

THE DYING PEACE

By

Vigilantes

**With a Preface by
Prof. Harold J. Laski**

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

This pamphlet is published by *The New Statesman and Nation* on behalf of a small group of expert students of international affairs, who, by virtue of their position, are able to speak with unusual knowledge of the diplomacy of recent years, and have formed certain positive conclusions regarding the measures necessary to make the world's peace system effective.

PREFACE

by HAROLD J. LASKI

THIS pamphlet is not merely the most formidable indictment so far published of the National Government's international policy. For that alone it would be valuable since it makes clear beyond the possibility of mistake the fatal direction given to our affairs since 1931. It is important for the British people to understand what its Government is doing in its name; and, on this side, these pages have the great merit of drawing attention to those implications with direct and incisive clarity.

But they do more than this. They make the reader see that we have got to make a choice between international government and international anarchy: more, we have got to make the choice quickly if it is to be a real choice. The time for lip service to the League-system has passed. We have either to fight for its existence or drift back into that fatal chaos of relationships which brought us inexorably into war in 1914. The time before us is short; the League will not survive another failure as painful as its breakdown in the Sino-Japanese dispute. And since that failure the Hitler Government, conscienceless and militarist by its very nature, has enormously added to the danger of the position. Unless we vindicate within a brief period the paramount claims of the League to the allegiance of its members, with all that this paramountcy implies, it is difficult to see any prospect of avoiding disaster.

The authors of this pamphlet have put forward concrete suggestions whereby this country at least may affirm, if it will, its determination to stand by the full implications of the Covenant. Their appeal is more than a party appeal. They represent a rallying-point round which may gather all, whether socialist or conservative, cleric or layman, who believe that the interests of civilisation can only be served by the maintenance of peace. No doubt they subordinate patriotism, in that vulgar sense of which Dr. Johnson spoke with noble scorn, to the claims of humanity. That is precisely the root of their supreme validity. For a Great Britain that is true to herself can know no patriotism distinct from those claims. If men and women of goodwill would insist that it is an obligation for the Government to give the League-system its energetic and unqualified support, even yet it may not be too late to give life and vigour to the League. The alternative is a mad scramble for power in the course of which

we shall destroy at least for this generation the decent habits of civilised mankind.

We are at one of those turning-points of history where the organised will of ordinary men may determine their fate. If the Churches, the trade unions, the political parties, those voluntary bodies which, like the League of Nations Union, are consecrated to the service of peace, make known their determination to serve it, they may give new hope to mankind. The authors of this pamphlet indicate a path it is urgent to tread now. Those who refuse to move along it will have a grim responsibility in the next years. For the only alternative to which they can point is, on experience, one which leads directly to conflict. It is our obligation to insist to our leaders that, for us, the maintenance of peace is the supreme consideration. We have to drive them to the recognition that since peace has become a function of world-government, we can permit them no alternative but the service of its plain demands.

I.—WAR AND THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

WAR, unlike earthquakes and floods, is not a natural calamity, but man-made. Whether the world has peace or war depends upon the policies of the Governments of the world, particularly the Governments of the Great Powers. The United States and the British Empire are the Great Powers which have the most influence upon the course of world events. Of these two, the British Empire, with its controlling influence in the League of Nations, its numerous obligations and commitments in all parts of the world, and its active share in the shaping of events ever since the Peace Conference, has the greater responsibility for the development of world affairs in the last two years.

The way the world has been going since September 1931 is unhappily only too clear. There has been a steady aggravation of the world crisis and an uninterrupted drift toward war. To-day there are wars, half-wars, and threats of war in three continents. The air is heavy with the fear and rumours of war. When the National Government came in two years ago no one would have believed the present state of affairs could be possible.

How is it, then, that a Government composed individually of men who dread war and ardently desire peace should in less than two years have brought us in sight of another world war? By what cruel trick of fate does Mr. MacDonald, who was a pacifist during the war, threaten to go down to history as 'the man who lost the peace'?

To understand the answer we must review the record of the Government on the main issues of foreign policy that have arisen since it came into power.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

(1) The Sino-Japanese conflict broke out in September 1931, a month after the advent of the National Government. The Assembly Report of February 24, 1933, registered the emphatic and unanimous opinion of the Members of the League that China had no responsibility whatever for the development of events since the outbreak of the conflict; that this development consisted essentially in Japanese aggression and violation of the Covenant and other treaties; that Manchukuo was a puppet set up and maintained by the Japanese army of occupation on indisputably Chinese

territory; and that the existence of Manchukuo was contrary to Treaty obligations and incompatible with peace in the Far East.

The Report of the Lytton Commission on which the Assembly's findings were based hints broadly that the alleged attack on the South Manchurian railway, which was made the official excuse for all that the Japanese Government has since done, never took place. It is not generally known but nevertheless a fact that within four days of the outbreak of the conflict a report was drawn up by an agent of the British Government on the spot, in which the Japanese story was riddled. The report left no doubt that the alleged 'incident' never happened—it was a fabrication of the Japanese military authorities, the Far Eastern equivalent of the burning of the Reichstag by the Nazis.

The British Government, although in possession of this decisive information, did not reveal it to the League of Nations.

What was the National Government's policy during the months that Japanese aggression developed, in the light of the information it possessed and of the decisive influence we wield in the counsels of the world in general and of the League in particular?

The Foreign Secretary stated his policy at length on March 22, 1932, in the House of Commons. He explained that he had made up his mind from the outset that this was a case in which conciliation only should be employed, and resort to sanctions ruled out in any circumstances. He stated his policy again in the House on February 27, 1933. This speech was made three days after the unanimous adoption of the Assembly Report of which the British Government was one of the chief authors,* and for which it had voted. Sir John Simon admitted that Japan had violated and was violating the Covenant. But he repeated the Japanese excuses already rejected by the Assembly, called both parties good friends of this country, referred to our Government as a 'neutral' which did not wish to be involved in any controversy with either party, and which was determined in no circumstances to concern itself with this distant conflict or to be a party to the struggle, and announced an embargo on the export of arms to both countries.

This policy amounted to informing the Japanese militarists that they could go as far as they liked without any fear of British interference. It was tantamount to a formal repudiation of the Covenant. The Covenant may be right or it may be wrong. But it happens to be a treaty by which we are bound. This

* As a member of the Committee of 19 and of its Drafting Committee that framed the Report.

treaty does not permit of neutrality. When all the Members of the League (including the British Government) have declared one party to be guilty of aggression and Covenant-breaking in a unanimous report which is accepted by the other party, and when the condemned State not only rejects the Report but proceeds to further military operations, it is a violation of the Covenant to take no action under Articles 10 and 16.

That is the broad fact about our policy in the Sino-Japanese conflict. The details are sufficiently familiar, and they make it clear that our policy has not been consistent with any reasonable interpretation of the Covenant.*

What is important to understand is the Foreign Secretary's point of view. When he arrived at the Paris Council Meeting in November 1931 he made no secret of his opinion that technically the Chinese were right, but in fact the Japanese were justified. That was the line taken by *The Times*, *Daily Telegraph*, and the Government Press generally in obviously inspired articles. The whole argument was that it was unrealistic not to dishonour treaty obligations forbidding resort to force by Japan to impose her view of her interests in Manchuria. Until Sir John Simon's advent, the League had made feeble efforts to keep the two issues distinct—the merits of Japan's claims in Manchuria and the methods which she had chosen to enforce those claims. The Foreign Secretary's contribution was to confound the two issues.† He attempted various deals by which the Japanese would have secured most of what they wanted under the military pressure of their occupation.

Undeterred by the failure to secure League or American support for his peculiar methods in November 1931, Sir John Simon tried again when the Japanese invaded Shanghai in January 1932. He strove unsuccessfully to do a little deal by which not only Japan but the other Great Powers would have compelled the Chinese to buy off Japanese aggression by submitting to an extension and consolidation of the Foreign Settlements in Shanghai. In spite of pledges to the United States, he tried up to the last moment to avoid committing himself to the non-recognition of Manchukuo, on the ground that it was not reasonable to expect Great Britain to remain bound by such a commitment for an indefinite time. This was part of the policy characterised by the repeated insistence that Japan had given pledges to respect the 'open door' in Manchuria and that therefor

* See special supplement to *The New Statesman and Nation*, October 8, 1932.

† He also adopted the Japanese view of their legal rights in Manchuria. But that is another story.

we had no reason to object to her violating China's integrity and independence—guaranteed by treaties to which we are a party.

The fundamental conceptions are clear: they consist in the belief that Chinese nationalism is a negligible quantity; the Japanese are technically wrong but really establishing order; the Covenant and the Nine Power Treaty should be dodged or ignored; it would pay us to connive at Japanese partition of China, provided we were promised a share in the proceeds.* That is the kind of policy which would have been pursued before the World War. It would have produced a settlement of sorts but would at the same time have laid the foundations for a second world war.

The only policy that is practicable to-day is still world-wide action on the basis of the Covenant to uphold the sanctity of treaty obligations; compel Japanese troops to withdraw from Chinese territory on pain of a world boycott of Japan; and to insist on a settlement based on the Assembly Report. A firm attitude on the basis of the Covenant would have settled the whole dispute in a few weeks after its outbreak. That is now generally agreed by all who have followed the matter, and has notably been insisted on by Viscount Cecil. He was British Delegate on the Council during most of the early months of the conflict, and therefore speaks with authority. The Americans and French were ready for an active policy, if we would join. An Anglo-Franco-American lead to-day would be followed by the whole League. It would quickly bring Japan to book. But our Government stubbornly refuse to honour their treaty obligations.

And so we have fallen between two stools—our Government's efforts to revert to pre-war practices have been thwarted by the existence of the League and the new fact of Chinese nationalism (itself immeasurably strengthened by the results of referring the dispute to the League). On the other hand, our bilking of the Covenant has stultified the League. That is why nothing has been settled and there is a condition of stalemate in the East. The Japanese are in occupation of a large part of China. But they are incapable of coming to terms with China in spite of the armistice. The Chinese have an Assembly report officially committing all the Governments Members of the League to non-recognition of Manchukuo, and to the view that Japan is the aggressor. The Assembly is still seised of the matter, and charged with co-ordinating

* For frank and full-blooded statements of the logical implications of these fundamental conceptions, see speeches by Mr. Amery and Sir N. Stewart Sandeman, quoted below, p. 29.

the policy of the Members of the League and the United States. But the Chinese know they cannot induce the Governments to act on their obligations under Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant until they are at war with Japan, either alone or with the help of some Great Power. Nationalist China is therefore buying munitions and making herself strong for a war of liberation. Bitterness and contempt for what is regarded as the faithlessness and cowardice of the West is nearly as strong as hatred for Japan. Japan is in the hands of her militarists, subjected to flaming war propaganda which is inspiring a mood of defiance against the whole world, and straining every nerve to prepare for war against Russia and America. A new race in armaments between the United States and Japan is well under way, and Australia is joining in after consultation with Canada, New Zealand, and the Imperial Defence Committee.*

THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

(2) The second great issue is disarmament. It has been hopelessly prejudiced by our mishandling of the first. The Disarmament Conference met in the thunder of Japanese guns at Shanghai. The proceedings have throughout been made to appear unreal by the portentous and lengthening shadow of the war in Asia. In the end disarmament is doomed for the same reason. The Japanese Government have already warned the Conference that they must alter their 'defence' requirements in view of the new situation in the Far East,† with particular reference to the threat to Manchukuo from Russia and China.‡ In Japan to-day the Army is supreme. The country is committed for two years to record military and naval expenditure. The Army and Air Force are being re-equipped, re-organised, and enlarged. A four years' naval building programme is being crammed into less than two years (it is to be completed in 1935). The country is being organised on a war footing under a National Defence Council. Vast stocks of arms and munitions have been accumulated. They already exceed the stocks on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War. More are being imported. Japan's war industries are working at high pressure. New air bases are being built in the northernmost Japanese possessions, and the

* See *Morning Post* of August 2, 1933, and *Daily Herald* of September 18, 1933.

† See League of Nations document, Conf. D./155.

‡ See the final speech of the Japanese chief delegate, Mr. Matsuoka, to the Assembly before quitting the League, also the preface to his pamphlet containing the text of this speech published at Geneva, in which the Japanese militarists' desire for a preventive war with the Soviet Union is frankly admitted.

