

DOCUMENTS ON
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POLICY 1918—1945

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DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945

SERIES D (1937-1945)

VOLUME XI

THE WAR YEARS

September 1, 1940-January 31, 1941

CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	IX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS	XI
DOCUMENTS	1
APPENDICES:	
I. Organization of the German Foreign Ministry	1241
II. List of German Files Used	1246
III. List of Principal Persons	1251
IV. Glossary of German Terms and Abbreviations	1263
V. Map: The Lithuanian Strip, 1940	1267

PREFACE¹

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents." In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

It was originally intended to complete the entire publication for the period 1918-1945 in some twenty volumes. When, however, the preliminary work on the selections for the years from 1933 to 1945 was completed in 1954 it became apparent that an adequate selection of the documents for this period would require a publication on a scale approximately double the size which had been anticipated at the outset. After considering the length of time it would take to carry out a program on this enlarged scale the participating Governments decided to limit the publication in English to the years 1933 to 1941—beginning January 30, 1933, when Hitler became Reich Chancellor and ending in December 1941 after the German declaration of war on the United States of America. Series C in six volumes covers the period 1933 to 1936-37. Two further volumes are planned for Series D: Volume XII (February 1-June 22, 1941) and volume XIII (June 23-December 31, 1941).

Prior to the return to the German Federal Republic in December 1958 of the last of the files of the former German Foreign Ministry a program was carried out of systematic microfilming of the files for the Weimar period aiming to make film copies of all documents of importance for the history of German foreign policy. These micro-

¹In each of the first four volumes published in the series there appears a "General Introduction" which describes some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

films are being made available to public research at the National Archives in Washington and at the Public Record Office in London. Each document printed in this publication bears a microfilm serial and frame number in the upper left-hand corner. The microfilm copy of the original German text can be located by reference to Appendix II, "List of German Files Used."

The editors have exercised complete freedom in the selection and editing of the documents falling in the period of this volume which opens on September 1, 1940, following the Vienna Award which established the new frontiers of Rumania and Hungary, and which ends on January 31, 1941.

The documents are printed in chronological order. A topical arrangement of the analytical list at the beginning of the volume is designed to help those who wish to read on particular subjects.

The documents have been selected jointly by the United States, British, and French editors, but the United States editors have had full editorial responsibility for this volume. The editors wish to express their appreciation to various officials of the Department of State for cooperation and assistance, and particularly to G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the Historical Division, as well as to members of the American Advisory Committee: Sidney B. Fay, Guy Stanton Ford, Carlton J. H. Hayes, Hajo Holborn, William L. Langer, Bernadotte E. Schmitt, and Raymond J. Sontag.

The translations were drafted by the Department of State's Division of Language Services, but the editors have final responsibility for the translations as well as full responsibility for the footnotes and other editorial matter. Valuable aid was given by Beverly A. Smith. The technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was done in the Division of Publishing Services of the Department of State under the direction of Norris E. Drew; the editors acknowledge gratefully his assistance and that of Elizabeth A. Vary, Collie E. Halbert, B. Etoile Tine, and other members of the staff of that Division.

Readers should bear in mind that these documents are presented as a source book for the study of history, and not as a finished interpretation of history. It has been the aim throughout to keep any interpretative comment out of the footnotes.

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS ¹

AFRICA

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 11	<p><i>The Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP to the State Secretary and Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Discusses the nature of the reply that might be given to General Maritz' suggestions for pro-Boer actions on the part of the Germans.</p>	49	63
Oct. 8	<p><i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division X</i></p> <p>Summarizes the reports of a confidential agent who had just returned from South Africa, where he had carried a message, approved by Ribbentrop, to General Hertzog and Malan.</p>	163	271
Nov. 6	<p><i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division X</i></p> <p>Discussion of Germany's demands regarding colonies which are to be made of France and other colonial powers, with particular emphasis on the creation of a German colonial empire in central Africa.</p>	298	483
Nov. 22	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i></p> <p>Records that a request for German arms from the South African nationalist organization Ossewa-Brandwag transmitted by the Consulate at Lourenço Marques is to be handled in a dilatory manner by the Foreign Ministry.</p> <p>(See also under "France," "Great Britain," "Italy," and "Spain.")</p>	382	670

BELGIUM

1940 Sept. 21	<p><i>The German Adjutant With the King of the Belgians to the State Secretary</i></p> <p>Refers to his letter to Schmundt, of which he had given Weizsäcker a copy, and to his warning that mishandling of the prisoner of war question might adversely affect German influence over the Belgian population.</p>	85	146
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¹ The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace topics through the volume this analytical list of documents has been arranged alphabetically by countries or regions, with the addition of five subject headings: "Danube Navigation," "Greater German Economic Sphere," "Military Documents," "Peace Moves," and "Sea Warfare."

BELGIUM—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 18	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Records a conversation between Hitler and Princess Marie-José on October 17 regarding Belgian questions. Hitler expressed his willingness to receive King Leopold.</p> <p>On the food supply question he objected to the proposal to bring in food from the United States as he anticipated that Britain would cause difficulties. On the question of release or return of Belgian prisoners of war Hitler would promise no concessions.</p>	183	312
Oct. 20	<p><i>Memorandum by Léon Degrelle, Belgian Rexist Leader</i></p> <p>Degrelle attempts to justify the entrusting of control of an enlarged Belgium in the Nationalist Socialist new Europe to his movement.</p>	204	339
Nov. 21	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Record of a conversation between Hitler and King Leopold of the Belgians on November 19.</p>	356	612
Dec. 6	<p><i>Counselor of Embassy Bergen to Counselor Siegfried</i></p> <p>States that he would like to defer a proposal made earlier regarding the strengthening of his position of Foreign Ministry representative in Belgium, since the meeting of Hitler and King Leopold has brought about no change in German-Belgian relations.</p>	463	801
1941 Jan. 11	<p><i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>Records statements made by King Leopold to Kiewitz about the plan to import 300,000 tons of grain from Russia after February 15 to prevent the famine threatening in Belgium; the problem is being discussed at the Reich Ministry of Economics.</p>	643	1075
Jan. 14	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>Expresses views and requests instructions in connection with the arrival in Berlin of a Belgian delegation which wants to negotiate about importing grain from Germany and possibly also from Russia.</p> <p>(See also under "France.")</p>	653	1095

BULGARIA

1940 Oct. 22	<p><i>The King of Bulgaria to Adolf Hitler</i></p> <p>Replies to invitation to join the Tripartite Pact. King Boris believes that objectives of this Pact could be served better if Bulgaria did not join; Bulgaria's accession to the Pact would increase Greek and Turkish hostility and possibly precipitate a war in the Balkans for which Bulgaria was not prepared and which was also not in the interest of Germany.</p>	217	364
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ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XIII

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 6	<p><i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria</i></p> <p>Instructions to obtain the consent and cooperation of the Bulgarian Government for the establishment of an air raid warning system, manned by German specialists, inside Bulgaria along the Greek border; it is to be feared that British aircraft will make attacks on the Rumanian oil fields from Greek airfields.</p>	295	479
Nov. 16	<p><i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria</i></p> <p>Information that the Bulgarian Minister in Germany stated his Government was prepared to set up an air raid warning system with Bulgarian personnel and a few German technical instructors; instructions to take up the matter with Bulgarian Government which had earlier agreed in principle to the dispatch of German special units to man the air raid warning system.</p>	345	591
Nov. 21	<p><i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Molotov has asked the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow whether Bulgaria has a treaty with Italy or an Italian guarantee and also whether Bulgaria intends to join the Tripartite Pact. The Bulgarian Government has not yet replied.</p>	373	647
Nov. 22	<p><i>The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Transmits a report from Papen on a conversation with King Boris; discussed were the King's recent visit with Hitler, Soviet inquiries regarding Bulgarian intentions, and the offer of a Russian guarantee; the King fears that official Bulgarian accession to the Tripartite Pact might result in a Russo-Turkish rapprochement.</p>	378	651
Nov. 22	<p><i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i></p> <p>Information from a "most secret source" that the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow was called to Dekanozov on November 18; Molotov was also there and asked whether Bulgaria would accede to the Tripartite Pact; he offered support for Bulgaria's national goals and economic assistance, demanding however that Bulgaria inform him of her commitment toward Italy and Germany; if there should be question of a guarantee, it would be given by the Soviet Government, too.</p>	379	653
Nov. 23	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i></p> <p>Record of a conversation between Hitler and the Bulgarian Minister, Draganov; Draganov gives reasons why the Bulgarian Government, although in principle prepared to accede to the Tripartite Pact, wants the date of signing to be deferred; discussion of Soviet policies; Hitler states that the decision as to joining the Tripartite Pact is up to Bulgaria, but that it would have been best if Bulgaria had joined the Pact from the beginning.</p>	384	672

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 24	<p><i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 373 and reports that instructions for the reply to Molotov are ready for dispatch to the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow; they state that Bulgaria does not feel threatened, that there was therefore no need for a guarantee, and that Bulgaria was considering accession to the Tripartite Pact.</p>	391	691
Nov. 26	<p><i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he was called to the Minister President who informed him about a Soviet proposal of mutual assistance brought to Sofia by Secretary General Sobolev of the Soviet Foreign Ministry; the Minister President also told of a Turkish démarche. Turkey was prepared to state that she would not attack Bulgaria provided Bulgaria did not engage in any hostile acts.</p>	403	712
Nov. 28	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Expresses the view that, in view of a recent Turkish proposal, a Bulgarian offer to conclude a nonaggression pact with Turkey would be advisable.</p>	413	725
Nov. 28	<p><i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow has delivered to Dekanozov the Bulgarian reply to the first Soviet inquiry reported in document No. 373 and that he was also informed by Molotov of the Soviet step taken meanwhile in Sofia; deliberations about the reply to be given by Bulgaria to the Soviet pact proposal have not yet been concluded, but the Foreign Minister told Richthofen what the general tenor of the reply would be.</p>	415	726
Nov. 30	<p><i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information from the Bulgarian Foreign Minister regarding the Bulgarian Government's reply to the Soviet proposal of November 25. The reply discussed Bulgaria's national goals, her relations with Turkey, and the negotiations with Germany about the Tripartite Pact.</p>	430	756
Dec. 1	<p><i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister sees no possibility for proposing a pact to Turkey after just having declined the Soviet offer of a pact; he is considering the possibility of proposing to Turkey a mutual declaration of nonaggression.</p>	433	759
Dec. 3	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Conversation between Hitler and the Bulgarian Minister, Draganov. Discussion of the Russian proposal of a pact with Bulgaria, the attitude of Turkey, the danger of Bolshevization in case of a Russian guarantee; Hitler asks Draganov to impress upon the King that Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact would present Russia with an accomplished fact and induce her to leave Bulgaria alone.</p>	438	767

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 7	<p><i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the Soviet reply to the Bulgarian rejection of the Soviet proposal for a pact. The reply contained the statement that Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact would be abandonment of Bulgaria's neutrality. Richthofen thereupon told the Foreign Minister that only a straightforward decision in favor of the Pact would save Bulgaria from further unpleasant steps by the Russians.</p>	468	806
Dec. 10	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with the Bulgarian Minister regarding the various Soviet proposals to Bulgaria. The Minister was under instructions to request Germany's advice as to the reply to be given; Woermann's recommendations.</p>	486	833
Dec. 19	<p><i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Soviet Minister expressed to the Bulgarian Foreign Minister his astonishment that the Bulgarian Government had not yet replied to the Soviet statement of December 6; the Foreign Minister thereupon asked the Minister to tell Moscow that Bulgaria highly valued friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but that she did not want to be drawn into the war.</p>	536	908
Dec. 23	<p><i>Ambassador Ritter to the Foreign Minister</i> Encloses a memorandum containing a timetable for the first stage of Operation <i>Marita</i>; the details must be discussed right away with the Bulgarian Government so that preparations for construction of bridges, supply stations, and barracks can be started.</p>	556	937
Dec. 27	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Instructions to inform the Bulgarian Minister President that his visit would be welcome; it is preferable that the meeting be held during the first days of January in Fuschl, where it would not attract attention.</p>	570	965
1941 Jan. 2	<p><i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> States that it is necessary soon to have military conversations with Bulgaria regarding German passage through Bulgaria. Proposes that it be arranged at the forthcoming visit of the Bulgarian Minister President that military talks take place directly between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarian High Command.</p>	593	1002
Jan. 2	<p><i>Note by the State Secretary</i> Brief for the conversations with the Bulgarian Minister President, discussing the politically most important points of the forthcoming conversations such as Turkey, Yugoslavia, the Tripartite Pact, and the Soviet Union.</p>	594	1003
Jan. 7	<p><i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Conversation between Hitler and Filov on January 4. Discussion of Bulgarian misgivings about joining the Tripartite Pact immediately, Soviet policy, the outlook for the Italo-Greek war; German determination to prevent the British from getting a foothold in Greece, the attitude of Turkey, the danger of Bolshevism, the Soviet Union's guarantee offer to Bulgaria.</p>	606	1018

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 11	<p><i>The Head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the OKW to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a decision by Hitler to get in touch with Bulgaria in order to prepare quarters for the troops crossing the Danube; the crossing is not to be expected before the end of January.</p>	644	1076
Jan. 13	<p><i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that talks with the Minister President and Foreign Minister indicate that Bulgaria, although still apprehensive about military consequences, is prepared for a speedy signing of the Tripartite Pact. The Bulgarians take a particularly serious view of the threat of British air bombardment uttered by the British Minister in Sofia and want to know what protection Germany could provide after Bulgaria had signed the Pact.</p>	648	1080
Jan. 13	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Bulgarian Minister, Draganov. Discussion of the attitude of the Soviet Union, Turkey, Britain, and Yugoslavia toward the German troop movements in the Balkans and of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact; Draganov wants assurances that a German air defense expert will come to Sofia soon, that the two General Staffs will meet soon to discuss operational questions, and that the two Governments reach agreement on Bulgaria's war aims with respect to Greece.</p>	649	1081
Jan. 14	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that a Tass communiqué published on January 13 regarding rumors of an alleged entry of German troops into Bulgaria created a sensation in Moscow diplomatic circles; while generally a sharp and obstinate position is taken in such Soviet communiqués, it was generally noted that the present one avoided any stand against Germany or Bulgaria.</p>	655	1100
Jan. 15	<p><i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records telephone instructions from the Foreign Minister regarding the questions raised in Draganov's talk with Weizsäcker on January 13 and in telegram No. 14 from Sofia of the same day.</p>	656	1101
Jan. 15	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records that he gave the Bulgarian Minister the answers to the questions raised in document No. 649. Germany agreed in principle to a Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean between the Maritsa and Struma estuaries; she was prepared to have General Staff discussions between the staff of Field Marshal List and the Bulgarian General Staff and to arrange for the journey to Bulgaria of German air warfare experts; Bulgaria must now state her readiness to sign the Tripartite Pact at a moment to be determined by Germany.</p>	658	1104

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XVII

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 15	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Instructions to tell the Bulgarian Government that Germany agrees to the immediate start of General Staff conversations and to the visit of a German air defense specialist; information for Minister Richthofen about the planned German military move through Bulgaria; if contrary to expectations, the Bulgarian Government should still maintain reservations about acceding to the Tripartite Pact, the resulting grave consequences for Bulgaria should be emphasized.	660	1106
Jan. 15	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records that Benzler, representative of the Foreign Ministry with Field Marshal List, will have responsibility for seeing that all foreign policy matters in connection with Operation <i>Marita</i> will remain in the hands of the Foreign Ministry.	662	1113
Jan. 22	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that President Roosevelt's emissary, Donovan, had told the Bulgarian Foreign Minister that the United States could not permit a British defeat; the Foreign Minister said that he evaded Donovan's questions as to Bulgaria's intentions and that he gave a negative reply to the question whether Bulgaria felt threatened by German troop concentrations in Rumania.	685	1160
Jan. 23	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Bulgarian Minister President informed him of the willingness of the King and the Government to sign the Tripartite Pact as soon as possible; in case of a satisfactory outcome of the General Staff conversations, signing could take place within a few days. Although the territorial question had been settled by the recent statement of the State Secretary, it would be appreciated if this were laid down in a note or protocol at the signing of the Pact.	693	1171
Jan. 24	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records learning from General Halder that the Staff conversations with the Bulgarians had been concluded. The latter showed willingness but expressed concern as the Bulgarian Army was not fully ready and the air defense inadequate; the Bulgarian General Staff requested that accession to the Tripartite Pact not be scheduled earlier than the start of the military operation.	704	1185
Jan. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Cultural Policy Department</i> Records a conversation on January 26 with the King of Bulgaria in the course of which were discussed the policy of France, England, and the Soviet Union, and the visit to Bulgaria of President Roosevelt's emissary, Colonel Donovan.	713	1201

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 27	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i></p> <p>Instructions to tell the Bulgarian Government that Germany would consider useful a Bulgarian-Turkish agreement expressing friendly understanding between the two countries such as the declaration proposed by Turkey; however, to avoid anything conflicting with present German-Bulgarian relations, it is necessary to omit from the preamble the reference to the earlier declaration at the conclusion of the Menemencioglu-Kiosseivanov conversations of January 1940.</p>	714	1203
Jan. 27	<p><i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i></p> <p>Records a number of foreign policy actions which have to be harmonized with the military situation; General Jodl has made certain statements provisionally about the timing of the German move into Bulgaria; he will speak more conclusively about the tempo of the military operations after the Military Attaché in Sofia has reported on the German-Bulgarian Staff conversations.</p>	719	1210
Jan. 28	<p><i>The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Information on a decision by Hitler regarding military operations in the Balkans; listing of the factor which will decide the moment for the entry of German troops into Bulgaria which will probably not take place before February 20.</p>	724	1216
Jan. 31	<p><i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i></p> <p>New decisions by Hitler regarding the preparations for Operation <i>Marita</i>. The attack on Greece is to start beginning of April and the entry into Bulgaria is to be as late as is compatible with this date; prerequisites for the operation are listed and clearances for preparatory moves are given.</p> <p>(See also under "Greece," "Military Documents," "Rumania," "Turkey," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")</p>	738	1236

DANUBE NAVIGATION

1940 Sept. 12	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>In a Soviet memorandum handed to Schulenburg, it is stated that the USSR as a Danubian power wants to be consulted in all questions concerning the Danube and that this includes the activities of the two Danube Commissions.</p>	50	64
Sept. 13	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i></p> <p>Weizsäcker forwards a copy of a memorandum to the Soviet Ambassador stressing that while the Soviet Union had never been in the International Danube Commission, she certainly ought to have a seat on the European Danube Commission; Germany is ready to start discussions with the USSR on that subject.</p>	53	66

DANUBE NAVIGATION—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc.No.	Page
1940 Sept. 14	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>A new Soviet memorandum approves the abolition of the International Danube Commission as an anti-German instrument, but points out that similarly the European Danube Commission had been an anti-Russian creation of the Paris Treaty of 1856. The Soviet Union is interested in a new regime for the lower Danube only; she has special interests there in view of the vital importance of the trade between it and the countries of the lower Danube.</p>	56	73
Oct. 11	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>The German answer to the Soviet memorandum on the Danube question accepts in principle the Soviet suggestion of a single commission for the Danube from Bratislava downward, but points to the need for a solution for the time being; therefore the European Danube Commission ought to be abolished as was the International Danube Commission and the problems there raised should be settled soon; Soviet suggestions for a place and date will be expected.</p>	174	287
Oct. 18	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Molotov called Italian participation in a Danube regime a geographical anomaly; Schulenburg said Germany could not possibly exclude Italy from the Danube commission.</p>	188	318
Oct. 20	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>The Soviet answer to the German suggestions concerning a new regime for the administration of the Danube is favorable on most points and the date of October 24 is proposed for the meeting of the new body that is to replace the European Danube Commission.</p>	201	335
Oct. 29	<p><i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Report by Martius, German delegate to the Danube conference, on a conversation with the Soviet delegate, Sobolev. The Soviet Union's goal is a mixed Soviet-Rumanian administration of the Danube delta and subsequent control over the whole Danube by a new commission.</p>	249	424
Nov. 3	<p><i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>The German delegate at the Danube conference reports a crisis in the negotiations. The Soviets will agree to the dissolution of the European Commission for the Danube only if their proposal for a mixed Russo-Rumanian administration is accepted as basis for negotiations and if the idea of a four power administration consisting of Germany, Italy, Rumania, and the Soviet Union is rejected.</p>	280	458
Nov. 3	<p><i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Expresses the opinion that the obstinate Soviet attitude at the Danube conference indicates that the Soviets want to push Germany away from the mouth of the Danube and to pursue a policy of blackmail toward Germany in the Danube and Black Sea area.</p>	281	459

DANUBE NAVIGATION—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 3	<p><i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>The German delegate at the Danube conference reports that further negotiations are futile unless the instructions for the Soviet delegation are changed and discusses possible courses of action such as representations in Moscow, recall of the delegation, adjournment of the conference; requests instructions.</p>	283	461
Nov. 5	<p><i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i></p> <p>Instructions concerning German policy at the Danube conference: Open conflict with the Soviet Government is to be avoided, consequently recall of the delegation or adjournment cannot be considered; Soviet representative is to be told that Germany cannot believe that Soviet Government intends to exclude her from a Danube settlement; conversations ought to be conducted in such a manner that Soviet representative will request new instructions from his Government.</p>	288	467
Nov. 5	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i></p> <p>Records conversation with the Rumanian statesman, Valer Pop, who referred to the difficulties that had arisen at the Danube conference; the Soviet proposal would result not in a Russo-Rumanian condominium but in Soviet predominance and the demand for free entry of Russian warships into the branches of the Danube was unacceptable.</p>	290	469
Nov. 10	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>Reviews the negotiations conducted so far at the Danube conference in Bucharest. A 4-point Soviet proposal made on November 7 indicated a more accommodating Soviet attitude; consequently the German delegate was instructed to agree to the proposal under certain conditions.</p>	310	510
Nov. 21	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i></p> <p>Records that no action has been taken regarding Rumanian requests that Germany make the Russian occupation of parts of the Kiliya branch of the Danube the subject of friendly discussions in Moscow; the Foreign Minister has decided against Germany's being the spokesman of such Rumanian requests in Moscow.</p>	376	650
Dec. 5	<p><i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that negotiations reveal Russian intention to undermine, by the new Russo-Rumanian administration, the former system of control in spite of its being formally acclaimed and suggests considering whether Moscow should not be informed that an accord on the dissolution of the European Danube Commission cannot be postponed past the middle of the month.</p>	451	788
Dec. 11	<p><i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that the Soviets have made a concrete proposal for an international administration for the entire Danube delta, providing for a Rumanian managing director with a Russian as deputy and with up to 25 percent Russian personnel; the Rumanian delegate has stated that Rumania would never accept such a proposal.</p>	489	838

DANUBE NAVIGATION—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 17	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Text of the statement made by the Soviet delegation rejecting the German-Italian compromise proposal and texts of the statements subsequently made by the German, Italian, and Rumanian delegations.	522	879
Dec. 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania</i> Directs the delegation at the Danube conference to return to Berlin in order to receive new instructions; the positions taken by Rumania and the Soviet Union seem irreconcilable and accordingly adjournment of the conference until after the forthcoming holidays is considered expedient.	524	883
1941 Jan. 2	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records that the Soviet Ambassador handed in a note and a draft protocol regarding accession by the Soviet Government to the provisional agreement of September 12, 1940, about matters of the Danube.	592	1002
Jan. 3	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on a conversation with Molotov on December 29, 1940, about the attitude of the Soviet delegate at the Danube conference in Bucharest; Molotov outlined the Soviet position on this matter, emphasizing that the Soviet Union was now a Danubian country and interested in all questions concerning the mouth of the Danube.	602	1013
Jan. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Comments upon a memorandum by Martius regarding an adjournment of the Bucharest Danube conference and suggests that the convening of the conference be delayed since the spectacle of a German-Russian dispute cannot with certainty be avoided at a public conference.	620	1044
Jan. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Expresses approval of an enclosed memorandum by Martius recommending acceptance of a Soviet draft protocol regarding accession to the provisional agreement of September 12, 1940, in the matter of the Danube; also desirable is postponement of the scheduled meeting of the committee for the fluvial Danube from January 13 to February 20.	621	1045
Jan. 11	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Information that the Foreign Minister wishes postponement of the maritime Danube conference until the second half of March, since a stalemate would be reached immediately; to carry out this intention, consideration is given to having Schulenburg tell the Soviet Government that Rumania intended to submit a new proposal for the further work of the conference and that postponement to a later date might be advisable.	641	1072
	(See also under "Rumania" and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")		

DENMARK

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 13	<i>Letter of King Christian X of Denmark</i> King Christian in a letter to an unnamed friend describes in detail his distaste for the German occupation and his efforts to ameliorate conditions for his people.	54	68
Oct. 1	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports interview with Clausen who discussed creation of a transition cabinet. Clausen would not himself be included. He believed such a development would soon lead to a Danish National Socialist cabinet. Renthe-Fink requests authorization to request resignation of conservative Minister of Commerce Christmas Møller, who was reported to have made anti-German statements.	137	230
Oct. 22	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reviews the attitude of the Danish parties toward Germany since April 9 and concludes that the only one prepared to come out in favor of true cooperation with Germany is the Danish National Socialist party of Clausen. German policy should be to bring a Clausen government into power by legal means. It might be necessary, however, to have a transition government or to tolerate Stauning for a while longer as events might dictate.	218	366
Dec. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark</i> Records his oral report to the Foreign Minister on developments in Denmark; the Møller case; prospects of the Danish National Socialists; attitude of the King.	537	909
[Dec. 30]	<i>Memorandum by the Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark</i> Reports conversation with the King. Renthe-Fink expressed concern over deterioration in Danish-German relations.	582	981
1941 Jan. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> The Foreign Minister authorized a statement to the Danish Government giving the German attitude toward changes in the Danish Cabinet currently under discussion.	657	1103

FAR EAST

1940 Sept. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Japan will march into Indochina on September 5; requests that Germany urge the French not to make difficulties.	8	10
Sept. 4	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> Previous requests by the Japanese to influence France to grant concessions to Japan in Indochina have not been acted upon, and there is no reason to change this attitude.	15	19

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 10	<i>The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a talk with Stahmer and Ott, Matsuoka endorsed Ribbentrop's ideas for cooperation by Germany, Italy, and Japan to neutralize the United States, and promised to push the plan in the Cabinet.	44	57
Sept. 19	<i>The Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in Italy</i> Transmits a telegram from Tokyo. Matsuoka has requested authority from the Emperor to sign the tripartite pact but has asked for secret additional agreements to which the German negotiators raised objections.	74	123
Sept. 20	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> A telegram from Tokyo states that the Japanese Foreign Minister has obtained authority from the Emperor to sign the tripartite pact and would like to do so at the earliest possible date.	77	132
Sept. 20	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> Matsuoka has stated that the secret protocol to the tripartite pact desired by Japan is not intended to limit her obligation to render assistance but merely to make for quicker handling of the pact by the Privy Council.	78	133
Sept. 21	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> The German negotiators in Tokyo report that the Japanese Foreign Minister will probably agree to abandoning the secret protocol he had proposed.	82	142
Sept. 21	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan</i> The French have indicated that they will resist if the Japanese attempt to move into Indochina in enforcement of their demands; the French have requested that German influence be brought to bear on Japan but no such action is to be undertaken.	83	143
Sept. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes information supplied by Japanese Foreign Ministry on recent diplomatic exchanges with France, the United States, and Britain over Indochina.	89	156
Sept. 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Transmits final agreed text of tripartite pact; Ciano to be requested to convey Italian approval to Tokyo at once as the Japanese wish to hasten the signing.	95	164
Sept. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> Submits draft of telegram to Tokyo suggesting that Germany take cognizance officially of Japan's stated intention not to alter the territorial status quo in Indochina. Weizsäcker and Woermann veto the suggestion.	100	178
Sept. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano agrees to the text of the pact as approved by the Reich Foreign Minister, and immediately instructs the Italian Embassy in Tokyo to convey this acceptance to the Government there.	101	179
Sept. 27	<i>Tripartite Pact</i> Text of the Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan.	118	204

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 27	<i>Ambassador Ott to Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka</i> Expresses German appreciation of Matsuoka's part in bringing about the Tripartite Pact, and restates some of the most important points of their conversations leading to the Pact.	119	205
Sept. 27	<i>Ambassador Ott to Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka</i> Acknowledges receipt of Japanese letter expressing confidence in German aid should war develop between Japan and Great Britain.	120	207
Sept. 27	<i>Ambassador Ott to Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka</i> Confirms statements made regarding disposal of former German colonies in the South Seas.	121	208
Sept. 27	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> The signing of the Tripartite Pact again expresses the inner unity of the countries involved.	122	208
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Accession of Hungary, Slovakia, and Rumania to the Tripartite Pact.		208
Oct. 4	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits intelligence from a good source that the Tripartite Pact is not highly regarded in official Italian circles; it is believed Japan seeks to retain full freedom of action.	152	261
Oct. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Japanese Foreign Minister urges earliest possible appointment of the technical commissions provided for in the Tripartite Pact, and also the appointment of economic and military subcommissions.	153	262
Oct. 5	<i>SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Conveys intelligence that the Japanese Ambassador in Rome was recalled because he opposed the Tripartite Pact, and that Japanese diplomatic personnel in European Missions are divided in their views on it.	156	265
Oct. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Japan has reasonable hopes for an early agreement between Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek. The Foreign Minister believes he can attain his objective in China without German help.	161	269
Oct. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> To Kurusu's inquiry as to whether Ambassador Schulenburg in Moscow had received any instructions concerning Japanese-Soviet relations, Weizsäcker replied that Schulenburg was aware of Germany's hope for an understanding between the two countries.	185	316
Oct. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Japanese Embassy in Washington believes that, should the United States enter the war after the elections, the prevailing policy would be to deal first with Germany.	210	352

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XXV

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with the Japanese Counselor of Embassy, Kase, who hinted at German support in the settlement of the Japanese-Chinese conflict.	257	433
Oct. 31	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Japanese Ambassador proposed to Molotov the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese nonaggression agreement.	260	437
Nov. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Explains that Japanese proposals for separate military and economic commissions for implementation of the Tripartite Pact are unsound because they would undermine control by the Foreign Ministers. Directs that the matter be discussed with the Italian Government with a view to similar replies to Tokyo.	270	446
Nov. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Japanese Government requests the Reich Government to suggest to Chiang Kai-shek that Japanese recognition of Wang Ching-wei is imminent. Japan wishes peace with China on her terms.	299	491
Nov. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Japanese Ambassador indicated that Japan would soon recognize the Wang Ching-wei regime, which Italy also would recognize, but no immediate recognition by Germany was expected.	303	497
Nov. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister that the Japanese Government requests Germany's aid in reaching an understanding with Soviet Russia and in ending the war in China.	311	512
Nov. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> In a conversation with the Chinese Ambassador, Ribbentrop indicated that Japan would soon recognize the Wang Ching-wei regime and asked about Chiang Kai-shek's views toward ending the Sino-Japanese conflict. The Ambassador mentioned Chiang Kai-shek's condition that Japanese troops evacuate China.	315	515
Nov. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between the Foreign Minister and the Thai Minister of State, Colonel Prayura Montri, in the course of which Thailand's claims to territories in French Indochina were discussed.	316	517
Nov. 15	<i>The Embassy in China to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a report from Chungking which describes the situation there. Some Chinese circles wish peace with Japan; other elements, encouraged by the Americans and British, oppose it; Chiang Kai-shek has not yet taken a definite stand.	336	576

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 [Nov. 15]	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Explains the divergent economic wishes of Japan and of Germany and outlines the problem of procedure in economic negotiations with Japan under the Tripartite Pact.	341	583
Nov. 16	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in China</i> Suggests that Japan wishes to exert pressure on Chiang Kai-shek through the rumor of her impending recognition of the Nanking regime. Directs that any expression of doubt be avoided regarding the impending conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Wang Ching-wei.	347	593
Nov. 21	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Molotov, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, raised the questions of Sakhalin and its oil as prerequisites for an accord with Japan; that Japan requests the Reich Foreign Minister's aid in inducing Soviet Russia to accept a single neutrality pact which would leave specific problems for later settlement.	371	644
Nov. 21	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Japanese warships will visit Saigon in order to induce Thailand to limit her demands on Indochina and to accept Japanese mediation. Should Thailand shift to the Anglo-Saxon camp, Japan might occupy Saigon.	372	646
Nov. 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who indicated that agreements with China and Soviet Russia were essential before a Japanese advance in southeastern Asia. He stated that in order to achieve a neutrality pact with Russia, Japan would renounce her oil rights in northern Sakhalin in return for 200,000 tons of oil from Russia.	423	744
Nov. 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records informing the Japanese Ambassador that Germany was preparing for revision of economic relations under the Tripartite Pact, but that this was independent of Germany's request for Japanese assistance in the procurement of raw materials from the East Indies.	424	744
Dec. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Thai Government has accepted Japan as mediator regarding French Indochina.	458	797
Dec. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records informing the Italian Minister that Wang Ching-wei's government should not be recognized for the time being.	483	831

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XXVII

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 9	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records explanation given to the Thai Minister of State, Montri, of Germany's views regarding the Thailand-Indochina problem; results of Japanese mediation should be awaited; Germany did not wish the use of force; Thailand's claims against Burma were encouraged.	484	831
Dec. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records informing the Japanese Ambassador of his conversation with the Thai Minister of State.	495	845
Dec. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains the Japanese move in requesting agrément for General Oshima as Ambassador in Germany.	508	863
Dec. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Japanese negotiations with Soviet Russia have come to a standstill; negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek are broken off; Vichy has accepted Japanese mediation in principle.	527	886
Dec. 19	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Japanese Foreign Minister considers visiting Berlin and recommends that he be encouraged to do so.	535	907
1941 Jan. 9	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in China to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards views from Nanking explaining motives of the Wang Ching-wei group in seeking German recognition.	630	1056
Jan. 9	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Suggests delay in recognition of Wang Ching-wei until Matsuoka's trip to Europe.	632	1061
Jan. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Japanese views regarding German imports of raw materials from Indochina.	651	1086
Jan. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records receiving from the Japanese Ambassador a note asserting that attempts by the Government of Indochina to establish close relations with Britain and the United States are detrimental to Japan as well as to German-French relations.	670	1125
Jan. 22	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Japan</i> Replies to document No. 651 and directs the Ambassador to insist on Germany's economic interests in the Greater East Asian sphere.	686	1161
Jan. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the view expressed by Oshima and Shiratori that a Japanese inquiry regarding German recognition of Wang Ching-wei was not advisable if the possibility of bringing German influence to bear on Chiang Kai-shek were not to be impaired.	716	1206

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 29	<p><i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports having been given by the Japanese Foreign Minister the texts of secret notes exchanged between the French and Japanese Governments on August 30, 1940, in which France recognizes Japan's paramount interests in the Far East and consents in principle to the entry of Japanese troops into Indochina; discusses the contents and significance of these notes.</p>	732	1228
Jan. 31	<p><i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports on his study of the advantages and disadvantages of a Japanese attack on Singapore.</p> <p>(See also under "Italy," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "United States.")</p>	735	1231

FINLAND

1940 Sept. 6	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Schulenburg had told Molotov that Germany wished 60 percent of the Petsamo nickel production over an indefinite period, while Molotov contended that arrangement applied only to 1940. The discussion was to be continued by Mikoyan and Schnurre.</p>	26	34
Sept. 6	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i></p> <p>Records information from the Finnish Minister regarding the latest developments in the Åland Islands question. Weizsäcker stated that Germany was generally favorable to disarmament of the Islands.</p>	27	35
Sept. 7	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i></p> <p>In any new Åland convention non-Baltic countries should be eliminated, but Germany, as the most important Baltic Sea country, must be included within the framework of her interests.</p>	31	41
Sept. 9	<p><i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Advises against discussing Petsamo ore deliveries with Mikoyan as the negotiations had been carried on with the Finnish, not the Soviet, Government. Molotov should be officially informed once more of the content of the governmental agreements with Finland.</p>	34	44
Sept. 16	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i></p> <p>Draft instructions to tell Molotov casually, on September 21, that German troops are being moved to northern Norway through Finland.</p>	65	92
Sept. 17	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i></p> <p>In discussing the Petsamo question Weizsäcker told the Finnish Minister that Germany had given up the idea of a concession since the Finnish Government had said there were legal difficulties in the way. The Minister asked for assistance in trying to avoid giving a concession to the Soviet Union.</p>	69	105

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 22	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland</i> Summarizes contents of notes exchanged with Finnish Minister on troop transport question. In accordance with Finnish wishes the agreement resembled that between Finland and the Soviet Union over Hangö. Germany will not, however, follow the Finnish suggestion to make the notification to the Soviet Union. First transports left Germany September 20 and 21.</p>	86	148
Sept. 23	<p><i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Finnish Foreign Minister informed the British and Soviet Ministers of the agreement with Germany on troop transport. The first took it calmly, the latter seriously and asked if the Germans had presented an ultimatum.</p>	91	160
Sept. 30	<p><i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr gave a negative answer to the Finnish Minister in reply to Finnish request for Germany to take a hand in discussions concerning the Åland Islands. He said Germany must reserve the right to be consulted in discussions of fortification of the Islands.</p>	136	229
Oct. 1	<p><i>Memorandum of the German and Finnish Governments</i> Explanations concerning terms of the contract between the Finnish Ministry of Defense and the firm of O. Y. Dahlberg & Hilbert A. B.</p>	139	232
Oct. 1	<p><i>The Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens</i> The Finnish Government hopes that the German Government will support it should difficulties arise with the Soviet Union as a result of fulfilling the terms of the contract with the firm of O. Y. Dahlberg & Hilbert A. B.</p>	140	234
Oct. 2	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to give Molotov the text of the agreement with Finland on troop transit traffic and to tell him that the complete text of the Tripartite Pact has been published; since the Pact was not directed against the Soviet Union, there was no obligation to consult.</p>	142	236
Oct. 4	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov requests further information on the movement of German troops through Finland, and says he will study the German views on the Tripartite Pact.</p>	148	244
Oct. 8	<p><i>The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat at Fuschl</i> Recommends that Germany strengthen Finnish will to resist in order to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control over the Petsamo nickel concession.</p>	162	270
Oct. 14	<p><i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Molotov's requests for information on troop transit traffic through Finland should be answered only by reference to general communication made by other channels.</p>	178	301

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Foreign Minister does not want the Petsamo question to become a point of controversy at present.	196	328
Oct. 19	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> General Jodl stated that only Luftwaffe troops were passing through Finland and that of 4,800 men, 3,000 had been in transit and 1,800 were on duty in connection with the transit traffic.	197	329
Oct. 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Finnish Minister President Ryti and Field Marshal Mannerheim are reported as saying that Germany might settle the Åland question by seizing the Islands and that Finland would be agreeable to such a solution.	213	361
Oct. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Finland wishes to resist Soviet pressure for a transfer of the Petsamo concession, and to keep the matter in abeyance.	232	397
Oct. 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Finnish Minister who told of efforts being made to achieve a close rapprochement with Sweden amounting to a union of the two countries.	251	425
Oct. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reviews the developments regarding the Petsamo nickel concession since May 1940.	253	428
Oct. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Recommends that German policy should be to encourage the Finns to refuse any transfer of the Petsamo concession to the Soviet Union but without allowing the German opposition to become known to the Russians.	258	434
Nov. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records the statement of the Finnish Minister that the Russians have now demanded the Petsamo concessions, and the Finnish request that Germany inform the Soviet Union of Germany's right of pre-emption. Reiterates proposal that Germany leave it to the Finns to resist Soviet pressure.	274	452
Nov. 2	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Mikoyan for the first time mentioned German delivery of arms to Finland.	277	456
Nov. 9	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Reviews the German, Soviet, Finnish, and British positions toward the Petsamo nickel concession. Suggests that the matter be broached with Molotov, with the insistence on guarantee of delivery of 60 percent of the production to Germany without time limit.	308	506

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 12	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> Records a memorandum from the Finnish Legation expressing the hope that Finland's position may be strengthened, and the wish to live in peace with Russia.	322	527
Nov. 19	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Finland</i> Directs that the Finnish Government be informed that Germany would not object to the transfer of the Petsamo concession to a Russo-Finnish company, provided that delivery of 60 percent of the product be guaranteed to Germany without time limit and that other German rights be recognized.	355	611
Nov. 26	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussing the Petsamo problem with Molotov who rejected the German point of view. He was willing to assure 60 percent of the nickel to Germany until end of the war, but would not recognize obligations arising from the German-Finnish agreements.	405	716
Nov. 27	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Explains the new mission of Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens in Finland and his instructions to encourage the Finns against a too compliant attitude toward the Soviet Union.	411	722
Dec. 2	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the Finnish presidential election campaign and asks for instructions on the attitude to take toward Ryti, the favored candidate.	435	763
Dec. 3	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that General Talvela is going to Berlin with instructions from Mannerheim. He will sound out Göring regarding his attitude toward the presidential candidacy of Mannerheim.	439	774
Dec. 4	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information received in Helsinki regarding Paasikivi's negotiations with Molotov regarding Petsamo. Molotov apparently would agree to a mixed commission.	447	781
Dec. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i> Directs that in relation to Mannerheim's candidacy the Minister should suggest that the Finns have to consider their relations with the Soviet Union and also whether Mannerheim would not be more useful as a military leader than as President.	461	799
Dec. 7	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records information from Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens concerning his mission in Finland.	474	813
Dec. 11	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Molotov's démarche concerning the Finnish presidential election.	491	841

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Minister in Finland</i> Advises that Germany would now prefer the election of Ryti.	525	884
Dec. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records information from Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens regarding the visit of General Talvela, emissary of Mannerheim, and his conversations with Göring.	542	917
Dec. 25	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Russians have demanded of Fieandt that they be given controlling authority in the joint Petsamo company and that the Embassy advised Fieandt to delay.	562	948
Dec. 25	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union and to the Legations in Sweden and Finland</i> States that both the Swedish and the Finnish Governments are advised against a closer union which would prejudice Finland's relations with the Soviet Union.	567	959
Dec. 31	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records remark by the Finnish Minister intimating that Finland would expect German support in case of future conflict with the Soviet Union.	587	995
1941 Jan. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Indicates that Soviet-Finnish negotiations regarding the Petsamo nickel concession have reached a crisis which requires a decision by the German Government: either to encourage Finnish resistance which would entail a promise of support against the Soviet Union or to advise Finnish compliance which would mean Soviet control of the nickel supply.	675	1137
Jan. 20	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Soviet deliveries of raw materials to Finland have abruptly stopped and that the Soviet Minister in Finland has been recalled to Moscow.	676	1139
Jan. 22	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a conversation with Kivimäki regarding Finland's negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Petsamo concession. Finland wishes to know the German attitude; fears the possibility of Soviet attack but not immediately.	687	1162
Jan. 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i> States that the Soviet-Finnish tension appears to be temporarily relaxed; directs that the Finnish Government be advised to negotiate dilatorily with the Russians and not surrender Petsamo.	703	1184
Jan. 26	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the military significance of the Soviet plan to obtain control of Petsamo: it would entail control of the German supply line to northern Norway.	711	1199

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i> Directs that the Finnish Government be advised further to resist Russian demands regarding the Petsamo nickel concession, invoking the English refusal of transfer. States that Schulenburg is being instructed to mention Germany's delivery rights to Molotov.	717	1206
Jan. 28	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out the instructions issued in telegram No. 58 (document No. 717); relates that Witting was pleased with the instruction to Schulenburg.	720	1212
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Visit of General Heinrichs, Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, to Berlin on January 30.		1231
Jan. 31	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussing Germany's interests in the Petsamo nickel mines with Molotov who mentioned the Soviet Union's political interest in the area, and stated his willingness to guarantee Germany delivery of 60 per cent of the ore for the duration of the war. (See also under "Sweden" and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	737	1235

FRANCE

1940 Sept. 2	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussing with General Stülpnagel developments in French Equatorial Africa and relations between the German and Italian Armistice Commissions.	5	6
Sept. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Records the position respecting German policy on French Equatorial Africa and the delimitation of jurisdiction in Africa.	14	19
Sept. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Reviews the situation produced by the rise of the resistance movement in the French African colonies.	20	25
Sept. 6	<i>The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Records a conversation with General Huntziger who stated that he had been appointed Commander of the French 100,000-man Army and expected soon to leave Wiesbaden; assesses the attitude of Huntziger.	25	33
Sept. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with Italian Secretary of Embassy Lanza who expressed concern regarding the situation in French Africa. Woermann stated that the matter was under intensive study.	28	36

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 8	<i>The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Attaché Group of the General Staff of the Army</i> Lists the measures ordered by Hitler for the restoration of order in Equatorial Africa by the French.	33	42
Sept. 10	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission</i> Instructions to take up with the French the question of safeguarding the French, Belgian, and Polish gold at Dakar.	45	59
Sept. 11	<i>The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the French Delegation to the German Armistice Commission</i> Outlines the measures and procedures to be permitted the French in restoring order in Equatorial Africa.	47	61
Sept. 14	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> French Foreign Minister Baudouin described the situation in Indochina, French Equatorial Africa, and French North Africa. Abetz took a noncommittal attitude.	59	76
Sept. 19	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Discusses difficulties experienced in trying to coordinate policy respecting Equatorial Africa and suggests measures for smoother relations between the Foreign Ministry and OKW.	72	110
[Sept. 23]	<i>The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits intelligence regarding the de Gaulle action at Dakar and makes recommendations for measures to be taken to restore the situation.	92	160
Sept. 24	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a decision by Hitler to release French air units in Africa for action at Dakar but to maintain for the time being the ban against French naval forces leaving Toulon; the decision was being communicated to the Italian Government.	96	165
Sept. 24	<i>The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on French suggestions that Germany grant political concessions in return for French cooperation, particularly in the economic field.	98	174
Sept. 25	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Laval on the situation in West Africa; Laval suggested a German declaration on the future of West Africa.	102	180
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Extract from the draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner for September 25 in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. Statements by Jodl on the situation in the Mediterranean and West Africa and relations with France.		181

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XXXV

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 26	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Records the receipt by Hencke of a French note requesting assurance from Germany on the future of the French colonies and forecasting a request for permission to employ additional naval forces from Toulon. The Armistice Commission intended to recommend to the OKW that the French request for use of further ships be granted.</p>	108	186
Oct. 1	<p><i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Gives an OKW report of an interview between Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and General Huntziger on September 26. Topics discussed: the situation in Dakar, Syria, Indochina, and France.</p>	112	190
Sept. 27	<p><i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission</i> It has been decided, with regard to the French gold, to await developments at Dakar; with regard to the Belgian gold, the French should be requested to ship it further into the interior, but the question of retention by the Bank of France of 10 percent against advances made to the Belgian Government in exile should be discussed further; with regard to the Polish gold the Bank's contention that it is entitled to all of it in return for advances made to the Polish Government in exile is unjustified. With regard to the Rumanian oil shares negotiations should be carried on to obtain possession of all of these.</p>	114	196
Oct. 5	<p><i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits for Foreign Ministry approval a draft instruction for the German-Italian Control Commission for Africa.</p>	154	263
Oct. 5	<p><i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission</i> Gives the German position on the establishment of French control of exports and imports.</p>	155	264
Oct. 6	<p><i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX</i> Confidential information from General Jodl regarding decisions taken at the Brenner about reinforcing the French troops in Africa.</p>	158	267
Oct. 9	<p><i>The Office of Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes a decree of the Military Administration in France concerning measures against the Jews.</p>	165	275
Oct. 12	<p><i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Contains a proposal of General von Stülpnagel to the OKW regarding the division of areas to be controlled by the German-Italian Control Commission for Africa.</p>	175	289

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission</i> Lists concessions which might be made to the French.	206	346
Undated	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> A draft letter, Ribbentrop to Laval, summarizing the results of the Hitler-Pétain conversation of October 24.	207	348
Oct. 24	<i>Protocol</i> Text of draft protocol between Germany, Italy, and France.	208	350
Oct. 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the conversation of Hitler with Laval at Montoire.	212	354
Oct. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the conversation of Hitler with Pétain at Montoire.	227	385
Oct. 26	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Laval about what he intended to do to implement France's alignment against Britain.	234	401
Oct. 27	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits intelligence that the French Cabinet approved the results of the conferences of Pétain and Laval with Hitler.	241	407
Oct. 31	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Report that Laval, Huntziger, and Bouthillier upon request enumerated certain steps to be taken by the French Government against pro-British propaganda in the occupied and unoccupied zones of France; a conference with the three is to be held the next day regarding the cooperation agreed upon at Montoire.	259	436
Oct. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a telephone conversation with Hemmen regarding the meeting with Laval, Huntziger, and Bouthillier. Summarizes promises made by the French regarding Belgian and French gold in Africa.	264	440
Oct. 31	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Records that on Hitler's orders all Jews from Baden and Saarpfalz were deported to unoccupied France on October 22 and 23; the French Government was not notified and asked the Armistice Commission for information; the latter requests instructions.	267	444
Nov. 1	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Objects to plans of Gauleiter Bürckel for evacuating 100,000 pro-French Lorrainers to unoccupied France.	271	448

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XXXVII

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 1	<p><i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports further on the conference with Laval, Huntziger, and Bouthillier. Laval and Huntziger suggested certain German concessions calculated to win over French public opinion to the Montoire policy of cooperation with Germany.</p>	272	449
Nov. 2	<p><i>The Director of the Legal Department to Ambassador Abetz</i> Instructions to inform the French Government in an unofficial and friendly manner that Hitler has decided that the evacuation of pro-French Lorrainers is to be carried out at once.</p>	278	456
Nov. 3	<p><i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he informed the representative of the French Foreign Ministry that the resettlement of people from Lorraine to France would begin November 4.</p>	282	460
Nov. 4	<p><i>Ambassador Ritter to Ambassador Abetz</i> The Foreign Minister intends to meet with Laval in the near future; prior to that there are not to be any separate conversations regarding Laval's proposals reported in document No. 272.</p>	285	464
Nov. 9	<p><i>The Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Abetz</i> Summarizes a 2-hour conversation between Laval and Göring which dealt with a number of problems of Franco-German collaboration.</p>	306	500
Nov. 12	<p><i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the High Command of the Wehrmacht has made interim decisions regarding the handling by the Armistice Commission of proposals submitted by General Huntziger.</p>	321	526
Nov. 14	<p><i>The Office of Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the text of a communiqué of the French Government which denies categorically that the expulsion of the French-speaking inhabitants of Lorraine was in accordance with an agreement entered into by the French and German Governments.</p>	331	570
Nov. 15	<p><i>Gauleiter Bürckel to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Denies that the French Government was uninformed about the impending evacuation of Lorrainers; discusses the measures taken prior to the actual beginning of the evacuation on November 11.</p>	337	578
Nov. 15	<p><i>The Office of Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Laval; Pétain is offended by German assertions that the Lorrainers were being expelled with his concurrence; Laval was unable to prevent the communiqué referred to in document No. 331; Laval suggests suspension of the deportations for 2 or 3 weeks.</p>	338	580

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 16	<i>The Office of Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Records a conversation with Laval during which the latter discussed France's relations with Britain, the situation in Morocco and Syria, the personalities of Noguès and Chiappe and the text of the reply to President Roosevelt, which Laval characterized as being very sharp.	343	587
Nov. 19	<i>The State Secretary to an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Expresses approval of Hencke's view that a French note of protest against the expulsions in Lorraine was unacceptable and requests a decision regarding the instructions to be sent to Hencke.	354	610
Nov. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records that he was informed of the great interest of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in the early conclusion of the political negotiations with France, so that the capacity of industry in unoccupied France can be fully utilized for German armaments orders.	358	624
Nov. 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records an instruction to Hencke by order of Hitler demanding return to the French delegation of the French note regarding resettlement of the Lorrainers.	367	638
Nov. 20	<i>Decision by the Führer</i> Designates Abetz's office as the German Embassy in Paris and defines its responsibilities.	368	638
Nov. 23	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports request by Laval for a decision as to whether a French military plan of operations against the rebellious French colonies should be discussed at Laval's forthcoming meeting with Ribbentrop or in a separate meeting of German and French military figures in Paris.	385	678
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Proposals for the treatment of various topics which will probably be brought up by Laval in his forthcoming meeting with the Foreign Minister.	401	710
Nov. 26	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records information received from Jodl concerning French wishes to discuss the military situation in Africa with the German military; in this connection Jodl mentioned a written instruction from Hitler that conversations resulting from the Hitler-Pétain meeting will for the time being be conducted exclusively by the Foreign Ministry in conjunction with the High Command of the Wehrmacht.	408	720
Nov. 27	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in Paris</i> In accordance with a suggestion made in document No. 385, Hitler has decided that a meeting is to take place at the Embassy in Paris on November 29 which will be attended by General Warlimont.	410	722

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The French delegation at Wiesbaden has presented a note stating that Pétain wished to transfer the seat of the French Government to Paris or Versailles between December 10 and 15.	418	735
Nov. 29	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris</i> Requests an opinion regarding the proposal which is to be made to the Foreign Minister that the French be told that a decision about their note regarding transfer of the seat of government is being deferred on account of the forthcoming conversations with Laval.	421	741
Nov. 30	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that at a meeting in Paris Huntziger and Darlan communicated the French plan of operations in Africa to General Warlimont.	428	752
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records that in a discussion of the military situation in North and West Africa, Admirals Schniewind and Fricke considered it necessary that the entire French Navy be deployed against de Gaulle and Britain and that France be given the necessary exemptions from the Armistice agreement.	432	759
Dec. 1	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Abetz reports telling Laval, Huntziger, and Darlan of his disappointment over the French plan of operations presented to General Warlimont; Laval stated that he, too, was disappointed.	434	760
Dec. 3	<i>The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris.</i> Refers to a recent French communiqué regarding Pétain's imminent installation at Versailles. Directs that the French Government be informed that neither the Chief of State nor the French ministers can yet move to the occupied territory which is still a zone of operations.	441	775
Dec. 3	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on actions by the military Propaganda Department originating in an alleged order by Hitler that the French fashion industry must be destroyed and the fashion center moved to Berlin. States that while French heavy industry must be limited in Germany's interest, the French luxury and fashion industry ought to be given a certain freedom of development.	442	775
Dec. 4	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having carried out instructions transmitted in document No. 441 and cites proposals of Laval for leaving Vichy as the official seat of government while permitting certain ministries to establish technical services at Paris.	446	780

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 6	<p><i>The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Encloses text of a note sent to the French delegation as a result of the failure to make the payments toward occupation costs due November 30; reports statement by Laval that he would not procure funds for these payments in view of the forthcoming negotiations with Ribbentrop which would take up also the question of occupation costs.</p>	456	794
Dec. 6	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that former French Premier Flandin was asked by Pétain to come to Vichy for a conference; records having been constantly in touch with Flandin who absolutely approves the policy of collaboration and will not attempt at the present time to take Laval's place.</p>	457	796
Dec. 7	<p><i>Ministerialdirektor Wiehl to Minister Hemmen</i></p> <p>States that the Foreign Minister considers the language of Hemmen's note to the French transmitted in document No. 456 as too soft; he asks that French attempts to take results of a forthcoming conversation between him and Laval for granted be rejected politely but firmly.</p>	472	811
Dec. 11	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports on a conference attended by Warlimont, Laval, Huntziger, and Darlan in the course of which the French presented a plan for military operations in Africa; the discussion concerned an offensive against the Chad colony, reprisals against British interference, and political propaganda among the natives in the Chad colony and Nigeria.</p>	490	839
Dec. 12	<p><i>Minute by the Chief of the Department of National Defense in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff</i></p> <p>Record of the conference held in Paris on December 10, referred to in document No. 490. Total impression is that there can be no doubt as to the sincerity of the military intentions of the Pétain Government.</p>	506	860
Dec. 13	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports having been assured by the Archbishop of Paris that the French clergy were ready to exert their influence on behalf of French collaboration with Germany and had been instructed by the Church accordingly.</p>	507	863
Dec. 13	<p><i>Marshal Pétain to Chancellor Hitler</i></p> <p>Communicates his decision to part with Laval and to pursue the policy of Franco-German cooperation with the assistance of Flandin as new Minister of Foreign Affairs.</p>	510	866
Dec. 14	<p><i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports telling the French Foreign Ministry representative that the German Government expected no changes in the French Government prior to a talk between Abetz and Pétain and also that nothing would be published regarding such changes.</p>	517	874

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XLI

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 14	<p><i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Paris</i></p> <p>States intention to propose to the Foreign Minister that the French be found officially in violation of the Armistice unless the payments toward occupation costs which are due are paid by December 16, noon; requests views regarding specific measures which are to be taken.</p>	518	875
Dec. 16	<p><i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that General Doyen, delivering the original of Pétain's letter to Hitler of December 13, stated on instructions from Huntziger that the resignation of Laval had purely domestic political reasons, representing no change of French policy toward Germany, and that Huntziger's continued presence in the Government was an explicit guarantee of this.</p>	521	879
Dec. 18	<p><i>Consul General Schleier to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Forwards the text of a message from the Einsatzgruppe Strasbourg of the Security Service to Paris headquarters regarding deportation of Alsatians. The deportations were ordered by Hitler and are to be completed by Christmas at the latest.</p>	526	885
Dec. 18	<p><i>The Director of the Political Department to the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission</i></p> <p>An instruction has been sent to Abetz stating that a move of Pétain to Versailles is not an acute question at this time; OKW was told that a written reply to a French note in this matter was out of the question.</p>	528	887
Dec. 18	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i></p> <p>Records information from Italian sources that United States coolness toward Vichy is being replaced by a policy of rapprochement with Pétain; United States Counselor of Embassy Murphy is proceeding to Vichy via North Africa to establish contact with Weygand.</p>	529	888
Dec. 18	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Transmits text of a letter from Pétain to Hitler regarding the French Government crisis of December 13. Pétain agrees to most of the proposals made by Abetz but refuses to appoint Laval as Minister of Interior unless an investigation which is under way should reveal that Pétain "had been deceived by certain outward appearances."</p>	530	888
Dec. 18	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Gives a detailed account of the French Government crisis of December 13 and of negotiations with Pétain in that matter.</p>	531	891
	<p><i>Editors' Note</i></p> <p>Extract from the draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner for December 20 in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff concerning a statement by Hitler tracing the sharpening of relations back to Weygand.</p>		918

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 21	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a communication about to be made by de Brinon on the basis of instructions from his Government which will state Pétain's refusal to work with Laval, but which will express willingness to accept most of the other German demands; requests authorization to accept the communication of de Brinon.</p>	543	918
Dec. 21	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris</i> Replies to document No. 543; authorizes Abetz to receive the communication from Pétain and gives instructions that a statement be transmitted to Pétain through de Brinon, expressing the utmost astonishment at Pétain's failure to reappoint Laval to the Cabinet.</p>	546	924
Dec. 23	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Pétain has written a letter to Hitler which he would like to have delivered through Darlan.</p>	552	930
Dec. 24	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> Forwards a request from the Foreign Minister that Abetz be instructed to present Huntziger with questions as to whether the United States Chargé d'Affaires during his trip from Algiers to Dakar had visited General Weygand.</p>	561	947
Dec. 24	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and Darlan; discussion of the effects of the dismissal of Laval on German-French relations.</p>	564	950
Dec. 25	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports briefly on the Hitler-Darlan meeting saying that the Pétain letter delivered by Darlan contained nothing new compared with the previous communication from Pétain.</p>	565	955
Dec. 25	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the text of the letter from Pétain which Darlan handed to Hitler on December 24 and in which Pétain explains the changes in the French Government and reaffirms his determination not to take Laval back into the Cabinet.</p>	566	955
Dec. 26	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments critically on Pétain's letter to Hitler transmitted in document No. 566. Asserts that French resistance is stiffening, and that the question of Laval has become a test of strength; outlines three possible positions which Germany may take in this matter.</p>	569	961
Dec. 28	<p><i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reviews French reluctance to agree to certain German demands in return for a relaxation of the line of demarcation and discusses a recent conference of several German departments concerned with this matter. Suggests that German-French negotiations be resumed in January and that an agreement be reached through French consent to the establishment of German commissioners with the French Ministry of Finance in return for a relaxation of supervision over the movement of goods and people across the line of demarcation.</p>	574	969

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XLIII

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 1	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses reports regarding departure of the French Government and fleet to North Africa, the reaction of Paris to the events of December 13, and recent statements by Laval on his plans.	588	995
Jan. 6	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a report sent by Stülpnagel to Hitler and the OKW about a communication made by General Doyen, informing Germany of French intentions to negotiate with Britain regarding transports of food to France and reiterating French desire for continued cooperation with Germany, regardless of the dismissal of Laval.	609	1028
Jan. 7	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that the German Armistice Commission should refuse to transmit the French statement referred to in document No. 609 and gives reasons for this opinion.	611	1035
Jan. 7	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the text of instructions from Flandin and Darlan to de Brinon asking him to make representations with German authorities on account of attacks by the Paris press on members of the French Government, and reports on his reply to de Brinon in this matter.	613	1036
Jan. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Forwards a report from the German Armistice Commission to the High Command of the Wehrmacht which states that recent concessions made by the French Government give the impression that France wants to prove that the policy of Montoire will be maintained and that there has been no closer contact with Britain, unknown to Germany.	618	1042
Jan. 8	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> States that Germany's complete reserve toward the Vichy Government can lead to a political vacuum in German-French relations and suggests that this vacuum be filled by starting economic discussions with the French.	628	1055
Jan. 13	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having received a communication from Darlan through Benoit-Méchin, French Government delegate for questions regarding prisoners of war in Berlin; in this communication the French Government inquires whether the return of Laval to the Government is an absolute prerequisite for continued French-German cooperation, and suggests that Darlan come to Paris to discuss the modalities of Laval's return.	645	1077
Jan. 14	<i>Minister Hemmen to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl</i> Encloses copy of a letter in which he had informed Ribbentrop of a communication from Huntziger assuring the Foreign Minister of the French Government's desire for cooperation with Germany and requesting early resumption of German-French discussions; he had asked Ribbentrop's authorization for using this communication from Huntziger for a fresh start in German-French economic negotiations, deadlocked since before Christmas.	654	1096

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 19	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> On instructions from Huntziger, Benoist-Méchin informed the Embassy that the departure of a German control commission for Casablanca could damage the French position in North Africa, since British whispering propaganda among the Arabs would represent this as being a German occupation force.</p>	671	1126
Jan. 19	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris</i> In view of reports about plans for an attempt on Laval's life, asks that this danger be brought to Laval's attention and that he be deterred from going into unoccupied France.</p>	673	1133
Jan. 19	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Laval's account of the latter's meeting with Pétain in the course of which the events of December 13 were discussed; a communiqué was agreed to at the end of the conversation.</p>	674	1134
Jan. 22	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Requests instructions with respect to proposals adopted by the interdepartmental Economic Policy Committee specifying demands to be represented by Hemmen in economic negotiations with the French as well as possible means of pressure to be applied in order to enforce these demands.</p>	689	1167
Jan. 22	<p><i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Hitler has repeated an earlier instruction that no official discussions with prominent Frenchmen may be held without his explicit instructions.</p>	690	1169
Jan. 26	<p><i>The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by his French opposite number that the French Government would reject, for political reasons, German supervision of the outer borders of France in return for a relaxation of the line of demarcation, since Vichy regarded this as a limitation of French sovereignty, in consideration of France's relations with other countries, particularly the United States.</p>	712	1200
	<p><i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to remarks by Abetz to Halder on January 28 regarding Hitler's attitude toward Laval.</p>		1217
Jan. 31	<p><i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information from de Brinon about a Cabinet meeting in Vichy in which the civilian ministers opposed a return of Laval to the Government which was demanded by Darlan and Huntziger; Darlan has also inquired at the Embassy whether he could come to Paris with proposals for Laval.</p> <p>(See also under "Africa," "Far East," "Italy," "Middle East," "Military Documents," "Spain," and "United States.")</p>	736	1234

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XLV

GREAT BRITAIN

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the High Command of the Army</i> Outlines a proposed division of the world's colonies after the cessation of hostilities.	16	20
Sept. 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a telegram from the Spanish Ambassador in London regarding British morale. (See also under "Greece," "Ireland," "Peace Moves," and "United States.")	105	185

GREATER GERMAN ECONOMIC SPHERE

1940 Sept. 27	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Germany does not consider the present moment suitable for detailed conversations about the greater economic sphere, but would be interested in learning more about the Italian program on that subject.	115	199
Oct. [11]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Discussions between Ribbentrop, Clodius, and Italian Foreign Trade Minister Riccardi of economic relations between Germany and Italy and the changes in European and world economic conditions that would result from the war.	173	284
Oct. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Reception of Italian Foreign Trade Minister Riccardi on October 14 by Hitler and other German dignitaries at which European economic problems were discussed in general terms.	177	297
Oct. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> In discussions with Funk and Clodius, the Italian Foreign Trade Minister registered Italy's claim to equal participation in the economic resources of south-east Europe. He wished to establish closer relations between his own and the Reich Economics Ministry.	181	309

GREECE

1940 Sept. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Greek Minister renewed protestations that reports of unneutral actions by Greece were false.	106	185
Sept. 30	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Statements of Count Ciano regarding Greece.	135	229
Oct. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys intelligence from a reliable source on the views of Italian political and military leaders regarding relations with Greece.	191	322

GREECE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 19	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano stated that Mussolini did not believe Turkey would interfere in case of an Italian attack on Greece. To a question whether such an attack was imminent, Ciano was noncommittal.	194	326
Oct. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports reliable intelligence that an Italian attack on Greece will come within the next few days. Nothing has come from the Italian Government regarding its plans.	225	383
Oct. 24	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with an official of the Greek Foreign Ministry regarding Greek-Italian relations.	226	384
Oct. 25	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Italian Minister has informed the Yugoslav Foreign Minister that Italian troop concentrations in Albania were not directed against Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister feared that an Italian action against Greece would lead to a general conflagration in the Balkans.	229	394
Oct. 26	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Greece</i> Instructions to observe the utmost reserve respecting Greek-Italian relations.	237	403
Oct. 27	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry and to the Special Train of the Foreign Minister</i> Ciano stated that the Italian ultimatum to Greece would be delivered during the night and that military operations would start at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day.	242	408
Oct. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Special Train of the Foreign Minister</i> Forwards a note from the Greek Minister with the text of a telegram from the Greek Minister President concerning the Italian ultimatum; Weizsäcker's remarks upon receiving the Greek note.	247	422
Oct. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the News Service and Press Department</i> Records that German citizens in Greece have been correctly treated; Greece is not officially calling for British assistance, but is appealing to all who are of good will to help her.	248	423
Oct. 29	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a statement by the Turkish Ambassador regarding the position Turkey would take in the event of a Bulgarian attack on Greece.	250	425
Oct. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Encloses a report of October 28 from the Military Attaché in Italy summarizing what had been officially told him by the Italian authorities about their intentions toward Greece.	252	427

GREECE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 31	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Greece</i> Instructions that no outwardly noticeable measures are to be taken regarding preparations for the departure of German citizens from Greece.	261	438
Nov. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records telling the Greek Minister that Germany stood with Italy.	287	466
Nov. 7	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Summarizes the main stages, as seen from the Foreign Ministry, leading up to Hitler's decision on October 19 not to address a friendly question to Mussolini regarding Italian intentions against Greece.	302	496
Nov. 25	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Greek Foreign Ministry denied that the British had suggested that they be allowed to bomb the Rumanian oil region from Greek territory; it was stated with decisiveness that British help was being rendered solely in defense against Italian aggression.	395	701
Dec. 7	<i>The Legation in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements of the Greek General Staff that no further British landing had taken place since the arrival of British Air Force units with ground crews and auxiliary services in mid-November.	470	810
Dec. 11	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Instructions to the Missions on the line to take in conversations in connection with the Italian military reverses in Albania.	499	851
Dec. 20	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Metaxas who emphasized that a disturbance of correct Greek-German relations as a result of a British military initiative was not to be final; Metaxas stated that Greece had no intention of making conquests in Albania, but that she must have assurances that she would no longer be exposed to an Italian thrust from that side.	540	916
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to suggestions for German mediation in the Greek-Italian war.		929
Dec. 31	<i>The Legation in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that there are no indications of a debarkation of British ground forces on the Greek mainland; in view of the favorable military situation and the Greek wish to avoid closer ties with Britain, dispatch of British ground forces to Greece is considered unlikely unless the Greeks should suffer a defeat and Germany should intervene.	584	988
1941 Jan. 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records that he had merely conveyed Hitler's thanks for the New Year's congratulations of the Greek King, not congratulations from Hitler in return.	600	1012

GREECE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 16	<p data-bbox="261 320 766 349"><i>The Embassy in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p data-bbox="261 349 850 513">Report of a conversation with the Greek Military Attaché which took place at his request; he denied that British ground forces were in Greece or that Greece participated in Turkish-English staff conversations, expressed uncertainty about German objectives, and discussed possible German military moves against Greece and Turkey.</p> <p data-bbox="261 533 850 581">(See also under "Bulgaria," "Italy," "Military Documents," and "Yugoslavia.")</p>	665	1115

HUNGARY

1940 Sept. 2	<p data-bbox="261 720 666 749"><i>The Regent of Hungary to Adolf Hitler</i></p> <p data-bbox="261 749 827 774">Expresses gratitude for the second Vienna Award.</p>	6	7
Undated	<p data-bbox="261 794 850 842"><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i></p> <p data-bbox="261 842 850 938">Records a conversation of Hitler with the Hungarian Minister on September 10. Hitler discusses German interests in Rumania, the minorities problem in Hungary, and the military situation.</p>	41	49
Sept. 28	<p data-bbox="261 958 638 987"><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i></p> <p data-bbox="261 987 850 1151">The Hungarian Minister, referring to a passage in Ribbentrop's public statement of September 27, stated that, if Germany desired, Hungary could openly express her willingness to affiliate with the Tripartite Pact; Weizsäcker told the Hungarian provisionally that an open pact was not involved and requests the Foreign Minister to confirm this position.</p>	130	224
Sept. 30	<p data-bbox="261 1170 781 1199"><i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p data-bbox="261 1199 850 1248">The Hungarian Government consents to the transit of German troops through Hungary to Rumania.</p>	131	226
Nov. 26	<p data-bbox="261 1267 850 1315"><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p data-bbox="261 1315 850 1460">Record of a conversation between Hitler and Teleki on November 20, attended also by Ribbentrop and Csáky. Topics of discussion were Germany's relations with Russia, the military strength of the Axis, Italy's war with Greece, Hungarian-Rumanian relations, and the attitude of Yugoslavia.</p>	365	632
Nov. 30	<p data-bbox="261 1479 781 1508"><i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p data-bbox="261 1508 850 1634">Reports a statement by the Hungarian Foreign Minister that in order to strengthen good relations with Yugoslavia he was willing to accept the Yugoslav suggestion that he visit Belgrade, but that he did not consider it desirable if this were merely a courtesy visit.</p>	431	758
Dec. 9	<p data-bbox="261 1653 770 1682"><i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary</i></p> <p data-bbox="261 1682 850 1763">The draft of the proposed Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement contains everything that needs to be said and the German Government has no additional suggestions to make.</p>	478	824

HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 9	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Rumanian Foreign Minister inquired about Csáky's visit to Belgrade; he cited reports that Csáky's visit to Belgrade was made in agreement with Berlin and he wondered why Germany made use of Hungarian mediation.	480	825
Dec. 11	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania</i> Replies to document No. 480 and states that in the matter of Csáky's trip to Belgrade, there is no question of a Hungarian mediation between Germany and Yugoslavia; it is a purely Hungarian matter. (See also under "Rumania" and "Slovakia.")	514	872

IRELAND

1940 Nov. 7	<i>The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports a conversation with the Secretary General of the Irish Ministry of External Affairs regarding the remarks about the Irish ports made by Churchill in the House of Commons on November 5.	300	493
Nov. 13	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Ireland</i> States that there are no objections to Hempel's telling de Valera that determined resistance against any British attempt to violate Irish neutrality would result in Ireland's being in a front with Germany.	330	570
Nov. 14	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records having been told by General Warlimont that if the Irish Government should request German assistance against a British attack, such assistance could involve only the concentration of German submarines around Irish ports occupied by the British and air attacks on these ports.	333	572
Nov. 26	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Ireland</i> Instructions to report on the possibility of a British attack on Ireland and to discuss the matter with influential persons in Ireland, preferably de Valera; suggestions as to how the matter might be treated in such a conversation.	407	718
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records statements reported to have been made by the Foreign Minister in a conversation with Hitler on November 26 regarding a possible British attack on Ireland.	416	727
Nov. 29	<i>The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Replies to document No. 407. Reports statements by the Secretary General of the Irish Ministry of External Affairs and discusses the probability of a British attack on Ireland and the military possibilities of a resistance by Ireland; emphasizes de Valera's circumspection in avoiding anything that might be construed by Great Britain as a departure from strict neutrality.	419	736

IRELAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 5	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Ireland</i> Instructions to bring up again with de Valera the possibility of British intervention in Ireland and to state that Germany was in a position to give Ireland a considerable quantity of captured British arms free of charge.</p>	455	793
Dec. 7	<p><i>The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests that it would be advisable to indicate in conversations with Irish leaders Germany's interest in the continued existence of an independent Ireland; states that an expression of German intentions to assist in the union of Northern Ireland with the Irish State would be premature.</p>	466	804
Dec. 10	<p><i>The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by the Secretary General of the Irish Ministry of External Affairs that a British attack on Ireland was unlikely at the present time; that militating against the possibility of British intervention were factors such as the prospects of Irish resistance, of irreconcilable Irish hostility in the future, and of the violent reaction of the Irish-American community in the United States.</p>	485	832
Dec. 17	<p><i>The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having sounded out the Irish Government as to whether it wanted to obtain arms shipments from the Germans; the reply given by the Secretary General of the Irish Ministry of External Affairs was that de Valera saw no possibility of having the arms shipped to Ireland unnoticed and therefore felt that Ireland's hazardous situation did not permit the taking of any risks.</p>	523	882
Dec. 29	<p><i>The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Records a conversation with de Valera regarding a German proposal to send additional personnel to the Mission in Dublin via German aircraft.</p> <p>(See also under "United States.")</p>	576	973

ITALY

1940 Sept. 10	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano stated that Mussolini was concerned by signs of annoyance in Moscow over Italy's failure to take up political discussions, and would like to start such negotiations as soon as possible; Mackensen stated that nothing had changed since Ribbentrop objected to such discussions with the Soviet Union; Ciano asked to have a new statement of Hitler's and Ribbentrop's views.</p>	42	54
Sept. 17	<p><i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> The assault on Britain will begin as soon as the weather is favorable; German strength in the east has also been increased in view of events in Rumania; since the war will last through the winter, efforts should be made to get Spain in, and to promote closer ties to Japan to keep America out of the war.</p>	68	102

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LI

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 20	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>In a conversation with Mussolini and Ciano on September 19, Ribbentrop presented a proposal for an alliance with Japan arguing that it would prevent American entry into the war; the Soviet Union would not be pleased by it but would act cautiously; steps to get Spain into the war were being planned.</p>	73	113
Sept. 20	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>In a conversation with Mussolini and Ciano on September 20, Ribbentrop discussed negotiations with Spain and with Japan.</p>	79	134
Sept. 22	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Ribbentrop and Mussolini agreed to await Soviet reaction to the tripartite pact, and later possibly to offer her a free hand in the direction of India or the Persian Gulf; Franco is to be offered a military alliance; a propaganda campaign against Roosevelt would be undertaken, and a break in relations considered.</p>	87	150
Sept. 25	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i></p> <p>Statements from the Italian General Staff regarding military dispositions in Albania and Libya.</p>	107	186
Sept. 29	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Conversation between Hitler and Ciano in Berlin on September 28; discussion of negotiations with Spain; it is agreed that Hitler and Mussolini will meet at the Brenner.</p>	124	211
Oct. 4	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Meeting of Hitler and Mussolini at the Brenner. Discussion of plans and operations against Britain; relations with the United States, the USSR, and France; negotiations with Spain; territorial claims after the war.</p>	149	245
Oct. 18	<p><i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i></p> <p>Writes that Ciano was rankled by the failure of Germany to give him sufficient advance notice of the dispatch of troops to Rumania. Ciano is trying to promote the appearance of some Italian troops alongside the Germans in order to save face. Outwardly the Italians show no indication of ill feeling.</p>	192	324
Oct. 19	<p><i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i></p> <p>Discusses Axis policies toward France, the problem of disposing of the remaining British positions on the Continent, and relations with Spain.</p>	199	331
Oct. 21	<p><i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Mackensen</i></p> <p>Ribbentrop feels that he had spoken plainly enough to Ciano regarding the dispatch of troops to Rumania; he is receptive, however, to the idea of a symbolic Italian participation in the Axis military representation in Rumania.</p>	209	352

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends that the German Consul General at Tirana be recalled before the expected arrival of Ciano.	240	406
Oct. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Conversation between Hitler and Mussolini at Florence. Hitler informs Mussolini of his talks with Laval, Pétain, and Franco; discusses relations with the USSR and Molotov's forthcoming visit to Berlin.	246	411
	<i>Editors' Note</i> General Thoma's report of November 3 on his mission to Libya. Hitler's decision regarding the question of sending armored units to Libya.		462
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Ciano's meeting with Ribbentrop at Schönhof, November 3 and 4. Revisions and final text of the German-Italian-Spanish secret protocol.		466
Nov. 5	<i>The Consul General at Milan, Temporarily at Bolzano, to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports deterioration of the situation in South Tirol, unwillingness of the German optants to migrate, and offers some explanations for the attitudes of the South Tirol Volksdeutsche.	291	470
Nov. 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and Ciano in the presence of Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg on November 18. Discussion of the defense measures for the protection of Rumanian oil fields against British air attack, and of strategic problems in the Mediterranean region generally. Hitler raised the question of possible Italian concessions in order to achieve the neutralization of Yugoslavia.	353	606
Nov. 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a brief reception of Count Ciano by Hitler in Vienna, on November 20. Ciano reported Mussolini's concurrence with Hitler's proposal to neutralize Yugoslavia by offering Salonika as an inducement.	366	637
Nov. 20	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Discusses the psychological and military consequences of Italy's attack on Greece. Proposes certain political and military measures.	369	639
Nov. 22	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Explains the reasons for the Italian reverse against Greece. Urges that Spain be brought into the war now, and agrees that under specific conditions Yugoslavia should be induced to adhere to the Axis.	383	671
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Records the conversation between Hitler and Grandi in the Reich Chancellery on November 25.	399	706

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LIII

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 5	<p><i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> States that Field Marshal Milch is instructed to arrange for the employment of German air force units in the Mediterranean against the British. Outlines policy toward Rumania, Yugoslavia, Soviet Russia, and Spain and suggests a meeting, possibly at the Brenner.</p>	452	789
Dec. 6	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the conversation of Field Marshal Milch with Mussolini, regarding the employment of German air force units in Italy.</p>	460	798
Dec. 7	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Mussolini's explanations for the Italian failure in Albania and his views on France and Spain.</p>	464	802
Dec. 8	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Records a conversation between Hitler and Alfieri, in the presence of Ribbentrop, Meissner, Schmidt, and Colonel Schmudt. Discussion of the acute Italian situation in Albania. Hitler's comments on Italian conduct of the war. Hitler proposes a meeting with Mussolini as soon as possible.</p>	477	817
Dec. 11	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains details of Field Marshal Milch's negotiations regarding employment of German air units in Italy and the Mediterranean.</p>	494	844
Dec. 12	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Italy</i> Summarizes statements made to Alfieri regarding the Italian position in Albania and the effects of Italian reverses on the political situation. Instructions on the line to follow in diplomatic conversations in Rome.</p>	498	850
Dec. 12	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussing with Ciano the subjects dealt with in document No. 498.</p>	504	857
Dec. 12	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Ciano discussed the rumor of his possible replacement by Grandi. Mackensen considers it improbable that Mussolini would drop Ciano.</p>	505	858
Dec. 14	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the shake-up in the Italian Army and Navy High Commands in consequence of the reverses in Albania.</p>	519	876
Dec. 15	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Ciano is extremely worried over the situation in North Africa but confident regarding Albania.</p>	520	878

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 20	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Records the conversation between Hitler and Alfieri in the Reich Chancellery on December 19 in the presence of Ribbentrop. Alfieri presented as matter of urgency a list of Italian requests for additional raw materials. Hitler stressed the need to coordinate Italian and German war production through the economic committees. He mentioned Germany's need for labor, the problem of transportation, and reiterated his wish for a meeting with Mussolini in which economic problems and war plans could be considered.</p>	538	911
Dec. 20	<p><i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Forwards requests from Mussolini for a German armored force for North Africa; and for material for 10 divisions.</p>	541	916
Dec. 23	<p><i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Italy</i></p> <p>Directs that the Italian Government be asked to send its economic experts to Berlin to discuss Italy's urgent requests for materials.</p>	554	932
Dec. 27	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i></p> <p>Records a remark by the Italian Ambassador that Mussolini hoped German-Soviet relations would not deteriorate. Weizsäcker informed Alfieri of the state of Schnurre's negotiations in Moscow.</p>	571	966
Dec. 30	<p><i>Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Italy</i></p> <p>Recommends organization of combined German-Italian command through which Germany, as dominant partner, could control Axis strategy.</p>	583	983
Dec. 31	<p><i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i></p> <p>Expresses solidarity with Mussolini and assures him that everything possible will be done to meet his requests; presents a general view of the war as regards England, France, Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, and North Africa; renews invitation for a meeting.</p>	586	990
1941			
Jan. 1	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports the delivery to Mussolini of Hitler's letter (document No. 586) and Mussolini's oral comments.</p>	589	996
Jan. 2	<p><i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i></p> <p>Acknowledges receipt of Hitler's letter of December 31 (document No. 586).</p>	595	1004
Jan. 2	<p><i>The German General at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces to the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i></p> <p>Analyzes the causes for the failures of the Italian armed forces. Reports that these have led to a crisis of confidence. Urges the need for German influence on the conduct of operations in the Mediterranean theater.</p>	597	1005

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LV

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Jan. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on Italo-Soviet conversations as described by Ciano.	599	1011
Jan. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that there is nothing definite underlying Mussolini's prediction of favorable change in the Albanian campaign.	603	1015
Jan. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Ribbentrop and Alfieri on January 6. Subject: The Soviet proposal to Italy to discuss the German-Italian guarantee to Rumania, the Danube question, and the question of the Straits. Alfieri handed Ribbentrop a memorandum setting forth the Italian position and Ribbentrop promised to send a more precise statement after further study.	610	1030
Jan. 7	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Transmits a summary of the results of economic negotiations with an Italian delegation, and notes objections of the OKW to furnishing Italy with the quantity of petroleum anticipated in the agreement.	619	1043
Jan. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Mussolini who confirms January 19 as the date of his meeting with Hitler.	635	1065
Jan. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat</i> Records instructions for Weizsäcker from Ribbentrop on what to tell the Italian Ambassador on the subject of Soviet-Italian negotiations.	646	1079
Jan. 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the conversation between Hitler and Mussolini in the presence of Ribbentrop and Ciano at the Berghof, January 19. Hitler discussed his negotiations with French politicians, the problem of French North Africa, the Balkans, and Franco's failure to enter the war. Mussolini agreed to try to induce Franco to join the conflict.	672	1127
Undated	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Text of a memorandum, handed to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires by Weizsäcker, and setting forth the German position on the three points raised by Molotov with the Italian Government.	688	1163
Jan. 29	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> A report by Clodius of his negotiations in Rome on German deliveries of petroleum products to Italy. He requests a decision at the highest level.	726	1218
Jan. 29	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports an account by the Italian Ambassador of a conversation with Molotov, in which the Italian position was stated on the questions of the Rumanian guarantee, the Danube, and the Straits.	727	1220

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 29	<p><i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Evaluates the political implications of Mussolini's dispatch of Cabinet ministers to the front.</p> <p>(See also under "France," "Greater German Economic Sphere," "Greece," "Middle East," "Military Documents," "Rumania," "Spain," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "Yugoslavia.")</p>	731	1225

LATIN AMERICA

1940 Oct. 17	<p><i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses attitude of Brazilian officials toward presidential election in the United States.</p>	182	311
Oct. 31	<p><i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX</i> Examines the problem of retaliation against Uruguayan nationals living in areas under German control. The number of Germans in Uruguay is so disproportionately greater that retaliatory measures are not recommended.</p>	265	441
Nov. 13	<p><i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that press reports of negotiations between the United States and Uruguay regarding military bases in Uruguay have caused a sensation with the public in Argentina; there is concern in official circles with respect to a possible infringement of Argentina's rights at La Plata estuary.</p>	327	549
Nov. 20	<p><i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the views of the Brazilian Foreign Minister: that Brazil would make naval and air bases available only to all American Governments, and not to the United States alone.</p>	361	629
Nov. 30	<p><i>The Embassy in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a series of recommendations regarding South America derived from a conference of several Chiefs of Mission.</p>	429	753
Dec. 23	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with the Argentine Ambassador who presented a memorandum on the project for a customs union with Brazil and other neighboring countries.</p>	555	933
1941 Jan. 23	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Proposes that Germany not insist on her right of most-favored-nation treatment in the initial stages of the Argentine-Brazilian custom union, such a waiver to be conditional on Argentina's not claiming special privileges as regards the future Greater German economic union.</p> <p>(See also under "United States.")</p>	698	1176

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LVII

MIDDLE EAST

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 9	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Refers to the proposals of the Grand Mufti for Arab-Axis collaboration in exchange for unrestricted recognition of the independence of the Arab countries. The Reich Government is positively disposed but wishes Ciano's opinion.	35	44
Sept. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano is skeptical concerning the Grand Mufti's proposals but says his experts would examine them more thoroughly.	40	48
Sept. 12	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Iraq wants Germany to associate herself with a written declaration on the independence of the Arab countries which supposedly had been issued by Italy; since Germany does not know about this declaration Ciano is to be asked for an explanation; Weizsäcker also suggests that a somewhat positive answer ought to be given to Iraq to keep her on the Axis side.	51	65
Sept. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano denied that Italy issued any written declaration on the independence of the Arabs; only vague statements had been made and the whole issue was discussed in an Italian memorandum.	57	74
Sept. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a memorandum by the Italian Government which states why Italy objects to a public declaration committing the Axis to Arab independence.	58	75
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Proposes that a statement on Arab independence be given to the Grand Mufti's envoy and sent out over the radio; also that Italy should convey to the Iraq Government Germany's readiness to reopen diplomatic relations.	127	220
Sept. 30	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to make some modifications in the memorandum of September 28 (document No. 127) and to take it up with the Italian Government.	133	228
Sept. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> The Grand Mufti's secretary reports that Arab leaders have examined, but rejected, the possibility of collaboration with the Soviet Union, unless they saw their independence threatened by Italy.	134	228
Oct. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Italian Government agreed to the text of the proposed German declaration to the Arabs as well as to other suggestions contained in Woermann's memorandum of September 28.	143	238
Oct. 3	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Afghanistan</i> The Afghan Minister has discussed his country's aspirations and inquired about Germany's aims in Asia as well as about Germany's attitude in the event of serious difficulties between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.	145	240

MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Iraq Minister of Justice; Iraqi concern over Italian policy. Papen recommends that he be authorized to make a statement to the Iraq Minister of Justice on Germany's postwar plans regarding the Near East.	146	241
Oct. 6	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to inquire about Italy's attitude toward the Arab idea of a federation of Arab states.	160	268
Oct. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Records a conversation of the Grand Mufti's envoy with Weizsäcker regarding the German declaration on policy toward the Arabs.	190	320
Nov. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports receiving from the Italian Foreign Ministry a memorandum regarding the steps taken by the Italian Minister in Baghdad with the Iraq Minister President in the matter of a resumption of German-Iraq diplomatic relations.	296	481
Nov. 15	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a memorandum from Anfuso recording a conversation between Buti, head of the Italian Foreign Ministry's Political Department, and the private secretary of the Grand Mufti.	342	586
Nov. 18	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports great anxiety in Iran as a result of British propaganda assertions that "Germany sold Iran to the Soviet Union;" requests instructions.	350	597
Nov. 20	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Iran</i> In reply to document No. 350, suggests that the Iranians be told that their concern is not justified and that there is complete accord between Germany and Russia.	364	632
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII</i> Brief drawn up for the conference with the State Secretary on December 9 reviewing German policy toward the Arabs and presenting proposals.	481	826
Dec. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records being informed by the Italian Embassy of recent reports from the Italian Minister in Baghdad according to which Minister President Gaylani, faced with British threats, had requested Axis assistance; the Italian Government wished to know Germany's views.	482	829
Dec. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII</i> Proposes that Papen be authorized to confirm in writing to the Iraq Minister in Ankara the statement expressing sympathy for the Arab struggle for independence, published by the German press on December 5.	496	846

MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 29	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records information received from the Italian Embassy regarding a recent report by the Italian Minister in Baghdad about conversations with Minister President Gaylani; the latter had spoken of American and Turkish efforts to dissuade Iraq from resuming diplomatic relations with Germany.	578	976
1941 Jan. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses copy of a letter to the Iraq Minister in Ankara, confirming the German statement to the Arabs, which had been communicated earlier to the private secretary of the Grand Mufti.	596	1004
Jan. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records information received from the Italian Embassy regarding conversations of Minister President Gaylani of Iraq and the Italian Minister in Baghdad; Gaylani felt encouraged by the friendly attitude of the Axis Powers.	601	1012
Jan. 8	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Informs Hentig that the French have yielded to the German request for a permit for him to enter Syria. Outlines the Foreign Minister's instructions.	626	1053
Jan. 20	<i>The Grand Mufti to Adolf Hitler</i> Summarizes the grievances of Arab nationalists against British and French policy in Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and Palestine; expresses admiration, friendship, and sympathy for Hitler and Germany; vows Arab determination to enter the struggle, provided certain moral and material interests are assured.	680	1151
Jan. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the private secretary of the Grand Mufti will journey to Berlin and Rome; according to his statements, Nuri as-Said has resigned from the Iraq Cabinet and the latter is now prepared to cooperate with Germany. (See also under "Turkey" and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	722	1215

MILITARY DOCUMENTS

1940 Oct. 10	<i>Führer's Directive</i> Outlines the chain of command for the German military mission to Rumania specifying that in foreign policy matters prior understanding with the Foreign Ministry must be sought.	171	281
Nov. 12	<i>Führer's Directive No. 18</i> Outlines the military operations respecting Spain, Portugal, North Africa, the Balkans, Russia, and England for which detailed planning is to proceed.	323	527

MILITARY DOCUMENTS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 25	<i>The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the German Armistice Commission</i> Conveys information regarding decisions reached by Keitel and Badoglio, in talks at Innsbruck November 14-15, concerning closer integration of their policies toward France.	400	709
Dec. 10	<i>Führer's Directive: Mediterranean</i> Directs that a German air wing be sent to southern Italy to combat the British fleet and shipping.	487	835
Dec. 10	<i>Führer's Directive No. 19: Operation Attila</i> Directs that plans be drawn up for the occupation of unoccupied France and for seizure of the French fleet.	488	836
Dec. 13	<i>Führer's Directive No. 20: Operation Marita</i> Outlines plan for the military occupation of Greece with build-up of forces in Rumania and movement through Bulgaria.	511	867
Dec. 18	<i>Führer's Directive No. 21: Operation Barbarossa</i> Outlines plan to crush the Soviet Union in a quick campaign.	532	899
1941	<i>Editors' Note</i> Extract from the draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff regarding Hitler's conference with top military leaders and with Ribbentrop on January 9.		1056
Jan. 11	<i>Führer's Directive No. 22</i> Directs that preparations be made to send German forces to support the Italians in North Africa and Albania.	642	1073
Jan. 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation between Hitler and Mussolini, in the presence of Ribbentrop, Ciano, Keitel, Jodl, Rintelen, Guzzoni, and Marras on January 20. Hitler surveys the military and strategic situation.	679	1145
Jan. 21	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Regarding <i>Sonnenblume</i> and <i>Alpenveilchen</i> : directs that the transport of an armored formation to Tripoli begin about February 15; and that only one German mountain division be made ready for Albania.	683	1158

NETHERLANDS

1940 Dec. 6	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands</i> The Foreign Minister has agreed to the mutual exemption of customs duties for Germany and the Netherlands. An appropriate decree by the Reich Minister of Finance will be published shortly in the official gazettes.	462	800
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ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LXI

NETHERLANDS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 16	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the situation in the occupied Netherlands.	667	1118
Jan. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records information from the Foreign Ministry representative at The Hague regarding the Reich Commissar's attitude concerning the recent pastoral letter of the Netherlands Roman Catholic Episcopate.	723	1215

NORWAY

1940 Oct. 2	<i>William Hagelin to Stabsleiter Schickedanz</i> Reports little opposition to the new form of government in Norway. Suggests that after a 6-months' absence of the King, on December 10, Quisling be named Regent and that Hagelin then become Minister President.	144	239
Oct. 25	<i>Vidkun Quisling to Stabsleiter Schickedanz</i> Encloses a memorandum dealing with the relationship between Norway and Germany, which assumes that the goal of the new relationship is the early establishment of a Pan-Germanic federation in which Norway would occupy a proper place. The establishment of such a federation would require a transitional arrangement in Norway with an independent Nasjonal Samling government. Quisling adds a 15-point outline for the establishment of the Pan-Germanic federation.	233	398
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Quisling's visit to Berlin, December 4-12.		814

PEACE MOVES

1940 Sept. 3	<i>Dr. Karl Haushofer to Dr. Albrecht Haushofer</i> Rudolf Hess has discussed with Karl Haushofer the possibilities of doing something to avoid the final struggle with England. Haushofer inquires of his son, Albrecht, whether through a third party a contact might not be made with the Hamiltons to this end.	12	15
Sept. 10	<i>Rudolf Hess to Dr. Karl Haushofer</i> Hess believes that possible contacts with England ought to be cultivated.	46	60
Sept. 15	<i>Memorandum by Dr. Albrecht Haushofer</i> Records a conversation with Hess on the possibilities of peace between Germany and Great Britain.	61	78
Sept. 19	<i>Dr. Albrecht Haushofer to His Parents</i> Transmits for safekeeping the copy of a letter to Hess concerning the difficulties of getting in touch with the Duke of Hamilton, and the draft of a letter to the Duke of Hamilton.	76	129

