YUGOSLAVIA: STUMBLING BLOCK TO STALIN

A series of nine articles by the Pulitzer prize winning correspondent

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Where stands Yugoslavia today? Against Stalin—and therefore firmly in the western camp? Or faithful to communism of the Tito brand—and consequently a bitter foe of democracy? The Communist attack in Korea showed the West how quickly the storm can break, and many observers—including the Yugoslavs themselves—feel that Marshal Tito’s country may be next to hear the thunder of Soviet arms.

With Tito land tensed for trouble, The Christian Science Monitor has sent its Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent, Edmund Stevens, to Yugoslavia to get the answers. Few newspapermen know Russia as intimately as Mr. Stevens, and in this new series of articles, appearing Monday, Wednesday, and Friday for three weeks, he weighs Yugoslavia in the balance. This is the first article of the series.

Tito Avoids Risk
Of Inciting Bear

By Edmund Stevens
Chief of the Mediterranean News Bureau of The Christian Science Monitor

Belgrade

As the war in Korea spreads, this capital of Communist but anti-Stalinist Yugoslavia gives a growing impression that important events are impending.

Although foreign diplomats here are more alarmist than the Yugoslavs themselves, including their government, nevertheless there is a strong feeling that this country may be on borrowed time so far as peace is concerned. For everyone knows that Marshal Tito may be next on Prime Minister Joseph Stalin’s list.

I asked a top figure of the regime why, when Yugoslavia might soon need all-out United Nations assistance, it had voted against the UN Security Council resolution on armed aid to South Korea. His answer was simple: The Yugoslavs sought to avoid giving the Soviets the slightest pretext for provocation. They were determined to maintain their independent stand of no alliance with either East or West as long as this was physically possible.

There were also, he added, ideological reasons for the neutral position on Korea: the persistent hope that Communist China might presently break away from the Kremlin, hesitancy to side actively against any Communist state no matter how ill-advised its actions.

“But,” he concluded, “the resolution passed, didn’t it, regardless of our vote? And wasn’t that the main thing?”

Further questions made it quite clear Yugoslavia would not dispute the validity of the majority decision. Between the lines I gained the impression that nowhere had the vigorous stand of the United States caused greater satisfaction than in Belgrade.

Constant Alarm Dulls Effect of Korea Events

Though Korean events have magnified the peril of invasion, the shock to the people has been lessened by the fact that Yugoslavia has been living in a state of perpetual alarm for almost two years—ever since the Cominform ceased hoping for internal collapse of the Tito regime. The cry of “Wolf!” has become familiar. Actually the Yugoslavs will tell you that the Soviets already have tried every trick in the book short of open war: economic sanctions, sabotage, assassination, political terrorism, and attempts to foment guerrilla warfare.

Border incidents are part of the weekly routine, from the accidental straying of Cominform sheep into Tito pastures to actual planned armed incursions. Although any one of these could serve as pretext for major trouble, the Yugoslavs do not fear their immediate Cominform neighbors. They are confident that their own 30-odd battleworthy divisions, well-trained and strong in morale, are more than a match for the combined forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, whose armies have been sapped and demoralized by recurrent purges and reorganizations. With such undeniable satellite forces, the Yugo-
slavs do not believe the Kremlin will try to repeat the Korean
tactic of a war by proxy against them.

Hence, despite constant reports of troop movements in
Hungary or of tanks rumbling through the streets of Sofia—
reports that are often deliberately played up and dramatized
as a sign of alertness—Belgrade observers do not believe action
against Yugoslavia can be imminent unless there is evidence of
Soviet troops concentrating in satellite areas adjoining Yugo-
slavia.

Attitude Toward Kremlin Deeply Jarred

Until very recently, the Yugoslav leaders, while persuaded
of the Kremlin's cynicism and utter ruthlessness—the tone of
Soviet press attacks has had a highly educational effect on
Marshal Tito and his immediates—have found it hard to believe
their erstwhile allies and teachers ever would make open war
upon them. The Yugoslav attitude also was influenced by the
traditional friendship of the Russians and south Slavs, and by
the abiding conviction that the Russian people bear them no
grudge and do not want war. But Korean developments have
deply jarred the pattern of their thinking.

In the event of Soviet attack, local strategists believe the
Initial thrust might come from Bulgaria. But this, they con-
sider, would be only a feint. The main invasion drives would
develop farther north, from Hungary and Romania, where the
Danube provides the sole natural barrier between the frontier
and the Russian weight.

The character of Yugoslav defense would depend on how
much outside help could be marshaled to swiftly counter over-
whelming Russian weight. But given western land inferiority
on all sectors of the European front, little optimism exists
about the early stages. While fighting delaying actions, the
Yugoslavs would withdraw their main forces to the moun-
tainous terrain where they may be relied upon to give a good
account of themselves.

Cominform's Fifth Column Strength Unknown

An unknown quantity in the pro-Cominform
fifth column which government spokesmen insist is virtually
nonexistent. Purges of such elements have been made in the
party and army, but on a modest scale compared with Soviet
purge standards.

Conceivably, some secret Cominform supporters still may
hold posts in the army or Ministry of the Interior. However, one
of the chief sources of Soviet blunders in Yugoslavia has been
the inferior quality of the Russians' intelligence work, com-
pared to the high caliber of Yugoslav intelligence in neighbor-
ing Cominform countries. This would hardly indicate the
presence of secret Cominform agents on the inside track.

Opposition to the regime in the country at large is mostly
anti-Communist, and in a showdown with the Cominform, even
the monarchists would back the government.

Given the present state of the world and the possibility of
swift developments, many observers in Belgrade, including
top diplomats, feel it is high time that in the common interest
western policy toward Marshal Tito emerged from the phase
of generalities and took concrete form.

One obstacle to fuller understanding has been Yugoslav
Intractability on their differences with Italy and Greece, thereby
delaying a long overdue rapprochement with these countries.
Commenting on the sudden recall of the newly appointed Yugo-
slav ambassador to Athens before he had presented his creden-
tials, one foreign resident in Belgrade remarked that sometimes
in their foreign policy the Yugoslavs knocked down with one
hand what had laboriously been set up with the other.

Whatever the faults of the Tito regime, its survival so far is
a testament of stamina and courage. And these are qualities
the West cannot undervalue in the coming days.

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Police Ease Curbs;
U.S. Amity Stressed

Having dealt with Yugoslavia's dangerous position on the
'most-West' frontier in his first article, Edmund Stevens now
focuses some further political and economic questions in
yonderland. For upon the successful solution of these problems
rests, to a considerable extent, Yugoslavia's future ability to
resist Russian pressure. This is the second in a series of
nine articles.

By Edmund Stevens
Chief of the Mediterranean News Bureau of The Christian Science Monitor

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Belgrade

Tito's Yugoslavia was once the toast of Moscow as the Soviet
Union's lustiest offspring, and the heavy imprint of this has
survived the severance of the family tie, though the resemblance
was greater in 1947, when the Yugoslavs still copied the Moscow
pattern literally.

Even then there were differences of degree. The incibus
of police control was a shade lighter in Belgrade than in Moscow.
People were less hesitant about talking to foreigners. On brief
afiliation they would draw you aside and pour out their
whispered grievances. This never would have happened in
Russia.

Since then the situation has evolved. In 1947 travel in Yugo-
slavia was complicated by police regulations. To go anywhere
you had to have a special pass from the Ministry of the Interior,
and you were constantly having to produce it. This time my
request in Belgrade for such a pass met with the answer that
it was no longer needed—we were free to go wherever we
wished. And never once, in our extensive travels, were we
challenged.

In Russia, meanwhile, the trend has been in the opposite
direction. In 1947 we still could travel, subject to regulation.
When we left Moscow, less than a year ago, most of the country
was out of bounds to foreigners.

People Eager to Talk—and Friendly

This time in Yugoslavia totally vanished was the previous
attitude of reserve, even outright hostility, toward Americans.
Everywhere people crowded around, eager to talk to us, took
us into their houses, invited us to share their bread. In Moscow
last year it was no longer possible to see our Russian friends
of longest acquaintance. Our next-door neighbors were even
afraid to say hello.

The friendliness of the Yugoslav people was expressed in many
ways. If, as often happened on flinty Dalmatian roads, we had
a flat to fix, we had eager helpers who refused payment. Only
by insisting could we get them to accept a cake of soap or a candy
bar.

One real one such stop in a little coastal fishing town. Out of
the crowd came an elderly man who spoke excellent English with
a Midwest accent. He had kept a store in Cedar Rapids 20 years
and then had returned home with his capital and set up a
business. He was doing all right before the war. But now the
government had closed him out. He earned his bread as a day
laboerer and dreamed of Cedar Rapids.

Eagerly, he asked us about living costs in America, the price
of bread, of meat, of sugar, of butter, of shoes. After each answer
he rapidly translated the figure into dinars for an open-mouthed
audience of townsfolk.
Ban on Foreign Travel Draws Grumbles

On numerous other occasions we were the center of impromptu meetings at which people asked about America and aired their grievances. More convincing than all the assurances we received from officials in Belgrade on relaxation of police control was this readiness of ordinary people to speak out in public.

There was Branko, from Zara, who asked us for a lift. Before the war, Zara had belonged to Italy, and Branko had been drafted into Mussolini's army. In 1943 he was captured by the Americans in Tunisia, and when we asked him how he was treated he remarked that if there was to be another war he only wished the Americans would capture him all over again. Those months in an American PW camp had been the happiest in his life.

Branko and many others complained bitterly over the ban on foreign travel. In this respect the Yugoslavs still have retained one of the ugliest features of the Soviet police state. Not only are Yugoslav nationals denied permission to leave the country—unless they are being sent for official reasons—but persons of Yugoslav birth who left the country long ago and who come back for a visit sometimes have trouble obtaining exit visas as they still are considered Yugoslav citizens, regardless of naturalization elsewhere.

As in the Soviet Union, personal reasons cut no ice with the authorities. In Belgrade I met a man whose wife and child were in France and he had been trying vainly for several years to join them. Recently he had received "friendly" advice to desist from further effort. Yugoslav wives of foreigners also have a hard time getting permission to accompany their husbands, though their situation is not as hopeless as the toughest feature of the Soviet police state. Not only are Yugoslavs, regardless of naturalization elsewhere.

In its quest for foreign exchange, the regime also has pushed lumber exports to the utmost. Yugoslavia is almost the sole country in southern Europe that still possesses extensive forest lands. Today, to pay for machinery, tall spruce and pine are being felled wholesale in the mountains of Bosnia and Croatia. The barren rocky ridges of nearby Dalmatia, stripped of its trees in past centuries, serve as grim reminder of what will happen farther inland if the present rate of cutting continues for long.

Food Shortages and Low Pay Spur Discontent

Our random conversational sampling revealed widespread discontent and grumbling over the shortage of food and consumer goods and the inadequacy of wages. There also was resentment over the inequalities of the rationing system, with two different cards for various categories, and the "closed" shops for certain favored groups, such as army officers and government officials.

Norms of rationed foodstuffs in most categories were described as woefully inadequate, so that most people had to eke out their ration with open market purchases at exorbitant prices. With the dinar quoted at 50 to the dollar, bread cost more than 100 dinars per kilo, butter from 8.80 to 1,000 dinars per kilo, sugar 500 per kilo, coffee ranged from 2,500 to 4,000 dinars—this compared with wages that ranged on the average between 3,000 and 6,000 dinars a month.

