

SELF-DETERMINATION
FOR
AUSTRIA

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By

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SELF-DETERMINATION FOR AUSTRIA

I

THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES

THE United States did not enter the war for the sake of material advantage, but, as its President proclaimed, in order to bring a new order into the world.

In the introduction to his message to Congress, in which President Wilson, on January 8, 1918, made known his programme—the famous Fourteen Points—he said:

“We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. . . . It is that the world be made . . . safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression.”¹

Two great ideas dominate this programme:

1. The right of self-determination of the peoples.
2. The creation of a new community of nations for the maintenance of the new order—the League of Nations.

¹ *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. Edited by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, *War and Peace*, vol. i, p. 158.

The President concluded his address:

"We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honour, and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test."¹

In his speech at Mount Vernon, on July 4, 1918—the well-known "Four Points"—he summed up his programme in the words:

"These great objects can be put into a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind."²

The President reiterated his lofty ideals again and again. Thus he said:

"Peoples and promises are not to be bartered about

¹ *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. Edited by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, *War and Peace*, vol. i, p. 162.

² *Ibid.*, p. 234.

from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game. . . . Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned." "Self-determination . . . is an imperative principle which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." ¹

These principles were accepted by the people of the United States. They formed the basis of the American Government's war policy. Hence they do not represent the private opinion of the President, but the official attitude of the United States.

These principles were also accepted by the Governments associated with the United States. Hence they also form the basis of the war policy of the Allied and Associated Powers.

But these principles were also accepted by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

On October 4, 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Government, through the good offices of the Swedish Government, proposed a dispatch to the President that an armistice be concluded and negotiations for peace begun. In this dispatch it declared expressly that "the fourteen points of President Wilson's message to Congress on January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's speech of February 12, 1918, are to be taken as the basis for the conclusion of peace". In like manner the Austro-Hungarian Government, in renewing, on October 17, 1918, its proposal for an armistice, declared again that it "accepted all the stipulations which the President has made a condition

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 180, 182-3.

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of beginning negotiations for an armistice and
peace”.

From a legal standpoint, therefore, the situation is
as follows:

The United States declared that she was ready to
conclude peace on the conditions proclaimed by its
President. Since the President also spoke in the name
of his Allies, his declarations were binding on all the
Entente Powers.

Austria-Hungary accepted these conditions. Hence
there came into existence between the two belligerents
an agreement which is naturally binding on both parties.
Relying upon this agreement, Austria-Hungary laid
down her arms. Let us now consider the course taken
by the other party to the agreement.

II

THE TREATY OF ST. GERMAIN AND THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

WITH the cessation of hostilities the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy fell to pieces. In his manifesto of October 16, 1918, the Emperor Charles had made an attempt to reconstruct the Monarchy in accordance with President Wilson's principles, in the form of a federated state of independent nations, in which every race should, within its own territory, establish its own national administration. But it was too late to bring about a peaceful adjustment among the various peoples making up the Monarchy. The Hungarians broke away, the Czechs and the Poles formed their own new, independent States. The Italians, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, and Rumanians joined the neighbouring States peopled by races of their own blood. Thereupon the Austrian Germans likewise declared themselves, on November 12, 1918, a new, independent State, the "German-Austrian Republic" (*Republik Deutschösterreich*).

The first fundamental constitutional law of the new Republic, adopted by the provisional National Assembly on November 12, 1918, declared in Article 2: "German Austria is a constituent part of the German Republic." By a law of November 22, 1918, the territory of the new Republic was declared to be the territory, within the frontiers of what was formerly Austria, occupied by Germans.

In taking this action, the Austrian Germans followed the principle of the right of self-determination of the

peoples proclaimed by President Wilson, that high ideal for which the United States and the associated Governments allege that they waged war against the Central Powers. They acted precisely as did the other nations of the Monarchy. They trusted in the promise made to them and the world that the time had passed—the words are the President's—when peoples could be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were pawns in a game.

This trust was most cruelly betrayed. The Treaty of Peace submitted, together with its covering note, to the German-Austrian representatives in St. Germain was a mockery of the proclaimed right of self-determination.

More than three and a half million Germans, a number equal to that of the population of Norway or Denmark, occupying exclusively a territory almost as large as Belgium, were handed over to the new State of Czechoslovakia. More than a half-million Germans went to Italy. In other words, more than four million Austrian Germans were subjected to foreign domination. And thus the Republic of German Austria, which would have had almost eleven million inhabitants if the right of self-determination had been respected, was cut down to a dwarf State of only six and a half millions.

One would naturally think that, after more than four million of their inhabitants had been torn from them, the Austrian Germans would at least have been permitted to exercise the elementary right of deciding of what State they would form a part. But even this right was denied them by the victors.

Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain provides:

"The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations." Therefore Austria engages to refrain, except with the consent of the said Council, from any action which could, directly or indirectly, or in any way whatsoever, endanger her independence, especially through participation in the affairs of another Power—until her admission to membership of the League of Nations.

The purpose of this article was to render impossible the union with the German Reich upon which German Austria had resolved.

It is typical of the victors' insincerity that they did not dare forbid the union of German Austria with Germany in so many words, but rather veiled the prohibition with the pretence of maintaining Austria's independence. Thus words were chosen that seemed in harmony with the ideals proclaimed by President Wilson, but were in reality a direct violation of those ideals. The text of the article demonstrates clearly what a bad conscience the victorious nations had when they drew up the Treaty.

But the insincerity of the Treaty of Peace culminates in the declaration that tiny German Austria, with its six and a half million inhabitants, is the direct successor and heir of the former great Austria, so that she is made responsible for everything which the victors believed they had a right to charge to their former enemy. The result is that the entire burden of the lost war was imposed upon the German Austrians, who had

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constituted a small minority in the old Austria, while the Austrian Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Italians, and Rumanians, who, like the Germans, had fought in the Austrian Army against the Entente, were suddenly transformed into victors who were permitted to enrich themselves at the expense of the Austrian Germans. Defenceless, half-starved by years of blockade, the ill-used German Austrians had no choice but to submit to superior force and sign the Treaty of St. Germain on September 19, 1919, if they did not desire to have the war resumed. For the Note accompanying the Treaty declared that the text could only be accepted or rejected, and that within a period of five days, on pain of having the victorious Powers impose their conditions by force. The Austrian representatives had been penned like wild beasts in barbed-wire enclosures. Oral negotiations, such as had heretofore been customary in discussing treaties of peace, were not permitted. The Austrians were only allowed to express their wishes and to receive answers in writing. History records no parallel of such procedure. It is downright blasphemous to call the dictated stipulations of St. Germain a treaty, for its substance as well as the manner in which it came into existence do violence to everything that religion, justice, and custom understand by the word treaty. The victors would have acted more honestly if they had openly declared that what they compelled the German-Austrian delegates to sign was an ultimatum, backed by force, to which the conquered had to submit.

The victorious Powers carried their contempt for the right of self-determination, proclaimed by them-

selves, so far that German Austria is not even permitted to bear the name chosen by herself.

When the territories of the former Empire occupied by Germans declared themselves a new, independent State, they purposely gave that State a new name. The intention was that the name should signify that this was no longer the former great State occupied by Germans, Czechs, Poles, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Italians, Ruthenians, and Rumanians, but an individual State made up of a mere fragment of the shattered Monarchy and inhabited by Germans. Accordingly, the Constitutional Law of November 18, 1918, expressly declared in Article 4 that the new State was not the legal successor of the old Austria. Nor, indeed, could this tiny German Austria, with but a fraction of the territory of the former State and with only six and a half million inhabitants, properly be such a successor. It would have been more justifiable to regard Czechoslovakia in that light, which is also a part of the old Austria; has thirteen and a half million inhabitants; and resembles the old State far more closely than does the new German Austria, since its population is made up of Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ruthenians.

Under threat of violence the victors compelled Austria to adopt the law of October 21, 1919, the first article of which reads: "German Austria, within the borders established by the Treaty of St. Germain, is a democratic Republic under the name Austria." That is, German Austria was forced to give up the new name which she had chosen and to accept one imposed by the conquerors.

This forcible change of name was not a mere pin-

prick. That could have been endured. It had a deeper meaning.

The old Austria, against which the Entente had fought, had fallen to pieces. It was necessary for the Entente to find someone upon whose shoulders it could lay all the burdens imposed by the Treaty of Peace. The hatred against everything German required that, among all the Austrian nationalities, the Germans should be chosen to bear the responsibility for the war. No consideration was given to the fact that only one of the five members of the Ministerial Council that issued the ultimatum to Serbia and then declared war was a German. Nor was any consideration paid to the fact that in the armies of the Monarchy, Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, and all the other nationalities making up the former Austro-Hungary, fought shoulder to shoulder with the Germans. The Austrian Germans, no more than a small fraction of the whole population, were held responsible for the ultimatum and the declaration of war, although they, just like the other sections of the population, were confronted by the Imperial Government with an accomplished fact, without having been consulted in advance. It is not generally known that the inhabitants of the Dual Monarchy had no voice in making peace or declaring war. This power rested solely with the Emperor.¹

The declaration of war on Serbia was decided upon in the two secret sessions of the Ministerial Council of July 7 and July 19, 1914. On July 28th the Emperor

¹ Constituent law of December 21, 1867 (R.G., B1, No. 145), Article 5: "The Emperor is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, declares war, and concludes peace."

