

MAN AND THE UNIVERSE

MAN AND THE UNIVERSE

By HANŠ DRIESCH

Translated by

W. H. JOHNSTON, B.A.

LONDON
GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
MUSEUM STREET

*The German original, "Der Mensch und die Welt", was first
published in Leipzig in 1928*

THIS TRANSLATION FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1929

All rights reserved

**PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
UNWIN BROTHERS LTD., WOKING**

PREFACE

THIS book was not written for philosophers or scientists—not, that is, in the last analysis, for my colleagues, but for all who care to be presented with a picture of the universe, complete and having a scientific foundation. This term has a twofold meaning. It means (1) that this book makes use of every kind of knowledge having a scientific basis, and (2) that we state quite exactly where knowledge ceases and conjecture begins.

Accordingly, this book is not a confession of faith, like my essay in Ethics called *Die Sittliche Tat*; or, at any rate, it is so only where this is expressly stated, as in the final section, which is devoted to Ethics.

It would have been easy to write a confession of my view of the universe, but such a book would have been of little value, for confessions of this kind are all too common. Those who will to believe may stay within the sphere of religious orthodoxies, all of which are irrefutable by science—a fact which, of course, does not prove their validity. My chief concern was to separate knowledge from mere assumption (or even belief), for in this way alone it is possible to set up a view of the world which can outlast the bare present.

Accordingly my book does full justice to science, and my philosophy is not blind to its results. I know that the latter quality is unfashionable, and that in these days there are many who desire to disregard science and give the name of philosophy only to the product of other sources of knowledge—immediate intuitions of the nature of reality or the like. I cannot persuade myself that such sources exist. On the other hand, I take the concept of

science in the whole of its fullness and multiplicity; and it seems to me that the modern contempt for science is due to the fact that its champions take the concept in too narrow a sense, namely, as denoting a mechanistic view of the world.

Others say that science is no more than a particular, although comprehensive, form of world-contemplation—the “intellectual” form, and that there are other forms, or, as the popular expression goes, standpoints as well.

This is not my own view. I hold that (1) in so far as we are dealing with real knowledge at all, there is only one standpoint with regard to the world, and only one form in which it can be apprehended, which is, precisely, Knowledge, or Intellect; (2) this intellectual form is far from exhausting itself in the mechanistic world-picture; and (3) (this is connected with (2)) the mechanistic world-view does not comprehend the whole of the world under one definite “point of view”, but comprehends one part only of the world under that point of view which alone is adequate to it. Thus *knowledge* is for me the only point of view which will comprehend the world. It is true that this knowledge further develops into a number of systems having different structures in accordance with the different parts of the world which I make my object. But it is one thing to consider different parts of a whole under one point of view, namely, that of knowledge, and evidently quite a different matter to contemplate a whole under different points of view. The second method gives us a multiple, or at any rate a dual world-view, while the result of the first is simple.

To speak in a more concrete manner, man cannot be considered “first” exclusively as a mechanical system,

“secondly” exclusively as an organic living being, “thirdly” exclusively as a Soul, and “fourthly” exclusively as a social-ethical entity, as though these were different methods of contemplation applied in turn to the same object. Rather, man is one extremely complex structure, in which one part (soul, spirit, life) enters into contact with the other (material) part. Our task is to determine the nature of the contact; and here the popular view, that man consists simply of body and soul, is much nearer to the truth than are many of the statements of philosophers who hold the “point-of-view” theory.

My work gives to man a definite position in the cosmos; it does not treat spirit as something alien to nature; spirit is that which penetrates nature. In many respects it resembles the work of Dacqué, although I pitch my claims less high. Civilization in its more particular manifestations plays a small part with both of us, if I rightly apprehend Dacqué; the fact that man is human is alone important for us.

It may be said that my view of the world betrays the fact that its author was at one time a natural scientist, who attacks every problem like a problem in natural science; but I would consider such an objection not as blame but as praise. For the true method of natural science is *the* method of knowledge in general, and bears the name of natural only because among the empirical sciences the schemes of nature were the first which reflected on the meaning of knowledge and the way in which contents of knowledge are acquired. It goes without saying that results which natural science has acquired in one field of knowledge (the inorganic, for example) must not be applied dogmatically to other parts: each part of

the world must be investigated separately and without bias. But the "method" is everywhere the same: to apprehend the form in which the subject-matter is ordered.