Even at these high prices there was precious little in the way of foodstuffs offered for sale in the open market. This paradox in a country which always has produced a large agricultural surplus is explained by the lack of manufactured goods. There is not much incentive to the peasants to sell their produce when they don't know what to do with money.

In 1947 the Yugoslavs looked far better fed and clothed. That was before the Cominform blockade. Deprived of the materials and equipment they had hoped to receive from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavs, in order to carry out their ambitious industrialization program, have had to buy from the West, mainly on a cash-and-carry basis.

Not only does this mean that there is no foreign currency available for buying manufactured goods, but the government has had to increase food exports at the expense of home consumption.

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Farmers Prosper: Incentive Retained

What is life like on a Yugoslav collective farm? Does it differ from a Russian collective? Today, Edmund Stevens, The Christian Science Monitor's former Moscow correspondent, takes you with him on a trip to one of Marshal Tito's collective farms. Because of his long experience in the Soviet Union, Mr. Stevens is able to draw sharp distinction between Russian farm life and the type of communism now operating in rural areas of Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia.

By Edmund Stevens
Chief of the Mediterranean News Bureau of The Christian Science Monitor

Belgrade

While the Tito government strains its economic bootstraps to industrialize, Yugoslavia remains overwhelmingly a peasant country.

In agriculture, as in all things, the Yugoslavs started out by copying the Soviet pattern. Collectivization was introduced well ahead of any of the other eastern European Communist states, with Soviet high-pressure methods.

Since the Cominform break, in the light of practical experience—partly as a result of peasant resistance to these methods—the Tito government has basically revised its tactics. Collectivization is still the ultimate aim, but it is now being abandoned.

Henceforth, official sources state, collectivization is to be on a strictly voluntary basis. The object will be to promote the prosperity of existing collectives, so that their example will encourage the individual peasants of the advantages of collectivization. The present proportion of collectivized peasant holdings is said to be about 20 per cent.

We visited one large collective in the fertile plain of the Sava River west of Belgrade. Our visit was unannounced, and we have reason to believe the answers to our questions were unrehearsed.

Quotas Set on Percentage Basis

Much of what we learned of the organization of working methods, workday unit system of compensation, experiences to the state, recalled the Soviet pattern. But differences were crucial. Thus, instead of the collective being obliged to deliver a fixed quantity of wheat, corn, beef, or meat, quotas were on a percentage basis—67 per cent of the total produced.

The difference in practice between this percentage system and the Soviet absolute figures is that it protects the individual peasants from the danger of being left empty-handed by making its obligations to the state, as sometimes happens, in the Soviet countryside.

Equally important is the provision that Yugoslav collective farmers may do as they please with the produce from their own
private garden plots and privately owned domestic animals, without any obligations to the state thereon. At the collective we visited each member family had about one hectare of garden plot, one cow and calf, up to five head of sheep, up to 10 hives, and unspecified amounts of poultry.

Soviet collective farmers also are entitled to their own garden plots and livestock. But on everything thus privately produced the state takes a heavy cut. Here, too, the quotas of tax in kind are fixed, and a farmer with a garden plot judged sufficient to maintain a cow and poultry is liable for a butter and egg quota regardless of whether he actually produces these commodities.

Year by year the delivery quotas from these private sources have been upped, practically to the point of diminishing returns. The officially stated purpose of this policy is to discourage collective farmers from devoting too much energy to their "spare time" private economies and shirking their duties to the collectives. This was because throughout the country collective farmers, discouraged by the small compensation they received for their work on the collectives, had in fact concentrated on their garden plots.

Soviet Farmers' Incentive Erased

After tolerating this situation in the war and immediate post-war years, the Soviet Government decided on drastic corrective measures. But instead of reducing the pressure on the collectives by liberalizing the delivery quota system, and thereby giving the farmers added incentive to work in the collectives, it simply clamped down on their garden plots.

We were unable to ascertain whether the tendency of collective farmers to prefer their private plots to work on the collective existed in Yugoslavia. But the workday compensation rates quoted to us were reassuring. We visited each collective and liquidated the measure. But instead of reducing the pressure on the collectives to work in the collective, it simply clamped down on their garden plots.

The principal ingredients of the per workday payment were: 3.3 kilos of wheat, 3 kilos of corn, ½ kilo of beet sugar, 1 kilo of potatoes, 1½ liters of wine, and 61 dinars in cash. The cash was from the money the collective received from the state in payment for produce deliveries. In addition, the collective was given coupons for the purchase of rationed manufactured goods at state prices. These coupons, in turn, were distributed to the members on a workday basis.

Thearness was in full swing at the time of our visit, and at noon everybody stopped work for a lunch of steaming soup, brimming with meat and vegetables, more palatable than the best available in Belgrade. A noon meal was served free to all the workers.

Originally organized in 1947, with 40 families, this collective had grown to number 301 households. Of these, 256 families were Serb, one Croat, one Slovak—descendants of a Lutheran Evangelical-Slovak community that had moved here from near Bratislava in the 13th century. They maintained their own Lutheran church and pastor. Of the remainder, 44 families were Serb and one Croatian. The collective included 68 Communist Party members.

Members Eagerly Point Out Advantages

The favorable atmosphere of this farm was matched some 50 kilometers away at the farm of a recently industrialized area, where Tito's latest speeches were explained. Unable to understand the collective farmers also are entitled to a butter and egg quota regardless of whether he actually produces these commodities.

In Yugoslavia's industrial development is at present beset with many of the handicaps and shortcomings that Soviet industrialization experienced in the early five-year-plan periods. These largely derive from the shortage of skilled workers and trained personnel in a technically backward country. While acknowledging this, the Yugoslav leaders claim the problem is less acute in their case than it ever was in Russia, for, they insist, the average Yugoslav, whether Serb, Croat, or Slovene, the peasants, have been called on to make heavy sacrifices. All the propaganda methods and techniques for exhorting the workers to the utmost effort, despite a scant immediate return, have been borrowed from Soviet practice.

