

PROBLEMS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

I. A BASIC CONDITION OF INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION: FREEDOM OF OPINION AND PRESS

COUNT CARLO SFORZA
New York City

II. UNIVERSALISM VERSUS REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

PITMAN B. POTTER
Oberlin College

III. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS BETWEEN AN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF NATIONAL STATES

ARNOLD BRECHT
New School for Social Research

IV. INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION: LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

EGON RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER
The American University

V. RECONSTRUCTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE

DINKO TOMAŠIĆ
Indiana University

VI. SMALL STATES AND A NEW LEAGUE, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF NORWAY

EDVARD HAMBRO
Norwegian Foreign Office, London, England

VII. THE FUTURE OF WESTERN DEPENDENCIES IN SOUTH EASTERN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

LENNOX A. MILLS
University of Minnesota

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: PROBLEMS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

A BASIC CONDITION OF INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION: FREEDOM OF OPINION AND PRESS

COUNT CARLO SFORZA

New York City

I

Distinguished American and foreign scholars are studying in this symposium various aspects of the weighty problem of international reconstruction. All of the other writers have chosen problems that are essentially political, and on that account it has seemed to me appropriate that I discuss a topic of a more broadly moral nature, i.e., the issue of freedom of opinion and press in the world of tomorrow. The fact that I have spent my life in diplomacy and politics may make up for my lack of personal importance if I can demonstrate that cynics and profiteers will prevail in politics unless we comprehend that in any sphere of international relations only those solutions will be adequate that are grounded upon the most complete security of opinion and press.

II

Exiled pretenders to thrones nearly always exhibit a liberalism both promising and reassuring. But this was not true in the case of Prince Victor-Napoleon, whom I knew quite well because of his ties with Italy—ties that consisted more in his vast estates in the Po valley than in his dynastic alliances. Faithful to the princely rule according to which the son has to affect views different from those of his father, Prince Victor was a dyed-in-the-wool conservative. His father had acquired a well-known reputation for liberalism (or even Jacobinism?) during the Second Empire—and afterwards. But Prince Victor-Napoleon had assumed the habit of speaking to me in frankness. And I did not doubt for a moment his sincerity on that evening when, listening under plane trees to an open air concert in Constantinople, he made the following remark on the founder of his family: "There is one thing about the Emperor (like all the Bonapartes, he said "Emperor" only when referring to the first; the one of December 2, he called Napoleon III) which is more inexplicable to me than anything else: that with his wonderful perspicacity, with his mistrust of men, whether flatterers or not, he should have attributed so much importance, at a certain moment, to the manifestation of lyrical enthusiasm of which he read summaries. Had he forgotten that newspapers, prefects, orators, and poets spoke on command—on his own

command? For my part," continued Prince Victor, "I have no doubt whatsoever that if the *Débats*, for example, had remained the *Débats* instead of being reduced to the *Journal de l'Empire*, the two or three capital mistakes of the Emperor could have been avoided."

It is, above all, his ideas about the press that characterize Napoleon among the dictators of the past, and make him most resemble the Hitler's and Mussolini's. Before him, and for two generations after him, the absolute governments of the old type muzzled the press with an official censorship honestly admitted. Imperial Austria had thus acted in Italy from 1816 to 1859. Napoleon, precursor of what one sees in Fascism in half of Europe, invented something better when he wrote to Fouché: "I do not believe in having only one newspaper, but I should like to have an organization without censorship, because I do not wish to be responsible for everything they might say. I desire that the staff of the retained newspapers be devoted men who have enough sense not to publish news contrary to the nation. The attitude of these newspapers would have to be managed in such a way as to attack England in her customs, usages, her literature, her Constitution. . . ."

As one can see from this, even the imposed hatreds were already totalitarian. Everything English had to be abominated, even English literature. This may perhaps be the reason why Napoleon liked among the English writers, in fact, only one false author: Ossian and his poetry.

Examining the Napoleonic adventure in the light of what the totalitarian régimes have forced us to see in our own days, we realize much better than the Michelet's and Hugo's one thing: what disaster it was for France and for her master, as well as for world peace, that the period of the Consulate and Empire completely lacked freedom of opinion, so that even a Chateaubriand was suspected as a precursor of the "Reds" of Neville Chamberlain's era.

Every day, Napoleon found enough time to glance through the Parisian newspapers which were placed on a corner of his desk in his study in the Tuilleries. These papers also included a *Corriere d'Italia*, about which Napoleon asked one day how it could be sent into Italy to fool the Italians just as the French sheets troubled and tricked the French. This "realistic" genius had his naïvetés: to believe that a journal edited a thousand miles on the other side of the Alps would meet the needs of a people in whose environment it was neither written nor planned. Napoleon read the newspapers only in order to watch whether they had a good influence "on the public spirit in relation to political opinions," as he wrote to Ripault, his personal librarian. He never considered that it might be useful for him to hear there the echo of the hopes, needs, and anxieties of his subjects.

"I intend that the newspapers serve the Government, and be not against it" (sic), he once wrote to Fouché. As his distant descendant,

Victor-Napoleon recognized in a conversation with me in exile, it is possible that the newspapers of the Empire believed they were "serving the government." But it is certain that with their baseness and flattery they betrayed the supreme interests of France which, then as now, were those of European peace. One day—too late alas—the same thing will be said of those Italian sheets which for years preached, as an infallible recipe for the greatness of their country, the hatred of a people so close to them as the French.

Later on, at St. Helena, Napoleon dictated the following words, when speaking of public opinion: "It is an invisible and mysterious power which nothing can resist; nothing is more mobile, more vague, and stronger; and however capricious it may be, it is nevertheless true, reasonable, and just more often than one thinks." As a statement, this is very precise, but it has no value in justifying the honor of the man who spoke in this way. The cemeteries of the history of political literature are full of declarations of statesmen who, when removed from power forever, show a perspicacity and generosity of which they never exhibited (other than by empty words) the slightest proof as long as they could have acted otherwise.

Let us look at the tragedy of 1914. Those who knew well imperial Austria and the two castes that ruled her, the feudal and the bureaucratic, will readily admit that the absolute lack of a free public opinion in Austria and, to a lesser extent in Hungary, was one of the main conditions that made possible, with the declaration of war on Serbia, the outbreak of the European conflagration. The rulers of Austria did their job: in proclaiming their intention of safeguarding the secular character of the Empire—perhaps without realizing that they thought only of themselves—the feudal caste protected its fiefs and *majorats*, while the bureaucratic caste looked after its positions and monopolies. From the moment when European war seemed inevitable, these groups could have been stopped only by the pressure of public opinion—opinion of millions of men and women who did not feel the slightest hatred toward their Slav neighbors. But what could these men do, what did they know, destined as they were to perish in the Carpathians and Alps if the great war came? No paper, not one, had informed and enlightened them. There was, to be sure, in Austria, as in Germany, an apparently advanced degree of freedom of the press. But this freedom was never practiced in the domain reserved for the rulers—foreign policy. The word with which the Austrian press, even on the Left, used to designate the circles who decided on peace and war was revealing: *die massgebenden Kreise*—"the circles which lead us." If there had existed in the Habsburg Empire free and independent voices as in England, France, and Italy, instead of the *Zeit*, *Neue Freie Presse*, and even *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, so respectful of the powerful despite its Marxist creed, the great crime would perhaps have been avoided.

With regard to the responsibility of the Austrian rulers in 1914, I have related elsewhere how the Vienna government made pressing and secret inquiries of the Rome cabinet as early as August, 1913, in order to obtain its consent to an immediate war against Serbia without the slightest pretext. These representations prove that the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo a year later was only a fortunate occasion for the rulers of Austria. The Italian Prime Minister Giolitti told me, late in life, of his indignant protest against the Austrian project, and added: "I should certainly never have made myself an accomplice of such a crime, in spite of all the advantages which our ally of the Triple Alliance dangled before my eyes. But on an occasion such as that I was happy to think that anyone would have had to conduct himself in the same way, if only for fear of public opinion. In a case of this sort, one realizes that a free press like the Italian compensates for all the little troubles that it provokes, and which we ministers complain about in the course of our daily administration."

In 1939, the first cannon shots, the first sinkings of neutral ships, the first bombardments of open cities in Poland and Finland, were preceded by a long undeclared war cunningly carried on in France and England under the cover of an ideological campaign. It was a peace-time war in which the fear of Communism—which can be combatted only by liberty—misled even Frenchmen, who on any other occasion would have been horrified at the idea of collaboration with those who had only one supreme aim: to destroy France. However, these wars of interest-ridden ideologies have nothing in common with the free clashes of ideas, and are, in fact, their antithesis. The struggle of ideologies, as the totalitarian régimes have carried it to the point of monstrously technical perfection, is only one of the first acts of the war of bombs and gas in which the horrible face of Gorgon is covered by the equally repugnant mask of the *agent provocateur*, the traitor.

Quite different is the form which the conflict of opinions can take in the interest of peace, in an atmosphere of liberty, even for an action which a government may prepare in secrecy. I shall cite a technical illustration.

In diplomatic negotiations, one of the most common errors is to see only the cause of one's own government. This may produce no trouble if the disputes are of a kind not to inflame opinions: delimitation of frontiers in distant colonies, navigation or labor conventions, etc. But as soon as psychological elements are involved, one must never forget the sentiments of the people who, mute or not, stand behind the governments that negotiate. The perfect treaty is one in which the reasons of discontent have been halved in two nearly equal parts. Such a treaty has assurance of enduring. To be even more certain of its duration, one has to be willing to have the public opinion of both countries brought to

bear upon its origin and importance in an extensive and unhampered manner. Understanding is nearly tantamount to approval.

May I be permitted to cite here a recollection of diplomatic negotiations which I directed? In at least two discussions with Eastern European governments, I had arrived finally at the point where I was sure that all my demands would be met. Being isolated, these governments had to give in to the will of Italy. In that very moment—and not a minute sooner—I let it be known outside of the normal diplomatic channels that on the point at issue I was prepared to reduce the scope of my demands, but under a condition which I communicated solely to the head of the government with which I negotiated: that the principal newspapers of his country should explain in articles not officially inspired that the demands of Italy were just, and that it was honorable, dignified, and in the long run profitable, to satisfy them. Italy had no cause for complaint of that method; in certain countries, its results have long been felt. Naturally, in order to do that, one has to be the opposite of a demagogical dictator feverishly in search of the slightest success. One has, in a word, to think more of one's country than of one's self, and one must never forget what incomparable value the slow and sure development of free public opinion can have for the future of the relations between two countries, in view of the sterility of old hatreds and suspicions.

Let us imagine for a moment what the psychological and diplomatic labors of the birth and growth of the Franco-British *Entente Cordiale* would have amounted to if the two countries had not possessed a free and powerful press upon which to rely. The efforts of a Lansdowne and a Delcassé, of a Paul Cambon and a Crowe, would have been frustrated for a long time by the barriers of old words of the Napoleonic period against "perfidie Albion" on the one side, and by Puritan and insular prejudices of so many average Englishmen of that time on the other side.

Likewise, when Visconti-Venosta and Prinetti, Barrère, and Tornielli worked with so much loyalty to dissipate the old misunderstandings between France and Italy, what could they have achieved, other than some meager diplomatic convention, if great newspapers like the *Corriere della Sera*, the moral independence of which was held up as an example all over the world, had not considered it their sacred duty to work for the restoration of a friendly understanding between the two countries?

I have mentioned the *Corriere della Sera*, and I have not exaggerated. In 1927, the need of living in freedom compelled me to accept invitations from great American universities and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The famous Ochs, who had raised the *New York Times* to such a high degree of technical perfection and international reputation, found himself once obliged to address a little speech to me at a journal-

ists' dinner offered me in New York. After the habitual and obligatory compliments, he said: "What I salute in you is the collaborator of the *Corriere della Sera* and what it has represented in Italy and in the whole world: a newspaper which constituted, until it was taken away from your friend Albertini by force, one of the most amazing achievements of our time, based on an integrity which honored our profession in the whole world."

I have told this anecdote because I should like to add something. Certain French political writers are in no doubt about the bad service they render to France—as to truth—when they insinuate that the re-establishment of friendship, and even trust, between their country and Italy, after the stormy period of Crispi, was facilitated by the "shower of gold" which Ambassador Barrère poured into the Italian press. The press of free Italy was one of the most honest in the world. Prince Bulow found this out only too well when, early in 1915, he could bribe, in spite of immense funds put at his disposal by Berlin, only some poor sheets which no one read, and which were read even less when they accommodated themselves to a Germanophile tendency. One has to look on a higher and healthier plane for the services which a diplomat like Barrère rendered to the cause of France in Italy. If he was able to defend so well the cause of France during the twenty years of his fruitful ambassadorship in the Farnese Palace, it was only because he loved, understood, and respected the free Italian atmosphere.

The free public opinion of a country constitutes the happiest force for a statesman if he succeeds in gaining the confidence of his people. During his years of struggle against Austria, then the strongest power on the Continent, Cavour used to say: "I never feel as sure as when Parliament is open." But—that was Cavour.

A new phenomenon has appeared in the Europe which is divided into the two closed worlds of freedom and totalitarianism, a phenomenon which did not exist when the place of the totalitarian régimes was held by the absolute monarchies. The latter could have all the defects in the world; but they were what they were, and proud of it. They had contempt for the criticisms as well as the eulogies coming from public opinion ruled by that "satanical license called liberty," as one of their authors, Donoso Cortés wrote. The contrary is true of the totalitarian régimes. Notwithstanding their territorial conquests and in spite of the fear which they inspire, they are most concerned about what the rest of the world thinks of them. The avalanche of corrupters and traitors which Fascism and the Third Reich created in, and despatched to, England and France in 1937-40 was mainly aimed, to be sure, at deceiving the two nations, and at sowing discord between them, especially in the direction of France. However, another element was involved—a passionate interest in being able

to provoke a few lines of praise in a genuinely free French or English publication. No régime is more sensitive to the opinion of free countries than is a dictatorship. In attaching so much importance to foreign judgments, the dictatorships merely evidence a natural fact: every political enterprise feels confident of itself only when it believes itself to have the support of a large and free public opinion. In the interior of the dictatorial prison, no opinion will be considered as free by anyone; therefore the eagerness for judgments from the outside—the only ones of any value. It would almost be touching and pathetic, if it were not humiliating from a national point of view, to see how régimes which keep on repeating *ad infinitum* the words "empire" and "imperial" seize upon the pettiest shred of praise uttered by a tourist from Denmark or Guatemala, and require its complete reproduction by their press. The chiefs of a totalitarian régime know full well that praise, spontaneous though from afar—and also paid for, as meagerly as possible—is worth more than the daily orchestra of a great yet enslaved press.

Here again, Napoleon has become timely because of methods bearing analogy to those of the totalitarians of today. Like them, Napoleon wanted to make believe that there was no censorship under his régime. In January, 1806, he had the following published in the *Moniteur*: "There is no censorship in France. Freedom of the press is the first conquest of the century. The Emperor wishes it to be preserved." In reality, he censored not only the papers, but even their names. One day he wrote to one of his underlings: "*Journal des Débats*, *Lois du pouvoir exécutif*, *Actes du Gouvernement* are names too reminiscent of the Revolution. The *Gazette de France* is an excellent name; that of *Journal de Paris* is also acceptable . . ." Napoleon never ceased writing virulent letters to his ministers of police, complaining about the "stupid newspapers" whose editors and writers were all, in his opinion, "quite imbecile" or "too stupid." In all probability, they were not so stupid; yet what could they do when they were receiving, one after another, admonitions of this kind? For Rome: "Not to speak of it in either good or bad terms." For Poland: "Never to mention the word Poland." It never occurred to Napoleon that if his newspapers were imbecile, it was he who made them so.

The totalitarians have had an advantage which Napoleon lacked. For the papers of enemy countries, he always remained "the ogre of Corsica." Those among the totalitarians, on the other hand, who have made themselves appear to be fighters against Bolshevism have succeeded in capturing strong sympathies among the possessing classes of all countries. The grave errors which these classes committed was the failure to understand that Bolshevism can be fought effectively only by its antithesis: freedom.

Before turning to what freedom of opinion and press could accomplish

in the Europe of tomorrow, I should like to say a word about a complaint often lodged against the press, even in circles attached to liberty. It is a pity, one often hears, that the press hinders and compromises, through its indiscretions, important diplomatic negotiations.

In 1918, too much was said about open diplomacy. The aims of a foreign policy must be clear, and clearly discussed. But it is in the interest of peace and understanding among nations that diplomatic transactions retain as long as possible—while negotiations are being carried on—a confidential character. This, and this alone, prevents points of honor and sterile questions of prestige from being raised every moment.

The same is true of the internal policy of parties. The most crystalline of American statesmen of the great Revolutionary period, Jefferson, admitted it candidly when he wrote: "We desire to go faster, but we mark our steps in order not to separate ourselves from our more timorous colleagues; this harmony of the ardent and the prudent permits us to preserve a united and compact mass."

All this is not useful and true unless the ardent as well as the timorous newspapers continue to say all they think and all they know. Their business is to inform; they have to perform it. When a statesman declares that he cannot divulge all as yet, his past speaks for him; and one has, or has not, confidence in him. A newspaper that keeps silent makes believe that nothing exists which it does not mention. It deceives.

One of the most charming inventions of the optimistic eighteenth century was that of a wise and philosophical China, a model held up to our crude régimes of the West. One of the Chinese legends of the literary France of Voltaire had it that the great public officials of the Middle Kingdom were divided into two classes: the Mandarins who *sign* and the Mandarins who *think*. Changing slightly the names of the two classes, there would be no harm—it might even be very advantageous—in having at the side of the Mandarins who *decide* the Mandarins who *stimulate thinking*, i.e., writers and free journalists, as their recognized honest and valuable collaborators.

This collaboration of free and widespread discussion with the work of those who will have to reconstitute a Europe less anarchical than that which rendered possible two atrocious wars from 1914 to 1939 seems to me the more necessary as the lack of comprehension among peoples will have increased.

Even before the two wars, even before the totalitarian dictatorships, ditches had been dug between the peoples, one doubted at times the driving forces behind the material progress in the nineteenth century. Why had the abysses between the nationalities been less profound throughout the period of Christianity, in so far as this word had a living meaning, than in our own days? Is it possible that press and radio, apparently

bringing the peoples closer together, have made them more conscious of their differences? To be sure, words are like pieces of silver; their value changes beyond the frontiers. A man in public life, if spoken of sympathetically in London, is called "distinguished," while in Paris he is referred to as being "*éminent*." How do we know that it is the same thing? And how know what is the same in the exuberant description of a Provençal or Neapolitan and in the four words of a Picard or a Piedmontese? How know that the circumspect "perhaps" of a Quaker pledges him more than the "certainly" of a Marseillais? And how realize, e.g., in Germany, that a calm and serene speech which a French government broadcasts over the radio from its office to its countrymen contains more far-reaching decision than the violent shouting of Hitler before ten thousand young Nazis in hysterical trance? The question may be raised whether all these differences spread by the radios of the whole world do not enhance the mutual incomprehensions of one country toward another.

Fortunately, however, the problem of radio is infinitely less vital and decisive than that of the press and its freedom. The camel-driver who removes a piece of paper from the path along which his caravan is about to pass, fearing that it may carry the imprint of a word of divine wisdom, seems to me to be nearer human perfectibility than the technicians of genius who have invented so many marvelous gadgets for the elimination of distance. It is true that innate and subtle journalists like Wickham Steed have confessed to intellectual joy when speaking over the radio, as well as to confidence in its beneficial influence. But the opinion of the humble seems to be better proof in this case than that of the talented. In Italy and France, for example,—in contrast to the United States—people listen to the radio only in moments of grave tension in order to get the real "news"; they have no use for the commentaries, and say: "One cannot reflect about it yet." This response recalls the reply of a major poet, Manzoni, to a question about the essence of genius: "*Pensarci su*,"—think about it—was the answer of the author of *Promessi Sposi*. No, the radio—precious for news, pernicious for false news—does not seem to me to have the ability of acquiring a real force in creating currents of ideas. It has all the defects of eloquence as compared with thought, without the enthralling fascination which direct eloquence can exercise over the masses.

Only the action of a free press can deeply impress the mind. Only the action of the written word will constitute an essential problem of the peace of tomorrow. Since freedom of opinion is one of the surest safeguards of peace, how guarantee it, how organize it?

This problem would have imposed itself as one of the most pressing upon the moral future of Europe even without the war which Germany has let loose against the world. The proof of the weakness or shortsighted-

ness of the democratic governments after Versailles is that they did not realize it. After what the Russian Marxists call "technological progress"—aviation, radio, communications on land, mass production—one thing is certain: that our political institutions have all become desperately archaic; that they need a complete remaking; and that it matters little whether this remaking will entail sacrificing some dogmas of ancient economic liberalism. What matters above all is that a new economic life, socialized or not, destroy not individual liberty, the Rights of Man. The results of the divorce of inventions and human reason can well be seen in Germany. Technology can supply the masters of Germany with new weapons against the West. However, we clearly are aware that any scientific or moral thinking is dead there; that we are faced with savages who know how to organize laboratories of poison gas and magnetic mines.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the declaration of the Rights of Man appeared as a supreme necessity of defense against some Tories in the United States and some nobles in France. The protection of these rights will be even more imperative tomorrow—if the war is going to end at all in time not to make us fear for the survival of *homo sapiens*. The states or federations of states which will have to continue, after the war, the defense of European civilization will have grown very strong, with their social and economic organizations embracing all branches of life. Only the certainty of free individualist criticism will remove the danger of a society as stupefying as the Fascist or Nazi adventures—even if more normal and less corrupting.

