



**GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION  
(COMMISSION OF RAILWAY SAFETY)**

# **RAILWAY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT**

**ON**

**COLLISION BETWEEN 9 AK PASSENGER TRAIN WITH  
BUS NO. P B A - 7883 AT MANNED LEVEL CROSSING NO. 30-B  
BETWEEN JANDOKE AND TARN TARAN STATIONS  
ON KHEM-KARAN—AMRITSAR SECTION  
OF NORTHERN RAILWAY**

**ON**

**11-9-1982**

**Collision of 9 AK Passenger train with Bus no. PBA 7883 at level crossing no. 30 (B class) between Jandoke and Tarn Taran stations on Khem Karan-Amritsar section of Northern Railway.**

**SUMMARY**

1. Date . . . . .	11-9-1982.
2. Time . . . . .	22.55 hrs.
3. Railway . . . . .	Northern
4. Gauge . . . . .	Broad Gauge (1676 mm).
5. Location . . . . .	Km. 24/13-14
6. Nature of accident . . . . .	Collision at level crossing.
7. Train involved . . . . .	9 AK passenger train
8. Speed . . . . .	54 kmph.
9. System of operation . . . . .	Absolute Block System.
10. Number of tracks . . . . .	Single line.
11. Gradient . . . . .	Level.
12. Alignment . . . . .	Straight but with a half degree left hand curve terminating at 86.20 metres from the centre of the level crossing.
13. Weather . . . . .	Clear
14. Visibility . . . . .	Normal under the headlights of the locomotive.
15. Casualties . . . . .	Killed—34 Injured—21 (Grievous 20) (Simple 1)
16. Cause . . . . .	Level crossing gates not having been closed in the face of an approaching train.
17. Persons held responsible . . . . .	Gateman on duty at level crossing No. 30-B.
18. Summary of recommendations . . . . .	(i) Level crossing to be protected by gate signals interlocked with station reception signals. (ii) Working instructions for level crossings should be correctly prepared on the basis of facilities actually provided. (iii) Proper registers for recording transactions between the station and the level crossing should be provided.

**ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT.**

C.T.S.S. . . . .	Chief Traffic Safety Superintendent.
D.R.M. . . . .	Divisional Railway Manager.
A.E.N. . . . .	Assistant Engineer.
A.T.S. . . . .	Assistant Traffic Superintendent.
S.M. . . . .	Station Master.
A.S.M. . . . .	Assistant Station Master.
P.W.I. . . . .	Permanent Way Inspector.
G.R. . . . .	General Rule.
T.I. . . . .	Traffic Inspector.
G.R.P. . . . .	Government Railway Police.
A.S.I. . . . .	Asstt. Sub-Inspector of Police.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
MINISTRY OF TOURISM & CIVIL AVIATION  
(COMMISSION OF RLY. SAFETY)

From :

Commissioner of Rly. Safety,  
Northern Circle,  
Lucknow.

To :

The Secretary,  
Ministry of Tourism & Civil Aviation,  
Govt. of India,  
New Delhi.

Through : *Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety, Lucknow.*

Sir,

In accordance with Rule 4 of the Statutory Investigation into Railway Accidents Rules, 1973 issued by the Ministry of Tourism & Civil Aviation vide notification No. RS. 13-T(8)/71 dated 19-4-1973, I have the honour to submit herewith my Report on the inquiry into the Collision of 9 AK passenger train with motor bus No. PBA-7883 at level crossing No. 30 (B class) at km. 24/13-14 between Jandoke and Tarn Taran stations on Khem Karan-Amritsar section of Firozpur Division on Northern Railway at about 22.55 hrs. on 11-9-1982.

### 1.2 *Inspection and Inquiry*

1.2.1 The site of accident was inspected by me on 14-9-1982 in the company of Shri N. P. Varma, Chief Traffic Safety Supdt., Shri K. M. Sharan, Chief Bridge Engineer, Shri S. N. Kashyap, Addl. Chief Engineer all from Headquarter office and Shri D. P. Joshi, Divisional Railway Manager, Firozpur and other railway officers. The affected rolling stock was also inspected later in Amritsar.

1.2.2 A press notification was issued inviting any member of the public having knowledge relating to the accident to give evidence at the inquiry or to communicate with me by post.

1.2.3 The Civil and police authorities were advised by the railway about the inquiry which was held by me at Amritsar on 14th and 15th September 1982 but no representative from their side attended the inquiry. The evidence of some further witnesses was recorded on 21-10-1982 and 24-1-1983.

1.2.4 The following officers were present at the inquiry :—

- (i) Shri N. P. Varma, Chief Traffic Safety, Supdt., Northern Railway, New Delhi (on all days).
- (ii) Shri K. M. Sharan, Chief Bridge, Engineer, Northern Railway, New Delhi (on 14 & 15 Sept. and 21 October, 1982).
- (iii) Shri S. N. Kashyap, Addl. Chief Engineer, Northern Railway, New Delhi (on 14 & 15 Sept. 1982).
- (iv) Shri D. P. Joshi, Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway, Firozpur (on 14, 15 Sept., and 21 October 1982).

Other railway officers were available and called when necessary.

1.2.5 The evidence of 47 witnesses in all was recorded on different dates in September and October 1982 and January 1983. Some of the injured bus passengers, who were visited by me in the hospital, gave statements which were recorded but they did not agree to sign the same.

1.2.6 In this report :—

- (i) The terms 'right/left', 'front/rear' and 'leading/trailing' wherever used are with reference to the direction of travel of 9 AK passenger train i.e. from Khem Karan towards Amritsar.

- (ii) The expression '9 AK' wherever used is with reference to 9 AK Up passenger train which left Khem Karan for Amritsar at 21.20 hrs. on 11-9-1982 and was approaching Tarn Taran station when the accident occurred.

### 1.3 The accident

1.3.1 At about 22.30 hrs. on 11-9-1982, Jandoke station sought line clear from Tarn Taran for 9 AK passenger which was duly granted at 22.32 hrs. At 22.45 hrs. the ASM/Tarn Taran telephonically advised the gateman of level crossing No. 30 (B class) regarding line clear having been granted for 9 AK passenger, duly supported by his private no. The gateman stated that he simultaneously acknowledged receipt of the advice by giving his private number whereas the A.S.M. has stated that the gateman gave his private number a few minutes later as an assurance of his having closed the level crossing gates.