Japanese Air Force and Navy are making themselves impregnable in the Southern Pacific Islands under Japanese mandate.* Military writers boast openly that Japan is preparing to fight Russia and America, and can count on British neutrality.† Their avowed object is to subjugate China so as to form a vast yellow empire which shall become the mistress of Asia and Australasia.‡

Meanwhile the Japanese Government have warned the Disarmament Conference that they cannot accept budgetary limitation, nor international supervision of armaments or of the trade in and manufacture of arms. They have given notice that they want a bigger army and air force, and will in 1935 insist upon a navy equal to the American or British. They will not abolish air bombing. They will not accept international judgment as to who is the aggressor under the Paris Pact, nor an obligation not to resort to force, nor an undertaking not to send forces across frontiers.§

The Soviet delegation have told the Conference they will sign nothing Japan does not sign. Russia's European neighbours have always said they would accept no obligations that left Russia free. The same will be the attitude of the neighbours of those neighbours.

As far back as February 25, 1932, Secretary of State Stimson communicated to the League a public and official warning that if the Nine Power Treaty were torn up the Washington Naval

* See the Press *passim*, and notably the despatches of the Tokio correspondent of *The Times* in the last eight months. See in particular the *Morning Post*, February 7, and the *Daily Telegraph*, April 25.

† See *Japan Chronicle*, February 4, 1933.

‡ See *The Times*, October 4, 1932, Tokio correspondent's article on "Japanism: A Japanese Nationalist Vision". See also the *Japanese Diplomatic Review (Gaiko Jiho)* of September 14, 1932; the military writer quoted in the *Japan Chronicle* of February 4, 1933; M. Edouard Herriot's article in the *Excelsior* of January 22, 1933; Col. P. T. Etherton and H. H. Tiltman, "Japan: Mistress of the Pacific?". In League Document A (extr.) 27, 1933, the Japanese Government say flatly: "Japan is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the Far East. No other nation or group of nations would assume that responsibility." The same challenge was flung in the face of the Assembly by Mr. Matsuoka. It means a claim to hegemony in the Far East and a flat repudiation of Article 11 of the Covenant.

§ The Japanese position on these matters is on record in the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference. But see also the Rengo (Japanese semi-official news agency) despatch of June 9, stating that Mr. Sato, the head of the Japanese delegation to the Conference, had received instructions "emphasising that Japan objects to adjudication of third party on act of aggression located as she is near such special countries as China and Russia. Instructions are reported to oppose placing of armaments conditions under supervision of League's permanent machinery and also to make reservations regarding Japan's adherence to a consultative pact".

Limitation Treaty no longer held good. The U.S.A. would regain its freedom of action and be compelled to start naval building and the fortification of naval bases in Guam and the Philippines.

The Assembly Report, exactly one year later, declared that the occupation by Japan of Manchuria was a violation of the Nine Power Treaty. The U.S.A. endorsed this view. Mr. Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy Swanson announced soon after taking office that the whole United States fleet would remain concentrated at Hawaii until the Sino-Japanese conflict was settled. The U.S.A. carried out the greatest naval manoeuvres in its history around Hawaii. The Japanese Government held equally vast and unprecedented manoeuvres, reported in our Press (e.g. *Daily Telegraph* of August 2) as Japan's 'reply' to America's 'challenge'.

The United States is trebling its annual naval expenditure and has embarked on a £47,000,000 naval programme. Japan is following suit, and is already complaining bitterly at America's action.

We are beginning—and only beginning—to reap the fruits of Sir John Simon's Far Eastern policy.

But our Government have contributed directly as well as indirectly to the failure of disarmament. Here, too, the scales have been evenly balanced. In the first months the French under the Tardieu Government were pretty bad; since the election of May 1932, with a Radical-Socialist and Socialist majority in the Chamber, they have been fairly good. The Americans have all along had a good policy, but have fought for it weakly and made bad tactical blunders. The rest of the Conference have been overwhelmingly in favour of drastic disarmament. If the British Government had given a strong lead we could have united Europe and America on a programme of real disarmament and pooled security that would have isolated Japan and cleared the way for applying the Covenant in the Far East. But instead our Government, after repudiating the Covenant, have by the operation of the same mental and moral processes wrecked disarmament.

Not only did we not bring any plan of our own before the Conference in its opening stage. We killed the schemes brought forward by others; and we killed them not by straightforward opposition but by hypocritical and crooked methods.

First there was a strong push by the Italians, with the support of the Germans, Russians, and many smaller States, and with American goodwill, to secure the abolition of the aggressive

weapons forbidden to Germany by the Versailles Treaty. If we had strongly backed the proposal it would in all probability have gone through. Instead, Sir John Simon welcomed the idea vaguely. He moved a resolution for 'qualitative' disarmament. He made a speech virtually accepting the view that this meant abolishing the weapons forbidden to Germany. Then he turned over the definition of aggressive weapons to the technical committees and disappeared from Geneva for six weeks. In the technical committees Admiral Pound explained to his startled hearers that battleships were more precious than rubies and could never be aggressive. At the same time the Government made their generous offer to abolish all tanks over 20 tons.* Viscount Cecil found this meant one tank cashiered by the War Office. In this way we did not kill qualitative disarmament; we merely turned the idea into a roaring farce.

Then came the Hoover proposal. It virtually proposed immediately abolishing one-third of our naval armaments, as well as all bombing 'planes and tanks, and drastically reducing land effectives. This proposal obtained so much support in the Conference that if we had backed it it probably would have gone through. It was a magnificent opportunity. On a similar occasion in 1922, at Washington, Mr. Balfour had responded nobly to Secretary of State Hughes' offer. There were some who hoped Sir John Simon might rise to this even greater occasion in the same spirit. It was a vain hope. In public the Foreign Secretary, in a frigid speech, damned the American proposal with faint praise, and worked in a little patronage and a few covert sneers. He admired, he said, the nobility and breadth of view of the President's proposal. But he would remind his American friends that no initiative, however generous, was capable alone of bringing disarmament. There must be unanimous agreement. In private Sir John Simon was at no pains to conceal his indignation at the surprise sprung on the British delegation by the Americans. The Hoover plan was no good, he explained, because it would never be accepted by Japan.

The British Government felt constrained to produce an alternative to the Hoover plan. The alternative proposed to retain bombing 'planes for police purposes, also tanks. It repeated the

* Lord Hailsham explained in the House of Lords why the Government could not altogether abolish tanks: They were not, as was popularly supposed [and as is incidentally stated in the War Office Manual for Tank Corps Officers], offensive weapons. They were life-saving engines, for they enabled infantrymen to advance upon and destroy machine-gun nests with a minimum loss of life.

demand for the abolition of all submarines. It wished to leave battleships intact till 1936, and to commit us to build slightly smaller (25,000 or possibly 22,000 tons) new battleships after that date.* The Government and their Press had the effrontery to pretend that these proposals went further in disarmament than the Hoover plan. They gave alluring figures of the money that would be saved. The figures were arrived at by assuming that we should in any case begin building battleships again after 1936, and then calculating the difference in cost between new 35,000-ton ships and the proposed 25,000 tonners. In this way we did not oppose the Hoover proposal. We merely drew a 25,000-ton red herring across its trail.

At the outset of the Conference the French submitted a quite feasible scheme for internationalising civil aviation. There was so much support for this idea in the Conference that with our backing it would have had an excellent chance of acceptance. Instead, the British Government were for a long time strongly opposed to any internationalisation. This made it impossible to abolish naval and military aviation. After strong criticism at home and pressure from the Conference the Government changed their tactics. They declared themselves favourable in principle to the abolition of naval and military aviation, but with guarantees against the abuse of civil aviation. The Government must also be satisfied that there would be no injury to vested interests in, or the future development of, civil flying. This was putting the private interests of aeroplane manufacturers and air companies above the cause of peace. In British Delegation and Air Ministry circles there was no concealment of the fact that this was a purely tactical manœuvre. Its object was to kill the proposal for abolishing naval and military aviation while avoiding the odium of openly opposing that proposal.†

We asked for a relatively bigger air force. Everyone was to disarm to our level. After that there should be an equal all-round reduction. At the same time the Government stuck to their pro-

* Initialing this plan was one of Sir Herbert Samuel's last acts before leaving the Cabinet.

† Cf. Mr. Amery, as reported in Hansard of February 27, 1933: "We go playing about at Geneva with a proposal for the abolition of all air forces and the internationalisation and civil control of aviation—a proposal which, I think, is as dishonest as it is silly. It is silly because it cannot possibly be carried out. Japan alone will prevent it. It is dishonest because I do not believe that the great majority of the Cabinet would have encouraged such a proposal being put forward unless they felt pretty certain that it would be rejected."

posal to maintain bombing 'planes for 'police purposes'. Mr. Baldwin drew a sombre and terrible picture in the House of the horrors of aerial warfare and its menace to civilisation. Later he was asked whether, in spite of the storm of protest at Geneva, the Government still held to their policy of police-bombing. He said this was a settled policy that could not be withdrawn merely because it had aroused opposition.*

The British Draft Convention came at the right moment. It filled a need, for it gave a concrete basis of discussion. The Government deserved credit for bringing forward a draft at all. But it was a bad draft. It was ludicrously one-sided. It called for virtually no British disarmament on land and none at all at sea, and would give us what we have not now, namely, an air fleet second to none in size (in fact, this would give us supremacy in the air, for our military 'planes climb and fly faster than those of any other country). It provided for no reduction or limitation of land armaments whatsoever—except to limit the weight of tanks and the calibre of guns (at some future and unspecified date). It made no provision for budget limitation or for abolishing the private manufacture of arms.

This last is not surprising, for the Government are strongly opposed to abolishing private manufacture, dislike even international control, and are wobbly on budget limitation.

* It is argued in support of the proposal to reserve the right of air-bombing for police purposes that this is a cheap and humane way to police outlying areas. It is cheap no doubt. As to its humanity, the testimony of an eye-witness is relevant. It is provided by Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Osburn, D.S.O., in the *News Chronicle* of June 5, 1933. He writes:

“How many who insist that the maintenance of the British Empire depends on our aviators being allowed to bomb the flocks and herds and the women and children in Arab and Indian villages trouble to visualise what actually happens? On such occasions the men of the village are often absent, so it is noncombatants who are usually the chief victims. When our troops enter a bombed village the pariah dogs are already at work eating the corpses of the babies and the old women who have been killed. Many suffering from ghastly wounds, especially some of the young children, are found still alive covered in flies and crying for water. As all uninjured adults have fled, these mutilated women and children must perforce lie unattended.”

Government apologists declare villages are always warned before being bombed. Evidently the warning is not always effective. No doubt that is the fault of the villagers. They are too badly organised and unsophisticated to behave as they should when subjected to the latest refinements of civilisation. They are not prompt enough in abandoning their homes. The women and children appear to be particularly careless. It is unfortunate. But in the view of the Government that is clearly no reason why we should modify our up-to-date police methods. As Mr. H. O. King points out in *The Times* of June 7, air-bombing expeditions are attended by a negligible loss of life.

President Roosevelt's message gave our Government a last chance. It was not taken. He expressed his desire for the abolition of all aggressive weapons forbidden to Germany, with special reference to tanks and war 'planes. We said nothing. He offered a non-aggression pact and an undertaking not to cross frontiers. We maintained our opposition to prohibiting resort to force as well as resort to war outside Europe, and our objection to any definition of what constituted aggression.

The Government's record on the Far East has created general suspicion of our good faith and loyalty to treaty obligations. The Foreign Secretary's and Prime Minister's public and private references to the conflict have deepened that suspicion. The unanimous and cynical repudiation of the Covenant in the Far East by the Government Press, and the calm assumption of that Press in discussing European conditions that we are free to keep or break our treaty obligations as we see fit, have made the suspicion border on pessimistic certainty. How, say the Continentals, can we look for our security to anything but our own armaments, since treaties are mere scraps of paper? It is these suspicions and these unanswerable questions that are killing disarmament and sapping the foundations of order and peace in the world.

