

ARMY (PURCHASE OF COMMISSIONS).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 6 July 1858;—for,

A "COPY of REPORT upon the EVIDENCE given by Sir *Charles Trevelyan* before the COMMISSION appointed to inquire into the PURCHASE and SALE of COMMISSIONS in the ARMY; together with a Copy of Sir *Charles Trevelyan's* EVIDENCE and STATEMENTS, and Copy of his LETTER to the Secretary of State for War, dated the 1st day of July 1858."

War Office, }
29 July 1858. }

J. PEEL.

(*Colonel North.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
30 July 1858.

COPY of REPORT upon the EVIDENCE given by Sir *Charles Trevelyan* before the COMMISSION appointed to inquire into the PURCHASE and SALE of COMMISSIONS in the ARMY; together with a Copy of Sir *Charles Trevelyan's* EVIDENCE and STATEMENTS, and Copy of his LETTER to the Secretary of State for War, dated the 1st day of July 1858.

ARMY PURCHASE.

MINUTE of the SECRETARY of STATE for WAR constituting a Committee for inquiring into the "Statement" which Sir *Charles Trevelyan* laid before the Commissioners on the Purchase and Sale of Commissions in the Army.

IN accordance with my letter of the 17th July to the Commissioners on the Purchase and Sale of Commissions in the Army, I appoint the following gentlemen a Committee to examine and report upon the "Statement" which Sir *Charles Trevelyan* laid before the Commission, and which is found at page 475 of the Report presented to both Houses of Parliament on the conclusion of the inquiry:—Sir Benjamin Hawes, Sir John Ramsden, Sir Henry Storks, Sir Alexander Tulloch, Messrs. Croomes and W. O. Marshall, and Captain Marvin.

War Office, 28 October 1857.

Panmure.

REPORT on Sir *Charles Trevelyan's* Statement relative to the Abolition of Purchase in the Army.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in the Secretary of State's Minute of the 28th of October last, we have examined carefully the statements laid by Sir *Charles Trevelyan* before the Commissioners upon Purchase and Sale of Commissions in the Army. We have assumed that henceforth no officer is to obtain promotion by purchase, but that every officer who has purchased, or who by service has acquired a right by custom to sell his commission, and who desires to realise its value, will be paid the regulated price only of his commission by the public.

The questions which presented themselves to us as likely to lead to the soundest conclusions in regard to the effect of the proposed changes were the following:—

I. *What*

I. *What do the regimental officers gain or lose by the following proposed alterations? (See pages 480, 481, of Report of Army Purchase Commissioners.)*

p. 83.

- a. Increase of pay.
- b. Relief from the band subscription.
- c. Discontinuance of the non-effective allowance.
- d. Discontinuance of additional pay, for length of service and brevet rank.
- e. Discontinuance of rations of provisions abroad.
- f. Discontinuance of mess allowance.
- g. Discontinuance of agency.
- h. Discontinuance of pensions to widows and children, except when the officer is killed in action.
- i. Taking also into consideration that the officer would not pay for any of his commissions.

II. *What are the relative advantages (in a pecuniary sense) of the present and proposed systems, taking into consideration the following points?*

- a. The result of the foregoing inquiry as to the loss or gain of regimental officers.
- b. The officer's prospect of promotion under Sir Charles Trevelyan's proposed scheme of voluntary and compulsory retirements (see page 487), as compared with his prospects under the existing system.
- c. The estimated number of general officers (see page 484).
- d. The establishment of a staff corps, with new rates of pay and allowances in lieu of the present staff system.
- e. The proposed scale of full-pay retirements.

p. 89.

p. 86.

III. *What would be the maximum charge of full-pay retirements and half-pay, under Sir Charles Trevelyan's scheme, estimated by him at—*

Full-pay retirements	-	-	-	-	-	-	£. 210,622
Half-pay	-	-	-	-	-	-	80,000

IV. *What would be the probable cost of compensating officers now in the service, who have purchased their commissions, and who may wish at any time to retire from the service? (See pages 487, 488; paragraphs 8 and 9.)*

p. 89.

V. *Would there be any, and if any, what expense thrown upon the War Office by the abolition of army agents? (See "Agency," page 483, where Sir Charles Trevelyan states his opinion no such expense would arise.)*

p. 85.

WE have endeavoured to arrive at an answer to these questions with as much accuracy as possible, for perfect accuracy is not attainable, and the following is the result :—

I. *What would the regimental officers gain or lose by the alterations proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan, viz.—*

p. 83.

- a. The increase of pay (*see* pages 480, 481).
- b. The relief from the band subscription.
- c. The discontinuance of the non-effective allowance.
- d. The discontinuance of additional pay for length of service and brevet rank.
- e. The discontinuance of rations of provisions abroad.
- f. The discontinuance of mess allowance.
- g. The discontinuance of agency.
- h. The discontinuance of pensions to widows and children (except when the officer is killed in action).
- i. And considering, at the same time, that the officer would not pay for any of his commissions?

The first Table appended shows the gain or loss which would result to each rank of non-purchasing combatant officers.

It follows from this statement that the senior ranks, from colonel to captain inclusive, will lose from 2 *l.* to 83 *l.* per annum, whilst the junior ranks, except lieutenants of seven years' standing, will gain from 6 *l.* to 58 *l.* per annum.

We must, however, observe that while we can calculate with accuracy the advantages which each officer will gain by the increase of pay and the discontinuance of band subscriptions; the loss to officers from the proposed discontinuance of pensions to their widows and of compassionate allowances to their children, and the abolition of rations to officers and their civil servants abroad, and especially to their families when in the tropics, cannot be accurately estimated, and these allowances, therefore, have been necessarily thrown, for the purposes of calculation, into an annual average amount per officer.

The discontinuance of rations abroad would be of no great importance to the unmarried officer. But, to a married officer who, from want of means to keep a separate establishment at home, is compelled to take his family abroad to the tropics, the loss will be very considerable, varying according to his family from 22 *l.* to 58 *l.*

With respect to the abolition of pensions to the widows of officers, not killed in action, &c., it is scarcely possible to calculate correctly the sum which each married officer would have to pay to secure to his widow a pension equal to that now granted by the public, so much would depend upon the respective ages of the parties, and upon the position of the officer, at home or abroad; nor is it more easy to ascertain what provision he would have to make for the loss of compassionate allowance to his children. These would be very heavy expenses to married officers, and the sum named in the statement before alluded to, represents rather the contribution that would be required from every officer of the rank, whether married or single, to make a fund whence pensions could be granted, than the amount of loss to individuals who had to provide deferred annuities for their widows and orphans.

Sir Charles Trevelyan estimates the saving to the public on this head at 78,401 *l.*, but this saving is no criterion of the loss to the officers. His view that the officers will be compensated by not purchasing their commissions, can only apply to those who have hitherto been purchasers, out of their own resources, or have otherwise found the means of purchasing.

The

The increase of pay obtained by such purchase at an earlier period than would otherwise have been the case, must, of course, also form an element in the calculation, and in order to illustrate the advantage which the earlier promotion thus acquired bears to its cost by purchase, we have endeavoured to show, in Tables (A.) and (B.) in the Appendix, a comparison between the prospects of non-purchasing and purchasing officers, every item being reduced to its present value.

Table (A.) represents the case of an officer in each rank who, having previously purchased no step, has served in his rank the average time in which officers obtain promotion by purchase. He is supposed to have the option of purchasing, and the table shows the present value of his prospective pay in each rank if he purchase, and if he do not purchase, the next step; if the sum of these values in the case of the purchasing officer exceeded the sum of those pertaining to the non-purchasing officer by an amount equal to the cost to the former of his step, it would follow, that in purchasing such a step an officer beneficially employs his money. It will be seen, however, that in each rank the loss is very considerable.

Table (B.) institutes a comparison between the prospects of a gentleman just entering the line with the intention of purchasing all his commissions, and those of one entering at the same time under the determination to purchase no step. Here the present value of the prospects of the former exceed the value of those of the latter by 1,071 *l.*; but for that he will have prospectively to invest sums of which the total present value is 2,487 *l.*, so that in reality he will be a loser of an amount equal to a present sum of 1,416 *l.* We would here remark that in 1856 there were in the line but 24 lieutenant-colonels who had purchased all their commissions, so that the circumstance of this loss is a very exceptional one. It appears also from the same authority, viz., a return submitted by Sir Charles Yorke to the Purchase Commission, that the total amount which had been paid by all the purchasing officers in the infantry of the line was 3,089,840 *l.*, and the sum paid on an average by each purchasing officer 942 *l.*; whence the proportion of the present value of average loss to each purchasing officer probably does not exceed 297 *l.*

These calculations are founded upon the ordinary rate of pay at Home and in the Colonies (except Ceylon, Hong Kong, and Mauritius). But in those stations and the East Indies higher rates are received, which, of course, would materially add to the advantage of the purchasing officer. The effect of this may be supposed from the following scale of pay and allowances for all regimental ranks at those stations above the rank of subaltern :

	East Indies.		Mauritius, Ceylon, or China.	
	Full Batta Station.	Half Batta.		
	£.	£.	£.	
Lieut.-Colonel commanding a corps	1,717	1,472	840	There are also some similar allowances in Victoria, though the precise extent is not known, being paid from colonial funds.
Ditto not in command - - -	1,237	992	780	
Major - - - - -	945	768	600	
Captain - - - - -	495	446	388	
			Exclusive of tentage or field allowance.	

The Tables (A.) and (B.) have been computed at the regulated prices of commissions; had the prices notoriously current been taken into calculation, the loss to purchasing officers would have been proportionately greater. On the other hand it must be remarked that there are many incidental advantages accruing

accruing to the purchasing officer which do not admit of computation ; such as higher rank at a comparatively early age ; the greater chance of receiving honorary distinctions ; increased pension to the widow ; and the prospective share of prize money, whatever it may be, which is of course proportioned to the rank of the officer.

II. *What are the relative advantages, in a professional point of view, and in a pecuniary sense, of the present and proposed systems, taking into consideration the following points, viz. :—*

- a. The result of the foregoing inquiry as to the loss or gain of regimental officers.
- b. The officer's prospect of promotion under Sir Charles Trevelyan's proposed scheme of voluntary and compulsory retirements as compared with his prospects under the existing system.
- c. The estimated number of general officers.
- d. The establishment of a staff corps with new rates of pay and allowances in lieu of the present staff system.
- e. The proposed scale of full-pay retirements ?

a. The result of the foregoing inquiry as to the loss or gain of regimental officers upon pay and allowances is, as has been already pointed out, various upon different ranks and positions of officers, and upon the two classes of officers who do and who do not purchase.

b. From the calculation we have made, and which we believe to be as accurate as possible, we find that, if the purchase system be abolished, and Sir Charles Trevelyan's plan substituted, the prospect of promotion would, up to the rank of colonel, be considerably slower than it is under the existing system, but that an officer would arrive at the rank of major-general nearly one year earlier than at present.

The average periods of obtaining the several ranks, under Sir Charles Trevelyan's system, we have calculated to be as follows :—

Rank Attained.	Years.	Years.		
Lieutenant at the age of	-	-	23 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	later than the present average.
Captain	-	-	32 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 5 $\frac{1}{2}$	" "
Lieut.-colonel (now Major)	-	-	45 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	" "
Colonel (now Lieut.-colonel)	-	-	50 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	" "
Major-general	-	-	58 $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{1}{2}$	earlier "

The plan submitted by Sir Charles Trevelyan excludes one source of advancement, that caused by exchanges, whence officers, both purchasing and non-purchasing, now benefit to an extent probably double that which they obtain from death vacancies ; purchasing officers being thus enabled to effect exchanges into corps where few are before them for purchase, or to avoid colonial service. On the other hand, non-purchasing officers, by remaining steadily in their corps, rise by exchanges of senior officers of the same rank to the head of the list, and are ultimately in a position to profit by the first vacancy arising in the corps from death or augmentation.

We

We must at the same time record our dissent from his view, that resignations under the proposed system would equal, or even approach, the proportion of the present retirements by the sale of commissions.

The periods of promotion have necessarily been calculated upon a system of seniority, but if the system of selection advocated by Sir Charles Trevelyan were carried into effect, it would of course cause the promotion of a certain number of officers to the higher grades in considerably less time than that stated in the table; but such acceleration of promotion, which is not susceptible of calculation, would occasion a corresponding retardation in that of the remaining officers.

c. and *d.* These circumstances would but very slightly affect the prospects of an officer upon his entrance into the service.

e. With regard to the system of retirement proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan, it may be doubted whether the majority of officers would derive the benefit anticipated by the change.

For instance, Table (C), in the Appendix, represents the cases of officers of the several ranks of captain, major, and lieutenant-colonel, of the ages of 45, 50, 55, 60, and 65 years respectively, who may desire to quit active service, and from this Table it appears that although the actual retired full-pay in the proposed system exceeds that in the present, yet the loss of pension to the widow generally more than counterbalances the gain, and in almost every case an officer could at present obtain for his commission a sum which would purchase an annuity greater than the retirement under the present or proposed system.

The general answer to the second question appears to us therefore to be that, considering the small benefit, if any, arising to officers from the proposed alterations in pay and allowances (the subalterns only gaining and regimental officers of higher rank losing), and looking to the loss all would sustain by the greater time it would take to attain successive steps of regimental promotion, the advantage in a pecuniary sense to each officer would be diminished by the proposed changes. The purchasing officer would save the interest of the money he, under the present system, invests in commissions, but would lose the accelerated promotion attainable by purchase, with the increased pay and other advantages previously referred to which that early promotion would secure him.

III. *What would be the maximum charge of full-pay retirements and half-pay, under Sir Charles Trevelyan's scheme, estimated by him at—*

	£.
Full-pay retirements - - - - -	210,622
Half-pay - - - - -	80,000

(See pages 485, 487, &c.)

pp. 87, 89, &c.

After giving our best consideration to this question, and after making careful calculations upon the best data to be procured, we have arrived at a result greatly differing from the estimate of Sir Charles Trevelyan.

We estimate that the annual maximum cost of retired full-pay of the army, founded upon the establishment of 1857-8, exclusive of the Household Cavalry, Foot Guards, and scientific corps, would amount to 512,271 *l.*, but as the number of officers has since been greatly increased, this amount will be largely increased also.

In calculating this amount we have carefully considered the cost of retirements, whether on full or half-pay, in the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Marines, and the East India Company's Service, and are of opinion that they corroborate the estimate we have arrived at.

pp. 91, 92.

We think it expedient here to advert to the compensation intended for the general officers now on the list, whose prospects of succeeding to the emoluments derived from regiments would be taken away by the change, as well as for the colonels of advanced age, whose prospect of attaining the rank of general officer, with its present contingent advantages, would be indefinitely postponed. It is impossible to enter into any calculations on these heads, but assuming from Sir Charles Trevelyan's explanatory Statement, p. 490 of Appendix to Report of Purchase Commissioners, that some compensation is intended, the expense of it must clearly be added to the cost of the measure, and will form a considerable item beyond the amount here stated.

With regard to half-pay, the conditions upon which it is proposed to be granted render the cost so uncertain, that we cannot offer any satisfactory opinion as to its probable amount; but we see no reason to object to the sum estimated by Sir Charles Trevelyan as a conjectural amount.

IV. *What would be the probable cost of compensating officers now in the service who have purchased their commissions, and who may wish at any time to retire from the service? (See pages 487, 488; paragraphs 8 and 9.)*

The cost of this compensation, though generally alluded to, has not been included in Sir Charles Trevelyan's financial Statement, but it is an important element in the expense of his scheme.

According to a Parliamentary return (No. 2 of the Appendix to the "Report on the Sale and Purchase of Commissions"), the gross value of the commissions of officers then serving amounted to 7,126,030 *l.* But it is impossible to estimate exactly the number of officers who would be disposed to avail themselves of the opportunity of selling their commissions to the public in preference to continuing to serve under the proposed arrangement. We have, however, calculated the probable amount in the best manner we are able, and have arrived at a total of 2,355,288 *l.*, which would allow of about one-third of the whole number retiring.

Sir Charles Trevelyan proposes in his Statement to compensate officers at current prices, but it is not possible to calculate with accuracy the compensation contemplated, in consequence of the uncertain value of commissions, arising from the varying and exceptional character of the service of the British Army.

There are also many officers, who have purchased their commissions, who have been placed upon half-pay by reduction, whose claim to realise their outlay could not be refused if the commissions in the army became purchasable by the public, and which would require to be added to the above amount.

V. *Would there be any, and if any, what expense thrown upon the War Office by the abolition of army agents?*

We have no doubt that some expense would be the result of such a change, but we are not prepared to say to what extent; we believe, however, that the additional expense would absorb a large portion of the saving estimated by Sir Charles Trevelyan under this head.

Having thus determined, to the best of our ability, the answers to the questions proposed, we next proceed to show their bearing generally upon Sir Charles Trevelyan's Statement.

Sir Charles Trevelyan has estimated that a net reduction of 81,866 *l.* a year, as compared with the present expense of the purchasing portions of the army, would result from his propositions, but differing as we do from him in the important item of the expense of full-pay retirements, we estimate that an increase of about 220,000 *l.* per annum would be thrown upon the public, to which

which must be added the cost of compensating officers who have purchased their commissions, or obtained by service a claim to sell. This estimate, being based upon the regulation prices, would be greatly increased should it be admitted that officers would have a fair claim to be compensated at such additional rates as are well known to have been generally paid by them.

We have, however, to observe that there are circumstances which may not improbably add still more to this increased expenditure, arising out of the proposed discontinuance of widows' pensions, which are proposed to be discontinued, on account of which a saving is credited in favour of the new scheme. It appears to us that even if they were discontinued by regulation, the Government would feel itself bound in justice, or would be compelled by public opinion, in numerous instances, to admit the claims of widows and children whose husbands and fathers had died from the effects of climate or service, leaving their families in distressed circumstances.

In conclusion, we have to remark, that we have confined our inquiries mainly to the financial bearing of Sir Charles Trevelyan's proposition, and have not considered it our duty, nor the intention of Lord Panmure, that we should give an opinion upon the expediency of the other changes involved in the proposition under consideration, such as the abolition of agency, the discontinuance of a variety of allowances, the establishment of a staff corps, the system of voluntary and compulsory full-pay retirements, &c., still less upon the general question of the purchase and sale of commissions in the army.

We have thought it desirable to obtain the opinion of a qualified actuary in corroboration of the several calculations we have made, whose statement is appended.

War Office, 3 June 1858.

(signed) *B. Hawes.*
H. K. Storks.
Alex. M. Tulloch.
John Croomes.
W. O. Marshall.
W. Marvin.

Eagle and Palladium Insurance Company,
3, Crescent, New Bridge-street, Blackfriars, London,
14 June 1858.

Sir,

IN compliance with the instructions which I have received, I have carefully read the Report of the Committee (appointed by Lord Panmure) on Sir Charles Trevelyan's statement relative to the abolition of purchase in the army, and have made myself acquainted with the processes and calculations, by means of which the Committee come to the conclusions they do upon the several questions discussed in the Report. As to the accuracy of the data collected from official sources, I am, of course, not competent to speak; but I am of opinion that the reasoning is sound, and that the calculations brought into play in the course of the investigation are made upon correct principles. It appears to me that the proposed change, if carried into effect, would bring about results very nearly corresponding with those predicted.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Chas. Gellicoe,*
Vice-President of the Institute of Actuaries.

Sir B. Hawes, K. C. B.
&c. &c. &c.

STATEMENT I.—TABLE showing the ANNUAL GAIN or LOSS to REGIMENTAL COMBATANT OFFICERS, who have

	P A Y.						Relief from Band Subscription.
	Present.		Proposed.		Gain.	Loss.	Gain.
	Day.	Year.	Day.	Year.			
COLONELS (the present Lieutenant-Colonels commanding Corps):	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>£. s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>£. s. d.</i>	<i>£. s. d.</i>	<i>£. s. d.</i>	<i>£. s. d.</i>
Household Cavalry - - -	29 2	593 5 10	28 -	611 - -	- - -	21 5 10	17 19 6
Cavalry of the Line - - -	23 -	419 15 -	24 -	498 - -	18 5 -	- - -	14 3 6
Military Train - - -	17 -	310 5 -	20 -	365 - -	54 15 -	- - -	10 6 -
Foot Guards - - -	26 9	488 3 9	24 -	438 - -	- - -	50 3 9	16 8 6
Infantry of the Line - - -	17 -	310 5 -	20 -	365 - -	54 15 -	- - -	10 6 -
West India and Colonial Regiments (omitting Malta Fencibles) - - -	17 -	310 5 -	20 -	365 - -	54 15 -	- - -	10 6 -
LIEUTENANT-COLONELS (the present Majors of Regiments):							
Household Cavalry - - -	24 5	445 12 1	24 -	438 - -	- - -	7 12 1	16 8 -
Cavalry of the Line - - -	19 3	351 6 3	20 -	365 - -	13 13 9	- - -	12 14 4
Military Train - - -	16 -	292 - -	17 -	310 5 -	18 5 -	- - -	10 14 1
Foot Guards - - -	23 -	419 15 -	20 -	365 - -	- - -	54 15 -	15 1 -
Infantry of the Line - - -	16 -	292 - -	17 -	310 5 -	18 5 -	- - -	10 14 1
West India and Colonial Regiments - - -	16 -	292 - -	17 -	310 5 -	18 5 -	- - -	10 9 8
BREVET-MAJORS:							
Military Train - - -	13 7	247 17 11	12 -	219 - -	- - -	28 17 11	8 13 2
Foot Guards - - -	9 4	170 6 8	10 -	182 10 -	12 3 4	- - -	5 15 8
Infantry of the Line - - -	13 7	247 17 11	12 -	219 - -	- - -	28 17 11	8 13 2
West India and Colonial Regiments - - -	13 7	247 17 11	12 -	219 - -	- - -	28 17 11	8 13 8
CAPTAINS:							
Household Cavalry - - -	16 1	275 5 6	16 -	292 - -	16 14 7	- - -	9 7 7
Cavalry of the Line - - -	14 7	206 2 11	15 -	273 15 -	7 12 1	- - -	9 5 7
Military Train - - -	11 7	211 7 11	12 -	219 - -	7 12 1	- - -	7 9 2
Foot Guards - - -	15 6	282 17 6	15 -	273 15 -	- - -	9 2 6	9 16 2
Infantry of the Line - - -	11 7	211 7 11	12 -	219 - -	7 12 1	- - -	7 9 2
West India and Colonial Regiments - - -	11 7	211 7 11	12 -	219 - -	7 12 1	- - -	7 9 8
LIEUTENANTS of more than Seven Years' Service:							
Military Train - - -	7 6	136 17 6	8 6	155 2 6	18 5 -	- - -	4 14 2
Infantry of the Line - - -	7 6	136 17 6	8 6	155 2 6	18 5 -	- - -	4 14 2
West India and Colonial Regiments - - -	7 6	136 17 6	8 6	155 2 6	18 5 -	- - -	4 13 -
LIEUTENANTS:							
Household Cavalry - - -	10 4	188 11 8	11 -	200 15 -	12 3 4	- - -	6 4 10
Cavalry of the Line - - -	9 -	164 5 -	10 -	182 10 -	18 5 -	- - -	5 12 5
Military Train - - -	6 6	118 12 6	8 6	155 2 6	36 10 -	- - -	4 2 2
Foot Guards - - -	7 4	133 16 8	10 -	182 10 -	48 13 4	- - -	4 11 8
Infantry of the Line - - -	6 6	118 12 6	8 6	155 2 6	36 10 -	- - -	4 2 2
West India and Colonial Regiments - - -	6 6	118 12 6	8 6	155 2 6	36 10 -	- - -	4 1 -
CORNETS:							
Household Cavalry - - -	8 -	146 - -	10 -	182 10 -	36 10 -	- - -	8 4 7
Cavalry of the Line - - -	8 -	146 - -	9 -	164 5 -	18 5 -	- - -	8 - -
ENSIGNS:							
Military Train - - -	5 3	95 16 3	7 6	136 17 6	41 1 3	- - -	4 18 -
Foot Guards - - -	5 6	100 7 6	9 -	164 5 -	63 17 6	- - -	4 4 4
Infantry of the Line - - -	5 3	95 16 3	7 6	136 17 6	41 1 3	- - -	4 18 -
West India and Colonial Regiments - - -	5 3	95 16 3	7 6	136 17 6	41 1 3	- - -	4 18 -

SALE OF COMMISSIONS IN THE ARMY.

11

not purchased any of their COMMISSIONS, from the Alteration in their Pay, &c., proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan.

Dis- continuance of Non-affective Allowance.	Discontinuance of Rations of Provisions Abroad.	Dis- continuance of Mess Allowance.	Dis- continuance of Agency.	Dis- continuance of Pensions to Widows and Children.	TOTAL.	
					Gain.	Loss.
Loss.	Loss.	Loss.	Loss.	Loss.	Gain.	Loss.
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
- - -	- - -	- - -	2 2 7	20 10 10	- - -	25 19 10
18 2 10	- - -	6 16 4	1 16 6	20 10 10	- - -	9 18 -
20 - -	- - -	7 10 -	1 10 5	20 10 10	15 9 9	- - -
- - -	- - -	- - -	1 16 6	20 10 10	- - -	56 2 7
13 10 9	18 16 10	7 6 4	1 10 5	20 10 10	3 5 10	- - -
12 6 2	Tropics - 57 19 6 Out of Tropics - 26 10 5	6 5 -	1 10 5	20 10 10	- - -	Tropics - 33 10 11 Out of Tropics - 2 1 10
- - -	- - -	- - -	1 16 6	20 15 -	- - -	13 15 7
12 16 7	- - -	6 16 4	1 10 5	20 15 -	- - -	15 9 3
20 - -	- - -	7 10 -	1 5 10	20 15 -	- - -	20 11 9
- - -	- - -	- - -	1 10 5	20 10 10	- - -	61 15 3
10 - 11	18 16 10	7 6 4	1 5 10	20 15 -	- - -	29 5 10
12 6 2	Tropics - 57 19 6 Out of Tropics - 26 10 5	6 5 -	1 5 10	20 15 -	- - -	Tropics - 69 16 10 Out of Tropics - 38 7 9
- - -	- - -	7 10 -	- 18 8	18 4 3	- - -	41 17 3
- - -	- - -	- - -	- 15 2	18 4 3	3 19 7	- - -
- - -	14 1 10	7 6 4	- 18 8	18 4 3	- - -	55 15 5
- - -	Tropics - 49 15 4 Out of Tropics - 10 1 2	6 5 -	- 18 8	18 4 3	- - -	Tropics - 83 7 1 Out of Tropics - 59 12 11
- - -	- - -	- - -	1 4 4	18 4 3	11 13 7	- - -
- - -	- - -	6 16 4	1 2 10	18 4 3	- - -	4 5 9
- - -	- - -	7 10 -	- 18 8	18 4 3	- - -	6 11 3
- - -	- - -	- - -	1 2 10	20 10 10	- - -	21 - -
- - -	14 1 10	7 6 4	- 18 8	18 4 3	- - -	20 9 5
- - -	Tropics - 42 15 4 Out of Tropics - 19 1 2	6 5 -	- 18 8	18 4 3	- - -	Tropics - 48 1 1 Out of Tropics - 24 6 11
- - -	- - -	7 10 -	- 12 11	8 19 1	5 17 2	- - -
- - -	9 2 6	7 6 4	- 12 11	8 19 1	- - -	3 1 8
- - -	Tropics - 22 16 3 Out of Tropics - 13 5 3	6 5 -	- 12 11	8 19 1	- - -	Tropics - 15 15 3 Out of Tropics - 6 4 3
- - -	- - -	- - -	- 16 9	8 19 1	9 2 3	- - -
- - -	- - -	6 16 4	- 15 2	8 19 1	7 6 10	- - -
- - -	- - -	7 10 -	- 12 11	8 19 1	23 10 2	- - -
- - -	- - -	- - -	- 15 2	18 4 3	39 5 7	- - -
- - -	9 2 6	7 6 4	- 12 11	8 19 1	14 11 4	- - -
- - -	Tropics - 22 16 3 Out of Tropics - 13 5 3	6 5 -	- 12 11	8 19 1	Tropics - 1 17 9 Out of Tropics - 11 8 9	- - -
- - -	- - -	- - -	- 15 2	3 - 5	40 19 -	- - -
- - -	- - -	6 16 4	- 13 8	3 - 5	15 14 7	- - -
- - -	- - -	7 10 -	- 11 5	3 - 5	34 17 5	- - -
- - -	- - -	- - -	- 13 8	8 19 1	58 9 1	- - -
- - -	9 2 6	7 6 4	- 11 5	3 - 5	26 18 7	- - -
- - -	Tropics - 22 16 3 Out of Tropics - 13 5 3	6 5 -	- 11 5	3 - 5	Tropics - 13 6 2 Out of Tropics - 23 17 2	- - -

TABLE (A.)

STATEMENT showing the GAIN or Loss to an Officer by the Investment of Capital in the Purchase of a higher Commission with its corresponding increase of Pay.

PRESENT RANK.	Present Service in Rank.*	STEP to be PURCHASED.	Sum required to be Sunk.	Present Value of Prospects, if he Purchase the Step.						Present Value of Prospects, if he do not Purchase the Step.						Present Value of Advantage to be derived from the Purchase.	Actual Gain or Loss by the Investment.	
				Present Value of Future Pay.						Present Value of Future Pay.								
				Lieut.	Captain.	Major.	Lieut.-Colonel.	General Officer.	TOTAL.	Ensign.	Lieut.	Captain.	Major.	Lieut.-Colonel.	General Officer.			TOTAL.
	Yrs. Mo.		£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Ensign	- - - 2 6	Lieutenant - - -	250	900-00	1251-16	532-42	1000-37	515-01	4304-05	40-17	888-06	1221-01	510-50	1000-05	402-51	4237-20	67-68	Loss - 182
Lieutenant	- - - 5 8	Captain - - -	1,100	- - -	2020-08	803-40	1778-00	052-63	5023-43	- - -	401-04	1640-00	701-70	1445-07	708-07	5085-03	537-50	Loss - 602
Captain	- - - 8 8	Major - - -	1,400	- - -	- - -	1654-80	3405-55	1800-45	6050-80	- - -	- - -	863-77	1317-56	2712-07	1530-27	6430-57	529-23	Loss - 871
Major	- - - 4 5	Lieutenant-Colonel -	1,300	- - -	- - -	- - -	4600-17	2305-41	6005-58	- - -	- - -	- - -	602-37	4221-05	1904-15	0727-57	268-01	Loss - 1,032

The above Table shows the cases of Officers who only purchase in the course of their military career the one commission named. The present values of the increased Allowances (excepting the allowances which are in fact pay) to which they succeed by purchase are not considered, inasmuch as, in most instances, they purport to be for greater expenses incurred. The present values in the above and next following Tables (being required for comparison only) are computed on the supposition that every Officer reaches the average limit of human life.

TABLE (B.)

STATEMENT showing the PRESENT VALUE of the Prospects of a Gentleman entering the Line, with the Intention of Purchasing ALL his Steps, as compared with those of one Intending to Purchase no Step.

RANK.	Non-Purchasing Officer.		Purchasing Officer.		Excess, or otherwise, in present Value of Pay of Purchasing over Non-Purchasing Officer.	Present Value of Sum to be sunk in buying the Rank.		Gain or Loss by Investment.	
	Average Age on attaining Rank.*	Present Value of Future Pay in Rank.	Average Age on attaining Rank.*	Present Value of Future Pay in Rank.		Sum.	Present Value.	Gain.	Loss.
Ensign	18	£. 200-01	18	£. 220-02	- 40-89	£. 450	£. 450		
Lieutenant	21	816-72	20 ½	506-75	- 300-07	250	221		
Captain	30 ½	1080-48	28 ½	078-46	- 102-02	1,100	730		
Major	44 ½	458-05	34 ½	512-11	+ 54-06	1,400	618		1,416
Lieutenant-colonel	50 ½	942-06	30 ½	1065-37	+ 722-41	1,300	461		
General Officer	70 ½	435-06	58 ½	1183-48	+ 747-52	- - -	- - -		
		3005-08	- - -	5006-10	+ 1071-11	4,500	2,487		

* Computed from the actual Services of Officers in the Ten years 1844-53.

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TABLE (C).

STATEMENT showing the Present Value of RETIREMENTS on FULL PAY under the Present and Proposed Systems, and the Sum obtainable by Sale.

RANK.	RETIRED FULL-PAY.						RETIREMENT BY SALE.	
	Present System.			Proposed System.		Gain or Loss by adoption of proposed Scale.	Amount to be obtained.	Equivalent Annuity.
	Annual Amount.	Value of Annuity.	Value of Widow's Pension.	Annual Amount.	Value of Annuity.			
AGE ON RETIREMENT—45:								
	£. s. d.	£.	£.	£. s. d.	£.	£.	£.	£. s. d.
Captain - - -	211 7 11	2,399	179	219 - -	2,485	Loss 93	1,800	158 12 8
Major - - -	292 - -	3,313	251	310 5 -	3,520	Loss 44	3,200	282 - 3
Lieutenant-colonel -	310 5 -	3,520	286	365 - -	4,142	Gain 336	4,500	396 11 7
AGE ON RETIREMENT—50:								
Captain - - -	211 7 11	2,177	183	219 - -	2,255	Loss 105	1,800	174 15 10
Major - - -	292 - -	3,007	256	310 5 -	3,195	Loss 68	3,200	311 9 1
Lieutenant-colonel -	310 5 -	3,195	293	365 - -	3,759	Gain 271	4,500	436 19 7
AGE ON RETIREMENT—55:								
Captain - - -	211 7 11	1,951	185	219 - -	2,021	Loss 115	1,800	195 - 9
Major - - -	292 - -	2,695	259	310 5 -	2,863	Loss 91	3,200	346 14 8
Lieutenant-colonel -	310 5 -	2,863	295	365 - -	3,368	Gain 210	4,500	487 11 10
AGE ON RETIREMENT—60:								
Captain - - -	211 7 11	1,683	185	219 - -	1,744	Loss 124	1,800	226 - 11
Major - - -	292 - -	2,325	259	310 5 -	2,470	Loss 114	3,200	401 17 2
Lieutenant-colonel -	310 5 -	2,470	296	365 - -	2,906	Gain 140	4,500	565 2 3
AGE ON RETIREMENT—65:								
Captain - - -	211 7 11	1,411	186	219 - -	1,462	Loss 195	1,800	269 12 5
Major - - -	292 - -	1,949	260	310 5 -	2,071	Loss 198	3,200	479 6 7
Lieutenant-colonel -	310 5 -	2,071	297	365 - -	2,457	Gain 82	4,500	674 1 1

COMPARATIVE VIEW of the ANNUAL COST of Sir Charles Trevelyan's proposed Scheme as computed in his Report to the Royal Commission on PURCHASE in the ARMY, and as re-computed by the Committee appointed by Lord Panmure.

N. B.—The Items in which the Committee differ in opinion from Sir Charles Trevelyan are printed in *Italics*.

EFFECTIVE SERVICES.

For the purposes of Comparison, the Committee adopt the Calculation of Sir Charles Trevelyan which shows a total of 1,643,203 *l.* as the annual cost of the proposed system, against 1,611,591 *l.* as the expense of the present.

NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES.

COMPUTATION OF SIR CHARLES TREVELYAN.

	Present Amount.	Proposed Amount.
Widows' pensions, compassionate allowances, Royal bounty allowances, and relief fund	£. 116,401	£. —
Pensions and other allowances, at the existing rates, to widows and families of officers who may die in consequence of wounds or disease contracted in the field	- -	38,000
Pensions to wounded officers	44,263	44,263
Full-pay retirements	60,000	—
55 Major-generals, at 800 <i>l.</i>	£. 44,000	
80 Colonels, at 1 <i>l.</i> a day	29,200	
90 Lieutenant-colonels, at 17 <i>s.</i> a day	27,922	210,622
500 Captains, &c., at 12 <i>s.</i> a day	109,500	
Rewards for military service	18,000	—
Half-pay	247,699	—
Half-pay of reduced officers, and officers under 45 years of age, who are temporarily or permanently disabled by wounds or ill-health	- -	80,000
£.	486,363	372,885

COMPUTATION OF THE COMMITTEE.

	Present Amount.	Proposed Amount.
Widows' pensions, compassionate allowances, Royal bounty allowances, and relief fund	£. 116,401	£. —
Pensions and other allowances at the existing rates, to widows and families of officers who may die in consequence of wounds or disease contracted in the field	- -	38,000
Pensions to wounded officers	44,263	44,263
Full-pay retirements	60,000	—
121·28 Major-generals, at 800 <i>l.</i>	£. 97,024	
*327·88 Colonels, at 1 <i>l.</i> and 1 <i>l.</i> 4 <i>s.</i> a day	22,914	
*422·75 Lieutenant-colonels, at 17 <i>s.</i> and 1 <i>l.</i> a day	133,856	512,271
*703·64 Captains, at 12 <i>s.</i> and 15 <i>s.</i> a day	158,477	
Rewards for military service	18,000	—
Half-pay	247,699	—
Half-pay of reduced officers, and officers under 45 years of age, who are temporarily or permanently disabled by wounds or ill-health	- -	80,000
£.	486,363	674,534

* These do not include retired officers of the Household Troops.

Comparative View of the Annual Cost of Sir Charles Trevelyan's proposed Scheme, &c.—continued.

RECAPITULATION.

SIR CHARLES TREVELYAN'S COMPUTATION.

	Present Amount.	Proposed Amount.	Increase in proposed Amount.	Decrease in proposed Amount.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
EFFECTIVE SERVICES.				
Regimental pay and allowances - - -	1,251,894	1,314,234	62,340	
Staff corps and allowances . - - -	86,774	124,298	37,524	
Establishment of general officers - - -	200,825	134,000	- -	66,825
Command pay and allowances to general officers -	72,098	70,761	- -	1,427
TOTAL Effective Services - - - £.	1,611,591	1,643,203	99,864	68,252
			68,252	
TOTAL Increase, Effective Services - - £.	- -	- -	31,612	
NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES.				
Widows' pensions - - - - -	116,401	38,000	- -	78,401
Pensions to wounded officers - - - -	44,263	44,263		
Full-pay retirements - - - - -	60,000	210,622	150,622	
Rewards for military service - - - -	18,000	- -	- -	18,000
Half-pay - - - - -	247,899	80,000	- -	167,899
TOTAL Non-Effective Services - - - £.	486,363	372,885	150,622	264,100
				150,622
TOTAL Decrease, Non-Effective Services - £.	- -	- -	- -	113,478
TOTAL Effective and Non-Effective Services - - - £.	2,097,954	2,016,088		

Total Decrease—Non-Effective Services	£.
	113,478
Total Increase—Effective Services	31,612
Net Estimated Decrease—Effective and Non-Effective Services - £.	81,866

Comparative View of the Annual Cost of Sir Charles Trevelyan's proposed Scheme, &c.—*continued.*

RECAPITULATION.

COMPUTATION BY THE COMMITTEE.

	Present Amount.	Proposed Amount.	Increase in proposed Amount.	Decrease in proposed Amount.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	
EFFECTIVE SERVICES.					
Regimental pay and allowances - - -	1,251,804	1,314,234	62,340	-	
Staff corps and allowances - - -	86,774	124,298	37,524	-	
Establishment of general officers - -	200,825	184,000	-	66,825	
Command pay and allowances to general officers - - - - -	72,098	70,671	-	1,427	
TOTAL Effective Services - - £.	1,611,591	1,643,203	99,864	68,252	Taken as correct.
			68,252		
TOTAL Increase, Effective Services - - - - £.	-	-	31,612		
NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES.					
Widows' pensions - - - - -	116,401	38,000	-	78,401	
Pensions to wounded officers - - -	44,263	44,263	-	-	
Full-pay retirements - - - - -	60,000	512,271	452,271	-	
Rewards for military service - - -	18,000	-	-	18,000	Taken as correct.
Half-pay - - - - -	247,699	80,000	-	167,699	
TOTAL Non-Effective Services - £.	486,363	674,534	452,271	284,100	
			284,100		
Total Increase, Non-Effective Services - - - - £.	-	-	188,171		
TOTAL Effective and Non-Effective Services - - - - £.	2,097,954	2,317,737			
					£.
Total Increase—Non-Effective Services - - - - -					188,171
Total Increase—Effective Services - - - - -					31,612
Net Estimated Increase—Effective and Non-Effective Services -					219,783
<i>To this annual charge should be added the Interest on the Compensation which it is estimated Officers would claim, say on 2,355,288 l. at 3 per cent.</i> - - - - -					70,659
Total Annual Increase - - - £.					290,442

THE following PAPER on the Arrangements proposed by Sir *Charles Trevelyan* for the Abolition of the Purchase and Sale of Commissions in the Army, having been laid before the Committee by Sir *Alexander Tulloch*, is submitted for the information of the Secretary of State.

As the preceding report has been confined to the financial bearings of Sir *Charles Trevelyan's* scheme, and, therefore, does not admit of showing sufficiently in detail the effect of the proposed changes on the incomes and prospects of the different classes of officers who are most likely to suffer by them, I beg to submit the following observations on that head.

The leading features of the scheme for the abolition of purchase appear to be founded on the supposed advantages which would result from an officer serving continuously during 30 years or upwards, and at the end of that period becoming entitled to retired full-pay, instead of being permitted to sell his commission at any time, if he purchased it, or after a comparatively limited period of service if he did not.

This arrangement contemplates no retirement to half-pay, except from certified bad health; no exchanging, no selling, no alternative, in short, during the greater part of a lifetime, by which an officer, whose means cannot meet the necessary expenses of his profession, or who is burdened with the wants of a rising family, can quit the service, carrying with him some permanent advantage in return for the time he has devoted to it.*

It is necessary, therefore, in the first instance, to ascertain whether his military income, as compared with the necessary expenses of an officer, may not, in some cases, where he is mainly or entirely dependent on his profession, present a positive barrier to his remaining in the service till he becomes entitled to retired full-pay, because, if that be the case, the proposed scheme would obviously deprive him of advantages which can now be attained at a comparatively early period of his career, and substitute others so remote as to be almost illusory. The proposed measure would, in fact, be one in which all the benefit would accrue to the wealthy, who could remain, while the poorer class of officers, for whose advantage it is proposed to abolish the system of purchase, would absolutely be driven out of the service in a few years, without any retirement, by the impossibility of meeting their necessary regimental expenditure.

For this class there have hitherto been various resources. If originally appointed to an expensive regiment, they could exchange to one which was less so, or to a regiment in the tropics, where the allowances were better, or to temporary half-pay; failing all these, they had the alternative of selling out, receiving a part of the price of their commissions.

Unfortunately, the army is so far different from other professions that an officer has no control over a large portion of his expenditure. His messing, clothing, band, and equipments, the dress and pay of his servants, the number and quality of his horses, the cost of public entertainments, as also a great part of his social expenses, are all fixed by custom or regulation, and are entirely beyond the exercise of economy on his part. Whether these expenses will admit of modification, may be well worthy of consideration, but till a change has actually been effected in them conclusions can only be drawn from their minimum amount as existing at present.

