that as a promise to which they will hold their statesmen forever.

May I give an illustration from very recent events in my own country? I am not going, naturally, into any political discussion. I won't say whether the impression was right or wrong, but the moment there was an impression in my country last summer, last autumn, that the then government was playing with the idea of war in the Near East, such a storm of public opinion instantly arose as swept them from office; a storm over the whole country, aye, over the whole empire. And I am satisfied that it represented the deepest feeling of my countrymen, and still more, of my countrywomen.

And that is the reason why in England there is such universal support for the League of Nations. It may well be mistaken. That is for you to judge. I am merely here to tell you, as far as I can, the facts; but this support is, I do venture to insist, absolutely genuine. It was shown in the recent election there. I doubt whether there are half a dozen members in the new House of Commons who would get up and say that they were not supporters of the League of Nations. And it is not any particular fancy for any form of words, but it is merely this, that they passionately desire peace and that they have not yet had presented

to them any plausible alternative by which they think peace can be assured.

A GREAT INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT

I notice in a very courteous and considerate reference to myself by one of your public men that I might perhaps be better employed in preaching peace in Europe than in the United States. Well, I was not aware—and I am sorry I have given the impression—that I was preaching peace in the United States. I know quite well that the United States and the people of the United States are absolutely convinced on that subject, and it is notoriously a work of supererogation to preach to the converted. I am here, let me repeat it, on the hospitable invitation of American friends of mine, repeated on more than one occasion since the armistice, that I should come here. And I have come, not with the idea of preaching peace or anything else, but of giving such information as is in my possession on the workings and the methods of a very great international experiment.

Whatever you may think of it, it is that;—one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest, international experiment that has ever been tried. And above all, I have come to hear from you and from your fellow citizens such comments and observations and criticisms as you are good enough to give to me. It is certainly not less important that the people of Europe should know what the people of the United States think on this great question than it is that the people of the United States should know the opinions of the people of Europe on this question. But if it should be suggested that I have not done my best, my poor best, to preach peace or the League of Nations in my own country and in Europe, then very respectfully I must submit that my critic is not well informed.

For the last four years or more I have done little or nothing else, not only I, but a large number of other men much more effective than myself; we have gone into the highways and hedges, to the byways and main streets, into every city and town and village of our own country, into many parts of the foreign countries of Europe, and have preached what we earnestly believe, that peace is essential for humanity and that the method which we have seen in operation is a successful and efficient method of peace and that so far none other has been suggested to us.

A short fortnight before I sailed for this country, I was in Paris at the invitation of a group of the young students in the university who asked me to talk on this subject. We went, and we had, I am bound to say, a most successful gathering. Our words were received with great favor, as far as one can judge by the journalistic notice which they received. And I was impressed, as indeed I have been for many months past, with the great and growing acceptance of this conception in France not less than in my own country. But, though the acceptance has been very great, I do not wish to suggest to you that there have never been any objectors. There have.

NOT A SUPERSTATE

There have been criticisms of various kinds. One of the commonest in the early days was that by the Covenant we were seeking to set up a superstate, that we were going to put England under the domination of a group of foreigners. And I remember reading one rather fantastic article which charged me personally, if I remember rightly, with a desire to establish Léon Bourgeois as a dictator of England. Of course, that is a complete and entire misconception of the League of Nations in its operation and, as I think, in its Covenant.

It is essentially and exclusively advisory. It has no executive powers, or almost none. I say "almost none" because there are some cases where it has been given executive powers, not by the Covenant but by some treaty outside the Covenant. For instance, it has been charged with the administration of the Free City of Danzig, and it has appointed a high commissioner to administer that territory. But that is entirely outside its regular business, and it is only accepted by the League in order to deal with a very exceptional situation.

People who talk of the superstate have been, I think, entirely misled as to its functions. They know that it consists of an Assembly of representatives of the nations, 52 of them now, three representatives from each, with a smaller Council which sits when the Assembly does not sit, and with a Secretariat in order to prepare work for these two bodies, and they conceive of it, its organization, as of the same nature as a parliamentary organization in

an ordinary country where the Assembly is the legislative body, the Council the executive body and the Secretariat the civil service. It is all quite inaccurate, quite misleading. That is not the nature of the work or the operations of the League in the least.

The League is merely a meeting place for the nations who are coming to consult with one another on subjects affecting the whole peace and happiness of humanity; to try, by consultation and conversation around the table, as it were, or in a hall, to find some solution of their difficulties which may be recommended to the nations concerned, but in no case to impose a solution on reluctant nations.

People have told me in my country that the League is an attack on the independence and sovereignty of its members. Well, I do not think anyone says that now in England. They feel that to suggest that the 52 nations that make up the League have parted with their independence and sovereignty is to make too great a demand on the credulity of any of us. They know the national character of such countries as Switzerland, as France, and, if I may say so, even as England itself, and they know that they are as tenacious as it is possible to be of their sovereignty and independence, and would not form a part of any organization which deprived them of it; no, not for an instant.

RECOGNIZES EQUALITY OF STATES

And then they know, at least we have told them often enough, that the very rule of procedure which prevails in the League, as in every other international organization, is the rule of unanimity, so that no decision can be taken except unanimously, which makes it impossible for the League to function as a superstate. It can't give orders to a minority, because the minority can always veto any resolution that might look like an order. As a matter of fact, it never tries to give orders under any circumstances. Its business is to make recommendations and suggestions to bring the nations together, to promote agreements, not to give another field for compulsion and coercion, of which there is too much in the world already.

Anyone who has seen the Assembly at work will see the futility of the suggestion. I wish I could bring before you a picture

of that Assembly of all the nations of the world—not all, but nearly all the nations of the world—representing every religion and race and language, sitting in a great chamber discussing on terms of perfect equality every question that comes before them. Some question arises. It may be of regulating or suppressing, let us say, the traffic in opium or cocaine. A member arises representing some quite small country. He is heard with absolutely the same attention and respect as if he represented the largest empire in the world. I am not sure that a criticism might not be made that the League goes almost too far in that direction.

Let me remind you of the dispute which came before it between Poland and Lithuania over the possession of Vilna. I will not go into detail as to that dispute, but in the end a solution of the controversy was suggested and recommended by a unanimous vote of both the Council and the Assembly to the two disputants. Unfortunately (it is the only occasion on which it has happened), neither of them felt able to accept the recommendation. What was the consequence? An attempt to force it on them? Not at all. The League's attitude was necessary according to its constitution and procedure. "We have presented this solution to you. We believe it is the best solution. We believe it will meet all your difficulties, but, if you reject it, that is all that we can do. We have done our function. All that we can add to it [and this they did add] is an appeal to both parties to refrain from a resort to war," an appeal which, I am glad to say to the honor of both of them, they listened to and obeyed.

I cite this case not as a typical case. It is the only case in which it has happened. In the other cases in which solutions have been suggested the solutions have been accepted and a complete end put to the controversy. But I do press it upon you as a complete answer to the suggestion that the League exists to force its views, or the views of a majority of its Members, upon a minority of nations and to trample under foot the independence or sovereignty of even the least of them.

NO OBLIGATION TO MOVE TROOPS

Well, then there is another objection that is sometimes put, which is, as it were, the converse of the one I have been considering.

Some of my fellow countrymen were very much concerned, at the outset, some of them are still concerned—a very small minority—lest by the League we should be launched into dangerous foreign complications, lest we should find ourselves mixed up with matters which did not directly affect us, but which might be of grave importance to our prosperity and our strength. It was even suggested that we might be compelled to go to war or to send troops in a quarrel with which we really had no concern. Well, that of course is also a complete misunderstanding of the League. No obligation to move national troops can be incurred by a Member of the League except with its full and free consent; indeed, no resolution of the League—that is, of the Council or Assembly of the League—can bind by itself any of the Governments represented in those bodies. As I say, they are there to take counsel with one another and not to be bound by the decisions which are given even unanimously by those bodies.

Let me give you an instance of what I mean. It is the practice, when the Assembly desires to see some international reform carried out, for it to first draw up the scheme, then to submit it to careful examination by its committees, and then, if it is adopted by the Assembly, to recommend that the Governments concerned shall enter into an agreement, a convention or treaty, on the subject. They are, of course, left entirely free as to whether they will or will not enter into that convention. It happened some months ago that the subject under consideration was the suppression of the white slave traffic,—the traffic in women and children. A convention was drawn up strengthening the international understandings on that subject and facilitating its suppression, and in order to save time it was proposed that a document should be immediately opened at the office of the Secretariat and that those Governments who chose to do so might instruct their delegates then and there to sign that document on their behalf. I think you will admit that is a very moderate proceeding. But even that did not go unchallenged, so careful are the bodies of the League not to infringe in any way the sovereignty of their Members or to drag them unwillingly into any engagements which they might not desire to undertake. And the result was considerable discussion—almost an angry discussion—on the point. I am glad, personally, to say that what seems to me good sense and good reason prevailed, and the pro-

cedure suggested was adopted, the protocol, as it was called, was opened, and I am glad to say was signed and accepted by a large number of Governments; but none the less the incident shows the extreme care and caution with which the League proceeds so as to avoid any possibility of enmeshing its Members in any engagements which their authorized constitutional principles would not approve.

And let me refer also in that connection to Article 8 of the Covenant itself. That is the article which provides for the promotion of disarmament among the nations. What does it do? It invites the Council to formulate schemes for disarmament for the consideration of the Governments concerned, and only when those Governments have approved of that scheme, and accepted it by their constitutional means, can any scheme, even for so desirable an object as disarmament, be adopted through the procedure and mechanism of the League.

USEFULNESS OF THE LEAGUE

I think I have said enough to show that whatever this League may be, it can not be charged with being a superstate, being a trap for unwary countries to lead them into engagements which they would not otherwise undertake.

But there is another criticism which is raised from precisely the opposite direction, and that is that the League, so far from being a superstate, has no power, is quite useless, that it can't do anything. That is a very common charge in my country. Just before I came here I read an article in one of our newspapers, one of the very few that is opposed to the League, in which they state that they regard the League as a danger because it encourages countries to disarm without giving them any real security. Well, I should be very glad to encourage countries to disarm, but what does this charge that the League is useless really mean?

It is usually put in one of two forms. It is said that the League has no force, no army behind it, and therefore it can not enforce its decisions. Well, that is quite true. The League has no army. It has no force. It has no means of calling on any force to enforce its decisions, and I am heartily glad of it. But when you say that it is useless, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Has the

League not been able to do anything? Anyone who thinks so is merely ignorant of the subject.

I have mentioned the dispute between Lithuania and Poland. Three other disputes, raising questions at least as important as that which gave birth to the great World War, the question, you remember, which arose between Serbia and Austria,—three such disputes have been settled, and settled completely and altogether by the operation of the League.

It has rescued Austria from financial chaos which threatened the peace of that part of the world; rescued it by as fine an exhibition of disinterested and, let me add, intelligent international statesmanship as has ever been seen in the history of the world.

But that is the least part of what it has done. It has done all this humanitarian work: rescued half a million prisoners of war, fought against diseases coming from the East, taken a real step forward for the suppression of the opium traffic and the traffic in other dangerous drugs, brought into operation and cooperation a real mass of nations in order to extirpate that blot on our civilization, the traffic in women and children. It has been the means to facilitate communication between the nations, to smooth over the lesser but still important financial and economic difficulties which separate, to lay down the principle of economic restoration in Europe, and above all it is engaged now in a Herculean task, the task of finding some really effective method of achieving, of completing that work so well begun at Washington, namely, the reduction of armaments throughout the world.

REJECTED USE OF FORCE

It is no new question. It was raised, I remember, when we were discussing the Covenant in Paris. Was the League to have force behind it? Were we to ask armaments from the League? It was raised, discussed and rejected, and rightly rejected. We decided to rely on the greatest of all forces, the force of public opinion, and events have proved that our decision was right.

The objection is sometimes put to me in another form. It is said the League is all very well to settle disputes between Jugoslavia and Albania or even between Finland and Sweden, but it

dare not deal with the major powers. Look at these grave questions, the Near East, the Ruhr question; why has the League not dealt with them? The reason is that it is afraid of England or France. Well, ladies and gentlemen, that is not true. In the Upper Silesian dispute, the dispute was quite as much between England and France as it was between Poland and Germany. They met repeatedly, over and over again, in efforts to find a solution, and the negotiation had reached a dangerous point of exasperation when at last it was referred to the tribunals of the League. The League did not reject it. It did not fear to undertake it because France and England were engaged in it. On the contrary, they undertook it; they arrived at a solution. You may criticise. Anything may be criticised, but it was a solution, and it was a solution that has been accepted by both parties and has now been acted upon, and that dispute, bitter and dangerous as it was, has been removed from among the possible causes of war in Europe.

Only lately, the other day, did we not see in Lausanne the British Government as a Member of the League suggesting that the controversy between themselves and the Turks as to the possession of Mosul should be referred to the League and offering to abide by the decision of the League, whatever it might be? I don't want to go into the question of Mosul, but surely there was a question which was as serious and as grave as any international question can be; in the old phrase, it touched the honor and essential interests of the countries concerned, and one Member of the League was not afraid, was not reluctant to refer it to the League.

I do think that after that it is taxing the forbearance and credulity of the advocates of the League a little to suggest that it is incapable of dealing with disputes involving the interests of some of the greater nations of the world. But it is true, it is quite true, that there are matters which the League might have dealt with and which it has not dealt with. I do not deny it; I regret it; but the League, like every other great institution, must grow. It has done much and it has shown it is ready to do more when it has grown to its full height. When it is as great and all-embracing as it ought to be, then it will be able to accomplish the objects which it has been created to adjust.

THE LESSON OF HISTORY

I do not want to trouble you with all the minor objections that have been made to my advocacy of this subject in England. There are, of course, many minor matters, but I can not help feeling that it may be that some of my critics have been influenced by a recollection, a kind of atavism, throwing them back to the attitude of Britain after the great French war of 1815. You will remember then that the Russian Government of the day made a proposal, I won't say for a league of nations, but for some kind of association of nations. It was a vague proposal, indefinite, not satisfactory, not, as I think, in the least resembling the present scheme. I don't think it was a practical scheme, but it is possible that, if the British Government of that day had gone into it, it might have been made into a practical proposal. But the attitude of the British statesmen of the day was very prudent and correct. They declared that they had no use for visionary schemes, they were practical men, concerned with the safety of their own country and nothing more, and they declined to be led into these vague and visionary undertakings.

It may be that we of my generation in England, looking back on their action, will think that they were wanting in the greatest of all qualities of statesmen, the quality of imagination; but the result was unquestionably unfortunate for us. It may be that Alexander of Russia's scheme was a bad one; I think it was. There was confusion in Europe almost immediately afterward, within 15 years of the close of the war. Less than 40 years afterward England was engaged in a European war in the Crimea. Then followed the Prussian war, the war in Denmark, the war in Austria, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and the Russo-Turkish war of 1876; and it was the consequences of the Franco-Prussian war, as we all know, which were largely responsible for the World War from which we have all been suffering.

It may be that Canning and Castlereagh were right in their decision. They were great men and I will not criticise them. But if it had been possible then for England to have established a really effective international organization, how much misery, how much suffering might not have been saved to the world to-day.

At any rate, we in England are determined now that we can

not afford to risk such an event again. We believe that we can not go on in the old way; that we have got to bring into Europe, into international affairs, a new spirit; that it is not enough merely to erect barriers against war, it is not enough merely to provide means for the settlement of disputes when they arise; we must do more than that. We must seek to take away the predisposing cause of war. We must bring into international life a spirit of brotherhood, co-operation and friendship.

After all, is it really true that Christian morality does not apply to international relations? I think not. I believe it is all-pervading, that it applies to the relations between nations as much as it does to the relations between individuals. I believe that the same principles which apply to individuals must apply to nations. I believe that national conduct should be guided by justice and by reason and by brotherhood, and that, in the end, these motives will be superior to a mere appeal to brute force.

I remember at the beginning of the war being taken as a spectator one day to the fighting line. It was a lovely day, and as we came out of the trenches we were taken by our guide a few hundred yards back to a village and to a church which had been submitted to artillery fire. The graveyard was all turned up. The tombs had been broken, a great breach had been made in the wall of the church looking toward the battle. Opposite the breach there was a great crucifix untouched and uninjured, looking with infinite pity on the madness of mankind, and, as I looked at it, I remembered the words of the dying Roman emperor: "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean!" It seemed that there was still hope for a tortured world, for the things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are not seen are eternal.

THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE

ADDRESS AT SYMPHONY HALL, BOSTON, UNDER THE AUSPICES
OF THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, WORLD PEACE
FOUNDATION, LEAGUE OF NATIONS NON-PARTISAN AS-
SOCIATION, APRIL 25, 1923

In that one of the American cities which is the most famous on our side of the Atlantic, may I try to describe to you how it was that we in England came into the League of Nations?