1.3.2 The train left Jandoke station at 22.45 hrs. and the 'Train entering section' signal was acknowledged by Tarn Taran at 22.47 hrs. The ASM/Tarn Taran then took steps for lowering the reception signals for the train. While the train was nearing Tarn Taran, it collided with a Punjab Roadways Bus No. PBA 7883 at level crossing No. 30 (B class) located in the block section at a distance of 460 metres beyond the Up outer signal of Tarn Taran. As a result of the collision, the bus was badly damaged and got entangled with the train engine, and got dragged for a distance of about 250.60 metres. After the collision, the train came to a stop with its rear end about 130 metres from the level crossing.

1.3.3 The bus was on its way from Amritsar to Bhatinda and formed part of a convoy of eight buses carrying people arrested in a political agitation at Amritsar. The ill-fated bus was the third bus from the head of the convoy. The buses were being escorted by police personnel from Amritsar.

1.3.4 The weather was clear and the visibility normal under the head-light of the train engine at the time of the accident. The head-light of the engine was in working order. Due to a left hand curve in the railway alignment on the approach from Jandoke side and on account of structures and trees on either side, the visibility of the level crossing from the approaching train was severely restricted. Similarly, any road vehicle could not sight any approaching train until the road vehicle almost reached the level crossing.

### 1.4 Casualties

As a result of the accident, 34 persons died, 20 received grievous injuries and one received simple injuries. The casualties were all amongst those travelling by the bus.

### 1.5 Passenger occupation

It was estimated that only about 25 to 30 persons were travelling in the train against a seating capacity of 320 when the accident occurred.

## 2.0 RELIEF MEASURES

### 2.1 Intimation

The first information regarding the occurrence of the accident was received by the ASM on duty at Tarn Taran from the Gateman of the level crossing No. 30 on telephone shortly after 23.00 hrs. The ASM immediately advised the Control office at Amritsar. At 23.15 hrs., the Guard of 9 AK conveyed detailed information of the accident on the portable control phone to Amritsar Control from where information was conveyed to all concerned. The local civil authorities were advised by the Station Master, Tarn Taran who reached the station at about 23.17 hrs.

### 2.2 Medical attention and relief

2.2.1 The injured were given first-aid by the Station Master, Tarn Taran and the local police authorities who reached the site of accident at about 23.30 hrs. The passengers travelling in the other buses following the ill-fated bus also assisted the injured. One of the injured was admitted in the Civil Hospital at Tarn Taran at about 23.30 hrs. and another 20 injured persons were taken by road by the police authorities to the S.G.T.B. Hospital, Amritsar where they were admitted by 03.30 hrs. The injured person who had been admitted in the Civil Hospital, Tarn Taran was later shifted to the S.G.T.B. Hospital, Amritsar on 14-9-1982.

2.2.2 I visited the S.G.T.B. Hospital at Amritsar on 14-9-1982 where 21 patients (20 with grievous injuries and one with simple injuries) were still under treatment. They were receiving due care and attention.

2.2.3 The railway authorities made ex-gratia payment to the next of kin of the deceased who could be located and to those injured in the accident.

### 2.3 Restoration

As a result of the accident, no train was cancelled but two trains were delayed. The section was cleared for through traffic at 05.00 hrs. on 12-9-1982.

### 3.0 COMPOSITION OF TRAIN AND DAMAGE

3.1.9 AK passenger train was hauled by a steam engine No. 24427 HPS/2 and had a load of 5 coaches.

3.1.1 Engine No. 24427 HPS/2, which was commissioned in 1960, had undergone/POH on 8-4-1982 after which it had covered 26653 kms. It had its last

trip inspection at Amritsar on 11-9-1982. The engine and tender were provided with vacuum brakes which were in working order. The head-lights and the speedometer fitted on the engine were also in working order.

3.1.2 The composition of 9 AK passenger train in marshalling order behind the engine was as under :—

Position behind engine	Coach number	Type of coach	Year built	Return date
1.	NR 4207 GS	IRS steel body	1953	9/82
2.	NR 2226 SPPH	IRS wooden body	1959	3/83
3.	NR 5143 LR	Do	1926	7/83
4.	NR 10165 GS	IRS steel body	1953	2/83
5.	NR 9025 GS	BEML (steel body)	1963	3/83

3.1.3 The length and weight of the train, excluding the engine, were 109.71 metres and 213.5 tonnes respectively. The train was equipped with vacuum brakes with all cylinders active. As per vacuum brake certificate No. 419999 dated 11-9-1982 issued by the Head Train Examiner, Amritsar, the vacuum in the engine and the Guard's van was 45 cm and 40 cm respectively.

### 3.2 Damage

3.2.1 As a result of the accident, the cowcatcher and the buffer beam of the engine got bent and the buffer beam gussets gave way. No damage was caused to the coaches of the train or any other railway assets.

3.2.2 The bus was badly damaged as a result of the collision.

3.2.3 The cost of damage to the railway assets was roughly assessed as Rs. 1975.00

### 4.0 LOCAL FEATURES

4.1 Level crossing No. 30 (B class), on the main road from Amritsar to Firozpur is located at 24/13-14 in the block section between Jandoke and Tarn Taran stations on the Khem Karan-Amritsar section of Firozpur Division. The normal position of gates is 'open' to road traffic. The level crossing is connected by a magneto telephone with Tarn Taran station. According to the Station Working Rules, the Station Master on duty is required to advise the gateman about the movement of any Up train about 10 minutes before the expected time of arrival duly supported by his private number. After receipt of advice, the gateman is required to close and lock the gate against road traffic and

confirm the same on telephone to the Station Master on duty supported by his private number.

4.2 Amritsar-Khem Karan section is provided with 'B' class stations with Standard-I signalling. The trains in the section are worked on the Absolute Block System. Tarn Taran station is provided with an Outer signal and a bracketed Home signal for reception of trains, and Starter and Advanced starter signals for the departure of the trains. Permission to approach for trains is granted on Neal's type ball token instruments which are interlocked with the last stop signals. The ball token and the lowering of the last stop signal is the authority for a train departing from Tarn Taran to enter the block section.

4.3 There are two 'C' class non-interlocked level crossings Nos. 27 and 28 situated between the Home signal and the Advanced Starter signal at the Amritsar and Khem Karan end respectively of Tarn Taran station yard. The normal position of both these level crossings is 'open' to road traffic, and they are closed for the passage of trains by the Pointsman on duty as detailed in the Station Working Rules.