Franz Joseph approved the proposal of Count Berchtold, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to declare war on Serbia. It is to be noted here that Berchtold was a Hungarian. The Germans, just like the Czechs, Poles, and other citizens of the Dual Monarchy, knew nothing of this proposal until they read of it in the newspapers. There can, therefore, be no more talk of German guilt for the war than of Polish, Croatian, or Czech guilt. If any responsibility at all rested on the Austrians, it was that they had suffered the adoption of a constitution under which it was possible for the Emperor to declare war upon the motion of five Ministers without consulting anybody else. But this guilt, if guilt it was, is shared equally by all the other peoples of the Monarchy.

And the statesmen of the Entente were, of course, perfectly familiar with these facts. But in order to be able to impose the responsibility for the war and all its consequences upon the shoulders of the Austrian Germans, recourse was had to the fiction that German Austria was not a newly established State, like Czechoslovakia, but was identical with the former Austria. To that end German Austria's name was taken from her and she was compelled to adopt the name Austria. This furnished the formal justification for the covering Note accompanying the Peace Treaty, which everywhere refers simply to "the Austrian people" and their responsibility for the war, and means thereby the Austrian Germans.

The peoples of the Entente Powers knew nothing about the situation in the old Monarchy. Hence they saw in the Peace of St. Germain a just punishment—which was precisely what had been intended by its

authors. To this end also the Austrian peace delegates were interned in a barbed-wire enclosure and verbal negotiations were refused. For if there had been an opportunity for such negotiations, the Austrians could have made the real situation known to the world, and the inhabitants of the Entente States would have discovered what an act of violence their statesmen were about to commit.

President Wilson had proclaimed the ideal of the right of self-determination of the peoples. And this is the way that ideal was realized!

The German Austrians know that the American people have no direct responsibility for these events, for they also were kept in ignorance of the truth about the situation by their leading statesmen. Nevertheless they cannot escape their share of responsibility for the injustice done to German Austria, for the United States is also expressly named as one of the parties to the Treaty. And although the Treaty was never ratified by America, it none the less bears the signatures of her representatives. Moreover—and this is the most important thing—it was drawn up with the consent of the President of the United States, and could not have been drawn up without it. For the Entente's victory had been made possible only through America's participation in the war. A bare threat by President Wilson to withdraw the American troops would have been sufficient to compel the Entente to make a just peace.

And the responsibility of the American Government became the responsibility of the American people at the moment when they became aware of the truth but

did not protest against the Treaty. Yet even then they did not learn the whole truth. The German Austrians are confident that if they ever do they will demand, with the same enthusiasm with which they entered the war, that the wrong done the Austrian Germans be righted.

III

AUSTRIA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

THE Treaty of St. Germain forcibly prevented the German Austrians from uniting with the people of the same blood in the German Reich. But it could not destroy their will to accomplish such a union. They still cherish the hope that the day will come when President Wilson's lofty ideals will be realized. This hope is based on Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, already referred to.

The Press of the countries opposed to such a union deliberately furthers the idea that Article 88 forbids the union of Austria with Germany. And since comparatively few persons are familiar with the Treaty of St. Germain, which has the dimensions of a thick book, the idea has found general belief. It cannot be too emphatically or too often made known that it is false.

Article 88 declares expressly that "the independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations". Hence the union of Austria with Germany is not forbidden, but merely made dependent on the Council's consent.

The purpose, with which the false assertions about the alleged prohibition of any union are disseminated is quite obvious. If the world can be made to believe that this union is really prohibited, every step taken by Austria towards bringing it about is made to appear as a violation of the alleged prohibition and hence of the Treaty of St. Germain. And that would furnish a

legal basis for resorting to reprisals against Austria if she should do anything to further union. In this manner the peoples of the victorious States are systematically deceived regarding the real situation, since if they knew the text of Article 88 they would never allow Austria to be deprived of the possibility of union provided for in the Treaty.

The manner in which the countries opposed to the union systematically further this ignorance as to the real contents of Article 88 is shown by the history of Austria's struggle for her right of self-determination. On October 10, 1920, the Austrian Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the Government to hold a plebiscite on the question of union with Germany. This did not imply that the union was to be effected in case of an affirmative vote. For the Austrians knew quite well that the Council of the League of Nations, which is dominated by the victorious Powers, would not consent to an immediate union. The purpose of the plebiscite was to establish the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Austrian Germans are in favour of union. For the opponents of union assert that it is desired only by a minority of hotheads, and that the majority is against it. This assertion was to be disproved by the plebiscite which, it was intended, should demonstrate how Austria was denied the right of self-determination.

The Entente Governments ought to have welcomed such a popular vote, for if it was true, as their Press maintained, that only an insignificant minority favoured union, this would have been demonstrated by the plebiscite, and the idea of union would have been

dead. But these same Governments knew perfectly well that a plebiscite would show an overwhelming majority for union, and hence that all assertions to the contrary would be disproved. The resolution, therefore, was most unwelcome to them. For if, as was expected, it had brought a great majority for union, the Austrian Government, basing its action on Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, would have petitioned the League of Nations to approve the union. And then the world would have learned that such union was not forbidden, but could be brought about with the consent of the League. This would have created an exceedingly embarrassing situation for the League. It would not have been able to consent to union against the will of the Great Powers opposed thereto, since it is precisely these Powers that dominate the League. It would, therefore, have been compelled to refuse Austria's petition.

But what reason could it have given? It had been the purpose of President Wilson, the creator of the League, that it should establish a society of the peoples to secure a new order in which the right of self-determination would be guaranteed to every nation. And the constitution of the League is an integral part of the Treaty of St. Germain. How, then, could a refusal to permit the union have been explained? If the petition to grant union had been rejected without the assignment of any reasons, or with threadbare and evasive diplomatic commonplaces, this would have demonstrated before the whole world that the League, the very first time it was called on to protect a people's right of self-determination, had denied all the ideal principles upon which it was based. The Great Powers

would have had to choose between consenting to the union or compromising the League in the gravest manner. And since they could not face these alternatives, the plebiscite had to be prevented by all means possible.

Hence the representatives of the Entente informed the Austrian Government that the holding of a plebiscite would be a violation of the Treaty of St. Germain, and they backed the declaration with threats. Their assertion was false, for while Article 88 forbids union without the consent of the League, it contains no prohibition for the Austrian people to express their desire for union. But since Austria is disarmed and powerless, the Government had no choice but to submit and to refrain from carrying out the will of Parliament as expressed in the resolution.

Thereupon a group of deputies presented to Parliament on February 10, 1921, the Bill ordaining a plebiscite. In order to deprive the Entente Powers of every pretext for interference, the preamble of the Bill expressly stated that the voters were merely to be asked to declare whether they were in favour of the union of Austria and Germany, and that Article 88 would not be affected by the plebiscite, since the sole purpose of the proposed vote was to learn the will of the people. If the plebiscite should result in a majority in favour of union, the Government, since Austria had in the meantime become a member of the League of Nations, should under the terms of Article 88 petition the League for consent to the union. In order to avoid any doubt as to the purpose of the plebiscite, the constitutional committee of the Parliament altered the

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tenor of the proposed law by adding to its text the provision that the question to be submitted to the voters should be whether they desired that the Government should thus petition the League.

One would naturally think that there could be no objection to such a plebiscite. For since Article 88 permits union, with the consent of the League, the Austrians must naturally be permitted to petition for such consent.

But not even that was permitted. The representatives of the Entente in Vienna threatened to resort to punitive sanctions—occupation of Austrian territory and the stoppage of credits and food supplies—if the Bill should become a law and the plebiscite should be carried out. This was naked violence, depriving the Austrians of even the few rights granted them by the Treaty of St. Germain. At the mercy of the conquerors, who were in a position to starve the people by stopping credits and food supplies, the Austrian Government, lacking the support of all the other States, was compelled to yield. The Bill was withdrawn and no plebiscite was held.

This action of the Entente evoked a storm of indignation in all the Austrian provinces. It was obvious that the right of self-determination of the peoples, which had been proclaimed with such moving pathos, had been merely a trick to weaken the Central Powers' resistance, and that the Entente was trampling on the ideals which it had inscribed on its banner. The movement for union assumed elemental force in the provinces, and the people decided to hold a plebiscite against the will of the Federal Government.

The plebiscite in Tyrol gave 145,302 votes for and only 1,805 votes against union with Germany. The inhabitants of the province of Salzburg voted 103,000 to 800 for union. The Styrian and Upper Austrian Diets also decided to hold a plebiscite. But the Entente intervened again and forced the abandonment of the plan by means of the severest threats.

This put an end for the time being to the movement in Austria for a plebiscite. The people realized their utterly defenceless condition and lack of any support from without, and saw that they must therefore submit to force. But it would be an error to believe that this means that the will to union has been broken. It has merely assumed a different form. For while the Entente has the physical power to prevent the formal, legal union of Austria with Germany, it cannot prevent the spiritual union of the Germans on both sides of the frontier. The Austrians know that the day will come when the world will realize what injustice has been done them, for in the long run truth cannot be suppressed by force. The peoples of the Entente countries will learn the truth and they themselves will compel their Governments to right the wrong done.

