

R E P O R T

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

EAST INDIA (TRANSPORT OF TROOPS);

WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
1 July 1858,*

Jovis, 4° die Februarii, 1858.

Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed to inquire concerning the measures resorted to, or which were available, and as to the Lines of Communication adopted for reinforcing our Army during the pending Revolt in India; and to report thereon to this House, with a view to ascertaining the arrangements which should be made towards meeting any future important emergencies involving the security of our Eastern Dominions.

Lunæ, 8° die Februarii, 1858.

Committee nominated, as follows:—

Sir De Lacy Evans.	Sir Charles Napier.
Viscount Goderich.	Mr. Osborne.
Lord Stanley.	Captain Vivian.
Sir John Pakington.	Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir Ed. Colebrooke.	Mr. Crawford.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Seymour.
Mr. Adderley.	

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Ordered, THAT the Returns (presented 5th February) relative to Transport and Conveyance of Troops be referred to the Committee.

Martis, 23° die Martii, 1858.

Ordered, THAT Mr. Sclater-Booth, Lord John Hay, and Mr. Adderley, be added to the Committee.

Jovis, 1° die Julii, 1858.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to report their Opinion, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to The House.

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R E P O R T.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire concerning the measures resorted to, or which were available, and as to the Lines of Communication adopted for reinforcing our Army during the pending Revolt in India, and to report thereon to The House, with a view to ascertaining the arrangements which should be made towards meeting any future important emergencies involving the security of our Eastern Dominions;—HAVE considered the Matters to them referred, and have come to the following RESOLUTIONS, which, together with the Evidence taken before them, they have agreed to report to The House:—

1. THAT the Inquiry which this Committee has been appointed to conduct may be divided into three branches: the first, relating to the Overland Route to India; the second, to the employment of Steamers, as compared with Sailing Vessels, for the Transport of Troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made during the Mutiny of the Military resources of this country and of the Colonies.

2. That the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the Mutiny at Meerut to have been sensible of the advantages of the Overland Route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political and other considerations deterred Her Majesty's Ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation.

3. That the Committee cannot judge of the validity of those political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the first week of September, when the more serious character of the war and the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, led to a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a compliance with it on the part of the Cabinet.

4. That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the Overland Route at the earliest possible period, and, apart from such considerations, it is much to be regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the evidence laid before the Committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape as to give any great advantage in favour of this route.

5. That although the Overland Route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India.

6. That if Steamers had been used in greater numbers, the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by Sailing Vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of Steam transport was attainable,

attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of Steam Vessels than were actually employed.

7. That Steamers should for the future be always made use of, as far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of the ordinary reliefs the Committee would not recommend the adoption of so costly a mode of transport.

8. That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape, without loss of time, forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course.

9. That the Committee observe with satisfaction that the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country, and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies.

10. That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the Army in India during the past year.

1 July 1858.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Jovis, 11^o die Februarii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir De Lacy Evans.	Mr. Byng.
Lord Stanley.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Adderley.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Sir Charles Napier.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Horsman.	

Sir DE LACY EVANS was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, at Twelve.

Martis, 16^o die Februarii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Bernal Osborne.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Byng.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	Sir Charles Napier.
Mr. Crawford.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Willoughby.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Adderley.

The Committee proceeded to the consideration of their course of proceeding.

Motion made and question proposed (Sir *J. Pakington*), "That the inquiries of this Committee ought to commence from the day on which it was determined by Her Majesty's Government and the Court of Directors, on account of the mutiny in India, that it was necessary to send reinforcements to our army in that country":—Amendment proposed (Mr. *Crawford*), to leave out all the words after the word, "That," in order to add these words: "The inquiries of this Committee should commence from the date when the Government and Board of Directors received the first despatches communicating the meeting at Barrackpore and elsewhere, in February":—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 8.
Sir Charles Napier.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Sir John Pakington.	Mr. Willoughby.
Lord Stanley.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Lord Goderich.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Osborne.	Mr. Crawford.
	Mr. Seymour.
	Mr. Byng.
	Mr. Adderley.

Words added. Main question as amended put and agreed to.

The Committee called and examined Mr. *Philip Melvill*, and Mr. *Mason*.

[Adjourned to Friday, at Twelve.

Veneris, 19^o die Februarii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.

Mr. Horsman.

Mr. Osborne.

Mr. Seymour.

Sir James Elphinstone.

Sir E. Colebrooke.

Mr. Crawford.

Captain Vivian.

Sir John Pakington.

Sir C. Napier.

Mr. Willoughby.

Lord Stanley.

The Committee examined Captain *Shepherd*.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, at Twelve.

Martis, 23^o die Februarii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.

Mr. Byng.

Mr. Seymour.

Lord Stanley.

Sir Charles Napier.

Sir James Elphinstone.

Mr. Willoughby.

Sir E. Colebrooke.

Captain Vivian.

Mr. Horsman.

Mr. Crawford.

The Committee examined Mr. *Lumsden*, Captain *Harris*, and Mr. *Mason*.

[Adjourned to Friday, at Twelve.

Veneris, 26^o die Februarii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Byng.

Mr. Adderley.

Mr. Seymour.

Captain Vivian.

Mr. Crawford.

Lord Goderich.

Sir Charles Napier.

Sir James Elphinstone.

Mr. Willoughby.

Sir E. Colebrooke.

Mr. Osborne.

The Committee examined Mr. *Mangles*, a Member of the House, Mr. *Mead*, and Admiral Sir *H. Leake*.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, 16th March, at Twelve.

Martis, 16^o die Martii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Byng.

Captain Vivian.

Mr. Crawford.

Mr. Horsman.

Lord Goderich.

Sir C. Napier.

Mr. Willoughby.

Sir James Elphinstone.

Sir E. Colebrooke.

Mr. Danby Seymour.

The Committee examined Admiral *Milne* and Captain *Hoseason*.

[Adjourned to Friday, at Twelve.

Veneris, 19^o die Martii, 1858.

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Lord Goderich.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Crawford.

Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Danby Seymour.
Mr. Byng.

The Committee examined the Right hon. *Vernon Smith*, Sir *Allan Macnab*, and Sir *Henry Storks*.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, at 12.

Martis, 23^o die Martii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Lord Goderich.
Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Crawford.

Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir Edward Colebrooke.
Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Danby Seymour.
Captain Vivian.

The Committee examined the Right hon. *H. Labouchere*, a Member of the House, and Sir *Frederick Currie*.

The following question being put to the witness (Mr. *Seymour*): "What does the oath of secrecy relate to?"—An objection was taken to the question (*The Chairman*).—Question put, "That that question be put." Committee divided:

- Ayes, 4.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Seymour.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.

Noes, 3.
Lord Goderich.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Byng.

The examination of the witness was resumed.

The Committee examined Sir *George Clerk*.

[Adjourned to Friday, at Twelve.

Veneris, 26^o die Martii, 1858.

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Selater-Booth.
Mr. Byng.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Crawford.
Captain Vivian.

Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Willoughby.
Lord John Hay.
Sir Charles Napier.
Mr. Osborne.

The Committee examined Captain *Engledue*, superintendent of the Peninsula and Oriental Company, at Southampton, Mr. *Allan*, Mr. *Hertslet*, and Mr. *Beatson*, staff surgeon.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, 13th April, at 12.

Martis, 13^o die Aprilis, 1858.

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir Charles Napier.	Lord John Hay.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Byng.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Captain Vivian.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned.]

Martis, 8. die Junii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Lord Goderich.	Captain Vivian.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Sir Charles Napier.	Mr. Bernal Osborne.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Lord John Hay.	Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Byng.	Sir James Elphinstone.

A draft report proposed by the Chairman, was read 1^o as follows:

“ The Minutes of the Evidence and the Documentary Statements annexed to this Report are for the most part from highly reliable sources, individual and official. The greater number of Witnesses were specially conversant and of much experience in connexion with the topics on which they were examined; and their testimony is the more valuable, having been obviously given with no other motive than that of furthering the public interests. The results of this investigation will therefore, it is hoped, be found to contain information well calculated to lead henceforth, on the questions referred to, to correct conclusions both as to the past and future.

“ With this preliminary observation, your Committee will now endeavour to point out as briefly as possible—

“ 1st. What measures appear to have been resorted to, in order rapidly to reinforce our army in India.

“ 2d. What might in some specified instances have been preferably adopted, with a view to accelerate the transmission of these reinforcements.

I.

“PRECEDING INCIDENTS.

1943.

“ On the 9th of April was received the first telegram of symptoms of disaffection in the sepoy ranks; of incendiary fires at different points, attributed to sepoys; and of a mutinous spirit in several native regiments stationed near Calcutta.

“ In the copies of despatches transmitted to this Committee, and particularly that of the 11th of February from General Hearsey (considered one of the most competent officers and best acquainted with the natives of any in India), there were already strong expressions of anticipated danger, such as, ‘We have at Barrackpore been dwelling upon a mine ready for explosion.’—Well might Sir C. Metcalfe say, that he expected to awake some fine morning and find India had been lost to the English Crown.’

“ From that period commenced a considerable anxiety in the public mind concerning Indian affairs. On the 19th of May a former Governor-General, inquired in the House of Lords whether reinforcements were being sent to India. The Minister for War replied in the affirmative, but added, ‘that the intelligence recently received from India had not been such as to create any apprehension in the minds of Her Majesty’s Ministers for the safety of our Indian dominions.’ In the House of Commons also (June 11), Ministers declared that the public need be ‘in no alarm as to the recent unfortunate occurrences, as the late disaffection among the troops in India had been put an end to.’

“ It

" It appears from the evidence of Colonel Sir H. Storks, of the War Department, that 'so soon as the first inkling of the mutiny in India took place,' the intelligence regarding which arrived on the 9th of April 1857, the Secretary of State for War addressed the President of the Board of Control (April 14), recommending a permanent increase of two regiments of infantry to the establishment of the Queen's troops in India,—in consideration of the 'recent occurrences in India,'—of the 'vast territories' of late years annexed to the possessions of the East India Company; and to supply the place of the troops detached for the 'War in Persia.' Certainly, for the augmented requirements thus shadowed forth, two regiments must seem but a scanty provision.

1945.

But it would appear that this communication of April 14 was not transmitted to the Court of Directors, by whom its receipt is denied.

" It appears in the same evidence, that the Court of Directors of the East India Company applied, in the latter part of April, for four regiments to replace the four regiments diverted from their Indian destination to China. The reason given for this requisition being—'the uncertainty of the duration of the operations in China.' On the 2d of May, the Secretary of State for War requested His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief to make arrangements for sending four regiments without delay to India, in conformity with the requisition of the Court of Directors. On the 21st of May, the Under Secretary of State for War, Sir Benjamin Hawes, addressed the Board of Control, to the effect, 'That, in the opinion of the War Department, the reinforcements to India ought not to be despatched later than the 20th June.' But Mr. Melville, the Secretary to the Military Department of the East India Company, states in effect, that till the accounts of the outbreak at Meerut, no anxiety as to the insufficiency of British troops prevailed 'on the part of the Governor-general,' nor 'in the Court of Directors.' That the communication made by Lord Canning was so 'satisfactory that no serious anxiety was entertained.' The director, Captain Shepherd, corroborates Mr. Melville. Some official statements in Parliament were of a similar import.

May 2 and 4.

260.

36.

183.

185.

187.

336.

" II.

" REVOLT at MEERUT, SEIZURE of DELHI by the MUTINEERS, 10th and 11th of May.

" On the night of the 26th or morning of the 27th of June, telegram of these events reached London. This telegram arrived at noon, on the 26th of June, at Trieste, bringing intelligence from Alexandria of June 21; from Bombay, May 27; Calcutta, May 18; Madras, May 25. Its transit was therefore about 20 hours from Trieste; six days from Alexandria; from Bombay to London 31 days; from Calcutta to London 40 days.

2175.

" Including 4,000 European troops then detached to Persia, the British portion of our Eastern army was then between 8,000 and 9,000 below its establishment. We had been rapidly annexing kingdoms to our already vast territory, while diminishing in an inverse ratio the means of securing the results of that ambitious policy.

1804.

" Various indications of the extension of hostility to our rule were now but too quickly perceivable. Over a line of 1,500 miles, from Calcutta to Peshawar, our utterly unprepared and isolated detachments, being in a few days outnumbered everywhere by unexpected foes, were placed in unparalleled difficulties.

" The political and material advantages accruing to the rebels by their seizure of Delhi were of the utmost magnitude. It was so appreciated throughout Asia and Europe. Every day, every hour of their retention of that fortress imperiled our dominion. The urgency of remedying this state of affairs was surely impossible to exaggerate. Such also, to the fullest extent, were the opinions of the Governor-general, as expressed in several of his telegraphic orders.

" For this purpose, then, to collect and despatch reinforcements by the speediest means, and by every practicable exertion, to the scene of action, became the most pressing duty of Government. They could only be collected from the forces in the United Kingdom, from those in the colonies, and, especially in the first instance, from the stations nearest India,—Ceylon, the Mauritius, the Cape. Accordingly, application to the Governors of these nearest colonies was immediately resolved on by the supreme authorities of the different Presidencies.

" Sir H. Lawrence, from Lucknow, on the 16th of May, telegraphed to the Governor-General, 'All is quiet here, but affairs are critical: get every European you can from China, Ceylon, and elsewhere; also all the Goorkas from the hills: time is everything.'

" Sir John Lawrence telegraphed for the Governor-General, June 3:—'All is safe as yet in the Punjab; but the aspect of affairs most threatening. The whole native army are ready to break out; and unless a blow be soon struck, the Irregulars as a body will soon follow their example. Send for our troops from Persia; intercept the force now on its way to China, and bring it to Calcutta. Every European soldier will be required to save the country, if the whole of the native troops turn against us. This is the opinion of all the leading men here. Every precaution which foresight can dictate is being taken, to hold our own independently of the natives.'