To meet this difficulty a small increase in the rate of pay, coupled with the following alterations in regard to some of the allowances, is proposed in the scheme under consideration:

First. A relief from band subscription, a measure to which there appear no material objections; for, if a band be really essential for a regiment it would appear

* See Evidence of Sir *Charles Trevelyan*, pages 286, 305, 307 of Appendix to Report of last Purchase Commission.

appear but right that the Government should pay for it, as in the case of the drums and fifes; and, if it be not essential, there seems no good reason why a taste for military music on the part of a few officers should be indulged at the expense of the mass.

Nor could the abolition of the non-effective allowance of 20*l.* a year to the senior major and senior lieutenant-colonel of each corps, which forms the next proposition, be reasonably objected to, provided an equivalent were added to the daily pay; but this does not appear to be contemplated, though it has never been maintained that these ranks have, with reference to their position and responsibility, been hitherto too highly paid, and though the rates have remained very nearly the same since the first establishment of the British army.

As to the discontinuance of additional pay for length of service, which forms another of the propositions, it is only necessary to observe, that if, under the proposed system, promotion were to be materially accelerated, there might be good reason for it, in so far as it could then only be claimed in a very few instances, and for a very short period; but as the result of calculation has shown that, under a system of non-purchase, promotion to the rank of field officer must, on the average, be retarded more than eight years, and to the rank of captain between five and six, it is obvious that additional pay for length of service will be more required under the proposed change than ever.

To the discontinuance of rations of provisions abroad, which is also proposed, no objection could well be raised, provided each officer received a corresponding equivalent in money. Indeed, this substitution would be rather an advantage to the public, by diminishing the complication of accounts; it would also be a boon to the unmarried officer, whose rations being usually of a coarser description than he requires, are often given to the messman at an undervalue; to the married officer, too, the amount in money would be equally acceptable, as enabling him to purchase more suitable articles of diet for his family; but of course the value of the rations must in each case be considered as an abatement of the nominal increase of pay.

The discontinuance of the mess allowance, which is another of the proposed alterations, would also be unobjectionable, provided a corresponding increase took place to the pay. Indeed the change would probably be an advantage, as making it more immediately the interest of each officer to keep the table expenses within reasonable limits, and prevent any undue outlay for plate and other articles, rather ornamental than useful.

As to the abolition of agency, there appears no reason why that should be mixed up with the proposed alteration in the pay of the officers, especially as, if they are deprived of any advantage they at present derive from having an agent, an equitable claim would arise for an addition of about 2*d.* in the pound, in consequence of that stoppage having in former years been made from their pay to provide one.

The discontinuance of the pension to widows, and the compassionate allowances to children, which forms the last and most important feature of the proposed scheme, is obviously liable to great objection, unless an allowance corresponding in value were given as an equivalent, and the application of that allowance made compulsory; so as to relieve the profession from the frequent subscriptions which would otherwise be required, particularly on foreign stations, for the support of wives and families left destitute. If such equivalent be given, however, it does not appear what either the Government or the army is to gain by the change; any insurance company undertaking such a risk, must, of course, calculate upon a profit, and that profit is clearly saved under the present system, by which the Government becomes, as it were, the insurer on behalf of the officer's family. There seems no good reason, therefore, for reckoning upon a saving of 78,401 *l.*, or even any lower amount, from that source.

The leading features of the proposed change have been thus briefly adverted to, for the purpose of showing that, except in the relief from band subscription, none of them really create any fund for increasing the income of an officer; they present merely a change of denomination in various allowances; the increase

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increase of pay proposed for some of the junior ranks is virtually obtained by abstracting a corresponding amount from the income of the higher.

When the proposition is thus analysed, the objections to which it is liable, so far as regards the alleged increase of pay, are easily illustrated by the following statements, showing the income of different officers under the present system, as compared with that which it is proposed to substitute :

	CAVALRY OF THE LINE.			INFANTRY OF THE LINE.		
	Colonels now Lieutenant- Colonels.	Lieutenant- Colonels now Majors.	Captains.	Colonels now Lieutenant- Colonels.	Lieutenant- Colonels now Majors.	Captains.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Proposed pay annually - - -	438 - -	365 - -	273 15 -	365 - -	310 5 -	219 - -
Add band, to be paid in future by the public - - - - -	14 3 6	12 14 4	9 5 7	10 6 -	10 14 1	7 9 2
TOTAL - - - £.	452 3 6	377 14 4	283 - 7	375 6 -	320 19 1	226 9 2
Deduct the following Loss of Allowances :						
Non-effective allowance - - -	20 - -	20 - -	- - -	20 - -	*10 - -	- - -
Mess allowance - - - - -	6 16 4	6 16 4	6 16 4	7 6 4	7 6 4	7 6 4
Rations abroad - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	18 16 10	18 16 10	14 1 10
Agency, say - - - - -	1 16 6	1 10 5	1 2 10	1 10 5	1 5 10	- 18 3
Average value of widows' pensions and compassionate allowances -	20 10 10	20 15 -	13 4 3	20 10 10	20 15 -	13 4 3
TOTAL Deductions - - - £.	49 3 8	49 1 9	21 3 5	68 4 5	58 4 -	35 10 8
Remains of increased pay - - -	402 19 10	328 12 7	261 17 2	307 1 7	262 15 1	190 18 6
Pay as at present - - - - -	419 15 -	351 6 3	268 2 11	310 5 -	292 - -	211 7 11
Loss in each rank - - - - -	16 15 2	23 13 8	4 5 9	3 3 5	29 4 11	20 9 5

* This is the allowance of 20*l.* divided equally between the two majors.

Besides this, the captain, if a brevet-major, would sustain a further loss by the proposed change, of 36*l.* 10*s.*, which he now draws, being 56*l.* 19*s.* 5*d.* in all, or between a third and a fourth of his whole income.

It appears unnecessary to go into the results, as affecting the same ranks in the different arms of the service ; it will be sufficient to state, that in all, with the single exception of the household cavalry, the proposed change of pay will involve nearly an equal loss.

It must also be observed, that in computing the rations on foreign stations, it is the average value of what is actually drawn by each rank that has been taken. This value, though it shows what the public pays for the rations, can afford no fair criterion of what each officer will lose by their being abolished. In tropical colonies, where an officer's family is entitled to rations as well as himself, the loss will probably average not less than 50*l.* a year.

In all these calculations, too, as well as those which relate to the subaltern's pay, it must be kept in view, that the amount stated for widows' pensions, and compassionate allowances, is not what a married officer could insure these advantages for, but what they would cost, supposing that every officer, married and single, were obliged to subscribe to a fund, out of which his family would, if he died, receive the benefits now granted by the Government. Were the subscriptions confined to the married officers, as no doubt practically would be the case, the insurance would be nearly thrice as high owing to the risk consequent on foreign service.

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The manner in which the proposed change will affect the subaltern grades of cavalry and infantry respectively is shown in the following scale:—

	CAVALRY OF LINE.		INFANTRY OF LINE.		
	Lieutenant.	Cornet.	Lieutenant of Seven Years' standing.	Lieutenant.	Ensign.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Proposed pay annually - - - -	182 10 -	164 5 -	155 2 6	155 2 6	130 17 6
Add band subscription, to be paid in future by the public - - - - -	5 12 5	8 - -	4 14 2	4 2 2	4 18 -
TOTAL - - - £.	188 2 5	172 5 -	159 10 8	159 4 8	141 15 6
Deduct the following Loss of Allowances:					
Mess allowance - - - - -	6 16 4	6 16 4	7 6 4	7 6 4	7 6 4
Rations abroad - - - - -	- - -	- - -	9 2 6	9 2 6	9 2 6
Agency, say - - - - -	- 15 2	- 13 8	- 12 11	- 12 11	- 11 5
Average value of widows' pensions and compassionate allowances - - -	8 19 1	*3 - 5	8 19 1	8 19 1	*3 - 5
TOTAL Deductions - - £.	16 10 7	10 10 5	26 - 10	26 - 10	20 - 8
Remains of increased pay - - - -	171 11 10	161 14 7	133 15 10	133 3 10	121 14 10
Pay as at present - - - - -	164 5 -	146 - -	130 17 6	118 12 6	95 16 3
Gain in each rank - - - - -	7 6 10	15 14 7	- - -	14 11 4	25 18 7
Loss - - - - -	- - -	- - -	3 1 8		Less income duty 3 l. 10 s. 7 d., to which the en- sign was not formerly liable.

* The value of the widows' pension and compassionate allowances has been rated so low as 3 l. 0 s. 5 d. annually, because no cornet or ensign, except those promoted from the ranks, is likely to have served the 10 years which are necessary to found a claim to them on the officer's death.

From this it is apparent that the nominal increase of 1 s. per day to the pay of each of the subalterns in cavalry is, in the case of the married man, mainly absorbed by the new charge proposed to be thrown upon him, of providing the widows' pension and compassionate allowance for his family, and that it is only in the case of the single man that any considerable addition would be made.

Yet from this income a subaltern, raised, perhaps, from the ranks, or who has no resource but his professional income, is expected to defray the following regimental expenses, over which he has no control, under the penalty of removal from the service:—

Forage for two horses - - - - -	£. s. d.	25 17 1 per annum.
Shoeing, &c., brushes, combs, sponges, &c. - - - - -	5 - -	"
Replacing horses, say every eighth year, one at 100 l., one at 60 l. - - - - -	20 - -	"
Saddlery, horse appointments, and keeping up uniform and clothing, 2 s. 6 d. a day - - - - -	45 12 6	"
Share of regimental entertainments - - - - -	5 - -	"
Pay of two servants, and clothing for ditto - - - - -	18 5 -	"
Property tax on 165 l. to 180 l. a year - - - - -	5 - -	"
TOTAL Deductions - - - £.	124 14 7	"
Proposed pay as cornet - - - - -	161 14 7	"
Remains - - - £.	37 - -	"

This would leave to the cornet about 2 s. per day for the support of his wife and family; or, if a bachelor, for the maintenance of himself at his mess, costing on the lowest average 5 s. a day; if a lieutenant, he would have a surplus of 8 d. or 7 d. a day more; but in either case it must be equally impossible to keep out of debt if depending wholly on his pay.

With these facts in view, it seems almost unnecessary to point out how speedily the proposed scheme must accomplish the ruin of the poorer class of officers,

officers, whose only prospect of retirement from the service, with any professional advantage, is postponed for 30 years, while they would be precluded from retrieving their circumstances by exchanging or selling out, though rendered necessary by an expenditure which they cannot limit.

For the infantry subaltern, a nominal addition of from 2*s.* to 2*s.* 3*d.* per day is proposed, but this is in a great measure neutralised by the allowances taken away, leaving the real surplus only about 22*l.* 8*s.* a year for an ensign, and 14*l.* 11*s.* 4*d.* a year for a lieutenant, and even this would be more than counter-balanced when the latter attained seven years' service in that rank, in consequence of his losing the 1*s.* a day of extra pay.

In short, under the proposed system, the subaltern would, at the end, say of seven years, derive from the increase to his pay only between 100*l.* and 150*l.* at the utmost, whereas, under the present he can, after about the same period, reckon upon the sale of his commission, even if he did not purchase, or he would be at liberty to make an advantageous exchange to another corps if likely to suit his circumstances better.

As a set-off against all these disadvantages in the several ranks by the proposed change, it is assumed in the scheme under consideration that the purchasing officer, by saving the interest of the money hitherto expended on his commissions, would gain to that extent an addition to his income, which would place him in a much better position than at present.

This argument, however, could not of course apply to that class of officers, amounting to about one-fourth of the whole, who have never purchased, and never intend to purchase, and it could only apply partially to a still larger proportion, who only purchase one or two of their commissions.

But before, in any case, the intended purchase-money can be considered as forming part of the future income of an officer, it is necessary to take into account the increase of pay and other advantages which he would have derived under the present system, had that amount been expended in obtaining increased rank. The purchasing officer does not give his money for nothing, otherwise the system would long ago have come to an end. The result in a financial point of view of purchasing a company for the regulation price may be taken as an illustration. By paying 1,100*l.* a lieutenant attains the rank of captain perhaps seven or eight years sooner, than he would as a non-purchaser, with an increased pay of 4*s.* 7*d.* a day, besides an allowance of from 2*s.* to 2*s.* 6*d.* for contingencies, a portion of which, under judicious management, usually forms an addition to his income, making a total increase of above 100*l.* a year. This increase, accumulated for the years during which the officer would, but for purchase, have remained on the pay of lieutenant, generally reimburses about half the sum paid for the promotion even after reckoning the same rate of interest on the purchase money as consols, with a fair addition for a temporary insurance on the life of the purchaser. The allowance to the widow and children, in the event of his death, is also at a higher rate, as well as his share of all prize money, and other contingent advantages from military service, besides which he would find himself at the end of the seven or eight years of accelerated rank, nearly at the head instead of just entering the list of captains, as would be the case had he not purchased.

It follows too, almost as a necessary consequence, that the officer would be likely to attain the rank of major, about as many years earlier as his promotion was accelerated in that of captain, in which case the difference of pay between these two ranks, has also to be added as one of the advantages of the purchase, and so on through all the senior grades, thus, ultimately, repaying in most instances the original outlay.

The advantages are equally great, though more of a prospective character, in purchasing the ranks of field officer, as the purchaser is thereby brought, at a comparatively early period of life, among the colonels, most of whom are advanced in years, and, by thus running a young life against old ones, he has almost the certainty, if he remain in his profession, of becoming a major-general at an age when he is likely to enjoy, for many years, the annuity and other benefits which that rank confers.*

But, besides increase of pay and improved prospects, there are, in this country, advantages

* The precise value of these contingencies in each rank is shown in Tables A and B annexed to the Report, the above is merely given as a familiar illustration.

advantages in respect of social position to be derived from obtaining military rank at an early age, which always form an important consideration. It must also be taken into account, that by purchasing a company an officer exchanges many years of tedious and unimportant subalterns' duty for that of a captain, with a better chance, in the event of warfare, of obtaining the honours of his profession.

Taking these advantages into account, the monied officer will be little disposed to ask for a change by which he will lose the prospect of attaining more rapidly to the higher grades, and the following statement will show how little advantage is likely to be derived from it by the officer who is without the means of purchasing.

Promotion under the present system may be derived from the following sources :—

1. Death vacancies.
2. Sale of commissions.
3. Retirements on full pay.
4. Resignations or dismissals.
5. Augmentation of establishment.

Promotion is also materially facilitated, though not absolutely created, by exchanges or removals, because every officer entering a corps must do so as the junior of his grade, so that even a non-purchaser rises, by each successive alteration in the position of those above him, till, attaining to be senior, he remains next for promotion to a vacancy by death or augmentation. These exchanges and removals being chiefly among the rich, who are anxious to avoid prolonged foreign service, or to seek better chances of purchase in other corps, especially benefit that class of officers who, for want of means, have to follow the fortunes of their regiment. The extent to which this peculiarity is likely to operate in favour of non-purchasers, may be inferred from the following table, showing the steps gained by exchanges and removals in the British army during the five years, 1849 to 1853 inclusive :—

	Steps by Exchanges in Five Years.	Steps by Removals in Five Years.	TOTAL.	Average by both in One Year.
Lieutenant-Colonels - - - - -	12	9	21	4 $\frac{1}{6}$
Majors - - - - -	14	5	19	3 $\frac{1}{6}$
Captains - - - - -	311	60	377	75 $\frac{1}{6}$
Lieutenants - - - - -	244	210	454	90 $\frac{1}{6}$
Ensigns - - - - -	34	270	304	60 $\frac{1}{6}$
TOTAL - - - - -	615	560	1,175	235

In addition to these, 328 changes took place above the rank of ensign in these corps, from which no advancement was derived, the officers being juniors of their respective grades.

If the advancement resulting from exchanges and removals be compared with what is derived from death vacancies, and it is just as valuable in carrying an officer to the head of his grade, it will be found, in the rank of field officer, more than equal to all the advancement resulting from mortality ; while in the rank of captain it is nearly four times, in that of lieutenant three times, and in that of ensign five times greater.

This advantage, however, the scheme in question proposes to take away, as well as that derived from the sale of commissions, every instance of which, among senior officers of the same grade, also facilitates the advancement of a non-purchaser. But, whether the army will be improved by thus retaining in its ranks persons who, from a growing distaste for their profession, advancing years, or family cares, would be disposed to leave it, provided they could obtain some modified advantage for their past services ; or whether a corps will benefit by its members being forced to remain when their means are unequal to their necessary expenditure, may at least be considered doubtful.

This

This leaves the promotion of officers restricted in future to what may arise from deaths, full-pay retirements, and resignations or dismissals; for owing to the fluctuating views of Parliament, in regard to the amount of military force to be kept up, augmentations are usually neutralised, as a source of promotion, by the reductions that follow, which except, perhaps, in scientific corps, such as the artillery and engineers,* throw a corresponding number of officers on half-pay who must ultimately be provided for.

In estimating what the remaining sources are likely to yield, there exists the preliminary difficulty that if retirements on full pay, and resignations were to create promotion in the regiments in which they occur, purchase would still be found to exist, only under a different name. Precisely the same course would be adopted as in the East India Company's service, and, indeed, latterly in our own, of inducing officers to retire or resign by the offer of a sum of money, the greater part contributed by the next in seniority, who would thereby obtain promotion. The reward of an officer then, instead of being regulated by his length of service, would be made to depend on the length of the purses of those below him, which appears just as objectionable as the worst features in the purchase arrangements.

Assuming that this cannot be the intention of those who object to all bargaining for rank, the promotion will, in the absence of more definite information on the subject, be considered as devolving on the senior in the army, and not on the senior in the corps, in which case no money inducements could be held out to officers to retire or resign when they would otherwise be indisposed to do so.

To death vacancies being given in the corps in which they occur, there would not, of course, be the same objections, but, for facility of calculation, it will for the present be assumed that these go like the other steps throughout the army. The number which occurred in 103 battalions of infantry of the line in the course of 20 years, from 1817 to 1836 inclusive, are found to have been as follows:—

	Strength of each Rank.	Of whom Died in 20 Years.	Proportion Died in One Year.	Annual Ratio of Deaths per 1,000.
Lieutenant-Colonels	123	59	$2 \frac{1}{2}$	24
Majors	206	84	$4 \frac{1}{2}$	$20 \frac{1}{5}$
Captains	1,030	407	$20 \frac{1}{2}$	$19 \frac{1}{5}$
Lieutenants	1,545	639	$34 \frac{1}{2}$	$22 \frac{1}{5}$
Ensigns	1,030	232	$11 \frac{1}{2}$	$11 \frac{1}{5}$
TOTAL	3,934	1,471	$73 \frac{1}{2}$	$18 \frac{1}{5}$

There can be no doubt that this exhibits a tolerably accurate estimate of the average loss annually, among regimental officers, as by another series of observations extending over 40 years, from 1813 to 1853, the mortality was found to be much the same, except among the ensigns.

It has been alleged that this mortality would be much higher but for the facility of selling out afforded to officers in bad health. The regulation, however, which renders it necessary for them to survive at least 60 days before such sale can be considered effectual, operates as a check upon this, more especially as most of the diseases on foreign stations where the mortality chiefly occurs, are of a description which run rapidly to a termination. It will, perhaps, be considered

* The extensive augmentations in these corps of late years, coupled with the peculiar advantages they have enjoyed in regard to retirement on full and half-pay, sufficiently account for their officers being kept effective without purchase. Similar causes have operated in the East India Company's service; and were this inquiry extended to foreign armies, it would be found that, owing to repeated augmentations, their numbers had also, since 1830, been nearly doubled in most of the continental nations. The augmentation even of a few battalions creates more promotion than all the death vacancies and retirements for a series of years; but the difficulty is, how to keep an army effective in officers when their numbers are stationary.

considered sufficient evidence of this, that the mortality among officers in the artillery in which purchase does not exist, has been found, in the average of 15 years, to be much below that of the line both at home and abroad;* and it is therefore necessary to solve the difficulty of keeping an army efficient, of which the mortality among officers is limited to about two per cent. annually, knowing at the same time that in the East India Company's service, where the average loss is nearly twice as great, it has been found impossible to do so, without resorting to a system analogous to purchase.

The extent to which promotion would probably be accelerated by the retirements on full-pay has next to be considered; the number of these which the scheme provides for each rank is as follows:—

55 Major-generals,
80 Colonels (now lieutenant-colonels),
90 Lieutenant-colonels (now majors),
500 Captains,

for the whole British army, amounting to above 5,000 officers.

This would afford promotion to the extent of less than two per cent. annually, which, in addition to the like ratio derived from death vacancies would make a total under the new system, of about four per cent. By a very simple computation this will be found to yield only about one promotion to the rank of captain in each regiment every second year, and considering that the subalterns are about twice as numerous, and that there is no retired full-pay for them, their chance of advancement must be equally remote. The prospects of the field officers requiring calculations of greater intricacy, will be hereafter adverted to.

The only part which remains to be considered is the amount of promotion likely to be derived from resignations; dismissals, fortunately, being so rare in our army that they may be left entirely out of consideration without materially affecting the results.

From the evidence of Sir Charles Trevelyan it seems to be assumed that the resignations will correspond nearly with the sales and exchanges to half-pay which, upon a long series of years, were about thrice as numerous as the deaths. This conclusion, however, rests on the erroneous supposition that, because many officers now only receive back the same amount for their commissions as they originally paid, they are not likely to hesitate more about resigning, when they will obtain their rank for nothing under the new system, than they would about selling out, under the present arrangements.

Any such argument, however, would of course be totally inapplicable to at least one-fourth of the army who are now allowed to sell though they never purchased, and a still larger proportion who are permitted to sell the whole of their commissions, after a certain service, though they purchased only one or two, and these perhaps the least expensive of them; there appears not the slightest reason to suppose that as many of these men would be just as ready to resign, receiving nothing for their past services as they would if they received several thousand pounds.

This cuts off at least one-half of the expected resignations. With regard to the other half, a great deal must obviously depend upon whether the retiring officer has means independent of his profession and of his family to maintain himself. If a father, with a view of advancing his son rapidly in his profession, places at his disposal several thousand pounds for the purchase of all his commissions, and that son is afterwards induced to sell, the money becomes his, and may be made available for his future support, in any way he thinks proper; but under the proposed system, by which rank will be obtained by service alone, it by no means follows, however much the son may dislike his profession, that his father will place the same amount at his disposal to live in idleness, consequently he will have to think well on the subject before he takes a step which leaves him penniless.

The operation of this cause alone must materially affect the number of resignations, as also the circumstance that though men may heedlessly quit their profession, when they attain rank at a comparatively early age, and have given little service in return, yet after serving 14 or 15 years, which under the proposed

* See p. 477, of "Report on Sanitary Condition of the Army."

proposed scheme will be required for the rank of captain, they will be disposed to consider well before they make such a sacrifice. Resignations will consequently be confined then, as now, to officers of five or six years' service; but these changes, however numerous, being all in the junior ranks, can add but little to the promotion.

So important a deduction as this need not depend either on conjecture or opinion, for the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Marines, and East India Company's service have all been constituted on much the same principles as are now proposed for the army generally. In these branches of the service there is no outlet by exchange, no half-pay till after a prolonged period of service, no retirement on full-pay till after many years, and no sale of commissions; in short, no alternative is left to those who do not wish seriously to follow out their profession, but to resign. A reference, therefore, to the numbers who have actually done so in these services should afford a fair criterion of what may be expected in the army generally under its proposed new constitution. They are as follows, taken upon the average of five years, from 1849 to 1853 inclusive :—

Resignations in	Second Captains.	Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants and Ensigns.	TOTAL.	Average Service.
Royal Artillery - - - -	6	10	nil	16	6½
Royal Engineers - - - -	nil	1	nil	1	1½
Royal Marines - - - -	nil	4	6	10	4½
East India Company's Army -	6	49	23	78	7
TOTAL - - - -	12	64	29	105	—
Average of One Year - - -	2½	12½	5½	21	6

To this might be added the instance of the Royal Navy, in which only six resignations took place in the whole course of five years, and these among young lieutenants, whose average service was but nine years.

A very large proportion, too, of the resignations referred to in the above table could not strictly be termed voluntary, seeing that they took place to avoid trial by court-martial; but even setting that consideration aside, the vacancies would not exceed a fourth part of those created annually by death, whereas it can be shown that the promotion produced by selling out is equal to three times the proportion from death vacancies.

It is true that, particularly in the cavalry of the line, officers are less dependent on their military income than in the other forces from which these deductions have been drawn, and that they may, therefore, be more disposed to resign when they find no other mode of getting out of the service; but it must be borne in mind that one of the express objects of the proposed change is to discourage such men from entering. If the arguments of those who advocate the proposed change be worth anything, such officers must gradually be weeded out of the army, and others substituted who are more devoted to their profession, and less disposed to quit it upon slight grounds. The inconsistency of first contending that a different class would be brought into the profession, and then assuming that in the important matter of resignation they would be more reckless than heretofore, though there would no longer be any money consideration to tempt them, appears too obvious to require comment.

But even supposing the number of resignations double or treble what the result of experience has shown in the preceding Table to be their probable amount, and even after giving credit for more than double the full-pay retirements, which the scheme estimates to be sufficient to keep the army effective, the result of calculation has established that the promotion under the new

system would be so much slower than under the old, that an officer entering at 18 would only attain the rank of—

	Years.	Years.
Lieutenant at the age of	- -	23 $\frac{1}{4}$ or 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ later than at present.
Captain " "	- -	32 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
Lieut.-colonel (now major)	- -	45 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
Colonel (now lieut.-colonel)	- -	50 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
Major-general	- -	58 $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{1}{2}$ earlier.

These results have necessarily been founded on the assumption, however, that the large proportion of death vacancies which takes place in tropical climates are divided equally throughout the army, instead of being given to the seniors undergoing the same risks. Could the calculations have been so framed as to show the effect of the promotion if given regimentally, it would have been found slower by three or four years in some cases, and advanced in a corresponding degree in others.

It has also been explained in the preceding report that no allowance has been made in these calculations for the operation of the proposed principle of selection, which must have a similar effect; and the retardation of promotion in the case of those who were thus passed over would create a still further difficulty in keeping the army efficient in the junior ranks. In the heavy cavalry, in particular, which serves chiefly at home, it may be doubtful whether any but a selected officer would attain his troop under 18 or 20 years.

Such a prospect, or even the average prospects of the whole army, as above estimated, will most assuredly find few advocates among the purchasing class, who would rather pay their money to attain rank several years earlier, with its consequent position and advantages, and with the option of getting back the price when they chose to retire, while even the non-purchaser would find that, under the proposed scheme, it would take him a longer time than under the present to attain the rank most likely to come within his reach, as will be seen by the statement on margin* by the military secretary, of the periods at which the several ranks are at present attained without any expenditure for commissions.

The purchaser and the non-purchaser would, in consequence, be equally dissatisfied with the change, unless they possessed so rare a confidence in their own talents, and in the discrimination and impartiality of the higher authorities in judging of them, as to make sure of being the fortunate individual selected to pass over the heads of others.

Yet this change, which certainly does not promise universal satisfaction, even in the classes expected to benefit from it, is likely to cost the public annually more than 512,271 *l.* for retired full-pay alone, instead of the 210,622 *l.* estimated to be necessary by the scheme under consideration. The difference arises chiefly from the number of retirements provided in the rank of field officers and generals being totally inadequate to meet the condition of retirement at certain ages, taking into account the mortality, the promotion, and the other contingencies on which such a question depends, viz. :

	Number of Retirements provided by Scheme.	Number required by Calculation.
For Captains - - - - -	500	708
Lieutenant-colonels (now majors) - - - - -	90	423
Colonels (now lieutenant-colonels) - - - - -	80	328
Major-generals - - - - -	55	121
	725	1,575

Thus, in the ranks of field officers, not one-fourth of the required retirements have been provided, and in the rank of major-general not a half; it is only in the rank of captain that the numbers at all approximate, though these are still much below what are required.

Fortunately

* Lieutenant-colonels, 36 years 5 months; Majors, 27 years 10 months; Captains, 13 years 15 days. (See p. 385 of Appendix to Report of last "Purchase Commission").

SALE OF COMMISSIONS IN THE ARMY.

27

Fortunately there is little necessity for going into all the intricacies of calculation necessary to attain the above results, because the experience of various other arms of the service, as given in the following summary, is sufficient to show how rapidly the retired full-pay has increased in the last 34 years, and, by inference, how totally inadequate the numbers proposed in the scheme must be to meet the requirements of the army:—

	Royal Artillery.	Royal Engineers.	Royal Marines.	East India Company's Army.
There were, on retired full-pay, in 1857, of and above the rank of captain - - - - -	82	27	69	730
Add field officers retired on full-pay who have since passed into the rank of general officers - - - - -	22	20	29	not known.
Total - - - - -	104	47	98	—
Deduct number on retired full-pay in 1823 of and above the rank of captain - - - - -	17	- - -	43	162
Increase since 1823 - - - - -	87	47	55	568
In 1823, the number employed on full pay in the same ranks was - - -	238	94	109	1,280
So that the increase alone on the retired full-pay list during the last 34 years has amounted to the following proportions of the original strength - - - - -	nearly two-fifths.	one half	one-half	three-sevenths.

But in addition to the numbers in the last of these columns, Mr. Melvill states, in his evidence before the last purchase commission (see p. 31), that there were still in the East India Company's army, 1,050 officers who had acquired right to retirement, though they had not availed themselves of it; and which had they chosen to do the increase in retired full-pay alone must now have been considerably in excess of the whole number serving of and above the rank of captain 34 years ago.

All these results, be it observed, are totally irrespective of the vast number of officers who must have died after being placed on retired full-pay between 1823 and 1857; the increase alone during that period appears, however, quite sufficient to insure conviction that the conclusions respecting the annuities required under the proposed scheme would ultimately be more than borne out by the result of experience.

A brief reference to the number of field officers in the East India Company's army who have retired, or are entitled to retire, on full-pay, will also show how much the scheme has underrated the several grades in which the retirement was expected to take places.

For instance, by information and returns obtained from Mr. Melvill, of the India House,—

	Majors.	Lieutenant-Colonels.
It appears that there are already on retired full-pay of that army -	251	155
And that there are also entitled to retire on full-pay with additional rank - - - - -	130	127
And of 510 more who were entitled to retire on full-pay without additional rank, it may be computed that the proportion in the rank of field officers must have been about - - - - -	123	120
Total probable number of field officers retired or entitled to retire on full-pay* - - - - -	504	402
Whereas the number of these ranks provided with retired full-pay by the scheme is only - - - - -	90	80

* In addition to these, Mr. Melvill states that nine captains were entitled to retire as colonels, 103 as lieutenant-colonels, and 171 as majors.

And this for an army much superior, numerically, in officers, and subject to only about half of the Indian rate of mortality, which, of course, must always have an important bearing on a question depending materially on survivorship.

It is anticipated by the scheme under consideration that an annual reduction on the half-pay list of 167,699*l.* will ultimately be applicable in diminution of the cost of retired full-pay. This may possibly be the case in the event of no great alteration taking place in the meantime in our military establishments; but that any saving of this kind cannot be looked forward to as a natural result of the abolition of purchase is sufficiently apparent from the following statement, showing the remarkable reduction of the half-pay list during 28 years in that portion of the British army in which the system of purchase prevails, contrasted with its increase as well as that of the retired full-pay in the East India Company's service and Royal Artillery, in which there is no purchase.

	Numbers in 1829.	Amount for 1829.	Numbers in 1857.	Amount for 1857.
Infantry and Cavalry of Line, and Household Troops :		£.		£.
Retired full-pay - - -	724	109,000	238	57,507
Half-pay - - - -	6,180	590,549	2,102	247,699
	Numbers in 1828.	Amount for 1828.	Numbers in 1856.	Amount for 1856.
East India Company's Army :		£.		£.
Retired full-pay - - -	207	62,919	730	218,024
Half-pay - - - -	247	26,818	404	41,478
Royal Artillery :				
Retired full-pay - - -	19	3,332	82	22,231
Half-pay - - - -	121	12,570	117	14,332 besides 11,100 <i>l.</i> of extra allow- ance.

The scheme under consideration further anticipates various financial advantages from proposed alterations in the pay and retiring allowance of general officers, the effect of which it is necessary to inquire into, as they materially affect the position and income of that class.

Owing to the want of any proper retirement for officers under the rank of major-general, many more, no doubt, have been appointed to that rank than could reasonably be expected to find employment; but as it has just been shown that nearly half a million a year has been saved by restricting the reward of old officers, even after 30 or 40 years' service, to the sale of their commissions, all or at least several of which they originally purchased, justice seems to require that in any change which may now be considered necessary, the rights of those who have been sufferers by such a system should be carefully guarded, and that those expectations of rank and pay which have been held out as the final reward of their professional career, should not in the end be disappointed.

As an illustration how carefully this has been attended to in other professions, it may not be irrelevant to point out that when, in August 1829, a reduction was considered necessary in the retiring allowances of civil departments, that change was made to affect those only who were appointed after a certain date, lest any injury should be done to persons who had entered under another system; and there certainly appears no good reason why a different course should be pursued with respect to officers who have not only given their service, but their money too, in the confident expectation that a similar degree of faith would be maintained with them.

The

The observations of Sir Charles Trevelyan in illustration of his scheme,* lead to the inference that he must contemplate suitable compensation for the old officers whose prospects of attaining promotion, or the emoluments of a regiment, under the existing system, are likely to be affected; but as there is no provision in the estimated cost to meet this charge, though it must necessarily be of considerable amount, some further details would be required before the case of the general officers could be commented upon with accuracy.

If the number of general officers, requiring to be provided with retired full-pay, had really been as low as is estimated in the scheme, there might be some prospect of the saving anticipated from the change; but as a close calculation has shown that the number must be at least 121 to insure retirement at the proposed ages, and as there are to be 138 also on the active list, the establishment of both, when the scheme is in full working condition, must consist of 259, at the rate chiefly of 800 *l.* a year, instead of the present establishment of 234, nearly one-half of whom only receive 456 *l.* a year, and the other half about 500 *l.* a year more. The present arrangement, therefore, appears likely to be found the more economical of the two, instead of leaving a surplus of 66,825 *l.*, as estimated.

The large number of general officers in the East India Company's army, amounting to about 250, though so few are upon active service, affords a convincing proof how inadequate must be the establishment originally proposed under the scheme to meet the requirements of full-pay retirement in the British army, and that any saving based on the supposition that 55 would be sufficient for that purpose, must involve some serious error either of calculation or principle.

In proposing one uniform rate of retired full pay for major-generals, after serving till they attain the age of from 60 to 65 years, it does not appear to have been kept in view how much their claims for such a reward differ.

1. Ten or twelve years of the above time may have been unemployed on half pay, arising from reduction or bad health, the real service extending over no longer a period than that exacted for the retirement of a captain or field officer.

2. The general officer may have been all his life in the Guards, the duties of which do not usually extend beyond the metropolis and its vicinity, or he may have been in the heavy cavalry, which entails no service out of the United Kingdom, except in cases of active warfare.

3. He may, from the chances of service, have had to pass the greater part of his life in unhealthy and tropical colonies.

4. Or he may, in addition to the above, have seen much hard service in the field.

Now, for all these officers, so differently situated with respect to their claims, a retiring allowance of 800 *l.* a year is proposed; all advantages from regiments, rewards for distinguished service, &c., being abolished.

Whereas, according to the present arrangement, the Commander-in-Chief has the power of apportioning the rewards, according to the extent and nature of the service performed. To one who may have the strongest claims, he can give nearly 1,000 *l.* a year by the colonelcy of a regiment. To another, who perhaps has the next best claim, he can give a good service pension of 100 *l.* or 200 *l.* a year, in addition to unattached general officer's pay. A third class, having only the claims arising from service at home, or on healthy foreign stations, might probably receive the unattached pay of 25 *s.* a day, while those who had been a considerable time unemployed would receive only the half pay of their last regimental rank.

If these boons to old officers be fairly distributed, an arrangement of this kind, which affords the means of proportioning the reward to the nature and extent of the service performed, appears preferable to one which lays down the same uniform rate of retirement in old age for all, however different may be the service by which it has been earned.

The undoubted result of the change proposed must be, that whenever any case of more than usual merit occurs, a general officer, who finds the ultimate reward

* See p. 490 of Appendix to Purchase Commission Report.

reward of his service to be merely the same full-pay retirement as had been considered appropriate for very inferior claims, would urge the necessity for some distinction being made in his favour, and the Secretary of State for War, having no longer any fund available, would be under the necessity of going for it to Parliament, whereas, at present, ample means are at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief whenever he sees cause for making a distinction.

It is obvious that this difficulty could not be met by promoting the deserving claimant to the rank of lieutenant-general, with its superior pay, because the number in that grade being very limited, the age for retirement might be reached long before a vacancy occurred. There seems, in fact, no way of meeting such a case, but by varying the rate of retirement in proportion to the service performed.

Whatever may be determined in that respect, however, justice to the generals, and a due regard to the efficiency of the army, appears to require, that on attaining an advanced age, coupled with a fair amount of service, there should be some retiring allowance for that rank, so as to withdraw from the active duties of their profession, men who, according to all the ordinary laws of nature, are beginning to be disqualified for it. If the summary of ages given by Sir Charles Trevelyan be correct, nearly three-fourths of our general officers have attained the limit usually assigned to the active exertions of mankind, and, in any other service but the British, would long ago have gone to a non-effective list, instead of still clinging to their profession, in the vain hope of further employment. It is one of the chief advantages of the scheme, that, though the amount proposed to be set apart for the purpose is inadequate, it faces the difficulty of that part of the question, and offers to provide for it, not merely so far as regards the higher ranks, but for all above the-rank of subaltern.

And here it may not be irrelevant to point out how much the sale of commissions has been increased by the want, during a long series of years, of any retirement of this kind, so necessary in every service, civil or military.

Even those who advocate the continuance of the purchase system, from a sense of its advantages when restricted within due limits, are disposed to regret that during upwards of 40 years, it has been so largely on the increase, as to bid fair to absorb every other description of promotion.

This will not be matter of surprise, when it is taken into consideration that not only was there during the greater part of this long period no retirement for an officer, except by going on half-pay, but that the income thus afforded, particularly in the rank of field officers, was so small as to bear no fair proportion to the sum which might be obtained, by selling even at the regulation price. The half pay of a lieutenant-colonel, for instance, was but 201 *l.* a year, and it ceased at his death; but the corresponding commission, if sold, yielded 4,500 *l.*, which, laid out at five per cent. interest, produced the same amount of income as the half pay, and left a surplus of nearly 500 *l.*, besides the capital sum being available for the officer's family. In like manner, the half pay of a major being only 173 *l.*, while the regulation price of the commission was 3,200 *l.*, the officer who sold at that rate, and laid out his money at five per cent., could, by a sacrifice of only 13 *l.* a year of income, preserve the whole of the capital for his family or other relatives at his decease. So far as regards these ranks, therefore, which necessarily involved a great number of the minor commissions, almost every officer preferred quitting the army by sale, even if he got nothing beyond the regulation; and any considerable sum in addition to it always turned the scale, in coming to a decision as to the mode of retirement.

Unfortunately, even when retired full-pay was at length attainable, the absence of any precaution as to the succession, immediately led to the practice of the retiring officer exacting a large bonus from the seniors of each rank, because they would obtain promotion, without purchase, by his vacancy; and in this way, instances have occurred of sums, very nearly equal to the regulation prices of commissions, being abstracted from those to whom it was the intention of the Government to have given the promotion gratuitously. When the retiring officer experienced any difficulty in obtaining this, he gave it to be understood in the corps, that if he could get a better equivalent, he would retire by sale. The seniors for promotion without purchase, and the seniors for promotion by purchase, were thus not unfrequently engaged in a regimental contest for the step, in which the longest pocket carried the day; and as a
natural

natural consequence, the prices of commissions were run up, in many cases, to a great excess beyond the regulation.

In giving all due credit to the liberality of that part of the scheme which proposes to provide a retired full-pay for each rank, on attaining a certain age, instead of leaving each officer to be rewarded as hitherto, at the expense of another who purchases his commission, it must be borne in mind that unless some stringent measure be adopted, with regard to the succession never going in the corps, every increase of retired allowance will only add to the practice of exacting from the senior officers of each rank a greater bonus even than at present, which of course they will in like manner consider themselves entitled to recover from their successors, and thus a new system of purchase will gradually be organised, without, perhaps, the advantages of the present one.

Adverting to the very large amount shown, by the preceding report, to be necessary for compensation to the officers who may be disposed to accept the prices of their commissions, and which on a moderate computation, will, for full and half-pay, amount to several millions; taking also into account the serious disorganisation which might arise, even in our best regiments, by a third, or even more, of the superior officers at once excepting that compensation, it appears worthy of consideration whether some medium course might not be practicable, which, at the same time that it prevented the abuse of extra prices, would, combined with the operation of retired full pay, gradually reduce the number of saleable commissions so to admit of the Government dealing on some future day (if considered necessary), with the whole question of purchase, at an expense which would not present the overwhelming financial difficulties with which it is at present surrounded.

I submit that this important object might readily be accomplished, if every vacant step, arising from a sale of commission, were filled, not by succession in the regiment, but by some of the officers who are seniors for purchase in the army.

The immediate result of such an arrangement would be, that the retiring officer, not knowing who was likely to be his successor, could make no bargain for any sum above the regulation price, and would consequently be guided in the mode of leaving the army, purely by the consideration, whether the regulation price in hand, or an annuity in the shape of retired full-pay to himself, with the contingent advantage of pension and compassionate allowances to his wife and family, would be most for his interest.

The same restriction would also be equally useful in reducing the sales among that class of officers, who, though not of sufficient standing to claim retired full-pay, have acquired right to sell their commissions by twenty years' service, or what is virtually the same, to go to half-pay in order to make way for another being brought in to sell. A wealthy officer, seeking promotion, of course does not care from what class he purchases; and the extra regulation price, which might prove an inadequate temptation to one who had the alternative of full-pay, would not, probably, be offered in vain to another who had nothing but the income derived from half-pay to put in competition with it.

Were this privilege of sale, after 20 years' service, accepted only by men in bad health, or labouring under growing infirmities, it might be a public advantage that they should be tempted out of a service, for the duties of which they are no longer fit; but a large proportion of this class of sellers are between 37 and 38 years of age, in excellent health, and with ample experience of their profession. Their chief inducement to leave the army is only the large extra price offered to them, and knowing that they are not likely to get more however long they serve.

The purchase system has also within the last 15 or 16 years received a considerable accession by officers being permitted to sell commissions which they did not buy, though they had served only a small portion of the 20 years formerly exacted. It is true that, in such cases, they receive nominally a part of the regulation price only, but no account is taken of what they may get beyond it, so that it is not uncommon for an officer who has been fortunate in his promotion to realise, in this way, after ten or a dozen years' service, nearly 2,000 *l.* by the sale of his commission; an inducement which tempts numbers to leave the army at an early age who would not otherwise do so.

It is from the continually accruing claims of these different classes of officers to dispose of their commissions, that the increasing sales are kept up. Restrict that

that source of supply, by the removal of all possibility of selling beyond the regulation price, and the number would soon be reduced, and officers would continue in the service till they acquired the right to retire on full-pay, leaving their commissions to be succeeded to without purchase. Sales would then for the most part be confined to a few whose means did not admit of their remaining in the army, or who might be in such precarious health as to render it prudent to realise for the benefit of their families, in which case the object would perhaps excuse the facility afforded.