4.4 There is a 'B' class interlocked level crossing No. 29, manned by 2 gatemen in 12-hour shifts, located between the Down Advanced Starter and Up Outer signal at the Khem Karan end of Tarn Taran station yard. The normal position of the gate is 'open' to road traffic and it is closed by the gateman on duty for reception/departure of trains. Whenever any movement is to take place, the Station Master on duty informs the gateman on telephone, who then clears the level crossing of any obstruction and closes and locks the gates against road traffic.

The key released from the gate leaf is inserted in a two lever ground frame. On pulling the lever, the slot is released for the lowering of the Down Advanced starter or the Up Outer signal, as the case may be. The gateman also confirms the action taken by him to the Station Master on telephone.

4.5 The railway alignment at the site of accident runs from South to North and has a half degree curve of length 1185 metres on the approach of the level crossing No. 30. The curve ends with its tangent point at a distance of 68.20 metres from the centre of the level crossing. A whistle board for an Up train is fixed at a distance of 800 metres from the centre of level crossing No. 30. Due to trees and building structures on either side of the level crossing and the railway alignment, the Driver of an approaching train cannot sight any road vehicle approaching or passing the level crossing until the train comes very close to the level crossing.

4.6 The permanent way in the section consists of 75 lbs rails laid on wooden sleepers with M+4 sleeper density. The track is stone, ballasted with a cushion of 75 mm. The height of bank at the site of accident is about 1.14 metres.

4.7 The kilometreage of the stations referred to in the report as reckoned from Amritsar are as under :—

	<i>Kms.</i>
Tarn Taran	23.23
Site of accident	24/13-14
Jandoke	33.25
Patti	43.74
Khem Karan	77.27

(There are 15-16 telegraph posts on an average in each kilometre).

4.8 Khem Karan-Amritsar is a controlled section with the control office located at Amritsar and the Divisional Headquarters at Firozpur. The maximum permissible speed and the booked speed of trains in the section is 60 kmph and 54 kmph respectively. Trains are permitted to run through over the main line of Tarn Taran at a speed not exceeding 45 kmph. There was no permanent or temporary speed restriction in force in the vicinity on the day of the accident.

## 5.0 SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

5.1 *Shri Gian Chand*, Driver of 9 AK passenger, (witness No. 1) stated that as his train was approaching level crossing No. 30-B between Jandoke and

Tarn Taran, a bus entered the level crossing from Tarn Taran side (i.e. left side) and collided with the train. The head light of the engine was on and he was sounding the train whistle from some distance.

Answering questions, he stated that—

- (i) The head light of the train engine was properly focused and he could clearly see upto a distance of about 275 and 300 metres;
- (ii) The brake power of the train was satisfactory and according to the vacuum brake power certificate issued to him, the vacuum in the engine was 45 cms;
- (iii) The weather was clear and the visibility was good but on account of a curve in the railway alignment, the level crossing was not visible from a distance. On account of buildings and trees on either side, it was also not possible to sight any road vehicles approaching the level crossing;
- (iv) He did not observe any other buses crossing the level crossing ahead of the one with which his train collided;
- (v) The gates of the level crossing were open and he did not find the gateman anywhere. The gate lamps were, however, duly lit.
- (vi) After the accident, some more buses had stopped on the left side (Amritsar side) of the level crossing but he did not notice any bus on the right side (Firozpur side) of the gate;
- (vii) He did not notice any lights provided near the level crossing nor did he notice any shops in the neighbourhood;
- (viii) He had started sounding the whistle even before he passed the whistle board provided for the purpose on the approach of the level crossing;
- (ix) The bus entered the level crossing when the train engine was only about 15 feet away;
- (x) On other occasions when working on this section, he had normally found the gate closed when the train passed the level crossing.

5.2 *Shri Janak Raj*, Fireman of 9 AK passenger (witness No. 2) generally corroborated what the driver of his train had stated.

5.3 *Shri R. K. Misra, Guard of 9 AK passenger* (witness No. 4) felt a sudden jerk with a drop in vacuum as his train passed level crossing No. 30B between Jandoke and Tarn Taran. He became aware of the collision after the train stopped. He advised Amritsar control of the accident on the portable control phone.

Answering questions, he stated that—

- (i) When he reached the level crossing after the accident he found the gates open but gate lamps were properly lit. He did not find the gateman anywhere;
- (ii) He heard some people saying that the gates were open but some others were saying that they were got opened forcibly. He could not, however, identify these people;
- (iii) He did not notice the position of locks on the gates.

5.4 *Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman of level crossing no. 30* (witness no. 5) stated that he received advice from the ASM on duty at Tarn Taran at 22.45 hrs. regarding lines clear having been granted to Jandoke for 9 AK passenger for which they exchanged private numbers. He closed the level crossing gates about 10 minutes after being advised. Immediately after closing the gates, two buses came from Amritsar side and two policemen alongwith three other persons came to him and told him that no train was visible and that the gates had been closed by him without any reason. They snatched the keys of level crossing as also the hand signal lamp from him, and while two men forcibly held him, the others opened the gates. After two buses had crossed the level crossing, the third bus which was coming at considerable speed, was hit by the train. He had attempted to release himself from the men who were holding him when he saw the train but he could not free himself. He was released only when the train had almost reached the level crossing. Two or three other buses reached the level crossing after the accident. Immediately after the collision, he conveyed information about the accident to the ASM and also told him that he had closed the gates but that he was forced to part with the keys and the gates were opened forcibly. As he feared being assaulted, he ran away from the level crossing and when he reached the station, he told the ASM how the accident had occurred. Thereafter, he hid himself and reached Amritsar the next day.

Answering questions, he stated that —

(i) The head light of the train engine was on and the whistle was being sounded. He had pointed out

the approaching train to the men who were holding him but they thought that the bus would be able to cross before the arrival of the train;

(ii) He could not say as to whether the two police men, who had snatched the keys from him, left by the bus which went across the level crossing;

(iii) He normally closed the gates about 10 minutes after receiving the advice of any Up train from the ASM, Tarn Taran. The advice is normally conveyed to him about 30 to 40 minutes before the expected arrival of the train;

(iv) The gate lamps were duly fixed in XX position and were properly lit;

(v) The first and second buses had stopped at the gate since it was closed but they went across after the gates were forcibly opened by the policemen and the other people accompanying them. The two men had caught hold of him did not get into the buses which went across the level crossing. He could neither identify them nor could he clarify as to why they had caught hold of him if they were not travelling by the buses which crossed the level crossing;

(vi) No instructions were given to the two men by the policemen;

(vii) Regarding the statement of the ASM that he made no mention of his being held or of the keys having been snatched from him to open the gates, he stated that he 'must have said so' and that the ASM may not have heard him properly.

