

It is intended at a later date to issue the Report of the Allied Mission to observe the Greek Elections with the complete Appendix. As, however, this will be a full and comprehensive document, some time must elapse before its publication.

Meanwhile, this White Paper is presented, consisting of the Report itself together with the more important extracts from its Appendix. A complete list of the documents forming the Appendix will be found on pages 23-24.

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# REPORT OF THE ALLIED MISSION TO OBSERVE THE GREEK ELECTIONS

Athens, 10th April, 1946

## I.—INTRODUCTION

WITH the publication of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe on the 11th February, 1945,\* the three Powers, Britain, Russia and the United States, formally assumed a responsibility for assisting liberated nations "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections." The following day a fierce civil war in Greece was brought to an end by the signing of the Varkiza Agreement, the final Article of which provided for the holding of a plebiscite to determine whether the country was to be a monarchy or a republic, to be followed by parliamentary elections, and stated that "the representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the popular will, the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers." This invitation, and its acceptance by Great Britain, France and the United States, created a precedent in the diplomatic history of free and independent countries. The British Government later requested the Dominion Governments to participate with it. The Government of the Union of South Africa accepted; the others declined. The participating Powers in accepting this invitation undertook to carry out the observation at their own expense.

The ten years preceding the elections of the 31st March, 1946, had produced a state of political disorder in Greece. Four and a half years of dictatorship, which abolished all political parties and suppressed normal political life, had been succeeded by a long period under Axis occupation and more than a year of civil strife between factions of the Right, represented by the Government, and the Left, represented by the National Liberation Front (EAM) of which the dominant element was the Communist Party (KKE). The agreement signed at Varkiza ended the open warfare, but did nothing to close the breach dividing the Greek people into two camps.

Even before Varkiza, in the early days of the civil war, the British and American Ambassadors in Athens had come to the conclusion that mutual hatred and suspicion among the Greeks had become so profound that an unprejudiced settlement of their internal affairs was unlikely to be achieved without the presence of impartial bystanders. Accordingly they communicated to their respective Governments the suggestion that the creation of an international commission to observe the plebiscite which, it was then thought, would precede elections, might avert the danger of a prolonged civil war. The same conclusion, reached independently by the conflicting Greek factions at Varkiza, led to negotiations between the

\* "Miscellaneous No. 5 (1945)," Cmd. 6598.

Greek Government and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States and later France and the Soviet Union. On the 20th August, 1945, the Greek Government issued an official announcement summarizing the preceding events and negotiations and stating that: "To-day the Greek Government finds itself in the happy position of being able to announce that the negotiations with the Allied Governments have led to the acceptance by Great Britain, the United States of America and France of the proposal that they should send observers. At the same time the Government regrets that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not accepted the proposal on the grounds that it is opposed in principle to the supervision of national elections by foreign States. Nevertheless, if at any time the Soviet Government should feel able to reconsider this decision the Greek Government would very gladly accept the participation of their representative along with those of the other three Allies."

The three Governments, Great Britain, France and the United States, formally accepted the Greek Government's invitation in a joint statement issued the 19th September, 1945. The Greek Government had by that time adopted the view that the elections should precede the plebiscite, and had hoped that they might be held in the autumn. It was soon discovered, however, that the breakdown of the electoral machinery resulting from the ten-year interruption of normal Greek political procedures would make it impossible to revise the electoral lists and allow for registration in so short a time. Consequently the date was fixed for the 20th January, 1946. The original date for the completion of registration was the 13th October, 1945, but when the elections were postponed from the autumn to the 20th January, the lists were reopened and an additional thirty-day period was granted, from the 12th November to the 12th December; this was further extended to the 14th January. Even the January date for the elections was unsatisfactory to the Centre and Left. The Communists announced their intention of abstaining and Liberal, Progressive, Agrarian and Socialist party leaders demanded a reorganization of the Government in return for their co-operation. After several intermediate changes Themistocles Sophoulis formed a Cabinet, and on the 4th December it was announced that the elections would be held on the 31st March, 1946. The Communists stated that they would not be satisfied unless representation in the Government was granted them and a general amnesty was proclaimed for political prisoners. On the 15th January, when the close of registration was postponed again, this time to the 10th February, to give them a further opportunity to be included, the Central Committee of the EAM called on its members to register, but it still reserved the right to abstain from voting.

## II.—FORMATION OF THE MISSION

In the meantime, the organization of the Mission was proceeding in London, Paris and Washington. On the 25th October Dr. Henry F. Grady was designated Chief of the United States contingent; shortly thereafter Mr. R. T. Windle was named Chief of the British contingent; and General Arnaud Laparra was appointed to head the French group.

In order to obtain a first-hand knowledge of the situation in Greece, and to make arrangements for the operation of the Mission, Dr. Grady, Mr. Windle and a representative of General Laparra met in London late in November, where they held preliminary discussions, and then, accompanied by Major-General Harry J. Malony and a military planning staff

consisting principally of United States officers, they proceeded via Naples to Athens where they were joined by General Laparra. This trip resulted in laying the foundation for close and cordial co-operation among the three participating nations and between them and the Greek Government. Agreement was reached on a tentative plan for the observation of the elections and the plan was developed, particularly with regard to the military operational and administrative side. During their stay in Athens the Allied Chiefs of Mission had an opportunity of talking not only with the Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, and Prime Minister Sophoulis, but also with the leaders of all the principal Greek political parties, and they found general accord, except on the part of the Communists, that the elections should be held as soon as possible.

Further progress in the development of the plan for the combined organization, operation and administration of the Mission was made at a conference held in London early in January by representatives of the three contingents, and on the 12th January an agreement was signed in that city which was the basis of the final organization of the Mission.

Two points were emphasized from the beginning. First it was established that the Mission was a civil one. The use of military personnel of the three participating Powers for the observation teams was decided upon for several reasons: because of the difficult conditions under which it was anticipated that many of them would be obliged to operate; because the expense foreseen and the time available precluded the organization of a civil force for this purpose; because the training and organization of military personnel makes it more easily adaptable for this type of work; and because the armies were able to help with a large number of competent men, many of them already trained in civil affairs and available in the European theater. In the second place, emphasis was laid on the fact that the enterprise was a joint Allied undertaking in which all policies, patterns of observation and decisions would be determined by the Mission as a unit, and that the Mission would submit one combined report to each of the participating nations.

The definitive plan for the organization of the Mission, which had been drawn up by the United States contingent and accepted in London, provided for a Central Office and for District Offices. The Central Office, which was established in Athens, consisted of a combined Central Board with its Civilian Staff, and a Combined Military Headquarters, headed by three general officers of the participating Powers. The Central Board was composed of the three Chiefs of Mission and other specified Members of the Mission. The Chiefs of Mission acted as chairman in weekly rotation. In addition, the Civilian Staff of the Central Board included a Secretariat, a Technical and Planning Section, an Indoctrination Section, a Reports Section, an Interpreters Section and a Press Section.

The Combined Military Headquarters consisted of the Operations Division, which was responsible for carrying out the program directed by the Mission, and the Administrative Division, charged with the problems of supply, communications, billeting and other administrative matters.

For operational purposes, Greece was divided into five Districts, with headquarters in Athens, Herakleion (Crete), Tripolis, Patras and Saloniki. A District Board, composed of Members of the Mission drawn from the several national contingents, was responsible for carrying out the observation program; the District Military Commanders directed operations and advised the District Boards on operational matters affecting the observation. Each Board was further assisted by a combined Secretariat, including members of the Mission's Technical and Planning and Interpreters Sections.

The Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections consisted of the following members:—

*British Contingent*

R. T. Windle, Chief of the British Mission.  
 A. J. Herbert, J.P., Assistant to the Chief.  
 Major-General S. C. Dumbreck, Military Member of the Mission.  
 Alderman J. W. Foster, J.P., Member of the Central Board and Reports Section.  
 Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Pretorius (South Africa), Member of the Central Board and Reports Section.  
 Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Morris (South Africa), Member of the Athens District Board.  
 E. V. Rees, Reports Section.  
 Squadron Leader A. N. Banks, Deputy Director of the Reports Section.  
 R. Ley, Member of the Athens District Board.  
 J. W. Horan, J.P., Member of the Saloniki District Board.  
 Major P. J. Strydom (South Africa), Member of the Saloniki District Board.  
 F. Tyrell, Member of the Patras District Board.  
 C. Thallon, Member of the Tripolis District Board.  
 Lieutenant-Commander B. A. Bacon, Member of the Herakleion District Board.

*French Contingent*

Brigadier-General Arnaud Laparra, Chief of the French Mission.  
 Marcel Lachaze, Deputy Chief of Mission, Member of the Central Board, Secretary-General.  
 Count Henry-Reynald de Simony, Member of the Athens District Board.  
 Jean Mottin, Member of the Patras District Board.  
 Roger Fabre, Member of the Saloniki District Board.

*United States Contingent*

Henry F. Grady, Ambassador, Chief of the United States Mission.  
 Harry J. Malony, Major-General, United States, Member of the Central Board, Chief of the Combined Staff.  
 Joseph Coy Green, Minister, Member of the Central Board, Member of the Athens District Board, Director of the Indoctrination Section, Director of the Reports Section.  
 Walter H. Mallory, Minister, Member of the Herakleion District Board.  
 James Grafton Rogers, Minister, Member of the Patras District Board.  
 William W. Waymack, Minister, Member of the Tripolis District Board.  
 Herman B. Wells, Minister, Member of the Saloniki District Board.