To the alterations here proposed in the mode of regulating purchase throughout the army, however just or expedient, there may be some objections, but none of them appear insuperable, nor in any way sufficient to warrant the risk of those abuses in regard to extra prices which are distinctly reprobated both by law and regulation, and the existence of which even the Commander-in-chief himself deeply regrets.*

The principal difficulty seems to be that the proposed change would make an inroad upon the regimental system, under which an officer has the prospect of ultimately rising to the command of a corps in which he originally commenced his career. Of this, however, he would still have the chance, so far as regards the promotion arising from death vacancies, and with respect to what arises from sales and retirements to full-pay, he might be noted for a removal to the first vacancy in his former corps. Under the proposed system, the alterations among the officers in one corps would, on an average, be nearly the same as in another during the year; and the difficulty of bringing back all who particularly wished it would consequently be much less than at present. To facilitate such an arrangement also, the officer, if not above the rank of captain, might be permitted to do duty for a time with his old corps in the expectation of a vacancy, and even were he disappointed in this, it would surely not be so serious a matter as having to pay several hundreds or thousands beyond the regulation for his promotion by purchase, or about as much for a retiring bonus.

The difficulty of bringing back a purchaser to his former corps would, of course, be greater, the higher the grade, and in that of field officer might long be impracticable, but the advantage of returning in that capacity will, perhaps, fairly admit of question, in so far as one who has not, in his early career, been submissive to discipline, or whose talent was found below mediocrity in the junior grades, would have a much better chance of commanding successfully where his youthful follies or deficient intellect had never been the subject of comment; whereas the officer, whose early career has been unexceptionable, would do equally well whether in command of the corps he originally entered or any other.

A few of the wealthy are the only persons who will suffer in promotion by the change, and these are precisely the class against whose rapid advancement, to the prejudice of the mass of other officers, there is so strong a feeling, because, by competition, direct and indirect, they raise the prices of commissions beyond the regulation rates, and present, to a civilian at least, the striking incongruity that those who commit most frequently breaches of discipline in this respect attain most rapidly to the position in which it becomes their duty to enforce the purchase regulations on others.

The result of the labours of the Committee having shown the apparent impracticability of the scheme under consideration, without heavy cost and doubtful success, it may not be considered beyond the province of one who has been deeply interested in that investigation to indicate what might perhaps be done with advantage to remove some objectionable features from the present system of purchase, which, whatever may be its defects, has hitherto maintained the regimental ranks of our officers in a state of efficiency, and saved the public an expenditure for that object of above half a million annually.

Alex. M. Tulloch, Colonel.

1 June 1858.

* See page 268 of evidence in "Report of last Purchase Commission."

Thursday, 9th June 1857.

Present:

The Duke of Somerset.
Lord Stanley.
Mr. Sidney Herbert.
Mr. Edward Ellice.
Lieut.-Gen. Wynyard.

Sir De Lacy Evans.
Sir Harry David Jones.
Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.
Mr. George Carr Glyn.

His Grace the DUKE of SOMERSET in the Chair.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, K. C. B., Examined.

4348. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) What opportunities have you had of observing the effect of the purchase system in the army?—Having been Assistant Secretary to the Treasury since January 1840, my attention has been necessarily directed to military finance, and in dealing with the references which have been constantly made to the Treasury, on the various modes of promotion and retirement in the British army, it has been impossible not to remark the powerful influence of the purchase system. I was also in charge of the commissariat from January 1840 to December 1854, which gave me much practical knowledge of the civil and military departments of the army. Previously to this, my Indian experience had directed my attention to military affairs more than is usual to civilians in the home service, inasmuch as the civil and military services are more frequently and directly associated in India than in England. I was twelve years in India, the first six in various situations in the Delhi territory and Rajpootana, and the last six as deputy secretary to Government in the political department at Calcutta.

Sir C. Trevelyan,
K. C. B.
9 June 1857.

As Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, his attention directed to military finance, and the purchase system.

4349. What is your view of the effect of the purchase system upon the remuneration of the officer?—The effect of the purchase system is to convert the pay of the officer into an annuity, for which he has paid an equivalent in the shape of a capital sum. That just reward of service which is provided by the public for the remuneration of its officers is thus absorbed and made away with by the purchase system. In many cases the officer not only serves for nothing, but contributes besides from his private funds towards the service of the State, inasmuch as the sum which has been paid by him for his commissions exceeds what would be necessary to purchase an annuity equal to his pay. The Commissioners of naval and military inquiry of 1840 observe in their report, page 40: "The real difficulty of the case, and it is one which was much pressed upon us in the course of our examination, lies in the position of an officer, who, having bought, and having moreover served with distinction for a considerable time, desires to retire by sale on permission being granted; he receives no more for his commissions than they actually cost him, and consequently he is in no way rewarded for his services; in fact, if he shall have paid the difference for restoration to full-pay in the course of his services, he may, on retirement by sale, actually suffer a pecuniary loss."

Effects of the system: it deprives the officer of his just remuneration:

and sometimes even inflicts pecuniary loss.

4350. What becomes of the amount which an officer has invested in his commissions, when he is promoted to be major-general?—He receives, in exchange for his commissions which he might have sold, an annuity entirely dependent upon his life, without any power of sale, and the capital sum invested by him in his commissions becomes extinguished.

Loss of purchase money on promotion to general's rank.

4351. Has not the Duke of Wellington specially adverted to the hardship thus imposed on this class of officers?—Yes; the Duke of Wellington observes as follows, in reference to this class of officers, in his memorandum appended to the report of the Select Committee on army and navy appointments, 1833: first of all, as to the 120 general officers then receiving 1 l. 5 s. a day, or 456 l. 5 s. a year: "They receive from the public an annuity for which they have sacrificed a capital larger than any that could be required from them, either by the public or any annuity office for the same annuity." Next, in reference to 138 general officers who were colonels of regiments: "Being colonels of regiments they cannot be allowed to sell out; their money is sunk in the service, and lost to them and their families for ever." His Grace next adverted to the case of a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry who had been promoted to the regimental colonelcy of a cavalry regiment: "Thus, then, this officer is rewarded, at the termination of from 30 to 35 years' service, with the command of a regiment of cavalry, which gives him a life annuity of 1,400 l. per annum, for which he has made the sacrifice of 15,000 l." And lastly, he remarked, as follows, on the case of a lieutenant-colonel of infantry who had paid more than the regulation price: "But supposing the reward of this officer's service to be 1,100 l. per annum, it is obvious that he had paid 6,000 guineas 12 years before; and even if nothing else is taken into consideration, it will be admitted that the reward, even in this most favoured case, was not extravagant, considering what is given in other services, in the British navy, and the rewards for exertion and service in other professions."

The Duke of Wellington's observations on this class of hardships.

Sir C. Trevelyan,
K. C. B.

9 June 1857.

Similar loss inflicted
on officers who become
paymasters ;

4352. Is the purchase money lost on attaining any other rank besides that of major-general?—Yes. The following extract from a letter from the Secretary-at-War to the Treasury, dated 20th November 1845, proposing increased rates of retired pay for regimental staff officers, shows the effect of a similar loss upon the interests of paymasters, and ultimately of the public. As regimental paymasters are officers of considerable pecuniary trust, the objections to their being involved in debt are more than usually obvious. “The paymaster was formerly a civilian; he is now invariably selected from the half-pay list of the army; and by the acceptance of a paymastership he not only abandons all claim to military promotion, but he loses the value of his commissions, if he had purchased them, as well as the contingent permission to sell those commissions which a further prescribed period of service as a combatant officer would confer if he had not purchased them.” Many paymasters lately appointed have risen from the ranks, having previously served as quartermaster.

4353. (Mr. E. Ellice.) Your answers have been prepared in consequence of questions which have been pre-arranged with you?—Yes.

4354. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) What becomes of the price of an officer's commission when he dies on service?—When an officer dies on service, either from wounds or from disease brought on by exposure and hard work, the capital which he has invested in his commissions becomes immediately extinguished. If he ensures that capital for the benefit of his family or his creditors, he has to pay a much higher rate of premium when he is ordered on active service or to an unhealthy station. His mind is divided between public and private cares, and he goes into battle with the consciousness that the provision for his wife and children, as well as his own life, is at stake. The purchase system puts the fortunes of families to hazard on a precarious life-tenure in a manner quite unknown in other professions. We encourage in the army what we should condemn in every other line of life, the sinking of the family property in an annuity on the life of a single member of it. This is the reverse of life assurance, to favour which a special exemption was made in the last Income Tax Act. Life assurance saves from income to secure a future capital; army purchase sacrifices an existing capital for the sake of obtaining an income.

and on officers who die
in the service.

An officer going into
battle hazards the
provision for his
family.

The purchase system
leads to habits of
extravagant expense
in the army ;

which result in
pecuniary embarrass-
ment.

4355. Does the indirect operation of the purchase system occasion pecuniary embarrassment to officers, independently of the actual loss of interest on the purchase money?—Yes. The encouragement which the purchase system gives to young men of fortune to enter the army as a pastime aggravates the pecuniary embarrassment of those who desire to follow it as a profession. The style of living in the army is pitched so high by the former class that it would be impossible for the younger officers to live upon their pay, even if they received it unfettered by purchase; no reference to civil life can account for this, for there is nothing of the sort in any other profession, and the great Anglo-Indian army is entirely free from it. The habit is so rooted in the present constitution of the English army that the efforts of commanding officers could only slightly keep it in check. All the tendencies of the purchase system are adverse to a well-regulated economy. The original commission is usually purchased by an advance of family property, which has to be secured by a life assurance. Therefore, besides the loss of the interest upon the advance, the premium upon the life assurance has to be deducted from the officer's pay. Then the young officer, in the struggle to get on, and to avoid being passed over, is tempted to borrow further sums, which are secured by further life assurances; and all this time he has to keep up an appearance of equality in his expenditure with associates belonging to rich landed, and still more frequently commercial and manufacturing families, who do not look upon the army as a profession, but only desire to spend a few years pleasantly in good society, with the prestige which belongs to the military character. It is a grievous thing that our young officers should be encouraged to contract debts in order to obtain promotion, instead of labouring to acquire those moral and intellectual qualifications which secure advancement in other professions.

4356. (Mr. E. Ellice.) Are the facts stated in that answer from your own experience, or are they opinions derived from your observations of the system of purchase?—To some extent from my own personal experience, for instance, of the habits of the Indian army, and my knowledge of the habits of the English army, and they are the observations of 30 years spent in close connexion with and observation of military affairs.

Habits of officers of
the Indian army
frugal.

4357. Having had great experience of the Indian army, do you state as a fact that generally speaking the officers of the Indian army do not incur debts, or are not extravagant in the outset of their career?—Of course there are many individual instances, but the habits of the officers in the Indian army, even of the younger officers, are very moderate and frugal; and I say this after personal observation during 12 years when I was in India, where I often lived more with the military than with civilians.

4358. You are not aware whether the extravagance which you have supposed to exist in the English army exists as the rule or the exception?—There is a prevailing extravagance in a large proportion of our regiments.

4359. Greater, from your own knowledge, than exists in the Indian army?—Certainly.

4360. (Chairman.) I understood you to say that an officer in the British army is subject to a severe tax, or something of that kind, in purchasing his promotion?—Yes.

4361. You

4361. You have had some experience in the Indian army; was there nothing of that kind there?—Yes, there was a common transaction which partook of the nature of purchase, but in its principle it was entirely different. The peculiar vice of the English system of promotion consists in what is commonly called the leap-frog principle, a principle by which less deserving officers, and officers with smaller claims of service and qualification, may pass over the heads of more deserving and better qualified officers, but there is nothing whatever of that kind in the Indian army. All that takes place there is this; when an old officer wishes to retire, his juniors club together to give him something in addition to his ordinary retirement, and then in their turn they obtain the same advantage.

Sir C. Trevelyan;
K. C. B.

9 June 1857.

System of purchase in
the Indian army.

4362. I ask you with respect to a tax upon the officers, whether an officer has to subscribe generally through a regiment, or whether he pays a sum for his own promotion; is there not an equal tax upon him?—No doubt.

4363. Do you believe that the tax upon the Indian officers has not frequently produced debt and embarrassment?—I have no doubt that it has occasionally embarrassed them; although I think that many useful hints are to be obtained from the Indian army, I by no means put it forward as a model. I consider that the principle of selection should be introduced into the Indian army, which would obviate this practice.

4364. (Mr. E. Ellice.) You think that the practice, as it exists, is as injurious to the Indian army as much as it is to the English army?—No; I think that this practice is a natural alleviation of the seniority system. It is pure seniority in the Indian army, the tendency of which is to fill the army with superannuated officers, and this alleviates it.

4365. But selection does take place in the Indian army after the rank of major, does it not?—No; majors are promoted to be lieutenant-colonels, and lieutenant-colonels to colonels, by seniority in succession.

4366. (Chairman.) With regard to the command of a regiment, they do not obtain that by seniority?—No.

4367. Therefore there is selection for the command of a regiment?—Yes.

4368. They obtain the rank of lieutenant-colonel, but are not posted to the command of a regiment, except by selection?—They become lieutenant-colonel by seniority, but obtain a regiment by selection.

4369. Having had some experience of the Indian army, how do you think that system has worked, or did you form any opinion about it?—Yes, I did, and I think it is much better than our system, and have no doubt that it approaches nearer to the true model than our system does, but it is capable of considerable improvement.

Indian system better
than ours, but capable
of improvement.

4370. Who makes that selection, the Commander-in-Chief in India?—Yes.

4371. Before he makes that selection is any report made to him, or is it done absolutely at his own discretion?—The knowledge possessed, not only by the Commander-in-Chief, but by the entire Anglo-Indian community in India of each other, both civil and military, is perfect. We require no reports there; we know every inch of every man's character.

Selections for the
command of regiment.

4372. I asked you as to the fact. Does the Commander-in-Chief, at his own discretion, make a selection?—Yes, for the command of regiments.

made by the Com-
mander-in-Chief,

4373. From your experience in India, having been there for some time, did those commands as given by the Commander-in-Chief meet with the approbation of the public opinion in India, or were objections taken to them as having been done by favour?—They were not always approved.

not always,

4374. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Generally speaking, were they approved or disapproved?—Generally speaking, they were approved. The power existed of keeping obviously incompetent men out, which was exercised.

though generally,
approved of by public
opinion.

4375. (Mr. E. Ellice.) That power would be essential to the good organization of an army, whether the system was by purchase or not?—Certainly.

4376. Are you aware at what age those colonels arrive at the command of regiments in India?—I think after about 32 years' service, about 50 years of age, but that applies to the full colonels, the lieutenant-colonels somewhat less.

4377. I mean the officer who commands the regiment. At what age generally does he arrive at the command of a regiment?—In the case of the lieutenant-colonel it would be somewhat less, after 25 or 27 years' service; so that his age on attaining the command of a regiment would be from 43 to 46 years.

4378. Would it not be a great advantage to the Indian army if some means of accelerating promotion were devised, so as to bring forward officers at a younger age for the command of a regiment?—No; I do not think that there is much to complain of now in the Indian army as to the age of the officers, but I think that further measures should be taken for securing proper professional instruction in that army, and that the principle of promotion by selection should be introduced in the regular army promotion, besides the command of regiments.

Not much to complain
of as to promotion in
the Indian army.

4379. You do not think it would be expedient for the service that officers should be brought forward for the command of regiments much under the age of 50?—I have just mentioned that I think that the power of selection should not be confined to the choice of actual lieutenant-colonels for the command of regiments, but that it should be extended

The power of selection
should be extended.

Sir C. Trevelyan,
K. C. B.

9 June 1857.

No body of men willingly admit the principle of selection.

The principle of promotion by selection might with proper care be introduced into our army.

Harmony in Indian regiments, and good feeling with respect to the purchase system.

to the whole profession from rank to rank; the effect of which would be to bring younger officers of superior ability quicker to the top.

4380. So that you would be of opinion that the principle of selection generally should be adopted in the Indian service, for the purpose of bringing forward younger officers?—Yes, I think so, but I must qualify that by saying that I do not think there is any pressing necessity, because the other circumstances of the Indian army have brought it into a good state, including the large fund of staff and civil situations, which are like salt to keep the whole mass sweet.

4381. Would it not be an advantage to the service, that men at an earlier period of life should be brought forward for higher commands in the Indian service than the command of a regiment?—Certainly, I fully admit that.

4382. And that it would be better to bring forward men in the prime of life to the command of armies in India?—I entirely concur in that.

4383. (*Chairman.*) You have stated that you do not think there is any pressing necessity for a change in the Indian army; do you think that army would be satisfied if the principle of selection was carried down through all the ranks?—No; no body of men will willingly admit of the introduction of that principle.

4384. Then the plan which you would propose not being much wanted, as you say, would be one very unsatisfactory to the officers of that service?—I conceive that it would be.

4385. Would it be a politic measure, when it is not much wanted in the service, to introduce a system that would offend all the officers?—No. I stated my opinion because it was drawn out of me, but I have never proposed any such reform in the Indian army, for I conceive that the general circumstances of the Indian army are so favourable, and have brought it into so good a state, that there is no pressing call for making any such change; but as a matter of abstract opinion, if I was asked what changes would make the Indian army still more perfect, I should say that.

4386. (*Mr. E. Ellice.*) The circumstances of the Indian army, and the general circumstances of society there, would make selection in the army a much less difficult proceeding than it would be in England under the influences of our society?—I think not; I see no difficulty here if we make up our minds that it ought to be done.

4387. Do not you think that the influences which you see prevail in all branches of the service—our parliamentary, and aristocratic, and other influences of that description, would make selection a very difficult thing in England?—I think not; I have had considerable experience in the civil service, and I have watched the course of public events for many years, and I believe that our public morality is so much improved that we have arrived at a period when we may safely adopt this principle, under proper regulations; very careful manipulation will, of course, be required.

4388. Will you have the goodness to state to the Commissioners what regulations you would suggest for that?—That is an entirely separate part of my evidence, and it involves the whole question of promotion.

4389. (*Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.*) You stated that you approved of the indirect system of purchase in the Indian army, as being preferable to that in the British army?—I think it preferable.

4390. You are aware that every officer, whether he wishes to purchase or not, is almost always obliged to subscribe?—There is, no doubt, a sort of moral compulsion. The officers in a sepoy regiment, however, live together like brothers to a degree which we have little conception of here: they thoroughly understand each other's circumstances, and there is a strong sympathy between them, which induces them to make allowance for those circumstances; and therefore when proposals of this kind are brought forward, it is always with a proper reference to the circumstances of the officers. If the junior officers could not contribute without embarrassing themselves, the purchase would be postponed.

4391. Still, more or less, almost every officer in the Indian army becomes a purchaser gradually?—Yes.

4392. Are you aware that a great many officers are constantly in very difficult circumstances in consequence of not having the money, and not choosing to refuse, and borrowing the money?—Such cases may occur, no doubt, but I believe not frequently.

4393. Gradually, therefore, every officer who arrives at the rank of major has purchased that commission?—Not necessarily, because it is not universal; it is very common, but by no means universal: it has grown up of late years.

4394. (*Chairman.*) You say that it is not universal; but it has been stated in evidence that the officer who does not assist by contributing towards the departure of the senior officer of the regiment, would be rather looked upon by his brother officers slightly?—He would be if he had the means and did not do it.

4395. If he has not the means, we have been told, that whenever he wishes to leave the regiment nobody will assist him?—My experience of the Indian army does not lead me to form the opinion that transactions of that kind are at all frequent. I was well acquainted with the officers of several regiments, and I am persuaded that nothing of that sort could have happened in any of them.

4396. It is some time since you left India, is it not?—Yes.

4397. This system, you say, has grown up more strongly of late years?—Yes; but I have heard a great deal of it since. I have a brother and other relations in the army in India.

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4398. Perhaps the evidence that has been given before the Commissioners referred to a period after you left India, but officers have stated that there would be great difficulty in any officer refusing?—I think if there was a clear case in which it would be advantageous for all the officers in a regiment that the senior major should go, and an officer who had the means refused to contribute, his conduct would be disapproved by his brother officers, but I am persuaded that they would not put any undue pressure upon an officer who could not contribute without embarrassing himself, and the natural result would be a postponement of the whole affair. The officers in the Indian regiments are much fewer in number than in the Queen's regiments; there are six captains instead of twelve.

4399. The Commissioners have been told that the officers do borrow money for this purpose, and that they are considerably embarrassed by obtaining the money?—Instances of that kind may have occurred, but it is not prevalent.

4400. Do you think the system a good one that involves such a principle as that, namely, collecting money from all the officers?—I never knew any system which did not include a portion of evil. Assuming that the strict seniority system of the Indian army is to be retained, I think that this plan of making up a purse to induce an old officer to retire is an useful alleviation of the evils of the system.

The purse system merely an alleviation of the seniority system.

4401. The seniority system you think so bad, that even such a practice as that which is adopted in the Indian army is good as an alleviation of that system?—Yes.

4402. (Mr. E. Ellice.) With reference to the system of selection, would not the facility and safety of selection be greater in the Indian service where the army is acting together or in the three Presidencies, and more immediately under the eye of the military authorities, than it would be in our army generally, which is scattered all over the world, in the East Indies, in the West Indies, in North America, at the Cape, and in the Mediterranean, where the number of officers are so immensely greater than in the Indian service?—I do not see much difference in that respect; the distances in India are immense; with the facilities of regular steam communication, the distances between Great Britain and its colonies now bear a fair comparison with the distances between the different Indian stations from Cape Comorin to Peshawur, and from the Straits to the Gulf. Sydney is the most distant port to which mails are conveyed under contract, and the period occupied in the transit between Southampton and Sydney is only 56½ days. If a system, such as has been alluded to, of selection, were to be adopted in the English army, and the means and appliances were to be suited accordingly, we must appoint inspectors to circles of command; for instance, for the North American colonies and the West Indies, for the Australian colonies, and for India and China.

System of selection as easily applicable in the British as in the Indian army.

4403. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) Have you not described a state of things as existing in India which cannot exist in this country, namely, a perfect knowledge of the mind and habits of every person in the service. Is there no difficulty on the part of the Commander-in-Chief in making a selection?—I conceive that the Commander-in-Chief, and his staff at the Horse Guards, might obtain a similar knowledge of every officer in the army.

4404. (Lieut.-General E. B. Wynyard.) Is it not notorious that the number of staff and civil appointments given to officers in the Indian army are immense, but that the strength of the officers of regiments was about one-half what they were in the Queen's service?—Yes.

4405. Does not that increase the facility very much?—The facilities for making a proper selection for staff appointments in India undoubtedly are very great; but I am of opinion that if proper arrangements were made, the facilities in this country would be equally great, or nearly so; certainly sufficiently great.

4406. (Sir H. D. Jones.) The opinion that you have given about the purchase system in India referred to the period before the Court of Directors sanctioned it?—Yes; but it has been formally recognised since. I do not recollect the date.

4407. Are you of opinion that in the one case it was *sub rosa*, and that now it is above board, and that may have affected the obligation upon every officer to contribute?—There was absolutely no concealment. I remember that from a particular circumstance. Lord William Bentinck very strongly objected to a transaction of that nature, as to a staff appointment, but that was because it was a staff appointment, and because a special selection ought to have been made for that appointment; but the plan of buying out an old officer among a set of his brother officers was never objected to, and there was no concealment.

4408. (Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.) You have expressed a very strong opinion. Is it preferable that a young man should gradually purchase (supposing that I am right in that view), and should be obliged to purchase gradually up to a certain rank, or that he should have the option of purchasing or not, and allowing people to go over his head or not, as in our service?—I would have no purchase whatever of any sort.

4409. I mean as comparing the two systems, in our service and in the Indian service, which do you think preferable?—I prefer the Indian system to ours.

4410. (Lord Stanley.) Your judgment is that both are very bad?—Yes; I consider that both are very bad, but that the English system is the worst of the two.

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4411. (Mr.

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The purchase system
not economical for the
State.

The State must give
compensation for the
risks incurred by
purchasing officers.

The pay of the junior
ranks should be in-
creased,—

and retirements given
to the old officers.

Present non-effective
list unnecessarily
large,

4411. (Mr. E. Ellice.) You have already stated that you think the system of purchase in India very defensible as accelerating promotion?—Yes, always assuming that the strict seniority system is to be maintained in its unmitigated form.

4412. Unless selection should take place in all the ranks of the army?—A regulated selection, and not an arbitrary selection.

4413. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Although productive of loss to the officers, has this system been an economical one for the State?—No. Like every other attempt to get good service for less than the market rate of remuneration, this has ended in failure. It is bad economy for an employer to give less than the market rate, but worst of all for an employer to give it, and for the employed not to get it, and that in an employment which often calls for the exercise of the highest qualifications, and for the endurance of the greatest hardships and risks which fall to the lot of man. The majority of military officers are not men of fortune, and even those who have some fortune can ill afford the heavy demands made upon them for the purchase of their commissions. The purchase system, no doubt, brings many persons of fortune into the army, but it operates still more powerfully and extensively in depressing the circumstances of officers whatever their means may be. It is necessary that military officers should be compensated for the loss of their pay, and for the risk they run of losing the capital sums which have been invested in the purchase of it. They *must* have the means of living and of maintaining their position in life; and as their pay has been spirited away by the purchase system, the public has to pay them over again in various ways. Even the expensive habits which are the indirect result of the system, ultimately take the form of a demand upon the public purse.

4414. (Chairman.) You state that the doing away with purchase would be desirable, because labour ought to find its own price, and that you ought to have an officer at the market rate; what do you mean by the market rate of an officer?—I mean as far as direct pay is concerned; for as regards that which is ordinarily considered to be the income of a commission, the officer has no remuneration at all; the great argument which is generally used in support of the purchase system is, that we get the officers' services for little or nothing, but I conceive that that is impossible. In this as in other similar cases, it has turned out in the end that the employer has had to pay more than he would have had to pay if he had begun by giving a proper market rate of remuneration.

4415. Do you mean to say that the pay of officers is now too low?—They have none, in consequence of the purchase system; I speak generally, of course.

4416. Then I understand that if the State appointed an officer, and the purchase system was done away with, the country would have a much larger addition to pay for the officer's services?—No, you would only have to give the existing pay; but you would have once for all to compensate the officer for his losses arising out of the change.

4417. Do you think the existing pay sufficient?—Generally speaking it is, but I think that the pay of the junior ranks, the lieutenants and ensigns, should be increased, in order to enable them to live by their profession, and they should be released from some burthens which are imposed upon them. We shall only half do our business if we abolish the purchase system without increasing the pay of the junior officers.

4418. Then you would begin the abolition of the purchase system by increasing the pay of the junior officers, what would you do with your senior officers when they become old?—I would have a retirement for them.

4419. Then you would adopt a system of retirement?—Yes.

4420. Then is there no economy in the present system?—No.

4421. Then there are two questions that will arise, increased expenditure and increase of pay?—An increase of pay in the junior ranks.

4422. Yes, and next an increase of retired allowances for the senior ranks?—Yes, and also a sum to compensate the officers.

4423. Putting that aside, I wish to deal with the future expenditure of the country?—There would be two causes of increase, one an increase of pay in the junior ranks, and the other the adoption of an adequate system of retirements, but there would also be many things to set off against that.

4424. Your plan is to have a sufficient retirement for aged officers?—Yes, it is the alpha and omega; the whole thing.

4425. What scheme have you to suggest that will provide a sufficient retirement for the old officers of the army?—I have a plan which I am ready to submit to the Commission.

4426. (Mr. E. Ellice.) As I understand from your answers, the State would benefit in no respect by the abolition of purchase, but there would be an increase of the pay of the junior officers?—It would benefit in many ways, which I can submit to the Commission. I stated before that the officer has no pay; that the ordinary pay of the officer has disappeared in consequence of the purchase system. Now I am prepared to show in what manner military officers are compensated for the loss of their pay; that is their pay, and not miscellaneous additional allowances, which would to a certain extent cease, supposing that a regulated system of remuneration were adopted.

4427. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) In what manner have military officers been compensated for the losses which they have suffered by the purchase system?—A supplementary plan of remuneration has been gradually constructed, chiefly in the shape of an *unnecessarily large non-effective system*, such as:—

Army Estimate, 1857-8.

	£.
Rewards for military services - - - - -	18,000
Pay of general officers - - - - -	49,083
Pay of colonels of regiments - - - - -	124,500
Retired full pay - - - - -	60,000
Half-pay - - - - -	262,405
Allowances in aid of regimental messes - - - - -	26,114
Total - - -	540,102

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These sums are for the guards and line only, and are irrespective of the amounts charged under the same heads for the artillery and engineers. That this has been the effect of the purchase system is not only consistent with reason and analogy, but the process by which the result has been arrived at may be clearly traced in documents of the highest authority.

4428. (*Chairman.*) You state that as independent of the sums allowed for the artillery and engineers; what sums are allowed under that head?—For rewards for military services they have 3,000 *l.* a year, while the rest of the army has 18,000 *l.*

4429. Compare the number of the artillery with the number of the army generally, how does the 3,000 *l.* stand as against the 18,000 *l.*?—As a very moderate item.

4430. (*Mr. E. Ellice.*) Do you remember the reason for which that 18,000 *l.* was given?—In lieu of garrison appointments.

4431. It was given to old officers who had been severely wounded?—No, I have omitted the 50,000 *l.* a year for wounds, because that may be considered as of the nature of compensation for wounds; these are good service pensions.

4432. Given for extremely good services?—They are very numerous; so numerous that they may fairly be considered to constitute a part of the additional remuneration of the army. There are already 136 officers receiving good service pensions under the new arrangement, and there is still a considerable number to be appointed as the remaining garrison appointments fall in. Sums distributed at irregular intervals, on the principle of a dividend, are naturally employed in making up to senior officers for their disappointments in promotion. When a distinguished officer is promoted to a regiment, he relinquishes his good service pension.

4433. (*Lord Stanley.*) But too numerous to be exceptional?—The old system is an excessive excrescence. A great deal of this would have to be given under any circumstances; but the excessive amount of it is distinctly traceable to the purchase system.

4434. (*Chairman.*) Take the first item of 18,000 *l.*, you state that an analogous sum was given to the artillery, amounting to 3,000 *l.*?—Yes.

4435. Therefore it does not seem to depend upon purchase, for the artillery have no purchase?—In a general question, where general results are looked to, you must look to general causes. To take that single point of the garrison appointments, the 18,000 *l.* was the equivalent for the garrison appointments previously given to old and deserving officers; there was a great run upon those appointments at that time; they were very unpopular, and considered to be sinecures; and the Duke of Wellington stood forward as the champion of the army, and in a famous memorandum he showed that, owing to the exhaustive process of the purchase system, it was indispensably necessary, not only to maintain, but to increase the rewards of the officers; and the committee on army and navy appointments, which had gone into the matter in a spirit of great economy, not only maintained the garrison appointments in substance, but added 7,000 *l.* a year for the unattached general officers.

4436. (*Mr. E. Ellice.*) That committee did not change the sum very much; it may have added the 7,000 *l.*, but it did not otherwise change the 18,000 *l.* at which the emoluments of the garrisons were estimated; but the garrison appointments themselves were abolished, because they were sinecure offices, and held in very disproportionate numbers by officers to whom they had been given as favours?—Yes, it was a bad way of remunerating old and deserving officers.

4437. For instance, the government of Edinburgh, which was 1,800 *l.* a year, was given to the Duke of Gordon?—Yes, and it was on account of the bestowal of sinecure appointment from political influence that they were abolished. We have made great progress since those days; but I may make this observation, which is, that whatever is the prevailing practice for the main body of the army must be extended to the other portions of the army; for instance, having given 18,000 *l.* a year to the line, it was necessary to give a sum, under the same head, to the artillery. I do not object to that.

4438. (*Chairman.*) Suppose the purchase system done away with, is that 18,000 *l.* a sum which we might consider as knocked off at once?—The whole of the emoluments of the army would have to be revised. I am not prepared to give an opinion as to the particular revision which would take place, but the whole of these items taken together, and also some others, constitute an amount of extra remuneration which, if it should be determined to compensate officers for the advantages they derive from their outlay under the purchase system, certainly might be revised with considerable economy to the public.

4439. In the French army, for instance, they attach money to the Legion of Honour?—Yes, but I should be sorry to see the retired allowances of our officers placed on so low a footing as the French; I would place them on a higher footing.

4440. With larger allowances?—Yes, and more suited to the state of society in this country.

which is due to the purchase system.

Rewards for military service.

Pensions for wounds.

The Duke of Wellington's memorandum showing the necessity of increasing the rewards of officers, to make up for their losses by the purchase system.

Whatever is the prevailing practice of the main body must be extended to the other parts.

Army remunerations might be revised with a saving to the public.

Our retiring allowances should be higher than in the French army.

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Pay of general officers
and of colonels.

The Duke of Wel-
lington's memorandum
of 1833, pointing out
the want of remunera-
tion to purchasing
officers.

The Duke of Wel-
lington's opinion that
purchase should be
maintained.

In the report of the
Commission of 1840,

necessity stated of
providing for non-
purchasing officer.

4441. Will you take the next item?—The next is the pay of general officers.

4442. What does that amount to?—£. 49,000 for the line and the guards.

4443. Is that an item to which we can look for a reduction?—I cannot commit myself to particular items, but I am persuaded, if you take that in connexion with the next item of 124,500 *l.* for the colonels, the two together might admit of reduction. The whole of these items taken together certainly might admit of reduction; that is the only way I can show it; but if you take each individual item, the operation cannot be dealt with piecemeal, but as a whole.

4444. (Sir *De Lacy Evans*.) You alluded to some documents in proof of your answer to the last question. What documents are those?—The memorandum of the Duke of Wellington, which is referred to by the Select Committee on Army and Navy Appointments (1833), as bringing “briefly, but powerfully into view the whole constitution of the British army, and the circumstances of its officers,” is an elaborate argument to show that the officers of the British army are underpaid, in consequence of the purchase system. The words with which his Grace commenced this part of his statement were: “An examination of the detailed operation of the *system of promotion by purchase*, or the remuneration intended to be given by the public to the officers of the army for their service, *will show that those who purchase their commissions*, which are certainly three-fourths of the whole number, *receive but little for their service besides the honour of serving the King*.” That this argument was not without effect upon the committee may be seen from the following paragraph of their report: “*Considering the great pecuniary sacrifices in the purchase of commissions*, as well as the length of service to which officers are subject before they can attain to be major-generals, the committee are of opinion that the emoluments of that rank ought not to be less than 400 *l.* a year; and as it could be made up to that amount at an annual charge of somewhat under 7,000 *l.*, they venture to recommend that it should be so increased immediately to all those who receive no other public emoluments, subject to such exceptions in this respect as may appear justified by distinguished service.”

4445. (Mr. *E. Ellice*.) The Duke of Wellington was at the head of the commission, subsequently appointed in 1840, and the report of that commission contains a strong opinion on the part of the Duke of Wellington that the system of purchase should still be maintained in the British army?—Yes, that was his opinion; he represented the prevailing opinion up to his death.

4446. You did not quote that paragraph from the Duke of Wellington's statement in 1833, as intending to convey the impression that the Duke of Wellington was averse to the continuance of the system of purchase in the army?—No; but to show that he was of opinion that the purchase system, by exhausting the pay of officers, had a strong tendency to cause an increase of expense to the public.

4447. But, in fact, with respect to the recommendations of that committee, it did cause no more increase of expense beyond the 7,000 *l.* than you have just stated?—The 7,000 *l.* seems to have been a voluntary boon on the part of the committee acting under the influence of the Duke of Wellington's memorandum.

4448. (Sir *De Lacy Evans*.) Have you any other authorities to refer to for the effect of the purchase system in increasing the non-effective allowances?—The Commissioners of Naval and Military Inquiry of 1840, speaking of the warrant of 27th October 1834, by which one promotion was allowed for every three vacancies on the half-pay list, observe: “The beneficial effects of the arrangement are most apparent in the case of the lieutenant. His full pay as such is 7 *s.* 6 *d.* a day, and he may retire under this warrant on the half-pay of a captain, 7 *s.* a day. This is nearly equivalent to full-pay, and the small diminution his pay will sustain by removal from the effective service as a lieutenant to the half-pay as a captain, is fully compensated by the increase of pension for his widow, from 40 *l.* to 50 *l.* It was chiefly for the benefit of officers of this class that the warrant was designed. There were many serving upon full pay, for whom, after a prolonged service as subaltern, some special provision seemed to be requisite. *The want of means to purchase advancement was their misfortune*, and if driven by dis-appointment to retire from the service, the only provision open for them was sale of commission, which in the infantry would produce 700 *l.*, or the half pay of their rank, which would not exceed 4 *s.* 6 *d.* a day.” And at page 30, “We look to the operation of the warrant of 27th October 1834 as offering the best means of providing for officers of the description alluded to by Sir Edward Blakeney, and as assisting generally the promotion of those who are not prepared to purchase. But we shall venture, in a subsequent part of our report, to suggest the adoption of further arrangements which, in our opinion, are calculated to facilitate the promotion of meritorious officers *without exacting any pecuniary sacrifice*.” The arrangements referred to were those connected with the enlargement of the establishment of officers on retired full pay, which was adopted at the recommendation of that Commission.

4449. (Mr. *E. Ellice*.) Would not the same allowances have been necessary provided the system of purchase had not existed, a certain number of officers having been promoted by selection, leaving others behind who would have had no other claim on the public than such as has been given to them by those warrants?—Whether an increase of the non-effective advantages of the officers would have been necessary if another system had existed, I cannot say. My object is at present confined to showing that the increases that were made are distinctly traceable to the purchase system, and were attributed to that.

4450. I ask you whether the same increases would not be necessary if your system were adopted?—If the principle of the army were to be changed from purchase to promotion by instruction

instruction—that is, proper qualification and good service—and a suitable system of retirement were to be adopted—and, in order to maintain the current of promotion in the service, there must be a system of retirement—it would not be difficult to find out what would be the minimum which would be necessary, and which the public must inevitably pay for the efficiency of its service.

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4451. In fact, they must pay the same price as you say they now pay, for officers passed over become too old for the ranks in consequence of the system of purchase, when those officers shall be passed over by the selection of other officers?—I believe the public would have to pay a great deal less. We have gone on so long compensating the army for losses by the system of purchase, that we might at less expense establish a proper system of retirement.

4452. In what respect should we have to pay less for those officers who are left behind by selection?—On a general comparison of the variety of expedients which have been adopted, in order to compensate military officers for the losses to which they are subjected by the purchase system, with a proper system of retirement, I am clearly of opinion that a proper system of retirement would be the cheapest of the two.

A proper system of retirements would be cheaper than the present system,—

4453. Would not a proper system of retirement be necessary whether officers are passed over by selection or by purchase?—Unquestionably, under either system; but I think that in order to patch up and supplement this bad system, we have established such a great variety of allowances, and swelled out the non-effective allowances of the army so much, that we might at less expense adopt a new system of retirement.

4454. Are you of opinion that the retirements now granted to those officers by the warrants you have mentioned are too great for their services?—No, certainly not. I speak now of the individual rates, 17s. a day for the colonels, and so on.

4455. (*Chairman.*) I understood you to say that the great point was to have a proper system of retirement?—Yes.

4456. Do you consider the system of retirement in the Indian army a proper system?—It approaches much nearer to a proper system than ours; but I conceive, that on a comparison of the Indian and French and English systems, a more perfect system than any of them might be established.

and might be established on a better plan than the Indian, French, or British systems.

4457. Do you mean, by a proper system of retirement, a system of compulsory retirement?—Yes, that element would be included; but I propose that it should be mitigated, and so arranged as to fall with the least possible severity on the officer.

4458. There must be a compulsory rule obliging him to leave the service at a different age, according to the rank he has attained at that time?—Yes.

Compulsory retirements.

4459. Through all the ranks?—Yes.

4460. Something like the French service?—Yes; but I think it might be better done than in the French service.

4461. (*Lieut.-Gen. E. B. Wynyard.*) There is no obligation in the Indian service that they should retire?—Not at present; but there is a virtual obligation when they get their promotion to full colonel; and even as regards lieutenant-colonels, certainly full colonels, it is entirely discretionary with the Government to employ them or not.

4462. (*Chairman.*) In the Indian army the amount of the retirement does not alone induce officers to retire, and the Commissioners have been informed that they constantly refuse to retire until a purse can be made up for them?—The cost of the retirements in the Indian army is very moderate indeed. There are several causes for that; one is, that India furnishes not merely a profession, but also to a great extent a home to the officers; and we find that the old colonels, when entitled to their retirement as colonels, even if there is no chance of employment in India, remain there in great numbers. Another cause is the great liberality of the allowances to lieutenant-colonels in command of regiments. Officers have, however, begun to retire faster since they have had a step of rank given them on retirement.

Cost of retirement in the Indian army moderate.

4463. Is the pay too high, and therefore they will not retire?—No, I do not say that the pay is too high, but I say that on a comparison of the retired allowances with the pay of the higher ranks (for that is the point), and especially the allowances for the command of a regiment, the inducement to retire is not much.

4464. You say that it would not be difficult to ascertain the minimum allowance that will induce an officer to retire?—That is, that will be a sufficient average inducement, for you cannot do without the element of compulsion, and I would include both elements. If the Commission wish to go into the question of retirement, I am ready to be examined upon it.

4465. I think it is very desirable that we should go into that question at once, and that we should understand the alpha and omega of the whole question; what is the sum that you would proceed to act upon?—It is exceedingly difficult to reduce such a question as this to precise sums, because it involves the entire expenditure of the army, not merely the pay, not merely all the non-effective allowances of different kinds, but also allowances in kind of various descriptions; and it would require a much longer time than I have been able to give to it to make the calculation with any certainty; but I have made another calculation which is more directly to the point, which is, the number of effective and non-effective officers in three corps d'armée: one the line and guards, which is a purchasing corps; another the artillery and engineers, which are non-purchasing corps; and another the Indian army, which is a non-purchasing corps; that is, in the sense in which the English line and guards purchase. Mr. Philip Melvill, who furnished me with the information

Difficult to reduce the question of retirements to precise sums.

Proportions of effective and non-effective officers in different branches.

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relating to the Indian army, requested that he might have an opportunity of revising it before it was finally recorded, and I beg to ask for the same opportunity myself. I beg to hand in this paper.

[The same was handed in as follows:]

COMPARISONS OF NUMBERS OF EFFECTIVE and NON-EFFECTIVE OFFICERS.

	Effective.	Non-effective.	TOTAL.
Guards and Line - - - - -	5,776 (A.)	2,533 (D.)	8,309
Per Centage of Total - - - - -	69 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Artillery and Engineers - - - - -	1,066 (B.)	361 (E.)	1,427
Per Centage of Total - - - - -	74 $\frac{2}{3}$	25 $\frac{1}{3}$	
Indian Army - - - - -	5,625 (C.)	1,328 (F.)	6,953
Per Centage of Total - - - - -	50 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	

(A.)		(D.)	
Army Estimate, p. 8. Colonels of Regiments not being active Officers, and Quartermasters and others not being affected by the Purchase system, have been deducted.	Household Cavalry - - - - - 81	Army Estimate, p. 135. General Officers, not being Colonels of Regiments or Battalions - - - - -	105
	Cavalry of the Line - - - - - 424	p. 40. Colonels of Regiments* - - - - -	136
	Military Train - - - - - 85	p. 136. On Retired Full-pay - - - - -	244
	Foot Guards - - - - - 227	p. 138. On Half-pay - - - - -	2,048
	Infantry of the Line - - - - - 3,322		2,533
	General Staff (exclusive of Officers on Regimental Full-pay) - - - - - 127		
	In India—Cavalry - - - - - 143		
	Infantry - - - - - 1,028		
	Riding House Troop - - - - - 4		
	West India Regiments - - - - - 162		
	Colonial Corps - - - - - 173		
	<u>5,776</u>		
		(E.)	
Army Estimate, p. 8. Colonels, &c., deducted as above.	Horse Artillery - - - - - 47	p. 135. General Officers, not being Colonels of Battalions - - - - -	28
	Foot Artillery - - - - - 666	p. 40. Colonels of Battalions - - - - -	23
	Engineers - - - - - 353	p. 137. On Retired Full-pay - - - - -	159
	<u>1,066</u>	p. 138. On Half-pay - - - - -	151
			361
		(F.)	
Mr. P. Melvill's Statement.	Infantry - - - - - 4,340	Colonels - - - - -	194 †
	Horse Artillery and Cavalry - - - - - 584	On Retired Full-pay - - - - -	730
	Foot Artillery and Engineers - - - - - 701	On Half-pay - - - - -	404
	<u>5,625 *</u>		1,328

* This number is according to the establishment. The actual strength was 5,142.

† These are the colonels of regiments who are on furlough, or residing unemployed in India.

I have been promised information as to the retired list of the French army, and am persuaded that it will show quite as remarkable a result. Their half-pay list, which I have, is very small indeed; and as regards those who retire in the ordinary way, after serving their full time, there can be no doubt that that list also is very moderate.

4466. You think that in the French army the retirement is so small, that they stay as long in the service as they can?—Yes, that is one reason; another is this, that an officer attains to the minimum of his retirement after 30 years' service, and then an annual increment goes on to a maximum of 50 years, so that he has a direct inducement to stay.

4467. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) According to these per-centages, I presume you wish to show that the non-effectives are considerably greater in the purchase corps than they are in the non-purchase corps?—Yes, that is the result to which I wish to call attention.

4468. (Chairman.) But in order to judge of the cost to the country we ought to have some estimates of the amounts?—The only direct and certain way of obtaining a result is by numbers, because the rates of remuneration vary so much; for instance, it would not be at all a fair comparison to say that the retired officers of the artillery cost so much for each individual, and the retired officers of the guards and line so much, and still less of the Indian army. Here we have a simple comparison of numbers; it is presumed that each of these military bodies are paid what they ought to be paid at established rates of pay, so that the real question is one of numbers.

4469. (Mr. E. Ellice.) You could not give us the number and the expense in each case?—I could do so with labour and time.

4470. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Can you furnish the Commission with a document of that sort, showing the expenses for each, the effectives and non-effectives, and the per-centages?—Yes, I can have it made out with assistance.

4471. (Chairman.) When you made that calculation of the guards, the line, the artillery, and Indian service, up to what date did you take it; for the artillery, for instance?—The last estimates.

4472. They take in all the augmentations?—Yes, the estimates for the existing year.

4473. (Mr. E. Ellice.) Do you think that any estimate founded upon this and the last year, which were exceptional, would be a good guide as showing the proportionate number of

Best results obtained
by comparing numbers,
not cost.

of officers upon full and retired allowances at a period of peace?—The general result would not be very different if a period of peace were to be taken, but it would be well to take it for both periods.

4474. Could you, in the paper which General Evans has asked you to furnish, take in 1840, when we were at peace, and give us the comparative numbers for this year and 1840?—Yes; I will furnish two comparative statements, for the present period, and for the period previously to the last war, one of numbers and the other of money.

4475. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Is there any other authority for the influence of the purchase system in increasing the non-effective allowances?—The Commissioners of 1854, on promotion in the army, observe, at pp. 12, 13 of their report, "As compared to the emoluments of men in other professions, there can be no doubt that the rates of pay assigned to the officers of the British army are very low; in many cases, indeed, officers receive less than the annuities they might have purchased for the money they have paid for their commissions. Considering, therefore, the arduous character of the service, we feel very strongly that they have a right to look forward to ultimately obtaining the honorary distinction and the pecuniary advantages to which they are now entitled when they rise to be general officers. We are persuaded that this rank, with the advantages attached to it, is not more than a very moderate reward for the services by which it is earned, and that the arrangement by which these services are given at so small a cost to the country, in consideration of their tending at length to this reward, is a highly advantageous one to the public." The "arrangement by which these services are given at so small a cost to the country" must be read in connexion with the preceding sentence, "and in many cases officers receive less than the annuities they might have purchased for the money they have paid for their commissions;" and, taken together, these sentences express the prevailing impression that the so-called gratuitous service of our military officers is cheap service. The same opinion is expressed in still more decided terms in the Duke of Wellington's memorandum, from which I have already quoted several passages:—"The promotion of the officers of the army by purchase is a saving of expense to the public and highly beneficial to the service, although it falls severely upon individuals." Terms of service which fall severely upon the persons employed cannot be really beneficial to the employer. Sooner or later, in some form or other, the servant will obtain his rights, and more than his rights, owing to the attempt to withhold them.

4476. Does the purchase system operate in any other way in increasing the pecuniary burden on the public?—The pensions to widows of officers are granted solely "as a compensation to the widow for the loss of the means of support by the death of her husband." The widow has to furnish a statement of her property, in order that the Secretary of State may determine whether he can, with propriety, submit her claim to the Queen for a pension; and the colonel and agent of the regiment in which her husband last served "humbly recommend her as a deserving object of Her Majesty's royal bounty." Allowances on the compassionate list are given to the legitimate children of deceased officers, provided it be shown that "their pecuniary circumstances, and those of their family, are so limited that they actually require assistance from the compassionate fund." Both these classes of allowances are therefore in great part attributable to the indirect working of the purchase system. We first, by the exhaustive process of that system, deprive military officers of the means of providing for their families, and then make it up to them by pensioning their widows and children. Arrangements could hardly be devised better calculated to overthrow the habits of economy which the great motive of providing for wife and children generally forms. It would probably be more satisfactory to military officers to be permitted to keep their property, and to be left to make their own arrangements for their families; and it would certainly be better for the public service, because ready-made settlements in the shape of pensions for widows and compassionate allowances for children encourage improvident early marriages, and supersede the necessity for frugality. I do not go the length of saying that there should be no such allowances to the widows and children of military officers if the purchase system were abolished; but the practice of granting them might certainly be brought within much narrower limits, and be made the exception instead of the rule. A proposal was lately made to introduce the practice of giving pensions to widows and orphans into the civil service, but it was deliberately rejected by the civil servants themselves, for the above-mentioned reasons.

4477. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) Are there not pensions paid to officers in the navy as well as in the army?—Yes.

4478. And there is no purchase in the navy?—No.

4479. Therefore the pensions are not given solely upon that ground?—I did not assert that there should be no pensions; in respect to all these classes of allowances, it was their excessive growth that I spoke of, and not their natural and proper amount.

4480. (Chairman.) Do you think that if you did away with the purchase system, and an officer was killed in the service of his country, a pension would not be equally given to his widow?—Yes, if an officer was killed, undoubtedly.

4481. And in other cases where he died in the discharge of his duty?—Yes, under certain circumstances; but the allowances now invariably made under this head should certainly be much curtailed.

4482. (Mr. E. Ellice.) Suppose there was no system of purchase in the army, must not the same allowances to widows and orphans be made?—Certainly not; it would be the exception instead of the rule, and it would be much less in its aggregate amount.

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Opinion of the Commission of 1854, on compensation due to purchasing officers.

The purchase system tends to increase the pensions to widows and children.

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Large scale of allow-
ances to one branch of
the service becomes a
rule for the other
branches.

Case of the widow of
Colonel Willoughby
Moore.

Amount of pensions
to widows and families
in the present year,—

4483. One of your branches of saving in the financial arrangement that you recommend, upon the abolition of purchase, would be a diminution of the pensions to the widows and orphans?—Yes; I believe it is the most unpopular topic that I could have put forward, but I am persuaded that military officers will, in a majority of cases, agree with the opinion which I have ventured to express.

4484. Have you ever made an estimate of that branch of savings in your calculations?—I have made no particular estimate of any branch of saving; that belongs to a subsequent stage of the inquiry. I consider it sufficient at present to show that the purchase system has been the cause of unnecessary expenditure, and that, if abolished, an advantageous financial revision of the army allowances might be made.

4485. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) Is there a very great difference between the scale of pensions given in the army and in the navy?—I have not had time to compare them.

4486. If the pensions are very nearly alike, then your argument, that the excessive pensions are the result of sale and purchase, would fall to the ground?—I submitted to the Commissioners, before you came in, that whatever may be established as the rate of allowance in any branch of the service is extended to all the others; for instance, according to my view, an excessive expenditure in pensions has been established in the purchasing portion of the army; it follows that that rate of expenditure must be extended to the non-purchasing part of the army, the artillery, engineers, and civil departments of the army, and more or less to the navy.

4487. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Can you mention an instance in which it would have been better for the widow of an officer to have retained her husband's property than to have received a pension from the public?—The widow of Colonel Willoughby Moore, who so nobly sacrificed his life in the "Europa," would have had both a more ample and a more suitable provision if her husband had retained the 12,000*L* which he had paid for his commissions. She would also in that case have had the money to leave to their family when she died, after a few months' enjoyment of the two pensions so liberally accorded to her, in addition to 400*L* specially allowed as compensation for the loss of her husband's baggage and horses. The amount provided in the army estimate for 1857-8 for the widows and families of military officers, excluding quartermasters, chaplains, medical and commissariat officers, and field train, is as follows:—

	Guards.	Line.	Artillery and Engineers.
	£.	£.	£.
Widows' Pensions - - - - -	660	76,352	17,329
Compassionate Allowances - - - - -	99	13,632	4,791
Royal Bounty - - - - -	280	16,365	—
Relief Fund - - - - -	-	595	30
	£.	106,934	22,150
Total - - - - -		£. 130,123	

which might be re-
duced with benefit to
the officers.

4488. (Mr. E. Ellice.) You are of opinion that a considerable saving might be made in that by the new financial arrangement that you propose?—I have no doubt of it, and with great advantage to the officers themselves.

4489. (Chairman.) Do you think that out of this 106,000*L*. a considerable saving could be made?—Yes; I am, of course, speaking prospectively, without reference to existing interests, which must under any circumstances be respected.

4490. Does that include what is given to the artillery officers?—That is a separate item.

Scale of allowances to
the artillery, the con-
sequence of that to the
line.

4491. Then artillery officers would be in no better position; they would be placed by you in a considerably worse position, as you would reduce their amounts of pension without giving them any increase which you give to the army?—I would not deprive the existing artillery officers of any advantage which they now have, without giving them full compensation; but the artillery is a minor quantity, which has been raised to the standard of the major, which is the line, and there can be no doubt that if a considerable reduction of expenditure takes place under this head in the line, it will ultimately extend to the artillery. I look to military officers, as a general rule, providing for their own wives and children.

4492. (Mr. E. Ellice.) Do you make the same reduction in allowances to the navy?—I have not considered that.

4493. (Lieut.-Gen. E. B. Wyngard.) You have stated that the one would naturally produce the other?—The navy is a very peculiar service; I cannot give an opinion upon it.

4494. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Your argument is based upon the supposition that all officers in the army are purchasing officers?—No; only the line and the guards; but the purchase system, in its indirect results, affects every branch of the military and naval service.

4495. (Lieut.-Gen. E. B. Wyngard.) And in the guards probably prevailing more than in the line?—Since officers who had not purchased their commissions have been allowed to sell them, it has spread through the whole army.

4496. (Mr. E. Ellice.) The proportion of pensions and allowances granted to the artillery appear quite as great, looking at the proportionate numbers of the respective forces,

forces, as they are in the line?—I have not made a comparison, but the great body of the army, the line, establishes a standard for these classes of allowances.

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4497. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) Is it not the fact that the artillery have larger retiring allowances, upon the ground that they have no purchase, and therefore it was necessary to find other means of relieving them of their senior officers?—That may be.

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4498. (Chairman.) Was it not stated by the Duke of Wellington, in the very reports that you have referred to, that they required large and increased retiring allowances for that reason?—In those days purchase was considered to be a great advantage to the officers; a privilege; and there was a feeling that the artillery and engineers should be compensated for the absence of that privilege.

4499. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) Was it not this, that it was found that the officers in the non-purchasing corps got so old as to be inefficient in the senior ranks, and therefore it was necessary for the public to buy them out, as they had no practice by which individuals could buy them out?—Yes; but there was one circumstance which overrode every other, namely, that a great reduction took place after the war, of one battalion, and a company in each of the remaining battalions, and that caused such a stagnation that very exceptional arrangements had to be made. Retirements are also permitted after too short a period of service. I by no means say that the system of retirement in the artillery and engineers is what it ought to be; our army retiring system is quite in its germ; we have got the nucleus of a good system, and nothing more.

Great reduction in the artillery after the war with France.

4500. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Is the process of exhaustion and compensation to which you have adverted confined to the case of the widows of officers?—No. The principle of compensation for the loss of the means of support of course extends to any members of the family who have furnished the means of purchasing the deceased officer's commissions. This has been recognised in the case of the mothers and sisters of officers who have died of their wounds, by the Royal Warrant of the 15th June 1855, subject to the usual conditions of their being in distressed circumstances, and of their having been dependent for support upon the deceased officer. Lately, on the same principle, it has been proposed to grant a pension to a father. The following letter from the War Department to the Treasury, relating to the Eddington family, will give some idea of the real bearing of this part of the subject:—"War Office, 24th March 1857.—Sir, I am directed by the Secretary at War to request that you will bring under the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury the case of Mrs. Eddington.

Necessity of extending compensation to other members of officers' families besides widows.

"Mrs. Eddington is the widow of Captain Eddington, who served his country during a long and active period to the end of the last war. Besides his widow, he left a family of two sons and two daughters. The sons followed the profession of the father, and were assisted in their career by their mother and sisters, who in so doing have advanced all their available means, about 1,100 *l.*, to further their promotion. These two officers, the elder a captain, and the second a lieutenant, belonged to the same corps, the 95th Foot, a regiment, as General Evans states, who commanded it, that was distinguished for its conspicuous gallantry, and which was a great deal more than decimated in the memorable battle of the Alma, in which they both lost their lives. The elder of these two has left a widow and children to become recipients of the royal bounty; and as the younger, so far from being able to contribute to his mother's support, was assisted by her in purchasing his promotion, she is, by the regulations, ineligible for pension on account of their services. (The regulation requires that she should be a widow, and in distressed circumstances, and mainly dependent upon the officer for support. Royal Warrant, 15 June 1855, page 235 of Addenda to War Office Regulations.) Mrs. Eddington and her daughters, having advanced the whole of their little fortunes in forwarding the promotion of Captain and Lieutenant Eddington, are now left entirely dependent upon a life interest of a limited nature, which is enjoyed by the mother, a lady advanced in years. By the death of these officers, not only is the principal sum of money which was lent wholly lost, but the family have been deprived of the interest which was payable upon it, and have thus suffered a material diminution of their already circumscribed means, a diminution which is aggravated by the melancholy circumstances attending this twofold bereavement.

Case of Mrs. Eddington and her sons.

"Under the strict regulations by which the Secretary at War is governed in such cases Mrs. Eddington is precluded from a participation in any of the Parliamentary grants placed under his control; but, in consideration of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the bereavement she has sustained by the death of two sons in the same battle, and the pecuniary loss thereby inflicted upon herself and daughters, Lord Panmure has desired me to recommend strongly this distressing case to the most favourable consideration of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, and that Mrs. Eddington be granted a special pension of not less than 40 *l.* per annum."

4501. (Chairman.) Was that granted?—Yes.

4502. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Is direct compensation ever given to surviving relatives for the loss of the money which has been invested in a deceased officer's commission?—Yes. As the Russian war advanced, the unreasonableness and inexpediency of sending officers into the field at the hazard not only of their lives, but also of the means they possessed of providing for their families, became so obvious that a Royal Warrant was passed authorising the payment of the regulation price of the commissions of officers who died of wounds received in action, to their families, on the usual condition that the surviving relatives had been deprived of the means of support, and with the further proviso that

Royal Warrant, authorising payment of price of commissions to the families of officers who died of wounds,—

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and which still leaves those who die of disease on service uncompensated.

Tendency of the purchase system to increase the half-pay list.

that they were not also to receive any pension or other provision from the Government. In these cases the State distinctly paid twice over for the services of its officers, once in the form of their ordinary pay, and a second time in that of compensation for the loss of the capital invested in their commissions; and after all, the redress fell far short of the hardship. My own cousin, for instance, Colonel Trevelyan, of the Coldstream Guards, died of cholera at Varna, and the 9,000*l.* which he had paid for his commissions was entirely lost to his brothers and sisters and their children, who, although not dependent upon him in a strict sense, were in circumstances which made his assistance of great importance to them. It must be remembered that the occasion of the issue of this warrant was not an exceptive or extraordinary contingency, but one which will recur every time officers who have purchased their commissions are called upon to risk their lives.

4503. What has been the effect of the purchase system upon the half-pay list?—The legitimate object of half-pay is to provide for officers who have been disabled by age, wounds, or ill-health, or who have been temporarily deprived of employment by reduction; but when half-pay was brought within the operation of the purchase-system, by permitting exchanges between full and half-pay, *paying or receiving the difference*, it became impossible even for the utmost vigilance of the War Office always to prevent effective officers from receiving an annuity from the public without performing any service. The extent to which this practice has prevailed will be seen from the following instance in the report of the Commissioners of 1854 on promotion in the army (p. 10):—"There are comparatively few officers who do not pass at least a great part of this time on half-pay; and we find accordingly, from a return which has been laid before us of the names and services of all the general officers who have held commands in the last 20 years, that more than half of them had not served in their profession for 10 years or upwards before their first appointment to commands as major-general; that in many cases the time so spent in retirement exceeded 20 years, and in one fell little short of 37 years." The purchase system also opposes an additional obstacle to the re-transfer of half-pay officers to full-pay, for when vacancies take place in regiments, officers who have been returned for purchase expect, according to the custom of the service, to have the benefit of them.

4504. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) With regard to the time spent upon half-pay, are you aware that no officer can be put on half-pay except by medical certificate, unless he has served now 21 years, and before it was 18 years?—Yes; and before that it was any time whatever.

4505. The length of time which you say general officers appear to have served on half-pay has been, generally speaking, half-pay subsequently to 21 years' service?—No, because the service of officers reported upon in 1854, as then being general officers, must have been chiefly before those stricter rules were laid down. "More than half of them had not served in their profession for *ten* years or upwards before their first appointment to commands as major-general."

4506. Is it not the case that officers, after they reach the rank of lieutenant-colonel, are necessarily, or at least a great number of them, forced upon half-pay?—There is a great difficulty in knowing how to dispose of officers of that rank now.

4507. When you come to general officers, of course very few are on full-pay?—Yes.

4508. And therefore an old general officer must have passed a very considerable portion of the latter part of his life on half-pay?—Yes; the great extent to which this now takes place is one of the defects of the present system; but it is inevitable to some extent.

4509. Is it not the fact that the company ranks in the army are very numerous compared with the field ranks?—No doubt.

4510. Therefore, if you have 12 captains in a regiment, and afterwards you have but two majorities and one lieutenant-colonelcy, there must be a considerable number on half-pay?—Yes, a large amount of non-effective allowances in the higher ranks is inevitable; but it is aggravated by the peculiar machinery of our half-pay system, and with a proper establishment and proper rules of promotion, that excessive charge in the higher ranks will be very much diminished.

4511. (Mr. E. Ellice.) But your answers have reference generally to the old half-pay list, rather than to the half-pay list under the late regulations?—Yes, my answers have reference to that; but the case of those general officers is strictly in point, because the time spent by them on half-pay was chiefly in the lower ranks.

4512. Such abuses as placing officers on half-pay with short service cannot exist now?—No; and I beg to say, once for all, that nothing can exceed the faithful and vigilant administration of the War Office. If there is anything to blame, it is in the system, and not in the administration.

4513. No officer can now be placed for short service on half-pay?—Except on reduction or loss of health.

4514. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Is promotion to unattached rank on half-pay consistent with the proper object of a half-pay list?—No. The practice of promoting to unattached rank on half-pay, which was first established as a general regulation by the Royal Warrant of the 27th of October 1834, in order to make a special provision for officers who were unable to purchase, has removed half-pay still further from its original object. This practice has since been extended to officers who have served for five years abroad in the adjutant or quartermaster-general's department, to officers who have been promoted to brevet rank

Promotion to unattached rank on half-pay.

rank for distinguished service in the field, and more recently to the officers of the 24 depôt battalions, the provisional depôt at Chatham, and the cavalry depôt at Maidstone. Thus, a supplementary system of promotion without purchase, uncontrolled by any fixed establishment, has been constructed in connexion with the half-pay list, and a hasty or inadvertent decision might at any time impose a serious prospective burden upon the public. The recent correspondence between the Treasury and the War Department respecting the extension of unattached promotion to the depôt battalions and the school of musketry at Hythe shows that, through the machinery of this new system, an indefinite power of promoting military officers has been placed in the hands of the public departments. This promotion, it will be remembered, is *not to active employment, but to half-pay*; and it involves a great extension of the practice of maintaining effective officers in a state of inaction on half-pay. Other examples might be given of the various indirect processes by which the half-pay list has been converted into a réserve fund to supply the deficiencies of the ordinary mode of promotion by purchase, or to compensate officers for the losses to which they are exposed by the system of purchase. It may truly be said that this system of promotion has so completely broken down, and has entailed upon the public such heavy and indefinite expense in the attempt to mend it, that a complete revision of the entire system has become indispensably necessary.

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4515. (Mr. E. Ellice.) But these promotions, or this facility of promotion, which you describe, is in no respect connected with the system of purchase; officers promoted to be deputy-assistant-quartermaster-generals, or promoted by brevet, have nothing to do with the system of purchase?—I do not mean that every individual case can be distinctly traced to the system of purchase, though most of them can, but the general prevailing cause of the whole of this supplemental system of promotion is the purchase system. Take the case just adverted to. In the Report of 1840 it is distinctly given as the reason for allowing officers who go on half-pay in order to accept the office of deputy-adjutant or quartermaster-general in the colonies, to go upon half-pay without exchange, that is, at the expense of the public, that the promotion may go in the regiment to enable non-purchasing officers to be promoted.

Officers to appointment to staff situations go on half-pay.

4516. Suppose an officer placed upon half-pay in order to enable the department to appoint him to the staff, or suppose brevet rank given to an officer for distinguished service, in either of those cases the same thing would take place, whether it was purchase or not?—In the case of the officer who goes on half-pay to take a staff appointment, under a properly constituted army system he would give up his regular pay altogether; and the true reason of his retaining half-pay, without doing duty for half-pay, is because he has paid for his commission, and it would be very unfair to make him give up all benefit for the money he gave for his commission; on getting his staff appointment he gets his staff pay as remuneration for his staff service, and in the shape of half-pay compensation for money that he paid for his commission.

4517. But many officers never purchased who are so appointed, and if you had no purchase system you must still appoint officers to staff situations?—Yes; but, as I said before, whatever is the dominant principle of the army must be carried throughout, and although there are many officers who have not purchased, they all have the right to sell; after serving 20 years they can sell their commissions at full price, and if they have not served so long, they are allowed for each year of service 100*l.* out of the sum realised by the sale of their commissions.

4518. Suppose you abolish the system of purchase to-morrow, you must promote officers to the staff, and the same consequences would follow, they must have half-pay as well, or a higher rate of pay?—There would be a rate of pay adjusted with a distinct reference to the nature of the staff duties which had to be performed; whereas now there are two rates of pay, one which is adjusted with reference to staff duties, and another which belongs to the purchase system, and which is of the nature of compensation for purchase.

4519. I am talking as to a matter of public finance. It does not signify whether the half-pay added to the present staff allowance forms one charge upon the public, or whether the larger sum paid to the staff officer forms that sum?—But it signifies a great deal that the pay of the soldier should be adjusted to the nature of the duties to be performed; that the pay of the staff should be adjusted to the staff, and the pay of the regimental officer to the regimental duty; whereas now there is no adjustment at all; there is a system of purchase allowed, which is quite foreign to any proper adjustment.

4520. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) Would it not be very simple, while the purchase system lasted, to make a regulation that officers on the staff should be paid, for the whole amount they now receive, one fixed amount alone?—Yes, but then what would become of the price which the officers had paid for their commissions? If they received as staff-pay only the proper rate of remuneration for their staff duties, then they would lose the sums they had paid for their commissions.

4521. (Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.) Do not you imagine that the staff-pay has been regulated with reference to the amount of half-pay which an officer receives, and thus making up the amount which it is considered he is entitled to?—I am quite sure that the whole together, the staff-pay and the half-pay, have been regulated with reference both to the duties which the officer has to perform and also to the sacrifice he has to make in suspending, during the time he is on the staff, the sale of his commission.

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4522. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) Comparing the staff-pay with the regimental pay, you will see that the staff-pay without the half-pay would be insufficient?—No doubt there are all kinds of inconsistencies; but if the rate of remuneration is adjusted with strict reference to the duties to be performed, you are certain to attain not only a more economical, but a more efficient result.

4523. That is, if your assumption is true, that the staff officer is now overpaid?—The staff officers in the colonies have very liberal allowances; for example, at Ceylon, the Mauritius, and China.

4524. If you pay a man for service rendered, does it make any difference whether you disburse the cash out of one pocket or the other?—It makes a great difference whether you distinctly adjust his remuneration to the responsibility and duty of his position, or whether you do it at hap-hazard, without any such adjustment; but there is another element, that these officers have made a large outlay for their commissions; and besides remunerating them for the performance of their duties, you must compensate them for their outlay and the risk they run of losing their capital.

4525. If that is the case, ought not regimental officers to receive half-pay likewise?—They receive compensation in various ways, both immediate and prospective; and although every officer does not receive all those allowances, yet they all have them in reversion.

4526. When officers are appointed to civil occupations, and the salary of the officer is not too high, they receive their half-pay with it?—Yes.

4527. Do you think that that is the result of sale and purchase?—Yes.

4528. Do you think that with regard to naval officers it is the same?—There I beg to decline a comparison; the conditions of that service are so entirely different.

The maximum advantages in one branch of the service are pressed for by other branches.

4529. (Chairman.) Does not the expenditure in the navy come under the consideration of the Treasury as well as the expenditure for the army?—Yes; and this comparison is continually going on in the minds of all the servants of the State. We find, from experience at the Treasury, that whatever is the maximum advantage which any one branch of the service has, all the others immediately press for the same advantage, and there is a constant comparison going on between the army and the navy. It happens just now that the officers of Greenwich Hospital receive on the whole very liberal allowances, larger than the corresponding officers at Chelsea; but they have subjected the Treasury to the *peine forte et dure* for two or three years in the House of Commons, because they say that the military officers at Chelsea get their half-pay in addition to their salary; and so they do.

4530. (Chairman.) Does not that seem to show that the reduction you contemplate is to extend not only to the army, but to the navy?—I have no doubt that there is a great deal that requires to be set right, and that the navy will come in due course; but there is an old English proverb which says, "One thing at a time, gentlemen."

Various modes by which the half-pay list becomes unduly increased.

4531. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) You have been asked some questions about the averages, the effectives and non-effectives; have you anything further to state?—Yes. It appears from the Act 51 Geo. 3, c. 103, that half-pay was originally granted only upon reduction, and that it was extended by that Act to officers who became "unfit for service, either from "wounds, or ill health, or infirmity, or age," to be certified in such manner as the Secretary at War and the Lords of the Treasury for the time being might direct.

These legitimate objects of half-pay are still provided for in the British army, by the admission to the benefit of that allowance:—

1st. Of officers compelled to retire in consequence of wounds received in action.

2d. Of officers compelled to retire in consequence of ill-health contracted on duty, as certified by the proper medical authorities, provided the officers have served more than three years; and,

3d. Of officers reduced from full-pay, subject to the same condition of previous service.

Exchanges to half-pay receiving the difference:

Permission to exchange to half-pay, *receiving the difference*, which is equivalent to a partial sale of an officer's commission, the remainder of the value being received in the shape of an annuity from the public, was first given in 1783. The Duke of York regarded every officer *who had purchased* as having a title to adopt this mode of sale, without much reference to the length of his service. Lord Hill, however, required a fair portion of military service, which is stated to have been 15 years for a subaltern, and 18 years for a captain. Twenty-one years' full-pay service has since been established by the warrant of 6th October 1854, as the condition of an officer exchanging to half-pay "for his own convenience."

Any officer, therefore, who has served for 21 years may exchange to half-pay for the rest of his life, with the additional advantage of realising a portion of the price of his commission; but care is taken at the War Office, in all except special cases, that the public may not by this process be burdened with a comparatively young officer on permanent half-pay, instead of one of advanced age, by requiring that the age of the officer coming on half-pay shall not fall short by more than five years of the age of the officer who quits the half-pay list in order to exchange with him.

in order to accept staff appointments;

Another large class of officers upon half-pay is composed of those who exchange to half-pay, in order to accept military situations, such as the general and garrison staff, staff officers of pensioners, adjutants of militia, &c.

Officers

Officers who are appointed deputy adjutant-general or deputy quartermaster-general in the colonies, are placed on half-pay without exchange, so that their half-pay is an additional charge. Officers appointed to other military situations are permitted to exchange to half-pay, whatever may have been the period of their full-pay service, and there is no restriction as to the comparative ages of the officers who are parties to the exchange. Officers actually in the receipt of half-pay are permitted to receive barrack-masterships and other civil situations, although they have not served 21 years on full pay.

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The practice of making promotions from full-pay to a superior rank ("unattached rank," as it is called) on half-pay, was introduced by the Royal Warrant of the 27th October 1834, under which one such promotion is made for every three vacancies that take place in the ranks of lieutenant-colonel, major, and captain on the half-pay list. The vacancies which these promotions create on the full-pay list are filled up by the transfer of an officer from the half-pay list; so that the immediate charge to the public is limited to the difference between the half-pay of the superior and of the inferior rank.

to receive unattached rank.

Promotion to unattached rank on half-pay may be purchased when an officer on half-pay declares his intention of selling in order to settle in the colonies. This neither relieves the half-pay list, nor assists old and deserving officers who are unable to purchase. The engineers and artillery are included in the benefit of this regulation.

Purchase of unattached rank from officers going to settle in colonies.

Officers placed on half-pay with a step of brevet rank for the purpose of serving as deputy adjutant-general or deputy quartermaster-general in the colonies, have their brevet rank converted into substantive, or, in other words, are promoted to an increased rate of half-pay, after five years' service in those situations.

Promotion to substantive rank.

A similar promotion to a superior rank on half-pay takes place when brevet rank conferred for distinguished service in the field is converted into substantive rank, under the 13th clause of the Warrant of the 6th October 1854.

Under the recent arrangements relating to the *dépôt* battalions, constantly accruing charges on the half-pay list have been authorised in order to provide a reward for the lieutenant-colonels, majors, and adjutants of those battalions.

Provision for officers of *dépôt* battalions,

And, lastly, provision has been made for the promotion of a limited number of lieutenants of long service acting as staff-officers of pensioners by a separate creation of half-pay charges. The Treasury observed that these officers ought to be promoted under the ordinary arrangement, by which one promotion is made for every three vacancies on the half-pay list; but the Commander-in-Chief replied, that this would materially injure the prospects of a somewhat long list of pressing candidates, the greater number of whom had served for 12, 13, or 14 years, "and others, although they have not been so long commissioned, have been a number of years in the ranks, and were promoted on account of their meritorious conduct, and many who, from their position in their respective regiments, have little hope of advancement, except by the unattached." Lord Hardinge added, that "although it is quite true that since the breaking out of the late war with Russia promotion has been very rapid in the regiments serving in the Crimea, it must be borne in mind that many of the regiments serving in the East Indies and the several colonies did not participate in this promotion, and that it is to these less fortunate corps that the candidates for unattached companies chiefly belong."

and for staff officers of pensioners.

The correspondence which has taken place between the Treasury and the War Department on the proposal to place the lieutenant-colonels commanding the 7th, 88th, and 76th regiments on half-pay without exchange, in order that the regimental succession might take place without purchase, furnishes additional proof of the insufficiency of the purchase system, either to reward distinguished service, or to keep up a wholesome circulation. If the purchase system had not been relieved from time to time by external applications at a heavy public expense, it must long ago have died a natural death; and the local congestions to which it is even now subject are so certain to be aggravated by peace, that if the system were to be left to itself it would not be likely to survive long.

Proposal to place certain old lieutenant-colonels on half-pay.

4532. (Mr. *Ellice*.) Would not those local congestions be much more frequent if there was no system of purchase?—No, not under a regulated system of retirements; it would then be impossible.

4533. You say a regulated system of retirement, then it must be some such system as the system of half-pay which you have now stated to the Commissioners as objectionable, or some system equally expensive?—No, very much less expensive, and much better, as it would place on retirement only superannuated officers, those who were too old for their work, and who ought to be placed on retirement. Whereas the half-pay system allows of officers who are highly efficient going on retirement, and it allows them to remain a long period on retirement, and then to come again on full-pay, which diminishes their efficiency.

A regulated system of retirement better than the present half-pay system;

4534. The statement that you have read mentions that the different permissions to retire on half-pay have been required by the particular circumstances of the service. The late war with Russia has created a necessity for providing for private soldiers who received the rank of officers, and all those cases must be provided for by some additional expense to the public, and if not, by a system of half-pay?—They must be all satisfactorily provided for. My position is this, that we have begun with a false system, and in order to remedy the defects of that system, we have built up an ill-digested and extravagant system of non-effective allowances and various other kinds of allowances; whereas if we returned to a true system of army administration based on proper principles of professional instruction

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and more economical.

Whole expense of
retirements.

Influence of the purchase.

instruction for active officers, and suitable retirement for superannuated officers, we should not only promote the efficiency of the army, but we should have a much more economical system.

4535. By whatever process you appoint officers to the army, whether they be more instructed or less instructed, some means must be devised of accelerating promotion in the service, or of providing for officers who by seniority have become unfit for service?—Unquestionably; the whole question depends upon a comparison of those means, and of the existing army system.

4536. Have you made any comparison between the expense of the present retirement by half-pay, and the retirement that would be occasioned by the system that you describe?—I have completely satisfied myself that by going direct to the point, and providing a proper system of first appointment, and a proper system of promotion, and a proper system of retirement, a much more economical arrangement might be made than the existing arrangement, and also much more effective.

4537. Whether the existing system is good, or whether another is substituted, there must be a large expense to the public for the retirement of officers from the service?—No doubt.

4538. (*Chairman.*) What is the amount of the half-pay?—It is only one of a class, and it does not do justice to my argument to take a single item. The half-pay of the guards and line, without the artillery and the engineers, is 262,405 *l.*

4539. (*Sir De Lacy Evans.*) Is that the half-pay of the regimental officers, or of all officers?—Of all officers of the guards and the line.

4540. And all ranks?—Yes; and then there is retired full-pay, 60,000 *l.* besides; and the pay of the greater part of the general officers and colonels of regiments is of the same nature; and the rewards for military services are of the same nature.

4541. Deducting those rewards for military services, what is the whole of the system together?—49,000 *l.*, the pay of general officers; 124,500 *l.*, the colonels of regiments; 60,000 *l.*, retired full-pay; and 262,000 *l.* the half-pay—deducting only 39 general officers who are actively employed. That is about half a million, besides the widows' pensions and compassionate allowances; and there are other allowances, which I am coming to.

4542. (*Chairman.*) The half-pay will take 262,000 *l.*, as I understand you?—Yes.

4543. And that is an item upon which you think there would be a reduction?—Yes; I have no doubt of it.

4544. Even after you have provided for the retiring allowances of all officers?—The half-pay must be distinguished from the retiring allowances. It ought to be only a temporary resting-place for officers in active service, who are temporarily disabled.

4545. You would provide a much more ample retirement than is provided in the French army?—Yes.

4546. And yet you think that with this more ample retirement, keeping up the current of promotion, there would be a saving on this item of half-pay?—A saving on the whole together. You must take every item, and there would be a saving on the whole of those items, rewards for military services, pay of general officers, pay of retired colonels, retired full-pay, and half-pay, which will amount altogether to 520,000 *l.* Then there are other items.

4547. Do you know what the retirement in the French army amounts to?—I have not been able to get that hitherto.

4548. (*Mr. Sidney Herbert.*) Have you made an estimate of what it would cost under your system as compared with the present one?—I have not ventured to give a detailed estimate yet. Many of the calculations will be very intricate. But in taking the comparative numbers of effective and non-effective officers, we go direct to the point, as the officers in the guards, in the line, in the artillery and engineers, and the Indian officers, are supposed to be paid according to their respective services, and the real question is the numbers.

4549. And the rate of mortality amongst them, with a view to give the proper amount of promotion?—Yes, which is somewhat greater in the Indian army; but, on the other hand, death vacancies will be more frequent in the Queen's service when officers have no longer an inducement to sell out and realize before they die.

4550. (*Chairman.*) Have you considered this question as a financial question, by a comparison of the non-effectives in the navy with the non-effectives in the army?—The navy system is a separate question altogether. My general impression is that they have a considerably larger non-effective system than the demands of the service require, and that the faults of our army arrangements have extended in their indirect influence to the navy.

4551. (*Mr. Sidney Herbert.*) Is it not very much greater in the navy?—I think that the navy has been a service, the details of which have been much less understood and much less looked after by Parliament and the country even than the army, and when the time comes for looking into them, I have no doubt that great improvements may be made.

4552. (*Chairman.*) There is a much larger proportion of non-effective service in the navy where there is no purchase than in the army?—There may be, but I deny that the navy ought to be taken as a standard, but rather that it should be considered as a subject for separate consideration and revision.

4553. (*Sir De Lacy Evans.*) Are these the only cases in which the influence of the purchase

purchase system in increasing the public expenditure has been apparent?—No. Although I have confined myself to instances in which the creation of additional charges is distinctly traceable to the purchase system, it must not be supposed that these are the only cases in which the influence of that system in increasing the military expenditure has been apparent. It seems to be assumed as a principle that an officer cannot be expected to provide for his wants from his pay, and justly so, because, in fact, he has no pay, and hence every new call upon him is met by a special allowance—lodging-money, soldier-servants or servant's allowance, forage allowance, fuel and light, rations of provisions for officers themselves and their servants, and in the inter-tropical colonies and Bermuda for their wives and children also, field allowance to enable them to equip themselves for the field, and colonial allowances to enable them to defray the increased expense of living in the colonies, are in a great degree founded upon this principle; and as officers are subjected to new expenses, new demands are made upon the Treasury for assistance. The committee appointed by the Treasury in 1852, to inquire into the naval and military establishments abroad,* reported that the benefit to individuals from some of these allowances was not commensurate with the expense incurred by the public in various ways in providing and issuing them; but while the remuneration of the officers of the army remains on its present footing, so far from giving up any existing emoluments, there must be a continual pressure for more. The purchase system has afflicted the British army with a disease analogous to that which is known as a "wolf in the stomach." The craving cannot be satisfied, because, whatever additional advantages are conceded, they must, according to the ordinary principles of demand and supply, be overtaken by a corresponding increase in the price of commissions. The superior allowances of the guards and the cavalry and the rifle regiments, for instance, are discounted in the commission market. The impossibility of maintaining the regulation price of commissions is owing to the same cause. The difference between the regulation and the market price represents the value of the additional advantages which have been conferred upon the officer since the regulation price was fixed; and as all officers have paid for these advantages, except to those to whom they were first granted, they derive no real benefit from them. There must be something very defective in an arrangement which constantly calls for new sacrifices from the state without conferring any permanent benefit upon its servants.

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purchase system in increasing the public expenditure by necessitating larger allowances than would be required if officers were not out of pocket by purchasing their commissions;

4554. (Mr. E. Ellice.) With reference to the allowances in the colonies, and the extra allowances for messes and other demands made by the War Office upon the Treasury, do the Treasury in forming their opinion as to granting or refusing those allowances consider the question of purchase in the army?—The Treasury is an executive department, and has to administer the existing system, and it must, in dealing with the cases which are submitted to it by the War Department for increased allowances, assume that the existing system will be maintained.

4555. But the Treasury, in giving its consent to those allowances, must admit that the requirements of the War Office are founded upon adequate reasons?—Yes, supposing the continuance of the existing system of purchase.

4556. Do you believe that those allowances would be necessary for officers' messes for the colonies, with no system of purchase?—I think they might be revised.

4557. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) You say that they are insufficient now for the wants of the officer?—Yes, because he has no pay.

4558. But the amount of pay, if it does not cover his wants now, would not cover his wants then?—Every officer, with the purchase system, who has expended his money in buying his commissions, would, without that system, be richer by that amount, because he would not have to submit to the deduction. In the case of my cousin, Colonel Trevelyan, for instance, I know that if he had obtained his commissions without having had to buy them, he would have had his 9,000*l.*

4559. And therefore he could have supplied those wants which his pay does not cover?—The true way of putting it is the reverse, that having been mulcted to the extent of 9,000*l.*, he really had so much less pay.

4560. (Chairman.) You have spoken of lodging and colonial allowances, have the commissariat officers no allowances of that kind?—Yes; whatever is the system for one class of officers must be the system for the whole.

4561. Therefore the commissariat officers who have paid nothing for their commissions have those allowances equally with the officers of the army?—Yes, all officers have.

4562. Then the commissariat officers who have not been mulcted have a clear gain and a great advantage over the officers of the army?—They have their pay without deduction, and see the benefit of it; for a long series of years there have been no deficiencies worth speaking of in the Treasury chests abroad, and there is no class of officers in the service with such pecuniary responsibilities as they have. I attribute that circumstance in a great degree to their having unincumbered pay.

4563. You stated that in doing away with the system of purchase, as I understood you, you must do away with lodging money?—Forgive me; I must state my case in my own way; I do not say that all those allowances can be done away with, but I say that when officers are compensated for the loss they have sustained in purchasing their commissions, and are left with unincumbered pay, a revision may be made of all those allowances.

and the allowances thus increased are extended to other branches of the service.

4564. There

* See Appendix No. XXX. to Report of Commissioners, 1857.

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4564. There is to be then a saving upon those, not only in the army but in the commissariat also?—I conceive that the allowances of the commissariat may be revised with advantage.

4565. (Mr. E. Ellice.) Would you consider it a sufficient answer to state to the War Office, when the permission of the Treasury was asked to make those allowances, that inasmuch as these officers have purchased their commissions, they cannot afford to pay these expenses, and the public must pay them?—I consider that the Treasury is not entitled to make any such answer, it being an executive department.

4566. But it is the duty of the Treasury to see that no more money is issued for a particular branch of the public service than they think is required?—Yes.