When the war came to an end there were, I think, four dominant currents of opinion,—currents of feeling. There was first, of course, profound horror. We, like many other nations, had gone through four years of intolerable suffering. Grief had smitten every household in the land; suffering had come upon hundreds of thousands of our fellow beings, and we could not fail to observe that, in spite of the kind of popular eulogy which prevailed on the subject of war, war was not in fact a purifying or an elevating influence on the great mass of the population.

Horror was our first feeling; apprehension was the second. What would a second war be like? Would it not be, as all the experts told us, far worse than even this war? And if it were, how could we hope that our civilization and our national life would survive after such an experience?

And the third dominant feeling was one of revolt—a wave of opinion which swept over the greater part of Europe, a revolt of the common people of the land. They said: "We have intrusted the management of international affairs to our rulers and statesmen; they have told us that these matters were too delicate and difficult for us, the common people, to interfere with; they have claimed that only experts and initiated persons could be trusted to deal with them. And what has been the result? The greatest catastrophe in history. And this terrible war has not only been a vehicle of the most fearful suffering to us all, but it has proved that the old system is a failure, or at any rate, is wholly inadequate to deal with the real difficulties of international affairs."

And, lastly, there was right through our people a profound feeling of disgust and disappointment. "Is this all we can show as the result of nineteen centuries of the gospel of Christianity and of love?" The feeling was prodigious that it was impossible to go on with the old state of things; that change was absolutely essential, or that some remedy or compromise or assurance must be forthcoming, so that, whatever happened, we should not be called on to go through it all again.

THREE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

They asked, "What remedy do you propose?"

Some said, "You must carry on perpetual preparations for war." The old remedy was still put forward as the real remedy and answer. No case in history has ever been recorded as offering so clearly a stone to those who asked for bread. I believe that the vast majority of my fellow countrymen rejected that solution absolutely as impossible. They said, "If you go on you will have the same causes of war existing as before."

Then there was another set of people who said: "Perhaps the old plan is not quite right, but the real plan is to make yourself so powerful, either by geographical position, or by elaborate preparations, or by alliances, that you will be able to dominate the world. We do not ask for a balance of power. That was perhaps a mistake. You can insist on your kind of peace and can carry out the dream which brought Germany to destruction." That plan also, and even more decisively, was rejected.

And if you are to reject those plans—the old system of the balance of power, the German system of a dominating group—it seems that, by a process of exclusion, you must try for a general agreement among all the nations in the world in some form or other, safeguarding the peace of the world.

When you have got as far as that you have got a very long way on toward a League of Nations. But you have not determined its character, and there is obviously more than one type of such a League which you could adopt. You can have a very lax and general agreement—not more than an agreement—that the nations will from time to time meet together and confer, without any machinery, without any written constitution, without any defined

objects. That was, very roughly, the plan that was adopted after the war of 1815. But it did not answer, and I do not think it ever would. If you merely say that the nations are to meet together, to remain absolutely in their original attitude toward one another, you mean that they are to meet together as nations to pursue their national objects, and nothing else. Now I am sure you won't get any further like that. You have got to realize the conception that if you want anything in this world you must try for it, and that if you want peace you must set up peace as the great policy of your organization. Such a system of occasional conferences, even if it succeeds to some extent, necessarily involves spasmodic action, no continuity of purpose. The conference decisions may or may not be carried out. A vast part of the effort expended will be almost wasted. Another conference a few years after takes place and has to start more or less over again. But the greatest objection is that just at the particular moment when it is most necessary, it is most likely to break down. You remember what happened in 1914. There was a proposal for a conference, but no conference was held. The war broke out, and the disaster happened. That will always happen unless you have some machinery in continual existence, always ready to be employed, and under a solemn obligation to be appealed to, that war shall not take place until every other possible means has been tried to settle the disputes between the nations.

Then there was the school just opposite to the occasional conference school. There was the school of the supergovernment—what Tennyson had in his mind when he talked about the “parliament of man, the federation of the world.” That did not appeal, I think, to the English ever. It had a certain following among some of the Latin races. I remember that the French Government pressed very strongly upon us that the League of Nations ought to have some kind of international army, or at any rate an international general staff. But we resisted it because we felt quite sure that such a plan was impracticable, and that it would be absolutely impossible to go back to our nation, the British, and tell them that their resources could be moved and their men could be asked to lay down their lives, and their taxpayers asked to pay the bill, not at the behest of their national Government, but at the behest of some international authority.

We said that under no circumstances would the British people ever allow an international authority to rush them into war unless they were fully convinced of the righteousness and propriety of that step. Indeed, I do not know any nation in the world—I may perhaps be misled by my national prejudices—which is so tenacious of its independence and sovereignty as the British nation. I was talking to one of your fellow citizens who had been engaged during the war in the work of one of those interallied committees, and he said to me, “I have a great respect and admiration for your country, but I must say that when you are working with them they have one quality—they are very tenacious of what they conceive to be their rights.” And I was not able to contradict him.

MIDDLE COURSE ADOPTED

Therefore, we put aside, and I think rightly put aside, anything in the nature of a supergovernment, and we adopted for the League a kind of middle course—not merely occasional conferences, and certainly not a supergovernment. We devised instead machinery for organized consultations between the nations. We proposed—and it is now in the Covenant—machinery for that object—the Assembly, the big council, the Assembly of all the nations who are Members of the League, the 52 nations who can come together with their representatives from all parts of the world and discuss matters of common interest. And we provided that they must come together at stated, not too distant, intervals, so that there would be regularly and automatically a great world conference for peace, representing all the nations of the world, who, we hoped, would come together to take counsel with one another as to what way peace could be best promoted, as to how difficulties as they had arisen could be best smoothed over, co-operation between the nations for common purposes could be facilitated and encouraged; and, generally, to bring the nations together and make them feel that they were engaged in one common task—a task which I would say is the most important and the most sacred of all the tasks nations can take in hand—the task of preserving the peace of the world.

And then, since this Assembly, which we knew would necessarily be a large one, was too cumbersome and too difficult for continuous

meetings, we saw that there must be some smaller body which could meet at shorter intervals and deal with the general objects of the League without calling the Assembly together. Therefore a so-called Council was devised, which originally was to consist of nine members—actually eight in practice, and the number has now been expanded to ten—four of them being permanent members, as representing countries that are so wide in their interests as to require representation at every international consultation, and six who are elected by the Assembly.

Then, in addition, there was the international Secretariat, which is evidently an essential part of any machinery of the kind; it must have a body of secretaries prepared for duty, to draw up reports, to do all the secretarial work, to organize the meetings and to see to the reporting and printing. That also was created and has functioned with remarkable success, as well as with remarkable devotion on the part of those who are members of it, ever since its foundation.

But I desire to call your especial attention to this—that if you will read carefully the Covenant, not only reading what other people say about it, but reading the document itself, you will see that the whole purpose and object of the League, the essential purpose, is not to force its decisions upon the world: nothing of the sort, not in the sense of making executive decisions, or of making any decisions. Purely and simply it is an organization to enable the nations to consult with one another—an organization with advisory powers, consultative powers only, not with coercive or compulsory powers in any case. And that is the way in which the Covenant actually works at Geneva to-day.

ARTICLE 10 OF NO GREAT VALUE

Of course, I am not going to shirk the difficulties. People will ask, "How do you explain Article 10?" I will tell you how. In practice Article 10 has never been employed, and I do not think it will ever be employed while the League lasts. In practice Article 10 is absolutely unimportant. It is not of any great value, and it is certainly of no injury at all. It operates only as a general declaration that any war of conquest ought not to be undertaken. If people tell me, "Well, it might have been dif-

ferently worded," all I can say is that most clauses of most public documents might with advantage be differently worded from the way in which they are worded.

The League is not there to make decisions with compulsory force. But it is quite true that in two articles there are one or two occasions provided for where coercion is contemplated. Roughly speaking, the two occasions are contained in Articles 15 and 16. What do they say? They say this—that before any nation resorts to war it must submit its dispute with the nation it proposes to go to war with to the Council or the Assembly, or to some court of arbitration, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice; that it is not in any case to go to war until some recommendation or decision has been given by one or other of those authorities; that the decision must be made within six months, and that in no case is it to go to war within three months after the decision has been made. The whole of the proceedings are to be in public.

The object of this procedure is two-fold—one to interpose a period of reflection, a cooling-down period, between the quarrel and the hostilities, if any; and the other, and the more important, is to see that the quarrel is laid before the people of the world, and that they are given an opportunity of expressing their opinion upon it, so that the force of public opinion—in some ways the greatest force in the world—can be exercised on the side of peace before it is too late. The Covenant says you are not to go to war without discussion; and if you have agreed to take the decision of an arbitral court or of the court of justice, or if there is an unanimous decision of the Council against you, then you are not to go to war against that decision. That is the nearest approach the Covenant ever makes toward enforcing a decision—namely, that where it is absolutely unanimous no one is to go to war.