(viii) He was released by the men holding him when the train had almost reached the level crossing;

(ix) He could not identify the policemen or the other men who had caught him. He did not receive any injury nor any damage to his clothes in his struggle to release himself from the grip of the men holding him;

(x) He denied that the gates were open when the buses reached the level crossing as stated by some witnesses;

*The witness was recalled for cross-examination on 21-10-1982 when he stated as under :—*

(xi) He gave his private number to the ASM, Tarn Taran as soon as the ASM advised him that he had granted line clear for 9 AK passenger. The gate was closed by him about 10 minutes later;

(xii) He was held by the police-men in uniform but he could not identify them;

(xiii) The policemen who had caught hold of him did not get into the buses which passed the level

crossing. He did not observe how and where they went after they released him.

(xiv) Although the ASM, Tarn Taran had stated that the gateman did not mention to him about his having been held by the policemen but the gateman stated that he had advised these facts to the ASM on the telephone as also when he subsequently reached the station;

(xv) He could not clarify as to why he should have been held by the men when they were not travelling by the buses which passed the level crossing. He did not notice their movement after the accident as he got busy in contacting the ASM;

(xvi) He was firmly held by the two men and in spite of all efforts, he could not release himself. He could not however explain as to how there was no sign of any struggle e.g. torn clothes or any injuries on his person;

(xvii) The three other persons with the policemen were not putting on any uniform. He could not say if they had got down from the buses which had stopped at the level crossing which had been closed;

(xviii) Although he was held by the policemen, he did not shout to attract the attention of anyone. He did not do so as he did not expect anyone to come to his rescue at that time of the night;

(xix) After reaching Amritsar next morning, he did not contact any one for two days. On 14-9-1982, he had gone to Darbar Sahib where some persons, whom did not know, asked him if he was Ninder Singh, Gateman. They told him that an inquiry into the accident was being held in the Rest House and that he should go and give evidence;

(xx) He was not wearing any railway uniform when he went to Darbar Sahib. He could not, however, say how anyone recognized him. He also did not make any efforts to ascertain the identity of the persons who had met him at Darbar Sahib;

(xxi) He had gone to Darbar Sahib at about 16.00 hrs. on 14-9-1982 and reached the Rest House at about 21.30 hrs. He denied giving any statement to the PWI or AEN or any other railway official before giving evidence at the inquiry. He could not offer and clarification when he was shown a rough statement recorded by an APWI and signed by him.

5.5 Shri Shiv Mohan, Assistant Station Master, Tarn Taran, (witness no. 6) stated that he granted line clear to Jandoke for 9 AK passenger at 22.32 hrs. on 11-9-1982. He advised the gateman of level crossing no. 30B at 22.45 hrs. supported by his private number. After the lapse of a few minutes, the

gateman gave his private number to him as an assurance of his having closed the gates. On receipt of the departure report of the train from Jandoke, he arranged for the reception of the train at his station. At about 23.00 hrs. he received information on the telephone regarding the accident from the Gateman of level crossing no 30B. He immediately advised the control. He again tried to contact the Gateman on the telephone to ascertain further details but there was no response. At about 23.16 hrs. he saw Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman coming towards the station in a frightened and confused mood. He stated that an accident had taken place at the level crossing after which he disappeared. He came to know further details of the accident from the Guard of the passenger train when he was advising the position to the control.

Answering questions, he stated that—

(i) When Shri Ninder Singh spoke to him on the telephone, he did not indicate any details as to how the accident occurred even though he enquired about it. The Gateman did not also give any details when he subsequently came to the station;

(ii) The Gateman had confirmed to him that the gates had been closed after he had conveyed the advice regarding the train movement;

(iii) He advised the gateman about the movement of 9 AK after having granted line clear for the train but a few seconds before receiving the 'Train entering section' signal from Jandoke;

(iv) The passengers of the train, who reached the station after the accident, told him that the level crossing gates were open which caused the accident.

5.6 Shri. Roop Lal, Gateman, (Off duty) of level crossing No. 30B (witness no. 12) was on duty upto 20.00 hrs. on 11-9-1982 after which Shri Ninder Singh took over charge. When he was in his quarter he was awakened by a loud noise at about 23.00 hrs. He rushed out of the gate-lodge and noticed that 9 AK passenger had collided with the bus. He did not find Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman but he heard some people saying that the gates had been got opened forcibly.

Answering questions, he stated that—

(i) He could not identify the people who said that the gates were got opened forcibly;

(ii) He found the gates open but the gate lamps were properly lit. He did not observe the position of the locks on the gates;

(iii) He saw four buses standing on the Amritsar side (left side) of the gate but none on the other side;

(iv) Explaining the procedure, he stated that the ASM, Tarn Taran advised the movement of Up trains sometimes after the train had left Jandoke and sometimes after it left Patti. In the former case, since the running time upto Tarn Taran is only about 13 minutes, he closed the gates immediately after being advised and the position confirmed to the ASM supported by his private number. If the advice from the ASM is of the train departure from Patti, it takes about 30 minutes for the train to reach the level crossing in which case, he closed the gates about 15 minutes later and the position confirmed to the ASM supported by his private number;

(v) Sometimes the ASM rang up again to advise the position of the train or to ascertain if the gates had been closed. He also sometimes contacted the ASM to ascertain the position of trains which had departed from Patti.

5.7 *Shri Manmohan Singh Station Master, Tarn Taran*, (witness no. 13) was advised of the accident at 23.15 hrs. Immediately on reaching the station, he checked up the block instruments, train signal register, private number book, log register and the lever frame. He seized the records and then went to the site of accident along with the PWI. On reaching there, he did not find the gateman at the gate although the gates were open. He took into custody the private number book of the gate.

Answering questions, he stated that —

(i) The gate leaves were open but the gate lamps were duly lit. The locks in the gate leaves were closed and hanging with the chain but the keys of the locks were not there;

(ii) The last entry scored out in the private number book of the level crossing was 32. The book was taken over by the PWI and later handed over to the AEN and ATS.

(iii) As a big crowd had collected at site, he could not find out how the accident occurred. The people present at site were, however, saying that the gates were open. The next day, one person who claimed to be a social worker, told him of a rumour that the gates were got opened forcibly.