And the movement for union has shaped its aims accordingly. The first aim is to keep Austria alive; the second, to make the world understand what bitter injustice has been perpetrated; and the third, to make the spiritual union of the Germans here and in Germany ever closer, and, through adapting the institutions of the Austrian Republic to those of the German Reich, to pave the way for a future formal union. No one can prevent the Austrians from doing this. It cannot be

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prevented, for instance, that the new Austrian Penal Code shall have the same text as the German Code. And thus the boundary that separates the two States, which has long ceased to exist in the hearts of the Germans of Austria and the Germans of Germany, will remain in fact a mere line on the map, until the day comes when it will also disappear there.

IV

ARE THE AUSTRIANS RACIALLY DISTINCT FROM THE GERMANS?

B E C A U S E of the important rôle played in the world by public opinion, the Entente Governments naturally endeavour to conceal from their citizens the wrong done to Austria by clothing their actions as far as possible in a mantle of morality. And just as in the Treaty of St. Germain they had not the honesty to forbid union in so many words, so they now try unceasingly with the help of their Press to convince their citizens that the best reasons exist for maintaining Austria's independence.

One of the reasons most often adduced is that the Austrians are a distinct race, with their own culture, and must therefore be protected from being swallowed up by the annexationist German Reich. It is, to be sure, a strange fact that these Austrians, despite their alleged peculiar characteristics, have no more ardent wish than to let themselves be thus swallowed up. But that makes no impression on the anti-union Press, which counts on its readers' ignorance of Austria and of her people, history, and culture. Nor is it troubled by the fact that the Austrians would still have the right to join Germany even if they were a distinct and separate race. For by what right can a people be compelled to maintain its State independence against its own will?

But the Austrians are not a distinct race. They are Germans, precisely as are the Bavarians, Swabians, Saxons, or any other Germans. These facts are familiar

to everyone who knows anything about Austria, but there are so few persons in the Entente countries who do know anything about the situation that the myth of the distinct racial characteristics of the Austrians is still generally believed there. For this reason it is necessary to state here briefly the facts which prove that the Austrians are a part of the great German race.

According to the last official census of March 7, 1923, the Republic of Austria has 6,535,363 inhabitants. The language of all but a small minority is German.¹ Hence the constitution of the Republic provides in Article 8 that German is the official language. Nevertheless, though it is highly improbable, the Austrians might theoretically belong to a non-German race, although their official language is German. Let us therefore glance briefly at their history.

At the beginning of the sixth century the Germanic race of the *Bajuvári*—whose descendants are the Bavarians of to-day—then, and for a long time occupying the land along the upper course of the Danube, invaded the district along the River Enns, pushing into the Austria of to-day, Salzburg, and Tyrol. The original Rhaetio-Celtic population was absorbed by the invaders. Toward the end of the same century the *Bajuvári* crossed the Brenner into South Tyrol, now handed over to Italy by the Treaty of St. Germain, bordering upon the Kingdom of Lombardy, and then went on through the Puster Valley into what is now Carinthia.

¹ The minorities speaking another language than German are: In the Burgenland, 41,758 Croats and 10,804 Magyars; in Carinthia, 37,224 Slovenes.

The present Lower Austria likewise has a German population. In the ninth and tenth centuries the whole district was wrested from the *Avari*, a Tartar race which had invaded it from Asia, and was settled by German tribes, chiefly Bavarians, but also Swabians, Franks, and Saxons. The Styria of to-day was also settled by Bavarians. In Western Tyrol and Vorarlberg the *Alemanni*, later known as Swabians, settled.

One sees, therefore, that the territory of the Republic of Austria has been occupied for more than a thousand years by German tribes, the same—Bavarians, Swabians, Franks, and Saxons—who form, together with other German tribes, the people of the present German Reich. Whoever asserts that the Austrians of to-day are anything but Germans thereby proves his utter ignorance of history.

And this is not all. The history of Austria up to most modern times is merely a chapter of German history. After the subjugation of the Bavarians by Charlemagne, the territory of the present Austria became a part of the Carolingian Empire. And after the division of the Empire into the West Frankish and East Frankish Empires, the precursors of France and Germany, Austria belonged to the Eastern Empire. In 1282 Rudolph of Habsburg, who had been chosen Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, conferred upon his sons, Albrecht and Rudolph, Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and parts of Carniola, and the rest of the Austrian territory was added under later rulers. The Habsburgs, from Albrecht II (1438) till their extinction with the death of Charles VI, were, with few interruptions, kings of Austria and emperors of Germany. Maria Theresa,

the daughter of Charles VI, founded the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty by her marriage to Franz of Lorraine, and they wore the German imperial crown up to the dissolution of the old German (Holy Roman) Empire under the Emperor Francis II in 1806. After the liberation of Germany from the Napoleonic yoke, the German States united in 1815 in the German Federation, to which Austria not only belonged, but in which she also enjoyed the primacy. The struggle between the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty and the upward-striving house of Hohenzollern for the leadership in Germany led to the fratricidal war of 1866, which resulted in the defeat of the Habsburgs. In the Treaty of Prague of 1866 the Emperor Francis Joseph surrendered Austria's position in Germany.

From the Middle Ages down to the year 1866, therefore, Austria's history was at the same time the history of the other German lands. But even the separation in 1866 was not a complete separation. Under the leadership of Prussia, twenty-two German States united to form the North German Federation, from which the States of Southern Germany at first remained aloof. But the war against France finally united all the German States in one federation, which assumed on December 9, 1870, the name *Deutsches Reich* (German Empire). This brought the long hoped-for union of the German States, but still without the Austrian provinces. However, the legal separation of Austria from the rest of Germany by the war of 1866 could not sever the bonds that had existed between the two nations for a thousand years. By September 1872 Austria had again entered into

political relations with Germany by joining with Germany and Russia in the so-called "Three Emperors' Alliance". This link developed in October 1879 into a still closer alliance, and in 1882, through the entrance of Italy into the Triple Alliance, which continued until Italy withdrew on May 4, 1915; it subsisted as the most intimate alliance between Germany and Austria up to the end of the World War.

It goes without saying that this community of blood and history resulted in a common culture. The Austrians no more regarded Goethe as a foreigner than the Germans the Viennese Mozart, nor was any distinction ever made between German and Austrian scholars. For centuries Austrian professors have taught at German and Germans at Austrian universities. There was no cultural barrier between the two countries. Nobody denies that the Austrians possess characteristics peculiar to themselves, but they differ no more from the other German races than those differ among themselves. The Prussians, Saxons, Würtembergers, or Bavarians also possess characteristics peculiar to themselves. But despite this it has never occurred to anyone that they should be compelled to belong to different States. Moreover, the differences between the Bavarian and the Austrian are much smaller than between the Bavarian and the Prussian. One finds similar differences among the inhabitants of all countries. The Southern Frenchman is quite different from his brother in Northern France. And even in the United States, whose population is comparatively homogeneous, the Californian is different from the New Yorker. Yet it would never occur to any American

that this was any reason for separating California from the Union, and for insisting that it form a State by itself. Trieste had been Austrian since 1382—that is, for more than five hundred years—but the Entente regarded it as a matter of course that it should be given to Italy because its population was Italian. Only in the case of the Austrians people cannot understand why they should desire to unite with their blood-brothers in Germany.

The opponents of German-Austrian union constantly try to make it appear that the Austrians' desire for union is the post-war discovery of a few nationalistic hotheads. But here, too, they count on the world's ignorance. When, following the war of 1866, Austria left the German Union, the German Austrians never reconciled themselves to the fact. A strong national movement for reunion with the German Empire came into existence among the Germans of the Dual Monarchy, for they knew perfectly well that the fratricidal war of 1866 was not a war between Germans, but between Habsburg and Hohenzollern for the supremacy in Germany. When Bismarck came to Vienna in the summer of 1892 to attend the marriage of his son, the whole city turned out to meet him and received him like a sovereign, greatly to the displeasure of the Emperor Francis Joseph. When the collapse of the Monarchy and the dethronement of the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns removed the hindrances that had hitherto made the union of the Austrian Germans with their brothers in Germany impossible, the agitation for union burst spontaneously into flame, and on November 12, 1918, the Austrian National Assembly

decreed: German-Austria is a part of the German Republic.

The foregoing survey of the people and their history can be briefly summed up as follows:

1. The Austrians are not a separate race, but are a German people like the other German races; moreover, they are less different from the Germans of Southern Germany, such as the Bavarians, than the Bavarians are from the Prussians or Saxons. They speak the same language as the other Germans; they are Germans—and nothing else.

2. The Austrians have a common history of more than a thousand years with the other Germans.

3. The Austrians have also a community of culture, art, and science with the other Germans.

4. The Austrians have never ceased to regard themselves as a part of the German people. Hence their will for union is no recent invention.