PEACE MOVES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 23	<i>Dr. Albrecht Haushofer to Rudolf Hess</i> Informs Hess that the letter to the Duke of Hamilton which Hess desired has been written and dispatched.	93	162
Sept. 23	<i>Dr. Albrecht Haushofer to Dr. Karl Haushofer</i> Expresses pessimism as to the future outcome of the war and says his political future depends upon the accuracy of his Cassandra-like predictions.	94	162
Oct. 23	<i>The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a report on the initiation of unofficial peace negotiations with Great Britain via Dr. Ekeberg, President of the Swedish Supreme Court.	223	380
Dec. 5	<i>The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the visit to Geneva of "a highly respected" member of the British Conservative party who mentioned tendencies in the British Government in opposition to Churchill's policy.	453	791
Dec. 23	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports attempt of a Swedish private person to bring about a meeting of British and German representatives to discuss possibilities of peace.	553	931
1941 Jan. 7	<i>The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards copies of reports by the German agent, Riesser, on conversations held with the British Consul in Geneva on July 18 and October 7, 1940.	622	1046

PORTUGAL

1940 Oct. 17	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Salazar regarding the outlook that the Iberian Peninsula might be drawn into the war.	184	315
Nov. 14	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Salazar who gave his views on Spain, England, and the United States.	332	571
Nov. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Recommends the delivery of arms to Portugal in order to pay for the importation of strategic raw materials from that country. (See also under "Spain.")	390	690

PROTECTORATE

1940 Oct. 5	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports decisions made by Hitler on the treatment of Czech resistance leaders and the future of the Protectorate.	157	266
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RUMANIA

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 3	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Horia Sima told Fabricius the Iron Guard wanted German support for a coup d'état to set up a genuine pro-Axis government in Rumania; Fabricius thinks that an Iron Guard coup would be dangerous and not in the German interest and therefore ought to be prevented.	9	11
Sept. 5	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Fabricius advised Antonescu to take dictatorial powers and to weaken the King's influence until the time would be ripe to demand his abdication.	17	22
Sept. 5	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conversations with Valer Pop and Antonescu; the King had practically given over all his powers to Antonescu, who hoped for an agreement with the Iron Guard; Antonescu stated again his intention to pursue close collaboration with Germany.	19	24
Sept. 6	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Antonescu has asked for King Carol's abdication; Fabricius inquires whether the King could find asylum in Germany.	21	28
Sept. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Instructions to make representations to Antonescu in case reports are true that Rumanians are making difficulties about date for evacuating southern Dobruja.	23	29
Sept. 6	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Negotiations for a Rumanian-Bulgarian agreement have been speeded up and now a treaty is ready for signature; the settlement provides that Bulgaria will pay a compensation of one billion lei to Rumania.	29	37
Sept. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Gestapo is now being requested to facilitate the return of Iron Guardists from Germany to Rumania; this constitutes a reversal of an earlier policy.	36	46
Sept. 13	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Manoilescu said Rumania was considering breaking off relations with Britain unless the Axis objected.	52	66
Sept. 19	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In a conversation with General Tippelskirch, Antonescu discussed the dispatch of German troops to Rumania and renewed his request that German equipment be sold to Rumania at the end of the training period.	75	126
Sept. 20	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hitler has decided that in sending the military mission to Rumania, the main emphasis should be put on the moving of German troops to Rumania and that no war material is to be given to Rumania during the war; the Foreign Ministry is to examine whether the USSR is to be informed of this German move.	80	136

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 21	<p><i>The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>In an OKW report concerning Hitler's decision on the sending of a German military mission to Rumania, it is stated that officially the task of the mission is to assist in the training of the Rumanian Army; its real task, which is to be kept secret, will be to protect the oil fields and to make the Rumanian Army a part of the German war machine, particularly in case of a common war against the USSR.</p>	84	144
Oct. 4	<p><i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Antonescu requested German fighter planes and antiaircraft batteries to defend the oil fields against threatening British attacks; Fabricius believes the request should be granted.</p>	151	260
Oct. 9	<p><i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Italy</i></p> <p>The Foreign Minister requests that in informing Ciano of the military mission to Rumania, it should be explained that no official announcement was made in order not to provoke immediate British sabotage actions against the oil fields.</p>	167	277
Oct. 10	<p><i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i></p> <p>The Missions are instructed to explain officially the sending of a German military mission to Rumania as an assistance in the reorganization of the Rumanian Army; its real purpose, however, is protection of the oil fields. Any suggestion of an anti-Soviet aspect of this action is to be rejected but its anti-British aspect is to be emphasized.</p>	169	279
Oct. 14	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and the special Rumanian envoy, Valer Pop. Discussion of problems arising from transfer of Rumanian territory to Hungary and of German-Rumanian economic relations.</p>	179	302
Oct. 18	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i></p> <p>The Rumanian envoy, Valer Pop, asked for German intervention in the Soviet-Rumanian boundary negotiations and emphasized the danger of Soviet control over the mouth of the Danube; Woermann gave no hope that Germany would intervene; upon Pop's insistence, the matter was to be brought before Hitler.</p>	189	318
Oct. 19	<p><i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>In a talk on German-Rumanian economic relations Neubacher said that the question of the price of grain and of the rate of exchange for the mark would be treated with regard for Rumania's economic interests; Antonescu stressed the importance of these issues to the stability of his regime.</p>	193	325
Oct. 26	<p><i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV</i></p> <p>Records intelligence that Soviet troops had occupied three islands in the Kiliya branch of the Danube; the Rumanian Government is reported to regard the action as part of a larger move to seize the entire Kiliya branch.</p>	236	403

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LXV

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 1	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that there is a conflict between General Antonescu and the leader of the Iron Guard, Horia Sima, who sent the General a letter criticizing his policy and demanding total power for the Legionnaire movement.	269	445
Nov. 2	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests vigorous action by the Foreign Minister to stop the "highly undesirable invasion" of Rumania by representatives of German private industry.	276	455
Nov. 16	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Rumania</i> Instructions to question Antonescu after his return from Rome about any agreements made on the dispatch to Rumania of Italian training units, which had been reported earlier.	346	592
Nov. 19	<i>Minister Neubacher to Minister Clodius</i> Describes extremist tendencies within the Iron Guard and expresses his belief that the growing disorder in Rumania will be suppressed in the next few weeks; otherwise immediate suspension of all German economic advisory activities would have to be proposed.	360	628
Nov. 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Antonescu held in Berlin on November 22.	380	654
Nov. 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and Antonescu on November 22. Antonescu explains his situation, asserts the principle of Rumania's claim to all of Transylvania, but states that Rumania would not bring up this issue until a general peace conference meets; Hitler states his views on the Soviet Union and the duration of the war, and states that world history will not end with the year 1940.	381	662
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Antonescu in the presence of Clodius on November 23. Review of some of the political questions taken up previously; lengthy discussion of German-Rumanian economic relations.	387	680
Nov. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation between Antonescu and Keitel on November 23 about the reorganization of the Rumanian Army and the possibility of German assistance in the motorization of Rumanian supply services; in a discussion on a Russian threat to Rumania, Antonescu agrees to Keitel's suggestion that another German division be added to the German training units stationed in Rumania.	388	684

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 25	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Records that at the farewell audience on November 23 Hitler told Antonescu he could assure Rumania, who was now an ally, that Germany would stand up for her in every respect and that Rumania's existence would be backed from now on by the Wehrmacht.</p>	389	689
Nov. 25	<p><i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>Summarizes the arguments against lowering the rate of interest on credits to Rumania below 5 percent, but indicates a disposition to consider secondly a rate as low as 4 percent.</p>	402	711
Nov. 29	<p><i>Minister Neubacher to Minister Clodius</i></p> <p>Reports on his talks with Antonescu and Iron Guard leaders during the Rumanian political crisis resulting from the assassinations of political opponents by Iron Guard members.</p>	426	748
Dec. 3	<p><i>The Minister in Rumania to the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i></p> <p>Reports on the visit of Bohle and Baldur von Schirach to Rumania.</p>	445	778
Dec. 14	<p><i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that Antonescu expressed concern that the recall of Fabricius and his replacement by Killinger might be interpreted as a change in Germany's policy toward Rumania or toward Antonescu personally; suggests that the latter be informed by Ribbentrop that there will be no change in German policy.</p>	513	870
Dec. 21	<p><i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that Antonescu agreed to the dispatch of additional German reinforcements.</p>	544	921
1941 Jan. 8	<p><i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports on excesses of the Iron Guard which resulted in a serious clash between Antonescu and Sima and seriously shook Antonescu's confidence in Sima; the Rumanian industrialist and supporter of the Iron Guard, Malaxa, plays a role in this conflict.</p>	623	1050
Jan. 9	<p><i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that Antonescu requested a visit with Hitler as soon as possible in order to discuss Rumanian defense policy and to get advice on domestic policy; Antonescu inquired about Hess' invitation to Sima to visit Berlin.</p>	631	1060
Jan. 13	<p><i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that Horia Sima declined to go along on the journey to Berlin, although Antonescu had given his approval.</p>	647	1079

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LXVII

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 16	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Record of a conversation between Hitler and Antonescu at the Obersalzberg on January 14; detailed discussion of Antonescu's relations with the Iron Guard and its leader, Horia Sima, and regarding Rumania's relations with her neighbors. Hitler again assured Antonescu that the German guarantee for Rumania was a binding obligation which would be honored not only at the Soviet-Rumanian border, but also at other borders.</p>	652	1087
Jan. 15	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i></p> <p>Submits to Weizsäcker a copy of the memorandum handed in by Antonescu on his Berlin visit, which Ribbentrop wants to have discussed by Weizsäcker, Ritter, Clodius, Woermann, and Wiehl; the enclosed memorandum deals with the various aspects of German-Rumanian cooperation in the military, economic, diplomatic, and political sphere.</p>	661	1109
Jan. 16	<p><i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports information that the OKW had given instructions to see that the operations of the Malaxa Works and Malaxa personally are not harmed.</p>	663	1113
Jan. 16	<p><i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Rumania</i></p> <p>Information sent to Antonescu by the OKW indicates that the strength of German troops scheduled to pass through Rumania during the next few weeks will be more than 500,000.</p>	664	1114
Jan. 22	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i></p> <p>Instructions to recommend to General Antonescu that he take drastic measures since blood had been shed in the struggle with the Iron Guard; proposes text for a proclamation to be issued by Antonescu announcing his assumption of leadership of the Iron Guard.</p>	691	1169
Jan. 23	<p><i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Transmits Antonescu's thanks for the Foreign Minister's proposals transmitted in document No. 691 which are entirely in accordance with his views.</p>	696	1175
Jan. 24	<p><i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports a conversation with Antonescu, who called Horia Sima a rebel with whom he would no longer cooperate. Antonescu, however, is confident of receiving the support of many members of the Iron Guard and has good news about the collapse of the insurrection in the provinces.</p>	699	1178
Jan. 24	<p><i>The Special Representative in Charge of Economic Questions to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports informing Antonescu of efforts to induce the Iron Guard leaders to cease hostilities; Antonescu's intention to punish them as rebels was in contradiction to what Neubacher had told the Iron Guard leaders.</p>	700	1179

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Instructions to urge Antonescu not to rely exclusively on the Army in rebuilding Rumania; only the Iron Guard can be considered as a possible political basis of the new state.	705	1186
Jan. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Raises the question whether the Iron Guard in its recent Putsch had been encouraged by some German authorities, in spite of the unequivocal directives given by Hitler; requests that detailed observations and conclusions on this matter be submitted by Neubacher, Fabricius, and Killinger.	706	1187
Jan. 25	<i>Minister Neubacher to Minister Clodius</i> Encloses a report, drawn up for Ribbentrop, regarding the recent fighting in Rumania between the Government and the Iron Guard; states that both sides made mistakes which led to a catastrophe, but that his action inducing Horia Sima to cease the struggle disappointed those who had hoped to exterminate the Iron Guard in a civil war.	709	1194
Jan. 27	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses background of the Iron Guard uprising and reports the directives which Antonescu plans to issue regarding the punishment of the guilty; asks for permission to write an article on the German attitude toward the attempted revolution in Rumania.	715	1204
Jan. 17	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Special Representative in Charge of Economic Questions</i> Instructions to report in the future not only on the Rumanian economy and German-Rumanian economic relations but also on all questions of interest to the economy of southeastern Europe as a whole. (See also under "Danube Navigation," "Hungary," "Italy," "Military Documents," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	729	1223

SEA WARFARE

1940 Nov. 9	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records notifying the Naval War Staff of the Führer's directive that the <i>Admiral Scheer</i> strictly observe the American security zone.	307	505
Nov. 11	<i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records the Foreign Minister's accord with the proposal for strict orders that the <i>Admiral Scheer</i> respect the American security zone. The Führer so decided; and Admiral Fricke was so informed. (See also under "Ireland," "Spain," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "United States.")	313	514

SLOVAKIA

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 10	<i>Note by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> In a conversation with Ribbentrop the Slovak Minister expressed the hope that the problem of the Slovak minority in Hungary could be solved as part of a general settlement for southeast Europe; Ribbentrop advised the Slovaks not to raise the issue.	37	46
Nov. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and the Slovak Minister President on November 24. Among the topics discussed were the problem of German advisers for Slovak administration, Slovakia's relations with Hungary and the Soviet Union, Slovakia's interest in the Moravian Slovaks, the present activities of Sidor, the Slovak Minister to the Vatican, and the danger of political catholicism affiliated with international catholicism.	393	693

SPAIN

1940 Sept. 6	<i>Ambassador Stohrer to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Transmits a memorandum setting forth considerations to be taken into account in connection with Serrano Suñer's forthcoming visit to Germany.	30	37
Sept. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys instructions given by the Spanish Foreign Minister to the Spanish Ambassador in London concerning the collection of intelligence on the effect of German military measures upon Britain.	39	48
Sept. 11	<i>Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler</i> Indicates the character of the mission of Serrano Suñer who is to present the letter to Hitler.	48	62
Sept. 16	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> A brief, for use in the conversation with Serrano Suñer, setting forth the German position regarding Spanish requests for military and economic deliveries.	62	81
Sept. 17	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Serrano Suñer on September 16.	63	83
Sept. 17	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and Serrano Suñer on September 17.	66	93
Sept. 17	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Serrano Suñer and Ribbentrop on September 17.	67	98
Sept. 18	<i>Adolf Hitler to Francisco Franco</i> Sets forth reasons for Spanish entrance into the war and outlines the major strategic considerations involved.	70	106

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 22	<i>Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler</i> Objects to German plans to occupy two ports in French Morocco; expresses willingness to meet Hitler near the French-Spanish border.	88	153
Sept. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Serrano Suñer on September 24. Discussion of North African situation, economic problems, and the question of a pact between the Axis Powers and Spain.	97	166
Sept. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador to Spain</i> Franco has written Serrano Suñer concerning statements by the British Ambassador in Spain which are regarded as signs of British weakness.	103	182
Sept. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador to Spain</i> Records a conversation with Serrano Suñer over the points at issue regarding Spain's entrance into the war.	104	183
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Conversation between Hitler and Serrano Suñer on September 25.		184
Sept. 27	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> The text of a memorandum handed to Stohrer by Serrano Suñer; sets forth conditions upon which Spain will sign an alliance with Germany and Italy and enter the war.	116	199
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation between Hitler and Serrano Suñer on September 27. Further discussion of points at issue between Germany and Spain; policy toward Portugal.	117	201
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The results of the economic talks with the Spanish delegates are summed up.	125	214
—	<i>Draft of an Agreement on Economic Questions in the Event of Spain's Entry Into the War</i> The draft agreement contains an appendix listing French enterprises in Morocco, and British and French firms in Spain in which full or partial ownership is to be transferred to Germany.	126	216
Oct. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer expresses the view that Spain will not consent to the cession of any Spanish possessions or to setting up of German bases on the Canary Islands but may accept Germany's economic demands and Germany's demands regarding French Morocco.	150	259
Oct. 10	<i>Spanish Minister of Interior Serrano Suñer to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Has discussed German economic proposals with Franco; Spanish counterproposals are to be expected soon.	172	283

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Outlines economic questions pending with Spain, including settlement of the Civil War debt, military deliveries to Spain, and Spanish trade with Britain. Reports sale of enemy property in Spain though earmarked for transfer to Germany.	198	329
Undated	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and Franco at Hendaye on October 23.	220	371
Oct. 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Ribbentrop and Serrano Suñer at Hendaye. Discussion of a German draft protocol relating to Spanish accession to the German-Italian alliance; also question of Spanish accession to the Tripartite Pact.	221	376
Oct. 23	<i>German-Spanish Supplementary Protocol to the German-Spanish-Italian Secret Protocol</i> A draft agreement to provide for negotiations defining German interests in French Morocco and Spain; German economic assistance to Spain; Spain's Civil War debt to Germany.	222	380
Oct. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Government has agreed to a new version of article 5 of the secret protocol regarding the territorial cessions to be made to Spain in Africa.	224	383
Oct. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Supplies information concerning the results of the conversations with Franco and Serrano Suñer, and with Pétain and Laval, to be communicated to Ciano.	228	392
Oct. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Foreign Minister has expressed the bitter feelings of Franco and himself that the changes which they had suggested in the protocol had been rejected.	235	402
Oct. 28	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Explains procedural plans in connection with the signing of the protocol and provisions for preserving secrecy.	245	410
Oct. 31	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Transmits a request of the Naval War Staff that the Spanish Government be asked to permit refueling of German destroyers in secluded Spanish waters.	268	445
Nov. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys information that a special messenger from the office of the Spanish Foreign Minister is bringing a letter to Hitler.	273	452
Nov. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on the Spanish incorporation of the Tangier Zone.	286	465

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 5	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Directs that the brother of the Caliph be informed that a trip to Berlin now would be inadvisable; he is also to be told unofficially that a revolt is not in the best interests of the Moroccans.	289	469
Nov. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> States that the German-Italian-Spanish protocol is due to arrive in Madrid on November 9 for signing by Suñer, gives instructions on what Serrano Suñer is to be told regarding the conversations with Pétain and Laval.	294	478
Nov. 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Instructions to invite Serrano Suñer to the Berghof on November 18 for political discussions.	312	513
Nov. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the domestic situation in Spain arising from the shortage of grain.	335	574
Nov. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Summarizes for the information of the Foreign Minister the position regarding the Spanish request for a deal concerning 100,000 tons of wheat originally destined for Switzerland as well as regarding other pending economic questions.	340	581
Nov. 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation between Hitler and Serrano Suñer in the presence of Ribbentrop at the Obersalzberg, November 18. Hitler's arguments for Spanish entry into the war in time for a winter campaign and Serrano Suñer's replies. Serrano Suñer's complaints regarding the protocol of Hendaye.	352	598
Undated	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation between Ribbentrop and Serrano Suñer on November 19 at Berchtesgaden. Ribbentrop urged Spanish entry into the war and discussed the world situation. Serrano Suñer stressed Spain's need for grain.	357	619
Nov. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Franco is consulting his military advisers about the Berchtesgaden discussions; Serrano Suñer has said that a favorable reply is to be anticipated. Serrano Suñer again urges transfer of 100,000 tons of grain to Spain.	398	705
Nov. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Franco agrees to beginning of contemplated preparations.	414	725
Nov. 29	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Franco agrees to military preparations but is unable to set a definite time; he asks that German military and economic experts be sent.	420	739

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LXXIII

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports confidential intelligence that the United States and Great Britain are again disposed to deliver some grain to Spain. Urges again that Germany transfer to Spain the 100,000 tons of grain in Lisbon, lest the propaganda value of such transfer be lost.	444	777
Dec. 4	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Instructions to inform Serrano Suñer that Hitler has learned with satisfaction of Franco's decision and has instructed Canaris to proceed to Madrid for further discussions.	448	782
Dec. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports consent of the Spanish Government to clandestine refueling of German destroyers in Spanish waters.	450	787
Dec. 7	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records that General Jodl will probably leave for Madrid as soon as Spain accepts the proposed target date for military operations.	473	812
Dec. 8	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Directs the Ambassador to explain the contradiction between Franco's views as expressed to Canaris and those expressed earlier.	476	816
Dec. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the generals fear immediate entry into the war and Franco now fears to act.	479	824
Dec. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Spanish Foreign Minister denied having made any promise of neutrality in return for the delivery of American foodstuffs.	492	842
Dec. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys intelligence from a good source that Spain, in order to receive grain, has promised the British not to re-export certain foodstuffs and raw materials.	493	843
Dec. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary</i> Reports that the famine in Spain is the basic factor in Franco's change of mind. Suggests possible courses for German policy in view of the new situation.	497	847
Dec. 12	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits memorandum by General Vigón on the discussion of Franco with Admiral Canaris on December 7.	500	852
Dec. 27	<i>The Consul at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry</i> A comprehensive report on the main political tendencies manifest in Spanish Morocco during the year 1940.	573	967
Dec. 29	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys substance of a telegram from Secretary of State Hull to the United States Ambassador in Spain and analyzes it in terms of Serrano Suñer's statements regarding the extent of commitments made to the United States.	577	975

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Argentine Ambassador regarding negotiations for shipment of grain to Spain. Analyzes the Spanish position and renews urgent recommendations that Germany supply grain and fertilizer to Spain.	627	1054
Jan. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Serrano Suñer told the Italian Ambassador that Spain would enter the war now if she had grain to prevent famine.	629	1056
Jan. 11	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Serrano Suñer and his followers aim to take over power from Franco; they suggest that the German Ambassador be authorized to intervene in their behalf.	639	1069
Jan. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out instructions issued in Salzburg and urging Franco to enter the war immediately. Franco explains his economic difficulties and asks for time to consider the matter.	677	1140
Jan. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Spain</i> Instructs the Ambassador to read a message to Franco practically demanding his entrance into the war.	682	1157
Jan. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he has delivered to Franco the oral message of the Reich Government.	692	1170
Jan. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that after reading the message for Franco, he argued with him at length trying to induce him to enter the war immediately.	695	1173
Jan. 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Spain</i> Directs the Ambassador to see Franco again and to read a statement demanding a clear answer in regard to Spain's entrance into the war.	702	1183
Jan. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the oral message of the Spanish Government in reply to the German demand that Spain enter the war immediately.	707	1188
Jan. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he delivered to Franco the new oral message of the Reich Government (document No. 692), and discussed with him the unsatisfactory Spanish oral message (document No. 707).	718	1208
Jan. 28	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Asks the Ambassador for explanations as to how Franco was able to avoid giving the unequivocal answer expected by the Germans.	725	1217

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LXXV

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 29	<p><i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Supplies explanations in reply to document No. 725.</p> <p>(See also under "France," "Great Britain," "Italy," "Military Documents," and "Portugal.")</p>	728	1222

SWEDEN

1940 Sept. 14	<p><i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the King of Sweden on the attitude of the Swedish press toward Germany and the means of altering the situation.</p>	55	72
Nov. 6	<p><i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a statement by the head of the political division in the Swedish Foreign Ministry concerning the Swedish position on a closer collaboration with Finland.</p>	293	478
Nov. 18	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with Sven Hedin on the German attitude regarding: Swedish aid to Finland in case of a Soviet attack; a Swedish-Finnish alliance; a postwar Nordic union of Sweden, Finland, and Norway.</p>	351	597
Nov. 25	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with the Swedish Foreign Minister who brought up the plan of a Swedish-Finnish union. The German attitude was noncommittal.</p>	375	649
Dec. 6	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records a conversation of Hitler with Sven Hedin on December 5. Hitler's views on a Finnish-Swedish union, on Finnish-Soviet relations, on the postwar world, and the future role of Britain.</p>	449	783
Dec. 21	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> A chronological record by the Swedish Minister of the negotiations respecting a closer connection between Sweden and Finland.</p> <p>(See also under "Finland.")</p>	547	925

SWITZERLAND

1940 [Sept. 3]	<p><i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Captured documents indicate close contact between the Swiss and French Armies; there were arrangements for coordination of the two Armies in case German troops first marched into Switzerland.</p>	11	14
Oct. 1	<p><i>Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland</i> Colonel Wille of the Swiss Army suggested that the Minister take up officially with the Federal Council the question of the French documents captured by the Germans.</p>	138	231

SWITZERLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 31	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records that the Swiss Minister mentioned a meeting in Munich at which General Haushofer was said to have spoken of the necessity for Switzerland to be partitioned among her neighbors.	263	439
Nov. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Reviews the liaison between the French and Swiss Armies referred to in document No. 11 on the basis of supplementary captured French documents supplied by the High Command of the Wehrmacht.	301	494
Nov. 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division II</i> Records a conversation with an official of the Department for German Internal Affairs regarding the political background of the recent banning of the "National Movement of Switzerland" by the Swiss Federal Council.	374	648

TURKEY

1940 Oct. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Turkish intervention in a Greek-Italian conflict is unlikely unless Bulgaria intervenes on Italy's side.	243	408
Oct. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Turkish Foreign Minister who spoke of Turkey's feeling of being encircled as a result of the Italian action in Greece; Saracoglu stated that it was solely up to the Axis Powers whether Turkey would be able to maintain peace with honor.	254	430
Nov. 6	<i>Note by the Ambassador to Turkey</i> Records a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador, Gerege, who suggested that it would be most valuable if he could take along to Ankara an authoritative statement from Hitler to Inönü designed to dispel the existing distrust between the two countries; Gerege also felt that Germany and Turkey should cooperate in the Arab question.	297	482
Nov. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador to Turkey</i> Records that the Turkish Ambassador told him about a conversation with the German Foreign Minister the previous day; Ribbentrop had stated he saw no reasons why Turkey should not enter again into friendly relations with Germany, at the same time as she had ties with Britain.	314	515
Nov. 20	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the political situation in Turkey has become tense again as a result of an alleged interview given by Papen and the journey of King Boris to Germany.	363	631

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 23	<p><i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on his first conversation with Saracoglu after returning from Berlin; the Turkish Foreign Minister was informed of the conversations recently held in Berlin and was told that the Axis was prepared to respect Turkey's sovereignty and possessions if she made up her mind to cooperate in the new order in Europe.</p>	386	679
Nov. 25	<p><i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry who emphasized that Turkey would act only in protection of her own interests and inquired about German intentions in case Italy should be unable to redress the situation in Albania.</p>	396	702
Nov. 29	<p><i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports telling the President of Turkey that Germany wanted Turkey's cooperation in the new order and was prepared to give Turkey assurances which were compatible with Turkey's commitments toward Britain; the President asked a number of questions to get an exact definition of Papen's offer.</p>	422	741
Dec. 2	<p><i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on his discussions with Saracoglu regarding the German proposals referred to in document No. 422 and requests instructions as to the further course of these conversations.</p>	436	764
Dec. 3	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Refers to document No. 422 and states that it is advisable when discussing reasons for a German military intervention in Balkans to use the expression "English forces gaining a foothold on Greek soil, which would represent a threat to German interests."</p>	443	777
Dec. 5	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Instructions to exercise reserve in conversations with the Turks; the question whether formulation of a treaty between Germany and Turkey is at all feasible at this time is still open; no further conversations are to be carried on regarding the question of the Straits.</p>	454	793
Dec. 6	<p><i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Replies to document No. 454; denies that he delivered anything in writing or that he carried on conversations about the question of the Straits; hopes that it will be possible to continue the conversations as breaking them off would drive Turkey into the arms of England.</p>	459	797
Dec. 14	<p><i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a talk with the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry who inquired about the continuation of German-Turkish political conversations and subsequently discussed recent talks between Turkey and Bulgaria.</p>	515	872

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Replies to document No. 459 and agrees to continuation of Papen's negotiations with Turkey; Germany must avoid, however, committing herself to solutions which would prejudice further negotiations with the Soviet Union.	548	927
Dec. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out the instructions transmitted in document No. 548 and states that Saracoglu was glad that Germany still intended to find a new basis for Germany's relationship with Turkey.	559	944
Dec. 27	<i>Minute by the State Secretary</i> Records that he stated in a private letter to Papen that an option for either Turkey or the Soviet Union would be premature and this fact determined the limit to which Papen could go in being accommodating.	572	966
1941 Jan. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on Turkish reactions to German troop transports to Rumania and suggests that Germany offer Turkey a treaty pledge respecting the Turkish borders in return for a pledge by Turkey that she would not lend armed assistance to Britain or Greece.	634	1064
Jan. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Replies to document No. 634 and gives instructions for conversations with the Turks on German troop movements in the Balkans; authorizes statement to Turkish Government that Germany does not intend to attack Turkish territory but asks that no formal treaty to this effect be offered. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Greece," "Italy," and "Middle East.")	659	1105

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

1940 Sept. 1	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov receives the news of the Vienna Award with reserve, and points out that the USSR had not been consulted as required by article III of the Treaty of Non-Aggression, in questions of interest to both countries.	1	1
Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Records a conversation between Ribbentrop and the Soviet Ambassador. Ribbentrop stated that the Soviet offer on the Lithuanian strip was not adequate; congratulations were exchanged on the results of 1 year of German-Soviet collaboration; Ribbentrop said Molotov's view that the Soviet Union should have been consulted prior to the Vienna Award was incorrect.	4	4

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform Molotov in writing that, since Soviet interests had been satisfied by the cession of Bessarabia, there were no common interests and therefore no obligation to consult; that the Soviet Government had given no notice, or only perfunctory notice, before acting in the Baltic and in Bessarabia; and that, without notice, the USSR had taken the part of Lithuania promised to Germany.	7	8
Sept. 4	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests modifications in statement to be given to Molotov.	13	18
Sept. 5	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Government insists on its plan for mixed commissions, one for Lithuania, the other for Latvia and Estonia, each to deal with both resettlement and property questions.	18	23
[Sept. 6]	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform the Soviet Government that the German Navy no longer intends to use the base on the Murman Coast, since bases are available in Norway.	22	29
Sept. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Replies to document No. 13.	24	30
Sept. 10	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 24 and reports that instructions have been carried out. Molotov stated that a written reply would be given, but noted that the German actions were not entirely in good faith since the USSR's interest in Rumania and Hungary could not have been in doubt.	38	47
Sept. [10]	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov notes with interest the German willingness to surrender, for a suitable compensation, its territorial claim in Lithuania.	43	56
Sept. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Encloses Soviet reply to the German statement on Vienna Award. Molotov repeatedly emphasized that annulment of article III of the Treaty of Non-Aggression could be discussed if the article was not satisfactory to Germany.	81	137
Sept. 26	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to tell Molotov that a military alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan is about to be signed; it is in no way directed against the USSR; a letter will soon be sent to Stalin inviting Molotov to Berlin.	109	187

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 26	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>Schnurre states that German deliveries of military supplies to the USSR are lagging and that as a result the suspension of Soviet deliveries may be expected; only Hitler can decide whether German deliveries to the USSR are to have a priority.</p>	111	189
Sept. 27	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Molotov, on hearing of the Tripartite Pact, requests the text, including any secret clauses; he also requests the text of the agreement permitting transit of German troops through Finland; he expresses satisfaction at the promise of a letter to Stalin and of an invitation to Berlin.</p>	113	195
Sept. 28	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>Schnurre reviews the lag in German deliveries to the Soviet Union, and stresses the serious consequences for the German economy if Soviet deliveries were to be suspended.</p>	128	221
Sept. 28	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i></p> <p>Records a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador concerning the Tripartite Pact.</p>	129	224
Oct. 6	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow has been informed by Molotov that the Soviet attitude toward the Tripartite Pact would depend on how the Pact was carried out.</p>	159	268
Oct. 9	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i></p> <p>Instructions to inform Molotov that rumors of the military occupation of Rumania by German troops are false; only a German military mission with certain instruction units has been sent at the request of the Rumanian Government.</p>	166	276
Oct. 10	<p><i>The Legation in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports disagreement with Soviet delegation over extent of indemnification for German property in Lithuania.</p>	168	278
Oct. 10	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports carrying out instructions given in document No. 166, and Molotov's reaction.</p>	170	279
Oct. 13	<p><i>Joachim von Ribbentrop to Josef Stalin</i></p> <p>Reviews events since his visit to Moscow in August 1939; points out the gains which have resulted for both parties from the German-Soviet Pact; intimates the desirability of closer relations between the USSR and the members of the Tripartite Pact; suggests that Molotov visit Berlin to formulate a common policy.</p>	176	291

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 18	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he has given Molotov the letter to Stalin.	186	317
Oct. 18	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Requests explanation for delivery of the letter (document No. 176) to Molotov rather than to Stalin.	187	317
Oct. 19	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov would have been annoyed at an attempt to give the letter to Stalin, and Stalin would have avoided a personal meeting since he has recently shown a strong reserve in public.	195	327
Oct. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov promised a favorable reply to Ribbentrop's letter to Stalin; Molotov would accept the invitation to Berlin.	200	334
Oct. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov stated that there had been no promise of complete indemnification for property of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche who were resettled. Schulenburg will make further representations.	202	336
Oct. 21	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to observe greatest restraint, even with Italian colleagues, regarding the letter to Stalin. The Italian Ambassador has been informed that such a letter was sent. Ribbentrop is handling the matter himself.	205	346
Oct. 22	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits Stalin's reply to Ribbentrop's letter (document No. 176).	211	353
Oct. 30	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits views on a communiqué regarding Molotov's impending visit to Berlin.	256	432
[Oct. 31]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> The text of a proposed communiqué with instructions to take the matter up with Molotov.	262	438
Nov. 2	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that Mikoyan's insistence on an agreement regarding turrets and armor plate is such as to require favorable action if economic negotiations are to be successful.	275	454
Nov. 8	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Soviet officials showed Germans great courtesy on the anniversary of the Revolution.	304	498

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940	<p><i>Draft</i> A German draft, providing for the adherence of the USSR to the Three Power Pact, and including two secret protocols, of which one defines the spheres of influence of each power and the other provides for free passage of Soviet warships through the Straits.—</p>	309	508
Nov. 11	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Outlines the secondary problems which may come up for discussion with Molotov.</p>	317	521
Nov. 11	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Summarizes recent favorable changes in the Soviet attitude in the economic negotiations in Moscow.</p>	318	523
Nov. 11	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Summarizes the position respecting the negotiations about Soviet payment for the strip of Lithuanian territory.</p>	319	524
Nov. 13	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Ribbentrop and Molotov in Berlin on November 12.</p>	325	533
Nov. 16	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and Molotov on November 12.</p>	326	541
Nov. 15	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and Molotov on November 13.</p>	328	550
Nov. 18	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Record of the final conversation between Ribbentrop and Molotov on November 13.</p>	329	562
Nov. 15	<p><i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> The visit of Molotov took place in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and resulted in agreement on all important questions.</p>	339	581
Nov. 16	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that the economic questions regarding Petsamo nickel, grain, and property claims be followed up in Moscow.</p>	344	590
Nov. 18	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits Hilger's account of the conversation between Göring and Molotov on November 13.</p>	348	594
Nov. 20	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that the Soviet Government intends to recall Shkvartsev as Ambassador in Germany and to appoint Dekanozov.</p>	362	630

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 21	<i>The Chief of the Economic Delegation in the Soviet Union to the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reports on the status of the economic negotiations with the Soviet Union.	377	650
Nov. 26	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation of November 25 with Molotov and sends the Soviet reply to the proposals made by Ribbentrop in document No. 329 regarding a four power pact.	404	714
Nov. 26	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on a discussion with Molotov regarding compensation for German property in the Baltic States.	406	717
Nov. 27	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes the Soviet counterproposals for the basis of the economic agreement.	409	720
Nov. 28	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the Soviet Government's reply in regard to grain deliveries, German counterdeliveries, and German property in the Baltic States.	412	723
Nov. 29	<i>The Head of the Economic Delegation in the Soviet Union to Ambassador Ritter</i> Describes difficulties with leading members of the German delegation.	425	746
Dec. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Notes the Soviet compliance in certain aspects of the economic negotiations and discusses the remaining problems.	437	765
Dec. 3	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that negotiations on resettlement of Germans from the Baltic States be promptly resumed.	440	774
Dec. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions for answering Molotov's query regarding delay in reception of Dekanozov by Hitler.	501	854
Dec. 12	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and the Soviet Ambassador, Dekanozov. Dekanozov presented a signed portrait of Stalin to Ribbentrop, discussed the time of his first reception by Hitler, and asked about reports of a Finnish-Swedish agreement.	502	854
Dec. 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Criticizes the Ambassador for admission of delay in the reception of Dekanozov.	509	864
Dec. 14	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains that he had not spoken of a delay in the reception of Dekanozov but of appearance of delay.	516	873

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 18	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits memorandum recording efforts of the Embassy to secure Soviet consent for the transit of two airplanes to Japan.	533	902
Dec. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the economic agreement is ready for signature, but that Soviet Government insists on simultaneous settlement of Baltic property claims.	539	914
Dec. 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Record of the conversation between Ribbentrop and the Soviet Ambassador, Dekanozov, on December 21. Dekanozov brought up the matter of the demarcation of the former German-Lithuanian boundary and the related Soviet proposal to purchase the strip of Lithuanian territory. Ribbentrop replied that the questions were being studied, but he hoped to reply next week.	545	922
Dec. 22	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Molotov insists on simultaneous conclusion of all agreements: the economic agreement; the compensation for Baltic property; the resettlement agreements for Latvia and Lithuania; and the agreement concerning the Lithuanian boundary.	550	928
Dec. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses an excerpt from a dispatch of November 26 by the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow emphasizing Soviet fears of a possible combined German-Japanese attack in the spring.	557	941
Dec. 24	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Explains that the boundary agreement must wait on determination of the compensation for the strip of Lithuanian territory. Directs that inquiries be made regarding such compensation.	558	943
Dec. 24	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests possible methods of compensation by the Soviet Government for the strip of Lithuanian territory. Reports intention to propose to Molotov that the economic, Baltic, and resettlement agreements be signed immediately.	560	945
Dec. 25	<i>The Head of the Economic Delegation in the Soviet Union to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Urges the importance and advantages of the new economic agreement and the dangers if its signature were delayed.	568	960
Dec. 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that the Soviet Government be informed that Germany would be willing to sell the strip of Lithuanian territory for additional raw materials with the value of 13 million gold dollars.	575	971
	<i>German-Soviet Boundary Agreement</i> German draft of an agreement defining the boundary between Germany and the Soviet Union in the former Lithuanian sector.	579	977

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 30	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conferring with Molotov who considered 13 million dollar evaluation of the strip of Lithuanian territory as greatly exaggerated. Requests authorization to settle the question on the basis of a compromise.	580	979
Dec. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Staff</i> An intelligence report that Stalin wishes the text of Hitler's speech of December 18.	581	980
1941 Jan. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Authorizes transmittal of the draft boundary treaty to the Soviet Government. Conclusion of the treaty depends, however, on proper compensation for the strip of Lithuanian territory.	590	1000
Jan. 2	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Molotov agreed in principle to the draft boundary treaty and was willing to double the Soviet offer for the strip of Lithuanian territory.	591	1000
Jan. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that Molotov's compromise figure for the purchase of the strip of Lithuanian territory can be accepted provided payment be immediate and in the form of nonferrous metals.	598	1010
Jan. 4	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Vyshinsky accepted the German standpoint in the Baltic agreement and that it is possible that all six agreements can be ready for signature on January 6.	604	1016
Jan. 4	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Urges cancellation of instruction to insist on immediate delivery of the raw materials to be provided as price for the strip of Lithuanian territory.	605	1017
Jan. 5	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Insists that payment for the strip of Lithuanian territory comprise: half the value in nonferrous metals to be delivered within 3 months; other raw materials that can be delivered within 3 months; and the balance in gold delivered immediately.	607	1027
Jan. 6	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out instructions contained in document No. 607. Molotov emphasized the restricted capacity of the USSR to deliver nonferrous metals. He was referring the question to his Government.	608	1028
Jan. 7	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Lists the quantities of nonferrous metals which the Soviet Government promises to deliver by August.	612	1036
Jan. 7	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports final offer by Molotov of compensation for the strip of Lithuanian territory: half the amount in nonferrous metals; the rest in other raw materials and gold; delivery within 1½ years.	614	1039

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 7	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Urges acceptance of Molotov's last offer for the strip of Lithuanian territory.	615	1040
Jan. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in the Soviet Union and Turkey, and to the Legations in Yugoslavia and Greece</i> Explains that strong German forces are moving into Rumania through Hungary; directs that a reserved attitude be taken in conversation.	616	1040
Jan. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Conveys information on German troop movements to Rumania.	617	1041
Jan. 8	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that rumors are circulating concerning German troops in Rumania.	624	1052
Jan. 8	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Molotov offers in payment for the strip of Lithuanian territory: either the whole sum in gold; or one-eighth in nonferrous metals and the balance in gold.	625	1052
Jan. 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructs the Ambassador, if questioned regarding German troops in Rumania, to say only that they are directed against the British in Greece.	636	1066
Jan. 10	<i>Economic Agreement of January 10, 1941, Between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i> Text of the agreement.	637	1066
Jan. 10	<i>German-Soviet Russian Secret Protocol</i> Text of the Secret Protocol of January 10 on the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory.	638	1068
Jan. 11	<i>Circular of Ambassador Ritter</i> Instructions on the line to take in official and non-official discussions regarding the new series of treaties concluded with the Soviet Union.	640	1070
Jan. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Staff</i> States that Kobulov still wishes text of Hitler's speech to the young officers, and is still curious about the people who call on the actress, Eyck.	650	1085
Jan. 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> States that the Soviet Ambassador presented a memorandum warning that the appearance of foreign troops in Bulgaria and at the Straits would be regarded as a violation of Soviet security interests.	668	1122

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 17	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Molotov expressed surprise that no answer had been received to the Soviet Government's statement of position of November 25 (document No. 404). Schulenburg replied that the issues were under discussion with Italy and Japan. Molotov issues a warning concerning foreign troops in Bulgaria and at the Straits.</p>	669	1124
Jan. 20	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Analyzes the Soviet démarche of January 17 and suggests the outlines of an answer.</p>	678	1144
Jan. 21	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary</i> Directs that the Soviet Ambassador be informed: that Germany does not expect Britain to occupy the Straits, but does expect Britain to seek a foothold in Greece; consequently German troops will march through Bulgaria to expel the British. The German Government adheres to the views expressed to Molotov in Berlin and is discussing Molotov's counterproposals with Italy and Japan.</p>	681	1155
Jan. 22	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records replying to the Soviet Ambassador in accordance with the instructions from the Foreign Minister (document No. 681) in regard to German troop movements in the Balkans.</p>	684	1159
Jan. 23	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports taking the step with Molotov parallel to that recorded in document No. 684.</p>	694	1172
Jan. 23	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records discussion with Kase, Japanese Counselor of Embassy, regarding the political significance of the agreements with the Soviet Union.</p>	697	1176
Jan. 29	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that in Moscow it is extraordinarily difficult to gain information about England. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Danube Navigation," "Far East," "Finland," "Italy," "Military Documents," and "United States.")</p>	733	1229

UNITED STATES

1940 Sept. 1	<p><i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests funds for distribution of copies of a recent speech by Senator Holt.</p>	2	1
Sept. 1	<p><i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports United States efforts to oppose German propaganda and suggests countermeasures.</p>	3	2

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 3	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses the destroyers-for-bases exchange between the United States and Great Britain.	10	12
Sept. 8	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests authorization to issue a visa to a Quaker leader who would like to come to Berlin to advise on German propaganda policy in the United States.	32	41
Sept. 14	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> In an analysis of the condition of the American armed forces, the Military Attaché states that public criticism of the training of these forces should not be taken too seriously; during the course of 1941, the United States should have 1,200,000 men well trained and equipped with equivalent air support.	60	78
Sept. 16	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives further appraisal of United States-Soviet economic negotiations on basis of conversations with Soviet Ambassador and personal observations.	64	91
Sept. 19	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> A press campaign and police searches indicate the United States Government may demand recall of certain German Consuls on the ground that their activities have exceeded the limits of diplomatic privilege. Steps will be taken to insure continuation of intelligence gathering activities in this contingency.	71	108
Sept. 23	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses implications of the American alien registration law for the Nazi party members resident in the United States.	90	157
Sept. 24	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché reports that the main aim of American policy is to bring about a military or diplomatic settlement in the Pacific which would free America for an active policy in the Atlantic; objectives there include control of the west coast of Africa and the exclusion of Germany from economic activity in Latin America.	99	177
Sept. 28	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> An appraisal by the Military Attaché of the effect of the Tripartite Pact on United States defense policy.	123	209
Sept. 30	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits intelligence received from an informant concerning the purported contents of a telegram from Kennedy to Roosevelt on the situation in Great Britain.	132	227
Oct. 2	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Further appraisal by the Military Attaché of the military effects of the Tripartite Pact in the United States.	141	234

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LXXXIX

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the chief expenditures of the Embassy for propaganda and press purposes.	147	243
Oct. 9	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to the Military Attaché the Tripartite Pact has not led to any change in United States policy because military preparations are inadequate to run the risk of war; American propaganda, however, tries to convince Japan of United States readiness for war and to persuade the Soviet Union that Germany menaces her.	164	273
Oct. 16	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché reports that the contest between those who favor entry of the United States into the war and those around Lindbergh who prefer a hemisphere defense policy continues unresolved; a third group which is dominant for the moment wants continued aid to Great Britain but no entry into the war until arms production is built up.	180	307
Oct. 20	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that a protest to the State Department prevented seizure of Embassy bank records by a congressional committee, but press reports assert the committee has evidence of secret activity by the Auslandsorganisation in the United States; requests instructions as to how to reply to such allegations.	203	337
Oct. 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes procedures used in publishing German propaganda material in the United States and difficulties encountered.	214	361
Oct. 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a report from Draeger, a Kreisleiter of the Auslandsorganisation in the United States, giving an account of his activities.	215	362
Oct. 22	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> Refers to document No. 203 and gives instructions on how to answer questions relating to Nazi party activity in the United States.	216	364
Oct. 23	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the United States</i> Instructions to check on reports that Soviet purchases of raw materials in the United States have increased considerably.	219	370
Oct. 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports of increased Soviet purchases of raw materials in the United States are correct. Embassy will furnish additional data.	230	395

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Oct. 26	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Mail addressed from Berlin to the New York Consulate, and presumably opened by American authorities, clearly designated the district leaders of the Nazi party in the United States; the argument cannot be upheld, therefore, that party titles known to the United States Government are merely ranks held in the party in Germany.</p>	238	404
Oct. 26	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i></p> <p>In view of the continuing public attacks on German diplomatic representatives in the United States the following step is being considered: to tell the State Department that it should either render a complaint in approved diplomatic form or else protect German officials from abuse.</p>	239	405
Oct. [28]	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Thomsen reports that he has repeatedly protested against the defamation of German Foreign Service personnel; recommends that appropriate steps be taken in Berlin.</p>	244	409
Oct. 30	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports the offer by Felix Jahnke to the New York Consulate General to send intelligence to Germany by radio. Strongly urges against such action.</p>	255	431
Oct. 31	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i></p> <p>Records protesting to the United States Chargé d'Affaires against the defamation by the American press of German representatives in that country.</p>	266	443
Nov. 2	<p><i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i></p> <p>Recommends the formulation of definite lines of propaganda in regard to the impending American election.</p>	279	457
Nov. 4	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports the publication by the <i>New York Enquirer</i> of Potocki's report on Roosevelt's preparations for entry into the war.</p>	284	463
Nov. 6	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Comments on the re-election of Roosevelt and on the prospects of his foreign policy.</p>	292	476
Nov. 8	<p><i>Circular of the State Secretary</i></p> <p>Instructs all Diplomatic Missions regarding discussion of the re-election of Roosevelt.</p>	305	499
Nov. 18	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that a break in diplomatic relations is unlikely; advises that revelations by the Dies Committee could lead to a break only if the State Department would act.</p>	349	596

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XCI

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Information Department</i> Outlines basic principles for propaganda for America since the re-election of Roosevelt.	359	624
Nov. 24	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Discusses Roosevelt's policy toward France and the significance of the nomination of Leahy as Ambassador to Vichy.	394	698
Nov. 30	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Roosevelt expressed to Lothian his annoyance at British propaganda pressure, and assured him only of aid for England within the previously existing framework.	427	751
Dec. 8	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the expansion of the American armament industry; programs, bottlenecks, future demands.	475	814
Dec. 12	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> Directs that the State Department be notified that three members of the American Embassy at Paris are personae non gratae. Their recall within 3 days is to be requested.	503	856
Dec. 14	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Advises against demanding a 3-day time limit for the recall of the three compromised members of the American Embassy at Paris.	512	869
Dec. 19	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Analyzes the policy of Roosevelt announced in the new plan for aid to Britain.	534	905
Dec. 25	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a recent shift in the statements of William Allen White; increased activity by the America First Committee; and the founding of the No Foreign Wars Committee.	563	949
Dec. 31	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits comment on the policy of President Roosevelt as revealed in the fireside chat of December 29.	585	989
1941 Jan. 9	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Refutes the view that it would make little difference to Germany if the United States entered the war. Discusses methods for preventing American intervention.	633	1061
Jan. 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Comments on the memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff (document No. 633), urging that the main propaganda effort be directed toward widening the gulf in America between isolationists and interventionists.	666	1117

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Jan. 24	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses the American repeal of the moral embargo on Soviet Russia.	701	1181
Jan. 26	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States and to the Consulate General at New York</i> Requests immediate reports regarding the views of Irish-Americans toward possible British military action in Ireland.	710	1198
Jan. 28	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the attitude and influence of the Irish-Americans which is different from that of World War I.	721	1213
Jan. 30	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Finland</i> Directs the Legation to avoid direct quotation from speeches of American isolationists lest their position toward the American public be compromised. (See also under "France," "Ireland," "Latin America," "Sea Warfare," and "Spain.")	734	1230

YUGOSLAVIA

1940 Sept. 26	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Yugoslav concern over the Italian demands on Greece.	110	189
Oct. 25	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports widely current rumors that there is much dissatisfaction because of the deterioration of Yugoslavia's military and political situation; a good many Serb generals are said to be considering a Putsch to replace the Regent by the young King.	231	396
Nov. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Records that the Yugoslav Military Attaché on instructions from War Minister Nedić brought up on November 4 and 6 with the OKH Yugoslav interests in Salonika; he intimated that in return for mediating in Yugoslavia's favor Germany might be able to make certain demands on Yugoslavia.	320	525
Nov. 12	<i>Note by the Director of the News Service and Press Department</i> Records a conversation with the pro-German Yugoslav journalist, Gregorić, who is visiting Berlin and wishes to call on the Foreign Minister.	324	532
Nov. 14	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Italo-Greek war has reawakened the old Serbian desire for a free outlet to the Aegean through Salonika.	334	573

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XCIII

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Nov. 20	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>Records that the Yugoslav Minister made representations regarding deliveries of airplane material which had stopped following objections raised by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires. Suggests in consideration of the Italian request continued halting of airplane deliveries to Yugoslavia.</p>	370	643
Nov. 24	<p><i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Cincar-Marković stated that he personally would welcome a meeting with the Reich Foreign Minister for the purpose of an exchange of views; reserved his reply, however, until he had spoken with the Prince Regent and the Minister President.</p>	392	692
Nov. 25	<p><i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Summarizes the political position of Yugoslavia. Determination to resist any threat from Italy and Bulgaria to Yugoslav vital interests has increased among the Serbs and in the Army; the attitude toward Germany is unchanged; Yugoslav foreign policy which is decisively influenced by the Prince Regent will continue to adhere to a policy of neutrality.</p>	397	704
Nov. 29	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Records conversation between Hitler and Cincar-Marković on November 28. Discussion of Germany's policy in the Balkans, the Italo-Greek war, and the possibility of German intervention in that conflict. Hitler states that this is the favorable moment for obtaining Italy's consent to the permanent consolidation of Yugoslavia's security, provided she took a clear position in favor of Germany; mentioned as elements of such a settlement are a nonaggression pact between Yugoslavia, Germany, and Italy, demilitarization of Dalmatia, and a Yugoslav outlet to the Aegean at Salonika.</p>	417	728
Dec. 7	<p><i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>The Yugoslav Foreign Minister stated that his Government had definitely rejected an Italian request for passage through Yugoslav territory of trucks sent to the area of hostilities.</p>	465	803
Dec. 7	<p><i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister has given him a written statement expressing willingness to discuss with the German and Italian Governments the signing of a nonaggression pact on the basis of the Italo-Yugoslav Agreement of March 25, 1937.</p>	467	805
Dec. 7	<p><i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Transmits the introductory statements of the declaration transmitted in document No. 467.</p>	469	807

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Dec. 7	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>Submits again document No. 370 and proposes that Germany continue not to send aviation material to Yugoslavia in view of the Italian request to that effect and the Yugoslav attitude regarding passage of trucks bound for Albania.</p>	471	810
Dec. 21	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i></p> <p>Instructions to tell Cincar-Marković that conclusion of a nonaggression pact would not meet the specifications for the strengthening of Yugoslavia's relations with the Axis envisaged in the conversations at Fuschl and Berchtesgaden and would leave open the question of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact.</p>	549	927
Dec. 23	<p><i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports carrying out of the instructions transmitted in document No. 549. Cincar-Marković expressed surprise since the idea of a three-sided nonaggression pact had originated with Hitler and since he had interpreted this idea in such a way that it would still leave open Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact.</p>	551	930
1941 Jan. 25	<p><i>The Chief of the Security Police and Security Service to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Encloses a letter from the Yugoslav journalist, Gregorić, to Dr. Schmidt of the Press Department; the letter discusses the political situation in Yugoslavia, states that Cincar-Marković's conversations in Germany did not produce a complete solution and suggests a meeting between Cvetković and Ribbentrop.</p>	708	1192
Jan. 29	<p><i>Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i></p> <p>After reading the letter from the Yugoslav journalist, Gregorić (document No. 708, enclosure), Hitler agreed to having Minister President Cvetković invited; he wished to receive him personally, preferably at the Berghof.</p> <p>(See also under "Greece," "Hungary," and "Italy.")</p>	730	1224

No. 1

104/112444

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 1, 1940—2:08 a. m.

No. 1815 of August 31

Received September 1—4:40 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister:¹

With reference to your telegram No. 1565 of August 30.²

Instruction carried out. Molotov, who was reserved in contrast to his usual manner, expressed his thanks for the information and stated as follows:

The Soviet Government was already informed regarding the Vienna conversations by the press and radio. He asked me to call the attention of the German Government to the fact that by its action it had violated article III of the Non-Aggression Pact, which provided for consultation.³ The Soviet Government had been confronted with accomplished facts by the German Government; this violated existing agreements and conflicted with assurances that the Soviet Government had received from the German Government regarding questions of common interest to both countries. The present case involved two states neighboring the Soviet Union, where she naturally had interests.

I told Molotov that I could not take a position with regard to his remarks and that I would immediately notify my Government. It was my supposition that there had been no time for consultation in the present case because of the urgency of the matter.

SCHULENBURG

¹ A marginal note indicates that this telegram was transmitted to Ribbentrop's Special Train on Sept. 1 at 5:30 a. m. as telegram No. 95.

² Vol. x of this series, document No. 415.

³ Vol. vii of this series, document No. 228.

No. 2

35/22785

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1940—1:03 a. m.

No. 1856 of August 31

Received September 1—5:00 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1826 of August 26.¹

¹ Not printed (897/291910).

The well-known isolationist Senator Holt recently delivered an important speech in the Senate on British propaganda in the United States, which he supplemented in the *Congressional Record* by a reprint of four articles on the same subject. The speech and the articles contain splendid material, including attacks on Lord Lothian and other British propagandists in America, excerpts from Peterson's book, *Propaganda For War*, as well as from Sidney Rogerson's book, *Propaganda in the Next War*, and numerous other pertinent quotations from the American press, which make the speech, as well as the articles, appear especially suited for the widest possible distribution. Through the *Congressional Record* the articles have already been made available to 100,000 interested persons. Senator Holt has, however, through an intermediary also declared himself prepared to circulate the "speech and articles as a reprint in 250,000 copies."

For this operation we would have to contribute \$3,000, which, to be sure, does not cover the entire cost. Holt is also being subsidized from another direction, however. I request instructions as to whether you agree to the project and whether the necessary funds can be made available.²

THOMSEN

² See document No. 3 and footnote 8.

No. 3

897/291863-65

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1940—7: 50 p. m.

Received September 2—8: 00 a. m.

No. 1863 of September 1

Inf. 301/g.

With reference to your telegram No. 976 (P 15422) of the 31st.¹

Our interference with British and Jewish propaganda in the United States has led to well-organized operations, evidently supported by the Government, to discredit our entire propaganda machinery and, if possible, to destroy it. The closing in on all organizations which are active on behalf of Germany in North America began with propaganda against the fifth column and a campaign of slander in all leading newspapers and periodicals against German officials and individuals here and their alleged subversive activity. At the same time spying began on prominent Reich Germans residing in the United States; as the Westrick affair shows,² it has assumed such forms

¹ Not found.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 287.

that Americans who still maintain contacts with representatives of the Reich are holding back because they are afraid of being subjected to cross-examination by the federal secret police and of having suspicion cast on them in public. Members of the Embassy are under surveillance on trips and at home.

This agitation has been seized upon by the Dies Committee,³ principally, indeed, from a mania for political advertising (see telegraphic report No. 1857 of August 31⁴), as the occasion for investigating Transocean, the Reichsbahn agency, and the Information Library, and for requesting the surrender of copies of all mailing lists, vouchers, and correspondence. Moreover, an investigation will be instituted here of George Sylvester Viereck, the well-known German-American writer and our informant in many matters, as well as of the other German agents (12 in all) registered with the State Department, while the approximately 140 registered and many nonregistered British agents have thus far had an entirely free hand. The result and details of the investigation will probably be (one word evidently missing here, probably: used [*verwendet*]) by the press for further agitation and may likewise not be unwelcome to the Roosevelt Government for increasing the war psychosis, since the interrogations will take place before the elections. It is to be expected, moreover, that through publication of the mailing lists, all persons who still had any contact with German agencies or subscribed to the Embassy periodical, *Facts in Review*, the publications of the German Tourist Information Office, and the German-American Chamber of Commerce, will be publicly discredited, in order to suppress entirely the circulation of German propaganda material.

All these operations aim at strengthening the impression already widespread among the American people that Diplomatic and other Reich Missions have the task of conducting subversive activity and espionage in America. Undoubtedly the tendency of Roosevelt to challenge us, through constant provocation, to a rupture of diplomatic relations has something to do with this.

In order to counteract this purpose, which is daily clearly manifested, I suggest that the following countermeasures be taken from here:

- 1) An operation to discredit the illustrated paper, *P. M.*, which has in recent weeks distinguished itself by especially venomous calumniations. The active "Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee," to which isolationist Senators belong, has declared itself ready for this. The Committee will publish a pamphlet directed against *P. M.*, written by a well-known clergyman, which is to be circulated in

³ The House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, of which Representative Martin Dies, Democrat of Texas, was Chairman.

⁴ Not found.

200,000 copies and also reprinted in the *Congressional Record*. Three thousand dollars would have to be made available for this purpose.

2) Circulation of the speeches and articles of Senator Holt in 250,000 copies (see my telegram No. 1856 of August 30 [31] ⁵).

3) The special literary activities outlined in telegraphic report No. 1196 [1169] of June 13,⁶ and approved by telegraphic instruction No. 664 of June 17.⁷ Of the five manuscripts, the three most important by Dreiser, Rascoe, and Porter are nearly finished. They will probably appear at the end of September.⁸

Please desist for the present from taking countermeasures there, possibly against American agencies or the American Express Company, until I get an idea of the probable course and result of the investigation and hearings conducted by the Dies Committee against Transocean, the Travel Office, and the Information Library. The hearing of Transocean is scheduled for September 20. The Dies Committee has no judicial powers. It can, if need be, only transmit the results of its investigation and hearing to the Department of Justice with its recommendation, and it is up to the Department of Justice to decide whether or not it wishes to institute criminal proceedings or other measures. It is entirely possible that even Dies must realize the weakness of his accusation and that, after being blown up considerably in the press, the matter will die down. The business of the three offices has not been technically interfered with thus far.

THOMSEN

⁵ Document No. 2.

⁶ Vol. IX of this series, document No. 422.

⁷ See *ibid.*, document No. 455, footnote 2.

⁸ The above-mentioned proposals were approved by the Foreign Ministry on Sept. 5 (telegram No. 999:4489/E097594).

No. 4

F14/411-415

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, September 2, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR SHKVARTSEV, SEPTEMBER 2, 1940

Ambassador Shkvartsev, accompanied by Secretary of Embassy Pavlov, started the conversation with an explanation of alleged frictions between the Soviet Union and Finland over the Åland Islands. This question, which was touched upon at his last visit,¹ can now be answered: The rumors do not correspond in any way to the real situation. The Foreign Minister welcomed this news. Furthermore, the

¹ See vol. X of this series, document No. 340.

Ambassador referred to the conversation which took place on August 12, 1940, concerning compensation for part of Lithuania.² The Foreign Minister explained that he had received the proposals through Count Schulenburg from Moscow. At this time German officials are dealing with this subject and their careful examination is not yet concluded. He could already say, however, that the proposal to pay the stated sum does not compensate for changing the agreements regarding this territory. The Foreign Minister believed that Soviet officials too would conclude that in regard to value their proposal in no way corresponded to the actual situation. After this proposal has been examined in principle and from the economic side once more, the Foreign Minister will ask the Führer for his views and will communicate the results to the Ambassador. Already, however, he could say that the proposal is not acceptable as it now stands. The Ambassador asked when he might expect an answer. The Foreign Minister regretted not being able to name a date, for various questions still had to be clarified. Count Schulenburg too had inquired by wire and he too had been asked to wait for an answer.³

The Ambassador then expressed his satisfaction over the German-Russian collaboration, the anniversary of which had been celebrated recently. The Foreign Minister replied that he shared this feeling and was convinced that this year had brought Germany as well as Soviet Russia great advantages. Germany had obtained great victories and would continue to do so in the future; the Soviet Union too derived a great advantage from these German victories. She had been able to carry through revisions which would not have been possible had the English system prevailed⁴ in Europe. The Foreign Minister hopes that German-Russian political and economic relations will continue to develop to mutual advantage.

According to a telegram from Count Schulenburg in Moscow regarding his interview with M. Molotov about the Vienna Award,⁵ M. Molotov expressed the view that the Soviet Union should have been consulted previously about the questions dealt with at Vienna. The Foreign Minister explained that he could not at this point go into details, but that today or tomorrow he would send Count Schulenburg the German views for transmittal to M. Molotov. By a telegram from Vienna to Count Schulenburg⁶ the Foreign Minister had had M. Molotov informed of the events that led to the Vienna Award, and on this occasion M. Molotov had made his remark. Today or tomorrow Count Schulenburg will receive the pertinent instructions,⁷

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 332.

³ Not found.

⁴ "Prevailed" was replaced by several illegible words in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

⁵ Document No. 1.

⁶ See vol. x of this series, document No. 415.

⁷ Document No. 7.

and M. Shkvartsev will be informed immediately. The Foreign Minister could say already, however, that M. Molotov's view that the Soviet Union should have been informed in advance about the Vienna Award is incorrect. The German conduct in no way contradicts the obligations for consultation under the German-Russian Pact.

MEYER-HEYDENHAGEN

No. 5

2549/523395-96

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German
Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

SECRET
No. 156

WIESBADEN, September 2, 1940—11:40 p. m.
Received September 3—12:35 a. m.

With reference to the instruction telephoned by Counselor Kramarz and our telephoned communication to Secretary of Legation von Grote.¹

1. I informed General von Stülpnagel on his return from Berlin today that in the view of the Foreign Ministry the development of the situation in French Equatorial Africa lay outside the terms of reference of the Armistice Commission, and that the entire issue in view of its political implications fell primarily within the competence of the Foreign Ministry.

General von Stülpnagel agreed with this entirely and added that he had already, of his own accord, advised the OKW (General Jodl) today that the question of Equatorial Africa had now passed into the sphere of high policy and had gone beyond the terms of reference of the Armistice Commission. General Jodl said on that occasion that the matter would be presented to the Führer tomorrow.

General von Stülpnagel, it may be added, pointed out to the OKW as early as August 22 that economic questions relating to the French colonies should be centrally handled, taking into account political considerations, either by the Foreign Ministry or the OKW (cf. telegram No. 140 of August 23²).

2. General von Stülpnagel was emphatic also in stating that in his discussions with General Huntziger he had never said anything likely to prejudge questions of significance for foreign policy.

3. With respect to Italy General von Stülpnagel stated that the German and the Italian Armistice Commissions had agreed upon certain zones solely in the interest of effective technical supervision over the carrying out of the armistice terms. To that end it was agreed in

¹No record of these telephone communications has been found. Cf. document No. 72.

²Not printed (365/206571-72).

writing that the drawing of these zones in no way signified the delimitation of political or economic spheres of interest.³ According to the agreement, control in metropolitan France, except for a zone east of the Rhone river, was to be exercised by the German Armistice Commission. No specific mention with respect to control had been made of Africa. The German Armistice Commission, for practical reasons, tacitly left supervision in Africa to the Italian Armistice Commission. Nothing was agreed in writing. Only regarding the Atlantic ports of the African Continent it was agreed that supervision would be exercised by the German Navy. But in compliance with the Führer's orders, no German control commission was to be sent even to these Atlantic ports, or to Africa generally.⁴ The Navy was now seeking to secure a new decision of the Führer that would authorize it to station control commissions in Casablanca and Dakar.

4. General von Stülpnagel maintains as his personal opinion that the French requests for greater freedom of movement with respect to their African possessions are motivated by no ulterior designs of breaching the Armistice Agreement, but rather by grave concern for the integrity of their empire. General von Stülpnagel is therefore in favor of giving consideration to the French wishes.

HENCKE

³ In a telephone communication to Grote on Sept. 3 Hencke reported: "General von Stülpnagel also has forbidden the use of the expression 'spheres of influence' both within the Armistice Commission and in dealing with the French and Italians, since undesirable misunderstandings might arise thereby. Reference is to be made—in keeping with the functions of the Armistice Commission—only to military control areas." (3697/E035937-39)

⁴ Grote recorded in a memorandum of Sept. 3: "The Armistice Commission has the impression that it is in accordance with the wishes of the Führer to avoid everything which might lead to conflicts of authority with the Italians concerning Africa. It believes that for this reason also the Führer decided that the proposed dispatch of German control commissions to Casablanca and Oran should not take place." (2549/523390-91)

No. 6

73/52729

The Regent of Hungary to Adolf Hitler

BUDAPEST, September 2, 1940.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to express my deepest gratitude for your sympathetic readiness to assist in the arbitration at Vienna. The embattled Greater German Reich, animated by a feeling of true responsibility, has devoted its energies to a problem which does not directly affect its interests and has thus performed a duty for all of Europe.

If at all possible, the second Vienna Award has strengthened Hungary still further in her conviction that the National Socialist Reich and fascist Italy, conscious of the true interests of the European

community, are prepared, through resolute and unselfish action, to demonstrate their determination to pacify and reorganize the Continent.

By the historic decision at Vienna an old wrong in the east has been righted, and I feel the sincere need, in the name of the Hungarians who on this and the other side of the Trianon border were the victims of this injustice and are at this moment filled with the joy of reunion, of begging Your Excellency to accept the assurance of our sincerest gratitude.¹

HORTHY

¹ This letter was delivered on Sept. 10. See document No. 41.

No. 7

1379/357818-21

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1580 of September 3

BERLIN, September 3, 1940—6:20 a. m.

Received September 3—1:50 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1815.¹

Please call on M. Molotov again and reply in accordance with the following memorandum to his statement that Germany by her action in Vienna had violated the obligation to consult contained in article III of the Non-Aggression Pact, and afterwards hand him this memorandum as a summary of your instructions. If there is anything you wish to say regarding the instructions, please report to me before you call on Molotov.²

Text of the memorandum:

In his last oral discussion with Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg, when the latter acquainted him with the Vienna conferences, Chairman M. said that he had to call Germany's attention to the fact that by her action in Vienna she had violated article III of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Treaty of August 23, 1939, which provided for consultation. The Soviet Government had been confronted by Germany with accomplished facts which violated existing agreements and conflicted with assurances which the Soviet Government had received from Germany regarding questions of common interest to the two countries. The present case involved two states neighboring the Soviet Union, where she naturally had interests.

Conscious of its friendly relations with the Soviet Union, which since the conclusion of the treaties of 1939 have continued to develop to the satisfaction of both parties and have been intensified in both the economic and the political fields, the Reich Government takes the following position on the interpretation made by the Soviet Government of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact:

¹ Document No. 1.

² See document No. 13.

In article III of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact an obligation was agreed upon for reciprocal information and consultation on questions of interest to both parties. Likewise at Moscow, at the delimitation of the respective spheres of interest, interest in Bessarabia was stressed on the part of Soviet Russia, while Germany declared herself politically disinterested in these areas. It is generally known, however, that Germany is intensely concerned in the remaining Rumanian territories and in the other problems of the Danube region, and is even vitally concerned there, in view of the close interpenetration of the German economy with that of Rumania, particularly in connection with the oil and grain questions; this has, moreover, also been communicated to the Soviet Government on various occasions and has been fully and completely recognized by it. On the other hand, after the settlement of the Bessarabian question a like interest in the remaining Rumanian territory on the part of the Soviet Union is not evident and has not been expressed by the Soviet Union to the Reich Government either at the time of the Moscow Agreement or later. The same is true of Hungary. There can consequently be no question here of common interests within the meaning of the Moscow Non-Aggression Pact. Thus even though in the case of Rumania and Hungary neighboring countries are involved, Germany has certainly not committed a violation of the obligation for consultation.

The Reich Government, moreover, believes itself the more justified in this view in that the Soviet Government itself, on the occasion of its various political moves in the recent past, by no means considered the fact of contiguity to Germany of the territories affected by its acts as a reason for prior consultation with the Reich Government. In this connection the Reich Government refers to Russian action in the Baltic countries, especially Lithuania. In the latter case, besides the fact that Lithuania is adjacent to Germany, an obligation existed to surrender to Germany a certain area in the southwest of Lithuania in the event that the Soviet Union should take special measures on Lithuanian territory for the safeguarding of her interests.³ Nevertheless, the Soviet Union effected a military occupation of that area although, as a result of the Russian measures, it should have been treated forthwith as territory belonging to Germany. Only after representations by the Reich Government was this question reopened.⁴

Furthermore, one might add that at the occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina the Reich Government likewise received only very short notice from the Soviet Union although, in view of the many Germans living there, Germany had a special interest in this case, too, and although the Reich Government had already pointed out that this was a new issue for Germany. Nevertheless the Reich Government, in view of its friendly relations with the Soviet Union and its desire for a pacification of the Danube region, took it upon itself to give the Rumanian Government, which had made most urgent representations for assistance to the Reich Government, the earnest advice to settle this question peacefully, which meant the cession of that territory to the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, the Reich Government would like further to observe, with reference to the statement that Germany had confronted the

³ See vol. VIII of this series, documents Nos. 159 and 218.

⁴ See vol. X of this series, documents Nos. 139 and 162.

Soviet Union with accomplished facts, that while the measures taken by the Soviet Union were planned measures for the occupation of various territories in the neighborhood of Germany and were not previously announced to the Reich Government, the steps of the Reich Government with respect to Rumania and Hungary served the purpose of securing the peace in the Danube region, which was gravely threatened by the tension between the two countries, and this could only be accomplished by the speediest diplomatic intervention. Moreover, the Reich Government is probably not mistaken in believing that by its act of pacification in the Danube region it has rendered a substantial service to all countries contiguous to these areas.

RIBBENTROP

No. 8

4040/E063811

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, September 3, 1940—8:30 a. m.

SECRET

Received September 3—4:35 p. m.

No. 895 of September 3

Pol. VIII 1087.

With reference to my telegram No. 823 of [August] 15.¹

The Chief of the European Department, on instructions from the Foreign Minister, has just informed me that the Japanese armed forces will march into Indochina on September 5. He gave the following explanations about this: The French Government, at the end of August, finally accepted the three demands mentioned in the previous telegram as well as the proposals of the Japanese Government to carry them out, and it has authorized the Governor General of Indochina to confer with the Chief of the Japanese delegation in Hanoi to put them into effect.² At yesterday's conferences in Hanoi it turned out that the powers of the Governor General were insufficient. As a result, and in view of the pressing war situation in China, the Japanese Government has informed the Governor General that the Japanese armed forces, under authorization of the already existing approval of the French Government, will march into Indochina on September 5.

The Director added to this information the request of the Foreign Minister that the Reich Government suggest to the French Government that the Governor General be instructed not to make difficulties for the Japanese action.³

OTT

¹ See vol. x of this series, document No. 339, footnote 2.

² See document No. 732.

³ The first paragraph of this telegram was repeated as telegram No. 147 of Sept. 4 (8745/E601476) to the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden, and copies of it were sent by express letter Pol. VIII 1087 Ang. I (8745/E601475) to the High Commands of the Wehrmacht, Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe.

No. 9

172/135549-50

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 3, 1940.

No. 1508 of September 3

Received September 3—11:45 p. m.

A confidential informant of the Legation had a discussion on September 2 with Sima, the leader of the Guardists, who asserted that Maniu had come to an agreement with the King, whereby both of them would oppose the implementation of the Award. The King was cleverly turning the general dissatisfaction of the people against the friends of Germany, that is the Guard in particular. Demonstrations were being held throughout Transylvania with cries of "No cession of Transylvania! Long live the King, long live Maniu! Down with Hitler, down with Mussolini!" The Gigurtu Government is probably being left in the dark by the King about his intentions; the General Staff, however, knows and supports them. A large part of the Army accordingly will not obey the order to withdraw. Confronted with this situation, the Guard could no longer remain passive. It would now have to take overt action against the pro-Maniu speakers and agitate against the King. It had no other choice. Sima is anxious that the Reich Government should know this and realize that this is a *counterrevolution* by the Guard in the interest of German-Rumanian collaboration.

Sima wants to wait and see whether his present information will be confirmed from all parts of the country, but he is convinced even now that a civil war in Rumania can no longer be avoided. He expects new arrests of Guardists, but they will no longer submit to that quietly. Sima asks the Reich to intervene in time. Contrary to its earlier and repeatedly emphasized intention not to intervene, it has now intervened in foreign relations; now it will also have to intervene in internal politics.

Sima believes that smooth implementation of the Arbitration Award and avoidance of civil war is attainable only if the Reich helps the Guard at this last moment to obtain decisive influence on the Government. Sima's statements about the plans of the King are incorrect. At demonstrations in Transylvania there were cries against the King. The sentiment in the Army is hostile to him in many places, but only because he is prepared to implement the Award. Gigurtu and Manoilescu are also willing to carry out the cession, as is the General Staff, which yesterday reached an agreement with the Hungarian Government on a time limit for the evacuation.

I should think that a Guardist Putsch in the present situation would be extremely dangerous and harmful to our interests. Since the Guard

is counting on support from the Reich Government, a Putsch could be avoided by bringing influence to bear on Sima's followers in Berlin.

FABRICIUS

No. 10

35/22802-05

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT WASHINGTON, September 3, 1940—10:52 p. m.
No. 1875 of September 3 Received September 4—1:25 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1727 of August 16¹ and our telegrams en clair Nos. 1867² and 1811 of September 3.³

Regarding the delivery to England, announced publicly today, of 50 American destroyers built in the previous World War, in exchange for naval and air bases on British possessions in the Western Hemisphere,⁴ the following may be said:

1. The transaction conflicts openly with several assurances made by the President very recently to the effect that negotiations regarding the transfer of naval and air bases to the United States of America had no connection at all with the much discussed question of the destroyers. This deliberate perversion of American public opinion while negotiations for such an exchange were actually in full swing shows plainly how firm President Roosevelt feels his position to be in giving military aid to England. These negotiations were doubtless concealed in order not to evoke in Congress and the press even more opposition to the transfer of the destroyers and in order to confront the American people with a fait accompli, against which an effective opposition would then no longer have a chance in view of the pro-British sentiment of the country.

2. The delivery of the destroyers without sanction of Congress in the form of law is an evasion of the law of June 15, 1917, which is disguised by the fact that the Attorney General, who accommodates the President wherever matters calling for a legal opinion are involved, certifies to the inapplicability of this law in the form of a legal opinion on the part of the highest authority in the Department of Justice. The President was aware that he had to choose this path, since the opposition to the delivery of the destroyers was very strong in the Senate and the House of Representatives and debate as to its

¹This telegram reported President Roosevelt's statements to the press on Aug. 15 regarding negotiations with Britain about the acquisition of naval and air bases for the defense of the Western Hemisphere (35/22697).

²Telegram No. 1867 (2422/511948) dealt with propaganda.

³Not found. It seems probable that the number of this telegram was garbled in transmission.

⁴See *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York, 1941), vol. ix, pp. 391-407; see also Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 199-207.

legality, as well as the military necessity for the transfer of the destroyers, might have imperiled his plan, or at least delayed it in an extremely undesirable manner. The measure plainly shows that Roosevelt sees that the time has come to disregard parliamentary limitations and arrogate to himself dictatorial functions.

3. The President in his capacity as Commander in Chief has overcome opposition in the Navy based on the requirements of home defense and the precarious situation of England. It is significant in this connection that the Chief of Naval Operations, on whose certification, that the destroyers are not needed for home defense, the transfer legally depends, simply certified to the fact that, balanced against the advantages that the cession of bases in British possessions would bring to the United States of America, the destroyers were not essential to home defense.

4. Roosevelt told the representatives of the press that the first group of destroyers was probably already on the way to England. Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal announced, however, that the first group consisting of 8 destroyers which was at present in Boston would be ready for delivery to the British Navy on September 6. The Under Secretary declared that the destroyers would be handed over complete with artillery and ammunition; they would go with their present American crews to Canadian ports, where they would be taken over by British crews. Since the average crew consists of 125 officers and men, the British Admiralty would have to send 6,250 officers and men to Canada to man 50 destroyers.

5. From the opinion of the Department of Justice of August 27, just published, it appears that in return there was also contemplated by the President delivery of motor torpedo boats now under construction, the so-called "mosquito boats," as well as of other not further specified "superannuated" war material. The Attorney General, however, stated in his opinion that the sale of the motor torpedo boats, since they had to be completed for England, would violate section 3 of the law of June 15, 1917.

6. The President's message has created great excitement in the American public and has already led to numerous comments by members of Congress, each of whom, according to whether he is noninterventionist or pro-Roosevelt in his attitude, expresses himself for or against the legality or expediency of the President's action. A selection of the more important reactions has been wired today en clair,⁵ as well as the President's message⁶ and the Anglo-American exchange of correspondence.⁷

7. The action of the President is supposed, primarily, to demonstrate to the American public that the American Government has, as

⁵ Telegram No. 1877, not printed (35/22808-11).

⁶ Quoted in part in telegram No. 1868, not printed (35/22795-96).

⁷ Telegram No. 1873, not printed (35/22797-99).

a result of the military developments of the past 2 months, arrived at the conviction that England can hold out and has enough resistance for a longer war until final victory over Germany.

The armed forces Attachés request that OKW Foreign Department [*Ausland*], OKH, and the Air Ministry be similarly informed.

THOMSEN

No. 11

F10/147-149

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

TOP SECRET

[SEPTEMBER 3, 1940.]²

The High Command of the Wehrmacht submitted, by letter dated July 29, 1940, a preliminary compilation of documents found in Dijon concerning the connection between the French and Swiss Armies.³ This first compilation, however, contained a series of discrepancies, and several original documents were missing. Consequently, on the basis of several discussions with me, the High Command of the Wehrmacht undertook a new, complete compilation of the documents and submitted this to me on August 26, 1940, with a corresponding new version of the letter of July 29. The original of an additional document pertaining to the matter, which was discovered elsewhere in France, was handed to me on September 2, 1940.

The original documents now available in German translation present the following picture:

A very close contact, documented for the period from May 1939 to the end of March 1940, existed between the Swiss and the French Armies. In order to maintain formal neutrality, this contact did not take the form of official General Staff conversations but that of semi-official conversations. The liaison man on the French side was a Colonel Garteiser on the staff of the French Commander in Chief on the northeast front (General Georges). Lieutenant Colonel Garteiser was in direct personal contact with the Swiss Army Commander, General Guisan, and a small group of high Swiss officers; his task was to inform the participating French General Staffs [*sic*] of his current conversations. On the Swiss side, General Guisan and high Swiss officers participated in these conversations; and the Swiss Government itself was aware of them. Thus, in a letter of March 13, 1940, from General Georges (annex H),⁴ it was expressly stated that the Swiss Government had requested the utmost discretion in order to avoid possible reactions on the domestic policy of the country from the appearance of imperfect neutrality. This request for discretion was strictly complied with on the French side by including

¹ Unsigned marginal note: "The earlier memorandum, already shown to the Führer."

² See document No. 301.

³ The OKW letters and the various sets of documents have not been found.

⁴ Not found.

only a small group of French General Staff officers. In spite of the semiofficial nature of the conversations, military documents were exchanged.

The subject of the conversations was the exchange of precise information regarding the organization, deployment, and intentions of the Commanders of the two Armies, but also, in addition, extensive and detailed arrangements concerning the coordination of the two Armies in case of "intervention" of the French Army in Switzerland. At one place (annex F⁵) it was determined, for example, that, for commands to certain Swiss units, a plan would be drawn up by French Lieutenant Colonel Garteiser and the Swiss Colonel, Gonnard, which would first be presented to Guisan, the Commander of the French [sic] Army and then to French General Besson for possible revision. That there was any intention on the part of France to march into Swiss territory for *offensive* purposes is not apparent from the documents. French "intervention," to judge from the text of the documents, was foreseen, rather, in case German troops first marched into Switzerland.

⁵ Not found.

No. 12

C109/C002185-87

Dr. Karl Haushofer to Dr. Albrecht Haushofer

MUNICH, September 3, 1940.

DEAREST ALBRECHT: Cordial thanks for your letter of the 29th¹ from the Hotel Imperial in Vienna. I had almost a vague premonition that you might be there.

If you composed your birthday letter to me in the air raid cellar, I could have reciprocated this kind service on the night of the 1st and 2nd because I promised your mother when I left the mountain cabin to go down when the alarm sounded and consequently spent 1½ hours in exercise and gymnastics.

For, as with you, everything has changed with us too. Through Lisa's sudden departure, which you witnessed, mother's trip to the Hart became unnecessary. Because her stomach and knee both took a turn for the worse, she remained at the Alpine cabin and, only because everything was so arranged, let me go down to the valley alone from the 31st to the 3rd. But I was rewarded, for it brought me a meeting with Tomo² from 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 2:00 o'clock in the morning, which included a 3-hour walk in the Grünwalder Forest, at which we conversed a good deal about serious matters. I have really got to tell you about a part of it now.

As you know, everything is so prepared for a very hard and severe attack on the island in question that the highest ranking person only

¹ Not found.

² The name given to Rudolf Hess in this correspondence.

has to press a button to set it off. But before this decision, which is perhaps inevitable, the thought once more occurs as to whether there is really no way of stopping something which would have such infinitely momentous consequences. There is a line of reasoning in connection with this which I must absolutely pass on to you because it was obviously communicated to me with this intention. Do you, too, see no way in which such possibilities could be discussed at a third place with a middle man, possibly the old Ian Hamilton³ or the other Hamilton?⁴ I replied to these suggestions that there would perhaps have been an excellent opportunity for this in Lisbon at the Centennial,⁵ if, instead of harmless figureheads, it had been possible to send well-disguised political persons there. In this connection it seems to me a stroke of fate that our old friend, Missis [sic] V. R., evidently, though after long delay, finally found a way of sending a note with cordial and gracious words of good wishes not only for your mother, but also for Heinz⁶ and me, and added the address. Address your reply to: Miss V. Roberts, c/o Postbox 506, Lisbon, Portugal.⁷ I have the feeling that no good possibility should be overlooked; at least it should be well considered.

That the larger stage has suddenly called for you again does not astonish me. Indeed, Tomo, too, on Saturday and Sunday almost expressed a wish to the same effect and was personally delightfully cordial.

As little as you did I desire to bear the responsibilities for decisions which are historically very important. But the time is certainly not wasted if it brought you a wonderful flight over the Salzkammergut directly over the Traunstein, close to the Schafberg, and an unexpected reunion with the "Butzelware."

As the author of three Roman plays, the political subject matter of this conference must have moved you strongly from the human angle—I do not mean like 2 years ago; but, like a year ago, you would have been interested in the strange show, the curious behavior [*Gebahren*]⁸—which, being an old-fashioned person, I still spell with an "h," and, in your place, even this year, I would have gone to the Halls somewhat oftener. I know them and the Bristol, and I know what it means to you and me that Larisch, that poor Camilla, that Hedebrum have joined the shades and that the picture by Moretto lies packed away in sandbags somewhere in the cellar.

³ Sir Ian S. M. Hamilton (1853–1947), British general and author.

⁴ On the basis of references later in this correspondence the reference here is to Douglas Douglas-Hamilton, Duke of Hamilton.

⁵ On June 2, 1940, Portugal had begun a series of celebrations commemorating the 800th anniversary of the foundation of the state and 300th anniversary of the restoration of national independence.

⁶ Dr. Heinz Haushofer, brother of Albrecht.

⁷ This sentence is in English in the original.

You did not have to conduct anxious conversations with ambassadors and ministers, but with sovereign personages, and you could pass by inquisitive journalists and marionettes of world history, precisely as you would Sulla's military or Augustus's diplomatic entourage and the Hellenistic private secretary of the younger Scipio.

At any rate, I thank you for the friendly collection of greetings for Polybius and the like, and I find it almost a pity that in your fine large room you missed the satyr show. But it has netted me a fine, long letter, which I shall take to the Alm, when I go up there again on Thursday, and add it to the friendly memories which it already has of you, and which are to me personally just as great a treasure as they are to your mother.

Just one last request. As the result of some error or other, your friend, Wolfgang Hofmann, seems already to have moved off into the higher spheres of militarism. But I am returning the card to you as an evidence of good will and because on its reverse side it shows a dear and lovely spot of earth which evokes these friendly memories.

Just another note: First Lieutenant Dr. Steinacher, who has already written me a third nice letter, can be reached by No. 30761 E; also interested in the matter of his promotion to Lieutenant Colonel are both Major Stolze in the OKW and a relative of Dr. Bausback (his brother-in-law, von Grueber, is the Commander of the Non-Commissioned Officers' Preparatory School of the VII Army Corps); he has special connections with the official who, he says, is responsible for this matter. Since, as Company Commander, he is now ready for action with the first wave, it is really high time that he got the ring, which he would have on the basis of his Austrian letters of commission and decorations if he had done nothing between 1919 and 1939 but sit around and grumble in coffee houses.

• I replied to the Japanese Secretary of Embassy as you suggested.⁸

With regard to the American from Wisconsin,⁹ I hope I shall still succeed in assembling *Dai Nihon*, *Die japanische Landeskunde*, *Die pazifische Geopolitik*, *die Weltpolitik*, *die Grenzen*, and one reprint or other. It will be difficult, though, because mother is momentarily out of commission.

Tomo seems to be staying here until Wednesday and wants to see me again. I had to take up with him again in another memorandum the affair of our Hamburg friends, as well as the career [*Laufbahn*] of their son and nephew, and he promised me definitely to straighten out, through the highest SS officials, the difficulties with the police

⁸ This referred to a request to permit translation of Haushofer's work on *Kulturpolitik* into Japanese (C109/C002183).

⁹ This referred to a request for copies of Haushofer's publications (C109/C002183).

and the Finance Office. So here, too, a ray of hope beckons, and with it, out of confused activity, I greet you in sincere thankfulness.

Yours,

[unsigned]

No. 13

1379/357823-24

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 4, 1940—5:30 p. m.

No. 1841 of September 4

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 1580 of September 3.¹

I would appreciate authorization to supplement the ideas contained in the memorandum to be handed to Molotov in the sense that the Soviet Government really opened up the great complex of questions by its settlement of the Bessarabian matter with unexpected speed, and that it had thereby forced us, in order to avoid military complications in the Balkans, to take quick decisions in the matter of the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute.

The beginning of the next to the last paragraph of the memorandum might give the Soviet Government the chance to rejoin that, before its action in Bessarabia, it had given the German Government the opportunity to state its views and had waited for the latter.

Further I would suggest deleting, in the third paragraph of the memorandum, the words "and has not been expressed by the Soviet Union to the Reich Government either at the time of the Moscow agreement or later," because they could provide Molotov with the opportunity again to revert to the talk between Mackensen and the Soviet Chargé in Rome last May (see my telegrams No. 1063 of June 3,² No. 1079 of June 6,³ No. 1094 of June 7,⁴ and telegraphic instruction No. 1007 of June 15 [16]⁵) and to state that the Soviet Government had at the time repeatedly demonstrated its interest.

Furthermore, my conversation with Molotov would be substantially facilitated if I were enabled at the same time to communicate to him the German Government's position in the matter of the strip of Lithuanian territory,⁶ for which Molotov has in the meantime pressed several times, as well as in the question of the Free Port Zone

¹ Document No. 7.

² See vol. ix of this series, document No. 382.

³ *Ibid.*, document No. 392.

⁴ See *ibid.*, document No. 392, footnote 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, document No. 454.

⁶ See document No. 4.

of Memel (see my telegrams No. 1799⁷ and No. 1800⁸ of August 30). The question of the Free Port Zone of Memel was also taken up with Schnurre on September 2 by Mikoyan in a manner which leaves no doubt as to the Soviet Government's displeasure and makes much more difficult the further pursuit of our interests in the Baltic States (see telegram No. 1829 of September 3⁹).

Please wire instructions.¹⁰

SCHULENBURG

⁷ Vol. x of this series, document No. 414.

⁸ Not printed (104/112438).

⁹ Not printed (104/112451-52).

¹⁰ See document No. 24.

No. 14

368/206875

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 4, 1940.

Pol. I M 12244 g.

General Huntziger has asked for an appointment with General von Stülpnagel for this evening. General von Stülpnagel requests information on the position of the Foreign Ministry on the question of French Equatorial Africa, if possible before the visit of General Huntziger.¹

The OKW has informed General von Stülpnagel that it approves his policy of granting every possible concession to the French. However, the Foreign Ministry would still have to state its position on this; the Foreign Minister wished to put the matter before the Führer.

Regarding the question of the delimitation of jurisdiction in the African area it may be noted that at the end of August a decision was obtained from the Führer on the question of rescinding the concessions granted in the past with respect to the disarmament of the navy and air force, which read, verbatim: "that the responsibility for the demands in the Mediterranean area lies with the Italians because they alone have to bear the consequences."

GROTE

¹ Concerning the Foreign Ministry's reply see document No. 20.

No. 15

4040/E063812

Minute by the Head of Political Division VIII

BERLIN, September 4, 1940.

zu Pol. VIII 1087.¹

The Japanese informed us on August 2 that if the occasion should arise they will forcibly march into northern Indochina.² They

¹ Pol. VIII 1087: Document No. 8.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 273.

also asked us at that time to influence France in their behalf. We took cognizance of the Japanese communication but refrained from exerting our influence upon France. Now also we will adopt the same attitude.

The OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL, and Senior Counselor Hencke at the Armistice Commission have been informed of the first paragraph of the telegram from Tokyo.³

Submitted herewith through the Deputy Director of the Political Department to Under State Secretary Woermann with request for approval.

KNOLL

³ See document No. 8 and footnote 3.

No. 16

1247/337457-58

*Memorandum by the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With
the High Command of the Army¹*

SEPTEMBER 4, 1940.

COLONIAL PLANS

Ministry for Colonies

Minister:	Ritter v. Epp
State Secretary:	Wenig
Division I:	Police, Personnel, Administration, Colonial Policy
	Under State Secretary Bielfeld
Division II:	Legal
	Minister Asmis
Division III:	Economics, Planning
	Weigelt (DB)

Also divisions on native questions and defense.

In a peaceful partition with England

To Germany:

- French and Belgian Congo
- Lake Chad area (forest resources)
- French Equatorial Africa
- the former [German] colonies.

¹ The document, in Eitzdorf's handwriting, contains the notation: "File. E[itzdorf], Sept. 4."

In a simultaneous partition of the British possessions

To Germany: (additionally)

Uganda
 Zanzibar
 Half of Kenya (southern mountainous area with Nairobi)
 Nigeria
 Gold Coast
 Dahomey
 Bases of Dakar and Bathurst.

The Navy requests additionally:

Ascension
 Tristan da Cunha
 St. Helena
 the Comoros
 the Mascarenes
 the Seychelles
 the Amirante Islands
 Madagascar for the Jews.

To Spain:

Morocco
 Algeria as far as Oran and southward to Z . . .
 Gibraltar
 Extension of Spanish New-Guinea to Cape Lopez.

To Italy:

Accession to the British protective treaties in Arabia
 (Hadramaut, etc.)
 Tunis
 Connection with Lake Chad and Libya—East Africa
 British and French Somaliland
 Remainder of Kenya
 Entry in place of England into the British-Egyptian
 relationship (including Sudan)
 Malta
 Aden
 Cyprus?

To Siam:

Claims made to Laos and Cambodia.

No. 17

172/135562-63

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 5, 1940—1:30 a. m.

SECRET

Received September 5—6:00 a. m.

No. 1525 of September 4

General Antonescu called on me twice in order to discuss the situation. His plan was to endeavor to form a government with the Iron Guard and some ministers acceptable to us, under exclusion of the King and his clique, but without as yet demanding his abdication. This plan has been unsuccessful for the time being. Georges Bratianu¹ rejected the partial solution. The Guard persists in its demand for abdication; its leader Sima could not be located.

Since only the strong hand of the General and quick decision can save the country from chaos, I advised Antonescu, in agreement with my Italian colleague, to assume dictatorial powers, remove the universally hated entourage of the King, and order the present ministers and state secretaries to remain at their posts pending a definitive settlement of the Cabinet question and the question of the King's possible abdication, and to rule by authoritarian methods.

Antonescu seemed to understand this. He is now with the King; information has just been received that Court Minister Urdareanu has resigned.

Antonescu has assured me still more plainly and explicitly that he sees his task in the complete fulfillment of the Vienna Award, the military mission, and the guarantee. He would also like to take Volksdeutsche as (group garbled) (not as heads of ministries); he requests us moreover to bring our influence to bear on Hungary with a view to the conclusion of a reciprocal minorities agreement, even if it should not be as far-reaching as the one agreed to in Vienna. I suggested to him the path of direct negotiations, but I should like you to consider whether we could not, in conjunction with Italy, support this wish in Budapest. My Italian colleague and I are anxious to have Manoilescu, as signer of the Vienna Award, remain in the Cabinet until the Award has been implemented. Antonescu, who, by the way, objects to Manoilescu on account of alleged shady machinations in the past, would approve of this.