" On the 17th May Lord Elphinstone telegraphed for authority, from the Governor-General, to despatch a fast steamer to Suez, to convey to the Home Government, as early as possible, the disastrous news from Delhi. This suggestion, the Governor-General did not deem it necessary to accede to.—Mr. Melville, the Military Secretary of the East India Company, estimates the time thus lost in transmitting the intelligence at about 10 days, 'not more.'

Papers laid before Parliament.

1209.

48.

49.

50.

1943. "Lord Elgin immediately assented to the desire of Lord Canning to postpone the Chinese operations, and to re-divert to Calcutta the four regiments on their way to Canton, which had been originally destined for India—two for reliefs, the other two to replace the regiments withdrawn from the Indian establishment during the Russian war. Lord Elgin also repaired himself to Calcutta, affording at the same time the opportune co-operation of the 'Shannon' and 'Sans Pareil' ships of war; the Government transports, 'Himalaya,' 'Assistance,' 'Assurance,' 'Simoom'; of a body of marines, and of the naval brigade of artillery, which has since so often performed, under Sir William Peel, such signal services.

"This reinforcement was highly opportune and important. Before its arrival at Calcutta that capital was not in security.

"III.

"CEYLON AND THE MAURITIUS.

2141. "The requisitions for assistance addressed to the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius were responded to in a manner entitling these authorities to the 'highest tribute of praise.'
2142. It was most 'meritorious.' Scarcely half a dozen hours had elapsed after his receipt of
2145. this requisition, when Sir Henry Ward had despatched from Ceylon to India nearly all the
4th June. force within the colony, retaining less than 300 British bayonets to maintain order in a population of one million seven hundred thousand.

"The praiseworthy promptitude of Governor Sir James Higginson was similarly displayed, by likewise almost denuding the Mauritius of its garrison. Never since its conquest, in 1810, was it left with so small a military defence.

4142. "The Government at home, seeing that from Ceylon there had been sent to India almost all its European troops, deemed it right to afford some substitute, by directing one regiment to be sent to that station; but Sir H. Ward, preferring to incur risk within his own command, despatched that regiment also, without delay, to Calcutta, and this at a time 'when there were not wanting rumours of the disposition on the part of the (Ceylon) population 'to disturbance and insurrection.'

"While touching, however, on the above incident in regard to the Mauritius, we are unwilling to leave without record in this report the offer of support, in case it should be required,—from the French Governor of the neighbouring island, extracts from which, and from the suitable reply of General Hay, are subjoined:

"The Governor of the Island of Bourbon (Réunion), to the Governor of the Mauritius,
14 September 1857.

"I know equally well that the troops at Mauritius have been, for the most part, sent to Bengal. You have more than 132,000 Indians in the island which you govern; these men, constantly in communication with Mussulmen of the revolted countries, have received letters inviting them, it is reported, to rise. It is to be feared that insurrectionary movements will disturb the sister island. The Government of the Emperor has sent me a garrison destined to replace the one which is to return to France after its term of colonial service is completed. This places, at the present moment, rather a large number of troops at my disposal. I am about to propose to you, that should you perceive any symptom of revolt, if the Indian population of your island should be considered, or should become excited by their co-religionists of the Peninsula, and should raise the standard, I would propose to you, I say, to place under your command a part of the garrison of Réunion. You have only to make a signal, and the French troops shall be under your orders.'

"Reply of Major-General Hay, administering the Government of Mauritius, to the Governor of Réunion.

"I beg to assure you that I feel the deepest gratitude for the noble offer of assistance you have made me, should the disastrous rebellion of the natives in India extend to the coolies in this island, and should I find myself placed in such a position as to require aid, I shall not hesitate to apply to you in the same frank and fraternal spirit which has dictated your generous offer.

"You will be pleased to hear that I have carefully watched the current of events and feelings here, and that I entertain no apprehension of a rising. I have, however, taken every precaution, and am prepared for whatever may occur.'

"IV.

"THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

"According to the last Colonial Statistical Tables presented to Parliament (for 1855), we find that the male white population of British South Africa, including Natal, numbered (British and Dutch) but 60,336; with a coloured population (Fingos and Hottentots), but little more numerous. The adults, therefore, of European origin may perhaps be estimated at one-fourth, or about 15,000.

2570.
Papers presented
to Parliament,
Despatch of Troops
to India, March
1858.

"From a return adduced in his evidence by Mr. Labouchere, the late Secretary of State for the Colonies, the troops in South Africa, on the 31st of July last, amounted, in 'rank and file,' to 10,666. It was a seasoned force. Assuming this return to be correct, we must add to it, for the non-rank and file, the most expensive as well as important element of efficiency, about 1,250.

"For colonial corps in the last official 'Tables' above quoted from, there are considerable items of charge for Kaffir and frontier police, mounted police, Fingo levies, &c., numbers not given. On the 7th of August, Governor Grey states his having augmented by 200 the BORDER MOUNTED POLICE, which he alludes to as a very efficient corps. He also states his intention of completing to its full establishment the Cape Mounted Rifles, viz. 1,084.

"The

“ The garrison of this dependency was therefore of the following strength :—

“ Artillery, engineers, 13 regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, rank, and file (by order of the Minister for War. ‘ War Department, ‘ November 12, 1856,’ the German Legionaries were directed ‘ to be told off’ into ‘ three regiments’ of about 800 men each) - -	10,666,
“ Non-rank and file (officers, serjeants, general staff departments, &c.) -	1,250
“ Colonial mounted and infantry police, border police corps, &c., for which charges are referred to of 74,000 l. per annum (£. 60,000 being mentioned as the Colonial charge; £. 14,000 from Imperial funds) - - - - -	1,300
“ TOTAL of all Ranks - - -	13,216

Page 12.

RETURN OF TROOPS
IN SOUTH AFRICA.
31st July 1857.

	Rank and File.
Artillery -	421
Engineers -	245
2d Foot -	746
6th „ -	717
12th „ -	409
13th „ -	768
45th „ -	850
60th „ -	717
73d „ -	745
80th „ -	779
85th „ -	769
89th „ -	707
Cape Mounted Rifles -	793
Three regi- ments of German Le- gion -	- 2,000
	10,666

(signed) R. Bates.
Major, Military
Secretary.

Officers, ser- jeants, staff, &c. -	1,250
Colonial Corps	1,300
TOTAL -	13,216

To which it appears should be added, a considerable force of volunteers, as thus alluded to in a despatch of November 26, 1857 (Appendix No. .)

“ ‘ When I assumed the Government there were no volunteer corps in existence. Since ‘ my arrival here 19 such corps have been raised, all armed, clothed (and mounted in the ‘ case of the cavalry) at their own cost. These are now, generally, in a state of high ‘ efficiency.’

“ No such inconsiderable community, in point of numbers, was probably ever before provided with so large an army,—not only free of cost to themselves, but with this extra important advantage, that the provisioning and requirements of the troops afforded the best possible market for the produce of various descriptions at the disposal of the colonists.

“ There is also an ‘ irregular mounted military force,’ referred to in the same despatch, as ‘ under the command of the general,’ of from 500 to 600 men, but not very distinctly particularised. Likewise a mounted ‘ police,’ (he says) ‘ paid out of a small reserved sche- ‘ dule of 14,000 l. per annum,’ granted from Imperial funds, ‘ for frontier purposes.’

“ Independent, however, of these circumstances, the comparative proximity of this station to India (being nearer to Calcutta than England by 7,200 miles), led justly to anticipation that powerful reinforcements would have been promptly transmitted from thence to the East. It will be seen in how far this was realised.

“ The actual state of ‘ starvation,’ and consequent prostration, into which the Kaffir tribes have fallen commenced in 1856, and is distinctly attributable to the ravages of the ‘ lung’ disease among their cattle. This disease also carried off many thousands of the cattle within our own provinces. The results, from this and other causes, lead to the inference, that REGULAR TROOPS were not then really required to be retained at the Cape to keep those tribes in check. The following extracts from despatches of the Governor appear to us to bear out this inference:—

State of the Kaffir
tribes.

“ To the Secretary of State, 14 July 1856.

“ ‘ IN British Kaffraria everything was quiet and prosperous; the natives, who, poor 14 July 1856.
‘ people, had suffered severely from the lung sickness among their cattle, were employed in
‘ large numbers in opening up the country by roads, and upon other public works, and ex-
‘ pressed themselves most grateful for the employment that was afforded to them.’

“ To the Secretary of State, 27 August 1857.

“ ‘ IF we are obliged to put forth our strength in India, I shall continue to augment the 27 August 1857.
‘ BORDER MOUNTED POLICE FORCE, and to get it into the highest state of efficiency; and
‘ if we are compelled to enter into any active operations against the native tribes, such ope-
‘ rations shall be principally carried on by rapid movements of the CAPE CORPS and the
‘ MOUNTED BORDER POLICE.’

“ To the Secretary of State, 2 November 1857.

“ ‘ THE Kaffir nation has been effectually crushed.’ 2 November 1857.

“ The Government of the Cape to the Governor-General of India, 25 August 1857.

“ SUGGESTS a proposition to receive in South Africa 10,000 sepoys, with their wives and 25 August 1857.
families, at the expense of the Indian treasury,—and observes—

“ ‘ It may not, however, be superfluous to state, that the colony is making rapid strides in
‘ material progress and social improvement; that the continuance of peace on the frontier,
‘ and the PROSPECT OF A COMPLETE EXEMPTION FOR THE FUTURE FROM KAFFIR WARS
‘ AND ALARMS, are working important changes throughout the colony, which may be traced
‘ in the enclosed, &c.’—The Governor-general transmitted this despatch to the Home
Government.

" REQUISITIONS FOR REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE CAPE.

" THE late Secretary of State for the Colonies directed the Governor of the Cape (June 29) to despatch a regiment of infantry to Calcutta 'as speedily as possible.' A regiment was also directed (July 14) to be sent 'forthwith' to Ceylon. Again, on the 26th of August, the Governor was instructed to send six regiments to India 'with as little delay as practicable.' The admiral on the station was at the same time directed to provide for this purpose maritime means of transport.

" On the 27th of November, the late Secretary of State for the Colonies again addressed the Governor as follows:—

" ' You are fully apprised of the desire of Her Majesty's Government that you should avail yourself of the circumstance of so large a number of troops being assembled in the British province of South Africa, to render the utmost assistance in your power to the Indian administration, and I trust that you will have been able to despatch considerable additional succours to that country, where seasoned troops will be especially valuable.—I should hope, from the accounts which I have lately received from you, that the present condition of the British provinces in South Africa, as well as of the native tribes in their vicinity, will have rendered such measures quite compatible with the due security of the colonists.'

" EXTRACT of a Despatch from the Right Honourable *H. Labouchere*, M.P., late Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Governor of the Cape, dated February 5, 1858.

Papers presented to Parliament, March 1858, p. 28.

" ' ALTHOUGH you have not fully complied with the instructions which I gave you in my despatch of the 26th August last, in which I expressed the expectation of Her Majesty's Government that you would be able to spare six regiments for service in India (including the one sent to Ceylon), retaining four in South Africa, besides the Cape Mounted Rifles and the German military settlers now under arms, and leaving you to determine, in conjunction with the Commander of the Forces, what particular regiments should be selected for that service.'

" ' I understand from your several despatches that the total amount of succours which you have sent to India and Ceylon from the force stationed at the Cape, have been four regiments and a detachment of artillery, viz:—95th Regiment, 800, which was sent to relieve the 89th; 13th Regiment, 500; 80th Regiment, 500 (sent to Ceylon); 6th Regiment, 760.'

Papers presented to Parliament, March 1858, p. 42.

" If this official statement of the Secretary of State be correct (and there is no reason to doubt it), no accounts had reached the Colonial Office up to February 5, 1858, that any greater reinforcements had been sent from the Cape to India than four regiments of infantry, numbering 2,560. Nine regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, besides artillery and engineers, having been therefore still retained by the Cape authorities.

" On the 29th of June (and 8th of July) Lord Elphinstone and the Council of Bombay addressed to the Governor of the Cape a most impressive representation of the alarming position of affairs in our eastern dominions,—soliciting 'four regiments of infantry and three companies of artillery to be sent to Bombay and Calcutta,' or, 'at the very least,' one regiment. This despatch reached the Cape on the 6th of August; and a reply was written to the Bombay Government, to the effect that one regiment, from the garrison of the Cape, the 95th (so soon as it should arrive from England) and one company of artillery, would be sent to that Presidency.

Page 20.

" There was at the same time a contingent promise, mentioned to the Secretary of State, as follows:

" ' I have, however, written to Sir James Jackson (the Commander of the Forces) requesting him to make every exertion to spare another regiment from this command; if we can with any safety accomplish this, such regiment shall immediately be sent on to Calcutta.' It was alleged that Sir J. Jackson was indisposed to send any troops from his command. No troops went, however, from thence till the 30th of August. On that day 400 or 500 men of the 13th regiment were embarked for India; in the following month, the 95th regiment was embarked.

Sir G. Grey. (No. 131.)

Pages 20, 23.

" The 89th, destined for New Zealand, the 23d and 93d, destined for China, and a relieved company of artillery destined for England, were diverted from these destinations to India by order of Sir G. Grey. But none of those corps belonged to the garrison of the Cape.

Papers presented to Parliament, March 1858, p. 17.

" The Governor of the Cape (November 5) informs the Secretary of State, that on 'mature consideration,' as the instructions of the 26th of August (directing six regiments to be sent forward to India) did not 'specially repeal' those of the 1st of August (directing only one regiment to be sent forward), he deems it for the 'public service' to continue to act on the more limited instruction of the 1st of August; 'for,' he adds, 'it does not do lightly to depart from a plan of operations once entered on.'—'It appears to me' (he goes on to say), 'to whom was entrusted THE FINEST VETERAN FORCE WHICH BELONGED TO ENGLAND,

‘ ENGLAND, that it was safer for these, and other reasons, not too largely to exceed the demands for troops made upon me.’—‘ The Indian Government’ (he further remarks), ‘ may have thought that disasters would result if too large masses of troops were suddenly poured into an unhealthy country.’—‘ It was most probable that no barrack accommodation existed for them.’

