ZILLA PARISHADS AS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT BODIES

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ZILLA PARISHADS AS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT BODIES

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CHAPTER I

PANCHAYATI RAJ-GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT

The concept of Panchayati Raj has developed from the idea of a close-knit community to that of an organic base for a three-fold revolution—economic, political and social. The process of this development has been partly conscious, partly unconscious, at times pushed forward with positive steps and at some stages emerging as a byproduct of certain other measures. "Human institutions evolve over a period of time and in the process get themselves adapted to the tradition and temper of the people."¹

The Village Community

The concept of Indian village as a close-knit community is to be traced to the Vedic period. It was a composite unit providing and protecting the whole of community life and in a sense it was a non-political unit.²

In ancient India, the office of the village headman, Gramini, was sometimes hereditary, initially appointed by the King, and at times elective. The State was concerned

1 <u>Report of the Committee on Democratic Decentraliza-</u> tion (Bombay : Government of Maharashtra, 1961), p. 7.

² Cf. extract from Kautilya's <u>Arthashastra</u> as quoted in the <u>Report of the Congress Village Panchayat Committee</u> (New Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1954), p. 10.

only with the land revenue. The village, left to itself for its needs and their satisfaction, grew on the strength of tribal vitalism. Economically this community rested on a co-operative basis, agriculture being its main activity. Socially it was supported by traditional caste obligations. Thus the individual was conditioned by the joint family operations and was carried by the weight of customary laws dealing with customary rights and customary duties.³

These socio-religious forces were simultaneously integrative and disintegrative. Sometimes they elevated village communities to organisms but many times they left these communities as mere social organizations.

This 'living and not dead institution' to put it in the words of Henry Maine, was therefore destined to decay. On the advent of the British centralized rule its unity was attacked both from within and without. Caste ideology and caste control slowly lost their influence over the actual relationships in social organization. Village community soon lost its economic and administrative functions. Discard was the practice and disdain for customary law habitual. But even before the advent of British rule,

³ O. C. Cox refers to caste structure as a labourstructure traditionalized into religious sanctions [<u>Caste, Class and Race</u> (New York : Doubleday & Co.) quoted in C. Taylor and D. Ensminger, <u>India's Roots of Democracy</u> (Calcutta : Orient Longmans, 1965), p. 34].

the panchayats had ceased to be operative in most parts of India for a considerable period.⁴

This itself may be regarded as a blessing in disguise. References to the past with no relation to the present carry little value. The modern concepts of equality, of participative nature of popular administrative functions and of decentralization of authority for the survival of democratic institutions: these were concepts alien to the ancient 'Tiny Republics'.

The old system of panchayats existing in pre-British India exercised greater power in certain respects, e. g., defence and distribution of justice, than the statutory panchayats created under the British rule. The old panchayat was a conventional body of hereditary leadership, protecting the system of caste functions and the operations of joint family system. On the other hand, the modern panchayat is a statutory body with an elected leadership and its recent development functions are not linked with the preservation of the old system. There are thus many points of difference than agreement between the new and the old village panchayats.

Local Government Under British Rule

The British policy of extending local government

4. Lord Hailey in Foreword to H. Tinker, <u>The Founda-</u> tions of Local Self Government in India, Pakistan and Burma (The University of London, 1954), p. xii.

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institutions in India was hesitating and halting. The British administration in India was essentially a revenue and law-and-order administration. It was too early to expect its conversion into a welfare administration. The true spirit of local government can first be traced in Lord Mayo's Resolution of 1870. He proposed a sharing of revenue with the provinces. Local authorities were to be liberalized and entrusted with the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical relief and local public works. Here local interest and care would be found effective.⁵

A British scholar, Hugh Tinker, states that the English people are curiously indifferent to the way in which (their) local councils are managed. This apathy was reflected in their experiments in local administration in India and many times the progress in local government here became a mere personal equation. This explains the initiation of the famous Resolution in 1882 by Lord Ripon and its subsequent defeat.

Ripon's Resolution for the first time stressed the educative aspect of administration. This would be clear from the following part of the Resolution: "It is not primarily with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put forward and supported. It is

5 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 37.

chiefly designed as an instrument of political and popular education. ... As education advances there is rapidly growing up all over the country an intelligent class of public spirited men who it is not only bad policy but sheer waste of power to fail to utilize."⁶ By introducing elective element in local bodies Lord Ripon felt that local interest and local knowledge would improve the efficiency of these institutions.

But the institutional framework and administrative practices which followed Lord Ripon's Resolution defeated the <u>raison d'etre</u> of his resolution. District bias, dominance of District Magistrates in Councils, meagre funds, official chairmanship, lack of pivotal committee system in working, and the cult of efficiency overshadowing the concept of political training - all rendered the process of sharing government activities to an administrative fiction. Local government was looked upon as one dealing with streets and street lights. It was conceived in terms of 'chairmen, committees, minutes and resolutions'.⁷

Local government, though good in itself, was in fact imposed from above, and with certain exceptions like the Act of 1888 in Bombay Province, it failed in its essence.

6 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 44.

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7 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 51.

Under Lord Curzon, departmental experts and district officers asserted their positions.

The Royal Commission on Decentralization unfortunately looked at the problem in terms of administrative improvement rather than linking it to political aspirations of the people. The growing body of Indian public opinion, however, insisted on the statutory obligation of consulting the people.⁸

The First World War affected political thinking in this country and the preponderant political opinion subordinated local governments to national politics.

New Role of Local Government

The achievements of rural local self-government bodies fell far below the expectations as a result of the combination of social, political, communal, economic and administrative factors. But, even then, the cause of revival of these bodies was winning a growing support.

The struggle for independence carried with it, as an article of faith, the pledge to re-establish grampanchayat as the grass-root base of Indian democracy.

To Mahatmaji, who attached cardinal importance to the ideal of village sufficiency, the role of village

^{8 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 84. Cf. Lok. B. G. Tilak's evidence before the Decentralization Commission.

panchayat was very crucial. He expected the new panchayats to become natural units of social justice and corporate vitality, and not remain merely administrative units of social security and revenue collection.

The following ideal regarding Panchayati raj of Mahatma Gandhi has distinctly influenced the thinking, though not the actual practice to the same extent, in Independent India. "My idea of village swaraj is that it is a complete republic independent of its neighbours for its vital wants, and yet inter-dependent for many others in which dependence is necessary - The Panchayat will be legislature, judiciary and executive combined to operate for its year of office."⁹

Gandhiji wanted to distribute the centre of power among several hundred villages and called its omission in the Constitution as a serious flaw. Many were offended when some delegates in the Constituent Assembly of India, described village panchayats as 'a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism'. However, at the request of Mahatma Gandhi and the Gandhian thinkers and social leaders, a directive principle was introduced in Article 40 of the Constitution. Article 40 reads as follows: "The State shall take steps to organize village

9 <u>Harijan</u>, July 1942, p. 238, quoted by R. V. Jathar, <u>Evolution of Panchayati Raj in India</u> (Dharwar: J. S. S. Institute of Economic Research, 1964), pp. 29-30.

panchayats and to endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. ..."

The institutional structure laid down by the Constitution, however, did not provide for the Panchayati raj organizations. The common man in rural India did not secure a direct hearing in the institutional framework of the Constitution. This growing sense of 'aloofness' reduced the majority of the people into mere spectators. This would have given rise to alarming social unrest but for the growing awareness of governmental authorities regarding the need for participative democracy which is an improvement on the old ideal of 'government by consent'.¹⁰

The initiation of a sense of belonging is important from the point of view of administration and development. The modern government is a government of 'involvement', and if it fails to 'associate' people directly State action would lose its foundation and might even be inefficient in the longrun. Hence decentralization becomes imperative for the preservation of democracy and also as a strategy in development mechanism.

¹⁰ Sir Earnest Barket, in his <u>Essays on Government</u>, writes: "Any society to be worthy of the name must consist of partners who enjoy a say in the affairs of the society. When a society ceases to be that it ceases to be a society." (<u>Indian Journal of Public Administration</u>, Special Number on Panchayati Raj, Vol. VIII, No. 4, October-December 1962, p. 459.)

The Community Development Programme

Modern government, in involving people in development processes, has adapted the Greek ideal to the changed times. Community Development is the mechanism through which the rural people are brought into direct relationship with some of the administrative processes affecting their welfare.

The Community Development programme, which was launched on 2nd October 1952 in 55 pilot projects, was eventually to cover the whole of the country. It sought to achieve the all-round development of the countryside through the efforts of the people, the beneficiaries of the programme. Drawing upon the accumulated experience of earlier projects of similar nature it followed an integrated approach to the village community.

The Community Development is not merely a programme, it is a process. The Community Development is also a method of extension. From the economic point of view Community Development aims at increasing agricultural produce and setting a firm foundation for the agro-industrial society. This is achieved by linking agriculture to industry and releasing surplus manpower by adapting improved means and skills. Socially, Community Development works on the ways of social behaviour and values of life by introducing institutions of community centres. The School and the Co-operative are institutional devices in the furtherance of this point of view. These operate on the

individuals' motives behind social action and introduce changes in their attitudes in community behaviour. This seeks to make the caste-ridden social structure more democratic. Politically, Community Development strengthens the village panchayat which becomes representative and participative in the process of development. It gives lead to community development schemes and serves as a chief channel of communication between the people on one side and their government at higher levels on the other.¹¹

The energy of Community Development is people's will to participate in efforts to improve their well-being. The method of Community Development is to link these 'felt needs' with the process of national planning and to make it comprehensive.¹² While aiming at a balanced development

11 B. Mukherji in his article "Community Development and Panchayati Raj" (The Indian Journal of Public Administration Special Number 'Panchayati Raj' Vol.VIII, No. 4, October-December 1962, New Delhi, p. 580) writes: "The unique contribution of Community Development is that it provides the ideology and the method which synthesise the process of economic development, social change and democratic growth into one process of people's development."

12 The U.N. document defines community development "as a process by which the efforts of the people are themselves are united with those of government authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of the communities, to integrate these communities into the life of the nation and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress." U.N. Economic and Social Council Document October 1956. Twentieth Report of Administrative Committee on Co-ordination to. Para 14, p.5, in S. C. Jain, <u>Community Development and Panchayati Raj</u> (Calcutta : Allied Publishers, 1967), p. 4. in the community, it converts government programme with people's participation into a people's programme with government participation. It supplies that programme a purpose, a meaning and a faith without which it would otherwise have been a mere blue-print.

The nature of development in rural sector may be predominantly agricultural, but in a real sense the complete development must also cover attitudes and accepted practices of the community. It is then only that a sustained progress can be assured.

All aspects of rural life are inter-related and a piecemeal approach to development would yield no lasting results. In an under-developed country economic and social development cannot be dealt with in isolation. The total development is the cumulative effect of link developments.

Social development is a conditioning factor in achieving what Rostow calls the take-off stage. Neglect or ignorance of this aspect would lead to disillusionment and disaster.¹³

The Etawah Project (1948) in Uttar Pradesh, the Firka Development Scheme in Madras (1946), the Martandam

13 Buchanan and Ellis, <u>Approaches to Economic Develop-</u> ment (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), quoted in C. Taylor and D. Ensminger, <u>India's Roots of Democracy</u> (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1965), p.477.

experiment in old Travancore-Cochin State (1921), the experiments at Nilokheri (1948) and Gurgaon in Punjab (1927) and in Baroda (1932), the Sarvodaya Scheme of Maharashtra (1948) and Shantiniketan (1921) - all have left their impressions on the concept of Community Development in its formulation and functioning.

The Etawah method is slow in the beginning, but once it takes roots in the community it spreads rapidly, clinging to the society, at the same time developing a firm foundation for further growth. The Etawah Project justified the integrated approach by combining technical and nontechnical services at the village level and introduced a new multipurpose service for the Village Level Workers, the key figure in development.

The Etawah project gave Community Development method one of its important characteristics. A development programme to be successful must be organically linked with the 'felt needs' of the community and must introduce and develop confidence in the members of the community.¹⁴ It attributed positive morality to government in supplying technical

14 A. Mayer, <u>Pilot Project India</u> (University of California Press, 1958), Preface, p. xii.

"What the Rochdale experiment in England is to the world's co-operative movement, what the Tennessee Valley Authority is to the integrated exploitation of the world's great watershed this the Etawah Project has fast became to be the movement of revitalizing the ways of life of the world's peasantry. ... The project at Etawah has become to the world a symbol of successful rural development initiated by an enlightened popular government and carried through without compulsion among a peasantry known for its conservatism."

know-how. It supplied a framework for programming and evaluating the progress achieved. It also gave due emphasis on adequate personnel to be made available for successful planning.

The Etawah project method tried to avoid some of the shortcomings of the earlier experiments like the Gurgaon, the Shantiniketan and the MartMandam.

The Gurgaon experiment of Brayne failed because the methods used were 'top heavy' and the schedule of its work was not linked with the schedule of priorities of the villagers. So, little of the social amenities created were used and still little maintained. The Gandhian project like one at Shantiniketan, had more of a moral appeal than a productive incentive sufficiently translated into the programmes of planning, target fixing, schedule of supply services and back-checking. The missionary approach experimented at Martandam (1921) failed to get people involved in the programme and it reduced local governments and State governments to the position of indifferent on-lookers.

The Etawah project method tried to avoid these shortcomings. Its basic force was self-help. Its method was trial and error. Its means were local institutions and its goal was comprehensive and integrated development with economic development as a key to it.

"Hardly anything worth achieving was achieved overnight or without difficulties. There were mistakes and failures in plenty. The mistakes were not committed in vain, nor the failures were accepted as finals. What distinguishes the Etawah project is that the mistakes were not repeated very often and the initial failures paved the way for the final success in most cases.¹⁵

The Martandam experiment had a demonstration farm, prized animals and equipment for prospective cottage industries in the area. The technique of its work, in the words of Dr. Hatche, was self help with intimate expert advice. In Brayne's experiment at Gurgaon the desire for improvement was regarded as the key of economic development. The Gurgaon scheme of rural development combined local activities with national development priorities. The Baroda experiment linked agriculture and industry. It emphasized that increased agricultural production formed a stable foundation for allround development of rural community. And sgriculture itself was a function with many variables like irrigation, soil conservation, contour-bunding, education in agriculture and social and economic legislation. The Rural Reconstruction Centre at Kosamba (Baroda) translated the goal of development into the desire for a higher standard.¹⁶

16 "All aspects of rural life are interrelated and no lasting results can be achieved if individual aspects of it are dealt with in isolation." V.T.Krishnamachari quoted in C. Taylor and D. Ensminger, India's Roots of Democracy (Celcutta: Orient Longmans, 1965), p. 173.

¹⁵ D.P.Singh, "The Pilot Development Project Etawah," Evolution of Community Development Programme in India (New Delhi: Ministry of Community Development, Panchayati Raj and Co-operation, Government of India, 1963), p. 68.

The Firka Development Scheme by its very definition referred to a group of villages (i.e. a Firka) and fostered a community sense. The scheme was on the lines of the Gandhian ideal of 'Village Swaraj' and it provided democratic institutions for the development of rural areas. Each Firka linked its rural economy to rural cottage industries by developing Khadi and Village industries. The Gandhian emphasis at Firka scheme and also in Shantiniketan experiment and in the Sarvodaya scheme: was economically on selfsufficiency, and socially on reducing social inequalities.

The relative failure of the Grow More Food campaign necessitated an integrated approach to development. The working of the refugee townships at Faridabad and Nilokheri provided self-help and agro-industrial approach in community building. A network of cluster-townships was created, each nucleus town catering to a surrounding area of approximately 25,000 people. The muscle and the machine were the two dimensions of progress.

Each of these experiments carried forward the objectives of community development. The Shantiniketan experiment linked development to the culture of the community. The Martandam experiment was a lesson in extension method. The Brayne scheme added comprehensiveness to development and at the same time acted as a red signal against 'imposed improvements'. The Nilokheri experiment showed the strength of cooperative approach coupled with minimum technical and

financial help from without. Picking up the thread of the Baroda experiment the Nilokheri model emphasized the twinnature of development: agricultural and industrial. Above all, Mahatma Gandhi's ideology has given tone to the whole rural reconstruction programme. "The theory of Community Development is that change cannot take place, in isolated fragments of a society but must be a total process involving the total person and the entire community."¹⁷

Though not peculiar to under-developed countries as such, India used this community development approach in its nation-building programme. Under the First Five Year Plan, Community Development was regarded as a method and National Extension Service as an agency of it. Pandit Nehru, while addressing the Development Commissioners' Conference at Mussorie, 1956, claimed, "I think nothing has happened in any country in the world during the last few years so big in content and so revolutionary in design as the community project in India."¹⁸

With all its vitality, institutional structure, builtin methods of administration, the Community Development was found 'wanting'. It was losing its 'extension' content and

17 <u>U.N. Community Development and Evaluation Mission</u> (Coldwell Mission) (New Delhi: Ministry of Community Development, Government of India, 1959), p. 3.

18 S. C. Jain, <u>Community Development and Penchayati Raj</u> <u>in India</u> (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1967), p. 11.

its 'method' elements were making the system more rigid, centralized, expenditure-biased and concentrating on 'physical outputs' as against 'non-physical' outputs which ultimately sustain and increase the major capital stock of an industrial nation. Its physical, particularly economic, results were also not equal to the expectations of the planners.¹⁹

The Fifth Development Commissioners' Conference in May 1956, therefore, observed: "We cannot go far from where we have arrived unless we have a wider partnership with technical departments, wider partnership with people's institutions and wider partnership with political institutions of the country."²⁰ These observations indicated the next phase of the community development programme.

The Panchayati Raj

The development of Panchayati Raj, therefore, can be said to be the logical outcome of the Community Development programme. Strengthening local institutions and associating them with political institutions now became imperative.

Responsibility and interest, which is evoked by

19 Kuznets, National Policy for Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad: Towards a Theory of Economic Growth, p.39, quoted in S.C. Jain, <u>Community Development and Panchayati</u> <u>Raj in India</u> (Calcutta: Allied Fublishers, 1967), p. 27.

20 Summary records of the Conference, p. 46.

participation in power, go together. The theory of democratic decentralization opened a new phase in local government by making lower units of administration more popularly elected, more socially broad-based, and covering a wider range of activities than hitherto vested in local institutions, in content and execution.

The mere existence of municipal institutions is not a sufficient guarantee for the survival of democracy. Municipal spirit can be sustained only through the twin process of democratization and decentralization. In a welfare State both government and people have inter-linking positive morality. The State must consciously work for raising the people's standard of living and the people must actively associate themselves with the process of planning and execution. The end-product of economic well-being is not the only thing we strive for. Social consciousness and social co-operation are also important factors in the social good.

If people are not involved in the process of planning, the planning machinery, centrally biased by nature, would turn these units of decentralization into administrative extensions. Welfare and development should be the functions of the governmental organs of the community which they immediately affect and ultimately benefit. There need not be any inherent contradiction between the 'real' needs of the community and its 'felt' needs. Felt needs elevate

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themselves to 'real' needs and merge in national priorities.

In a truly democratic government the right of locating and fixing priorities should rest with the community organs because it is essentially a community function. Panchayati Raj is just restoring these rights to the community.

Community Development is a great deal more than a new system of administration. It involves the creation of new levels of Government.²¹

The stiffening of the Community Development process might have been the immediate cause, but Panchayati Raj has its own logic and integrated function in the State administration and especially in welfare administration.

Community Development and local government are intimately inter-linked. The rural local governments are also conceived as units for economic planning and production. Close-knit and economically viable units of production with common identifiable problems would naturally form an appropriate unit for area-planning. The question is of viable socio-economic units adequately large to sustain and provide either 'devolved' or 'delegated' technical services to the area, and at the same time sufficiently small to retain its social unity.²²

21 Editorial, <u>Indian Journal of Public Administration</u> Special Number, Panchayati Raj, Vol.VIII, No.4, 1962, p.441. 22 Seminar on Public Administration in Panchayati Raj, Mussoorie, 1962. Agenda Papers (New Delhi: Central Institute of Community Development, Government of India, 1962), pp.8-15. The Community Development had already made the block as the unit of 'area planning' and supply centre for commonagency services. The Community Development movement had also made the whole administrative organization development oriented. Both the Community Development organization and the Local Government institutions work on the strength of people's participation and accountability to the people. If one is weak, the other is overstrained and it also becomes diffident about its social utility. Both prosper if government allows local people to arrive by themselves as far as possible, at the decisions which concern them and which help them.

The Community Development movement has exposed the limitations of the old-fashioned local institutions and has made a strong case for new types of local institutions to undertake new types of functions. Here a bold policy of decentralization inspired by the same kind of ideology as the Community Development is necessary for the success of these new institutions. Local government cannot be strong where the content of the community development programme is thin. So the community development content of rural local government needs to be substantiated.

The need for local government is a logical necessity for modern governments which live and grow in development. Local governments in developing economies are expected to create, locate and foster areas of community co-operation

and link them up to the regional and national development. In doing so the local government would add vitality to the whole democratic process and would make it broad-based. With adequate responsibility and power it would maintain and add to the community functions already initiated by the Community Development Programme. For this, the unit of local government must be sufficiently small so that people can understand it. It must be sufficiently near so that people can live to its expectations. "So long as we do not discover or create a representative and democratic institution which will supply local interest, supervision and care necessary to ensure that expenditure of money upon local objects conforms with the needs and wishes of the locality, invest it with adequate power and assign to it appropriate finances we will never be able to evoke local interest and excite local initiative in the field of development."23

Democratic Decentralization

For successful implementation of plan-schemes and distributive benefits of development, devolution of administrative authority is inadequate. What is needed is decentralization in the name of democracy. And decentralization includes both the processes of deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is delegation of adequate authority for the

^{23 &}lt;u>Report of the Team for the Study of Community</u> <u>Projects and National Extension Services</u> (New Delhi: Committee on Plan Projects, 1957), Vol. I, p. 5.

discharge of specified functions and devolution means the legal conferring of deferred powers. Community Development organization was less formal. Its method was co-operation and its energy good, while local government would be more formal, more rigid and organizationally more compulsive.

In the present context of development central-local relationship has also undergone a radical change. No local unit of any system of government can claim complete 'autonomy'. Henry Maddick has ruled out the crave for local autonomy on the Brazilian style. To him it is not Local versus Central government but the two working together recognizing their inter-dependence which would produce the greatest result.²⁴

Decentralization has another aspect also. It is not only a matter of convenience - an administrative device of democracy. It is democracy itself in the ultimate sense. This institutional arrangement at lower level of administration would develop the sense of belonging to the Nation. By

²⁴ Henry Maddick. <u>Decentralization for Development</u> (New York: Division for Public Administration, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, 1961), p. 199.

The Cambridge Conference on Local Government in Africa expresses similar views (p. 67 of the report). "It is a mistake where rapid development is the primary objective to maintain 'local autonomy' or freedom from central government interference as the governing principle in central-local relations. Poor local governments like poor people are likely to get poorer if left to their own resources. They need help if they are to overcome their disabilities and realize their potentialities for useful work." <u>Decentraliza-</u> tion for National and Local Development (New York : U.N.O., 1962), p. 66.

participating in administration people would be practising democracy. The more they realise it, the more they would respect it. J. P. Narayan calls it the logical development from the government by consent into the government of participation.

The philosophy of decentralization claims that all powers and responsibilities regarding development matters intimately affecting the rural people should belong to a viable socio-economic community. The exceptions would be those powers and responsibilities which can be better exercised by some other governmental organization at a higher level and for a larger area of operation.

Decentralization has its own problems. These problems could be minimized but not neglected. It is an irony of fate that when democracy demands decentralization, technological improvements favour larger units of administration and the trend in both the developed and under-developed countries is towards centralization. The size, complexity and the urgency of the problem of development is such that in under-developed countries it is the central government only that can meet it. Planned development by its very definition is centripetal and local government by its very nature is centrifugal. What would be the organizational effect of dovetailing of these outwardly opposite tendencies? There is a reasonable fear that outside [central] help would result in outside dominance. But the alternative would be local governments 'living in the era of oil lamp, the open well and a sweeper'.

There are additional dangers of decentralization in a society with a high degree of illiteracy and overridden with caste and communal factions. But these work less as the cause than as the effect of economic under-development. On the other hand this makes it more necessary to devolve real power on the local bodies to accelerate the rate of development.

In order to sustain development it must be spread to the grass-roots of democracy. And this is possible only with decentralization-with local institutions better equipped with efficient services and adequately provided for with respect to financial resources and personnel requirements.

The Unit and Scope of Decentralization

Having admitted the importance of democratic decentralization the next question to be considered is the territorial units on which different development functions should be devolved. The territorial units to be taken into account for the purpose are the district, the block (mostly identical with the taluka in Maharashtra) and the village.

Since the advent of the British rule the district has been looked upon as a seat of power and authority of the State Government. Historically the product of administrative convenience, the district lacks socio-economic homogeneity. District-based development giving greater weightage to technological and executive aspects might discount considerations of participative aspects of democracy. Local government is something much more than and different from being a mere instrument of the State Government. The district is a suitable rural local government organ to bring about co-ordination in the operation of development functions devolved on lower local government organs, to determine policies for the whole district and to handle important programmes for the whole district.

The block has grown up to be regarded as a socioeconomic community. Historically the taluka, which is coextensive with the block in Maharashtra, has been an important unit of administration. Entrusted with the Community Development functions it is suitable as the basic unit of area-planning. With decentralisation of adequate functions and authority, the block, including small urban centres, would be a suitable local government organ below the district, operating certain block-wide programmes on its own right as well as certain other programmes as an agency of the district local government organ. The village panchayat should, as far as possible and feasible, execute development activities located in the village.²⁵

²⁵ N. R. Inamdar. <u>Functioning of Village Panchayats</u> (Bombay : Popular Prakashan, 1970), pp. 4-6.

Development and democracy is the twin purpose of the Panchayati Raj. Development is modernizing rural mind to respond to the modern technology. Democracy is associating people with the process of decision-making. What a local government does or should do is linked with what the State/ Central government does or people expect it to do. An <u>a priori</u> list of functions is both impossible and unscientific. If the organizational relations between these various levels of government are expected to be of 'oceanic circles' each area-organization would be doing the functions which it would best perform. It would leave the rest to the higher bodies on the assumption that the same would be better performed at that level. At each level there would be enough and enough important functions to encourage and involve resourceful leadership in its working.

The functions of these local bodies can be grouped in three types: (i) civic, (ii) welfare, and (iii) social and economic. The civic functions are the traditional functions of the local bodies. These include sanitation, water-supply, construction and maintenance of streets, regulation of housing, street-lighting, control of fairs etc. Welfare services include education, public health, medical relief etc. These involve cost considerations and need minimum operational standard. These functions are always aided by the State government. To these functions 'social and economic' functions are added. These are broadly known

as 'development functions' and form the most important class of functions in the present context.

The Naik Committee of Maharashtra classified the schemes into four categories, viz., the State, District, Taluka-Block and Village Schemes. Schemes like research, State technical institutions, university education, national and State highways, central cattle-breeding farms, and development of industrial areas were prima facie considered as suitable for State operation only. Schemes from the remaining three categories were recommended to be transferred to the 'local sector' with certain reservations, e.g. schemes which involve adjudication of rights and obligation between individuals or as between individuals and the State (revenue/Tenancy Courts), schemes of intensive co-ordinated development like intensive development of cotton, development of fisheries, programme of contour-bunding, irrigation works irrigating more than 250 acres of land. Similarly in case of forest department the main function is not only the conservation and exploitation of existing forests but also to evolve afforestation schemes and maintain reserve forests. Till people realize the importance of afforestation it would be of little use by handing over the afforestation schemes to the local bodies. The Naik Committee had however recommended the transfer of minor schemes of afforestation to local bodies.

By definition local bodies are fit to handle schemes

under Community Development programme and by nature these bodies are the most suitable agencies for the schemes of the social welfare department. Also a large number of schemes of almost all development departments like services under 'Health' have been transferred to the local units. Adequately staffed and competent Building and Communication Department therefore becomes a necessity to the local units to cover building activities of these departments. Administration of loans, which are mostly for agricultural and irrigational purposes, for rural housing and cottage industries, and the extension work with regard to the cooperatives have become inevitable for these local bodies. It is only with these powers that a co-ordinated economic development of the area is possible. Primary education and basic education along with school buildings and the schemes of loans and scholarships have been historically with these local bodies. The State exercised control through the system of grants-in-aid.

The Mehta Committee favoured the following criteria regarding the allocation of functions. "The governing consideration in distributing the functions between the village panchayats, the panchayat samitis and the Zilla Parishad will generally be that all the functions concerning a yillage within the jurisdiction of a village panchayat should be the responsibility of the village panchayat except for functions involving similar interests of more than one

village panchayat : these should be the responsibility of the panchayat samiti. Similarly such functions of the panchayat samiti as may involve more than one panchayat samiti should be the responsibility of the Zilla Parishad.²⁶

First Schedule of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, gives subjects of activities including development activities covered by Zilla Parishads. Second Schedule gives similar list with respect to panchayat samitis. Also Schedule I of the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1958, records subjects of activities including development activities for a village panchayat.] It includes establishment and management of agricultural schools, crop-competitions, crop campaigns, distribution of fertilizers, demonstration of improved agricultural practices, improved seeds, establishment of godowns [Agriculture]; veterinary aid, excluding District Veterinary Hospitals, improvement of breed, cattle shows [Animal Husbandry]; Grant of Scholarships, freeships to backward class students, establishment of hostels for them, economic development of backward classes, removal of untouchability [Social Welfare]; primary schools and secondary schools - their establishment and maintenance, loans and scholarships to students [Education]; Subsidized Medical Practitioners' Centres, Rural

^{26 &}lt;u>Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects</u> and National Extension Services (New Delhi: Committee on Plan Projects, 1957), Vol.III, Pt.I, Appendix 6, p. 167.

Medical Relief Centres, Primary Health Centres, Supply of Medicine (including Ayurvedic and Unani), Maternity and child welfare centres, vaccination, Rural sanitation [Medicine and Public Health]; Construction and maintenance of village roads, Other District Roads, Major District Roads and bridges, administrative buildings, rural parks, construction under Public Health Schemes [Building and Communication and Public Health Engineering]; Minor irrigation works [Irrigation]; training-cum-production centres. grants-in-aid to individual craftsmen, stipend to trainees, promotion of village and cottage industries [Industries]; extension work in co-operation, publicity, work under Community Development programme, Local Development Works Programme and Rural Housing, Adult literacy, Kisan melas, Community Recreation Centres, Women's and Children's organizations and welfare [Social Education] and other miscellaneous work pertaining to the general welfare of the area.

Panchayati Raj - Various Aspects of Its Study

Penchayati Raj has now passed the experimental stage and has come to stay. In view of the shortcomings that have come to light its organizational structure and institutional framework may need modification. This institution has been characterized by a rewarding combination of development functions with the traditional functions of local governments. Hence it is no surprise that this living institution has been approached from various perspectives.

In the Foundations of Local Self Government in India, Pakistan and Burma (University of London, London, 1954) Hugh Tinker looks at it mainly from the historical angle. He refers to the favourable condition for the growth of local government in England (viz. expanding economy) and the efforts of the Utilitarians and the Fabians to revive the institution. Tinker traces the history of Indian local government. In the early nineteenth century it was natural that local government was regarded as an extension of government. The Riponian regolution converted it into an educational apparatus. Tinker deals with the Royal Commission on Decentralization (1907) and the Morley-Minto reforms (1909) as the path-breaking landmarks in the history of local government. These clearly indicated that the period of tutelage was over. He also analyses the strain on the development of these institutions with reference to the disturbed political atmosphere in India during the first half of the twentieth century.

Community Development organization is a version of local government and is frequently employed in developing countries. There is abundant literature available on the subject and the organization has been constantly under study. Evolution of the concept of the Community Development has been the subject matter of one Central government report. Ministry of Community Development, Panchayati Raj and Cooperation of the Government of India, New Delhi has published

a report entitled 'Evolution of Community Development in India' (1963), wherein the history of the conceptual growth of the community movement from the Baroda Experiment down to the Nilokheri township has been traced,

The Programme Evaluation Organization of the Planning Commission, New Delhi, has turned out a number of evaluation reports dealing with various aspects and activities of the Community Development Organization. Thus the Fifth Evaluation Report (1958), the first report after the implementation of the Mehta Committee report (1957), deals with the organization of the block, its financial pattern, the office of the Village Level Worker, and the organization at the village level. The Sixth Report deals with co-operatives and the Seventh Report in main deals with Agriculture and rural industrialization.

The role and the functionining of village panchayats have been a resourceful subject for many studies, e.g., <u>A</u> <u>Study of Panchayats</u> [Programme Evaluation Orgenization, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 1958]. Some studies are conducted by social and political organizations also, like <u>The Report of the Congress Village Panchayats Committee</u> [All India Congress Committee, New Delhi, 1954]. Co-operative and its link with village panchayat has been a similar subject of study e.g. <u>Panchayat and the Co-operatives</u> [Ministry of Community Development and Co-operation, Government of India, New Delhi, 1961]. Similar specific aspects

picked up for study are <u>Panchayat Raj Elections</u> [Government of India, Ministry of Community Development and Co-operation, 1965], and <u>Collector in the Nineteen Sixties</u> [Indian Journal of Public Administration, Special Number, Vol. XI, No. 3, July-September 1965]. The latter reviews the role of the Collector in its historic setting and studies the impact of the Panchayati Raj movement on his historic duties and emphasizes his special role in developing countries.

Decentralization for Democracy [by Henry Maddick : Division for Public Administration, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N.O., New York, 1961]; <u>Decentralization</u> for National and Local Development [Department of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N.O., New York, 1962], <u>Rural Develop-</u> ment Administration [P. R. Dubhashi, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1970] look at the problem from the organizational point of view. Shri Dubhashi says rightly, "In recent years Development Administration has come to be recognized as a distinct form of Public Administration with special reference to the under-developed countries. Together with the 'Economics of Growth' and 'Politics of Modernity', Development Administration has assumed a central place in the discussions on the process of change that is unfolding itself in the developing world of today."²⁷

27 P. R. Dubhashi. <u>Rural Development Administration in</u> <u>India</u> (Bombay : Popular Prakashan, 1970), Introduction, p. ix.

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Maddick deals with the common problems of development and the operational aspect of these institutions with special reference to the field services, popular control and the organizational partnership involved. The U. N. report concerns itself with the forms of decentralization, size of the area and tiers of administration, problems of people's participation and the hierarchical relationship in the organizational structure.

The problem has been studied from the point of view of other disciplines also. India's Roots of Democracy [Ensminger and Taylor, Orient Longmans, Calcutta, 1965], Indian Village and India's Changing Villages [S. C. Dube, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1955 and 1958 respectively] emphasize the sociological aspect of the concept. Taylor looks at the village rather as a social organism than a social organization. He states that a prior study of the social setting is a sine que non for the understanding of any social phenomenon. Indian Village is a case study of Village Shamirpet [Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh]. Shri Dube regards the village as a territorial as well as a social, economic and ritual unit. Alongside the economic structure he deals with the web of family ties and caste considerations. These form the backbone of the village-structure. In 'India's Changing Villages' he gives emphasis on cultural factors in the Community Development. He insists that a wide-scale acceptance of a particular programme is determined

by a complex of cultural factors "ranging from simple habits and accepted social practices to the intricate patterns of belief, social structure, world-view and values and attitudes."²⁸

The U.N. study report [Bangkok, 1960] links Community Development and Economic Development and sets it against the Asian setting. The Report states that developing a society is developing its productivity not only in the aggregate but on per capita basis also. Community Development project will therefore have to make a substantial contribution in the economic sphere by increasing agricultural output in an agricultural economy like ours.

There are a number of evaluation studies and analytical readings on the working of the Community Development, e.g., <u>Indian Journal of Public Administration</u>, New Delhi, Special Number on Panchayati Raj, October-December 1962, Vol. VIII, No. 4; <u>The U. N. Community Development and</u> <u>Evaluation Mission</u> (Coldwell Mission) [Government of India, Ministry of Community Development, 1959]; <u>Seminar on Public</u> <u>Administration in Panchayat Raj</u>, Mussoorie, 1962, Agenda Papers [Central Institute of Community Development, Government of India, New Delhi, 1962] - the list is too long for its mention here.

28 S. C. Dube. <u>India's Changing Villages</u> (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1958), p. 132.

Even with this the importance of case studies cannot be minimized. The Report of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee served as a model for the Panchayati Raj institutions throughout the States. But in its implementation the States have departed more than agreed with one another on the model of Panchayati Raj. The Maharashtra pattern is based on the recommendations of the Naik Committee [Report of the Committee on Democratic Decentralization, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1961]. There are wide variations in the statutory patterns among different States. The size and population of village panchayats vary widely from State to State, many times within the States also. The Sarpanch of the gram-panchayat is directly elected in Rajasthan; in Maharashtra the panchas elect the sarpanch from amongst themselves. In Mysore the panchayat samiti is indirectly constituted. In Maharashtra each Zilla Parishad constituency returns two members to Panchayat Samiti from the panchas forming the electorate. Representatives directly elected to the Parishad from the constituencies within the area of the Panchayat Samiti are also the ex-officio members of it. The functions and powers of Zilla Parishad vary considerably from State to State. It is a co-ordinating body in Rajasthan; it is partly administrative in Andhra Pradesh, and fully executive and strongest of the Panchayati Raj bodies in Maharashtra.

Even within the State, the performance of these bodies

differs depending on socio-economic factors. This underlines the importance of the case study method. Various case studies have been conducted like <u>Functioning of Village</u> <u>Penchayats</u> [N. R. Inamdar, Popular Prakashan, Bombey,1970], <u>Penchayati Raj in Rajasthan--A Case Study in Jaipur District</u> [M. V. Mathur and associates, Impex India, New Delhi, 1966], <u>Panchayat Samitis--A Case Study in Andhra Pradesh</u> [B. <u>Sarveswara Rao, Andhra University, Waltair, 1959, included</u> in Jacob, <u>Readings on Penchayati Raj</u> [National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad, 1967].

<u>Functioning of Village Panchayats</u> deals with the establishment of panchayets, democratization of their constitution, extending their scope and strengthening their financial and personnel resources, and the apparatus of audit and control over their working. It points out the gap between 'the ideal' and 'the real' and thus contributes to a better understanding of the village panchayats that have now assumed a more significant role in laying the foundation of a socially awake and economically secured democracy.²⁹ <u>Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan</u> looks at these institutions from the structural, organizational, functional and financial considerations. It thus deals with its leadership, the infra-institutional structure [the committee

29 N. R. Inamdar, <u>Functioning of Village Panchayats</u> (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1970), Introduction, p. 11.

system], its organizational behaviour and financial tendencies. It also critically examines the working of gramsabha. The Andhra case study refers to a set of two panchayat samitis--one with a poor soil, with little irrigation potential, backward in technology, in standards and levels of living [Panchayat Samiti, Pendurathi (Visakhapetnam)]; second in contrast is the Panchayat Samiti, Kapileswarapuram (East Godavari District) with alluvial soil, abundant irrigation, commerical crops, advancement in literacy, education and political awareness.

The Subject of Study and the Methodology V

Zilla Parishads in Maharashtra have completed about a decade of their existence. A State-wide evaluation survey has been recently completed. Similar evaluation studies have already been completed in other States also e.g., Report of the Committee on Panchayati Raj (K.B.Committee), Government of Mysore, Bangalore, 1963; Report of the Study Team on Panchayati Raj, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, 1964.

The present thesis seeks to enlighten the theme of Zilla Parishads as local governments and development organizations. To elucidate the theme an intensive study of a selected Zilla Parishad in Maharashtra viz., Zilla Parishad, Nasik, is proposed in this thesis. No such case studies have been done on the subject of the dichotomy of local government and development functions. The case

study of the Zilla Parishad, Nasik, follows the belowmentioned methodology:

(1) Study of the administrative records at the offices of the Zilla Parishad under reference and the two selected Panchayat Samitis one of which is largely irrigated and the other mostly non-irrigated, in the same Zilla Parishad. These also include relevant records at the State Government level. Village panchayats are excluded from this study on the following grounds:

- (A) They are not the creation of the Panchayati Raj Act;
 - (B) The Maharashtra Pattern of the Panchayati
- Raj is district-biased.

(2) Information collected with the help of the questionnaire administered to the members of the Zilla Parishad under study and the Panchayat Samitis inxquestion from the 1962 and 1967 bodies, and other persons and institutions connected with these bodies.

(3) Personal discussions with the elected officebearers and officials and other knowledgeable persons.

(4) Personal observations of the conduct of the meetings of the Zilla Parishad and the Panchayat Samitis under study.

(5) Selected case studies of the different aspects of the working of the Zilla Parished and Pancheyet Samitis under reference.

CHAPTER II

THE STATUTORY PATTERN

Community Bevelopment is a twofold process. It works on the initiative of the people. Also it works through their participation. The Committee on Plan Projects for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Services, popularly known as the Mehta Committee, observed that this primary purpose was not realized. The Committee attributed this failure to the creation of ad-hoc bodies at local levels. These bodies were mostly nominated, therefore of an advisory nature. The Report strongly felt that the replacement of these bodies by popular and vigorous democratic bodies had become long overdue. The Mehta Committee Report insisted on the creation of a statutory elective body comprehensive in its functions, equipped with adequate executive apparatus and supported by necessary financial resources.¹ The Mehta Committee accordingly urged for decentralization in the field of development. The Committee therefore recommended the creation of elective and responsive local bodies to carry out various development functions.

The recommendations of the Committee gave a stimulus

^{1 &}lt;u>Report of the Team for the Study of Community</u> <u>Projects and National Extension Service</u> (New Delhi:Committee on Plan Projects, The National Development Council, Government of India, 1957), Vol. I, p. 6.

all over the country to consider the problem of 'decentralization for development'. Rajasthan was the first State to re-design its system of local government on 2nd October 1959, in the light of the recommendations of the Mehta Committee. Andhra Pradesh followed it in November 1959, followed by the rest of the States. The Maharashtra pattern of democratic decentralization now called 'Panchayati Raj' rests on the report of the Committee on Democratic Decentralization. The Committee, known as the Naik Committee, was constituted on 1st May 1960, by the State Government. It submitted its report on 15th March 1961 and the 'Panchayati Raj' was introduced in Maharashtra on 1st May 1962. The Maharashtra Pattern - Selient Features

The Maharashtra pattern while following in general the recommendations of the Mehta Committee, differs significantly from its prototype in three respects. The Mehta Committee considered Block as the appropriate level of decentralization and envisaged Parishad at the district level as a co-ordinating body with supervisory and advisory unctions. Secondly, the Mehta Committee recommended the firect system of elections for interlinking the three rs of the proposed local bodies. Thirdly, it accepted principle of co-option with respect to the MLAs and of the State legislatures to these bodies. With the Community Development orgenization the Block me to stay as a development unit. Various technical

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With the Community Development organization the Block has come to stay as a development unit. Various technical

services are co-ordinated at the block level through the office of the Block Development Officer (B.D.O.). The block operates on a larger area than a village panchayat. But it is still small to retain the community sense, attracting the interest and the services of the people within the area. The Mehta Committee therefore favoured Block as the appropriate level of decentralization. This pattern is followed in the Rajasthan model.

The Naik Committee analysed the schemes operated at the district and the taluka (block) levels. It found that the taluka level schemes formed a small proportion of the schemes operated at the district level. Out of the total provision of Rs. 35.44 crores allotted for the district level schemes for the year 1960-61 provision for the taluka level schemes, including the Community Development Programme, came to Rs. 5.98 crores i.e. approximately 16 per cent. Even with such schemes, better execution resulted only after the co-operation of the district level authority especially in case of construction works and recruitment procedures. The Naik Committee therefore concluded that the District body was the best operative unit of local administration as it alone was capable of providing the requisite resources, necessary administrative and technical personnel and equipment required for a properly co-ordinated development of the district. In order to make decentralization tangible and substantial the Naik Committee recommended

a strong executive body at the district level.² The Mehta Committee, though favoured taluka as a unit for decentralization, still visualized the possibility of a sub-division or a district to take its place. Such a district unit would then be carrying out similar developmental activities but on a correspondingly larger scale than that of the Panchayat Samiti. In Maharashtra the Panchayat Samiti is not a corporate body. It is mainly the 'agency' of the Zilla Parishad.

The principle of indirect elections as recommended by the Mehta Committee, for the bodies above the Village Panchayat, establishes an organic link between the three tiers of the Panchayati Raj institutions. This helps their institutional co-ordination. Thus Sarpanchas are exofficio members of the Panchayat Semiti in Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa. In Orissa one additional member from the Village Panchayat is also selected to the Panchayat Samiti. But it is only through the direct elections, the Naik Committee argues, that a conscious sense of direct participation can be created. This would definitely improve the quality of local leadership. And it is this local leadership which is expected to develop through this experiment.

2 Report of the Committee on Democratic Decentralization (Bombay: Co-operation and Rural Development Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1961), pp. 74-75.

Most of the States, which have introduced the Panchayati Raj, have provided for the ex-officio membership to the MLAs and MLCs, with a right to vote also in some States viz. Madras. Andhra Pradesh, Mysore and Orissa. Similar ex-officio membership is extended to the MPs also, but it is provided at the district level organization except in Uttar Pradesh where he is also the member of the Kshetra Samiti. This membership is justified on the ground of liaison with State Governments. It also provides betterinformed leadership to these local institutions. The Naik Committee disagreed with this established practice on the ground that it would affect free discussions on local issues at local levels and would therefore dwarf local leadership. The Maharashtra pattern while excluding the ex-officio membership on these bodies to the legislators in the locality, has given them representation on the District Planning Advisory Bodies and has accorded them the right to receive information from these bodies. The Panchayati Raj bodies have been also instructed that, whenever a meeting is to be arranged with a Minister, legislators from the area should be invited to attend the same.

Ex-officio membership to the District Officers of Development Departments in the District level body is also a common feature where district bodies are co-ordinating and advisory in nature as per the Mehta pattern. There is a wide variety of modes for associating the officers to

these bodies. Thus, in Andhra Pradesh, Madras and Mysore the Block Development Officer is the member of the Panchayat Samiti. In Rajasthan all the district level officers can attend the meetings of the Panchayat Samitis. The Collector is the member of the Parishad in Andhra Pradesh, Mysore and Madras. In Gujarat he is an associate member. He is the President of the Parishad in Madras and Mysore while he is the Chairman of all its Standing Committees in Andhra Pradesh. In all the three States he exercises wide powers regarding the execution of work and powers relating to suspension/prohibition of the resolutions of the Panchayati Raj bodies.

In Maharashtra most of the district level officers of the development departments are under the administrative control of the Parishad; notable exceptions are the Civil Surgeon, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the District Industries Officer. The Collector is not associated with the working of the Zilla Perishad. He exercises certain controlling and directing powers, e.g., execution of a scarcity work.

The Statutory Pattern

The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act No. V of 1962) provides the following structure for the Panchayati Raj bodies in Maharashtra. The structure of Village Panchayats has already been provided for, by the Bombay Village Panchayats Act,

1958 (Bombay Act No.III of 1959). The structure has been so devised that the Zilla Parishad and the Panchayat Samitis are organically linked together. A Panchayat Samiti in a similar manner is linked with the Village Panchayats.

Zilla Parishad Constitution

Total elected membership of a Zilla Parishad is between 40 and 60. These members are directly elected, generally a population upto 35,000 returning one candidate. Chairmen of the Panchayat Samitis in the district are its ex-officio members. This establishes an organic link between a Panchayat Samiti and the Zilla Parishad. Panchayat Samiti acts as an agency of its Zilla Parishad for implementing development programmes. Therefore such a link is of vital importance. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes get representation on the basis of reservation according to the population norm and two women are co-opted on Parishad if they are not elected. This keeps the Parishad aware of its responsibilities in connection with the women and the backward class people and social justice control be extended to them through the Parishad mechanism. The Chairmen of five federal co-operative societies dealing with credit, land development, marketing, industrial cooperatives and co-operative training are co-opted on the Zilla Parishad. This makes technical guidance available to the Parishad.

Committee System

The Zilla Parishad works on a committee pattern. To this pattern certain advantages of the portfolio system also are added. There are seven subject committees: Finance, Works, Agriculture, Co-operation, Education, Health and Social Welfare (the last added recently), and a Standing Committee. If a Vice-President belongs to the Scheduled Castes/Tribes he becomes the Chairman of the Social Welfare Committee. The President, the Vice-President and the Chairmen of various Subject Committees are full-time functionaries. They are ex-officio members of the Standing Committee. They are responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the Parishad. As such they are paid honoraria and accommodation facilities.

Election to various Subject Committees is done by a single transferable vote. This helps the representation of all important groups in the Zilla Parishad and gives them all an opportunity in sharing the decisions of the Parishad. The term of the Body is normally of 5 years. The Deputy Chief Executive Officer works as the Secretary of the Parishad, while the district heads of the departments under the Parishad act as the ex-officio secretaries of the respective Subject Committees.

Panchayat Samiti

A Panchayat Samiti in Maharashtra works as an area committee of the Zilla Parishad. It therefore provides a

downward ex-officio membership for the elected representatives in the Parishad from the constituencies in the block. Each Parishad constituency is divided into two electoral colleges of panch and sarpanch each returning one panch/ sarpanch to the Panchayat Samiti, thus providing a working link between the Panchayat Samiti and the Village Panchayats in its area. There is a provision for co-option of Scheduled Castes/Tribes representative and co-option of woman member on the lines similar with the Parishad. Cooption of the Chairman of the taluka Sales and Furchase Union and one chairman of an agricultural co-operative society in the taluka provides technical guidance in allied subjects.

Chairman and Deputy Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti are from the elected members of the Samiti and are its full-time functionaries. They are accordingly paid honoraria and accommodation facilities. The law does not allow them to be a member of any Subject Committee of the Zilla Parishad nor occupy its Chairmanship. The Panchayat Samiti, itself a committee of the Parishad, works as a whole. In Maharashtra, a Panchayat Samiti is not a corporate body. In Rajasthan it is the fulcrum of the whole system. (In Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh there seems to be compromise between the two extreme ends where Zilla Parishads have specific administrative duties as compared with the Rajasthan type.) The term of the body is normally of five

years. The Block Development Officer is the ex-officio secretary of a Panchayat Samiti.

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Village Panchayat

Village Panchayat is a directly elected body with membership between 7 and 15. Panchas are elected ward-wise. The voters are the same as those who vote for State Assembly elections. The chairman of the village agricultural co-operative society is an associate member. There is a provision of co-option in case of woman representative and representatives from the Scheduled Castes/Tribes, on the lines similar with those of the Panchayat Samiti. The term of the office is normally of four years. The secretary of a Panchayat belongs to the Class III District Services. <u>Functions</u>

The First Schedule of the Zilla Parishads and Replacement Series Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 (pp. 6868 to 6874) enumerates the various subjects which a Zilla Parishad deals with executing and maintain works of developmental schemes. A Zilla Parishad is also empowered to engage in promotional activities from its own funds, in respect of health, safety, education, comfort, convenience or social, economic or cultural well-being of the inhabitants of the district. Replacement Series The Second Schedule of the Act (pp. 6874 to 6877) refers to the subjects which a Panchayat Samiti can deal with. Finance V

The most important source of income of a Zilla


Parishad is the government grant. Various grants are received by a Zilla Parishad and through the Parishad the Panchayat Samitis in its area. The first in order is the grant of the average land revenue. Zilla Parishad receives 70 per cent of it while remaining 30 per cent is paid to the Village Panchayats. Other grants are as follows: Equalization grant makes the land revenue grant equal to rupees two per capita of the population of the District in case it falls short of this minimum. Purposive grants cover 90 per cent expenditure on the concerned schemes. Plan grants cover the schemes included in the Five Year Plan and cover 100 per cent expenditure. Grants are also given to stimulate development and schemes of agricultural production have been so far considered under the incentive grants. Seventy-five per cent of the expenditure incurred on the administration is covered by the Establishment grant. Deficit adjustment grant is a device to fill in the gap between the income of the Parishad and the expenditure incurred in excess by it on the development schemes. Government stipulated that the Deficit Adjustment Grant would be totally discontinued from 1972. By that time the Zilla Parishads would be in a position to increase their revenues sufficiently to cover this gap. Surcharge on Stamp duty and forest grants are additional sources of revenue. The main source of own income of a Zilla Parishad is an increase in land cess and the matching grant received on it.

For a Panchayat Samiti the main source of income is the block grant received according to the schematic pattern. Land Revenue Recoupment Fund provides for deficits on account of land revenue in case of its suspension or remission by the Government.

Imposition of taxes is a potential source of revenue which Zilla Parishads and Village Panchayats can tap. Panchayat Samiti, a non-corporate body, cannot levy taxes.

The essence of Panchayati Raj is a three tiered organic structure entrusted with a wide range of development functions and with popular participation as its 'modus operandi'.³ The Maharashtra pattern, while modifying the Committee pattern as advocated in the Mehta/report, seeks to satisfy these conditions. Its success depends on the extent to which it can stand the 'Ten Acid Tests' enunciated at the Hyderabad Conference on Community Development in July 1961. The most important amongst these tests are: (i) increase in agricultural production, (ii) utilization of resources--men and material, (iii) assistance to the weaker sections of the community and (iv) progressive dispersal of authority and initiative both vertically and horizontally with special emphasis on the role of voluntary associations.

3 Henry Maddick. <u>Panchayati Raj--A Study of Rural Local</u> <u>Government in India</u> (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1970), p.71.



CHAPTER III

INTRODUCING THE DISTRICT

Rhomboidal in shape, the district Nasik is situated partly in the Tapi river basin and partly in the Upper Godavari river basin. The total geographical area of the district is 15,573 sq.kms. and its total population according to the 1961 Census is 18,55,246. The district occupies 5.08 per cent of the area of the Maharashtra State and comprises 4.69 per cent of its population. According to the area covered, the district stands fifth in the State of Maharashtra and according to the population it is third in the State.

The district Nasik lies between 19° 33' and 20° 53' North latitude and 73° 16' and 75° 6' East longitude. It is surrounded by Dangs and Surat districts of Gujarat State on the North-West, Dhulia district on the North, Jalgaon district on the North-East and East, Aurangabad district on the South-East, Ahmednagar district to the South and Thana district on the South-West and West. <u>Geographical Features</u>

The district can be broadly divided into three zones as follows: (i) the Western zone, (ii) the Central zone and (iii) the Eastern zone.

The Western zone includes talukas Peint, Surgana

and the Western parts of the talukas Igatpuri, Nasik, Dindori, Kalwan and Baglan. This some resembles more the Konkan tract than the Up-Ghat areas and is known as the Dangi or Kokan area. The rainfall in this zone is the heaviest in the district, over 3500 mm. annually. The area is mostly covered by forests. Major portion of the area under cultivation in this zone is situated on slopes and terraces with poor shallow soil where Paddy, Nagli and Khuresani (local oilseed) are grown.

The Central zone consists of the Eastern parts of Igatpuri, Nasik, Dindori, Kalwan and Baglan talukas and the Western parts of Sinnar and Niphed talukas. The climate is equitable and dry. The rainfall is moderate between 635 to 1016 mm. annually. The soil is medium. With irrigation facilities, the area produces the main food crops of the district, Bajra and Wheat, and grows commercial crops like Sugarcane, Grapes and Vegetables.

The Eastern zone consists of Yeola, Chandor, Nandgaon and Malegaon talukas and the eastern parts of Sinnar and Niphad talukas. The rainfall is lowest in this area. It is less than 635 mm. and that too is uncertain. The area is almost plain. It contains rich black and medium black soil. It is served with a network of irrigation facilities. The area produces food crops like Bajra and Jowar and cash crops like Cotton, Groundnut and Sugarcane.

The climate except for the western slopes of Sahyadris,

is salubrious in general. The climate of western parts, particularly below the ghat area in Peint and Surgana mahals, is different from the district in general. It is somewhat similar to that prevailing in Thana and Kolaba districts, with severe but short winter and sultry and long summer.

Hilly Ranges and the River System

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With the exception of the Sahyadris, the general direction of the mountain ranges is from the West to the East, with the higher portion nearer to the West. Both flat-topped and peaked mountains are found, the former predominate in number though not necessarily in height.

In the extreme North, the Selbari range approximately forms the boundary between the districts of Nasik and Dhulia. The Satmala or the Ajanta range runs across the district and acts as a watershed between Girna and its tributaries, draining towards the river Tapi on the one hand and the river Godavari and its tributaries on the other. A low range separates Dindori taluka from Nasik taluka and it contains a curious mass of rocks considerably higher and bolder than the surrounding elevation. The eastward range from the Sahyadris, towards south in Igatpuri taluka, contains very high summits, the highest being Kalsubai, with an elevation of about 5,400 feet.

The district is drained by the two chief rivers, the Girna and the Godavari, with their tributaries. The Girna

rises at the West of the district in the Satmala ranges, near Hatgad, in Surgana Mahal and flows through the talukas of Surgana, Kalwan, Baglan (Satana) and Malegaon and passes into the district Jalgaon. The Godavari river rises at Brahmagiri in the Trimbak range to the South, and flows through the talukas of Nasik and Niphad and passes into the district of Ahmednagar. The Nasik district has got six important perennial rivers with the following length in the district (Table 3.1). The other important seasonal rivers are Mosam (80 kms.), Pimpalas (46 kms.) and Nasardi (46 kms.).