Whether Antonescu will still demand the King's abdication is not yet certain. It is reported from Constanța that the royal yacht has been under steam since today.

¹ Rumanian politician, leader of a National Liberal party opposition group, 1930-1939.

The Putsch of the Guard must be considered defeated. The report about shots inside the palace was false; there was firing only outside the palace.

FABRICIUS

No. 18

9324/E661008-09

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 1849 of September 5

Moscow, September 5, 1940—4:25 p. m.

Received September 5—5:45 p. m.

W IV 5020.

With reference to my telegram No. 1737 of August 23.¹

The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs transmitted to us yesterday evening the reply to our memorandum, given to M. Molotov on August 23, concerning resettlement from the Baltic States and indemnification of German property interests. The text of the memorandum² is being brought via airplane by Consul General Nöldeke tomorrow.

The Soviet Government describes as unsuitable the German proposal for the formation of two mixed commissions, one of which would concern itself only with resettlement and the other only with mutual property claims, because in its view the carrying out of the resettlement and the satisfaction of property claims are inseparable.

The Soviet Government insists that a special mixed commission should be formed for Lithuania alone and another for Latvia and Estonia, and that both should deal with resettlement as well as with property claims. In this connection the Soviet Government holds that the mixed commission for Lithuania will handle also the resettlement and property interests of the Lithuanians who wish to move from the Memel Territory to Lithuania. As the site of the commission's negotiations the Soviet Government proposes Kaunas. The Soviet Government is agreed that the commission for Estonia and Latvia should also deal with the subsequent resettlement of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche. Place of negotiation: Riga.

With respect to the basic principles for the satisfaction of the property claims of the Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche and of the rights of the settlers to dispose of their property until their resettlement, the Soviet Government refers to its memorandum of August 7³ (cf. reports D/1727 of Aug. 8 and of Aug. 19³).

¹ See vol. x of this series, document No. 307, footnote 3.

² Not printed (9324/E661015-19).

³ These were the German and Russian texts of the Soviet memorandum of Aug. 7, not printed (9324/E660951-54, E660983-85).

Schnurre will state his position on the Soviet memorandum in a separate telegram.⁴

SCHULENBURG

⁴In telegram No. 1855 of Sept. 5 (9324/E661010-11) Schnurre recommended that the Soviet proposal be accepted, since further negotiations about procedure would result in the loss of valuable time. The German Government acted affirmatively on Schnurre's recommendation (telegram No. 1627 of Sept. 7, Wiehl to the Embassy in Moscow: 9324/E661012-14), and the mixed commissions took up their discussions in Kaunas and Riga, respectively, on Sept. 23. See document No. 168.

No. 19

172/135571-73

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 5, 1940.

No. 1530 of September 5

Received September 5—7:10 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1525 of September 4.¹

Valer Pop called on me shortly after midnight. They do not know what to do and want my advice. I repeated what I had told General Antonescu, that if he wished to save the country from chaos there was only one course: dictatorship. In reply to Pop's question whether Germany demanded the King's abdication, I said that we do not meddle in internal affairs, and therefore also not in the question whether and to what extent the King should be frozen out; the Iron Guard was demanding his abdication. Pop said that he could now see clearly and was very grateful for my advice.

As General Antonescu informed me this morning, my advice has been favorably received. To be sure, it had taken him until 4:00 o'clock to convince the King that he should not interfere in either domestic or foreign policy and must also for all practical purposes surrender the supreme command of the Army. Maniu and even Dinu Bratianu² had thought that the only possible course was for the King to abdicate, and it had not been easy for him to make the King understand this.

The King had finally signed the decrees which repealed the Constitution of February 27, 1938, which prohibited the King henceforth from undertaking anything without the Minister President and restricted him to ceremonial duties. His [Antonescu's] authority to lead the Rumanian state, on the other hand, was not restricted. He had ordered all ministers to remain at their posts and continue their work. He had the Army firmly in hand and we could depend on him absolutely to restore order and complete carrying out the Vienna

¹ Document No. 17.

² Leading figure in the National Liberal party, and uncle of Georges Bratianu. See document No. 17, footnote 1.

Award according to plan. He adhered to the appointment of the military mission and desired the closest cooperation with Germany. He was giving his word on that and we could rely on it. His most ardent wish, as soon as affairs were settled here, was to visit the Führer in order to discuss with him the orientation of his policy.

The young people in the Guard still caused him some concern, but he believed that he would be able to come to terms with them as soon as Sima was found. He had given strictest orders to stop the interrogation of Guardists, and prohibited any sanctions on account of the coup d'état. The rumors that several Guardists had been shot as punishment were false. The great difficulty of taking Sima into the Government lay in the fact that Sima had publicly demanded abdication of the King.

It was his endeavor to form a government with capable men. He had already talked with the Minister of Economics so that in matters connected with the delivery of goods to Germany and the provisioning of the country itself there would be no interference. With respect to our other wishes he assured me that he had given strict instructions for the repair of roads and the bridges from Galați to Reni, so as to facilitate passage of the refugees from Bessarabia. He had also taken care that the Minister of Interior would provide for order in the Banat so that the Volksdeutsche would no longer be molested.

He told me that one of the principal points of his program was order and honesty. He did not want to burden his Cabinet with persons who had engaged in any financial profiteering or shady transactions. If he made any exception in that direction, he would lose the respect of the people.

Antonescu's appointment, according to the first reports, has been welcomed enthusiastically by the people. They see in him a savior, though of course among the old politicians and journalists there are many who are against him. I believe that we have found in him a man at the head of the Rumanian Government who is firmly resolved to carry out our important demands here.

FABRICIUS

No. 20

121/119848-50

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 5, 1940.

Drafting Officer: Counselor Kramarz.

Subject: The revolt in the French colonies.

1. Development of the situation in Africa to date:

On August 28, 1940, the Armistice Commission received the first report that the Chad Colony had joined de Gaulle. The insurrection-

ist movement spread and is now reported to extend to the Cameroons and the major part of French Equatorial Africa. In consequence, the French delegation, by its notes of August 29 and 30,¹ requested authorization for the following measures:

- a) Dispatch of naval vessels from Toulon to the West African coast.
- b) Dispatch of aircraft to French Equatorial Africa for supplying the population.
- c) Speeding repatriation to Dakar of the Senegalese units reorganized in the south of France.
- d) Use of the radio to inform the population.
- e) Use of a cipher in radio communications with the colonial governors.

The German Armistice Commission agreed in principle to the French request, with the proviso, however, that the decision requested was within the authority of the Italian Armistice Commission. The Italian Armistice Commission first declined the request for a), but in the end gave authorization for dispatching naval vessels² and aircraft contingents.

2. Jurisdictional delimitation of the German Armistice Commission.

The competence of the Italian Armistice Commission to decide these questions is not expressly provided for in the armistice agreements. The two agreements make mention only of the demilitarized zones on the Mediterranean coast. It is furthermore stipulated in a protocol of a conference with General Roatta³ that Italy is to determine the strength of the military forces for the French possessions in the Mediterranean, Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, and Syria, and of the naval forces for the colonies in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. This notwithstanding, control in the entire African area—in so far as it was exercised at all—was in the past left to the Italians; with this, according to the opinion of the Armistice Commission, the Führer is in agreement. Moreover, the Führer has so far declined the request for dispatching naval control commissions to Dakar and Casablanca. The Navy intends, however, to bring up the question again.

In a lengthy conversation on August 31, General Huntziger portrayed the signs of disintegration in the French colonial empire. He cites as the cause, apart from British propaganda, the stringent isolation of the colonies from the mother country. In order to restore order quickly and put a halt to the danger of further disaffection in

¹ Not found.

² Dispatch of three cruisers and three destroyers was authorized. Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice* (Paris, 1947), vol. I, p. 186.

³ See vol. x of this series, document No. 54.

Africa, General Huntziger renewed the requests cited at the beginning, requesting that France be given greater freedom of movement everywhere in her colonies so as to enable her to save the French colonial empire. When discussion of this problem was resumed, General von Stülpnagel took the position that this was no longer purely a matter concerned with the armistice, but a problem touching foreign policy and so for the Foreign Minister to decide.

3. Conference with General Jodl.

With this in view a conference was held with General Jodl at the office of the State Secretary on September 4, 1940. During its course General Jodl pointed out that from the military standpoint there were the following possibilities for dealing with the matter:

- a) We could more or less keep out of the matter, as we have done in the past.
- b) We could intervene, using German resources, and try to restore order.
- c) Germany could grant France a certain measure of freedom and demand, under the threat of countermeasures, that she promptly restore order with her own resources.

In General Jodl's opinion only the last method holds out prospect of success. As a precautionary measure the French would have to be required to supply full information on all measures they take in this connection. The Italians would have to be informed in advance of this proposed line of action, most conveniently through the Embassy, particularly because of the Führer's statement relative to the disarmament question, namely, that "the responsibility for the demands in the Mediterranean area lies with the Italians because they alone have to bear the consequences."

In agreement with the OKW it was therefore proposed to have Minister Hencke request General von Stülpnagel to convey to General Huntziger the following statement:

"The German Government will give the French Government the opportunity to restore order at this time in the French colonies of West and Equatorial Africa, and will to this end release to it the necessary forces and resources to be specified later. The German Government demands in return that

"a) France on her part take promptly now all necessary measures to suppress the revolt;

"b) Germany, retaining the necessary controls, be given advance information of the measures contemplated.

"Failure on the part of the French Government in this situation would necessarily entail serious consequences in Germany's general policy toward France."⁴

⁴Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "In the event of failure we reserve our course of action for the time being."

Prior to this step agreement by Italy and assurance of parallel action by the Italian Armistice Commission would have to be secured through the German Embassy.

4. French gold holdings in Dakar.

During the conference with General Jodl mention was also made of the question of the return of the French, Belgian, and Polish gold holdings stored in Dakar. A study is yet to be made of the technical means (use of planes) by which the return of the gold will be accomplished. The plan provides for the French gold holdings to be brought to Paris, while the remainder of the Belgian and Polish gold holdings would be taken to Berlin.

Herewith submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister for decision.⁵

WOERMANN

⁵ For Hitler's decision on this subject, see document No. 33.

No. 21

172/135575

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 6, 1940.

SECRET

Received September 6—12:55 a. m.

No. 1535 of September 5

For the Foreign Minister.

Following new street demonstrations of the Guard, Minister President Antonescu has demanded that the King abdicate at once. He wants to force him to leave Bucharest by dawn at the latest. The only destination possible is Germany, preferably Sigmaringen. The trip is to be made by plane. Please advise me by telegraph whether asylum can be promised in Germany, and how the plane can fly in.¹

FABRICIUS

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Transmitted to Gottfriedsen [of the Foreign Minister's personal staff] at Sonnenburg, Sept. 6, 1:30 a. m."

No record of a reply to this request has been found. Bucharest telegram No. 1536, which was transmitted by telephone in the morning of Sept. 6, reported that King Carol had abdicated at 6:00 a. m. that day and was planning to seek asylum in Switzerland (172/135585). A lengthy report by Fabricius of Sept. 11, reviewing the political crisis in Rumania that led to the abdication, also shows that the question of an asylum in Germany was raised without indicating what the German reply was (285/181701-14).

No. 22

104/112457

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1604 [of September 5] BERLIN [September 6, 1940—1: 50 a. m.]
 [Received September 6—5: 30 a. m.]
 zu Pol. I 969 g. Rs.¹

Drafting Officer: Counselor Kramarz.

The Navy intends to abandon the base on the Murman Coast,² as such bases are now available in Norway. Please inform the Russians of this decision and, on behalf of the Reich Government, convey our thanks for valuable assistance.³ In addition to the official statement, the Commander in Chief of the Navy intends also to express his gratitude in a personal letter to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy. Therefore please wire when notification has been made.⁴

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. I 969 g. Rs.: Not found.

² See vol. VIII of this series, documents Nos. 195, 248, and 257, and vol. IX of this series, document No. 94.

³ On the Moscow Embassy copy, from which times of dispatch and receipt have also been taken, the word "valuable" is underlined and the following marginal note is appended: "This will attract M. Molotov's attention! [Dies wird H. Molotov auffallen!] Ti[ppelskirch], Sept. 6." (285/181824)

⁴ Schulenburg replied in a telegram of Sept. 9 as follows: "Instruction carried out. Molotov expressed satisfaction that we had found useful the base placed at our disposal." (104/112474)

No. 23

271/177047-48

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 1119

BERLIN, September 5, 1940.
 Sent September 6—2: 45 a. m.

Please call on Minister President General Antonescu and tell him the following:

According to information which we have received from Sofia no final agreement has as yet been reached between Rumania and Bulgaria, because the Rumanian representatives are taking an intransigent attitude on the question of the time limits for evacuation, not wanting evacuation to start before October 1.¹ This is contrary to the

¹ Richthofen's telegram No. 381 of Sept. 2 had conveyed this information (172/135539). That same day the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin in a conversation with Woermann "asked on instruction from his Government that pressure be brought to bear in Bucharest once more"; he said that the Bulgarian Minister in Rome was making a similar démarche there (Woermann memorandum of Sept. 2: 535/242718-19).

assurances given by Rumania in Vienna, where it was agreed that the Vienna Award must not in any way delay the Rumanian-Bulgarian settlement, and where it was even established by a formal exchange of notes that the Rumanian Government would do everything to bring its negotiations with Bulgaria to a speedy conclusion also in a formal sense.² We could only give the Rumanian Government the friendly advice to concede for southern Dobruja the same time limits for evacuation as for Transylvania. The most important thing was to begin at once with the evacuation of an initial sector of southern Dobruja by the Rumanians and the occupation of that sector by the Bulgarians. The simultaneous evacuation of Transylvania and southern Dobruja would thus constitute a single action, which would be regarded as the conclusion of all revisionist claims made against Rumania. This would surely be desirable also from the standpoint of Rumania's domestic policy interests, because in that case renewed unrest would not be continually spread among the people. Rumania would also find herself in a difficult situation if the Bulgarians, for lack of an agreement with the Rumanians, were to start the occupation of southern Dobruja on their own account. The Embassy in Rome has been instructed to arrange with the Italian Government that identical instructions be given its Minister in Bucharest.³ Please make your démarche conform with that of the Italian Minister. A report has just been received according to which a Bulgarian-Rumanian agreement is close at hand. If this should be confirmed, there will be no need for the démarche; if the report proves to be incorrect, please proceed according to instructions.⁴

RIBBENTROP

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 413.

³ Telegram No. 1219, not printed (271/177049).

⁴ The text of this telegram was sent for information to the Legation in Bulgaria (271/177048-49).

No. 24

1379/357827-30

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1609 of September 5

BERLIN, September 6, 1940—4:35 a. m.

Received September 6—10:00 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1841.¹

To your suggestions I make the following comments for your information.

1. It is correct that the Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionist demands on Rumania were set in motion by the occupation of Bessarabia

¹ Document No. 13.

and northern Bucovina. One cannot assert, however, that it was the Russian action which made our diplomatic intervention so urgent that for this reason it was no longer possible for us to approach the Soviet Government. Besides, the necessity for swift diplomatic action is emphasized in the closing sentence of the memorandum. Therefore, please insert in the first sentence of the next to the last paragraph of the memorandum, after the words "occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina" the qualifying clause: "which also gave the impulse for the present launching of revisionist demands on Rumania".

2. That the Soviet Government, before the occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, formally gave us an opportunity to express our views is not disputed in our memorandum, but it is merely pointed out that it gave us only a very short period in which to do so. In this regard, therefore, a change in the text of the memorandum is not necessary.

3. Please retain without change the words in the third paragraph of the memorandum, in which it is said that such interests in Rumania were not expressed by the Soviet Union to the Reich Government either at the time of the Moscow agreements or later. If M. Molotov should object that the Soviet Government had demonstrated its interest in Rumania during discussion of the conversation between Mackensen and the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, the reply should be made that such an interest could not be inferred from his inquiry at that time, as he had then only inquired about the attitude of the Reich Government toward an alleged statement of Mackensen, which in fact he had not made in the sense imputed to him at all. I should like, moreover, to mention for your personal information that this passage in our memorandum is of particular importance because we are anxious at this opportunity to demonstrate once and for all to the Soviet Government that we have really vital importance [*Bedeutung*] and predominant interests in Rumania, which have caused us to guarantee Rumania territory within its present borders. Please bear this in mind in connection with the orientation of your conversations now and in the future. If necessary, you could point out to M. Molotov orally in this connection that after settlement of the Bessarabian question the mere geographic contiguity of the Soviet Union to Rumania could not be invested with a significance comparable to the German interests in Rumania. The Soviet Union, in contrast to Germany, certainly has sufficient oil wells and grain production so that her relationship with Rumania for this very reason could decidedly not be placed on a level with ours. Please do not, however, initiate any such detailed discussion of your own accord.

4. I leave it to you whether or not you think it opportune to bring up on this occasion the question of the strip of Lithuanian territory.² If you think it advisable, you may tell M. Molotov that the Government of the Reich is prepared in principle, against adequate compensation, to forego the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory which was agreed upon in Moscow. The compensation which the Soviet Government has offered is, to be sure, not at all acceptable to us in this form. At the moment we are engaged in drawing up a proposal for adequate compensation and we shall soon approach the Soviet Government with this proposal.³

5. On the other hand, I request you not to broach the question of the Memel Free Port on this occasion.⁴ We must persist in our view that we cannot grant the Soviet Government a free port zone in Memel. But this question will have to be discussed separately with the Soviet Government.⁵

Please report by wire⁶ on the course of your conversation with M. Molotov.

RIBBENTROP

²The territory variously referred to as the Lithuanian strip (*Litauischer Streifen*), as the Lithuanian tip (*Litauischer Zipfel*), or as the Suwalki area (*Suwalki Gebiet*) lay just east of the Masurian Lakes beyond the historic boundary of East Prussia. See map, Appendix V.

In the treaty of July 12, 1920, between Lithuania and Soviet Russia the territory was recognized as a part of Lithuania, but it was occupied by Poland in 1920 and incorporated in the Polish Republic. The Russo-German Secret Additional Protocol of Sept. 28, 1939 (vol. VIII of this series, document No. 159) refers to "the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of the line marked on the attached map" (see *ibid.*, Appendix VI) as falling to Germany. For the boundaries of this area see *ibid.*, document No. 193.

The Soviet Government agreed that its Army would not occupy the area in case it should occupy Lithuania, and Germany reserved the right to determine the date of its incorporation in Germany (*ibid.*, document No. 218). After Soviet forces occupied Lithuania the German Government on July 9, 1940, reiterated the reservation (vol. X of this series, document No. 139). For the initial suggestions of purchase of the area by the Soviet Union, see *ibid.*, documents Nos. 162, 275, 302, and 332.

³See document No. 43.

⁴Cf. vol. X of this series, document No. 414.

⁵On Sept. 7 (telegram No. 1627:9324/E661012-14) the Embassy in Moscow was informed by Wiehl that a note verbale on the question of the Memel Free Port had been prepared in Berlin, but was being held back until a Soviet reply to the démarche, made in accordance with telegram No. 1609 of Sept. 5, was received. In this note verbale the position was being taken that the agreements on the Memel Free Port were out of date, but that the German Government would be prepared to negotiate concerning special transit privileges for Soviet commerce through Memel, and concerning possible Soviet property clauses respecting Lithuanian investments. In telegram No. 1916 of Sept. 12 (104/112503-04) Schulenburg reported that in recent days two Soviet protests had been made about the Memel situation by representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

A memorandum of Nov. 11 by Wiehl stated that the note verbale, on orders of Ribbentrop, had still not been sent, but the Soviet Government had not reverted to the matter (104/112827-28).

⁶Document No. 38.

No. 25

368/206889-90

*The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With
the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

SECRET

WIESBADEN, September 6, 1940—12:00 noon.

Del. No. 100

Received September 6—12:30 p. m.

General Huntziger informed me last evening that Marshal Pétain has appointed him Commander in Chief of the 100,000-man army. His Government fears internal unrest during the coming winter, which may require military intervention, and therefore wants to see him installed now in the post of Commander in Chief. He expects trouble, on the one hand, from the opponents of the present Pétain regime, who out of a misconceived patriotism are becoming increasingly hostile to a policy of compliance and collaboration with Germany and whose movement is receiving impetus from de Gaulle's propaganda and the events in the colonies; on the other hand, intensive Communist propaganda is beginning to make itself felt in both the free and occupied zones, the effects of which are worrying him and might easily lead to outbreaks as a result of the grave unemployment and food supply difficulties which must without a doubt be expected next winter, especially in such important trouble spots as Marseilles and Toulon.

Huntziger expects that with the dangerous season coming closer and closer he would probably have to leave Wiesbaden in 3 weeks. He made this statement the occasion for sounding a lament that he could not point to any positive results of these 2 months of negotiations despite acceptance of the greatest sacrifices and the most cooperative compliance with our wishes on his part. I in turn called his attention to the continuous difficulties which his assistants were constantly raising in the subcommittees, and which had so far held up any positive decisions and real progress in setting up the commissioners and the frontier control with consequent relaxation of the demarcation line. These difficulties were being raised by the French experts at a mounting rate, especially in the past months. I have allowed this to go unchallenged for the time being because it assists me in filling the interval to September 20 or the end of the month, prior to which time the Commander in Chief, von Brauchitsch, would in any event much prefer not to have any relaxation of the demarcation line.

In general I cannot resist the impression that Huntziger, with an air of innocence, is deliberately playing up the precarious situation of his Government and developments in the colonies with the idea of getting some concessions out of us. If his anxiety over the developments in West Africa were really so sincere he would, for instance,

surely be determined on his own to prevent under all circumstances the large hoards of gold in Dakar from falling into the hands of the rebels or the English, who would certainly and very effectively use them immediately against the Vichy Government. But such genuine concern I have not been able to detect either in him or in the new Governor of the Bank of France,¹ who is here now. I have likewise noticed on various occasions that even when the Vichy Government is ostensibly complying with our wishes in an honest and unresisting manner, it still makes overt or covert reservations.

Huntziger also informed me that following his departure the French Government intended to split the French delegation on the pattern of the German Armistice Commission into two separate delegations functioning entirely independently of each other, a military delegation headed by a general, and an economic delegation under civilian direction. The choice of the latter personality is still under consideration in Vichy at this time.

HEMMEN

¹ M. de Boisanger.

No. 26

B19/B003724

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1858 of September 6

Moscow, September 6, 1940—6:40 p. m.

Received September 6—8:25 p. m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1372 of August 6¹ and 1592 of September 4 (W V 33281).²

At the time I received telegraphic instruction 1372 of August 6 I spoke with Molotov about the deliveries of nickel ore from the Petsamo area to Germany and stated according to instructions that the German claim on Finland for deliveries of nickel ore from the Petsamo area amounting to at least 60 percent of the total production there was for an unlimited period and that I requested him to take cognizance of this.

Molotov replied that in the past conversations on this matter reference was always made only to deliveries of nickel ore in 1940. However, if we wanted deliveries of definite amounts of nickel ore in the following years as well, this would have to be made the subject of further conversations.

I told Molotov we based our claim also for the coming years to a guarantee of nickel ore deliveries in the amount of 60 percent (as con-

¹ Vol. x of this series, document No. 301.

² Not found.

firmed by him) upon the very considerable material expenditures made by Germany in order to render the nickel mines productive. We were therefore very definitely relying on Molotov's promise of 60 per cent remaining valid also after 1940.

Molotov avoided a continuation of the discussion with the remark that People's Commissar Mikoyan was the one competent for further conversations on this question.

Since the above conversation with Molotov occurred shortly before Schnurre's trip to Moscow,³ and the latter is entirely familiar with the details of the question, I refrained from taking the question up again with Molotov or Mikoyan before his arrival.

Schnurre's opinion follows separately.⁴

SCHULENBURG

³ See document No. 128 and footnote 5.

⁴ See document No. 34.

No. 27

B19/B003725

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 675

BERLIN, September 6, 1940.

The Finnish Minister made statements to me today concerning the latest developments in the Åland question that are identical with those in telegraphic report No. 544 from Helsinki.¹ He added only that Molotov did not himself seem entirely sure in regard to the plan of eliminating Germany in the Åland question. The Minister hoped to learn the German position with regard to the Russian intention, in the sense of course, that we would not let ourselves be entirely eliminated. In the opinion of the Finns the legal situation is such that the old Åland Convention still exists and it is impossible simply to ignore the rights of the parties to this convention, at least of Germany. The Minister does not believe that Russia will get in touch with us directly in this matter.

I replied to the Minister that we were, to be sure, informed to some extent through Minister von Blücher, but had not concerned ourselves with the problem recently. However, the prospective solution

¹ Blücher had reported in telegram No. 544 of Sept. 3 (Pol. VI 2413):

"The Finnish Government proposed that the Convention of 1921 continue in force. The Soviet Government opposed this, since the Baltic States, Poland, and Denmark no longer counted. England, France, and Italy had no interest in the Baltic, and Germany was too far away. The Finnish Minister in Moscow got the impression that the Soviet Government would be willing to accept only Sweden as a third power in a new Åland convention." (2943/570205)

Cf. vol. x of this series, documents Nos. 62 and 223.

aiming at disarmament of the islands corresponded to the standpoint which the German Government had thought natural in the past.

For the sake of orientation I am attaching a copy of the opinion which we gave the Finnish Government on July 2.² I believe that it should be authoritative today, too, and that the Legation in Helsinki should be instructed accordingly.³

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 62, footnote 6.

³ See document No. 31.

No. 28

121/119851

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 6, 1940.

Secretary of Embassy Lanza, who is still conducting the business of the Embassy as a result of Alfieri's and Zamboni's illness and the absence of Casardi, expressed to me today concern about the situation in French Africa, particularly Morocco.

I told him that this question was in the stage of most intensive study by us and by the German military authorities; upon conclusion [of this study] we would get in touch with the Italian Government.¹ In any case, we were of the opinion that something would have to be done quickly about the matter, and by the French themselves.

Signor Lanza at this point countered with the question whether it would not be better to disarm the French in the colonies completely. In view of the intended operation against Egypt, it was a worry for Italy to have armed Frenchmen at her back. I hereupon expressed it as my personal view that it appeared to us that it would be a greater evil, if the French colonies in Africa were to fall into the hands of de Gaulle and his adherents.

WOERMANN

¹ On Sept. 9 Weizsäcker handed to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires a note summarizing the German decision. The German Military Attaché in Rome, the note stated, had been instructed to propose identical steps by Italy and Germany at the Armistice Commissions in Turin and Wiesbaden informing the French that, in case they failed to restore order in Equatorial Africa, Germany and Italy reserved the right to take appropriate action of their own. That same day, Sept. 9, the Italian Government gave its assent to this procedure (telegram No. 1234 of Sept. 9, Weizsäcker to the Embassy in Italy: 121/119864-65). See document No. 33 and footnote 2.

No. 29

271/177046

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1544 of September 6

BUCHAREST, September 6, 1940.

Received September 7—11:55 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1119 of September 5.¹

At my first conference with General Antonescu I immediately talked with him in the sense of the above telegram and pointed to the need for speedy conclusion of the treaty with Bulgaria. He promised me this.

As the Bulgarian Minister informed me today, the agreement has actually proceeded so far that it will be possible to sign the treaty at noon on Sunday; agreement has been reached on indemnity of one billion lei. The question of whether it is to be paid in 12 or in 18 months is still open; likewise, whether Rumania must in return reimburse for military requisitions. The boundary commission will convene on September 13; the Bulgarian civilian authorities will enter on September 15, and the military authorities from September 20 to 30.

In consultation with the Italian Minister I shall inquire of the Rumanian Government whether the definitive conclusion can now be really expected at last.²

FABRICIUS

¹ Document No. 23.

² The treaty between Bulgaria and Rumania was signed at Craiova on Sept. 7. For the text see Korkisch, "Die rumänischen Gebietsabtretungen an Ungarn und Bulgarien und die Regelung damit zusammenhängender Volkstumsfragen" in *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, vol. x (Berlin, 1940-41), pp. 750-752.

No. 30

F18/476-481

Ambassador Stohrer to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

MADRID, September 6, 1940.

DEAR HERR REICH MINISTER: I take the liberty of sending you another memorandum with material for the visit of the Spanish Minister of Interior, Serrano Suñer.¹ In the memorandum are once more assembled the essential considerations, which I took the liberty of presenting in person and of supplementing through my "G. A." of August 8 and my letter of August 27.²

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

STOHRER

¹ See vol. x of this series, document No. 250, footnote 1.

² *Ibid.*, documents Nos. 313 and 405.

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

MADRID, September 6, 1940.

TRIP TO GERMANY OF SERRANO SUÑER, THE SPANISH MINISTER
OF INTERIOR(Double surname, pronounced : Serrano Súnjer ; given name is
Ramón=Raimund)

I

The trip has been arranged in order to discuss with a leading responsible Spanish statesman the question of Spain's possible entry into the war (which the Spanish Government itself proposed, see memorandum, enclosure 1³).

A) According to Spain's own statement, the conditions for Spain's entry into the war are of a political and military-economic nature, namely:

- 1) Assurances as to the political territorial aspirations of Spain (these appear in the Spanish memorandum, enclosure 1).
- 2) Military and other (i. e., economic) aid by Germany.

Precise information on what Spain desires of us in the way of military assistance is in the possession of Admiral Canaris. It was drawn up in several conversations between Admiral Canaris and the Spanish Air Minister (former Chief of the General Staff), General Vigón. (See also General Vigón's memorandum of August 26, enclosure 2.⁴)

Telegrams Nos. 2800 of August 16 and 2993 of September 4 (see enclosure 3)⁵ from the Embassy in Madrid, give information regarding the requirements in the economic field. The figures given there in part represent maximum demands. They come from the Spanish Ministry of Trade. See also General Vigón's memorandum of August 26 (enclosure 4).⁶ Señor Serrano Suñer has likewise promised to bring with him data on the economic requirements.

B) Our demands in return for satisfying the Spanish aspirations and desires; the following should be considered:

- 1) Recognition of Spanish debts arising out of the Civil War (plus the sum that is necessary to indemnify the Germans resident in Spain) and the promise to pay off these debts in a definite number of years through deliveries of raw materials (possibly also cash payments and permission for investments in Spain).

³ Not printed (F18/482) ; this enclosure is an extract from telegram No. 878 of June 21 (77/58152-53) which transmitted the Spanish memorandum dated June 19 (see vol. ix of this series, document No. 488) to the Embassy in Spain.

⁴ Not found. Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 373.

⁵ See *ibid.*, document No. 355 and footnote 5.

⁶ Not printed (F18/485). This memorandum enumerated the quantities of nitrates, fibers, petroleum products, and grain needed by Spain in peacetime.

2) Return of former German property ceded through the Versailles Treaty and of other German rights in Tangier and of the parts of Morocco and Algiers falling to Spain.

3) Participation of the Reich in the English, French, etc., mining property to be liquidated, or in other enterprises of our enemies in Spain and Spanish Morocco that are of interest to us (see enclosure 5⁷).

4) Participation of the Reich in mining operations in the parts of French Morocco and Algiers to be ceded to Spain, by some sort of sole or joint exploitation.

5) Cession of portions of territory on the Gulf of Guinea now held by Spain.

6) Guarantees as to the granting of equality in connection with economic activity in Spain and the present and future Spanish territories in North Africa.

7) General assurances of close collaboration with Germany in the political, cultural, military, and economic fields. On this last point: demand that the Spanish economy be integrated into the reorganization of the European economy contemplated by the Axis Powers; development of agriculture, of the production of raw materials, and of only those industries indigenous to Spain.

In connection with points 2, 3, 4, data are being compiled by the secretariat of State Secretary Keppler.

C) In deciding as to the expediency of Spain's entry into the war, one should note especially that:

Spain is militarily and economically weak, politically disunited at home, and therefore incapable of waging a war of more than a few months' duration. All the more so because public opinion in Spain since the 3-year Civil War is averse to new warlike complications.

Spain's entry into the war ought therefore to be as late as possible and in any case *only* by agreement with the Reich Government. (See also letter of August 27, 1940, to the Foreign Minister.⁸)

II

Aside from the problems arising from these negotiations, the opportunity should be seized for a frank talk with the Spanish Minister regarding the most important domestic problems of Spain.

The justification for broaching these purely Spanish questions lies in:

1) the close and friendly relations existing between the two countries and governments,

2) the desire to see Spain militarily and economically strong, and strong also in her internal policy,

⁷ Not printed (F18/486-492; F6/0055-0056). This memorandum contained a tabulation of the larger firms in Spain having foreign capital participation.

⁸ Vol. x of this series, document No. 405.

3) the desire to make such a Spain an Axis partner.

In the discussion of Spain's domestic problems it will be desirable to stress the fact that we wish to advise, help, but not instruct or obtrude; likewise, however, that we are interested only in a Spain that makes and keeps herself strong.

In enclosure 6⁹ there is material for conversations with Señor Serrano Suñer regarding questions of foreign policy, economic problems, and questions of domestic policy. The suggestions have purposely been kept very critical.

III

Serrano Suñer is today the most influential and important Spanish statesman, the confidant and brother-in-law of Franco. Negotiations and conversations in the fields discussed above can therefore at present be conducted only with him with any prospect of success. His political activity, however, makes him a controversial figure in Spain.

In No. 1525 g. of July 27, 1940, a concise report was given of the political attitude of Serrano Suñer and the strong opposition to him (enclosure 7).¹⁰

Enclosure 8 gives information regarding the person of Serrano Suñer.¹¹

IV

The strong opposition mentioned, which exists in large parts of Spain and particularly in Army circles against Serrano Suñer, since he is being made responsible for the (actually) very unsatisfactory situation in Spain, requires that certain precautions be taken on our side. It might be desirable in public utterances connected with the Minister's visit (speeches, press articles, etc.,) which are naturally being forwarded to Spain, besides the customary courtesies for Señor Serrano Suñer, always to give prominence to the achievements of the Generalissimo and Chief of State and of the Spanish Army and also to mention the Falange. It might also be mentioned incidentally in addresses that the visit of Señor Serrano Suñer was taking place at *his* request.

The names and personal data of the persons accompanying Serrano Suñer on his journey are given in enclosure 9.¹²

STOHRER

⁹ Not printed (F6/0057-0062).

¹⁰ Not printed (F6/0066-0070); see vol. x of this series, document No. 250 and footnote 1.

¹¹ Not printed (F6/0078-0079).

¹² Not found.

No. 31

2943/570206

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

No. 469

BERLIN, September 7, 1940.
zu Pol. VI 2418.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 544 of September 3.¹

The Åland Convention of 1921 has today been superseded to all intents and purposes by the political developments of recent years. Whether the conclusion of a new Åland convention is in the German interest must still be considered. Non-Baltic Sea powers should no longer be included in any new convention (this would mean that besides England and France, Italy, which has been a signatory power heretofore, would also step out), but of course Germany within the framework of her interests, as the most important Baltic Sea country, would be included. The argument of too great a distance is not valid.

Please follow the further development of the Åland question attentively, but in conversations maintain reserve with regard to the German position.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Pol. VI 2418: See document No. 27, footnote 1.

No. 32

35/22826-27

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1940—4:09 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 9—2:50 a. m.

No. 1912 of September 8

For the State Secretary personally.

Malcolm Lovell, leader of the New York Quakers, concerning whom I have reported in another connection (cf. telegram No. 1559 of July 29 Foreign Minister¹), expressed the wish to me that he might come to Berlin immediately at our expense by clipper via Lisbon, camouflaged outwardly as a Quaker, in order that he might discuss with the Chief of the Information Department and other influential people a propaganda method of influencing American public opinion in the coming critical months. I approve the proposal and request for the following reasons that I be authorized to issue a visa. Lovell has developed into one of my best and most resourceful contacts of late,

¹ Not found.

partly because of his inner conviction of the necessity of a German-American settlement, and partly in expectation of later personal advantages. A strong contributing factor has been the bland rejection of the Lothian peace feeler² by the English Government, in contrast to our willing attitude. Lovell's Quakerism is to be attributed more to old family tradition than to deep religious conviction. Lovell has excellent connections in both the Democratic and Republican camps. Both parties have offered him high official posts. His political aim is to keep America out of the war under all circumstances; for this reason he is a passionate opponent of Roosevelt's foreign policy. As an excellent speaker he has influence on meetings of all kinds of groups, and he is thoroughly familiar with the American mentality. I consider him absolutely reliable, trustworthy, and capable of giving valuable suggestions, especially in the field of radio propaganda. His connection with us is entirely camouflaged as contact in the interest of humanitarian efforts.³

THOMSEN

² Documents bearing on this episode have not been found. In the State Secretary's file on Anglo-German relations is a notation (B15/B002571) stating: "Telegram Washington 1488 of July 19 (Lothian) is in the file *War/Secreta*." This *War/Secreta* file, according to notations on the covers of the State Secretary's regular War series, was kept in an iron box (*Kassette*). Neither this box nor its contents have been found. Cf. Ernst von Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen* (Munich, Leipzig, and Freiburg, 1950), p. 294; Sir Lewis Namier, *In the Nazi Era* (London, 1952), p. 83; and Weizsäcker's letter to Victor Gollancz quoted in the *Times Literary Supplement*, June 22, 1951, p. 389.

³ No reply to this telegram has been found, but Thomsen reported further on Sept. 25: "Financial considerations aside, plans for Lovell's trip must be given up on account of passport difficulties. After Lovell had obtained from the State Department without objection a passport and travel permit for the purpose of undertaking a humanitarian mission, a rival Quaker group in Philadelphia successfully intervened with the State Department in representing his journey as purposeless, with the result that Lovell's passport was withdrawn." (Washington telegram No. 2041: 35/22898)

No. 33

F2/0453-0454

The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Attaché Group of the General Staff of the Army

No. 00 91/40 g.K. Ausl III a

BERLIN, September 8, 1940.

Subject: Restoration of order in Equatorial Africa by the French.

The Führer has ordered the following measures for the restoration of order in Equatorial Africa by the French:

1. The French shall be requested to indicate promptly what forces in their opinion would be required to restore order. The following principles have been laid down with respect to such forces:

a) Army: Forces now in metropolitan France—apart from the six battalions of Senegalese already approved—will not be released; the forces now in Africa, which have not yet been demobilized, will have to suffice.

b) Navy: If a request is made for forces in addition to the three cruisers already approved,¹ their sailing shall not be authorized until reports are in on the conduct and success of the three cruisers. Disarmament of the remaining units shall proceed as planned.

c) Air Force: Disarmament of the French Air Force shall proceed, excluding the police planes which have been provided for and the additional pursuit craft (the latter subject to recall at any time). In case of necessity there are likewise excluded from the disarmament process at this time, but also subject to recall, the two groups of Farman planes which were authorized.

2. Establishment of a mixed German-Italian control commission in North Africa, under German direction, to be combined with an Italian-African control agency. It is to operate as a "roving" control commission.

Request is made to get the Italians, through the Military Attaché in Rome, to agree to 1 and 2. Following this, the demand under 1 will be presented to the French in Wiesbaden by the Armistice Commission.²

The Foreign Ministry has been informed of the foregoing as basis for its political discussions with the Italians.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order:
BRINKMANN

¹ See document No. 20 and footnote 2.

² Weizsäcker noted on Sept. 9:

"I gave our Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, Minister von Plessen, the following instructions by telephone yesterday evening, September 8:

"Military Attaché Herr von Rintelen will probably receive today or tomorrow an instruction from OKH dealing with the restoration of order in Equatorial Africa by the French. Please get in touch with Herr von Rintelen immediately (this evening) and arrange with him that he will not take the step directed before he has discussed with you certain modifications in his orders. The points concerned are (a) that the statements to be made to the French (Nos. 1 and 2 of the directive to Rintelen) are to be made simultaneously and with identical text in Turin and Wiesbaden after agreement with the Italians; (b) that under No. 2 the 8th, 9th, and 10th words (from 'under' through 'direction') are to be omitted, and (c) that the proposed German-Italian control commission would be dispatched to the headquarters of the French Commander in Africa, from which we may assume that this headquarters will have a changing location according to requirements.

"I might add that these modifications have been directed on the basis of an agreement with the OKW (General Jodl)." (121/119863)

For the Italian reply to this step see document No. 72.

No. 34

B19/B003728

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1874 of September 9

Moscow, September 9, 1940—2: 10 p. m.

Received September 9—3: 55 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1858 of September 6.¹

Molotov's statement shows that in spite of our renouncing acquisition of the concession, when it comes to carrying out the delivery to us of the Finnish nickel ore as laid down in the treaty, we will run into difficulties from the side of the Soviet Government as soon as it has obtained the concession or can otherwise exercise complete authority in the Petsamo area. Although it will be detrimental to the economic interests which we have to uphold here if we create a new and serious subject of dispute with the Soviet Government over Petsamo, we cannot on the other hand accept without contradiction the position taken by Molotov. In that connection I would not consider it advantageous to follow Molotov's suggestion to discuss the nickel ore deliveries from Petsamo with Mikoyan, since that would bring about a wrong position. Our partner in the negotiations concerning Finnish nickel ore deliveries is the Finnish Government, not the Soviet Government. It may be advisable, however, in view of possible future developments, to inform Molotov officially once more of the content of our governmental agreements with Finland, pointing out that these are not limited in point of time and that we had accepted the limitations of Finnish nickel ore deliveries to 60 percent of production in order to keep in accord with Soviet wishes as made known to us.

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 26.

No. 35

71/50701-03

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1232

BERLIN, September 9, 1940.

e. o. Pol. VII 2730 g.

For Ambassador von Mackensen.

In agreement with the Iraq Government (except for Nuri Said), the Saudi Arabian Government, and leading statesmen of Syria, the Grand Mufti has sent to us his private secretary, Tewfik al-Shakir, with the following proposals:¹

¹ See vol. x of this series, document No. 403.

1. That the Axis Powers publicly recognize:

a) The independence of the Arab countries, including Syria, Palestine with Transjordan, Egypt, the Sudan, as well as the border regions of the Arabian Peninsula, which are under an English Protectorate, including Aden as an integral part of Yemen.

b) The absence of any intention on the part of the Axis Powers to restrict the independence of these countries by mandate or something similar. Italy reserves the right to maintain, via the Sudan, imperial routes between vital points in the colonial empire in agreement with Egypt.

c) Right of the Arab countries to form a union.

d) Right of the Arab countries to solve the Jewish question in the national and racial interest on the German-Italian model.

e) Preservation of the status quo in Palestine and other Arab states with respect to the property of Christian churches and missions, as well as with respect to freedom of worship, charity, and freedom of the religious conscience.

2. Resumption of diplomatic relations between Iraq and Germany.

3. Declaration on the part of the Iraq Government of its willingness to conclude a secret treaty with the Axis Powers providing for friendly collaboration in all matters of common interest.

The Iraq Government is then prepared to:

1) Issue a declaration of the strict neutrality of Iraq, which is to be followed by similar declarations by Syria and Palestine-Transjordan, which will result in a ban on the passage through Iraq of English or Indian troops and a promise by Iraq not to support the English war effort.

2) Oust Foreign Minister Nuri Said, who is subservient to the English.

3) Conclude a secret agreement with the Axis Powers, giving them a preferred position in the economic and cultural field, while protecting the interests of Iraq.

4) Render good offices for the conclusion of similar treaties with other Arab countries.

5) Organize against England a large-scale rebellion in Palestine-Transjordan, with its base in Syria, with captured French equipment and financial support from the Axis Powers up to half of the required amount, that is, up to some 20,000 pounds sterling, in gold.

The Iraq Government makes this contingent upon immediate proclamation of an independent Syrian Government. Since Syria is a mandate of the League of Nations, which no longer exists, French rule in Syria is without foundation. The question cannot be postponed until peace is concluded, but must be decided at once in view of the contemplated insurrection in Palestine-Transjordan. To avoid Turkish suspicion, Syria will outwardly declare a strict neutrality, but will secretly cooperate with the Axis Powers and support the uprising in Palestine-Transjordan.

6) Defend the neutrality of Iraq against any aggressor (for this there are allegedly available in Iraq: 100,000 troops, up to 200,000 tribesmen, and 400 planes).

The Reich Government takes a positive stand on the matter; that is, it would, in certain circumstances, be prepared to help with captured arms and money, but it would proceed only in agreement with Italy.

Please ascertain Count Ciano's attitude toward the questions raised by the Grand Mufti's private secretary, and particularly the Italian view as to whether the operations contemplated by the private secretary really have a chance of success.²

The matter must be kept secret from the Iraq Legation in Rome, which is in contact with Nuri Said.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 40.

No. 36

271/177031

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, September 9, 1940.

For Senior Counselor Heinburg.

In the changed circumstances it is necessary to withdraw our letter to the Gestapo stating that we wish to be consulted in every case of Iron Guard members leaving the country.¹ We now request the Gestapo, on the contrary, to accord facilities as far as practicable to Iron Guardists who wish to leave the country.²

Please telephone.

WOERMANN

¹ Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 128.

² The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Aug. 1–Nov. 30, 1940 (typescript, MSC-065j, of the U. S. Army, Historical Division, European Command, filmed on serial 9936) contains this passage for Sept. 13:

"During the Department conference, Colonel Brinkmann reports on a radio message, received at 12:30 a. m., September 13, by the counterintelligence, section II, from the Wehrmacht Attaché at Bucharest (Colonel Gerstenberg), according to which the antagonism between General Antonescu and the Iron Guard has deepened. The latter plans large demonstrations on September 13, on the occasion of the name-day of Codreanu. The German Ambassador at Bucharest has again urged the dispatch of the military mission."

And for Sept. 14:

"According to a radio message from Bucharest, received at 5:00 p. m., the demonstration yesterday took a quiet course and an agreement between General Antonescu and Sima has been reached."

No. 37

2276/479894

Note by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 10, 1940.

Pol. IV 2850 g.

In the discussion which the Foreign Minister had with him yesterday the Slovak Minister spoke among other things of the Slovak minorities in Hungary. He expressed the hope that a solution to

this question might be found within the framework of a total settlement of the problems of southeastern Europe. The Foreign Minister replied that 100 percent ethnographic solutions were not possible in the region of southeastern Europe. It would therefore be well if Bratislava gave up striving for such a revision. As a proof that 100 percent ethnographic solutions are impossible the Foreign Minister cited the existence of 600,000 Germans in Rumania. Germany was not making any territorial claims on their account either. The Foreign Minister added that this latter argument might also be useful on other occasions.

Herewith respectfully submitted through the State Secretary to the Under State Secretary.

SCHMIDT

No. 38

104/112472

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 10, 1940—12:55 a. m.

No. 1884 of September 9

Received September 10—4:30 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally:

With reference to your telegram No. 1609 of September 5.¹

Instruction carried out. Handed memorandum to Molotov this evening. Molotov read it through attentively and declared that the matter was so important for the Soviet Government that it would reply in writing.² But he had to state now that the position taken by the German Government could not alter the Soviet standpoint. The Soviet Government persisted in its view that the conduct of the German Government in Vienna had not been entirely in good faith, for it could not have been in doubt that the Soviet Government was interested in Rumania and Hungary. At the same time the Soviet Government was by no means disputing the fact that Germany had special interests in Rumania.

To justify his standpoint, Molotov pointed out in particular that the press of the entire world assumed as a matter of course that in the present case a consultation between Germany and the Soviet Union had certainly taken place.³

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 24.

² See document No. 81, enclosure.

³ A more detailed record of this conversation between Schulenburg and Molotov is found in a memorandum by Hilger of Sept. 18 (1379/357844-47). See document No. 81, footnote 4.

No. 39

499/234197-98

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 3062 of September 10 MADRID, September 10, 1940—12:15 p. m.

With reference to my cipher letter No. 1587 g. of September 7.¹

The Spanish Foreign Minister instructed the Spanish Ambassador in London to extend his reporting beyond the inquiries at Spanish Consulates ordered by the Generalissimo² also to the following points:

1. Extensive reports on the targets and effects of the German air attacks.
2. Effect of the air attacks on factories, harbors, ships, and airfields.
3. Effects on the morale of the population, the workers' organizations, the leading circles, and the members of Parliament.
4. Food supplies and work in industry.
5. Morale of the British airmen, especially the pilots.
6. Morale of the Navy.

The Minister added that he would be glad to submit still further questions to the Ambassador in London if we wished.

The armed forces Attachés and Abwehr have been informed.

STOHRER

¹ Not found.

² On Sept. 6 Franco informed Stohrer that he had instructed the Spanish Ambassador in London to ask all Spanish Consuls in England for "detailed reports on the morale of the population and the effects of our attacks by air." (memorandum by Stohrer of Sept. 7: 499/234195-96)

No. 40

71/50704

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, September 10, 1940—12:35 p. m.

Special Security Handling

Received September 10—12:50 p. m.

No. 1646 of September 10

For the State Secretary personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1232 of September 9.¹

I informed Count Ciano in detail this morning of the proposals of the Grand Mufti, and asked him to express an opinion, principally from the standpoint of their chances of success. He stated that for years he had maintained constant relations with the Grand Mufti, of which his secret fund could tell a tale. The return on this gift of millions had not been exactly great and had really been confined to

¹ Document No. 35.

occasional destruction of pipelines, which in most cases could be quickly repaired. He would in any case, however, have the present proposals studied; for this purpose I left with him a memorandum on their contents. In this job, he has an outstanding assistant in the person of Guarnaschelli, who not only knows very thoroughly the conditions in question but, above all, the persons involved. He would inform me as soon as possible of the attitude of the Italian Government.²

I called Count Ciano's attention particularly to the need for maintaining the strictest secrecy as far as the Iraq Legation here was concerned.

MACKENSEN

² See document No. 58.

No. 41

F14/416-427

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*¹

RECORD OF THE RECEPTION BY THE FÜHRER OF COUNT SZTÓJAY,
THE HUNGARIAN MINISTER, ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1940, FROM 12:40 TO
1:50 P. M.

Those present: Minister of State Meissner, Senior Counselor Hewel.

By direction of the Regent, Count Sztójay conveyed to the Führer the former's best regards and the expression of his deepest gratitude for the assistance given by the Führer in the Vienna Award. He gave him a handwritten letter from the Regent.²

The Führer stated that nature had especially complicated the solution of the Hungarian-Rumanian problem by reason of the fact that the Hungarians lived in the east and the Rumanians in the west of the contested territory. It had been difficult to find the balance in attempting to repair, on the one hand, a historic wrong and, on the other, to prevent the remainder of the Rumanian state from collapsing. The consequences of such a collapse would have been incalculable, for the danger of an irruption of foreign powers into this area had been great. It had not been easy to induce the Rumanians to surrender so large a territory. They had told the Führer at a conference that they could at best return a territory of 14 square kilometers. The Government was too weak to survive greater sacrifices. This had indeed proved to be the case. The Führer had pointed out to them that such a concession was far from adequate and so, after much arguing, this solution was reached which must satisfy the one and save the other from collapse.

¹ Marginal note: "[For] F[ührer]."

² Document No. 6.

The Führer referred to the great significance of a victory of the Axis Powers for Hungary. If the Axis Powers lost the war, which was out of the question to be sure, all these revisions would become void. The enemy powers would go on a spree of concocting new solutions which would make any national revival impossible. Above all, a large Czechoslovakia would arise, largely at Hungary's expense, no doubt.

The thing to do in the momentary situation was to stick it out. It was, unfortunately, not possible to conduct operations whenever one wanted to, for modern warfare was to a great extent dependent on the weather. The weather was idiotic at present and he simply could not fight. Bad weather was always good only for the defense. He, the Führer, was not fighting in order to create as much unrest and engage in as many military operations as possible, but in order to crush the foe. And this waiting for the auspicious moment was predicated upon economic security. We were, to be sure, fairly independent in the matter of our oil supply, but it might always happen that one factory or another stopped producing and that it would then be necessary to fall back on reserves. Italy, too, was quite especially dependent upon Rumania for her oil supplies. We were allied with Italy for better or worse, and if anything happened to Italy, or if Italy suffered hardship in any field, it would affect us exactly as much as it did her. The preservation of the Rumanian oil fields was also of extreme psychological importance. England was at present living to an incredible degree entirely on bluff. If the Rumanian oil fields went up in flames today, it would mean a considerable stiffening of the British will to resist. Even last fall the British had intended to destroy the oil fields by sabotage. Thank God they had not succeeded! At that time there had been two vital economic factors for Germany: Swedish iron and Rumanian petroleum. The British realized this very well. The first problem had been disposed of. With a production of 44 million tons of iron, Germany was today the greatest power factor in competition with America. The second problem, petroleum, was still important despite increased domestic production. He hoped that he had secured this also by the policy of pacification in the Balkans, which had been given expression in the Vienna Award. He had had to give the guarantee although it had not been easy for him, for now he naturally had to bear to the last the consequences of this guarantee. But the guarantee had been the only acceptable quid pro quo for the Rumanians. Without this guarantee they would never have been able to submit to the Vienna Award. He had, however, with a good conscience, been able to assume this great responsibility, for the Rumanian oil region was tremendously important. For Germany as well as for Italy there was no longer any question of turning back in this respect. Aside from these oil interests, he had had no reason

for supporting Rumania, which had until recently pursued a perfidious policy: starting with the completely unmotivated and senseless entry into the World War on the side of the Entente, and her post-war policy, symbolized by the name of that unsavory and venal fellow, Titulescu. King Carol, too, had been an unreliable man, with whom he had established no personal relationship. The Rumanian closest to us had been Codreanu.³ Realizing that the Rumanian oil wells were of decisive importance for a long war, he and the Duce had decided to protect the valuable region themselves. He could only wish that Hungary understood all that was involved here. The difficulty had, indeed, been to measure out the territory to be returned in such a way that Rumania would not collapse. The East would have penetrated this area and the end would have been unpredictable. Even if the Kremlin and the other Governments had agreed on a delimitation of interests, a clash of forces could hardly have been avoided. He knew this from personal experience for, in the last analysis, two worlds which were basically deadly enemies, came into collision here. Such a clash would have meant danger of infection, which would have spread to the whole of the Balkans. Even Germany, which is on the best terms with Russia and also has no desire to jeopardize this friendly relationship, would, by such a development in the Balkans, have been confronted with difficult problems.

If, therefore, there was anyone who must be interested in a definite victory of the Axis Powers, it was Hungary. Naturally it had also been very difficult for Rumania to give up valuable pieces of territory on three sides. He could give the Hungarians only one piece of advice with regard to the future, "treat the Germans well." Human passions would never die down and there would be no stability in the Balkans if it were not constantly safeguarded. From the point of view of national policy, good treatment of the minorities would cost Hungary nothing at all and anyway the Führer would surely be in a position to take one million of them into Germany. But, with a sound nationalities policy, Hungary could provide herself with a lodestone which would very considerably strengthen her position. Peoples are definite, stable entities, and the Germans in the southeast would naturally always at heart be loyal to their Fatherland. The nationalities policy of the Hungarians in recent years had not always been a felicitous one, and the Germans had not felt strongly drawn to Hungary; otherwise revision would have been even more favorable to Hungary. A good nationalities policy could only strengthen Hungary, for the time would come when Hungary would draw very closely to the new Europe, that is, to the Axis Powers. We had too great a history in common to make it possible for the Hungarians ever to adopt an eastern orientation.

³ Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Commander of the Rumanian Iron Guard, was killed Nov. 30, 1938, by a police escort while being transported from one prison to another. See vol. v of this series, document No. 260.

The Führer then spoke about the military situation, and was of the opinion that the war was already won and that it was now only a question of how much would be destroyed. He made comparisons with the World War and described the positions of 1918 and the present; he spoke of the fortified coast from Narvik to the Spanish border, explained the favorable positions for attacks by submarines, and above all, by the Luftwaffe. It was irresponsible nonsense for Churchill to say that even if England lay in ruins, the English would continue to fight from Canada. If everything lay in ruins in England, the English would not do anything more because they would then not be able to do anything more. Churchill had committed an act of sheer insanity in ordering the night attacks. He had attacked with a weapon in which Germany was immeasurably superior to England and if he now had leaflets dropped which caught fire from the sun's rays, it was a childish challenge, for he [the Führer] could throw 100,000 times as many incendiary bombs on England and the results would be devastating.

Sztójay told of reports that they had received from the Hungarian Mission in London, to the effect that the city was strongly urging the conclusion of a peace. These reports were already 3 weeks old. Also the fact that the Duke of Windsor had been sent to the Bahamas was proof of great uncertainty, for undoubtedly this was a person who would have attracted those in favor of a sound settlement.

He wished now to reply to the Führer's statements. There was no doubt at all in Hungary that the victory of the Axis Powers was definitely in the interest of the Hungarians. The Hungarians, without exception, felt that they had a close community of destiny with the Axis Powers, and Hungary having realized this, would indeed act accordingly, as had been stated also in the letter of the Hungarian President [sic].

As for the treatment of the minorities, he thought that here, too, misunderstandings existed. He had seen to it that Minister Frick and Obergruppenführer Lorenz were invited to Hungary. They had been able to inspect everything, even without escort, in order to convince themselves that most of the complaints had been unfounded. The Volksdeutsche had absolutely equal rights in the economic and political sphere. They could rise in government and in business, and especially in the military service, to the highest offices, and there were many instances of this. Perhaps the Hungarians had a somewhat bad conscience in the school question, but this was due to extremism after the war, at a time when even a man so highly esteemed by the Führer as Gömbös⁴ overshot the mark. The Magyarization and assimilation were not compulsory. But Hungary saw even more clearly on this

⁴ Julius Gömbös, leader of the "party for defense of the race"; Minister President of Hungary 1932-1936.

matter today and would do everything she could to improve still further the situation of the Volksdeutsche. The only group that did not quite sympathize with the Hungarians were the Transylvanian Saxons. The Führer said that they, the Hungarians, had to pursue a policy aimed at attracting all the Germans in the Balkans. Sztójay replied that that was a great goal to set oneself. Naturally there were still difficulties with the lower officials, especially in educational and cultural matters, which sometimes also had a denominational basis, but this would be changed now. The goal of becoming a magnet for all Germans was a very beautiful thought for Hungarians and they wished to be a bridge to Germany for the Germans living down there.

As far as sticking it out was concerned, Hungary's sympathies were 100 percent with the lot of the Axis Powers, which she was prepared to share in every way, even if she had to impose restrictions upon herself. This collaboration was politically and ideologically conditioned and was also fortified by the feeling of comradeship. This was especially the case with the soldiers and it could not be denied that the volksdeutsch soldiers and officers who were in Hungary felt quite at home there.

The problem of Rumania and the problem of oil were viewed by Hungary exactly as by the Führer. Hungary as the weaker country was much more exposed to the dangers of a southeast without peace than was Germany. The Führer remarked that beyond the interest in oil, he also had no interest in falling out with Russia. We had no differences with them and also did not wish to have any, and he was happier, therefore, if everything was quiet down there.

Sztójay stated that Hungary intended to cultivate the best neighborly relations with Rumania. The Führer welcomed this and pointed out how important it was, since there was otherwise the danger that this country would one day suddenly fold up. A loss of the oil wells was the worst that could happen to us today. Sztójay described Rumania as a typical Balkan country and described the corruption that had prevailed there. Antonescu had to take very drastic measures if he wanted to create order there. The Führer was of the opinion that it was a great achievement even to succeed in postponing the disintegration. As he had already stated, he was interested in only one thing, and that was oil. In reply to Sztójay's comment that the entry into Cluj would take place the next day, the Führer said that it was Hungary's great good luck that, as a former Austrian, he was well acquainted with the conditions down there, for otherwise Hungary would never have got Cluj. The Rumanians nearly had a stroke when they heard of it. Sztójay further described the dangers of the unrest that existed in the territories to be occupied, spoke of the evidences of disintegration within the Army and of the unpleasant role that Maniu, whom he described as pro-Bolshevik, had played there. When

the Führer observed that he had had a grave warning issued to the Rumanians to wind things up quickly and in orderly fashion, Sztójay said that he thought that things would remain quiet, for by Friday everything would be over; then the last area to be ceded would be occupied.

The Führer closed the conversation with the comment that our attitude in this matter had not been based on abstract ideals, but had been dictated by the interest in oil.

He asked the Hungarian Minister to thank the Regent for his letter and to give him his regards.

HEWEL

No. 42

B14/B002231-33

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1647 of September 10

ROME, September 10, 1940—4: 50 p. m.

Received September 10—5: 15 p. m.

On special instructions from the Duce, Ciano asked me to see him this morning in order to ask me to lay once more before the Führer and Foreign Minister the question of Italian-Russian relations, whose development had excited the Duce's concern. The fact that in the end Italy had more or less allowed Molotov's proposals of last June to lapse, i. e., had so far evaded answering his memorandum of June 25 (which you know about),¹ even though the initiative for political conversations had come from Italy—all this, according to reports of the Italian Ambassador in Moscow, had a chilling effect in the Kremlin, and in fact has caused such irritation that signs of a certain tension, which might easily become worse, are already discernible today. The Ambassador consequently has asked permission not to carry out the démarche ordered by Ciano in concert with the Reich Foreign Minister after his return from Vienna, which was to inform also from the Italian side of the action taken in Vienna, because he could not afford to expose himself to the (1 group missing) of getting from Molotov some such reply as that Russian-Italian relations were not of such a nature that he expected such notification. The attitude which Molotov had shown toward Count von Schulenburg during their conversation in this same connection had been quite unfriendly, and his reply amounted to saying that we were violating obligations entered into by treaty if, as had happened, we informed them of the development only after the fact.² Ciano read to me a detailed private letter of Rosso

¹ See vol. x of this series, document No. 290.

² See document No. 1.

to Anfuso,³ in which the Ambassador, recapitulating the development of relations since his return, very earnestly points out the danger entailed in the long run by a negative treatment of the whole question by Rome, and especially if the war against England is not brought to an end before winter. If the Duce should persevere in his intention to renew Italian-Russian relations on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship of 1933,⁴ it would be desirable to hurry and act expeditiously lest the growing Russian mistrust lead to genuine tension, which would then be inevitable, together with all the dangerous repercussions involved.

The Duce, Ciano went on, fully shares these apprehensions of the Ambassador and would therefore like to get the political discussion with Russia started as soon as possible. He has already declared himself willing, but without saying anything about the date or for that matter the personnel, to send an economic delegation to Moscow, as Gorelkin had requested in his talk here with Giannini on July 18.⁵ The Duce is well aware of our reservations as to any further political conversations with the Russians,⁶ and would of course do nothing without prior consultation with us, for the Rome-Berlin relationship naturally took precedence over everything else; nevertheless, he would ask that we give due consideration to his grave apprehension that Russia's relations to the Axis Powers might take a turn which, always assuming that the war with England continues, might make it look possible that Russia one day would drift away.

Upon my remark that since our last conversation on this subject⁷ nothing had really occurred that could have altered the view of the Reich Foreign Minister communicated to him on that occasion, and that I could not conceive of any possibility of talking with the Russians with any prospect of improving relations and yet not touching the subject awkward to us, Ciano had Anfuso show him once more the text of Molotov's memorandum of June 25, and after reading it aloud, said that the conversation no doubt would have to turn about these questions. To my objection that this would bring up subjects which we deemed dangerous to discuss with the Russians, for instance the question of the Straits, Ciano replied that it would naturally be

³ Presumably Rosso's letter of Sept. 3, 1940, published in Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941* (Florence, 1953), pp. 60-63.

⁴ The Treaty of Friendship, Non-Aggression, and Neutrality Between Italy and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Rome Sept. 2, 1933, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1933* (London, 1933), vol. cxxxvi, pp. 725-726.

⁵ See vol. x of this series, document No. 290.

⁶ See *ibid.*, document No. 348.

⁷ See *ibid.*, document No. 357.

necessary to proceed with appropriate caution and watch the turn of the conversation, of whose course we would naturally be kept fully informed at all times. He fully shared the Duce's apprehension but in contrast to the Duce's impetuous drive was for great moderation in pace at this time.

In any event he would be grateful if I brought the Duce's view to the attention of the highest level as soon as possible. He hoped that he would be able to hear from me in perhaps 2 or 3 days how the Führer and the Foreign Minister viewed this idea.*

MACKENSEN

* See document No. 73.

No. 43

407/214737

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, September 10 [sic], 1940—5: 58 p. m.
No. 1900 of September 11 Received September 11—8: 00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1649 of September 10.¹

Molotov displayed great interest in, and had me repeat several times, the statement that "the Government of the Reich is prepared in principle, against adequate compensation, to forego the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory which was agreed upon in Moscow." I had the impression that Molotov was satisfied. The statement that the compensation offered was certainly not acceptable to us in this form and that we were engaged in drawing up a counterproposal,² Molotov noted with interest, without any further comment.

SCHULENBURG

¹ This telegram (1379/357840), conveyed a request from Ribbentrop for information as to how Molotov had reacted to the German position, concerning the strip of Lithuanian territory, set forth in paragraph 4 of document No. 24.

² In a memorandum of Oct. 10 (104/112572-74) Schnurre informed Ribbentrop that an instruction for Schulenburg containing the German counterproposals had been drafted and was ready to be sent after a few changes were made. On Oct. 19, Schnurre discussed the matter with Ribbentrop, who said that nothing should be done until he had taken it up again with Hitler (unsigned memorandum of Oct. 19: 2097/453282). See, further, document No. 319.

No. 44

174/136415

The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, September 10, 1940—8:05 p. m.

No. 919 of September 10

Received September 10—10:30 a. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.¹

As instructed, I informed the Foreign Minister in the presence of the Ambassador about the Reich Foreign Minister's ideas concerning the cooperation of Germany, Italy, and Japan for the purpose of neutralizing America, and urgently pointed out the necessity for a quick decision.²

¹The distribution list has been crossed out, and an unsigned marginal note states: "Distribution will be made by the Foreign Minister's Secretariat in so far as the Foreign Minister wishes any distribution at all."

²The text of these instructions has not been found, but a Japanese memorandum introduced as exhibit No. 549 at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sets forth the "salient points" made by Stahmer in his talks with Matsuoka on Sept. 9 and 10. The text of the document which was presented to the Tribunal in English reads verbatim as follows:

"1. Germany does not want the present conflict develop into a World War, and wishes to bring it to termination as quickly as possible. She particularly wants the United States to stay out.

"2. Germany does not look for Japan's military assistance at this juncture in connection with her war with England.

"3. What she wishes of Japan is to have Japan play the role of restraining and preventing the U. S. from entering the war, by all means. Although Germany thinks at present that the U. S. will not enter the war, she cannot take chance.

"4. Germany hardly thinks that she and the U. S. will come to blows in the near future, but that the clash and war between Japan and the U. S. cannot eventually be avoided.

"5. It is, so Germany believes, to the mutual advantage of both, Japan and Germany (of course Italy to be included) to enter into an understanding or agreement, whereby they will be thoroughly prepared effectively to meet emergency, at any moment. This can only prevent, if anything can prevent, America from entering the present war, or entering into an armed conflict with Japan in the future.

"6. A strong and determined attitude, unequivocal and unmistakable, on the part of the three nations, Japan, Germany and Italy, and the knowledge of it by the U. S. and the world at large at this juncture, that alone can only be of a powerful and effective deterrent on the U. S. A weak, lukewarm attitude or declaration at this juncture will only invite derision and danger.

"7. Germany hopes Japan will also size up the situation and will realize the magnitude and the reality of the potential (may be impending, who knows) danger coming from the Western Hemisphere, and will act quickly and decisively to forestall it by reaching an agreement between the three (Japan, Germany and Italy) of such a nature that neither the U. S. nor the rest of the world would be left in doubt, conjecturing.

"8. Hardly necessary to say that Germany (and Italy) will do everything in her power to restrain the U. S. on the Atlantic and will at once start supplying Japan with as much of the war equipment (such as aeroplanes, tanks and other war tools with men even, if Japan wishes it) as she can reasonably spare, and will otherwise help her in every possible way. (Matsuoka remarked that these things might and in fact will have to be left to a sort of mixed military and naval commission of the Axis, granted that Japan joins the Axis in the sense and in the way Germany wants.)

"9. Of course, Germany recognizes and respects Japan's political leadership in Greater East Asia. All she wants in these regions is of economic nature,

The Foreign Minister recognized this necessity, agreed for his part with making America the objective, and promised to see that the Cabinet made proposals in the very near future. In his statements he emphasized the extraordinary increase in the American pressure on Japan and the growing danger of a sudden entry into the war against Germany, and asked in detail about the reliability of the German-Russian alliance. The 2-hour conversation went off in an atmosphere of friendly frankness. I have the impression that the atmosphere for our undertaking is favorable owing to America's attitude and the strong domestic pressure on the Cabinet, which the Foreign Minister could not conceal. The Foreign Minister promised to keep the conversations secret. The Foreign Minister asked that the agreement in principle of the Italian Government be communicated so as to save as much time as possible in the mutual interest.³

STAHMER
OTT

(Footnote 2—continued)

and she is ready to cooperate with Japan to further her aims. Naturally she looks to Japan to do her best to accommodate German enterprises and to enable Germany to obtain in these regions materials she needs and may need.

"10. Better to reach agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan first and then immediately to approach Soviet Russia. Germany is prepared to act part of an honest broker on the question of rapprochement between Japan and Soviet Russia, and she can see no insurmountable obstacle on the path may be settled without much difficulty. German-Soviet relations are good contrary to what the British propaganda tries to represent, and Russia is carrying out to the satisfaction of Germany all her engagements.

"11. Despite the fact that the Axis (including Japan) must be thoroughly prepared to meet the worst emergency, Germany will on the other hand, make use of every means in her power to prevent the clashing between the U. S. and Japan, and even to improve the relations between the two, if it is humanly possible.

"12. Germany, in asking Japan to join the Axis in the fullest sense of the word and that quickly, before the war against England closes, is taking a long view of carrying on stupendous struggle against the British Empire, not to say the Anglo-Saxondom including America. (In short, he is indicating that this war is destined to develop into a strife against the Anglo-Saxondom.) The present war may end before long, but this great struggle will go on for tens of years yet, in one form or another. (Matsuoka emphasized this phrase.) Let the three (Germany, Italy and Japan) stand together knitted very closely until the great aim is finally achieved.

"13. As to when Italy should be asked to join in the present discussion, the German Foreign Minister will consider and let the Japanese Foreign Minister know. The German Government has not yet conferred with Italy. Neither Stahmer nor anyone on the German side has seen the Soviet official on the matter.

"14. Stahmer's words may be regarded as coming directly from Ribbentrop.

"15. The Japanese Foreign Minister also made observation on several points, but they are not noted here."

³ Except for telegram No. 919 printed here, no documents on Stahmer's negotiations in Tokyo have been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry itself, but a number of documents on the later phase of the negotiations were found in the secret files of the Embassy in Rome. The early phase of Stahmer's negotiations is documented from the Japanese side in material introduced at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. See also exhibit No. 2744 (Stahmer's affidavit).

A memorandum dated Nov. 18, 1943 (2133/466838-48), listing files in the Geheimbüro of the Political Department, records that there was then one volume entitled "Three Power Pact" in the Geheime Reichssache-Akten and another volume in the Geheim-Akten, neither of which has been found.

No. 45

1001/305826-27

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission

Draft Telegram
(by teletype)

BERLIN, September 10, 1940.
zu W-Frie. 362.¹

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Dumont.

With reference to your report Del. W 426 of August 23.²

In view of the unrest in the French colonies and the possibility of English intervention, you are requested to demand that the French safeguard the French, Belgian, and Polish gold in Dakar³ and to leave no doubt that we will hold the French Government responsible for the safety of the gold. Please request the French to submit proposals concerning the manner of protection and tell them that we reserve our position with respect to these proposals and, possibly, with respect to assistance and supervision. In our opinion provision should be made first of all for having the gold brought as quickly as possible away from the coast to a safe place and from there returned to France possibly by stages.

For your information: The Luftwaffe is prepared to make available 8 Condor planes, each of which can transport 3 tons of gold.⁴

President Schaefer, who at the request of our bank commissioner in Brussels wrote to the Bank of France asking for transfer of the Belgian gold to North Africa or Paris, has at our request been asked by the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan to refrain in the future from approaching the French directly about such important matters,

¹ W-Frie. 362: Not found.

² Not printed (1001/305899-900). This was a cover note transmitting the translation of the French note of Aug. 20 printed as document No. 371 in vol. x of this series.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ On Sept. 20 the French Government notified the German Government that it had decided to transfer the French gold 400 kilometers farther into the interior, and would if necessary take further steps to render it still more secure. The French Government had also expressed willingness to return the Belgian gold to Paris or Brussels, on condition of a deduction in the amount of 800 to 1,000 million French francs for advances to the Belgian Government in exile. The German negotiator had objected to this deduction, and furthermore the Bank of France had refused to assume responsibility for the return shipment. As for the Polish gold, the Bank of France took the position that since its advances to the Polish Government in exile exceeded the amount of Polish gold, the Bank of France must regard this gold as its own. (Telegram Del. No. 125 of Sept. 20 from Wiesbaden: 368/207006-08)

Minutes of the meeting on Sept. 20, of which telegram Del. No. 125 gave an account, are printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 363-372.

but rather to inform us thereof so that double negotiations and all the intolerable situations that might result therefrom may be avoided.

WIEHL

No. 46

C109/C002188-89

Rudolf Hess to Dr. Karl Haushofer

at present at GALLSPACH.

September 10, 1940.

DEAR FRIEND: Albrecht brought me your letter,¹ which, at the beginning, besides containing official information, alluded to our walk together on the last day of August, which I, too, recall with so much pleasure.

Albrecht will have told you about our conversation, which, besides volksdeutsch matters, above all touched upon the other matter, which is so close to the hearts of us both. I reconsidered the latter carefully once more and have arrived at the following conclusion:

Under no condition must we disregard the contact or allow it to die aborning. I consider it best that you or Albrecht write to the old lady, who is a friend of your family, suggesting that she try to ask Albrecht's friend whether he would be prepared if necessary to come to the neutral territory in which she resides, or at any rate has an address through which she can be reached, just to talk with Albrecht. If he could not do this just now, he might, in any case, send word through her where he expects to be in the near future. Possibly a neutral acquaintance, who had some business to attend to over there anyway, might look him up and make some communication to him, using you or Albrecht as reference. This person probably would not care to have to inquire as to his whereabouts only after he got there or to make futile trips. You thought that knowing about his whereabouts had no military significance at all; if necessary, you would also pledge yourselves not to make any use of it with regard to any quarter which might profit from it. What the neutral would have to transmit would be of such great importance that his having made known his whereabouts would be by comparison insignificant.

The prerequisite naturally was that the inquiry in question and the reply would not go through official channels, for you would not in any case want to cause your friends over there any trouble.

It would be best to have the letter to the old lady with whom you are acquainted delivered through a confidential agent of the AO to the address that is known to you. For this purpose Albrecht would have to speak either with Bohle or my brother. At the same time the lady would have to be given the address of this agent in L.—or if the latter does not live there permanently, of another agent of the AO who does live there permanently, to which the reply can in turn be delivered.

As for the neutral I have in mind, I would like to speak to you orally about it some time. There is no hurry about that since, in any case, there would first have to be a reply received here from over there.

¹ See document No. 12.

Meanwhile let's both keep our fingers crossed. Should success be the fate of the enterprise, the oracle given to you with regard to the month of August would yet be fulfilled, since the name of the young friend and the old lady friend of your family occurred to you during our quiet walk on the last day of that month.

With best regards to you and to Martha,

Yours, as ever,

R[UDOLF] H[ESS]

Can be reached by telephone through: Linz-Gallspach A

No. 47

121/120476-77

The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the French Delegation to the German Armistice Commission

No. 137

SEPTEMBER 11, 1940.

GENERAL: At the instruction of the German High Command of the Wehrmacht, to which the French delegation's note No. 3461/EM of September 5, 1940,¹ has been submitted, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

The Reich Government expects that the French Government will with the utmost vigor immediately take the necessary measures to stamp out completely the rebellion in Equatorial Africa and to prevent any similar rebellions from breaking out.

The German Armistice Commission, in agreement with the Italian Armistice Commission, has already taken cognizance of the situation by consenting to the following measures by the French Government:

- a) dispatch of three cruisers and three destroyers from the Mediterranean to the coast of West Africa,
- b) transfer of six battalions of Senegalese from metropolitan France to West Africa,
- c) commitment of two groups of Farman planes to Equatorial Africa as supply transports.

If in the opinion of the French Government additional forces are required to repair the situation in Africa, it is requested that this requirement be communicated immediately to the German Armistice Commission, with an exact description of the forces needed.

The decision of the German and Italian Armistice Commissions on such requests will be determined by the following principles:

1) *Army:*

No further transportation of forces from metropolitan France to Africa can be permitted under any circumstances. In case of necessity recourse should be had to the ample forces in North Africa.

¹Text in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. 1, pp. 255-256.

2) *Navy:*

The release of further units from the Mediterranean for the West African coast can be granted only when it has been ascertained that the three cruisers and three destroyers previously released have reached the west coast of Africa and have been effectively employed for their tasks.

3) *Air Force:*

In addition to the 2 groups of Farman planes already made available, a total of 14 police groups and 4 groups of fighter planes (the latter subject to recall) will be made available for commitment in North Africa, Equatorial Africa, and West Africa. The units necessary to maintain order are to be taken from these forces. Equipment of these police groups with planes designed for reconnaissance and bombing.

The German Armistice Commission expressly emphasizes that, irrespective of the release, already effected or still to follow, of certain units for Equatorial Africa, the basic requirement of disarmament of the French Navy and Air Force (also in metropolitan France) will be maintained. The details of the method of execution are still to be worked out by the German and Italian Armistice Commissions. In fixing the time limit for the disarmament, account will be taken of the situation resulting from the French action in Equatorial Africa.

With regard to the employment of the forces made available for West Africa the French Government will be given a free hand. It must, however, immediately inform the German and Italian Armistice Commissions in each case of the intended employment.

In case the French Government fails to restore quiet and order in the threatened areas, the German and Italian Governments reserve the right to take any further action.

Please note, moreover, that the formation of a mixed German-Italian control commission for the French section of the Atlantic coast of Africa and for Equatorial Africa is contemplated.

Accept, etc.

VON STÜLPNAGEL
General of Infantry

No. 48

F8/0223-0224;
F8/0226¹

Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler

SAN SEBASTIÁN, September 11, 1940.

DEAR FÜHRER: The Minister of Interior [*Gobernación*], Serrano Suñer, will be the bearer of these lines in which I wish to express to you anew my greetings and my friendship.²

Through him I am again coming in contact with you to ascertain your ideas in everything that concerns our domestic situation and our position in foreign policy. He will lay particular emphasis on the viewpoints, the explanation of which was already begun by Gen-

¹ The file contains both the Spanish text and a German translation.

² See documents Nos. 63 and 66.

eral Vigón on his previous trip³ [so as to interpret them still more precisely].⁴

With firm faith in your imminent and final victory and with the best wishes for your personal health and the happiness and welfare of the Greater German Reich, I remain, etc.

F. FRANCO

³ See vol. IX of this series, document No. 456.

⁴ The words in brackets appear in the German but not the Spanish text.

No. 49

269/174974-75

*The Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP to the State Secretary and
Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, September 11, 1940.

Amt V

Ndf/Hdt. 29921/8

Subject: Agreement with Maritz.

Reference: Your Pol. X 3402.¹

The estimate of General Maritz in paragraphs IV and V of the memorandum by Herr Költzsch¹ is probably about right and it may be taken as true that his influence now among the African Nationalists is also not very great. Also the agreement of 1914 referred to cannot be revived today because the necessary prerequisites are lacking and the situation does not correspond to what it was at that time.²

I am likewise of the opinion that everything must be avoided on our part which might induce the Nationalist Boers to make an insurrection, since they do not have the military resources to be successful against the Smuts Government and the police strength at its disposal. The uprising would necessarily collapse in the course of a few days or weeks and, the mentality of the Boers being what it is, it would be Germany that would be saddled with the responsibility for their inevitable defeat.

On the other hand, however, it appears essential to support so far as possible the legitimate strivings of the Nationalist Boers for independence from the South African Union, to the end that no premature relaxation contrary to German interests in South Africa ensues. If the Foreign Ministry considers a direct reply to the request of General Maritz to be advisable, it would probably be better not to make this reply through Mrs. Maritz and her husband, but instead by a secure channel directly to General Hertzog and Dr. Malan, but in such a manner that there is no possibility of compromising Germany,

¹ Not found.

² See vol. X of this series, document No. 335.

and also so that no claims can be later deduced from it with respect to the agreement of 1914. It also seems more advisable to me, as Herr Költzsch has likewise indicated, that the Boers should be informed that Germany would welcome a South African Nationalist Government independent of Britain. In addition it would be more appropriate to give support to these efforts from here through propaganda over the radio, but without binding force on the German Government, by continuing the previous attacks against the Smuts Government and its adherents. Care would always have to be taken, however, in all this not to encourage prematurely any efforts aimed at an open revolt in South Africa. In that connection it is completely unnecessary to refer to German South-West Africa since the Nationalist Boers already regard the return of that area to Germany as a foregone conclusion.

Heil Hitler!

NEUENDORF

No. 50

104/112501-02

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1912 of September 11 Moscow, September 12, 1940—1:13 a. m.
Received September 12—7:35 a. m.

First Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky asked me to call on him yesterday and handed me a memorandum reading as follows:

"According to reports of the DNB and the German radio of September 1, the German Government intends very shortly to call a meeting of experts on international Danubian questions in Vienna¹ for the purpose of modifying the present regime of the Danube which is under international law.

"The Soviet Government considers it necessary to inform the German Government that the regime of navigation on the Danube cannot be a matter of indifference to the Soviet Union as a Danubian country and it can therefore not waive its right to participate in the settlement of the questions affecting this regime. Consequently the Soviet Government hopes that the German Government will inform it regarding the meeting of experts on international Danubian questions to be called in Vienna."

M. Vyshinsky stated on this point that Ambassador Shkvartsev had been instructed to hand the Foreign Minister the above memorandum. He added that the Soviet Government had heard that the negotiations regarding a reorganization of the International Danube Commission were to take place shortly under German auspices. The

¹ See vol. x of this series, document No. 303.

Soviet Government had now become a Danubian country and was consequently vitally interested in all Danubian questions. This referred not only to the sphere of activity of the European Danube Commission but also to the activity of the International Danube Commission. The Soviet Union wished to participate always in negotiations regarding the Danube. Vyshinsky requested me to find out in Berlin what the Government of the Reich thought of this attitude of the Soviet Government and to inform him of the result as quickly as possible.

Please send telegraphic instructions.²

SCHULENBURG

² Document No. 53.

No. 51

71/50705-06

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 1253

BERLIN, September 12, 1940.
zu Pol. VII 2774 g.¹

Drafting Officer: Counselor Melchers.

With reference to your telegram No. 1646 of September 10.²

The Ambassador at Therapia wires as follows:

"The Iraq Minister of Justice, who is here again,³ presented, via the Hungarian Minister, the urgent request that the Government of the Reich, too, associate itself in written form with the written declaration of the Italian Government regarding the independence of the Arab states of Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine, and Syria. Only if there were a joint statement of the Axis Powers could the Iraq Government proceed to remove Foreign Minister Said and to foment immediately new disorders in Palestine. Everything was ready for it. In Iraq, except for some planes, there were no English troops. The situation in Syria was very difficult because the English Consul was seeking to stir up the French against the Pétain Government and food supplies were extremely short."

End of telegram from Therapia.

Please inform Count Ciano, with reference to the conversation of September 10, about the inquiry of the Iraq Minister of Justice, and at the same time ask him to communicate to you the alleged written declaration of the Italian Government of which the Iraq Minister of Justice spoke and which, according to the secretary of the Grand Mufti, is supposed to have been made on July 7 in the form of a letter from the Italian Minister in Baghdad to the Minister President of

¹ Pol. VII 2774 g.: Not found.

² Document No. 40.

³ See vol. x of this series, document No. 125.

Iraq. We have thus far had no knowledge of it. Please say that some sort of positive reply to the Iraq inquiry seems to us advisable in order to prevent a defection of the Iraqis; that, in this respect, however, we would be guided entirely by the wishes of the Italians.

Please report by wire.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ Document No. 57.

No. 52

271/177016

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

BUCHAREST, September 13, 1940—1:30 a. m.

No. 1584 of September 12

Received September 13—6:10 a. m.

Foreign Minister Manoilescu told me that he was entertaining the idea of breaking off diplomatic relations with England. He said this spontaneously (actually the Italian Minister has talked to him about this in private). The reason was:

1. The insulting attitude of the British Chargé d'Affaires, who rejected the Rumanian proposal to purchase the British Danube ships (cf. telegram No. 1556¹) with the remark that he allegedly could not even transmit such a proposal to London.

2. The German large-scale attack on England, regarding which Rumania wished to express her sympathy by this act. The Minister added that he did not wish to bring about the rupture if this did not suit Germany and Italy, because there was a danger in the case of a break that England might attack the petroleum area from the direction of the Aegean Sea before we had provided effective protection. In reply to my question on this point the Foreign Minister said that he did not yet have General Antonescu's consent to his inquiry.²

FABRICIUS

¹ Not found.

² On Sept. 14, Weizsäcker informed Ribbentrop that the High Command of the Wehrmacht was against Rumania's breaking with England at the present time, since the possibility of an attack on the Rumanian oil fields could not be entirely excluded (172/135645).

On Sept. 28, Weizsäcker instructed Fabricius to inform Manoilescu that an Anglo-Rumanian break ought to be avoided for the time being (172/135709).

No. 53

104/112507-09.

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

No. 1680

BERLIN, September 13, 1940.

zu W XII 5946.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 1912 of September 11.²

¹ W XII 5946: Not found.

² Document No. 50.

The Russian Ambassador here handed me the same memorandum on September 9.³ During the subsequent conversation I explained to him the difference between the European and the International Danube Commissions and emphasized that at Vienna it was merely a question of dissolving the International Danube Commission and making a provisional agreement for the duration of the war regarding measures necessitated by this dissolution to maintain unhindered navigation on the Danube. Moreover, the conversations in Vienna were apparently about over; after informing myself on this subject, I would make a further communication to him.

Having established that a provisional agreement was actually to be signed in Vienna on September 12, I gave an oral reply to the Russian Ambassador on September 12, prior to my handing him the following memorandum:⁴

"Heretofore, two international commissions were responsible for international Danube questions: The International Danube Commission dealt with the so-called fluvial Danube, i. e., the section of the Danube upstream from Brăila, and the European Danube Commission with the so-called maritime Danube, i. e., the section extending downstream from Brăila to the arms of the Danube delta.

1) The *International Danube Commission* was a creation of the Treaty of Versailles. Its actual function, to guarantee unhindered navigation on the Danube upward from Brăila, was of relatively minor importance and had been performed, prior to the establishment of the Commission, without such a large organization through the cooperation of the riparian countries. It was the intention of the Western Powers that the Commission should rather serve primarily to increase the opportunities of these Powers to exercise influence in southeastern Europe.

After Germany had withdrawn from the International Commission in 1936 and after Austria and Czechoslovakia later had disappeared, England, France, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary were still members of the Commission. That during the war it should continue its activity, which was rather insignificant from the outset—and with England and France as leading participants at that—was less and less in keeping with the new conditions. For this reason, the members of the rump Commission—with the exception of England and France—agreed at Germany's suggestion to consider the Commission as dissolved.

The experts from the participating Governments met in Vienna to discuss the questions requiring a provisional settlement as a result of the dissolution of the International Danube Commission. The result of these discussions is found in the enclosed provisional agreement,⁵ not intended for publication.

³Weizsäcker recorded the conversation with Shkvartsev in a memorandum of Sept. 9 (104/112475-78).

⁴Weizsäcker recorded this conversation in a memorandum of Sept. 12 to which were attached the memorandum quoted and also a special memorandum containing the text of the provisional agreement signed at Vienna on Sept. 12 by the governmental experts on Danubian questions who had met there from Sept. 5 to 12 (104/112495-500).

⁵See footnote 4.

After dissolution of the International Danube Commission, whose purpose had been predominantly political, only questions of a technical nature regarding navigation on the fluvial Danube remained to be settled. For this reason, there was no participation by the Soviet Government in the proceedings mentioned; all the more so, as the Soviet Union was never a member of the International Danube Commission and also is not one of the riparian countries of the fluvial Danube.

2) Since Germany's re-entry in 1939, the *European Danube Commission* consists of Germany, Italy, Rumania, England, and France. The German Government regards the accession of the Soviet Union as a matter of course, especially since the latter has become a riparian country of the maritime Danube. On the other hand, it considers further membership of England and France in the European Danube Commission no longer appropriate. The German Government is quite prepared to enter into an exchange of ideas with the Soviet Government on the questions of the European Danube Commission.[""]

For matters concerning the Danube above Brăila, the provisional agreement which follows by courier provides for establishment of an advisory committee consisting of the countries represented in Vienna—Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria. Also established are two subcommittees, one to wind up the International Danube Commission, and one to carry on the administration of the Iron Gate. The agreement in no way prejudices the settlement of questions regarding Danube navigation after peace has been concluded.

This is for your information and, if necessary, for the guidance of your conversation. We now intend to wait and see whether the Soviet Government will return to this matter, perhaps in the sense of a participation in the European Danube Commission; the Russian Ambassador here called this probable, when I handed him our memorandum. Incidentally, our conversation on this occasion took place without asperity.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 54

945/300041-47

*Letter of King Christian X of Denmark*¹

AMALIENBORG, September 13, 1940.

DEAR FRIEND: I have not had any opportunity to write to you since April. I am entrusting this letter to Consul General Langberg.² My thoughts are often with you and I have followed with sincere sympathy the tragic fate of France, which has also overtaken Belgium, Holland, and Norway. Poor Carl³ is now in London. The action is

¹ The addressee of this letter is not indicated. The text printed is a copy found in the file of Renthe-Fink.

² Michael Arentz Langberg, Danish Vice Consul at Nice.

³ i. e., King Haakon VII of Norway, King Christian's brother.

not yet over, and a certain well-known man may still break his neck. A letter written after such a long time may naturally contain [illegible word], but I shall limit myself to that which is most essential, and here that is the German occupation, which oppresses us all like a nightmare. I immediately set the tone with respect to the German General, and I have a talk with him at least once a week unless it is necessary to do so oftener. Although the conversations are painful to me, I believe nevertheless that they are useful, and I have the satisfaction that *my* people fully understand. The most difficult thing was to ameliorate conditions, especially when our own Nazis fraternized with the German soldiers and under the protection of the German soldiers tried to provoke brawls in the streets. After the first brawl I summoned the General and said that for his own sake and mine such a thing must never occur again, and I made an agreement with the General that if German soldiers participated in demonstrations, the police were to inform the German city commandant, who would then dispatch an officer to send the German soldiers home. On the following day an attempt at a repetition was made. The police phoned; a German officer ordered them off and the Danish demonstrators were given a proper drubbing. This cooperation is nationwide and is extremely effective for preserving calm. We handle our people and the Germans handle theirs. I had the most unpleasant experience with a 20-year-old youth who on a bet tried to steal a German machine gun but was caught by the German sentry and turned over to the command of the fortress, which under German law sentenced him to death by shooting. I summoned the German General and appealed to him earnestly not to shoot any of my subjects. We did not have any death penalty and the only effect of it would be to make a martyr out of the youth and thereby aggravate relations between the occupation troops and the population. To be sure, military laws applied in an enemy country, but the troops in our land called themselves our protectors. A combined court composed of an equal number of Germans and Danes was established. The Germans condemned him to death; the Danes, to 6 years' penal servitude; thereby he escaped with his life and on the day that the Germans leave the country he will be released. Some isolated cases of cutting of military telephone lines have occurred and these have been tried by our police, so that we now have a definite scale which by agreement with the Germans will be followed in the future. The worst people we have here are the uniformed civilians who belong to the propaganda department in Berlin and appear as inquisitive meddlers both in the ministries and in private transactions in order to investigate our economic relations. The German General told me that if we had only military personnel here, it would go much better. These civilians have caused a great deal of irritation, but I admit that after I had complained to

the German Minister this thing stopped—possibly they had by then found out all they wanted to know. I had a critical experience with Ribbentrop, who demanded that we conclude a customs and currency union with Germany, which would have meant the total ruin of our independent arrangements. Fortunately the entire Government supported me, so that we politely rejected this arrangement and pointed to the procedure of clearing hitherto followed.⁴ We already have one-half billion crowns' worth of Reich certificates [*Reichsscheine*], partly for goods and partly for services demanded by the German occupation troops for the construction of airfields and artillery positions. In my distress I wrote to Gustav of Sweden, who approved my position on the question. This strengthened me greatly. At the German Reichsbank the Director gave me his approval; Ribbentrop, on the other hand, stated that the rejection would harm Denmark when the reorganization of Europe is carried out. I followed the old saying: Don't buy the hide before the bear is killed. The conduct of the people toward the Germans is dignified. On the street they are ignored—which they do not appreciate. They do everything to make themselves popular, which has the opposite effect. The Germans do not understand that their presence here is not wanted. In the cemetery in Frederikshavn 80 Germans from a torpedoed transport are buried; in the same cemetery lies a fallen British flier and every day there are fresh wreaths on his grave—which does not please the Germans. The censorship which the Germans practice is of the worst kind. A newspaper vendor in the Amaliegade had said: four pages of lies, two pages of advertisements, all for 19 øre. I am strengthened by hearing the British radio. But telegrams from abroad no longer get into the newspaper, except for telegrams from Germany and Italy, and people curse when a telegram from Paris reports news which supposedly comes from Copenhagen. We were more fortunate than poor Norway. In this country the worst damage was suffered at Aalborg, which the British successfully bombed; there the Germans constructed a large airfield; the repairs after the bombing required 14 days; several Danes were also killed. Here in Copenhagen, too, there were air-raid alarms, because the British are dropping mines into the Sound; none of the British were shot down, however; the rest of us, on the other hand, received shell splinters, and nevertheless the Germans reported that the British had made an air attack on Copenhagen which had been repulsed, with 20 British planes shot down. This lie is really too brazen. In the Kattegat and the Great Belt, too, mines have been dropped, so that temporarily the connection between Korsør and Nyborg has been cut. Several German transports have been sunk

⁴ Cf. vol. x of this series, documents Nos. 189, 229, 268, and 332.

in the Great Belt and also off Hornbaek in the vicinity of Sjaelland's Reef and especially near Skagen. Humanly speaking it is painful to have seen these troops embark and then learn that 2 hours later they all drowned. I have spoken with people who saw them going to the Free Port and literally all of these young men wept so that the front part of their uniforms showed traces of tears. We were in Copenhagen all summer and the flag was waving day and night. The people appreciated it and in Jutland, where we generally stay 3 months, they also recognize that this was right. I myself had much to do; for example, my diary, which comprises 200 pages, has covered only about 2 months, but I am forcing myself to keep it and it is especially interesting on account of the German conversations. Adrini⁵ has been a great source of strength to me, although she has wept much over what has happened, just as she did in 1914. She dutifully goes into the air-raid shelter and dispenses chocolate. I did it only for 1 hour when the first 2-hour air-raid alarm was sounded, and now when the sirens shriek I turn over from my right to my left side; that is my preparedness. I had had *Rita* for 2 months at the yacht club and when time and the weather permitted I would sail along the coast to Skodsborg and back; but it has been years since we had such a nasty, wet, and cold August. Domestic politics must not be forgotten. I had a change of Ministers twice; that went off quite calmly. Now I have three politicians and three nonpoliticians; among the latter is Erik Scavenius; he committed a blunder in that he was altogether too active in behalf of the currency and customs union with Germany, just as he recently advocated that the Navy should help the Germans in mine sweeping. In this matter too, no one supported him and the German Admiral here realized that our refusal was right, but the gentlemen in Berlin thought that they knew better. I must acknowledge that after he had been repudiated for the second time Scavenius this time reported that he was sick, although I would have found it more proper if he had resigned. He thinks we are living in 1914 and fails to realize that April 9, 1940, is a totally different situation from the one at that time. Since I consider the communication that I received from Germany at the time of the occupation⁶ as the sole basis for our relations with Germany and since it was stated therein that Germany was taking over our defense and we sent all the troops home—2,000 for garrison duty—we could not therefore undertake the mine sweeping. The Germans expected a British landing in Jutland, which I said was impossible; I likewise do not believe that the British intend to bomb

⁵ i.e., Queen Alexandrine.