“ But it was obvious that the reinforcements requested, were for the *field*, not for *barracks*.

“ Although, as has been mentioned, the Kaffirs were officially represented (November 2d and 5th) as ‘ effectually crushed,’ ‘ completely broken,’ ‘ the prospect of complete exemption from future wars’ with them announced;—‘ the blessings of a lasting peace and ‘ a prosperity surpassing any expectations,’ predicted;—the Governor, notwithstanding, addresses the Secretary of State (November 11), as follows:—

Papers presented to Parliament, March 1858.

“ ‘ You informed me in your despatch of the 26th of August last, that two young regiments were coming out to relieve two veteran regiments in this colony. I think, until this relief is accomplished, no more troops can go on from hence to India; nor, indeed, are they at this moment required there.’

“ And yet at that date, the ‘ finest veteran force which belonged to England,’ had only afforded a reinforcement to India of two regiments and some artillery. In the return before quoted, the rank and file of artillery at the Cape (31 July 1857), were 421. In the statement of General Peel, in the House of Commons (25 March), the artillery, rank and file, at the Cape, at the date of the last returns (1 December 1857), were 353.—Difference 68. While at the same time, the Governor-General had not yet a sufficient number of soldiers at his disposal, to rescue the beleagured women, children, and sick, from Lucknow!

“ And nearly at the same period, the condition of the survivors of the starving and helpless tribes, to guard against whom so many troops were still withheld from India, was described, as follows, by the Governor, in his despatch (Appendix, No.).

“ ‘ The Kaffir population has dispersed, upwards of thirty thousand have become hired servants in the colony, some thousands have fled to Faku’s country, and beyond it, some thousands to Moshesh’s country, some thousands, I fear, have perished, and some thousands have been supported by charitable aid afforded them.’—‘ It will be found that sixty-eight thousand and thirty-four souls, that is, two-thirds of the population, have disappeared from British Kaffraria alone in the first seven months of this year.’

Appendix, No.

“ It was under those circumstances that ‘ Her Majesty’s (late) Government thought it right to point out,’ ‘ discrepancies’ and ‘ conflicting statements’ in the representations from the Cape relative to the Kaffirs, and as to the reasons assigned for placing the German Legionary settlers on ‘ full pay and field allowances,’ ‘ although there was no enemy in the field, nor any present apprehension of such an enemy:’ (and though there were then in the colony) ‘ no less than ten British regiments, besides the Cape Mounted Rifles.’

Appendix, Nos.

“ General Sir George Napier, who was Governor of the Cape for six years, and maintained peace throughout that period, states in his evidence (1851),—‘ The Committee must be aware that there are a great many people in the colony, who make a great deal of money by wars, whose constant cry was ‘ HAVE MORE TROOPS.’

Committee of Inquiry, 1851.

“ Sir George Clerk, who was recently Special Commissioner on the Kaffir frontier, was offered the appointment of Governor, and who may fairly therefore be regarded as well and intimately acquainted with this topic,—states in his evidence that the Dutch settlers are quite capable of restraining Kaffir trespassing and cattle-lifting propensities, without the aid of any British regular troops or of regular military operations. The Kaffirs, he adds, are not a people likely to invade our territory, unless their pasture-lands are attempted to be taken from them. The many thousands of them who have lately passed in a starving state, seeking for labour within our territory, can be restrained (he is of opinion) from any disorderly conduct by the local police.

2237.

2243.

2250.

“ But this witness goes on to state, that the prosperity of this colony depends on the expenditure from the military chest; that the greater the amount of this expenditure, the more it contributes to the profit and good humour of the colonists; that a Governor would thus find things made much easier to him in every way, by retaining ‘ a large army expending there money brought from England.’

2226.

2229.

2237.

2241.

“ The expenditure from the Imperial Treasury for the forces above enumerated, has been at the rate of 600,000*l.* per annum. The Home Government have, however, to defray large additional sums beyond the above 600,000*l.* for maintaining the forces referred to; for instance, share of recruiting expenses, of transport of reliefs and drafts, for clothing, arms, and military stores, share of pension, invalid and non-effective charges. Such an extent of disbursement must of course be well calculated to gratify and enhance the ‘ material prosperity’ of its recipients, whose scanty numbers (and consequently greater advantage) have been already given from official returns.

“ And in these facts may no doubt be traced an explanation of the apparent remarkable tardiness, in parting with troops from this colony, to succour on the present occasion our Eastern, as previously (it is said) our Crimean Army.

“ But

“ But the description in Sir G. Grey’s despatch, already quoted, of the ruin of the Kaffir tribes, is fully corroborated by the last intelligence from that colony, published in the ‘ Cape Town Mail ’ of March 22d, of which the following is an extract :—

“ ‘ The Royal Mail Steamer “ Bosphorus ” leaves for England this afternoon.

“ ‘ The breaking up of the late formidable Caffre nation seems to be almost completed. Kreili, the paramount chief, being called to account for his conduct, has fled beyond the the Bashee River, leaving depopulated all the country between that river and the Kei. Four of the other principal chiefs sentenced, after formal trial, to imprisonment for various crimes—Macomo, Seyolo, Vandana, and Quesha—are at present confined on Robben Island, at the entrance of Table Bay, and another, the much-trusted Pato, in the Cape Town prison. Dilima, son of the last-mentioned chief, has also been apprehended and convicted of “ horse-stealing.”

“ ‘ The last year’s revenue had been 65,000*l.* in excess of the expenditure.’

“ Finally, taking all the circumstances to which our attention has been directed, into consideration,—the local interests of border farmers or graziers in Africa, on the one hand,—and on the other, the requirements of a great war still raging in the most important dependency of the empire,—your Committee are of opinion, that of the 13,000 efficient troops of all ranks at the Cape, besides numerous volunteer corps, 9,000 or 10,000 men might, and ought to have been spared for reinforcing the army in India. This assumes that a portion of the most favoured of all military corps (the German Legionaries) would have been willing to participate in field duty. Even if the larger number (10,000) were despatched, there might have still remained a German regiment of 800, Cape Mounted Rifles 1,084, foot and mounted police 1,300, total 3,184, besides the organized volunteers; altogether an ample force for the totally improbable eventuality of any operations against the wretched remains of the Kaffir people. And if the Home Government and the Government of India had been without delay informed by the authorities of the Cape, that such an amount of succour would be available, we may safely assume that means would have been procured to place, before the end of the last year, this powerful aid at the disposal of our commanders on the Ganges.

“ Of our small and widely dispersed army, it should be borne in mind, that, independent of India, about fifty regiments are usually stationed in distant colonies or garrisons, for the most part, thousands of miles asunder. This includes about 9,000 men of colonial corps. It is important then that prompt and unqualified action in regard to inter-co-operation by the civil and military chiefs of these various detached forces should be peremptorily enjoined by the supreme Government, for all occurrences of any serious or unforeseen national exigency.

“ But the principle, even without any instruction from Government, which should guide our remote authorities on such critical occasions, has been so well and patriotically laid down in a passage of Governor Sir Henry Ward’s despatch to Viscount Canning, of the 1st of June 1857, that we trust it may be of utility to quote it in this place.

“ ‘ I mention this (he says) to show that not a moment has been lost here in complying with your Lordship’s wishes at so critical a moment. But in justice to the Major-general (Lockyer), as well as to myself, I must add, that nothing but the strongest sense of duty could have induced us to hazard the step which we have taken. *We feel that it is in India at the present moment that the battle of British supremacy must be fought; that it is upon India that the prestige of England depends; and that all minor considerations must be lost sight of, to sustain the national honour.* Although, therefore, I see clearly that by reducing the English element in the small military force maintained here too low, we lose our best security for the good behaviour of the rest, and that with large capitals invested, and small groups of planters scattered over separate districts, we might be reduced by any sudden combination against us to the state of the European communities in the valley of the Ganges, whose perils your Lordship so feelingly describes, I prefer this responsibility to that of withholding the aid which your Lordship asks, and which circumstances so imperiously require.’

“ Such also was the conduct of the civil and military chiefs of the Mauritius;—so likewise, in a brilliant degree, at a previous period, was that of the civil and military chiefs of Malta (Sir W. Reid and General Sir James Ferguson), who, on hearing of the dangerously reduced numbers of our army in the Crimea towards the close of 1854 immediately despatched thither, without waiting for orders from any quarter, every British soldier on the island,—trusting to the inhabitants for its defence.”

“ V.

“ CANADA.

“ On the arrival of the eventful accounts from the East, there were in Canada and the adjoining provinces, no very considerable body of troops. But not only was the immediate withdrawal of the chief portion of them, cordially concurred in by the authorities and population of that colony,—but the spontaneous offers to raise Canadian regiments in aid of the parent State, made during the Crimean war, were now again transmitted, in a similar spirit of patriotism.

"Canada is increasing in population and resources, very much more rapidly than the United States, or any other portion of that continent. This and the other less considerable provinces of British North America, now contain a population of 3,000,000,—which was about that of the United States, when they successfully contended with and threw off the yoke of England. This noble dependency, is evidently destined to become at no distant period a powerful State.

2051.
2054.
2055.

"Through its centre flows into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the greatest estuary in the world. On the shores of the chain of lakes or inland seas, of which this estuary is the only outlet, is now or ere long will be, an extraordinary amount of agricultural produce for exportation. On its northern bank is the fortress of Québec, whose port is already so considerable an entrepôt, and in which there have been of late as many at a time, as 1,300 vessels.—Such are the maritime prospects and resources of these shores, of above a thousand miles extent.

30.

"We have had the evidence on this topic of Sir Allan MacNab. This gentleman originally served as a British officer in the war with the United States, of 1812, 1813, and 1814. Since then, he has filled several of the highest official appointments in that country, including those of President of the Chamber of Deputies and President of the Executive Council, or chief Minister.

"He states that a very remarkable feeling of loyalty and attachment to the mother country exists in Upper Canada;—that it was settled by the United Empire Loyalists, a description of people who, rather than forfeit their allegiance, left their property in the United States and accepted grants of land from the Crown;—also by half-pay officers and soldiers who had served during the old revolutionary war. In fact (he says), all the leading families of Upper Canada are men of that description now; and in Lower Canada no men could have behaved better than the Frenchmen did, during the last American war.

2048.

"He is of opinion that the French part of the population, are similarly attached with the British of Upper Canada, to the alliance with England; that they are a 'very well inclined, very loyal, and very excellent people.'

2057.

"'They (French and English) want,' he says, 'what they are fairly entitled to, namely, to have the British army opened to them as it is opened here. I do not see any difference in a man born in Canada and a man born in England.'

"They were desirous, he states, as does also the late Secretary of State for the Colonies, of raising Canadian troops to aid us, during the Crimean war; as recently for the war in India. He thinks that if this force had been officered by Canadians, the commanders and staff to have been taken from the British army,—that in such case, the Canadians would have felt that it was the opening of a new profession to the young gentlemen of that country; and—'THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MIXING THEM UP WITH THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE GENERAL DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE.'

2055.

"A corps is now, it appears, at length to be embodied in Canada,—but not quite, we regret to perceive, in conformity with the opinion of this witness,—as a large proportion of the officers are to be British. Appendix, No.

"We have had and are but too likely to continue to have, abundant reason to regret, that our former policy towards the United States has, it may be feared, engendered in that now powerful federation, feelings towards the parent State, rather of rivalry or alienation than attachment. We should sedulously avoid a similar error in respect to the remaining portion of that great continent, which still willingly acknowledges our sovereignty. The people of the home territory of this empire, can scarcely be deemed adequate to the varied and immense responsibilities they are so wont to undertake. Not only the present but future contingencies of war are within the scope of the inquiry of this Committee. Emergencies may yet arise to task us beyond our unaided means. In such an event, to be enabled to count on the cordial and powerful co-operation, of a numerous and gallant kindred race, at no great distance from our shores, would certainly be a resource greatly desirable. With this view then, to increase the ties of mutual sympathy between us and such truly loyal fellow-subjects, will, in the opinion of your Committee, be a sound policy; and to this end no course seems more likely to contribute, than that of identifying them with our army and with our military enterprises.

" VI.

"THE QUESTION OF STEAM OR SAILING VESSELS, FOR TRANSPORT OF TROOPS
INDIA.

"OUR last war with a revolted colony, that of the United States, was eminently unsuccessful. One of the causes assigned for the failures in that contest, was that the colonists were near to, or in the midst of their own resources, however insufficient these resources sometimes might be;—while England had to convey her troops, stores and reinforcements, over a sea line of 3,000 miles. But the advantages of a short line of communication between a base of operations or source of supply and an army in the field, need no demonstration.

"We have still a native army in India, of perhaps one hundred and fifty thousand men. The European army (of Her Majesty and the East India Company) at present actually in India, may number probably eighty thousand men.

" The

b 4

“ The distance over sea by which the latter part of this great army has to be conveyed and has to carry on its communications, reliefs, and successive drafts from Britain to the mouths of the Indus and Ganges, to Calcutta, Madras, Kurrachee and Bombay,—may, in round numbers, be reckoned (according to past arrangements), as about fourteen thousand miles.

“ The maintenance of war under such unparalleled circumstances, from so vast a distance, and on such a scale of magnitude, is without example in history; must aggravate the arduousness of the national efforts to an extreme extent, and possibly, for a considerable period. To alleviate the difficulties, dangers, and sacrifices thus entailed, demand the adoption for their remedy, of every expedient that can be devised.

“ Hitherto, on all occasions, it has been the practice to effect the reliefs of regiments in India, by this long sea voyage, in sailing vessels. This habitude may, perhaps, partly account for the announcement of opinions on the part of the authorities of the Admiralty and of other departments, at the commencement of the late events, that sailing vessels would be still preferable to steamers for the conveyance of the troops.

“ Up to the 10th of July that opinion continued to be acted on. To that date, of 31 vessels taken up, nearly the whole were sailers; but it has been alleged, and perhaps correctly, that the prevailing winds in July and August, warranted for these months, the opinion in favour of sailing ships.

“ In the interval from the 10th of July to the 1st of December, of the 59 ships taken up for troops (several of a good, some of the best class), 29 were screw steamers. This at all events afforded tests, though not accurate ones, of the relative qualities of steamers and sailing vessels in accomplishing the transit. No sufficient experience, it is stated, had been yet had, of the employment on long voyages of screw steamers. Doubts were entertained as to the means of replenishing coal on the voyage. But slight provision at depôts, appears to have been previously made, either by Government or for the mercantile marine. Of the four regiments despatched about the middle of July, two were embarked on steamers, two on clippers, or fast sailing vessels.

“ According to the Return furnished by the Marine Department of the East India Company, giving names of transports and length of passages to the four principal ports of India, the following will be the average results, as between steamers and sailing ships:—

“ FROM ENGLAND TO CALCUTTA :

“ From 6th August to 21st October 1857: average of nine steamers, omitting fractions	- - - - -	82 days.
“ Average of 22 sailing ships: 10th June 1857 to 27th August 1858	- - - - -	116 days.
“ In favour of steamers: difference	- - -	34 days.

“ TO MADRAS :

“ Average of 2 steamers	- - - - -	90 days.
“ ” 2 sailing ships	- - - - -	131 days.
“ Difference in favour of steamers	- - -	41 days.

“ TO BOMBAY :

“ Average of 5 steamers	- - - - -	76 days.
“ ” 9 sailing ships	- - - - -	118 days.
“ Difference in favour of steamers	- - -	42 days.

“ TO KURRACHEE :

“ Average of 3 steamers	- - - - -	91 days.
“ ” 10 ships	- - - - -	128 days.
“ Difference in favour of steamers	- - -	37 days.

“ Average of the whole of the 19 passages by steamers to the four ports of India

“ Average of passages of 43 sailing ships

“ Difference between averages of steam and sailing vessels

“ The

“ The expense charged for steamers in most of these cases may perhaps have been treble that for sailing ships. This great enhancement of charge however for steamers, gradually diminished after the first unusual pressure of demand. But in so vital an emergency expense was expressly admitted to be unimportant as an element of calculation.

“ As to the exact value of these averages, it is for nautical men to form a judgment. But though they may be wanting in some of the particulars requisite for complete comparison, still it must be admitted that the above averages do afford element for an approximative estimate of the relative motive powers of wind and steam, in relation to the class of transports at present available in the merchant marine market.

“ Looking again to this official return, dated 27 February 1858, we have to notice the following amongst the results of the long sea route on the present occasion :—

“ To CALCUTTA, were conveyed by steamers	-	-	-	6,798	men.
“ ” ” sailing ships	-	-	-	9,489	”
“ TOTAL to Calcutta	-	-	-	16,287	”
“ To MADRAS, by steamers	-	-	-	2,089	”
“ ” sailing ships	-	-	-	985	”
“ TOTAL to Madras	-	-	-	3,074	”
“ To BOMBAY, by steamers	-	-	-	3,906	”
“ ” sailing ships	-	-	-	3,439	”
“ TOTAL to Bombay	-	-	-	7,345	”
“ To KURRACHEE, by steamers	-	-	-	1,351	”
“ ” sailing ships	-	-	-	2,321	”
“ TOTAL to Kurrachee	-	-	-	4,272	”

“ By steamers 1,951 men,—by sailing ships 4,029,—were sent to CEYLON (Total 5,980); but as this was a destination merely of rendezvous, expressly to ‘await orders as to port of destination,’ to refer to the transport of this portion of the troops might lead to inaccuracy.

“ It appears, then, from the above, without referring to Ceylon, that 27 steamers carried to the four ports of disembarkation in India, 14,144 men; averaging therefore 548 men in each ship. That in 55 sailing ships were conveyed 16,234 men; averaging 289 men in each. Now by the same official statement of averages, it appears that the 14,144 men conveyed on steamers, arrived at their destinations on an average of 37 days sooner than the 16,234 men embarked on sailing ships. We have no sufficient evidence to enable us to state, that any considerably greater number of steam transports could or could not have been procured at that time in the market. But we may at least observe, that in so far as that could have been done, a portion of the latter number would have arrived at their destinations by some weeks earlier than they actually did. But we draw this inference distinctly, with a view to the future, rather than to the past.

VII.

“ THE ‘ OVERLAND ROUTE.’ ”

“ The transport of troops by this route, we believe, to be a branch of our inquiry of great importance. A controversy in regard to it, between the Board of Control and the East India Directors, appears to have commenced coevally with our first information of the Indian revolt.

“ The expediency of dispatching by this line some portion of the reinforcements, was repeatedly proposed by members of the House of Commons so far back as during the last year’s Parliamentary Session. Her Majesty’s Government then dissented, however, from these propositions.

“ Subsequently to those discussions, political obstacles to the passage of our soldiers through Egypt, have been occasionally alluded to by members of the Government. But the slightest inkling as to the weight or character of these political considerations, has not been communicated to your Committee. And though alleged to have been entertained by the Cabinet in July, as they were waived in September, and since then continuously to the present time, we are totally unable to attribute any importance, if even a reality, to these assigned considerations. Moreover, it seems to have been forgotten, that if there were any validity in this political obstacle, it ought similarly have operated to prevent what has been going on for years in the knowledge of all Europe, namely, the constant passage and re-passage through Egypt of all ranks of our military officers, from commanders-in-chief down to the humblest subaltern.

“ Mr.

1895. " Mr. Vernon Smith, the late President of the Board of Control, states that, 'on looking
back, the only things he regretted are, that the forces that were under engagement to go
out in slow sailing vessels were not taken out of those vessels, and put in other ships, and
that more screw steamers were not sent at an earlier period;' that he considered the dangers
of the Red Sea in the hot season immense; that there was the possibility of the demoralisation
of the troops; that, in short, there was no manner of preparation there for the passage
overland; and that he had a gentleman in his office, Sir G. Clerk, with whom he was constantly
in communication, who was decidedly of the same opinion as himself with respect to
this route, and as to the insalubrious climate of the Red Sea in summer. Dr. Beatson, he
added, was also prepared to give valuable evidence on the latter point. Colonel Sir H.
Storks, Secretary for Military Correspondence at the War Department, was likewise suggested
as a witness on the part of the Board of Control.
- 1896.
1915. " 1. Sir H. Storks generally coincided in the opinions of Mr. Vernon Smith. He had
twice passed through Egypt. He 'went down the Red Sea in May, and returned in the
month of October 1851.' On going down the Red Sea no death took place during his
voyage; but on returning in October, two deaths occurred, a naval surgeon, and an officer
of the East Indian Civil Service. He attributes these deaths to sleeping on deck; almost
all the passengers except himself slept on deck. His own health was 'not at all' injured.
He had merely passed through Egypt. But he entertained a 'strong opinion about the
'insalubrity of the passage through Egypt for troops during the summer months;' believed
that troops landed in India after this passage, would not be in so good a condition as after
the voyage round the Cape. He adds, however, in the latter part of his evidence, that
with respect to the troops subsequently sent through Egypt, everything 'has gone on very
'well.' The railway is in the 'most efficient state.' Excepting in the hot months, 'there
'would be no difficulty in sending any number of troops across the Isthmus of Suez, with
'proper arrangements.'
- 1922.
- 1926.
- 2002.
- 2019.
2257. " 2. Sir G. Clerk states that he has been over the Red Sea passage three times, but not
during the worst part of the year (July and August). Could not say the climate of the
Red Sea was unhealthy when he was there, but it is impossible for a crowd to be comfortably
stowed away. Believed that ladies and children pass by that route, but they have
accommodation. The companies that work the line there, have everything admirably conducted,
and they would have done it as well as any other company in the world, perhaps better.
The ships are good, the service well looked after on shore and afloat,—but they cannot do
impossibilities. He deems it the 'very worst route that could be thought of for
'troops;' a 'precarious,' 'false and baseless system of transit, where the troops have to
'scramble on jackasses across the desert, and you cannot rely upon anything even so
'organised as that for a continuance.' In regard to the climate, his objections, he said,
principally applied to the months of 'July and August.' Under the circumstances that
did occur, however, he was of opinion that this transit might have been practicable, provided
provisions, means of transport, and accommodation had been prepared, and 'provided
'Egypt belonged to us.' At Suez 'you require rations for the men to eat and ships to
'float them, and good drinking water is brought from far off.' 'You may evaporate altogether
'in a healthy climate; that is the condition of Suez.' At the same time, he had not heard
a word against the conduct of the troops now going by this line, for whom 'there have been
'admirable arrangements made.'
- 2258.
- 2265.
- 2285.
- 2268.
- 2277.
- " This witness is well known to be a high authority on questions of Indian as well as
Kaffir policy, but we confess that some of his opinions on this local and partly maritime
topic, appear to us totally unsupported by facts. Already, though at a later period than
necessary, above 5,000 British troops have arrived in India in excellent health, by this
'precarious, false, and baseless' transit.
- 2834.
- 2855.
- 2961.
- 2963.
- 2998.
- 2997.
- 2998.
- 2999.
- 2991.
- 2991.
- 2911.
- 2901.
- 2902.
2255. " 3. Dr. Beatson, whose sanatory objections to the Red Sea passage were so much relied
on, had 'passed down' that sea 'only once,' in the month of August 1851; found no difficulty
in passing through Egypt; the heat in the Red Sea was the most intense he ever
experienced; but there was no sickness, no malady, no deaths, in the Red Sea; but on the
passage from Aden to Galle an engineman died. There was 'very great discomfort from
'intense heat;' but on the whole, so far as he himself was concerned, he 'preferred very much
'this mode of transit to India to four months' voyage round the Cape.' He had been in the
last Burma war. Of the force with which he served (1,050 men), 43 died of cholera, after
the capture of Rangoon. To a crowded deck passage from Madras, and to hardships and
privations during the attack on Rangoon, he attributes the loss of these 43 men. 'All
'fresh arrivals (in India) are very subject to outbreaks of cholera.' With regard to the
transit by the Red Sea, Dr. Beatson 'would not hesitate to adopt it in a great emergency;
'did not think the risk so great, provided suitable arrangements existed for embarking the
'men; but would not recommend it in ordinary circumstances.'
- " Various corroborative statements will be found in our proceedings, to the effect,—that
so soon as the events of Meerut and Delhi became known,—the Directors of the East India
Company submitted earnest representations to Government, and continued to do so, with a
view to despatching a portion of the reinforcements by Egypt. Almost the whole of them
had directed their exclusive attention, from earliest life, to Indian affairs. They were necessarily,
for many years, in constant communication with their civil and military officers,
constantly going to and returning from the East in all seasons, by the short overland route.
But their representations remained without result for nearly three months. On the 10th
September

September permission was given for detachments to be passed over Egypt. The first detachment of 200 men embarked at Malta on the 1st of October, and arrived at Aden in 12 days.

" Above four months elapsed before 281 men of the first regiment (the 69th foot) were sent by this line; they embarked at Plymouth on the 11th of November, and arrived at Madras in 34 days, being less than half the time of the swiftest passage round the Cape. The 94th regiment embarked from Plymouth on the 8th December, and arrived at Kurrachee in 37 days. The 863 officers and men of this corps were conveyed from Plymouth to Alexandria on the Peninsular and Oriental Company's ship 'Albeona;' from Suez to Kurrachee on the steamer 'Oriental.' The 71st foot, 861 officers and men, proceeded from Malta on Her Majesty's ships 'Vulture' and 'Princess Royal,'—arrived at Bombay, 1st wing in 18 days,—2d wing in 16 days.

Appendix, No. .

" It appears that the Governor-General in Council assumed that the Home Government would have despatched troops by the way of Egypt. The following is a passage from the Governor-General in Council's letter to the Home Government, dated 7th of August 1857: ' We are also in communication with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company for the conveyance from Suez of the troops that may possibly have been despatched to India by that route. Soon after, the intelligence of the mutinies reached England. It is understood that the ordinary mail steamers of this company can bring 400 men from Suez each trip, and more if there are few passengers. Instructions have accordingly been given for preparing the 'Bentinck,' the steamer which conveys the present mail, for the reception on board of that vessel of as many men as she can convey in addition to the ordinary passengers.'

Appendix, No. .

1820.

" In France likewise it seemed to have been assumed, as a matter of course, that the acceleration of our reinforcements must at that moment have been a paramount object of British policy. Not doubting then of the overland route being adopted, the Emperor Napoleon spontaneously, and in the most generous manner, promptly tendered permission for the passage over France by British troops, to enable their being embarked, if deemed desirable, at Marseilles for Egypt. This was appropriately acknowledged in the House of Commons during the last year's Session, by the then Premier.—The same anticipation, doubtless, actuated the Sultan's Government, by whom a firman was immediately offered and transmitted for our troops to pass over the Egyptian territory. Every one, we believe, who had the slightest knowledge of the local Government of the latter territory, was fully aware of the special willingness of his Highness the Viceroy or Pacha, to render every possible assistance towards the progress of our forces.

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" This was amply proved; when at length, the superintendent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, in Egypt, Mr. Holton, was authorised to make application on the subject. Extracts of the reply, transmitted to us from the East India House, are as follows:

Appendix, No. .