There are in Yugoslavia shock workers, shock brigades, medals, and badges for distinction on the "labor front," published pledges for plan fulfillment ahead of time, miners and workers in industry who by rationalization schemes double and triple their output and who get their pictures in the papers. There also are rounds of "socialist competition" between individual workers, brigades, shops, and factories.

Curiously, Yugoslavia's faithful adoption of the Soviet industrialization pattern was one of the factors that caused the Cominform break. The Soviets wanted to keep Yugoslavia as a source of raw materials subordinate to their own requirements and interests.

Youthful Zest Vies With Wasteful Methods

Yugoslavia's industrial development is at present beset with many of the handicaps and shortcomings that Soviet industrialization experienced in the early five-year-plan periods. These largely derive from the shortage of skilled workers and trained personnel in a technically backward country. While acknowledging this, the Yugoslav leaders claim the problem is less acute in their case than it ever was in Russia, for, they insist, the average Yugoslav, whether Serb, Croat, or Slovene,
was more literate, enlightened, and generally civilized to begin with than the Russian muzhik (peasant).

But as it may, the waste in effort and materials is enormous by western efficiency standards. American engineers whom we found supervising a major industrial construction job grew agitated when they mentioned the subject. They estimated that it cost the equivalent of $800 to pour a cubic yard of concrete. The waste of lumber and other building materials through careless handling was, they said, appalling. Valuable machinery was put out of commission through lack of maintenance and improper operation.

The root of the trouble was, they said, that people were placed in jobs requiring a high degree of technical knowledge and skill after only the most cursory cram courses. But on the job they were stubborn and not amenable to suggestion. They were utterly reckless in their disregard for labor safety precautions, and casualties on the job were consequently high. In particular, they remarked that most of the workers were untrained teenagers.

Traveling through the country, one gains the impression that most of the work in Yugoslavia is being done by youngsters. They are, in fact, Tito's staunchest supporters. For them the new regime, with its banners, parades, songs, camaraderie, volunteer brigades, campers' outings, is a continuous dramatic adventure in which even ditch-digging is endowed with an aura of romance and heroism.

We saw them by the hundreds, building the new superhighway linking Belgrade and Zagreb, now nearing completion. We saw them again in the mines and steel mills of Bosnia. And everywhere they tried to make up in numbers and enthusiasm for what they lacked in know-how.

Point to Finished Projects—Shrug Off Losses

Government officials with whom we spoke agreed that the waste and inefficiency were regrettable. But they insisted that Yugoslavia, cut off from the East and unable to obtain much help from the West, had no alternative save to get on with the job as best it could by its own efforts and with its own resources. The waste and loss would have to be charged to experience. The main thing, they insisted, was that somehow things got done; the new factories, housing developments, highways, railways were there to prove it. And I was unable to shake this official optimism.

Many persons, workers included, voice great expectations of the newly adopted law on the establishment of workers' councils for the avowed object of giving the workers a direct and active voice in the management of the plants and factories where they work. The measure was hailed in the press as a major step toward greater industrial democracy. It also represents—on paper, at least—the first major Yugoslav departure from contemporary Soviet industrial practices.

The new law sets up in each factory workers' councils, comprised of representatives chosen by the workers from among their own numbers, with authority to approve basic plans and the balance sheet of the enterprise—and to appoint and dismiss the board of managers or individual members thereof. Other wide powers vested in the councils include authority to distribute funds placed at the disposal of the enterprise and to draft and change the bylaws of the enterprise, subject to the approval of the higher authorities. Also subject to approval from above is the production plan, which must be integrated in the over-all plan.

Tito Claims Anti-Bureaucracy Weapon

According to Marshal Tito, the new law should have an important educational effect. He declared in his recent speech in Parliament that "in an undeveloped country such as Yugoslavia, workers could best be trained . . . in the very process of management . . . . They will get to know not only the production processes, but all the problems of their enterprise."

Because it transfers to the workers important functions hitherto performed by the state, the new law, it is stated, will prove a powerful weapon against the danger of bureaucracy as exemplified by what the Yugoslavs call "bureaucratic centralization" in the Soviet Union.

Tito also claims that with the formation of factory councils Yugoslavia in one respect has advanced farther along the road of socialism than the Soviet Union.

"From now on the state-owned means of production (factories, railways, etc.) will gradually pass to a higher form of socialist property. State ownership is the lowest form of socialist property, and not the highest, as the leaders of the U.S.S.R. maintain. Now you see this is our road to socialism—the only proper road in dealing with the reduction of state functions in economy."

In its implications, this is a Marxist ideological blockbuster, aimed at the very core of the present Soviet political and economic setup, with its emphases on centralized control.

MONDAY, JULY 31, 1950

Titoland Derides 'Perpetuity' Pattern of Stalin's Socialist Ideology

By Edmund Stevens

Chief of Mediterranean News Bureau of The Christian Science Monitor

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Belgrade

A square splotch of slightly different hue from the surrounding walk space marks the spot where a certain portrait hangs no more in many a room in Yugoslavia. Sometimes the telltale blank is covered with some other picture or decoration. More often it is left empty, throwing out of symmetry the other portraits: Lenin, flanked on one side by Marshal Tito and on the other by the splotch. Thus is one forcefully reminded at almost every turn of Soviet Prime Minister Joseph Stalin's removal from the local scene. Back in 1947 the familiar features of the Kremlin dictator were as ubiquitous in Belgrade as in Moscow. Portraits are a major item in the highly developed Communist political symbolism. For the Yugoslavs, the removal of Stalin's picture signified their complete break with the Soviets.