The strength of the Mission when it began operations in Greece was 1,155, divided as follows:—

		<i>British</i>	<i>French</i>	<i>American</i>
Civilian	... ..	21	5	91
Military	... ..	273	164	601
Totals	... ..	294	169	692

Of the 240 teams of observers 96 were assigned to the Athens District, 14 to Herakleion, 24 to Tripolis, 48 to Patras and 58 to Saloniki. Actual observations began on the 10th March and the pre-election phase ended on the 27th March. In the pre-election period 1,556 registration places were visited. On election day observations were made at 105 polling places where the teams stayed all day. In addition, roving teams visited 708; the counting of the ballots was also observed from beginning to end in 105.

### III.—PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS OF THE MISSION

Preparations for the indoctrination of the three Allied contingents had been made in the respective capitals during December and January. There plans were drawn up for courses of lectures, and pamphlets were prepared on the general background, Greek politics, Greek electoral procedure, and the Greek language.

The main body of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections assembled in Naples for the indoctrination period in February. The three contingents conducted their programs separately, but the whole scheme was carefully co-ordinated and each group received similar instruction. The training of the military personnel, from the 11th-16th February, included Map Reading, Physical Training, First Aid, Orientation, and Instructions for Driving of Vehicles. A week of general indoctrination followed during which lectures were delivered on the organization and purpose of the Mission, geography, history, constitution and politics of Greece, Greek electoral procedure, methods of observation and the duties of the observers. The indoctrination program was completed on the 23rd February and the Mission departed to take up its duties in Greece.

In the meantime an advance group had gone to Athens early in January. The military section of this group carried out a reconnaissance in the several districts; the civilian section selected interpreters for the observation teams, each national contingent choosing its own. The French contingent recruited most of their 46 interpreters from Greek-speaking French citizens. The British and American contingents, although acting independently, followed a carefully co-ordinated recruiting program. Over 2,000 applications were received and considered by the two contingents. The most promising aspirants were given a rigorous examination, and the 114 engaged by the British and 110 by the Americans were selected only after their language qualifications had been tested and their backgrounds investigated. Naturally, it was not possible to obtain so great a number of intelligent English-speaking Greeks who had no political views or sympathies of their own. It can be stated, however, that extremists of both Left and Right, and also German collaborators, were ruled out, although efforts were made by some politically-minded groups in Athens to pack the body of interpreters, and some attacks were launched by both sides impugning the good faith of the interpreters chosen and the competence of the Mission in selecting them. Under the actual test of performance these interpreters carried out their duties competently and faithfully, and their work was so directed as to exclude the possibility of their influencing the observation by their political views.

The majority of the interpreters were recruited in Athens, but most of those needed for Macedonia and Thrace were found in Saloniki and a few were engaged in the other Districts. Owing to the limited number of interpreters required, it was decided later that women should not be engaged where men were available.

At the same time a group of experts in the technique of sampling public opinion met in Athens to work out the details of the plan for the technical side of the observation program, and to make a few actual tests of the procedure being elaborated.

#### IV.—GREEK POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL PROCEDURE

In Greece a two-party system such as that familiar in England and the United States is not traditional. There have usually been many separate small parties grouped about individual leaders; and few politicians have ever been able to rally a real majority of the voters of the country to the steady support of a single party. Governments have therefore often had to be formed by coalitions of two or more groups which seldom managed to hold together long. The situation in the winter of 1945-46, after almost ten years of dictatorship, war, German occupation and civil strife, looked highly complicated: there were more than forty separate political parties, groups, coalitions, associations and movements, stretching from extreme Left to extreme Right, with almost all intermediate stages represented. The picture allowed some simplification, however, since nearly all these parties fell readily enough into three broad divisions of Left, Centre and Right.

At the extreme Left was the KKE (Communist Party of Greece), constituting the principal and dominating element of the EAM (National Liberation Front), a coalition which comprised five closely united parties. Another Left-wing coalition, separate from, but cooperating with the EAM, was the Socialist Party of Greece—ELD. A few other small independent parties also stood on the Left.

The Center was made up of several elements represented in the Government of the past few months. It included the Progressive Party of George Cafandaris, a loosely-knit group of younger Liberals, the Agrarian Party of Alexander Mylonas, and, much more important, the old Liberal Party led by Themistocles Sophoulis. Slightly farther to the Right was a coalition led by three former Liberal leaders, Sophocles Venizelos, George Papandreou, and P. Kanellopoulos.

The chief element on the Right was the Populist Party governed by a committee of four and representing the old Royalist tradition. Nearly a dozen smaller Conservative parties extended farther to the Right; and at the extreme Right was the "X" organization, rather a small political army than a political party.

When the time came to file nominations for the elections of the 31st March, many of the smaller parties joined one coalition or another and the number of parties actually participating in the election was reduced to twelve. The principal parties were: on the Right, the United National Coalition, comprising the Populist Party and ten others; the National Party of Greece under General Zervas; and eight smaller organizations. Cooperating with the Right for the period of the election was the National Political Union, a Center coalition made up of four groups of former Liberals. Constituting the Center during that period was the Liberal Party under Premier Sophoulis, with which the Agrarian Socialist Party of A. Mylonas was cooperating.

The entire Left Wing, of which the Communist Party and the other members of the EAM coalition were the dominating factor, instructed its partisans to abstain from voting in the elections. This group included as well the ELD coalition, the Union of Leftist Democrats led by John Sophianopoulos, and a small group of former Liberals. Also abstaining were two parties and three or four smaller groups of the Left Center, the principal element being Cafandaris' Progressive Party.

The purpose of the Greek elections of the 31st March, 1946, was to elect a Parliament with revisionary constitutional powers. The special election law established a quota of one deputy to 20,000 inhabitants, and the total number of deputies to be chosen throughout the country was 354.

Greek electoral laws governing this election granted suffrage to males who were 21 years old or more on the 1st January, 1945, and prescribed that the name of each voter must appear on a registration list drawn up for his polling district in which he was resident on the 28th October, 1940. Registration procedure in cities provided for the issuance to each voter, after he had established his identity, of an election booklet properly stamped by the issuing authority, while his name was at the same time inscribed on the registry of voters. In rural areas electoral booklets were not required, since identification is not a problem in small communities, where everyone is known to everybody.

The inspection of registration lists was one of the main tasks of the Allied observers. Normally, these lists were based on the registers of 1928, the year of the latest completely tabulated census in Greece.

In every succeeding year, through 1935, supplementary lists were drawn up containing on the positive side the names of those who had come of age or moved into the area, and on the negative side the names of those who had died or moved away. In many places the revisions were never incorporated in the original registers; moreover, additions and subtractions were often included in the same list, giving rise to misunderstandings and charges of irregularity in registration. The situation was further complicated by the fact that no new lists had been drawn up after 1935, for General Metaxas dissolved Parliament in the following year; no more elections were permitted to be held, and the operation of electoral machinery ceased. During the war and the ensuing four years under enemy occupation many of the old lists had been either inadvertently or willfully destroyed or lost, also many citizens had died or had moved from their usual residences. As a result of all this the lists were inaccurate and contained the names of many persons either dead or otherwise ineligible. The confusion caused by the age and multiplicity of the lists made the problem of establishing accurate electoral registers a difficult one, and in view of the widespread accusations of falsification it was of great importance that the observers examine with care as many lists as time permitted, in order to determine, so far as possible, the extent of falsification and error and to distinguish between willful and inadvertent misrepresentation.

The electoral law of 1945-46, passed on the 9th June, 1945, authorized the three following procedures:—

- (1) If the electoral lists were lost or destroyed, they were to be completely recompiled;
- (2) Wherever old lists did exist, they were to be revised and brought up to date according to the information available;
- (3) The electoral lists for Athens, Piræus and Saloniki were to be recompiled irrespective of whether any old records remained or not. (This was because these cities contained so many displaced persons.)

The task of revision and recompilation of the electoral lists was carried on from June 1945 to the 10th February, 1946, the day on which registration closed. After this the law required that the new or revised lists should be publicly displayed for five days, this period being allowed for complaints, appeals and corrections.

## V.—THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

During the time preceding the elections while the Allied Mission was in Greece the press of all shades of opinion from one extreme to the other



appeared freely and without interference in the principal cities of the country. No restraint on freedom of expression was apparent; indeed, the violence of editorial comment in some papers would by western standards be characterized as license rather than liberty. In Athens and other large cities it was possible to buy and read any newspaper one wished. In some rural communities where one party exercised virtual domination newspapers of the opposing parties were not always tolerated; and observers in some instances witnessed the seizure and tearing up of such papers. Measures of this kind, however, were resorted to by extremists of all factions. In the cities again individuals and groups enjoyed freedom of speech and freedom of assembly; and Leftist mass meetings in Athens and Piræus attended by as many as 40,000 persons bore witness to the fact that there was no interference with political meetings and demonstrations conducted in accordance with the law. Conditions in the rural areas were not so good.

Throughout the election campaign the parties of the Left engaged in constant agitation for a postponement of the elections, threatening to abstain if their demands were not met. These two issues, of postponement and abstention, were always in the foreground of political discussion. The Government, which made one concession to the Left by agreeing to use the system of proportional representation, yielded on a second point by deferring the elections from late autumn to January and again from January to the 31st March. The cooperating groups of the Left declined to permit their members to register during the period fixed by the election law, though that period was twice extended; finally, the Leftist Parties authorized their members to register and during a further special extension from the 15th January to the 10th February many of them did so. But EAM and the parties cooperating with it continued to use the threat of abstention in an effort to obtain representation in the Government, a general amnesty, and a purge of the military and civil services. When these demands were rejected the Leftist groups announced their final decision to abstain. They used all available forms of propaganda to dissuade others from voting.