Whoever is familiar with these facts knows that when the anti-union Press asserts that the Austrians are a separate race, it is guilty of a distortion of the truth which can succeed only so long as the world is kept from knowing that truth. And when the world does finally learn the truth, it will fail to understand why the Austrians have been refused the right that was taken as a matter of course in the case of the Italians, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Rumanians, Croats, and others.

V

AUSTRIA'S SITUATION TO-DAY

I. THE BREAK-UP OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC UNIT AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR PRESENT-DAY AUSTRIA

THE union of the Austrian Germans with their Motherland is not only a justifiable political demand, it is also a question of life and death for the six and a half million Austrians.

But here, too, the Entente counts on the ignorance of the world. It asserts constantly through its Press that Austria is quite capable of existing as an independent State. Even if this assertion were true it would, of course, furnish no reason for refusing to permit union with Germany. The object of the assertion is to make the uninformed inhabitants of the Entente countries believe that the refusal of the right of self-determination does not affect Austria's vital interests. The Entente Governments reason thus: The union of Austria with the German Reich would be most unpleasant for us politically. Why, then, should we permit it, since Austria is quite well capable of existing alone? We are not hindering the cultural relations between the two countries; the demand for union is nothing but a stubborn bit of dogmatism.

Whoever knows Austria knows that, left to herself, she is economically incapable of existence in the long run; that the lives of six and a half million Austrian men, women, and children are here being sacrificed to the political egotism of the Entente Govern-

ments. Hence this question demands special elucidation.

Austria's present situation can only be understood—and the Entente reckons on this—by one familiar with the economic structure of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and with the economic position which the Austrian Germans occupied in it.

That Monarchy was an economic unit containing nearly fifty-two million inhabitants. Its geographical character varied more, almost, than any other area of equal size. It contained broad plains and high, snow-capped mountains. Rich deposits of coal and iron were the basis of important heavy industries, agriculture flourished in great fertile districts. Salt, petroleum, and wood nourished industry and trade. In the great city of Vienna, whose extraordinarily favourable geographical position at the centre of the Empire had been supplemented by an excellent railway service, were all the conditions of a highly developed manufacture of high-quality wares and a network of banking and business organization encompassing the entire land.

As a result of all these favourable factors, the Monarchy was a self-contained economic unit, which produced its own food-stuffs, furnished its industries with the necessary raw materials, and, through import tariffs, furthered their export. Only tropical products had to be imported.

The partition of the Monarchy by the Treaty of St. Germain, which was made on the basis of political and not economic considerations, broke this great economic unit to pieces in a senseless manner. The consequences have to be borne by all the Succession

States, but most of all by the new Republic of Austria, since her territory had occupied a special economic position in the Monarchy.

The economic apparatus represented by the Monarchy was based on a mutually complementary division of labour which was the outcome of centuries of development. The territory of the present Austria is a long drawn-out stretch of Alpine land extending from west to east. Here, based on the iron deposits, there had grown up a great industry in steel and semi-manufactured goods; there were important iron-foundries and iron-works, a great automobile industry, and machinery and electrical works; associated with these were important metallurgical works and coach and locomotive manufacturies. Plentiful timber and water-power had given rise to an important paper industry, and in Vienna, the cultural centre, dress-making and millinery establishments sprang up, a cabinet-making industry, and handicrafts. In addition to this, Vienna had developed the great central organization required for the conduct of the economic life of the whole Monarchy.

But all these industries could exist only in the territory of the Monarchy as it then was. The coal deposits lie almost entirely in the territory of present-day Czechoslovakia. The textile industry's spinning-mills were situated in the Alpine lands, the weaving-mills in Bohemia and Moravia. The Alpine iron industry imported the pig-iron for its foundries from Moravia. The steel-works, which now lie in Czechoslovakia, bought pig-iron they needed for steel from the Alpine Mining Company in Styria. In the chemical industry,

the German-Austrian provinces, with their deposits of salt, manufactured soda, while the same industry in Bohemia, where the coal deposits were situated, manufactured coal derivatives. The food-stuffs required, which could be grown in the Alpine districts only in limited quantities, were furnished by the predominantly agricultural areas, such as Galicia and Hungary, which took industrial products in return.

These are but a few illustrations of the economic interdependence of the different lands of the old Monarchy. Many more could be adduced.

The Treaty of St. Germain ruthlessly severed the new Republic from this economically homogeneous structure. The newly created States and the already existing ones that received portions of the Monarchy's territory were bound for political reasons to make the severance as thorough as possible. Their aim was complete independence of Austria. But there can be no political independence without economic independence. They were compelled to create industries to produce those things which they had formerly imported from the German-Austrian territory. In order that these industries might come into existence and continue to exist they had to be protected against German-Austrian industry, and this was possible only by means of high import duties and import prohibitions. The new industries could not operate as economically as before, but that made no difference in view of their object—economic independence of Austria.

But military reasons also played a decisive rôle in shaping the economic policies of the Succession States. Since the promised disarmament has been imposed

only on the conquered States and the conditions in Europe are far from being stable, each one of the Succession States is concerned to increase its armed forces. No State that desires to be a military power can permit itself to be dependent for its military requirements—and these include almost all products—on any other country. Thus, to give but one example, Czechoslovakia cannot permit herself to be dependent on Austria for her coaches, locomotives, automobiles, and electro-technical requirements, since in case of war Austria might not deliver these articles and the Czechoslovakian Army would therefore soon be unable to fight. Here is the reason why no commercial treaty whatever between the Succession States and Austria can alter the situation as long as the present political uncertainty continues to exist in Europe.

When Austria was torn out of the economic structure as described, she was deprived on the one hand of almost the entire market for her industries, and on the other hand cut off from the agricultural districts from which she received her food-stuffs.

The situation was fully realized by the League of Nations experts, W. T. Layton and Ch. Rist, who visited Austria to study methods of dealing with her economic distress. But since the economic problem is really a political problem, they did not venture to speak openly about it, but contented themselves with saying that the problem was one that involved much more than merely the Austrian question; that it was a European question. And as to this the experts declared—in so many words—that they did not think themselves justified in making any concrete suggestions.

2. VIENNA'S ECONOMIC POSITION

In the old Monarchy, Vienna was the financial and commercial centre of the whole Austro-Hungarian economic territory. The partition of the Monarchy altered this situation fundamentally.

The financial situation was affected in the same way as the industrial situation. None of the Succession States can, in the existing political condition of Europe, admit that it is as dependent financially on Vienna as it was before the war, when all were part of the old Monarchy. Financial dependence on a city in another country is to-day quite a different matter from what it was then. To-day it is no longer merely an economic, but also a political and a military question. For if the financial centre is in a foreign State, this means that industry, and, as a result, military power are also dependent on that State. Hence the Succession States sought to make themselves financially independent of Austria. The first step to that end was the confiscation of the branches of the Viennese banks in the new States, and the organization of new banks or the extension of already existing smaller provincial institutions. An example of this can be given from Czechoslovakia. Her economic life, which was before the war almost entirely financed from Vienna, is now almost entirely independent of that city's banks. The Zivnostenska Bank and the Bohemian Union Bank in Prague were, in comparison with the great Viennese banks, modest provincial institutions. The shares of the Bohemian Discount Bank were held by the Lower Austrian Discount Society in Vienna. The Prague

branches of the Viennese banks were dependent on their Viennese central offices. To-day the Bohemian banks are independent of Vienna and have a far greater capital and deposits. The result of this development was that a number of the Viennese banks became bankrupt, and those that pulled through had to reduce their staffs to modest proportions. Wholesale commerce in Vienna has been restricted in the same manner.

It, too, was based on the industry of the whole Empire, which it supplied with raw materials and whose products it sold. Its headquarters was Vienna, where almost all the firms in the Monarchy had their head offices. After the collapse of Austria-Hungary, most of the firms that conducted business in the Succession States from Viennese offices were obliged to remove their head offices thither. The offices in Vienna were either closed or left in the hands of agents. The Succession States favoured their own commerce for the same reasons as their manufactures and banking, and endeavoured to eliminate Vienna as far as possible. Hence the wholesale houses in Vienna also had to reduce their organization considerably, since it was far too large for the new conditions.

The annihilation of the great economic structure of the Monarchy was absolutely disastrous to the industries engaged in making high-quality wares and luxury articles.

As long as Vienna was the cultural heart of a great empire, the seat of the imperial court, of diplomacy, of civil and military officials, of a wealthy nobility, and a well-to-do citizenry, there was a great market for all the products of art and luxury. At a single blow

Vienna, which had been the capital of a rich State of fifty-two millions, was converted into the capital of a tiny State of six and a half millions of impoverished inhabitants. The court and the army have disappeared, the once numerous official bodies have in part been abolished, in part reduced in numbers, the whole body of civil servants and officials has been reduced to a proletarian standard of life by the total loss of their capital and the reduction of their salaries to a small fraction of the former figures; the nobility and citizenry are impoverished. This meant the complete destruction of the market for cultural wares of all kinds. All that was left was the great apparatus for producing goods for which there were no buyers.