Long after the initial Communists rift the Stalin portraits stayed on their hooks unmolested. The sedulously cultivated Stalin legend retained its hold in the widespread con-
vation among the Yugoslav Communist Party rank and file that Stalin's heart was in the right place, that the quarrel was all the fault of his subordinates, that once "good old Joe knew the facts he would set things right.

For a time the Yugoslav leaders seemed to foster this view, perhaps because they believed it themselves or because it bolstered their own standing with their followers. In any event, Stalin's name was deferentially kept out of the quarrel.

Neutrality Fiction Bared

Stalin himself exploded the fiction of his neutrality when he stepped down from his pedestal and directly lent his name to the Soviet denunciations of Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the portraits began to disappear. They were not removed overnight—as happens in Moscow when some top official suddenly falls from grace. Nor, so far as may be ascertained, were instructions issued to eliminate all reminders of Stalin. Even today Stalin's writings are sold in Belgrade bookshops.

But the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership began to dismantle the Stalin legend. Yugoslav Politburo member Milovan Dijas denounced "the un-Marxist treatment of the role of the leader, which often takes the shape of vulgar historical falsifications and idolatries similar to those in absolute monarchies."

While Stalin's name still was not mentioned, views closely identified with him came in for sharp criticism. If hitherto the dispute with the Kremlin had hinged on practical Soviet-Yugoslav relations, it now spread to the broader realms of policy and ideology. The Yugoslavs, using the traditional Marxist-Leninist jargon and terms of reference, accused the Soviets of deviation, whereas they, the Yugoslavs, were the true champions of the "tactical" commissar. The main line of attack has been on the question of the theory of the state. The Yugoslavs call the turn on the obvious discrepancy between the Marxist doctrine of the gradual "withering away" of the State and the Soviet trend toward ever greater concentration of political and administrative power and strengthening of the police apparatus.

Kremlin Claims Refuted

In this connection, the Yugoslavs deride assertions of current Kremlin theorists that in the Soviet Union the transition to socialism is already accomplished. If this were so, the Yugoslavs contend, the withering away process would be well advanced, which is certainly not the case. Comments Mr. Dijas: "Such premises actually suit a bureaucracy which wants to hide from the people the intensification of its privileged position. The term the Yugoslavs have coined for present conditions in the Soviet Union is 'bureaucratic centralism'—an unwieldy, over-centralized state apparatus, staffed by a privileged official caste whose primary concern is perpetuating itself and its privileges."

In the process of centralization, runs the argument, the Soviet Communist Party has lost the role assigned to it by Lenin as the active guiding force of political, intellectual, and economic affairs—and has simply become a part of the bureaucratic state machinery. The party central committee, instead of concerning itself primarily with questions of policy, gets directly involved in the petty routine of government. As an example of this, one Yugoslav writer gives the central committee's current emphasis on "momentous" decisions prescribing the length of elementary school recess periods and the dimensions of schoolbooks, instead of leaving such details to the competent department of the Ministry of Education.

Mass Ousters Assailed

The most recent and most forceful attack on Soviet home policies was made by Marshal Tito in his speech to Parliament on June 26. On this occasion Marshal Tito for the first time took Stalin to task by name. He recalled how Stalin, as far back as 1939 had asserted: "The function of our socialist state has changed. The function of compulsion inside the state has ceased, has withered away. The exploiters are no more, and there is nothing left to suppress. The sharp edge of our army, our police, and intelligence service is no longer turned toward the interior of the country but is turned outside, toward foreign enemies."

Such assertions, said Marshal Tito, "bear no resemblance to reality." And he inquires ironically: "What are the NKVD (secret police) and the militia doing? Are their functions directed outside the country? If so, who does the deporting of millions of citizens of various nationalities to Siberia and the Far North?"

Not only is this the first time the Yugoslavs have directly challenged Stalin's veracity. It is also the first time the Yugoslavs have referred to the most vengeful feature of the Kremlin policy—the mass deportations—and thereby presumably have placed themselves on record as condemning that sort of thing.

In his Ouster 8 Assailed

"It seems to me that the Kremlin, by exalting the Russians to a special status as "the leading nationality," had revived Great-Russian nationalism, and that this inevitably had led to "national persecution and economic enslavement," not only inside the U.S.S.R. but to imperialism also in relations between the Soviet Union and its satellites. Hence the oppression and exploitation from which the Yugoslavs revolted.

At many points—notably on the bureaucratic degeneration of the state and the party and the revival of Russian nationalism and imperialism—the Yugoslav arguments recall the charges made by Leon Trotsky against "Stalinism" more than 20 years ago. And the Soviets have, in fact, hurled at Marshal Tito the epithet of "Trotskyite." But on one issue the Yugoslavs are notably at variance with Trotsky: far from challenging Stalinism, they claim that it is impossible to build socialism in one country, they are fully committed to this effort. Titoism stems not from Trotskyism of the '20's, but from Stalinism of the '40's. This the Yugoslav leaders frankly admit, though they claim that long before the open break they had started thinking for themselves.

Returning to the symbolism of portraits, we did encounter Stalin on the wall behind him. But the Marshal and the Generalissimo were gazing in different directions.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1950
Yugoslav leaders now blame many past and present troubles on their former practice of accepting the Soviet pattern uncritically and applying it wholesale to their country. Recalling this early period, Marshal Tito acknowledged:

"He formed the habit of always assuming that everything the Soviet Union did was the only way and the best way and that it should be done in our country."

He added: "This un-Marxian approach was, however, noticed in time, and we started out on our own road."

Just where this road is leading is a crucial question not only for Yugoslavia but for the entire world. One thing seems reasonably certain. It is not leading back to Moscow. Doubtless the Yugoslav leaders would like nothing better than to compose their differences with Stalin & Co. on terms that would leave intact their independence.