PREVENTS WAR BEING RUSHED

The only sanction given is this—that the Members of the League are to agree that if they have satisfied themselves in their own judgment, and after considering the matter, that a breach of the Covenant has actually taken place, then they will agree to break off relations with the offending state and put economic pressure

upon it. That is the whole extent of compulsion contemplated by the Covenant. It does not even contemplate, without further consent, military action, but it does contemplate that against a reckless, criminal state economic pressure should be used to preserve the peace of the world. Even in that case there is no attempt at enforcing, except in the way I have described, a decision of the League. The object is to prevent war from being rushed without due consideration and delay, not to force nations to do what a majority of the League desire. That never can happen. It is merely to prevent war from taking place until every possible means has been exhausted for preserving the peace of the world. That is the whole of the compulsory power of the League.

But the Covenant contains a number of other articles designed, not for compulsion or coercion at all, but in order to facilitate agreement between the countries of the world regarding common objects which we all desire—objects of a social character, such as the facilitation of intercommunications, the abolition of harassing passport or customs regulations; or humanitarian objects, like the rescue of prisoners of war or the prevention of disease; or moral objects, like the prevention of the opium traffic or the traffic in women and children. These are matters indicated as matters on which the nations can take counsel together to see if they can arrive at some common agreement regarding them. That is the main object of the League—to make the nations recognize that they are not only nations, but parts of humanity, and that as such their common interests are infinitely greater than any hostility they ought to feel toward one another. You will see that, in fact, force plays little or no part, or only a very indirect part, in the whole of this organization; that each nation is left in complete possession of its independence and sovereignty.

PUBLICITY A GREAT FACTOR

“That is all very fine,” it will be said, “but how do you expect that the great objects which you describe will be carried out? What is the agency on which those who believe in the Covenant rely in order to secure the great objects it has in view?” The agency is, as I have said, public opinion, and the method is publicity.

We believe, and in the working of the League we think we have proved, that international affairs can be carried on almost entirely with complete publicity. We believe that the open debates of the Assembly, the open debates of the committees of the Assembly, and the almost universally open debates of the Council—that all these things, far from embarrassing those who take part, are really of assistance to them, because they have this great advantage, that in an open and public debate a nation which desires to put forward a disreputable or even an unreasonable point of view, will hesitate once or twice if the facts are to be made public to the whole world.

I remember a case we were discussing, I think it was at the first Assembly, the admission of Bulgaria, because, as you know, three of the enemy states have already been admitted to the League—Hungary, Bulgaria and Austria. Bulgaria was one of the first, but all her neighbors raised vehement objections to her admission, and you know that you have got to get a two-thirds majority for the admission of a state. It is almost the only case of importance where the Assembly goes by a majority vote and not by unanimity in its decisions.

Well, during the committee stage, the admission had been fought with some vigor by those states. When we came to the Assembly the general feeling of the Assembly was that Bulgaria ought to be admitted. Nevertheless, there was a danger. If one or two of the states resisted, it was possible that others would join them on general grounds. It was, therefore, a matter of profound joy to me that when it came to a point—the decision being in the open and subject to the pressure of public opinion—the objection was not persisted in and Bulgaria was admitted unanimously.

PUBLIC OPINION AS A FORCE

Publicity has been absolutely successful. It has been proved that publicity and public opinion alone can secure great material advantages in the dealings of the world. But it doesn't stop there. We all know that public opinion is a tremendous force. In individual cases we know it constantly. If we are candid with ourselves we know that almost everything we do or say is largely

affected by the public opinion, the habits, the thought of our neighbors. And in organized bodies it is just the same.

I was for many years a member of a sort of professional trades union. We didn't call it a trades union, but the difference is not very easily described. The body was the Bar Council. It was composed of myself and about 20 or 30 other barristers. We had no official powers. We were there to advise the bar as to what was proper professional conduct. Constantly cases came up before us for decision. We expressed our opinion. The striking thing was that, though we had no powers and our opinions very often conflicted with the pecuniary interests of the members of the bar, I do not remember a single case where anyone resisted our opinion. Not that we could have forced it, but that they would have had to face public opinion.

Public opinion is a force among nations. I will take the instance of a nation which is not prepared to accept the rule of another nation and will, therefore, not pay attention to or obey the laws enacted for its government. That has happened, as we all know, in the case of Ireland during many years. And Ireland has been successful. Public opinion has been too strong for the much greater power of her neighbor. In fact, Ireland has now succeeded in obtaining her demands, with the assent and approval of the majority of Englishmen, because public opinion insisted that that demand should be granted. If we are to believe what we read in the newspapers, and I for one believe what is printed in the papers, Ireland has decided to make application for membership in the League. For my part, I rejoice profoundly at it.

I am not the least shy in claiming that the League acts by public opinion and ought to act by public opinion.¹ I for one care very little even about the small compulsory powers given it under Article 16. The thing that we are most interested in, and the thing that is essential to its success, the thing on which its whole future depends, is simply getting the nations to come around a table together to consult with one another how they can best advance the interests of peace and progress among all of them.

“SOLE HOPE OF FUTURE”

Ladies and gentlemen, that is the case. To us this seems the sole hope of the future. We see no other. We are convinced

¹Reply to a question on publicity is given at p. 446.

that another such war as that of 1914 will destroy us all—Europe first, but I think all parts of the world very soon after. We can't flatter ourselves that civilizations are in their nature permanent. We know that at various times great civilizations have existed and have perished; and the world has relapsed into something like barbarism after their perishing.

We are now constantly hearing of the immense civilization that existed in Egypt. It perished so completely that for centuries nobody knew that it existed. We are now, by the knowledge and skill of our eminent explorers, discovering and bringing to light once again those tremendous works of men which were as wonderful in their time as any we can show to-day.

There were others—Venetian, Greek, Roman civilizations. As to the latter, we know something of the history of its perishing. We know that the Romans reached a tremendous degree of civilization and that subsequently the whole of the Roman Empire gradually disintegrated into the barbarism of the eighth and ninth centuries. The Roman Empire had already conquered itself before the barbarians invaded her. It is more true to say that Roman civilization was killed by Christianity. It is more true because when Christianity came and set up a new standard of morality, and the Roman Empire failed to conform to that new standard, it perished by the degeneration which was made the more obvious by the existence of a standard with which to compare it.

Shall we go in the same direction? Is it not true that up till now the international system has been based not on the principle of love, but upon the principle of hate, that the nations have been taught so to regard themselves? Aye, there are still some men in all nations who are not ashamed to preach the unvarnished doctrine of hate for other nations. It is not possible to have any compromise between a gospel of hate and a gospel of love. They can not coexist.

I am satisfied myself that if we can not Christianize our civilization, Christianity will destroy our civilization. I do not recognize myself in these matters any difference between the rules or principles which govern nations and those which govern individuals. I believe that the doctrine to love one another, the doctrine of brotherhood, the doctrine of mutual help and assistance, applies as much to nations as it does to men and women. I believe that to nations as well as to men the warning is addressed—"Unless ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish."

REPLIES TO QUESTIONS

ARMAMENT

QUESTION¹: Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask Lord Robert Cecil if, in order to achieve the disarmament of which he has spoken, he is prepared to advocate the scrapping of European imperialism in the East and more specifically the scrapping of British imperialism in Egypt, India, Mesopotamia and elsewhere where British rule rests upon force and not upon the moral consent of the governed.

ANSWER: I am prepared to advocate the scrapping of any policy which I should describe as imperialistic, whether it was the policy of my own country or of any other. But I would not advocate in the case of my own country or of any other the abandonment of any trust undertaken by that country on behalf of weak and struggling peoples. And I would not advocate any policy which would hand over the populations of great districts to disorder, bloodshed and slaughter, because plausible arguments were suggested for that course by those who, it may be, would not suffer from the result of the policy they recommend.

QUESTION¹: Could not Lord Robert tell us what progress has been made up to date with the League's disarmament scheme?