The Mission was subjected to some misrepresentation in the Greek press. At the outset the Right newspapers raised a clamor charging that only Communist interpreters were being engaged, and that the members of the Mission were "babes in the wood" who would allow themselves to be exploited for political purposes. Some of these reports were cabled abroad by correspondents. It was also asserted in some papers that the Mission was supporting the Government's decision in fixing the elections for the 31st March. The Press Release issued by the Mission, the 14th February, made clear that the responsibility for deciding when the elections should be held and whether the conditions were suitable for the conduct of elections rested with the Greek Government and not with the Mission which was restricting its task to observation alone. Another unfounded charge which received some publicity in the press was that there was dissension and disagreement among the national contingents in the Mission. Later in the campaign the Left-wing press, notably the Communist *Rizospastis* belittled and ridiculed the Mission, accusing it of being a tool of the Right, and publishing false accounts alleging that employees had been dismissed from their positions because of disagreement with their chiefs in judging the situation. The Mission's press releases were usually published in full by Right-wing and Center papers, ignored or only partly reproduced by papers of the Left. Extremist papers of both Right and Left interpreted the press release of the 4th March to mean that the Mission sponsored the holding of the elections on the 31st March.

## VI.—NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTACTS WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENTS

Admiral Voulgaris' announcement fixing the date of the elections for the 20th January, 1946, followed by the Liberal Party's statement that it would abstain, brought about the fall of his Government. A new Government was formed with M. Sophoulis as Prime Minister, pledged to hold the elections before the end of March 1946.

The position now seemed to be sufficiently clarified to justify the Allied Governments in sending the Chiefs of Mission on a preliminary visit to Greece and they arrived in Athens towards the end of November 1945. The week following the 29th November, 1945, was devoted by the Allied party to calls upon various members of the Government, visits to the provinces and interviews with leading officials and opposition politicians.

The members of the Government whom the heads of the Mission visited were:—

- M. Sophoulis, Prime Minister (twice).
- M. Cafandaris, Deputy Prime Minister.
- M. Sophianopoulos, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- M. Rendis, Minister of the Interior and Minister of Justice (twice).
- M. Merkouris, Minister of Public Order.
- M. Kartalis, Minister of Supply.

The subjects of discussion with the above covered the whole range of the task of the Mission and dealt specifically with four problems:—

1. The accommodation of the observers which the Greek Government undertook to provide.
2. The date of the elections which the Prime Minister fixed for the 31st March, 1946.
3. The state of law and order throughout the country which, according to many authorities both in and out of the Government, made the completion of accurate electoral rolls extremely difficult.
4. The method of the election, which the Prime Minister eventually decided in favor of proportional representation.

The members of the Mission spoke at all times with one voice and made it clear that whatever understanding or misunderstanding might exist between the Greek Government and one or the other of the Allied Governments concerned, the task of the Mission was not to exercise either pressure or coercion, but simply to conduct an operation of observing and reporting. It was in this spirit that agreement was achieved with the Greek Government on all points. The Allied members of the Mission left Athens on the 9th December satisfied that they had a clear-cut target to aim at.

No further contacts took place until the arrival of the American, British and French Missions at the beginning of February 1946.

On the 12th February the senior members of the Mission (American, British and French) paid a visit to the Minister of the Interior, M. Khavinis (who had replaced M. Rendis on his appointment as Foreign Secretary). The subjects discussed were:—

1. The use of indelible chemical to prevent multiple voting by staining the voter's hands. (When it was assumed that all political parties would take part in the election the Greek Government had explored the possibility of using a dye or stain to identify electors

who had voted, in order to prevent plural voting. However, after certain political parties announced they would abstain, the Greek Government finally decided not to use the stain in order to diminish the possibility of reprisals.)

2. The number of electors in prison and the possibility of arrangements being made for them to vote. The Minister replied that no arrangements could be made and in any case the number involved could barely affect one seat in the Parliament under the system of proportional representation.
3. Tasks of Observers. It was agreed that the Mission's function, if it detected irregularities, would be to report them either to the Government in Athens or to the local authorities concerned.

On the 15th February the senior members of the Mission called on the Prime Minister, M. Sophoulis, and submitted an announcement for the press which was accepted. Other subjects discussed were:—

1. The prerequisites for elections. It was made clear that it was the responsibility of the Greek Government to secure a satisfactory state of law and order. The Prime Minister reaffirmed that the elections would take place on the 31st March.
2. The state of the registers. It was pointed out that sampling technicians of the Mission had found some lists illegible and impossible to work from in manuscript. The Prime Minister said they must and would be printed by the 31st March.

On the 27th February the senior members of the Mission again visited the Prime Minister to discuss a report in the press that he had declared to reporters that morning that elections if held on the 31st March would be unfair and one-sided. The Prime Minister denied having made any such statement.

On the 7th March the heads of the Mission visited the Regent and received yet another assurance that the elections would be held on the 31st March.

On the 8th March Mr. F. N. Wingent, Acting Secretary-General, visited M. Lianopoulos at the Ministry of Interior. The following points were clarified:—

1. The date of the commencement of the election campaign. M. Lianopoulos explained that the initial momentum of the election campaign was started by the decree issued on the 19th January, 1946, which stated that an election would be held.
2. The possibility of special election officials and also interpreters employed by the Mission being allowed to vote although they would be away from their polling stations on election day. M. Lianopoulos explained that the law did not provide for any persons whatsoever to vote at any place other than his proper polling place.
3. The position of unconvicted prisoners. M. Lianopoulos reiterated that existing law in Greece did not provide for proxy voting and that only those prisoners who were released before election day and had been registered would be able to vote.

On the 12th March the Secretary-General was informed that observer teams were unable to locate the lists of electors in several polling places in the Patras area. M. Lachaze and Mr. Wingent visited M. Lianopoulos at the Ministry of the Interior on the same day in order to obtain the

necessary explanations. M. Lianopoulos explained that in all places where the lists had been completely revised it was necessary to deposit them in the courts and that they were now in the process of being printed. He promised that the task would be completed not later than the 22nd March.

## VII.—OPERATION OF THE MISSION

### THE CENTRAL OFFICE

*The Central Board* was the directive agency of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections. In the beginning the Board was composed of all the members of the Mission present in Athens. Later the membership was limited to the three Chiefs of Mission and the following: British—Major-General S. C. Dumbreck, Mr. J. W. Foster, and Lt.-Col. J. D. Pretorius (South Africa); French—M. Marcel Lachaze; American—Major-General Harry J. Malony, Mr. Joseph C. Green. The American, British, and French Chiefs acted as chairman in weekly rotation.

During the early part of March, when plans were being considered and approved for the conduct of the Mission's work, the Board met daily. After all the basic plans had been considered and approved, the Board met only on call when something of importance was on the agenda for consideration.

There were invited to attend meetings of the Board from time to time the Technical Advisers and heads of Sections whenever it was felt that their participation in the discussion would be helpful in assisting the Board to reach accurate conclusions on the matters before it.

On three occasions, at Bagnoli at the inception of the Allied Mission and twice in Athens, the Board invited all members of the three national contingents of the Mission to a joint meeting. The most interesting meeting of this nature was that following a week of actual operations in the field testing out the various methods that had been agreed upon for the general plan of observation.

Instructions to the District Offices were issued from the Central Office by direction of the Central Board. The Board likewise studied the reports received from the District Offices and from other sources and on the basis of information compiled by the Central staff in consultation with the District staffs, it presented for the approval of the Mission a combined report for submission to each of the Governments participating in the operation, a copy of which will likewise be transmitted to the Greek Government.

#### A.—*The Civilian Staff*

1. *The General Secretariat* consisted of the three Secretaries-General of the participating contingents, United States, British and French, together with their staff, including in each case a civilian Administrative Section, a Press Section, and an Interpreters and Translators Section. The Secretaries-General were: American—Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Foreign Service Officer with the rank of Counselor of Embassy, from the Mission's inception until the 24th February when he was succeeded by Mr. James H. Keeley, Foreign Service Officer with the rank of Counselor of Embassy; British—Colonel C. M. Woodhouse until the 9th March when he was succeeded by Major F. N. Wingent; French—M. Marcel Lachaze, Counselor of State. Mr. William O. Baxter, Department of State, acted as Executive Officer of the Secretariat-General.

The Secretaries-General were directly responsible for:—

- (a) Acting as Secretaries of the Allied Mission and of the Central Board in accordance with the rotation of the chairmanship.
- (b) Maintaining the records and files of the Mission.
- (c) Advising their own contingents and the Allied Mission as a whole, with regard to political developments and policies affecting the work of the Mission.
- (d) Maintaining liaison with the Greek Government and with the Allied civilian authorities in Greece.
- (e) General coordination between the members and staffs of the three national components of the Mission and between the civilian and military staffs of their own contingents.

In actual practice the Secretaries-General also served as the continual functioning nucleus of the Central Plans Committee, originating and clearing with the Chiefs of Mission numerous urgent matters in which the time factor did not permit their submission to the Plans Committee as a whole.

- (a) *The Civilian Administrative Section* was responsible for all administrative arrangements in connection with the recruitment and payment of personnel. Its other functions included the preparation of budget estimates for the Mission, procurement of office supplies and equipment, transportation arrangements and the drafting of travel orders, preparation of vouchers covering *per diem* and representation and the pay of personnel employed in Greece, and liaison with the military side of the Mission on billeting, messing and travel arrangements.
- (b) *The Press Section* was responsible for keeping the Greek press informed of the Mission's operations, for providing background material on the work of the Mission to the French, British and American correspondents in Athens: for furnishing the Chiefs of Mission with election news and editorial comment in the Greek Press; and for issuing releases to Greek and foreign correspondents.
- (c) *The Interpreters and Translators Section* interviewed applicants, engaged interpreters, briefed them on their duties and assigned them to their posts.