They know the Kremlin too well not to realize that any solution that gave Soviet domination a bridgehead in Yugoslavia sooner or later would land them before a firing squad. But they likewise sense that any solution which left Yugoslavian independence untouched—and thereby gave Marshal Tito the moral victory—is about the last thing in the world the Kremlin is likely to agree to. For this would blast the very foundations of the Soviet structure of concentrated power and, by analogy, weaken the Soviet hold on all other Communist states, including China.

Ever-Widening Rift With Moscow Seen

In Belgrade I asked Moshe Pijade, member of the Yugoslav Politburo and credited with being Yugoslavia's leading theorist, if he saw any likelihood of reconciliation with Moscow. His answer was an emphatic negative. He added that the trend could be only toward ever-widening divergence.

Mr. Pijade is a quiet, scholarly man with a plain-spoken manner and a humorous glint. Transferred to a university campus, he doubtless would become a favorite professor. But there has been little of the academic in his career, save that in the Belgrade prison he conducted classes in Marxism for his fellow inmates.

Having studied art in Munich and Paris, Mr. Pijade cut short a promising career as a painter to become a revolutionary. Arrested in 1924 when an underground printing plant he operated was discovered, he spent the next 17 years behind the bars save for a few months of freedom in 1939.

He finally was released on April 4, 1941, two days before Hitler blitzed Yugoslavia. During the war he played a leading role in the partisan movement, mostly in Montenegro. In 1942 he became first editor of the newspaper Borba, official organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party. While in prison he translated many of the French classics into Serbo-Croatian. He also wrote an extensive monograph on the Serbian sculptor Mestrovic.

Mr. Pijade's first doubts as to Soviet policies and intentions germinated during a four-month sojourn in Moscow in 1944 as head of the Yugoslav liaison delegation. He was disturbed then by the Soviet attitude of easy superiority and condescension toward the native Communist forces in Yugoslavia—and by Kremlin attempts to dictate policy down to the last detail. He attributed the early successes of the partisan movement in Yugoslavia to lack of effective wartime contact with Moscow which enabled the partisans to develop their own initiative.

Anti-Bureaucratic Steps Claimed

The partisan movement, Mr. Pijade insisted, had developed from the outset as a popular mass movement, and the current regime retained these roots. It was only in the immediate post-war period that Moscow was able, for a time, to impose the stereotypes of the bureaucratic police state.

Now, he insisted, the government was doing everything in its power to eliminate bureaucracy wherever this had taken root. The most effective methods for combating it were to encourage greater freedom of criticism and local initiative and to introduce more democracy, especially in the management of factories and other economic enterprises. In this connection Mr. Pijade, like other Yugoslav leaders, attached great importance to the newly established workers' councils. Those he described as the first important step toward transferring economic administration from government agencies to the hands of the working collective, thereby reducing government activities, in line with the Marxist theory of the "withdrawing away of the state."

Much, Mr. Pijade insisted, already had been done to correct previous mistakes in agriculture—mistakes due to the importation of Soviet pressure methods. He cited the shift of the collective farm program to what he described as a strictly voluntary basis.

The subject of the UDBA (Odbab)—the Yugoslav internal security organization modeled originally on the Soviet NKVD (secret police)—was mentioned in conversation. When I asked Mr. Pijade how he reconciled this organ with his plans for greater freedom, he insisted the internal police system must be likewise was sanguine on the prospects of freedom for greater freedom, he insisted the internal police system must be leveled with the prospect of freedom for individual police freedom.

Multiple Party Vote Contests Pictured

Concerning Yugoslav elections, which have followed the Soviet one-ticket system, Mr. Pijade saw the possibility of contests developing between rival candidates. This, he declared, already had happened in several districts in Slovenia in the last elections. The Yugoslav Constitution, he asserted, made ample provision for this, since it permitted candidates to be entered merely by collecting signatures, whereas in Russia they must be sponsored by some "social" organization.

Mr. Pijade likewise was sanguine on the prospects of freedom for foreign correspondents—a point strongly disputed by some correspondents whose stories were censored. He also claimed the internal censorship was far less stringent than in the Soviet Union.

He ridiculed the Soviet campaign to claim all the world's important discoveries and inventions for Russians as the extreme example of the revival of Russian nationalism. He contrasted the "leading nation" role, currently assigned to the "socialist" countries in the Soviet Union, to the complete equality which he said obtained among the different peoples of Yugoslavia.

Religion, too, Mr. Pijade contended, was benefiting from the general relaxation of controls. The churches, he insisted, were entirely free as long as they kept out of politics. As the imprisoned Roman Catholic Primate, Archbishop Stepinac, Mr. Pijade stated he would have been released long ago if only the Vatican had agreed to replace him with a more acceptable to the Belgrade regime. The objection of the pope, Bishop Stepinac, he declared, was based entirely on his claims that his wartime record included collaboration with Nazis and Fascists.

The picture Mr. Pijade painted was one of conscious efforts in Yugoslavia toward a more liberal, democratic socialism. Westerners, accustomed to the dichotomy between Communist words and deeds, between the elaborate phrases of the Soviet Constitution and the actual way the police state, have a right to be skeptical. At the same time, to discount these Yugoslav assertions a priori is to overlook many important differences of degree, differences that are especially striking to anyone who has lived in Moscow.
Belgrade Smooths Tourist Path as Scarcity Recedes

By Edmund Stevens

Curt of the Mediterranean News Bureau of The Christian Science Monitor
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Belgrade

Among the brighter features of the recent picture in Yugoslavia is the receni opening of the country to tourists. Yugoslav consular officials now are authorized to issue tourist visas promptly upon request.