ANSWER: The progress in the direction of disarmament has been manifold. The League has agreed to summon a conference of all the powers to extend the principles of the Washington treaty to all those powers that were not represented and were not bound by the Washington treaty. I hope that that conference will take place very shortly. The League has further agreed on the general principle that disarmament to be effective must be general, and that in order to secure anything like general disarmament you must provide some security to enable those nations that at present rely on their armaments to rely on the efforts of all their neighbors to protect them. It has instructed a committee to draw up a definite scheme in the form of a treaty to carry out those general principles. That committee has met several times. It

¹At New York.

has now before it a draft treaty to carry out those objects. It has discussed that draft treaty not unfavorably, and it is to pass upon it definitely at its meeting summoned for the 4th of June next. If, as I hope, it accepts that draft in some such form as it now stands, that treaty will come before the Assembly in September next and if it is adopted there it will go to the various Governments for ratification, for approval and ratification, during the course of the following year.

In the mean time the League has pressed upon the Governments of the world the desirability of cutting down their expenses on armaments to the greatest degree possible. As I told you just now the armaments are far too great, but they have been cut down considerably, and we have every hope that they will be cut down further in the coming year.

One other thing the League has very much at heart; it desires a universal agreement to limit and control the traffic in arms. We have not yet been fortunate enough to secure the full assent of all the Governments, but we have got an assent to the principle, I think, of some such limitation from all the Governments, and we are awaiting specific proposals from the Government that showed itself least favorable to the scheme, which has assured us of its desire to co-operate in dealing with this matter.

I think that comprises the greater part of the work the League has done. The subject is evidently one of not less difficulty than importance, and I myself confidently believe that with the support of the public opinion of the world we may yet, in the course of the next few months, see very important steps taken toward the greatest reform that can be carried out in the interest of humanity.

UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE

QUESTION¹: I have one question to ask. It is this. Lord Robert will remember that when the Versailles treaty, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, was sent to our American Senate for ratification, a majority of the Senate, not two-thirds, but a majority of the Senate proposed certain reservations. They failed to receive a two-thirds vote, and the treaty consequently was not ratified. My question is this: In your opinion, Lord

¹At New York.

Robert, if the treaty had been ratified with those reservations, would the nations of Europe, parties to the League, have acquiesced in them?

ANSWER: Well, I am in a little of a difficulty, because I remember those reservations were very numerous, and I don't remember in detail everything that was in them. Therefore I hesitate to reply with a plain affirmative or negative, as I like to do to questions that are asked me. All I can say is this: that I am satisfied that the nations of the world would not display any pettifogging or huckstering spirit in dealing with any offer of co-operation that might come from America; that they would not look too closely at the terms of their offer; that those of us who are really and sincerely anxious to obtain world co-operation for a worthy object, would be ready to accept that co-operation—I will not say in any form it was offered,—but in any form that was at all consistent with the main object for which the co-operation was asked.

QUESTION¹: Lord Robert, you were frank enough to say the other day that you admitted there were serious faults in the Covenant and in the structure of the League. Would you care to tell us what you consider some of its defects? You are aware, of course, that these faults and others played a very great part in the rejection of the treaty by our Senate. You can not, however, be aware that one reason for the American position to the League is the widespread belief that despite the machinery created by the Covenant for the amendment of the Covenant, it is practically impossible, since any change would call for a unanimous vote by the Council of the League. It would, I am sure, tend to clarify the situation in this country if you felt that you could give us your opinion both as to the possibility of amendment and whether, if it is possible, there is in your judgment a likelihood of there being an earnest effort to rebuild the structure of the League along more democratic lines within the next five years.

ANSWER: I am asked really two substantial questions: one is a question of procedure and one is a question of substance.

As to the question of procedure, I am of opinion that there is no insuperable difficulty in obtaining amendments to the Covenant. I think in a great international instrument amendments ought

¹At New York.

only to be carried out with caution and with reserve. I think, therefore, it is right that they should be carried out only with the assent of those who are the principal Members of the League,—principal either because of their situation in the world, or because they have been elected by their fellows to represent them on the Council of the League. But my experience is that if there is a real genuine opinion in the Assembly that a particular change ought to be made, the Council have never shown themselves reactionary or obstructive in accepting that intimation of opinion, and I believe that any amendment which can be supported by solid reasons would have a very good chance of being adopted and carried through under the constitution of the League.

Now, as to the question of substance, I am asked whether I would like to see changes made in the Covenant, and particularly changes in the direction of making it more democratic. I say that I would like to see some changes made in the Covenant, but I am not quite sure what is meant by democratic changes. The Assembly and the Council at present consist of those who have been nominated to attend its meetings by the citizens of the respective countries which have been intrusted under democratic constitutions with the principal direction of the affairs of these countries. I do not myself see how, from a purely democratic point of view, you could greatly improve that constitution; but if there is any particular proposal that it is desired to put forward in that direction, I am quite sure it would receive ample consideration.

As to the changes in the structure of the Covenant, when I first said I thought there were defects in the Covenant, I think I was mainly considering two. One was that I think it would be very desirable to include in the Covenant some quite express and definite declaration in favor of the abolition of war; and, secondly, I would like to see the membership of the League expanded so as to include all important nations who are at present outside it.

QUESTION¹: Why can't the European nations make the League of Nations a success without the United States?

ANSWER: I am of the opinion that the League of Nations is already a great success, and I am confident that it will grow in strength and authority. It is not, therefore, to secure the success of the League of Nations that any one desires the presence of the

¹At Boston.

United States in it. It is to increase its success. The League acts by public opinion. It is essential for its complete success that the great mass of public opinion should be represented in the League. The more of public opinion that is represented there the greater will be its prestige, and therefore as long as great nations are outside it, it must suffer in prestige and in authority from their absence. But that doesn't mean that it will not and can not accomplish a great deal, whatever happens.

FRANCE AND GERMANY

QUESTION¹: An incident occurred in the House of Commons a few weeks ago in which Lord Robert Cecil was concerned, which has aroused a great deal of interest among English and Americans on this side. They are asking why it was, when the proposal was made from the Liberal side of the House of Commons, that the present dispute in the Ruhr should be submitted to the League of Nations, Lord Robert gave his voice against that suggestion, and his reasons.

ANSWER: I am very glad indeed to explain, and I am particularly glad that my actions in the House of Commons excite so much interest over here. An amendment to the address [from the throne to Parliament], in our English procedure, amounts to a vote of want of confidence in the Government of the day; and therefore, it was essential for the Government, whatever they thought about the motion itself, to vote against it. The question I had to resolve was whether I should vote with them or vote against them. I had no doubt at all, and I stated that I had no doubt, that it was desirable that this dispute should be referred to the League of Nations at the earliest possible moment; but I thought, and I think, that when it comes to a great and critical exercise of the executive action of any country, it must be left to the executive Government of the day to decide the moment and the method by which that action may most usefully be taken. I said, therefore, that while I was in favor of the policy recommended, I could not be a party to putting the House of Commons, without the knowledge which a Government necessarily has, into the place of the executive. I regretted, I still regret, that an

¹At New York.

attempt was made, as it seems to me, to utilize the League of Nations for party purposes. I have no desire that it should ever be used for party purposes, on one side or the other, and in these circumstances I thought it was better, I thought it was my duty as a member of Parliament to give the vote I did. I am glad to remember also that in a subsequent debate, the leader of the Liberal Party, the party that proposed the amendment, expressed the view that the action I had taken was, from my point of view, perfectly right and legitimate.

QUESTION¹: Why doesn't the League of Nations step in and settle the trouble between France and Germany at the present time?

ANSWER: The League of Nations can only step in if it is asked to do so by one of its Members. I am very strongly of opinion that it is most desirable that the whole of the disputes between France and Germany, not only on the question of reparation, but on the question of the safety of France and other matters, should be referred to the League. I regret very much that it has so far been found impossible for any Member of the League to raise the question before the organs of the League. I hope to find out if I can, when I get back to Europe, why that has not been done. I think it ought to be done as soon as possible. I am satisfied, whenever it is done, a solution will be found; and I very much fear that until it is done no solution will be found.

QUESTION¹: Do you feel that the presence of the United States in the League would make it more possible to bring the question of reparation before the League?

ANSWER: If I am asked that question plainly and simply, though I refrain from anything which looks like giving advice, I can't help saying that it would undoubtedly make it much easier to deal with such questions as the Ruhr. If the United States were a Member of the Council she would be the ideal nation to bring a matter before the Council. She would speak with great influence and would be free from any interest in pressing such a question upon the consideration of the Council.

GERMANY AND RUSSIA—ADMISSION

QUESTION¹: The admission of Germany and Russia to the League.

¹At Boston.

ANSWER: I am asked what I think about the admission of Germany and Russia to the League. I am strongly in favor of the admission of Germany to the League, and as far as I am concerned I should be very glad to see Russia in the League, too, as soon as possible, but of course we are governed by Article 1, which says that a country to be admitted must show a sincere intention of observing its international obligations. Personally, I would also consider that question as weightily as I could. We want all trustworthy nations in the League because they will be of assistance in carrying out the work of peace, and I would much rather have an untrustworthy nation in the League than out of it.