Table 3.1 : River System in Nasik District (Perennial Rivers)

| | ~ | Talukes through which it flows |
|---------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Darna | 80 | Igatpuri, Nasik, Dindori, Niphad |
| 2. Kadwa | 74 | Dindori, Niphad |
| 3. Kotwan | 30 | Dindori |
| 4. Manyad | 48 | Nandgaon |
| 5. Godavari | 111 | Nasik, Niphad |
| 6. Girna | 144 | Surgana, Kalwan, Baglan, Malegaon |
| (Bombay : Bur | c Review and Dist ik District (1968 Seau of Economics Maharashtra), p. | -69 end 1969-70) and Statistics, |

The Administrative Set-up

The territory of the district Nasik, as it stands today, was formerly included, partly in Khandesh district (Dhulia) and partly in Ahmednagar district. It was in 1869, that Nasik was made a full-fledged district with eight subdivisions of the Ahmednagar district, three sub-divisions of the Khandesh district and the State of Peint. Territorial changes continued on the grounds of administrative convenience. At present the district is divided into 11 talukas and two Mahals. The administrative set-up is shown in the Table 3.2.

The District Local Board Nasik

The organization of the District Local Board Nasik is a predecessor organization to the organization of the Zilla Parishad. Constituted under the Bombay Local Boards Act, 1923, the Nasik District Local Board was reconstituted vide Government Resolution, Local Self and Public Health Department No. DLB.1056/C dated 17th December 1956. It raised the membership of the District Local Board Nasik, from 48 to 56. The break-up of the seats was as follows.

| | Categories of the Seats | | | | | ., | | | Number | | |
|----|-------------------------|-----|------|----|-------|-----|------|-----|---------|---|----|
| 1. | Reserved | for | the | Sc | hedu] | led | Cast | tes | • | | 6 |
| 2. | Reserved | for | the | Sc | hedu] | ed | Tri | bes | ٢. | | 16 |
| Ś. | Reserved | for | Wom | en | i | • | • • | • | | 7 | 2 |
| 4. | General | | •• • | ×, | | | • | | , | • | 32 |
| | | | • | , | | 5 | To | tal | · · · · | | 56 |

| District/Taluka | Name of the Headquarters | Area in sq.miles | No. of inhabited villages | No. of Towns | Population in 1961 |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| <u>Nasik District</u> | Nasik | <u>6013.0</u> | 1,652 | <u>15</u> | 1,755,246 |
| 1. Baglan Taluka | Satana | 628.5 | 152 | . 1 | 153,470 |
| 2. Malegaon Taluka | Malegaon | 754.2 | 139 | 2 | 313,008 |
| 3. Surgana Mahal | Surgana | 316.4 | 158 | - | 58,247 |
| 4. Kalwan Taluka | Kalwan | 431.0 | 159 | 1 1 1 1 | 99,593 |
| 5. Peint Mahal | Peint | 341.8 | 149 | • • • | 68,425 |
| 6. Dindori Taluka | Dindori | 496.1 | 122 | - | 112,110 |
| 7. Chandor Taluka | Chandor | 369.8 | 102 | . 1 | 96,931 |
| 8. Nandgaon Taluka | Nandgaon | 430.7 | 80 | 2 | 121,211 |
| 9. Nasik Taluka | Nasik | 524.5 . | 129 | 5 | 327,281 |
| O. Niphad Taluka | Niphad | 417.4 | 119 | 1 | 154,990 |
| l. Yeola Taluka | Yeola | 403.7 | 117 | 1 | 103,326 |
| 12. Igatpuri Taluka 🍸 | Igatpuri | 377.3 | 125 | 1 | 113,251 |
| 13. Sinnar Taluka | Sinnar | 516.6 | 101 | 1 | 133,403 |
| Source : Census of Ind | ia <u>, 1961</u> Distri | | | | |

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Table 3.2 : The Administrative Set-up of the District of Nasik

The number or nomenclature of the Subject Committees were not fixed under the Act. In case of District Local Board, Nasik, four Subject Committees were appointed viz., the Standing Committee, the Public Health Committee, the Budget Committee, and the Works Committee. Primary Education was purely the function of the School Board. The District Local Boards had little concern except to the extent of contributing the prescribed share in the Local Fund Cess received by them. The District Local Board would in general meet once in a month. The number of meetings held during the years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60 were 13, 8 and 7 respectively. The average attendance according to the records of the meeting was commendable. It varied between 80.36 per cent to \$2.50 per cent.


Land revenue grant (grant on account of 15 per cent land revenue) and local rates formed the most important sources of income to these bodies. The Land revenue grant proceeds were Rs. 2,59,029 in the year 1958-59, and Rs. 1,18,166 for the period from 1-4-1959 to 30-4-1960. In case of local rates figures for the same periods stood at Rs. 5,47,621 and Rs. 6,54,865 respectively. Other important sources of receipts were hospital receipts, receipts from tolls on ferries and roads and government contributions for civil and medical works. District Local Boards lacked substantial and expanding sources of income. Total receipts excluding opening balance, for the District Local Board,

Nasik during the years 1958-59 and 1959-60 (including period upto 30th April 1960) were Rs. 30,98,198 and Rs.31,55,255 respectively.

The trend of expenditure showed a steady rise. The total expenditure of the District Local Board, Nasik in the year 1958-59 was Rs. 28,95,083. In the year 1959-60 (including period upto 30th April 1960) the expenditure was Rs. 29,63,851. Important heads of expenditure of the District Local Board were Administration, Education (on account of the contribution of the prescribed share of the Local Fund Cess), and Medical and Civil Works. The general trend of increase in expenditure can be seen from Table 3.3 which details expenditure under the head 'Administration'. Teble 3.3 : Trends in Expenditure - Head 'Administration'

| | 1958-59 | 1959-60 (including period upto 30-4-1960) | | | | |
|--|----------|---|--|--|--|--|
| Office Establishment | 85,665 | 1,03,388 | | | | |
| OIIICS Parsonaliment | 0,007 | 1,00,000 | | | | |
| Office Contingency and Stationery and Printing | 20,463 | 15,808 | | | | |
| Establishment (Octroi) | 13,694 | 30,038 | | | | |
| Travelling Allowance for Establishment | 852 | 821 | | | | |
| Travelling Allowance to D.L.B. Members | 15,991 | 15,242 | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Total | 1,36,665 | 1,65,297 | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Source : <u>Annuel Administrative Reports, 1958-59 and 1959-60</u> (Bombay: District Local Boards, Government of Maharashtra, 1965). | | | | | | |

The context of local government changed in 1947 when India became independent. With the object of associating people with administration and with the desire to increase the pace of development, Government established in every district a Rural Development Board, side by side with the District Local Board. By the Primery Education Act, 1947, the Government of Bombay, took upon themselves the responsibility of primary education from the local bodies. The District Local Boards were thus gradually divested of a large part of their primary functions before they were finally replaced by the Panchayati Raj institutions.



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CHAPTER IV

THE EMERGING INSTITUTIONAL REALIZATION

Political leadership is a vital condition for the success of any government and in democratic government it is more true. Modern governments are development-oriented and by the very nature of the development process they are deeply involved in the people, their institutions and the ways of thinking. Here the presence or absence of resourceful and responsive leadership would mean the difference between the success or failure of a development programme.

Leadership - The Concept

Indeed, rural progress would be real and enduring only when it would be accepted and exerted for, through the effective leadership of the area. It is through this leadership that the community understands its problems, realises its responsibilities, exercises the necessary power and maintains a constant and intelligent watch on local administration.¹

The institutional purpose, strength and success of the Panchayati Raj bodies would depend on the creation and

¹ Balwantrai Mehta Committee on Plan Projects. <u>Report</u> of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service (New Delhi: Committee on Plan Projects, 1957), p. 23.

development of the right type of leadership in rural areas. This leadership is a hope in activating village organizations to cover all people, including weaker sections of the community, under common programmes of development. Leadership at lower levels of administration has, therefore, assumed greater importance. Rural leadership, the political ties and pressures, influence of political factors in the decision-making process, would all assume greater significance than even the development activities for which Panchayati Raj institutions were primarily created.²

The Third Five Year Plan lists following functions of the leadership.³

- 1. To bring about public participation and promote the acceptance of programmes by the people.
- 2. To assist village panchayats and co-operatives in their work.
- 3. To assist in training programmes for village leaders and others.
- 4. To organize programmes for the benefit of the community using local manpower resources.
- 5. To promote the rehabilitation of the weaker sections of the population.

2 Ralph Retzlaff, <u>Political Change in Rural India</u> (Philadelphia: Association for Asian Studies, 1963), p. 2.

3 <u>Third Five Year Plan</u> (New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, 1961), p. 341. The leadership problem has three aspects. The sociological aspect deals with the social surrounding of the emerging leadership - the institutional limitations and social changes brought therein. The structural aspect is related to the formal and informal relationships established or expected between non-officials and officials at different levels of administration. The political aspect looks at leadership as a function of political parties and tries to evaluate its role within the accepted framework of political practices and political realities. [The structural aspect forms the subject matter of an independent chapter (Chapter IX - Panchayati Raj and the People) and, hence, is not dealt with in this chapter.]

Statutory Provisions of Representation

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The statutory provisions for various types of representation with their numerical limits at different levels of Panchayati Raj institutions in Maharashtra are as follows:

(i) The Zilla Parishad consists of councillors chosen by direct election from electoral divisions in the district. The total elected strength of the House is between 40 and 60. There is one councillor as far as is practicable for every thirty-five thousand of population.

(ii) If the elected councillors do not include a woman then two women each residing in a different Block in the District, and if the elected councillors include one

woman, then one more woman residing in a Block in the District (other than the Block in which the woman elected is resident), is co-opted.

(iii) The chairmen of all Panchayat Samitis in the District, ex-officio, are councillors.

(iv) The chairmen of such five federal co-operative societies as conduct business in relation to (a) credit,
(b) land development, (c) marketing, (d) industrial co-operative and (e) co-operative training or education, are also associate members of the Zilla Parishad.

(v) Reservation for the Scheduled Castes/Tribes as per population has been provided for.

Every Panchayat Samiti consists of :

(i) all councillors who are elected to the Zilla Parishad from the electoral divisions included in the Block,

(ii) the co-opted councillor (if any) residing in the Block,

(iii) the chairman of the co-operative society dealing with the purchase and sale of agricultural products in the Block,

(iv) the chairman of a co-operative society conducting business relating to agriculture other than that referred to at (iii) (associate member),

(v) if the elected members of the Panchayat Samiti do not include a woman, one woman residing in the Block (co-opted member),

(vi) if the elected members of the Panchayat Samiti do not include a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, one member belonging to each group and residing in the Block (co-opted member), and

(vii) Sarpanchas elected by the members of panchayats. (Restriction of candidature to sarpanch was subsequently removed.) Each Parishad electoral division is divided into two electoral colleges for this purpose.⁴

(i) The Village Panchayat in Maharashtra consists of members between 7 and 15. Chairman (or chairmen) of cooperative society (or societies) conducting business in the village relating to agriculture or granting of loans are accorded associate membership.

(ii) Each village is divided into a number of wards and the number of members of a panchayat to be elected from each ward is determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner.

(iii) In every panchayet <u>two</u> seats are reserved for women, and having regard to the population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the village, reservation of seats is prescribed by the Government.⁵

4 The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act V of 1962) Replacement Series (Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1968), pp. 6773 and 6792 A-B.

5 Bombay Code, Vol. IV, Part III, 1959-60 (Government of Bombay, Bombay, 1961), pp. 5526-27.

The Sociological Aspect of Leadership

Sociologically, the individual is conditioned by his caste, by his family institution and by the village community taken together. Villager's outlook is limited to the village he lives in. Aptly the Russian name for village is the same word as that used for the universe.⁶

The village community as such weighs considerably on the habits and tastes of the individual, the traditions and practices of social behaviour and his scale of attitudes and values, which ultimately determine his participation in the programmes of development. The proper function of a local leader is to lift these local views and priorities and link the same with the comprehensive national views and wider plan priorities.

Family also occupies a very important position in the social organization of the village community. It covers and conditions limitless activities of the individual--his economic profession, his social status, his marital relations and his religious beliefs. It is a nest and a cage at one and the same time.⁷

⁶ Henry Maddick, <u>Seminar on Public Administration in</u> <u>Panchayati Raj, Mussoorie 1962, Agenda Papers</u> (Mussooria: Central Institute of Community Development, Government of India, 1962), p. 74.

⁷ S.C. Dube rightly says, "In social structure of Indian village communities, the family occupies by far the most important place. It derives its significance not merely from its economic functions and its dominant role as the agency of socialization and social control, but its ritual importance is also very great to the average Hindu." S. C. Dube. <u>Indian Village</u> (London: Routledge Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955), p. 131.

Caste system is the denominator of all social relations and events in life--and in the life to follow also. It restricts or releases opportunities in all walks of life, economic, political and social. It rigidly develops the concept of social status and creates 'a city within a city'. Social distance according to the caste-status results ultimately in the isolation of ideas and attitudes.⁸

Thus, the analysis of the sociological aspect of rural leadership in the Zilla Parishad under study would facilitate a proper realization of the political realities.

New institutions need new types of leadership-democratic and development oriented. The old type of leadership was criticized as urban-biased, caste-bound, conservative and naturally supplied from the upper classes, economically as well as socially. It was less elective also. Because of its composition and ethos it could conveniently perform the patronship (guiding) functions of leadership.

The role of leadership has now undergone a change. Now its partnership functions have come to the surface. Hence it is necessary to note as to what extent this change in its role is reflected in the composition of the emerging leadership in the pancheyati raj institutions.

8 Carl Taylor and D. Ensminger, <u>India's Roots of</u> <u>Democracy</u> (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1965), p. 60.

The new leadership in the Zilla Parishad under study is predominantly supplied by one caste--the Maratha, the majority caste in rural areas in Maharashtra. It has supplied more than half of the present leadership (67 out of 120 respondents i.e. 55.83 per cent) at the Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samiti levels taken together. At the Panchayat Samiti level this proportion is significantly higher, viz., 65.63 per cent (21 out of 32 respondents). The Zilla Parishad level leadership is shared by other castes, important among them being the Marwari (3.41 per cent), the Wani (2.27 per cent), the Mali (3.41 per cent), the Banjara (5.68 per cent), the Adivasi Kokna (22.75 per cent) and the Adivasi Koli (3.41 per cent). The Banjara community has settled in close-knit localities in specific parts of the district, and therefore could secure better representation. The Adivasis, all castes together, including Kokna, Koli and Thakur, inhabit much of the western part of the district and could therefore obtain representation on the basis of their numerical strength. The predominance of the traditional leader class (the Brahmins and the Marwaris-Wanis) has been liquidated from the rural local bodies. Taking into consideration the representation at the Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samiti levels the weaker sections of society like the Harijans and the Chamars, and the minority castes like the Mali (4.17 per cent), the Hatkar (2.50 per cent) and the Rajput (1.14 per cent), have

secured scanty and in some cases no representation. The Malis, popularly included in Maratha caste, could get the little representation they have because of their clustersettlements in specific areas. (Table 4.1) Majority castedominance seems to be an unavoidable feature of the leadership in under-developed communities.

Table 4.1 : Castewise Representation

| Caste | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|----------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------|
| Brahmin | | 1. | 2 |
| Weni | 1 | | |
| | | * | |
| Marwadi | 3 | • | . 3 |
| Rajput | 1 | - | - 1 |
| Maratha | . 46 | 21 | 67 |
| Mali | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Hatker | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Banjara | · · · 5 | 2 | 7 |
| Adiyasi Kokna | 20 | . 🛥 | 20 |
| Adivasi Koli | 3 | - | 3 |
| Adivasi Bhil | - | 1 | 1 |
| Adivasi Thakur | 1 | - | · 1 |
| Chamar | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Hərijan | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Non-response | - | | - |
| | | | · · · · |
| Total | 88 | 32 | 120 |
| | | | • • • • |

The majority of the representatives (117 out of 120 cases covered) (i.e., 97.50 per cent) have agriculture as

their main occupation. A majority belongs to the main bracket -- 6 to 20-- of the size of family. This bracket constitutes 71.67 per cent of the total sample. Small size families, upto 5 members, also form a conspicuous propor-It was gathered in the course of the investigation tion. that generally large families afforded the sparing of a few of their members for the social-cum-political work in the . local bodies. But now even small sized families are throwing up such leaders mainly because of the growing political consciousness in rural areas. Most of the representatives have studied in rural educational centres and a majority upto the seventh standard only (Table 4.2). Eighty-six out of 120 respondents, i.e. 71.67 per cent, have received education in rural educational centres. Fifty-seven have completed their secondary education (i.e., 7th standard) and 29 have studied upto the 4th standard. Together they form 71.67 per cent of the total respondents covered. Twenty-one members (17.50 per cent) have reached the S.S.C. standard while there are only 8 graduate members (6.67 per cent). Two members (1.67 per cent) had post-graduate degree also. This reflects the educational standard of the leadership in these local institutions at the Zilla Parishad and Penchayat Samiti levels.

The leadership is spread in a sufficiently even way over the various income groups. If they are broadly classified in two major groups, viz., (i) upto Rs. 6,000 yearly

| Place of Educatio | n N | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------|
| (A) Educational Standard | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
| Literate | 3 | | 3 |
| Primary 4th std. | 15 | 14 | 29 |
| Secondary 7th std. | 46 | 11 | 57 |
| S. S. C. | 15 | 6 | 21 |
| Graduate | 7 | 1 | 8 |
| Post-graduate | 2 | • • | 2 |
| Illiterate | - | - | · – |
| Non-respondent | - | - | - |
| Total | 88 | 32 | 120 |
| (B) Place of Education | Zille Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
| Rural | 62 | 24 | 86 |
| Urban | 24 | 8 | . 34 |
| Total | 86 | 34 | 120 |
| | | | |

and (ii) above Rs. 6,000 yearly, the proportion of the respondents distributed into these two groups is roughly 40:60, cases at either of the two extreme ends being minimum (Table 4.3). Only five cases (4.17 per cent) were reported

Table 4.2 : Educational Standard of the Candidates and the

| Te | ble | 4.3 | ÷. | Income | Pattern | |
|----|-----|-----|----|--------|---------|--|
|----|-----|-----|----|--------|---------|--|

| Income group Rs. | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Upto 1000 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| 1001 - 2500 | 19 | 3 | 22 |
| 2501 - 4000 | 6 | 3 | 9 |
| 4001 - 6000 | 7 | 5 | 12 |
| 6001 - 10000 | 18 | 5 | 23 |
| 10001 - 20000 | 11 | 9 | 20 |
| 20001 - 30000 | 10 | 3 | 13 |
| 30001 - 50000 | 7 | 1 | 8 |
| 50001 and above | 6 | 2 | 8 |
| Non-respondent | • | - | - |
| Total | 88 | 32 | 120 |

as having annual income less than Rs. 1,000. The number of respondents falling within the income group between Rs.1001-2500 annually is 22 (18.33 per cent). Together they form the low-income group constituting 22.50 per cent of the total representatives (not an insignificant minority). There were nine members (7.50 per cent) with annual income upto Rs. 4,000 yearly and 12 members (10.00 per cent) with an annual income of Rs. 6,000. The leadership seems to be concentrated within the rich farmers' group with an annual income between Rs. 6,001 and Rs. 30,000. The numerical strength of this group is 56, i.e., 46.67 per cent. Eight members, i.e. 6.67 per cent, had shown their income as between Rs. 30,001 and Hs. 50,000 annually while there was an equal number of respondents who had crossed this limit.

As regards the age distribution of the representatives the leadership in these institutions has been concentrated in the bracket of 31-45 years, these are 65.00 per cent of the total respondents (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 : Age Pattern of the Candidates

| Age group Years | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|---------|
| 21 - 25 | . 1 ., | 1 | 2 |
| 26 - 30 | | 2 | . 11 |
| 31 - 35 | 13 | 7 | . 20 |
| 36 - 40 | 14 | 12 | 26 |
| 41 - 45 | 28 | 4 | 32 |
| 46 - 50 | 6 | 3 | 9 |
| 51 - 60 | 12 | 2 | 14 |
| 61 and above | 4 | l | 5 |
| Non-respondent | 1 | • | 1 |
| in a chuẩn chuẩn Chuẩn chuẩn | | | |
| Total | 88 | 32 | · 120 - |

Two members were below 25 years of age while 11 members, i.e. 9.17 per cent, belonged to the age-group

26 to 30 years. There were 9 (7.50 per cent) members reaching 50 years of age, 7 members (5.83 per cent) reaching 60 years of age, and 5 members (4.17 per cent) belonged to the advanced age group. The leadership of these bodies thus leans towards the middle-aged group.

This leadership is equipped with various types of experiences. Majority of them have worked in multipurpose credit societies, and are linked with the activities of the supervising unions and farmers' associations at taluka and district levels. All are connected, at one level or the other, in one capacity or the other, with one of the five co-operative organizations represented in the Zilla Parishad. Representatives from Adivasi areas have organized forest workers' societies, and Adivasi Seva Societies at village, taluka and district levels, and have also run student's' hostels for them.

The leadership has received training in administrative work in local bodies. All the respondents have worked as Sarpanchas in their respective Village Panchayats before becoming the members of the Taluka Panchayat Samitis. A majority (86.67 per cent) of them have been the members of the taluka/district organizations of their respective political parties and have also participated in the activities of associate organizations of these parties.

It is interesting to note how the present leadership in these institutions thinks of itself and reflects on the

leadership of the earlier generation. Table 4.5 gives the details of it.

Table 4.5 : Responses on Leadership - Old and New

.

| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Both belong to good gradition | - | 2 | 2 |
| New leadership is develop- ment-oriented | 10 | 6 | 16 |
| New leadership is vigorous | 10 | 6 | 16 |
| New leadership is educated | 4 | 4 | 8 |
| New leadership is versatile | 6 | 1 | 7 |
| New leadership is power biased | 19 | 6 | 25 |
| New leadership favours short- cuts to power positions | 3 | - | 3 |
| New leadership is ego-centric | 2 | - | . 2 |
| New leadership is supported by money and power | 6 | 1 | 7 |
| New leadership is incompetent to hold together in-party groups | s 8 | - | 8 |
| Old leadership was competent to hold together the party groups. | - | 1 | 1 |
| Old leadership was based on political movements. | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Old leadership was having a 'faith' in its role | | 2 | 13 |
| Old leadership was mature | 2 | | 2 |
| Old leadership was haughty | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| Old leadership failed to create second line of leadership | 2 | - | 2 |
| | * • • • • | | · |

75

.

(continued)

. . Table 4.5 : (continued) Zilla Panchayat Total Parishad Samiti Old leadership was coming in the way of the New 1 1 Old and New are alike 6 2 8. Old leadership also was rural . 1 1 Old leadership was caste-1 biased _ and the second Total Responses 100 35. 135 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - **5**77 - 1949 - 1949 - **2**1 No Response 7 - - -Total No.of Respondents 88 32 120 _ _ _ and the second second states and the second states and the second states and the second states are set of the s

The new leadership is presented as the development oriented, resourceful, but at the same time a power-biased leadership. Its effectiveness is crippled by intra-party factions. In comparison with this the old leadership had a 'faith' in its role but at the same time it did not encourage free discussion within the party. To some members, both the new and old leadership were alike.

The Political Aspect of Leadership (Organization)

A set of the set of

The political behaviour of the Panchayati Raj institutions is linked up with the composition of its membership. the nature of election system adopted and the role of political parties in these institutions.

The main function of a village panchayat is to build up a local community sufficient to provide a firm base for development activities. It has to work in two ways. Firstly, weakening group solidarity which is the outcome of caste, family and old ties. And secondly, inviting leadership from a wider range of social segments and giving it a representative and responsive community base.

The election to village panchayats in Maharashtra and everywhere is direct with secret ballot, and it rests on adult franchise. In Maharashtra panchas are elected ward-wise and Sarpancha is elected by the panchas. In Punjab and Assam, Gramsabha elects panchas and Sarpancha also. In Rajasthan, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, panchas are elected ward-wise as in Maharashtra but the Sarpanch is directly elected by the Gramsabha.

At Panchayat Samiti level the composition of members differs in a significant way in various States and is related to their expected role in the development administration. In Rajasthan and also in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, Sarpanchas are ex-officio members. In some States (vis., Orissa) penchayats get additional representation. In some cases (vis., Assam) members are returned by village panchayat constituencies, in others (Madras, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab) by electoral colleges of panchas and/or Sarpanchas. In Gujarat, members elected to Zilla Parishad and Sarpanchas are ex-officio members of Panchayat Samitis.

In Maharashtra, members elected to Zilla Parishad are exofficio members of their respective Panchayat Samitis and a prescribed number of Sarpanchas (restriction of being a Sarpanch now being deleted) are elected from an electoral college of Panchas and Sarpanchas. (Appendix No. 1.)

The variations in the composition of district level bodies are also related to the expected role of these bodies. In Maharashtra, it is dominated by the directly elected members and the chairmen of Panchayat Samitis in the district as ex-officio members. Panchayat Samiti gets additional representation on Zilla Parishad in case of Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. In Rajasthan, Zilla Parishad is mainly an advisory body which consists of exofficio membership of Samiti Pradhens and M.L.A.s and M.P.s from the district. The predominance of the directly elected members in these bodies at any level is a sign of their real power. The indirect system of elections signifies less accountability of the representatives to the electorate.

In the composition of these bodies two aspects need special mention. One, the system of co-option at various levels, and two, the desirability of ex-officio membership of the M.L.A.s and M.P.s. Co-option is an age-old practice in local self government. But its justification in the context of Panchayati Raj institutions needs re-thinking. The co-option of women at every level of these institutions and also for the weaker sections of the society has some

social justification, though the purpose has been defeated. The functional usefulness of these co-options has not been significant. The co-opted members (other than those coopted on account of technical knowledge) have voting right and as such the system has been misused. Instead of getting able men in the body the system has been used, rather misused, to get 'trusted yes-men' in. Or the posts are distributed as political gifts among the supporters as in the 'spoils' system.

Co-opted women naturally belong to the households of rural elite class or to the families close to the centres of influence. In case of one Panchayat Samiti the co-opted woman representative was a close relative of the chairman of the Panchayat Samiti. In another case she was the wife of a prominent taluka leader. In still another case, a woman member was co-opted to the Zilla Parished, her representation was treated as a form of compensation. Her husband belonged to the ruling faction in the party in power, and was assassinated in a political feud. Still co-option of women needs to be continued, as it is linked with the concept of social justice. The case of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is also justified on similar grounds.⁹

Study Group on the Welfare of Weaker Sections (Chairman: J.P.Narayan) classified the families below the annual income of Rs.1,000 as economically backward. But this would result in too large a coverage as far as rural areas are concerned.

⁹ Weaker sections should be defined on the three-foldbasis--economic, educational and social--as per the 48th report of the Estimates Committee of the Lok Sabha referred to in the Report of the Committee on Panchayati Raj Election (Chairman: K. Santhanam)(New Delhi: Ministry of Community Development and Co-operation, Government of India, 1965), pp. 34-35.

Ex-officio membership of WLAs and MPs has a totally different context. The Community Development movement in its initial stage was an official movement and naturally MLAs and MPs were associated with it as a non-official element. If by Panchayati Raj institutions we finally mean local government institutions, the need for docking these representatives to such institutions becomes irrelevant.

MLAs and MPs naturally desire to nurse their constituencies. Where Panchayat Samitis are statutory and therefore strong, they fear the rivalry of the chairmen of these bodies. In Rajasthan the Pradhan overpowers the MLA of the area and establishes a relationship with him on the basis of mutual benefits. He is never reduced to the position of a 'pocket man' of the MLA or the MP from that area. The Government reaches the taluka level mainly through the machinery of Panchayat Samiti and MLA's influential say in the distribution of resources for development in his constituency is more political than economic.¹⁰

Tables 4.6 and 4.7 refer to the reflections on the ex-officio membership of the MLAs and MPs of these bodies and its institutional utility. The opinion seems to favour

^{10 &}quot;No member of legislature would forgo an arrangement so wonderfully helpful in making his importance felt in the local affairs of his constituency." B. Maheshwari, <u>Studies</u> <u>in Panchayat Raj</u> (Delhi : Metropolitan Book Co. P. Ltd., 1963), quotes B. G. Rao, "Undoing Democratic Decentralization," <u>Commerce Annual</u>, 1961, p. 87.

Table 4.6 : Ex-officio Membership for MLA/MP

-

| Yes No | He sho never a memb | be Respons er | • |
|--|--|-----------------------|--------------|
| Zilla Parishad | len der 1 e | 2. k - 11 | 88 |
| Panchayat Samitica 17 17 13 | · · · · · • • | eta de la 2 00 | ta 32 |
| Total 54 62 | , | | 120 |
| | an an an an an Sealainn Sealainn | | |
| Table 4.7 : Membership of MLA/M | | | |
| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Tota |
| Serves no utility | 40 | | 49 |
| Little bit useful | 21 | 8 | 29 |
| Detrimental | 2 - | 2 | 4 |
| No scope at present | 22 - | 13 | 35 |
| Depends on individual ability | 1 ., | - | 1 |
| Encroachment on Zilla Parishad organization | | | د د |
| No Response | 1 . 1 | - | 1 |
| | | | ; • • • • |
| Total : Coles - Deckarage - 100 | 8 8 | 32 | 120 |
| | | | •, • • |
| | | ably large n | umber, |
| the accepted practice. Still, | a consider | | - |
| the accepted practice. Still, viz., 54 out of 120 (Table 4.6) | | | |

(Table 4.7) lament for little scope left to him in the present circumstances. This is mainly because of the fact that most of the members of Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishad belonging to the responsive age group (31-45 years, Table 4.4) as referred to earlier, aspire for vertical movement in the leadership ladder. As such they are not prepared to minimize their effective role in these feeder institutions. Panchayat Samitis in Maharashtra are nonstatutory and hence any ambitious element is not retained longer at these levels of administration. If these bodies become statutory and sufficiently powerful, ambitious men, like 'Pradhans' from Panchayat Samitis in Rajasthan, would definitely plead for little guidance and help from the MLAs and MPs and would fully justify the present statutory provisions.

The Political Aspect of Leadership (Behavioural)

Direct elections to Penchayati Raj institutions run counter to the Sarvodaya concept of Panchayati Raj. If the structure of these institutions is conceived in terms of 'tiers' and not 'layers' then these need 'inter-linking' and not 'mere linking'. This well-knit inter-connected system implies the system of indirect elections. A directly elected Zilla Parishad may be a powerful body, but in this context it would never be a Panchayati Raj institution. On the contrary, the system of direct elections increases the political awareness of the voters and develops the sense of participation in the formation of these institutions. This helps the growth of a responsive and responsible rural leadership. A judicious mixture of direct and indirect systems of election would make these bodies sufficiently 'inter-linked' and at the same time adequately responsible.

The system of election, direct or indirect (and with it the role of political parties) is itself related to the concept of 'Panchayati Raj'. Jay Prakash Narayan describing the role of political parties in the 'Panchayati Raj' says: "The opinion regarding the role of political parties in Panchayati Raj is directly conditioned by the view held of its character, purpose and structure."¹¹

In a true Panchayati Raj system it is unnatural to divide community between the 'governing' and 'opposing' stay bodies. But politics has come to kay in these institutions. The Report of the Congress Village Panchayat Committee (All India Congress Committee, New Delhi, 1954) urged the political parties not to utilize panchayats as a means to their political ends and to endeavour for the establishment of typically British a-political traditions in local government institutions. But when it came to practice, a Committee of the Congress Party in Rajasthan recommended that party

11 Jay Prakash Narayan, "The Role of Political Parties in Panchayati Raj," <u>Indian Journal of Public Administration</u>, Special Number on Panchayati Raj, October-December 1962, Vol. VIII, No. 4, p. 602.

organization be modelled on the lines of the Panchayati Raj system. In response to this the then President of the Rajasthan Congress remarked that the Congress would see that it would be in majority in the panchayats even if she would not contest officially.¹²

Power and politics are twins. Those who are interested in the distribution of resources of development cannot ignore an institution which influences this distribution. Exclusion of politics from Panchayati Raj elections is an almost impossible end to attain. What we can do at the most is to check its evils.

Any excess is vice. If political parties are properly organized they can help creating a consensus and can maintain it. This consensus will form the 'terra ferma' for all development activities. Without it development would be uncertain, expensive and marked by undue strain.

Political parties do not create factions in rural areas though they conveniently live on the same. Political parties would act as a disintegrative force in close social patterns of caste and communal ties and would elevate all horizontally to one common platform.¹³ Also it is a

12 H.C. Mathur, "Penchayati Raj and Political Parties," Indian Journal of Public Administration, Special Number on Panchayati Raj, Vol.VIII, No.4, October-December 1962, p.613.

13 Myron Weiner, Indian Journal of Public Administration, Special Number on Panchayati Raj, Vol.VIII, No. 4, October-December 1962. "Party conflicts would be a more desirable form of conflict than that involving traditional loyalties." [P. 627]. structural anomaly when political parties are officially allowed at one level and not at the other, the lower level.

But politics at local level is less ideological and more ego-centric. Local politics is an interest-group oriented politics (definitely better than the casteoriented politics) where political party is utilized as a matter of convenience and not referred to as an article of faith. The whole politics revolves round one or two leading personalities. It extends to all fields of power in the area, from the multipurpose society in a village to its federative association at the district level. It finds its expression in extending local concessions. 'Who gets what' is a crucial question and even State-level leaders cannot afford to be indifferent as to what happens in their influence zones. In Maharashtra, Panchayat Semiti is a non-statutory body, but where it is not so, the question assumes serious considerations.

The analysis of the data pertaining to the Zilla Parishad elections studied here confirms these propositions, at the same time pointing towards their empirical adjustments.

The issue of tickets is an important consideration in the context of elections. The composition of the two elected bodies in 1962 and 1967 elections of the Zilla Parishad indicates that 42 respondents out of 88 (i.e. 47.73 per cent) at the Zilla Parishad level have contested

85.

only in the election of 1967, while 26, i.e. 29.55 per cent, of the 1962 Parishad Body could not and did not contest the Parishad elections in 1967. The picture at Panchayat Samiti level is not different where 15 respondents out of 32, i.e. 46.88 per cent, have contested only in the elections of 1967. While 8, i.e. 25.00 per cent, of the 1962 Panchayat Samiti bodies did not report at the Panchayat Samiti elections in 1967. Only 14 members, i.e. 11.67 per cent, were successful contestants in both the bodies, of 1962 end 1967, at the Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samiti levels. (Table 4.8).

| Teble 4.8 | : | Contesting | Panchay | yati | Raj | Elections |
|-----------|---|------------|---------|------|-----|-----------|

| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Participation in 1962 Fanchayat Samiti election | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| Participation in 1967 Panchayat Samiti election | 1 | 15 | 16 |
| Participation in 1962 Zilla Parishad election | 26 | - | 26 |
| Participation in 1967 Zilla Farishad election | 42 | - | 42 |
| Participation in election at both levels in 1962 and 1967 | 14 | · _ · | 14 |
| Co-opted and Associate member | 4 | 9 | 13 |
| No Response | - | - | - |
| Totel | 88 | 32 | 120 |

This is mainly because of a local faction developed during the general election in 1965. A faction in the district Congress criticized the official list of the candidates for the 1965 general elections as partial and favouring the group in power. It successfully tried for important changes in the list at the State-level organization of the party. As local politics is less ideological and more personal it has no end. Frequent showdowns are not limited to Parishad/Samiti bodies only but extend to all venues of power. It may be a Land Mortgage Bank in one case, and a District Central Co-operative Bank in another. Or it may be an election of the Board of Directors of a sugar factory.

As local elections are not fought in reality on party programme as such, the issue of ticket gets a practical consideration. Out of the 86 responses regarding the reason for securing the tickets, 42 referred to the local work of the candidate and inclination of local groups of workers.

The candidates also do not observe much party discipline when they are sure of success in the election. In one case a locally influential candidate was refused ticket by the party organization at the taluka level. Because of his local work, and the traditional authority and the status of his family, he won the election. He subsequently became the Sabhapati of his taluka Panchayat Samiti. His hold on

the people in the area compelled the party boases to accept him in the party fold again. To this he readily agreed as he was aspiring for the membership of the State legislature. He knows that in general elections party organization is advantageous for success. He also seemed to be aware that much success of a non-statutory Panchayat Samiti rested on the cordial relationship established with the highest level body.

The principle of reservation and the system of the second second rotation is also used advantageously by the ruling faction of the party in power. In one taluka a Zilla Parishad constituency returned a pro-Communist representative in 1962 Zilla Parishad elections. The ruling group had no confidence in winning over him, or winning against him, so the constituency was declared officially as a reserved constituency for Adivasis. This was a typical example of 'gerry mendering'. Similar device was used against the condidate belonging to the other faction within the Congress Party, so as to block his way to Zilla Parishad in 1962 and 1967 elections. But he was successful in Panchayat Semiti elections in both the elections and again successful in retaining his chairmanship in the Panchayat Samiti and therefore got ex-officio representation on the Zilla Parishad against the wishes of the ruling faction.

The prospective candidates are at times 'pressurized' and many closed and filed cases in various organizations like the Land Mortgage Banks are reopened, informally discussed and action threatened. Fearing dirty linen being washed again in public a political bargain is struck, which rests more on personal interest and less on other considerations.

The official agreement reached between the two factions of the ruling party, informally known as the 'Andarsool Pact', consistently failed in its operation at the various important meetings of the General Body of the Parishad. These meetings were called to discuss the increase in cess and elections to the posts of officebearers of the Parishad and its subject committees.

The election manifesto is a personal appeal to voters on their local demands. The candidates officially sponsored by the political parties also concentrate in their appeal on personal work done by themeandidate in the locality and for the locality than the work of the party as such. The promise is for development probjects, from a percolation tank to petty repairs to a village road. The Panchayati Raj leadership being 'material benefits oriented' the man who brings an S.T. route for the village or a percolation tank naturally becomes the leader. Table 4.9 lists various promises offered by the candidates. It shows their agricultural and developmental bias. Percolation tank is a typical development activity in the Nasik Zilla Parishad. It appears prominently where there is more

| • • | * • • •, • • • • • • • • • • | Zilla | Panchayat | Total |
|------|--|----------|-----------|-----------|
| | | Parishad | | |
| 1. | Agricultural development | 13 | - | 13 |
| 2. | Attending local area development | 3 | - | 3 |
| 3. | Percolation tanks | 21 | 3 | 24 |
| 4. | Lift irrigation schemes | 2 | - | · 2 |
| ° 5. | Vasant bandhara | 5 | | 5 |
| 6. | Piped-water supply (drinking water) schemes | 8 | 1 | 9 |
| .7. | Minor/Village approach roads | 23 | 4 | 27 |
| 8. | Rural electrification | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 9. | Ventilation of local grievances | 29 | 6 | 35 |
| A1. | School buildings | · 9 | 2 | 11 |
| A2. | Relying on old record of service | 4 | - | 4 |
| A3. | Party Manifesto pleading maximum development work | 6 | _ | 6 |
| A4. | Influencing distribution of resources favouring the area | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| A5. | Clean administration | 6 | ••• | 6 |
| A6. | Taking people in confidence in administration | 1 | - | 1 |
| A7. | Maximum development works promised | 14 | 7 | 21 |
| A8. | Rural Sanitation | 2 | . •. | 2 |
| A9. | Work in Adivasi area | 3 | - | 3 |
| Tot | al Responses | 156 | 25 | 181 |
| N : | Response | 8 | 7 | 15 |
| | | | | |
| Tot | al Respondents | 88 | 32 | 120 |
| | | | | |

Table 4.9 : Election Manifesto

irrigation potential but less irrigation facility. Out of 181 responses recorded regarding the promises of development activities extended to the voters (maximum 3 per each respondent) 44 responses (item Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5) directly deal with agricultural development while 71 responses record other development activities (item Nos. 2, 7, 8, A1, A4, A7). Here roads, minor and village approach roads (item No. 7), are specifically referred to by 27 respondents. Ventilation of grievances and redressing them, the traditional service of a leader, also occupies an important place in the list of promises (item No. 9). Thirty-five respondents have accepted this work with pledge.

The nature of election manifesto automatically determines the nature of propaganda and the personal calculations of success or otherwise. The district level body in the Maharashtra pattern is a political body. Naturally the district units of various political parties were geared up in the process of propaganda. With a split among the District Headquarter officials, Congress, the party in power at the State-level, was more worried and hence State-level leaders and Ministers had arranged, during the 1962 and 1967 elections, extensive tours in various parts of the district under consideration and similar troubled areas in other parts of the State. Late Shri Vinayakrao Patil (the then President of Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee) toured these areas and tried with the help of Shri Vasantrao Dada Patil, the then Secretary of the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee, to patch up the differences between the party rank and file, either by assuring justice within the party itself¹⁴ or threatening disciplinary action against the rebels.¹⁵

The major problems of the District come up during the election period. Each group tried to utilize them and exploit the situation. Issues which the opposition groups wanted to capitalize were mainly (i) increase in cess on agriculture, (ii) service fees at Parishad dispensaries, (iii) the impact of profession: tax on small traders, (iv) residence and other problems of the agricultural labourers, (v) grievances of the panchayat secretaries.

The Congress Party assuring solutions to many similar problems was in an advantageous position to promise 'projects of pride' for the District creating a 'District Image'. It promised to plead the case of Nasik for the site of the proposed North Maharashtra University, promised releasing works under the famine code and major irrigation projects, e.g., The Karanjwan Irrigation Dam (Taluka Dindori)

¹⁴ The Editorial, <u>The Daily Gaonkari</u>, 17th August 1962, Nasik. It quoted speech from Shri Y.B. Chavan, then, the Chief Minister, Maharashtra. Shri Vinayakrao Patil at an election meeting in Aurangabad, from <u>The Daily Gaonkari</u>, dated 21-5-1962.

¹⁵ Shri Khode, President of the District Congress, Akola District compared the defections with adopted sons who worry more about the estate of their parents than love them. The Daily Gaonkari, 26-5-1962.

| demanded since 1905. The plans | s were appr | oved on the | eve : |
|---|---|---|--------|
| of the election. Congress also | | | |
| fighters that she would strive | | | |
| | | • | |
| problems. People from rural an | reas were a | lso happy wi | Lth |
| the proposed extension of the (| | | There- |
| fore, the response to the party | str work was/ | ong as reflecte d | l in |
| the Table 4.10 (item 1) which the | tries to an | alyse the re | asons |
| for the success in the election | | | |
| | | | - |
| Table 4.10 : Reasons for Succes | s in Elect | ions | .' |
| | | | |
| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
| · • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • | | | |
| 1. Party work | 37 | 9 | 46 |
| 2. Effective propaganda | 4 | - | 4 |
| 3. Individual work | 71 | 13 | 84 |
| 4. Caste-majority | - 4 11 - | 1 1 | 5 |
| 5. Success in earlier State-election | 1 1 . | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | 2 |
| 6. Opposition candidate | ~ ~ | | 2 |
| not local 7. Contacts with people | 2 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1 | | ··· 2 |
| 7. Contacts with people | | - | • |
| 8. Supported by influential people in a locality 9. Voters prefer a change | 1 | • | 1 |
| 9. Voters prefer a change | 1 | - | 1 |
| Al. Family status | 2 | kan an a | - 2 |
| A2. Educational level of the candidate | 1 | - - | 1 |
| Total Responses | | | 152 |
| No Response | | | 10 |
| | | | 120 |
| Total Respondents | | <i></i> | 140 |
| | | | |

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Even with this, local problems weigh much. And here opposition groups were in a favourable position. In 1967 elections these groups were lucky in utilizing the services of a local paper at the district level. While the 'Daily Gaonkari' was looked upon as a pro-Congress paper, the 'Weekly Deshdoot' was treated as an anti-Congress paper. 'Weekly Deshdoot' covered news items, tours and activities of the opposition leaders and as an election tactic it favourably reported the speeches of the opposition leaders with inter-State status (viz., Prof. Humayun Kabir's address to the Bharatiya Kranti Dal workers reported in the weekly Deshdoot 22nd March 1967 or Shri Nanasahib Kunte's public talk on The United Front Politics, in its issue on 3rd June 1967). Twisted news items are a favourite game - like the news coverage of a public meeting at Jalgaon (District Jalgaon), where election malpractices of the ruling party were exposed (The Deshdoot, dated 8th March. 1971). Congress-Republican election front was also sensitive and rumours about its discord were frequent. Even if, such a rumour is refuted (The Daily Gaonkari, Nasik, 15-5-1967), the refutation comes late and in the meantime the purpose of the original rumous is served.

Local work of a candidate obviously weighed much in the factor analysis of the success in the elections (84 responses out of 152 recorded). Panchayati Raj institutions have succeeded the Community Development Organization which

had demonstrated a marked expenditure bias. In some cases villages voted for the candidate who assured to comply with the 'felt needs' of the villagers as such, viz., repairs to the school buildings. The community need is thus put to 'auction' and the votes go to the highest bidder (case in Taluka Niphad). In the Table under reference caste considerations as a factor influencing elections is concealed. The predominance of one caste in rural areas, the normal fact of cluster-settlements in specific areas of the minority castes, other than the Brahmins and Merwari-Wanis, and partly the sophistication in the replies, explain the absence of caste as a factor influencing election.

The responses about the media of propaganda are also conditioned by the nature of the election manifesto (Table 4.11). Here each member was asked to record not more than three preferences. Parishad election is a 'local' election on a 'local' programme. And, therefore, the whole propaganda machine is personalized. Naturally individual contacts and door-to-door visits (76 responses) assume greater importance than in general elections to legislatures. This is aided by local group discussions (37 responses) and distribution of election-pamphlets (53 responses). These pamphlets, as noted earlier, contain little of the party philosophy and concentrate more on the local work done by the candidate. The role of public meetings is also not insignificant. It

| The state of stopagailua | Table 4.11 | 1 | Media | of | Propaganda |
|--------------------------|------------|---|-------|----|------------|
|--------------------------|------------|---|-------|----|------------|

| Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|-------------------|---|--|
| 29 | 2 | 31 |
| 64 | 12 | 76 |
| 52 | 1 | 53 |
| 32 | 5 | 37 |
| • | - | - |
| 177 | 20 | 197 |
| 3 | 7 | 10 |
| 88 88 | 32 | 120 |
| | Parishad 29 64 52 32 - 177 3 | Parishad Samiti 29 2 64 12 52 1 32 5 - 177 20 3 7 |

has figured in 31 out of 197 responses recorded. This comes to nearly 15 per cent. But public meetings are effective more at the Parishad level elections than at the Panchayat Samiti level elections. At Panchayat Samiti level politics is practically personalized.

It is in the effectiveness of the new leadership that the strength or weakness of the Panchayati Raj institutions would ultimately depend. The purpose of elections is to create resourceful leadership at various levels of administration. If we look at the age-composition of this leadership it will be found that the effective leadership is concentrated in the age-group of 31 to 45 years. This age-group is adequately matured. It has already received firsthand experience of administration by working in various social, economic and political institutions at the village/ taluka and district levels. The group is not too young to rejoice the experiment of the Panchayati Raj with novelty nor too old to reject the same with hard boiled hesitation. Panchayati Raj bodies are development bodies and local government bodies at one and the same time. The character and the composition of the leadership would decide the extent to which and the way in which these two roles are fused.

Socially the leadership is dominated by the Marathas --the majority caste in rural areas in Maharashtra. When the institution of Panchayati Raj is meant for rural development this situation would appear to be natural. In addition it is an advantageous position, because development functions need assimilation of the decisions taken at a higher level and their adaption by the lower levels. This is a common feature in early stages of development and with plan-priorities. A body with such a rural bias will definitely quicken this process in rural areas.

The difficulty is with the educational level of this leadership. Most of the representatives have studied upto the 4th or the 7th standard. Together they form 71.67 per cent of the total respondents. In performing traditional local government functions this would pose little difficulties. But as far as the new development functions are concerned, this low level of education would limit the comprehension and appreciation of the true nature of these developmental-cum-local government bodies.

One good feature of this leadership is that it is economically representative in character. The rural government is naturally controlled by the rural elite. They are the first clients to whom the development ideas are easily sold. But the low-income group constitutes 22.50 per cent of the total respondents. The numerical strength of this class will have an effective say in spreading development over a large area.

The representatives have been associated with the local governments in their areas in the capacities of Sarpanchas/Panchas. Thus politically trained, they have also been associated with a variety of social and economic activities in their local areas. This has made them responsive. It is an asset in local government functioning.

CHAPTER V

THE INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOUR

The General Body of the Zilla Parishad is the plenary organization competent to decide policy matters in all respects and take decisions with larger financial implications. The committees have been delegated the functions of decision-making within certain limits, financial and administrative, and of detailed consideration at preliminary stage of various matters. The elected office-bearers also have been vested with certain decision-making powers.

The Committee System

Local councils all over the world make use of the committee system in their infra-institutional arrangements and India is no exception to this practice. The nature of people in general and the nature of local business in particular compel the framers of local institutions to earve out structural relationship within the institution on the lines of the committee system. The committee system dates from ancient times.¹

. 3

The District Council is too large a body to meet

1 The practice of instituting committees, both statutory and ad-hoc, to assist the Council of Elders was common. In Kautilya we find a detailed description of various committees and the duties allotted to them. It was more elaborate than the description given by Aristotle of the Greek institutions of his time.

frequently and to deal with a wide variety of activities. So it elects a few members from the council to attend to the day-to-day business of the council, retaining the ultimate responsibility with itself. The District Council would meet at fairly infrequent intervals and would endorse the decisions taken by its various committees in their frequent meetings. It may also guide these committees in their business by appropriate general body resolutions.

The nature of local business favours the committee system. The functions of these bodies are in main developmental. These concern with the allocation of resources, fixation of locations where these resources would be utilized, rousing people's co-operation in the implementation of schemes and the like. As these functions intimately affect the welfare of the people, it is essential and convenient too, to associate them in the processes of decision-making and to arrive at the decisions with maximum attainable unanimity through committee system.

The committee system not only lends acceptability and, therefore stability, to its decisions, it also fulfils the fundamental requisite of a participative democracy. The advantage of the committee system is that it associates the members even from the opposition not only with the processes of policy formulation but also with the details of the decisions and thus checks the bureaucratic dominance.

The Maharashtra Pattern

The statutory pattern of the committee system in Maharashtra is as follows:

Every Zilla Parishad appoints a Standing Committee and also the following Subject Committees :

(a) Finance Committee.

and the (b) Works Committee, a

(c) Agriculture Committee,

(d) Co-operatives Committee,

(e) Education Committee,

(f) Health Committee.

To this original list a new Committee on Social Welfare is added. Formerly this work was attended to by the Standing Committee.

In addition to this a Zilla Parishad can appoint ad-hoc committees for enquiry and report regarding various subjects dealt with by the Parishad. Reports of such committees are presented to the Standing Committee or the appropriate Subject Committees.

The Standing Committee consists of the President of the Zilla Parishad as its ex-officio chairman and the chairmen of the various subject committees as its exofficio members. There are <u>seven</u> councillors elected by the Zilla Parishad. Two persons with special knowledge or experience of the subjects dealt with by the Standing Committee are also co-opted by the Zilla Parishad. The Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Parishad acts as the ex-officio secretary of the Standing Committee. Till the creation of a separate Social Welfare Committee, the Social Welfare Officer of the Parishad acted as the exofficio Joint Secretary of the Standing Committee.

The Co-operative Committee consists of <u>five</u> councillors elected by the Zilla Parishad. In addition it has <u>five</u> 'associate' councillors. They are the chairmen of five federal co-operative bodies in the district. They have right to vote. The Education Committee consists of <u>seven</u> councillors elected by the Zilla Parishad. Zilla Parishad co-opts <u>two</u> persons who have a special knowledge or experience in the subjects dealt with by the Education Committee. <u>Two</u> presidents from amongst the Presidents of the non-authorized municipalities are co-opted on this Committee by the Zilla Parishad as the Parishad deals with primary education in these areas. Members in the last category are co-opted annually.

The Subject Committees of Agriculture, Works, Finance and Health each consist of <u>seven</u> councillors elected by the Zilla Parishad and <u>two</u> persons co-opted as associate members who have a special knowledge or experience in respect of subjects allotted to the relevant Subject Committees.

The Social Welfare Committee has a preponderance of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes members. Out of ten,

five members belong to the Scheduled Caste/Tribe, three to socially and educationally backward classes and two women members co-opted by the Zilla Parishad. The law provides that the Vice-President of the Zilla Parishad shall be the Chairman of the Social Welfare Committee if he is a member of a Scheduled Caste/Tribe. In such a case he cannot become the Chairman of any other Subject Committee.

The Heads of Departments of the Zilla Parishad act as ex-officio secretaries of their respective Subject Committees.

There are four Chairmen of Subject Committees (including the Vice-President of the Zilla Parishad). No Chairman can head more than two Subject Committees. The law, however, does not prescribe the specific allocations of committees to particular chairmen except in case of the newly constituted Social Welfare Committee.

Under Section 81 of the Act no councillor can be elected on more than two Subject Committees including the Standing Committee. With this arrangement practically all the councillors of a Zilla Parishad are enabled to become members of different Subject Committees and thus participate in the decision-making processes. The members are elected by the proportional representation system. The term of office is co-terminus with the term of office of the councillor of the Zilla Parishad.²

2 The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act. 1961 (Maharashtra Act No. V of 1962) Replacement Series No. XXXII (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1968), pp. 6798-6801. Prof. Maddick praising the committee system in Zilla Parishad from Maharashtra said that the Maharashtra Government Report on Democratic Decentralization provided perhaps one of the best rationalizations of the committee system.³ Committee System : The Structural Bearing

(1) Elections to the Subject Committees

The elections of members to the Subject Committees of a Zilla Parishad, as per the Maharashtra pattern, are based on the proportional representation system with a single transferable vote. In the absence of any such system

3 Henry Maddick, <u>Panchayati Raj--A Study of Rural</u> Local Government in India (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1970), p. 168.

the important committees might otherwise have been swarmed up with the majority group in the council. This tendency to monopolize the membership is seen in the Rajasthan pattern.⁴ This leads to the concentration of power within the dominant group and limits distributive benefits to a close circle. In such a case the participative function of the committee system is sacrificed. The proportional representation system mirrors the strength of the District Council in its verious Subject Committees. While associating opposition in the committee working it retains the responsibility of execution with the majority group in the council.

(11) Member Participation

Member participation is limited, though not discouraging. Obviously it is not ideally the best. The agenda may appear colourless but the meeting is rarely a dull affair. This is much more so, when we move from the Subject Committees to the General Body meetings of the Zilla Parishad; And from the Zilla Parishad to the meetings of the Panchayat Samitis. Discussion in the General Body meeting is livelier than that in the Subject Committee meetings. Similarly interest shown in the discussion by

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⁴ Here in one Zilla Parishad in Rajasthan, seven MLAs out of 17 were associated with one Committee (the Production Committee) and the strength of the committee was nine. M. V. Mathur and Others, <u>Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan</u> (New Delhi: Impex India, 1966), p. 61.

the members at the Fanchayat Samiti level is better than that shown at the Zilla Parishad level. At the village level, below the Sarpancha (not even the Deputy Sarpancha) there seems to be little realization of the active role of members in the decision-making. It is a difficult and drawn out process to create interest in these institutions and get local people involved in its working. More difficult when people were trained in the paternal approach to the government. It would naturally take time for them to participate actively in rural self-government and rural development which together mean Panchayati Kaj.⁵

This participation is the result of the "materialbenefits" orientation" given to these institutions and not necessarily of the realization of the principle of selfgovernment. Most of the members of the Subject Committees are concerned primarily with the interests of their talukas (to be more exact, their constituencies). They rarely visualize the district picture. (Representation on Subject Committees is not taluka-wise.) Out of 88 respondents 73 (i.e. \$2.95 per cent) stated that their approach in the deliberations of the Subject Committee meetings was to protect their taluka interests.

The meetings of the General Body appear to be dominated by the President (Sabhapati in case of a Panchayat

5 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 76.

Samiti). At times, the meetings are dominated by officials like the Block Development Officer at the Panchayat Samiti level. Sometimes a few prominent members belonging to the ruling or opposition groups dominate the proceedings. Most of the members are passive till it does not affect any interest of their areas. When it comes to that, they are without exception aggressive and are reluctant for any compromise which their group leaders would try for. Thus their representation serves at least the prime purpose--ventilating local grievances and bringing local problems to the fore.