5.8 *Shri Ram Chand, Permanent Way Inspector, Tarn Taran*, (witness no. 14) reached the site of the accident at about 23.40 hrs. He did not find the gateman at the level crossing. The gates were open and the gate lamps were properly lit. He heard some persons saying that the gates were got forcibly opened. The locks in the gate leaves were in open position and the keys were inserted in the lock on the gate leaf towards Firozpur (right) side.

Answering questions, he stated that—

(i) Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman had been working at the gate for about 2½ years but he himself had been incharge of the section only for the previous three months during which he had found Shri Ninder Singh a conscientious worker;

(ii) He did not further investigate how the gates were got opened forcibly;

(iii) He learnt that two buses carrying the Akali prisoners has passed the level crossing while the third bus met with the accident.

5.9 *Shri Surinder Singh, Driver of Bus No. PJA 244* (witness no. 20) stated that there were eight buses in all and his bus was leading right from Amritsar. There were 58 persons in his bus including the crew. One police hawaldar and two constables were also travelling in the bus. The bus passed the level crossing in open position. He came to know of the accident at about 02.00 hrs. on 12-9-1982 through the driver of a truck coming from Amritsar side.

Answering questions, he stated that—

(i) The speed of his bus was about 20/25 kmph and the head-lights were on.

(ii) The gates were open and he did not see the gateman when his bus passed the level crossing. He also did not find any light at the level crossing;

(iii) He did not see the lights of the train nor did he hear the engine whistle;

(iv) The driver of the bus behind him came to know of the accident shortly after it had passed the level crossing and it went back but he came to know of the accident only at about 02.00 hrs. from a truck driver although his bus had reached Harike at about 00.30 hrs;

(v) Before passing the level crossing, the distance between his bus and the one immediately behind him was about 20-22 yards. He could not indicate the distance of the other buses.

5.10 *Shri Avtar Singh, Driver of Bus no. PJA 244* (witness no. 21) generally stated what the conductor of the bus had stated. He however stated that the bus stopped at the petrol pump situated about one kilometer after passing the level crossing. He stopped his bus thereon receiving the dipper light signal from the bus behind and came to know of the accident. He then went back to the level crossing and rendered whatever assistance was possible. After about 1/2 hour, he left for Harike. When his bus had passed the level crossing, it was open but the gate lights were lit. However, he did not see any gateman. The

distance between his bus and that behind him was about 100 yards and the speed of his bus was about 30 kmph when he passed the level crossing.

Answering questions, he stated that—

- (i) His bus was leading the convoy right from the start. They stopped for a minute or so at the shrine of Baba Deep Singh ;
- (ii) On questioning, he stated that he did not take back his bus to the level crossing, but the bus behind him went back from the petrol pump;
- (iii) He did not see the light of the train nor did he hear the engine whistle when the passed the level crossing.

5.11 *Shri Ajit Singh, driver of bus no. PJA 1293* (witness no. 22) stated that his bus (second from the front) started from Amritsar with 52 persons apart from the driver, conductor and two police constables. The bus passed the level crossing at a speed of about 20-25 kmph. The gate lights were lit but he did not notice any gateman at the level crossing. He also did not notice the train nor did he hear its noise. Shortly after passing the level crossing, he noticed that the lights of the 4th bus in the convoy had become stationary. He took his bus upto the petrol pump from where he took it back to the level crossing and rendered assistance to the injured. He did not meet any other bus at the petrol pump. The bus left for Bhatinda at about 09.00 hrs. next morning.

Answering questions, he stated that—

- (i) He did not meet the first bus of the convoy viz. PJA 244 at the petrol pump located after passing the level crossing nor did he inform the driver of that bus about the accident;
- (ii) The leading bus was about 100 yards ahead of him and the one behind him was about 25 yards away when they passed the level crossing;
- (iii) No attempt was made by the bus which met with the accident to over-take him. His bus started in the second position from the front from Amritsar and this position continued during the run. He could not say whether the ill-fated bus over-took any other bus behind him.

5.12. *Shri Anup Singh, Conductor of bus no. PJA 1293* (witness no. 23) stated that the bus (second from the front) left Amritsar with 54 people including two police constables, the driver and himself. The level crossing gate was open and the bus passed it at a

speed of about 25-30 kmph. He did not notice any train nor did he hear the engine whistle. He also did not notice the gate lights as he was sitting in the rear of the bus. While passing the level crossing, he could see the lights of the third bus behind him. After covering a distance of about 50-60 metres beyond the level crossing, his bus was stopped on hearing a loud noise. The driver took the bus upto the petrol pump to turn it and returned to the level crossing. The driver of his bus tried to attract the attention of the front bus which was about 100 metres ahead to stop but it did not stop. His bus left for Bhatinda about 09.00 hrs. next morning.

Answering questions, he stated that—

- (i) The front bus was about 50 to 100 yards ahead of his bus. He could not indicate the distance of the bus behind him as it was night time and the head lights of the bus were on;
- (ii) His bus did not come across the first bus at the petrol pump as it had gone ahead;
- (iii) On returning back, he saw five buses had stopped at the level crossing apart from the one involved in the accident;
- (iv) No attempt was made by the ill-fated bus to over-take his bus during the journey;
- (v) On hearing the loud noise of the collision, the police constable as also some other people in the bus asked the driver to stop. The driver went upto the petrol pump which was a short distance ahead to turn the bus and returned back to the level crossing. He did not notice any shop or pole lights near the level crossing;

(vi) Since he was sitting in the rear of the bus, he could not say whether the front bus stopped at the level crossing before passing it.

5.13 *Shri Paramjit Singh, Conductor of Bus No. PUN 1294* (4th from front) (witness no. 47) stated that the level crossing was in open position. His bus was about 50 to 60 yards behind the ill-fated bus which collided with the train. His bus and the other buses behind him immediately came to a stop and rendered assistance to those injured in the accident.

Answering questions, he stated that—

- (i) There were no police personnel in his bus;
- (ii) The speed of his bus was about 30-40 kmph;
- (iii) He neither saw nor heard the sound of the approaching train;
- (iv) The level crossing gates were open and after two buses had already passed the third bus was hit by the train. The ill-fated bus did

not stop short of the level crossing before the accident;

- (v) He did not observe whether the gate lamps were lit. He did not see the gateman at the level crossing;
- (iv) None of the buses tried to over-take any bus as all drivers had been instructed not to do so.