⁶ Apparently a reference to the German note presented Apr. 9, 1940. See vol. ix of this series, document No. 66.

Copenhagen. Here at home we are all well. Since we last saw each other I have gotten two grandchildren, both of whom are well. I wish all the more that the Germans may leave; the poor men only desire to go home to their families. I recently told the German General that we felt as if we had a dear mother-in-law in our home, but we looked forward to the day when she would leave.

The observance of my 70th birthday will be kept within modest bounds as a result of the presence of the guests, but I have consented to ride through the city on that day in an open car. The guard will not have any music parade, which the people will also understand. The Germans, on the other hand, march twice a week through the Østergade with 125 men and a commander on horseback in order to relieve 6 men in front of the d'Angleterre, where the General lives under a large Nazi flag, as a result of which no one goes there, so that the war profit of the proprietor has been considerably reduced. And some of the servants come from Berlin, since the Germans consider the Danish personnel as spies.

I could write much more, but I consider this letter long enough.

With cordial greetings to both of you, I am,

Yours, etc.

CHRISTIAN

P. S. Consul Jarding, who is in Cannes, is receiving this letter, since it is easier that way.

No. 55

205/142544

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, September 14, 1940—8:00 p. m.

No. 1421 of September 14

Received September 14—10:50 p. m.

To be kept secret.

I had an opportunity today to talk exhaustively with the King of Sweden about the devastating effect of the press here on German-Swedish relations. The King, who was completely informed through the Foreign Minister, showed real understanding for my serious complaints regarding the attitude of the newspapers here. In case the latest admonitions of the Foreign Minister are unsuccessful, he is prepared, personally, to warn in the sharpest form the representatives of the press. The Swedish Constitution does not provide for any drastic measures against the press. The King told me, however, that he was willing, if need be, to proceed unconstitutionally.

Please also transmit the foregoing text to the Reichsmarschall.

WIED

No. 56

711/262287-89

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1956 of September 14 Moscow, September 14, 1940—11:10 p. m.
Received September 15—3:00 a. m.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 1912 of September 11,¹ 1930 of September 13,² and 1932.³

Molotov asked me to see him today and made the following statement:

The Soviet Ambassador had briefly reported by telegram about the substance of the German position on the question of the Danube Commission, and indicated that a detailed report would follow. The Soviet Government attaches great importance to bringing about complete clarity in this question, and has therefore put its position down in writing with the reservation that it might make further communications as a result of Shkvartsev's written report. With these words, Molotov handed me the memorandum,⁴ the beginning of which contains the substance of the answer given to Shkvartsev,⁵ and then renders the Soviet Government's position about as follows:

"The Soviet Government recognizes that the purpose of the formation of the International Danube Commission was to strengthen English and long-standing French influence on the Danube, including also that part which runs through Germany. This therefore constituted an act inimical to Germany. For this reason, the Soviet Government considers the termination of the Danube Commission justified.

"The Soviet Government, however, sees no reason for the continued existence of the European Danube Commission since its formation dates back to the Paris Treaty of 1856, and was aimed at establishing a predominant position of England and France on the lower Danube, at the expense of Russia's interests. The Treaty of Versailles, by excluding the Soviet Union, strengthened the Commission's role as a tool of the Anglo-French bloc directed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, therefore, finds it necessary to liquidate the European Danube Commission as well.

"The Soviet Government does not intend to participate in those questions which deal with the Danube above Bratislava, as the Danube flows through Germany in that part. But the Soviet Government considers it necessary to establish an international statute for the

¹ Document No. 50.

² Not printed (711/262292). This telegram reported that the Soviet press had just published the text of the memorandum handed to Schulenburg by Vyshinsky (see document No. 50).

³ Not printed (271/177018).

⁴ The Soviet text, with a German translation of this memorandum, which bore the date of Sept. 14, was sent by Schulenburg to Berlin on Sept. 16 (711/262278-84).

⁵ See document No. 53.

Danube from Bratislava down to the river's mouth in accordance with the interests of riparian states, that is, the Soviet Union, Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia. That is why the Soviet Government likewise deems necessary the formation of a new Danube commission, in which the Soviet Government is all the more interested since it considers Soviet trade with the Danubian states as vital for all parts concerned and this trade is developing successfully."

I wish to recommend most strongly that the aforesaid desire of the Soviet Government be met as far as possible, especially since this would certainly temper their displeasure at the Vienna conversations. Molotov was in a talkative and amiable mood today.

SCHULENBURG

No. 57

71/50710-11

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

Special Security Handling
No. 1677 of September 14

ROME, September 14, 1940—11:45 p. m.
Received September 15—12:15 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1253 of September 12.¹

I called on Count Ciano at noon today and informed him, in connection with the conversation of September 10,² of the substance of the telegram cited above; at the same time I stated that—and why—some kind of positive reply to the Iraq inquiry seemed to us advisable, but that we would be guided in this respect entirely by Italy's wishes.

Ciano, [laughing as he said it],³ immediately characterized as pure fantasy the assertion of the Iraq Minister of Justice that Italy had some time ago given a written declaration on the independence of the Arab countries. Being interested in the opposite, he would take care not to make such statements. In order, however, to be quite sure about his reply to me, he summoned his specialist, Guarigliana Schelli.⁴ The latter confirmed without hesitation what Ciano had told me, and at Ciano's request, also fetched the file in question. According to this, the actual facts in the case are these: The Italian Minister⁵ in June and later on again in July (not on the 7th, but on the 15th) expressed himself in Baghdad in rather general terms, repeating, moreover, what the Bari radio had reported several times before, namely, the very general statement that Italy was interested in seeing the Arab states succeed

¹ Document No. 51.

² See document No. 40.

³ The words in brackets were garbled in transmission, and have been supplied from the Rome copy (2281/481585-87).

⁴ Guarnaschelli is meant.

⁵ Luigi Gabrielli.

in preserving or winning their independence from England with their territorial integrity left intact by the British. For purely propagandistic reasons, such statements by the Italian Minister seemed useful at the time, but they were never in the nature of a binding statement of any kind nor were they ever in their entirety put down in writing.

Ciano asked Signor Guarigliana on this occasion how the reply was proceeding which I was to receive, concerning the questions raised in our conversation of the 10th. Guarigliana stated that the memorandum had just been completed and was ready to be submitted. Ciano thereupon asked that it be brought to him at once and stated, while he read it aloud, that it, too, confirmed the fact that no commitments of any kind had been made in writing. Moreover, he said that the Italian attitude, as presented in the memorandum, met our wishes, in so far as it was not negative, but termed advantageous a certain compliance with Arab wishes, even if this compliance naturally fell short of these extensive wishes. Italy had already spent millions on her relations with the Grand Mufti, without achieving any notable results.

Count Ciano let me have the text of the memorandum submitted by Guarigliana, which I am transmitting in translation in the following telegram.⁶ He mentioned in conclusion that he would, indeed, shortly have the opportunity to discuss this matter also with the Reich Foreign Minister.

Alfieri, who was still with Ciano when the latter asked me into his study, witnessed the conversation, with my consent.

MACKENSEN

⁶ Document No. 58.

No. 58

71/50712-13

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Special Security Handling ROME, September 14, 1940—11:55 p. m.
 TOP SECRET Received September 15—12:15 a. m.
 No. 1678 of September 14

With reference to my telegram No. 1677 of September 14.¹

Translation of the [Italian] memorandum. Secret.

The proposals submitted in Berlin by Tewfik al-Shakir, the private secretary of the Mufti, have been studied with interest and our thanks are expressed for the friendly communication.

According to these proposals, the Axis Powers are to recognize publicly the independence of the Arab states, the absence of any intention

¹ Document No. 57.

at all of restricting this independence, the right of the Arab states to form a "union."

Such a public declaration is not considered expedient. It should be mentioned, among other things, that the granting of unlimited independence to the Arab states would then make it possible for these states to fall under the influence of other powers, and might be dangerous to their own territorial integrity and independence, since they possess no adequate experience in complete self-government, and are too weak.

These remarks must naturally remain strictly confidential.

It should also be noted that reports in our possession consistently justify the assumption that Iraq is not in a position, even if she receives financial support, to organize a *large-scale* rebellion in the Arab Levant states. There is not even a basis for supposing that Iraq (even assuming that it succeeded in taking an attitude of strict neutrality) would be strong enough to prevent English and Indian troops from passing through its territory and to protect its own neutrality.

It does not seem expedient, nevertheless, to ignore the suggestions made to us. It would therefore be advisable to take a dilatory attitude toward the Arabs. Thus far assurances have been given orally and not officially in favor of the independence and the integrity of the Arab states. These assurances were of a general nature, and they could be reiterated orally and also by radio. We should not go beyond that, however. We intend, moreover, to grant the request of the Mufti for financial assistance, even though it is not in the amount indicated. This financial aid might make it possible for the Mufti to resume attempts at assassination, disruption of lines of communications, of pipelines, etc., to the detriment of England, as is his intention.

As far as the resumption of diplomatic relations between Germany and Iraq is concerned, this would naturally be welcomed by us.

Rome, September 11, 1940. Conclusion of the translation.

MACKENSEN

No. 59

121/119884-85

Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

PARIS, September 14, 1940.

No. 595 of September 14

Received September 15—4:15 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Minister Baudouin, who called on me today, described the situation in Indochina, French Equatorial Africa, and French North Africa.

1) Indochina.

He asked that the Germans intervene with the Japanese Government in order to halt Tokyo's projected movement of troops to Tonkin, because this would immediately lead to an invasion by the elite divisions of Chiang Kai-shek. In the Franco-Japanese Agreement

of the end of August 1940¹ France recognized Japanese hegemony in the new order in East Asia, the most far-reaching prerogatives in the economy of Indochina and military controls in Indochina in return for Japanese [consent to] Indochina's remaining under France. The impending military complications meant France's loss of Indochina, which was very important also for Germany because of rubber, rice, and other shipments. The United States was two-faced on the question of Indochina. At the request of the French Government the American Government, through Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, indicated in unmistakable language its decision not to intervene,² although American business is protesting against the rights granted to Japanese business in Indochina.

2) French Equatorial Africa.

The revolt stirred up by England affects areas which form landing stages to the Sudan and follow the route taken at one time by Marchand's Fashoda expedition. Countermeasures by the French Government via the Niger Colony are impossible during the next month because of the rainy season. The key position for fighting the rebellion is therefore the port city of Pointe-Noire with the railroad line to Brazzaville. Some French fleet units which left Toulon a few days ago by way of Gibraltar are heading for Pointe-Noire. Yesterday British fleet units left Gibraltar likewise with Pointe-Noire as their destination. The port of Dakar is protected by the battleship *Richelieu* which, although it cannot be maneuvered, has its guns ready for battle. Off Pointe-Noire is the British cruiser *Delhi*. After the French units arrive, the *Delhi* will be given an ultimatum to leave, and in case of refusal fire will be opened.

3) French North Africa.

The French Government has no confirmation of the rumors about an air landing by de Gaulle in Tunis. The situation in French North Africa is no longer so precarious as it was only 8 days ago. A relaxation of the demobilization provisions for the purpose of upholding the authority of the French Government is, however, necessary.

I took a completely noncommittal attitude toward the statements of Baudouin. I remarked that the questions of the African colonial territories were being handled by the Italian Armistice Commission. Whether there was an agreement with the Axis Powers on the Japanese course of action in East Asia or whether such agreement was reached in each individual case, I did not know.

ABETZ

¹ See document No. 8.

² On the position of the United States with regard to Japanese actions affecting French Indochina, see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. II, pp. 289 ff.

No. 60

35/22854

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1940—6:10 a. m.

No. 1966 of September 14 - Received September 15—6:30 a. m.

For OKW, Foreign Department [*Ausland*], OKH Attaché Branch, and Air Ministry, Attaché Group.

American Army

1. Starting September 16, 4 divisions of the National Guard (30th, 41st, 44th, and 45th) will be called in for active service for 1 year. Also a number of troop units of the Coast Artillery as well as 4 observation sections of the National Guard. Part of the Coast Artillery units will be used at once at their coast defense installations, which provide conditions similar to those in time of war. Details (see written report ¹).

Thus, from September 16 on, the United States Army will consist of 9 infantry divisions of the Regular Army—4 of them not yet ready—2 armored divisions, not yet ready, 1 cavalry division, and 4 entirely unready National Guard divisions called in for active service.

It remains to be seen what further divisions of the militia will still join the active Army. Also the drafting of recruits on the basis of general compulsory military service.

2. Following the large-scale troop maneuvers there was public criticism, some of it very sharp, regarding the training, efficiency, and equipment of the American Army and its Air Force.

I urgently recommend that these typically American criticisms not be given too much credence. In the course of 1941 and by the summer of 1942 *at the latest* an army of 1,200,000 men, excellently equipped and trained, and with the highest morale, as well as a constantly growing Air Force of the first order must be counted on.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

¹ Not found.

No. 61

C109/C002190-94

Memorandum by Dr. Albrecht Haushofer

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, September 15, 1940.

ARE THERE STILL POSSIBILITIES OF A GERMAN-ENGLISH PEACE?

On September 8 I was summoned to Bad G. to report to the Deputy of the Führer ¹ on the subject discussed in this memorandum. The conversation which the two of us had alone lasted 2 hours. I had the opportunity to speak in all frankness.

I was immediately asked about the possibilities of making known to persons of importance in England Hitler's serious desire for peace.

¹ Rudolf Hess.

It was quite clear that the continuance of the war was suicidal for the white race. Even with complete success in Europe, Germany was not in a position to take over inheritance of the Empire. The Führer had not wanted to see the Empire destroyed and did not want it even today. Was there not somebody in England who was ready for peace?

First I asked for permission to discuss fundamental things. It was necessary to realize that not only Jews and Freemasons, but practically all Englishmen who mattered, regarded a treaty signed by the Führer as a worthless scrap of paper. To the question as to why this was so, I referred to the 10-year term of our Polish Treaty,² to the Non-Aggression Pact with Denmark, signed only a year ago,³ to the "final" frontier demarcation of Munich.⁴ What guarantee did England have that a new treaty would not be broken again at once if it suited us? It must be realized that, even in the Anglo-Saxon world, the Führer was regarded as Satan's representative on earth and had to be fought. If the worst came to the worst, the English would rather transfer their whole Empire bit by bit to the Americans than sign a peace that left to National Socialist Germany the mastery of Europe. The present war, I am convinced, shows that Europe has become too small for its previous anarchic form of existence; it is only through close German-English cooperation that it can achieve a true federative order (based by no means merely on the police rule of a single power), while maintaining a part of its world position and having security against Soviet Russian Eurasia. France was smashed, probably for a long time to come, and we had opportunity currently to observe what Italy is capable of accomplishing. As long, however, as German-English rivalry existed, and in so far as both sides thought in terms of security, the lesson of this war was this: Every German had to tell himself: we have no security as long as provision is not made that the Atlantic gateways of Europe from Gibraltar to Narvik are free of any possible blockade. That is: there must be no English fleet. Every Englishman must, however, under the same conditions, argue: we have no security as long as anywhere within a radius of 2,000 kilometers from London there is a plane that we do not control. That is: there must be no German air force. There is only one way out of this dilemma: friendship intensified to fusion, with a joint fleet, a joint air force, and joint defense of possessions in the world—just what the English are now about to conclude with the United States. Here I was interrupted and asked why, indeed, the English were prepared to seek such a relationship with America and not with us. My reply was: because Roosevelt is a

² See Series C, vol. II, document No. 219.

³ See vol. VI of this series, document No. 461.

⁴ See vol. II of this series, document No. 675.

man, and represents a *Weltanschauung* and a way of life, that the Englishman thinks he understands, to which he can become accustomed, even where it does not seem to be to his liking. Perhaps he fools himself—but, at any rate, that is what he believes. A man like Churchill—himself half-American—is convinced of it. Hitler, however, seems to the Englishman the incarnation of what he hates, what he has fought against for centuries—this feeling grips the worker no less than the plutocrats. In fact, I am of the opinion that those Englishmen who have property to lose, that is, precisely the portions of the so-called plutocracy that count, are those who would be readiest to talk peace. But even they regard a peace only as an armistice. I was compelled to express these things so strongly because I ought not—precisely because of my long experience in attempting to effect a settlement with England in the past and my numerous English friendships—make it appear that I seriously believe in the possibility of a settlement between Adolf Hitler and England in the present stage of development. I was thereupon asked whether I was not of the opinion that feelers had perhaps not been successful because the right language had not been used. I replied that, to be sure—if certain persons, whom we both knew well, were meant by this statement—then certainly the wrong language had been used. But at the present stage this had little significance. I was then asked directly why all Englishmen were so opposed to Herr v. R[ibbentrop]. I conceded that, in the eyes of the English, Herr v. R., like some other personages, played, to be sure, the same role as did Duff Cooper, Eden, and Churchill in the eyes of the Germans. In the case of Herr v. R., there was also the conviction, precisely in the view of Englishmen who were formerly friendly to Germany that—from completely biased motives—he had informed the Führer wrongly about England and that he personally bore an unusually large share of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. But I again stressed the fact that the rejection of peace feelers by England was today due not so much to persons as to the fundamental outlook mentioned above.

Nevertheless, I was asked to name those whom I thought might be reached as possible contacts. I mentioned, among diplomats, Minister O'Malley in Budapest,⁵ the former head of the Southeastern Department of the Foreign Office, a clever person in the higher echelons of officialdom, but perhaps without influence precisely because of his former friendliness toward Germany; Sir Samuel Hoare, who is half-shelved and half on the watch in Madrid, whom I do not know well personally, but to whom I can at any time open a personal path; as the most promising, the Washington Ambassador Lothian, with whom I have had close personal connections for years, who as a member of the highest aristocracy and at the same time as a person of

⁵ Owen St. Clair O'Malley, British Minister in Hungary since 1939.

very independent mind, is perhaps best in a position to undertake a bold step—provided that he could be convinced that even a bad and uncertain peace would be better than the continuance of the war—a conviction at which he will only arrive if he convinces himself in Washington that English hopes of America are not realizable. Whether or not this is so could only be judged in Washington itself; from Germany not at all. As the final possibility I then mentioned that of a personal meeting on neutral soil with the closest of my English friends: the young Duke of Hamilton, who has access at all times to all important persons in London, even to Churchill and the King. I stressed in this case the inevitable difficulty of making a contact and again repeated my conviction of the improbability of its succeeding—whatever approach we took.

The upshot of the conversation was H.'s statement that he would consider the whole matter thoroughly once more and send me word in case I was to take steps. For this extremely ticklish case, and in the event that I might possibly have to make a trip alone—I asked for very precise directives from the highest authority. From the whole conversation I had the strong impression that it was not conducted without the prior knowledge of the Führer, and that I probably would not hear any more about the matter unless a new understanding had been reached between him and his Deputy.

On the personal side of the conversation I must say that—despite the fact that I felt bound to say unusually hard things—it ended in great friendliness, even cordiality. I spent the night in Bad G. and the next morning still had the opportunity, on a walk together, in the presence of the Chief Adjutant, to bring up all the volksdeutsch questions from the resettlement in all parts of Europe to the difficulties as to personnel in the central offices in Berlin—which resulted in H.'s direct intervention.

A[LBRECHT] H[AUSHOFER]

No. 62

F18/447-448

Unsigned Memorandum

BERLIN, September 16, 1940.

BRIEF FOR THE CONVERSATION WITH SUÑER REGARDING SPANISH REQUESTS FOR DELIVERIES

1) Military material.

Requested amounts are too high.¹ The individual items requested cannot be evaluated until it is known for what military actions the

¹ See document No. 30.

weapons are to be used. In general the OKW is of the opinion that support by complete German military units would be more effective than deliveries of weapons to Spain.

Separate items:

One hundred long-barrel guns and 100 mortars cannot be delivered from captured French matériel in these amounts; moreover, the captured matériel has not yet been adequately inspected and repaired for immediate delivery.

Twenty-four mobile coastal guns and 100 anti-aircraft guns from our own stocks can also not be delivered in these amounts; delivery of anti-aircraft guns is especially difficult at the moment.

Three squadrons of seaplanes would likewise be very difficult at the moment; however, delivery of a limited number could be considered if absolutely necessary.

With respect to anti-aircraft guns and planes it should be kept in mind that the Spaniards are already familiar with our matériel, so that here delivery of the weapons even without crews could be advantageous. In the case of the heavy artillery, however, a lengthy training period for Spanish soldiers is necessary.

2) Economic deliveries.² (All amounts requested by the Spaniards seem to be greatly exaggerated and should be checked.)

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| a) 6-7,000 tons bread grain | Can be delivered. |
| b) 4,000 tons gasoline | We need more exact data as to time of delivery and minimum quantities absolutely needed; it will be possible to deliver these. |
| 100,000 tons diesel oil | |
| 200,000 tons kerosene | |
| 40,000 tons lubricating oil | |
| c) 200,000 tons coal | Can also be delivered. |
| d) 625,000 tons nitrogen fertilizer | Can be delivered by postponing important German needs. |
| e) 100,000-150,000 tons scrap | Can be delivered. |
| 100,000 tons paper pulp | |
| 48,000 tons cellulose | |
| f) 35,000 tons manganese ore | Can be delivered by Germany. |
| 25,000 tons crude rubber | |
| 100,000 tons cotton | |
| 25,000 tons manila hemp and jute | |
| 30,000 tons peanut seeds | |

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 355.

No. 63

F14/428-446

Unsigned Memorandum

RM 29

BERLIN, September 17, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE SPANISH MINISTER OF INTERIOR, SERRANO SUÑER, ON SEPTEMBER 16, 1940, AT 11:00 A. M.

Serrano Suñer expressed his thanks, in the first place, for the very cordial reception given him in Germany, and the Foreign Minister replied that he was happy to get to know Señor Suñer personally; his friend Ciano had already told him so much about him that he was no longer a stranger to him. The reception which Berlin could give the Spanish guest was unfortunately only a wartime one, as was now always the case with all receptions owing to the danger of air raids. He (the Foreign Minister) hoped, however, that Serrano Suñer would also visit Berlin in peacetime at some future date, when it would be possible to give him quite a different reception.

Suñer expressed his conviction that Germany and Spain should come into closer contact. After having supported one another heretofore almost solely through the press, the two countries ought now to get to know each other better politically, too. His present visit was the first official contact between the two Governments. In this connection the Foreign Minister made an appreciative remark about the attitude of the Spanish press. Serrano Suñer pointed to his leading article in the newspaper *Arriba*. He now wished to discuss the questions to be dealt with between Spain and Germany with the same sincerity. He was not a diplomat, but had been sent to Germany with a concrete mission as the representative of the Spanish Government and as the personal agent of Generalissimo Franco.

After the Civil War Spain had had to suffer under great economic difficulties and dislocations. These difficulties were expressed particularly in the lack of grain, gasoline, and war material. Nevertheless Spain did not want to stand aside in the fight for the new order in Europe, after having already made a not inconsiderable contribution to this conflict through her Civil War. Spain wanted "to be present in an effective way," and therefore to participate in the present war; without the previously mentioned economic difficulties she would have entered the war long ago. However, she was now willing to join the fight in spite of these difficulties in proportion to the support that could be given her in augmenting her inadequate supplies. It was a question of assuring the delivery to Spain of the materials that were absolutely necessary for such a struggle.

Moreover, in entering the war Spain wanted to conform entirely to the general plan of Germany and wanted to avoid possibly becoming a burden to Germany in the further course of events.

Public opinion, which some time ago had been entirely unprepared for Spain's entry into the war, regarded such entry in an absolutely positive way, and also the Army, but especially the youth united in the Falange, had an affirmative attitude toward Spain's participation in the conflict. Only a small part of the Spanish public took a negative attitude, but such minorities existed in every country.

Serrano Suñer stressed Franco's wish not to enter the conflict precipitately and not to divert Germany from her main objective.

Regarding relations with England he stated that they became more difficult every day. England blocked Spain's imports of foodstuffs, made difficulties in gasoline deliveries, and refused to issue her navicerts. This could easily bring about a situation no longer compatible with Spain's honor and her instinct to defend herself.

Moreover, Spain was awaiting with great impatience the possibility of an operation against Gibraltar.

In all candor, however, he had to say that in Spain they had noted with some surprise that the materials necessary for carrying on war, especially artillery, had not yet arrived from Germany. Without artillery they could defend neither the Straits of Gibraltar nor the Canary Islands. Spain had resorted to makeshift measures in removing 15.24 cm. ships' guns from a number of cruisers and setting them up at the endangered spots. But for really effective artillery large coastal batteries were needed. Spain needed 10 guns to forestall a landing by the English in Tarifa, for which from all accounts the plans had already been made.

On the other hand Spain would fully understand if at this moment Germany might have no interest in the Spanish affair since she was occupied elsewhere in her fight against England. They would also understand in Spain that possibly at the desire of the Italians the operations against the other gateway to the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, were for the time being to be given priority. After all, they were aware in Spain of the fact that so far Germany had had extraordinary success with tactical surprises and possibly for this reason, too, wanted to proceed with reserve at first in Spain. Precisely because of the surprise factor, however, he would advise having the desired guns set up at Gibraltar in good time, so as to be able to intervene all the faster when the time came.

In the further course of the conversation Serrano Suñer then came to speak of the note verbale containing the Spanish wishes with regard to Gibraltar and Morocco, delivered by the Spanish Embassy in Berlin on June 17 [19].¹ He stated that the matter had been pre-

¹ See vol. IX of this series, document No. 488.

sented by the Embassy here in a not very fortunate way, and stressed that so far no answer had been forthcoming from the German side.

As regards Morocco he gave expression to the Spanish Government's fears as to the further development of conditions there. He termed the present situation not good, but emphasized that Spain was ready and was effectively prepared for all contingencies. As regards the future position of Morocco, he appealed to Germany's reason and sense of justice and stated that Spain's desire was to get all of French Morocco in her hands. Morocco belonged to Spain's Lebensraum and was an area which from the economic standpoint compensated for certain of Spain's deficiencies in agricultural production, and with its phosphates could deliver the necessary fertilizers for Spanish agriculture. From the political standpoint it was the natural and historical objective of Spanish expansion. The present division into the Tangier zone and the French and Spanish zones was something entirely unnatural. Morocco had to become a Spanish protectorate as one unit. Its population was notoriously unable politically and administratively to govern itself and therefore some European country had to exercise general supervision in any case. Among the European countries Spain alone came into question for this supervision, both by geography and by tradition. Whereas for Spain, Morocco was a natural objective of expansion, the French expansion to Morocco had an aggressive character.

Also from the standpoint of security it was absolutely necessary for Spain to acquire all of Morocco. Besides her 1,200 km. border with Portugal, which at times had been synonymous with a border with England, and her 600 km. border with France, she now also possessed an extraordinarily vulnerable 300 km. border with French Morocco.

The Foreign Minister interjected here that since the defeat of France neither the French-Spanish nor the Portuguese-Spanish border could represent any sort of threat. Moreover, the Portuguese would no longer tolerate England's possibly gaining a foothold on their soil.

Serrano Suñer replied, however, that Spain had enough to do with her two European borders and wanted to make the Moroccan border absolutely sure by shifting it to the Sahara.

Moreover, Spain demanded the region of Oran, since the population there was Spanish. Finally, she also wanted to lay claim to a small border rectification south of the Spanish colony Rio de Oro as far as Bahia del Galgo.

Spain had great understanding for Germany's economic interests. Although Morocco's mineral wealth, especially phosphates, lead, cobalt, and other raw materials, had been greatly exaggerated, Spain was nevertheless willing to admit special treatment for Germany (*régimen de comercio excepcional*).

Moreover Serrano Suñer stressed that also from the standpoint of internal order in Spain and because of the consolidation of the National Revolution, an action in the field of foreign policy was necessary. Of course this was a Spanish interest in the first place, but Germany and Italy were also interested in the inner soundness of the Spanish regime in bringing about the new order in Europe.

As far as Italy was concerned Serrano Suñer stated that in Spain they had a high regard for the Italians as true friends, but believed that Spain herself also had a right to the position of a great power.

After a remark concerning the somewhat difficult defense position of the Canary Islands at present, Serrano Suñer came to speak of Portugal. The situation in this country had at times caused Spain great concern. Spain would not forget the understanding attitude of Portugal during the Civil War. However, one could not avoid the realization in looking at the map of Europe that geographically speaking Portugal really had no right to exist; she had only a moral and political justification for independence as a result of her almost 800-year existence. Spain recognized this, but had to require that Portugal align herself with the Spanish group, also in her political attitude. Portugal had been very much concerned about Germany's advance in France as far as Hendaye. However, he had explained to the Portuguese Ambassador in Madrid that Portugal's fear of Germany was justified only to the extent that Portugal let her policy be influenced by England. If Portuguese policy were no longer subject to English influence, then every reason for fearing Germany would disappear.

When the Foreign Minister asked what the Portuguese had answered, Serrano Suñer replied that Portugal's attitude had thereupon improved somewhat. However, Portugal had not believed in German victory and so her policy had been vacillating. She had merely concluded a protocol with Spain which toward the outside meant a rapprochement by Portugal with the authoritarian states.² If at that time Germany and Spain had made a joint diplomatic effort with Portugal, she could perhaps have been drawn entirely over to the side of the authoritarian states. In this connection Serrano Suñer criticized the attitude of the Spanish diplomats rather sharply and underlined once more how easy it was to influence Portugal by means of joint pressure on the part of Germany and Spain.

Serrano Suñer then announced that he wanted to say a number of things about America and especially about Mexico, an intention, however, which he did not carry out in the further course of the conversation.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 95.

With the aid of a map,³ which he then gave the Foreign Minister, he explained the Spanish territorial claims, which in the main coincided with those noted on the German map.

The Foreign Minister replied that he could agree in principle to the territorial demands, but would later come back to certain details. He explained the delimitation of areas of influence between Italy, Spain, and Germany in Africa and stressed that Germany claimed for herself the entire area in Central Africa.

Then the Foreign Minister explained the German standpoint in general and expressed great satisfaction that Spain had undertaken a revision of her former attitude and was willing in principle to enter the war. In the assumption that Franco's letter to the Führer⁴ contained approximately what Serrano Suñer had just said regarding the Spanish standpoint, and without wanting to anticipate the Führer in any way, he could nevertheless even now communicate Germany's basic position.

Serrano Suñer interjected that the letter to the Führer contained only the statement that Spain would do everything in her power to intervene effectively in the struggle, and that the Spaniards were anxious, after a number of sporadic feelers, now formally to make contact with the German statesmen by sending to Germany the Minister of Interior as a Cabinet member and personal agent of Spain.

Then the Foreign Minister spoke of the fact that the Spanish note regarding claims in Morocco and Gibraltar had not been answered. The question was so important that they had subjected it to close study in Germany. Through the Embassy in Madrid and through Admiral Canaris they had made inquiries in order to obtain an exact overall picture of the situation.⁵ Therefore it was good that the answer could now be made in the course of personal contact with a Spanish Cabinet member, for notes of reply and written expositions usually contributed less to the solution of problems than personal contact and acts. The Foreign Minister then described the common ideological bonds between Spain and Germany. Even if Germany had not wanted to do so, she would nevertheless, on the basis of their common ideology, finally have come to render assistance in the struggle of the new, young forces in Europe. Thus the Führer and Mussolini had also stood at the side of Spain in her Civil War. Today Germany and Italy were glad that they had decided on this help at the time, for it was precisely in the southwest of Europe that they could use a new Spain. At the time there had been great rejoicing in Germany at Franco's victory in the Civil War, and they also understood very well

³ Not found.

⁴ Document No. 48.

⁵ See vol. x of this series, documents Nos. 274, 313, 369, and 373.

that owing to the necessary work of reconstruction Spain could not enter the war the very first day. Now, however, the situation had undergone a basic change as compared with the beginning of the war. Germany had destroyed France and would ensure that in future that country would never again play a role that could in any way lead to new conflicts. Germany was now involved in a decisive battle against England, as was also Italy, whose attack on Egypt had begun day before yesterday. England would now be finally defeated. It was hard to predict how long the war would go on. The Führer had recently given the answer to this question to a foreign statesman, by saying that Germany would do everything to conquer England quickly, but was also prepared for a longer war. He (the Foreign Minister) believed personally that the war would be short. Victory by Germany and Italy was absolutely certain and could no longer be snatched from the grasp of the two countries. In England things were getting worse and worse. After a while there would be nothing left of London but rubble and ashes. Really patriotic Englishmen should actually hope for an early German invasion, since otherwise the whole country would be destroyed. The British had two possibilities: either give up the war now or take off with their Government to America, in which case the British Isles would be occupied by Germany. Germany would take care that no more Anglo-Saxons landed on the European Continent. For practical purposes the war was already decided. Whether England would succeed in drawing America actively into the conflict was extremely doubtful. The Americans wanted merely to play the role of an heir to the British Empire. Nevertheless Germany was today still involved in the decisive battle with England. He (the Foreign Minister) had the task of doing everything on the political side to make the war easier for the German soldiers. Therefore Germany welcomed every new ally and would be happy if Spain would also enter the war.

In this connection the Foreign Minister spoke of the Duke of Alba's reports from London, which the Spanish Government had kindly made available to him through the German Embassy in Madrid. He doubted whether these reports really corresponded to the facts. Suñer shared the Foreign Minister's opinion and reported that Alba had stated even during the battle in Flanders that the Germans would never be able to push beyond Holland. Only when a German aerial bomb recently hit near the Spanish Embassy in London did he regard the situation for England as less favorable. The Foreign Minister mentioned in this connection Alba's attitude during the life of the Non-Intervention Committee.⁶ At that time he had even tried to get the German auxiliaries out of Spain as quickly as possible. He was in a

⁶ The International Committee for the Application of Non-Intervention in Spain. See vol. III of this series.

difficult situation in his double position as a Scottish nobleman and a Spanish grandee, and was extraordinarily susceptible to British influence. His main source of information was Vansittart. Serrano Suñer expressed himself in a similar way regarding the Duke of Alba. It had not been possible for the young Spain to fill all diplomatic posts in a suitable way, and therefore holdovers of the former regime, such as the Duke of Alba and others, were simply still at their posts today. Suñer also mentioned the Marquis de Magaz in this connection. Spain had been badly represented in Berlin. The Ambassador had not only been too old, but he had also had too liberalistic an attitude.

Returning to the general questions the Foreign Minister stressed the task that awaited Germany, Italy, and Spain after the victory, which was no longer in doubt. It would be a matter of reorganizing Europe and the African area. He was glad that beside the two countries, Germany and Italy, an additional great country would participate in the reorganization of these areas. For through her entry into the war Spain would be able to play the important role appropriate to her. At the same time he wanted to stress, however, that Spain's entry into the war would take place entirely of her own free will, on condition that the necessary military and economic assistance were accorded her.

Upon an inquiry as to Spain's needs Serrano Suñer mentioned the following points:

In grain there was a shortage of 600,000 tons, which could be reduced to 400,000 tons by imports from abroad and from French Morocco. This latter amount was the absolute minimum contribution which Spain could not get along without.

Serrano Suñer set Spain's war needs of gasoline at 56,000 tons a month. When the Foreign Minister pointed out to him that after all in the present military situation no large-scale troop movements were necessary in Spain, Serrano Suñer replied that nevertheless there was a possibility of an English attack on the northern coast of Spain at the Atlantic Ocean. Moreover, the population there was not reliable, and an attacker might receive support from the Communist elements of the population, which were very strong in this area. Furthermore, no one knew how the still very strong French Army in Morocco would act. It was not impossible that it would place itself at the disposal of England or General de Gaulle. Present supplies of gasoline would last for 115 days in the case of motor vehicle gasoline, and 250 days in the case of aviation gasoline, whereas stocks of lubricating oils were very low. The Foreign Minister pointed out to Serrano Suñer that aggressive actions at the Atlantic coast or at other points on Spanish territory were not very probable in view of the presence of a few groups of dive bombers. For as soon as German dive bombers appeared on the scene all the ships within a radius of several hundred

kilometers would have to withdraw. Moreover, the figures seemed to him to be too high, especially with regard to the gasoline, since, as he had said, large-scale troop movements would not be involved. In any case, however, Spain would be delivered what was absolutely necessary to her. Germany could also make available sufficient quantities of coal, nitrogen, and scrap. But Germany could not furnish crude rubber, cotton, Manila hemp, and a few other commodities requested by Spain. For the rest he believed that the end phase of the war in which Spain would participate would only be short, but he could give assurance that even if the war should drag on for a longer time Spain would be furnished what was really necessary to her.

As regards military support, the Führer would communicate everything necessary during tomorrow's conference. He (the Foreign Minister) wanted today to say only that to him the military side of the problem did not seem difficult to solve.

With the aid of the German map the territorial questions were then discussed once more; the Foreign Minister spoke of the Führer's wish that Spain might cede Germany one of the Canary Islands so that a German base might be established there. Also Germany wanted to set up bases in Agadir and Mogador with an appropriate hinterland. When Serrano Suñer expressed strong objections to ceding one of the Canary Islands, since the islands were an old Spanish province and their cession was incompatible with Spanish national feeling, the Foreign Minister replied that the cession of one of the islands as well as the bases was entirely in the Spanish interest. Germany, Italy, and Spain as a family of three would have to direct the destinies of Europe and Africa jointly. What they had jointly won in Europe and Africa, however, they would also have to defend jointly if necessary. Owing to the increasing speed of airplanes America was moving closer and closer to this European-African area, and in 10 years the distance from Africa to America would possibly be no greater than today the distance from Germany to England across the North Sea.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister also announced Germany's economic requirements: debt payment, assurance of part of the raw materials from Morocco in particular (copper, iron, phosphates), participation in businesses, etc. Within the framework of the over-all arrangements these economic matters would likewise have to be settled.

Serrano Suñer seemed quite willing to comply with these economic wishes, but was not very cooperative with regard to the territorial demands. He stressed the contribution that Spain had made with her Civil War more or less as a prior performance in the conflict of ideologies and for the new order in Europe, whereupon the Foreign Minister answered that both countries could well be content with

themselves: Spain had won the Civil War, Germany the Battle of Flanders, which would influence the development of Europe in the future just as decisively as in ancient times the Battle of Cannae.

When in conclusion the Foreign Minister put the precise question when Spain could enter the war, Serrano Suñer replied that Spain would be ready for the war the moment the installation of the 10 long-bore guns at Gibraltar was completed.

It was then decided that the economic experts of the two delegations would meet in the presence of Ambassador von Stohrer in order to discuss economic questions⁷ and then another conference of Ministers would be held. The conversation was concluded after having lasted more than 3 hours.

⁷ See document No. 126, footnote 1.

No. 64

35/22861-62

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1940—8:00 p. m.

No. 1975 of September 16

Received September 17—9:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1025 of September 13 (Pol. V 8800).¹

I last reported in telegrams No. 1695 of August 11² and No. 1796 of August 22³ concerning the negotiations conducted in recent months between the United States and Russia. I must conclude both from my conversations with Ambassador Oumansky and from my personal observations that what is involved here for Soviet Russia is a clarification of economic questions. Soviet Russia, which is greatly interested in delivery of American machine tools and other factory equipment, has been seriously affected by the export embargo on goods of military importance in force since July 2, and is making a determined effort through the Ambassador here to obtain important modification in her favor (cf. telegram No. 1796). Also a matter of consequence in the relations between the two countries is the unilateral blocking by the United States of the Baltic assets. Without concessions on the part of the United States in this area which would be regarded from the Soviet point of view as extensive, it seems that the first prerequisite for a political rapprochement between the two countries is lacking. How seriously the Soviet Government regards these economic questions is shown by the communications of the Ambassador here, concerning which I reported in telegram No. 1796.

¹ Not found.

² Vol. x of this series, document No. 327.

³ *Ibid.*, document No. 379.

The American Government is doubtless attempting, in connection with the stiffening of British and American foreign policies with respect to Japan, to utilize the above-mentioned negotiations for a political rapprochement with Soviet Russia. Its favorable attitude up until very recently in the question of approving export licenses for oil and scrap and chartering American ships, especially tankers, for shipping cargoes to Russia, makes this tendency of American foreign policy quite evident (cf. telegram No. 1695). However, in view of the very extensive demands of American industry in connection with the new large-scale rearmament program and what are in the American view priority deliveries to Great Britain and Canada, the American Government will not be able to satisfy the Soviet Russian desires within the foreseeable future, so that for a really comprehensive understanding the *quid pro quo* is lacking.

In my opinion the American Government will not allow these negotiations to be broken off under any circumstances, and by means of concessions will keep open as in the past the possibility of an understanding with Russia.

THOMSEN

No. 65

F5/0463-0464

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Draft Telegram

BERLIN, September 16, 1940.

RAM 31 g. Rs.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please call on M. Molotov on the afternoon of September 21, if by that time you are not otherwise instructed,¹ and communicate to him verbally and casually, preferably while engaged on another errand, the following:

The continued penetration of English planes into Germany and into the territories occupied by Germany makes it necessary to strengthen the defenses at several points, and particularly in northern Norway. Part of this reinforcement is an antiaircraft artillery battalion, which, with its equipment, is to be stationed in northern Norway. Investigation of the transport facilities revealed that for this purpose the route by way of Finland would present the least difficulty. This antiaircraft battery will presumably be landed near Haparanda on September 22

¹ It is not clear whether this telegram and the telegram to Helsinki quoted in footnote 3 were sent or not, or whether, if sent, they were countermanded by later instructions. A note of Sept. 21 by the Foreign Intelligence Branch of OKW reads:

"According to a communication from the Foreign Ministry the Führer has decided against informing the Soviet Government about the German troops passing through Finland." (9860/E692869)

The communication from the Foreign Ministry has not been found.

and transported to Norway, part way by rail, and the rest by road. The Finnish Government, appreciating the special circumstances, has granted the German request to permit this transport to take place.²

We are anxious to inform the Soviet Government of this step in advance.

We assume—and request express confirmation—that the Soviet Government will keep this communication strictly secret.

Wire report that instruction has been carried out.³

RIBBENTROP

² See document No. 86.

³ A draft telegram from the Foreign Minister to the Minister in Finland, also dated Sept. 16, has the following text:

“For the Minister personally.

“Arrangements have been made by German and Finnish military authorities for the transport of an anti-aircraft artillery battalion through Finland. I wired the Moscow Embassy in this matter as follows:

“Insert [text of RAM 31 g. Rs.].

“End of telegram to Moscow.

“Please notify the Foreign Minister in Helsinki on the afternoon of Sept. 21 of the step which is being taken in Moscow.” (F5/0464)

No. 66

F14/455-465

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 17, 1940.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE SPANISH MINISTER OF INTERIOR, SERRANO SUÑER, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, IN BERLIN ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1940

As a preliminary Serrano Suñer delivered a short oral message of Generalissimo Franco, in which the latter expressed to the Führer his gratitude, sympathy, and high esteem, and emphasized to him his “loyalty of yesterday, of today, and for always.” Franco had commissioned him to bring about a direct contact with the German Government in this decisive time. Since he had already informed the Foreign Minister of the Spanish wishes, he did not at the moment want to come back to that again, but only wished to emphasize that the Spanish attitude toward Germany had not changed in the least. It was not a question of a revision of Spanish foreign policy, but only of a clarification of the conditions under which Spain was ready to fight the war together with Germany. Whenever Spain's supply of foodstuffs and war material was secure she could immediately enter the war. With reference to the war material, Suñer declared that the details of the Spanish wishes had been conveyed to Admiral Canaris.¹

¹ See document No. 30, enclosure.

and Suñer made precise the wish for placing artillery at their disposal by specifying that the Spaniards considered ten 38-centimeter guns necessary for Gibraltar.

The Führer replied that the German people had not forgotten the stand which Spain had taken in the World War and that this feeling of appreciation had been the most profound cause for the German conduct during the Civil War. Now Germany was in the decisive struggle against England. Continentally this struggle was already decided. A British landing on the Continent was to be characterized as an absolute chimera. The only military possibility still existing was an attempt by England to alienate the French colonies in North Africa from the Pétain Government and use them as a new position for the continuation of the war. Aside from that, England had no more opportunities whatever for penetration into the European Continent, from Norway to Spain and Portugal.

In this connection, Suñer pointed to the Spanish fear concerning an English landing on the Cantabrian coast and in this regard mentioned that communistic elements in the population of the Asturias would render the situation very complicated in the event of such a landing attempt. The Führer replied that he could set Serrano Suñer's mind at rest in this respect on the basis of experiences with landings in Norway where indeed the entire population had been on the side of the English, and the latter, in spite of that, could achieve no success. In Norway it had also been shown that coast artillery was not suitable for repelling an attack, but instead that air defense brought the most favorable results. If a group of Stukas and a group of heavy pursuit planes were made available for the conquest of Gibraltar, then within 8 days no enemy ship would any longer dare to venture into these Spanish areas within a radius of 350 kilometers, for while the heavy bombs of 1,800 kilograms which these machines carried could perhaps not completely destroy a ship, a direct hit would render it so incapable of battle that a repair of several months would be necessary. The English, however, would not want to run such a risk. In Norway, in any case, we had forced the English to retreat only through the use of Stukas.

When Serrano Suñer for his part pointed again to the great strength of the fortress of Gibraltar, the Führer replied that an attack with heavy artillery against an establishment of that type would not be as effective as would be an operation with the special weapons used in overwhelming the Maginot Line. Heavy aerial bombs had an effect many times as great as the heaviest artillery and even the works of the Maginot Line could not stand up under it, since armored structures, which according to World War experience could withstand the heaviest artillery, had been annihilated by 1,000-, 1,400-, and 1,800-kilogram aerial bombs inside of 10 minutes. Even when there was

no direct hit, the concussion effect of a 1,000-kilogram bomb was in itself tremendous. Therefore, the decisive factor for the conquest and later defense of Gibraltar is the guaranteeing of absolute air supremacy. To be sure, we had set up heavy artillery on the Channel coast; it was however intended only for very bad weather when penetration by air attacks upon the enemy positions was completely out of the question. Aside from that the installation of 38-centimeter guns would take several months. Already in the middle of July we had installed the batteries erected in the vicinity of Calais.

The superiority of the Stukas as compared to heavy artillery is shown by the following figures: A great long-barreled gun could fire 200 rounds without repair, while a Stuka squadron of 36 machines in use thrice daily could drop 120 bombs of 1,000 kilograms each, every one of which contained the appropriate amount of high-powered explosives, while a 38-centimeter shell contained only 70 to 75 kilograms of explosives. It was a sure thing that one could not long resist the attack of a dive-bombing group of Junkers 88's and that, at the approach of this feared opponent, the English fleet would immediately get away from Gibraltar and from the entire vicinity.

The Führer declared further that it would not be possible to provide 38-centimeter guns for Gibraltar. Even the transporting would involve extraordinary difficulties, and the installation would require 3 to 4 months. Germany could, however, make special artillery available for the Gibraltar undertaking. Moreover, it was clear that Germany would do everything in her power to help Spain. For once Spain entered the war, Germany would have every interest in her success, since indeed a Spanish victory would be a German one at the same time. In the Gibraltar undertaking, it would be primarily a matter of taking the fortress itself with extraordinary speed and protecting the Straits.

Serrano Suñer thanked the Führer and pointed out that in the previous discussions which had taken place on this subject between German military experts, among others General von Richthofen and Admiral Canaris, with General Franco, the German intentions had not clearly come to light; indeed, quite on the contrary a certain confusion had arisen. As a result of the Führer's explanations, the military possibilities appeared in an entirely new light. He was asking the Führer whether he was ready to put down in writing the views just expressed so that he could convey them to General Franco on his return.

The Führer promised this² and emphasized that the question of the capture of Gibraltar had already been studied minutely by the German side. For example, a commission of German front-line officers who had had a leading part in the conquest of important French and

² See document No. 70.

Belgian fortifications, like Fort Eben Emaël and the Maginot Line, had gone to Spain in order to examine the question on the spot. On the basis of the impressions of this commission as well as of the particulars about the condition of Gibraltar which Germany had possessed from former times or obtained recently through Admiral Canaris they had come to the conclusion that Gibraltar could be conquered by a modern attack with relatively modest means. It was a matter of methods which Germany had already used so successfully in the west. Gibraltar was definitely less capable of resistance than the fortifications in the west. Casemated guns could be silenced more easily than perchance the guns of the Maginot Line which were installed in armored cupolas, and the exposed artillery of Gibraltar could be overwhelmed even more easily. The military cooperation of Germany in the Spanish war would consist of:

1. Immediately expelling enemy ships from the Straits, and
2. making available a small troop of specialists with special weapons by whom Gibraltar could be quickly overwhelmed without great sacrifice of blood. This would be a matter of a small selected special troop of assault engineers equipped with special armor-destroying guns—the so-called “Scharten” or “Pillbox-crackers” [*Bunkerknacker*]. As soon as Gibraltar was taken, the problem of the Mediterranean would therewith be settled and no serious danger from French Morocco either could any longer threaten.

In the further course of the conversation, Serrano Suñer, in the same fashion as in his conference with the Foreign Minister again criticized a few Spanish diplomats.³ In Berlin, Spain had unfortunately been represented by an Ambassador too old and too liberalistic, but the Falange had not been able to build up the necessary young forces fast enough to fill the posts important in foreign policy with the right people. The Führer replied that he had great appreciation of this difficulty for Germany also in certain instances in 1934 still had representatives abroad with the spirit of 1932. Suñer seized upon this remark and said that Germany in fact had not always been well represented in Salamanca.⁴ Sometimes it was a matter of Germans who, to be sure, spoke Spanish because they had formerly lived in South America, but who had had no idea of the actual Spanish problems and of the Spanish spirit.

In the further course of the conversation, Serrano Suñer came to speak about Morocco, and justified the Spanish claims for it in a manner similar to that in the conversation with the Foreign Minister. He characterized Morocco as Spain's Lebensraum and as her natural objective for expansion. For reasons of domestic strengthening of the

³ See document No. 63.

⁴ Salamanca had been the seat of General Franco's Government during much of the Spanish Civil War.

regime and of external security, Spain was raising the known territorial demands.

The Führer agreed with him in the last point with the remark that many a domestic difficulty which Spain at the moment perhaps still had to face could quickly and easily be overcome by successes with foreign policy. This was an old historical experience. Moreover, it was a matter of two questions:

1. of the problem of the war, which essentially was a military question, and
2. of the future configuration of the relationships in Europe and Africa.

Here Germany on the one hand had economic interests—she wanted to buy raw materials and sell finished manufactured goods—and on the other hand there was the problem of security for her African future in Central Africa. For under certain conditions, a great danger could threaten her possessions there and even the whole new order as well. It was not out of the question that England and France would try to entice America to the Azores and in these efforts find support in certain imperialistic tendencies of America now already coming to the fore. England could in this way gain a foothold in the islands stretching out in front of Africa—whereby, in time, a very unpleasant situation would arise. For the Continent would be dependent upon that power which kept the outlying islands occupied, especially if it concerned a power with naval superiority. Now the control of the seas could be exercised neither by Italy, nor by Germany, nor by Spain. Therefore, it was necessary to set up defensive strong points on the islands in good time. Suñer interjected here that the defense of the Canary Islands could probably best be arranged within the framework of a military alliance between Germany, Italy, and Spain. The Führer replied that it was a matter not only of the Azores but of the other island groups, so that one must take the position of defending against the Western Hemisphere the parts of the earth—Europe and Africa—designated as the Eastern Hemisphere. But for this bases were needed in the islands and on the African coast.

To this, Serrano Suñer remarked that Germany had won the war and could claim the leadership in the new order. The defense of the European-African area, however, must take place within the framework of a military alliance of the three powers and of a wise policy.

The Führer continuing explained the German interests. It was a matter of:

- first, to render the northern area free from blockade;
- second, to create security toward the east, for danger always threat-

ens from the east, and Germany was filling a very useful role as the eastern bulwark for Europe; and

third, to assure Germany a great colonial area, which was not, however, a matter of area for settlement, of which she possessed enough on the European Continent, but instead purely a matter of colonies for raw materials. The European countries could maintain themselves against the American Continent only if they too conducted a European continental policy and in so doing made Africa an absolutely integral part of the Eastern Hemisphere. The bloc of North and South America must be confronted by the European bloc. Serrano Suñer agreed with these remarks and gave notice of an additional Spanish territorial claim against France at the Pyrenees border. This involved not extensive territorial demands but merely rectifications of the border, which, since it had been set by France, ran entirely to Spain's disadvantage. He also touched briefly on the religious problem and stressed that Spain though a Catholic country nevertheless had often been in conflict with the Vatican and had had to defend the honor of the State against the Pope.

The Führer replied that with closer relations to Spain a direct contact at the Spanish-French border between Generalissimo Franco and himself seemed indicated. Such a conversation could, without attracting too much attention, easily be arranged at the proper time. Serrano Suñer seized on this idea with satisfaction.

After a 1-hour duration the interview was concluded.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 67

F14/447-454

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 30

BERLIN, September 17, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE SPANISH MINISTER OF INTERIOR, SERRANO SUÑER, IN THE PRESENCE OF STATE SECRETARY VON WEIZSÄCKER, ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1940

Referring to the conversations which he will have shortly with Mussolini and Ciano in Rome, the Foreign Minister suggested to Serrano Suñer that the conversation be continued on Sunday morning, September 22; meanwhile Serrano Suñer would have sent a written report to Generalissimo Franco in Madrid, together with the letter promised by the Führer,¹ by a special fast airplane which was kept ready for this purpose, and would himself have inspected the points of the Maginot Line and the French coast mentioned by the Führer. In

¹ See documents Nos. 66 and 70.

order to clarify the situation he wished to summarize the German viewpoint once more in concrete form :

1. The military question would be explained comprehensively by the Führer in the letter to Franco. From this it would be seen how Germany judged the situation and the extent to which she could contribute to the military operations against Gibraltar by making available armaments and technical experts. It seemed to him that the success of this action was completely assured. Furthermore, he, the Foreign Minister, was in complete agreement with the opinion expressed yesterday evening by Serrano Suñer that the declaration of war against England would have to consist in a bombardment of Gibraltar. Military matters need therefore no longer be discussed in the present conversations, for Generalissimo Franco would be able to reach a definite decision on the basis of the Führer's letter.

2. As regards supplying Spain with food and other raw materials, the question of grain and raw material supplies would be thoroughly studied by Germany. Even now assurance could be given that the quantities which Spain absolutely needed for her military operations would in any event be delivered by Germany. In this connection, however, attention must be called to the fact that some of the Spanish wishes could not be fulfilled, since Germany did not have these raw materials herself.

In connection with the grain shipments, as to which Germany could satisfy Spain completely,² he suggested that an expert from the Ministry of Food be sent to Spain; he could act as an adviser and make available to the Spanish authorities the German experiences in regard to marketing rules, over-all estimates, and management of agricultural production and questions of distribution. In answer to a question by Suñer, the Foreign Minister expressly stated that he meant only an adviser to the Spanish Government. Serrano Suñer accepted this proposal with thanks and stated that Spain was really very much interested in the German experiences in these fields.

In this connection the Foreign Minister also suggested that a German gasoline expert be sent to Spain. He expressed the conviction that the additional quantity of 56,000 tons a month requested by Spain³ was perhaps set too high since, as had often been pointed out, large movements by the Spanish Army would not be necessary. Thus the gasoline expert could help to determine the quantity Spain needed in each case and also make available the German experiences in regard to distribution, etc.

Serrano Suñer replied that the Foreign Minister was perhaps right in his opinion regarding the limited scope of the military operations, but that it was also necessary to take precautions in case of less favorable developments involving fighting in Morocco or necessitating defense of the Cantabrian coast against attacks from the sea, and that the request for 56,000 tons of gasoline per month was based on these considerations.

The Foreign Minister replied that with the assistance of Germany Gibraltar would surely be captured with lightning speed. That would

² Cf. document No. 62; also vol. x of this series, document No. 404.

³ See document No. 63.

be the end for the English in the Mediterranean, and their fleet would have to withdraw from there as fast as possible. He did not believe there would be an operation in Morocco or at the Atlantic coast, and consequently it would surely be possible to get along with much less gasoline. In any case, Spain would receive enough supplies from Germany to ensure that she would not suffer any shortages. Serrano Suñer again expressed misgivings. He hoped sincerely that the Foreign Minister was right, but to be quite honest he had to refer once more to the fact that even in case Gibraltar was captured the strait would not be completely closed and there was definitely the possibility that part of the English squadron would escape from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic, especially during the night, and would threaten the Spanish coast there. Spain wanted in any event to be prepared for such a case. North Africa could also be threatened by the English fleet and by possible landing attempts. It was also to be feared that French Morocco would join de Gaulle and thereby the English, and thus create an extremely complicated situation.

The Foreign Minister tried again to dispel Suñer's misgivings. If Gibraltar was in Spanish possession and several Stuka units were made available, no enemy ship could let itself be seen within a wide radius. Just this morning Italian Minister of Colonies, Teruzzi, had told him that the English fleet could hardly hold its position in Alexandria and if the Italians conquered Egypt the fleet would probably withdraw very quickly through the Suez Canal.⁴

Turning to the territorial questions, the Foreign Minister said that Germany would take Morocco away from France in her peace treaty with that country and give it to Spain, with the exception of the bases of Mogador and Agadir and their hinterland as well as certain economic reservations, to be determined by friendly agreement, in the form of German participation in the Moroccan sources of raw materials (phosphates, manganese). Referring to the clear separation of Spanish, Italian, and German interests in Africa and the necessity of a joint defense of the European-African area against America, the Foreign Minister again asked Serrano Suñer in precise terms whether Spain was willing to cede one of the Canary Islands to Germany. He requested that this question be submitted to Generalissimo Franco and referred in this connection to Roosevelt's policy in South America; with large-scale participation of members of the Spanish race in South America, he was absorbing that Continent completely.

Using a map, the Foreign Minister then repeated the Führer's statements on the defense situation in the light of these tendencies of Roosevelt and the necessity of counterbalancing the American Continent with a European-African Eastern Hemisphere.⁵ The Foreign

⁴ No memorandum on Ribbentrop's conversation with Teruzzi has been found.

⁵ See document No. 66.

Minister pointed out that the African islands situated on the fringe of this continental bloc must be equipped for defense immediately.

Serrano Suñer expressed the strongest misgivings here. For national reasons it was absolutely impossible for Spain to cede islands which belonged to Spain historically and constituted a part of Spain. He completely understood the Führer's great conception of the continental defense of Europe and Africa, and he himself saw the danger which could threaten this bloc from America, but he believed that this defense could be completely assured within the framework of a military alliance. The Foreign Minister referred to the necessity for extremely advanced technical installations on these bases and expressed the fear that Spain alone was perhaps not in a position to provide these. Serrano Suñer nevertheless did not deviate from his point of view. He tried to divert the German interest to the Portuguese island of Madeira. After all, Portugal had only become great because she had been on the side of Germany's opponents in the World War, and if Germany held Madeira and San Luis de Senegal as defense bases, just as good a defense system could be established as one with the Canary Islands and the bases of Mogador and Agadir in Morocco. Suñer indicated in this manner that cession of the last two bases in Morocco did not please the Spaniards either. Thus he referred, for example, among other things to the fact that Mogador was needed as a harbor for the hinterland of Morocco. He added that if the most important sources of raw materials and these two bases were not given to Spain, Morocco would be more or less "eviscerated" and deprived of its main value.

When the Foreign Minister indicated that after all Morocco was falling to Spain through the German victory over France, Serrano Suñer replied that Spain was quite prepared to conquer Morocco with her own blood, and that she could claim title to the territory in her own right through her participation in the war and the sacrifice of human lives necessitated thereby. The Foreign Minister pointed out that Germany would be willing to take Spanish Guinea and the small Spanish islands (Fernando Po, etc.) of Central Africa in exchange for the Moroccan territory to be given to Spain. Germany claimed the Central African territory as her colony and it would be well to have clearly defined spheres of interest in Africa from the very start. Serrano Suñer did not discuss this further. He said, however, that he was willing to inform Franco of Germany's wishes, but expressed the strongest doubt on his part as to whether Franco would be able to meet the wishes regarding cession of one of the Canary Islands. He himself had come to Germany with authorization to discuss only problems within the framework of the Spanish requests presented in the Spanish note, and he could not go beyond this.

Following a thorough discussion of the technical program for further negotiations preceding the conclusion of a protocol, the conversation was brought to a close after having lasted for 1 hour.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 68

F10/006-016

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

SEPTEMBER 17, 1940.

DUCE: In the first place please accept my most cordial thanks for your last letter.² I read it with great interest and can only endorse your general views on the situation.

The fact that a relatively long interval lies between my last letter³ and today's is due not only to the tremendous amount of preparatory work but also to the uncertainty of a situation that makes it difficult to prognosticate even for the very near future.

I shall now try, Duce, to give you in a few sentences an idea of the work that has been done since the conclusion of the operations in the west.

The first task consisted in the protection of what had been won. This protection actually begins at Kirkenes and ends at the Channel and the Spanish border. Not only must these areas be protected from possible attacks from outside, but above all preparations for our own attacks must be carried out and safeguarded. Today the Norwegian fiords have been closed off against attacks from the sea and the entire area has been secured from attacks from the air to such an extent that a serious threat need no longer be feared. The same is true for the Danish coast and now also for the Dutch-Belgian-French coastline. The demands thereby made on our antiaircraft forces are enormous. This applies most of all to protecting our preparations for attacking England. And these preparations, Duce, are really tremendous. This is the second task, which has now been in progress for months. The first task was to clean out the harbors and put them in order, clean the canals, repair the locks, remove countless sunken ships, clear away mines—a task which is both time-consuming and dangerous. Our entire North Sea and the Channel are now already one single monstrous mine field. The shallowness of this sea makes it possible to sink ships not only with anchored mines but also especially with magnetic mines. Along with this we must now lay our mine fields. For this work hundreds of thousands of workers have been called up in these ports. There is a lack of quarters for them, some of the roads had been destroyed, bridges for bringing up con-

¹ The copy in the file is not signed.

² Vol. x of this series, document No. 388.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 166.

struction materials had been blown up, and the railroads were in large part out of commission. Nevertheless we have been able in the course of the last few months to bring order into this whole situation, to open up a large part of the railroad network, build new bridges, replace the emergency bridges which had been built during the advance and which blocked the canals, and so create the prerequisites for moving up additional forces along the Dutch-Belgian-French coast. Countless medium and heavy batteries were installed. They are already ready for action, or will be in the very near future. Since some of these batteries are themselves within reach of British coastal batteries, they have been set in the heaviest concrete, particularly the accommodations for crews and ammunition. Independent of this, material is being made available for transport and weapons, as well as for putting the airfields in order. But this description would be incomplete, Duce, if I did not point out that during the same period we have also strengthened our borders toward the east—a measure taken if for no other reason than that the regeneration of our armored command can best be undertaken in its home areas. Then there are the organization of numerous new units, the discharge or demobilization of a number of older divisions, and their replacement by divisions of younger men. These measures, Duce, seemed necessary to me particularly in consideration of the uncertain developments in Rumania. For whatever happens:

Duce, I believe we must be so strong that we can in all circumstances cope successfully with any projected new intrigue on the part of England as well as any possible new coalition of forces!

The attack on England, upon which all our work and preparations are centered, has suffered the worst kind of delay so far owing to the weather; our meteorologists are at a loss to explain this or find parallels for it. For a month and a half we have been waiting for a few clear days in the west, for we absolutely must have that much time to justify the really large-scale commitment of our Luftwaffe. Since we unfortunately do not possess supremacy at sea, the absolute mastery of the air is the most decisive prerequisite for the success of the operation. For weeks now we have been carrying on aggressive warfare of progressive intensity with our air forces against the British Island. The character of these attacks, however, is still one of more or less severe reprisal raids. Unfortunately we have not had the weather needed for the really large-scale attack. Nevertheless we have certainly already had notable successes even with our present attacks. As in Norway, our pilots are fighting under the most unfavorable conditions imaginable with really admirable heroism. Such extraordinary progress has been made in attrition of the British Air Force that, to the extent of the radius of our fighter planes, we can already talk of a real control of the air. I am waiting, as I did last year, for

weather that will make it possible for me to have the final, annihilating blows dealt, and—I can assure you of this, Duce—with me is waiting the entire German Wehrmacht!

I have observed your own successes with great pleasure, Duce, the defeat of British Somaliland and the successful attacks in North Africa. The German people are with you in these battles, and every success which you achieve, Duce, whether on land or sea or in the air, is felt here exactly as if it were our own.

Since circumstances do not allow us to foresee when hostilities will cease, we are, I believe, forced to act farsightedly in making all possible preparations so that no matter what is still possible this fall we can in any case continue to prosecute the war successfully in the winter. I am therefore convinced that it can be important to make it possible for Spain to enter the war. In this regard the Spanish Government has approached Germany with a number of military and economic requests. The military requests can be filled very easily, for they involve in the main only the detachment of some artillery and a number of special troops. The economic requests are more difficult. My Foreign Minister will report the details to you, Duce. The German harvest can be called a good average harvest. The potato, turnip, and cabbage crop will probably be very good; perhaps it will even set a record. In these circumstances, and considering the fact that we still have reserves available, I believe I would be justified in giving the Spanish Government the needed aid. Nevertheless it is a very serious sacrifice for us in some areas. However, I see the problem today in the following terms:

France as such is finished. There is still danger of a secession movement in her northern colonies. There is no assurance that such secession might not even occur in secret agreement with the French Government. If, however—whether with or without the knowledge or desire of the Vichy Government—North Africa should join up with the British, this might give new impetus to the British cause, at least for a certain period. But as soon as there is a reliable bridge to North Africa via Spain I would no longer consider this danger to be very great. For Spain, too, a clear decision in this direction means increased security. This is one point.

The other point is our relations with Japan. My Foreign Minister will give you the reports, Duce, that we have received regarding the possibility of a new development in the east.⁴ I believe in principle that in spite of all other misgivings a close cooperation with Japan is the best way either to keep America entirely out of the picture or to render her entry into the war ineffective.

If you should consider it advisable, Duce, for us two to confer once again, I would gladly come either to the border or to a north-Italian city so as to return in this way your last visit, which I still today recall so vividly.

⁴ See document No. 73.

Moreover, my Foreign Minister is familiar with everything and can speak with you on all problems, Duce.

Once more, please accept my thanks for your last letter, and my cordial regards.

In loyal comradeship

[EDITORS' NOTE. Operation *Seeloeve*, the invasion of Britain, preparations for which had been going on since the issuance of directive No. 16 (volume X of this series, document No. 177) on July 16, 1940, was postponed again on September 14, and on September 17 it was postponed indefinitely. On October 12 a directive was issued postponing the operation until the spring of 1941. These directives and other documents on the postponement of Operation *Seeloeve* are printed in "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*, pages 137-140.]

No. 69

B19/B003750

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 707

BERLIN, September 17, 1940.

The Finnish Minister spoke to me again today about the Petsamo nickel question. He asked me to state precisely in what sense we had renounced a German concession on the nickel deposits. I expressed myself to the effect that we had told the Finnish Government in the summer of this year that we did not want to take up the question of a German concession on the nickel deposits after the Finnish Government had told us that the existing legal situation was contrary to this and could not be changed. We had also made it known in Moscow that we did not want to take up this question.¹ Thus one cannot speak of a "waiver in favor of Russia."

The Minister then asked me, in the form of a request for good advice, whether we could not be of assistance to the Finns in evading the Russian insistence on granting the concession to Russia. When I did not give the Minister any hope that we would intervene in the matter in Moscow at this time, M. Kivimäki said that then the result would probably be that Finland would break her word, i. e., by granting the concession in favor of Russia, for Finnish policy was entirely directed at present at gaining time and not becoming involved in a quarrel with Russia now. This was the danger that lurked behind Molotov's words in this nickel question.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See vol. x of this series, document No. 259.

No. 70

F8/0217-0222

*Adolf Hitler to Francisco Franco*¹

SEPTEMBER 18, 1940.

DEAR CAUDILLO: Minister of Interior Serrano Suñer has brought me your letter,² and I cordially return your greetings and the friendship they express. We have entered into an exchange of ideas regarding the problems which at the moment affect not only Europe but probably the entire world. The suggested conferences as well as those which have just taken place and those still going on with your Minister Serrano Suñer prompt me, my dear Caudillo, to describe my thoughts to you on these problems in a few points. The opinions of my General Staff are entirely the same as those set down here.

1. The war will decide the future of Europe. There is not a country in Europe that can avoid its political and economic effects. The end of the war will also decide Spain's future, perhaps for centuries. But even today Spain is suffering, though she is still not a participant in the war. The virtual blockade imposed on Spain by England will not be loosened as long as England herself is not conquered, but will only become more severe. In the face of this, any measures for economic assistance can only be of an emergency and temporary nature. But the mere expulsion of the English from the Mediterranean will convert it into an inland sea withdrawn from English interference and again open for commerce. This alone would provide a radical solution to Spain's supply problem. And this aim can and will be attained rapidly and with certainty through Spain's entry into the war.

2. Spain's entry into the war on the side of the Axis Powers must begin with the expulsion of the English fleet from Gibraltar and immediately thereafter the seizure of the fortified rock.

This operation must and can be successfully carried through within a few days, if high-grade, well-trying, modern means of attack and attack troops are employed. Germany is willing to provide them under Spanish command in the quantities needed.

3. Once Gibraltar is in Spanish possession the western Mediterranean is eliminated as a base of operations for the English fleet. Aside from the threat from isolated British submarines, then possible only to a limited extent, a sure connection will have been brought about between Spain and North Africa (Spanish Morocco). The Spanish Mediterranean coast itself will then no longer be endangered.

4. Aside from the blockade, which for all practical purposes has already been imposed on Spain, England will then have only the possi-

¹ The copy in the file is not signed.

² Document No. 48.

bility of operating against the Atlantic coast of Spain. Defense of this coast by means of heavy batteries could only be assured—and even then only to a limited extent—if quantities were used which neither Germany nor anyone else can make available.

The best—even the only sure—protection consists in placing dive bomber units in the vicinity of the coast; these are more effective than heavy coastal batteries, as experience from Narvik to the Spanish border has shown, and thus they appear to be the only suitable means for keeping enemy naval forces far from the coasts in all circumstances.

In this regard, too, Germany gives assurance of support.

It would be all the more futile to install medium and heavy coastal batteries at this time since their installation would require such extensive and time-consuming preparations that:

- I. The purpose of the procedure would not remain secret but would certainly be betrayed, and
- II. the protective effect would occur much too late.

5. Considering the military situation of England at the present time it is out of the question for England to try a landing operation on the Spanish coast or in Portugal. Should such an attempt nevertheless be made, Germany gives assurance in this case, too, of all necessary support on land and in the air to any extent desired.

6. It is more probable, however, that after losing Gibraltar England will try instead to seize a naval base on the Canary Islands. Therefore the defensive power of the islands in the Canary group which might be considered for naval bases must be strengthened in so far as possible *before* the start of the war. Either before or at the latest at the same time as the beginning of the war it will in my opinion be necessary to transfer German dive bombers or long-range fighters to Palmas. Past experience has shown that they provide the *absolute* certainty of keeping the British ships far away. Preparations for this should best be made before the beginning of the war.

7. If Italy should also succeed in getting so close to Alexandria in the course of this winter that these British naval bases could be eliminated at least by means of air attacks, then the entire strategic position in the Mediterranean will be lost to the English. The Spanish merchant marine in the Mediterranean could then supply Spain freely in a manner quite different from present possibilities. In case of necessity, large parts of the Italian and German fleets could be united in the Atlantic. North Africa would be delivered up to seizure by Italy, Spain, and Germany. The danger that a North African area detached from France might unite with British forces would thereby be definitely eliminated.

8. Germany is willing, as already stated, not only to make the necessary military means available under Spanish command for this purpose, but also to provide economic help to the greatest extent pos-

sible for Germany herself. The conversations in this regard are now being held.

These, dear Caudillo, are, briefly stated, the ideas concerning the decisive character of a Spanish participation in a conflict whose outcome will in any case decide the future of Spain for a long time to come.

In case Spain decides for intervention in this struggle, Germany is resolved to stand exactly as loyally and firmly by her side until a victorious and successful conclusion, as we did earlier during the Spanish Civil War. It is a matter of course that this success will be brought about. At most it can only be a question of time. But Spain's entry into the fight will help to show England even more emphatically the hopelessness of continuing the war and force her to give up once and for all her unjustified claims.

Please accept, my dear Caudillo, my most cordial regards.

In comradely affection, etc.³

³ By telegram No. 3211 (136/74354) sent at 11:35 p.m. on Sept. 20, the Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid reported that he had just handed Hitler's letter to Franco. Franco had read it immediately and said that he hoped to send his reply by special courier Figueras on Sept. 22. See document No. 88 and footnote 5.

No. 71

35/22871-73

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1940—3:03 a. m.

No. 1992 of September 18 Received September 19—3:35 p. m.

For the State Secretary and the Personnel Department.

With reference to my telegram No. 1983 of September 17.¹

I have already reported in telegram No. 1209 of June 18² that efforts are being made here to restrict or prohibit the political propaganda activity of the official representatives of the German Reich, it being claimed that such activity goes beyond diplomatic and consular privileges and is contradictory to the widespread American concept of government. For some time the American federal police [*Bundespolizei*] have been involved in a detailed investigation of the general conduct and propaganda activity of official representatives of the German Reich, the Information Library, the news agencies, and other offices. Owing to the incidents known to you, which gave the American Government a certain formal legal justification,

¹ This telegram reported search of the Washington offices of the Transocean Agency by agents of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities and newspaper attacks on Consul General Spiegel, New Orleans (35/22863-64).

² Vol. IX of this series, document No. 475.

the investigation seems to be concentrated especially on Consul General von Spiegel, Consul General Wiedemann, Consul Scholz, and Consul Gyssling, the activity of all of whom is under constant criticism in the press here because of alleged violation of the rights of hospitality. The aim of the investigation is undoubtedly to collect sufficient material to be able at the proper time to bring about the recall of these persons as *personae non gratae* with formal justification.

Also along these lines are the successful efforts by North America at the Havana Conference to pledge all the countries of the Western Hemisphere to proceed jointly against the alleged fifth column, against foreign propaganda activity, and against the alleged abuse of diplomatic and consular privileges on the part of representatives of foreign governments (cf. telegraphic report No. 1623 of August 3^a); and the North American thesis, first advanced in the case of Consul Ried,⁴ to the effect that a Foreign Service official of a foreign power who is *persona non grata* in one country in the Western Hemisphere should therewith simultaneously be no longer admissible to any other country of the Western Hemisphere. The statement made by Secretary of State Hull in connection with the investigation in the case of Consul General von Spiegel, reported in telegraphic report No. 1983, to the effect that the surveillance of Spiegel is taking place in connection with events which might come about in the not too distant future, seems, according to reliable information, to relate to the implementation of the measures decided on at the Havana Conference⁵ by the countries of the Western Hemisphere against inadmissible propaganda activity by foreign diplomats and consuls. After ratification of the Havana Convention, which was submitted to the Senate on the 16th of this month, they seem here to want to set the example and to consider requiring the recall of those German Consuls who are accused of abusing the rights of hospitality. In such a case the American Government in formal justification of its demand will probably cite the incidents known to you, in which the Consuls mentioned—even though in part a considerable time ago—made statements or exhibited an attitude considered here to be inconsistent with diplomatic usage and the duties of a guest. Reference on our part to the propaganda activity of members of the Foreign Service, Information Library, and various establishments of other powers would probably be countered, as officials of the State Department have already told me orally in other connections, by the statement that their conduct is much more reserved in comparison to that of the Germans.

Should further developments be in accordance with this tendency which is becoming apparent, I shall in due time submit suggestions

³ Not printed (19/12549-51).

⁴ See vol. x of this series, document No. 287, footnote 3.

⁵ See *ibid.*, Editors' Note, p. 258.

intended to assure the continued functioning of the sources of information here (especially those from the British Empire), which are of extreme importance especially in time of war.

THOMSEN

No. 72

121/119892-97

*The Foreign Ministry to the Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*

BERLIN, September 19, 1940.
e. o. Pol. IM 13005 g.

By order of the Foreign Minister I am reverting below to a matter which, substantively, has in the meantime been settled.

On August 30 General Huntziger, referring to previous communications, told the deputy chairman of the Armistice Commission about the separatist movement in French Equatorial Africa and, handing over a note,¹ made certain requests for the purpose of restoring the situation. In this conversation General Huntziger was told, among other things, that it was for the Italian Government to decide on these requests, since the threatened areas lay within its sphere of interest. On the same day the Italian Armistice Commission announced that it had rejected the request of the French Government to send ships to Dakar, since it believed that the forces there were sufficient.

The Foreign Ministry considered that the leaving of the decision to Italy and the reason given for it were not in accordance with the situation. Nor was the decision made by Italy in agreement with the German view. The Foreign Ministry therefore instructed its representative with the Armistice Commission, Minister Hencke, to inform the chairman of the Armistice Commission that in the view of the Foreign Ministry the development of the situation in French Equatorial Africa lay outside the terms of reference of the Armistice Commission and that the entire issue in its political aspects fell within the competence of the Foreign Ministry.² Herr Hencke carried out this instruction after the return of General Stülpnagel to Wiesbaden on September 2. The latter expressed agreement and added that on the same day he had already, on his own initiative, pointed out to the High Command of the Wehrmacht that this question was

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 5.

now one of high policy and went beyond the competence of the Armistice Commission.

In these circumstances a conference was scheduled for September 4 in the Foreign Ministry.³ At this conference an agreement was reached on the further handling of the matter, subject to the approval of the Foreign Minister. It was determined, among other things, that there was no justification for any claim by Italy to hegemony in Equatorial Africa. The plan under discussion for supervision of French measures to restore order should accordingly be in the hands of a mixed German-Italian commission, without any designated chairman. The necessary instruction—except for the military part, namely the military resources to be released to France—was to be transmitted by the Foreign Ministry through Minister Hencke to General Stülpnagel, after Italy's approval had been obtained.

By a letter of September 8⁴ the High Command of the Wehrmacht informed the Foreign Ministry that the Führer had made certain arrangements in this matter. According to this, the aforesaid supervision was to be exercised by a German-Italian commission under German leadership. The concurrence of Italy was to be obtained through the Military Attaché in Rome. The Foreign Ministry was informed of the arrangement as a basis for its political discussions with the Italian Government. By these political discussions one had in mind especially an agreement, in accordance with the preceding talks, on certain consequences with which to threaten the French Government in case of failure on its part.

On the basis of an agreement by telephone between the Foreign Ministry and the OKW the words, "under German direction," contained in this communication, were deleted from the order sent to the Military Attaché, after it was ascertained that they had not been expressly stipulated by the Führer.⁵

On September 9 the Foreign Ministry then settled the political part with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin.

On September 11 the Foreign Ministry received a copy of a memorandum of the same day—OKW/Aus. III No. 03370/40 geh.⁶ According to that, Marshal Badoglio had asked the German Military Attaché in Rome, when the latter carried out his instructions on September 10, who the head of the control commission was to be and had said that the Duce wished that it might be an Italian officer. When General von Rintelen replied that the plan had been to have a German head, Marshal Badoglio asked that the Duce's wish for an Italian

³ See document No. 20.

⁴ Document No. 33.

⁵ See *ibid.*, footnote 2.

⁶ Not found.

head be communicated to Berlin, together with the reason for it, namely that "the entire area is after all in the Italian sphere of interest." The transmitted copy of the memorandum contains the following supplement:

Supplement by Foreign Intelligence [*Ausland*]:

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht decided on September 11 that the head of the Control Commission must be an Italian officer. General von Rintelen has been informed.

It was later ascertained that General von Rintelen had carried out this instruction on September 11, by the time the memorandum was received by the Foreign Ministry.

I have not set forth the facts in this case in such detail in order to object to the decision, as such, as finally made. The reason rather is for the following two facts in particular:

1) At two stages the high policy question of whether the areas concerned belong to the Italian sphere of interest has been prejudged, independently of the Foreign Ministry, namely in the conversation with General Huntziger on August 30 mentioned in the beginning, and in the fact that the Italian claim to head the control commission was accepted on September 11, without disputing the reason given for it, that "the entire area in question is after all in the Italian sphere of interest."

2) In a question discussed by the Foreign Ministry and the High Command of the Wehrmacht jointly, decisions at variance with the result of the discussion were reached and communicated to the Italian Government, without further consultation with the Foreign Ministry, and with the pendulum swinging in opposite directions—first a German and then an Italian head of the Control Commission.

By direction of the Foreign Minister I add the urgent request that such a procedure be avoided in the interest of the matter itself, but also in the interest of the close cooperation which I know that the High Command of the Wehrmacht as well as the Foreign Ministry desires, and in particular I state again the wish of the Foreign Minister which is easily understandable and has basically never been disputed, that instructions to the Wehrmacht Attachés which concern the political field should not be issued without the previous approval of the Foreign Ministry.

By order:
WEIZSÄCKER

No. 73

66/46358-73

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*¹

ROME, September 20, 1940.

RAM 31.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER VON RIBBENTROP AND THE DUCE IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNT CIANO AS WELL AS AMBASSADORS VON MACKENSEN AND ALFIERI, IN ROME ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1940²

To begin with the Foreign Minister conveyed most cordial greetings from the Führer to the Duce and then stated that the Führer had sent him to Rome to make a comprehensive exposition of the German view of the war situation. At the same time he had brought along a letter from the Führer to the Duce, which had already been delivered to the Duce.³

In regard to the war situation the Foreign Minister remarked that the struggle against England might already have been concluded victoriously had the weather been better. Contrary to meteorologists' predictions, however, weather conditions for large-scale air operations against England had been extremely unfavorable during past weeks.

Nevertheless, Germany had achieved superiority in the air and was bombing England, especially London, day and night, while the English at most were sending a few planes against Germany at night to drop bombs there at random. In daylight no Englishman dared appear over German territory. Germany, however, was carrying out severe reprisal attacks by day as well as by night. Once, as early as August, the German Luftwaffe had been poised for a full-scale attack. But because of bad weather this attack had had to be called off. Since then no large-scale attack had been launched, since the Führer only wanted to assume responsibility for the undertaking when it was certain that such an attack would be the beginning of the annihilation of England. Although Germany had carried out only reprisal bombings, the consequences for England had already been exceedingly serious. If these attacks continued, London would in a short time be reduced to ashes and rubble. The English armament industries were seriously affected, and important harbors, such as Portland, for example, were completely paralyzed. From the south coast to London, furthermore, all airfields had been rendered useless.

¹ An earlier draft by Schmidt (F17/497-523, not filmed consecutively), contains extensive corrections by Ribbentrop. The copy printed here embodies Ribbentrop's corrections.

² According to the Italian memorandum of this conversation, it lasted from 5:00 p. m. to 7:00 p. m.; Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe* (Milan, 1948), pp. 586-591.

³ Document No. 68.

The Führer had instructed him (the Foreign Minister) to tell the Duce that Germany had already achieved air superiority; for the Churchill figure of 3 to 1 losses in favor of England would have to be reversed to correspond to reality, so that it could be said of Churchill that he was lying in a ratio of 6 to 1. For German fighter planes, absolute dominance of the air was indisputable, and recently the Führer had also received reports that the power of resistance of the English fighter planes was steadily becoming weaker. But the weather had thus far been against Germany.

Within the scope of the general war against the British Isles upon which Germany had now entered, gigantic preparations, which had required a certain length of time, had been made by Germany—as the Führer had also stated in his letter to the Duce. The Führer was absolutely convinced that the war was already won for Germany and Italy. Final victory could no longer be wrested from these two countries, and it was theirs with 100 percent certainty. When the war would end could still not be predicted at the moment, but that it would end in a victory for Germany and Italy was certain. And for that reason the Führer would in no circumstances incur any risk; when the operation was begun, it must and would be 100 percent successful.

To carry out the operations against England successfully, the attacker must be absolute master in the air over all England. Victory could probably also be won without the fulfillment of this condition, but would then involve heavy losses.

Reports coming from England showed that at the present moment she was staging the biggest bluff in her history, for, from all that could be learned, England's situation was extremely serious. Besides, the German Luftwaffe was so strong that the losses, which in reality constituted at the most merely a third of the English figures, meant nothing to it, since replacements in men and materials were abundantly assured.

In summary, the Foreign Minister declared that the Führer was determined to vanquish England in her own territory and moreover that he was going to carry out this intention.⁴

Turning to the foreign policy situation in general, the Foreign Minister made the following statement: In view of England's difficult situation at a moment when the island itself was being attacked by Germany, while at the same time Italy was proceeding against Egypt, one must ask on what, then, rested the hope for a favorable outcome of the war which was still being displayed by Great Britain. In the Führer's opinion England hoped to be saved by America and Russia. The English people, who were absolutely infantile and in complete ignorance of the true situation, were being successfully imbued with this idea by the British ruling class, which undoubtedly

⁴ See Editors' Note, p. 105.

still possessed a certain hardiness that had survived from previous centuries.

In regard to America's attitude toward the war he (the Foreign Minister) could bring good news. In a few days, if Italy agreed, a military alliance between Italy, Japan, and Germany could be concluded. He (the Foreign Minister) had sent a confidential representative to Japan, not in an official capacity but purely personally, to carry on the conversations there with Japanese officials.⁵ Because of the personal and confidential nature of this negotiation no one else had been informed—thus, among others, neither the Italian Ambassador in Berlin nor the local Japanese Ambassador. The Foreign Minister expressed his conviction that, if Italy gave her consent, the alliance with Japan against the entry of America into the war could be concluded during the following week. The Führer was very favorably disposed toward the conclusion of this alliance, and he had declared that it would have great political significance.

Whether President Roosevelt actually intended to bring America into the war was of course not absolutely certain. If, however, there should be such an intention, there were three reasons that kept America out of the war. These were:

- (1) The general disinclination of the Americans to participate directly in a war;
- (2) the conviction in American business circles that no economic advantages would result for them from such participation; and
- (3) fear of Japan's attitude.

With proper propagandist treatment the agreement with Japan could become the biggest brake on possible efforts by Roosevelt looking toward entry into the war. If a world coalition such as would exist on the basis of the pact threatened to turn against America, the United States would ponder a hundred times before participating in the war, and the isolationists would have a very forceful argument if they maintained that in these circumstances the risk of war was too great for America. For these reasons the Führer had authorized him to conclude such a pact.

As far as the reaction to the conclusion of this pact was concerned, one would normally have to assume that Russia would thereby be driven automatically into the arms of America and England. The Foreign Minister did not, however, believe that this would occur. Stalin had told him that Russia had had enough of shedding her blood for England and France. She was 95 percent purely a land power; her Navy was poor. Therefore she could not expect any help in the East from America and England, for they were in no position to attack the Japanese fleet at its bases. On land Russia would thus find herself completely alone in opposition to Japan in the east, and

⁵ See document No. 44.

would have to reckon with the strong Manchurian Army. In the west the West Wall alone had sufficed at the conclusion of the pact between Germany and Russia to deter Russia from ties with the Western Powers (even while Belgium and Holland were still available as an open door for an attack on Germany). Today, however, Germany controlled the entire coast from Hammerfest to Biarritz, and the Führer would never permit the Anglo-Saxons to land on the Continent of Europe. Any sort of help in Europe for Russia from England and America was thus excluded for all time. If, therefore, Russia wished to join England and America she would have to carry the full burden of such a policy all alone, since she would find herself all alone facing Germany and Japan in the east as well as in the west, without any possibilities of help from England and America. Stalin was a wise statesman and knew how dangerous such a situation could be for Russia. For he was acquainted with the military weaknesses of his country and knew that the German Army could annihilate the Russian Army any time, endanger the regime, and destroy the industrial centers of the Soviet Union in Central Russia. The Russian Army was weak. The Führer with his usual circumspection had already taken his precautionary military measures. Enough troops were stationed in France to keep her in check, and they were, furthermore, ready in case England should attempt a landing in Portugal, etc. Special divisions had already completed their strategic concentration against England. All the rest, however, were concentrated in the east. If Russia should ever start anything, which he (the Foreign Minister) for that matter considered absolutely out of the question, Germany was prepared for all eventualities. If there were a fool at the head of the Soviet Union, perhaps one could look for a reaction in the previously indicated direction. But Stalin was intelligent and wished not to expose his country to certain annihilation, but to continue making profitable deals. Thus far he had utilized the situation very much to his advantage. He was fully within his rights in so doing, but here also there were certain limits beyond which one could not go. The Vienna Award had plainly indicated to the Russians where this limit lay, and in the north the same thing applied. Germany and Russia had duly conferred concerning Bessarabia and assigned it to the Russian sphere of influence; * but beyond that they had not made any agreements. Moscow would surely not be highly pleased at first by the Japanese pact. Formally it was in order because of its clause about Russia; but even if Russia were not satisfied, she would in all probability be very cautious, since Stalin was greatly worried about the German Army, and in addition must say to himself that by continuing his present policy he could make other favorable bargains with us. In this connection Russia could be di-

* See vol. x of this series, document No. 10.

verted to the Persian Gulf and India. These however were thoughts pertaining to the future.

Regarding the conversations between Russia and Italy, the Foreign Minister stated that in Germany the situation had been investigated very carefully.⁷ The intention was by no means to act aggressively toward Russia; on the contrary the friendly policy was to be continued unconditionally. It was well, however, on account of the ideological difficulties with Russia always to have a clear delimitation of spheres of interest. The Führer took the position that there must in no circumstances be any overlapping of respective interests. Judging by certain experiences which Germany had already had, ideological complications might easily occur because of that kind of overlapping. For these reasons any Russian advance toward the Balkans and Constantinople appeared to Germany to be a very precarious matter. If Russia should also have a say in matters occurring beyond the Danube, there would, for example, be possible complications in Bulgaria, with its disordered domestic situation. (Parenthetically, the Reich Foreign Minister here mentioned the fact that Bulgaria had officially thanked England for her support in the Dobruja question and that Germany had made an inquiry concerning this;⁸ the Duce also found this step on the part of the Bulgarians very strange.) Also, with respect to the plans regarding Yugoslavia which Italy had for the future, intermeddling by Russia was undesirable because of the Pan-Slavic tendencies which bound the two countries. The Duce agreed. But Russia could be taken into the Danube Commission. Moreover, the Axis would take a friendly attitude toward Russia. The Foreign Minister thought that perhaps Russia could be committed toward us even more.

Referring to the Russian tendency to advance toward Constantinople, the Foreign Minister here brought up the question of the relationship between Turkey and Russia. In this connection he stressed that an agreement between Russia and Turkey was not in the interest of the Axis. However, he, the Foreign Minister, thought that the natural aversion of the Turks to having Russia too near the Straits was a sufficient brake to prevent the relationship from becoming too close. To Germany it did not appear fitting for us to go into this problem too deeply. The Duce agreed with this.

In regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister emphasized that here it was exclusively a question of Italian interests to be settled by Italy alone; in this she could safely rely on the sympathetic support of Germany. But it seemed to us better not to touch on these problems at the present time, but to concentrate our entire effort on the destruction of England. As far as Germany was concerned, she had

⁷ See document No. 42.

⁸ The inquiry to which Ribbentrop referred was sent in telegram No. 596 of Sept. 19 from the Foreign Ministry to Sofia (585/242731). The Minister in Bulgaria replied with telegram No. 425 of Sept. 21 (585/242734-35).

an interest in the northern German districts⁹ (Norway, etc.); this was recognized by the Duce.

In this connection the Foreign Minister began to speak about Spain. On his Berlin visit Serrano Suñer had communicated the intention of Spain to enter the war.¹⁰ He had indicated that she could do so only if the country's supply of grain, gasoline, and several other materials was assured. He had also brought up territorial claims to the western coastal strip of Morocco and indicated that Spain desired the most rapid possible conquest of Gibraltar. The Führer was prepared, in spite of the sacrifice that this would mean for Germany, to supply Spain with grain, gasoline, and several other materials. In addition, he was prepared to use his influence so that by the treaty of peace Morocco would go to Spain. Germany would secure for herself several bases on the Moroccan coast, e. g., Agadir and Mogador. Furthermore, we should like to take over one of the Canary Islands. In addition we would assure ourselves in advance of a certain share of the raw material deposits in Morocco, e. g., the large phosphate deposits in northern Morocco, ore deposits, etc. Italy would undoubtedly have no objections to this, since for her part she would secure large phosphate deposits in the strips of Algiers bordering on Tunis. The Duce agreed with this.

The Foreign Minister then said there would be a statement by the Führer concerning the military side of the Spanish problem, i. e., the capture of Gibraltar. The Spaniards wished to capture Gibraltar themselves. In order to prevent a failure, however, special troops with special weapons and several squadrons would be placed at their disposal by the Germans. The Führer had studied the problem of Gibraltar carefully from the military standpoint and had come to the conclusion that the capture of the Rock was quite possible, but only if the Spaniards received aid.