The inside story of this perticipation can be realized by the ways in which the members think about their participation in meetings. Table 5.1 tells that nearly 42 per cent of the responses recorded (62 out of 145) referred to the raising of questions in the meetings and participation in the party meetings (items 4 and 5). In party meetings, members are informal and frank. The line of action is decided in the party meeting and then they appear to follow the lead of their leaders in the General Body meeting of the Parishad. It should also be noted that party meetings are rare at the Panchayat Samiti level. Only two responses out of 31 stated positively, that party meetings were held before the Panchayat Samiti meetings (item 5). The participation by tabling resolutions is obviously limited to the leaders and prominent members from either side. Critical speeches need a prior study of the problems under discussion.

| • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|--|-------------------|---------------------|-------|
| 1. Tabling a resolution | 8 | 4 | 12 |
| 2. Seconding a resolution | 9 | - 4 | 13 |
| 3. Critical speeches | 7 | 4 | 11 |
| 4. Raising questions | 19 | 12 | 31 |
| 5. Discussion in party meeting | 29 | . 2 | 31 |
| 6. Approaching the officer | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| 7. Independent action | 1 | | 1 |
| 8. Approaching office-bearers | - | 1 | 1 |
| 9. All types (Sr.Nos. 1 to 8) suitebly used | 27 | 10 | 37 |
| Total | 105 | 40 | 145 |

Table 5.1 : Nature of Participation

The co-opted membership has failed to come up to the expectations. Co-option to the subject committees presumes knowledge and interest in the subject covered by the committee. But the system is not fruitfully used. The principle of co-option is used for group politics and right type of men are not necessarily co-opted for the right committees. Out of 54 Councillors, who were the members of the various subject committees, 24, without hesitation, stated that the co-opted members served no useful purpose. The opinion of the members of the General Body, however, seems to be indecisive as tabulated in Table 5.2. Thirty-four

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| | | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | - Total |
|-----------|---|-------------------|--|---------|
| 1. | Co-opted/Associate members participate | 24 | 10 | 34 |
| 2. | Co-opted/Associate members do not participate | 20 | 14 | - 34 |
| 3. | Co-opted/Associate members have voting value | 8 | , e edu e e 4 | 12 |
| 4. | Co-opted/Associate members are useful if experienced (included in item 7) | | | |
| 5. | Co-opted/Associate members are useful if have voting right (included in item 3) | | and and an and a second se | ۰ ۱ |
| 6. | Associate members are disinterested | 3 | • | 3 |
| 7. | Associate members participate according to their subjects | | na ser e | 21 |
| | Co-opted/Associate members are of little help | 1 | • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • | 1 |
| 9. | Utility limited because of party restrictions | 4 | | 4 |
| A1. | Co-opted/Associate members serve no purpose | 3 | • | 3 |
| A2. | Co-opted/Associate members are not studious | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Non | -respondent | .2 | 3 | 5 |
| - | | • • • • • | 32 | • • • • |

· Performence of Co atod/Accordate Memb Table 5 2

(i.e. 28.33 per cent) respondents confirm their participation and 21 (i.e. 17.50 per cent) accept their utility in the General Body meeting when their subjects are discussed (items Nos. 1 and 7). This may be partly because of the fact that item No. 1 of the Table includes co-opted and associate members also. The associate members also occupy key posts in the various district co-operative organizations. An average Councillor is reluctant to state his reflections on this subject freely.

(iii) Political Parties

Party politics percolates in the working of the committees. More so when directly elected members dominate the working of these institutions. The politics at Parishad level may not be linked with the State or national politics. But as politics, it carries with it similar stresses and strains. Even in England the Labour Party has formed a model code of conduct for the labour groups in the local councils.

Folitical parties can be a constructive or destructive force influencing the working of the committees. At the district level, political groups meet before the meeting of the Council and decide as to the stand they should take on various items of the agenda. There is freedom of opinion in the party meeting. But once a decision is taken, it becomes a whip strictly enforced on all important issues, viz., elections to various committees or policy decisions like the increase in cess. These meetings are attended by the MLAs from the party and the party office-bearers in many cases. On important occasions even the State ministers from the district attend such meetings. While guiding the meeting they tremendously influence the line of action. Table 5.3-A while confirming the presumption clearly shows that such meetings are less frequent at Panchayat Samiti levels. Out of the 88 total respondents, 81 (i.e. 92.05 per cent) reported the utility of discussions in the party meetings (Table 5.3-B) and 77 (i.e. 87.50 per cent) believed in their useful guidance (Table 5.3-C).

Table 5.3-A : Party Meetings

| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|---------|
| 1. Party meetings are held | 78 | 14 · · · | 92 |
| 2. Party meeting is not a practice | - | 8 | 8 |
| 3. Party meetings are held on important occasions | 6 | 10 | 16 |
| 4. Members informally gather in groups | 1 | - | 1 |
| Non-respondent | 3 | - | 3 |
| Total Respondents | 88 | 32 | 120 |
| | | | |

| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat 1 Samiti | lota |
|---|---|---|---------------------|
| 1. Useful discussion takes | | | |
| place in party meetings. | 81 | 1 | 81 |
| 2. Discussion is not fruitful | 2 | • • | |
| 4. Chairman should explain the object first, to make the meeting useful. | 1997) 1997 1 99 | uttu (telling 1994 te <mark>ll</mark> ing dari | :] |
| Non-respondent | ·** · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | ••• •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • | · 1 |
| | , | | |
| Total - But Managers and Labor | | | · · · · |
| | | • • • • • • • | |
| and the state of the second | | | |
| | | | |
| TEDIE 5.3-C : Guidance by the 1 | nvitee | | |
| Teble 5.3-C : Guidance by the I | * • • • • | | • • |
| TEDIC 5.3-0 : Guidance by the 1 | * • • • • | Panchavat 1 | • • |
| 1. Farty leaders guide the | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat I Samiti | lote |
| | Zilla Parishad 77 | Panchayat 7 Samiti | lots - 77 |
| Farty leaders guide the meeting Party leaders do not take much interest Minister attends important meetings and guides | Zilla Parishad 77 4 | Panchayat 7 Samiti | lots - 77 |
| Farty leaders guide the meeting Party leaders do not take much interest Minister attends important meetings and guides Influential party members are also the members of | Zilla Parishad 77 4 | Panchayat 7 Samiti | - - - 7 |
| Farty leaders guide the meeting Party leaders do not take much interest Minister attends important meetings and guides Influential party members are also the members of the Parishad Leaders XIMAY dominate instead of | Zilla Parishad 77 4 | Panchayat 7 Samiti | - lota - 7 |
| Farty leaders guide the meeting Party leaders do not take much interest Minister attends important meetings and guides Influential party members are also the members of the Parishad Leaders MENAY dominate instead of | Zilla Parishad 77 4 1 | Panchayat 7 Samiti | • • |

Table 5.3-B : Discussions in Party Meetings

Party meetings before the Council/Committee meetings might mean order in the otherwise unassorted discussion. But then a Council/Committee meeting becomes a mere formality endorsing a decision already arrived at. The virtue of committee system is in associating opposition in the process of detailing the decisions. Resort to numerical strength therefore defeats this. By eliminating discussion one eliminates democracy. At local levels these organizations must be development mechanisms first. It is only in a secondary way that they should behave as power-mechanisms and that too because we cannot avoid politics. The Zilla Parished is primarily a forum for discussing local problems and affairs from an essentially local angle. The temptation to give its proceedings a party orientation should, therefore, be resisted.⁶

(iv) Role of the Opposition

Table 5.4 tells that adequate scope is given to the Opposition in expressing their views in the meetings of the Council/committees of the Parishad under survey. This is partly because of the fact that the ruling party itself is faction-ridden with little party discipline. When it came to measure the impact of this on the decisions, 56 out of 117 respondents stated that the impact was negligible (item Nos. 2 and 3, Table 5.4-B). The bulging in the Table at

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6 M.V. Mathur and others, <u>Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan</u> (New Delhi: Impex India, 1966), p. 85.

Zilla Panchayat Total Parishad Samiti 1. Adequate scope is given to Opposition during the meeting 78 30 108 2. Little scope is given to Opposition ¢. 1 9 Non-respondent 3 . _ . Total 88 32 120 Table 5.4-B : Impact of Opposition on Decision-making Zilla Panchayat Total Parishad Samiti 1. Opposition influences decisions 9 2 11 2. There is no impact on 12 3 decisions 15 3. Decision is by majority 29 12 41 4. Constructive proposals from Opposition receive support, 24 10 • . 34 5. Influential leaders dominate 5 5 6. Efforts are done for unanimity 3 3 6 7. Opinion of the Opposition 5 5 consulted Non-respondent 1 2 3 88 32 120 Total

Table 5.4-A : Scope Given to 'Opposition' and Its Impact

item No. 4 which says that a constructive approach receives support shows sophistication on the part of the respondents and also their strength helped by the factions in the ruling group.

(v) The Non-official-Official Relationship

The relationship between non-officials and officials determines the role and the actual scope of the committees. Here the role of the official is crucial. In the tutelage period of these institutions he has to perform a three-fold task of being a friend, philosopher and guide to the new masters of the organization. He should not monopolize the discussion (however earnest and well meaning he may be) nor should he show complete indifference in the working of these institutions. In the interest of the Panchayati Raj institutions, a way has to be found out between these two attitudes.⁷

In the transitional stage, the interest shown by the officers who are development oriented would go a long way in setting these institutions on a right track. Yet in the final analysis they must assume the role of 'Swiss executives'. Officials' dominance is felt more at the lower levels than at the higher ones. And in the committees than in the council. The elected office-bearers do not brook the dominance of the official. They are the most eloquent

13.2.6

7 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 83.

councillors politically and functionally. The performance of the officials in various meetings in the Parishad under consideration was satisfactory and 54 out of 139 responses recording their behaviour in the General Body meeting referred to their co-operative attitude. Corresponding figures in case of subject committees is 36 out of 91.

At the Samiti level the Extension Officers fail to impress the meetings. Block Development Officer, the generalist, acts as a co-ordinator but it is in the interest of the institution that these Extension Officers also perform better salesmanship in relation to their ideas.

The good relationship recorded between the nonofficials and the officials is still a personal equation. A story goes in the Zills Parishad under reference that a newly elected President had some work with the Chief Executive Officer. As he got him on the phone, the President expressed his willingness to call on the officer in his office if it was not convenient for him to attend the President in his chamber. The Chief Executive Officer in this case very happily called on the President in his chamber and the President had the smoothest relations with him throughout his term. The lesson is that the officer is second, but never secondary in importance. Even then, the relations between non-officials and officials should be 'institutionally' linked and not 'individually'.

The officers do not assert themselves in the General

Body meetings, but in subject committee meetings they do so easily because of their expertise and the small size of the committees. The members are not well informed about the subjects in which they have little interest beyond their local approach. Even to date, the government officer carries respect among the councillors, for example, the Chief Executive Officer in the District Council as and when he attends, and the Block Development Officer in case of a Panchayat Samiti meeting. In either case the official speech is not interrupted, and receives rapt attention.

The pattern as a whole is smooth. The relationship would improve as Panchayati Raj institutions get firmly rooted in the soil and the uncalled for rivalry between the departments and the Panchayati Raj institutions or between the officials and the non-officials settles down. The adjustment is a two-way process and both are equally important functionaries. The disquieting tendencies from the non-official side, as recorded by the officers are: (i) their frequent interference in the matters of administration, (ii) scant regard for technical notes when they are unfavourable, (iii) informal pressures to regularize the work irregularly carried out. Adjustment is a process of time. No short cut nor clear-cut solution could be suggested in the short run.

The behaviour of the elected office-bearers in committees also is satisfactory. Out of 142 responses

recorded about the behaviour of the President, 84 note his impartiality, his balance in the meeting, and his readiness to concur with the opposition in constructive suggestions. Thirty-six call him a pro-party President, 11 feel that he works under the pressure of the intra-party factions, while another 11 note his partial behaviour at the time of important meetings or prestige decisions.

Also in case of subject committees similar note is sounded. Forty responses, out of 63 recorded, refer to the impartiality and the co-operative attitude of their chairmen while 23 label the behaviour of their chairmen as party biased.

(vi) The Subject Committees at Work

All the committees do not carry equal prestige. The Standing Committee which performs the co-ordinating function has naturally more powers as compared with the other subject committees (Table 5.5).⁸ Various subject committees are responsible for the execution of development schemes pertaining to their subjects. As expenditure proposals need budgetary concurrence, the Subject Committee of Finance assumes a pervading influence over the rest of the committees. The structure of the committees also has a

⁸ Schedule Third, Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Semitis Act, 1961 (Maharashtre Act No. V of 1962) Replacement Series No. XXXII (Bombay : Government of Maharashtra, 1968), pp. 6877-6880.

| | ÷. | | (Value in Rs.) | | |
|---|--|--|---|--|--|
| Powers | Chairman, Subject Committee, including Standing Committee | Chairman, Standing Committee (District List Subjects) | Subject Committees including Standing Committee | Standing Committee (District List Subjects | |
| . Acquisition of movable property | 5000 -1 0000 | 10 00 0-1 5000 | 15000-30000 | 30000-50000 | |
| . Sale or transfer of movable property | 2500- 50 00 | 5000- 7500 | 7500-15000 | 15000-25000 | |
| . Acquisition of immovable property | 5000-10000 | 10000-25000 | 25000-50000 | 50000-100000 | |
| . Lease, sale or other transfer of | | | | | |
| immovable property | 1000- 2500 | 2500- 5000 | 5000-10000 | 10000-20000 | |

Table 5.5 : Powers Allotted to the Various Subject Committees

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Samitis Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act No. V of 1902). .

bearing on the matter. That is why the Standing Committee with President as its chairman, ex-officio, with chairman of the other subject committees as its members, ex-officio and with Deputy Chief Executive Officer as its secretary, ex-officio, naturally leads the rest. Patronage is the other side of power. The chairmanship of the Works Committee assumes a coveted position. Thus in one case when the chairman of the Subject Committee of Works was changed, the new chairman effected changes in the earlier budgetary provisions. Therefore, in the bargaining for power positions among different groups the chairmanship of the Works or the Finance Committee is at the stake.

All subject committees have rich potential area of development activities. Therefore, rating of the importance of various subject committees would be redundant. Panchayati Raj institutions have become 'material-benefits' oriented with the result that the committees of Works or Finance get precedence over the rest of the committees. Panchayati Raj subserves inter alia, the function of agricultural development. Naturally, Subject Committee for Agriculture should have been rated first by the respondents. Prof. M.V. Mathur in his case study of Jaipur Zilla Parishad (Rajasthan) notes how a so-called minor committee like Health at the Panchayat Samiti level emerges as the most active committee because of its able and enthusiastic chairmanship. The chairmen of the committee took great pains to popularize

health measures. His colleagues also were equally inspired by his enthusiasm. Therefore, out of 18 meetings which he called in a year hardly 5 were adjourned for want of quorum.⁹

One discouraging feature about these committees is that their reports are not properly placed before the General Body. They are placed very irregularly. Informative notes on technical subjects do not necessary accompany these reports. As they are placed in a blanket file confirmation of the reports becomes a mere ritual. It is really unfortunate that the reports of these subject committees are not taken seriously. Thus, in a General Body meeting of the Zilla Parishad under reference 'en bloc' approval was asked for, for the following subject committee reports (Table 5.6).

In one way this has made subject committees supreme in their fields. The discussion of a subject is normally initiated in the subject committee. Its recommendations are generally approved by the Standing Committee and very rarely are referred back for reconsideration. Table 5.7 validates these observations.

To improve the working of the subject committees ad-hoc study groups should be formed within the committee

9 M. V. Mathur, <u>Panchayati Raj in Rajesthan</u> (New Delhi: Impex India, 1966), pp. 81-82.

| Procee | loc' Approval of Subjec adings | C COMMITCESS |
|---|---|---|
| Name of the Subject Committee (1) | Period of the meet under reference (2) | ings No.of meet- ings during the period |
| | ، به به به به به به ^ا م ام ام ا | |
| 1. Standing | 23-12-1967 to 19-10-1 | 968 13 |
| 2. Finance | 21-12-1967 to 25-10-1 | 968 12 |
| 3. Works | 22-12-1967 to 7-10-1 | 968 12 |
| 4. Agriculture | 26-12-1967 to 29-10-1 | 968 10 |
| 5. Co-operatives | 27-12-1967 to 21- 9-1 | 968 12 |
| 6. Education | 23-12-1967 to 19- 9-1 | 968 13 |
| 7. Health | 21-12-1967 to 30- 8-1 | 968 11 |
| Table 5.7 : Relati Commit | | 1 |
| | | |
| 1. Subject is init | iated in | |
| Subject Committ | | <u>52 52</u> |
| 2. Subject Committ is altered | ce decision | <u>52</u> 18 } 18 } |
| 2. Subject Committ | cee decision cee decision | |
| Subject Committ is altered Subject Committ | cee decision cee decision referred back se by the | 18 } 18 } |
| Subject Committ is altered Subject Committ is upheld Subject is not to the Committe | tee decision tee decision referred back tee by the ttee erred back to mmittee for | 18 18 34 34 |

Table 5.6 : 'En bloc' Approval of Subject Committee Proceedings

itself and members given opportunity to study the problems in the field, such as, in the Works Committee inspection of the proposed sites of percolation tanks or a Vasant Bandhara, in Agriculture Committee visit to villages under the Applied Nutrition Programme or a Fertilizer Demonstration Plot.

The problem of co-ordination is well attended to in the Maharashtra pattern. In the committee structure at the Zilla Parishad level, the Standing Committee performs this task, while at the Panchayat Samiti level the Block Development Officer as a generalist functions as a coordinating force.

The system of question hour needs reference. This parliamentary technique of acquiring information and critically examining the administration has been well utilized at the Parishad level. At Panchayat Samiti level the system would be equally useful even though some questions would relate to the administration as such rather than seek information on some particular topic. Here a Block Development Officer was keen in one case on a seven days' notice, as he found it difficult to collect the information off-hand. The Functional Aspect - The Behavioural Pattern

Effective functioning of local government is essential not only for the efficient implementation of the development programmes, but also for projecting the image of the Councillors in a favourable light in public. To this

end the role of the committees and particularly of its their chairmen assumes importance. Alongside the legal structure, the conventions grow up, and they together form the behavioural pattern of the Panchayati Raj bodies.¹⁰

1. Zilla Parishad General Body Meetings

A Zilla Parishad meets as often as may be necessary. The law prescribes that the interval between the two meetings should never exceed three months. (Section 111 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961.)

The Agenda

The normal agenda of the General Body meeting is as follows :

- 1. Condolence resolutions.
- 2. Leave applications from the members.
- 3. Written answers to questions from the members.
- 4. Confirming the proceedings of the earlier meeting.
- 5. Confirming the proceedings of the subject committee meetings.
- 6. Election duties.
- 7. Sanctions to works programmes beyond the competence of the subject committee.
- 8. Administrative senction to works programmes e.g.

¹⁰ Henry Maddick, <u>Penchayati Raj--A Study of Rural Local</u> <u>Government in India</u> (London : Longman Group Ltd., 1970), pp. 181-82.

percolation tanks, repairs to roads, revised estimates of works and tenders (in a committee).

- 9. Policy decisions on the schemes viz., district garage, matters referred to by the subject committees viz., upgrading of roads (Works Committee), upgrading of Ayurvedic dispensaries into allopathic dispensaries (Health Committee), demand for forest cess (Agriculture and Finance Committees), rent proposals for school buildings (Education Committee), pending claims (Finance Committee).
- 10. Approval of the budget.
- 11. Donations to the educational institutions and the welfare institutions.
- 12. Common-pool vehicles, allotment of and expenditure incurred on repairs.
- 13. Creation and approval of new posts and proposals for repatriation.
- 14. Proposals for land acquisition for school buildings, for schemes of rural housing etc.

There are requisition meetings and special meetings also. During the period under report these discussed motions of no-confidence against the President, the Vice-President, and the Chairmen of the Subject Committees. Meetings were also called to discuss specific subjects like the proposals for increase in cess and the white paper on Education. The meeting begins normally by 1.00 p.m. By this time all the Nasik bound buses from the taluka places in the district reach the city. There is adequate time for lunch. Members after attending the meeting can catch the last bus on their route. All important meetings are preceded by party meetings. In such cases the members have to report earlier.

51. The meeting begins by the scheduled time as the quorum is always available at that time. There is always a brisk (but brief) exchange of words in the beginning. This normally refers to the exclusion of subjects proposed by the opposition members as extraordinary subjects on the meeting. In a General Body meeting on 10-9-1968 when the opposition asked explanation for such exclusion, the Vice-President, then in chair, stated that information was called for on those subjects. Immediately a member from the Opposition stood up and read out the list and said that all subjects in that list did not require collection of information and such subjects should have been included in the list of extraordinary subjects. The chairman used his discretion in the interests of his party and the matter ended, though not in a convincing way.

The practice of question hour is best developed and the Parishad members have used this system for spotlighting their local problems. They also initiate discussion in the form of supplementary questions. The members from the

ruling group are many times reluctant, for obvious reasons, to extend the time limit.

The members have developed a parliamentary technique for moving various items of discussion. In a general body meeting on 2-12-1968 one Opposition member moved a suggestion to treat the proceedings of its meeting on 14-10-1968 as illegal. As it was seconded by a member from the Opposition bench, immediately the ruling group moved and seconded a counter-suggestion to confirm the proceedings of the said meeting. The formalities were completed in both the cases, the two suggestions were put to vote and the majority group won by 41 to 21.

The General Body meeting is the most fruitful platform for the councillors to make public issues of their grievances. At the same time the weaknesses, the irregularities and unhealthy tendencies in the administration are also exposed and in this respect the Parishad has lived upto the mark.

In the General Body meeting on 11-12-1968, approval was asked for revised estimates in case of some fourteen percolation tanks (Table 5.8). There was much criticism on the tendency to manipulate the initial estimates within the ceiling of Rs. 1 lakh. Naturally in the final stage, the revised estimates change drastically. Estimated quantities of work, on various items change, the details of rates alter which ultimately make the original estimates meaningless.

| | (Value | in Rs.) |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Location of work Percolation tank (1) | Original Estimates (2) | Revised Estimates (3) |
| 1. Dongrale (Taluka Malegaon) | 1,84,142 | 1,89,823 |
| 2. Sherul (Taluka Malegaon) | 88,480 | 1,09,263 |
| 3. Tilvan (Taluka Baglan) | 97,770 | 1,43,072 |
| 4. Dharane (Taluka Baglan) | 1,45,000 | 1,86,558 |
| 5. Kankepur (Taluka Kolwan) | 99,830 | 1,40,142 |
| 6. Khuntewadi (Taluka Kolwan) | 1,27,908 | 1,68,040 |
| 7. Dahivad (Taluka Kolwan) | 2,42,838 | 3,14,320 |
| 8. Daregaon (Taluka Chander) | 1,50,302 | 1,91,248 |
| 9. Vinchur (Taluka Niphad) | 84,803 | 1,51,633 |
| 10. Dhaner (Taluka Nandgaon) | 89,300 | 1,35,000 |
| 11. Nandur Shirgote (Taluka Sinnar) | 77,400 | 1,55,924 |
| 12. Pimpalnare (Taluka Dindori) | 98,501 | 2,75,346 |
| 13. Pardhadi (Taluka Nandgaon) | 2,31,187 | 3,59,000 |
| 14. Talwade (Taluka Niphad) | 93,200 | 1,39,910 |
| | | |

Table 5.8 : Percolation Tanks Revised Estimates

Source : Zilla Parishad Nasik: Proceedings of the meeting. General Body meeting on 11-12-1968.

For example, the estimates of a percolation tank at Pimpalnare (Taluka Dindori - Sr. No. 12 from the list) changed from As. 98,501 to Rs. 2,75,346. Many of the works from the above list were already completed. Therefore though a committee was appointed (that too, after repeated insistence of the Opposition), the work of the Committee was reduced to a postmortem job. And there was no follow up of the resolution (Resolution No. 178 of the General Body meeting on 11-12-1968). Full informative notes were not supplied on this vital item by the office. Approval for fourteen of similar proposals was unjustified. The works were distributed over a wider area, with opposition reluctant to reopen the cases in their areas. Therefore, a united stand became impossible.

Development proposals like improvement of roads, their upgrading and their subsequent transfer to State department, are approved without much discussion. This shows the "material-benefits oriented" approach towards the proposals and not the realization of the importance of the subject as such. Thus in a General Body meeting on 11-12-1968, 87 proposals for upgrading the roads, 98 proposals for roads to be included in the Fourth Five Year Plan, and priority roads, 21 in number, were accepted with little or no discussion.

Party discipline dominates the behaviour of the members. The cases of the appointment of a legal adviser to the Parishad (meeting on 11-12-1968) and the loan case of Gram Panchayat Ghoti (Taluka Igatpuri) (meeting on 10-9-1968) are examples of it.

The level of discussion is generally high. When considered that all government is a government by the elite,

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the member participation is also commendable. The budget meeting is used as a meeting for general discussion. In the meeting on 27th March 1968 a sizable number of the councillors participated and brought their local complaints to the fore. Complaints related to the pattern of partial expenditure between the Western and the Eastern parts of the district and between the Adivasi and non-Adivasi areas. There was a constructive criticism on Parishad's diverting much of its revenue towards the ambitious district level scheme of the percolation tanks. In Adivasi areas where there were few feasible sites for such tanks, an equally ambitious plan for road work and of small bandharas was demanded. Many members, including the members from the non-Adivasi areas, demanded a definite allocation for development work in these areas. Ultimately, Rs. 5 lakhs were earmarked for this purpose. This enthusiasm was partly political because the representatives from the Adivasi areas formed a recognizable voting bloc.

In the special meetings, viz., on the increase in land cess (22-4-1968) and the White Paper on Education (20-5-1968), councillors dealt with various 'problems' and 'issues' involved in the subjects and not local cases as such. In the cess meeting they dealt with the justification of imposing a tax on agriculture-income. The councillors also insisted on the inclusion of all development heads in the expenditure pattern of the proposed increase in cess. In the meeting on the White Paper on Education they referred to the practical problems of the rural areas, like the paucity of science teachers, inadequate laboratory provisions, the problem of teachers in backward and interior areas where a teacher takes such an appointment as a punishment (and even the Department also means the same).

The President is a sober man and because of his nature seems to have won the confidence of the Opposition leaders also. On the contrary the complaint from his people is that he is too lenient to the Opposition members. This is definitely commendable in view of the fact that the present body (1967-72) is much faction-ridden as compared with the first body (1962-67). He guided the General Body properly and respected the feelings of the Opposition. Accordingly he made satisfactory changes in the proceedings of the meeting. A subject referred to the working of the Maharashtra Seva Sangha, Manmad (Taluka Nandgaon). That institution was patronized by a Spanish missionary, Father Ferrer, and the councillors in general resented his activities. In the budget meeting he also accepted the suggestion of earmarking a definite sum for the development work in Adivasi areas, even though that suggestion was moved from the Opposition benches.

The relations among the members were informal and prominent councillors from either group mixed freely at the tea interval. The rest of the members found it difficult

to be so informal and formed small groups to which they were accustomed. Same informality was exuded in the chambers of the elected office-bearers.

As between the popular element and the officials, the councillors and the elected office-bearers dominated the deliberations and rightly so. The officers preferred to be silent, the office-bearers explaining and defending the administration. This was possible because the General Body meeting was always preceded by a meeting of the office-bearers and the officers. The official position on various items of the agenda was discussed in that meeting.

A rare incident occurred in one meeting. When the General Body decided to discuss the behaviour of one of its officers viz., the District Health Officer, all officers with pre-intimation to the Chief Executive Officer left the hall.

Much of the constructive tendencies in the institutional behaviour at the Parishad level have been marred because of an excessive faction-ridden composition of the present body. Application for loan from one Gram Panchayat from Taluka Igatpuri for the construction of a motel and a park on the Bombay Agra highway was summarily rejected by the councillors of the Zilla Parishad. The Sabhapati of the Panchayat Samiti under reference was ready to supply additional information regarding the loan-application but councillors showed little interest in the information.

2. Subject Committees of the Zilla Parishad

Each Standing Committee and Subject Committee meets as often as may be necessary. The interval between the two consecutive meetings cannot exceed one month (Section 119 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961).

The actual number of meetings are obviously more than the prescribed minimum. Table 5.9 deals with their frequency. <u>Agenda</u>

Excluding procedural items of the agenda which occur in all Subject Committees (such as condolence resolutions, leave applications from the members and confirming the proceedings of the earlier meetings), following subjects occurred in the agenda of various Subject Committee meetings.

(a) The Standing Committee

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(1) Subjects referred to by the Subject Committees. (2) Approval of statements of expenditure. (3) Administrative approval to the schemes of the Works Committee. (4) Acceptance of tenders, schedule of rates etc. (5) Election matters in case of Village Panchayats. (6) Creation of new Panchayats and changing their boundaries. (7) Approving inspection reports by the officers. (8) Extension of term to a gram-panchayat. (9) Schemes of Social Welfare Department (before a statutory committee was formed for the subject).

| ame of the Subject | 1962-63 | | 196 | 1963-64 | | 1964-65 | | 1965-66 | | 1966-67 | | 1967-68 | | 1968-69 | |
|---------------------|---------|--|--------|----------|-------|--------------|------------|----------------|---------|----------|------------|--------------------|---------|---------|--|
| ommittee | Ā | B | A | B | A | 8 | A | B | A | B | Ă | B | Ā | B | |
| | • | •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• | | | | | - | | • • • • | | •••• ••• • | | • •• •• | | |
| . General Body | 4 | - | 7. | <u>Å</u> | 7 | • • • • • | 6 | - | 6 | . | 11 | ч. 1 | 12 | | |
| 2. Standing | 5 | - | 11 | - | 12 | 1 | 12 | - | 12 | 2 | 10 | :1 | 14 | | |
| 3. Finance | 3 | | : 11 | 1 | 9 | - | 10 | - - | 13 | 2 | 12 | 1 | 12 | 2 | |
| +. Works | 5 | • | 12 | - | 12 | . 1 1 | 10 | - | 12 | 2 | 9 | 1 | 14 | | |
| 5. Agriculture | 6 | | 13 | | 14 | ្រា | 12 | - | - 14 | 4 | 9 | 2 | 11 | | |
| 6. Co-operatives | 6 | - | 13 | | 16 | - | 13 | •. | 12 | - | 10 | 3 | 8 | 4 | |
| 7. Education | 5 | • | .14 | | 13 | - | 15 | | 13 | 1 | 12 | 1 | ້ 15 ້ | 1 | |
| 8. Health | 5 | | 11 | - | 13 | - | 12 | - | 12 | - | 8 | 2 | 11 | 1 | |
| | : | - | | | | ۲. | • | • | | | | | | • | |
| | | | | | | ••• ••• | — — | | | | | | | | |
| | | 18. A = | No. of | ? meet | ings | calle | d du | ring | the 1 | perio | d. | • | | | |
| | | B = | No. of | e meet | ings | adjou | irned | for | want | of q | uoru | m., | • | | |
| Note : Zilla Parish | | · · · · · | | ad an | let) | More 3 | 062 | | · · · | | | - | | | |

Table 5.9 : Frequency of Subject Committee Meetings

(b) Finance Committee

(1) Time-bar Travelling Allowance claims. (2) Approval of statements of expenditure and revised statements. (3)
Budget finalization. (4) Application for grants. (5) Administration report to be included in the Annual Administration report.

(c) Works Committee

(1) Works programme, changes and approval. (2) Tendercalls and their approval. (3) Periodic review of progress: agency schemes and schemes from own income. (4) Sale of scrap and used up material. (5) Return of deposits. (6) Administrative report of the department to be included in the Annual Administration Report.

(d) Agriculture Committee

(1) Follow up of the schemes of development (especially the Applied Nutrition Programme). (2) Fixation of agency - distribution of fertilizers, M.S. sheets, etc. (3) Programming the schemes - fixation of target : Hybrid campaign. (4) Subsidies - pedigree bull, oil engines. (5) Approval of expenditure - prizes for crop competitions, expenditure on medicines, for pest control, insecticides, purchase of seeds. (6) Approval of Administrative report to be included in the Annual Administrative Report.

(e) <u>Co-operatives</u> Committee

(1) Follow-up of the resolutions from the earlier

meetings. (2) Noting important tapal. (3) Sanction of loans under Small Scale Industries schemes. (4) Approval of expenditure statements of the department. (5) Instituting new production centres, peripatetic industrial schools etc. (6) Recommendatary resolutions to the Government.

(f) Education Committee

(1) Noting important circulars. (2) Rent cases of school buildings. (3) Repairs to school buildings and cases of special repairs. (4) Transfer of teachers - powers to the Committee. (5) Proposals for additional class-rooms.
(6) Purchase of materials. (7) Grants to educational institutions - recommendations to the Finance Committee. (8) Administration of student-hostels.

(g) <u>Health Committee</u>

(1) Noting important circulars. (2) Follow-up of schemes, especially Family Planning. (3) Opening of Primary Health Centres. (4) Upgrading the Ayurvedic dispensaries.
(5) Supply of medicine to the dispensaries. (6) Scheme for medical assistance to the Parishad staff. (7) Training schemes.

The meeting of a subject committee is normally scheduled at any convenient time between 11.30 a.m. to 12.30 noon. It lasts for a period of two hours or so. As every chairman heads two subject committees, the meeting of the other subject committee is also held on the same day and it frequently begins by 3.00 p.m. The members conveniently catch the last bus bound on their route. When meetings are called on consecutive days members who are represented on both the committees attend much of their personal work in the office or in the headquarter city.

Except the Committee for Co-operatives, the meetings attain the quorum without any delay. The Committee/for Cooperatives was frequently adjourned for want of quorum in the years 1967-68 and 1968-69. Nor could it attain the desired minimum frequency of meetings. This is a sad commentary on the working of the Committee. It lacks prestige because it has no control over the distribution of resources. It has no patronizing power except for small amounts of individual loans under Small Scale Industries schemes and location of peripatetic industrial schools. In the field of co-operatives the Parishad's functions are confined to the extension work only.

The conduct of the meeting of a subject committee is informal and its working is much personal. When a chairman has a full grasp over the subject he simply dictates to the meeting and covers the whole agenda in a very short time. Little discussion takes place in the meetings of the subject committees.

The normal complaint from the officers is that the members are not interested in the subjects pertaining to the committees, but in the specific personal/local problems. The officer of the Department of Agriculture stated that

most of the subjects on the agenda were initiated by the office and not by the members of the committee. Even if an intimation is circulated for suggesting subjects for the meeting, members do not take much cognizance of it.

The system of despatching agenda and meeting papers needs improvement. The Finance Committee had called a meeting to approve the budget. But the draft budget was not circulated properly among its members. Many received the copy at the time of the meeting only. As such, approval of the budget by the committee became only a formality. The prominent members also preferred to reserve the discussion of the budget to the General Body meeting which was scheduled to meet shortly. In this Committee meeting the co-opted member arrived late and most of the members were busy in preparing their Travelling Allowance bills.

Some cases were reported where the concerned subject committee was not taken into confidence. The issue of a Parishad Public School (Vidya Niketan) was directly taken over to the General Body meeting sidetracking the Education Committee, and the proposals for repairs on a UNICEF jeep were not routed through the Health Committee on the ground that the Subject Committee was not competent to sanction repairs beyond Rs. 2,000.

The behaviour of the committee is at times factionridden and therefore erratic. Approval of tenders itself is a tender issue. Many times a low quoted tender is not

approved on the ground that the contractor is new, and the contract goes normally to a known contractor. In one meeting of the Works Committee a contract with 26.25 per cent low rate was found unworkable but in another case a contract with 21.51 per cent low rate was accepted as workable. Abnormally low rates make original estimates meaningless. A low rate contract initially accepted, leads to a drastically revised estimate. This disturbs the whole allocation and future planning. In another case, the general body meeting sanctioned a limiting donation to one educational institution in the district. And in the next meeting of the Finance Committee, similar applications from the rest of institutions 22 in number, totalling Rs. 11,89,631 were summarily dismissed on the ground that the financial position of the Parishad had become weak. (Finance Committee 30-5-1968). Recommendations of a Panchayat Samiti on the priority of road works were changed in the Works Committee in its meeting (29-2-1968) and the Subject Committee insisted that it had a final say in the details of programme.

Much of the success of the Subject Committees in Agriculture and Co-operatives rests on the educative activities and the effective co-ordination between the nonofficial and the officials, more in comparison with other subject committees. The case of purchase of gram by a Panchayat Samiti in the Western track of the district shows how a lack of co-ordination may mean loss in money and faith in the government administration (Agriculture Committee 28-3-1968).

Subject Committees are the most important factor in the 'process of sharing the decision'. They have a rich potential. And their efficient working would have a bearing on the fuller utilization of their scope.

3. Panchayat Samiti at Taluka Level

A Panchayat Samiti meets as often as may be necessary. The interval between the two successive meetings should not be more than a month (Section 117 of Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961).

Panchayat Samiti, technically a committee of a Zilla Parishad at the taluka level, meets every month. As a live socio-economic unit its meetings never lack quorum (Table 5.10). Its effectiveness in maintaining enthusiasm largely rests on the budget allotted to it during the year. It is maximum in state I block of the Community Development pattern and minimum and ad-hoc when state II is over.

Agenda

Normal agenda of the meeting is as follows :

- 1. Condolence resolutions.
- 2. Leave applications.
- 3. Follow up of earlier resolutions.

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4. Approval of the monthly expenditure statements.

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| | 1965-66 | | 196 | 5-67 | - 196 | 7-68 | 1968-69 | | |
|---|---|--|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|--|----------|--|
| | M | N | M | N | M | N | M | N | |
| 1. No. of meetings | 14 | 15 | 13 | 13 | 10 | 13 | N.A. | 13 | |
| 2. Meetings adjourned for want of quorum | • | | ĺ | ĺ | 1 | | N.A. | • | |
| 3. Average attendance | 18 | 11 | 18 | - | 14 | 9 | N.A. | 1 | |
| 5. Approv | | - | | | | | unity | | |
| 6. Review | | | | | | | | | |
| o. Review works, | rure | al manp | ower s | scheme | • | | | - | |
| • | | - | | | | unde | r vario | นธ | |
| works, 7. Review | of t | the pro | gress | of sc | hemes | | r vario ion, hy | | |
| works, 7. Review develo | of t pment | the pro | gress , viz, | of sc , cro | hemes p com | petit: | | br | |
| works, 7. Review develo campai | of t pment gn, p | the pro theads theads | gress , viz, ntrol, | of sc , cro , fami lcatio | hemes p com ly pl n, ad | petit: annin | ion, hy | br: 1 | |
| works, 7. Review develo campai | of t pment gn, F , rur | the pro t heads best co ral ele | gress , viz, ntrol, | of sc , cro , fami lcatio | hemes p com ly pl | petit: annin | ion, hy g, smal | br 1 | |
| works, 7. Review develo campai saving | of t pment gn, F , rur gn et velop | the pro theads best co ral ele to. | gress , viz. ntrol, ctrifi | of sc , cro , fami lcatio | hemes p com ly pl n, ad class | petit: annin ult 1 -room | ion, hy g, smal iteracy s, perc | br 1 | |

Table 5.10 : Frequency of Meetings of Panchayat Samiti

9. Cases of loan recovery.

10. Rent proposals for schools.

- 11. Village panchayats, approving their budgets, sanctioning excess expenditure and confirming audit compliance.
 - 12. Audit reports of the Samiti.
- 13. Noting important circulars.
 - 14. Approval of administrative reports.

The meeting begins normally by 1.00 p.m. and lasts for two or three hours. Members can conveniently attend their work in the town after the meeting is over and can pick up the last bus leaving for their residential places. Generally the members gather in groups at some convenient places in the city like the Shetkari Sahakari Sangh or a Mamlatdar's office and expect a government vehicle to pick them up from there. The Block Development Officer, the coordinating authority at the taluka level, is the most important functionary. A sincere and development oriented Block Development Officer and a resourceful Sabhapati with good contacts at higher levels of administration were an ideal combination for one Panchayat Samiti under reference. This Panchayat Samiti had a spill-over provision of its stage I budget to spend during the period under reference. (This stage was over by March 1968.) The difference in the stage of development (Community Development pattern) is immediately felt in the conduct of the meeting. The second Panchayat Samiti under reference was in the stage II during the period under reference. (It entered stage II in April 1963.) A block after completing stage II development gets an ad-hoc grant.

In Panchayat Samiti meetings, it is not surprising that Zilla Parishad members elected from the areas included in the Panchayat Samiti, are most vocal and impressive. They are also better informed.

Because of the system of rotation, the office of the Sabhapati has lost much of its grandeur. In one Panchayat Samiti under survey a Sabhapati broke the agreement regarding rotation and managed to tide over the vote of noconfidence. With this he established his hold on the whole working. That this Panchayat Samiti belonged to Stage I is no accident.

The members are much more interested in the allocation of resources and are 'local' in their outlook. They of are critical neither of their own budget nor/the budgets of the Village Panchayats. Panchayat budgets are scrutinized by the office staff and are voted 'en bloc' without discussion. For example, the budgets for 1968-69 in case of 45 Village Panchayats were voted in February 1968 meeting of one Panchayat Samiti. As the financial year was coming to an end the budget approval became a formality. The very number of budgets, 45, st one time, defeats the purpose of its approval. At least salient features of some of these budgets should have been discussed because some panchayats are definitely progressive. In another Panchayat Samiti the number was 33 in its January 1969 meeting.

Same is the fate of technical reports viz., the audit reports, the budget of the Panchayat Samiti, and approval of excess expenditure. These items are 'voted' without any discussion. This simply strengthens the bureaucratic hold over the administration. (Panchayat Samiti meeting on 24-5-1968 in case of one Panchayat Samiti under reference.)

Important discussions in a meeting centre round the review of incomplete works. Works are left incomplete because some petty item of the contract is not attended to, like a Rahat to a well. When alterations in the items of work are not approved (a community well with more than 10' diameter), the final bill also cannot be paid.

In the actual working local and personal factors many times weigh much. In One Panchayat Samiti a seed plot for hybrid bajra was recommended to one farmer (25-3-1968). But a similar demand was subsequently turned down in another case stating that taluka farms were to be given priority as a matter of policy.

In another Panchayat Samiti this personal game of patronizing local groups reached its peak as the Sabhapati had broken the rotation system and was facing a vote of no-confidence. The Panchayat Samiti was allotted a pending cess grant of Rs. 71,000. The Sabhapati wanted a blanket-

sanction for its expenditure under two broad heads : (i) construction - roads and (ii) bandharas. Opposition wanted a location programme. Both wanted to use this sum as gifts to their supporters. And none was certain of the supporters. Sabhapati who had a majority in that meeting (10th March 1969) was ready to put his demand for broadblanket sanction to vote. The opposition was not in a position to accept that challenge. Because unlike the Sabhapati, the Opposition could not negotiate from the position of strength. It is strange to note that in an earlier meeting on 30-11-1968 a member from his group had given a detailed list of road work to be proposed against an expected grant of Rs. 32,000. The Opposition, ignorant of this sum, wanted a general approval for the amount so that in detailing the programme they would get some of their works included in the list. Sabhapati wanted to favour his group and pursued his list successfully without any compromise with the opposition who were helpless over the division of 6:4.

The members of this Panchayat Samiti were more vocal, more enthusiastic and better informed as compared with the other Panchayat Samiti under reference. Enthusiasm is thus a function of development work.

The proceedings prepared by the Block Development Officer and countersigned by the Sabhapati are rarely discussed and are voted hurriedly. Co-option of women members is discouraging in both the Panchayat Samitis. The posts have only a voting value. They leave the meeting hall after signing the muster, as soon as a jeep is ready to take them back. Other categories of co-option have fared better.

4. District Planning Advisory Committee

This body is constituted at the district level as Department Circular No. ZPA 2664 dated 22-3-1965. Its membership includes the Councillors of the Parishad, and the MLAs and the MPs of the district. The guardian minister acts as its chairman. Along with the Parishad officers, Government Officers in the State-sector working at the district level are instructed to attend the meeting. The main purpose of the Body, to put it in the words of the Hon. Minister in chair at the meeting of the District Planning Advisory Committee on 30th August 1968, is "to review the progress of the schemes and of the expenditure incurred in the State-sector and the Local Sector at the district level." It meets at least twice a year.

The meeting is used as a good opportunity by the MLAs to ventilate their grievances about the development activities in their talukas. (They have no representation on the Parishad in Maharashtra as in other States.) The shortfalls in the government expenditure are picked up to initiate discussion. While offering criticism constructive suggestions are also put forth by the participants. A Sabhapati from one taluka criticized the low expenditure on the schemes of minor irrigation (MIN 1-2, subsidy on new wells and installation of pumping sets) and suggested proper co-ordination between the Department of Agriculture, the Block Development Officer and the Land Mortgage Bank, working through its taluka branch. In another case one associate member of the Parishad referred to the plantation scheme in the catchment area of a percolation tank and suggested that the expenditure on this item be included in the estimates of the tank itself. Surrender of grant of Rs. 92,000 under the scheme of Aid to Industrial Societies (SSI-34) was criticized by a member who stated that local leaders were never associated in the implementation of the said scheme. Changes effected in the proposals for rural electrification also were frequent subjects of criticism.

For government officers it is an opportunity to explain their difficulties and remove misunderstanding about the governmental working, to evoke good response from the members. Thus in one case, in the budget for 1967-68 Rs. 59,000 were provided for the scheme of crop protection (AGR 11). Subsequently the subsidy on the purchase of implements was discontinued by the Government and only Rs. 16,706 could be spent under the scheme, during the budget-year, utilizing only 28.31 per cent of the provision. It covered expenditure on insecticides. This removed the misunderstanding as far as the implementation of the scheme of crop protection during the year was concerned.

Office-bearers from the Parishad use these meetings as a platform to put forth their demands and bring to the notice of the Hon. Minister their difficulties in the implementation of schemes. The President in one meeting made a strong case for an additional grant against the expenditure incurred by the Parishad on its district level scheme of percolation tanks. He was ultimately successful in getting an additional grant of Rs. 8 lakhs for the said ambitious scheme.

The Hon. Minister in chair took keen interest in the meeting. He was very informal in his behaviour throughout the meeting. At the same time he was assertive about the position of the Government. At one point, he brought to the notice of the meeting the discrepancy between the guiding notes of the meeting and the actual information supplied by the concerned officers, viz., the Parishad Executive Engineer who briefed on the scheme of Vasant bandharas. On another point he resented the absence of some district level officers (viz., the District Agricultural Officer) and asked for his explanation. The interest evinced by the Minister in the proceedings of the meeting would raise the status of the District Planning Advisory Committee and would make it more effective.

The attendance was good, the time schedule was well observed, the level of discussion was without exception high and the decorum of the meeting fully preserved.11

5. The Village Panchayat Level

The Village Panchayat forms the lowest link in the administrative structure of Panchayati Raj. No subcommittees are instituted and the general trend favours ad-hoc committees at this level.

The Second Five Year Plan conceives three types of functions of the Village Panchayat: (1) Civic functions. (2) Development functions. (3) Agency functions.

The more we move towards the lower strata of organization, the distinction between the development and nondevelopment functions get blurred. What is important is their assured execution. For this a Village Panchayat must co-ordinate the working of the village level institutions like the co-operatives and social organizations like the Yuvak Mandal, which together form an institutional base for development at the village level.

6. The Mandi Centres

From the organizational point of view, the creation of a fourth tier between the Panchayat Samiti and the Village Panchayats needs reference here. The concept of the 'Mandi Centre' is the product of the experiments in the

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¹¹ Zilla Parishad Nasik, The District Planning Advisory Committee Proceedings of the Meetings 30-8-1968 and 26-2-1968, and personal observations.

district development planning in Wardha district. This research was conducted by the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona (Maharashtra) at the request of the State Government. The Mandi Centre is an additional link in the network of communication and extension of socio-economic overheads. It is expected to provide in a course of time civic and economic amenities, educational services. and cultural facilities, banking and godown facilities. The Mandi centre helps to distribute the benefits of development to the area and ensures that no part of the district remains under-developed in this respect.¹² These Mandi centres would take note of the potentiality of the area while they develop its resources. For example, in case of the Panchayat Samiti Malegaon, the considerations regarding the impact of the proposed Haranbari dam would weigh considerably in the plans of its area development.

The Mandi centres are compact semi-urbanized units. Over and above the economic advantages that accrue, these centres develop as compact social units where community feeling is strong and equal to the Panchayat Samiti level. The district centres lack this feeling and at the village level the community becomes too 'local'. Mandi centres

12 "The Development of Mandi Centres and the Framework of Socie-economic Overheads," <u>Wardha Plan - Technical</u> <u>Papers</u> 1965 (The Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Foona 4), pp. 1-4.

would improve popular participation. Hence the concept of a fourth tier can be justified on these grounds. Without creating any statutory institution a sub-committee of the Panchayat Samiti can be formed for the area planning of these centres. The Wardha experiment may be repeated in diverse conditions to frame a 'model' for such centres. The difficulty with the Panchayat Samiti is that, itself being a non-statutory body it cannot create sub-committees. In such a case, in the office of the Samiti a 'cell' for area planning may be created and its progress may be discussed in the monthly meetings of the Panchayat Samiti.

Small municipalities are akin to such semi-urbanized mandi-centres. A question is normally posed - Whether they should be included in the Parishad area or should be left out on the ground that these centres are urban centres and Parishad by definition is a body for rural areas. The Naik Committee of the Government of Maharashtra had reconmended the inclusion of municipalities upto a population of 20,000 in the administration of the District Council (p. 82 of the Report). Population in these areas is rural in main, the activities of such municipalities are less urban, and at the teluka level they are the only centre of activity. Socio-economic overheads also have a tendency to concentrate there. Hence they need to be included in the structure of the Panchayati Raj institutions, so the status of some of the municipal areas may be reconsidered. There is little fear

of civic and economic amenities being concentrated in these areas while they are included in the regular structure. The Gujarat Zilla Parishads Act has already incorporated such areas in the structure of the Panchayati Raj institutions.

A question was asked to the members of the Parishad under survey. Seventy-three out of 120 (i.e. 68.83 per cent) respondents did not favour the inclusion of municipalities in the structure of the Panchayati Kaj institutions. The main reason was the urban nature of their problems. There was a dominant note that the Parishads were meant for rural areas only and there was grudge against the prourban tendencies of development even in the present structure. This was evinced in the case of the stadium in Nasik partly to be financed by the Parishad.

7. Three Tiers and the Organizational Relations

In the context of development the distinction between the decision-making and the decision-executing functions gets blurred. The society becomes so small as can be seen 'with one eye' (Aristotle). When a local governmental institution is yet to create 'the minimum overheads of development' the nature of relationship between the various levels of administration naturally is of the 'agency' type. Much work is planned and financed by the higher agency and is executed by the lower. This was reflected in the administrative relations between the Parishad and a Panchayat

Samiti. Majority of the respondents (70 per cent) complained of the 'agency' status of Panchayat Samitis. "Work is not 'of' the Panchayat Samiti but is done 'through' the Panchayat Samiti." This was their main grievance. They have strongly favoured taluka level as the powerful area organization. Ninety-three respondents out of 120 (i.e. 77.50 per cent) have unquestionally favoured Panchayat Samiti to be a powerful seat of administration on the lines of the Rajasthan pattern. Official dominance at the Panchayat Samiti level as is feared at present, would disappear as the machinery settles down.

Parisheds are powerful political bodies even at this stage when they themselves have been created by the Act of the State Government. They have powers of patronage. At this stage the power of locating the projects and allocating the resources assumes greater importance and influences the distribution of development benefits. Political considerations weigh much while extending administrative sanctions to projects or initiating works. A road work, for example, was not executed in one case as the area returned an opposition candidate. In another case the site for a percolation tank was earlier approved. In subsequent elections, candidate from an opposition group was elected es a Sarpanch of the concerned village pancheyat. The Parished seat was won by a member of the ruling group. But he was helpless. The work was not initiated with the fear

that it would benefit the Sarpanch from the Opposition. The tendencies are visible more at the Parishad-Panchayat Samiti level. As we move to the Panchayat Samiti-Village Panchayat level, the party sting is weakened (though not totally absent) and the opinion seems to be equally divided on this point. This proves that the community sense is more powerful at the Samiti-Village Panchayat level. Seventy-six respondents out of 120, i.e. 63.33 per cent, accepted that political considerations weighed much while distributing development benefits at the Zilla Parishad level. Only 39 (i.e. 32.50 per cent) respondents felt that political considerations carried little influence in allocating development projects. At Panchayat Samiti-Village Panchayat level these two views are evenly balanced in the proportion of 53.33 : 42.50.

A question was asked to the members whether development centred round the villages of the elected members as such. Sixty-one out of 120 answered in the affirmative. But a sizable number 44 (i.e. 36.67 per cent), categorically rejected the assumption. Most of them were the members of the Parishad. This shows a sense of maturity in the attitudes of the members. They have felt the need to look at the problems of development from a comprehensive angle. Wherever such development had taken place it was explained in terms of the effective leadership of the locality moving people to Shramdan, convincing them to collect their share of 'Public Contribution' of the project, and leader's alertness in the meetings when schemes were allotted.

The post of a Sarpanch had assumed over-emphasis in this co-ordination. A Village Panchayat acting as an 'agency' to a Panchayat Samiti for all development works in the area is linked with it through a Sarpanch-member returned from Sarpanch/Panch electoral college. (This restriction is removed and now any Panch can contest the election.) Members of the Parishad frequently retained their posts of Sarpanch of their villages. Through this, personal though not institutional co-ordination is achieved at a higher level.

8. The Committee System and Development

The plural committee system tries to distribute the benefits of a participative democracy by associating people with the processes of planning and implementation. But it is not free from defects. First, it involves procedural delays. Second, when power politics percolates through its working, which is not unlikely, then it defeats its primary purpose of associating people with the development work. Third, the problem of co-ordination between the committees and the General Body is always unsolved.

Procedural delay is an unavoidable phenomenon in the growth of an organization. But certain conventions developed in the Zilla Parishad under survey have diluted its deterent effect on the pace of development. A subject first appears on an agenda of a Subject Committee. Normally the committee decisions are honoured by the General Body. Presuming concurrence of the committee members, the chairman of a subject committee can take decisions on procedural matters. The subject committee accords ex-post-facto sanction to such decisions. Therefore procedural delays do not affect materially the development pace at the Parishad level.

The Maharashtra pattern vests certain powers in the chairmen of the subject committees which they can exercise upto the limits prescribed in the Act. The Naik Committee on Democratic Decentralization of the Government of Maharashtra tried to combine the merits of the committee system with those of the Cabinet system.¹³

The difficulty with the plural committee system is that it might fall an easy prey of power politics. The power of patronage and its employment with a political motive, erratic behaviour in the working of the committees and the uncompromising attitude towares the proposals from

¹³ The Committee recommended, "that the Bistrict Council should function through committees but at the same time the President and Chairmen of Committees be made full time functionaries responsible for implementation of the decisions of the Council and its Committees." The Report of the <u>Committee on Democratic Decentralization</u> (Bombay: Co-operation and Rural Development Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1961), p. 86.

the Opposition, mar the development process. These tendencies are effectively counterbalanced at the Panchayat Samiti level. This level shows a better and stronger sense of socio-economic community than that felt at the district level. This discourages continuous political showdowns and dilutes its vigour in the day-to-day working of the institution.

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The present dilemma is the product of uneasy relationship between the development mechanism and the power mechanism. The first we cannot give up. The second we cannot avoid. The power mechanism gives vigour and vitality to the development mechanism which otherwise would be a colourless departmental activity. On the contrary the power mechanism, if deprived of the development mechanism, degenerates into a destructive game of 'ins' and 'outs'. Their combination is essential and natural at the local government level.

CHAPTER VI

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

The success or failure of the Panchayati Raj institutions lies to a great extent in the success or failure in creating and maintaining an organization appropriate to deal with their problems. A modern development organization is not a detached dehumanized bureaucratic machine applied to various jobs. It is a factor, and an important factor, in the process of decision-making. Democracy expects local bodies to deliberate and formulate policies and act as a base of political authority. This is constitutionally sound. But as we move from the Centre to local units of administration, from the developed countries to the developing countries the distinction between the the executive and deliberative functions becomes blurred. Most of the local representatives are not conversant with operating the public affairs. In many cases they are illiterate. And here the role of the executive becomes crucial. Because of the expertise and administrative experience of the officials the deliberative or policymaking function is articulated and realised in a better way. Both officials and non-officials act and react. Their collaboration and co-operation in the local administrative process is essential and decisive. Here without

losing political authority the representative body gains in operational efficiency.

Mr. J. H. Warren referring to the role played by the Executives as advisers on policy matters accepted the officers' right to advise on policy-matters. In the most developed local authorities this right of the Officers is not only accepted but the officers are given an understanding that they are expected to do this.¹

This does not mean disloyalty to democratic ideas. The pattern of administration has to be in conformity with the spirit and the ideology of these bodies. But the new role of these institutions would be judged by their operational efficiency. When Alexander Pope, the poet, said that the best system was one which was administered best he was really emphasizing a vital truth.

There are four basic patterns of field administration and local government. One is the comprehensive local government system. Here the local unit of administration

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1 <u>Report of the Committee on Democratic Decentraliza-</u> <u>tion</u> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1961), p. 120. Raghubir Sahai referring to the role played by the officers in Panchayati Raj also expresses similar views. "In the formative stage of the Panchayati Raj, the official because of his equipment, education, training, knowledge about rules and regulations and relevant clauses of the legislation and administrative experience has a greater duty to see that the intentions of the legislature are carried out to the maximum benefit derived with the co-operation of the elected representatives." "Relations of Officials and Non-Officials," <u>Indian Journal of Public Administration</u>, Special Number, October-December 1962, Vol. VIII, No.4, 1962, p. 556.

controls and co-ordinates practically all the services which an individual receives. The Zilla Parishads in India might be classified in this group. Second is the partnership system. Here local government has certain functions legally provided for. At times local government acts as an 'agency' for the Central Government which performs certain functions independently. Both simultaneously work in their respective areas of operation and co-ordination is not done at the local unit level. The third system is the Dual system where local units are autonomous in local services. In the Integrated system, the fourth type, local authority has little control over the activities of the Central Government services and the technical staff working in its area. Each system has its own problems. In a comprehensive local government system the main problem is the provision of adequate technical services and assurance of sufficient technical supervision. As there is a large measure of decentralization to the local bodies problems of finance and personnel also assumes importance.² And here counts the operational efficiency of the apparatus.