Since the Disarmament Conference began the Government have been buffeted this way and that between public opinion, which wanted disarmament, and the fighting services and arms manufacturers, who wanted battleships, tanks, and bombing 'planes. They have done their best to satisfy both sides—public opinion with words and gestures, and the fighting services and arms manufacturers by giving them what they asked. An indignant writer in a newspaper has suggested that the Government attach more importance to being able to bomb villages in Iraq or on the North-West Frontier than to delivering London from the danger of aerial bombardment. This is unjust. If you are sincerely convinced that talk of disarmament is a dangerous illusion and war is inevitable, it obviously becomes your duty to hang on to bombing 'planes by fair means or foul. The Government's real feeling is that we have disarmed too much already, and ought to begin rearming. That feeling was frankly expressed by Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell. He hurried home from the Disarmament Conference in 1932 to defend the naval estimates. He apologised to the House that they were so small. He promised they would be bigger next year. They were. In 1933, when social services were cut to the bone and the country was half bankrupt, we increased our war budget by £4,500,000 in the middle of the

Disarmament Conference. That is the final comment on our record at Geneva.*

THE REARMING OF GERMANY

(3) The third issue is that of Germany. The triumph of the Nazis has been due to many and complex factors; some internal, some deriving from economic forces, some from the treatment meted out to Germany during and since the Peace Conference. But at every turn the struggle between the liberal and pacifist and the nationalist and militarist forces in Germany has been close fought. It would not have required much statesmanship on the part of the outside world to secure a different outcome.

Two important factors in the evolution of Germany since September 1931 have been her treatment over equality in disarmament and the example of Japan. Our Government prevented the Disarmament Conference taking up any of the proposals for substantial disarmament, so that Germany could not get equality that way. So long as equality was asked for by moderate German Governments pledged to international co-operation, no notice was taken. Sir John Simon went out of his way to be melodramatically offensive when the German Delegation asked that this subject should be discussed. As for Japan, Herr Frick—now Hitler's Minister of the Interior—said in a speech some months after the outbreak of the conflict: "I pay the League my respects, but I thank Japan for her example." Herr von Papen, in his famous 'cannon-fodder' speech, asked what right the Members of the League had to condemn Germany hypocritically for fighting a merely moral fight against an immoral treaty, when they did not raise a finger to stop countries that had resorted to war and broken all treaties? The German Press has been full of the impression made on Germany by the utter failure of the other Great Powers to do anything whatever in face of Japan's cynical and glaring violation of the Covenant.

To-day Germany is rattling back to barbarism. Rearmament is proceeding apace. Captain Göring, the morphinomaniac and ex-inhabitant of a Swedish lunatic asylum, who is one of the new Germany's principal rulers, has announced that Germany is to

* Unless we add the fact that when the President of the Disarmament Conference came to London, after seeing MM. Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier, and other Prime Ministers, Mr. MacDonald was too busy to receive him; he was referred instead to the Under-Secretary, Captain Eden. Or that the Government Press are loudly proclaiming that we must spend a lot more on the navy next year. (See, e.g., *Daily Telegraph* of August 23.)

acquire so-called 'police 'planes'. These are military 'planes in all but name. Our newspapers report ambitious plans and huge budget appropriations for a great new German air fleet of what are euphemistically described as 'civilian' 'planes of all types, some more powerful and of longer flying range than any existing bomber, others faster than any fighter 'plane. Our armaments firms have been advertising tanks, a weapon forbidden to Germany by the Versailles Treaty, in German military journals. The accumulation of quantities of machine-guns and the building of big guns in Germany are the talk of every chancellery in Europe. Drastic German laws punish as treason any divulgence of these treaty-breaking war preparations. The Nazis are proceeding openly with their campaign for the conquest of Austria. Our Government refuse to bring these questions before the League. Instead, they wait timidly on Mussolini.*

With regard to Hitler's Germany as in the case of militarist Japan, the alternative is either world-wide action through the League—culminating if necessary in economic and financial sanctions, to make the existing regime return to civilisation and respect its treaty obligations, on pain of foundering in revolution if it refuses—or another war, into which we shall all be dragged one by one, so soon as the German and Japanese war-makers feel sufficiently strong; the League has been sabotaged into impotence, and the nations have drifted their several ways, looking only to armaments and alliances for their security. The League is the only basis on which we can hang together, and unless we hang together we shall hang separately.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE MOSCOW TRIAL

(4) Another nail in the coffin of peace was driven by the Government's policy toward Russia. The chief counts against this policy in this country have been the damage done to trade and the fact that it was responsible for keeping two Englishmen in gaol for several weeks who would otherwise have been immediately released. As the *New Statesman and Nation* and other papers have pointed out, the Soviet Ambassador told Sir John Simon that if he held his hand for a week the accused Englishmen would be deported

* Cf. *Observer*, August 27, Diplomatic Correspondent, *a propos* of the Austro-German conflict: "Signor Mussolini has as little confidence as Great Britain in the efficacy of a resort to the League of Nations." Resorting to the League means preparedness to see the matter through. Our Government will not take the risk of making the League work. They prefer the certainty of another war.

without trial;* next day Sir John Simon sent his threatening Note. Anyone who heard the full-throated baying of the Government's followers in the House will realise that this gesture was popular. But it condemned our people to gaol.

But a far more serious indictment is that, coming at the time it did, it greatly encouraged the Japanese to push ahead with their plan for seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway and preparing for war against Russia, which in Japanese military circles is considered as the inevitable next step after the conquest of Manchuria and the subjugation of China. Japanese military writers say frankly that they count on Great Britain to make this policy possible.†

Worst of all, our policy not only indirectly helped to foment war but was itself a direct threat to peace. Mr. A. J. Cummings, the distinguished political editor of the *News Chronicle* and one of the acutest and best-informed observers of the contemporary scene, who was himself an eye-witness of the Moscow trial, writes that public opinion passed through "an emotional typhoon such as had not visited the British Isles for a generation". He adds that "The attitude of the British Government made intelligible the tempestuous outburst in the British Press and the warlike emotions aroused in the public mind."‡ He is very far from justifying the

* Cf. also Mr. A. J. Cummings, *The Moscow Trial*: "I am strongly of the opinion that if after the arrest a friendly approach had been made in private to the Soviets the prisoners would have been expelled without trial. I am certain, and for very good reasons, that if the embargo had not been established within a few hours of the delivery of judgment the imprisoned Englishmen—Thornton and MacDonald—would have been released and deported within two or three days."

† E.g. Mr. H. Shinsaku, quoted in the *Japan Chronicle* of February 4, 1933.

‡ Some of our Tories have always hankered for intervention and war against Russia. Cf. the following passage in Hansard, February 27, 1933, from a speech by Mr. Lansbury:

"Mr. Matsuoka, who was the Japanese Minister at Geneva, has stated that in Japan there are two trends of thought. One regards the Soviet Union as a menace to Japan and thinks that Japan should strike at the Soviet Union before the potential menace fully materialises. [Hon. Members: Hear, Hear!] I hear hon. Members cheering. That reminds me of what two hon. Members said to me a few days ago. They said that it would be a good thing if Russia and Japan could be occupied with one another in the Far East, as that would make it easier to deal with Communism in Europe. That is about the maddest theory that has ever been put forward. I should not have mentioned it but for the cheers of a couple of hon. Members below the Gangway."

Major-General Sir Alfred Knox, Mr. Cazalet, and others frequently show by their speeches in the House that they still suffer from an interventionist hang-over.

Soviet Government's attitude. But he describes the hasty clapping on of the British embargo as 'a genuine act of war'. He concludes that "Thus the stage was set for a bitter conflict which, but for the economic stress in both countries and the fact that for geographical-strategical reasons neither country could get at the other's throat, might have ended in a first-class war. Only a very cocksure prophet would predict that the Moscow trial will not yet take its place as an indirect originating cause of the war for which European diplomacy is surely preparing the way." His final comment is that "a new British alignment in regard to Russia is vital to the peace of the world".

MR. MACDONALD'S RECORD

(5) The Prime Minister's record in foreign affairs is an important part of the Government's achievements. Let us begin with the Conference at Lausanne where the Prime Minister concluded a Confidence Pact with France. When this aroused an acute sense of lack of confidence in Italy and Germany, he admitted those countries. But not before the Pact had so compromised Signor Grandi as to cause that gentleman to lose his post as Foreign Minister. Poland, the Little Entente, and other States then protested so vigorously against this Committee of Great Powers that they too had to be admitted, and the Pact was thrown open to all. After that the Confidence Pact disappeared into political limbo, leaving nothing but a good deal of distrust and bitterness behind.

The next move in the same direction was the Prime Minister's appearance at Geneva with a British Draft Disarmament Convention in Articles 1-5 of which the Great Powers (including Japan, mentioned by name although she had been condemned as an aggressor and treaty-breaker and had left the League) were given a veto power over even the summoning of a conference. The usual fight with the small states ensued and the objectionable provisions were knocked out.

In the meantime the Prime Minister had returned from Rome committed to Mussolini's Four Power Pact proposal.* It created

* How the astute and vigorous dictator 'put over' this proposal on our vague Prime Minister and yielding Foreign Secretary is an entertaining but scarcely edifying story. The news is reliably reported to have caused consternation among those whose task it was in London to watch from afar over the pilgrims.

such suspicion, fear, and anger throughout Europe as wellnigh to destroy the whole effect of the British draft at Geneva. So marked were the disastrous results of the Four Power Pact proposal that Sir Austen Chamberlain made it the occasion for his grave warning in the House of Commons on April 13 that is quoted on the cover of this pamphlet. Once more the smaller Powers and those who did not wish the League to be put out of business as a political instrument protested vigorously and successfully.

THE SOUTH AMERICAN WARS

(6) The Government's attitude toward the little wars in South America has been characterised by the same bland ignoring of its obligations as a Member of the League as is exemplified by its Far Eastern policy. Peru, faithfully imitating Japan, fomented trouble among the Peruvian settlers in the Colombian territory of Letitia and then occupied the territory. Hostilities followed. The Council in due course adopted a unanimous report under Article 15 which was accepted by Colombia and rejected by Peru. Some time after Peru despatched ships up the Western coast of South America and through the Panama Canal with the object of proceeding up the Amazon to attack the Colombian forces that were endeavouring to dislodge the Peruvians from Letitia and had seized some Peruvian military posts along the river bank.

The Council met on Saturday, May 6, and decided that it was incompatible with the terms of its Report for any Member of the League to give any assistance to these warships. The Dutch Government, although not on the Council or its Peruvian Committee, was apprised by telephone the same afternoon, and that very night—Saturday, May 6—cabled instructions to the Governor of Curaçao cancelling its previous instructions to afford facilities which had been sent in ignorance of the Council's deliberations and ordering the Governor not to allow the Peruvian warships even to enter the harbour. By that time, however, the Peruvian squadron, acting in virtue of assurances received from the Dutch Consul in Panama, on the basis of the original instructions, had already arrived at Curaçao. This put the Governor in a dilemma. The Peruvians argued that having made the voyage on the strength of Dutch assurances and being entirely without water or fuel he could not very well turn them adrift. The Governor compromised by allowing them to stay eight hours—the Peruvians asked for

twenty-four—and giving them just enough water and fuel to carry them to the next port, but refusing repairs. The Peruvians were indignant and left a written protest.

Meanwhile, on Monday, May 8, the Council had confirmed in detail the decision of May 6, in spite of the objections and difficulties raised by the British delegate (a junior Foreign Office official). Nevertheless, when the Peruvian warships arrived at Trinidad on Thursday, May 11, five days after the decision of the Council and three days after that decision had been confirmed in detail, they were given all the supplies they wanted and left for the Amazon. The unhappy junior official representing Great Britain on the Council gave that body some halting and confused explanations, and an even more involved and lame excuse was given by the Prime Minister in reply to a question in the House.* The real reason why our instructions to Trinidad to refuse facilities arrived too late was soon divulged.† The Dutch Government was informed by our Foreign Office that while they agreed in principle to refusing facilities they were reluctant to act for fear of offending Peru and injuring our important commercial interests in that country.

It is a striking tribute to the efficiency of the League system that in spite of this kind of passive sabotage from one of its chief Members, the League finally stopped the war between Peru and Colombia, and is well on the way to settling the dispute to the satisfaction of both parties and in a way that will provide more solid foundations for peace between those two countries than have ever existed.