2. *The Technical and Planning Section* analyzed the general problem of observing the Greek elections and formulated for the consideration of the Plans Committee the means of collecting pertinent information for the Mission.

Through its representatives on the Plans Committee, the Staff explained the methods and validity of measurements by means of scientific sampling surveys for consideration in connection with the over-all pattern of observation. It prepared general and specific instructions for the execution of approved plans of observations, including pertinent questionnaires and reporting forms to be used by observers; it selected places to be observed, and implemented other aspects of the sampling procedure used.

The Staff also assisted the District Boards in the indoctrination of the observers, coordinated the activities of the District statisticians to conform to the general plan of observation, provided a statistical analysis of the findings of the surveys undertaken, and drew the relevant conclusions therefrom.

3. *Technical Advisers.*—In addition to the technical advisers assigned to specific Sections there were attached to the Mission other political and technical advisers dealing with particular subjects.

4. *The Division of Indoctrination and Reports* comprised the Indoctrination Section and the Reports Section.

- (a) *The Indoctrination Section* was charged with the preparation of pamphlets for distribution to the members of the staff and the formulation and carrying out of the course of indoctrination at Bagnoli and Naples.
- (b) *The Reports Section* analyzed reports from the Districts and issued a daily summary of the findings for the use of the Central Board. It also prepared and submitted to the Chiefs of Mission a draft for the final report which they were to present to the Governments participating in the Mission and to the Greek Government.

*The Central Plans Committee.*—The Central Plans Committee consisted of the Secretaries-General, who presided in rotation corresponding to the chairmanship of the Central Board, representatives of the Technical and Planning Section of the Division of Indoctrination and Reports, as well as the Operations officers of the Combined Central Staff. On occasion other persons were invited to attend meetings, particularly when matters concerning their work were under discussion.

The Committee received from the Technical and Planning and Sampling Sections as well as from other sections of the Mission, suggestions concerning the over-all plan of observation and other problems connected with the work of the Mission. All such suggestions were discussed and appropriate recommendations made to the Central Board.

Memorandum Blue (Appendix: Chapter VII—3)\* is a typical example of the results of the deliberations of the Committee.

All forms utilized by the statisticians, as well as the instructions accompanying them, were first submitted to the Committee for detailed consideration. One of the main considerations governing the preparation of such material was to achieve objectivity so as to obtain uniform data and at the same time not overburden the observer to such an extent as to affect adversely his morale.

The recommendations of the Committee had to do with three main phases of the Mission's work: pre-election inquiries (Forms A, B, C-1 and C-2);\* election day inquiries (Forms D and D-1);\* and a post-election day check (Form F).\* All these forms relate particularly to the work of the Technical and Planning Section. In addition Form Z,\* which was sponsored by the Reports Section, was considered by the Committee before its approval by the Central Board. This form was concerned solely with general observations of a non-technical nature and was designed to assist the Reports Section and the District Boards in formulating general conclusions with respect to the matters covered therein.

The Central Plans Committee likewise considered and approved a summary of Greek Election Law dealing with legal inquiries likely to be encountered during the work of the Mission.

B.—*The Combined Military Headquarters* made and executed the plan for the integration of command; for the assembly, training, transportation to and from Greece, and deployment of the military components; with their supplies, communications and transportation. Directives from the Central Board prepared by the Secretariat were in appropriate cases transformed into military orders in the office of the Central Staff.

#### METHODS OF OBSERVATION

From the outset the Mission attempted to make use of every available method of gathering information about the circumstances under which the election was being held. Much important information was obtained from

\* Not printed.

official sources in the Greek Government, much from political leaders, much from the press, and much from the personal observation of the members of the Mission during their travels about the country. This method of obtaining information by intelligent general observation was used by the Mission to the limit of its possibility. There were, however, certain essentially quantitative problems which needed scientific investigation in order to serve as a check upon the general impressions of the observers. For example, it was considered desirable to obtain, independently of official and political sources, the best possible estimates both of the number of eligible voters in Greece, and of the number of potential voters who were not registered. In addition it was desired to investigate as systematically as possible the extent to which local party leaders and individual voters were satisfied or dissatisfied with the preparations for the elections. For these and other purposes, several statistically designed inquiries were employed.

The plans for these inquiries specified both the questions to be asked and the persons for whom the desired information was to be obtained. The choice of these persons was determined systematically in several steps. First, a sample of places such as villages or precincts of cities was selected by the statistician. These were the geographic locations where the observer by following specific rules found: (i) the persons to be interviewed; (ii) the lists to be examined; (iii) the polling places to be observed, or whatever the particular inquiry called for.

Besides planning the sample of places and persons from which information was wanted, it was necessary also to plan the means by which accurate and consistent data were to be obtained from the persons interviewed. In order that the questions should be interpreted in the same way by all observers, considerable time was spent in designing and testing the questionnaire-forms, and in instructing the observers in their use. This indoctrination of observers and the preparation of detailed reporting forms was an essential part of the method, since otherwise it would have been impossible to evaluate objectively the reports of 240 observers of three different nationalities. In this way with a limited amount of time and personnel it became possible to obtain the desired information with a known degree of accuracy.

The General Observation Plan as described on pages 4, 5 and 6 of the Pattern of Observation of the Greek Elections (see Appendix: Chapter VII—3)\* was designed to obtain a record of information based upon the impressions of the observers and common-sense interpretations of the conditions encountered in the execution of the tasks assigned for the development of the Scientific Sampling methods. In a broader sense, the General Observation Plan covers all the intelligence, other than that gathered through the Scientific Plan, received in the Mission. Information gathered by every element of the Mission, encompassing the Chiefs of Mission, the Central Office Staff, the District Offices and their staffs, and the observers, contributed to the General Observation Plan. The main responsibility for the execution of this plan rested with the District Boards.

#### THE DISTRICT OFFICES

In the five District Offices, Athens, Herakleion, Tripolis, Patras and Saloniki, District Boards were set up modeled after and representing the Central Board of the Mission. Each was assisted by a District Secretariat modeled after the General Secretariat. The primary function of the District Boards was the conduct of the observation operations within their respective Districts. Assisted by technical experts the Boards approved or modified plans submitted by the Senior District Operations Officers. One senior military commander was appointed in each District. Originally it was planned

\* Not printed.

that two commanders would be British, two American and one French, but after the final assignment of personnel three were American, one British and one French.

For convenience of administration a sub-district office was set up at Larissa in the Athens District and another at Yannina in the Patras District.

Members of the District Boards and their staffs first assembled in Athens to attend meetings in which final plans were crystallized. By about the 5th March the District Officers and observation teams were established at their posts. Between the 5th and 8th March special indoctrination was given in the use of Forms A, B, and C, and the teams were sent out on trial runs. The results were examined and individual efforts were criticized in order to correct obvious weaknesses. The trial runs offered the District Commanders and technical experts an opportunity to determine which teams were suitable for operating B and C Forms.

Soon after the establishment of the District Offices the Boards held meetings with local officials and representatives of the press in order to explain the purpose and the operation of the Mission. In every instance promises of cooperation were received which in most cases were faithfully kept.

Operations fell into two divisions. During the pre-election period information was gathered through the use of Forms A, B, and C requiring interviews with registration officials and leaders of political parties as well as household investigations for the purpose of checking numbers of eligible voters. Form Z called for general observations on the part of the observer regarding the political conditions of regions visited while Form E was used for the special investigations of complaints. There were executed 1,413 A Forms, 143 B Forms, 145 C Forms; and 143 special investigations were made and reported upon.

The pre-election forms were completed by the 27th March whereupon the teams returned to District or sub-district offices for special indoctrination in the use of Forms D and D-1, to be used on election day for covering stationary and roving assignments. 105 D Forms and 708 D-1 Forms were executed. 113 of the post-election day Forms F were executed. These forms were used to report on illegalities and abstentions.

Field trips made by District Board members, interviews with party delegations and attendance at political meetings were sources of valuable information. Complaints of violence and intimidation coming to the offices from varied sources were investigated by specially indoctrinated teams.

The observation teams began operations on the 11th March. After a week of operations the District Board members returned to Athens for two days and made reports on conditions in their respective Districts, and on the functioning of their organizations. By the 21st March, 230 out of 240 teams were in operation. In all, 1,556 registration places were visited in the pre-election period. During the election and post-election period, stationary teams remained at 105 polling places, and 113 teams carrying out roving assignments, visited 708 polling places. At 105 places, the counting of the ballots was observed from beginning to end.

#### OBSERVATION FORMS EXECUTED

District	Pre-election			Post-election			Pre-election
	Form A	Form B	Form C	Form D	Form D-1	Form F	Form Z
I	498	53	53	35	305	44	65
II	117	11	11	8	59	9	...
III	130	15	15	11	101	10	51
IV	238	23	26	20	66	20	...
V	430	41	40	31	177	30	308
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,413</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>708</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>424</b>



During the period of observation, weekly or semi-weekly reports were transmitted to the Central Board. These reports dealt with conditions which might influence the election. They included information in regard to registration lists, law and order, intimidation, and attitudes of the police and of Government officials. The District Offices in turn received information from the Central Board in the form of copies of minutes of Central Board meetings and Daily Summaries of observations, prepared by the Reports Section.

On the 3rd or 4th April the members of the District Boards and their staffs returned to Athens to write their final reports and to co-operate with the Technical and Planning Section and the Reports Section in the compilation of the Final Report.

### VIII — CONCLUSIONS

The Greek election for members of the unicameral Parliament took place on Sunday, the 31st March, in 3,398 polling places throughout the nation.