It may be admissible to call my method "rational", if that be desired; but then the term must not be used in the sense of a universally comprehensive mechanistic form, which fails in practice as soon as it is applied to the organic world. What I call the rational method is capable also of mastering that which is popularly called occult or mystical, or even magical; everything, that is, which belongs to the realm of Psychological Research, both in its animistic and in its spiritistic form, and to astrology. The actual data and the method of dealing with them are purely questions of fact of a scientific kind. To master these things in the rational manner means, precisely, to determine the order which pervades them and the facts which they represent. It is true that this does not give complete understanding; but we cannot "understand" even the laws of impact. Nothing can be understood completely. It is one of the tasks of rationalism to determine where the limits of understanding begin; and beyond there is no instrument of knowledge in the strict sense.

Mortal man must recognize this and be satisfied. He may use faith to complement what he knows; but such additions should not be called knowledge.

HANS DRIESCH

LEIPSIK,
12th February, 1928

PREFATORY NOTE

IN the form of this book my complete philosophical system presents itself to the English-speaking reader for the first time, at least on a larger scale. My London Lectures of 1924, published under the title *The Possibility of Metaphysics*, give nothing but what might be called the skeleton of parts of my system, and this in a very condensed form.

This book may be taken as an introduction to my larger works, and it is my hope that the reader may use it in this way.

My thanks are due to the publishers, Messrs. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., and to Mr. W. H. Johnston, B.A., who has made the translation in quite an excellent way. I know well that this has not been a very easy task.

HANS DRIESCH

LEIPSIK,
17th June, 1929

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

PHILOSOPHY is the quintessence of common sense, and it should therefore be possible to render a philosophical work in the language of every day. I have made this my aim, but have been prevented from achieving it completely by the fact that Philosophy, like every other science, has its peculiar technical terms. To substitute more familiar words for them would involve inaccuracy, and to circumscribe them whenever they occur, clumsiness. I have been compelled by these considerations to use a number of technical terms in the body of the text, and I have drawn up the following list of them for the use of those readers who may wish to consult it:—

A priori.—Knowledge of which the truth, and propositions of which the certainty, is evident without the corroboration of facts are said to be true, or certain, *a priori*—mathematical and logical truths are of this kind.

Contingent.—Existing facts or events are said to be contingent if there is no essential reason discoverable why they should not be different from what they are.

Critique.—A critical examination, or systematic analysis, of a problem or subject, always from an impartial standpoint, and therefore not necessarily adverse. It is in this sense that Kant composed his three Critiques, which constitute the bulk of his teaching: The Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgment.

Determinism.—That view of the world which holds that the whole course of events is rigidly fixed, or *determined*, beforehand.

Dualism.—That view of the nature of reality which holds that it is essentially, or ultimately, twofold, consisting of spirit and also of matter, or again of good and evil.

Empirical.—Knowledge the truth of which is apprehended,

not *a priori*, but through experience, is said to be empirical.

Entelechy.—Driesch employs this term to denote the controlling, but immaterial and non-physical, principle of all Life and all organisms. This theory is the essence of his own "Vitalism".

Entity.—I have used *entity* to denote anything that exists, whether materially or spiritually, and that, grammatically, can be the subject of a sentence.

Image.—The mental picture of an external object which passes through the mind during the process of *imagination* is called its image.

Intuit.—I have used *intuit* to mean: to apprehend, as *e.g.* by vision or by any other of the senses.

Posit, to.—To assert or maintain, or definitely express.

Sensuous.—When an object is experienced through the senses the experience is called a *sensuous* experience.

Subjective; Objective.—That which experiences (the self or ego) is called the subject, as opposed to that which it experiences, which is called the object. *Subjective* and *objective* are the corresponding adjectives.

*World as it is, *the**.—An expression essential to Kant's philosophy. From one standpoint (he modified this at a later period) he held that we perceive through our senses a world of appearance; behind these experiences, and causing them, he held *the world as it is* to lie; more generally, therefore, the term means ultimate or absolute Reality.

CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| PREFACE | 5 |
| PREFATORY NOTE | 9 |
| TRANSLATOR'S NOTE | 11 |
| A. THE APPREHENSION OF THE UNIVERSE | 15 |
| I. THE NATURAL WORLD-PICTURE | 15 |
| II. THE BEGINNING OF CRITICISM AND ITS METHOD | 22 |
| 1. Error as the Father of Doubt | 22 |
| 2. What is "Real"? | 26 |
| 3. Unanswered Questions | 29 |
| III. THE CORRECTED WORLD-PICTURE | 31 |
| 1. The True "Critical" Starting-Point | 31 |
| 2. The Apprehension of the Order of "My" World | 33 |
| 3. The Apprehension of the Order of Nature, and Especially of the Soul | 36 |
| 4. The World "In Itself" | 42 |
| 5. "Metaphysics" | 56 |
| B. THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE | 60 |
| I. THE NON-LIVING AND THE LIVING | 60 |
| II. THE SPIRITUAL ELEMENT AND ITS FORMS | 68 |
| 1. The Stages of Spirit | 69 |
| 2. Supra-Personal Spirit | 76 |
| 3. The Spiritual as Such | 82 |
| (a) What is the Object of "Knowledge"? | 82 |
| (b) How is Knowledge "Acquired"? | 87 |
| (c) The Many and the One | 92 |
| III. THE "BEYOND" AND DEATH | 95 |
| IV. RELIGION | 98 |
| V. ART | 100 |

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| C. MAN AS A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSE | 104 |
| I. VOLITION | 104 |
| 1. Knowing and Willing | 104 |
| 2. Willing and Acting | 105 |
| 3. Experience and Event | 110 |
| (a) In How Many Ways are the Two Con- | |
| nected? | 111 |
| (b) The Connection Between Volition and | |
| Event in Particular | 116 |
| (c) Volition with Reference to Another | 123 |
| II. OUGHT | 127 |
| III. FREE WILL | 137 |
| IV. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PART WHICH IT PLAYS | |
| IN THE WORLD | 152 |
| V. THE QUESTION OF IMMORTALITY | 160 |
| D. CONCLUSION: MAN AND THE UNIVERSE | 165 |
| INDEX | 171 |

INDEX

- Appearance, 49 *sq.*
 Aristotle, 82
 Atoms, 26, 28, 60, 64
 Augustine, 32

 Berkeley, 29
 Birth-control, 155
 Blastomeres, 67, 74
 Bozzano, 98
 Breysig, 80
 Buckle, 80
 Buddha, 132, 155

 Christian Science, 114
 Clairvoyance, 88
 Cognition, 50 *sq.*
 Consciousness, 145 *sq.*
 Coué, 114, 119 *sq.*, 126, 160

 Darwin, 78
 Descartes, 32
 Determinism, 138, 142
 Dreams, 18 *sqq.*, 47

 Einstein, 61, 64
 Entelechy, 81 *sq.*

 Freud, 119 *sq.*

 Gandhi, 154
 Geley, 147
 Goethe, 90, 153

 Hegel, 164
 Henderson, Professor, 77
 Hume, 57, 109
 Hypnosis, 44 *sq.*, 89, 113
 Hypnotic state, 124 *sqq.*

 Idealism, 27

 James, William, 91
 Jesus, 132, 155

 Kant, 29 *sqq.*, 33, 49 *sq.*, 57, 130 *sq.*,
 135, 138 *sq.*, 161
 Karma, 169
 Knowledge, 85 *sq.*

 Lamarck, 78
 Lamprecht, 80
 League of Nations, 136
 Leibniz, 29, 91
 Lessing, Th., 80, 153
 Levitation, 114
 Locke, 57
 Lotze, 45

 Materialism, 56
 Materialists, 27
 Mattiesen, 98
 Maxwell, 28, 64
 Metagnomes, 90-*sq.*

 Natural Man, 15, 16, 18
 Nature, 42 *sq.*, 47
 Newton, 28, 62, 64, 77

 Oesterreich, 98
 Osty, 90 *sq.*

 Pawlow, 113, 116
 Phenomena of Contrast, 9, 24
 Post-hypnosis, 143, 151
 Premonition and prophecy, 90
 Primary properties, 26, 29
 Primitive Men, 22
 Psychical research, 98
 Psychical secretion, 113
 Psychology, 40 *sq.*
 Psychometry, 88
 Psycho-physical parallelism, 70

- Real, 48 *sq.*
Realism, 56
Reason and consequence, 51 *sq.*
- Scheler, 147
Schelling, 147, 164
Schneider, 80
Schopenhauer, 103, 132, 147, 153
Secondary properties, 26, 60
Soul, 69 *sqq.*
Spinoza, 138, 149, 159
- Stoics, 143 *sq.*
Sum, sum-like action, sum-events,
64, 66, 67, 68
- Taine, 80
Telekinesis, 114
Telepathy, 88, 142
Totalizing forces, totality events.
63, 65 *sq.*, 68 *sqq.*, 74 *sqq.*
- Yogis, 114



GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
LONDON: 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.1
CAPE TOWN: 73 ST GEORGE'S STREET
SYDNEY, N.S.W.: WYNARD SQUARE
AUCKLAND, N.Z.: 41 ALBERT STREET
WELLINGTON, N.Z.: 4 WILLIS STREET
TORONTO, 77 WELLINGTON STREET, WEST

The Intelligible World :

Metaphysics and Value

BY PROFESSOR W. M. URBAN, PH.D.