Nor was there a market for them anywhere else in the State, for the provinces had also been impoverished by the war and its consequences. The disproportion between Vienna and the new State became most sharply apparent. Its population of two millions was in correct proportion to a great country of fifty-two millions, but it is most unhealthy for a State of but six and a half million inhabitants. The largest city in Switzerland, Zurich, has but 207,161 inhabitants. And since Switzerland has a population of 3,880,300, Vienna, to have the same relation to Austria, should have but 350,000. Actually, however, it has five times that number.

In view of this situation it can readily be understood that Vienna has suffered most from the annihilation of the great Austro-Hungarian economic structure, and that, as a result of the disproportion between its size and the size of the new State, the Austrian provinces

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are also naturally affected, and their economic situation is rendered more unfavourable.

3. RECAPITULATION

The situation depicted can be summed up as follows:

The German-Austrian lands were in the old Monarchy the directing brains of the entire Austro-Hungarian economic structure. As a result of the destruction of the Monarchy, this great technical apparatus with its numerous employees is left without any field of activity. Austria's present situation is precisely such as would result if the State of New York were suddenly separated from the rest of the United States, cut off from the sea, surrounded by high tariff walls, and then required to continue to exist as if nothing had happened.

What would the world say to such madness? But it keeps silent about Austria because it knows nothing about what has happened and is purposely kept in ignorance of the true state of affairs by its Governments.

VI

HOW CAN AUSTRIA BE HELPED?

I. AUSTRIA AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE

THE victors made an independent State of Austria against her will—not because they wanted to do her a kindness, but for selfish political reasons. They did not want Germany to be enlarged by the addition of six and a half million Austrian Germans. This was the sole reason why the Entente trampled upon the right of self-determination proclaimed by President Wilson.

Everybody who was familiar with Central European affairs knew that German Austria could not exist as an independent State. The German-Austrian representatives in St. Germain, who were not permitted by the victors to speak, brought forward a wealth of material proving this. But the Entente refused to accept any proof. Their press endeavoured by every variety of argument to demonstrate that Austria's desperate condition was only temporary, and that, as soon as she had got over the transition period, she could exist as an independent State. These arguments were supported by references to Switzerland, which, it was declared, is also a mountainous country, and, despite less favourable conditions than those in Austria, is nevertheless able to exist. Austria, it was pointed out, is larger than Switzerland, has more agricultural land, plenty of iron and also coal, although the deposits of the latter are smaller and of poorer quality, whereas Switzerland is poor in mineral resources and possesses neither iron

nor coal. Austria, it was further asserted, has natural beauties which, while not so grandiose as those of Switzerland, are nevertheless unique in Europe.

But the comparison with Switzerland overlooks the most important point. It leaves out of consideration the different historical development of the two countries.

The Switzerland of to-day is the outcome of centuries of organic development, starting from a collection of small, thinly populated peasant Republics. The original scattered population was able to support itself adequately with the help of arable land and cattle-breeding. With the growing development of agriculture, especially Alpine farming and dairying, and with the rise and the growth of industry and the tourist traffic, the means of livelihood increased steadily, and simultaneously the population. Thus the proportion of the country's revenue from manufactures and the tourist traffic to the number of inhabitants continued to be approximately right. Yet despite this development, Switzerland has never been quite able to solve the problem, and a part of her population has always been obliged to emigrate or to seek temporary employment abroad.

Without doubt Austria would have quite as well been able to exist as Switzerland if she had had a similar history. But her development was diametrically opposite.

As a part of the great Austro-Hungarian economic structure, Austria was able to maintain a comparatively large population. Within this great union she could earn enough to secure her people a good livelihood.

Not only was intensive cultivation unnecessary, it would actually have been uneconomic, since it was more advantageous to buy the necessary farm products in the Monarchy's agrarian sections in exchange for industrial wares and commercial and administrative services than to grow them at great expense on Austria's own poor soil. And in any event only a portion of the food-stuffs needed could have been grown; even the most intensive farming methods could not have produced enough on the mountainous German-Austrian soil to meet the demand. The same was true of coal. It would have been highly unprofitable to mine Austria's own poor coal at great expense instead of buying the better and cheaper coal of Bohemia or Moravia. Nor was there any reason for the systematic encouragement of the tourist traffic along lines followed by Switzerland, since the Monarchy, which could supply all its own needs, could employ its capital and labour to much greater profit.

And now the whole situation was altered at one stroke, and the possibilities of gainful activity were reduced to a fraction of what they had been. But the population remained as it was. Austria could, of course, attempt to follow Switzerland's example by encouraging tourist traffic, resorting to intensive agricultural methods, and so on, but that requires time, and, above all, capital. And the country, impoverished by the war, has no capital. It is not enough—to cite but one example—to attract tourists by an advertising campaign. The necessary hotels must be built to accommodate them. A further unfavourable factor is the fact that the other European countries have also been

impoverished by the war, and hence no longer possess the same purchasing and consuming power.

The wise men of St. Germain did not think of all these things. They did not want to think of them. They believed that, if they re-drew the boundaries in Central Europe to meet their political desires, that would solve Central Europe's economic problems.

The prophecies of those who knew the situation have been fulfilled. Austria's situation grew steadily worse, and in the summer of 1922 the State was face to face with utter dissolution. The currency had become almost valueless. No credit could be had. There was a lack of food-stuffs, fuel, clothing—in brief, of all the necessities of life. The Government was helpless. Complete anarchy threatened. In this desperate situation it requested the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, in a note of August 7, 1922, to inform it whether the Powers were prepared to assume the guaranty for a loan, since it was no longer in a position to administer the State's affairs further. The Government declared in this communication that it would hold the Powers responsible for the collapse, and that it "committed the future fate of Austria to the hands of these Powers".

The Powers, which obviously still refused to regard the situation as grave, replied that they would not guarantee a loan, but that they had nevertheless decided "to submit Austria's case to the League of Nations for investigation".

No Austrian who lived through this period will ever forget that answer. It mirrored with complete fidelity the egoism and ruthlessness of the Entente Govern-

ments. Against their will and their protests the German Austrians had been, as it were, imprisoned in a State incapable of existence, and now they were to be left to perish miserably in their prison. Burning indignation seized the whole people. If they must die, they declared, they would first start a conflagration in all Europe. The spectre of Bolshevism raised its head menacingly.

The Austrian Chancellor took the only step still possible. He visited Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Italy to negotiate with Austria's most important neighbours about the State's continued existence. Just what went on in Berlin, Prague, and Verona has never been made known in full detail. But what is known is that Central Europe stood face to face with political chaos, since Austria's neighbours purposed to occupy the country and perhaps to partition it among themselves in order to prevent the outbreak of a Bolshevik revolution.

Now, however, the Entente Governments suddenly sprang to action, for they realized that a catastrophe with immeasurable consequences menaced Central Europe. Even Austria's neighbour States were not yet so firmly consolidated that the flames of a Bolshevik revolution in Austria might not also set their houses afire. And it was highly probable that the occupation and partition of Austria would have led to a conflict among the beneficiaries. And that would mean, in view of the complicated alliances existing among the European countries, the possibility of another great war.

Thereupon the Entente Governments, acting with a celerity hitherto unknown, decided to grant help. In the Geneva Agreement of October 4, 1922, between Eng-

land, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, on the one side, and Austria on the other, these Powers declared their willingness to assume the guarantee for 84 per cent. of a loan of 650 gold crowns to be issued by Austria. This was to make Austria's continued existence possible.

The Entente States were still unwilling to admit that the new Austrian State is incapable of existing. They asserted that she merely needed to get over a transition period in order to become independent. The loan was to bridge over this period. The Austrian crisis was regarded as merely a financial one; all that was needed was to put the finances in order. Again those who knew the situation pointed out that the loan would merely be treating the symptom, not the disease, and that the only real solution of the whole Austrian problem was union with Germany. But the Entente Governments refused to listen. It was enough for them that the immediate danger for Central Europe was averted through the loan.

With the help of the loan a new bank of issue was established and the currency was stabilized. The conditions of life improved. The relief work appeared to have succeeded.

But first appearances were deceptive. By drastic economies and taxation to the breaking-point, and with the help of the proceeds of the loan, the State succeeded in balancing its budget. These heroic measures brought a short period of pseudo-prosperity, but then a new economic depression set in. The collapse of a great number of banks and industrial undertakings, and unemployment on a vast scale for

such a small State proved again that they were right who declared that Austria could not exist if cut off from her source of raw materials and a market for her products.

Yet not even this new crisis could move the Entente Governments to abandon their opposition to Austria's union with Germany. In order to help her they had the situation "studied" again. Everybody knew perfectly well that the experts sent by the League of Nations to Vienna would merely repeat what was common knowledge, but Austria had to be "studied" once more. The result was a report by the experts to the League, in which they said:

"In our view it (the economic crisis) is mainly due to the circumstances of the last few years, which have abruptly checked the natural expansion of the industries of Austria towards those markets to which her geographical position and her history have hitherto directed them. Close her markets, and the readaptation of Austria's industries will involve long and painful restrictions. Give her the means of disposing of her products, and she will have no difficulty in finding ways of developing her production and rapidly raising her standard of life."¹

This is merely a cautious and diplomatic way of saying: "Let Austria unite with Germany; then she will be able to exist."