This is a radical change-over from the previous practice of referring every application to Belgrade, where it took months to get an answer, likely as not in the negative. This, too, is a notable departure from the Soviet pattern.

The change was prompted by the desire to attract much-needed foreign currency through the tourist trade. The Soviet Union is also interested in foreign currency. However, in 1947, the MVD (secret police of Russia) forced cancellation of plans worked out by Intourist for a postwar resumption of tourist traffic. Before the war sizable contingents of foreign tourists followed well-marked itineraries in the Soviet Union. They also have set up a highly efficient organization for ministering to their requirements. Every branch office of the official Yugoslav travel agency, now has a special department with employees who command the main foreign languages.

Tourist Scrip Cuts Cost in Half

Since the present artificial exchange rate of 50 dinars to the dollar makes Yugoslavia prohibitively expensive for most visitors, Putnik now issues a special tourist scrip, which tourists may purchase for foreign currency and then pay half price for their accommodations, meals, and travel tickets.

The man behind this program is Stanjo Simic, one of Yugoslavia's most distinguished elder statesmen, a veteran of the prewar diplomatic service who served the present regime for several years as foreign minister and now holds the cabinet post of minister of hospitals and tourism.

Already Mr. Simic's organization has done a creditable job of refurbishing hotel accommodations, which during the summer months are filled to overflowing with Yugoslav vacationists. Thousands of whom flock to the sea and mountains, taking advantage of liberal rail fare and hotel rate discounts. If so far few tourists have availed themselves of the new opportunities, it is mainly due to lack of information. People in the West had come to think of Yugoslavia as a forbidden zone, like other eastern European countries, where travel was not quite safe. Up until a few months ago the United States State Department supported this view by stamping every passport: "Not valid for travel in Yugoslavia."

Actually, it would be in the interests of better relations and better understanding if more Americans took advantage of the present travel opportunities.

Good rail connections provide the most effortless and easy way of reaching Yugoslavia. But to really see the country and the people, to go and stop wherever one wants, a car is the best way. Motoring is considerably rougher in Yugoslavia than in western Europe. The road surfaces are mostly gravel and dirt. Dust swirls in the wake of every passing vehicle. However, nowhere will the motorist find a better road than the recently completed superhighway linking Zagreb and Belgrade. There one can drive for almost 300 miles without encountering a single curve or intersection, town—or service station.

Buying Gasoline Means Manhunt

Getting gasoline in Yugoslavia is always an adventure in itself. There are very few regular filling pumps. Most of the larger towns have a gasoline depot somewhere on the outskirts. Not demand is so slack that there is no full-time personnel on duty and the man who has the keys is usually elsewhere and otherwise engaged. Hence, when we needed gasoline, our first step was to take aboard some local inhabitant who knew the man with the keys and where he might be found. Thus guided, we began our manhunt.

Few countries can offer the tourist such contrasts as Yugoslavia. From the wooded uplands of Slovenia to the lush flat farmlands of Croatia, where the road threads whitewashed villages, to the sun-baked crags of Montenegro. In little towns that huddle in closed green valleys of Bosnia the tourist can often find the Pretentiousness of the broad streets and boulevards contrasts starkly with the shabbiness of the main square. In the Karageorgevs, here the new Tito regime has come to know the story of passive peasant opposition, hard as though carved from the living rock by Mestrovic.

Belgrade, the capital, has much the appearance of a boom town. Its main buildings, new or rebuilt since the war, seem blatanl in their unweathered whiteness, lacking in taste or atmosphere. The pretentiousness of the broad streets and boulevards contrasts starkly with the shabbiness of the townpeople and the poverty displayed in every shop window. Everything here bears witness to the new regime, its aspirations, accomplishments, and failures.

For the tourist the most appealing part of Yugoslavia is Dalmatia, the narrow rocky fringe of the blue Adriatic. Nowhere is the setting of the medieval city state more perfectly preserved than in Dubrovnik (Ragusa) with the tall stone palaces of its vanished sea captains and merchant princes, Venetian churches, and massive, sea-washed ramparts. Up the coast from Dubrovnik is the ancient port of Split, sometimes called the Dalmatian Naples, for its colorful, noisy, water front and the volatile, garrulous gaiety of its inhabitants. Here is preserved one of the most amazing relics of antiquity—the huge rambling palace that Roman emperor Diocletian built here upon retirement. Half the people of Split still live within...
Belgrade

We met the Noviches in Zagreb. A tall youth elbowed through the crowd around the car and hailed us in an unmistakable western accent. "So you're American," he said. "So am I—or, rather, was— from Grand Rapids. Jack Novich is the name."

We invited Jack to drive around town with us. He readily agreed, provided we made it after working hours and would let him bring his two kid brothers. "They'd love it," he explained. "We haven't ridden in a car since we left Grand Rapids."

Later in the afternoon, as we toured the town, we learned their story—the story of Jack, 23; Joe, 16, and Homer, 9. Their parents, who had come to the United States from Yugoslavia in the early '20's, had heeded Marshal Tito's call for repatriates. After a rally staged by a left-wing Slav society, they had signed up. Having sold their small house and car and stocked up on clothing and food staples, they were given free passage on a Yugoslav ship.

That was in 1947. The clothing, Jack remarked, had been a wonderful investment. They still had enough, including shoes, to last them through another year. They had also brought along their sewing machine, and their mother was handy at mending and remaking. The food stocks, alas, had long since been used up. But now that Yugoslavia had signed an agreement to admit repatriates, they were given free clothing and food stocks. Alas, had long since been used up.

"The norms were too low, and everyone has overfulfilled them," commented. "The norms are set too low, and everyone has overfulfilled them."