This report is written before final figures are available as to the exact total of votes cast and the precise results. These figures may not be available for some weeks as the compilation of the totals is slow under the system of proportional representation; but the results are already known for all practical purposes. About 1,117,000 votes were cast. The Mission calculates that about 1,850,000 men were valid registrants. The registration list was larger, but this was due almost wholly to the retention from earlier enrollments of names of men now dead, missing or who had changed residence. Practically all the parties of the Left and three of the minor parties of the Center instructed their followers not to vote at the election. The result of this deliberate abstention as a policy reduced the vote. The Mission estimates that the total abstention for party reasons was 280,000, that is 15 percent of the valid registrants.

The results of the voting gave the Populist Party (Laikon Komma), a conservative party, a majority of both the popular vote and the seats in the Parliament. The National Political Union, cooperating with the Right and the Liberal Party under ex-Premier Sophoulis, won almost all of the remaining votes and seats.

The election day weather was ideal everywhere in Greece. The day was sunny, the air mild, the sky almost cloudless and there was little or no wind. Except in a few mountain villages, representing a negligible number of voters, the quiet and order were unbroken. The observers of the Mission almost everywhere reported little gatherings of people near the polling places or groups strolling on the streets and roads, but scarcely any public demonstrations of political feeling. The conduct of the election in the voting places was rarely anything but regular and lawful. Disputes or complaints by party watchers at the polls were few. The counting of ballots which followed after sunset was also almost universally quiet and proper, and there were no celebrations or party demonstrations of any size when the results began to appear.

It may be said in general that the Greek Election of the 31st March ranks well as respects peace, order and regularity of proceedings on election day when compared with earlier national polls and that as respects public decorum, law obedience and orderly balloting it can stand comparison with conditions which prevail in France, Great Britain, and the United States on election days.

The Mission is convinced that its presence lessened the intensity of political feeling in Greece, that the strikingly orderly conduct of the elections

was, in part, due to the fact that the Mission was visibly present throughout the length and breadth of the country, and that the people were convinced of its non-partisan character and of its intention to report the election as valid only if the facts justified that conclusion.

Some aspects of the pre-electoral or electoral events which have been so far omitted or mentioned only briefly as part of the general account need special consideration. These are as follows:—

#### THE REGISTRATION LISTS

The Mission finds no evidence of deliberate fraud on any important scale in the making up of lists of qualified voters nor of fraud in capitalizing on the opportunities which excessive registration offered. It is true that the old registration lists contained many names of men dead or not qualified to vote. This was to a great extent the result of war, disorder and careless administration of the Greek electoral laws.

The Government had stated that the number of voters on the lists amounted to 2,211,791. This figure is probably inaccurate and certainly misleading, for it includes names of many persons who are dead.

The scientific sampling experts of the Mission have estimated that the number of males qualified to be registered is 1,989,000 and that of these 1,850,000 were actually registered. The number therefore of those qualified who were not actually registered was only 139,000 and of this figure only 6,000 claimed to have been refused registration. It was found that many of the voting lists were newly made and accurate. Others were old and inadequately corrected. It was found by examination of the registration lists that about 70 percent of the names on the lists belonged to valid registrants, about 13 percent were clearly invalid, and the remainder were of doubtful validity.

The EAM, and to a lesser extent some representatives of more central groups, complained repeatedly to the Mission and in their newspapers that the registration lists were deliberately inflated with false names, that impediments were put to a proper registration of their own adherents and that a nation-wide program of false and multiple voting was being prepared. The Communists and other EAM spokesmen, questioned frequently, repeated these charges in some form. They pointed out that the Greek Government had announced that the lists of enrolled voters contained 2,211,791 names and that this figure not only far surpassed earlier registration totals but exceeded by some 20 percent the normal percentage of males over 21 in a population which they estimated at about 7,200,000 for the nation.

These charges gave the Mission some concern and were thoroughly investigated. However, the Mission finds that the defects of the Register were such as could be observed and controlled and that the Register was sufficiently accurate to enable the will of the people to be made known. The Mission recommends that in order to remove all possible justification for such charges in the future a new census should be taken and a complete revision of the registration lists made before the opinion of the Greek people is again sought on matters of national import.

#### INTIMIDATION

The parties of the Left Wing presented to the Mission in every district and almost every day during the months before the Election charges and evidence that, to use their own language, "a reign of terror existed in Greece." They said that the Rightist partisans, and particularly the small

political army known as the X-ites or Chites, were determined to prevent the Left-wing parties from expressing themselves at the polls. In lesser degree similar charges were made by the Rightist elements of terrorism by the Left, and particularly by Communists and other EAM partisans in some localities on the northern boundaries of Greece along the Albanian border and in Macedonia.

The Mission finds that there is some substance to these charges. It is convinced that there was everywhere in Greece considerable antagonism to the extreme Left-wing adherents and that in some localities, particularly in the agricultural regions of the Peloponnesus, in Thessaly and northwest Greece, most markedly in the neighbourhoods of Larissa, Volos, Missolonghi, Arta, Agrinion, and in the mountain regions south and west of Yannina, there was a fear of EAM and a bitterness against it and the former members of its disbanded armed force (ELAS) which led to a determination on the part of its opponents that it should be excluded from influence in the Government of the country. In the larger cities and towns the charges of intimidation were not so grave nor so generally made, and the Mission is not convinced that there was any serious intimidation outside of the areas specifically mentioned above and a few scattered localities elsewhere.

In a few localities along the border of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, intimidation was exercised against the Rightist adherents by extremist bands of the Left.

Thus intimidation by both sides was to some extent exhibited in acts of violence which occurred in the early months of the year and tended to diminish as the elections approached. The more important part of the intimidation was intangible and very difficult to prove. It took the form of village ostracism, persecution in the way of attacks upon houses, the humiliation of women, threatening gestures and messages, depredation upon flocks of sheep, gardens and vineyards, assaults along lonely trails, and all sorts of minor incidents.

The character of this intimidation needs some explanation. During the occupation of Greece by the Axis Powers resistance movements sprang up in various parts of the country. Many of these were of definite political complexions. The most important was EAM with its militant branch ELAS. In the course of time this organization became a Leftist group completely under Communist control. Unfortunately, these resistance groups quarreled among themselves and before the end of the occupation EAM was fighting not only against the Germans and Italians but also against various Rightist organizations of its own people, especially the X-ites or Chites, the most militant group of the extreme Right. Excesses of all kinds were committed by both sides. EAM, which was numerically the strongest resistance group, felt that it was entitled to control the Government of Greece. ELAS undertook to march upon Athens in an attempt to take over the Government by force. A brief, but bitter, civil war ensued. The British forces which had already landed and were in the process of driving out the Germans were obliged to establish and maintain order. They assisted the forces of the Government. There was severe fighting in Athens and in a few provincial cities. ELAS was defeated and eventually disarmed. The fear and bitterness which developed before and during this civil war has resulted in the continuance of extreme hostility between the two factions.

These conditions undoubtedly affected the election. They had an important bearing on the abstention of EAM members from going to the polls on the 31st March. The Mission believes that if the parties of the Left had participated they would, under the operation of the proportional

representation system, have elected some representatives to the National Assembly. In the judgment of the Mission, as shown by the figures, abstention had some effect but not sufficient greatly to affect the outcome.

#### PRESENCE OF BRITISH TROOPS IN GREECE

Since the liberation of Greece and the civil war of December 1944, Great Britain has maintained armed forces in the country. The Mission finds that the presence of these armed forces had no effect upon the electoral campaign except perhaps to discourage any possible major disorder, and no effect whatever upon the outcome of the election. It may be noted that on election day officers and men were kept in quarters.

#### LAW AND ORDER

Conditions of law and order during the months preceding the elections were not as good as they were ordinarily in Greece before the war. In particular the civil authorities were not able to restrain the activities of armed bands in some parts of the country. The amount of disorder was, however, greatly exaggerated in the foreign press. The great majority of Greek citizens knew little of serious incidents of disorder beyond what they learned from hearsay or read in their newspapers. The Mission finds that, notwithstanding the disorders which occurred, conditions in Greece except in certain isolated localities were sufficiently orderly to permit of an electoral campaign. On election day a high level of law and order was maintained and only in a very few localities was the voting interfered with.

A great many of the complaints brought before the Mission by the Leftists alleged that the police favoured the Rightist cause and gave little attention to acts committed against Leftists. The Mission finds after investigating many such charges that the police as a whole were loyal to their duties and carried them out to the best of their ability, but it also finds that some of the gendarmerie were definitely partisan and permitted their partisanship to effect the carrying out of their duties. However, improper action by the gendarmerie played a very unimportant rôle in its effect on the elections.

#### VOTING

In general, the mechanism of voting was operated in conformity with the provisions of the law. The law provided for the appointment of a chairman at each voting place from the ranks of the judiciary or the bar, for assurance that the voter who appeared was on the registration lists, that he had an opportunity to receive and indeed was offered the full set of party ballots, that he chose the one he wanted secretly, that he marked the one he chose himself, that he sealed the ballot himself in an official envelope and publicly deposited it in the box, that non-partisan aid was given to illiterates and disabled electors, that the personnel of the committees were properly chosen by lot from the electors and that representatives of participating parties were welcomed and served as party watchers. The rules were generally observed; in short, the regulations made to insure a free and democratic election were nearly everywhere followed. Here and there some of the election regulations were deliberately or carelessly broken. In some cases election posters were, for example, too near or even in the polling places. In many cases the registration lists were so complicated that the Electoral Committees found it difficult to use them in the prescribed method. In most of the villages every voter is known personally by the whole community and there is a tendency to omit or abbreviate the formalities.