Even in France, where the opposition to union is strongest, and which, therefore, proclaims most

¹ *The Economic Situation of Austria*. Report presented to the Council of the League of Nations by W. T. Layton and Charles Rist (c. 440 [1], M (1). 162. 1925. ii.

loudly the possibility of Austria's existence, one finds admissions that she cannot exist by herself. Thus the *Nouvelle Revue* said, in October 1925:

"The bread which the scanty agricultural districts cannot furnish, as well as the raw materials that are lacking, must be secured in exchange for industrial products. The Succession States have everywhere closed their frontiers to Austria. The gravest consequences are to be feared if this condition should continue for any length of time. Austria cannot exist without markets outside of her own narrow confines. It is the duty of the League of Nations to find ways and means of at least lowering these tariff walls if not of doing away with them altogether."

But the *Nouvelle Revue* failed to draw the correct deduction from this realization: that the League should consent to the union. Instead of that, the League was to find "ways and means" of reducing the tariff barriers. Yet everybody who is only partially familiar with economic and political conditions in Europe knows that there are no such "ways and means". The Succession States, as we have already seen, are unable for economic and especially political reasons to lower their import duties and restore to Austria her former markets, since that would mean that they would become dependent on Austria. Furthermore, everyone interested in the newly created industries of these States—employers and employees alike—would for reasons easily understood, never consent to the ruin of their own livelihood in order to help Austria. The outlet which Austria needs can be found only in Germany, never in the Succession States.

To-day, six years after the League's loan-guarantee, Austria is virtually in the same position as then. It is true that her sudden and complete dissolution was prevented by the League. But there are two ways in which a people can be destroyed—suddenly, through some catastrophe, or by gradually languishing away. Austria is slowly dying in the latter way. This does not mean that the State will become a depopulated desert through the actual physical death of its inhabitants. It will always be possible for human beings to exist on its territory. But a people is destroyed when its numbers are reduced to a fraction and the survivors sink from a high level of civilization to the plane of a primitive mountain peasant race.

Here we have the crux of the Austrian problem. The State is not in a position to earn enough to maintain its inhabitants on their former cultural level. If this situation be not altered, the only solution is a lowering of the standard of life. And this way has already been taken. We see it most plainly in the State's finances. They have been put in order, but it was possible only by drastic reduction of expenditure. In accordance with a natural economic law, these reductions first of all affect things that are not actual necessities of life—that is, all cultural activities. Our educational institutions, such as universities, technical colleges, and secondary and elementary schools, are suffering severely from restrictions on their expenditure. The lowered standards would be much more apparent but for the fact that they are still living on the intellectual capital of earlier days. Former teachers and educational apparatus are still available, so that the work can go on

in a makeshift fashion. But in a few decades all this will be at an end; the teachers will be dead, the apparatus worn out; there will not be enough new teachers to replace the old staffs, the buildings cannot be repaired or renewed, and it is not possible to buy the educational apparatus and appliances without which it is impossible to keep abreast of the march of science. Salaries are so low that it is even now extremely difficult to secure the teachers needed by our universities, since highly qualified instructors go abroad to wealthier institutions instead of remaining in Austria and teaching with insufficient scientific apparatus at the cost of personal sacrifices.

The same is true of all cultural institutions. The libraries can no longer buy even the most indispensable new books. Art institutes, such as picture-galleries, can buy no new works. The theatres are rapidly deteriorating. In short, in every department of cultural life one finds either retrogression or at best stagnation, and this, while all other nations are going ahead, also means retrogression.

In the course of time this must necessarily lead to a lowering of the individual cultural level. Unless Austria's situation be materially altered, a people of a lower grade of civilization will take the place of the present highly civilized population.

And this lowering of the cultural level also reacts on the economic situation. Badly trained engineers and business men mean lower profits from industry and trade. This in turn lessens tax-paying power and reduces the revenue of the State, compelling still further economies. The whole is a vicious circle,

leading to a continuous further decrease of population. The surplus population must emigrate or die prematurely for lack of sufficient nourishment. Families must be limited. These are the means by which nature compensates for the disproportion between population and the means of existence. The process must continue until the population has been reduced to the number capable of eking out a bare existence on Austria's meagre mountainous soil. The end of the process will be also the end of a civilized and cultured Austrian race.

No sophistry can get round these hard facts, nor can any loans or other superficial remedies do away with them, for they are the product of hard-and-fast natural laws. Only one thing could be of any avail so long as Austria remains isolated. That would be the continuous payment to Austria by foreign countries of regular sums covering her financial requirements—a sort of pension, in other words. But the Austrians would not accept the rôle of beggars nor would the other States be either able or willing to take such a course.

If an inevitable natural process were responsible for the situation one might require the Austrians to bear their terrible lot. But there is a means of putting an end to all their wretchedness with a single step—that is, to give Austria her right of self-determination. But this is denied because it does not suit the Entente's political plans.

But, it may be objected, must Austria, if she requires a great economic territory, necessarily ally herself precisely with Germany? Can she not join some other State?

Let us consider this question.

2. THE SO-CALLED DANUBE FEDERATION

The only alternative to union with Germany would be connection with one of the Succession States. For Switzerland, the only neighbour of Austria that received no part of the old Monarchy, would resist most strongly any alliance so disruptive of her whole State structure.

We have already seen that the Succession States cannot, for important political and economic reasons, do away with their tariff barriers against Austria. It must be clearly understood that there can be no economic without political community of interest. Could one imagine the United States as a united economic area without tariff barriers of any kind, if each State of the Union were at liberty to determine its own foreign policy and to carry on war? The union is united economically because, despite the independence of the States in local affairs, there is a Federal Government with a President in Washington which conducts federal business and foreign policy in the interests of the whole.

Economic community of interest is conditional upon a uniform currency, a uniform economic policy, and above all, a uniform conduct of foreign policy, and hence a uniform army and navy. And such a community of interest is possible only if all the members surrender a part of their sovereignty in the interests of the common weal. Such a state of affairs cannot be brought about through commercial treaties or any politico-commercial system.

But let us assume the improbable event that the

Succession States were willing to unite with Austria and constitute a joint economic area, with uniform tariffs and currency. Such a union would be short-lived, since the foreign relations of the individual States are so different that situations would soon arise which would make it impossible to maintain the union.

Poland's relations to Russia—to cite but a single instance—are determined by quite different conditions from those which determine the policy of Czechoslovakia or Austria. Poland is the immediate neighbour of Russia. Extensive areas are still disputed territory, despite the officially fixed borders. The antagonism is still sharper between Poland and Lithuania, which live in a state of latent war because of Vilna. It is very possible that Poland might be involved in war with either Russia or Lithuania. Such an event would immediately affect the value of the uniform currency. Trade and commerce between Poland and Russia would cease. Poland would demand that the other States of this economic union should also break off their relations with Russia and Lithuania, since their continuance would be a tremendous handicap to Poland in waging war. In modern warfare everything—from cannons to wool—is war material. Poland could not suffer the other States of the union to furnish war material to her enemies. These States would therefore have to choose between becoming allies of Poland or dissolving the union. If they chose the first alternative, States which, like Austria, were in no manner interested in the conflict, would nevertheless have to take part in the war and face all its consequences. If they chose the second alternative, it would mean the disso-

lution of the economic union. The States that left it would be obliged immediately to create a new currency in order not to suffer financially through the depreciation of the former currency due to the war. And these are only a few of the most obvious consequences that would arise if a member of such a union were drawn into a foreign conflict. In reality, the consequences would be much more numerous and vital. We know from experience what internal administrative measures are required by a state of war—guarding of transport facilities and the transmission of news, sharp control of foreigners entering the country, systematic rationing of food supplies—in brief, all of those acts of interference in the lives of the citizens that are the inevitable consequences of war.

An analogous situation exists between Yugoslavia and Italy, where the conflict over Fiume, Dalmatia, and Albania may lead to a conflict in the Balkans at any time, and between Rumania and Russia, since Russia has never acknowledged Rumania's sovereignty over Bessarabia.

A proof of the fact that there can be no economic union without political union is furnished by the so-called Latin Currency Union, which was established in 1865 by France, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland in order to assure a uniform currency in these States. Yet even in times of peace it could not prevent fluctuations between the different francs, and during the war it collapsed utterly. The Swiss franc is to-day worth almost five times as much as the French franc. The currency union established between Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in 1872 met with a like fate. When the war

broke out the quotations for the different currencies immediately became divergent. No uniform currency can be supported without a common bank of issue or uniform conduct of the different banks. And such a uniform conduct is not possible without a uniform control and regulation of all the methods of making payments, for payments are not made only with notes and currency. But such uniformity in the financial field requires again a uniform conduct of commercial and political affairs. And this brings us back to the necessity of uniform conduct of foreign policy and complete community of political interests.

It is clear, therefore, that if we Austrians wished to unite economically with the Succession States it can be done neither by means of commercial treaties nor any other politico-commercial system, but only by a political union in a common State or federation of States. The question, then, is whether such a political union is possible.

In considering this question, one important point is always overlooked. It is regularly assumed that the solution depends only on Austria. Nobody stops to consider whether the Succession States desire such a union or not. But those States will not consent to it merely out of sympathy for poor Austria. It must be made to appear to them as the most advantageous solution. And the advantages can only be either economic or political.