5.14 *Shri Nagina Singh, Driver of Bus No. PBA 7883* (third from front) (witness no. 33) was examined in the hospital as he was driving the bus which collided with the train. He stated that the level crossing gates were open and the two buses ahead of him had crossed it. He could not see the train coming from Khem Karan side due to the trees and buildings as also a curve in the railway alignment. He neither saw the train head lights nor did he hear the engine whistle. The speed of his bus was about 10-15 kmph when he reached the level crossing. The distance between the difference buses may have been about 5 to 6 yards. He did not see any gateman at the level crossing but the gate lamps were lit showing white light towards his bus.

5.15 *Shri Sohan Singh, Public witness* (witness No. 34) was travelling in the ill-fated bus and was sitting in the rear. He did not see the lights of the train nor did he hear the engine whistle. The gates of the level crossing were wide open. The bus was being driven at a fast speed and it had over-taken four other buses before reaching the level crossing. One of the persons sitting in the bus had cautioned the driver to slow down but he did not pay any heed.

5.16 *Shri Mal Singh, Public witness* (witness No. 35) was travelling in the ill-fated bus. He stated that the level crossing gates were open and he did not see the gateman. He did not see the light of the approaching train nor did he hear the engine whistle. His bus was being driven at a very fast speed and it had over-taken several other buses after leaving Amritsar. The driver of the bus had been cautioned by one of the persons to drive slowly. The head lights of his bus were on.

5.17 *Shri Bachan Singh, Public witness* (witness No. 36) was travelling in the ill-fated bus. His bus was the last bus when it started from Amritsar. The bus was being driven at a fast speed and he cautioned the driver to drive slowly but he did not pay any heed. The level crossing gates were wide open and no bus had stopped at the level crossing. He did not notice the train light nor did he hear the engine whistle.

5.18 *Shri Dalip Singh, Assis:ant Sub-Inspector of Police* (witness No. 37) stated that the Akalis who had been arrested were being taken from Amritsar to Bhatinda in eight buses. He alongwith seven constables was in the front bus and two head constables alongwith eight constables were in the last bus. He could not say if any police personnel from the last bus got into any other bus when they stopped for a short while at the shrine of Baba Deep Singh. The bus did not stop anywhere else during the journey and the first two buses crossed the level crossing which was in open position. He did not see the gateman when his bus passed the level crossing. Both the buses stopped about 200 yards after passing the level crossing on hearing the loud noise of the collision between the train and the third bus. The witness alongwith the police personnel went back to the level crossing. He then went to the police station from where he contacted the higher authorities to apprise them of the accident.

Answering questions, he stated that—

- (i) He was sitting in the front seat adjacent to the driver;
- (ii) He did not notice whether the lamps had been provided at the level crossing. He did not see the approaching train nor did he hear the engine whistle, as there is a curve in the railway alignment;
- (iii) The buses were being driven at moderate speed and there was no attempt to over-take by any bus;
- (iv) All the police personnel escorting the buses were in uniform;
- (v) No police personnel forced the gateman of the level crossing to open the gates nor was he held any one;
- (vi) When the bus stopped at the shrine of Baba Deep Singh one head constable (Shri Surjit Singh) who was travelling in the last bus got into the bus which met with the accident but he could not say how and why he did so;
- (vii) No detailed list was made out to indicate the particulars of the people in each bus and to note down their sequence. However, the bus which met with the accident was in the same position in the convoy when it left Amritsar as far as he could recollect;
- (viii) Since the arrested persons were political prisoners, it was not considered necessary to have police personnel in each buses. The

police personnel were, therefore, travelling only in the first and the last bus. He did not find the gateman at the level crossing when his bus reached thereafter the occurrence of the accident.

5.19 *Shri Kuldip Singh and six other police constables of Amritsar* (witness Nos. 38 to 44) all stated that the gates were open when their bus reached the level crossing. They were all travelling in the front bus. They did not see the train nor did they hear its engine whistle.

5.20 *Shri Surjit Singh, Head Constable, Amritsar* (witness No. 40) was travelling in the ill-fated bus. He alongwith another Head constable and eight constables had initially boarded the last bus but since the bus was over crowded, he got down and got into the 3rd bus which subsequently met with the accident. There was no other police personnel in that bus.

Answering questions, he stated that—

- (i) The Assistant Sub-Inspector and seven constables were travelling in the front bus. Before starting from Amritsar, while he was checking up the other buses, they started moving and he got into the third bus. The other Head constable and eight constables were in the last bus;
- (ii) He was sitting near the conductor of the bus in the rear on the left side;
- (iii) The bus did not stop anywhere enroute after leaving Amritsar;
- (iv) The distance between the different buses was only about 15 to 20 paces each and the approximate speed of his bus was 50 kmph. His bus did not over-take any other bus nor did anyone warn the driver against over speeding. The head lights of his bus were on;
- (v) As he was sitting in the rear of the bus, he could not say whether the gate lamps were lit. He did not, however, see the train nor did he hear the engine whistle;
- (vi) All police personnel were in uniform;
- (vii) It was not true that any of the police personnel got the level crossing gates opened forcibly;
- (viii) As it was night time and he was sitting in the rear, he could not say whether the gateman was present at the level crossing;

- (ix) While approaching the level crossing, the bus in front of his bus was about 200 metres ahead and the one behind was about 100 metre away.

5.21 *Shri Jagdish Chander, Head Constable, Amritsar* (witness No. 46) was travelling in the last bus alongwith seven constables. *Shri Surjit Singh, Head Constable* had been instructed by the (higher officials to check up the buses before starting.

Answering questions, he stated that—

- (i) There were 8 other constables alongwith him in the last bus;
- (ii) All the bus drivers had been instructed not to over-take each other before starting from Amritsar;
- (iii) When his bus stopped at the level crossing due to the accident, he did not find the gateman at the level crossing. He learnt from the other people that the gates were open when the buses were passing.

## 6.0. TESTS AND OBSERVATIONS

6.1. When the site of accident was inspected, it was observed that due to the left hand curve in the railway alignment on Khem Karan side, the visibility of the level crossing no. 30 (B class) from a train coming from Jandoke side is severely restricted. The visibility is further effected by the trees and building structures on either side of the rail and road alignment. The existence of a high boundary wall of a rice mill situated on the left side of the railway alignment near the level crossing makes it impossible for any road vehicle approaching the level crossing from Amritsar side to be observed from an approaching up train.

6.2. The Up outer signal of Tarn Taran cannot be seen from the station platform or from the lever frame cabin provided on the platform at Tarn Taran. A repeater has, therefore, been provided for the signal in the cabin. The Up loop home signal also cannot be easily sighted from the lever frame cabin although it can be observed from the station platform.

6.3. The telephone communication between Tarn Taran station and the level crossing no. 30 B had last failed on 28-3-1982 and that with level crossing no. 29B on 19-3-1982.

## 7.0. DISCUSSION

### 7.1. Time of accident

According to the station records of Jandoke and Tarn Taran, 9 AK passenger started from Jandoke at 22.45 hrs. Since the running time between Jandoke

and Tarn Taran is 13 minutes and the accident occurred just before reaching Tarn Taran, the time of accident has been treated as 22.55 hrs. as there is no other direct evidence.

## 7.2 Speed

The driver of 9 AK passenger has stated that the speed of his train in the section was about 54 kmph. Since the train was due to stop at Tarn Taran and there is no evidence of over-speeding from the timings of the train movement, the speed of the train as 54 kmph as indicated by the driver is accepted.

## 7.3. Cause of accident

The following possibilities have been considered to determine the cause of the accident :—

- (i) Possibility of the level crossing gates having been closed for the train but got opened forcibly.
- (ii) Possibility of the level crossing gates not having been closed for the train.
- (iii) Could the driver of the passenger train avert the accident ?

### 7.3.1 Possibility of level crossing gates having been closed for the train but got opened forcibly.

The only evidence in support of this possibility is that of Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman on duty at the level crossing. Three other witnesses viz. the Gateman who was off duty, the Station Master/Tarn Taran and Permanent Way Inspector, Tarn Taran (witness no. 12, 13 and 14) have only vaguely stated that they had overheard some people saying that the gates had been got opened forcibly. None of these witnesses, however, could identify these people nor was any effort made to secure their presence for tendering evidence at the inquiry. It is, therefore, not possible to rely on the vague statement made by these three witnesses based on hearsay.

7.3.1.1 The possibility of the gateman having been forced to open the gates after he had closed them for the passage of 9 AK passenger does not appear to be true in view of the following considerations :—

- (i) The ASM, Tarn Taran (witness No. 6) has stated that the gateman did not any time tell him that he had been held by any one or that the gates were opened forcibly by some unauthorised persons although the gateman had spoken to him on the telephone from the level crossing soon after the accident and had subsequently come to the station before he disappeared. He did not also tell any such

thing to the gateman of level crossing no. 29B when he passed the level crossing on his way to the station. I do not see any reason to disbelieve them and am, therefore, unable to accept the plea of Shri Ninder Singh regarding his being held by anyone for forcibly opening the level crossing gates.

- (ii) The conduct of Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman after the accident has not been reliable. Even if he disappeared from the site of accident due to fear of physical assault, he should have subsequently reported to his senior officers instead of absconding for 3 days until he appeared at the inquiry late in the evening on 14-9-1982. Further, his statement (Q. 28 and 29) that he was told of the inquiry into the accident by some unknown persons at the Darbar Saheb (Golden Temple) at about 16.00 hours on 14-9-1982 is not believable considering the fact that hundreds of people visit the Darbar Saheb every day and he was not in uniform as to be easily identifiable. He did not even care to ascertain the identity of the persons who are alleged to have met him at the Darbar Saheb. I am, therefore, unable to place reliance on the pleas put forward by him.
- (iii) Some persons (other than policemen or bus crew) travelling in the ill-fated bus who had been admitted in the hospital were questioned by me and all of them (witness nos. 33 to 36) stated that the gates of the level crossing were open and that the gateman was not seen by them. The police personnel as also the driver and conductor of the leading two buses which went across the level crossing have also stated that the gates were open. Since the Akalis taking part in the political agitation were not willing to give evidence at the inquiry, I was not able to take the evidence of any persons travelling in the first and second buses. However, I see no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the Akalis travelling in the third bus which met with the accident who all stated that the gates were open.
- (iv) There are several inconsistencies in the statement of Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman. In his statement, he stated that he was held by two men (not police personnel), while the keys were snatched from him by the policemen but during cross-examination (Q. No. 17), he stated that he was held by

two policemen in uniform. He could not, however, identify any of them. He did not also observe how they left the site after releasing him. Normally, any one interested in getting the gates opened, should have been travelling in one of the first two buses which went across. Anyone forcibly holding the gateman should have normally released him as soon as the gates were opened and they should have got into the buses. It is not believable that Shri Ninder Singh would not bother to observe their movements after they released their hold on him. If the gates were forcibly opened before the passage of the first bus, it should have been possible for Shri Ninder Singh to show the danger signal to the train. It is not believable that he would continue to be held even after the gates had been opened and the train had come very close to the level crossing. These inconsistencies in the evidence of Shri Ninder Singh raise serious doubts against him and it appears that the plea put forward by him of his having been held and the gates having been opened forcibly is intended to cover up his lapse.

(v) If Shri Ninder Singh had been forcibly held by anyone, it is logical to expect some struggle on his part to free himself. There was no sign of any struggle by way of any injury to his person or damage to his clothes as admitted by him (Q No. 12). It is also natural to expect that he should have shouted for help particularly as the other gateman, who was off duty, was in his quarter located near the level crossing. Shri Ninder Singh's plea that he did not shout for help as he did not expect anyone to come to his rescue at that hour (Q. No. 27) is not acceptable.

(vi) The ASM, Tara Taran has stated that he advised the Gateman of the level crossing regarding line clear having been granted for 9 AK passenger at 22.45 hrs. and according to the ASM, the gateman gave his private number *after* the lapse of a few minutes in token of his having closed the gates. Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman has, however, stated that he acknowledged receipt of the advice from the ASM by giving his private number simultaneously and that the gates were closed about 10 minutes later. On the basis of the gateman's evidence, the arrival time of the train at the level crossing would be about the same as when the gates

are alleged to have been closed by the gateman. It is quite possible that the train reached the level crossing before the Gateman could close the gates resulting in the accident.

(vii) The SM, Tara Taran in reply to Q No. 1 stated that he saw the locks in closed position and hanging in the gate leaves but without the keys. The P.W.I., Tara Taran has, however, stated that the locks were in open position, and the keys were inserted in the locks on the gate leaf on Firozpur side (right side). It is very unlikely that the locks would be in closed position without the keys, in case any out-sider would have opened the gates. The presence of locks in the closed position without the keys is more likely when the gates were in their normal position i.e. open to road traffic. I am therefore inclined to give greater credence to the statement of the SM who is a disinterested witness.