4567. And, therefore, if they think these allowances now necessary for lodging and for servants, and for messes, in addition to the present pay of the officers, they would equally think them reasonable in addition to the present pay, whether the purchase system existed or not?—That is a question which supposes a new state of things. It supposes that the officers have received a large compensation for the sums laid out in their commissions, and that their pay has been restored to them unincumbered.

4568. No; it supposes the present pay without reference to purchase or no purchase, and the necessary expense that an officer is put to in the colonies on account of those several allowances; and the pay remaining the same, would not the Treasury agree to the same allowances, whether purchase existed or not?—That is the whole question. My argument is, that if the officers are compensated for their losses by the purchase system, and if all officers are excused from the band contribution, which I think they ought to be, and if the lieutenants and ensigns have a higher rate of pay allowed to them, and if the staff pay is revised and adjusted to the duties to be performed, an advantageous revision might be made of the extra and miscellaneous allowances which are at present issued.

4569. Your proposal would rather go to an increase of pay and the abolition of the purchase system than to effecting any economy?—I conceive that the general result would be decidedly advantageous to the public, especially as regards the charges of administration; and with regard to the commissariat, it must not be forgotten that they have an amount of public money in their charge, and pecuniary responsibilities which no army officer has; and it does not follow, that on a general revision their rates of remuneration should be substantially altered from what they are now. That is a question of detail, and their existing remuneration may be, although we have arrived at it by accident, a proper result.

4570. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) I think you stated that the reason why the artillery and the non-purchasing corps have the same advantages that the purchasing corps have is that the system of purchase having once obtained governs all our military services?—Yes, as a general proposition.

4571. The Horse Guards and the War Department would be always governed, then, by the allowances given to the army?—Yes.

4572. The commissariat formerly was under the Treasury?—Yes.

4573. Their principal duty is that of accountants and bankers for the Treasury?—Yes.

4574. You were the person who arranged what their pay and allowances should be?—The Treasury.

4575. And you, holding the opinion that they were not entitled to those allowances because they had not been mulcted in the purchase-money, still gave them those allowances, though you were acting for the Treasury and not for the Horse Guards?—Your question involves two separate ones—one is whether, taking a general view of the duties of the commissariat, the present rate of pay is more or less than enough. The other is how far the various allowances received by the commissariat have indirectly arisen out of the purchase system. I am able to trace the operation of the purchase system even in the case of the commissariat; I remember that when the servant's allowance was given many years ago to the line, and was afterwards extended to the medical department (I think it grew out of the commission of 1840), the commissariat officers pressed the Treasury to extend it to them, but I resisted it for many years, which caused great discontent; but at last, on the breaking out of the late war, it was conceded by the War Department with the consent of the Treasury.

4576. That the commissariat should have the servant's allowance?—Yes, in lieu of soldier servants.

4577. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) What bearing has the purchase system upon the remuneration of the ranks of the army?—In other professions the remuneration consists not only of what is received, but of what is hoped to be obtained. A few prizes in expectation are thus made to do the work of a much larger number of actual payments; and a stimulating and elevating moral influence is created, the value of which cannot be estimated in money. A general desire exists to raise the army to a higher standard in the scale of professions, to make its ranks attractive to a better class of men and to increase the inducements to self-improvement and good conduct; but these natural aspirations are repelled by the purchase system, which has built up an artificial and unnatural wall of separation between the officers and the privates of the army. Persons promoted from the ranks have not the means of purchasing themselves on; they cannot stand the expense of messing, and of the general style of living among the officers, and the depressing influence of the system confines the ranks of the army to the class of society least suited from education and manners to associate with gentlemen. The following extract from a letter from the Secretary-at-War to the Treasury, dated the 6th of December 1845, is illustrative of

“ the

Allowances given to the commissariat on the grounds that the rest of the army have them.

The purchase system opposed to promotion from the ranks;

the effect of the existing system upon the interest both of the non-commissioned officers and the public:—"At present the promotion of a non-commissioned officer is almost equivalent to ruin. The purchase of uniforms, subscription to mess, band, &c., &c., and the purchase of a horse, if in a cavalry regiment, more than swallow up the first year's pay. The officer is necessarily in debt, and his life is a perpetual struggle to free himself from the incumbrances which have been imposed upon him as a reward for his good conduct; and in this struggle he is frequently exposed to temptations which end in his disgrace; at best he must lead a life of self-denial and privation. I propose, therefore, to give to every officer promoted from the ranks a certain sum by way of outfit, viz. 100*l.* for the infantry, and 150*l.* for the cavalry." When it is remembered that our army is recruited on the voluntary principle, it must be admitted that this is a serious state of things.

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4578. (*Chairman.*) According to your system, I understand that you would have your promotions governed partly by examinations?—I have not said that: I did not use the word "examination."

4579. I understood you to say that officers were to be promoted by merit, or that some new system of inspection was to be introduced?—I spoke of professional instruction and qualification for service.

4580. You are aware probably that in France the system is something of that kind, that professional knowledge and qualifications are tested before promotion?—Yes.

4581. Are you aware that under that system a private soldier can seldom rise to any high place as an officer?—Yes, they generally rise to the rank of captain.

4582. And they remain there?—Yes, for the most part, because their qualifications for promotion consist chiefly in familiarity with and skill in all detailed army matters.

4583. Do you think that that is a good system which would raise a number of old men to the post of captains and keep them there?—I think that, under a proper system, they would not be old. If the higher promotions in the army were thrown open to the men, we should draw into the ranks of the army young men of very improved character, who, after a few years' training in the ranks, might establish their qualifications for higher promotion; and in the next place, even supposing that they would be older on the average than the young men who are introduced as officers, yet it is so important a part of a proper army system, that it ought not to be omitted.

the encouragement of which would draw a better class into the ranks.

4584. Do you think that the experience of the French army can be no guide to us on that subject?—It may be some guide, but we must adapt our army arrangements to the habits and circumstances of the English people, and not to those of the French people.

4585. (*Mr. Sidney Herbert.*) If you do that do you know of any other profession in this country where the higher ranks are filled by persons rising from the lowest class of society?—There is no other profession precisely analogous to the army.

4586. Is it so in the navy?—No, but the government services ought to be formed with a general view to the practice existing in the open professions, and we do find a system of advancement quite analogous, in the merchant service, for instance, and in the railroad service, and among civil engineers, and in manufacturing and other industrial employments.

4587. Civil engineers are men who have received expensive educations?—No doubt somewhat expensive.

4588. Should you say that in the civil service in this country that messengers ought to become clerks?—I wish not to be understood as excluding a general division of labour. I conceive that there is a natural division of labour between the ranks of the army and the officers of the army; but, nevertheless, the line of separation ought not to be so exclusive and so strict as to offer no hope of promotion to the privates of the army. I think that it might be modified from its present extreme rigour.

4589. If this prospect of promotion from the ranks afterwards attracted a great number of young men of greater intelligence into regiments, a greater number of whom would consequently be disappointed, would the army be very easy to manage if it were so composed?—I have no doubt that the army would be in every respect improved, and that whatever its good qualities are now, they would then be much greater.

4590. Would you make all promotion come from the ranks?—Undoubtedly not. I would have that the exceptive case; still it should be a liberal exception, and every man in the ranks, who by previous education, and subsequent cultivation, and thorough good conduct, had acquired the necessary qualifications for an officer, and deserved to be an officer, should look forward to promotion.

4591. Without reference to their having received a liberal education or not?—Provided they educated themselves under the greatly improved regimental school system which we have established.

4592. Do you think that you would get a body of officers who would work together in the same harmonious way that they do now, under that system?—I am sure we should.

4593. (*Mr. E. Ellice.*) Do you not think, with reference to the number of persons engaged in the military and naval professions, as many men rise from the lower ranks to be officers as persons in the same condition of life as sailors and soldiers entering into other professions rise to eminence in those professions?—No. I think if the British army were compared with

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with the British mercantile service, it would be found that a much larger proportion of able-bodied sailors in the lower ranks of life rise to be officers and men of wealth generally than in the army.

4594. (*Chairman.*) You instance the merchant service as an example?—I give as an example the whole of the open professions.

4595. Do you think that the system of appointing captains in the merchant service is satisfactory?—I only compare them on that one point of an open career, and upon no other. I beg to guard myself against making a general comparison.

4596. (*Mr. Sidney Herbert.*) With reference to results?—I make the comparison merely on this point, that a much larger proportion of persons from the lower class rise to merited distinction and wealth in the merchant service than in the army.

4597. (*Chairman.*) We have heard great objections made to our merchant service as compared with the foreign merchant service, so much so, that a stricter system of examination has been recommended before men shall attain to commands in the merchant service?—Yes; in comparing the two I suppose that all the necessary means and appliances are taken into account, I presume equal circumstances.

4598. Does not the scientific and professional examination tend naturally to prevent the poorer class from rising?—No doubt, and that is so in the army; all I say is, that artificial and unnecessary obstructions and barriers should be removed.

The merits of privates and non-commissioned officers should be tested before promoting them to commissions.

4599. (*Mr. Sidney Herbert.*) If officers were only admitted after a very strict examination, you would have fewer promotions from the ranks than you have now?—I think not; a strict examination for the officers should be combined with a regulated mode of allowing privates and non-commissioned officers to rise to be officers; there should, of course, be tests for them also, partly in the nature of examinations, but chiefly consisting of proved good service and superior qualifications acquired in the regiment itself; and I think it would be an advantageous arrangement for all parties if a certain proportion of commissions in each regiment were given to the non-commissioned officers, provided men were forthcoming every way qualified for them. The soldiers would then have something certain to look forward to as a motive to exertion and good conduct, and a superior class of men would be attracted.

4600. But the examination must be identical in both cases; you could not say to one man, "You shall be subjected to a very strict examination," and to the other, "You shall come off much easier"?—No; I think it would be undesirable to have an identical examination, and unnecessary, because, so far as non-commissioned officers promoted from the ranks are concerned, they might be deficient in scholastic acquirements, but they would be superior in experience.

4601. But inferior as being older, would they not?—You must take the whole together.

4602. In admitting to the profession, have you any right to look to anything but to the competency of the individuals, which you should test in a proper way, and not favour particular classes?—It would not be to favour particular classes; but in the appointments to a body like the officers of the British army, competency of several kinds is required; and there is a competency founded on actual experience; and there will be always this advantage in favour of the experience of the non-commissioned officer, that he will be a tried and proved man; we shall know him, every inch of him; he is no speculation, but a young man who passes, probably, the best literary examination is, after all, a speculation.

Expenses incurred in rewarding non-commissioned officers, which would not be required if they were rewarded by commissions.

4603. (*Sir De Lacy Evans.*) You quoted a letter from the War Office, which appeared to be intended to remedy the ruinous position of non-commissioned officers who are promoted; was that the only mode of remedying it?—As usual, without attempting to reach the seat of the disease, we have confined our attention to the symptoms, and our treatment has in consequence been both ineffectual and expensive. The outfits provided for non-commissioned officers promoted to commissions (3,000*l.*, army estimate, 1857-8), and the advantages conceded to them in reference to appointments to the regimental staff, have failed to make their position agreeable or advantageous to them, and the public has to pay in the shape of a separate set of pecuniary rewards, created of late years for deserving non-commissioned officers and men (good-conduct pay, 68,000*l.*; rewards to serjeants on the non-effective estimate, 4,305*l.*; army estimate, 1857-8), for the absence of the natural advancement which is the reward of distinguished merit in every other line of life. No addition that could be made to the soldier's pay would stand in the place of opening to him the career of his own profession. The army would be raised in character and position throughout every portion of it; it would become more aristocratic in the best and truest sense, because education and professional qualification, and the zealous discharge of duty, would be the only conditions of success in it; and the military service would be opened to our respectable and energetic middle class, who have at present neither part nor lot in it. No non-commissioned officer would, of course, be promoted who had not proved himself fit by his conduct and manners, as well as by his education and intelligence, to hold Her Majesty's commission. Even according to the narrowest financial view, this is the only course which is open to us, for the national mind is so strongly bent upon the amelioration of the soldier's condition and prospects,

prospects, and the soldier is making such good use of the superior means of improvement which have been provided for him, that we must either greatly increase his advantages in the position in which he now is, and thus incur the expense of a double set of promotions, or so re-arrange our military system as to make the existing higher promotion bear with practical influence upon the body of the army.

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4604. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) You quoted a letter of mine, dated 1845, as to the outfit; was that based upon anything but this, that the pay was insufficient to provide a man with a horse and uniform, and would not that be just the case whether with purchase or not?—I conceive not. The expense of the mess is a direct result of the purchase system, and the general style of regimental expenditure is increased by that system.

4605. (Chairman.) I understood you to say that under the present system there was no middle class in the army?—Yes.

Under the present system no place in the army for the middle classes.

4606. What did you mean by that?—I mean this: I belong myself to a landed country family, and I know from my own personal experience that the large middle class in the country, the sons of farmers, one of the most energetic and spirited classes in the country, who are not at all deficient in military spirit, and enter freely into the yeomanry, which is the only military service open to them, never think of the army; there is no place for them there; they have not money to purchase themselves on as officers, and they cannot go into the ranks according to the present system, without any prospect of promotion.

4607. Then your middle class begins with the farmers?—The middle class that I mean is between the classes who receive a liberal education, the clergy, the medical profession, and upwards, and the labouring people.

4608. What do you call the artillery; are they all of the upper class too?—They are, a great proportion of them, sons of officers.

4609. (Mr. Sidney Herbert.) And the sons of clergymen?—Yes.

4610. How would you rank them, as belonging to the middle class or upper class?—I rank them with the upper class.

4611. Are there any sons of well-to-do tradesmen?—There are a few of them, but the artillery, it must be recollected, has been a close service; none have been admitted to commissions except such as were nominated by the Master-general of the Ordnance, until lately. And then as to the ranks, there is the same objection on the part of the class forming the farming and shopkeeping class, and the great middle class, who carry on all our great industrial and marine operations; they have exactly the same objection to going into the ranks of the artillery as the line. Owing to the scientific character of the service, promotion to the rank of officer is even more completely closed in the artillery than in the line.

4612. (Lord Stanley.) What I understand you to mean is this, that between the class of men who can enter as officers under the present system, and the class of men who will enter as privates, there is a large class below the one position and above the other?—Yes.

4613. (Mr. E. Ellice.) With regard to the middle classes, a great majority of the officers who purchase in the army come from the middle class, do they not?—My meaning is this: a class between the clergy and the legal and medical professions and the higher merchants on one side, and the workpeople on the other, has no place in the British army under the present system.

4614. (Lieut.-General E. B. Wynyard.) You referred to the Duke of Wellington's statement that one-fourth of the officers in the army are not purchasers; why, therefore, should men be deterred from coming in?—There are cases in which they rise, but the obstructions are so great as to offer great objections to their entering the army.

Thursday, 18th June 1857.

PRESENT :

The Duke of Somerset.
 Lord Stanley.
 Lieut.-Gen. Wynyard.
 Sir De Lacy Evans.

Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.
 Sir Harry D. Jones.
 Mr. George Carr Glyn.

His Grace the DUKE OF SOMERSET in the Chair.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, K. C. B. ; further Examined.

Sir C. Trevelyan,
 K. C. B.

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Proposal of the Admiralty to assimilate the pensions of widows and families of officers of the navy to those of the army.

4615. (*Chairman.*) You have brought some papers with you to show the effect of purchase upon the services generally?—Yes. I have selected this letter from the Admiralty to the Treasury on the subject of a revision of the naval warrant for widows' pensions, to show how invariably the expenditure, which is generated in the purchasing portion of the army, has extended to the non-purchasing portions of the service, including the navy; and here that principle is taken quite as a matter of course, not only by the Admiralty, but by the Treasury.

4616. (*Mr. G. Carr Glyn.*) What is the date of that?—The 8th of August 1855.

4617. Does that paper begin by stating that the increased expenditure in the army is dependant upon the purchase system?—No. My object at present is limited to showing that whatever new advantages are conceded to the purchasing portion of the army become extended to the other branches of the public service, naval and military.

4618. It comes to this, does it not, that whenever any bounty is given to the army that is extended also to the navy?—Yes; anything that is applicable to the navy under similar circumstances, such as widows' pensions; the major of the proposition is to be proved, and I endeavoured to prove it in my last examination upon this subject, namely, that purchase does generate unnecessary expenditure in the purchasing portion of the army; and I wish now to show, that when it has been so generated, it is extended to the other portions of the service.

4619. (*Lord Stanley.*) When any boon is conferred on the purchasing part of the service, in consideration of the outlay made by officers in the purchase of commissions, a similar boon is extended, though without the same necessity, to those who have not purchased?—Yes.

4620. (*Chairman.*) Does the paper clearly trace it to having originated with the purchasing portion of the army? Read it. "My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having had under their consideration the various changes that have been made in the rank and retirement of the several grades of officers of the Royal Navy, since the establishment of the existing Queen's regulations for Her Majesty's service at sea; and having had reference to Her Majesty's Warrant of the 15th June 1855, for making better provision for the widows and families of officers of the army; and deeming the present to be a fitting and expedient time for revising and amending the scale of pensions, and allowances authorized to be granted to the widows and families of naval and marine officers, under the aforesaid regulations; and having given very careful deliberation to the subject, with the view of assimilating, as far as is practicable, the amount of pension in the several corresponding ranks of the military and naval services, and of giving to the widows of naval and marine officers the increased advantages which Her Majesty has by Her Warrant accorded to the widows and officers of the army," and so on. The Treasury Minute upon this was as follows: "Write to the Secretary to the Admiralty, that my Lords are pleased to sanction the scale of pensions and allowances to the widows and families of naval and marine officers which it is proposed to submit to Her Majesty in Council, on the understanding that such pensions and allowances are assimilated, as far as practicable, to those accorded by the Royal Warrant of 15th June 1855 to the widows and families of officers of the army." This increase of expenditure is traced by this letter from the purchasing portion of the army to the navy, but the question remains, whether it was caused by the purchasing system. That formed the subject of a great part of my last day's evidence. I also submitted to the commissioners, in my last day's evidence, that I did not conceive there was any present call for a revision of the position of the officers in the Indian army.

4621. (*Chairman.*) You stated, in answer to question 4385, you would leave seniority as the rule in the Indian service at present?—My meaning was, that changes ought not to be made in the terms of service of large bodies of public servants without some pressing necessity; and as far as the promotion of officers in the Indian army was concerned, I saw no such pressing necessity; but there is another point of view of great delicacy and importance, namely, the bearing of the existing system of the Indian army upon the native soldiery; and there can be no doubt that new measures are required to meet the new exigencies which have arisen in that direction.

4622. I did not understand that you applied that to the subject of making up a purse, or to the seniority system in the army, but to some other alterations?—I conceive that, owing to circumstances which have occurred, and the state of feeling which exists in the Indian

Reference to former evidence on rules of promotion in the Indian army,—

Indian army, the time has arrived for a revision, but not in consequence of the stagnation of promotion, but owing to other causes.

4623. (*Chairman.*) A little discrepancy arose, for in an answer to Question 4385 you stated that you would make no change in the Indian army, and at Question 4408, with regard to the two systems of purchase, the Indian and our system, you said, "I would have no purchase of any sort"—My meaning was, that so long as the seniority system is maintained in the Indian army, the practice of making up a purse to enable senior officers to retire is an useful mitigation of it, but that a better arrangement still would be to allow of no purchase of any sort, and to base the military system upon professional qualification.

4624. You referred, on the last day of your examination, to the effect of purchase in excluding the middle class, by which you were understood to mean the sons of farmers?—In suggesting that our army should be so constituted as to enable the middle class, by whose energy the industrial system of this country is maintained, to take their share of service in it, I had in view the safety of the country more than the interests of that class. The reputation we have acquired as a nation "boutiquière," a nation of shopkeepers, has twice encouraged the aggression of powerful enemies since the beginning of this century; and in the event of an attack upon this country, the entire absence of military habits and experience on the part of the middle class in town and country might lead to very disastrous consequences. In former days, this important portion of our community was carefully trained to the use of arms, with an express view to national defence; and they have shown, on many well-known occasions, what they are capable of for the honour and safety of England. They first established our military reputation at Cressy and Agincourt, and held all England, Scotland, and Ireland in subjection under Cromwell; but since the Restoration it has been the practice to exclude them from our military system, and to base the defence of the country almost entirely upon the highest and lowest classes. It is like fighting with one hand tied.

4625. (*Sir Harry D. Jones.*) Do you think that the middle class of whom you speak would enlist in the army under present circumstances?—No; but they would under such a revision of our system as might with great advantage be adopted on the abolition of purchase.

4626. (*Mr. G. Carr Glyn.*) That is to say, with increased pay and with increased retiring allowances?—No, I do not think it is necessary to increase the pay of the soldier, but only of the junior officers; I consider that an arrangement by which all his wants are provided for, with a pension at the end of his service, is sufficient for the soldier; the object, I conceive, is to hold out such an inducement to the soldier of promotion and distinction, as will draw to the army the middle class, who are represented by farmers in the country and shopkeepers in town, that is, the great industrial class. Persons of this class would be especially suited for employment in the executive establishments, acting under the central corps of administrative officers proposed to be formed on the principle of the "Intendance" of the continental armies,—that is, in the military train, the store branch, the hospital corps, and the service of provisions and forage, which is at present done by the commissariat. The application, according to a well-adjusted scheme, of the business habits of the middle class to the administration of the army would supply a great desideratum.

4627. Do you mean by promotion from the ranks?—By regulated promotion from the ranks; for instance, if it were laid down that one-third, or one-fourth, or some other fixed proportion of the commissions in each regiment, would be given to non-commissioned officers, provided individuals of that rank were forthcoming in a regiment in every way qualified for such promotion, but only on that condition; that would, I think, meet the case; a great many commissions are given even now, and if these were fixed and guaranteed as a permanent proportion, that alone would be a great inducement. The officers of the army always seem disposed to favour the promotion of deserving non-commissioned officers. Commissions have been given as follows to non-commissioned officers in the last four years:—

1853-4	-	-	-	-	-	23
1854-5	-	-	-	-	-	101
1855-6	-	-	-	-	-	100
1856-7	-	-	-	-	-	147
Total for Four Years						371

4628. (*Chairman.*) Am I to understand you that in a regiment you would lay down a rule, that upon vacancies occurring, one-third should be given to men in the ranks?—That a certain proportion of the commissions, one-third or one-fourth, should be given to non-commissioned officers, provided non-commissioned officers in every way qualified were forthcoming.

4629. But there would be an examination of those men, would there not?—Yes; but different from that of the officers.

4630. Then you would bring in another class of officers; there would be one class of officers with a superior education in the military college, and another of men rising from the ranks without that education, but having a good knowledge of their profession?—If the arrangements I suggest were made, we should draw into the ranks of the army a number

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where it would be better if purchase were abolished.

Desirable to introduce into our army more of the middle class,—

who might be attracted by the prospect of promotion, and eventual employment in the civil branch.

A fixed proportion of first commissions to be given to the ranks.

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of men of good education, and those who were not well educated would take pains to cultivate themselves in the military schools.

4631. But the only prize that you would offer them would be a rate of subsistence upon which they could live, and a pension on retirement?—With the prospect of promotion, contingent upon qualification and good conduct, many young men of superior education, farmers' sons, and sons of other families of the middle class, who now emigrate to Australia, and betake themselves to various occupations, would be attracted to the army.

4632. Take a cavalry regiment, and suppose such a man promoted, how would he get his accoutrements, unless you made the same allowance that is at present made; or would you continue that?—I am not at present prepared to give a conclusive opinion on that point, but I conceive that if these arrangements were adopted, not only should we get men into the ranks with superior education, but also men of superior means, farmers' sons for instance, who are too numerous, all of them, to get farms. A fair proportion of them would, I believe, enter the army.

4633. Would not that make it necessary to adopt the system that is practised in some other armies, namely, that the horse should be purchased, and not belong to the officer, but to the public, and that the whole expense should be incurred by the government instead of the soldier?—Even if that were so, it would be merely what we have now, for we provide an outfit for the non-commissioned officers who are promoted to be officers; but I conceive that we should by these means attract into the ranks of the army a large proportion of so superior a class of men, that in most cases they would provide their own horses, as they do in the yeomanry now. In the infantry the expense of the first outfit is much less. The main reason for these outfits will cease when subalterns are enabled to live upon their pay, by increasing the pay of the junior ranks and exempting officers of every rank from the subscription of twenty days' pay on first appointment, and the subsequent annual contributions, and subscriptions on promotion, towards the expense of the regimental band. If the formation of a band of music upon an economical scale is essential to the credit and appearance of a regiment, as stated in the Queen's Regulations, the public, and not the officers, should pay for it.

4634. (Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.) Do you think that that class of persons would be content to undergo the drudgery and confinement to barracks; sleeping in rooms with 20 or 30 men, and doing all the hard work of the soldier, and all for this prospective promotion?—Yes.

4635. (Lord Stanley.) Such a stimulus might be useful in time of war, but would it apply, in your opinion, in a time of peace?—Certainly, though in a less degree, because every army system is put into accelerated action in time of war, but I think it would also apply in time of peace. I think, if the prospect I have described were opened to that class, a considerable number would enter the ranks with the hope of obtaining the higher promotion, and those most likely to gain that promotion would have the greatest inducement to enter. The expense of the recruiting system and the abuses connected with it will, of course, be diminished in proportion as the service is made popular and attractive.

4636. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Is the maintenance of the purchase system compatible with the establishment of professional qualification as the ruling principle of the army?—No. It is extremely important for the financial interests of the public that the army should be constituted upon a principle of professional instruction and qualification, but while the purchase system continues, the army cannot be regulated upon this principle.

The purchase system
incompatible with a
system based on pro-
fessional qualifications.

Purchase and professional qualification are incompatible and antagonistic principles. We must take our choice of them. The army cannot be constituted upon both at the same time. If certain sums of money have to be deposited as the condition of the successive steps of appointment and promotion, those who can command ready money to the requisite amount, must be appointed and promoted in preference to other better qualified persons. Those who are unable to make the deposit cannot be advanced in the army, whatever their other qualifications and claims may be. However much a man may devote himself to the army, whatever he may undergo in the way of colonial and tropical service, and whatever pains he may take to acquire the various branches of military science, he is liable to the mortification and discouragement of being frequently passed over by persons inferior to him in every claim of service and professional ability, if he has not money enough to purchase his successive steps of promotion. The large and important class of well educated young men, who depend for their advancement in life upon their own exertions, and not upon already accumulated means, and who constitute the pith of the law, the church, and other active professions, are thus ordinarily excluded from the army. On the other hand, idle young men, who dislike the restraints of school, and desire to lead an easy enjoyable life, are attracted to the army as the only profession in which advancement depends, not so much upon personal qualifications as upon a certain command of money. Even those who combine the pecuniary with personal qualifications often find, as they advance in the army, that the growing amount paid by them for their successive commissions is more than they can with justice to their families risk upon their lives, or sacrifice upon their promotion to be major-general, and they therefore leave the army at a period of their career when the experience they have acquired makes their services peculiarly valuable. Thus the public is charged with the cost of training young men to an extent quite out of proportion to the number of mature officers who remain in the army.

4637. (Chairman.) You have stated that professional qualification and purchase are quite incompatible?—Yes; as a general proposition.

4638. Looking at this country, one observes that persons occasionally purchase a living in

in the church for their sons; they purchase the advowson with the view of putting their son into the church; how does that prevent their having an examination for the young man afterwards?—No doubt, there are men of good qualifications both in the army and in the church in spite of purchase. I only state as a general proposition, that purchase and professional qualification are antagonistic principles, and that the tendency of purchase is to discourage and exclude qualification; but the state of the church is not now before us, nor is it proposed to make any change in the state of the church. It is hardly a good argument to draw an inference from the more defective and imperfect phases of the church in favour of army purchase; it would perhaps be better in the church also if men were promoted only according to their qualifications.

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4639. In your evidence given the other day, you stated emphatically that we must consider what the state of society in this country is, and we find in other professions that money does obtain advancement for persons; and therefore as far as the state of the society in the country goes, though it may not be a good arrangement for other purposes, it at least shows that the country is accustomed to see advancement obtained by money?—Yes; and it shows that a considerable degree of qualification is consistent with purchase, as in the church; but nevertheless they are antagonistic principles, and so far as purchase has unqualified operation, it excludes merit.

4640. You have stated that there may be some professional qualification undoubtedly with purchase, although you think that the two principles are antagonistic, but if there may be some professional qualification with purchase, why does that entirely exclude merit?—The army is at present based on promotion by purchase; it is an indispensable qualification for promotion that an officer should be able to return himself for purchase, that is, that he should have sufficient money to purchase his promotion; and however well qualified he may be, he cannot obtain his promotion under ordinary circumstances, unless he is able to deposit that money, which shows that they are antagonistic principles. On the other hand, a less qualified officer who has money is promoted in preference to a more qualified officer who has not money, which is another proof that they are antagonistic principles.

4641. Take the case of a person purchasing his first commission. You may establish any professional qualification you please by which to test a young man who purchased his first commission, but you might refuse him that commission though he purchased it, as well as you might refuse him when he did not offer to purchase?—Yes. In the case of the first commission, the operation of the purchase system is to confine the choice of the public to those persons who are able to deposit the price of a commission; and a large number of persons, many of whom are highly qualified, and who form the heart and core, for that is an important point, of the law and other active professions, are entirely excluded by it.

4642. Do you mean that the same class that goes into the law do not often go into the army?—Yes, but only those go into the army who can deposit the price of their first commission over and above the expense of their education, and who also have the means, or the prospect of having the means, of buying themselves on.

4643. (Lord Stanley.) As I understand you, you rest your statement upon two arguments; first, that the necessity of purchase limits the number of candidates, and therefore of necessity lowers the standard of qualification; and, secondly, that the man who is actually serving gratuitously feels that the State has no right to require from him the same amount of personal qualification as if he was paid for that service?—Yes, the first case describes a direct operation of the purchase system, while the last indicates the indirect influence of that system upon a man who, having obtained his first commission by purchase, seeks to rise higher by purchase, and not by superior qualification. A person so situated naturally does not take the same pains to qualify himself as if his progress in his profession were dependent upon his exertions; but the operation of the purchase system in keeping back better qualified men, and pushing forward less qualified men, is much more positive and direct than that; the better qualified man cannot be promoted unless he deposits the money, and the less qualified man must be promoted over his head if he is able to deposit the money.

4644. If you quadruple the number of candidates for first commissions, the probability is, that among that larger number you would find that a good many were qualified, and you would be able materially to raise the standard of qualification?—I have no doubt of it. It is notorious also that, as a general rule, the persons who do best in the law are the well-educated poor men who are obliged to work; and if we had the same class of well-educated poor men in the army, they would work their way up and improve the efficiency of the army.

4645. (Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.) Do you mean that the men in the army who have purchased their commissions are inferior to those who have come in without purchase?—By no means.

4646. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) Is it not, after all, the establishment of a proper qualification test?—No; it is the establishment of a test which is quite foreign to what ought to be the real standard and rule of promotion. The rule of promotion in the army, as in every other active profession, should be superior personal qualification; money is quite a different standard; it is quite extrinsic to the real merits of the case; you might as well take height or complexion, or any other incidental quality.

4647. But the possession of money is not a disqualification, is it?—No, but the absence of it is, according to the present system.

4648. (Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.) If you have the power of examining as to proper qualification

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education in the individual, does it signify to the State whether a man has purchased or not?—Not, if the qualifications were equal; but by excluding a large class of highly educated young men who have not the means of purchasing their steps, you do not get such good men.

4649. If you get qualified men, that is all that you want?—But we want to get the best qualified; the class of men who will work the hardest, and who we find by experience in other professions, are disposed to work the hardest.

4650. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) Do you think that the state of the regimental officers is such as to require a change of the description you have pointed out?—The state of our regiments is very good, but I believe it to be chiefly owing, not to the excellence of our regimental system (for all regimental systems are much the same), but to the same causes which make the English nation succeed in other lines, which make them the best sailors, the best merchants, and the best conductors of various industrial enterprises. It is not because our regimental system is of a superior kind, but because our officers and men are made of excellent stuff.

4651. (Sir Harry D. Jones.) You stated, as one of the objections to the purchase system, that gentlemen would enter into the army for a few years, and then retire?—Yes, because they often go in, not to work, but to idle away their time; but if they were all made to work, as young men do at a profession, their going in and coming out again would be an advantage.

4652. (Chairman.) You stated, I think, that there was the cost of teaching young men who did not afterwards remain in the army?—Yes.

4653. That was one of the objections?—Yes.

4654. (Sir H. D. Jones.) Have you any idea of the number of regiments of militia during the last war, or the number of regimental officers in those regiments, who had served in the regular army, and had sold out?—A considerable number, no doubt, had served in the army, and then sold.

4655. Is not that a point of great importance to the English nation, that they should be enabled to obtain men who would come forward to command the militia regiments?—Yes, but I conceive that the object may be equally obtained by either system, either with or without purchase. I believe that quite as many young men of the upper classes will enter the army to stay a longer or a shorter time, under the new system as under the old; and it is with a view to a more extensive application of that principle, that I suggest that our terms of service should be so revised as to allow of the introduction of the middle class, who are now entirely excluded.

4656. (Chairman.) Do you wish to effect something like that which is effected in Prussia, namely, to pass a great number of men through the army for a short time, so as to give a more military character to the population?—To call to the assistance of the State a class which is now practically excluded, a most important class, upon whom the defence of the country in a great degree depends. Then as regards the higher classes, I would so frame the system as to provide for an effective training, so that every person who enters the army should follow it while in the army, as if it was to be his profession for life; but even so a considerable number of the upper classes will enter the army for a few years, and then leave it again; and that, although objectionable in one point of view, will be advantageous in another.

4657. Therefore, looking to the mere question of young men going into the army and remaining there for eight or ten years and then leaving it, you do not consider that to be an evil, as I understand you?—No, provided they are taught to do their work well.

4658. Provided that they perform the regimental duties when they are there?—Yes.

4659. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Why do you attach so much importance to professional qualifications?—Because efficiency is almost synonymous with economy, especially in military affairs, in which war may be altogether prevented, or if commenced, may be brought to a more speedy conclusion, by a well-regulated vigorous military organisation. The same proposition may be proved by particular instances of a very decisive character. If our army were regulated upon the principle of professional instruction and qualification, no persons would be likely to obtain commissions who were not able to render valuable service; the effective remuneration would be rendered at once more advantageous to the officers, and more economical to the public, by substituting fixed money payments for the numerous petty allowances at present received; and the non-effective charge would be reduced to a minimum by prospectively revising the different allowances which come under this head, according to the principles which ought to govern temporary and permanent retirement. Thus, the heavy charge caused by the large number of effective officers on the non-effective lists, and the diminished efficiency arising from the long intervals of inaction to which officers are subjected, would both be avoided. Our existing system is so framed as first to create dead weight, and then to cast it off upon the shoulders of the public; admissions and promotions made without sufficient securities for qualification, and involuntary absence from professional duties during the active period of life, necessarily result in an overgrown retired list.

Notwithstanding the great expense of this system, it was pronounced by the Commissioners on promotion in the army in 1854, not to have worked well as regards the primary and most important object "of furnishing officers fit to hold commands," and they recommended that all officers who had served for three years in the rank of lieutenant-colonel, or in other equivalent positions, should be promoted to the rank of colonel, and that colonels

A system of promotion based on professional qualifications would be more economical.

colonels should be eligible to be selected for commands. However extensive promotion may be, it must fall short of the public advantages to be obtained from it if it is indiscriminate. The principle of selection is indispensable for giving proper effect to it.

4660. Can you mention any other instances of the financial importance of the army being constituted on the principle of professional qualification, instead of that of purchase?—Yes. In those countries in which there is a regulated system of professional instruction, “military administration,” the “rules and regulations of the service,” and “military accounts,” are taught as part of the course of study at the military colleges, and several admirable books have been published on these subjects by the professors appointed to teach them, who are generally old officers of the staff or of the “Intendance.” These manuals are to military administration what Blackstone’s Commentaries have been to English law. They describe, in a systematic manner, both its principles and their practical application. A much slighter degree of attention to the subject than this in our army would be inconsistent with the continuance of evils of great magnitude, affecting both the efficiency and economy of the service, which, although entirely indefensible when examined with the light of reason and experience, have maintained their ground from year to year in consequence of the great neglect of military affairs as a branch of practical science.

4661. What evils are those to which you allude?—One instance of this is the “stoppage system” as it is called. The ration stoppages involve settlements of account of so operose and cumbrous a nature that, although they are gone through in time of peace, at the cost of a great waste of labour, the arrangement is immediately abandoned on the breaking out of war. The stoppages on shipboard are even more objectionable, because they are complicated with the naval regulations, and with various arrangements connected with the different conditions under which messing is provided for the different ranks on board Queen’s ships, transports, and freight ships. Then there are the deductions from the bounty professed to be paid to recruits, which caused a mutiny at the recruiting depôt of the Land Transport Corps at Bristol during the late war, and which have long been the occasion of much discontent, and of many imputations of breach of faith; and the hospital stoppages. If the principle of professional qualification were substituted for that of purchase, as the basis of our military system, this obsolete machinery would be immediately discontinued, and our arrangements would be adapted to the actual fact, which is, that the soldier’s wages consist of a net rate of pay, a free ration, free lodging, free instruction, and various other advantages which are provided for him at the expense of the public.

4662. Have stoppages anything to do with purchase?—My argument is this, and it is the whole of my argument, that purchase and professional qualification are, on a general view, incompatible principles; that in consequence of our retaining the purchase system, and basing our army upon that system, we cannot have professional qualification; we cannot deal with army matters as they are dealt with in other countries. I am endeavouring to show that if purchase were got rid of, and our army were based upon professional qualification, some obvious evils would be immediately discontinued, which would at once save more than it would cost to extinguish the purchase system.

4663. (Sir Harry D. Jones.) Are you aware that the regulations which you refer to have been of a permanent nature, or have they been frequently changed?—Substantially they have existed for a great number of years, but in their details they have been in course of change; and I am of opinion that these, and many other evils, will not be effectually abated until, in connexion with the abolition of purchase, the army is based broadly and directly upon a system of professional qualification.

4664. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Can you mention any other instance in which the financial interests of the public are even more directly involved?—“Army agency” is another part of the existing system which must immediately yield before the application of professional principles to the government of our army. About 42,000*l.* a year is paid for doing over again what must, at any rate, be done in a more simple and direct manner by the public establishments. We purchase, at the cost of this large annual outlay, double accounts, complication, delay, and insecurity. The matter would not bear the slightest examination by impartial, official, or professional accountants. But army agency is the stronghold of the purchase system. The pecuniary transactions of many different kinds, by which that system is maintained, are managed by the intervention of the army agents. “Purchase” and “army agency” are twin sisters, which live and die together; and if we purchase the right of abolishing “purchase,” we shall not only save the 42,000*l.* a year, but shall obtain a much greater value in the shape of short and early accounts, diminished balances, increased security, and more simple, easy, and economical working of the machinery of our military system. Mr. Anderson, the chief financial officer of the Treasury, and Mr. Kirby, Accountant general of the War Department,* gave decided evidence to this effect before the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure in 1850, and the reasons urged by them have since been strengthened by the formation of a new public establishment for the performance of the duties formerly entrusted to the army agents connected with the clothing of the army. See also “Reports and Treasury Minutes relating to the audit of the naval and military accounts,”—Parliamentary Paper, 160, Sess. 1856, page 33 to 45. The objections to the present system of army agency are, of course, confined to the inter-

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The military administration in our army is mismanaged;

it is complicated,—

and might be simplified with advantage and saving of expense.

Evils of army agency.

* Report from the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure.—Parliamentary Paper, No. 062, Session 1850. For Mr. Anderson’s evidence, see answers to Questions 5109 to 5208. For Mr. Kirby’s, see 5596 to 5802. See also Sir C. Trevelyan’s evidence, 6143 to 6240, and 6242 to 6264.

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18 June 1857.

A system of professional qualification would lead to a re-organisation of the civil department of the army,—

in which military officers chiefly should be employed,—

and to a beneficial simplification of the army regulations, which are now very confused.

General advantages which would result from a re-constitution of the army on sound principles.

vention of the agents in the public accounts. As private agents and bankers, they might continue to render useful service to military officers.

4665. What would be the effect of the change of system upon the civil departments of the army?—Another consequence of the substitution of professional instruction and qualification for purchase, would be, the re-organisation of what are now called the civil departments of the army, under the central action of a body of selected professional officers, answering to the "Intendance" of the continental armies. By this measure alone we should save at the commencement of the next war, more than enough to buy up all the vested interests connected with the purchase system: and in the subordinate executive branches of the administration we should open a suitable field of promotion to a very deserving class of non-commissioned officers who are disqualified by age or other circumstances for commissions. Long before the last war commenced, I earnestly represented that if we continued to neglect the civil administration of the army, the breaking out of war again must be attended with immense waste; and when this actually occurred, I suggested the adoption of arrangements calculated to keep within some limits the torrent of expenditure which was flowing out at that time. To those statements I must refer for a full explanation of this part of the subject. I will confine myself at present to saying that the economy of peace is as nothing compared with the economy of war; and that economy in war is not to be obtained without the assistance of a well organised and well supported body of professional officers such as the British army might furnish when the principle of appointment and promotion (upon which everything else depends) shall be instruction and qualification and good service, and not money. The French attach great importance to the principle that all the administrators of the army should be chosen from among military officers, as being highly conducive to the harmonious working of the military system; and it is evident from the disadvantages under which our civil commissariat officers have laboured, notwithstanding all their zeal and ability, that the old prejudice against the commissariat will not be overcome until a change is made corresponding to that which took place in the French army in 1817, by which the "Commissaires des guerres" were converted into the "Intendance Militaire."

4666. What would be the effect of the abolition of purchase as regards the simplification of the regulations of the army?—The return to just principles must be followed by the revision of the regulations for every branch of our military system. They are at present in so scattered, confused, and imperfect a state, that even if the system itself were simple and intelligible, it would be difficult to make it out from them; but there have been so many shifts and expedients, as different defects have displayed themselves, and the departures from a sound consistent plan have been overlaid by so many complex arrangements in the way of compensation and mitigation, that it is difficult to understand some parts of the system, however clearly they may be explained.

4667. What, therefore, would be the general nature of the equivalent which would be obtained by extinguishing the purchase system?—Although the sum which would have to be laid out in extinguishing the purchase system would be large, there would soon be a rich return in the collapse of the extravagant and complicated system which has been gradually built up to compensate military officers for the absence of pay, and in the increased efficiency of every branch of army administration, which must be the result of making promotion depend upon personal qualification and claims of service instead of upon length of purse. The nation would not only compensate officers for what they had paid for their commissions, but would also purchase the power of giving to them and their successors the fair reward of their service, in the shape of unincumbered full-pay, as well as the right to take any further steps that might be necessary to secure the full advantage of the outlay, such as the adoption of a proper system of first appointments and retirements; the abolition of exchanges between full and half-pay, and between different regiments on full-pay; and the establishment of proper rules of promotion, which would probably have to be combined with the full recognition of field officers as belonging to a general or army line of promotion.

