

## THE MOROCCO TANGLE.

THE latter half of 1907 brought Morocco again to the front. France had advanced too far for retreat without doing something of lasting consequence after Casa Blanca, and the haggling over that desirable piece of goods, Maghreb el-Aksa, the African "Far West," was necessarily resumed. The pretence of its having been taken off the market by the Conference of Algeciras, could not be kept up for very long, and here, at the beginning of 1908, we are once more on the eve of a new deal in the expansion-business of the Powers. A sale by auction to the highest bidder of facilities or non-obstruction in the sub-division of the earth, now progressing on such a grand scale, is in progress—this special lot to be taken up or relinquished as a stand off for other bargains.

*Pour acquit de conscience*, so far as the actually most interested but least consulted parties are concerned—the parties to be gobbled up—it is requisite they should be represented in a light as unfavourable as possible, unfit for self-rule; so that the act of annihilating them as a free and independent people, may be represented as an act of justice to the claims of civilisation, an act of stringent ethical necessity, an act of purest philanthropy, tending to their weal on earth and in heaven. The aggressive character of such philanthropy and the remarkable circumstance of its invariably tending to the worldly advantage of the philanthropist, and to his utmost pecuniary profit, are only accidental in the great crusade of Western righteousness against Eastern barbarism. It is astonishing how depraved a class of God's creatures the inhabitants of the coveted regions generally are, *in casu* how low and contemptible a race the Moors always have been, and how utterly incapable of regulating their own affairs. Even the Omayyad Caliphs, brethren in the faith, and notably Abd'er-Rahman III., were long ago of that opinion when they considered the time ripe for excursions to the South. They were distressed over the state of things on the opposite coast, and yearned to improve their kinsfolk by subjecting them to the word of command from Cordova.

*ST. MALACHY AND THE PAPAL SUCCESSION.* 39

Antipopes of the "Great Schism" are put before Urban VI., who was crowned at Rome on Easter Sunday, 1378.

Still another argument which we have not seen advanced anywhere, and we have done. This pretended prophecy aims at fixing approximately the time of the end of the world. Now, is it not manifestly absurd, as well as impious, to think that God would communicate to St. Malachy or to any saint knowledge which He wishes to be perfectly occult, and which He withheld from the Apostles and conceals even from the angels<sup>5</sup>? That prince of theologians, Thomas Aquinas, holds that the time of the end of the world cannot be known *even by revelation*.<sup>6</sup> We are not surprised to find then that the forecasts, not merely of Whiston and other so-called prophets of the past, but even of such illustrious preachers of the divine Word as St. Norbert and St. Vincent Ferrer have always turned out false and been productive of no little mischief. One further remark: We all know how ready is the faith of our own simple, God-fearing people; all the greater is the responsibility Catholic writers and publishers incur by palming off on them forged and counterfeit documents purporting to be the genuine prophecies and revelations of saints and other holy persons. This censure does not, of course, apply to works of erudition and scholarship like those of Abbé Maitre.

J. A. DOWLING.

<sup>5</sup> Acts I-7; Mark xiii. 32.

<sup>6</sup> Supp., p. 3, q. 77, a. 2.

The Moors, however, kept on living in liberty as much as they could manage, continually threatened on all sorts of grounds, especially that of piracy—an accusation certainly not without foundation—but freebooting was then a pastime much in vogue all round. If they escaped more severe punishment than the loss of one or two harbours on their coast-line, it may have been for the reason given by Voltaire in his *Essai des Moeurs*, written about the time when *le roi soleil* entered into a treaty of peace with the Emperor of Morocco of his day, illustrious descendant of the Prophet of God through his daughter Fatima, the wife of Ali. The reason was that such a detestable people as the people of el-Maghreb could continue to exist only because of the discord among the Christians, who, though perfectly willing to put an end to the disgraceful misrule of the Maghrebine authorities, were not able to come to an agreement among themselves about the division of the spoils.

The relations between France and Morocco have not always been of the friendly character on which Voltaire threw his sarcastic light. In 1848, *e.g.*, a French squadron was sent to Tangier, under the Prince of Joinville, son of Louis Philippe, by way of protest against the assistance given by the then reigning Sultan to the Algerian Emir Abd' el-Kader. As to Great Britain, she has often had cause to regret the withdrawing, in 1684, from Tangier, which had come to the English crown as part of the dowry of Catharina de Braganza on her marriage with Charles II. Only twenty years had passed before the impregnable Gibraltar fell into the hands of Prince George of Hessen-Darmstadt and Admiral George Rooke, to remain a British station on the high road to the East. And a spirit, quite different from that which prompted the abandoning of Tangier, as an unprofitable possession, moved, later on, to the taking of Malta, in 1800; to the acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope, in 1815; of Aden, in 1839; of Perim, in 1857; of Cyprus, in 1878; of Egypt, in 1882.