PUBLICITY

QUESTION¹: As to publicity.

ANSWER: We want as much public statement of truth as it is possible to get. The provisions of the Covenant are practically that all the proceedings of the League are to take place in public; and every proceeding is recorded not only by the representatives of the press present, but an official verbatim report is kept, and every effort made to distribute as widely as possible the accounts of what takes place. We believe the League will be a great agent for publicity, but there is one other method which, I venture to suggest from my experience, is very effective. We have in my country a very large society called "The League of Nations Union," and one of its chief objects and purposes is to distribute among the common people full knowledge of all the international affairs that come before the League, including, of course, the causes of war, if any future war arises.

SIX BRITISH VOTES

QUESTION¹ regarding the six votes of Great Britain in the League.

ANSWER: I am asked to explain why Great Britain has six votes to one. The historical reason is extremely simple. The British Dominions, as you all know, fought very gallantly in the late war. They sent their own contingents, and they took rightly

¹At Boston.

a national pride in the doings of their own armies. When it came to the peace it was impossible to say that nations, if they are nations, who had fought so gallantly should not be consulted as to the terms of peace. Accordingly, they were admitted to the conference at Paris to consider what terms of peace should be made. Once admitted, it was almost impossible to say they should not become Members of the League, which was the outgrowth of the conference at Paris.

They represent, many of them, different points of view to Great Britain's. They have their own national and international interests, and it is important to have their point of view there. We do not desire to exclude any nation from the League. Therefore, it is desirable to have them there to tell us what their point of view is.

But if it is suggested that their presence adds to the general power of the British Empire then, very respectfully, I disagree. Different nations in the League undoubtedly have different degrees of influence, not because of the votes they command, because the votes are unimportant. Decisions have to be unanimous if there are decisions, and in any case the whole proceedings of the League are advisory and consultative. Therefore, it is not a question of votes, but undoubtedly the influence of the countries is greater or less, according to the position, the reputation, the riches, the power, etc., which they possess. A great country rightly has more influence than a smaller power, and the British Empire, if it spoke with one solitary voice, would have all the influence which attaches to it from its large possessions, its immense population and its very considerable wealth. It doesn't speak with one voice. It speaks with six voices, and six voices that are sometimes discordant.

POWER OF COMPULSION

QUESTION¹ in relation to the compulsory powers given the League under Article 16, and as to whether the League would consider rewriting Article 16 if the United States should decide to enter.

ANSWER: It is not, I am afraid, for me to say what is to go in or remain out of the Covenant. There are 52 nations to be con-

¹At Boston.

sulted. What I should say about that particular provision is this, that though it is true that public opinion and publicity are the great agents of the League and of human society, yet there are always some criminals in human society, and there may be some criminals among the nations. We do observe our criminal law. We do send people to prison and punish them under our jurisprudence. I think we shall have to continue to do that for some years to come, and it may be that some coercive jurisdiction, at any rate as far as Europe is concerned, is desirable.

In that case of Serbia and Albania to which I referred, one of the crucial instances was this. Serbia had actually invaded Albania. A meeting of the Council was summoned in order to consider it, and Great Britain gave notice that she would propose that economic pressure be put upon Serbia unless she withdrew her troops. Thereupon the Serbian Government sent a communication to the Council, calling attention to this announcement by one of the Members of the League (I suppose having satisfied herself that the case really was one contemplated by Article 16, and that the sanction would be put in force), and saying that in view of that "We have decided to recall our troops." It is possible she would have done it in any case. She did do it.

Her troops did no damage to Albanians in her retreat, as I recall. Surely, Albania and Serbia made friends, concluded a treaty of peace and amity, and the Serbian minister himself announced last year in my hearing from the tribune of the Assembly that the relations between the two countries are now amicable; and he attributed it largely to the action which the League had taken.

I am sure that the League would be more than ready to consider any proposition the United States should make to it. In view of that instance, I think there would be probably some difficulty in inducing, as far as Europe is concerned, a withdrawal of the powers of Article 16.

IRISH QUESTION

QUESTION¹: If the League of Nations is potent to the settlement of international disputes as Lord Robert says, why is it that the dispute between the Irish irregulars and the Free State has not been referred to it?

¹At Boston.

ANSWER: Well, the warfare in Ireland is—I have not been there—but if I may trust the reports in the papers, it is in the nature of a civil war. It is a warfare carried on unhappily by Irishmen against Irishmen. It is a matter for the deepest regret that it should go on and continue, but the League of Nations exists necessarily not to deal with internal affairs, however deplorable, however dangerous they may be. It has enough to do if it settles the affairs between the nations of the world without attempting to deal with affairs which are of a domestic and internal character. At the same time—for I want to give as full an answer as I can—at the same time, if there were any assurances given to the League of Nations that its decisions would be acceptable to the parties, I am quite sure that the League would be ready to do whatever it could to put an end to the struggles and to the incidents which all lovers of Ireland and humanity most profoundly deplore.

LORD ROBERT CECIL TO DENNIS F. RILEY

DENNIS RILEY, Esq., Secretary,
Central Council of Irish County Associations,
21 Calvin St., Somerville, Mass.

Dear Sir,—I write to thank you for your letter of April 17 concerning the League of Nations and some questions that have arisen in connection with the interpretation of the Covenant.

I will endeavor to answer your questions as satisfactorily as I can, although some of them, as you will admit, are of a highly hypothetical nature.

I think your first three questions are really part of one general question and should be dealt with together. The answer appears to me to be as follows:

The purpose of the League of Nations is to deal with questions of an international character. Minority questions are not of an international character, unless stipulations have been laid down concerning them by international treaties. Unless such treaties have been made, generally speaking, all questions concerning racial, religious and linguistic minorities fall within the domestic sovereignty of the state within whose territories the minorities are placed. For this reason, both the Irish struggle for independence and the American Revolution would, under the terms of the

Covenant, have been considered as a matter falling within the domestic relations of Great Britain and therefore outside the scope of the machinery of the League. This would mean that the Members of the League as such would not intervene, either to support or oppose the revolutionary movement. This appears to be a necessary result of the fact that the League has been created to deal with strictly international questions.

In reply to your fourth question, however, whether the League would have prohibited France from aiding the American Revolution, I think that the answer is as follows:

France, under the Covenant, could not have declared war against Great Britain without first referring her dispute to the Council or Assembly of the League. Had she taken this step, however, she would have been able to explain to the world at large, before the forum of world opinion, the reasons for which she held that the American Revolution was a matter of international importance and why she also held that the American revolutionary leaders deserved the active support of other countries. Had this procedure not succeeded in securing a specific settlement of the dispute between the American revolutionary leaders and the British Government, the French Government would, in my view, at the end of the statutory period of nine months, during which, under the Covenant, the mediation of the League is to be exercised, have had the right to declare war on Great Britain in support of the American Revolution, unless all the disinterested Members of the Council of the League had been unanimously against her contention that the question was one of international importance. If France had been able to secure the support of one single disinterested Member of the Council, she would have been free, in my view, to take any action she thought right to support the American Revolution.

The reply to your question concerning the separation of Cuba from Spain in 1898 appears to me to be the same as that which I have just given.

In reply to your last question, I think it most important that the League of Nations should become universal at the earliest possible moment and that it should include even countries which have shown themselves in the past to have been in bad faith in the interpretation of international treaties, provided they are now

willing to give assurances of their determination to observe their obligations in the future.

Yours very truly,

ROBERT CECIL.

THE OPIUM QUESTION

STEPHEN G. PORTER TO LORD ROBERT CECIL

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1923.

Lord ROBERT CECIL,
Care Hon. Henry White,
1624 Crescent Place,
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Lord Cecil,—On my return to Washington I was handed a letter from Mrs. Oliver Strachey dated March 31st, 1923, stating—

“Lord Robert Cecil asks me to tell you how much he hopes it may be possible for him to see you while in Washington. He is anxious to talk with you, particularly upon the question of restrictions upon opium and other drugs, upon which subject he feels that conversation with you would be very helpful to him.”

On April 18th I received a letter from Mrs. John J. Moorhead, Secretary of the Opium Committee, Foreign Policy Association, stating that you are keeping Saturday morning, April 21st, at 12 o'clock for a talk with me regarding the League of Nations Opium Commission, followed by a telegram from Mrs. Moorhead requesting a confirmation of the appointment.