The District Level: The Chief Executive Officer and His Team

The Zilla Parishad administrative organization, under

2 Decentralization for National and Local Development (New York: U.N. Technical Assistance Programme, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N.O., 1962), p. 13. the Act, has introduced a dichotomy in the organizational pattern. The upper cadres of Class I and Class II are government nominees, while Class III and Class IV (Technical and non-technical) servants are borne on the Parishad cadre. In order to maintain stability and organizational unity, the government has retained with itself certain powers like those which deal with the staffing pattern, formation of the departments, the structure of grades and pay scales etc. There are two Selection Boards constituted by the Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, for the recruitment of Class III (technical) services and Class III (non-technical) and Class IV services from the Parishad cadre. The Divisional Selection Board for Class III technical services is headed by the Divisional Commissioner and the District Selection Board for other Class III services and Class IV services is headed by the Collector.

The Chief Executive Officer is normally drawn from the I.A.S. cadre. He heads the Parishad organization at the district and the taluka level. He is assisted by a Deputy Chief Executive Officer (of the rank of the Deputy Collector) who acts as the Secretary of the Parishad. Various branches are headed by Class I and Class II officers and the district heads of all development departments act as secretaries of the various subject committees and all work under the administrative control of the Chief Executive Officer. Following is the pattern of State services transferred to the Zilla Parishad organization (district level) :

| | Name of the Post | Cadre | No. of Posts |
|-----|--|-------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. | Chief Executive Officer | I | 1 |
| 2. | Deputy Chief Executive Officer | I | 1 |
| 3. | Planning Officer | I | 1 |
| 4. | Administrative Officer | I | 1 |
| 5. | Revenue Officer | II | 1 |
| 6. | Social Welfare Officer | II | 1 |
| 7. | Agriculture Development Officer | Ĩ | 1 |
| 8. | Chief Accounts and Finance Officer | I | 1 |
| 9. | Accounts Officer | II | 1 |
| 10. | Co-operation and Industries Officer | II | l |
| 11. | Executive Engineer | I | 1 |
| 12. | Additional Executive Engineer | I | l (Post sanctioned in 1970-71) |
| 13. | Education Officer | I | 1 |
| 14. | District Health Officer | · I | 1 |
| 15. | Assistant District Health Officer | II | 1 |
| 16. | District Agricultural Officer | II | 1 |
| 17. | Campaign Officer | II | 1 |
| - | District Animal Husbandry Officer | II | 1 |
| 19. | Deputy Education Officer | II | 1 |
| 20. | Head Mistress | II | 1 |
| 21. | Junior Superintendent | II | 2 |
| 22. | Deputy Engineers (Panchayat Samiti level) | II | 8 |
| 23. | Medical Officer (Primary Health Centre) | II | 5 |

Source : Annual Administrative Report 1970-71, Zilla Parishad Nasik.

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The main problem with the organization of the upper cadre (of the government nominees) is that of co-ordination. Chief Executive Officer, the main co-ordinator at the district level, normally belongs to the I.A.S. cadre which carries status, greater merit, resourcefulness and enjoys to an extent the prestige of its predecessor cadre - the I.C.S. This makes the Chief Executive Officer high and above his colleagues in the district team (the upper cadre in the Parishad), and this conceals the unsatisfactory inter-departmental co-ordination. Co-ordination retains vitality when it is among near equals. It is reduced to subordination if the leader of the team is much superior in status to his team-mates.³

Technical departments at regional or higher level have a crucial role to play. Psychologically they do not feel inferior to the Chief Executive Officer, functionally they cover a larger area than the district, institutionally they have enjoyed an independent status and their expertise makes it difficult for their personnel to play a second fiddle to a generalist. Still they have a vital part to play in all achievements. The role of a technical department is to provide technical and organizational support to the local institutions. It has to help its district level officer with the Parishad in performing his role in

3 B. Mukherji, <u>Community Development in India</u> (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1961), p. 122.

development and give him policy directives. The Act expects the technical officers to be in liaison with the Parishad general administrative officer, when on tour and stationed at the district headquarters. The Government has authorized various heads of departments to inspect the working of the Parishad and extend technical guidance" (Section 127 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961). The Divisional Commissioner plays an important role in this co-ordination. He inspects all Zilla Parishads in his division. The Parishad under survey was regularly visited by him and inspected. But the regional officers have not played their expected role. They regard inspection work as outside their normal work. When they attend the district offices of their departments, they feel more concerned with their immediate work at hand. for example, the preparation of the Education map or the formulation of district targets for hybrid crops in the light of the regional target. May be, they are discouraged or unable to play their role. The Heads of the State Departments rely more on their office staff who are senior in service and grade than their outstationed divisional/ district staff. Whatever may be the reason, the fact remains that this tendency of the technical departments has

4 <u>The Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati</u> <u>Rej</u> (Bombay : Government of Maharashtra, 1971), Table No. 40, pp. 333-37.

affected the Parishad organization as an area organization. The members of the technical departments do not feel attached to the Parishad and to that extent effective control of the Chief Executive Officer over his team is affected. Organic unity of a service is the function of the unity of command. Because of the different authorities of appointment, transfer, fines and punishment the district team finds it hard to achieve homogeneous character.

Unsatisfactory inter-departmental co-ordination is proverbial and is seen in the unco-ordinated programmes by these various departments at regional and lower levels. Whenever an activity is not covered by the Parishad, e.g., soil conservation programme and tractor service scheme, this lack of co-ordination ends into waste and loss of faith in the institution. This affects the functional administration of the Parishad. In the Parishad under survey a missionary organization therefore could build its strong core and could compete with the Parishad organization for loyalty of the rural folk mainly due to its co-ordinated activity. Ultimately that missionary organization was uprooted, not because of its failure in , · • development activities but because of its anti-national patronship. Team work in the field is a 'sine qua non' for a vigorous all round development.5

^{5 &}quot;The problem of co-ordination or combining the horizontal responsibilities of the area-specialists with

The frequency of transfers with regard to these officers is also a factor affecting co-ordination. The district heads of departments belong to different services and are deputed to Zilla Parishads for a specific period. The Chief Executive Officer, even, does not escape from these frequent transfers (Table 6.1). In case of the Zilla Parishad under reference the picture is not different. Within a period of seven years (1962-69) five Chief Executive Officers were transferred. The longest, and, therefore enviable, duration of office was 23 months in one case. On the officers' side, the victims of frequent transfers are normally the Parishad Executive Engineers.

For administrative purposes the system of co-ordination meetings has proved to be very effective. The meeting is normally bi-monthly attended by the Block Development Officers and the Sabhapatis from the Panchayat Samitis from the district. It reviews progress reports of the various 'drives' in the period and saves much time and correspondence. In one meeting of the above type under observation, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer read out progressive totals of achievements under specific 'drives' like the Rabi Campaign, family planning, vasectomies and

the vertical responsibilities of the subject specialists still continues to defy solution." The Programme Evaluation Organization, 4th Report (New Delhi : Planning Commission, Government of India, 1957), quoted by the U.N. Study Report, <u>Community Development and Economic</u> <u>Development</u> (Bangkok: 1960), p. 90.

Sr. Name of the No.of Chief Executive Officers whose duration was for a period of Parishad Less than Less than Less than one year two years three years ----Sholapur 1. 5 Dhulia a province of 3 and 1 and 3 and 1 and 1 2. 3. Thana 4. Yeotmal 5. 6. 7. Ratnagiri **4** 3 8. Kolhapur • Note : The above statement indicates the position of transfers from 1962-63 to 1969-70. Source: The Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra. 1971), para 5.52, p. 59. الأناف والعاري tubectomies, loan recovery, distribution of hybrid seed. The defaulters were named, explanations for shortfalls were asked for from the Block Development Officers of the concerned Panchayat Samitis and their difficulties in the implementation of these schemes (viz., failures in family planning operations, late receipt of hybrid seed, its inferior quality etc.) were listened to (though not necessarily solved).

<u>Table 6.1</u> : Frequency of Transfers : Chief Executive Officers of Zilla Parishads

Co-ordination was looked at as merely surface adjustment of views and not as an organizational device. The

representatives and even the Block Development Officers have therefore answered in an affirmative tone. (Ref. Questionnaire. Block 8, Question 3.A. Appendix No. 10) As stated earlier the Chief Executive Officer is effectively an 'unus' and not a 'primus' among his team-members (who themselves are not equal).

The question of writing confidential reports of the officials has an important bearing on the effective organizational co-ordination from within. The Chief Executive Officer has established his full control over the Class III and Class IV personnel through this right. The moot question is whether his confidential report should be written (or at least endorsed with remarks) by the nonofficial head of the institution i.e. the President of the Zilla Parishad.

Out of 120 respondents (both from the Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samiti levels), 71 favoured control over officers; quite a few did not hesitate to cover the Chief Executive Officer also. Table 6.2 tries to describe the pattern of their control. Fifty-three respondents out of 120, i.e. 44.16 per cent, favour the right to confidential reporting on the working of the officials. To fifteen members (i.e. 12.50 per cent) right to pass no-confidence resolution was sufficient, while another eleven were satisfied with the official discussion of the conduct of the officer in the General Body meeting of the Parishad. representatives and even the Block Development Officers have therefore answered in an affirmative tone. (Ref. Questionnaire. Block 8, Question 3.A. Appendix No. 10) As stated earlier the Chief Executive Officer is effectively an 'unus' and not a 'primus' among his team-members (who themselves are not equal).

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| Table 6.2 : Control Over Offici Pattern of Control | a ls by Non | -officials | 8 |
|---|--|---------------------|----------|
| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
| 1. Right to Confidential Reporting | 38 | 15 | 53 |
| 2. Right to no-confidence is sufficient/essential | 14 | 1 | 15 |
| 3. Right to discuss the conduct of the officers | 11 | • | 11 |
| 4. Government should immediately implement resolutions on the above subjects passed by a Parishad | 3 | | |
| 5. Non-official should equally be held responsible for failures in imple- mentation | ، ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ (۲۰۰۰) ۱۹۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ ۱۹۰۰ - ۴۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ | • • | · • |
| 6. Parishad should have right to transfer the officer | 4 | | 4 |
| 7. Right to confidential reporting is unwarranted | 5 | 6 | 11 |
| Total | 75 | 22 | 97 |
| Non-respondent | 13 | 10 | 23 |
| Grand Total | 88 | 32 | 120 |

The non-respondents in the Table are 23 in number i.g. 19.17 per cent. This partly shows their inability to look at the problem from an organizational point of view. Percentage is higher obviously at the Panchayat Samiti

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level where 10 of 32 could not reply. Also nobody agrees to pin down the responsibility of failures on non-officials (item 5).

The Block Development Officers were divided on the matter, and a majority leaned in favour of the freedom from non-officials. Those who favoured the right of the non-officials to write confidential reports of the officers under their control, were aware of the anticipated misuse of this right. But to them it was a temporary phenomenon, and in the ultimate analysis the principle which supported the right of the non-officials had stronger logic on its side. One Block Development Officer remarked that if he was to be made accountable to the non-official, then the non-official should also be equally held responsible for the execution of schemes. Quoting some survey in Rajasthan in this regard he remarked, "Accountability and responsibility go hand in hand."

The Personnel

Class III and Class IV personnel form the most numerous staff in the organization. Their attitudes, their grievances, their personal limitations affect considerably the development organization. Mr. C. F. Snider referring to the modern personnel policy says that it requires not only a merit system of recruitment but also such other factors like reasonable probation period, promotion linked with capacity and performance, protected tenure.

orientation and refresher courses while in service, and fair and adequate retirement-benefits.⁶

Many of these factors are wanting and they are much needed in the Panchayati Raj services. The Parishad personnel is a 'composite' personnel. It includes the old District Local Board employees, it covers the 'transferred' government employees, and it has its 'own' employees also. The Government opinion on the homogeneous character of the Parishad services is also not steady. The Local Self Government Committee Report (1939) did not favour the formation of a cadre while the Administrative Enquiry Committee (1948) favoured common cadres controlled by a Board representing local bodies. Both these reports relate to the period before the introduction of the Panchayati Raj which drastically changed the content of local government. The 'composite' nature of the Parishad personnel is now giving way to a homogeneous personnel policy. The dead-line time limit regarding repatriation to the parent departments in case of the government servants transferred to the Parishad services is now over. Also under Section 252 the Zilla Parishad is empowered to prepare and sanction a Schedule of Establishment. The Zilla Parishad under survey has utilized this power from time to time. Table 6.3 gives the details of it for the period ending 1968-69. The Divisional

6 P. R. Dubhashi. <u>Rurel Development Administration in</u> <u>India</u> (Bombay : Popular Prakashan, 1970), p. 196. Table 6.3 : Schedule of Establishment (Section 252) Zilla Parishad, Nasik

| Sr. No. | Date of Senction | Cadre | Post | Sanctioned Strength | Number appoin- ted | Remarks |
|------------|---------------------|-----------|--|------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | | | | | | |
| 1. | 30- 1-1965 | Class III | Head Accountant | 1 | 1 | |
| 2. | 30- 1-1965 | Class III | Senior Assistant (one for each Deputy Engineer) | 5 | 5 | • |
| • 3• | 30- 1-1965 | Class III | Office Assistant | 60 | 25 | Merged wit Junior Assistent |
| 4. | 30- 1-1965 | Class III | Senior Assistant (Accounts) | 1 | 1 | |
| | | · , | (Finance Department) | | | |
| 5. | 30- 9-1965 | Class III | Superintendent (Health Department) | 1 | 1 | |
| 6. | 30- 9-1965 | Class III | Senior Assistant (Agriculture Department) | 1 | 1 | |
| 7. | 30- 9-1965 | Class III | Senior Assistant (Health Department) | 1 . | 1 | |
| 8. | 30- 9-1965 | Class III | Deputy Accountant (Finance Department) | . 1 | - 1 | |
| 9. | 30- 9-1965 | Class III | Senior Assistant (Finance Department) | 1 | 1 | |
| 10. | 2-11-1965 | Class III | Junior Assistant (Estt. Deputy Engineer) | 6 | 6 | |
| 11. | 30- 9-1965 | Class III | Senior Assistant (M. I. P. Division) | 1 | - | |
| 12. | 30- 9-1965 | Class III | Junior Assistant (M. I. P. Division) | 3 | - | |
| | | | | • • • | | |
| 13. | 30- 9-1965 | Class IV | Peon (M. I. P. Division) | 1. | - | |
| 14. | 30- 9-1965 | Class IV | Attendant (M. I. P. Division) | 1 | • | |
| 15. | 27- 3-1968 | Class III | Senior Assistant (Finance Department, | 1 | • 1. 1. 1. | |
| | • | | Provident Fund Section) | • | | |
| 16. | 27- 3-1968 | Class III | Junior Assistant (Finance Department, | 1 | 1 | |

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Source : Annual Administration Report 1968-69, Zilla Parishad Nasik, Statement No.4, p. 15.

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Selection Board for Class III (technical) and the District Selection Board for Class III (ministerial) and Class IV services as per the Parishad Act, 1961, are expected to introduce uniformity in recruitment and promotions and . also in controls -- administrative and disciplinary. The Divisional Commissioner is the ex-officio chairman of the Divisional Selection Board. The Government nominees of the District Selection Board are also the members of the Divisional Selection Board. The Collector is the ex-officio chairman of the District Selection Board and the Resident Deputy Collector acts as the ex-officio secretary of the District Selection Board. The Chief Executive Officer or the Deputy Chief Executive Officer represents the Parishad on the District Selection Board. There are two nominated members on the Board and the Parishad officer of the concerned department for which the posts are to be filled in attends the meeting in an advisory capacity. The term of the Board is for 5 years. The Selection Board meets 'as and when required'. Total meetings of the District Selection Board for the Nasik Zilla Parishad were 11 in the period from 1966-67 to 1968-69; 4 in 1966-67, 5 in 1967-68 and 2 in 1968-69. Would it further help the organizational unity, if the English system is followed in the course of time, to fill in the officers' posts? There all 'key' posts are filled in by the local authorities from the 'narrow pannel' of officers supplied by the Government. 27 **.** .

And for all such posts the reference from the earlier employer carries considerable weight. The report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee, the Government of Maharashtra, 1968, has stated that the government at the most would include the posts in the Local Government sector in its existing service cadres thereby allowing it to depute officers to work under Zilla Parishads. Constituting an independent local government service has been ruled out by the Committee.⁷ But the Panchayati Raj Evaluation Committee (Maharashtra, 1971) favours Statewide cadre of higher officials.

Staff is a vital part of the organization. Its quality and sense of devotion make difference between success or failure. Here important considerations are pay, promotion and training. The discontent among the staff of the Parishad under consideration was general and minimum. The reasons, as they were, mainly concerned with the low time-scale and little prospects for promotion. These are not specific to Zilla Parishad services as such. The tendency noticed was compensating promotion for a steady job in the habitual locality - this reflects partly the unenthusiastic attitude of the staff towards the institution in general. In one Panchayat Samiti under survey one

7 <u>The Report of the Administrative Reorganization</u> <u>Committee</u> (Bombay : Government of Maharashtra, 1968), pp. 147-48. Senior Assistant Accounts and an Extension Officer (Village Panchayats) declined promotions on these considerations. The office of the Assistant Block Development Officer is of a stationary character and Extension Officers are reluctant to accept this promotion which means loss of their travelling allowances which are regular and considerable.

Promotion is an important consideration in the service. The Naik Committee of Maharashtra had stressed this point and had recommended that the entire ministerial staff of the Council be regarded as one unit in case of promotion. There are little prospects for Class III (technical) services. The discontent among the Village Level Workers was mainly because of the paucity of promotional channels in respect of their cadre. The tendency of technical departments is to protect their field men and pick them up for promotion. The Village Level Worker is an orphan of the Rural Development Department. He undergoes an intensive course in agriculture as a part of the inservice training, and he is not entertained while considering promotions in the Department of Agriculture--much work of which sher attends at the village level. Their grievances reached an agitational level and in the districts of Thana and Kolaba the Village Level Workers refused to look after the work of the Department of Agriculture. In the Parishad under survey their agitation was short-lived and so defeated. in the second second

To solve some of these problems and mitigate others. the Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj, Maharashtra, has recommended that posts equivalent in number to Class II posts under the Zilla Parishad be considered as available for promotion for Class III employees of the Parishad, in the corresponding category of the State Service.⁸ It has also recommended a 'Development Service Cadre' as the development wing of the State civil service on the lines of State revenue service. The Nasik Zilla Parishad had resolved in its General Body meeting on 24-3-1971 (Resolution No. 97) requesting the Government to constitute a development cadre. This when materialized, would open more channels of promotion for the Parishad personnel. The Irrigation and Power Department as the Evaluation Committee Report quotes, has actually issued orders for extending promotional channels for her employees (vide Government Resolution, Irrigation and Power Department No. GAD-1070-E(I) dated 19th October 1970).

The present promotional channels for the Zilla Parishad employees are governed by the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads District Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1967. Thus 25 per cent posts of the Extension Officer (Agriculture) and Agricultural Supervisor can be filled in by promotion from the cadre of Junior Extension Officer (Agriculture)

8 <u>Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati</u> Raj (Bombay : Government of Maharashtra, 1971), p. 56.

District Technical Services (Class III) Grade III. In case of the posts of Junior Extension Officers to be filled in from the Agricultural Assistants (Subordinate Agricultural Grade I services) and the Gramsevaks with suitable qualifications, the promotion of persons from these two categories would be in the ratio of 3:1. The channel of promotion in case of the Department of Agriculture starts from the post of the Junior Agricultural Assistant (District Service (Class III) (Subordinate Agricultural) Grade II, rising upto the post of the Senior Extension Officer (Agriculture) or the posts of the Agricultural Officer (District Technical Service (Class III) (Agriculture) Grade I. The service and the cadre with present pay scales are noted below in Table 6.4.

The actual number of promotions effected in the technical departments is obviously very small.: The minimum period of service is expected in the junior grade. For example, Junior Agricultural Assistant is required to put in 5 years continuous service in that grade before becoming eligible for the promotion to the Assistant Extension Officer (Agriculture). The minimum qualifications required and the number of posts actually sanctioned in the higher cadre are the causes of this state of affairs. Thus, during the period from 1966-67 to 1968-69, one Tracer, in the works department of the Zilla Perishad under survey was promoted to the post of Junior Draftsman. There are

| Sr. No. | Service | Cadre | Post | Pay scale with special pay if any (in Rs.) for the period from 1st April 1966 |
|------------|---|-----------|--|--|
| 1 |)istrict Service (Class III) (Subordinate | Grade II | Junior Agricultural Assistant | 95-2-195-3-120-E.B3-135 |
| | Agriculturel) | Grade I | 1. Assistant Extension) Officer (Agriculture)) | 115-4-135-5-160-E.B. -5-185-6-215. |
| | | | 2. Agricultural Assistant | |
| - | District Technical Service | Grade III | 1. Junior Extension Officer (Agriculture) | 150-8-190-10-230-E.5. -10-280-15-325. |
| | (Class III) (Agriculture) | | 2. Junior Agricultural Supervisor | - do - (Agriculture graduates to start on Rs. 200) |
| | | Grade II | 1. Extension Officer (Agriculture) | 200-10-280-E.B15-400 |
| | ••• | | 2. Agricultural Supervisor | - do - (Persons possessing post-graduate qualification or equivalent quali- fication in Agriculture to start on Rs. 250) |
| | | Grade I | 1. Senior Extension Officer (Agriculture) | 275-15-410-E.B20-570. |
| | | | 2. Agricultural Officer | - do - |

Table 6.4 : Channel of Promotion - Department of Agriculture (Zilla Parishad Level)

Source : The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads (Pay Scale and Dearness Allowance) (Amendment) Rules 1969, Schedule A, pp. 4 and 13.

fifteen posts of Junior Draftsman and one post each of Draftsman and Head Draftsman as per the present establishment of the Works Department of the Parished under survey. This restricts promotional mobility. In case of the Parishad Department of Education, ten years service is required for a primary teacher with S.S.C. or its equivalent examination (fifteen years in case of a P.S.C. teacher) before becoming eligible for the promotion to the post of Assistant Deputy Educational Inspector (Grade III). The total sanctioned strength of the Assistant Deputy Educational Inspector (i.e. Extension Officer (Education)) of the Nasik Zilla Parishad Education Department is 50 . . (Grade II 36 and Grade III 14). Out of the total number of primary teachers in the District, viz. 6,675, only eleven primary teachers thus could get promotion to the posts of the Assistant Deputy Educational Inspector (Grade III) during the period from 1966-67 to 1968-69. Promotions in the non-technical cadre (ministerial service) are not so discouraging. From Office Assistants (now merged with Junior Assistant) (District Service) (Class III) (Subordinate Ministerial Grade I) the promotional channel rises upto Assistant Block Development Officer on the ministerial side and to Head Accountant or Divisional Accountant on the Accounts side. Following is the actual promotional movement in the General Administration Department of the Zilla Parishad under survey for the period 1966-67 to 1968-69.

Junior Assistant (District Service Class III Subordinate Ministerial) Senior Assistant (Ministerial) Senior Assistant (Accounts) (43) (23)1 Office Superintendent Deputy Accountant (3) (10) Assistant Block Assistant Block Development Officer Development Officer (2)(4)

The non-filling of Class III posts is also frequent (Table 6.5). If this is linked up with intra-departmental promotions from junior levels to senior levels in Class III, it may help to reduce some of the grievances of the staff. Training

If satisfaction is the outcome of adequate amount of pay and promotion, then efficiency is the function. <u>inter alia</u> of training. Henry Maddick calls staff as the spinal cord of the whole organization and urges on introducing professionalism meaning thereby a sense of compulsive efficiency in the local government services of the developing countries.⁹

Staff associations on the model of the NALGO (U.K.) have much scope in this regard - postal courses, summer

⁹ Henry Maddick, <u>Decentralization for Development</u> (New York: Division of Public Administration, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N.O., 1961), p. 187.

| Sr. No. | Year | Less than 6 months | | | | | | | Vacant throughout the year | | | Position by the o of the year (Actual Strength) | |
|------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|---|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---|-------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---|-------------|
| | | Class III Tech. | Class III | Class IV | Class III Tech. | Class III | IV | Class III Tech. | Class III | Class IV | Class III Tech. | Class III | Class IV |
| 1. | 196 5-66 | 3 (3 W) | 3 (3 W) | 1 (1 AH) | 2 (2 W) | 9 (7 W) (2 AH) | - | 26 (26 N) | 28 (26 W) (2 AH) | 1 (1 H) | 74 | 217 | 110 |
| 2. | 1966-67 | 2 (1 C) (1 H) | 9 (6 F) (2 H) (1 A) | (1 F) | (4W) | | - | (1 SV) (4 V) | (6 F) | (1 ¹ F) | 77 | 203 | 111 |
| 3. | 1967-68 | (1 A) (1 C) (1 H) | (1 SW) (1 C) (2 H) (3 F) | (1 ¹ F) | 6 (1 SW) (1 F) (4 W) | 2 (1 SW) (1 A) | (1 ¹ A) | 7 (4 W) (3 SW) | 6 (2 SW) (2 A) (2 F) | 2 (1 A) (1 F) | 77 | 202 | 105 |
| 4. | 1968-69 | 10 (2 A) (1 H) (7 F) | 3 (1 SW) (2 H) |) | 2 (1 SW) (1 C) | 1 (1 SW) | 2 (1 A) (1 E) | 11 (3 SW) (7 F) (1 C) | 2)(2 SW) | - | 121 | 169 | 77 |
| Ref | erence : | W = V A = J | Social W Works Agricult Animal H | ure | · | . | E = E H = I | Co-opera Educatio Health Finance | | d Indus | | | |

Table 6.5 : Statement of Vacant Posts Class III (Technical), Class III and Class IV Servants, Zilla Parishad Nasik

Source: Annual Administrative Reports. Zilla Parishad Nasik.

schools, seminars and research studies in collaboration with Universities and voluntary agencies in the field. Was The 'AVARD' is a similar institute in our soil. The aspect of training has received much attention in the Community Development programme. Still it ewaits satisfactory co-ordination and improvement. It is a three-fold process where, along with experience and the supervision by the experienced, individual's self-development through libraries and professional institutions equally counts. It is this approach which would make training, in the words of Keynes, 'a technique of thinking, an apparatus of mind which enables its possessor to right conclusion'.¹⁰

Training facilities under Community Development pattern were encouraging, though not necessarily adequate. The village level workers received training in about 100 Gramsevak Training Centres. The Block Development Officers were trained in Orientation, Study and Training Centres (11 in number). Social Education Officers had special training centres (6 in number). The National Institute for Study and Research in Community Development, Mussoorie (now the National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh) conducts courses for higher administrative cadres.

¹⁰ Shri P. R. Dubhashi in his book <u>Rural Development</u> <u>Administration in India</u> (Bombay: Popular Frakashan, 1970) says, "Training will be conducted linking theory and practice--treating theory in its etymological sense of an 'oversight' of phenomena and practice as the live source of a body of principles applicable to varying situations." (P. 270.)

Along with the officers, orientation courses for the non-officials also assume greater significance in developing countries. Otherwise while democratising the officials, the non-officials might be bureaucratized. The nonofficials receive training in Panchayati Raj centres, which are 14 at present in Maharashtra. Professional efficiency is also expected from them. A majority of the respondents (96 out of 120 i.e. 80 per cent) appreciated the need for such orientation courses. Though the conduct of training centres does not confirm this tendency, the reflections of the non-officials seek to explain some of the shortcomings in these centres. Table 6.6 narrates the story and pins down the missing elements in these centres as the divorce of theory and practice at training centres (item 1) and the people's ignorance about the importance of such training (as a 'technique of thinking') (item 9B). Some desired to make this training compulsory (item 9) and advocated automatic discontinuation of the membership if a councillor failed to attend such facilities within a specific number of opportunities (e.g. three as per the Rejesthan pattern). Nearness of the centre, its peripatetic character, off-season courses - all are important considerations in the effective working of these training centres.

The difficulty with these training courses is that these do not develop an enthusiastic approach to the

| Table 6.6 : Non-offici | lals' Reflect | ions on | Training C | ent res |
|--|----------------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------|
| | Pe | Zilla rishad | | Total |
| l. Training to non- officials is essen | ntiel | 13 | - | 13 |
| 2. Training is not es | sential. | 2 | - | 2 |
| 3. Intimation for cou always received la | te | 1 | - | l |
| 4. Personal difficult | ies | 7 | 2 | 9 |
| 5. Training is theore bookish | tical- | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| 7. Training centres s be peripatetic. T should preferably Taluka places | 'hey | 3 | - | 3 |
| 8. Non-officials lack enthusiasm | 5 | 2 | . – | 2 |
| 9. Training should be compulsory | • | 9 | | 9 |
| 9A. Courses should be attractive | | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| 9B. People have not un the importance of | derstood training | 22 | 1 | 23 |
| 9C. Training centres a not be at a distan the normal places | nce from | 5 | - | 5 |
| 9D. There should be re courses also | fresher | 2 | - | 2 |
| 9E. Number of centres inadequate | is | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Total | | 73 | 8 | 81 |
| | | ~ ~ | | + |

Table 6.6 : Non-officials' Reflections on Training Cent

village problems which ultimately the non-officials have to face. What is required is 'an attitude building' process, itself a slow method resulting in no immediate tangible returns. The councillors of these bodies as a class are illiterate and this fact should be given due consideration.

The Coldwell Mission of the U.N.O. (1959) looked at these training centres as the important ways of communication from the top to the village level administration. It suggested that each syllabus should have an appendix dealing with the actual problems in the village. The courses should have less number of lectures and more discussions and the training programmes should deal with a number of case studies. The courses would be different and emphasis would differ with different groups of trainees. Thus for non-officials it would be a policy formation training, and training creating a faith in the institution and a purpose in their role. For officials it would be refreshers courses, and in-service training, with follow-up as an essential and regular activity. The Block Development Officer would need a new development orientation in response to his changed role. (This would be doubly so, when the majority of them happen to have been recruited from the revenue department as is the case of the Parishad under survey. There seems to be no reason why it should be different in other districts.)

The Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj, Maharashtra, 1971, has suggested the establishment of a new training institution for officials and non-officials. It would deal with

- (1) Theoretical training, including an intensive study of enactments, rules, orders etc.
 applicable to Panchayati Raj;
 - (ii) Maintenance of all statistics relating to Panchayati Raj matters in the State;
 - (iii) Conducting from time to time and on continuous basis evaluation of the performance of the Panchayati Raj bodies;
 - (iv) Acting as an adviser to the Rural Development Department in the matters relating to the Panchayati Raj.¹¹

From the point of professionalism in the service, departmental training needs expansion. Thus, in the General Administration Department a Junior Assistant receives three months training before he is promoted to the post of the Senior Assistant Accounts. Similarly Senior Assistant Accounts undergoes a three months training course before appearing for the examination for the post of the Deputy Accountant. (Appendix No. 5.)

¹¹ The Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj (Bombay : Government of Maharashtra, 1971), para 5.55, pp. 61-62.

The Problem of the Planning Officer

The post of Planning Officer is of crucial importance in the district administration in the context of 'planning from below'. The Heble Committee, on the follow-up of the Administrative Reforms Committee, Government of Maharashtra, 1968, recommended to replace him by the District Statistical Officer (vide pp. 136 to 138 of the Committee report). It would be too early to decide on an important post like this in such a way. The Planning Officer is expected to help taking decisions. He is an educator first and then an executive. His initial job chart speaks eloquently of the significance attached to his post (vide Appendix No. 3). As Panchayati Raj institutions develop and settle this post will gain in stature. The Evaluation Committee of the Government of Maharashtra (1971) has therefore recommended to re-designate him as the Deputy Chief Executive Officer (Planning) with some special pay.

But, as the case stands at present, the Planning Officer has miserably failed to impress the Panchayati Raj institutions. And it is this failure which is echoed in the recommendation of the Heble Committee to replace him by a district statistical officer. Table 6.7 overwhlemingly confirms this situation. Two major complaints against him and his work were (1) he lacked popular contact, (2) the nature of his job was much paper work only. Special meetings of the Panchayat Samitis are called for the

| la Parishad | • | |
|-------------------|---|---|
| Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | |
| | | 16 |
| 61 | 16 | 77 |
| 4 | | |
| 9 | 7 | 16 |
| | | |
| | la Parishad Zilla Parishad 14 61 9 | he Planning Officer an la Parishad Zilla Panchayat Parishad Samiti 14 2 61 16 4 7 9 7 88 32 |

Table 6 7 . Chamternets ...

formulation of the development plans. One such meeting was called for, during the period under reference, to discuss long term plan schemes (subsequently to be included in the Fourth Five-Year Plan). Such meetings should have been called for in consultation with the Planning Officer. It would help him to chalk out his tour-programme in such a way as to enable him to attend maximum number of such meetings or to depute a Senior Assistant from his department for the purpose. As this is not done, such meetings unfortunately turn out to be administrative rituals. Member participation is reduced to the suggestion/inclusion of a particular work or a project in the Panchayat Samiti proposals rather than any deliberation on the area-planning

which involves co-ordination of the activities and phasing of the programme. And here the Planning Officer is much in need.

The Block Development Officer and His Team

The Block Development Officer, who is the secretary of a Panchayat Samiti, is the chief area co-ordinator at the Samiti level. He is a generalist normally drawn from the revenue cadre (though not necessarily so) and given orientation-training. In the block work he is assisted by the team of 8 Extension Officers dealing with different subjects - Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Co-operation, and Education, Works, Village Panchayats, Social Welfare, Health and Industries. The Deputy Engineer attached to Panchayat Samiti looks after the works programme in the Block (taluka). The staffing position of one Panchayat Samiti (C.P.A. pattern) under survey is as follows (Panchayat Samiti level).

| | Post | Cadre | Recruitment | No.of Posts |
|-----------|-------------------------------------|-----------|----------------|-------------|
| 1. | The Block Development Officer | | State | |
| 2. | Deputy Accountant | Class III | Zilla Parishad | 1 |
| 2. | Senior Assistant | • | Zilla Parishad | |
| • - | Assistant | Class III | Zilla Parishad | |

| | Post | Cadre | Recruitment | No. of Posts |
|----|---------------------------|-----------|---|--------------|
| 5. | Senior Assistent | Class III | State (Depart- ment of Agriculture) | 2 |
| | Junior Assistant | Class III | Zilla Parishad | 5 |
| 7. | Extension Officers | Class III | Zilla Parishad | 16 |
| 8. | Peons | Class IV | Zilla Parishad | 14 |
| 9. | Agricultural Assistant | Class III | State (Depart- ment of Agriculture) | 21 |

<u>Note</u>: This staffing position excludes staff controlled by the Health Units and the staff of the office of the Deputy Engineer attached to the Panchayat Samiti. This also excludes Assistant/Junior Gramsevaks who are controlled by the Block Development Officer but who work at the village level. The staffing pattern is in main illustrative. The staff excluded from the list is controlled by the Block Development Officer. But it does not work under the same roof and have their independent establishments.

The co-ordination achieved at this level is mainly of the administrative type. The Fifth Evaluation Report of the Programme Evaluation Organization, Planning Commission (1958) was not enthusiastic over the state of coordination at the block level (p. 42). In case of the Block Development Officer, who is high above his team in knowledge, length of service and competence, co-ordination does not become a 'process' but is reduced to 'a line of acceptance'. The Extension Officers in co-ordination meetings with the Block Development Officer never feel that they share in the decision-making process regarding the programmes of their subject-matter activities. The Block Development Officer's suggestion is like 'the aye of the President' and therefore he has it 'irrespective of the seven nays'. This unenthusiastic attitude of the Extension Officers is also felt in the meetings of the Panchayat Samiti. They 'attend' these meetings as instructed but leave it to the Block Development Officer to explain or defend their points.

This has given rise to the practice of patronizing by the Block Development Officer. The Panchayat Samiti pattern is basically the schematic pattern of the Community Development block. All the Extension Officers are not adequately employed when the stage II is over. Even in stage II, all are not fully utilized because of the variations in the Blocks. In addition to this, some subjects have lost their scope in the new pattern of Panchayati Raj. As such these posts have become superfluous. The posts of Extension Officer (Industries) and Extension Officer (Cooperation) are the examples. Community Development programme has lost much of its novelty (though not utility), and accordingly the post of the Extension Officer Social Education has lost its importance. The Block Development Officer, who is overworked when the block is of 'A' type (more than

 $M_{1}^{2}(x) = (x^{2} - x^{2})^{2} (x^{2} -$

2 1/2 C.P.A. pattern), naturally takes help of some of these officers. In such cases, the concerned Extension Officer enjoys a 'status' within the team, which is harmful. In one Panchayat Samiti under survey, Extension Officer Industries was consistently associated with the Block Development Officer in this manner. In another case, arrangements for exhibition in a village fair near the taluka place were not entrusted to the Extension Officer Social Education who was available but was not in the good books of the Block Development Officer, with the result that the work was carried out by a Statistical Assistant in the office.

For administrative co-ordination, the Village Level Worker meeting is the practice. It is a replica of the co-ordination meeting at the district level attended by the Block Development Officer and the Sabhapati of a Panchayat Samiti. At taluka level Sarpanchas are not invited. The meeting deals with new 'drives', follow up of the 'old', loan recoveries, various official celebrations, compliance with the audit objections, information called by the office etc. It also notes important circulars received during the interval between two such meetings. Extension Officers have little control over the Gramsevaks in the meeting, partly because they are 'poor sellers' of their ideas. In some cases Extension Officers happen to be promoted from the same gramsevak cadre (as in case of an Extension

Officer Village Panchayats, in one Panchayat Samiti under observation). The meeting is always halting and halfheartedly conducted till the Block Development Officer joins it. He pins down the discussion to the problems under consideration. At times he appears to be stern and uncompromising in the meeting about various official compliances (though he would be considerate when dealing with individual cases of the late submission of the information by the Village Level Workers).

The Block Development Officer is like an entrepreneur. His job is to organize the available resources and put them to the optimum use. Development orientation is a special requisite in his case. But he is glued down to the desk. Most of the Block Development Officers from the Zilla Parishad under survey originally belong to the revenue department. They are not unhappy with a preponderance of desk work to the extent they should have been.¹²

The Block Development Officer is expected to tour for a longer period and observe a specified number of night halts. The nature of work also has become full of frequent 'drives' and numerous 'campaigns'. If he is to do

12 "As long as a desk shrewn with files is the hallmark of status and field work with its dirty hands and dirty boots has low prestige success in implementing development plan will be limited." Dr. Belshaw's article "Underdeveloped Areas Shannan" quoted by Henry Maddick, Decentralization for Development (New York: U.N.O., 1961), p. 96. justice to development then he needs to be assisted by an Assistant Block Development Officer at least in case of 'A' type of blocks (of more than 2 1/2 C.P.A. patternthe post is filled in only in case of tribal blocks). The more the paper work, the more is the manipulation. Referring to the work diary which the Block Development Officers received in January 1968, one Block Development Officer complained that it was too exhaustive and felt that it made some of the earlier returns superfluous.

A detailed survey of the staffing pattern of the Block by the O. and M. unit is now overdue, since the staffing pattern which is inherited from the Community Development Organization needs to be reviewed. Considering the nature of development work to be entrusted to the Zilla Parishad and the stage of development in the Community Development block a new staffing pattern should be evolved through experiments and then uniformly adhered to. The Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj in Maharashtra, after considering the situation has given following extension staffing pattern for Panchayat Samitis (Table 6.8). (Appendix No. 2.)

The Village Level Worker at the Village Panchayat Level

The Village Level Worker is a gift from the Etawah Project. He is the most important and the only multipurpose functionary at the village level. New knowledge and new

| Category of Post | Pe | Panchayat Samiti | | | | |
|--|--|---------------------------------------|------------|--|--|--|
| | | Type 'B' Nos. | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| L. Extension Officer Agriculture | 2 | 2 | 1 | | | |
| 2. Extension Officer Agriculture (taken fro Intensive Cultivation | m · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | . · · · | | | |
| Development Block) | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | |
| 3. Extension Officer Panchayats | 2 | 2 | 1 | | | |
| 4. Extension Officer Animal Husbandry | 1 | 1 | 1 1 | | | |
| 5. Extension Officer Education | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | |
| 6. Extension Officer | | | , , | | | |
| Works | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | |
| Type A - 2 1/2 and above Type B - 1 1/2 and above Blocks. Type C - Less than 1 1/2 Source : Report of the Ev Raj (Bombay : Go | but less the Schematic Bl <u>aluation Com</u> vernment of | n 2 1/2 Sc .ocks. mittee on 1 | Panchayati | | | |
| para 5.34, p. 48 | • Andrewski (* 1995) Standard (* 1995) | | | | | |
| echniques must be spread | over a wide | r area in a | a developi | | | |
| conomy. For this most p | roductive in | vestment, 1 | the Gram- | | | |
| evak (the Village Level) | Worker) is t | he only age | ent at the | | | |
| village level. But there | are heavy c | laims on hi | Im and the | | | |
| and the second | | · • | | | | |

Table 6.8 : Extension Staffing Pattern for Panchayat Samiti

Mehta Report grudgingly recorded that very little time was left with a Gramsevak to attend to development work. Much of his time was claimed either by revenue work (33 to 47 per cent) and miscellaneous work including office work (20 to 30 per cent).¹³

For effective functioning the jurisdiction of the Gramsevak is an important consideration. The Mehta Report has recommended five villages (with total population of 4,000) per Gramsevak plus developmental activities. At present he deals with 6,600 population on an average. It is also difficult to relieve a Gramsevak of his panchayat work. There are nearly 20,800 panchayats in Maharashtra and each cannot be provided with a full-time secretary. If a Gramsevak is to be relieved of his panchayat work, this would need an expansion in the present cadre from 5,800 to 15.000.¹⁴ This expansion could be opposed on the ground of economy and on the ground that the multi-purpose nature of the village level worker is the essence of his services. He should be institutionally linked with the development agency of the village. Panchayat secretaries should also be trained in agricultural extension. (This training conducted by the Department of Agriculture is at present

14 <u>Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee</u> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1968), pp. 149-50.

¹³ The Report of the Committee on Plan Projects Vol. II, (New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, 1957), p. 133.

discontinued). The Panchayat has a vital part to play in the development of the village. Here the Sarpanch and the Gramsevak both have a key role to play.

The total number of Gramsevaks and Assistant Gramsevaks in the Nasik Zilla Parishad is 230 and 383 respectively. In one Panchayat Samiti under survey it was noticed that out of the total strength 73 of the Gramsevaks and the Assistant Gramsevaks, hardly 23 had passed the S.S.C. examination. The percentage of Gramsevak/Assistant Gramsevak with P.S.C. as a qualification was obviously larger in case of Assistant Gramsevaks where 34 out of 41 were P.S.C. Fifty per cent of the Gramsevaks (16 out of 32) had passed the S.S.C. examination while 7 Assistant Gramsevaks out of 41 had passed the S.S.C. examination.

The minimum qualification for the post of Assistant Gramsevak is P.S.C. with a diploma from an Agricultural School or S.S.C. or its equivalent examination. He belongs to the District Service [(Class III) (Subordinate Executive and Village Extension) Grade II] in the pay scale of Rs. 95-2-105-3-120-E.B.-3-135. Reasonable channels of promotion open to him are the posts of Gramsevak (by promotion 50 per cent) (District Service Class III Subordinate Executive and Village Extension, Grade I) in the pay scale of Rs. 115-4-135-5-160-E.B.-5-185-6-215, and Senior Gramsevak (or Junior Extension Officer (Panchayat and Social Welfare)) in the District Service (Class III Executive and Village Extension, Grade III) in the pay scale of Rs.150-10-230-E.B.-10-270-15-300. Promotions to the post of an Extension Officer (Panchayat and Social Welfare) [District Service (Class III Executive and Village Extension, Grade II] is exceptional. In one Panchayat Samiti under survey 1 Gramsevak was promoted as a Junior Extension Officer (Panchayat and Social Welfare) during the period from 1966-67 to 1968-69. The corresponding figure for the district was 8. In the same period 4 Assistant Gramsevaks were promoted to the posts of Gramsevak.

The Assistant Gramsevak receives six months training in Agriculture and the Gramsevak has to complete one year's course in Agriculture at Kosbad Hill, District Thana. Training programme as far as the Gramsevak is concerned is lagging behind and in the Panchayat Samiti under consideration only 15 out of 32 Gramsevaks had completed the one-year training. As far as the Assistant Gramsevaks are concerned 35 out of 41 had completed the six months course at Kosbad Hill.

Transfers within the block are not frequent. Such transfers are effected only when the administrative cooperation between the Sarpanch and the Gramsevak is disturbed. No such transfer was effected in the Panchayat Samitis under survey during the period from 1966-67 to 1968-69.

The ratio of the number of Gramsevaks to the number of villages covered is fairly close to the recommendations of the Mehta Committee (5 villages per Gramsevak) in one Panchayat Samiti under survey. Here the number of villages is 139 while the number of Gramsevaks is 32, which roughly comes to 4.33 villages per every Gramsevak. The figures for the Zilla Parishad are 1,642 villages and 230 Gramsevaks.

The role of the Gramsevak has not been satisfactory. Nor is it understood properly. To many he is a minor government servant at the village level. Few regard him as a social worker, and his claim to development leadership is always disputed. The Fifth Evaluation Report on the Working of Community Development and National Extension Service Blocks (Programme Evaluation Organization, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 1958) attributes this failure of a Gramsevak to the lack of up-to-date knowledge on his part, lack of interest in the job, lack of rural background, end has suggested better approach to villagers and greater readiness to live in villages as a clue to his success.¹⁵

Panchayat is not merely a unit of administration. It is a forum through which community sense is developed.

¹⁵ S. C. Dube accounting for the unsatisfactory performance of the Village Level Worker says, "A rigid schedule, externally determined target, and lack of opportunities for individual initiative coupled with authoritarian supervision and general public apathy do not provide adequate incentive for originality, innovation and dedicated work." S. C. Dube, <u>India's Changing Villages</u> (London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1958), p. 186.

The team at the village level consists of the Talathi (revenue department), the Panchayat Secretary (Development department) and the Secretary of the multi-purpose cooperative society at the village level. The Talathi has been taken back in the revenue department. The other two who have remained in the field of development are without eny institutional co-ordination.

The general trend of the representatives was that the Gramsevak was not a helpful functionary. Seventy-seven out of 120 (i.e. 64.17 per cent) endorsed this view. The normal complaints against him in order of frequency were: (i) his circle was too large to have any effective control over the activities of his area; (ii) he did not mix with the people; (iii) he preferred to stay at the taluka place under one pretext or the other; (iv) he has become merely a desk-worker disregarding the extension duties; (v) there was little control over him; (vi) his alliance with the ruling faction tarred his general image; (vii) he has turned out to be a shirker; (viii) he has no adequate knowledge even in agriculture.

A Block Development Officer though not fully satisfied with his work has been sympathetic to him. He uses him as an administrative agent at the village level but he still wants to use him as a development instrumentality. The general opinion of the Block Development Officers is that his role should be redefined, and that he should be given

better training in new trades while increasing his knowledge of agriculture and making his need felt at the village level. (Appendix No. 4.)

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
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The dilemmafaced by the development administration is natural and inevitable. For more efficient performance of the Zilla Parishads development functions need the services of higher cadre personnel, both generalist and technical. But Zilla Parishads cannot afford to have these services on their own staff and therefore need the support of the State Government. The higher personnel would also find within an individual Zilla Parishad prospects for their promotion and varied work too restricted. On the other hand, the fuller realization of the local self governing character of these institutions involves coverage of a large number of developmental services under their own fold and on their own musterroll. If the development personnel is not transferred to these bodies along with the development functions, the implementation of development administration would be unsatisfactory. This is the dilemma faced by the Zilla Parishads as Local Government bodies and as development organizations. A via-media has therefore to be struck between these two claims which would retain for the Zilla Parishads the character of local self government

organization while making available to them adequate development personnel. The District Selection Boards and the proparation of the Schedule of Establishment under Section 252 of the Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, have a bearing on the local self government character of these institutions. The trend towards the formation of the development cadres covering the whole State, though affecting the local self government character of the Zilla Parishads would strengthen its roots and foster the self-reliant, efficient and resourceful character of the Zilla Parishads.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE ZILLA PARISHADS



CHAPTER VII

THE ZILLA PARISHAD AT WORK

The pragmatic test of any concept is very practical -- 'how does it work?' How is it received by the people through whom it works? How is it accommodated with by the people for whom it works?

Development Schemes

(i) Agriculture

The programme with top priority where the Community Development organization has failed and where therefore the Panchayati Raj bodies must succeed is the increase in agricultural production. This increase is directly linked, in main, with the improvement and application of scientific methods in the following fields: (a) improved seeds, (b) fertilizers, (c) plant protection measures, and (d) improved implements.

Propagation of hybrid and improved seeds has been one of the most ambitious and successful programmes under agriculture, undertaken by this Zilla Parishad. It covers hybrid jowar, hybrid bajra, hybrid maize and improved seeds of rice (Taichung Seed and I.R. 8), Mexican wheat and Niphad wheat (917.19 and 747). Table 7.1 gives us a picture of the progress of the scheme for the period from

| · 1. | | | nybitu a | - | | | (Figure | s in acres |) |
|---|--------|------------------|----------|----------|------------------|------------|----------|------------------|---------|
| | 1 | 966-67 | | | 1967-68 | | • +- | 1968 -69 | |
| Crop | Target | Achieve- ment | Per | Target | Achieve- ment | Percent | Target | Achieve- ment | Percent |
| Kharif | | - | | · | | | | · | |
| Hybrid bajra | 5,000 | 3,500 | 70.00 | 1,19,000 | 52,487 | 44.11 | 2,50,000 | 1,22,628 | 49.05 |
| Hybrid jowar | 1,000 | | - | 5,000 | 614 | 12.28 | 5,000 | 1,445 | 28.92 |
| Hybrid maize | 1,000 | 68 6 | 63.6 | 10,000 | 690 | 6.9 | 22,000 | 238 | 1.08 |
| Taichung and I.R. 8 Rice | 1,000 | 2,140 | 214.00 | 4,000 | 3,336 | 83.40 | 20,000 | 17,510 | 87.55 |
| <u>Rabi</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| Mexican and improved seed - Wheat | 8,100 | 1,444 | 17.83 | 25,000 | 57,350 | 229.40 | 75,000 | 70,998 | 94.66 |
| Hybrid jowar | 6,050 | 480 | 7.93 | 5,000 | - | . . | 2,000 | 223 | 11.15 |
| Hybrid maize | 1,500 | 291 | 19.40 | 3,000 | - | - | | - | - |

Table 7.1 : Propagation of the Hybrid and Improved Seed

1966-67 to 1968-69. This shows that the position is commendable except for jowar and maize which are not the staple crops of the district. In case of wheat and rice the picture is much satisfactory. Taking this response into consideration the Government revised the targets in 1969-70 as shown in the Table 7.2.

Table 7.2 : Propagation of Hybrid and Improved Seeds Programme for 1969-70

| Crop | Target (Acres) |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|
| <u>Kharif</u> | |
| 1. Taichung and I.R. 8 Rice | 15,000 |
| 2. Hybrid Bajra | 1,75,000 |
| 3. Hybrid Jowar | 1,600 |
| Rabi | |
| 4. Hybrid Jowar | 1,050 |
| 5. Mexican and Improved seed: Wheat | 65,000 |
| | |

It was found difficult to popularize jowar and maize. Demand for green maize earheads is seasonal and mainly from urban centres. Maize also can be used as a raw material for starch industries. There is no local market available except Bombay which is 188 kms. away from the district place. In order to popularize the hybrid maize, 200 quintals of seed were distributed to the farmers in the form of subsidy.

Even in case of hybrid bajra there seems to be a drop, after the initial boost. The main reason as it was found out was the supply of inferior seed in 1967-68. This resulted in less number of shoots to the main stem. In some cases untimely rains around the foundation seed farms washed away the bajra flowers and the male seed was found sterile. Hybrid or for that matter improved seed is a matter of many technical details which a farmer must constantly know and adhere to. In case of hybrid, for instance, the distance between the two rows while sowing, needs to be 9" while one farmer from Taluka Niphad, sowed it at a distance of 6". The effect was that the length of the earheads was less and his total output per acre was reduced to 11.5 guintals from 13.5 guintals which he himself had produced the year before. Some farmers used hybrid bajra of the last year as the seed for the next sowing. This is unscientific in case of hybrid, though not in case of improved seeds.

Another reason for the shortfall is the way in which the targets are arrived at. The target-figure for the year 1967-68 as reported 'from below' calculated with the help of the Agricultural Assistants at the Block level was 56,000 acres. The State Department of Agriculture revised the figure to 75,000 acres, while the Government at the Sachivalaya level insisted on a further upward revision upto 1,19,000 acres. It may be noted that the

actual realization of the target in the year 1967-68 came to 52,487 acres which is close to the figure 'from below'.

The main reason for adapting improved seeds or hybrid seeds was that they yielded better crop and fetched a better price. For example, in case of Taichung I.R. 8 the length of every earhead was 9.25" (in other varieties it was 9.00"), number of grains per stem was 191 (in other varieties within a range of 120-140) and the output was 32.40 quintels, seven to twelve guintals more than the other varieties. One farmer from taluka Kalwan produced 70 quintals of jowar on his 10-acre plot, and again went into the foundation seed plot for maize -- he was humourously called 'a hybrid farmer'. What is needed is wider use of the extension method to remove some popular misunderstandings about the hybrid--that the stalk does not serve as a palatable fodder for farm animals, that the hybrid cake does not taste good and breaks into crumbs as it loses its oven-freshness.

Extension must be systematic and with convincing arguments. The Block Development Officer from one Panchayat Samiti under survey wanted to call a public meeting in a village for the propagation of hybrid seed. He first briefed the Gramsevak of the village panchayat under reference. Then the Agricultural Officer attended the village, distributed literature and aroused adequate curiosity among the farmers. When the Block Development

Officer called a public meeting in that village he had a good response. The intimation of the meeting was given late i.e. by 9.00 p.m. Still the meeting was wellattended and farmers who had grown hybrid crops in the earlier season showed an encouraging participation in the meeting. The said meeting was over by 11.30 p.m.

In another village one farmer produced before the Block Development Officer two earheads, one of hybrid grain and another of a local strain. He argued, as it was, that the local strain gave him more yield. The Block Development Officer instantly compared the earheads and showed how the hybrid earhead was longer and contained more grains. He said that, as the hybrid stalk was short, maximum feeding would definitely make grains weigh more. The shortfall in this particular case he attributed to the failure of rains. With the application of fertilizers the case had become still worse. The local strain on the contrary was accustomed to the uncertainties of rain.

For all improved seeds the use of fertilizers has become a concomitant variation. The farmers have realized the importance of fertilizers and the demand for chemical fertilizers is growing. The district stood second in the consumption of fertilizers in the State figures during the Third Five Year Plan. The increase in the fertilizers' consumption during the Second and the Third Five Year Plans can be seen from the Table 7.3. The increase in demand

are left disused while new ones are dug up.1

Table 7.4 : Compost Manuring

| | _ | · · · | (Number) |
|-----------|-----------------|---------|----------|
| New Pits | 1966-67 | 1967-68 | 1968-69 |
| Compost | 18,930 | 3,263 | 1,978 |
| Farm Pits | 17,360 | 2,114 | 1,639 |
| Total | 36,290 | 5,377 | 3,617 |
| | • • • • • • • • | | |

The crop-protection schemes have fared better. During the Third Five Year Plan period the performance exceeded the financial targets. Expenditure figures for insecticide and pesticide control show a continuous rise from 1967-68 (Rs. 11,218.12) to 1968-69 (Rs. 23,825.14). the Even here there were complaints raised at/State level (e.g., in the Fifth Annual Conference of the Presidents, Vice-Presidents and the Chief Executive Officers of the Zilla

¹ S. C. Dube gives socio-cultural dimensions of the failure of a similar scheme in Rajasthan. He states that the scheme for compost-manuring failed because the pits were on the outskirts of the village (on hygienic grounds only). Garbage collection is traditionally regarded as the work of women. Though they would attend similar work in their own farmyards, people disliked the idea of their female family members carrying garbage to the outskirts of the village. No Rajput will send his daughter-in-law with a basket in her hand to collect dung. "When it comes down to established social practices neither appeal on scientific grounds nor logic can easily persuade the village people to give up their traditional life-ways." India's Changing Villages (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1958), [P. 135].

Parishads and the Commissioners of the Divisions) that Endrin supplied was found defective and that there were delays in sanctioning the loans by the banks. With respect to the crop protection implements the situation is not encouraging. More than 50 per cent of the sprayers and dusters have been found out of order in the year 1968-69.

Propagation of improved methods of sowing, use of improved seeds, and crop protection measures are a matter of extension-education in which demonstrations play an important role. The figures for 1966-67 and 1968-69 show a considerable increase in the number of demonstrations held. This increase justifies the increase in yield of rice and wheat. The drop in case of jowar shows difficulties in pushing the programme still further. Bajra and wheat are the staple cereals of the district (Table 7.5).

Table 7.5 : Propagation of Improved Agricultural Practices - Demonstrations Held

| | | No.of demonst | trations held in |
|-------|-----|---------------|------------------|
| Crop | | 1966-67 | 1968-69 |
| Rice | | 150 | 707 |
| Wheat | | 55 | 962 |
| Bajra | · . | 141 | 763 |
| Jowar | | 90 | 51 |

Increase in agricultural production is a complex function. Here equally important are the schemes of soil conservation, provision of adequate credit facilities, stable price system and appropriate land reforms. None of these is controlled by the Zilla Parishads.