Though it was Spain alone that held on to Moroccan territory in places such as Ceuta, Melilla, Ifni, the other Powers made their influence felt; and their desire for civilising primitive nations grew *pari passu* with their desire for expansion. Consequently, the unspeakable Moor, quite unfit for decent self-government, became in ever-increasing degree an

object of the tenderest solicitude. A pity that the zealous care, taken to assist him on the path towards nobler ideals should have led to the chaos which now so loudly calls for intervention. It is the old story over again: the officious West obliges the easy-going East with an overdose of care, causes trouble, turns everything topsy-turvy, and thus has a pretext handy when the time arrives for stepping in and staying in. Turbid water makes excellent fishing.

Few unbiassed observers, who have paid attention to the course of events in Morocco for the last twenty or thirty years, will deny that the present confusion in that country is largely an artificial product. What are the guarantees for an effective Government with every outsider putting his finger into the pie? What chance of a good police and an impartial administration of justice where foreigners, who enjoy the peculiar, not to say unfair, advantages of extra-territoriality, encroach upon the rights of the courts by extending those advantages, through a scandalous traffic in consular protection, to natives, and too often natives of the worst description? The abuses inherent in this system, as practised in Tangier, together with the extortionate attacks on the exchequer by means of foreign claims, came vividly to light in a controversy between Mr. Ion Perdicaris, the same who got kidnapped by Raisuli in the Spring of 1904, and Colonel Matthews, Consul General for the United States of North America, at Tangier. The leading points of that controversy were published in a pamphlet, written by a "foreign resident" (Ion Perdicaris) and printed by W. P. Griffith & Sons, Ltd., Old Bailey, London. A few quotations will suffice as an excuse for the feelings with which the Moor regards his white benefactors:—

"It may sound incredible, but it is an actual fact that it only requires a verbal message to the authorities from one of the *protégés* of an underling of a Legation to secure, not merely the imprisonment of an unprotected native, but sometimes even the application of the lash.

A few years ago eight men, selected at random from a village of the interior, were sent to Fez on the unsupportable charge of a foreign official, who declared that he had been robbed. Every one of the eight men was flogged, and one so severely that he died from the effects of his beating. A pecuniary indemnity of twenty thousand francs was, furthermore, assessed upon the district where the robbery was alleged to have occurred. And now comes the worst part of the story: from circumstances which subsequently transpired, it would appear morally certain that no robbery had ever been committed.

In another case where there was no doubt of the actual commission of a theft, eight victims also suffered, of whom five at least were absolutely innocent of any complicity in the robbery of the numismatic collection of the United States' Consul in Tangier. But as that functionary had demanded a considerable indemnity from the Moorish Government, which indemnity was paid upon condition that the United States' Consul should not interfere on behalf of the prisoners—of whom three only were accused of robbery—he could not, it seems, do anything to modify the ferocity of the punishment of the alleged culprits.

Within the last few days, a native who picked up an ear-ring in the street and offered it for sale, has been cruelly flogged subsequent to the intervention, direct or indirect, of the United States' consulate, on the ground that the Moor had been concerned in the robbery of a shop of a protected Jew. . . .

It must not, however, be inferred that the United States' consulate is the only one whose procedure in this respect is open to criticism."

"It is a matter that affects the honour of every Foreign Government represented in Tangier," Ion Perdicaris wrote under the date of September 5, 1885.

"As it now appears that on demands made by American *protégés*, groups of men, chained together like wild beasts, have been marched through the country to endure the horrors of imprisonment in the foetid dungeons of Mequinez, I trust you will permit me, as an American citizen, and one jealous of the honour of our Flag, to ask you to suspend payment on claims alleged to be due to American *protégés*. . . .

When it is remembered that the American claims were enforced under the same conditions and according to the same procedure as those of other nationalities, I fear that, possibly, a great amount of injustice may have been committed."

Consul-General Matthews did not fail to answer; he replied in a letter, dated September 7, 1885, and the opening sentence gives at once the gist of his opinion in the matter: the fault lies with the native authorities and the native mal-administration:

"While being quite willing to do justice to all alike, while deeply regretting the cruelties to which natives are subjected by local authorities, while deploring the mal-administration of justice practised by native functionaries, I cannot lose sight of the fact that my official duty demands that the interests of American citizens, their agents and *protégés* should be watched over and have justice done to them. . . . But I emphatically protest against the insinuation that any man has been submitted to cruel treatment at the request of any one of those under the United States' consular authority."

Concluding, Mr. Ion Perdicaris gives the sequel to his correspondence with Colonel Matthews as follows:

"Some reports of irregularities in the American consulate at Tangier having reached the authorities at Washington, Mr. Ingraham

the United States' Consul at Cadiz, was despatched to hold an investigation at Tangier last January. Amongst several other matters on which Mr. Ingraham demanded information, there was the question of American claims, and he desired to know the total amount, the names of the *soi-disant* creditors, and of parties against whom certain sums were claimed. Colonel Matthews stated that he kept no record which could enable him to give information on these points, and in spite of all his efforts Mr. Ingraham was unable to gain the knowledge he desired."