The League, indeed, came within an ace of also settling the Bolivia-Paraguay conflict when an unexpected hitch occurred. The two parties had accepted a League commission to proceed to the Chaco with wide powers both for stopping the fighting and settling the dispute out of which the conflict arose. The Commission had been appointed and was on the eve of departure when both parties informed the Council that they wished it to invite the four neighbouring Powers—the Argentine, Brazil, Chili, and Peru—to mediate between them. This, it subsequently transpired, was Brazil's move, undertaken by M. Mello Franco, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, who, when he was Brazilian Ambassador and Permanent Delegate accredited to the League, attempted to secure a permanent seat on the Council, and when the League refused persuaded his Government to resign from membership. His calculation at the time was

* Cf. Hansard, May 22, 1933.

† For details see the *New Statesman and Nation*, May 27, 1933, p. 680.

that these tactics would get him what he wanted, and the calmness with which the League took his country's defection had left a strong desire to do the League a bad turn whenever a suitable occasion presented itself.

The Council was reluctant to accede to the demand of the two parties, for, as it pointed out, the dispute had been dragging on accompanied by hostilities for years, and all the attempts at mediation and conciliation had failed and merely resulted in paralysing the League's action. The Covenant was the only treaty on the basis of which the matter could be dealt with effectively, and a Commission on the spot with wide powers was the only method that gave any real hope of stopping the bloodshed. However, in view of the demand of both parties, it invited the four neighbouring Powers to act on its behalf and as its mandatory. The British delegate (our *Chargé d'Affaires* in Berne) deprecated undue insistence on the necessity for settlement on the basis of the Covenant and under League auspices, and was for letting matters take their course. Sir John Simon was visiting M. Mello Franco at the time the latter was sabotaging the League.

It remains only to add that this war was made possible and can still be carried on thanks only to the purchase of vast supplies—millions of pounds worth—of arms and munitions, chiefly from this country.*

THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

(7) The failure of the Government to strive officiously to keep peace alive and the consequent failure of disarmament and reversion to militarism in Europe and Asia have had the worst possible effect on the economic situation. The world's statesmen and economic and financial experts have been pointing out for years, unanimously and emphatically, that without political pacification there can be no recovery from the world crisis.

But we have also contributed directly to the failure of the Economic Conference. It was thanks to our opposition that the Economic Conference met nearly eighteen months too late. We rejected the pressing demands of other countries to hold it more than a year ago, on the ground that we must first hold the Ottawa Conference. At Ottawa we committed ourselves to economic nationalism and economic imperialism. The result was

* For details, see "Patriotism, Ltd." (Union of Democratic Control. 6d.)

that Sir Walter Layton resigned his post as British member of the Preparatory Commission of the Economic Conference, on the ground that in his opinion our economic policy made it impossible for the Conference to succeed. Indeed, our economic policy has been such that the Government could not find a single independent economist of repute who would consent to go to the Preparatory Commission on its behalf. Consequently we were represented by two Treasury officials.

When international preparations for the Conference were at last put in hand, no chance was given to complete them. The Prime Minister was in such a hurry to be Chairman of a World Conference and so careless of the A B C of preparing conferences that he fulminated publicly against the Preparatory Commission within two weeks of its meeting in the autumn of 1932. The experts, he said, seemed to misapprehend their task. It was not for them to prepare the ground. All they need do was to draw up a list of subjects for the Conference. The latter should meet in plenary session before Christmas.

This outburst was quickly hushed up. Harassed officials exerted their utmost tact to explain as clearly and soothingly as possible that: (a) the Preparatory Commission included Treasury officials, acting on instructions from Mr. MacDonal's own Government; (b) the Commission had had its task defined by a Committee of the League Council of which the Chairman was Mr. MacDonal himself or in his absence Sir John Simon; (c) if it was merely a matter of drawing up a list of subjects for the agenda the Preparatory Commission was unnecessary—a member of the Economic or Financial Section of the League Secretariat with two hours and a stenographer at his disposal would suffice; (d) a world conference dealing with so considerable and important a range of subjects as those involved in the world crisis must really be rather carefully prepared if it were to reach significant decisions.

The Prime Minister was only partially convinced. He reluctantly abandoned the idea of a great speech to his friends, the leading statesmen of the whole wide world, assembled on the eve of the season of peace on earth and goodwill to men. But he used his influence as President to skimp the preparations for the Conference and his presence at Washington to rush President Roosevelt into fixing the date for June 12. Thus we were responsible, paradoxically enough, both for the Conference meeting too late and for its international preparation being insufficient.

But national preparations were insufficient too, at least in this country. For if the Prime Minister was in a hurry his Government were not. Repeated attempts before the Conference met to get them to disclose their policy failed. Soon after the Conference met the reason became plain—they had no policy, except to stick to Ottawa, tariffs, and quotas.

Mr. Chamberlain told the Conference in effect what Mr. MacDonald had told President Roosevelt—that other people's tariffs and quotas were too high and arbitrary, but ours were right and necessary. They should make concessions to us, but we could make none to them.

On financial and price policy we hovered uncertainly between: (a) the desire of gold standard countries for immediate stabilisation on a gold basis; (b) the business men's nostrum of raising prices through currency manipulation and the creation of artificial scarcity by limiting production; (c) the American policy of re-starting economic activity by inflation and increased consumption through public works and compulsory high wages and short hours, to be followed only later by currency stabilisation, and then in terms of commodity prices. We did not wish to commit ourselves to any of these policies, and we had no clear views of our own.

On trade policy, Mr. Runciman explained to the other nations that he was willing to join in recommending the abolition of export and import restrictions and prohibitions, but could not accept any obligation to act on this recommendation. He was in favour of bilateral tariff treaties, but against any multilateral agreement to lower tariffs. He insisted upon our right to discriminate at Ottawa against other nations. But he waved the 'most favoured nation' clause threateningly at all who might be tempted to act on the League Economic Committee's recommendation by concluding a multilateral convention, open to all who wished to adhere, for the reciprocal lowering of tariffs.

On public works Mr. Runciman said no, other members of the Government said yes, perhaps, and Mr. MacDonald, when called upon to explain, said yes and no together and tried to get out of the difficulty by alleging falsely that the question at issue was public works in Eastern Europe.

The Cabinet as a whole were as usual divided, not much interested, and anxious chiefly not to have to take any big decision.

The Prime Minister was throughout less concerned with what

the Conference accomplished than with avoiding an open confession of failure that would injure his prestige:

In short, our record at the Economic Conference and elsewhere has done not a little directly and indirectly to aggravate and perpetuate the world crisis, strengthen policies of economic nationalism and international anarchy, and raise doubts of the capacity of our rulers and the honesty of their intentions.

(8) The United States has been offended and estranged by our Far Eastern and disarmament policies. The Ottawa Conference gave a powerful impetus to economic nationalism in the States. Isolationism is still strong in America. President Roosevelt did his gallant best to convert his people to international co-operation. If his initial moves had scored a fair measure of success, he would have gone ahead rapidly. But our Government persisted in wrecking all chance of successful co-operation in the Far East and over disarmament. At the Economic Conference we faced the United States with either doing something positive on the national scale or jeopardising her national policy for the sake of international futilities. From the outset it was clear, thanks largely to our Government, that there was no chance at the London Conference of agreement on any big constructive policy by *international* action (e.g. Anglo-Scandinavian-American, even if we could not win over the 'gold' group), nor even of any considerable easing of trade restrictions. This has for the time being decided the issue in favour of American economic isolation. That policy is likely to reveal its inadequacy before long. In any case the United States cannot afford political isolation, for it is getting more and more anxious over the war situation in the Far East, and realises clearly that the Japanese militarists can be stopped without war only through world-wide action.

OUR INTERNATIONAL ANARCHISTS

A large part of the admitted failure of our foreign policy is due to the personal shortcomings of Sir John Simon. The Foreign Secretary was given virtually a free hand by the Cabinet until the results of his policies became so calamitous that they could no longer be ignored. He was given his post not because of merit but in order to 'square' his section of the Liberal Party, and so keep up the pretence of 'National' Government. He is such an admitted failure and so notoriously unpopular that he rarely goes to Geneva and leaves the real work to be done by his able and amiable

Under-Secretary, Mr. Eden.* The methods that have caused him to be disliked and distrusted are the old lawyer's trick of *suppressio veri et suggestio falsi*, and treating the Covenant as a contract in which he must pick holes in the interests of a shady client. The general impression conveyed by his methods is summed up in the now popular saying that "Sir John Simon has secured so many convictions against others that he has lost all his own".

But what is more important than his methods is his fundamental attitude—the Foreign Secretary is unable to understand why there is so much fuss about war and treaty-breaking. In his view it is natural that the Japanese should enforce their claims by resort to arms. The Covenant and Nine Power Treaty and other such obligations are to Sir John Simon merely pawns to juggle with in a game where British interests in the shape of concessions, coalmines, investments, railways, etc., are the only counters. He does not recognise any other British interest. The suggestion that it would pay us to honour our obligations under the Covenant strikes him as academic. He does not consider the Covenant to be a 'reality', still less a 'British interest'. He is not disturbed when told that his policy will lead to war, for he believes that war is inevitable.

Even as a 'Realpolitiker' he is a failure. For he attaches more importance to the friendship of militarist Japan than to that of the United States. He believes British trade and interests in China can and will be promoted by the Japanese invader and will not suffer by our earning Chinese contempt and laying the foundations for a great war. He believes that it is possible to maintain the 'open door' while partitioning China. Chinese nationalism, like Indian nationalism, is a sealed book to him. He cannot see the connection between our Far Eastern policy and the collapse of the Disarmament Conference.† But even if he were a good 'Realpolitiker' his policy would fail. For 'Realpolitik' is the politics

* When it is not left to underlings. Under the National Government the practice, inaugurated by Sir Austen Chamberlain and followed by Mr. Arthur Henderson, of our country being represented in the Council by the Foreign Secretary, has been abandoned. Sir John Simon, like Mr. MacDonald, is too busy to bother much about the League. He generally leaves it to Captain Eden, but sometimes to the head of a division, or even lesser official from the Foreign Office, or to our Chargé d'Affaires in Berne—all these have sat for Great Britain on the Council, an unheard-of thing a few years ago.

† Cf. Mr. Hector C. Bywater in the *Daily Telegraph* of August 23, 1933, writing of the American naval programme: "This vast project, it is understood, came as a complete surprise to the British Cabinet, which had assumed that the United States was still eager for naval disarmament." The touch of reproachful righteousness is good.

of international anarchy, of the pre-war world to which we cannot return. That is the only world the Foreign Secretary understands. The logical culmination of Sir John Simon's policy would be to scrap the League. Meanwhile he dislikes it heartily, pays it lip service, and finds that its existence hampers and discredits him at every turn. His attempts to pursue a pre-war policy are continually being wrecked on the post-war realities that to him are hidden.

Another reason why the National Government's foreign policy is laying world peace in ruins is to be found in the personality of the Prime Minister. The case of the Prime Minister is a private tragedy and a public danger. He is now as defeatist in foreign policy as he has long been known to be on domestic issues. He regards the causes he used to stand for as a Socialist and pacifist as lost causes. His highest ambition is to keep things together anyhow for another couple of years. He does not believe that it is possible to get rid of war. He seems to have no understanding of the collective peace system. He suggests that there is much to be said for a strong military power defending its interests and imposing its view of law and order by force on a weak country. He brushes aside impatiently the suggestion that to uphold the Covenant is a British interest relevant to our policy in the Far East. He has gone so far as to say that he would do nothing to make Article 16 a reality in the Far East lest it be invoked in Europe. He, like his Foreign Secretary, believes in a free hand for this country. The logical culmination of the Prime Minister's attitude in international affairs would be to scrap the League and relapse into international anarchy. But unlike Sir John Simon, Mr. MacDonald has had the courage of his convictions. He has made no secret of his aversion to the League. He has repeatedly made strenuous efforts to revive the pre-war concert of the Great Powers.