The mode of operation of the Department of Agriculture seems to be campaign-biased. Various 'campaigns' and 'drives' make problem-orientation difficult. It also affects the working of other departments as the services are pooled on such occasions. There is little enthusiasm left for evolving long-term planning in consideration of local situations. The campaigns are not adequately coordinated. In one case fertilizers were pushed as a part of the campaign without corresponding considerations of improved seeds or irrigation facilities. Local manuring cannot record success when there is a scarcity of fuel. Here the dung cake is used as a cheap fuel.

The importance of supply lines and the effect of the rates for allied services cannot be minimized. The general complaint about the improved seeds was that they were received late. The abrupt increase in the rates for boring and blasting services from Rs. 10 per foot to Rs. 19 per foot seriously disturbed the cost schedules of the farmers and effected the programme of well irrigation.

It was observed that a small cultivator normally remained aloof from such extension programmes. The reason is economic. High prices for chemical fertilizers, initial cost of well-boring, the rates of hybrid seed as compared with the local variety or improved seed, all discourage him from adapting the innovation. At times he experiences that the sarpanch or his close associates make the maximum gain out of such innovations and manage to get prizes in cropcompetitions. Part of this observation is confirmed by a U.N. report which states that as a rule large farmers adapt technical changes more widely than the small farmers--and the community development staff concentrates therefore, more on the better off people.²

(ii) Animal Husbandry

Animal Husbandry is closely associated with the development activities in Agriculture. Its development drive is three-fold: (a) Breeding, (b) Feeding, and (c) Diseasecontrol. In Animal Husbandry disease-control activities have shown better performance. Veterinary aspect had always been predominant in the activities of the department. Also the farmers have realized the value of their cattle-wealth. These factors have contributed to the success of the scheme. Under Breeding the important schemes are Premium Bull Centres, Supplementary Cattle Breeding Centres and Artificial Insemination Centres. There are two Premium Bull Centres in the district and seven Supplementary Cattle Breeding Centres (spread over the talukas in the district). The

2 <u>Community Development and Economic Development</u> (U. N. Study Report, Bangkok: 1960), p. 23.

progress of the two centres of the Premium Bull scheme is slow. The record shows that the number of cows mated with , hes increased from 127 in the year 1967-68 to 182 in the year 1968-69. These centres are located at Bhare and Karanjali both in the western tract of the district. The general disinterestedness of the tribal people affects the progress of these centres. Transport difficulties also account for the slow progress. Cattle breeding programme at Igatpuri Centre (Taluka Igatpuri) recorded better success as it was carried out with a prolonged programme rather than a campaign-approach. Cattle breeding centres in the non-tribal areas were as a rule successful. The farmers have shown better awareness about their 'cattle wealth'. The stumbling difficulty is that of reduction in grazing lands. The scheme for fodder bank is a centrally sponsored scheme operated at the State level in the adjoining district Dhulia.

Artificial Insemination Centre also works for the improvement of the breed. Building for the District Artificial Insemination Centre was completed in 1966-67. Two sub-centres were started, one at Yeola (Taluka Yeola, 1967) and another at Sinnar (Taluka Sinnar, 1968). The construction work at Malegaon (Taluka Malegaon) was completed in 1970. These centres, especially one at Malegaon, have developed milk-producing areas around. The progress is slow but definite. The 1968-69 report shows

that 56 cases of Artificial Insemination were successful out of 77 cases tried.

The centres have to overcome a number of difficulties. Even if people understand the value of pure bred animals they are not ready to appreciate the value of artificial insemination. Secondly in a common grazing land it is practically difficult to secure the cows from stray bulls. And when the bull is released in the name of the God, his castration is impossible. Thirdly the parent pedigree bull must be changed every three years. Because a calf reaches maturity by two years and a half, and if mated with its parent bull, its pedigree vigour is affected. In one case a sterile cow was brought to the Artificial Insemination. Centre. Such cases increase failures and affect the success of the centre. The maintenance subsidy of Rs. 30 per bull is inadequate and therefore not properly used. For improving breed, institutions in private sector also must be encouraged. The Nasik Panjarpole Panchavati Sanstha Nasik gets an annual grant of Rs. 2,000 for maintaining and increasing the Gir breed and improving local strains by mating them with Gir Bulls.

Veterinary aspect of the department has been the traditional aspect. The Parishad runs 12 Veterinary Dispensaries and 44 Veterinary Aid Centres. On an average 50,000 animals are treated annually. Inadequate supply of medicine is the chronic difficulty. The provision of Rs. 1,000 per Veterinary Aid Centre is hardly tenable when the animal population has recorded a three-fold increase within ten years. In tribal areas it is difficult to carry sick animals to these aid centres because of the hardships of transport. For the successful working of the centres, effective injections must be made available at these aid centres. Preventive measures in case of various animal epidemics have been a routine feature of the Department and the record for the Third Five Year Plan with respect to certain important diseases is reproduced below.

| 1. Diphtheria | 4,20,532 | 4. Black quarter | 10,615 |
|-------------------|----------|---------------------|----------|
| 2. Rinder pest | 5,02,977 | 5. Ranikhet (birds) | 2,03,262 |
| 3. Foot and Mouth | 5,05,115 | 6. Foul Fox (birds) | 19,102 |

Good extension work has been done by the Department through its annual exhibitions and cattle shows. In 1967-68 two such exhibitions were held, one at Ghoti (Taluka Igatpuri) and another at Nasik (District Headquarters). In 1968-69 exhibitions were held at Ghoti and Satana (Taluka Baglan). Exhibitions and propaganda work were successful in Igatpuri taluka which offered good grazing facilities to the growing number of cattle. Such exhibitions help to remove misconceptions about the schemes like the Artificial Insemination scheme.

The scheme that recorded discouraging progress was poultry development. In tribal areas people were reluctant

to dispose off their Deshi birds which served their purposes of food also. Another thing noticed was that the eggs on transport to hilly tracts lost their hatchability as the embryos suffered during the transport. In non-tribal areas the scheme was much misused. As most of the defaulters were local leaders recovery was impossible. Adequate financial assistance should have been given to those who have received training in poultry-keeping at government centres. The availability of a ready market also has a bearing on the success of the scheme. This shows why the centre at Nasik could prosper selling 3,000 birds as egainst the target of 1,000 birds a year while another at Dindori (Taluka Dindori) could record little progress. Ram-rearing and piggery development need adequate extension-education to overcome psychological resistence of the people.³

(iii) Minor Irrigation

Associated with the schemes for Agricultural development are the schemes for the development of minor irrigation. Important schemes of development of minor irrigation include

³ This has a scope for extension activity because in case of piggery development the resistance is partly religious and partly out of difference in food habits. People in general and farmers in particular are conservative. It is difficult to overcome their reluctance for any change. Thus in Rajasthan, the Department wanted to develop the Malpura bred Ram as it was disease resistant while people preferred the old Marwari bred which yielded more wool and to which they were accustomed. The scheme in this respect could make little headway. M. V. Mathur, <u>Panchayati Raj in</u> Rajasthan (New Delhi: Impex India, 1966), pp. 106-07.

the programme of percolation tanks, Vasant bandharas, lift irrigation schemes and community wells. Of all the programmes under minor irrigation the scheme of percolation tanks has been regarded as the most ambitious scheme of the Parishad with a wider spread over the district as compared to any other scheme.

Percolation tank increases the sub-soil/level in the downstream area and improves well irrigation. The programme was first introduced in 1964 as a scarcity work in taluka Sinner. Soon it became a regular activity and 26 new works were taken up by the end of the Third Five Year Plan. As it boosted the Rabi Campaign an ambitious programme was provided for by the Zilla Parishad from the first and the second increase in local cess. Sixteen works were completed in the year 1966-67 and 13 more in 1967-68. In 1968-69 ten works were added to the list of completed percolation tanks. The Zilla Parishad picked up similar projects under scarcity work also. In October 1970, a survey division was established by the Zilla Parishad under survey and the preparation of the plans and estimates for the proposed sites of percolation tanks was taken up as a regular activity. The Zilla Parishad was successful in receiving additional grant from the Government under this programme. The State Deputy Minister for Rural Development Department happened to belong to this district and the Zilla Parishad could manage to utilize his good offices.

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water

Vasant bandhara is a novel scheme sponsored by the Government. Percolation tank, howsoever useful, creates problems of organization and is subject to financial vagaries of administration. For the completion of work one has to wait for a long period. Also, with declining rains since 1952 its functional utility has been under doubt. On the contrary the Vasant bandhara, named after the Hon. Chief Minister of Maharashtra, is like digging a well in one's own farm. The cost borne by the Government in this case is for bandhara of 60 feet in length, 2.5 feet in breadth with 2 feet deep foundation. The government provides wooden planks to be removed as the rainy season starts. Each bandhara is expected to irrigate 4 to 6 acres of land. Total number of Vasant bandharas completed during the period from 1966-67 to 1968-69 is 137. The Zilla Parishad also introduced its own design in certain places and styled it as 'Saptashring bandhara' e.g. the one at Nanduri (Taluka Kalwan).

Lift Irrigation Schemes face an initial difficulty because most of the rivers in the district are 'notified rivers'. But these works show a marvellous feat of cooperation. Special mention needs to be made of one such lift irrigation scheme at Umberkhed (Taluka Niphad). A local pleader offered development leadership and enthused people for a co-operative venture. People constructed a well of 75' x 75' x 50' dimensions near the banks of the River Kadwa. The then Minister for Irrigation, Maharashtra State,

visited the site, encouraged the people to form a lift irrigation society and extended government assistance to the extent of Rs. 2.17 lakh. The society purchased four oil engines and 2,800 feet pipeline of 12" diameter and immediately went into commission. Initially it provided irrigation facility to nearly 900 acres. The total cost of the project after completion would be Rs. 6.75 lakh and would provide irrigation to nearly 1,720 acres. The Pale Lift Irrigation Scheme (Pale, Taluka Kalwan) was also revived in 1965, and in the Rabi Campaign next year it provided irrigation facility to 200 acres of wheat fields.⁴

Under the scheme of community wells, in 1966-67, works at twenty-four villages were completed increasing irrigation potential by 511 acres. The grants under this scheme were subsequently discontinued, hence no work was taken up in the following years.

As in Animal Husbandry, the general reaction of the people was satisfactory regarding the implementation of the schemes under minor irrigation. The scheme of percelation tanks is the most ambitious programme undertaken by the Parishad. The cost-benefit ratio is unfortunately not satisfactory in some cases. Among the successful cases, the percolation tank at Jambutke (Taluka Dindori) can be cited

4 <u>The Maharashtra Times</u>, Bombay, 19th March 1968. The Saptashring (Nasik: Zilla Parishad Nasik), March 1968.

as a worthy example. It has encouraged pisci-culture also. The project of a percolation tank can be used as a showpiece of physical work completed. So the location of such a tank becomes a useful tool in election campaigns. Personal politics therefore enters while making a scheme 'feasible' or 'not feasible'. The Survey and Estimates Division of the Parishad declared one percolation tank as non-feasible. The Chairman of the Subject Committee, paid a personal visit to the site, directed certain changes in the method of measurements and declared the said percolation tank as feasible. In another case a percolation tank was administratively approved and technically sanctioned. But the actual work was not initiated as the local Parishad member belonged to the Opposition group. Cost incurred on a percolation tank is heavy. It gives adequate scope for manipulation while calculating various items of construction. The item 'hard rock' many times refers in practice to work done on soft murum. Original estimates are so calculated as to make the scheme feasible. With this the revised estimates drastically differ from the original (Table 5.8). One member humorously remarked that people go after percolation tanks because they start 'percolating' as soon as the tender is passed.

A percolation tank in order to pay must be followed by what is termed as the development collaterals. Simultaneous changes in the cropping pattern, extension in credit facilities, and development in the system of transport and

marketing are the broader perspectives of the problem.

Vasant bandharas, because of the low cost of their construction do not attract the attention of the people and the contractors. People do not remove the wooden planks even with the advent of the rainy season - as such they are decayed. The nature of Parishad working is of 'drives' and 'campaigns' with the effect that these become merely expanditure schemes and money allotted is spent on many locations which otherwise would not have been feasible. A Vasant bandhara is feasible on those streams which run a minimum flow even in the months of December-January. The State Minister for Irrigation, while answering a question in the Vidhan Sabha, hed to put on the record that out of 1,600 bandharas in Western Maharashtra only 150 bandharas could store water after the monscon period.⁵

The success of the Lift Irrigation schemes is linked up with the problems of organisation and finance. In case of the scheme at Umberkhed, it was reported that a deadlock occurred when a high caste cultivator objected to it, as one low caste cultivator because of the situation of his

^{5 &}lt;u>The Daily Loksette</u>, Bombay, 1st April 1969. With proper care similar works can be made paying. <u>The</u> <u>Maharashtra Times</u> dated 26-10-1967 quotes an encouraging example of one Chri Phalke (Koreguon, Taluka Karjat, District Ahmednagar). He has constructed a tali (bandhara), 500 feet long and 35 feet in height. He now can irrigate 174 acres of his land and has 44 acres of silt land when the water dries up in late summer.

land was to receive irrigation facilities earlier to him. The story at Pale is different but similar in its effect. Here the cultivators utilized the land for cereals and vegetable crops. Increased water-cess ultimately increased the debt burden on the cultivators and the society stopped functioning during the period 1962-65.

(iv) Works

Works play an important role in the capital formation of the community. They mostly include the construction and repairs of roads, digging of wells, schemes of piped water supply to villages and construction of school buildings. It is only with the creation of the socio-economic overheads that any economic progress can be sustained. An elaborate superstructure of technology and development must be supported on this framework of socio-economic overheads which form its physical base.⁶

Roads play a crucial role in the development of the rural areas. In the Wardha Scheme, therefore, emphasis was laid on the construction of a network of roads in the rural areas. A detailed survey of the system of communications in the Tribal Development Block Harsul (Taluka Peint, District Nasik) was conducted by the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics in 1965. It shows that the whole

^{6 &}lt;u>Community Development and Economic Development</u> (U. N. Study Report, Bangkok: 1960), p. 44.

system was based on the facility of weekly markets which were five in the Block--Harsul, Thanapada, Deodongra, Ozar and Girnare (the last market place is from the adjoining taluka Nasik). But there was little interconnecting system of roads and the market places instead of linking the taluka have created detached pockets of growth in the Block. The way from Peint to Harsul is via Nasik only, covering 68 kms., while with proper interconnecting roads it would be less than 26 kms. Proper road outlets towards Dahanu and Mokhada area (North East of Thana District) would also develop its forest industry.

The Parishad inherited 750 miles of roads from the District Local Board and 328 miles from the Government. The Parishad added 118.50 miles of district roads during the Third Five Year Plan. The progress of road works can be seen from Table 7.6, for the period 1966-67 to 1968-69. Communications play a vital part in bringing development in backward areas. In the Third Five Year Plan, the bridge on the Amti Nala was completed 10 months before the schedule and with a net saving of Rs. 10,472. It linked Surgana with the rest of the district even in the monscon period. Similarly, the bridge on the river Behadi has linked Kalwan, a taluka place, to Nasik, the district place. The project of Deo river bridge was pursued since 1957. In rainy days the river would many times cut off east of Sinnar taluka from the west. The work with its completion in 1967-68 at a

| | year | Ae ITRUIAB (| zê file elîr | OI CHG |
|-------------|---------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| ,- - | | | (M: | iles) |
| Туре | | 1966-67 | 1967-68 | 1968-69 |
| 1. Tar-maca | damized | 43.50 | 48.35 | 51.55 |
| 2. Concrete | roads | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 |
| 3. Metalled | roads | 381.94 | 420.46 | 403.67 |
| 4. Murum ro | ads . | 634.32 | 1143.96 |) |
| 5. Kaccha r | oads | 289.00 | | 955.59 |
| Total | | 1348.89 | 1612.90 | 1410.94 |
| | | | | |

<u>Table 7.6</u>: Transport and Communications: Development in Roads--Progressive figures at the end of the year

total cost of Rs. 2.5 lakh has linked east of Sinnar to its taluka place Sinnar, and has brought the sugarcane areas in the West Nagar district nearer to Bombay. The Darna River Bridge is an ambitious plan project completed in 1967-68. It has opened the North-West part of the taluka Sinnar to the markets of Nasik and Bhagur. It has favourably affected the vegetable trade to Bombay.

Scarcity works and the construction of village approach-roads, under the scheme T.C. 12, also increase the communication facilities. During the Third Five Year Plan 168 miles (murum and kaccha) were added under this head and the scarcity works resulted in 170 miles of road works. In the year 1966-67 Rs. 12,357 were spent on scarcity works (roads), while the corresponding figure for the year 1968-69 was Rs. 61,408.

Digging of wells and schemes of piped water supply are another salient features of the works programme. In its first five years the Parishad completed 711 new works and also repaired 54 old wells. The progress in the years 1966-67 to 1968-69 is as follows: Number of New wells completed 293. Number of old wells repaired 90. The piped water supply scheme has so far covered 43 villages. the most embitious scheme under this head is the Ghoti piped water supply scheme which was completed in 1968-69 with a total estimated cost of Rs. 3.32 lakh.

The State Government has sanctioned a Regional Water Supply Scheme (June 1969) for the Panchayat Samiti Malegaon. The work includes in main the construction of a dam on the river Bor with an estimated cost of Rs. 1.16 crores. The 43 villages included in the scheme have to cover 10 per cent of the total cost in the form of local contribution. The villages have transferred their land-revenue grant (Rs.1.40 lakh) to this purpose. But they are reluctant to do so every year till they complete their 10 per cent share. On the contrary they feel that Government should contribute this amount in the form of long term loans to the Village Panchayats. The completion of the project appears to be a challenge to the organizational skill of the Parishad leadership. Because it is very difficult to hold these 43 villages together for an indefinite period. Very recently one

important village from the group has shown signs of rebellion and has insisted on the completion of its own water supply scheme sanctioned earlier.

Among the rest of the schemes under 'Works', provision of primary school-buildings (class-rooms), construction of buildings and staff quarters for the Primary Health Centres and Rural Housing Schemes need mention. The construction of class-rooms could never cope up with the expansion in primary education. It was short of the requirement by 1,120 rooms in the year 1968-69. There are 18 Primary Health Centres; construction of staff quarters on 16 centres has been already completed while the work on the remaining two is under progress. Out of 13 Rural Housing Schemes, Brahmanwade (Taluka Nasik) and Kondhar (Taluka Nandgaon) are the most successful projects.

Varied activities under the heading 'Works' result in a tangible, physical realization of the Panchayati Raj movement. Therefore they are much in demand. Development orientation is a prerequisite of effective rural leadership. The shortcomings noted by the respondents in this respect, according to their frequency are (a) sub-standard construction, (b) delay in approving the plans and the estimates, (c) inadequate technical personnel, (d) March Fever affecting the quality of the work, (e) indifference with respect to the village schemes with small outlays.

A disturbing feature of the execution of the schemes

under 'Works' is the large number of incomplete works. In the monthly meetings of every Panchayat Samiti the Deputy Engineer reads out a long list of incomplete works. Most of the schemes are left incomplete for want of some petty item of work. This is frequent in case of works entrusted to the village panchayats. Thus in one case no wheel and pulley were attached to a drinking water well for a period of one year. Also the work with its parapet well was not completed. In case of a school building the frontal roof piece (patti) was not fixed even with repeated requests and final payments were withheld in both the cases.⁷

Another cause of incomplete works is the alterations effected in the specifications of the work. Under one pretext or another the local representatives and the nonofficials effect certain changes in the items of work earlier approved. It then becomes difficult to regularize the same. One representative remarked, 'The skill and utility of the officer lies in regularizing these alterations which respond to local variations'. A well has to be dug to 30 feet in order to reach its perennial source. People are reluctant to go so deep when good water source is available at the depth of 20 feet. In many cases such wells dry up in late

⁷ S. C. Jain quotes one Block Development Officer in Rajasthan who stated that whenever he found a building incomplete during his tour he took it for granted that it must have been started in the block period. <u>Community</u> <u>Development and Penchayati Raj in India</u> (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1967), p. 542.

summer and are abandoned. In one case, the diameter of a well was increased to 30 feet in order to increase its storage capacity. But it is difficult to regularize such alterations. In this particular case the technical report of the Deputy Engineer concerned was not favourable, thus adding to the difficulties of the officer at the Parishad level.

Financial provision under 'roads' is proverbially inadequate, and along with the malpractices political pressures are exerted. This results in local imbalance in development, and abrupt changes in the programme accelerates it. A chairman of the Works Committee in one case, changed the earlier programme in order to favour those talukas which helped his re-election to the chairmanship.

The whole programme of construction works including the construction of class-rooms suffered because of the governmental restrictions imposed under the Emergency. Works after 9-9-1965 could not be financed. School building activity is to a greater extent a leadership function. Able leaders collect popular contribution quite in advance. At Girnare (Taluka Nesik) the primary school building is having 12 class-rooms while at Sonaj (Taluka Malegaon) the primary school building comprises of 13 class-rooms. The local leaders at Sonaj propose to have staff quarters for the teachers to attract better talent.

The programme for the construction of wells: for

drinking purposes is an activity without any plan. Little thought is given to put in use wells left in disuse, during the period of three years following the Third Five Year Plan the number of old wells repaired came to 90, or to ascertain the causes as to why they were left so. Without giving any thought to the potential availability of the subsoil water, new wells are dug making both the old and the new uneconomic.

Under 'Rural Housing' in one case of a rehabilitated village, it was found that the first instalment for the construction of houses was not properly utilized. The main problem of the village was drinking water supply and the villagers felt that the government was indifferent to the needs of the area as it returned an Opposition candidate to the State legislature. There was no follow up of the work, so even the part utilization of the first instalment practically lost its value.

(v) <u>Health</u>

With the old proverb 'Health is Wealth', schemes under Health occupy an important place in the development of the community. These include the establishment of the Primary Health Centres, work under the scheme of Family Planning and extension of health education. Of all the schemes under 'Health' the scheme of Primary Health Centres has been the most successful. Primary Health Centre is the first composite health unit reaching the interior areas where it was long needed.

There are 18 Primary Health Centres in the District and with the help of nearly 60 sub-centres they are trying to extend medical facilities to the rural and the interior areas of the district. The Primary Health Centres work as Maternity and Child Welfare Centres also. Table 7.7 gives the growth in the services extended. Except for the indoor treatment, which is limited by the inadequate provision on medicines, services record progress in all directions. Medical and Health services were never so effectively combined in rural areas where they were practically nonexistent.

Family planning is a central programme routed through the Parishad. In 1963 the district was awarded the Late R. D. Karve Shield of the State Government. In July 1966 the State Family Planning Parishad was held in Nasik. In May 1967 (21st May) Family Planning Operation Camp was organized at Chandor (Taluka Chandor). Well-known doctors from Bombay attended the Camp; special mention must be made of Padmashri Dr. Shirodkar, the world-known gynaecologist. The Bombay team was assisted by the team of doctors from Nasik, both government and private. The Camp was successful with a record of 200 cases of tubectomies in one day. Majority of women who underwent the operation had 4 to 6 issues and belonged to 26-35 age-bracket. Table 7.8 (A and B) shows the break-up of the same. The Third Five Year Plan figure for the district was 5,880 vasectomies and 2,856 tubectomies.

Table 7.7 : Primary Health Centre and Health Services: Record of Progress Type of service 1967-68 Unit 1968-69 1. Outdoor treatment 2,08,528 No. 1,27,747 2. Indoor treatment 795 887 No. 3. Antenatal care No. 5,588 8,429 4. Post-natal care 4,601 No. 8,867 5. Maternity cases including cases attended at home 3,214 No. 5,694 6. Provision of beds No. 139 209 7. Family Planning Operation: Vasectomies 15,282 7,984 No. Tubectomies No. 3,391 4,370 8. Small-pox inoculations 1,07,025 1,38,090 No. 9. Child care : Cases attended at Public Health Centre 2,964 No. 4,369 10,348 At home No. 13,129 10. Health Education:

. Health Education: A. Public latrines in use No. 421 206 B. Public W.C.S in use No. 647 351

| 21 - 25 9 26 - 30 63 31 - 35 88 36 - 40 36 41 - 45 4 Total 200 Le 7.8B : Size of Family Dof issues No.of cases No.of cases 2 2 8 6 3 20 9 5 4 51 10 2 5 60 11 1 6 39 7 14 Total 200 The Seventh Evaluation Report states that the Heretion is the most important desideretum. ⁸ People | | (years) | No | of cases |
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| 31 - 35 88 36 - 40 36 41 - 45 4 Total 200 Le 7.8B : Size of Family 200 Dof issues No.of cases No.of case 2 2 8 6 3 20 9 5 4 51 10 2 5 60 11 1 6 39 7 14 Total 200 The Seventh Evaluation Report states that the H | 21 - 25 | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | ана — т ала — т ала — т ала — т ала — тала — т - тала — тала - тала — тала | 9 |
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| 7 14 Total 200 The Seventh Evaluation Report states that the H | 3 | 20 | - | - |
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| cation is the most important desideratum. People | 3 4 5 6 7 | 20 51 60 39 14 | 10 11 Total | 2 1 200 |
| | 3 4 5 6 7 | 20 51 60 39 14 | 10 11 Total | 2 1 200 |

Table 7 Streenily Planning Onemation Comp. Chanden (New

ment and Allied Fields (New Delhi: Programme Evaluation Organization, Planning Commission, 1960), p. 98.

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village sanitation is not properly developed, so improved latrines are not fully appreciated. Under Health Education, efforts were made to inculcate the sense of village sanitation. In 1966-67 nearly 6,600 meetings all over the district were arranged with the help of the staff from the Primary Health Centres and the estimated total audience was 1,42,532. Film shows (Magic Lantern) were also arranged in Adivasi areas, 23 in taluka Peint and 10 in taluka Dindori. Also 17 exhibitions were held. The Family Planning Centres serve good venues of propaganda in this respect.

Obviously the schemes are not without difficulties. Financial difficulties are common to all development departments. In case of the Primary Health Centres they crop up in various forms - inadequacy of staff quarters for nurses and midwives, little provision on medicine, inability to supply new and effective injections, shortage of trained personnel from compounders to doctors. General opinion of the respondents was that the Centres (sub-centres) were inadequate in number and also inadequately provided for. regarding Another complaint was/the location of some Primary Health Centres where factional pressures exerted successfully.

The cost-benefit ratio of the Primary Health Centres in Nasik District works out to Re. 1 per patient. This is not satisfactory. It shows under-utilization of its services. A Primary Health Centre is expected to treat 50 to 150 outdoor patients every day. The functioning would be

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improved as these centres are to be manned by two Medical Officers both M.B.B.S. (one under the Family Planning Programme), from 1970-71. Provision under medicine needs reconsideration. This would increase the popularity of the centres as well as the efficiency in their working. In rural areas efficient private practitioners are much in need.

To improve the working of these centres frequent inspections by the District Health Officers are essential. These, however, do not materialize. The District Health Officer needs to be relieved of some of his housekeeping duties. This is a basic difficulty faced by all technical departments (e.g. works) which awaits administrative solution.

Family planning is a complex phenomenon. It has evolved through the stages of birth control and has now developed into the 'Family Welfare Planning' programme. Its success is linked up with the leadership function while its failure shows the limitations of the administrative machinery and of the rural situation. Participation of the Parishad has accelerated the progress. Chandor Camp, May 1967 is a record event in the family planning movement in the State. But latterly there is a declining trend, especially in case of vasectomy operations throughout the State. The figures for the District for the years 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70 are 15282, 7984 and 5315 respectively. Vasectomy operation saves time and money. Also it is not so complicated as the

tubectomy operation. Still it seems that the male members are reluctant to undergo such an operation. Here there is adequate field for extension education to remove their prejudices. Difficulty with tubectomy is the lack of after-care. There is also much ignorance about the 'loop' where 25 per cent failures in accommodating loops are accepted and 2 per cent failures of the loop are scientifically acknowledged. There is little selection of cases when there is a crave for achieving 'physical targets'. Unfortunately the cases of failure are given undue publicity. Instead of serving as a warning, this publicity has resulted in a discouraging effect on the whole scheme. Failures are like bad coins which remain in circulation. Every patient needs check-up within seven days from the date of operation to ascertain its success or failure. This was not followed in a number of vasectomies and undetected cases of failures affected the progress in vasectomies. Follow-up and its proper evaluation must be carried out as a regular activity. Shortage of lady doctors has affected the progress in loop insertions. Reluctance of village women to avail of the services of male doctors in this respect is difficult to overcome.

In case of health education much area needs to be exploited and a sustained effort is awaited. There is a declining trend noticed in case of public latrines and W.C.s in use. Even progressive villages show little consciousness in this respect.

(vi) Education and Social Education

Extension in education records a spectacular progress. The primary education has been made compulsory by the Constitution of India. The number of primary school students in this district has increased from 1,73,190 in 1962-63 to 2,29,593 in 1969-70. The sheer weight of the increase in the number of pupils is sufficient to make all existing services inadequate. The growth-rate of the number of students in primary education for the Bombey division with 1962-63 as the base year, is 3 per cent. Shortage of trained teachers and inadequacy of class-rooms are the two important problems.

There is a fairly large percentage of untrained teachers. To add to this, the number of teachers below the S.S.C. level is also fairly large. The percentage of the number of untrained teachers to the total number of teachers in primary schools works out to 18.91 in 1967-68 and 14.19 in 1968-69 as per the Zilla Perishad Administrative Reports.⁹

There is a dearth of class-rooms also. The number of class-rooms required by the end of 1968-69 was 1,120. Fifty

9 The Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1971) states that out of 6,675 primary teachers in the District only 2,056 trained teachers are matriculates/S.S.C. This forms onethird of the total strength of the trained primary teachers (Table No. 14. p. 292).

per cent of the school buildings are in rented premises. This creates another problem because upward revision of rent is a constant demand and a recurring subject on the agenda of the Subject Committee of Education. Difficulties in construction have affected the construction programme of class-rooms. Besides the shortage of cement and the non-availability of qualified overseers, the government ban on new construction in emergency disturbed the programme.

These two factors have affected the quality of education at the primary level and have resulted in 47 per cent wastage at the middle stage level (standard V to standard VIII). The primary teachers do not remain immune from local politics. The more he is dissatisfied with his job conditions the more is he involved in it. The transfer of teachers is an annual feature where non-official interest/ interference is the maximum. The transfer is many times linked with non-educational considerations.

The one-teacher school is a case by itself. These are normally in remote places where the ideal teacher-pupil ratio of 1:40 cannot be maintained. But these schools are never upto the mark. Here a 'cluster school' should be introduced. This would be located in a convenient pada-wadi which has comparatively better communication facilities. The teachers also will be in a company which will add to their conveniences and efficiency. In tribal areas Ashramschools are the only feasible solution. The Parishad under

survey had appointed a committee to study in detail, the problem of education in Adivasi areas. Though its recommendations were not implemented this shows the importance of the problem. Teachers in general feel Parished inspection ineffective as compared with the inspection by the Department of Education. Also they have some genuine complaints against the administration. For example many have stated that their difficulties of varied nature remained unsolved for a long time.

Some of these observations have also been borne by the pilot study of the Educational Administration in the Zilla Parishads in Maharashtra. The study conducted by Dr. N. R. Inamdar confirms the following three observations. (i) The quantitative expanse in primary education has been accompanied by the decline in its quality. (ii) There is much interference by the non-officials in the educational administration of the Zilla Parishads. The teachers have been used by the non-officials for their political ends, with the effect that the identity of the educational officer has been completely lost. (iii) There is a deterioration in the performance of inspection and supervision functions of the Zilla Parishads. Not only the administrative and educative values of inspection have been lost, but in the present pattern even the minimum requirements of supervision have not been achieved. Concluding its observations the pilot study records that inadequate financial resources

might be a general reason "but much more important reason is the crisis of confidence among the educational administrators, namely the Education Officer and the ADEIs, as well as among the teachers in the village schools, which has been the result of the pattern of educational administration in the Zilla Parishad. "10

Still a good teacher with a missionary zeal can overcome many of these difficulties. Group gathering (Gat Sammelan) is an eventful day in a teacher's life. In one such group-gathering in a village from the Panchayat Samiti under survey it was noticed that a teacher was affectionately received by his past students. The teacher in question, before his transfer to this village in the interior, had stayed in a developed village on the Bombay-Agra Road. Hence he was reluctant to accept this transfer. Now he is reluctant to leave this village, nor the villagers are ready to relieve him. They want him to be with them to see their primary school developed into a full-fledged High School.

Gram-Gaurav functions are arranged when the village becomes fully literate. The Panchayat Samitis under reference show practically a full coverage. [In case of the Panchayat Samiti Malegaon 155 villages out of 160 have been shown literate (adult literacy) while for the Panchayat

10 N. R. Inamdar, "Educational Administration in the Zilla Parishads in Maharashtra : A Pilot Study" (unpublished, Poona: Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Poona, 1971), pp. 374-75.

Samiti Nandgaon the corresponding number is 96 out of 100.] The figures are not accepted as reliable figures even at the official level. But one senior officer of the Parishad remarked; "The old generation has now become very keen that the younger ones get the maximum possible education. The grandfather is keenly interested in the progress of his nephew, encourages him to study more and himself pleads his case before his own sons. This is the most significant non-physical achievement of the Gram-Gaurays."

(vii) Co-operation and Industries

Co-operation is a means to community development and not merely an instrument for securing cheap credit facilities. Therefore, the relation between the co-operatives and the Panchayati Raj institutions is of organic importance. These two institutions together with the third, the school, form the basic structure of our village life.¹¹ It is

Also the National Development Council in 1958 resolved that "It was essential that co-operatives should be organized on the basis of village community as the primary unit and that the responsibility and initiative for social and economic development at the village level should be placed fully on the village co-operatives and the village Panchayats." <u>Community Development and Economic Development</u> (U.N. Study Report, Bangkok: 1960), p. 80.

¹¹ Village Teachers Role in Community Development (New Delhi: Ministry of Community Development and Co-operation, Government of India, 1959), p. 19; B. Maheshwari, <u>Studies in</u> <u>Panchayati Raj</u> (Delhi: Metropolitan Book Company Pvt.Ltd., 1963), p. 55, "The economic or social edifice of rural India is to be built on a triangle of which the school forms the base, the co-operative and the Panchayat the two other arms. Each has to support the other and to sustain, nourish and strengthen the community. All development activities have to be properly integrated and pressed into the service of the people."

natural therefore that the Parishad is entrusted with the development work, extension work in the field of cooperation, leaving all quasi-judicial matters (viz., powers relating to the supersession of managing committees, powers of arbitration, liquidation and levy of surcharge etc.) with the State department only.

In case of promotional activities, the Parishad is the primary agency and its record during the period from 1966-67 to 1968-69 is encouraging. In 1966-67, 54 societies of various kinds (majority of Farming and Industrial societies) were registered. In 1967-68 the number of societies registered was much less, viz. 38. Here service societies and Milk Producers' societies were predominant. The number again rose in the year 1968-69 and it was 79. In this year the co-operative housing societies were sizable in number.

As far as the extension in credit is concerned, in 1967-68 credit to the extent of Rs. 4.87 crores was advanced by the Primary Societies in the form of short and medium term loans. The corresponding figure in 1968-69 was Rs.6.49 crores. It covered varied items, like contribution to share capital in processing industries, loans for construction of godowns and cattle sheds, schemes of land improvement in case of farming societies, improvements in market yards and financial assistance to the schemes for rural housing for backward and scheduled caste people.

The Parishad is entrusted with the registration of

various societies and sponsoring their applications for financial assistance. But Parishad is not the only agency in the field. There is much overlapping because the Deputy Registrar of Co-operatives performs similar functions. And unlike him, the Parishad lacks control over semi-judicial matters relating to the subject. To this extent its effective role in the field is affected. The feeling is developed in the Subject Committee of Co-operation that it has been neglected while constituting the Panchayati Raj institutions. Members have become least enthusiastic and the frequency of adjourned meetings for want of quorum is maximum in case of co-operation.

The only interest which the members could show in its working was at the time of distributing loans under the schemes of small scale industries development. The amount of loans extended under the scheme the State Aid to Industries was increasing though not adequately. In 1966-67 it was Rs. 49,950, in 1967-68 it rose to Rs. 54,150 while in the year 1968-69 it recorded further increase and was Rs. 68,000.

Like Co-operation, rural industrialization is an equally neglected subject. Along with the Extension Officer Co-operation, the Extension Officer Industries at the Panchayat Samiti level is used mainly for office purposes. The schematic pattern has already provided for the post which in practice now carries little work. The extension of

loans to individual artisans is sporadic and inadequate. Also there is no follow-up. The training schemes do not relate to the resource-utilization of the area. Nor do they impart new techniques of the trade. Majority of the students do not remain in trade after receiving instructions. They seem to join the courses for the sake of stipend only. The approach of the officer also is not far removed from this. Late Dr. D. R. Gadgil criticised the policy of training programmes and common facility centres and remarked that the training programmes were implemented much in advance of the development of industries. This was mainly because of the ease with which financial targets pertaining to the schemes could be reached.¹² The location of a common facility centre presupposes a decision on the development of the locality in relation to its area, resources and plan priorities. And a worthy training scheme must be then closely associated with this proposed development.

Rural industrialization has remained the weak link in the rural development programmes undertaken so far. The main reason has been the lack of perspective. Distribution of socio-economic overheads (e.g. transport system, extension of civil amenities like light and water, extension of social

¹² D. R. Gadgil, <u>Notes on Rural Industrialization</u> (submitted to the Rural Industries Planning Committee, The Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, 1963), p. 7.

amenities such as medical centres, community centres etc.) is a pre-condition to rural development. Late Dr. D. R. Gadgil in his Notes on Rural Industrialization had advocated the policy of the strategy of industrialization (deciding the priorities of various activities to be undertaken and actions contemplated) and the use of the intermediate technology (i.e. employment of labour intensive methods for a considerable period). Rapid rural electrification programme also has a bearing on rural industrialization.

Most of these activities are not controlled by the Parishad. But the importance of the educative role and the collaborative action it can play in this field cannot be minimized. The extension of rural electrification within the available funds of the State Electricity Board would not have been possible but for the co-operation of the Parishad agency.

Also there is a lack of co-ordination between the industrial and non-industrial programmes of rural development. Even within the industrial programmes, activities of the various Central Boards, like the All India Khadi and Village Industries Board, Handloom Board etc., are not co-ordinated.¹³

^{13 &}lt;u>The Sixth Evaluation Report on the Working of the</u> <u>Community Development and National Extension Service Block</u> (New Delhi : Planning Evaluation Organization, Planning Commission, Government of India, 1959), pp. 137-39.

(viii) Social Welfare

For Mahatmaji, the social justification of the Panchayati institutions was the realization of the Antyodaya--the uplift of the economically and socially backward classes. Till recently the subject was dealt with, because of its importance, directly by the Standing Committee of the Parishad. With new amendment in the Act, a separate Subject Committee has been constituted for the welfare of the backward class people and the Cheirman of this Subject Committee would belong to the same class; This institutional improvement is meant to accelerate the rate of growth of these sections of the community.

The schemes implemented under social welfare pertain to the grant of scholarships, tuition fees and examination fees to the Scheduled Caste/Tribe students, grants to hostels for backward class students, propagation of improved agricultural practices in backward class areas, and industrial development in the Scheduled Caste/Tribe areas.

At present there are eight Tribal Development Blocks and one Multi-purpose T. D. Project (Peint) functioning in the district. The rate of growth can be visualized from the classified data regarding various schemes of social welfare, implemented in the years 1967-68 and 1968-69 (Table 7.9).

The scourge of untouchability is slowly vanishing. The Government of India Untouchability Offences Act, 1955,

| NOTTAL 8 | | | |
|---|------------|-----------|-------------|
| Item | Unit | 1967-68 | 1968-69 |
| 1. Studentship tuit fees and Examina fees to Backward Class students | ation | 1,58,113 | 1,68,918.50 |
| 2. Number of stude benefited | nts No. | 4,555 | 5,110 |
| 3. Aid to hostels Backward Class Students | for No. | 100 | 73 |
| 4. Medical aid to Adiyasi Student | s Rs. | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| 5. Supply of oil engines | Rs. | 6,000 | 6,000 |
| 6. Supply of impro implements | ved No. | 128 | 120 |
| 7. Supply of wheel barrow for carr night soil: Gra Panchayats assi | ying m | 10 | · · · · 8 |
| 8. Propaganda to eradicate untouchability | Rs. | 9,621 | 10,170 |
| 9. Aided hostels | No. | 87 | 77 |
| 10. Grant Utilizati | on: | | .* |
| A. State grants given | Rs. | 10,84,390 | 13,31,975 |
| B. Total expend | iture Rs. | 10,12,069 | 12,43,036 |
| Percentage expenditure | <i>g</i> | 99.00 | 98.00 |
| · · | • | · | |

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Table 7.9 : Implementation of the Schemes Under Social Welfare

and The Government of Maharashtra Act of 1956 (Hindu Places of Worship Entry Authorization Act) prescribe penalties for the offences under the Act. But these offences are allowed to be treated as 'compoundable'. This has resulted in 'compromises under duress'. Amount spent on propaganda work in this respect is also inadequate and unsatisfactory. Proper education and sufficient economic development is the only solution for the problem. It is noteworthy that the Zilla Parishad Nasik has resolved, when most of the Zilla Parishads are spending nothing from their general grant. to earmark 10 per cent of its income from the increased cess on land, for the development work in the areas of backward class and Scheduled Caste people. In this district they form a conspicuous minority and have gained a bargaining power. Low percentage of literacy and deplorable economic conditions are the main hurdles in implementing the schemes in these areas--what is needed here is not a campaign but an all out crusade.

Local Planning

The Planning Commission emphasized the importance of local planning in order to make the Five Year Plans realistic. It was obvious that the Panchayati Raj institutions were assigned a crucial role in the process of 'planning from below'. The process of local planning has a direct bearing on the functional aspect of the institution. In order to make this institution meaningful it is necessary

to understand the nature of decision making process as well as the nature of the decisions themselves.

The defect with our planning system is that its base is 'desk-assumptions', with little or no relation to any survey of actual local needs. Also the decision-making process is schemewise, departmental and not integrative. The general tendency in the secretariat is to build State plans in terms of prototype central schemes - may be because of the financial arrangements with the Centre with respect to the plan schemes. This has reduced planning into a mere distribution of financial resources from the State to the Parishads - Panchayat Samitis and Village Panchayats.¹⁴

Commenting on the Agricultural Planning, the Report of the Agricultural Administration Committee of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture stated that the process of planning was reduced to a mechanical action. It consisted of the divisions and sub-divisions of the State target till it reached the village panchayat level.¹⁵ There was little correspondence between the expectations and their actual realization. The whole concept of 'planning from below' therefore resulted into a mere ritual. People were not

14 "At present we have a <u>spectale</u> of financial targets being fulfilled without the proportionate additional production being realized." <u>Report of the Agricultural</u> <u>Administration Committee</u> (New Delhi: Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, 1958), [p. 43].

15 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 43.

conscious about the process of planning and the importance of their participation in it. Focus on local needs was wanting and the utilization of local resources was meagre. This was the result of the defective schemewise approach to planning. The Ford Foundation Team recommended that the programmes should be tailored to fit the local conditions 'village by village, block by block, area by area'.¹⁶

Integrated approach is another aspect of local planning. Development is a totality phenomenon and should find a belanced and simultaneous expression in all the - 1 . . · development activities conducted by various departments. The success of an irrigation tank depends equally on the successful planning of the use of water in the area it caters, changes in the crop pattern of the area, extension of credit facilities, assured supply lines and secured marketing conditions. Even within the department itself the approach needs to be integrative. Thus along with the expansion of the Primary Health Centres, provision of staff quarters, availability of competent M.B.B.S. doctors, adequate supply of medicine and effective health education - all need consideration. To an average villager, the Village Panchayat is an all-purposive organization. His approach to development therefore is not piecemeel. So the

16 <u>Report on India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It</u> (New Delhi: Ford Foundation Team, Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Ministry of Community Development and Co-operation, Covernment of India, 1959), p. 18.

U. N. report mentions that a health service is only one aspect of planning at the local level. Many other services like Agriculture, Education are of equal importance. What is required is a balanced programme and not a heterogeneous series of unrelated movements.¹⁷

At the same time it must be realized that the National Planning is not merely a summation of local plans. Planning is a two-way process. The local plans work in the general framework provided by the National Government and by doing so they vitalize it. The overall objectives, the basic priorities and the nature of co-ordination of various activities would be determined at the national level. But the extent to which and the manner in which an effort in a given direction should go would be settled at each local level. For example, the priority for land development would be a national decision while the problem of water-logging, the PanDesan land, should be a local effort in that direction (vide the Wardha Plan).

17 <u>W.H.O. Methodology of Plädning: An Integrated Health</u> <u>Programme for Rural Areas</u> (II Report, Geneva, 1954), p. 44; <u>Decentralization for National and Local Development</u> (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N., 1962), p. 7.

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Similar views are expressed by Shri V.T. Krishnamachari when he stated that, "All aspects of rural life are inter-related and no lasting results can be achieved if individual aspects of it are dealt with in isolation." Ensminger and Taylor, <u>India's Roots of Democracy</u> (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1965), p. 173.

The nature of decisions at local level is such that the 'non-officials' and the officials need work in collaboration, in both the processes of decision-making and policy implementation. The strong commonsense of one is supplemented by the expert advice of the other, while both are needed to overcome the reluctance of the age-old practices or the resistance of the affected interest-groups.

An attempt at local planning was made by the Zilla Parishad Nasik when it published a report in October 1964, entitled "Fourth Five Year Flan Nasik District and Long Term Schemes of Development -- A Draft Plan". It could not deal with the financial planning. Nor resource planning was attempted. Also the pattern of schemes suggested, fitted in the earlier prototype of the plan schemes. Still it did much work in detailing the broad picture of development of the District. It also showed the extent of financial commitment in case of schemes picked up for implementation. It tried for an integrated approach by advocating development collaterals. Therefore, along with the programmes for the increase in agricultural production it pleaded for the schemes of minor irrigation (percolation tanks), good weather roads, and development schemes under Animal Husbandry and Co-operation. Total provision for Agriculture in this proposed Draft comes to Rs. 585.75 lakh and the total provision for the District of Rs. 2017.03 lakh. The break-up of the figure under the head Agriculture is

(i) Agriculture Rs. 372.37 lakh, (ii) Minor Irrigation
Rs. 198.60 lakh, (iii) Animal Husbandry Rs. 10.54 lakh, (iv)
Co-operation Rs. 4.24 lakh. The total comes to Rs. 585.75
lakh.

Similar attempt was again made by the Zilla Parishad in 1969. In response to a circular letter received from the Office of the Commissioner, Bombay (letter No. F.Y.P. 9965 dated 9-9-1969) the Zilla Parishad called a General Body meeting on 18th October 1969 to link Five Year Plans to local development plans. Preparatory to this meeting Fanchayat Samitis were instructed to evolve draft plans of the area and forward the same to the Parishad for compilation and consolidation. The draft plan tried to translate local needs of the people with the help of the consultations through Panchayat Samiti meetings and collection of vital statistics. It co-ordinated the development programmes of Panchayat Samitis by a special co-ordination meeting of the office-bearers of the Parishad, Chairmen of the Panchayat Samitis, officers from the Parishad and the Block Development Officers (meeting on 13th October 1969 - a week before the General Body meeting). The Draft showed the awareness of the sizable proportion of the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribes population in the District (24.5 per cent of the district population; the State figure is 6 per cent; 1961 Census). It also referred to the irrigation potential of its two main river systems--the Godavari River System

and the Girna River System. But the report failed to allot any priorities to the various schemes proposed. Also it left, as in the earlier attempt, the onus of finding financial resources to the Government. Still these attempts can be regarded as a slow but definite progress towards local planning. With the increase in the area of decision-making, importance of such attempts would increase. As it stands, however it cannot be related to planning in an economic sense. With the absence of definite financial context this has been reduced to mere 'listing' of various wishes of the people. That is why this draft plan included the construction of an airport at Nasik and also demanded that the location of the proposed North Maharashtra University at the District Headquarters.

XXX XXX XXX

To the people, Panchayati institutions are allpurpose organizations and their impact on development is a totality function. It will be instructive to know the reflections of the representatives in this regard, because these will serve the guidelines while developing these institutions. The reflections are recorded below in the order of frequency.

1. Inadequate financial provision.

2. Improper implementation (regional disparity, pressures/pulls, sectional outlook).

3. General disregard for Adivasi areas.

4. Administrative delay.

5. Limited range of activities transferred to Parishad.

6. Little provision for new schemes.

These show the signs of the stresses and the strains to which these institutions are subjected. Along with the inadequacy of finance, the Panchayati Raj administration notes its resentment regarding the improper implementation. At the same time Zilla Parishads would like to cover maximum fields of development activities and add their own schemes of development also. Regional disparity is translated into social disparity when Adivasi areas are proverbially disregarded. A bird's eye view gives us a picture of shades and lights where light is occasional while shades dominate, where Government rather than the people is a prime-mover, where hope rather than the achievement is the main support.

Inadequacy of finance is a chronic ailment of local governments. Even though Zilla Parishads have been placed on a better footing, regarding financial resources, still these resources are found inadequate to sustain the present development tempo. The financial inadequacy acts as a common deterrent to all development schemes. The shortage of medicine and lack of effective new injections, in case of Primary Health Centres is but another version of inadequate finances to these bodies. The shortage of trained personnel, in the works department and in the Health and Animal Husbandry services, is related to the paucity of finances. Construction programme of class-rooms and village works could make little headway as the provisions under these expenditure heads were drastically cut down following the emergency of 1962 and also with the declaration of Indo-Pak war. For the same reason, expansion programmes under Small Scale Industries and Co-operatives could record little progress.

Politicization of the whole process of development also has its share in adding the stresses and strains, to this development organization. Politics has enthused these institutions of development. But it has also resulted in introducing sectional outlook towards development. This has lead to regional imbalance in development. Location of a percolation tank or a Primary Health Centre is considered more on the grounds of local politics than of economics. The experience of the Wardha district development programme confirms these observations. The locations of the proposed mandi centres in Wardha district were altered according to the considerations of local politics. This tendency has affected the quality of the works. The specifications of the items of work are altered and schemes are declared feasible because of local politics. Local politics has also affected the role and efficiency of the primary teachers in general.

In the administrative set-up the behavioural patterns between the officials and officials and between the nonofficials and the officials have a direct bearing on the content and speed of development. The administrative coordination integrates the development services and reduces administrative delay. Technical officers of the Zilla Parishad are controlled by the Chief Executive Officer for administrative purposes. But the officers are organically linked with their parent departments, which effectively control their services and where the technical officers espire to move up.

The relations between the non-officials and the officials determine the process of adapting the development schemes. The expertise of the officers needs to be toned with the people's consensus of the contents of development. These are expressed by and pursued through the representatives and non-officials. The nature of development in the early stages of development would always be amenities! oriented. A development officer is primarily concerned ÷ . with the technical feasibility of these projects. At the same time he should take the non-official in confidence, on all administrative actions he proposes to pursue. In one case, the Parishad Executive Engineer, of the Parishad under survey, issued tender notices without informing the Chairman of the Subject Committee of Works. The Parishad Executive Engineer was technically competent to issue such

notices, technical sanction was already accorded to the works included in the tender notice issued by him, still his action was difficult to justify. The non-officials, on the other hand also need to develop respect for technical expertise. They should know that though the officer is second in a democratic set up, he is never secondary in importance. This is more true when we deal with local self governments.

Popular co-operation is the basis of all development activities. Where it is unfailing and expanding, rural area covers a wide range of development activities. Popular co-operation is the product of development leadership on one hand, and the use of proper extension methods on the other. When the leadership is resourceful and effective, the popular co-operation can overcome the problems of organization and finance. The story of the lift irrigation scheme at Umberkhed (Taluka Niphad) concludes with this note. Good extension work, both by non-officials and officials, also increases popular co-operation. Many times, there are psychological and sociological barriers in the implementation of the schemes, misunderstandings about the hybrid seeds and its stalk are the example of the former while reluctance in castrating stray bulls released in the name of God, or misconceptions regarding family planning are the examples of the latter. Sheer ignorance, as in case of public health education may also retard development

speed. A good extension work in all these areas would definitely result in speedier development.

However, due consideration should be given to the following facts. Panchayati Raj is more than a programme of physical change. It is a process of attitude building. Its non-physical achievements are therefore a matter of equal importance. The development in attitude building is not easily reflected in statistical processes. But if such a change is produced it is a worthy contribution to national development.¹⁸

The Panchayati Raj institutions have created an awareness in the minds of men of the purposes of local government. They have realized also the vast array of opportunities created for development. They have also shown readiness to accept obligations arising out of this development process. The process of programme assimilation has become quicker and the need for collaborative action strengthened. Much credit for this goes to these new institutions of development.

Functional efficiency is a four-fold function: (1) The level of the area organization where a scheme is operated. (2) The socio-economic texture of the community for which a scheme is operated. (3) The extent of popular

18 <u>Community Development and Economic Development</u> (U. N. Study Report, Bangkok: 1960), p. 19.

participation. (4) The co-ordination between the nonofficials and the officials.

In the context of local government functions, the level of the area organization naturally becomes smaller and coincides for administrative purposes with the area of a village Panchayat or with that of a group village panchayat. The strength and the weaknesses of the small face to face community are reflected in the organization. But when we come to civic and development functions (in main, the plan schemes and the transferred schemes) this area organization becomes inadequate. Its perspective is not comprehensive. Also, it is not adequate for the provision of technical services. It lacks the necessary technical personnel. In comparison with this, there is much gain at the Panchayat Samiti level or the Zilla Parishad level. The community sense is tengible at the Panchayat Samiti level and is stronger than that which is felt at the Parishad level. The services of the technical personnel are better secured at the Zilla Parishad level and to some extent at the Panchayat Samiti level. The Block Development Officer and the Deputy Engineer at the Panchayat Samiti level are Class II officers of the State services. The services of the Class I and Class II officers from the transferred schemes operated at the district level are controlled by the Zilla Parishad. In development activities like the feasibility of a percolation

tank or the propagation of improved seeds, technical considerations weigh much. In civic functions like the construction of roads, or the piped water supply schemes, technical guidance assures economy and avoids waste of the already scarce resources.

The distributive benefits are linked with the socioeconomic composition of the community and are limited by the extent of popular participation. The Panchayati Raj bodies are primarily meant for rural development. The Community Development programme has extended basic local amenities over a wider area. The rising expectations of the community now are catered by the addition of development functions to these bodies. The fear is expressed that the distributive benefits would concentrate in the fertile track, in the irrigated areas of the district and in the hands of the farmers with large holdings. Popular contribution in the form of cash would be available with more ease in these areas. Thus instead of spreading development it would create pockets of development in the otherwise under-developed area. The fear is natural in the early stages of development and is not totally unwarranted. But the bio-deta of the members of the Parishad shows that the leadership is widely spread over the income pattern and the age-group distribution. The leadership is not restricted to the traditional elite only. For housekeeping functions the old liaison-type leadership was adequate. But for

development functions what is naturally needed is the new development oriented leadership. This is assured by the widely spread leadership. This leadership will extend distributive benefits over a larger area.

In the tutelage stage the partnership between the non-officials and the officials assumes greater importance. The duties of the government officers are expected to be protective and not restrictive. The position of an officer is second to the non-officials. But the non-officials should realize that he is not secondary in importance. A developing economy rests on the mature partnership between the non-officials and the officials. Middle-aged leadership combined with the resourceful Chief Executive Officer from the I.A.S. cadre (Junior Scale) as found in the Parishad under survey seems to be an encouraging combination.

Local government before the introduction of the Panchayati Raj was limited in its meaning and scope. Development-orientation of this institution has not only increased its scope but has added significant meaning to the content of local government. There is a hiatus between their expectations and the actual organization at present. The cause of this gap is that the Parishad can afford little of 'own income' planning. Still people look at these institutions as local governments and not mere local agencies of the Government.


This has been reflected in the variety of development

activities and the ease with which people are adapting various programmes. People have shown the will and the capacity to receive these institutions. Now they will have to show the will and the capacity to realize the expectations entertained of them.

Here there are adequate signs of light than shade. The process of assimilation and adaption has sufficiently gathered momentum. When own resources are limited, planning and execution become: location of sites and extension work in order to get local support. This is achieved in a variety of development programmes. In one village, a teacher developed his one-teacher' school into a fully developed middle school with eight teachers. With the help of the progressive leadership, one village in the Panchayat Samiti under survey, could get street lights, covered gutters, and the piped water supply scheme operated in the village. This village boasts of its thirteen-roomed primary school building and eight-roomed high school building, all built in stone. The Family Planning Operation Camp at Chandor (Taluka Chandor) in May 1967 could record success because of the combined efforts of the elected office-bearers of the Parishad, the President of the Parishad was returned from the same taluka- and the efforts of the Block Development Officer with his team at the Block level, fully assisted by the District level team. The Block team was told that a similar camp at Satara in 1961 had recorded

48 operations for the day while another at Baroda in 1963 lifted the figure to 123. This acted as a good stimulant and Chandor Camp had a record, perhaps a world record till this date, of 200 tubectomy operations a day. This shows the marvellous process of assimilation. Ambitious projects like the Darna river bridge, tireless pursuit for the bridge on the river Deo since 1957, percolation tanks like Jambutke (Taluka Dindori) or Kazi Sangvi (Taluka Chandor), participation in the crop campaigns Rabi and Kharif, pushing forward the programme for rural electrification, awakening the backward Adivasis - all speak of the catalytic effect of the Panchayati Raj agency which combines effectively development functions with old local government functions. This can only be compared with a silent revolution in rural areas. People are enthusiastic, though not necessarily exuberant about this experiment. People are sober though not necessarily pessimistic about the future of this experiment. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. The Great Political Sage Aristotle said for the times to come that 'the road to survive was the Golden Mean'.