4668. Should we lose any advantage which we at present possess if the army were re-constituted in the manner proposed?—No. In energy, intelligence, and high and honourable spirit, the British army hardly leaves anything to be desired; and when to this shall be added the professional instruction which distinguishes the great continental armies, we shall have every possible guarantee for our future safety and success. It is a mistake to suppose that, if our army were remodelled on professional principles, it would no longer furnish suitable occupation for young men who are heirs to considerable properties. This object would be more completely attained than before. The army would be a school as well as a play-ground; and our young men of fortune would be the better all their lives for having been associated for a time with what would be really a liberal profession. Only the incompetent, who ought under any circumstances to be excluded, would fail to obtain admission; and many who now depend upon their money and connexions for advancement would be stimulated to acquire the personal qualifications necessary for success. Our aristocratic families are so strongly impressed with the necessity of giving their sons the best possible education, and are regarded with such general favour and respect, that we need be under no alarm about their obtaining their full share in this as well as in every other competition. We should do them injustice if we doubted their success, and argued as if they stood in need of protection. Whatever raises the standard of education in a profession gives an advantage to the upper class. In the case supposed, more young men of that class would enter the army, because, even in time of peace, it would offer a suitable career to those who are disposed towards an active intellectual life. Now and closer relations

relations would be established with the upper, middle, and lower orders; our army would become even less of a military caste than at present, and it would be more completely incorporated with English society than ever.

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4669. What system would you propose to substitute for the present system of army purchase, under the several heads of first appointments, promotion, and retirement?—With regard to first appointments, there are two principles upon which such appointments may be made: First, the principle of competition, which furnishes a direct security for the intellectual qualities, superior cultivation, intelligence, and so forth, and an indirect security for the moral qualities; for the peculiar virtue of a state of pupilage is application to study; and a young man who has the necessary self-denial and perseverance, and preference of the future to the present, to enable him to excel his contemporaries, is likely also to be morally superior; this is the universal experience of persons engaged in education. Therefore, in my opinion, the simple application of the competitive system which is now in force with regard to the scientific corps would furnish a sufficient guarantee to the public, and I should extremely deprecate any retrograde step as regards those corps. But there is also another principle of making first appointments, which has many advocates, namely, the principle of nomination, which is supposed to secure the moral qualities, because it allows of a more particular reference to the antecedents of the young men; we find, by experience in the civil departments, that these two principles can with great advantage be combined. The practice in the Treasury, in the Colonial Office, and in other offices, is this: when a vacancy occurs, a limited number of young men are nominated, who compete together, and the best is chosen. The efficacy of that plan is much greater than appears at first sight. On the first appearance of it, it looks as if the only sifting was the sifting produced by the examination, but it is not so: there is also a preliminary self-acting operation, which is even more valuable. When the principle of examination is a fixed test, there is hardly any young man so inferior who does not think that he may cram up to it; but when you introduce the competitive principle, it becomes a race; and as in a race you endeavour to enter a winning horse, so in a competitive examination you only put forward young men who are likely to succeed. We find by practical experience that the standard of the candidates is elevated by this natural preliminary self-acting process. Candidates do not apply who think they have no chance of beating their more industrious contemporaries, and candidates who have been nominated are often withdrawn, and others are substituted for them until the competitors have been all brought up to a high standard. To apply this to the army, I would suggest, in reference to all except the scientific corps, that the Commander-in-Chief should keep a list precisely as he does now; that he should not admit upon that list anybody in respect to whose antecedents he was not entirely satisfied; that for every commission which became vacant he should nominate three young men from this list, and that there should be competitive examinations not oftener than once in every month, so that if there were 20 vacancies there would be 60 candidates, and the 20 best would be chosen; and that the young men who failed in the first instance should be permitted to go up a second time, but not a third time; for after the second time it would give them too great an opportunity for cramming.

System proposed to be substituted for the present one,—as to first appointments,—

which should be a mixture of competition and nomination.

4670. I understand your plan to be nomination, and limited competition for first entry?—Yes.

4671. Nomination by the Commander-in-Chief, and limited competition?—Yes; that the Commander-in-Chief, the colonels of the Guards, or whoever has the nomination now, should continue to have the nomination, but that for every vacancy they should nominate three candidates, and that the candidates, within certain limited periods of time, should be examined together. The nomination of the candidates would give the Commander-in-Chief and the colonels of the Guards the same power of rejecting bad, and putting forward good candidates which they have at present, while the competition would secure for the public the best of the candidates so put forward.

4672. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Is that system adopted in the Treasury, and some other departments of the Government?—Yes; we have had sufficient experience to test it, and to pronounce a confident opinion upon it. It is a great improvement, and it answers very well.

4673. Does that take place in the War Department?—Yes; there have been repeated competitive examinations in the War Department.

4674. (Chairman.) With regard to this examination, which is to be competitive, do you mean that persons should be nominated without reference to their having any professional knowledge of any kind, and an examination into their general knowledge, or how is that to be?—It is very important that we should take our young men to give them a professional training, when their school education is finished and they pair off to the different professions, that is, at the turning point of their lives, when they go to the universities to follow the learned professions, or enter into private business. They should come into the army after they have finished their school education. I take the sixth form of our public schools as the standard, and I think that 18 should be the minimum age. It would be better at that stage to have no professional test, the object at that point being to obtain the best material for the service of the public, the raw material to be worked up in the military profession; and the way to obtain the ablest young men is to take those who have done best in their studies, whatever they may have been. We should, however, not go below the standard of a liberal education; but whether it be Latin, or Greek, or mathematics, or modern languages, or any other education which disciplines and expands the mind, it may be called a liberal education, and I would examine them together, and choose the best.

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Preliminary training
at a military college,—

at the expense of the
pupils.

4675. Having nominated your young man, and having chosen the young man out of the three who would compete with him, would you then put him at once into the army, or would you adopt the French system?—Then I would put him through a course of professional training at a military college, say for two years in peace, and, in order to increase the supply of officers, only one year in time of war. In proposing this I have two distinct objects in view: one is to give professional instruction in foreign languages, military history, military topography, military organisation and administration, military exercise and discipline, at least to the extent of enabling a young man to put his company through their manoeuvres before he joins his regiment, so that he may be able to teach his men, and not his men teach him, and in riding and sword and rifle exercise. The students would in this, as in every other military college, be in the position of privates, and they would be taught practically the duties of a private and of a non-commissioned officer. They would also learn to *obey*, which is the first step to knowing how to command. The other object is to establish a probation to test the moral qualifications. The young men should undergo, during those two years, a sifting on all the main points of character which constitute fitness for command, and those who come short should be eliminated; and where young men are rusticated now, I would in a majority of cases say to them that they appeared to have mistaken their profession. Where they show a high-handed, heady, unreasonable disposition, or are timid, helpless, and indecisive, I would make that remark to them. I consider it very necessary, for the efficiency of this collegiate system, that the parents of the young men should have no pecuniary assistance either from the State or from the parents of the other young men at the college; while there is an unlimited supply of young men to be obtained who will be completely educated at the expense of their parents, it is wrong to impose upon the tax-payer the obligation of paying for them; and it is the natural duty and responsibility of parents to give the best possible education to their children, and I would require it of them; but there is even a more important motive than that.

4676. You would exclude from the college a young man, although he might have been nominated, and gain the first prize in the competitive examination, if his parents could not afford to maintain him at the college?—Yes, I would; but parents who could give their sons a sufficiently good education to enable them to pass the necessary competitive examination would generally be able to pay the college expenses for two years.

4677. That is different from the French system, is it not?—Yes, I am endeavouring to describe what I consider the proper application of the French system to English habits; while I am opposed to giving undue privileges to wealth by enabling a less meritorious man to pass over the head of a more meritorious man, I would not deprive wealth of its natural advantages; there is nothing which is so properly and entirely an attribute of wealth as the opportunity it affords of giving a superior education to children, and it is unfair that the State should interpose when a father is doing his best to educate his son, and should, by coming in with the resources of the State, give an advantage to another young man over him. This plan of putting all candidates for commissions through a course of professional training in common at their parents' expense, would also tend to give a more firm and wholesome tone to the army. We should see more of that noble equality in the presence of duty, which is quite consistent with superior social claims of every kind, I mean that gentlemanly equality which prevails at our public schools and universities, and in other liberal professions; and we should hear less of a military aristocracy of rank and wealth who are considered to have a sort of prescriptive right to easy work and early promotion, on one side, and, on the other, of a class of poor officers who, although they are passed over by their more wealthy and powerful comrades, are assisted, and patronised, and almost treated as objects of charity. Care ought to be taken to keep the college expenses within moderate limits, and to discourage extravagant habits in the young men. This military college would be quite on a par with our universities, both in respect to the class of young men entering it, and also as to the professional rewards; in fact it would be superior, because the rewards would have a more direct bearing upon the future success in life of the young men. There would be no occasion for bursaries and other artificial inducements which are necessary at unprofessional places of education. The professorships would furnish suitable employment to distinguished officers of the staff, and of the administrative corps.

4678. Your young man having been two years at college, would you examine him again before he went into the army?—No; according to the manner in which he passed his college examinations, I would post him to the army, and would give him any advantage I could in the choice of cavalry and infantry, and so forth.

4679. (Sir H. J. Bentinck.) Would you do away with the present system that has obtained at Sandhurst in favour of old officers, who can put their sons in for a smaller amount?—Yes; I would do away with it. I conceive that our army system should be so constituted as to enable old officers, if they are provident, to save enough for their sons' education; and if they are unable to do that, they must be content, as others are, to put their sons into such professions as they are able. If the young men have a strong taste for the army, and are unable to go to the military college, they might take their chance of obtaining a commission by serving in the ranks, and being promoted as non-commissioned officers, according to the fixed proportion proposed.

4680. (Sir H. D. James.) When the competitive examination takes place, is it to be merely with reference to general education, and is there to be no subsequent examination of a professional nature before they get their commission?—The examination for selection to the college would be entirely scholastic and physical. A strong sound frame is of more value to an officer than to any one else. The education at the military college would

be entirely professional, and then I would have no further examination till the rank of captain; I would establish as the principle of promotion in the junior ranks, a certain proportion of promotions to be made according to the principle of seniority, and according to the principle of selection, in the manner suggested by the Commission of 1854 for the Artillery and Engineers. I quote the words—"The opinion thus expressed by two such distinguished officers, together with a consideration of the grounds on which that opinion is supported, might warrant a doubt whether the principle of selection in the promotion of officers of the ordnance corps might not be carried somewhat further than we have ventured to recommend; and whether as in the continental armies, some definite proportion of the vacancies which occur in every rank above that of second lieutenant ought to be filled up by the promotion of the most deserving officers in the rank below without regard to seniority;" and in the preceding page, they give their reason: "In every other profession and walk in life, experience proves that men, and especially young men, cannot be induced to submit to that persevering labour which is the only road to excellence, unless by some powerful motive. In almost every other employment the great stimulus to exertion is the hope held out to men of obtaining by it advancement in the career which they have chosen."

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Proposed system of promotion of officers in the junior ranks, partly by seniority and partly by selection.

4681. (*Chairman.*) What is that paper from which you have read?—The Report of the Commissioners in 1854; and taking that as the basis of promotion, I would propose the following means of selection:—First of all, I would suggest that there should be one more examination before a young officer obtains his company or troop, and only one.

An examination for the rank of captain.

4682. He would go from the college without any examination?—He would pass the college examinations.

4683. Which would be a professional examination, and then he would enter the army; he would have no further examination till he became a captain?—I would only have one other examination, which should be exclusively professional on the theory and practice of his profession. It should be a fixed test examination for the rank of captain, and not a competitive examination. In the same way a midshipman passes in seamanship before he is eligible for promotion.

4684. Then you would raise to the rank of captains, men by seniority?—To a certain extent by seniority.

4685. As long as they could pass?—Yes; but they would be liable to be postponed in favour of others more deserving. Then with regard to the proportion for selection, I think that two-thirds should be promoted by seniority, and one-third by selection up to the rank of captain; and in order to attain the very important object of securing satisfactory and safe grounds for making this selection, I would propose the following means, looking upon them merely in the light of grounds of selection:—First, there should be one more examination in the theory and practice of the military profession, and especially in everything that relates to the exercise, discipline, and internal economy of a regiment, before the young officers become eligible for their company or troop; but although it should not be a competitive, but a fixed standard examination, the young men should be encouraged to take up as many extra subjects as possible, and whatever they took up and succeeded in, over and above the fixed standard, should be counted to their credit. In other words, the young men should be encouraged to go up for honours.

Mode of carrying out the system of selection.

4686. When they were examined as captains?—Yes.

4687. But they may be old men instead of young men?—I would allow them to pass this examination at any time of life.

4688. (*Mr. G. Carr Glyn.*) That examination would be competitive, would it not?—No, provided they passed the minimum standard, and were otherwise qualified for promotion, they would have a right to be promoted according to seniority within the proportion fixed.

4689. *Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.*) If he did not pass, then should he be passed over?—Yes, but the existing officers must not be dealt with penally. If a pure system of selection were to be applied to the army in its present state, it would be a harsh proceeding; but what I propose is that a modified system of selection should be applied to the army after it shall have been prepared by a system of instruction; for we find that exactly in proportion as we lift the standard, and equalize it, the necessity for the pure application of the principle of selection is diminished. I will give an instance of a public office, the Treasury; if the principle of selection had been applied 25 years ago, it would have acted very hardly, because there were then some men who had done well and exerted themselves, and a great many who had not, but a general improvement has since taken place. With regard to the French intendance, and the staff, I observe in all their books, that in the early stages, for some time after the young men have passed the examinations which gave them their position in those professional and scientific bodies, it is difficult to choose between them, for they have all passed superior examinations, they are very much alike, and it is only when they come to the higher and more important employments, when individual character is strongly brought out, that there is much occasion for selection. If all our young officers were educated together at military colleges, and were made to come up to a respectable standard, the harshness of the principle of selection would be entirely mitigated, and the actual application of it would be of a very different kind from what it would be now.

4690. (*Chairman.*) Suppose two young men enter the army, and suppose that one remains in England, having every opportunity to pursue his military studies, and that another is sent out as a lieutenant to a distant colony, where his time is taken up with the small details of regimental business, having no opportunity or facilities for study; would it be fair in that case to apply the same rule?—If the circumstances were as stated, no

Its application to the troops in the colonies. doubt

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doubt it would be unfair; but I conceive that nearly equal facilities can be afforded by proper books and proper instructors, and, above all, that a proper system of inspection may be established over the whole British army.

4691. How could there be, in a little island in the West Indies, the same opportunities for obtaining good instruction as in England or in London?—Of course, the opportunities cannot be entirely equalized, but I conceive that with the help of books, and such local instructors as might be provided in each command, the chances would be very fairly equalized. Of course the element of chance is not to be excluded from human affairs, but I beg to be allowed to state my whole plan. I conceive that with proper manuals and other books, and proper means of instruction provided in each command, which has been already contemplated by Mr. Sidney Herbert's plan, the means of instruction may be sufficiently equalized.

4692. (Lord Stanley.) Admitting that the means can be equalized, how would you deal with the case of a young officer who had been engaged in actual service in a distant colony, and thereby had been prevented from employing his time in the theoretical study of his profession, as in the Caffre War?—In every army system the claims of service have precedence; actual good service will always take precedence even of instruction, important as it is. An officer would gain more by taking the field against the Caffres than by studying at home; the test should be that a young man had made the most of his opportunities, whatever they might be; and if he remained in cantonments he would be expected to study and pass an examination.

4693. But that puts an end to any sort of competition?—I exclude the idea or competition in the ordinary sense of the word, that is, the officers being examined together in didactic and scholastic learning. I mean this, that all the elements of superior qualification should be counted to the credit of each young man; and among those should be the manner in which he passed his examination for his company.

4694. (Chairman.) By bringing in all those elements, one officer being abroad a long way from home, and another to be examined at home, would you not open a wide door to favouritism?—I think not. There is a fallacy in the stress which is laid upon favouritism. The argument supposes the continuance of all that class of motives, interest, patronage, favour, and so forth, and on that hypothesis a certain allowance is always made to persons in authority in the exercise of their patronage as it is called. Now, if the nation were deliberately to determine that that class of motives should be set aside, and that promotion in the army should depend upon qualification and merit, then the thing would be put on an entirely different basis. We know that our moral state in England is sufficiently advanced to allow of pure, disinterested, and just motives prevailing, and being fully acted upon, when it is given in charge to persons to follow this course; we have examples of it in our judges, superior and inferior; every magistrate who decides a case is an example of it. We have recently had a remarkable example, which comes very near to the case now before this Commission, in the Civil Service Commission, for, by the machinery established by the Order in Council of May 1854, the power of checking interest and favour has been introduced into the very heart of the administration on points on which personal feelings are most sensitive.

Favouritism might be excluded from it, as is now the case by the Civil Service Commission.

4695. Is the promotion in the civil service settled by the Civil Service Commissioners; I thought it was only on first entrance?—It is only at first entrance, but if perfect impartiality is obtained in the main point of the first entrance, it may also be obtained as to promotion. The first entrance is the part of a young man's career which is most exposed to indirect influences of this kind. After he has established claims of good service it is comparatively easy to protect him.

4696. How is a person promoted in the civil service at present?—He is promoted according to his merits.

4697. By whom?—By the head of the office.

4698. Do you mean that it is possible for the head of an office, looking at the various qualifications which make a good clerk, to select one over another, and not do what other people might consider a great injustice?—Yes, it is quite possible; although there has been no regulated mode of providing for the promotion and weighing comparative claims in the civil service, the improvement which has taken place of late years is such as satisfactorily to prove that the thing is quite practicable, and I would propose the establishment of a machinery in the army which would place it beyond all doubt whatever.

4699. How long has this been tried in the civil service?—Promotion by merit has been making continual progress in the civil service for a great many years. The establishment of checks over the exercise of patronage in making the first appointments dates from May 1854.

4700. You have had three years' experience of it, and you think the system so satisfactory that you would at once have sufficient confidence to apply it to the whole British army?—Yes, I should, provided means and appliances were established suited to the state of the army. The moment it was determined that an appointment to the civil service should not go by favour, but should be according to qualification, it was entrusted to persons acting in a judicial capacity to see to the execution of the principle, and the thing was done; when those gentlemen retire, and others succeed them, it will be equally done.

4701. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) Do you mean that a young man may enter the civil service by competitive examination, and that he may rise to be Secretary of the Treasury without being called upon to prove his qualifications?—Without any further examination, but there are other ample means of testing his qualifications.

4702. (Chairman.)

4702. (*Chairman.*) There would be nomination in the first instance, and competition afterwards?—Yes, but there is no further examination.

4703. (*Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.*) Is the examination for admission as to general education?—Entirely, except for the Foreign Office, where foreign languages are required.

4704. (*Mr. G. Carr Glyn.*) I presume that public opinion and the press have had more to do with this than any commission?—No question of it. We are improving as a community, and have made great progress of late years in the art of self-government.

4705. (*Chairman.*) But in the army we should not have public opinion brought to bear. Suppose a young officer in India; who would know anything about him? how would you settle that promotion?—There is a very influential public opinion within the army on army matters; and when qualification and good service have been established as the rule of promotion, the army will expect it to be acted up to. I assume that, as the army is to be revised on professional principles, after a young officer has served with his regiment a reasonable time, say two years, he will become eligible to be a candidate for the staff school at Aldershot or elsewhere, which will, of course, be entirely competitive. There would be a separate line of promotion for the staff; and after he had passed the staff school he would be posted to the staff according to the general result of the manner in which he had acquitted himself in the staff school; and he should then give another year to each of those arms of the service to which he had not belonged, so that an artillery officer would be put through a cavalry and an infantry regiment, and a cavalry officer *vice versa*, and so on. The staff being the great prize of the army, a much larger number of young men would compete for the staff than could be appointed to it.

4706. Going into the staff, would a young man leave his regiment?—Yes.

4707. The staff is to be a separate corps altogether?—Yes, with its own grades of officers, a corps of officers without men.

4708. He would no longer be connected with any regiment?—Except by going through a further apprenticeship in the other arms of the service. In its bearing on promotion it would be thus, that more young men would compete for the staff than could be appointed to it, and many of those who did not obtain the first places would yet pass excellent examinations; and I would carry to the credit of those young men the manner in which they had acquitted themselves in those examinations, and that would be a second means of selection. A third means, which goes more direct to the point than any, would be the combination of the superintendence of the commanding officers of regiments with the system of inspection by general officers. On the occasion of each half-yearly inspection, the officer commanding the regiment should submit a distinct and explicit statement of the qualifications of his officers under given heads, and the general officer should take any means he thought proper to test them, by questioning them, or by making them put their company, or the regiment, through its manœuvres, or by examining into the state of their companies; for I understand that it is quite practicable for a general officer who has risen through all the subordinate grades, and has acquired practical experience in the command of a regiment, not only to judge of the comparative management of different regiments, but also to test the comparative merits of officers in managing their different companies, by the defaulters' book, soldiers' accounts, and so on. I would extend the system of inspection to the whole British empire, for we can now avail ourselves of our greatly improved means of steam communication; there is no part of the empire so distant that the military force stationed in it may not be regularly inspected, and the inspecting general officers should meet occasionally, either once a year or once in 15 months, and compare the results of their observations; and I would have a regulated process at head-quarters, under which the results of these different investigations should be recorded. I may mention, in order to show that I do not speak entirely without personal experience, that for many years I had the management of the commissariat. The first step I took upon taking charge, when I was quite new to the department, was to write to all the officers and clerks, about 150 or more, to desire that they would furnish me with a statement of their services, a sort of summary of their history. I entered these statements in a book under their respective names, and added to it, from time to time, all the good and bad results which came out in the official correspondence in reference to them; for some years that book was of the greatest use to me; but at last I acquired such familiarity with the characters, qualifications, and claims of the different officers, that I rarely had to look at it; and I am confident that if a proper system of examination and inspection, and of recording the results at head-quarters, were established, what I did on a small scale might be done on a large scale, and probably in a much more effectual manner.

4709. The success in the commissariat you considered would justify the application of the same principle to the army?—Yes, judging of it by the qualifications of the officers. As the Crimean war went on, though there was great confusion, owing to the want of a proper organisation of the different army departments, one general officer after another bore testimony to the individual efficiency of the commissariat officers, showing that whatever the defects might be, it was not in the character of the officers.

4710. Do you think that the head of the commissariat was very satisfactory in the Crimea?—We selected the best man we had available at home in that rank.

4711. When you get above the rank of captain, would you make any difference then?—Yes.

4712. What would the system be then?—Everybody admits that it is desirable to have our best men in the command of regiments; and few people deny that the best men are known, at least in their regiments. Every man's gauge is taken there by his personal merits; and the real difficulty consists in this, that officers who daily meet in social intercourse do

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staff by competition.

The merits of regi-
mental officers might
be tested by the
generals when inspect-
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not like being openly superseded, and therefore I would have the purely regimental promotion stop with the rank of captain; and the promotion from captain to major and from major to lieutenant-colonel should go through the entire branch of the army, as in the Indian, and I believe in all the continental armies. Under any circumstances there would be an advantage in an officer commencing his career as field officer, apart from those with whom he had associated on a footing of equality as captains.

4713. Then it would begin before it does in the Indian service, for I understand that there a man is posted to the command of a regiment by selection; and if he were to rise to major by seniority you would select for majors, in the first instance, from all the captains in the service, and select from all the majors in the service for lieutenant-colonels?—I would follow the Indian system by placing the several ranks of field officers in army, not regimental lines of promotion, but would improve upon it by introducing the principle of selection in promoting to those ranks; when a captain was promoted to be major he would leave his regiment, and be posted to any other where there happened to be a vacancy.

4714. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) You do not mean that you would propose that they should be all selected from the rank of captain, but only that a proportion would be by selection?—When a proper system has been established, and when the plan has been worked up to that point (it will take years to work it up to the higher ranks), I think that the promotion to the rank of major may very safely be left to be by selection only. I mean that the characters of the officers will be so fully known by the time they arrive at the higher ranks, and such a satisfactory machinery will be established of inspecting officers and at headquarters, that you might safely say that it shall be entirely according to qualification; and the practical result will be, that they will all be so well qualified that the seniors will generally go up, but that every now and then a more than usually deserving man will be taken out of his turn. The inspecting officers will see that every officer has a sufficient knowledge of the duties, not only of his own rank, but also of the rank immediately above his own—that a captain can put a regiment, and a field officer a brigade, through its movements, for instance, and that he also possesses business habits and other qualifications besides knowledge of exercise and drill.

4715. As you would select among the senior captains for majors; suppose a regiment had the misfortune of having in the senior captain a man who was not considered fit to be promoted, the whole of the promotion in that regiment would be stopped?—No, those next to him would go over his head.

4716. You would not take the senior captains only, but all?—I would have a mixed system of promotion, by seniority and selection. I should not be afraid of having it all by selection from the rank of captain upwards.

4717. I supposed you to select from all the senior captains in that branch of the service. I then took a regiment and supposed that the senior captain was not so fit as others to have his promotion, and I asked you whether the consequence would not be that all the regiment would suffer for it?—All the captains in the army would be eligible to be promoted to be majors after a fixed period of service as captains; but if a man was unfit to be promoted to be a major, he would remain with his regiment till, under the operation of a rule which I will submit to the Commission, namely, the rule of retirement, he was placed on the non-effective list.

4718. Your selection must go through all the captains?—Yes; with regard to those three ranks, ensign, lieutenant, and captain, it would be regimental promotion. Then I would give increased consolidation and efficiency to the regimental system, by putting an end to the practice of exchanging to and from half-pay, and from regiment to regiment; for the period of purely regimental service will be so much shortened by making the ranks of major and lieutenant-colonel general or army ranks, that we may safely say that there shall be no exchange, and that each regiment shall be a practical military school, in which the young officers shall be brought up together as comrades, and learn their profession together, looking to the staff, and to the administrative corps, and to the higher promotion.

4719. (Sir Harry D. Jones.) How long do you think it would take a man to rise to the top of the captains by seniority?—The system would be so mixed that it is difficult to say; in the first place, a great number would be taken off by the staff, and by the body of administrative officers proposed to be formed on the principle of the "Intendance" of the continental armies.

4720. (Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.) The promotion from ensign to lieutenant, and lieutenant to captain, is to be regimental?—Yes.

and partly by seniority,
and partly by selection.

4721. And by seniority?—Partly seniority and partly selection.

4722. How are you to prevent in those ranks indirect purchase? Suppose the captain thought that he was not likely to be employed, and suppose he said, I will go out of your way if you will find me a purse; how could you prevent that?—The infusion of the principle of selection would act as a preservative against that practice. Where there is a liability to selection, bargains to buy officers out cannot be depended upon.

4723. If a senior lieutenant were generally admitted to be a qualified man to get a company, and the senior captain is not likely to get his majority; he says, I will go, if you will make up a purse of money, and they all agree and say, Let us have the promotion, by all means?—That would be a limited adoption of the Indian principle, which requires for its proper carrying out the plan of seniority; the lieutenant would have to undergo the usual examination, and there would be a considerable liability of another officer being selected. But, if it should be determined to abolish purchase, and to give to military officers a liberal compensation for any loss to which they may be subjected in consequence,
any

Promotion from the
rank of captain up-
wards to be by
selection throughout
the army.

Promotion up to the
rank of captain to be
regimental,—

any attempt to revive the practice should be made a punishable offence, as it is in other branches of the service.

4724. (*Chairman.*) By your plan there are to be no exchanges in any part of the service?—I would have none. I would equalize army service.

4725. For instance, take the marines, how would your system increase promotion in the marines?—In the marines there would be no large staff or administrative corps; the promotion to both these corps would be from the army, and that would make a great deal of promotion. In the next place, a considerable number of young men would voluntarily resign; as they had paid nothing for their commissions, they would take nothing from their comrades on quitting the army.

4726. Take the marines. I understand that exchanges are allowed at present. Supposing that a man is married, and that he does not like to go on board ship, he would stay with his regiment, and another man who was not married, and who would sooner go on board ship, would be permitted to exchange. Now, supposing that system of exchange was stopped, I understand that your system as applied to the army will make promotion so rapid, that there will be no suffering from this system?—My meaning was, that the regimental career would be so much shortened by striking off the two higher ranks from the regimental promotion, that we might fairly say, that as long as an officer belongs to a regiment, he must submit to all the conditions of service which his regiment undergoes. It is very desirable that officers should have the full experience of their regiments, so that when their regiments go abroad they should not remain at home. It is very desirable for the efficiency of the army that all officers should have their turn of experience, home, foreign, and tropical; it will improve our officers very much; and besides that, it would put an entire stop to a prevailing abuse, for exchange is so closely connected with purchase that it would be difficult to have one without the other.

4727. You think it must be a necessary part of the system to stop all exchanges?—Yes, as a general proposition; if they are in any case allowed, it must not be for the benefit of the officers, but distinctly for the public benefit, under very strict regulations on the part of the superior authorities. The only other suggestion I have to make is, that it would be desirable to take this opportunity of putting the important rank of colonel on a proper footing.

4728. Would you select the lieutenant-colonel; or how is that to be done; by the reports of the general officers?—As we went higher, the promotion would be more entirely by selection. One of the most important posts in the army is the command of a regiment, and the qualities which qualify for the command of a regiment are of so marked a kind, that there would be no difficulty on the part of the inspecting general officers, and the Commander-in-Chief, in selecting proper persons for the command of regiments.

4729. I understand that you would make an alteration with regard to the colonel?—As an extensive revision of the system must be made, it seems desirable to take this opportunity of restoring the rank of colonel to its proper authority and efficiency. At present it exists in two separate forms; first of all there is the brevet rank of colonel, which does not carry pay, but renders an officer eligible for command and promotion; there is also the rank of regimental colonel, which is merely a means of rewarding deserving senior officers. I would provide for that otherwise. I would have an effective list of general officers; there are about 40 now employed, and I would have, say 60 general officers on the effective list. I would keep those 60 general officers in as constant employment as possible, so as to increase their experience and keep their active qualities in exercise.

4730. You would reward them by calling them colonels of regiments?—No.

4731. Would you have a real colonel to a regiment besides the lieutenant-colonel?—Yes; according to the present constitution of the British army, the regimental colonel is a very anomalous officer. He first goes up the ladder to become a general, and then descends a step to become a colonel in order to get the pay. Since the clothing of the army has been resumed by the Government, and the colonels have been remunerated by a fixed rate of pay voted on the army estimate, the last substantial link which connected officers of this rank with their regiments has been broken. I would therefore give the rank of colonel to the present lieutenant-colonels, and the rank of lieutenant-colonel to the present majors, and would suppress the rank of major, and so would assimilate the Line to the Guards, the Artillery, the Engineers, and the Marines. The same operation was formerly performed in the Artillery. In 1827, the majors of that corps received the rank, though not the pay, of lieutenant-colonels. I would have for field officers colonels and lieutenant-colonels. It was proposed after the great war to suppress the rank of major, and one major in each cavalry regiment was reduced, but the Duke of Wellington maintained that it was necessary to keep two majors in the infantry, that one might command the regimental dépôt. We have now 24 dépôt battalions, but instead of appointing 24 regimental majors to command them, we have created 24 unattached lieutenant-colonels to command them, and 24 unattached majors to be second in command. One of the incidental advantages of this plan would be, that we should save the pay and allowances of the 24 majors. Another incidental advantage would be, that without entirely doing away with the distinction between the Guards and the Line, it would very much diminish it, and bring them nearer to a level. Without depressing the Guards it would elevate the Line a step. The continued existence of a rank without specified duties is full of embarrassment. It is very desirable that those officers who have proved their superior fitness for command in the important post of the command of a regiment should be promoted as speedily as possible to be major-generals, but this cannot be while a large and indefinite number of brevet-colonels is interposed between the officers actually in command of regiments and the major-generals.

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No exchanges to be permitted.

No difficulty in selecting officers for the command of regiments.

Proposal to abolish the rank of major.

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4732. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) With regard to exchange. Assuming that purchase is done away with, and the exchange of one officer with another, without being in actual service either at home or abroad, what public inconvenience would arise from that officer exchanging, it always being done with a certain loss of rank; we know that it is often done to obtain promotion by purchase in another regiment?—I am looking only to the public interests. I am endeavouring to submit a plan that will contain as many guarantees as possible for the public advantage, and I conceive it to be a great general object that our officers should have varied experience; our regiments are continually making the round of the different parts of the empire, and the officers should go with them; they should not have an opportunity of avoiding Colonial and Indian service, either as favoured officers or through wealth; instead of remaining at home the officers should go with their regiment when it goes abroad. That is the principal object. A secondary object is, that you cannot have exchange between regiments without opening a wide door to the money principle; if exchange were permitted, wealthy officers would, under the new, as under the old system, remain at home, while their poorer comrades would go abroad.

4733. Sir Harry D. Jones.) Are you not aware that it is a great boon to married men with large families to be able to effect an exchange and to remain at home?—No doubt it is; but in the management of bodies of men you must take general results; you must adopt those rules which, on the whole, promise the highest average of good, and then you must take the bad with the good. Besides, the boon referred to is generally available only for those who can afford to pay for it; and it is not desirable that the service should be framed upon a system to encourage officers to shirk the chances and duties they undertake to face.

4734. (Chairman.) Now will you favour the Commissioners with your view as to retirements?—The principle of retirements in the Indian army is based upon a mixed principle of length of service and rank. The French system is also based on a mixed principle of length of service and rank. An officer must have served a certain number of years in the rank in which he happens to be when he retires, to be qualified to retire on the pay of that rank; but there is a principle in the French system of retirements which I think ought to be avoided, which is, that there is a minimum and a maximum of retired allowance proportioned to length of service, the minimum being attained at 30 years, and it rises to 50 years, and the tendency is to induce officers to remain longer than they ought, in the hope of getting a better retirement. I consider this very objectionable, and it is unnecessary, because the rank which an officer has at any given time attained may fairly be presumed to represent his claims at that time; and if he is allowed to retire on the pay of that rank, his claims are sufficiently met. In our own service, so far as a regulated system has been introduced, it is based on length of service and rank; the regimental staff officers, paymasters, and quartermasters, have full discretion and power of retirement after 30 years' service, and for shorter periods, according to health.

4735. Would you make a regulation that every officer, before he was entitled to retirement, should have served 20 years?—No; I think the proper bases of retirement are rank, which represents acquired claims, and age, which represents efficiency. The French have also introduced into their service the principle of compulsory retirement according to certain ages; generals must retire at 65, major-generals at 62, colonels at 60, and so on; the application of this principle is indispensable for an effective system of retirement. You cannot otherwise disencumber the service of superannuated officers, or keep the stream of promotion reasonably current.

4736. Suppose the case of an officer in the army who has had no opportunities of promotion, and has remained many years a lieutenant; at what time may he retire and get the retired allowance?—I was going to submit that, besides introducing the compulsory principle of the French service, I would qualify it by the introduction of a voluntary principle, and I would work the two together. Those two principles have been proposed by the Civil Service Superannuation Commissioners; they have undergone great discussion, and there is a general accord of opinion that the circumstances of human nature are such, that there is an age at which, although a person may not have become inefficient, or his efficiency may not be seriously impaired, yet there is often a craving after rest, a desire to retire; and it is very desirable to meet that by fixing an age in reference to each rank at which officers should be permitted to retire. The ages which have occurred to me are as follows: major-generals should, I think, be expected to retire at the age of 65; they would still be available for service, and there have been distinguished instances in which great experience and ability have been brought to the aid of the public service after that age, and these qualities might still be made available; but as a general rule, officers of that rank should retire at 65, and at 60 they should have the power of retiring. Officers who have attained higher rank than that of major-general should be considered available for any further service that might be required of them, and should remain on the fixed establishments of their respective ranks until the close of their lives.

4737. Suppose a general officer to retire at 60, would he receive the same amount as if he stayed till he was 65?—Yes. Then I would suggest that a colonel must retire at 60, and may retire at 55; that a lieutenant-colonel must retire at 55, and may retire at 50; and that a captain or lieutenant must retire at 50, and may retire at 45. The effect of this would be to establish an absolute certainty that we should have in the army no officer of these ranks older than the maximum age applicable to each; but at the same time, at five years preceding those respective maximum ages, the officers of the several ranks would be permitted to retire. If their state of health, or the increase of their families, or the circumstance of their having other pursuits, induced them to wish to retire, they would have

have the power of doing so. Those officers who were attached to their profession, and desired to follow it to the end, would remain, and the rest would retire.

4738. (Mr. *G. Carr Glyn.*) That would give a full current of promotion?—Yes. This principle has been introduced in a very imperfect state by the retired full-pay. After 21 years' service, officers may retire on the full-pay of their ranks. We find that of the 60,000*l.* which has been appropriated for this full-pay retirement, only about 50,000*l.* has been taken, which I attribute partly to the absence of any compulsory clause; of course officers wish to take all the chances, and as long as they can remain with their regiments on full-pay, or go on half-pay with the prospect of promotion, they prefer to do it. That is one cause; but another, and perhaps the cause which chiefly operates, is this, that owing to the strangely confused and disjointed state into which the half-pay list has fallen, the War Office, in order to protect the interests of the public, has established a rule that no officer is to retire on full-pay without another officer being brought from half-pay to take his place in his regiment; so that, although the officer who retires may gain something, those who remain in the regiment gain nothing, or are even damaged by it; whereas, according to the plan I suggest, every retirement would give an actual promotion in the regiment. As exchange to and from half-pay would be abolished, and no officers would be placed on half-pay except on reduction, or loss of health, or wounds, we might safely allow the vacancies caused by the retirement of officers to be filled by promotion in the regiment, without bringing an officer from half-pay; indeed, we should not long be able to do it, for after working the half-pay list for some years on this principle, there would be no effective officers to bring back from half-pay.

4739. (Sir *De Lacy Evans.*) Have you any means of making a calculation as to the extent of the financial loss which the State will bear by having so large a retirement as this compulsory system would require?—I have not been able to make any exact calculation, but I am confident, from the bearings of the subject, that the whole expense, both of the retirements and of the compensation to officers for losses in consequence of the abolition of purchase, will be by no means serious. It must not be supposed that every officer will retire in this way; this is merely a weir to catch the overflowing of the waters; the current of promotion in the meantime is going on along the channel of the river, and retirements before the regulated ages, and casualties, and promotions to the list of general officers, besides the staff and the administrative corps, will be continually keeping the current of promotion going. The full-pay retirements at the regulated ages will be confined to the officers who become superannuated in the different ranks.

Other sources of promotion besides the regulated retirements.

4740. (Sir *Harry D. Jones.*) That will be your only current of promotion; you would not have any brevets, as you have now?—No, nor unattached rank; I would merely promote to actual vacancies.

4741. (Sir *H. J. W. Bentinck.*) Do you think that that system would keep the current of promotion going as rapidly as the present system of promotion does, under which officers retire, and get the price of their commission?—I think so; I would have no limit to the number of general officers who retire after 65 years of age; provided proper regulations were established in the different ranks, but especially provided no promotions were made except to vacancies, I think we might very properly leave the number of retired general officers unlimited. There would be only one exception to the rule of promoting only to vacancies, which would be in time of war; an officer, of whatever rank, for really distinguished service in the field, must be promoted then and there, and officers so promoted should be made supernumeraries of their respective ranks. It must, however, be remembered that the principle of giving promotion to higher rank, as a reward for service in the field, when there is no occasion for the services of the promoted officer in that rank, is a dangerous one. It is certain, at a later period, either to cause an outcry against undue expense, or to be compensated by barring the promotion of other deserving officers. On the whole, it would be a material improvement to adhere strictly to the principle of looking only to the actual requirements of the public service. Where there is much danger, there will, of course, be vacancies in nearly equal proportion. Otherwise there may be no limit to the number of supernumeraries.

4742. (Chairman.) With regard to the general officers, when they retire, what is the amount on which you propose they should retire?—I have not entered into those details, knowing that it is quite practicable to arrange a rate suited to each rank.

4743. Do you think that there would not be the same charge for general officers as there is now?—I think not.

4744. You appear to have convinced your own mind upon that point, but I should be very glad if you would put the Commissioners in the way of forming an opinion upon it; they are very anxious to have your opinion upon the financial part of the question?—When the existing rewards are put together, they are extremely liberal. The unattached pay of general officers of the guards and line is 49,000*l.*, and the pay of colonels of regiments 124,500*l.* The rewards for military services are also chiefly for general officers; and after all this, the claims of superannuated officers for employment as general officers are often urged on the ground that they have sacrificed so much money in purchasing their commissions.

4745. Do you think that you could give to general officers through the whole British army a smaller amount of retirement than is represented by those two sums of 124,000*l.* and 49,000*l.*?—Yes, I conceive so: including good-service pensions, it is about 200,000*l.*

4746. Do you think that 200,000*l.* would be too much to allow for the retirement of general officers?—I have not made a strict calculation; but I believe, when proper regulations have been established throughout the service, so that every rank will be limited to its

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Intended calculation
of probable cost of
proposed system of
retirements.

effective numbers, and the promotions will be tested and sifted, that by the time the percolation has been completed up to the rank of general officers, less than 200,000*l.* will furnish liberal rewards.

4747. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) Until you fix in your own mind a scale of retirement for those general officers, how can you form any calculation at all?—The plan I have suggested is so strictly adjusted to the necessities of the service, and is so capable of exact regulation, that it may be fairly considered to represent the minimum amount which the State will have to pay for the efficient service of its military officers; and when we have once satisfied ourselves that we have a system which, properly worked, will give us the minimum cost of the army, it will be a secondary consideration whether it will cost something more or less: we shall know that we have the cheapest army that we can have consistently with the primary object of having an efficient army, which is all we can desire.

4748. But it is very important that the Commissioners should know the annual amount that it would be necessary to raise?—I have no doubt that, with the help of actuaries and military accountants, I might arrive at a satisfactory approximation; but I have not had time for both; all I have been able to do has been to put together all my previous experience, and think out the whole subject, and form a general plan.

4749. Is it possible to go into an economical view of the question without having these data before us?—No, not as to actual amounts.

4750. (Sir D. Lacy Evans.) You promised to send in to the Commissioners a written statement about that?—Yes; Lord Panmure has been so kind as to place at my disposal Mr. Marshall, the head of the estimate department of the War Office; and with his assistance and Mr. Melvill's, I am having a statement made out of the number of effective and non-effective officers in the household brigade and the line, the artillery and engineers, and the Indian army, at three different periods, one being the year 1840, one the present year, and one intermediate before the last war; and separate statements of the expense, under all the different heads of pay and allowances, for each of the above-mentioned bodies of officers and periods: and until we have them we cannot proceed.

4751. (Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.) If your stream of promotion should be more rapid than it is now, you could not limit the number of general officers, as is now done; you must go on as long as there are any to be promoted?—They would be limited by fixed establishments and by proper regulations; there would be a fixed establishment for each of the subordinate ranks of captain, lieutenant-colonel, and colonel, with suitable rates of full pay retirement for each. Then there would be a fixed establishment of active general officers. If all these fixed establishments are properly adhered to, the number of general officers who will retire at 65 on the pay of their rank will not be formidable.