How obtain and safeguard the necessary guarantees of freedom of opinion in the world of tomorrow? Nothing would be as easy as to draw up plans divided into articles and paragraphs; for nothing is easier to write than a constitution. But the game would be in vain. Human liberty is a constant experience of relative values—work renewed in each generation in order to assure, on the one hand, the life of a state worthy of that name, and in order to guarantee the citizens, on the other hand, full autonomy and expression of thought. "The liberty of our sentiments," Benedetto Croce writes, "and of the truths we think, our faith and our ideals—this is our work for the state; this is liberty. The belief that this liberty does not serve the state is equivalent to the supposition that the blood which circulates in our veins is in illegal agitation against the calm sovereign of our organism."¹

III

Lord Balfour once declared that English free institutions and the individual liberty which they defend are the "life-blood" of the British Empire. If he could have seen what happened in the post-war totalitarian

¹ Croce, *Orientamenti* (Milan, 1935), p. 15.

régimes, he would have asserted that free opinion and a free press are at least as necessary as the formal respect for the desires of a parliament. In the first years of Fascism in Italy, one could believe that certain liberties still persisted. Some of us, for example, expressed very severe criticisms in addresses before the houses of Parliament. Why were we allowed to speak? Because the press had been muzzled, and even Parliament becomes an organ without life if the press is not there, conscious of its duties and free in its means of polemic. "Conscious of its duties," I just said. Wickham Steed remarks with complete justice in his book, *The Press*, that the sins of omission of the press can be as grave as the active sins. For them, too, the famous passage of the Anglican confession holds true: "We have done that which we ought not to have done, and have left undone that which we ought to have done; and there is no health in us."

European civilization is on the rim of an abyss. What has happened in Germany, in Russia, and in the countries in which a millenary humanistic refinement seemed to be fused with the very essence of the people, proves that the signs of the Christian transformation are, more than was assumed, only skin-deep. If literature and the newspapers should have to speak only on orders, the long night of the period of Attila would probably fall quite rapidly over Europe. By contrast, it suffices that literature and newspapers live, although, as often, in an environment fraught with difficulties; for there can be no true written political thought which is against the democracies and against peace. The rare intellectuals who put themselves at the service of adventurers of war and of hatred know well, deep in their hearts that they sign their death warrants. Only the freedom of opinion and press can save human liberty and safeguard the peace of tomorrow.

As to the European union after the war, all the plans that one reads, particularly in the English press, leave one skeptical. How can one help smiling when Hellenists and novelists—though famous—carry on their battles, *more anglio*, in letters to the *Times* in order to establish whether Germany should, or should not, be admitted into the new "federal union"; and even a Germany under the dictatorship of the old military caste which would guarantee a new "moral order," cooked up *à la prussienne*? Other voices repeat the half-hypocritical and half-cowardly phrase heard before the fourth division of Poland: "After all, the peoples have the right to choose the régime which they prefer," shutting their eyes, of course, to the fact that these régimes were established everywhere by force. It is, in fact, *Martine* in Molière who would enter the domain of public law with her famous words: "And if I like to be beaten?"

On the morrow of the last war, the Covenant dared to declare that the League of Nations could only be an association of nations "which govern themselves freely." However, the interpreters of the Pact, quickly re-

penting such audacity, soon reduced the initial formula to nothing. The results could be seen; the pitiable history of the League of Nations, as it vegetated in Geneva, is nothing but a history of the intrigues and betrayals by the dictatorial states remaining in the League for one purpose alone—to ridicule it first, and kill it later. But we must realize that technically it is not easy to say what is a free régime. Hitler and other dictators have boasted of impressive plebiscites. Unhappy Poland never ceased to possess a parliament, even when the gang of “colonels” in power ruled the country contrary to the will and the interests of the entire nation—which pays today, under the insolent yoke of the Germans, for the error or weakness of not having revolted against a régime of corruption, incompetence, and, essentially, treason. The proof to be asked of régimes which tomorrow will have interest—be it even only economic—in joining a union of free peoples in Europe can only be this: absolute liberty of the press, and circulation, without limitation or censorship, of foreign newspapers. Whoever has seen in Italy and Germany, as I have seen, the feverish search, defying all sorts of threats and dangers, for free and documented newspapers from London or Paris, from Toulouse or Basle, knows what this means. Whatever it be, a régime in which a free press can live and circulate is a régime which does not compromise nor debase human dignity.

IV

The pass-word for entrance into the world of the future, which will no longer be anarchical but strongly organized, will have to be found on this path. There, too, reasons for hope may be found even for countries in which freedom has least historical rootage, e.g., Germany. May I be permitted to close with an optimistic argument drawn from the American “melting pot?”

The proof that everything comes from education, and nothing from “race,” is provided by the numerous Christian sects, mostly of German origin, which proclaim the doctrine of non-resistance. Mennonites, New Mennonites, Dunkers, Brethren in Christ, Briuserites, Yorkers, Amish—all descend from the old Anabaptists of the Rhine shores: largely German, though to some extent of Swiss and Dutch origin. All sing the same German hymns, and in spite of differences about the form of baptism, or whether to have churches or not, all believe in non-resistance. Even today, if one of our automobiles damages, in Lancaster county, the cart of an Amish farmer, he will refuse to demand an indemnity. It was a Pennsylvania group of German origin which formulated the following declaration of faith on March 21, 1917, in the middle of a war unleashed by the Vaterland: “We believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,” and after four other “We believe’s” the following: “We believe in the non-conformity of the world, and in the doctrine of non-resistance in a qualified sense; that it is

not the Christian's privilege to take up the sword or fight with carnal weapons . . . "

The Germans of Pennsylvania were transformed by freedom.

Liberty alone—including the first of the liberties, that of opinion and press—will be able to make an end of the pretexts of war and of race hatreds in this world.

UNIVERSALISM VERSUS REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

PITMAN B. POTTER

Oberlin College

One of the issues likely to become more acute than many others as we move into the period of post-war international reorganization in the next few months is that of regionalism versus universalism. This is the conflict between the view that international organization should proceed upon a regional basis—leaving definition of the proper region or regions aside for the moment—and the view that it should proceed upon a world-wide basis. The partisans of these two views are vigorous in their support, and the problem in itself is extremely important from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint. It has so far not received anything like the attention it deserves.¹

The problem is, of course, not unknown in the national and local spheres of government.² Here it is formulated as the question of the proper area of government, or even the ideal size of the state, and this slightly different formulation carries its own implication concerning the treatment of the problem. The issue also arises on the border-line between national and international political problems when the formation of federal unions is

¹ There is no good comprehensive monographic study of regionalism in English. A monumental doctoral thesis on *Regionalism in Relation to the League of Nations*, by Robert Blum, written in 1936, lies in manuscript in the library of the University of California, and a somewhat more limited manuscript on *Regional Understandings*, written by Miss Bessie Randolph, and dated 1926, is in the Harvard Library. Probably the best fragmentary treatment of the subject is to be found in Dr. E. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *Victory Is Not Enough* (New York, 1942), pp. 185, 283-91. See also A. Brecht, "Limited-Purpose Federations," *Social Research*, Vol. X, No. 2 (May, 1943), p. 135. In French, see J. R. de Orús y Arregú, "Le Régionalisme dans l'Organisation Internationale," in *Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours*, Vol. 53 (Paris, 1936), p. 1.

Brief notice of the question is taken by the present writer in *Which Way America?*, University of Wisconsin symposium on post-war planning and adjustment, to be published during the coming winter. He has drawn on that discussion for various elements incorporated herein. He would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer for very useful criticism of the present article in draft form.

² J. W. Garner, *Political Science and Government* (New York, 1928), p. 77.

under consideration, together with the question of the proper allocation of powers to the central government. We shall later draw upon experience in all of these matters for aid in solving our own problem.

The formulation of the problem indicated in the title of this paper itself involves a slight exaggeration and a slight distortion. It is not absolutely necessary that the two ideas of regionalism and universalism should clash or come into sharp conflict. Their reconciliation constitutes the main task of this paper, however, and must be postponed for the moment. It is certainly true, moreover, that in current discussion the two doctrines usually are put forward by their advocates as though they were rival and irreconcilable principles. Just how far this is the case will appear later.

The universalist picture of international organization seems, at first glance, to be in part a result of hasty, superficial, and to some extent sentimental reactions. International coöperation, and even institutional organization, is needed today, and there are national states all over the world. From this combination of facts it is instinctively concluded that world-wide international organization is needed. Sometimes to this oversimplified reasoning is added a sentimental or emotional impulse which is just as hasty in its operation and far more urgent. In its inception, the universal view is uncritical and somewhat arbitrary.

The regionalist view pretends to great realism and hard common sense.³ Territorial propinquity counts for a great deal in interstate relations, interstate coöperation, and interstate organization. States and peoples living at great distances from one another—often, as a result of this factor, of different race, religion, economic conditions, and general culture patterns—cannot understand or appreciate one another properly. They cannot, even if they could summon up sufficient perception or imagination for this feat, act effectively at great distances from their home bases. For these two reasons above all others, the regionalist opposes a superficial and ineffective universalism.

The regionalist criticism of superficial universalism is salutary. The idea that all nations, just because they are independent, are substantially alike is, of course, pitifully naive. The rather artificial and abstract internationalism of the pacifist and (strange combination) the lawyer has long merited correction on realistic grounds. A similar correction might seem to be overdue for those who likewise try to over-simplify the international scene on ideological lines: it is not clear that "democracy" means the same thing in Iowa, Yorkshire, Moscow, and Szechuan.

On the other hand, the regionalist is not without his little naivetés also. States and peoples are not necessarily alike because they live next to one another, and though the regionalist doctrine could make room for this fact,

³ Ranshofen-Wertheimer, pp. 283-284,

the regionalist advocate too often overlooks it. Just as two or more nations widely separated on the surface of the globe may, as a result of special circumstances—and in this increasingly small world such exceptions may be all the more important—have very similar interests. Not all of the oversimplifying and superficial theorizing is on one side in this controversy.

It is time, however, for an attempt at greater precision and analysis before we press the principle of regionalism any further. Just exactly what is involved in this (today) very popular concept?

The basic idea of the regionalist is that the conditions obtaining in any particular area on the earth's surface tend to give to the nations located there a certain community of interest. The geometrical element in this conception should not be pressed too hard: we must not think precisely of conditions round about any certain definite point on the earth's surface, and we must admit that the extent of the area in question may vary. Nevertheless, the regionalist aspect of the general geo-political philosophy or doctrine is reasonably clear. And—the doctrine continues—community of interests leads, and should lead, to distinct and separate international organization.

One must admit that, within limits, this view is reasonably sound. To the above principle, there can be little or no demurrer. The value of regional or area studies in the field of international relations has long been recognized and is being justly exploited today by many groups studying both immediate and long-run post-war problems. So far, so good.

It is, however, entirely legitimate to ask the regionalist how big a region he is talking about. Without pressing the matter unreasonably, we may still point out that there must be some limits to a region if it is not in turn going to become the whole world again. And are considerations of mere distance, or considerations of topography, or cultural considerations (including railroad, steamship, aerial, electrical, etc., communications) going to be taken into account? Or is the matter wholly subjective, so that a "region" is whatever area the peoples living in a given part of the world like to think is a region? The latter test is dangerously vague, the objective tests are virtually non-existent.

It may, perhaps, be interpolated here that even if the regionalist has, as he does have, a good deal of hard fact to back him up, he is, in so far as he opposes wider international union, the exponent of a view or a mental attitude which is fading out rather than becoming more intense, and which is bound to fade more and more with every passing year. With the development of transportation and communications in modern times, the basis for medieval particularism has been largely swept away. The same developments tomorrow are likely to destroy both the objective and the subjective grounds for regionalism still existing today. The improvements recently made in the science and art of public administration count

in the same direction. As a matter of fact, regionalism is but one aspect of the general attitude which at its extreme fringe is isolationism, and is being overtaken gradually by the same fate which is in course of overwhelming that aberration. It is also a mild form of anarchism or flight from order and unity, although some regionalists feel that stronger and more effective international organization can be had on a regional than on a universal basis.⁴ The regionalist again seems to some extent, or in one special context, to be engaged in a vain effort to turn the clock back.

Of course we should remember how the situation appears from the nationalist, rather than the internationalist, viewpoint. From the nationalist viewpoint, regionalism is progress, and difficult progress, made at a considerable cost. It would constitute a distinct advance for nationalistic Europe. It would constitute a victory over an often strong xenophobia—which attitude, with reference to the rest of the world, regionalism seems to the outsider to manifest. It is also open to the regionalist to point out that close regional union is a more exacting thing than a loose or thin universalism, just as it is much easier to like, or at least tolerate, strangers at a distance than close by. And if medieval particularism was altered by developments in the direction of national unity, these developments constituted also modifications of medieval universalism, such as it was, for good or for bad.

Before considering some details of the problem of regionalism, however, it should be recalled that the answer to be given to that problem may turn to some degree upon whether we are discussing the so-called political aspects of international relations or the so-called non-political aspects. This distinction is far from a clear-cut one, and most treacherous in many ways,⁵ but we may for the moment assume that the distinction is valid and that, for example, in the former category go such questions as disarmament and security, in the latter such matters as health and communications. Now it is probably true that most of the arguments in favor of regionalism originated with those—students or politicians—who were thinking of political questions, and, presumably, trying to reduce their responsibilities for action at some distant point of the compass. On the other hand, some of the most vigorous champions of regionalism today are preoccupied largely, or even mainly, with social problems, or at least economic problems of one sort or another.⁶

The fact seems to be that the very treacherous distinction alluded to helps but slightly toward a solution of the present problem. The distinc-

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ "Note on the Distinction between Political and Technical Questions," in *Polit. Sci. Quar.*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (June, 1935), p. 264.

⁶ J. Hostie, "Communications and Transit," in Institute on World Organization, *World Organization* (Washington, 1942), p. 158.

tion itself is largely unreliable: so-called political problems (e.g., armaments) are increasingly technical today, and so-called non-political questions (e.g., health) retain so much of the element of state policy, discretion, and choice of values that the results are not very different. If by non-political is meant a branch of subject-matter from which the political element has been extracted (which has been "de-politicalized," as this writer called it over twenty years ago)⁷ by agreement on principle and procedure, then there is much to be said in behalf of the analysis. The result counts at least as heavily, however, on the side of universalism as on the side of regionalism: when subjects are so treated, they can all the more readily be handled on a world basis. We shall not need to pay further attention to the political versus non-political distinction in this discussion, and certainly we shall not hesitate to refer to experience and evidence on the "non-political" side as a basis for conclusions concerning the issue in general.

Returning to the concrete geological or geographical aspect of the matter, however, it should be noted that an international organization—a union of states and its organs or agencies—may be "regional" in any one of a number of different senses. It may be regional in membership; it may be regional in its area of operations; or it may be regional in its significance. These elements may overlap, but they may also diverge or even seem to conflict. The union of Central American states, while it lasted, was regional in all three senses and not much more, except as other American states were interested in seeing peace and prosperity maintained in Central America. The union supporting the International Wine Office includes only states of Europe and North Africa, but the scope of its activities is world-wide. The League of Nations was world-wide in membership, but in many matters (e.g., Danzig and the Saar) it acted very locally, although, in turn, these activities had world-wide political interest. It is absolutely impossible to overlook the multiple permutations and combinations possible among these various phases of the matter, and the regionalist must be prepared to say what he means when he advocates regionalism. Of course he usually means regional membership and assumes that this implies, of necessity, regional operation and regional significance. This is by no means the case, however, and the common mistake of local minorities—overlooking the interests of the community as a whole—ought not to be tolerated here any more than elsewhere.

A still further refinement of the problem calls for notice. At times, the term region (or regional) is used to refer to a group of countries widely scattered over the face of the earth, such as the British Commonwealth.⁸

⁷ P. B. Potter, *Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (1st ed., New York, 1922), p. 283.

⁸ E. Culbertson, *World Federation Plan* (New York, 1942), p. 24.

In other cases, individual states are missing from a regional grouping: Canada is, in general, not part of the Pan American system. The whole colonial phenomenon plays havoc with the regionalist picture; that dependencies in large numbers are being dealt with, in reference to international organizations today, in their own names⁹ alters this slightly, but by no means simplifies the situation. If Portugal should join a European union, would this include her African and Asiatic colonies? Finally, there are found blocks of states with practically no geographical element in common, yet with community of race, religion, social or political principle: the democracies, the Catholic nations, the Anglo-Saxons, and heaven knows what else. It may be that the difficulty could be easily met in these cases by simply admitting that there is no case of regionalism present, but the trouble with such an explanation is that the regionalist himself is not always ready to accept this way out; and in any event the underlying problem, that of sectionalism or sectarianism versus the common interest, is present, and the relations between sectionalism and sectarianism demand careful but full exploration and explanation.

Finally we must distinguish, both as regards regionalism in membership and regionalism in activity, between international organization which adopts regionalism as a principle and that which either refrains from such an attitude or deliberately takes an opposite attitude, yet is in fact regionalist in composition and activity. It is the organization insisting on regionalism in principle which raises the issue most sharply. In principle, the organization which professes to be open to all nations is not regionalist in character, particularly if it has a general membership in fact and a program of action of a general character. On the other hand, a number of unions of states in Europe which have professed to be universal have included virtually no extra-European members or only the United States or the United States and one or two British Dominions.¹⁰ This phenomenon is tending to disappear, as Latin American and other smaller states in other continents join such organizations in larger numbers, but it still calls for attention.

We may, perhaps, already begin to draw a few tentative conclusions in this whole matter. Thus we should certainly not agree with any position that would deny all value to regionalism as a principle of international organization or insist upon general and complete application of the universal principle. Such a position would have the weakness, *a priori*, of any doctrine so narrow as to take on the character of an "ism," although the same must be said for regionalism as such; the true solution of any

⁹ International Telecommunication Convention, 1932: United States *Treaty Series* No. 867.

¹⁰ For example, the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission: League of Nations, *Handbook of International Organization* (rev. ed., Geneva, 1938), p. 250.

political problem must always be a compromise, or rather a combination of elements in sound proportions. Apart from such abstract reasoning, the number of regional international organizations which have been formed in the past—the Pan American Union, the various Baltic organizations, the Institute of Pacific Relations—and their utility, would lead us to the same conclusion.

On the other hand, we should not exaggerate the significance of this evidence or swing to the opposite extreme. The regional international organizations have been no more successful, on the whole, than the universal unions. Some have been egregious failures,¹¹ while certain universal organizations have enjoyed pronounced success.¹² No position which should try to exclude universalism entirely and place all international organization on a regional basis would be acceptable; and it does not seem superfluous to make this point, in view of the extreme views held on the subject in certain quarters.

It is at this juncture that the experience enjoyed—or suffered—in connection with the League of Nations may profitably be considered. Indeed, the advocates of regionalism are prone to cite the League experience in special support of their doctrine. The League, it is sometimes asserted, came to grief precisely because it tried to operate, especially in the field of sanctions and security, on a world-wide basis, which was too great a task, instead of organizing international security by regions where countries would both feel an interest and be able to act effectively.¹³

Superficially, this analysis seems very cogent, and when we recall, for example, British reluctance in the twenties to contemplate sanctions action in Eastern Europe and the obvious inclination of the French in the thirties to interpret the sanctions and security sections of the Covenant almost exclusively in terms of Western Europe, the picture appears to become all the more conclusive. But is it really so conclusive? For one thing, the analysis disregards entirely the non-political side of League action, and, for reasons already given, we feel compelled to refer to this aspect of the problem at every step. Indeed, the analysis just reviewed even disregards all aspects of the political activity of the League other than sanctions action. This activity included limitation of armaments, supervision of mandates, settlement of disputes, and still other items, and in these matters the success or lack of success of the activity of the League did not seem to be particularly dependent upon the regional principle either. If, however, the regionalist were willing to say that he was

¹¹ For example, the International Central American Bureau.

¹² The Universal Postal Union inevitably comes to mind, but could be matched by many more.

¹³ H. Hoover and H. Gibson, *The Problems of Lasting Peace* (New York, 1942), p. 264.

thinking about the problem of enforcement alone in all his argumentation—which obviously he is not—then the problem would take on a quite different appearance, without even then becoming quite simple.

Actually, the League experience is not a clear support for regionalism, even on the narrow question of sanctions. Action against Japan was not taken in 1931–33 for numerous reasons, and lack of interest and lack of ability to act in the Far East were not clear and prominent among them. Certainly there was no lack of interest, in both the objective and the subjective senses of that much abused term, either in Great Britain or in the United States. And if inability to act alone against Japan in the Western Pacific was one—and perhaps the one—decisive reason for British refusal to go ahead at this time, the inability was not a general and inevitable inability based on the factor of distance alone, but a special and imposed disability brought about by the irresponsible attitude of the United States and the effects of the unwise action promoted by the United States at the Washington Conference. Also if we turn to those circumstances where League action came to grief in the end—specifically, the Ethiopian case—we find that the failure had virtually nothing at all to do with distance, regionalism, or anything else of that order, unless again French preoccupation with the Rhine frontier in contrast to the security of Ethiopia can be so described. In that case, however, regionalism simply means national preoccupation with the homeland, and this is a bit too elementary to go very far as a basis of international theory. The places where action had to be taken or pressure brought to bear by the League powers if the aggressions of 1935–36 were to be brought to an end were Rome and Berlin (and Moscow, if we keep all angles of the situation in mind); if effective action was not taken in this sense, it was not because of the remoteness of these countries. It might be added—a small point, but a real one—that, in general, nearness to or remoteness from Geneva seemed to have little or nothing to do with the interest and loyalty of this, that, or the other member of the League.

We might press slightly further our effort to deal with this problem in terms of subject-matter. Is it a fact that certain subjects demand or permit regional treatment, while others demand or permit universal treatment? To a slight degree, yes; thus, to resort to an extreme if not ridiculous case, navigation on the Danube River must be regulated on the Danube River, and disease or piracy or any other evil must be suppressed where it is found. It will be recalled, however, that states all over the world may be interested in that action and may be willing to join in it, thus rather wiping out the regionalistic aspect of the case. On the other side, it may be argued by the universalist that “germs know no frontiers”—or radio waves, or ideas, for that matter. Even here, the ambiguous nature of the regionalist principle must be emphasized: the universal

character of the problems of health and communications does not mean that regional treatment of these matters within the framework of the general world organization is not, or may not be, very useful. In subject-matter, as in the other aspects of this problem, the proper answer seems to be something of a composite.

Perhaps it may be justifiable to emphasize quite frankly and clearly before going further one or more of the definitely dangerous or objectionable aspects of regionalism. Thus, not only is regionalism a reactionary principle when considered in relation to recent developments toward universalism, but also it tends to sanctify, crystallize, and institutionalize elements of selfishness and opposition to the general welfare which, if not thus dignified, might gradually be eliminated or assimilated, to the advantage of all concerned. One quite possible result of any strong application of regionalism would be the setting up of large blocks of nations against one another, or even of continents and hemispheres one against the other. The implications and political effects of the Monroe Doctrine have at times approached this result. A strong European regional union would be dangerous to all the rest of the world, if only because of the power of such an aggregate and the obviously competitive interests of European against non-European countries. Or—if we let our scientific imagination run off in the other direction—if we begin to regionalize, we may find that the process tends to go further than we had anticipated and we get sub-regions, sub-sub-regions, and so *ad infinitum*. This tendency has actually been encountered in one or more cases in recent years.¹⁴

One other objection to the regionalist principle is based on quite different assumptions. It consists, that is, not of a complaint that regionalism means too much or would go too far, but that it does not mean enough. As already pointed out, while nations at a distance from one another may vary in interest for reasons connected purely with their location, and may differ in race, social institutions, and other features also because of their remote separation, the opposite may also be the case, and remotely separated nations—the cases of Australia and Canada spring to mind—resemble one another in more ways than one. Conversely, the nations of a given area may vary so widely in race and social patterns that regional unity means little or nothing. Europe itself is a proverbial case in point. An Asiatic union would include strange bedfellows (Russia, Japan, China, Thailand, India—not to touch on the countries of Oceania or hither Asia, or the countries with colonies in the Orient). The basic idea of regionalism is open to two serious objections: neighboring nations are not always logical or actual coöperators, while distant nations often are.

It is, of course, possible to vary the picture of propinquous nations so

¹⁴ Convention of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, 1931, Preamble and Arts. 1, 2: 131 League of Nations *Treaty Series*, p. 249.

that we do not assert that they are alike or feel alike, but merely that, being forced to live together in a more or less limited area, they simply must cooperate and organize, or both, in order to deal with matters of common concern. The case for regionalism thus made out is both stronger and weaker than the usual presentation—and is distinctly the picture of the situation less frequently presented. The cogency of the argument is greater, but perhaps the conclusion should be somewhat different. It is precisely in such a situation that not a local, but a general, organization may be useful. The local states need peace and cooperation, but they may not be able by themselves to attain these results. It is just such a configuration of circumstances that gives rise to demands for wider and more resourceful action by a broader community.

It was mentioned at the beginning of this discussion that the problem of regionalism was formulated in national politics in a fashion somewhat different from that in which it is formulated in the international sphere. In the latter, the issue is drawn between local and general organization on the basis of a hypothesis of differing interests. In the former case, it is rather assumed that the interests of people in general—if not everywhere—are the same, and that the only open question is that of whether these interests can best be served by a limited or an extensive (in terms of area) political organization. As usual, the truth lies between the two extremes or in a combination of the two views: variations of interest and policy, and hence in the legislation and administration required to serve them, are greater than formally minded students of national political science are wont to imagine, but there is a much greater body of common interest to be served in the international sphere than the particularists perceive—or where there is not, this is not traceable to factors of place or location. Study of the problem in terms of effectiveness in relation to area and technology is highly to be recommended—as in all fields of administration;¹⁵ approaching the problem with preconceived and exaggerated notions of divergent interests can only render its treatment unnecessarily difficult.

In the same manner, the problem could be assimilated to that of the formation of federal unions and distribution of powers between the members thereof and the central government.¹⁶ In any such case, states seem ripe for federation when they have a body of common interests which can be handled so much more effectively on federal lines that the difficulties and sacrifices involved in the latter course of action are more than justified by the results. And those functions are to be attributed to the central government which can be so much more effectively handled by it that the

¹⁵ L. D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (rev. ed., New York, 1939), Chap. 12.

¹⁶ Discussed in work cited in note 7 above (4th ed.), Chap. 12, Sec. 3.

benefits to the members outweigh the cost. Now the same test should apply in our present problem. Whether a regional or a universal organization is to be preferred, and whether given matters are to be dealt with regionally or locally, should depend on the practical results to be anticipated from one as against the other method of treatment—not on sentimental, philosophical, or metaphysical considerations. Here, as at so many other points, the establishment and operation of international organization would benefit appreciably, in all probability, from the application of a little elementary general political science.

The final question to be considered in this whole field, however, is that of the coördination of any local or regional organizations with that of the general international community. It must be admitted that most, if not all, of the advocates of regionalism recognize the need for such coördination,¹⁷ thus giving evidence of their sanity and common sense, but also, perhaps, of certain misgivings concerning the superlative values of their own favorite principle. In any case, such coördination is indispensable if the obvious potential evils of regionalism are to be guarded against and its full benefits obtained.

The great difficulty here, however, is not to secure agreement in principle, but to work out the modalities. Shall coördination be given structural form or be sought merely in the realm of action or procedure? Shall collaboration be obtained by asking the regional organizations, once set up, to seek this result by communicating one with another or with the central organization? Shall it be sought by giving the central organization power to impose it upon the regional organizations? Or shall the original creation of the latter be left to the central international authorities? Having local agencies set up from the center would produce the desired result with most certainty, as witness the cases where it was employed under League auspices,¹⁸ but would probably not satisfy the devotees of regionalism, or the most eager among them. Asking local agencies to coöperate voluntarily would be too uncertain and leave the burden and the power too largely in the hands of the local authorities. Giving the central organization power to impose order seems to be too drastic, almost more drastic than central creation of agencies, and indeed to be quite unworkable if the experience under the League with the much milder Article XXIV may be taken as a guide.¹⁹

¹⁷ Orde y Arregú, as cited, pp. 82, 90.

¹⁸ The International Institute for Intellectual Coöperation (Paris), the International Educational Cinematographic Institute (Rome), the International Centre for Leprosy Research (Rio de Janeiro), etc.

¹⁹ Discussed by the present writer in "The League of Nations and Other International Organization," in Geneva Research Centre, *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. V, No. 6 (Geneva, 1934).

The solution probably lies in the direction of action by the states forming regional organizations, action to place such unions within the framework of the general organization at the time they are founded. This was the solution adopted in the Locarno agreements;²⁰ it has been adopted in many other agreements of a political character.²¹ It is the solution envisaged in those international conventions dealing with postal communications and such matters where regional or limited unions within the general union are permitted.²² The states should, probably, give to the general organization the right to intervene in any case where such action is not taken—perhaps by inadvertence—and seek some type of coördination. Here, as elsewhere in political action, the willingness of the parties to follow a line of action or a principle determines, as much as any structural or procedural arrangements, what the outcome will be. One can only hope for the best.

No attention has been given in this discussion to cases where the doctrine of regionalism has been used in bad faith or merely to obstruct the progress of international organization in general. That such cases exist cannot be denied.²³ They must—unless the bad faith is so flagrant that it can be exposed and the effort discredited in its entirety, which must be rarely—be met on the merits and argued out on that basis. Above all, the issue must not be merely evaded or ignored.

Similarly, while this discussion has been concerned chiefly, if not exclusively, with the problem of what is desirable in the realm of regionalism and universalism, we should not forget that meantime the states or their governments—ultimately the peoples—are doing various things having some bearing on the problem. A number of these have been noted already. Another type of state action significant in this connection is the preference for bilateral over multilateral international arrangements manifested at times by various countries, a prominent feature of German diplomacy in the 1930's. We cannot review in detail all the circumstances which would dictate one or the other form of arrangement in different cases—and there are numerous such considerations on both sides. What we must do, however, is to note that bilateralism constitutes an exagger-

²⁰ Treaty of Locarno, Preamble and Arts. 2-4, 7: 54 League of Nations *Treaty Series*, p. 289.

²¹ Pact of Organization of the Little Entente, 1933, Art. 10: 139 League of Nations *Treaty Series*, p. 233.

²² Convention of the Universal Postal Union, 1929, Art. 5: 102 League of Nations *Treaty Series*, p. 245.

²³ That is, cases where regionalism has been advocated, not with a view to rendering international relations and coöperation more effective, but with a view to preserving greater national liberty of action while pretending to do the other thing. See, for example, much of the insistence by the United States on limiting her participation in international organization to the Western Hemisphere.

ated—that is, a very narrow—form of regionalism. Even where an effort is made to achieve universalism by cumulating many bilateral arrangements,²⁴ it is a bastard sort of universalism which may conceivably be attained. Here as elsewhere we must remember that states may go in for bilateralism or other forms of regionalism either on the pretense that it is a superior form of international organization or on the basis of cynical self-seeking or on the basis of some subtle or clumsy blend of the two; in any case, this does not modify our conclusions on grounds of reasoned analysis.

The total result of our inquiry is obviously inconclusive and synthetic. Neither universalism nor regionalism can be adopted as final and exclusive principles. Both constitute notes or elements which must at all times be present, in varying strength, in any political organization, especially any international organization—and, what is more, always have been and always will be present in this form. If there is a general trend noticeable in this connection, it is a trend from regionalism to universalism. But this trend is by no means so strong as to eliminate the former; and it may be admitted that there is some limited trend today back toward regionalism from an exaggerated and superficial universalism. The principal task of the student of international organization is not to waste more time debating over regionalism versus universalism, but to study the ways in which, in concrete cases, the two principles can be utilized in combination and the standards to be applied in determining the dosage of each to be adopted. The present discussion should point in this direction.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS BETWEEN AN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF NATIONAL STATES

ARNOLD BRECHT

Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research

Universal feeling seems to converge upon the postulate that after this war an International Government shall be formed to control war and peace of the world, and that the United States shall take full share in it. This dual demand is considered a fundamental platform on which all men of good-will can meet. There is a far-spread tendency, however, to postpone inquiries into its exact meaning and implications. This vagueness may have merits for winning popular support. It has none in preparing for final action. It may even defeat the movement's purpose, because

²⁴ C. Hull, "American Foreign Trade Policies," in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation*, No. 323 (New York, 1936), p. 458.

little may come from the longing for International Government, unless details are well prepared in advance. Or, built with a marble façade on shaky foundations, International Government may lead to disaster rather than avert it.

None of the United Nations—at least none of the “Big Four”—has thus far given up its sovereignty.¹ For this very reason, no insurmountable difficulty may lie in the way of continuing their alliance to some good purpose after the war, and gradually extending it to other nations. That is still a far cry, however, from the establishment of an International Government which, distinct from the governments of its constituent members, should have the power to take consequential steps independently. If we stake our hopes on this latter type, we must answer the question of how shall the powers be divided between the International Government and the governments of the national states? In passing through the immense flood of discussions on International Government, it is amazing to see how scant are the contributions to this question.

I

Powers to be given the International Government cannot be discussed fruitfully without paying attention to the composition of the body that is to exercise them. On first thought, it may seem safe to assume that the United States will always be a partner in making decisions. That, however, is a dangerous fallacy. Among the first institutions likely to be considered is an international court vested with authority to make final decisions on such vital questions as whether a country has acted as an aggressor and whether therefore the members of the international organization are obligated to take certain steps. Such a court has *persons* as its members rather than countries, and although one of its members may always be an American citizen appointed on the proposal of the United States Government, it is not the government but the individual that renders an opinion in court. If the court directly or indirectly were to decide on peace or war, then peace and war would not be a matter on which the people of the United States had a final vote.

In fact, it would not be much different with American participation in the executive and legislative bodies of an International Government. Only if Congress were to direct the vote of the American representatives there

¹ “There are bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral organizations among several of the United Nations, but there is no organization of the United Nations as a whole. It cannot be said that any action, military or political, has been in any genuine sense an action of the United Nations. In the final sense . . . the United Nations is not yet a reality. No permanent institution has been established which can be designated by this name.” Quincy Wright, “United Nations—Phrase or Reality?,” *Annals of Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Soc. Sci.*, Vol. 228 (July, 1943), p. 1.

by joint resolution of the two houses could one properly say that the *United States* had a share in the decisions. If the country were represented merely by delegates of the President or State Department, their vote might be in conflict with the opinions of Congress, which, according to the Constitution, has the power to declare war. Even if the boldest dreams should come true through the establishment of an international parliament chosen in universal elections, the United States as a nation would have no vote unless its representatives were held to cast their votes uniformly on the basis of a preceding caucus decision.

These are great difficulties in themselves. They are aggravated by the fact that, although American members of international bodies may present the views of the United States correctly and efficiently, they may be outvoted in court as well as in council and legislature, unless unanimity be required as it was in the League, or at least unanimity of the Great Powers. Thus the decision on war and peace may not rest with the United States, either in form or in substance.

We must face these difficulties squarely and not leave it to opponents to bring them into the battle. To preserve the peace of the world, to save civilization, and to develop higher social standards, the United States should certainly brace itself to overcome narrow isolationist feelings and show its good intention to cooperate in the establishment of International Government. But it should do so constructively, after thorough analysis of the entire problem, rather than blindly.

Sacrifices in self-determination will be more readily accepted if the powers of the International Government are to be slight than if they are to have vital importance. To give the International Government non-consequential powers does not, however, seem to help us towards the end we are seeking. On the contrary, the leading idea is that in certain situations the International Government should decide on war for all member states, especially if one country, without being provoked, should attack another for any reason anywhere in the world. Furthermore, it should have an armed force, called an International Police Force, even in peace-time, and a monopoly in the production and use of certain weapons. These, indeed, are not matters of slight concern.

The main problem remains, therefore—however much we try to escape from it—whether war for the United States shall become the automatic consequence of a decision made over the head of Congress and people of the United States by an international court, council, or legislature. If the question were only that of minor upheavals to be suppressed by concerted action, it might not seem too bold to leave the decision to an international body. But there is no guarantee that aggression will come only from minor powers, or that it will not end in global conflagration. At any rate, no "police action" undertaken by the International Government would be an

action merely of that somewhat impersonal body. It would automatically engage the United States. Its duration, scope, and result would decide the fate of the United States exactly as if this country had gone to war on its own determination. If the cause were remote and of doubtful justification, Congress might have hesitated. Once drawn into the conflict without its consent, there is little choice but to go on.

For all these reasons, I feel that pledges, if any, of the United States to surrender to an International Government the power to decide on war and peace cannot be general and unconditional. Special arrangements may, of course, be made with other countries for mutual assistance in regard to *specific* dangers, such as rebellion of defeated countries. But pledges in *general* terms, covering any disturbances anywhere in the world, cannot be recommended before certain conditions are fulfilled. Suppose Great Britain withdrew from India before the various states there came to an agreement on a reasonable and constructive federation or some other sort of peaceful régime. In that event, according to the best judgment, some sort of war would be likely to arise. It would not be merely civil war, but war between what then would be separate states. Should any such aggression in any part of India against any other part compel the United States to rush to the protection of one of the parties? Again, if Europe be left in a condition of atomistic anarchy of small states with no constructive links between them and with intolerable injustices prevailing, the United States would have good reason to refuse being drawn without its consent into any violent conflict certain to arise from such conditions.

In sum, if the United States were ever to surrender the decision on war and peace to an international court or council, such transfer could not be recommended regardless of whether conditions were just or unjust, reasonable or unreasonable, constructive or destructive, encouraging or depressive. It should be envisaged only on condition that a just and workable order of the world is going to be established, and go into effect only in regard to regions where this is achieved. In the meantime, the United States should be extremely active in bringing that order about (see II, below), should promote other aspects of International Government (see III, below); but, except for special alliances against specific dangers, it should keep the decision on war and peace for itself in its own hands.³

³ This article rests on the negative assumption that a complete monopoly in armaments for the International Government will not be obtainable at the outset. Professor R. M. MacIver (*Towards an Abiding Peace*, New York, 1943) rightly emphasizes that until it is achieved the danger of wars among nations will persist. He urges, therefore, that the monopoly should be brought about, if only by gradual steps. Strong as his argument is, it shows implicitly that until the millennium is reached nations and federations must be on their guard. I plan to review this important book, which came out after this article was written, in the November issue of *Social Research*.

II

To establish just and orderly conditions in densely populated territories which are divided among a great number of national units, and efficiently to control practices that may lead to war there, more is necessary than a world-wide International Government erected as a superstructure immediately over the national units. Control must begin much earlier than with the suppression of actual aggression, and it must be automatic, i.e., independent of any initiative to be taken by some government agency. This can be achieved to an adequate extent only within regional federations. We must, therefore, accustom ourselves to thinking in terms, not of *one* International Government, but of several levels of such governments, including minor regions, such as federations of medium-sized states; major or quasi-continental regions, such as a European or an Indian Federation; and a global organization, which may originate in the United Nations or the League of Nations, or both.

It is not necessary that quasi-continental combinations be "perfect unions" with a federal monopoly in foreign policy, in armaments, in interstate commerce, and the like. It is sufficient that they be limited to a few well-defined purposes, i.e., that they constitute limited-purpose federations.³ Among these purposes, however, must be that of preventing war among the members by a number of devices, which must begin operating far earlier than with the actual event of unprovoked aggression. Such devices should include: (1) Maintenance of certain minimum standards of freedom and equality of individuals within the member states. For, if some authoritarian government is able to silence any kind of possible opposition by terroristic methods, it can more easily prepare for aggression and do so secretly. On the other hand, if freedom and equality are secured to all individuals, including those who belong to political, racial, or religious minorities, the present sinister significance of boundaries is modified. (2) Maintenance of a certain minimum of political institutions to secure popular representation and free elections. This, too, is a guarantee against secret preparation for aggression. (3) Maintenance of certain minimum conditions of free communication, free traffic, and free commerce within the federal territory and with the world at large.

To establish adequate standards of this kind efficiently for the whole world is not feasible, because—as we shall see in section III below—traditional views in the various sections of the world are too different to be brought upon a common denominator other than one of extremely low standards. Nor can world institutions secure automatic control. Within regions, such control can be established. Individuals whose rights are

³ See my article on "Limited-Purpose Federations" in *Social Research*, Vol. 10 (May, 1943), p. 135.

violated by local (national) authorities can be granted appeal to federal courts, or to one federal supreme court, and the federal court or courts can be authorized to go into the details of the case with the usual tools of evidence, including inspection on the spot. Numerous federal states have demonstrated that this arrangement is workable. The United States, Canada, and Australia have proved that it can operate on a continental or quasi-continental scope.

In Europe, too, there will be no difficulty, after the defeat of totalitarianism, in establishing minimum standards and their automatic control to a remarkably high degree, at least outside of the Soviet Union and, at present, Spain. Spain is likely to fall in line soon. Whether the Soviet Union is ready to accept minimum standards and their effective control by federal institutions, depends on her own decision. If she should wish to stay apart, it would not affect the significance of the arrangement for the rest of Europe. Nor would it preclude her from continuing treaty relations with Great Britain and eventually entering into such relations with other members of the European Federation, as this federation is to be one of limited purposes only rather than a perfect union or *bloc*. Members may enter into any treaty relations with outside powers, provided they are not in contravention of the principles and limited purposes of the federation.⁴

Other measures which would tend to prevent war within a regional federation lie in technological and economic fields. While it is not feasible to monopolize public control of the main railroads of the whole world, it is quite possible to do so within a densely populated continent. This holds true for the main continental airlines as well. If thus the most important means of transportation by land and air are brought under federal control, preparations for war are strongly checked from this additional angle. Federal control of other public utilities may follow. Furthermore, institutions to facilitate interstate commerce can be equipped with greater powers on a continental than on a global scale. It is not feasible for global institutions directly to establish the necessary interstate arrangements within densely populated regions like Europe or India, although the details should keep in line with a world-wide schedule.

Such regional organization as here outlined protects neighboring states from mutual attack more efficiently than any clumsy machinery on the global level can do directly. It takes the rigid meaning from intra-continental boundary lines. It secures life and liberty and regard for

⁴ A catalogue of such minimum standards as may be adopted and automatically controlled in Europe may be found in my article on "European Federation; The Democratic Alternative," in *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 55 (Feb., 1942), pp. 561 ff. Such minimum standards should not be confused with a bill of rights, as they include far less than does such a bill in its traditional meaning. The reasons are discussed in the article.

human dignity, irrespective of where people live. In barring terroristic régimes, it meets the greatest dangers in psychological preparation for war. It controls important tools such as transportation by land and air. It interlocks the economic and technical affairs of the member states.