REFERENCE S- PERCOLATION TANK LIFT IRRIGATION SCHEME · · · · · · L. SECOND CLASS BANDHARA VASANT BANDHARA -----. COMMUNITY WELL PIPED WATER SUPPLY SCHEME PRIMARY HEALTH CENTRE **C**, '3 CI FRIMARY SCHOOL BUILDING ASHRAM SCHOOL RURAL HOUSING SCHEME -X COMMUNITY CENTRE 🔄 VETERINARY AID CENTRE AND AI CENTRE ED VIDYA NIKETAN ROADS 1.2 $\langle \langle \boldsymbol{\omega} \rangle$ Ē AMBODE **** → → → ⁺ ⁻ ^{*} KUMBHALE C HARSUL OZ AR 키 다. $\sim \sim$ mon \mathcal{V} from the second -----· _ _ _



CHAPTER VIII

PANCHAYATI RAJ FINANCES

Financial Administration

Finance is the crux of administration. Creation or continuation of any service or a scheme is directly linked with financial administration. Kautilya, the founder of the Indian Science of Public Administration, therefore says, 'Finance is the consideration' [312 20 20 1900 1].

The operational success of Panchayati Raj institutions is organically connected with their financial resources and their strength. Along with weak finance, weak financial administration has caused slow development of local units in India. Administrative decentralization and financial decentralization are the two aspects of the same phenomenon. Devolution of administrative powers without devolution of financial powers is superfluous. And devolution of financial powers without devolution of administrative powers is meaningless. Together they give meaning and purpose to the Panchayati Raj institution.

Finance is crucial to any local governmental system. The ability of Local Self Governments to discharge functions entrusted to them is linked with the adequacy of financial resources. To the extent these sources of revenue are local, the local authorities gain independence. To the

extent they are predictable, the local authorities can plan for future development in a more effective manner. To the extent these are evenly spread, the local authorities receive wider local support.¹

Indian system of Centre-State relationship is of a comprehensive type. Here a multi-purpose area administrator administers most of the government services in the area. In such a system, the main problem is raising of local resources through proper and adequate tax-authorization to the area organization. As there is a limit to this tax-authorization, this is supplemented by a rational Grants-in-aid system. This is expected to go a long way in preparing and executing the budget of the area organization in a satisfactory way.

The Budget

Budget is the most important tool of financial administration to translate local aspirations of development, to channel their participation in development and to relate that development to the nation-wide plan-priorities.²

¹ Henry Maddick, <u>Decentralization for Development</u> (New York: Division for Public Administration, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N.O., 1961), p. 140.

² The Administrative Reorganization Committee of the Government of Maharashtra defines budget, as "a comprehensive plan expressed in financial terms, by which a total operating programme is effected for a given period. It indicates the tax and other revenues and receipts expected to be realised and the expenditure on the various services, activities and schemes proposed to be undertaken during the ensuing financial year." Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1968), p. 79.

Budget which is thus a tool of planning assumes greater importance in developing countries. Its preparation and execution give tone to area development and reflect its limits. It allocates funds to the area organizations within the limits of the national/State priorities. It establishes financial procedures of allocation and grant utilization. It also deals with the finances of the major schemes of development.

The present budgetary system of the State government has a bearing on Panchayati Raj institutions. Firstly, because all developmental activities are interlinked. But mainly because of the fact that the bulk of the funds received by these institutions are received from the State Government only. The own income and the own-schemes are proportionately not significant in the total picture. (Budget Proforma: Appendix No. 9.)

The budgetary procedure to which the administration is accustomed is 'fiscal' in nature and not 'performance' oriented. It concentrates more on the cost of the service rather than devising administrative means to achieve the same. In a developing economy the latter part is more important. The budget process is more 'restrictive' than 'instructive' and the budget execution is more 'cautious' than 'constructive'. This is reflected in the pase and the limit of area development which a Parishad budget proposes. The system is also marked with delays in

communication of grants. Partly this is due to the failure on the part of the administrative departments at the secretariat level and partly due to the failure of the Heads of the Executive Departments to keep a detailed break-up of the proposed expenditure ready for distribution among disbursing officers.

Over-budgeting and under-budgeting are both harmful and more so in a developing economy. The first cuts off some essential civic/economic services. The second leaves them in an under-nourished state. As the Parishad budget is linked more with the State budget than with its area needs as such, the execution of the Budget is marked with a 'March fever' in expenditure. Annual Administration Reports are full of examples of over/under budgeting because of the delay in the communication of grants. Thus, in the year 1966-67 a grant of Rs. 1,65,000 under Public Health Works was not known at the time of budgeting and hence could not be provided for. Grants to the extent of Rs. 8,40,435 under special Rabi and Kharif Campaigns, could not be spent as they were received late. The schemes mentioned above are 'purposive' in financial nature and have an impact on Parishad's own income.

This defect is partly removed at the State-level in the revised system of budgeting and its presentation. From 1965-66 the demands for grants are arranged according to the administrative departments of the Government and not

according to the Major Heads of expenditure. The common Major Head is split up departmentwise. Also the Finance Department tries to ensure pre-budget scrutiny of the new schemes. But these changes are yet to have their impact on the Panchayati Raj budgets.

Delay in sanctioning the schemes is also a disturbing factor. Inclusion of a scheme in the budget does not mean its automatic sanction. It assures provision subject to the approval of the scheme, after a detailed scrutiny by the Finance Department. As this takes a considerable time. the actual work on the scheme frequently commences late in the year and the scheme becomes a victim of the 'March Epidemic'. If not, then the amounts are surrendered not because the area development does not really need these allocations, but because of the fact that they are not made available to the Executive Officers sufficiently in time. In the year 1967-68, grants received under Backward Class and Social Welfare were received late in March 1968. For the fear of its being surrendered, it was spent in the same month. In the same grant Rs. 19,669 were received as an unexpected amount! Expenditure on the construction of administrative office building was provided for in the budget for the year 1967-68. But the administrative sanction of the construction work was delayed. This resulted in a net saving of Rs. 1,13,268. All this makes budgeting a mere guess-work.

The time old red-tape has received greater sanctity. At least in a developing economy it should not get a premium. Means must be found out to avoid delay in communicating grants and the 'March expenditure panic' should be discouraged. In Andhra Pradesh unspent grants are surrendered only if they remain unspent after twelve months from their receipt.

The State Finance Department has taken constructive steps to avoid delay in sanctioning schemes since the inception of these institutions and has issued orders, long in May 1963, that proposals for new expenditures should be accompanied by the detailed break-up of expenditure and should be included in the budget only with the prior concurrence of the Finance Department. The departments should have a reserve of already scrutinized and approved proposals and from this they should select schemes which deserve priority in the budget for the year. But this has so far turned out to be a mere pious hope!

Most of the budgetary difficulties can be avoided by proper administrative action. Proper use of reappropriations, justified cases of supplementary demands, and strict adherence to time-schedule for budget preparation provide some of the solutions. Then a lapse of grant would not be frequent and even if so, would cause little worry.

Local finance is not an isolated matter and it is vitally linked up with the State finance. A major part of

the Zilla Parishad's budget covers State activities on agency basis and development activities on the 'transferred' schemes. The budgeted estimates are based on anticipated allocations at the State level. The budget of a Panchayat Samiti, which in main covers activities out of the 'Block grants' is forwarded to the Zilla Parishad and included in the budget estimates of the Zilla Parishad. The State Government approves such budget estimates with or without modifications. The budget estimates so approved and certified by the State Government are deemed to have been duly approved by the Zilla Parishad. Hence a strict timeschedule in the budgetary activities at the various levels of administration is necessary for realistic budget estimates. March-April are the budget months and the Central Ministry has recommended the following schedule for being adapted by the States and the Local bodies (Table 8.1). If a Zilla Parishad fails to approve the budget estimate on or before the prescribed date, the Chief Executive Officer forwards the budget estimates to the State Government. The Government approves these estimates with or without modification. The budget estimates so approved are considered to have been duly approved by the Zilla Parishad. Powers similar to those of the Chief Executive Officer are exercised by the Block Development Officers in case of the Panchayat Samitis.

Table 8.1 ; Budget Time Schedule

| Item of Budget Calendar | Last date for Zilla Parishad | Last date for Panchayat Samiti | Last date for Village Panchayat | |
|---|------------------------------------|---|--|--|
| | · | | | |
| 1. Indication of Grants | October | November | November | |
| | 31st | 15th | 30th | |
| 2. Preparation and passing | December | December | December | |
| of Budget | 31st | 31st | 31st | |
| 3. Consultation with Gram Sabha | - | • | Januar y 21st | |
| 4. Communication to the | January | Janua ry | January | |
| Supervisory Body | 31st | 31st | 31st | |
| 5. Return by the | February | February | Februa ry | |
| Supervisory Body | 28th | 28th | 28th | |
| 6. Final passing | March | Merch | March | |
| | 15th | 15th | 15th | |
| Source : S. C. Jain, Community Development and Panchayati Raj in India (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1967), p. 472. | | | | |

The Statutory Pattern

The financial pattern as provided in the Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, is naturally based on the recommendations of the Naik Committee (Government of Maharashtra, 1961). There are in main four sources from which the resources flow in: first, the State grants and loans; second, plan grants - State allocations on 'transferred schemes'; third, the Block grant; and fourth, the own income of the Parishad.

While allocating resources to Parishads and Panchayats • . . . the Naik Committee had taken care to see that all tax and non-tax revenue which was available to the ex-District Local Boards was made available to the new District Councils. The financial position of the District Councils has also been improved. The Committee realized the propriety of handing over the whole of land revenue to these bodies as it accrued entirely within their limits and was paid by persons who were to be benefited by their activities.³ The land revenue grant is supplemented by a detailed Grant-in-aid system in place of the earlier system in which grants were sanctioned by different development departments for various purposes. The new system would assure minimum operation of vital services in the area and direct grants like local cess matching grants might improve its operational efficiency.

1. Land Revenue and Land Revenue Equalization Grant

Seventy per cent of the land revenue including nonagricultural assessment is given to a Zilla Parishad and the remaining thirty per cent to the Village Panchayats. (Panchayat Samitis being 'agencies' of the Parishad do not receive any share, nor need it in the present set-up.) This is a fixed quantity based on a five years' average. If

^{3 &}lt;u>Report of the Committee on Democratic Decentralization</u> (The Naik Committee) (Bombay: Co-operation and Rural Development Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1961), p. 125.

this quantity falls short of Rs. 2 per capita of the District population, an Equalisation Grant is given to cover the gap.

2. Local Cess Matching Grant

Zilla Parishads are empowered to increase local cess within a prescribed maximum and are encouraged to do so with 100 per cent additional (matching) grant on the receipts so increased. This forms the most important source of Parishad's own income.

3. Plan Grants

These grants offer 100 per cent coverage for all plan schemes and works transferred to the Zilla Parishads by the State Government.

4. Purposive Grants

These grants cover many schemes transferred by the Government, which implement the national policy objectives. There is heavy capital expenditure on these schemes and the grant coverage is 90 per cent. From 1st April 1968 the distinction between 'purposive' and 'non-purposive' is discontinued and all such transferred schemes enjoy 90 per cent grant, remaining 10 per cent being included in the 'Deficit'.

5. Establishment Grant

This covers 75 per cent of the establishment charges on salaries and allowances (i.e. average annual cost) of the government staff transferred to the Parishad. From April 1970 this grant also covers establishment charges on posts subsequently created by the Parishad (i.e. after 1st May 1962) and approved by the Government.

6. Incentive Grant

This grant is meant as a bonus for progress in local development work. Pending finalisation of rules, this grant is given on agricultural production programme.

7. Stamp Duty Grant and Forest Revenue Grant

As per the provisions of the Act, additional income from the levy of the surcharge (1/2 per cent) on stamp duty is given to the Parishads and the Village Pancheyats. Similarly, 2 per cent Forest Revenue Grant is also given to the concerned Parishads. Here the estimates are based on average receipts for three years in the preceding State Five Year Plan. The grant was discontinued but has again come into operation from the year 1968-69.

8. Block Grent

This grant is received from the Central Government through the State Government. This grant, under the Central Scheme of Community Development, covers expenditure on works and development schemes as per the schematic budget in stage I and II (Appendix No. 6). Full provision is made in the corresponding plan scheme. Government is giving ad-hoc grants to the blocks after the completion of the stage II, - this would be the case of all blocks by March 1972-for general maintenance and specific grants for incomplete works (after the expiry of the extension period covering the spill-over).

9. Deficit Adjustment Grant

Initially, this grant was to cover 10 per cent deficit on 'purposive' schemes, 25 per cent deficit on Establishment charges and 100 per cent deficit on all non-purposive schemes. The Act provided full coverage under this grant for the first five years of the Parishad (i.e. upto the year 1966-67). It was to be reduced progressively so as to be discontinued by the end of the tenth year since the commencement of the Zilla Parishads. But in 1968, the distinction between the 'purposive' and 'non-purposive' was dropped and all schemes and works became purposive thus entitled to 90 per cent grant. The deficit adjustment grant was discontinued (1970) after extending the coverage of the Establishment Grant, so as to include posts created by the Parishad after 1st May 1962 and approved by the Government. (Appendices No. 7 and 8.)

All grants have a tendency to increase. Land revenue and Equalization Grants remain fixed for the first ten years. Even with all these grants, the Panchayati Raj institutions are finding it difficult to make both ends meet. Grants to local bodies are numerous. Their accounting system is also complicated. Departmental grants are 'tied up' grants. They are required to be spent on the schemes of the department as distinct from the own schemes of the Parishad. The administrative practice in case of departmental grants results, in many cases, in late intimation of the grants. Anticipated grants are also not fully received. This virtually reduces the budgetary processes at Parishad level to a mere ritual. Forward planning thus becomes impossible.⁴

The linking of Panchayati Raj institutions with the Community Development organization at the taluka level has made the whole system rigid. The concept of 'sharing' or 'partnership' is obviously absent. In the schematic budget there is a financial rigidity.

In case of plan grants, after the plan period is over, the committed expenditure on these schemes continues and becomes an additional burden on the own income of the Parishad. In case of block grants the government has not evolved any policy decision regarding the blocks completing their stage II of the development. At present an ad-hoc grant of Rs. 1 lakh per year is given to such blocks.

Grants should be related to the resource utilization

⁴ M.V. Mathur, <u>Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan</u> (New Delhi: Impex India, 1966), p. 220.

of the area and should try to achieve a balanced development in the area. The schematic budget partly solves this problem. But its rigidity overshadows its virtues. State share covers capital expenditure. It is a matter for consideration if this can be financed out of loans floated by the Parishads and backed by the State. People would thus pay for the area development and would come closer to their area organizations. People must realize that all services and projects have to be paid for and that Central resources are not unlimited. This tendency is more pronounced in developing countries.⁵

Grants from the state and/or Centre form an important part of the total revenue of the local bodies. Even in England, it is 55 per cent of the whole revenue receipts. As such, its nature, its quantity, its procedure and the accounting system must be given serious thought. Pool system is recommended by some observers. It would have accounting convenience (i.e. preparing accounts for one issuing authority) and facilitate development also. The Santhanam Committee has recommended the Madras experiment where all funds from the Central Government and the State departments are pooled together and a new schematic budget is formed for all Panchayat Union Councils (corresponding

5 Henry Maddick, <u>Decentralization for Development</u> (New York: Division of Public Administration, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N.O., 1961), p. 147. to Panchayat Samitis in Maharashtra).

Recurring grants avoid uncertainty and also introduce an element of elasticity. Such grants induce local governments to initiate and extend their services. As such they do not cover full expenditure, so they introduce financial prudence while achieving area planning.

Various committees and evaluation reports on the working of the Panchayati Raj institutions have recommended the establishment of a statutory Finance Commission for these institutions. Such a Commission would deal with the working of the grants on the pattern of the Commonwealth Grants Commission of Australia. The Australian Commission deals with the assessment of local needs, the quantity and conditions for the grant-demands, linking up grants with the vital functions in the area both from the point of view of the National as well as Local authorities and providing checks to excess or unwarranted expenditure.

As the situation stands, the position of the Panchayati Raj budgeting is far from satisfactory. The Santhanam Committee on the Panchayati Raj Finances has stated that

⁶ The Santhanam Committee of the Government of India has categorically stated that, "All funds and subventions including specific and purposive department grants may be pooled at the State level and disbursed in a consolidated form to various Panchayat Samitis." <u>Report of the</u> <u>Committee on Panchayat Raj Finances</u> (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Community Development, 1963), Part I, p. 147.

in most cases there was no relation between the budget estimates and the actuals. Panchayati Raj bodies include arbitrary estimates of anticipated government grants because they fear that their omission would prejudice their case.7

between the means and the social wants. And if the Budget does not reflect this over a period of time, it adds much strain on the means in a developing economy.

Income Pattern of Panchayati Rej Institutions

There is a limit to grants and the way out is to increase the own income of the Parishad. If the own resources are not adequate, the Panchayati Raj institutions would turn into government departments instead of developing into governments at local levels. Equally important in a developing economy is the proper utilization of these 'scarce means'. The growth problems of these institutions have a financial bearing and in this context the study of their income and expenditure patterns becomes imperative.

Self-sufficiency in finance has been venerated by tradition. Even the Act does not limit the transfer of works and schemes to suit the ideal of self-sufficiency in finance. On the contrary there is a gap compelling

7 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 39.

efficiency and economy while utilizing resources on the part of the local institutions.

Table 3.2 gives us a picture of the general receipts of the Zilla Parishad, Nasik. The year 1962-63 is the first year of the Parishad. The first year covers the period from 1-5-1962 to 31-3-1963. The 1963-64 budget is the first budget for the full financial year. The year 1965-66 is the last year of the Third Five Year Plan of the State and 1966-67 is the first year of the Fourth Five Year Plan. These peculiarities are reflected in the budgeted amounts for the respective years. For example, agency grants and government grants steep up in the year 1965-66 percentage rise is 44.25, the last year of the Third Five Year Plan.

Taxes and fees include income from the profession tax, and receipts under the Bombay Motor Vehicle Act, 1958, (as a compensation for octroi). Local cess is the income from cess on land revenue under Sections 144, 151 and 152 and also increase in it under Section 155. Local rates cover water cess, increased from 19 paise to 20 paise per rupes from the year 1969-70. Government grants are received under the Grant-in-aid system and Agency grants are given as the Plan grants. Interest accrues on Government bonds received through the ex-District Local Board and now held by the Parishad, on call money and sundry items. Receipts

Teble 8.2 : Receipts of Zilla Parished (Revenue Section)

| | 1962-63 | Percen- tage Total | 1963-64 | Percen- tage Total | 1965-66 | Percen- tage Total | 1966-67 | Percen- tage total |
|--|----------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Taxes and Fees | 1,07,000 | 0.67 | 1,09,435 | 0.59 | 1,68,400 | 0.58 | 1,68,435 | 0.60 |
| 2. Local Cess | 3,65,000 | 2.28 | 4,00,000 | 2.15 | 10,40,000 | 3.59 | 11,08,620 | 3.97 |
| 3. Local Rates | 1,65,000 | 1.03 | 1,65,000 | 0.89 | 2,50,000 | 0.86 | 2,50,000 | 0.89 |
| 4. Government Grants | 1,47,06,804 | 92.04 | 1,74,34,529 | 93.65 | 2,51,49,440 | 86.72 | 2,55,26,546 |) 91.37 |
| 5. Agency Grants | 4,17,433 | 2.61 | 3,00,000 | 1.61 | 14,14,500 | 4.88 | - | } . |
| 6. Interest | 3,200 | 0.02 | 1,600 | 0,01 | 12,000 | 0.04 | 15,200 | 0.05 |
| 7. Police | 1,200 | 0.01 | 1,200 | 0.01 | 200 | - | 200 | - |
| 8. Education | 1,43,809 | 0.90 | 1,54,059 | 0.83 | 2,07,060 | 0.71 | 1,89,060 | 0.68 |
| 9. Medical and Ayurvedic | 9,450 | 0.06 | 11,750 | 0.06 | 27,200 | 0.09 | 38,100 | 0.14 |
| 10. Public Health | 1,456 | 0.01 | 1,950 | 0.01 | 3,000 | 0.01 | 2,500 | 0.01 |
| 11. Agriculture | — | | - | - | 14,000 | 0.05 | 35,000 | 0.12 |
| 12. Animal Husbandry | • • | - | 1,000 | 0.01 | 7,000 | 0.02 | 10,000 | . 0.04 |
| 13. Cottage and Small Scale Industries | - | - | 5,000 | 0.03 | 4,000 | 0.01 | 2,500 | 0.01 |
| 14. Works | 57,410 | 0.36 | 26,950 | 0.14 | 1,73,450 | 0.60 | 1,36,050 | 0.49 |
| 15. Pensions | - , | - | - | - | - | • | • | - |
| 16. Sundry | 2,000 | 0.01 | 2,500 | 0.01 | 31,000 | 0.11 | 33,500 | 0.12 |
| 17. Forest | - | - | - | - | , → 14. ₁ , | - | - | - |
| 18. Matching Grants | - | - | - | - | 5,00,000 | 1.73 | 4,22,529 | 1.51 |
| Total | 1,59,79,562 | | 1,86,14,973 | | 2,90,01,250 | | 2,79,38,240 | |

Source : Annual Budget Books, Zilla Parishad Nasik.


under the head 'Police' refer to the collection of fines under the Bombay Public Vehicle Act, 1920. Bulk receipts under 'Education' refer to the fees collected from the Primary, Secondary and Basic Training Schools and receipts from the non-local authorized Municipalities (i.e. percentage in receipts of the fees collected from the primary schools excluding municipal areas of Nasik (Taluka Nasik) and Malegaon (Taluka Malegaon)). They also include receipts of recovery from advance payments in earlier financial years. Fees for medical services form the core of receipts under medicine. Similar non-governmental receipts are covered under Public Health, viz., services of vaccinators rendered in municipal areas. Under Agriculture, the main source of income is fees collected under crop competitions. Collection of rent for the use of agricultural instruments is also considerable. The base of receipts under Animal Husbandry is the fees from Slaughter-houses (viz., Slaughter-house, Malegaon, Taluka Malegaon), fees for examination and treatment for animals and also fees under cattle shows. House rent for rented premises, rent for building machinery on hire to the contractors and fees for inspection fall under the heading 'Works'. Fees collected from the students in the training centres, and receipts from the sale of goods from the industrial centres are included under the head 'Cottage and Small Scale Industries'. Sundry account includes receipts from the Parishad monthly

'Saptashring' and unclassified receipts.

Of the total receipts the government grants occupy the largest share, e.g., 93.65 per cent to the total receipts in the year 1963-64. This is natural and inevitable in a developing country. Some sources of income like the collection of fines under the Public Vehicles Act (item 7, Table 8.2), are comparatively inelastic and insignificant. Some other sources of income are elastic. But they are either 'tied up', like the Government grants (plan grants, incentive grants) or they are uncertain like the Agency grants which cover the plan period of the scheme. Their continuation is not known and when completed they merge into the 'committed' expenditure. The local cess and the matching grant on the increase in the local cess can be treated as the most fruitful source of own income. But there is a legal restriction on it and most of the Zilla Parishads including the Zilla Parishad, Nesik, heve exhausted this source. There would be little upward rise in its anticipated receipts unless the ceiling of increase (Re. 1 per rupee) is raised. This matter is receiving consideration and the State Evaluation Committee has recommended to raise the ceiling upto Rs. 3 as cess per every rupes of land revenue. Heads like 'Education' show large receipts, but considering expenditure on this head, it does not add to the 'own income' of the Parishad. The schemes under the head 'Education' come under 'purposive'

nature and are not fully covered by the transfer of grants. Thus, in the year 1965-66 the budgeted expenditure under 'Education' was Rs. 1,29,75,300. It thus added a net burden of Rs. 12,97,530 (i.e., 10 per cent). On the other hand, receipts under it during the same year were Rs.2,07,060. Obviously much burden of this difference, like such differences elsewhere, was carried to the Deficit Adjustment Grant till 1968, which has since been discontinued. The steep rise in the interest receipts is mainly the function of interest on Call Money. It is related in a real sense to developmental activities and the range and frequency of financial transactions of the Parishad. Table 8.3 gives details of various grants.

On the side of income therefore receipts from taxes and fees form the major portion. The most prolific source of income under the head 'Taxes and Fees' is the profession tax. Receipts under the Bombay Motor Vehicles Act, 1958, are comparatively steady. In the year 1962-63 receipts were Rs. 91,000. In the year 1965-66, the estimated receipts were Rs. 1,50,000 (implying nearly 65 per cent increase). This tax is an ex-District Local Board tax imposed in 1952-53. Increase in receipts is partly because of the better collection machinery but mainly because of the general increase in trading activities. Parishad has not been able to add a single new resource. It seems to have failed in this primary function--with the only exception of the increase in the land cess.



| | | · . | | (Figures in | Rupees) |
|-----|---|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| Na | ture of grant | 1962-63 | 1963-64 | 1965-66 | 1966-67 |
| 1. | Land Revenue | 15,20,000 | 16,09,301 | 20,20,990 | 16,06,497 |
| 2. | Land Revenue (Equalisation Grant) | 10,26,800 | 11,51,227 | 8,01,430 | 12,15,927 |
| 3. | Purposive Grant | 65,56,315 | 73,42,275 | 1,01,19,420 | 1,27,07,460 |
| 4. | Establish- ment Grant | 8,55,196 | 13,96,660 | 16,20,243 | 17,49,150 |
| 5. | Deficit Adjustment Grant | 21,00,000 | 15,03,737 | 6,85,017 | 15,47,466 |
| 6. | Local Cess Matching Grant | | - | 5,00,000 | 4,22,529 |
| 7. | Incentive Grant | - | - | - | - |
| 8. | Plan Grants | 11,23,993 | 26,08,329 | 54,33,840 | 29,38,146 |
| 9. | Block Grant | 15,24,500 | 18,23,000 | 44,18,500 | 37,61,500 |
| 10. | Stamp Duty | - | - | 50,000 | 58,620 |
| 11. | Forest Grant | - | - | - | - |
| | * * * * * * * | | • • • • • • • | | |

Table 8.3 : Details of Government Grants

1

Source : Annual Administration Reports, Zilla Parishad Nasik.

Tax authority to local bodies calls for special considerations. The overall restriction is the State/national policy. The immediate restriction is its effect on the services rendered by them to the people. If these bodies are expected to perform functions of development, merely authorizing these bodies to tax an ambitious range of goods and services is inadequate. The Taxation Enquiry Commission 1953-54 wanted to reserve certain taxes to local bodies viz., duty on transfer of property, service taxes, vehicle tax, entertainment tax. Some of the taxes, viz., land cess, profession tax, recommended by the Taxation Enquiry Commission have already been handed over to the local bodies in Maharashtra. Certain taxes, may be minimum in number, need to be made compulsory under the Act.

For village panchayats the house tax is the most important source. It is simple, direct and its incidence is universal. Practically all persons in the village are covered by this tax and therefore make them interested in the good government of the village.⁸

But the tendency in local institutions is to impose minimum taxation and keep the rates to the minimum. Even the receipts under the House Tax can be increased by graded taxation, i.e., houses on the main street in a village or eround the main chowk can be taxed at a higher rate, people taking pride in having houses in that 'elite' area. But these bodies are either unwilling or unable (due to the

⁸ Fifth Evaluation Report (New Delhi: Programme Evaluation Organization, Planning Commission, 1958), p. 118.

nearness of administration to the people) to collect whatever they impose most reluctantly.

Local finance forms an integral part of the whole financial structure in the country. A sound system of local finance presumes a sound policy of local taxation. The Santhanam Committee on Panchayati Raj Finances, 1963, pleaded the case of these local institutions. Transfer of substantial and growing resources of income to these bodies was accepted as essential for the stability and growth of these bodies.

Much of the important sources of revenue have been exhausted between the Centre and the States. Still whatever is left can be better utilized. In certain cases, viz., the entertainment tax the method of tax-sharing by the local bodies with the State government can be fruitfully adapted.

People are not reluctant to pay taxes, as it is often presumed. People pay taxes when they are explained properly and the tax-proceeds are spent on their felt needs. In Ghana, the Ministry of Local Government carried out a campaign 'Pay Your Taxes'. They informed the people what was done with their taxes. The result was that not only people accepted the tax proposals but many times taxes were collected on the spot.⁹ It is with such efforts that people

⁹ Decentralization for National and Local Government (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division of Public Administration, U.N., 1962), p. 60.

would feel that the panchayats: are their own institutions and taxes are for their own benefits.

The case of increase in cess is an instance to cite. Local cess has been accepted as the main source of income for the Parishad. Out of 136 responses recorded (each respondent was asked to record not more than two preferences) responses. local cess bagged 109 preferences. To augment local resources the increase in cess became imperative and immediate. Much informative propaganda was effected regarding its benefits and limits on development without it. As such, nearly 65.83 per cent of the members accepted the proposals as shown in Table 8.4. This tax incidence on farmers was objected to by 20.83 per cent. But even some members from the opposition refuted that claim by accepting the insignificant load of the land revenue itself¹⁰ (1.5 per cent of the total farm produce in a year). Some exemptions can still be made to the cultivators within the lower brackets of income. The State Evaluation Committee, Maharashtra (1971) recommended that the farmers paying land revenue less than Rs. 5 per year should be excluded from paying the increase in cess beyond the present limits imposed by the Act.¹¹ Some were ready to accept the tax

 <u>Report of the Committee on Democratic Decentrelization</u> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1961), p. 129.
 <u>Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj</u> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1971), p. 77.

| Representatives | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------|--|--|
| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total | | |
| 1. For the increase in cess | 61 | 18 | 79 | | |
| 2. Against any increase in cess | 21 | 13 | 34 | | |
| 3. Subject to party discipline | 4 | • | 4 | | |
| 4. Non-respondent | 2 | 1 | 3 | | |
| Total | 88 | 32 | 120 | | |
| | | | | | |

Table 8.4 : Increase in Local Cess : Reflections of the Representatives

proposals with an assurance to earmark some amount for development in the Adivagi areas. In Zilla Parishad Nasik, the Adivasis form a sizable minority. Taking these things into account the percentage of members favouring increase in cess would considerably go up.

People accepted tax proposals on the following grounds. (i) Additional revenue for development in the form of matching grants (58 responses out of 124 recorded). (ii) 0.000 income for local development. The second increase in land cess in the Zilla Parishad Nasik has covered all development heads and has become a fruitful source of own revenue for development activities. The first increase on local cess was of 30 paise per rupee of land revenue. It covered development under roads, percolation tanks and minor irrigation. The second increase in cess is of 130 paise per rupee of land revenue effected from 1-8-1968, the time by which the senction for the first increase expired. This increase has added development works under Education, Health and Agriculture.¹²

A fruitful source of income then would be upward revision of rates and fees for various services rendered in the fields of Education, Health and Public Health. Thus, under the head Education (1) Rs. 12,000 were received as fees from the Middle Schools (Government Girls' High School, Nasik) and (11) Rs. 20,000 by the sale of articles manufactured in the Basic and Agricultural Schools. (111) Rs. 1,60,000 were to be received as a part of the expenditure incurred on the primary education in the Municipal areas of Nasik and Malegaon (vide Budget for the year 1965-66). The Parishad as such cannot take any unilateral decision regarding the upward revision of fees but can make a case for the same. Receipts under the sale of articles (item (i1)) can be increased. Under Medicine Rs.25,000 is

¹² General Body Resolution No. 106 dated 22-4-1968. (Annual Administrative Report, Zilla Parishad Nasik, year 1968-69) p. 45.

The Report of the Committee on Panchayati Raj Finances (the K. B. Committee) Government of Mysore, Bangalore, 1963 has suggested a consolidated cess of 40 paise per rupee. This would be divided between Health 9 paise, Education 19 paise and Land and Water Cess 12 paise. This along with the land revenue collection without deducting any cost of collection would be handed over to the Panchayati Raj institutions (pp. 201-02).

the expected collection of fees from six allopathic and 21 Ayurvedic dispensaries and service charges of Primary Health Centres and Maternity Homes (Budget 1965-66). Under Agriculture Rs. 10,000 would be collected as the entrance fee for crop competitions, and under Animal Husbandry Rs. 7,000 would be received as fees from the slaughterhouses (Slaughter House, Malegaon, Taluka Malegaon). The Dak Bungalow at Igatpuri (Taluka Igatpuri) is likely to fetch Rs. 5,000. And the budget estimates for the Parishad monthly, the 'Saptashring', is Rs. 12,000. (All these figures relate to the budget for the year 1965-66.)

There is much scope for the upward revision in many of the fees and rates so collected. And the cases would not be so complicated as those under the head 'Education'. Proposal for the service charges of the Dak Bungalow with its upward revision has been forwarded to the Government with reference to the Dak Bungalow at Igatpuri. Fees for Veterinary Services have been revised, vide Subject Committee Resolution (Agriculture) No. 20 dated 27th May 1968. The sale of goods and articles (vis., receipts from the seed farms) can also be augmented. There was a proposal for a 'fair tax' to be introduced at the Parishad level. Sharing in the administration cost and therefore in the collection of the various present fairs was considered but was not approved (Finance Committee Resolution No. 40, dated 24-9-1966).

People are ready to pay when payment is linked with development and a kind of betterment levy was appreciated in the down-stream areas of the percolation tanks. Development of non-tax resources would ultimately lead to an increase in revenue and in a real way serve the purpose of local finance. Income from cattle pounds and grazing lands would be substantial in village panchayats. Income from inland fisheries would come handy in the areas of percolation tanks (e.g., percolation tank at Jumbutke, Taluka Dindori), and annual auction of the silt land in that area is a case in the matter. One Grampanchayat (Ghoti Village Panchayat, Taluka Igatpuri) had asked a loan for the construction of a motel and a park on the national highway (Bombay-Agra Road) and to develop it into an outstation resort. (By the by the proposal was rejected.)

The members of the Parishad were asked about their preferences in strengthening Parishad's own income. Their responses in the order of frequency are: (1) Imposition of a betterment levy. (2) Rural industrialization developing non-tax resources. (3) Tax on the turnover of the cooperative societies and fees from the market yards. (There are promising market yards in the district such as at Malegaon (Taluka Malegaon) and Lasalgaon (Taluka Niphad).) (4) Increase in profession tax. (5) Parishad to engage in commercial activities (ruled out by the Act). (6) Full coverage by the Government grants and their release in time.

The Administrative Reorganization Committee of Maharashtra (1968) has recommended the collection of market fees and their division as follows: Development Reserve (25 per cent), Zilla Parishad (20 per cent), Panchayat Samiti (20 per cent), Village Panchayat where the market yard is located (35 per cent).¹³

Sources of revenue for local governments differ in different countries and within a country in different areas. The Maharashtra Act provides for profession tax, general water tax (if public water taps or posts are installed by the local authority), entertainment tax, pilgrim tax, special tax on lands or buildings, market fees etc. Pilgrim tax is an important source in case of some Village Panchayats like Chandanpuri (Taluka Malegaon) or Vani (Taluka Dindori). Zilla Parishads, including the Parishad under survey, have not exhausted the items in the list laid down under Article 157 of the Act under reference. The Zilla Parishad under survey has not imposed any tax on her own. The only source of income under the heading 'taxes and fees' for the Zilla Parishad Nasik is the profession tax. This is an ex-District Local Board tax. The sundry receipts under the head 'Taxes and Fees' cover receipts under the Bombay Motor Vehicles Act, 1958 (which compensate the receipts under

13 Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1968), pp. 145-46.

octroi). In Greece, there is a tax on vacant plots. In Japan, profits from horse races are taxed. In Brazil there is a tax on the main cash crop, coffee. Local bodies can provide certain services and can charge for the same, for example, refuse collection charges in Greece. There is much scope in taxing sites on public highways, taxing economic activities, mineral water tax, market fees, licensing grazing lands etc. Handing over certain resources to local bodies in the light of the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee on Panchayati Raj Finances (1963) or . sharing in tax proceeds may be adapted. Certain incentives can be given to local bodies for better tax collection and old recoveries. Thus in Sudan, local governments get an agreed share in the collection and an incentive bonus on every increased collection. The Evaluation Committee of the Government of Maharashtra, 1971, has suggested an incentive grant on total resources raised by the Parishad (excluding the land cess). This incentive would have the same effect as the local cess matching grant would have on the land revenue.14

14 <u>Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati</u> <u>Rej</u> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1971), p. 81. <u>The</u> <u>Administrative Reorganization Committee</u> (Government of Maharashtra, 1968) has also suggested 5 per cent bonus on full recovery. It has recommended the release of the full revenue on 70 per cent collection, 50 per cent land revenue for collection between 30 per cent to 70 per cent and no land revenue as a ponalty for collection less than 30 per cent of land revenue(pp. 146-47). Revision of local rates and cess (e.g. irrigation cess and land revenue), declaration of schemes as purposive and non-purposive, stamp duty and increase in its share, increase in the forest duty and increasing share in it, share in sand and quarries fees etc. can be properly dealt with at the State and the Union level.

As far as Panchayat Samitis are concerned much of their income comes from the schematic budget only. Rest of their income is of an 'agency' type. All the development blocks would be completing their stage II by the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan (March 1972). A statutory pattern needs to be evolved for them which rests with the Central Government. These bodies in Maharashtra are not corporate bodies and hence cannot levy taxes.

All this makes for the case for a Finance Commission for Panchayati Raj bodies on the pattern of the Union Finance Commission. It would give more elasticity to the financial pattern of these bodies. It would deal with rules for Grant-in-aid, decide the future of Community Development grants, evolve sharing tax proposals, and would have a machinery to ascertain local needs including increasing committed expenditure.

Financing local works of development through District Financing Corporations instead of through government grants may go a long way. The study group on financial matters of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Presidents/Vice-Presidents

and Chief Executive Officers of Zilla Parishads and Commissioners of Divisions, Bombay 1967, has suggested that a District Development Fund should be raised to which Parishads would contribute 5 per cent of their total income realized in the preceding financial year. Estimated contribution of each Parishad would be to the tune of Rs.15 lakh every year, and 75 per cent loan should be advanced against it for development purposes. If loans could be covered by the Public Debts Act, it would give them additional security. The Finance Committee of the Zilla Parishad, Nasik, has accordingly resolved and requested the State Government to establish a Parishad Finance Corporation (vide resolution No. 16 dated 28-7-1966).

Such corporations would also develop into the main source of technical and financial guidance on the lines of the Small Industries Service Institution, Bombay 70, meant for the Small Scale Industries. An audit wing can be attached to these bodies. In Guatemala, such agencies have become the main source of technical assistance and have provided legal, engineering, purchasing, budgeting, accounting, revenue and other services. In Israel, the joint stock companies of local authorities grant loans not only for civic amenities (water works, sanitation, piped water supply etc.) but also for commercial enterprises. The Iller Bank in Turkey, floats loans on behalf of the local institutions. Every Evaluation Report harps on this point.

PATTERN OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF ZILLA PARTSHAD NASIN COME EXPENDITURE :5 32.5 t: 300 275 **150** 225 200 175 1965-66 -61 1967 -62 194 -69 1964 1962-63 1943-64 Inca YEAR

TRENDS IN EXPENDITURE IN VARIOUS

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TRENDS IN EXPENDITURE IN YARIOUS DEVELOPMENT HEADS OF ZILLA PARISHAD NASIK 140 135 130 EDUCATION 125 120 115 1 10 105 100 AKING 95 9.0 Rs In 1-16 1-1-14 1-12 CO-OPERATION -1-10 AND SMALL SCALE AND 1-08 COTTAGE LNDUSTRIES. -**}-**₽6 1 PH

1.02

The Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj in Maharashtra, 1971, has advocated the case for a District Agro-Industrial Corporation.¹⁵ Earlier the Naik Committee in para 9.17 of its report also had recommended the setting up of a Local Finance Corporation for floating loans on behalf of the Zilla Parishads.

Expenditure Pattern of Panchayati Raj Institutions

Table 8.5 gives a general picture of expenditure for the years under reference. The trend in expenditure is of 'increase in general' which is partly because of the transfer of many services to Parishad since its inception and partly because of the increase in the cost of the services.

Expenditure under the head 'Honoraria' covers honorerium and travelling allowances for the President, Vice-President, Chairmen of Subject Committees, and Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen of thirteen Panchayat Samitis, house rent for their accommodations and travelling allowances of the members as they attend meetings. General Administration covers establishment charges. Expenditure under the head 'Interest' refers to the interest payment on the amount of loan of the ex-District Local Board for the construction of

¹⁵ Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1971), p. 83. The details of the scheme have been worked out in the Appendix No. 16 of the said report, pp. 431-33.

| Item | 1962-63 | Percen- tage Total | 1963-64 | Percen- tage Total | 1965-66 | Percen- tage Total | · |
|--|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|--|------------|
| 1. Honoraria and Allowances | 65,475 | 0.36 | 1,54,200 | 0.83 | 1,72,000 | 0.62 | - |
| 2. General Administration | 4,48,871 | 2.47 | 4,68,600 | 2.52 | 18,98,700 | 6.79 | · · · · |
| 3. Interest | 56,744 | 0.31 | - | - | | • | |
| 4. Education | 90,35,299 | 49.81 | 1,06,95,338 | 57.56 | 1,29,75,300 | 46.40 | |
| 5. Medicine | 1,49,931 | 0.83 | 1,23,000 | 0.66 | 1,74,000 | 0.62 | |
| 6. Public Health | 5,94,416 | 3.28 | 4,24,300 | 2.28 | 6,18,200 | 2.21 | |
| 7. Ayurvedic | 64,030 | 0.35 | 68,500 | 0.37 | 72,600 | 0.26 | * • * 2 |
| 8. Agriculture | 1,97,161 | 1.09 | 1,98,900 | 1.07 | 3,67,200 | 1.31 | |
| 9. Animal Husbandry | 1,85,700 | 1.02 | 2,09,200 | 1.13 | 2,79,600 | 1.00 | |
| 10. Forest | 2,000 | 0.01 | - | - | • • • • • • | | • |
| ll. Social Welfare | 9,87,088 | 5.44 | 10,12,560 | 5.45 | 11,39,540 | 4.07 | |
| 12. Co-operation | 8,266 | 0.05 | 14,600 | 0.08 | 19,500 | 0.07 | · · |
| 13. Cottage and Small Scale Industries | 91,539 | 0.50 | 92,000 | . 0.50 | 96,800 | 0.35 | |
| 14. Community Development | 17,99,500 | 9.92 | 22,23,000 | 11.96 | 40,83,500 | 14.60 | * |
| 15. Sundry | 720 | , — | - | • | | an (1997) 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - | |
| 16. Works (Roade) | 29,30,410 | 16.15 | 12,85,831 | 6.92 | 32,45,900 | 11.61 | ta segu |
| 17. Public Health Engineering | 18,330 | 0.10 | 36,000 | 0.19 | - | | · · |
| 18. Irrigation | 28,990 | 0.16 | 1,80,000 | 0.97 | 2,31,600 | 0.83 | ···. |
| 19. Pension | 1,66,460 | 0.92 | 20,710 | 0.11 | 20,700 | 0.07 | • • |
| 20. General | 19,10,059 | 7.23 | 13,75,159 | 7.40 | 25,69,770 | 9.19 | • • • • |
| | 1,81,40,992 | | 1,85,81,898 | | 2,79,64,910 | | • |

Table 8.5 : Expenditure of Zilla Parishad (Revenue Section)

Source : Budget Books, Zilla Parishad Nasik.

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| | 1966-67 | Percen- tage Total |
|--------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| | 1,78,000 | 0.65 |
| •••••• | 25,38,000 | 9.31 |
| | • • • | – . |
| 1 | ,36,18,400 | 49.93 |
| | 1,83,000 | 0.67 |
| | 7,30,500 | 2,68 |
| • • | 73,000 | 0,27 |
| | 7,10,346 | 2,60 |
| | 3,02,700 | 1.11 |
| | • | - |
| | 5,36,200 | 1.97 |
| · · · | 18,800 | 0.07 |
| | 93,900 | 0.34 |
| • | 32,79,000 | 12.02 |
| | - | • |
| | 36,35,800 | 13.33 |
| | 30,000 | 0.11 |
| ·••. | 5,56,900 | 2.04 |
| · . · | 18,000 | 0.07 |
| •••• | 7,72,410 | 2.83 |
| 2 | 2,72,74,95 <u>,</u> 6 | |

primary school buildings (item subsequently merged with the appropriate head). Much expenditure under 'Education' refers to the pay and allowances of the teaching staff and rent for school buildings. Establishment charges of dispensaries and R.M.P./S.M.P. centres bulge the expenditure under the head 'Medicine'. Similar charges for Primary Health Centres and for Ayurvedic dispensaries are covered by 'Public Health' and 'Ayurvedic'. The heads 'Agriculture' and 'Animal Husbandry' cover development expenditure on many schemes as well as corresponding establishment charges. Forest development was provided for under the Third Five Year Plan, and expenditure was a grant to grampanchayats for the same purpose. 'Social Welfare' includes expenditure on freeships and merit scholarships, campaigns on untouchability and hostel grants for Backward Class students. Cooperation covers subsidy for co-operative industrial units and grants for godowns. Establishment charges of training centres and stipends to the trainees are included under the head 'Industries'. Under 'Works', roads exhaust, again like Agriculture, much development expenditure on various schemes. Similar is the case with minor irrigation. Public Health Engineering refers to the construction work in connection with rural water supply (piped water supply, and construction of wells). Sundry expenditure in 1962-63 referred to the expenditure on social education and it was merged in the proper head. Pensions are committed

expenditure. General expenditure includes contribution to land revenue recoupment fund (1 per cent), interest charges on educational trusts with the Zilla Parishad, establishment charges of the Gram Panchayat Secretaries and the share of Village Panchayats in the profession tax (30 per cent).

The expenditure is 'establishment oriented'. The percentage expenditure on honoraria and allowances may be small (0.83 per cent in 1963-64) in relation to the total expenditure. But the whole burden of it falls on the 'own income! of the Parishad. As such its impact is fully felt. Expenditure on general administration is steeply increasing. (It was Rs. 4,68,600 in the year 1963-64 while it rose to Rs. 25,38,000 in a period of three years, i.e. by the year 1966-67, which rise was 441.61 per cent.) Expenditures under 'Education, Medicine, Public Health, Ayurvedic show a steady rise. In these cases, expenditure on development as such is proportionately small. Thus, in the year 1966-67, under 'Education' budgeted expenditure is Rs. 1,36,18,400. Out of this expenditure, expenditure on educational concessions to Economically Backward Class students comes to Rs. 19,74,000, i.e. hardly 14.79 per cent of the total expenditure. Expenditure on rural libraries is 0.05per cent only (Rs. 7,000). Under Public Health, Primary Health Centres cut the largest slice--Rs.4,61,000-out of Rs. 7.30,500 (year 1966-67) and expenditure on

medicine in these centres is Rs. 48,000, i.e. 10.41 per cent of the total expenditure under Primary Health Centres. On the development of library it works out to Rs. 8,000, i.e. 1.73 per cent.

The real heads of production-oriented development thus are reduced to Agriculture with Animal Husbandry, works and minor irrigation and small scale industries. Even in Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, establishment schemes dominate and schemes which directly contribute to development, such as subsidies for the purchase of agricultural equipment, improved seeds, pesticides, crop-competition, special Kharif and Rabi competition, Agricultural Exhibitions and Animal Shows, subsidy on livestock improvement form a negligible portion. (Agricultural Demonstration Exhibition Rs. 8,800 (1.24 per cent), Kharif and Rabi Crop Competition Rs. 19,800 (2.78 per cent). Pest Control equipment subsidy of Rs. 40,000 (5.63 per cent), Livestock improvement Rs. 15,000 (2.11 per cent), Animal Show Rs.900 (0.13 per cent), account for small amounts as egainst the total expenditure on Agriculture of Rs. 7,10,346 in the budget for the year 1966-67.) The rural industrial potential is also not fully utilized and establishment allowances of Extension Officers Industries form a third of the total expenditure (Rs. 36,000 out of Rs. 93,900, in the year 1966-67). Establishment charges for a lacquer works centre and two stationary industrial schools came to Rs. 38,000

and for two technical training institutions to Rs. 19,000 (Paints, printing and weaving). All together practically exhaust the provision made in the budget for the year 1966-67.

Without providing establishment it is difficult to extend services and to assure their continuity and efficiency. Some expenditure on establishment matters is unavoidable. To some extent, establishment expenditure on development services can be treated as development expenditure. Also in rural areas the optimum services would never be realized. In such cases what is required is the expenditure on 'selling the idea' - the educational expenditure in Agriculture on Exhibition. in Animal Husbandry on Animal Shows. Various schemes of subsidy do not reach the villagers especially in the case of social welfare schemes. A complaint was received that one Adivasi member came to know a particular subsidy only when the amount was surrendered by the Panchayat Samiti. And he was a Deputy Chairman of that Panchayat Samiti. Educative expenditure is much more needed in social and backward class welfare, which is a special duty of Panchayati Raj institutions. Antyodaya was a cherished desire of Mahatma Gandhi.Development is a total function, and along with works and irrigation which spread and make development tangible, other development biased heads would follow.

Another tendency noticed in expenditure is the

proverbial 'March Fever'. The grants are irregular and uncertain. As these form the bulk of the receipts to-date, development services do not steadily develop. General consensus of the representatives regarding the efficient execution of the development works rested on full and timely receipt of the government grants. For many administrative reasons and practices this has remained merely a wishful thinking. Grants are received late, available amounts are not made known and Parishad takes them with surprise. The fear of the lapse of grant acts as a catalyser, and there is a mad rush for expenditure (--financial proprieties are not observed and this is morally justified --), the end is wasteful and unwarranted expenditure. This has a harmful impact on the 'modus operandi' of the development administration (Table 8.6).

The members of the Parishad and the two Panchayat Samitis under survey were asked about this 'Mad March Rush'. Their reflections are recorded in Table 8.7. It is interesting and instructive to note that nearly onethird of the total responses favour completion of a work at an earlier date assuring its payment before the end of the financial year (item No. 3). This would avoid rush of work, initiating work without prior sanction, and inferior quality of work in the absence of supervision. Early and adequate amounts of grants (item No. 4) have a bearing on

Other

Sources

47,18,014

41,26,782

54,86,095

44,93,628

58,08,312

73,49,048

45,71,957

59,56,950

35,03,353

70,96,740

| | Receipt | Expenditure | | |
|----------------|----------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|
| | Government Grants | Other Sources | Block Grants | Ot Sc |
| April 1967 | 8,21,037 | 21,20,121 | 76,179 | 47, |
| May 1967 | 30,65,125 | 16,82,346 | 1,26,892 | 41, |
| June 1967 | 17,19,460 | 19,81,681 | 1,60,220 | 54 |
| July 1967 | 25,87,699 | 21,68,870 | 1,52,289 | 44, |
| August 1967 | 27,15,438 | 19,95,861 | 1,02,269 | 58 |
| September 1967 | 38,31,200 | 37,10,586 | 1,12,323 | 70 |
| October 1967 | 24,87,055 | 48,80,098 | 83,314 | 73 |
| November 1967 | 35,09,935 | 37,22,246 | 45,361 | 45 |
| December 1967 | 29,02,352 | 31,02,676 | 1,14,584 | 59, |
| January 1968 | 40,96,146 | 15,12,398 | 1,17,128 | 35, |
| February 1968 | 25,90,085 | 27,91,343 | 2,06,553 | 61, |
| | | | | |

Table 8.6 : March Fever

| February 1968 | 25,90,085 | 27,91,343 | 2,06,553 | 61,90,138 | |
|--|-------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|--|
| March 1968 | 78,31,006 | 52,92,986 | 5,98,821 | 1,10,92,448 | |
| | | | | | |
| Total | 3,81,56,538 | 3,49,61,212 | 18,90,933 | 7,03,93,465 | |
| en e | | | | | |
| Total Receipts | 1967-68 | Rs. 7,31,17 | ,750 | | |
| Receipts in Mar | ch 1968 | Rs. 1,31,23 | ,992 i.e. l | 7.95 % | |
| Total expenditu | ire 1967-68 | Rs. 7,22,84 | ,398 | | |
| Expenditure in | March 1968 | Rs. 1,16,91 | ,269 i.e. l | 6.17 % | |
| Source : Annual Administration Report 1967-68, Zilla Parishad, Nasik. | | | | | |

| 1. Early and adequate | | | |
|--|-----------|-----|--|
| 1. Early and adequate | | | |
| | | | |
| financial provision | 13 | 4 | |
| 2. Carry forward the unspent | • | | |
| balance to the next year | 5 | 2 | |
| 3. Works to be initiated and | ` | 7 5 | |
| completed in advance | 28 | 15 | |
| 4. Grants to be received in the first quarter of the | | | |
| financial year | 28 | 5 | |
| • | | F | |
| 5. Immediate reappropriation | 5 | 2 | |
| 6. Liaison with State Govern- | , | | |
| ment for diverting unspent | | | |
| balances | 5 | 1 | |
| 7. Delay in expenditure due | | | |
| to technical procedure | 3 | - | |
| 8. Change in financial year | · · · · · | - | |
| | | · . | |
| 9. Strict quarterly reports help reappropriation | 3 | | |
| verh reshrohrervou | , | - | |
| 9A. Expenditure should be only | - | | |
| on the budgeted items. | 3 | | |
| Total Responses | 97 | 29 | |
| | | | |
| Non-respondents | 10 | 6 | |

restricting 'March Fever'.¹⁶ Quick reallocation of unspent balances (item No. 5) and carrying unspent provision to the next year (item No. 2) as per the Andhra pattern auggest some improvement in our financial practice. The Parishad under survey has always enjoyed good liaison with the State government (item No. 6) and always had the maximum coverage for her programmes through the reallocation of funds. For example, additional Rs. 8 lakhs were sanctioned (year 1968-69) for percolation tanks by the Deputy Minister for Rural Development (Ref. Proceedings of the meeting of the District Planning Advisory Committee, August 1968). He happens to come from the same district.

Yearly grants have a democratic sanctity and the lapse of grant is unavoidable. But this cannot be regarded as the main disturbing factor in the otherwise smooth development. There is a delay in the Budget and the Appropriation Act. But the controlling officers are authorised to spend 10 per cent of the provision made in the budget on the continuing schemes. This provision they themselves communicate to the Administrative Offices. Administrative action regarding the reappropriation of the

¹⁶ Report of the Committee on Panchayati Rej (K. B. Committee), Government of Mysore, Bangalore, 1963, states: "It should be insisted that all funds received by the Taluka Development Boards should be distributed within two months period failing which the executive officer of the Taluka Development Board should be permitted to distribute funds to avoid lapse of funds." (p. 193.)

unspent balances, strict compliance of the quarterly statements of accounts and measures to minimize the delay in communicating the amounts sanctioned in the Appropriation Act, may assure smooth progress.

With the 'March Rush' is linked another question, viz. the change in the 'Financial Year'. Much of the development activity comes to standstill in rainy season, and also the distributive benefits from the schemes of Agriculture. Rains and dislocated communications make tours and physical inspection difficult. Hence it is felt that this time could be properly utilized for office work and the preparation of executive plans to be launched as soon as the rains cease. Delay in intimating the Appropriated figures would thus be neutralized and even the uncertainty about land revenue, which is a function of the Monsoons, would be narrowed. With Zilla Parishads land revenue is an important source of income. Obviously the change in the financial year needs national consideration. As such it needs to be properly dealt with at an appropriate level.

Financial pattern of the Panchayati Raj institutions is still in the process of growth. The execution of a development budget is itself a new concept with us. The lack of planning is related to the lack of control over the total resources to be utilized. Own income of the Parishad is negligible. This has affected Parishad's role

as the local government and its related functions. Government grants are development biased. But here Parishad has no control over them. The increase in local cess on land and the matching grant received on it form an important part of the own income of the Parishad. This grant has to be earmarked as per the law. The Parishad has provided development works under roads, percolation tanks and minor irrigation, under the first increase in cess, while in the second increase in the cess following three heads were added to the earlier list: (1) Agriculture, (2) Education and (3) Health. Sanctioned budgets and actual expenditures are always at variance. Therefore, planning has become inadequate and its execution imperfect. The Sixth Evaluation Report of the Programme Evaluation Organization (Government of India, New Delhi, 1959) also confirms this view. Government policy in this regard must be recast and productive assets should be handed over to the Zilla Parishads. Sharing and transfer of taxes need reconsideration. The case for a finance commission at the State level to consider the Zilla Parishad finances has therefore become imperative.

A true picture of the Panchayati Raj Finances would be possible only when the income and expenditure patterns of the three tiers in each district are integrated in a single financial map.¹⁷

17 Henry Maddick, <u>Panchayati Raj--A Study of Rural Local</u> <u>Covernment in India</u> (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1970), p.151.