The Mission is well aware that some plural voting did occur but is of the opinion that irregularities on election day were not great, that they were in most cases not matters of bad faith, and the conduct of the voting was, except in numerically negligible cases, satisfactory. The lack of general complaints is significant.

#### COUNTING OF THE BALLOTS

Practically everywhere the committees proceeded to the counting of the ballots immediately upon the closing of the polls. The counting was carried on in the presence of the representatives of the contending parties. The counting was watched in detail by Allied observers at a scientifically selected set of polling places, however remote the place might be or inconvenient for observation. The votes and returns of the various precincts were again examined and to some extent observed by the Mission in the Courts of First Instance throughout Greece during the week following the election. Generally speaking, the Courts of Greece retained public confidence even through the years of turmoil, and their proceedings were reported by our observers as being impartial and methodical. The parties, with rare exceptions, do not seem to have troubled to send representatives to watch the counting in the Court.

The Mission has not received complaints about the counting, and the tabulation of the ballots was in its judgment almost beyond criticism.

#### ABSTENTION

Some weeks before the election the Left-wing parties announced a policy of abstention on the ground that terrorism would prevent the expression of their party strength and, to a lesser degree, on the ground that the full registration of their membership had been prevented by intimidation, lack of time, or deliberate impediments.

The Mission made studies of a considerable number of the registration lists and protocol books in polling places drawn from the 3,398 voting precincts of the country. At the end of voting, a sample of names was selected from the registration lists on a scientific basis, and the protocol books examined to note whether votes had been cast in each case. All of the persons whose names were drawn were found or inquired about in the communities. The information obtained by this investigation is representative of the country as a whole.

There were about 1,117,000 votes cast out of a total of 1,850,000 possible valid votes, that is 60 percent. It was found by inquiries pursued by the technical sampling method that 9.3 per cent. of the valid registrants assert that they took part in the boycott. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that an additional number of persons who did not vote because "they were not in the neighbourhood on election day" could have reached the polls if they had desired strongly to do so. Taking this class into consideration, it is estimated that the proportion of qualified voters who abstained for "party" reasons is about 15 percent, and certainly between 10 and 20 percent. The Mission is convinced that these figures are approximately correct.

If 15 percent of the valid registrants who did not participate in the balloting had cast their vote, the aggregate vote would have been increased and they could have succeeded under the system of proportional representation in seating perhaps 20 percent, but not more than 25 percent, of the representatives in the Parliament. This would not have prevented the Right from having a strong plurality, but it might have prevented it having an absolute majority.

Abstention as a political policy is almost unknown in Western Europe and in English-speaking countries, but is it not a new development in Greek politics. The Greek law since 1932 has made voting compulsory and has forbidden not only a boycott of elections but also propaganda and solicitation of a boycott. Technically, the abstention in the March election was illegal, but popular opinion recognizes that the practice is now too well established to permit of control by legalistic means. That abstention, although a contravention of Greek law, was countenanced by the authorities gave even dissident elements an opportunity fully to indicate their views.

The remaining 25 percent of the valid registrants did not vote for such reasons as sickness, physical incapacity, indifference, or similar causes which seemed to have no relation to any political policy. The Mission regrets that any substantial fraction of the Greek people felt it necessary to refrain from voting, but does not find that it represents a new or alarming element in Greek politics.

### IX.—FINAL JUDGMENT

The Mission finds that the proceedings of election day were orderly and satisfactory. The registration lists in large areas contained irregularities but there was no significant amount of illegal voting. Intimidation existed, in some degree, from both extremes and was even on occasions given countenance by members of the gendarmerie but it was not extensive enough to affect seriously the election. The practice of deliberate abstention did not reach large proportions.

The Mission therefore concludes that notwithstanding the present intensity of political emotions in Greece conditions were such as to warrant the holding of elections, that the election proceedings were on the whole free and fair and that the general outcome represents a true and valid verdict of the Greek people.

On behalf of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections:

For the United States  
of America:

HENRY F. GRADY.

For France:

A. LAPARRA.

For Great Britain.

R. T. WINDLE.

### APPENDIX

[Not printed except as specified below]

#### CHAPTER I

1. Translation of statement released to the press by the Greek Government, the 20th August, 1945.
2. Statement released to the press by the United States Department of State, the 20th August, 1945.
3. Statement released to the press simultaneously by the British Foreign Office, the United States Department of State, and the French Foreign Office, the 19th September, 1945 (No. 691).
4. Executive Order, No. 9657, issued by the President of the United States.

#### CHAPTER II

1. Combined Operations Plan for the observation of Greek Elections, the 5th January, 1946.
2. Organization of Civilian Staff, the 9th January, 1946.
3. Organizational and Operational Agreement, the 12th January, 1946.
4. Telegram of the 24th January, 1946, from War Office to G.H.Q., C.M.F., for Land Forces, Greece, authorizing the provision of facilities to Allied Mission for observation of Greek Elections.

5. Plan for United States Military Section, the 29th December, 1945
6. H.Q. Land Forces, Greece, Administrative Order No. 21 (General Administrative Plan), 16th February, 1946.
7. Historique Succinct de la Mission Française.
8. Assignments of British Personnel.
9. Assignments of French Personnel.
10. Assignments of United States Personnel.
11. Biographies of British Members of the Mission.
12. Biographies of French Members of the Mission.
13. Biographies of United States Members of the Mission.
14. Greek Officials (Operations Directive No. 5).
15. Organizational Chart of Allied Mission to observe Elections in Greece.
16. Assistance required from the Greek Government for the Allied Mission to observe Greek Elections, the 7th December, 1945.
17. Response of the Greek Government to the Mission's Memorandum of the 7th December, 1945.
18. Bill 882, the 13th February, 1946, issued through Ministry of Interior, State Commission to facilitate the work of AMFOGE, providing for assistance to the Mission; attached Cable to Prefects on above subject.

## CHAPTER III

1. Memorandum on Indoctrination Program.
2. Summaries of American Lectures: General Introduction, Hygiene and Sanitation, Geography of Greece, Greek History, Greek People and Language, Greek Politics and Parties, Final Suggestions.
- 2A. Summaries of British Lectures: Opening Address, Nature and Purpose of Mission, Geography of Greece, History of Greece to 1940, History, 1940-46, Character and Customs of the Greek People, Greek Politics and Parties, Anglo-Greek Relations.
3. Text of Joint British-American Lecture on Organization of Mission.
4. Text of Joint British-American Lecture on Greek Electoral System.
5. Text of Joint British-American Lecture on Methods of Observation and Duties of Observers.
6. Text of American Lecture on Constitution and Government of Greece.
7. Summaries of two French Lectures.
8. Summaries of Pamphlets issued by Indoctrination Section.

## CHAPTER IV

1. List of Political Parties at time of Election.
2. Summary of Greek Electoral Procedure, Election Law No. 5493, the 21st May, 1932.

## CHAPTER V

No documents.

## CHAPTER VI

Statement by the Mission to the Greek press, dated the 14th February, 1946

## CHAPTER VII

1. Minutes of the Central Board.
2. Report of Military Headquarters.
3. Pattern of Observation of the Greek Elections, the 28th February, 1946. (Memo. Blue).
4. Instructions for carrying out Memo. Blue, Operations Directive No 1.
- \*\*5. Description of Sample Surveys with Statistical Supplement.
6. Memorandum on General Observations—Form Z.
7. Photographs of Operational Maps.

## CHAPTER VIII

\*Analytical Report prepared by Technical and Planning Section.

## MISCELLANEOUS

1. Identification Cards.
2. Brassard.

\*Summary of Final Report issued to the press simultaneously in Athens, London, Paris, Washington and Capetown, the 10th April, 1946.

\* Printed.

\*\* Two extracts only printed.

## CHAPTER VII

## 5—B. STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT

## I.—DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE SURVEYS

For objectivity all samples employed in these surveys were selected in so far as possible in the Central Office. Further sampling in the field was carried out under the direction of statisticians from the Central or District Offices. A brief description of each survey follows:—

“A.” Inquiry “A” was based upon a sample of about one-half the registration officials and party leaders in Greece. Observation teams were sent to 1,462 of the approximately 3,000 registration areas of the country. The registration areas to be visited were selected according to a scientific plan from a list of all such areas furnished by the Greek Government. In addition to furnishing information about the registration procedure and the sentiment of the party leaders, this inquiry served to bring to the notice of the Mission the conditions which might be expected to prevail on election day.

“B.” Inquiry “B” was based upon a cross-section of the Greek voting population, that is, males of 21 years and over on the 1st January, 1945. It comprised a sample of 147 registration areas (or about 1/22 of the total). Within each of these registration areas a sample of blocks or land segments was selected, and a predetermined fraction of the households within each block was specified for investigation. The rate of sampling within each registration area was fixed at 1 out of 36. Every effort was made by the statistical advisers in the district offices to insure that the households in question were selected in an objective way. The purpose of this survey was to estimate (i) the total number of eligible voters in Greece, (ii) the ratio of that number to the total population, (iii) to determine the proportion of eligible voters who were not registered.

“C.” Inquiry “C” was based upon a sample of names selected from the registration lists at each of the registration areas covered in Inquiry “B.” Starting numbers were furnished to the observers by the district statisticians; the sample was then selected by the observer at the rate of one name in every forty in the villages, and one name in every eighty in the cities. Names were taken from the “subtractions lists” as well as from the “additions lists,” and inquiries were then made locally to determine the accuracy of the register in respect of each name.

“D.” Inquiry “D” was based upon a sample of 105 polling places selected from the official list according to a statistical plan. Observers were stationed at these polling places throughout the entire voting and counting on election day. The object of this inquiry was to determine the extent of irregularities in voting procedure.