The Foreign Minister then placed before the Duce the German map¹¹ of the Spanish territorial demands, which were noted by the Italians. In response to a question of the Foreign Minister to the Duce, it was confirmed that the Spanish aspirations in no wise clashed with Italy. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister announced Serrano Suñer's intention of also visiting Rome.

Upon his return to Berlin he (the Foreign Minister) intended to sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suñer dealing with the entry of Spain into the war as well as the supplying of the country with the above-mentioned materials, recognizing Spanish aspirations, and proposing an advance against Gibraltar as a declaration of war against England. In addition, it would be stated in the protocol that the

⁹ The German text reads: "Gauë."

¹⁰ See documents Nos. 66 and 67.

¹¹ Not found.

entry of Spain into the war would be left up to the free judgment of that country. Orally provision had been made for Spain's entry into the war when Franco had finished his preparations and when, above all, the German special weapons and troops as well as the airplanes had arrived at their destinations in Spain.

In addition, economic questions would be regulated by the protocol and Germany's rights in English and French concerns, such as Rio Tinto for example, protected, namely in settlement of the debts arising from the Spanish Civil War. The last question, however, Germany would settle in a generous way. The Foreign Minister broached the question of whether Italy would not wish to make a similar protocol with Spain concerning the entry into the war.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister emphasized once again that the war had been won by Italy and Germany, that victory could no longer be wrested from these countries, and that, favorable weather permitting, operations could still be concluded this fall. At the end he handed the Duce another copy of the draft of the treaty with Japan, which the latter noted.¹²

In his reply the Duce first of all spoke of England. According to Italian reports from London, the morale of the English people was very bad, and even in the Government there were a number of men who secretly were of the opinion that it would be well if a compromise would end the war, because they felt that England had already lost this war and feared the advance of the German Army against the island, i. e., a landing on English territory. Of course, the English still continued to bluff a great deal, but the people were tired and did not wish to go on living in air raid shelters, but again to be able to devote themselves peacefully to their work. The Duce emphasized that Germany had already won the war of nerves against England. The English fighter planes had already lost southern England. ("You—i. e., Germany—already control the air there.") If England lost London, the Empire was lost. If the Government moved to Canada, the British Empire would probably collapse. Moreover, he was firmly convinced that the operation against England would be carried out successfully.

Turning to the question of America and Japan, the Duce stated that America's intervention in the conflict on the side of England was to a certain extent already a *fait accompli*. America supported the English with materials; for any intervention by the American Army, however, it was already too late. In addition to the sale of the 50 destroyers and the sending of so-called "volunteer" airplane pilots, America was sending war material across the Atlantic from day to day. He (the Duce) was not too much worried by the situation, for he asked himself what more America could really do. He

¹² See document No. 44, footnote 3.

fully approved of the agreement with Japan and considered it a very important political blow against America and against morale in England. It appeared to him to be a very important means of keeping America peaceful and quiet, because the United States stood in great fear of the "Japs." The American Navy, like England's Army, was poorly prepared for battle, since both had been developed on a purely dilettante basis, and the English and Americans believed it was merely a question of sport.

The Foreign Minister here interposed that in a naval battle between Japan and America the chances of a Japanese victory were in his opinion 2 to 1.

In the further course of his statements the Duce brought up the question of what the consequences of the Japanese-German-Italian alliance would be. What would Russia say to it? The mood of the Soviet Union with respect to the Axis was not very good. The Vienna Award and the matter of the Danube Commission and the guarantee to Rumania were very displeasing to the Russians.

Here the Foreign Minister interposed that Molotov recently had been quite amiable again toward the German Ambassador.

Continuing, the Duce declared that it was not only a question of what the Russians said, but also what they would do. He was convinced that they would do nothing. For opportunistic reasons Italy had desired to pursue a policy of rapprochement toward Russia. A rapprochement with Russia had come about contrary to the innermost conviction of Italy, which has no love for Soviet Russia. He did not believe that Russia would undertake anything, if only because Stalin perhaps feared that in a conflict he would lose what he had already gained. Also, he (the Duce) shared the Führer's view that a clear-cut delimitation of interests between Russia and the Axis would have to be made. By the Japanese alliance they were in a certain sense building on the basis of the old anti-Comintern tendencies, which had in the meantime lain dormant. The pact would come as a bombshell.

To this the Foreign Minister replied that in the alliance with Japan it was, in his opinion, a question of a world coalition against the extension of the war and against warmongers. Germany, Italy, and Spain would establish and guarantee the new order in this hemisphere in Europe and Africa after the final vanquishing of England, which was imminent. Russia was an immense empire, quite apart and separated from these events and having no immediate connection with them; and in East Asia, Japan would establish the new order. If America should then desire to set herself against this order even after the annihilation of England, she would have to contend with practically the whole world, being opposed by Germany, Italy,

Spain, and Japan, while Russia stood aloof. The Duce agreed fully and completely and stated that he was prepared to have Count Ciano, whom the Reich Foreign Minister had invited to sign the pact, go to Berlin the following week. Using the above theme, he intended to exploit the conclusion of the alliance for propaganda purposes.

In regard to Yugoslavia and Greece the Duce declared that Italy would not proceed militarily against the two countries right away. Italy had concentrated 500,000 men on the Yugoslav border and 200,000 men on the Greek border as a precautionary measure. The domestic situation in Yugoslavia was bad, while the Greeks were playing the same role in the Mediterranean as Norway had done 6 months ago as England's stooge. When Italy had captured Egypt, the English fleet could no longer remain in Alexandria and would then possibly seek shelter in Greek harbors. To this the Foreign Minister remarked that it could then the more easily be bombed there.

The Duce emphasized that at the moment the war against England was the principal matter, that he therefore wished to remain at peace as far as Yugoslavia and Greece were concerned, and intended first of all to carry out the conquest of Egypt.

In regard to Spain, the Duce stressed Italy's friendly relations with this country. Her intervention in the struggle by capturing Gibraltar would be hailed, since the loss would hit England very hard and open free access to the Atlantic for Italy. Also, in view of the continuing danger of North Africa's joining de Gaulle, the possibility of having the Balearic Islands at our disposal was very advantageous. If Spain went with the Axis, any possible danger threatening from North Africa was obviated. Moreover, he (the Duce) felt that one could not rule out the possibility of some secret connection between Pétain and de Gaulle; at any rate, the attitude of France was not clear. The tragic error of that country was that she still believed that she was not defeated. On this point the Foreign Minister stated that the Führer was determined never again to permit France to play a role in European politics. The Duce received this statement with visible satisfaction and then went on to the question of the time when Spain should enter the war. Should the war end even before the coming of winter, Spain would naturally have to enter the war before then. But if the war could be expected to last through the winter, it would perhaps be better if Spain did not enter the war until after the winter. Spain was a card that would have to be played at the right time. He then suggested a real tripartite alliance.

The Foreign Minister expressed his personal conviction that Spain should begin its military actions in a few weeks, in order to allow England no rest at all and deal her blow after blow, politically and morally. If the alliance with Japan could be fully concluded about

the middle of next week, this would constitute a severe blow against England, which could then be followed several weeks later with the second blow by Spain.

In reply to a question of the Duce regarding Portugal's attitude, the Foreign Minister mentioned the diplomatic efforts of Spain to draw that country toward her, as Serrano Suñer had told him in Berlin, and added that common pressure in the same direction by Italy, Spain, and Germany on Salazar appeared to him advisable. The Foreign Minister answered affirmatively the Duce's question whether the agreement with Spain meant an alliance to be kept secret until entry into the war.

The Duce then read the draft of the agreement with Japan through again and declared that he was satisfied with it and with the 10-year duration of the treaty.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister also mentioned the mediation effort of the King of Sweden, who at the time had written a letter to the Führer.¹³ The Führer, however, had in no wise agreed to this mediation—partly because it was possible that the action had been inspired by England in order to test the German state of mind. At any rate, the Führer had replied that such mediation efforts were useless as long as the Churchill Government was in power in England.

The conference then took a more conversational turn, with the most varied subjects being briefly touched upon once more. Among other things the Duce mentioned the domestic situation in Spain, which he too appraised rather negatively. The Falange was disunited, the priests had too much influence, and little or nothing at all had been done by way of reconstruction. He explained this inactivity of the Spaniards partially by the fact that for 700 years they had been directly or indirectly under Arab domination, and expressed the opinion that a success in foreign policy might serve to relieve the domestic situation.

In another connection the Turkish question was also examined again from the standpoint of the Turkish statesmen. The Foreign Minister and the Duce agreed that Turkish policy was considerably influenced by England's bribery of Turkish statesmen, including even the present President. If Kemal had still been living, Turkey would surely have pursued a better policy. To a question by the Foreign Minister the Duce replied that Italy for her part was, however, ready at all times to do everything to win over Turkey.

After approximately 2 hours, the conversation, which took place in a very friendly and cordial atmosphere, came to a close.

¹³ The communication to Hitler has not been found. Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 279, footnote 1.

To Count Ciano, the Foreign Minister again mentioned that Rumania had asked us for a military mission and that we would send one. It would also be well if we were gradually to give the Rumanians a certain amount of military support on account of the Russians and as protection for the oil fields.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 74

2366/489193-99

The Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 1297 of September 19 BERLIN, September 19 [1940]—9:20 p. m.
Received September 19—9:25 p. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.¹

I. The Foreign Minister just submitted the following:

1. The draft of a secret supplementary protocol to the tripartite pact, as announced in telegram No. 959,² section III.
2. Two secret notes which are to be exchanged when the pact is concluded.

II. We raised various objections, particularly to paragraph III of the secret supplementary protocol, which is to be drawn up unilaterally for Japan, and we shall have additional discussions on this point with the Foreign Minister.

III. The Foreign Minister is now obtaining the Emperor's approval for concluding the pact and full powers for negotiations concerning the supplementary documents mentioned under I.

IV. In order to avoid delays we are sending the following texts of the documents under I. Explanations will follow.

SECRET NOTE NO. 1³

EXCELLENCY: I have the honour to state that the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Government of Germany and Italy that the present European war will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between

¹ The text which follows is that of a telegram from the Embassy in Tokyo to the Foreign Ministry. From subsequent references, it is evident that its number is 978.

² Not found.

³ The text is in English in the original.

Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German and Italian Governments to such a possibility ⁴ and to ask the German and Italian Governments whether in such eventuality the Japanese Government may expect assistance and cooperation in every possible form as provided for under paragraph III of the present pact (group garbled).

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.

SECRET NOTE No. 2 ⁵

EXCELLENCY: I have the honour to state to Your Excellency in the affirmative as German and Italian Governments recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in regard to the establishment of a new order in greater East Asia, it is considered highly desirable by their Government that all the former German colonies in the Pacific area should be ceded to Japan, without compensation in the case of the group of islands mandated by Japan and with proper compensation in the case of other mandated islands as well as those actually in (group garbled) possession.

It is understood as matter of course that Japan shall accord a specially favourable Treaty of Peace to the activities of Germany and her nationals in these regions as compared to any other nation or their nationals.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.

SECRET SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL ⁵

With reference to the pact signed on this day by the representatives of Japan, Germany and Italy, the contracting parties have arrived at the following understanding:

I. With a view to determine by consultation with one another the detailed arrangement on the cooperation and mutual assistance between Japan, Germany and Italy as stipulated in paragraph III of the pact, joint military and naval commissions, preferably one at Tokyo and another at Berlin or Rome, together with a joint economic commission, be sent forthwith be organized [sic]. The composition of the aforesaid commission shall be determined through consultation by the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy.

The conclusions of the said commissions shall be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force.

II. Whether or not a contracting party or parties has or have been attacked openly or covertly as that stipulated in paragraph

⁴In telegram No. 970 of Sept. 20 (2366/489200) the Embassy in Tokyo reported: "The text of secret note No. 1 transmitted by telegram No. 966 of September 19 has been changed as follows as a result of our representations:

The wording at the end of paragraph 2 after the words 'to such a possibility and' is changed to 'they feel confident that Germany and Italy will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power.'

After this there follows unchanged the text of paragraph 3, beginning 'I avail, etc.'

⁵The text is in English in the original.

III of the pact shall be determined by the respective Governments, and in case the fact of such an attack has been established the measures of mutual assistance of political, economic and military nature while adopted by the contracting parties shall be studied and recommended by the aforesaid commissions, subject to approval of the respective Governments.

III. As the cooperation and mutual assistance stipulated in paragraph III of the pact have in view as fundamental aims the efforts to establish forthwith a new order in greater East Asia and Europe, to eventuate in a new world order, blessing humanity with a just and equitable peace, Germany and Italy shall, in time of peace or of war, take all possible measures to restrain a third power or powers on the Atlantic with a view to better enabling Japan, Germany and Italy to accomplish their common aim of establishing a new order in greater East Asia and in the Pacific basin in general.

In the event of Japan being attacked by a power or powers not at present involved in either the European war or the Sino-Japanese conflict referred to in the last part of paragraph III of the present pact, Germany and Italy also undertake to come to Japan's assistance in the Pacific Ocean with all their means and resources.

IV. While Germany and Italy undertake to use their good offices with a view to improve the relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R., Japan, Germany and Italy shall make utmost efforts to induce the U.S.S.R. to act in accord with the main conceptions of the present pact.

V. The contracting parties undertake to exchange from time to time without delay all useful inventions and devices of war and to supply one another with war equipments, such as aeroplanes, tanks, guns, explosives, etc., which each party may reasonably spare, together with technical skill and men, should they be required. Furthermore they are prepared to do utmost in furnishing one another with and in aiding one another in the (group garbled) to them homely minerals including oil and other materials as well as what those for war industries and various requisites for livelihood with machinery of all sorts employed in the production of such requisites.

VI. In conformity with the spirit which prompted the conclusion of the present pact, the Governments of the contracting parties undertake to enter into negotiations without delay, with a view to deciding upon measures of assuring to the other contracting parties or their nationals, in their commercial and industrial activities in the regions where the contracting parties are respectively recognized to have leadership by virtue of paragraph I and II of the present pact, a position which is preponderant in comparison to that of any third power and its nationals.

VII. The present protocol shall remain secret and shall not be published.

Done in triplicate at, the post of

Stahmer
Ott

End of telegram from Tokyo.

(Last part arrived today, 10:30 p. m.)

The Foreign Minister's Secretariat

No. 75

172/135664-69

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*TOP SECRET MILITARY
St.S. No. 714

BERLIN, September 19, 1940.

General von Tippelskirch¹ called on me today after his return from Bucharest and handed me, secretly for now, his report to the OKW on his conferences in Bucharest from September 15 to 17, dealing with the dispatch of a German military mission.

The report is enclosed.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

No. 479 g. Kdos. (Att. Abt.)

BERLIN, September 18, 1940.

REPORT ON THE CONFERENCES IN BUCHAREST, SEPTEMBER 15-17, 1940

I

My instructions were to listen to particulars regarding the Army and the Air Force, including anti-aircraft defense, supplementary to the request that the Reich Government send a German military mission, and to obtain, in particular:

An estimate as to instruction teams that would be required;

An estimate as to officers required for training and organization of the new army and for schools of all descriptions.

II

On the basis of the talks, General Antonescu presented his proposals to me, which are enclosed.²

III

For explanation of these proposals, the following is to be reported on the course of the talks:

Except for a short interval, General Antonescu conducted the talks himself.

¹The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Aug. 1-Nov. 30, 1940) contains this passage for Sept. 14:

"Colonel Brinkmann reports at 5:35 p. m. that the Führer has decided to send Lieutenant General von Tippelskirch to Bucharest temporarily in order to gain time and to prepare adequately for the military mission. The OKH had been informed accordingly."

²Not printed (172/135670-75). In a telegram sent Sept. 18, immediately after Tippelskirch's visit, Fabricius recommended speedy compliance with Antonescu's requests for dispatch of German units of division strength, primarily motorized and air units (172/135659).

I have the definite impression that General A. places great value on the early arrival of German troops in the country. He believes that a Russian attack may occur at any time and does not feel safe from Hungary, either. He told me when I left: Just give me two months of peace for the internal reorganization of the country, then I believe I can vouch for Rumania.

He thinks he would have that security only after a practical demonstration of the German guarantee by the presence of German troops in the country. He attaches particular value to mobile and motorized troops, airmen and anti-aircraft artillery, because he feels practically defenseless in this respect. Furthermore he would like to provide his army with such units at the earliest possible date. (The oil fields are well protected against sabotage, to be sure, but against air attacks their defenses are totally inadequate,—enclosure . . .)

On this account he also hopes to receive German matériel for the organization of Rumanian units. He thought at first that he would be able within a short time to have the Rumanian Army take over the matériel of the German units transferred to Rumania, as soon as tactical and technical training was completed. I left no doubt in his mind that I was not authorized to make any such promises, and that in my opinion it would very largely depend on the war situation and the German production possibilities whether this desire could be fulfilled within the foreseeable future.

He insisted nevertheless on incorporating this wish in his proposal in this form. It seems quite obvious that he wants at least to use this formula vis-à-vis other countries and probably his own as well as the simplest justification for the presence of German forces. A *promise* of the eventual transfer of German weapons is in any case not the indispensable preliminary condition for the dispatch of German troops. Of primary importance to General A. is that German troops should come; the hope of receiving modern weapons for his Army at the same time is a secondary consideration.

In discussing what in his opinion would be a reasonable maximum of German troops to be moved to Rumania, he drew a not very comprehensible distinction between the existing guarantee of the boundaries and a formal military alliance. In the case of the former he believes that for considerations of foreign policy he cannot go beyond a limited number of units without incurring serious international difficulties. He set this maximum in his proposal. In the case of a military alliance he believes that he could accept German troops in theoretically unlimited numbers. He probably thinks that a military alliance would mean an even stronger commitment on the part of Germany to the security of Rumania against an attack. I avoided any discussion on the subject.

He is most anxious to build up a really effective Army of his own. He has already drafted some concrete plans to that end, which aim at contraction and better organization. He is quite aware that the present Army is an inflated torso, in which no one unit possesses everything it is supposed to have according to the table of equipment. Conditions seem to be especially disastrous in the supply organizations of this oversized Army.

General A. is currently massing the bulk of his Army in the east. A situation map indicating the planned disposition is enclosed.⁹ He is still undecided how far he ought to go with demobilization. It has allegedly been ordered for the west. In the east he had intended to carry it out by the dismissal of 30 percent of the effectives, but has changed his mind because he has supposedly received reports of new threatening measures on the new border with Russia. They concern continuous provocative border violations by the Russians, for which they then blame the Rumanians; the concentration of river crossing and bridge construction material at several points along the Prut; and the construction of numerous airfields in southern Bessarabia.

I told him that I was unable to view these matters as harbingers of an acute threat and reminded him that the German guarantee for *all* of Rumania's borders had created an entirely new situation. It is my impression that he still has to struggle with himself in order to be convinced of this. However that may be, he expressed the intention to proceed with discharge of up to 40 percent of the effectives in the east, too, if he could be genuinely convinced that he could accept this responsibility before his country.

IV

Other impressions.

General A. gives the impression of a man of strong will. He attacks the tasks he has set for himself with ironlike energy. He certainly possesses great authority in his country, because of his repeatedly proven uncompromising rejection of the former King and his entourage.

His immediate efforts are focused on eradicating the manifestations of corruption left by the defunct regime. He is doing this with ruthless determination.

To judge his constructive abilities as a statesman is not yet possible.

Absolute quiet reigns throughout the country. The Legion movement has been curbed, at least for the time being. Whether it can be converted to active support of the state, is too early to say. The general opinion is that General Antonescu stands high above the leader of the Legion, Sima, both in will power and intellectual capacity.

Personally General A. makes a very pleasant and frank impression.

V. TIPPELSKIRCH

⁹ Not found.

No. 76

C109/C002197-202

Dr. Albrecht Haushofer to His Parents

BERLIN, September 19, 1940.

DEAR PARENTS: I am sending you enclosed herewith some important documents:

First, T.'s letter to Father;¹

Secondly, my answer to T.,² which has already been sent and, I hope, has your subsequent approval;

Thirdly, the draft of a letter to D.,³ which I will keep to myself and not show to anyone else. I request that you examine it to see whether it might involve any danger for the woman who may transmit it. I really believe that it sounds harmless enough. I have inserted the reference to the "authorities" over there purposely as a safeguard for the transmitter and recipient. So I should like to have your honest opinion and any corrections.

Fourthly, a report of what I said on the 8th in G⁴—as an accounting before history (save till the last).

The whole thing is a fool's errand⁵—but we cannot do anything about that. According to our latest reports the treaties of union between the Empire and the United States are about to be signed.

Best wishes,

ALBRECHT

[Enclosure 1]

TOP SECRET

SEPTEMBER 19, 1940.

MY DEAR HERR HESS: Your letter of the 10th⁶ reached me yesterday after a delay caused by the antiquated postal service of Partnach-Alm. I again gave a thorough study to the possibilities discussed therein and request—before taking the steps proposed—that you yourself examine once more the thoughts set forth below.

I have in the meantime been thinking of the technical route by which a message from me must travel before it can reach the Duke of H[amilton]. With your help, delivery to Lisbon can of course be assured without difficulty. About the rest of the route we do not know. Foreign control must be taken into account; the letter must therefore in no case be composed in such a way that it will simply be seized and destroyed or that it will directly endanger the woman transmitting it or the ultimate recipient. In view of my close personal relations and intimate acquaintance with Douglas H[amilton] I can write a few lines to him (which should be enclosed with

¹ Document No. 46.

² Enclosure 1.

³ Enclosure 2.

⁴ Document No. 61.

⁵ The preceding part of this sentence is in English in the original.

⁶ See document No. 46.

the letter to Mrs. R., without any indication of place and without a full name—an A. would suffice for the signature) in such a way that *he alone* will recognize that behind my wish to see him in Lisbon there is something more serious than a personal whim. All the rest, however, seems to me extremely hazardous and detrimental to the success of the letter. Let us suppose that the case were reversed: an old lady in Germany receives a letter from an unknown source abroad, with the request to forward a message whose recipient is asked to disclose to an unknown foreigner where he will be staying for a certain period—and this recipient were a high officer in the air force (of course I do not know exactly what position H. holds at the moment; judging from his past I can conceive of only three things: He is an active air force general, or he directs the air defense of an important part of Scotland, or he has a responsible position in the Air Ministry). I do not think that you need much imagination to picture to yourself the faces that Canaris or Heydrich would make and the smirk with which they would consider any offer of “security” or “confidence” in such a letter if a subordinate should submit such a case to them. They would not merely make faces, you may be certain! The measures would come quite automatically—and neither the old lady nor the air force officer would have an easy time of it! In England it is no different.

Now another thing. Here too I would ask you to picture the situation in reverse. Let us assume that I received such a letter from one of my English friends. I would quite naturally report the matter to the highest German authorities I could contact, as soon as I had realized the import it might have, and would ask for instructions on what I should do myself (at that, I am a civilian and H. is an officer). If it should be decided that I was to comply with the wish for a meeting with my friend, I would then be most anxious to get my instructions, if not from the Führer himself, at least from a person who receives them directly and at the same time has the gift of transmitting the finest and lightest nuances—an art which has been mastered by you yourself but not by all Reich Ministers. In addition, I should very urgently request that my action be fully covered vis-à-vis other high authorities of my own country—uninformed or unfavorable. It is not any different with H. He *cannot* fly to Lisbon—any more than I can!—unless he is given leave, that is unless at least Air Minister Sinclair and Foreign Minister Halifax know about it. If, however, he receives permission to reply or to go, there is no need of indicating any place in England; if he does not receive it, then any attempt through a neutral mediator would also have little success. In this case the technical problem of contacting H. is the least of the difficulties. A neutral who knows England and can move about in England—presumably there would be little sense in entrusting anyone

else with such a mission—will be able to find the first peer of Scotland very quickly as long as conditions in the Isle are still halfway in order. (At the time of a successful invasion all the possibilities we are discussing here would be pointless anyway.)

My proposal is therefore as follows:

Through the old friend I will write a letter to H.—in a form that will incriminate no one but will be understandable to the recipient—with the proposal for a meeting in Lisbon. If nothing comes of that, it will be possible (if the military situation leaves enough time for it), assuming that a suitable intermediary is available, to make a second attempt through a neutral going to England, who might be given a personal message to take along. With respect to this possibility, I must add, however, that H. is extremely reserved—as many English are toward anyone they do not know personally. Since the entire Anglo-German problem after all springs from a most profound crisis in mutual confidence, this would not be immaterial.

Please excuse the length of this letter; I merely wished to explain the situation to you fully.

I already tried to explain to you not long ago that, for the reasons I gave, the possibilities of successful efforts at a settlement between the Führer and the British upper class seem to me—to my extreme regret—infinitesimally small. Nevertheless I should not want to close this letter without pointing out once more that I still think there would be a somewhat greater chance of success in going through Ambassador Lothian in Washington or Sir Samuel Hoare in Madrid rather than through my friend H. To be sure, they are—politically speaking—more inaccessible.

Would you send me a line or give me a telephone call with final instructions? If necessary, will you also inform your brother in advance? Presumably I will then have to discuss with him the forwarding of the letter to Lisbon and the arrangement for a cover address for the reply in L[isbon].

With cordial greetings and best wishes for your health,

Yours, etc.

A[LBRECHT] H[AUSHOFER]

[Enclosure 2]

Draft Letter to D. H.?

MY DEAR D.: Even if this letter has only a slight chance of reaching you—there is a chance and I want to make use of it.

¹The draft letter is in English in the original. The Duke of Hamilton's report of his interview with Hess on May 11, 1941, is printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1948), vol. xxxviii, document No. 116-M. This refers to a letter dated Sept. 23, 1940, from Albrecht Haushofer. The excerpt printed here is evidently a draft of that letter. See also Rainer Hildebrandt, *Wir sind die Letzten: Aus dem Leben des Widerstandskämpfers Albrecht Haushofer und seiner Freunde* (Neuwied-Berlin, n.d.), p. 110.

First of all to give you a sign of unaltered and unalterable personal attachment. I do hope you have been spared in all this ordeal, and I hope the same is true of your brothers. I heard of your father's deliverance from long suffering; and I heard that your brother-in-law Northumberland lost his life near Dunkerque. I need hardly tell you, how I feel about all that . . .

Now there is one thing more. If you remember some of my last communications before the war started you will realize that there is a certain significance in the fact that I am, at present, able to ask you whether there is the slightest chance of our meeting and having a talk somewhere on the outskirts of Europe, perhaps in Portugal. There are some things I could tell you, that might make it worth while for you to try a short trip to Lisbon—if you could make your authorities understand so much that they would give you leave. As to myself—I could reach Lisbon any time (without any kind of difficulty) within a few days after receiving news from you. If there is an answer to this letter, please address it to

No. 77

2366/489201

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 20, 1940—7:15 p. m.¹

No. 1312 of September 20

Telegram No. 971 of September 20 from Tokyo.

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to our telegram No. 970 of September 20.²

1. The Foreign Minister just stated that the Emperor had given him full powers to sign the pact.

2. The Foreign Minister suggests, in order to accelerate matters as much as possible, that the texts be signed here in the English language and therewith go into force. He agreed with our suggestion of another, later signing after completion of the translation into the language of the country; he said the Japanese translation will take about one week. In this connection we are thinking of the signing by the Foreign Ministers of a solemn historical document, in the language of the country concerned, in the capital cities. Stahmer, Ott.

The Foreign Ministry

¹ It is not clear from the file copy whether the time indicated was when the telegram was sent from Berlin or received in Rome.

² See document No. 74, footnote 4.

No. 78

2366/489202-03

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 20, 1940—9:00 p. m.¹

No. 1314 of September 20

Telegram No. 976 of September 20 from Tokyo.

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

Explanations as announced in telegram No. 966, section IV of September 19.²

1. Secret Supplementary Protocol:

The Foreign Minister emphasized that the protocol should not contain any sort of limitations of the obligation of assistance laid down in the pact, but in the interests of quick handling by the Privy Council it should indicate as clearly as possible the advantages for Japan resulting from the pact.

Section III complies with the demand of the Navy, which on this condition unreservedly approved the pact. In our opinion this section remains within the framework of the obligation of assistance laid down in the pact. In order to eliminate the one-sided wording in favor of Japan we recommend, in case the Reich Foreign Minister considers this necessary, that Japan be obligated in so far as possible to undertake action in the Pacific Ocean for relieving pressure elsewhere and to provide armed assistance in other seas.

2. Nothing to remark regarding Secret Note No. 1.

3. Regarding Secret Note No. 2:

The Foreign Minister explained the assurance "especially favourable treatment"³ to the effect that Reich citizens in these areas are to be accorded particularly favorable treatment going beyond the preferred economic position which (one group evidently missing) according to section VI of the Secret Supplementary Protocol.

4. Until the instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister have arrived we shall avoid further discussion about suggestions on the text. Stahmer, Ott.

[Telegram to Rome unsigned]

¹ It is not clear from the file copy whether the time indicated was when the telegram was sent from Berlin or received in Rome.

² See document No. 74 and footnote 1.

³ English in the original.

No. 79

F5/0168-0174

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

ROME, September 20, 1940.

[RAM 32.]¹

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER VON RIBBENTROP AND THE DUCE, IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADORS VON MACKENSEN AND ALFIERI, IN ROME, SEPTEMBER 20, 1940

First of all the Führer's letter to Franco² was translated into French for the Duce. The Foreign Minister pointed out in this connection that he was now awaiting Franco's reply not only to the Führer's military analysis which had just been presented but also to the report submitted to Madrid by Serrano Suñer on political and economic questions. As the Duce had correctly foreseen, negotiations with the Spaniards were not indeed making very rapid progress. He heard from Berlin, for example, that the negotiations on economic matters were proceeding quite slowly.³

As regards the future course, it was his intention to use the occasion of the signing of the agreement with Japan to sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suñer concerning Spain's entry into the war. But he wanted to ask the Duce whether, as he had implied the day before,⁴ he preferred a real military alliance. (The Duce replied in the affirmative.) This would also, of course, have to remain secret until Spain entered the war, for otherwise the Gibraltar operation would be jeopardized. In this connection the Duce stated that England must sense the danger somewhat, as she was making strenuous preparations for the defense of Gibraltar. Vessels were being assembled, guns were being emplaced, and a force of approximately 10,000 men had been concentrated. All this indicated that England intended to defend Gibraltar.

When the Foreign Minister asked the Duce whether he considered the capture of Gibraltar difficult, he replied in the negative. If the British fleet were chased out of Gibraltar, the garrison on the Rock could not hold out long after that. The Foreign Minister then proposed that they first await Franco's reply, regarding which he would inform the Duce in detail through Ambassador von Mackensen.

The Duce agreed and in turn proposed concluding a military alliance in the form of a tripartite pact with Spain. During the presence of

¹ The file number is from another copy (66/46354-57).

² Document No. 70.

³ See document No. 198.

⁴ See document No. 73.

Count Ciano for the signing of the Japanese agreement, the Spanish tripartite pact could at the same time be signed in secret. That would also make it easier to keep it secret, for the attention of the world would undoubtedly be concentrated primarily on Japan.

The Foreign Minister then expressed some thoughts on the negotiations with Serrano Suñer. He emphasized the difficulties which the Spaniards were making in opposition to the German request for cession of one of the Canary Islands. The Führer had had this request presented to the Spaniards in order—looking far into the future—to counteract, through a series of naval bases, dangers which could arise for the European and African Continents—which might be designated as the Eastern Hemisphere—from the Western Hemisphere under the leadership of the United States. The Spaniards were surely loyal friends of the Axis and would fulfill to the letter any commitments once entered into. But on specific points, such as the one just mentioned, for example, they were somewhat difficult.

In this connection the Duce mentioned again that the war was of very great value for Franco, for the stability of his Government and the unity of the country. To the Foreign Minister's question regarding the source of Franco's authority, of which the Duce had spoken yesterday, the latter replied that Franco was supported by the Army and the (internally disunited) Falange, which had a right wing, the so-called "Requetes" whose motto was "God, King, and Fatherland," and a left wing with aspirations toward social reform.

When the Foreign Minister inquired whether the Duce believed that the Spaniards could administer the Moroccan area to which they laid claim, the Duce simply shrugged his shoulders slightly and asked about the preparations which the Spaniards were supposed to have made in Spanish Morocco against an attack from French Morocco, especially whether they had weapons and airplanes.

Thereupon the Foreign Minister brought up the new Japanese requests with respect to a supplementary protocol to the treaty itself,⁵ some of which requests he characterized as somewhat childish, to which the Duce retorted that the Japanese were, to be sure, very clever children. The Foreign Minister traced some of the Japanese wishes to Japan's fear that after England was defeated the English fleet would go to the United States and be absorbed by Roosevelt. But since the latter knew that, owing to the dominant position of the Axis in Europe, there were no laurels to be won in the Atlantic, it was possible that a large part of the Anglo-American fleet would therefore be concentrated in the Pacific. This fear had led the Japanese to request certain commitments on the part of the Axis Powers. The Foreign Minister would tell them, however, that the Axis had

⁵ See document No. 74.

so far assumed the lion's share of the war against England anyway, and now the share still remaining for Japan's participation was apparently supposed to be partly borne by the Axis, too. The Foreign Minister also informed the Duce briefly concerning the Japanese colonial demands with respect to the former German South Sea colonies. The Duce inquired whether the Emperor had already given his approval. The Foreign Minister replied that the Emperor agreed in principle, but that some details were still unsettled.

After further, less important, supplementary points in the Japanese proposals were mentioned, the conversation again turned to England, in which connection the Foreign Minister stated that, as one who knew the English well, he had always been convinced that there would be a war with England. He illustrated with various instances of his personal experience with Englishmen when he was Ambassador in London.

SCHMIDT

No. 80

272/177424

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
to the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET MILITARY

BERLIN, September 20, 1940.

No. 00104 g. Kdos. Ausl. III E

Subject: German Military Mission in Bucharest.

For the State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Freiherr von Weizsäcker.

With reference to the conference with Lieutenant General von Tippleskirch on September 19,¹ the following is respectfully brought to your notice:

1. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, after hearing the report of the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht on the afternoon of September 19, has made the following decision:

a) Contrary to the Rumanian proposals, German troops approximately in the strength of one division will be sent to Rumania as early as possible.

b) A transfer of German war material to Rumania is out of the question for the duration of the war.

c) The other Rumanian proposals will be reviewed by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in consultation with the Army and the Luftwaffe.

2. The High Command of the Wehrmacht is considering the assignment of the Army and Air Attachés in Bucharest to the Army and

¹ See document No. 75.

Air Force Missions, as an additional duty, in order to ensure liaison with the German Legation in Bucharest.²

3. The Foreign Ministry is requested to examine the following political questions:

a) Transit of the German units through Hungary. It would be desirable to have personnel transported together with their weapons.

b) Notification of the Soviet Union regarding the sending of German Wehrmacht units to Rumania.

4. If it is found that some points relating to the complex of questions referred to earlier require further discussion with the Rumanians before the troops are dispatched, it is planned to send Lieutenant General von Tippelskirch once more for a short visit to Bucharest.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order:
CANARIS

¹ On Sept. 21 the Foreign Ministry, over Weizsäcker's signature, sent a letter to the Wehrmacht High Command, requesting further explanations of this particular point and expressing meanwhile certain objections in principle "as the armed forces Attachés were members of the Diplomatic Corps with all the rights but also with all the restrictions pertaining to that position." (272/177423)

No. 81

104/112531-38

Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union

Moscow, September 21, 1940.

Subject: Conversation with Molotov on September 21, 1940, regarding Vienna conferences.

Before my departure for Berlin, Molotov received me on September 21, 1940, at 5:00 p. m. He handed me on this occasion a detailed memorandum¹ in reply to the German memorandum on the subject of the Vienna conversations, which I had transmitted to him on September 9, 1940,² by order of the Reich Government.

In the course of the conversation Molotov explained verbally the contents of the memorandum, expressing essentially the same ideas as on September 9 (see the memorandum of Counselor of Embassy Hilger of September 18, 1940³).

When I pointed out that I could not recall that he, Molotov, had ever spoken of German support for the claims of the Soviet Government to southern Bucovina and that I could merely remember the casual little phrase that the Soviet Union would "for the present"

¹ *Infra.*

² Document No. 33.

³ See *ibid.*, footnote 3.

confine herself to northern Bucovina, Molotov replied that apparently he had made this remark in indefinite form at the time.⁴

Molotov then—several times, in fact—reverted to the last paragraph of the memorandum, in which he emphasized that an amendment or annulment of article III of the Non-Aggression Treaty might be discussed if this article inconvenienced us in any way or had proved restrictive.

I replied that, in my opinion, the German Government harbored no intentions of this kind at all.

M. Molotov further stated that the German action in Vienna had given the foreign press cause to speak of German-Soviet disagreements and to assert that the guarantee of the Rumanian frontier was directed against the Soviet Union. It would have been easy to forestall all such rumors by asking the Soviet Government in advance about its intentions. The Soviet Government would in such a case have given the unequivocal reply that it had no aggressive designs of any kind on Rumania.

In conclusion M. Molotov repeated his request that during my stay in Berlin I do everything I could to clarify the position of the Soviet Government on this question, which, of course, I promised to do.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

[Enclosure]

Moscow, September 21, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

In reply to German Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg's memorandum of September 9 of this year, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to state as follows:

1. In reply to the declaration of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, of August 31 of this year,⁵ to the effect that the Government of the German Reich had disregarded article III of the Treaty of Consultation, the Government of the German Reich states that Germany had not violated her obligations to consult. In justification of its position the Government of the German Reich refers

⁴ Molotov's statements regarding southern Bucovina as recorded in Hilger's memorandum of Sept. 18 (1379/357844-47) were as follows: "He [Molotov] remembered in this connection that the Soviet Government had notified the German Government before taking measures concerning Bessarabia and Bucovina. Furthermore, at the request of the German Ambassador the Soviet Government had postponed the execution of its decision until the attitude of the German Government had been ascertained. On the basis of this attitude the Soviet Government had reduced its original claims, which included all of Bucovina, but had expressly declared that in certain circumstances it counted on support by the German Government for its claims in southern Bucovina. By the guarantee of Rumanian territory pronounced on the part of Germany at Vienna the German Government had violated this point also."

⁵ Cf. vol. x of this series, documents Nos. 4, 13, 20, and 25.

⁶ See document No. 1.

to the fact that, after the solution of the Bessarabian question, the USSR and Germany, from the standpoint of the Moscow Non-Aggression Treaty, no longer had any common interests with respect to Rumania and Hungary.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion that such a construction by the Government of the German Reich contravenes article III of the Treaty of August 23, 1939, by virtue of which the contracting parties obligate themselves in the future to "maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests."

There is no doubt that the decisions reached at Vienna regarding the transfer of a considerable portion of Transylvania to Hungary and regarding the guarantee of the national territory of Rumania by Germany and Italy involve the very questions that affect the common interests of our countries and consequently make the consultation provided for in article III of the Treaty of August 23, 1939, obligatory. Certain information regarding the above-mentioned decisions at Vienna was not, however, given by the Government of the German Reich to the Government of the USSR until after the Vienna Award, and this confronted the Soviet Union with an accomplished fact.

The Soviet Government must also point to the fact that the granting of the guarantee to Rumania with respect to her national territory gave occasion for the assertion that this act of the Reich Government was directed against the USSR. As is known, assertions of this kind actually received a wide circulation. If, however, the Government of the German Reich had approached the Government of the USSR on this question in advance, there would have been no occasion for the circulation of such assertions and the Government of the German Reich at the same time would have fully convinced itself that the USSR does not intend to threaten the territorial integrity of Rumania. This shows the extraordinary importance of prompt information and consultation on questions affecting the common interests of the USSR and Germany.

The Soviet Government is unfortunately compelled to state that the view expressed in the reply of the Government of the German Reich of September 9, 1940, is also at variance with the declaration that Count von der Schulenburg made by order of the Reich Government on June 23, 1940.* As is known, the Reich Government in this case replied—to a specific inquiry of the Soviet Government—that the obligation to inform and consult arising out of article III of the Treaty was applicable to the countries of southeastern Europe and the Balkans. It appears from the foregoing that the Government of the

* This refers apparently to Ribbentrop's instruction of June 25 to Schulenburg (vol. x of this series, document No. 13), which Schulenburg on June 26 reported having carried out (*ibid.*, document No. 20).

German Reich in June of this year recognized the obligation to consult on questions concerning such countries as Rumania and Hungary, particularly on such important questions as those dealt with at Vienna, which affect the interests of the USSR.

The Soviet Government, for its part, considers it its duty to state that it reaffirms its declarations concerning the recognition of the special economic interests of Germany in Rumania, especially in the fields of petroleum and grain deliveries. At the same time, however, it finds itself compelled to declare that the inference which might be drawn from Count von der Schulenburg's memorandum of September 9, 1940, is incorrect: that after the solution of the Bessarabian question the Soviet Government had recognized in their entirety the exclusive interests of Germany in the Rumanian question and also in the other questions affecting the Danube Basin. In reality the Soviet Government has neither orally nor in writing recognized such a right on the part of Germany.

2. To justify the omission of a consultation with the Government of the USSR in the Vienna decisions, the Government of the German Reich alleges that the Government of the USSR also did not consult with the Reich Government on its measures in the Baltic countries, especially in Lithuania, and gave only short notice with regard to Bessarabia and northern Bucovina.

The Soviet Government must, above all, point out that during the entire time that the Treaty of August 23, 1939, has been in effect, the Government of the German Reich has not once declared that the Soviet Government has violated its treaty obligations or failed to enter into consultation with the German Government on the above-mentioned questions. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that a prompt declaration regarding all claims that may arise, in case there actually are such claims, is the best way to bring about mutual understanding and to assure the complete and effective performance of the obligations under the Treaty. The Soviet Government must point out that in the course of the entire year that the Treaty of August 23, 1939, has been in effect, it has not received any such declarations and claims from the Reich Government.

To turn to the substance of this matter, the Soviet Government believes it necessary to state that the said statement of the Reich Government is not in accord with the actual situation. The Soviet Government not only informed the German Government in advance of the measures it intended to take in the Baltic States, particularly in Lithuania, but even received from the Government of the German Reich on June 17, 1940, a communication⁷ stating that the measures carried out by the Soviet Government in those states were regarded by Germany as measures which concerned solely the Soviet

⁷ Not found. Cf. vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 465 and 471.

Union and those states. Such a declaration by the German Government was entirely comprehensible to the Soviet Government, especially as Germany had, as recently as August 1939, recognized the special interests of the Soviet Union in the Baltic States, and the measures which the Soviet Union had taken regarding those states, particularly Lithuania, in no way went beyond the scope of the Soviet-German Pact of August 23, 1939. In regard to a certain area in south-eastern Lithuania, however, the Soviet Government in June of this year clearly confirmed Germany's rights to it and reserved its new proposals concerning this Lithuanian territory for a special agreement with the Government of the German Reich.⁸

The same thing must be said concerning the question of Bessarabia and Bucovina, in regard to which the Soviet Government held a consultation with the Government of the German Reich, at which it met the viewpoint expressed by the German Government by substantially paring down its intentions with regard to Bucovina. At the same time it voiced the hope that the German Government would give its support in the future when the question of southern Bucovina was opened. This declaration of the Soviet Government met with no objection from Germany.

The Soviet Government, moreover, on June 25 of this year also communicated to the Italian Government through the Italian Ambassador, Signor Rosso, its attitude on the questions pertaining to Rumania, and it was convinced that the Government of the German Reich would be duly informed of this communication of the Soviet Government. Emphasizing that the USSR wished to obtain from Rumania merely what was rightfully hers, the Soviet Government declared in this communication: "Regarding other territories of Rumania, the USSR is mindful of the interests of Italy and Germany and is prepared to come to an understanding with them on these questions."⁹

On the basis of the foregoing explanations, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to declare that the measures it took in regard to the Baltic States and Bessarabia were entirely in accord with the Soviet-German Treaty and that the new and lesser problems which were not anticipated in this treaty have been or will be solved by the Soviet Government in agreement with the Government of the German Reich.

Hence the reference of the Government of the German Reich to the measures carried out by the Soviet Union in the Baltic region as an explanation of the failure to consult with the Soviet Government regarding the Vienna decisions is not confirmed by the facts and therefore not justified.

⁸ Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 162.

⁹ An Italian translation of the memorandum handed by Molotov to Rosso is printed in Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 41-42. See also vol. x of this series, document No. 21.

3. In conclusion the German Government refers to the circumstance that in the settlement of the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute on August 30 it had to proceed to very rapid diplomatic intervention.

Here the Soviet Government deems it necessary to recall that this question had already been considered during the conferences in Salzburg between the Reich Government and the Governments of Hungary and Rumania and that consequently the German Government had sufficient time at its disposal to enter into consultation with the Government of the USSR on this question.

The aforesaid circumstance, therefore, cannot serve as justification for the failure of the Government of the German Reich to fulfill its obligation under the Non-Aggression Treaty to consult in the Rumanian question and in the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute.

The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that the precise and strict observance of this treaty, particularly of article III of the treaty, is also one of the most important conditions in the matter of the pacification of the Danube Basin, to which reference is made in the memorandum of September 9 of this year.

In conclusion the Soviet Government deems it necessary to add to the foregoing that, if article III of the Non-Aggression Treaty involves certain inconveniences and restrictions from the standpoint of the German Government, the Soviet Government is prepared to negotiate on the question of an amendment to or deletion of this article in the treaty. The Soviet Government considers it desirable to have a special agreement regarding the time and manner of dealing with this question.¹⁰

¹⁰ Weizsäcker recorded on Sept. 23 that Schulenburg had handed him this memorandum and enclosure that day and that the Ambassador would give the original to the Foreign Minister after the latter's return from Rome (104/112530).

No. 82

2366/489204-05

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 21, 1940—11:30 p. m.¹

No. 1331 of September 21

No. 984 of September 21 from Tokyo.

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 766 of September 20.²

In a 5-hour conversation with the Foreign Minister today we carried out the instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister one after the other, with the following result:

¹ It is not clear from the file copy whether the time indicated was when the telegram was sent from Berlin or received in Rome.

² Not found.

I. The formulation of the text of the Tripartite Pact was decided with the following two changes suggested:

a. The Foreign Minister asks that the earlier formulation be retained as in the text set forth in the telegram cited above, without mention of the concealed attack, since he has already obtained the Emperor's approval of this passage, and any change would lead to difficulties and great delay.

b. He suggests the following text for the new section 4: With a view to implementing the present pact joint technical commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy, will meet without delay.*

Reason:

The term "joint technical commissions" is meant as a collective expression for the various special commissions to be formed from representatives of the armed forces and business. We recommend acceptance in order to facilitate elimination of the Secret Supplementary Protocol.

II. We shall probably be able to eliminate the Secret Supplementary Protocol and the two Secret Notes. We are trying to obtain final consent to this as soon as possible and a decision about the place of signing, which is very important for Japanese prestige. Stahmer, Ott.

[Telegram to Rome unsigned]

* The foregoing sentence is in English in the original.

No. 83

4040/E063814-15

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

No. 781

BERLIN, September 21, 1940.
zu Pol. VIII 1166.¹

Drafting Officer: Counselor Knoll.

I. Only for your information.

The Chairman of the French delegation to the Armistice Commission stated on the evening of September 20 that the Japanese delegation in Hanoi had made new demands, after a technical agreement about the details of the passage through the country seemed to have been reached, which practically amounted to military occupation of Tonkin through permanent quartering of 32,000 men. In the face of the announcement by the Japanese military authorities that the passage would in any case begin at midnight on September 22, the French Governor General had been instructed to suggest postponing the date for material reasons and in case the Japanese threat was carried out

¹ Pol. VIII 1166: Not printed (8745/E610477-78). This document recorded a telephone message, sent from Wiesbaden at 11:00 p. m. on Sept. 20, transmitting a note from Doyen to Stülpnagel. The contents of the note are summarized in the document printed here.

to resist by force, but to continue trying to localize the incident. The French Ambassador there was instructed to inform the Japanese Government to this effect.

On September 21, General Doyen orally requested of the Chairman of the Armistice Commission that we exercise a moderating influence on Japan.²

II. I request, however, that you initiate nothing on your part.

Please send merely a telegraphic report on how the situation is evaluated there.³

WEIZSÄCKER

² This request had been transmitted in telegram No. 174 of Sept. 21 from Wiesbaden (368/207009-10) as well as by telephone at 1:15 p. m. on Sept. 21 (8745/E610483). Ribbentrop had decided that nothing should be initiated on the German side concerning the matter (Bruns memorandum of Sept. 21: 4040/E063813).

³ See document No. 89.

No. 84

2012/443295-97

The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry

SEPTEMBER 21, 1940.

Pol. I 1085 g. Rs.

Ausld. No. 108/40 g. Kdos Chefsache Ausl. III org.

I am forwarding the enclosed copy of the OKW report WFSt/L No. 33 298/40 g. K. Chefsache, of September 20, 1940, concerning the Führer's decision in the question of the military mission to Rumania.

BÜRKNER

[Enclosure]

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 20, 1940.

High Command of the Wehrmacht

WFSt/Abt L No. 33 298/40 g. K. Chefsache (I)

Concerning the request of the Rumanian Government for German training personnel and instruction units, the Führer and Supreme Commander has decided:

1. The Army and the Luftwaffe will send military missions to Rumania. Their ostensible task will be to instruct our friend Rumania in organizing and training her armed forces.

2. Their *real tasks*, which must not become apparent either to the Rumanians or to our own troops, are:

a) To protect the oil fields from seizure by a third power and from destruction;

b) to enable the Rumanian Army to carry out definite tasks in accordance with an effective plan developed in favor of Germany's interests;

c) in case a war with Soviet Russia is forced upon us, to prepare for the commitment of German and Rumanian forces from the direction of Rumania.

3. Hence results the following with regard to the work and setup of the military mission of the *Army* and the strength of the instruction units:

a) German troops are to be employed in the direct *protection of the oil fields* (sabotage, riots) only in special circumstances. This is a task of the Rumanians. We must seem to be collaborating with the special units already in the oil fields.

b) The German "*instruction unit*" should at first be limited to one motorized division strengthened by tanks. To what extent it will later on be strengthened "according to the requirements of the training program" is yet to be determined.

c) *Training* is to be carried out in such a manner that certain Rumanian units are trained for later employment on our side as "model divisions." Influence must be exerted on the Rumanian command to give preferential treatment to these units with regard to personnel and war material.

The influencing of the *whole Army*, for instance through the development of the officer corps, courses in schools, etc., will be secondary to this principal task for the time being.

d) The tasks of individuals assigned to the military mission in *preparations for major troop concentrations* are to be camouflaged.

4. The task of the Luftwaffe military mission is above all to protect the oil fields by instruction units against air attacks, and to train the Rumanian Air Force *for this purpose* and, as far as possible, for later combined operations with the Rumanian Army forces.

After this the important thing is to prepare for the possible employment, later, of stronger German forces from Rumania. The Luftwaffe High Command will decide on the basis of the over-all situation in what strength forces are available for the military mission.

5. To adjust questions which concern the military missions of *both branches of the armed forces* and require decision on the spot, a joint chief will be appointed by a separate special order. For the rest, the military missions are directly subordinate to their own *High Commands*. In order to establish close liaison with the German Legation, Army and Luftwaffe are requested to assign their Attachés to the military missions in addition to their normal duties.¹

6. The initiation of negotiations with Hungarian authorities for the transit of German units through Hungarian territory will be un-

¹ Brackets have been placed around this sentence and a line drawn through it on the copy printed. No such marks appear on the copy in the file of OKW directives from the archives of the German Navy (8589/E602759-61).

dertaken by the High Command of the Wehrmacht (Ausl.) in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry.

7. The Commanders in Chief of the Army and the Luftwaffe are asked for their opinions as to when and in what strength the military missions for Rumania will be available.

8. The names of officers who are to be sent for preliminary investigations or as advance parties are to be submitted to the High Command of the Wehrmacht, which will obtain the Führer's consent and have the names of these officers announced through the Foreign Ministry.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KETTEL

No. 85

124/122429-30;
124/122437-38

*The German Adjutant With the King of the Belgians to the
State Secretary*

LAEKEN PALACE, September 21, 1940.

DEAR HERE STATE SECRETARY: On the occasion of my talk with you on the 13th of this month I promised you a copy of the letter I had written a few weeks ago to the Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant with the Führer,¹ because at that time doubts had apparently arisen regarding the loyal attitude of the King of the Belgians. In that respect the atmosphere has cleared. However, the reaction in the mood of the population predicted at the end of that letter has come to pass, and for the following reasons:

(1) In the prisoner question unfortunately nothing is changed; on the contrary, men "fit to bear arms" (civilians who have never been in the army, mostly youngsters) arriving from unoccupied France, who wanted to go back to Belgium, were *newly detained* as prisoners of war and transported to Germany.

Here are a few explanatory words on how this problem arose:

On May 28, at the negotiations about the capitulation in Anvaing not a word was said about any evacuation of Belgian soldiers to Germany. The passage in question in the protocol reads as follows:

"I. Honorable Surrender

"(1) Officers of the Belgian armed forces retain their sidearms.

"(2) Commissioned and non-commissioned officers remain with their troops in the rear prisoner assembly areas until the troops are disbanded."

¹ Vol. x of this series, document No. 240.

The expression "disbanded" was taken at the time by everybody as meaning "demobilization" in Belgium itself. Hence our own unit commanders and local commands, after the surrender of arms, released on their own initiative numerous Belgian soldiers and officers of Belgian units marching through, so that about two-thirds of those in the mobilized Army remained in the country and have since resumed their economic activities. Later OKW suddenly ordered the evacuation of the Belgians to Germany where about 180,000 (of whom 50,000 are professional soldiers) have arrived, and the successive release of *Flemings only*. Thus whoever, as a good soldier, had remained with his unit, is now being put behind the barbed wire in Germany. Our industry and agriculture are taking over this manpower. The astonishing consequence is that in this manner we have in fact *more Flemings* in Germany than Walloons and that now, because of the Belgian civilians (from France) lately taken prisoner, this number, including that of the Flemings, is even increased, while the Military Commander here is in urgent need of manpower, since he must get the highly developed Belgian economy going again for our benefit.

Although in the meanwhile it had once been announced *urbi et orbi* that all Belgian prisoners would be released after our harvest, nothing of the kind was done, for the teletype message of the OKH in question, dated July 15,² was supposed to have been "unauthorized". Even worse than the economic disadvantages of this muddle is the damaging effect on German prestige. Such organizational shortcomings are not expected from us; justified comparisons are drawn with Norway and Holland, whose prisoners have been released; the population—especially the women—which despite everything is *Belgian* in its thinking, simply does not understand why one man is permitted to rejoin his family, while the next is held by us. Even the King, who no longer otherwise mentions political matters, has repeatedly pointed out, both to the Military Commander and to me, the bad effects of our ever stiffening attitude in the prisoner question. I know the line of reasoning which is involved here: The Führer does not trust the Walloons and one supposes in this way to keep a pledge in hand. Yet the same result would be achieved without economic losses (on both sides) if, as it was originally planned and ordered, only the professional portions of the Army were held as prisoners of war and kept in Belgian camps for controlled use as workers in the country (as is done in Holland).

Feelings are further depressed by:

(2) Apprehensions regarding *bread grains*. The country had always to rely on grain imports from overseas for two-thirds of its needs. It is hoped that 80,000 to 100,000 tons can be secured from

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 240.

northern France; only then can the population expect a daily bread ration of 225 grams with from 350 to 525 grams for heavy workers, while in Germany they are getting 1,000 grams.

(3) Introduction of *food ration cards* which sometimes cannot be honored. Admittedly, that is mostly the fault of the cumbersome Belgian administration itself.

(4) The recent *heavy quartering* of troops in Belgium whereby, apart from other inconveniences, black markets are fostered.

(5) Introduction of the 1:12.50 *exchange rate*, as against 1:10 in the beginning.

(6) The calling in, without specific explanation of our intentions, of all *foreign securities* (including Congo securities) that are held here by everybody, including the Flemings, and by which the small people, too, are affected. Everybody here believes that we want to expropriate them at a low compulsory exchange rate. The unpopular character of this measure is obvious, however necessary it might appear on our side.

(7) In industrial circles, which had decided for collaboration from the beginning, there are complaints about lack of clarity in our requisitions, about overlapping spheres of authority between military and economic agencies, and a good deal of interference, including seizures of raw materials, and also about the fixing of the price of coal.

I hope that with this I have supplemented to a certain extent my oral report which was prematurely interrupted by another engagement.²

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

W. KIEWITZ

² Weizsäcker replied on Sept. 26 that he had looked into the prisoner of war question and believed that Kiewitz would see a noticeable falling off in complaints on this score in the near future (124/122439).

No. 86

B19/B003761-62

The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

SECRET
No. 493

BERLIN, September 22, 1940.
zu Pol. VI 2912 g.¹

For the Minister.

The Finnish Minister approached us on September 20 on instructions of his Government with the wish to regulate the question of the transit of German troops and war material to northern Norway through Finland, already discussed between German and Finnish

¹ Pol. VI 2912 g.: Not found.

military authorities, in a manner similar to the Finnish-Russian Agreement on Hangö.² In this the Finnish Government is evidently interested in being covered as respects Russia by a regular agreement between the two Governments.

Accordingly an exchange of notes took place today with the Finnish Minister, of the following content:

"1. The Finnish Government, upon request of the Government of the Reich, grants transit of war material with escort personnel from the northern ports of the Baltic Sea by way of Rovaniemi along the northern Arctic Highway to Kirkenes in northern Norway.

"2. The Government of the German Reich shall duly indicate to the Finnish Government the ports of debarkation involved, the number of transport vessels, the dates of sailing and arrival, and the scheduled daily stages of the transports in northern Finland.

"3. The Government of the German Reich shall notify the Finnish Government at least one day in advance of the arrival of the transport vessels.

"4. Ordnance shall be shipped apart from the troops in separate freight cars. A special agreement will be made regarding the number of officers and men for the guard details on the freight cars carrying ordnance."

End of the note.

The exchange of notes has been discussed with the OKW and in particular with the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

Points 2-4 go back to Finnish requests. It should be noted with regard to point 4 that this formulation has been chosen in consideration of the Russian-Finnish agreements on Hangö, but that in practice, in the opinion of the OKW, the Finns will leave us a free hand.

The Finnish Government also suggested that we inform the Russian Government on the date of arrival of the ships in Finland, or directly prior to that date. However, we intend to refrain from doing so. The Finnish Minister here considers it proper for the Finnish Government on its part to inform the Russian Government as a precautionary measure, whereas the Finnish Foreign Minister does not want to inform the Russians on his own initiative for the time being, but only in case of a Russian inquiry. However, we are not exerting any influence on this decision to be taken by the Finnish Government.

For your information: The first transport comprises 6 transport ships and 1 tanker, which put to sea from Swinemünde and Stettin, September 20 and 21, bound for Waskiluoto³ and Oulu.

WEIZSÄCKER

² This agreement, signed in Moscow on Sept. 6, 1940, provided for Soviet transit traffic with the leased area of Hangö to the extent of two trains a day in each direction over Finnish railways.

Blücher had reported the conclusion of this agreement in telegram No. 559 of Sept. 11, 1940, 8:05 p. m. (B19/B003741).

³ This is a part of the harbor of Vaasa.

No. 87

66/46349-53

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

ROME, September 22, 1940.

RAM 33.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DUCE, IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNT CIANO AND AMBASSADOR VON MACKENSEN, IN PALAZZO VENEZIA ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister first informed the Duce of the status of the Japanese negotiations by reading aloud the main parts of telegram No. 984 of September 21 from Tokyo.¹ The Duce for his part also agreed to retain the earlier formulation—mentioned under I *a* of the said telegram—which made no mention of the “veiled attack,” and also consented to the formulation proposed under I *b* for point IV regarding the establishment of technical commissions for implementing the pact. The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that it would still be possible to sign the tripartite pact together with Count Ciano in Berlin at the end of the coming week, at the latest. The Foreign Minister made known his intention of inviting Serrano Suñer as a guest at the signing, along with the representatives of the pro-Axis countries Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Count Ciano first expressed misgivings as to whether the presence of a Spanish representative might not give the tripartite pact with Japan an excessively strong anti-Russian flavor, in view of the well-known anti-Bolshevist attitude of the Spanish Government; he dropped his objections, however, when the Duce declared that he himself found the presence of Serrano Suñer quite useful because it emphasized Spain's solidarity with the three signatory Powers.

As for Russia, it was decided, as a result of a suggestion of the Reich Foreign Minister, to await her reaction to the Japanese pact and then, at the proper moment and in a friendly manner, to offer her a free hand toward the south to fulfill any possible wishes in the direction of the Persian Gulf or India.

The Foreign Minister further informed the Duce of the status of the Spanish negotiations. He mentioned that a special envoy had been sent to Serrano Suñer, who was in Brussels at the moment, to inform him in accordance with the agreement reached on Friday² between the Foreign Minister and the Duce, that Germany and Italy wished to conclude a tripartite pact with Spain. Serrano Suñer would inform Generalissimo Franco of this wish in writing and by special courier, and it was to be hoped that Franco's reply would

¹ Document No. 82.

² Sept. 20; see document No. 79.

arrive in the middle of the week so that a secret military alliance with Spain could be signed approximately at the same time as the Japanese pact.

In connection with the Spanish question the conversation also turned to Portugal and the pressure to be exerted on Minister President Salazar by Germany, Italy, and Spain to induce a turning away from England and toward Spain. Without making a definite statement to this effect the Duce seemed to agree with this idea. He emphasized Portugal's fear of being absorbed by Spain.

On the basis of telegram No. 1320 of September 21, 1940, from Therapia concerning the Turkish proposals for a Russo-Turkish friendship treaty³ which would include a Soviet guarantee of the Turkish frontier in return for free passage through the Straits, a discussion arose on the position of the Axis toward the Turks. The Foreign Minister repeated the opinion he had expressed during earlier conversations⁴ that an overly close understanding between Turkey and Russia was not in the interest of the Axis Powers, but he stressed that the danger of such close cooperation was not very great. He raised the question whether an attempt should not also be made to extricate Turkey from the English system. In reply to a question about the relations between Turkey and Italy and certain Turkish fears, the Duce declared that Turkey had nothing to fear from Italy. Italy had no territorial claims against that country; it was only a matter of Italy's economic interests, of which the Turks were fully informed. As England's position continued to deteriorate, Turkey would automatically be drawn over to the side of Italy and Germany, in spite of the somewhat obstinate President who, completely misunderstanding the present situation, had endeavored up to now to continue Kemal's pro-Allied policy.

In connection with the Japanese pact and the probable strong reaction thereto in America, the Foreign Minister confidentially informed the Duce of another blow which it might be possible to strike at Roosevelt on the basis of some extremely incriminating documents.⁵ The Duce shared the opinion that Roosevelt was the person really responsible for the present war, the outbreak of which he had promoted with all available means in order to conceal his political difficulties at home, especially in view of the failure of the New Deal at the present time. The Duce fully consented to this plan of attacking Roosevelt, but said that Roosevelt's prospects in the election were favorable since his opponent, Willkie, had committed the mistake of proposing the same program as Roosevelt in his election campaign.

³ Not found. Telegram No. 756 of Sept. 20 from Therapia contained intelligence along these lines (380/210329). Telegram No. 1320 presumably transmitted the contents of Therapia telegram No. 756 to Rome.

⁴ See document No. 73.

⁵ The documents referred to have not been found.

In the Duce's opinion, the American public was at present rather solidly lined up behind Roosevelt even though a last-minute change, brought about by an unforeseen event, was altogether possible owing to the hysterical character of the mass of American voters. The Foreign Minister asked whether it would not be much more appropriate demonstratively [*demonstrativ*] to break off diplomatic relations with the United States after publication of the documents, stating that we bore no enmity toward the American people, but that we no longer wanted to maintain relations with the Roosevelt Government after it had become known how tremendous was the guilt it had incurred by promoting the war. The Duce agreed with this idea, especially since Italian experience had been that the American Consuls not only sent completely false reports to the United States regarding Italy's situation, but in numerous cases also acted as spies for England.

In reply to the Foreign Minister's question regarding the status of operations in Egypt, the Duce said that the progress of the military operations was completely satisfactory. The first stage of the offensive, which had penetrated up to 100 kilometers into enemy territory, was now concluded. According to a report by Graziani all preparations had been made for the second stage, which was to involve an additional 120 kilometers to Mersa Matrûh. Graziani himself would come to Rome soon to discuss with the Duce details of this second phase of the Italian offensive against Egypt. The third phase would end with the capture of Alexandria and would necessitate covering another 300 kilometers. When the Foreign Minister asked when in these circumstances the conclusion of the entire operation against Egypt might be expected, the Duce replied with some hesitation that he hoped to be able to conclude the Egyptian campaign by the end of October. After the capture of Mersa Matrûh the British fleet would have to withdraw from Alexandria because of the possibilities for Italian air action and, if by that time Gibraltar should have come into Spanish possession, the fleet might break through Gibraltar into the Atlantic. A retreat through the Suez Canal was too dangerous, since the highest possible speed in the Canal itself was 6 kilometers per hour. In any case, strong English resistance was to be expected in Egypt, for the loss of that country might result in the collapse of the whole Empire.

After the Duce had announced that he would also reply to the Führer's letter in writing, the conversation was brought to a cordial close.

SCHMIDT

No. 88

F8/0209-0216¹*Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler*

SEPTEMBER 22, 1940.

MY DEAR FÜHRER: I received your letter² in which you stated to me your views and those of your General Staff in connection with the problems with respect to Spain which are arising from the war, views which with the exception of small details match my thoughts and plans and those of my General Staffs.

I must thank you for the cordial reception which you and your people prepared for my Envoy, Minister Serrano Suñer, who reported to me about your conversation and about your esteemed ideas, which satisfy our wishes, and with which we believe ourselves to be in complete agreement, as you will see from the content of this letter. In spite of complete agreement with your words "to recognize the Spanish claims to Morocco with the one limitation of assuring Germany through favorable commercial agreements a share in the raw material of this area," there is to be sure one point where they are inconsistent, namely in the wishes of Herr von Ribbentrop, expressed in the form of a proposal during the conversations between our Ministers, for the establishment of an enclave for German military bases by occupying both the harbors of the southern zone.³ In our view these are unnecessary in peacetime and superfluous in wartime, because in this case you could not only count upon these harbors but on all that Spain possesses, since our friendship is to be sealed firmly for the future. The advantages that these bases could offer would counterbalance neither the difficulties which this type of enclave always produces nor the harm which they would cause to those areas for which they constitute the outlet to the sea.

I thank you very much for your idea, put before Minister Suñer, of providing me with an opportunity for us to meet near the Spanish border,⁴ for, apart from my eager wish to greet you personally, we could have a more thorough and more direct exchange of ideas than our present communications make possible. I should therefore like to state to you my opinion about the individual points of your letter.

1. In regard to your train of thought set forth in point 1 concerning the political and economic effects of the present struggle, I can only say to you that I have agreed from the first day with the

¹ The file copy is in the German language.

² Document No. 70.

³ See document No. 67.

⁴ See document No. 66.

view which you have expressed there. Only our isolation and the lack of resources most indispensable for our national existence made action by us impossible.

I agree with you that driving the English out of the Mediterranean will improve our transport situation, although it is obvious that all Spain's problems of supply will not thereby be solved, since many products and raw materials which Spain lacks are not to be found in the Mediterranean basin.

2. I am likewise of the opinion that the first action, upon our intervening, must be the occupation of Gibraltar. Since 1936 our military policy in the Straits has been shaped in this sense, in that we are forestalling the English intentions of expanding and protecting their bases.

I agree with your view that it is possible to achieve the success of this operation within a few days by the use of modern equipment and tried troops. In this sense, the equipment which you offer me will be of great effect.

For our part, we have been preparing the operation in secret for a long time, since the area in which it is to take place has no suitable network of communications. With respect to the special conditions of the Rock, points of resistance can withstand even the strongest action from the air, so that they will have to be destroyed by good and accurate artillery. The extraordinary importance of the enterprise would, in my opinion, justify a strong concentration of resources.

3. The fall of Gibraltar would actually protect the western Mediterranean and rule out any danger, except for the temporary dangers which might arise in case de Gaulle should succeed with his plan for rebellion in Algiers and Tunis.

A concentration of our troops in Morocco will prevent this danger.

In this respect it would be useful if your control commissions increased precautionary measures to the utmost.

4. I completely share your view about the effectiveness of dive bombers for the defense of the coasts, as well as about the actual impossibility of establishing fixed artillery emplacements with heavy material on the vulnerable points on the coast. Evidently a mistake has crept into the transmittal of my wish, for my wish concerned not stationary guns of large caliber, but mobile pieces of about 20 centimeters. I consider these to be further necessary, and indeed in rather large quantities, because of the conditions of the terrain which is mountainous and irregular. The possibility of constructing airports is therefore extraordinarily limited. In most cases, these will lie far removed from the coast and from the objects to be defended. Furthermore, one must reckon with the limitations which necessarily result from the storms and rains frequently occurring there.

In any case, the strong air forces offered by you are indispensable.

5. At the present moment, there is actually little probability of the English undertaking a landing attempt on the peninsula. Even if this should be the case, our own resources and those which you offer me would quickly ruin this plan.

6. The possibility of a surprise attack on the Canary Islands by the English in order to provide a naval base to protect their overseas connections has always been a worry of mine. So far as we are able to do so, we are placing there supplies of food, ammunition, and the modest artillery material which we are getting from other less-threatened regions; we effected a partial mobilization several months ago, and also have sent arms for the entire island group. We have transferred a fighter group there which would no longer have been able to get there once the war had begun. I am of your view and consider the presence of dive bombers and long-range fighters in Las Palmas extremely useful, for which bomb material and spare parts must be sent in advance.

7. Obviously freedom of movement in the western Mediterranean is dependent upon Italian successes in Alexandria and Suez, by which the destruction of the English fleet in these waters will be made possible. At such a moment a great part of our provisioning problem would be solved.

8. I consider the offer for our undertaking contained in your point 8 as extremely useful and absolutely necessary. For the economic aid which you with such foresight offer me, to the greatest extent possible for Germany, is just as important as the military equipment. For our part, I offer you reciprocal aid of the same type and to the greatest extent possible, considering our potentialities.

In the meantime I consider it my duty to point out to you that in my opinion the conversations hitherto conducted by our specialists have largely taken the course of strictly commercially oriented negotiations.⁵ In setting out to settle old matters, and by striving to solve the economic problems and the post-war exchange of commodities, they have deviated from the main subject, which affects both parties equally and which will find its complete solution in the statements of your letter, with which I completely agree.

I would like to thank you once again, dear Führer, for the offer of solidarity. I reply with the assurance of my unchangeable and sincere adherence to you personally, to the German people, and to the cause for which you fight. I hope, in defense of this cause, to be able to renew the old bonds of comradeship between our armies.

In the expectation of being able to express this to you personally, I assure you of my most sincere feelings of friendship and I greet you.⁶

Yours,

F. FRANCO

⁵ Spanish economic experts had accompanied Serrano Suñer on his mission to Germany. Filmed on 324/194001-18 are the minutes of a meeting on Sept. 18 of the Spanish and German economic experts and a memorandum of Sept. 17 which formed the basis of discussion. Following this meeting one of the Spanish experts, Figueras, returned to Madrid for further instructions. See document No. 70, footnote 3.

⁶ Concerning the delivery of this letter, see document No. 117.

No. 89

4040/E063816-17

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, September 23, 1940—7:30 a. m.

No. 990 of September 23

Received September 23—4:00 p. m.

Pol. VIII 1178.

With reference to your telegram No. 781 of September 21¹ and to my telegram No. 987 of September 22.²

The Deputy Foreign Minister called on me yesterday upon instructions from the Foreign Minister and informed me that the Japanese-French Agreement, regarding the three well-known military demands of Japan,³ was signed in Hanoi yesterday at 1:00 p. m. The Deputy Foreign Minister added the following background information: The Emperor had considered an order for the troops to march in on September 22 since the negotiations were deliberately stalled by the French. French resistance relied on American-English support. The American Government entered its protest in August through a sharp diplomatic note against the measures Japan planned to take (see my telegram No. 815 of August 14⁴). In its long delayed answer Japan pointed out that on its part it abstains from any interference whatsoever in the Western Hemisphere; in return it requests from America a similar conduct concerning the Japanese sphere of interest. On the whole, Japan believes that literal adherence to outdated treaties does not conform to the changed world situation.⁵

Besides, the action in Indochina did not aim at a change in the status quo but solely at a defeat of Chiang Kai-shek in this manner. On September 21 the American Ambassador protested again, but limited himself to repeat, in a mild way, the request that Japan should not proceed by the use of force.⁶

The British Ambassador protested against the action in Indochina with the argument that, as a result, the balance of power in East Asia

¹ Document No. 83.

² Not printed (216/147594).

³ In telegram No. 795 of Sept. 25 (8745/E610488) to Tokyo, Woermann referred to the Japanese demands mentioned in Ott's telegram No. 765 of Aug. 2 (vol. x of this series, document No. 273) and asked what the third Japanese demand was. In telegram No. 1006 of Sept. 26 (8745/E610504) Ott explained that the third demand was the right to supply and reinforce Japanese troops through Indochina.

⁴ Vol. x of this series, document No. 339.

⁵ For the text of the Japanese reply of Sept. 14, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 293-294.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 295-297.

would be substantially changed. The British Government would then not be willing to renew the closing off of the Burma Road for deliveries to China. This was promised at the time in the expectation of a Japanese peace with Chiang Kai-shek. England is ready even today to use its good offices to bring about this peace. The Foreign Minister rejected this offer. The Deputy Foreign Minister explained that the demand of Siam for the cession of the formerly Siamese parts of Indochina occurred without getting in touch with Japan.

The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry gave an explanation today about the resultant solution in Indochina (see the German News Agency dispatch, Tokyo 141 ff. of September 23). He again stressed that Japan has no territorial designs in Indochina and is simply striving for a quick termination of the China conflict. Interventions by third powers are out of the question, in view of the peaceful agreement with France.

OTT

No. 90

9923/E694656-59

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1940—8:05 p. m.

SECRET

Received September 24—9:45 a. m.

No. 2026 of September 23

Pol. IX 1932.

For State Secretary von Weizsäcker and State Secretary Bohle.

The obligation of aliens to register pursuant to the American registration law of June 28, 1940,¹ raises the important question of whether party members living here should declare their membership in the NSDAP in Germany. The question is of political importance from several points of view. The problem is raised by a detailed registration form to be filled out under oath by every alien; it contains two pertinent questions, whose text, along with the official explanation, I am wiring at this time in telegram No. 2021 [2027].²

The aim of these questions in particular is to ascertain who are alien members of subversive organizations in the United States of

¹ 54 Stat. 670.

² The texts of the questions contained in telegram No. 2027 of Sept. 23 (35/22885-86) were as follows:

"Question 10. I am or have been within the past 5 years, or intend to be engaged in the following activities: in addition to other information list memberships or activities in clubs, organizations, or societies. . . .

"Question 15. Within the past 5 years I have (have not) been affiliated with or active in (a member of, official of, a worker for) organizations, devoted in whole or in part to influencing or furthering the political activities, public relations, or public policy of a foreign government."

America which are subject to foreign political influence. The intent of the registration law is to expose such organizations and their members, as is plainly evident from the debates on the subject in Congress.

On the other hand there is the fact that party members living in the United States of America do not belong to any party organization here and are under very strict instructions to refrain from any party-political activity and any intervention in affairs of this country. They are listed as individual members with the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP in Germany and by instruction they carry on no activity for the party here or in Germany during their sojourn in the United States of America. If these party members should answer questions 10 and 15 in the affirmative they would not only be making a false statement but would at the same time confirm the accusation that they are active here in this country for the German Government or the NSDAP. According to the text of the registration form this is the only way an affirmative answer to these questions by the party members would be interpreted by the American Government. From the same standpoint, this would provide the American Government with an extraordinarily strong political and propaganda weapon, since it would then establish from the registration that the National Socialist Government or the NSDAP maintains some 500 agents in the form of party members here for subversive purposes. Therewith the campaign against the imaginary German fifth column, systematically fanned by the American Government, could for the first time become a concrete issue; and all of this based on the admission by the party members upon registering in clear contradiction to the actual circumstances.

It cannot be foreseen what further political, propagandist, or other use the American Government would make of this information. Since the exact occupation and employer are to be listed on the registration form and numerous party members work in plants which might possibly be employed for armament purposes, it must be expected in the first place that the employer will be informed by the Government regarding the party membership and that at least 90 percent of the party members will then be put out on the street on the grounds of their alleged confession of their subversive activity. These legal, political, and human considerations make it appear justifiable to answer questions 10 and 7 [15] in the negative, particularly since the problem of party membership or party organization has not been made the subject of official objection here in recent years.

Unfortunately, however, both questions have been formulated in such an elastic way through inclusion of the concepts of "memberships" and "member" that they go beyond the real purpose of the law,

so that even the fact of membership in the NSDAP in Germany before entry into the country can be considered covered by the questionnaire.

In any case there is a danger, especially in view of the anti-German attitude even of the American courts, that if party membership is found out subsequently—and in most cases it is already known to the American authorities—the questions will be given such an interpretation by government agencies or the courts that party members will be exposed to severe punishment on the grounds of perjury.

If it were then also discovered that the party members were advised by the German officials abroad not to admit their party membership—which party members would have to cite in their defense—complications in the relations between the two Governments could result whose effects cannot be predicted. I believe that the American courts and authorities would certainly reject such advice given party members by the German officials abroad as not authoritative and would argue to the contrary that in such an interpretation of American domestic regulations regarding (group garbled) an inquiry by the German officials abroad should have been directed to the American Government.

In order to prevent such complications and not to expose the party members to the danger of criminal prosecution I consider it advisable to discuss the interpretation of questions 10 and 15 in the near future in joint negotiations with the State Department and the Justice Department. The Justice Department has given an occasion for this in a written invitation to all Missions asking their cooperation. If we miss the opportunity for a joint discussion we would expose ourselves later to the reproach of lack of good will.

During this discussion the Embassy can bring up all the arguments against an affirmative answer to these questions; it can clarify the position of party members and explain that in view of this situation with respect to the law and the facts the Embassy and the Consular authorities will accordingly instruct the party members to answer questions 10 and 15 in the negative. It is possible that the American Government will not be satisfied with such an explanation and will in further negotiations insist that both questions be answered in the affirmative in the manner which we do not desire. Thereupon the Embassy would not only be able to hold to its interpretation; it would also be given the opportunity of raising objections of every sort to the implications of questions 10 and 15 and of making the facts of the case clear to the public.

In the pros and cons of this important question, which has also been discussed in detail with Kreisleiter Draeger,³ I consider the above ar-

³ Friedhelm Draeger, Consul at New York, had responsibilities for liaison between the Auslandsorganisation and National Socialist party members in the northeastern part of the United States.

rangement the most appropriate. Since the period for registration is already in force I request early telegraphic instructions as to whether I may proceed in this manner.⁴

THOMSEN

⁴ Instructions sent by Bohle in telegram No. 1099 of Sept. 29 expressed agreement with Thomsen's proposal for negotiations with the Departments of State and Justice concerning the interpretation of questions 10 and 15 of the new alien registration forms. Thomsen was also instructed to deny that there had been any National Socialist political activity in the United States in the last 5 years, since the entire party organization in the United States had been dissolved in 1933. Thomsen should also explain that party members were card-file members in Germany so as not to lose their membership if they should return to Germany. (35/22920-21)

See, further, documents Nos. 203 and 216.

No. 91

B19/B003766

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, September 23, 1940—9:37 p. m.

No. 584 of September 23

Received September 24—5:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 493.¹

Today the Finnish Foreign Minister made use of conversations with the English and Russian Ministers in order to give them in an incidental way information regarding yesterday's German-Finnish exchange of notes. The English Minister received the communication calmly and said he would have to report to London and probably register a protest. The Russian Minister assumed a very serious expression and dumbfounded the Foreign Minister with the question: "Did the Germans issue you an ultimatum?" The Foreign Minister regained his composure quickly and answered: "We did not let it get that far."

BLÜCHER

¹ Document No. 86.

No. 92

121/120479-81

*The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*¹

TOP SECRET

[SEPTEMBER 23, 1940.]

After clearing with General of Artillery Jodl, the Armistice Commission sent the following telephone message at 10:00 p. m. to the Adjutantur of the Führer (Commander Puttkammer):

¹ A note by a night duty officer of the Foreign Ministry records that this document is a telephone message from Welck, received at 10:05 p. m. on Sept. 23, and that it was being forwarded to State Secretary Weizsäcker.

On September 23, at 6:15 p. m., the Chairman of the French delegation to the German Armistice Commission stated that an emissary of General de Gaulle had arrived in Dakar by air and announced that General de Gaulle with British ships and troops was under way to take Dakar. The French Governor General had seized the emissary. He intended to defend Dakar and had made the necessary preparations. At 8:30 p. m. General Doyen had supplemented this with the following oral communication:²

What the French Government had feared had occurred and since 1:00 p. m. the fight for Dakar had been on. The French Government was resolved to defend the colony with every means. It had taken the following emergency measures:

a. Dispatch of three submarines from Casablanca to Dakar.
 b. Dispatch of bombers ready for action from Morocco in the direction of Dakar. These measures however were not sufficient. The French Government was therefore making the following requests:

(a) Release of the naval forces in Toulon (the battleship *Strasbourg*, two 10,000 ton cruisers, one 7,600 ton cruiser, and a number of destroyers),

(b) Release of all air force units in Africa which, for possible action against England, have so far been exempted from disarmament.

The French Government asked that there should be no lack of confidence in it. The loss of Dakar would be an irreparable blow to it; apart from the repercussions on the situation in equatorial Africa, valuable assets, necessary for the survival of metropolitan France, would be lost. In addition, communications with South America would be interrupted. To prevent Dakar from falling into the hands of the English was a matter of hours. Hence an immediate decision was requested.

To the query as to whether the French Government, despite a naval situation that was unfavorable to it, insisted on dispatching from Toulon the fleet units mentioned, the answer was:

The Government had taken the risk into account and insisted on its request.

The opinion of the Chairman of the Armistice Commission is: In the note of the 11th of this month³ the French were enjoined to maintain or restore order in Africa. It is recommended that in the present tense situation the French be given the means to do it. These consist of:

a. Permission for the fleet units in Toulon to sail.

b. Granting of free disposition over the air force units now in Africa which have so far been exempted from demobilization with a view to action against England. An early decision of the Führer is requested.⁴

² Minutes of this conversation between Doyen and Stülpnagel are printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 384-387.

³ Document No. 47.

⁴ Around midnight of Sept. 23 the night duty officer at the Foreign Ministry was informed by Weizsäcker that the German Government intended to reject the French request. Meanwhile the Italian Government was being asked to state its position. At 3:00 a. m. on Sept. 24 word was received in Berlin that Ciano on his own responsibility agreed that the French request should be rejected. (Rademacher memorandum of Sept. 24: 2549/523372)

The French Government made an identical request to the Italian Government by way of the Italian Armistice Commission.

Armistice Commission
Chefgruppe Ia

End of telegram from the Armistice Commission to the Adjutantur of the Führer.

The note of the 11th of this month was submitted to the Foreign Ministry with dispatch No. 1980 of September 12.⁵

WELCK

⁵ Covering dispatch not printed (121/120473-74).

No. 93

C109/C002203

Dr. Albrecht Haushofer to Rudolf Hess

SEPTEMBER 23, 1940.

MY DEAR HERR HESS: In accordance with your last telephone call I got in touch with your brother immediately. Everything went off well, and I can now report that the mission has been accomplished to the extent that the letter you desired was written and dispatched this morning.¹ It is to be hoped that it will be more efficacious than sober judgment would indicate.

Yours, etc.

H[AUSHOFER]

¹ See document No. 76, enclosures 1 and 2, and footnote 7.

No. 94

C109/C002204-05

Dr. Albrecht Haushofer to Dr. Karl Haushofer

BERLIN, September 23, 1940.

DEAR FATHER: I am enclosing the copy of a short letter¹ of serious contents, which perhaps had better be kept by you than by me. I have now made it clear enough that in the action involved I did not take the initiative.

On the subject of Roeseler: I had told him what he reported for the express purpose of his passing it on to you, because I am of the opinion that you should not be entirely in the dark about what is going on—and because I am furthermore of the opinion that oral transmission by a

¹ See document No. 93.

man whose disposition you know thoroughly is a far less ticklish matter than any letter and especially than any telephone conversation. (Both are spheres in which I am often nervous about what you permit yourself in all innocence. I would never, for example, have dictated that letter of 3 weeks ago to such a gossip as Mrs. Sch. !)

Now to the English matters. I am convinced, as before, that there is not the slightest prospect of peace; and so I don't have the least faith in the possibility about which you know. However, I also believe that I could not have refused my services any longer. You know that for myself I do not see any possibility of any satisfying activity in the future. If our wild men obtain the well-known "total victory" from Glasgow to Capetown, the drunken sergeants and corrupt exploiters will set the tone; experts with quiet manners will not be needed then. If this does not come about, if the English succeed in absorbing the first shock and then, with American help and by utilizing the Bolshevist uncertainty factor, are able to bring about a long-drawn-out balance in the war, then to be sure there will be a need sooner or later for people like us—but then under circumstances in which there will be little enough left to save. And so if I am engaged in activity at this time it means only that there is the danger of a meaningless attrition—which I can counter only by making it quite clear in advance how little chance of success any attempt has. This I have tried to do. If the order is given nevertheless, there is nothing more I can do. One thing I must be entirely clear about, however: *I* will have a political future only if I am *right* with my Cassandra predictions (I hope to a more limited degree than I fear at heart). Recently I spoke with old W. about the same subject. We are in quite similar situations. He too feels that he would be given an activity of his own only if external circumstances should develop which would deprive him of all pleasure in his activity: i. e., if he is proved right in the Cassandra reputation he also possesses. Otherwise he can go exactly the same way as I: then the Lorenz types will simply have the higher historical justification on their side. And why not—after all, Commodus was the successor of Marcus Aurelius.

Well, enough of that. Last night we again sat in the cellar for 3 hours.

Best regards to both of you.

ALBRECHT

No. 95

2366/489206-09

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 24, 1940—4:00 a. m.¹

TOP SECRET

No. 1336 of September 20 [sic]

For the Chief of Mission or his representative personally.

To be decoded personally.

1. In the course of the negotiations in Tokyo the following text of the tripartite pact has now been formulated in the English language:²

THREE POWERS PACT BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY

The Governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that the ultimate aspirations for a world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

Article I:

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article II:

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article III:

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Article IV:

With a view to implementing the present pact joint technical commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, will meet without delay.

Article V:

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia.

¹ It is not clear from the file copy whether the time indicated was when the telegram was sent from Berlin or received in Rome.

² The following text is in English in the original.

Article VI:

The present pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for 10 years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the high contracting parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this pact and have affixed hereto their seals.

Done in triplicate at Berlin, the day of September, 1940.

2. Please deliver the above pact to Count Ciano at once and ask him to instruct the Italian Embassy in Tokyo to convey the approval of the Italian Government of this text. This is extremely urgent because the decision of the Japanese Privy Council, which is scheduled for Tuesday evening,³ depends on prior approval by the German and Italian Governments.

3. The Japanese have proposed in the interest of speed that the pact be signed in the English language, but that then the text be published only in the three languages of the countries concerned. I have agreed to this on condition that the signing in the English language be kept absolutely secret and that subsequently signing in the three languages be done through diplomatic channels. Please ask Ciano either to wire at once to the Italian Embassy in Tokyo an Italian translation prepared in Rome, or to instruct the Italian Embassy itself to prepare the translation, in agreement with the German Embassy.

4. Please wire at once what is being done there.

RIBBENTROP

¹ i. e., Sept. 24.

No. 96

121/119908-09

Memorandum by the State Secretary

MOST URGENT
St.S. No. 728

BERLIN, September 24, 1940.

This afternoon about 5:00 o'clock General Jodl told me the following regarding the question of dealing with the Dakar affair:

After closer re-examination the Führer had at noon today decided that he nevertheless wanted to release the French air units now in Africa for action against the enemy's advance on Dakar. As for the naval forces in Toulon, the ban on their sailing is to be maintained for the time being.¹

¹ The note of Sept. 24 from General von Stülpnagel to General Doyen conveying this decision is printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 338-339. The German text is not printed (368/207044-45). See also Editor's Note, p. 181.

In order not to let this decision appear as a simple alteration of the decision communicated to the Italians last night,² and still to keep the Italians entirely in line with us, I suggested to General Jodl that we have Herr von Mackensen deliver the following communication in Rome immediately:

"We should like to formulate more clearly the proposal conveyed by Herr von Mackensen last night to Count Ciano, regarding the reply to the French Armistice Commission in the Dakar affair, as follows:

"The ban on the sailing of the naval forces in Toulon is being maintained for the time being, nor should any French military aircraft be transferred from Europe to Africa. But no objection will be made if the French Government employs French air force units now in Africa for defense against the enemy assault on Dakar.

"No reply is needed to this communication, if, as might be expected, this formulation meets the Italian views."

General Jodl agreed with this formulation and believes that it would not meet with any Italian objections. Obviously General Jodl assumes Italian agreement from remarks that have reached him by way of the Turin-Wiesbaden Armistice Commissions.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister with the request for authorization of an appropriate instruction to Rome.³

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 92, footnote 4.

³ Such an instruction was sent by teletype to the Embassy in Rome on Sept. 24 (121/119913). Already at 6:40 p. m. on Sept. 24 word had been received at the Foreign Ministry from Wiesbaden that the Italian Government had given its assent to the German position (memorandum by Grote of Sept. 24: 121/119910).

No. 97

66/46326-48

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 33a

BERLIN, September 26, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE SPANISH MINISTER OF INTERIOR, SERRANO SUÑER, IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADOR VON STOHRER, IN BERLIN ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister first conveyed the greetings of Count Ciano and mentioned that both the latter and the Duce hoped to welcome Serrano Suñer in Rome on the return trip.

Serrano Suñer expressed his thanks and stated that he had received in Brussels and transmitted to Madrid the information from the Reich Foreign Minister concerning the tripartite pact to be concluded

with Spain.¹ At present, he only had a reply of the Caudillo to his first report, whereas he still did not have any expression of the Generalissimo's views regarding the Reich Foreign Minister's suggestion concerning the tripartite pact.

Serrano Suñer reported that he had heard from Madrid about a démarche by the English Ambassador with the Spanish Foreign Minister. The English Ambassador had talked about the sympathies of England toward Spain and had given guarantees that England had no hostile intentions toward Spain. Besides, he had intimated that England would be prepared to see to it that after the war French Morocco would be ceded to Spain.

To this the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that here again it was apparent how little the English took into consideration former allies. Their action in this question was typically English.

Then, Serrano Suñer mentioned a communication of the Duke of Alba, to whom the English Colonial Secretary² had stated unofficially that Spain was perhaps threatened by danger from Tunisia.

To that the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that in the meantime the English were bombarding French territory in Dakar. De Gaulle had appeared before Dakar and had attacked the three cruisers and three destroyers whose departure from Toulon for Dakar had been approved by the German and Italian Armistice Commissions.³ Besides, the battleship *Richelieu*, which lay in dry dock in Dakar, had intervened in the fight. Thus far, the situation was obscure; however, it appeared that the Governor would remain faithful to the Vichy Government. In reprisal the French had attacked Gibraltar today with a sizable number of planes.

Serrano Suñer then mentioned that Generalissimo Franco in his letter to him (Serrano Suñer) referred to the fact that the Armistice Commission had authorized France to ship Senegalese regiments as well as armored cars to Africa in order to suppress the followers of de Gaulle. Franco had asked whether the French had given any guarantees in regard to the employment of these troops. This appeared necessary to him, because he thought it possible that these troops might serve to increase de Gaulle's strength.

The Foreign Minister replied that he was not accurately informed on this subject, since it concerned purely military negotiations of the Armistice Commission. However, he knew that some time ago the French had informed Germany and Italy that the situation in North Africa would become very precarious if they did not receive permission to transport ships, planes, and troops there. Thereupon, the German and Italian Commissions had decided jointly to make an attempt to strengthen Pétain's position in Morocco.

¹ See document No. 87.

² Lord Lloyd.

³ See document No. 20 and footnote 2.

Yesterday evening the Vichy Government had requested permission to send to Dakar more units of the French fleet (the *Strasbourg*) as well as a number of planes. Concerning the first point the Führer had decided in the negative, but he had given a certain freedom of action to the French in the use of planes already stationed in Africa.⁴ However, the situation would be observed by Germany with attention and the necessary distrust.

In this connection Serrano Suñer touched upon another fear of the Spaniards. It was known that de Gaulle and the generals sympathizing with him intended to attack Spanish Morocco. They were kept from doing so only by the shortage of 7.5-cm. artillery ammunition. (Serrano Suñer spoke of 8-cm. pieces, but intended to get further information on the exact caliber.) Ammunition for these pieces was manufactured only in Finland, Italy, and France. In present circumstances, of course, no shipments could be made from Finland and Italy, so that the munitions plants in France would represent the sole source of supplies. Franco therefore requested that the French munitions plants be closely supervised.

The Foreign Minister promised to get exact information on the number of munitions plants in unoccupied territory and on the measures taken for supervision and then give an answer to Serrano Suñer.

Serrano Suñer then turned to general problems. The Generalissimo had noted with great satisfaction the Führer's letter⁵ which was written in the spirit of loyal friendship. Consistent with the loyalty and frankness which had hitherto prevailed in German-Spanish negotiations, he would have to declare, however, that the Generalissimo "had been distressed in a friendly way" because of the German claim for bases in Morocco. With great regret, he had thought he recognized a certain sign of distrust toward Spain, and he would, therefore, like once more to reemphasize solemnly that his attitude toward Germany was not a momentary opportunism, but an eternal reality. In an alliance with Germany all the bases, ports, and airports would also in case of war be at the disposal of the friendly and allied nation. Concerning the measures taken at present by Spain herself for the defense of her bases Serrano Suñer mentioned the stationing of fighter squadrons in the Canary Islands and the previously mentioned installation of 15.24-cm. pieces dismantled from warships for the defense of the islands.

Regarding economic problems Serrano Suñer declared that the Spanish experts felt that in some cases the Germans made too great demands which would unnecessarily impair Spanish interests and in this manner would indirectly harm the German interest itself. For Spain the point of departure for economic problems was the following:

⁴ See document No. 96.

⁵ Document No. 70.