" ' The answer of the Viceroy respecting the passage of the troops, ex 'Ripon,' through Egypt, was received last evening. His Highness states that it will be a satisfaction to him to give facility to the passage of not only 200 men, as in the present instance, but that of 20,000, if necessary, and not 'en bourgeois,' but in uniform, and with their arms, if required.'

" ' No physical difficulty exists,' the superintendent adds, ' in the passage of troops through this country; 10,000 men (by rail and marching) might easily be transported (from Alexandria) to Suez in 60 hours.' ' A thousand men can easily be transported across the Isthmus in 30 hours; baggage and stores in 48 hours.' ' Artillery could also be transported; but until after the completion of the railway (next April) it would have to be limited to very light field pieces.' ' The Viceroy is very desirous to convey through his country as many soldiers as possible; and so great a disposition does he display to facilitate their movements, that he adds, ' I will consider them not as transit passengers, but as my own, and will carry them by my own private engines, carriages, and trucks.'

Appendix, No. .

" It is certainly worthy of remark that, in support of the course they pursued, the late Government only had to adduce the before-named two or three official witnesses, who coincided, it is true, with their chiefs, but whose actual information on the matter was obviously deficient.—Neither of them having been ever, as they admit, in Egypt or on the Red Sea, during the summer months.

" On the other hand, in the annexed Minutes of Evidence, and in the Appendix, are contained numerous and concurrent testimonies in favour of the adoption of this line of transit. Several of them from persons of most extensive local and practical experience, and therefore of great and unquestionable authority on the subject.

" 1. Captain Harris states—that he has been 40 years at sea; originally commanded the 'Lowther Castle,' East India Company's ship; subsequently commanded during 11 years Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers; navigated in those steamers between Calcutta and Suez during nine years; passed up and down the Red Sea 68 times, at all seasons of the year; is at present nautical assessor to the Board of Trade; is of opinion that no serious maritime dangers are incurred in the Red Sea, certainly not for steamers; to tow the ordinary Arab vessels of the country would be dangerous; no danger whatever in towing English vessels up the Red Sea, but doubts that steamers could tow sailing clipper-vessels

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clipper-vessels against the monsoon from Bombay to Aden. In the monsoon at sea, the rain is merely in occasional squalls; on the whole, it is fine weather in that season from Socotra to Bombay; it is when the south-west monsoon reaches the western ghauts of India that it precipitates itself in heavy rains. Passengers coming from India are usually in impaired health, therefore occasional deaths take place; passengers leaving England, arriving in this very hot weather, usually make no difference in their diet or mode of living, and on the voyage to India consequently deaths sometimes occur, as everywhere else, from imprudence; but with troops, he apprehended that the commanding officer or their doctor would take care that proper attention was paid to their diet. To persons in ordinary health, no impediment whatever from heat or personal suffering to undertaking that voyage. In the hot season of the year in the Red Sea, might have had occasional sickness on board his ship, but never any violent diseases, such as fever or cholera; his passengers suffered considerable inconvenience from heat, but no cases of sickness in consequence of it, that he remembered; considers Suez a sanatorium, one of the finest climates in the world; does not see how troops could be demoralized there; in the summer extremely warm, but still healthy; sees no difficulty as to water. At Aden, the water of the Peninsula, though not good, is used without injury to health by the garrison and inhabitants; does not think that even in the monsoon, troops would experience more than ordinary occasional sickness in passing down the Red Sea; an entire regiment, the 94th, was landed at Kurrachee without a case of sickness; other detachments landed in India without a single case of sickness; as a maritime station, states that Aden is one of the finest harbours in the world; at Aden it rarely happens that you have any gales of wind at all,—never amounting to a gale; counts the voyage during the south-west monsoon (June, July, and August), from Malta to Bombay as 20 days,—from the Mauritius to Bombay as 30 days,—from the Cape to Bombay 35 to 40 days. Thinks we have had a proof that clippers proceeding round the Cape cannot arrive in India, even with the inducement of a high premium, so quickly as screw steamers.

Four days from Malta to Alexandria, thence three days to Suez, five days from Suez to Aden, thence to Bombay, eight days.

“ Under all circumstances, and in all seasons, considers that the best way of carrying troops to India is for the Government to organise a line of sea transport down the Red Sea; this might be organised by the Government, but it could also be as efficiently carried out by private enterprise.”

“ The extraordinary experience of this witness, as a navigator of eastern seas, has induced us to extend this summary of his important evidence.”

“ 2. Admiral Sir Henry Leeke, of Her Majesty's Navy, was Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy for the last five to six years—directed the embarkation of the army for the Persian Gulf. During the six months ending 17th September, when he left Bombay, there were 140 vessels lying in Bombay Harbour, and only one steamer—had a great many steamers under his command, but they were dispersed over the Indian Ocean. About 110 of these were very fine ships, splendid and fast sailing ships belonging to this country. When the 10th Hussars went to the Crimea, they did not lose a man on the voyage to Suez, and but 12 horses out of 1,400. Some men who had had chest complaints were all recovered when they arrived at Cairo. This regiment and the 12th Lancers were embarked for Egypt under his direction—four steamers and six sailing ships conveyed them,—there were 1,600 men and 1,400 horses. The hay and water required nearly as much tonnage as ten times as many men. Had the Government judged fit to send screw line-of-battle ships to Calcutta and Bombay with troops, it would have had an extraordinary and electric effect on the whole population of the country. The moral effect would have been enormous. The steam companies have large depôts of provisions at Suez; is favourable to employing line-of-battle ships for troops, if lower-deck guns taken out; does not see why troops being on board should upset the crew of a well-disciplined man-of-war. Received permission from the Court of Directors to build a 60-gun frigate (68-pounders), to be so constructed as to be capable of being converted into a line-of-battle ship, or a transport, a screw vessel on the plan of the ‘Shannon.’ Was aware that there is a difference of opinion as to the expediency of carrying troops on board ships of war. Does not think there would be any injury to the health of troops in the passage through Egypt or by the Red Sea,—nor the slightest difficulty on the score of health, want of provisions, or water,—but you must take care of your commissariat beforehand. Went with his family to India by the Red Sea—for three days it was intolerably hot, but nothing to interfere with health,—‘we were as healthy as usual, and we ate and drank as much as usual.’

“ 3. Mr. Engledue, formerly a lieutenant in the English navy, has been employed for the Peninsular and Oriental Company, since 1840, in the transmission of mails and passengers through Egypt,—was the first superintendent sent out to arrange the coaling stations to India; has been 18 years officially concerned in this transit,—is now superintendent for that company, at Southampton; at different times has been in Egypt, in India, to Calcutta, down the Red Sea; across the Indian Ocean; and has made several trips at all seasons of the year; considers Suez, in the month of July, though hot, one of the purest atmospheres you can breathe; landed there himself, when nearly dying from dysentery,—remained there 12 days, but had recovered some days before the end of that period. The European troops at Aden have been healthy; considers that it is as hot in Malta as in the Red Sea; believes Cairo to be particularly healthy; thinks that on an emergency there are no serious difficulties to be apprehended for troops in the Red Sea; believes that a body of troops conveyed by one of the Peninsular Company's ships would be much more comfortable than under

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under canvas in the field, in the hot season of the year. A vessel (he says) going nine or ten knots an hour always creates a draught, and with double awnings, and sails over the usual awnings, and wetting them, you might make matters very comfortable; found it equally warm in India as in the Red Sea, in June, July, and August; only showers of rain occasionally in the Red Sea; in the Indian Ocean, rain comes in the monsoon only in squalls, and not continuously, as in India; rarely in the monsoon any severe weather in the Red Sea; between Aden and India there are sometimes heavy seas; but nothing like the Atlantic Seas.

"The first detachment of the 57th regiment proceeded from Malta to Aden in plain clothes, as ordered from home. The Pacha said 'he did not wish anything of the kind, that they might march through with their arms. He turned into ridicule the idea of our sending them in plain clothes.' The arms, accoutrements, and kits of the men were packed in arm-chests adapted to the purpose, but not exceeding 200 lbs. the case. The whole journey (of this detachment), deducting stoppage and certain accidental detentions, was completed from Alexandria to Suez in 17 hours. 'The arrangements made for giving (the troops) two meals *en route* were excellent.' 'The men were provided with one day's cooked provisions in the haversacks, in case of need.' 'The railway is capable of carrying any number of men, the viceroy frequently being accompanied in his excursions through the country by 5,000 troops at a time.'

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"I have never known but one feeling, either with the old pacha, Mehemet Ali, or the present one' (says this witness),—'and that is to give every facility in sending things through Egypt, troops and baggage, and everything else.'—Even when our fleets were bombarding Acre, then garrisoned by Egyptian troops, Mehemet Ali declared his determination not to interrupt in any way our passage over his territory.

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"The fact fortunately is, that the continuous use of this line by England contributes in a very important degree to the revenues of the Viceroy, and to the pecuniary advantage of his people.

"4. Admiral Alexander Milne, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, thinks it is always objectionable to send troops in line-of-battle ships to any great distance, particularly across the tropics; it is all very well in the Mediterranean. Our ships of war (16 line of battle, besides frigates and smaller vessels), brought home 21,404 men from the Crimea. Some of these large ships brought home as many as 1,700 men, with a full crew. The lower deck guns were not taken out. There are merchant ships lying at the Cape generally. There were four ships of great power at the Cape—the 'Penelope,' the 'Megæra,' the 'Castor,' the 'Boscawen'; a line-of-battle ship, ready if required. The Transport Department under the Admiralty is reduced since the war. There were nine of Her Majesty's ships set apart since the peace for transport services;—the 'Himalaya,' the 'Urgent,' the 'Perseverance,' the 'Assurance,' the 'Assistance,' the 'Simoom,' the 'Vulcan,' the 'Megæra,' and the 'Transit.' The 'Transit' was lost, and there are now only eight.—When the troops were brought home from the Crimea, they must have been 'exceedingly crowded' in the ships of war. 'It is lucky that there was no sickness.' 'We all know' (Admiral Milne says), 'that it is a great inconvenience to have ships lumbered with troops, and the discipline and drill and everything is interfered with; it is always to be avoided if it can be.'

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"5. Mr. Lumsden, senior member of the Council at Bombay, left Bombay the 15th August 1857, for England, over land. Has been seven times up and down the Red Sea; so far from the health of his fellow passengers having been affected, it was quite the reverse; they were all very well. The heat of the voyage in the Red Sea continues for two or three days. There are reefs in the Red Sea,—but it has been very well surveyed by the officers of the Indian Navy. Does not of late years recollect a case of the loss of a ship. Does not think the monsoon is felt at all in the Red Sea. There would be no difficulty on the score of health, in sending by it at any time of the year a considerable number of troops by way of Egypt, with proper precautions, not over-crowded, and with good awnings.—After the news from Delhi, they all at Bombay had the impression that it would end in a serious general revolt. Was very anxious to obtain troops from Malta, where he heard there were 10 regiments. The water at Suez is brackish; Nile water is sent from Cairo. Had for several months an unusual number of clippers, very fine vessels, at Bombay; 500, 1,000, or 2,000 men might remain at Cairo without inconvenience. Lord Elphinstone showed from the first the greatest energy and activity, and sent and received telegrams himself without waiting to consult his Council.

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"6. Mr. Mead states that he was ten years in India. Has been six times up and down the Red Sea. On the last occasion the ship was full of women and children; no death or sickness occurred. Does not recollect on any occasion any death or sickness in the Red Sea. Recollects at the commencement of this revolt, before he left Calcutta, a proclamation published by Nena Sahib, stating as an encouragement to the revolters, that the Viceroy of Egypt and the Sultan had totally cut off the means England had possessed of sending reinforcements through Egypt.

"7. The Chairman of the Court of Directors, Mr. Mangles, states that Colonel Fraser, who was employed during the Crimean War to superintend the transport across Egypt in the 10th and 12th regiments of Cavalry, from India, wrote to the War Department, in August last, very strongly in favour of the overland route. Recollected that Lord Elphinstone in his private letters expressed several times his regret that the overland route had not

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not been adopted. He had written on the part of the Court, very early in the day, to the President of the India Board, to ask whether the Admiralty would give some line-of-battle ships to take out troops; and the answer was, that Sir Charles Wood had no ships for us. Says 'We were not (in the first instance) so satisfied as we are now, as to the great superiority of screw steamers (over sailing vessels).' Was of opinion that to have sent out troops to India in the very hot season, would have cost life; but that as it was a grave emergency, that risk might well have been run, as the rapid appearance of reinforcements in India would have been of such eminent service.

" 8. Captain Hoseason, a commander in the Royal Navy, has served nine years in the Mediterranean; considers Egypt very healthy; that there is an error in regard to the word 'monsoon;' it is only a wind blowing periodically in a certain direction; it is just as healthy as any other wind. The south-west monsoon (he says) is not an infectious wind; it is a retarding wind for vessels coming from India to Suez, but it is wholesome, in fact, it purifies all India when it comes. Has been many times in Alexandria; no inconvenience to lay in the harbour of Alexandria; has been two months at a time there; the harbour is of great capacity, the facility of going in and coming out of it, for steamers, is proved by the wonderful regularity of the mail steamers going to and coming from India.

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" 9. Captain Shepherd, a Director of the East India Company, and member of the Committee where all matters connected with shipping and transport of troops to India are managed, has no hesitation in saying, that from the first he was very anxious that troops should be sent overland; that they fixed the period for the ships to be ready, but the troops were not ready under three weeks; had heard the other day that the 94th Regiment, after all their misfortunes in the Bay of Biscay, had arrived at Kurrachee, by Egypt, in 37 days from London. Had his wishes been acted on, troops would have arrived at Bombay 22 days sooner; at Kurrachee, the difference would have been greater. Were the affair to occur again, he would certainly, for the long sea voyage, have recommended screw steamers, in preference to clippers or sailing vessels. A proposal was made, on the 22d of August, to the East India Company, by Messrs. Croskey & Co., on behalf of the European and American Steam Company, for the conveyance of troops overland, to the effect that there should be a fortnightly despatch from this country, and that 1,000 men should be sent by each conveyance. The reply was, that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of sending any considerable number of troops through Egypt.