Not long afterwards, the representatives of Great Britain at Tangier got instructions which were intended to put an end to the extortions practised, under cover of the existing regulations, by *protégés* of the different foreign legations and consulates. But the disreputable custom, once established, was not easily shaken, and little more was effected by this new effort to stem the tide of a rapidly increasing evil, than by the abortive attempt at the Convention of Madrid, in 1880. And when Haji Muhammad el-Mokri brought the subject before the Conference at Algeciras, again trying to put some limit to the protection of Moorish subjects by foreign Powers, *pour le bon motif*, the proposal again met with no favour; the *conférenciers* lacked the spirit of Sir John Drummond Hay, a man earnest even in such trivial issues of international justice.

Meanwhile a brisk trade was going on in fire-arms and ammunition, supplied by European and Jewish merchants in the coast towns, to robbers and rebels who, instigated by agents in foreign pay, undermined the authority of the Sultan from the interior, as the foreigners themselves were doing from without. Several pretenders arose in the provinces with more or less success, marching towards the capital, keeping the regular army at bay. Tangier itself became unsafe by the depredations of that daring bandit, Raisuli, who carried off residents of standing in the foreign community. Government, in the face of difficulties, studiously fostered, might have proved a pretty arduous task even for a stronger man than Mulay Abd' el-Aziz, a little over sixteen when he mounted the throne, and now not quite thirty. Small wonder that dismissing all foreigners from his services one day, mistrusting every one of them, he turned his ear to the sweet song of that syren Marianne; or, that *la pénétration pacifique* jumping out of the box with hideous mien, he fled to the protecting arms of

the Deutsche Michel, where the Anglo-French treaty of April, 8, 1904, left him.

The French aspirations began, indeed, to look alarming. As to the manner in which the "pacific penetration" was purposed to work, it must be remembered that between Morocco and the Algerine province of Oran no natural boundary exists, a circumstance to be utilised by France for the extension of her frontier and of her claims upon the Maghrebine neighbour. M. Eug. Etienne, member of the Chamber of Deputies, entering into details respecting the first steps in pacific penetration, had already given the following particulars: "What a splendid tool in capable hands are the Cheurfas of Ouezzan, who have placed themselves under the protection of the French. . . ." The Shereef of Ouezzan is the first man in Morocco after, and perhaps before, the Sultan . . . . They permit us to exercise our power over the Blad' es-Siba, on the whole territory of the independent Berbers, that is to say on two-thirds of the whole of Morocco. (Cf. the reports of the leaders of the Doutté and Bernard missions, published in the *Renseignements Coloniaux*.)

This conception of pacific penetration got an immense sobering down at the memorable visit of Emperor Wilhelm to Tangier on the 31st of March, 1905, when His Majesty's word was pledged that "the sovereignty and integrity of Morocco would be maintained." It hardly served the maintenance of the Sultan's sovereignty, however, that the imperial visitor expressed a wish to meet the brigand Raisuli, who, accordingly, was invited to grace the festivities with his presence, under German guarantee that nothing would happen to him from the side of the native authorities.

While the Sultan still had a leaning to France, M. St. René de Tallandier, accredited to the Shereefian Court by the Quai d'Orsay, insisted upon French control of the Moroccan customs; in fact, of the whole financial administration of Morocco. In addition, and more ruinous to the French aspirations than the foregoing exorbitant demands *à bout portant*, M. St. René de Tallandier began to bore the Sultan (to use the expression of Mr. Walter B. Harris, the well-known correspondent of *The Times*), by the discussion of reforms which sound policy should postpone for years. Put aside, as M. St.

René de Tallandier wrote himself, *pour raisons d'économie* this prepared the way, as nothing else could have done, for the Count von Tattenbach who, transferred from the Prussian cavalry to the diplomatic service, as a protégé of Prince von Bismarck, had already proved himself a man of deep insight on this new field of action. Promoted to the post of German Minister at Lissabon, he reappeared upon the Moroccan scene after the visit of Emperor Wilhelm, to give more precision and a wider scope to the work of the German *Chargé d'Affaires* at Tangier, Mr. von Kuhlmann, a young man, also of great diplomatic promise and very subtle, as the slower moving M. St. René de Tallandier, too sure of the prestige which France enjoyed, was destined to find out.

The prestige went to Germany after Emperor Wilhelm's veto, emphasised by the Conference of Algeciras, as far as that august meeting in the solemn foolery of its final act emphasised anything, while it persisted in neglecting the real needs of Morocco. The programme, presented by Haji Muhammad el-Mokri, contained, besides his proposal for the limitation of consular protection and consequent unjust claims, other proposals for the imposing of an import duty of 100 per cent. on alcoholic beverages and narcotics, and measures of the kind, which, though beneficial to the country, would harm the European trade. This programme of the Moorish delegate, who wished for real reform, was almost openly ridiculed. The European trade had to be protected before all else, even if it supplied the rifles and cartridges used against the Shereefian authority; and, the German star being in the ascendant, we heard a good deal of the German trade interests, of the sixteen or more German firms at Tangier, doing export, import, and commission business, with an aggregate capital of more than 2,000,000 M., etc., etc. A German daily service was established between Tangier and Gibraltar; the Hamburg-American line made Tangier a port of call for her steamers to and from the Mediterranean, at the personal request of Emperor Wilhelm.

*Tout était pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes.* Trade in general, and German trade in particular, were satisfied; the work of pacific penetration by France, though considerably checked by Germany, went on as best it could, till one fine day the news came of a French agent, Dr.



Mauchamp, having been murdered at Marakesh. The French Government pressed with great energy for reparation, and promptly seized the opportunity for also exacting speedy satisfaction in the cases of M. Charbonnier, murdered, and of MM. Lassallas and Gironcourt, attacked on previous occasions. An indemnity was, of course, the *pièce de résistance* in the long list of demands, embracing the settlement of all claims which had been presented to the Maghzen up to the date of that demand, May 25th, 1907. And *mirabile dictu*, it insisted, among other things, upon "immediate organisation of the new police, provided for in the Convention of Algeciras," as if Morocco, not France and Spain, had retarded that organisation, one of the most impracticable and ludicrous results of the Algeciras farce.

The occupation of Ujda enforced all these demands, much to the displeasure of Madrid, where that invasion was considered a menace to the national interests at Melilla. This accounts, to a certain extent, for the reluctance repeatedly shown by Spain to throw herself headlong with France into an adventure of which it is difficult to calculate the outcome. Spanish assertion of historical rights to a voice in the shaping of the destiny of North-Western Africa, lost much of its vigour after the signing of the Hispano-French treaty, which sprang from the Anglo-French treaty, and one cannot help remembering in this connection what occurred ten years earlier, as the outcome of the Convention concluding the Melilla squabble of those days on the 5th of March, 1894, when the Spanish representatives met with a polite rebuff, both in London and in Paris: We intend to manage Morocco as we please—*con permiso de Usted!* And since there has come a firm reminder from Berlin: *Ich bin der Dritte im Bunde!* But appearances have to be saved and, to counterbalance past neglect, the Spanish Government, after long deliberation, and stimulated by a visit to Madrid of M. Pichon, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, seems now decided to stand by France in what is euphemistically called "carrying into effect the provisions of the Act of Algeciras." Conformably with Arts. 24, 25, 80, and 91, of that Act, the Sultan of Morocco has consequently been moved to empower the two Governments to stop the contraband trade in wines, arms, and ammunition in Moroccan waters. Within a few days, probably by way of

penance for grave sins of omission in the police supervision so strongly urged at Algeciras, due prominence was given to the actual seizure of nine thousand cartridges and a case of Mauser pistols on board a Spanish mail steamer.

The murder of Dr. Mauchamp and the subsequent military occupation of Ujda were still fresh in the public mind, when news flashed along the wires of the trapping of Kaid Maclean by Raisuli who, without doubt, chose that eminent Scotchman not only from patriotic motives, to take revenge for the Kaid's introduction of the bagpipe into Morocco, but also because, being patronised by nobody less than the Emperor of Germany, he could not stoop to the kid-napping of anyone lower in status than the honoured military adviser of his Sultan.

The release of Mr. Ion Perdicaris had been quickly obtained, comparatively speaking, chiefly through the good offices of France. But the more and more unsettled condition of the country, together with the more and more illusory character of the Sultan's sovereignty, for a long time made all efforts fail in the case of the worthy Kaid Maclean. At last, an accessory game of hide and seek progressing between the Shereefian troops and the tribes under whose protection Raisuli held his prisoner, the arduous bargaining to somewhat rebate the robber captain's humiliating terms led, two months ago, to an agreement with Sir Gerard Lowther. But the liberation of Sir Harry Maclean remained unaccomplished for a time owing to delays connected with the delivery to Raisuli of exchange prisoners, incarcerated in different places of the interior where it was difficult to enforce the Sultan's written acceptance of Raisuli's demands.

The Casa Blanca affair had brought new trouble after the lifting of Kaid Maclean, new danger, new incentive to the disintegration of the Moroccan Empire. In the beginning of April it had become necessary to despatch the French cruiser *Lalande* to Casa Blanca. Considerable unrest had been reported in the vicinity of that town, the tribes objecting to the installation of a French supervisor of the customs, first fruit of the Sultan's entrusting the control of the customs in Moroccan ports to the French syndicate which floated the loan of 1904. The unrest took at length a more acute form, but no precautions were taken either by France or by Spain,

responsible for the police at Casa Blanca, to protect the men engaged in improving the port, nor by the *Compagnie Marocaine*, which was in charge of the work. The men were mobbed on Monday, the 22nd of July, eight of them were killed, five Frenchmen, two Spaniards, and one Italian. This could scarcely have happened if the police had been at work according to the theory of the Algeciras Act. But then it did happen, a deplorable instance of a mob getting out of hand as a mob may anywhere, even in the most civilised countries; and this was a mob, rashly irritated by imprudent rudeness, which intensified an already existing excitement. Did, however, the violence of a heated rabble, warrant the passionate action taken by France, after plenty of time for cool reflection, by France, which showed such a remarkable slowness to decide upon the proper line of conduct at the proper moment, though empowered at her own wish to preserve order and provide assistance for the purpose of all necessary reforms?

What now happened to correct the first error? Nothing for two weeks. The town remained in ferment as a natural result of the threatening tone assumed, after his arrival, by the commander of the *Galilée* in his pourparlers with the Basha. But the Basha had the population and the native troops well under control, so well, indeed, that the agitation gradually subsided. "The town was then at the feet of the French and the town authorities; the townspeople and the natives were ready to do anything demanded of them," a British merchant at Casa Blanca wrote. Nevertheless, without previous warning, in the early morning of Monday, the 5th of August, a party of sixty or seventy French marines were landed, they brutally forced their way to the custom-house and the French Consulate, pushing and beating the natives who had helped them to get on shore. If the commander of the *Galilée* was not deliberately preparing the way for General Drude, that landing, in that manner, could only proceed from a ghastly lack of judgment. It has been justly characterised as nervous irresponsibility trying to make up in over-action for inaction when it was requisite to guard the lives and the property of whites and natives against possibilities.

A single rifle shot was heard, fired by the Moors as the French telegrams asserted. The Moors, on the contrary, with

the correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, accuse a French sailor, not less nervous than his commander, of the act. It will probably remain a mystery to what side the delinquent belonged, as in the case of that other fatal rifle shot, which changed the relations between the Americans and the Filipinos, as thoroughly as the relations between the Trojans and the Rutuli were changed by the arrow, shot at Æneas under the walls of Laurentum; *Incertum, qua pulsa manu, quo turbine adacta*. But whoever forgot himself, *pressa insignis gloria facti*, gave the signal for terrible doings. A sickening scene of carnage followed, the French shooting down everybody (practically all unarmed),” to quote once more from the letter of the British merchant to the Secretary of the Over Seas League. Another witness of the mode in which the French troops gave their lesson of civilisation to the Moors, appears in the person of Dr. Robert Kerr, Scotch missionary at Rabat, then on a visit to Casa Blanca. He speaks of the landing as previously arranged, several days before, “planned to take place on the Monday morning,” and describes as follows (*Glasgow Herald*) the action of the French and Spanish marines after the wicked and unjustifiable bombardment of the Moorish quarter (almost simultaneous with the passing by the Peace Conference at the Hague of an unanimous resolution that the bombardment of unfortified places is wrong and under no circumstance to be tolerated):—

. . . from their commanding position (they) kept up a terrible fire on those passing in the streets. Old men and women flying in confusion this way and that were shot down. This hellish butchery appeared to give them unfeigned delight. Soon the streets were filled with dead. From the consulate window, not fifty yards away, I saw two young women walking as quickly as they could to some friend's house near to the European consulate. Suddenly a volley was fired into them by the Spanish marines. They fell, but picked themselves up and took refuge in a ledge of a wall. After waiting a few minutes they made to return, when another volley was fired at them, and they fell again. The scene was too awful. One of these brave daughters of Ishmael refused to flee without taking with her her khaik or outer garment which fell from her. She turned back, picked up her garment, and fled as fast as she could, bleeding all over.

The French Foreign Legion were sent to clear the streets, shooting everyone who came in their way, but later they took to looting and apparently got out of all control, the drinkshops having a peculiar attraction for them. During the evening I saw a large number of them lying helplessly drunk in the streets.

On Thursday morning the Foreign Legion was sent to search the houses and sanctuaries, when, I understand, many innocent people were shot down. I saw one poor Arab who was found in a house near the British consulate. It appeared to me that they were thirsting for revenge. His hands were tied behind his back, while the Foreign Legion battered his head with the butt end of their guns and revolvers; then they made him bend his head over a barrel and a sword was brought down on his neck pretending to cut off his head. Then he was kicked and finally taken along with others to be shot at the beach.

As it was fairly safe to go out, I made a visit through the streets. What met one's eyes was too painful to describe. Old men and women had been caught in the fire and shot down; horses, cows, bullocks, dogs, etc., were all lying dead. I only saw two wounded—a Jew and a Moor—while the nature of the wounds revealed that soft-nosed bullets had been used to carry out this pacific penetration.

I am told on reliable authority that not a few Jews were shot in their houses by the Foreign Legion.

In contrasting the action of the Moorish Governor and his men, they were angels compared to the French and their men.

The natives of the surrounding district must have been more than angels not to retaliate. How they set to work and how they were retaliated upon again, we have read, and continue to read, in the daily papers. As described, the shelling and shooting of the Moors, up in defence of their country, evoke the usual admiration for the bravery and heroism of disciplined, well-armed troops, assisted by quick-firing guns, melinite shells from the war ships, military balloons, all the modern appliances for destruction up to date, gallantly mowing down untrained tribesmen who, for weapons, besides their swords and spears, which they have no chance to use, possess nothing but old-fashioned rifles, lacking even sufficient ammunition for these.

This is the "necessary and justifiable intervention of France," vindicated by M. Pichon in the Chamber of Deputies. It is satisfactory to remark that he could not convince all his hearers of the equity of the methods employed. Among the unconvinced was M. Laroche, ex-colonial governor, who lodged a strong protest against the unnecessary and unjustifiable practices characteristic of the expedition under debate, as, *e.g.*, the taking of hostages—a protest which could only be met with rather lame explanations. While "undertaking the work of justice by making an example and punishing the

murderers and robbers of unfortunate Frenchmen in agreement with the unanimous decision of the Powers," at the same time safeguarding the rights of Sultan Abd' el-Aziz, whose sovereignty and the integrity of whose empire are represented as paramount in all this business, the French keep in view the consideration that the Shereefian exchequer must be made to pay for the rare sample of pacific penetration held up to our admiration, that they have to exact, in accordance with custom, besides a snug indemnity for damaged trade interests, the money value of the Europeans killed, nobody thinking of any compensation to the relations of the slaughtered Moors. Another consideration is "to assure the safety of Europeans, but not to go further than that," for the French Government "does not contemplate and never contemplated the conquest of Morocco." In fact, continuing to quote M. Pichon, and now from his speech in the Senate on the 24th of December, it only endeavours to carry out "practically" the Algeciras Act in all its clauses, the *theory* evidently having exploded with the disturbance created by the commander of the *Galilée*.

How the work of justice is being carried out, needs no further comment. As regards the safety of Europeans, they never were more unsafe in Morocco than after the unwarranted attack upon Casa Blanca. They have had to evacuate the inland towns with indecorous haste; even the European community of Tangier has been heard crying for warships to protect the consulates, and for passenger-steamers to facilitate a general exodus. The disintegration of Morocco, studiously prepared for long years, is plainly reaching a seasonable stage for whatever Power wants to profit by it and enjoys a free hand. France can derive more profit from the present state of affairs than any other Power. But France enjoys no free hand, since, declining to go to war in support of the thesis that a French colonial empire in Africa is impossible while Morocco remains independent, she sees herself obliged to suffer the patronage of the Conference of Algeciras, which rather accentuated than not Emperor Wilhelm's dictum: "The sovereignty and integrity of Morocco must be maintained."

France, trying to forget that this sovereignty and integrity had formerly been declared a menace to the stability of French rule in North-Africa, already made *bonne mine à*

*mauvais jeu*. M. Bourgeois, in the Chamber of Deputies on the 12th of April, 1906, gave the keynote to later statements from the lips of other leaders—statements of the sour grapes variety—by praising the *acute moralité* of the Algeciras performance, on which the curtain had just descended, and by accepting the impossible police regulations of its final act and all the rest. Nevertheless, the Quai d'Orsay, hopefully anticipating a brighter future, did not cease to strive after as much more than *la France prépondérante dans un Maroc indépendant* as it could get without being called to task. Does French diplomacy greet the dawn of that brighter future in the Moroccan confusion, worse confounded by the horrors of Casa Blanca?

One of the first consequences of French intervention in such a shape, was the open revolt of Mulay Hafid, who, on the strength of the same *acute moralité* which came to a head at Algeciras, had been secretly encouraged for several years past, in his claims against his half-brother, Mulay Abd' el-Aziz, the reigning Sultan, the youngest son of the late Sultan, Mulay Hasan. There are two other half-brothers of Mulay Abd' el-Aziz: the young Hasan, who is living among the Riff people, and Muhammad, who occasionally acted as Viceroy before Sultan Hassan, on his deathbed, secured the succession to his Benjamin. Until Mulay Hafid asserted himself, Mulay Muhammad, who fled to the south, lost no opportunity to turn to his own account the dislike in which many, principally among the orthodox, held Sultan Abd' el-Aziz for his indifference to native opinion, his affectation of European manners, his sudden change of policy, conspicuous, *e.g.*, in the rise and fall of el-Menebhi, a clever man, of whom it seems strange that we hear so little in the present imbroglio. Mulay Hafid wavered a long time before venturing on the decisive step; but the Casa Blanca affair put an end to his hesitation. Concerning his attitude towards foreign influence, it must be remembered that, when the inhabitants of Marakesh proclaimed him Sultan, more prematurely, as it appears now, than suited his own plans, his first act was to release some prisoners connected with the murder of Dr. Mauchamp, while the trump card, played in his favour against his half-brother, was his hate, *versus* the latter's love, of Europeans, a foible ascribed to the teachings of a Circassian