But, I asked, wasn't it a good thing if the factory had produced more than its quota? The trouble was, Jack explained, the manager must now find additional money to pay the workers for their extra earnings, which wouldn't have happened if higher norms had been set. "The manager is to blame for setting too low figures, and..."
Tito Leans to West
In Fact—Not Theory

By Edmund Stevens
Chief of the Mediterranean News Bureau of The Christian Science Monitor
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Belgrade

In Zara, several thousand Italians await repatriation. This old Venetian town, born and shelled to shambles in war-time, has not yet been reconstructed. Formerly an Italian enclave on the Dalmatian coast, the peace treaty transferred Zara to Yugoslavia.

The local inhabitants had the right to apply for Italian citizenship and move to Italy. For many of them it is a long, slow process. A few families are allowed to leave from time to time. Few have any notion of what they will do in crowded Italy. The Yugoslav press plays up Italian unemployment. But this does not discourage them from wanting to go.

In Fiume, despite postwar population shifts—the exodus of Italians and influx of Slavs from the hinterland—one still hears the Italian language on every street corner. There are Italian schools and a one-sheet daily paper in Italian which carefully follows the Yugoslav Government line.

As Yugoslavia's main seaport, Fiume teems with activity. Flags of many nations fly in its harbor. Most of Yugoslavia's growing commerce with the West passes through its reconstructed waterfront. In addition, coffee, sugar, soap, fountain pens, nylon stockings, and hundreds of other items are smuggled ashore by seamen who sell them cheap so as to get some dinars for pocket money without having to change at the official rate. As a result prices are lower and goods more plentiful in Fiume than anywhere else in Yugoslavia.

Holiday Crowds Carefree and Gay

A few miles beyond Fiume lies Abbazia, once the main seaside resort of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which under Italian rule was largely frequented by well-to-do central Europeans. Today its many luxury hotels are still intact, but their names and clientele are altered beyond recognition. There is a Hotel Moscow, a Hotel Warsaw, a Hotel Slavia, a Hotel Belgrade. The people who throng the beaches are all Yugoslavs, enjoying to the full their two-week vacations at special rates. The sunburned crowds—well sprinkled with attractive young people—are as carefree and gay as holiday crowds anywhere else.

Of the former Italian towns we visited, Poja was by far the most depressing. Poja, as the Fiume paper phrased it, was not "liberated" from the "Anglo-American imperialists" until September, 1947. At that time there was a mass voluntary evacuation of the people. Today, this city, once teeming with life, is silent and semideserted. Most of the people we spoke to knew no Italian and had only moved in recently. Yugoslav naval uniforms were everywhere in evidence.

Our trip through the Zone B of the Trieste Free Territory left us with the distinct impression that the area had been closely integrated with Yugoslavia, although economic conditions seemed better, due mostly to the considerable amount of contact with Zone A. But collectivization of the peasantry, for example, appeared far more widespread in Zone B than in adjacent areas annexed outright by Yugoslavia.

While Zone B has thus been assimilated, there is notably less talk of taking over Zone A, which includes the city of Trieste. In the not too distant past, the Yugoslavs charged that the presence of western power forces in Zone A was part of a nefarious "imperialist plot" and demanded their withdrawal. Today the Yugoslavs are still officially committed to this view. Under the surface, however, I gained the impression that the last straw to make the Yugoslavs snap in the Anglo-American Trieste garrison, that on the contrary they would secretly like to see it reinforced.

Practice No Part of Theory

For, far from threatening Yugoslavia, this small western military outpost on the edge of southeast Europe is to the Yugoslavs a source of comfort and reassurance, a welcome counterweight to Soviet pressure. This curious attitude illustrates the present paradoxical relationship between the West and Yugoslavia. In theory the Belgrade regime is opposed to everything the West stands for. It is avowedly Communist and pledged to establish a Communist way of life. It is outspokenly anti-capitalist and until a few months ago denounced the West in language almost identical with that of Moscow. But now the overriding element in Yugoslav foreign policy is the quarrel with Moscow. For the present this dwarfs all other issues as far as the Yugoslavs are concerned. In fact, though not in theory, the Soviet Union has today become the Yugoslav Government's enemy Number One. Likewise, the United States has in practice become Yugoslavia's sole source of effective foreign support.

In theory, American policy should support and encourage Tito's stand against the Kremlin, without in any way aiding and strengthening communism within Yugoslavia. In practice this distinction is impossible. Tito's capacity to resist the Kremlin depends on the internal strength of his own brand of communism. Moreover, Tito repeatedly has stressed his unwillingness to make any political concessions in exchange for western support.

Matter of Mutual Expediency

American policy now has recognized these facts and has extended to Tito a limited measure of economic and diplomatic support without in any way appearing to approve of his regime. In carrying out a delicate policy, the United States has been fortunate in the staff of its Belgrade Embassy, headed by Ambassador George Allen.

The Tito government, for its part, has curbed anti-American propaganda. In the Belgrade press, the "American imperialists" now have become the "American realists." It has also soft-pedaled some aspects of the system most repugnant to Americans.

Despite a few encouraging signs, Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the United States and the West is still a matter of mutual
the policy enunciated by their bonds of sympathy and
understanding. As a Communist state, Yugoslavia still professes
a greater politeness for the Cominform countries—if only
they would stop behaving in such a nasty manner toward Yugo-
slavia. Hence, Yugoslavia's policy on the Korean issue.
Despite the heat generated by the Tito-Cominform quarrel,
many persons, both in and out of Belgrade, view with skepticism
any likelihood of the Yugoslavs and the Soviet Union being on
opposite sides in some future war. Tell you that in part,
wars the south Slavs have invariably wound up on the Russian
side and that they are likely in the long run to return to the bosom
of Mother Russia.
Such arguments based on precedent ignore the special circum-
stances—the toughness of the Tito regime and its resolute cham-
pionship of Yugoslav independence. The south Slavs have often
been allies of the Russians but never their slaves.