All of Germany's needs must, of course, be satisfied, but only in so far as this would be possible after taking into account the absolutely necessary needs of Spain herself. With these two reservations (i. e., regarding the bases and the above-mentioned attitude toward the economic demands) General Franco agreed with the Führer's letter and would greatly welcome closer cooperation with Germany.

The Foreign Minister suggested that they try to get a comprehensive view of the present state of the negotiations between Germany and Spain.

First, he turned to the question of the tripartite alliance between Spain, Germany, and Italy. The suggestion for this had been made to him by the Italian side, with a period of 10 years proposed for the alliance.⁶ In this connection the actual military operation, namely the attack on Gibraltar, would have to be planned according to the suggestion in the Führer's letter to Franco.⁷ Since preparations for this operation would still take some time, the publication of the alliance would take place only on the day of the aerial attack on Gibraltar. Until that time, the treaty of alliance would have to remain secret, because otherwise the operation against Gibraltar, although not impossible, would be nevertheless much more difficult to execute. The signing of this agreement ought to take place while Serrano Suñer was still in Germany. Count Ciano might also come to Germany in a few days anyway, so that a joint signing could take place at that time. Furthermore, the contents of this treaty of alliance would need to comprise but very few words and would contain as its main point the obligation of mutual aid in all respects. No long statements were necessary for friendly countries whose interests ran as parallel as did those of the three treaty Powers. Only the following needed to be stated: "Spain, Germany, and Italy have decided to conclude a military alliance, and will support each other everywhere, politically, militarily, and economically. The pact has been concluded for a period of 10 years." The date of Spain's entry into the war would be fixed in a secret clause, to the effect that, as soon as the necessary preparations had been made, the war would be started by Spain with an attack on Gibraltar. In a supplementary protocol Germany would pledge herself to furnish certain military and economic aid. In another protocol the matériel deliveries between Germany and Spain would have to be dealt with. At the same time it would contain the assurance that in the peace treaty Morocco would be transferred to Spain with certain German reservations. The Foreign Minister then requested Serrano Suñer to state whether in principle Spain would be prepared to conclude such a pact. He would then instruct the proper authorities in the Foreign Ministry to draft a treaty text.

⁶ See document No. 79.

⁷ Document No. 70.

To this question Serrano Suñer did not give a direct answer, but first described the Spanish attitude toward the protocol proposal as it was submitted to him before he received in Brussels the news from the Reich Foreign Minister about the [proposed] conclusion of a tripartite pact. He mentioned that in the Spanish view this protocol ought to contain three points:

1. Spain's decision to participate now in the war; 2. the assurance of military and material aid to Spain; and 3. the recognition of Spain's territorial and national demands.

To this the Foreign Minister declared that in the discussions in Rome the Duce had suggested a tripartite alliance with Spain. This had seemed like a good idea to him (the Foreign Minister), and the Führer had also agreed. When three great states with common interests concluded an agreement, they should do this not in the form of a small protocol, but rather by a solemn treaty. Basically, of course, as matters stand the treaty would amount to the same thing.

In connection with the German demands Serrano Suñer spoke of the political climate in Spain, which had to be considered in order to understand the Spanish attitude. There were elements in Spain who feared that Germany did not correctly understand Spain's difficulties, the great sacrifices which she had already made, and her economic situation. The text of the treaty, therefore, would have to be drawn up with extraordinary care.

When Serrano Suñer again talked of the distrust expressed in Germany's demand for bases, the Foreign Minister replied that nothing of the sort was involved. When Germany called for bases this was done because she would establish in the future a great colonial empire in Central Africa. The demand for bases was not an expression of distrust, but was made in view of possible future developments which would force Germany not only to defend her own position, but with it simultaneously that of Spain. Distrust was also out of the question because the interests of the three treaty partners in Africa were exactly defined. During his visit to Rome he (the Foreign Minister) had shown the Duce the maps presented by the Spanish gentlemen. Without wanting to anticipate him he thought he could say even now that Spain's and Italy's interests did not clash. However, it would have to be left to Mussolini himself to state his position more exactly about that. In these circumstances the three treaty partners would have to provide jointly for the defense of the African Continent against a possible attack from America. In order to guarantee such a defense, timely and thorough preparations were necessary because of the highly advanced state of warfare. With all respect for the bravery of the Spanish Army he still must point out that present wars are won by

those who have the best technical equipment and who, if possible, have prepared materially for the struggle for decades. In the American foe one would also have to deal with a people which had made extraordinary technical progress. He therefore requested that the German desires as to bases in Morocco and transfer of an island in the Canary Islands group be understood from the point of view of common defense requirements.

Serrano Suñer replied that he had submitted to Generalissimo Franco the Führer's great conception of the future, consisting of some sort of Monroe Doctrine for the European-African bloc, and that Franco, after having also taken note of the Führer's letter, had assumed a very positive attitude toward those thoughts. However, as regards what Germany reserves for herself in Africa, Germany's interests were understood by the Spaniards, to be sure, but they asked themselves whether the method suggested by Germany for satisfying these interests was really the only possible one. After all, a military alliance between two countries generally involves preventive relations [*Präventivbeziehungen*], so that for instance any special bases for Germany would thereby really become superfluous.

To Serrano Suñer's question why in view of the general military alliance Germany still made this special demand regarding bases, the Foreign Minister replied that if Spain fell back on German support only in the moment of the attack, the aid would come too late. For construction of ports, buildings, airport installations, and similar material preparations for defense would have to be completed long in advance, during peacetime.

Serrano Suñer replied that two cases must be distinguished:

1. An immediate attack. The two general staffs were already taking the necessary precautions in negotiations with each other, to meet this contingency. 2. A future attack. In that case Spain with the help of Germany would already have perfected her material measures for defense and would then put at the disposal of the allied nation all the ports, airports, and bases within the entire Spanish territory.

In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister asked Serrano Suñer some precise questions. First, what answer had Franco given to the Führer's request for the cession of one of the Canary Islands.

Serrano Suñer replied that within the limits of his authority to negotiate he had not been in a position to communicate this request officially to the Generalissimo, because he had been strictly confined within the bounds of his mission, namely to negotiate within the framework which was laid down by the Spanish note regarding the Spanish claims.⁸ However, he had brought this request to the Generalissimo's attention purely for his information and somewhat unofficially. In the same unofficial way Franco had given a negative answer to the ques-

⁸ See vol. ix of this series, document No. 488.

tion. Furthermore, Spain had already made so many defense preparations in the Canary Islands that she could adequately defend herself there.

Serrano Suñer confirmed the statement of the Reich Foreign Minister that the request had consequently been rejected.

Secondly, the Reich Foreign Minister asked for the Spanish answer to the request for the transfer of Spanish Guinea and Fernando Po. To this, too, Serrano Suñer gave a negative answer. As justification he pointed out that in this case it was a question of very old Spanish possessions, and in this connection he also mentioned the counterclaim of Spain for expansion of the territory of Guinea in order to obtain for this territory the black population required for full exploitation.

The Reich Foreign Minister noted that in this case also Spain's answer was negative, and then he asked for a precise answer concerning the things Germany reserves for herself in Morocco and the bases.

Serrano Suñer answered that Spain would agree to satisfy in individual negotiations the economic interests of Germany in Morocco, also in the form of share capital. In principle Spain would agree to this solution.

However, as to the enclaves demanded by Germany, he also took a negative position on this matter, arguing that the value of Moroccan territory for Spain would be extraordinarily decreased by the cession of such bases. Anyhow, the whole problem was dealt with in the letter of the Generalissimo to the Führer.⁹

To another question of the Reich Foreign Minister regarding Spain's desire concerning the frontier of the Pyrenees, Serrano Suñer replied that in this case it was a question of strategic frontier corrections of a lesser degree.

The Reich Foreign Minister then turned to the economic negotiations and debt consolidation.¹⁰ He stressed that England and France owned certain interests in enterprises on Spanish territory which were known as international shares. Germany wanted to have these assets transferred to her and credit them to the Spanish debts. Now the Spanish economic representatives accompanying Serrano Suñer had broken off negotiations on this point with the remark that the chief of the delegation himself would like to discuss this with the Reich Foreign Minister.

Serrano Suñer replied that this set of problems must be considered from the point of view indicated previously. Germany was to receive preferentially everything that she might need from Spain, provided however that Spain still retained enough for her most urgent needs. This was the basic principle for the settlement of economic problems.

⁹ See document No. 88.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, footnote 5.

With respect to details, he might remark, in response to the German proposal to take over foreign companies on Spanish soil, that the list of these companies presented by Germany contained a number of mistakes, since it also named firms as foreign which were exclusively in Spanish possession. As for the Rio Tinto matter, in the Spanish view this involved an economic Gibraltar which had been forced upon the Spaniards in a moment of economic and political weakness.¹¹ At a time when Spain started to unfurl her flag and wanted to regain lost ground in the name of her honor, she would have to claim ownership rights herself in the Rio Tinto Company, of which she was once robbed. However, she would of course be able to assure Germany economically of preferential deliveries of this company's products.

The Foreign Minister showed by an example the precise nature of the idea which formed the basis for the German proposal. According to this, a company on Spanish soil which had previously been completely in French possession would be transferred in such a manner that Germany would receive a majority of the shares amounting to 51 percent, whereas Spain would receive the remaining 49 percent. This majority and minority relationship could vary according to the cases in question. In principle, however, the shares transferred to German possession would be credited to the Spanish debts from the Civil War. From this transaction, Spain would gain the following three advantages: 1. Instead of a purely French company Spain herself would in the above-mentioned cases own a large part of such a company; 2. a debt reduction for Spain in the amount of the credit for the German shares in the company would result; and 3. instead of a French company a mixed German-Spanish company would now continue the operation.

The Foreign Minister tried by means of other examples to bring home this line of thought to Serrano Suñer. Serrano Suñer did not, however, commit himself on that in any definite manner.

Summarizing, the Foreign Minister stated in conclusion that some points had come out of this discussion on which there was not yet agreement. The Generalissimo's letter of reply to the Führer, which could be presented tomorrow when he is to be received by the Führer¹² must also be awaited in order to reach a final opinion. However, he would request that the Spanish side reconsider matters in the light of the discussion just conducted and in so doing reflect that everything which had been planned for the future of Spain had really become possible only through the Battle of Flanders and the Battle of England. Germany readily recognized the great efforts which Spain had made in the Civil War, but she believed that for her part

¹¹ Control of the copper and sulphur mines at Rio Tinto had been acquired by the Rio Tinto Company, Ltd., in 1873.

¹² See Editors' Note, p. 184.

she too had contributed much to Franco's success in the Civil War. Her attitude had arisen from the feeling of friendship which Germany had always harbored toward Spain, and particularly on account of her attitude in the World War. It ought to be realized, however, that a great Spain could only be made possible through final German victory.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 98

368/207037-40

*The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions
With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

SECRET

WIESBADEN, September 24, 1940—8: 10 p. m.

Del. No. 131

Received September 24—8: 45 p. m.

With reference to the copy sent to you of the teletype communication of September 21 from the Armistice Commission to OKW Department L, concerning a conversation of General Doyen with General von Stülpnagel about acknowledging German-French cooperation by making certain political concessions.¹

On September 20 M. de Boisanger, the chairman of the French economic delegation, discussed with me, obviously on the basis of the same instructions, similar points of view.² But everything was very vague and ill-defined. In reply to my request that he explain himself in more concrete terms Boisanger did not know what else to do except to hand me confidentially his instructions, the text of which follows:

"The attitude of the German Government with regard to orders placed in the occupied territory, and the demand of that Government (which was voiced after the conclusion of the Agreement for the sup-

¹ In telegram No. 174 of Sept. 21 (368/207009-10) Welck had reported:

"Doyen pointed out that the German wishes to utilize fully for armament purposes French industry in the unoccupied zone amounted to German-French cooperation. Certain dangers to France would result from this: in the first place the possibility of English air raids on French territory; and in the second place the danger of internal opposition against the Pétain Government, since not all Frenchmen were as yet convinced that such a policy was right.

"It would seem therefore only fair that Germany should acknowledge this cooperation by making certain political concessions that might still be discussed in detail. In particular the Frenchmen who now were to fight for the French colonial possessions ought to know that these possessions would in the main be retained by France. As a consequence of such cooperation France anticipated a decided improvement in the relations between the two nations."

Minutes of this conversation are printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 326-334.

² Minutes of this conversation are printed in *ibid.*, pp. 363-372.

ply of aluminum, bauxite, alumina, etc.³) for negotiations about the placing of orders for war material in the unoccupied territory, beginning with orders to the aircraft industry, is the following: The German Government is convinced that it has the right to give orders to industry directly in the occupied territory; it does not ignore the fact that in order to obtain the expected results it is partly dependent on the good will of industrialists and workers, regardless of any pressure to which they might be subjected. The German Government recognizes the French Government's freedom of action in the unoccupied territory.

"Acceptance of the German demands after the conclusion of the aluminum agreement is a serious political problem and involves various risks, such as the possibility of bombing by English flyers in both parts of France, the possibility of France getting into a difficult position with respect to England in the event of a German-English peace, difficulties of the Government with public opinion which would not understand why collaboration with Germany should be carried that far. The French delegation should accordingly make an effort to obtain compensation of a political nature in the general conversations.

"This compensation is justified less by the importance of the material contribution, substantial as that may be, than by the tangible evidence of France's new orientation. The compensation cannot be indicated more definitely at present, but must be designed to show that Germany, more or less officially, recognizes the collaboration offered it by the French Government. Depending on the climate of the conversations, certain matters may be asked for, on which the position of the French Government is being outlined. More definite formulation is left to the French delegation. At any rate, it would be necessary that as a consequence of this collaboration the climate between the two countries should improve."

Today Boisanger again took up the foregoing request.⁴

At first he emphasized France's great willingness to collaborate with us economically to a far greater extent even than previously, especially through greater utilization of war industry, particularly the engine and aircraft factories in the unoccupied zone. However, during his recent stay in Vichy the necessity of obtaining from us some form of political recognition of such collaboration was extensively discussed. Concrete proposals were not put forward at Vichy. He had rather been instructed to find out first how the German Government was reacting to the idea in principle. Such recognition was needed by the Pétain Government in order to justify to itself and to the people the kind of German-French collaboration as had taken shape at Wiesbaden, which was really a new thing between two countries at war, and which moreover could lead France into a difficult position. One would

³ An agreement for the delivery of certain of these materials from unoccupied France to Germany was concluded on Sept. 4, 1940. The agreement and a number of documents relating to its conclusion are printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 195-205. Wiesbaden report Del. W. No. 771 of Sept. 13 (4382/E083025-27) contains a summary of the negotiations.

⁴ Minutes of this conversation are printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 412-414.

prefer to leave to Germany the proposals regarding the form of such recognition, but he was thinking of the possible transmission of a letter in which French cooperation was officially recognized, further of a preferential release of prisoners of war, and possibly of a rectification of the line of demarcation. He also thought the idea presented by General Doyen to General von Stülpnagel very fortunate, that is, that France's struggle for the retention of her colonies should be effectively supported now by a firm commitment for the integrity of all French colonial possessions, especially in the case of a German-English armistice. Thus far Boisanger.

I postponed dealing with Boisanger's suggestion of September 20 until I had further taken up the important financial promises made to me at the same time, concerning the Dakar gold and the cession of Rumanian oil holdings, first because it was very vague and secondly because it had been pointedly advanced by Boisanger as a political matter. After the parallel intervention of General Doyen with General von Stülpnagel on the following day, the latter asked me further to elucidate the question in a report supplementing his own. Incidentally, with respect to Doyen's intervention, Boisanger said that it was made purely for the purpose of information. In the days of his recent stay in Vichy the question had been extensively and repeatedly discussed with him and he had been explicitly instructed to take the matter up here.

To pursue the idea further is not without risk, in my opinion.

The French Government is trying here to obtain political compensations for its willingness to render economic services that go beyond the text of the Armistice Treaty and its obligations under the Treaty. It is attempting to obtain thereby in advance certain terms from the German Government which in some way would prejudge the later peace negotiations. The suggested letter, for example, can have only the purpose of being presented at the peace negotiations. But the cat was let out of the bag by General Doyen with his suggestion for guaranteeing the French colonial possessions at this time. Boisanger expressed it characteristically in the form that the French colonial officer must know now that he was fighting for his own colonies and not *pour le roi de Prusse*. Very plain also was a further remark that the French Government wished as soon as possible to get out of the present state of suspense under the armistice and into settled conditions.

Since they believe that this political demand can be based above all orders for aircraft which we plan to place in the unoccupied zone, it is to be noted that these unfortunately are still very much in the first stage of preparation and that no definitive orders, whether for engines or aircraft parts, have so far been placed.

Besides, in the negotiations here, we have always argued that by such and similar orders French unemployment is to be relieved and the beginning of French reconstruction is to be assisted and that they are therefore in the best interests of France, for which no special political compensation should be needed.⁵

HEMMEN

⁵ At the meeting of the Economic Policy Committee on Oct. 1, 1940, the following was agreed: "The granting of any French requests of the kind mentioned in telegram Del. No. 131, involving political or trade concessions for economic collaboration with us, is—except in case of instructions from higher quarters—out of the question. Herr Hemmen is to be requested to adopt a noncommittal attitude if the French should revert to this idea." (1002/306509-12)

No. 99

35/22889-91

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1940—6:00 p. m.

No. 2036 of September 24

Received September 25—8:45 a. m.

JOINT REPORT BY THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AND THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ; ALSO FOR OKW FOREIGN DEPARTMENT [*Ausland*], CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMY, AND CHIEF OF THE OPERATIONS STAFF OF THE LUFTWAFFE

The first aim of the United States continues to be to bring the situation in the Pacific Ocean to a military or diplomatic solution, if possible by involving English naval forces. This frees the rear for a large-scale imperialist policy in the Atlantic Ocean. There the intention is to bring the western parts of Africa under the influence of the United States and to control the communications of the Central and South American countries with Europe, that is to say, particularly the southern part of the Atlantic Ocean and the straits at Dakar and Natal. The connection between this and the policy of obtaining bases on the Atlantic front and the formation of a defense bloc with Canada has been repeatedly explained. In the constantly increasing cooperation in defense policy between England and the United States, Washington is the leader and London complies with its wishes.

Negotiations regarding Singapore, Port Darwin, and the bases in the Pacific Ocean, that is, operational and political cooperation between the United States and England, are in the foreground, since Japan is to be disposed of first.

Efforts to separate Russia and Japan and to draw Russia to the side of the United States seem to be continuing. Russia's demands play a

considerable role in this. In spite of the embargo Russia demands the sale of machine tools for armament purposes, the transfer of tankers, the dispatch of American technicians, entirely prohibited for months, for building factories to produce high octane gasoline. The United States will probably show itself favorably inclined if it can thereby assure political cooperation with Russia in the Far East.

As far as the African coast is concerned, it seems that here they have an eye on Freetown, are planning joint utilization of Capetown, and are entirely in agreement with England with regard to Dakar and elimination of German influence there.

On September 23 Roosevelt described his program before the American Legion declaring that the war had to be kept from American shores and must not jeopardize America's freedom and her institutions. That is the slogan under which they are reaching out politically and militarily as far as Singapore and West Africa for the defense of America, and are claiming the right to create broad outlying defenses for the territory of the Monroe Doctrine as newly concocted according to the wishes of the Americans in Havana and by the agreements with Canada.

It is characteristic of the boundless conceit of the Americans that on the one hand the United States pushes the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine so far that it also wants to control the economic relations of the Latin American countries, whereas on the other hand it has no compunction about intervening in questions vital to Japan and claims the right to look around for bases in West Africa and to decide according to its wishes the future of the eastern area of the Atlantic Ocean.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

No. 100

4040/E063818

Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 24, 1940.
zu Pol. VIII 1178.¹

The Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister informed our Ambassador again on September 22 that "the Japanese action in Indochina did not aim at a change in the status quo but solely at a defeat of Chiang Kai-shek in this manner." As early as August 2 the Japanese Foreign Minister informed our Ambassador that "he had assured the French Ambassador that Japan had no territorial aspirations in Indochina and would later evacuate the territory."² It should be considered whether

¹ Pol. VIII 1178: Document No. 89.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 273.

we ought not acknowledge receipt of these statements in order, in this way, to express our interest in these Japanese intentions, but without committing ourselves. In this case the Embassy in Tokyo could be sent an instruction along somewhat the following lines:

"With reference to your telegram No. 990.

"Please thank the Foreign Minister for keeping us informed about the course of the negotiations with France concerning Japanese wishes in French Indochina; express the satisfaction of the Reich Government over the peaceful settlement, and state that the Reich Government has taken cognizance of the fact that the Japanese Government has no territorial aspirations in Indochina and will evacuate the area at the proper time."

Submitted herewith through the Deputy Director of the Political Department and the Under State Secretary to the State Secretary.³

KNOLL

¹ Marginal notes: "In my opinion not exactly necessary, therefore better omitted. W[oermann]."

"I share your view. W[eizsäcker]."

No. 101

2386/489212-13

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, September 24, 1940.

TOP SECRET

No. 1727 of September 24

To be submitted immediately.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 1724 of today.¹

I handed Ciano the text of the pact at 10:45 a. m., immediately after it had been decoded, and asked him to instruct the [Italian] Embassy in Tokyo to convey its approval; I stressed the great urgency of this matter, especially in view of today's meeting of the Japanese Privy Council.² After I had answered in the affirmative Ciano's question whether the draft had the approval of the Reich Foreign Minister, Ciano declared that that satisfied him completely, and, without reading the text, he reached for the telegram forms. He read to me the instruction to the Embassy in Tokyo which is to the effect that the Japanese Government should be informed with the greatest speed of the "integral consent" of the Italians to the draft of the pact, and his German colleagues should be informed accord-

¹ Not found.

² Cf. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, exhibits Nos. 552, 553, and 1030.

ingly. In my presence at 10:55 a. m. Ciano dispatched the final draft to Anfuso to be sent off in code.

Ciano consents likewise to the stipulation that the pact will be signed in the English version, that this fact will be kept absolutely secret, and that later on, the pact, translated into the three languages of the countries concerned, will be signed in the three Foreign Ministries. He instructed Anfuso to undertake the translation into Italian immediately, which then will be cabled to Tokyo and given to me for transmittal to Berlin.

Ciano, as well as the Duce later on, who mentioned this topic briefly on the occasion of the presentation of Reich Minister Rust,³ seemed very happy about the speedy and satisfactory progress of this entire question.

MACKENSEN

³ Rust had gone to Rome in September 1940, to visit the Italian Minister of Education, Bottai. No records of his conversations in Rome have been found.

No. 102

121/119917

Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, September 25, 1940—3:30 a. m.

No. 684 of September 25

Received September 25—3:50 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

During his visit today¹ Laval emphasized the firm resolve of the French Government to resist the English attacks on Dakar by every means. Dakar was a key position for the West African colonial possessions; besides, toward the interior from Dakar, gold amounting to 65 billions of francs was stored. Laval believes the Government can rely on the loyalty of the troops there. In view of the strength of the English attacks, however, he considers further reinforcement of the French naval and air forces urgently necessary. A victorious repulse of the English attacks would deal a decisive blow to the de Gaulle propaganda and give a vigorous lift to Laval's anti-English policy in France. He wished and hoped that France could contribute her modest share to the final overthrow of England.

Laval furthermore inquired whether a German declaration would be possible to the effect that the peace treaty would leave France's West African colonial possessions untouched. As a reason for this query he indicated that the loyal and peaceful attitude of the native population would be encouraged thereby. The strength of the

¹ i. e., on Sept. 24.

de Gaulle propaganda was in the claim that "the Free French were defending the colonial possessions threatened by Germany".²

ABETZ

² In a memorandum of Sept. 25, prepared in connection with forthcoming political talks with Scapini, special emissary from the French Government on prisoners of war, Woermann recommended to the Foreign Minister that no sort of declaration should be made to M. Scapini on this or any other political subject; representatives of the Foreign Ministry should simply listen to what Scapini had to say (587/243341-43). Accordingly, in conversations with Scapini on Sept. 28 and Sept. 30, Rintelen and Weizsäcker, respectively, adopted a noncommittal position. (Rintelen memorandum of Sept. 28: 587/243344-46; Weizsäcker memorandum of Sept. 30: 587/243347-48)

[EDITORS' NOTE. The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (August 1-November 30, 1940) contains this passage for September 25:

"Upon the occasion of his report this afternoon, the first he has made since returning from his trip to the occupied western areas and his subsequent illness, the Chief of the National Defense Department [Warlimont] asks the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff [Jodl] for a general survey of the military and political situation, particularly with regard to the situation in the Mediterranean and West Africa.

"The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff calls the entire situation fluid. In particular the numerous diplomatic talks during the last week have not reached any final conclusion.

"The discussions with Spanish Minister of Interior Serrano Suñer [see document No. 97] have taken a satisfactory course, but in the main were devoted to general political questions which would result from Spain's entry into the war. Direct questions of joint conduct of war were not discussed as far as he knows, so that the bases for close military cooperation with Spain and Italy in the Mediterranean do not yet exist.

"The discussions of the Reich Foreign Minister at Rome have exclusively or at least in the main had to do with the German-Italian-Japanese military and friendship pacts. [See documents Nos. 73, 79, and 87.]

"After the latest development, the questions of warfare in the Mediterranean will have to be considered in close connection with what has happened in West Africa (Dakar). He (the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff) in agreement with the Chief of the National Defense Department has already used every opportunity to convince the Führer of the extensive chances of utilizing joint German and French interests in the all-important fight against England.

"While the Führer on the occasion of releasing French forces for defense against English attacks on Dakar followed the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and excluded the French naval forces stationed at Toulon, thereby again expressing his distrust of French intentions [see document No. 96] it nevertheless appears that a change

is taking place in his views. One ought to recognize clearly in this connection that a complete change in the fundamental principles of carrying on the war and in the war aims would be involved. Especially the difficulties which might be raised by Italy and Spain, as the German allies chiefly interested in annexing the French colonies, should not be overlooked.

“With regard to the conduct of war against England, however, no doubt can exist that the cooperation of France will open important new possibilities. At the same time the danger of the British gaining influence in North Africa would be warded off.

“What seemed of importance to him (the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff) is consequently the influencing of the Führer further in this direction. The intention of the latter to meet the former French Ambassador in Berlin, François-Poncet, together with Marshal Pétain, has already been discussed. However, such a shift would doubtless be preceded by a meeting of the Führer and Mussolini.”]

No. 103

F6/0080-0081

Memorandum by the Ambassador to Spain

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, September 25, 1940.

The Spanish Minister of Interior, Serrano Suñer, just told me the following:

In a private letter that arrived today with a special courier from Madrid, Franco has informed his brother-in-law that immediately after the start of the English action in Dakar the English Ambassador undertook a démarche with the Spanish Foreign Minister and stated in the name of his Government that the operation of the British had nothing whatsoever to do with Morocco, where England freely recognized the special Spanish interests.

Moreover, according to Franco a Spanish Minister, not named by Suñer (not the Foreign Minister), recently spoke with the English Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, and told him that England had lost the war and was only making her situation worse by resisting further. The English Ambassador replied that he judged the situation similarly, but that Germany simply could not be trusted. If an agreement could be reached with Germany, one could not be sure Germany would hold to it.

The Spanish Minister of Interior considers both English statements to indicate visible weakness on the part of England and possibly even the beginning of an inclination toward peace.

Herewith respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister.

V. STÖHRER

No. 104

F6/0082-0087

Memorandum by the Ambassador to Spain

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, September 25, 1940.

This afternoon a detailed conversation with Spanish Minister of Interior Serrano Suñer. Theme: the questions touched on yesterday at the conference with the Reich Foreign Minister.¹

The Spanish Minister stated approximately the following:

I believe we should come to the signing of a protocol as soon as possible. The excellent impression which the German-Spanish conversations in Berlin have made in the world would be weakened if those voices should receive support which claim to detect disagreement between the two negotiating parties in the length of the conversations here. If we should sign such a protocol tomorrow or the day after tomorrow it could not, of course, go into detail. But one could establish therein Spain's intention to intervene in the war on the side of the Axis Powers and also state in the intention to conclude a 10-year alliance.

Either now or in the immediate future the conditions for Spain's actual entry into the war should then be established, i. e., the military and economic assistance which Spain needs. In further negotiations the additional groundwork for the conclusion of the alliance could then be arranged.

The further treatment of the economic questions, in which Germany is particularly interested, should then also be speeded up.

In the further course of the conversation the Minister then dealt in more detail with the individual questions discussed yesterday in the presence of the Foreign Minister.

1. The Minister once more termed the cession of one of the Canary Islands not subject to discussion. He spoke of historical tradition, probably also with reference to Fernando Po and Guinea, thus doubtless also refusing to oblige in regard to these two last-named areas. But he did not do so regarding the bases in French Morocco which we have in mind, although he again said in quite general terms that in case of a war an allied Spain would of course make all her harbors, airfields, possessions, etc., available and would also try herself to carry out the necessary military development of such important points.

Thereafter our economic demands were discussed once more in detail. With regard to French Morocco the Minister already said yesterday that Spain would agree to our laying claim to the French companies and rights in French Morocco, which would be transferred to Spain, on condition that vital Spanish raw material interests would not be endangered thereby. Today the Minister was more approach-

¹ See document No. 97.

able regarding our wishes to take over certain French and English companies and rights in Spain herself, in connection with payment of the Spanish Civil War debts. I explained to him once more in detail our ideas and intentions in this regard, concerning which in spite of yesterday's detailed conference he was evidently still somewhat confused. The Minister only stressed repeatedly that it was not in our interest, either, to replace the British control of the mines, etc., by German control, since this would create permanent dissatisfaction among the Spanish people comparable—as he expressed it—to a volcano constantly on the point of eruption.

During the entire conversation I pointed out again and again to Señor Serrano Suñer, in the sense of the Foreign Minister's closing statement yesterday, that of course Spain owed us an adequate quid pro quo for bringing about the fulfilment of her territorial aspirations, and that in this regard we place quite particular value on economic acquisitions; Spain could not expect us to provide her with a new colonial empire through our victories and not get anything for it.

In summary I should like to say:

That we will see our territorial and economic demands in Morocco fulfilled without further ado.

That it will also be possible to obtain participation in the heretofore English and French companies in Spain under a formula respecting the national feelings of the Spaniards.

But that a cession of parts of the insular and colonial possessions of Spain could be obtained from her only through the application of force.

Respectfully submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

V. STOHRER

[EDITORS' NOTE. On the afternoon of September 25, Hitler received Serrano Suñer in the presence of Ribbentrop "for a lengthy conversation". (Cf. *Völkischer Beobachter*, September 26.) No memorandum of a conversation of that date has been found, but there is a Schmidt memorandum of a conversation dated September 27 (document No. 117). No corroborative evidence has been found that Hitler actually received Serrano Suñer for a further conversation on September 27, and the presumption is strong that the date September 27 on the Schmidt memorandum is a mistake, clerical or otherwise. Schmidt himself in his book, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-45* (Bonn, 1949), page 497, refers to a conversation of Hitler with Serrano Suñer on September 25, but makes no mention of a further conversation on September 27.]

No. 105

B15/B002783

The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

MADRID, September 25, 1940.

No. 3257 of September 25

Received September 25—7:30 p. m.

The Spanish Ambassador in London telegraphed to the Foreign Ministry here on September 24 as follows:

After the severe air attacks of the last 2 weeks on London the morale of the civilian population is still reasonably good. The danger in this connection arose during the first air attacks, since these were directed against the districts occupied by the workers. Later bombing also of the aristocratic and commercial quarters likewise aroused hatred of the enemy in people who had previously been unaffected and strengthened the singleminded determination to carry on the war to the limit. In the armed forces an improved spirit prevails. Passage of convoys through the Channel and traffic in the harbor of the capital city are carried on with complete regularity.

In the period from the beginning of August to the first week in September the number of ships sunk remained considerably below the average since the beginning of the war, but according to official figures it has in the recent period again exceeded that figure.

Public opinion has already displayed many variations under the influence of the air attacks and will possibly fluctuate still more. Nevertheless, I have observed that up to now neither the air attacks on the city and elsewhere in the capital nor the continuation of the blockade have destroyed the conviction that the war is likely to continue for a long time. (End of the telegram from London.)

HEBERLEIN

No. 106

449/222796

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 25, 1940.

The Greek Minister called on me today. Acting without instructions, he tried to learn something about the result of the conferences in Rome.¹

I told him that I had no information myself.

He showed concern that Greece had also been discussed there, and then protested anew that all reports of unneutral actions by Greece were false. He referred to the speech delivered by our Consul General in Salonika, from which he seemed to derive some hope. In the end he

¹ See documents Nos. 73, 79, and 87.

said that if any grievances against Greece existed, they ought to be brought out openly. Time and again it had happened that accusations, such as, for instance, the incident of the English ship that had put into a Greek port, had turned out to be without any foundation.

I told the Minister that we were continually receiving reports that Greece was giving assistance to England.

The Minister was very downcast when he left me.

WOERMANN

No. 107

B14/B002259

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

BERLIN, September 25, 1940.

The General Staff of the Italian Army has communicated to the German Military Attaché the following changes in the Italian strategic concentrations in Albania:

a. Albania.

"Three more divisions, in addition to the 5 divisions already there, are being sent to Albania. Of these reinforcing divisions, 1 is to be stationed on the Greek frontier, 1 on the Yugoslavian frontier, and the third will remain in reserve."

Comment:

Even with this reinforcement the Italian forces may not be strong enough (according to OKW) to carry out a major operation, in particular against Greece.

b. Libya.

The five divisions of the Fifth Army which are in Libya are now being reinforced from Italy in order that they can be used in case Tunis is occupied.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the Under State Secretary and the State Secretary.

KRAMARZ

No. 108

121/120461-62

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry

BERLIN, September 26, 1940.

At 12:35 a. m. Minister Hencke reported by telephone as follows:

"This evening at 10:45¹ there arrived a long note from the French delegation which is being translated at the moment.² According to

¹ i. e., the evening of Sept. 25.

² The text of the note is in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. 1, pp. 389-392.

a preliminary communication from the Chief of Staff, the note, in describing the battles at Dakar, emphasizes the extraordinary situation in which, on the one hand, Germany and France are now waging war against the common foe, England; while, on the other hand, a state of war still exists between Germany and France. By her heroic action France had demonstrated that she deserved the confidence of Germany. She was determined also to continue to repel English attacks. For this it was necessary, however, that Germany generously release to her the necessary material means without, as formerly, imposing reductions on every French request. France also needs as moral support the assurance of Germany that she may keep her colonial possessions for the future also, for the defense of which she is now shedding blood.

In the note a request for the release of additional naval forces from Toulon is forecast. Various less important details are also mentioned. A more detailed report will follow.³

The Armistice Commission intends to recommend to the OKW for military reasons the release of additional French warships for use in Africa. Hencke."

Minister Hencke remarked on this point that the Commander in Chief of the Navy would probably report to the Führer in this sense tomorrow.⁴

For the night service of the Political Department:

VON THADDEN
Secretary of Legation

³ Not printed (121/120458-60).

⁴ Raeder's minute concerning his report to Hitler on Sept. 26, 1940, is printed in "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*, pp. 141-143, and contains this passage: "The Führer is obviously hesitant about releasing additional French forces at Toulon; he feels himself bound by previous decisions. He wishes to discuss this matter with the Duce before deciding." No record that Hitler made a formal decision on this point has been found, but see document No. 158. Meanwhile the French, in a note from General Doyen on Sept. 29, instead of repeating the request to reinforce Dakar, asked that naval forces of specified strength might be kept on an active status in Toulon (*La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 392-395).

No. 109

285/181759-61

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 26, 1940—[1:10 a. m.]¹

TOP SECRET

Received September 26—12:05 p. m.

No. 1746 of September 26 [25]

[RAM 33 g. Rs.]

Exclusively for the Chargé in person.

¹ The information in brackets is supplied from another copy (F5/0452-0454).

The following instruction is only to be carried out if on Thursday you receive from my Secretariat by telephone or telegraph the word "Execution."²

Please call on M. Molotov on Thursday, September 26, and tell him on my behalf that in view of the cordial relations existing between Germany and the Soviet Union I was desirous of informing him in advance, in strict confidence, of the following:³

1) The warmongering agitation in ~~America~~,⁴ which at this stage of the final defeat of England is seeking a last outlet in the extension and prolongation of the war, has led to negotiations between the two Axis Powers on the one hand and Japan on the other, which will result, presumably in the next few days, in the signing of a military alliance between the three Powers.

2) This alliance, consistent with its origin, is directed exclusively against ~~American~~⁵ warmongers. To be sure, this as usual is not expressly stated in the treaty, but can be unmistakably inferred from its terms.

3) The treaty, of course, does not pursue any aggressive aims against ~~America~~.⁶ Its exclusive purpose is rather to bring the elements pressing for ~~America's entry into the war~~⁷ to their senses, by conclusively demonstrating to them that if they enter the present struggle, they will automatically have to deal with the three Great Powers as adversaries.

4) From the beginning of their negotiations, the three treaty Powers have been in complete agreement that their alliance shall in no way affect the relationship each of them has with the Soviet Union. In order to dispel any doubt of this abroad as well, a special article was inserted in the treaty to the effect that the existing political relations [*status*] between each of the three treaty Powers and the Soviet Union shall not be affected by the treaty. This proviso means, therefore, that not only the treaties concluded by the three Powers with the Soviet Union, particularly the German-Soviet treaties of the autumn of 1939, shall remain in full force and effect, but that this applies in general to the entire political relationship to the Soviet Union.

5) The pact would probably serve as a damper on the warmongers, especially in ~~America~~,⁸ would operate against a further extension of the present war, and perhaps in this way would serve the restoration of world peace.

6) At this opportunity please also tell M. Molotov that I have taken cognizance of the memorandum handed to Count von der Schulenburg on September 21⁹ and that I intend shortly to address

²Marginal note: "Note! Secretary of Legation Schreiner (Schwelmer?) of the Secretariat telephoned and gave the word 'Execution.' v. T[ippelskirch], Sept. 26, 6:30 p. m."

The correct spelling is "Schweimer."

³In the message as delivered to Molotov the words scored through were changed.

⁴Changed to: "the democratic countries."

⁵Changed to: "democratic."

⁶"Against America" deleted.

⁷Changed to: "prolongation and extension of the war."

⁸Changed to: "in the democratic countries."

⁹Document No. 81, enclosure.

a personal letter to M. Stalin¹⁰ in which I will reply to the memorandum in the spirit of German-Russian friendship, but beyond that will frankly and confidentially set forth the German conception of the present political situation. I should hope that this letter will contribute anew to the strengthening of our friendly relations. Besides, the letter will contain an invitation to Berlin for M. Molotov, whose return visit we are expecting after two visits to Moscow and with whom on this occasion I should like to discuss important questions relating to the establishment of common political aims for the future.

RIBBENTROP

¹⁰ Document No. 176.

No. 110

271/176981

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BELGRADE, September 26, 1940—10:55 a. m.

No. 709 of September 26

Received September 26—12:50 p. m.

Uncertainty as to the outcome of the conversations in Rome¹ with respect to the Balkans has caused great uneasiness here, which expresses itself in numerous (1 group missing) regarding Italian demands on Greece, to which Germany is said to have assented. Since in the event of an Italian-Greek conflict, the possibility of an Italian demand for passage through Yugoslav territory in the direction of Salonika is expected, the danger of being drawn into a conflict is considered serious.

I am convinced that Yugoslavia will fight only if she considers her own vital interests directly threatened, that is to say, not for Greece. An Italian invasion of southern Serbia would, however, undoubtedly be considered such a threat and would therefore be repulsed with arms.

HEEREN

¹ See documents Nos. 73 and 87.

No. 111

104/112539

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 26, 1940.

W 4499 g.

It is necessary to obtain a decision from the Führer regarding the continuance of trade with the Soviet Union. The directives issued during the last few weeks by the Reichsmarschall concerning the abso-

lute priority of all armament contracts and the further increasing of these armament contracts¹ make it impossible for German industry to execute, in addition to these contracts, the scheduled deliveries to Russia. In this state of affairs, it will be impossible to balance the considerable deficit already existing in German deliveries. On the contrary, a further great lag in German deliveries must be expected.

The Moscow negotiations on the balancing of the deliveries were broken off on the 12th of this month as the delegation had not sufficient authority to reply to the Soviet proposals.² If satisfactory replies are not given Moscow soon, a *suspension of the Russian deliveries* to Germany is to be expected. This applies particularly to the Russian supplies of grain and oil. The continuance of the exchange of goods with the Soviet Union at the present level depends on whether the Russian transactions have a priority, as before, or at least a preferential parity with the armament contracts. This can only be decided by the Führer. The German economic authorities, especially the Ministry of Economics, are finding themselves unable, because of the directives which have been issued, to deal with the question of foreign trade with Russia constructively.

Herewith to be submitted to the Foreign Minister.

General Thomas informs me that the Reichsmarschall expects my report on the Moscow negotiations soon. I request an opportunity to report in person first.

SCHNURRE

¹ The directives referred to here have not been found. Material relating to them is contained in the group of documents introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals as No. 1456-PS, but was not included in the published collection.

² For a comprehensive summary of these negotiations see document No. 128.

No. 112

121/120017-23

Unsigned Memorandum

BERLIN, October 1, 1940.

Pol. I M 13584 g.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht has transmitted the following report of a conversation on September 26 between the Commander in Chief of the Army¹ and General Huntziger:

"1) Situation in Dakar.

General Huntziger described the course of the fighting there, which was also known from other statements of the French Government. It was the firm intention of the French Government to hold Dakar and, should it, contrary to expectations, be lost, to fall back into the interior in order then to retake it.

¹ Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch.

He stressed the fact that the French Government was entirely serious in its fight against English encroachments, and against the former French general, M. de Gaulle, and he wished to emphasize this particularly in view of the fact that in Germany and Italy there had been doubts as to the loyalty of the French Government. On the other hand, he did not want to conceal the fact that it was not easy for the French Government to convince the French who were fighting down there of the necessity and usefulness of this fight. English propaganda, which made use of the argument that the French were defending their colonies only in the end to lose them to Germany or Italy anyway, was very effective and difficult to refute. France had a dark and uncertain future ahead of her. One might give her a gleam of hope and thus enable the French Government to combat English propaganda and the doubts of the French effectively. It was the hard fact, however, that though France had concluded an armistice agreement with Germany she was actually fighting, and indeed fighting with Germany against England. This fact had to be taken into consideration.

France was fighting against England not only off Dakar, but also over Gibraltar. In this connection it was very disturbing that the French planes starting from Morocco and Algeria did not fly over the Spanish Rif but had to make a large arc around Spanish Morocco. They did not want to do anything to Spain, but, on the contrary, through the attack on Gibraltar, were fighting for Spain. General Huntziger made a formal request for revocation of the ban on flying over. The Commander in Chief of the Army promised to convey the request.

General Huntziger then described the situation in Morocco. Every 5 days now a company of fully equipped white troops was being sent by air to Senegal to strengthen the forces there. The roads leading from Morocco and Algeria to Central Africa were also being made usable for transports again through depots of supplies, etc., and in this way a permanent route was being restored.

General Huntziger then said that there were still 180,000 men in North Africa. Their numbers were being reduced. Actually 150,000 men were needed. Italy recently demanded the reduction to 30,000 men. This was impossible; it meant anarchy and the virtual abandonment of North Africa by France. General Huntziger had appealed personally to Marshal Badoglio. The latter had admitted the validity of the reasons. Now 100,000 men were to be retained. This might do in an emergency if they were kept mobile and well equipped with arms. General Huntziger referred particularly to the need for armored reconnaissance cars and also a small number of tanks. It was the intention to shift the bulk of the forces to Morocco, which was more difficult than Tunisia and Algeria. Also, landing attempts by

the English were to be expected principally on the African west coast. Regarding the fleet, he presented the same requests as were communicated through the Armistice Commission.²

To the rejoinder that the English, too, could constantly increase their forces and thus would always remain superior, he objected that this had its limits as a result of the other tasks confronting the English, but that at least the French ships gave strong support to the defense of the west coast, as was already evident from the battles heretofore fought; finally that the English had to fight far from their bases while the French ships could depend on their harbors.

In conclusion, General Huntziger summarized his wishes as follows:

Clarity as to the fate of the French colonies for the moral support of those who were fighting; freedom of movement for parts of the fleet; a certain flexibility in the possibilities of utilizing the North African units.

2) In Syria the situation was difficult. Three divisions were needed there. That was more than could be left there at present, for the reservists, including the white cadres for the reserve divisions coming from North Africa, who were very numerous there, were anxious to get home. They could not be left there without endangering the morale of the troops. For the time being only 16-18,000 men, mostly colored, remained there. The cadres for these had to be filled from forces that had become superfluous in North Africa. It was hoped that they could be transported there by sea if the Italian coastal waters were used, under cover of warships. Demobilization traffic, from Beirut to Marseilles, was at present undergoing no interference from the English.

3) Indochina continued to be a source of great anxiety. Though there was an agreement with the Japanese Government,³ it was feared that the local Japanese command might not obey. In this way the fighting had broken out. It was to be feared that the very flourishing Tonkin would become a Sino-Japanese theater of war.

The agreement allowed Japan three air bases with an occupation force of 6,000 men at most and the right to march through once from Langson along the railroad to Haiphong. From the statements of General Huntziger it appeared that the Japanese troops on Chinese territory were evidently cut off from their rearward communications and now needed a way out of this situation through Tonkin.

The Commander in Chief of the Army observed with regard to the questions thus far raised, that he could not of his own initiative take a position on them since they were not only principally of a political nature, but in many ways also seriously affected Italian interests. He

² See documents Nos. 92, 96, and 108.

³ See document No. 8.

would be glad, however, to bring them up for discussion with the competent authority.

4) General Huntziger then asked that he be permitted to make some additional statements on the situation in France.

The French Government urgently needed to strengthen its influence in the occupied territory. The line of demarcation had divided France into two parts and thus caused serious material and moral disadvantages.

Especially disturbing was the supervision of postal and telephone communications along the long line. For us it was practically impossible to supervise it effectively. It was much simpler to place the demarcation line at the frontiers, that is, for unoccupied France, at the Pyrenees, which were easy to guard, and the Mediterranean coast. The interests of both would be served thereby.

The influence of the French Government against English and de Gaulle propaganda in the occupied area was inadequate. For 2 months they had sat with their hands tied in the field of radio. He therefore asked that the French Secret Service be permitted to work against propaganda and espionage in the occupied area. After all, one knew one's own country best. In Paris especially this activity was urgently needed. There, too, defamation of their own Government was intolerable. The Commander in Chief of the Army stated that it had already been found that a portion of the French Police was not loyal to us, that even with the increased use of such forces, he would have to expect a similarly varied behavior. This was intolerable to the occupying power.

A very difficult problem for the French Government was that of supplying the country with food. This was less a question of production than of transportation. The French Government thought that, with the supplies that were available and with a rigid system of rationing, both the interests of the population and of the occupation troops could be satisfied. It therefore made the request that the entire question of supply be placed completely in the hands of the French Government, which could then satisfy the demands of the German occupation troops efficiently and speedily. At the moment a supply system would be seriously jeopardized through poor cooperation between the French and the German authorities. Transports were being stopped at different places by German authorities. Requisitions were being filled by both German and French authorities. The French Government could best solve this problem itself, since it knew its country and its resources very well.

The Field Marshal replied that there had unfortunately been no French authority that had had a sufficient grasp of the conditions in

the country and enough power to guarantee supplies. The effort was being made, however, to have all the administrative work of the country done by the French authorities, who would then only have the German demands to fulfill. Things were moving and requisitions would then be done away with. Especially difficult was the question of fats and it was very important that France should bring its peanut supplies from Central Africa into the mother country as soon as possible.

General Huntziger replied that this had already been considered, but the stumbling block was first of all a question of transportation.

Finally General Huntziger also mentioned the labor and raw materials situation. He said that a great portion of French industry was shut down for lack of raw materials. There were over a million unemployed in France. The few factories that were in operation were working for Germany. The French Government would be glad to mobilize its entire industry for German armament if it could only be supplied with raw materials. It realized that France must otherwise collapse.

The Field Marshal replied that this was principally a matter of coal supply and therefore a transportation question. The French troops had themselves so seriously damaged their country by destruction of railroads, bridges, and canals that it was taking a rather long time to restore transportation in occupied territory. If the General would look at how much had already been done in this field by the employment and labor of the German occupation troops, he would not be able to suppress a feeling of gratitude toward the German occupation troops. Thus only a few days ago the canal from Paris to Lens was again made navigable through the work of German troops.

In conclusion the Field Marshal asked what the intentions of Marshal Pétain were for his trip into occupied territory. General Huntziger replied that he was not sufficiently informed about it, but he believed that Marshal Pétain was anxious to visit some cities that had suffered especially severely as a result of the war in order to show himself to the people there. He mentioned Orleans and Tours.

The Commander in Chief of the Army approved the idea of visiting the cities that had suffered particularly heavy destruction. The French Government had an urgent task there. General Huntziger also referred here again to the great shortage of raw materials.

At the close of the conversation, General Huntziger expressed his gratitude to the Field Marshal for having given him the opportunity to present his thoughts and anxieties in such detail.

The Field Marshal again stressed the fact that he would transmit the various points and questions, in so far as it appeared to him proper, to the competent authorities."

No. 113

F5/0455-0457

The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 27, 1940—5:13 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 27—9:15 a. m.

No. 2041 of September 26

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1746 of September 26.¹

Instruction carried out with Molotov tonight at 10 p. m. as directed. Molotov listened very attentively to the communication. At item 6) Molotov showed evident satisfaction and said that at the moment an indication of his attitude was not necessary, as the reply to the letter that the Foreign Minister intended to send to Stalin would provide an opportunity for it.

Before Molotov went into the matter of the military alliance with Japan, he inquired—on the basis of a telegraphic report from the Soviet Embassy in Berlin—regarding a German-Finnish agreement² which, according to a Finnish communiqué, provided for the granting of passage for German troops through Finland to Norway, and which was referred to by Press Chief Schmidt at his press conference. At the same time Molotov mentioned a report from the Berlin office of the United Press, which was broadcast over the radio, stating that German troops had landed in the Finnish port of Vaasa. I said that I had no further information on the subject.

Thereafter Molotov stated as follows on the subject of the military alliance: He gratefully took note of the communication from the Foreign Minister. The Soviet Embassy in Tokyo had a few days ago reported on a plan for such an agreement. The Soviet Government was, of course, extremely interested in this question, because it involved a neighboring country³ to which the Soviet Union was linked by numerous interests. Hence it was understandable that the Soviet Government not only had a great interest, but also the desire to be informed in advance regarding the agreement and its contents. This desire the Soviet Government based on articles 3 and 4 of the Non-Aggression Treaty.⁴ If the reverse were the case, the Soviet Government would also inform us in advance and communicate to us the contents of the treaty. The Soviet Government so construed article 4 that it was entitled to see the treaty between the Axis Powers and Japan and to receive information of any secret protocols and agreements as

¹ Document No. 109.² See documents Nos. 65 and 86.³ The Moscow Embassy copy contains at this point also the words "and a great state." (285/181748-50)⁴ Vol. VII of this series, document No. 228.

well, for which confidential treatment was promised in advance. He asked to be informed whether the German Government concurred in his interpretation of article 4 and reiterated his desire to be acquainted with the contents of the treaty *before* its signing, in order to be able to express his views on it. If, contrary to his expectation, the German Government did not agree with his interpretation of article 4, he asked that the position of the German Government be communicated to him.

As particularly significant in Molotov's utterances appear to me:

- 1) The great interest he showed in the treaty with Japan;
- 2) the constant harping on article 3 and especially article 4 of the Non-Aggression Treaty, in which connection he quoted article 18⁵ verbatim;
- 3) the insistence on seeing the text of the treaty, including the secret portions.

After Molotov had concluded his statements on the question of the military alliance, he reverted again to the German-Finnish agreement referred to at the beginning and declared that for the last 3 days the Soviet Government had received reports relative to the landing of German troops at Vaasa, Oulu, and Pori, without having been informed thereof by Germany. The Soviet Government wished to receive the text of the agreement on the passage of troops through Finland, including its secret portions. This demand, too, was based on articles 3 and 4 of the Non-Aggression Treaty. If we concurred in this interpretation of the articles mentioned, he asked to be informed as to the object of the agreement, against whom it was directed, and the purposes that were being served thereby. The agreement was being discussed in public, while the Soviet Government knew nothing about it.

I told Molotov that I would communicate his statements to my Government.⁶

TIPPELSKIRCH

⁵ The figure is correctly given as "4" in the Moscow Embassy copy (285/-181748-50).

⁶ See document No. 142.

No. 114

3697/E036017-18

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission

Telegram by teletype

No. 203

BERLIN, September 27, 1940.
e. o. W-Frie. 469.

With reference to your telegram No. 125 of September 20.¹

¹ See document No. 45, footnote 4.

1. French gold:

We assume that the French Government has carried out its decision to transfer the gold into the interior of the country, to Kayes. Before making further decisions on the return of the gold we wish first to await developments in the situation at Dakar.

2. Please ask the French to transfer the Belgian gold also from Thies to Kayes. In clarification of the claim advanced by the French for a deduction of 800 to 1,000 million French francs for advances to the Belgian Government in exile, conversations are to be initiated as soon as possible between the commissioners for the Bank of France and the Belgian National Bank and M. Boisanger at Wiesbaden. Bank Director Jost and Regierungsrat Semper, representatives of Herr von Becker, the commissioner for the Belgian National Bank, participated at a meeting here and are therefore informed. Please invite both directly to the discussions at Wiesbaden at the proper moment.

The reservation made against the deduction is to stand in any case, as we must maintain the view that the Belgian Government in exile, at least after the date of the Belgian surrender, was no longer entitled to dispose of the gold or to receive advances on the security of this gold. To the question of the risk in connection with the return of the gold, the reply is to be made that the responsibility lies with the one to whom the gold belongs. The removal or return may not, moreover, be delayed by the question of risk.²

3. Polish gold:

Any claim on the part of the French to the Polish gold deposit is without foundation. The Polish Government in exile was no longer entitled, after the collapse of the former Polish state, to dispose of the gold. If the Bank of France nevertheless made advances to the pretended Polish Government, it acquired no claim thereby to the gold deposit as security for its loans.

Please first ask the French to clarify the situation and in any case to place the gold in safekeeping. The dispatching of a special negotiator does not seem to me necessary in view of the fact that Reichsbank Director Hartlieb is on the delegation.

With regard to point 4 of the above-mentioned telegraphic report:³

² See, further, document No. 264, footnote 3.

³ Point 4 of telegram No. 125 of Sept. 20 reads as follows:

"(4) Before his departure for Vichy I had also proposed to M. de Boisanger that as a proof of loyal collaboration and with reference to our urgent interest in securing oil supplies from Rumania and the simultaneous decrease of the French interest in Rumania, he obtain for us the consent of his Government to the transfer to us of the French shares in Rumanian oil companies, as 'other means of payment to be agreed upon' in accordance with the note on occupation costs, Del. W. No. 280 of Aug. 8, 1940.

"De Boisanger now states that in principle his Government is agreeable to this. Yet in the interest of future collaboration it would like to retain an interest, even if a minority one, in French hands. But it does not make that a condition.

We note the willingness of the French Government to assign to us its capital participation in Rumanian petroleum companies. Please so conduct the negotiations that, if possible, we get the entire property into our hands. Only if in individual cases we have control of the majority of the stock could the French—without taking cognizance of their wish for retention of a minority—be left for the time being with a certain interest, the ultimate fate of which we could reserve for a later decision. Compliance with the desire of the French for recognition of their present oil holdings in Iraq is out of the question entirely, as this problem is not yet ripe for decision. We will in any case of course only be able to settle it in agreement with the Italians, but this had better not be pointed out to them for the moment.

With regard to the Bor mining company, telegraphic instruction No. 199 of September 24⁴ still applies.

With reference to the communication of the French Government regarding its claim on the Rumanian Government in the amount of 850 million French francs for deliveries of arms, please do not revert to this for the present, since it is not yet possible to judge whether the Rumanians will refuse to give further recognition to this political claim.

WIEHL

(Footnote 3—continued)

Furthermore it has expressed the wish for a discussion on Balkan economic questions, and it will transmit a memorandum on this within the next few days. It is also prepared to talk in this connection about the Mines de Bor. As compensation for its renunciation in Rumania it asks the German Government for the recognition of its present holdings of oil shares in Iraq, amounting to 22 percent as against 44 percent held by England, 22 percent by America and 12 percent in private hands.

"Concerning the Rumanian oil shares Boisanger also stated that besides the holdings in private hands the French Government itself had a long-term claim, amounting to 850 million French francs, against the Rumanian Government for arms furnished, which was secured by a lien on the export dues on Rumanian oil."

⁴ By notes dated Aug. 19 and 29 the French Government was informed that Dr. Hans Kuntze had been placed in charge of La Compagnie Française des Mines de Bor and that Consul General Neuhausen had been authorized by Kuntze to take charge of the mines situated in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The French Government had lodged a protest against these measures by a note of Sept. 11 (telegram Del. No. 108 of Sept. 12: 1001/305817-20. See also *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 370-371). By telegram No. 199 (1001/305759) Hemmen was informed that the German Government maintained its demand for the transfer of French-held shares in the company to German hands, especially as it had received information that copper from Bor was still being shipped to Great Britain.

No. 115

2074/450108

The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Italy

Draft Telegram

BERLIN, September 27, 1940.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1711 and 1736.¹

As you know, it is not particularly convenient for us to conduct with Riccardi at the present moment detailed economic conversations about the greater economic sphere; as in the past, we do not consider the moment suitable for that.² Nevertheless, we would be interested in learning more about the Italian program as soon as possible and in receiving even at this time the Italian memoranda which are being prepared. I suggest that this be proposed, in case the nature of the confidential information available there should make this feasible.³

CLODIUS

¹ Rome telegrams of Sept. 21 and 24, respectively, not printed (2074/450095-96; 2074/450098-99). They reported that Foreign Trade Minister Riccardi was planning to come to Berlin at the beginning of October to discuss with Funk, Clodius, and other German experts questions regarding Europe's economic future and that an Italian memorandum on this subject was being drawn up which was still confidential. Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 311, footnote 3.

² On Aug. 23 Woermann had informed the Embassy in Italy that the Foreign Ministry did not consider questions relating to the greater economic sphere ready for detailed discussion (telegram No. 1155: B14/B002202-03).

³ In the next few days the question of discussions with Riccardi remained under consideration, and on Oct. 3 it was agreed with the Italian Government that Riccardi should come to Berlin on Oct. 11 (telegram No. 1791 of Oct. 3, Mackensen to the Foreign Ministry: 9874/E693056). Meanwhile, as Mackensen reported in telegram No. 1793 of Oct. 3 (B14/B002270-75), Riccardi had given to the economic expert of the German Embassy a memorandum containing his ideas on building a new economic order in Europe; he requested that it be speedily transmitted to Ribbentrop, Funk, and Clodius to serve as a basis for the impending Berlin discussions. Mackensen's telegram gave a translation of Riccardi's memorandum. See document No. 173.

No. 116

F18/472-474

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

SEPTEMBER 27, 1940.

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO AMBASSADOR VON STOHRER BY THE SPANISH MINISTER OF INTERIOR, SEPTEMBER 27, 1940²

The personal contact between the Führer and the German Government on the one hand, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy,

¹ The translation is from the German. The Spanish text is filmed on F18/475.

² This heading appears in handwriting on the German text.

Count Galeazzo Ciano, and the Minister of Interior of Spain, Serrano Suñer on the other, the last two representing respectively the Duce and General Franco, has made possible an exchange of views of the highest value for determining the position of the three countries in their relations to each other and in their coordinated stand before the world.

Spain therewith reiterates her decision, which was already fixed from the first, not to remain aloof in the case of possible intervention of extracontinental powers in Europe and Africa either in the present conflict or in the future.

In accordance with this decision which is based on the principles and sacrifices which enabled Spain, in a hard civil war, to set up the national regime which liberated the country from the democratic capitalistic intrigues, and in accordance with the traditional friendship of the three peoples, the Spanish Government declares its solidarity with the policy of the Axis and its readiness to conclude in the form of a tripartite pact a military alliance for 10 years with Germany and Italy. To such a pact there might be added as annexes bilateral agreements between Spain and the two Powers for regulating economic questions and other matters. This tripartite pact with its annexes give definite expression to Spain's desire to carry through the task, in cooperation with Germany and Italy, of establishing an order of maximum justice.

This secret protocol enters into force when, in accord with the other two Powers and with their aid, Spain has completed her military preparations and provided herself with the necessary raw materials, gasoline, and foodstuffs. The interested Powers are setting to work without delay in order to determine the extent, form, and conditions for the cooperation of the two belligerent Powers in preparing Spain most efficaciously for concluding the pact of alliance.

Spain's declaration of solidarity assumes recognition of the following claims and aspirations:

- (1) Reincorporation of Gibraltar into Spanish sovereign territory.
- (2) Annexation by Spain of the province of Oran and of the whole of Morocco, extension of the Spanish frontier to the desert and without restriction other than the granting of preferential treatment with respect to mining and participation in ownership of mines in Morocco, which will be awarded to Germany through the channels of negotiation. This can be laid down in a special treaty or included in an agreement of a general nature regarding the economic relations of the two countries.

No. 117

F5/0197-0202

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*¹

BERLIN, September 28, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE SPANISH MINISTER OF INTERIOR, SERRANO SUÑER, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND STATE SECRETARY DR. MEISSNER, IN BERLIN ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1940²

Serrano Suñer first presented Franco's reply to the Führer.³ After the latter had taken cognizance of it he mentioned the struggle going on between the French and the English in Dakar and emphasized the necessity for German bases on the islands located off West Africa—which was underscored again by this incident. If England could somehow get a foothold on these island groups there was the danger that she would then invite America to establish herself there. Lately, the English had given up so many bases of their own that it would be easy for them to give away territories of other countries to America. England alone was not to be feared any more as an adversary. The British Empire possibly would disintegrate, and its parts would drag America into the conflict. Here, however, was the problem which was decisive beyond the present war for the whole future, whether and to what degree it would also be possible in the future to keep the Anglo-Saxon world coalition from Europe and Africa. This was also a question of principle, for if the Anglo-Saxons gained a foothold on any one point (for instance on the islands located off Africa and Europe) the European Monroe Doctrine would be finished. But this very thing was the important counterpart to the American Monroe Doctrine and must include Europe and Africa. From this point of view the outcome of the struggle for Dakar was of decisive importance. Should the French lose, it would already be too late for certain things.

The Führer then turned to the individual phases of the struggle, de Gaulle's abortive landing attempt and the efforts of the English. The Governor undoubtedly was on the side of the French Government, but it was not known to what extent he had control of the troops. The Führer declared in this regard that in his opinion it could not be ruled out that England would offer Dakar to the United States in the event of a successful conclusion to the Dakar operation. In his opinion this intention was the real reason that England had attacked the city.

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

² See Editors' Note, p. 184.

³ Document No. 88.

To an incidental remark of Serrano Suñer that there was concern in Spain about a possible attack from Tunisia and Algiers, the Führer replied that in case of an English success in Dakar Great Britain undoubtedly would attempt to get a foothold in French Morocco also. But in the event of an English defeat the situation would be eased. Since, however, England was fighting for her very existence [*Sein oder Nichtsein*], she would try by all means to get possession of bases in North Africa, thus obtaining a better chance of attacking Italy by air. In this way she could also check a possible defeat, which perhaps threatened her in Egypt. In this connection the position of Gibraltar was also of utmost importance to England.

The French would not be in such a difficult position in North Africa today if Germany and Italy had had bases there. The construction of such bases had even been offered to the French, but they refused, because this allegedly would have caused the Pétain Government difficulties in domestic politics. Pleasure trips with her ships such as England now was taking with impunity along the North African coast would in that event have been quite impossible. To be sure, nothing could be done against ships by horizontal bombers, but they could easily be driven away by dive bombers. The new Junkers 88 with a range of over 1,000 km. would keep the English fleet at a respectful distance.

In conclusion the Führer declared that he would probably give Generalissimo Franco a written, perhaps even also an oral, answer during the conversation with him.⁴

In his reply Serrano Suñer took up the idea of a personal talk with Franco as the only possible solution of the delicate and urgent problems which had come up during the course of the Berlin conversations. Serrano Suñer called the defense of the Canary Islands particularly urgent, and he thought it desirable that, despite the reinforcement of the Spanish Air Force there, German fliers based on the islands should take part in their defense.

Thereupon the Führer explained again the technical possibilities of dive bombers compared with the far inferior accuracy of the horizontal bombers. Admittedly, the latter category could also be efficiently employed; however, in an attack on smaller targets, such as ships, 30 planes would perhaps score one or two hits. The accuracy of dive bombers, however, was very much greater. In contrast to the older model, which did not have a range of more than 300 km., new models had now come out with a range of 1,000 km. Nevertheless, it was important to have the air bases close to the shores to be defended. For in any fight against a hostile fleet it was also necessary to employ, besides bombers, reconnaissance planes to locate the enemy fleet. Now, if a

⁴ Cf. document No. 220.

base was located 1,000 km. from the target to be protected, a reconnaissance plane would have to make a flight of 3 hours in order to return again to its base. During that time the enemy fleet could have sailed 150 to 160 km. farther. On the basis of practical experiences in Norway it had been shown that about 3 to 4 hours before dusk a fleet has an opportunity for attack against which there is hardly any defense. At that time the German bases had been located at a considerable distance from the northern part of Norway so that reconnaissance planes could no longer fetch the combat units in time.

On a map the Führer then showed with the aid of compasses the possibilities of air strategy from bases on the islands and along the coast, such as Germany considered desirable.

Apparently, Serrano Suñer had a poor grasp of the geographical facts. Thus he declared that the Cape Verde Islands could, after all, be defended by coastal artillery from the African coast, and he was surprised when the Führer proved to him that these islands were located 200 km. off the coast.

In connection with the discussion from the standpoint of air and naval strategy of the islands located off Africa and Europe—the Azores, Cape Verde Islands, and Madeira—the conversation turned to Portugal, whose collaboration for the security of these islands was considered necessary. In this connection Serrano Suñer repeated his statements on that country which he had already made to the Foreign Minister during an earlier conversation.⁵ Geographically her existence was not justified. Still, she had nevertheless lived independently for 800 years, and it would be difficult for Spain to absorb 7 million “weeping Portuguese.” Therefore, only an alliance with Portugal would be feasible.

The Führer agreed and stressed again the importance of advanced bases in view of the fact that England had become more and more an American colony and that France would never forgive the territorial transfers to Spain, Italy, and Germany which would be imposed on her, and would always be ready to act with any non-European power against her conquerors.

Serrano Suñer replied that France was finished for a long time. Without any doubt England was a colony of the United States. For that reason, however, Portugal would have to break with England; otherwise she for her part would also be a colony of the U. S. A. and a dangerous bridgehead. Portugal, therefore, must be brought into the system of the Tripartite Pact.

To a question of the Führer whether this was really possible Serrano Suñer answered in the affirmative and repeated the remark which he had made in a previous conversation on Portugal's fears at the

⁵ See document No. 63.

appearance of German troops in Hendaye. At that time he had told the Portuguese that they must break with England and that in this case any fear of Germany would be unnecessary.

The Führer expressed the opinion that it was not possible to negotiate with the Portuguese about this problem, since England, at the slightest suspicion of Portugal's defection would undoubtedly occupy the Portuguese islands at once. The Foreign Minister agreed. The Portuguese problem was not to be solved by diplomatic negotiations, but only by a military operation.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 118

2871/564922-25

*Tripartite Pact*¹

SEPTEMBER 27, 1940.

THREE POWERS² PACT BETWEEN GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN

The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.

Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3

Germany, Italy and Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with

¹ The text is in English in the original.

² Thus in the original.

all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Article 4

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan will meet without delay.

Article 5

Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article 6

The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed hereto their Seals.

Done in triplicate at Berlin, the 27th day of September 1940—in the XVIIIth year of the Fascist Era—, corresponding to the 27th day of the 9th month of the 15th year of Syowa.

JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP
CIANO
KURUSU

No. 119

*Ambassador Ott to Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka*¹

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. g. 1000

TOKYO, September 27, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: At the moment when our conversations on the Tripartite Pact, begun on the 9th of this month in Tokyo, are about to conclude successfully, it is Minister Stahmer's and my sincere desire to express to Your Excellency our deepest appreciation for the decisive

¹ This document is a translation from the original German submitted from the files of the Japanese Foreign Ministry as exhibit No. 555a to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. No copy has been found in the records of the German Foreign Ministry.

part which you have played throughout in a most generous and accommodating spirit. We would like also to take this opportunity to state once more in this letter some of the most important points touched upon in our conversations.

The German Government is convinced that the contracting parties are about to enter a new and decisive phase of world history in which it will be their task to assume the leadership in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe respectively.

The fact that for a long time the interests of the contracting parties will be the same, together with their unlimited confidence in each other, forms the secure foundation for the Pact.

The German Government is firmly convinced that the technical details concerning the execution of the Pact can be settled without difficulties; it would not be in keeping with the far-reaching importance of the Pact, and would also not be practically possible, to try to regulate at the present time all the individual cases which may sometime come up. These questions can only be settled, instance by instance, in a spirit of intimate cooperation.

Conclusions of the Technical Commissions, provided for in article 4 of the Pact should be submitted to the three Governments for approval in order to be put into force.

Needless to say, the question, whether an attack within the meaning of article 3 of the Pact has taken place, must be determined through joint consultation of the three contracting parties.

If Japan, contrary to the peaceful intent of the Pact, be attacked by a power so far not engaged in the European War or the China conflict, Germany will consider it a matter of course to give Japan full support and assist her with all military and economic means.

With regard to the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, Germany will do everything within her power to promote a friendly understanding and will at any time offer her good offices to this end.

Germany will use her industrial strength and her other technical and material resources as far as possible in favor of Japan in order both to facilitate the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and to enable her to be better prepared for any emergency. Germany and Japan will further undertake to aid each other in procuring in every possible way necessary raw materials and minerals including oil.

The German Foreign Minister is firmly convinced that, if Italy's assistance and cooperation are sought in reference to the matters above enumerated, she will of course act in concord with Germany and Japan.

I have the honor to submit these statements to Your Excellency as the views of the German Foreign Minister conveyed personally by his

special delegate, Minister Stahmer, and repeated also in instructions to me from my Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

OTT

No. 120

*Ambassador Ott to Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka*¹

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. g. 1001

TOKYO, September 27, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter Jyo-ni Nr. 133 of this date with contents as follows:

"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

"However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power."²

I take this occasion to note the contents of Your Excellency's letter.

Accept, Mr. Minister, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

OTT

¹This document from the files of the Japanese Foreign Ministry was submitted as exhibit No. 555b to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. No copy has been found in the records of the German Foreign Ministry.

²The above language is that of the agreed English text; it is not an independent translation of the German text of Ott's letter. Cf. document No. 74 and footnote 4.

No. 121

*Ambassador Ott to Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka*¹

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TOKYO, September 27, 1940.

No. g. 1002

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter Jyo-ni Nr. 134 of this date² and to confirm the oral declaration reproduced in it which I made concerning the former German colonies in the South Seas.

I avail myself of this opportunity to assure Your Excellency once more of my highest consideration.

OTT

¹ This document from the files of the Japanese Foreign Ministry was submitted as exhibit No. 555c to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. No copy was found in the records of the German Foreign Ministry.

² This letter was submitted as exhibit No. 556 to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and reads as follows:

"Excellency: I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to confirm the following oral declaration which was made by Your Excellency on behalf of the German Government:

"The German Government agree that the former German Colonies actually under Japan's Mandate in the South Seas shall remain in Japan's possession, it being understood that Germany be in a way compensated therefor. In regard to other former Colonies in the South Seas, they shall be restored automatically to Germany upon conclusion of peace ending the present European War. Afterwards the German Government would be prepared to confer, in an accommodating spirit, with the Japanese Government with a view to disposing of them as far as possible in Japan's favour against compensation."

"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration."

No. 122

F10/005

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

Telegram en clair

BERLIN, September 27, 1940.

A 2117.

DUCE: At this moment the Tripartite Pact has been signed between fascist Italy, National Socialist Germany, and heroic Japan. The Pact once again expresses the profound inner unity of our countries and the agreement on their objectives. In this historic moment I think of you, Duce, with most friendly feelings and in most sincere comradeship.

ADOLF HITLER

[EDITORS' NOTE. Documents concerning the accession of Hungary, Rumania, and Slovakia to the Tripartite Pact are not included in the

volume. Relevant papers are filmed on serial No. 2366. The protocol of accession to the Pact was signed by Hungary on November 20, 1940, by Rumania on November 23, and by Slovakia on November 24. See *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, December 1940 (Essen, 1940), pages 951-952.]

No. 123

35/22914-10

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1940—11:06 a. m.

SECRET

Received September 29—2:30 p. m.

No. 2079 of September 28

For OKW Foreign Department [*Ausland*], Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, and [Luftwaffe] Operations Staff.

Effect of the German-Italian-Japanese Treaty on defense policy.

1. The events of September 27 have confirmed the concern on the part of the leading armed forces authorities, which was very evident on September 26, that the United States of America may be confronted with a diplomatic defeat of the first order if it does not bring its policy into harmony with the real strength of its armed forces. The Berlin treaty [sic] completely destroyed the impression made by the application of the embargo on scrap imposed just previously. They have always believed here and have prided themselves that they could coerce a Great Power to America's will by such means.

On September 27 they awakened for the first time from their boundless conceit. The wirepullers now see the correctness of the standpoint of the American General Staff which warned the politicians and also the Navy to observe moderation. In order to conceal the alarm and confusion on September 27 they first gave out a few slogans for guidance in expression of views: Japan would feel the might of the American fleet and would be restricted in her ability to make war by further embargoes; Italy was now only a camp follower of Japan and Germany with no will of her own. Russia was alarmed, recognized the danger and would logically have to seek her future on the side of the U. S. A. On the whole the Berlin treaty was nothing but a confession of Germany's concern; she had seized on this treaty as a way out, since she realized that England could not be defeated in a short time and the war could be expected to last for years. The treaty could never have any effect against the United States of America as long as England

held out. Germany herself had admitted that it would take a long time to defeat England. Therefore the United States should help England in every way.

2. On this subject I wish to report as follows: Miracles do not happen. For the time being the American fleet can dare to fight Japan only in cooperation with strong English naval forces. As for my conclusions regarding the armament possibilities of the United States, even with the greatest efforts and the expenditure of additional dozens of billions it will make no difference before the end of 1941. To be sure, 1941 will bring a sharp increase in the aircraft and armament industries and the development of the potential power of the United States of America. However, before the middle of 1941 at the earliest the Army and Air Force will not have the necessary forces at their disposal for undertaking any important aggressive measures outside the Western Hemisphere. The development of these forces may even take still longer. Stronger support of the English and an increase in deliveries of war material to them in the coming months are possible only at the expense of American rearmament.

Some people wonder whether in view of the Berlin treaty the Americans are inclined to weaken themselves and delay their rearmament, which is taking long enough in any case.

3. The embargo plans, which have been much praised by Americans with the souls of shopkeepers who imagine they can fight a war with economic measures, are considered by the General Staff to be not very useful and also dangerous.

With the prohibition on September 26 of exports of any kind of iron and steel scrap the Americans have opened an embargo fight whose course cannot yet be predicted. In the first place it is questionable whether the Japanese can be greatly hampered in armament production and prosecution of war in the foreseeable future by the lack of American scrap deliveries. The quantities of scrap which they have received in recent years permit the inference that they have built up large stockpiles, so that even the American General Staff assumes they will be self-sufficient for at least a year. Thus for this period at least an embargo will be without results. Further embargo measures would also not influence the Japanese supply situation in the near future, and would also injure the American economy and could result in dangerous countermeasures on the part of Japan. It would be particularly unpleasant for the United States to have the sources of strategic raw materials in the Philippines, Netherlands Indies, British Malaya, and even Japan herself cut off. The bulk of American imports of rubber, tin, manila fiber, quinine, silk, tungsten, etc., comes from these areas. Stockpiling of the above-mentioned raw materials is being feverishly accelerated at the moment in the United States of America, as supplies are still very inadequate. The Americans now are independent of

imports of many strategic raw materials for one year at most and in some cases less. It is very doubtful whether within this time sufficient natural and artificial sources of raw materials can be developed in the United States and elsewhere, e. g., in the case of tungsten in Brazil. The embargo fight between the United States and Japan will probably be more injurious to the Americans, since Japan has been prepared for it for a long time.

4. The domestic struggle against the warmongers in America should continue to be waged via the General Staff, and this is also the way, I wish to report confidentially, to reach Lindbergh and other great Americans. In America everything is decided through the forces working against each other from opposite poles. If we wish to continue supporting the forces which understand us it is desirable that you continue to send as detailed information as possible quickly and daily, if only in order to refute the very active British propaganda.

I again request, in addition to factual material, evaluations of the situation, which will enable me to enliven and intensify these very welcome conversations in such a way that I may thereby exercise a continuing influence.

5. A telegraphic report on the troops available to the British in the Dominions and India follows at the same time.¹

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

¹ Not printed (35/22917-18).

No. 124

F6/0404-0409

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 29, 1940.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND COUNT CIANO
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND STATE
SECRETARY MEISSNER, IN BERLIN ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1940¹

At the beginning the Führer directed to Count Ciano the question whether the possibility existed for a meeting with the Duce at the Brenner. He considered it right to bring about an exchange of views with the Duce concerning the general situation, but especially concerning the Spanish question, before far-reaching decisions were made. Also he wanted to speak with him about the strategic situation. As concerned Spain, Germany, on the basis of the experiences gained during the Civil War, was clear about the fact that one could not make

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

progress with the Spanish without quite concrete and detailed agreements. The important thing for Germany and Italy was to end the war successfully in great security and in as short a time as possible.

The Spanish proposals to Germany, somewhat crassly expressed, were about as follows:

1. Germany is to deliver for the coming year 400,000-700,000 tons of grain;
2. Germany is to deliver all the fuel;
3. Germany is to deliver the equipment which the Army lacks;
4. Germany is to supply artillery, airplanes, as well as special weapons and special troops for the conquest of Gibraltar;
5. Germany is to hand over to Spain all of Morocco and, besides that, Oran, and is to help her get a border revision west [*south?*]² of Rio de Oro;
6. Spain is to promise to Germany, in return, her friendship.

One must consider thoroughly whether one wants to enter into such obligations and bar other possibilities from oneself. Aside from that, he (the Führer) was afraid that the agreements concerning Morocco would somehow leak out and become known in France. In this case the French would possibly even come to an agreement with the English if they knew that Morocco would be lost to them in any case after the conclusion of the war. At all events, it would be more favorable for Germany if the French remained in Morocco and defended it against the English. If the Spanish were to occupy the territory, in the event of an English attack, they probably would only call for German and Italian help and moreover they would let the tempo of their Civil War prevail in their military measures. It was therefore necessary to talk over very calmly for a few hours with the Duce the whole question as to its usefulness and its military significance, especially since the deliveries demanded of Germany would represent a great sacrifice, which after all could not be made in return only for the good graces of the Spanish. Thus far, at any rate, the Spanish had not held out the prospect of a quid pro quo. One must ponder the problem very coolly and examine its possible effects. The case would be entirely clear if Spain would assume distinct obligations. Considering the uncertainty of the Spanish attitude, Germany and Italy in this conversation between the Führer and the Duce would have to agree upon a common stand on the Spanish problem. The agreements with Spain would only contain obligations for her partners and in practice would have to be made good militarily by Germany and Italy. The consequences could be very unpleasant. It would not be impossible that, the commitments concerning Morocco and Oran becoming known, North Africa even might fall into the hands of the English. That would make a con-

² Cf. document No. 246.

quest of this territory necessary. This military undertaking would have to be carried out over the very dubious bridge, Spain, during which the possibility would definitely exist that Spain then would withdraw again into her neutrality. At all events, England would then have in Africa a great number of air bases, which to be sure would not be decisive for the war, but which could really turn out to be very unpleasant, since air penetration from Germany and Italy would be difficult on account of the great distance.

The Führer then mentioned in this connection the invitation which Franco had extended to him to meet with him on the Spanish-French border.³ He did not yet know whether he ought to accept this invitation. It would all depend on the conversation with the Duce. In any case he was not convinced that Spain had "the same intensity of will for giving as for taking." Moreover it was customary for allies to support one another reciprocally; in the case of Spain, however, the reciprocity would have to be missed.

When Spain was engaged in the Civil War, Germany had supported Franco in a very extensive measure considering her [Germany's] condition at the time. This support moreover had not been without risk. It was not limited only to the delivery of matériel, but volunteers were also made available and many Germans and Italians had fallen in Spain. He did not intend to compute this blood sacrifice in terms of economic values, but instead considered it an outright gift to Spain.

Economically Germany had given out many hundreds of millions for Spain. He (the Führer) had taken the position at the time that the payment of this debt should be left alone during the war, but that it would have to be taken up again after the victory of Franco.⁴ When now the Germans demand the payment of the 400 million debt incurred during the Spanish Civil War, this is often interpreted by the Spanish as a tactless confusing of economic and idealistic considerations, and as a German, one feels toward the Spanish almost like a Jew, who wants to make business out of the holiest possessions of mankind. Therefore in all agreements with the Spanish one must, to begin with, clearly stipulate the terms, and if Germany is to furnish grain, the question of compensation must be settled now.

Italy and Germany had done very much for Spain in the year 1936. Italy just had her Abyssinia undertaking behind her, while Germany was in the midst of her rearming. Without the help of both countries there would today be no Franco.

From all these considerations a joint discussion with the Duce was necessary before making further decisions which could be very far-reaching. In no case should any step which would be undertaken with

³ See document No. 88.

⁴ See vol. III of this series, document No. 577.

regard to Spain lead to a deterioration of the strategic position in the Mediterranean Sea.

Count Ciano replied that the Duce certainly would gladly seize the opportunity for a discussion with the Führer. He had already frequently spoken to him (Ciano) about it. Concerning the date the Führer might make a suggestion.

Moreover the Duce had the same fears as those the Führer had just mentioned concerning the difficulties involved in an entry of Spain into the war. Italy also had not forgotten the experiences of the Spanish Civil War. At that time Franco had declared that if he received 12 transport planes or bombers, he would have the war won in a few days. These 12 airplanes became more than 1,000 airplanes, 6,000 dead, and 14 billion lire. With all due sympathy for Spain, this made one wonder, and now again the Duce feared that many sacrifices would be demanded of Italy and Germany without return. Aside from this, it was to be feared that following the pattern of the Spanish Civil War, Spain's demands as now reported would be increased more and more in the further course of events. Therefore caution was in order and a discussion very appropriate.

It was then decided to hold the discussion between the Führer and the Duce at the Brenner in connection with the visit of Serrano Suñer in Rome on Friday, October 4, 1940.⁵

SCHMIDT
Minister

⁵ See document No. 149.

No. 125

3882/E047589-91

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, September 28, 1940.

W 4532 g. Rs.

The conversations with Señores Carceller and Figueras of the Spanish delegation¹ have led to the drafting of three documents, which are being taken along by the Spanish delegation for submission to their Government:

1) Draft of an agreement on economic questions in the event of Spain's entry into the war.²

It is provided therein that, aside from the closest economic cooperation and the appointment of governmental committees, the French-owned mines in French Morocco, with which we are concerned, are to pass into German possession subject to the granting of some Spanish

¹ See document No. 88, footnote 5.

² Document No. 126.

participation. Also that those French and English-owned mining enterprises in Spain, in which we are principally interested, are to be transferred to joint German-Spanish ownership, in connection with which the extent of German and Spanish participation is to be determined by later agreements. In determining who may have a majority of shares, there shall be no discrimination between Germany and Spain when the final distribution is made. The entire production of these enterprises shall be admitted for export to Germany in so far as it is not necessary for Spain's domestic requirements.

This settlement was termed the utmost supportable by the Spanish representatives after they had first wanted to claim for Spain complete ownership of the enterprises in question both in French Morocco and in Spain and to limit Germany solely to deliveries.

2) Draft of a special German-Spanish agreement on reciprocal deliveries.³

In this it is promised that Germany will deliver to Spain most of the foodstuffs and raw materials declared necessary by Spain in the event of war, in accordance with Spain's most urgent requirements as determined by mutual agreement. The promise of definite quantities is avoided. German deliveries are to be compensated for by Spanish raw materials.⁴

3) Summary of some further economic questions that were discussed.⁵

The principal point contained therein is that negotiations should take place at once regarding the amount and liquidation of German claims against Spain arising out of deliveries during the Civil War, and that the Spanish representatives expressed the opinion that this liquidation would be possible in a relatively short time, some 5 to 6 years from the beginning of peace, through deliveries of raw materials.

The documents on 2) and 3) were received by the Spanish representatives merely as proposals of the German Government to the Spanish Government, since the Spanish representatives were not authorized to commit their Government in a discussion of the questions contained therein. On the other hand, the draft of the agreement on figure 1), whose problems came within the terms of reference of the Suñer delegation, was initialed by Señor Carceller and me.

As to the further course of the negotiations, the Spanish gentlemen thought that after the documents were examined by the Spanish Government, a German delegation should come to Madrid as soon as

³ Not printed (324/193939-43). See document No. 126, footnote 1.

⁴ An unsigned memorandum of Sept. 27 (F18/442-446) summarizes the position taken by German economic experts, at a meeting at the Foreign Ministry that day, on Germany's capacity to deliver various commodities requested by Spain. The consensus was that no wheat but only rye could be delivered; furthermore that the requested quantities of coke, nitrate fertilizers, and petroleum products were too high. Finally, delivery to Spain of any amount of artificial rubber was considered completely impossible.

⁵ Not printed (324/193945-48). See document No. 126, footnote 1.

possible in order to negotiate binding agreements there. As soon as it is ready, the Spanish Government will inform Ambassador von Stohrer, who has received copies of the documents.⁶

To be submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

⁶ See documents Nos. 150, 198, and 220.

No. 126

F18/461-466

*Draft of an Agreement on Economic Questions in the Event of Spain's Entry Into the War*¹

Article I

The German and Spanish Governments are in agreement in their intention to cooperate very closely also in economic questions, with the aim of effecting the greatest possible economic integration of the two countries, taking into consideration the requirements of a rapid economic reconstruction of Spain.

The production of Germany and Spain is to be systematically integrated. In building up the industry, mining, and agriculture of its country each of the two Governments will take account of the supply and marketing needs of the other country in so far as the requirements of its own national economy at all permit.

Spain is willing—under reservation of a possible agreement with Italy—to accord the needs of Germany preferred treatment in the delivery of Spanish products, in so far as the national Spanish needs are met, as well as to accord Germany preferred treatment over all other countries in economic matters in general—assuming otherwise acceptable conditions.

In case Spain desires to make use of technical, economic, or financial aid from outside within the framework of her national reconstruction and in the expansion of her industries, her transportation and financial

¹This undated draft is one of several documents which were drawn up in connection with the German-Spanish economic discussions. (See document No. 125.)

In addition to the document printed which is marked "B" there are in the files drafts of two other agreements. One, marked "A", is the draft of a special German-Spanish trade agreement (324/193939-43). The other, marked "C", is a "summary of some further economic questions concerning which a decision by the Spanish Government, in the sense which has been discussed, is to be brought about" (324/193945-48). Both drafts contained marginal notes stating that the Spanish representatives regarded them merely as proposals of the German Government to the Spanish Government. As for the document printed, Wiehl stated that he and Carceller had initiated it (see document No. 125), but an initialed copy has not been found.

systems, or in the creation of new sources of production, the Spanish Government will apply primarily to Germany—assuming otherwise acceptable conditions.

In order to ensure and supervise the above cooperation a German and a Spanish governmental committee will be formed. The committees will remain in constant direct contact through their chairmen and will convene periodically for conferences. They may appoint mixed German-Spanish subcommittees for dealing with separate questions.

Article II

The German Government intends, within the framework of the peace treaty with France, to require the transfer to Germany of certain French-owned economic assets in French Morocco. The appended list A serves as a basis for the extent of these economic assets. The list may be changed or supplemented by agreement between the German and Spanish Governments.

Economic assets in the possession of Moroccan citizens will not be affected hereby.

The Spanish Government will facilitate, in every way it can, the transfer of these French assets to German ownership and will not recognize changes in ownership which occurred after September 3, 1939, and are contrary to the arrangements in the peace treaty with France.

The companies in Morocco engaged in production, and passing into German ownership, are to receive from the Spanish Government the assurance of free disposal of their production as well as of the receipts from the export of their products. It is the duty of these enterprises engaged in production, however, to contribute to satisfying the requirements of Spain and Morocco in proportion to their share in the total production of Spain and Morocco.

The German Government is willing to grant the Spanish Government shares in an amount still to be agreed upon in some of the enterprises mentioned in list A, in consideration of the need of Spain and Morocco for the products of these enterprises.

German and Italian nationals are to enjoy the same rights as Spanish nationals in the territory of Morocco.

Article III

Pursuant to the peace treaties to be concluded with the enemy powers a limited number of economic assets in Spain, which are now enemy-owned, are to be transferred to joint German-Spanish ownership. The appended list B serves as a basis for the extent of these economic assets. The list may be changed or supplemented by agreement of the German and Spanish Governments.

The extent of German and Spanish shares in the separate economic assets will be determined forthwith by agreement between the committees mentioned in article I. In so doing no distinction is to be made between the German and Spanish sides in regard to possible controlling interests.

The Spanish Government is willing to permit the export to Germany of the entire output of the production enterprises named in list B, in so far as this is not required by Spain for her own use.

Article IV

The Spanish Government is willing to facilitate in so far as possible German capital participation in Spanish enterprises within the general framework of Spanish legislation, if in individual cases the German Government expresses a wish to this effect.

Article V

In so far as enterprises and capital shares in Spain and in her present and future possessions fall to Germany pursuant to the above articles II, III, and IV, the Spanish Government agrees that Germany is to receive representation in proportion to her capital investment in the management and supervisory bodies of the enterprises in question.

[Enclosure]

LIST A

FRENCH-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN FRENCH MOROCCO

Manganese ore deposits:	Bou Afra
Owner:	1) Soc. anonyme des mines de Bou Afra Paris: Rue Jules Lefebvre
Manganese ore deposits:	Imini (southeast of Marrakech)
Owner:	2) Soc. Chérif.d'études minières Rabat and Paris
Manganese ore deposits:	Tasdremt (west of Imini)
Owner:	3) Soc. Chérif.d'études minières Rabat and Paris
Molybdenum ore deposits:	Amismiz
Owner:	4) Soc. "Le Molybdène" Paris and Casablanca
Nickel ore, cobalt ore deposits:	Bou Azzer
Owner:	5) Soc. Min. de Bou-Azzer et du Grara Casablanca and Paris

Phosphate deposits:

Owner:

Uled Abdun and Ganntur

6) Office Chérifien des Phosphates

Rabat: Boulevard du Général d'Amade

Paris: Rue des Pyramides 21

(Owner: French state) and the mine railways to the coast connected with it, along with the transshipment facilities and the dock installations

Iron ore deposits:

Owner:

Khenifra

7) Société d'études et d'exploitations minières du Tadla

Paris

LIST B

ENGLISH-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN SPAIN

- 1) Minas de Rio Tinto
Owner: Rio Tinto Co. Ltd., London
- 2) Tharsis Sulphur Copper Mines Ltd., Glasgow
- 3) Sevilla Sulphur & Copper Co., Seville
- 4) The Pena Copper Mines Ltd., London
- 5) Ferrocarril de Zafra a Huelva
- 6) The Orconera Iron Ore Co. Ltd., London
- 7) Wild and Co., "Parocha," London
- 8) Wild and Co., "Vivero," London
- 9) The Alquife Mines and Railway Co. Ltd., London
- 10) The Bacares Iron Ore Mines Ltd., London
- 11) Bairds Mining Co., England
- 12) The Sierra Co. Ltd. in Monte Rubio, England
- 13) Compania del Norte Africana, England
- 14) Minas del Centenillo, S.A. Linares
- 15) San Finx Tin Mines Ltd., London

FRENCH-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN SPAIN

- 1) Cia. Minera y Metallurgica Pennaroya, S.A. Paris, Madrid
- 2) Société Française des Pirites "Ferroval"
- 3) "El Conjuero," Schneider-le-Creusot, Paris
- 4) Société des Etains de Silleda, S.A., Paris

No. 127

71/50714-16

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

SEPTEMBER 28, 1940.

CONCERNING THE INSTRUCTION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER
OF SEPTEMBER 24, 1940¹

1. The instruction of the Reich Minister of September 24 was based on the assumption that a written statement on the independence of the Arab countries had not been issued by the Italian Government. We have meanwhile learned from a secret source that the Italian Minister in Baghdad, who had perhaps misunderstood an instruction from his Government, actually gave such a written statement to the Iraq Minister President on July 7 of this year.²

We cannot, without loss of prestige, allow the steps taken by the Arabs at various times to obtain such a statement from us to go completely unanswered. It is therefore proposed that the following oral statement, to be broadcast in Arabic on the radio, be made to the private secretary of the Grand Mufti who has been waiting here for over a month:

“Germany’s desire has always been that the Arab countries should rid themselves of English and French rule, enjoy greater autonomy than heretofore, and achieve complete independence. The Arab countries may therefore count on Germany’s full sympathy in their efforts to attain this goal.”

The Italian Government should be informed that the Iraq Government still maintained that it was in possession of a written declaration by the Italian Minister in Baghdad on the independence of the Arab countries and was prepared to submit this letter. There must be some misunderstanding, therefore, on the part of the Italian Government. The German Government now intended to make to the private secretary of the Grand Mufti the following oral statement, to be broadcast over the Arab radio: insertion as above.

2. It is further proposed to inform the Italian Government that the private secretary of the Grand Mufti had stated here that he was instructed to go also to Rome in order to present to the Italian

¹ Not found.

² This information had come from the private secretary of the Grand Mufti, who claimed to have seen a letter in which the Italian Minister in Baghdad, acting upon instructions from Rome dated July 7, informed the Minister President of Iraq that “the Italian Government recognizes the independence of Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan, as well as of all countries under English protectorate or mandate.” (instruction Pol. VII 2815 g. of Sept. 18, Woermann to the Embassy in Rome: 2281/481593-94)

Government the wishes of the Arabs. The suggestion should therefore be made to the Italian Government to receive M. Tewfik al-Shakir.

3. Since the Iraq Minister of Justice, Naji Shawkat, is waiting in Istanbul for the result of the conversations of the private secretary of the Grand Mufti in Berlin and Rome, it is proposed that the statement to be made here to the private secretary be communicated to him also, and that he be informed of the latter's journey to Rome. The Italian Government should also be notified of this.