mother, Lalla Rakia, bought for old Hasan in the slave market of Stamboul. Hafid once in the lists, well ahead of young Hasan and Muhammad, the demise of Abd' el-Aziz—opportune exits are by no means infrequent in successions to Eastern, or, for that matter, Western thrones!—may at least bring the internecine war to a happy close, provided no other pretenders arise and the semi-independent tribes keep reasonably quiet. Thus far the Shereefian troops and the rebels have met with pretty equal luck, alternately conquering or being conquered, according to the tribes who throw their strength into this scale or that. Both Mulay Abd' el-Aziz and Mulay Hafid lack money. The former has been reduced to the necessity of pawning his jewels, while all sorts of claims exhaust his treasury; the latter is probably without anything to pawn, but, on the other hand, being unrecognised by the Powers, has no pressing foreign claims to meet. France having taken sides with the Sultan of the North, will naturally be best suited by his bringing his contumacious brother to submission. Should he fail to do so she cannot be expected to seek in vain for a plausible motive for a *volte-face*.

More annoying than such questions, reserved for the future, has been the trouble on the Algerian frontier. For the same reasons which made the conquest of Algeria result in complications with Morocco, the warlike *penetration pacifique* of that neighbouring country has moved the Beni Snassen to hostile deeds. This, too, might have been foreseen. Some of the brotherhoods to which the majority of the North-African Moslemin belong are guided by spiritual leaders in Morocco, and the expedition under General Drude had perceptibly weakened the French force in Algeria. After a few weeks of sharp fighting, the unruly tribes were subdued; General Lyautey could telegraph that the operations against them might be regarded as having come to an end: the Beni Snassen bring in their arms, pay their fines and, among other conditions imposed upon them, will construct a road to connect Ujda with Port Say. Meantime, during this action on the frontier, a new military post was established at Cherrâa, even further west than Ujda, which looks like a postponement of the return march from there *ad Calendas Graecas*.



The landing of marines at Casa Blanca, followed by that fatal rifle shot, as a seal on French aggression, so thoroughly changed the situation which the Convention at Algieras tried but failed to provide for, that, even if the little work done could have some practical effect, it must now come to naught. There could be no better proof of this than the recent note of France in agreement with Spain, to the Powers, showing the necessity of working the police organisation, the feat *par excellence* of the Algieras Act, on a basis quite different from that theoretically assumed. And one new departure entails the other. M. Pichon, on the 15th of November, full of caution, opposed his eloquence to steps of which it would be impossible to foresee the consequences, resisted M. Boni de Castellane, who wanted the internationalisation of Morocco, M. Deschanel, who wanted no internationalisation, M. Delafosse, who wanted to move on, and M. Ribot, who derided *le petit jeu* of putting the whole stake of French policy on one of the Sultans. The same M. Pichon, speaking from the same place on the 5th of December, in principle, still refusing to be driven on to conquest, already proclaimed his determination to see all rights of France in Morocco unflinchingly respected. Rather an ambiguous phrase, though not more ambiguous than the one uttered by Prince von Buelow in the Reichstag, six days before: "We should no more have gone to war about Morocco than we should have gone to war in 1870 about the Spanish succession, but the former, like the latter, might give occasion to our having to defend our honour, prestige, and position in the world."

The party of aggression in France, of which the Moroccan Committee can be called the centre, has steadily gained influence. By a strange degree of fate, it seems destined that M. Clémenceau, the formidable antagonist of the idea of colonial expansion in the East, which was at one time personified in Jules Ferry, *le Tonquinois*, must father, as *le Marocain*, an idea of colonial expansion a good deal wilder. The fear of the German bugbear momentarily laid, and general considerations of prudence pushed aside, excuses for marching forward can easily be found. At Rabat, Salee, Tetuan and elsewhere, the organisation of the police, finally resolved upon, is breeding unrest. Fez, exempted from taxation by

Mulay Abd' el-Aziz as a defensive measure against Mulay Hafid,<sup>1</sup> is reported in a state of grave disorder, the great market place having been sacked, and the French post-office attacked. Naval preparations have been made at Toulon, notwithstanding the bad season, and fresh troops sent to give General d'Amade, ordered from la Rochelle to Casa Blanca, a more imposing force than the six thousand men under the command of General Drude, whose functions he took over. The latter's failure to properly hatch the egg he found in the Moroccan nest, may have been caused by the malarial fever from which he suffers, or by his incapacity to grasp the situation at Casa Blanca, as *Le Temps* reproaches him, or by both combined. Or perhaps he failed—worst mistake of all—to grasp the changing situation at the Quai d'Orsay. Anyway, before the first reinforcements arrived, and before General d'Amade disembarked, he took the Kasbah of the Mediuna, levelling the path for operations on a grander scale. An expedition to Fez is talked of, in which contingency the direction of affairs will be confided to General Baillaud, now commanding the 19th army corps in Algeria.