Measures directed immediately against armament and aggression should be regarded as an important supplement, but no more than a supplement, to those more constructive features. General disarmament alone, without justice, would not abolish war—people would fight with scythes and bricks, but fight they would if they felt frustrated, unless they were confronted with superior power. Leaving aside here the question of discriminative measures against defeated countries during a transitional period, nothing could better serve to quell fights between neighboring peoples than a complete federal monopoly of armaments. That, however, may be impossible to achieve, even in regional federations. A "Declaration of Aims and Principles for a European Federation," distributed recently by the Pan-European Conference,⁶ has indeed proposed such a complete federal monopoly in armaments for Europe. It has further advocated that the commander-in-chief of the European Police Force should always be chosen from one of the smaller nations of Europe. These proposals are, however, unrealistic, at least in case Great Britain should care to be a member of the European Federation, which I think would be highly desirable. British autonomy regarding the navy would be abolished and all British armaments subjected to the control of a federal European council in which Great Britain would have only one of several votes. I am afraid such ideas, in over-simplifying matters, do more harm than good to sound endeavors towards some kind of European federation. If Great Britain were ever to yield control of her armaments entirely to an International Government, she could do so only to a World Government—on condition that all others did the same—or to a Government of the British Commonwealth, or to an Anglo-American union, but not to a Pan-European Government, unless it were controlled by her.⁶

It is less utopian—although still very optimistic—to think that Continental Europe without Great Britain and Russia may reach complete monopolization of its armament questions under federal control. In that event, some special arrangement with Great Britain will be necessary. At

⁶ See *New York Times*, June 5, 1943, p. 18.

⁶ The Pan-European Conference has no mandate to speak for Europe, except the mandate of reason. It actually consists of a self-appointed board of three members, who make their statements according to their own judgment, with or without previous discussion with the members of the Conference or its committees, who—although equally handpicked—have no vote.

least, the European Covenant should try to provide for some effective limitation of armaments within the member states and a federal monopoly in the production and possession of certain heavy arms. A federal police force may be set up to enforce the Covenant whenever necessary, after the federal supreme court has declared that a member state violated its constitutional duties or in case of aggression. To suppress armed rebellion, conditions may be formulated under which all armed forces of the member states are to be subordinated to a federal commander-in-chief to be appointed by the council or legislature.

In sum, distribution of powers between the supranational government and the national governments can be outlined effectively for a regional federation. It may even be possible to leave details, in so far as they cannot be formulated definitely in the formative stage of the federation, to a legislative body to determine with qualified majorities. Thus one may boldly imagine an article on distribution of powers in the Constitution of the European Federation which would read as follows:

"The Legislative Body of the Federation has the power, by two-thirds of the votes cast, to establish, valid for the entire territory of the Federation—(1) minimum standards to protect individuals from arbitrary or cruel measures; (2) minimum political rights of representation and minimum standards for free elections; (3) minimum rights of emigration and immigration; (4) minimum standards to protect national, racial, and religious minorities; (5) principles for the solution of technological, economic, and financial problems; (6) principles restricting armament and the production of arms in the member states; (7) principles for the arbitration of conflicts between member states.

"The Legislative Body may furthermore create institutions designed and authorized to control the application and execution of the standards, rights, and principles so established, and for the arbitration of conflicts between member states. It may maintain military and police forces on behalf of the Federation and undertake the production of arms, especially those the production of which has been denied to the member states, subject to principles that may be established by a world-wide organization.

"The Legislative Body, or by delegation the Executive Body, may determine economic, police, and military measures to be applied against a member state that should violate its obligations under this Constitution; provided that, except in defense against aggression or armed rebellion, no such measure shall be applied before the Supreme Court of the Federation has established the violation.

"No decision of the Legislative or Executive Body may discriminate against any member state, except in so far as such discrimination is devised to secure compliance with legitimate rulings after they have been violated and until compliance is attained.⁷ Controversies about the validity of federal decisions are decided finally by the Supreme Court.

⁷ Temporary discriminations resulting from defeat in the present war are a matter of armistice conditions and peace treaties rather than the affair of the Federation, which is bound to observe them as long as they are in effect.

"Decisions of the Legislative or Executive Body and other federal institutions, unless they exceed the powers granted, have supremacy over contradictory state and local regulations."⁹

All this may be feasible on a regional level. Far less can be done on a global scale. But considerably more can be accomplished on the higher level after some regional settlement of this kind has been reached.

III

If we now return to the distribution of powers in matters of war and peace between the governments of individual nations and an International Government of global jurisdiction, the problem has lost much of its stringency. Once Europe and other densely populated regions have been organized satisfactorily so as to maintain regional peace under normal conditions through regional institutions, it remains for a global organization mainly to do two things, namely, to provide subsidiary support in the maintenance of regional peace and to maintain peace between regions or empires. Hard as it is to plan for a world government with such functions, it is a problem much more limited than that of directly policing and pacifying all the individual nations.

(1) Whenever a federal government is threatened by the rebellion of one of its member states in violation of basic principles, it may call for help, if that should be necessary. Whether the United States cared to grant military support would, under the old system, be for Congress to decide from case to case. To leave such well-limited decision to a World Government, in which American delegates would have an adequate vote, can be seriously considered.

(2) All justiciable conflicts between federations or between them and the remaining independent units or among the latter may be subjected to the decision of a World Court. This problem is so familiar that I need not discuss it here. The risk for the United States in subjecting itself to this procedure is so limited that it can well be endured.

(3) Non-justiciable political conflicts may be subjected to compulsory arbitration. There are several alternatives as to jurisdiction and procedure of arbitration and the meaning of the award. To choose among them is beyond the purpose of this article.

(4) As to the limitation of armaments, the world-wide organization would, after the defeat of the totalitarian countries and the establishment of Europe's federation, be faced with a problem not very different from

⁹ The above suggestions paraphrase more moderate ones made in "European Federation," cited above. See that article as to details and also regarding the composition of the Legislative Body and the distribution of votes. The result of the latter proposals was that decisions for which two-thirds majority was required could be blocked by any two or three major countries or any ten minor ones.

that of making an agreement between Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Once agreement on limitations is reached, international institutions may obtain the power to supervise conformance with the established principles. This right of surveillance would then be one of the powers transferred to the International Government. The right to determine the principles themselves could hardly be surrendered in this way. They must be established in the Covenant or by subsequent agreements.

(5) The International Government may furthermore obtain the power to administer territories, facilities, and plants for the common welfare of humanity. Such arrangement may be of greatest benefit in the administration of colonial territories, of canals and straits of global importance, of international airways, of air fields, and of plants for the production of such armaments as under the agreements on armament restriction may not be produced by individual states or regional federations. The difficulty here is less with the formulation of the powers of the International Government than with the acquisition of the territories and other assets from those who own or control them today.

(6) In this context, the International Government may also obtain the power to maintain an international police force and to summon armed forces from the member countries in those rare cases in which the International Government is given the power to start armed expeditions.

(7) In addition, the global organization may pursue humanitarian, social, technological, economic, educational, and similar aims by establishing institutions which in these fields have independence in the disbursement of their funds and the claim to obtain information from the member states, but normally no further powers.

(8) Specific boards with broader powers in these fields may be established for deciding on well-defined questions and discharging well-defined administrative functions. Such boards may emerge in the field of currency stabilization or of trade regulations, and also in that of giving passports to stateless persons. The powers of these boards must be determined exactly and specifically. This can be done either in the original Covenant or in subsequent treaties.

(9) Maintenance of basic standards of individual justice and individual security—primary function of regional federations—can play only a minor rôle, if any, in the direct activities of the global organization. It is, of course, highly desirable that the global Covenant establish minimum standards of individual justice and security everywhere in the world and provide world courts which will hear appeals from countries where such standards are not secured either directly or through federal institutions, or where the municipal or federal courts deny justice. But it is not difficult to foresee that, while a regional bill of minimum standards can be elaborate and powerful, a global bill is doomed to be vague and timid and to

leave ample loopholes.⁹ Nor would it be technically feasible to grant every individual appeal to a global supreme court just as to a regional one. It would be a great achievement if the executive council of the World Organization could be given the power to bring the violation of fundamental principles of justice in any part of the world to a judicial procedure before an international court. Or, as Quincy Wright has proposed, the court itself may be given the power to accept individual complaints if it thinks they are so important as to warrant the procedure, although this selection is a political rather than judicial decision. One glance at the Soviet Union or colonial empires will dampen hopes that the powers given the global organization in this respect will go very far. But the attempt should be made with an ardent and crusading insistency.

(10) The chances are even worse that minimum standards as to political rights of individuals or groups for participation in government can be stipulated on a global scale.

In sum, the functions of an International Government of global jurisdiction can be most easily developed in the administration of facilities of world-wide significance and as a subsidiary controller of affairs that cannot be mastered by regional arrangements. Its importance should be sought, not in individual, local, or regional, but in world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION: LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

EGON F. RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER

The American University

The time has come to prepare in advance everything that can legitimately be prepared for the revival of international activities after the present catastrophe. Since there are too many unknown factors, it is impossible to envisage the international machinery of the future in all of its details. We cannot as yet foresee the shape that the agency or agencies eventually superseding the League of Nations will assume. The international organization-to-be will certainly assume a striking difference in character, dependent on whether the League is reconstructed or a different type of international agency is created. From an administrative point of view, however, the problems will not be so different from what they were before; it will therefore be fruitful to discuss some of these problems in the light of the Geneva experience.

Much of this experience cannot be found in reports and minutes, or, if

⁹ See "Limited-Purpose Federations" (cited above), p. 144, especially the reference to the Slavery Convention of the League of Nations of 1926.

recorded, is unintelligible even to the informed outsider who relies exclusively on documentary material. Thus, the chief repository of information and the main source of interpretation must be sought in the memories and minds of present and former League officials, now dispersed all over the world. Unless an effort is made to collect this material, there is danger that much of it will be lost. Having been connected for more than ten years as a senior Member of Section with various services, political and non-political, of the League Secretariat, the writer can claim a certain practical experience on which to base his observations. The severance of his connection with the Secretariat, on the other hand, affords him freedom to speak without official restraint.

I. STATUS OF THE HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCY

Article VI of the League Covenant, the constitutional basis for the activities of the permanent Secretariat, stipulates that the "Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required." Paragraph 3 states that "the Secretariat and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council," and Paragraph 4 requires that "the Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council." Only one further indication as to the rôle of the Secretary-General is contained in the Covenant. Article XI declares that in case of emergency "the Secretary-General shall, on the request of any member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council."

Even if we had no supporting evidence in contemporary literature, it would appear from the mere wording of the Covenant that in the minds of the original shapers of the instrument the head of the permanent Secretariat was to be an administrative officer and not a policy-shaping one. Only in staff matters were broad powers conferred upon him. But even this semi-dictatorial position in questions of personnel would probably not have been granted had those who drafted the Covenant been able to foresee the subsequent development of the League Secretariat, the staff of which comprised 664 officials in 1930 when the League was at the height of its development.¹

It is easy to see in retrospect that it was an initial error in the original construction of the League to conceive the head of its executive branch as a kind of superior official. The mere designation of the post as "Secretary-General," and not as "Chancellor," as originally suggested, is a clear indication of the desire to restrict the function to a narrow range of responsibilities. Moreover, the choice of the person selected to fill the post as first

¹At the same time, the International Labor Office employed 424, and the Registry of the Permanent Court of International Justice 24, officials.

Secretary-General gave further indication of the intention of the fathers of the Covenant. Sir Eric Drummond was a member of the British diplomatic service. Nothing predestined him for the unique mission he was asked to undertake except the keen interest he had taken in the work of the League of Nations Commission in Paris. He grew, however, with his task and with the importance of the work entrusted to him. While lacking in imagination, he had respect for the imagination of others and was prepared to take risks while essentially remaining a British civil servant. He was not an inspiring leader of men, but he was certainly more than an able administrator and organizer. Sir Eric might have gone into history as a pioneer and prototype of the international administrator of the future had not his stature suffered subsequently by his acceptance of an ambassadorship and his identification with the policies of Sir John Simon and Neville Chamberlain. The picture of the creator of the League machinery trying to appease Mussolini as H. M. Ambassador to Rome was more than could be borne by those who had considered him throughout thirteen years as the embodiment of the spirit of Geneva.

II. THE ART AND CRAFT OF RECRUITING INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL

In a Sidney Hall lecture, delivered by F. P. Walters at Oxford, the former British Undersecretary-General of the League Secretariat gave a graphic account of the dilemma facing the first Secretary-General. Should the secretarial work of the Assembly, the Council, and the other League organs be entrusted to a staff composed of national delegations? Was an international civil service possible? Sir Maurice Hankey, who had been invited, and had declined, to serve as the first Secretary-General, was in favor of an organization based on national representation in the future international body. Sir Eric Drummond boldly decided from the first "to organize his staff as an international civil service, each official being supposed to act only on the instructions of the Secretary-General and in the interest of the League, without regard to the policy of his own government."¹

It must have been a unique adventure on which Sir Eric embarked. No precedent existed which could have guided him in implementing his momentous decision. The existing public international unions and bureaus, such as the Universal Postal Union, with their small staffs offered no comparable prototype. The multi-national civil service of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, recruited from about eleven nations, could not serve as a pattern either, as it was based on the loyalty to a sovereign state which had grown by a slow process spread over hundreds of years. Moreover, the example of the interallied bodies of the preceding war suggested a system of delegations rather than that of an international civil

¹ "Administrative Problems of International Organization," Barnett House Paper No. 24 (London University Press, Humphrey Milford, London, 1941).

service. There is, however, hardly any disagreement regarding the wisdom of Sir Eric's momentous decision, and it is extremely unlikely that any future international agency would revert to the system of national representation.

None of the persons originally called upon to assist the Secretary-General in the recruitment of his fast-growing staff had any previous experience in personnel management. Apart from the principle of creating an international civil service rather than a multi-national administration composed of national nuclei, the guiding idea was to make appointments only after the administrative need had arisen in each individual case, and not to create in advance the administrative frames for needs which did not yet actually exist.

This *modus procedendi* was successful because of the glamor of service in the League Secretariat and the attractiveness of the League salaries compared with salaries paid to public officials in the countries of the European continent. League emoluments were generous, but by no means excessive if compared with those of diplomatic officials abroad instead of the salaries paid to officials at home. The erroneous application of the yardstick of national salaries led to false comparisons, paradoxical evaluations, and to polemics the heat of which can be explained only by the background of general European impoverishment and envy. The Bulgarian member of the Financial Section, for instance, received a salary which was in gold a multiple of the Bulgarian prime minister's pay. The standard of living of the gentleman in Geneva was nevertheless incomparably lower than that of his first magistrate at home.

Apart from a majority of the French officials, who, as a rule, lived below their income and were, therefore, able to effect savings, the majority of the higher officials spent their salaries in full. Duties of a representative nature accounted for this, besides the necessity of sending children home for education. Swiss educational institutions were certainly among the best in the world, but schooling in Switzerland could not possibly qualify the children of Swedish or Rumanian officials for a professional life in their respective countries.³ The a-patriation index in the international salaries was therefore fully justified, as was—from this point of view—the exemption from taxes which was part of the diplomatic immunities granted to the officials of the First Division.⁴ Similar arguments apply to

³ Naturalization of international officials in Switzerland was practically precluded by the fact that the officials of the First Division enjoyed diplomatic status and were, therefore, neither Swiss taxpayers nor residents in the legal sense.

⁴ The term "First Division" was used in keeping with the British administrative practice. According to the Report of the "Committee of Thirteen" (1930), this Division "comprises the staff which directly gives effect to the resolutions of the Assembly, the Council, and the organs of the League and carries out the preparatory work on which their decisions may be based; it consists of the present members of the Section and officials occupying higher posts."

the intermediary and clerical staffs (II, and to a certain degree III, Division). On the occasion of the Lytton Report, considerable sums were offered by Japanese agents to the clerical staff for a premature disclosure of that document. The attempt, it is gratifying to say, was wholly unsuccessful.

Slowly, rules and regulations for the recruitment of the international staff evolved. They were finally integrated into the Staff Regulations, a copy of which was transmitted to the successful candidate together with the letter of appointment by the Secretary-General.⁵ As the relevant paragraphs of the Staff Regulations are hardly accessible to the public at large, it may be of some documentary value to accompany the following comments and evaluations by excerpts from these regulations.⁶

Article 9 of the Staff Regulations states that "all positions in the Secretariat shall be open equally to men and women." This stipulation reflects the considerable influence which feminist pressure groups were able to mobilize at the beginning of the long armistice. Women found, comparatively speaking, less obstacles within the Geneva administration than in any other public administration, not excluding the British civil service, the diplomatic branch of which, at that time, was still closed to persons of the feminine sex. More than a dozen women held, in the first decade, positions of administrative rank. One of them, Dame Rachel Crowdy, was in charge of the combined Opium and Social Questions Sections. When the reins of the Secretariat passed from the hands of the first British Secretary-General into those of his French successor, the administrative rôle and importance of the women officials degenerated slowly and almost imperceptibly, but steadily. Women who left were not always replaced by women. Dame Rachel Crowdy had already been replaced by a Swedish diplomatist under Sir Eric. Miss Nancy Williams, who for many years headed the personnel office and had been an able if slightly erratic chief of service, was succeeded by a Czech director of personnel. By 1938, the number of women belonging to the First Division was cut in half, and those remaining were mostly employed in technical work. They were heads of the English Interpreters', Translators', and Précis-Writers' Service, and of the Children's Information Service, as well as editors of the *Official Journal*, etc.

In fairness to M. Avenol, the second Secretary-General, it must be said that this retrograde development not only was a consequence of his per-

⁵ The following quotations are based on the March, 1932, issue of the Staff Regulations. The innumerable amendments introduced by the Secretary-General, especially after 1937, have been neglected, as a rule, because they were less dictated by the normal evolution of the international administration than by the exigencies of a growing emergency.

⁶ While restricted in their circulation, the Staff Regulations are not a confidential document. No breach of any official secret is therefore involved in the publication of these excerpts.

sonal views and tastes, but reflected a general development. A first consequence of the decline of democratic government in Europe was the decrease of women holding administrative rank in the various European administrations. To find women with the necessary technical qualifications and experience became more and more difficult. The *cadres* from which these women could be recruited were disappearing.

Article 10 of the Staff Regulations is devoted to the "Recruitment in the First Division." It is more revealing in what it omits than in what it specifies. Such recruitment shall "be effected with special regard to the international character of the Secretariat and the importance of securing the collaboration on its staff of nationals of various Members of the League." The term "special regard to the international character" is deliberately vague. But it implies a number of important aspects: the need of recruiting the type of person best suited for international work, and the (by no means complementary) need of distributing the available posts more or less evenly among the various Member States. The Secretary-General found himself face to face with the problem of reconciling a fair distribution of posts among the different nationals with securing, simultaneously, the best possible men and women for the available openings.

The Secretariat had to be made fairly representative of the different nationalities, cultures, and regions participating in its organization, even if no proportional representation of the Member States according to their importance or their contribution to the League budget was envisaged. It would have been absurd to deny Soviet Russia a post or posts in the Secretariat after her entry into the League, even if at that moment no vacancy existed.⁷ A member representing one-sixth of the inhabited globe was clearly entitled to representation on the international staff.

The legitimate desire on the part of the head of the organization to make the Secretariat truly representative of the countries participating in the League soon was viewed by these countries as a positive right to have officials of their own nationality appointed on the staff. Some countries, among them the Poland of Marshal Pilsudski and his successors, did not hesitate to submit the Secretary-General to open pressure, at times closely approaching blackmail.

⁷ As a matter of fact, Soviet Russia never claimed more than one post in the Secretariat, that of an Undersecretary-General—a purely political position. Russia showed no desire to participate in the various activities of the Secretariat. The official explanation given for this attitude was that Soviet Russia could not spare a sufficient number of qualified administrators to fill other positions within the Secretariat. The powers in Moscow probably feared that, removed from control and close supervision, some of its citizens might fall victim to capitalist contagion and begin to doubt the superiority of the Soviet system. Another explanation is that the Kremlin by this attitude wished to indicate its disinterestedness in all but the political aspects of the League work. The fact that the Russians, in spite of considerable encouragement, never presented candidates for any position within the International Labor Office lends weight to this interpretation.

The quality of the international staff was the second major aspect implied in the above-quoted passage from Article 10. To recruit collaborators of the right type was a delicate and difficult task. It could not be satisfactorily accomplished according to mere rules and standards, but clearly demanded an intuitive approach to human qualities on the part of the appointing agency.

III. QUALIFICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

To the outsider, it might seem that entirely de-nationalized individuals, internationalists by temperament and cosmopolitans by upbringing and personal taste, would be best qualified for international service. Such an opinion, however, is not subscribed to by those with inside knowledge. Experience has taught even the most fanatical adherents of the League that members of the cosmopolitan tribe of globe-trotters and persons without country or roots were, if not useless, certainly far less useful than typical Frenchmen, Englishmen, Poles, or Czechs, who, while essentially remaining nationals of their countries in their outlook and reactions, had become convinced of the necessity of an international body. Only the blending, in one person, of national characteristics with a belief in the necessity of the international work of the League enabled a person to serve with real usefulness within an organization the task of which was to reconcile national aspirations with international action.