In reply to your request I am inclosing herewith House Joint Resolution 453, the hearings thereon, and the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives. The resolution was passed in the House on February 26, 1923, and in the Senate on March 1—in both instances by a unanimous vote—and was signed by the President on March 2, 1923.¹

The resolution, hearings and report clearly show that the Congress is firmly convinced, by reason of the extraordinary nature of these drugs, that the only effective remedy for this

¹The resolution as approved by the President is printed as an annex to this letter.

appalling international affliction, which is increasing and spreading to an alarming degree, is the limitation of production of the raw materials—opium and coca leaves—to the quantity needed only for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes.

I am confident that these documents will give you the information which you desire in a much more satisfactory and permanent form than an informal conversation with me.

In the *International Interpreter*, reprinted by permission in the *New York Times* of March 11, 1923, there was a signed article by you claiming a great many accomplishments by the League of Nations. Among other things you said:

“It [the League] has struck vigorous blows at the world evils like . . . the sale of opium, cocaine and other noxious drugs.”

As the author of the resolution, I am not willing that this erroneous statement should pass unnoticed, as the League of Nations, instead of suppressing the traffic in habit-forming drugs, did quite the contrary. The official record of the proceedings of the League on file in the State Department in Washington, with which I assume you are entirely familiar, discloses the following indisputable facts:

Under Article 23 of the treaty of Versailles the execution of the treaty of The Hague (opium treaty) was delegated to the League of Nations, the Council of which appointed an opium advisory committee of nine, representing certain nations, and three advisers or assessors, who were appointed by the Council irrespective of nationality. These were Sir John Jordan, M. Henri Brenier and Mrs. Hamilton Wright.

At the meeting held in June, 1921, upon motion of Wellington Koo, the Chinese representative on the Opium Advisory Committee, a resolution was adopted recommending the reduction and restriction of the cultivation of the poppy and the production of opium therefrom to strictly medicinal and scientific purposes.

The Koo resolution was ratified by the Council of the League of Nations, which recommended its adoption by the Assembly of the League. The Assembly is composed of a representative from each nation which is a Member of the League of Nations.

At the meeting of the Assembly of the League held on October 10, 1921, the Assembly recommended that the words “strictly medicinal and scientific” be stricken out and the word “legitimate” be sub-

stituted in lieu thereof, on the statement of the Indian delegate, Mr. Sastri, "that the Indian population is throughout vast areas without adequate medical assistance and, therefore, habitually takes opium in small doses as a prophylactic or as an effective remedy against disease with which some of these regions are constantly infected."

The uses of opium enumerated by Mr. Sastri in his argument in favor of the amendment are clearly medicinal, and, therefore, there was no necessity for the amendment; further, anyone of average intelligence knows that opium is not a prophylactic or preventive of any disease, especially the fevers which occur in tropical countries. Mr. Sastri's statement regarding the "small doses" habitually taken by the people of India should arouse curiosity as to how much in his opinion a large dose would be, as the official record of the British India Government shows the people of India consumed 532 tons of opium in 1919.

It is perfectly obvious that the striking out of the specific words "strictly medicinal and scientific" and the substitution in lieu thereof of the general word "legitimate" was intended to legitimize and thereby continue to encourage the sale of large quantities of this drug without restrictions on its use, which is "legitimate" in the Oriental possessions of many European countries, and thereby preserve the enormous and immoral revenues which the opium-producing countries derive from its production and sale.

Mrs. Hamilton Wright of the United States, one of the advisers and assessors of the Opium Advisory Committee of the League of Nations, suggests the following in connection with the amendment:

"If the eating of opium is legitimate, it must follow that its cultivation is legitimate. If it is legitimate for the Indian to consume opium, why not the Chinese? And, to go a step further, if it is a legitimate thing for the Oriental, why not for the Occidental? . . . If opium is a good thing, why are there any regulations at all? But if it is an evil thing, real regulation means suppression or restriction of cultivation to its legitimate medicinal need."

All the authorities agree that the Oriental suffers the same harmful effects as the Occidental. The reaction to the drugs is the same. The only real difference lies in the Orientals' helplessness to protect themselves from the traffic.

In the face of this official action of the League may I most respectfully state that your signed article claiming that the League of Nations "has struck vigorous blows at world evils, like the sale of opium, cocaine and other noxious drugs," is wholly without the facts to support it, and that, instead of striking "vigorous blows" at the evil, it legitimized and thereby encouraged it.

Moreover, may I call your attention to Article 19¹ of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provides that, as to certain colonies and territories "which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in" the constitution of the League.

In view of the express recognition of the legitimacy of the opium traffic in certain parts of the world by the Sastri amendment, I am indeed curious to know how the League intends to discharge, so far as the opium traffic is concerned, "the sacred trust of civilization for the well-being and development of people not yet able to stand by themselves."

If I visited Great Britain making addresses in support of the policies of your minority party, these policies being highly beneficial to my own country, and made any erroneous statements of fact, you would be fully justified in correcting the misapprehension which my public utterances had created, and by this letter I am availing myself of a like privilege.

Your erroneous statements as to what the League of Nations has accomplished, coupled with your advocacy of the League, permits the inference that the United States, by refusing to become a member thereof, is not only indifferent but opposed to the suppression of this deadly traffic. As a matter of fact, the United States, without regard to revenue, has always pursued a program designed to suppress the illicit traffic in habit-forming narcotic drugs, and I earnestly trust that the nation of which you are a very distinguished citizen will ere long adopt the same policy and thereby further cement the ties of friendship which now exist between our respective countries.

By the unanimous action of Congress, supported by the most virile public sentiment I have ever known, the United States has

¹Article 22 is referred to.

taken the lead in a world-wide movement for the destruction of this great international affliction. By reason of its nonmembership in the League, it is not bound by the official action of the League to which I have referred, and is therefore free and untrammelled in its humanitarian efforts.

And may I not hope, earnestly hope, that you will urge upon your Government the adoption of the policy of suppression of the traffic without regard to revenue? And may I not also hope you will urge your Government to disregard the findings of fact of your royal commission of 1893, appointed to investigate the opium traffic in the possessions of the British Empire, which, unfortunately, states among other things: "As regards the general physical and moral effects of the use of opium, the commission found that hard work, energy and thrift existed side by side with the opium habit. . . . They were of the opinion that the opium habit did not lead to insanity, crime or suicide . . . and it would be impracticable to issue opium only upon the prescription of medical practitioners."

It is the duty of the two great English-speaking nations to join in a common and wholehearted effort to eradicate the illicit international traffic in these insidious drugs, so that their use, which De Quincey spoke of as having the "keys to paradise, but which opened at last the doors of perdition," shall be strictly confined to the human purposes for which nature intended them—the alleviation of human suffering.

I am, my dear Lord Cecil,

Very sincerely yours,

STEPHEN G. PORTER.

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION—No. 96—67TH CONGRESS.]

[H. J. Res. 453.]

Joint Resolution Requesting the President to urge upon the governments of certain nations the immediate necessity of limiting the production of habit-forming narcotic drugs and the raw materials from which they are made to the amount actually required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes.

Whereas the unlawful use in the United States of America of opium (the coagulated juice of *Papaver somniferum*) and its derivatives (morphia, codeine,

heroin), and cocaine (obtained from coca leaves—*Erythroxylum coca*) and other preparations made from these plants or their by-products, with attendant irreparable injury to health and morality and resultant death from continued use, is increasing and spreading; and

Whereas the special committee of investigation of traffic in narcotic drugs appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, in its report dated April 15, 1919, having considered the secrecy connected with the unlawful sale and use of these drugs, and the other difficulties in obtaining information which would give the exact number of addicts in the United States, says: "The committee is of the opinion that the total number of addicts in this country probably exceeds one million at the present time," and further says that "the range of ages of addicts was reported as twelve to seventy-five years. The large majority of addicts of all ages was reported as using morphine or opium or its preparations. * * *

Most of the heroin addicts are comparatively young, a portion of them being boys and girls under the age of twenty. This is also true of cocaine addicts," and as this report is in harmony with the opinion of many who have carefully investigated the subject; and

Whereas the annual production of opium is approximately one thousand five hundred tons, of which approximately one hundred tons, according to the best available information, is sufficient for the world's medicinal and scientific needs, and the growth of coca leaves is likewise greatly in excess of what is required for the same needs, and thus vast quantities of each are available for the manufacture of habit-forming narcotic drugs for illicit sale and consumption; and

Whereas opium is obtained in paying quantities from poppies cultivated in small areas of India, Persia, and Turkey, where the soil and climate are peculiarly adapted to the production of poppies containing opium rich in morphia, codeine, and other narcotic derivatives; and