CHAPTER IX

PEOPLE AND THE PANCHAYATI RAJ

All social institutions, according to the Greek Theory of Education, are the products of mind. They are made what they are by men who work them at every stage of their development. Popular attitude sets tone to social institutions, popular aspirations make them dynamic and popular grievances, if not healed properly and in time, decide their fate. For social institutions thus people are their 'meaning and the sole purpose'.

Community Development movement turned out to be a top-heavy and a government biased programme. It was a government programme with people's participation as and when mustered and not a people's movement with government participation as and when required. Local leaders are the 'brokers of ideas'. And it seems that the idea of the Community Development was not sold properly.

The Non-official Leadership and Development

In an integrative type like the Indian system, various technical services are co-ordinated at the area level. At this level better understanding on the part of the people regarding the role of the government and their own role is considered to be effective and continuous. The function of the leadership is here to improve the communication between

man and man and between the man and the government, and to bridge the gaps of disagreement between the two. The success or failure of a movement therefore is linked with the success or failure of its leadership. Its operational efficiency is conditioned by the responses of the leadership.

The respondents were asked to record their responses, not more than three, regarding the criteria employed while selecting their leaders. They are tabulated in Table 9.1. The Table reveals that the party mandate is the main reason why office-bearers are voted in (84 responses out of 162 recorded). Zilla Parishads in Maharashtra are directly elected bodies. They have a power of patronage. Naturally political parties take a good deal of interest in the working of these institutions. While allocating various chairmanships within the party-fold, knowledge of the subject concerned and educational qualifications are also stated to be the matters of consideration (item Nos. 2 and 3). Candidate's experience also receives due consideration (item No. 4). Even with these concessions. which are in fact more of wishful thinking in nature, the fact remains that party-preferences colour the selection. Then what remains is the formal election of the officebearers. Here party factions, group loyalties and bargaining capacities of the groups are the important considerations of the 'real politik'. The Congress Party in the

| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|--|-------------------|---------------------|-------|
| 1. Party mandate | 64 | 20 | 84 |
| 2. Candidate's knowledge of the subject concerned | 13 | . 1 | 14 |
| 3. Educational qualification | ns 14 | - | 14 |
| 4. Experience of working in similar capacities | 16 | 5 | 21 |
| 5. Age and seniority | 3. | - | 3 |
| 6. Skill in conciliation | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| 7. Strength of intra party factions | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| 8. Control over voting blocks | 2 | - | 2 |
| 9. Regional representation | 1 | - | 1 |
| Al. Supporters of the ruling faction | 3 | • | 3 |
| A2. Bargaining power of the Scheduled Castes/Tribes | 2 | - | 2 |
| A3. Better election probabili | .ty 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Total Responses | 130 | 32 | 162 |
| Non-respondent | 2 | - | 2 |

Table 9.1 : Considerations for Selecting Office-bearers

District is torn in three factions. One, the Jan-Congress, has merged subsequently with the Bharatiya Kranti Dal, the other two have remained in the official party only to plot against one another with the help of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal faction. This was reflected in the game of 'the musical chair' as noticed in the 'voting in' and the 'voting out' of the office-bearers during the years 1967-68 to 1969-70 (Table 9.2). The Adivasis form a conspicuous minority and have always bagged the chairmanship of one subject committee. Chairmanship of the Committee of Works and Finance has always been the bone of contention between the Bharatiya Kranti Dal and the faction from the Congress Party in the Parishad. With the amendment in the Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Semitis Act, 1961, chairmanship of the newly constituted Subject Committee of Social Welfare goes only to the member belonging to the Scheduled Caste/ Tribe.

The general relationship between the office-bearers has been commendable, irrespective of the factions. One reason for this might be that in the beginning all belonged to the same parent organization--the National Congress. But much credit for this commendable relationship goes to the President and the Vice-President who commanded respect because of their work and their age. Both are conciliatory because of their grounding in the co-operative field. Being seasoned both are adaptive.

In the initial stages of development the attitude of the government servants is of crucial importance. The administrator should be a sympathetic interpreter, a

| Name of the Post | Name of the Occupant | Term of Occupation | Period of Vacancy | Reason for Vacancy | Remarks |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|---|--|
| | | | | | · ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ |
| President of the Zilla Parishad | l. Shri A | 12-8-1967 to 11-7-1968 | 12-7-1968 to 4-8-1968 | Vote of No Confidence on 2-1-1968 | The vote of no confidence was passed in the General Body meeting on 2-1-1968. But its execution was suspended by the Commissioner, Bombay, under Article 267A of the Act, vide Commissioner's letter No. VPC.5555 and VPC.5556 dated 7-1-1968. |
| • | • | | | | A special civil application was filed by the Councillors from the Opposition. The Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Commissioner Bombay and office of Presiden was declared vacant from 12-7-1968. |
| | 2. Shri B | 12-7-1968 to 4-8-1968 | - | Election to the office of the President | 2. The office of the President was held by Shri B as an interim arrangement under Article 52 of the Act. Shri B belonged to the Opposition group. |
| | 3. Shri A | 5-8-1968 to 10-4-1971 | 10-4-1971 to 18-5-1971 | Vote of No Confidence on 10-4-1971 | 3. Shri A was reinstated as the President. Shri D, Vice-President of the Parishad, held the office of the President as an interim arrangement under the provisions of the Act. |
| · . | | | | · | |
| | 4. Shri C | 19-5-1971 to | 8-7-1971 to 20-8-1971 | Resignation | 4. Shri C resigned on account of the Party directive. This was the result of the compromise arrived at between the two factions of the ruling Congress Party. |
| · | | 8-7-1971 | 20-0-17/1 | | |
| | 5. Shri D | 21-8-1971 | - | | |

tireless listener of complaints. He should report faithfully the popular feelings and reactions.¹ According to the theory of Panchayati Raj the position of the government servant is subordinate vis-a-vis the people's representative. The practice of Panchayati Raj requires that an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect should be created. In it, the State supervision is actually State service, State advice and State co-operation. It is not only a matter of legal provision but of convention and the proper use of discretion on either side. Therefore, it is a matter of time only.

Fersonal and informal relations of a local representative with government officers and the elected officebearers have a direct bearing on the development work in his constituency. This reflection to some extent is alarming. It means that services are personalized. Also the fear of nepotism lurks. One Panchayat Samiti member sercastically remarked "You get a loan under the scheme of improvement in horticulture (grape gardening) when you belong to the ruling group. If you don't, then minor repairs to the school building in your village go unattended for an indefinite period." Services to be safe and continuous should be institutionalized. One member from a

¹ K. Santhanam, <u>Planning and Plain Thinking</u>, p. 150, quoted by B. Maheshwari, <u>Studies in Panchayati Raj</u> (Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co. Private Ltd., 1963), p. 94.

panchayat samiti under survey therefore disapproved categorically the way the chairman of his Panchayat Samiti had followed. On any issue the said Chairman would remark, "I have already contacted the President of the Parishad in this matter ... (or) I will speak with the Chief Executive Officer in this regard ... (or) I will refer this case to the Minister in my Bombay trip." Such promises serve no good purpose. Also from the point of view of the administration the system is undesirable.

÷., Table 9.3 refers to the impact of cordial relationship with the officers in case of developmental works in the constituencies. Most of the members, nearly one-third (item No. 4) have accepted the fact that this relationship has resulted in initiating a variety of development works in their constituencies - sanctioning loans, effecting minor repairs, preparing revised estimates, completing works and conducting technical surveys. It is obvious that this impact is much felt at the Panchayat Samiti level. Here out of 31 respondents 15 have stated that the good relationship with the officer has been fruitful in securing a wide range of development works. The Panchayati organization under the impact of the Community Development pattern has become expenditure biased, hence the importance of this relationship. Government officers need workable projects to spend money on.

| | --- | | |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|-------|
| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
| | * * * * * | | |
| 1. The impact is good | 10 | 6 | 16 |
| 2. It boosts the work | 24 | 5 | 29 |
| 3. Technical difficulties are minimized | 5 | - | 5 |
| 4. Variety of development works initiated | 24 | 15 | 39 |
| 5. No causal relationship | 18 | 5 | 23 |
| 6. Relations with higher levels of administration effective | 1 | - | 1 |
| 7. Minority faction always at a disadvantage | 3 | - | - 3 |
| Total respondents | 85 | 31 | 116 |
| Non-respondent | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Total | 88 | 32 | 120 |
| | | · · - | |

Table 9.3 : Development Work in the Constituency - Impact of Officers' Relationship

Twenty-three (18 from the Parishad and 5 from the Panchayat Samitis) do not correlate development-work with 'good relationship effect'. They cover mostly the taluka leaders and prominent members from the Opposition. Works in their constituencies need no props or lobbying. But it is this section (19.17 per cent) on which the hopes to institutionalize the services can be founded. It is through them that the majority of the representatives would notice that varied development works are a function of a development leadership and not a concession to be received from the administration. It is with this leadership that people in one village managed to complete its piped water scheme.

Extension method is an educative method. For its success sincere partnership between the representatives of the people and the representatives of the administration is essential. But officers on tour rarely seek or receive cooperation from the representatives of the area, elected to the Samiti or the Parishad. The general consensus of the officers is that the elected members, if they accompany, use the presence of the officer to develop their own image among the people. When there are factions, as there are, this restricts the co-operation from the other group to the minimum. On the other hand, the representatives have stated that they never know in advance the tour programmes of the officers. Also the tendency of the officers is to meet only the Sarpanch, the Village Level Worker and those villagers who are connected with the case-papers in their hand. This is more frequent in case of officers from the Parishad level. One Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti regarded this partnership as an unwarranted alliance. He accepted that such partnership would result in quick disposal in some cases. But he maintained that the nature

of work expected from the representatives is different in kind than that expected from the government servants. He, therefore, categorically avoided touring with the officers.

Till the rural leadership develops the role of officers would be of additional importance to the people in general. Local representatives act as a liaison between the people and the government. Table 9.4-A concludes that though one-sixth of the representatives feel that the people can and do have direct contact with the administration (item No. 3) 60 per cent of the representatives feel usefulness in their role as a liaison with government (72 out of 120 respondents). A strange trend was noticed in case of utility of the office-bearers serving as a liaison. Fifty-eight out of 120, i.e. 48.33 per cent (Table 9.4-B, item No. 2), preferred direct approach to the officers as more useful and more effective. This partly is the reaction of the party factions experienced in the working of the Parishad. This prejudice would be diluted in a course of time. And the utility of this office would increase. The efforts are to institutionalize the working of the Panchayati Raj. As such this tendency needs encouragement.

The elected office-bearers were asked about the organizational relations they maintain with the government officers and with their team-mates. The answer was affirmative in tone. But in case of the two Panchayat Samitis

.

Zilla Panchayat Total Parishad Samiti 1. Representative is a link 52 20 72 2. People use his services 9 2 11 3. People have direct contacts 17 4 21 4. Representative does not 5 serve as a link 5 · · • Total respondents 83 26 109 5 6 Non-respondent 11 88 32 Total 120 Table 9.4-B : Office-bearers as a Link Zilla Panchayat Total • Parishad Samiti 1. Office-bearers are a link 29 9 38 2. People/representatives have direct contact 40 18 58 3. Office-bearer is useful 13 2 15 for ordinary members 4. The bond between the officebearers and representatives 2 1 3 would be strengthened 5. Office-bearers are partial 2 2 -116 Total respondents 85 31 3 1 4 Non-respondent 88 32 120 Total

Table 9.4-A : Role of the Representative as a Link

under survey it was noticed that the concerned Deputy Chairmen were never taken in confidence. The election of a Deputy Chairman is a product of compromise and he belongs to the minority faction in the ruling group. The post in practice carries little power of patronage. One energetic Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti under survey described how silent and disinterested he was as a Deputy Chairman of that Panchayat Samiti. And he justified his behaviour then.

As stated earlier, officers' co-operation is always received with a premium. Eighty-three out of 120 respondents (69.17 per cent) accepted his leading role in the realization of developmental works. There were hardly twelve representatives who thought of qualifying his role by expecting development orientation in him. They also wanted to apply popular checks on his power and treat him as 'second, though not inferior'.

This state of affairs is partly reflected in Table 9.5. This Table records the determinants of the successful implementation of the development schemes. Here preference to Parishad or Panchayat Samiti as an institution is insignificant (item Nos. 1 and 2). Even the members of the Panchayat Samitis do not regard these institutional devices as significant. The responses bulge the item Nos. 4 and 5. These refer to the role of government officers and that of

| - | | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|----|--|-------------------|---------------------|-------------|
| | Institutional efforts of Parishad | 8 | 3 | , 11 |
| 2. | Institutional efforts of Panchayat Samiti | | - | |
| 3. | Leadership at Parishad and Panchayat Samiti level (office-bearers) | 21 | 4 | 25 |
| 4. | Efficiency of Government officers | 58 | 13 | 71 |
| 5. | Alert local representative | 53 | 16 | 69 |
| 6. | Co-operation from the people | 34 | 15 | 49 |
| 7. | Co-operation between local/regional leadership | 1 | . - | 1 |
| | Total responses | 179 | 51 | 230 |
| • | Non-respondent | 6 | 1 | 7 |

Table 9.5 : Determinants of Successful Implementation

the local representatives. Popular co-operation is next in order (item No. 6). The whole personal bias in implementing the schemes can be linked with the first impact of development-works. It need not be lamented upon. The point at stake is the continuity of the service and keeping up its enthusiasm. Here the institutional approach should be the guideline.

Popular Participation and Development

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Popular participation is an institutional device to

imbibe a sense of oneness among the people of the area in various developmental projects. It is a process by which surplus time and energy of the rural people can be constructively used in the community work. If the functions of the Panchayati Raj bodies are to increase progressively, pari passu, public interest in its working must increase to create a base for popular participation. It has also an economic justification as capital itself is short. The post-Independence institutional design of local government system is based on this assumption.

But with all this, popular participation has lost Committee its novelty and vogue. The Mehta/report had already noted that popular initiative was one of the least successful aspects of the Community Development Programme. Above the level of the Village Panchayat there was little enthusiasm and interest. Even at the Panchayat level the extent of popular initiative was not encouraging.²

The problem can be looked at from four different angles. (i) The functional angle: Villagers' contribution to the programmes of development in the form of money, material and manpower. (ii) The social angle: the responses to the needs of the Scheduled Castes/Tribes people. (iii)

^{2 &}lt;u>The Report of the Team for the Study of Community</u> <u>Projects and National Extension Service</u> (New Delhi : Committee on Plan Projects, 1957), Vol. I, p. 5. <u>The</u> <u>Reserve Bank of India Bulletin</u>, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 1961, had also expressed similar views in the Summary Review of the Community Development Programme in India.

The psychological angle: the change in the attitude amongst villagers and their experience. (iv) The institutional angle: the participation through village level institutions.

As far as the contribution in the form of money, material and manpower is concerned it is noticed that the people from the higher income groups, rich farmers, traders and middle class people, contributed in cash and material. In case of manual labour, Shramdan, they naturally had supervisory duties. For the villagers from the low income groups and for the landless labourers the choice was practically restricted to manpower. "To give a day's work free was equivalent to the loss of a day's meal--this sacrifice was disproportionate." This was a pungent remark by one of the respondents. Most of the programmes undertaken had construction bias and amenities orientation. These benefited the rich section of the village community. It was very difficult for the low income group to appreciate the concept of 'creating social overheads'.

The prestige of an individual or his family or the reputation of the village at times spurred popular participation. A rich trader in one wadi of a particular village thus contributed in full, the cost of men and material for the construction of a one-room school in his wadi. The Block Development Officer attended the inauguration and it added to the prestige of the trader in his village. In another case a Chairman of one Panchayat Samiti could enthuse the people from his native village to muster their co-operation while he assured all administrative help. The net result was a wide range of developmental works-covered gutters, a panchayat ghar, street-lights, a primary health centre, piped water supply and a S.T. shed.

The 'modus operandi' is personal. So the contribution is declining, the fear of manipulation is increasing and the system stands disreputed. The Panchayat Raj Evaluation Committee, 1971, Government of Maharashtra, has expressed the view that this method called by various euphemistic names should be abandoned.³

But, unless something better is substituted in its place, mere condemnation of Shramdan would not serve any purpose. Popular contribution is the essence of the Community Development movement which is now elevated and absorbed in the Panchayati Raj structure. The real weakness of our rural society is its disinterestedness in the problems of community welfare. And it is not an uncommon phenomenon. Awareness of this aspect of the problem was shown by the rural elite. Partly, this might have been the outcome of their sophistication. But the very fact that they have shown concern over the continuous decline in

^{3 &}lt;u>Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Rej</u> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1971), p. 211.

popular participation is itself encouraging. Contribution in cash being ruled out a tendency has developed to adjust the contribution. There is a difference between the P.W.D. rates and the rates for the locally available labour, the former being higher. This gives scope for adjustment. People in a village from one of the Panchayat Samitis under survey were proud of their local representative who could bring different development works to their village and executed the same with no cash contribution from them. It is very difficult to pass a final judgement on this. Because this very practice might be misused by an unscrupulous local leader.

To overcome this, in a developing economy we need the basic approach and the apparatus of the Community Development movement. The way out is a programme based on the 'felt needs' of the village instead of a prototype programme. Small projects within the reach of the villagers on being completed, create confidence in their minds, while big show-pieces completed to vr official pressure or as per standard patterns affect people's will and capacity to co-operate. This was the lesson of the Gurgaon experiment (1920) where Brayne's good ideas were spoiled as they were not 'felt' by the people. With this can be constrasted the success of the Etawah Project (1948) which lies in its organic link with the 'felt needs' of the area.⁴

⁴ The U.N. Study Report also endorses similar reflections. "When a programme is disappointingly slow in

When we come to consider the responses of the weaker sections of the society the picture is disappointing. Panchayati Raj should give premium to those schemes which aim at the uplift of the weaker sections of the society.

But the weaker sections are not much interested in the amenity programmes which benefit all classes in general. It was noticed that they co-operated more with the leaders than with the work as such. They would listen to those leaders who normally solve their local difficulties. For obvious reasons they are reluctant to contribute in cash. The way to institutionalize their co-operation is to explain the schemes to them and convince them as a class regarding the social utility of the projects. This is not happening and the feeling is nowadays developed that the prime duty in any development project is with the government only.

The respondents were asked regarding the co-operation of the weeker sections of the society in developmental works. Their responses are shown in Table 9.6. The affirmative tone appears to the tune of 48 per cent. This is mainly because of the fact that the Adivasis in the

generating the enthusiasm, initiative and other desired mental adjustments the main reason is likely to be that in the circumstances it has failed to show villagers conclusively that they can get concrete results that they value." U. N. Study Report, <u>Community Development and</u> Economic Development (Bangkok : 1960), p. 69.

| | Zilla Parishad | Panchayat Samiti | Total |
|--|-------------------|---------------------|-------|
| 1. Full co-operation | 39 | 19 | 58 |
| 2. Adequate co-operation | 15 | 3 | 18 |
| 3. Discouraging co-operation | 22 | . 8 | 30 |
| 5. Their demands are side- tracked as they are in minority | 2 | - | 2 |
| 6. No cash contribution because of poverty | 6 | 2 | 8 |
| 7. Apathy because of backward- ness | 1 | - | 1 |
| Total respondents | 85 | 32 | 117 |
| Non-response | 3 | - | 3 |
| Total | 88 | 32 | 120 |

| Table 9.6 : | Co-operation Developmental | from the Works | Weaker | Sections | in |
|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|--------|----------|----|
|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|--------|----------|----|

Parishad under survey constitute a sizable minority. Scheduled Castes are 3.67 per cent (67,845) and Scheduled Tribes are 24.45 per cent (4,63,707) in the total population of the District (18,55,246) as per the 1961 Census.⁵ It has given them a bargaining power with the ruling group in the Parishad. They secure a Chairmanship of one

^{5 &}lt;u>Socio-Economic Review</u> 1962-63 and 1963-64 (Bombay: Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Government of Maharashtra, 1964), p. 37.

Subject Committee, normally the least important one. With the latest amendment in the Act, a separate committee has been constituted -- the Social Welfare Committee with its chairman from the Scheduled Castes/Tribes population. This institutional change is likely to improve their participation in developmental works. Eighteen out of 120 respondents accept their workable participation. This is mainly a leadership function. Some of the complaints from the Adivasi people are genuine. But they are not fully echoed in the Table. These are: (i) that the demands of the Adivasi areas are side-tracked, (ii) that there is inadequate awakening among the Adivasis and (iii) that their economic plight makes cash contribution impossible (item Nos. 5, 6, and 7). It was only after a tirade of criticism from all quarters in the General Body meeting on 24-8-1968 that the Parishad under survey ultimately sanctioned Rs. 10 lakh for development works in Adivasi areas (Western talukas of the district).

Shramdan is a technique of public participation in community work. Defence labour bank created at the time of the Chinese aggression (1962) is a new version of it. When capital is short, idle manpower itself becomes a capital factor. The Uttar Pradesh Government has authorized every Panchayat in the State to call five days compulsory shramdan from its residents, every year. But shramdan has lost much of its novelty, and also much of its utility,

because of the malpractices involved in it. Table 9.7 concludes that the opinion is still divided though the answer is drifting towards the negation of shramdan as an instrument for community works. The main reasons for the decline in its importance and use are (according to their frequency): (1) the concept is not 'sold' properly, (2) people have lost their faith in the utility of this technique, (3) village factions make community sense difficult, (4) economic backwardness is a strong deterrent, (5) resourceful leadership is lacking.

There is a distinction between 'community work' done out of people's participation and the community development sustained only through the change in the attitude of the people of the area. In its absence community work simply becomes a show-piece or a high-pressure drive with little regard and less room for people's co-operation.⁶

Public participation is public education. Without it even a well-intentioned plan becomes a mere mechanical fixture. Delegating responsibility to the elected or nominated representatives is inadequate. When people do

⁶ The Seventh Evaluation Report thus says: "When the visit of the dignitary is over the compost pits often remain unused, soakage pits are never kept in condition, and the hygenic significance of the repairs to the wells is little appreciated and it turns into a show piece." The Seventh Evaluation Report (New Delhi: The Programme Evaluation Organization, Planning Commission, 1960), [p.121].

Zilla Panchayat Total Parishad Samiti 1. People are willing for Shramdan 16 26 10 2. There is an element of 26 8 compulsion 34 3. People co-operate if 11 1 12 convinced 2 2 4. People are preoccupied 4 5. People have lost faith in shramdan as a 6 2 8 technique 3 2 5 6. Village factions dominate 7. Through Shramdan more work in small compact 2 2 villages is possible 1 1 8. Rich farmers are reluctant 9. No appreciation of the 1 1 work done 9A. Shramdan is conditioned by the economic backward-2 5 3 ness of the people 9B. Resourceful leadership is 4 4 lacking 9C. People feel that local development is a respon-sibility of the Government 2 2 28 104 76 Total 16 12 L Non-response 88 32 120 Total respondents

Table 9.7 : Shramdan

not take interest in the affairs of the community, shramdan becomes mere compliance with the wishes of their leaders and the government, and the sacrifices do not remain voluntary. In one village from the Panchayat Samiti under survey, people's rating for various social needs was as follows: (i) approach road, (ii) village school, and (iii) soil conservation activities. Even in scarcity conditions they showed little enthusiasm for soil conservation activities but they were available in adequate number for road works. Same enthusiasm was shown in the construction of the class-rooms in their village.

People's attitude towards shramdan is also changing. General discussions with the rural leaders corroborate the following observations. (i) Village people feel that they are being discriminated as compared with the urban people. Urban people do not collect initial contribution (people's contribution) in order to secure an amenity covered by Government funds. (ii) Also, the popular contribution being a precondition for government grants, rich villages are always at an advantage. (iii) When the Zilla Parishad has increased the cess on land revenue to the maximum extent possible, the case for people's contribution prima facie has become weak. Rural leaders therefore preferred a betterment levy (a project tax) to shramdan and its popular contribution.

Institutions play an important role in shaping people's

attitude through their working and the operational procedures. Rural voluntary organizations have a vital function to perform in creating and maintaining a favourable climate for popular participation. The Bharat Sevak Samaj in its Lok Karya Kshetra Programme [(a) an anithin Honey] had selected a group of villages from the Kosi river project. The resources of the area were developed and local leadership was created to man the development works. Voluntary associations of this type have a large potential. These should grow in number, size and in the area of their operation. In the Parishad under survey, the Dang Seva Mandal, Nasik. works for the betterment of the Adivasi people and for the spread of education among them. The Maharashtra Shetkari Sangh, Manmad (Taluka Nandgaon), had as its aim the sconomic betterment of the farmers. It successfully undertook the work of desilting an old tank in one village from the Panchayat Samiti under survey. The same institution undertook a wide programme of well-boring in the same - Panchayat Samiti. But it could make little progress as that institution was discredited for its anti-national activities. Voluntary associations like the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi, the Harijan Seva Sangh, can create healthy atmosphere for the social and economic growth of the community as such. The school and the co-operative can join this structure. On this would be raised the superstructure of the local government. For if community is weak, local

government of the area cannot be strong.⁷ Gram Sabha

Gram Sabha is an institutional approach to popular participation. It provides a base for the three-tier structure of the Panchayati Raj institutions. It is regarded as the grass-root organization of Democracy. To J. P. Narayan, the Sarvodaya thinker, gram sabha signifies village democracy. To him representative government from the village to Delhi was no good substitute for direct democracy.⁸

Whatever may be the ideal theory of Gram Sabha, in practice it has exposed certain limitations in its extension, certain weaknesses in its working and has developed certain unhealthy practices. The Gram Sabha as it stands today is therefore away from its Panchayati Raj context and far away from the Rousseaunian ideal which J.P. Narayan has advocated.

The respondents were asked whether the gram sabhas were effective or not. Eighty out of 120 respondents (i.e. 66.67 per cent) answered in negative. The reasons varied

8 <u>Seminar on Fundamental Problems of Panchayati Raj</u> (New Delhi: All India Panchayat Parishad, 1964), p. 69.

⁷ N. R. Inamdar in <u>Administration of the Community</u> <u>Development Block Haveli</u> (Poona: University of Poona, 1962) remarks, "Popular participation is a comprehensive process which has to be encouraged through all sections of the Community and at all lavels of the village and the Block" (p. 114).

and, according to their frequency, can be listed as follows: (1) There is a general spathy amongst the people in the working of the Gram Sabha. (2) Villages are divided into factions and the ruling faction monopolizes the gram-sabha. (3) Gram Sabha can only recommend but has no machinery to secure the execution of its recommendations. (4) People are illiterate. They have not appreciated the importance of Gram Sabha. (5) So far no tangible results have been produced through the institution of Gram Sabha. (6) The elected panchayat does not reflect the real leadership of the village.

These reflections focus our attention on the maladies of this institution. The Gram Sabha does not function as it should have functioned. The meetings are thinly sttended, quorum is seldom achieved, and many times the gram sabha reports are paper compliances. This was the candid confession of many of the respondents. Village factions create divisions in the gram sabha and its decisions lose community support. Accordingly, these decisions carry little influence on the decisions arrived at by the Gram Panchayat. Village Panchayat at times is not identical with the real and effective leadership of the village. For example, in one village with the Phad system of irrigation, it was very difficult to convince the influential people in the village about the cultivation of hybrid bajra. The scheme could record little progress

irrespective of the co-operation of the Village Panchayat and its Sarpanch. In the following year, this group (the real leadership), felt enthusiastic about the hybrid campaign and the result was that the whole Phad went in for hybrid bajra. To these psychological difficulties of communication should be added the physical difficulties of communication. It was observed that the various padas (settlements attached to the main village) had shown little response to the Gram Sabha meetings. Even the response from the main village is not encouraging in many cases. The Evalugtion Committee on Panchayati Raj, Government of Maharashtra, stated that as many as 49 per cent of the total gram-sabhas (in some fifteen districts mentioned in the report) did not hold even the two minimum meetings prescribed by the Act.⁹ In case of Zilla Parishad Nasik only 505 Village Panchayats out of 1,050 held two minimum meetings. Rest could not record even that minimum.

The gram-sabha thus does not live upto its expectations. Though a statutory institution, it has no binding authority. Popular participation is sparse, therefore participation in development is limited. Control of the Gram Sabha over the Village Panchayat is ineffective,

^{9 &}lt;u>Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayeti</u> <u>Raj</u> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1971), Table 50, p. 382.

therefore its educative aspect has become insignificant. "The idea of Gram Sabha by and large has not struck roots in the minds of the people. It has so far reached the prominent persons in the village. ... The positive outlook of the prominent persons in the village on the Gram Sabha has to be tapped and activised to bring the common people in large number within the fold of the Gram Sabha."¹⁰

The Gram Sabha has failed. But it is a basic institution at the village level. Therefore, it must succeed. Democracy has been defined as 'a government where everybody has a say'. Here a democratic administration by a Panchayat cannot be a good substitute for it.

What should be the future form of Gram Sabha then? Can it be a deliberative body? Can it be a deliberativecum-executive body? Or should it be a consultative body as it is but with more vitality?

Making Gram Sabha a deliberative body is ideally the best. But in practice, instead of giving a solution it would pose another problem. The administrative homogeneity would be disturbed at the village level. Similar deliberative powers would be claimed by the higher level institutions and the gravity of the problem would assume larger proportions. Present experience also does

10 N. R. Inamdar, <u>Functioning of Village Panchayats</u> (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1970), pp. 76-77. not justify extension of statutory powers to gram sabha. It is feared, not without reasons, that extension of functions to the Gram Sabha would tend to irritate the destructive forces and thus defeat its own purpose.

Gram Sabha as a deliberative-cum-executive body is also not a desirable proposition for similar reasons. It is again an over-simplification of the issue. What is practicable and justifiable is to develop Gram Sabha as a consultative body, a forum of thought, an essential medium for rural education by activising people into an enduring partnership 'a partnership in all virtues, in every walk of life and in all perfection'. The immediate task is to make the institution of Gram Sabha a 'live' institution and then allow it to grow to its potential. The growth would be gradual and 'from within'. This growth cannot be dissociated from the actualities of the rural life.¹¹

The immediate task is to create a faith in the village people regarding the social utility of the institution of Gram Sabha and make that institution based on the village community as such. For its efficient working a committee system may be introduced. The defeated faction should be encouraged to co-operate with it. This would give gram sabha a wider base. The presence of the Sarpanch

11 M. V. Mathur, <u>Penchayati Raj in Rejesthen</u> (New Delhi: Impex India, 1966), p. 175.

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should be made compulsory and the panchas would remain absent only with prior permission. This would establish a vital link between the gram sabha and the gram panchayat. Proceedings of the gram sabhas should be recorded and approved by the Village Panchayats in their subsequent meetings. There should be a regular follow-up of these resolutions. This would increase the stature of the Gram Sabha.¹² The statement regarding the loans distributed and recoveries effected during the preceding year should be made available to the people before the day of the meeting. This would have a healthy effect on the practices employed in these matters.

The Gram Sabha agenda should cover the Budget and earlier audit reports along with their compliances. It should discuss the Annual Administration Report and the progress report of the development works. It should consider the proposed works-programme of the village. Taxation proposals or increase in the existing rates also should be put forth for discussion though they need not be 'voted for'. This would result in developing the feeling that the Gram Sabhe is intimately linked with the vital decisions of the village community. As this feeling gathers,

^{12 &}lt;u>Fundamental Problems of Panchayati Raj</u> (New Delhi: Seminar, All India Panchayat Parishad, 1964), p. 84. Also Seminar on Public Administration in Panchayat Raj, Mussoorie, 1962. Agenda Papers. (Mussoorie: Central Institute of Community Development, Government of India, 1962), pp. 75-77.

the faith in the institution also would grow. It has been suggested that low power transmitters should be installed and these should broadcast panchayat news, important decisions and interesting discussions of the Panchayat meetings. This would create deeper interest in the working of the institution and with this general apathy of the people would diminish. Henry Maddick states that the use of low-power transmitter proved a success in Egypt.¹³

Administrative improvements in the media of announcement (e.g., coloured posters with bold lettering), the timing of the meeting, its place, good arrangement for womenmembers, informal discussion (people need not come near the stage and then ask questions) would add to the operational efficiency of the Gram Sabha.

Gram Sabha is an additional tier to popularize development programmes. In doing so, it tries to fill in the gap between the two roles of the Zilla Parishads one as a local government body and second as the district development organization. The Gram Sabha would establish an active dislogue between the village people and their elected leaders at the Village Panchayat level, regarding development programmes to be undertaken. This would involve the village community in the decision-making process and

¹³ Henry Maddick, <u>Pencheyati Raj--A Study of Rural</u> Local Government in India (London : Longman, 1970), p.258.

would develop a supporting structure for the village panchayat. As the gram sabha would act as a galvanizer on behalf of the people, it would to a certain extent remedy the defects in popular participation caused by the failure of shramdan.

Faith and interest are the two sides of the same problem and have a direct bearing on the functional efficiency of the institution. These two would operate for the success of gram sabha and such a gram sabha would further the cause of development.

CHAPTER X

PANCHAYATI RAJ AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT

From an organizational point of view the nature of devolution is a determinant of the Central-local relations. The system of devolution may be an 'open end system' which gives the maximum latitude to the local bodies. Or it may be a 'contract system' where a central government, while allotting the execution of a particular service to the local government, retains its supervisory rights. Multiple independent statutes make the central local relations complex. Hence the Ministry of Local Government at Central and State levels is the most useful co-ordinating agency dealing with the creation, content and course of widely acceptable standards of practice concerning with many organizational problems. Its mere existence is encouraging to local governments.

Central-Local Relations

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A developing country need not be bound by the old concepts of inter-relations. Decentralization is meant to accelerate the rate of development which is vital for the newly independent countries. To realize this, 'mutuality of interest' must be the guiding principle in detailing the Centre-State-Local relations. The Cambridge Conference

on Local Government in Africa concluded that local governments in developing countries need help to overcome their transitional disabilities as they grow to their potentialities and become useful service institutions. Where rapid development is the main objective local autonomy cannot be the guiding principle.¹ Tutor-pupil relationship is a natural phenomenon in earlier stages though it cannot be a permanent feature of any democratic organization.

This change in attitude would find its expression in a similar change in the functional procedures and processes in the organisation. Instead of making decisions the administration would help people in making decisions. In this context the Rural Development Department, the Finance Department and the Planning Department of the Government of Maharashtra would need to establish new relationship with these Panchayati Raj bodies. On the non-governmental level what is much awaited is the growth of local authority associations on the pattern of the 'NALGO', the National Association of Local Government Officers (U.K.), which is

"Where governments are willing and able to dedicate themselves in improving the living conditions of their people and to encourage popular participation in civic affairs the terms 'partnership', 'interdependence', and 'unity of purpose' are more suggestive of the principles which should underlie relationship between the two units at all levels."[p. 85].

¹ Similar thought has been expressed by Sady Emil in his article "Improvements of Local Government and Administration for Development Purposes," <u>Journal of Local</u> <u>Administration Overseas</u> (quoted in <u>Decentralization for</u> <u>National and Local Development</u>, U.N. Publication, 1962).

an educative and a research institution rolled into one. The Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Development (AVARD) had once a similar potentiality which unfortunately did not develop.

Along with the institutional devices noted above much desired state-level co-ordination is achieved by the annual co-ordination meetings of the Chief Executive Officers and the Presidents of Zilla Parishads, the Divisional Commissioners and the secretariat departments. Such conferences bring many important issues for consideration before appropriate authorities and a speedy solution is arrived at. For example, the Fourth Conference at Bombay, 1966 was divided in the following discussion groups: (i) Works and Schemes, (ii) Miscellaneous, (iii) Finance and Accounts, (iv) Administrative matters including staff matters and related financial matters. Following was the membership pattern of the groups: (i) the government officers at the Secretariat level, (ii) the Chief Executive Officers of the Zilla Parishads, and (iii) the Presidents of Zilla Parishads. The Divisional Commissioners would act as the chairmen of these groups. Groups one and two discussed some 19 items. The third group had 20 items for discussion, while the fourth had 22 items on its agenda. Such conferences have gone a long way in arriving at some practical solutions or recognizing the limitations of the government. This is much desired in the initial period of

these institutions. In 1966, the conference dealt with the below noted subjects: (1) Strengthening the staff of the audit organization, (2) transferring the authority in respect of Village Panchayet audit notes to Chief Executive Officers from the Collector, (3) the proposal for a separate gramsevak for agricultural and developmental (panchayat) work, (4) increasing the ceiling on expenditure on petrol for block jeeps, (5) grants for post-stage II blocks, (6) functional difficulties in developmental schemes.

The Collector and the Panchayati Raj Institutions

The Collector, historically an agent of the State was to the people 'the Imperial Court'. It is a matter of importance to see whether his role has diminished or changed in the new set up.

The Collector in the British rule was not only the 'eyes and ears' of the Government but also its 'voice' and . 'hands'. The Naik Committee of the Government of Maharashtra quoting recommendations of the Central Council of Local Self Government (6th meeting at Bangalore, November 1960),² had stated that, in the Collector, operating outside the district local body, Government gets an independent authority

^{2 &}lt;u>Report of the Committee on Democratic Decentralization</u> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1961): "The Collector should be kept outside the three tier system and should be the agent of the government in the field with a duty to keep government informed of the happenings and the general trend of events and where the government so decides to take necessary coercive action" (p. 102).

at the district level to watch the functions on behalf of the Government and to whom people can look for in redressing injustice arising out of the abuse or the excessive use of power.

The argument of the Report was that the Collector was already over-burdened with other duties and as such would do no justice as far as time and attention to the work of were this newly created organization arg concerned. The loss of his efficient services to the Panchayati Raj bodies has been compensated in Maharashtra by creating an equivalent post of a Chief Executive Officer in the Parishad.

The historic position of the Collector has weakened in the process of democratization of the government machinery. The Government of India Act, 1935, created many provincial services. Also the technical departments in a course of time started grudging against the Collector's dominance in the district. The State Acts like the Bombay Separation of Judiciary and Executive Functions Act, 1951, further weakened his position.

The strength of the Collector lies in the all pervading scope of his office, in the totality of his functions, holding everything within his office and nothing beyond it.³

^{3 &}quot;The Collector represents the unity of purpose and perspective." R. K. Vepa, "The Collector in 1960 in Andhra Pradesh," <u>Indian Journal of Public Administration</u>, Special Number: Collector in the Nineteen Sixties, Vol. XI, No. 3, July-September 1965, p. 410.

It is for this reason that he has been made the chairman of the Parishad Standing Committees in Andhra Pradesh and his presence and participation has been accepted as of much value to the Panchayati Raj institutions.

Collector's duties of 'eyes and ears' have become less important. Popular ministries have their own party organization at lower levels of administration. They are active in the field and keep the ministry informed of the happenings in the area, e.g., flood, famine, scarcity, failure of crops, disturbed law and order situation, developing tensions etc.

Still the Collector is not fully stripped off his old glamour. He still is the revenue head of the district. On the development side he is the Deputy Commissioner for Industries. He is the chairman of many district level committees and he looks after the state-sector schemes. The Maharashtra Act has given him some supervisory powers. But as the Parishad institutions develop to its potentiality his role in some of these fields would be reduced or played out.

To what extent can he be retained? Modernization of government has made its administration more and more technical. When Zilla Parishads are not self-reliant, as in the beginning, the Collector assumes the role of a coordinator. Even when Zilla Parishads develop to the

full-fledged self-reliant status, the Collector would serve as a vital link between these bodies and the government at the higher level.

The Collector's role needs to be redefined in this context. His office should be made more effective by adding responsibilities and ellotting adequate authority to him.

It is true that the Collector is now desk-bound and the tendency of his cadre is to move towards Sachivalaya. Still with proper articulation of his functions and redefinition of the area of his operation as a generalist, his office can be retained as useful.⁴

The prevalence of two officers, the Chief Executive Officer and the Collector, both of the same senior scale in the I.A.S. cadre, in the district is not a commendable solution. Shri P. R. Dubhashi, in his article "Leadership Role of the Collector,"⁵ has suggested the upgrading of

4 "If a French prefect so akin to the Indian Collector can remain useful and vigorous functionary in a highly developed society there is no good reason why the Collector should become an anachronism or even lose much of his utility as India makes further progress towards modernization." Indian Journal of Public Administration, Special Number, July-September 1965, Editorial, pp. 2-3.

B. Maheshwari in his book <u>Studies in Panchayati Raj</u> (Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co. Ltd., 1963) has quoted T.N. Chaturyedi who concludes that the Collector's presence has done much good to Zilla Parishad. "The Collector is in a position to get things done in a way the government likes and the way they ought to be done. The conduct and the attitude of the Collector determines the tone and trend of all officers towards these bodies" (p. 103).

5 Ibid., pp. 622-23.

the post of the Collector, making him a sub-regional coordinator controlling two or three districts and the Commissioner thus would be having two Collectors working under him. The administrative relations would be on the analogy of the Prants and the Collectors. If this is not possible then recruiting the Chief Executive Officer from the junior scale I.A.S. (as it is done at present) or from the development cadres would charge that office with adequate enthusiasm and development orientation.

Out of 120 respondents, 73 favoured Collector's inclusion in the Parishad (i.e. 60.83 per cent) and 38 (i.e. 31.67 per cent) were satisfied with the present provisions. Those who favoured the inclusion of the Collector in the Parishad had in their mind the considerations of the revenue problems and the problems of land acquisition for development purposes. Those who preferred the statusquo asked for more 'revenue rights' to the Parishad. Some pleaded his independent status on the ground that the Collector was the head of the election machinery of the Panchayat Raj bodies and as such should be beyond it.

Control and Supervision

1. Audit

Audit has two aspects--corrective and educative. Normally the corrective aspect is implemented with more vigour and the real purpose of audit i.e. its educative aspect is defeated. The system of control and supervision should encourage the observance of proper financial proprieties while incurring expenditure. Its main function should be of guidance and its authority should rest more on influence than power. Without education the system of control and supervision would become stultifying. Without encouraging the practice of financial proprieties the system would be reduced to mechanical rigidity.⁶

If recommedations of the Bangalore Conference are accepted and audit functions in the Panchayati Raj instituted are handed over to the Finance Department this educative aspect will be lost. In Kenya, the auditor acts as an educator and single mistakes are reasons for educative action, and not punishment.

Our audit system is ineffective due to its remoteness. It is deficient due to its 'paper compliance' approach. It is wasteful due to its infrequency. The Study Team on Panchayati Raj, Government of Rajasthan, 1964, had recommended the decentralization of audit and increase in the number of audit parties. With this it hoped to conduct audit of each Parishad and Panchayat Samiti twice in a year and of each Village Panchayat once in a year.⁷

⁶ Henry Maddick, 'Seminar on Public Administration in Panchayati Raj, Mussoorie, 1962. Agenda Papers. (New Delhi: Central Institute of Community Development, Government of India, 1962), p. 37.

^{7 &}lt;u>Report of the Study Team on Panchayati Raj</u> (Jaipur: Government of Rajasthan, 1964), p. 272.

The Ford Foundation Report on India's Food Crisis gives the following guiding notes for the audit organization.

- 1. In programmes moving into new areas greater margin of error should be permitted.
- 2. For new employees in the new and expanding programmes similar greater margin of error should be permitted.
 - 3. The criteria for evaluating administrative and financial decisions should include the standard of reasonableness of the actions under the circumstances of the time and place.
 - 4. A good production programme requires a high level of initiative and experimentation.
 - 5. The overall basis of appraisal should be in programme results which contribute to increased production.⁸

What worth is the inspection if it is not followed by a diagnosis? What worth is the diagnosis if it is not accompanied by a prescription? What worth is the prescription if no treatment is envisaged? All is like a cloud that does not rain.

The main complaint from the Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samiti members was that audit was not frequent. They pleaded

⁸ Ford Foundation Report on India's Food Crisis (New Delhi: Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, 1959), p. 125.

for yearly audit for Village Panchayats and effective compliance of the objections within the term of the Sarpanch concerned. This would make him responsible. At the same time it would also create his favourable image in the working of the Panchayat. The tendency noticed was to use the audit objections raised during the term of the predecessor Sarpanch as a weapon in the game of politics. The new Sarpanch would also take no institutional responsibility for the defective/incomplete works executed by the Village Panchayat during the term of his predecessors. The suggestion of the respondents was to increase the strength of the department.

Non-compliance of audit points is a common feature. In case of one Panchayat Samiti under observation compliance with certain points raised in audit reports/inspection notes from 1962-63 onwards was awaited. Table 10.1 gives the position of that Panchayat Samiti in the year 1968-69.

Table 10.1 : Non-compliance of Audit Points at Panchayat Samiti Level

| Tear | No.of points awaiting compliance |
|---------|----------------------------------|
| 1962-63 | 18 |
| 1963-64 | 10 |
| 1964-65 | 12 |
| 1965-66 | 27 (ell points) |
| 1966-67 | 18 (all points) |
| 1967-68 | 16 (all points) |
| | |

The Table indicates that there was no compliance since 1965-66. Non-compliance with the audit points in proper time defeats the very purpose of audit.

Many audit points deal with constructional items. They pertain in some cases to expenditures incurred without prior sanction, in others to wrong classifications where compliance is mainly technical. For example in one case, final instalment on the construction of a well was paid and debited to the block grant special purposes. The work had originally been taken up by the Ex-District Local Board and as such this expenditure should have been debited to the unspent balances of the Ex-District Local Board account. Revised plans and estimates are not produced at the time of the audit. Sanctions are rarely asked for. The Block Development Officers do not carry out annual verification of the Dead Stock articles under Rule 88 of the draft Audit Code. Even this would reduce the pending list of non-compliances. Thus in one case 7 office racks were recorded in the Dead Stock Register while the bill under reference showed 8 racks. Discrepancies like this, if not clarified properly, amount to fraud. Entries in the logbook of the jeep is a constant source of objections. Entries never tally and the petrol charges always exceed the sanctioned amount. Jeep frequently runs for nonofficial purposes and at times beyond the jurisdiction of the Panchayat Samiti and the skill of the Block Development

Officer lies in proper adjustment. In one year in case of one Panchayat Samiti under observation petrol charges were Rs. 8821.96 as against the limit of Rs. 3000 per year. Also it was wrongly debited to block grant special purposes. It should have been met from the Parishad's own funds.

Another tendency noticed is that of paper compliance. In one case a customer retained a spray-pump for one year. He was charged rent of Rs. 266.40 (that too when it was pointed out in the audit notes). And the compliance was 'that the amount was being recovered. Sanction for rent and its maximum period were referred to the Zilla Parishad.' This in fact meant an indefinite postponement.

Irregular practices end in misuse of money. In one Panchayat Samiti, an amount of Rs. 687.90 was drawn in cash by the end of the financial year (i.e., on 29th March 1963). Purpose was the purchase of furniture and cash withdrawal was justified lest the amount would have relapsed. But the amount was kept undisbursed for a period of 3 months and more. Overwriting is also frequent. Such irregularities are near-frauds. Non-officials try to get such irregularities 'regularized' (e.g., the purchase of table fans without referring to the rate contract with the firm and with no provision in stage II block in case of one Panchayat Samiti under survey).

In view of the work and its nature, the strength of

account personnel at Parishad/Samiti level needs to be increased. Also Deputy Accountant's training should be made more vigorous. Its present duration of 4 months is felt inadequate. As far as non-officials are concerned there should be a realization on their part about the 'audit propriety' of their acts and that their 'regularizing the irregular' is ultimately harmful to the institution as such. Right to physical verification (say, 10 per cent) would make audit more effective and definitely useful especially in tribal areas (as the Internal Audit Officer of the Parishad under survey stated). In the past the Rural Development Department had sent a party to settle a vast number of objections under the Community Development Programme. Such a party is long awaited. The 'troika' consisting of an officer on special duty from the Rural Development Department, the C.A.F.O. of the Parishad and the representative of the Chief Auditor, Local Fund Accounts, only would be able to clear the way.

Taking into consideration the statistical approach to the disposal of audit points in the monthly co-ordination meetings of the Chief Executive Officers and officers, the Maharashtra Evaluation Committee, 1971, has recommended the creation of an estimates and accounts committee on the pattern of the State legislature. This committee constituted for every financial year at the time of the commencement of the financial year would examine the budget estimates

of the Parishad and also would consider the audit notes of the Chief Auditor, Local Fund Accounts.⁹ The Evaluation Committee also felt that these accounts and audit reports should be brought before the State legislature as per the recommendations of the Khanna Committee of the Union Government.

2. Control

The State Government has naturally retained many controlling powers in the constitution of these institutions and there was a tirade of criticism on this tendency in the legislative debates.¹⁰ The contention of criticism was that the powers of supervision/control with the Collector/ Commissioner were a step strengthening bureaucracy. 'Democracy with too many checks would make it void--would mean a retrograde step.'

But it is equally true that government cannot let these institutions fail. Government can divide the work but cannot divide the responsibility which is its. The State government has retained its traditional powers of control/supervision with respect to these local bodies. Also it has the power to direct district councils/Village Panchayats to undertake or refrain from undertaking

- 9 <u>Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj</u> (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1971), p. 179.
- 10 Bombay Legislative Debates 1961, Vol.V, pp.941-1018.

particular schemes of development. This power is with a view to correlate local planning with national planning and the latter should have a premium. The Commissioner can call the meeting of the Zilla Parishad/Panchayat Samiti/ Subject Committees if no such meeting is called within.a specified period. He has a right to inspect the office of the Parishad/Samiti. He can prevent extravagance in Establishment. The Collector with the concurrence of the Commissioner can suspend execution of orders or the resolutions of a Parishad. He has emergency powers also. Finally, the State Government has the power to dissolve or supersede a Zilla Parishad/Panchayat Samiti for incompetency, default or abuse of power.¹¹

This obviously is not the regular feature of the administration and with proper administrative arrangements there would be few occasions to invoke these sanctions. As far as the Zilla Parishad under review is concerned no such powers were evoked during the period under report. Nor were there any instances of this type since the inception of the Panchayati Raj institutions in Maharashtra (May 1962).

In the ultimate analysis, as the Naik Committee Report has stated, the success of decentralization depends

¹¹ Maharashtra Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 Replacement Series (Bombay: 1968), Chapter XVI, pp. 6853-59.

on the sense of responsibility the councils show while exercising their powers and on the establishment of true democratic traditions in its working.¹²

12 <u>Report of the Committee on Democratic Decentraliza-</u> tion (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1961), pp.142-43.

CHAPTER XI

THE SUMMING UP

Panchayati Raj institutions are living and growing institutions. As they grow with the people they introduce certain changes in the traditional patterns of behaviour between the people and their government. Hence these institutions should be studied as a continuous process, their success or failure should be gauged in the context of spread and speed of the change these bodies have introduced in rural India. As such a final judgement on their functioning or prospects is both premature and unscientific.

New Concept of Local Government

Modern government is 'the government of involvement' --it is involved in its people. With the increase in welfare functions it is spreading over wider areas of operation. For the success of these functions it needs association and co-operation of the people and their institutions. The Community Development movement was an attempt on the part of the Government to associate people with the process of development and thereby make democratic government steady and secure. The Community Development movement proved inadequate in its operational aspect and insufficient in its development contents. It therefore created ground for new types of local institutions to undertake new types of

development functions. These institutions were to be comprehensive in scope and participative in operation in comparison with the earlier local administrative organizations.

Local governments in developing countries sustain and strengthen local areas of community co-operation and link them up with the wider national areas of development. In doing so they add vitality to the whole process of planning and extend its distributive benefits to larger areas. This development orientation in alliance with democracy has introduced a change in kind in the contents and scope of local government functioning. Devolution of administrative authority and concentration on traditional civic functions were adequate in the pre-independence days. What was needed was a bold policy of decentralisation with increasing local participation in the process of planning as its method and the practice of democracy as its aim.

Development and democracy are the two main props of Panchayati Raj which is the new version of local government administration. Development is not merely the creation of socio-economic overheads but modernizing rural mind and make it responsive to modern technology. Democracy is not merely the association of people with the decision-meking process but developing a community sense.

Democracy and Development

Local government works on the strength of popular

participation in development mechanism and democratic arrangement for associating people with the decision-making processes. Decentralization politically aims at the development of local leadership which assumes responsibilities in the administration of local area development. Economically, it intends to accelerate development activities, creating socio-economic overheads in general and increasing agricultural production in particular. Socially, decentralization tries to develop community sense which strengthens the process of development and at the same time spreads it over a wider social area.

Political leadership is a vital condition for the success of democracy. Responsible to the people for their authority and responsive to their 'felt needs' this development leadership acclimatizes national plan priorities to local areas and translates local development needs into the national plan targets. In this process of dovetailing national development plans with local development needs, political leadership assumes great significance, because it influences the decisions of development when they are locally applied.

The Panchayati raj bodies have been mainly ushered in, for local development in rural areas. The process of decision-making therefore has a great bearing on the effective role played by these institutions of development. The nature of a decision and the way of its implementation are

to a larger extent conditioned by the range and the quantum of influence exercised by the non-official and the official elements when a decision is arrived at. In the Maharashtra pattern chairmen of the various subject committees have power to accord administrative sanctions to the schemes of development and these decisions are ex-post facto ratified. The role of the officials gains when an administrative approval needs also a technical sanction. Even here the non-officials try to influence the process of decision-making while judging technical feasibility of administrative viability of a project or a scheme under consideration.

Development projects in modern times are initiated at the popular level. Though the intimation about the availability of funds at the State level speeds the process, real decisions are taken at the table of the non-official. An assertive President can gainfully mould the proposals of development at this level of decision-making.¹ A resourceful Chairman of one Panchayat Samiti under survey therefore could successfully steer his own plan of development works consisting of small bandharas, construction of class-rooms

¹ G. Ram Reddy in his article, "Some Aspects of Decision Making in Panchayati Raj," (Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. V, No. 2, 1970, p. 1702) discusses the case of package villages to 'set up' food production, 1963, and records how the President of one Panchayat Samiti altered the list of villages to be covered, deleting two villages from the Opposition group and substituting in their place two additional villages from his group.

and road works in the constituencies of his supporters and thereby strengthened his own hold on the Panchayat Samiti administration. Protection of the interests of the committee-members, irrespective of their political affiliations, also weighs in this process of decision-making because as an administrative head the President/Sabhapati values smooth sailing while in office. This tendency explains as to how the powerful opposition members from the Zilla Parishad under survey could manage to initiate varied development works in their talukas.

The new leadership is development oriented and therefore has strengthened the contents of development. The old leadership was urban-biased and less elective. It was suitable to perform patronship functions of leadership and to act as a liaison between the local people and the Government. Panchayati raj institutions are not merely administrative extensions of government at local levels, they are governments at local levels. Hence with the new leadership, the partnership functions (as distinct from the patronship functions) have come to the fore.

The new leadership (as seen in Chapter IV 'The Emerging Institutional Realization') is predominently supplied by one casts - the Maratha (67 out of 120 respondents, i.e. 55.83 per cent). But it is the majority casts in rural Maharashtra. Still this leadership is evenly

spread over the economic classes in the society. The leadership is not concentrated in irrigated tract only. Also it seems unlikely that the rich peasantry would manage to lead these institutions for an indefinite period and monopolize the benefits that flow from such leadership. Because the low income group (i.e. upto the annual income of Rs. 2,500) forms 22.5 per cent of the total respondents. it is felt that this would try to prevent development being concentrated in fewer fertile areas or in rich villages. The leadership is concentrated in the 31-45 years agegroup. It forms 65 per cent (i.e. 78 out of 120 respondents) of the whole leadership. 'All progress is a conserving innovation.' It is hoped that this age-group with adequate maturity would prevent amateur rejoicing over accomplishments and would reduce complacency. Panchayati raj institutions have enabled a large number of people to acquire leadership at local levels. Success or failure of this leadership would be translated into the success or failure of the Panchayati raj institutions.

The disquieting feature of the present leadership of the Parished under survey is its low level of education. Members conscious of this fact have asked for minimum educational qualifications as a qualifying condition for the post of an office-bearer on the lines of the Rajasthan pattern. Development functions added to these bodies are new functions. In this respect mere 'appreciation' of these

functions is not sufficient. What is required is the 'comprehension' of the new role assigned to these bodies. It is this combination of 'appreciation' and 'comprehension' which elevates the 'interest' in development into the 'faith' in the new role.

In the working of these institutions democracy is introduced, inter alia, through the device of the committee system. The Maharashtra pattern combines the advantages of the committee system with those of the portfolio system. This has increased the participative character of these institutions. At the same time it has retained its administrative efficiency. Development functions at local levels of administration meinly concern with the allocation of resources, location of projects and mustering popular cooperation in the execution of development schemes. As it stands, most of the development schemes are 'transferred' schemes and much of the expenditure on these schemes is covered by various government grants. (Government grants formed 91.37 per cent of the total receipts of the Parishad under survey, in the year 1966-67.) Still by associating people with the processes of decision-making, Zilla Parishads have made development acceptable and durable. They have proved better agencies of development than the departmental agencies employed so far. Without distinguishing between the State and the local sector schemes people have come to regard Zilla Parishads as the prime source of

development in rural areas. This has helped the expansion of the State sector schemes also, as in the case of the rural electrification or the implementation of the programme of soil conservation. The Parishad under survey has claimed a lion's share in the successful execution of the schemes like the Family Planning. The Chandor Camp (May 1967, Taluka Chandor) organized by the Zilla Parishad Nasik, is an example on record.