Such a union offers no economic advantages to the Succession States. At first they also suffered from the partition of the old Monarchy, for the disruption of a great economic structure centuries old affected them as

well. But their ten years of independence have demonstrated that they are economically fully capable of existing. The difficulties with which they have to contend are due to the fact that their internal affairs have not been put in order. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary possess all the natural advantages requisite to economic progress. What possible interest could they have in joining with an Austria which can offer them nothing except competition? Only political interests could come into consideration. Are there any?

The favourite argument used to turn Austria's eyes away from Germany is the catchword of the Danube Federation. And despite the fact that everybody familiar with Central European conditions knows that such a federation is an impossibility, it is put forward again and again—in reliance on the ignorance of the world—as the means of creating for Austria the economic elbow-room necessary for her existence. But of all those who recommend the Danube Federation, no one has ever come forward with any definite plan for its constitution or establishment. But mere talk about it cannot help Austria. Let us look into the question of the Danube Federation.

The first question that presents itself is: What States in addition to Austria should join to create it?

The very term Danube Federation is misleading. Its supporters always talk as if the old Monarchy had been a geographic unity consisting of a number of States situated along the Danube. But that is absolutely erroneous.

Only Upper Austria, Lower Austria, a part of

Moravia, Hungary—without Transylvania—and parts of Croatia belonged to the Danube basin. The greater and economically most important part of the old Monarchy had nothing to do with the Danube. Bohemia, the greater part of Moravia, and Silesia belong to the Elbe and Oder systems. It is significant that Bohemia's commerce was not served by the port of Trieste, but by Hamburg. Galicia, separated from the Danube countries by the Carpathians, belongs geographically to the Russian lowlands and the area of the Vistula and the Dniester. The northern half of the Bukovina is geographically a part of Eastern Galicia, the southern half a part of Rumania. North Tyrol, Salzburg, and Carinthia belong geographically to Bavaria. Vorarlberg, separated from Tyrol by the Arlberg, occupies a place half-way between Bavaria and Switzerland and belongs to the Lake Constance system. Carniola, large parts of Croatia, and the coast lands with Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia are Mediterranean lands; Bosnia and Herzegovina belong geographically to the Balkans.

A glance at the map will demonstrate that the old Monarchy came into existence, not because of any geographical uniformity of its territory, but for political reasons. Two determining causes brought the Monarchy into existence. One was the struggle of the Habsburgs to gain power in order to strengthen their position in the German Empire. By clever political moves, chiefly by matrimonial alliances and inheritance, they were able steadily to increase the territory under their sway. The other cause was the menace of conquest by the Turks, which moved these States to unite

for common defence. This political union, which lasted for centuries, naturally led to an economic union. The common tariff frontier and currency, and also the roads and railroads serving the common interest, naturally welded all parts of the Monarchy into a united whole.

But the mainspring of this whole development lay in the political community of interest. Economic unity was the result, not the cause of that community. The Danube played no decisive part. As compared with the railroads it hardly came into consideration at all as a means of transport. And these geographical considerations are responsible for the fact that the States carved out of the old economic territory—with the exception of the Austria of to-day—were able to achieve economic independence and the possibility of existence in a comparatively short period.

If the Danube Federation is to be taken literally—that is, that only the lands of the old Monarchy along the Danube are to be united—this new federation could consist only of Hungary and a part of Austria—Upper and Lower Austria. And this would mean in turn the partition of Austria—that is, a solution which the protagonists of the Danube Federation assuredly do not envisage.

What they obviously do mean is the union of those districts that formerly belonged to Austro-Hungary. There are two possibilities of such a union.

The one is that merely those areas which formed the Monarchy should unite again.

The new States made up entirely of parts of the former Monarchy are only the Republic of Austria,

Czechoslovakia,¹ and Hungary. All the other portions were united with States already in existence or with States created out of the territory of others. A Danube Federation of the scope of the former Monarchy would, therefore, be possible only if the States named were willing to surrender the territories gained by them.

Portions of the Monarchy were handed over as follows:

To Poland: Galicia and parts of Silesia.

To Rumania: Bukovina, Transylvania, and parts of Hungary.

To Yugoslavia: Carniola, Croatia, and Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia (without Zara and certain islands), parts of Hungary, Styria, and Carinthia.

To Italy: South Tyrol, the coast district, Trieste, Istria, Fiume, Zara, and some Dalmatian islands and parts of Carinthia.

These districts would have to be surrendered by Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Italy, and reunited with Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The bare idea that these States would, merely to assist Austria, voluntarily give up what they won through the war, is so fantastic that no politically intelligent person can maintain it for a moment.

The second possibility would be a federation of all the States, possessing territory formerly belonging to the old Monarchy.

Such a federation would have to include Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Italy, in other words, a federation extending

¹ The small Huldshin district taken from Germany and added to Czechoslovakia can be disregarded.

from the Baltic to Africa, and from Switzerland to the Black Sea. For such a federation to be capable of existence, every State belonging to it would have to surrender a part of its sovereignty to the central government. That would mean, to cite Italy only, that she would cease to be a European Great Power. She would be in the minority in the federation and would find herself in the same position as in the days when Austria ruled over a great part of Italy, for the proposed federation would be neither more nor less than a vastly expanded Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It is quite unthinkable that Italy would consent, nor can it be supposed that the other States, whose war aim was the attainment of independence, would be ready to join such a federation.

But even if by a miracle these States should consent to unite, a terrible internal conflict would immediately set in. The member States would have to retain their sovereignty in purely internal affairs. But they all possess districts which one of the others would like to recover. Hungary would demand the return of the territories that were handed over to Rumania and Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia would demand the return of Zara and Fiume, and so on. The difficulties which the Monarchy was not able to overcome in the course of centuries would suddenly spring up again in a vastly aggravated form. Nobody can seriously regard it as possible that all these States, made up of ten different nations, could come together to form an orderly federation. And even if they could, the other European Powers could not view with indifference such a complete realignment of power in Europe. Hence they would

do everything possible to prevent it. It is plain that this second possibility can also be left out of the discussion.

But is there, perhaps, a third possibility—namely, that Austria should be united with some, not all, of the Succession States?

Here the difficult question arises: With which? Naturally, only adjoining States could come in consideration. That would be Czechoslovakia, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary.

Czechoslovakia is a State of 13,600,000 inhabitants made up of Czechs, Slovaks, Magyars, Ruthenians, Germans, and Poles. Of these, 64·4 per cent. are Czechs and Slovaks, and 22·9 per cent. Germans. The Germans would naturally immediately join with the six and a half million Austrian Germans. The result would be that 8,700,000 Czechoslovaks would find themselves outnumbered by 10,500,000 Germans. Moreover, Vienna is almost three times as large as Prague, the Czech capital. Hence the supremacy of the Czechoslovaks would be at an end. In her own interest, Czechoslovakia must oppose any union with Austria.

The six and a half million Germans would not constitute so great a danger for Italy. But even so, Italy would have to alter her policy in South Tyrol fundamentally, for she could not proceed with the same ruthlessness against almost seven million Germans as against the 250,000 in South Tyrol. Hence union with Austria would create great internal difficulties for her. But, above all, the other Powers—most of all France—could not suffer such an aggrandizement of Italy, which would then extend far into Central Europe and become the most influential Power there.

Yugoslavia would also be bound to reject union with Austria for the same reasons as apply to Czechoslovakia. It will be long before she becomes consolidated. The enmity between the Croats and Serbs has grown to proportions that seriously menace the kingdom's existence. The addition of six and a half million Germans would render this internal crisis very acute. Despite its size, Yugoslavia has but twelve million inhabitants. The six and a half million Germans would ally themselves with Croats, who are nearer akin to them historically and culturally, and would elbow out the now dominant Serbs and thus make any adjustment of Serb-Croat differences all but impossible. And in view of Yugoslavia's extraordinarily difficult foreign relations, due to her differences with Italy, she, too, would be bound to refuse most decidedly any union with Austria.

There remains only Hungary. Through all the centuries during which the Hungarians formed a part of the Monarchy they were at loggerheads with all the other races. Germans and Magyars alike breathed a sigh of relief at their separation. A reunion of the two peoples would not merely revive the old differences but would create new ones. Austria is a democratic Republic. She will have no more to do with the House of Habsburg. So insignificant is the number of adherents of the former ruling dynasty that the Habsburg monarchistic party has not been able to elect a single delegate to any representative body. But Hungary is still, as formerly, a country dominated by a small body of nobles; she has not even a universal and secret suffrage, and is therefore the very opposite of a

democracy. She has remained a monarchy in principle. Although the Habsburgs have been dethroned, Hungary still calls itself a kingdom, is governed by a viceroy, and makes no secret of the fact that she is merely waiting for an opportunity again to place a Habsburger on a throne which is regarded as merely temporarily vacant.

This opposition alone would make an amicable common life of the two peoples impossible. A reunion of the two States would naturally revive the aspirations of the Habsburgs, now so hopeless, to regain sway in Austria. Hence the new Austria-Hungary would become the centre of all efforts to restore the Monarchy, and would not only be a menace to all the other Succession States, but would seriously endanger the peace of Europe. In the interests of self-preservation, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, and Italy could never consent to such a reunion.