4. The Italian Counselor of Embassy, Zamboni, informed us here on August 17, as instructed,³ that the Iraq Minister President had expressed to the Italian Minister in Baghdad the desire for a resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany and had requested the Italian Government to transmit this intention to the German Government. The reply to this has been postponed in order first to await the outcome of the conversations with the private secretary of the Grand Mufti. It is now proposed that the Italian Government be asked to inform the Iraq Minister President that the Reich Government agreed to Iraq's resumption of diplomatic relations and awaited concrete proposals from the Iraq Government.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

The matter has been discussed here with Ambassador von Mackensen. Perhaps the Foreign Minister or Ambassador von Mackensen could settle it with Count Ciano while he is still in Berlin, in accordance with the above memorandum.⁴

WOERMANN

³ Vol. x of this series, document No. 359.

⁴ See document No. 133.

No. 128

F5/0458-0462

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, September 28, 1940.

W 4520 g. Rs.

1) In the period from August 24 to September 12 of this year, negotiations took place in Moscow at the request of the Russians for the purpose of reviewing the status of the shipments from both sides under the Economic Treaty of February 11, 1940.¹ The negotiations revealed that German deliveries for the first half-year fell short of the commitment in the Treaty by roughly 73 million reichsmarks. For the balancing of this deficit the Russians handed in proposals which amounted in substance to a shortening of the delivery periods.

¹ See vol. viii of this series, document No. 607.

Negotiations were temporarily broken off on September 12, in order that we might reexamine the Soviet proposals in Berlin and work out German counterproposals for additional shipments to the Soviet Union. The Russians stated that, in accordance with the Treaty provisions, they would temporarily suspend their shipments, if neither their proposals nor our counterproposals led to the projected ratio of deliveries.

2) The German commitments for the coming half-year are:

to February 11, 1941	RM 233 million
to May 11, 1941	RM 311 million
including the undelivered balance of	
73 million reichsmarks mentioned	
above.	

This must be augmented by German shipments in return for Bessarabian grain and Bessarabian oil seed (RM 40 million) and shipments in return for the German raw-material imports from the Baltic territories. The survey undertaken jointly with the Ministry of Economics and the OKW² revealed that if the armament program ordered by the Führer is carried out,³ neither a balancing of the existing deficit of 73 million reichsmarks nor the delivery on schedule of the remainder of the German commitment is possible. In addition, there is the directive issued by the Reichsmarschall to avoid shipments to Russia which would directly or indirectly strengthen Russia's war potential.⁴ If these decisions are upheld, the suspension of Russian shipments to Germany must shortly be expected.

3) This means that the large imports of raw materials, especially of *grain, petroleum, cotton, precious and nonferrous metals, and phosphate* will cease, at least for a time, and at the best will recommence later on a much smaller scale and with great sacrifices of German supplies. Particularly serious, in the opinion of the Ministry of Food, would be the effect on *grain supplies*. Russia has supplied us to date with almost one million tons of grain. Russia is the only country that has a good grain harvest and therefore might be in a position to continue with large shipments. The Ministry of Food points out that the national grain reserve will be used up in the current crop year, so that we would enter the next crop year without such a reserve.

4) The Minister of Economics, the Minister of Food, and the OKW requested us to obtain from the Führer another decision regarding

² The survey referred to has not been found.

³ i. e., in connection with the build-up of a 180-division Army. See vol. x of this series, Editors' Note and footnote 1, pp. 370 and 374, respectively.

⁴ Göring's directive has not been found.

the continuation of trade with the Soviet Union.⁵ Raw material deliveries from Russia can be kept at approximately their present level only if the German shipments to the USSR are prepared at the rate indicated under item 2 (RM 233 million, RM 311 million, and 40 million reichsmarks of Bessarabian grain, etc.), and, as formerly, receive a priority or at least a preferred parity rating as against the armament contracts. Since deliveries of machinery, rolling mill products, and coal are principally involved, such an arrangement can be made only at the expense of the armament contracts.

5) The Russians, presumably reacting to the changed German attitude, have canceled all long-range projects in the Economic Treaty of February 11, 1940. This means that they do not want to have processes, installations, and capital goods deliverable over a long-term period, but to restrict themselves to goods which will benefit their economy, especially their military rearmament, within the next 8 to 10 months. Hence the impact on our military requirements in the resulting narrower sphere of machinery and rolling mill products is much more severe than formerly.

6) The supplies from the Russians have heretofore been a very substantial prop to the German war economy. Since the new economic treaties went into effect, Russia has supplied over 300 million reichsmarks worth of raw materials, roughly 100 million reichsmarks of which was in grain. Russia has thus far received compensation only in the amount of about 150 million reichsmarks. The striking disproportion between German and Russian deliveries is evident from the fact that in August, as against 65 million reichsmarks of Russian deliveries, there were only 20 million reichsmarks of German deliveries. Our sole economic connection with Iran, Afghanistan, Manchukuo, China, Japan and, beyond that, with South America, is the route across Russia, which is being used to an increasing extent for German raw material imports (soybeans from Manchukuo).

SCHNURRE

Submitted to the Foreign Minister as directed.

SCHNURRE⁶

BERLIN, September 28, 1940.

⁵In telegram No. 1809 of Oct. 5 the Embassy in Moscow was informed that conclusive decisions would be made in the next few days on the Soviet wishes respecting deliveries from Germany, and then German counterproposals would be prepared. Schnurre would head the delegation to Moscow to continue the negotiations (3733/E041929-30). See document No. 170.

⁶Marginal note: "The contents of the memorandum were presented to the Reichsmarschall, who agreed with the views of Minister Schnurre. B[runs], Sept. 30."

No. 129

104/112544

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 736

BERLIN, September 28, 1940.

Toward evening today I received the Russian Ambassador and, as instructed, informed him how and when M. Molotov was told in advance of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.¹ I emphasized particularly that the Foreign Minister would have liked to receive the Ambassador personally at his first free moment, but that since Herr von Ribbentrop is unfortunately confined to quarters, he has entrusted the notification to me.

In the conversation I limited myself to the instructions cabled to Moscow on September 25.² Instead of naming America as the power at which this treaty was directed, I used a more general term, saying the warning was directed against the democratic powers.

After thus informing the Ambassador I called his attention to the sixth paragraph from the end of yesterday's declaration by the Foreign Minister,³ which mentions, among other things, "the relations that are developing" between the signatories and Soviet Russia. I explained that this passage means a consolidation and a deepening of relations between the Treaty Powers, especially Japan, and the Soviet Union, particularly in view of common political goals. I added that M. Shkvtartsev is already familiar with our long-standing efforts to this end regarding Japan.

The Ambassador accepted my communication with an expression of thanks, asked no questions, and wished the Foreign Minister a speedy recovery.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 113.

² Document No. 109.

³ Cf. *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, October 1940, pp. 785-786.

No. 130

73/52768-69

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 735

BERLIN, September 28, 1940.

Today the Hungarian Minister on instructions of his Government inquired about the meaning of the following sentence in the statement of the Foreign Minister regarding the Tripartite Pact:¹

¹ For the text of Ribbentrop's statement of Sept. 27, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, October 1940, pp. 785-786.

“Any state, therefore, which of its own accord approaches this bloc with the intention of contributing to the restoration of peaceful relations among the nations [*Jeder Staat, der diesem Block daher selbst mit den Absichten, zur Wiederherstellung friedlicher Beziehungen der Völker beizutragen, gegenübertritt,*] will be sincerely and gratefully welcomed and will be invited to cooperate in the political and economic reorganization.”

It is true, M. Sztójay cited this sentence somewhat differently, referring to the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* where it reads as follows:

“Any state, therefore, which of its own accord *wants to accede* to this bloc with the intention of contributing to the restoration of peaceful relations will be sincerely and gratefully welcomed and will cooperate in the economic and political reorganization [*an der Mitarbeit bei der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Neugestaltung teilnehmen*].”

The Hungarian Government now wanted to know whether this remark was to be understood as an invitation to States so far not participating to accede, what formalities were required for accession, and what obligations would arise for those which were now acceding. The Hungarian Government, which so far had always cooperated with the Axis Powers very closely, could, if we desired it, express openly its readiness for direct or indirect affiliation [*Anschluss oder Nebenanschluss*] or give official expression, in some form or other, of its sympathy with the pact which has been concluded.

M. Sztójay intimated that his Government was obviously prepared to participate but that it wished to make some soundings beforehand; for it remembered what had happened on the occasion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the German-Italian alliance.

I first corrected the version of the Foreign Minister's statement which was cited wrongly in the DAZ [*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*]. On the basis of the correct formulation as well as on the basis of the Preamble of the Treaty, I then told the Minister, while reserving the taking of a position by the Foreign Minister, that an open pact was not involved. I interpreted the Foreign Minister's sentence, mentioned by the Minister, as a general appeal to those States which were in sympathy with what had taken place yesterday; I would not attribute a formal or legal meaning to the sentence. For the rest, I reserved the right to give M. Sztójay a more specific reply after I had presented this statement of the Hungarian Government.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister with the request for instructions whether I may confirm that the position which I took with the Hungarian Minister was correct.²

WEIZSÄCKER

²In a further memorandum of Oct. 4, Weizsäcker noted rumors in the press regarding Hungary's impending accession to the Tripartite Pact and again requested Ribbentrop's authorization to inform the Hungarian Minister that the provisional reply of Sept. 28 to the Hungarian inquiry was now to be considered as final (73/52790).

The documentation in Foreign Ministry files of the subsequent steps is incomplete. Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Oct. 10, 1940, and C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945* (Edinburgh, 1956), vol. 1, pp. 438-444.

In the files, however, is a telegram, No. 1443 of Oct. 15 from Ribbentrop to the Embassy in Italy, stating that with Italian and Japanese consent Ribbentrop had informed the Hungarian Minister of the three Powers' agreement in principle to Hungary's accession to the Tripartite Pact. In this telegram Ribbentrop also requested Mussolini's approval of a draft protocol for Hungary's accession (2366/489228-32). Mackensen reported Mussolini's approval in telegram No. 1870 of Oct. 17 (2366/489238).

No. 131

73/52772

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, September 30, 1940—4: 45 p. m.

No. 635 of September 30

Received September 30—8: 40 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 855 of September 28.¹

Instruction carried out yesterday with the Deputy Foreign Minister.

Vörnle just informed me that the Hungarian Government has given its consent to the transit. The Military Attaché should discuss the details with the Chief of the General Staff. The Military Attaché immediately called on the latter for the purpose of a preliminary discussion; for the rest, he is awaiting the instructions from the OKW which had been promised in your telegraphic instruction.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹This instruction (Pol. I 1038 g. Rs.) has not been found. It is apparent, however, from telegram No. 1272 sent to Bucharest over Woermann's signature, that the Legation in Budapest had been instructed to request Hungary's permission for the transit of German units which were to be transferred to Rumania (172/135720).

No. 132

35/22923-24

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 30, 1940—11:15 p. m.
 No. 2093 of September 30 Received October 1—4:50 p. m.

For State Secretary von Weizsäcker.

Kennedy reported as follows in a telegram sent directly to Roosevelt which arrived here on September 27:

1. The failure at Dakar called forth severe public criticism of the Churchill leadership for the first time since the establishment of the present government.

2. He had information that Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey would seek to join the Axis because England no longer impressed them.

3. The English will try very hard to bring the U. S. A. into the war as soon as possible. He—Kennedy—warned the President urgently not to take irreparable steps. England was finished (completely through¹), and the U. S. A. would have to pay the bill.²

Source: the reliable informant known to you.

In contrast to the optimism exhibited here on the score of England's ability to resist (cf. also the statements made by the American general, Strong, on his return from England³), Kennedy nevertheless perseveres consistently in his opinion that the defeat of England is unavoidable. His telegram was formulated before the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. That England is striving to draw the U. S. A. into the war as asserted by Kennedy is probably motivated mainly by the psychological encouragement of the English people which would be connected therewith. Actually America's entry into the war—especially since the conclusion of the Berlin pact [sic]—would mean a reduction rather than an increase in the aid to England.

THOMSEN

¹ The words in parenthesis are in English in the original.

² Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1958), vol. III, pp. 48-49.

³ Brig. Gen. George V. Strong, United States Army Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, was a member of a United States military mission to Britain whose other members were Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons and Col. Carl Spaatz. General Strong, speaking for the mission on its return, made statements which were generally optimistic with regard to Britain's ability to resist further German aerial attacks. For the text of these statements, see the *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1940, p. 17 and Sept. 22, p. 13.

No. 133

71/50717

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 1367

BERLIN, September 30, 1940.
e. o. Pol. VII 3000 g.

With reference to the conversation here with Ambassador von Mackensen.

Please approach the Italian Government on the Arab question in the sense of the memorandum of September 28,¹ a copy of which was handed to you in Berlin.

In doing so, please substitute the following text for the formula for the oral statement under number 1:

“Germany has always followed with interest the struggle of the Arab countries to attain their independence. In their striving toward this goal, the Arab countries will be able in the future also to count upon the full sympathy of Germany.”

Should it appear advisable, the following words might be added to the statement:

“. . . who finds herself in full accord with her Italian ally in this matter.”

Report by wire on the result of the step taken there.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 127.

² See document No. 143.

No. 134

2281/481604

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*¹

SECRET

BERLIN, September 30, 1940.
Pol. VII 3030 g.

Subject: The Arab states and Soviet Russia.

The private secretary of the Grand Mufti gave me the following confidential information about the attitude of the Arab states toward Soviet Russia:

¹ Copies of this memorandum were sent for information on Oct. 5 to the Embassies in Italy, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, and to the Legation in Iran.

Examining the possibility of making use of the present world situation to achieve the complete independence of the Arab countries, the Arab leaders had also studied the question whether a collaboration with Soviet Russia would be advisable. They had rejected this idea, however, as Soviet Russia's striving toward a warm water port constituted a threat to the Arab countries, and as the Communist system was unacceptable to Mohammedans. They [the Arab leaders] had decided, therefore, to try a rapprochement with the Axis Powers. If, however, they saw their independence threatened by Italy, they might possibly consider alignment with Soviet Russia as the lesser evil, since they would presumably enjoy greater independence as a Soviet Republic than under Italian rule.

GROBBA

No. 135

449/222798

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 740

BERLIN, September 30, 1940.

At the time of his departure¹ Count Ciano talked to me once more about the Greeks, in rather vehement terms. Although I recalled to him that it had been agreed during the discussions² that the Greek issue was not of any particular urgency at the moment, Ciano persisted that something must in fact be done in order to prevent the British fleet from hiding among the Greek islands if it should flee from Egypt.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ On Sept. 29.

² No record has been found of discussions on Greece during Ciano's visit in Berlin on Sept. 27 and 28.

No. 136

171/135176

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI

BERLIN, September 30, 1940.

Pol. VI 2563.

In accordance with instructions, I informed the Finnish Minister today of our *definitively* negative attitude on the Finnish request that we inject ourselves in Moscow into the Finnish-Russian Åland conversations in order to induce Russia to abandon her demand for con-

sultation.¹ As he told me, after his talks with the State Secretary and myself, the Finnish Minister had expected no other answer. He also informed me that, according to the information he had received from Helsinki, the Russian Government was adhering firmly to its demand that the Finns pledge themselves to consult, but had declared itself willing that Finland should also give *Sweden* the right to be consulted; but not other powers, since, in the Russian view, only the Soviet Union, Finland, and Sweden were concerned in the Åland question. I pointed out to the Minister, as the State Secretary observed in his conversation of September 11, that in the event the fortification of the islands came up for discussion, we must reserve the right to announce our interest. The Minister stated in conclusion that he understood our attitude very well.

GRUNDHERR

¹The Finnish Minister had presented such a request in an interview with the State Secretary on Sept. 11. He had stated that a new situation had come about in the Åland issue on Sept. 4, when Molotov had asked that Finland agree to consult the Soviet Union in connection with any steps taken by Finland in accordance with the Convention of 1921. The Finnish Minister renewed his request in a further interview with Weizsäcker on Sept. 17. Weizsäcker informed the Minister that as the Finnish-Soviet negotiations looked to a disarmament of the Ålands, Germany felt no additional action necessary; that it would be only in the opposite case, a fortification of the islands, that Germany would announce her interest again. (Weizsäcker memoranda St.S. 687 of Sept. 11: B19/B003731-33; and St.S. 706 of Sept. 17: B19/B003746-47)

A Soviet-Finnish agreement regarding demilitarization of the Åland Islands was signed at Moscow on Oct. 11, 1940; the text in English translation is in *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941* (New York, 1941), pp. 65-67; in German translation in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, November 1940, pp. 872-873.

No. 137

247/164200-01

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

COPENHAGEN, October 1, 1940—2: 10 a. m.

No. 1072 of September 30

Received October 1—3: 30 a. m.

For Minister Luther and Minister von Grundherr.

I. Clausen, leader of the Danish nationalists, told me today that the leader corps of the Army and Navy have been in touch with him about overthrowing the present cabinet by exerting influence on the King and forming a new government under General With, the former Commander in Chief of the Army, together with the National Socialists.¹

¹A minute of the interview kept by Secretary of Legation Meissner includes a list of persons proposed as ministers in a With cabinet (9-11/299464-66).

In order to keep his hands free for later, Clausen declined to join such a cabinet himself, but, terming it an interim cabinet, said he was willing to tolerate the formation of a government if certain posts were filled with persons of his choice.

Clausen believes that on the basis of the concessions he has obtained this method must lead within the predictable future to the government under his leadership which he desires; he is convinced that General With and the officers' party cannot be injurious in the projected coalition, although he is aware that the others might attempt to win the race themselves.

Clausen says that With will go to the King tomorrow. After Clausen's statements I, too, am of the opinion that an interim cabinet with With will start off internal political developments and could prepare the way for a National Socialist government. On the other hand it would be wrong to place trust in With. I would therefore suggest that we continue our waiting attitude and not commit ourselves in any way for a With government. There is hardly any risk, since With must know that we will tolerate him only as long as he does not undertake anything disloyal to us and the National Socialists.

II. The conservative Minister of Commerce, Christmas Møller, who is one of the main instigators against us, has recently agitated against us at a number of closed meetings in a manner intolerable for the prestige of the Reich and for our interests. I request that, independent of the possible developments indicated under I, I be empowered to demand his resignation.²

RENTHE-FINK

² As a result of German pressure Møller was forced to resign from the Government on Oct. 3, 1940. See document No. 218.

No. 138

4692/E226406-07

Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland

BERN, October 1, 1940.

On the occasion of a meeting with Colonel Wille¹ the conversation came around to our advance and to the French documents which fell into our hands. Colonel Wille said to me that I was a friend of Switzerland, and then, after a long pause, he went on to ask whether it would not be desirable for the matter (by that he meant the agreements made by General Guisan with Gamelin²) to be discussed by me officially with the Federal Government. I told him that was out of the question, since I had heard of the matter only privately. He said

¹ Ulrich Wille, Chief of the infantry arm of the Swiss Army.

² See document No. 11.

that he had also heard of it only privately, but nevertheless three times already and he believed that if we brought up the matter the Federal Council would concern itself with the retirement of the General. Wille said further that, in general, it would be best if they demobilized altogether. Then the General could not stay, since his functions would all automatically lapse. The difficulty for the Federal Council was that it could not give the General any directives. He was actually responsible only to Parliament, but not to the Federal Council. Altogether, the question of responsibility as it concerned the General was very unclear.

As for the matter itself, Colonel Wille said that the agreements with the French were not made after May 10, as I had heard, but after April 9 following our march into Norway, and that this was done without the knowledge of the Federal Council. He (Wille) assumed that the agreements were made when a deputation of Swiss officers were in France. At that time, to be sure, we had shown no interest in the visit of a deputation of Swiss officers. In reply to my question whether similar talks had been carried on with us, Wille said that he knew this was not the case.³

KÖCHER

³In report No. 340 g. Rs. of Oct. 3 (4692/E226405), Köcher informed the Foreign Ministry of this conversation with Wille, but without mentioning Wille's suggestion that the matter be brought officially to the attention of the Federal Government by the Germans. On Oct. 14, Köcher was instructed at Ribbentrop's direction to say, in case the documents on Swiss-French agreements were mentioned again, that he "knew nothing of the existence of such documents." (Pol. II 1139 g. Rs. : 4692/E226408)

No. 139

21110/456748-49

Memorandum of the German and Finnish Governments

SECRET

HELSINKI, October 1, 1940.

V Ld (D) 3270/40 g¹

Statements concerning contract No. 1187 of October 1, 1940,² between the Finnish Ministry of Defense, Helsinki, and the firm of O. Y. Dahlberg & Hilbert A. B., Helsinki, P. Esplanaadik 33.

(1) The Finnish Ministry of Defense declared that it is obligated fully for the financial requirements of this contract in respect to the Greater German Reich and the firm of J. Veltjens Arms and Munitions, Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, Berliner Strasse 165.

(2) Regarding the payment arrangements in this contract, it is possible that in view of developments in mutual trade and exchange of goods the Government Committees of the Greater German Reich and

¹A handwritten notation following the file number reads: "R[eichs] Wi[rtschafts] Min[isterium]." (Reich Economic Ministry)

²Not found.

of the Finnish state may change the due dates of installments II and III of the payments.

(3) In connection with the installment due immediately the purchaser has the right to take into account the claims of the Finnish state arising from property belonging to the Finnish state taken over by the Greater German Reich in Norway, by counting such as a first payment, or as a payment in kind.

(4) All orders from Germany and the areas occupied by Germany, which, according to the list of items, are covered by this contract, are to be treated by the parties to the contract in such a manner that the secrecy of these transactions is preserved.

(5) A part of the deliveries of arms provided for in the above-mentioned contract are supplied in return for the transit of German supplies and German troops through Finland to Norway. The total amount and the extent of the arms deliveries are still to be determined by the Greater German Reich.

(6) The requirements of the Greater German Reich from the Finnish state in connection with the transit (money, goods, or special services) will immediately following calculation and approval be put on the deliveries account in connection with contract No. 1187 of October 1, 1940, between the Finnish Ministry of Defense and the firm of O. Y. Dahlberg & Hilbert A. B. Accounting will take place monthly.

(7) The Finnish state pledges itself to grant to the Greater German Reich a right of pre-emption for the same consideration as might be asked of or offered by any other interested party, on any concessions in Finland of interest to the Greater German Reich, in so far as the Finnish state intends to offer these abroad at all and in so far as the Finnish state is subject to no previous commitment. The foregoing pledge of the Finnish state is to be valid until October 1, 1945.

(8) With regard to the provision in contract No. 1187 of October 1, 1940, between the Finnish Ministry of Defense and the firm of O. Y. Dahlberg & Hilbert A. B. regarding an arbitral tribunal the following is agreed:

The arbitral tribunal shall be composed of the Minister of the Greater German Reich in Helsinki, the Minister of the Finnish state in Berlin, and a chairman to be chosen by the two Ministers.

(9) Two copies of this statement have been prepared, one for the Government of the Greater German Reich and one for the Government of the Finnish state.

As Special Representative
of the Greater German Reich:
J. VELTJENS

For the Government
of the Republic of Finland:
R. WALDEN
Minister of Defense
Major General

No. 140

4545/E146178

The Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens

HELSINKI, October 1, 1940.

DEAR LIEUTENANT COLONEL: In connection with point 7 of the explanations concerning contract No. 1187 of October 1, 1940,¹ between the Finnish Ministry of Defense, Helsinki, and the firm of O. Y. Dahlberg & Hilbert A. B., Helsinki, P. Esplanaadik 33, I would like to assure you that the Finnish Government has assumed the obligation there mentioned gladly. At the same time I would like to express the wish that the Government of the Greater German Reich, in case of possible difficulties which might arise for the Finnish state from the Soviet Union as a result of fulfilling the terms of the contract, would lend its support in eliminating such difficulties.

Accept, etc.

Minister of Foreign Affairs

¹ Document No. 139.

No. 141

35/22930-32

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 2, 1940—12: 54 p. m. [*a. m.*?]
 No. 2107 of October 1 Received October 2—3: 45 p. m.

For OKW Foreign Department [*Ausland*], OKH Attaché Group, the Chief of the General Staff, the Air Ministry Attaché Group, the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Luftwaffe.

Military effects of the Berlin treaty [*sic*] of September 27 in the United States up to the evening of October 1:

1. After September 27 an objective evaluation in accordance with the views of the General Staff first won the upper hand. Prominent newspapermen even admit that in the next 2 years the American fleet will not be able to enforce the will of the United States on the Japanese. To be sure, this admission of a fact reported from here for years but which has heretofore not been conceded in the American press was immediately corrected. On September 30 the opinion again appeared in the press that the American fleet would keep the Japanese in check in the Far East and that an arrangement with the English on the use of Singapore would alter conditions in the Far East to the disadvantage of the Japanese. This is typical of the influence of political circles who proceed from the peculiar idea that, by using a geographical

point such as Singapore, even without strong assistance from the English fleet which is quite indispensable for operations against Japan, they can strengthen the position of the United States with respect to Japan or frighten Japan away from pursuing her policy by means of such threats. For the time being we can wait calmly and see whether the Americans dare not only to announce ineffective embargoes against Japan such as the one on scrap iron, but also to cut off more important things such as oil and cotton and thus defy Japan. The embargo on scrap iron was after all only a gesture, since at the same time no measures were taken to put obstacles in the way of shipments of iron and steel to Japan.

[2.] In the conferences with the Army Commander in Chief [*Oberbefehlshaber Heer*] the politically responsible authorities have probably heard the opinion that the Tripartite Treaty is a logical result of American policy of recent years, which interfered in both the European and the Asiatic power relationships without having sufficient military forces behind it. The treaty of Germany and Italy with Japan is not surprising. It does not involve danger for the United States if it continues the systematic rearmament that is necessary to retain its position in the world and pursues a moderate policy suited to its armament.

3. There does not seem to be any unified opinion as yet concerning pursuit of a policy in accord with the armament possibilities of the United States. In the General Staff itself the opinions go all the way from the uncertainty of a small group as to whether they should now join up with England, to the belief of the circle close to me, which considers the fate of the Empire to be sealed and declares somewhat drastically that "you can't go to bed with a corpse". The influential Army Commander inclines toward this view. He has probably spoken against the transfer of further war material belonging to the Army, especially a considerable number of B-17 Flying Fortresses, which up to September 27 were on the point of being given to England. For the time being there has been no talk of this since September 27. The opposed forces are again fighting one another, in general the State Department and Jewry on the one hand and the General Staff on the other. The outcome of this internal strife can at this time still not be predicted, particularly in view of Roosevelt's impulsive conduct that is influenced by Jewry.

4. In judging the military and operational situation, views in the General Staff differ as to whether Germany will be able to bring about a decision against the island of Britain by destroying from the air the installations vital for the life of the English people and for the production of airplanes, whether she is seeking the decision here alone, or whether the Axis Powers will turn at the same time to other places—first of all Gibraltar and Suez—which have especial importance for

England as a naval power and empire. The attitude of Turkey is being observed with the greatest interest. A push by Russia in the direction of Persia and India is thought to be entirely possible, and by many to be probable and is being taken into account.

5. The directions for guidance of the American press reported in telegram No. 2079 of September 28¹ can be found in numerous variations everywhere. Many papers deal with Russo-Japanese relations and state that Japan is not free militarily as long as her relations with Russia have not been clarified. Then in striking agreement it is suggested to the Russians that they demand of the Japanese the evacuation of Manchuria, return of the southern half of Sakhalin, and relinquishment of the fishing rights, that is, a revision of the results of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. In the General Staff they believe, to be sure, that Russia's advantage lies on the side of the Axis Powers and do not doubt the Russian attitude in support of German policy, whereas official American policy still hopes to be able to win Russia, naturally, as always, with a mistaken belief in the power of economic measures.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

¹ Document No. 123.

No. 142

104/112554-58

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

IMMEDIATE
No. 1787

BERLIN, October 2, 1940—8:25 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1041 [2041].¹

Please call on M. Molotov again and, in reply to his statement, tell him as follows:

I

The German-Finnish agreement which he mentioned involved a purely technical matter of military communications without political implications. Just as we reached an understanding with Sweden about similar transport through Swedish territory to the areas of Oslo, Trondheim, and Narvik, an understanding was reached with Finland about transit to the area of Kirkenes. The area of Kirkenes, which needed military protection against England because of the mines there, can be reached by us by land only through Finnish territory. The transport went by way of Oulu and Vaasa, but not by way of Pori. In

¹ Document No. 113.

view of the purely technical communications aspect of the matter we naturally saw no reason expressly to notify the Soviet Government of it. The understanding with Finland was reached by an exchange of notes, which contains verbatim the following four points:

"1. The Finnish Government, upon request of the Government of the Reich, grants transit of war material with escort personnel from the northern ports of the Baltic Sea by way of Rovaniemi along the northern Arctic Highway to Kirkenes in northern Norway.

"2. The Government of the German Reich shall duly indicate to the Finnish Government the ports of debarkation involved, the number of transport vessels, the dates of sailing and arrival, and the scheduled daily stages of the transports in northern Finland.

"3. The Government of the German Reich shall notify the Finnish Government at least one day in advance of the arrival of the transport vessels.

"4. Ordnance shall be shipped apart from the troops in separate freight cars. A special agreement will be made regarding the number of officers and men for the guard details on the freight cars carrying ordnance."

Should M. Molotov expressly ask for it, you are authorized to hand him the text of the foregoing four points in the form of a memorandum.²

II

In respect to the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan,³ M. Molotov will surely have seen from the contents of the Pact, which have meanwhile been published, as well as from the official statement made by the German Government in connection with it,⁴ that the question raised by him in regard to articles 3 and 4 of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was pointless. The three partners were from the beginning in complete agreement that their accord should in no way affect the Soviet Union. Therefore the most comprehensive formula imaginable was selected in article 5 of the Pact, which made it clear that not only the treaties concluded with the Soviet Union, but also the entire political relationship to the Soviet Union was left entirely unchanged by the Pact. Therefore there can be no question of a coalition of powers which was directly or indirectly aligned against the Soviet Union in the sense of article 4 of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. On the contrary, it was clearly stated in the declaration of the German Government that the parties to the Tripartite Pact were looking toward further favorable developments in the relations already existing with the Soviet Union.

² The files of the German Embassy in Moscow contain Soviet and German texts of such a memorandum (285/181689-90).

³ Document No. 118.

⁴ For the text in English translation of Ribbentrop's statement on the occasion of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, see German Library of Information, *Facts in Review* (New York, 1940), vol. II, No. 40, pp. 487-488; German text in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, October 1940, pp. 785-786.

Since the whole relationship of Germany, and the relationship of Italy and Japan to the Soviet Union as well, was left out of the picture by an express stipulation in the Tripartite Pact, it therefore did not affect common German-Soviet interests and thus did not come under the provision for consultations in article 3 of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Nevertheless, I considered it proper to inform M. Molotov as soon as there was a definite prospect that the Pact would be signed. Actually, the last decisions in this connection were not made in Tokyo until September 27.

Moreover, you are explicitly authorized by me to tell M. Molotov most emphatically that no agreements of any sort have been made with Japan other than the published text of the Treaty. There were no secret protocols nor any other secret agreements.

In a few days I expect to dispatch to M. Stalin the letter which I promised.⁵

RIBBENTROP

⁵ See document No. 176.

No. 143

71/50718-19

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1785 of October 2

ROME, October 2, 1940—9:40 p. m.

Received October 2—9:50 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1367 of September 30.¹

On my instructions, Bismarck today spoke to Anfuso, who had called in the specialist, Guarnaschelli, about the directives contained in the memorandum of September 28 of Under State Secretary Woermann.² Result of conversation as follows:

1) The Italians freely admitted that the Italian Minister in Baghdad, acting without instructions, had actually at the beginning of July given the Iraq Minister President a brief written statement, the substance of which coincided with the statements intended by us to be made by the private secretary of the Grand Mufti over the radio. The actual existence of the letter had only come to the attention of the Italian Government after [my]³ conversation of September 14 with Count Ciano (see telegraphic report No. 1677 of September 14⁴).

¹ Document No. 133.

² Document No. 127.

³ This passage was garbled in transmission. As received in Berlin it reads: "The actual existence of the letter had in our opinion only come to the attention of the Italian Government through the conversation of Sept. 14." The draft of the telegram as prepared in Rome is filmed on 2281/481600-01.

⁴ Document No. 57.

Anfuso agreed entirely to the oral statement, which is repeated verbatim in telegraphic instruction No. 1367 of September 30, and which is to be broadcast over the radio in Arabic by the private secretary of the Grand Mufti, including the supplement which I consider desirable, "who is in complete accord with the Italian ally." He added that the Italian Government had repeatedly made similar declarations over its Arab radio station.

2) The Italian Government is prepared to receive the private secretary of the Grand Mufti in order to have him present the Arab wishes.

3) The Italians were told that the Iraq Minister of Justice in Istanbul had been informed of the statement to be made and the journey on to Rome of the private secretary.

4) The Italian Government will inform the Iraq Minister President through its Minister in Baghdad that the Reich Government agreed to Iraq's resumption of diplomatic relations and awaited concrete proposals from the Iraq Government.

MACKENSEN

No. 144

4466/E087337-39

William Hagelin to Stabsleiter Schickedanz

OSLO, October 2, 1940.

DEAR HERR SCHICKEDANZ: I have already written you in outline about the intended reorganization.¹ As you know the Reich Commissar was in Berlin in order to obtain approval for the whole thing and for the speech he made on the radio. Contrary to the expectations of the Reich Commissar, the reorganization has so far not met with the slightest resistance. Thus it has been shown that we were right in our opinion that the Norwegian people will submit to us when we have the power. We know our fellow-countrymen; the more you negotiate with them the greater become their demands. Hence I should like at this date to call attention to a very important point. On December 10 of this year it will be 6 months that the King has been out of the country. According to the Constitution he must either return immediately by December 10, or he will forfeit his throne. This is very important in the minds of the people, although he has been formally deposed

¹ A report of Sept. 20 from Hagelin (4465/E087243-45) and an unsigned report of Sept. 24, probably also from Hagelin (4465/E087246-47), dealt with stages of the negotiations for the reorganization of the government announced by Reich Commissar Terboven in a radio address to the Norwegian people on Sept. 25 (text in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, October 1940, pp. 789-796). The Administrative Council, established the previous April, was abolished, political parties were dissolved, and the Norwegian people were told that only through Quisling's Nasjonal Samling could they find their way back to freedom. A new council of provisional ministers was named. Quisling was not included, but Hagelin was appointed to the post for the Interior.

by the Reich Commissar. I am of the opinion that the movement for joining the Nasjonal Samling will be so rapid that it might be possible on December 10 to appoint Quisling as Chief of State [*Riksforsstander*], in the same way as Horthy in Hungary. I shall continue to keep you posted on the situation and the progress of the Nasjonal Samling and request that you begin now to consult with your friends as to how the present temporary solution, which apparently will not function badly, can be shortened.

Quisling does not, in fact, desire the position of Minister President, but would like to leave that to me, while he takes over the function of the former King as Chief of State. He has requested me to go to Berlin as soon as that is possible, in order to talk everything over with you and our friends. I shall do that as soon as I can; now I am too busy with the reorganization of the Department, but I shall see to it that it does not take too long before we meet again. In the meantime I can express my heartfelt gratitude only by writing. You may rest assured that we shall never forget it. I am fully aware that without assistance we would never have achieved our goal.

Yours,

WILLIAM HAGELIN

No. 145

617/249909-10

The State Secretary to the Legation in Afghanistan

SECRET
No. 287

BERLIN, October 3, 1940.
Pol. VII 1090 g. Rs.

Drafting Officer: Counselor Melchers.

With reference to your telegram No. 333 of September 10.¹

The Afghan Minister called on me on September 30² and conveyed greetings from his Minister President and War Minister, as well as their good wishes for a favorable outcome of the war. He inquired whether German aims in Asia coincided with Afghan hopes; he alluded to the oppression of Arab countries and referred to the 15 million Afghans who were forced to suffer on Indian territory. My statement that Germany's goal was the liberation of the peoples of the region referred to, who were under the British yoke, as well as the restoration of their rights, was received with satisfaction by the Afghan Minister. He stated that justice for Afghanistan would be created only when the country's frontier had been extended to the Indus; this would also apply if India should secede from the British Empire.

¹ Not printed (617/249903).

² Weizsäcker's memorandum of this conversation, dated Sept. 30, differs only in a few details from the account given in this instruction (617/249906-08).

Although Afghanistan's number one enemy was England, Russian pressure combined with Russian troop concentrations, border conflicts, and hindrances to commerce had created a critical situation also in the north. The Afghan inquired whether Germany would be prepared, in case of serious difficulties between Afghanistan and Russia, to effect a compromise. I replied that if we were presented with a question of this kind we would examine it. The Afghan remarked that Afghanistan had given proof of her loyal attitude by vigorously resisting English pressure to break off relations with Germany. Today he wanted to present Afghanistan's wishes as a matter of precaution, but he requested strict secrecy; he called the fulfillment of these wishes a matter for the future.

I replied in the negative to the inquiry whether article 2 of the Tripartite Pact of September 27 applied to the region in question. Please continue to observe complete reserve in this matter.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 146

285/181634-36

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*¹

No. A 4328

THERAPIA, October 3, 1940.
Pol. VII 3081 g.

Subject: Germany and the Arab question in the Near East.

The Iraq Minister of Justice, who is in Istanbul, recently again asked me to discuss some matters with him, on which occasion I handed him the letters of the Secretary General [sic] of the Grand Mufti, who is in Berlin.²

The fact that the Italian Government had pretended that it had no knowledge of a written promise regarding the later independence of the Arab countries of the Near East, has increased enormously the distrust of the Iraq nationalists of the Italian Government's intentions.³ The actual course of this affair—the written statement by Italian Minister Gabbrielli, not authorized by Rome—will surely not remain concealed from the Iraqis. The Iraq Minister of Justice told me flatly that it was impossible for him to return to Baghdad empty-handed. All the hopes of the Arab world were pinned on Germany.

¹ Copies of this report were sent on Oct. 12 to the Embassies in Italy and the Soviet Union, and to the Legation in Iran.

² During the stay of the Grand Mufti's private secretary in Berlin, various communications from him to the Iraq Minister of Justice, then in Istanbul, were sent through the facilities of the German Foreign Ministry (telegram No. 431, Woermann to Ankara, Sept. 14: 2361/488163; telegram No. 499, Woermann to Ankara, Sept. 27: 2361/488173; letter, Grobba to Papen, Sept. 27: 2361/488179-80).

³ See documents Nos. 57 and 58.

If these hopes were disappointed, the Arab countries would eventually do better to come to an understanding with the English regime.

The discussion revealed once more the Arabs' abysmal distrust of the plans of Rome. At the same time the gentlemen do not yet know that the Italian Government relies on the Iraq Foreign Minister, pro-English Nuri Said, who is regarded as a traitor to his country.

Since I could not reveal to the Iraq Minister of Justice the true state of affairs, and since, on the other hand, he refused to leave Istanbul empty-handed, there was nothing for me to do but to continue putting him off.

I do not wish to neglect pointing out, however, that these developments are of extremely serious importance also for the policy of the Reich.

As seen from here, it is first of all a question of committing the Arab forces in Syria and Palestine in a way that will favorably affect Italy's position in the war. As it seems, our allies do not view the matter from the standpoint of a military advantage, although in view of Turkey's political attitude I regard this as a serious mistake.

But the question, whether the Reich should refrain fully from any participation in the solution of the Arab problem of the Near East, has a significance for the postwar settlement in the Near East that should by no means be underestimated.

Italy's hegemony in the Mediterranean—that is, the absolute control of the maritime route (through the Suez Canal) to our Central African possessions which are to be regained, as well as to the oil deposits in the Near East—makes it appear imperative that the Reich should secure at least one land connection to the Persian Gulf independent of this maritime route.

There was never any doubt in my mind that Turkey, which had been driven by the Italian threat into the English orbit, will and must after the war again enter into an intimate relationship with the Reich. If, therefore, a safe land route via the Balkans and Turkey to the Persian Gulf is to be established after the war, dealing with the Arab problem of the Near East becomes for us a question that we have to face. A secure and friendly relationship with the Arab states of the Near East would, moreover, in no way affect the prerogatives which the Führer promised to Italy's Mediterranean interests.

The return of Turkey to a friendly relationship with us, moreover, presupposes the autonomy of the Arab countries of the Near East. For this would relieve Turkey of her anxiety of being hedged in on all sides by the dominant Mediterranean power, Italy. This later danger would more than anything else drive Turkey into the arms of the Soviet Union.

For these reasons, which I have outlined briefly, it is, in my opinion, urgent that the Reich define—especially within the Arab movement—

its economic and cultural interest in the Near East so that the hopes of the Arab world are not dashed even before the war has taken a decisive turn on this Continent.

If the Italian Government does not desire a joint German-Italian declaration on the independence of the Arab states of the Near East, the Iraq nationalists ought nevertheless to be told what the view of the Reich Government is with regard to the future shape of things. It would, in my opinion, suffice, if I were authorized to communicate orally to the Iraq Minister of Justice a confidential statement of this kind.⁴

PAPEN

⁴ See document No. 190 and footnote 3.

No. 147

35/22944-45

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 2141 of October 3

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1940—8:22 a. m.

Received October 5—3:00 p. m.

With reference to your instruction P 187 g. which arrived here August 6 and to your telegram 545 of May 22 (Inf. 2867).¹

1. For *propaganda* purposes the Embassy in telegram 545 of May 22 was granted \$15,000 per month (Information Department), for the period April to September. This amount has been used exclusively for financing the Embassy periodical *Facts in Review*. This was necessary because the number of copies, as a result of constantly growing interest and demand, increased to 80,000 a week, or 360,000 a month, and the number of pages from the original 4 to from 12 to 16 according to the type of propaganda material to be included. Please continue to make this sum available regularly each month. Since owing to the larger circulation the Embassy periodical has been coming out as a publication of the Information Library, the latter has received a tremendous number of inquiries, especially regarding the program of the German short-wave transmitter. Since September 1, therefore, the Information Library has been sending the program to 25,000 interested persons every week, which is extremely valuable for promoting the German short-wave transmitter. This involves expenses amounting to \$3,000 a month, which I request be authorized to the Embassy regularly every month starting September 1. This sum also includes the expenses of the monitoring office of the Information Library, which takes down the material of the short-wave transmitter (Lord H[aw] H[aw]) and disseminates it either through *F[acts] i[n] R[evue]* or in other

¹ Neither found.

suitable ways. Thus a total of at least \$18,000 a month should be made available for pure propaganda work, all of which is to be turned over by us to the Information Library. This does not include the funds for the regular budget of the Information Library particularly for purposes of cultural policy.

2. For *press* purposes besides the usual peace time press fund the Embassy applied for a lump payment of \$50,000 for a special press war fund, and was granted it in instruction 379 of April 8.² This fund is used for press policy activities, exertion of influence on newspapers, informants, etc. Most of these payments are of such a delicate nature that the method of settlement mentioned in your telegram No. 749 of July 8² is used for them. Furthermore, funds for press policy activities of the consular offices in the United States are taken from here. This fund is already so depleted that I request that it be replenished in the same amount of \$50,000, with which I believe I can manage until the end of the fiscal year, to judge from the experiences thus far during the war. This sum would only suffice to maintain the press-policy work so far undertaken by the Embassy.

3. Since the expenses for (1) propaganda, and (2) for press-policy work depend upon political developments and special directives from you, which naturally cannot be anticipated at this time, I must reserve the right as in the past to request in each case special funds for special tasks, to be accounted for as such.

THOMSEN

² Not found.

No. 148

104/112559-60

The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 4, 1940—10:40 p. m.

SECRET

Received October 5—6:30 a. m.

No. 2095 of October 4

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1787 of October 2.¹

Molotov received me today at 6:00 p. m., after he had at first asked me to call at 5:00. When I drove into the Kremlin I met the English Ambassador in his car. Molotov apologized, upon greeting me, for having had to change the time of the visit because of pressure of business.

To the communications I made in accordance with instructions, Molotov made the following remarks.

¹ Document No. 142.

I. German-Finnish Agreement.

Under the German-Russian accord, Finland, as we knew, belonged to the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The interest of the Soviet Union in the agreement was therefore understandable and for this reason the Soviet Union wanted to be duly informed. The Soviet Government was anxious, if possible, to be given additional, more detailed information about the German-Finnish Agreement, especially regarding the number of German troops involved and the duration of the Agreement (whether meant for a single action or for a longer period?), and also whether all the German troops would go only to Kirkenes.

To my query as to whether the Soviet Government had not also been informed by the Finnish Government, Molotov replied in the negative and added that the Finnish Government had informed him "at about the time of the publication of the report," but it had not yet replied to the questions addressed to it.

I told M. Molotov that I would communicate his wish to Berlin and remarked that, as far as I knew, it was not our intention to retain German troops in Finland and that, moreover, the Agreement was conditional upon the threat to Kirkenes by England.

Upon his request, I left with M. Molotov the text of the four points.*

II. Tripartite Pact.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Government would have to examine the matter closely since my communications contained views of the German Government with regard to the interpretation of articles 3 and 4 of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. He could, therefore, say nothing further on this at the moment.

TIPPELSKIRCH

* See document No. 142, footnote 2.

No. 149

F6/0420-0429;
F1/0530;
F6/0430-0442;
F1/0544;
F6/0443-0455;
F13/465-472

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

At the BRENNER, October 4, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE DUCE
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT CIANO,
AT THE BRENNER, ON OCTOBER 4, 1940

Even before the start of the actual conference the Duce spoke of good news that had come from England. With this he meant Chamber-

lain's resignation,¹ which he considered to be a sign of a domestic crisis and an outgrowth of difficulties which the English Government had to overcome at present.

The Führer began the conversation with the remark that he wanted to speak with the Duce about the new situation that had developed with regard to Spain. He would also give a picture of the general situation regarding both the preparations for the attack on England and the military possibilities.

He then explained that immediately after the conclusion of the campaign against France large-scale preparations had been made for the final struggle with England. It was clear, to be sure, that with the defeat of France the war had been won for the Axis Powers, and that the rest was merely a question of time. However, for various reasons, especially with a view to economic reconstruction, Germany and Italy had an interest in bringing about the end of the war as soon as possible. It was for this purpose that preparations for a landing in England had already been instituted last summer, and this on a broad front from Norway to Brest. The first thing to do had been to repair the traffic channels. Inasmuch as after the conclusion of the French campaign there remained only one single railroad bridge across the Meuse to connect the German railroad system with the French-Dutch-Belgian system, it had first been necessary to construct a large number of emergency bridges. But these for their part had obstructed river and canal traffic, so that extensive bridge construction had become necessary in order to restore land and water traffic to full operation. The Todt Organization, with 100,000 workers, had been employed, and had built several hundred new bridges.

Furthermore it had been necessary to free the harbors of the conquered territory and clear away the ships that had been sunk by the Germans. Owing to the great difference between high and low tide it had also been very important for the utilization of these harbors to repair the locks.

Thereafter we had begun to install medium and heavy batteries and long-range guns with a range up to 130 kilometers. Owing to the need for rail transport, however, this task could be begun only after repair of the railroad network. Then there was also the preparation of transport ships for crossing the sea. Here mistakes had been made at first; too many ships of this type had been concentrated too close together in a few harbors, so that a number of losses were incurred through English air raids. Now the concentration of these ships had been relaxed and they had been distributed over a larger number of harbors. This had been possible, however, only after these

¹ The resignation of Neville Chamberlain as Lord President of the Council was announced on Oct. 3.

harbors had been cleared. Hand in hand with this went the necessary expansion of anti-aircraft defenses.

All in all in this manner a gigantic task had been accomplished within a relatively very short time. After completing all these preparations Germany had been waiting for the last 4 weeks for favorable weather so as to be able to strike the great blow against England. Only 5 days of good weather would be needed to gain air supremacy. Thereafter 8 to 10 more days of quiet weather would be needed to permit the crossing by sea and make possible the necessary cover by the Luftwaffe at the same time. For England would certainly not proceed with large ships against the German troops while they were crossing the sea, but would employ a considerable number of smaller units for the purpose, and to fight these off successfully air supremacy was absolutely necessary. For the actual crossing of the Channel the preparations had been made down to the last detail. For example, Germany had produced tanks with floats, as well as the necessary steel or concrete pontoons on which these tanks could be transferred from water to land and back to water.

On the basis of weather predictions Germany had made the decision to attack about 4 weeks ago. He (the Führer) had personally conferred once more with the weather experts and had obtained from them the absolute assurance that in all circumstances a period of fine weather was imminent. Thereupon he had given the Reichsmarschall the order to attack at 7:00 a. m. Contrary to the predictions, however, the weather had been bad and they had waited one hour after another for the predicted improvement, until it finally came around 2:00 p. m. After a few hours, however, the weather changed and the action had to be broken off. Since then the German Wehrmacht had been waiting for good weather every day for the last 4 weeks and their hopes had been disappointed time and again.

Tactically the German plans had been aimed first at destruction of English fighter planes. The plan had been to attack London with strong bomber units accompanied by likewise very strong fighter escorts, thereby forcing the English fighter arm to fight. The German fighters, though not as fast as the Italian ones, were absolutely superior to the English machines, whereas the long-range fighters [*Zerstörer*] were naturally not entirely superior to the regular fighters [*Jäger*]. At first the losses had been 1:2 in favor of Germany, and as time went on had risen to 1:3 or even more, since in the meantime the quality of the English crews had deteriorated considerably. In connection with the destruction of the enemy fighter arm, the destruction of the airfields in the vicinity of the projected landing points had been provided for, according to the methods tested in Poland and France. The first large-scale attack 4 weeks ago had been carried out with about 1,500 bombers and fighters.

Since then the waiting period had not been allowed to pass by unused. In spite of unfavorable weather England had been under attack day and night. Every hour of good weather had been used for this purpose, so that signs of disintegration were already becoming visible in Great Britain, and they were constantly being augmented especially by the night attacks on London. Even though it was not possible to aim with exactness in bad weather and it was not known where the bombs fell, nevertheless in the long run it would be impossible to stand the nervous strain of these constant attacks. As soon as the weather became somewhat better attacks would be systematically carried out on airfields, engine, and airplane factories, waterworks, canal installations, antiaircraft factories, gasoline and oil dumps, power plants and the like. Owing to the constant attacks on London the English were forced to concentrate their air defense there, so that it was easier for certain special formations of the Luftwaffe to carry out systematic low-level attacks to destroy key industries all over the country outside of London, render harbor installations unusable, and infest them with a new type of mine which the British cannot clear away for months.

Nevertheless the bad weather was naturally a great obstacle, and the results that would have been attained in 4 days with favorable weather could be reached in these circumstances in 40 to 50 days at best. In any case an extraordinary amount had been done, and more was simply not possible in the given circumstances.

For the rest, in no circumstances must there be a reversal anywhere. For in such a case unpleasant consequences might arise for the Axis Powers. He was thinking not so much of military as of psychological consequences, particularly on the English who, considering that their Empire was constructed almost entirely on the basis of prestige, would gain new courage from such a reversal.

Now the question arose as to why the English continued to hold out despite everything in a situation which was hopeless for them from a military point of view. In his opinion this fact was due to two hopes. Great Britain placed her hopes in America and in Russia.

But America would only be able to deliver matériel. The figures published on her delivery capacity were lies pure and simple. It was possible to construct a rather good picture of the production capacity of the American airplane industry by considering the number of workers employed, the amount of aluminum produced, and the possibilities for manufacturing engines; one came to the conclusion that the American possibilities in this field stayed within moderate bounds. In this connection the Führer stressed the difficulties in Britain's supply of aluminum.

And now America had also been warned by the Tripartite Pact. The Führer termed the official reaction very cowardly, and expressed his

conviction that seeing the possibility of a two-front war would have quite a dampening effect on America.

England's second hope was based on Russia. In this connection the Führer remarked that a year ago Stalin had certainly believed there would be a long European war accompanied by a general attrition of Europe. He had certainly expected this to result in a relief for Russia and new perspectives in a Europe which had been bled white, and now he was doubtless disappointed at the quick conclusion of the war. The Kremlin had calculated wrong this time. Germany was not afraid of Russia and had prepared everything for defense. To be sure, 17 divisions of older age groups had been demobilized, but 40 new divisions had been organized, so that after March a total of 100 first-class divisions, 24 of them armored, would be available. He (the Führer) considered it out of the question that Russia would undertake anything.

The Reich Foreign Minister underscored these statements and pointed out that in his opinion the Russians were afraid of Germany and Stalin would certainly not undertake anything on his own initiative; the Duce readily granted this.

The Führer then said he approved directing the Russians toward India or at least the Indian Ocean, but added that he doubted it would be possible really to set the Russians in motion actively in this direction. In any case the Russians would not represent any problem for Germany even if worst came to worst. However, as the well-known *Pravda* article on the Tripartite Pact proved, they seemed to regard matters very reasonably.²

Thus both hopes of the English were illusory and would bring only disappointments sooner or later. Independent of the question of the direct attack on England, however, it was a matter of attacking the British Empire at other places, too, and of inflicting injury on it at every possible point. After a short mention of the Spanish question the Führer came to speak of territorial demands on France. Franco had approached him (the Führer) with the question of eventual participation in the war by Spain, and had thereby advanced certain territorial claims to Gibraltar and Morocco. On the basis of the war already won Germany and Italy had their own claims on France, too. Thus Italy wanted, with regard to metropolitan France, a correction of the Italian-French border, as well as Corsica and Tunis. He (the Führer) wanted to assure the Duce herewith that Germany would never conclude peace with France without satisfaction of the Italian claims.

² A translation of the *Pravda* article of Sept. 30 is printed in Harriet L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-1945* (Princeton, 1945), pp. 249-250.

The Duce interjected here that it was only a question of 8,000 square kilometers, i. e., 1,000 square kilometers of Nice and 7,000 for the remaining area.

The Führer continued by explaining the German claims on France. Here it was mainly a question of Alsace-Lorraine, with new strategical borders, as well as colonial bases on the Atlantic coast of Morocco in Agadir or Casablanca, which Germany wanted to build up for her own purposes. She would build docks, repair shops, drydocks, and oil stations there, and of course also fortifications. In Africa she required besides the return of her former colonies only a rounding out of her colonial possessions in Central Africa.

With regard to the bases, the Führer mentioned that such a request had also been made of Spain in case Morocco should be assigned to her. As a substitute for this he would also be satisfied with one of the Canary Islands. However, Franco had rejected these claims in a letter to him, with the remark that in time of peace Germany did not need these bases, and in wartime all of Spain's harbors would be at her disposal.³ To this the remark should be made that Germany was not interested in Spanish harbors, but that she needed bases of her own, already developed and equipped by herself in peacetime.

For the rest, Spain's entry into the war was of strategic significance only in connection with the conquest of Gibraltar; her military help was absolutely nil, especially in consideration of the fact, again confirmed just recently by reports from Admiral Canaris,⁴ that the inner situation of the country was bad, Franco's position was not very strong, and the economy was entirely prostrate. It was for this reason that Spain had asked to have 400,000 tons of grain placed at her disposal by Germany in case she entered the war.⁵ For Germany this amounted to a serious sacrifice. From the standpoint of nutrition the Reich had not been badly prepared for the war, but at its start one could not foresee the operation in Norway, which was purely an import area as far as grain was concerned. Holland and Belgium were also import areas, so that Germany had to reduce her own grain consumption very greatly. If the grain harvest was only fair, then it would be necessary to use considerable amounts of potatoes, available owing to a good harvest, for the production of bread.

Other misgivings arose because, as experience has shown, the Spaniards make further demands later on, as they did for example during the Civil War when at first they asked for only 12 transport planes (and ended with 800, interjected the Duce at this point). The danger existed that these habits might now be resumed also with regard to food support, especially since owing to the lack of statistics the

³ See document No. 88.

⁴ These reports by Canaris have not been found.

⁵ See document No. 63.

Spaniards themselves had no exact picture of their own supply situation.

Then the Führer spoke of the debt question. At the start of the Civil War he had told Franco that he would ask for no repayment from him during the hostilities, but at that time he was not yet aware how large the support of Spain would be.⁶ He had only asked that after his victory Franco pay back his debts as a man of honor.⁷ If Franco had lost, he (the Führer) would simply have bet on the wrong card. The total amount that Spain owed Germany amounted to 400 million reichsmarks, which had to be paid off some day somehow. Also the new requests for grain, gasoline (at the extremely high rate of 56,000 tons a month) and the like had to be paid for some day.⁸ But when one brought up this question the Spaniards took the position, as Franco had also hinted in his letter to the Führer, that this was a matter of confusing idealism and materialism. The Führer was almost represented as if he were a little Jew who was haggling about the most sacred possessions of mankind.⁹

The Spanish claims related to Gibraltar, Morocco, and Oran.¹⁰ It would doubtless be very difficult to make this last demand acceptable to the French. The danger existed here that the French would learn of these things and then take the position that there was no use in further defending their African colonies, considering the plans to cede them to Spain later. It was possible that a local movement to secede from the Vichy Government might be started by an energetic officer and in this way West Morocco would be played into the hands of the English. Then the Axis Powers would face the necessity of conquering Morocco by force of arms. This would in itself be a difficult venture, and it was not impossible that it would be further complicated by a break with the Axis Powers at this moment by Spain.

On the other hand the Axis Powers had done everything since the armistice to prevent such a development. They had waived the surrender of the French fleet in order that it might not escape to North Africa and there support an independent French colonial empire that would have been useful to the English as an air base and would have posed a serious threat especially for Italy. At the conclusion of the armistice they had said in Germany and Italy that it was good if the Pétain Government remained at the helm, because it was possible to exert an influence on it, whereas a French émigré government in London under de Gaulle would have been withdrawn from any influence by the Axis Powers.

⁶ Cf. vol. III of this series, documents Nos. 213 and 223.

⁷ These words were scored through in the original text.

⁸ See document No. 63.

⁹ See document No. 88.

¹⁰ See document No. 116.

For this reason Germany had taken a negative attitude toward the Spanish wishes for signing a protocol in which Germany conceded the Spanish claims.¹¹ In return for their claims the Spaniards had merely expressed their sympathy for the Axis Powers in this protocol and in a vague form stated they were ready to enter the war at a time still to be established.¹² At best one could agree officially to the Spanish territorial claims when there was absolute certainty that landings by the English in Africa were impossible, i. e., only when England was entirely beaten or when bases for dive bombers were assured in a circumference of 350 kilometers from the landing points of the English.

In these circumstances the question arose whether it was not possible to bring France and Spain to a common line and in this way bring about a continental coalition against England. The French knew that they had to cede some territory. The Italian claims had already been communicated to them before the war. If it were now made clear to them that they could compensate themselves with English Nigeria for a limited cession of Moroccan territory, then it might perhaps not be impossible to move them to accept more modest Spanish claims. Naturally it had to be made clear to the Spaniards that they had to get along entirely without the cession of Oran and keep their wishes as to Morocco within dimensions acceptable to the French. In these circumstances the French would after all still retain the main parts of their colonial empire, for Germany intended to ask only to round off her territory in Central Africa but nothing more. She had received a considerable increase in territory in the east and north of Europe and did not intend to make big demands for colonies only because they would look good on the map. Germany was aware that a great deal of time was necessary to develop colonies. Holland had needed 200 years to make the Dutch Indies into a really productive colony, and the English colonies had also not been built up from one day to the next; in many cases they were still entirely undeveloped and worthless today.

In these circumstances one had to consider the situation carefully before taking any final steps with the Spaniards. If a compromise could be found between the French hopes and the Spanish wishes a European coalition against England would thereby be brought into being. It was therefore a question of finding out whether there was any equivalent for France in Nigeria for cession of part of Morocco.

The Führer then pointed to the various concessions which had been made the French after the armistice, without anything really having been received from them in return. He informed the Duce about the essential content of the conversation between Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and General Huntziger,¹³ and stressed in particular

¹¹ Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 16.

¹² See vol. ix of this series, document No. 488.

¹³ Document No. 112.

the wish expressed by Huntziger that France recognized her defeat, to be sure, but did want to save the main part of her colonial empire. One would have to be clear about the fact that France should never again be permitted to become a strong power, since she would in no case forget the present defeat by Germany and Italy and would take the first opportunity for *revanche*. France would never get over the fact that Germany ruled on the Rhine and that an Italian empire existed in the Mediterranean. She had attacked Germany 29 times in the course of three centuries on account of the Rhine, and she would do the same with Italy for the sake of the Mediterranean. The French were simply not a Romanic people, but were Gauls with the characteristics typical of the latter, and the talk of the Latin sister was absolutely without justification. In spite of the present difficulties England and France would sooner or later get together again. At the moment, however, the ideal solution consisted in creating a European coalition against England including France and Spain. The question was whether one could find a compromise between the French hopes and the Spanish wishes, and possibly feelers would have to be put out to the French to ascertain whether they were willing to relinquish at least part of Morocco for British Nigeria. The German colonial claims were moderate, as he had already mentioned. They consisted merely in rounding off the former German colonial possessions in Central Africa to consolidate the [word illegible] German colonies as compactly as possible. Germany was not out to win the greatest possible number of square kilometers of colonial territory, but simply needed raw materials, in particular lumber, whose lack made itself unpleasantly felt in the production of the new Vista fiber. Then she also wanted to obtain oils and fats from the colonies. In connection with this there arose the necessity of securing the sea route to the new German colonies by means of bases along the French coast, and access to the open sea through the development of the Norwegian positions. Germany would never get out of Norway. She intended to develop Trondheim as a large naval harbor.

If a compromise between the French and the Spanish interests should not be possible, however, one should consider very carefully which of the then available possibilities to prefer. An attack on Gibraltar was technically quite feasible. Germany possessed certain specialized troops that had successfully accomplished similar tasks in the west, and they could doubtless also achieve the conquest of the Rock. At any rate the war was won for the Axis Powers unless they should do something very inept. For this reason, too, there must in no circumstances be a reversal.

The Führer then came to speak of the reorganization of the German armored forces. Part had been set aside for the operation against

England; however, a total of 14 divisions had been newly organized, and if Italy needed specialized troops of this kind, Germany would be glad to make them available. The Führer would also be glad to offer the Duce Stukas and long-range fighters with a radius of action of 400-500 km., as thanks for his placing Italian air forces at our disposal in the west. Moreover, Germany had developed the aforementioned mines with which the Suez Canal could be closed for months. The same was true of the harbor of Alexandria. These were mines which lay on the bottom of the sea and were still effective at a depth of 30 meters. Special airplanes were necessary for laying them, since the mines were very heavy. They contained 600 kg. of explosives, so as to exert their destructive effect on ships even from such depths. Naturally Germany would also provide the planes. In this connection the Führer stressed the advantage of deep water harbors, such as Italy possessed, for example, in contrast to the German North Sea and Baltic harbors like Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, though of course the German fleet had the alternative of moving to Norway.

The Duce answered that in Italy they had followed the preparations for the landing in England with great interest. He was firmly convinced that with good weather and after air supremacy had been achieved this operation of the German Wehrmacht would be successfully executed. In the present circumstances, however, the bad weather perhaps signified another winter of war. Italy was not concerned at the prospect, since it was her first war winter, morale was good, her food supplies assured and the party strong, so that the people followed their leadership willingly. He also believed that England's secret and open hopes were placed in the United States and Russia. In the meantime, however, according to the reports received in Italy, the German Luftwaffe had already shattered the nerves of the English people by its constant bombing attacks. A crisis also seemed to be developing within the English Government. Chamberlain's retirement seemed to be a sign of this. Here he saw a certain parallel between Chamberlain-Churchill and Daladier-Reynaud.

No danger threatened from Russia. It was doubtless good to direct Russia toward India. He did not believe, however, that the Soviet Union would do anything concrete in this direction.

The United States came into question solely as a deliverer of war material. After the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact the domestic situation in the United States had also become more difficult owing to a strengthening of the anti-interventionist groups. For America it was too late to try playing a role in the present conflict. Moreover, Roosevelt's position was no longer as strong as before, for the Americans feared a war on two fronts.

The Duce agreed entirely with the Führer in regard to the creation of a continental coalition with the inclusion of France and Spain. He

listed once more in this connection the Italian claims on France. They amounted in all to 8,000 square kilometers, and it was a question of a border correction at Nice, whereby the right of option was to be provided for the inhabitants of this area, and of Corsica, Tunis, and French Somaliland. He assumed that the German claims were also modest. Germany would however surely demand the return of Alsace-Lorraine.

In this connection the Duce asked the Führer how many inhabitants France would still have after the territorial cessions. The Führer replied after short deliberation that he estimated the future population of France would be over 35 million, or even up to 38 or 39 million.

To a further question of the Duce as to the German demands on France the Führer replied that we demanded Alsace-Lorraine with a strategically improved border, as well as the ore basins of Longwy and Briey, and also a further border correction south of Belfort.

The Duce asked further about the German demands in northern France, whereupon the Führer answered that these would depend on the development of relations with the Netherlands and with Belgium. Since he wanted Holland to retain her colonial empire, the connections with this country could only be of a loose kind. Belgium would have to give up her unclear attitude and decide definitely for Germany. In any case, however, Germany would have to have bases on the coast.

The Duce replied that in order to bring about clear relations with France, which were a prerequisite for her participation in the continental coalition, it would be necessary to conclude a peace treaty with her in the near future. In the present situation France was constantly asking for new concessions, but had also stumbled into a real state of enmity with England. If Germany and Italy wanted to utilize this attitude for their own purposes, the position of France had to be entirely clarified. If France were denied the weapons she had asked to have released, the danger would exist that a new de Gaulle would arise (the old one having been finished by the failure at Dakar) and cause new difficulties. This danger was especially great if something were arranged with Spain that meant great damage to France. On the other hand he, too, was convinced that France was the enemy of the Axis Powers and would always remain so, and that one should therefore not let her regain her strength.

With regard to Spain, the Duce stated that an understanding between that country and France would be impossible if Spain's claim to Morocco should be recognized. Spain demanded much and gave nothing. He had had a long, frank conversation with Serrano Suñer in this sense. Incidentally, the latter had described the domestic situation in Spain to him as very bad; there was economic distress and food was scarce all over the country. The Duce then read the memorandum of his conversation with Serrano Suñer, which was also transmitted in

writing at the end of the conference.¹⁴ He summarized his attitude toward Spain with the words "wait and see."

In conclusion the Duce remarked once more in regard to this whole complex of questions that he found the idea of a continental coalition excellent, but that the prerequisite for its realization consisted in settling the relations of the Axis to France and finding a compromise between France and Spain.

Regarding Italy's military situation, the Duce stated that he had just given the order for execution of the second phase of the campaign against Egypt, which would culminate in the conquest of Mersa Matrûh. The operation would begin between October 10 and 15, and would be concluded the same month. The occupation of Mersa Matrûh would permit the Italians to dispatch bombers with fighter escorts to Alexandria, which was only 220 kilometers away. To be sure, the Italian generals had said it was "incautious" to execute the operations at the present moment. He (the Duce) had summoned Graziani to Rome, however, and issued him the strict order to begin the action. Italy had a considerable number of troops available in Libya. There were 15 divisions, 12 of which originated in the mother country and 3 in Libya; they had shown themselves to be very good and loyal soldiers. Whereas in the previous phase long distances had had to be covered by foot, the intention now was to transport the troops by truck so that they could be fresh for the attack on Mersa Matrûh.

Although he did not need any assistance for this second phase of the campaign against Egypt, since the available 200 armored vehicles, 100 of them heavy tanks, were sufficient, he might be forced to utilize the aid of Germany for the third phase, i. e., the battle against Alexandria, in the form of "auto wagons," ["*Autowagen*"], German tanks, and dive bombers. The English would doubtless defend the Nile delta stubbornly, because they were well aware of its importance for the entire Empire, and realized the tremendous repercussions of a defeat in Egypt on India and the Near East. This third phase would begin in the middle of November. At the moment the weather was very favorable for the Italians, whereas at 35° [95° F.] in the shade it was still too hot for the English. The improved weather situation was also reflected in water consumption, which had fallen from 5 litres per man in August to 2 litres. In November it would only be 1 litre. For the operation against Alexandria he would request of Germany 50 to 100 large tanks of 30 tons. For the rest he was firmly convinced that the Italian Army would beat the English. The losses in the campaign thus far had been very small, amounting to merely 500 men.

¹⁴ The memorandum referred to has not been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry, but a memorandum of Mussolini's conversation with Serrano Suñer on Oct. 1, 1940, is printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 592-594.

The Führer expressed his satisfaction with the Italian successes in Africa. Every blow hurt the prestige of the British Empire, which, as he had already said, was the greatest prestige phenomenon in the world and was therefore especially sensitive on this score. He was awaiting impatiently the moment when he could land in England. Forty divisions were lying in readiness for this operation, and were practicing day and night the loading, unloading, landing, and every other kind of special operation involved in the operation against England.

The Duce then also mentioned that the Italian supplies of airplane gasoline would last for 13 months and that the Italian Navy was also supplied with fuel for the same period. Moreover, he had given the Navy strict orders to attack the English wherever they were encountered. So far the Navy had lost 10 submarines, 5 destroyers, and the cruiser *Colleoni*; i. e., it had lost 25,000 tons out of 600,000.

The Führer gave the German losses as 10 destroyers, 2 light and 1 heavy cruiser, and the *Admiral Graf Spee*. The Duce said the Italian Air Force had lost 200 machines in action and 400 in training. The English had also lost 400 machines. Italy was building 500 new machines a month, including a very efficient new fighter, which the Duce called the best in the world, as well as a new model bomber.

The Führer termed the German losses in personnel in the campaign thus far relatively small. Germany had lost a total of 150,000 men in dead and wounded. The losses in matériel and ammunition amounted to practically nothing. The losses of the Luftwaffe had been made up by current production, so that the number of machines was kept constantly at the same level. Germany too was developing new models. The dive bombers, when they had fighter escorts, had proved to be very good, as had the long-distance bombers and the Ju. 88. The German fighters were good; their only shortcoming was too small a radius of action. Besides the long-distance bombers and the long-distance fighters still other new models were in the process of development. In any case there was not a spot in England, including the west coast, where German bombs were not being dropped.

Germany had lost 23 submarines so far. However, production was constantly increasing and would be brought from 10 per month to 17 and finally 25. However, at the moment a large number of submarines were being used for training purposes, so as to get the crews ready for the large number of boats now being produced with their tasks. Moreover, Germany had built 8 new destroyers, so that the loss of 10 had already been largely compensated for, and also 3 heavy cruisers. She would not build any more large ships, as the intention was first to await the results of the war experiences in order to make the necessary new improvements after the end of the war. Since the

commissioning of the *Bismarck* and the *Tirpitz* Germany possessed 4 very modern and very fast battleships (speed of 31 knots).

To the question of concluding peace with France the Führer stated that in winter the air war against England could be carried on only from French territory. Both in Germany and in England it was impossible to launch planes owing to the frequent ground fogs. If it were possible to start from airfields in France where there was no fog, however, then bombing attacks could easily be executed even in case of ground fog, since the church towers, chimneys, and other elevated parts of buildings stood out above the ground fog and permitted clear recognition of the position of the objectives to be bombed. Also the submarine harbors along the French coasts, where there were also Italian submarines which the Duce had kindly made available, were extremely important as bases for operations.

Then the Duce asked what treatment should now be accorded Spain.

The Führer answered that he intended to tell Franco plainly, in a letter of reply, that the Spanish claims were too high and that Oran could not be awarded to Spain.¹⁵ These things could only be discussed with Franco directly, and if the latter was still interested in a conversation with him (the Führer) after the disclosures to be made to him in the reply, then he was willing to meet with him at the Spanish-French border.

The Duce mentioned here the plan of a meeting with Franco in an Italian town outside of Rome. For reasons of domestic policy Franco evidently placed great value on a visit to Italy. Because of the Vatican, however, he wanted to avoid Rome. One should be careful in the case of Spain to prevent this country, in which there was a strongly Anglophile party including even the Foreign Minister himself,¹⁶ from going over to the side of England. For this reason he (the Duce) wanted first of all to tell Serrano Suñer, who was waiting for him in Rome, that Germany and Italy were entirely of Spain's opinion in regard to the claims which Spain had against England, i. e., Gibraltar. The territorial claims against France, however, could only be settled conclusively at the time peace was concluded, along with the territorial claims of Germany and Italy. It was not advisable to say more at the moment, and one should anyway follow a wait-and-see policy. The Führer expressed agreement with this, and for his part posed the question of getting together with France. He would prefer to establish personal contact with François-Poncet, who incidentally was the French delegate to the Red Cross.

¹⁵ See document No. 221. Such a letter from Hitler to Franco has not been found.

¹⁶ Juan Beigbeder y Atienza.

The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that this was not quite accurate,¹⁷ but that a meeting could easily be arranged.

A possible meeting between the Führer and General Huntziger was also discussed. It was stressed in this connection that in return for the alleviations and concessions granted the French, something should be demanded of them: the reconquest or defense of their colonial empire by fighting against the British. In this France would be given the possibility of receiving compensation in the form of British colonies for any cessions of [her own] colonial territory.

In reply to a question interjected by the Duce the Führer said he was also willing to permit the French Government to return to Paris as soon as agreement had been reached with it on this question.

The Führer then called Field Marshal Keitel into the conference. With the aid of maps the latter explained the military problems that had come up in the course of the conversation so far, in particular the question of the bases along the coast of West Africa and the radius of action of the German air force along the West African and European coasts.

Immediately thereafter the conversation was continued at a luncheon for four.

SCHMIDT

¹⁷ André François-Poncet had been designated President of the French Red Cross by the Vichy Government in July 1940, but shortly thereafter the appointment was canceled at the behest of German authorities in Paris.

No. 150

77/58179

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, October 4, 1940.

No. 3373 of October 4

Received October 5—12:45 a. m.

On the return trip I again discussed exhaustively in detailed conversations with influential members of the Spanish delegation, particularly Figueras, the Secretary General of the Morocco Administration, the questions treated in Berlin, and tried to create better understanding on the part of the Spaniards for the fact that they had to give something in return for the great concession contemplated by us. From the course of these discussions, in which the Spaniards undoubtedly reflected the views of the Spanish Minister of Interior, it seems to me *fairly certain* that out of regard for public opinion the Spanish Government would *not* consent to a cession of former Spanish colonial territory (on which, indeed, we also did not wish to insist) nor to the granting of a base in the Canary Islands.

On the other hand it probably will not be especially difficult for the Spaniards to resign themselves to our retaining a portion of French

Morocco, although they express objections precisely to the selection of Agadir because this port is the principal approach to Ifni, which is in their possession.

The Spaniards will probably also comply with our economic demands in Morocco and Spain, which are contained in a draft of an agreement prepared by Ministerialdirektor Wiehl and designated as "B."¹ Statements by Señor Figueras also make it appear possible, moreover, that the Spaniards will also give their consent to the payment of the Spanish debt arising out of the Civil War, in the manner originally proposed by us.

I request instructions as to the further handling of the matter.²
STOHRER

¹ Document No. 126.

² On instructions from Ribbentrop, Weizsäcker wired Stohrer on Oct. 12 that these questions were still being studied and that he should await further instructions while maintaining in the meantime an attitude of reserve (telegram No. 1720: 77/58180).

No. 151

182/85407

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

URGENT

BUCHAREST, October 4, 1940—11:00 p. m.

No. 1716 of October 4

Received October 5—1:30 p. m.

For Reich Air Ministry. Attaché Group.

General Antonescu requests that we send elements for the aerial defense of Ploesti (antiaircraft artillery and pursuit planes, the latter perhaps by air) simultaneously with the arrival of the advance party. The General bases his request on (1) the Tippelskirch protocol,¹ and (2) the danger to the oil fields, which would become increasingly great as soon as the arrival of the advance party becomes known in England.

GERSTENBERG

Supplement by the Chief of Mission: It is my opinion, also, that it is imperative to send at least pursuit planes in the near future, because the relations between Rumania and England have grown worse in the last few days in consequence of the arrest,² and it is possible that the news of the arrival of the advance parties might

¹ See document No. 75 and footnote 1.

² Fabricius reported on Oct. 1 that five British petroleum engineers had been arrested on Sept. 27 and had confessed to acts of sabotage against oil transports to Germany (telegram No. 1690: 182/85387).

lead to the rupture of relations threatened by the English Minister.³ In pro-English circles of the capital there is much talk of imminent English air attacks on the oil fields.

FABRICIUS

³This had been reported by Fabricius in telegram No. 1708 of Oct. 4 (182/85402).

No. 152

2366/489217-19

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. 2872

ROME, October 4, 1940.

Subject: Tripartite Pact.

From a generally reliable source I have heard the following concerning the opinion of Italian circles regarding the Tripartite Pact:

1. In the Palazzo Chigi¹ the practical effectiveness of the Tripartite Pact is not very highly valued, as far as Japan is concerned. The statements on the Pact made by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry were received here with considerable amazement.² At the instance of Mussolini they were published only in very brief abstract. Special displeasure was caused by the statement that the Pact did not work automatically, and that the attack of a third country need not necessarily lead to a declaration of war by the other signatory countries. (In Rome the automatic effectiveness of the Pact was strongly emphasized on the first day after it was signed.)

The Palazzo Chigi sees in the Japanese statement an attempt on the part of Japan to preserve full freedom of action even after conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, in order that she may continue her political and diplomatic game as heretofore without committing herself to the policy of the Axis. Japan, in the opinion of Italian political circles, concluded the Pact only in order to consolidate her own position in the Far East and to obtain a weapon against the continuation of the smuggling of war material to Chiang Kai-shek. The Palazzo Chigi is firmly of the belief that Japan will not carry through a radical anti-British policy.

2. They take the view in the Palazzo that despite the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact the United States, even if it does not enter the war on the side of England immediately after the presidential elections,

¹ The Italian Foreign Ministry.

² Cf. statements on the Pact by Yakichiro Suma, Foreign Office spokesman, reported in the *New York Times* of Sept. 28, 1940, p. 1.

will expedite deliveries of all kinds to England. This tendency will be noticeable especially in regard to delivery of American planes on a very large scale.

By order:
BISMARCK

No. 153

4079/E069140-41

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1055 of October 5

TOKYO, October 5, 1940—10:50 a. m.

Received October 5—9:35 p. m.

Pol. VIII 1240.

The Foreign Minister repeatedly stressed the desire of the Japanese Government for the earliest possible appointment of the technical commissions provided for in the Tripartite Pact. On the Japanese side it is proposed for Tokyo that a main commission be appointed, consisting of the Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Economics, Finance, and Transportation, the Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff and the Admiralty Staff, as well as the German and Italian Ambassadors; also the appointment of two subcommissions as follows:

1. An economic commission, consisting of the Director of the Economic Department of the Foreign Ministry and representatives of the German and Italian Embassies; specialists from the appropriate Japanese ministries would be summoned at need.

2. A military commission, regarding the composition of which no final Japanese proposals are available as yet. The Japanese intend to have the German and Italian armed forces Attachés belong to it, and experts from home would be assigned to them for the handling of special questions. The Foreign Ministry assumes that in Europe likewise a main commission and two subcommissions will be formed and that they will be composed in a way similar to those appointed here, with the provision that they will meet in either a German or an Italian city as the occasion requires. In view of the great interest of the Japanese Government and public in the early establishment of the commissions, I request, in agreement with the Italian Ambassador, that approval be given for the formal establishment of the main commission through the issuance of a joint statement, primarily intended for the public, by the Deputy Foreign Minister and the two Axis Ambassadors at a meeting to be set by the Foreign Minister.¹

OTT

¹ See document No. 185.

No. 154

121/120026-27

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 191 of October 5

HWIX, OCTOBER 5, 1940—10:50 p. m.

Received October 5—11:40 p. m.

With reference to my report No. 2331 of September 26.¹

The Armistice Commission has composed the following draft of an instruction for the Mixed German-Italian Control Commission for Africa.

“German Armistice Commission, Chefgruppe I a, instruction for the Mixed German-Italian Control Commission.

1. The German and Italian Armistice Commissions shall be equally responsible for the Mixed German-Italian Control Commission.

2. The Commission shall be composed of a German delegation and an Italian delegation. The head of the Italian delegation, as chairman, will be responsible for the joint activity of the entire commission, in close cooperation with the chief of the German delegation.

3. It is the function of the Commission ‘to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement in West and Equatorial Africa, as well as on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.’

In detail:

a. Military—control of the deployment of the forces made available to the French for restoring peace and order, attitude of the officers’ corps, morale of the troops, condition of ships and coastal fortifications.

b. Political—general evaluation of political developments, attitude of the French authorities, morale of the population, observation of English influence.

c. Economic—in cooperation with an economic delegation that may be sent, reporting on general economic conditions, the food situation, imports and exports, control of merchant shipping, the air transport situation, proposals for economic policy measures.

4. The control area extends over the whole of West and Equatorial Africa and the Atlantic coast of Morocco; it represents a unified whole. The implementation of the controls is to be managed in close cooperation between the heads of the German and Italian delegations in such a way that, depending on the situation of the control areas and control tasks, either a mixed commission, or a German or an Italian commission separately, will be sent. In this connection, the principle will obtain that the areas bordering on Algeria and Libya on the south will be controlled primarily by Italian authorities, and the entire Atlantic coast of Africa by German authorities, while the interior of Equatorial Africa will be subject to control by both sides.

¹ Not found.

5. The seat of the Mixed Control Commission shall be dependent on the military and political situation. It shall be designated by the German and Italian Armistice Commissions upon the joint proposal of the heads of the German and Italian delegations. In so doing account shall be taken of the transportation and supply situation."

If there are any objections on the part of the Foreign Ministry, please telephone instructions in the course of October 7.

I also wish to refer to my telephoned report to Secretary of Legation von Grote, according to which the Control Commission is supposed to be ready to leave as of October 15. Therefore please name the proposed representative from the Foreign Ministry as soon as possible and inform me of his name.²

HENCKE

² In a memorandum of Oct. 7 (2032/444947) Woermann recorded that he had asked Hencke on the telephone how the division of areas in Africa for control purposes had been arrived at and what considerations had been taken into account. Hencke had inquired of General von Stülpnagel, who had told him:

"Earlier there had been a decision by the Führer that special consideration should be given to Italy. From this decision it had resulted that Italy was given the chairmanship of the Control Commission. The consideration that the Italian arm extended to Africa more readily than the German had also played a part. The present division had also come about from the point of view that Italy would receive the regions adjoining to the south the areas already controlled by her. Practical reasons had, therefore, been the ones which had governed. General von Stülpnagel did not insist on the proposed division and was ready to consider any other proposal."

The proposals with regard to division of the control areas made by General von Stülpnagel to the OKW appear in Hencke's telegram of Oct. 12, document No. 175.

No. 155

4382/E083059

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission

Telegram by teletype

No. 223

BERLIN, October 5, 1940.

With reference to your telegram Del. No. 138 of September 30.¹

There are no objections to recognizing in principle, within the framework of the restoration of German-French trade, the establishment of a French control of imports and exports on the outer borders of France in the occupied area as well. Please, however, reserve the practical implementation of this control, especially its establishment locally, until special administrative regulations have been issued, with regard to which Herr Michel, Commissioner for Foreign Trade, is to negotiate later.

¹ Not printed (4382/E083060).

For your information: It is agreed here that this can only be a question of a control of the main crossing points, and that Alsace-Lorraine must be expected and probably also other areas, as for example the two northern départements.

WIEHL

No. 156

825/230086-87

SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

SECRET

BERLIN, October 5, 1940.

VI E 12 RM/Bu AZ: 5321

D II 941 g.

DEAR PARTY COMRADE VON RIBBENTROP: One of my informants has learned from reliable Japanese press and diplomatic circles details regarding the recall of Japanese Ambassador Eiji Amau from Rome, which I submit to you herewith for your information.

The outgoing Japanese Ambassador in Rome, Eiji Amau, had a talk of about 40 minutes duration with Foreign Minister Count Ciano on Monday, September 23, 1940, in the course of which Ciano informed him of your negotiations with Tokyo and the imminent signing of the Tripartite Pact.

Although Amau has heretofore been considered a moderate friend of the Axis and always maintained good relations with Ciano, he immediately took a sharp stand against the Pact plan. He complained to Count Ciano that he had not been informed in time and designated a German-Italian-Japanese alliance as tactically unwise at the present moment.

Count Ciano thereupon broke off the conversation, which had assumed a stormy character, and had the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo make a report to the Japanese Foreign Ministry regarding Amau's attitude. The result was that Amau was prematurely recalled from his post at Rome, which he had been supposed to occupy for some months more, according to an alleged earlier plan of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

It could not be determined whether the Japanese Prime Minister still has the intention, which he is known in Rome to have had, to entrust Amau with the formation of a Commissariat for Propaganda.

In Japanese establishments in Rome (Embassy, Domei Agency, journalists, Japanese shipping company) it is being briskly debated at present whether the Berlin Pact brings Japan more advantages or more disadvantages. Opinions are divided. The attitudes of the officials of the Japanese Missions all over Europe are said to be similarly divided. They are convinced, however, that the newly appointed Ambassadors and Ministers will put an end to this debate by extensive changes in personnel.

HEYDRICH

SS-Gruppenführer

No. 157

F17/031-032

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry in the Protectorate
to the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET

PRAGUE, October 5, 1940.

12.065/D.Pol.2 g.

Subject: The Führer's decision.

With reference to my report of September 27, 1940—No. 11.663/D. Pol. 2 g.¹

Regarding the reception of the Reich Protector² and Secretary of State Frank by the Führer, I have learned the following from authentic sources:

To begin with, the Minister of Justice, Gürtner, gave a report on the Czech resistance movement, in which he stated that the first trial of the four chief ringleaders would shortly take place before the People's Court.

The Führer objected to this procedure and declared that execution squads were good enough for Czech insurgents and rebels. It was a mistake to create martyrs through court sentences, as was proved in the case of Andreas Hofer and Schlageter. The Czechs would regard any sentence as an injustice. As this matter had already entered the path of court proceedings it was to be continued within this form. The trials were to be postponed until after the war, and then amid the din of the victory celebrations the proceedings would pass unnoticed. Only death sentences could be pronounced, but would be commuted later on to life imprisonment or deportation.

Regarding the question of the future of the Protectorate, the Führer touched on the following three possibilities:

1. Continuation of Czech autonomy, under which the Germans would live in the Protectorate as fellow citizens with equal rights. This possibility was however, out of the question, as one had always to reckon with Czech intrigues.
2. The resettlement of the Czechs and the Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by German settlers. This possibility was out of the question too, as its execution would take a hundred years.
3. The Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by Germanizing the Czechs, i. e., by their assimilation. The latter would be possible with the greater part of the Czech people. Those Czechs against whom there were racial objections or who were anti-German were to be excepted from this assimilation. This category was to be weeded out.

¹ Not found.

² Constantin Freiherr von Neurath.

The Führer decided in favor of the third possibility; he gave orders via Reich Minister Lammers, to put a stop to the multitude of plans regarding partition of the Protectorate. The Führer further decided that, in the interests of a uniform policy with regard to the Czechs, a central Reich authority for the whole of the Bohemian and Moravian area should remain at Prague.

The present status of the Protectorate thus continues.

*The Führer's decision followed the lines of the memoranda submitted by the Reich Protector and State Secretary Frank.*³

DR. ZIEMKE

³ Neurath's memorandum of Aug. 31, 1940, and Frank's of Aug. 28 are printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiii, document No. 3859-PS (G. B. Exhibit 520), pp. 252-271. The origin of these two documents and of the document printed was also taken up during the proceedings at Nuremberg (*ibid.*, vol. xvii, pp. 59-69).

No. 158

368/207103

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX

BERLIN, October 6, 1940.

Minister Hencke communicated the following by telephone today at 10:30 a. m. :¹

After his return from the Brenner, General Jodl issued the following instruction to General von Stülpnagel :²

For the time being the French Armistice Commission does not need to make any further requests for reinforcement of the French troops in Africa, since this question will be discussed with it thoroughly in the near future.

General Jodl added confidentially that the decision will turn out to be favorable for the French, since the military standpoint won out at the Brenner, also with the Italians, who were originally more reluctant.

Submitted herewith via the Deputy Director of the Political Department and the Under State Secretary for the Political Department to the State Secretary.

FREYTAG

¹ On Oct. 3 Hencke had informed the Foreign Ministry that he had received the following confidential information from General von Stülpnagel:

"The Armistice Commission has been instructed by the High Command of the Wehrmacht to avoid in the near future any unpleasantness toward the French. If vigorous notes, threats, etc., should be needed on the merits of a case, attempt to postpone dealing with the matter for a while." (3697/E035995-97)

² See document No. 108, footnote 4.

No. 159

104/112563

The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 2110 of October 6

Moscow, October 6, 1940—12:40 p. m.

Received October 6—3:00 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2095 of October 4.¹

On the occasion of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, I visited Ambassador Togo of Japan and Ambassador Rosso of Italy.

Togo told me that he had seen Molotov after the signing of the Tripartite Pact.² Molotov declared that the attitude of the Soviet Government will depend on how the Tripartite Pact is implemented. In general Molotov was reserved, and it was Togo's impression that he even showed a certain dissatisfaction with the conclusion of the Pact.

Rosso counts on further normalization of Russo-Japanese relations. He had not seen Molotov since last June. (See our telegram No. 1235 of June 26.³)

TIPPELSKIRCH

¹ Document No. 148.

² In a memorandum of Oct. 9 Weizsäcker recorded: "The Japanese Ambassador told me today that Molotov inquired of Ambassador Togo during a conversation on the Tripartite Pact whether, in addition to the published Treaty, there existed also secret clauses. Togo has denied this." (St.S. No. 756:4079/E069142)

³ Vol. x of this series, document No. 21.

No. 160

71/50720

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 1401

BERLIN, October 6, 1940—7:00 p. m.

Pol. VII 3037 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 1785 of October 2.¹

1. In order to introduce the statement in a form adapted to the Oriental mentality, it is the intention, without conceding anything in substance, to preface it with the following introduction:

"Germany, which has always been animated by feelings of friendship for the Arabs and cherishes the wish that they may prosper and

¹ Document No. 143.

be happy and take a place among the peoples of the earth in accordance with their historic and natural importance, has . . .”

2. From conversations with the private secretary of the Grand Mufti and from reports from other quarters, it seems that one of the chief desires of the Arabs is for a statement that the Axis Powers raise no objections to a federation of the Arab countries. Should Italy be inclined to respond to this wish of the Arabs, please report this to us. Otherwise we, for our part, would omit this point at the moment.

3. The statement is to be made to the private secretary of the Grand Mufti here orally, and it is then to be broadcast over the German radio in the Arabic language, but not (as mentioned in your telegram) by the private secretary of the Grand Mufti. Please report by wire.²

WEIZSÄCKER

² In telegram No. 1819 of Oct. 8, Mackensen reported that the Italians opposed as “premature” the idea of having the Axis Powers state, at this time, that they would not object to an Arab federation; the Italians would appreciate it if Germany would omit this point (71/50721).

No. 161

111/116279

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

Tokyo, October 8, 1940—1:45 a. m.

No. 1065 of October 8

Received October 8—3:00 p. m.

The Foreign Minister informed me yesterday, on the occasion of a celebration by the Japanese-German-Italian Friendship Society, that he has reasonable hopes that an agreement will soon be reached between Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek. After contacts looking to an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek have been advanced by various ways, the further conduct of secret negotiations has now been transferred to him, the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister has not as yet informed me about the details of the intended agreement. He remarked that as a last resort he would ask the Reich Government if he could count on its good offices, but he emphasized that he can attain his objective without German help.¹

OTT

¹ See document No. 257.

No. 162

104/112565-66

*The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat at Fuschl*¹

Teletype

No. 34

OCTOBER 8, [1940]—7:30 p. m.
W 4646 g.

In the matter of the granting of the Petsamo nickel concession the Finnish Government finds itself exposed to daily increasing pressure from the Soviet Government.² The Finns are afraid that bad intentions lie concealed behind Molotov's persistence. If the Finnish Government yields to Russian pressure and by national emergency legislation cancels the present Canadian nickel concession and gives it to the Soviet Government, an unpleasant and unfavorable situation would arise for us: Our own nickel interests, which had been established in the negotiations with the Finnish Government, would be completely wiped out, as Russia will not respect the German-Finnish agreements. With the transfer of the nickel concession Soviet Russia will acquire exclusive territorial influence in this area as well and thereby border directly on the area of Kirkenes, which is protected by our troops. The military, and the Reichsmarschall in particular, have voiced the hope that we shall not lose Petsamo. The Deputy of the Reichsmarschall, Lt. Col. Veltjens, has, among other things, obtained an option for the nickel concession, as compensation for the German supplies of arms.³

Up to now, the Foreign Ministry has been telling the Finns that Germany will confine herself to carrying out the German-Finnish nickel contracts and will not on her own initiative take up the question of the concession with the Russians.⁴ It will now be necessary to go beyond that and to strengthen the Finnish will to resist. They should be told we were in favor of their holding the question of the concession in abeyance and not definitely concluding the matter by a transfer to Russia. It is not necessary to comply with the wish of the Finns that we support their attitude in Moscow.

Minister Schnurre requests an opportunity to report personally on this situation and on the present status of the delivery of arms

¹ A residence of the Foreign Minister was located at Fuschl, near Salzburg.

² The Foreign Ministry had received several reports of increased Soviet pressure on Finland with respect to the nickel concession. (Helsinki telegram No. 567 of Sept. 16: B19/B003744; Moscow telegram No. 1962 of Sept. 16: B19/B003745; Helsinki telegram No. 586 of Sept. 23: B19/B003769; Helsinki telegram No. 602 of Sept. 30: B19/B003780; Helsinki telegram No. 631 of Oct. 7: B19/B003785.)

³ See document No. 140.

⁴ See document No. 69.

to Finland. The matter is urgent since otherwise it must be expected that the Finns will give in.⁵

⁵ See document No. 196.

No. 163

540/240619-21

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division X

SECRET

BERLIN, October 8, 1940.

The confidential agent who was sent to the Union of South Africa in April 1940 has returned and made a report.¹ From his report it appears in brief as follows:

Although the majority of the South African population is for the peace policy of Hertzog, the Nationalist leaders will not attempt to seize control for themselves before they are convinced that England has been dealt a devastating blow. Preparations have been made for a large Nationalist demonstration, which will furnish the prelude for a Nationalist popular uprising. Before going into action, however, it is apparently the intention to await the final defeat of England. In the meantime Smuts is constantly strengthening his position through a systematic elimination of all influential Nationalists from the armed forces, the administration, and the police.