Institutional participation in the area-planning is encouraging. Member participation in the general body meetings and in the meetings of the District Planning Advisory Committee raises hopes of democratization of the whole process of development. The meetings of the District Planning Advisory Committee are dominated by the elected office-bearers of the Parishad, prominent members from the Opposition, and the MLAs and MPs from the district. The meetings are used as platforms for ventilating grievances in the execution of development schemes. The office-bearers of the Parishad take these meetings as opportunities to put forth their institutional claims before the Minister who represents the Government at the district level and presides over the meeting. It was through such rigorous representation that the Zilla Parishad under survey could secure maximum State support for her ambitious development programme of percolation tanks. An energetic Chairman of a Subject Committee or a resourceful Sabhapati at the Panchayat Samiti

level are some of the effective agencies of democracy to translate local demands of development. The enthusiasm at the Panchayat Samiti level, it may be noted, is also conditioned by the stage of development of the Panchayat Samiti. It is maximum in Stage I and minimum in post-Stage II.

These observations were supported by the reflections of the respondents also. In general they felt homely and were informal in dealing with the Parishad officers. They were asked whether there was any possibility of the Parishad agency being reduced to another government agency in the field. Nearly 60 per cent of the members positively rejected this possibility. A cognizable minority feared this possibility. They felt that Parishad controlled little area of operation where it had a free hand. Officers' dominance also was felt to a greater extent in its working especially at the Panchayat Samiti level. The hopes of transforming these bodies into democratic agencies of development as distinct from the administrative agencies, mostly lies in allaying these fears by positive measures.

Obviously there are some missing links in the process of democratization. Political groupism and factional patronage have acted as a serious handicap in the realization of the proper role of development leadership. To some extent it is an unavoidable concomitant of political parties, because no political party can afford to neglect

these bodies which lead them to the grass roots of democracy. This is reflected in the use (or rather the misuse) of the principle of co-option which instead of increasing technical competence of the institution merely added to the voting strength of the ruling party. The distributive benefits of development are turned to political use and the ruling group tries to divert these benefits to the areas of its supporters. A Sabhapati of the Works Committee of the Parishad under survey effected changes in the works programme as forwarded by one Panchayat Samiti. He insisted that the finalization of the programme was the right of the Subject Committee and the resistance by a member who happened to belong to that Panchayat Samiti was outvoted. As democracy matures the corrosive influence of political evils mentioned above would be effectively checked. Working of the Subject Committees also needs improvement in the contents and the approach to discussion. Inspection tours and study tours, at least within the district, would definitely improve the knowledge of the members of their subjects and their interest in the working of the committees.

Development Functions and Development Organization

The functions of Panchayati raj bodies are comprehensive and cover a wide range of activities. The functions of these bodies can be divided into three categories : (i)

Civic functions, (ii) Welfare functions and (iii) Economic functions. Civic functions are traditional functions of local governments. Welfare functions articulate the social philosophy of the Government of the country and economic functions show the way through which the Government intends to realize them. Welfare functions and economic functions taken together broadly cover the development functions of the government. Development is a process of summation, a process of integration, and all the three types of functions are organically linked together. The old distinction between them has lost much of its rationale in the present context of development and the dichotomy between local government and development organizations is now more apparent than real. The old approach to local government was administrative and these institutions were treated as extended parts of the principal government. Civic functions like metalled roads and street lamps naturally formed the core of development activities. With the present pace and expanse in development activities these functions have merged in the larger social amenities programme which forms a part of the total welfare functions.

As we look at the functional administration of the Panchayati raj institutions we come to a general conclusion that these bodies have created development awareness in the minds of the people. Zilla Parishads have extended development in a variety of fields by formulating and pushing the

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programmes of development. Implementation of Kharif and Rabi campaigns, wide coverage of the scheme of percolation tanks, extension in health facilities (Primary Health centres) - the functional expanse in all these fields is directly linked with the introduction of the Panchayati raj institutions. These bodies have also tried with success, in moving the Government to implement their pending development projects, like the Deo-river bridge (Taluka Sinnar). This bridge was proposed in 1957, that is before the inception of the Panchayati raj in Maharashtra. Parishad was successful in getting this project completed.

The content of local development as initiated by the Panchayati raj institutions seems to be material-benefits oriented rather than economic development oriented, in a proper sense. There is more attention to social amenities programmes than to development schemes in agriculture and rural industrialization (the merits of Nilokheri experiment are sadly forgotten!). Economic progress in rural areas would have greater impact on the rural society. Therefore, emphasis on economic development projects is a much desired thing.²

² Dr. N. R. Inamdar records that even a village panchayat like that of Dehu which, in many other ways is a successful village panchayat, concerns with civic problems around and in matters of socio-economic development lags behind. "The enthusiasm of the multifold village leadership remained to be geared up and channellized for constructive purposes for the achievement of the goals of the higher socio-economic development of the village." <u>Functioning of Village</u> <u>Panchayats</u> (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1970), p. 216.

Development Administration and Democracy

As democracy has influenced the process of development, in its turn development functions also have their impact on the democratic machinery of the Panchayati raj institutions. Institutionally, this impact is translated into the relationship of the non-officials with the officials. Financially, this impact is realized in the pattern of government grants and financial powers retained by the Government.

Development administration initially poses a dilemma before a democratic organization at the local level. The dilemma is inevitable and natural. Development administration, to be successful, needs professional efficiency. This efficiency is the result of high cadre technical and generalist services employed in development administration. Continued efficiency is retained through training and refresher courses and enthusiasm is ensured through better prospects of promotion and the possibility of executing a variety of jobs. As no local government can afford such a cadre on its own muster roll, it has to rely on the state government for the provision of such services. If these services are not provided for, the fear is that the local governments would again return to the 'era of oil lamp, the open well and the sweeper'.

With little prospects of promotion within a single

Zilla Parishad and with still little variety in the execution of functions, higher cadre development personnel would not feel attracted to these organizations and the State government would have to make provision for it. Statecontrolled development personnel, if oriented properly, would in the long run strengthen the self-governing character of these new local governments. With the exception of State cadre, Government has empowered these bodies to prepare a schedule of establishment for Class III and Class IV services and put it into practice with the concurrence of the Government.

In developing countries, at lower levels of administration, the distinction between the deliberative and the executive functions gets blurred. At this level of decision making, both non-officials and officials become important factors and in the initial period of these institutions, the role of the official becomes crucial. Behavioural pattern of the Parishad under survey also confirms this assumption. Eighty-three out of 120 respondents (69.17 per cent) have stated that the opinions of the government officers are accepted with premium.

Both officials and non-officials have a responsibility to share. Acceptance of practices is the result of a persuasive discussion and clear deliberation. The official has a crucial role to play in this process, and in the

early stages of these institutions, his is a pivotal posi-It is through his purposive role vis-a-vis the tion. popular representatives, that the Panchayati raj institutions realize their two-fold objectives - one, co-ordinating and executing State plans and two, serving as a popular open end channel of communication between the Government and the people. The cordial relationship between the two brings in a variety of development works.³ A development oriented officer gets recognition and reward in the nonofficials' circle for his co-operative nature. In a Panchayat Samiti under survey one Block Development Officer was requested to lay the corner-stone of a village school building. It was a rare honour because in normal circumstances such ceremonies are performed by non-officials. When the said Block Development Officer was transferred he was given a traditional send off by offering him a Sriphal (coconut fruit) and a shawl.

The contents of local development as initiated by the Panchayati raj bodies can be judged by the extent of mobilization of the local financial resources. Financially Panchayati raj institutions are placed on a better footing, as compared with the old local government institutions.

³ P. R. Dubhashi records, "The operational problems of local government hinge on the roles and mutual relationship of officials and non-officials in the Panchayati Raj system. ... With the advent of the Panchayati Raj, the district administration is undergoing a kaleidoscopic change." <u>Rural Development Administration in India</u> (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1970), Introduction, p. xi.

But in reality, the increase in local cess and a matching grant on it are the only substantial source of 'own incomet to these bodies. In the Zilla Parishad under survey local cess receipts formed 3.97 per cent of the total revenue receipts of Rs. 2,79,38,240 for the year 1966-67. In response to the development needs, this increase in local cess has to be spread over a wider range of development activities, as the second increase in local cess, in case of the Zilla Parishad Nasik, vividly shows. With the concurrence of the Government, Zilla Parishad can levy taxes or increase fees for various services rendered. But this power has not been utilized by the Zilla Parishads. The situation is further aggravated when the growing establishment charges cut further slices off the proverbially inadequate 'own income' of these bodies. Percentage expenditure might be small in case of single items of expenditure like the expenditure on honoraria and allowances in 1966-67 which formed 0.65 per cent of the total expenditure during the year. But its full impact was felt on the total receipts during the same year.

As Parishad lacks own resources, the result is a financial pattern controlled and influenced by the State government. To this extent, the effective control by local bodies over local development is affected. With very insignificant sources of revenue allotted and realized, little scope is left for decision making or administrative

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improvement at the local level. If this feeling is developed it would result in the progressive loss of interest in area planning and local development. This would also effect the agency role of these institutions in case of development schemes transferred to them. Lack of adequate financial resources has been an historic impediment to the growth of the local governing institutions. In the new context of development this should be comprehensively dealt with. By discontinuing the classification of grants as purposive and non-purposive and making all grants purposive, government has moved on the right path to relieve the financial burden on these bodies. Establishment grants also cover the expenditure on posts created after 1st May 1962, and to that extent relieve Zilla Parishads of their financial problem of balancing the budget. Upward revision of various rates would be a fruitful source of Parishad's own income. It must be noted that democracy can go slow but it cannot allow itself to go soft. People must be educated to pay their taxes. The success of the increase in local cess is as much encouraging as the 'Pay your own taxes' scheme employed in Ghana. Establishment of a Panchayati Raj Finance Corporation at the State level and constituting a Fanchayati Raj Finance Commission would introduce much order in the present situation.

Process of planning is by nature centripetal and national planning axiomatically assumes priority over local planning. With restricted own income, local planning is reduced to the administrative function of distributing targets of achievement or locating sites of various works. Still the association of the people with the deliberative process as far as possible and with the executive process as far as workable would strengthen development. Because if democracy works efficiently, pari passu development functions also are performed equally efficiently.

Obviously government cannot transfer all development functions to the Zilla Parishads, nor can hand+over all its development resources to these bodies. The overall responsibility of development is still with the government. It can divide the work but cannot divide the responsibility. Hence, in the Act, the Government has retained its traditional powers of supervision and control. These controls can also be justified when much of the expenditure incurred by these bodies comes from the State government resources only. In case of audit functions, its curative aspect needs more emphasis as compared with its punitive aspect. Rigorous audit would ensure proper spending and at the same time develop better financial practices in the working of these institutions. Members in general pleaded for yearly audit of the village panchayats and favoured an effective compliance of the audit notes. But their practice does not confirm that they have fully realized the 'audit-propriety' of their acts. In order to make audit effective, the audit

wing should be strengthened and in order to retain its educative value, guiding principles from the Ford Foundation Report (<u>India's Food Crisis</u>, 1959) should form the basic structure of the audit organization. As far as controlling powers vested in the hands of the Collectors and the Divisional Commissioners are concerned, the Government has accepted in practice that these powers would be used as 'medicine and not the daily bread'. These powers were not invoked in case of the Zilla Parishad under survey, during the period under reference. Here much rests on the conventions established by these institutions in their day-to-day working.

Building up Community Sense

Development of community sense is an important objective of the Panchayati raj institutions. In order to be democratic, modern societies need to be communicative in a social sense. It is only when the development leadership establishes effective liaison with the various social classes that the economic development is sustained and furthered.

Community sense is developed when the community organ accepts the common purpose of development, expresses common beliefs in its arrangements and follows common patterns of behaviour in its working. By promoting a sense of community and by merging individual ends in community ends the Community Development programme created a foundation for the local government system. The prime duty of the Panchayati raj institutions now is to vitalize the whole process by making it participative and to provide an enlarging and steady base to democracy. It therefore supplements the process of Community Development and not supplants it. The Banchayati raj system can be looked upon as the logical outcome of the Community Development programme.

In this context, considerations regarding the unit have of local government has an important bearing. The unit of government should be small so that people can comprehend it. It should be so close that popular consensus can appreciably influence its working. The Maharashtra pattern has gained in efficiency but it is feared that it has lost in gathering and retaining the community sense. District Unit lacks community feelings. The seat of district administration is always urban - this further dilutes the popular. attachment. On the contrary, the community sense is strongly felt at the taluka (block) level. It is also provided through an administrative machinery of the Block Development Officer. If the taluka body (in Western Maharashtra coinciding with the development block) is made the kingpin of the Panchayati raj system it would help to improve the community sense. The consensus of the representatives from the Parishad under survey confirms this view (93 out of 120 respondents i.e. 77.50 per cent). Decentrali-

sation at the Panchayat Samiti level would reduce the intensity of party politics which now inhibits the development of community sense in the working of these bodies. Also this is in line with the general pattern recommended by the Balwantrai Mehta Committee.

In such a case, a Panchayat Samiti would need to be enlarged and made more representative. Representation for organizational levels like the proposed mandi centres would have to be thought of. At present members directly elected to Parishad dominate the Panchayat Samiti discussions. Instead, if a Panchayat Samiti is represented on the Zilla Parishad by two members only, one elected by the Panchayat Samiti from amongst its elected members and the second the Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti, ex-officio, it would add to increasing member participation at the Panchayat Samiti level. At this level, the services of Class II officers would be adequate. There would be more free discussion than one which is now carried in the presence of and along with the Class I officers.

The prototype of the Panchayati raj structure can be conceived on the following lines.

1. <u>Village level</u>: The number of panchas may be between 7 and 14 as at present and elected wardwise. Sarpancha should be elected from amongst the elected Panchas but his election should be endorsed by the Gramsabha.

This would secure for his office popularly sanction as distinct from the sanction of a faction.

2. <u>Panchayat Samiti level</u>: The present membership pattern may be retained. Pancha/Sarpanch elected from the electoral colleges would link grampanchayats to the Panchayat Samiti in an institutional way. Directly elected members of the Zilla Parishad from the constituencies (one per every two electoral colleges as at present) would follow the system of geographical representation. Representation for the mandi centres should also be secured at the Panchayat Samiti level. This would improve the process of area planning. Institutional representation for the Agricultural Produce Market Committees, the Supervising Unions, would make development comprehensive.

3. <u>Zilla Parishad level</u> : The Chairmen of the Panchayat Samitis should be the ex-officio members of the Parishad (as at present). In addition each Panchayat Samiti would send its additional representative from amongst the elected members. Ex-officio membership of the MLAs and MPs may also be considered at the Parishad level. Representation of municipalities and urban areas would make these bodies broad based. Associate membership of the Chairmen of the five Federal Co-operative Societies as at present would add technical competence to the deliberations at the Parishad level. By and large, the Parishad should be in main a consultative and supervisory body. All these reforms would

call for structural changes and changes in the methods of election. As such they need further investigation.

Community sense is fostered by the efficient working of the various associate organizations. Such voluntary organizations like the Yuvak Sangh created in the Community Development period are not functioning continuously. It seems that the Panchayati raj institutions have neglected these associations. If these organizations function effectively they strengthen the general willingness of the people as they adopt development programmes.

Community sense is strengthened in proportion to the realization of backward class welfare. The present tendency noticed under the programmes of social welfare is that of utilization of financial allotments made available by the Central/State Governments. Little is utilized from the general grants received by these bodies or from their 'own (Parishad) income receipts'. The Parishad under survey has really made a good beginning in this regard by earmarking 10 per cent of the receipts from the increase in cess and has resolved to utilize this amount for the welfare of the backward classes. When the proportion of the backward class population and the Scheduled Castes/Tribes population is considerable, as is in the case of the Zilla Parishad under survey, their claim on general fund is doubly strengthened. While implementing the schemes for these sections, rigid criterion of economic feasibility would

serve little purpose. The aim should be the creation of an atmosphere of goodwill and the development of a sense of belonging to the community as a whole. Panchayati raj institutions are a befitting agency for this task. Creation of an independent Subject Committee - the Social Welfare Committee - shows the awareness on the part of the Government. Strengthening the status of this Committee on the lines recommended by the Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj (Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1971) would go a long way in improving the lost of these underprivileged classes. If not, then the social communications between the two would further shrink and would end, in the words of Plato, in 'a city within a city'.

Panchayati raj structure thus represents a new trend in rural administration. It is dovetailing development functions with traditional local government functions. In doing so it has reiterated the importance of local planning in the new context. By elevating traditional functions to social amenities it has evoked popular enthusiasm and sublimated it with idealism. There are some stresses and strains felt in its working, there are some weak points in its structural adjustments. Still it assures a better future, because local representatives have overwhelmingly accepted the desirability of these new institutions of development over the old system of local government - the ex-district local boards. Out of 170 reflections of the respondents, 125 have endorsed this view. With their wide range of activities, with the provision of technical personnel and with improved financial arrangements people have found these organizations as better vehicles of local development. To them Zilla Parishad is an all-purposive organization and the hiatus between the development functions and the local government functions is merely pedantic. As it stands, people have accepted this new version of local government. They are confident of fusing development functions and traditional civic functions into one development organization and positively hope for it. When asked to note, nearly 76 per cent (91 out of 120) of the respondents in the Zilla Parishad under survey concurred with this observation.

People have a play in local planning concerning Parishads' 'own income'. It is a small beginning of a great thing. Its importance would be realized when Parishad's 'own income' would become sizable. State plan priorities form the outer limit of local planning. But elected office-bearers have shown confidence in pushing their local plans of development into the overall State plans. The scope of participation in local planning increases to the extent these local demands are included in regular plan works. In this respect respondents have happily noted that their resolutions regarding development works beyond the scope of the Parished authority, have

been well-received at the State-level.

What they need is more funds. What they claim for is more executive (as distinct from the administrative) authority. What they try for is more and real transfer of development schemes. Such a vigorous local government would definitely play a leading role in the struggle to satisfy million expectations of development. And the challenging magnitude of the problem might evoke a matching response. Bertrand Russel therefore rightly says in his 'Roads to Freedom' :

"The world that we must seek is a world in which creative spirit is alive, in which life is an adventure, full of joy and hope, based rather upon the impulse to construct than upon the desire to retain what we possess or to seize what is possessed by others. ... Such a world is possible, it ewaits only for men to wish to create it."

ZILLA PARISHAD - SUMMARY OF COMPOSITION AND METHOD OF ELECTION

| | • | | 2 | | (Chapter | IV, p. 78) | • | | , | |
|---|-------------------|------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|------------|------------------|-----------------------|----------|
| | Andhra Pradesh | | Bihar | Gujarat | Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala | Madhya Pradesh | | Maha- rashtra | | Or |
| | | | | , an an an an | | | | | | |
| Ex-officio and Associate Members: Voting | | | | | | | | | - | |
| Pradhans | x | x | x | x | | x | x | x | x | • • |
| Chairmen of municipalities and towns | ••• | x | | - | | - | x | - | - | |
| MLAs and MLCs | x | x | x | - | | x | x | 1 | X | |
| M.Ps. and M.C.S.s | x | x | x | - | : | x | x | 1 1 | x | |
| Presidents of School Board | - | – . | - | - | · · | • | - | | - | |
| Collector | x | - | . 🗕 | - | | - ' | x | . | x | |
| Pres.of co-operative central banks | | x | x | - | No Zilla | · • | x | , – | - | 4 N 1 |
| Reserved, Co-opted or Appointed by Government | | | | | Parishad | • | | | | |
| Women | x | x | x | x | | x | - | x | x ⁴ | |
| Scheduled tribes and castes | x | х. Х | x | x | | x | • | X | x4 | |
| Co-operatives | | - | • · | | | X | _ | 7 • | - | |
| Others | • | - | - | x ⁵ | * • . • | . . | | | 1972) - L. | |
| Officials appointed by Govt. | - | - | · _ | . = | • • | • ' , | . – | · • · | x ² | |
| Chairman of municipality apptd. by state government | - | - | . | + | | - | - | | | - |
| Members Directly Elected by: | | | | • | | | | | н. 1 | |
| Constituencies | | - | - | x | | •••• | - | X | _ | |
| Co-operative society members | | - | - | | • | | - | - | | |
| Members Indirectly Elected by: | | | | | | | | | | • |
| College of panchayat sarpanches | · ••• | - | - | - | | - | - | | - | |
| College of commissioners of muni- | | | · . | , , , | | | | | ·. | |
| cipalities and notified area committees | - | - | x | - | | - | - | - | - | |
| College of menaging committees of central co-operative banks | | - | x | - | • | - | - | . 🛥 | ~ | • |
| State Panchayat parished | ÷ | - | x | - | | - | - | • • 🛥 | - | |
| | | | | | | | _ | - | · · · · | |

)rissa Punjab Rajasthan Uttar West Pradesh Bengal х X X x x X x x x x x X x X X x x X x x x **x**⁶ X x X X

(continued)

| | Andhra Pradesh | | Bihar | Gujarat | Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala | Madhya Pradesh | Madras | Maha- rashtra | Mysore | Orissa |
|--|-------------------|------------|--------------|---------|---------------------------------|-------------------|--------|------------------|----------|----------------|
| Ex-officio and Associate Members : Non-voting | | | | | | | | | | |
| M.L.A.s and M.L.C.s | - | - | - | x | | - | | - | - | x |
| M.P.s and M.C.S.s | . – | - | ` • ' | x | | • | - | - | • | X . |
| Collector | - | . - | . 🗕 | x | No Zilla | - | | . 🛥 | | x |
| Chairmen of federal co-operative societies | - | - | . – | • | Parishad | - | · · | x | - | - |
| Officials appointed by government | • | x | | - | | x ¹ | xl | •••••• | • | x ³ |

APPENDIX 1 : (continued)

Reference : x = Provision exists - = No provision.

Notes: 1 - District officers for public health, education, agriculture and other development departments to Zilla Parishad, no voting rights.

- 2 Upto fifteen officers may be nominated to Zilla Perishad by government (with voting rights).
- 3.- Collector and district officers of medical, education, public health, agriculture, veterinary, panchayat forest, welfare and other departments and sub-divisional officers -- no voting rights.
- 4 Appointed by government.
- 5 Two persons having experience in education (co-opted).
- 6 Persons (not exceeding three) chosen by state government from persons engaged in social, cultural, literary or professional activities.

Source : Henry Maddick, Panchayati Raj : A Study of Rural Local Covernment in India. London: Longman Group Ltd., 1970, p. 99.

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Punjab Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Benga] х х х

STAFF PATTERN OF A PANCHAYAT SAMITI (Chepter VI, p. 194)

| | A | В | C |
|--|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| Office Superintendent | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Accounts Branch | | | |
| Deputy Accountant Senior Clerk Junior Clerk (for maintenance of all | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 |
| accounts except loan accounts) Additional Junior Clerk or Clerks should be given at the rate of one Junior Clerk for every 3,000 loan accounts. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Cashier | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Establishment Brench | | | |
| Senior Clerks | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Planning and Development Branch for Works, Schemes and Institutions | | | |
| Senior Clerks Junior Clerks | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Statistical Assistant | 4 | 2 3 1 1 | 1 2 1 |
| Jeep Driver Senior Clerk (Recovery) from | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Intensive Cultivation Block | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Typing and Registry Branch | | | |
| Junior Clerks (one for inward and one for outward) | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Typists | 2 2 | 2 2 | 2 2 |
| <u>Class IV Staff</u> | _ | | _ |
| For Chairman and Deputy Chairman For Block Development Officer | 1 1 2 | 1 | 1 |
| For Office For all Extension Officers | | 2 | 2 |
| For each Stockman (Attendants) | 5 1 | 5 1 | 5 1 |
| ClassificationNo.of schematic BlocksA2 1/2 and aboveB1 1/2 and above but less thanCLess than 1 1/2] | 2 1/: | 2 | |
| | | \ _ | |
| Source: Government of Maharashtra, Rural Develop ment, <u>Report of The Evaluation Committee</u> <u>Raj</u> , Bombay, 1971, pp. 427-28. | on Pa | epart | ati |
| | | | |

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PLANNING OFFICER - MODEL JOB CHART (Chapter VI. p. 187)

1. Preparation of development Plans of the district and blocks subject to such instructions or direction as the State Government may give as required under the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act.

2. Preparation of programme and progress cards in respect of each Plan Scheme and preparation of periodical progress reports for submission to Divisional Commissioner/Government in such standard forms as may be laid down for guidance.

3. Work in connection with the periodical Co-ordination meeting of the Heads of Departments of the Zilla Parishads to be held by the Chief Executive Officers for reviewing progress and follow up action.

4. All correspondence relating to plan progress and programme with the Heads of Departments of Zilla Parishad and with the Commissioner and State Government.

5. Maintenance of Scheme-wise register of monthly figures of expenditure on plan Schemes and physical targets and achievements.

6. Matters relevant to Planning arising out of monthly meetings.

7. Scrutiny and follow-up action on inspection reports

of Block Development Officers in so far as the matters relate to Plan Schemes.

8. Observance of terms and conditions in respect of Plan Schemes and steps to be taken towards this end.

9. Internal evaluation of plan performance in the district both generally and particularly with reference to any individual Scheme.

10. Collection of Statistics relating to planning and development in the district.

Source : Government of Maharashtra, Rural Development Department, Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj, Bombay, 1971, p. 422.

(Chapter VI, p. 201)

(A) EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY OF A VILLAGE LEVEL WORKER FROM VILLAGE SAKORE, TALUKA NANDGAON

11-8-69

Attended office work of the Grampanchayat; Meeting was called at the office of the Vividh Vikas Karyakari (Multi-purpose) Society to discuss crop-protection and insecticide control measures; Accompanied Shri S., a farmer, to his farm and guided him regarding fruit gardening; Demonstration of improved agricultural implements was arranged on the adjoining bajra plot of Shri B. (weeding process demonstrated); Attended a programme of Bhajani Mandal, late in the evening; (Such programmes are used as a venue for informal discussions, concerning village problems.) It was followed by a discussion on family plenning and Small Saving;

12-8-69

Visit paid to village MD., four miles away from the H.Q. (date of last visit was 3/8/69.) Lists under the profession tax were completed; Called on Shri M., a farmer, to inspect his plot of Bajra. But he was not available; Discussions were arranged with the grampanchayat members regarding defaulters' and recovery problems; Halt at village MD. 13-8-69

Attended office work of the Grampanchayat; left for

the office of the Panchayat Samiti and called on the Extension Officer (Agriculture); In the evening proceeded to village P.; Meeting was arranged in the office of the Grampanchayat P, for the propagation of Small Saving; The meeting was poorly attended. Halt at village P.;

14-8-69

In the morning another meeting was arranged in the office of the Society; This meeting was better attended by the villagers; Visited Jeevan Shikshan Mandir and discussed the arrangements regarding the Independence Day programme; Left the village P for H.Q. at 8.00 p.m.;

15-8-69

Celebrations of the Independence Day; Shramdan and tree-plantation programmes arranged; Lecture by Shri S. local member of the Panchayat Samiti; Programme of Bhajani Mandal arranged at night;

<u>16-8-69</u>

Visited village W, ten miles away from the H.Q. (last visit paid was on 7-8-69); Visited Vividh Vikas Karyakari Society and completed loan cases; Propaganda meeting arranged in the evening covered postal savings, and family planning; Halt at village W.;

<u>17-8-69</u>

Holiday, attended office work in the morning; Called

on Shri S., local member of the Panchayat Samiti and discussed the implementation of schemes under insecticide: and pesticide control and other office matters.

| | THE MONTHLY DIARY - WORK FROM VILLAGE UMRANE, TA | والكالميسة ويستعده بتبري كالكالمت بمستبر بالمراجع والمراجع |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| 1. Visit to the De | emonstration Centre | · 1 |
| 2. Demonstrations | (a) Compost manuring | a |
| A general second second second | (b) Improved Seed - Whe | at 2 |
| 3. Propaganda for and 747 - Case | improved seed Wheat 917 as attempted | 12 |
| 4. Subsidy cases f Scheme of Hort | for new wells under the ticulture | 5 |
| 5. Propagation of Cases attended | hybrid Maize - 50% subs l | idy - 12 |
| 6. Fruit gardening | g cases attended | • 10 |
| 7. Insecticide and Number of part | l pesticide control work ties contacted | . 10 |
| 8. Recovery cases | attended | 35 |
| 9. Green manuring Number of part | propagation of the sche ies contacted | me. 5 |

DEPUTY ACCOUNTANT'S TRAINING: SUBJECTS COVERED (Chapter VI, p. 186)

(1) Service Rules -

The Bombay Civil Services Rules, Volumes I and II.

(2) Works and Stores Accounts -

(a) The Central Public Works Account Code.

- (b) The Maharashtra Public Works Department Manual.
- (3) Budget -
 - (a) The Bombay Budget Manual.
 - (b) The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis (Budget Estimates) Rules, 1966.

(4) Accounts -

- (a) The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961.
- (b) The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Account Code, 1968.
- (c) Bombay Financial Rules, 1959.
- (d) The Bombay General Provident Fund Rules.
- (e) The Maharashtra Contingent Expenditure Rules, 1965.
- (f) The Maharashtra Treasury Rules, 1960.

Source : Government of Maharashtra, Rural Development Department, Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj. Bombay, 1971, pp. 461-62.

(Chapter VIII, p. 275)

| | · | | | | | |
|--------|---|--------------|----------------|------------------------|------------|----------------------|
| | | | (| Figures in | lakhs of | f Rs.) |
| | Heads | Total | Recur- ring | Non- recur- ring | Loan | Othe than loan |
| т. | Block Headquarters - | | | | | |
| • • | (a) Personnel | 2.60 | 2,60 | | | 2.60 |
| | (b) Transport (I jeep) | 2.00 0.15 | 2.00 | - 0,15 | | 0.15 |
| | (c) Office equipment, furniture, etc. | 0.15 | . — | 0,15 | - | 0.15 |
| | (d) Project Office, Seed store, Information centre, etc. | 0,25 | - | 0,25 | - | 0.25 |
| | Total | 3.15 | 2.60 | 0.55 | | 3.15 |
| II. | Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Extension methods and demonstration of improved practice, including equipment | 0.50 | - | 0.50 | - | 0.50 |
| III. | Irrigation) | | | | | |
| IV. | Reclamation (including soil) conservation, contour bunding etc.) | 3.40 | - | 3.40 | 3.00 | 0,40 |
| V. | Health and Rural Sanitation - | | | | | |
| | (1) (a) Dispensaryrecurring expenditure | 0.20 | 0,20 | - | - | 0,20 |
| | (b) Dispensary building | 0,10 | - | 0,10 | - | 0,10 |
| | (c) Dispensary equipment | 0.10 | - | 0,10 | - | 0.10 |
| | (2) Drinking water-supply | 0.50 | - | 0,50 | - | 0,50 |
| | (3) Drainage and Sanitation | 0.25 | • | 0.25 | - | 0.25 |
| | Total | 1.15 | 0,20 | 0.95 | 3.00 | 1.15 |
| VI. | Education | 0,60 | 0.15 | 0.45 | - . | 0.60 |
| VII. | Social Education (including audio-visual eids and women, youths and children's programme) | 0.70 | 0.40 | 0.30 | - | 0.70 |
| III. | Communications | 0.85 | - | 0.85 | • | 0.85 |
| IX. | Rural Arts, Crafts and Industries | 0.65 | 0.25 | 0.40 | - | 0.65 |
| X. | Housing for Project Staff and Rural Housing | 1.00 | - | 1.00 | 1.00 | - |
| • " | Grand Total | 12.00 | 3.60 | 8.40 | 4.00 | 8,00 |

Analysis of cost :-

(i) Cost of one Development Block

= Rs. 12.00 lakhs

(continued)

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 (ii) Share of Centre: 75 per cent of Non-recurring, non-loan expenditure, 50 per cent of recurring expenditure plus Rs. 4.00 lekhs loan

(iii) Share of State Government

.. = Rs. 9.10 lakhs .. = Rs. 2.90 lakhs

Source : Manual on Community Development (Political and Services Department (Planning and Development), Government of Bombay, Nagpur, 1959), Vol. I, p. 312.

SCHEMATIC BUDGET FOR A DEVELOPMENT BLOCK DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF FIVE YEARS WITH A CEILING OF RS. 5 LAKHS

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| • | | | (F: | igures in | Lakhs o | f Rs.) |
|-------------|--|---|----------------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| • • • | Heads | Total | Recur- ring | Non- recur- ring | Loan | Other than loan |
| I. | Block Headquarters - | | | | | |
| | (a) Personnel | 0.70 | 0.70 | · · · · • | - | 0.70 |
| | (b) Transport (I Jeep) | 0.15 | 7 | 0.15 | - | 0.15 |
| | Total | 0.85 | 0.70 | 0.15 | - | 0.85 |
| II. | Animal Husbandry and Agricultural Extension | 0.50 | | 0,50 | - | 0.50 |
| ļII. | Irrigation > | 0 de | | o dr | 0 75 | |
| IV. | Reclamation \$ | 0.85 | - | 0.85 | 0.75 | 0,10 |
| V. | Health and Rural Sanitation | 0.50 | - | 0.50 | - | 0.50 |
| VI. | Education | 0.50 | - | 0.50 | • | 0.50 |
| II. | Social Education (including Audio-Visual Aids) | 0,50 | 0.35 | 0.15 | | 0.50 |
| II. | Communication | 0.50 | - | 0.50 | - | 0.50 |
| IX. | Rural Arts, Crafts and Industries | 0.50 | 0.10 | 0.40 | - | 0,50 |
| X. | Rural Housing | 0.30 | - | 0.30 | 0.30 | - |
| • | Grand Total | 5.00 | 1.15 | 3.85 | 1.05 | 3.95 |
| | | | | | · · · · · · · · · | |
| (1) | Cost of one Second Stage Block for years | l de la composición d La composición de la c | •• | - 1 | Rs. 5.00 | lakhs |
| (11) | Share of Centre: 50 per cent of recurrin expenditure, 75 per cent of non-recurrin expenditure and 100 per cent of loan | lg lg | | • | ls. 3.73 | lakhs |
| <u>ii</u>) | Share of State Government: 50 per cent of recurring expenditure and 25 per cent of non-recurring expenditure | f | · · · · | | s. 1.27 | |

- Ks. 1.27 lakhs

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Source: Manual on Community Development (Political and Services Department (Planning and Development), Government of Bombay, Nagpur, 1959), Vol. I, p. 315. -

..

non-recurring expenditure

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APPENDIX 7 (Chapter VIII, p. 276)

A note explaining effects of the Maharashtra Ordinance No. IV of 1969 published on 31-1-1969 on the income resources of the Zilla Parishad Nasik.

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Finance Department Zilla Parishad Nasik.

An ordinance further to amend the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act 1961 (Ordinance No.II of 1969) has been published on 31-1-69 and the salient features of the amendments carried out in sections 143, 146, 151A, 152A, 182, 183 and the deletion of section 184 has been explained in Govt. R.D.O. letter No.ZPA/1069/434/N dated 3-3-69.

Amendments in sections 143, 146, 151A and 152A

Under section 146 of the M.Z.P. and P.S. Act 1961 the State Govt. was authorised in Western Maharashtra area of the State, to levy a cess not exceeding nineteen paise on every rupee of Water rate leviable under the provisions of the Bombay Irrigation Act 1879. This above rate of nineteen paise has been raised to twenty paise from 1-4-68. The average receipts on account of irrigation cess of this Zilla Parishad ranges between Rs. 2 to 25,0000 for year. The revision will increase the Revenue by 10 to 13,000 per year.

Amendment in section 182

The schemes transferred to Zilla Parishads under section 100(i)(b) were classified in two categories "Purposive" and "non-purposive". The purposive schemes were entitled to a purposive grant of 90% of the actual expenditure. While expenditure on "non-purposive" schemes was met out of Deficit Adjustment grant. Now the section 182 has been amended and all "non-purposive" schemes have been converted into "purposive" and in Zilla Parishad will be entitled to a purposive grant of 90% of the total expenditure. The estimated non-purposive expenditure of this Zilla Parishad was Rs. 27,97,400/- per year. Before issue of this ordinance, the Zilla Parishad Nasik was to receive purposive grant of Rs. 1,35,72,900 but now the Zilla Parishad is entitled to receive purposive grant of Rs. 1,60,90,560.

Amendment in section 183

Under the new provision the Zilla Parishads will be given Establishment Grant at 75% of the average annual cost of the posts rendered surplus to Govt. not only on 1-3-62 but at any time thereafter owing to transfer of works and schemes to Zilla Parishads and which the Zilla Parishads create and fill from whatever source. The average annual costs of the posts rendered surplus to Govt. has not yet been fixed and as such the establishment

grant has been calculated at 75% of the expenditure on account pay and allowances of the posts transferred by Govt. The establishment grant for the year 1968-69 has been calculated by Govt. as usual and as such there is no remarkable changes in the Establishment grant.

Deletion of Section 184

According to section 184, Zilla Parishads were to get deficit Adjustment grant on progressively reduced scales upto the end of 1971-72. The "non-Purposive schemes have been converted into purposive schemes by amending and consequently the deficit segment has been reduced considerably, the provision of section 184 has been deleted.

The net deficit of Rs. 27,27,951 is as against the total non-plan expenditure of Rs. 2,16,38,400 on account of Govt. transferred schemes during 1968-69. Out of this total deficit 20% reduced deficit Adjustment Grant (Rs. 27,27,951 - 5,45,590 = 21,22,361) of Rs. 21,22,361 would have been received by this Zilla Parishad during 1968-69.

The comparative position of various grants payable to Zilla Parishad Nasik under various sections of the Act is shown below.

| Sr. Nature of No. Grant | Position before Ordinance | Position after Ordinance |
|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Furposive grant | 1,35,72,900 | 1,60,90,560 |
| 2. Establishment grant | 25,15,125 | 25,15,125 |
| 3. Land Revenue grant | 15,84,854 | 15,84,854 |
| 4. Equalisation grant | 12,37,570 | 12,37,570 |
| 5. Deficit Adjustment Grant | 21,82,361 | - |
| 6. Deficit met from Zilla Parishad resources | 5,45,590 | 2,10,291 |
| Total | 2,15,38,400 | 2,16,38,400 |

As it seems from the figures of deficit to be met from Zilla Parishad resources that the Zilla Parishad is benefited during the year 1968-69 but in the current year and in future the deficit will go on increasing because of increase in non-plan expenditure and consequently the lion's share of the matching grant of this Zilla Parishad will be locked up for meeting this deficit.

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Chief Executive Officer Zilla Parishad Nasik.

(Chapter VIII, p. 276)

No. 2P.FD.BUDGET.69/66 Finance Department, Z.P.Nasik. Nasik. 25th August 1966.

To,

. . 2 .

The Secretary to Government of Maharashtra Rural Develooment Department, Sachivalaya, BOMBAY-32.

Subject:- Maharashtra Zilla Parishads (Deficit Adjustment Grant) Rules 1966 (Draft).

Sir,

With reference to the notification No.DAG.1066-DIV published in the Government Gazette (extraordinary) dated 15-7-1966 whereby draft rules of Maharashtra Zilla Parishads Deficit Adjustment Grant Rules, 1966 have been published, for inviting objections. These rules have been discussed in the meeting of the Finance Committee of the Zilla Parishad held on 22-8-1966 and the findings of the Committee are as under :-

1) Five per cent Land Revenue Grant D.A. Grant and the Epidemic Grant have not been taken into account while computing internal revenues of existing Boards (vide rule No. 2(4)) as these grants were paid to the erstwhile D.L.Bs. 5% Land Revenue Grant was freely utilised by the D.L.Bs. on any items of expenditure and as such the same should have been taken into account in computing internal revenue of existing Boards.

2) While calculating the committed level of expenditure of the Zilla Parishad no provision has been made for inclusion of the travelling allowance of the administrative staff transferred to Zilla Parishads for which Estt. Grant is being received. Similarly the following items of expenditure have also not been taken into account.

- i) Contribution to the depreciation fund in respect of Government transferred assets and also Ex-Board assets where there was not practice of full depreciation of all assets of these Bodies.
- ii) Leave salary and pay of leave substituties of transferred posts.
- iii) Provident Fund interest at guaranteed rates where the investments do not give the return.
 - iv) Extra expenditure on establishment if pension
 Scheme is made applicable to Zilla Parishad
 employees.
 - v) Purchase of equipments or replacement of Government transferred assets like Marathi Typewriters, duplicators etc.
 - vi Contingent expenditure on furniture, telephone, Jeeps and rent of residential buildings supplied to non-officials of the Zilla Parishad.

- vii) Rent (where Panchayat Samitis do not have their own buildings) or repairs of Block buildings including Primary Health Centre buildings etc.
- viii) Special expenditure on preparation of Administrative reports, meeting expenses etc.

All these items of expenditure will have to be met from the current revenue of the Zilla Parished if they are not taken into account while calculating Deficit Adjustment Grant.

3) The average annual actual expenditure on printing and stationery on account of Government business transferred to Zilla Parishad has been taken into account in the committed level of expenditure of the Zilla Parishad vide para (K)(F) of the Draft Rules but it is not practicable to allocate expenditure on printing and stationery in respect of Government and Zilla Parishad business separately (including that even on agency Schemes). Pooled purchases are made in respect of stationery, Printing and equipments and as such it is very difficult to allocate expenditure separately. Similar difficulty arises in respect of other items of expenditure like postages, clothing to Class IV etc.

4) The proposed addition of 1.2 per cent (prescribed vide rule No.2) into the Deficit Adjustment Grant, due to the periodical increments in the pay of Government Servants

borne on schemes transferred to Zilla Parishads is very meagre and inadequate to make good the increase in expenditure. This ceiling limit needs to be revised.

5) There is also one fundamental point which needs consideration. There are many institutions and schemes operating in municipal limits on which expenditure is incurred by Zilla Parishads from purposive grants (for example maintenance grants and E.B.C. grants in educational institutions). The Zilla Parishads receive 90 per cent purposive grants from Government on this expenditure and the remaining 10 per cent is met from Deficit Adjustment Grants. When this Deficit Adjustment Grant is reduced progressively by Government the whole expenditure will have to be borne by the Zilla Parishad from its revenue which is derived from Zilla Parishad (rural) area only; and the question arises as to why Zilla Parishad should spend its revenue on Schemes implemented in municipal limits.

6) According to the current year's Budget Estimates of this Zilla Parishad, the deficit is about Rs. 16 lacs and the Finance Committee of this Zilla Parishad feels that it would not be possible for this Zilla Parishad to meet this deficit from the present resources of the Zilla Parishad. This Zilla Parishad had also considered the scope of additional taxation open to the Zilla Parishad under various sections of the Act in order to augment its resources for setting the Zilla Parishad on a financially sound footing

but the returns of these new taxes are disappointing so far as this District is concerned, a fair percentage is just wasted in collection only. In the circumstances it would not be possible for this Zilla Parishad to make up this deficit by tapping new sources and hence the Finance Committee of the Zilla Parishad has resolved to request Government not to reduce the quantum of Deficit Adjustment Grant by amending section 184 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act 1961 suitably.

It is therefore requested to move Government to amend the section 184 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 suitably so that Zilla Parishads will get full Deficit Adjustment Grant as usual.

. Sd/-----

Chief Executive Officer, Nasik. Zilla Parishad, Nasik.

O.C.Signed by) C.E.O.

Copy forwarded w.cs. to all Chief Executive Officers Zilla Parishads (in Maharashtra State) for information & communicating their comments to this Zilla Parishad.

Sd/- ---

For Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nasik.

PROFORMA OF THE BUDGET

(Chapter VIII, p. 267)

| | | Original Estimates 1971-72 | Revised Estimates 1971-72 | Budget Estimates 1972-73 |
|------|--|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| HEAD | | Govt. Z.P. Totel | Govt. Z.P. Total | Govt. Z.P. Total |
| | | grant income | | grant income |

Deduct : Refunds.

XIII. Public Works

Deduct : Refunds.

XIV. Pensions

XV. Miscellaneous

Deduct : Refunds.

Deduct amount transferred to capital

TOTAL REVENUE

(continued)

PROFORMA OF THE BUDGET

(Chapter VIII, p. 267)

| HEAD | Revised Estimates 1971-72 | Budget Estimates 1972-73 | | |
|------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|--|
| | Govt. Z.P. Total grant income | Govt. Z.P. Total grant income | | |

REVENUE (RECEIPTS)

A. TAXES

I. Taxes and Fees

Deduct : Refunds.

B. ASSIGNED REVENUES

II. Local Cess

<u>Deduct</u> : Refunds.

III. Local Rates

Deduct : Refunds.

C. GRANTS

IV. Grant from Government under the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961

IV.A. Other Grants paid by Government

D. OTHER SOURCES

V. Interest

Deduct : Refunds.

VI. Police

Deduct : Refunds.

VII. Education

Deduct : Refunds.

VIII. Medical

Deduct : Refunds.

IX. Public Health

Deduct : Refunds

X. Agriculture

Deduct : Refunds.

XI. Animal Husbandry

Deduct : Refunds.

XII. Industries and Cottage Industries

Deduct : Refunds.

XIII. Public Works

Deduct : Refunds.

XIV. Pensions

XV. Miscellaneous

Deduct : Refunds.

Deduct amount transferred to capital

TOTAL REVENUE

(continued)

Appendix 9 : (continued)

| | Act | | penditure 0-71 | | Expenditure 971-72 | Budget | Expenditure 1972-73 |
|------|-----|------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------|------------------------|
| HEAD | | vt. ant | Z. P. income | Govt. grant | Z. P. income | Govt. grant | Z. P. income |

EXPENDITURE (REVENUE)

A. ADMINISTRATION

- 1. President, Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen, Councillors and Members
- 2. General Administration

B. EDUCATION

3. Education

C. PUBLIC WORKS (INCLUDING COMMUNICATION)

4. Buildings and Communications

5. Irrigation

D. SANITATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH

6. Medical

7. Ayurved

8. Public Health

9. Public Health Engineering

E. MISCELLANEOUS

10. Interest

11. Agriculture

12. Animal Husbandry

13. Forests

14. Social Welfare

15. Co-operation

16. Industries

17. Community Development

18. Miscellaneous Departments

TO. WTOCETTSWOOD DEDSLEMBURS

19. Pensions and Other Retirement Benefits

20. Miscellaneous

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Source : The Budget Estimates 1972-73, Zilla Parishad, Nasik.

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QUESTIONNAIRE (Chapter VI, p. 168)

I. Bio-data

(1) Name (2) Age (3) Religion and Caste

(4) Size of the Family

(5) (a) Main Occupation (b) Subsidiary Occupation

(6) Annual Income: (i) From Main occupation (ii) From

Subsidiary occupation (iii) From other sources.

(7) Educational Qualification : (a) Literate (b) Primary

(c) Secondary (d) Upto S.S.C. (e) Upto graduation

(f) Post-graduation.

Place of Education : Rural/Urban

(8) Experience in Social Work: (a) Within the Constituency
(b) Outside the constituency. (9) Experience in Political
Work: (a) Within the Constituency (b) Outside the
Constituency.

II. Elections

- (1) How many times have you contested Zilla Parishad/ Panchayat Samiti elections? Mention specific years.
- (2) Who were your opponents? To which political party did they belong?
- (3) Whether your candidature was sponsored by your party? State the factors that strengthened your selection by the Party.

- (4)(a) What was the election-manifesto of your party?
 - (b) List the order of priority of development works from your election-manifesto.

Do you concur with this order?

- (5) Note the factors that contributed to your success in the election (in the order of importance):
 (a) Party work (b) Effective propaganda (c) Candidate's individual work (d) Caste dominance (e) Party success in earlier State election (f) Party work within and outside the constituency (g) Other.
- (6) Media of Propaganda (in the order of importance):
 (a) General meetings (attended by district/State
 level leaders and State ministers) (b) Door-to-door
 visits (c) Pamphlets (d) Ward meetings (e) Processions (f) Other medium.
- (7)(a) How did people respond to the results of the elections?
 - (b) Did the elections result in creating factions in the constituency?
- III. Institutional Behaviour (Zilla Parishad/Panchayat Samiti)
 - (1) State the number of meetings of the Zilla Parishad/ Panchayat Samiti, held within a period of one year.
 - (2) Did you attend all the meetings?Note reasons, if any, for your absence.
 - (3) Member-participation in the meetings: (a) Tabling aresolution (b) Seconding a resolution (c) Critical

- speech (d) Raising questions (e) Other means suitably adapted.
- (4) Do you feel that the member-participation is restricted to few prominent members only? If so, state reasons for the same.
- (5) Explain the role of the President in the General Body meeting of the Zilla Parishad.
- (6) Explain the role of the office-bearers of the Zilla Parishad in the General Body meeting.
- (7) Explain the role of officers in the General Body meeting of the Zilla Parishad.
- (8) Elucidate the role of the General Body of the Zilla Parishad in financial matters.
- (9) Whether the Co-opted/Associate members have fulfilled the expectations about their representation?
- (10) Is it that a member gives premium to the demands of his Panchayat Samiti over the demands of the General
 - Body of the Zilla Parishad?
- (11) To what extent the General Body of the Zilla Parishad approves the recommendations of the Subject Committees? Does the General Body refer back frequently, the recommendations of the Subject Committees?
- (12) Mention important General Body meetings in your term. State reasons for the same.

IV. Subject Committee Working

(1) Name the Subject Committees of which you are a member.

- (2) Note the number of meetings within a period of one month. Note the number of meetings adjourned for want of quorum.
- (3) If you have remained absent, state reasons of.
- (4) Explain the role of the office-bearers in the meeting.
- (5) Explain the role of the officers in the meeting.
- (6) Elucidate your role in the meeting.
- (7) Does a Subject Committee discuss at length, on the items of its agenda?

If the discussion is brief, state reasons for the same.

(8) The relation between the Standing Committee and the Subject Committees:

(a) Introducing the subject (b) Frequency of the
Standing Committee amending the decisions of the
Subject Committees (c) Frequency of referring back
the subject by the Standing Committee to the Subject
Committees.

- (9) The relation between Subject Committees and the General Body of the Zilla Parishad:
 (a) Introducing the subject (b) Frequency of the General Body amending the decisions of the Subject
 Committees (c) Frequency of referring back the subject by the General Body to the Subject Committees.
- (10) Whether the members of the Subject Committee visit Works/Projects and collect firsthand information about the schemes? If so, to what extent do they utilize this information in the meetings?

(11) Note the utility of the Co-opted/Associated memeber of the Subject Committee.

V-A. Non-Officials

 Factors leading to the selection of the Non-official (Give order of importance)

(a) Party decision (b) Knowledge of the subject
concerned (c) Educational qualifications (d) Experience
in the working of various committees (e) Seniority
(f) Other.

- (2) Give reasons for re-election, if any, of the nonofficials.
- (3) Do you approve the performance of the non-officials?Support your statement.
- (4) State with reasons, the behavioural relationship between the non-officials.
- (5) State, with reasons, the behavioural relationship you maintain with the non-officials.
- (6)(a) What is the behavioural pattern of the non-officials and the officials? Account for the same.
 - (b) Does this affect the implementation of development schemes? Give examples.
- V-B. Councillors and Officials
 - (1) State, with reasons, the behavioural relationship you maintain with the officers.
 - (2) Access the impact of this relationship on development work in your constituency. Give examples.

- (3) Do you correspond with the officers regarding the work in your constituency? How do they react?
- (4) Do you accompany with the officer while he is touring your constituency? Does it serve any use?
- (5) To what extent the officer on tour attends to the grievances/suggestions from the people? Does this result in better execution?
- (6) Do the people accept your liaison role?
- (7)(a) Do you approve the 'freedom of the Executive'?(b) Do you practise this right of the Executive?
- (8) Is it that the non-officials are an inevitable intermediary?

V-C. Non-Officials

- (1) State the relationship you have cultivated with the Chief Executive Officer and the technical officers of the Parishad.
- (2) Do you confide to other non-officials?
- (3) Note your reflections on the working of the Zilla Parishad/Panchayat Samiti meetings.
- (4) How would you enthuse people in development works?
- (5) (a) Do you inspect on site, various works of the Zilla Parishad/Panchayat Samiti?

(b) How do you secure officers' co-operation?

- (6) Mention your days of touring.
- (7) State, in your opinion, the ways to improve the operational efficiency of the Zilla Parishad/Panchayat Samiti.

VI. Functional Administration

- (1) Note important achievements of the Zilla Perishad in the following fields: (a) Agriculture (b) Animal Husbandry (c) Minor irrigation (d) Co-operation (e) Small Scale Industries (f) Roads (g) Other Constructional activities (h) Education (i) Social Education (j) Health.
- (2) What were the shortcomings noticed in the implementation of the schemes of development in the following fields: (a) Agriculture (b) Animal Husbandry (c) Minor irrigation (d) Co-operation (e) Small Scale Industries (f) Roads (g) Other constructional activities (h) Education (i) Social Education (j) Health.
- (3) Note, with reasons, people's co-operation.
- (4) Explain the effective ways while solicitating popular co-operation.
- (5) Could the Scheduled Castes/Tribes population offer popular contribution and Shramdan in development works? If not, how the same could be increased?
- (6) To what extent the role of the officer is important in developmental activities?
- (7) Determinants of successful implementation of the schemes of development (Give list in order of
- importance): (a) Efforts of the Zilla Parishad/
- non-officials (c) Efficiency of the officer

(d) Effective and alert local representative (e) Co-operation from the people (f) Other.

- (8) Whether Zilla Parishads/Panchayat Samitis have any effective role in fixing the targets of various development schemes?
- (9) Do Zilla Parishad/Panchayat Samiti have any Five Year/Annual Plan of development?
- (10) State ways in your opinion to improve the efficiency in the administration of the schemes.
- (11) (a) Do you justify the post of a Planning Officer? Why?
 - (b) Mention ways to improve the role of the Planning Officer.

VII. Panchayati Raj Finances

- (1) What are the financial resources of Zilla Parishads/ Panchayat Samitis?
- (2) (a) Are these resources inadequate?

(b) How would you augment the same?

- (3) Do you suggest the case for 'increase in local cess'? Give reasons.
- (4) Whether government grants are received in time?
- (5) State ways to improve the financial arrangements to balance expenditure on infreasing developmental works.
- (6) Whether the present staff is surplus?
- (7) Do gram-panchayats receive government grant in time? If not, give reasons.

- (8) Have you any suggestions to offer for the implementation of the budget?
- (9) Do you agree with the strict and timely audit?
- (10) How would you avoid expenditure on unproductive works?
- (11) What are the ways to accelerate development works?
- (12) Suggest means to check the 'March fever'.
- (13) Access the impact of the officers' opinion in the budget decisions.

VIII. The Officials

- (1) Do you feel that a Parishad should control its Class I and Class II Officers?
- (2) How would you divide the executive powers between the Chief Executive Officer and the President of the
 - Zilla Parishad?
- (3) (a) Is there any effective co-ordination between the officials and the Chief Executive Officer?
 - (b) If not, state reasons and suggest means to effect that co-ordination.
- (4) Whether technical officers are free in the technical matters dealing with their subjects?
- (5) Who controls the staff of the Zilla Parishad?
- (6) Would you like to qualify the control exercised by the Zilla Parishad over its non-officials?
- (7) (a) Have you noticed any discontent among the staff of the Zilla Parishad?
 - (b) If so, note reasons of and state the ways to improve the situation.

- (8) Does a Block Development Officer effectively control the staff at the Panchayat Samiti level?
- (9) (a) Mention the provision for the orientation and the training courses.
 - (b) Whether training facilities are adequate? State difficulties experienced in conducting such courses.

IX. Gram Sevak

- (1) Are you satisfied with the performance of the Gram Sevak?
- (2) What are the shortcomings in his role?

X. Organizational Relations

- Note the extent of the executive and administrative powers transferred by the Parishad to the Panchayat Samitis.
- (2) Do you agree with the opinion that 'a Panchayat Samiti should be the agency of execution'?
- (3) (a) Does a Panchayat Samiti co-operate with the Zilla Parishad in its working?
 - (b) Is there any non-cooperation at the Zilla Parishad-Panchayat Samiti level on account of political and individual differences?
- (4) What is the organizational relation between a Zilla Parishad and a Panchayat Samiti?
- (5) (a) How a gram panchayat co-operates with the Zilla Parishad/Panchayat Samiti?

- (5) (b) Is there any non-cooperation at the Panchayat Samiti-Village Panchayat level on account of political and individual differences?
- (6) (a) Whether development is oriented according to the expressed will of a Gram Panchayat?
- (b) Do Village Panchayats co-operate in new development works? If not, state reasons.
 - (c) How would you enthuse gram panchayats for
 - development works?
- (7) Is Shramdan 'a myth'?
- (8) Does development centre round the village panchayats of the members of the Panchayat Samiti?
 - (9) (a) Do gram-sabhas function effectively?
 - (b) What are the hindrances in its effective

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functioning?

- (10) Should municipal areas be represented on the Zilla Parishad body? Give reasons.
- XI. Development and Local Functions

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- (1) What is the role played by a Zilla Parishad in local area planning?
- (2) Do Zilla Parishads experience difficulties in dove-
- Local Government?
- (3) State the share of the Parishad's 'Own Income' in the total financial resources of the Zilla Parishad.
- (4) Do you feel that the Zilla Parishad is adequately

- (2) Whether the budget and other reports are discussed in details in the party meetings? Are the discussions instructive?
- (3) Do party leaders at the district/State level guide such meetings?
- (4) Does the guardian minister of the district serve any useful purpose? If so, in what ways?
- (5) Whether the opposition is duly regarded while a subject is under discussion?
- (6) To what extent the opposition does influence the decision-making process?

XIV. The Collector

- (1) In what ways the Collector is associated with the Zilla Parishad?
- (2) Would you advocate an ex-officio membership for the Collector?

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XV. General Reflections

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