Demy 8vo. Author of "Valuation: its Nature and Laws" 16s.

The general thesis of the book is that the *intelligible world*—the only world, that is, intelligible to thought—is one in which existence and value are ultimately inseparable. Reality is existence plus meaning and value. In the light of this thesis, the fundamental problems of philosophy are interpreted and a system of philosophy developed. This system constitutes a reinstatement of the *Great Tradition* in philosophy in modern terms, and in the light of this tradition the various "modernistic" tendencies in recent philosophy are examined and critically evaluated.

Identity and Reality

BY EMILE MEYERSON

TRANSLATED BY KATE LOEWENBERG

Demy 8vo. 16s.

This is the authorized English translation of M. Emile Meyerson's well-known "*Identité et Réalité*"; the author himself has written a special preface for it. The book deals with the principles of Causality, Inertia, Conservation of Energy, Time, etc., etc., and reveals a broader knowledge and a greater grasp of detail than is anywhere else to be found.

Hegel's Science of Logic

TRANSLATED BY W. H. JOHNSTON AND L. G. STRUTHERS

Demy 8vo. Two Vols. 32s. the set.

"This may be justly described as a great translation. That it makes its appearance in the Library of Philosophy is fitting in every way : the Library is a monument of international scholarship."—*Sunday Times*.

Contemporary American Philosophy

EDITED BY PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD

Demy 8vo. 2 Vols. 16s. each.

This companion work to "Contemporary British Philosophy" contains contributions by W. M. Urban, George Santayana, W. Pepperell Montague, G. H. Palmer, and thirty other distinguished American writers.

The Correspondence of Spinoza

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY BY
PROFESSOR A. WOLF

Demy 8vo. Illustrated 15s.

"Dr. Wolf and—for we must not omit them—his publishers, Messrs. Allen & Unwin, who so often have aided the cause of Philosophy, are doing a very useful service in keeping our attention fixed upon the life and work of one of the very greatest figures of all time."—*Observer*.

The Renewal of Culture

BY LARS RINGBOM

La. Cr. 8vo. TRANSLATED BY G. C. WHEELER *7s. 6d.*

In this book Dr. Ringbom develops a thesis of great interest and significance. He begins with a biological analysis of human society, and shows how human nature is dominated by the desire for power—creative or destructive. A civilization in which a lust of destructive power predominates is doomed to extinction. Progress is due to two antagonistic instincts—for self-preservation and for race-preservation, individualism and collectivism. Freedom nowadays is threatened by collectivism; we rely too much on subordination; whereas it is a free and voluntary co-operation that is required, an identification of individual and racial instincts. Dr. Ringbom, who has known the excesses both of the Russian Imperial system and of the Mob rule, sees signs of a new development.

The Science of Character

BY LUDWIG KLAGES

Demy 8vo. TRANSLATED BY W. H. JOHNSTON *10s. 6d.*

The author of this work enjoys the reputation of being the leading psychologist of Germany. His importance has two aspects; he treats human character as a totality, without turning all his attention to one only of its many mainsprings; and he bases his work on a sound philosophical foundation.

Experience and Nature

BY JOHN DEWEY

Royal 8vo. *12s. 6d.*

Mr. Dewey is one of the most prominent workers in philosophy in America to-day and has a large following and a steadily growing reputation in this country. This latest volume of his is addressed specifically to the general reader, and makes clear and explicit the metaphysical basis of his singularly humane philosophy of life. "Philosophy," he has said, "recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men."

The Philosophy of John Dewey

BY JOSEPH RATNER

Demy 8vo. *16s.*

This book is specially designed to help the lay reader to understand Mr. Dewey's philosophic principles, not only in themselves, but in their manifold relations to the rest of his work. It consists of selections from his many works, arranged in such a manner as to give a consecutive account of his general philosophic standpoint.

All prices are net.

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD