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TURKEY IN THE WORLD WAR

**ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY
OF THE WORLD WAR**

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TURKISH SERIES

TURKEY
IN THE WORLD WAR

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

IN the autumn of 1914, when the scientific study of the effects of war upon modern life passed suddenly from theory to history, the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace proposed to adjust the program of its researches to the new and altered problems which the War presented. The existing program, which had been prepared as the result of a conference of economists held at Berne in 1911, and which dealt with the facts then at hand, had just begun to show the quality of its contributions; but for many reasons it could no longer be followed out. A plan was therefore drawn up at the request of the Director of the Division, in which it was proposed, by means of an historical survey, to attempt to measure the economic cost of the War and the displacement which it was causing in the processes of civilization. Such an "Economic and Social History of the World War," it was felt, if undertaken by men of judicial temper and adequate training, might ultimately, by reason of its scientific obligations to truth, furnish data for the forming of sound public opinion, and thus contribute fundamentally toward the aims of an institution dedicated to the cause of international peace.

The need for such an analysis, conceived and executed in the spirit of historical research, was increasingly obvious as the War developed, releasing complex forces of national life not only for the vast process of destruction, but also for the stimulation of new capacities for production. This new economic activity, which under normal conditions of peace might have been a gain to society, and the surprising capacity exhibited by the belligerent nations for enduring long and increasing loss—often while presenting the outward semblance of new prosperity—made necessary a reconsideration of the whole field of war economics. A double obligation was therefore placed upon the Division of Economics and History. It was obliged to concentrate its work upon the problem thus presented, and to study it as a whole; in other words, to apply to it the tests and disciplines of history. Just as the War itself was a single event, though penetrating by seemingly unconnected ways to the remotest parts of the world, so the analysis of it must be developed

according to a plan at once all embracing and yet adjustable to the practical limits of the available data.

During the actual progress of the War, however, the execution of this plan for a scientific and objective study of war economics proved impossible in any large and authoritative way. Incidental studies and surveys of portions of the field could be made and were made under the direction of the Division, but it was impossible to undertake a general history for obvious reasons. In the first place, an authoritative statement of the resources of belligerents bore directly on the conduct of armies in the field. The result was to remove as far as possible from scrutiny those data of the economic life of the countries at war which would ordinarily, in time of peace, be readily available for investigation. In addition to this difficulty of consulting documents, collaborators competent to deal with them were for the most part called into national service in the belligerent countries and so were unavailable for research. The plan for a war history was therefore postponed until conditions should arise which would make possible not only access to essential documents, but also the coöperation of economists, historians, and men of affairs in the nations, chiefly concerned, whose joint work would not be misunderstood either in purpose or in content.

Upon the termination of the War, the Endowment once more took up the original plan, and it was found with but slight modification to be applicable to the situation. Work was begun in the summer and autumn of 1918. In the first place a final conference of the Advisory Board of Economists of the Division of Economics and History was held in Paris, which limited itself to planning a series of short preliminary surveys of special fields. Since, however, the purely preliminary character of such studies was further emphasized by the fact that they were directed more especially toward those problems which were then fronting Europe as questions of urgency, it was considered best not to treat them as part of the general survey, but rather as of contemporary value in the period of war settlement. It was clear that not only could no general program be laid down *a priori* by this conference as a whole, but that a new and more highly specialized research organization than that already existing would be needed to undertake the Economic and Social History of the World War, one based more upon national grounds in the first in-

stance, and less upon purely international coöperation. Until the facts of national history could be ascertained, it would be impossible to proceed with comparative analysis; and the different national histories were themselves of almost baffling intricacy and variety. Consequently the former European Committee of Research was dissolved, and in its place it was decided to erect an Editorial Board in each of the larger countries and to nominate special editors in the smaller ones, who should concentrate, for the present at least, upon their own economic and social war history.

The nomination of these boards by the General Editor was the first step taken in every country where the work has begun. And if any justification were needed for the plan of the Endowment, it at once may be found in the lists of those, distinguished in scholarship or in public affairs, who have accepted the responsibility of editorship. This responsibility is by no means light, involving as it does the adaptation of the general editorial plan to the varying demands of national circumstances or methods of work; and the measure of success attained is due to the generous and earnest coöperation of those in charge in each country.

Once the editorial organization was established, there could be little doubt as to the first step which should be taken in each instance toward the actual preparation of the history. Without documents there can be no history. The essential records of the War, local as well as central, have therefore to be preserved and to be made available for research in so far as is compatible with public interest. But this archival task is a very great one, belonging of right to the Governments and other owners of historical sources and not to the historian or economist who proposes to use them. It is an obligation of ownership; for all such documents are public trust. The collaborators on this section of the war history, therefore, working within their own field as researchers, could only survey the situation as they found it and report their findings in the forms of guides or manuals; and perhaps, by stimulating a comparison of methods, help to further the adoption of those found to be most practical. In every country, therefore, this was the point of departure for actual work; although special monographs have not been written in every instance.

The first stage of the work upon the War History, dealing with little more than the externals of archives, seemed for a while to

exhaust the possibilities of research, and had the plan of the history been limited to research based upon official documents, little more could have been done, for once documents have been labeled "secret" few government officials can be found with sufficient courage or initiative to break open the seal. Thus vast masses of source material essential for the historian were effectively placed beyond his reach, although much of it was quite harmless from any point of view. While war conditions thus continued to hamper research, and were likely to do so for many years to come, some alternative had to be found.

Fortunately such an alternative was at hand in the narrative, amply supported by documentary evidence, of those who had played some part in the conduct of affairs during the War, or who, as close observers in privileged positions, were able to record from first- or at least secondhand knowledge the economic history of different phases of the Great War, and of its effect upon society. Thus a series of monographs was planned consisting for the most part of unofficial yet authoritative statements, descriptive or historical, which may best be described as about halfway between memoirs and bluebooks. These monographs make up the main body of the work assigned so far. They are not limited to contemporary war-time studies; for the economic history of the War must deal with a longer period than that of the actual fighting. It must cover the years of "deflation" as well, at least sufficiently to secure some fairer measure of the economic displacement than is possible in purely contemporary judgments.

With this phase of the work, the editorial problems assumed a new aspect. The series of monographs had to be planned primarily with regard to the availability of contributors, rather than of source material as in the case of most histories; for the contributors themselves controlled the sources. This in turn involved a new attitude toward those two ideals which historians have sought to emphasize, consistency and objectivity. In order to bring out the chief contribution of each writer it was impossible to keep within narrowly logical outlines; facts would have to be repeated in different settings and seen from different angles, and sections included which do not lie within the strict limits of history; and absolute objectivity could not be obtained in every part. Under the stress of controversy or

apology, partial views would here and there find their expression. But these views are in some instances an intrinsic part of the history itself, contemporary measurements of facts as significant as the facts with which they deal. Moreover, the work as a whole is planned to furnish its own corrective; and where it does not, others will.

In addition to the monographic treatment of source material, a number of studies by specialists are already in preparation, dealing with technical or limited subjects, historical or statistical. These monographs also partake to some extent of the nature of first-hand material, registering as they do the data of history close enough to the source to permit verification in ways impossible later. But they also belong to that constructive process by which history passes from analysis to synthesis. The process is a long and difficult one, however, and work upon it has only just begun. To quote an apt characterization; in the first stages of a history like this, one is only "picking cotton." The tangled threads of events have still to be woven into the pattern of history; and for this creative and constructive work different plans and organizations may be needed.

In a work which is the product of so complex and varied coöperation as this, it is impossible to indicate in any but a most general way the apportionment of responsibility of editors and authors for the contents of the different monographs. For the plan of the History as a whole and its effective execution the General Editor is responsible; but the arrangement of the detailed programs of study has been largely the work of the different Editorial Boards and divisional Editors, who have also read the manuscripts prepared under their direction. The acceptance of a monograph in this series, however, does not commit the editors to the opinions or conclusions of the authors. Like other editors, they are asked to vouch for the scientific merit, the appropriateness and usefulness of the volumes admitted to the series; but the authors are naturally free to make their individual contributions in their own way. In like manner the publication of the monographs does not commit the Endowment to agreement with any specific conclusions which may be expressed therein. The responsibility of the Endowment is to History itself—an obligation not to avoid but to secure and preserve variant narratives and points of view, in so far as they are essential for the understanding of the War as a whole.

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In the study of the effect of war upon organized society, the history of the Turkish Empire presents a laboratory which neither historian nor sociologist has as yet fully appreciated. Projecting as it did into the modern world the military ethics of ancient and medieval times, it maintained power under conditions which impeded progress and made possible only those liberties which were not directed toward the exercise of political power. The keynote to the whole political organization lay, as Dr. Emin has pointed out, in its military history. Therefore, the revolution of today which has established the new Turkish national state is much more far-reaching than has hitherto been appreciated. This volume, therefore, while it is conceived wholly within the spirit of the series of which it forms a part, deals with the effect of more than a single war. Its fundamental theme is war itself and the effects of the war system upon society. Nevertheless it concentrates upon the epoch-making events of the World War and shows its setting in the disruption of social practice and political organization in Southeastern Europe.

For this difficult task the author, Dr. Ahmed Emin, is peculiarly well qualified, both by reason of his intimate knowledge of the events themselves and because of his training as sociologist and historian. Objectivity in such matters can only be acquired by one who has learned to look at national tradition and outlook through the study of the institutions of other nations; the comparative method must be added to the historical. Fortunately, the author of this volume has been able so to deal with the phenomena of Turkey under the stress of war as to furnish a contribution to science and, at the same time, a lesson in social and political justice.

J. T. S.

FOREWORD

THE effects of the World War upon Turkey were exceptionally deep and far-reaching. The main reason for this was the great disproportion between the primitive equipment of Turkey and the huge effort called for by an unequal struggle on various distant fronts with efficiently equipped and powerful enemies. This disproportion was further increased by the policy of the war dictatorship, which reduced Turkey to a dependent position, and turned her into a mere source of supplies and men for Germany and the other Central Powers, instead of enabling her to use her meager resources for her own best good in her own particularly difficult position. The economic and social consequences of this—which ended in total collapse—as well as the ceaseless attempts to solve unlooked-for difficulties by a sort of system of trial and error, form an interesting chapter in the general history of the War. Unfortunately, the source materials for such a study are sadly lacking. To begin with, the changes can only to a limited extent be measured in a quantitative way. The gathering of statistics is the most neglected field of government activity in Turkey. Prior to 1927 no modern census had ever been taken; even the exact number of the inhabitants was unknown. The official estimates are based on the population registers. In addition to other technical defects these registers do not give any estimate of the proportion of those not registered, a proportion especially great in Turkey's distant provinces. And as for other statistical material, it is mostly made up either of estimates of varying degrees of accuracy, or of fragments that apply only to limited periods and areas.

Certain publications cover the military history of Turkey's part in the War. The reports of the Turkish general staff, and volumes by private military authors contain much accurate information on military matters. There are also many technical works and memoirs, written by leading German generals, by various other participants in the War, and by authorities on military affairs in general.

The data for the political history of the War are less to be depended on. The documents in the archives have not been published, as they have been in the other defeated countries. What has been

written by the former war leaders is necessarily biased, being published in self-defense. The statements made by the members of the war cabinets before the so-called "fifth division" of the Chamber of Deputies are of a similar character. And most of the private contributions to the political history of the War in Turkey are also more or less biased.

Both military and political works speak incidentally of the social and economic effects of the War; but direct and special investigations into any such effects have not as yet been made. During the War military secrecy forbade it. After the War the chaotic conditions which then ruled gave rise to a great deal of bitter agitation against the misrule during the War; but the time was not yet ripe for any inquiry governed by the scientific attitude. The long series of books and pamphlets written by serious German economists during the War undoubtedly contain valuable material. They did not, however, dwell on the effects of the War, since they largely aimed at enlightening the German public upon those economic problems that might arise in Turkey after peace was signed.

Furthermore, any thorough-going investigation of the economic and social effects of the War would be extremely hard in the case of Turkey. The different parts of the country vary so much that they cannot be reduced to any general average. The influences that were at work differed in effect in different places.

In view of this, an investigation of a general character into the various social and economic problems created by the War cannot be expected to be complete in any sense. This present volume aims only at indicating the main lines taken by those problems, and the nature of the ever changing experiments that were made in the hope of coping with them.

At the same time, if documents and statistics be few, one thing can at least be said. The author had opportunities to view the war situation from the inside. During the first period of the War, he was at first Assistant-Professor of Sociology and later Professor of Statistics in Constantinople University. In this capacity, he was in constant touch with the late Zia Goek Alp Bey, then Professor of Sociology, who has been held to be the cultural leader of the Turkish nationalist movement both before and during the War, and who was an influential member of the Committee of Union and

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Progress, the political dictatorship that was behind the war government.

As a war correspondent, the author was able to get a first-hand view of the machinery by which the War was carried on; and, as an editor, it was possible for him closely to observe the economic and social conditions arising out of the War. In addition, he was, during the armistice, exiled to Malta by the British occupationary forces, and interned there for twenty months along with more than a hundred of those who had been most prominent in Turkey during the War—governors and cabinet members, senators, deputies, and generals. And this long association with the makers of the War also helped the author to understand what had been going on behind the scenes.

A. E.

Constantinople, May 1, 1929.

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PART I
TURKEY BEFORE THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER I

A LONG CAREER OF WAR

The Background of Conquest.

THE World War did not mean for Turkey a break in stable peace conditions. It was the culmination of a long series of wars, in which she had taken part, first as an aggressor, then as an object of aggression. In the beginning, the ruins of the Seljukian and Byzantine empires formed a kind of empty frame which the efficient Turkish war machine rapidly and successfully filled; and then in its turn the ruins of the Ottoman Empire became a possibility which whetted national appetites, and constantly threatened the peace and stability of Europe.

We can discern in the past of Turkey an ever active process of growth and decay. To the men in power in Turkey in July, 1914, the World War seemed to be, first, an exceptional chance not only to end the undesirable and undignified rôle Turkey had so long played, that of merely so much booty, to be divided in this way or that, as the Great Powers might see fit; second, it seemed to be a chance for Turkey once more to become the aggressor. And the attempt to regain that rôle, so out of proportion to her resources and equipment, ended in the total collapse of the ancient Empire. The Turkish Republic of the present should be looked upon as a new life, which came into being two years after the Sick Man of Europe had passed away.

The social and economic conditions affected by the last war were at the time in a state of change and flux, and bore the imprints of a chaotic career of war that began in the past. The effects of the Great War can be much better understood if we begin with the records of Turkey's earlier history, and study its general character and trend.

That will be the task of the first part of this volume. The bulk of it will be devoted to the actual social and economic effects of the World War. And a third section will have to consider effects and conditions since the armistice; for in the Near East active hostilities continued up to 1923 and were interrupted for only a few months by the Armistice of Mudros in 1918.

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Many European and American historians have been inclined to see

in Turkish history the workings of a single factor, religion. The ever present consciousness of religious difference has prevented any dispassionate study of one of the most interesting and important evolutions, and devolutions, in history. In reality, however, religion has always played a secondary part in Turkish history, and has always had to adjust itself to the main factors. The long period of success and growth in the national life of the Ottoman Turks must be directly ascribed to the absence of the dogmatic attitude in public life and to the complete subordination of authority to reason.

When did this interesting experiment in nationalism begin, and how was it made possible? To understand that, we must first glance at the beginnings of the Empire to which the World War has given the final blow.

The founders of the Ottoman Empire migrated westward from Central Asia in the middle of the thirteenth century. They were driven from their homes both by the Mongol invasion and by a long period of drought. Asia Minor, misruled both by the Byzantine Empire and the Seljukian Turks, discontented and depopulated, attracted them. After they had separated, for various reasons, from the main group of fifty thousand Turkish immigrants, they formed only a small group of four hundred tents, or two thousand souls.

They were good soldiers and good shepherds. They followed a simple mode of life. In religion they were really shamanists, and Moham-medan only in name. The whole country, up to the western and northern coastal regions, had been Turkified by the Seljuks two centuries before they came; and the peasants of the country, embittered by the misrule of their Byzantine landlords and priests, readily embraced the religion and language of the handful of nomad conquerors. Headed by Erthogroul Bey the latter settled in Sugud, in the frontier region between Byzantine and Seljukian territory. And as they grew gradually stronger, in territory and independence, they made themselves the forerunners of the new Ottoman Empire.

This frontier region, with its discontent and its spirit of revolt, was also potent with new ideas.

There was the same anarchy in both adjoining empires. While the great landowners in the Empire of the East looked to the Church to maintain their sway over the oppressed and mutinous masses, religious fanaticism had, as a result of the Crusades, become the dominant feature of the Seljukian Empire. Its economic situation was

also no better than that of its Christian neighbor. In this frontier borderland between, two forces had been turned against them, those who had been made to suffer either in purse or conscience, and those who, knowing themselves capable and deserving of advancement, could hope for none under the corrupt rule of either empire. And both those forces were drawn to the just and liberal system of government of the first "Sultans."

These Sultans were high-minded, public-spirited, self-denying men who refused to take any income from their country, and lived on what was brought them by their sheep. Their spirit of self-denial went so far, indeed, that Ala-ed-Din Pasha, heir to the throne, and rightly the second Sultan, refused to accept the position because, he felt, he could make himself more useful by his activities as a private worker and organizer than by any actual rulership. Hadji Bektash Veli was among the most powerful figures of the time. He founded the Bektashi sect, which in its original form was one of the most liberal sects in history, and was an urbane negation of all orthodox Mohammedanism. These broad and liberal interpretations of religion were a matter of clear-cut state policy toward such problems in the first period of Turkish history. Every variety of religious opinion was tolerated, and also atheism.

The Machinery of Conquest.

The machinery of government, planned and worked out for the new empire, was one which could serve only when any former dogmatic authority or vested interest could wholly be ignored. It might seem in fact the offspring of some utopian spirit, and no system that, for any length of time, could ever be made to work in real life.

Its main purpose was conquest, for, as has been said, the vast territories on either side formed a kind of empty frame. They were lands that asked to be given order and rule. At that time, the beginning of the fourteenth century, they would have tempted any organized and ambitious government. And the force that was to conquer and rule them was evolved and got itself together.

What was needed, it was felt, was a standing army with a permanent system of recruiting and supply; and the army that was put in being was marvelously organized. It had been so planned that for a backbone it could be given a yearly levy of youths who, non-Turkish in blood, could be carefully selected and rigorously trained in special

institutions. To quote from Sir Edward Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*,¹

Cut off from all ties of country, kith and kin, but with high pay and privilege, with ample opportunities for military advancement and for the gratification of the violent, the sensual, and the sordid sides of their animal natures amid the customary atrocities of successful warfare, this military brotherhood grew up to be the strongest and fiercest instrument of imperial ambition, with remorseless fanaticism, prompted by the most subtle statecraft ever devised upon earth.

As for those youths who showed special aptitude, they were sent to the "Enderoun" School, where they were carefully educated to be future commanders and statesmen.

As a consequence of this system, the Sultan was the only real power in the country; he had no rivals even of the second or third order. He ruled at the head of his Turkified slaves who, though for the most part of specialized training, were parts of a strictly organized and intricate machine.

There were few chances for favoritism in public life under such circumstances, and anything resembling an hereditary aristocracy, outside that of the imperial family, was little tolerated. Political and religious refugees of mark and talent, coming from any corner of the world, always possessed a good chance of preferment in Turkish public life. There were great opportunities for the inventor; for every idea which promised to be practical was most highly prized. That may explain why the Ottoman Empire was in technical equipment always ahead of its time, and benefited by the use of gunpowder before the rest of the world.

The Turks themselves formed, seemingly, a class bereft of privileges. Careers in the army or governing circles were all but closed to them. Of the forty-nine grand viziers who came to power between 1453 and 1623, only five were Turks; and even these held office mostly in the latter part of the sixteenth century when the original system had already been shattered. Eleven were South Slavs, eleven Albanians, one, an Armenian, one, a Georgian, one, an Italian, one, a Circassian, and eighteen belonged to various other outside races. Every possible language was spoken in the Sultan's train. Even the sons of new converts—who at once took rank as Turks by birth—

¹ P. 15.

were debarred from public life. The general object seemed to be to keep the great mass of the population from aspiring to become creatures of the Government, and to force them to devote their energies to commerce, agriculture, manufacturing, and to the learned professions. Such an arrangement, of high value to the internal development of the new empire, also contributed greatly to the absolute autocracy of the Sultans, for it kept any influential political groups from growing up.

The community life of non-Turkish races went on without interference.

The Ottoman Empire [says Yorga]² formed a happy contrast in this regard to the contemporary world. The Slavs were not oppressed as in Greek times. There was no trace of the German anarchy of the same period. Inspectors made their rounds four times a year to see that the non-Turkish peoples were well treated. For them there was a change in just one thing that affected their everyday lives: The great landowners were now of a different race. The Turks paid cash for all they bought. The man who stole a chicken from a peasant made himself liable to the death penalty. In every way, indeed, it was recognized that without such a reign of law, it would be impossible to hold territories where the majority of the inhabitants were Christians.

The Imperial Government.

Broadly speaking, the Ottoman Empire had, in its time of growth and rise—from 1299 to 1566—many of the characteristics of a modern government. It pursued its various policies, military, political, economic, and social, with a full knowledge of existing conditions and a clear perception of the main object to be gained. Statistics as to population, housing, occupation, live stock, revenues, and military matters—all were carefully kept. Much thought and attention was given to military and political affairs in the foreign world. And the study of history and geography was encouraged.

The standards of living and of public health were much higher than those of Europe in general at that time. Foreign ambassadors in Turkey often showed the same envious admiration that is felt today by the Turk traveling in Europe or America, when he observes the working of Western public institutions. In so far as sanitation,³

² *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Vol. 2, p. 196.

³ For example, such establishments as tanneries had, for sanitary reasons, to be built outside the city walls.

cleanliness, regularity of food supply, and a constant struggle against the high cost of living could go, city life was in good control. It was one of the ordinary functions of state to maintain free caravanserais, or inns, for strangers, and free public kitchens, hospitals, asylums, and libraries. There were many opportunities to obtain a free education.

Government aid and encouragement were lent to manufacturing, commerce, and agriculture, and they were protected from all unlawful interference. Skilled immigrants, no matter what country they came from, were given many kinds of assistance. When some center of industry was captured, some of the artisans taken were sent to the home territory of the Empire. When Selim I took Tabriz, an important manufacturing town at that time—1512—he brought a thousand such workmen to Constantinople as a sort of present. Nor were problems of population in general lost sight of. After the plague of 1466 many of the inhabitants of Dalmatia were sent to Constantinople to make good the losses it had suffered. When, in 1475, Feodosia was taken, five hundred Latin families were sent to the same destination for the same purpose.

Much careful consideration was given to matters of home and foreign trade. When the first vessels of the Turkish navy were built, in 1462, they were built with the express purpose of protecting Turkish commerce. The protection of commerce was also the underlying reason for lasting wars with the Knights of Rhodes and Malta. Through Venice, and the Papacy itself, insistent diplomatic and economic pressure was brought to bear upon the Knights, with the object of forcing them to cease interfering with Turkish overseas commerce. When in 1580, at the request of Venice, the Pope ordered the Knights to cease their molestations, the Knights returned the following answer:⁴

As is very well known to the Pope and to Christendom, the Knights of Malta wage eternal war against all infidels. Since the loss of Rhodes, the need of revenge has been added to religious duty. As the Turks are infidels, it is a good and religious thing to seize their property, when and wheresoever it may be found. If the Knights live at the expense of Turkish commerce, not until now has any fault been found with that. And if any single Christian republic has suffered loss thereby, many others have

⁴ Miège, *Histoire de Malte*, Vol. 3.

benefited. To ruin the commerce of the Turks means to deal the hardest of blows against them. When Turkish merchantmen are under eternal menace, the Turks must protect them with their naval forces, which for the same reason they will not be able to use against the nations of Christendom.

This protest being without effect, the Knights disobeyed the Pope, and were punished by a ban on all wheat exports from Sicily to Malta. And, incidentally, it may be said that at this time the number of Turkish prisoners—prisoners taken from Turkish ships—then in Malta, numbered more than ten thousand, or about half the population of the island.

Agriculture was highly advanced. Not only did Asia Minor feed Turkey, the Aegean Islands, and Greece; it was also Italy's chief source of supply, so far as wheat was concerned. One of the means of putting pressure on the Italian states was to threaten to cut off their wheat imports. And a bad harvest in Turkey meant much suffering for Italians.

Economics and Religion.

The economic and social situation in Turkey up to the middle of the sixteenth century is well expressed by a phrase of Professor Patten's. Her position was one of "surplus economy." And all historical phraseology might gain in clearness, if for "Orient" and "Occident" were substituted such terms as "surplus" and "deficit economy," which would really bring out the character of existing conditions in a given area. If such terms were used it would become quite clear that static social groups are mostly associated with deficit, and dynamic groups with surplus economy. Before the full advent of the commercial revolution in the West, the Turkish Empire formed a dynamic group, although geographically it was situated most largely in the Orient. It would be wrong and misleading to speak of stereotyped conditions as peculiar to any fixed geographical area; there are everywhere reactions to the sum total of the existing stimuli, a change in the stimuli causing corresponding changes in the reactions. Every environment and period has its own religion, as part of its general equipment of existence. Words like Christianity and Islam may denote a common source of some of the general dogmas respectively in force, but cannot give any idea of the special character of religious life. "Surplus economy" brings about a religion of the successful,

who treat the divinities on an equal footing, while "deficit economy" tries to supplant by religion the material possessions that are wanting, it makes itself humble and obedient to supernatural forces, and has an influential priesthood.

In the period when the Ottoman Empire was waging successful warfare, Islam was a religion well adapted to the viewpoint of the successful warrior. It had a certain ceremonial value, and acted as insurance for the after life. Not that, when drunk with success, its sons gave much time to thoughts of the after life. And in the Turk of that time there was no trace of fatalism. Ill fortune was not humbly accepted as a punishment sent from heaven for unknown sins; with promptness and energy steps were taken to change the course of destiny. Religious bigotry, an outstanding characteristic of the period of national decline, was ridiculed; and everywhere people took a broad and liberal view of life.

Orthodox Islamic dogma forbids the making and publishing of images of men and animals. Even two generations ago to do so was considered a deadly sin by the majority of Turkish people. Evlia Tchelebi, a most interesting Turkish writer of history and travels—he wrote in the sixteenth century—tells how bigotry was looked upon in his time.⁵ Evlia had accompanied Melek Ahmed Pasha on some primitive raid against the semi-independent Khan of Bitlis. There were certain valuable books among the spoils, spoils that were to be publicly auctioned for the benefit of the treasury. One of these books, containing five miniatures, was bought by a fanatic at the price of 1600 piasters, about \$570 in our money. When he found that there were pictures of men in it, he covered their faces with black ink, cut their throats with a knife, spat on the pages, and "ruined in a few moments a work of art which had meant months of patient labor." Evlia Tchelebi devotes two pages to the wrath he felt at such an act of bigotry and hypocrisy, and then he tells how the man was punished:

When [he says] Melek heard of the incident, he gave orders at once: "Bring that pilgrim of Mecca here." And when he was before him, he asked the fellow: "Why did you do this?"

"Because," he answered, "it is a book written by Christian priests. I have done what God has ordered."

⁵ *Evlia Tchelebi*, Djevdet Edition, Vol. 4, pp. 247-249.

"It is not your business," said Melek, "to execute the commands of God. But it is my duty to punish a man who has destroyed a work of art. Let him be given a thousand lashes."

And, when after his punishment, the fellow tried to get himself away, he was jeered at and stoned by both soldiers and populace.

Religion, as a reason for making war, played almost no part at all. Campaigns against neighboring Mohammedan states were not less frequent than those against Christians. And even when it was a case of two hostile camps ceaselessly at war, they were not divided along religious lines. In spite of the constant pressure in Europe to launch new crusades and bring about a united European front against the supremacy of Turkey, one of the rival groups in Europe was always seeking to obtain secret or open understandings with her. On the other hand, coöperation with the Mohammedan enemies of the Ottoman Empire invariably formed part of the plan of action for the complete and final defeat of the Sultan.

The Empire at Its Height.

The outstanding object of war was conquest. The Ottoman Empire was in the position of sole heir to both the Seljuk and Byzantine possessions. And when they had been won, that brought new appetite for conquests in all directions—Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, the northern shores of the Black Sea, Hungary, Greece, Bosnia, and the African side of the Mediterranean. The Aegean Islands were seized for the defense of the Empire and for the purpose of protecting coastal trade. And Turkey had to wage wars of defense as often as her foreign enemies came to believe there was good opportunity for reconquest and revenge; for instance, when the Empire was suffering from internal troubles, or when a strong Sultan had passed away.

The state of war was the normal state. Any state of general peace was the exception. The existence of a standing army with a perfectly organized supply service, and capable of making the business of war a very profitable one, was often the real cause of war. The costly machine insisted that it be used. With that there were other incentives, the desire for adventure and booty, for example, and the high rewards that were paid for individual deeds of daring. The lust for war was there; and peace-loving Sultans such as Murat II (1421-1451), Bajazet II (1481-1512), and—at times—Suleiman the Magnificent

(1520-1566) were hard put to it to keep that war-loving standing army under due subjection.

The cost of waging war was too great to make it profitable in itself. The Empire's regular revenue, drawn from economic sources, had to be lavishly spent for it. The long wars in the time of Selim I and Suleiman (1512-1566) had been made possible by the economies of Bajazet. And he had managed to maintain twenty years of uninterrupted peace only by enduring foreign humiliations, provocations, and the discontent of the military classes. Only when a war ended with the conquest of a rich province could the revenue therefrom compensate for the expense incurred.

With few exceptions, every new war had a definite object. Sentiment had very little to do with the matter. When Francis I of France asked Sultan Suleiman for help against Spain, he received in answer nothing but an expression of regret for his defeat at St. Quentin, for such a war could be of no direct benefit to Turkey. Even the strong sentiment against Spain because of her outrages against the Moors could not induce the Sultan to take aggressive action against her. It is noteworthy that Francis I sought to conclude a loan of 2,000,000 gold⁶ ducats in Turkey, and to obtain ammunition, horses, and warships. He was granted none of them. At that time, the relationship between Europe and Turkey was the direct opposite of what it later became. On the eve of the era of capital, when money was still very scarce in Europe, there was plenty of it in the Ottoman Empire. Though taxes were comparatively light, the yearly revenues so derived exceeded fourteen millions of gold ducats, or about \$270,000,000, at the present-day value of money.

The net gains from the Ottoman Empire's career of successful warfare, which lasted nearly three centuries, was some 2,000,000 square miles of territory containing a mixed population of 50,000,000, speaking twenty different languages.

This territory was too great for further expansion, and the machine of government too artificial to maintain its old efficiency forever. An era of decline was bound to follow this excessive growth and those moral consequences of abundant material success that accompanied it.

⁶ Venetian ducats were used in Turkey as a monetary unit for gold until Turkish gold was coined in the seventeenth century.

CHAPTER II

WAR BECOMES A LOSING BUSINESS

The Price of Aggression.

THERE is a limit to every imperialistic growth, for the price paid for aggression is a very high one. Incessant wars leading to abnormal expansion absorb the resources of the home country, throw away the fittest and most courageous elements of the population, and make so many claims upon the spirit of self-denial and self-sacrifice that in time they can produce only returns that grow ever less. Moreover, the factor of increasing distances begins to work against the conqueror. The burden of policing a vast and heterogeneous population becomes heavier and heavier, and the defeated are in the end led to unite in self-defense.

The skilful masters of Ottoman statecraft had made many provisions to meet the natural elements of decline. It was thanks only to that that a light artificial scheme of organization, selection, and training could be carried on for two and a half centuries. And when of necessity the end came at last, the breakdown was immediate and complete.

It was no mere chance that, in the era of success, there had been a long series of capable leaders, and that the period of decline was ushered in by a succession of incapable Sultans. The first Ottoman emperors were the offspring of virtually monogamic unions with well-educated Balkan princesses. Such emperors were strictly trained, and had first to prove their capacity to rule as governors of provinces and as army commanders. The mastery of some handicraft was even made a part of their education. But as the Empire grew in power and success, there was inaugurated a life of royal pomp, accompanied by conditions in which dynastic marriage became a matter of limitless polygamy with ignorant slave girls. The many sons so born had none of the feeling for each other that true brothers have. The death of a Sultan was often the signal for a civil war to decide who would inherit the throne. To prevent this, the monstrous habit of killing off brothers, nephews, cousins, even sons, became a sanctioned measure of state, and the heir who was successful in such a civil war, or who was permitted to survive by the Sultan was often the best

fitted to rule. But it was a rule departed from by Sultan Suleiman. Influenced in his old age by his favorite Russian wife, he left his throne, in 1566, to a very weak man, Sultan Selim II. As all the powers of government were centralized in the person of the ruler, it was possible for unfitness on his part to break down the whole artificially organized fabric of state. And Selim's successors were mostly of his type, for the conditions that now ruled could rear only that type of leader.

Furthermore, the strict training, the system of making the princes governors of provinces came to an end. Future Sultans grew up in the ignorant atmosphere of the harem, among innumerable slave women. Polygamy became the ruler's sole interest. When Sultan Osman II (1618-1623) attempted to do away with the harem life, to establish a monogamic union with the educated daughter of one of his ministers, and to take an active share in the business of state, he was lynched by the guards, who represented those who had a vested interest in the corrupt system. They gave this reason for their anger: "A Sultan must live in pomp and solemnity. And this young Sultan is seeking to bring the methods of his great ancestors to degradation." The sole recreation of Sultan Mustapha (1617-1618) was to throw gold coins into the sea. And because another young prince found it very amusing, the whole Ottoman navy was kept busy firing salvos.

The Break-up of the War Machine.

The tremendous power of the throne, which in the time of the Empire's growth was the steadfast guardian of the public interest, had now fallen to nothing. While the Sultans amused themselves in their harems, three several influences began to struggle for the power they had lost, and all three were narrow and selfish enough. The first was the organized brotherhood of janissaries, the second the ulema, or the country's religious teachers and judges, and the third was made up of the different cliques of palace women. In addition to these elements, all struggling against each other, either separately or in semi-alliance, there was always a vast amount of personal intrigue at work.

The janissaries, chosen as children from non-Mohammedan communities, in a sort of settled blood tax, had once been a force under high discipline, and one of the chief instruments of conquest. When the decline set in, their training was abandoned as a measure of

economy. Youths of fifteen and sixteen were taken instead of children of six and seven. Furthermore, the Turks revolted against the old order of things which put them aside to the profit of the recruited Christian boys; and in their revolt they forced their way into not only this military caste of janissaries, but into all those offices which had been virtually closed to them for two hundred and fifty years. At the same time the janissaries, now mostly native Turks, grew in number from 30,000 to 60,000. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were 400,000 of them, though only 25,000 were in actual military service. And the janissaries were no longer the advocates of war, for the probability of defeat was now far greater than it once had been. Since, too, they no longer had that easy source of booty that once had lain in war, the Sultan, the treasury, and the populace became their victims. Every new Sultan had to make their caste a "gift" of not less than 2,500,000 ducats, while both government and people were entirely at their mercy. The majority of them had, in addition to their nominal positions as soldiers, a secondary profession. They were merchants, artisans, firemen, and beggars. But, each and all, they acted the part of bands of brigands who were above the law.

From time to time the debauchery of the Palace led to temporary returns to decency. At such times the influence of religion began to assert itself, the general feeling being this: "The country is going to ruin. It is hopeless to seek to stop it by the forces of this world. God must be our refuge." And the representatives of religion were, of course, ready to play their part. But they put a heavy price on their intervention. They insisted that the highest law authority in the religious world should be consulted upon every detail of state activity, including even the making of war and peace, and the appointment of governors, army commanders, and state officials.

Neither the army leaders nor the palace women found this to their liking. Both alike declared that religious teachers should stay by their books, and do no meddling with state affairs. In 1602, there were serious clashes between the powers of religion and the army. In spite of such opposition, however, all real power began more and more to pass into the hands of the ulema. The Ottoman Empire, once the abode of freedom of thought, and the embodiment of the complete victory of reason over authority, became a blind theocracy; that, too, just at the time when Europe was beginning to free herself from such bonds, and develop as seemed best to her.

Every new invention, every project or idea that was new had been welcomed in the time of the Empire's growth and greatness. The molahs who ruled in the era of decline were against every sort of innovation. Only such tools and such ideas as existed in the time of Mohammed and were spoken of in the Koran were sanctioned, all later developments being held to be the product of heathenism. Even things that had been a part of the life of former generations were at best only tolerated. An old style of gun could be used, but not a *new* one. Galleys might be used as warships, but anything of more recent date was tabooed. Nor could there be any discussion of such priestly decisions; the "door of controversy" was declared to be closed.

Uncompromising as to everything else, the ulema had little to say against any form of debauch. Indeed, many of them were themselves steeped in it, and they made no attempt to interfere with the private life of the Sultan. The selling of fetwas¹ also became very common.

The Dynasty.

The Empire, in its days of power, had largely maintained its strength by holding to the principle of selection. Its rulers were given their places because of their merit, fitness, training, and resourcefulness. In the era of decline, only the artful, the corrupt, and the debauched had any chance of holding their positions. There were instances where at a stroke a dancer or a gypsy was made admiral of the fleet, or general of the janissaries. As a rule positions of state were sold by those most influential to the highest bidder, and sold on the explicit understanding that the buyer would use every arbitrary means in the work of extortion, and duly share his gains with his protector in Constantinople. As every new sale of such offices promised new profits, officeholders were often changed so that each new incumbent could enter upon the work, and suck the peoples' savings dry once more. Those in power in Constantinople also derived great incomes from the presents and bribes of foreign governments.

Indeed, the private fortunes that were accumulated were huge. Sokollou Mehmed Pasha, a potent grand vizier in the first years of

¹ A "fetwa" is a religious decision delivered by an authorized religious dignitary to decide questions as to whether some given act is or is not in accordance with religious traditions, and, in connection therewith, what course—religious, political, or individual—should be followed.

the decline, spent 18,000,000 ducats a year for his pleasures, and when he died, left a fortune valued at 22,000,000 in gold; while other powerful representatives of official corruption often had incomes of eight or ten millions.

But they had also every reason for spending every ducat they got, for any right of possession of wealth of that sort was limited to the life of the possessor. Death might come at any moment, in case some rival rose to power; and on the owner's death everything was seized. As one way to prevent this, it became a matter of custom to invest one's possessions, during one's own lifetime, in pious foundations, such as mosques, religious seminaries, schools, fountains, soup kitchens, and the like. The heirs of the givers could be made perpetual guardians of such foundations, and in that way be certain of at least a small income. It was also wise not to attract attention to one's wealth by any external display. The houses of the wealthy were very simple so far as everything outside was concerned, but anything but that, within. And it was common for wealthy officials to add "the poor" to their names in the hope in that way to deceive their successors.

What had been borne by those who could bear it was now shifted to the backs of the peasantry. In addition to extortions that had no pretense of legality, taxes were collected two or three times a year. The whole system was a burden so unbearable, in fact, that in wholesale migrations the peasants fled from it. Great areas could no longer be farmed. A country that had once exported grain at wholesale was now so reduced that famines became the regular thing. And many of the starving lived on animals that had died, and on wild roots and berries. It was a common thing for wolves to enter even the large towns.

The economic ruin of the Ottoman Empire cannot be ascribed simply to the change in the trade routes. That may have had its influence, but it was by no means the main thing, for long after the decline had begun, the Empire still controlled the resources of Syria and Egypt, the trade route to Persia, and also took an active part in the trade of the Mediterranean. The ruin of agricultural production and manufacturing by misgovernment and depopulation must be held to be the chief factors.

The decrease in population, an alarming decrease, was a phase of the process of breakdown which was not easy to remedy. Even suc-

cessful war had demanded a toll of the best blood; and when the Empire no longer waged successful war, such human resources as Christian children, prisoners, slaves, and the inhabitants of conquered provinces were at an end. The price in blood had to be paid by the Turkish population of the home country. And as all army organization had become very bad, and army equipment worse than that of Turkey's old-time enemies, losses were far higher, proportionately, than before.

Furthermore, internal struggles were now habitual. Misgovernment was not accepted with resignation and the spirit of fatalism by the suffering people. There were ceaseless revolts. Sometimes they took the form of open rebellion, sometimes of new religious movements. In all cases merciless repressive measures followed. A hundred thousand peasants perished during the so-called "Djelali" rising. The casualties in other great rebellions were not less than 30,000. Every period of extreme anarchy was ended by some government terrorist who established order at a huge price in human life. In 1656, the Grand Vizier, Keuprulu Mehmed Pasha, sentenced 36,000 to death; and the chief executioner accounted for 4,000 with his own hand.

Turkish Fatalism and the Non-Turk.

It became more and more hopeless for the common people to struggle against the existing evils. Turkish fatalism was not a matter of choice, nor a result of religious, racial, or climatic conditions. It was the only possible reaction to misgovernment, and to the overwhelming obstacles and misfortunes encountered in everyday life. If the people made head against them for a time, no one could expect a decreasing population with an ever-falling standard of living to resist and be proof against them forever. At a time when the population of Europe, once stationary, had begun to grow, the Ottoman Empire began to know a terrible decrease.

While the Turkish population was hard hit by the things that made for this decrease, the non-Mohammedan peoples could successfully resist them, for they enjoyed self-government. Because of that there could be growth and advancement in their standards of living, health, and education. Through foreign residents and missionaries they were in closer contact with the outside world. They could take

some share at least in the new progressive movements in western Europe.

During the Empire's period of growth and power, these organized foreign elements were one of its sources of strength. They could be governed without effort, and furnished both money and men. They were genuinely attached to the Empire, for they were treated with complete religious toleration, with justice,—though, of course, it was justice in keeping with the ideas of the time,—and they found the burdens of taxation lighter than under their former masters. All the hopes of the Empire's Christian enemies, and all their efforts to induce its Christian subjects to rise against it, came to naught. But when the era of reaction and misgovernment set in, things became different. The non-Turkish populations became well-organized internal enemies of the decaying Empire, and actively coöperated with its enemies outside.

And there were plenty of these enemies. The rising Russian Empire in particular had determined to be the heir of the Ottoman Empire, even as the Turks once had made themselves the heirs of the two decadent empires of the Seljuks and the Byzantines. After 1552, to be at war with Russia became not the exception but the rule. The Russians sought forcibly to hasten the moment of inheritance. Austrian, Hungarian, and all other potential heirs had the same dream. And again and again, now together and now alone, they took action in the hope of ending further waiting. But it would be wrong to give the impression that the Ottoman Empire's career of war was now one only of defensive wars. Aggressive wars, mostly in the East with Persia, were also undertaken, and with varying success. In 1640, the Grand Vizier, Kara Mustapha, engaged in purely religious wars to drain off popular discontent. In 1768, too, when the Empire was especially weak, it declared war on Russia out of a purely sentimental desire to protect Poland.

The Meaning of Fatalism.

The first Ottoman leaders always based their actions upon the cold facts that were before them. In the era of decline their successors were ignorant of conditions in the outside world; and they had no first idea of how their own forces, in strength and equipment, might compare with those of their enemies. As for one of the later Sultans,

Murad III, anyone who even dared to bring him bad news was killed at once.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman army sought and found the secret of success in technical equipment and organization. In 1512, a small number of Turks, more than a thousand miles from their base, defeated a large Persian army at Tchaldiran, by means of heavy cannon, which they cast on the very battlefield. This dependence on the most modern of weapons was still quite unusual in the Europe of that time. The Italian Giorgio² had this to say of the above battle: "Such willingness to use artillery is criminal. It is unworthy of brave men." But when the time of decadence came, no value was attached to making the business of war a thorough one. Even by 1605, at the battle of Tabriz, the Turks could put in the field only a handful of cannon, and they had come as gifts from England and Portugal, then competing for eastern trade. Even if the heads of the Government saw the value of progressive material equipment in the national struggle for existence, the powers of theology opposed every sort of innovation, and the janissaries held the introduction of new weapons to be an interference with their long established rights.

The result was that the Ottoman Empire continued to make war, almost as a matter of course, and the forces and equipment it could bring to war were always more inferior. Save in the time of the so-called Tulip Period (1703-1730)³ peace never lasted for long. And every new war meant not only a loss of territory, but also a new drain upon the vitality of the country. Enough that it was slowly dying. For three hundred years the great problem of who should inherit its territories was one of the constant causes of war in Europe. And, strangely enough, the Empire itself often took part in those wars as the ally of one of its would-be heirs.

² Quoted by Yorgu, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Vol. 2, p. 390.

³ A period when the growing of tulips was a national craze.

CHAPTER III

THE EFFORT TO SURVIVE

Self-Criticism.

FOR more than three centuries a long list of foreign observers predicted the approaching end of the Ottoman Empire. Many of them agreed that not even God himself could perform the miracle that alone could prolong its existence. And outwardly there seemed to be evidence more than enough to justify such predictions. For all to see, there was progressive disintegration from within, and increasing dismemberment from without. While Europe was making ready for a new order of things, in the Ottoman Empire a few chance remnants of old institutions had become a solid, inanimate mass, which religious and military vested interests allowed no one to touch or change.

Again and again, however, the predictions of foreign observers were disproved by history, and first of all, because of the excellent qualities of the Turkish common people. In some way they managed to live secluded from the governing classes, and to resist all the influences tending to corruption and degeneration. Secondly, energetic and public-spirited leaders appeared from time to time. They put at least provisional order into public affairs and served as a cloak to the sick body. In the third place, the Empire was so large that it could afford to lose outstanding portions of its territory without the main body being endangered. Finally, the heirs could never agree as to the division of the spoils. They themselves were for the most part at war with one another and had no chance to deal, with all their available forces, a final blow at the decaying Empire.

In spite of successive defeats in war, and the continued decrease in internal revenues, the governing classes were, for a long time, unwilling to admit that anything was wrong. With a dull apathy the changing and progressing Europeans were looked upon as men much like devils, who used their brains to make everything easy, and with whose cleverness no one could imaginably compete. Some contact was kept up with the outside world by the mutual exchange of diplomatic representatives, and by residents and refugees from abroad, by an occasional traveler, and by the non-Turkish elements of the population, the leading members of whom had been in contact with the in-

fluences of Western civilization for about a century before the Turks. Occasionally European innovations were brought in, such as the printing press (1728), but no general adjustment to Western progress was attempted. Many a Turkish statesman drew up lengthy projects of reform, many a Turkish historian wrote bitter words of criticism, but it was of no avail. No new method of doing things could be adopted because all these new methods had to come from Europe, and could easily be denounced as "Christian and infidel" by those who benefited by anarchy, disorder, and reaction. The common people were not deceived by the fanatical propaganda, but they had no organization, and no way of combating it. A popular saying, often repeated among the Turks in the seventeenth century gives the one view of their country's place in the world: "If you seek wealth, go to India. If you seek learning and knowledge go to Europe. But if you seek palatial splendor, come to the Empire of the Ottomans."

Interest in Changes in the West.

In 1774, a treaty with the Russians, signed at Kutchuk Kainardja, put virtually to an end the independence of Turkey. This final humiliation prepared the ground for the adoption of the ways and means which seemed to have produced the superiority of Western Europe. The French Revolution gave a great stimulus to the new trend of things. And even before the actual outbreak of the Revolution, eighteenth-century liberalism had gained ground among the advanced minds in the Empire. Sultan Selim III, who came to the throne in 1789, was a public-spirited and enlightened man, who fully represented the idea of the general good as opposed to private interest, the new against the old, and health and energy as against theological death in life.

From the time of the French Revolution, this struggle, and it has been a bitter struggle between the old and the new in the Ottoman Empire, has continued. It has gone on with varying success for generation after generation. Internal forces and the Great Powers took sides in it in accordance with their own purposes and interests. The Powers that desired to hasten the death of the Sick Man, gave their help to the reactionary elements and the vested interests that made for conservatism. On the other hand, those Powers whose interest it was to retard the process of decay, or who wished to see the Sick Man make some partial return to health, protected the reformers. During

the period of the Napoleonic wars the Ottoman Empire was not looked upon as an object to be divided immediately, but rather as a possible source of military help. Therefore, its military reorganization was desired, and actively worked for, by those who needed its aid. With the help of French experts new military schools were established, and a new army called the "soldiers of the new *régime*," was organized. A new arsenal and new artillery equipment also were part of these military reforms. At the same time, there was much zeal for the spreading of new ideas, and the opening of new and progressive schools. The janissaries and the fanatical elements, who represented the interests of the old *régime*, could not be expected to view these innovations with any degree of satisfaction. In 1807, they deposed the Sultan and put the weak-minded Mustapha on the throne. The official charge against Selim consisted in his introducing infidel institutions and infidel methods of military drill.

Sultan Selim spent his whole time in prison, passing on to his young nephew Mahmoud the new ideals he had fought for, and on account of which he had been deposed.

Meanwhile, the partisans of reform who had fled from the capital and the provinces united at Rustchuk, at that time within the borders of European Turkey, and decided to march on Constantinople under the command of Alemdar Mustapha Pasha. It was the first revolution in Ottoman history ever made in the cause of progress. In 1808, the city was taken, and the reactionary elements responsible for the events of 1807 were severely punished. As Selim at the last moment had been slain by them, Mahmoud was raised to the throne. But the guardians of progress were able to hold their power for only a very short time. They were too much engrossed in their personal success to be on their guard against counter-revolution, and such a revolution was successful. After the downfall of the so-called "Comrades of Rustchuk," the reactionaries became so completely dominant that for twenty-eight years the young Sultan had carefully to hide his zeal for Westernization, and seem to be a partisan of the old *régime*. Even continued humiliations in foreign relations could not break down the position of the reactionaries. But they did add more and more to the strength of the movement for a new order of things. It was inevitable that the success of the Greek revolution and struggle for independence in 1821 should make for self-criticism and for greater hostility to the dominant forces; and in 1826 Mahmoud thought himself

strong enough to make an open fight against reaction, and to clear away everything that could block the entry of Western civilization. As the first logical step, the janissaries were annihilated. After the bombardment of their main barracks, the Government and the people coöperated in seizing the fugitives in all corners of the Empire. More than one hundred thousand of them were killed, as so many members of one huge band of brigands who had terrorized the authorities and the public both.

The Reformers in Possession.

It was now the fanatical reactionaries who lived in terror, and they could offer no opposition to the organization of a new army with modern European equipment, to the opening of schools, to the reorganization of the whole administrative machinery after Western models, or even to the adoption of European dress. Mahmoud's choice of the red Venetian-Greek cap, later called a "fez," was particularly unpopular. It is strange enough that the demand, a century later, for the retention of this same "fez" should become the fiercest rallying-cry of the cohorts of religion.

To make his central government really strong Sultan Mahmoud had to undertake military operations against certain local powers and chieftains. But in the end he was everywhere successful, and it was a success that was so unexpected and so genuine that the Russian Secret Committee, which, on September 4, 1829, met under the presidency of Nicholas I, was greatly alarmed, and made it a categorical first principle to oppose by every means all movements toward change and progress in the Ottoman Empire. About the same time Metternich gave the Austrian ambassador in Constantinople instructions to the same effect.

By 1832, Sultan Mahmoud believed himself strong enough to dispense with the methods of terror and to resort to those of persuasion. On May 14, 1832, he began to publish a weekly paper called *Takvimi-Vekayih*, the Calendar of Events, which was given the task of dispelling from the popular mind certain possible misunderstandings as to some of the measures of the Government.

What Sultan Mahmoud left at his death in 1839, was, of course, nothing that had been built up from the country itself, and built of the life and character of the people. It was only a copy of the structures in the West, put together in the hope that it would be instru-

mental in creating a new sort of life. In view of the ignorance of the people, their scanty resources, and the long schooling that Europe had had, it was not to be expected that such hopes could be realized at once. But even so, an almost superficial, imitative Westernization, if along with it there was coupled the destruction of some of the internal obstacles to development, would mean a new lease of life for the Ottoman Empire.

Mr. Goodsell, an American missionary, speaking of the death of Mahmoud, speaks as follows of his work:

Many of the Christians wept, as, indeed, they had reason to, for all his measures were for their good. . . . There are few events in the history of nations more remarkable than these attempts at reform, and these constitutional guarantees, emanating not from the demands of the people, but from the throne of one of the most despotic governments that ever existed, and steadily carried forward in opposition to the wishes of the official forces of the Empire.¹

The new principles of lawful government, securing equality before the law to all subjects, without distinction of race and religion, were solemnly formulated and proclaimed in the Charter of Kulhane on November 3, 1839. This Charter was written by the liberal ministers of the new Sultan, Abdul-Medjid. After the death of Mahmoud, they took up the task of reform, and they wished to make it clear to the outside world that the Ottoman Empire had every desire to recover and live on.

The "Sick Man" Renews His Strength.

In 1844, Tsar Nicholas of Russia, during a talk with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador, spoke of it in the following terms: "We have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man." It was a diagnosis which, at that time, was somewhat in error. For as a matter of fact the Empire was then on the way to recovery from its ancient ailments. It had the will to live, and was being attended with great care by Great Britain, if only because the British found it profitable to create a Turkey that would be self-supporting and relatively strong, to stand against Russia as a kind of dependent "ally," and as an agent of their policy in the Middle East. Since 1842, two years before

¹ Goodsell, *Forty Years in the Turkish Empire*: pp. 238 and 241. The quotation is a note in his personal journal made on July 5, 1839.

Tsar Nicholas had spoken to a British ambassador of the "very sick man," another British ambassador, Stratford Canning, had been showing the Turkish statesmen the right road to take if they would make their country a well-appointed and healthy organism. There was, at that time, the same enthusiasm in Europe for Turkey's struggle for national regeneration, in spite of Russia, as was poured out for the liberation of Greece and Italy. Turkish students sent to France and England were offered unusual opportunities to learn to know the spirit of the West. Turkey was fully identified with the liberal camp in Europe. Russia and Austria regarded her reform movement as the most undesirable of settlements for the Eastern Question; and they sought to undermine the work of reform by intriguing with its reactionary opponents, with the Christian minorities, and by inventing pretexts for intervention.

In 1848, the era of revolution in Europe brought the Ottoman Empire a rich harvest of able men. They came as fugitives. Turkey refused to give them up, even though Austria and Russia threatened war. Many of them became Turks, and entered the Turkish public service. And this, when Europe was on the eve of the Crimean War, increased the popularity of Turkey in the West.

The war itself, and the close contacts with Western Europe which it resulted in, gave great impetus to the Turkish progressive movement. Old feelings of religious discrimination were swept away by successful association with Christian powers. The Declaration of Paris (1856), which made Turkey a part of the concert of the Powers, was taken to mean that she would no longer be looked upon as a ready prey by European imperialism, and that she would be freed from external control; and her longing for progress was great and general. Hopes ran high for a kind of magical regeneration.

The Period of "Tanzimat," and the First Young Turks.

But disillusion was soon to follow. The Ottoman Government exploited the sympathy it had aroused by contracting a long series of loans in Europe. In 1854 the modest sum of £T3,000,000 was obtained, in 1855, £T5,000,000; and, till 1877, such loans continued to grow larger and larger. They were for the most part wasted in palace luxury, and in ostentation such as the creation of one of the largest fleets of the period. In 1858, in spite of the surplus money so obtained, the minor debts of the Palace, contracted within six

months, amounted to £T3,000,000. And this wastefulness in the Palace set a bad example. Corruption increased.

The stimulus from abroad could not be turned wholly into creative work; it became in part a source of unrest. In 1858, a conspiracy under General Husni Pasha was discovered, a conspiracy which aimed to curtail the arbitrary powers of the dynasty, and establish constitutional control over the activities of the Government itself. From 1859 on, this movement was maintained by a group of progressive men who called themselves "new Ottomans," and set themselves the work of Westernizing Turkish society socially and intellectually. Nor did they stop at accepting Western methods and administrative forms. A prolific literature in the shape of historical works, novels, plays, essays, and newspaper articles was the agency used to incite a retarded society rapidly to adjust itself to Western civilization. The dynasty and the Government were no longer steadily at the head of the progressive movement; and its public-spirited statesmen, aligned with Great Britain and France, were in continuous struggle with corrupt and reactionary forces, acting as tools of General Ignatieff, the powerful Russian ambassador. The two parties alternated in power. Sultan Abdul-Aziz on the throne since 1861, supported the powers of corruption who provided him with plenty of money, and always gave him rosy pictures of the situation. Whenever things became too difficult the forces of uprightness were entrusted with the government. But the "new Ottomans" could be active only when the forces of uprightness were in power. The rest of their time they spent in voluntary exile in London and Paris, or in forced exile in some corner of the Empire. Shinassi, one of the pioneers of the movement, a serious man interested more in cultural uplift than in politics, was exiled in 1859, in 1867, and in 1871, and always to far-distant points. In 1862 the whole group fled to London to publish their paper *Hurriet (Liberty)*, for the press law of 1861 had been set aside, to enable the Government to take swift measures against "political license."

The work achieved between 1826 and 1876, called the period of "Tanzimat" or of reforms, in Turkish history, was far from satisfying these radical patriots.

As a matter of fact contact with the outside world had created needs which could not hastily be satisfied under the existing conditions and available resources. Viewed by an impartial observer, how-

ever, the outlook was amazing. Social elements that had been lethargic had now been made highly dynamic. Turkish society had become self-critical. It had become interested in curing the shortcomings of the country, in increasing its population, in improving public health, in education, and in the nation's economic resources. The field was free for any progressive work. A great deal of it was actually achieved by the new type of public men, able, sane, and honest, whenever they were given an opportunity by the central authorities.

The Ottoman Government was no longer a theocracy. Some activities, like the care of religious institutions and the administration of a part of the civil laws—those of marriage, divorce, and inheritance—were entrusted to the reorganized department of the “Sheikh-ul-Islam”; the organized communities of the non-Mohammedan races already possessed similar privileges. The rest of the government machinery was set free to develop in accordance with existing needs, to adopt laws from European sources, and to remain above religious differences in its treatment of all citizens alike. This compromise, of course, made easier the approximation of the administrative structure to European patterns, but had this great disadvantage; it rendered all unification on any common ground impossible. On the contrary, the non-Mohammedan peoples, self-governing in the administration of their educational and social institutions, and cut off by language and religion, could not but be given an inclination toward a severed allegiance from the Empire and toward political independence. There were foreign powers like Russia which actively agitated among the minorities in order to cause disintegration from within, and to create pretexts for intervention. Russia worked with the same purpose and with the same means among the Turkish reactionaries. They were incited against the progressive measures of the Government, against modifications of the old theocracy, against sharing political equality with the Christians. Furthermore, Russian *agents provocateurs* stirred up Mohammedans and Christians against each other with a view to producing clashes between them, to be used as the material for propaganda and intervention.

The Western Powers Give Less Support.

The Western powers no longer encouraged, with their former enthusiasm, the Turkish struggle for progress and survival as against Russian ambitions. In Great Britain, the question of whether to save

the Sick Man from death or to hand him over to Russian greed had become an important issue of party politics. With the famous pamphlet entitled, *Russia, by a Manchester Manufacturer*, issued by Richard Cobden in 1856, the British Liberal party laid the permanent foundation of a policy opposed to the continuance of a Mohammedan Empire in Europe, and adhering to those ambitions of Christian Russia, which called for a forced death of the Sick Man, and a partition of the estate in a way to make Russia the chief heir. More than that, the political unrest in the Empire and the senseless waste of the Palace were not of a nature to encourage the British Conservative party. The extensive social movement in Turkey, that made for improvements in the conditions of life, and changes of the intellectual outlook, was now hardly noticed outside of Turkey.

France took a deeper interest in the intellectual life of the Ottoman Empire, because the existing situation presented unusual opportunities to extend French culture and the French language in the Near East. French had become a second official language of the Empire. Everybody of any education felt obliged to learn it. At the Government Medical School, French was the only medium of instruction. In 1868 a gift of 5,000,000 francs from the French treasury gave Turkey the "Lycée de Galata Serail" which has long been one of Turkey's chief centers of education, and which, though a Turkish government school, has to the present time used French as the language of instruction, even in the primary grades. Such an opportunity for a Mohammedan country to acquire the stimulus of Western thought met with bitter opposition all over Europe. The Pope severely denounced it; so also did Russia and Austria. The Greeks took it as an interference with their monopoly of the exposition of Western civilization in the Near East. All these parties feared that the Institute might prove a common ground for interracial reconciliation. In fact, it did become that, to some extent, but the reconciliation took place on a cosmopolitan basis, and not on a national one.

After the War of 1870, the French showed less interest in Near-Eastern affairs. Russia had almost a free field. The Russian ambassador and the forces of reaction were masters of the Palace and the Government. But the resistance of the Turkish people to Russian designs became daily more resolute. In 1860 there was one official and one semi-official paper in Turkey. In 1872, forty-one independent

papers and periodicals—in 1876, forty-seven—represented the popular interest in natural survival and progress, as well as the general resentment against Russian plans.

Unable to cause a general breakdown from within, Russia instigated Pan-Slavic revolutions in Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Faced by the acuteness of the threat, in 1876 Turkish progressive elements organized a revolution, deposed Sultan Abdul-Aziz, and brought to the throne Sultan Murad, a man with a progressive mind, the only member of the dynasty who had identified himself with the patriotic movement. But a few weeks later, he had also to be deposed, for the news of the suicide of his dethroned uncle had bereft him of his reason.

CHAPTER IV

BACK TO THE OLD RÉGIME

Abdul-Hamid and the War with Russia.

THE next heir was Abdul-Hamid. To attain the throne he had to subscribe to every demand of the progressive forces. After his accession, energetic and efficient men occupied all important offices; a free press made itself a vigilant guardian of democracy against possible machinations of the Palace. The revolutionary movements in the Balkans were successfully suppressed. Russia, thereupon, found a rallying cry in the massacres of Christians, and resorted to skilful propaganda to inflame the world. The denunciations of Mr. Gladstone aroused public opinion in Great Britain. The Turcophobe agitation developed such strength that any cool-headed examination of the facts could not even be suggested. An international commission assembled in Constantinople to find a new form of administration for the European possessions of Turkey. Its work was, however, interrupted by the solemn proclamation of a constitutional government.

On the failure of international action, caused by this unexpected event, Russia turned to direct action, and simply took up arms against Turkey. It was a unique struggle. Both parties had exactly the same purpose in view: Russia wished to destroy the progressive movement and the strong desire for national existence in the Turkish people; for she was interested in the speedy demise of the Empire, and in an early disposal of the inheritance, with herself to benefit most. Abdul-Hamid, the ruler of Turkey, for his part considered the war a welcome opportunity to put down the progressive movement, and put an end to this active interest of the people in their own destinies. Even before the war had begun he had dismissed the progressive leaders from office, exiled them to various corners of the Empire, or forced them to leave the country. The elections to Turkey's first Assembly took the form of mere nominations. This Assembly had just one session, further sittings being postponed indefinitely. The war was used as a pretext for silencing every sort of opposition.

The actual course of the war proved that the Empire had already profited a great deal from its contact with the West. In 1829 a Rus-

sian army of 13,000 had been able to march almost uninterruptedly to the doors of Constantinople. In 1877 a large Russian army was successfully held back for month after month in spite of the fact that the Turkish forces were in the hands of the Sultan himself, whose purposes were other than purely military. It was his intention that the chief army leaders should not coöperate against the enemy, but always consider each other as hostile rivals. A united front might mean success during the war, but after it, it could easily be turned against that autocracy which the Sultan was setting up.

In spite of a sweeping Russian success, the war did not result in a general dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The Congress of Berlin interfered with Russia's movement in that direction. Large slices of territory were taken from Turkey, but an area of more than 2,000,000 square kilometers, in Europe, Asia, and Africa was left under her direct domination, with no greater restrictions upon her sovereignty than existed before the war. The right of intervention for the purpose of enforcing reforms, as contemplated by the Treaty of Berlin, never got further than the paper it was written on.

The Tyrant and the Spy System.

Abdul-Hamid, who became the sole master of the vast territory, had a single purpose in mind: to enjoy his autocratic power without restriction or hindrance. Those who stood in his way were suppressed, one after another. He began with those who had made themselves prominent in the progressive movement; then came those who had attracted any sort of notice as dissenting, or who were suspected of entertaining feelings not those of entire obedience to the Sultan. Absolute uniformity was demanded and enforced. The result was the suppression of everything original, energetic, honest, and capable, and the artificial selection of the unfit. The only efficient organization in the country was the huge spy system, which had the task of detecting every inclination to oppose, or to criticize. Those supposed to be capable of disobedience were dealt with summarily, being condemned either to instant death or to exile in distant towns. While dissent was severely punished, those taking part in the work of detecting dissent were highly rewarded. They formed an extensive hierarchy. Those depending directly on the Sultan were small tyrants in their own spheres, being allowed to make their own laws, and to enrich themselves in every way possible. It was the general belief, too, that

they were engaged in the bitterest rivalry and ceaselessly watched one another. All had large followings of spies who gave their services both for the rewards accruing and the protection they obtained. The chief spies themselves had minor spies, who in their turn also served for both pay and protection. The spy system constituted the real government, with its seat at the Palace. The nominal government machinery was a complicated bureaucracy which could not be expected to achieve any consistent aim, no matter what it might be. The sole task of provincial administration was that of maintaining "public order." Its representatives in every district were expected to send a daily telegram to the Palace reporting that "public order was perfect." Revolutionary outbreaks were mercilessly crushed. In his constant fear of the unexpected, Sultan Abdul-Hamid stood for a death-like lack of all movement. It was a fear that did not allow the army to drill, and kept the navy imprisoned in the Golden Horn.

Constantinople the Favorite.

This policy of personal safety necessitated the creation of certain privileged classes. The whole native population of Constantinople was treated as such a class, because it lived in the immediate neighborhood of the Sultan. It was practically exempt from all taxes and from military service. The salaries of Constantinople officials were paid much more regularly than of those officials in the provinces. Constantinople was really a place which took everything from the rest of the Empire without giving anything in return. In the provinces, the only people who enjoyed any favors were the local notables, chiefs of tribes in the eastern and southern provinces, and those having any spiritual influence over the people. Under their collective oppressions, backed by the Palace, the common people were believed to be incapable of revolt. Therefore, they were made to pay the heaviest taxes; and for them military service was perpetual. In their case the crippled alone were exempt. And among the peasants it was a common thing for young men to cripple themselves, to expose their bodies to contagious diseases, to resort to brigandage, or to migrate in order to escape service.

A third class which the Sultan tried to get under his control were the students. All the higher institutions of learning were free boarding schools, where the student was clothed, given everything he needed, and even a monthly salary. It was an experiment in democ-

racy without being meant to be one. Thousands of young men from distant villages and from poor families took advantage of the generosity of the Sultan. They were, however, hardly mindful of the instructions delivered in a course called "Morals," given in all the higher schools by palace spies, a course which admonished the students that they should always feel grateful to the Sultan, that liberty meant vagrancy, and that constitutional control meant an interference with the sacred rights of the Sultan-Khalif. Although the first and last Elective Assembly had been closed on February 5, 1877, the Constitutional Charter continued to be published in the official year-book, to create the impression that the Charter, which the Sultan had given his oath to respect, had not been abrogated but merely suspended. Every allusion to this Constitution was considered, however, to be a grave political crime.

In addition to the privileges bestowed upon the population of Constantinople, the provincial notables, and the students, the Sultan attached a great deal of importance to the faithfulness of his body-guards. Upon the rank and file of this force were lavished every sort of distinction and advantage.

To maintain the spy system and these privileged classes naturally cost a great deal. Although very little money was spent for the development of the country, the average yearly deficit amounted to about \$13,000,000. This could be measured only by the increase in the debt, as no budget and no effective control of finances existed. All moneys obtained were spent arbitrarily, the main part going to the Palace, and each department obtaining big or little slices in accordance with the personal influence of the various officeholders. The growth of the national debt between 1882 and 1909,—in loans, advances, the squandering of the capital of the State Bank of Agriculture and so on,—amounted to \$275,000,000.¹

The efforts of Abdul-Hamid to enforce blind obedience and to suppress all signs of opposition met some apparent success, but only in Constantinople and in the provinces inhabited by a population uniformly Turkish. In Constantinople the spy system was too effective to allow of open revolt. The Turkish provinces, on the other hand, had lost the capacity for any spontaneous resistance to evil, for the

¹ From a lecture delivered on March 15, 1910, by M. Charles Laurent, French adviser to the Turkish Ministry of Finance, quoted by Mandelstam, *Le Sort de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1917), p. 3.

burden of the external and internal defense of the old Empire, as also the weight of taxation, rested mainly on them. This constant drain upon their energies resulted in depopulation, in general destitution and in a philosophy of fatalism.

Formation of the "Committee of Union and Progress."

Still, a great deal of individual effort was made to resist the process of decay and to bring about some fundamental improvement. Between 1877 and 1890 there was limited freedom of discussion on non-political subjects, and some degree of criticism was tolerated. Year by year, however, the margin of toleration became more and more restricted, most books and newspapers being listed as "pernicious publications" a year or two after they were published. In 1890 the Sultan, encouraged by the visit of the German Emperor, came to believe that a complete silencing of criticism was more consistent with his system. Many journalists were exiled to Yemen, and a press censorship was instituted. The result was the increase of secret agitation and the tendency to flee to Europe. In 1894 and 1895 world-wide indignation was aroused by the Armenian massacres. For them much of the responsibility must be laid upon the Sultan, a responsibility shared with Russia and the Armenian revolutionaries. Enough that they stirred the Turkish patriots to action, and caused the formation of the "Committee of Union and Progress" among the students of the Medical School. Its membership rapidly increased but the various conspiracies it organized were unsuccessful. That of 1897 among the students of the Military Academy resulted in thirteen students being condemned to death, and eighty-one to exile.

The easy victory in the war with Greece in 1897 fortified the position of the Sultan. He forgot his proposals made to the Young Turks just before the war, according to which some sort of constitutional control was to be established as a compromise, and entered upon a new series of restrictions. The literary discussion that went on between the poets of the old school and the partisans of Westernization in language and literature was brought to an end. The writing of poetry was forbidden, eulogies of the Sultan being the only exception. No more novels that treated of Turkish life could be written; and licenses for new periodicals were refused.

Men interested in the existence and development of the country saw that their only chance lay in getting away to foreign countries

and there publishing newspapers and periodicals denouncing the evils of the Sultan's autocracy. Professor Avram Galanti² gives a list of seventy Young Turk periodicals published in Paris, London, Geneva, Cairo, Athens, Cyprus, Sofia, and Crete. A great number of them were illustrated comic papers, as they were thought to be best fitted to make clear to the people how the situation really stood. A few also published French, English, or Arabic editions. Such periodicals, numerous though they were, were easily introduced into the country by means of the foreign post offices. They constituted the only channel of communication with the West which the Sultan could not control. Beneath the quiet surface, these "pernicious publications" continued to give the Turkish people the stimulus of Western civilization and the thirst for better things.

Foreign Intrigue and the Non-Turks.

The non-Turkish sections of the population were, as a rule, not interested in the survival of the Empire, and in better government. Few took part in the Young Turk agitation. At times, there was a limited coöperation between the Young Turk and Armenian revolutionaries, but it meant only a struggle against a common enemy, the Sultan, and not a movement with a common aim. Most of the non-Turkish elements were conscious or unconscious tools of foreign designs for the dismemberment of Turkey. The Powers which looked forward to making the disintegrating Empire a source of new territories looked upon the racial minorities as welcome agencies for preparing the ground from within. They launched propagandas of independence and nationalism among such chosen elements. When their instigated movements of revolt were repressed, the sufferings of the minorities were made the occasion for new and bitter propaganda—to prove that the very existence of the Ottoman Empire was an anomaly, and that any possible seizure of territory belonging to the Empire could not but be legitimate and humane. On the other hand certain of these minorities, having felt the influence of nationalism before the Turks had felt it, believed that they could secure the aid of the Powers as disinterested protectors, and hoped thus to obtain complete independence. In the case of the Armenians, the feelings awakened in them by close contact with American missionaries were

² *Short Studies* (in Turkish), Constantinople, 1925; pp. 133-137.

also instrumental in bringing about higher standards of individual and collective existence, which could not be satisfied by the conditions which then surrounded them.

Russia was the chief power behind the Armenians; and Russia also took an active interest in the Kurdish problem and in Balkan affairs. France worked among the Syrians, Great Britain in Mesopotamia and Arabia, Italy in Tripoli, Austria among the Albanians, Greece in the Islands, and among the Greeks in Asia Minor. Macedonia was a common meeting ground for all the conflicting Balkan interests, and as it seemed to be most loosely attached to the Empire, the would-be European heirs of the Sick Man gave their especial attention to Macedonian problems.

The Sultan interested himself in these aspirations only when they caused an acute crisis, and disturbed that superficial order he was so desirous of maintaining. That is why he was so severe when dealing with the Armenians, while he tolerated the very successful religious and cultural activities of France in Syria, of Austria in Albania, particularly among Catholic Albanians, and of Greeks everywhere in Turkey.

In addition to the troubles caused by non-Turkish elements under outside influences, there went on in distant parts of the Empire a chronic conflict between the authority of local chiefs and the slack authority of Constantinople. The Sultan made it a question of personal prestige to enforce submission in such far-away regions, and did not stop to think of the disproportion between the sacrifices necessitated and the ends in view. Yemen was held to be the graveyard of 2,000,000 Anatolian soldiers. Even if this is exaggeration, the truth cannot be far from it. There the revolts and the tribal wars were perpetual, and always on a large scale. New shiploads of Turkish recruits were constantly being sent there, and very few ever saw their homes again. Revolts of the same character broke out from time to time among the Druses, the Arabs, the Kurds, and the Albanians. The Anatolian Turks alone carried the burden of maintaining the integrity of the vast Empire, an Empire not founded on any common basis of interest, and an Empire which sought to maintain the vain splendors of distant possessions with nothing but the resources drawn from the primitive pastoral and agricultural life of the homeland.

Internal unrest and the high cost of quelling such troubles, de-

structive foreign influences, and ever accumulating difficulties that never were settled, but always postponed by a government which obstinately refused to see the plain facts, would have brought about an early downfall of the Hamidian *régime*, and would quickly have caused a crisis in the Eastern Question had not a new stream of vitality been introduced by Germany.

German Organizers, Military and Economic.

After Great Britain and France, Germany came to feel that a dominating political and economic influence over a strengthened Turkey might be a better bargain than some small share of the spoils. It might mean, at one and the same time, a source of added military strength, capable of being used at need against Russia, and control over the world's most important highways.

In spite of Bismarck's lack of interest in Near-Eastern affairs, and the pains taken not to arouse the displeasure of Russia, even as early as 1883 the German ambassador in Constantinople offered the Sultan the assistance of German experts for the reorganization of the Turkish army. General von der Goltz, in charge of German reorganizers, spent twelve years in Turkey. Although the Sultan did not allow the Germans to have any part in actual military affairs, their work was of effective value. They trained a large number of young officers who were one of the elements of success in the Greek War of 1897, and became in every regard the exponents of Western methods. Under such influences hundreds of Turkish officers and army surgeons were sent to Germany to complete their training.

Germany's voluntary offer of a kind of aid which France had politely refused to grant in 1877, was the prelude to German economic activities in Turkey. Between 1883 and 1888 the possibilities of exploiting the resources of the Ottoman Empire were carefully studied by German experts. In 1888 the Bagdad Railway concession was obtained, and a direct line from Hamburg to Constantinople—the Deutsche Levant Linie—was established. In 1889, the new German Emperor, William II, made his first visit to Constantinople. This visit, which Bismarck tried to make Russia believe was a mere tourist's caprice, was the starting point of the German policy of Pan-Islamism. In 1890, as we have said, Sultan Abdul-Hamid, encouraged by this new friend, did away with the last remnants of freedom of speech. After this final step, the newspapers were ordered to dwell

constantly upon the qualities of the Sultan as the religious leader of 300,000,000 Mohammedans, and to speak with all solemnity of those religious services which took place every Friday. Abdul-Hamid delighted in assembling in Constantinople emissaries from all Mohammedan countries, in conferring titles and offices upon them, and in rendering his position as ruler invulnerable by his religious prestige. It was curious enough that the ruler of a state, the very existence of which was challenged by certain of the Powers, resorted to a counter-attack, and challenged the right of such Powers to rule over nearly 250,000,000 Mohammedan subjects. This Pan-Islamic orientation was strengthened by the second visit of the Kaiser in 1898, and by the construction of a Railway to Hedjaz in 1900 with funds collected from all over the Mohammedan world. Since 1897, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein had been entrusted, as German ambassador to Constantinople, with the work of consolidating German influence. German exports to Turkey rose from 11,700,000 marks in 1888 to 71,000,000 in 1905. Turkish exports to Germany which had amounted only to 2,300,000 marks in 1888, rose to 51,600,000 in 1905. During the same period Turkish exports to other countries remained stationary. The increase in general imports caused by the construction of the Anatolian Railway could not be compared with the increase in the German figures.

At first the German initiative did not create any alarm in Great Britain. On the contrary the strengthening of Turkey at the expense of Russia by means of a new railway system was welcomed. How the necessary capital should be furnished by the international money market was the only question discussed in connection with the Bagdad Railway. After the German success became quite apparent, the older Powers interested in the Eastern Question began to form a united front against this new and vigorous competitor. On the one side there was the German conception—a relatively strong and relatively independent Turkey dominated by German economic interests; on the other the Russian idea, adhered to by Great Britain and France after 1903, which aimed at accelerating the division of the spoils.

Macedonia and the Revolution of 1908.

From 1903 on, the Macedonian problem once more made the whole Eastern Question one of acute international interest. It was not easy

to find a way out; all the Balkan states had overlapping claims of territory. All were engaging in one sort of war—peculiar to themselves—carried on by organized bands and a terroristic propaganda, with a view to making their claims as large as possible. But, as every Balkan state was backed by a different Power, the necessity of compromise came to be felt in the end. In order to force the Sultan to accept the introduction of the Murzsteg program of reforms the island of Mytilene had to be occupied in November, 1905. As a result, foreign inspectors, officers of the gendarmerie, and experts on police reform were entrusted with the task of making Macedonia a safe place to live in. This was the normal method of gradually liquidating Turkish sovereignty in a given area. The final effect in this case was, however, quite an unexpected one. Abdul-Hamid had felt obliged to send to Macedonia well-educated and efficient officials and army officers. These men, stimulated by the clash of Balkan nationalistic aspirations, developed a new sort of Turkish nationalism. They took advantage of the relatively greater opportunities for meeting and discussion in the Macedonian provinces in order to establish large revolutionary organizations. The conference at Reval in 1907 of the British and Russian rulers, during which Middle Eastern affairs were discussed, gave the Young Turks the impression that the country would be treated as so much lifeless prey unless quick action was taken. As a result of a decision by a secret committee, which still called itself that of Union and Progress, various military formations declared open revolution against the state of affairs maintained by the Sultan and demanded the reestablishment of the constitutional *régime*, suspended since 1877. The Sultan, after vain attempts to resist, granted the demands of the revolutionaries on July 10, 1908, and for the first time in thirty-two years issued a call for general parliamentary elections.

CHAPTER V

YOUNG TURK CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL SURVIVAL

Roseate Dreams.

THE Young Turk Revolution offered the world an unexpected solution of the Eastern Question. This old source of international conflict was now to be eliminated simply by Turkey's becoming entirely occidental in government, social life, and technical equipment.

For the authors of the Revolution, the breakdown of despotism and the establishment of constitutional government meant a panacea capable of changing everything at a single stroke. They thought that all the complicated problems arising from the existence of a mixed and unassimilated population could be settled by their formula of unification of races, on the common ground of equal Ottoman citizenship. They further argued that the desire to make Turkish conquests manifested by the civilized Powers marked only the ill-will felt against the Hamidian despotism, that all the liberty-loving Western nations would rejoice in seeing the Turks aspire to become like one of them, and would sincerely help them, so far as they could, to reach this lofty goal.

At first everything seemed to justify these optimistic expectations. The downfall of a despotic theocracy and the advent, for Turkey, of a progressive democracy that was ready to end all religious and racial discrimination among its citizens was warmly acclaimed the world over. All the elements of the Empire's mixed population readily took part in the long festivities which celebrated the delivery from despotism and the daybreak of a new era. The Turks themselves without exception seemed to be happy. Even the former Sultan insisted on being the most ardent of Young Turks, and ascribed the crushing burdens of his despotic *régime* to the bad councils of his subordinates.

The Revolution being mainly dictated by acute external dangers, the Young Turks felt the necessity of acting most moderately in the management of internal affairs, and in the clearing away of the past. The old Sultan was left on his throne as a constitutional ruler. A few dozen of those dignitaries who had made most mischief escaped with

temporary exile. With these exceptions, all on whom rested the heavy responsibility for the stagnation and terror that had been imposed on the whole country and the endless series of crimes against both individuals and the public at large, were granted a general political amnesty. The Young Turks went even further in moderation and self-denial. They refused all offices, and left the conduct of public affairs to those relatively honest and capable statesmen and officials who were a part of the Government's machinery.

The Bitter Awakening.

This rosy idealism and negation of personal interest were, however, not of long duration. A very bitter awakening was to follow. That solution of the Eastern Question, which at first seemed to be most ideal in every respect, did not satisfy any of the interested parties. The Young Turk Revolution was certainly popular with the common people almost everywhere, but gave little pleasure to the ruling classes. For them, it really meant a preposterous claim to equality, advanced by a subordinate caste to whom they were unwilling to grant a share in the monopolized benefits of Western civilization. As for the attitude of the Powers, they could not be expected to remain content with a settlement of the Eastern Question which would save Turkey from the position of being so much booty, and make her the independent mistress of an invulnerable home. Such an example, apart from its own disadvantages, might create similar aspirations among other retarded people. Therefore, the one effect of the Revolution on the imperialistic Powers was that it forced them to change the means by which they planned to get hold of their booty. Instead of patiently waiting till Abdul-Hamid's misrule caused an early breakdown, as they had before, they had to resort to immediate measures, in the shape of intrigues or physical action, to prevent a recovery and the advent of a new Turkey founded upon national ideals. The Young Turks, however, found it hard to understand why their ardent appeals to Great Britain and France, whom they idealized as creators of liberal institutions, met with a cold reception, why their requests for material and moral help were politely refused, and why these Powers were indifferent to Turkey's ambitions to make herself like them.

Another disappointment for the Young Turks was the hostile attitude of non-Mohammedan sections of the population to "Ottoman-

ism." For a few days they took a spontaneous part in the joy over the country's delivery, and heartily fraternized with the Turks. Then they were reminded by their secret leaders that while equality, as Ottoman citizens, might mean temporary safety, and better opportunities for them individually, as a group they ought to hold fast to their ideal of independence won by the help of some friendly foreign Power, or of union with kindred people in the adjoining countries. Few became supporters of loyal Ottoman citizenship. The great mass, influenced by their churches or by the treacherous secret propaganda of foreign governments, cherished the idea of breaking away from the Empire. They even began to ask themselves if a despotic rule, blind to all religious and national propaganda among non-Mohammedans, was not more advantageous for their development as free units than a nationalistic government highly averse to opening up questions that might affect the integrity and solidarity of the country.

The Separatist Danger.

Nor were separatist tendencies confined merely to non-Mohammedans. Arabs, Kurds, Albanians, Circassians, Georgians, and others who had felt a vague attachment to the Khalif and the Sultan as Mohammedans now became suddenly aware that they had a separate language, a past of their own, and territory in which they largely dwelt apart. They formed nationalist clubs, began to publish newspapers of their own, and to develop their language and literature. The younger generation, priding themselves on their new national consciousness, felt little sympathy for a colorless Ottomanism, and were even hostile to a Turkish nationalism.

The portion of the population which could be called Mohammedan Turks did not for their part constitute a uniform whole. Only a minority, stimulated by foreign ideas of nationalism, had any degree of national consciousness, the rest thought of themselves only as Mohammedans. In the absence of a common system of public education, the scarcity of social contacts and the entire lack of free discussion, they had not attained to any sameness of feeling, thought, and behavior. The skilful religious propaganda of the defeated theocracy had left deep traces upon the public mind. These factors were an impediment to any immediate and radical change of the old social and political system.

Those materially affected by the Revolution formed a large class of malcontents who were prepared to appeal to the religious feelings of the masses. Among such malcontents were most of the members of the dynasty and their following, former officials, those who had lost by the abolition of unnecessary offices,¹ government contractors, religious preachers who enjoyed the favor of the Palace, tribal chiefs, and other local notables. The natural tendency of the new Government not to be satisfied with a fictitious authority, but to enforce its will could only make new enemies in those distant provinces where the local life of the tribe survived, and where the authority of the central Government had never been taken very seriously.

Even the minority of the well-educated could not agree upon the best methods to follow. During the years they had spent in exile, they had formed two hostile parties, one insisting on strict centralization, the other on decentralization, having in mind some sort of federal state. The party for centralization, the secret Committee of Union and Progress, was itself divided by personal ambitions, by the bonds of different leaderships, and by conflicting ideas. As many of its members were army officers, the theory that the army should interfere in politics, and the bitter opposition to this theory divided the party into two hostile camps. The question of conservatism and radicalism also became an issue hardly capable of compromise. Those who had united against the despotic *régime* divided again as soon as positive work had to be done. Scheming politicians appealing to popular feeling, supported by the adherents of narrow-minded dogma, and those governed by ideas of personal advantage, easily defeated the intelligent and public-spirited minority within the party which appealed to reason.

The successful majority, which at first influenced a non-partisan government from behind the scenes, and later openly assumed power, was not devoid of patriotism, nor of a certain sort of vague idealism. The knowledge and experience possessed by its members were, however, very limited. They could not look beyond the problems that arose from the immediate situation, and could not see that radical changes of methods must be proportioned to the deficient resources and moral equipment of the country. In the face of endless difficulties

¹ Officials were always ten times more numerous than offices, the latter being created not from necessity, but as rewards for obedient servants of the Sultan, and their followers.

and overwhelming opposition, their chief concern became the maintenance of their political power as a group, and the enforcement, among the various elements of the Empire, of a strict submission to the authority of the central Government. Appealing to chauvinism in their foreign policy, they were uncompromising and blind to the practical exigencies of the situation. The necessity of hastily enforcing the long-delayed unification of differing races, an ambition to maintain a strict hold upon political power, though they represented only a small and internally divided political body as against a strong and united opposition,—all this, too, amid the pressure of external and internal difficulties,—resulted in the creation of a new despotism, only a short time after the old Hamidian despotism had been solemnly abolished. The main difference between the old and the new consisted in the attitude toward Western civilization. The new leaders sought all possible contacts with the West, by means of travel, by the sending to Western schools of large numbers of students, by the employment of foreign experts, and by local study of the working of Western institutions. To add to this they stood for complete liberty of speech outside the sphere of party politics.

As things were, even the normal situation presented insoluble problems, unless those in control contemplated a radical departure from existing methods, a clearing away of certain outstanding difficulties, and a sacrifice of certain fictitious rights. On the other hand, new crises, revolts, wars, and the formation of a solid and aggressive block by all the opposing interests made it practically impossible for the country to develop in any steady and consistent way.

The Powers, above all Russia and Great Britain, interested in the early dismemberment of the Empire and in the failure of a democratic experiment in an Eastern country, allied themselves with all Turkey's elements of discontent. These included the religious and racial minorities,—Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Circassians, and Albanians,—the adherents of the old *régime*, the religious fanatics, the leaders of the opposition press, all those whose ambitions had been left unsatisfied, and with them some intellectuals who opposed the secret Committee as a matter of principle. This opposition did not unite in any formal alliance, but acted in concert under the influence of common interest. In the elections Russian and British political agents worked actively for the success of opposition candidates.

Shortly after the Revolution began a long series of troubles, insti-

gated partly by the opposition as a whole, partly by interested individuals, and partly arising from disorders inherent in a period of change.

Bulgarian Independence.

On October 5, 1908, Bulgaria proclaimed her independence, and on October 7, Austria formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, encouraged probably by Germany, which had lost its influential position in Turkey after the Revolution. These acts were in reality the confirmation of accomplished facts, the Ottoman sovereignty in both territories being only a fiction. Still, they resulted in frantic agitation among the people. The Committee could not but display the highest degree of resentment, in order to silence the propaganda of the adherents of the old *régime*, who ascribed the loss to the inexperience of the Young Turks, contrasting it with the high diplomatic qualities of Abdul-Hamid. Popular meetings, resolutions, a general boycott of Austrian and Bulgarian goods, and the aggressive tone of the press brought about a warlike atmosphere. The encouraging attitude of Russia who resented all secret coöperation between Austria and a Slavic Bulgaria, the attitude of Servia, disappointed in her Bosnian dreams, and the resentment of Great Britain who had always treated Bulgaria as a protégé, might easily have precipitated a general European war, if the interested parties had felt prepared for it. Within a few months an arrangement with Austria was reached to the effect that Austria should pay Turkey some \$10,000,000 in compensation for those Turkish Crownlands which were a part of Bosnia. The conflict with Bulgaria lasted until April 6, 1909, when Russia intervened and proposed that Turkey recognize Bulgarian independence in return for Bulgaria's renunciation of certain instalments of the Turkish war indemnity, amounting to \$1,500,000. And, under the pressure of a counter-revolution, on April 19, Turkey yielded.

After the first impressions made by these events had passed away, the general dissatisfaction with the new order of things became more and more apparent. All those elements that had lost their special privileges, began to show their anger. The population of Constantinople could not view with favor the new obligation they were under, those of paying taxes and doing military service. The non-Turks, to say nothing of their political aspirations, could also find fault with

the extension of military service to all Turkish subjects: for the possibility of buying exemption had been done away with. Sultan Abdul-Hamid was secretly preparing his counter-revolution, relying on the adherents of the old *régime* and the reactionaries. Even fair-minded people felt their own disappointment, for the Constitution had not proved to be a panacea. Personal jealousies and frictions more and more gained ground.

Chaos and Counter-Revolution.

The once all-powerful Committee completely lost its political influence. Its great majority in Parliament, which had assembled on December 17, 1908, dwindled away by the end of January to a small minority. The Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, representing the forces of discontent and enjoying the protection of Great Britain, was given a marked vote of confidence, in spite of the strong opposition of the Committee; and, taking advantage of his success, he tried to end its power. He dismissed from his cabinet the ministers friendly to it, and sought to remove from the capital the elite troops kept there by the Committee as a military formation they could depend upon. But the Young Turks responded by a military and naval demonstration; and under this pressure Parliament entirely changed its mind and passed a vote of want of confidence by a majority of 198 to 8.

The next cabinet tried to silence the organs of the opposition by a new press law. The Palace immediately became the champion of freedom of speech. Under its secret influence, popular meetings took place everywhere to protest against any restrictions of the "sacred" liberty of the press. The new law was rejected by Parliament.

On April 5, 1909, a fanatically hostile journalist of the opposition was murdered on the main thoroughfare of Constantinople under very mysterious circumstances. His funeral assumed the character of a demonstration against the Government in which the whole population took part. On April 13 all the military contingents in Constantinople revolted against the Unionist Government, killed such young officers as they met with, demanded that the religious law be applied with strictness, and insisted on the Sultan's becoming as powerful a shepherd of the people as he had been before the Revolution. Those well-drilled and model regiments which the Unionists considered a faithful bodyguard, won over by money, and worked

upon by religious suggestion, headed the movement. Behind this counter-revolution were the Sultan, all the opposition elements, a reactionary society called "the Mohammedan Union," and most of the opposition papers. The Unionists immediately assembled in Salonica and formed an army of 25,000 with the purpose of taking the capital, deposing the Sultan, and punishing the authors of the reactionary movements. By April 24, they were masters of the situation. On that day the deposing of Sultan Abdul-Hamid was decided upon, and unanimously, at a joint sitting of the senators and deputies. And a large number of reactionaries were given drastic punishment by a special court martial.

The military dictatorship, established, apart from the regular government machinery, by the commander of the Salonica army and based on martial law, succeeded in creating a superficial appearance of order and harmony. Taking advantage of this situation, the Government engaged in a radical house cleaning. The different departments, filled with superfluous officials, were reorganized on the basis of efficiency. Most officials concerned were dismissed, receiving an indemnity that was either paid in monthly instalments or in a lump sum. The army was radically "purified," every officer obtaining the rank due him by the length of his service and his actual accomplishments. Many favorites of the former Sultan who, though mere boys, had easily obtained the title of general, were degraded to the rank of second lieutenant. Parliament worked efficiently, giving all its attention to the passing of needed and useful laws. And the press had to abandon its program of destructive criticism, for the time being.

Under existing conditions even terrorism could make itself felt for only so long. A spirit of anarchy gradually gained ground. The press became bolder and bolder, warning the Government over and over again that a boiling kettle must some day overflow or explode, if the lid was fastened down too long. The opposition easily forgot the severe penalties which followed the counter-revolution of April, 1909. Local revolts became contagious. From 1909 to 1911, there was always some sort of trouble in Albania. On May 8, 1910, it assumed a general character and called for operations by a specially organized army. In the Kurdish provinces some kind of rebellion had been the normal condition ever since the Young Turk Government had first sought to assert its authority without possessing the effective means of doing it. On September 27, 1910, the Druses in Syria engaged in

a serious revolt, and several army divisions were needed to put it down. Yemen was another field of ceaseless military operations. On January 20, 1911, they assumed the character of a regular war. An army of thirty battalions had to struggle for months against a strong tribal confederation. Both the Arab and Armenian national questions were also developing in a militant sense. The Macedonian question remained a permanent source of trouble. Some of the measures taken by the Government, measures essentially Turkish, like the settlement of Mohammedan immigrants in districts populated by a dense non-Mohammedan majority, caused alarm among those interested in the future ownership of Macedonia, and stirred them to counter-activities. Those measures of the Government which aimed solely to establish public order were no more destined to satisfy Balkan neighbors and their agents, all alike interested in the maintenance of a chronic state of unrest. The Turkish Government proceeded to disarm the inhabitants, to eliminate every sort of brigandage by means of a special law, enforced by well-equipped gendarmerie formations. It also began to build new churches, because both the Bulgarian and Greek communities laid claim to those existing, and it was vainly hoped that an end could be put to the bloody conflicts, if both communities possessed churches of their own. The policing of Macedonia was for Turkey an extremely heavy charge which could not, under the existing circumstances, bring about any radical change in the situation.

The Macedonian imbroglio was complicated by the advent of the Cretan question. Having much the same situation as Bulgaria and Bosnia, Crete had become practically a part of Greece. Only a Turkish flag hoisted somewhere on the island with the flags of the four protecting Powers denoted that a certain relationship had existed between Crete and Turkey. Yet the attempts of Greece formally to annex the island caused in Turkey, between 1909 and 1911, endless meetings of protest, warlike demonstrations, and a boycott of Greek shipping and goods.

It might have been thought that all these internal difficulties which, for the most part, foreshadowed grave external dangers, would bring about feelings of unity among the leading political classes. This was by no means the case. The divergencies in purpose, interest, and ambition were much stronger than the pressure of internal and external troubles to which the country—backward, primitively-equipped,

and disorganized—was exposed. In this regard even successive foreign wars could not produce any marked difference.

As the situation developed more and more, the opposing sides no longer constituted regular political parties seeking to further their special aims by means of discussions and persuasion. They had become fighting groups, resolved to keep, or obtain, public power at any cost.

The "Committee" Becomes the Despot.

On the one side was the Committee of Union and Progress, which did not now adhere to its initial and idealistic plan to control and influence, in a patriotic way, the workings of the Government's machinery. It had gradually worked its way into the Cabinet and into the offices of the Government. It had branches everywhere; and outside of Constantinople, the "responsible secretaries" of these branches, mostly former officers, formed the real governing power. Its branches in those parts of European Turkey where the Revolution of 1908 had originated, assumed an independent attitude, and defended the orthodox political faith against the "miserable Byzantine influences" of Constantinople. They published organs with titles such as *The Weapon*, *The Bullet*, and *The Sword*, which were absolutely out of touch with reality, and attacked and provoked political opponents and foreign Powers alike in the language of the demented.

Moderate patriots with good sense, disapproving of these extremist tendencies, had in great numbers left the ranks of the Committee. Their places had been more than filled by office seekers. The Committee, however, still had in its ranks some of the most daring, the best educated, and the most highly esteemed men in the country. But they clung to it from pure party fanaticism. Its attitude was one of exclusive proprietorship of the public powers. The Committee claimed that, having preserved liberty, it had to act as its guardian, and could not allow anybody to obtain power by taking advantage of the normal constitutional rules. The result was that under the pretence of safeguarding liberty, liberty was sadly crushed.

The opposition was composed of various small groups. They included those deprived of their former privileges, many of the personally dissatisfied, some very broad-minded men, representatives of all the minorities, and also foreign agents. Truly incapable of co-

operating for any progressive purpose, they coöperated efficiently to crush the members of the Union and Progress group whom they looked upon as usurpers, enemies, obstacles, and rivals. In this agitated atmosphere fair-minded patriots could have no voice.

At the beginning of 1911, discontent with the despotic methods of the Committee was general. It spread even to the ranks of the Committee. In April, several of the conservative members of the parliamentary majority on which the Committee depended, fell under the influence of the opposition forces. They were agitated for the most part by the fact that the Sheikh-ul-Islam, Moussa Kiazim Eftendy, had become a Freemason. The new opposition group which called itself "the second division of Union and Progress" issued a political declaration and published a program of ten articles. It was openly a reactionary step, as well as a revolt of the ranks against some of the methods of the leaders. The articles dealt with the adoption of more conservative methods, the extension of the prerogatives of the Sultan, the retirement of certain young politicians from the Cabinet and party positions, and called for a ban upon the granting of economic concessions to deputies. The Unionist congress which met to examine these demands was forced to accept them as a whole, for the Extremist Young Turks did not feel strong enough to resist. But this peace, reluctantly concluded by both sides, was of no practical value. The Young Turks lost their hold on Parliament.

While efforts in Europe looking to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire were rapidly progressing, its political leaders became more and more violent in their struggle to obtain absolute power and eliminate the opposition. On July 11, 1911, an opposition journalist was killed on the open street by the terrorist elements of the Committee. This was the third case, since 1908, of writers being done to death by Committee agents, with the purpose of spreading terror.

The war with Italy, which broke out in September, 1911, did not halt the internal conflicts. The Unionist Government wished to bring on new elections before the constitutional time limit. According to the Constitution, there was no possibility of this, because the Committee of Union and Progress itself, fearing the bad intentions of Sultan Abdul-Hamid, blocked the door to dissolution. Therefore, the Government could only demand a modification of the constitutional law, in so far as it could give the Sultan the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies with the consent of the Senate.

The deputies rejected the modification by a great majority. And the Chamber was, thereupon, dissolved in accordance with certain legal subtleties that were legal only in part.

The elections, which in no way represented a free vote, produced a unanimous Parliament. The general public voiced its anger at such proceedings, and in various ways. On June 11, 1912, large groups of army officers revolted against the Government and demanded the establishment of a government which could inspire confidence in the outside world, non-participation of irresponsible elements in public business, the dissolution of the Chamber in case the elections were proven to be illegal, the return of officers in political positions to their original places in the army, and the opening of equal opportunity for advancement to everybody. They furthermore insisted that these were steps that should not have to be taken again, and that army officers should be forbidden to take part in politics.

The "Great Cabinet."

On July 9, 1912, the Unionists felt compelled to retire, and a Cabinet of old dignitaries came to power. This, the "Great Cabinet," as it is called in Turkish political history, was full of zeal to restore constitutional privileges and establish internal harmony. The press rejoiced in its regained liberty, political exiles were allowed to return, a political amnesty was proclaimed which included even the chief members of Abdul-Hamid's palace clique, and all state officials were forced to swear that they would, henceforth, be of no political party.

It seemed for a moment that good Turkish patriots would join hands now to repair the mistakes caused by the narrow-minded and extremist methods of the Young Turks. This would have been welcome to the Turkish majority of the population. They were most anxious to see some sort of internal peace established and the doors opened to activities that would lead to a quiet and prosperous future. They were, however, without organization and could not impose their will. All those engaged in the lusty sport of politics were for excitement and adventure.

It might have been thought that the Unionists had been robbed of something sacred that had been their own. They agitated against this Cabinet of the old, under the pretext that members of the old *régime* were included in the amnesty. On the other hand, the opposition itself was not satisfied, because a violent revenge had not been taken upon

the Unionists, and because state officials serving under the former Government had not been removed from office.

The Balkan War, which broke out on November 8, 1912, caused the "Great Cabinet" to resign, and a more purely opposition Cabinet to be formed. In spite of the terrible experiences of the war, political differences became more and more violent. On January 10, 1913, a group of demonstrators led by Enver Bey, who later became the war dictator, seized the Sublime Porte, killed Nazim Pasha, the War Minister, and again brought government by the Committee into power. It succeeded in retaining this power until the Armistice of 1918.

The outside world had not been a disinterested spectator of the internal happenings in Turkey. The Young Turk efforts for Turkey's national survival and development, as well as their everlasting troubles and feuds had been given every attention. Even within a year after the Revolution, the new attitude of mind it had succeeded in creating was disappearing. The Ottoman Empire was no longer looked upon as a living and striving organism, but as the old object of international greed and rivalry. The Revolution had unquestionably produced some differences in the attitude of the would-be heirs. Free contact with the West, the new era of discussion and the awakening national consciousness were creating a new soul in the formerly lifeless body. These meant new difficulties in getting one's share when the decisive moment of partition came. Besides, Turkey was giving a great deal of thought to national defense. After the counter-revolution of 1909 in particular, the army and navy were the two branches of government where great improvements had really been achieved. A staff of German officers were devising reforms in the army, a British admiral and his staff were busy in the navy, and French and Italian officers in the gendarmerie. At the same time many Turkish officers were receiving their training outside the country.

Peaceful Prospects and the Reality.

For some time, the means used to break the internal resistance of Turkey were confined to secret activities such as instigating local revolts, agitating among the minorities, and intriguing with the forces of the opposition. After 1910, international diplomacy became inclined to contemplate, or at least tolerate, a settlement of the Eastern Question by the use of armed force. As a prelude to this, Turkey was

given repeated and insistent assurances that she had nothing to fear from external dangers, and that the Great Powers would never tolerate a breach in the peace of Europe. The visit of the Tsar of Bulgaria to Constantinople on March 21, and that of the King of Servia on April 3, also had the object of dissipating any feelings of alarm which might exist in Turkey. With the same object, in May, 1910, the Italian Government invited 150 prominent Turks to visit Italy. During this visit they were repeatedly assured that Italy had no territorial ambitions and would not annex Tripoli under any circumstances, even if Turkey insisted upon ceding it to Italy. When the same sort of assurances were given to the Turkish Government, Turkey felt free to transfer all her defensive forces in Tripoli to Yemen. On September 29, 1911, the Italian aggression followed, a first step toward disposing of the Turkish heritage by force of arms. The various European Powers could not but tolerate this settlement. For interference would have brought grave consequences in view of their other commitments.

The leaders in Turkey did not become aware of the fact that the general process of liquidation had set in. Their horizon was confined solely to the local situation in Tripoli. Making great sacrifices, Turkey continued her struggle in her possession overseas, which was already lost, until her last resources were exhausted. The length of the war offered Italy the chance of conquering the Dodecanese, and gave the Balkan governments time and opportunity to complete their anti-Turkish alliance.

This second step in the breaking up of Turkey was made the easier by the fact that those in power at the time were not Nationalist Young Turks, but the personal followers of the elder Kiamil Pasha, the faithful friend of Great Britain. Kiamil felt sure that Great Britain would not allow Turkey to be attacked while he was in power. On August 27, the Turkish Government was led to dismiss 67,000 trained soldiers stationed on her European frontiers, to prove that she did not credit the threatening news of war. When war became a certainty, Turkey yielded on every possible point to the Balkan Allies, and asked for the intervention of the Powers to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. When the Balkan Allies became aware that Turkey would make many concessions for the sake of peace, they created an accomplished fact in the shape of Montenegro's declaration of war. The other Allies followed one another. Turkey was in the

worst possible situation to meet this aggression. The Government, composed of old men brought up under the old *régime*, incapable of organizing an energetic effort commensurate with the task in view and the existing resources, out of touch with the national spirit then awakening, accustomed to humbling themselves before the Great Powers in order to win good will and assistance, from the first moment lost hold upon the situation. Defeat came like a great torrent and found hardly any resistance. The losses of the organized Turkish armies, especially the Western army, which, from an early moment had no communication with its base, were appalling. The Turkish population in the areas occupied by the enemy also had to endure heavy losses.

The result of the Balkan War was not merely a further breaking away of outstanding parts of the Ottoman Empire. The territory Turkey lost stood first in development. It was wide open to the stimuli of Western civilization, and it was inhabited by a prosperous and thriving Turkish population, only a small part of which could advantageously be settled in Asia Minor, during the successive waves of migration that followed.

Balkan Defeat a Gain.

However, the disastrous defeat suffered in the Balkan War was, for the spirit of Turkey, an incentive. It called for an increased self-realization and self-criticism. An editorial in the *Ikdam*, written in April, 1913, gave expression to this.

The defeat has proved [said this editorial] that the road we have been following was not the right one. It has also proved that we still have much to achieve if we really mean to exist and develop. We must free ourselves from our mistakes and weaknesses, and give up the old incapacity, the old ignorance, and the old vanity. We cannot longer halt at half measures, at half education, at half knowledge. We must take hold of the problem in a basic and systematic way and not interpret progress as mere external display.

So general was the disappointment of the people at the incapacity they had shown that it readily gave birth to a national outcry for better things in public life. It was the beginning of a new national solidarity, one that sought to improve the common lot by drawing on the united powers of everyone. The old sources of solidarity, such as a general obedience to old institutions, and a general resistance to

innovations began to be out of fashion. Petty political groupings lost their hold upon the people. The public welfare began more and more to take the place of personal interest. New and radical reviews sprang up, and, for the first time religious problems were discussed in a modern way. Conservatives suddenly came to feel that they could not defend the absolute authority of orthodox belief by help of the police. To defend it by the use of reason, they, too, established newspapers. The old fanatical insistence that women should play no part in active life had also broken down. The war had called upon them to do much. The dogmatic could no longer object to their acting as nurses, to their forming charitable associations, and to their taking part in all sorts of patriotic demonstrations. As a result, indeed, of the new position occupied by women in the national life, a special university for women was created, and lecture courses were started for the benefit of women in general.

The broad public interest in better things for Turkey could be clearly measured by the character and the number of periodicals that appeared between 1911 and 1913. In this period political dailies printed in Turkish and established in Constantinople, decreased from nine to six and humorous papers from seven to four. On the other hand popular weeklies increased from nine to eleven, scientific publications from three to seven, and religious journals from four to six. In addition eleven school and educational periodicals—some of them largely for the entertainment of children—and three women's papers suddenly sprang into existence.

This atmosphere was not a favorable one for political conspiracies. Such opponents of the Government of Union and Progress as tried their luck on June 2, 1913, met with complete disaster, and this in spite of an efficient organization and a daring spirit. They succeeded in murdering the Grand Vizier, Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, but were unable to seize power. The Unionists took advantage of the murder to consolidate their position and destroy their opponents. Some were hanged, some exiled, and some saw fit to come to a friendly understanding with the authorities.

Between the Balkan War and the Great War Turkey had a government which enjoyed real national authority. It was strongly and enthusiastically backed by a newly awakened national unity. But for the shock caused by the crushing defeat in the Balkan War, this change could not imaginably have come about, nor would the Turks

have been able to display such lasting moral resistance during the European War.

After the murder of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha a new Cabinet was formed under the presidency of Saïd Halim Pasha, an Egyptian prince who had chosen to become a Turkish citizen. The new Government, carrying out the program of the old, immediately turned to Great Britain for experts who could help her reorganize her state machinery. At first, too, Great Britain promised to provide them, but, for some reason, she failed to do so.

More Army Instructors from Germany.

After this failure, Turkey turned to Germany; and in November, General Liman von Sanders was sent, with a large staff of German officers, to reorganize the Turkish army. This stirred up an international storm. The animosity displayed was interpreted by Turkish leaders as so much opposition to Turkey's assuming charge of her own national defense. It provoked a spirit of corresponding opposition in military circles, and gave Enver Bey, the dashing young officer, now called a national hero, a pretext for seizing the Ministry of War in January, 1914, and carrying out the contemplated military reforms in more radical fashion. The army was again "purified"; hundreds of generals and higher officers were put on the retired list, and such higher commands were given to younger officers.

While Turkey was trying to consolidate her hold on the territory left her by the Balkan War, the interested Powers were by no means inclined to postpone the process of liquidation already started by the wars in Tripoli and the Balkans, and the crises over Bosnia and Bulgaria that preceded them. Russia made a direct move by taking up the Armenian question. The rôle of a protector of the Armenian people was an easy and attractive one for her to play; it could easily mask her eagerness to gain control of the eastern half of Asia Minor. The Russians prepared the ground by propaganda among the Armenian population and by intriguing both with Armenian and with Kurdish local leaders. They could not make up their minds, however, to take advantage of the favorable situation, and proceed to direct action. Long-drawn-out negotiations were engaged in between the representatives of the Great Powers to decide what kind of future government was to be bestowed upon the eastern provinces. Russian ambitions were opposed by Germany and Austria and given no enthu-

siastic support by France and Great Britain. On January 13, a compromise was reached whereby local reforms were to be introduced under the supervision of two neutral inspectors-general, with full consideration for the minority rights of the Armenians. It was not exactly what the Russians desired; still they signed the agreement on February 7, because nothing better seemed to be possible at the moment. At any rate, the first step had been taken in the separation of these eastern provinces from Turkey. "Reforms under foreign supervision" in a given part of the Ottoman Empire meant always, in the phraseology of the Eastern Question, a preliminary to amputation. The fiction of the maintenance of Turkish sovereign rights was, in every case, offered merely as an anaesthetic.

The Bagdad Railway.

In the case of the other Powers the process of liquidation took the form of fixing their respective zones of economic influence. The problem of financing the construction of the Bagdad Railway was made the pretext of long negotiations on the subject. Germany discussed successively with Russia, France, and Great Britain the compensations to be offered to them in return for their recognition of her economic preponderance in Asia Minor. The question was completely and finally settled between Germany and Russia by the agreement of Potsdam (November, 1910); between France and Germany by the Berlin agreement (December, 1913), and between Germany and Great Britain by the important agreement of June 15, 1914. At the same time, Turkey also engaged in separate negotiations with these Powers to settle other questions that were still outstanding. In every case the existence of an economic zone of influence was virtually recognized by Turkey, in return for a promised modification of the Capitulations, and permission to raise the customs duties to 15 per cent *ad valorem*.

Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London, who negotiated the understanding with Great Britain, takes the following view of the situation:²

The real purpose of these treaties was to divide Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was anxiously avoided out of regard for the rights of the Sultan. Russia's share consisted in the

² Quoted by Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway*, Macmillan, 1923, p. 266.

eastern provinces; France had Syria and the adjoining provinces; Great Britain, Mesopotamia and the territory crossed by the Smyrna-Aidin railway; Germany, Asia Minor proper.

Turkey had no illusions as to the character of the arrangements made. The political leaders had their excuse in the retarded state of the country. In order to develop it foreign capital was necessary. This capital was not prepared to come in on a business basis. It insisted on extracting political and economic concessions, and on interfering more and more with the independence of Turkey. Still, the heavy price had to be paid, for the undeveloped and primitive state of Turkey was known to be, in itself, a real danger to her. Her backward condition had always offered a ready pretense for the imperialistic designs of foreign Powers; and the Turkish leaders had come to this decision: To throw off the yoke of European imperialism, Turkey must consent temporarily to be victimized by it, and on a larger scale than before. The price was a heavy one, but it had to be paid.

The Turkish Government did not confine itself to temporarily satisfying the designs of the Powers. It did everything possible to establish friendly relations with the Entente group. In May, 1914, a Turkish mission consisting of several members of the Cabinet visited the Tsar at Livadia and discussed the political situation with Russia's ministers. Speaking on May 23, M. Sazonov declared that the Turkish mission had left on him the impression that Turkey was trying to bring about peaceful relations with Russia. A Russo-Turkish Association, established in Constantinople, was given the task of ending that traditional hostility, which Russians and Turks were known to feel toward each other.

An Era of Good Will.

Efforts of the same sort were made to attract the good will and confidence of the French; and a long list of British experts were engaged for the different departments of state, merely as a mark of friendship to Great Britain.

The only obstacle to the establishment of perfect peace and harmony in external relations seemed to be the question of the Greco-Turkish populations, which had been left by the Balkan War. The Turkish minority in Greece found the Greek rule too oppressive. A general exodus to Turkey was the result. The Turkish note of April

10, 1914, to the Powers, gives the number of Turkish immigrants who had come from Greece since the Balkan War as 163,000. Wrought upon by the tales of horror spread by these refugees, Turkey made reprisals against the Greeks in Turkey. More than once the danger of war became acute. The Greek acquisition of the two old American battleships, the *Idaho* and the *Mississippi*, did not, of course, render them more amenable to compromise. At this moment, Germany intervened both in Constantinople and Athens, and with great success. Not only was the former attitude of hostility abandoned; M. Venizelos even advocated the radical dissipation of all possible sources of conflict with Turkey and the conclusion of some sort of alliance. An exchange of the Turkish and Greek populations concerned was to do away with the principal cause of misunderstanding, and prove to Turkey that Greece had abandoned the old dream of an Hellenic Empire and no longer had designs upon the Aegean coast of Asia Minor. In a note dated June 28, 1914, the Greek Government formally accepted the principle of an exchange. A mixed commission began to study the problem of how best to carry it out. The Great War, however, halted this work and made impossible the important meeting at Brussels arranged between M. Venizelos and the Turkish Grand Vizier.

On the eve of the War, the old Eastern Question had, apparently, assumed a most peaceful aspect. Turkish territory was still considered as open country, to be occupied some day; but that had been put off indefinitely. The immediate aspirations of the Powers had been satisfied by the concessions offered by Turkey, and the various understandings reached among themselves. From that viewpoint European peace seemed to be assured for some time to come; the greatest danger spot had been successfully neutralized by mutual consent. Turkey, although dissatisfied with her lot, was preparing to take the utmost advantage of these conditions of peace, established with great pain and sacrifice, and by making internal progress, thenceforth, cease to play the rôle of being merely an object of international greed, when, astounding everyone, the Great War broke out. The impulsive decision that was taken by some of the Turkish leaders when faced by this event, was instrumental in changing the composition and constitution of Turkish society in every respect. Both the immediate and the ultimate effects will be studied in the second and third sections of this volume.

PART II
THE ACTUAL WAR PERIOD

CHAPTER VI

HOW TURKEY ENTERED THE WAR

Moderates and Extremists.

ON the eve of the Great War, moderate elements seemed to be dominant in Turkish politics. Although the general situation of the country was not hopeful, they found reason for feeling optimistic. All the pending questions with the foreign Powers were temporarily settled. Of course, Turkey had to make, in addition to the territorial sacrifices of the Balkan War, new sacrifices when she recognized economic spheres of foreign influence, and accepted a disguised international control for the eastern provinces. In return, she had obtained, however, a new lease of life in the shape of perfect peace abroad, and the possibility of improving, with the help of foreign capital, the physical equipment of the country in the matter of roads, railways, and other technical accessories of modern progress. Many foreign experts were busily introducing up-to-date methods into the working of the government machinery; and the Turkish people, deeply stirred by their defeat in the Balkan War, were eager to accept new ideas and to share in the general work of betterment.

The Moderates, for their part, so interpreting the situation, were inclined to believe that Turkey could, by patient work, gradually get herself successfully out of her difficulties, escape further humiliating treatment as the object of imperialistic greed, and fit herself for the position of an equal among the Powers.

The government's policy was mainly influenced by the Moderates. Under the existing conditions, the Extremists had hardly any chance of asserting their will. But they formed an influential minority and could not but look upon moderation as an undesirable necessity imposed by circumstances. They unquestionably were ready to impose their point of view at the first opportunity.

In the Cabinet in power at the outbreak of the War, the militarists formed a small minority. They had, however, a great influence in the party organization and in the army. The young officers who filled its higher ranks after its "purification" of older officers at the beginning of 1914, were naturally inclined to make as early a use as possible of

the war machine they had control of, to do away with the humiliating memory of the Balkan defeat.

Irredentist tendencies were also rather strong among the immigrants from Macedonia. A large proportion of the party leaders and higher officials had formerly lived in Macedonia. As most of them possessed landed property in the territories lost to Turkey, irredentism had a meaning that was also capable of interpretation in terms of at least unconscious personal interest.

Other aggressive tendencies were created by the newly awakening Turkish nationalism. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, most of the Turkish reformers had been inclined to exalt the accomplishments of Western progress, and to paint the situation in Turkey in very dark colors, to reveal more clearly how far Turkey still had to go, and to urge her onward. In the eyes of the new Nationalists, this old tendency meant only a colorless, cosmopolitan aspiration, harmful to what was really national. Although they were eager to adopt the ways of Western progress, they did not look upon foreign governments as necessarily agents of this progress, and agents to whom a special respect was due. On the contrary, most of the foreign governments were sworn enemies, standing deliberately in the way of Turkey's modernization. They were not inclined to extend their monopoly of Western civilization to a Mohammedan community. The Capitulations were the instruments by which the imperialistic Powers exploited Turkey, in an economic sense, and hindered any free development of Turkey as an independent nation. The program of the new nationalism was not content with a merely passive attitude, in the face of the aggressive designs of the Powers. What limited capacity for positive action Turkey possessed extended itself, in imagination, in two directions; toward union with those kindred in race and language (Pan-Turanism); and toward union with those of the same religion (Pan-Islamism).

Pan-Turanism vs. Pan-Islamism.

In some minds, these two positive policies could find a common ground. Both meant a potential expansion at the expense of those Powers which threatened the very existence of Turkey. The leaders and convinced partisans of both movements were, however, well aware of the antagonism between the religious and the national basis of solidarity. One side desired to see a Mohammedan cosmopolitanism,

which to the other seemed to be even a greater danger to the development of a national culture than any cosmopolitanism of the Western pattern. Again, the Pan-Islamites were bitter enemies of a nationalistic tendency which aimed to supplant the old religious solidarity for one based on a common origin, common language, and common interest. The two sides were also at odds as to what course should be followed in other ways. The real Nationalists were for complete adoption of the Western attitude, its science, laws, and manner of life. The Islamists desired to make only a limited use of it; and sought to bring new vitality to the country by a return to the ideals and the life of the time of the Prophet.

In the face of a common danger both sides were inclined to avoid conflicts, and to cooperate to a limited extent. One aim they kept in view was that of inspiring the nation with self-confidence by reminding it of its glorious past. Another was to improve its means of self-defense with all possible speed, by the active help of the people. In spite of the devastations of the Balkan War, subscriptions from the Turkish public within three years made it possible to order from British shipyards the two dreadnoughts, the *Sultan Osman* and *Reshadia*, and many smaller craft.

The activity in the army and in the navy, and the ardent popular interest and eagerness to help in everything pertaining to national defense were not sufficient to produce a feeling of security. Turkey was felt to be too isolated in view of the mighty groupings in Europe. As had been seen in the arrangements regarding the zones of economic influence, the Powers might at any time come to a new settlement and pay one another out of the purse of Turkey. The Moderates, too, although satisfied with the temporary understanding they had reached with Russia, the traditional enemy, preferred to belong to one of the groups of Powers. The Extremists were eager to join hands with some foreign Power in the hope of realizing their Pan-Turanian or Pan-Islamic dreams. In spite of the strength of their imaginations, they did not believe that their goal could be reached with the resources at the disposal of Turkey alone.

In a general way, admittance to either of the two great alliances of Powers would have been welcomed by the average Turkish patriot of the period. Even at the beginning of the war in Tripoli, the Grand Vizier, Saïd Pasha, had expressed, in a speech before the Chamber of Deputies, the very keen desire of the Turkish Government to find

foreign allies. In a circular despatch, the Turkish representatives abroad were asked to report upon the effect this move had produced. No foreign Power showed any interest in discussing the matter. Only Russia seemed to be ready to conclude an alliance, but under conditions which would have amounted to a protectorate.

After the Balkan War, both groups of Powers were constantly communicated with regarding the matter, and by different political leaders. The Moderates, interested in giving at least a minimum amount of orderly government, prosperity, education, and health to a long-suffering people, had turned their eyes toward the Western Powers. As the existence of Turkey was endangered from that side, an alliance with the Entente group would have meant that they were willing not only to see Turkey live and develop, but also that they were ready to give her material and moral help in her immense task, that of regenerating a backward country which hitherto had come only in part under the benefits of modern progress. Germany and Austria, in view of their geographical position, could not constitute a direct danger; therefore, an alliance with the Entente could give Turkey a perfect sense of external security. But the overtures made by Turkey never met any success. Great Britain and France attached much more value to the coöperation of Russia than to a return to their policy before the Crimean War.

The Alliance with Germany.

The Extremists were much more interested in a closer association with Germany and Austria. One would have said that these two Powers seemed to require Turkey to be strong for their own military purposes. They were eager to extend her every moral and material help in her military reorganization. Besides, both Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian dreams could only be realized at the expense of Russia, Great Britain, and France, with the help of Germany. When all efforts working for an association of Turkey with the Western Powers had proved unsuccessful, first Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, the Grand Vizier, in the latter part of the Balkan War, and then Saïd Halim Pasha, his successor, approached Germany and Austria for the same purpose. The offer was never refused, but never accepted. They extended to Turkey their diplomatic help and protection at every possible opportunity, but did not seem to be inclined to accept the risk of alliance with a Turkey weak and exposed to endless ex-

ternal and internal dangers. In May, however, Germany secretly prepared the basis of a Greco-Turkish alliance; and this became known in Turkey as the offer of an alliance on the part of Germany herself.

It was only on July 15, 1914, that Baron Wangenheim, the German ambassador, gave an answer to Turkey's original proposal for an alliance. It was seventeen days after the Serajevo murder, and a general war seemed to be imminent. In a despatch dated July 17, the Turkish Embassy in Berlin informed the home Government that a war was not avoidable.

On July 31, just on the eve of the War, a defensive alliance with Germany was actually signed in the name of Turkey "for the purpose of preserving peace." Only three members of the Cabinet were informed of the step taken. It was never discussed at a formal meeting of the Cabinet. On the contrary, the three plotters decided to keep the whole matter secret from their colleagues. Not until after the signing of the treaty was the Minister of Marine informed of the conclusion of an alliance with Germany. The Minister of Finance had an opportunity to read the text on August 1, but he received the impression that it was a mere project.

The Turco-German treaty was in reality a military convention which contained an explicit obligation on the part of Turkey to take part immediately in any war in which Russia was engaged. The main articles read as follows:

1. The two contracting powers agree to observe strict neutrality in the present war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
2. If Russia intervenes and takes active military measures, and the necessity arises for Germany to carry out her pledges of alliance to Austria, Turkey is under obligation in such a case, to carry out her pledges made to Germany.
3. In case of war, the German Military Mission will remain at the disposal of Turkey. As agreed upon directly between the head of the Military Mission and His Excellency the Minister of War, Turkey will grant to the German Military Mission an active influence and authority in the general management of the army.
4. In case Turkish territories are threatened by Russia, Germany agrees to defend them if need be by force of arms.
5. The present agreement has for its purpose the safe-guarding of both Empires from international complications which may arise out of the present war. It will take effect immediately after it has

been signed by the delegates mentioned above; and its mutual and identical pledges will remain in force until December 31, 1918.

Tricked into War.

Of the five persons in Turkey who knew of this treaty one—Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance—took it for a rough draft and criticized it severely, pointing out that it would make Turkey the mere tool of German military aims, without affording Turkey any protection, for instance, from a possible attack on the part of Great Britain. Djemal Pasha, the Minister of Marine, who heard of the treaty only after its signature, felt very proud of it, because Turkey, rejected as an ally even by Bulgaria, had now succeeded in becoming the ally of two Great Powers. Italy, the third in the Triple Alliance, would hear of it later on. Djemal Pasha speaks in his published memoirs of his golden dreams based on this alliance. He was hoping, just fifteen hours after the actual outbreak of the Great War, that such a war might be averted for at least five years, and that Turkey might happily prosper in peace with the moral and material help of Germany and Austria. Saïd Halim Pasha, the Grand Vizier, who had signed the treaty as a delegate, was not aware that his signature would involve Turkey in a general war. He insisted, even months later, that the Treaty with Germany left Turkey the right of maintaining her neutrality.¹

Only two men, Talaat, the Minister of the Interior, and Enver, the Minister of War, knew quite well what their venture would lead to. Talaat at times had his fears about it. He took the matter as a great gamble. For him Turkey's free existence was in any event problematical. In case of victory everything might be gained; in case of defeat the loss would be little greater than the normal chances of loss. So the adventure was worth attempting.

Only a single man, Enver, rejoiced in the possibility of taking part in a big war on the side of Germany, of reaching fame and power himself, of realizing with the help of Germany at least some Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian dreams, and of dealing a deathblow

¹ The original Turkish text of the Treaty as well as certain individual details concerning Turkey's entry into the War, are, with the very kind permission of the author, taken from an unpublished volume by Raouf Ahmed Bey, councilor of the Turkish Embassy in Paris at the outbreak of the Great War.

to Russia, which was sure to end the existence of Turkey on the first possible occasion. This man alone was able to impose his will on the whole country, and have it enter the War during its first period. He was also the chief factor in maintaining Turkish resistance for four years at a price which no other people could have been made to pay.

Different factors favored Enver and his German associates in their attempts to produce an atmosphere that would make possible a war on the side of Germany, and even made it popular.

The general ground was in itself favorable. In 1909 the German imperialist Rohrbach had declared Turkey to be stricken by a disease which he called "Anglomania." At that period, everything German was really hated, while everything British and French, on the contrary, was almost worshiped. After 1910 the situation gradually changed. As allies of Russia, Great Britain and France withheld sympathy and help from Turkey. With their treatment of the minority question and their anti-nationalistic interferences in Turkish party politics, they created the impression that they were interested in the failure of the Young Turk experiment. Germany, on the other hand, never lost an occasion to prove to Turkey that she was the only friend that could be relied upon in time of need. The loan of 1910, refused by France, was immediately granted by Germany, which, at the same time, sold Turkey two warships. Military help of every kind was granted, and diplomatic help accorded as often as possible. The general public in Turkey was beginning for the first time since the Crimean War to suspect British good faith, and have confidence in Germany. The requisition of the two dreadnoughts under construction in Great Britain—battleships made possible by popular contributions to the Turkish Navy League—produced an overwhelming impression on Turkish public opinion. It led the great mass of the people to adopt decidedly anti-British views. When the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* reached Turkish waters on August 11, and it was announced that they had been bought by Turkey to take the place of the two ships requisitioned by Great Britain, the joy of the people over this undreamed of piece of luck was unfeigned.

Entente Weakness and Inaction.

The struggle between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente to influence the attitude of Turkey was a one-sided one. Germany was in a favorable position, and worked with great zeal and tenacity to

enlist the active help of Turkey. German diplomats and soldiers kept Turkish statesmen under a heavy bombardment of promises, arguments, and threats. The two warships—in every sense German in spite of the fiction of their sale, and the impatience of their crews, as Germans, to enter the War, were a formidable weapon in German hands. The forces of propaganda, promptly organized at the German Embassy, were busily engaged in influencing the press and Turkish public opinion by spreading exaggerated war news and giving the people a strongly German view of the international situation. Long before Turkey's entry into the War, every Turkish paper had openly taken the German side.

The Entente was guiltily and fatalistically inactive. The efficient propagandist systems of the Entente embassies were at a complete standstill, and left an unfettered freedom of opportunity to the Germans. The Entente side made one of its gravest mistakes in overlooking the help to Germany which the entry of Turkey into the War might be; and, accordingly, no active desire was displayed to secure the aid of Turkey, or to obtain her military neutrality. Commandant Larcher, who has made a serious study of the Turkish phase of the European War, writes as follows:²

The Allies followed the obsolete policy which is symbolized by the term, "Eastern Question," and refused to realize that there were new Turkish and Mohammedan problems. While they continued actively to negotiate with the Slav states in the Balkans, they protested solemnly at the violation of time-honored international conventions, threatening the Turks with reprisals and withholding from them any real favors. Besides, unaware of the gravity of having Turkey enter the World War, they took no military measures, either of intimidation or security.

There were two kinds of negotiations going on between Entente embassies and Turkish statesmen. The first consisted of the attempts of pro-German war partisans to deceive the Entente and to gain time. The second was the struggle of the Moderates to make the Entente pay a good price for Turkish neutrality, in order to be able completely to checkmate the partisans of war. The representations of the Entente also had the same aims; some tried to gain time, and others wanted really to find out if it was not possible to buy the neutrality of Turkey.

² Commandant Larcher: *La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale*; Paris, 1925, p. 43.

Turkish Moderates were not keen to enter the War on either side. They wanted only to take advantage of the international situation, to gain recognition for complete Turkish independence, bring about the abolition of the Capitulations, both juridical and economic, and the return of certain of the Aegean Islands retained by Greece and Italy. The Entente ambassadors made only vague promises regarding the Capitulations, putting more emphasis on their own counter-claims: The Straits were to be left open, and the German warships and the German Military Mission were to be sent away.

The militarists were eager, as a matter of principle, to enter the War. Enver Pasha, in spite of his being the chief representative of German influence in Turkey, made Russia's ambassador a proposal to fight on her side, on the following conditions:³ German officers should not be dismissed immediately, for they were needed for the defensive mobilization Turkey was engaged in. The mobilized armies should be used, however, to help Russia in checking the movement of the Balkan armies hostile to the Entente, or in attacking Austria along with friendly Balkan forces. The price asked in return was the recognition of complete Turkish independence and a rearrangement of the Balkan map to the advantage of Turkey. As the Russian Foreign Office instructed the Embassy in Constantinople⁴ to continue the negotiations with a view to gaining time, but not to enter into any categorical engagement, it is not possible to surmise whether Enver wanted only to gain time, or whether he would really have been willing to engage in a war against Germany, in case he had been offered the opportunity to do so.

While the Entente Powers failed to make any serious diplomatic effort to hinder Turkey's entrance into the War, not one of their various plans to force her hands, or to intimidate her by a display of force, was carried out.

Consequently, the Turkish statesmen then in power had to decide the whole issue uninfluenced in any way by the Entente, but under an overwhelming pressure from the Germans. Those who stood for peace continued for three months to be in a constant struggle with those in favor of war.

³ Telegram (No. 628), dated August 5, 1914, of the Russian ambassador to M. Sazonov, published by the Soviet Government.

⁴ Telegram (No. 1705), dated August 6.

Turkey To Side with the Victors.

Mobilization and the closing of the Straits were the first steps taken by the latter. These steps were not discussed in a regular cabinet meeting. The order for mobilizing all national forces as a measure of precaution had simply to be signed one by one by the individual cabinet members, at the close of a cabinet sitting, on August 1. Nobody could, single-handed, take the responsibility of opposing such a measure of precaution. Following this sitting, military measures were discussed in an intimate circle made up of a few ministers, a sort of informal war cabinet. The Grand Vizier and the Ministers of the Interior, War, Marine, Finance, and Justice composed it, and its existence was unknown to the other Ministers. During the sitting held by this war cabinet, on August 4, it was decided as a matter of principle not to take any sort of action before Bulgaria and Rumania made clear their attitude. The Grand Vizier maintained that the treaty with Germany did not impose on Turkey any obligation to enter the War, and, on August 9, the following decisions were taken:

1. To have the text of the Treaty with Germany examined from a legal point of view.
2. To seek to conclude alliances with Bulgaria and Rumania.
3. To convince the Entente that Turkey meant to remain neutral.
4. To form a special commission that would charge itself with the responsibility of food supply, both for the people and the army.
5. To gain time until the outcome of the War became clear.
6. Not to allow the German ambassador to interfere with military affairs, or the German commander, General Liman von Sanders, with politics.
7. Under no circumstances to enter the War on any side, before the negotiations with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece had taken a favorable turn.
8. To open negotiations with the French and Russian ambassadors.

When the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* took refuge in Turkish waters, the Moderates insisted with some energy on their being disarmed or sent away within the time limit fixed by international law. They could not, however, oppose the purchase of the warships, although they knew it was a fiction. Their acquisition had been too

popular. The Moderates devoted all their powers to preventing the actual outbreak of hostilities. Their point of view was this: The War was an undreamed-of opportunity to ensure Turkey's continued existence and independence. No belligerent would dare deliberately to attack a neutral military force of a million hardened soldiers. Turkey would remain strong and fresh, while her would-be heirs were weakening each other. In proof of this, they spoke of the fact that when Turkey had abolished the Capitulations on September 9, 1914, she had met with only mild protests from the belligerents. Moreover, a neutral Turkey could draw other political and economic advantages from the general hostilities; while if Turkey were to enter the War, she would be put out of existence in case of an Entente success, or become a German colony in case of German victory.

The militarists did not dare openly to assert their desire for war. The sufferings of the Balkan War were too fresh in mind, and the efforts that would be called for by a general war looked too overpowering for a Turkey ill-provided for it and scanty of population. Even before she entered the War, the hardships imposed on the country by the mobilization and by the narrowing of communications with the outside world gave a clear idea of what a calamity an actual state of war would be.

Gamblers and High Stakes.

But the attitude of the Extremists toward international events was that of gamblers with an exceptional chance of a winning. The Germans were marching on Paris. The War might end in a few weeks. Turkey would lose the opportunity of strangling Russia by keeping the Straits closed. She would also fail to take advantage of the great opportunity of sitting at the peace table side by side with the victors. The Extremists refused to think of the possibility of a German defeat, and believed dogmatically in the final success of Germany.

The German military and naval elements in Turkey were more than impatient to see Turkey enter the War. At first their leaders admitted the necessity of gaining time to complete the mobilization, distances being too great in Turkey, the means of transport too bad, and the general equipment too deficient. After Turkey had, to some extent, completed her mobilization, the uncertain attitude of Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania was used by the Turkish partisans of Germany as a pretext to delay her participation in the War. Ger-

many responded to the plea that only £T60,000 existed in the treasury by advancing 6 per cent German treasury notes to the value of £T5,000,000. In reply to the excuse based on the attitude of the Balkan countries, Germany made new diplomatic efforts and promises.

In spite of the pledges given by the militarists to the Moderate majority in the Cabinet that the War would not come as a surprise, and that the Germans in the Turkish army and navy would not be allowed to take any high-handed action, war looked to be inevitable to every outside observer. The militarist members of the Government were warned from many sides how grave would be the consequences of war, but without any real effect. Among others Rifat Pasha, the Turkish ambassador in Paris, sent the following telegram from Bordeaux on September 4:

The Russians have taken Lemberg, they dominate the road of Vienna. Rumania is sure to take sides against Austria. Italy will also take the same course of action. Germany is isolated and doomed to defeat. Hostility to the Entente may endanger our very existence. The only sane policy for Turkey consists in obtaining advantages from the Entente by pursuing strict and sincere neutrality.

Rifat Pasha repeated his warnings on September 28:

The country's physical make-up does not permit her leaders to pursue fantastic dreams of conquest. The low standard of living of the people and Turkey's primitive development necessitate a long and peaceful growth. The deceiving attraction of possible military successes may only lead to our annihilation. German interferences must promptly be brought to an end. Are we obliged to show more partiality to Germany than Italy, her old ally and friend? The Entente is ready to condemn us to death if we act as enemies. Germany has no interest in saving us. She considers us as a mere tool. In case of defeat she will use us as a means of satisfying the appetite of the victors; in case of victory she will turn us into a protectorate. The Entente is in a position to injure us even in the event of Entente defeat. We are on the direct road to dismemberment. We should recall the fact that an Extremist foreign policy has always been the cause of our misfortunes. It even made possible the miracle of a Balkan Alliance against us.

The militarists were not in a mood to be influenced by such warnings. They hesitated to enter the War only because of the doubtful attitude of the Balkan neighbors. For repeated negotiations with

them never led to positive results. M. Tosheff, the Bulgarian minister, was against Bulgaria's entering the War, and insisted that Turkey should likewise keep out of it.

A German Admiral Settles the Matter.

On October 28, a *fait accompli* was created by the German commander-in-chief of the Turkish fleet. He attacked vessels of the Russian fleet and bombarded Russian harbors. The German admiral had obtained, after long and insistent demands, permission to engage in manoeuvres in the Black Sea; but the actual aggression took place without the knowledge of any member of the Turkish Government. Even ministers known for their extreme desire for war have always claimed to have been wholly in ignorance of the intentions of the admiral.

When the Attorney General of the Angora Tribunal of Independence on August 22, 1926, drew up an indictment against some of those guilty of war offenses which were part of a new political conspiracy, he took the following view of Turkey's entrance into the War:

Turkey entered the War at a moment when the German offensive was halted on the Marne and the future issue of the conflict had become clear. The whole Turkish nation was dragged into the War as a result of a *fait accompli*, the work of a German admiral who received his orders from the Kaiser. In other words, a great and historic Empire had become a toy of this German admiral whose very name was unknown to the Turkish people. Turkish ministers who submitted to such steps look more like obedient, submissive servants of the Kaiser than ministers responsible for the welfare of Turkey. Could not these so-called Turkish patriots punish the folly of a German officer who had played with the self-respect of the Turkish State?

On October 29 the influential members of the Cabinet assembled in the house of Halil Bey, the Minister of Justice, to discuss the situation. The majority proved to be against the War, and proposed to give full satisfaction to the Entente by dismissing the German admiral, sending all German officers home, and tearing the German treaty into pieces. Talaat, the Minister of the Interior representing the war party, admitted that a real neutrality would call for all this, but maintained that it was impossible to do it immediately as

the City of Constantinople and the Government of Turkey were under the threat of German guns. Then a compromise was agreed upon, which took the form of proposing to the Entente that an inquiry should be made into the responsibility for the Black Sea incidents.

This proposal was refused by Russia. The Russian ambassador left Constantinople on October 31. On the same day the war party composed of certain ministers and influential members of the party organization held a meeting in the house of the Grand Vizier. They spoke of the great opportunity the War would give Turkey to conquer Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, Tripoli, and sections of Russia inhabited by Turks. The Grand Vizier maintained that Turkey had not the resources for making new conquests, and gave notice that he would retire if war could not be avoided.

He was persuaded, however, to remain in office after war had been deliberately decided upon; and only four of the Moderates retired from the Cabinet as a matter of principle. The retired members were spoken of as traitors, and insulted and menaced by their former colleagues. The militarists gained absolute control of the situation and refused to permit the War any longer to be made a matter for argument. The public was influenced in the same direction by articles in the press, and various proclamations and warlike demonstrations. The majority did not sincerely rejoice in engaging in a new war against three great Powers. The people had already, as we have said, had some taste of the hardships to come, during the period of armed neutrality. But they were unorganized and had no means of voicing their grievances. Turkey was worse off in this respect than the other belligerents. She had no organized labor movement, no political opposition, no organization representing higher intellectual interests and ideas of peace. The organized forces in the country were exclusively in the hands of the militarist minority and its partisans who were either impulsive, patriotic hot-heads, or mere self-seekers and dogmatic party adherents, eagerly assisted and in part dominated by German political and military representatives. This combination was hardly in a mood to tolerate opposition. Besides, the fact that the War was directed against Russia, the traditional enemy, and was undertaken on the side of two Great Central Powers could be used successfully to create some degree of enthusiasm and confidence, especially as no expression could be given to the views of the other side.

On November 4, Russia declared war on Turkey. Great Britain and France followed on November 5.

The whole situation can be summed up in this way: The majority of Turkish leaders were fully conscious that the primitive resources of Turkey would not allow of her deliberately going into a world war with real belief in any final gain. Her geographical separation from Germany and Austria, and the doubtful attitude of the countries in the area between, were facts which the warmest partisans of war could not ignore, although they were impatient to try the fortunes of the country in the great and exciting gamble going on all over Europe. Three months had elapsed between the outbreak of the War and Turkey's joining it. During this period the situation could be studied, deliberately and objectively, from every aspect. Not a single argument could be advanced by the militarists in favor of entering the War, in any free discussion with the Moderates. Yet this *fait accompli*, created by a foreign admiral who had in mind only the interest of his own country, could suffice to precipitate Turkey into it; and all the risks and consequences of his act were accepted by the militarist minds of the country with the passionate eagerness of gamblers.

CHAPTER VII

RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT

Divided Human Resources.

TURKISH staff officers who in recent years have made objective studies of the general situation existing at the beginning of the World War, have come to the unanimous conclusion that Turkey would have been able successfully to defend her neutrality against any external aggression if she had not committed the great mistake of entering the War, especially at such an early period. The disproportion between the resources of Turkey and those of her opponents was too great to admit of the War's being seriously regarded as the possible means of Turkey's survival, and even realizing fantastic designs of conquest. A brief glance at the resources and equipment of the country may be enough to make it clear that a long war with numerically superior enemies on numerous distant fronts would necessitate Turkey's risking the essentials of her very existence, without having reason to look for any advantage in return.

The Ottoman Empire, as it existed before the War, was far from constituting an area that was a simple geographical unit. It was situated between 13° and 42° of latitude, and in climate was in part a tropical, in part Mediterranean, and in part Middle-European. Physically such geographical differences could not be thought of as making up a general average with its variations. There were three or more geographical divisions, with entirely different social and economic conditions, and different degrees of development. The entire area was estimated to be something between 1,710,000 and 1,790,000 square kilometers, to have a frontier line of 12,000 kilometers, and a coast line of 8,000 kilometers.

The peoples inhabiting this area differed among themselves in every respect. They comprised every variation of culture,—primitive tribal groups, tribal federations, and feudal relationships based on service and protection extended by local chieftains—and also the highest intellectual types. They could not in any respect be thought of as differentiations from a single mold. No sort of general amalgamation had taken place during recent centuries. The only common bond was obedience to the same ruler, as long as that ruler was able

to impose obedience. And these peoples felt themselves to be separated from one another by differences of religion, language, and ethnic origin.

The exact number of the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire is not known. A real census had never been taken.¹ The estimates vary greatly. The only positive information can be obtained from the population registers; and the number of those actually registered in 1914 was 19,043,383. But the provinces of Bagdad, Basra, Hedjaz, Medina, Assir, Yemen, and Lebanon were not included in the registers. Mossoul, Aleppo, Zor, Syria, and Jerusalem were only partly registered. Even in the areas where population registers have been regularly kept for generations, the unregistered have numbered on an average more than 10 per cent. In the eastern provinces only a small portion of the female population was registered. All these considerations would lead to a total estimate of about 25,000,000. In Western books estimates of the population of pre-war Turkey vary between 20 and 23 millions. The Turks themselves are generally held to number from 9 to 10 millions; the Arabs, 6,000,000; the Kurds, 1,500,000; the Greeks, 1,500,000; the Armenians, 1,000,000; and miscellaneous, 2,000,000.

From the viewpoint of war resources, nine or ten million Turks must be held to be the only willing bearers of the military burden. The rest of the population was mainly a hostile element which did not regard its destiny as the same as that of the Empire.

Individuals belonging to various groups performed their service within the war machinery. Some of them may have done this in a loyal way. A large number of urban Arabs and Kurds were influenced to some extent by a Mohammedan sense of solidarity in the first period of the War. But in a general way they did not constitute a dependable military element. Some of them, even in the first half of the War, had to be looked upon as out-and-out enemies. As often as they had the chance to, they did everything possible to contribute to the defeat of the Empire. This course of action seemed to them the only way of deliverance. The large section of the inhabitants in the southern and eastern provinces who belonged to tribal organizations were interested only in their local affairs and merely aimed to draw

¹ Some figures furnished by a Turkish census taken after the above was written are given in the Appendix. But at the present time, July, 1928, complete figures are not available.

from the situation the greatest possible advantage for themselves. As for the Turks, the only element interested in the survival of the Empire, they did not constitute an abundant source to draw healthy soldiers from.

The expression "Turk" means in a practical sense a Turkish-speaking Mohammedan who has no consciousness of belonging to any special group such as Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, or Georgians. The term has not yet acquired the meaning of citizenship, or that relationship which leaves out questions of religion or racial origin. The word "Ottoman" was formerly used to express the idea of citizenship.

For generations the chief burden of defending the Empire, quelling internal revolts, and acting as an element of cohesion in the vast Empire had lain with the Turks. This heavy task had not rested on all Turks equally. The people of the towns were given the means of escaping military duties at the front. The actual burden of fighting lay with the rural classes.

Along with military service, the main burden of taxation also rested on the peasants. They had to pay to the State in kind one-eighth of all they produced. This division of the revenue was farmed out by assignment. Influential local notables who had made a specialty of such business did not stop at extracting only one-eighth. By a complicated system of exploitation, they obtained much more than that. In addition they interfered arbitrarily in the details of the farm work. Harvesting had to be postponed indefinitely because the tax collector or his representative had not arrived to keep check on it. Sometimes such delays caused crops to be ruined by unfavorable weather. The peasants abstained from raising vegetables and fruit, for the checking up of these products gave the tax gatherers special opportunities to create difficulties. In addition to the above taxes, the country people had to pay property taxes, taxes upon all their stock, including their draft animals, special taxes for roads and schools, taxes levied illegally for the construction of public buildings in the vicinity of towns, and also they had to contribute to various national projects. Furthermore, they had lavishly to entertain notables, officials, and officers of the gendarmerie passing through their villages.

Bad Health Conditions.

They obtained no benefits of any kind from the State in return for these sacrifices. The only public activity which touched the village

was that of the tax collector and conscription officer. The health service did not reach it at all. There were large areas, including towns, without any medical assistance and at the mercy of every sort of charlatan. Medical aid was badly needed. The rate of infant mortality was appalling. There are Turkish medical experts who put it at 80 per cent. This is certainly a figure purposely exaggerated to create alarm. Nevertheless, half that figure might agree with the facts. Malaria was general, especially in the most fertile areas. Syphilis was also a formidable element of destruction.

According to a report on village sanitary conditions made by the chief medical officer of the Third Army in the eastern provinces, 60 per cent of the villages were situated in unhealthy surroundings; in 14 per cent malaria was found in an epidemic form, and syphilis in 9 per cent, although the territory was outside the principal malarial and syphilitic areas. Seventy-two per cent of the inhabitants were verminous, and consequently exposed to typhus. Only 57 per cent of the houses had any sanitary conveniences. Smallpox had a free hand. Those who could read and write constituted only 0.7 per cent of the total. In the villages inhabited by Christian majorities they reached 21 per cent. Anyone hoping to find in the villages where polygamy was practiced an average of eight or ten children per household was sorely undeceived by the reality. The average number did not exceed two. Birth control was not a general practice. There was a high birth rate. But the early death of children was such a usual occurrence that parents came to view it with resignation. They would merely say, "God has given them. God has taken them."

Health conditions in the towns and cities were not much better. In 1914 only a few cities had a really modern sewer system and water supply. In general, municipal conditions had not been influenced by present-day ideas of social hygiene, although municipal laws were perfect on paper.

Education at a Low Point.

The facilities for education were no better than those for medical care in the country. The system of compulsory education had existed in Turkey for over sixty years, on paper. But in actual fact only a few villayets in the western provinces had real schools. Even in the towns and cities the schools were not sufficient for one-fourth of the children of school age. According to the statistics for government

schools in 1912-1913, there were 12,814 primary schools with 596,460 pupils and 19,212 teachers; 153 secondary schools with 27,461 pupils and 1,518 teachers; 17 normal schools with 1,518 students and 141 teachers; 17 other higher institutions of learning—the University, the schools of law, medicine, and engineering; and civil service, agricultural, veterinary, and forestry schools, with 6,677 students and 368 teachers. This does not include private and foreign schools, or schools depending on non-Turkish communities.²

The Turkish school system was democratic in its make-up, so far as it existed. It was free in all its grades; some secondary and normal schools and higher institutions of learning also offered free board. Unfortunately, their number was small, and the unpractical education they gave made the graduates dependent on the State for a living.

Nevertheless, there had been marked progress in this respect since the Young Turk Revolution. Before 1908, at least as much was paid in salaries to the officials of the Ministry as was actually expended on schools. In 1908, the first year with a regular budget, expenses for education amounted to £T200,000 and the salaries of officials were only 20 per cent of that. In 1909, £T660,000 was paid for education, and salaries had fallen to 9 per cent. In 1910, they were only 3 per cent of an educational grant of £T940,000. And in 1914 the latter was £T1,237,000.

The backward state of public education offered opportunities to all sorts of undesirables to gain power, influence, and money at the expense of the people by claiming to possess mystic or divine powers, or to be otherwise endowed.

An Exploited Farming Class.

The people in the rural districts were also exploited, in some parts of the country, by semi-feudal chiefs and notables, in other parts by bands of brigands. As public safety could not be maintained everywhere in any permanent way, peasants had to pay regular tributes to

² The non-Turkish community schools were financed and administered directly by the various communities in question. They taught those who attended them the language and the ideals of their respective races, whether Armenian, Greek, or Jewish. The latter, for the most part, used French in their schools as the language of instruction.

the brigands in addition to their official contributions to the Government. To obtain justice in the law courts was costly, slow, and complicated. The prison system was exceedingly deficient.

The prospect of making any money by their work being a hopeless one for the producing classes, many peasants preferred to produce just enough for their own food and for the seed for the coming year. Even if they wanted to produce more they could not, in some of the most out-of-the-way places, sell their produce to advantage. Transport facilities were either lacking, or in many cases so costly that produce could be brought only to the local market, which was generally glutted. In the principal consuming centers along the coast Russian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and even French flour of good quality could be bought at a lower price than native flour of bad quality. There was small possibility of obtaining rural credits. The State Agricultural Bank was an excellent institution for this purpose. It had regular sources of revenue assigned to it by the State in addition to the 9 per cent interest it charged; and as it had to pay no interest upon its capital it was destined to increase annually. Its capital was subject to assaults from time to time by the Government; and, while they had been especially frequent under the old *régime*, the Bank constituted the only effective help from the central Government to the peasant classes. But, in view of the great needs of the peasants, this help was not sufficient; and it did not prevent the peasant classes from having to borrow at exorbitant rates from the local notables, or from the middlemen who bought their produce in advance. Under these conditions, it became the habit of peasants in many parts of the country to leave their field work in charge of their children and seek employment in Constantinople, or some other large town. Every big Turkish city had a large percentage of temporary residents, mostly bachelors, who visited their homes from time to time, sent home part of the money they made, and retired to their home villages in their old age or when they had saved a small sum of money. Turkish emigration to America and other foreign countries had also this temporary character, and was the result of Turkey's unbearable rural conditions.

This was the general situation of the Turkish rural population, generally spoken of as the soldier mines of Turkey. For them Constantinople was still the old Byzantine city which took without giv-

ing, and considered the provinces as a field of exploitation for its own benefit. In spite of the great theoretical interest displayed in the welfare of the people, the new government machinery had only produced certain changes in some of the larger cities, but had not been able to influence conditions of life in the villages.

As the Turkish people were accustomed to look to the Government for all initiative, it was not possible for them to engage in any direct struggle for betterment.

The inefficient bureaucracy was, however, not capable of playing the rôle of social and economic leadership. On the other hand, the non-Turkish elements were not used to considering the Turkish Government as actually their own Government. Accordingly, they relied only on themselves to manage their schools and their charitable institutions, and resorted at need to common measures to defend their common interests. With moral help and protection from foreign sources, the active assistance of missionaries, and their own efficient teamwork, stimulated by the adverse social pressure of their environments, they took, in every respect, fuller advantages of modern education, sanitation, and economic opportunities. They had a lower death rate than the Turks, infant mortality with them being markedly lower. They were rapidly increasing in numbers while the Turkish element constantly decreased. In the case of non-Turks, political inferiority was one of the direct causes of their economic prosperity. As for the Turks, on the contrary, the business of government and their heavy responsibility as the possessors of an empire disproportionate in size to their numbers brought about economic inferiority. The conflict between political and economic supremacy, in addition to selfish foreign agitations and a separatist group consciousness, was a potential source of racial troubles, which only awaited a favorable occasion to break out.

The Inadequacy of Turkey's Railways.

Next to the problem of population the problems of transport and communication presented such difficulties that they made unthinkable a modern war against several well-equipped industrial nations.

Turkey possessed anything resembling a railway system only in the European provinces lost to her after the Balkan War. The fragmentary railways in Asia Minor did not constitute a system. They could not even be looked upon as real railways in a strict European

or American sense. The lines existing, and their length at the beginning of the European War, were the following:

	<i>Kilometers</i>
The Oriental Railway	466
Haidar-Pasha-Angora	578
Arific-Ada Bazar	10
Eski-Shehr-Konia ^a	445
The Bagdad Railway ^a	935
Smyrna-Kassaba	266
Alla Shehr ^a	250
Soma-Panderma	183
Damascus-Hamas	682
Jaffa-Jerusalem	86
Mersina-Adana	67
Mudania-Brusa ^a	41
The Hedjaz Railway	1,750
	5,759

This railway service of 5,759 kilometers for an area of 1,760,000 square kilometers made a very poor showing compared with the railways of Germany—(64,000 kilometers for 540,000 square kilometers), of France—(51,000 for 536,000), and of India—(55,000 for 3,160,000).

The only line the Turkish General Staff was eager to see built was the one in the direction of the Russian frontier, for a war with Russia was a possibility that had to be contemplated. The Turkish Government was, however, under an obligation never to build such a line without the consent of Russia. Of course, the Russian Government always found a reason to withhold its consent, so Turkey had no railway connection with her eastern frontier, while Russia had in the Caucasus a regular railway and road system based upon strategical considerations. The line to the South was not completed owing to the opposition that had existed for years to the project of a Bagdad Railway. The last international difficulties in its way had been removed only a month before the World War started.

Between Constantinople and Adana the line was interrupted in two places. In the case of one, communications had been maintained for some time by a narrow-gauge line going through the uncompleted Amanus tunnel. The tunnel was only completed in January, 1917.

^a Sections constructed before the War.

In the case of the other, the interruption was caused by the fact that the Taurus Tunnel was not ready, and about 70 or 80 kilometers of adjoining line not yet constructed. At Rayak, another gauge was used; and, consequently, military supplies had to be loaded and unloaded three times between railhead and the terminus. The capacity of the line, already very limited, was by this reduced to a minimum.

So far as speed went, it could not be spoken of as a railway. Furthermore, the strategically important stations were small affairs built only for local needs and lacking the facilities for large loading operations. The technical staff of the railway was mostly non-Turkish in nationality, and was not dependable as a military element. All lines had only a single track. The engines available on the various lines numbered 280; passenger coaches, 720; and freight cars, 4,500. About one-fourth of them were in need of repairs. With the available equipment, only 100 small trains could be made up; and as the lines were of different gauges, there was no possibility of "routing" them with any smoothness. Sixty soldiers had to be assigned to every freight car.

This interrupted one-track line in the direction of Bozanti-Adana-Osmanié-Aleppo was destined to provide for the needs of several hundred thousand soldiers and commissariat animals on the Caucasus, Palestine, Hedjaz, and Mesopotamia fronts. It had to transport the necessary artillery, ammunition, and the like for all the above armies, to serve the military formations on the lines of communication and do this while meeting all local traffic needs and supplying the wants of the coastal regions, or, in great part, Constantinople and the neighboring country. So poor a vehicle, bearing as it was a load to tax it to the utmost limit, might be expected to be managed most carefully and economically. But this was not the case. Special *trains de luxe*, carrying the commander-in-chief or persons of high rank interfered sometimes for days with the regular transport arrangements on which the very existence of hundreds of thousands of souls and huge armies depended.

Turkey Poor in Fuel.

The fuel question was another source of difficulties. Turkey possessed in the Ereğli coal fields an adequate supply of fuel. These fields were, however, situated on the Black Sea. As the Black Sea was

made unsafe by the Russian navy most of the Turkish transports carrying coal were sunk *en route*. The cargoes of the small number that escaped, and the lignite deposits exploited near Constantinople and Rodosto, were not sufficient even for the actual needs of the city of Constantinople.

Coal had to be obtained from Germany. As the possibilities of transport from Germany were very limited, several trains a week loaded with coal interfered badly with the transport of the most necessary materials for war. The coal thus obtained was mostly absorbed by the factories doing war work, and by the northern section of the Anatolian railway. Wood had to be burnt exclusively from Bozanti south. A special army bureau was formed for this purpose. It cooperated with local contractors who had to be supplied with soldiers owing to the lack of workmen. It was necessary to take 31,428 men from the army, mainly to cope with the fuel question. Only a small part of them worked for the contractors, who provided for other army necessaries. An active business was done in the selling of the needed papers to soldiers who wanted to escape actual military service, at least temporarily. In addition, the forests of the whole neighborhood were ruined, as military considerations had to come before anything else.⁴

The construction of a railway line to the Eregli coal fields would have saved enormous expenditures of money and effort. It would have been an easy matter to accomplish this urgent task. It was believed that it would take, under war conditions, from ten to twelve months to construct it. In spite of the great need of coal, the work was not started, because nobody believed the War would last such a long time. After the War, it was thought, the sea route would be free, and land transport would not pay. Instead, a very ambitious scheme was engaged in, to build a railway from Angora in the direction of Sivas and Erzeroum. The scheme, carried out with military resources, was known beforehand not to be of any possible war value, for, during the War, the necessary bridges could not be obtained from Germany. The cost in money, effort, and human life was disproportionate to the results accomplished.

⁴ Hussein Husni Emir, *Yildirim Ordoussi*, p. 313. "Yildirim Ordoussi," "the Army of Lightning," was the name given to a special army group organized to recover Bagdad from the British.

Bad Roads and Primitive Transport.

The ordinary roads on which the Army mainly depended were in no better condition than the railways. Roads were few and those that did exist were badly in need of repairs. The War surprised Turkey in the midst of a very extensive scheme of road building. But such new roads as had been constructed were all in the western provinces, and could have no direct bearing on the War.

At the beginning of the War, even roads which connected the interrupted parts of the railway, and served to complete the lines of communication with the South were partly lacking. This fact had not attracted any attention before, because the South had communications by sea. The road between Bozanti and Tarsus was also in need of repairs. The section between Osmanié and Katima could not be used even by horse carts. It took eight months after the beginning of the War to construct or repair the most urgent roads in this part of the country. All the military and civil authorities were ordered to give their maximum attention to the business. The labor battalions were largely used for it. The roads necessary for military purposes in Syria and Palestine were completed, in spite of all concerted efforts, only in February, 1916. Not till the eighth month of the War could motor cars use the roads between Bozanti-Tarsus-Adana-Osmanié-Aleppo. On bad roads, which these were, the heavy motor lorries without rubber tires, imported from Germany, were not of much use and their remains can still be seen on all the roads in the country. With the exception of a limited number of non-commercial cars, motor transport had not been introduced into the Turkish army before the War; and for that reason regular trucks with rubber tires were lacking.

Primitive transport by draft animals had to be depended on in the main. The Great War was, in general, described by Turkish critics as the losing battle of the primitive Anatolian oxcart, or *kagni*, against airplanes, railways, steamships, and motor cars. The peacetime equipment of the Army in horse- and oxcarts, horses, camels, mules, and donkeys was, of course, limited. For the needs of the mobilized forces a large number of animals had to be requisitioned. A statistical survey of 1913, which should not be taken too literally, gives the following estimate of the number of transport animals; 339,432 horses, 1,373,715 mules and donkeys, 314,810 camels, and 2,397,348

oxen. A part of them belonged to nomad tribes and were not available for military purposes unless bought for cash. The loss in overloaded animals on the bad roads was very great. Bubonic plague and other contagious diseases were frequent among the draft animals. The veterinary staff numbered only 250. New animals had to be constantly requisitioned, which gravely hindered the carrying on of any agricultural work. Finally, the peasants had to be supplied with a certain necessary number of animals to prevent a general famine. The roads leading to the Russian front were covered with heavy snow during the winter months; and often peasant women had to carry on their backs the ammunition urgently needed by the army.

Paralysis of Sea Transport.

Turkey, with her extensive coast line, depended in peace time mainly on water transport. During the War, the Aegean and the Mediterranean Seas were entirely closed. With the exception of a rare Greek sailing vessel engaged in smuggling from the Islands, the blockade was complete. On the Black Sea, the water route was open until the summer of 1915, owing to the superior strength of the Turkish navy, including the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*. After Russia's battleships had been completed, the supremacy passed to her. They sank not only a large number of steamers but they also bombarded the port of Zonguldak, the center of the Turkish coal fields, and ruined all port equipment. Only small quantities of coal could be moved, in little sailing vessels. And even in their case the Russian ships, by pursuing them systematically, succeeded in sinking about one thousand of them. Transportation on the Black Sea became free again only after the Russian Revolution.

The Sea of Marmora, the main line of communications with the Dardanelles front, and one of the few channels that remained open and could supply Constantinople with the necessaries of life, was made unsafe by British and French submarines. A large number of submarines could freely circulate in the Sea of Marmora, because they received secret help from the Greek population living near the coast. The British lost nine and the French four, and they sank in all about fifty Turkish steamers. Later on, few enemy submarines entered these waters, for the risk in passing under the mine area in the Straits was very great.

In 1912, Turkey possessed a steam tonnage of 110,000; and of this only 50,000 tons remained at the end of the War. The existing ships belonged mostly to the State Navigation Department. Only six exceeded 3,000 tons. No private company had a ship of more than 1,000 tons. The number of German ships which took refuge in Turkish waters and were used for military purposes was very small. River navigation did not exist with the exception of that on the Euphrates and the Tigris.

Larcher⁵ ascribes the main cause of the Turkish defeat and the failure of the Holy War to Turkey's being cut off from all sea communication.

Lack of Means of Communication.

Turkey's telegraph system was much better developed than her transport system. There were 55,383 kilometers of telegraph lines, not counting the 11,027 kilometers attached to the railways. Yet the system was hardly capable of meeting the great needs created by the War. In the areas of the more distant fronts, there were only single lines. Their capacity was low, and the general system deficient and primitive. The Morse apparatus in use gave rise to errors and loss of time, retarding the most urgent military communications. The lines were so busy with military affairs that, during the War, they hardly existed for commercial and private purposes. Before the War—in 1913—the total number of telegrams to destinations within the country was 3,102,642, and 49,612 were sent abroad. During the War even urgent telegrams had often to be sent by mail.

In Turkey at the beginning of the War a wireless system did not exist. It was only developed in the latter part of it, and was not of much practical use. With the exception of Constantinople a telephone service did not exist in any part of Turkey. Owing to the great distances and the sparseness of military formations, telephonic communications were not of general use on the fronts, with the exception of the Dardanelles. Constantinople could communicate by telephone with Berlin, Vienna, and Sofia, but not with its own army fronts.

The postal department was quite well organized before the War. Still letters sometimes took weeks to reach points in the interior not

⁵ *La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale*, p. 147.

situated on the railway. The total number of pieces of mail, in 1913, was 51,178,963, and was made up as follows:

Government correspondence	10,740,365
Ordinary letters	20,308,201
Unstamped letters	196,997
Post cards	1,826,033
Printed matter	1,141,829
Newspapers	15,299,291
Samples	286,310
Registered letters	1,378,454
	<hr/>
	51,177,480

In all, 8,435,077 ordinary and 366,093 registered letters were sent abroad.

Industrial Limitations.

Turkey's industrial equipment was very limited at the beginning of the War. She depended on imports for almost every manufactured product. The flourishing business of the Turkish artisan had been entirely ruined by large-scale foreign industry, so far as articles of primary need were concerned. Only a few crafts producing special art products had managed to survive. The Government possessed several factories which manufactured various kinds of war materials. There were a few industrial enterprises such as breweries, gas works, and cement factories, established with foreign capital. In spite of the facilities granted by the special law of 1913, into such enterprises little native capital had gone. Small industries could not develop, because the privileges conceded to foreign Powers by the Capitulations made competition with giant industries abroad quite impossible. The Turkish Government was not allowed to raise customs duties above a rate fixed by international agreement. There was no possibility of obtaining industrial credits. Nor did existing difficulties encourage small industrial undertakings to coöperate with a view to improving their chances of obtaining collective credits.

In general, industrial productivity was so restricted that the new needs created by the War could hardly be met at home. Turkey had to pursue her struggle against industrially equipped nations without the help of industrial equipment, and depend for the most part on limited imports from Germany and Austria.

According to a partial survey made in 1913, in seven of the most important centers of population the number of industrial establishments employing more than five workmen amounted to 269. The number increased to 282 in 1915. Of the 282, 78 produced food-stuffs, and 21 building materials. Thirteen were tanneries; 24, lumber yards; 70, textile workshops; 55, printing plants; and 13 small chemical factories. Establishments producing manufactures of metal, alcoholic beverages, shoes, and ready-made clothes were not included in the survey. Fifty-five per cent of these 282 establishments were in Constantinople. Two hundred and fourteen, or 81 per cent of the total, were in private hands. The total number of employees amounted in 1913 to 16,975, and in 1915 to 14,060. Of this number in 1913, 666 were employed in administrative and technical activities and 517 in 1915. Like most Turkish statistical material, these figures are not at all complete and can convey only a general impression of the limited capacity of Turkish industry at the beginning of the War.

Economic Deficits.

The unfavorable economic situation of the country found expression in the adverse trade balance. The statistical yearbook published by the Ministry of Finance in 1912 estimates the adverse balance between 1884 and 1909 at £T160,000,000.

Imports were £T20,638,000 and exports £T12,799,000 in 1884. Up to 1909 there had been an increase of 162 per cent in imports and of 142 per cent in exports.

The totals after the Young Turk Revolution were as follows:

	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>
1908	£T31,432,200	£T18,439,100
1909	32,883,000	18,299,300
1910	40,125,700	21,937,900
1911	44,990,700	24,712,100

Factors influencing the general economic balance were not at all favorable to Turkey. Yearly interest payments and the amortization of old loans amounted to £T7,426,000; that is, about \$33,400,000. In addition £T886,000 had to be paid to foreign owners of the railways, for by the so-called "kilometer guarantee" the Government had been forced to guarantee a minimum income in order to encour-

age railway construction. Large sums were paid to foreign insurance companies. Navigation, even in coastal waters, was in foreign hands, the Greeks controlling most of the local service. Foreigners had to be paid to transport Turkish goods from one Turkish harbor to another. The country, in spite of its historic and natural attractions, had not become a great center for tourists. Most of the 20,000 or more who came to Turkey visited only a few places, and lived aboard ship. The expenditures of Turks going to foreign countries for health, pleasure, and study exceeded any income derived from tourists. The money sent by emigrants in America was balanced by the expenditures in foreign countries of those living on incomes derived from their possessions in Turkey.

Financially, the deficit was made good by foreign loans. This factor alone cannot, however, explain the economic situation actually existing at any period. If we take foreign loans to amount to three or even to four milliard francs, they can hardly make good the difference in the commercial balance, to say nothing of the economic balance. Turkish economists are at a loss to explain the situation. The statistical material at hand is, of course, defective; but, export goods being free of duty, the mistakes would probably be in the import statistics; for a large proportion of the imports were smuggled in, and goods ordered by the Government as well as certain kinds of other goods, which were free of duty, did not figure in the import statistics.

At any rate, the great deficit was fully paralleled by the decrease in population, the lack of economic development, a declining standard of living—it was below the poverty line—and a decrease in the capital of production.

Turkey was, at the beginning of the World War, in an unfavorable financial situation. The wholesome change brought about by the Young Turk Revolution consisted in the establishing of strict budgetary methods and in the giving of frank expression to all drawbacks in the situation. The per-capita taxation was low; but, in view of the undeveloped resources of the country, a sudden increase in receipts could not be expected. The system of taxation was admitted to be full of mistakes and dangers, and in need of urgent reforms to relieve the overburdened peasant classes. But immediate and radical reforms were not contemplated, for the leaders did not dare to face the risk of a temporary decrease in revenues, and unconsciously preferred to leave the burden on the inarticulate peasant rather than draw down

upon themselves the displeasure of the politically vociferous population of the cities.

In view of limited revenues expenses had to be cut to a sum that did not even provide for necessities. Many urgent needs in the domains of health, education, economic development, and administrative reform had to be neglected. The salaries paid did not constitute living wages. The result was that officials were either in pecuniary troubles or became addicted to habits of bribery. This, for the people, meant an added tax, sometimes a tax higher than the legal one. And, for the treasury, it meant the bartering of a great public good for the price of a very small individual benefit. Although the officials were so much underpaid, their number was large, and the public functions so inefficiently organized that in some of the departments of state more than 25 per cent of their allotted funds was spent for salaries. Even in the Administration of the Public Debt, handled by foreign representatives of the bondholders, the overhead expenses were more than 19 per cent. In proportion to her budget, Turkey was assuredly that country which paid the greatest amount for salaries.

In the budget for the fiscal year 1911-1912, £T11,288,000—or 30.7 per cent, went to payments on the Public Debt; £T11,280,000 was assigned to the Ministry of War; £T1,718,500, or 4.7 per cent, to the Navy; £T1,429,000, or 3.9 per cent, to the gendarmerie; £T850,000, or 2.3 per cent, to education; and £T373,000, or 1 per cent, to commerce and agriculture.

Budgets for pre-war years made the following showing in receipts, expenditures, and in estimated and actual deficits—all sums being in pounds Turkish:

	<i>Receipts</i>	<i>Expenditures</i>	<i>Estimated Deficit</i>	<i>Actual Deficit</i>
1909-1910	25,078,962	30,539,545	5,460,582
1910-1911	29,183,418	35,994,587	6,811,169
1911-1912	31,645,708	41,161,729	9,516,021	22,638,531
1912-1913	33,682,475	36,891,366	3,208,891	10,373,118 ⁶

The deficits were covered by foreign loans in 1908, 1909, 1911, and 1914, which in all amounted to about £T20,000,000. But every successive loan only increased the general burden, for such loans were

⁶ From a table prepared by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration for Mears' *Modern Turkey*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1924.

used for current expenses and not for the development of the resources of the country.

From the viewpoint of her economic and financial situation Turkey could in no sense be considered a country that shared in the new conditions created by the industrial revolution and the accumulation of capital. A low standard of living was maintained, as the result of meager individual efforts, relying on primitive tools. Collective ways of doing things inspired by a consciousness of common economic interests were almost non-existent. Economic coöperation was a mere word. It found its most important expression in the remains of the disorganized guilds.

A general system of credit, mutual confidence, and belief in the future possibilities of the country had as yet hardly been established. Its natural resources had been developed only in a limited and wasteful way. Forest areas, estimated to be about 6,000,000 hectares,—of which 5,909,980 belonged to the State, and 461,279 to private individuals—were gradually being destroyed. Although the mineral resources were rich and varied, the value of the total mineral output, in 1913, amounted to £T2,040,000.

There was hardly any labor movement in Turkey before the War. Agricultural labor was quite unorganized. The few unions in Constantinople were not solid and lasting organizations. Only that of the typesetters had been able to show a certain development and to improve, by concerted action, the pitiful working conditions that existed. In 1914 no law in Turkey protected labor, with the exception of the strike law, which tolerated strikes under certain restrictions.

CHAPTER VIII

WAR GOVERNMENT

Parliament in Turkey.

At the beginning of the War, the official form of government in Turkey was parliamentary, following a pattern partly British and partly French. There was a Sultan who had his share in the performance of certain formalities and ceremonies, and a government, responsible collectively to Parliament, and composed of a Grand Vizier or Prime Minister, a Sheikh-ul-Islam or Chief of Religious Organizations, and Ministers of War, the Navy, the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Public Works, Agriculture and Commerce, Education, Finance, Pious Foundations, and Posts and Telegraphs. The Sultan was supposed to appoint the Grand Vizier and the Sheikh-ul-Islam after consultations with party chiefs. The former prepared the list of his colleagues, obtained the sanction of the Sultan for it, and then read the program of the Cabinet before both Houses of Parliament, asking only the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence or non-confidence.

The Senate was a consultative assembly, the members of which were appointed for life by the Sultan upon the recommendation of the government in power. Membership in the Senate also hinged upon various conditions, and was limited to forty. It was meant to include distinguished and experienced representatives of various professions, as for example foreign ministers, governors, and army commanders, also private individuals distinguished in commerce, law, learning, and technology. The Senate could express opinions, reject, but only once, bills emanating from the Chamber of Deputies, and originate projects of law. It was supposed, as a non-political body, to have a tempering effect upon the passions and impulses of the Chamber of Deputies, but never to have the final word. The Government answered questions asked by the Senators, defended itself against their criticisms, but did not accept interpellations which might end in the fall of the entire cabinet or of one of the ministers.

The Chamber of Deputies was composed of the representatives of the people elected in an indirect and complicated way. The right of

voting was only restricted by sex and age—twenty years. Voters did not elect a deputy directly, but only a secondary elector. The proportion was one elector to 500 voters. The electors gave their secret vote to one or more deputies. In every electoral district the number of deputies was proportioned to the number of the whole population, one deputy to every fifty thousand. The electors could choose any names they wished from a list drawn up by the electoral commission and containing the names of the candidates, if their candidacy did not arouse any legal objection. The restrictions upon candidates were only those of sex, of age—thirty years—capacity to read and write, and character; that is, no one could be an elector who had been condemned for any common-law offense.

The Chamber was elected for four years. It could both originate laws and examine those submitted to it by the Government. It could also make interpellations which might result in votes of confidence or non-confidence.

The Government's power was extremely centralized. All governors and officials were appointed by the Government, and could be changed at any time. In the Law for Provincial Administration a beginning had been made in conferring a certain amount of local freedom upon the people. They elected provincial assemblies which could compile provincial budgets from certain sources of revenue assigned to the special provincial administrations. In particular they could assess the estimated expense for primary schools, and fix the rate for the road tax within the limits prescribed by the law. The provincial assemblies met once a year for forty days, to prepare the budget of the year and take account of the actual results of the previous budget. Such budgets included—in addition to the provisions for primary schools and roads within the province, as cited above—the local sanitary and veterinary administration and local economic improvements. In reality, the powers of these assemblies were only illusory. The governor appointed by the central Government was the *ex-officio* president of the assembly and the executive head of the "special administration." The heads of the educational, sanitary, public works, agricultural, and veterinary bureaus were the same persons as were appointed by the central Administration to discharge duties of a national character. They drew their salaries from the national budget, and performed the work of the provincial administration as a secondary activity. There was no effective responsibility

connected with this activity which the assembly was empowered to examine into and pass judgment upon.

Local Government in Tutelage.

Local municipal authorities had more freedom according to the letter of the law, but were generally under the tutelage of the governor. Their sphere of work in the life of the town was confined mainly to sanitary problems, carrying out building laws, street cleaning, and control of the cost of living.

National laws were the same for all parts of the Empire. They were generally taken from one or more foreign examples, modified slightly according to what were thought to be local needs, and put into execution without a serious, objective study of the conditions of life which they were expected to regulate. They looked, generally, quite perfect on paper, and provided a strict and intricate government control for every contingency. As the development of the various parts of the country was far from being uniform, the same law could not be applied everywhere. In some parts the Government had not even the means that admitted of any attempt to apply it; in others such a law proved to be a misfit which could not be smoothly applied. Artificial provisions in a law often acted as an obstacle to the normal course of public life. A long-drawn correspondence had to be engaged in to have it interpreted, and to obtain instructions concerning its application to positive cases. As the bureaucratic system was based upon the idea of never sanctioning anything which fell short of the perfect and the ideal, and then of shifting the responsibility for saying the final word to some one else, the element of time was often lost sight of. In general, a new law had this effect: It kept things in suspense until the final decision, which often came too late. As such laws proved so inefficient, too often the need of changing them was felt. And taken altogether they were an interference with the continuity of life and with the possibility of planning for the future. New laws were generally carried into effect with a too abundant display of energy. Later they fell into neglect or disuse. The people were wont to say that "a government interdiction lasted only three days."

Actual Conditions during the War.

The forces that had been put in play in Turkey did not, during the War, take precisely the course that had been arranged on paper. At

the same time they did not keep within the normal limits of peace times. War opened the way to loose developments; and while the letter of the Constitution was never touched upon or questioned, it was simply ignored.

Ordinarily Sultans were accustomed to take advantage of external dangers to consolidate their personal power. Mehmed V, who was on the throne during the first years of the War, was not desirous or capable of taking such a course. As Abdul-Hamid's successor he had been kept a prisoner for thirty-three years. He had entirely lost, during this time, any taste for power or domination. He had become a kind-hearted, cultured old gentleman with too broad and too resigned a philosophy of life to concern himself deeply with the business of political maneuvering. Besides, he interpreted his rôle of constitutional monarch very strictly. He abstained from all intervention, and in general, was only informed of public affairs after they had taken their final turn. Mehmed V considered the War to be an unfortunate necessity which could not be avoided, and spent his time writing poems in praise of the fighting soldiers. He was one of the few men in public life who took a real interest in the people, and felt for their sufferings. On the occasion of the first victory in the Dardanelles, when a general offensive of the Allied navies had been repulsed, Mehmed was given the title of "Ghazi" or "victorious conqueror." He celebrated the event by writing an ode which was given vast publicity for its value as domestic war propaganda; and odes were written to him by many Turkish poets.

Upon his death, on July 3, 1918, Mehmed VI ascended the throne. He was a very different sort of man. He had ambitions of the same character as Abdul-Hamid. He had always been an enemy of the Union and Progress group and an associate of those who opposed them. Being a clever man he did not manifest his real feelings when he reached the throne. On the contrary, he made a display of friendship and of entire confidence in the war leaders. He imposed himself cautiously, trying above all to gain popularity. Whenever a fire broke out in Constantinople the Sultan was sure to go to the spot, and take a detailed interest in the work of the fire brigade and in the people affected. But as Mehmed VI ascended the throne only a few months before the end of the War, his will to rule had no time to develop and influence public affairs. This development came after the War and will be spoken of in the third part of this volume.

The Real Governing Forces.

The Cabinet had been the most effective instrument of public control before the War, but, during the War, it lost its importance as the ultimate and deciding factor. Important decisions were taken by a triumvirate—Enver, Talaat, and Djemal—either acting in concert, or each in his own assigned sphere of influence.

Larcher¹ has this to say of them:

The three chiefs formed a sort of triumvirate. Of humble origin, they had won their own way in life, and were remarkable, above all, for these characteristics—audacity, energy, tenacity, presence of mind in the most desperate situations, and belief both in their own destiny and the destiny of the Turkish people.

The War had given Enver, as the military leader, the first place among the three, and he carried on the business of the War as if he had been an independent dictator.

Talaat held sway in politics and in government affairs. He came nearer than many of his political friends to putting public interest above personal and party interests, and managed to maintain his naturally modest manner in spite of a rapid ascent from the position of minor telegraph official to that of Minister of the Interior, and later Prime Minister. This is what Hindenberg thought of him:² “He impressed me as a genial man. He was well aware of the mission of his country and of the feebleness of the Turkish Empire. He possessed a clear picture of things.”

Through his subtle intelligence he managed to maintain a great influence over his political friends; he also enjoyed some general popularity, but was ultimately overwhelmed by the various individuals and groups about him who felt that war-time was a good time to gain political power or personal wealth. The tendency to corruption was too great to be stopped by a few well-meaning men. Talaat used his energy to avert open personal conflicts among leaders, and postpone every sort of trouble by means of compromises.

As there was no very important position left in Constantinople for Djemal Pasha, the Minister of Marine, he was given a geographical sphere of domination. Under the title of Commander of the Fourth Army, in addition to his place in the Cabinet, he was allowed to become the autocratic ruler of Syria and Palestine. His will was law in

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 80.

² Hindenberg, *Memoirs*, French translation, p. 162.

this region. All civil authorities took their orders from him, instead of from the central Government. Extremely energetic and capable, he was certainly not content with a place second to Enver's, but he preferred slowly to prepare for the future rather than accept the risks of an open struggle during the War. His method was to overawe the masses by pomp and splendor, and gain the confidence and friendship of the educated by making himself modest, almost humble, when with them. In an address, delivered at the University, on one of his frequent visits in Constantinople, "You represent the brains of the country," he told the University's professors; "We are mere hands, destined to execute your orders."

The other members of the Cabinet were of only secondary importance. Its decisions and the functions of other ministers were of so little importance that vacancies in the Cabinet were not filled for months. As two or three ministers were usually away from Constantinople on inspections in the interior or on visits to Germany, cabinet meetings some times took place with only four ministers present instead of twelve.

When the Cabinet of Saïd Halim Pasha resigned on February 4, 1916, and a cabinet composed largely of the same men, but presided over by Talaat Pasha took its place, nobody attached any importance to this change. The press claimed that "it was the Party of Union and Progress that had formed the new Government, just as it had the old, and that its policy would not be changed; but as Talaat Pasha was the active leader of the party his assumption of the duties of the Grand Vizier might mean greater activity and energy in the management of public affairs." The real explanation had to be sought in the fact that the military situation had taken a favorable turn, and the party of Union and Progress no longer felt the need of keeping outsiders like Saïd Halim Pasha in the position of Prime Minister. Saïd Halim Pasha, as an Egyptian prince and no native of Turkey, was a stranger to the party, and, by his conservative and Pan-Islamic views, aroused the antagonism of its radical and Turanian elements.

The "General Council."

The real executive control over non-military affairs was, more and more, shifted from the legally competent and responsible Cab-

³ From the *Tevhid-Efkiar* (a daily paper the name of which means "Unifier of Views"), of February 5, 1916.

net to the irresponsible, secret "General Council" of the Union and Progress party. The general assembly delegated by the last pre-war congress was simply dissolved, because it opposed both the war policy of the Government, and this powerful Council, constituted in an irregular way by some of the party leaders. Its members did not derive their power from the rank and file of the party, nor did many of them enjoy much popularity. They had merely become important in a small circle connected with the party hierarchy. They received their power mainly from Enver and Talaat, and still constituted, with their borrowed authority, some sort of prop to these leaders. One of the members, Zia Goek Alp, professor of sociology in the University, and a sort of prophet of Turkish nationalism, was a very important man on account of the currents of intellectual discussion and social change which he had been instrumental in creating. His work will be spoken of in another chapter.

Theoretically, the sole purpose of the General Council was to maintain touch with the various branches of the party and prepare the program of the annual congress. In practice, the various members, drawing regular salaries, had arrived at a perfect division of labor and acted much as if they were ministers, the difference being that they were more influential than most ministers. Appointments to important offices were made by the Council; and state functionaries of every description found it more advantageous to take important and urgent business to the Council, instead of the regular government departments.

Kemal, or "Kara the Black."

Along with the Council, there was a political chieftain, Kemal Bey by name, whom everybody had to reckon with, for he was believed to represent a real force in war-time. Kemal, nicknamed "Kara"—"the Black"—partly because of his dark complexion, and partly because of the mystery surrounding him, was the political boss of the local party organization in Constantinople. He represented the most radical section of it, and had about him a large number of followers, minor politicians blindly devoted to him either from party-mindedness or from self-interest. With the help of this well-disciplined force, which looked to him for rewards and dreaded his anger, he got into touch with the various guilds. If some small division of any form of trade or labor was not organized as a guild, his

men would take the initiative and do it. His main strength lay in a large and primitive following, most of them rough fellows from the eastern provinces who, driven from home by the unbearable rural conditions there, were trying to make a temporary living in Constantinople as street porters. Kemal Bey had succeeded in giving the country's leaders the impression that at any time he could organize a revolt against them, with the help of these wild elements, so obedient to him. He gained by degrees first the position of food dictator, and then that of arbitrary regulator of the whole economic life of Constantinople.

His influence on the business world was contested by a rival, who for his part believed that by availing himself of the War, he could center in himself the economic life of all Turkey. He was Ismail Hakki Pasha, the General Director of the Commissariat. His power and influence emanated from the confidence Enver Pasha had in him, and from his capacity for handling the huge machinery of army supply, transport, factories, and railway construction. Not content with this work, he also insisted on managing national business that had nothing to do with the War. As for war business, Kemal and Ismail Hakki carried on a constant struggle for the absolute control of it. They possessed it in turn, they made and unmade fortunes, and they rewarded those who could be useful to them by giving them opportunities to profiteer. As both were strongly backed, in various ways, they never contrived to defeat each other out and out, and secure any lasting control.

There were other minor political bosses and other groups which were, in their particular fields, ceaselessly struggling to attain various ends and advantages. There were also certain honest idealists who sought to debar petty private interests and personal greed for power from political life, insisting that the sacrifices imposed by the War should be shared by everybody. This latter idea little appealed to the ruling classes. Most of them had no personal experience of the hardships imposed by the War, and believed themselves entitled to special privileges in view of their position. Very little sincere and spontaneous interest was shown in the welfare of the people, and new problems created by the War were hardly handled with efficiency and fairness.

During the first period of the War there were few chances openly to criticize misrule and abuses. One man alone stood out from the

beginning as an open opponent of the War and a bitter critic of its abuses. He was Ahmed Riza Bey, a member of the Senate and former president of the Chamber of Deputies. He was the man who, with most persistence, had fought against the autocracy of Abdul-Hamid. In Paris for fifteen years he had published a revolutionary journal *Meshveret*,—"Discussion"—which had been Abdul-Hamid's nightmare. His long association in Paris with French thinkers—he had been a close friend of August Comte and an ardent positivist—had given him a wider intellectual outlook than most of the leaders of the day. At first closely allied with the Young Turks, he had later become their bitter opponent, without associating himself, however, with the organized opposition forces. His utterances in the Senate were never published in the papers. He was considered a dangerous man to be in touch with, and everybody kept aloof from him during the War.

In the Chamber, the Government possessed a united bloc. The Cabinet was blindly supported in plenary sittings, and war abuses totally ignored. Critical opinions were only expressed in secret sittings of the party assembly. When the desire to criticize became too loud and bold, Enver threatened the deputies by letting them know that he could send them collectively to the fighting line as soldiers, by a single motion of his finger. In the latter period of the War, when discontent had become too general and too well justified, government forces themselves thought it wise to let grievances be aired both in Parliament and in the press. A few of the Government's supporters were even asked to form a Socialist party with a view to representing Turkey at international Socialist congresses and thus serve as a bridge of peace, should it become necessary. This party felt obliged to adopt a Socialist tone in the Chamber and to insist on the principle of peace. A general criticism of abuses was also more and more tolerated. The Chamber began to have lively sittings when discussing shortcomings in the handling of food, and abuses at large in public life. The accounts of such sittings were published in the papers. Toward the end of the War, Fethi Bey, Turkish minister in Sofia and a secretary general of the Committee of Union and Progress in early days, resigned from his position, was elected a deputy in a by-election in Constantinople, and organized the party of "Moderate Liberals" as a real opposition.

The press censorship was very rigorous at first. The papers often

contained nothing but the official *communiqué* upon the Turkish military situation, and filled their pages, which had been reduced to one-third of their ordinary size by the shortage of paper, with editorials or general war news from German and Austrian sources. News of Turkish defeats and their consequences were sometimes kept secret for months. From 1917 on, a mild criticism of economic abuses was tolerated. On June 11, 1918, military censorship was altogether abolished. Papers could publish anything under their own responsibility. No longer had anyone authority to see proofs before publication. A military censor was merely at the disposal of the journalists to answer inquiries as to whether some item of war news was or was not a war secret.

The "Outside Places."

In the provinces, the Government's power was not the same everywhere. The bonds between the center and the "outside places" as the provinces were called, had become very loose. All depended on the personal influence which the governor enjoyed within the party hierarchy. Nobody dared to interfere with the activity of an old and important member of the party. The situation in Smyrna was a very remarkable example of this. Rahmi Bey, its governor, was considered a party leader of the first class; and, as a governor, he felt free almost totally to ignore the existence of the War. He carried out, in his territory, only such general war measures as he saw fit. Enemy citizens were not interned in Smyrna; on the contrary, they were offered facilities to continue doing business. Military requisitions were refused authority, general measures regarding the distribution of food ignored, deportations of non-Turks were not made, and government inspectors were not admitted to the Smyrna territory. Indeed it was more like some neutral neighbor State than a province of Turkey. Djemal Pasha ruled in the same independent way in Syria. Other governors could not assert this degree of independence of action; but there were many cases of independence proportionate to the political influence of the governor. In general, there was bitter conflict between the military and civilian authorities. The military were for arbitrary seizure of all resources for army purposes. The civilians stood frequently for the defense of the rights of the civil population, and for regard for the possibilities of future produc-

tion. Success in these struggles also depended on the personal influence of the governor.

General laws were so much ignored by influential governors in the provinces, and the Government was so powerless to impose its will on individual governors, that the Ministry of the Interior felt the need of issuing, on October 20, 1916, the following general warning to all governors. "The Government stands for a strict application of laws. Many officials are indulging in lawless acts. The right of property is interfered with in many arbitrary ways, in violation of the existing laws. The personal freedom of the citizen is violated in many places in incredible fashion. In some provinces taxes are raised and popular subscriptions opened in violation of the constitution. As the Government conceives of the constitutional principle as one demanding an equal and strict application of laws, it has resolved, with this in view, to break down all obstacles in its way. Officials, whether great or small, who are found guilty of violations of the laws will be dealt with energetically. And, in the case of all, this is the final warning."

But this warning was not of much effect. On the contrary, chaos assumed larger proportions the longer the War went on.

CHAPTER IX
THE GENERAL ECONOMIC POLICY DURING
THE WAR

Militarism Gone Mad.

TURKEY was less prepared than any of the belligerents to face the economic consequences of a general war of long duration. This was, however, not realized, not even thought of, by the military authorities when they mobilized the resources of the country, first for so-called armed neutrality, and then for the War. Any mention of economic considerations was looked upon by them as a sort of dangerous sentimentalism. Their point of view was this: A world war of such vast extent could not last more than a few weeks. It would be decided by the first great battle. Turkey being handicapped by lack of roads, means of transport, and industrial resources, everything available must be devoted lavishly and urgently to immediate military purposes. Even if this indiscriminate activity should be injurious to her economic life, such injury could easily be repaired after a victorious war. This manner of looking at things caused those in power blindly to waste the country's existing resources, and to refuse to make any sort of provision for the future. This proved a suicidal policy, as it soon became clear that the War would not end within a few weeks or months.

Nor was this reckless waste of economic resources in any proportion to real military needs. The leading military authorities seemed to be touched by some mania for asserting their power in spite of every obstacle, and in opposition to every consideration which had not, in their mind, a purely military character. The order of mobilization, issued on August 2, 1914, called upon all men between twenty and forty-five years to appear within three days before the nearest enlistments authority, supplied with three days' food. No exceptions were made. Even disabled men had to answer the general call, and have their disability established by a medical examination. This measure, which looked on paper like extreme speed, meant in reality nothing but chaos for the army, and useless ruin for the country's business. Over a million men who were included in the order rushed to the enlisting centers only to find that the small office

staffs could not handle so large a number in weeks, or even months. The result was that for weeks they could do nothing. Their own food soon ran out. As they had not yet become regular soldiers, they could not be given military rations. That is, the hasty and general call to arms meant congestion, misery, hunger, and sickness in all the large cities. Many peasants who came with the best intention of enlisting, deserted before it came their turn to be examined. And as they were later condemned to death by default as deserters, they had no choice but to become outlaws.

The economic consequences of this senseless haste were grave. The harvest of 1914 was exceptionally good everywhere in Turkey. If it could have been gathered as usual, there would have been no famine during the War. It was harvest time in all those regions which supplied the main population centers with food, and the crop was an excellent one. The sudden removal of every able-bodied man and the reckless requisitioning of draft animals made it impossible to reap it. In some districts peasant women were unaccustomed to doing field work. Even urgent necessity could not make them break with social prejudices. For the most part old men, children, and women with varying degrees of experience formed the producing force; and they were deprived to a great extent of their means of production and transportation. Small industries were similarly crippled by the sudden enrolment of soldiers of all classes.

The local military authorities saw the impossibility of carrying out, absolutely, the order of mobilization; but they could not object to it, as any criticism or hesitation had been made punishable by death. Civilian authorities in some provinces, aware of the coming calamity, suggested the gradual call of the various classes in order to alleviate the sudden chaos. Others making similar suggestions were immediately dismissed. And, from this time on, the military and civilian authorities formed two opposing parties. The civilians tried to bring military exigencies of the moment as far as possible into harmony with the permanent requirements of economic life and the interests of the general public. The military authorities, generally speaking, refused to think of the consequences their extravagant policy would have for the army itself. The interests, even the lives, of the people, and ordinary business considerations, did not concern them. A peasant boy, or a woman driving an oxcart, would sometimes be kept waiting on some coming military supplies for weeks

without being given food either for self or beast. No thought of life, health, labor, or the implements of labor, which, sometimes quite unnecessarily, were withheld from field production, could move some of the military authorities to a broader view of the situation. Enver Pasha, the war dictator, dismissed a delegation who besought him to show a more reasonable attitude with the following remark: "We are fighting for our existence. We cannot be expected to think, at so vital a time, of secondary matters like agriculture and commerce."

The effect of this attitude of mind made itself particularly felt because mobilization had interrupted a very hopeful business boom. "The economic prospects of Turkey were never so bright, as on the eve of the World War."¹ The new administration had done away with many former restrictions, and made free development possible. The human losses in the Italian and Balkan Wars had been made good by migrations from former Turkish territories in Europe. Many concessions for mining and for works of public utility had been granted. And, again; "There was a feeling abroad and in the land that an era of exceptional commercial and industrial activity was about to dawn in Turkey. The Ottoman Empire was in a fair way to become modernized according to Western standards."²

The mobilization struck the business life of the country like lightning from the clearest sky. All branches of economic life were affected as much as agriculture. The commissary department of the army proceeded to a general requisitioning. It was not confined to goods of immediate military necessity. Things like silk hosiery for women, boots for children, and printing presses were included in this requisition mania. Merchants were ready to sell every sort of goods at any price to escape it. An additional incentive for selling lay in the urgent need of money to meet the military tax. Certain classes of soldiers were given the opportunity of escaping military service by paying £T30, or about \$135 at the exchange rate of the period. Those who did not pay within two weeks were required to pay twice this sum later on. As a consequence of the general craze to obtain cash, the weak machinery of credit stopped completely. There was a universal rush to the banks to withdraw deposits. One of the large banks became insolvent. The rest held a general meeting to discuss

¹ Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

² *Ibid.*, p. 238, quoting from American consular reports.

the situation. At their request the Government proclaimed a moratorium for a month, which during the War was prolonged ten times for various periods.

War and Money in Turkey.

The urgent need of money was not confined to large population centers like Constantinople. Its most manifest sign in the provincial towns was the selling of large gold coins of the normal value of £T5, or \$22, for £T4.5, or \$20. These coins could command, in ordinary times, about one dollar more than their gold value, because they were in great demand, and they fitted into the customary money-saving methods of large sections of the population. It was the general habit to change small savings into these big gold coins and have them worn by one's wife or daughter as an undeniable sign of wealth. The mobilization obliged so many people to change them into smaller coins that they suffered a loss of more than one-tenth of their gold value.

A similar fall occurred in the prices of all commodities. Although a state of war would normally tend to raise prices, the first effect was a general decline in centers of production. The reason was quite obvious. There was no possibility of moving commodities. The rail-ways were reserved for military supplies. All the lesser means of transportation were similarly requisitioned. One could not even send one's goods to the nearest market. Everybody was eager to sell, not knowing what the future had in store. And this was helped on by speculators who were eagerly buying without letting people see how eager they were.

The fall in the price of export articles was especially heavy. From the time of mobilization on, commercial relations with the outside world virtually ceased. Although Turkish harbors were not officially blockaded, only a very few neutral ships came to them. Entente vessels, alarmed by the temporary closing of the Straits for the laying of mines, and by the general attitude of Turkey, tried to escape from Turkish waters as quickly as possible. As internal transport had also entirely ceased, opium, for instance, fell within a few days from 300 piasters to 90 piasters, and mohair from 20 to 8.

While prices were falling in the production centers, large consumption centers like Constantinople were experiencing a state of panic, and a sudden rise in the price of primary necessities. Al-

though Constantinople had, in general, breadstuffs enough for the next two or three months, and immediate danger did not exist, people became panic-stricken and tried to get as many loaves of bread and sacks of flour as possible. As a result one had to wait for hours before bakeries to get a single loaf. Large quantities of bread or flour, if seen in the streets, ran the risk of being seized by the mob just as in times of famine. A special court martial was instituted to punish those who tried to get more bread than they actually needed, and to deal with those who violated municipal and police regulations regarding foodstuffs, and spread alarming news.

The Government of the Ottoman Empire was above all one of the City of Constantinople. It usually devoted more attention to minor problems of the capital than to the important needs of the whole Empire. The alarming food outlook in Constantinople gave rise to long lists of government measures and regulations. These will be dealt with in a special chapter.

The scarcity of means of transport for intercourse both with the interior and with foreign countries, caused general restrictions to be laid down, which were accompanied by a sanctioned system of favoritism in business. This abnormal "war trade" and its various results will also be taken up in another chapter.

The general attitude of the Government toward the economic problems created by the War was one of helplessness. Whenever things became too alarming some violent, impulsive course was followed. It generally lasted only a few weeks; and sometimes, its impracticability becoming too apparent, it was supplanted by another experiment. All such experimenting, too, was done in the dark, and without any knowledge of the actual facts. At times examples set by Germany were imitated in an imperfect way; on other occasions the most perfect system was devised on paper without any thought as to the means and ways of carrying it out.

Actual power to deal with economic problems was centralized in the hands of two or three men, who were bitter rivals. All took advantage of the abnormal situation to gain as much power as possible. The other leaders did not dwell on the problems created directly by the War. They took the general sufferings and privations on the one hand, and extravagance and the accumulation of wealth on the other, as natural outgrowths of the War, complicated in Turkey by great deficiencies in production and transportation. In

order to distract attention from difficulties which they believed it impossible to solve, the government authorities went to excess in the consideration they gave to projects and economic problems that would come up after the War. So outstanding and in such contrast was this neglect of the present and concern for the future that the Senate declared, in its reply to the message of the Sultan, read at the beginning of the session of 1917-1918, that the Government would do well to "put aside post-war economic measures and try to mitigate the grave consequences of the food shortage."

As a matter of fact, some real activity was displayed during the War in the formulation of an "economic policy" and in rendering a business life attractive for the Turks. What was called an "economic policy" certainly had some specific general aims, but was very vague and haphazard as to the best ways of arriving at them. Its chief purpose was to achieve full economic independence, to Turkify business life, and to develop the economic resources of the country. In the program read by the new Talaat Pasha cabinet before Parliament on February 16, 1917, the method of development to be followed was defined as "a coöperation of Western knowledge and capital with Turkish labor and capital." But this whole "economic policy" did not go beyond a mere desire for the development of the country. Actual conditions had never been investigated, and the exact steps to be followed were also ignored.

Yousouf Aktchora Bey, one of the leaders of the Pan-Turkish movement, expresses the following opinion as to the attitude of mind existing in Turkey in regard to an economic policy.⁸ "The present-day world keeps always to the facts, it takes a constructive and objective view of economic problems. *We* readily believe that a simple economic measure can produce results similar to those improbable effects which we meet in the old myths."

The End of the Capitulations.

The romantic view of economic things inspired the leaders with endless optimism as to the possibilities of the future. Their confidence was mainly based on the abolition of the Capitulations which had given foreigners a privileged position. Turks could hardly com-

⁸ *Politics and Economics*, p. 121; Constantinople, 1924. (Addresses made and articles written during and after the War.)

pete with them, for foreigners were free from certain taxes, enjoyed the special protection of their embassies, and were not in any real way within the jurisdiction of Turkish courts. In many cases the consular courts were directly competent. Turkey, as a state, was deprived of certain sovereign rights, as far as economic matters were concerned. She could not change her customs tariff from one that was uniform and *ad valorem* to a tariff that was differentiated and specific, without the permission of the Powers. A consent of all the Great Powers was necessary to raise the general rate of the *ad valorem* duty. Such permissions were usually withheld. If one of the Powers did give its consent, it gave it in return for special concessions and on the understanding that the other Powers also consented.

Another result of the Capitulations system had also constituted a grievance for both Government and people. The public utility companies and banks established in Turkey with foreign capital would only employ foreigners and non-Turks. Mohammedan Turks were debarred, as a matter of principle, from technical and clerical services. They might only be employed as laborers.

The war Government in Turkey immediately took advantage of the freedom of action created by the War in order to correct some of the old economic wrongs. To begin with, a law dealing with the status of foreigners in Turkey abolished all the old privileges and established perfect equality of taxation. The *ad valorem* customs tariff was totally done away with; and on March 3, 1916, the first differentiated and specific tariff went into effect. It was based on the idea of protecting foodstuffs produced in Turkey, as well as local products like cement and simple textiles. On the other hand, agricultural implements and certain other sorts of machinery used in production were entirely exempted from duty. The first tariff was to remain in force for three years, as an experiment. Its publication gave birth to enthusiastic outbursts of patriotism. Papers pointed out that Turkey, although an agricultural country, was importing foodstuffs to a value of millions of pounds and that the protection of agriculture was a pressing necessity.

An aggressive nationalism developed during the War as a reaction against pre-war economic privileges accorded to foreigners. The slogan "Turkey for the Turks" included all opportunities to earn money in Turkey and during the War it was aimed largely at

the Germans. A very acute suspicion of German post-war designs was dominant in all minds. The Germans in general acted very cautiously in order to take the edge off Turkish distrust. In interested circles in Germany great hope was built on the prospects of a German monopoly in the exploitation of resources. Some imperialistic writers had definite suggestions for a German colonization of Asia Minor. They were generally induced to keep silent; and German activity seemed to be confined to a very thorough and manifold investigation of Turkish economic problems. Certain German writers wrote pamphlets and articles intended for the Turkish public, pointing out that the Germans only wished to cooperate on equal terms, that a German migration on a large scale was not intended, and that Germany desired as an ally not a Turkey in the position of Egypt, but an economically independent state, mindful of its own national interests. They repeated on every occasion that Turkey should remain really Turkish, not German, nor even Turco-German.

"Economic Turkism."

These new ideas of "economic Turkism" provided for the creation of a Turkish commercial class. The experiments made for this purpose in connection with the food problem and war commerce will be pointed out in the next two chapters. During the War some additional steps were taken in this direction by inducing public utility companies with foreign capital, organized legally as Turkish companies, to employ a large number of Turks, and by giving a large number of young men opportunities to prepare for a business and technical career.

A special law, called "the Language Law," enacted on March 24, 1916, made it compulsory after July 10 of the same year for all companies possessing concessions of any sort to keep their correspondence, their books, and carry on their current business entirely in Turkish. This meant, of course, the potential employment of many Turks. This measure, as also one calling for the compulsory teaching of Turkish, including Turkish history and geography, in foreign schools, and an order making the use of Turkish compulsory on signboards, caused a great deal of perturbation in foreign circles.

Special interest in vocational training was considered a natural consequence of the policy of economic Turkification. Particular

pains were taken to reform the schools of arts and crafts, the professional colleges for men, and the few vocational schools for women. The boys sent to Germany included not merely regular students, but apprentices who were to receive practical training as skilled workers. Orphanages also had courses for artisans of every variety. A school for training Turkish railwaymen was opened in Smyrna. The idea was to conquer fields of activity monopolized by non-Turks. Furthermore, there was urgent need of filling the gaps created by the deportation of skilled workers. Owing to the blockade and the necessity of substituting goods of native manufacture for former imports, the lack of skilled labor was badly felt. In addition to current needs, the development of war factories and projects for rapidly industrializing the country by a system of strict protection made necessary the training of a new artisan class. War undoubtedly made for a certain rapid success in this connection. The efforts of the Government, in conjunction with the high wages paid skilled labor, were instrumental in largely increasing the supply of it.

The projects of industrialization, as well as the huge war losses, brought the population problem to the fore. Although the population of Turkey had been decreasing for centuries, the question had never aroused the general interest of the public. In an environment where too individualistic a view was generally taken of the struggle for life, where interdependence of interests and coöperation of every sort were in their infancy, the totals and the density of population could not possibly attract genuine interest as economic factors which influenced both the development of the country, and individual well-being. Previous to the War, the question of population had only two sides; military strength, and the various ratios of the racial elements involved.

During the War, the economic side of the question of population was widely discussed in lecture courses and in articles in newspapers and reviews; and general discussions were stimulated among readers. The deplorable situation of the country in this regard was pointed out in all its naked truth. Indeed, this was in such contrast to the fantastic view taken at times of the strength of the country, solely for the purposes of war propaganda, that in 1916 the censorship prohibited similar discussion, at least in daily papers. They were resumed in June, 1918, when the pre-publication censorship was discarded. Aroused by these discussions, the war dictator began to

form fanciful projects for rapidly increasing the population. They never took any positive form.

In connection with its economic policy, the measures actually taken by the Government included the employment of foreign economic experts and professors, the reorganization of the Agricultural Bank, the establishment of the Bank of National Credit, the creation, in all provinces, of a new office, that of commercial director, the standardization of the currency by a special law, and the extension of "the Law for Encouraging Industry," passed in 1909.

Among the new foreign experts there was one for education (German), one for commerce (German), several for agriculture (German), one for forestry (Austrian), one for general statistics (German), and one for industrial statistics (Hungarian). A German was made director-general of the Agricultural Bank. And a large proportion of the German professors at the University were giving various courses in economics.

The Law for Encouraging Industry, revised, on March 27, 1915, contained the following stipulations:

1. All employees and laborers in factories, with the exception of technical experts not to be found in the country, must be Turkish citizens.

2. Every new factory shall receive a free grant of, roughly, 5,000 square meters from the state, and shall also be granted freedom from taxation for fifteen years, free permits for construction, free entry for machinery, tools, and raw materials not obtainable in the country, and freedom from export duties and other taxes on exports.

3. Foreign individuals and companies must gradually be excluded from the privileges granted by the above law, unless the Government has given them special pledges as embodied in concessions.

The Bank of National Credit was established on January 1, 1917, with a capital of £T4,000,000 divided into 400,000 shares. The Government obligated itself to take 50,000 shares, and all shares not taken by popular subscription by February 28. This Bank was not at once to take the place of the Ottoman Bank as a state bank; but it was intended to do so some day, in order to save the country from the tutelage of foreign capital. As this bank was also held to be one of the instruments of the new Nationalist economic policy, it was given many privileges, including the right to develop the famous Arghana copper mine.

War-Time Production.

It is hardly possible to measure statistically the general economic effects of the War in Turkey. Imports and exports having taken place mostly through military channels, no statistics are available. The various figures published during the War upon agricultural production are all biased. They sought to convey the idea that the special measures taken by the Government were instrumental in raising production, and that all fears were groundless, whereas production actually continued to decrease during the War. Correct statistical data are available only for the special products upon which duties were raised by the administration of the international Public Debt and Tobacco Régie, and a few other products like cotton, figs, and coal. The production of silk cocoons, about 4,114,000 kilograms in 1888, and 18,238,000 kilograms in 1908, fell in 1914 to 2,530,477. In 1915 it was 932,211, in 1916, 1,356,200, in 1917, 109,978, and in 1918, 790,806 kilograms.

The average salt production for the five pre-war years was 350,000,000 kilograms. It was 209,320,733 in 1914, 153,624,387 in 1915, 159,215,903 in 1915, 140,875,547 in 1917, and 163,606,677 in 1918.

A remarkable increase was noticed in the revenue derived by the Public Debt Administration from the fisheries of Constantinople. The receipts, £T48,000 in pre-war years, were 67,318 in 1914, 50,732 in 1915, 94,633 in 1916, 355,805 in 1917 and 600,690 in 1918. This large increase was due partly to the importance which fishing came to have as a result of the general food shortage, and partly to an unusual abundance of fish.

Tobacco production, 55,306,905 kilograms in 1914, decreased to 43,869,768 in 1914 and to 13,872,008 in 1915, was 14,912,257 in 1916, 17,037,513 in 1917, and 21,041,496 in 1918.

Cotton, 24,000,000 kilograms in 1913, increased to 27,000,000 in 1914, decreased to 3,000,000 in 1915 and to 2,000,000 in 1916, remained at 2,000,000 in 1917, and was 3,000,000 in 1918.

The yield of Smyrna figs was 28,000 tons in 1910, 20,900 in 1913, 17,600 in 1914, 15,400 in 1915, 19,800 in 1916, 15,400 in 1917, and 17,600 in 1918.

Coal production, 826,000 tons in 1913, decreased to 651,240 in 1914, to 420,317 in 1915, to 408,203 in 1916, to 146,000 in 1917,

and was 186,000 in 1918. The great decrease in the last two war years was due to the destruction of the loading apparatus in the harbor of Zonguldak by the Russian fleet.

Among alcoholic beverages, the production of wine decreased from 12,500,250 kilograms in 1914 to 3,886,065, in 1915; it was 7,861,934 in 1916 and 6,394,345 in 1917. On the other hand, the production of rakki, which is the ordinary native beverage, increased. It was 2,860,477 kilograms in 1914, 2,130,192 in 1915, 5,243,358 in 1916, and 4,589,920 in 1917. The production of raw alcohol, only 386 kilograms in 1914, owing to strong foreign competition, rose to 21,463 in 1915, to 75,405 in 1916, and to 965,336 in 1917. For beer the figures were 7,598,330 kilograms in 1914, 6,518,288 in 1915, 5,106,706 in 1916, 2,076,231 in 1917, and 4,277,881 in 1918.

CHAPTER X

THE FOOD QUESTION

Feeding Constantinople.

ALTHOUGH Turkey was rated as an agricultural country, she was, as a whole, unable to feed herself in normal years. She was dependent on foreign countries for a varying percentage of her consumption of wheat and flour.

This was due mainly to Constantinople's being so large a consuming center. All the other big cities combined did not offer difficulties so great as those offered by Constantinople alone.

Most of the agricultural sections of Turkey had always produced just enough for their local needs, and kept supplies buried in special underground storing places to be used in case of years of famine. A year of abundance was a calamity for regions lacking transport facilities, for it reduced prices without creating new markets for the surplus. In some years, wheat was so low that it did not pay to take it to the nearest market. Prices and production in such places had no influence on the national market formed by the provinces that were linked together by railway. In these provinces the hinterland usually supplied the coast towns, and in good years exported some wheat and oats of good quality.

Constantinople was, in reality, the only place which could not get a sufficient supply from the hinterland. Its daily requirements, with those of the large military formations quartered there, amounted to thirty-five or forty carloads. Thrace and the provinces of Eski-Shehir, Angora, Konia, Broussa, Smyrna, and Adana, which usually met most of the capital's breadstuff needs, could produce the whole of it, when the capacity of the one-track railway admitted of it, and certain other handicaps did not exist. The cost of production was too high in Turkey to compete at all times with foreign imports. The customs duty of 11 per cent *ad valorem*, uniformly applied to all imports, had not constituted a measure of protection. The existing small mills had not been able to compete with the foreign milling industry. And the result was that only four times in the twenty-five years before the War had Constantinople been able to obtain an adequate supply of food from the interior. One-fourth to

one-third of its breadstuffs had usually to be imported, generally in the form of flour. Of this amount 50 per cent came from France, 20 from Russia, 15 from Italy, and 15 from Rumania and Bulgaria. The flour from Italy and France was white, but had not much food value, being a by-product of the macaroni and semolina factories. That of the highest quality came from Russia and Rumania, and more rarely from America; that of the next quality came from Bulgaria. Of the unmilled wheat, Rumania furnished 40 per cent, Russia 35 per cent, and Bulgaria 25 per cent.

The price of wheat in Constantinople, under the influence of both home and foreign markets, fluctuated in normal times between 39 paras and 44, or from 4.37 to 4.82 cents an okka, the okka weighing 2.755 lbs. The differences in prices between home markets lay in the cost of transport, wharfage, commissions, insurance, and bank charges. All these expenses made a total difference of about one-fourth between Constantinople and the Eski-Shehir area.

The wars prior to the World War had not produced great differences in price. The war with Italy in Tripoli produced a brief market crisis known as the "Italian crisis," the banks having suddenly cut off credits. But food prices were not affected except in the actual war zone. During the Balkan War, communications between the interior and the coast were not interrupted. Requisition orders, however, at times caused price increases of 10 or 15 per cent.

At the beginning of the World War, the food situation in Turkey was not bad. The crop of 1913-1914 was not of the best, but the large stocks of the exceptional crop of 1912-1913 which had remained unsold, made up for that. In the interior a surplus everywhere awaited transportation to the coast towns. Even the peasants living near the railways had followed old customs and preserved a stock in their primitive underground storing places which would keep them alive for at least a year, and also suffice for next year's seeding.

The seizing of all means of transport by the Government caused prices in the interior to fall by about half a cent an okka. On the other hand Constantinople, cut off from communication with the interior, was seized by a foolish panic. The city was provided with grain for approximately the next two months. And, as Turkey had only mobilized and not actually entered, the War, at least a certain amount of breadstuffs could be obtained from Rumania.

Faced by the alarm in the capital, the Government began to put into force its first measures for meeting the food difficulty. At the sitting of the Cabinet, held on August 9, 1914, a special commission composed of the Ministers of War, the Interior, and Finance was entrusted with the task "of providing for the needs of the army and the people."

Government Control and Turkish Coöperatives.

This first step was followed by many other government measures for the supply of foodstuffs. But the restrictions imposed by the War were not compensated for by policies of efficiency, economy, wise distribution, just rationing, increase of production, and the provision of supplies for a long state of war. The unbelievable mismanagement of the food problem hardly constituted an improvement on the existing possibilities. On the contrary, the interference of the Government, its constant changes of method, and its protection of profiteering and blind experimentation were among the main causes of the general sufferings during the War. The trouble was not actual food shortage; it was bad distribution, coupled with unnecessary waste, and a monopoly that for the most part served private interests.

Even before the War, Kemal Bey, the influential member of the Union and Progress party who had made up his mind to become an economic dictator, had started an economic movement which aimed to organize both associations of small industries and workers, and coöperative societies among Turkish consumers. This movement had partly personal, partly partisan, and partly nationalist motives. It aimed at the Turkification of business life under the personal influence of Kemal Bey.

The crisis in transport matters and the chaos created by the food shortage in Constantinople gave the new economic organization an opportunity to step in. It formed the bakers' syndicate to handle the bread question. The bakers themselves had no influence on this syndicate. It was run by Kemal Bey through a secretary he appointed. In addition to the private profit made by the bakers, the syndicate tried to accumulate some capital of its own by the sale of bread. The chief difficulties were met by raising prices and lowering the quality.

The syndicate was not able to regulate the distribution of bread.

The Government did not enter upon any sort of strict rationing at the time of the mobilization. The municipality distributed the flour among the bakeries, calculating how many loaves could be made from one sack of flour and giving out the minimum necessary for each district. The police tried to limit everybody's share by allowing no one to buy more than one loaf at a time. It was a very arbitrary and superficial control, which did not keep the overcautious from buying more than they needed, and compelled others to wait for hours in vain before the bakeries. There were cases, from time to time, of such shops being pillaged by the mob.

One of the chief sources of difficulty was the transport problem. Ismail Hakki Pasha, the powerful head of the commissariat, refused to take account of considerations which did not directly concern the army. He requisitioned some of the mills in Constantinople, monopolized railway transports, and was capable at any moment of requisitioning stocks of goods meant to furnish Constantinople with the necessaries of life. Under the pressure, however, of civilian elements in the Government, he consented, a few weeks after mobilization, to permit first forty and later fifty carloads of supplies, when supplies were obtainable, to reach the civilian population and the commercial world.

Although the means of transport were so limited, the available means could not be proportioned according to the primary needs of the people. Any influential man could, at the expense of food transportation, obtain freight cars for commodities of no value to the public weal. Of breadstuffs alone Constantinople required twenty-three carloads a day, if the 1.28 kilo loaf was to be shared among three people per diem, and eighteen carloads if it was to be the daily allowance for four people. The supplies from Rumania, though abundant were irregular, and largely destined for the army. The cereal trade and all mills not requisitioned were mostly in the hands of Greeks, who were inclined to make things as difficult as possible.

Attempts of the municipality to regulate the breadstuff question proved a failure. First the Chamber of Commerce, and then the governor of the province of Constantinople was given the task of allotting the available carloads from the viewpoint of public interest. Both experiments entirely failed, because private interests always proved to be the stronger.

Kemal Made Food Dictator.

The municipality, having been too inefficient in the distribution of food, having taken no due account of the war situation, and having displayed a lack of foresight, and laid up stocks insufficient for the future, the Government felt it necessary to intervene. On January 20, 1915, an agreement was concluded between Talaat, the Minister of the Interior, and Kemal, the would-be food dictator, which gave the latter absolute control over food distribution. The stipulations were the following:

1. Kemal Bey was to have unrestricted authority in all food problems. No interference from any side was to be permitted. And no question of responsibility was to be raised by taking advantage of the letter of existing laws.

2. He was to be guaranteed a daily minimum of twenty-three car-loads of wheat or flour for Constantinople.

3. He was authorized to seize all mills.

4. He was to receive some initial capital from the city of Constantinople and from the secret funds of the Ministry of the Interior.

Officially the task of victualing Constantinople was entrusted to the municipality, but its execution was in the hands of Kemal Bey as the head of the "Esnaf-Djemietî" or "tradesmen's union," which had no real existence. In order that the municipality might not try really to play its nominal rôle, one of the followers of the food dictator was appointed mayor of the city.

The system used was this: The grain merchants bought cereals in the outlying markets and sold them to the unofficial administrative food monopoly. Freight cars were given them in which to bring in the grain. The trade in cereals being entirely in the hands of non-Turks—for the most part Greeks—the opportunity offered by the monopoly was taken advantage of to create a set of Turkish merchants. In many cases influential politicians acted as men of straw for non-Turkish merchants. The monopoly was little interested in the actual feeding of the people in war-time. The possibilities of future trade that could be Turkified and considerations of personal and party interest were more predominant. The intermediaries were made to earn a great deal of money from the food they supplied; and the organization itself was accumulating a large capital with a

view to creating commercial monopolies after the War. As a consequence, a poor quality of official war bread consisting mostly of maize was sold at a constantly increasing price. In order to keep this bread within reasonable price limits, the State had to grant subsidies. Although railway transport was a monopoly, the trade in cereals was free. Luxury bread, made largely from wheat obtained by illicit methods, was sold at exorbitant prices. This made well-to-do people independent of official food distributions. A special bakery was kept busy all through the War preparing first-quality bread for cabinet members, high officials, and influential politicians. It was sold, at the expense of the State, at the price of war bread, although it cost much more to produce it.

The terrible food conditions in themselves caused deep discontent. In addition, the inequality of the war burden, the official profiteering, and the creation of a wealthy class who had been enriched not by their own intelligence, but by official appointment, increased the general feeling of revolt.

On November 18, 1915, a special commission composed of the Ministers of War and the Interior, Finance and Commerce, prepared to adopt measures "to meet the primary and secondary needs of the provinces." The Ministers had been forced to conclude that the critical situation had been produced by the lack of confidence created by requisitions contravening the explicit regulations governing the trade in, and the transport of food supplies. All business threatened to stop entirely. The government machinery, largely employing inexperienced traders, was not able to regulate the food supplies of Constantinople's population which in war-time numbered with all the refugees, a million souls.

In consideration of these conditions, the following measures were adopted: The transportation of every sort of supplies was made free. That is, no permit was necessary. Since the European railways were assigned to the service of supplies for the army of the Dardanelles, no commercial freight could as yet be allowed on them. Any cars carrying civilian supplies were immediately to be seized. But shipments to Constantinople from any other direction were not to be interfered with. There were to be no requisitions. And the ministerial commission was prepared to listen to complaints.

This liberal policy was of short duration. Already, on November 26, a second ministerial order had been published reducing the num-

ber of freight cars available for the transportation of food other than breadstuffs on the Anatolian railways to two a day, the order further stating that food supplies found in any cars but the above two, which belonged to the municipality, would be requisitioned. No restrictions however, would be put on any other form of food transport.¹

On December 10, 1915, direct railway communication with Austria and Germany was established as a result of the conquest of Serbia. This afforded some relief to the food situation, as it now became possible to obtain sugar in large quantities.

On December 3 there was constituted a commission of primary necessities, which laid down the following rules:

All supplies serving as food for man and beast were to be duty free until the end of the War. There was to be no requisitioning of imports from Rumania by sea, or from Greece by rail. In case of military necessity a customs duty of 30 per cent, in kind, was to be placed on other imports. In every province a commission composed of the governor or lieutenant-governor, two members of the municipal council, and two local merchants was to care for local needs.

One Kind of "Tradesmen's Union."

The strict censorship meanwhile permitted no criticism of the food outlook. The severe attacks made against the Government by a few members of the Senate were not published. No word of criticism could be uttered in an open session of the Chamber. The party congress of 1916 became, however, the scene of violent attacks. The making of the trade in food supplies an illegal monopoly, the entrusting of food distribution to irresponsible interests in which the Government had no part, and the exorbitant profits made were severely criticized. In addition to the large gains made by individuals, a net profit of about \$1,200,000 was admitted to have been made by the "tradesmen's union" on the bread of Constantinople alone. A further profit of \$1,500,000 had also been made on other necessities of life; and as much more was added by a successful deal in wool, the wool being sold to the army at thirteen times its purchase price.

After long arguments the private interests proved to be master of the situation. The following compromise was adopted: The party

¹ At that time motor transport hardly existed in Turkey, outside of the army; and all beasts of burden had been requisitioned for military purposes.

congress declared the money to have been rightfully earned by the promoters of the "union" and to belong to them personally. They, for their part, consented to make a series of endowments with the money "for the purpose of bettering national commerce and industry." A bank and several business institutions were to be founded with this end. Some prominent members of the party were designated in the charters of the foundations as donors and directors. The whole arrangement meant of course the continuation of monopolistic trade in food in an extended and sanctioned form.

The German System at Work.

After thirteen months of this unhappy experiment with irresponsible men and methods, the municipality of Constantinople was again entrusted with the official distribution of food. The chief opponent of Kemal Bey's system was appointed mayor. For some time the public interest became the real concern of the food administration. The German system of food distribution, that of equality in privation, was tried. Profiteers were not protected; on the contrary, they were severely prosecuted. The "tradesmen's unions" were forbidden to interfere with the food problem. They continued to exist as private business organizations which still secured great commercial advantages owing to the political influence of their promoter; and the Association of National Defense, of which the former mayor was president, was no longer allowed to have charge of bread distribution.

But this sweeping victory of public over private interest could not be pleasant to the profiteers. They continued to intrigue against the mayor. Most of the government leaders found him needlessly strict, and were inclined to tolerate some degree of profiteering for the benefit of unduly insistent political friends. Ismail Hakki Pasha, as the administrator of the commissariat, had been finding the methods of the new mayor an obstacle to his arbitrary control of food supplies. After a keen struggle between the two had gone on for some time, the army leader got rid of his rival by simply requisitioning all supplies destined for the civilian population of Constantinople. This action was clearly against all existing regulations and was certainly meant as a challenge to the civilians. But, as the war dictator took sides with the head of the commissariat, the civilian authorities did not dare to protect the mayor. His resignation

was readily accepted, and a man was made mayor who could be expected to look with favor on arbitrary methods of handling war affairs.²

The situation was not found an easy one by the new administrators. Enemy submarines in the Sea of Marmora were rendering the victualing of Constantinople by sea most difficult. Arbitrary methods and changing experiments carried with them a great element of waste. And since the general harvest of 1915 had surpassed all expectations, the sufferings of the people were far greater than any dearth of supplies and the means of transport could account for.

The growing scarcity of food forced the Government on April 19, 1916, to make public a provisional law³ which authorized the mayor of Constantinople and the governors of provinces:

1. To proceed, in case of necessity, to the seizure of mills, bakeries, means of transport, and factories, under the guaranty of a reasonable indemnity.
2. To fix, in case of necessity, maximum prices for foodstuffs and other articles of primary necessity.
3. To prescribe the method by which food should be distributed.

As these measures did not prove to be sufficiently effective, a further provisional law of July 23, 1916, created a Food Board under the presidency of the Minister of the Interior, and including "the head of the army commissariat, the undersecretaries of State, of Finance and Commerce, the director general of the Bank of Agriculture and other competent persons whom the Minister might designate." The new Board was to receive a loan of £T3,000,000, or, at the rate of exchange of the time, about \$5,000,000, as its initial capital. All distinctions between military and civilian food supply were entirely to disappear. The Board could at any time establish a monopoly of trade. The country was to be divided into zones between which interchanges of foodstuffs for commercial purposes were to be forbidden. And the Board was to be managed by two German experts.

These new measures, however, were not to the taste of the flour-

² In accordance with the example afforded by the municipal system of Paris, the mayor of Constantinople is not elected, but appointed.

³ The term given during the War to legal measures which were enacted without having been submitted to Parliament.

ishing "war traders," and, upon their insistent demand, the spirit of the whole measure was changed by the declaration that "the export of any foodstuff from one zone to another for commercial purposes would be forbidden only if the foodstuff in question was abnormally scarce in the first zone." Again, private interests had defeated an initiative inspired by public interest.

The "Outside Places" Also Suffer.

During the first year of the War, only Constantinople suffered seriously from lack of food. Most of the provinces were abundantly supplied. Prices even fell in some areas on account of the impossibility of transport. Then conditions began gradually to grow bad owing to the calling of new classes to the colors, the requisitioning of farm stock, crops, and seed grain, the influx of refugees from the area occupied by the Russians, and the general waste and lack of foresight in the administration. In Syria and Palestine a serious famine was caused in 1915 by a plague of locusts. On February 24, 1918, the Government obtained an advance of £T500,000 from the Chamber in order to assist localities which could not furnish their own food. A special fund of £T250,000 was advanced in Syria. In addition, the army stationed in Syria was authorized to spend several hundred thousand pounds in relieving the famine. But such money grants, and other measures taken in Syria by the army command and civil governors, could hardly produce any lasting relief. An appeal for assistance was made to Mr. Wilson and the Pope. It was suggested that enemy subjects, as well as neutrals, should control the distribution of the provisions to be sent, and see that the army should not benefit. This appeal had only one result,—the blockade of the Syrian coast became more drastic.

In addition to coping with these calamities, the Government had to supply the nomad tribes with food, not because they were suffering, but merely for political reasons. The British authorities were furnishing them with foodstuffs sufficient for their upkeep, at pre-war prices. The Turkish authorities felt the need of doing the same thing.

A Drive for "War Agriculture."

When facing the whole critical situation, the Government at last became aware that something had to be done to increase produc-

tion. The German leaders also began to see their mistake in having been willing merely to look on while so devastating an economic system was doing its work in Turkey, of having even contributed to it with the idea of immediate benefit. A general campaign was engaged in to increase the food resources of the country. A German specialist effectively combatted the locust peril. From the first months of 1916 on, a general movement was got under way, under the name and slogan of "war agriculture." All the organizations depending on the Ministry of Agriculture and the army commissariat began to distribute seeds free of charge, to loan agricultural machinery, to start courses in practical agriculture for the people. The Navy League and the Society for National Defense had a part in similar activities, and, in addition engaged in agriculture on a vast scale. The Turkish Red Crescent, and several banks and commercial associations also became cultivators. Seed potatoes were introduced into some regions for the first time. Newspapers said daily that agricultural production had become a question of national defense, and set aside special columns for practical hints to would-be farmers.

The budget of 1916 contained an appropriation of £T700,000 for seeds, £T400,000 for cattle, £T400,000 for new agricultural machinery, and £T200,000 for the anti-locust campaign.

The Provisional Law of Agricultural Service, promulgated on October 7, 1916, and passed by Parliament in a permanent form, on February 26, 1917, contained the following stipulations:

Article 1. The services of all Turkish citizens, both men and women, who are for any reason exempt from military service and whose regular occupation is farming, may be requisitioned by the Government for a period to be fixed by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Article 2. Those who are not regularly farmers, but for any reason do not serve in the army, are likewise subject to employment by the Government in agricultural labor in the locality in which they live.

The present law is also applicable to associations for public service, like the Navy League, the Society for National Defence, the Red Crescent, and to all other such associations.

Article 3. The rules to be followed in applying the present law will be determined by special instructions.

Article 4. In order to secure the carrying out of agricultural work, the Ministry of Agriculture is empowered to compel farmers and farm laborers, living in villages and towns, to take their draft animals with them when requisitioned for service.

Article 5. Anyone opposing the enforcement of the present law and its detailed application may be condemned by a justice of the peace to a fine of from 20 to 500 piasters; and in case of a repetition of the offense, to imprisonment for from one week to three months. Any report indicating that an agricultural official has been guilty of a breach of the law will have the value of legal evidence until the contrary is proved.

Article 6. A credit of £T150,000 is added to the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce for the enforcement of the present law.

Article 7. The present law will go into effect on the day of its promulgation.

All these measures were rather late, because human lives and draft animals employed in agriculture had been too carelessly wasted for two years; and the means of production, always primitive and deficient, had in many regions been exhausted. Owing to the loss of territory or proximity to war fronts the area available for agriculture had also been diminished.

Maximum Bread Prices.

The "war agriculture" movement was followed on October 14, 1916, by the enactment of maximum bread prices for the whole country,⁴ such prices being 2 piasters in Konia, 2.50 piasters in large consumption centers like Broussa and Smyrna, and 3 piasters in towns which had been occupied by enemy forces during the Balkan War.

On October 21, 1916, there was a sudden change of policy and complete freedom was granted in this respect, "because the people were learning to indulge in illegal trading as a result of restrictive measures."

On November 2, the Food Board announced that breadstuffs could be purchased only by agents of the Board, that growers would be allowed to keep only enough for seed and their own maintenance, and that they must, forthwith, sell all they had left.

On February 19, 1917, a violent debate on the food problem took place in the Senate. The Grand Vizier admitted "that unscrupulous

⁴ War bread, the cost of which was met in part by the Government, was distributed only in Constantinople. In October, 1916, the 1¼ kilogram loaf was sold at 1.50 piasters. As the Government was then making good a daily deficit of £T3,000, on November 6 the price was raised to 2 piasters.

profiteering had assumed great proportions of late" and assured the members of the Senate that the Government would not remain indifferent.

The following system, he announced, had been worked out as a means of meeting the high cost of living: No maximum prices for foodstuffs would be fixed, but all means of transport would be put at the disposition of the Food Board, and the Board would grant means of transport only to those merchants who would pledge themselves to sell their foodstuffs at a profit not greater than 15 or 20 per cent.

On March 10, the Grand Vizier obtained a new credit of £T3,500,000 for the Food Board by promising the Chamber that the food problem would be settled radically, and that the Government would be able to control food prices by indirect methods. He also made the statement that the booty, in cereals, taken in Rumania would be sufficient to feed the whole population of Turkey for several years.

On March 24, the Food Board proceeded to take a census of the population of Constantinople, and announced that, in addition to the war bread there would be available for daily individual distribution 300 grams of beans and 15 of sugar, the former at a price of 10 piasters per 1.28 kilograms, and the latter at 20 piasters.

On July 6, 1917, the Government tried to take over the distribution of meat. All who consumed at least three kilograms per week were asked to register. As half of those who registered did not claim the ordered meat, this measure also resulted in disorganization and chaos.

Tevhid, then a government organ, in its issue of July 6, defended the general policy of the Government in the following terms:

We had no sort of economic organization before this war. We were entirely lacking in those special organizations which a long war would require. The existing deficiency and confusion must be taken as a matter of course. All the economic institutions we now possess are products of the War. The defects are many, but there are some places where we really succeeded. Our present Food Board is better than none. The radical measure to resort to is the creation of an independent ministry of food.

On September 5 the handling of the food problems of the civil population was turned over to the army commissariat, because "the

unification of the two separate administrations was thought to promise great advantages." On September 9 a new special census was taken for the purpose of new distributions.

On September 27 the following new measures were announced: Farmers must till 35 deunums⁵ for each yoke of oxen they possessed. If a farmer possessed more than one yoke, additional draft animals could be requisitioned in case of exceptional necessity. Animals which might be used for agricultural work could not be slaughtered even by their owners. All farmers must work eight hours a day. Proprietors of large farms would be freed from military service. They could also free three laborers from military service for each 500 deunums of cultivated land they owned. And landed properties not cultivated by their owners could be used for agricultural purposes by neighboring villages and towns.

The new Food Board was divided on October 12, 1917, into five sections, for food proper, and for accounting, agriculture, inspection, and personal claims.

On November 1 it was decided that there should be three meatless days a week in Constantinople; but they were little observed.

On January 10, 1918, the free interchange of meat, butter, fresh and dry vegetables, and fruits between Constantinople and certain provinces was made legal.

A Food Commission and a Food Ministry.

On March 9, 1918, severe attacks were made on the Government in the Chamber by the newly formed opposition bloc. They were based on the food situation. Many positive instances of abuses, negligence, and lack of sense of responsibility were pointed out. The Government was also criticized for not insisting upon its due share of the cereals and petroleum taken in Rumania. Supporters of Kemal Bey's economic system saw the source of weakness in the lack of a responsible ministry of food. The Government responded by suggesting the formation everywhere of food commissions composed of the local governor, the highest military commander, the highest officers of the gendarmerie, the chief accountant, and two members of the municipal council. It was further proposed, on March 30, to double the tax in kind on produce, to provide food for the army and

⁵ 1 deunum = 918 square meters or 0.226 acres.

state officials, teachers, boarding schools, and religious seminaries, but to give the peasants entire freedom to sell the remainder of their crops. On the same date a suggestion emanating from the Chamber that a "Supreme Food Commission" should be established, composed of five Senators, five Deputies, and sixteen representatives of different departments and professions, was finally accepted.

This Commission displayed extraordinary activity and succeeded in having the tolerated trade in permits for illegal transport declared a punishable offense. Some further measures, such as the prohibition of the use of milk, sugar, and flour for pastries, sweet dishes, and candies, an increase in the supply of fish and the securing of equality of distribution were suggested, and in part adopted. The Commission, however, soon lost its authority, as the head of the commissariat refused to let it have more than an advisory character.

On July 21, 1918, a Food Ministry was created with Kemal Bey as Minister. The law that created the Ministry ignored the existence of the Food Commission, which simply disappeared. The new Minister built up an elaborate organization, handed out offices to his followers, and devised a most complicated system of red tape. The Ministry itself displayed its power by letting state officials, public institutions, newspapers, trade corporations, and so on, have various kinds of food at prices much lower than those of the market, but its main purpose became clear when bread was made a source of general corruption. Uneatable materials offered for sale by influential people were bought as flour. As the new Minister believed in competing with unfettered business like any other business man, high prices had to be paid for the flour, and the weekly grant that the State had to make, for Constantinople's bread,—mostly uneatable—exceeded £T140,000.

Owing to the loss of their influence by the military authorities toward the end of the War, Kemal Bey was able to make himself a real economic dictator. He even succeeded in removing from office his powerful rival, İsmail Hakkı Pasha, head of the commissariat. This dictatorship was, however, short-lived, for on the eve of the armistice the whole Union and Progress Government had to retire.

The entire food policy of the War Government in Turkey can be summarized as an extremely unequal distribution of the war burden. The real public interest was understood by very few. Most of the country's leaders saw no harm in encouraging food profiteering. It

was felt that something had to be done to supply the masses with a certain amount of cheap food; but, in spite of brief temporary restrictions, the permanent system followed amounted to letting privileged merchants sell things at any price and giving the well-to-do classes an opportunity to buy anything on the market, as long as they could afford to pay the excessively high prices. Prodigal and extravagant living was not only not restricted by the public authorities; but the members of the Government were the first to set bad examples.

In brief, the food supply in Turkey, because of bad roads and inadequate means of transport, was unequal to the country's needs even in normal times. During the War, production decreased and the means of transport became more inadequate. The elements of mismanagement, abuses, and waste vastly complicated the situation. As a consequence a more or less acute state of famine existed during the last two years of the War in all parts of the country. The high death rate during the War can, in part, be directly attributed to famine.

CHAPTER XI

WAR TRADE

Large Stocks To Start With.

THE World War reduced Turkey to a state of almost total economic isolation. The sea routes, the main thoroughfares for Turkey's commercial relations with the outside world, were blockaded. The Persian frontier could not become a source of great commercial activity owing to the lack of means of transport and to the fact that Persia, although officially neutral, was invaded by the Turks, the British, and the Russians, and for most of the time her western provinces were an active war front. The Bulgarian frontier was the channel for war supplies from the industrial allies, and served to a very limited extent for commercial intercourse.

It was fortunate for Turkey that she possessed an exceptionally large stock of manufactured goods. The stagnation caused by the Balkan War had been followed by a period of extreme activity in the import trade. In spite of repeated requisitions, imported goods of every variety could be found even during the last year of the War. This does not mean, of course, that they existed all through it in abundant quantity. The demand was always greater than the supply, and it increased as the War went on. Some little relief was obtained through importations from Germany and Austria. Some activity was also shown in increasing home manufactures and in finding substitutes for the primary necessities that were lacking.

Trade relations with allied countries were not based on free methods of competition, for the distribution and export of every sort of goods were subject to monopolies and restrictions on both sides. Exports from Turkey to Germany were under the control of the "German Central Buying Company," the *Zentraleinkaufsgesellschaft*. Similar organizations existed in Austria and Hungary. As they had monopoly rights and fixed the prices of export goods, the Turkish Government created, on September 21, 1916, "the Export Commission" to control her export trade. All exports from Turkey were dependent on permits from this Commission. Prices were fixed by it. It could stipulate that exports should be made only in exchange for imports in kind. The Commission had also to see to it

that the transactions of exporters were within their financial capacity.

The special circumstances of the War had temporarily made an exporting country of Turkey. General imports from Germany were certainly larger in volume, but they consisted mostly of materials of war, which were furnished to the Turkish Government on credit, while Turkish exports were paid for in advance. The Central Buying Company was Turkey's export medium from May to July, 1916, the total of exports being 280 carloads of cereals, 50 of minerals—ores,—and 13,000 kilograms of butter, oils, and dried fish. The result was that the Turkish paper pound was exchanged at twenty-four marks at a time when the German mark was still on a parity basis; and in the interior of the country Turkish paper had sunk to 55 per cent of its nominal value, owing to lack of confidence in it. Of course, the presence of large German contingents in Turkey drawing their pay in marks had also something to do with the favorable economic balance.

Imports from Germany and Austria were mostly under monopoly control, either that of the Government or of its favorites. Individuals had little chance to buy things in large quantity on a commercial basis. Even if they did, they could not obtain railroad cars on personal application. Goods belonging to private individuals were bought under the cover of some high official of the Government and transported as war supplies. This smuggling took place, in the case of certain favored individuals, with the knowledge of the authorities. Smuggling without the knowledge of the authorities was also a flourishing business. Individuals traveling with special passes used this privilege to smuggle in gold and other commodities of value, the price of which differed greatly in Turkey and Germany.

Import Scandals.

The daily *Vakit*, in its issue of August 7, 1918, complained of the situation in these words:

We have lost our position in German eyes, because our Government, instead of protecting public interests, is making itself the tool of private interests. There are many Turks in Germany who are able to use official channels for deceptively transporting their private commercial wares. It has become a rule to smuggle in sacks which Turkish authori-

ties in Germany have put under seal as containing official documents. Turkish travellers have to undergo an especially severe customs examination on account of the bad record made by Turks travelling on government business.

Among the imports from Germany and Austria sugar and paper were of supreme importance, as nothing of the sort was produced in Turkey. As an article of mass consumption, sugar was considered an attractive commodity for money-making purposes. Many scandals that became public were connected with sugar imports. A former minister of education and several deputies were incriminated in August, 1918, as a result of revelations regarding fourteen carloads of sugar which they tried to bring in under false pretenses. Sugar was sold in Turkey before the War at 2 piasters an okka— $1\frac{1}{4}$ kilograms. In Constantinople the cost price, during the War, at various times and under different circumstances, was from 5 to 20 piasters. Sugar was sometimes distributed in small quantities to the people at from 20 to 40 piasters. The price under free war trading fluctuated between 160 and 350 piasters. During the last two years of the War, the head of the commissariat, who was at the same time director general of military railways, tried to use sugar as a source of revenue for railway construction. The sugar which cost him 15 piasters was sold at 80 piasters an okka to privileged wholesale traders who, in their turn, sold it to retail merchants or middlemen at a profit of more than 100 per cent.

Paper imports from Germany and Austria were extremely restricted, so far as free war trading was concerned, as both countries had paper monopolies. The quality used for newspapers was distributed by the German and Austrian Embassies directly to the Turkish press. It came in small quantities, and was rationed to the newspapers at cost price, or one-fifth of the retail price in Turkey. The idea was to use paper as a means of exercising pressure and controlling the policy of the whole press. Newspaper men who found this state of affairs humiliating, appealed to the Government, without, however, finding any like response. Thereupon "the Association of the Ottoman Press" was constituted, its main purpose being to combat the control of paper imports by foreign embassies. Its object was soon gained through the assistance of the German Association of Newspaper Publishers. With the financial help of the New National Credit Bank, paper was bought directly in Germany, and dis-

tributed at cost price among the various papers according to their actual and average requirements.

In home trade the chief means of making money lay in the permits to ship goods—from a postal package to a carload. The prices paid for permits varied from £T1,500 to £T2,500 per carload. In general, the man who obtained the permit had nothing to ship. Government leaders gave away permits to enable political or personal friends to earn a little money without risk or trouble, the full understanding being that the permit should be sold to genuine merchants who had something to ship. That was characteristic of the economic policy followed during the War by the leaders of the Union and Progress party. They could not stop to think that the heavy price paid for the permits would constitute a new reason and excuse for raising prices and rendering life more and more difficult. Neither could they see that the system of permits made it impossible to control the character of the goods shipped. The means of transport being limited, they were intended to serve, above all, to supply consumption centers with food. But the chief consideration with the war traders was nothing of that kind. They gave preference to the sort of merchandise which promised the highest profits.

The Trade in Shipping Permits.

The trade in permits was a constant source of discontent. Everybody but the government leaders knew the connection between such traffic and the high cost of living. When the "Supreme Food Commission" was created in the spring of 1918, as one achievement of the newly awakening opposition bloc, the first thing it did was to prohibit the issuing and the trading in, of such permits. The order of the Sultan published in the official gazette of May 28, 1918, read: "I ratify the decision of the Cabinet approving the resolution adopted by the Supreme Food Commission, forbidding all trade in permits for postal and freight transportation."

The daily *Vakit* published the following comment on this order:

Our leaders, prompted by pity or the desire to do something for a friend, have often made great sacrifices of that public interest which it is their business to safeguard. They have contributed to raise the cost of living by giving shipping permits to people who were known to have nothing to ship. The question of war transportation in this coun-

try, where the means are so limited, should not be settled according to such personal considerations. What should always inspire them is the desire to maintain the life and health of the people by rendering food supplies as abundant and as cheap as possible. The merchant who pays from £T2,000 to £T2,500 for a permit, in addition to the actual cost of transport, does not inscribe it in his account book as an item of charity. He adds it, in greatly increased proportion, to the price of the goods, in order to insure himself against unknown future possibilities connected with such a system. As a result, a wholesale price of 10 piasters is not made 13 or 14 by the cost of transport, but 30 or 40. The retail merchant also feels justified in adding a profit of 15 or 20 piasters for himself. The whole fantastically high cost of living can only be ascribed to the wrong-headedness of a Government which should, in reason, be expected to seek to reduce prices in war-time. The prohibition of such a custom is ridiculous in itself, for it means an admission that up to the present such an enormity has been knowingly sanctioned.

The method of protecting political and personal friends was not confined to issuing transport permits alone. Such privileged persons were often given a certain amount of capital and such advance information as enabled them to make sales to the army.

Individuals less fortunate, desirous of taking advantage of war conditions, likewise profited in all sorts of commodities, preferring those which were scarcest and most needed. Goods changed hands not from merchant to consumer, but from one merchant to another without ever reaching the consumer. Such merchants established a special place, where, following stock-exchange methods, and specifying the quantity and quality of the commodity they sold merchandise that might—or might not—exist. It was possible for one and the same commodity to double or triple in price in a single day; and retail prices were fixed according to the latest quotation on the profiteers' exchange.

Toward the end of 1916 such profiteering went to insane lengths. Those in charge of the press censorship suffered from it like everybody else. They were ready to allow the most violent attacks to be made upon it, and the Government was forced to intervene. In January, 1917, the first measures were taken against profiteers. On February 5, the first drug profiteers were punished. Several hundreds of profiteers were arrested in May. A provisional anti-profit-

earing law was promulgated on May 24, 1917, and an Anti-Profiteering Commission with the vice-president of the Chamber at its head, was established to see to its enforcement. It was virtually an anti-profiteering dictatorship, with unlimited powers. The Commission gave orders that all goods so sold should be returned to the original seller through a method it devised called "Zindjirlémé," or "chaining." The last buyer had to return the goods purchased to the man he bought them from, and demand his money back, and so on. In due course the "chain" would go back to the original owner, the individual possessing the goods before the chain of profiteering began. There was this alternative: The last buyer could retain the goods by asking all the intermediaries to pay him over their profits less a discount of 2 per cent, and he in his turn would guarantee to sell the goods in question at a profit of only 25 per cent above the first, or producer's, price. All merchants were obliged to declare the amount of goods they possessed, display their prices in the shop windows and sell under a card system established by the Commission. Undeclared goods were simply seized and the proprietor punished; and, for every kind of goods, maximum prices were fixed.

Turkey's Anti-Profiteering Commission.

The Commission did its work so drastically that prices dropped very nearly to pre-war levels. Many people were able to procure the things they needed. Officials, teachers, members of unions, and newspaper men were the chief beneficiaries. The quantity of goods was so limited that there was nothing that could be made subject to general distribution, even in Constantinople. Cases of sickness, death, birth, and marriage were given the preference, according to the commodity required, the need being certified, and often falsely, either by a physician or by the local authorities.

Every day a bulletin was issued by the Commission enumerating the new measures, and giving the list of offenders sent to a special court martial, as well as the nature of the offense. Several months' imprisonment or a fine of several hundred pounds was the penalty awaiting those who sold above maximum prices, or possessed undeclared goods. The difference between the sale price and the maximum price was returned to the buyer.

After some time, however, the Commission lost its first zeal. Some classes of goods were really exhausted. Those who were losing by the

work of the Commission were indulging in active propaganda. They claimed that certain merchants had been given special favors. And the Anti-Profiteering Law gradually became impotent.

On February 14, 1918, the Commission was severely attacked in the Chamber. The members of the Justice and Commerce Committees of the Chamber of Deputies agreed that the Anti-Profiteering Law had not been of any practical value. They were of the opinion that the demand being great and the supply small, it was useless to struggle. Furthermore, they added, the vast organization that was needed to remedy such evils could not be created during a war, and the municipal laws already contained clauses against ordinary kinds of profiteering in foodstuffs. The press did not share this view. It pointed out that this sort of organization was the one precisely called for by the abnormal conditions produced by the War, and that the anti-profiteering machinery had been created because the municipal laws had proved to be powerless against profiteering. On February 15 the president of the Anti-Profiteering Commission defended his work. He declared that the stocks he had found had not been great enough to permit of any general and equal distribution to the people at large; but nevertheless the Commission had succeeded at least to a certain degree in protecting purchasers, and it had also had its psychological value when it had given the people an opportunity to complain of profiteering, and to voice their grievances.

A special committee of the Chamber was charged with the task of investigating the whole problem. Its report, read on March 18, 1918, included a project of "a law for economic affairs" and proposed the creation of a ministry for the same which should provide and distribute foodstuffs, regulate exports, home manufacturing and inland commerce, make the maximum use of available means of transport, forbid speculation, increase production, prepare post-war economic measures, create organizations in all parts of the country, extend the tithes system (a tax in kind of one-eighth which till then had been imposed only on certain natural products) to every sort of product, and fix maximum prices which should in no case be less than five times pre-war prices. As suggested by various deputies, this intricate project, looking perfect on paper and containing details as to every sort of regulation, was enlarged to include new tasks. But it was a project that was never put into effect.

On May 31, 1918, a policy diametrically opposite was embarked

upon. The system of maximum prices was abolished, and trade was made entirely free. The justification offered was that freedom of trade and high prices would enable the tribesmen in the South to smuggle things in from enemy sources. The prices, it was admitted, would be out of reach of the general public, but the new system would at least make it possible to supply the wealthy classes with things like tea and coffee.

Turkey was not very successful during the War in manufacturing articles of necessity which could not be imported, and in finding substitutes for things that were lacking. Serious attempts on a huge scale were made only by the Ministry of War. Some new factories for the manufacture of clothes and army shoes were created. A large factory for the manufacture of wooden carts and household furniture was established by an association that had the encouragement and protection of the Ministry of War. The plan to change twenty-two orphanages into factories, contemplated in September, 1916, was never carried out.

There were, of course, many attempts on a small scale to manufacture, in a primitive way at least, things which could not be imported. Various substitutes had to be found for staples like sugar, coffee, and tea, but there was no display of organized and concentrated effort.

War-Time Companies.

It became the fashion in Turkey during the World War to form companies for commercial and industrial purposes. Kemal Bey, the would-be economic dictator, here set the first example. The commercial organizations created with the money made in monopolistic war trade had been given the character of joint-stock companies. The dividends for the first year were so high that immediately there was a general craze to invest money indiscriminately in all new companies. Most of them proved to be failures, and this killed the newly-awakened zeal to do things by economic coöperation.

Kemal Bey's companies included one to deal in "National Products," a company engaged in the grain trade, a "National Groceries Company," a "National Bakers' Company," a "National Weaving Company," and an "Economic Bank." Turkish consumers' co-operatives were also established by the agents of Kemal Bey before and during the War. He worked on broad lines and worked "both

from the center to the periphery and from the periphery to the center." Central organizations were to establish branches everywhere. On the other hand, small local economic organisms that were alike were to receive a central organization as soon as there were thirty-five of them.

According to some general statistics published in the Constantinople papers on September 9, 1918, the companies created during the War included 42 that were commercial and industrial; 15, building and transport; 9, insurance; 6, agricultural; and 16, financial. The commercial companies had a nominal capital of £T2,298,800, the industrial £T2,863,000, the agricultural, £T495,000, the financial, £T542,000, the building and transport, £T2,019,000, the insurance, £T1,403,950. In all, the total was £T16,623,150, of which £T6,194,689 was actually paid up. Of joint-stock companies organized in Turkey before and during the War, 3 were organized in 1909, 13 in 1910, 22 in 1911, 8 in 1912, 5 in 1913, 10 in 1914, 15 in 1915, 15 in 1916, 29 in 1917, and 19 during the first months of 1918. Of the total of 139, 95 had their head offices in Constantinople.

CHAPTER XII

PRICES AND WAGES

Paper Currency and Depreciation.

THE World War had, in Turkey, a revolutionizing effect on the prices of commodities. The rise was general both in consumption centers with a relatively high cost of living, and in isolated production centers where, before the War, it cost almost nothing to live, and, under the guise of hospitality, there was a sort of communism in food. In very few branches of industry did wages rise in the same proportion. As a result, the standard of living, already low before the War, fell in general to a very low level during the course of it, and in the years that followed.

The introduction of paper currency was in itself a reason for such a decline. As the paper money gradually lost in value, this caused a rise in prices; and the rise was always greater, proportionately, than the depreciation of the currency.

During the first year of the War, Turkey was the only belligerent country except Great Britain which maintained the gold standard. The first notes were issued in July, 1915, under circumstances that will be indicated in the chapter on war finances. They had full gold value and in Constantinople remained at par for two months. Then a gradual process of depreciation set in which, during the War, caused the following fluctuations:

	<i>1915</i>	<i>1916</i>	<i>1917</i>	<i>1918</i>
January	...	105	187	460
February	...	110	210	490
March	...	114	262	473
April	...	117	268	422
May	...	122	258	432
June	...	121	305	462
July	Par	121	381	460
August	Par	133	411	486
September	102	137	447	536
October	108	154	487	458
November	104	178	550	340
December	105	183	470	438

The depreciation of paper money by no means kept pace with its actual exchange value. A Turkish pound had the following value in Swiss francs during the various months of the war:

	<i>1915</i>	<i>1916</i>	<i>1917</i>	<i>1918</i>
January	22.785	23.125	17.	15.80
February	22.7854	21.15	17.	16.50
March	22.785	21.425	16.20	12.725
April	22.10	20.35	15.95	15.40
May	21.675	19.	15.75	15.04
June	21.875	22.50	13.55	13.85
July	21.75	22.40	12.55	13.75
August	21.425	21.30	12.80	13.475
September	21.525	21.40	12.40	13.25
October	21.775	19.80	14.40	15.25
November	22.675	16.50	12.825	14.725
December	23.05	16.80	16.825	12.125

The depreciation of Turkish pounds in Constantinople was always more than twice as great as the fall on neutral markets. The fall also continued in 1916, when the Turkish pound rose to twenty-four German marks instead of eighteen, while the mark had deviated very little from parity.

This phenomenon may be ascribed to three reasons: The people in Turkey had no confidence in paper money. The cases of inflation after the Crimean War had made people extremely distrustful of it. Secondly, the confidence in "final victory" was gradually dwindling away. But for that, the guarantee of Germany to pay everything in gold after the War and to keep the value of a Turkish pound at a constant rate of 18.50 marks would have protected the pound from depreciating, at least in Constantinople. Thirdly, with new issues of paper the money in circulation became too abundant for market needs. Money could be sent into foreign countries only in cases of real need. A currency commission was watching over monetary transactions with neutral countries.

All the efforts of the Government to maintain the value of paper currency proved to be ineffective. Legally, and by compulsion, a paper pound could be made to have the same currency value as a gold pound. Exchange at a higher rate was a public offense. The numerous money-changing shops were closed by the Government;

changers of gold were tried by court-martials. Government leaders and newspapers were ceaselessly pointing out the senselessness of not accepting paper money on a gold basis. But everyone distrusted such money and was anxious to invest his surplus in real estate, jewelry, carpets, and the like. The *Vakit*, in its issue of November 20, 1917, rejoiced "in the ignorance of the wealthy who could not understand the great value of paper money, and tried to get rid of it as quickly as possible to the ultimate advantage of the common people."

The provinces were generally much more distrustful than Constantinople. Nearly everywhere, transactions among the people took place in coined money. Paper was not looked upon as a medium of exchange. It had some value as a commodity, because it was accepted by the Government as a medium for the payment of taxes. It differed in value in various places. But, in general, its value was nowhere more than three-fourths of the rate in Constantinople. In the central provinces, three and a half paper pounds were worth a gold pound in the second year of the War, four and five in the third, and six in the fourth year. In Syria and Arabia paper was not accepted at all, or accepted at one-eighth or one-tenth of its face value. People in the provinces used immediately to exchange any paper they got hold of for gold and silver. The restrictions of the Government always had the opposite effect to what was intended, and caused the people to lose any last remaining confidence they had. The prohibition of the transport of gold had not the desired result. It was a premium on smuggling, and was one of the causes of the depreciation of the currency in the provinces.

While the purchase value of paper money continued to fall, those factors enumerated in the chapter on war trade contributed in their turn to accelerate a general rise in the prices of all commodities.

Two Sets of Prices.

There were always two sets of prices, a rather reasonable one for government distributions, and an exorbitant price for free marketing. In the case of many commodities the wide difference between the two could not be accounted for as the public saw it, for the government price was often above the actual cost price. If it had been possible to manage things for the public good alone, and if profiteering had not been officially protected, the difference between the two

would have remained at least reasonable in the cost of commodities which existed in fairly sufficient quantity.

Wheat, which cost at most £T.99 a sack before the War, reached the maximum wholesale price of £T51 in the course of it. When trading in cereals was declared to be free, the army commissariat, at brief intervals and in the Constantinople market, purchased wheat of medium quality at prices varying from £T28 to £T32 a sack.

Before the War, bread in Constantinople cost between 0.875 to 1.25 piasters a kilogram, according to its quality. The official war bread first cost 1.25 piasters, rose to 2 piasters in November, 1916, and never went higher than 2.50 piasters. Maximum prices in the provinces were between 2 and 3 piasters. There was at times an official luxury bread, which sold at a maximum price of 16 piasters. It was of a very low quality. Free-trade white bread was sold at 15 piasters a kilogram in January, 1917, at 21 in August, at 35 in November, at 30 in March, 1918, at 43.75 in April, 1918, and at 56 in December, 1918.

Along with bread from time to time the Government distributed small quantities of foodstuffs of other sorts. They were priced at the distribution center on October 25, 1917, as follows: sugar, 20 piasters an okka; olive oil, 88 piasters; cheese, 40 piasters. Petroleum brought 8 piasters. Official prices fluctuated around these averages.

The Public Debt Administration kept, from January 1, 1917, on, a statistical record of retail prices in Constantinople, to be used in estimating what high-cost-of-living bonus should be paid to its officials. It is the only source available for elaborate data on this subject. The following table may convey a comparative idea of war fluctuations in retail prices. They are in piasters.

	<i>July,</i> <i>1914</i>	<i>January,</i> <i>1917</i>	<i>September,</i> <i>1917</i>	<i>January,</i> <i>1918</i>	<i>September,</i> <i>1918</i>
Sugar	8	62	150	140	250
Coffee	12	160	450	1,000	600
Rice	3	35	90	95	90
Macaroni	3	42	90	110	95
Potatoes	1	8	20	36	27
Beans	4	19	55	65	65
Onions	0.50	6	11	16	16
Olive Oil	8	45	140	200	180

TURKEY IN THE WORLD WAR

	1914 July,	1917 January,	1917 September,	1918 January,	1918 September,
Salt	1.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	5.50
Milk	2	9	19	40	45
Cheese	12	55	130	250	280
Mutton	7	28	65	130	120
Butter	20	100	210	260	400
Eggs	0.50	1.50	2.50	7.25	4.25
Soap	7	32	75	140	140
Petroleum	1.50	50	110	125	160
Charcoal	0.50	2.75	5.50	10	13
Wood	45	150	320	330	540

More Price Troubles.

These differences in prices cannot convey any true conception of the changes that took place, for the increases were accompanied by a general inferiority in quality. It was no longer possible to obtain pre-war goods. In addition, most of the foodstuffs were adulterated. The newspapers of April 14, 1917, complain that three-quarters of the substance sold as butter was merely water. A process had been invented to make three parts of water unite with one part of butter substitute. Some things, like salt, at times entirely disappeared from the market, as a result of speculation; and any price had to be paid. If a speculator decided to withdraw some given commodity from the market, thrilling changes might be witnessed. Lemons costing 3 piasters apiece on August 20, 1917, were sold at 20 piasters a week later.

In some cases, fantastic orders of the Government could cause the disappearance of articles of primary necessity until such orders were recalled. It was, for instance, made a government order, in October, 1917, that matches imported into Turkey must be packed in boxes of a given size containing from fifty to sixty each, and labeled in Turkish. It was quite impossible to carry out this regulation. Matches had to be bought anywhere, and in the sort of containers immediately available. It was impossible to manufacture boxes in Turkey. No chance exporter of small quantities would give himself the trouble, in war-time, to pack in prescribed ways with Turkish labels. All these points had to be explained in the newspapers to make the Government recall the order.

There was generally a great difference in retail prices between

Constantinople and the provinces. In Smyrna, one of the few well-governed cities, the difference between its prices and those of Constantinople was one of 250 or 300 per cent. This could not be explained on commercial grounds. Corruption in the transport business, and the abundance of middlemen were the chief causes. In other centers, not connected by railways with consumption centers, the difference was far greater.

There was often a close interdependence between the prices of various commodities of primary necessity. The rise in one commodity, for some particular reason, would immediately result in a corresponding rise in other commodities. The substitutes also followed this general movement. For instance, whenever the price of imported tea rose, the substitutes obtained in the country in abundant quantity experienced the same proportionate rise.

In imported articles of clothing the rate of increase was very great. A suit of clothes which cost £T5 before the War cost £T10 in September, 1916, £T15 in January, 1917, £T20 in July, 1917, £T72 in March, 1918, £T90 in September, 1918, and £T100 in December, 1918.

A pair of shoes costing £T.70 before the War cost £T2.50 in January, 1917, £T3.50 in July, 1917, £T9 in March, 1918, £T12 in September, 1918, and £T18 in December, 1918. The Anti-Profiteering Commission succeeded, but only for a short time—in November, 1917—in holding certain things to fixed prices, for instance shoes for men, of imported leather, at £T5, shoes of domestic leather at £T1.25, and shoes for women at from £T2 to £T3. It was the general custom to have one's clothes turned inside out; and a very lively business was done in second-hand clothes.

Unexpected events could double prices in a single day. The news of Rumania's entering the War caused petroleum prices to rise 80 per cent on August 29, 1916. When Rumania was occupied, skilful speculators caused the price of Rumania's true exports to rise, and exports not Rumanian to fall, at the expense of ignorant war traders.

The armistice with Russia in December, 1917, aroused false hopes and drove all prices down. It was expected that about one million tons of Russian and Rumanian ships in the Black Sea would return to service and carry necessaries of life from Rumania, European Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. This fall in prices, one of

about 20 per cent, was followed by a sudden rise, when the above hopes proved to be illusory.

The peace rumors on October 5, 1918, caused a sudden fall of 35 per cent in all prices. The rumor that hundreds of loaded vessels were waiting near the Dardanelles and would reach Constantinople in a few days induced every wholesale merchant to sell at any price. The Turkish gold pound fluctuated between 3.90 and 4.50 in paper pounds on that day. Again, a general rise followed.

Housing Problems.

The question of housing offered a very serious problem in Constantinople. The city being safer in many regards than the rest of the Empire, hundreds of thousands of refugees were drawn to the capital. In the increasing congestion, rents tended to rise above the paying capacity of the average man or salary. Until the spring of 1918 no measures were taken to meet the housing difficulty, and everybody had to solve the problem for himself. Landlords refused to make new yearly leases. The demand was so great that rents for apartment houses in particular often doubled within a few months. Rents rose about 200 or 300 per cent a year. The projected general "economic law" of March 18, 1918, for the first time took up the rent question. As this project was not passed, a special housing law was promulgated on April 8, 1918, stipulating that rents could be raised only 50 per cent above those actually paid on March 1, 1916. All existing contracts were to be regarded as holding good until six months after the War. Law courts were declared to be without authority to consider suits of law aiming at the vacating of a house, unless the tenant had not observed the terms of his lease, or unless the proprietor had to live in the house himself. The new law little satisfied the landlords, because the rents then being paid—on March 1—did not cover the taxes, the high insurance rates, and the cost of repairs. They resorted to every means to have their houses vacated and to rent them to trustworthy people who were willing to pay the actual rents then being asked, and make no attempt to get the help of the law. In the provinces no housing difficulties existed. The rents were those of pre-war times, and were paid in gold and silver.

The general rise in the cost of living amounted to 300 per cent in 1916. According to a rather crude calculation kept by the Public

Department Administration, there were the following changes after January, 1917—July, 1914, being taken as 100:

	1917	1918	1919	1920
January	405%	1645%	2130%	1440%
February	475	1640	2200	1355
March	565	1700	1680	1350
April	580	1860	1305	1390
May	605	1730	1215	1330
June	670	1850	1225	1365
July	790	1905	1170	1420
August	800	1920	1170	1440
September	975	1860	1240	1430
October	1255	1485	1135	1430
November	1480	1675	1170	1435
December	1465	2205	1260	1440

The press complained constantly of the high cost of living. The *Vakit* pointed out that the increase in Turkey, in February, 1918, amounted to 1970 per cent while in Germany, under more unfavorable food conditions, with the German mark at the same rate as the Turkish paper pound, it had risen only by 24 per cent.

In the provinces, where metal currency remained in use, the rise amounted to 50 per cent in the second year of the War, to 100 in the third year and to 200 in the fourth.

Salaries Withheld and Salaries Increased.

The salaries of government officials, very low even before the War, and scarcely constituting a living wage, did not rise with the high cost of living to any appreciable degree. On the contrary, it gradually became the practice after the outbreak of the War to withhold 50 per cent of such salaries for purposes of economy. A state official could hope only to get half of his pre-war salary regularly. And, at irregular intervals, once in a few months, he obtained one of the unpaid half-month balances. On November 21, 1915, it was announced in the papers that salaries would be paid henceforth fully and regularly, but it would not be possible to pay for the months past.

The law of January 8, 1916, added a high-cost-of-living bonus of 20 per cent to salaries up to £T10 a month, and 15 per cent to salaries over £T10. This regulation was maintained during the

War, and for a year after it, without any regard to the cost of living and the depreciation of paper money. A law of December 3, 1919, made the following changes:

To salaries of £T10 a month, and less, it added 300 per cent; to those between £T10 and £T30, 300 per cent on the first 10 pounds, and 100 per cent on the balance; to salaries over £T30, 300 per cent on the first £T10, and 75 per cent on the rest. A salary minimum of £T6 a month was established, which, with the cost of living what it was, should have been at least £T24.

The Public Debt Administration, as well as banks and other similar institutions also granted a bonus which corresponded more or less to the changes in cost of living.

Brain workers did not differ much from government officials in their earnings. Newspapers, by reducing their size by two-thirds, continued to sell at one cent until the third year of the War. In 1917 their price was increased by 100 per cent, and in March, 1918, by another 200 per cent. The editorial and reporting staffs could not obtain increases of like proportion. But the typesetters, one of the few well-organized branches of labor, managed to obtain such increases.

The following were the daily wages—in piasters—paid to typesetters:

	<i>For newspaper work</i>	<i>For book work</i>
Before the War	25-30	20-30
In the second year of the War	40-45	30-40
In the last year of the War	60-80	50-70
After the armistice	100-120	85-100
In 1926	200-230	190-210

The wages paid typesetters would have been higher had they been entirely free to dispose of their own time and labor. But most of them had to perform their military duties. They were in part set free from them, so that they might do part-time work at their regular jobs and thus enable the newspapers to continue publication. By day they worked in military printing offices. If a newspaper publisher complained of them they risked losing the chance to earn anything more than their pay as private soldiers.

As all able-bodied men were in service either as common soldiers or skilled workers, and as the deportations had created large gaps,

it was hardly possible to obtain skilled workers in any other field of labor. The small number of those available were paid wages which more than corresponded to the high cost of living. A porter who earned, ordinarily, £T3 a month, in the last year of the War earned £T75, or £T90. With the exception of the newly rich, they were the only people who prospered during the War.

Another class of laborers were loaned by the army to private contractors for certain periods of time. They were supposed not to receive any wages outside of their soldier's pay, but were generally paid a small wage by the contractors to make them work more willingly.

There was a great demand for work on the part of women and children. Therefore the wages they obtained had generally no relation to the cost of living. The large number of refugee women, ready to work at any price, was another thing that kept wages down. Special measures had to be taken to find employment for women and children.

In the provinces, the scarcity of labor was much more acutely felt. Wages were on an average double those of pre-war times, calculated in gold.

For people with a fixed salary, the difference between the cost of living and wages was appalling. Government employees were generally out of money after the first week of the month.

The deplorable situation of such civil servants led to a violent discussion of the situation in Parliament, on November 18, 1917. It was pointed out that all independent wage earners could maintain their existence by adding the tax of the higher cost of living to what they asked for their services or their merchandise, while the Government official could not shift it to anyone. One of the deputies explained that an official of the first class was in a worse position than a common porter. All agreed that the impartiality of judges and the dignity of public service were in danger, and that urgent sacrifices should be made to find a way out. It was found impossible to increase salaries. The only positive step taken was to exempt officials from paying the special tax which had been placed on those who had been, for some reason or other, freed from military service. A decision to make the necessities of life a standard ration in the case of officials and teachers, in the same manner as they were rationed to army officers, could be carried out regularly only in the

case of those serving within the actual war zones. Smyrna was the one province which not only distributed provisions, but made the distribution always three months in advance, in order to "free officials from anxieties regarding material existence."

Hardships and Efforts at Coöperative Relief.

A remedy applied in Constantinople was the opening of a lunch room which served about 1,500 lunches a day to officials at a very low price. But this did not last for long. Government officials were also allowed to engage in farming as an auxiliary source of income. But they were forbidden to engage in business, either directly or indirectly.

The collective efforts of the sufferers to meet the high cost of living took such forms as establishing coöperative farming groups, or buying at wholesale where the commodity was produced. The first method was practical when practiced on a small scale by a few individuals. Coöperative societies of consumers were much more numerous, and in a few instances were more or less successful. Almost every ministry had its own coöperative. To add to them, in many sections of the city there were general coöperatives which were mostly composed of small consumers. Out of the 758 members of the "Fatih Society," for instance, 120 had one share each, 83 two each, 14 three each, 12 four each, 23 five each, 1 seven, 9 ten each, 2 sixteen each, 1 twenty, and 1 fifty shares. Of the 3,231 members of the "Bosphorus Society," 1,781 had one, 690 two, and 162 three shares.

The value of such organizations, for the individual, was in practice not very great; but everyone sought to better himself as best he could. Many salaried state officials found secondary work, or engaged in some sort of business in spite of the official interdiction. Some covered the gap between a low salary and the high cost of living by corruption. The business activities of such members of the family as had been mere consumers before the War also brought relief, in some instances. Everybody was always seeking some sort of food at prices below those of the market; and the shrewd for the most part succeeded.

The standard of living fell constantly. In June, 1917, when meat cost £T.30 or £T.40 an okka in Constantinople, about 2,000 animals were slaughtered in the city daily. In June, 1918, the price

had risen to £T1.20 or £T1.30, and the daily consumption had dropped to 600.

The charitable institutions offered some degree of relief to the admittedly poor. The majority of those of good social standing who were rendered destitute by the War had to pay the difference between prices and wages in health and life. Even large owners of real estate were often among the destitute if their property had been requisitioned for army purposes. During the first year of the War they had to look on while their houses were in the hands of others, and often uselessly destroyed. They had, in addition, to pay taxes without drawing any income. They were, however, by the provisional law of March 7, 1916, relieved of this obligation—to pay taxes—and were promised redress after the War.

Failures of Water and Gas Supply.

War privations were not only caused by the great difference between prices and wages. There were many other daily afflictions. For instance, the water supply of Constantinople, provided by two different companies, one on the Asiatic side, and the other in the European section of the city, almost entirely failed, during the War, with disastrous results for the health and comfort of the population. Water also became the subject of profiteering. The electric service had been reduced on account of the coal shortage. Two gas companies on the European side closed down altogether; the one on the Asiatic side gave only partial service. The rest of the country, depending mostly on petroleum for lighting, experienced great difficulties. The newspaper *Tanin* advised its readers to console themselves by thinking of the bright future of the country, when they had to sit in the dark on account of the petroleum shortage.

The congestion of population being what it was in Constantinople, the badly handled street cars could be entered only after a virtual struggle. Women often complained in letters to the press that getting into a car meant for a woman the same thing as the actual fighting in the trenches meant for the men. For some time, the small boats in the harbor could be used only by those with special police permits that showed that they must take that means of getting home from their work. Long-distance traveling was impossible unless a permit had been obtained and a place reserved weeks ahead. The police were constantly announcing that the trains were

filled for so many days or weeks in advance, and new applications could be considered only for trains of later dates. On December 11, 1917, it was announced, for instance, that the trains for the interior were filled until the thirty-first of the month.

Communications were equally difficult. Telegrams were generally sent by mail, even if they were urgent. Mails were irregular and slow. In addition, all letters written were subject to the following conditions as announced by the military censor on November 23, 1915:

Letters must not exceed two pages; they must be written in good handwriting so that the censor could read them without difficulty. They must not contain any signs. If a letter contained too many numerals, the Chamber of Commerce must bear witness that they were not ciphers, but had only a commercial character. Letters must be addressed directly to the addressee, and not sent in care of anyone.

CHAPTER XIII

WAR FINANCES

Falling Revenues and New Taxes.

THE World War cost Turkey very dearly in human life, money, and territory. In a strictly financial sense, however, in the end it laid a smaller charge upon the Turkish treasury than might reasonably have been expected. This can be explained by Turkey's low standard of living, by salaries which did not rise with the increase in the cost of living, by indiscriminate methods of requisition and by the cancellation, on the part of the Entente Powers, of all war debts incurred by Turkey to Germany and Austria, as a consequence of war materials supplied and the money advances that were made.

Even under such circumstances, the War necessitated extraordinary expenses which were at least four times the normal. They could hardly be met by any increase in the revenues, which with few exceptions, tended to fall off.

During the war years and the years preceding them, estimated and actual receipts were the following:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Estimated Receipts</i>	<i>Actual Receipts</i>
1909-1910	£T25,078,962	£T.....
1910-1911	29,183,418
1911-1912	31,645,708	27,269,751
1912-1913	33,682,475	27,544,759
1913-1914	33,682,475	29,201,865
1914-1915	36,004,213	24,739,164
1915-1916	30,015,892	22,325,793
1916-1917	27,961,116	25,199,526
1917-1918	31,689,090
1918-1919	42,397,297

It must be kept in mind that the pre-war figures mean gold pounds, while receipts during the War are in depreciated paper pounds.

In the case of some taxes the effect of this depreciation was counteracted by multiplying the normal rates by a coefficient of 2, 3, 4, 5 in equal measure with the decrease in the value of paper money. The income tax, for instance, was increased fourfold in 1917, in order to obtain in gold value the amount of revenue, as originally

intended. The tax on sheep and cattle changed constantly in coefficient according to the depreciation of paper. This system could not, however, be applied to all taxes.

The chief effort of the Government to find new revenues was made in the sphere of consumption taxes, a field of revenue entirely forbidden by the Capitulations up to the time of the War. In the joy of being able to cross over into a forbidden zone, taxes on commodities of consumption which did not constitute primary necessities were first planned in 1915. They were raised in an imperfect way in 1916-1917, producing a revenue of about £T200,000. Sugar, petroleum, matches, coffee, tea, cigarette paper, and playing cards were included in the new taxes. The estimates for 1918 were, for matches £T200,000, for cigarette paper £T700,000, and for playing cards £T60,000.

For alcoholic drinks a new system of assessment was devised in 1918, which was based on a demand for 0.125 piasters for every per cent of alcohol in a liter of drink. This duty was levied by the Public Debt Administration. While it produced a revenue of £T200,734 in 1914, £T,96,582 in 1915, £T144,992 in 1916, and £T266,807 in 1917, it suddenly, under the application of the new system, reached £T582,760 and exceeded £T1,000,000 in 1919.

A tax upon war earnings had, since 1916, been insistently demanded by certain newspapers. On December 26, 1917, the Government reluctantly submitted such a project of law to Parliament. It was passed in 1918, but it was given no application during the War. The rates were the following: For limited liability companies, from the first 5 per cent of profits, 10 per cent of such profits; from the next 5 per cent, 15 per cent thereof; from all profits between 10 and 25 per cent, 25 per cent thereof; on all between 25 and 50 per cent, 35 per cent thereof; and 50 per cent on all profits exceeding 50 per cent. In the case of private individuals, partnerships, and joint-stock companies, the first £T500 of profits was to be taxed 5 per cent; profits between £T501 and £T2,500, 10 per cent; between £T2,501 and £T5,000, 15 per cent; between £T5,001 and £T10,000, 20 per cent; between £T10,001 and £T25,000, 25 per cent; between £T25,001 and £T50,000, 35 per cent; and all profits of £T50,000 or more, 50 per cent.

The war tax on those of military age, who for some reason or other had been exempted from military service, also proved a finan-

cial failure. This tax was of a twofold kind. It was a fixed levy of £T2.50 on salaries; and it was a tax equal to three times the tax on income in the case of merchants, manufacturers, and members of the liberal professions.

The Tax on Production.

Of the two chief sources of revenue in the Turkish budget, during the War, the taxes on production became a very prolific field of exploitation, while the customs receipts came almost entirely to an end. The former were raised in kind, in the form of 12 per cent of the gross production, and as such were passed on the armies. Owing to the increase in food prices, they constituted a larger income for the Government than the figures in the budget indicated. The Government attempted to buy from producers, under compulsion, an amount equal to the tax, at prices determined by itself. This procedure created a general feeling of revolt. The people in some centers, like Konia, obtained religious decisions upon it to the effect that the delivery of the first twelfth to the state was ordered by religion, while the imposition of a second constituted an irreligious act. Toward the end of the War the Government found it impossible to buy at compulsory prices, and had to pay the market price in cash to buy foodstuffs in any quantity.

As trade relations with the outside world were at a standstill, the customs receipts had almost wholly ceased, and the custom houses were quite idle. None the less, a new and specific tariff began to be put in operation instead of the old *ad valorem* system. This tariff had been drafted before the War by the British expert in the Turkish customs service with a view to its being applied as soon as the Powers would consent to the abrogation of the Capitulations. The new freedom acquired by the state of war was taken advantage of to apply the tariff immediately. The old *ad valorem* rate was uniformly 11 per cent. The new tariff provided for duties on a weight basis, which, normally would mean from 20 to 25 per cent. But, as a matter of fact, no more than 2 or 3 per cent could be raised; for all commodities had risen in value, while paper money had depreciated. The Government shrank from using a gold standard for customs duties, for it might restrict the importation of foreign goods, which were so desirable and necessary in war-time.

While the revenues constantly decreased during the War, there

was a steady increase in expenditures. The actual budgetary provisions for expenditures were the following:

	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Total credits authorized by the Chamber</i>	<i>Actual expenditures</i>	<i>Actual deficits</i>
	£T30,539,545	£T.....	£T.....	£T.....
1909-1910	£T30,539,545	£T.....	£T.....	£T.....
1910-1911	35,994,587	37,002,276
1911-1912	41,161,729	39,627,052	29,908,282	2,638,531
1912-1913	36,891,366	57,164,452	38,919,877	10,375,118
1913-1914	36,891,366	49,395,788	35,329,950	6,128,085
1914-1915	37,054,605	73,932,320	57,841,339	33,102,175
1915-1916	38,451,440	84,722,237	65,546,105	43,219,312
1916-1917	42,347,421	100,706,659	82,980,780	57,781,254
1917-1918	60,288,787	116,915,452	85,226,362
1918-1919	60,146,352	136,888,532	94,509,235

The figures for expenditures have no real meaning; they are nothing but vague estimates. Expenditures for the War, which took the largest place in the budgets, had a confidential character, and no account was ever rendered in their case. They were entered in the budget of a grand total, without any details. In general, the budgetary *régime* existed only in a nominal way during the War. The final accounts of the actual receipts and expenditures, constitutionally required, were never prepared in the war years. The budgets were applied to some extent, so far as non-military matters were concerned. In that case, the court of accounts had the right of prepayment control over the detailed items of expenditure.

The actual expenditures for war cannot be determined in any exact way. Even if the available figures are accepted as corresponding to the truth, they do not convey the right idea of the situation, because many compulsory services and requisitions remained unpaid for, and unrecorded. Besides, the lack of means or a careless conception of economic interests caused the military authorities to waste a large part of the country's actual productive capital, and it cannot be valued as are ordinary commodities.

In view of the disproportion between revenues and expenditures, this question will occur as a matter of course: "How was it possible to fill the gap?" The principal method was to contract foreign or domestic debts, and make requisitions. The second method was to allow hardly any increase in salaries, although the value of paper money kept depreciating, and the cost of living rose to 2,000 per

cent above normal, if measured in paper money. As salaries constituted nearly one-half of the budget, this procedure was certainly a vast measure of economy for the Treasury, but it was an unbearable war burden for those who lived on such salaries.

As for the total debt contracted, Turkey entered the War with a national debt of £T170,648,107, or about \$750,851,671. A portion of this had to be deducted, as three of the older loans constituted charges against Egypt. They amounted together to £T17,041,750.

War Debts in Paper Money.

The issue of paper money must be regarded as the chief means of contracting war debts. Until the second year of the War Turkey's currency was almost exclusively gold and silver, and amounted to about £T50,000,000, or \$228,800,000, to which must be added the equivalent of about £T10,000,000 in foreign metallic money. Bank notes in circulation amounted only to some £T1,000,000, issued by the Ottoman Bank.

During the War, the issue of new paper had to be contemplated. At first it was planned to make it an increase of the notes of the Ottoman Bank. That institution, although almost a state bank in Turkey, was in reality an enemy—a Franco-British—institution, and could not but refuse. Arrangements were then made to have the Public Debt Administration, which, during the War, represented only German, Austrian, and Turkish bondholders, supervise such paper-money issues.

The first issue, one of £T6,583,094, as authorized by the law of June 13, 1915, was fully covered by gold loaned by Germany. In accordance with an agreement signed on July 3 by the Turkish Government and the Public Debt Administration, the latter would receive gold to the value of £T6,583,094 in Berlin from the German Government, deposit it in the vaults of the Deutsche Bank under its own seal, and retain full liberty to have it transported to Constantinople, to any part of the allied countries, or even to a neutral country. The paper would be redeemed in full in gold six months after the conclusion of peace. It was stipulated in the law that the paper money should be legal tender and equal in value to gold. Those who refused to recognize this value were liable to a fine of from £T1 to £T15, or to anywhere from one day to one month in prison.

The law authorizing the second issue was passed on October 31,

1915. It made possible new notes to the value of £T6,000,000, not covered directly by gold, but by German treasury notes of equal value, which were delivered in Berlin to the Public Debt Administration and kept in Berlin under its seal. The second issue was redeemable in gold a year after the conclusion of peace.

On November 22, 1915, £T750,000 was added to the first issue. The law of February 16, 1916, authorized the Government to add £T1,240,000 to the second issue.

On February 28, 1916, a third issue of £T11,510,000 took place, guaranteed by German treasury bonds and payable in gold a year after the conclusion of peace. On July 23, £T900,000 was added to the second issue. On July 25, 1916, £T200,000 was added to the third issue. The provisional law of August 6, 1916, authorized the Government to make a fourth issue of £T30,000,000, covered by German treasury notes and payable within five years in equal yearly instalments. This period was to begin two years after the conclusion of peace. Parliament ratified this law on December 21, 1916, with this amendment: The amount of the fourth issue was increased to £T35,981,400. A fifth issue of £T42,500,000 took place under the law of February 4, 1917. It was also guaranteed by German treasury bonds, and payable in gold in yearly payments of from six to ten million during a period of four years, to begin after the period of payment of the fourth issue was terminated. An agreement was made with the Public Debt Administration which confined the issue to £T32,000,000. A further agreement signed on October 4, 1917, raised the amount of the fourth issue to £T53,981,000 by a newly added £T18,000,000.

A sixth issue of £T32,000,000 took place on October 4, 1917. It was made redeemable in gold in sums of from £T6,000,000 to £T10,000,000 within a period of four years, to begin after the redemption of the fifth issue had been completed.

On September 25, 1918, £T6,000,000 was further added to the fourth issue, increasing it to a total of £T59,981,400. On the same date a seventh issue of £T24,000,000 was made. This brought the total to about £T160,000,000.

The War Debt after the War.

As this paper money was directly guaranteed by Germany, it amounted at first to a foreign loan. After the War, the gold re-

serves in Germany and Austria were seized by the Entente Powers in accordance with the peace treaties, and accepted later, by way of compromise, as a payment for war damages suffered by Entente citizens in Turkey. Thus these issues of paper currency lost the character of a foreign loan, and were no longer covered by gold or by any other kind of guarantee. They managed, however, to maintain a relatively high value on account of Turkey's insistently shrinking from any sort of inflation. Their gradual fall from year to year is to be ascribed rather to the adverse trade balance than to any lack of guarantee. Turkey's paper currency had laid no charge upon the Government. In addition to paying no interest, Turkey is not put to the expense of supporting a gold reserve.

While making possible these issues of paper money Germany and Austria also advanced to the Turkish Government various sums of money in gold, silver, marks, crowns, and Turkish pounds, as well as materials of war in kind. In addition to the above sum deposited in gold to the account of the Public Debt Administration as a guarantee of the first issue of paper, Germany advanced Turkey £T8,689,094 in gold, £T2,321,273 in silver, £T16,560,774 in German paper money, and £T22,237,637 in marks. Austria advanced Turkey £T2,109,724 as her part of the first paper issue, besides £T57,546 in gold and £T6,317,911 in kroner.¹ In accordance with the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, Turkey was entirely freed from this indebtedness. Furthermore, Turkey rid herself of the obligation to pay Germany and Austria for some £T40,000,000 worth of war supplies. The warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* also became Turkish property, without any payment therefor. The Entente Powers resorted to these measures to improve Turkey's financial strength; they relieved her from her debts to her former allies for the purpose of enabling her to pay a high war indemnity to the Allied Powers. As the Treaty of Lausanne did not admit of the principle of war indemnity, the whole policy merely resulted in freeing Turkey from all war debts to foreign countries.

The national debt, amounting to £T170,648,107 in 1914, nominally rose to £T465,673,338 as a result of the War. But the real situation was this:

The total consolidated, outstanding foreign debt of Turkey on

¹ Mears, *op. cit.*, pp. 403 ff.

March 1, 1923, was £T146,475,081. Of this £T16,353,216 must be deducted, as it represents the three loans—those of 1855, 1891, and 1894—guaranteed by Egyptian tribute and the so-called “surplus receipts” of Cyprus. Under the Treaty of Lausanne the territories detached from Turkey as a result of the Great War and the Balkan War were to assume their proportionate shares of the £T129,384,910 held to be the debt to be allotted. The determination of the proportionate shares was left to an arbiter appointed by the League of Nations. Under a decision rendered by him in April, 1925, they were assigned according to the following ratios: Turkey, 62.25 per cent, or £T84,597,495, Greece 10.57 per cent, Serbia 5.25 per cent, Syria and Greater Lebanon 8.17 per cent, Irak 3.96 per cent, other Arab states 3.90 per cent, Palestine 2.47 per cent, Bulgaria 1.63 per cent, Albania 1.57 per cent, and Italy 0.23 per cent.

The debts to Germany and Austria, being canceled by the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, the War has not increased the foreign indebtedness of Turkey. As a consequence of the pre-war debt's being distributed among the various parts of the old Empire, the foreign debt has even decreased to one-half of the pre-war amount.

The question whether the interest should be paid in gold, in Turkish pounds, or in some other form of exchange was left open by the Treaty of Lausanne. Therefore it is impossible to say at the time of writing² what sort of charge the foreign indebtedness constitutes for the Turkish treasury.

While the War has practically decreased the foreign indebtedness of Turkey, some internal debts were contracted which are now becoming a charge upon the treasury. The law of April 3, 1918, authorized the Government to make the first internal loan in Turkey. This was not meant merely as a means of obtaining ready money for war expenses. The idea was to save the paper money from a fresh depreciation by adding a new issue, the eighth, to those before it, and thus once for all establish the Government's credit throughout the country. Very liberal terms were, therefore, offered to subscribers. Interest of 2½ per cent in gold was to be paid semiannually, or a total of 5 per cent. One per cent in gold was to be devoted

² Early in 1928. For the final settlement, reached in May, 1928, see Appendix II.

annually to amortization. The interest for the first six months was to be paid in gold on the day of the subscription. Definite government revenues were assigned to the service of the loan. In addition, payment in gold was guaranteed by Germany. The subscription, opened on May 1, was closed in Constantinople on May 31, and in the provinces on June 30. The campaign for the loan was carried out with great skill and with forms of advertising unusual in Turkey. All the country's intellectual forces were mobilized for this purpose. The subscriptions reached £T17,851,120, an amount unexpectedly high for a first internal loan.

Taxing by Requisitions.

Requisitions formed one of the most important means of filling the gap between revenues and expenses. As they did not stop at articles of military necessity and included all sorts of commercial goods, they may be looked upon as an indiscriminate, irregular, and illegal war tax. From the beginning of 1917 they had to be made a matter of public record. Up to March of that year requisitions totaling £T7,850,000 were so recorded, and, to the year end, £T30,000,000. The grand total has been put at £T50,000,000.

Unpaid salaries, unpaid interest on portions of the public debt held by enemy subjects, property taken from Rumania and the Ukraine, and damages to public and private property must be added to the foregoing in order to form an idea of the gross material losses caused by the War. Larcher estimates that the total war losses suffered by Turkey amount to 10,000,000,000 francs. Mehmed Emin, a Turkish military author, puts his estimate at £T500,000,000. Seligman's figure is £T1,800,000,000. Turkish financial experts do not admit that the amount exceeds £T250,000,000. They maintain that the ships sunk during the War were of small importance, and that the damage to property and means of production did not represent a great sum, compared with the losses in industrial countries. They agree that the greatest price was paid in human life. In point of fact, Turkey lost half her pre-war territory of 2,410,000 square kilometers, and half her population of twenty-one or twenty-two millions.⁸

⁸ According to the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey pays no reparation. A demand for the payment of the costs of the Allied occupation, which amounted,

Unifying the Currency.

Various attempts at financial reform were made during the War. The most positive and lasting of them was the unification of the currency. Before the War, gold and silver coins had eighty-eight different valuations in various parts of the Empire and for varying commercial transactions. The gold pound was accepted in certain connections as being equivalent to 100 piasters. In all dealings with the Government it had a par value of 102.50 piasters. In general business in Constantinople it was worth 108 piasters, and in many provinces, 255 piasters. In some provinces, the pound had a different value, in wholesale transactions, for every sort of commodity.

The "Law for the Unification of the Currency," enacted on April 14, 1916, contains the following principles:

1. The basis of Turkish currency shall be gold, and its unit the piaster.

2. The piaster which represents the unit of gold currency is to be of nickel and contain forty paras.⁴

3. (This article enumerates the varieties of coins in nickel, silver, and gold, and prescribes their exact composition.)

4. The maximum amount compulsory for legal tender in the case of silver shall be three hundred piasters, and in the case of nickel fifty piasters. No one shall be obliged to accept any greater sum.

5. The use of varying currency rates usual in different parts of the Empire is henceforth prohibited. No speculation in money tending to make its value greater or less than its legal value is permissible.

6. Money operations which may tend to produce fluctuations from the legal rate are forbidden. For such breaches of the law penalties of from three months to two years in prison may be imposed.

7. Debts contracted before the promulgation of this law shall be paid in the currency specified. If there is no such specification, paper money shall, in general, be accepted as legal tender. But this shall

in the case of the British army alone, to £29,115,000, was withdrawn. In addition to the gold reserves deposited to Turkey's credit by Germany and Austria, the sum paid by Turkey for two battleships ordered in Great Britain is to constitute a general settlement of claims for damages made by Entente subjects.

⁴ The para is worth one-fortieth of a piaster and was up to a century ago, an actual copper coin.

not hold for the State. In all transactions with it, the only legal tender shall be such currency as has hereby been declared to be so.

The new law did not make any actual mention of the paper currency. As it was supposed to have the guarantee of gold behind it, it was taken as a matter of course that it would be regarded as being the same as gold. The penalties assigned by the law were likewise applicable to those who tried to create a difference in value between paper and gold. In this regard, however, the Law for the Unification of the Currency was powerless, and the State had soon to tolerate the difference in value between paper and gold. Still, the law succeeded in unifying the currency in most of the commercial centers of the country, where paper money was the basis for all transactions. There gold was purchased as a commodity. In the eastern provinces the situation was the opposite. In them, until recent times, gold and silver had been the regular means of exchange, while paper had been accepted only according to the current exchange rates.

CHAPTER XIV

REFORMS DURING THE WAR

Growing Freedom and Progress.

ALTHOUGH the men ruling Turkey during the War proved incapable of dealing with economic problems created by the War, they must be conceded some degree of success in framing various administrative and social reforms.

A time of war, particularly under the circumstances existing in Turkey, must seem at first sight hardly propitious for any sort of radical reform activity; and to understand the various radical measures taken by the Turkish war Government, three factors must be held in mind:

1. During the War Turkey was freer than before it to take every sort of initiative, because her relationship with the outside world as based on the Capitulations had ceased. The Entente Powers, being at war with Turkey, could not interfere in Turkish affairs. Germany and Austria had to treat Turkey on an equal footing as an ally, and were obliged to abstain from meddling in what were strictly her private concerns.

2. Religious fanaticism, which had blocked the way in the case of many social reforms, lost its power after the failure of the Holy War; and the state of affairs dreamed of by some Turkish radicals as an "enlightened despotism" was almost established.

3. The close contact with Germany was a stimulus in many respects.

These factors did not produce immediate and lasting results in all parts of the Empire. In Constantinople itself, however, and especially during the latter years of the War, there was an atmosphere that was markedly intelligent and progressive, in spite of all the abuses and shortcomings in government affairs and in economic life. Mr. Leo Stürmer, who spent a part of the war period in Turkey as the correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung*, and afterward, while in Switzerland, published a volume that was pro-Entente, says this of the new atmosphere in Turkey:¹ "The War with its enormous intellectual activity has certainly brought all political and economic

¹ *Zwei Kriegsjahre in der Türkei*, Geneva, 1916, p. 160.

resources to the highest possible stage of development. The work accomplished, be it good or bad, is clever technically, and there is modern exactness and thoroughness of conception in it."

Some special aspects of war-time reforms will be dealt with in the chapters on religion, women, Turkish nationalism, and social welfare. The remaining reforms contemplated and carried out by the war Government will be discussed in the present chapter.

One of the main projects of the war Government was the establishment of a state of perfect equality in Turkey's relations with the foreign world. As early as September 8, 1914, she gave notice that the Capitulations had been ended forever. This attempt to take advantage of European complications had nowhere met with favor. The Entente, not desiring to exasperate Turkey, had protested, but not very strongly, against her action. Germany was much more vehement. The German ambassador, angry at such a step being taken without his being consulted, solemnly declared that Germany would not oppose the Entente, if it desired to force the Dardanelles and punish Turkey for her audacity; and he did all he could in an indirect way, to persuade the Entente ambassadors to take collective action in the name of European solidarity. The Entente Powers did not, however, consent to share in a collective step, where an enemy power had taken the initiative.

During the War, Turkish leaders were well aware that only a decisive military victory could render the abrogation of the Capitulations permanent. In case Turkey lost, a situation worse than a *ré-gime* of Capitulations must be contemplated; and there was no sort of step that could be taken to meet such a calamity. Some pro-Entente politicians tried to leave a door open by according friendly treatment to enemy subjects and institutions. The Government concentrated its strength in an effort to make Germany and Austria recognize the independence of Turkey. On November 1, 1916, it took a further step by declaring null and void all international conventions in which there remained any traces of the era of the Capitulations, or of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, or of the Treaty of Berlin.

Only on January 11, 1917, could a positive answer from Germany be obtained. On that day the new treaties which were to regulate the permanent relations between the two countries were ratified by Germany. They were based on principles of international law and en-

tirely ignored the Capitulations. As a special favor to Turkey, or as a curious coincidence, the ratification took place just one day after the Entente Powers had proclaimed, in their collective answer to Mr. Wilson's peace note, that one of their war aims called for "the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks" and "the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to Western Civilization."

Besides these diplomatic efforts toward self-assertion Turkey sought to become worthy of her new independence in legal and economic matters by preparing new codes of civil and commercial laws, and by devising certain prison reforms. Through these reforms objections were to be met which might be made by foreigners in connection with the abolition of the Capitulations.

A special commission was formed to make a study of internal administration and of local variations of provincial government, with a view to establishing a new system, and one more in harmony with conditions actually existing. Administrative inspectors and directors of public education were asked to prepare reports on the social situation and on the effects of the Government's measures in their spheres of activity.

German Help in Reform.

A great number of German experts were engaged to assist the Government in its work of reform, and to try to improve government methods. German advisers were attached to the Ministries of Education, Commerce, Agriculture, and Justice; and an Austrian adviser was attached to the Department of Forestry. These advisers were given the status of undersecretaries of state, though they possessed only an advisory authority. Other important offices offered to the Germans included the position of director general of statistics, the directorship of the Agricultural Bank, and that of the Boy Scout movement. The University engaged nineteen German professors for its various faculties. But most of these foreign advisers were of no great actual assistance, for they had to leave the country, as a result of the armistice, just when they had studied local conditions and were in a position to give advice that would be useful.

Revising the Calendar.

The War saw the initiation of another series of reforms, which, secondary in themselves, were important enough as tests of the new

radical orientation. To begin with, the European method of reckoning time took the place of the old Turkish method. In the Turkish system, the fixed element was not noon, but sunset. As the hours for the five daily prayers were fixed according to the Turkish system, European time conflicted with religious prejudices, as well as with daily habits. Its adoption certainly created bitter resentment, and was applied outside of Constantinople only to a very limited extent.

The reform of the calendar also produced some discontent. Three different calendars were in use in Turkey up to the time of the World War. They were:

1. *The Lunar calendar.* This reckoned time from the hegira on. It had fallen into disuse as a practical means of reckoning time. It appeared in newspapers and on some government documents, as an additional date, but was actually used only for fixing the time of religious festivals and calculating the nights of full moon.

The religious authorities did not sanction any fixing of the new moon by astronomical methods; the new lunar month was considered to have begun when the new moon had been seen by at least two Mohammedan witnesses. In bad weather, this could not be done; therefore the lunar month began on different dates in different localities. If the moon could not be seen on account of bad weather, the lunar month was made to last thirty days. The maximum concession theologians could make to modern methods in this regard consisted in the permission, granted during the War, to spread by telegraph the news that the new moon had been seen.

2. *The Julian calendar.* As the lunar calendar was found to be inappropriate for government business, as well as for commercial purposes, the Julian or Roman calendar had been copied from the Greeks in the second half of the nineteenth century, without however, the use of the Christian date. There was also this difference: The new year was calculated from March on. At first, the number of solar years was used in calculation of events since the hegira. But the difference between lunar and solar time—about ten days a year—gradually became apparent. The difference was artificially done away with by adding a year to the Julian calendar, as soon as the need arose. Then this method was given up, the year mentioned in the Julian calendar not meaning anything at all.

3. *The Gregorian calendar,* which differed by thirteen days from the Roman.

A law, specially promulgated during the War, aimed to unify the calendar and end those practical difficulties which the use of three calendars could not but give rise to. The Gregorian calendar was uniformly adopted, but the Government did not dare to go as far as the adoption of the Christian year. The old, artificial year of the Julian calendar was kept, being used as a compromise.

The unification of the monetary system has been spoken of in the chapter on finance. The law calling for the unification of weights and measures and the exclusive adoption of the metric system, a question which had come up at the same time, was nothing but the reenactment of a law passed in 1863. It had, however, never been enforced; nor was the new law of any greater success. As a result of newspaper criticism, the Minister of Interior was asked, in Parliament, why the law remained merely a paper law, and why the confusion in regard to weights and measures still continued. The state of war was given as an excuse.

In all these reforms the word "unification" was used, in order not to let people see at first that a systematic adoption of western ways and methods was being carried out.

Besides these general attempts at reform, much zealous activity was displayed in Syria by Djemal Pasha, who had practically the position of viceroy and played the rôle of an enlightened despot. He had gathered around him many educated Turks and German experts. In spite of the difficult task he already had, that of commanding the forces on the Palestine front, and at the same time that of handling the Arab problem, he found time for modern city planning, the construction of new roads and water and sewer systems, the opening of new schools, new experiments in agriculture, and the making of archaeological excavations. As mentioned in the chapter on war government, the Vali of Smyrna felt himself to be independent enough to ignore the War entirely. He entered upon reforms of his own, and even continued stubbornly to cooperate with enemy residents.

When Turkey took possession of Batum, Kars, and Ardahan, certain reforms were also made in those parts, to give Turks in Russia a fair illustration of Turkish administration. While the home country was generally misruled, the most energetic and capable officials were sent to the new territory to establish a smoothly working, efficient, and honest administration.

Encouraging the Fine Arts.

Its position as an enlightened despotism also stimulated the Government to take interest in the furthering of the fine arts. A provisional law made it compulsory upon the authorities to organize annual exhibitions of paintings. These exhibitions were regularly held from 1916 on. The Government, and the leading members of it, individually, likewise aided painters by giving them large orders. This encouragement inaugurated a flourishing period in Turkish painting. Several young artists, both men and women, acquired prominence, and some excellent work was produced.

Music also enjoyed the special protection of the Government. In May, 1917, two conservatories of music were opened in Constantinople, one for men, the other for women. And in these schools the first steps were taken toward giving the preference to western music as compared with oriental.

On the other hand, ancient Turkish architecture, and certain other arts, such as expert penmanship, the decoration of books, and fine bookbinding in the old style, all apparently doomed to extinction, were revived. A school was opened to give instruction in them. A Turkish museum of furniture, household utensils, and antique textiles was organized, with the idea of creating among the people a national taste. For the same purpose, the old palace of the Sultan on Seraglio Point was reconstructed, every section being remodeled in the fashion of the particular period in which it was originally built.

The Turkish drama was similarly favored. The city of Constantinople granted a large subsidy to the only real theater in the country. A school for actors was opened by the city. A staff composed of the most prominent literary men was entrusted with the responsibility of choosing the plays, and of taking control in all other respects. They had to make their beginning with non-Turkish actresses, who could not even pronounce the language perfectly. Only toward the end of the War did a changing public sentiment allow the first Turkish women to appear upon the stage. In spite of the long history of the Turkish theater, it began only during the World War to give real and artistic pleasure. Such progress was, however, confined to acting. There were few original plays, most of those that were staged being adaptations from the French.

CHAPTER XV

WAR AND RELIGION

The Holy War.

THE Mohammedan religion was under two differing influences during the World War. The first aimed at increasing its importance, and using it as a means of enlisting the help of Mohammedans outside of Turkey in the German-Turkish cause. The second, on the contrary, was directed toward curbing its authority, with the object of opening the country's path to a free and rational development.

These two trends were mutually opposed, and had ultimately to engage in an open struggle for supremacy. The first was dominant between 1914 and 1916; the second after 1916.

Three weeks after Turkey joined the ranks of the belligerents, the Holy War was declared in Constantinople with great solemnities. The following proclamation was issued on November 23, 1914. It was signed by the most prominent religious dignitaries, as well as by the Sultan in his capacity of "Khalif," and addressed to all Mohammedans in the world:

Central Europe has not been able to escape the calamities let loose by the Moscovite Government in the Near and Far East with the object of enslaving humanity and annihilating the benefits of freedom, a divine gift to nations and peoples. Russia, for centuries so cruel and infuriate an enemy of human happiness, has now dragged the Governments of Great Britain and France into the World War. The national pride of these countries delights immoderately in enslaving thousands of Mohammedans. While they nourish the base aspiration of gratifying their lust of power by crushing the liberty of the populations subjected to their illegitimate and tyrannical domination, they have never ceased to manifest an inveterate hatred which drives them to menace and—so far as they can—to weaken the Khalifate, because that sublime power constitutes the main pillar of the Mohammedan world and of the strength of Islam.

The oppressive group known as the Triple Entente has not only robbed, during the last century, the Mohammedans of India, Central Asia, and most of the African countries, of their political independence, of their governments and even of their liberty; but it has also, owing to the mutual help extended by its members, caused us to lose

the most precious parts of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, in a more recent day, almost yesterday, it has been morally and materially responsible for the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of innocent Mohammedans, for the rape of thousands of Mohammedan virgins, and for the fanatical profanation of the sacred things of Islam during the Balkan War, which it provoked by encouraging and protecting our neighbors. In addition to all that, they have lately been the authors of new complications of a nature to transform the world into an immense battlefield; they are seeking to cast the fiercest sparks of this furnace of war and massacre into the very heart of the Mohammedan people, and may God forever forbid it!—to quench the lights of the divine faith.

It is clear that all those who persecute the Mohammedan religion, the embodiment of the very inspiration of the Creator (whose infinite might and whose power to chasten are inconceivable to men) for the blessing of humanity in this world, and in the next, will, sooner or later, be the victims of a heavenly wrath which will crush them body and soul. Moreover, the Servant of the two Holy Cities, the Khalif of the Mohammedans and the Commander of the Faithful has considered it as the greatest duty of the Mohammedan Khalifate to call all the Mohammedan people to a general Holy War in accordance with the rulings of the sacred fetwas, in order that we may take all measures and avail ourselves of the zeal of Mohammedans, to defend from impure defilements—with the aid of the Almighty—the tomb of the Prophet (for all the Faithful the apple of the eye) Jerusalem, Nedgef, Kerbela, the seat of the Khalifate, in short all those Mohammedan sacred places where there are relics of prophets, as well as tombs of the saints and the martyrs, and to call upon the Almighty to grant his avenging aid for the annihilation of the enemies of Islam.

The Khalif has called to arms, without any exception, all his subjects between the ages of twenty and forty-five who live beneath his rule. He is, step by step, bringing into the field for this Holy War the Imperial army and navy, the professors of the schools of theology and those teachers who till the present day have consecrated their lives to the diffusion of knowledge, the students of theology and science—the future hope of religion and the nation—most of the state officials and the children of the fatherland supporting dependent families and aged parents. In addition, this is to give to all the Faithful the order to take part in the Holy War and to accord to it the aid of their persons and their goods.

Consequently, in accordance with the terms of the sacred fetwas, all Mohammedans living in the territories exposed to the persecutions of

the above-named oppressive powers, such as the Crimea, Kazan, Turkistan, Bokhara, Khiva, India, China, Afghanistan, Persia, Africa, and other countries, must consider it, in concert with Ottomans, as their most supreme religious duty to participate in the Holy War with their bodies and goods, keeping in mind the inspirations of the Koran. This is the one way of preserving ourselves from misfortunes which might fall upon us both in this world and the next, and of gaining eternal felicity. Moreover, in consideration of the fact that our enemies are calling to arms the Mohammedans submitted to their domination, that they are sending them against the Khalif and his allies, that they are forcing them to die on the most murderous of battlefields in the East and the West, that they are committing, in other words, the thousandfold more diabolical vileness, that of committing their crimes against the Mohammedan religion by the very hands of the true Faithful, that they are thus preparing the most atrocious calamity which can befall Mohammedan hearts, the Mohammedan world should not shrink before any sacrifice that may help to make, and as soon as possible, an end to this scourge. For this purpose it is necessary to endure the more horrible oppression, believing in God. Mohammedans who will haste to take part in the Holy War in the name of their sacred religion can rely in all things on the aid of God. The chosen people who will sacrifice their lives and goods for the exaltation and the glory of the Mohammedan religion will enjoy the intercession of the Prophet on the day of judgment.

O Mohammedan brethren! In accordance with the inspirations of the Koran, the Mohammedan people have developed every kind of virtue and merit; they have acquired every good quality which humankind must make its own, and are worthy to serve as examples to the whole world. Therefore, all those who profess this sublime religion that has for its basis unity, union, character, labor and knowledge, for its object the right and welfare of men, must group themselves about the standard of Mohammed, whatever be the race, the country, and the government they belong to. They must turn their hearts toward God, their faces toward Mecca, live as one great religious people that does not recognize any master but God, that carries on its brow the sublime sign of divine majesty, and gives proof of its capacity to resist its oppressors and disturbers who aim to injure its greatness.

O Mohammedans, true servants of God! Those who will share in the Holy War and come back alive will enjoy a great felicity; those who will find in it their death will have the honor of martyrdom. In accordance with the promise of God, those who will sacrifice themselves for

the cause of right, will have glory and happiness here below, as well as in Paradise.

O Mohammedans, aspiring to glory and happiness, ready to sacrifice your lives and goods, and to defy all perils and difficulties in the defense of right, group yourselves with solidarity and with united hearts around the imperial throne, in accordance with the order of the Supreme Being who has promised us felicity in this world and in the world to come. Embrace, as one body, the pedestal of the Khalifate and hold it in mind that it is the Commander of the Faithful, the Khalif of Mohammedans, engaged in war with Russia, France, Great Britain, and their allies, all bitter enemies of Islam, who calls you to the Holy War.

Mohammedan warriors! With the aid of God and the intercession of the Prophet, you will defeat and crush the enemies of religion, and you will fill all Mohammedan hearts with eternal joy in accordance with the divine promise.

Signed: Haïri, Sheikh-ul-Islam; Ziaeddin, Moussa Kiazim, and Essad; all of whom preceded him as Sheikh-ul-Islam; Ali Haïhar, fetwa emini,¹ and with them the names of twenty-five other high religious dignitaries.

The Appeal Fails.

This ardent appeal to religious solidarity constituted a social experiment of immense scope, undertaken in connection with the World War. It ended in complete failure, proving that at the present time we can rightly attribute to religion only a limited influence as an incentive to spontaneous and voluntary sacrifice. It is true that the experiment was not made under favorable conditions. The distances were great, the possibilities of communication lacking in the territories engaged in war. But results in the territories with a population left a free choice to follow the holy call to arms were not more promising. The net military result of the proclamation of the Holy War may be estimated by the measures of precaution it caused the Entente Powers to take. They merely did not proceed at once to enlist everywhere large numbers of Mohammedan soldiers, and they had to keep about half a million men,² in part white troops, in Mohammedan territories with a view to crushing every possible desire and inclination to revolt. In 1915 France enlisted only 2,500 men

¹ The "fetwa emini" was the highest of those religious dignitaries who were authorized to make religious decisions.

² Larcher, *op. cit.*, p. 528.

in Algiers; but this number was increased to 50,000 in 1918. Great Britain was able to use a large number of Mohammedan soldiers even against the Turkish front. In general, the propaganda connected with the Holy War did not seriously menace any of the Entente colonies, and did not prove to be a means of saving German colonies. In the case of Turkey, Pan-Islamic agitation was of some use in stirring the religious feelings of the Kurdish and Arab peoples, to a certain extent, in the first year of the War. Some advantage was also taken of Mohammedan prisoners of war who had, however, no really free choice.

There was in Turkey little disillusionment in this meager result of the proclamation of a Holy War, because only a small minority expected much from it. This minority was composed of a few fanatics who really dreamed of a universal theocracy which would unite all Mohammedans in one great empire and rule it according to the laws of Mohammed's time. They were especially intent upon opposing the development of racial and national differences, and with them class feeling, among Mohammedans. For many political leaders who could hardly be called religious believers, the Holy War had two meanings. It gave Turkey moral prestige in the eyes of Germany, and it was one sort of counter-propaganda against the Entente Powers, who very rightly counted on the minorities in Turkey as their natural allies.

For the general public in Turkey a Holy War meant no more than one of the endless street demonstrations of the time. The procession which ended in the proclamation of the Holy War in the court of the Fatih mosque⁸ in Stamboul was neither very numerous nor very enthusiastic. It was generally known that a call to arms could not have any influence on independent or semi-independent Mohammedan countries such as Persia, Afghanistan, and Morocco. They gave little recognition to the supremacy of the Khalif, because recognition would result for them in political subordination. The Holy War had not much effect on the Shi'ite Mohammedans. Generally speaking, the Mohammedans living in European dependencies looked up to the Khalif with veneration and envy, because they took pride in Turkey's being the largest seemingly independent Mohammedan country, and because it ruled over millions of Chris-

⁸ The mosque built by Mohammed the Conqueror.

tians. These feelings meant, however, an interest in improving their own conditions of existence and not a spirit of sacrifice in favor of Turkey. The anti-European agitators in such dependencies made it a matter of course to migrate to Turkey whenever they felt unsafe in their own homes. There were also among them idealists of a higher order who felt a deep sense of revolt against the general subjugation of Mohammedan people to European imperialism. They wanted to create a new consciousness of religious unity in Mohammedan countries, and end that lethargy which is the final result of orthodox uniformity.

Pan-Islamism.

To them were partly due the Pan-Islamic currents in Turkey. The most important of these pioneers was Djemaliddine Afghani who sought to use Pan-Islamism as a weapon against the military and economic imperialism of Europe. In 1880, he formulated his principles in the following manner:⁴

Mohammedans must eject every European and Christian from their countries. Europeans call fanaticism in the Orient everything which at home they might well term nationalism and patriotism. Conceptions held high in the West, such as self-respect, national pride and national prestige, are looked down upon in the East as chauvinism. An exclusive national consciousness is encouraged in the West, but is given the name of "xenophobia" when it is found in the East. We should not be fooled by the Europeans; they are united in their efforts to destroy Mohammedanism. Mohammedans must awaken, they must unite and have faith in knowledge and economic activity. The loss of Constantinople stimulated the people of the Western world to fresh efforts. In their extreme fear they began to equip themselves with new ideas and new ways of doing things. This enabled them to conquer the East. The Mohammedans are today in the same desperate position. They must do away with their theological differences, reform their religion, improve their way of writing. The crusades have never ceased. The hostility of Europe to Asia is a fact to be reckoned with. The Europeans wish to get hold of our wealth, to make colonies of our territories, and slaves of ourselves. They do not look upon Mohammedans as human beings; we have no rights in their eyes. They call us barbarians, try to sow discord among us, and are set upon destroying Turkey as the principal pillar of Islam.

⁴ Riza Nour, *Turkish History*, I, 189.

This agitation had greatly appealed to the vanity of Abdul-Hamid. He offered his hospitality to all Pan-Islamic agitators, and sent consuls, emissaries, and missionaries to all countries with Mohammedan populations, to China and India, to Africa, Java, the Philippines, and Japan. His attempt to build a railway from Palestine to Hedjaz with money subscribed by the Mohammedans of the whole world was one of his chief undertakings of this sort. People in Turkey had little interest in such a policy. Their own unhappy situation left them no great leisure to enjoy the enterprises of imperialism. For a nation dependent upon primitive forms of agriculture, such a movement did not correspond to the actualities of life.

In reality, the whole myth of Pan-Islamism was more than anything else a creation of European minds. Things Mohammedan had in these minds an aspect incapable of being reduced to terms of normal human behavior, and Pan-Islamism had an aspect highly mysterious and unknowable. Possible developments, to be brought about by Mohammedan religious fanaticism, were not subjected to any final analysis of pure reason. It was hardly understood that solidarity, in so far as it existed among Mohammedans, was due only to a very limited extent to the idea of spiritual oneness, but much more to the general result of local nationalistic developments and common hostility to foreign domination and exploitation.

German Policies Based on Mohammedan Solidarity.

Germany built up a whole Near-Eastern policy on the potential results of Mohammedan solidarity. As explained in a former chapter, Abdul-Hamid could make up his mind to engage openly in Pan-Islamic agitation only after he received direct encouragement from Germany on the occasion of the first visit of the German emperor to Constantinople, in 1889. In that year Pan-German expectations, as based on Pan-Islamism, were formulated as follows by Friedrich Naumann:⁵

It is possible that the World War will break out before the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. If it does, the Khalif of Constantinople will once more uplift the standard of the Holy War. The Sick Man will raise himself for the last time to cry aloud to Egypt, to the Soudan, to

⁵ Quoted by Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan, and India: "War against England!" It is not unimportant to know who will support him on his bed, when he utters this cry.

Germany took advantage of every possibility to prepare the ground for this rôle, and the Kaiser continued systematically to do everything he could to imprint on the minds of Mohammedans the idea that they would always find in him their supporter, friend, and leader.

When the World War broke out, Germany made an independent appeal to the Mohammedan world, long before Turkey entered the War. In a proclamation by the German Emperor, issued on September 9, 1914, it was declared⁶ that Germany did not consider Mohammedans as belligerents and that Mohammedan soldiers, made prisoners by German armies, would be sent to Turkey and put at the disposal of the Khalif.

In the actual Holy War, the ideas of nationalism and local interests, successfully advocated by Great Britain, proved to be more potent than the purely religious appeal made by Turkey. While Pan-Islamism did not prove to be any great military menace to Great Britain, British agitation among the Arabs was, in the second year of the War, already yielding good fruit. Even Mecca, the spiritual center of Islam, fell under British influence, and the Emir of Mecca, a descendant of the Prophet, took the Entente side.

These events were not openly discussed in Turkey. The only explicit allusion to them consisted in the *communiqué* published in Turkish papers on June 18, 1916, to the effect that "it had become necessary to remove Sheriff Hussein from his office as Emir of Mecca, and that his place had been given to Sheriff Ali Haidar Pasha."

The underlying social changes brought about by the failure of Pan-Islamism were, however, tremendous in importance. Up to that time, the war situation had been taken advantage of by the Pan-Islamists to increase the prestige and authority of religion. The Nationalists and Modernists had kept silent because the Holy War had officially, been treated as a military weapon of aggression. As soon, however, as the failure had become too apparent, the Nationalists in power decided to take the opposite stand, and to use their unlimited

⁶ Larcher, *op. cit.*, p. 526.

authority as a war government for the purpose of ending that un-moving stagnation which in many respects had been imposed on the country by religious dogmas.

The New Nationalism.

The nationalist movement, which aimed at limiting the activities of religion to considerations of the world to come, and forbidding it to interfere with new social and economic developments, was headed by Zia Goek Alp, already mentioned, the professor of sociology in Constantinople University and a member of the General Council of Union and Progress.⁷

In Western Europe [he wrote] conceptions of religious association and national association are kept distinct from one another. In the East, where social development is still much retarded, most people are not conscious of their social identity. They often give wrong answers to questions about their religion and their nationality. The only common bond among the members of a religious brotherhood consists in religion; while nationality has in common—and apart from religion—language, morals, laws, fine arts, economics, science, philosophy, and methods of procedure. All these may vary in character and degree of development among the adherents of a single religion; but they are one and the same for the citizens of a country. The sum total of a nation's religious, moral, legal, political, aesthetic, economic and educational institutions may be called its "culture." Citizenship of a country denotes relationship within the same culture. A religious brotherhood in general comprises various nationalities, and has to be looked upon as something international. Religious and national institutions were intermingled in mediæval Europe. They have now become distinct and independent. Social evolution results always in division of labor; this in its turn necessitates a discrimination of groups which have varying purposes and are based on different kinds of solidarity. Turkish society cannot escape the effects of the social evolution which Europe has been submitted to. It must entirely separate its national institutions from those religious institutions that are common to the whole brotherhood of Mohammedanism.

This was a direct attack on the remains of theocracy in Turkey, and it was not suffered to remain merely in the field of theory. The

⁷ *Khalifate and National Sovereignty*, a collection of various essays published by the Government, Angora, 1923.

Government proposed, at the party conference of 1916, a project of law which would cover the matter of the unification of the laws.

The motives of this fundamental innovation⁸ were formulated in a rather curious way. The Government did not advance any direct claim to a right to extend its own authority. It wished to give religious institutions which came under the authority of the Sheikh-ul-Islam every opportunity to perform their proper religious duties. Certain secondary functions were now absorbing all their attention, and leaving them no leisure for their chief work. When Turkey's judicial system was Westernized, in 1871, jurisdiction over some sections of civil law was left to religious tribunals. These civil tribunals were now to be incorporated in the general judicial system of Turkey. In addition, the guardianship of orphans, the care of pious foundations and the management of primary schools deriving their income from such foundations were to be taken from the Sheikh-ul-Islam and given to the competent departments of state. The domain of pure religion, relieved from such unnecessary burdens, was to devote its energy to two important purposes; it would have charge of morals and the interpretation of religious dogmas. Its moral task would, broadly, be that of strengthening the bonds of morality among the people, which would be done by preaching, the press, and the modern training of religious teachers. "Interpretation" would consist of the filling of the gaps between religious dogmas as generally accepted, and modern science and philosophy.

This apparent zeal to strengthen the prestige of religious institutions did not blind religious dignitaries and those who shared their convictions. They knew quite well that the real purpose was to safeguard the national movement at the expense of the authority of religion. They were also aware that the Government was not, out of kindness, freeing the domain of religion from unpleasant burdens, but was putting into effect the theory of Zia Goek Alp that the State should not allow any institution to share its general authority. This attitude the Pan-Islamists could not tolerate under any form or excuse. They maintained, first, that national distinctions were not admissible under Mohammedan dogma. Secondly, they believed in the unification of the general authority of the state, but that unification ought to take place within the bosom of religion; the foreign

⁸ Extracts from the report presented to the conference.

institutions which had gradually been introduced, by way of compromise, ought to give place to a rigid execution of religious laws and to a return to the conditions existing in "the blessed period of felicity,"—that is, to the time of Mohammed.

No Renewal of "The Blessed Period of Felicity."

The conflict between the two forces was high and violent; but it was fought out behind the scenes. In the press, only Nationalist ideas could be given voice. The old ideal secretly cherished by Turkish intellectuals that an enlightened despotism should crush fanatical opposition and freely introduce western institutions as a consistent whole, had come very near to being realized. The weekly *Sebil-ul-Rechad*, the violent mouthpiece of the religious fanatics, was suppressed for two years and was allowed to reappear only at the close of the War. The civil government had insisted on its suppression; and the Prime Minister gave the following evasive answer to a question asked in the Chamber by conservative deputies: "There is a war censorship everywhere in the world; and the suppression of the *Sebil-ul-Rechad* is solely a question of censorship." All other fanatical organs were similarly treated in revenge for the long silence imposed on the educated classes by religious intolerance.

The above project of law was accepted by the majority of the members of the party conference. Haïry Effendi, the Sheikh-ul-Islam of the time, offended at the curtailment of his authority, retired from office. The contemplated legislation was laid before the Chamber on February 24, 1917. The plenary discussions were generally favorable to it. In the Senate some objections were made, but only by three members.

The new law, passed by a great majority, was accompanied by a new marriage law, which established civil marriage for all Turkish citizens, without distinctions of religion. Certain paragraphs took account, however, of certain specific religious rules and traditions that maintained in Mohammedan, Christian, and Jewish communities. Such clauses in the case of Mohammedans were meant as a mild compromise to satisfy the adherents of religious law. After their inclusion, similar clauses for the Christian and Jewish communities became necessary. Polygamy was not directly abolished, but it was made conditional on the written consent of the first wife.

Zia Goek Alp was not content with this initial victory. He con-

tinued to fight against the old established authority of religion, not only with scientific arguments, but also with effective weapons taken from the Mohammedan theological system, which he had carefully studied as a preparation for his work. In the religious review which he published through one of his disciples, he defended the idea of a living religion, a religion which should not hold to dogmas, but unconditionally adapt itself to the changing requirements of society. He did not try to argue about the details of religious behavior; he simply maintained that intricate rules as to prayers, fasting, pilgrimages, and so on, were meant for the voluntary religious devotee, and not for the general public. He continued to emphasize the difference between Arab and Turkish conceptions of life and religion, insisting on the idea that the Arab God was one of rage and the Turkish deity one of love.

The End of Pan-Islamism.

The unification of legal jurisdiction meant of course the end of the Holy War and of Pan-Islamistic aspirations. It was a direct challenge to the feelings of orthodox Mohammedans. Mr. Mandelstam, the former chief dragoman of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, in a volume⁹ written during the War, and a violent attack upon Turkey, warmly approves of the unification of state authority at the expense of religious authority, but is at a loss to understand how it was made possible in Turkey, particularly after a Holy War had been declared and religious feelings kindled. He can only ascribe it to German influences. Zia Goek Alp was of the opposite view. He considered German influences to be, in this respect, not an aid but a handicap. He used to say that the Mohammedan fanatics were defeated during the War in spite of German battleships and guns. As a fact, Germany could scarcely look with favor on a reform movement in a modernist sense, for it would tend to nullify the expected effects of the Holy War, and that while the War was still going on.

A religious reform of great potential importance was the translation of the *Koran* into Turkish, in spite of vehement protests by the orthodox. It also became customary to say the important Friday "Hutbè" in Turkish, and to pray and preach in the same language.

⁹ *Le Sort de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1917.

Strange to say, the first victory of reason over religious authority in Turkey cannot but be considered as a direct social effect of the War. Without the unlimited power acquired by the Government through the state of war, and the complete failure of Pan-Islamism as represented by the Holy War, no Turkish government would have dared to think of taking such a course, especially so soon.

CHAPTER XVI

TURKISH NATIONALISM

"Old Turk" Ottomans and "Young Turk" Nationalists.

WHEN Vambéry, the noted Hungarian Orientalist, visited Constantinople, he found that the word "Turk" conveyed to the educated Turks and to the dignitaries of the Empire a meaning akin to barbarism and rudeness. He tried to interest these Turks in the question of their racial and cultural affinity with the Turks in Central Asia. They all felt insulted at this suggested relationship to a nomad people. They thought of themselves as Mohammedans and Ottomans, and used the term Turk only in connection with low-class people, particularly peasants. The peasant classes themselves accepted resignedly this humiliating designation. They used to say of themselves to explain their lack of urban manners: "We must be excused. We are only Turks." In addition, the word was used in a more special way to designate the large peasant population who had remained apart from orthodox Islam and were called "red-heads." So used, this word carried a burden of insult in the eyes of the orthodox.

Orientalists, seeking to trace the racial origins of Turks, were looked upon as a lot of queer people who did not know where to waste their time and interest. A small number of Turkish investigators who worked quietly in their corner hardly attracted public notice at all.

The poems of the only poet, Mehmed Emin Bey, who used pure Turkish, and labored secretly for Turkish nationalism, were eagerly read and translated by foreign Orientalists, but they were regarded in Turkey as the work of a man who was trying very hard to be original.

Turkish patriotism, as it existed before the Young Turk Revolution, did not include any element of social solidarity among individuals. It meant an attachment to land and to religion, a pride in Ottoman and Mohammedan history, and a collective consciousness of not being like foreigners. The country was called "the lands of the Ottomans," the state, "the Sublime Ottoman State," the language, "the Ottoman language." The word "Turk" was found in

the Turkish language only as a translation from foreign languages. The reform party originally called itself the "New Ottomans." The phrase "Young Turk" was at first used by supporters of the Palace, and in its French form. And it was meant to refer jeeringly to the foreign and infidel influences which the numerous political fugitives in foreign countries were exposed to.

"Old" Turks felt themselves to be Ottomans and Mohammedans. Those of the younger generation, with a little Western education, easily became cosmopolitans, who took pride in teaching their children a foreign language before they taught them Turkish, and who generally spoke French in their own homes. A family without a foreign governess to teach the children foreign languages and foreign ways could not claim to belong to the fashionable set.

After the Revolution, the one outstanding aim of the new men was to uphold constitutional government and create a kind of neutral nationalism which should include all Ottoman citizens, without regard to race or religion.

This policy was meant generously, and was to show what a wonderfully modern and humane attitude of mind had come in with the Young Turks. They were genuinely astonished when they became aware that their proposals were unconditionally rejected and that the non-Turkish elements stuck fantastically to their old separatist tendencies. Even Mohammedan Ottomans such as Arabs, Albanians, Circassians, and Kurds brought no enthusiasm to the idea of a political Ottomanism. They found more pleasure in emphasizing their differences in origin, language, customs, and aims than in forgetting, for the sake of Ottoman citizenship, their consciousness of a varying social identity.

The Non-Turks.

This general willingness to coöperate in a political sense began to suggest to the Turks that they also constituted a different group with differing origins, language, and aspirations.

It was, however, not easy to assert this new consciousness. To begin with, the Non-Turks violently attacked such a tendency, claiming that it was treason to the idea of Ottomanism. They did not care to remember that they had taken the first steps in separatism; they vaguely felt that their development as distinct groups and their potential separation in the future, each in his own territory, called

for the maintenance of Turks in the position of neutral guardians of the Empire. As soon as the Turks followed them in the path of a new nationalism, an immediate clash would be unavoidable.

The opposition to the idea of a distinct grouping around the standard of Turkish nationalism was not less strong on the part of the Turks. Deeply-rooted Ottoman and Mohammedan loyalties, as well as cosmopolitan tendencies, were in the way. Even those who were in their hearts Turkish Nationalists hesitated to assert it in view of the possible practical results. The Turks constituted less than one-half of the entire population. Ottomanism was after all the only possible formula that could assimilate the country's mixed population, at least in a political sense. There was no possibility of making Turks of them. Besides, many Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, and Albanians were serving in the Government, and in the army, even as they were also strongly represented in the party organization. And a distinct Turkish nationalism would be held to be insulting by all alike.

A situation parallel to the one in Turkey was to be found in Austria. As Professor Arnold Toynbee makes clear¹ the Turks considered themselves, like the Germans in Austria, to be one and the same thing as the Government, and did not feel the need of a separate national consciousness as early as did the other elements of the population. The conception of "Austrian," extended as a field of political assimilation to all non-German citizens, was sincerely accepted by the Germans and some others, who had become prominent in the service of the Empire or lost their consciousness of difference by intermarriage and social selection. The situation was exactly similar in Turkey.

While the Turkish Government felt obliged, in face of strong opposition, to adhere to the policy of a "unification of dissimilar elements," even after it ceased to believe in its practicability, a distinct Turkish nationalism began to develop from two distinct sources.

Zia Goek Alp, a Chosen Leader.

The first awakening among young Turkish idealists was the spirit of revolt against the idea of Ottomanism, a conception openly re-

¹ *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, p. 129.

jected by all racial elements, and binding in only one way upon the Turks. In the annual convention of the Committee of Union and Progress, held in Salonica in 1909, a queer-looking, bashful young man by the name of Mehmed Zia Bey made his appearance as a delegate from Diar-i-Bekir and he soon became the new national movement's natural leader.

Zia Bey was born, in Diar-i-Bekir, in 1875. He was the son of deeply religious parents, and came of stock that had produced local notables and state officials. He had been born in a town in a frontier country, where the conflicting aspirations of Turks and Arabs, Kurds and Armenians came face to face. It—Diar-i-Bekir—had always shown itself especially able to produce outstanding thinkers.

As a boy Zia Bey was greatly tormented by the conflict between his religious beliefs and the teachings of natural science in the secondary school he was attending. Unable to set his mind at rest, at sixteen he attempted to commit suicide. After recovering from a wound on his forehead, he decided to learn French, and to seek deeper truth in scientific works. He also went to Constantinople and entered the veterinary school, where, as it happened, the natural sciences were at that time being taught with great thoroughness. The misrule of the Sultan, which, in the capital, he had opportunities to observe closely, led him to ally himself with the revolutionary movement among the students. By so doing he attracted the attention of spies and was exiled to his native city. There he was impressed by the aggressive national spirit of the Armenians of the neighborhood, and decided to build up a Kurdish nationalism as a defensive weapon. He also tried to work out a Kurdish alphabet and give the Kurds a national soul; but soon he was entering into relations with the Young Turks, and was changing his opinion as to the character of the nationalism he desired to champion.

In 1909, when he attended the convention of the party of Union and Progress, he was already an ardent Turkish nationalist with a deeper mental training than most of the men in the new political life. Unable to interest the party in his radical ideas, he remained in Salonica and began to create an atmosphere proper to the diffusion of new ideas. Together with some other young men, he established two different societies: "Yeni Lissan"—"The New Language," and "Yeni Hayat"—"The New Life." The literary weekly *Guentch Kalemer*—"Young Pens"—was the organ of the first, or "The New

Language" group, and the weekly *Yeni Phelsséphé*—"New Philosophy"—served as the mouthpiece of the second. The new intellectual force entered on its work with great energy and with a full consciousness of the aims to reach. Its leader was one of the few men in public life interested not in their own personal success, but in that of their ideals. He steadily inspired his young disciples, letting them obtain full credit for the work, while he himself, by choice, remained in the background. He did a great deal of sociological and philosophical reading, and communicated the results of his researches to his followers in long informal talks. Fouillée, Tarde, Nietzsche, Bergson, Le Bon, Gobineau, Durkheim, became successively their favorite authors.

The two societies opened a general campaign to win over the intellectual youth of Constantinople, as well as the more prominent Turkish thinkers and writers. They found the first too colorless, too cosmopolitan, too much deprived of national ideals and national enthusiasm. As for the second, they belonged to yesterday, they formed a part of the old *régime*, and they could be expected to act only as the guardians of "the graveyard, where the old literature was buried."

The attacks of the new Nationalists, and the radical theories they advocated were not taken seriously by the fashionable and intellectual world of Constantinople. It merely laughed at the movement. But the energy, the enthusiasm of the Nationalists, and their increasing influence, soon induced Constantinople's prominent men of letters to begin a counter-offensive. This proved to be, however, a losing battle. The followers of the new movement formed a small minority. They were severely attacked and ridiculed by men with an established fame. Even those inclined to agree with their ideas maintained that their time had not yet arrived. But their influence continued to grow. Their belief that a language could admit only of a simple grammatical structure and that words taken from the Arab and the Persian should be considered as by rights Turkish and used only in accordance with Turkish rules, entirely triumphed in a short time. Even the most extreme opponents felt obliged to change their elegant style and use a simpler Turkish. As in every successful social movement, many of the opponents of yesterday were gradually joining the ranks of the new men as ardent converts.

"The Turkish Hearth."

In a direction parallel with the movement initiated by Zia Bey, a second movement began to gain ground in Constantinople. It took its stimulus directly from Turks in Russia. There were in Turkey a large number of Turkish fugitives from Russia who were bearers of some very new ideas for the Turks in Turkey. In Abdul-Hamid's time, they had studied in the higher Turkish schools, but had had no chance to spread their ideas of a common Turkish nationalism. Those who had attempted to do so were exiled by the Sultan. After the Young Turk Revolution they began to inform the Turks that they were not alone in the world, that millions of men kindred to them in origin and language were living in Asia. Besides these Russian Turks, settled in Turkey, others who were prominent left Russia either permanently or for the time being, to spread the same gospel.

As a matter of fact, a Turkish Nationalist movement had begun in Russia long before the Turks in Turkey had developed any such social consciousness. The policy initiated in Russia by Ivan the Terrible in 1552 with a view to Russifying the Turks by converting them to Christianity was still at work. In 1864, 160,000 Turks were obliged to become Christians. After 1876 the Russification took a general character. This pressure caused some of the Turkish population, particularly in northern Russia, to lose their social identity, but the rest began to feel an ardent national consciousness. They tried to do away with the religious differences between Sunnite and Shiite Turks, unify as far as possible the various dialects, and they interested themselves in western researches upon the origins of the Turkish race.

As soon as the doors were opened, this new nationalism was imported into Turkey. There it began to work in close coöperation with the movement initiated by Zia Bey.

On December 1, 1911, the Nationalists of Russian origin established a weekly review called *Turk Yourdou*—"The Turkish Hearth." Soon poems and articles signed Zia Goek Alp began to attract attention in this review. The writer was the leader of the movement in Salonica, who had added to his name a new one, taken from old Turkish sources.

Turkish medical students, excited by the formation of an asso-

ciation of Arab students, held on March 25, 1912, a meeting at the office of the *Turk Yourdou*, with a like object, the furthering of a Turkish national self-consciousness, and decided to establish the first "Turkish Hearth" as a non-political association. According to its official program, it set itself the tasks of "working for the national education of the Turkish people, who constitute the most important element in Islam; of raising the intellectual, social, and economic level of the Turkish people; of improving the Turkish language; and of contributing to the uplift of the Turkish race. These tasks were to be accomplished by opening clubs, by giving evening courses, by public lectures, by establishing schools, and by publishing periodicals and books."

Defeat in the Balkan War proved to be a strong stimulus to the Nationalist movement. The failure of the idea of Ottomanism, and the open treason of all the non-Turkish races including the Mohammedan Albanians, had fully justified the belief of the Nationalists that Ottoman solidarity was unreal, and that the only sort of solidarity the Turkish state could depend on was the national Turkish one. And, almost suddenly, both Turkey and the outside world found themselves facing a strong movement called Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism. This open movement, secretly favored and protected by the Union and Progress Government, which had come into power during the War, was meant to be a defensive weapon against Pan-Slavism. In its first aspect it aimed at establishing a union of all the Turks in the world, in its second, it meant a fraternization with all races of a common Turanian origin, including Hungarians, Finns, and Bulgars.

Pan-Turanism and Pan-Turkism.

After the Balkan disaster the few millions of Turks had felt themselves too much alone in the world when confronted with the Russian giant. Those favoring a nationalistic orientation looked about for peoples of a common source. They had no wish to limit themselves to Turks, who had a common language and religion; a Turanian solidarity denoting an ethnological relationship in a distant past seemed to be a broader and more attractive conception, particularly as such feelings were warmly responded to by Hungarians. The word "Turan" became a very fashionable one. It was used to denote the supreme ideal of Turkish nationalism. Zia Goek

Alp expressed this in these words: "The country of the Turk is not Turkey, is not Turkestan. It is a great and eternal land, 'Turan.'" The most prominent woman writer in Turkey, Halidé Edib Hanoûm, gave this name to one of her best-known novels. There was a literary column in the *Tanin*, the Government organ after the Balkan War, carrying the title of "From the Note Book of a Turanian." Even barber shops, restaurants, and coffeehouses were given the new and fashionable name.

Then, after some time, the idea of Turanian solidarity began to be neglected as something unreal and unpractical. More importance was now attached to the idea of Pan-Turkism. The only possibility of a safe future was seen in a close union with the Turks outside of Turkey. Their number was reckoned to amount to sixty or seventy millions. Western observers are more conservative in their estimates. E. Oberhumer² sets down the following figures after minute investigations. He gives them as a minimum:

Russia	15,000,000
China	1,000,000
Khiva	800,000
Bochara	1,000,000
Asia Minor	8,000,000
Persia	2,000,000
Southeastern Europe	2,000,000
	<hr/>
	29,800,000

J. Deny, in the introduction to his Turkish grammar offers this estimate:³

Turkey	10,000,000
Russia	19,000,000
Persia	2,500,000
China	1,800,000
Afghanistan	500,000
The Balkans	800,000
	<hr/>
	34,600,000

The Pan-Turks did not seek merely to study the origins of their race and to awaken love for and interest in it; they even tried to re-

² *Die Türken und das Osmanische Reich*, Tuebner, Berlin, 1917, p. 17.

³ Quoted by Larcher, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

vive olden-day customs and the ancient language. They almost became a new sect with a distinct social identity. It became the fashion among them to find the original Turkish for all the Arab and Persian words used in Turkish. If the word did not exist, it was created. It became impossible to understand this new language. Even in everyday life, new salutations and new manners were introduced. When Pan-Turks came together old-time usages were revived, horse meat was eaten, and the traditional and ancient Turkish beverage, kumiss, was drunk.

This period of sectarian fervor was of short duration. It was ended in part by ridicule from outside, in part by an internal reaction against such extremes.⁴ The language spoken in Constantinople was adapted as the standard language for all the Turkish world, and other extremist tendencies were also abandoned.

A long list of men were devoting themselves with enthusiasm and sacrifice to the new cause. "Turkish Hearths" were increasing in number and in importance. Still, Zia Goek Alp⁵ was the outstanding figure in the movement. For him, Pan-Turkism was a monomania; and he tried in all sorts of ways to communicate his enthusiasm to others by his talks to young men, his courses and lectures in the University, by articles and books, suggestions to the men in power, the revival of old Turkish fables and legends, and particularly by the writing of poetry of every sort. He felt the need of winning over the masses through their feelings. He urged the people to seek for the lost "Kizil-Elma," the "Red Apple," and he meant by that all the old virtues lost to the Turks as a result of their forgetting their national origins and traditions.

The World War was sincerely welcomed by Zia Bey. For him, it meant a period of enthusiasm, appropriate for the diffusion of Nationalist ideas, as well as a means of realizing Pan-Turkish dreams. He could not see the abuses of the War, the grave mistakes and misdeeds of the leaders. It was certain he idolized them. They were in his eyes those dreamed-of men of action who could translate his theories into deeds; and, during the War, he enjoyed great influence. The

⁴ Zia Bey himself used in later times to ridicule those particular times, saying that old Turkish meals upset the stomach, but caused the head to take a more normal view of things.

⁵ Zia Goek Alp died on October 25, 1924, and died destitute. Though ill, he was too proud to let anybody know of his money troubles.

military leaders let him become almost an intellectual dictator. He could make and unmake men in intellectual life. Both as a national leader and as an influential party man he had followers of every variety. They blindly accepted his theories, which took almost the form of dogmas. Zia often altered the problems he was emphasizing. His followers, indeed, found it hard to follow the changes in this versatile master mind. Together, they were like some strange sect and to adhere to it demanded ceaseless intellectual effort.

There was one point which had become quite stabilized. During the first year of the War, the movement headed by Zia Goek Alp had already acquired a prophet and a Bible. The prophet was M. Emile Durkheim, the French sociologist, and the Bible his *Règles de la méthode sociologique*. Other holy books were *De la division du travail social* and *Les formes primitives de la vie religieuse* by the same author. In general, all the works sanctioned by the adherents of the "Année sociologique" were sacred readings. While Zia Bey evolved a true scientific spirit in the explanation of past institutions and in doing away with the old established rules, he did not shrink from setting up a new sect with a fixed catechism, to help the new cause gain ground.

In an interview he gave to the newspaper *Vakit*⁶ he stressed three periods or phases of Pan-Turkism: Idealistic Turkism had as its dream a splendid future for all the Turks in the world. Historical Turkism took delight in reviving the past with its ancient language and customs. Sociological Turkism studied the past with a view to laying down main lines of future policy in accordance with social realities. While past tendencies had an imitative character or took an interest in external display—he called it "turquerie"—sociological Turkism sought to take its form from, and base itself directly on, the social characteristics of the race.

Zia Goek Alp had many real admirers, but he had many more opponents. They included all the non-Turks in the Empire, all orthodox religious believers, as well as certain people of education who objected to seeing science used for sectarian purposes. Moreover, his insistence on the theory that "there were no individuals, there was only society" revolted those who found the sacrifices of war too heavy to bear, considering its manifold abuses.

⁶ December 29, 1917.

The work of Zia Goek Alp was not the only center of nationalistic activity during the War. The practical activities of the Turkish Hearth in Constantinople were also of profound influence. Hamdullah Soubhi Bey, the enthusiastic spirit at the head of it, had lamented in an article published June 11, 1913,⁷ that "the Turkish Hearth movement was a naked and starving child, the offspring of this poor country's idealistic youth and love, and that it could find no spot to rest upon in surroundings where, everywhere, jealousy and malice held an absolute sway." But, during the War, the Turkish Hearth became a place of life and activity. With its small theater, its movies, lectures, evening courses, art collections, and social reunions, it attracted large crowds of men and women, it guided young men, it made a beginning in bringing both sexes into common ground, it became an enthusiastic source of national spirit. In this environment there were numbers of young people who felt toward one another the bonds of a new brotherhood, as well as increasing numbers of those who were sympathetic. In 1918, the branch in Constantinople alone had 2,540 members. Between 1913 and 1918 its income, derived mostly from donations, amounted to \$70,000.

Two opposing currents became more and more manifest among the Turkish Nationalists. Yussof Aktchora Bey, one of the leaders of the movement, calls them democratic or defensive Turkism, and imperialistic Turkism.⁸ The first maintained that all should be devoted to internal consolidation and improvement; the second argued, on the other hand, that the first aim could not but be a unification of all Turks, if not in a direct political way, at least in a cultural and economic sense.

Democracy vs. Imperialism.

When Batoum and Baku were taken by the Turks in 1918, and the road to Central Asia seemed to be open as a result of the Russian Revolution, both democratic and imperialistic forces had suddenly to meet a vital situation. For the imperialists it meant the realization of a fantastic dream. They wanted to penetrate Central Asia in every possible way, and encouraged young men to go among

⁷ Quoted in a speech delivered at the general annual convention in June, 1918.

⁸ Yussof Aktchora, *Politics and Economics*, Constantinople, 1924, p. 18.

their Turkish brothers as teachers, as engineers, as physicians, to act as one sort of Nationalist missionaries. The democratic opposition to this policy was expressed in an article of Halidé Edib Hanoum, the authoress, published in the *Vakit* of June 30, 1917. Under the title of "Let Us Take Care of Our Own Home," she wrote unrestrainedly, and as follows:

The forces of Pan-Turkism seek to induce us to interest ourselves in the welfare of all Mohammedan Turks, and of Turanians as well. Our young men now engaged in war are coming more and more to the conclusion that ideals do not mean anything in themselves, that they have a right to existence only as instruments to save this country. Many of its children today have the conviction that the only attractive fields of activity for them lie in their own home country, ruined and gutted as a consequence of many wars. This country has been declining in population, health, and standards of living. By the disaster of the present war the Ottoman Turks have been reduced to numbers so small that even their continued existence in our wide territories has become a matter of doubt. The occupation of the Caucasus has awakened ambitious aims. There the Turks are asking for our guidance. This is surely very charming for our national pride. We must not, forget, however, that we have not doctors enough for our provincial capitals, to say nothing of our smaller towns and villages. All our teachers would not suffice for the schools of Constantinople. Our engineers are insufficient to meet the proper needs of a single province. A mere handful of our young men will be saved from the firebrand of war. The country can be saved only if these young men remain here and decide to work uninterruptedly. Their existence will certainly be more difficult and less romantic than that of Jesus. To work in those lands outside might be very attractive, but it would be work done for an unrealizable Utopia. Races are mere theories, nations are realities. Our brothers are calling upon us because they think we may be of use to them. Do you really think they will decide to trust us with their destinies, if they learn the bitter truth as to the real Turkey, lying behind our small and vociferous set of visionaries? A Turkish brother who sees a village in Turkey or hears of it, cannot feel love and respect for the physician, teacher, engineer, or state official who abandons his own sick country; he will only have a feeling of distrust for him. We can give the most help to our brothers beyond our borders by concerning ourselves solely with our own home country. We should not deceive both ourselves and other people. Every Turk who carries into foreign countries his energy and capacity puts himself in the position of one robbing his own mother, his own home.

This manifestation of anti-imperialism caused a general outburst among the Pan-Turks. Keuprulu Zadé Fouad Bey, professor of the history of literature in Constantinople University, thus expressed the opposing view:⁹

I also reject Pan-Turanism; it has no practical value. I have a feeling of solidarity only for those who share both my language and my religion. But this great group must be united. We may be a backward people in relation to the West, but we are very advanced as compared with the East. Our brothers are awaiting us impatiently. We cannot let ourselves dwell upon the interests of the Turks in any single region, but must meet the needs of the entire Turkish world between the Mediterranean and China. We should not adhere to the maxim of "sacred selfishness." Our maxim is "One for all, and all for one." If some of us adhere to the dangerously selfish theory of reserving our whole energies for our own field, the primary task of Turkism is to correct such wrong conceptions. The great Turkish world of the future cannot be built in any other manner.

There were further outbursts in the *New Review*. Halidé Hanoum was treated as a traitor to the cause. She was accused of advocating a veiled Ottomanism to the detriment of Turkism. This tendency was jeeringly called "Turkeyism," and adherents of this idea were reminded that the energies they were withholding from the Turks outside the frontier and reserving for Turkey would also benefit non-Turks, as there were many of them in Turkey itself.

The armistice put an end to all these discussions, to the short-lived success of the Pan-Turks, and inaugurated a period when, for some years, the very words "national" and "Turkism" became taboo.

⁹ *Vakit*, July 16, 1918.

CHAPTER XVII

RACIAL PROBLEMS

An Empire of Many Races.

THE Ottoman Empire contained a great internal factor of disequilibrium, a mixture of races. When the general equilibrium became disturbed by the World War, it was to be expected that this factor would play its part; as, in fact, it did. Racial feuds were fought out with much more violence than the actual warfare on the fronts. In the War, some degree of restraint was placed upon methods of wholesale destruction, by internationally established rules. Moreover, the killing was mostly done in an impersonal way, by disciplined war machines equipped with long-distance mechanical devices. Conflicts between races knew no limits of this character. Once the passions had been let loose, everywhere those who were feeble were massacred by those who were strong, in fighting that was hand to hand, and with all the atrocity that could be added.

These pages cannot assume the delicate task of fixing exact moral responsibilities. They will simply state causes and effects, so far as they can be discerned in the midst of conflicting reports and opposing contentions.

The Ottoman Empire was built up in territory containing the greatest imaginable differences, alike in the character of the country, in racial origins, in language, economic standards, and social development. No general attempts had been made to bring the differing peoples together either by force or by persuasion. On the contrary, an artificial social equilibrium had been established by granting them the widest religious, educational, and cultural autonomy. And so long as the Ottoman rule offered better opportunities to its subjects than the neighboring states all went well. The Empire was a general refuge for every sort of foreign dissenter, for it tolerated, unreservedly, every sort of dissent.

After the processes of decline, coupled with misrule, had made their appearance, populations of the same stock who found themselves isolated in border regions, one after another fell away, either to become independent, or to be annexed to some neighbor country populated by the same race. Those in the interior were also highly intermixed; but they could not contemplate breaking away in any

direct manner. Besides, the great mass of the population was composed of quiet individuals concerned only with their local and personal interests. A large section of the Armenians and Greeks in Asia Minor had not shown any resistance to the normal environmental pressure. They had adopted the Turkish language and were entirely assimilated in manner of life, pleasures, folklore, and ideas. Even their religious tenets had many common traits as the result of a process of give and take. No aggressive consciousness of difference was noticeable in group relations. There was, generally, neighborly intercourse and coöperation of a pleasant character among the hard-working middle and poorer classes.

A long series of factors began to operate, particularly from the second half of the nineteenth century on, to disturb this racial peace. They can in the main be reduced to the following classes:

1. Revolt against the misrule of a government which non-Turkish, especially non-Mohammedan, elements did not consider as their own.

2. The old feeling of independence created by an individual religious community organization; and earlier exposures to stimuli coming from the West, or, as Professor Arnold Toynbee terms it, the infection of nationalism.

3. Influences and incitements coming from kindred races outside the Empire; from the Balkan states, and also from the imperialistic powers, which commonly singled out certain elements as instruments of their greed of conquest.

Great Britain did her work, at different times, among Turkish dissenters—Druses, Bulgarians, Armenians, Circassians, and Kurds; Russia among Turks—at first among reactionary, and later among radical elements—among Slavs, Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds; France among progressive Turks, Catholics, Syrians, and Druses.

So long as the Turks remained indifferent to the idea of nationalism racial conflicts were confined to an occasional local uprising and massacre. When nationalism gained firm ground among the Turks, incessant and violent conflicts could not be avoided; and such storms were vehement and merciless.

Religion Not the Trouble Maker.

Religious differences played almost no trouble-making rôle. Religious toleration was a trait that was firmly established and deeply

rooted. There were, perhaps, silent animosities between the various sects of the same religion—especially in the case of Orthodox and Catholic Armenians, Greek Orthodox and Arab Orthodox Christians in Jerusalem—but no acute antagonism between adherents of the great religious groups. The troubles that occurred from time to time always had the character of conflicts between elements that were the same. There was no instance of a general conflict where one side was wholly Christian and the other wholly Mohammedan. Professor Toynbee rightly designates “the curse of imported nationalism” as the chief source of trouble.¹ He has this to say upon the subject:

In modern Turkey, Middle-Eastern civilization has been dispossessed by Western civilization, and the bigotry of Islam by the bigotry of Nationalism; and the new religion transplanted to this alien soil has been bearing terrible fruits. Even in England and America the mental tension of the European War has produced outbreaks of witch-hunting against aliens, attacks on the “hyphenated,” and campaigns for a “hundred per cent Anglo-Saxonism.” But in the Near-East, where the mixture of nationalities is not the exception but the rule, “Ottomanism” and “Hellenism” and their congeners have produced wholesale massacre and eviction. Are we without sin, because we have been less exposed to the same temptation and have to that extent committed and suffered less evil than our Near-Eastern neighbors? Surely we are not more virtuous but only less unfortunate than they are; and who knows whether, in the long course of history, the present relative positions may not some time be reversed, and our lives, in turn, be upset by the irresistible influence of some foreign idea?

Are we then to take refuge in fatalism, and to excuse the Near-Easterner for what he does on the plea that he has no choice but to go on doing it forever, not this time because it is his nature but because it has been forced upon him by his modern Western environment? Such pessimism, I believe, is not warranted by the facts, if we examine them coolly. Let us look upon this Western political influence on the East in its most unfavorable aspect as a kind of mental disease, on a par with the physical diseases which Western traders and colonists bring with them when they first arrive in Non-Western countries. The malady has a more virulent effect upon constitutions newly exposed to it than upon those accustomed to it for generations. Hundreds of thousands may be swept away by a first epidemic of nationalism no less than by the first ravages

¹ “The Truth about Near-Eastern Atrocities,” *Current History*, July, 1923.

of smallpox or syphilis, but the death rate cannot remain permanently at the level of 1895-97, of 1909, of 1912-13, of 1915, or of 1919-23. Experience shows that though in such cases an appalling percentage will perish outright, the survivors will sooner or later become immune and that, when the community has paid the price of adjustment to the new environment, equilibrium is established again.

Professor Toynbee is the first to take the word "massacre" to be the symptom of another evil, and has courageously studied the causes and the character of the evil without confining himself to one country and to religious discriminations.² He came to the important conclusion that all Near-Eastern peoples had reacted in the same way to the same stimuli at various periods, and that massacres are not spontaneous outbursts on the part of the lower classes, but movements directed by higher-placed authorities and better educated men to eliminate a turbulent minority or a hostile group. Religious prejudice and interested propaganda have kept even the intellectual classes in the West from forming a correct idea of the character and extent of the evil.

During the European War [to quote from Professor Toynbee], while people in England were raking up the Ottoman Turks' nomadic ancestry in order to account for their murder of 600,000 Armenians, 500,000 Turkish speaking Central-Asian nomads of the Kirghiz Kazak Confederacy were being exterminated—also under superior orders—by that "justest of mankind" the Russian muzhik; men, women, children were shot down, or were put to death in a more horrible way by being robbed of their animals and equipment and then being driven forth in winter time to perish in mountain and desert. A lucky few escaped across the Chinese frontier. These atrocities were courageously exposed and denounced by Mr. Kerenski in the Duma before the first Russian Revolution, but who listened or cared? Not the Tsar's Government nor the great public in the West.³

² He makes the following statement in the introduction to *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*: "The atrocities have been revealed in their true light, as crimes incidental to an abnormal process, which all parties have committed in turn, and not as the peculiar practice of one domination and nationality."

³ *Ibid.*, p. 842. See Czaplicka, M. A., *The Turks of Central Asia, in History and at the Present Day* (Oxford, 1918, Clarendon Press), p. 17. The respective estimates of the total number of murdered Kazaks and Armenians are both conjectural. (A.J.T.)

The Evils of Nationalism.

The great evil of exterminating organized minorities which, encouraged from without and incited by national ideas from within, tended to differentiate more and more instead of potentially assimilating, caused horrible ravages everywhere in the Near and Middle East during the whole nineteenth century. Millions of people suffered indescribably; millions of others, all over the world had, morally, a part in their sufferings. Although a beginning has been made in the scientific study of the disease, the lessons derived from it, so dearly paid for, have had no influence on practical politics. The problem of the minorities is far from being settled. In the Near and Middle East the question of their rights has been solved only on paper. Its very existence will always remain a potential source of trouble. "Minority rights" tend to maintain and assert variations from the general type, and are invariably incitements to strife. They are still considered to be a means of penetration by the forces of imperialism as well as by countries of kindred race having an independent existence in neighboring territories. Consequently the majority will look upon the minorities as a people suspect, and will be inclined to coerce them as a group, and reduce to a minimum their opportunities to succeed in life as individuals. This unnatural relationship between the state and the subject, which takes the place of loyal citizenship, is full of the sources of friction. The only practical solution indicated by the bitter experience of the past would seem to consist in combining two measures:

1. Doing away with all minority barriers other than those essentially religious, together with the establishment of a common public-school system which would abolish every kind of hostile discrimination. In this case members of minorities that freely choose to become true and loyal citizens of the state with which they were formerly connected merely as organized and subject masses would amalgamate with the majority, religion being considered a private and personal matter.

2. All who felt themselves linked to other nations by bonds of blood, language, and political obedience would either gradually migrate to the country of their choice, or remain in their present territory, under the status of foreign citizens. To give, throughout the Near and Middle East, a loyal meaning to the idea of citizenship

would clear the horizon and do away with many important potential causes of friction and war.

Up to the present we have spoken only of the general aspects of racial conflict in Turkey, and incidentally of the nature of the general minority problem. But the various factors of antagonism acted differently in the case of different races. Therefore the position of each will have to be considered alone.

The Arabs.

Before the War, the Arab problem was for the Ottoman Empire above all difficult. In number, the Arabs amounted only to seven millions, but they populated, in scanty fashion, more than half of the Empire. Most of them were Mohammedans. And if they were of the same religion as the Turks, this, however, was outweighed by differences of language and culture.

Until the Young Turk revolution, the Arab problem offered two different aspects. Mohammedan Arabs, partly out of hatred of the central government, partly in a revolt against misrule, partly because incited by foreign agents, had engaged from time to time in local rebellions which had been subdued sometimes by force and sometimes by conferring titles and privileges upon local chieftains. The Christian Syrians, influenced by systematic propaganda, by their higher degree of enlightenment and by their restless temper, were not only constantly opposed to the Government, but they had also begun to develop a broad conception of Arab nationalism. As the Syrian press was not free, they found in the Egyptian press, as well as in the free Syrian press in America, a vehicle for spreading ideas of Arab nationalism. For a long time the Mohammedans remained hostile to this propaganda; and Mohammedan and Christian Syrians lived in a continuous state of hostilities in all towns with a mixed population.

After the Young Turk revolution ideas of Arab nationalism easily gained ground among the Mohammedans. Under the secret leadership of French consuls and agents, a general revolutionary agitation was started against the central authorities and in favor of Arab independence. The Union and Progress Government, being strongly centralistic, was not ready to make any concessions, and the antagonism grew from day to day. When the opposition came to power in 1912, and manifested its approval of decentralization with

a view to gaining the support of non-Turkish elements, an Arab congress met in Beyrout and formulated a separatist platform which came very near to independence. As soon as the Unionists came back to power, they tried to gain the friendship of Mohammedan Arabs by a long list of promises. Their success was, however, only apparent and temporary.

When Turkey's entry into the War became a possibility, Great Britain began at once to make preparations to enlist the active help of the Arabs. The Indian Expeditionary Force "D," which had been sent from India in the first days of October,—four weeks before Turkey actually entered the War—with the aim of intimidating her, had also the task of instigating the Arabs to revolt against Turkey. For this purpose, Sir Percy Cox accompanied this force as a "political officer." On October 23, 1914, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, British high commissioner in Egypt concluded the first secret agreement with the Emir of Mecca in which Great Britain pledged herself "to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within territories in which Great Britain was free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France."⁴

From the beginning of the War, Djemal Pasha, who had his headquarters in Damascus as the commander of the Fourth Army and a sort of viceroy of all territories inhabited by Arabs, engaged in a radical activity to crush Arab nationalism and to make the Turkish possession of Arab territories real and effective. To begin with, the privileged position which Lebanon had enjoyed since 1861 was abolished. Then a strong Pan-Islamic agitation was set going—at first with some success,—to weaken the effects of nationalism and to take maximum advantage of the local resources for the purposes of war. Djemal Pasha made on the one hand a vigorous display of authority and, on the other hand, energetic efforts to improve the municipal conditions in the large towns. His construction of new streets, his arrangements for new water supplies, his new orphanages and schools were mainly calculated to impress the local population. The special schools managed by Turks had, at the same time, the purpose of gradually Turkifying the Arabs.

The terrible famine of 1916, and the impossibility of dealing with it adequately, swept away all the favorable impressions which the

⁴ Earle, *op. cit.*, pp. 283 and 287.

person and rule of Djemal Pasha might have left upon some sections of the Syrian population. The discontent, which became more and more apparent, was met by severe measures of repression. Revolutionary documents had been seized in the archives of the French consulate that implicated numbers of notables. They were brought before a special court-martial. A *communiqué* published on April 23, 1916, announced that two hundred had been found guilty, some being condemned to death and others to imprisonment or exile. This repressive measure left the situation quiet upon the surface, but in a bitter ferment beneath it.

The Emir of Mecca assumed the championship of the Arab cause, and reached an agreement with Great Britain as a result of negotiations which took place between July, 1915, and January, 1916. He kept it secret for several months. In February, 1916, he was visited by the Turkish war dictator and by Djemal Pasha. He presented each with a sword, expressing the wish that they might use them against "the enemies of Islam." In May, 1916, he asked for and received money from Constantinople "to equip fresh forces against the Entente." On June 27, 1916, he openly proclaimed Arab independence, giving as reasons the misrule of the war Government, the destitution in Hedjaz, anti-religious tendencies in Constantinople, restrictions placed upon the powers of the Khalif, the publication of a manifesto by the Government urging the police not to interfere with those who ate openly during the fasting month of Ramazan, and the severe punishment of Arab nationalists.

After the secession of Hedjaz the link between Arab territory and the Empire became extremely loose. The anti-Turkish agitation of the German authorities, which aimed at establishing a direct sphere of domination in Syria and Mesopotamia, accentuated this tendency still more. During the last year of the War, the Pan-Turks had come to the conclusion that a Turkification of Arabian territories was impossible and undesirable. An article of Zia Goek Alp, published in the *Yeni Medjmouha* of March 15, 1918, openly advocated Arabian independence and the formation of a new federation in which Turks and Arabs should participate as two independent states.

This broad policy came too late. Before anything was done for its

⁵ Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs* (Turkish edition), p. 186.

realization, the Turkish armies on the southern fronts were overthrown by Entente armies. The Arab population joined hands with them at the first opportunity, and manifested a violent hatred against Turkey's remaining officials and her scattered military formations.

The Kurds.

After the Turkish victory over the Persians in 1514 some territory inhabited by Kurds was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. This territory was more and more extended by later conquests; but it never became possible to establish in it any real authority. The power of the Government existed only in part, and in towns which were inhabited mostly by Turks or Turkified Kurds. Outside the towns, feudal local lords maintained full sway, partly in conjunction, partly in conflict with sheikhs; and they derived their authority from pretended supernatural agencies which were not exactly Mohammedan in character. The rural population depended either on tribal chieftains and sheikhs, or upon mere serfs of notables who lived mostly in towns. Tribal warfare interrupted by truces was the normal condition. Marauding was the legitimate occupation of a large proportion of the population. One chief usually took revenge upon another by killing some of his serfs, who constituted his most valuable personal capital. Slavery was in general a flourishing institution. Slaves and serfs usually obtained some means of livelihood, and were granted protection in return of their services. Other people of the lower classes found life even harder; they migrated temporarily to the coast towns, or, from 1900 on, even to America.

Whenever the central government tried to assert its authority, Kurdish tribes and notables formed tribal confederations to resist, unless they had secured influential situations as partisans of the Government. There were extensive local revolts in 1828, 1843, and 1880. Abdul-Hamid managed to use the Kurds as tools of his despotic power. He tolerated the local independence of the chiefs, organized some of them in irregular formations called "the Hamieh cavalry." The chiefs found it very convenient to recognize some sort of superior authority, for that authority conferred on them military titles (meaning ornamental uniforms), pecuniary profits, and immunity from punishment for every sort of offense.

Those Kurds who had studied in the higher government schools

entered the government service or the liberal professions, thinking of themselves not as Kurds but as members of the ruling race. They took no interest in the fate of their racial fellows; and for that reason, too, the Kurds were never able to create a written language and a literature. It is true that a few Kurds among the Young Turk fugitives in Europe, stimulated by their Western environment, began to develop a national consciousness. They even published an organ of their own. But it was a movement that was a living one only in theory.

Kurds were often heard of in connection with Armenian troubles and the reasons for this were manifold. The relations between the Armenians and Kurds were most friendly until Russia began its campaigns in Turkey and Persia. Mutual hatred created by Russian secret agents, Western interest in the destiny of Armenians, the influence of Abdul-Hamid, economic differences made Kurdish marauders look upon Armenians as their legitimate prey.

After the Young Turk revolution, government power, which insisted upon asserting itself, repeatedly came into conflict with the united Kurdish tribal forces; but this did not indicate any insurrection that would continue.

The Kurdish national movement, which began to manifest itself after the manner of all similar movements in the Ottoman Empire, found tribal organization with its eternal conflicts of interest a greater obstacle even than government authority. There were few idealists in this movement. It consisted mainly in the activity of certain notables living in Constantinople who hoped some day to become the rulers of a Kurdistan created by the help of Russia or Great Britain. When, on February 8, 1914, it had been arranged to accord the six Eastern provinces a special form of government under the supervision of two neutral inspectors, Russia displayed a feverish activity among the Kurds. The revolt of Bitlis, staged by the local Russian consul, which was to have been followed by Armenian massacres, to create a pretext for active Russian intervention, was only averted by a mere chance.

During the World War, the Kurds did not act in any uniform way. Some, who lived in the towns, served in the Turkish ranks and felt much as the Turks did. There were also whole tribes that cooperated with the Government, for the relationship between Russia and the Armenians meant a direct danger to them. Those Kurds

who could not be enlisted by the Government, and felt themselves under the Russo-Armenian menace on account of the inaccessible nature of the territory they were living in,—the “Dersim” country in particular—looked upon the War as an excellent opportunity to gather rich booty. They took part in the massacres and pillaging which accompanied Armenian deportations. They attacked the Turks in the rear, whenever they were badly defeated by the Russians. In case of a Russian defeat or retreat, Kurdish mountaineers were immediately on the spot to pillage the scattered and weak formations. The War meant for them an unhoped-for opportunity to make themselves generally prosperous.

The Greeks.

The number of Greeks remaining under Ottoman domination after the Balkan War was about 1,500,000. They were actually and potentially Pan-Hellens in sentiment. The Greek Orthodox Church had proved to be the most efficient machine for assimilation in the Near East. It succeeded in uniting under the name of Greeks a great variety of peoples of differing origin and various languages. The Pan-Hellenic movement, taking advantage of the church, of the community organization, and the community schools, had successfully won its way into the heart of the Ottoman Greeks. The greater part of the Turkish-speaking Greeks could not entirely approve of this tendency, but such doubts were confined to the older generation. Those of the new played the part of the most ardent of Pan-Hellens in order to have it forgotten that by origin they were Greeks who spoke Turkish.

The Greeks suffered relatively little by the World War. There were, certainly, Greek deportations from the coast area which meant suffering for those affected; but such deportations had been more or less a matter of military necessity. The places the deported were sent to were not very distant and the sufferings endured were merely those of a forced mass migration taking place during the War and in a backward country. These deportations can certainly not be compared with the treatment received by the Armenians. Although the Greeks did not differ from the Armenians in their separatist ideas, they were careful not to manifest them; and their coöperation with the Entente did not go beyond individual spying. To add to that, King Constantine was considered as an ally by Germany. The

Greeks in Turkey pretended to favor the policy of Constantine, and posed as his would-be friends.

Greek merchants took some advantage of the exceptional opportunity created by the War; and most of them worked under the protection of some influential Turk. Still, they felt acutely the menace of a coming commercial awakening among the Turks. The compulsory learning of Turkish, its use by foreign companies, and the appearance of monopolistic Turkish business organizations supported by the Government, were viewed by them with great alarm. They were, however, very careful not to show their anxiety, and often even professed to be loyal Turkish patriots.

The Jews.

The Jews found a very friendly welcome in Turkey when in the fifteenth century they were deported from Spain. As they confined themselves to their own affairs, and carefully abstained from becoming a source of political trouble, they always enjoyed a privileged position in the Ottoman Empire; and the Turks were the only element in the Empire that had no anti-Semitic feelings of any sort. This indulgence had a curious result. The Spanish Jews kept Spanish as their mother tongue, and generally learned Turkish very imperfectly. This circumstance, with the interest in Zionism displayed by a few of them during the War, brought them into conflict with Turkish nationalism. This conflict did not, broadly speaking, take any aggressive form. Djemal Pasha, who had launched a campaign against Arab nationalism in Palestine and Syria, also included in it some measures against Zionism, deporting some of its active leaders, and evacuating the Jewish population of Jaffa.

Of all the elements involved, the Jews took most advantage of the exceptional opportunities created by the War; and Turkish nationalists showed themselves for the most part ready to act with them in the world of business, if they were prepared to adopt the Turkish language, and made plain their ability to adapt themselves to Turkish life in other ways, which, curiously enough, they had not been able to do in times past.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ARMENIANS AND THE WAR

A Scattered People.

THE number of Armenians in Turkey at the beginning of the World War has been put at a figure anywhere from 1,000,000 to 2,500,000. Estimates by unbiased authorities vary between 1,300,000 and 1,500,000. According to that made by General Zalenyi for the Caucasus Geographical Society,¹ the total amounted to 2,900,000: 1,500,000 being in Turkey; 1,000,000 in Russia; 150,000 in Persia; and 250,000 in Europe, America, and the East Indies. M. Zarceski, the French consul at Van, offers the following figures in an article published in the *Revue de Paris* of April 15, 1914: Total number, 3,000,000: of whom there were in Turkey, 1,300,000; in Russia, 1,100,000; in Persia, 100,000; and about 500,000 in America, Egypt, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, etc. All authorities agree that the Armenians existed nowhere in Asia Minor as a compact national body. They were scattered all over the country. As for those nine Eastern Provinces, in which the Armenians were, in a way, herded together, and which were claimed as the territory of Greater Armenia, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* gives the following information, based on the publications of the Caucasus Geographical Society:

The population of the nine Turkish villayets, Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Kharput, Diarbekr, Sivas, Aleppo, Adana, and Trebizond, was 6,000,000 (Armenians, 913,875 or 15 per cent; other Christians 632,875 or 11 per cent; Moslems, 4,453,250, or 74 per cent). In the first five villayets which contain most of the Armenians, the population was 2,642,000 (Armenians 633,250 or 24 per cent; other Christians, 179,875, or 7 per cent; Moslems, 1,828,875 or 69 per cent; and in the seven Armenian kazas or districts, the population was 282,375 (Armenians 184,875 or 65 per cent; other Christians 1,000 or 3 per cent; Moslems 96,500 or 34.7 per cent).

The Armenians officially inscribed on Turkish population registers numbered, in 1907, 980,000. Turkish authorities maintain that

¹ *Zapiski*, Vol. XVIII, Tiflis, 1896, with map, quoted by the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in its article on Armenia.

there could hardly be many not registered; for, all Christians being free from military service before the Young Turk revolution, there was no reason why they should not register, and many reasons and inducements why they should. The authorities further agree that, as non-Turk community organizations were held responsible for the registration of their members, extensive errors were out of the question.

The whole Armenian problem lies in the physical impossibility that such a scattered minority could by force possess themselves of a wide, undeveloped, and distant territory, and yet that that minority, supported alternately by Russia and Great Britain, was determined to realize so ambitious a national program and realize it in its entirety.

It was also unfortunate that the Armenians were divided into Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant groups. This often meant the separation of level-headed and intelligent men from the mass of their fellows. As religious differences brought to naught all the effects of cultural solidarity, such natural leaders could not influence the Orthodox masses, and successfully combat reckless attempts at revolution.

The Historical Background.

There had been Catholic Armenians since 1335. In 1439, at the council of Florence, the United Armenian Church was constituted. These Catholics did not form a separate community until 1830, and were frequently persecuted by the patriarchs. In that year, on the intervention of France, they were made a separate community, with their own ecclesiastical head.

The Protestant movement [I again quote the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*], initiated at Constantinople by American missionaries in 1831, was opposed by the patriarchs and Russia. In 1846 the patriarch anathematized all Armenians with Protestant sympathies, and this led to the formation of the Evangelical Church of the Armenians, which was made, after much opposition from France and Russia, a community, at the instance of the British ambassador.²

The Armenians were the element in the Ottoman Empire which benefited earliest and extensively from contact with the West. There were two chief reasons for this: The Armenian monastery, founded

² *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Eleventh Edition: "Armenia."

on the island of St. Ghazaros in 1717, with the help of the government of Venice, assumed the task of transmitting Western thought to the Armenians in Turkey by means of publications in Armenian covering various branches of knowledge, and by acting as an academy for Turkish Armenians. The second source of Western culture was America. For eighty years or more, the Armenians alone in this part of the world availed themselves of the opportunities for education offered by the American missionaries.

These opportunities helped to secure for Armenians a preponderant position in the intellectual and economic life of the Ottoman Empire. After 1820, when a lasting era of reform was ushered in by Sultan Mahmoud, the Armenians became a natural intermediary between the outside world and Turkey. They occupied a high position both in the Turkish Government, and also in the world of education, journalism, literature, music, the drama, architecture, and medicine, as well as in business and social life. They were the favorite and the spoiled children of the reform era, the years from 1820 to 1876. In 1862, as a result of a democratic movement that began in 1844 and was directed against the powers of the church, they were even granted the right to set up in Constantinople a representative assembly of 140 members which elected lay and clerical councils as their executives and supervised their activities. This amounted to the establishment of a powerful constitutional government in the interest,—whether religious or legal, social, educational, economic, or financial—of the Armenians. The patriarch, who had been a despot, became a constitutional ruler without a fixed territory, but with almost sovereign rights in many respects. The period of reform in Turkey gave the Armenians many other opportunities of development both as individuals and as a community. Toward them the Turks had marked feelings of confidence and attachment. They frequently spoke of them in the press as our “faithful brothers,” and “our faithful Armenian subjects.”

The development of nationalism, the activity of terrorists and revolutionaries coming from Russia, as well as the advent of Abdul-Hamid, put an end to this friendly coöperation; and it had only a brief return at the time of the Young Turk revolution.

The War: Enemies Within.

When the World War broke out it was generally known that the

Armenians were warm supporters of the Entente. This point is not contested by anybody; nor has it been contested that large quantities of arms and bombs were in the hands of revolutionary Armenians. How far did they take the initiative in making active use of these arms to express their feeling for the Entente, in particular for Russia? This question has given rise to hot controversies. Propagandists for the Entente have maintained that no provocation on the part of the Armenians ever took place and that they took only certain defensive measures. The Turks insist, on the other hand, that the bellicose attitude of the Armenians was general enough to justify wholesale deportations.

M. Mandelstam³ goes furthest in denying all Armenian provocation. He has this to say: "Contrary to the deceitful declaration of the Turkish Government no Armenian revolt or revolution has ever taken place. The Armenians have taken up arms, when they saw themselves threatened by massacre, following a natural instinct to sell their lives as dearly as possible."

The opposing view is, of course, taken by the party of Union and Progress when defending their actions. In the report presented to their party conference in 1916 they offer the following justification of the deportations:⁴

As soon as the order of mobilization was issued, Turkish Armenians crossed the frontiers on their way to Egypt, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Russia, and joined the Russian army or bands of Armenian irregulars. The various revolutionary organizations temporarily dropped their differences and held a general meeting. They decided to start disorders, massacres, and acts of incendiarism behind the front in case Turkey entered the War, and to induce Armenian soldiers to desert with their weapons. Bands composed of such deserters were to menace the lines of communication of the Turkish army. The Catholicos of Etchmiadine proclaimed the Russian Tsar to be the protector of all Armenians. In its issue of August, 1914, the official organ of the Catholicos, *Ararat*, carried a sacred command that made it compulsory upon all Armenians to support the Russian armies with their persons and their goods.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 248.

⁴ The report was published in all the Turkish papers of October 1, 1916. The historian is bound to present such evidence as a historical document, but it should be remembered that in all such questions as this, the parties to the dispute offer only their own point of view.

Russian Armenians and Local Revolts.

When desertions from the army increased, the Turkish Government took measures of precaution, but still hoped that the Armenians would be wise enough not to yield to foreign incitations. After Russia's proclamation of war Armenian volunteer formations crossed the border in Bayizid, devastated villages, massacred Mohammedans, cut the railroad between Van and Bitlis, destroyed bridges and telegraph lines, attacked Turkish detachments, and engaged in out and out war with the forces of Turkey. They seized Zeitoun in February, massacring all Mohammedan families. Twenty-five hundred armed Armenians seized the town of Van on April 20, and set up a temporary Armenian government. On April 12, several thousand armed deserters created disorders around Diar-Bekr. In Sivas, an Armenian force of 30,000 deserters was organized, with a view of making rear attacks upon the army on the Russian front. On June 12, the Armenians of Kara-Hissar revolted and massacred the Mohammedans in the town. In Marash, armed bands of five hundred or more Armenians disturbed the public peace. Revolutionary documents and arms were seized almost everywhere. The Turkish army, being thus between two fires, it became necessary to deport Armenians from the neighborhood of the front and from the vicinity of railroad and other lines of communication.

Mr. Lewis Einstein makes the following statements:⁵ "The Armenians did not conceal the fact that they were in favor of the Entente; and a small minority of revolutionaries actively helped the Russians. But the punishment was inflicted on the innocent majority."

Major Larcher in his military study made after the War writes as follows:⁶

In November, 1914, a Russian proclamation had incited the Armenians to take up arms against the Turks, "their tyrants," and promised their liberation. The Catholicos of Etchmiadzine was in favor of this policy. The Armenians never concealed their attachment to the Entente cause. Those living near the front openly joined hands with the Russians. In December, 1914, the Armenians of Erzeroum took refuge in Russia. Everywhere volunteers escaped to Russia to enlist in Russo-Armenian formations. They often attacked isolated detachments

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 395.

and convoys. They opposed in general military service and military requisitions. In Van they bargained with the authorities as to the number of soldiers they would consent to furnish. At first they agreed upon 3,000 and then they reduced this to 400. They turned the Armenian quarter in Van into a fortress and defended it for a month. A Turkish battery had to be detached from the front and sent against them.

Deportation Is Decided Upon.

On May 16, 1915, all arms concealed by the Armenians began to be collected. On June 11, 1915, the following measures were decided upon by the Turkish Government and were incorporated in an emergency law that was later ratified by Parliament: Non-Turkish soldiers in active formations were (1) to be transferred to military formations "without arms," and engaged in services in the rear. (2) The high command of the army was authorized to deport non-Mohammedan elements of population from points of concentration and from the army's lines of communication.

These measures, which were broadly applicable to all non-Mohammedans, were actually applied only to the Gregorian Armenians. The Armenian Catholics and the Greeks of the interior and the Black Sea coast, who were believed not to have hostile intentions, were exempted. The methods used in the deportations are generally known as the Armenian massacres of 1915 and 1916. They were used extensively as war propaganda by the Entente; and looked at dispassionately and,—even biasedly, as the Turks would view it,—it cannot be denied that they add a sad chapter to the horrible practices generally resorted to among Near Eastern peoples as a means of crushing revolts and securing unity. Even during the War, it was admitted in the official Turkish publications "that the Armenians sometimes became the victims of regrettable abuses and violence." Opponents of Turkey, and many neutral observers, were not so guarded in their language when describing these events.

For the purpose of this volume the writer has made an investigation of his own. He has obtained most of his information largely from former government officials in the Eastern Provinces, largely Free Masons who strongly disapproved of the Government's policy at the time of the deportations. And in the matter of these unfortunate occurrences, distorted by both sides for the purposes of propa-

ganda, statements already made by the author, and these that follow, will probably be found to embody the substantial truth.

On the eve of the World War, the Armenian Dachnak-zoutioun party applied for permission to hold a party congress in Erzeroum. Permission being withheld, the congress was held secretly. It came to the conclusion that a Russo-Turkish war might mean calamity for the Armenians, that they should therefor abstain from hasty action until the outcome of such a war should become clear, and that they should coöperate with the Russians in case of a Russian invasion. Extremists like Karakine Pasdirmadjian secretly left for Russia, and immediately began the formation of an Armenian voluntary division in which fugitives and deserters from Turkey played a large part.

On the other hand, some moderate members of the revolutionary party residing in Bulgaria made the following appeal to the Turkish Minister of the Interior through their personal friend Tufekdjieff, a Bulgarian revolutionist: "Turkey should abstain from entering the war. If she insists upon entering it, she should do so on the Russian side. At any rate, she should pledge herself in an imperial proclamation that at the end of the War she will carry out the projects of reform, already drawn up, for the Eastern Provinces." But the Turkish Government refused to engage in such a discussion and warned the Armenian leaders in Constantinople that the whole Armenian community would be held responsible, in case Armenian revolutionary organizations took any hostile action.

The First Massacres.

When Turkey actually entered the War, the plain of Passinlar, north of Erzeroum, was the concentration point for the Eastern Army. The plain of Elashkird-Bayizid, separated from it by the Sovanly mountains, was temporarily cut off from all communication with the rest of Turkey. It included the districts of Bayizid, Diadin, Toprak Kala, Kara Klissia, and Totak, as also the subdistrict of Abaga (attached to the district of Barkiri in Van) and about sixteen villages attached to the district of Malaskird in Mush. The registered population amounted to 100,000; and six nomad Kurdish tribes numbering about 40,000 were also living in this territory. A short time after the proclamation of war by Russia (in the first days of December, 1914), the whole plain was invaded by the Armenian

volunteer division, wearing Russian uniforms. One of the regiments was commanded by M. Pastirmadjian, the deputy from Erzeroum in the Turkish parliament. The local Armenian population amounted to 10 or 12 per cent of the total. The Turco-Kurdish population was entirely defenseless, because government forces did not exist, and the tribal warriors, who formed a light cavalry division, had been sent to the front. Within eighteen days the whole local Mohammedan population had been massacred by Armenian soldiers helped by local Armenians. Only one-tenth managed to escape, and only a small part of them managed to reach the other side of the mountains.

These events created an unofficial state of war between the Armenians and the Turks. By April, 1915, hostilities were general. On April 20, the town of Van, in which the Armenians were in the majority, was seized by local Armenians with the aid of leaders coming from Russia, and a temporary Armenian government was instituted.

The existence of a separate Armenian population of from 500,000 to 600,000 in the rear of the Eastern army, including thousands of organized revolutionaries and daring fighters well armed with modern rifles, constituted a great military danger. Some measures of precaution were certainly justified; but the actual action taken has been challenged on the Turkish side as well as on that of the Western Powers as not being commensurate with military necessity.

The plight of the deported Armenians will always be considered one of the saddest in history. A wholesale deportation in war-time, if many of the deported were women and children, would be a great calamity anywhere; and it was particularly the case in the war area which formed the scene of this deportation, for it was entirely lacking in railways and roads, as well as in the most primitive means of transportation.

The Deportations.

In addition, as the event proved, the sufferings of the deported were by no means confined to those which were unavoidable in view of strict military necessity or the existing general conditions. In the first place, the time allowed for leaving a town or village and for selling out all movable goods was extremely short, being limited in some cases to a day or two. Second, the deported were not only left

unprotected from attacks which were sure to come from marauders, but the "special organization" created with the help of two influential members of the Committee of Union and Progress was in some cases directly instrumental in bringing about attacks and massacres. Third, the area chosen as the home of the deported was in part a desert incapable of supporting the existence of a large mass of people who reached it from a cold mountain climate after endless hardships. The lack of medical and other help for those in need was such as even the general lack of medicines and the like in war-time could hardly excuse.

The deportations taken as a whole, were meant to be only a temporary military measure. But for certain influential Turkish politicians they meant the extermination of the Armenian minority in Turkey with the idea of bringing about racial homogeneity in Asia Minor. Other politicians accepted this point of view, while others again took the opposite side, with varying degrees of consistence.

Those who put forward the policy of general extermination were said to take this stand:

A dense Armenian population, in the Eastern Provinces, has proved to be a danger to the very existence of Turkey. We are acting as instruments to remove this danger. We know that, successful or not successful, we shall be universally despised and condemned. Only in a very distant future can our personal sacrifice for the national cause hope to be recognized.

Officially the Turkish Government remained within legal limits. The deportations were the result of one of the "emergency laws" made by the cabinet. The property rights of the deported were cared for by another law. And the Central Government never identified itself, as such, with organized excesses.

As to the chief responsibility, Professor Toynbee has this to say:⁷ "Hundreds of thousands of people were done to death and thousands turned over to robbers and murderers by the administrative action of a few dozen criminals in control of the Ottoman Empire."

In Constantinople, which was under the direct authority of the Central Government, only a small number of Armenian revolutionaries and leaders were harmed. Energetic governors like those of

⁷ *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, p. 266.

Smyrna and Kutahia were able to save the whole Armenian population from deportation. Many governors worked with varying success for that end or retired from office. Most peaceful Turkish citizens in towns with a mixed population did everything in their power to save the Armenians, with whom they were on friendly personal and economic relations. Still, everywhere there were people of prominence who took advantage of an opportunity that for one thing was a chance to purchase Armenian goods at the lowest of prices.

Moved by the vigorous attacks of enemy propaganda and by the action of those in the Government who opposed deportations on an unnecessarily extended scale, a commission of investigation composed of inspectors of the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice was formed in 1917 to punish those guilty of excesses. Some minor offenders were really punished; but those favoring the deportations being very influential in the Government, the whole thing amounted more to a demonstration rather than a sincere attempt to fix complete responsibility.

Massacres and Counter-massacres.

In Western accounts the number of those who perished as a result of deportations is given by common accord as about 600,000. This figure cannot be verified, for both the exact number of Armenians living in Turkey before and after the War and the number of fugitives are alike unknown. A French investigation, made in 1920, came to the conclusion that the Turkish population and soldiers behaved generally in a correct way toward the deported, but that some 500,000 perished as a result of Kurdish attacks upon the convoys, and of privation, sickness, and exhaustion following the long march.⁶ Turkish estimates are between 200,000 and 300,000. They claim that only convoys from rich districts were attacked by marauders, that the number of those actually murdered amounted to six or seven thousand, that the great mortality must be ascribed to the privations caused by war in those primitive regions, to fatigue and sickness, as well as to the immediate change from an extremely cold region to a tropical one during an exceptionally hot season.

After the Russian Revolution there was a third chapter of war massacres, little heard of in the West, those new outrages com-

⁶ Larcher, *op. cit.*, p. 896.

mitted by Armenians against Mohammedans in the wide area under Russian occupation. Lieutenant Colonel Twerdo Khlebof, commander of the second Russian fortress artillery regiment stationed at Erzeroum until the recapture of the town by Turks on February 27, 1918, contributes the following:⁹

At the time of the Russian occupation of Erzeroum, in 1916, not a single Armenian was allowed to approach, and so long as General Kalivine, head of the First Army Corps, was in command of this district, divisions in which there were Armenians were not sent there. After the Revolution all earlier measures were annulled. The Armenians forced their way into Erzeroum, immediately began to pillage the town and villages, to massacre the inhabitants, and to commit all sorts of excesses.

These officers and others give detailed accounts of these events in their personal diaries and in the official war journals of their regiments. The estimates of the number of Turks massacred by Armenians differ greatly. In Djemal Pasha's *Memoirs*¹⁰ there is this statement: "Let us for the time accept it as true that of 1,500,000 Armenians in all, 600,000 perished during the deportations. But it must not be forgotten that the Turks massacred by Armenians after the Russian Revolution number 1,500,000."

This statement is grossly exaggerated, like all similar statements in the East. The population of the entire region occupied by Russia hardly amounted to 1,500,000. About 1,000,000 fled at the approach of the Russian army. The general desire to retire with the army may certainly be ascribed to the fear of Armenian excesses, and Armenian bands may be held morally responsible for the great mortality among the fugitives. But with the Russian military authorities acting vigilantly to save the lives of the Turks, those actually massacred by Armenians in the period between the Russian Revolution and the Turkish reoccupation can hardly have exceeded 40,000.

News of these massacres, and books, illustrated, and going into details, which were circulated by the Turkish Government, aroused great agitation among the Turkish people. Many of those who had bitterly and sincerely regretted the deportations, began to take the opposite view. New anxiety took possession of those Armenians who

⁹ *War Memoirs*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰ Turkish edition, Vol. II, pp. 2-8.

had been exempted from deportation. Turkish papers, fearing that this time there would be really spontaneous outbreaks, began to point out that the Armenians living in Constantinople and in certain other towns could not be held responsible for the crimes committed by Armenians in distant areas.

The peace negotiations with the new Armenian Republic in Caucasia in June and July, 1918, gave rise to outbursts of friendly feelings in Constantinople. All responsibility for past events was jointly ascribed to Russia, Great Britain, Abdul-Hamid, and Armenian revolutionaries. Both sides felt and urged that after the bitter experiences of the past there should now be harmonious understanding and coöperation, and outsiders should not be allowed to interfere. Turkish papers described the Armenians as a valuable and capable element of the population, one that had contributed a great deal toward transplanting Western institutions into Turkey, and occupied an important position in the Empire as economic producers. But, the moment the armistice was signed, this warm and friendly tone suddenly disappeared, and once more bitter hatred became the rule.

CHAPTER XIX

EDUCATION AND THE WAR

Drafted Teachers.

As a general rule the number of open schools, as well as the number of male teachers and pupils, decreased through the War. Most of the schools in the provinces were occupied for military purposes, because they were the only suitable large buildings in some localities. Secondly, certain classes of young teachers who, before, were exempted from military service, and students who were considered to be on leave until they finished their studies, were called to arms as reserve officers during the War. The teachers in all schools for boys were men, and those serving in the army could not as yet be replaced by women. Even under normal conditions, their number was disproportionate to the existing needs. Besides, very few were willing to go outside of Constantinople; and by the extension of military service to young teachers most of the provincial schools were deprived even of these few. In Constantinople the situation was quite different in both respects. There, the need of requisitioning school buildings did not exist, as military barracks, hospitals, and similar buildings were abundant. On the contrary, many schools once in charge of those who were now enemies could be used for Turkish school purposes. The War did not cause a decrease in the numbers of teachers in Constantinople. Moreover, since teachers not of active military age were exempt from military service, thousands of men belonging to the liberal professions applied for employment in the teaching staffs of the primary schools. The number of applicants being too many, only those with powerful friends in the Government had any chance of success.

A New University and the First Coeducation.

Roughly speaking, Constantinople was almost alone in benefiting by the new educational opportunities that developed during the War. A great deal of consideration was, above all, given to the University of Constantinople. It obtained full administrative and academic autonomy, in the fashion of German universities. Nineteen German professors, some of high academic standing, were engaged

for the faculties of arts, law, and science. Every professor was given permission to order any number of books pertaining to his specialty with a view to enlarging the library. The number of students was very small; there were many courses attended by none at all. But the energies of the enlarged and reorganized staff found other outlets. To begin with, a great number of lecture courses for the general public were organized. The cultural Turkish Hearth in Constantinople had introduced the innovation of admitting women to its lectures and concerts. The University immediately seized upon this example and opened its public courses to women. It was a thrilling experience for men and women to face each other in the lecture hall of the University, in spite of all the dark prejudices of the past, fortified by long centuries.

A second activity of the University consisted in its publications. Every faculty published a bi-monthly review, containing original essays by its professors. The Institute of Sociology had its own monthly. To add to this, new scientific societies were organized in the University, such as the Academy for Islamic and Turkish Studies and the Society of Pedagogy, which also published regular journals. A special section of the Ministry of Education, having its seat in the University Building, supervised the publication of original and translated scientific works. Competent university professors acted as advisers. This section likewise displayed great activity during the War. Among other things, it reprinted Turkish classics, and began the publication of a Turkish history in thirty-five volumes. It gave special attention to printing books for children.

The task of language reform was also entrusted to university professors, the Turkish language being genuinely in need of reform; for as the great number of words taken from Arabic and Persian had largely retained their original spelling and their own grammatical rules, one had to know these different grammars to be able to write Turkish correctly. To spell well one had to have some knowledge of the two languages. In growing revolt against this, everyone wrote certain Arabic and Persian words as they were pronounced. But as everyone chose different words, there was great chaos. It was sometimes found that the same words had been written in two or more different ways by the same writer in the same article. As for scientific expression, no two people translated them in the

same way, and it was accordingly very difficult to convey exact shades of meaning in matters of the higher learning.

Three different commissions were at work devising a standard system of spelling, writing a new grammar, preparing an ample dictionary, and establishing the correct terminology in various fields of knowledge. Some of the immediate results of these activities were published in the form of pamphlets. But the whole enterprise had to come to an end with the ending of the War.

Difficulties of Language Reform.

Besides the chaos in spelling, grammar, and terminology, during the War the problem of reforming the actual method of writing and printing Turkish was also taken up. In writing Turkish, characters have four different forms which vary according as they stand alone, or occur at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end of a word. These varying forms make it hard to learn to read and write Turkish correctly, and have always been considered one of the chief causes of illiteracy. They also complicate typesetting. The need of reform had been generally admitted, but no agreement could be reached as to how to bring it about. During the War, those in favor of writing Turkish in Latin characters were a small minority. Various systems of writing Arabic characters in only one way, notwithstanding their position in the word, were advocated. One of them happened to appeal to the war dictator. He ordered its general use in the army, as one proof of his great power. The order was naturally followed, but it proved to be an additional handicap. Correspondence and military publications using the new characters looked as if they were written in cypher, and had to be translated into the old characters in order to be understood. Although the daily *Tanin* used daily to publish a short paragraph printed in the new characters, the power of a dictator did not prove sufficient to ensure the permanent adoption of the change; and it had to be given up during the second year of the War.

Next to the University and its various dependent institutions, the various schools for girls benefited most by the War. In addition to special university courses, many normal schools and lyceums were opened for girls. All these schools were overcrowded, while the schools for boys were empty. The extension of military service to students, the possibility and the necessity of making a living at a

tender age, and the discovery that higher learning did not pay financially, discouraged boys from attending secondary schools, superior professional schools, and the University as well. The girls, however, felt the need of making the best possible use of their new opportunities and invaded all such schools—a situation which has not changed much since the War. Two former schools of the applied arts, for girls, were reorganized under the management of German directors, and a new school of fine arts was also opened for them.

The Road to Germany.

One of the general educational changes brought about by the War consisted in the replacement of French by German. Although German efforts to put an end to the teaching of French as a compulsory course were not successful, the teaching of German was likewise made compulsory. The old Galata-Sarail School still retained French as its medium of instruction, but another Turkish lyceum was organized on precisely the same model, and in it everything was taught in German by German teachers, with the object of encouraging Turkish students to go to Germany to complete their studies. In general, the learning of German became the fashion of the day.

Going to Germany to complete one's education also became a fashion of the war days. Three things encouraged it. First, young men who had not yet reached the age of military service were allowed to go to Germany for the purpose of study. They were considered to be on leave until they completed their studies. And many fathers, who could do it, sent their boys to Germany to have them escape such military service. Secondly, Germany facilitated, and in part subsidized, these Turkish students. A great many of them were supported by German-Turkish associations or admitted free of charge to German boarding institutions. And, third, the Turkish Government constantly, and at its own expense, increased the number of Turks studying in Germany. For they included not only young students, but army officers of the various engineering branches, government employees of different classes, and orphan boys who were to be turned into skilled artisans. Many of the above government employees were employed in German government offices to gain practical experience.

According to information published by the German-Turkish So-

ciety on August 13, 1918, there were at that time more than 2,000 Turkish students in Germany. They were attending every variety of German school—universities and normal schools, technical schools, colleges, and secondary schools. Most of them were boys, but the number of girls kept increasing. Some of the students were living in the special home founded by the German-Turkish Society; others had been placed in good German families. In 1917, 63 per cent were rated in their reports as "very good," 16 per cent as "good," 2 per cent as "fairly good," and the remainder as lacking the needed capacity for study. Two hundred Turkish orphan boys were employed in industry, 15 in agriculture, and 120 in mining.

The sending of such a large number of students to Germany was held to be of great importance. During the discussion of the educational budget of 1918, one deputy made the following statement: "There is a difference of four centuries between ourselves and Western Europe. The large number of students we are sending to the West have the task of decreasing this great difference." These students in Germany lived under the guardianship of a staff of four inspectors.

Turkey's Boy Scouts.

Another educational measure stimulated by Germans was the re-organization of the Turkish Boy Scouts. Where the movement had formerly been aimless and haphazard, German direction gave it a military character, and changed it completely. A provisional law enacted in April, 1916, also made membership compulsory. Boys between twelve and seventeen had to belong to the organization called that of "Healthy Boys," those over seventeen to that of "Vigorous Boys." All had to be registered in the groups corresponding to their age, and take part in military drills until they were called to service. Boys not in normal health or living in foreign countries, alone were exempted. Army corps commanders and enlisting bureaus were entrusted with the task of supervising the execution of the law. The "Healthy Boys" had to have as their scout masters teachers or other suitable persons who had to take special courses of training; the "Vigorous Boys" were to be drilled by officers holding special certificates of competence. Those officers who obtained these certificates from the head of the Boy Scout organization were exempt from service in southern Turkey, and enjoyed other privileges. Interest

in the new movement was aroused by periodicals and occasional publications, by propaganda in the daily papers, by lectures, and by demonstrations. Printed matter to the extent of hundreds of thousands of copies was distributed free of charge; and, within a few months, hundreds of lectures were delivered. About three hundred teachers and officers took part in the ten-days' course of training, which began in August, 1916. The educational influence, for good and for evil, of this huge military mechanism would have been very marked if it, too, had not come to an end at the end of the War.

Spreading Education in Other Ways.

Besides the activity displayed by the Government in the various educational fields, several private societies were also working in the same direction. The organization of Turkish Hearths was the most prominent among them. Its work has been spoken of in the chapter on Turkish nationalism. Next in importance was the "Society for National Education and Training." It had a very ambitious program which included the following:

1. Educational work through periodicals, books, lectures, and conferences.
2. The spreading of new ideas and of new standards by means of groups of traveling lecturers.
3. The investigation of social conditions in the interior, the collecting of old songs, and folklore, and pictures of national monuments.
4. The giving of oral and written advice to applicants.
5. The giving of evening courses in the various school grades, and also business courses.
6. The supervision of students coming to Constantinople from the interior, and the guidance of those going to foreign countries.

Although the Society could not carry out its whole extensive program, it organized lectures and evening courses, and opened competitions for the writing of a series of popular pamphlets designed to educate the country's peasants. These pamphlets called upon Turks to "learn about their religion, their country, their history, and their language, about beauty, righteousness, health, work, the world, duties and rights, and courtesy." The society also introduced this innovation: It organized a series of public lectures by

women. Like the University and the Turkish Hearth, it admitted both men and women to its courses and lectures.

Another society, called "the Home of Knowledge," made its specialty the educating of women who had had no opportunity to go to school; and its elementary courses for the illiterate were well attended, even by women of advanced ages. It also gave courses to retarded girls who wished to pursue studies in secondary schools or in the University. There were likewise certain courses in business training.

In addition to these two societies, a "Society for the Enlightenment of Peasants," and various teacher's societies, associations, and clubs established by the graduates of some of the higher schools were among those new institutions which came into existence as an indirect result of the War.

The provinces took little part in individual movements for education. Smyrna alone formed a society, called "Towards the People," and subscribed about \$150,000 for it; but the armistice kept it from beginning its actual work.

Educational war propaganda was extraordinarily neglected in Turkey. The main activity in this regard was negative. Everything was done to hinder the spreading of the truth. The positive work consisted in publishing the illustrated and popular *War Review* and a series of books. Writers were occasionally invited to the various fronts, and asked to write poems and books. An artificial system of trenches, and small models of service stations immediately behind the front were set up in Constantinople to give the public an idea of war conditions. A few information bureaus were also started, after German models.

The Germans were much more active in this regard. There were German exhibitions of war literature and pictures in Constantinople, Konia, Aleppo, Bagdad, etc. And other German organizations both secret and public, were busily engaged in educating the Turks as to the course of the War,—or its course as interpreted by German propaganda.

CHAPTER XX

THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN

A "Collective Guardianship" of Women.

ONE of the chief strongholds of religious reaction in Turkey lay in the oversensitiveness of popular feeling as to the position of women. It appealed to masculine jealousy to maintain strict and established rules in regard to seclusion and veiling. Religion was made the guardian of the existing situation. The masses of the people willingly shared in this guardianship; and, together this took the form of a sort of general responsibility for the honor and morality of women. If the immoral conduct of any woman came to public attention, the whole neighborhood felt itself insulted, and consequently justified in attacking and invading the guilty house, and in thus avenging its injured honor. The very mildest punishment for a detected woman was removal from the locality. Illicit intercourse with a non-Mohammedan man was sure to end in a lynching. Even such a marriage was not tolerated. Men could marry non-Mohammedan girls, but no Turkish woman was allowed to marry a non-Mohammedan, unless he formally embraced Islam. There existed almost a feeling of collective guardianship of women when it came to protecting them from those not of the "true faith." But it was a guardianship in which the outsider began at once to participate as soon as he passed the religious initiation.

Even the most harmless and respectable forms of social intercourse with men were not tolerated. A woman willing to uncover her face before men not belonging to a very narrow circle of relatives was socially boycotted and insulted, the general rule being that a woman could show her face only to those men with whom marriage according to religious standards would have been considered incest.

Few were the families so emancipated that they could entirely disregard such social pressure even in their strictly private life. Many an educated man who was, in theory, an opponent of the system, was unconsciously under its influence, and could not bring himself to introduce his wife even to his best friend. Enlightened centers like Constantinople claimed that they held to the system out of regard for the feelings of the more ignorant, particularly the peasant

classes. But even in Constantinople a woman was not permitted to go about the streets in the company of a man, even her husband, father, or brother, because the street crowds could not instantly be sure of the identity of the man, and did not want unknowingly to share in the responsibility of a guilty relationship. A man and wife could not go anywhere in the same carriage, or do their shopping together. The police would readily interfere to stop such "evil conduct." In provincial towns the pressure was still greater than in Constantinople. The woman's place there was the home in the most strict sense of the word. She was not allowed even to go to the shopping districts. She was, of course, very busy at home, because it remained in many respects a manufacturing place for preserved foods. Some branches of weaving also survived in spite of European competition.

Women's dress was likewise under the collective control of the masses. Women were expected to clothe themselves modestly outside their homes and to confine themselves to the standard dress of the day. It was, however, impossible to impose this rule upon the well-to-do classes in Constantinople, and in certain other large cities. There was a gradual change, every new veiling attire of today became the property of the masses tomorrow, and, after a time, yesterday's styles disappeared entirely. This was severely attacked by the women of the poorer classes. They regarded every misfortune in life as a punishment sent from heaven upon the whole community which tolerated such license in the dress of women.

The conditions of life of the peasant classes were entirely different. With them, the women had to do most of the farm work, and do it in the open air. The women of a village, veiled only in form, were much freer in their social intercourse within the village itself. They veiled only before strangers to the village. A large part of the peasant population in the central part of Asia Minor, as well as the Turkish nomads, had wholly broken away from the orthodox system. They had broad religious conceptions and were opponents of any system of veiling. The sections of the population adhering to orthodox Islam, spoke of the agnostics, who were generally called "red-heads," in an extremely insulting tone, and avoided any intimate social intercourse with them, but did not let their hostility go beyond that.

Abdul-Hamid, Protector of Virtue.

This whole system, as above described, was in part the work of Abdul-Hamid. Women were freer in some respects before his accession to the throne. He used the subjugation of women as an easy way of gaining popularity among the ignorant. His attitude was based in fact on a repulsive hypocrisy. His own harem was the most immoral imaginable. Along with his numerous legal wives, he kept a large number of slave girls, although slavery was legally forbidden in Turkey. Most of the members of the palace clique followed his example on a smaller scale.

This was not thought to conflict with the above system. It was taken as a matter of course, because this restrictive moral system was devised for women only. Fortunately, such examples were not followed by the rest of the people. Among them, unbroken monogamic marriage remained the rule, although any man had the legal, and to some extent the social, right to divorce his wife by the mere saying of a single word, and he could then marry several women or buy slave girls.

When the Young Turks came to power in 1908, they found the prejudices affecting the women, left behind by Abdul-Hamid, too strong for them to touch. From the beginnings of the new era intellectual women began to voice their anger against existing conditions, but they found hardly any real echo. On the contrary, several times the Young Turks felt themselves obliged to issue police orders regarding the changing dress of women, and remind both women and their male guardians that carelessness in veiling constituted a grave religious offense.

The change brought about by the Balkan War was certainly an important initial step in the emancipation of women, but the oppressive system was too firmly established to allow great departures from it to take place at once.

A Feminist Movement Led by a Man.

The so-called enlightened despotism created during the War attacked the woman question in a systematic way. Zia Goek Alp was the leader of the feminist movement. He prepared suggestions for the political leaders. Then a long series of articles by him appeared in the weekly *New Review*, his chief mouthpiece. In addition, he

issued a pamphlet against the veiling and seclusion of women, printing it on a copying machine. In his articles we find the following:

The subjugation of women, which has gone so far as to deprive them of their most elementary human rights and freedom, is not of Turkish or Mohammedan origin. It is an unfortunate heritage passed on to us by Persians and Byzantines, and the Turks must get rid of these foreign influences. Both Turkish and Mohammedan beginnings were feministic in character. The old Turkish family was monogamous, and based the mutual love and respect of a single man and a single woman on equal terms. Every Turkish house possessed two idols, one female and one male. The former was always put on the left side, which was considered the place of honor. The family was held sacred. The man who sought to make love to a married woman was condemned to death.

Primitive Mohammedanism was not less ready to concede a position of respect to woman. Mohammed was an enemy of the system, prevalent among us now, of marriage without any previous acquaintance. A man, planning to marry, asked for his advice. The prophet told him: "Go and see that woman, and get to know her before you decide anything." Of a man who abused his wife he spoke in this way: "He is such a shameless man that he is flogging his wife like a slave woman, forgetting that in a few hours he will again find himself loving and esteeming her." On another occasion he declared that a woman with a lofty character was the most sublime of God's works. To a question as to the location of Paradise he gave this answer: "It lies under the feet of mothers."

The situation now existing in Turkey is too ugly to accord with old Mohammedan and Turkish conceptions. We are in no sense suggesting the imitation of foreign examples. We can easily attain perfection, if we get rid of foreign influences—those of Persia and Byzantium—and return to what we were in the beginning.

The pamphlet against veiling was at that time too radical to be given general publicity in the press. It was privately circulated, and contained these statements:

The forms of social life have nothing to do with religion, whose field is the world to come, and those problems which as yet reason cannot solve. A social usage such as veiling is easily traceable to certain instincts, and to primitive social origins. Its perpetuation in the present century is the greatest possible insult to our women. It is based on the

supposition that they are fundamentally immoral, and must constantly be kept by physical barriers from taking wrong steps. An ethical system which is based on external guardianship, and not on confidence in one's character and self-respect is not worthy of the Turkish nation. The discarding of veils can have no immoral consequences, and will be, on the contrary, the starting point of a higher ethical development.

Zia Goek Alp sought also to create a desire for a better kind of home life. He criticized severely the prevalent system of the great patriarchal house, where many members of a family lived, often in a dependent way. He maintained that one phase of primitive Turkish life was the nest-like home, and every new couple created its own, be it ever so modest at the beginning. He made clear in numerous articles and lectures that his feministic system did not aim at giving women freedom to dress in extravagant ways, or to act as if they were the heroines of sentimental novels. It sought only to give women opportunities to discharge duties in society which till then were reserved for men.

War Work the Emancipator.

This agitation also made it easier to meet the new social and economic needs that were an outgrowth of the War. As everywhere else, the enlisting of men created vacancies in government offices and in commercial establishments. Turkish women were, for the first time, hired to fill the vacancies. Not only did they prove efficient and ardent workers, but the old idea that any intercourse between men and women meeting for the first time must have immoral consequences was seen to be baseless. The office girl behaved like a self-respecting person, and the men in the office who would consider the veiled woman in the street as prey to be pursued felt the need of respecting a woman who was honestly working to feed a family and to take the place of a man who was doing his military service.

This helpful experience gave some of the Government's leaders, including the war dictator, the idea of establishing "the Society for Finding Employment for Women," and it was an organization that prospered. It drew its chief income from the funds of the army. It found thousands of women employment in army workshops, where the principal work was the making of uniforms and army clothing. The women workers in these shops were given warm lunches and a

certain amount of food in addition to money wages. This Society, also freely gave its services to employers of every sort.

On December 14, 1917, the Society made it compulsory that all its single employees should marry,¹ though with a minimum age for men of twenty-five and of twenty for women. A list of those eligible was to be published in the local press. Any man showing an interest in any particular woman should be given an opportunity to see her picture and to learn all particulars about her. He would then make his offer in a sealed envelope. In his case a police investigation would follow. And if this resulted favorably, the Society would act as an intermediary. Young women without trousseaus would receive help. The Society would likewise try to find employment for the would-be husband if he was without it. All who insisted on remaining single were to forfeit the 15 per cent of their salaries which had been depositing every month in the pension fund, and would lose their positions as well. Women were to receive a wage increase of 90 per cent, on marriage, and a further 20 per cent on the birth of the first child. In February this special organization assumed the character of a general matrimonial agency, and extended its services to those having no connection with the Bureau.

On February 9, 1918, there was constituted the first labor battalion composed entirely of women, again through the intermediary of the above Society. It was designed to be a regular unit of the army and given the title of "the First Women's Labor Battalion, attached to the First Army." Similar formations were gradually to be increased in number and to be employed in all military services behind the front. The officers were in the beginning to be men; but such men were to be replaced by women as soon as a sufficient number of female officers had been trained. All grades received the same pay and rations as regular soldiers. The staff of every battalion included a chief of battalion, two chiefs of company, one accountant—a woman—one secretary—also a woman—female sergeants and corporals, a civil engineer, and an expert agriculturist. Women soldiers were to live in barracks, to be drilled and trained like men, to be allowed to spend four nights a week in their homes, in case they were married, and to wear uniforms.

The public activity of women was not confined to government

¹ The *Vakit*, December 15, 1917.

services. The municipality of Constantinople employed a great number of women as street cleaners. They wore special uniforms and trousers.

Many women voluntarily engaged in work for the charitable societies, and in the hospitals. Others made good beginnings in business; and women were being given various chances to make new starts in life. In the University, in addition to the regular courses of the special department for them, women were by degrees admitted to all courses open to the general public. The School of Commerce organized special courses for girls desiring to acquire a business education. Private professional schools were also established to enable women to make an independent living.

The women of the peasantry were far more active than those of the towns and cities. They were the chief productive force in the rural districts. After harvesting their crop they themselves brought it to market, and even traveled to the large centers of population to escape the middlemen and obtain better prices. They also constituted one of the principal transport forces of the army, often carrying on their backs the ammunition it required. The admiration aroused by such war work led some municipalities, and even towns as conservative as Konia, to decide to erect special monuments to commemorate the patriotic services of Turkish women.

Along with these economic and social changes, educated men and women began to meet each other in common social gatherings, a development which had seemed very far off a few years before. The main branch of the Turkish Hearth, a nonpolitical association destined to develop the cultural elements of Turkish nationalism, took the first step in this regard. The two American colleges in Constantinople also offered an opportunity to Turkish men and women to meet each other for the first time on a social and intellectual plane. Membership in the various executive committees of the charitable societies gave a further opportunity for social intercourse. Gradually, too, private life began to have its first shy social gatherings. The time when a husband and wife could not appear together in the street commenced to seem very distant. The veil was not entirely discarded, but only survived in form, never being actually used to cover the face by most of the women in Constantinople. Provincial towns generally found local resistance too firm to admit of the following of this new example set by Constantinople, and by

the peasant women as well. In the provinces there were entirely different social and economic conditions, and the ways of Constantinople could be followed, even in a limited way, only by the families of some of the government officials.

The emancipation of women did not assume any political aspect during the War; the rapid changes already brought about satisfied even the most radical feminists. Moreover, political life in the entire country was at such a standstill that any movement for the political rights of women could scarcely have found anything that could have been of help or stimulus.

CHAPTER XXI

WAR MORALS

The Effect of Privations.

THE Great War surprised Turkey at a time of social transition. The old social structure with all its sanctions was shaken, and no new ethical system had taken its place. All sane adaptations of Western models met some sort of resistance, while influences making for sex immorality, drinking, and gambling easily penetrated even to distant corners.

The Hamidian period had put a premium on lack of character and morals. For thirty-three years Abdul-Hamid had eliminated the morally strong and fit, and favored the survival of those who could intrigue, spy, and steal. The Young Turk party system could not place ideals of public interest and individual integrity above party interest. The state officials were not paid a living wage; the average standard of living was below the poverty line according to Western standards. Outside of the newly organized Turkish Hearths and some Masonic lodges in Constantinople and a few other cities, there were hardly any professional or social organizations which could serve as agencies of social control over public morals. The army and navy were the only professions where a high standard of morality was insisted on in a more or less effective way. The old generation had lost its authority over the younger one. As for women, the system of seclusion had stood in the way of the development of a new sort of self-respect. In the general social chaos, there was too much hypocrisy, hand in hand with too loose a conception of conduct.

In consequence of this, people in Turkey were, from the viewpoint of morality, less prepared to resist the social and economic effects of the War than any other belligerents. In addition to the meager material resources of the country, the privations imposed by the War were far heavier than they were anywhere else, and formed a stronger incentive to go beyond the limits laid down by virtue. The uneven distribution of the war burdens, the contrast between privation and easily acquired war wealth, the hopelessness of final success, the great migrations caused by Russian victories, all alike were factors contributing to the laxity of morals.

The daily *Vakit* of September 11, 1918, speaks in this way of the general situation :

The unbearable privations of the War have shaken all the sacred bonds of society, and have caused physical attraction to assume an irresistible character. Our situation is worse than that of other belligerents. With us no general system of education, and hardly any social organizations that make for altruism strengthen the moral resistance of the people. We had to face the War with scantier resources than any other nation. More than that, the hardships of the War have not been evenly distributed. For some sections of the population it had been an extraordinary occasion for profit and enjoyment. Therefore, there is a dangerous possibility that the desires of the flesh may entirely strangle the sacred obligations of social bonds and personal integrity. The best of measures with which we can meet this horrible state of affairs is this: The Government can prove in an effective way that it is the firm and honest guardian of public interest. Then only can those forces that are seeking to strengthen national, moral, and religious bonds enter upon their work without exposing themselves to the charge of hypocrisy. It is true that our social bonds have become dangerously loose as a consequence of the War. Many honest people are of the opinion that every hope of improvement is already lost. Single individuals may be excused if they give themselves up to despair in the face of unfair odds; but a nation must struggle against evil influences until the last moment, even if it is openly facing the danger of complete destruction.

Bad Examples and Illicit Trading.

The evil example of the war leaders had a great influence in weakening the spirit of sacrifice and resistance, and in encouraging abuses. They certainly did not feel the need of sharing the general privations of the people. Most of them thought themselves very honest. They were, in a sense; but this honesty did not keep them from putting themselves above the law in the matter of food distribution, and from living in abundance. Whenever a minister had to travel on government business, his table had to be supplied with luxuries, unusual even in times of peace. For a single journey from Constantinople to Batoum, in 1918, when hunger was the normal condition of the people, the table expenses of the war dictator and his staff was \$32,000. Most of those in high political positions obtained their food supplies at cost from the food-distribution authorities. Mr. Einstein, of the American Embassy in Constantinople,

relates in his memoirs that the Turkish ministers had their daily game of poker or billiards in the fashionable club, in the days of anxiety in 1915 when the Dardanelles might be forced at any moment.

The opportunities offered by illicit war trading were too attractive to be resisted by people of ordinary character. There grew up a general craze to share in it. Even such people as university professors were caught engaging in forbidden transactions like the smuggling of gold from Germany and Austria. On December 19, 1917, the Faculty of Arts of the University of Constantinople passed the following motion after a warm discussion: "The council of professors of the Faculty of Arts considers that any sort of commercial activity on the part of a professor violates the professional etiquette of his position; and the council solemnly declares that it will cease coöperating with any professor who makes himself guilty of such conduct."

In view of the existing conditions, the great numbers—a high percentage—of government officials who managed to remain honest in spite of their small salaries must be regarded as war heroes. On September 3, 1918, one of this class, a telegraph operator with a large family, who was receiving \$24 a month, addressed the following letter to the daily papers:

We are, literally, starving. Members of our families are suffering from diseases directly caused by hunger. Most of us have none of that education which would equip us with unshakably firm moral principles. How can we be expected rigorously to respect the limit between moral and immoral? A man not in want can be held responsible for violating moral and legal rules. Can the same standard be applied to a hungry man? I have remained faithful to my conscience up to the present. I have had to sell everything we had, merely to keep my family and myself alive. The temptation is becoming irresistible. If I trespass the limit of the strictly moral would you judge me as severely as you would the act of a man who has on his conscience a huge fortune made in War?

The *Vakit* of the same date gives the following answer to this question:

A corrupt act cannot be approved of, but the individual guilty of it under the circumstances now existing in Turkey cannot be looked upon as a man entirely lost to society.

The same paper started a campaign to build up a realization of the meaning of crimes against society in general. It pointed out that people who thought themselves honest, and would not knowingly harm an ant, did not hesitate to endanger the health and the lives of thousands by profiteering in foodstuffs, by mixing, for instance, the stuff they sold as flour with powdered white stone. The paper complained of the fact that the existing laws punished crimes against individuals most severely, while the man who committed a crime against whole masses of people got off with a fine of a few pounds.

The riches acquired through the War were as a rule as quickly wasted as they were acquired. They were a large factor in the moral breakdown, because the examples of luxury and dissipation found many would-be imitators, who became more and more careless in the choice of means.

The desire to share in such war abuses was so general that they gradually lost the character of misdemeanors in the eyes of a large class of people. The acquisition of material goods by dodging war laws and restrictions received a war-time nickname. It was called an "anafor," literally a wind, or an undercurrent at sea. The expression had no evil meaning, according to the loose moral standards of the day. It meant something extremely clever and successful, and the man guilty of war abuses took pride in admitting his guilt among his friends and was rather envied.

Drinking and Gambling.

These destructive moral tendencies found their chief expression in drinking and gambling. The former became a contagious social disease. The growth of drinking habits and also widespread feelings of despair are clearly illustrated by the increased production of "rakki," a very strong, and the most commonly used of alcoholic beverages. The figures for its consumption, in kilograms, are the following:

1914	2,860,477
1915	2,130,192
1916	5,243,358
1917	4,589,920

No class, sex, or age was exempt from the disease of gambling.

Mere boys of thirteen and fourteen spent in this way all the money they could get. The press campaign against it was of hardly any influence. During the sitting of Parliament, in December, 1917, when the stamp duties on playing cards came up for discussion, the gambling habit was most severely attacked. The arguments advanced by various deputies might be expressed in these words: The gambling plague was devastating all classes of the population. It was the regular thing for boys in the primary grades to gamble in the coffeehouses. Between that and the fashionable clubs for the wealthy and the influential, there was a continuous chain of gaming places. Some restriction must be laid upon this evil. The money seized in such places should be given to the charitable societies. The duty on every pack of cards should be raised from 20 cents to \$2.

The Minister of Finance made this answer to these charges:

The gambling habit has really taken a most deadly form. It must be struggled against. The Government might do something to prevent officials from gambling. But it would be waste of time and effort to attempt to do the same thing among the people at large. Heavy duties would not be a preventive, and would only put a premium on smuggling. The proposed duty is already twice as high as the highest duty of the same sort anywhere else in the world.

The duty was not increased, but an anti-gambling law was passed by the Chamber of Deputies. It was rigorously enforced, but only for a few days. Several gambling places in Constantinople and Smyrna were searched by the police; and then the law was entirely forgotten and gambling extended the sphere of its influence more and more.

The effect of the War on sexual morals was very destructive. New and infectious currents of luxury and debauchery on the one hand, and poverty and inadequate support for soldiers' families on the other, were the chief causes of a general wave of prostitution.

War-Time Turkey and Prostitution.

Up to the time of the War, prostitution was tolerated only among non-Mohammedan women. Although the law did not discriminate, the police and populace coöperated in preventing prostitution from becoming a tolerated profession among Mohammedans. True, their secret and professional prostitution was by no means rare; but

whenever a house harboring it was discovered, it was attacked and stoned by the mob, and the inhabitants removed from the neighborhood by the police. In smaller towns and village communities with a purely Turkish population Mohammedan women were tolerated as prostitutes and as dancers for drinking parties. The larger towns with mixed populations and with a segregated district composed of non-Mohammedan prostitutes, made a pretense of forbidding the open prostitution of Mohammedan women out of regard for the feelings of the smaller towns and the rural districts.

During the War, when the number of prostitutes increased in large proportion, a continuation of the old attitude would have meant to make more easy the spread of venereal diseases. As soon as the value of religion as a weapon of war proved to be worthless, the authorities saw no danger in officially tolerating the creation of special segregated districts for Mohammedan women. This attitude of toleration was used as one of the most insistent means of secret propaganda against the war Government, although the difference between old and new conditions was one of better policing and the control of venereal diseases. The propaganda was not as effective as it might have been some years before, for the popular mind had suddenly changed under the new stimuli of the war era. The word "economic" had acquired a magical influence at the expense of the old attitude, always ready, as it was, to yield to religious fanaticism. The numerous adherents of Turkish economic unity favored the new measures, for they would mean the saving of a part of the money which had formerly gone into non-Turkish houses.

According to an investigation made in 1920, the number of Mohammedan prostitutes amounted to 804, and of non-Mohammedans to 1,367. Some 746 women, registered during the War, had returned to a regular life. The hospital for prostitutes infected with venereal diseases was visited in 1917 by 2,512 women,—1,416 of them Mohammedans; in 1918 by 2,841 women—1,675 being Mohammedans; in 1919 by 3,378—1,879 Mohammedans; and in 1920 by 3,132, of whom the Mohammedans now numbered 1,785.

Secret prostitution was much more widespread proportionately than the vice in its open and registered form, particularly among Mohammedan women of better standing. It became the fashion among the war profiteers to keep Turkish mistresses and to show

them off in public, something which was not usual before the War. Secret houses of assignation in fashionable districts were often frequented by educated women of relatively good families driven by poverty or lured by debauch. Besides these places, 58 drinking places, with 231 girls, sprang up during the War to cater to German soldiers. A social survey of Constantinople made in 1922 under the direction of Prof. C. R. Johnson of Robert College, estimates the number of open and secret prostitutes at between 4,000 and 4,500 in Constantinople.¹ There is no exact record for the war years, but the number then must certainly have been far larger. But many women belonging to destitute soldiers' families saved themselves from their involuntary fall as soon as the support of the family returned from the front.

It is very remarkable that intercourse between non-Mohammedans and Mohammedan prostitutes was fanatically opposed. There, the economic argument had no effect. The rumor that a German officer had been seen to enter a Mohammedan house of ill fame would always start a kind of nervous agitation among the people. Mr. C. T. Riggs, who wrote the chapter on adult delinquency in the Johnson social survey, was not allowed to see the ward in the hospital for venereal diseases where the Mohammedan prostitutes were quartered.

The number of Moslems entering the hospital [he writes],² is 56 or 57 per cent of the whole, whereas the number of Moslem inmates in the licensed houses would seem to be comparatively small. It has been impossible to trace the location of these Moslem girls, owing to the jealousy with which they are surrounded and safeguarded from non-Moslem eyes.

The struggle against the widespread secret, and the increase of open prostitution had no great effect. On September 11, 1918, a physician, a specialist, made these statements in the daily press:

The situation is a most disheartening one. Never before have so many cases of syphilis been found in Constantinople. The disease is spreading among the better classes. The woman not a professional prostitute who sells herself from destitution or debauchery transmits the disease to the husband; and there are other cases where the husband is the agent of contagion. Society is not protected against this danger. The police

¹ *Constantinople Today*, New York, 1922, p. 363.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 365.

force, composed of men, is powerless. Women, highly educated, and receiving large salaries, must be entrusted with the task of prevention.

Home Morality Protected by Courts-Martial.

As the waves of debauchery behind the front caused heads of families to grow apprehensive for the safety of their homes and to desert the front line, special courts-martial were set up to handle the task of safeguarding public morals. They imposed very severe penalties on those instrumental in dragging the families of soldiers into a life of vice. These courts-martial also settled in a few minutes or hours cases on which an ordinary law court might have spent weeks or months. They dealt with all acts incompatible with public order and morals, with gambling, sending uncensored letters, smuggling arms, speaking in the street to unknown women, selling liquor to soldiers, drunkenness, selling above fixed prices, publicly insulting the great prophets, stirring up the different races against each other, resisting the orders of state officials, keeping bars open after hours, the presence of enemy subjects in the streets late at night, the purchase of stolen goods, and so on. The papers daily contained long lists of condemnations for all these various offenses; and identity of the offenders, if they were not too prominent, was made public. The same publicity was given to those who engaged in secret prostitution. Penalties were not always those fixed by the law. The form of misconduct which figured most widely in the daily lists might mean a sentence of two months in one case or of six in another. It was governed by the convictions of the military judges in each individual case. An inexperienced youth got off with a fine of a few pounds, while a policeman was given six months for the same offense.

In spite of all severe measures, offenses, particularly various sorts of robberies, kept increasing. Extreme need led to individual and to organized efforts to make a living by stealing and robbing. On November 28, 1917, a band of thieves composed entirely of women was discovered. They all belonged to really destitute families, and seemed to have resorted to such a life out of despair. They worked together very capably. Everything they took became common property. By a complicated system of coöperation, they managed to steal about seven hundred various articles, of a total value of \$80,000. Some of the members of the band sold the stolen goods in distant towns,

bought food supplies with the proceeds, and sold such food to advantage in the streets of Constantinople. Three other similarly organized bands, comprising both men and women, were caught in Constantinople in 1917.

During the last two years of the War men and women constantly argued the question; which was more responsible for the decline in moral standards during the War? Men argued that the foolish expenditures of women upon their toilets, their lack of patriotism, and their desire to vie with one another in display, were responsible for the illegal acts committed by the men. The women answered that only a small group of them deserved this charge, that the great majority of women were struggling bitterly to take the place of the male supporter of the family, who was absent or lost to them, that men with illicitly acquired wealth were responsible for ruining women of weak character and for destroying all the sacred standards of life by their bad examples and displays of debauchery.

CHAPTER XXII

WAR AND HEALTH

The Handicap of Exhaustion.

THE World War meant for Turkey an unequal struggle between an undeveloped country, with few resources and a scant population, and numerous enemies who were well developed and well equipped. As a natural result, a heavy price in human life and health had to be paid.

The war losses were even heavier than the above factors would account for. Arbitrary and impulsive methods of conducting the War, as well as endless waste and abuses, meant losses that had to be added to those arising from superior enemy weapons, aggression on every front, a strict blockade, a dearth of food, lack of communications in the interior, an economic system that was primitive, and that could not be adjusted to the new and extraordinary demands made upon it, and so on. The wholesale and enforced migrations was another chapter of loss, and one filled with devastation and calamity.

The World War found Turkey in a condition of material and moral exhaustion as a result both of the Italian and Balkan wars and of internal troubles. The number of immigrants that had poured in from the territories lost to her exceeded 300,000. Most of them were still in an unsettled condition when the Great War broke out; and their health was peculiarly exposed to dangers arising therefrom.

In 1915, half a million Armenians were deported, for reasons in part military, in part political. Differences of climate, hardships and privations, the lack of medical assistance, and attacks made upon them on the march took a heavy toll of them.

Between 1916 and 1918 the Russian occupation forced almost a million¹ Turks and Kurds to migrate to western Turkey. This exodus was sudden and general. The help organized by the Government, the army, and the Red Crescent came too late, and was insufficient. Many refugees perished on the way. Only two or three provinces

¹ The figures of the Board of Immigration are 862,962.

gave real care to those allotted to them. In most provinces they were simply abandoned to their fate.

When the Russians retired in 1918, such of these refugees as survived rushed back to their homes. The distances were great, the army of occupation had left nothing for them to eat, and almost half of them perished of hunger and disease.

During the war years about 70 per cent of all refugees and immigrants had found some sort of employment. About 400,000 of them were fed, but inadequately, by the Board of Immigration. The Board established 41 hospitals, 28 orphanages, 3 soup kitchens, and 9 workshops; but they were not sufficient to really provide for the health and feeding of the immigrants. The losses suffered by the respective eastern provinces, as a result of the exodus, varied from 25 to 75 per cent of the entire population. During the armistice period 461,062 Turks and about 335,000 Armenians and Greeks were repatriated.

Mortality Figures for Constantinople.

There are no exact figures to give a measure of health conditions in the case of the settled civilian population. In Constantinople alone were any mortality statistics kept that were even more or less correct; and the health bureau of the capital gives the following figures for the years 1912-1923:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Children</i>	<i>Total Mortality</i>
1912	9,231	12,431	5,893	27,555
1913	8,614	9,924	5,585	24,123
1914	7,919	9,795	4,530	22,244
1915	8,152	10,838	4,266	22,756
1916	9,015	9,468	4,082	22,455
1917	9,781	11,078	4,421	25,270
1918	16,509	17,106	6,979	40,594
1919	8,375	9,546	4,891	22,812
1920	8,944	10,211	5,613	24,768
1921	7,761	8,820	5,522	22,103
1922	7,675	8,581	5,775	22,031
1923	7,771	8,795	5,554	22,120
1924	6,942	8,197	4,654	19,793
1925	6,286	7,200	4,227	17,663

As the exact population of Constantinople is not known and has greatly fluctuated at various times, during and after wars, the ideas conveyed by these figures are not necessarily what they may seem. From 1912 on, every year was a war year. There are no data available for the years before 1912. The table shows in a general way that the mortality had greatly increased in 1918. The figures do not include military losses. The data for infant mortality are even less dependable, for there is more irregularity in the registration of the deaths of infants.

The measures taken to safeguard the civil population from infectious diseases were, in Constantinople, fairly successful. The plague, which several times showed itself in the city, was not given any chance of doing harm. Cholera never became a general danger. Typhus was much more destructive and radical measures of protection had to be taken. Among them were free public baths, compulsory searching of all houses for the infected, the required showing of certificates of cleanliness on every possible occasion, compulsory vaccination, nonadmittance of soldiers into street cars, and the creation of a car service especially for them. In the provinces such work was taken over by the army medical corps. Any regular sanitary organization in the provinces and municipalities was lacking in many parts of the country. As most of the good physicians were enlisted in the army, the war staff was hardly capable of coping with the new problems to be met.

The critical problem of infant mortality during the War was very often the subject of discussion. No effective measures could be taken, because it was a problem closely connected with the general difficulties as to food. The habit of breast feeding which counterbalanced to some extent the effects of primitive sanitary conditions, could not be of great value, as most of the mothers were not receiving proper food. Babies only a few months old were given as their sole food war bread made of maize soaked in water. Only about 30,000 liters of milk were produced a day, for a population of a million, and it was too costly to use as a food for children.

What the Army Suffered.

The army medical service was well organized centrally, but it had to face insoluble problems. To begin with, there was no possibility

of doing preventive work. The army, which was expected to show the highest degree of endurance, was badly clothed and badly fed. There were instances where soldiers, equipped for a hot climate, were suddenly sent to the Caucasus front in winter time. As only a one-third ration could be issued, the death rate due to exposure, hunger, and resulting disease was great.

On the Syrian front, soldiers had often not only to live on half rations, but they were given the same flour soup for months and months, and at last became incapable of touching a spoonful of it. Various food supplies which were bought for the army were consumed behind the front, and never reached the fighting units.

Toward the end of 1917 the Fourth Army, in Syria, gave the following answer to a request for food supplies, received from the Irak army:²

"The food situation in the Fourth Army is so dreadful that only 350 grams of flour can be given to men and 2.5 kilograms of forage to animals. If communications are not improved it is doubtful whether we can go on."

Hussein Hussnu Emir gives the following description of the general situation on the eve of the third battle of Gaza:³

The Turkish soldiers concentrated at that time in Palestine had not enough bread to maintain their strength. They received almost no meat, no butter, no sugar, no vegetables, no fruits. Only a thin tent gave a semblance of protection from the hot sun by day, and from the cold of the night. They were wretchedly clothed. They had no boots at all, or what they had were so bad that they meant injury to the feet of many who wore them. Soldiers had been without word from home for years and years. Owing to the bad communications no leave was ever given. There was no amusement of any sort, no tobacco, no coffee. And men so placed could not but see that their German comrades on the same front were well fed, and enjoyed every sort of comfort and amusement.

With the exception of the Dardanelles campaign, such conditions were the ordinary thing; and the task of caring for the health of the army was, accordingly, a very ungrateful one. Owing to the blockade, medical supplies and instruments were lacking. During the

² Hussein Hussnu Emir, *op. cit.*, p. 62. ³ *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

latter period of the War, serious surgical operations had to be undertaken without anaesthetics.

The Medical Service and Army Losses.

The number of physicians for the entire health service amounted to 2,555. According to official figures 2,998,321 men were enrolled in the army during the four years of war; and though the total at any one time never exceeded 1,200,000, compared with such a total the numbers of the medical staff were very small. Of active army surgeons there were 1,202—1,173 Turks, 9 Greeks, 17 Armenians, 3 Jews; and there were 1,353 reserve surgeons—528 Turks, 331 Greeks, 229 Armenians, 116 Jews, and 79 Catholic Maronites. The losses of the army medical corps during the War were very heavy. Active surgeons to the number of 163, and 186 on the reserve met death either during the fighting or through sickness, a total of 13.66 per cent. Physicians who had passed the service age had to be called to the colors by an emergency law. This measure added ninety-two to the number available.

There are fairly accurate figures as to disease in the army during the War, and the corresponding mortality from it.⁴ The totals for the nine armies were the following:

	<i>Reported sick</i>	<i>Reported wounded</i>	<i>Deaths from sickness</i>	<i>Deaths from wounds</i>
1st year of war	409,560	225,537	57,462	21,988
2d year of war	853,079	314,936	126,216	21,986
3d year of war	947,075	48,667	133,469	8,081
4th year of war	844,878	122,697	84,712	7,407
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	3,054,592	711,837	401,859	59,462

In addition to cases in the nine regular armies, the following cases of sickness and death were reported by the various military formations and enlistment stations during the four years of the War:

⁴ These figures, prepared for the second volume of *The Sanitary History of the War*, edited by the Medical department of the Ministry of War, have not yet been published. The writer returns thanks for permission to use them before publication.

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	<i>Reported sick</i>	<i>Reported wounded</i>	<i>Deaths from sickness</i>	<i>Deaths from wounds</i>
Enlistment stations	306,596	15,786	41,122	688
Various small formations ⁶	79,830	1,091	18,481	246
Army corps in Rumania	16,481	13,106	809	2,744
Army corps in Galicia ⁶	7,111	10,326	280	4,571
Army corps in Macedonia ⁶	4,804	376	671	187
The Dardanelles ⁷	29,303	822	1,039	372
Yemen and Assir	8,143	392	1,342	99
Hedjaz	8,711	17	1,156	9
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	460,979	51,916	64,900	8,916
Total for the nine armies	3,054,492	711,837	401,859	59,462
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Grand Total	3,515,471	763,753	466,759	68,378

Among causes of sickness, malaria came first, with 461,799 cases and 23,351 deaths. Next was dysentery with about 147,000 cases and 40,000 deaths. The figures for intermittent fever were, approximately, 103,000 cases and 4,000 deaths; for typhus 93,000 cases and 26,000 deaths; for syphilis about 27,000 cases and 150 deaths.

The loss of life due directly to the War is variously estimated as between 1,500,000 and 2,500,000. Dr. Riza Nour Bey⁸ speaks even of 3,000,000. It is a fact, however, that of the able-bodied men who saw active service at the front only from 10 to 20 per cent returned to their villages. Without the mass desertions during the last period of the War, the survival of the Turkish nation might have become problematical.

⁶ Fortified places like Smyrna and Tchataldja, the inspectorship of commissariat, depot battalions, and so on.

⁶ These army corps attached to a German army were cared for according to German standards.

⁷ The losses in the Dardanelles campaign not included.

⁸ *Turkish History*, I, 19.

CHAPTER XXIII

RELIEF WORK

Little Support from the Government.

CASES requiring relief, due to the War, can be classified, by causes, as follows:

1. Temporary loss of health or permanent disability.
2. The high cost of living, and lack of food.
3. Loss of the family's ordinary support.
4. Forced migration.
5. War imprisonment.

Owing to the primitive material resources of the country, the lack of efficient organization, the non-development of the idea of social service on the one side, and the unusually heavy war burden and the numerous abuses and sources of waste on the other, all the above five general causes meant suffering, and they could be remedied only in small part.

The Government was not markedly active in relief work. What it did in the way of protecting the health both of the army and the civilian population has been dealt with in the previous chapter. Beyond this its activity was merely nominal. Soldiers' families without support were paid 5 piasters a day, that is 20 cents at the beginning of the War, and 5 cents at its end. In 1917 the entire provision for this purpose amounted to £T5,500,000. On rare occasions a certain quantity of food was given out to needy families of soldiers. But such help was only occasional, and can hardly be looked upon as part of the relief system.

As was pointed out in the chapter on food problems, the help afforded by the Government to the general public in its struggle with the high cost of living, and the food shortage was far from being effective. The giving out of uneatable war bread and irregular distributions of small quantities of other foodstuffs at reasonable prices were hardly sufficient to offset the results of the disastrous economic policy of enriching a few speculators at the expense of the general public. Besides, this help was limited mainly to Constantinople. Other relief activity was displayed when things became too dreadful in some given area. This was the case in Syria and Pales-

tine in 1915, and in the Eastern Provinces after the Russian occupation.

An organization to support soldiers crippled in the War was started on May 27, 1917, and took the form of a private society under the patronage of the Ministry of War. With the money collected from public and private sources a department store was opened. The overhead expenses were, however, so high that not much was left for the original purpose of the organization. A few cripples were sent to Germany to obtain as radical a cure as they could be given. Others received artificial legs or arms, as well as small amounts of money. The relief was not general, nor was it effective. Only through their own organization could the crippled obtain such privileges as the sole right to sell certain things—mainly tobacco—in certain places.

The Treatment of Prisoners.

The help extended to prisoners of war could hardly be spoken of as an established system. In a general way, prisoners taken by both sides were not treated in an ideal way. In Turkey, the usual sufferings and privations were increased by the country-wide shortage of everything; and the treatment of prisoners was not uniform. The staffs of the internment camps were composed of retired officers, recalled to active service, and they were rather mixed. Owing simply to the character of the camp commander, prisoners were treated like honored guests in some camps, while in others they were subjected to a rule that was repellant and oppressive.

The same thing was true of civilian prisoners. In some cases they were interned in distant localities, in others, particularly Smyrna, they were not only free, but were treated as close friends. Most of the 10,000 enemy residents in Constantinople were free. From time to time both sides resorted to reprisals to force each other to act more humanely. Such measures hardly made for an improvement in the situation of the prisoners concerned.

All classes of prisoners were cared for by the Society of the Red Crescent. It kept the record of prisoners; it exchanged lists, and acted as an agency for the distribution of correspondence, money and packages; it acted as an intermediary for the inspection of camps on both sides and looked after the exchange and repatriation of prisoners. Its own help to prisoners was rather limited. There

were 120,000 Turkish prisoners in the British colonies alone; and the Society means could not extend them any regular help. The Society from time to time organized campaigns to obtain gifts for them. But such efforts did not produce much, due in part to a lack of public spirit, and in part to the general living conditions. Even the families of prisoners could not give much help. On an average 100,000 packages a year were sent, or about one package a year for every three prisoners.

Splendid Work by the Red Crescent.

The activities of the Red Crescent were not confined to prisoners of war. It was in a position to assume the entire responsibility for many sorts of relief work, owing to its efficient management and to the abundance of its financial resources. The Red Crescent had a very prudent and far-sighted business manager in the person of Dr. Djelal Mouhtar Bey. As soon as the World War broke out he decided for himself, being very pessimistic, that Turkey could not escape sharing in it, and that the War would last at least four years. He persuaded his colleagues to devote the entire capital of the Society to the accumulation of food and other supplies. As the price of certain commodities increased several hundred times, the Red Crescent turned out to be the most successful of war speculators. In addition a special agent in Vienna continued to make large purchases for the Red Crescent during all the years of war, at almost cost prices. The Red Crescent was also a successful farmer on a large scale, secured its wood supply directly from forests it controlled, had its own means of transportation on land and sea, and maintained a large workshop for both the making of repairs, and for the construction of carts, wooden bedsteads, etc. It produced wheat alone to the amount of several thousand tons a year. The Red Crescent furthermore showed itself very capable in the management of local fisheries, and a good preserver of fish and other foods.

With its organization for business, production, and transport immune from the danger of requisition, the Red Crescent was thus able to do a great deal of relief work. It maintained hospitals in Damascus, Medina, Sivas, Samsoun, and Mossoul, as well as several field hospitals. It also maintained homes for convalescent officers and soldiers. During the Dardanelles campaign 20,000 wounded were cared

for by the Red Crescent. In Constantinople it had eight hospitals with a total capacity of 5,500 beds.

The twenty-two free kitchens of the Red Crescent were also Constantinople's chief source of food relief. They distributed about 25,000 portions of warm food a day. The distribution was well organized. When applicants for relief had been investigated they were given colored cards. Each color indicated the number of persons entitled to relief in the given family. Distributors wearing overalls and caps of the same color as the various cards gave out the food in receptacles of different sizes made to accommodate one, two, or more portions.

The Red Crescent was even more active during the Turko-Greek War, which broke out during the armistice. It maintained hospitals and field dispensaries to care for the wounded and the refugees. It also showed great activity in the area of conflict, where many towns and villages had been destroyed by the Greek army before its withdrawal from Asia Minor. At the time when Constantinople and the rest of Turkey were like two enemy camps, the Red Crescent represented the only means of contact. When the British army retired from Turkey, the Red Crescent bought its superfluous supplies *in toto*. This successful *coup* enabled the organization to continue its activity on a large scale for some time longer.

The Orphan Problem and Private Relief Work.

During the War the orphan problem was one of the most acute. In addition to army losses, famine, and infectious diseases, the hasty flight from areas occupied by the Russians had deprived thousands of children of their natural supporter. An influential member of the Committee of Union and Progress—Ismail Mehir Effendi, took the initiative in organizing orphanages. Before the War there were about one hundred in Turkey, maintained for non-Turkish children by foreign missions or non-Turkish communities. There existed no single Turkish orphanage, public or private. By making use largely of the buildings of closed enemy schools, about eighty were opened during the War. They were meant to care for from fifteen to eighteen thousand; but owing to financial difficulties such orphanages were reduced to 65 with a capacity of 11,000. A special tax on tobacco and on certain other sources of public revenues was imposed for the "general directorate of orphanages" established

during the second year of the War. It also received help from the Government, from municipalities, and from private individuals.

This organization was efficient and active in many ways. Still it did not offer a successful solution of the entire orphan problem. Several thousand were living in luxurious boarding schools. The supposition was that they were being trained to become skilled artisans, and thus make good the shortage of skilled labor left by Armenian deportations; but after a time the course of training had become that of the regular curriculum of primary and secondary schools, and the school workshops were largely closed.

While a few were given so many opportunities, many thousands received very little care. The Board of Migration, a regular part of Turkish government machinery from the time of the Russo-Turkish War in 1876, because of the constant Turkish migrations from new territories lost to Turkey, at times cared for orphans to the number of 20,000.

Still, the streets of all the large towns, and particularly Constantinople, offered a dreadful exhibition of hungry, sick, and crippled children. Some had really no place to go, and slept in the open; but others were exploited by heartless men and women, and were tortured in many ways in order that they might suffer, lament, and excite immediate sympathy. As an article in the *Vakit* vehemently put it, tears and compassion had also been turned into material for trade and speculation.

The situation of these children attracted the notice of one of the Masonic lodges. Its members took the initiative and organized "the Society for the Protection of Children," its executive committee being composed of Masons. This society was instrumental in having the authorities prohibit the employment of children in the streets for begging purposes. It also drew the attention of the Government to the infant mortality caused primarily by the lack of pure milk. The supply of milk, in itself very limited, was absorbed by shops that specialized exclusively in certain sweet dishes made with milk. And, as a result of press propaganda organized by the above society, the making of such dishes was forbidden.

The society likewise established a children's home. It maintained 130 beds, and its workers undertook to gather up children from the streets, to wash and clothe them, to care for them, and to find places for them as adopted children or apprentices. Although the latter

alternative amounted, in most instances, to procuring victims for those who profited by hard child labor, the society's work accomplished much good as a whole. Given the existing shortage of men on the one hand, and the general destitution on the other, it was impossible to prevent child labor, and cases of child labor at its worst. Feeble children, some of them girls, were often seen trying to carry the heavy loads of street porters.

The Society for Finding Employment for Women.

Women deprived of male support by the War were cared for by the Society for Finding Employment for Women. This society, on which we have already dwelt in Chapter XX, enjoyed the protection of the war dictator and his wife. It gave employment to from six to seven thousand women in its workshops, which specialized on the making of sandbags for the trenches and clothing for the army. It paid women a minimum wage of 10 piasters a day, or, at first about 40 cents in American money, and about 10 cents toward the end of the War. Its employees were also given a warm lunch and half a loaf of bread. When there was abundant work, some seven or eight thousand women were, in addition, given work that they could do at home. The Society for Finding Employment for Women, though originally established as a charity, proved to be a good business venture. Set going with donations amounting to £T2,790, it made, during its first three years of existence, net profits of £T44,363, after paying all expenses.

Another organization which had as its head the wife of the war dictator was "the Women's Aid Society for Soldiers' Families." It assisted in 1915, in a not very effective way, 15,179 such families, or 41,014 dependents in all, distributing in a year about 500 tons of food supplies. It did most of its work with funds from the army. From time to time it organized schemes for interesting people in the War and for raising money. It had a wooden gun placed before the War Office, and people drove nails into it, the nails being sold at varying prices for the benefit of the Society. It also constructed a model trench with the accompanying barbed wire entanglements, communication lines, etc., which could be visited on the payment of an entrance fee.

"The Society for National Defense" was also a dispenser of war relief. Although of wide ramifications, it had not the efficiency of

the Red Crescent. It collected clothes and supplies for soldiers, and beds for hospitals. It visited and made presents to the wounded. It organized public lunch rooms, helped destitute families, had a large part in the so-called war-farming, and distributed seeds. Its main activity consisted in propaganda among the people to maintain their morale.

Besides these organizations there were several small benevolent societies which worked quietly in their own corners. The sum total of relief, however, bore no proportion to the existing need, nor to what might be considered as the existing possibilities, considering the means available in the country.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE END OF THE WAR

Desertions and Brigandage at Wholesale.

IN Turkey, the disproportion between the struggle engaged in and the resources available did not cause an open revolution, as in Russia. The body was so feeble and so unorganized that it went on to its agony without any collective resistance. There were, however, unmistakable signs that complete exhaustion and breakdown were only a question of time.

The Turkish soldier, in spite of his usual obedience and self-forgetfulness, began more and more to mutiny individually against the conditions of life about him. He had to make his fight with very primitive equipment against an enemy well-equipped who was also greatly superior to him in numbers. His never-changing diet consisted of food both uneatable and not even sufficient for his bodily upkeep. He was not protected from heat and cold, nor from sickness. Officers were rarely granted leaves of absence, non-commissioned officers and soldiers never. In addition, the army mail service did not function at all on distant fronts. The Turkish soldier, as we have already said, had to live for years without any news from home; and what he heard in a general way about home conditions was not at all reassuring. He could never be without the thought that his family had no means of livelihood. He could not but see that a relatively high standard of living was carefully maintained for German soldiers fighting on the same fronts, and nominally members of the same fighting force. The Constantinople papers were full of details as to how war fortunes were made and spent. The same papers also frequently inveighed against people "destitute of any moral sense who led astray members of soldiers' families left without support." And the supreme commanders of the army visited the front in luxurious special trains, with a display of pomp and extravagance which was in evil contrast to the misery of the fighting men.

Toward the end of 1916 a few soldiers—but always more and more—began to discover that a sense of duty was out of place with conditions as they were, and that the risks incurred by desertion were less than those of the fighting line. At the beginning of 1917

desertions had reached the number of 300,000. By the summer of 1918 the figure amounted to more than 500,000.

Deserters could not go back to their villages. They were outlaws. Capital punishment awaited them the moment they were caught. As they had kept their rifles and sufficient ammunition they took refuge in the mountains. And their common lot induced them to form bands of various sizes. Some contained as many as one hundred and fifty. Such bands often robbed trains on the Smyrna-Panderma line; they attacked villages, sometimes even towns. Particularly in the Brusa area, strong bands were entirely masters of the situation. They divided the territory into zones of influence and ruled over the peasant population. Collective safety could be bought from them for definite sums. The peasant population had no choice but to pay. The Government was not strong enough to protect them, though at the beginning of the War it had been able totally to disarm them. No means of self-defense existed.

The growing disintegration was all too plain, but the powers in control continued not to see it. They were warned over and over again by clear-sighted observers. Such warnings had no effect; they led only to ill-feeling against their authors. Mustapha Kemal Pasha, the builder of New Turkey, then the commander of an army, had a very clear vision of what might be in store for his country, and vainly tried to communicate his anxieties to the war dictator. In a confidential report addressed on September 20, 1917, to Enver Pasha, he said:

There are no bonds left between the Government and the people. What we call the people are composed now of women, disabled men, and children. For all alike the Government is the power which insistently drives them to hunger and death. The administrative machinery is devoid of authority. Public life is in full anarchy. Every new step taken by the Government increases the general hatred the people feel for it. All officials accept bribes, and are capable of every sort of corruption and abuse. The machinery of justice has entirely stopped. The police forces do not function. Economic life is breaking down with formidable speed. Neither people nor government employees have any confidence in the future. The determination to live rids even the best and the most honest of every sort of sacred feeling. If the War lasts much longer, the whole structure of Government and dynasty, decrepit in all its parts, may suddenly fall to pieces.

The end of the War is not near. The other side has more power to resist than ourselves. The attitude of the Germans is devoid of initiative. They seem to say "Come and defeat us, if you can!" The keys which may terminate the War are not in our hands.

Our army is very weak. Most of the formations are now reduced to one-fifth of their prescribed strength. The Seventh Army, which constitutes our only organized strength, has been shaken without exchanging a single shot with the enemy. It fully demonstrates the general exhaustion. The 59th Division which was sent from Constantinople at full strength—with battalions a thousand strong—consisted, 50 per cent, of men so weak that they could not keep their feet. The rest consisted of undeveloped youths between seventeen and twenty, and of used-up men between the ages of forty-five and fifty-five. The best organized divisions lose half their numbers by desertion or sickness before they reach the front. The army cannot remedy this situation; it is a result of general conditions.

Pessimism is a danger in itself. Positive and sweeping measures must be taken to improve the outlook. The Government's power must be reorganized with a view solely to the safeguarding of public interests; the forces of the police and gendarmerie must be strengthened; justice, food problems, and economic affairs must be regulated and private interests disregarded. Abuses must be reduced to a minimum. If home conditions are in a healthy state, local defeats at the front cannot shake the national structure from its foundations.

Military policy must be defensive, and aim at saving the life of every soldier possible. We should not hand over a man for the purposes of foreign governments. No Germans should be employed in the Turkish service. What is left of the Turkish army must not be exposed to senseless dangers for the personal ambitions of a Falkenhayn. The writer of these lines is personally ready to accept any subordinate position, but believes in principle that no German should be given direct control of hundreds of thousands of Turkish lives. The Germans should not be given the opportunity to take advantage of the length of the War to reduce Turkey to the position of a colony in disguise.

A Country "Saved by Desertion."

The only effect of this report was to bring its author suspicion and animosity. Nothing was done to change methods. Positive remedies for desertion, such as the reorganization of the mail service, the granting of leaves of absence, and improvements in food and clothing were hardly considered. Extremely severe punishments were

tried, but with effects just the opposite to what was sought. In self-defense deserters were more energetic and took concerted action against the Government's power. The absence of public safety became more and more a direct menace to the Government itself. It was like an embryonic revolution. In many areas real authority rested with the outlaws. There were no forces available for use against them. To add to this, the experiment of enlisting soldiers of Mohammedan faith and Turkish race in the Caucasus, and in the territories occupied by German-Bulgarian armies in Macedonia, had not given the expected results. The need of refilling the ranks was strongly felt. The only possible measure was a general amnesty for all offenses in any way connected with desertion; and it was proclaimed on July 20, 1918. In addition, proclamation after proclamation was issued to induce deserters to return to the front. And the following language was used:

By whom is our internal safety endangered in war-time? By soldiers, corporals, and sergeants who have been summoned to arms to defend the honor and rights of their country. In many cases they have become the tools of sedition and have left their companies to retire to the mountains. Such men endanger the public safety by their revolt against the laws and regulations of the country. Yet the Government has chosen to forgive and not punish. All offenders will surely profit by such good will, and return to their formations. It will strengthen the country's power to produce, and at the same time fill the army's ranks once more.

As no signs of repentance were manifested to justify this optimism, another proclamation was issued on July 29 in a severe tone:

Deserters! You were asked to take the road that leads to God. If you had encountered on this road not military service, but even hell itself you should not have thought of deserting. You ought to have been patient and remained at the front, even if you were being deliberately cut to pieces. Privation and pain should not have influenced your actions. But you thought only of your good pleasure and put butter on our enemies' bread.

The situation had, of course, got past the time when any such eloquence could have been of effect. The desertions were an expression of the revolt felt against the War and against the way it was conducted. Nothing was taking place to change this feeling. Rather,

things were evolving in the opposite direction. As Larcher¹ rightly observes, "the Turkish nation saved itself from total destruction by deserting." He further argues that without such wholesale desertions no able-bodied men would have remained in the country, and the "war of independence" after the armistice would have been impossible.

The outlook among the civilian population was not encouraging. The Russian Revolution, the reconquest of territories occupied in Russia, and the successful march into the Caucasus and Persia, alone had delayed a general outbreak. But by the summer of 1918, the general public had become so dissatisfied, that no prospect of conquest and no military success in Russia could make people forget the defeats in Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Under the imposed quietness upon the surface things were becoming more and more ready to explode.

The Press Is Allowed To Speak.

The measure devised by the Government to remedy the gloomy outlook was to grant the press a limited liberty to air the general grievances. The political censorship, and censorship before publication, were entirely abolished on June 11, 1918. Newspapers were given the opportunity to consult military experts, in cases when they were not sure whether certain war news was worthy of publication.

The next day, the daily *Vakit* commented upon the Government's measure as follows:

During this war, the burdens imposed on the people have been far greater than could reasonably have been expected, because the Government has made itself the agent of private interests against public interests. The truth must be told. It is much better to do it now. The state of war imposes moderation and puts a limit on all excesses of speech. Tomorrow it may be too late. We merely deceive ourselves if we think that telling the truth may be harmful from a military point of view. The economic chaos in this country is known both to our allies and our enemies. They even believe that the reality is fivefold or tenfold worse than it is. We doubt very much whether the bad impression created in Germany and Austria by our selling at 200 to 300 piasters necessaries of life which we bought in those countries for 5 or 10 piasters can be

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 560.

dissipated by any stubborn silence. Public discussion is a proof of the existence of the desire for improvement and that it is at work; it re-opens the way that leads to confidence. The Government has finally understood that silence is not a remedy. The abolition of the censorship is a result of this new attitude of mind.

The militarist members of the Government had not lost every hope of success. They tolerated freedom of discussion for a special reason of their own. The possibility of sharing booty was occupying their attention. Bulgaria had made conquests at the expense of Rumania and Greece. The new territories occupied had a large Turkish population. Turkish army corps had fought both on the Macedonian and the Rumanian fronts. And Turkey was demanding a good share of the booty. The same sort of differences existed with Germany over the oil fields of the Caucasus. The militarists saw their advantage in using the press for the purpose of attacking their allies and defending Turkish territorial aspiration. Under a censorship such attacks would not have been possible, because the Government would have been directly responsible for them.

The general outlook was very tempting for the militarists and the Pan-Turanians. After the armistice, on May 26, with the new Armenian Republic and the Peace of Batoum, Turkish sway seemed to be complete in the Caucasus and northern Persia. In the new Azerbaijan Republic, the Turkish Federalist party came into power and a military alliance with Turkey was concluded. With the other Turkish republics established after the Russian Revolution, the Pan-Turanian dream seemed to have become a reality.

The civilian members of the Government were not as optimistic as the military. In spite of successes in a Pan-Turanian sense, the internal situation was becoming more and more desperate. The Turkish military forces facing the British armies in the South were in a state of disintegration. There were clear signs that the German position in the West was hopeless.

In the face of this outlook the civilian members of the Union and Progress party felt the need of preparing for the future slowly and by degrees in order not to be overwhelmed by a sudden cataclysm. The formation of a Moderate opposition by some former members of the party was not only tolerated, but also encouraged. On July 15, one who had opposed the entire conduct of the War was made Minister of the Interior. In August, 1918, political exiles were al-

lowed to return to Constantinople. In September, the war dictator was the only man in the country who had any illusions left. He kept the news of disasters on all fronts from his colleagues in order to gain time. After the piercing of the Bulgarian army and the Turkish defeat at Nablus, it however became quite clear that the end was in sight.

The Fall of the War Government.

On October 2, the Minister of the Interior retired. His resignation was followed, on October 7, by that of the whole war Cabinet. On October 9, a new Cabinet was formed under Izzet Pasha, which contained two or three Unionist members, but which, as a whole, could be regarded as a Cabinet that saw things from a nonpartisan and purely patriotic point of view.

This change of cabinet meant not only the downfall of the Union and Progress party, but was also followed by its open incrimination for serious offenses and responsibilities even by its own former but now dissident members. The party held a general convention to decide upon the attitude it should take. The Grand Vizier pleaded guilty in the name of his Cabinet and his party. He confessed that many had committed abuses during the War, that they should have been punished, that his party had failed in its policy and could do nothing but retire. The following were some of his statements at the convention:

The War, which has lasted beyond expectation has caused and facilitated abuses in transport matters, in business transactions, as well as in food distribution. It is impossible to deny these things today. Undoubtedly, it was the task of the Government to punish such acts. This has not been done. The persons who are responsible for this neglect are known. It is we who have been to blame, and we are ready to bear the full responsibility.

The reason for our neglect is quite clear. The abuses had become too general. Many officials, soldiers, and merchants were implicated. If we had arrested and punished all these people, we would have been deprived of many co-workers whom above all we needed. Therefore, we put off the investigation and punishment of abuses till the end of the War. Those who have followed us in the Government will certainly take this upon themselves.

Our policy is defeated. It is impossible for us to retain public power in any form whatsoever. Therefore, we have not only resigned office

but we also step down from the leadership of the party, and put this body at the disposal of the convention which is its real master.

The convention voted, with very few dissenting voices, for the dissolution of the party. Such members as were not directly responsible for the War decided upon the formation of a new party called "the Modern Party" from which certain groups of party members implicated in war offenses should be excluded. But this new party was universally regarded as a mere continuation of the old one; it was received coldly by the impartial public, and with violent attacks by the opposition, then in process of formation. On October 20 a general amnesty was proclaimed. All political exiles and refugees living in enemy countries began to pour in. All alike they began to form parties and publish newspapers with the aim of winning power. Party formations were the general fashion of the day; and on the part of the opposing political elements, there was much secret agitation.

On October 21, the country's journalists held a meeting and agreed, with one exception, to act in concert upon questions of national safety and existence. But this declaration, signed by all—save the above exception, a Turkish editor—did not, for a single day, modify the violent and conflicting campaign now taking place in the press.

The Cabinet of Izzet Pasha on October 31 signed an armistice at Mudros with Admiral Galthrop as the representative of all the Allied governments.

About the same time Enver Pasha, the war dictator, and other leaders responsible for the bad management of the War, fled to Russia. This flight, which was thought by opposition forces to have been winked at, and even facilitated, by certain members of the Government, led to very sharp attacks on the Cabinet. The Sultan asked for the resignation of a few members who were believed to have sympathies more or less Unionist. This illegal interference on the part of the Throne caused the entire Cabinet to submit its resignation. And it was then that the chaos of the armistice period set in.

PART III
THE AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE WAR

CHAPTER XXV

BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH

The "Sick Man" Seemingly at His End.

At the moment of the armistice the chances of survival for Turkey seemed to be very remote. As things looked, Mr. Asquith was almost justified in saying in a public speech that "the Sick Man had really died this time, that whatever might be written on his gravestone, his resurrection was impossible."

All territories with an Arab population were under Allied occupation. Nobody had the illusion that a peace treaty would give any part of them back to Turkey. On the contrary, it was feared that the secret treaties concerning the partition of Turkey would be applied in some form or other to the rest of the Empire, that non-Turkish races would claim independence and would find enthusiastic protectors outside.

In the interior, there was no possibility of forming a purely Turkish political front to face the great national dangers. Those outstanding characters who had shown an ability to dominate and organize had to leave the country to escape the severe punishments which awaited them. Those who would have taken an unselfish and altruistic interest in the survival of the Empire had largely perished during the War. Those who were left were no longer united and were discredited in the eyes of the public. After the sacrifices of the war period, an appeal to the people urging them to decide to make new efforts and sacrifices to preserve their national life could not be expected to find a ready response. A condemnation of the past and an entire disregard of the possibilities of the near future were much more to their taste. Zia Goek Alp, the intellectual leader during the War had always stressed the point that it was for the individual to sacrifice himself for society. This idea was ridiculed and attacked in every possible way on the eve of the armistice. Its opponents maintained that on the contrary society could only be thought of as an agency for the protection of the individual, whose interests and happiness were paramount.

Two distinct camps were forming in the country, one trying to concentrate public attention on the past, the other on the future.

The second was in a minority. As those responsible for the War were in this camp, and they were seeking to concentrate attention on the future in order to make people forget the past, this minority was most vulnerable to attack.

The other camp was headed by the Sultan himself. It included all the opponents of the Union and Progress party and all the non-Turkish elements. Many of these were inspired by personal motives, but those who had openly opposed the War and the war party as a matter of principle were not lacking. Political exiles returning from the interior, and fugitives who had spent the war years in enemy or neutral countries were most bitter in their attacks, and showed themselves off as martyrs.

The non-Turkish races did not consist only of non-Mohammedans. Many Arabs, Kurds, Albanians, and Circassians were on the same side. The policy of Turkish nationalism advocated during the War more or less along the lines of racial kinship, had helped to make such races feel that they were strangers to the Turkish national cause. Besides, in some cases, self-interest led them to think it was better to save themselves from the sinking ship and be on the winning side.

The Victors Support the Forces of Reaction.

When the enemy forces began to pour in, they received a frenzied welcome from all these elements that took sides with them. The armistice concluded at Mudros did not imply an unconditional surrender. According to Article 7, only strategic points would be occupied in case such action were necessary for the security of the Allied forces. Such restrictions were, however, entirely disregarded, and a complete military occupation took place. From the first moment a *de facto* government was established. The Capitulations abolished during the War were crudely restored. There was nobody with authority to object to this arbitrary interpretation of the armistice. The Sultan and the Government chosen by him, as well as opposition elements and non-Turkish races, favored an occupation; for, as they saw it, they still had to fear the rebirth of the Union and Progress party. The last Parliament of the Ottoman Empire had been dissolved by the Sultan a short time after the entrance of the Allied forces.

Those who really loved their country had only the press to voice

their indignation. And such newspapers as felt as they did called attention to the real position of the country internationally, criticized the arbitrary acts and abuses of the Government and, indirectly, threatened the Sultan and his clique. A censorship appeared highly desirable to the Government, but the Unionist Government had met with such criticism for its censorship that it was not easy, after so short a time, to establish another.

In December, 1919, the Allied authorities came to the rescue of the Government. Their censorship was not only tolerated, but welcomed by those who held power. In January, 1919, wholesale arrests of the adherents of the War Government took place. New arrests followed in March, when an Extremist Government came to power. It belonged to the party of the "Liberal Entente" and contained the most bitter enemies of all patriotic elements. Two leading journalists were exiled to the interior, and the press was silenced.

It is unfortunately not possible in this volume, devoted to the study of the effects of the War itself upon the economic and social life of the Turkish people, to describe the policy and action of the occupying and victorious Powers or their local representatives, nor to trace the sad story of partisan conflict in these months following the armistice. Suffice it to say that the constant humiliations inflicted upon some of those who had represented the patriotic ideals of Turkey during the War, and the inefficiency and corruption of the Government which had the Allied support, had much to do in creating a new outlook; and in stirring up a stronger national feeling than had ever been known in Turkey before. Independent-minded patriots, former opposition elements, honest in their patriotic attachment, Unionists who had not shared in the responsibilities of the War, formed themselves increasingly into a compact mass, under the common desire to maintain their country's existence. Those in power dwindled more and more to a minority of those who sought personal profit and influence, or were incited by party fanaticism. The policy they followed could not attract any other group of adherents. On the one hand, they were a cosmopolitan, anti-national group. On the other, they tried to appeal to religious fanaticism, and abolished all the social reforms of the war Government as anti-religious. This contradictory attitude in itself made it impossible for them to gain any substantial following. Many independent patriots devoted themselves to securing the assistance of America in some

form or other. The first incentive to this was supplied by the Fourteen Points. They were looked on as the one moral refuge in the empoisoned post-war atmosphere. As the Twelfth Point concerned the integrity of Turkish portions of the Empire,¹ the Americans were expected to defend this principle. In addition, the material and moral assistance that America could offer toward saving Turkey from a state of arrested development was considered both desirable and necessary. In a meeting of political leaders, newspaper men, and patriotic citizens of different groups, the "Turkish Wilsonian League" was established, and it set itself the task of preparing the ground both in Turkey and in America for American aid. This idea took two different forms. Some of the adherents of the Wilsonian League spoke openly of an American mandate. They aimed to put the destinies of Turkey into the hands of Americans in the form of a temporary guardianship. The majority desired only such a material and moral coöperation with America as would insure Turkey's protection from European greed, and afford her some such systematic schooling as is given pupils of retarded development. The whole plan was vigorously attacked by the more extreme Nationalists, who saw in it a loss of all belief in their capacity and an abandonment of the idea of independence.

The occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks on May 14, 1919, as a result of a decision taken by the Supreme Council in Paris brought all these discussions to an end.

The Conduct of the Greeks.

The entry of the Greeks, and the excesses committed by them, gave rise to a universal storm of indignation in Turkey. The inter-Allied censors judged it better policy to allow the Turkish press to give this indignation voice. Turkey's newspapers entered into an agreement to reprint Mr. Wilson's Twelfth Point day after day, with as much display as possible. Violent public meetings were held everywhere in Turkey, and, in the country surrounding the area occupied by the Greeks, anti-Greek organizations were formed for self-defense.

In August, the Allied authorities felt obliged to send an inter-Allied commission composed of Admiral Bristol, the American High

¹ Point XII.—The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty. . . .

Commissioner and one British, one French, one Italian general to examine into the Turkish grievances and get at the real truth as to Greek control. The commission came to the conclusion² "that the Greek occupation of Smyrna bore more resemblance to a conquest and a crusade than to any civilizing mission; that it was contrary to the principle of nationalities, since, with the exception of Aivalik, everywhere the Turkish element was more numerous than the Greek; that Turkish national sentiment would not accept the annexation; that it would yield only to force, that the Greeks alone could not conduct a military expedition with any chance of success, and that they should be replaced by Allied troops."

Mr. Venizelos succeeded in persuading Mr. Lloyd George to suppress the report, and to let things stand as they were. The Turks, not receiving any redress, came more and more to the conclusion that they had nothing left to lose, and that active measures must be taken in their own defense. All thought of the past and of war guilt disappeared entirely. The Government, fearing that those arrested as guilty of war offenses would be freed by the excited public, handed them over to the British to be deported to Malta. This measure almost made martyrs of the deported, and discredited the Government to the last degree. Its endeavors to regain popularity by admitting into the Cabinet honest and respectable elements were not successful.

In the midst of the general despair, there was one master mind who studied the possibilities of the situation and laid out a complete program not only for the saving of Turkey, but also for the absolute clearing away of the past and the creation of a Turkey that would be new, and based on an entirely new foundation.

Mustapha Kemal Pasha left Constantinople on May 17 with the title of Army Inspector for the Eastern Provinces. A short time after reaching the East he resigned his position and began to execute plans that were wholly his own. On July 11 he was outlawed by the Constantinople Government. On July 23, 1919, a National congress met in Erzeroum under his presidency, and took the first step in organizing Turkish resistance to the designs of imperialism. It really meant the foundation of a popular government in opposi-

² The report was never officially published. The Paris *Eclair* succeeded in getting hold of it and was first to make it public, in October, 1919. The Turkish papers were allowed to reproduce it on condition that they made no comments.

tion to the Sultan's Government in Constantinople. This became more clear at a congress held in Sivas on September 4. This congress established a permanent "Association To Defend the Rights of European and Asiatic Turkey." Its executive committee, called "the Representative Body" was in reality a *de facto* government in Asia Minor. The declaration issued by the congress comprised a complete program for the liberation and independence of Turkish territory.

The "National Pact."

The attempts of the Government in Constantinople to use force resulted in absolute failure. The Sultan gave in, and the Extremist Cabinet of Damad Ferid was replaced on October 5, 1919, by one composed of independent men. An order for holding parliamentary elections at once was issued. Nationalist candidates had a sweeping victory everywhere, including Constantinople. The Representative Body did not succeed, however, in having Parliament meet at some place in the interior not occupied by Allied forces. Parliament began its session in the capital on January 11, and, on January 28, 1920, issued the following declaration of principles, known as "the National Pact" and embodying the minimum peace aims:

The members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies recognize and affirm that the independence of the State and the future of the Nation can be assured by an absolute adherence to the following principles, which represent the maximum of sacrifices which can be endured to achieve a just and lasting peace, and that the continued existence of a stable Ottoman Sultanate and society is impossible if we do not adhere to the said principles:

ARTICLE 1. Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are peopled by Arab majorities, and which on the conclusion of the Armistice of October 30, 1918, were under occupation by enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with a free plebiscite of the inhabitants, all such territories (whether within or outside the lines of the said Armistice) which are inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority, who are united in religion, in race and in aim, are imbued with sentiments of mutual regard, are prepared for individual sacrifice, and have an absolute respect for one another's racial rights and social circumstances, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in law.

ARTICLE 2. We are willing that, in the case of the three sanjaks which united themselves by a general vote to the mother country when

they first were free, recourse should again be had, if necessary, to a free popular vote.

ARTICLE 3. The determination, also, of the juridical status of Western Thrace, which has been made dependent on the Turkish peace, must be affected in accordance with a vote which shall be given by the inhabitants, in complete freedom.

ARTICLE 4. The security of the city of Constantinople (which is the seat of the Khalifate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government), and likewise the security of the Sea of Marmora must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and traffic of the world, shall be valid.

ARTICLE 5. The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the Entente Powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us—in reliance on the belief that the Moslem minorities in neighboring countries will also be given the benefit of the same rights.

ARTICLE 6. It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development may so be rendered possible, and that it should be possible to conduct our affairs in the form of a more modern and regular administration.

For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other fields.

The conditions of settlement of what our indebtedness shall be shown to be shall likewise not be contrary to such principles.

The situation was now well in hand from the Turkish point of view. All efforts were being concentrated on the peace problem, and, to arrive at the desired solution, all the national forces were acting in a way that was concerted and coördinated.

The Allied Powers became suddenly aware that things had gone too far, and that the chances of dictating a peace as victors were diminishing more and more. A regular state of war existed between the Greeks and the local Turkish "national forces" in the Smyrna area. In Cilicia armed resistance to the French occupation also attained successes. In Constantinople, British efforts to maintain an anti-national front as a prop to British influence not only resulted in absolute failure, but had precisely the opposite effect. Nor were

the Italians more successful in penetrating to the hinterland of Adalia.

The Supreme Council in Paris then decided to change its methods and to crush Turkish resistance by force. On March 16, the British made the military occupation of Constantinople even stricter than it had been. Some twenty-four supposed leaders of Turkish action and thought—among them ministers, deputies, generals, and journalists—were deported to Malta as hostages. On April 6 an Extremist Government was again put in power. On April 11, the Sheikh-ul-Islam was made to promulgate a fetwa denouncing the Nationalists as rebels. The following day Parliament was dissolved by an order of the Sultan.

Mustapha Kemal Establishes the Angora Government.

The result was the complete separation and the independence of the Nationalist Government in the interior. Immediately after the occupation of Constantinople, an order Mustapha Kemal Pasha sent out a call for elections for a new Assembly which should meet in Angora. Members of the Constantinople Parliament who reached Angora within a certain time should be considered as, by right, members of the new Assembly.

This Assembly—"the Grand National Assembly"—began its session on April 23, 1920. The new Government had no easy path. Not only had a real army to be created for the struggle with the Greeks, but the Turkish forces organized by the Sultan and the successive revolts inspired by the same sources had also to be dealt with. The story of how this was made possible in a blockaded country, worn out by wars, is an amazing one.

Since, for everything the resources of only three provinces of the former Empire were available, Mustapha Kemal Pasha saw at once that time was his chief ally. He abstained from impulsive, haphazard actions, and set himself the task of organizing a regular army first of all, getting his equipment little by little from all possible sources.

In the meantime on August 10, a dictated peace treaty was signed at Sèvres which turned Turkey into a sort of disguised colony of the three Allied Powers. But the stillborn treaty did not alter the situation. The Extremist Cabinet in Constantinople was changed at the desire of the Powers, and attempts were made to reach some sort of compromise with the Nationalist Government. They had no re-

sult. Nor was anything accomplished by the negotiations in London in February, 1921, or by the conference in Paris in March, 1922. The Greeks, after an actual war lasting for more than two years, were sweepingly defeated, as a result of the Turkish offensive beginning on August 26, 1922. This freed Asia Minor from every sort of occupation, as the Angora agreement signed between Turkey and France had resulted in the evacuation of Cilicia by the French. The conference held in Mudania on October 3 prevented the extension of hostilities to Great Britain. And the Greeks also peacefully evacuated Thrace, in its turn.

On October 30 the Grand National Assembly decided to abolish the Sultanate. On October 4, Constantinople joined the Nationalist cause in spite of the Allied occupation. On October 7 the last Sultan fled on board a British battleship. On November 30 peace negotiations, founded on a basis of free discussion, were started in Lausanne. And on July 24, Turkey, near death at the moment of the armistice, succeeded in bringing about the signing of a treaty which conceded to her the full rank of a free and independent nation.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Turkey's Enemies Are Her Salvation.

THE armistice period found in Turkey an entirely disintegrated social body. The situation was ripe for a lasting foreign yoke on the one hand, and for social retrogression on the other. A few million Turks, engaged in a primitive form of agriculture, had had to act, for centuries, as the only element of cohesion in the huge Ottoman Empire. They had paid a yearly toll of blood to police Yemen, Albania, Macedonia, Kurdestan, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Arabia, as well as the heterogeneous peoples of the Anatolian homeland. The Great War, coming after the defeats in the war in Tripoli—1911-1912—and the Balkan War—1912-1913—exhausted all the resources of Turkey. Following the armistice of 1918, the Turkish people were so worn out and apathetic that nothing in their home affairs could stimulate them to any new effort. The leading classes themselves had lost spirit and were bitterly at odds.

Nationalism and social progress were in bad repute, because they were identified with the war Government. A great coalition of the remnants of the old *régime*—deprived of their privileges by the Turkish Revolution—of all the political elements opposing the Unionist party for personal reasons, of cosmopolitans, of fanatics, of non-Turkish races such as the Albanians, Circassians, and Kurds, awakening to a new national consciousness, and of non-Mohammedan peoples such as Armenians and Greeks, had assumed the task of doing away with every trace of Turkish social cohesion, and of killing off all modernist beginnings as products of the desire for regeneration and independence. A coalition of such forces had the best possible chance of succeeding. The prestige of the victorious Allied Powers, particularly the old and deep-rooted respect for everything British, the influence of the Throne, and the power of religious belief were on their side. And yet, instead of killing Turkey, they enabled the Turkish people, within only three years, to become the sole masters in their house, to do away with such old

restrictions upon their independence as the Capitulations, to destroy institutions so seemingly solid as monarchy and religious authority, and to find a way to lasting, free development and perfect unity. If any disinterested and powerful agency disposing of limitless energy and will had resolved to gain these ends, it is doubtful whether it could have won anything more than an uncertain compromise. Only a combination of extremely adverse factors and a well-directed energetic struggle against such factors could produce results so radical, and produce them in so short a time.

The bitterest enemies of Turkey proved to be the most efficient means of supplying Turkish leaders with a constant and abundant stimulus. As a result of their fanatical attitude, their humiliating methods, and their partiality, it was brought home to every Turk that he could lose no more, and that he must do something to defend himself, if he was at least to die with honor and not miserably.

The Allied Powers were not aware of the sweeping social changes which had taken place in Turkey during the War. They obtained their information indirectly and from biased sources. Their own war psychology made it impossible for them to learn that such sources were biased. And as they insistently ignored the existing facts, the action they took could not gain them the results they aimed at.

A Country with Nothing Left To Lose.

They not only inspired the Turks with the desperate feeling that they had nothing to lose, but they also brought about a process of national unification which the best of Turkish efforts would have failed to do. In addition, the corrupt and chaotic rule established by the Allied authorities brushed away all fanciful ideas as to government by the Western Powers. It was a discovery that led both to a sense of self-confidence and to a feeling of contempt for foreign strength and prestige. People who considered it folly to provoke the British after the experiences of the War, came more and more to the conclusion that the traditional respect for everything British was uncalled for and that they had merely been "bluffed." This change of feeling was of fundamental importance for Turkey's future destiny. Since the Crimean War, several generations of Turks had fanatically held to the belief that the British nation, mother of liberty and progress, was composed of superior beings, who never de-

parted from fair play, whose every act was pure wisdom, and who pursued a policy which not only took account of the facts of today, but also of the possibilities which might develop in half a century. This belief had such authority that in itself it would have been sufficient to check any independent action on the part of Turkish nationalism after the War, had not the British authorities in charge in Turkey during the first period of the armistice disproved it by an alliance with all the forces of reaction. This was of great influence in opening Turkish eyes, and just at the time when Russia could no longer play the rôle of patron saint of reaction. The new situation seemed to be a complete change of rôles; Great Britain, the mother of liberty, had taken the place of old Russia in the mind of the progressive elements, while Russia was at least trying to be the patron of change and innovation. This new aspect of things greatly influenced the turn events took in Turkey after the armistice. The alliance of Turkey's powers of reaction with the British, and with the Greeks as well, was enough to discredit all old institutions,—dynasty, empire, Khalifate, and religion alike. Conservative minds saw the possibility of leaping in a few months over distances which would normally mean the work of years, even of generations.

The new opportunities, however, could not have been turned to advantage, if a far-sighted, energetic, and daring leader like Mustapha Kemal Pasha had not made his appearance at the right time. When he left Constantinople with the idea of starting a Nationalist movement, his ambitious program was quite clear in his mind. It did not stop at freeing Turkey from foreign occupation, from restrictions like the Capitulations, and from foreign economic supremacy. His plan, one for doing away with the dynasty, with the old system of government, and with the authority of tradition, had been prepared in detail. Only small parts of it were communicated even to his most intimate co-workers. In handling, with great care and daring methods, an impossible situation, it was always his standpoint that it sufficed for the soldier to see merely his immediate goal; there was no need of his seeing the entire project that was ahead. If he, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, had disclosed it at the beginning to anyone whatever, he would have found no one willing to work with him as things were then, for all other minds needed time and new stimulation to bridge the distance between the existing order of things and the far distant goal.

Mustapha Kemal Is Given His Opportunity.

The occupation of Constantinople by the Allies on March 16, 1920, was the best possible help to Mustapha Kemal Pasha in the execution of his plans. Up to that time he had been left alone in the interior. Some of his truest sympathizers could not be led to join him. There was the Turkish intellectuals' old dread of giving up the comforts of the capital and being exposed to the hardships of provincial life; and, at the same time, going to Anatolia meant a loss of the existing means of livelihood, with none to hope for in the provinces, and the risk of losing everything in case of failure, which seemed to be more than probable. But the occupation of Constantinople and the deportations to Malta constituted a greater risk; and Turkish intellectuals with national feelings rushed to take refuge in the interior. Thus the elements necessary for establishing a new government were assembled as a result of direct Allied pressure. This pressure was also instrumental in bringing about a closer solidarity in Nationalist ranks, and a more daring spirit.

The new Government had no head. The leader of the new movement was careful to avoid personal animosities by investing the Grand National Assembly with full power. It was the real executive, and the representatives it elected to supervise routine affairs in the various departments had hardly anything to say. They did not even form a true cabinet, and had no sort of collective responsibility.

The Grand National Assembly was, as a body, very jealous of its rights and powers. But it was a democratic body, composed of real representatives of the common people, and acted in all situations with remarkable common sense and a spirit of unselfishness.

Turkey's local ruling classes and property holders avoided taking any part in the Assembly, for they were afraid of losing either their power or their property in case of failure. One consequence, too, was that they, the ruling classes, who till then had monopolized elections, not only avoided becoming candidates, but they thrust in elements that had nothing to lose. This resulted in the Assembly's becoming a virgin political power, ready for sacrifices, and prepared, under good leadership, to make a complete *tavola rasa* of the past.

The new Government declared itself to be only a temporary government, established to save the country, the dynasty, and the Khalfate from foreign domination. In order not to revolt conservative

feelings old institutions were not attacked, but those at the moment in control of them were treated as traitors to the national cause. The principle of doing one thing at a time was carefully observed.

At first all efforts were directed toward national unification. In almost all parts of the country contagious revolts, instigated partly by foreign agents and the Palace, partly by local dignitaries, were going on. They were first crushed by force. Then "tribunals of independence," composed of members of the Assembly, went to the affected areas to examine the situation and try the guilty quickly, for the procedure of the regular courts was thought to be too slow to produce that general internal unity so necessary to the formation of a compact front in the face of foreign occupation.

The next step was the building up of a regular army. Up to that time the physical arm was represented by irregular bands, the chiefs of which did not distinguish between the tasks of patriotism and exceptional opportunities to seize power, and make use of it for personal ends. Some were incorporated into the new army in subordinate positions. Others made common cause with the other side and force had to be used against them.

As soon as the task of forming a regular army had been completed, the new Government felt itself solidly constituted in the interior and went patiently to work to defeat the forces of the enemy. This was accomplished. The physical defeat of the Greeks, with the consequent moral defeat of the British Near-Eastern policy, resulted in the almost complete realization of "the national pact." Turkish territories were free, the Capitulations done away with, and the domination of foreigners. And for the first time in two centuries the Turks were a really independent nation.

As soon as this result appeared on the horizon in the form of the Mudania Convention, a beginning was made in the execution of the social program.

The Abolition of Sultanate and Khalifate.

On November 2 the "personal Sultanate" was abolished, and the "Sultanate of the nation" was proclaimed. The dynasty was allowed to keep the title of Khalif in its purely religious meaning. The breakdown of the old empire and the monarchical form of government was received with real joy. Only after the change had actually taken place did everybody become aware that the dynasty had lost

its right to existence in the public eyes. From November on, the power of the Nationalist Government in Angora was undisputed. The institution of the Khalifate had no real function. Its survival was tolerated, for it was thought to be more advisable to kill the past in two strokes than in one, as this would give the people a better opportunity to adjust themselves to the new with the least possible resistance.

On March 1, 1924, the abolition of the Sultanate was followed by the abolition of the Khalifate. It was harder to secure an immediate readjustment in the public mind to this new measure. Even those who considered that domination by the past in the guise of religious tradition was an obstacle to progress, believed that the Khalifate gave Turkey an external prestige that was world-wide. Mustapha Kemal Pasha and those who understood the stand taken by him took pains to explain that such a belief was nothing but a delusion, that the Khalifate was never considered a danger by the Powers, that it only misled Turkey, and gave her an illusion of strength which did not exist in reality. Those who knew this could easily prove that Mohammedans outside of Turkey had not thought of helping Islam in general by any sacrifice of themselves, but were merely using her to help them in their struggle for independence. Mustapha Kemal Pasha explicitly declared in the speech he devoted to the new step that the few million existing Turks must devote all their energies to their own development, and could not afford to give any to the liberation of more numerous Mohammedan communities. The latter must simply help themselves, if they were not satisfied with their lot.

The resolutions of March 1, 1924, did not halt at the abolition of the Khalifate. Through the "unification of courts and schools," a complete separation of religion from public affairs was attained. Religious traditions were deprived of the last possibility of influencing laws and education. This meant at the same time that classes of people who relied on religion to secure personal and political influence were completely ignored and silenced. As a matter of fact, any discussion of the resolutions was declared high treason.

The whole attitude taken by Mustapha Kemal Pasha regarding the Khalifate and religious traditions meant a direct negation of deeply rooted beliefs, habits of mind, and interests. Moreover, the ending of the supposed external influence of the Khalifate also meant a complete discrediting of the spirit of military adventure.

And such an attitude was very remarkable in view of the general outlook. A military leader who had achieved so much, in so short a time, and against such odds, might in Turkey be expected to appeal to religious feelings in order the more easily to maintain his popularity; and at the same time one might expect him to be all too ready for military adventures. In both respects, he took the exactly opposite direction. The defiance of religious tradition was an especially risky step. At that time the great majority of people in Turkey were thinking and acting only in terms of religious tradition. Any sort of innovation had to be sanctioned by religious authority in order to be acceptable. Fanaticism was particularly powerful in the matter of the position of women. A distinctive Mohammedan headdress was rigidly insisted on. And most educated people believed that interference with such traditions might be something altogether too dangerous.

Attacking the Whole Front of Reaction.

Mustapha Kemal Pasha did not hesitate to attack the entire reactionary front, after his initial success, the abolition of the Khalifate. He compelled everybody to adopt the headgear of western Europe. The Turkish fez had embodied one of the few fortified positions left to reactionaries. They instinctively felt that the abandonment of the fez would mean the end of their power, that it would put the seal on the liberation of the people from the influence of religious tradition. But they were given no chance to stir up a revolt against this innovation, so dangerous and radical in their eyes. It was sanctioned by the National Assembly by a special law passed in September, 1925.

The woman question was similarly settled by certain special measures. The habit of veiling was not only deprived of the police protection it formerly enjoyed; it was also discouraged in every possible way. The legal and social emancipation of Turkish women became as complete as in any Western country.

As a result of these and other similar measures, religion has been left no power to interfere with politics, laws, the form of dress, and the like. The Minister of Justice, in a speech made at the inauguration of the Law School in Angora, put the situation briefly in these words: "Up to the present we have done everything mechanically and blindly, because 'they' said so. Now we are going to adapt ourselves freely to the requirements of every given situation because

'we' think so." Really, a more complete and rapid victory of reason over authority could not be imagined.

How could one of the most static societies in the world be so easily and so quickly made dynamic? The secret lies in the remarkable discovery by Mustapha Kemal Pasha that the elements of reaction and fanaticism in Turkey never possessed any influence of their own, but enjoyed only that influence which the public authorities let them have in return for the protection they extended to rulers. As soon as the existing authorities made up their minds that they could afford to ignore the fanatical elements, changes could be made even more easily than might have been possible in other countries.

The change of the attitude of mind toward military adventuring is not less remarkable. The Turks, as a people with military traditions, could reasonably be expected to be taken by opportunities to reconquer the vast territories they had lost in Europe, Asia, and Africa. With the disturbed state of some of these territories, many chances might have been found to intrigue and to foment trouble. One of the greatest achievements of the new leaders in Turkey was their success in killing the old instinct for territorial expansion, instead of encouraging it, which, as successful soldiers, they might have been expected to do. A close observer of the situation would be astonished to learn how great a variety of most inviting military and political adventures those leaders resolutely refused to share in. They insistently had their way and concentrated the nation's energies on problems of internal development.

Internal developments were facilitated by another important circumstance. The period of the armistice was instrumental in preparing the way for a complete sifting of the Near East on the lines of national allegiance. All those who had been Turkish citizens in name while hostile to Turkey and attached to other countries, had felt no need of making any secret of their feelings under the Greek and Allied occupation. On the contrary, in general they had displayed a fanatical spirit of hatred and hostility. Some of them had thought it wise to flee with the foreign armies. Those remaining in the Smyrna area were given notice to leave the country at earliest. Still others had emigrated to Greece as a result of the exchanges of population arranged between Turkey and Greece, exchanges which excepted only Constantinople on the one side, and western Thrace on the

other. And while these exchanges of population included merely the Greeks, in the hostile elements spoken of before there was to be found every class of non-Turks, and with them those Turks who were against their own people.

Unification.

One of the most mixed populations in the world had as a result of the armistice period become highly uniform. The Turkish national spirit had asserted itself fully against variations from the national type, and laid the basis of a strict unification. The new constitution did not accept the principle of Ottomanism. All Turkish citizens were called Turks. Non-Turks were allowed to have their own group interests, but only those of religion. The Kurds were alone in having their unspoken claim to a distinctive racial existence tolerated to some extent; and, after the Kurdish revolt of 1925, this toleration ceased entirely. Those guilty of the revolt were drastically eliminated, and those who enjoyed local influence as Kurdish notables were requested to migrate to the western part of the country. Now the idea of Turkish nationalism has absolute sway. A complete foundation has been laid for the policy of unification.

So many changes in such a short time had, of course, to be paid for. Social cohesion suffered in the first stages of the revolution, and individual liberty in the second.

It is true that the new institutions were protected from the beginning by the enforced silence of the reactionary elements, but this restriction of liberty was in strict accordance with the law. To appeal to religious feeling for political purposes was declared to be high treason. Anything could be said, however, by due attention to the way in which it was said. Criticism of the acts of the Government, whether voiced in Parliament or the press was free and without any limitation.

Even before peace had been signed, indeed, attacks upon the Government had become louder and louder. The authorities took the stand that the only remedy for troubles arising from the liberty of the press was liberty itself. For about two years this principle was adhered to. But, as in all stages of recent Turkish history, the discontented elements united in a party of their own. Some seemed to be more and more disposed to appeal to religion and conservatism to obtain power and influence; and a decreasing national stability and

social cohesion had also found expression in the Kurdish revolt. Accordingly, while the revolt was being suppressed by force, a new law "to secure stability" was passed which was used against the opposition press as well as against the opposition party in the Assembly. Those against whom the law was directed were charged with "using religion for political ends and facilitating revolt by undermining the authority of the Government." At first only the party organization of the above new party was dissolved. But a plot aimed at the person of the president became the occasion for proceeding against individuals, and the elimination of elements constituting, in the eyes of the authorities, an actual or potential menace to national stability. All these measures were, however, well planned in advance, and were never followed by unrestrained excesses. In March, 1927, the mandates of the so-called "tribunals of independence" expired. They were not renewed, for the desired stability was declared to have been achieved.

A great deal of work is still needed to complete the social regeneration of Turkey in the field of education. It is a fact, however, that all obstacles to progress have been eliminated and the ground has been prepared for every sort of constructive activity. There are few countries where today reason has won such a complete victory over authority, and where the present and the future have so fully asserted their rights as against the claims of the past. Only a few years ago the outlook was the very opposite of this. Circumstances such as the breakdown of Russian imperialism, the experiments upon which British imperialism embarked, in a stubborn disregard of existent facts, and the existence in Turkey of a far-sighted leadership with eyes closely fixed on all facts and possibilities, a leadership combating, methodically and one by one, all the forces that would hold progress back—these things, working together, have done their part to keep in forward movement this unique and astonishing social change.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Lost Resources and the Loss of Skilled Labor.

THE economic aspect of things in Turkey was not so brilliant as the social aspect during the first years of the Nationalist *régime*. An efficient and enterprising leadership could do away over night with many social obstacles to progress, but it could not do much in the economic field. On the contrary, radical social changes had to be paid for in economic values.

At the moment when the Nationalist movement in Asia Minor was set going, the eastern part of the country had been ruined by the Russian occupation; the western part, which had not suffered much from the War, was occupied by the Greeks and Italians, Cilicia by the French, and Constantinople and Thrace by other Allied forces. Most of these territories had been largely exposed to destruction before their evacuation. The resources of a few provinces of the former Empire had been drawn upon for the war of independence. This had meant, of course, the ruthless use of all available resources in a relatively small area. Thus, all parts of the country, at best on a very low level of economic development, had lost most of their productive capital during and after the War.

The enforced or voluntary emigration of elements economically active had resulted in a further shortage both of production and of skilled labor. The Turkish immigrants from Macedonia who poured in individually or in masses as a result of exchanges of population, although a very valuable element, needed time to become productive. The exchanges had taken place so quickly that the available organization proved to be inadequate to settle the immigrants properly. It also took time to train Turkish skilled artisans to do work once done exclusively by Armenians and Greeks. As all exporting and importing had likewise been in the latter hands, a period of readjustment proved to be necessary to fill their places.

On the other hand, the business situation, both foreign and domestic, had greatly changed. The economic results of the Russian Revolution were felt very acutely in Turkey. The heavy Black Sea transit trade, from which Turkey had derived certain advantages, had

entirely come to an end. In the matter of home trade, the old commercial relations of the Empire, which had formerly centered in Constantinople, had found new channels. Even in the territory left to New Turkey, a great many changes had taken place. During the years of separation between Constantinople and Angora, Anatolian harbors like Mersine and Samsoun had become accustomed to deal directly with foreign countries, without the intermediation of Constantinople. The transference of the capital from Constantinople to the interior, an excellent measure in many regards, which enabled the new rulers to get rid of some of the old methods of doing things, necessitated other readjustments.

The Government unquestionably felt the need of coping with the situation. And as the new economic problems were complicated, and the competent authorities lacked the necessary knowledge and experience, nothing but blind experimentation could be resorted to. This meant of course waste of time, energy, and limited means. It also formed an obstacle to the building up of confidence in the future. It was never known how soon the impracticable measures in force would be put an end to, and by what new experiments they would be superseded. The great variety of social and political innovations also created doubts in the ever cautious business world as to their durability and stability.

Although salaries were far from constituting a living wage, the financial needs of the Government kept increasing. Not only were new taxes imposed, but old taxes, sure to bring revenue, were abolished for social considerations. Foreign capital was reluctant to offer itself for the building of public works. On the one hand, it had a feeling of insecurity. On the other hand, the Government was suspicious of every foreign move, and thought that every foreign enterprise trying to find a field of activity in Turkey had secret political designs. The failure of the Lausanne peace conference to find a solution for the liquidation of the foreign debt, and the ending of relations based on the Capitulations, which foreign capitalists were used to and no mention of which would Turkey ever hear again, also stood in the way of coöperation with foreign capital.

The First Railroad Built by Turkish Money.

To balance these drawbacks there were many assets. To begin with, the new Turkish Government, in contrast with the old one, was

quick to act and prompt to correct an error. Its sincere aim was the public interest, the rapid economic regeneration of Turkey in general, and of the Turks themselves in particular. Its financial policy had several sound principles. The reckless extravagances of the old Empire and the heavy foreign debt, incurred for loans which had been used only for unproductive purposes, had inspired the new rulers with the firm resolution never to contract foreign loans to balance budgets. This principle had been held to, in spite of great difficulties. When it was seen that foreign capital would not be advanced on any terms which the Government was ready to accept, it was decided to construct railways out of the ordinary funds. This was a difficult undertaking for an impoverished country; and it was severely criticized by some financial experts. It is a fact, however, that several hundred kilometers of railway have been so constructed. And under other conditions, this money would have been spent on military expenses, without leaving any trace behind.

Road building has also been given much attention. Turkey had 8,161 kilometers of national roads at the beginning of 1927, and 16,200 kilometers of provincial roads. But of the first only 1,200 kilometers, and of the second only 1,750 could be officially described as being in good condition. In order to remedy this great defect, the provinces were not only made to increase the road tax, but a special law made it compulsory upon them to spend the receipts derived from road taxes exclusively upon roads. The result was great activity in road building all over Turkey.

Another sound feature of Turkish financial policy was an almost heroic refusal to yield to the alluring devices of currency inflation. Although very difficult financial situations had to be met, the project of issuing new paper money was never suggested. The paper money put in circulation by the war Government was not increased in any form. At present,¹ it is being supplanted by new republican currency of exactly the same amount. The money of the old Empire, badly worn from twelve years' use, is being gradually retired from circulation.

Helping the Turkish Farmer.

The new system of taxation has one very good point. Up to 1924 the whole burden was borne by the agricultural population, particu-

¹ Late in 1927.

larly the small farmer; and the tax in kind, of one-eighth his gross production, was not only very heavy in itself, but the manner in which it was farmed out—to influential local notables—forced the farmer to pay much more than was legally due, and to become a sort of serf. With the total abolition of this tax, the institution of a light land tax, and a consumption tax easily shifted to the consumer, the producing classes were put in a new position. As another form of farm relief it was also decided to collect the tax on farm stock at the time of the year when the farmer could best pay it, instead of the most unfavorable season, as formerly. The help of the Agricultural Bank also became more efficient, and the farmer was granted additional aid in many ways, for instance, by the freeing of oil used for tractors from the state tax, by the distribution of seeds in bad years, the loaning of tractors, and better agricultural schools for the sons of farmers.

On the other hand, the people of the towns and cities, till then almost free from taxation, now had to pay many direct and indirect taxes to the central government; and their local and provincial taxes also became an ever growing burden. The provincial administrations assessed the entire cost of primary education on the people. This burden increased, in Constantinople, four times in four years—from £T250,000 to £T1,000,000. The road tax was not only added to, but the regulation that what it brought in should be used exclusively for road building necessitated the institution of new provincial taxes to cover expenses which the receipts from the road tax had met before. At the same time, towns and cities were given the right to levy *octroi* duties on the necessaries of life, which they levied immediately and to the maximum. They have, in fact, become an additional factor in the high cost of living.

Higher Taxes, but Public Safety.

The greatest advantage gained by the people in return for the high taxes paid, has been public safety in every sense of the word. The present *régime* has shown by its conduct in the most complicated situations that it is against foreign adventures for the sake of territorial expansion, or influence, or power. Pan-Mohammedan and Pan-Turkish policies have been entirely abandoned. The Government does its best to avoid giving provocation to foreign Powers or being drawn into political intrigues. Its military policy is a strictly

defensive one. Internal development in an economic and social sense is the sincere aim of Turkish leaders. This precept was expressed, at a business congress in Smyrna, in February, 1923, in this way: "Gentlemen, those who make conquests by the sword end by being conquered by those who make the plough their weapon, and by ceding their place to them. In the struggle between the sword and the plough, it is the latter which wins."

The fact that the task of policing a large and heterogeneous empire has come to an end,—Turkey having become a relatively uniform people—is also a great economic asset. At the same congress these words were used by its president to describe this new situation: "If the blood of foreign soldiers is shed hereafter on the Albanian mountains and the Arabian deserts, for the maintenance of public order, it will be Serbian, Italian, Greek, and English blood, not Turkish."

As a result of the complete removal of this burden of empire, it had been possible to reduce military service to two years,—to one for those with secondary school educations. And frequent leaves of absence, with every sort of aid to the soldier that may help him to pursue his regular work, are rendering such service incomparably easier. In addition, barracks have now become clean and healthy places, and schools of a sort for one part of the people.

Brigandage, a chronic disease in Asia Minor, has entirely ceased, and Turkey has grown to be one of the best policed countries in the world. This new public order is undoubtedly one of the most important causes of the country's economic development. In the same connection, the fact that the influence of feudal chieftains and local notables has been checked in all parts of Turkey, is an additional advantage.

The new situation is best reflected by the increased economic activities in every field. As soon as farming, trade, and industry began to be profitable, people began to take to them as they might to any kind of welcome and pleasant effort, and all trace vanished of the old indolent and fatalistic view of life.

Freed from the burden of the system of taxes on production and its concomitants, and knowing that the fruit of his labor would go to himself, the farmer at once developed a keen interest in new methods of farming, and began to acquire new implements. Imports of modern agricultural implements amounted to £T529,737 in 1923,

£T2,154,867 in 1924, and continued to increase until 1926, when a reaction became noticeable owing to bad crops on the one hand, and a lack of mechanical skill and the poor facilities for repairs on the other. But more land was in use for farming than had ever been under the plow before, and the country could dispense with imported breadstuffs.

The new *régime* also meant great and constant increases in Turkey's live stock. Sheep—exclusive of lambs—reached a total of 9,357,449 in 1923, 10,528,423 in 1924, 11,468,722 in 1925, and 12,871,194 in 1926. Goats of ordinary breed increased from 5,834,471 to 8,115,883 between 1923 and 1926, and Angora goats from 2,024,052 to 2,740,502.

According to a private statement obtained from the Ministry of Finance for the purposes of this volume, at the beginning of 1927 the total of oxen was put at 5,016,231; donkeys, 949,385; buffaloes, 552,196; horses, 344,723; mules, 19,989; and that of sheep and goats at, roughly, 30,000,000.

The Turk Becomes a Man of Business.

In trade and industry, a keen spirit of protectionism developed. Not only was native production guarded and encouraged in every possible way, but the Turkish element, new to the activities of trade and commerce, was also given protection when competing with non-Turkish elements possessing old business experience. New Turkish banks were established to support purely Turkish enterprises. In some respects this policy even went beyond legal limits to protect the economic interests of Turks. Extensive public works undertaken in Turkey, and financed in Turkey, could employ only Turkish citizens, except in a few of the higher positions. Before the War, contractors had been wont to employ only Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, because they were in a sense Turkish citizens, and systematically avoided employing any actual Turks. As a matter of fact, non-Turks, superior to the Turks in their knowledge of foreign languages, and held by their employers to be racially and religiously akin to themselves, had succeeded in spreading the belief that Turks had no capacity for business or for work that called for continued and steady application.

After the Nationalist change, the term "Turks" was interpreted in a racial sense, and foreign companies and other institutions were

obliged to discharge all non-Turks and employ only Turks. It was supposed that this radical change would disturb all public works and bring business life to a standstill. On the contrary, the experiment proved to be a success, and many Turks, educated at home or abroad, proved to be capable of meeting the requirements of their new positions on technical and clerical staffs. Commercial relations in the interior and in foreign countries also began to fall under Turkish control. Indeed, many capable government officials retired from the public service and went into business. Favoritism and party spirit played a certain rôle in these new economic activities, but to a slighter degree than former experiences might have led one to expect.

What has been achieved up to the present is only a beginning. The Nationalist Government has had, of course, more success than any outsider would have looked for in strengthening the economic position of the Turkish race; and it is as the only element loyally working for the defense and survival of the country that it has done it. Sufficient time, however, must pass to give the new generation a modern business training, to obtain foreign capital on a purely business basis, to develop the dormant resources of the country and so produce a surplus and raise the national standard of living, which is still so low.

CONCLUSION

If from the viewpoint of international peace we survey all the social and economic changes that have taken place in Turkey as a result of the World War, and of the chaos during the armistice period, we cannot but come to this conclusion: The unexpected setting up in Turkey of a *régime* peace-loving, self-confident, self-reliant, and energetic, capable of seeing facts very clearly and acting according to them promptly and efficiently, unquestionably constitutes a great gain for international tranquillity. One of the worst breeding grounds of war was drained dry when the Turkish people assumed complete control of their own destinies. The internal stabilization in Turkey brought to a natural end the traditional activities of those Powers which had formerly been preparing the ground for their own intervention by playing one diverse and discontented part of the population against another. The new Turkey with her stable and uniform domestic situation, and her sincere hatred of intrigue and adventure abroad, surely constitutes a new and solid factor in a region geographically very important, when once, feeble and without a goal, she had been rightly looked upon as the greatest possible danger to peace.

APPENDIX I

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST TURKISH CENSUS

AFTER this volume was written, the first really scientific and reliable census was taken in Turkey. This was on October 28, 1927. The census was arranged for and carried out with great skill and accuracy by M. Camille Jaquart, a Belgian expert who had been appointed director general of statistics in Turkey.

Detailed information regarding the methods used in the census has not yet been published, nor are the figures covering language, religion, education, and so on available. The first figures were however published in July, 1928, by the Board of Statistics, under the following title:

"The General Census of October 28, 1927; the Population of Turkey according to Provinces, Districts, Towns and Villages."

Some of the most important data will be found below:

	<i>Population</i>	<i>Per-centage of the whole population</i>	<i>Area in square kilo-meters</i>	<i>Per-centage of the whole area</i>	<i>Inhab-itanis per square kilometer</i>
European Turkey	1,044,306	7.65	23,975	3.15	43
Asiatic Turkey	12,615,969	92.35	738,761	96.85	17
Total	13,660,275	10.00	762,736	100.00	18
Black Sea Coast	2,174,425	15.91	73,621	9.66	29 •
Marmora and Aegean Coast	2,746,069	20.12	92,744	12.16	29
Mediterranean Coast	753,639	5.51	56,279	7.37	13
Interior of Asia Minor	6,941,836	50.81	516,117	67.66	13

One-third of the population is comprised in the European provinces and in the western coastal regions, which form together a fourth of the whole area. The density of population which is 43 in Europe, and 29 near the western coast, falls as low as 8 in the Eastern Provinces. The province of Constantinople (the European section) has a density of 187; the Asiatic section, 85. Next to it come the provinces of Trebizond with 63, Mersine 26, Tokat 25, Biledjik

¹ Marshes of a total area of 1,170 square kilometers and lakes of a total of 8,434 are not included.

24, Aintab 19, and Tchanak 18. The lowest, 2, is found in the province of Akkiari in the east. In general the density gradually decreases from the extreme west to the extreme east.

There are in Turkey 147 cities with a population exceeding 5,000. They contain 2,780,102 people. These 147 cities may be grouped as follows: 79 contain from 5,000 to 10,000; 39, from 10,000 to 20,000; 14, from 20,000 to 30,000; 7, from 30,000 to 40,000; and 6, from 40,000 up.

The cities of the last group are the following:

Constantinople	673,029
Smyrna	153,845
Angora	74,784
Adana	72,652
Brusa	61,451
Konia	47,286

Turkey is divided into 63 provinces, 323 districts (kazas), and 699 subdistricts (nahiyas). The population living in the seats of provinces and districts numbers 3,305,879. There are, in all, 40,991 towns and villages. On an average, each town or village in European Turkey has 1,030, and in Asiatic Turkey, 316 inhabitants. The general average in Turkey is 333.

Of the total population of 13,660,275, 6,584,474 are males and 7,675,801 are females. That is, the percentage of males is 48.20, and of females, 51.80. In other words the figures are 1,000 to 1,075.

With the exception of 15 provinces, the females are everywhere in excess. The proportion amounts, in Kastamuni, to 1,000 to 1,250. In Trebizond it is 1,000 to 1,207; in Denizli, 1,000 to 1,202; in Mougla, 1,000 to 1,176; and in Afion Kara Hissar, 1,000 to 1,180.

In the eastern provinces males are generally in excess. Thus in Bayazet there are 1,193 males to 1,000 females; in Kars, 1,116; and in Van, 1,112 to 1,000.

Industry and Labor.²

Industrial establishments	65,245
Number of employees (about 88,000 being women)	256,855
Value of yearly production	432,740,855
Raw material derived from country	203,299,683
Raw material imported	29,365,023
Horse power of motors	163,548
Industrial establishments without motor	62,423
Industrial establishments with motor	2,822

² All sums are in Turkish pounds.

TURKEY IN THE WORLD WAR

Mining.

(tons)

	1923	1924	1925	1926
Coal	870,820	1,088,583	1,703,443	1,222,387
Lignite	759	701	6,061	12,207
Copper	188	830	197	7,534
Lead	8,000	1,441	17,673
Antimony	75	600
Chrome	3,400	6,667	6,445
Manganese	43	107	78
Boracite	4,911	12,224	12,347	18,360

Trade.²

	<i>Imports</i>		<i>Exports</i>	
	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports with America</i>	<i>Exports</i>
1923	144,788,671	84,651,190	11,059,352	6,749,602
1924	193,611,048	158,867,958	11,377,884	16,391,604
1925	242,314,138	193,119,459	19,654,074	25,102,934
1926	234,591,722	187,742,801	8,179,454	24,829,955

Agricultural Production, 1925-1927.

(in kilos)

	1927 ^a	1925	1926
Wheat	1,333,150,811	1,075,287,021	2,469,367,407
Total of other grains	1,067,246,985	2,421,479,549	2,384,031,152
Beans, peas, etc.	100,222,773	270,833,840	259,494,399
Potatoes	20,738,756	72,602,178	76,170,398
Beets	23,935,398	6,483,584	7,605,101
Onions	14,453,550	44,796,817	34,377,089
Garlic	944,421	5,563,897	4,925,419
Tobacco	47,531,635	39,348,960	48,024,690
Sesame	10,969,168	22,961,506	31,211,614
Opium	112,257	105,884
Cotton	38,905,036	76,011,016	27,341,532
General total of farm products	2,664,037,881	3,965,646,902	5,350,241,359

Population Engaged in Farming, 1927.

Number of families	1,751,239
Number of individuals	9,216,918
Number of plows and machines	1,413,509

^a The year 1927 was dry.

RESULTS OF THE FIRST TURKISH CENSUS 301

Railways Under Construction.

(Normal Gauge)

		<i>Contracting Company</i>
Samsoun-Turhal	205.5 km.	Native Turkish
Kayseri-Sivas	180 km.	Native Turkish
Turhal-Sivas	195 km.	Native Turkish
Ankara-Eregli	580 km. (coalfields)	The Swedish Co.
Kutahia-Balikesir	225 km.	Julius Berger
Keller-Diari-Bekir	520 km.	The Swedish Co.

Revenue of the Anatolian Railway, 1922-1927.

	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
Revenue from passengers	1,064,706	2,018,459	2,546,606	2,939,935	2,882,220	3,522,197
Revenue from merchandise	1,909,988	2,353,816	3,353,086	4,502,405	4,476,977	5,868,414
Total gross revenue	3,089,018	4,551,526	6,157,916	7,875,789	8,053,316	9,972,120
Net revenue	1,260,700	2,783,834	2,978,492	3,530,135
Percentage of expenses to revenue			79.50	64.70	63	64.60

*Banking.**

Transactions of the State "Institution of Loans against Security."

	<i>Loans</i>	<i>Savings received</i>
1921	1,556,389	913,932
1922	1,486,001	2,668,630
1923	1,158,187	3,095,108
1924	1,959,363	4,059,706
1925	1,906,591	4,426,060
1926	3,351,226	6,720,745
1927	4,165,196	9,835,086

*Statements of the Agricultural Bank.**

	1918	1923	1924	1925	1926
Cash on hand	563,572	6,528,992	4,191,720	5,510,000	11,684,402
Rural loans	5,435,022	17,039,879	19,936,733	20,491,653
Capital	10,299,477	15,077,920	30,000,000	30,000,000	30,000,000
Reserve fund	96,902	108,208	230,936	472,596
Savings	126,012	700,735	723,948	737,735	2,940,455
Net profits	192,235	318,097	690,524	1,680,209	1,809,191

* All sums are in Turkish pounds.

TURKEY IN THE WORLD WAR

Turkish Corporations, December 31, 1927.

<i>Character</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Capital*</i>
Banks	36	183,517,500
Commercial companies	40	9,365,000
Industrial companies	45	8,044,050
Transportation companies	20	6,650,000
Mining companies	16	6,695,000
Farming companies	6	1,068,000
Construction companies	7	1,127,000
Lumber companies	4	3,650,000
Coöperative societies	27	8,835,750
Monopolies	9	32,000,000
Other corporations	8	1,054,000

APPENDIX II'

FOREIGN DEBT OF TURKEY

ACCORDING to a table prepared by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration on June 1, 1928, the capital in circulation and the interest and sinking-fund payments due on February 28, 1914, of the Ottoman Public Debt amounted to the totals below:

	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Interest and sinking fund</i>
Loans included in the Mouharrem		
Consolidation of the Debt	£T47,936,197.62	£T2,157,375.35
Loans not so included	94,566,634.68	7,356,019.73

On August 6, 1924, the situation was the following, all amounts regarded as paid being entered under "Capital"; and interest and unpaid amortization dues being entered under "Payments Overdue and Outstanding":

Total amount of the Ottoman Public Debt:

	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Payments overdue and outstanding</i>	<i>Total</i>
Loans included in the			
Mouharrem Consoli-			
dation	£T 41,306,763	£T 6,705,594.35	£T 48,012,357.35
Loans not so included	81,096,075	33,310,473.46	114,406,548.46
Total	122,402,838	40,016,067.81	162,418,905.81

To be collected from Turkey as a result of the Lausanne Treaty:

Included in the Mou-			
harrem Consolida-			
tion	25,707,074	2,532,600.24	28,239,674.24
Not so included	54,186,967	24,670,844.41	78,857,811.41
Total	79,894,041	27,203,444.65	107,097,485.65

¹ All figures in this appendix are, with the kind permission of the author, taken from a volume as yet unpublished—*The Science of Finance and Financial Legislation*—by Prof. Ibrahim Fazil Bey of the University of Constantinople.

Percentage due from Turkey:

"Consolidated"	62.23	37.77	58.82
Not "Consolidated"	66.82	74.66	68.93
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Average percentage	65.27	67.98	65.94

In the following table will be found the yearly amounts due as interest and as sinking-fund payments:

Total annual payments required:

	<i>Regular payments</i>	<i>To carry amounts overdue</i>	<i>Total</i>
Included in the Consolidated Debt	£T2,157,375.35	£T 335,279.72	£T 2,492,655.07
Not included in the Consolidated Debt	6,478,713.48	1,665,523.69	8,144,237.17
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	8,636,088.83	2,000,803.41	10,636,892.24

Annual war debt payment due from Turkey:

Included in the Consolidated Debt	1,342,632.62	126,630.01	1,469,262.63
Not included in the Consolidated Debt	4,446,859.67	1,233,542.23	5,680,401.90
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	5,789,492.29	1,360,172.24	7,149,664.53

Percentage due from Turkey:

Included in the Consolidated Debt	62.23	37.77	58.94
Not included in the Consolidated Debt	68.64	74.06	69.75
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total percentage	67.04	67.98	67.21

During the Lausanne Conference the two parties could not agree upon the monetary form in which annual payments were to be made. The position of the independent Ottoman Public Debt Administration was also a subject of acute conflict. These questions were to be settled between the Turkish Government and the bondholders. After repeated negotiations, without result, and on various dates, an agreement was reached in May, 1928, along the following general lines:

1. The Turkish gold pound was accepted as the unit of payment.

2. The Public Debt Administration in its old form was to be discontinued. Two separate "Councils" (one for the loans included in the Consolidation, the other for those non-included) should sit in Paris as a supervising body. In cases where the two sets of bondholders had interests in common the two Councils might hold common sittings.
3. The Turkish foreign debt was put at £T83,454,679, and the outstanding annuities to be paid by Turkey, at £T22,217,286.56. In addition, the share of treasury notes assigned to Turkey for payment was £T3,521,936.
4. Turkey was not to pay in *gold* the amounts given in the table above. But, in return for her acceptance of the gold standard, the amounts were to be greatly reduced. For eight years, as from June 1, 1928, to May 31, 1936, Turkey was to make an annual payment of £T2,000,000 in gold. Thereafter payments were to be made as follows:
 - For the next six years, or from June 1, 1936, to May 31, 1942, the annual payment would be £T2,380,000.
 - For the next five years, or from June 1, 1942, to May 31, 1947, the annual payment would be £T2,780,000.
 - For the next five years, or from June 1, 1947, to May 31, 1952, the annual payment would be £T3,180,000.
 - And finally, after June 1, 1952, it would be £T3,400,000.
5. Out of such annual payments the expenses of the Councils were first to be met, then interest and bank commissions. The balance would be used for the amortization of the capital.
6. For the periods from 1929 to 1942, the gross receipts of the customhouses of Galata, Stamboul, and Haidar Pascha were to be offered as a guarantee. After 1942 those of Samsoun would be added. A representative of the Public Debt Council in Constantinople was to supervise receipts, and make weekly reports to the Council.

SOURCES

It is not the intention of the writer to attempt an exhaustive bibliography. Some indications of the source material he has used are given below; but, as indicated in the text, the author has also had access to first-hand material which is as yet unpublished.

In spite of the censorship, the Turkish daily papers may be regarded as offering the chief material for an investigation into the social and economic results of the War. For the purposes of this volume the author went through the files of the following periodicals:

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Current History (monthly), 1919-1925.
Darul Funoun Edebiat Fakultessi Medjmouhassi (The Review of the Faculty of Arts of the University) (monthly), 1915-1918.
Der Neue Orient (bi-weekly), Berlin, 1917. Thanks to the editorship of Professor Martin Hartmann a good source in which to study the intellectual movement in Turkey during the War.
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Idjtimahiat Medjmouhassi, Sociological Review (monthly), 1917-1918.
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