It was nothing short of the miraculous that such a synthesis was almost reached in practice during the first decade of the League's existence. The Secretariat became a collective entity, passionately devoted to its supra-national work, but never utopian nor, in a sentimental way, pacifistic. This was made possible by preference being given to candidates whose past services and experience, writings, or public activities suggested a deep sympathy for the underlying purposes of the League, but who, at the same time, had been able to gain or preserve the respect and good-will of their national authorities.

I should like to illustrate the recruiting method employed by the manner in which I myself was called upon to join the Secretariat in 1930. A post in the Information Section had become vacant for which I seemed qualified by my past activities, my age, and my knowledge of languages. Having as one of about a hundred persons submitted my application, I was subjected by my future chief, M. Comert, the director of the Information Section, in the course of a long promenade in St. James Park, to an informal but none the less serious examination. I was questioned regarding the motives which had induced me to apply for the post. This was apparently done in order to find out whether I had the kind of approach to the questions of international coöperation that would make me assimilable in the League Secretariat. It was a kind of philosophical test, a quest for my

Weltanschauung. Having passed these preliminaries, my Foreign Office was requested to state its opinion on the different candidates of my own nationality. By securing at least tacit consent on the part of the governments, the Secretary-General gained a kind of collateral security.

Other appointments were made in a less personal manner. In later years, the method of formal examination loomed increasingly large and became more and more the rule, especially for appointments in technical sections. On paper, the system of examinations looked most equitable, precluding arbitrary and undue patronage. But in practice it put the administration face to face with nearly insurmountable problems, save in regard to appointments for technical work for which a specialized type of training was required. A major obstacle was one peculiar to international administration—the difference in the educational background of candidates coming from such widely separated countries as China and Greece. It was extremely difficult to evolve a type of examination which would not involuntarily discriminate against certain candidates because of a standardized method of formulating questions and grading them. But even if it had been possible to overcome these obstacles, a difficulty of another order remained. Most of the persons applying for positions in the First Division had already achieved professional success and therefore would not willingly have submitted to an examination. The chief, if negative, value of examinations was perhaps that they provided the League with a safeguard against second-rate candidates in whose behalf strong national pressure was being applied.

In other respects, the difference of educational standards proved less of an obstacle than might be assumed. Certain university degrees constitute a fairly good common denominator, whether the candidate be English, Rumanian, or Chilean. Qualifications for higher administrative posts are fairly comparable in the countries of Western civilization. The problem becomes baffling only when it is necessary to deal with persons belonging to entirely different cultures or races. An Indian or a Chinese trained and educated in his own country would certainly better represent India or China from the point of view of the psychology of his country. But—leaving aside the language question—his lack of familiarity with the customs of the Western world and the traditions and techniques of a Western administration might make him practically useless for the day-to-day routine of an international agency—and also to his own country. The way out chosen by Geneva consisted in recruiting Asiatics trained in London or Paris, and hence thoroughly familiar with Western habits and administrative traditions. While this compromise worked admirably in the case of some Chinese, it proved unsatisfactory in the case of the Indians, some of whom could not be considered representative of their country. Certain of them considered themselves more "Oxford men" than exponents of the

inarticulate millions of India—more English gentlemen than their genuinely Anglo-Saxon colleagues. The Japanese, of course, were as a rule able to present candidates efficiently trained for their work, supremely qualified, entirely westernized in their outward appearance, but Japanese when faced with the dilemma created by the sinister development of Japanese politics.

One of the most serious problems facing the chief of personnel of an international agency can be summed up in the juxtaposition: "language proficiency versus general ability." Twenty years of experience in international administration have shown that a natural gift for languages is often in inverse ratio to other qualifications and gifts. In the case of persons whose mother tongue was English or French—the two official languages of the League—the problem was of minor importance, although sufficient knowledge of both languages⁶ was required of any League official. Persons whose mother tongue was neither French nor English were at a special disadvantage. In addition to their mother tongue, a full knowledge of one of the two official languages and a knowledge of the other sufficient to carry out administrative work in it was required of them. While lack of general qualifications cannot be compensated by any amount of experience and routine, deficient knowledge of languages can be made up for, to a certain point, by any person of general ability. The prerequisite of proficiency in English and French therefore lowered rather than improved the standard of the international administration, apart from the fact that it tended to enhance the disproportionate percentage of officials whose native tongue was either English or French. In future, in my opinion, the gift of tongues should be relegated to a less prominent place in the general scale of qualifications for international work.

This raises another, and much neglected, point of importance in connection with international administration. Experience has shown that newly recruited international officials coming from national administrations or other professional activities needed, as a rule, up to a year to reach the standard of efficiency required of members of the international administration. The training was exclusively of the in-service sort. The preparation given by graduate schools of the type of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, was of a purely scientific nature, with special emphasis on international law. It familiarized the students with the problems of international life and government rather than with administrative problems. No attempt was made, either by the Rappard Institute or by any of the European diplomatic schools or colleges like

⁶ The Geneva experience proved that the "insular" British, with their alleged inability to learn other languages, were as a rule much more adroit in handling French than the French in acquiring the minimum knowledge of English needed in a bi-lingual administration.

the Vienna *Konsular Akademie*, to deal in its instruction with the technical exigencies of diplomacy or international administration. As most of the officials of the First Division were recruited at a relatively mature age (compared with the diplomatic and kindred services of the different countries), the problem was of lesser importance in the past. Coinciding with the progressive contraction of the international services, it led, however, to a dangerously false age distribution within the League Secretariat, a mistake any future international administration will have to avoid. The post-war world will probably witness not only a revival of international activities, but an extraordinary growth of all kinds of public and semi-official or private international agencies and unions in many fields of human activity. It would, therefore, be a mistake to rely entirely upon in-service training. From the beginning, future international bodies must recruit young people who will make international administration their life career. A systematic study of the possibilities and methods of training staffs for the international agencies of the future should therefore be recommended to authorities and academic bodies attempting to prepare for the future so far as it can be done in advance.

Considering the difficulties which accompany the recruiting of international officials, it is truly remarkable how few mistakes were made as long as the Geneva administration remained master of its own house. The situation changed with the rise of authoritarian or totalitarian governments. With their growth and numerical increase, the whole structure of the Secretariat was challenged to the core.

IV. HOMOGENEITY OF THE EARLY SECRETARIAT

The nucleus of the League Secretariat was composed of a body of extraordinarily able men who were passionately devoted to the idea of the League and bound by personal loyalty to the first Secretary-General. These members of the first hour had been recruited chiefly from among officials of the Interallied technical bodies. They had learned to appreciate the potentialities of supra-national organization, had acquired personal experience in the running of multi-national committees, and were eager to put their unique insight at the service of peace-time collaboration. They were prepared to put the needs of the League above their predilection for the points of view of their own governments. This applies especially to the British, including those hailing from the Dominions. These British officials were certainly the ones who most earnestly strove to be objective, fair, impartial, and international in their daily practice. Having been most actively engaged in defeating Germany, they were now least swayed by prejudices against their erst-while foes.

Something similar can be said of the original French officials, but with the reservation that they consciously or subconsciously identified the

Versailles settlement with international justice, and that they were more political-minded than their British colleagues. As to the "neutrals" of the original Secretariat, they had been chiefly recruited, not at home, but in London or Paris, where they had shown definitely pro-Allied views during the war. If the atmosphere of the Secretariat was distinctly inter-Allied in the early twenties, it was nevertheless not narrow or nationalistic, and the Secretariat itself favored, more than the governments and peoples of the countries of which it was composed, everything which could possibly facilitate the early admission of Germany into the League.

The homogeneity of the Secretariat was first challenged when Fascism took over in Italy. This development created for the Secretary-General of the League and the Director of the International Labor Office the unenviable situation of having under their command a whole group of officials antagonistic to or unpopular with their own government—in many cases unable to carry out the simple tasks of liaison. Their value as officials was thus diminished in one very important respect.

This created a very real dilemma during the first ten years of Fascism. Mussolini professed sympathy for Geneva and posed as a friend of peace. He tried to prove that Fascism, being an internal institution, was in no way incompatible with the ideals of international collaboration.⁹ Italy occupied a prominent place as a permanent member of the Council, and she still coöperated fully in most of the innumerable committees of the League. Moreover, the general feeling that Italy had been treated unfairly at the Peace Conference and the belief that Fascism was, partly at least, the Italian answer to the disappointment of the nation in the Paris settlement, led to the desire to avoid everything which could possibly hurt Italy's feelings and drive her to sever her ties with the victors of yesterday. Under these circumstances, the Secretary-General had to choose between his desire to keep old trusted collaborators and, on the other hand, separating himself from the liberal and democratic elements among his Italian officials. The first meant, under the given circumstances, to sacrifice what seemed major considerations of international coöperation to considerations of personnel. To dismiss anti-fascist officials, on the other hand, was equivalent to sacrificing to political exigencies the basis upon which the international administration had been built. Dismissing officials for being loyal to the League rather than to their government would have meant impairment of the human foundation upon which the whole administration rested.

⁹ While the bombardment and seizure of Corfu in 1923 clearly illustrated the dangers inherent in Fascist foreign policy, the subsequent evacuation of that island under the pressure exerted by the Conference of Ambassadors suggested a willingness on the part of Rome not to force issues and to avoid any breach with the Allies of yesterday.

In fairness to Sir Eric, it must be said that, unlike his successor, he made serious efforts to preserve his independence against outside pressure, by backing individual officials whose removal was desired, sometimes with considerable inconvenience to himself. But he was, unfortunately, unable to safeguard the prerogatives that had been guaranteed by the Covenant itself. He yielded, step by step, fighting, it is true, for each individual position, but yield he did, thus inevitably preparing the ground for more serious future defections. A similar situation faced the Director of the International Labor Office. The Secretariat and the Labor Office began to exchange its "liberal" Italians, who were not prepared to make the necessary accommodations, for people more in harmony with the new philosophy and technique of the Italian government, or offered posts to Fascist nominees while keeping the old and trusted Italians in technical jobs.

As the Fascist government at that time still wished to remain inside the charmed circle, and had, moreover, not yet fully adopted a policy of revisionism and dynamism in international affairs, the practical consequences were not immediately visible. The new Italian officials remained on the whole coöperative. They were, as a group, more Italian than Fascist. This situation was bound to change with the increasing separation of Italian foreign policies from the general line of Allied coöperation. But only with the entry of Germany into the League was international administration submitted to its first serious test of continuity. The subsequent estrangement between the Italians and Japanese and their previous allies and the evolution of a revisionist front, united in their dislike of Geneva methods and procedures, tended increasingly to destroy that psychological unity and singleness of purpose characteristic of the first years. How did Geneva stand this test?

V. THE REVISIONIST AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE

With Germany's entry into the League and the simultaneous inclusion of Germans in the League staff, a number of problems arose with which the Geneva administration had not been faced in the past. The German officials quite naturally introduced a new outlook in international problems. Their interest centered upon the questions of equality of status for the defeated countries, upon revisionism, disarmament, and the problems of minorities. They were bound to challenge opinions that had been accepted as a matter of course among the older officials. A terrific effort at impartiality was suddenly demanded of a majority of officials whose instinctive sympathies were naturally with London and Paris.

The second problem introduced by the presence of the Germans consisted in the challenge to the homogeneity of the international staff. The bulk of the older officials had made the League their career. They had life-long contracts, and had severed all links binding them to the national

administrations of their own countries. They neither expected nor had been promised official positions in case of their return home, whereas the majority of the Germans were government officials on leave for the duration of their service at Geneva. They looked forward to returning to Germany and to resuming their previous activities in the Wilhelmstrasse in the German diplomatic service or in the ministerial departments from which they had been temporarily severed. They never made that break with the past that would have allowed them to transfer their allegiance fully to Geneva. On the other hand, they brought to their respective activities considerable administrative experience, a general civil service attitude, and that German readiness to obey orders that is at least as typical of the average German as his inclination to serve Germany first and last. As long as they were not prevented by Berlin from serving the League loyally, they were, on the whole, exemplary officials, reliable if not inspiring, and by no means disliked or distrusted by their colleagues hailing from other countries.¹⁰

In the case of the Italians, the coöperative attitude of early Fascism had blurred the recognition that a foreign body had entered the League organism. With astonishment first, with growing apprehension later, League officials became aware that their Italian colleagues served as agents of their government within the Secretariat and were guided in their conduct by their loyalty, not to the League, but to their home government.

The more the revisionist attitude of Rome developed, the more these Italian officials constituted a nation "cell," grouped around the Fascist Undersecretary-General Paulucci di Calbole Barone, a typical representative of Fascist party officialdom. A similar, if less extreme, situation arose with regard to other officials, as one European country after another abandoned its democratic or near-democratic régime in favor of an authoritarian, semi-fascist, or totalitarian system of government. A twofold problem was thus created, consisting in the decreasing reliability of individual officials and, secondly, in the increasing difficulty of recruiting the type of personnel suitable for international work.

There is no need to dwell upon the first aspect. As to the second, it became more and more difficult to select candidates with an international outlook who would at the same time be acceptable to their government.

¹⁰ With two exceptions, all of the previous German League officials made their peace with the Nazis. Some attained even a kind of unsavory celebrity, amongst them Cecil von Renthe-Fink, German minister to Denmark at the time of the German invasion of that country, and the gentle Dr. Nolda, whose sinister rôle in the German invasion of Norway has been exposed by Carl J. Hambro in his record of the invasion of his country.

The very qualities that would make a candidate from such countries an ideal recruit now invariably disqualified him in the eyes of his home régime. The candidates most likely to find favor at home would be staunch nationalists, party men, potential agents. Thus the circle of persons from which the successful candidate could be chosen without slight to his government was so much narrowed down that the Secretary-General had to make appointments from among persons whom he would certainly not have chosen had he retained a free hand. These persons would instinctively be considered as outsiders by their colleagues at Geneva, and they themselves would find the Geneva atmosphere uncongenial. They were mentally and temperamentally unfit for their new tasks.

Such development created problems far beyond the comparatively minor question of individual trustworthiness or readiness to cooperate and play the game. It threatened to demoralize the whole body of those who remained loyal and were determined to maintain their allegiance to the League over and above their allegiance to their own country. As soon as one group, or a number of groups, within the Secretariat became organized on national rather than professional lines and began to play national politics within the international body, those retaining their previous allegiance and standards of professional ethics put their own countries at a distinct disadvantage. There were times, at the beginning of the thirties, when the governments of Italy, Germany, Japan, and Poland were informed by some of their countrymen in the League Secretariat of the most confidential developments, while London risked facing unknown situations. If this did not assume really dangerous proportions, it was due in part to the fact that London and Paris were engaged at the time in a policy of weakness and compliance toward the rising power and impudence of the totalitarian and authoritarian countries; it was due even more to the fact that these developments occurred at a time when the center of international policies had already begun to shift from Geneva. What happened at Geneva had, in itself, become less important. The decline of international ethics in that center was therefore of less consequence than it would have been had similar developments taken place in the heyday of League influence, during the years 1925 to 1930.

VI. CONDITIONS FOR A WORKING INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

There is no magic formula for producing a wholly efficient and reliable international administration. But there are a number of conditions that must be met in creating the basis for a working international machinery.

The most important single step consists in protecting the international official, as much as is humanly possible, against unfair pressure from out-

side. This can be done most effectively by maintaining the comparatively high level of salaries prevalent at Geneva, but even more by granting life contracts to the bulk of officials, thereby freeing them from any apprehension regarding their future. Lifetime appointments are possible and practical for most of those engaged in political and technical work. The only serious argument that can be advanced against such a policy is the danger of such officials losing contact with the national life of their own countries. This danger can be circumvented by introducing the academic device of the sabbatical year, enabling officials to resume from time to time the necessary contact with their countrymen. This would not prevent the creation of another type of appointment of shorter duration reserved for officials chiefly engaged in liaison work at home. A clear distinction, however, would have to be maintained between these two categories, preventing any identification of the *bona fide* international official with the diplomatic representative of a government within the international body. Moreover, the international official would have to be protected against other kinds of pressure by the creation of internationally recognized passports issued by the international body itself.¹¹ This would enable him to travel and to carry out his duties without any possibility of backdoor interference by diplomatic or consular officials of his country of origin.

The Geneva experiment has demonstrated that international administration is possible, and that it can be successful up to a certain point, even under particularly unfavorable conditions. It has shown that citizens of forty or more nations can be brought together in one service, and that differences in background, social origins, education, and psychology do not in themselves constitute an insurmountable obstacle to international coöperation. Sir Eric Drummond once jokingly declared that the quarrels that occurred during his tenure of office never arose between officials of different nationalities, as one would have expected, but rather between officials of the same origin. At a time when the world was politically and spiritually deeply disunited, Germans served in Geneva under French directors and Englishmen under a Japanese chief, as if this were the most natural arrangement in the world. It was the difference in their administrative traditions and methods rather than their national psychologies that created the difficulties that actually arose.

There is a significant lesson to be learned from this experience. Among

¹¹ Contrary to a widespread belief, such League passports did not exist. An attempt to obtain authorization by the Assembly to issue such travelling documents failed. This led, in the thirties, to the absurd situation of officials who had lost their nationality through denaturalization enjoying diplomatic privileges in their capacity as members of the League Secretariat, but possessing no valid passports.

the members of the League administration, nationality played a less important rôle than could possibly have been expected, up to the moment when outside influence artificially recreated barriers. Any group of officials engaged in the same endeavor, bound by the same rules and regulations, and thrown together in the same locality, is certain to develop an *esprit de corps*. The pursuit in which they are engaged constitutes more than a mere material bond. The League was no exception to this rule. Quicker than could have been anticipated, there developed among the international officials at Geneva this *esprit de corps*, a common psychology, a common defense against the outsider. This common denominator was membership in the Secretariat, and it was soon stronger than previous professions and even national differences. This development would certainly have continued and given rise to a definite type of international official. But the mounting disorganization of international life, the growing divergence of the political régimes at home, the increasing need on the part of the individual official to manoeuver for position in his own country, the difficulty of assimilating the freshly recruited newcomers belonging to an altogether different type of humankind, arrested and even reversed the development.

If such uniformity could be attained between 1920 and 1935 in Geneva, by a League whose political influence after 1928 was constantly on the decline, in a world receding with gigantic strides into the old mechanism of unrestricted power politics, it is safe to assume that, whatever the difficulties of future collective action may be, they will not be found in the assembling and functioning of an international civil service. Although the League possessed no vestige of sovereignty, and although the personal security of the individual officer was increasingly threatened as the international anarchy developed and outside influences were increasingly allowed to interfere, the common purpose proved stronger than the elements of disintegration.

How incomparably easier such a process would be if the loose association which constituted the League could be superseded, after the present conflict, by a more obligatory and coercive body of international action! Such an international agency would in a short time develop all the loyalties and devotions of old established national administrations. International government, which really would be government, not sham government, would have not the slightest difficulty in creating a civil service equal, and probably superior, to that of any individual country. Such an agency would have a unique basis for the recruiting of its collaborators, and would attract the keenest and most disinterested minds of the different nations. It could enlist the *élite* of an entire generation for its incomparably fascinating task.

RECONSTRUCTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE

DINKO TOMAŠIĆ

Indiana University

I

The area of small nations between the Baltic and the Mediterranean has always been exposed to the rivalries and pressures of the Great Powers, due to its strategic and commercial importance, and because of its location on crossroads of conflicting cultures, religions, political and economic systems. A like situation might again arise at the end of the present war when the peasant peoples of these regions find themselves faced with the growing strength of the Soviet socialism and an expanding Western capitalism, whose application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms might widely differ. The problem of reconstruction of this part of Europe should be examined, therefore, from the point of view of the possibility of reorganizing this zone of perennial friction and insecurity into a politically and economically balanced and stabilized unit, and into a constructive link between the two diverse worlds of ideas and of institutional practices.

The internal political difficulties of these countries, from Poland to Greece, have in the main resulted from the incompatibility of the feudal-like régimes with the growing political activation of the people. The states formed on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire inherited many of its feudal characteristics. In Poland, a military group, landed gentry, and state officials, supported by the Church hierarchy, ruled the country, while the parliament and the written constitution existed only nominally.¹ In Hungary, the landed magnates and gentry were the actual ruling classes,² and in Austria medieval scholasticism and clericalism were the ideological and political agents behind the authoritarian régime.³ Of all succession states, Czechoslovakia alone seemed superficially free of feudal remnants, because this industrially advanced country had an independent and liberal bourgeois class.⁴ But even this Czech bourgeoisie and its intelligentsia as a dominant group have not been quite free from a certain "colonial" attitude in regard to industrially undeveloped Slovakia and Ruthenia, which explained dissatisfaction in these regions. In the Catholic

¹ Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (New York, 1939), pp. 13, 23, 96-97, 156, 181-185, 299.

² *South-Eastern Europe; A Political and Economic Survey* (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1939), pp. 57-59.

³ Ernst Karl Winter, "Salvage for a Fourth Austria," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (Apr., 1941), p. 68. See also G. E. R. Gedyé, *Betrayal in Central Europe* (New York, 1939), Chap. 3.

⁴ Raymond L. Buell, *Europe: A History of Ten Years* (New York, 1939), pp. 313-322.

Slovak parts of this state, the feudal forces manifested themselves in the dominant influence of the Church in all spheres of national life. Equally dominant was the Church among Slovenes; while in Croatia its political influence declined with the growth of the peasant movement.⁵

The states formed in southeastern Europe as heirs to the Ottoman Empire retained some of the main characteristics of that political system. In Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Albania, the royal courts, backed by the army, ruled their respective countries in much the same way as former Turkish pashas. This is why in all of these countries the dynasts, the court camarillas, and the army played such a preponderant rôle in internal political struggles.⁶

The net result of such a political development was that in the states of Central Europe the power remained concentrated in the hands of dominant minorities while the majorities became increasingly self-conscious and aggressive in their political behavior, demanding a share in economic and political control. These majority groups consisted of peasants, growing middle classes, industrial and agricultural workers, and national minorities. When mobilized politically into movements and parties, these dissatisfied strata, which represented the overwhelming majority of the population, became a real threat to the minorities that had monopolized the social power.

In a properly functioning democratic system, such a situation could be corrected without any great internal or international repercussions. The representatives of the majorities would increasingly tend to share the responsibilities of the government. On the other hand, the ruling minorities would endeavor to identify themselves with the interests and aspirations of the majority. Events did not take such a turn in these countries. There the ruling few, facing the threat of being overthrown by the ascending majority movements, and not experienced enough to cope with the complexities of an age of industrialism and democratization, resorted to authoritarian methods and force as a means of self-defense. The series of *coup d'états* and dictatorships in this part of the world between the two world wars was to a great extent an expression of the fears and anxieties of these privileged small groups which felt impotent against the growing strength of the organized people.

The authoritarian régimes, however, only increased the internal tensions, and central Europe became a fertile field for underground activities and revolutionary movements. It was in such conditions that Com-

⁵ Dinko Tomašić, "Croatia in European Politics," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (Apr., 1942), pp. 67, 72-73.

⁶ *South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, pp. 68-73, 78, 88, 90-94, 99-104. Greece secured independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro in 1878, Bulgaria in 1908, and Albania in 1913.

munism was spreading and that Fascist-like and Nazi-like terroristic organizations such as IMRO in Macedonia, Ustasi in Croatia, Arrow Cross in Hungary, Iron Guard in Rumania, and Zbor in Serbia rose and flourished. The ruling groups had to rely more and more on the army and police force, and a régime of oppression and violence resulted.

Weakened by economic and political difficulties, and unable to unite for common defense and economic coöperation, the ruling classes could not expect to be able to resist the growing might of Nazism. Besides, the ruling few were aware of the fact that an attack on their countries, whether they resisted or not, might easily mean the end of their rule. It was for these reasons that they became inclined toward a policy of conciliation. As early as 1934, the Polish government proceeded to a rapprochement with Nazi Germany and concluded a non-aggression pact for ten years. There were signs indicating that in 1934, shortly before his death, King Alexander of Yugoslavia conducted secret negotiations with Hitler and consented to the annexation of Austria. Following this policy of appeasement, the rulers of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, one after another, signed the Tripartite Pact.

The overlordship imposed by Hitler only increased the instability of this area. Both the Nazis and Fascists deepened the existing antagonisms by playing one faction against the other and by favoring one nation at the expense of its neighbors. Widespread sabotage, guerrillas, counter-guerrillas, and mass executions are the results of this policy. And there can be no doubt that the end of hostilities will find this territory in a state of chaos and anarchy unless joint Allied armed forces, including British, American, and Soviet troupes, occupy the entire area and keep it occupied until a lasting solution for the whole complexity of its problems can be found.

Since the recent past of this part of the world reveals all political systems imposed from above failing against the increasing resistance of the people, the only policy that can be followed by the occupational authorities in the political reconstruction of these regions seems to be that of defeudalization and democratization. Any plan aimed at restoring the former ruling minorities to power, in disregard of the wishes of the peoples concerned, might prove disastrous from the point of view of consolidation of the area, and might easily lead to civil wars and revolutions, especially if the dissatisfied majorities should look towards the Soviet Union to support their claims. In such a case, Russia, even if unwilling, might be forced to interfere. The signs of such a possibility are already clearly visible in the factional strifes and civil wars even now developing in underground Central Europe.⁷

⁷ The clash in Yugoslavia between the "Chetniks" and the "Partisans" and "Green Cadres" is an expression of the sharp conflict which exists between the feudal and the anti-feudal tendencies in that country. This cleavage seems to have

The democratization of these countries would have to be preceded by a complete demilitarization of the whole area. Speaking generally, in all of the countries the army formerly engaged in political activities. In some of them, as in Yugoslavia and Poland, the military had such influence that not even a shadow of criticism could be voiced against it. In the Belgrade Parliament, for instance, no one ever dared to criticize the army's budget or its administration and policies.⁸ A privileged status, unequalled by that of any other class, was acquired and held by the army in this entire area, because it was mainly upon the support of the army that the minority rule depended. As long as such a state of affairs exists in a country, the parliaments, the "bill of rights," and any other democratic institutions have only a nominal existence; they exist as long as it pleases the army. And these countries become still more politically unstable when the army itself is split between various cliques and their feuds.

The power and influence of the militaristic groups have been justified on the ground of the necessity of defense for countries constantly threatened by aggressive neighbors. It was clearly shown in the recent past, however, that, taken separately, not one of the countries was able to defend itself, and that internal conditions prevented all of them from uniting for common defense. Their defense in the future will become even more precarious because of the new techniques of warfare which put small countries at the complete mercy of powerful neighbors. Therefore, the reasons for building up big and expensive national armies in small countries seem to be out of date. Not only are there no military reasons for such a plan, but it would prove disastrous also for economic reasons, just as it has in the recent past, for small and economically undeveloped countries to keep armies of the kind that used to absorb up to forty per cent of their budgets.

The only way in which effective defense of central Europe can be achieved is by means of a common defense plan entrusted to a regional military authority composed of the representatives of all the nations from Poland to Greece and supported by a new League of Nations, or any like international organization, in which Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union would take a part.⁹ Not only in such a case would the

deepened as a result of differences in the attitudes taken on this issue by the Soviet Union and by some British and American official circles. The situation in underground Poland is not unlike that in Yugoslavia.

⁸ Dinko Tomašić, "The Struggle for Power in Yugoslavia," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (July, 1941), pp. 164-165.

⁹ This would be in agreement with the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of 1942 in which the two contracting parties expressed a desire "to unite with other like-minded states in adopting proposals for common action to resist aggression in the post-war period" (Art. III), and also "to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the reestablishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe" (Art. V).

military security of these regions be safeguarded, but the nations of the area would be enabled to reduce considerably the size of their armies and relieve their budgets and their policies from the pressure of militarism.

The problem of demilitarization of this area is closely connected with that of the restoration of monarchies. Monarchies themselves are feudal remnants, and once restored, they may foster the revival of some of their feudal counterparts like the landed aristocracy, personal armies, and personal bureaucracies. It was, for instance, the exclusive personal privilege of Yugoslavia's monarchs to appoint the army chiefs and to direct the foreign policy of the country; no political party or government was strong enough to interfere with these feudal practices inherited from the days of the Turkish administration of Serbia.

The danger of the refeudalization of the countries of central Europe with the help of the restored monarchies would be particularly great in those cases in which the dynasties should not be reestablished on the basis of "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."¹⁰ Not only would this be a denial of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, but such unpopular dynasts would have to revive the privileged minorities of the past in order to protect the dynastic interests. This was in the past, for instance, the case of Greece, where the restoration of the monarchy meant the strengthening of a military group that led the country into military dictatorship.

Among all feudal remnants described above, however, the abolishment of praetorianism—that is, the prevention of the rule of the military cliques—seems the most important from the point of view of democratization. Once the danger of military *putsches* is eliminated, all other feudal remnants, including the monarchies and aristocracies, would lose in significance, because in an age of industrialism the main support of the power of feudalists is their personal armies.

Once the feudal remnants lose in prestige and importance, the road for the democratization of such defeudalized countries is wide open. A further glimpse into the social structure of central Europe might give us an idea of the "age of the common man" which would develop in these countries, once the hundred million people of the area are emancipated from the pressure of the past.

II

Taken as a whole, the area between the Baltic and the Mediterranean has a rural character. Between 77 and 86 per cent of the people live in communities of less than ten thousand inhabitants. Only between three and ten per cent live in urban areas greater than one hundred thousand. There are certain differences, however, between the various countries and

¹⁰ *Atlantic Charter*, Point 3.

sections of this part of Europe. In Croatia, for instance, 77.7 per cent of the people are engaged in agriculture, 10.4 per cent in industry and professions, 5.1 per cent in commerce, banking, and transport, and 6.8 per cent are engaged in civil service and other occupations. The proportions are not dissimilar in Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Poland, Slovakia, and, to a certain extent, in Greece. In Hungary, 55.8 per cent of the people are engaged in agriculture and 30.1 per cent in industrial and commercial activities; but this still classifies it among predominantly rural countries.¹² Even in Austria and Bohemia, the only two sections of the area which are predominantly industrial, about one-third of the population is engaged in agriculture.

The low economic standard of these countries is illustrated by the fact that their pre-war import was 6-9 dollars per capita as compared with 96 dollars of imported goods per capita in Belgium and 99 dollars per capita in the United Kingdom. The main reason for these conditions is found in the fact that before the war there were about eighteen million too many people for the level of the agricultural development of these regions.¹³ This agricultural over-population was a heavy burden upon the whole economy of this part of Europe, and the problem of economic reconstruction of the area seems to consist primarily in finding ways of employing this surplus manpower in a more economical manner. This means that a way should be found to provide productive employment for at least nine million active surplus people, to make them an economic and social asset instead of an economic liability.

Something might be done to improve this situation by bringing more land under cultivation. But according to students of this problem, the arable land created in this way and the industries which could be developed in connection with such a project would employ only a rather limited part of the active surplus manpower.¹⁴ A more radical solution seems necessary, though land reclamation should not be overlooked as a supplementary measure. All the countries have tried to cope with the question by promoting industrialization. But so far this has not proved a sound

¹² *Handbook of Central and East Europe* (Zurich, 1932), p. 360.

¹³ One-third of the agricultural population in Poland, Croatia, and Bulgaria represents a burden which prevents the further advance of agriculture in these countries. See Rudolf Bićanić, "Excess Population," *The Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, European Agriculture* (London, 1942), pp. 141-142.

¹⁴ It is estimated that there are about forty million acres of unproductive land between the Baltic and the Mediterranean, consisting of marshes, flooded land, sandy ground, and land depleted by erosion. There are also about sixty-five million acres of forests, and a great part of this could be used for more productive purposes. Yet all the cultivable land which could be created in this way could absorb hardly more than one million surplus manpower. R. Bićanić, *op. cit.*, pp. 142 f.

remedy. Industries in the area could be built only behind high protective tariff barriers, and the industrialization benefited mainly the urban populations. In many cases, this kind of industrialization actually reduced the standard of living of the peasant, whose low cash income could not secure many of the needed but highly priced industrial products. This was due only partly to the lack of natural resources, to the high interest on capital, and to the deficiency in skilled labor. The main reason for the failure of industrialization in this part of Europe was a deficient home demand—that is, the lack of an internal market sufficiently developed to absorb an increasing output of the home industries.¹⁵ And the only way to develop the internal market in such an overwhelmingly agricultural area is by raising the purchasing power of the broadest stratum of its population, i.e., the peasantry. But this would necessitate a radical change in the existing system of cultivation in these countries.

At present, by far the greatest portion of arable land in this area is used for the cultivation of cereals; only about 14 per cent is used for the cultivation of vegetables and fodder. The cultivation of wheat, maize, and other cereals is extensive in nature and absorbs relatively much less manpower than gardening, livestock breeding, and dairy production. Moreover, the cash income from the sale of cereals has considerably decreased, due primarily to the competition of vast, extensively cultivated, and greatly mechanized agricultural regions overseas. The export of cereals in the countries of southeastern Europe, for example, not only dropped to one-third of its level before the first World War, but had to be kept even at this greatly reduced volume by artificial means. This raised the internal price of wheat in the countries well above the world level.¹⁶

The replacement of the existing uneconomic production of wheat and maize by livestock breeding, poultry and dairy farming, fruit growing, gardening, and cultivation of plants for industrial use would have a number of beneficial effects. In the first place, it would absorb the greater part of the existing surplus manpower and would stimulate the development of industries connected with the processing of local agricultural products. The industries built on these foundations would have to be decentralized and kept in the villages, or close to them, in order best to absorb the remaining surplus manpower.¹⁷ In this way, the peasants employed in nearby industries would not have to be uprooted from their native social and cultural environment, and some of the undesirable consequences of modern urbanization and proletarianization would be avoided. Combined with increased incomes, this would make for more satisfactory and creative living in the rural areas.

¹⁵ *South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*; also R. Bićanić, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

¹⁶ *South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, p. 184.

¹⁷ At present, less than one-third of the available labor hours are used in the winter months.

Many of these industries could be organized on a coöperative basis in which peasants, too, would participate. Increased in all of these ways, the cash receipts of the peasants would raise the purchasing power and standard of living in the whole area.¹⁸ This would prepare a sound basis for further mechanization of agriculture and for an increasing industrialization of the regions.

At present, the average size of peasant holdings in southeastern Europe is twelve acres; but many holdings are smaller.¹⁹ In order to increase the average to a level necessary for a decent standard of living,²⁰ some changes in the existing conditions of land tenure will be needed, such as expropriation of the feudal estates and limitation of the size and ownership of landholdings. Once a system of small-sized farms is developed and sufficiently mechanized, these can be worked by the members of a peasant family alone, especially with the help of the new type of agricultural machines adapted to such small-sized rural properties. The economic efficiency of the small farms could be increased through agricultural coöperatives in marketing, credit, and supply of agricultural equipment.

This project of economic reconstruction, including land reclamation, the intensification of agriculture, and industrialization, presupposes a common authority to coördinate economic plans within the entire area between the Baltic and the Aegean in order to develop it into a complementary and well-balanced economic unit. Within the sphere of such a regional economic authority would come such problems as the stabilization of prices and of foreign exchange, the problem of tariff barriers, the development of means of transport and communications, wage legislation and labor migration, and the regional allocation of industries and production. But the steps taken by such a regional authority would have to be coördinated with those of an international economic authority within the new League of Nations, considering the interests of a world market and the needs of a world economic and social reconstruction. A regional economic project in central Europe, for instance, would need abundant capital equipment and technical knowledge which could not possibly be provided by these countries alone. Such a situation might easily provoke rivalries between the Great Powers over priorities of investment. In order to avoid conflicts, and to prevent the political and economic dependency which

¹⁸ This is, for instance, the case of Greece, whose standard of living is higher than in the neighboring countries because of the cultivation of industrial plants and the development of industries processing the agricultural products, especially tobacco and currants (*South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, p. 158). This is also the case of the Dalmatian coast, where the peasants are engaged primarily in wine production.

¹⁹ In 1931, the number of inhabitants per square kilometer of cultivated land was 336 in Greece, 181 in Yugoslavia, 147 in Hungary, 140 in Bulgaria, and 128 in Rumania (*South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, p. 158).

²⁰ It is estimated that three to four acres of cultivated land *per head* would be necessary.

might result from such investments, as has often occurred in the past history of these countries, the new League of Nations could be entrusted with powers of supervision over schemes of economic development in the area. The League, in which the Western Powers and the Soviet Union would be represented, should keep these territories open for investment on equal terms to the governmentalized and non-governmentalized capital exporting economies; and this would involve a study of the possibilities of investments and of their profitableness from the point of view of both the lending and the borrowing countries.²¹

The most significant result of the democratization of central Europe and of its economic reconstruction on the basis of small-sized farms and industrial decentralization will be manifested in accession to power by the political parties supported by the peasantry. This process has already been taking place in most of central European countries. In Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania, and Croatia, strong peasant movements have been seeking to develop a "peasant democracy," until checked in their endeavors by military *coup d'états*, royal dictatorships, and Nazi invasion. But these movements persist and are very active underground; their strength will grow in the course of time. The coming into power of these parties supported by the peasantry and "peasant ideologies" will have the most stabilizing effect for central European countries, as the peasants of this whole area have much in common, not only in matters of economic interest, but also from the point of view of political and cultural aspirations, attitudes, and philosophy of life.²²

There are only four to five million industrial workers in this region as compared to sixty-three million peasants, or an active agricultural population of more than forty million; but even so, the working class in a democratized central Europe will undoubtedly have an important influence upon affairs of those countries, especially when allied with the peasants or with the middle classes. Its influence and strength will grow with the increasing industrialization.

The bourgeoisie, especially the industrial and commercial middle class, is not yet well developed in most of the countries of the area. In

²¹ J. E. Meade, *The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace* (New York, 1940), pp. 112-113.

²² The representatives of the "peasant communities" from central Europe met in London in 1942 and agreed on a common "Peasant Program" which stresses the necessity for providing the peoples of this area with democratic institutions (Preamble) and with sufficient land, agricultural coöperatives, credit, insurance, and stabilization of prices (Points 1-4); it proposes scientific improvement in land, machinery, seeds, and livestock breeding (Points 5-6), and demands development of agricultural industries, improvement in communications, lowering of tariff barriers (Points 9-11), and agricultural education and general rural welfare as essential parts of the common platform (Points 7-8).

these—primarily in such as are less industrially developed—a considerable part of the middle-class population consists of civil service employees. They cannot be relied upon as defenders of democratic régimes; in fact, in the past they easily lent their support to authoritarian systems. But along with the increasing industrialization will develop an independent middle class of small and medium-sized business men and learned professionals who, together with the peasantry and the industrial workers, will become the backbone of a democratic system in central Europe.

III

One of the immediate tasks of reconstruction will consist in eliminating the cultural friction and the national antagonisms so traditional in this part of Europe; as is well known, the difficulties of these countries and their chronic instability in the past developed on cultural and psychological as well as on economic and political grounds. If a solution of national and cultural rivalries and sensitivities is not found, all plans concerning economic and political reorganization in this part of the world will be constructed on very shaky foundations. National, cultural, and religious struggles prevented both the Ottoman and Austrian Empires from consolidating themselves in these regions. The same explanation could be given for the failure of the régimes created by the Treaty of Versailles, because the succession states, although lacking national and cultural homogeneity, organized themselves in the form of strongly centralized communities with master nations and subjected nationalities. No attempt was made to replace the former Austro-Hungarian Empire by a system of multi-ethnic confederated communities organized on the principle of ethnic equality and coöperation. The result was the heightening of hostilities and tensions between the nations of the area, the formation of antagonistic *blocs*, the rise of power politics, and final disintegration.

There is no doubt that in an age of political activation of the masses the principle of reconstruction to be applied in this direction will have to be that of self-determination as declared by the Atlantic Charter.²³ But in an area consisting of a great variety of ethnic groups with widely different levels of political and cultural development, the difficulty will consist in finding ways to apply the principles of "sovereign rights" and "self-government" without unnecessary parceling, and without endangering the stability of the whole area.

There cannot be any doubt that the principle of national independence will have to be applied in the cases in which the national consciousness and the mass will to statehood is already strongly developed and stabilized and can readily be recognized in the trends of the past and present polit-

²³ *Atlantic Charter*, Points 2 and 3.

ical behavior of a people. It is too soon to expect that in an age of nationalism these politically activated and nationally conscious peoples would be willing to sacrifice their political autonomy and cultural identity, even for a union organized on a universal basis. It is true that such a shift in allegiance would require a social and ideological revolution replacing national for international loyalties, which is not likely to happen in the immediate future.²⁴ Much less would any politically mature people, whose loyalties have become definitely molded to its own separate culture and traditions, accept a union dominated by another nation.²⁵ If the principle of "sovereign rights and self-government" is denied to such a people, the reaction resulting from the loss of dignity and from the frustrated drive toward full statehood will certainly take a violent and revolutionary course. The history of all the peoples in central Europe, from Greece to Poland, is a long record of revolutionary struggle for freedom from alien domination. This has been true also of some newer political formations, like Yugoslavia, where revolutionary movements and terroristic activities developed as soon as the Croats realized that the new state was organized and ruled for the exclusive interests of the Serbian ruling minority, and that the Croats not only did not gain any freedom from former oppression, but had lost even that degree of self-government which they enjoyed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The feeling of humiliation which the Croats experienced in this way, and their frustrated will to full nationhood, prompted them to develop a strong movement for independence. Their reaction against the violent methods employed by the Serbian rulers to subdue them resulted in underground terroristic activities which culminated in the assassination of King Alexander, under whose dictatorship the status of Croatia reached its lowest level.²⁶ It is rightly expected, therefore, that after the years of Nazi and Fascist misrule and persecution of European nations there is going to be a resurgence of nationalism all over Europe. No post-war planning which ignores these realities can possibly be successful.

On the other hand, it is certain that the desire for independent nationhood does not exist in the regions with ethnically mixed populations where the different national allegiances of the various ethnic groups of the region take precedence over common territorial and other loyalties. This is, for instance, the case with Transylvania, where the allegiances of the natives to Rumanian or to Hungarian national symbols transcend their

²⁴ John H. Herz, "Power Politics and World Organization," in this REVIEW, Dec., 1942, pp. 1045-46.

²⁵ Hoover and Gibson, *The Problems of Lasting Peace* (New York, 1943), pp. 230-233.

²⁶ Dinko Tomašić, "The Struggle for Power in Yugoslavia," *op. cit.*, pp. 148-159.

attachments to any common local Transylvanian traditions.²⁷ One of the ways to solve the problem of such regions is to partition the contested territory between the contesting nations. Bosnia, for instance, which for ages has been a bone of contention between the Croats and the Serbs, was divided in 1939 between these two nations on the basis of an amicable agreement.²⁸ But such a partition could be made also on the basis of a plebiscite, financed and controlled by the League of Nations or a like international authority. In either case, a transfer of populations might be necessary when the ethnic groups were so interspersed that clear lines of ethnic demarcation could not be found, and when the remaining minorities presented a disturbing political problem, as in various irredentist movements. The transfer of populations between Greece and Turkey, for instance, definitely eliminated the existing tensions and made for friendly relations between the two nations.

It is expected, on the other hand, that in a new Central Europe, whose political and economic stability will be safeguarded through a system of regional and international collective security, the imperialistic tendencies of the small nations will tend to weaken, and that the need for strategic boundaries will lose much of its former importance. In such a case, the trend of the remaining small minorities will be towards acculturation and amalgamation rather than toward irredentism.

The problem of an ethnically mixed region, however, might involve the question of ethnic pride, historical and local traditions, national aspirations, and other sensitivities. It is for this reason that its solution should be sought primarily on the basis of the wishes of the nations and populations concerned. In case, however, a solution satisfactory to all parties cannot be found, such a territory should come under the direct control and administration of the League of Nations or of a regional authority, at least until a lasting solution of its problem can be discovered.

A different case is that of territories settled by distinct ethnic groups which, although insisting on the recognition of their cultural individuality, have not developed claims to independent nationhood. The Slovenes, for instance, have advanced claims to local autonomy, but as yet have not developed mass demands for separate statehood. This is often the case of ethnic units which lack a tradition of independence and self-government, whose middle classes are not sufficiently developed, and which do not, therefore, feel sufficiently confident to form an independence movement of

²⁷ The Rumanian official figures for 1930 gave the following percentages for the inhabitants of Transylvania: Rumanians, 57.82, Hungarians, 24.38, Germans 9.81, Jews, 3.22, others, 4.77.

²⁸ Bosnia-Herzegovina is settled by Croatian-Catholics (23 per cent), Croatian-Moslems (30 per cent), and Eastern Orthodox Serbs (43 per cent).

their own.²⁹ In these cases, the principle of self-determination could be applied in the form of a local self-government within a multi-ethnic federal state. Such local autonomy, however, should be sufficiently advanced to meet the desire of these peoples to develop along the lines of their own standards and values. If an autonomous growth is denied to such self-conscious peoples, their reaction might easily take a non-coöperative and destructive trend. Macedonians, for instance, to whom even the right to use their ethnic name and language was prohibited, reacted with a series of political assassinations which undermined the stability of the whole Balkans.

As for the relations to be organized between the independent nations of this area, two main tendencies seem discernible in a growing variety of general and concrete proposals. One is directed toward strengthening the "balance of power" held by victor nations against the defeated peoples; the other is aimed at the abolishment of national sovereignty and toward a strongly integrated multi-ethnic community between the Baltic and the Mediterranean. It does not seem, however, that the restoration of the Versailles system of power politics could add anything to the lasting security of these regions. The Polish-Czechoslovak declaration of 1940 and the Greek-Yugoslav agreement of 1942, for instance, seem to have been attempts to renew the ill-fated "Little Entente" system in an extended form. But the idea that a particular group of nations in this area should be specifically designated to be the "basis of a new order"³⁰ or a "guarantee of its stability"³¹ implies the domination of some peoples and the degradation of others. This would inevitably provoke antagonisms between the "victors" and the "defeated" peoples, and would definitely bar the possibility of their constructive coöperation.

On the other hand, those who propose a more radical political scheme, such as a federated state with a common parliament, a "super-state" or "supra-national" government, or a new empire to be imposed from above upon culturally divergent peoples, overlook the fact that before both the material and the psychological basis for unity is prepared, there is no chance that such an artificial creation will last, as the case of Yugoslavia has proved. The instability of that country and its downfall resulted in the main from the divergencies in social structures and dominant political philosophies in Croatia and Serbia, and from the wide differences in the standards of administration and in the levels of education in the two countries. Due to these dissimilarities, Croatian and Serb views clashed practically on all issues. This is why a common parliament meant only

²⁹ Dinko Tomašić, "The Struggle for Power in Yugoslavia," *op. cit.*, pp. 161-164. See the same writer's "Sociology in Yugoslavia," *American Journal of Sociology* (July, 1941), pp. 66-69.

³⁰ Polish-Czechoslovak Declaration of Nov. 11, 1940.

³¹ *Ibid.*

the heightening of the existing conflicts, and this is why the rising tensions between the two peoples reached a climax in the assassination of the Croatian peasant leaders by a Serb nationalist representative in the midst of a debate in the Belgrade Skupshtina (Parliament). If each of these two nations had had its own parliament to settle local issues, and if they had had a joint central body to discuss the problems of a common economic and military policy, such a union might have had a good chance to consolidate itself and to exert a stabilizing influence in Central Europe.³²

The case of Yugoslavia shows that relations between the sovereign nations of this area can be organized only on terms of national autonomy and international equality, devoid of any domination or hegemony. This seems the only basis on which a genuine solidarity could develop between the countries concerned. And it is only on these foundations that an association of nations with a joint economic and military policy could be formed which would guarantee the freedom and advancement of the constituent peoples and would enable them to solidify one of the most unstable and most exposed parts of the world—an area which in the recent past has twice precipitated crises of global significance.

Once the imperialistic tendencies and mutual fears and suspicions are eliminated and a certain community of interests and ideals is realized, there is no reason why a central authority among the nations of this area should not function successfully. A central body could be organized in the form of a council, whose powers would be limited mainly to those regional military and economic matters and minority problems discussed in the preceding pages. This "Regional Council" could be composed of delegations sent by the national legislatures and elected for a definite term. On this basis, the regional authority would come into direct relations with the peoples of the area, which would not be the case if the Council should consist only of representatives sent by the national governments. In this way also the stability of the Council would not be threatened by the possible frequent changes in national governments and their policies.

The authority of the Regional Council (if created) and its strength will depend in the main upon popular support and favorable public opinion in the constituent countries. This is why it would be of special importance to devise a system of national representation in the Council which would give all the member nations a sense of equal participation in the decisions of the body, and which would forestall the feeling that one particular nation (or a group of nations) is in a position to impose its hegemony upon the rest. For this reason, an equal number of councilors delegated by each national house of representatives might be advisable, especially in cases

³² Dinko Tomašić, "Croatia in European Politics," *op. cit.*, pp. 81-85. See the same writer's "The Struggle for Power in Yugoslavia," *op. cit.*, pp. 148-165.

where the number of peoples within such an association is limited. This system of numerical equality might be combined with a plan of proportional representation if the Regional Council should extend its authority over a larger group of nations, because on this basis the possibility of domination of one nation, or of a group of nations, over the others would be less likely. In a Council so constituted, a simple or qualified majority vote would be sufficient for reaching decisions on most of the issues. In some cases, however, when affecting the basic relations between the members of the union, a unanimous vote might be necessary.

There is no doubt that such a system of collective military and economic security, integrated within a system of world collective security, could function very effectively if organized for the whole area between the Baltic, the Adriatic, and the Aegean. But smaller commonwealths, also, with common historical, cultural, and economic ties, could be formed on the same principle. On this basis, successful Yugoslav, Danubian, Balkan, Czechoslovak, or other groupings of states could develop. But in any case a new League of Nations, in which these regional *blocs* were represented, would have to plan its own effective instruments for dealing with regional conflicts if the regional agencies should fail to solve them. Such procedures would include also changes in the basic relations between the members of the regional communities if they failed to satisfy the peoples concerned.

Cultural and political independence within a wider system of collective security and economic coördination seems to be the way by which sovereign nations can be integrated into regional and international associations without endangering their own autochthonous development. Croatia and Hungary, for instance, lived in a joint union for several hundred years, retaining their distinct cultural individualities, separate legislatures, and independent finances. But for the insistence of Hungarian nationalists upon dominating Croatia economically and politically, the union might still be alive.

Cultural and political diversification in which many groups find possibility of self-realization and of affirmation of their unique values might be very desirable from the point of view of social advancement and of a durable peace. A continuous struggle of each ethnic group, no matter how small, to assert its cultural distinctiveness by making specific contributions to the community of nations would only stimulate the growth of a world civilization, and would enrich humanity as a whole.²³ And a growing number of separate cultural and political units will only contribute to the stability of the world by preventing the formation and the expansion of imperialistic and rival empires.²⁴ The evolution of Russian Czardom into

²³ Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago, 1942), II., pp. 1334-35.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 921.

a union of republics and of the British Empire into a commonwealth of nations gives an indication of such a trend.

There seems to be no doubt, therefore, that only the independent peoples of central Europe organized into free associations to foster the ideals of all-human welfare and justice³⁵ will be able to lay the foundations for a better future in this area. If, on the contrary, some peoples of central Europe do not renounce the idea of domination and power politics and others are again forced into political and economic submission, the rivalries between the Great Powers, inevitable in such circumstances, might provoke a new crisis of global significance in a not distant future. The present Russian-Polish dispute and the Anglo-American-Soviet differences in the Balkans suggest such possibilities.

SMALL STATES AND A NEW LEAGUE—FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF NORWAY

EDVARD HAMBRO

Norwegian Foreign Office, London, England

It is right that post-war planning should be made the subject of popular discussion. It is, on the whole, a healthy sign that so many books and articles are devoted to the winning of the peace, although some of them indubitably create a smoke screen of confusion. The same applies to committees and other organizations for the same purpose. These committees and their statements have two things in common: innumerable and inconclusive quotations from democratic leaders and illustrations drawn from the "success" of, or "failure" of, the League of Nations.

The "Four Freedoms," the "Atlantic Charter," the "Declaration of the United Nations," as well as other speeches, articles, and statements of all sorts are vague and all-comprising. They give ample scope for divergent interpretations. It should also be remembered that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, important though their utterances are, speak for themselves. They cannot bind Congress or Parliament, although it is true that the British Parliament feels a strong loyalty to the leader of the nation.

These two characteristics of the declarations of program give great scope to the professors, diplomats, politicians, journalists, and other prophets who dream of the future. Those of the soberer cast of mind try not to indulge in the luxury of day dreams. They realize that the future must be built on the experience of the past. They ask searching questions about the League.

³⁵ On the importance of the quest for "justice" as a unifying symbol, see H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, 1935), pp. 249-250.

Opinions may—and indeed do—differ about the League. But certain facts can be agreed upon.

The first is that the League represents the most thoroughgoing and most ambitious effort at world collaboration yet attempted. Neither will it be contradicted that the League did create the best “international civil service,” if not the only one, that has ever existed. Most people will also agree that the League achieved a signal success in the so-called technical fields, and that this work ought to be continued. It will further probably be admitted that the League has been instrumental in settling certain disputes and in preventing some minor wars. And even the most ardent enemies of the League will find it hard to argue that it ever caused wars.

Now in the fifth year of the Second World War, the peoples of the United Nations discuss a new League. The “New League” is used in this connection as a convenient term for the kind of world organization we hope will be established when victory is won.

Since this new League must have the support and enlist the confidence of all the United Nations, it might be helpful to single out one of them and see what the “public” of that state would think of such a plan. For many reasons—which the space of this article excludes from further elucidation—Norway is rather a good sample of the smaller allies in this war.

Most Norwegians would answer without any hesitation that their country would join a new League immediately. They would point out their attachment to international arbitration, to disarmament, to international collaboration in all fields, to their dependence on foreign trade, and would cite their record as a member of the existing League.

Next they would ask themselves why the old League “failed”—to use the popular phrase—and how the “New League” ought to be organized. The Norwegians knew that the old League was not perfect. Their numerous efforts to amend the Covenant and to change the rules of procedure prove that. Still, it was felt that it was not the League that failed, but the member states. This is a commonplace, but it is one of those commonplaces that must be repeated again and again. The League was only a means of collaboration. One could not at any moment take more out of it than the members were willing to put into it. This is the case in international life as well as within the nations. The best constitution is hopeless if politics is a racket and the politicians corrupt. The best courts in the most perfect system of “a government of laws and not of men” are worthless if the judges are venal. The most perfect WLB is meaningless if the parties disregard it.

The League was bound to be unimportant if the states would not use it. International courts are useless, and treaties of no avail, if all the world lives in a psychosis of fear. The fear of war is—to the Norwegian mind—one of the most potent causes of war. And one of the inherent weaknesses

of the League, one of the chief causes for fear and distrust, was—again in the deep-rooted convictions of the Norwegian public—the lack of universality. It is here suggested that the failure of the American Senate to assent to ratification of the Covenant had a very great part in creating the fear complex of insecurity. The absence of the United States from any world organization will have the same psychological results after this war.

The Norwegians do not theorize about the interdependence of the world. For them it is so obvious that they are quite amazed that others do not recognize it in the same way.

Many small things—apparently far removed from political science—make the Norwegian world-conscious in the extreme. His eating and drinking habits are, of course, quite international. He will start the day with grapefruit from Palestine or orange juice from Spain. He will continue with Kellogg's corn flakes. He will drink coffee from South America or Central America or tea from India, with sugar from Cuba. His wines are from Spain and Portugal as well as France and Germany. He smokes cigarettes from Egypt, England, or the United States, and cigars from Havana. The American films compete with the best films from France. Thomas Wolfe and Sinclair Lewis are widely read. The housewives use Singer sewing machines; and American motor cars are seen on all roads.

On the other hand, you could eat Norwegian fish in all of the Mediterranean countries and Latin America. Norwegian sardines could be bought in the village groceries in Poland and Hungary. Norwegian fish hooks were popular around the Black Sea. Norway was one of the world's greatest exporters of aluminum; her electro-chemical industry was of international importance; and so on.

One will also find Norwegians all over the world. There are more Norwegian churches in the United States than in Norway. Norwegian citizens are judges in Egypt, engineers in Turkey, civil servants in China, merchants in Argentina, and farmers in South Africa.

The Norwegian merchant fleet is the third largest in the world, and far larger than any other in the world in proportion to population. The Norwegian flag is seen in all ports and on all oceans. The Norwegian whaling fleet used to sail every year all the way from the far north of Europe down to the vicinity of the South Pole. Such a nation naturally thinks in terms of the world, and this attitude must also be reflected in the realm of politics.

The Norwegians can easily point out that universality—which does not mean immediate admittance of the enemy—never spoiled the chances of success in any dispute. The Asiatic and American members of the League Council did not prevent the settlement of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute of 1925. It was the states close to Italy rather than the others that made the application of sanctions difficult during the Ethiopian affair. Experience

seems to prove—according to the Norwegian view—that the states far removed from a conflict are more able to get the right perspective and take a disinterested attitude than are the neighbors. And since intelligence, so far as we know, does not depend entirely on geographic factors, citizens of far-away states may be able to grasp the essential characteristics of a conflict as well as neighbors.

The need for universality does not, however, mean that sub-groupings within the larger framework cannot be both possible and desirable. Certain problems can in fact be settled well and effectively by groups of states, if these groups are the natural result of practical need and entirely loyal to the aims of the universal organization.

Norwegians have their own peculiar experience with regionalism. For approximately four hundred years, they were united with Denmark and for nearly one hundred years with Sweden. But the very strong feeling of unity and the fertile collaboration among the Nordic states did not really develop until the last of the formal unions had been dissolved in 1905. Collaboration started earlier, but grew by leaps and bounds in the last generation; and the interesting thing is that it does not rest on a formal union of any kind. It springs, not from any treaty, but simply from the feeling of the peoples, from practical needs, and from a realistic conception of international coöperation.

By way of illustration, it may be mentioned that several important laws in the Scandinavian countries are the result of this collaboration. There are several important journals with editorial boards consisting of citizens from all these states. There is a fertile exchange of teachers and pupils, guest performances by the theatres, Scandinavian exhibitions, etc. And the most spectacular field of collaboration has been in economics and in foreign affairs, as shown by the meetings of heads of states, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and experts, and in Scandinavian neutrality laws before the outbreak of the present war.

This collaboration embraced first only Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Later, Finland and Iceland were included. The last part of the development saw the addition of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. This last group came first into the Scandinavian orbit—if such an expression is permissible—in the field of trade. The Oslo Convention, concluded in 1930 between the Low Countries and the Scandinavian states, was an active step in the direction of economic internationalism.

This collaboration—which was brought to a virtual standstill by the action of other states—developed later into consultations also in the field of foreign politics, and it shows that sub-groups based on common interests are not exclusively of a geographic character. This common interest group may very well be called to life again after the present war. But when people talk of regional groups after the war in connection with

the states of the North, they think mostly of the Scandinavian collaboration.

The Scandinavian situation is not, it is true, as simple as it was supposed to be before the war started. Norway is the only one of these states that is a United Nation. Denmark was—like Norway—overrun by the enemy, but she did not fight back. She is not, therefore—notwithstanding her strong sympathies—one of the Allies. Nor is Iceland, occupied by the United Nations. Finland is actively in the other camp. It is difficult to visualize her future before she is out of the war.

Sweden is the only one of these countries that has not, so far, been involved in the war. She has violated the classical laws of neutrality and given the Germans certain concessions in order to keep peace. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the Swedish people is pro-Norwegian and pro-democratic. There has been a strong revival of Scandinavian sentiment—at times a rather possessive sentiment—in Sweden during this war. There are circles who talk about a "Nordic Defensive League," and others who talk even more strongly of a "United States of the North"—very often with an open or hidden presumption of Swedish leadership. There are even Swedes who talk openly of leading Norwegian foreign policy. The answer to these speculations is, first of all, that the Norwegians like the Swedes, but do not wish to be united with them. The Norwegians are among the United Nations, and the Swedes have stayed out of the war and even given the Germans concessions directly harmful to the Norwegian cause. The Norwegians are fighting a struggle for national existence, and they will not want the benevolent tutelage of any neutral nation.

However, if Sweden joins the "New League," the Norwegians will in all probability be very happy to join hands with the Swedes within this framework. And there is little reason to believe that the Swedes will not want to join the United Nations when the war is over and the New League is created.

Many Norwegians undoubtedly want to continue some Nordic collaboration. They were proud of their common achievements. They felt that the Nordic states had shown the world a fine example of effective, friendly, and loyal collaboration. The Norwegians feel rather sentimental about it—as do the other Scandinavians. But the post-war world will have very little use for sentimentality; and the Norwegians will not forget that they have fought this war and fought it with the Allies. Norway belongs among them.

First of all, Norway wants to be a member of the "New League." The establishment of such an organization is, next to national liberation, her chief war aim. The second thing to be remembered in Norway's foreign policy is that she is a maritime power. Her interests are far-flung

and not tied down by any continental limitations. She has greater interests in the Pacific and in the carrying trade between North, Central, and South America than in many European countries. The very idea of a European union is repugnant and unrealistic to the world-conscious Norwegian. To his mind, such a plan would only mean the stifling of Norwegian trade and shipping as well as a new subjugation, under another name, to Germany's New Order, to Pan-Germany or Mittel-Europa. Norway has much more in common with the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations than with most European states. She is not only a United Nation and a maritime state, but predominantly an Atlantic and a North Sea state.

These considerations do not imply that Norway turns her back on Scandinavia. She is still in favor of close cultural collaboration with these states, and even of economic and political collaboration, if this can be achieved within the other framework. But politically the order of importance for Norway's rôles must be: (1) United Nations state; (2) maritime state; (3) Atlantic state; (4) North Sea state; and (5) Scandinavian state.

If for any tragic reason the United Nations should not become a reality after the war, the Norwegians must, of course, look for other solutions, and there seem to be only two possibilities apart from a "New League," namely, the Anglo-Saxon group and the Scandinavian *bloc*. Both of these groups might embrace the Low Countries.

However, the Norwegians—although they must envisage the possibility of no "New League"—hope very sincerely that this new and democratic world organization will be brought into existence and that all nations, small and large, eventually even our common enemies, will join. They consider that the smaller nations which have been overrun by the Germans have much to contribute on account of their political and social maturity, their spirit of sacrifice, their discipline and democracy, so hard tried and strengthened during the occupation.

They know that the smaller nations have not always been paragons of wisdom and virtue, but they believe that the Great Powers, on the whole, do not have a better record. They are very apprehensive when they hear or read of the "Big Four." They feel that a balance of power is impossible in the future, and are convinced that the Concert of Europe cannot be recreated in the form of a "World Quartet." The history of European development between Vienna and Versailles is not reassuring. Norwegians, as citizens of a small state, cannot afford to be ignorant. They have to learn history. They know very well that the Holy Alliance and the Great Power dictatorship that followed did not—as an astonishing number of people still believe—keep the peace for a hundred years. They remember intervention in Spain, the Greek war of liberation, Polish wars of liberation, the Mexican war, the Crimean war, the Prussian wars with Den-

mark and Austria, the Franco-Prussian war, the Sino-Japanese war, the Russo-Japanese war, the Spanish-American war, the Boer war, and the two Balkan wars—just to mention the more well known of the outbursts in the “century of peace”.

Norwegians may be prejudiced—and what nationality is not, in some way?—but they do not feel that the Great Powers have shown such a degree of wisdom and foresight as would entitle them to be the trustees of the world. They feel—perhaps because they are from a small nation—that the only claim the Great Powers have to rule the world lies in their strength. And power—as the leaders of the great democracies have themselves so insistently declared—should not be the only basis of the world of tomorrow.

The Norwegians admit that the Great Powers should have a preponderant weight in the council of nations. They do not believe in absolute equality, except of course equality before the law. Although superior force may be necessary to keep some small states in line, this force should be the force of the United Nations, and not of a Great Power directorate. If the small states need the authority of the Great Powers, the Great Powers, in turn, need the democratic control of a world organization in which the voices of the smaller states are heard.

Briefly, the Norwegian public thinks that the end of this war will see either a “New League” or chaos, and that half-measures will only be the prelude to new wars.

THE FUTURE OF WESTERN DEPENDENCIES IN SOUTH EASTERN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

LENNOX A. MILLS

University of Minnesota

The future of South Eastern Asia and the Philippines is one of the most complicated problems with which the peace settlement will have to grapple. There is a certain broad similarity between the countries concerned which is likely to be a trap for the unwary. It seems so simple to set up free and democratic governments, to equip and train citizen armies to defend their independence, and to raise the standard of living. It also seems reasonable to assume that if the 145,000,000 people of South Eastern Asia and the Philippines could be federated, their combined resources would go a long way towards enabling them to maintain their independence.

Unfortunately, deep-seated differences based on race, religion, and history are the dominating influences, and overshadow the similarities of strategic and economic weakness and lack of independence. Disunion bids

fair to increase as a result of the nationalism which is beginning to appear. The Burmese regard themselves as a master race, and have an inflated sense of their own power and superiority because of their former conquests in Thailand and Assam. The Thais have something of the same feelings towards the Malays and the Cambodians of Indo-China. One reason why the Malays asked the British to establish a protectorate over the peninsula was to safeguard their independence against Thai ambitions. This fear and hostility have been strengthened by Thai annexation in 1943 of four of the nine Malay States, and a claim to most of the others. The Malays, Indonesians, and Filipinos come from the same racial stock, but so far as the latter are concerned, centuries of divergent development have made the differences more important than the similarity in racial characteristics which is noticeable among the three peoples. Even among the Indonesians of the Netherlands East Indies, there is a disunity which threatens to grow with the spread of nationalism. Finally, all the peoples of South Eastern Asia and the Philippines fear and dislike the local Chinese communities in varying degrees, and have tried to weaken their economic power as far as they have been allowed to do so. The sole exception is Burma, and here the Indian replaces the Chinese as the object of dislike. One principal reason why a small minority of Burmese aided the Japanese was that the British had incurred their hostility because they protected the Indians against discriminatory legislation.

Religious cleavages reinforce the disunity based on race. The Malays and Indonesians are Moslems, while the Chinese, Thais, and Burmese are Buddhists, and the Filipinos are Christians. Mohammedanism is distinctly more easy-going than in India and the Arab world; but it retains a good deal of the intolerance which is a fundamental tenet of the faith. One main cause of the Moro revolt against the control of the Christian Filipinos in Mindanao in the thirties was religious antagonism. In Malaya and the East Indies, the religious difference partially explains why it is impossible to solve the Chinese problem by intermarriage and assimilation. The Moslem will not allow his daughter to marry a man whom he regards as a worshipper of idols and an unclean eater of pigs. He fears and sometimes envies the partial economic stranglehold which the Chinese has acquired in his country; but he consoles himself with the promise in the Koran that Allah will even the score by an eternity of very literal fire.

A federation would be outside the comprehension of 95 per cent of the population, and would be opposed by the small minority who did understand it. It would be a lifeless structure imposed from outside, without foundations among the peoples; and it would last only as long as its creators should continue to bolster it up. A feeling of community of interests may eventually arise; but this lies so far in the future that it is not a matter of practical politics. The post-war settlement must start from

the realization that for a long time to come the various countries will remain politically separate.

Even on this basis, no standardized solution can be applied. Conditions within each dependency differ to such an important degree that policies must be modified to fit local conditions. Malaya, for example, will have to overcome greater difficulties than any other dependency in establishing democracy. The typical Malay is a dyed-in-the-wool conservative, firmly convinced that government should come from above and never from the people. He believes that the Sultans and the aristocratic families have a hereditary right to rule, and that the ordinary man—the small farmer or fisherman—should not interfere. It is true that the ruler ought to consult the interests of his subjects; but when the government gives an order, the Malay really likes to obey it.

The principal obstacle, however, to the establishment of democracy in Malaya is that the Malays are outnumbered by the immigrant races, the Chinese and Indians. The Malays are only 42.4 per cent of the population of the Peninsula, while the Chinese are 41.3 per cent and the Indians 14.8 per cent. From the democratic point of view, the Malays are one of the least politically-minded races on earth, while the Indians, and especially the Chinese, are far more mature. They are also much more aggressive, particularly the Chinese. If the Malay sees that his interests are slighted, he feels bitter resentment; but he is not likely to take overt action, while the Chinese will do so. If democracy were established when the war is over, the result would be that the Chinese would dominate Malaya politically, as they already do to a considerable extent economically. The Malays, and especially their leaders, already strongly resent the presence of the Chinese, who have been able to pour into the country only because the British Government protected their lives and property. To place the unwanted intruder in political control of the Peninsula would exacerbate the ill-will between the two races which was beginning to show itself increasingly in the thirties.

The complications do not end here. The majority of the Chinese and Indians remain only a few years in Malaya and eventually return to their own homes. Only about one-third of the Chinese have been born in the Peninsula, and even of these some go eventually to China. Of the Indians, only five out of twelve are permanently domiciled in the Peninsula. The migrants look upon Malaya as a foreign country to which they temporarily migrated to make money, since economic opportunities were so much greater than in China or India.

A small though growing minority, particularly among the Malaya-born Chinese, have developed a Malayan patriotism and look upon the country as their permanent home. A very large number, however, still retain their loyalty to China, even though the family has been several

generations in Malaya. The growth of nationalism in China and India has strengthened the tendency to look upon them, and not Malaya, as the native country, and has retarded the development of a Malayan patriotism. The government of Chiang Kai-shek has tried for many years to promote this attitude, working through membership in the Kuomintang and propaganda in the Chinese vernacular schools. The British attempted with limited success to counteract Chiang Kai-shek's policy, since they wished to develop a sense of Malayan unity and patriotism. There can be no doubt that the Chungking government will resume this policy after the war.

The main obstacle to the establishment of democracy in Malaya is that the area is not a country, but only a geographic expression. It is the home of three separate and unassimilable races, each of which dislikes and looks down upon the other two. Only the Malays have a feeling of loyalty for the Peninsula, while the majority of the other races look upon it as a place of exile to which they have come temporarily to make money. The Malays are as yet incapable of taking part in a democratic system of government. The British Government felt that it had a special obligation to protect their interests, since it took over control of the Peninsula at their request and not by conquest. It considered that it had no right to transfer control of the Peninsula to the Chinese and Indians, and it also believed that the vote could not be given to the immigrant races until they had acquired a patriotic attachment towards the country in which they had settled. For all these reasons, it was felt to be impossible to set up the degree of self-government which exists in, for example, Ceylon. The pre-war political problem of Malaya will continue unchanged in the post-war period, unless it has been rendered more difficult of solution by the Japanese attempts to stimulate hatred of the Chinese. To lay down the goal of a Malayan democracy will be easy; the difficulty will be to give the ideal its practical application.

The Malayan situation has been treated at some length because it will present one of the most difficult questions which the peace settlement will have to tackle. All the other countries of South Eastern Asia, however, have their own peculiar local conditions, and the policy applied to each will have to be adapted to its special needs. Subject to this proviso, there are certain general problems which affect the whole area. These may be divided into the three categories of political, economic, and strategic. With the sole exception of Thailand, all the countries under review were dependencies of the United States, Great Britain, Holland, or France. The degree of self-government varied widely. The Philippines were approaching the goal of independence, Burma was well on the road towards Dominion status, the Netherlands East Indies had made some advance, while Malaya and French Indo-China had hardly taken the first steps.

The United Nations have accepted the principle that democratic governments shall be created as rapidly as possible; but the pace of the advance will differ widely, owing to the varying stages of civilization and the local problems of each dependency. Before Malaya, for example, can become a democracy, three antagonistic races must learn to work together; two of them must acquire loyalty to the country in which they have settled; and the Malays must revolutionize their thinking and become democrats instead of loyal subjects of their Sultans.

In every country of South Eastern Asia, there is a very small minority of Western-educated who are government officials, clerks, journalists, and professional men. They claim to be the people of the country, and demand the establishment of democratic government. Their support is principally urban, and they have very little influence in the villages in which nine-tenths of the population live. The typical native of East Asia is a small farmer, whose interests are practically limited to the state of the crops and the affairs of the village. Centuries of autocratic rule have created the belief that the villager has no part in government; that is the function of the mysterious beings who live in the far away capitals of Bangkok, Singapore, Rangoon, or Batavia. The farmers are exceedingly conservative, and the idea that the common man should control the government is a revolutionary break with immemorial custom, and therefore wrong. The villager neither understands nor wants democracy: his choice is a benevolent despot who will ascertain the needs of the cultivator and provide for them. There is an immense gulf between the small farmers and the politically conscious minority in the towns. This does not mean that Western control is popular: foreign rule is never popular, however benevolent it may be. There is a vague feeling of unrest, an undercurrent of revolt against the overlordship of the Westerner. On occasion, the native political leaders have been able to turn this to their own account; but it is significant that they did not do it by preaching the doctrines of democracy. In Burma, for instance, hostility to the Indian immigrants and to the British because they protected them was one powerful political weapon. Sometimes religious antagonism to the Christian government has been a useful means of incitement. The Buddhist church has great influence over the Burmese; and the priests dispensed a very intoxicating potion compounded of religion, nationalism, the vanished glories of the conquering kings of Burma, and anti-foreign feeling. In the Javanese revolt of 1927, many recruits were secured by assurance that success would mean the return of the Golden Age of the Emperors of Mataram. Taxes would be reduced, the crops would never fail, and everyone would be prosperous. For a cash contribution, the villager could buy an office at the court of the new king. The urban political leaders can spasmodically galvanize the villagers into action; but they cannot exert a continuing influence upon

them. Every attempt to do this has failed, and once the incitement of the moment has passed, the villager relapses into his customary indifference to matters outside his own narrow interests. He is not an alert and conscious Western democrat, but a tradition-bound Asiatic peasant with a vague feeling of unrest against control by rulers who are alien to him in point of view, color, and religion.

The establishment of democracy at the end of the war would mean that control would be transferred from a foreign bureaucracy to the Western-educated minority in the towns. This would be self-government, but it would not be democratic government. A wide measure of enfranchisement would not affect the situation, for the farmer would not know what to do with his vote. He would continue to be controlled by his traditional belief that all power belongs to the government. In the last election in Thailand, many of the voters regarded a seat in the legislature as a new kind of dole, and as a means of giving a bright young man a good start in life.

Another great obstacle to the successful establishment of democracy is the almost total absence of an indigenous middle class. With the one partial exception of the Philippines, the great bulk of the middle class are foreigners—Indians in Burma and Chinese in the other countries. They are the retail shopkeepers, produce-buyers and money-lenders, the mine, plantation, and small factory owners, and the professional men. Very little educated leadership is available to play the rôle which the middle class discharged in the development of Western democracy during the nineteenth century. The Chinese and the Indians cannot take the place of an indigenous middle class, since they have incurred the unpopularity which always seems to accrue to an alien race that acquires what is regarded as an undue share of the wealth of the country. This hostility towards them is growing; and it was most marked in the Philippines and Thailand, the two countries where the nationalist leaders have been most free to carry out their policies. Elsewhere the hostility of the local political parties was held in check by the Western rulers. The post-war period is far more likely to see an attack upon the economic power of the Chinese and Indians than any alliance with them.

The establishment of genuine democracy will be a slow and difficult process. It will involve a revolution in the way of thought of scores of millions of hide-bound conservatives. Education is only a partial solution: the Philippines and Burma are among the best educated and constitutionally most advanced countries of the tropics, but only a small fraction of the voters really understand democracy as apart from repeating its slogans. Moreover, the spread of education will be dependent upon the amount of funds available. In the past, it has always been hampered by lack of revenue: for example, the Philippines, when under American control down to 1935, spent, on an average, 20 per cent of the revenue on the

schools, but they never managed to provide instruction for more than about 38 per cent of the children of school age.¹ It will not be easy to find the very large additional sums needed to educate the whole population, especially when one considers the immense cost of reconstruction in the countries now under Japanese control. Education will have to be accompanied by a grant of self-government by instalments, in order that the people may gradually learn how to govern themselves. During this period of apprenticeship, one of the Western powers will have to assume the task of guidance and decreasing control in each dependency.

The economic prosperity of South Eastern Asia and the Philippines will continue, as in the past, to depend upon the extent to which they can sell their products abroad, particularly in the United States and Europe. A considerable part of the exports are the produce of the small grower with his rice fields or a few rubber trees or coconut palms. His standard of living rises and falls with the fluctuating demand for his produce in American and European markets. Large-scale production, mine or plantation, is controlled by American, European, or Chinese companies. They are as essential to the well-being of the area as the native cultivator, since the latter provides only a minor part of the revenue which sustains the elaborate and expensive social services. The bulk of the money comes from the foreign investor in the form of export taxes, import duties, income taxes, or land rentals. The prosperity of the whole area is vitally dependent upon the world price of the exports and the demand for them in foreign markets. For example, the American-Filipino Commission appointed in 1938 pointed out that the Philippines were threatened with economic ruin unless Congress altered the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act and kept open the American market after the islands became independent in 1946.²

The producers of some of the staple exports, such as tin and rubber, formed international agreements in the thirties which kept the world price of their commodities fairly stable and allowed a reasonable profit. The method adopted was to limit production to the estimated world consumption, and some of the international committees of management, e.g., for rubber, included representatives of the consumers as well as of the growers. The weak point in the agreements was that they could not control the wide fluctuations in demand, particularly in the United States. On balance, however, they were of undoubted benefit to the native small growers as well as to the Western plantations.

Industrialization was in its infancy in the pre-war period, and was largely confined to instrumentalities for preparing the local products for their foreign markets, e.g., rubber mills, oil refineries, and tin smelters.

¹ L. A. Mills, *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (London, 1942), p. 366.

² *Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs Report of May 20, 1938*, Vol. I, *passim*.

Manufacturing was furthest advanced in Java, since the Dutch had begun to foster its development behind the shelter of tariffs and quotas. The main purpose was to promote Javanese prosperity by drawing off part of the excessive population which was trying to make a living by agriculture. More could be done in the other dependencies to encourage the growth of small industries which would supply the domestic market and replace imports. In most cases, this would require protective tariffs, since pre-war experience showed that local manufactures could not compete in price with Japanese, Chinese, or Indian imports. The development of manufacturing is not compatible with strict adherence to the Open Door. Moreover, manufacturing for the domestic market can be on only a small scale, since the local demand is limited. Any output on a large scale would have to find foreign markets, and this depends upon the tariff policies of the rest of the world. The pre-war experience of Hong Kong was that China and most other countries except Great Britain raised their tariffs to exclude the island's manufactures.

It seems reasonably safe to assume that the economic structure of South Eastern Asia will remain fundamentally the same. The producing countries will continue to depend for their prosperity upon the demand for their exports in foreign markets over which they have no control. The manner in which the Open Door policy is applied after the war will have a vital effect upon their standard of living. Everything will depend upon whether it is to be one-sided or reciprocal. If the industrialized nations demand entrance for their manufactures, but reserve the right to impose protective duties upon exports, it will be impossible in the long run to raise the standard of living in the dependencies. Ultimately, too, it will be impossible for the dependencies to buy the manufactures which the industrialized nations hope to sell to them, if hostile tariffs which prevent the sale of their exports preclude them from acquiring the necessary foreign exchange. There can be no complaint if, for example, the new synthetic rubber industry is able to hold its own in open competition with plantation rubber. If, however, it proves impossible to do this without the aid of a high tariff, then a very serious blow will be dealt to the prosperity of the tropics. There is a genuine risk of a conflict between two of the principles of the United Nations, viz., the Open Door and raising the standard of living in the tropics. It is worthy of note that one reason why the Open Door was abandoned in the Netherlands East Indies in 1933 was that the government might acquire a bargaining power. Larger import quotas were offered to the foreign countries which agreed to buy increased quantities of the exports, and vice versa. The great question about the Open Door is whether it will open both ways or will admit only one-way traffic.

Money will have to be found for an expansion of the social services far beyond the pre-war levels, in addition to the large amounts which will be

needed to repair the destruction caused by the war. Part of the contentment with the present low level of subsistence is due to the loss of vitality caused by tropical diseases, and the remedy is improved medical and health services. Education, among other results, will enable the small farmer to hold his own better with the village money-lender *cum* shop-keeper *cum* produce-buyer. The millstone of rural debt will have to be lightened by a greatly expanded system of rural credit. Many of the most essential reforms can never pay for themselves in terms of money. In slum clearance, for example, the beneficiaries cannot afford to pay high enough rentals to cover the cost of interest and sinking fund. Industrialization will help to some extent, and will often have to be financed by foreign loans.

These reforms will require far larger financial resources than the various governments are at all likely to command, even if the pre-war rates of taxes are raised considerably. It will not be practicable to float large domestic loans, for there are no accumulations of indigenous capital in South Eastern Asia. The peoples lack thrift and foresight, they tend to spend what they have on the desire of the moment, and they vastly prefer agriculture and fishing to other forms of economic activity. These characteristics largely explain the dominance of Western and Chinese capital, and they also mean that it will be a long time before indigenous can replace foreign capital. The campaign against the low standard of living will have to be financed principally by loans from abroad, and particularly from the United States and Great Britain. Large loans will not be forthcoming unless the debtor countries are able to repay them in the long run, and ability to do so will depend upon whether they are able to sell their exports abroad. In the last analysis, improvement of the social services depends upon the tariff policies of the industrialized nations.

The provision of strategic security will require the acceptance of military as well as political and economic responsibilities by the principal Allies. The Philippines and South Eastern Asia will be as unable to defend themselves in the future as in the past. Political independence and the creation of citizen armies would be ineffective against the war industries of a great power, as they were in 1942. The Filipinos had both of these things, and in Bataan they had a strong defensive position, far superior to any that existed in the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, or Burma. All this served only to delay the Japanese conquest, because it was an inadequate substitute for the superior number of the attackers and the dependence upon imported aeroplanes and other types of matériel. With the exception of the East Indies, all of the countries under review have a small population; and this, together with their lack of heavy industries, makes their security dependent upon the protection of the Great Powers.

This means principally the United States and the British Empire. These must avoid the blunders of the inter-war period—disarmament car-

ried to the point of futility, coupled with unwillingness to use such force as was available. In the long run, peace will be uncertain unless it is supported by adequate armaments and the determination to use them promptly. The Allies must have predominant naval and air power, and the bases which are indispensable for their use. There must be secure sea lines of communication linking the South Western Pacific with the United States and Great Britain. When the various peoples receive political independence, their sovereign rights must be limited so that they will play their part in the general scheme of collective security. Permanent peace will be jeopardized if weak sovereign states are created as they were in Europe after the last war. Above all, there must be close and continued collaboration between the United States and the British Empire. Pearl Harbor, Port Darwin, a restored Singapore, and the other naval and air bases will have to be available without restriction to the armed forces of the permanent Allies. If the United Nations drift apart, and the members have to fall back upon national self-help, then sooner or later the world risks the outbreak of another great war in the Pacific.

Until the dependencies become capable of managing their own affairs, they will have to remain under foreign tutelage. Joint international control would be a bad solution. The colonial peoples would resent it as a retrograde step: they want independence, and would regard international government as a device to postpone it. For another thing, joint international control has been prolific of friction and disputes in the areas where it has been tried. It would be wiser to follow the principle of the League mandates, giving a single state sole and undivided responsibility for the government of each dependency. The most suitable guardians during the period of transition towards self-government are the former colonial powers. The British, the Dutch, and the rest have an experience and a knowledge of local needs which no other nations possess. The British and the Dutch especially have a good record in the matter of social services and in the very difficult policy of promoting self-government.

The United Nations will require some formal means of collaboration to carry out their postwar policies. Perhaps the most suitable would be the continuation of the present Pacific Council, with the addition of representatives of the colonial peoples. One weakness of pre-war tropical administration was that the problems were often similar, but the governments had little knowledge of one another's policies and their results. Interchange of information and, on occasion, of technical experts would save a good deal of wasted effort. The Pacific Council would secure, as far as possible, a common policy in the economic development and tariff policies of South Eastern Asia and the Philippines. It would be the agency for floating international loans for economic development and improving the standard of living. It would receive regular reports from the colonial governments,

and have the power to require information and explanation from them. This could include the right to send out commissions of inquiry to make investigations on the spot. The Council would also review periodically the progress made in the promotion of democratic government in the dependencies, and in the raising of their standard of living.

The precise powers of the Pacific Council must depend upon the degree of responsibility which the members are prepared to assume. If the present colonial powers are to remain solely responsible for defense of the dependencies and for their economic and social progress, it is obvious that they cannot be subjected to control from states which decline to accept any responsibility. In this case, the Pacific Council would have only advisory and consultative functions. The Council could be given wider than merely advisory powers if the states which have no colonial possessions were prepared to accept, as part of an international system, their proportionate share of responsibility for the security and economic development of South Eastern Asia and the Philippines. In this part of the world, as in others, the whole program of the United Nations depends for its success upon the extent to which the Great Powers, and particularly the United States, are prepared to take their part in a collective system.