What is fundamentally wrong with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary is that they are international anarchists. They are still living in the pre-war world. They no doubt want peace. But they have not the faintest conception of what we must do if we are to have peace. That is the root of the matter. For in being international anarchists they merely reflect the wellnigh universal condition of the party they are leading. In the early days of this Parliament, Mr. Robert Bernays, Liberal M.P., wrote an article in the *News Chronicle* in which he expressed his astonishment at the downright hatred of the League he found among a large

majority of his Conservative colleagues, particularly among the older Conservatives. That state of mind, indeed, has been made abundantly clear over the Sino-Japanese conflict and on disarmament. The Conservative Press has unanimously and vociferously advocated repudiating the Covenant in this conflict. The great bulk of Conservative M.P.s have adopted the same attitude. Sir John Simon's disastrous and dishonourable speeches, to which reference has already been made, were received with satisfaction by the mass of his supporters. The prominent Conservatives who believe that the Covenant should be applied to the Sino-Japanese conflict, and that we should reduce our armaments, can be counted on the fingers of one's hand. The City is in no better case. It is notoriously pro-Japanese in the touching belief that: (a) the Japanese militarists are capable of making Manchuria a paying concern against the will of its thirty million Chinese inhabitants and of the four hundred million Chinese next door to Manchuria; (b) they will allow the Western countries, and in particular Great Britain, a share of the loot; and (c) Japan, in tearing up treaties and laying the foundations of the next world war, is working for law and order in the Far East.

To understand the position we might picture the Conservative Party as a primitive tribe which has become subjected to strange diseases and discontents owing to its contact with a higher civilisation. Some of the members of the tribe have learnt the elements of Western hygiene and medicine. But the tribe as a whole is still wedded to its tribal law and witch doctors. When an emergency occurs, such as an epidemic of measles or smallpox, the tribe immediately disowns the few members who would practise the new-fangled Western methods. It reverts to the time-hallowed ordeal by poison, exorcising of devils, sympathetic magic, and other rites. It is not that the tribe is any less intelligent or erudite than the Western-trained members in its midst. Nor that it is not desperately keen to rescue its young men from a horrible death. But its learning and traditions are all wrong. The Conservatives are pagans suckled in a creed outworn. The Conservative Party to-day is unfit to give us peace because its members, almost to a man, are steeped in the anarchic philosophy of international relations that brought us to the World War and that we were supposed to have renounced in the Peace Treaty.

These statements may be thought extreme. But they are in no way exaggerated. Consider, for instance, the following remarks by Mr. Amery (reported in Hansard, February 27, 1933), which

seem fairly to express the sentiments of the mass of elderly Tory backbenchers who surprised their Liberal colleague by their hatred of the League:

"I confess that I see no reason whatever why, either in act, or in word, or in sympathy, we should go individually, or internationally, against Japan in this matter. . . . Who is there among us to cast the first stone and to say that Japan ought not to have acted with the object of creating peace and order in Manchuria and defending herself against the continual aggression of vigorous Chinese nationalism? Our whole policy in India, our whole policy in Egypt, stand condemned if we condemn Japan. . . . It seems to me that Japan has an arguable case based on those essentials which go far deeper than the verbiage of the Covenant of the League of Nations. . . . I do not believe that you can settle these great problems on the principles upon which the Covenant of the League is based. . . . The realities of the world have not changed; they have not been changed by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and they will continue long after the Covenant has disappeared. . . . The worship of unrealities to which this country, above all countries, has been giving itself at Geneva since the war is not going to conduce to the peace of the world. . . . There is a good deal of conscious or unconscious hypocrisy when we talk about the League of Nations, about disarmament, and about peace."

If this is not enough, hear Sir Nairne Stewart Sandeman, reported in the same issue of Hansard:

"I frankly am pro-Japanese, entirely pro-Japanese, because I believe that the Japanese will settle the question in Manchuria and settle it very quickly, and the less time that is spent in settling the row in Manchuria the sooner we shall get on to doing trade in China. Frankly I wish we were in closer touch with Japan and were prepared to say that we were going into the Yangtse Valley. I know that that is not possible at the moment, but if we could do that I am certain that it would mean at once peace in China, and the poor Chinese people would know that the next day's livelihood was safe and we could make goods and export them to China. . . . Personally I am very glad indeed that Japan has come in without fear and has said what she is going to do. The Japanese at least have a policy. It is to settle one part of the world, and they are going to settle Manchuria. [An hon. Member: 'And set up a National Government.'] No, they will not set up a National Government. They will set up a beneficent autocracy, which is possibly the best form of rule that you can get. . . . The people know what they want, and what they want is real Conservative Government. They have always wanted it and always will want it. . . . We are getting rather tired of the League of Nations. [Hon. Members: 'No.'] Well, a great many of us are. . . . As far as cotton

goods are concerned, I hate Japan, but I do admire her pluck. She has not been afraid to come out and say, 'I am going to do so and so and I do not care what you say to me.' Right is might, and very often might is right, and the Japanese are going to carry out there what they have started, and the sooner the thing is finished the better. I do not see why we should not give Japan munitions to help her to finish it, because the sooner it is through the better for China and for everybody in that country."

Psycho-analysts, it will be remembered, gained their insight into the working of nearly normal minds by studying the exaggerations of the mentally afflicted. Gulliver was for a long time able to keep his kinship with the Yahoos a secret from the Houghnynms by modestly refusing to disrobe. In the same way the lucubrations of this pinchbeck Prussian who has learned nothing and forgotten the World War, and the hoarse growlings of this pocket King Kong, tired of civilisation and longing to return to his life in the jungle, supply a clue to the working of the Tory mind. These Yahoos with no fear of indecent exposure are less modest but of much the same mental make-up as the bulk of the Tory Party. The difference between them and My Lord Hailsham or Londonderry, for instance, is slight. They lack the woolly uplift of the Prime Minister and the crocodile tears of the Foreign Secretary. But on fundamentals the Government and its supporters are much of one mind.

It is scarcely an exaggeration to say this Government have no foreign policy. Every attempt they make to frame a policy on pre-war lines has been wrecked on the existence of post-war facts such as the League, the new States, the new attitude of smaller countries generally, and Eastern nationalism. They want to settle things on pre-war lines, but they cannot. We could settle things on League lines, but our rulers do not understand what that means. And so nothing gets settled and we drift toward more and more distress, greater and greater danger of war. That is because our rulers believe in the inevitability of war. We could go in the opposite direction if we had a Government that believed peace was possible.

II.—PEACE *VERSUS* PATRIOTISM

"The Anglo-Saxon community in particular suffers from a delusion that afternoon meetings (with tea), small regular subscriptions to societies with noble intentions, the circulation of nicely printed reports, and a polite and deferential attitude towards all that is respected and influential in life, may be considered not merely as progressive activities, but as all that is required in the way of progressive activities. This job calls for something much rougher and more fundamental. I do not see how we can avoid the conclusion that the search for world peace, since it is a project to subordinate our sovereign government to something larger, comes near to or passes the legal definition of treason. Moreover, the necessary conditions for world peace bring us into sharp conflict not simply with the ordinary patriot, but with much that is regarded by large sections of people as current morality. And, as a further obstacle, such views must necessarily antagonise big interests entrenched behind tariff walls and currency advantages. A real world peace movement must be a revolutionary movement in politics, finance, industrialism, and the daily life alike. It is not a proposed change in certain formal aspects of life; it is a proposal to change the whole of life."

H. G. WELLS in *The Way the World is Going*

THE power of modern Governments to conscript every able-bodied male citizen and compel him to kill or be killed is an exercise of tyranny far beyond the imagination of even the most despotic monarch a couple of centuries ago. The unfettered right of a Government to go to war at its discretion is a comparatively modern phenomenon, due to developing the concept of sovereignty into belief in international anarchy and the doctrine that human beings cannot have any moral or political duty transcending the frontiers of their country. The medieval world believed in the unity of Christendom under the Pope and the Emperor. Grotius' famous book on international law and many of his successors made much of the doctrine of 'natural law'. This doctrine, to begin with at any rate, attempted to establish certain common obligations for all States. It tried to limit the right of making war by distinguishing between just and unjust wars.*

At the same time as the licence to make war was becoming complete, war itself, from being the sport of kings, leaving the civil population indifferent, became an affair of whole nations concentra-

* As a corollary, Grotius and some of his eighteenth-century successors taught that when war broke out it was the duty of States not directly involved in the conflict so to act as not to give any assistance to the State whose cause was unjust; neutrality was only permissible when it was impossible to determine which side was right.

ting all their manhood, material resources, and spiritual energy in a frenzy of hatred and destruction. The penalty of defeat and the price of victory alike was the danger of social dissolution. On the one hand democracy was spreading, the rights of the individual and the possibility of a good life for all were becoming more and more fully recognised, and the nations were being fused into one world-wide society economically and culturally. On the other hand, the tyranny of Governments over their subjects, the logical implications of international anarchy, and the development of the powers of mutual destruction were being steadily more emphasised and prized in all civilised States.

What was it that reconciled civilised human beings to the growth of this monstrous paradox? It was patriotism. What was it that set the civilised nations against each other in an orgy of mutual hatred and destruction that they were incapable of ending until overtaken by exhaustion and revolution? Again patriotism. In what name did the public elect the National Government and then withhold opposition to its anarchic foreign policy? In what name did Italy succumb to Fascism, Germany to Hitlerism, and Japan to her militarists? Once more—patriotism. It is patriotism that makes us all slaves to war.

This does not mean that to get peace we must get rid of patriotism. That would be a hopeless enterprise. The springs of patriotism lie deep in human nature and flow from primitive emotions—love of home and family, sense of kinship with those who speak our tongue and share our traditions—that cannot be eradicated. But they may issue in action which is either noble or vile, just as did Christian faith in the age of religious wars. Indeed, nationalism or patriotism is for all practical purposes the popular religion of to-day even when it assumes the trappings of Christianity. But whereas we cannot and do not want to get rid of patriotism, we must civilise patriotism or perish.

Since the World War patriotism, so far from becoming civilised, has assumed the most fanatical, savage, and menacing forms. We thought we went to war to crush Prussianism and enthrone liberty and democracy. And to-day—where are freedom and democracy? Half Europe is under dictatorships. The Prussian State has been resurrected with a vengeance in Italy, has broken out in government by assassination in Japan, and has become a nightmare in Germany.

REACTION AND REVOLUTION

A nationalist reaction is raging. The reactionaries in all countries have certain common dogmas. They are summarised in the following three sayings by Mussolini: (1) "Beyond the State—nothing." (2) "The State is an absolute in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State." (3) "Above all, Fascism . . . believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. . . . War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. . . . A doctrine which is founded upon this harmful postulate of peace is hostile to Fascism. And thus hostile to the spirit of Fascism, though accepted for what use they can be in dealing with particular political situations, are all the international leagues and societies." Hitler has been even more vehement in repudiating every international tie, exalting the absolutism of the State and glorifying war. He carries Mussolini's attitude of opportunism toward the League, pending the next war, one step farther. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler says that the purpose of home policy is to forge a sword sharp enough to strike, and the purpose of foreign policy is to gain time and lull suspicions until the sword is ready. State idolatry, international anarchy, bloody terror, and war—those are the things the nationalist reaction is bringing in its train.

In this country, too, the tide of reaction is rising. But we wear our reaction with a difference. Our rulers are the Kerenskis, not the Lenins, of reaction. Whereas others are feverishly preparing for war, they content themselves with losing the peace like gentlemen. But our reactionaries are growing bolder. After two years' drift and passive sabotage of the League they are taking the offensive. The Government Press are beginning to urge rearmament. They either repudiate the League with contemptuous dislike, or shed crocodile tears over its weakness, or simply ignore it and discuss the international situation in pre-war terms. The Prime Minister and his henchmen in the Press are now openly committed to the view that the League should be reduced to the status of the Berne Postal Union, founded half a century ago, and confine itself to co-operation on technical matters; in order to deal with political questions we should "return to the system of the Concert of the Great Powers which existed between 1815 and 1914".*

* See Professor Zimmern, in the *Fortnightly Review* of July 1933, expounding what he assures us are the Prime Minister's views. It appears only too likely that Professor Zimmern has reason for this assurance.

What does it all mean? Looking back, we see that the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, the Metternich era, 1848, were but phases in a mighty process, the rise of the middle class, and with it political democracy and nationalism. Looking under the surface to-day we see that the World War, the Russian Revolution, the founding of the League of Nations and its International Labour Organisation, and the present era of reaction are but phases in a process—the rise of a new class, the workers, and with them the idea of social justice and of curbing by world-wide economic and political organisation the forces let loose in the last century.

The reaction to-day is far more terrible than the reaction after the Napoleonic wars. The power of the State to persecute and destroy has grown immensely. Nationalist fanaticism is using the arts of demagoguery and the new inventions of the radio, cinema, and the popular Press to achieve results which would have left the old reactionaries aghast. The war our new reactionaries are preparing is infinitely more terrible even than the last world war.