4752. (Chairman.) With regard to the general officers, as far as I can discover from your evidence, the Commissioners at present have no data before them, on which to form a safe opinion as to the cost of the scheme?—The Commissioners have before them data upon which they can form a safe opinion as to what will enable us to arrive at a maximum of efficiency with a minimum of expenditure; but to reduce those data to pounds, shillings, and pence, cannot be done until we can compare the details of the proposed plan with the whole of the past expenditure.

4753. In all the statements you have made as to the cost of the present system to the country, you have looked rather to the inefficiency of the present system than to its actual money cost?—My primary object in making these statements has been to show that purchase is an evil root which has produced a morbid and excessive growth of expenditure under various heads, and that it would be more economical to abolish purchase, and to begin again and establish a new scale of pay and allowances. My financial argument is confined to that. I believe, also, that purchase is not conducive to the efficiency of the army.

4754. Under your system of retirement of colonels, are they to retire at their full pay?—Yes.

4755. Are the captains equally to retire on their full pay?—Yes.

4756. And is a lieutenant to receive a pension according to his age, or merely according to his rank?—A lieutenant who does not qualify himself to be promoted to be a captain ought to leave the service.

4757. May there not have been a want of promotion in a regiment; may there not have been a great stagnation in the regiment?—The state of things must be bad, indeed, when it would be impossible to promote deserving lieutenants previously to the age of 50; it would be almost incredible; some men might attain that age, or near that age, because they were not able to pass the examination, or were not fit to be promoted to a company, and they ought to be told that they had better leave the army.

4758. With regard to lieutenants, would your compulsory system begin sooner?—I think it would be sufficient to lay down as a rule that anybody of the rank of, or below the rank of captain, who had reached the age of 50 without having obtained promotion, must retire. We should have the security of the competitive selection, as before described, and of the training at the military college; this is a very important substantive part of the system; it will furnish a probation; it will establish a standard; and it is as much a part of the system as the rank of ensign or lieutenant.

4759. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) Is this college to be entirely self-supported?—Yes, on this principle, that there is an abundant class of persons in England who can afford to give their sons a first-rate education.

4760. And so far money is to have its weight?—Yes.

4761. (Chairman.) Have you made any calculation as to the whole amount that would cover

cover the dead weight of the army under your system?—I have not had time to make any detailed calculations.

4762. You cannot give any approximation to it?—There is a financial calculation connected with the subject, which has been looked upon with great dismay; but I think it will not be attended with much difficulty; which is, the compensation to officers for their losses owing to the abolition of the purchase system. The ordinary way of making the calculation is, to take the existing value of their commissions, that is to say, all that anybody has paid for his commissions, and all they would be entitled to, supposing them to leave the army.

4763. You mean, all they would be entitled to under the regulations of the service?—Yes; or all that they have paid.

4764. They are two different things?—Yes.

4765. Suppose a calculation is made strictly upon what they are entitled to, according to the regulations of the service, would you withhold that?—I would go further; according to the letter of the military regulations, officers are entitled to the regulation price, but according to the equity of the case, I think they are also entitled to any sum which they may prudently have invested according to the custom of the service. The only exceptions that I would make to the grant of compensation, would be in cases of fancy prices, where an officer has paid much more than his brother officers to indulge his private tastes; I would not admit that.

4766. You would allow what had been nominally paid for the lieutenant-colonelcy of a regiment?—Yes.

4767. But not the excessive amount that might have been paid in some cases?—No. The practical operation would be this: an account would be taken at a given date of the whole amount every officer was entitled to, under the purchase system, at that date—that is, if they all retired, and the army was disbanded at that date. People ordinarily take the cost to the country at that gross sum; but they forget that there is no intention of disbanding the army. The practical working of the arrangement would be this:—Take the case of a single regiment, a cavalry regiment, for instance; No. 1 is an officer who, we will say, would be the eldest son of a gentleman of fortune, a landed proprietor, who had entered the army merely to spend a few years agreeably. No. 2 would be the son of a rich manufacturer, who had no occasion to work for his bread. No. 3 would be a good officer, who would gladly follow the army as a profession, but he is married, and has an increasing family, and it is necessary for him to realise the price of his commissions to provide for his family, and he cannot go on foreign service. No. 4 would represent the body of the officers of the army, those who had not much money, and those who had none, and who were anxious to go through with it, and follow the army as a profession; and in every regiment they would calculate in this way. No. 1 intends to go, No. 2 never intended to stay, No. 3 must go, and No. 4 says, I will stay, and I shall step into their places.

4768. Financially, how would you deal with those people?—No. 4, who would stay, would be the case of the great majority, and I would give Nos. 1, 2, and 3 all they were entitled to, and let them go. It would be a self-adjusting process, because the inducement to some to stay would be in proportion to the inclination to go in others.

4769. You would pay those not only what they were legally entitled to under the regulation, but that which they were entitled to under the custom of the regiment?—Yes, I would, and No. 4 would cast in his lot finally with the army, and give up what he had paid, and take in exchange for his existing prospects the prospects of the army under the new arrangement.

4770. What would you pay him for giving up, suppose No. 4 to be a purchasing officer, and to be looking forward to purchase higher steps; how would you deal with him then?—He would come under the new system of promotion as I have described it; if he was a captain, he would be promoted to be lieutenant-colonel according to his claims and qualifications.

4771. He would have to be examined?—He would be reported upon by his commanding officer and the inspecting general officer, and would be invited and encouraged to go up for examination; but the new system must not be introduced at one fell swoop.

4772. How do you propose to deal with the army; would you say that the system should come into operation six years hence or ten years hence; but when it did come into operation, how would you deal with the officers?—The working of the new system would be in the best possible hands; that is, in the hands of selected military officers of high character, who enjoy the confidence of the army; and they would temper the application of the new system to the existing body of officers. It would chiefly be brought into operation through the top and the bottom. The senior officers would be selected to be lieutenant-colonels and colonels, according to qualification, and underneath would be a new growth from the military college, not only in their place, but in the place of the officers who retired.

4773. But in the case of an officer who wished to purchase, and who, under your system, could not purchase, you must be prepared to give him at once the sums for his commissions which he is entitled to under the custom of the service?—Yes, to those who retire.

4774. Every one who says, I am not willing to be passed over. I am ready to purchase, and I am not ready to be passed over under the new system. I entered the army on different conditions; you have changed them?—Yes, we should say in substance to the officers, You have entered the army on certain terms of service, and those terms would not have been lightly departed from; but the public good renders it necessary that the terms of service should be revised; these are the new terms, and if you choose to remain, you will take

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take your chance of promotion according to the new system; but if you choose to go, we will give you full compensation, by giving you what you are entitled to under the purchase system at the present time.

4775. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) What do you consider the equivalent would be to No. 4, under the new terms of service; you retain a good man, but you say you give him an equivalent in the new terms of service. What are the new terms of service?—Promotion without purchase, with the addition of the vacancies which would be created by the retirements, besides increased rates of pay, and full-pay retirement at those increased rates. Even now, under certain circumstances, officers have to sacrifice the price of their commissions, for instance, when they are promoted to be major-general; and I would propose to apply that principle to all the officers of the army who elect to remain.

4776. Would you not then be imposing a very great hardship upon them?—It would be a revision of the terms of service; it would be a new investment, so to speak, which they might accept or reject as they thought proper.

4777. Can you make a new arrangement with a man who has entered the service under a different system?—Otherwise the army must always remain as it is.

4778. No; you can repay them all their money?—I do not see why those who remain should receive back what they had paid for their commissions; but I see that my plan might be said to be attended with this hardship. An officer might say to the Government, You have revised my terms of service. You have said to me, If you choose to remain, you must remain according to the new terms, but you may go and receive the full amount you are entitled to under the purchase system; so far so good; but under the old system I not only had the power of retiring, but I had also the power of remaining, and taking my own time for retirement. I cannot say at this present time whether it would be convenient to me to retire or not, but if I do not retire I lose my money; it is hard to force me to make a sudden decision—I think that even that may be met. I believe that if we opened an account with every officer in the army, crediting him with the amount to which he was entitled at a given date under the purchase system, we might be very indulgent as to the time of retirement. I am not sure that we might not leave officers to choose their own time for retiring; there might even be a public convenience in preventing the retirement of a large number of officers at the same time; but this is going far into the details of the question, and I cannot commit myself to an opinion. I will confine myself to saying that, even in the case supposed, the grievance might be remedied; and that, judging from all the consideration I have been able to give to the subject, it would be by no means the formidable operation that is generally expected. People constantly suppose that a very large sum will have to be paid, but what will be paid will be the minor, and not the major, quantity. The major number of officers will remain; and if it was found that it was not inconsistent with other important public objects, and would not lead to abuse, they might remain with those sums to their credit, and retire when they liked with those sums. Of course, after the date at which the general account was taken, all promotion which took place would be under the new system.

4779. (Sir Harry D. Jones.) There would be no promotion from the ranks under your system?—That is a separate question. I assume that the larger proportion of our officers will come through the military college, and represent the principle of theoretical and practical instruction, and that a certain regulated number will come from the ranks.

4780. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) You stated that you had heard some formidable figures mentioned; what amount have you heard estimated?—£. 7,000,000 £ for the regulated amount alone.

4781. (Chairman.) If the whole of the officers were to insist upon their money, that is the amount they must receive according to the regulated amount?—Yes.

4782. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) If they would not re-enlist?—Certainly; and I may add that this is a very favourable time for the operation. The purchase system is so thoroughly unsound, so rotten at core, that both peace and war destroy it. I mean that if it were left to its natural operation, it must die a natural death, either in a state of peace or a state of war. I have shown how the regiments which have not been engaged in the late war have stagnated.

4783. (Chairman.) It occurred in the artillery some time ago that there was great stagnation, and the Duke of Wellington allowed certain officers to sell out to increase the promotion; therefore, there the system of sale was worked out, not as the vice of the system, but as an advantage to the public service, to let officers sell out?—It was done there to relieve the seniors; but pure seniority is a bad principle, and you cannot compare two army corps without bringing all their circumstances into parallel. We must recollect that promotion in the artillery has not hitherto been quickened by a participation in the advantages of the general staff, and that it is not the same attractive service as the cavalry, the guards, and the rifles, and most of the line regiments, into which young men constantly enter for a limited service of a few years as officers.

4784. You yourself compared the artillery with the line, but your comparison does not appear to be quite just, because, in answer to Question 4465, you gave the effective and non-effective officers of the army, the guards, and the line, and then the artillery and engineers; for what date was that?—It was from the present estimates.

4785. You have taken the line after a considerable reduction, have you not?—The reduction has not been considerable as regards the officers.

4786. With regard to the artillery, has there been any reduction?—No.

4787. Would it not have been fairer, if you took the two services, to have taken them

at

Sale of commissions in
the Artillery to quicken
promotion.

at a time when they could have been more consistently compared?—I took what came readiest to hand. Only 33 lieutenant-colonels and 207 captains, at a total present cost of 33,726 l. a year, have, however, been reduced to half-pay in consequence of the peace, while the whole of the subalterns (536 in all) have, with the consent of the Treasury, been retained on the effective list as supernumeraries, whereby the charge for the pay of officers supernumerary to the establishments of regiments has been increased to 47,630 l., besides the cost of their allowances; on the other hand, the large augmentations in the artillery of late years have undoubtedly increased the proportion of effective officers in that force.

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4788. When I compared the artillery with the line, you said that the comparison was not to be made; but when you compared them, you took advantage of their present position, and you did not suggest that the artillery and the line could not be fairly compared?—I did not intend to take any unfair advantage; I took the present estimates because they came nearest to hand, and because they gave the most comprehensive view of every branch of the military service. The non-effective services of the guards and line are 30½, and of the artillery and engineers only 25½, per cent. of the effective services of these respective corps, which is a considerable difference; but I have now arranged for having a comparison made, not only of the number of officers, but of their cost for three different periods: one the present period, another the year immediately preceding the late war, and the other the year 1840. As the purchase system dies a natural death in time of peace, it dies a sort of violent death in time of war. In one case repletion, and in the other depletion, is the cause of its decease.

4789. How does it die a natural death in peace?—By stagnation. Even now the regiments which have not partaken of the war promotion are in a very stagnated state. I have instanced three regiments, especially the 76th, and a number of others are coming on to the same state; and this in spite of all the unattached promotion and other arrangements which have been made to supplement the system.

Under the purchase system promotion stagnates in peace time.

4790. Your opinion is directly at variance with that of the Duke of Wellington, who stated that during a time of peace the purchase system had kept the regiments effective; you think, on the contrary, that in a time of peace it tends to render all the regiments ineffective?—I conceive that the general result, not merely of the purchase system, but of the entire existing system, of which purchase forms the prevailing element, has been such as to produce a stagnation of promotion in time of peace; and if we had to do with war habitually, the purchase system would soon perish of itself. In the Crimean regiments it came nearly to a stand-still; for why should a captain lay out hundreds and hundreds for promotion when he may be shot the next hour, and when the casualties of warfare may give him promotion without any cost? There was also a difficulty in filling up the cornetcies in the Crimean cavalry regiments, owing to a sufficient number of young men not coming forward with the regulation price. The cost of commissions has been so driven down by the war, that we could not have a more favourable time for taking an account of their value. If we wait for a few years, the price of commissions will get up again.

In war time purchase is suspended.

4791. If during war the system of purchase naturally dies a violent death, then, at least during war, we are quit of the inconveniences of the system?—Yes; it has been suggested that the moment we take the field the purchase system should be suspended. When an army is brought into active operation, the true principles of army administration must be had recourse to, which are efficiency and merit.

Supply of officers on the breaking out of war.

4792. Suppose another war to break out, and there was a great demand for officers, how would your competitive system answer?—In the first place, instead of a two years' course, I would have only a one year's course, which would at once double the number of officers.

4793. Do you know how the system has worked in France?—They have separate examinations in time of war.

4794. Did they not alter the system?—Yes, to that extent; it has also happened, on more than one occasion, that the regular supply of civil and military servants from Haileybury and Addiscombe has not sufficed for the East India Company's service.

4795. Any system that you established during peace would be very apt to fail you when war arose, would it not?—The point to be aimed at is to establish such a system in time of peace that it may be worked with a minimum amount of alteration in time of war; and as in time of war qualification and efficiency must be the principle, I would establish qualification and efficiency as the principle also in time of peace. There is a very simple and easy mode of increasing the number of officers in war, which is, to follow the example of the East India Company in the management of their civil and military services. When the regular supply of young men through the East India colleges has not been sufficient, they have had examinations equal to, or nearly equal to, the examinations at Haileybury and Addiscombe, and have sent young men out without their having gone through a probation at these institutions.

4796. (Lieut.-General Wynyard.) You are aware that in time of peace the great evil that arises is stagnation of promotion; and therefore, at the breaking out of war, whether you promote by merit or not, you will have so old a class of officers that you will be in the same dilemma if you do away with purchase?—Our peace system should be so regulated as to establish a maximum of age for each rank, which would furnish a guarantee that there would be no colonels older than 60, lieutenant-colonels than 55, and captains and lieutenants than 50.

4797. Your maximum is high for war, is it not?—Yes; but we should see, at the breaking out of war, that many of the older officers would go into retirement. The indirect tendency

Effects of establishing minimum and maximum ages for retirement.

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tendency of a system of minimum and maximum retirements would be, that many officers, knowing that they might retire at certain ages, would work up to those points. Our English army is very different from the Indian army; not only is there a prestige which must always belong to the military profession, and attract young men into it at a cheaper rate than into other professions, but here our officers are generally stationed in their native country, and we shall continue to have in our army young men with all kinds of connexions, property, and prospects, and they will form their plans of life according to the new system. One will say, I should like to retire at 45 or 50; I might still have many years of life left; I have some private property and pursuits; and so on. That is the best principle, hope and inducement; but there would be also the compulsory principle. There would be another inferior sort of man, who could not look forward to promotion; and when he attained the age of 45 or 50, that is, five years short of his maximum, he would say, Well, I do not know whether I shall get my promotion; it is time for me to think of retiring; and in order to escape the discredit of being placed on the shelf, he would voluntarily retire, as he would get nothing by staying. This compulsory principle of retirement would give additional value to promotion, and would stimulate officers to exert themselves to achieve it.

4798. (Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.) You admit that purchase hitherto has rather accelerated promotion?—Yes.

4799. If you did away with the system of purchase, would not promotion be checked?—You would do away with one element of promotion.

4800. Then you leave it only to selection on seniority?—No, there would be more than that; there would be the staff and the administrative corps.

4801. What do you conceive will be the advantage of promotion in the army by the removal of officers to the staff?—The vacancies will be filled up by promotion in regiments.

4802. Would you limit the staff corps?—In time of peace I would limit it to a peace establishment, and increase it in time of war: so many colonels, so many lieutenant-colonels, so many captains, and so many lieutenants.

4803. What would you put the total number at?—I have not worked it out.

4804. (Sir De Lacy Evans.) I think there are 39 general officers who are now employed?—There would still be 39; I would have an active list of 60 general officers.

4805. You must calculate, that as there are so many general officers, there would be, on the average, four or five staff officers for each general officer. There are assistant quarter-masters, and assistant adjutant-generals, and there are two or three aides-de-camp?—The staff of the British army must always be larger in proportion than that of any other army; as our troops are scattered over the whole world, we must have a little army with staff and everything complete at each station. I must explain that the effect of purchase in accelerating promotion is much more apparent than real. Many circumstances connected with the army make it more attractive to young men than other professions, and while this is the case, a large number of young men, in this rich country, will enter the army who will not remain long in it. It is not purchase which now brings persons of this class into it, but other circumstances quite irrespective of purchase. They enter rather in spite of purchase, than because of it. Even when purchase does accelerate promotion, it acts in a partial and irregular manner, pushing forward some and keeping back others. If every officer in the army was for purchase, a congestion would take place equal to that which is ordinarily supposed to occur in the marines and artillery. There is, undoubtedly, one mode in which promotion is accelerated by purchase, but it is anything but conducive to the efficiency of the army, namely, that married officers, however zealous and efficient they may be, are often obliged to sell out in order to avoid risking, by the contingencies of foreign service, the fortunes of their families, which have been invested in their commissions.

Effect of purchase in accelerating promotion more apparent than real.

4806. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) Do you think that any partial alteration of the system of purchase would mitigate, or meet some of the evils that you have described in the higher classes of officers, lieutenant-colonels, majors, and captains?—I think it would be merely a temporary palliative, and besides being ineffectual, it would raise a separate class of evils of its own. Whether rightly or wrongly, I have come to the conclusion that the two principles of purchase and of professional qualification and good service are so different, and so constantly conflict and clash, that it would be far easier to change the system at once and altogether, than to let these two principles go on concurrently. At present, though there are many mitigations, and many excellent arrangements, yet the basis of our army system is purchase. There may be a question whether an officer ought to be promoted with more or less of qualification and efficiency; that is matter of opinion, but there is no question about the money. A man must have so much money to be promoted; so that it is really the truth that the basis upon which our army is now founded is money, and I conceive that to be so inconsistent with the principle of promotion according to qualification and good service, that I am persuaded it would be easier and cheaper, and better for all concerned, to make the substitution entire and complete; of course, in saying that, I do not mean that it should be done in an inconsiderate or abrupt manner; it must be thoroughly thought out, and worked out in a variety of ways, and a number of the best men in the country must agree upon the course to be pursued before anything is done.

Partial alteration of the system of purchase not advisable.

4807. (Mr. G. Carr Glyn.) The two great points in your plan would be, increase of pay in the junior ranks, and some certain increase in the amount of the retirement?—Yes.

4808. The two ends of the establishment would require a different compensation from that which they receive now?—With regard to an increase of pay in the junior ranks, if you expect to get young men of more advanced age and more complete education, and

on

on whose education larger sums have been laid out, you must enable them to live by their profession; up to the time of their entering the army I would throw the expense of their education entirely upon their parents; after that they ought to be able to live by their profession.

4809. That is no element in the calculation?—Yes, unquestionably it is, for it is exceedingly objectionable on public, and even on strictly financial grounds, that young officers should at the outset of life be so situated that they cannot help getting into debt; who can blame a young ensign for getting into debt on 5 s. 3 d. a day? Public opinion almost sanctions it; it is altogether inconsistent with a sound state of moral feeling.

4810. (*Chairman.*) How would you compensate the artillery for introducing to them a new system, when they have entered the service upon a system of seniority?—The artillery may be kept to the last, because they have no purchase, and they have a system of appointment according to professional qualification. Their standard at entrance is already very much raised; and although the system of seniority which prevails in the artillery is an evil, still it is not such a flagrant and crying evil as to require that we should at once apply ourselves to altering it. I would revise the arrangements relating to the household troops and the line first, and then, after the experience of a few years in the working of the new system amongst them, I would proceed to the artillery. But there is one great difficulty in the artillery; the line takes its tour of service in entire regiments, but the artillery goes in small detachments, and in order to produce an equality of foreign service you must have a large body to choose from, and that is the difficulty. The present lieutenant-colonels are all under 47; so in that portion of the regiment, the middle of it, the promotion is extremely satisfactory; but we have a large body of officers who have entered together of late years, and have before them the prospect of a dreadful stagnation. They cannot long be left much in arrear of the rest of the army. If the proposals I have submitted to the commission are adopted, the officers of the artillery and engineers will be eligible for the staff and administrative corps, in common with the rest of the army.

4811. (*Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.*) They would not like selection?—No, nobody likes it; the great majority prefer their ease, and hold by “the old gradation, where each second stood heir to the first.”

4812. (*Chairman.*) Would it be fair to put selection upon men who have entered upon the good faith of another system being carried out?—Not without conceding to them some equivalent advantages.

4813. You would have to consider the claims of the artillery, when you came to deal with them?—The practical genius of our nation leads to our doing at each time only what the circumstances of the time indispensably require; and the circumstances of the present time require that we should consider the purchase system in the guards and the line; the artillery, notwithstanding the evil of seniority and the bad prospect as to future promotion, is, on the whole, in such a satisfactory state that it may safely wait for a few years.

4814. How has that satisfactory state been attained; by the force of money which was advanced to five general officers' retirement in the artillery?—That has had something to do with it.

4815. (*Sir H. J. W. Bentinck.*) Do you think it is the general opinion throughout the army that your view is a correct one, with regard to the doing away with purchase at once?—Habit is a very powerful element.

4816. But I am talking of the opinion that prevails in the army, not of habit?—My experience in life teaches me that bodies of men are always in favour of the system under which they have been bred and trained; they naturally fall into routine. The force of habit in human nature is such, that whatever is the system under which we have been brought up, to that the great majority will adhere. I have also made this observation, that bodies of men are never reformed from within. I remember the time when the church and the law, the other two great professions, were by no means in the satisfactory state they now are. I remember the discussions that took place about their improvement. And it was not till pressure was brought to bear upon them from without, and until the laymen took up the cause, that they seriously set to work to reform themselves.

4817. (*Chairman.*) According to the scale that you have given in, comparing that with the period at which officers obtain their different ranks under the different systems, we find from the return, that an officer who does not purchase becomes on an average a captain in 13 years, or about the age of 31, and he would have to remain, unless promotion was slower under your system than under the present system, as captain without the possibility of retirement for 20 years, I suppose till 50?—He would have to remain in the rank of captain till he was 45 years of age, if he did not qualify himself for promotion.

4818. If he had no opportunity, with this limited amount of promotion, he would have to remain 20 years?—No officer who was fit to be promoted to be field officer would remain that time as captain; promotion would be going on; the regimental officers would be thinned by selections for the staff and the administrative corps; retirement and death would be going on among the general officers, and voluntary retirement in all ranks, both before and after the regulated ages; and there is another point to be considered in making a comparison of the old with the new system. Persons who are in favour of purchase often call attention to the very small proportion of death vacancies in the lower ranks; that is an indirect result of the purchase system; for when an officer gets seriously ill, he sells; the very fact of his getting into a bad state of health induces him to do it.

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No immediate urgency
for altering the system
of promotion in the
artillery,

though eventually it
will be necessary.

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4819. Does not the public gain by that, by getting efficient men promoted instead of retaining inefficient men?—Of course; if there were not some elements of circulation in the present system, it must collapse at once.

4820. Looking at the efficiency of the system, is it not a good argument, that a man feeling his health to be failing, or that he is unequal to the labours of the service, can take the first opportunity of retiring?—Yes; it is good in itself. I was merely adverting to it in a particular point of view, to show that death vacancies will be more frequent under the new system than the old.

4821. Under your system, supposing a captain to have served some ten years after attaining his captaincy, and not to be promoted, he would have to remain?—Yes, until he retired.

4822. Until he was 50?—He might retire at 45 if he liked, and he must retire at 50.

A half-pay list must
be retained.

4823. You would keep a man, perhaps from ill health or from being ill fitted for his duties without giving him the means of retiring?—The half-pay list must be retained to meet the casualties of the service; when an officer loses his health before he is entitled to full pay retirement, he must go on half-pay.

4824. There are 262,000*l.* for half-pay, must we not provide a large portion of that still?—No, only a small portion.

4825. How do you know that it will be only a small portion?—I judge from the analogy of the services where the half-pay list is worked according to its true intention. In the Indian and French services the half-pay list is very small; nobody in either of those services is put on half-pay who has not lost his health, and that is an effectual bar; people do not lose their health voluntarily; the transfer to half-pay must be under a certificate of a medical board.

4826. The French half-pay is very small. A captain only gets about 30*l.* or 40*l.* a year?—Yes; they have separate classes, *disponibilité*, which is officers who have been reduced, and *non-activité*, who are officers under temporary ill-health, and then a third class (*réforme*) who answer to our commuted officers. The whole number on half-pay is extremely small for an army which has upwards of 16,000 officers. In the Indian army out of 6,953 officers, only 404 are on half-pay.

Miscellaneous allow-
ances might be conso-
lidated;

4827. (Mr. G. Carr Glym.) I think, in your answer to question 4427, you gave a detail of figures, but you informed the Committee afterwards that you did not wish to give those figures as showing the full amount that would be diminished by the alteration of the system of purchase, but that they were subject to deductions, and the result would be probably very different?—Yes; the existing anomalous and exaggerated system of half-pay would be reduced to the real half-pay, that is, to the half-pay of the officers who would be placed upon it on reduction or loss of health. There is also a large class of miscellaneous allowances, which I formerly discussed with Sir George Cathcart, when he was employed on a committee on army expenditure at the Treasury: it would be a great advantage both to the officers and to the public that these allowances should be consolidated.*

which would save in
administration.

4828. (Chairman.) In recasting them you do not expect to make any serious diminution in the amounts, do you?—No; but we should save a great deal in administration.

4829. With regard to the lodging allowances and the colonial allowances, you must give them something of that kind if you send them to the colonies?—We cannot substantially reduce the emoluments of the army; but there are certain points on which the half-pay and other charges may be economised very considerably. The purchase system bears so heavily upon the circumstances of officers, that the prevailing feeling is, that we can never do too much for them; the practice of allowing them to retain pensions for wounds, for instance, not only with full-pay, but with liberal staff-pay, does not exist anywhere else, and ought not to be.

4830. If an officer is in no way rewarded for his services, surely you ought to do something for him?—Yes, at present it is all very well; but when, by the abolition of the purchase system, we get a *bonâ fide* and sufficient rate of pay, without any outlay for the purchase of commissions, we shall be entitled to revise those allowances. The retired full-pay, supplemented by the real half-pay, I mean half-pay according to the true view of the object of that allowance, will be a sufficient life insurance as far as the officer himself is concerned.

Pensions should be
given to the widows of
officers who died of
wounds or disease on
service; and this
should be extended to
non-commissioned
officers and privates.

4831. (Chairman.) Suppose an officer is going into battle—you dwelt upon an officer losing a large sum of money on going into battle. I will suppose an officer under your system going into battle dependent upon his pay; what prospect (as you have hinted at a considerable reduction in pensions and compensation) would that officer have. How would he be relieved from anxieties as to his family?—The pay of the officer should be sufficient, with frugality, to enable him, with the help of life insurance, to make some provision for his family; but it is of so much public importance that officers should go into the field free from all anxiety about their families, that I would retain pensions for the widows of officers who lose their lives from wounds, or from ill health contracted on actual service; and more than that, I would extend them to the widows of those non-commissioned officers and privates who have been permitted by their commanding officers to marry, and have lost their lives in the manner already described. Besides giving an additional advantage, it would improve the character of the army to grant pensions to the widows of non-commissioned officers and privates under such circumstances, and would be in every respect better than leaving them to be dealt with as objects of charity by patriotic funds and in other ways. One great and unnecessary occasion for life insurance would be done away with

* See Appendix, No. XXX. to Report of Commissioners, 1857.]

with by the abolition of purchase. With the permission of the Commissioners I will read an extract from a letter I have received from my brother with respect to Colonel Willoughby Moore: "I distinctly remember his having told me that he had in all 12,000 *l.* invested in his commissions, and that if he died the whole would be lost, as he could not afford to insure, from want of sufficient income, and that he would not sell his commission, as in his position as an officer consisted his pleasure and occupation." As another proof that the excess of expenditure in our army has its root in purchase, I refer to the extraordinary indulgencies, the pensions to widows in time of peace, and the allowing officers to receive pensions for wounds in addition to full-pay, staff-pay, and good service pension, which are conceded to officers who come under the operation of the purchase system, but not to the men.

Sir C. Trevelyan,
K. C. B.

18 June 1857.

4832. (*Chairman.*) How is it done in France; is it given to the man?—It is done by rates of retired pay, but they are so small there that it is not a fair comparison.

4833. I find that an officer in France has a retired allowance if he is wounded. It does not seem, therefore, to be a necessary part of a purchase system, or to have arisen in France in any way out of that system?—Every officer and soldier in France must live. I do not object to pensions for wounds, provided they are not given in addition to full pay.

4834. But it does not appear to belong to a purchase system?—I am able to trace the increase of expenditure which takes place in the line and guards, and flows from them to other branches of the service, in so many cases directly to the purchase system, that I am confident that that system influences the expenditure connected with the officers of the army in almost all cases; the prevailing feeling is, and it has been expressed by the highest authorities upon repeated occasions, that our officers spend so much on their commissions that we can hardly do too much for them.

4835. (*Sir De Lacy Evans.*) Are you aware that, in the East India Company's service, there is a contribution made from each officer's pay as a fund for pensions?—Yes.

4836. Are you aware that a project was submitted to the Horse Guards a good many years ago, for a similar system in our service voluntarily, but to be sanctioned by the authorities, and the objection to it was that it would operate as an inducement to young men at a premature age to marry, having this provision made for them?—I was not aware of it, but I do not doubt the fact. In India, a civilian was commonly reputed to be worth 300 *l.* a year, dead or alive, and a military officer something less, which had a great effect in encouraging early marriages.

4837. (*Chairman.*) You referred to a report of 1693; in the Mutiny Act of the following year, I think purchase was forbidden under a penalty?—Yes, it was.

Purchase abolished by
William III.

4838. I find it was omitted again in 1701, before King William's death; can you explain that?—I imagine that the influences which were concerned in the purchase system were too strong for him; I cannot believe that he changed his opinion. King William's regulation was not abolished at once; it was gradually frittered away.

but restored during his
reign.

4839. But the words were struck out of the Mutiny Act, and the words having been put into the Mutiny Act, and having been struck out, does it not look as if there was a tacit understanding that something of the kind was to go on?—Queen Anne revived the prohibition in a modified form.

4840. That was afterwards again, but it was struck out during the reign of King William?—Yes; I suppose they were too strong for him on this as on other occasions. A characteristic thing took place in Queen Anne's reign,—she introduced a modified prohibition that nobody was to sell who had not served for 20 years; the prohibition to sell previously to 20 years' service was soon disregarded, but upon it was built the converse proposition, that is, that anybody who had served 20 years might sell under any circumstances, whether he had purchased or not. Queen Anne only meant to limit the purchase system, but her regulation has been worked in an opposite sense. Of late years, the permission to sell commissions which have not been purchased has been extended by allowing of their sale after only three years' service, and giving the officer 100 *l.* out of the produce of the sale for every year he has served. I wish to state, in conclusion, that I neither advocate our army being made a *métier* as in France, nor an exclusive aristocratic body as in Austria; but I think that it should be regulated solely with a view to the highest practicable degree of efficiency, and that its character in other respects should be moulded by the social habits and genius of the English people. It is a great recommendation of this system, that it would correct the existing disposition to confine the honours of the military profession to gallantry in the field, and would turn to valuable account in the service of the country a great amount of education and talent which is at present comparatively wasted.

A modified prohibition
to purchase introduced
in Queen Anne's reign.

[For the Figured Statement and accompanying explanation, which was prepared by desire of the Commission for the purpose of showing the financial application of the proposals contained in this Evidence, see Appendix, No. XXXI. page 475.]

Appendix, No. XXXI.

COMPARISON of the PRESENT and PROPOSED PAY and ALLOWANCES of the OFFICERS of the HOUSEHOLD TROOPS, and of the CAVALRY and INFANTRY OF THE LINE.

[The following STATEMENTS have been prepared by desire of the ARMY PURCHASE COMMISSION for the purpose of showing the financial application of the proposals contained in Sir C. Trevelyan's Evidence. The Reasons for the several Proposals will be found in the Evidence.]

- | | |
|---|---|
| EVIDENCE. | It is proposed,— |
| <p>Question
4349 to 4355.
4402.
4413 to 4417.
4669 to 4733.</p> | <p>1st.—That a rate of pay and allowances should be fixed suited to each rank, which should be attained by professional qualification and good service, without any outlay on the part of the officer beyond what is required for his preliminary general and professional education.</p> |
| 4728 to 4731. | <p>2d.—That there should be only two ranks of regimental field officers,—colonels and lieutenant-colonels,—and that the honorary rank of colonels of regiments and the rank of major should be discontinued.</p> |
| 4734 to 4741.
4796, 4797. | <p>3d.—That with the exception of the three highest ranks of general officers,—that is, field marshal, general, and lieutenant-general,—a certain age should be fixed in reference to each rank at which officers should be <i>permitted</i>, and another age somewhat more advanced at which they should be <i>obliged</i> to retire on full pay.</p> |
| 4823 to 4827. | <p>4th.—That in the event of an officer being incapacitated for service by ill-health previously to his becoming entitled to full-pay retirement, he should be placed on temporary or permanent half-pay, as the case may require.</p> |
| 4476, 4487.
4830, 4831. | <p>5th.—That under ordinary circumstances, officers should provide for their wives and children without assistance from the State; but that when an officer dies of wounds or of disease contracted in the field, an allowance in aid should be made.</p> |
| 4430 to 4432. | <p>6th.—That ample rewards and retirements being provided under the proposed arrangements, the existing appropriation of 18,000<i>l.</i> a year for military rewards, which is divisible among nearly 200 officers, and has in a great measure lost its original character of rewards for distinguished service, should cease.</p> |
| 4553.
4705 to 4707.
4827 to 4830. | <p>7th.—That consolidated rates of pay and allowances should be fixed for officers on the staff, including the full, half, or unattached pay at present received by them; and that they should not receive rations of provisions, fuel, or light, except in the field; and,</p> |
| 4761 to 4778. | <p>8th.—That an account should be taken of the amount which each officer now in the service, below the rank of general officer, might fairly expect to receive for the value of his commissions according to the custom of the service, and that he should have the option of retiring whenever it may be convenient to him to do so, receiving that amount from the State, or of remaining in the service under the revised regulations.</p> |
| | <p>9th.—That as the existing general officers have already lost, by their promotion to that rank, the option of disposing of their commissions, they are, of course, entitled to retain every advantage arising out of the present system.</p> |
| 4741. | <p>10th.—That, in the absence of vacancies, officers of every rank promoted for distinguished service in the field should be borne as supernumeraries of their respective ranks.</p> |

NUMBERS and COST, including PAY, MONEY ALLOWANCES, and the VALUE of ALLOWANCES in KIND, of all COMBATANT OFFICERS of HER MAJESTY'S FORCES, and of the FORCES of the EAST INDIA COMPANY, together with the NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGE arising therefrom, for the Years 1840, 1853, and 1857.

	Effective Services. (1)				Non-Effective Services.				Gross Totals of Effective and Non-Effective Services.	
	Numbers.	Per-centage of Total Numbers.	Charge.	Per-centage of Total Charge.	Numbers.	Per-centage of Total Numbers.	Charge.	Per-centage of Total Charge.	Numbers.	Charge.
1840:			£.				£.			£.
Guards, Line, and General Staff, at Home and in the Colonies - -	3,854	45 $\frac{1}{10}$	1,137,197	53 $\frac{2}{3}$	4,447	54 $\frac{0}{10}$	980,007	46 $\frac{1}{3}$	8,101	2,117,204
Ditto - ditto - in India	1,119	-	(2) 442,769							
Artillery and Engineers	709	57 $\frac{1}{3}$	238,035	68 $\frac{2}{3}$	532	42 $\frac{7}{8}$	108,207	31 $\frac{1}{4}$	1,241	346,242
East India Company's Officers - - -	3,964	80 $\frac{1}{4}$	(2) 1,764,568	79 $\frac{2}{3}$	950	19 $\frac{1}{4}$	(2) 448,387	20 $\frac{1}{4}$	4,914	2,212,955
1853:										
Guards, Line, and General Staff, at Home and in the Colonies - -	3,722	57 $\frac{1}{3}$	1,155,575	61 $\frac{5}{8}$	2,759	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	711,177	38 $\frac{2}{18}$	6,481	1,866,752
Ditto - ditto - in India	1,310	-	(2) 516,196							
Artillery and Engineers	848	71 $\frac{1}{3}$	288,751	71	338	28 $\frac{1}{3}$	117,921	29	1,186	406,672
East India Company's Officers - - -	5,015	78 $\frac{2}{3}$	(2) 2,184,523	78 $\frac{1}{4}$	1,361	21 $\frac{1}{3}$	(2) 606,287	21 $\frac{2}{3}$	6,376	2,790,810
1857:										
Guards, Line, and General Staff, at Home and in the Colonies (4) -	4,341	62 $\frac{2}{3}$	1,342,193	66 $\frac{1}{10}$	2,580	37 $\frac{1}{6}$	688,612	33 $\frac{1}{3}$	6,921	2,030,805
Ditto - ditto - in India	978	-	(2) 385,220							
Artillery and Engineers	1,070	74 $\frac{2}{3}$	360,525	71 $\frac{1}{4}$	365	25 $\frac{2}{3}$	145,713	28 $\frac{2}{3}$	1,435	506,238
East India Company's Officers - - -	(4) 5,142	78 $\frac{1}{6}$	(2) 2,176,415	77 $\frac{1}{3}$	1,430	21 $\frac{1}{6}$	(2) 634,835	22 $\frac{1}{3}$	6,572	2,811,250

(1) For the details of the Effective Services, see statement overleaf.

(2) Including pay, batta, house rent, allowance for tents and tent carriage, horse allowance, regimental and company command money, mess allowance, and the off-reckonings, or colonel's allowance, of such colonels of the Company's Forces as are in India.

(3) The Non-Effective Services include the colonels of regiments on furlough in England, and grants to military and orphan funds for widows and children.

(4) This comparison is seriously affected by the following circumstances:—

1st. That, according to the strength of regiments which has been fixed since the last war, the proportion of officers to men has been increased in the proportion of 20 to 17; and,

2d. That 536 supernumerary subaltern officers were retained on the effective list after the war.

(5) These numbers do not agree with those given in the answer to Question 4465, which were taken at the "Establishment," then as to infantry and cavalry, lately augmented, but vacancies not filled up. The present statement is *actual strength*. There is also a slight variation as to the number of colonels,—those residing in India, though not employed, having been included in the Effective List as being on the spot and available for service at any moment.

DETAILS of the EFFECTIVE PORTION of the Preceding STATEMENT.

CORPS.	Num- bers.	Pay.	Additional Pay.	Extra Pay to Engineer Officers.	Non- Effective Allowances.	Command Money.	Contingent Allowance, including the Special Personal Allowances of the Foot Guards.	Forage.	Fuel and Light and Lodging.	Servants.	Black Servants.	Rations to Officers, &c.	Colonial Allowance.	Mess, including Table Allowance.	Allow- ance to Riding Masters.	Horse Allow- ance, Cape Corps.	GROSS TOTAL of Pay and Allow- ances.
		£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1840:																	
Guards, Line, and General Staff, at Home and in the Colonies - - - -	3,034	607,284	8,014	- -	5,518	4,763	40,230	65,024	150,058	104,001	0,745	14,426	24,737	27,530	3,123	344	1,137,107
Artillery and Engineers (including General Staff) -	700	136,368	4,045	20,103	- -	9,000	5,307	8,322	10,068	10,758	1,257	2,005	6,700	3,312	-	-	238,035
1853:																	
Guards, Line, and General Staff, at Home and in the Colonies - - - -	3,722	682,138	4,544	- -	5,578	4,878	47,280	74,506	153,547	107,365	4,772	11,080	25,304	29,030	3,281	600	1,155,575
Artillery and Engineers (including General Staff) -	848	168,760	2,750	28,400	- -	9,775	4,280	0,320	24,033	23,667	2,280	2,705	7,813	3,975	-	-	288,751
1857:																	
Guards, Line, and General Staff, at Home and in the Colonies - - - -	4,341	797,078	12,094	- -	5,778	5,312	51,370	73,753	177,210	125,051	3,703	18,915	32,010	31,172	1,148	2,390	1,342,193
Artillery and Engineers (including General Staff) -	1,070	210,839	3,455	34,000	- -	9,242	7,886	11,642	30,854	20,905	7,040	2,864	8,026	4,712	-	-	360,525

STATEMENT of the Number of REGIMENTAL COMBATANT OFFICERS, with the EXISTING and PROPOSED RATES of PAY and ALLOWANCES.

P A Y.