This survey of all conceivable alliances for Austria demonstrates that the only possible union is with Germany. In discussing the various imaginable forms of a Danube Federation I have purposely considered only the viewpoint of the other States. My object was to show that these must oppose it, no matter what form it might assume. And as a matter of fact, every time such a federation has been mentioned the Succession States have protested against it officially.

But Austria herself must also be permitted to have something to say about a Danube Federation. And she rejects emphatically union with any country other than Germany, not merely because of comprehensible national sentiment, but from the sober realization that any one of the other associations proposed would mean

Austria's end as a State. The Austrian Germans know what national struggles they were compelled to carry on in the old Monarchy. Then, however, they were on firm ground, supported by the German dynasty in its historic position and by their own economic power. But if, impoverished and defenceless, they were to become part of one of the Succession States, they would be at the mercy of dominant peoples of other races in that State. Therefore they energetically reject any such union. Contempt for the right of self-determination can assuredly not be carried so far as to compel Austria to accept union with other States against her will.

Clearly, the idea of a Danube Federation is incapable of realization, it is a mere catchword of the Entente and the Entente Press, designed to keep the truth about the necessity of Austria's union with Germany from the knowledge of people ignorant of Central European conditions. From whichever side we view the Austrian problem, the conclusion must always be the same. There is but one solution—in the interests not merely of Austria but of the peace of Europe and therefore of the world.

The solution is the union of the Austrian Germans with their blood-brothers in the German Reich.

3. PAN-EUROPE

Yet one more prescription is recommended for the cure of Austria's ills: Pan-Europe. In the "United States of Europe", proposed by Coudenhove, Austria is to find the great economic territory which she requires for her existence.

I would be the last to make light of Coudenhove's great idea. But is there anybody who seriously believes that it can be realized at any time within our vision?

It may be asked: if the Americans were able to create the United States of America, why should it not be possible to create a United States of Europe? But anyone asking such a question overlooks the fundamental differences between American and European history.

When North America was settled by the whites it was virtually unoccupied land, for the sparse Indian population cannot be regarded as a population in the modern meaning of the word. As the American settlers moved westward, new States were established, all united by identical interests. But the deciding factor was that the constant stream of immigrants was absorbed in and assimilated by the white settlers, so that every such immigrant, no matter from which country he came, became soon an English-speaking American. Thus the white population gradually developed as a homogeneous mass to its present great proportions, and one State of the Union after another came into existence. Yet despite this favourable historical development, the United States did not come into being without some friction. The Civil War was required to overcome the economic differences between the Northern and Southern States and to unite all in a single federation.

The development in Europe was wholly different. For thousands of years peoples of different races and tongues, whose origin is lost in the mists of prehistoric days, have lived there crowded together. Europe's

whole history, from the pre-Christian era to our own times, is full of unending wars, which were at bottom merely struggles to preserve the identity of the races that carried them on. One people always endeavoured to subjugate another, either physically or economically; the people attacked always defended itself against subjection. This continuous struggle that had gone on for thousands of years found its last terrible expression in the World War. This is not the place to go into the causes of that war. We must content ourselves with a bare statement of the facts. But these facts decided the political face of Europe.

This age-long struggle of the European peoples can be ended only by a reconciliation of their perpetually conflicting interests. But such a reconciliation requires the surrender of a part of each people's particularist egotism, and its adjustment to the higher interests of a great European community. America had the tremendous advantage of being able to make this adjustment gradually in the case of every immigrant and thus to create a population thoroughly imbued with American spirit. But Europe has a population of 460 millions, of different races and tongues, divided by thousands of years of conflicting interests and hardly acquainted with the bare idea of a common European State. Unless a miracle intervenes, only a complete change of European habits of mind can move these peoples to surrender any part of their particularist egotism in the interests of a European union.

I would not assert that it is impossible to achieve this, and that efforts directed to that end are useless; but anyone knows how difficult it is for a new idea to

permeate the life of the peoples, and how long it requires—it took Christianity more than a thousand years to conquer Europe—knows that Europe is still far removed from that new habit of mind that is a prerequisite of Pan-Europe, and that Pan-Europe cannot become a reality for a very long time to come.

And Austria cannot wait for the realization of that ideal. Only a speedy remedy can save her. Help must come quickly.

Yet even if we regard Pan-Europe as possible, the union of Austria and Germany would be no obstacle to its realization. Does the fact that Würtemberg or Bavaria belongs to the German Reich hinder the coming into existence of a United States of Europe? On the contrary, the union of Austria with Germany would merely further the Pan-European idea, since it would reduce by one State the number to be won for it.

VII

UNION IS THE ONLY NATURAL SOLUTION

OUR study of the situation has proved:

1. Austria cannot exist permanently as an independent State.
2. Austria requires, if she is to live, to be associated with a large economic area.
3. Austria's union with any one of the Succession States is impossible.
4. Austria cannot wait until the United States of Europe is realized at some far-distant time.

These facts cannot be controverted. They show with irrefutable logic that there is only one State with which Austria can unite, in which she will find everything she requires, and that State is Germany. Such a union is the most natural and most obvious in view of the following facts:

1. The Austrians are racially Germans, precisely as are the other races making up the German Reich.
2. The Austrians speak the same language as their brothers in Germany.
3. The Austrians are united with the German Reich by a common history extending over a thousand years.
4. The Austrians have from earliest times had a common culture, science, and art with the German Reich.

Hence the union of Austria with Germany is not merely the best solution in the interests of the Austrians,

but also in the best interests of European peace and therefore of the world.

The Entente aimed at creating a new enduring order in Europe through the Peace Treaties. This aim would have been attained if the Entente had remained true to the principles proclaimed by itself—peace without victors and vanquished, and the right of self-determination of the peoples. But after its victory it betrayed all these high ideals for which it claimed to have fought. Hatred against the German people dictated the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain—that hatred which revealed its deepest roots in Clemenceau's utterance: "There are twenty million Germans too many in the world."

But hatred is an evil counsellor in politics. The victors overlooked the fact that a people of seventy millions cannot be held in perpetual slavery, that there can be neither European peace nor an economic reconstruction of Europe without the German people's aid. They also overlooked the fact that the assertion of the guilt of the German people for the war, which furnished the moral justification for the merciless conditions of peace, cannot be maintained for all eternity. The historians of all nations already know that that assertion was a lie. And the peoples themselves will soon know it. But with the refutation of the thesis of German guilt there disappears also every justification for the oppression of the German people. What remains is naked injustice. As long as this injustice is not made good, there can be no stable peace in Europe. And one phase of that injustice is the denial to the German Austrians of the right of self-determination.

The righting of this wrong is furthermore not merely a moral requirement, but would also be a wise political act. The union of Austria with Germany would definitely close up one source of European crises. The only political motive for preventing the union is France's fear of a greater Germany, and this motive, too, is baseless to-day. The developments of the last year have proved, and the result of the last Reichstag election has again demonstrated, that the German people cherish no thoughts of revenge and have no other wish than to live their own cultural and economic life, and to co-operate in bringing about world peace. Any doubt of the genuineness of Germany's desire for peace is dissipated by the Pact of Locarno, proposed by Germany, under which she, France, and Belgium engage to refrain from any war of aggression and any other act of violence, and to adjust all differences by arbitration. The undertaking is guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy. This means that the French frontier is protected by Great Britain and Italy, and that every danger for France is done away with, for disarmed Germany could not, even if she would, dare to wage war against the greatest military Power of the world, France, and the latter's allies, Great Britain and Italy.

Since the sole political reason for preventing Austria's union with Germany has disappeared, the denial to the Austrians of the right of self-determination is not merely purposeless, it endangers the peace of Europe. Hence it is the duty of all persons who desire to work for the establishment of that peace, and so of the peace of the world, to help right the wrong done to the Austrians.

VIII


CONCLUSION

THE only way to save the world from moral collapse is to return to the ideal of justice. And that involves the righting of wrongs done. So long as wrongs are not redressed, so long as there are in Europe peoples bartered about from one State to another like pawns on a chessboard, so long there will be no peace in Europe. The oppressed peoples will constantly try to shake off the yoke, and they will not be deterred by any moral considerations, for they have been taught that morality has nothing to do with the life of nations. This makes international understanding impossible from the outset—and peace can only be built upon understanding. Europe, therefore, will be perpetually full of material for conflict, which may at any moment set the Continent ablaze. In view of the political and economic ties binding Europe with other continents, there would be no chance of isolating a European conflagration. That was proved by the World War. Unless Europe has peace, therefore, there is no peace for the rest of the world. Self-determination for the six and a half million Austrians is not a small matter of secondary importance in world politics. What is at stake is not the concern of us alone, but the question: Is the principle of justice valid or is it not? And that concerns the whole world.

It was America's President who said that justice and fair dealing for the peoples of the world must be made secure against violence and the selfish spirit of aggression; that all the peoples had, in fact, that interest

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in common; and that the American people, for their part, realized absolutely that unless justice were accorded to others, it could not be accorded to them.



REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA


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