“E.” Inquiry “E” was based upon a sample of names selected on polling day from the registration lists of 113 polling places distributed throughout Greece. The object of this inquiry was to investigate certain aspects of the election, particularly the extent of illegal voting and abstention.

## 5.—D. STATEMENT OF THE METHOD USED

During the period between the 7th March and the 3rd April, 1946, five nation-wide sample surveys of Greece and numerous local investigations of a statistical character were conducted to obtain first-hand information for the Mission. In planning and carrying out these surveys, certain principles were followed which have been tested and proved in basically similar applications.



The essential principles of the sampling method may be stated as follows:

- (1) The selection of the sample must be such that each person, or household, or polling place in the group about which inferences are to be drawn is given a known (non-zero) probability of being chosen.
- (2) The conduct of each interview of inquiry must be so standardized as to ensure statistically comparable results.

In order to ensure that the above principles are actually put into practice, careful planning is necessary. The questionnaires or reporting forms must be prepared and tested in the field. The interviewers must be properly indoctrinated in the interpretation of the questions to be asked, and trained to record the answers consistently. The places or persons to be investigated must be specified either definitely or by prescribed rules. Every effort must be made to obtain a complete report on each unit in the sample.

When these principles are faithfully followed and the information requested is accurately reported, it is possible to deduce statistical conclusions with a calculable degree of accuracy.

## CHAPTER VIII

### ANALYTICAL REPORT PREPARED BY THE TECHNICAL AND PLANNING SECTION

#### A.—MAIN FINDINGS

The investigations initiated by the Planning Section conveniently fall into two phases: (i) pre-election period, and (ii) election day (including follow-up observations after the elections).

#### I.—PRE-ELECTION PERIOD

##### 1. *Statement of Problem*

The objectives of the pre-election period were to determine:

- (1) The number of eligible persons, if any, denied either directly or indirectly the opportunity to register.
- (2) The number of names on electoral lists (the register) which do not belong to valid voters.
- (3) The general state of readiness for the elections as reflected by statements of registration officials and of local party representatives.

##### 2. *Procedure*

Three sample surveys were designed to get the essential information. For convenience, they were labelled "A," "B," "C."

"A" consisted of registration officials and local party representatives located at approximately 1,462 of the registration centers in Greece. Of the latter, those interviewed were as follows by party groups: Right, 996; Right Center, 250; Center, 505; and Left, 830.

"B" consisted of 2,700 men of voting age living in nearly 2,000 households located in 150 cities, towns, villages and surrounding open country throughout Greece.

"C" consisted of 2,365 names selected from recompiled or positive lists (those which *add* registrants) and 424 names selected from negative lists

(those which *subtract* registrants) located in the same 150 cities, towns and villages of Sample B.

Appropriate questionnaire forms (A, B, and C) were prepared for each survey. Specimen forms are attached in Part E of this report.\*

### 3. Results

*For Problem (1).*—In spite of the refusal of certain political parties to take an active part in the registration until January 1946, an estimated 93 percent of the eligible males of Greece were registered (Survey "B"). A larger percentage—95.8 percent—of eligible males were said by informants to be registered. Of the estimated 4.2 percent that would thus not have been registered, 7 percent (6,000 persons, or 0.29 percent of all eligible voters) stated that they were "refused" registration. In addition, there is estimated to be a group of approximately 12,000 persons whose reason for not being registered was that they had "insufficient time" to do so.

The reasons given for the non-registration of the remaining 66,000 are classified in Part B,\* but do not indicate definite obstruction by the registration officials.

*For Problem (2).*—The estimated proportion of names on the electoral lists that may be classified as "valid," "invalid" and "doubtful" are shown below for each AMFOGE district, and for the whole of Greece (Survey "C").

Class	AMFOGE DISTRICT					Greece
	1	2	3	4	5	
"Valid" ... ..	73%	80%	48%	58%	86%	71%
"Doubtful" ... ..	13%	14%	33%	22%	7%	16%
"Invalid" ... ..	14%	6%	19%	20%	7%	13%

The final column indicates that, for Greece as a whole, not less than 71 percent and not more than 87 percent of the names on the registration lists belonged to valid voters. It is notable that the lists are much worse than average in District 3 and considerably better than average in District 5.

*For Problem (3).*—A summary for the whole of Greece of the opinions of local party representatives on the conduct of registration at their registration centers is given below (Survey "A").

	PARTY GROUPS			
	Right	Right Center	Center	Left
Expressing dissatisfaction with electoral lists ... ..	3%	1%	5%	34%
Claiming party members unable to register ... ..	4%	3%	3%	24%
Claiming party members afraid to register ... ..	0.1%	1%	1%	10%

It is notable that 34 percent of the interviewed party leaders of the Left expressed "dissatisfaction" with electoral lists in their districts; that 24 percent of these Leftist leaders asserted that members of their party were "unable" to register, while 10 percent said that some of their members were "afraid" to register. Very few of the representatives of the other parties expressed dissatisfaction with the lists or with the way in which they were prepared.

\* Not printed.

## II.—ELECTION DAY

1. *Statement of Problem*

The objectives of the election day phase were:

- (4) To measure the extent of certain types of illegal voting.
- (5) To determine the number of registered voters, if any, who were denied either directly or indirectly the opportunity to vote for the party of their choice.
- (6) To determine the number of voters who did not participate in the balloting, and to classify their reasons for abstention.

2. *Procedure*

Two sample surveys were designed to get the essential information for these problems. For convenience these were labelled "D" and "F."

"D" consisted of 105 polling centers distributed throughout Greece.

"F" consisted of 1,345 names selected from recompiled and revised (positive) lists located in 113 polling centers distributed throughout Greece.

Special reporting forms (D and F) prepared for these enquiries are attached in Part E.\*

3. *Results*

*For Problem (4).*—From survey "D" the total vote of the country was estimated to be 1,085,000, with an upper limit of 1,114,000, under the assumption that the voting and counting at the unobserved places was conducted just as properly as at the observed places. The official return thus far made public (1,106,510 for 3,392 of the 3,398 polling places in Greece) though somewhat higher than the sample estimate, falls well within the limits of the calculated variability of that estimate.

A maximum of 2 percent of the names listed on protocol books as having voted were found to belong to persons who were dead, or absent, or who denied having voted (Sample "F"). This type of illegality could, in other words, account for only about 22,000 votes out of a total of 1,107,000.

It appears, therefore, that the effect of the illegal practices mentioned above was not great enough in the country as a whole to effect the election returns to any appreciable extent.

*For Problem (5).*—Of the registered voters who did not vote, only six-tenths of 1 percent of those investigated could be definitely regarded as having abstained because they were unfairly prevented from voting (Sample "F"). The estimated number of such persons in the whole of Greece is 11,000.

*For Problem (6).*—Returns from all but 6 precincts in Greece indicate that about 1,107,000 of the estimated 1,850,000 men eligible to vote actually cast their ballots. On the basis of the information obtained (Sample "F"), the remaining 40·3 percent of the electorate who did not vote may be classified as follows:—

	<i>Percent of electorate</i>
Claim to have participated in boycott ... ..	9·3
Denied having voted, though listed on protocol book ... ..	0·4
Not in the neighbourhood on election day (moved, Army, unknown) ... ..	17·9
Ill or otherwise physically unable to reach polls ...	5·7
Gave other reasons (business, &c.) ... ..	2·5
Unfairly prevented from voting ... ..	0·6
No reason given ... ..	3·9
Total not voting ... ..	40·3

\* Not printed.

It thus appears that the total abstention for "party" reasons was somewhere between 10 percent and 20 percent of the total number of persons eligible to vote. (Lower limit based on 9.3 percent who "claim to have participated in boycott" plus 0.4 percent who "denied having voted though listed on protocol book." Upper limit based on this 9.7 percent together with about one-half of these "not in neighbourhood on election day," or 10 percent, making a total of 20 percent.)

### III.—STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Certain numerical data collected in the course of the statistical investigations are assembled below for convenience of reference. With the exception of "(3) total votes cast," these figures are estimates made by the Sampling staff. The data and reasoning upon which the estimates are based may be found in Part B.

(a) Total population of Greece	...	...	...	7,500,000
(b) Total males over 21 on the 1st January, 1945				
(27.09% of (a))	...	...	...	2,032,000
(c) Total eligible to register (97.89% of (b))	...	...	...	1,989,000
(d) Total potential voters registered (93.0% of (c))	...	...	...	1,850,000
(e) Total votes cast	...	...	...	1,106,510*
(f) Total potential voters "abstaining" (40.1% of (d))	...	...	...	743,000
(g) Number abstaining for "party" reasons (15% of (d))	...	...	...	280,000†
(h) Number abstaining for other reasons (25% of (d))	...	...	...	463,000†

### IV.—GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

#### 1. Pre-election Period

Investigations made before election day disclosed that the number of persons unfairly excluded from the registration lists was relatively small. About 20,000 persons alleged that they could not register because of "lack of bread ration card," "lack of police identification card," or "lack of sufficient time." Another 6,000 were allegedly "refused" registration. Even if all of these allegations were true, the total was clearly not sufficient in an electorate of 1,850,000 to produce any material change in the result of the election.

On the other hand, there was some basis for complaints that the registration lists contained names of persons who were dead or who had moved away. It was found, in fact, that there was an average of at least one non-valid name on the list for every seven valid names. However, it was felt that the presence of such names on the registration lists could not alone prevent the holding of a valid election, provided the polling procedure was conducted in accordance with the law.