RANK AND REGIMENT.	No.	Present Daily Rate of Pay.	Proposed Daily Rate of Pay.	Difference.		Total Amount of present Pay per Annum.	Total Amount of Proposed Pay per Annum.
				More.	Less.		
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
COLONELS (the present Lieutenant-Colonels commanding Corps):							
Household Cavalry - - - -	3	1 9 2	1 8 -	-	- 1 2	1,596 17 6	1,533 - -
Cavalry of the Line - - - -	19	1 3 -	1 4 -	- 1 -	-	7,975 5 -	8,322 - -
Military Train - - - -	2	- 17 -	1 - -	- 3 -	-	620 10 -	730 - -
Foot Guards - - - -	3	1 6 9	1 4 -	-	- 2 9	1,464 11 3	1,314 - -
Infantry of the Line - - - -	82	- 17 -	1 - -	- 3 -	-	25,440 10 -	29,930 - -
West India and Colonial Corps (omitting Malta Fencibles) - - - -	11	- 17 -	1 - -	- 3 -	-	3,412 15 -	4,015 - -
						£. 40,510 8 9	45,844 - -
LIEUTENANT-COLONELS (the present Majors of Regiments):							
Household Cavalry - - - -	3	1 4 5	1 4 -	-	- 5	1,336 16 3	1,314 - -
Cavalry of the Line - - - -	19	- 19 3	1 - -	- 9 -	-	6,674 18 9	6,935 - -
Military Train - - - -	4	- 16 -	- 17 -	- 1 -	-	1,168 - -	1,241 - -
Foot Guards - - - -	7	1 3 -	1 - -	-	- 3 -	2,938 5 -	2,555 - -
Infantry of the Line - - - -	162	- 16 -	- 17 -	- 1 -	-	47,304 - -	50,260 - -
West India and Colonial Corps - - - -	14	- 16 -	- 17 -	- 1 -	-	4,088 - -	4,343 10 -
						£. 63,510 - -	66,648 10 -
CAPTAINS:							
Household Cavalry - - - -	24	- 15 1	- 16 -	- 11 -	-	6,606 10 -	7,008 - -
Cavalry of the Line - - - -	116	- 14 7	- 15 -	- 5 -	-	30,872 18 4	31,755 - -
Military Train - - - -	25	- 11 7	- 12 -	- 5 -	-	5,284 17 4	5,475 - -
Foot Guards - - - -	70	- 15 6	- 15 -	-	- 6	19,801 5 -	19,162 10 -
Infantry of the Line - - - -	972	- 11 7	- 12 -	- 5 -	-	205,476 15 -	212,868 - -
West India and Colonial Corps - - - -	78	- 11 7	- 12 -	- 5 -	-	16,488 17 6	17,082 - -
						£. 284,531 3 2	293,350 10 -
LIEUTENANTS:							
Household Cavalry - - - -	24	- 10 4	- 11 -	- 8 -	-	4,526 - -	4,818 - -
Cavalry of the Line - - - -	116	- 9 -	- 10 -	- 1 -	-	19,053 - -	21,170 - -
Military Train - - - -	30	- 6 6	- 8 6	- 2 -	-	3,558 15 -	4,653 15 -
Foot Guards - - - -	84	- 7 4	- 10 -	- 2 8	-	11,242 - -	15,330 - -
Infantry of the Line - - - -	1,134	- 6 6	- 8 6	- 2 -	-	134,520 15 -	175,911 15 -
West India and Colonial Corps - - - -	117	- 6 6	- 8 6	- 2 -	-	13,879 2 6	18,149 12 6
						£. 186,779 12 6	240,033 2 6
CORNETS:							
Household Cavalry - - - -	24	- 8 -	- 10 -	- 2 -	-	3,504 - -	4,380 - -
Cavalry of the Line - - - -	116	- 8 -	- 9 -	- 1 -	-	16,936 - -	19,053 - -
						£. 20,550 - -	23,433 - -
ENSIGNS:							
Military Train - - - -	12	- 5 3	- 7 6	- 2 3	-	1,149 15 -	1,642 10 -
Foot Guards - - - -	56	- 5 6	- 9 -	- 3 6	-	5,621 - -	9,198 - -
Infantry of the Line - - - -	810	- 5 3	- 7 6	- 2 3	-	77,608 2 6	110,868 15 -
West India and Colonial Corps - - - -	78	- 5 3	- 7 6	- 2 3	-	7,473 7 6	10,676 5 -
						£. 91,852 5 -	132,385 10 -
ADJUTANTS*:							
Household Cavalry - - - -	3	- 13 -	- 14 6	- 1 6	-	711 15 -	793 17 6
Cavalry of the Line - - - -	19	- 11 6	- 13 6	- 2 -	-	3,987 12 6	4,681 2 6
Military Train - - - -	7	- 10 -	- 12 -	- 2 -	-	1,277 10 -	1,533 - -
Foot Guards - - - -	7	- 10 -	- 13 6	- 3 6	-	1,277 10 -	1,724 12 6
Infantry of the Line - - - -	81	- 10 -	- 12 -	- 2 -	-	14,782 10 -	17,739 - -
West India and Colonial Corps - - - -	8	- 10 -	- 12 -	- 2 -	-	1,460 - -	1,752 - -
Ceylon Rifle Regiment - - - -	1	- 12 6	- 12 -	-	- 6	228 2 6	219 - -
						£. 23,725 - -	28,442 12 6
						£. 830,137	
Total of proposed Pay - - - -						£. 711,348	
Total of present Pay - - - -							
Increase in proposed Pay - - - -						£. 118,789	

* It is proposed that the pay of an Adjutant should consist of his pay as a subaltern, and of an allowance of 3 s. 6 d. a day, to be drawn only by the officer actually doing the duty of adjutant.

STATEMENT of the Number of Regimental Combatant Officers, &c.—continued.

ALLOWANCES.

	Present Amount.	Proposed Amount.
	£.	£.
(A) Non-effective Allowance - - - - -	5,778	—
(B) Contingent Allowance to Captains of Troops and Companies, that proposed for the Foot Guards being double the rate for Infantry of the Line - - - - -	51,371	45,003
(C) Command Money - - - - -	5,311	5,311
(D) Allowance to Riding Masters - - - - -	1,148	1,148
(E) Additional Pay - - - - -	12,004	—
(F) Remount Allowance - - - - -	2,309	2,309
(G) Fuel and Light and Lodging, value of - - - - -	106,688	106,688
(H) Forage (value of) - - - - -	55,576	55,576
(I) Soldier Servants (value of) - - - - -	118,835	118,835
(K) Black Servants' Allowance - - - - -	5,338	5,338
(L) Rations of Provisions to Officers, &c. in the Colonies* - - - - -	17,915	—
(M) Colonial Allowances - - - - -	29,079	29,079
(N) Mess Allowance - - - - -	21,110	—
(O) Table Allowance at St. James's and Dublin - - - - -	5,004	5,004
(P) Expense of Bands (now paid by Officers) - - - - -	—	48,816
(Q) Agency - - - - -	42,000	—
(R) Field Allowance - - - - -	—	—
TOTALS - - - - £.	540,546	484,097
	£.	
Present Amount - - - - -	540,546	
Proposed Amount - - - - -	484,097	
Decrease in proposed Allowances - - - - £.	56,449	

Non-Effective Allowance (A).

An Allowance granted since 1803 to the senior Lieutenant-colonel and Major of Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry, to compensate them for certain losses they sustained by some regimental arrangements then made. The amount is 20*l.* per annum to each Officer.

Contingent Allowances to Captains, including Special Allowances to the Foot Guards (B).

The Contingent Allowance to Captains was granted in 1783. It is an allowance to each Captain commanding a Troop or Company, and varies in amount from 18 *l.* to 102 *l.* per annum, according to the number of men under the Captain's command. The object of the Allowance is to indemnify the Officer for his liability to pay for the repair of arms, for the burial of soldiers, and to pay their debts when their effects are insufficient. The Captain is supposed generally to make a small profit out of the Allowance. The Special Personal Allowances to the Foot Guards amount to 9,298 *l.*, for which are substituted in the proposed charge double the ordinary Contingent Allowance for Infantry Regiments. The Special Allowance to the Foot Guards for Recruiting, Hospital, and other expenses, commonly called the "Stock Purse," has been omitted from both sides as not being personal to the Officers.

Command Money (C).

This is an Allowance of 3*s.* a day to the Officer actually present and in command of a Regiment of Infantry of the Line for the time being.

Allowance to Riding Masters (D).

An allowance of 7*l.* per troop per annum is given to Riding Masters, to enable them to pay for rough riders, and a few other small expenses not otherwise provided for.

Additional Pay (E).

Brevet Majors receive 2*s.* a day, and Lieutenants of seven years service 1*s.* a day as additional pay.

* This allowance would be resumed when a force takes the field.

Remount Allowance (F).

An Allowance to Officers of the Cape Mounted Riflemen and the Military Train, to enable them to purchase their horses, the Officers of these Corps having Infantry pay only, although they are mounted.

Fuel and Light and Lodging Allowance (G).

This is the assumed value of the Barrack accommodation, and of the fuel and light ration of each Officer. It is founded upon the money allowance granted to an Officer when not accommodated in Barracks.

Forage (H).

This is the assumed value of the Forage ration, calculated at 2s. a day each ration.

Servants (I).

This is the assumed value to the Officer of his soldier servant, calculated at 1s. 6d. a day.

Black Servants' Allowance (K).

This Allowance is granted to Officers of European Regiments in the tropics, where they are not allowed to employ soldiers as servants.

Rations of Provisions to Officers, &c. (L).

This is the value (after deducting the stoppage) of the rations of provisions supplied to Officers and their regulated number of civil servants in the Colonies, and of those allowed to their families at tropical stations. The issue of rations to Officers and their servants would be resumed when a force takes the field.

Colonial Allowance (M).

Special Allowances granted in some of the Colonies in consideration of the great expense of the necessaries of life.

Mess Allowance (N).

The original object of this Allowance is described as follows, in the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army, July 1844, page 130. "The principal object of this Allowance is to enable Regimental Officers of every rank, but more especially of the junior ranks, to enjoy the comfort and advantages which it is calculated to afford, by placing it in the power of every individual to drink a moderate quantity of wine daily at or after dinner, on reasonable terms, and such as his rate of pay may fairly justify." In the new edition of the Queen's Regulations, just published, the above has been altered as follows:—"The principal object of this Allowance is to enable the Officers of a regiment, of every rank, but more especially of the junior ranks, to enjoy the comfort and advantages of a mess, without incurring expenses which their pay is not calculated to meet." The Allowance was first granted in 1811 only to regiments stationed in the United Kingdom, not including the Foot Guards, and it was afterwards extended to the West Indies, St. Helena, and the Western Coast of Africa. It has been repeatedly refused to Officers at other stations, on the ground that the local duty on wine was low. No Allowance is made in aid of the Serjeants' mess, although the formation of messes for non-commissioned officers of that rank is enjoined in the Queen's Regulations, "as the means of supporting their consequence and respectability." Page 126, new edition.

Table Allowance at St. James's and Dublin (O).

An Allowance granted to the Officers who mount the Queen's guard in London and Dublin to provide them with a table. It is a very old Allowance, and was formerly as high as 9,881*l.*

Expense of Bands (P).

It is proposed to relieve the Officers of their present contributions towards the expense of the bands, which are stated in the Queen's Regulations to be "essential to the credit and appearance of a regiment."

Agency (Q).

See the Answer to Question 4664. As the public duties of the Army Agents chiefly consist in keeping duplicate accounts, which would be discontinued, and the accounts kept at the War Office would be thereby reduced and simplified, the existing establishment of the War Office, which has been strengthened since the last war by the addition of many experienced and active temporary clerks, would, it is believed, be sufficient for every duty connected with the Army Accounts, without any permanent augmentation being made in consequence of the cessation of the public and official functions of the Army Agents.

Field Allowance (R).

This allowance, which is only issued when a force takes the field, would remain as at present.

S T A F F.

PRESENT RANKS and PAY of OFFICERS corresponding with the proposed STAFF.					PROPOSED STAFF to include all OFFICERS on the STAFF, except GENERAL OFFICERS in command.		
Nos.	RANKS.	Daily Rate of Staff Pay.	Annual Amount of Staff Pay.	Average Daily Rate of Pay, including Staff Pay.	Nos.	PAY.	Pay per Annum.
1	Military Secretary at Head Quarters	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.		<i>It is proposed that the duties of these three officers should be performed by General Officers selected from the fixed establishment, receiving a special allowance of 3l. a day in addition to their pay as Major-generals or Lieutenant-generals.</i>	£.
1	Adjutant-general	3 15 10	1,384	6 13 9			3,285*
1	Quartermaster-general	3 15 10	1,384				
3							
7	Deputy Adjutants-general	{ 2 at 1 17 11	1,384	1 12 2	20	Colonels, at 2l. a day	14,600
		{ 5 at - 19 -	1,734				
8	Deputy Quartermasters-general	{ 1 at 1 17 11	692				
		{ 7 at - 19 -	2,427				
15							
18	Assistant Adjutants-general	{ 1 at - 19 -	346	1 3 6	50	Lieut.-colonels, at 1 l. 4 s. a day	21,900
		{ 17 at - 14 3	4,421				
13	Assistant Quartermasters-general	{ 1 at - 19 -	346				
		{ 12 at - 14 3	3,121				
6	Commandants	- 7 -	766				
5	Military Secretaries	- 19 -	1,734				
42							
3	Deputy Assistant Adjutants-general	{ 1 at - 14 3	260	- 16 9	80	Captains, at 1 l. a day	29,200
		{ 2 at - 9 6	347				
5	Deputy Assistant Quartermasters-general	{ 1 at - 14 3	260				
		{ 4 at - 9 6	693				
10	Assistant Military Secretaries	- 9 6	1,734				
34	Majors of Brigade	- 9 6	5,895				
1	Staff Captain	- 11 7	211				
33							
70	Aides-de-Camp	- 9 6	12,156	- 14 5	80	Lieutenants, at 15 s. a day	21,900
28	Town or Fort Majors, and Town or Fort Adjutants	- 4 9	2,427				
6	Garrison Adjutants	- 4 9	520				
104							
217	TOTAL PAY	£.	46,222 †	230	TOTAL PAY	£.	90,985

The above Officers receive, in addition to their Staff Pay, Half Pay or Full Pay of their Regimental Ranks.

ALLOWANCES.

ALLOWANCES.

Lodging Allowance	£.	9,353			£.	10,082
Forage Allowance		18,117				19,500
Servants' Allowance		7,182				
Rations of Provisions in the Colonies		900				
Fuel and Light		1,169				
Colonial Allowance		3,831				3,831
TOTAL ALLOWANCES	£.	40,552			£.	33,413
TOTAL of the whole	£.	86,774 †			£.	124,298

ESTABLISHMENT OF GENERAL OFFICERS.

Nos.	PRESENT.	Pay per Annum.	Nos.	PROPOSED.	Pay per Annum.		
1	£.	£.			£.		
2	at 2,200		3	Field Marshals, at 2,000 l. per annum	6,000		
4	" 1,800						
1	" 1,500		25	Generals, 1,200 l. per annum	30,000		
4	" 1,450	155,200					
18	" 1,350			50	Lieut.-generals, 1,000 l. per annum	50,000	
2	" 1,200						
58	" 1,100		60	Major-generals, 800 l. per annum	48,000		
44	" 1,000						
100	Unattached General Officers, at 1 l. 5 s. a day	45,625					
234	TOTAL	£.	200,825	138 †	TOTAL	£.	134,000 †

* This is exclusive of their pay as General Officers on the fixed establishment.

† These sums are exclusive of the full and half pay which these officers receive in addition to their staff pay.

‡ Including the 55 retired Major-generals estimated for on the opposite page, the comparison will be as follows:—

	Present Establishment.	Proposed Establishment.
Number	234	193
Cost	£. 200,825	£. 178,000

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COMMAND PAY OF GENERAL OFFICERS.

No.	PRESENT.	Pay per Annum.	No.	PROPOSED.	Pay per Annum.
		£.			£.
9	General Commanding in Chief, 9 l. 9 s. 6 d. a day	3,458		General Commanding in Chief, 10 l. a day	3,650
36	Generals, 5 l. 13 s. 9 d. a day [none employed as such].			Generals, 6 l. a day.	
10	Lieut.-Generals, 3 l. 15 s. 10 d. a day	12,455	9	Lieut.-Generals, 4 l. a day	13,140
	Major-Generals, 1 l. 17 s. 11 d. a day	24,911	36	Major-Generals, 2 l. a day	26,280
	Officers acting as General Officers Commanding } 1 l. 2 s. 9 d.	4,152	10	Officers acting as General Officers Commanding } 1 l. 10 s.	5,475
	TOTAL - - £.	44,976		TOTAL - - £.	48,545

ALLOWANCES OF GENERAL OFFICERS, &c. COMMANDING.

	£.		£.
Lodging allowance	9,289	- - - - -	9,289
Furniture allowance (at two-thirds of lodging allowance)	6,966	- - - - -	6,966
Forage allowance	803	- - - - -	803
Rations of provisions in the Colonies	2,330	- - - - -	-
Fuel and light	1,161	- - - - -	-
Servants' allowance	1,505	- - - - -	-
Table allowance	5,068	- - - - -	5,068
TOTAL - - £.	27,122	TOTAL - - £.	22,126
TOTAL of Command Pay and Allowances - - } £.	72,098	TOTAL of Command Pay and Allowances - - } £.	70,671

NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES. (1)

	Present Amount.	Proposed Amount.
	£.	£.
Widows' Pensions, Compassionate Allowances, Royal Bounty Allowances, and Relief Fund	116,401	-
Pensions and other allowances, at the existing rates, to widows and families of officers who may die in consequence of wounds or disease contracted in the field	-	38,000
Pensions to wounded officers	44,263	44,263
Full-pay retirements	60,000	-
55 Major-Generals, at 800 l.	£. 44,000	
80 Colonels, at 1 l. a day	29,200	
90 Lieut.-Colonels, at 17 s. a day	27,922	
500 Captains, &c., at 12 s. a day	109,500	210,622 (2)
Rewards for military service (3)	18,000 (2)	-
Half-pay	247,899	-
Half-pay of reduced officers (4), and officers under 45 years of age, who are temporarily or permanently disabled by wounds or ill health	-	80,000
	£. 486,363	372,885

(1) All persons would, of course, retain the Non-Effective Allowances of which they are now in the receipt.

(2) It must be remembered that these are merely estimated charges which would gradually accrue during a long series of years, and that the actual amount would depend upon the number of officers who retired according to the ages applicable to each rank, as shown at page 89. For the grounds and expected practical working of the proposed full-pay retirements, see the answers to Questions 4734 to 4741, and 4796, 4797.

(3) See paragraph 6, page 80.

(4) It will deserve consideration at the end of another war, whether, instead of burdening the public with annuities, and obstructing regimental promotion, it would not be better to give so many months' pay on reduction to young officers, and to leave them free to enter into other lines of life, unembarrassed by the liability of being recalled to active service. The public would then have the unrestricted choice of the most suitable persons for any exigencies which might afterwards arise; and there might be a mutual advantage in the re-engagement of some of those who had been previously reduced. The extent to which the doctrine, that half-pay is partly of the nature of a "retaining fee," has been carried in the Army and Navy, has been productive of many unfortunate results.

RECAPITULATION.

	Present Amount.	Proposed Amount.	Increase in proposed Amount.	Decrease in proposed Amount.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
EFFECTIVE SERVICES:				
Regimental pay and allowances - - -	1,251,804	1,314,234	62,340	—
Staff corps and allowances - - -	86,774 *	124,208	37,524	—
Establishment of General Officers - -	200,825	134,000	- -	66,825
Command pay and allowances to General Officers - - - - - }	72,098	70,671	- -	1,427
Total Effective Services - - - £.	1,611,591	1,643,203	90,864	68,252
Total Increase, Effective Services - - -	- - -	- - -	31,612	
NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES:				
Widows' pensions - - - - -	116,401	38,000	- -	78,401
Pensions to wounded officers - - -	44,263	44,263	—	—
Full-pay retirements - - - - -	60,000	210,622	150,622	—
Rewards for military service - - -	18,000	- - -	- -	18,000
Half-pay - - - - -	247,699	80,000	- -	167,699
Total Non-Effective Services - £.	486,363	372,885	150,622	204,100
Total Decrease, Non-Effective Ser- vices - - - - - }	- - -	- - -	- - -	113,478
Total Effective and Non- Effective Services - - } £.	2,097,954	2,016,088		

	£.
Total Decrease, Non-Effective Services - - -	113,478
Total Increase, Effective Services - - -	31,612
Net Estimated Decrease, Effective and Non-Effective Services - - - } £.	81,866

* This is exclusive of the full or half-pay which staff officers at present receive in addition to their staff pay.

This revised establishment offers three distinct advantages to the officer:—

Advantages to the officer from the proposed revised establishment.

- 1st. An increase of pay, especially in the junior ranks, and in the rank of colonel commanding a regiment;
- 2dly. Exemption from having to purchase commissions both on first appointment and in the successive steps of promotion; and,
- 3dly. A regulated system of full-pay retirement at the increased rates, without any limitation except as to age.

But these advantages would be neutralized if the plan did not provide a sufficient current of promotion during peace.

The principal sources of promotion under the proposed new establishment would be:—

1st. Voluntary full-pay retirements between the following ages:

Major-general	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60 to 65
Colonel commanding (now lieutenant-colonel)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55 to 60
Lieutenant-colonel (now major)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50 to 55
Captain or subaltern	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45 to 50

2d. Compulsory full-pay retirements at the following ages:—

Major-general	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	65
Colonel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60
Lieutenant-colonel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55
Captain or subaltern	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50

These arrangements would establish a maximum beyond which promotion could not be retarded in the respective ranks, and would, *in addition to this*, accelerate promotion to the extent of the voluntary retirements which would take place within the five years allowed to the officers of each rank to choose whether they would retire on the full pay of such rank. See the Answers to Questions 4734-4741, and 4796-7.

3d. Voluntary retirements previously to 45 years of age, at which officers would become entitled to retire on the full pay of captain or subaltern.

The retirements by sale during the 24 months from the 1st April 1852 to the 31st March 1854, which immediately preceded the late war, were as follows:

Lieutenant-colonels	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
Majors	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28
Captains	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	266
Lieutenants	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	245
Ensigns	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	94

being 664 in all, or at the rate of about 332 a year.

I have in several places in my evidence, and especially in my answers to Questions 4668 and 4805, stated my reasons for thinking that retirements of this description will be as numerous, or nearly so, under the new system as under the old.

4th. Selections for the under-mentioned separate corps, which would be promotion both to the officers selected and to those who would fill the vacancies created thereby in the regiments:

- The Staff Corps.
- The Administrative Corps.
- The Permanent Staff of the Depot Battalions.
- The Permanent Staff of the Militia.
- The Staff Officers of Pensioners.

The three last would furnish suitable employment to many married officers to whom it would not be convenient to go upon foreign service.

5th. Death vacancies.

The deaths on full pay in the *regimental* ranks during the above-mentioned 24 months, were—

Lieutenant-colonels	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Majors	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Captains	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
Lieutenants	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58
Ensigns and Cornets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29

being 142 in all, or at the rate of 71 a year.

The death vacancies and voluntary retirements taken together, in the two years from the 1st April 1852 to the 31st March 1854, amounted to 806, or at the rate of 403 a year; and as the number of officers on the effective establishments of the Guards and line at home, in the colonies, and in India in 1853 was 5,032, these two causes alone would maintain a considerable amount of promotion.

Vacancies would also occur in the several ranks of general officers under the proposed new establishment in a larger proportion than in the regimental ranks; and death vacancies in the regimental ranks are likely to be more frequent under the new, than under the old system, because, under present circumstances, when an officer finds himself getting into a bad state of health, he naturally endeavours to sell, in order to realize the price of his commissions.

It must also be remembered that the two years upon which this calculation has been made, were years of peace; that nearly all the causes of promotion are stimulated by war; and that a fair proportion of years of war ought to be taken into account in framing averages for army promotion.

Probable cost of compensating officers who may elect to retire, receiving the price of their commissions.

The average of 332 officers who retired by sale in each of the two years immediately preceding the last war, also furnishes a measure of the probable cost of compensating officers who may prefer to retire, receiving the price of their commissions, instead of remaining in the army under the revised terms of service. The regulation price of the commissions of the officers who retired in each of those two years was about 521,000*l.*, and the customary price about 753,000*l.*; but, in applying this calculation to the compensation of the officers who would retire upon the revision of their terms of service, a very large deduction would have to be made on account of commissions *obtained without purchase*, the holders of which would receive compensation only to the extent to which officers are permitted by the existing regulations to receive the *regulated* price of such commissions. No time could be more favourable than the present for making the change, for in the majority of the Crimean regiments the larger number of officers have obtained some, if not all, their commissions without purchase, whereas every month adds to the number of commissions sold, and to the amount which officers who have not purchased their commissions are entitled to realize according to their length of service.

The principles upon which compensation should be made, are described in the answers to the questions, beginning at 4761 and ending at 4778. Retirements of this kind would be largest in the first year, because those who retired at once would receive the full value of what they gave up; whereas, as time went on, promotions would take place, without purchase, to fill the vacancies created by those retirements and by other causes, and the officers who retired at a later period, after having been so promoted, would only receive the value of the commissions to which they had attained up to the date when the purchase system was abolished. There would, therefore, be an increasing tendency to look forward to promotion and full-pay retirement, instead of looking back to retiring with the value of the commissions which had been acquired under the purchase system. The officers who enter under the revised arrangements without purchase, will, of course, not receive anything for their commissions, if they resign them before they become entitled to retire on full pay.

Great importance of making no more first appointments to the army by purchase.

Of one thing there can be no doubt, that if our object is to abolish purchase, and to encourage the introduction of young men who will vigorously sustain an improved army system, we cannot too soon begin to make the first appointments to commissions by selecting from the Commander-in-Chief's list, not those who can pay the regulation price, but those who show the greatest strength of character and mental activity, as tested by a competing examination. It would be unreasonable to take inferior young men when better could be got, and to go on accumulating claims under the purchase system, which would have to be bought up at a heavy public cost before many months had passed. In making changes in bodies of men everything depends upon the *undergrowth*; and every day's experience more clearly demonstrates that even the slightest admission of the principle of competition makes all the difference between the old system of patronage and the new system of first appointment and subsequent promotion according to qualification and merit. This is the first step, and all the others follow by a natural sequence.

See Q. 4669-4674.

Present and proposed establishments of general officers.

The comparison of the present and proposed establishment of general officers deserves a separate notice.

The present establishment, as fixed by the Royal warrant of the 6th October 1854, is as follows:—

50 Generals.
70 Lieutenant-Generals.
114 Major Generals.

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The proposed establishment is,—

28 Generals, including the three Field Marshals.
50 Lieutenant-Generals.
60 Major-Generals.

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And as many more major-generals as may be placed on the retired list at the age of 65.

The present establishment of general officers includes non-effective as well as effective, and the former in much larger proportion than the latter, as will be seen from the following statement of their probable ages on the 14th of this month, arranged in periods of five years :—

Periods of Age.	Number of Field Marshals.	Number of Generals.	Number of Lieut.-Generals.	Number of Major-Generals.	REMARKS.
90 and above - - - -	-	6	—	—	In this return one officer was wanting to complete the fixed establishment of 234, under the warrant of 6 October 1854.
85 to 90 - - - -	-	2	—	—	
80 to 85 - - - -	2	6	1	—	
75 to 80 - - - -	-	21	12	4	
70 to 75 - - - -	-	12	24	11	
65 to 70 - - - -	-	5	26	26	
60 to 65 - - - -	-	1	5	27	
55 to 60 - - - -	-	-	1	16	
50 to 55 - - - -	-	-	1	17	
45 to 50 - - - -	-	-	-	5	
40 to 45 - - - -	—	—	—	—	
35 to 40 - - - -	1	1	—	—	
TOTAL - -	8	54	70	106	

It would therefore appear that of 233 general officers on the fixed establishment on the 14th of this month, 158 were above, and only 75 of all the four ranks of field-marshal, general, lieutenant-general, and major-general, were below 65 years of age. It will be at once obvious to those who know this part of the British army, that, in order to constitute a really active list of 60 major-generals, it will be necessary to select for the new establishment those officers now belonging to that rank who are both efficient and available, and to complete the number by promoting the most distinguished of the colonels.

According to the proposed establishment, the mixed character of effective and non-effective would be retained in the higher ranks of field-marshal, general, and lieutenant-general; but 60 major-generals would be maintained in a constant state of efficiency by promoting the most distinguished among them to the vacancies in the list of lieutenant-generals caused by deaths in that and in the higher ranks; by placing on the Retired List, on their full pay of 800 *l.* a year, the major-generals who attain the age of 65 in that rank; and by filling the vacancies created by these two causes in the Active List of 60 major-generals, by promoting the most distinguished officers of the rank of colonel.

The number of retired major-generals under this arrangement is estimated in my financial statement at 55, but it may be more or less.

A large proportion of the promotions which have been made of late years to the rank and emoluments of general officers has not been *army promotion* in any proper sense.

Numerous cases might be mentioned in which officers have been so promoted who had not served since the Peninsular war, and had been employed during the long interval in other branches of the public service, or in private pursuits.

In many other instances officers have been promoted to be general officers who were totally incapable, from age and infirmity, of exercising the functions of command.

These evils have probably been aggravated by the changes made by the Royal warrant of the 6th October 1854. Every major who is able to deposit the regulated price is entitled to be promoted to be lieutenant-colonel. Every lieutenant-colonel who has served for three years in command of a regiment, or in one of the other specified situations, is promoted to be colonel; and the senior colonel on a list thus greatly augmented is promoted, in regular succession, to be a major-general. The question is in what length of time the junior colonel, and those who are to follow him, may expect to succeed to a death vacancy among the general officers.*

According

* See the Answers to 4728-4731.

According to the proposed establishment the whole of the promotion to the rank of general officer would be *effective promotion*; that is, all the promotions would be made on the ground of superior qualification or distinguished service; and would, therefore, act more powerfully in encouraging exertion, and in placing able men in an eminent and influential position, than a much larger amount of promotion given on different principles.

As an efficient army is of no use if it is not efficiently commanded, and as not only the maintenance of our present high position as a nation, but our actual safety depends upon our having at all times a sufficient number of highly qualified officers to command the forces of the state, it must be admitted that the establishment of the principle of effective promotion to the rank of general officer would be a great improvement. Nothing can supply the want of able commanders in the time of need. We ought to have at least as large a proportion of leading men of proved ability in the army, as in the law, the church, and other professions.

It would not be difficult to satisfy the just claims of such of the existing colonels as could not, either now or hereafter, be included in the revised establishment of general officers, but it is not necessary to enter upon this part of the subject at present. Those general officers who are already in the receipt of larger emoluments than they would have upon the revised establishment, would, of course, be paid the difference.

Practice in the Irish Constabulary Force in regard to the examination of candidates for cadetships.

In my answer to Question 4599, speaking of the promotion of non-commissioned officers to be officers, I said, "A strict examination (on first admission) for the officers should be combined with a regulated mode of allowing privates and non-commissioned officers to rise to be officers; there should, of course, be tests for them also, partly in the nature of examinations, but chiefly consisting of proved good service and superior qualifications acquired in the regiment itself; and I think it would be an advantageous arrangement for all parties if a certain proportion of commissions in each regiment were given to the non-commissioned officers, provided men were forthcoming every way qualified for them. The soldiers would then have something certain to look forward to as a motive to exertion and good conduct, and a superior class of men would be attracted."

These arrangements have been already carried into effect with great success, in the Irish constabulary force, which is a highly efficient body of about 12,000 men, organised on military principles. Two-thirds of the vacant cadetships are filled up by the Government, and one-third by Major-General Sir Duncan M'Gregor, who commands the force; and Sir Duncan M'Gregor alternately appoints the son of an old constabulary officer and a head constable to his vacancies, thus filling every sixth vacancy from the ranks. The Government candidates and the sons of officers are examined, under the superintendence of the Civil Service Commissioners, on the combined principle of nomination and competition which is in use in the Civil Service, and is proposed to be extended to the line and guards; four candidates being nominated for each vacancy, of whom the best is chosen. The examination of the head constables selected to compete for the proportion of vacancies assigned to their class, is committed to a Board consisting of the three officers next in rank to the Inspector-general, who does not interfere further than to select the candidates, and to ask them, after the examination has taken place and before the decision is announced, whether they are satisfied that the examination has been fairly conducted. The principle upon which this examination is framed is described in the fourth paragraph of the accompanying circular (No. 2), dated the 16th September 1856, headed, "Competitive Examinations in the Constabulary Force," and the proportion in which the elements of previous good service and proved efficiency are allowed to count, will be seen from the numbers assigned to perfection under the several heads of examination (No. 3).

The Irish constabulary force was previously remarkable for admitting no recruit who could not read and write and keep accounts, and for the entire trustworthiness of the men, so that they are sent by ones, twos, or threes to any place, however distant, where there is any duty to be performed, without an officer or non-commissioned officer being in charge of the party; and these competitive examinations have already given an increased stimulus to the education of the force. Even the sub-constables in the remote country hamlets are employing schoolmasters in the evening to instruct them in their barracks. The non-commissioned officers and privates of the line and guards already enjoy superior advantages in their improved regimental schools; but in order to give the more intelligent and industrious private a fair chance of working up to a proper educational standard to fit him for a commission, and to enable him eventually to pass his examination for a troop or company, the elements of the higher military knowledge should be taught in the regimental schools.

Widows' pensions.

The proposal in reference to which I chiefly crave a dispassionate and deliberate attention is that which relates to the pensions for the widows, and to the compassionate allowances for the children of officers. My experience of the laws which govern large bodies of public servants convinces me that there is no guarantee for frugal and provident habits like that which nature has furnished in the responsibility every body is under of providing for his family, and that this motive cannot with impunity be interfered with. These ready-made settlements at the public expense encourage premature marriages, discourage economy, and, after all, give but a miserable pittance to an officer's widow. According to the Table of English life, and taking the interest of money at only three per cent., the payment of 1*s.* a day, or 18*l.* a year*, will provide an annuity of 68*l.* 11*s.* 4*d.* for the wife after the death of

* The husband would have to pay the 18*l.* a year only so long as he and his wife lived; and the wife's annuity would commence at his death, and last as long as her life.

of the husband, supposing the husband to be 28 years, and the wife to be 23 years old at marriage. The ordinary pension to the widow of a captain is 50*l.*, of a lieutenant 40*l.*, and of an ensign 36*l.* a year. The special pensions, at higher rates than these, to the widows of officers killed in action or dying from illness contracted in the field, are proposed to be retained.

There is a maxim of Bacon's, in his "Regimen of Health," which is applicable to this subject: "Beware of any sudden change in any great point of diet, and if necessity enforce it, fit the rest to it; for it is a secret both in nature and in state that it is safer to change many things than one." In this case necessity *has* enforced a great change*, and the chief object of my proposals has been to "fit the rest to it;" for it is evident that this is one of the instances in which "it is safer to change many things than one."

Expediency of adapting the other circumstances of the Service to the impending change.

Treasury, 25 July 1857.

C. E. Trevelyan.

(No. 1.)

Constabulary Office, Dublin Castle,
22 August 1856.

REGULATIONS under which Gentlemen are to be admitted as Cadets of Constabulary.

I.

No person will be admitted as a cadet, who is not of sound constitution, or who is subject to any mental or physical inability.

II.

The candidate must be unmarried, and between the ages of 18 and 24 years.

III.

The candidate will be required to produce a certified copy of the registry of his birth, or some other satisfactory proof of his age, and a certificate of his moral character from the clergyman of his church in the parish in which he resides, or from two magistrates of the county.

IV.

Every gentleman on being *nominated* for a cadetship will receive intimation of the day on which he ought to present himself at Dublin Castle, to go through a competitive examination with other candidates for the appointment.

The candidate who is placed *first* by the Examining Board will, on his nomination being confirmed by the Lord Lieutenant, be ordered to the depôt. But, previously to his entering on his course of instruction there, some person on his behalf must become answerable to the commandant of the depôt, that such cadet, in addition to his regulated pay, shall receive a sum at the rate of 50*l.* per annum, until his appointment to the office of sub-inspector.

V.

The examination will comprise—

1st. Writing to dictation, in order to test the candidate's orthography, handwriting, and readiness.

2ndly. Arithmetic generally, but especially in numeration, and the first four rules, simple and compound, in proportion, interest, per-centage, vulgar and decimal fractions.

3rdly. Each candidate will also be tested in the rapidity with which he can perform compound addition.

4thly. Questions in geography, particularly the geography of Ireland.

5thly. Composition, with the view of discovering the ability of the candidates to draw up such reports as are continually required of the officers of the force.

VI.

The cadet will be borne on the strength of the reserve, as a constable, but will be allowed to occupy the quarters, wear the undress uniform, and perform the duties of an officer.

VII. The

* The Act 49 Geo. 3, c. 126, which ordains that an officer who pays more than the regulation price for his commission shall be cashiered, and that an officer who sells his commission for more than that price shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, has been re-published and re-affirmed in the new edition of the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army, dated on the 1st of the present month.—See pages 71-2. This Act of Parliament should clearly either be enforced or repealed. Everybody must feel the depressing moral influence of a system which at once ostentatiously promulgates and avowedly evades the highest legal sanctions.

VII.

The cadets will be appointed to the rank of sub-inspector, as vacancies offer, according to their standing, proficiency, and conduct.

VIII.

But cadets, being only in a state of probation, will not be considered as permanently attached to the force until they attain to the rank of sub-inspector, and they are clearly to understand, that if, in the interim, His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant should be pleased to dispense with their services, in consequence either of unfavourable reports received of their conduct or proficiency while at the depôt, or of their character and position previous to their joining it, they are not to expect or require any reason to be assigned for their removal from the establishment, on which account it will not be *obligatory* on a cadet to purchase uniform, or to incur any other expense, consequent on his belonging to the force.

(By command of the Lord Lieutenant,)

D. M'Gregor,

Inspector-General

(No. 2.)

Constabulary Office, Dublin Castle,
16 September 1856.

COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS in the Constabulary Force.

HIS Excellency the Lord Lieutenant having been pleased to direct that constabulary cadets shall only be appointed after competitive examinations, the same rule will be extended to those cadetships which may be placed at the Inspector-General's disposal.

2. Henceforward, therefore, when such a vacancy shall occur, the first four head constables, or officers' sons (as the case may be) whose names are on the Inspector-General's list, will be called to Dublin to compete for it.

3. The candidates will be examined in the several branches specified in the printed paper dated the 22nd August 1856.*

4. To perfection in each branch will be attached a fixed number, from which will be deducted for every mistake or defect a certain number, and the candidate who at the close of the examination, shall have retained the highest number, will be selected for recommendation to His Excellency for the appointment. But it is to be observed, with regard to head constable candidates, that a certain number will be given to them for every year's service in the force and as a head constable, as well as for every chevron, or other proof of their past eminent efficiency. They will also be examined as to their knowledge of police duties, and the general regulations of the force, to which corresponding numbers will be attached, but those numbers will not relieve them from the consequences referred to at No. 6. If, with those advantages accorded to the old and zealous head constables, they should still be unable successfully to compete with their younger comrades, it can only be regretted that the eventual good of the service, and the encouragement that ought to be given to the aspiring young men of the establishment, to qualify themselves by superior education for advancement, will render it necessary to pass over, perhaps, not a few of the respectable senior members of the force.

5. All the unsuccessful head constables will be permitted to undergo a second competitive trial, after the lapse of a period of not less than one year; provided they shall not have come under the objection at No. 6.

6. Should any candidate fail, at his first examination, to gain, in any one branch, a number equal to *one-third* of the highest number annexed to that branch, or fail, on the whole examination, to secure a number equal to *one-half* of the highest number that could possibly be acquired, he shall be finally rejected without the possibility of another trial, though he may be pronounced superior to any of his competitors.

7. In such a case, four new candidates would be called forward to contend for the appointment.

8. Should any candidate selected for examination decline coming forward, it is requested that he will forthwith communicate his intention to the Inspector-General, in order that another may be invited to attend. But the candidate declining to present himself from any cause whatever, will not have another opportunity of appearing for at least one year there-
after

* See the preceding Paper.

after. And unless his reasons for not appearing prove perfectly satisfactory, he will not be examined at all.

9. The successful head constable will continue to discharge the duties of that rank, until he be appointed in his turn to a sub-inspectorship.

10. The usual travelling expenses will be granted to the head constables in coming to and returning from Dublin for their first, but not for their second examination.

11. The foregoing regulations will also be applied (except in cases of very extraordinary merit, which seldom occur) to the promotion of constables to the rank of second head constable, and of head constables of the second class to the grade of first class.

12. Vacancies in these ranks will be filled up as far as a due regard for the service will allow, by candidates stationed in the counties and ridings in which they occur; with which object a city will form a part of the county in which it is situated.

13. When a first-class head constableness shall become vacant, four old and respectable head constables of the second class will be called to Dublin to undergo a competitive examination for the appointment. The examinations will be conducted on the same conditions, and in the same branches as that for a cadetship, with the exception of vulgar and decimal fractions, which will be dispensed with; and should all the candidates fail (*see* No. 6) four additional candidates will be brought forward, it may be from other counties or ridings, as well as that in which the vacancy has fallen.

14. In the case of constables competing for second-class head constablenesses, they will only be required, in geography, to answer questions relating to their county, and to every county adjoining; and in arithmetic the examination will be confined to the first four rules, simple and compound, to proportion, or the rule of three, and to separate addition to test the candidate's rapidity, nor will they be finally rejected unless they fail in any one branch in gaining a number equal to *one-fourth* of the highest number annexed to that branch, or fail on the whole examination, in showing a number equal to one-third of the number denoting perfection.

D. M^r Gregor,
Inspector-General

Should this scheme be found, on experience, to work well, it will probably be applied, with necessary modifications, to the promotion of the junior ranks.—D. M^r G.

(No. 3.)

COMPETITIVE EXAMINATION for Cadetship (Irish Constabulary).

The numbers assigned to *perfection* in the several heads of examination are as follow:—

Arithmetic, including fractions, vulgar and decimal - - - -	344
Separate addition of money, to test rapidity and accuracy - - -	26
Geography - - - - -	90
Writing to dictation:	
To test Orthography - - - - -	80
Handwriting - - - - -	20
	100
Composition (English) - - - - -	100
For every year's service in the force - - - - -	2
For every year's service as head constable - - - - -	3
For every chevron* - - - - -	10
For other recorded proofs of former efficiency (the maximum) - -	25
For knowledge of police duties and the general regulations of the force (maximum) - - - - -	50

The arithmetical examination comprises the following rules, the numbers assigned to each branch being as stated below:

Notation, enumeration, and the four simple rules - - - -	48
Four compound rules - - - - -	72
Proportion, interest, per-centage - - - - -	104
Vulgar and decimal fractions - - - - -	120
	344
TOTAL (as above) - - - -	

* A peculiar mark of distinction for gallant conduct, difficult of attainment.

Sir,

Treasury, 1 July 1858.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving the copy you were so good as to direct to be forwarded to me of the Report of the Committee appointed by the late Secretary of State for War, to examine and report upon the statement, showing the practical application of the proposals contained in my evidence before the Royal Commission on the Purchase and Sale of Commissions in the Army.

Although the observations which I have to make upon some of the particulars embraced in that Report, and the conclusions which have been deduced from them by the Committee, and also upon the contents of the memorandum which has been appended to the Report, will require more time than I can at present devote to the subject, consistently with the discharge of my public duties, I think it right to apprise you that the subject does not appear to me to have been stated with that completeness which would enable an impartial opinion to be formed of the effects, financially or otherwise, of my proposals upon the interests of the public, or of the military officers who are immediately concerned in the changes recommended by me; and that it is my intention to submit to you my reasons for differing from the Committee in some important respects.

In the event of a copy of the Report of the Committee being submitted to Parliament, I hope you will, in justice to me, and in order to a proper understanding of the subject, obtain permission to append to it a copy of my evidence and statement, and of this letter.

The Right Hon.
Major-General Peel, M.P.,
&c. &c.

I have, &c.
(signed) C. E. Trevelyan.

ARMY (PURCHASE OF COMMISSIONS).

COPY of REPORT upon the EVIDENCE given by,
Sir Charles Trevelyan before the COMMISSION
appointed to inquire into the PURCHASE and
SALE of COMMISSIONS in the ARMY; together
with a Copy of Sir Charles Trevelyan's EVIDENCE
and STATEMENTS, and of his LETTER to the
Secretary of State for War, dated 1 July 1858.

(Colonel North.)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
30 July 1858.