7.3.2 On the above considerations, I am unable to believe the gateman's version that the level crossing gates had been closed by him and that they had been opened forcibly by unauthorised persons.

7.3.2.1. *Possibility of the level crossing gates not having been closed for the train.*

The Akali prisoners travelling in the ill-fated bus who were examined in the hospital stated that the level crossing gates were wide open when the bus reached the level crossing. Even if the police personnel and the driver/conductor of the buses are considered interested parties and their evidence ignored, there is no reason to doubt the statements of the Akali prisoners. Unfortunately I could not take the evidence of any of the Akali prisoners in the first and second buses as they boycotted the inquiry by any government agency. According to the evidence, the buses were not far from each other and, in case the level crossing gates had been closed for the passage of the train, the first and second buses would have had to stop short of the level crossing. In case anyone from the first or second bus had got the gates opened forcibly, sometime would have been lost in the process and the third bus would have also reached the level crossing by that time. In that case all the three buses would have crossed the level crossing almost one behind the other which is not supported by the evidence. Further, the anomalies indicated under para 7.3.1.1. above rule out the possibility of the gates having been closed and got opened forcibly as contended by the

gateman. In view of all these considerations, I am convinced that Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman on duty had not closed the level crossing gates for the passage of the train although information of the train movement had been conveyed to him well in time by the ASM/Tarn Taran.

### 7.3.3. *Could the driver of the passenger train avert the accident ?*

As indicated in para 4.5 above, the view of the level crossing from a train approaching from Jandoke side is restricted by a curve in the railway alignment and by the trees and building structures on either side of the road and railway embankment. The view of any road vehicle approaching the level crossing from Amritsar side is further obstructed by a high boundary wall of a rice mill located on the left side of the railway line near the level crossing. It was, therefore, not possible for the drivers of the train and the buses to sight each other until they almost reached the level crossing. The witnesses travelling in the buses have all stated that they neither saw the train nor heard its engine whistle. Even if the train driver's statement that he was continuously sounding the whistle is accepted, it is possible that the people travelling in the buses may not have heard the whistle due to the sound of the bus engine. The driver of the train could not, therefore, possibly avert the collision and I do not attach any blame to him for the accident.

7.3.4. There are some discrepancies in the evidence of certain witnesses e.g. speed of the bus (statements of witness nos. 34, 35, 36 and 45), number of policemen in the leading bus, etc. Since these discrepancies do not have any bearing on the final conclusions, they have not been discussed in detail.

## 8.0. CONCLUSION

### 8.1. *Cause of the accident*

On careful consideration of the factual, material and circumstantial evidence, I have come to the conclusion that the collision of 9 AK passenger train with Motor Bus No. PBA 7883 at level crossing no. 30 (B class) at km. 24/13-14 between Jandoke and Tarn Taran stations on Khem Karan-Amritsar section of Ferozpur division on 11-9-1982 was caused due to the level crossing gates having been left open in the face of the approaching train.

### 8.2. *Responsibility*

Shri Ninder Singh, Gateman on duty at the level crossing is held responsible for not closing the gates even though he had been advised of the train movement. By his action, he disregarded the working instructions and violated General Rule 229 extract reproduced at Annexure-I).

8.2.1. Shri Ninder Singh was appointed to railway service on 8-3-1980. He had attended the Safety Camp at Ferozpur in August 1981. He had put in only 2½ years service prior to the accident and the same was satisfactory. He had also received a cash award of Rs. 50/- in 1981-82 for his services.

### 8.3. *Relief arrangements*

The injured were promptly transferred in buses and ambulance vehicles and they had all been admitted in the hospital by 03.30 hrs. on 12-9-1982. I am satisfied that the relief arrangements and the medical attention to the injured were satisfactory.

## 9.0 REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1. Keeping in view the heavy road traffic across the level crossing and the local features viz, inadequate visibility due to the curve in the railway alignment and trees and building structures on either side, the level crossing should be protected by gates signals interlocked with the station reception signals.

9.2 The working instructions at the gate at the time of the accident indicated lifting barriers, gate signals, and lever frame for operating the signals having been provided although none of these arrangements existed at the gate when the accident occurred. The gate working instructions also made no mention of the telephone connection provided between the gate and Tarn Taran station and the procedure for exchange of private numbers between the Gateman and ASM. This indicates that due care was not exercised by the concerned officials before the working instructions for the level crossing were issued. Working instructions for level crossings should be correctly prepared on the basis of the facilities actually provided. The position should be checked up elsewhere also on the railway to ensure that correct working instructions for level crossings are issued.

9.3. Proper registers for recording the transactions between the station and the level crossing had not been provided at the gate and registers meant to be used as log register for cabins were being used. It is suggested that the registers for transactions between the level crossing and station should be standardised and provided at the gates were required.

Yours faithfully,  
**SURESH CHANDRA**  
 Commissioner of Rly. Safety,  
 Northern Circle, Lucknow.

**EXTRACT FROM GENERAL AND SUBSIDIARY RULES OF NORTHERN RAILWAY**

“229. *ROAD TRAFFIC-I* Subject to such special instructions in that behalf as are permitted by these rules, all gates at level crossings shall be kept constantly closed and securely fastened across the

thorough fare on both sides of the railways and shall only be opened when it is necessary and safe to open them for the passage of road traffic xx xx  
xx xx xx xx”.

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**VIEWS OF THE RAILWAY BOARD ON VARIOUS PARAS OF THE REPORT**

**I. Cause and Responsibility :—**Cause of the accident and responsibility therefor as per findings of CRS are acceptable to this Ministry.

**II. Remarks and Recommendations :**

**Para 9.1 :—**The gate No. 30-B between Jandoke and Tarn Taran stations has since been interlocked with station signals and gate signals have also been provided. This has been noted by CCRS.

**Para 9.2 :—**The gate working instructions as also station working rules have since been rectified to include use of gate telephones and exchange of private num-

bers. The Railway Administration has also been asked to check up the position at other level crossing gates and take corrective action where called for.

**Para 9.3 :—**It is noted that the Railway Administration has taken in hand the work of modifying the rules pertaining to exchange of private numbers and maintenance and standardisation of registers for transactions between the level crossings and the stations. Other Railways have been directed to take similar action.

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