Whereas in Persia and Turkey the growth of the poppy and the production of opium therefrom, resulting in large revenues to those respective governments, is controllable by virtue of their sovereign power to limit the exportation thereof and to restrict production to the quantity actually required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes; and

Whereas the British Government in India, which derives large revenues from the growth of the poppy and the production of opium therefrom, has full power to limit production to the amount actually required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes; and

Whereas the production of coca leaves (*Erythroxylum coca*) is limited to certain areas of Peru and Bolivia and the Netherlands possession of Java, and their production is controllable by virtue of the sovereign power of those Governments to limit the exportation thereof and to restrict production to the quantities actually required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes; and

Whereas the antinarcotic laws of a majority of the larger nations of the world provide severe penalties for dispensing habit-forming narcotic drugs without a record of the amount thereof dispensed, thus providing reliable data from which a reasonably accurate calculation can be made of the amount of these drugs needed for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes; and

Whereas on January 23, 1912, as the result of the meeting of the International Opium Commission at Shanghai, China, in 1909, and the conference at The

Hague in 1912, a treaty was made between the United States of America and other powers which was intended to suppress the illicit traffic in habit-forming narcotic drugs, and notwithstanding that upward of seven years have passed since its ratification, the treaty and the laws in pursuance thereof subsequently adopted by the contracting powers have utterly failed to suppress such illicit traffic, by reason of the fact that the treaty attempted to regulate the transportation and sale of these drugs without adequate restriction upon production, the source or root of the evil; and

Whereas failure of such treaty and the laws adopted in pursuance thereof to provide adequate restrictions upon production has resulted in extensive and flagrant violations of the laws by reason of the fact that the great commercial value of these drugs, the large financial gains derived from handling them, and the smallness of their bulk, which renders detection in transportation and sale exceedingly difficult, have induced and encouraged the unscrupulous to divert enormous quantities into the channels of illicit international traffic, thereby rendering partially, if not wholly, ineffective the treaty and the laws adopted in pursuance thereof; and

Whereas in June, 1921, the opium advisory committee of the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution urging the restriction of the cultivation of the poppy and the production of opium therefrom to "strictly medicinal and scientific" purposes, which resolution was approved by the Council of the league but when said resolution was presented for final approval to the Assembly of the league, which is composed of a representative from each nation which is a member thereof, it was amended by striking out the words "strictly medicinal and scientific" and substituting the word "legitimate" in lieu thereof; and

Whereas the substitution of the general word "legitimate" for the specific words "medicinal and scientific" permits the continuance of the sale of enormous quantities of opium and its derivatives in many sections of the Orient by the opium producers of India, Turkey, and Persia, where it is "legitimate" to sell and transport these drugs in unrestricted quantities regardless of their ultimate use by the purchaser; and

Whereas the continuance of the sale and transportation of such drugs, without restriction on their use, results in the diversion of large quantities thereof into the channels of illegal international traffic and in the unlawful importation into the United States, and the sale here for unlawful purposes, of preparations made therefrom such as morphia, heroin, and cocaine; and

Whereas the United States of America, in dealing with the traffic in habit-forming narcotic drugs within its own territory and possessions, notably in the Philippine Islands, and in cooperating sympathetically with the efforts of the Government of China in dealing with its opium problem, has always been committed, without regard to revenue, to a program for the complete suppression and prohibition of the production of and traffic in them, except for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes; Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the imperative duty of the United States Government to safeguard its people from the persistent ravages of habit-forming narcotic drugs.

SEC. 2. That the effective control of these drugs can be obtained only by limiting the production thereof to the quantity required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes, thus eradicating the source or root of the present conditions, which are solely due to production many times greater than is necessary for such purposes.

SEC. 3. That in the hope of accomplishing this end, the President be, and he hereby is, requested to urge upon the Governments of Great Britain, Persia, and Turkey the immediate necessity of limiting the growth of the poppy (*Papaver somniferum*) and the production of opium and its derivatives exclusively to the amount actually required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes.

SEC. 4. That the President be, and he hereby is, requested to urge upon the Governments of Peru, Bolivia, and the Netherlands the immediate necessity of limiting the production of coca leaves (*Erythroxylum coca*) and their derivatives to the quantity exclusively required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes.

SEC. 5. That the President be, and he hereby is, requested to report to Congress on the first Monday in December, 1923, the result of his action.

Approved, March 2, 1923.

LORD ROBERT CECIL TO MR. PORTER

107 EAST SEVENTIETH STREET, NEW YORK, April 23, 1923.

My dear Mr. Porter,—I write to thank you for your letter of April 21 in which you are good enough to explain to me your views concerning the work of the League of Nations in connection with the traffic in opium and dangerous drugs.

I entirely agree with you as to the evils of the traffic in opium and other similar drugs, and though I have no right to speak for my Government I can assure you that they take the same view on the subject most thoroughly. Indeed, if you will allow me to say so, no country or people can claim a monopoly of virtue in this respect.

You criticise my statement that "the League has struck vigorous blows at this trade." Nevertheless I adhere to that expression without qualification. International action against the opium traffic rests on the convention of 1912, which provides for the gradual but complete suppression within the territory of each signatory of the abuse of prepared opium and its derivatives. That is the only international convention in force. The League has not recommended any weakening of its terms. On the contrary, it has successfully urged considerable extension of the number of states who have signed it, including 51 out of its 52 Members. Persia, the remaining Member, is now considering its adoption.

The main difficulty in dealing with the suppression of the abuse of opium, in countries which have accepted the convention, is the smuggling traffic, and the League has recommended that in order to deal with this no import or export of the drug to or from any country shall be allowed for any purpose whatever except under governmental license of the export and import countries. This system has already been adopted by nearly 40 Members of the League.

It has further put in operation a system for the exchange of information concerning the activities of smugglers between the various countries, which in the few months it has been in operation has led to the suppression of some large-scale agents of the illicit trade; and in this connection the Members of the League have undertaken to supply full annual reports as to production, import, export and consumption of drugs within their territories and concerning their oppressive measures.

Investigation on the subject, however, convinced the expert advisers of the League that it would be impossible adequately to cope with the smuggling of an article so easily concealed as a drug, unless there was established a world control over the production of opium. This was, of course, an entirely new line of attack, but one which I believe all sincere enemies of the traffic have since agreed to regard as the only really effective way of dealing with the matter.

To limit production so as to destroy the supply for the abusive use of the drug, it is necessary to inquire what is the world consumption of the drug that is not abusive, and it was in drafting the instructions for this inquiry that the word "legitimate," to which you refer, was used. I was present at the debate of the Assembly when the amendment was made, and I am quite sure that none of those there intended to give any countenance, direct or indirect, to the use of the drug for any improper purposes; indeed, it would be an insult to the 40 or 50 states who took part in the discussion to make such a suggestion or in any way to imply that they "legitimized, and thereby encouraged," the evil. The word "legitimate" was simply used as giving to the committee charged with the investigation the power of framing a definition of the exact scope of the inquiry into the nonabusive use of the drug. It was felt that while "medicinal and scientific"

did indicate the only purpose which the members of the Assembly could countenance, it might be possible to find some definition which would more accurately express the meaning which we all desired.

I venture to think that M. Sastri, who is, as no doubt you know, the representative of progressive thought in India and is as little likely as any man in the world to desire maintenance of the abuse of opium in that country, expressed the view, as I understood him, that "medicinal" might exclude genuine medical use of the drug which was not authorized by a regular physician, an authorization which was not always possible to obtain in certain of the wilder parts of India. As a matter of fact, I understand the committee charged with the investigation has in fact reverted to the use of the words "medicinal and scientific," being unable to find any others which better express the universal desire on the subject.

To sum up: The League has recommended successfully the extension of the existing convention for dealing with the traffic in opium. It has induced many countries to set up machinery in support of this convention, and it has done a good deal to organize a world crusade against smugglers and other illicit dealers in opium. These seem to me important steps, and would by themselves justify the expression that the "League has struck vigorous blows at this dangerous trade."

But in effect the League has gone further. It has, through its Advisory Committee, on which a very distinguished American citizen sits, taken the entirely new step of trying to limit world production of opium, which is no doubt the only fundamental way of dealing with the evil. I do not in any way complain of the difficulty which even so sincere an inquirer as yourself has found in following from outside exactly what the League has done, but I venture respectfully to suggest to you that the misapprehension into which you have fallen goes far to justify my efforts, not to propose any change in the policy of the United States Government in this or any other matter, but to give information as to what the League is actually doing.

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT CECIL.

The Hon. STEPHEN G. PORTER, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.