#### 2. Election Day.

Not more than 2 percent of the votes were cast illegally in the names of dead or unidentifiable persons. In the polling places observed throughout election day proceedings were orderly. The irregularities observed were few and by their nature could have had little, if any, effect on the returns

\* Published returns for 3,392 of 3,398 precincts.

† Estimated range is 90,000 above or below the stated figure. The proportion of persons abstaining because of "party" reasons lies somewhere between 10 percent and 20 percent of the total potential voters registered. The figure 15 percent is here presented as the medium between these extremes.

for these places. Moreover, any difference in the degree of regularity of procedure which may have existed between the observed and unobserved polling places was found to have had no appreciable effect on the total number of votes cast.

The statistical evidence supports the conclusion that the polling generally was free and fair, such irregularities as appear to have existed being of such minor character or limited extent as to have had no controlling effect upon the integrity of the elections.

RAYMOND JESSEN.

OSCAR KEMPTHORNE.

S. SHEPARD JONES.

PRESS RELEASE

10th April, 1946

### SUMMARY OF REPORT OF ALLIED MISSION TO OBSERVE THE GREEK ELECTION

The Greek elections of the 31st March were conducted under conditions that warranted holding them on the date selected; they were on the whole free and fair, and the results represent a true and valid verdict of the Greek people, in the considered judgment of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections.

This is the Mission's final judgment in a report to the American, British and French Governments, made after analysis of factual information gathered in all parts of Greece by 240 trained observation teams throughout the period of pre-election campaigning, on election day and in the few days immediately after.

The report recognized "the present intensity of political emotions in Greece" and gives the election a favorable verdict after giving that factor in all its aspects study and consideration.

If Leftist parties which boycotted the election had taken part, the single-house parliament that was chosen would now include perhaps 20 percent but certainly not more than 25 percent of representatives of those parties, but this would not have altered the general outcome, the Mission reports.

The Populist party, a conservative party, had a majority in the popular vote and has a majority in the parliament now. Almost all of the remaining votes and seats were won by the National Political Union, a party cooperating with the Populists, and the Liberal party under former Premier Sophoulis.

The Allied Mission's report states that election day was peaceful and orderly, ranking well with past Greek elections and capable of standing comparison as to decorum with general elections in France, Great Britain and America.

It points out that while some of the registration lists of voters had been completely recompiled for the election, and were satisfactory, others have not been corrected by striking off the names of all the dead and others not qualified to vote. War and disorder and careless administration of electoral laws are mentioned as being responsible for this.

The total registration figures are therefore inaccurate and misleading. The Mission's experts find that Greece's population is about 7,500,000, that a maximum of 1,989,000 males were qualified to be registered, and that of those 1,850,000 actually were validly registered. This was 93 percent of the eligibles. The number who voted the 31st March was 1,117,000.

While the presence of the names of dead or otherwise ineligible men on the uncorrected registers provided opportunity for fraud, the Mission found no evidence of such fraud on an important scale either in making up the lists of qualified voters or in plural voting.

Among the specific findings of the section of scientific sampling experts of the Mission were these:—

For all Greece, 71 percent of the names on registration lists were unquestionably valid, only 13 percent were invalid, and 16 percent were of doubtful validity.

Sixty percent of the number validly registered actually voted. The 40 percent who did not vote included an estimated 9.3 percent who allegedly abstained for "party" reasons, and varying percentages for other reasons not identifiable with political strategy.

However, the technical analysts have allowed, in their basic estimates, for from 10 to an absolute maximum 20 percent of "party" abstention, with 15 percent as a probable maximum. The 15 percent estimate gives a total for deliberate abstainers of 280,000.

But of the votes actually cast not more than 2 percent were cast illegally in the names of dead or unidentifiable persons. In other words, fraud of this kind may have been responsible for a maximum of 22,000 votes out of approximately 1,117,000 and could not have influenced general election results.

Of the registered voters who did not vote, only 11,000 can be definitely regarded as having abstained because unfairly prevented from voting, the sampling staff says.

Though, therefore, the Mission finds that the opportunity for fraud that was presented by the exaggerated registration lists was not exploited in this election, it recommends in its report that all registration lists in Greece, in rural as well as city areas, be completely recompiled before the opinion of the Greek people is again sought on matters of national import, so as to remove all possible justification for fraud charges based on inaccurate registers in the future.

Some intimidation of voters both by Rightists and by Leftists was found, varying by regions and even villages. While this was not general enough to be consequential on election day itself, it is regarded by the Mission as an inevitable product of Greece's experience under domestic dictatorship, under enemy occupation, and especially of the brief but desperate "civil war" between Leftist forces of the resistance movement and Greek Government forces at the end of 1944. The passions thus generated did produce intimidation in the year preceding the election. This was particularly marked against extreme Leftists in the agricultural regions of the Peloponnesus and in the north-western Greece.

These conditions, says the Mission, had an important bearing on the abstention of EAM members from voting, and it did have "some effect" on the election, without materially affecting the outcome.

Presence of British troops in Greece had no effect whatever on the election results, the Mission finds.

Investigation of complaints about pro-Rightist bias by police and gendarmerie led to the conclusion that the police as a whole were loyal to their duties but that some of the gendarmerie showed partisanship. This, however, had a very minor influence on the general results, the Mission says.

While under the present Greek election law abstention is illegal, its practice as party strategy is too well established by custom to permit control by legalistic means, says the Mission, and it does not feel that party abstentions this time either altered the results or represent a new and alarming element in Greek politics. The fact that abstention, although a contravention of Greek law, was countenanced by the authorities gave even dissident elements an opportunity fully to indicate their views.

The Mission is convinced that its presence in Greece had a reassuring effect and contributed to orderliness.

To-day's report by the Mission, which will be sent to the co-operating Allied Governments of France, the United States, Great Britain, and the Union of South Africa, reveals how the unprecedented task of election observation in Greece was planned and organized and the methods used to arrive at conclusions. This summary of the report has been furnished to the above-named Governments and to the Greek Government and the Soviet Government.

The Mission grew out of the agreement at Yalta by America, Great Britain and Russia to help liberated countries set up democratic governments, followed by the agreement of Greek political parties to seek such Allied help through election observation, and by the specific request thereafter of the then Greek Government. America, Great Britain and France accepted the invitation. Russia declined.

Last October Dr. Henry F. Grady was named Chief of the American contingent, R. T. Windle of the British, and General Arnaud Laparra of the French. From November onward, through conferences in Athens and the other capitals, the Mission took form. It was decided, by acceptance of an American plan, that the cooperating nationalities should merge completely into an Allied team, whose policies would be determined by the whole and whose report would be a single document.

For operational purposes, Greece was divided into five districts, with an Allied District Board stationed at each District Office, and in Athens a Central Board, headed by the three Chiefs of Mission, functioned continuously from the 25th February to the 10th April.

The observers, all of whom had been given an intensive background course on Greek conditions for a week in Italy before moving to Greece, consisted of selected men from the Allied armed forces. Army personnel was used because of availability in the area, acquaintance with Mediterranean conditions, and suitability for the arduous task of constant travel in mountainous country under practically military conditions as to rations, equipment and general living. Operationally, the whole undertaking was set up on a military basis in order to meet requirements of supply, communications and immediate organizational efficiency.

Two distinct methods of ascertaining facts were adopted.

One was the method of scientific sampling, developed in great detail on the ground in Greece by outstanding American and British experts, before the observation teams arrived.

Questionnaire forms designed to assemble precisely the information needed in order to answer the important questions were prepared. These were used by the 240 observer teams, which visited 1,556 polling places in the pre-election period, watched the actual voting procedure all day at 105 selected polling places, visited in addition 708 other polling places on election day, and conducted many post-election inquiries and special investigations of typical complaints.

Through a huge amount of data thus gathered from places carefully selected so as to be representative, under secrecy as to when and where observers would appear, the sampling section of the Mission was able to arrive at definite statistical conclusions and report them to the whole Mission.

The final report from this section was signed by Dr. Raymond Jessen, of the Statistical Laboratory of Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa; by Mr. Oscar Kempthorne, of the Statistical Department of Rothamsted Experiment Station, Harpenden, Herts, England; and by Dr. S. Shepard Jones, Division of Public Liaison and in charge of Public Attitudes Branch, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Meantime, in every district a simultaneous program of general inquiry, modeled on "intelligence service" was carried out, in which civilian personnel as well as all the military observers participated. Every available source of information was explored in this phase of the study. In the end the judgments arrived at through this method by the Allied district boards were compared with the conclusions based on scientific sampling, and were found to supplement and confirm each other on every basic point.

Observer teams consisted of three men, an officer observer, the interpreter and a driver. Jeeps were the vehicles used, frequently supplemented by long and difficult journeys on donkeys to remote places, sometimes by long walks. Water craft were also employed. And for reaching islands, as well as maintaining communication between central and district headquarters, aircraft of several types were in operation regularly.

Interpreters for the Mission were all men. They were chosen by a careful screening process to guard against political bias. And the training of observer teams was so designed as to reduce the interpreter's rôle to that of translation solely.

Close contact was maintained between the Mission and those officials of the Greek Government responsible for decisions and preparations for the election. The Mission accepted no responsibility in these fields beyond keeping itself informed and reporting to the Greek authorities such conditions as it found which might effect the election seriously.

The Mission's report points out that the date of the election was several times postponed by the Greek Government to meet requests by Left Wing parties, and that the method of proportional representation was adopted also as a concession to the Left.

Complete freedom of the press of Greece was found to characterize the election period. The Mission mentions some criticisms to which it was itself subjected, now from the Right and now from the Left.

The report transmitted to the co-operating Allied Governments ten days after the election will be published in full, with complete documentation and explanation, as early as possible.

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