But the revolution that the reactionaries are breeding and which will surely break out if they have their way will also be fiercer and more profound than the upheavals of 1848.* It is no accident but a portent that Soviet Russia has put on the old Prussian State inside out, that the Red Terror is not much better than the Brown, and that Communists are preaching the inevitability of war and preparing to turn war when it comes into a civil war. To the vertical loyalty of the patriots they oppose the horizontal loyalty of the proletariat. To the cry, "My country, right or wrong," they reply, "Workers of all countries, unite; the World Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is your country."

If the reactionaries are suffered to remain in power much longer, civilisation may founder in the shock of these two rival creeds.

* Cp. *Manchester Guardian*, March 28:

"The German working class is now dominated by an intense mass emotion compounded of fear (a fear that is only too justified) and a controlled fury. A hatred such as never existed before in Germany has been aroused. A passionate longing which your correspondent has often observed amongst the oppressed of Eastern Europe is now deeply engrafted in the consciousness of the most pacific and internationally minded class in the world—namely, the German industrial labour: the longing that there may be another war. War may shake the Hitlerite dictatorship, and in any case weapons will pass into the hands of the workmen, whose dream is now to possess a rifle or a carbine some day, for use not abroad, but at home.

"Perhaps the future historian will see in the agony under the Brown Terror the birthpangs of the German revolution—a revolution compared with which the upheaval of 1918 will seem a mild reform."

INTERNATIONALISM AND ISOLATIONISM

But there is a third creed which is broader, saner, and more realistic than either of the others. It is the creed on which this country acted when it used its decisive influence in world affairs to bring the League of Nations into existence. For it should not be forgotten that British and Dominion statesmen had more to do than any other country, not excluding the United States, with framing the Covenant and making the League live.

The authors of the Covenant were no visionaries, but hard-headed statesmen schooled in the terrible experience of the Great War. They believed that another war would destroy civilisation. They realised that to have peace we must subordinate sovereignty to world-wide institutions and obligations.

The World War was the inevitable result of international anarchy, of a world where each Government was sole judge of its own rights and of the action which it should take to defend those rights. In the pre-war world States proceeded on the assumption that (a) to have peace you must prepare for war; (b) war was sooner or later inevitable; (c) safety lay in being stronger than your neighbours. The world was so powerfully organised for war that States were dragged into war, as in 1914, when not only the peoples but actually the Governments in *all* the belligerent countries were firmly convinced that they were defending themselves, and that the war had been imposed upon them by unscrupulous enemies. The League is a revolt against all that. It gives a reasonable chance for the first time of getting rid of war altogether. For in the League States have undertaken obligations not to go to war, to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and to take joint action against a peace-breaker. Above all, they have undertaken to submit to international judgment the question of whether a State is acting in self-defence or guilty of aggression.

The only way to get peace is to make the League of Nations a reality. The only alternative to the League that has been or can be proposed is to revert to international anarchy, through isolation as preached by Lord Beaverbrook, or military alliances as favoured by the *Morning Post*. States will not accept international judgment on what is self-defence unless it is backed by international action against the peace-breaker. And self-judged self-defence means international anarchy and war.

We see to what a pass we have been brought by the Government ignoring the Covenant in fact while paying lip-service to the

League. Is it not clear that if it had the courage of its cynical convictions, took the advice of the Rothermeres and Beaverbrooks and *Morning Posts*, and openly repudiated the Covenant, we should find ourselves back in no time in the jungle of international anarchy? This country, as part of a world-wide Commonwealth, a close neighbour of Europe, as one of the world's greatest workshops, markets, and financial centres, would find it a physical impossibility to cease intercourse and trade with the rest of the world. We should be compelled to maintain a thousand contacts and sources of potential friction with every community under the sun. That means we should be bound to have disputes with other States. In those disputes each side would be judge of its own rights. Any party in the State which attempted always to yield our view of our rights to the foreigner rather than endanger peace would soon be driven from office by those who stood for 'defending the country's honour and vital interests' and 'a strong foreign policy'.

International anarchy means a see-saw between isolation and alliances. They are but different aspects of the same game—the game of the Balance of Power. That game is merely the political expression of the doctrine "if you want peace, prepare for war". International anarchy means a world organised for war, a world in which war is bound to come, however passionately the great mass of the people in all countries desires peace.

But so long as the League exists, even a small minority, provided it be resolute and clear-headed, can get peace. In the League it will find the instrument, the world-wide institutions and obligations it requires to organise the world for peace. The first need is for the Government of a Great Power to have the courage and intelligence to use that instrument for the purpose for which it was designed. The forces working for peace or for war in the world are so nicely balanced, and the British Commonwealth is such a decisive factor in determining the course of world events, that this country can lead the world to peace or make irresistible the drift towards Armageddon.

WHO ARE THE REALISTS?

At present we have a Government that does not believe in the possibility of peace. Germany, Italy, and Japan have Governments that believe war is inevitable and desirable. Hence the great paradox. The wiseacres tell us that the idealism of the League

system is so exalted that it will break down even if worked by Governments that believe in the League. But instead the League is proving a fact so hard that the Governments and politicians who are completely sceptical, or even regard it as a sin against the Holy Ghost of their particular brand of nationalist dogma, feel constrained to pay it lip-service. The League to-day does not represent idealism against reality. It represents the reality of the modern world of crowded, interdependent, peace-loving peoples, a reality so stubborn that it wrecks the policies of the nationalist Governments, inspired by a sort of inverted idealism, an international cynicism so base that they shrink from proclaiming it openly. If hypocrisy be the tribute paid by vice to virtue, the League is reaping in full measure that tribute to the reality of its existence.

But this tug-of-war between reaction and reality cannot go on indefinitely. There is grave danger of the world blundering into another great war simply through ignoring the elementary conditions, indeed the very existence of the peace system. The League is not an entity that can function apart from the nations composing it. It is merely a set of treaty obligations and a system of international machinery which those nations are pledged to use. If there is general disregard of their pledges by the Members of the League, there is no way to make the League function. In two years we have moved from a state of profound peace to general apprehension about the next world war. If we continue to progress backwards much farther along the path paved with the good intentions of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon, our children are not long for this world.

What are we to do to have peace? Ultimately, the only way is to sweep out the Kerenskis of reaction, and put in a Peace Government capable of leading the world. But for that time and preparation are necessary. We still have time. The situation to-day is grave, but it is not desperate. Adam Smith once said there was much ruin in a nation. There is even more in a civilisation. So far from being inevitable, war to-day is so terrible and unnatural that to make it requires long and almost prohibitively expensive training and equipment. In this process such moral resistances and material difficulties have to be overcome that the Government which embarks in earnest and over a long period on the task of preparing for war runs a grave and increasing risk of revolution.

GREAT BRITAIN'S PART

The first thing to do is to regain confidence in ourselves. In the last two years we have become apathetic and frightened. Our prestige has sunk and we have got into the habit of waiting on others instead of having a policy of our own. Let us remember that this country wields "enormous influence . . . both in Geneva and throughout the world. Great Britain often has it in her hands to decide the great issues which arise in international affairs. A strong lead from the British Government in favour of the principles upon which the League is founded will always rally the support of the overwhelming majority of other nations."*

That is the spirit we must recapture. After all, England has had time to learn and to teach some lessons of political wisdom. The dictators who rule in Europe to-day are mere upstarts in statecraft and social philosophy. Most of what they think now we condemned in the days of Philip II and the Inquisition. Let us by all means learn from them—what to adopt and what to avoid. Above all let us learn from them the lesson of self-confidence and faith. And then let us proclaim to the world that our own political traditions are saner and more profound, in every way more inspiring and hopeful for civilisation than the ancient creeds of despotic terror and eternal war that have sprung up again like toadstools from the blood-soaked soil of the battlefields.

The second thing we must do is to be clear on the point that to have peace we must make the League of Nations a reality. On paper, the world has a comprehensive peace-system, of which the basis is the Covenant and its collateral the Paris Pact. Nay more, we have laid new and world-wide foundations for society, a vast structure of international machinery for adjusting differences and for co-operating on matters of common concern over a wide range of subjects—economics, finance, transport and communications, health, traffic in narcotics, in arms, in women and children. We are organised for coping with both international and economic anarchy, for regulating the life of the world. We have a nascent World Commonwealth. But the machinery rusts unused. The world's peace system is but a paper bulwark against war. The World Commonwealth remains an ideal to which most of us do not pay even the compliment of lip-service.

World-wide institutions need a world loyalty to make them live. The nationalist reactionaries who have refused to live up to our

* Mr. Arthur Henderson, *Labour's Foreign Policy*.

League obligations, and have thereby discredited and weakened the League, now draw the conclusion that they have been right all along in saying that the League is no good and we must return to international anarchy and prepare for war. They are like men who kick up the dust and then complain they cannot see. Their remedy is to step back half a century or more.

Those of us who have not abandoned faith in civilisation and the hope of peace will, on the contrary, conclude that it behoves us to find a way of creating the new corporate spirit. That is the third thing we must do, the most fundamental and the most difficult.

A world loyalty cannot be manufactured out of whole cloth. We must build on beginnings that already exist. A world loyalty strong enough to engender a code of international conduct capable of restraining the homicidal tendencies of patriots must fulfil three conditions. It must: (a) be rooted in reality, i.e. have a 'local habitation and a name', and possess institutions with a hold on governments and public opinion; (b) spring from existing collective emotional loyalties deep and general enough to move the mass of men; (c) appear not as a departure from but a development of our own political traditions.

Through our country's membership of the League we have become citizens of a world community. We are responsible for our Government, and our Government has certain duties to the League. We are committed to a world-wide network of institutions and obligations for preserving peace and promoting the common interests of civilised nations.

THE INDIVIDUAL, THE STATE, AND THE WORLD

The League of Nations, therefore, is the new reality to which we must be loyal. That means a readjustment of our ideas of the relationship between the individual and the community. We must enlarge the scale of our political thinking. We can do so without any violence to our traditions. The Covenant owes everything to our political philosophy. The English, as contrasted with the Prusso-Nazi-Fascist, view of the State has generally been humanist and rational and regarded war as an evil—a contrast to the Prussian philosophy of the time. Thomas Hill Green, for instance, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford half a century ago, taught that the State derived its right to exist from the extent to which it served the common good of the people within its jurisdiction. Its purpose,

he said, should be to realise full equality between all its citizens. A State containing privileged classes or bodies of people thwarted in their development was imperfect and its imperfection was a source of danger to other States. War was always wrong, unnecessary and harmful. A State "that needs to defend its interests by action injurious to those outside it" has no ultimate justification for its action. Such a State "by no means fulfils its purpose, and might perhaps be swept away and superseded by another with advantage to the ends for which the true State exists."*

These doctrines, applied to our membership of the League, lead straight to the conclusion that a government injuring the world community by a Covenant-breaking war may be swept away, even at the cost of destroying the State or superseding it by another.

So much for the first and the third conditions which an effective world loyalty must fulfil. Let us now examine the emotional tap-roots from which a world loyalty may grow. There are four main sources of collective loyalty in human society to-day. They may be distinguished analytically, but they usually occur blended in a greater or lesser degree.

PATRIOTISM

The first and strongest is patriotism. To-day patriotism is often a curse and an enemy of civilisation. But there have always been patriots who believed in living for their countrymen rather than dying for their country. It has been pointed out times without number in the last few years by statesmen, writers, and thinkers that such patriotism is not offended but fulfilled by loyalty to the concept of world peace through world order guaranteed by the League of Nations. Thomas Hill Green argued that "it is utterly false to speak as if the desire for one's own nation to show more military strength than others were the only or the right form of patriotism". The love of mankind, no doubt, must be particularised to have any power over life or action.

"But there is no reason why this localised or nationalised philanthropy should take the form of a jealousy of other nations or a desire to fight them, personally or by proxy. Those in whom it is strongest are every day expressing it in good works which benefit their fellow-citizens without interfering with the men of other nations. Those who from

* From the lecture on "The Rights of the State over the Individual in War" in *The Principles of Political Obligation*.

time to time talk of the need of a great war to bring unselfish impulses into play, give us reason to suspect that they are too selfish themselves to recognise the unselfish activity that is going on all round them. . . . Patriotism, in that special military sense in which it is distinguished from public spirit, is not the temper of the citizen dealing with fellow-citizens, or with men who are themselves citizens in their several States, but that of the follower of the feudal chief, or of the member of a privileged class conscious of a power, resting ultimately on force, over an inferior population, or of a nation holding empire over other nations."