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" 10. Mr. Allen, managing director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company,—states that the Company has latterly charged 40*l*. per man to Calcutta, all expenses of every description included therein. The Pacha of Egypt charges the company 5*l*. per soldier and 10*l*. per officer, for the use of his railway across Egypt, and for the use of his carriages. The Pacha's ordinary charge for passengers is 10*l*. There are particular charges for different kinds of mercantile commodities. Gold and silver and jewellery form a very large portion of them. The duties levied by the Pacha on silver and gold is 7*s*. 6*d*. per cent. During the last year there were forwarded by the company through Egypt at least a million and a half sterling of silver per month.—(The duty payable therefore, last year, to the Pacha on silver alone, must have been about 76,000*l*. The additional transit charge would probably have carried this payment on silver to above 100,000*l*.)—Ladies and children pass at all seasons of the year. The Peninsular Company receive from the Government for assisting to forward the mails over 200,000*l*. a year. The company have 45 steam ships, ranging from 2,600 tons to 700. About two-thirds of these ships are in the Eastern Seas, one-third on this side of Egypt. The 10th Dragoons, in 1854, were a little troublesome at Cairo, but nothing of that sort has occurred since. The water at Aden is a little brackish, but the troops drink it, and are very healthy. If the authorities had called on the company in the month of July last to send troops for them overland, the company could have done it then just the same as it has been done since; he anticipated no difficulties whatever. The Pacha attributes great importance to the overland transit; is very desirous of facilitating it; does not believe the Pacha consulted the Sultan about it.

Appendix, No. .

" 11. Dr. Fraser, surgeon 10th Hussars, states from Suez, 3d January 1858, 'The temporary hospital I have opened here succeeds satisfactorily.'

" 'At present, however, everything is going on well, especially that which I regard as the most important item; fresh water is delivered with regularity, and in sufficient quantity. I have therefore no fear but that those under my charge will be comfortably provided for, as in almost every other respect we are independent, having such an ample supply of preserved provisions of every kind, to have recourse to if need be. The house, of course, has been thoroughly cleaned, fumigated, and white-washed, and though of humble appearance, the men are as well provided for in essentials, that is, so far as their comfort and well-being in every respect are concerned, as if the structure were of greater pretensions. It is well ventilated, and in an airy situation.' (December 16, 1857.)

" Early in this inquiry, a letter was addressed to our Chairman, which was laid by him before the Committee. It was transmitted through a Member of the Committee, Mr. Bernal Osborne. It appears to your Committee so specially relevant, and so unimpeachable a testimony on the point at issue, that we deem it right to submit it, verbatim, in our Report, as follows:

Appendix, No. .

" Sir,
" I have seen in the papers that you are Chairman of a Committee of the House of Commons, to inquire, amongst other matters, as to the practicability of conveying troops to India in the summer, through
Oaklands, Clonmel, 3 March 1858.

through Egypt and the Red Sea. It appears to me that the question was solved when a large force under Sir David Baird proceeded from India in the year 1801, and landed at Kosseir in May and June; crossed in nine days the desert to Kherie, on the Nile; proceeded down that river, garrisoned Alexandria; and in the following year, 1802, several regiments returned to India by Suez and the Red Sea, in the month of June. That force, amounting to 5,000 men, consisted of a troop of horse artillery, six guns, some field batteries, a troop of dragoons, and several regiments of infantry. They had with them guns and small arms, ammunition, camp equipage, baggage, and 126 chests of treasure. The troops generally were very healthy. The march across the Suez Desert from the Lake of Pilgrims, near Grand Cairo, to Suez, was performed in four days with the greatest ease; marching by night and encamping during the day. In June the ships proceeded to India, the wind at that season blowing down the Red Sea. They made a very quick passage.

"There are probably several officers in England, who, like myself, served the whole campaign under Sir David Baird; but I am very willing to give any information on the subject, if the Committee should wish me to do so.

"I have marched through the whole of Oude in June and July, and I found the heat much more oppressive than I did in the Suez Desert.

"Lieut.-General
"Sir De Lacy Evans, G. C. B., M. P.

"I have, &c.
(signed) "P. Phipps,
"Colonel, E. I. C.

"Most truly does Colonel Phipps observe, that the question was in fact solved by the historical facts which he so graphically relates. And this was when there were no Steam Navigation Company's agents to aid our arrangements, and when no railway existed.

"Coming down now to the actual present time, annexed are a series of official letters on the subject, addressed through the Military Secretary to His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief. They are from Colonel Pocklington, Deputy Quartermaster-general, appointed in October last to direct and superintend the transit of the troops. This correspondence, continued to the latest date, has been transmitted to the Committee by the Secretary of State for War. It is most explicit and satisfactory. Colonel Pocklington informs His Royal Highness that 'No difficulty whatever exists in the transit, small bodies of troops being treated in every respect as ordinary overland passengers. The transit administration evince every disposition to favour our troops, and to attend to their individual comfort, and the security of the stores.' In the course of the evidence, it was requested that a comprehensive Report might be obtained from Colonel Pocklington for the information of the Committee. Within the interval of about a month it was transmitted to us. Not having been in Egypt during the summer months, he abstains from giving any decisive opinion as to whether the transit during that period 'would or would not prove detrimental to the health and stamina of the men.' But he says, that during his 'six months' experience (autumn, winter, and early spring) of the overland route, I am not prepared to mention a single disadvantage this line possesses as a medium of transport for troops to reinforce Her Majesty's army in India."

Appendix, No.

Overland route.

"As the authority of this Report is beyond question, as the facts appear to be most carefully stated, and having been expressly prepared by direction of the War Department for this Committee,—we herewith submit it:

"Sir,
"In obedience to the instructions of His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, contained in your letter of the 22d ultimo, with enclosure from the War Office, dated 20th March 1858, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, the report called for respecting the advantages or disadvantages of the overland route for the transport of troops to India.

" Alexandria, 7 April 1858.

" Major-General Sir Charles Yorke, K. C. B.,

" &c. &c. &c.

" Military Secretary, Horse Guards, London.

"I have, &c.
(signed) "E. H. F. Pocklington,
"Col. Dep. Quartermaster-gen.

"REPORT on the Overland Route to India as a Means of Transport for Her Majesty's Troops.

"THE advantages of the overland route are very considerable, and the trajet most simple. Advantages.
"A thousand men per week can be conveyed across the isthmus by the Transit Administration of Egypt, without interference with the ordinary passenger traffic.
"Between 300 and 400 men can move at a time, and perform the distance from ship to ship in 26 hours.

"The transit by rail is completed to within almost 20 miles of Suez.
"This last portion of the journey is performed by the soldiers on donkeys in about six hours.
"The same nativity does not exist as heretofore in the completion of the line of rail to Suez, but it is expected to be finished throughout before the end of the current year.
"There can be no doubt as to the experiment having succeeded, and the chief cause Number of troops crossed overland of good order and success arises from the practice of conveying the troops continuously from 5 October 1857 to 7 April from ship to ship on either side of the isthmus, never allowing them to land for detention 1858:—Officers, 214; Men, 5,303.
in the country. General Arrangements, &c.

"Troops, if practicable, should not arrive at Alexandria till corresponding tonnage is available in the Suez Roads to receive them. Moreover, it is highly important that all troops, moving by passenger ships down the Red Sea, should receive 'between deck' accommodation accessible at all times, for, at the minimum, one-half of the number of men embarked, the same as in transports specially chartered for the conveyance of soldiers. The absence of this has created very natural dissatisfaction, and been a subject of complaint by the troops. No article of baggage accompanying the troops is allowed to exceed 250 lbs. in weight; two such are a camel's load. An occasional package of three-and-a-half tons can, on an emergency, be conveyed across the Desert at the present moment.

"Two meals during the transit are furnished to the soldiers at the cost of the steam-ship company conveying the troops.

"One day's cooked provisions are taken in their haversacks in case of accidents in the Desert.

For

" For passage across the Isthmus, including disembarkation at Alexandrin, and re-shipment at Suez (performed by lighters and steam-tugs), but exclusive of refreshments, the Transit Administration of Egypt charge 5 *l.* for each officer, first-class carriage, and 224 lbs. of baggage allowed to each; 3 *l.* for each soldier, second-class carriage, and 112 lbs. of baggage to each.

" First-class carriages hold 24 persons; second-class carriages hold 30 persons. Line of rail single.

" A thousand camels could, at 10 days' notice, be procured for Desert transport.

" A thousand donkeys at Cairo by 48 hours' previous warning.

Disadvantages.

" During six months' experience (autumn, winter, and early spring) of the overland route, I am not prepared to mention a single disadvantage this line possesses, as a medium of transport for troops to re-inforce Her Majesty's army in India.

" The limited amount of material that just at present can be conveyed, seems the only military difficulty, but on completion of the railway to Suez this will no longer exist.

Concluding remarks.

" The expediency of forwarding troops overland to India in the summer, exposed to the Desert's sun, with the great heat of the Red Sea following, is a matter for consideration, and how far the injurious effects likely to arise from the said exposure, would or would not prove detrimental to the health and stamina of the men.

" The last detachment of young soldiers (260 men of various corps) that crossed the Desert on the 27th ultimo, seemed, on arrival at Suez, to feel the effects of their six hours' exposure to the sun.

" To perform the trajet on donkey-back during dark nights would be most tedious, liable to accidents, and unadvisable.

" The advantages of the overland route have been greatly enhanced by the facilities afforded our troops by his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, followed by the ready and most obliging co-operation of the director and executive officers of the transit administration, whose prompt attention has been invariably given to any suggestion it was thought requisite to offer for the convenience or comfort of Her Majesty's troops.

" (signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington.*

" Alexandria, 7 April 1858.

" Colonel and Deputy Quartermaster-general.

" It is well known that on the very day of the arrival at Constantinople of the news of the revolt, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe telegraphed to Her Majesty's Government to know if he should apply to the Turkish Government to allow our troops to pass through Egypt on their way to India. On the 2d of July Her Majesty's Government replied by telegraph, that it was not their intention to send troops by that route. On the 2d of October Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was directed to ask the formal permission of the Porte and the Pacha of Egypt to pass over the Isthmus, which was immediately complied with by both. Three months, therefore, had already elapsed before detachments were sent by this line, and nearly four months elapsed before we availed ourselves of it for a regiment of infantry.

Overland route.

" In the summer of 1854, the 10th and 12th Regiments of Dragoons (1,400 horses, 1,600 men), arrived in Egypt from India, and were forwarded thence to the Crimea. These corps, though their transfer took place during the hot months or monsoon alleged to be so insalubrious, and though they had to remain some short time in Egypt, are known to have been remarkably healthy and efficient, and to have continued so, throughout their Crimean service. This transit, and all the arrangements for it, were superintended by Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, of the Bombay Army, who was selected for that duty by the then Governor General, the Marquis of Dalhousie. It appears that while thus employed, anticipating the possibility of additional troops being required from India 'during the sultry months of June, July, and August,' Colonel Fraser proposed a plan to the Governor-general for effecting that object. Lord Dalhousie not only approved of it, but directed it to be strictly adhered to in the event of any further transit.

" The internal means of transport after disembarkation of troops also requires notice. Much difficulty and delay are represented to have occurred in forwarding the troops to Allahabad, Cawnpore, and Lucknow. It is said to have taken a month to push forward 3,000 men by detachments to Allahabad. The reinforcements, therefore, have usually joined the army by driblets. Six little steamers are mentioned as having been got ready to assist these movements, but of so small locomotive power as to be unable to tow against the stream. There are in India some thousand miles of river navigation, the Indus, the Ganges, and some of their principal tributaries, being of course the most important. Such as these are doubtless the best natural highways of all countries. The great towns, many of which are strategic posts, are almost invariably on the banks of rivers. To navigate the majority of them effectively, steamers, we are told, ought not to draw more than two feet of water. It is to be hoped that such vessels have been provided, or are in course of construction, as undoubtedly by this means our military operations would be powerfully facilitated.

Screw Steamers on the Long Sea voyage.

" Opinions having been very generally expressed and entertained as has been observed, in the House of Commons, to the effect that screw steamers were not employed in a sufficient proportion for the conveyance of reinforcements to India by the long-sea voyage; that the overland route was not adopted for a portion of these reinforcements at as early a period in the crisis as its advantages and facilities justified; and generally, that the national forces were not expedited to the scene of action with as much promptitude as the painful and momentous character of the revolt demanded.

" On reverting to the statements and calculations brought forward in a preceding page (xvi), it will be seen that, had the 16,000 men embarked upon 55 sailing ships been conveyed on steamers, they would have arrived and become available for operations, on an average, 37 days sooner, or at all events considerably sooner, than they actually reached their destinations.

“ During from three to nearly four months elapsed as we have remarked, before Her Majesty’s Government directed arrangements or preparations to be made for transporting, by Egypt, a portion of the reinforcements so imminently needed by our army in the East. Reiterated objections were made, that tedious and difficult negotiations were involved; that great injury to the military stores and efficiency of the troops must arise from their disembarkation at Alexandria and re-embarkation at Suez; that the passage of the desert presented serious obstacles; and that the extreme insalubrity of the transit rendered its adoption altogether inadmissible.—The evidence annexed to this report induces your Committee to feel convinced, that these objections were either great exaggerations or totally and completely unfounded. Overland route.

“ Several thousands of our troops, we must repeat, have now reached India by this line, with extraordinary advantage as to economy of time, and with perfect preservation of health. —The first regiment that was despatched by this line, passed from Plymouth to Bombay in 37 days. Of the first regiment sent from Malta, the first wing arrived at Bombay in 16 days, the second wing in 18 days. An overwhelming mass of evidence, from numerous reliable witnesses, has been laid before your Committee, attesting the peculiar facilities, especially in periods of emergency, connected with this mode of communication with our great Indian possessions. With only two exceptions, these sources of information were as available to the Government as to your Committee. Many of these witnesses were in official situations, and personally known to members of the Government. We have no evidence to show that Her Majesty’s ministers sought for reliable information from any one who might be supposed specially acquainted with the subject.—It is obvious, that had orders been given to make preparations for this passage on the 1st of July instead of the 1st of October or 1st of November, an earlier arrival in India of some thousand troops must have been effected, than actually took place.

“ Under what circumstances our ships of war should or should not be required to submit to the inconvenience or disagreeableness of assisting to transport in times of war Her Majesty’s military forces, is one of the topics connected with this inquiry, remaining for observation. Under no Government appears some distinct regulation on this point, from high authority more requisite than under ours,—since joint naval and military operations, great or small, on some portion of the globe, seem with us to be almost continuous. The greater the reason, therefore, for the most unreserved mutual co-operation of both branches of our armed forces. On the score of economy, too, a word may be said on this head. About nine millions sterling was the charge for hired transports in the Crimean war. Very large also will be the charge under the same head for reinforcements to India. The latter, indeed, will not figure just now in Parliamentary estimates, but we cannot be certain that English tax-payers may not yet be compelled to contribute in some manner towards them. The greater part by far of these transport charges are inevitable. But in some instances it may surely be hoped that a diminution of them might be effected. Doubtless a naval battle can probably be better fought when the combatant ships have but their fighting crews on board. On the other hand, however, the result of a battle on shore may be hazarded, or the fruits of victory imperfectly gained, partly in consequence of the means of transport in war ships having been unnecessarily restricted.

“ We have been led to these remarks in some degree, because of the strong disinclination to admitting troops on board war ships, evinced in his evidence by one of the most justly influential of our official naval administrators,—and because we cannot gather from that evidence, that the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Navy,—the greatest navy in the world,—have deemed it their duty to render any very adequate support or co-operation to the policy of our authorities in the east, or to the more rapid augmentation of our forces there, naval or military, during the present lamentable crisis in that quarter. 1746.

“ The evidence, however, of Admiral Sir Henry Leeke, an officer of superior practical experience, is of a directly contrary tenor on this question. He is favourable to employing line-of-battle ships for troops if lower-deck guns be taken out—does not see why troops being on board should upset the crew of a well-disciplined man-of-war.

“ ON THE FUTURE TRANSPORT OF REINFORCEMENTS.

“ Hitherto, the reliefs and drafts of British troops for India have been numerically of comparative small amount. Henceforth, we fear, for a considerable period, it must be far different. During the course of the present, the second year of the Indian revolt, augmentations or drafts, to supply losses in the field, and yet more in hospital; the wear and tear from sword and sickness, and the requirements generally of present Indian policy, ought not to be estimated at less than 20,000 men. Anticipating good results from the operations now in course of execution, still the next year will probably demand from us, as many as from 10,000 to 12,000, and perhaps for one or two further years, as many as from 8,000 to 10,000. Nothing, as is well known, more frequently proves fallacious than political prophecy. Who will pretend to predicate what contingencies may or may not arise during the next two

or three years in Europe or Asia. Still we are bound to make provision, as far as our lights enable us, for apparent probabilities.

“ During the discussions on this subject, there has been no one statement more completely erroneous, than that troops proceeding by the long sea voyage are likely to reach India more ready for immediate efficient action than those arriving there by the shorter overland line. The longer troops are on board ship, inevitably without adequate exercise, the more inefficient they will inevitably be, for immediate exertion, after disembarking. And this will be the more certain in warm climates. There are members of your Committee who have seen, even after a six weeks' voyage, hundreds of soldiers fall out on the line of movement, and prove incapable of a five miles' march,—many even fall dead, from exertion being required, without a due period of preparatory exercise.

“ Now, the time occupied by troops from England to India is, by the one line, from 33 to 40 days. From Malta to India, from 16 to 18 or 20 days. Compare these periods with the 83 by steamers, or the 120 days by sailing ships, on the long sea route, and the difference will be admitted to be great.

“ Again, let us take into calculation that, during the longer route, we shall have, under present circumstances, from 15,000 to 20,000 troops, in effect, *hors de combat*, and beyond power of counter orders,—for a period, annually, of from three to four months. This is a serious consideration. While, as to the shorter line, it will be but for the brief period of some 14 days, during the transit from Suez to India, that the troops will be beyond reach of recall, for any unexpected European contingency.

“ For these reasons, your Committee would therefore earnestly recommend that all regiments for reliefs or augmentation of our eastern army, be henceforth sent overland, from England, Gibraltar, or Malta. From the two latter undoubtedly in preference, because of their greater proximity to India, and because those stations are known to be particularly well adapted for acclimatising troops for eastern service. With respect to detachments of recruits, when not pressingly required, and when yet of insufficient age and strength for immediate service, it may perhaps be found preferable that they should proceed by the long sea voyage.

“ Three or four extra regiments being successively kept up in Gibraltar and Malta, the most acclimatised corps of these garrisons might, with facility, be pushed on to their Indian destinations, as required. On this side the Isthmus, maritime means are of course always available for constantly maintaining the forces at Malta up to their proposed or necessary strength. Ships of war might (without any transport cost) convey the troops thence, as they now do, to Alexandria.

“ Two first-class steamers, independent of the four monthly mail vessels, plying between Suez and Aden, would probably be amply efficient for the transit from Suez;—one of these steamers to proceed onward to India, when requisite. It is also to be borne in mind, in regard to the passage between Aden and India, that clipper sailing vessels are deemed as well adapted as steamers, for rapidly performing that voyage during some periods of the year.—To provide against accidental delays (if it be not already done), a commodious ship should obviously be permanently anchored off Suez,—for reception of troops when necessary, fully provided with awnings, water, and commissariat stores. For the completion and continuance of these arrangements, in the most safe and satisfactory manner, Her Majesty's Government have the advantage of the services or advice of Colonels Fraser and Pocklington, both of whom officers of great intelligence, practically conversant with the subject, and one of whom, Colonel Pocklington, being now and for above six months back, actually employed in performance of the duties connected with this passage.

Appendix, No.

Recapitulation.

“ We shall briefly recapitulate then the following particulars, as bearing on the recommendation which your committee have deemed it their duty thus to submit. For three days, during the months of June, July, and August, the temperature in passing down the Red Sea is stated to be intensely warm, but not unhealthy; while on the other hand, on the long sea voyage, ships have to encounter a similar temperature twice under the line, during which they are not unfrequently becalmed.—But even this extreme heat is solely referrible to summer months, and need not be incurred except in urgent emergency. The length of voyage round the Cape, we must again bear in mind, is, to our principal ports of Indian debarkation, from 13,000 to 14,000 miles. From Malta to Bombay or Kurrachee, the distance being reduced to 4,000 miles; to Calcutta about 5,700. In respect to the power of promptly throwing in military succours for all Eastern contingencies, the Malta and Egypt line secures, therefore, an advantage, in point of distance, of from 8,500 to 10,000 miles. It has been very idle to talk of the influence of other powers, on this matter, over the Pacha of Egypt. That Pacha is an acknowledged hereditary viceroy, scarcely more than nominally recognising the suzerainty of the Porte. The Viceroy reaps a revenue, direct or indirect, from English mercantile and passenger traffic, of perhaps above 200,000 *l.* per annum; a profit greatly to be increased by the continuance of what is now proposed. and herein is a sure guarantee for the enduring goodwill towards England of the ruler of; Egypt.

Egypt. As to the security of this communication, it rests, of course, on the same basis as does the possession of all our colonies and dependencies—the superiority of England at sea. And at present it may also be observed, as seriously obstructive to rivals; that in Gibraltar and Malta, Aden and Perim,—we in fact hold the keys of the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

“ A considerable time has now intervened since your Committee have been charged with the duty of this inquiry, and yet its interest and importance have scarcely, perhaps not at all, diminished. Great achievements have been accomplished, signally to the advancement of the national fame,—but an extensive hostility to our rule, it cannot be denied, has been evoked,—which throws a gloom of uncertainty over the duration and termination of the conflict. Four months of heroic constancy were inevitably required for the siege and victorious assault of Delhi. No more brilliant fête of arms ennobles British annals; but not one soldier, despatched as reinforcement from England, shared in it. It is true it did not put an end, as was hoped, to the stupendous insurrection; but had it not succeeded, British dominion in the East may have become, it must be feared, beyond restoration. The part borne however, in connexion with this achievement as well as others which followed, by the Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub,—in respect to creating and forwarding reinforcements to every point endangered,—can surely never be thought of, without the highest feeling of admiration.

“ No diligence or exertion in England could by possibility have saved from the perfidy of the enemy, the gallant and lamented General and those who fell victims with him at Cawnpore.—Perhaps the same may almost be said, as to the position of the heroic Lawrence at Lucknow, in whose fall his country have had such irreparable cause of sorrow. These and other grievous losses, however, will, perhaps, be eventually considered as contributed to in no small degree by a previous policy of territorial acquisition, followed so untowardly, with a diminution by many thousand bayonets, of the British forces at the disposal of the succeeding Government of India.

“ But the early operations of Havelock and Outram, and of our present skilful Commander-in-Chief Sir Colin Campbell, have undoubtedly been retarded and enfeebled, by the insufficient energy and exertion of those in England, who were mainly responsible for a more rapid transmission of additional forces in furtherance of the operations of those able chiefs.

“ Doubtless hitherto, in all ordinary circumstances, it devolved to the gentlemen charged with the administration of the East India Company's affairs, to appreciate the military requirements of India, and to take charge of the forwarding the same to their destinations. And it is but just to state, that in the more than usual responsibilities thus in this instance imposed upon them, they exerted themselves in a manner very highly to their credit.—But this was truly a case of peril and magnitude beyond all precedent, beyond the sphere of routine, and should have called into action the most prominent efforts and deepest consideration of the highest functionaries of the State. The two Government departments immediately connected however with the development of military force, are, of course, that of War and the Admiralty. The Naval Department, it appears, declared an inability to afford any assistance; and what is more alarming as to the distribution of our great maritime resources, it was alleged that we had not a first class line-of-battle ship manned or ready for sea, in the British Channel. That distribution no doubt, however, depends for the greater part on the Cabinet rather than on the First Naval Lord.—Of the Secretary of State for War, whose duties would seem above all others to have been concerned, no proof, we regret to say, has been adduced, to enable us to offer, on this occasion, any expression of our acknowledgment of commensurate or energetic interposition by that department, in the matters under consideration.

“ We have given details of the evidence which might not perhaps, at first sight, have seemed requisite. But there appeared no other adequate method of rebutting, conclusively, inaccurate statements emanating from the highest official authority.

“ Your Committee have given the utmost attention to the investigation referred to their consideration. They hope the results may be of some public utility. And they close their remarks with the consolatory reflection, that, if many deplorable bereavements have occurred in this fierce and unforeseen contest,—it will at all events as to the British-soldiers and civilians engaged in it, be ever borne in memory, that none of any nation in the world have ever sustained with more firmness, self-devotion, and patriotism, the interests and renown of their country.”

[Adjourned to Friday 18th, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 18 die Junii, 1838.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Lord John Hay. Mr. Danby Seymour. Sir E. Colebrooke. Mr. Osborne. Captain Vivian. Lord Goderich. Sir James Elphinstone.		Sir Charles Napier. Mr. Crawford. Mr. Horsman. Mr. Byng. Mr. Selater-Booth. Mr. Willoughby.
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The following Resolutions, proposed by Lord *Goderich* were read:—

“ 1. That the inquiry which this Committee has been appointed to conduct may be divided into three branches: the first, relating to the overland route to India; the second, to the employment of steamers, as compared with sailing vessels, for the transport of troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made during the mutiny of the military resources of this country and of the colonies.

“ 2. That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route to India at the earliest period at which it could have been used with a certainty that the troops sent across Egypt would on their arrival at Suez have found transport ready to convey them down the Red Sea; but that that certainty could not have been obtained before the end of August or beginning of September; that the troops could then only have been despatched in small numbers, and would have arrived at Calcutta about a fortnight sooner than the first reinforcements sent round the Cape.

“ 3. That although the overland route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be adopted as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India.

“ 4. That if steamers had been used in greater numbers the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by sailing vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of steam transport was attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam vessels than were actually employed.

“ 5. That steamers should for the future be always made use of, as far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of the ordinary reliefs, the Committee would not recommend the adoption of so costly a mode of transport.

“ 6. That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape, without loss of time, forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course.

“ 7. That the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country; and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies.

“ 8. That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that credit is due to those who have been charged with the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the army in India during the past year.”

Motion made and question proposed, “ That the Committee do now proceed to take into consideration the Draft Report proposed by the Chairman.”—Amendment proposed (Mr. *Crawford*), to leave out all the words after the word “ That,” in order to add these words, “ before proceeding to consider any Draft Report, it is desirable to ascertain and determine by Resolution the opinion of the Committee upon the principal points involved in the matters referred to the Committee.” Question put, “ That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question.” Committee divided:

Ayes, 6. Sir C. Napier. Sir James Elphinstone. Mr. Horsman. Mr. Byng. Mr. Selater-Booth. Mr. Willoughby.		Noes, 7. Lord John Hay. Mr. Danby Seymour. Sir E. Colebrooke. Mr. Osborne. Captain Vivian. Lord Goderich. Mr. Crawford.
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Words

Words added. Question as amended put and agreed to.

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That the Resolutions proposed by Lord *Goderich* be now taken into consideration." Put and agreed to.