However this turn out, enough has occurred since the Conference of Algeiras to thoroughly disillusion those who believe that the last word there spoken, was really a final word, once for all solving the Morocco question. It remains with us and, *apropos* of Casa Blanca, presents itself in an ever more malignant form fraught with serious danger to the peace of the world, in just retribution for too ardent and intrusive a method of civilisation. Much depends on Germany in this critical junction. Will Wilhelm-strasse accommodate France in return for compensation elsewhere? The Baghdad railway is still hanging fire, to mention only that. Germany, by the mouth of the Prince von Bismarck, gave France permission to occupy Tunis. It was on the occasion of a visit, paid to Friedrichsruhe, by the Comte de St. Vallier, and "permission" was the word Prince von Bismarck used in mentioning the incident to his friends, as we were told some months ago by Lord Beresford. Germany may give France permission to occupy Morocco for a consideration, though France declare never so loudly that she does not want to. Prince von Bismarck

<sup>1</sup> Without avail. This article was hardly in type when its prognosis of further complications became verified by Mulay Hafid's being proclaimed Sultan in the Northern Capital.

would have wished Marianne to have plenty to do in Morocco, a wish expressed in 1880, with the *arrière pensée* of diverting her attention from her lost children in Alsace and Lorraine. There is no reason to believe that the foreign policy of Germany moves now in a different direction; the whole history of the negotiations relative to Morocco, between Paris and Berlin, can be made to hinge on negotiations in which other Powers are no less interested, relative to a bargain in more distant climes. The recent visit of Emperor Wilhelm to England concurring with revelations of international import in the Harden-von Moltke trial, and followed by French preparations to go in for Morocco—if the expression could be permitted—on an extensive scale, give rise to the conjecture that, with the aid of Great Britain and the *entente cordiale*, some arrangement has been made in which the exigencies of the Baghdad railway received due attention.

Such an arrangement would cut both ways for Germany: directly by concessions gained, indirectly by Marianne's availing herself of the gracious consent to put her hand a little farther, and still a little farther, into the Maghrebine hornets' nest. The deeper she goes, the deeper she must go, attracted by glory, newly-acquired rights to maintain, new offences to avenge, as the fly is attracted to that delectable compound known in the chemist's shop by the suggestive name of Tangle-foot. For the conquest of Morocco a hundred thousand men will be required, at a low estimate, and how many years of a weakened, increasingly taxed France?

But desire or no desire, permission or no permission, the Morocco question, far from having breathed its last at Algieras, is growing every day a more vital part of the great and intricate Eastern question, the solution of which has been, and most probably will continue to be, the despair of ages. The powers at each new bend of the road, for their sins of greed and meddling, confronted with that incubus, whose demoniac body is composed of a host of lesser Eastern questions, hopelessly confused. Among the principal, the Morocco one might be baptised the Western Eastern to distinguish it from the Far Eastern (that of the Pacific), from the Eastern Eastern (that of the Persian Gulf), from the Central Eastern (that of the Balkans and the sick man at Stamboul, still far from dead,—the praise belongs to Allah!), all together, in a certain, rather provoking sense, *e pluribus unum*.

J. F. SCHELTEMA.

## VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

### CATHOLICS AND THE BANK OF IRELAND.

#### II.

IN the last number of this REVIEW we drew attention to the singular disadvantages under which Catholics appear to labour in the Head Office of the Bank of Ireland, in College Green. We showed that, of the twenty-one Chief Officials employed there, one only is a Catholic, and of the £12,000 or more distributed yearly in salaries among them only £375 is paid to that solitary Catholic. So far, therefore, as the chief positions in the Head Office of the Bank of Ireland are concerned twenty Protestants receive promotion for every Catholic, and over £31 is paid in salaries to Protestants for every pound paid to Catholics.

Further, we drew attention to the fact that a very large proportion of the Protestant Officials in question are Freemasons. We had verified that statement in regard to half their number; and we have reason to believe that it is true of others amongst them also.

We also invited our readers and the Directors and Catholic Shareholders and Customers of the Bank to consider whether or not this condition of things implied a preferential treatment of Protestants and Freemasons in the service of the Bank, and a corresponding want of justice and fair play towards its Catholic Officials.

It was no part of our purpose to deal with the less important positions in the Head Office; though, had we wished, we could have laid before our readers some striking facts, in reference to them too. In the Secretary's Department, for instance, together with the Secretary himself, the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Assistant Secretary—all three Protestants and all three Freemasons, and drawing amongst them £2,400 of annual salary—there are ten other members of the staff; and all without a single exception are Protestants. So that into this, the innermost sanctuary of the Bank, where men may hope to prepare themselves and qualify for the higher positions, not even one Catholic has been allowed to penetrate. But we are not now concerned with minor Clerkships. We are immediately interested in the promotion to