The idea of justice began within a State from considerations of interest and then developed into habitual and unquestioning respect for each other's rights by all good citizens. In the same way,

"although considerations of an identity of interests, arising out of trade may be the occasion of men's recognising in men of other nations those rights which war violates, there is no reason why, upon that occasion and through the familiarity which trade brings about, an idea of justice, as a relation which should subsist between all mankind as well as between members of the same State, may not come to act on men's minds as independently of all calculation of their several interests as does the idea which regulates the conduct of the good citizen".

This is the noblest form of patriotism—love of our fellow-men and love of justice. A patriot in this sense will hold that on the issue of peace our first loyalty must go to the organised community of nations, and that a government which violates its obligations to that community thereby forfeits all claim to the obedience of good citizens.

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY OF THE WORKERS

The second great emotional force in the world to-day is the international solidarity of the workers. In its extremest form it becomes the Communist dogma of proletarian unity in revolt against the rest of society. But the great bulk of the Labour Movement does not deny the claims of patriotism. It is, however, asserting with increasing force that patriotism must be subordinated to loyalty to the collective peace system. In July a Congress of the International Federation of Trade Unions, the organised Labour Movement pledged itself emphatically to the view that every political, economic, or other dispute must be submitted to arbitration or to the League, and that a Government resorting

to war in defiance of this obligation must be boycotted. This boycott should be made effective by a general strike, both within the aggressor country and in other countries, to withhold supplies from the aggressor Government. The International Socialist Conference in August adopted the same view. It was strongly emphasised at the Brighton Trades Union Congress in September.

Mr. Arthur Henderson, in his pamphlet *Labour's Foreign Policy*, declares that the Labour Movement is determined to use its united resources against a Government that breaks its pledge to keep the peace. Sir Stafford Cripps in several speeches has emphasised that it is the duty of the workers to be loyal to the League even against their own Government, and even to the extent of revolutionary action if ever the Government were condemned by the League as an aggressor. The same doctrine was proclaimed forcefully at the International Socialist Conference by Dr. Hugh Dalton. Dr. Dalton drew attention to what he called the ideal solution, namely, that the economic sanctions of the Labour Movement should be co-ordinated with the political sanctions of the League, and laid stress upon the refusal of arbitration as the test of aggression.

Mr. Walter Citrine, speaking as President of the International Trades Union Congress, said that—

“It seems everywhere expected of the working-class organisations that they will by means of the general strike resist the attempts to make war. . . . Governments must be made to face their responsibility. . . . The world's Peace Charter has been written. It is embodied in the Covenant and the Treaty, variously known as the Peace Pact, the Paris Pact, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Labour puts loyalty to that Charter foremost on the issue of peace. We declare that a Government which commits the supreme international crime of war betrays civilisation. Governments must comply with their obligations as members of the League and signatories of the Peace Pact. They must submit to international judgment on the question whether they are acting in self-defence or are guilty of aggression. From this Congress we announce that as Trade Unionists we shall accept not the word of our Governments, but the judgment of the world community on the question of war and peace.”

HATRED OF WAR

The third source of intense mass emotion to-day is the fear and loathing of war. The resolutions at Oxford and the other Universities in which the intellectual élite of our country pledged themselves by great majorities ‘in no circumstances to fight for

king and country' are significant. The resolution was thus drafted in order to enable not only absolute pacifists but also believers in fighting a revolutionary war, or fighting for the League against an internationally condemned aggressor, to vote in its favour. Mr. Beverley Nichols' book *Cry Havoc* is another sign of the times, for in it the author declares his unalterable determination never to fight for king and country and his readiness to fight in an international army for the League. The Anti-War Movement is another outcome of intense hatred of war. It has suffered from Communist influence to the extent of making it a movement not so much for preventing war as for preparing to turn the war it assumes to be inevitable into a civil war.

RELIGION AND WAR

The last but not the least of the collective loyalties that sway men to-day is organised religion. Except for a few out-and-out pacifists, organised religion hitherto has been indistinguishable in its attitude to war from patriotism. Indeed, it is notorious that in the Great War the Christian God in each country was degraded into becoming a tribal god of war, and that the Churches became adjuncts of the recruiting centres and Foreign Office propaganda bureaux.

But there is to-day a sincere revolt against the utter inability of the Churches to apply Christianity to war, and a growing determination that this shall not be allowed to happen again. This determination was expressed at the Lambeth Conference in 1930 in a resolution (No. 27) declaring that—

“When nations have solemnly bound themselves by Treaty, Covenant, or Pact for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the Conference holds that the Christian Church in every nation should refuse to countenance any war in regard to which the Government of its own country has not declared its willingness to submit the matter in dispute to arbitration or conciliation.”

THE STATE WITHIN THE LAW

It is clear that our ideas of the relation between the individual and the community are already widening and that a world loyalty to the collective peace system is growing up without conscious

volition under the pressure of immediate necessities. Our task is to harness these new forces, to give them conscious direction and an ultimate goal.

The ultimate goal is not difficult to discern. Let us proclaim that if civilisation is to survive mankind must be organised into a World Commonwealth. The League is the basis of the future Commonwealth and the instrument by means of which we can achieve our purpose.

To imprint conscious direction on the nascent world loyalty we must give a new meaning to the word 'constitutional'. This meaning must be in harmony with the enlarged scale of political thinking and the new attitude to war that are now necessary in view of our membership of the League. That is our fourth task.

In law, international treaty obligations rank as part of the constitution of a country. The courts, for instance, are obliged to regard a treaty by which this country is bound as a basis for giving judgment, just as they do an Act of Parliament.* The word 'constitutional' must therefore henceforward connote not only what has hitherto been known as the Constitution of this country, but the obligations which have been assimilated to the Constitution through our signature of the Covenant, the Paris Pact, and the other treaties that together make up the world's collective peace system, or, as Mr. Walter Citrine has put it, the world's Peace Charter. The basis of that Charter is the obligation to submit to third-party judgment on what constitutes aggression or resort to war. Our duty is henceforth to compel the Government for which we are responsible to remain loyal to the world's Peace Charter, and to consider that any Government which violates this Charter becomes a rebel against the world community and a traitor to civilisation, breaks the Constitution, and forfeits all claim to the obedience of its citizens. The duty of all good citizens is to compel such a Government to return to its constitutional obligations and acknowledge the authority of the world community of which we are a member.

In this way the word 'constitutional' connotes a fundamental change in the tenets of traditional patriotism. In this way we can develop our own political traditions and enlarge our view of the relations between the individual and the community, into a fighting

* It has even been contended in this country and in the United States that all international law must be regarded as part of the legal systems of civilised countries, and this principle was explicitly laid down in one or two post-war constitutions.

peace policy that will make a reality of the League, and that will point the way to a world loyalty, a new political philosophy and religion. Fortified by this new philosophy and religion we can unhesitatingly reject the quack nostrums of Communism and Fascism and show the world how to have peace and save civilisation.

A PEACE ACT

Our fifth task is to give immediate expression to this new and revolutionary attitude by incorporating in the law of the land our fundamental obligations as a member of the organised world community. As Mr. Arthur Henderson has pointed out in his pamphlet *Labour's Foreign Policy*, there is still the greatest ignorance at home as to just what are these obligations and the greatest uncertainty abroad as to whether our Government will act upon them. Very few understand the meaning of a number of complicated treaties, whereas everyone who matters understands the main lines of a first-class Act of Parliament. Therefore, says Mr. Henderson, let us pass a Peace Act of Parliament pledging this country to settle all its disputes by the peaceful means prescribed in the treaties to which it is a party, not to resort to force, and not to aid or abet a country which is resorting to force.

The basis of the Peace Act would be the same as the basis of the Covenant, namely, the undertaking to submit to third-party judgment on the merits of any dispute in which we were engaged, including the claim in case of hostilities to be acting in self-defence and the steps to be taken to restore peace. The undertaking not to resort to force would clearly take the form of forbidding the Government to commit any of the acts described in the definition of aggression approved by a large number of countries at Geneva and subsequently embodied in a treaty between the Soviet Union and eight other States.

The debates and discussions that would accompany the passing of the Peace Act would be a first-class education to the people of this country in the A B C of our obligations as a Member of the League and a signatory of the Paris Pact. The adoption of the Act would make it clear to the world and to our own people that we were determined always to behave as a loyal member of the world community. The collective peace system would be firmly anchored in the law and the public conscience of this country. There is no doubt that once we had adopted the Peace Act our example would be followed in other countries.

Indeed, we should ourselves, as Mr. Henderson has pointed out, be following the example of the Spanish Republic, which has already incorporated in its constitution the principles to which Spain is committed as a Member of the League and signatory of the Paris Pact. The Congress of the Labour and Socialist International as far back as 1928 pledged all the Labour and Socialist Parties to work for passing precisely the kind of legislation that has just been proposed (and also gave the first impetus to what has since, as shown above, become a pledge by the Socialist and Trade Union Movement in general and our Labour movement in particular to adopt an attitude of revolutionary opposition to a Covenant-breaker).

Once the Peace Act were put on the Statute Book no Government would dare to repeal it, for by so doing it would brand itself as a potential war-maker and traitor to civilisation and arouse the most passionate opposition.

UNIVERSALISING THE LEAGUE

These two things—the wider interpretation of constitutionalism in the light of our membership of the world community and the Peace Act of Parliament—are measures that this country can carry out single-handed. There is one more principle to which we can pledge ourselves, for it is also within the unaided power of this country: that principle is consultation with the United States and the Soviet Union—the two great Powers outside the League—whenever there is any threat to world peace. Both countries have acted on this principle in the Far Eastern conflict, the United States officially, the Soviet Union informally. Both countries have participated in the Disarmament Conference, and have in connection with this Conference declared their willingness to enter into a Consultative and Non-Aggression Pact and to accept a definition of aggression. These declarations were made in connection with the Disarmament Convention and were accompanied in the case of the Soviet Union by the raising of certain difficulties as to the relation of this consultative procedure to the machinery of the League. Although it should therefore be our policy to get both countries into a Consultative and Non-Aggression Pact, strengthened by a definition of aggression and related to the machinery of the League, that is not a matter that this Government alone can decide. But we can pledge ourselves unequivocally to act on the principle

of consultation, so that in fact, whatever may be the form, the League will become truly world-wide when it comes to concerting measures to deal with a breach of the peace.

This third principle is directed outward, whereas the new interpretation of constitutionalism on the one hand, and the Peace Act on the other, are directed inwards. They are ways of bringing the League into the life of this country, of making an intimate and ever-present reality of our membership of the world community, and thereby giving strength and vitality to that community, of which the British Commonwealth of Nations is so large a part. It is this two-fold proposal which must be driven into the public mind.

AN ELECTION ISSUE

The time has come when the issue must be clearly drawn between those who believe in world peace through world order, based on a world loyalty, and those who understand only international anarchy and consequently hold that patriotism must be supreme and war inevitable. There will, of course, be many who will say this issue is not important. They will plead for ambiguity and for some question-begging formula.

But this issue is real. It is supremely important. It must be fought to a finish at the next General Election. Otherwise the battle for peace that has hung so nicely balanced for the last fifteen years will be lost. We who survived the last war will have the agony of seeing our children slaughtered in the next.

If the twofold proposal outlined above is ever to become a reality, it must be backed by organisation and leadership. It must be pressed, not as a separate idea, a sort of magic panacea guaranteed to produce instant results, but as part of a comprehensive peace policy to be carried out by a Government over a period of years.