Motion made and question proposed, "That the inquiry which this Committee has been appointed to conduct may be divided into three branches: the first, relating to the overland route to India; the second, to the employment of steamers, as compared with sailing vessels, for the transport of troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made during the mutiny of the military resources of this country and of the colonies." Question put and agreed to.

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route to India at the earliest period at which it could have been used with a certainty that the troops sent across Egypt would on their arrival at Suez have found transport ready to convey them down the Red Sea; but that that certainty could not have been obtained before the end of August or beginning of September; that the troops could then only have been despatched in small numbers, and would have arrived at Calcutta about a fortnight sooner than the first reinforcements sent round the Cape."

Motion by leave withdrawn.

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That although the overland route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be adopted as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India."—Amendment proposed (Sir *C. Napier*), To leave out all the words after the word "emergency," in order to add these words: "the Government are the best judges whether on common occasions it should be adopted." Question put, "That the words as far as the word 'adopted' stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 10.
 Lord John Hay.
 Mr. Danby Seymour.
 Sir E. Colebrooke.
 Captain Vivian.
 Lord Goderich.
 Mr. Crawford.
 Mr. Horsman.
 Mr. Byng.
 Mr. Selater-Booth.
 Mr. Willoughby.

Noes, 3.
 Mr. Osborne.
 Sir C. Napier.
 Sir J. Elphinstone.

Further amendment proposed (Captain *Vivian*), To leave out the word "adopted," in order to insert the words "relied upon." Question put, "That the word proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 2.
 Lord John Hay.
 Lord Goderich.

Noes, 11.
 Mr. D. Seymour.
 Sir E. Colebrooke.
 Mr. Osborne.
 Captain Vivian.
 Sir C. Napier.
 Sir J. Elphinstone.
 Mr. Crawford.
 Mr. Horsman.
 Mr. Byng.
 Mr. Selater-Booth.
 Mr. Willoughby.

Words "relied upon" inserted.

Another amendment proposed (Mr. *Willoughby*), To leave out all the words after the word "as," in order, to add these words, "the sole and exclusive route under ordinary circumstances for the transmission of troops to India." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 9.
 Lord John Hay.
 Mr. D. Seymour.
 Sir E. Colebrooke.
 Mr. Osborne.
 Captain Vivian.
 Lord Goderich.
 Sir C. Napier.
 Mr. Crawford.
 Mr. Horsman.

Noes, 4.
 Sir J. Elphinstone.
 Mr. Byng.
 Mr. Selater-Booth.
 Mr. Willoughby.

Original question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That although the Overland Route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India."

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That Steamers should for the future be always made use of, as far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of the ordinary reliefs, the Committee would not recommend the adoption of so costly a mode of transport."

Question put, and agreed to.

[Adjourned to Monday, at Twelve.

Luna, 21^o die Junii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Lord John Hay.	Sir J. Elphinstone.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Crawford.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir C. Napier.	Mr. Byng.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	

Motion made and question proposed (Mr. *Horsman*), "That the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the mutiny at Meerut to have been sensible of the advantages of the overland route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political considerations deterred Her Majesty's Ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation."—Amendment proposed (Lord *Goderich*), After the word "political" to insert the words "and other." Question, "That those words be there inserted," put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 5.
Lord John Hay.	Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Willoughby.	Sir J. Elphinstone.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Horsman.
Mr. D. Seymour.	Mr. Byng.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Lord Goderich.	
Mr. Crawford.	

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the Mutiny at Meerut to have been sensible of the advantages of the Overland Route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political and other considerations deterred Her Majesty's Ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation."

Motion made, and question proposed (Mr. *Horsman*), "That the Committee cannot judge of the validity of those political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the early part of September, when the more serious character of the war led to a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a compliance with it on the part of the Cabinet."—Amendment proposed (Mr. *D. Seymour*), after the word "war," to insert the words "and the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta." Question, "That those words be there inserted," put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 8.	Noes, 4.
Lord John Hay.	Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Byng.
Mr. D. Seymour.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Captain Vivian.	
Lord Goderich.	
Mr. Crawford.	
Mr. Osborne.	

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved,

Resolved, "That the Committee cannot judge of the validity of those political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the first week of September, when the more serious character of the war and the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, led to a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a compliance with it on the part of the Cabinet."

Motion made, and question proposed (Mr. *Horsman*), "That the sudden and unexpected transmission of reinforcements by the overland route, when it was first suggested by the Directors, would necessarily have been attended with some risk and inconvenience. But it does not appear that any greater danger was to be apprehended from the attempt, if confined to small bodies of troops, than in so grave an emergency might have been fairly encountered and overcome, if no political considerations had stood in the way."—Amendment proposed (Lord *Goderich*), to leave out all the words after the word, "That," in order to add these words, "it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route, at the earliest possible period at which it could have been used with a certainty that the troops sent across Egypt would, on their arrival at Suez, have found transport ready to convey them down the Red Sea; but that that certainty could not have been obtained before the end of August or beginning of September; that the troops could then only have been despatched in small number, and would have arrived at Calcutta about a fortnight sooner than the first reinforcements sent round the Cape." Question put, "That the words to the word, 'Directors,' inclusive, stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 6.
Sir C. Napier.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Sclater-Booth.

Noes, 7.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. D. Seymour.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Osborne.

Question, "That the remaining words stand part of the question," put and negatived. Question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That the proposed words be there added." Amendment proposed (Sir *C. Napier*), That instead thereof, these words be there added: "The unexpected transmission of reinforcements by the overland route, when first suggested by the Directors, would have been attended with no considerable risk or inconvenience, as mail steamers had been in the habit, for several years, of traversing the Red Sea, and are capable of transporting between 300 and 400 troops, besides passengers, and 1,000 without passengers, in perfect safety, in 40 days less than steamers and in 80 days shorter than sailing vessels round the Cape of Good Hope." Question put (Lord *Goderich*), "That the words 'it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route,' be there added." Committee divided:

Ayes, 8.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. D. Seymour.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Osborne.

Noes, 4.
Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Sclater-Booth.

Question again proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That the remaining words from the word 'route' to the end of the question be there added."—Amendment proposed (Sir *E. Colebrooke*), to leave out all the words after the word "period" in order to add these words, "And apart from such considerations it is to be much regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the evidence laid before the Committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape as to give any great advantage in favour of this route."—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out as far as the words 'Red Sea,' stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 6.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. D. Seymour.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Osborne.

Noes, 7.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Sir C. Napier.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Sclater-Booth.

Question, "That the remaining words stand part of the question," put, and negatived.

Question proposed (Sir E. Colebrooke), That those words be added after the word "period." Amendment proposed (Lord Goderich), to leave out the word "much." Question put, "That the word 'much' stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Noes, 5.
Lord J. Hay.
Mr. Seymour.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Osborne.

Amendment proposed (Mr. Crawford) to leave out all the words after the word "date." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Danby Seymour.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Osborne.

Noes, 5.
Mr. Crawford.
Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the Overland Route at the earliest possible period, and, apart from such considerations, it is much to be regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the evidence laid before the Committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape as to give any great advantage in favour of this route."

Veneris, 25 die Junii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Crawford.

Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Selater-Booth.
Mr. Danby Seymour.
Mr. Osborne.

Motion made, and question proposed (Sir James Elphinstone), "That the attention of the Government should be directed to increasing the facilities and diminishing the cost of this mode of transmitting troops to India, so as to render it available for that purpose as far as circumstances may permit, even in ordinary times." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.
Sir C. Napier.
Sir J. Elphinstone.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Noes, 8.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Osborne.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Crawford.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. D. Seymour.

Motion

Motion made, and Question proposed (Sir J. Elphinstone), "That it would be highly impolitic to discontinue the advantage afforded by the overland route in transmitting troops to India." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.
Sir C. Napier.
Sir J. Elphinstone.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Noes, 8.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Osborne.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Crawford.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. D. Seymour.

Motion made, and Question proposed (Sir J. Elphinstone), "That this route should be employed for the transport of regiments at such periods of the year as a full consideration of the circumstances may justify; but that drafts of recruits continue to be sent round the Cape of Good Hope as hitherto." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.
Sir C. Napier.
Sir J. Elphinstone.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Noes, 8.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Osborne.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Crawford.
Lord J. Hay.
Mr. D. Seymour.

Motion made, and Question proposed (Lord Goderich), "That if steamers had been used in greater numbers, the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by sailing vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of steam transport was attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam vessels than were actually employed."—Amendment proposed (Sir E. Colebrooke), To leave out all the words after the word "That," in order to add these words, "a comparison of the length of the passages performed by steam and sailing vessels despatched with troops during the months of July and December inclusive, has established the superiority of the former for the rapid transmission of troops, and removed some doubts which had previously been entertained by several naval authorities on this subject; but looking to the uncertainty which existed as to the supply of coal on this route, the home Government was justified in not resorting to this mode of transport in a greater degree than it was actually employed." Question put, "That the word 'if' stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 8.
Mr. Osborne.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Byng.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Crawford.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Selater-Booth.
Mr. Danby Seymour.

Noes, 4.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Horsman.

Amendment proposed (Captain Vivian), To leave out the words from "but" to "whilst," inclusive. Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:—

Ayes, 7.
Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Osborne.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Byng.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Danby Seymour.

Noes, 3.
Captain Vivian.
Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved, "That if steamers had been used in greater numbers, the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by sailing vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of steam transport was attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam vessels than were actually employed."

Motion made, and Question proposed (Sir C. Napier), "That the Committee desire to express their opinion that great credit is due to the East India Company for the promptness

ness with which they faced the difficulties in which they were suddenly placed, as well as for the systematic and business-like manner in which they carried out the operations which devolved upon them; but the Committee feel bound to state, that it was proved satisfactorily that the passage round the Cape by steamers has had an advantage over sailing vessels of upwards of a month; and that, although frequently warned in the House of Commons by naval authorities, Her Majesty's Government do not appear to have made sufficient inquiry on the subject, nor did they advise the Board of Control or the East India Directors to give the preference to steamers; on the contrary, they recommended sailing vessels to be employed." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 2.
Sir C. Napier.
Sir J. Elphinstone.

Noes, 11.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Osborne.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Selater-Booth.
Mr. Danby Seymour.

Motion made, and Question proposed (*Lord Goderich*), "That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape without loss of time forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course." Amendment proposed (*Captain Vivian*), To leave out all the words after the words "to India." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided.

Ayes, 7.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Osborne.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Crawford.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Byng.

Noes, 2.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Horsman.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved, "That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape without loss of time forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course."

Motion made and question proposed (*Lord Goderich*), "That the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country; and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies."—Amendment proposed (*Mr. Crawford*), after the word "That" to insert the words "the Committee observe with satisfaction that."—Question, "That those words be there inserted," put and agreed to.

Further amendment made, by omission of the words, "That the Committee"—Amendment proposed (*Captain Vivian*), to leave out all the words after the words "mother country." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Danby Seymour.

Noes, 4.
Mr. Osborne.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That the Committee observe with satisfaction that the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country; and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies."

Motion

ON EAST INDIA (TRANSPORT OF TROOPS).

XXXV

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that credit is due to those who have been charged with the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the army in India during the past year."—Amendment proposed (Mr. *Osborne*), After the word "sent" to insert these words, "and having special reference to the recognition by the Government of India of the promptitude and efficiency with which the Home Government supported the Government of India with troops and all military appliances."—Question put, "That those words be there inserted."

Ayes, 4.
Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Osborne.
Lord Goderich.
Mr. Danby Seymour.

Noes, 7.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Amendment made (Mr. *Crawford*), By inserting after the words "opinion that," the word "great." Another amendment proposed (Mr. *Crawford*), To leave out the words "those who have been charged with," in order to insert the words "the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 4.
Mr. Osborne.
Lord Goderich.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Danby Seymour.

Noes, 8.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Captain Vivian.
Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Question, "That those words be there inserted," put and agreed to.

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the army in India during the past year."

Motion made and question proposed (Mr. *Byng*), "That the frequent reference made to 'political objections' against the earlier adoption of the overland route for the transmission of troops to India has seriously embarrassed the proceedings of this Committee, inasmuch as they felt themselves necessarily debarred from inquiring whether those objections were or were not sufficiently valid; and they are in consequence precluded from expressing any definite opinion upon a very important branch of this inquiry." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 3.
Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Selater-Booth.

Noes, 9.
Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Osborne.
Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.
Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Crawford.
Lord John Hay.
Mr. Danby Seymour.

Question, "That the following Resolutions, together with the Minutes of Evidence, be the Report of the Committee to The House," put and agreed to.

"1. That the inquiry which this Committee has been appointed to conduct may be divided into three branches: the first, relating to the Overland Route to India; the second, to the employment of Steamers, as compared with Sailing Vessels, for the transport of troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made during the Mutiny of the military resources of this country and of the Colonies.

"2. That the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the mutiny at Meerut to have been sensible of the advantages of the overland route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political and other considerations deterred Her Majesty's Ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation.

"3. That the Committee cannot judge of the validity of those political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the first week of September, when the more serious character of the war and the lateness

of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, led to a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a compliance with it on the part of the Cabinet.

“ 4. That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the Overland Route at the earliest possible period, and, apart from such considerations, it is much to be regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the evidence laid before the Committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape, as to give any great advantage in favour of this route.

“ 5. That although the Overland Route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India.

“ 6. That if Steamers had been used in greater numbers the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by sailing vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of steam transport was attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam vessels than were actually employed.

“ 7. That Steamers should for the future be always made use of, as far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of the ordinary reliefs, the Committee would not recommend the adoption of so costly a mode of transport.

“ 8. That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape without loss of time forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course.

“ 9. That the Committee observe with satisfaction that the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country; and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies.

“ 10. That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the Army in India during the past year.”

Ordered, To Report.

R E P O R T
FROM THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON
EAST INDIA
(TRANSPORT OF TROOPS);
WITH THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
1 July 1858.*

382.

Under 4 oz.