It is to be hoped that the proposal of a 'Peace Act' and of organising revolutionary resistance to a Government that involves us in war because it has turned traitor to the League, will be taken up by non-party bodies, such as the National Peace Council, the New Commonwealth Society, and the various pacifist groups in the Universities. It may further be hoped that the League of Nations Union will drive home the fact that there is now a law against war, a common law binding all citizens of all the States Members of the League. The very existence of this law is almost universally ignored. And yet it does exist. It is a fact

that we have become citizens of the world through signing the Covenant. Momentous consequences flow from that fact. They affect the nature of the State, its relations to other States, and its rights over the individual in war time, the legal status of war and the duties of citizenship. We require something like a political and patriotic reformation, a revolutionary readjustment of fundamental concepts, in order to bring our ideas and our loyalties into harmony with these new facts. Could not the League of Nations Union with advantage begin to explain the League to public opinion in terms of the new civic duties flowing from the fact that the Covenant is part of our Constitution? A Peace Act of Parliament to weld Covenant and Constitution into one whole; uncompromising loyalty to the League, issuing on the one hand in whole-hearted support for a government acting as a loyal member of the League, and on the other in determined and if necessary revolutionary opposition to a Covenant-breaker—those are the necessities that would seem to be the implications of our signature to the Covenant of the League.

In view of the Lambeth Conference resolution quoted above, we are entitled to hope that the Churches may accept and preach as the golden mean between impotence in the face of the problem of war and the absolute pacifist position, the doctrine that it is the duty of every good Christian to support any Government only in so far as it shows itself a guardian of peace by loyalty to the League, and to become a conscientious objector against any Government which had been declared by the League to be guilty of aggression or resort to war. If this doctrine became part of the conception of good citizenship of the millions of sincere Christians in this country, we could rest assured that all future British Governments would act as vigilant servants of peace.

There is thus room and need for non-party and all-party support and discussion on the twofold peace proposal. The central issue transcends politics and becomes a moral problem worthy of consideration by the Churches.

THE LEAGUE IN PARTY POLITICS

But if the Peace Act is ever to get on the Statute Book, if the issue between world order and peace versus international anarchy and war is to be fought out before it is too late, the proposal must be adopted by a major political party. Let us face the fact that

this means bringing the League into party politics. That is perhaps the chief merit of the proposal. For to bring the League into party politics is to bring the problem of peace back to reality by plunging it into national life.

To-day world peace and the League as its guardian are discredited and dying because they are being killed by kindness, smothered in hypocrisy and unreality. It has become common form for every politician to describe whatever iniquity he is contemplating as a tribute to the League and peace and to talk of the League as though it were an entity independent of the Governments of which it is composed and the treaty obligations by which they are bound.

The result in this country has been that instead of our Government's sins of omission and commission and the growing alarm at the danger of war they have produced recoiling on its own head, the League of Nations is getting the discredit for the results of our letting it down. Some of our stoutest pacifists are now in despair echoing the demand of the Yahoo Press that we return to isolation. It is this mental and moral confusion, where wolves in sheep's clothing are suffered to do the devil's work in the name of the Lord, and some indubitable and highly respected sheep have been deluded into imitating the wolf howl in the belief that they were raising a cry for peace, that must be ended at all costs if we are not to drift into another world war.

The United States are often quoted as a horrible example of bringing the League into party politics. It is forgotten that the issue then was whether or not America should become a Member of the League. The time has long gone by when any political party that had any hope of being returned to power could advocate this country withdrawing from the League. The commitments and record of all parties and of several Imperial Conferences, the attitude of public opinion, the complex structure of treaty obligations built up by successive Coalition, Conservative, and Labour Governments in the last fifteen years on which our international position and relations are based, and of which the Covenant is the keystone, put such a possibility beyond the pale of practical politics. Whatever may be the lines on which the controversy over the 'Peace Act and direct action against war' proposal would develop, it would proceed on the basis of the acceptance of the Covenant by all parties as our basic treaty obligation.

The real issue is different. What we are up against to-day is that although this country has been for fifteen years one of the principal Members of the League, the vast majority of our people,

including newspaper editors,* Members of Parliament, and Cabinet Ministers, not only have not the faintest conception of even the elementary principles of the post-war collective peace system, but have their minds stuffed full of ideas that are the antithesis of these principles and that must be ruthlessly scrapped if the principles are ever to be translated into practice. There has probably never been so much hypocrisy and confusion of thought in international relations as there is to-day.

Nothing less than a first-class political campaign is required to implant in the minds of at least a few Cabinet Ministers and a sprinkling of M.P.s and foreign editors the elementary knowledge required if our Government is to make the post-war peace system work, if we are to have a public opinion that will know a war policy when it sees it. The present abysmal ignorance and blind clinging to the outworn creed of international anarchy must be ended. It has already brought us within sight of another great war. We need, above all, a Peace Government. Only a real peace policy, based on the fundamental conviction that loyalty to the League comes first, that loyalty to one's own country is a secondary matter on the issue of peace, can give us the hope of national salvation.

* The *Clarion*, *Daily Herald*, *Manchester Guardian*, *News Chronicle*, *New Statesman and Nation*, *Spectator*, *Time and Tide*, and *Week-End Review* are among the honourable exceptions.

III.—HOW TO GET PEACE

“One may well ask . . . whether Nationalism has not become since the war an even more disruptive and explosive force than it was before. . . . We have seen the whole of belligerent Europe pass through very grave economic revolutions. . . . But although the breakdown of the present order has come far more from the nationalist and militarist agitator than from the Socialist, the business or professional man of Europe . . . seems very nearly as friendly as ever to those nationalist doctrines whose outcome has . . . so shaken his social order that it is extremely doubtful whether Western civilisation can now survive. . . . And not only that. He often reserves his hostility for those who attempt to prevent a repetition of the revolutions and civil wars which began in 1914. He admits that that vast upheaval was the natural result of the anarchist basis of international life, of the fact that nations live with one another in ‘a state of nature’, each a law unto himself with no organised society to give order and system to their relations; but any attempt to remedy that anarchy immediately excites his deepest hostility.”
—Sir NORMAN ANGELL.

“The consciousness of a common purpose in mankind, or even the acknowledgment that such a common purpose is possible, would alter the face of world politics at once.”—GRAHAM WALLAS.

WE have seen that what we must do in this country if the world is to have peace is to return to power at the first opportunity a Peace Government pledged to carry out a peace policy based on the League.

The national financial crisis made many good citizens believe that we must shelve party politics and elect a National Government. It is plain now that our financial crisis was merely a preliminary symptom of the world-wide economic crisis. The latter, by the operation of a sort of vicious circle, has given rise to political reaction and economic nationalism, which in turn have aggravated and complicated the economic crisis until it has become a peace crisis, threatening to end in war and revolution.

For the last year and more statesmen and experts, without distinction of party or nationality, have been telling us, at Geneva, London, and elsewhere, that the economic and political aspects of the crisis are inseparable, and can be tackled only by a bold and comprehensive international policy. No final economic recovery, they say, without political pacification, without putting an end to the fear of war and restoring international confidence.

A PEACE GOVERNMENT

There is only one conclusion to be drawn from these facts: At the next election, too, we must forsake ordinary party allegiances and prejudices and concentrate on electing a Peace Government.

But the sad history of the doctor's mandate shows it is impossible to trust any Government with a free hand. Nature proverbially abhors a vacuum. A Government elected to power without a policy will go on having no policy. Or it will follow the line of least resistance emerging from the competitive pressures of its different members and of organised interests. That line will generally lead it backwards.

There is no tried and proven orthodoxy on which a Peace Government can fall back. The task of organising the world for peace is new and unprecedented. To tackle that job in earnest requires a revolutionary reorientation of fundamental political concepts.

For these reasons we must be clear at the outset that to have peace it is essential to return to power only men who have individually and collectively pledged themselves to the three principles outlined in the last chapter—revolutionary resistance to a Covenant-breaker; putting the Covenant into the Constitution; and contact with the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. in case of any threat to world peace.

It is neither possible nor desirable to commit a party or a Government to a detailed policy in advance. But any Government composed of men and supported by a party pledged to these three principles could be trusted to pursue a sound and bold peace policy. Indeed, the main lines of such a policy, based on these principles, have been sketched by Mr. Arthur Henderson in his pamphlet *Labour's Foreign Policy*. The *Spectator*, *News Chronicle*, and *Star* have pointed out that the policy put forward in this pamphlet is in no way a party policy. It should, they say, be a policy common to all who want peace and believe we can have it only by making a reality of the League. It is the kind of policy that inevitably results, whatever the party in power, from basing our international relations, in deed as well as in word, on the Covenant.

What we must do, therefore, is to persuade all existing organisations—the League of Nations Union, the National Peace Council, the New Commonwealth Society, Youth Leagues, study circles, and associations of all kinds, whether or not belonging to a political party—to make these principles familiar to all who are politically

active. The object would be to compel all parliamentary candidates in all constituencies to pledge themselves to these three principles on pain of losing the peace vote.

Theoretically this would mean electing a Peace Government with support from all three parties. But let us be honest. Some of us saw from the outset that to elect a National Government with a doctor's mandate meant in fact electing a Conservative Government together with a fringe of M.P.s prepared to stick to the Conservatives through thick and thin.* It should be equally clear from the outset that to vote for a Peace Government composed and supported by men pledged to the three peace principles means in fact voting for Labour and for those who will support a Labour Government so long as it carries out its peace policy.

The Conservative Party is an anarchist party. It believes in the inevitability of war, not in a real peace policy. Even if a few Liberal candidates forgot their record of the last two years† and accepted the three principles, the electors would have to choose between voting for Labour and a Peace Government or wasting their vote on the Liberal and thereby splitting the peace vote and perhaps letting in an international anarchist. The situation is so grave that we must be realistic and put first things first. If we care for the lives of our children we cannot take the risk of putting in the Conservatives again until they have abandoned their belief in anarchy and war. Nor can we ignore the fact that Liberal parties have decayed and fallen to pieces not only in this but in all countries; there is no prospect of political Liberalism coming back in the near future, for the causes of its decline are many and deep-seated.

Let us also, in the name of political realism and honesty, recognise that the pursuit of peace will not be an easy task. To anyone open to persuasion there is nothing disloyal to one's country in saying that it should form part of a World Commonwealth, any more than an Englishman is unpatriotic if he is loyal to the Empire. Fundamentally our peace policy must be advocated because it is sound and constructive. We must appeal to common sense and reason. We must put our case on its merits as they appear to fair-minded men and women, to all who love their country in terms of home and civilisation.

* Tempered by such strange devices as the 'agreement to differ' in the Cabinet.

† Sir Herbert Samuel, while still in the Government, made a speech in which he praised Sir John Simon's masterly handling of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Has a single prominent Liberal so far raised his voice to condemn the Government's betrayal of peace and the League in the Far East?

But let us be realists. Let us face the fact that the proposal to subordinate the readiness to fight for king and country, to loyalty to the League, strikes at the root of what many consider most sacred in patriotism. What they prize is precisely the anarchic refusal to look beyond the State, the element of barbarous and blind fanaticism, the readiness to kill and be killed at the word of command. This fanaticism is the last refuge of those who need to give an outlet to their passions by forgetting themselves and behaving in a way which, without the sanction of patriotism, they would recognise as wicked. On this subject they feel mystic and violent.

That is why a real peace policy will be bitterly opposed. It will be derided and subjected to every kind of misrepresentation and appeal to passion and prejudice.

THE POVERTY FRONT AND THE PEACE FRONT

We who believe in world peace through world order must have the courage of our convictions. We must be prepared for a hard fight. We must be ready with an answering passion. We must show that to insist on the right of the people to decide for themselves on the dread issue of peace or war and to refuse to be driven like sheep to the slaughter at the bidding of an anarchist and traitor Government, is an integral part of the struggle to free the disinherited from the tyranny of their exploiters, to secure a fair distribution of wealth and the chance of a decent life for all. It is no accident that the City in its cynical greed and worship of the golden calf has joined with the Conservative Party in believing that its interests are on the side of Japanese militarism against the League. The exploiters of the poor and the believers in violence against the weak are always in the same camp. Those who made the world crisis are now making the next world war. The poverty front and the peace front have become one. We must make the people understand that unlimited sovereignty and economic anarchy already mean starvation in the midst of plenty and in a few years will mean another world war, of which will be born a new dark age destructive of all that makes life dear to civilised men.

Above all, let us throw down a ringing challenge to the base and insane creed of the Fascists, Nazis, and their nationalist and militarist brethren in all countries. They would degrade patriotism to idolatry of the State, the worship of Moloch and Juggernaut. They teach that we must all be slaves of the State, and that the

State is bound for ever to the treadmill of war. We must spurn these savage superstitions in the name of civilisation and set before the world a saner and more splendid vision. We must raise patriotism to the love of humanity and teach that we can and will achieve the unity of mankind in a World Commonwealth.

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