In contrast to the hesitant behavior of the old Nationalist leaders, Hertzog and Malan, there is a group of younger Nationalists, who have their center in Bloemfontein, who are radical and prepared to take action at once by making use of the Ossewa-Brandwag organization. This organization is a secret Nationalist league drawn up on military lines, which has spread over the whole country and is reported to have over 100,000 members. Among the members women are numerous. Since Hertzog and Pirow among others keep apart from the Ossewa-Brandwag it is believed that a resistance movement originating with it would not at the moment have the entire Nationalist party behind it. Since the organization also does not have sufficient supplies of arms available, it could scarcely be expected that such an uprising would be successful without energetic assistance from the outside. On the other hand the forces with which Smuts could oppose a well-led uprising are not strong, since a considerable number of troop units are absent from the Union (Kenya). The South African troops are reported to be poorly equipped and only moderately well trained.

¹ The identity of the confidential agent does not appear from the documents found in the files. The material which constituted his report appears in eight annexes (540/240622-41) to the memorandum printed which summarizes their contents.

The economic position of the Union is not unfavorable. Exports of the principal products of the country (gold, diamonds, wool, corn) were higher in the first half of 1940 than in the previous year. There is anxiety among considerable elements, even of the Nationalists, about the future of the gold mining industry. Since this is by far the largest industrial activity of the country, there is some anxiety about what will happen to gold production if Germany is victorious and a currency without gold backing replaces the English pound as a world currency. These and other doubts regarding the economic future of the Union cause a number of African Nationalists, in spite of their complete distaste for it, to approve nevertheless the war policy of General Smuts, because for them England means better business conditions. These considerations play a great part with many Nationalists.

The confidential agent spoke with General Hertzog and Malan personally and informed them (by instruction of Consul General Karlowa, with the approval of the Foreign Minister) that Germany was prepared to recognize an independent South African republic, whose territory would also include the three British protectorates and that Germany was prepared to guarantee these boundaries. Also that Germany would recognize and guarantee South Africa as the predominant white state in the South African area, and that in the South-West no solid German colonization would be undertaken as a result of which South-West Africa might emerge as a white state rivaling the Union. Hertzog was "visibly pleased" to receive this communication and replied that "it had always been his desire to live in friendship with Germany and that he wished from the heart for a peace based on such conditions." No further communication or statement of position has been received from Hertzog, however.

Hertzog has declared that he was prepared for a return of South-West Africa to Germany, but has made reservations regarding guarantees which would have to be given in regard to treatment of South Africans who had emigrated to South-West Africa after the war.

Malan on the contrary has maintained that South-West Africa must remain with the Union, which would be prepared to compensate Germany for her claims by a money settlement.

Especially worth reading is the report of the confidential agent regarding the effect of the radio transmission beamed on Africa (the Zeesen station), which attracts extraordinary attention. These radio transmissions are the sole (but at the same time a very effective) means of propaganda which in practice are available to us in South Africa. (The confidential agent has had the opportunity to report at length to the specialist in Kult R.)

There are no opportunities for influencing the Nationalist press, because all the material which might be sent would arrive with much

too great delay. The editors of the Nationalist newspapers listen to the Zeesen station and make use of its transmissions in their editorials.

DR. BIELFELD

No. 164

35/22983-86

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1940—11:49 a. m.

SECRET

Received October 10—4:45 p. m.

No. 2178 of October 9

For OKW Foreign Department [*Ausland*], for OKH Attaché Branch, for Chief of the Army Command [*Chef der Heeresleitung*], for the Reich Air Ministry Attaché Group, and for the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Luftwaffe.

Military results of the Berlin treaty [sic] from September 27 to the evening of October 9.

1. Still decisive is the fact that the United States is not yet sufficiently armed to pursue a policy based on war as the ultima ratio. Just as before the beginning of the war, when they wanted to make the public think that the United States would enter a possible war immediately, and very much as when later they zealously spread the word by means of oral propaganda that serious jeopardy to England would result in the United States immediately entering the war, they are now again working with a propaganda of intimidation in order to hide the fact that they are still forced, as in the past, in consideration of their inadequate armament, to pursue an extremely cautious policy aimed at winning time.

2. They want to produce the impression that the American fleets are at the point of striking if Japan does not comply with American wishes laid down in dozens of notes in the past years. The Commander, Admiral Richardson, was ostentatiously ordered to Washington, as if there were no Commander in Chief of the Navy there and the preparations for a war in the Pacific Ocean now had to be discussed. Naval reserves are being called up, and they think they can impress the world with about 27,000 men, some of them inadequately trained. At the same time newspaper articles by paid writers state that the American fleet is capable of defeating the Japanese and cutting them off from all imports, and has resolved to do so. In addition a loan to China amounting to 25 million dollars; employment of Admiral Yarnell, formerly squadron commander in the Far East and now retired, who as an "expert" recommends determined pressure on

Japan, increased aid to China, and strengthening of the occupation troops of the Philippines. Finally the high point:

Pretended recall of Americans from Japan.

All propaganda, in the hope of impressing the Powers, especially Japan.

3. In particular they hope to make an impression on Russia, too. The familiar scare technique of the 100 German divisions that are supposed to have been suddenly deployed in Poland against Russia is also being used again. Also the Russians are being instructed in a fatherly way in the press about how much the German policy in Rumania and the troop transports there are directed at Russia. They describe in the press how the Under Secretary in the State Department has again received the Russian Ambassador after a long interval and at the same time point out that Russia was overlooked in the conclusion of the Berlin treaty. A Russian rapprochement with England and America is urgently in Russia's interest. Also the English Ambassador in Moscow is now conducting political negotiations.

Intensive discussions by the State Department, Secretary of State Hull, and others with the English Ambassador and the Australian Minister are being zealously reported, at the same time, as if the most important military decisions were imminent. The English Ambassador has informed the press that he has had to give up his planned flight to England owing to the situation in the Far East. All this is propaganda in order to influence the outside world, just as they have already tried without scruple to intimidate Germany, Italy, and Japan and to win time. All these are petty propaganda measures, to which can just now be added a miserable embargo on wheat, the export of which is supported by government funds—which in practice does not prevent Japan from buying as much other wheat in the U. S. A. as she wishes. So far that is all that has come of the threat of the most severe economic measures against Japan.

The opening by the English of the road through Burma to China, which has been announced with great fanfare, is being utilized propagandistically for the purposes of American policy. Considering the need for weapons elsewhere, it is not divulged where the weapons for China are to come from.

4. Add to this continued intensive propaganda against Germany. Operations against England so far are supposedly nothing but a chain of failures. England, it is said, will not only hold out for a long time but in 1941 will even proceed to the offensive. Press representatives who are creatures of the Government say that the alleged failures of the measures against England so far can be compared with the turning point in Napoleon's fate, the burning of Moscow, or the Battle of

the Marne, although they have to admit at the same time, to be sure, that the General Staff rejects such opinions.

5. I do not find it necessary to change any part of my past evaluation of the situation, especially as reported in the last few weeks. Since the severe blow of September 27 the leading American authorities have not yet united on a point of view with regard to the conduct of a policy consonant with the armament possibilities of the United States. They are trying to save face. I am convinced that at least up to the middle of January 1941 the armament of the United States on land and in the air will be sufficient only for playing policeman in the Western Hemisphere, and that the American fleet alone will not be in a position for the next 2 years to force the will of the Americans on the Japanese with even a reasonable prospect of success. Only one important fact should be noted from the last few days: the concentration of the Atlantic fleet under one admiral. The power relationships in the Atlantic Ocean were not changed thereby. This has, however, created a basis for operations in which, when the time is ripe and conditions allow, they propose to get along in the Atlantic Ocean with weak forces and concentrate superior English and American forces against Japan from the direction of Singapore and Hawaii.

The views expressed on this subject in my telegram No. 1967 of September 14¹ have not been abandoned, and they constitute the final hope of the politicians here, who meanwhile in order to gain time wish to deceive the world about the present weakness of the United States by means of clever propaganda.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

¹ Not printed (35/22856-59). In this telegram Bötticher had discussed many aspects of American defense policy and had gone into the possibility that American plans might call for merely defensive activity in the Atlantic, while preparing for action against Japan, in cooperation with British naval forces, in the Pacific.

No. 165

121/120050

The Office of Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 820 of October 9

PARIS, October 9, 1940—9:40 p. m.

Received October 9—10:10 p. m.

For Dr. Schwarzmann of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

The Chief of the Military Administration in France issued a decree on September 27 concerning measures against Jews. Section 1 states that such persons are considered Jews as have belonged to the Jewish

religion or as are descended from more than two Jewish grandparents. Section 2: Return to the occupied area by Jews who have fled from there is prohibited. Section 3: Every Jew must register in the Jewish register by October 20. Section 4: Compulsory designation of Jewish businesses by October 31. The Administrative Division of the Chief of the Military Administration states that the decree applies to all Jews in the occupied area, no matter what their nationality. Military area headquarters are instructed to except American Jews from the application of the decree.

With regard to Jewish businesses, each case involving citizens of other countries is to be investigated and dealt with individually. A number of Foreign Missions have inquired what procedure is to be followed in regard to Jews who are citizens of their countries.

Please communicate the position of the Ministry immediately and send instructions for passing on to the Military Administration, in particular concerning the treatment of foreign Jews who work with Diplomatic or Consular Missions.¹

SCHLEIER

¹ No direct reply to this telegram has been found.

No. 166

104/112568

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1832

BERLIN, October 9, 1940.

Please call on M. Molotov tomorrow, Thursday, and communicate to him the following. But please do not make it appear as if this communication were the real occasion for your *démarche*, but rather use some other reason and merely introduce the following as incidental to the discussion of the other subject.

Various reports have lately appeared in the English press concerning the dispatch of fairly large German military units to Rumania. These reports are entirely tendentious. The truth of the matter is this: On the basis of the guarantee given it by the Axis Powers the Rumanian Government some time ago made a request of us to make available to it for the training of the Rumanian Army a German military mission with certain instruction units from the German armed forces. In view of our interest in seeing that peace and order are maintained in the Balkans and in order to protect our oil and grain interests against any attempt on the part of England to disturb them, we declared ourselves willing to accede to the Rumanian request. The Soviet Union is aware that we have a vital interest in these areas and we cannot permit them to be endangered by the English whose press is continually

playing with such ideas. In view of our friendly relations we wish to inform the Soviet Government of this.

I have already informed Ambassador Shkvartsev today to the same effect.

RIBBENTROP

No. 167

182/85443-44

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 1421

BERLIN, October 9, 1940.

Sent October 10—1:20 a. m.

e. o. Pol. I 1119 g. Rs.

By instruction of the Reich Foreign Minister, please communicate the following to Count Ciano on Thursday morning:

The Foreign Minister informed Count Ciano already on the occasion of his last visit to Rome that General Antonescu had requested the Reich Government to send a military mission with several instruction units to Rumania.¹ It was to have the task of assisting the Rumanian armed forces in the reorganization planned by General Antonescu.

The matter has now entered an active stage and the Reich Government has decided to comply with General Antonescu's request. First, a small advance party will leave for Bucharest in a few days' time in order to make preparations for the housing of the military mission and the instruction units, which are to follow very shortly. During the last few days General Antonescu has extended his request, making a very urgent appeal that we also quickly send several pursuit plane units for the protection of the oil fields against sabotage attempts from the air.² He explained this request with his grave concern that once the dispatch of a military mission and of demonstration units becomes known the English will attempt such sabotage before these have even arrived. The Reich Government has complied with this request, too, in consideration of Germany's and Italy's great interest in the continued undisturbed production of oil.

The Reich Foreign Minister assumes that on the basis of his earlier communication Count Ciano has already provisionally informed the Duce and will also convey the above to him. End of communication.

Please confirm to me by telephone at once that you were able to carry out these instructions on Thursday morning.³

RITTER

¹ See document No. 73.

² See document No. 151.

³ On Oct. 10, Counselor of Embassy Bismarck telegraphed that in the absence of Ambassador Mackensen, he had made the requested communication that morning and that Ciano had received it "without comment." (telegram No. 1830: 182/85445)

No. 168

9324/E661079

The Legation in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 236 of October 10

KAUNAS, October 10, 1940—6:20 p. m.

Received October 10—7:25 p. m.

WIV 5738.

After the negotiations on the most essential point had resulted in agreement and the Soviet delegation had declared itself ready to discuss the precise directives for the valuation of German property,¹ Dekanozov made the following surprising statement regarding the matter of indemnification: In the memorandum the Soviet Government had not agreed to full indemnification, but only to the discussion of the question of indemnification.² It could compensate only for a certain percentage of property subject to nationalization, and as far as the Volksdeutsche were concerned the percentage would be 10 percent payable in 1 year, or 25 percent payable in 10 years; in the case of Reich Germans, these percentages would be doubled.

I rejected any discussion of an interpretation of an unequivocally settled preliminary question, as I lacked authorization, and I referred to the clear German demand for full indemnification, which was not contradicted. After a lengthy debate during which I argued for our position with all emphasis and justified it in detail, Dekanozov stated that in diplomatic discourse one avoided a blunt "no", and therefore the Russian memorandum of September 4³ had merely referred, with respect to the indemnification question to the earlier (group garbled⁴), which according to the Russian interpretation provided merely for the discussion of the question of indemnification without giving definite assent. He also was not authorized to depart from this principle.

The question of indemnification can now only be treated further in Moscow. The Memel problem meanwhile has not been discussed.⁵ I suggest that I be permitted to return for an oral report.⁶ Same text to Moscow and Riga.

NÖLDEKE
ZECHLIN

¹ See document No. 18 and footnote 5.

² The reference is apparently to the Soviet memorandum of Aug. 7 (9324/E660951-54). See document No. 18 and footnote 4.

³ Not printed (9324/E661015-19). See document No. 18.

⁴ The garbled passage evidently referred to the memorandum of Aug. 7. See footnote 2.

⁵ See document No. 24 and footnote 5.

⁶ Telegram No. 337 of Oct. 11 (9324/E661080) instructed Nöldeke to return to Berlin for an oral report.

After reports were received from Benzler, the head of the German delegation in Riga, regarding the problems he was meeting (telegrams Nos. 410 of Oct. 11: 9324/E661082-85 and 417 of Oct. 12: 3783/E041941), the Foreign Ministry on Oct. 15 by telegram No. 433 (9324/E661086) directed him to join the discussions with Nöldeke in Berlin.

No. 169

182/85447-48

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*¹

Telegram

URGENT

Multex 341

BERLIN, October 10, 1940.

Pol. I M 13821 g.

I. The following directives are for the guidance of your conversation relative to the sending of a Wehrmacht mission to Rumania:

"In connection with the promise of a guarantee which was extended to the Rumanian Government in Vienna, it is planned to reorganize the Rumanian Army on the basis of German war experiences. To this end, upon the express desire of the Rumanian Government, a German Wehrmacht mission is being sent to Rumania; it will at the same time have at its disposal units of various arms to serve as instruction units so as to speed and render more effective the training of Rumanian troops according to modern principles."

II. To this is added for your own information that Germany's and Italy's great interest in an undisturbed Rumanian production of oil and the danger of sabotage attempts by the English have been decisive in the sending of substantial instruction units. Everything must be scrupulously avoided that might lend an anti-Russian tendency to this action. Every suggestion of this sort by others must be energetically rejected. The anti-English aspect, on the other hand, may be underscored because of the threatened sabotage attempts against the oil fields, if for nothing else.

Supplement for Budapest, Sofia, Belgrade, Tokyo, Madrid:

III. You are instructed to inform the Government there in conformity with the directive for guidance of conversation under I, bearing in mind II.

Supplement for all: Acknowledge receipt.

RIBBENTROP

¹ This circular was sent to the German Missions in Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Japan, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ireland, and the United States.

No. 170

104/112577-78

The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2142 of October 10

Moscow, October 10, 1940—11:20 p. m.

Received October 11—3:25 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1832 of October 9.¹

I called on Molotov today at 6:30 p. m. I told him that the occasion of my visit was the communication that Hilger had made 3 days

¹ Document No. 166.

ago to People's Commissar Mikoyan regarding the impending arrival of a German delegation for the purpose of resuming economic negotiations.² I stressed the fact that, in view of the importance of the question, I was anxious to inform him, Molotov, too, that the delegation, which was led by Schnurre, would be strengthened by the addition of influential personalities who were authorized to make independent decisions, and that, on the basis of the preliminary work done in Berlin, we had the impression that a basis for an understanding had been created.³

Molotov appeared interested, inquired about the exact date of Schnurre's arrival and remarked that it remained to be seen what the negotiations would bring.

I then brought the conversation around casually to the real purpose of my visit and gave Molotov the information prescribed, which he listened to with interest. After I had finished, Molotov said that if it was only (group garbled) a case of instruction units, the numerical strength of the German troop units in Rumania could not be very large. To Molotov's question as to whether I knew the number of German troops sent to Rumania, I replied in the negative, but I again stressed Germany's vital interest in those regions that had to be protected against danger from the English. Molotov did not wish to admit the existence of such danger, remarking with a smile that England now had other worries and ought to be glad to save her own life.

In conclusion, Molotov inquired about the information which he recently requested in the Finnish matter,⁴ to which I replied that this information would presumably be brought back by the Ambassador, who would return in a few days.

TIPPESKIRCH

² This had been reported by Tippelskirch in telegram No. 2118 of Oct. 7 (104/112564).

³ The delegation headed by Schnurre left Berlin for Moscow on Oct. 28 (telegram No. 449, Berlin to Riga : 9324/E661108).

⁴ See document No. 113.

No. 171

272/177399-401

Führer's Directive

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, October 10, 1940.

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I) No. 00845/40 g. K.

Subject: Directive for the Commanders of the Army and Luftwaffe
troops assigned to Rumania.¹

1. With a view to giving effective implementation to the guarantee extended to Rumania, units of the Army and the Luftwaffe are being sent to Rumania by agreement with the Chief of the Rumanian Government.

The tasks entrusted to the commanding officers of these units have been defined by the High Command of the Wehrmacht in conformity with my instructions laid down in the directive of September 20.²

These tasks will accordingly be exclusively restricted to military matters.

2. In carrying out this operation it must be borne in mind that it possesses most far-reaching significance from the point of view of foreign policy and involves the possibility of complications. Its importance for the relationship of Germany to Rumania is of absolutely crucial nature. Owing to the key position which Rumania occupies in the Balkans, our relationship to the other Balkan countries, Italy and especially Soviet Russia is affected by it in the most decisive manner. It is necessary therefore to avoid the least appearance of a military occupation of Rumania, and from the outset to impart to the transfer of German military units to that country the character of the dispatch of a German Wehrmacht mission with the necessary instruction troops.

3. For reasons of policy and concealment, the commanding officers

¹This directive was based on several previous drafts reflecting an exchange of views between the Foreign Ministry and the High Command of the Wehrmacht. On Sept. 14 Weizsäcker had sent to Admiral Canaris a draft containing the proposal that the military mission be attached to the German Legation and that it operate under the direction of the Minister or Chargé d'Affaires in all matters not of a strictly military nature (2012/443279-82). On Oct. 1 General Jodl transmitted to the Foreign Ministry his own draft on behalf of the Wehrmacht High Command, with supplementary explanations (2012/443298-304). According to this document, the chief of the military mission was to be placed under the authority of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, but was still expected to refer to the Legation in political matters. On Oct. 4, Weizsäcker discussed a new Foreign Ministry draft with Admiral Canaris who expressed doubt that Keitel would agree to the suggestion that the position of the commanding officers of the military units should be similar to that of Military Attachés (272/177406-08).

²Document No. 84, enclosure.

of the Army and Luftwaffe units will be designated as "Commanders of the German Army or Luftwaffe Mission in Rumania."

4. The commanding officers of the missions are subordinate to the High Commands of the Army and the Luftwaffe, respectively. These will outline in detail their tasks and powers and decide on the strength and equipment of the missions in accordance with the directives.

5. All matters of common concern to the Army and Luftwaffe missions will be dealt with by the senior commanding officer; in this capacity he will be designated as "Chief of the German Wehrmacht Mission in Rumania."

Where the commanding officers of the two missions disagree on the handling of such matters, a decision will be rendered on my behalf by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

The "Chief of the German Wehrmacht Mission in Rumania" will also handle *matters of common concern* with the authorities of the Rumanian armed forces. This includes all questions which touch conjointly the prestige and conduct of the German military authorities and personnel; further, all demands and requests, especially those of a material nature which must be presented jointly to prevent any differences in treatment.

In this capacity he will also have control of those units with functions within the sphere of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, which are attached to the Wehrmacht mission (transport, signal communication, intelligence, war economy). The concrete tasks of these units will be regulated by the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

6. The commanding officers of the mission will report to their High Command on all matters of purely military concern. The senior commanding officer, in his capacity of "Chief of the German Wehrmacht Mission" will report to the High Command of the Wehrmacht on all matters of common concern to the Wehrmacht.

7. Whenever superior military authorities [in Berlin] issue to the commanding officers of the missions military orders which might have repercussions in the field of foreign policy, the High Command of the Wehrmacht will establish prior agreement thereon with the Foreign Ministry.

This rule does not apply to orders of a purely military nature or operational directives which do not come to the attention of the Rumanian authorities.

8. The commanding officers of the missions will deal only with the corresponding authorities of the Rumanian armed forces.

Negotiations with the Rumanian Government on matters concerning the missions will be (exclusively) conducted by the German Minister.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 172

F18/281

*Spanish Minister of Interior Serrano Suñer to Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop*¹

MADRID, October 10, 1940.

DEAR HERR MINISTER: Upon my return from Berlin and Rome I had several conversations with the Caudillo for the purpose of continuing the examination of the questions and views which were considered during our meeting in the capital of the Reich. We have received here the economic proposals which were put forward by the German Government² and expect very soon to make a concrete counterproposal with the object of arriving at an agreement on those matters, as well as on those dealing with the details and circumstances of the 10-year pact of military alliance with Germany and Italy.³ We believe that all of these must be treated with the utmost secrecy so as not to prejudice our securing several shiploads of Argentine wheat and others from Canada, which we have still been able to purchase although with great difficulty. All of this for the good of the common cause. Consequently, even our diplomatic bureaucrats, while playing a certain balancing act in order to obtain the greatest possible quantities of wheat and gasoline, will not know of our negotiations which will be carried on only through our personal contact and those maintained in secret correspondence between the Führer and the Caudillo.

We have already installed in the Canary Islands four batteries, and also a substantial number of pursuit planes and machine-gun nests, which eliminate any possibility of an English or American landing, and yesterday one of the bravest generals of our Army was dispatched to take command of the Grand Canary.

We have just recently sent to Morocco two additional divisions under good command. The Caudillo has requested me to inform you of his impression that de Gaulle is preparing an uprising in Oran.

I renew to you, Herr Reich Minister, the expression of my personal friendship and request you to repeat my respects and compliments to the Führer, with best wishes for the collaboration of our two peoples for the common good.

RAMÓN SERRANO SUÑER

¹The translation is from the German. The Spanish text is filmed on F18/282-283.

²See document No. 126.

³See document No. 116.

No. 173

F14/176-81

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry

OCTOBER [11], 1940.

RECORD OF THE VISIT OF THE ITALIAN MINISTER FOR TRADE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROL, RICCARDI, WITH THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER ON OCTOBER 11, 1940, FROM 5:00 TO 6:10 P. M.¹

Present: the Foreign Minister
Minister Riccardi
Minister Clodius
and—after 5:35 p. m., when the following memorandum begins—interpreter Noack

The conversation was conducted in the French language.

At the arrival of the interpreter the Reich Foreign Minister stated that Africa had been divided between the two friendly Powers into various spheres of interest, with East Africa the center of gravity for Italy and Equatorial Africa for Germany. There were tremendous economic problems to be solved there after the joint victory. Africa was a gigantic deposit of raw materials still awaiting real exploitation. In addition there were still other raw material areas such as Iraq with its oil wells, among others; here Germany and Italy had decided to split "half-part"² when they succeeded to the British and other interests. In from 10 to 20 years in any case our scarcity of raw materials could be eliminated through the development of these areas. The Belgian Congo area alone at present yielded only 5 to 10 percent of what one could get from it by thorough exploitation. Just as important as exploitation was the organization of the defense of the colonial empire. Both would proceed in accordance with the revolutionary ideas of our two countries. Thus, for example, we would continue building our economy on the basis of production and labor power and not on the basis of gold. The gold would then flow back from America of its own accord. Roosevelt was so concerned purely on account of these economic considerations. Furthermore, closer economic cooperation was to be sought with the Japanese and—why not?—also with the Russians. That would put the Americans in a very ticklish position; their political isolation would be followed by economic isolation. If economics, which always had to follow the lead of politics, were placed on a new basis with the establishment of domination over two continents, it would then not be difficult to regulate the individual economic questions because of the close political

¹ See document No. 115, footnote 3.

² In English in the original.

cooperation of the two friendly nations. In this the creation of a central clearing office—which was incidentally a brilliant idea—would be of very great significance. No matter how the future developed, the friendship between Germany and Italy would last for centuries, for in surveying the political scene it became evident that we were the only large nations without conflicting interests. Thus it would doubtless be possible to find ways and means of bringing about an agreement between Riccardi and Funk.³ This must also be done where our interests clashed, e. g., in the Balkan countries and in Hungary. If one always kept our motto in mind: We will do everything together, then agreement could always be reached. One question was particularly important and a solution had to be found at once: the question of eliminating the undervaluation of the reichsmark in the Balkan countries.

CLODIUS: Italy had raised the exchange rate of the free currencies by 4 percent, but not that of the mark. In Central Europe (Hungary, etc.) the rate of exchange of the mark, moreover, had been too low for years.

RICCARDI: The elimination of the difference in the rates of exchange was for Italy in particular a question of appearances and therefore very difficult to put through at the present time.

CLODIUS: But just at this time it was particularly important, when the establishment of a central clearing was being considered; equality of the rates of exchange was a prerequisite for this.

RICCARDI: But the solution of this question was not opportune for Italy just at this time.

CLODIUS: It was, after all, merely a question of lowering the exchange rate of the dollar by 4 percent; everything else was then unimportant.

RICCARDI: Minister Funk's speech in Königsberg⁴ had aroused displeasure in Italy and had been very disquieting particularly to the industrialists, who were interested in the further expansion of Italian autarky; that was not merely an economic problem, but primarily a political and military one.

REICH FOREIGN MINISTER: Funk's speech had been only of a general nature. The individual questions would after all be solved jointly. After our victory the bases of world economy would be quite different. The English would then disappear as world traders and our economic units would become their successors. All questions would then be relatively easy to solve, but it was a task for generations—

³ See document No. 181.

⁴ In this speech made on Aug. 11 on the opening of a trade fair, Funk had discussed the changes in the European and world economy that would result from a German victory over Great Britain.

RICCARDI: —and for men.

REICH FOREIGN MINISTER: His help in the solution of these individual questions would always be available. In 1919 Germany had had a Foreign Minister by the name of Rathenau⁵ who wanted to dissolve the Foreign Ministry as such and instead attach an office for foreign policy to the Ministry of Economics. At the time he had been considered an economic genius. At any rate he had considered politics merely as a function of economics. That had been possible only for an international, rootless Jew. According to our opinion that was madness; for the power of a people had to be based in first place on the national strength of its people. Economics was simply a tool of politics and as such had to support politics. Therefore if after our victory we applied ourselves to the settlement of the economic questions we should never disregard the strength of the people. We had forgotten it after the war. The result had been that even small countries threatened us by concluding treaties if we did not show ourselves to be amenable to them. From this it was clear that not everything must be based on economics. Thank God these times in Germany and Italy had now definitely passed. It was clear to the Führer and the Duce that a successful economic policy could be carried out only with strong armed forces. It had been particularly difficult to tear Japan away from her old conceptions. For 6 years he had fought for an alliance with Japan. Last year Count Ciano and he had been directly on the verge of concluding the treaty with Japan;⁶ that had been shortly before the conclusion of the treaty with Moscow. At the last moment Arita⁷ had then stated that Japan's situation did not permit this alliance because the country was dependent economically upon North America. Time and again he had sent telegrams to Japan—all in all perhaps several hundreds of them—again and again with the urgent admonition: abandon these ideas, do not subordinate your policy to economics. Finally he had been able to prevail with his ideas. He was also convinced that Japan could later continue to trade with the United States. The present embargo of the United States had after all been imposed before Japan's alliance with the Axis Powers. Others could have followed; this had not been the case, however. He was convinced that Japan's economy would develop favorably in the future, too; for in the first place the urge now existed for the country to make itself economically independent, and in the second place the mercenary spirit of the Americans would know how to prevent the Pacific Ocean from being closed off even if the

⁵ Walther Rathenau, German Foreign Minister, January–June 1922.

⁶ On the negotiations in 1939 for a German-Italian-Japanese alliance, see vols. VI and VII of this series, *passim*.

⁷ Hachiro Arita, Japanese Foreign Minister, October 1938–August 1939; January–July 1940.

Government wanted to do so. Credit for having supported the policy of our two Powers in Japan was due in particular to the two last Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin⁸ and Rome,⁹ in whom we had enthusiastic friends of our countries. He considered a war between Japan and the United States to be very improbable, for the Americans knew very well that the Japanese fleet was superior to theirs. At any rate it had been very difficult to turn the Japanese away from their old ideas. For us it had long been a matter of course that politics should not be forgotten in the economy, but that both had to work together as closely as possible.

At the conclusion of the conversation the Reich Foreign Minister gave Minister Riccardi the Order of the Grand Cross of the German Eagle.

NOACK

⁸ Hiroshi Oshima.
⁹ Toshio Shiratori.

No. 174

104/112580-82

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 11, 1940.

Prince Bismarck telephones from Rome that the Italian Government, informed of the action which we are planning in the question of the Danube,¹ has expressed its complete agreement.

Accordingly, there is no further objection to inserting the proposed paragraph on this question into the letter to M. Stalin.²

The text of the communication which can now be addressed to the Soviet Government in reply to its memorandum, handed to Count Schulenburg by Molotov on September 14,³ is again enclosed here. According to the proposal with regard to the letter to M. Stalin, Count Schulenburg is to be instructed to give this reply to M. Molotov personally. I request instructions whether this is to be the case, or whether the reply is to be wired to Moscow even before Count Schulenburg's return trip, so that it may be handed in by the Chargé d'Affaires more quickly.⁴

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

¹ This refers to the German communication to the Soviet Government, printed as enclosure to this document.

² Document No. 176. The reference to the Danube question in this letter follows only in parts a draft submitted by Wiehl on Oct. 10 (711/262251-52).

³ See document No. 56.

⁴ The text of the instruction as actually sent to Moscow has not been found, but a subsequent reference to it indicates that it was dispatched on Oct. 11 and bore the number W 4696 g. Telegram No. 1857 of Oct. 15 instructed Schulenburg to continue the talks with Molotov on Danubian questions in accordance with the instructions of Oct. 11 (104/112586). See document No. 188.

[Enclosure]

In its memorandum of September 14, the Soviet Government expresses its interest in participating in the settlement of problems regarding the Danube from its mouth to Bratislava. It proposes to establish the international statute for this part of the Danube in accord with the interests of the riparian states and to form a new Danube commission for this purpose.

The German Government recognizes this interest of the Soviet Government and is prepared to do its share to help in its realization. It agrees to the idea of creating a unified commission for the Danube below Bratislava to its mouth. In this it presupposes that the Italian Government, which has consented to the proposals listed below, shall also be a member of this commission.

The creation of such a unified commission, however, will require some time since in such a basic reorganization the consent of all states concerned on a number of questions has to be obtained, and since in most of these states the international Danube Statute of 1921⁵ still is legally in force. It will, therefore, be necessary to provide for interim solutions during the period until the new commission is created.

Such an interim solution has already been created with regard to the Danube above Brăila through the "provisional agreement" of September 12, 1940, abolishing the International Danube Commission. This agreement has already been communicated to the Soviet Government.⁶ The German Government proposes that the Soviet Government accede to this provisional agreement. It is prepared, if the Soviet Government should accept this proposal, to bring about the necessary decisions by the other countries concerned.

With respect to the European Danube Commission, the German Government deems it necessary, as does the Soviet Government, to liquidate this Commission soon and to terminate the participation of England or France in the problems of the lower Danube and the Danube delta. To carry on technical functions heretofore performed by the European Commission in the period prior to the setting up of a definitive unified Danube commission, a provisional arrangement, with the Soviet Government participating, would be desirable. The German Government considers it most advisable that such a provisional settlement be arranged in conferences between authorized experts representing Germany, Italy, Rumania, and the Soviet Union. The German Government considers Bucharest a suitable place for such a conference, but would be prepared, if it should be desired, to have it held somewhere in Germany, perhaps Dresden. The German Govern-

⁵ For the text of this document, signed on July 23, 1921, see the British White Paper, Cmd. 1754 (1922): *Convention Instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube*.

⁶ See document No. 53.

ment would consider it desirable if these conferences could still take place during the month of October. It asks to be informed whether the Soviet Government agrees to this procedure and, if so, when its delegates would be available for this conference and what meeting place it desires. The German Government then will inform the Italian and Rumanian Governments. The latter has been informed provisionally of the above proposal in respect to the European Danube Commission.⁷

After the Western Powers thus are eliminated from all Danube questions and provisions made to continue, for the time being, the arrangements to assure unimpeded Danube navigation with the participation of the Soviet Union, preparations for the formation of a new unified Danube commission can then begin. Regarding the procedure to be followed here, another understanding between the German, the Italian, and the Soviet Governments should be brought about.

⁷ Not found. On Oct. 15, Zamboni, Italian Counselor of Embassy, informed Woermann that the Rumanian Government had handed his Government a memorandum setting forth its opposition to the dissolution of the European Danube Commission. To Zamboni's inquiry of the German Government's attitude, Woermann replied that the Rumanian step in Rome was superseded by the German-Italian accord reached in the meantime on the basis of the Soviet proposals. (Woermann memorandum of October 15: 711/262239-40)

Zamboni promised to send a copy of the Rumanian memorandum; a German translation is in the file (711/262229-37).

No. 175

368/207134-36

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

HWIX, OCTOBER 12, 1940—11: 10 p. m.

Unnumbered

Received October 13—12: 40 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 191 of October 5.¹

Yesterday General von Stülpnagel sent to the National Defense Department of the OKW the following proposal on defining the control areas of the Mixed German-Italian Control Commission for Africa:

"In preparation of instructions for the Mixed German-Italian Control Commission under Italian chairmanship, difficulties have arisen regarding the delimitation of the control areas. The German Armistice Commission is interested in delimiting the control areas in such a way that from the very start not only the military interests are secured but in addition political considerations which may arise later will be taken into account in advance.

The main points of German interest lie:

- a) on the Atlantic coast of Africa,
- b) in Equatorial Africa.

¹ Document No. 154.

These are areas which, in the opinion of the German Armistice Commission, do not touch on Italy's military and political sphere of interest.

In the main there are two solutions which can be considered for the implementation of the controls:

Solution 1:

West and Equatorial Africa and the Atlantic coast of Morocco represent a unified control area, within which the controls will be exercised as determined in each case either by German or Italian authorities or by mixed commissions. This solution has the disadvantage that in the distribution of functions, which can be done only in close cooperation between the chairmen of the German and Italian delegations, the Italian chairman will in the last analysis also decide about purely German areas of interest. In view of the fact that a German control in the Italian areas of interest in Tunisia and Algeria is consciously excluded, this situation does not appear desirable.

Solution 2:

(Cf. *b*, also accompanying map.²)

The following line shall serve as boundary between the German and Italian control areas in West and Equatorial Africa:

The boundary between Algeria and Mauretania to the line of 5° west longitude, 5° west longitude to the line of 18° north latitude, the line of 18° north latitude to the Sudan.

Morocco, on the other hand, shall be under mixed control, with the main center of German control on the Atlantic coast.

This solution has the disadvantage that no clear situation is created for Morocco. It would be desirable also to include all or part of Morocco in the German control area; however, owing to the difficult political situation in Morocco there are objections to this solution, which make it appear undesirable to arouse the impression, by dividing the Moroccan area, that we intend a partition. In consideration of the anti-Italian attitude of the population in Morocco, however, the German Armistice Commission is of the opinion that it is advisable for the mixed control authorities there to be under a German chairman.

Aside from this special situation for Morocco, however, solution 2 involves a clear delimitation of controls between Germany and Italy which would restrict the activity of a mixed German-Italian commission to Morocco, but would otherwise assign one independent control area to a German commission and another to an Italian commission. Therefore the German Armistice Commission advocates solution 2.

The German Armistice Commission is clearly aware that at the moment, owing to the political situation, it does not seem advisable to dispatch the Mixed Commission as yet; it might even be that, on the basis of possible new political directives for our attitude toward France, the functions of the Mixed Commission as visualized so far might be considerably changed. However, it does not seem necessary for this reason to make any changes in the organization of the German delegation now under way; it will be suitable for other tasks even in its intended form. It is proposed, however, that the Commission not be permitted actually to convene as early as October 15, but that from that time on it be kept ready to leave on short notice.

² Not found.

In any case, however, the delimitation of the control areas is important and needs to be clarified. Before the German Armistice Commission approaches the Italian Armistice Commission with a proposal on this score it is requested that the questions introduced above be examined and decided upon.

The Foreign Ministry has been informed by the representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Armistice Commission."

Conclusion of the report to the OKW; the map mentioned in the report will follow by courier.³

HENCKE

³ Ambassador Ritter noted in a memorandum of Oct. 15 (368/207144):

"I spoke to General Jodl today about the proposal of the German Armistice Commission in the telegram of Oct. 12—unnumbered—relative to the delimitation of the control area between Italy and Germany.

"He agreed with me that the dispatching of the German-Italian commission was not timely at the moment. The German Armistice Commission could, however, speak with the Italian Armistice Commission now in preparation of this delimitation. General Jodl agrees that this should be based upon solution 2."

No. 176

F5/0433-0451

*Joachim von Ribbentrop to Josef Stalin*¹

BERLIN, October 13, 1940.

MY DEAR M. STALIN: Over a year ago, through your decision and the Führer's, the relations between Germany and Soviet Russia were re-examined and put on a completely new basis. I believe that the decision to reach an understanding between our two countries—which resulted from the realization that the Lebensräume of our peoples adjoin each other but need not necessarily overlap, and which led to a delimitation of mutual spheres of influence and to the German-Soviet Russian Non-Aggression² and Friendship Treaties³—has proved advantageous to both sides. I am convinced that the consistent continuance of this policy of good neighborliness and a further strengthening of the political and economic collaboration will redound to the greater and greater benefit of the two great peoples in the future. Germany, at any rate, is prepared and determined to work to this end.

With such a goal, it seems to me, a direct contact between the responsible persons of both countries becomes particularly important. I believe that such a personal contact through other than the customary diplomatic channels is indispensable from time to time in authoritarian regimes such as ours. Today, therefore, I would like to review briefly the events since my last visit to Moscow.⁴ Because of

¹ Concerning the delivery of this letter, see documents Nos. 186 and 195.

² Vol. VII of this series, document No. 228.

³ Vol. VIII of this series, document No. 157.

⁴ Sept. 27-29, 1939; see *ibid.*, documents Nos. 152, 162, and 163.

the historical importance of these events and in continuation of our exchange of ideas of last year, I would like to review for you the policy which Germany has pursued during this period.

After the conclusion of the Polish campaign we became aware—and this was confirmed by many reports which were received during the winter—that England, faithful to her traditional policy, was building her whole war strategy on the hope of an extension of the war. The attempts made in 1939 to win over the Soviet Union to a military coalition against Germany had already pointed in this direction. They were frustrated by the German-Soviet Russian Agreement. Later on, the attitude of England and France in the Soviet Russian-Finnish conflict was similar.

In the spring of 1940, these concealed intentions became quite evident. With this began the active phase of the English policy of extending this war to other peoples of Europe. After the end of the Soviet Russian-Finnish War, Norway was selected as the first target. By the occupation of Narvik and other Norwegian bases, Germany's iron ore supplies were to be cut off and a new front established in Scandinavia. It was only due to the timely intervention of the German leadership and to the quick blows of our troops—who chased the English and the French out of Norway—that all of Scandinavia did not become a theater of war.

Several weeks later this Anglo-French game was to be repeated in Holland and Belgium. And here, too, Germany was able at the eleventh hour to prevent the contemplated thrust of the Anglo-French armies against the Ruhr region (of which we had been informed some time before) by the decisive victories of our armies. Today, even in France, "England's continental sword," it has become apparent to most Frenchmen that their country in the last analysis had to bleed to death as a victim of this traditional humanitarian policy of England. As to the present English rulers, who declared war on Germany and who thereby plunged the British people into misfortune, even they themselves were finally no longer able to conceal their traditional British policy and their contempt for their own allies. On the contrary, when fate turned against them, all their hypocritical protestations ceased. With true English cynicism, they have treacherously forsaken their friends. In fact, in order to save themselves they slandered their erstwhile allies, and later on they even openly opposed them by force. Åndalsnes, Dunkirk, Oran, Dakar, are names which—it appears to me—could sufficiently enlighten the world on the value of England's friendship. However, on this occasion we Germans, too, learned a lesson: that the English are not only unscrupulous politicians, but also bad soldiers. Our troops have routed them wherever they accepted battle. The German soldier was superior to them everywhere.

The Balkans were the next goal of the English policy of extending the war. According to reports which have reached us, all sorts of plans were repeatedly drawn up there this year, and in one instance their execution was already ordered. That those plans were not duly carried out was—as we know today—due exclusively to the almost unbelievable dilettantism and the astonishing discord among the political as well as the military leaders of England and France.

Germany's foes have endeavored to conceal from the world their measures for extending the war, and they have tried before the whole world to brand our exposure of these English methods of extending the war as a maneuver of German propaganda. In the meantime, fate would have it that documents of inestimable importance fell into the hands of the German armies advancing with lightning speed in the various theaters of war. As is well known, we succeeded in capturing the secret political files of the French General Staff,⁵ which were already prepared for shipment, and thereby obtained incontrovertible proof of the correctness of our reports regarding the intentions of our adversary and the conclusions we had drawn from them. A number of these documents, as you will remember, have already been published in the press, and an enormous amount of material is still being translated and examined. If needed, it is to be published in a White Book. With truly striking conclusiveness the background of the English war policy is here revealed. You will understand that we are gratified at being able to open the eyes of the world to the unprecedented incompetence as well as to the almost criminal recklessness with which the present English rulers, by their declaration of war on Germany, plunged into misfortune not only their own people but also other peoples of Europe. But even beyond that, the documents at our disposal prove that the gentlemen on the Thames would not have shrunk from attacking completely disinterested nations, merely because they continued their natural trade with Germany despite English representations and even threats. Undoubtedly, the Soviet-Russian oil center of Baku and the oil port of Batum, for example, would even this year have become the victim of British attacks, if the collapse of France and the expulsion of the English Army from Europe had not broken the English spirit of aggression and put an abrupt end to these activities.

Nevertheless, recognizing the complete absurdity of continuing this war, on July 19 the Führer again offered peace to England.⁶ After the refusal of this last offer Germany is now determined to prosecute the war against England and her Empire until the final defeat of

⁵ See vol. x of this series, Editors' Note, p. 124.

⁶ For the German text of Hitler's speech before the Reichstag, July 19, 1940, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, August 1940, pp. 603-622; for official translation, see *Facts in Review*, vol. II, No. 32, pp. 362-375.

Britain. This fight to the finish is now in progress and will only end when the foe is annihilated militarily or when a real understanding is assured through elimination of the forces responsible for the war. It does not matter when this takes place.

For one thing is sure: The war as such has been won by us anyway. It is only a question of how long it will be before England, under the impact of our operations, admits to complete collapse.

In this final phase of the war, to guard against any moves which England might yet make in her desperate situation, the Axis, as an obvious precaution, was forced after the defeat of France to secure its military and strategic position in Europe as well as its political and diplomatic position in the world. In addition, there was the safeguarding of the requirements for maintaining our economic life. Immediately after the end of the campaign in the West, Germany and Italy started with this task, and now they have carried it out in its broad outlines. In this connection there may also be mentioned the task, which is unprecedented for Germany, of securing her Norwegian coastal positions all the way from the Skagerrak to Kirkenes. Germany has therefore entered into certain purely technical agreements with Sweden and Finland, of which I have already fully informed you through the German Embassy.⁷ They are exclusively for the purpose of facilitating supply of the coastal cities in the North (Narvik and Kirkenes)—which are difficult for us to reach by land—by shipping supplies via the territory of these countries.

The policy which we have recently pursued in the Rumanian-Hungarian controversy is similarly oriented. Our guarantee to Rumania⁸ is due exclusively to the necessity of protecting this Balkan region—which is especially important from the standpoint of the German supplies of oil and grain—against any disturbance by war, sabotage, etc., in the interior of this area, as well as against invasion attempts from the outside. The anti-German press tried at that time to place on the guarantee of the Axis Powers to Rumania constructions whose purpose was all too apparent. The truth of the matter is that toward the end of August—as we know—the situation between Rumania and Hungary, fomented by English agents as the notorious agitators in the Balkans, had reached such a point that the outbreak of war was imminent and, in fact, air skirmishes had already occurred. It was obvious that the peace could be saved in the Balkans only through the most rapid diplomatic intervention. There was no time for any negotiations or consultations. Matters had already gone too far from a military standpoint. This accounts for the completely improvised meeting in Vienna and the Award within 24 hours. It is,

⁷ See documents Nos. 142 and 148.

⁸ See vol. x of this series, document No. 413.

therefore, probably superfluous to emphasize that the tendency shown in the anti-German press at that time—to construe these German-Italian actions as aimed against the Soviet Union—was entirely unfounded and dictated solely by the intention to disrupt relations between the Axis and the Soviet Union.

The German military mission, too, sent a few days ago at the request of the Rumanians, together with the attached instruction units of the German Wehrmacht, which again was taken as an occasion for flimsy speculations by our foes, serves both to train the Rumanian Army and to safeguard German interests, because the German economy and the economies of these territories are closely interdependent. If England, as some reports seem to indicate, really intended to undertake some action against the oil fields of Rumania, for instance, we have indeed already taken measures to give the appropriate answer to such English attempts at intervention from abroad or of sabotage from within. In view of the completely misleading and tendentious press reports, which have been increasing in number during the last few days, I informed your Ambassador, M. Shkvtartsev, a few days ago as to the true motives for our action and of the measures actually taken.⁹

In connection with the sabotage attempts by the English, the question raised by your Government concerning reorganization of the regime on the Danube is of some importance.¹⁰ I may inform you that, in agreement with the Italian Government, we shall make proposals in the next few days which will take into account your wishes in the matter.¹¹

After these measures to safeguard the position of the Axis in Europe, the principal interest of the Reich Government and of the Italian Government during recent weeks was aimed at preventing the spread of the war beyond Europe into a world conflagration. For, as the hopes of the English of finding allies in Europe faded, the English Government intensified its efforts to support particularly those circles which in the democracies overseas aimed at an entry into the war against Germany and Italy and on the side of England. In contrast to this was the interest of those peoples which were animated in the same degree by the desire for a new order in the world as against the congealed plutocratic democracies and which saw, just as we did, these interests threatened by a further extension of the European war into a world conflagration. This condition applied particularly to Japan. Some time ago, therefore, upon orders from the Führer, I sent an emissary to Tokyo to ascertain unofficially whether the common interests could be expressed in the form of a pact directed against the

⁹ See document No. 166.

¹⁰ See documents Nos. 50, 53, and 56.

¹¹ See documents Nos. 174 and 188.

further extension of the war to other peoples.¹² The exchange of ideas which followed very soon resulted in a complete and general consensus between Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo, on the fact that, in the interest of an early restoration of peace, any further spread of war should be prevented and that the best way to counteract the warmongering of an international clique would be by a military alliance of the three Powers. Thus, despite all the British intrigues, the Berlin treaty was concluded with surprising rapidity—as I was able to advise you through the Embassy as soon as the final agreement had been reached on the day before the signing.¹³ I believe that the conclusion of this Treaty will hasten the downfall of the present English rulers, who are alone in opposing the final restoration of peace, and that it will thereby serve the interests of all peoples.

As to the question of the attitude toward the Soviet Union of the three partners to this alliance, I should like to state in advance that from the very beginning of the exchange of views all three Powers held equally to the opinion that this Pact was not aimed in any way against the Soviet Union; that, on the contrary, the friendly relations of the three Powers and their treaties with the Soviet Union should remain completely unaffected by this agreement. This attitude has, indeed, found its formal expression in the text of the Berlin treaty.¹⁴ As to Germany, the conclusion of this Pact is the logical result of a conception of foreign policy—long adhered to by the Reich Government—in which both friendly German-Soviet cooperation and friendly German-Japanese cooperation have a place side by side and undisturbed. Beyond that, however, neighborly relations between Germany and Soviet Russia as well as neighborly relations between Soviet Russia and Japan, together with the friendship between the Axis Powers and Japan, are logical elements of a natural political constellation which, if intelligently managed, will work out to the best advantage of all the participating Powers. You will remember that at the time of my first visit to Moscow,¹⁵ I discussed similar ideas with you quite frankly and that I offered our good offices for the adjustment of differences still existing at the time between the Soviet Russians and the Japanese. I have endeavored since then to work in this direction, and I would welcome it, if the trend toward reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union—which is becoming more and more clearly manifest in Japan, too—could lead to its logical goal.

In summing up, I should like to state that, in the opinion of the Führer, also, it appears to be the historic mission of the four Powers—the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan, and Germany—to adopt a long-range

¹² See document No. 44.

¹³ See documents Nos. 109 and 113.

¹⁴ Document No. 118.

¹⁵ Aug. 23-24, 1939; see vol. VII of this series, documents Nos. 213 and 234.

policy and to direct the future development of their peoples into the right channels by delimitation of their interests for the ages.

In order further to clarify issues of such decisive importance for the future of our peoples and in order to discuss them in concrete form, we would welcome it if M. Molotov would pay us a visit in Berlin soon. I should like to extend a most cordial invitation to him in the name of the Reich Government. After my two visits to Moscow, it would now be a particular pleasure for me personally to see M. Molotov in Berlin. His visit would then give the Führer the opportunity to explain to M. Molotov personally his views regarding the future molding of relations between our two countries. Upon his return, M. Molotov will be able to report to you at length concerning the aims and intentions of the Führer. If then—as I believe I may expect—the opportunity should arise for further elaboration of a common policy in accordance with my foregoing statements, I should be happy to come to Moscow again personally in order to resume the exchange of ideas with you, my dear M. Stalin, and to discuss—possibly together with representatives of Japan and Italy—the bases of a policy which would only be of *practical* advantage to all of us.

With best regards,

Yours, etc.

RIBBENTROP

No. 177

F13/512-16;
F14/157-60

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, October 15, 1940.

RECEPTION OF ITALIAN FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER RICCARDI, BY THE FÜHRER, ON OCTOBER 14, 1940, FROM 12:30 P. M. TO 1:30 P. M. ALSO PRESENT WERE MINISTER DR. FUNK, STATE MINISTER MEISSNER, SENIOR COUNSELOR HEWEL, AND DR. NOACK AS INTERPRETER

Riccardi thanks the Führer for the great honor bestowed upon him by this reception. The Führer regrets that Riccardi has to experience Berlin during the blackout. He is sure that he could enjoy the city much more otherwise. Riccardi says that he is used to blackouts from Rome, where they are carried out even more widely than in Berlin. The Führer is of the opinion that Rome is much more beautiful in moonlight than Berlin. Really, one ought to black out certain cities in peacetime when the moon is out as a special sight to see, such as Nürnberg or Dresden, for example, which are much more beautiful thus than with their lights on. Riccardi describes the Via Appia in

moonlight as particularly impressive; from the artistic standpoint the Führer is certainly right. But the Führer says that one must not overlook the economic aspect either. The blackout was also of very great economic importance. Tremendous quantities of coal were saved in this way, and the means of transportation could be used for other purposes. Riccardi stresses here how very grateful they were in Italy for the coal deliveries, especially since they had the greatest respect for the accomplishments represented by these deliveries. When the Führer objects, saying that this was only a question of transportation, Riccardi says that this was precisely the reason for his admiration being so great; for Germany's territory had now been extended to such a degree that it was precisely transportation which was doubtless one of the main problems. The Führer concedes that great areas have been conquered and that unfortunately means of transportation were not secured in corresponding quantities. Part of the rolling stock had been removed in time and another part had been destroyed by our bombers. The expansion of our transportation network required particular energy and discipline. One should remember that at the present time 80,000 railway cars of coal were en route daily in Germany.

Another problem was that of the transportation of oil. The Russian oil could be transported only by land, and in addition there was the different railroad gauge that necessitated reloading at the border. Rumanian exports of oil to Germany were also constantly increasing, but most of this also had to be transported by land, especially in winter when river transportation was entirely impossible. It was fortunate that the English were so unsystematic and unintelligent in their air warfare that they did not do us any perceptible damage, not even in the transportation system, where we had expected it most. Riccardi says that this was fortunate not only for Germany but also for Italy. Italy, too, had hardly suffered at all, in comparison to the chances which the English air force had had. He mentions the Italian need for rubber, manganese, and asbestos. They would like to get asbestos from Russia, and Italy had asked Germany to act as a middleman in Russia, since they did not want to apply there directly.

The Führer states that he was just trying to discuss a number of new problems with Russia.¹ It was uncertain as yet what would be the result; above all it was necessary to prevent Russia from approaching the Bosphorus via Rumania. For Rumania there existed the danger of the English long-range bombers from the Mediterranean, but we had now taken precautions and scarcely anything could happen any more. Our policy meant in a certain way a frustration of Russian wishes,

¹ See document No. 176.

but we had to remain hard here. One Rumanian bird in the hand was worth more than two Russian birds in the bush, or one should really say that the Rumanian bird was in reality worth more than two birds. Economically the Russians demanded of us mainly what we could least do without during the war, not only war material as such, but in particular, the most valuable machine tools for the manufacture of war material. It was indeed good that the others in the world were even less able to supply these things. Riccardi knows Rumania from his own observation and says that though the people are lazy and uninteresting still the market is most decidedly interesting. The yield in oil and minerals could be tremendously increased, much more than we suppose today. The Führer believes that our knowledge of the Rumanian potentialities amounts at most to 10 percent of what the others know who had restricted important sources of production for the purpose of price fixing. However, the sure possession of the Rumanian oil wells meant for us a guarantee of victory. Beyond the purely military problem, which we had solved unequivocally and once for all, there were only three important problems for Germany in a war of long duration, and these were the problems of the three raw materials of coal, iron, and oil.

1. Coal was only a transportation problem that could be solved.
2. There was enough iron in Germany, especially since we now had the Swedish and former Polish deposits and those in Lorraine and Luxembourg at our disposal. They only had to be put in order.
3. Oil: In Germany more and more refineries would now be put in operation, but it would naturally be better to take the oil that comes out of the ground than that which was made out of coal, for here, too, the transportation problem again played the decisive role. To produce a ton of oil one needed 5 tons of coal, and to produce 2 million tons of oil one needed just as much coal as Germany now had to deliver to Italy. Furthermore, the possession of the Rumanian oil fields was also of decisive importance psychologically for deciding the war. The rest of the world also knew that. Thus the question of holding out in this war which uses up such tremendous amounts of materials is really only an arithmetical calculation. Now that the oil is assured for Germany, too, the psychological enthusiasm for the war will surely wane. Rumania is one of the most important factors for our victory; and the difficulties there had now been eliminated.

Hungary was somewhat unreliable, which was also evident in the fact that she had now lowered the flags of revision that had recently flown from the tops of her flagpoles. A further difficulty was Russia's push via Rumania to the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, which simply had to be countered by diplomatic means. The third difficulty was England's awareness of the importance of this area for us, but here, too, he saw no danger now that the entire southeast was so firmly in our hands.

Riccardi pictures the conditions in Italy and says that Italy, too, is making her calculations and establishing her needs for the war. And they had come to the conviction that "General Time" had deserted the English and gone over to the Axis Powers. One could say without exaggeration that today "Time" was working for us and no longer for the Allies.

As far as Hungary was concerned, he had had the impression at first that they had filled their bellies to such a degree that they were satisfied, but ingratitude seemed to be one of their main characteristics. However, it would be possible to handle them.

He had gone over all the problems very carefully with Reich Minister Funk,² and he had come to the conclusion that if one remained alert one could regard not only the present but also the future with equanimity. The Führer states that the decisive thing was simply the fact that we had already won the war as such. The English had made the mistake of using World War criteria for the present war. They had believed they would be able to mobilize almost all of Europe against us as they did then and thus force us into a long, destructive, bloody war in which millions would be killed and immeasurable quantities of material consumed. Thus they wanted to wear us down in a war on two fronts. Now all this had turned out quite differently. The blood sacrifices were so small that they hardly counted at all, and the consumption of material was entirely insignificant. Things looked quite different in London, however. The English could report what they wished, but conditions there must be horrible. An American newspaper had recently reported triumphantly that the destruction by the German Luftwaffe could not be so very significant, for out of 82 American enterprises only 8 had been entirely destroyed and 17 damaged. In contrast to the American newspaper he was entirely satisfied with these figures. It was even more than he had expected. They should wait 2 or 3 months more and see how London looked then. If he could not land by then, at least he would destroy their entire industry. We had aerial photographs now that gave an eloquent picture of the effect of our attacks. On these one could see how armament plants and airplane factories had first been hit by a few bombs and then revealed more and more destruction after repeated attacks until today they were entirely demolished. Thus he was having this work continued every night and every day. This was also true in regard to refrigeration plants, warehouses, dock installations, and in general all important centers of English economic life. Riccardi has himself

² See document No. 181.

been a flyer and is convinced that England must give in this winter, for the fog did not work for England but against her. The Führer is of the same opinion and describes the effect of the English ground fog, which made it impossible for the English planes to land, whereas in our territory there were always alternate airports where our planes could come down. You can take off in fog but not land. He was looking forward to the low-lying fog that occurred in London now and then, during which you could see everything yet not be seen, and during which the tops of the high houses, churches, and chimneys rose above the fog.

Riccardi stressed in conclusion that he was exceedingly well satisfied with his conversations with Reich Minister Funk and he hoped that on the third front, too, namely the economic front, work equal to that of the Wehrmacht had been done and would still be done.³

HEWEL

³ Marginal note: "F[ührer]".

No. 178

104/112579

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1855

BERLIN, October 14, 1940—9:45 p. m.
e. o. Pol. I M 13938 g.

For the Ambassador only.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 2095 of October 4¹ and 2142 of October 10.²

We may for the present regard the two inquiries of Molotov concerning the transportation of German troops through Finland first of all as taken care of by the general communication that you have taken along with you.³ Please, therefore, do not revert to Molotov's inquiry of your own accord. Should Molotov repeat his inquiry, try to dispose of it with the communication mentioned. Should Molotov nevertheless insist, please send me another telegraphic report.

RITTER

¹ Document No. 148.

² Document No. 170.

³ The reference is apparently to Ribbentrop's letter to Stalin, document No. 176; regarding the circumstances of the transmission and delivery of the letter see documents Nos. 186 and 195.

No. 179

F13/473-476;
F13/478-482*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, October 14, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND
RUMANIAN MINISTER VALER POP, IN BERLIN ON OCTOBER 14, 1940¹

With reference to the minorities stipulations of the Vienna Award² and the statement made by the Foreign Minister with the concurrence of Count Ciano in the presence of Count Csáky, as well as to the assurances then given by the latter on behalf of the Hungarian Government, Pop talked about the direct negotiations between the Rumanian and Hungarian Governments, initiated on that basis. As chairman of the Rumanian delegation he had been instructed by his Government not only to do everything required for an honest implementation of the Award, but also to see to it that the foundations would be laid for a new and better relationship between Rumania and Hungary. The negotiations had led to no result because Hungary had refused under a variety of pretexts to regulate the status of minorities, and because the well-known incidents had taken place in the meantime when the territory awarded to Hungary was occupied. Pop mentioned in this connection a number of especially grave cases of atrocities and shootings, and asserted upon remonstrance of the Foreign Minister, that the Rumanian Government possessed definite proof that the incidents had actually occurred as represented in the Rumanian memorandum.³ Some of these instances had even been corroborated by the Hungarian Government itself in its statement that certain measures had been taken because the Rumanian population had shown hostility to the Hungarian troops. Despite this situation and although the deputy of the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Minister Vörnle, had blurted out during a conversation what was virtually a declaration of war on Rumania, Pop had decided nevertheless to make a last attempt at settling the difficulties by having a talk with Count Csáky. Csáky had told him on that occasion that Hungary was willing to conclude a minorities agreement, to be sure, but that it would be impossible to carry such an agreement into effect in view of the state of agitation of Hungarian public opinion. In striving to prevent further deterioration of the situation, the Head of the Rumanian Government had restrained

¹ Valer Pop had been sent to Berlin to deal with Hungarian-Rumanian minorities questions and to conduct a special mission for political and economic matters (undated memorandum by Woermann: 182/85468-69).

² Vol. x of this series, document No. 413.

³ Not printed (F13/477; F13/483-489).

the Rumanian press. Stories of the atrocities committed by the Hungarians had seeped through nevertheless. In these circumstances reproaches were made against the Rumanian Government from all quarters. It was being told from all sides that as the national Government it could not remain passive in the face of these events. There was danger that the Government would be overthrown unless it took some action. While it was possible to submit to territorial cessions imposed by an arbitral award, it was dishonorable for any government to stand by inactive while 1,300,000 Rumanians were being tormented in Hungary. The Rumanian Government did not want to resort to reprisals, but appealed to the German and Italian Governments, asking for redress under article 7 of the Vienna Award. In a letter, which he would subsequently deliver, the Rumanian Government was making three proposals: ⁴

1. To appoint an investigating committee.

When the Foreign Minister interjected that this had already been done,⁵ Pop stated that he had been informed of this and was under instructions to express the gratitude of the Rumanian Government for the appointment of the investigating commission.

2. To see to it that the guilty would be punished.

3. To institute a preventive control system, which would preclude the recurrence of such happenings in the future.

Pop emphasized that all of these proposals were of course being put forward on the basis of reciprocity, and that Rumania would not only permit, but even welcome a commission investigating the cases charged by Hungary.

In conclusion Pop presented to the Foreign Minister a letter from the Rumanian Foreign Minister,⁶ together with a memorandum of the Rumanian Government⁷ and a summary of the acts of lawlessness and violence perpetrated upon the Rumanian population in the territories newly occupied by Hungary.⁸

The Foreign Minister, after reading Sturdza's letter, cited the Hungarian assertions that much had happened on the Rumanian side,

⁴This was a personal letter dated Oct. 9 from Rumanian Foreign Minister Mihai Sturdza to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop (F13/491-495). Sturdza, formerly Minister to Stockholm, replaced Manoilescu at the Foreign Ministry when General Antonescu reshuffled his Cabinet on Sept. 15.

⁵On Oct. 7 the Rumanian Government had put forward the proposal that a German-Italian mixed commission be set up immediately to investigate conditions in Transylvania (Weizsäcker memorandum of Oct. 7: 271/176918). This was followed on Oct. 11 by a similar proposal of the Hungarian Government (Weizsäcker memorandum of Oct. 11: 271/176863-64). On Oct. 12 Woermann recorded telling the Italian Chargé d'Affaires that Ribbentrop had given his approval (271/176837), and a draft telegram of Oct. 13 to the Missions in Budapest and Bucharest stated that Minister Altenburg had been named head of the German delegation.

⁶Not printed (F13/491-495).

⁷See footnote 3.

⁸Not printed (F13/496-511).

too, and asked Pop whether he had any data on that matter. Moreover, when territories changed hands, and especially in cases where national antagonisms were as intense as they were between Hungary and Rumania, it was inevitable that incidents should occur at the time of the transfer. This was deplorable, and for the victims painful to be sure, but all the experience of history indicated that such occurrences, partly due to acts of personal vengeance, had to be reckoned with in connection with the cession of territories. It was a different matter, however, if such incidents were systematically organized by a government. This matter would be looked into. It was clear, in any case—he had also said this in Vienna—that Germany and Italy would not tolerate any systematic persecution of minorities. He (the Foreign Minister) had accordingly declared in Vienna, in the presence of Csáky, that Germany and Italy expected an appropriate attitude on the part of both the Hungarian and the Rumanian Governments.⁹ The fact was that unfortunately certain deplorable incidents had occurred. Only last Saturday¹⁰ he (the Foreign Minister) had raised this subject in his last conversation with the Hungarian Minister in Berlin,¹¹ and had asked him to telegraph Count Csáky immediately in order to remind him of the promise made in Vienna and urge him to stop the outrages.

The best course at the moment would probably be to get the investigating commission installed on the spot as quickly as possible, so that the facts could be established with complete impartiality. After that one would have to await the report of the commission. The most important thing, however, was first of all to have tranquillity in the territories affected. This would no doubt be encouraged by the appearance of the commission. Its chairman, Minister Altenburg, would visit all places where incidents had occurred and investigate everything carefully.

Pop proposed in this connection that one permanent delegate each be appointed for Hungary and Rumania; these delegates would not be members of the commission but would merely be at its disposal to supply information on local conditions.

The Foreign Minister agreed to this proposal subject to concurrence of the Italian Government.

Following this, Pop went on to the second part of his statements and said that the Rumanian regime had changed and the old system had been eliminated. A nationalist government, based on the prin-

⁹ Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 410.

¹⁰ Oct. 12. Woermann recorded in a memorandum of Oct. 12 (271/176818) that the Hungarian Minister had requested an appointment with Ribbentrop before the latter saw Valer Pop.

¹¹ No record of this conversation has been found.

ciples of the Legion, had arisen and the new Government was pursuing a course entirely different from that of its predecessor, both in domestic and foreign policy.

Upon a remark thrown in by the Foreign Minister about the military mission which had by now arrived in Rumania, Pop expressed his gratification at its arrival.

The Foreign Minister stated that it was surely to Rumania's advantage that Germany's military experience had been made accessible to her through the instruction units sent to Rumania. The appearance of the German military mission in Rumania was beneficial also to the entire situation in the Balkans.

Pop agreed, remarking that the presence of the military mission had not only given Rumania a greater sense of security, but could also be viewed as an auspicious omen of the collaboration between Rumania and Germany. The Rumanian Government at any rate was firmly resolved to cooperate with the Axis in all spheres. He could say in all candor that while Italy was closely related to Rumania by race, she could not offer to the Rumanian people what it needed most; namely, discipline and a feeling for order, in brief, a Prussian spirit.

Rumania desired collaboration with Germany in the military sphere (where it had already started), in the political sphere, where it could easily be accomplished, and in the economic sphere. Rumania's financial and economic system, which was still strongly based on liberal doctrines, had to be changed over to the new course; in order to achieve this Rumania needed the advice of experts who already had experience in converting an economy from one system to a new one. The Rumanian Government had therefore contemplated appealing to Germany for such economic and financial advisers; if the Foreign Minister was agreeable to the idea, Rumania would very shortly approach the Reich Government with practical proposals.

The Foreign Minister replied that he could indorse the Rumanian proposal. Germany had given Rumania a guarantee and now stood ready to help wherever help was needed. Germany would be glad to make available her vast experience in the fields of finance, industry, and agriculture. The Foreign Minister mentioned in this connection that Minister Neubacher, who was hitherto charged mainly with the negotiations for petroleum and the deliveries of grain, and through them had established good contact with the Rumanian Government authorities, would be appointed permanent deputy of the German Minister, i. e., permanent Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania. It might be possible to assign to him several experts who could advise the Rumanian Government in the aforementioned fields of finance, business, and agriculture. In any case Germany considered it desirable to have all such matters channeled through the Legation.

Pop replied that the Rumanians had not thought of Minister Neubacher at first because he had special tasks to carry out in Rumania. He had had Herr Wohlthat in mind as an adviser.

The Foreign Minister replied that Herr Wohlthat, as Pop probably knew, was on a mission in Holland and could hardly be spared there. The Reichsbank, however, could assign to Minister Neubacher some other expert like Wohlthat; he would himself discuss this with the President of the Reichsbank and Minister of Economics Funk. Reich Minister Darré would surely also be able to name a comparable agricultural adviser. Minister Neubacher would continue in his present economic mission in Rumania. But in addition, experts qualifying as advisers to the Rumanian Government would be assigned to him.

Pop expressed himself in a very positive way regarding the person of Minister Neubacher, and he stressed that Neubacher enjoyed great popularity in Rumania. He (Pop) would immediately report to General Antonescu, and thought that within a few days' time he would be able to present to the German Government a formal request for the dispatch of advisers.

The Foreign Minister also pointed out that all negotiations in this connection had to be conducted exclusively through State Secretary von Weizsäcker, Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, or Minister Neubacher, because everything was concentrated at the Foreign Ministry.

Pop then added concerning the duration of his stay that he would remain in Berlin until he had helped the new Minister,¹² who had not previously engaged in diplomatic and political work, to get acquainted with his post; that is, he would remain in Germany for a week or two after the Minister's assumption of his office. Technical reasons prevented him from entering upon his official duties sooner than 2 weeks hence, for it was necessary to await the King's official accession to the throne and the appropriate notification of the heads of state, which still had to be engrossed.

In conclusion and by way of a summary the Foreign Minister stated that the investigating commission would leave at once and that he would await its report before resuming his talk with Pop about any further measures that might have to be taken. A certain reassurance would result just from the appearance of the commissions as well as from the communications which he had had conveyed to Hungary.¹³

He entirely approved of Minister Pop's continued stay in Berlin and asked that all matters, especially the question of the financial, eco-

¹² Constantin Grecianu.

¹³ Instructions to remind the Hungarian Government of its promise to treat the minorities well were contained in telegram No. 857 to Budapest of Sept. 28 (73/52766-67).

conomic, and agricultural advisers, be dealt with exclusively through the Foreign Ministry (State Secretary von Weizsäcker, Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, Minister Neubacher).

Pop added at this point that the Rumanians would also like to have railway and road construction experts.

The Foreign Minister promised that he would make the necessary arrangements with Reich Transportation Minister Dorpmüller and Dr. Todt.

SCHMIDT

No. 180

35/22997-99

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1940—4:02 a. m.

No. 2231 of October 16

Received October 17—5:00 a. m.

For OKW Foreign Department [*Ausland*], for OKH Attaché Branch, for the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, for the Air Ministry Attaché Group, for the Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

Evaluation of the situation with regard to defense policy up to the morning of October 16.

1. I must repeatedly point to the diametrically opposing forces operating against each other which determine America's fate. Lindbergh's speech of October 14¹ was an expression of the will of the forces that consider Roosevelt's domestic policy to be ruinous and his foreign policy to be the way to entanglement in the war. To be sure, these circles also desire adequate defensive ability for the United States, but they are opponents of the imperialistic policy of intervention in Europe and Asia and of American hegemony in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans which was proclaimed anew by Roosevelt in his speech on October 12.² At the same time they oppose the present policy which links England's fate with that of the United States, which supports England more extensively, and seeks to make the American nation hysterical by asserting that Germany, Italy, and Japan, after defeating England, will attack the Western Hemisphere. Lindbergh's influence is growing. His commanding spirit takes the lead in circles which can become decisive for America's future attitude toward us and in com-

¹ For the report of Lindbergh's speech of Oct. 14, see the *New York Times*, Oct. 15, 1940, p. 1.

² For the text of President Roosevelt's address at Dayton, Ohio, on Oct. 12, 1940, on Hemisphere defense, see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. IX, pp. 460-467.

bating the fight of international Jewry directed against Germany. It is essential to support these forces. By casting suspicion on them as vassals of Germany an attempt is being made by Roosevelt and the Jews to cut the ground from under them. For this reason, and also at the request of persons worthy of attention, I have previously suggested that Lindbergh, his speeches and his connections with leading German personages not be mentioned in the press, in speeches and discussions, etc.

2. Lindbergh is the representative of the movement for reorientation which, with its strongest support in the General Staff, rejects any intervention in political and military conflicts in Europe and Asia and demands a strong America protected in its independence by adequate armaments, but not reaching aggressively beyond the Western Hemisphere. Opposed to this direction is a group of men entirely without judgment, who are nevertheless powerful in the press; this group consists of retired army officers, ambitious admirals, and official writers who desire America's entry into the war, the sooner the better. A third trend is probably the strongest at the moment; it has representatives on the General Staff, too, but particularly among the independent advisers. This group, to which belong journalists of wide influence and prominent historians such as the well-known D. S. Freeman, demands support of England through the delivery of war material and planes, and has set up the following statement of position:

"As far as the Army and the Air Force are concerned, we are not ready; and we are not even almost ready or half ready, except with respect to the Navy. We must still gain time before we consider entering the war, if we think it is actually necessary to enter the war. It is to the interest of England as well as to our own that in the coming 6 months we become a powerful producer of weapons, but not a belligerent state." In so far as those on the General Staff incline toward the idea of entry into the war by the United States or consider the time at which America will be sufficiently armed to be able to take the risk of entering the war, the opinion is that American policy must be one of gaining time, that 6 months are not sufficient and that before the middle of 1941 no steps should be taken which might result in war.

3. I consider it possible that the Lindbergh trend will prevail, although at the moment a victory of Roosevelt's war policy may seem probable. It is evident from Roosevelt's speech to the nation on the morning of October 16^s how much he fears Lindbergh's ideas. On the occasion of calling up the youth for military service he stated once again that the "aggressor nations" forced America to adopt compulsory military service, and had instituted the total war which is now forcing

^s For the text of President Roosevelt's address on Oct. 16, 1940, see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. ix, pp. 473-475.

America to resort to the measures which she is taking without hysteria in the interest of peace. One need moreover only follow the latest developments as described in my reports No. 2178 of October 9⁴ and No. 2107 of October 1⁵ to recognize that with Roosevelt his deeds do not correspond to his big words and for the time being the more objective evaluation in the sense of the General Staff has won the upper hand.⁶

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

⁴ Document No. 164.

⁵ Document No. 141.

⁶ On Oct. 26 Weizsäcker replied in telegram No. 1218 directed to the Chargé d'Affaires personally:

"The evaluation of Lindbergh's speech of Oct. 14 and proposals for press policy in the treatment of it belong in your field of competence, not in that of the Military Attaché. The Military Attaché is inclined to make this kind of event, by including it within the framework of his observations on military policy, into a subject for his own reporting, which, in general, however, is appreciated here. Please see that the precedence of the Embassy is maintained." (35/23063)

No. 181

2074/450222-25

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 16, 1940.

THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS HELD UP TO NOW WITH THE ITALIAN FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER, RICCARDI

Signor Riccardi, during the past 6 days of his sojourn in Berlin, had numerous detailed discussions with Minister Funk and myself about the future economic organization of Europe and German-Italian cooperation in this sphere.¹ In general no concrete results emerged from these theoretical discussions. The following points, however, are to be emphasized:

1. Signor Riccardi finally abandoned as hopeless his ever-recurring attempts to enter into a concrete discussion with us about devaluation of the German reichsmark, and he himself has finally realized that such a devaluation is impossible if only for political reasons.

2. In very concrete form Signor Riccardi has registered Italy's claim to participate equally in all new acquisitions of sources of raw material and industrial enterprises in the southeastern European states. In this connection he has characterized Yugoslavia as belonging to the Italian sphere of interest, and Rumania to that of Germany, and

¹No records of these individual discussions have been found. See, however, documents Nos. 173 and 177.

accordingly has demanded an Italian participation of 51 percent in Yugoslavia, and of 49 percent in Rumania. Herr Funk replied that division into spheres of interest was a foreign policy question, about which he could not express himself, and he furthermore added jokingly that the raw materials, moreover, did not belong to him but to the Reichsmarschall who alone was in a position to make dispositions about them. (I would like to observe in this connection that there was agreement between Herr Funk and myself that the cession to Italy of the majority of shares in the copper mines of Bor in Yugoslavia, the biggest copper deposit in Europe, which had been especially mentioned by Riccardi, was out of the question.) The conversation closed with a remark by Signor Riccardi to the effect that he knew that no definitive settlement could be made at the moment. He had only wanted to register the Italian claims.

3. Signor Riccardi desires a closer cooperation of his Ministry with the Reich Economics Ministry concerning the questions of the future new economic order in Europe. The main reason for this is his rivalry with Ambassador Giannini. Obviously, he would like to eliminate the influence of the Italian Foreign Ministry as much as possible. After Signor Riccardi had first requested formation of a new German-Italian commission and then had been dissuaded from this idea, Herr Funk finally expressed his agreement as far as he was concerned to a special representative of the Italian Foreign Trade Ministry establishing contact with the appropriate special representative of the Economics Ministry in order to study questions of organizing large areas [*Grossraumfragen*], without, however, being able to conclude agreements. Whether in Signor Riccardi's opinion this Italian representative should stay in Berlin only temporarily or permanently was not clear.

Herr Funk expressly emphasized that such a contact nevertheless required the previous consent of the two Foreign Ministers so that in this question he was able to speak only for himself.

I drew Herr Funk's attention to the fact that there should not be any other contacts outside of the Foreign Ministry and the Government Committee as this would be dangerous also from a substantive point of view. Herr Funk thought that since there had always been the closest cooperation and complete agreement between him and myself, there was no danger that the special representative of Signor Riccardi would succeed in gaining influence on affairs outside of purely theoretical studies. He would always refer the gentleman to me.

4. Besides the general discussions with Herr Funk, Signor Riccardi has had very detailed discussions with me about a number of concrete questions which refer partly to German-Italian exchange of goods and payments and partly to German-Italian economic cooperation in southeastern Europe. He was satisfied with the promises of German deliveries of raw materials which I had given to him and he stated

that after his return he would immediately report to the Duce on how accommodatingly the Italian wishes had been treated by us. For our part, I obtained from him the promise of additional delivery of 10,000 tons of rice and approximately 10,000 tons of hemp. To be sure, with regard to the portion of 4,000 tons of additional deliveries of hemp, the Duce's consent was still outstanding, but he would obtain it immediately after his return. Hemp, owing to its use as a yarn for string, is of absolutely decisive importance for the safeguarding of Germany's food supplies.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister with request that I be given an opportunity for a supplementary oral report with respect to sections 2 and 3 of this memorandum.²

CLODIUS

² In the files is a telegram from Clodius, dated Oct. 18, informing the Embassy in Italy about the conversations held with Riccardi in Berlin (telegram No. 1463: 9874/E693057-58). In this connection Clodius stated that Riccardi seemed to be satisfied with his visit but that "despite German reassurances concern was expressed time and again that Italy might be pushed too far into the background and that Italian interests in other countries, especially in southeastern Europe, might suffer." Clodius also stated that the Foreign Ministry had objected to Riccardi's idea of a permanent liaison between domestic departments of the two Governments and that his proposal for signing a protocol had also been rejected. There is in the files the draft of a "protocol about the new economic order in Europe," apparently prepared for such an occasion (2032/444982-90).

No. 182

1053/312182

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

RIO DE JANEIRO, October 17, 1940—2:20 p. m.

No. 1090 of October 17

Received October 17—11:15 p. m.

The approaching presidential election in the U. S. A. is showing its effect here in the increasing nervousness of government circles that are friendly to us, the President, the military, and the police. The anticipated re-election of Roosevelt is expected to bring about an intensification of his extortionary policy toward President Vargas, who in particular would be forced to dismiss his pro-German followers. Police Chief Filinto Müller said yesterday in a conversation that the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff, and he could be saved only by a dazzling German victory over England and a consequent waning of Roosevelt's prospects.

The slackening of Brazilian resistance is shown also in the far-reaching toleration of pro-Roosevelt propaganda in the press while attacks on him and even objective criticism are suppressed as unneutral. The same text to Washington, Buenos Aires, and Santiago.

PRÜFER

No. 183

F14/183-89

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, October 18, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND ITALIAN CROWN PRINCESS MARIE JOSÉ,¹ AT THE TEAHOUSE OF THE OBERSALZBERG, ON OCTOBER 17, 1940

Referring to his visit to Italy, the Führer in opening the conversation remarked that a few years ago when he had last met the Crown Princess in Naples,² he would not have believed that the next encounter would take place in such tragic circumstances. In Europe one faced decisions that would determine the future for centuries ahead. It was a matter of removing tensions that had come into existence within the last 50 or 60 years and had reached such a degree that a forcible discharge was inevitable. He therefore did not think that the present war could have been avoided in the long run by any preventive measures.

Belgium's tragedy consisted in being centrally situated between the European fields of force that had created the tensions. Belgium had not had this fate for the first time in the present war or the World War, but had been in the same situation since the time of Caesar.

He (the Führer) believed that the general situation would shortly be clarified to such an extent that he personally could visualize his future plans more distinctly. After the conclusion of the military preparations for the last phase of the struggle he had now himself proceeded to form constructive plans for the European future; for to him the evolving of the war had been quite unexpected and surprising. He had wanted to devote himself to the domestic progress of Germany, especially in the social and cultural fields. The war had been forced upon him by the English and he regarded every day that the war continued as a day lost from his real task, that of domestic progress. Now that the die was cast he would continue to fight until the persons in England responsible for the coming of the war had disappeared and until there was absolute security for the Reich against any sort of attack. He would continue the war even if the British Empire should perish by it. He had talked over all these matters with the Duce and found that the latter agreed with his views.

Now that he had formulated his own view of the future of Europe he thought that the time had come when he might usefully have a talk

¹ Princess Marie-José was a sister of Leopold III, King of the Belgians.

² The occasion was during Hitler's visit to Italy in May, 1938.

with King Leopold personally about the development of the future relationship between Belgium and Germany.

At this point Crown Princess Marie interjected that this was the very point on which she wanted to speak with the Führer. King Leopold on his part also attached great importance to a personal talk with the Führer and would travel strictly incognito to any place indicated by the Führer for such a talk. He would, for instance, even come to the Obersalzberg.

The Führer replied that for the sake of keeping such a talk secret it might indeed be advisable to let it take place at the Obersalzberg. He had several important conversations scheduled for the next few days through which the situation would be further clarified and after that, that is in about 10 or 12 days, he could send word to the King about the exact date of the talk.³

Crown Princess Marie José received this statement of the Führer with great satisfaction and said in a somewhat hesitant voice, and reading from a slip of paper with notes, that her brother had begged her to assure the Führer that he had engaged in no political negotiations since May 28 and that, despite certain rumors spread by people who wanted to hide behind his name, he had taken no political action even indirectly. Nor had he anything to do with the occurrences in the Congo.⁴

The Führer replied that he did not doubt that in the least.

Crown Princess Marie José then spoke of the supply situation in Belgium. The situation with respect to grain was particularly difficult and was likely to get even worse in winter. It was therefore contemplated in Belgium to seek American aid by sending a Belgian personage to America.

The Führer replied that Germany was also strongly interested in the supply situation of Belgium, since in the end Germany would have to replace any deficiencies from her own supplies. But he doubted whether it would be possible to import grain from America. That could be done only with English consent and with their unscrupulousness the English would rather let the whole of Europe starve than make any concession. A foretaste of the treatment of the supply question by Great Britain was furnished by the difficulties the English were making on that score, and on a steadily increasing scale, for Spain, a neutral country. He was therefore very skeptical regarding the plan mentioned, but he was willing to have the question examined by his associates.

³ See document No. 356.

⁴ The Governor-General of the Belgian Congo, M. Pierre Ryckmans, had declared at Elisabethville on July 22, 1940, that the Belgian Congo would continue in the war, with the aim of liberating Belgium and assisting Great Britain. The Belgian Minister of the Colonies, M. Albert de Vleeschauwer, had been acting in London as Administrator-General of the Congo.

Crown Princess Marie, continuing, took up the question of the Belgian prisoners of war. She mentioned the labor shortage in Belgium. She stressed the strong desire of Belgian families to have their fathers and sons back and followed this up by asking whether the Führer would consider release of the Belgian prisoners of war.

The Führer replied that this involved a problem closely linked with the military struggle of the Reich against England and remarked in this connection that in the present difficulties France could really be glad that part of her territory was occupied by the Germans and especially that the younger generation (the young workers) had not yet returned home, since in that case possibly a social revolution might break out.

Crown Princess Marie José nevertheless again pleaded for the release of the Belgian prisoners of war. She described the difficult situation of families where the father was still in Germany and, as a sort of compromise solution, she suggested the establishment of prison camps on Belgian soil and institution of strict surveillance. If release should not become possible, the return of the prisoners to camps in their own country at least might have a moral repercussion on the attitude of the whole population.

The Führer replied that he would revert to this question in his conversation with King Leopold. It involved a serious and difficult problem. He recalled that after the end of the World War the German prisoners were kept for over a year, which was not to say, however, that Germany intended now to retaliate. That was by no means his intention. In the question of prisoners Germany was acting solely from apprehension on the part of a country that had been forced into a war for life or death. Hence she had so far released only those prisoners who she assumed, from their mentality and attitude, would undertake nothing against Germany. In this manner particularly the Flemish prisoners had been released. Germany had no interest, by a general release of prisoners, in possibly giving Belgium an injection of chauvinist . . . [the following 9 lines are illegible]. Besides, it was possible to grant Belgian prisoners in German camps more liberties, such as occupation in agriculture, etc., than if they were kept in Belgium. It would in any case be difficult to release all the Belgian prisoners, unless the relationship between Belgium and Germany underwent a complete change.

Crown Princess Marie José next asked the Führer whether or not at least the sick, especially those with lung afflictions, for whom the cold climate of Germany was not helpful, could be released.

The Führer answered that as far as he knew the state of health of the Belgian prisoners was good. They were also being better treated than, for example, the Polish prisoners, just as there was a difference in the treatment of white and black Frenchmen.

Crown Princess Marie José immediately replied that her words were not meant at all as a complaint about the treatment of prisoners. She had wanted only to refer to a few cases of sickness.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer mentioned the development and continuation of the operations against England and London and in conclusion spoke in terms of full approval of the attitude taken by King Leopold. He had acted in a very manly way and very wisely by remaining with the Army and in the country. If the Belgian Government had acted in the same way from the beginning, much misfortune would have been avoided, although one ought not fail to recognize that the position of the country in the midst of the political fields of force had made the situation difficult. Now definitive and clear solutions would be found which would remove these difficulties once and for all.

Subsequent to the conversation the Führer and Crown Princess Marie José took a walk around the teahouse. Then, in the company of Reichsleiter and Frau Ley, tea was taken with the entourage of the Führer.⁵

SCHMIDT

⁵ Notes taken by King Leopold on the account given to him by Princess Marie-José of this interview are printed in *Recueil de documents établi par le Secrétariat du Roi concernant la période 1936-1949* (Brussels, 1950), p. 405.

No. 184

129/120990-91

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1316 of October 16

LISBON, October 17, 1940—10:46 p. m.

Received October 18—1:15 p. m.

Today I had a long interview with Minister President Salazar, from whom I was taking leave on departure on my official journey. In contrast to earlier occasions, he showed himself a good deal more confident regarding the possibility that the Iberian Peninsula might stay out of the present war. The entry of America, whose attitude was influenced merely by the fear that its security might be threatened by Germany, would essentially be dependent upon our progress in the west and thus in the last resort on a German advance into the Iberian Peninsula. As in the past, Salazar considers any English demands on Portugal or, indeed, landing attempts on the Continent as out of the question. But with regard to the Azores he did betray certain apprehensions which are, in fact, manifested in the recent dispatch to Horta of substantial military units. To my question as to the specific purpose of that measure, Salazar replied only with a general remark

on the necessity to be prepared for anything in these days. He does not believe in a Spanish attack on Gibraltar at the present moment and would consider it a disastrous step, since in that case Spain, due to the automatic state of war with England, would be cut off from the sea, her sole basis of food supply. Such a risk could be incurred only in the very latest stage of the war, when existing food supplies could finally be used up. Since Spain, due to her weak position, could take action only in closest agreement with Germany, the future of the Iberian Peninsula was in German hands.

HUENK

No. 185

174/138439

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 772

BERLIN, October 17, 1940.

Today the Japanese Ambassador asked me the status of the conversations on the composition of the commissions in accordance with article 4 of the Tripartite Pact.¹ He was informed that his Government would shortly send us detailed proposals, but he did not yet have any with him. We are letting the matter rest until the proposals arrive.

Kurusu is expecting an instruction from his Government shortly regarding the authorization mentioned in telegraphic report No. 1102 from Tokyo² for signing the Protocol relative to the extension of the Treaty to new countries.

Kurusu was interested in learning whether Count Schulenburg took with him to Moscow instructions relative to Japanese-Russian relations.³ I replied that we continued to hope that the Tripartite Pact will have a favorable effect also on Japanese-Russian relations. This hope of ours was naturally known to Count Schulenburg. (The Ambassador did not speak about the report which originated in Tokyo regarding Stalin's alleged plan to invite the Powers of the Tripartite Pact to attend a conference in Moscow.⁴) As for the rest, I answered the Ambassador's question regarding Count Schulenburg's instructions to the effect that the latter had been authorized to inform Moscow on the historical events in the Balkans in the course of the last few weeks and months, as they are regarded here.

The conversation ended with economic matters but it is not worth while recording Kurusu's statements.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 153.

² Not found.

³ Schulenburg had returned to Moscow from Berlin on Oct. 15 with Ribbentrop's letter to Stalin. See documents Nos. 176 and 195.

⁴ No further record of the Tokyo report referred to has been found.

No. 186

F5/0430

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 18, 1940—12:08 a. m.

No. 2200 of October 17

Received October 18—1:50 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Today I handed M. Molotov the letter intended for M. Stalin,¹ and strongly urged him to accept the invitation to Berlin as soon as possible. Molotov stated again that he could not deny that he owed a visit to Berlin, but that he would have to reserve his answer until after he had studied the letter.

I then touched upon the complaints of the resettlement commissions in the Baltic countries² and in Bessarabia.³ Molotov, of course, attempted to dispute the justice of the complaints, but in the end he promised to re-examine them.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 176.

² See document No. 168.

³ See vol. x of this series, document No. 50, footnote 4.

No. 187

F5/0429

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SONNENBURG, October 18, 1940.

No. 1878

Received Berlin, October 18—3:30 p. m.

Sent October 18—5:15 p. m. [5:55 p. m.]¹[Received October 19—3:50 a. m.]¹

For the Ambassador personally.

I request immediate information by wire as to why my letter to Stalin was not delivered to the Soviet Russian Government until October 17,² and why, in keeping with the importance of its contents and the entire matter, the letter addressed to Stalin was not—as I had taken for granted—delivered by you to M. Stalin at a personal audience.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ The information in brackets is taken from the Moscow Embassy copy (1379/357896).

² See document No. 186.

³ See document No. 195.

No. 188

2141/468316

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2207 of October 18

Moscow, October 18, 1940—9: 25 p. m.

Received October 18—11: 50 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1857 of October 15.¹

As instructed, I discussed the question of the Danube commission with Molotov on October 17 and handed him the German reply, transmitted with the instruction of October 11,¹ in the form of a note.

Molotov replied that the participation of Italy in a new Danube commission was an anomaly because Italy was not a riparian country of the Danube.

I emphasized to Molotov that we had shown the greatest deference to Soviet wishes but that we were not in a position to exclude Italy from the Danube commission.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 174, footnote 4.

² Marginal note in Wiehl's handwriting: "Woermann will inform Zamboni and add that we do not intend to inform Bucharest."

No. 189

711/262225-28

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, October 18, 1940.

Minister Valer Pop, calling today in the company of M. Brabetzianu,¹ made reference to the negative reply which I had given him yesterday² in reference to the Soviet-Rumanian dispute about the

¹ Counselor and Chargé d'Affaires of the Rumanian Legation in Berlin.

² Woermann recorded on Oct. 17 the following: "Today I informed the Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires that, in our opinion, the Soviet Russian demands with respect to boundary demarcation on the Danube did not constitute a reason for breaking off the negotiations for establishing the boundary. This did not mean that we were taking a position on the substance of the dispute; it did mean, however, that we did not think that we ought to comply with the Rumanian request for German intervention in Moscow." (711/262228)

The Embassy in Moscow and the Bucharest Legation were told of this reply to the Rumanians in a Woermann telegram of Oct. 23 (182/85512).

tracing of the boundary at the Danube delta. He urged that we reconsider the matter. If the Russians were to receive the area in dispute, there would be a danger that they would allow everything there to fill up with sand, as a result of which the Sulina channel, which was not far from it, might eventually become impassable. The Russians would then, on the other hand, make the Danube arms and channels in their territory navigable, so that the main navigation to the Black Sea would be exclusively in Russian hands.

I told M. Valer Pop that I, in concurrence with our experts, did not view this as a concrete danger since the Danube commission, as it would be organized in the future, would surely see to it that such a state of affairs should not materialize. I did not believe that it would be possible to revoke the decision already taken that we would not interfere in this matter.

M. Pop then referred to another request for German intervention in Moscow—brought forward here in a pro memoria on September 17 [27?] ³—in the matter of another border dispute with the Soviet Union; this one related to the region of Herța on the border of Bucovina, where the Russians in a totally arbitrary manner had occupied and laid claim to a piece of territory that had always been part of Rumania. I told the Minister that no decision had yet been reached on this subject, but did not give him any hopes that we would intercede in this matter in Moscow. M. Valer Pop suggested that it would not be necessary for us to undertake an official *démarche* in Moscow, but that we would only have to point out this matter to the Soviet Government in an amicable manner. Finally he requested that he be given an opportunity to present these two questions once more to the Foreign Minister before any negative decision was taken.

Postscript: According to a note of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat of October 12, Minister Hewel has been instructed to bring this matter to the Führer's attention.⁴

WOERMANN

³ On Sept. 27 a Rumanian pro memoria (1621/388011-16), which appears to be the same as that referred to here, had been forwarded to Woermann by Bergmann of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (1621/388010). The pro memoria had been handed to Heinburg for transmittal to the Foreign Minister on Sept. 26 (1621/388003).

⁴ There is no record of a decision by Hitler in the matter. However, Woermann recorded on Oct. 25 that by instruction of the Foreign Minister, he gave Pop the "definitive" reply that Germany would not intervene in Moscow as the Rumanians had requested. According to Woermann, Pop showed understanding for the German attitude and expressed the hope that Rumania might get some redress through direct negotiations with the Soviet Union. (711/262218)

No. 190

71/50731-35

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry

BERLIN, October 18, 1940.

zu Pol. VII 3111 g.¹

Subject: Conversation of the State Secretary with the private secretary of the Grand Mufti on the occasion of the communication of a statement on German policy toward the Arabs.

STATE SECRETARY: What are your impressions of wartime Germany?

PRIVATE SECRETARY: I have noticed hardly anything of the war here. I find no appreciable difference compared with previous times.

STATE SECRETARY: What is your opinion of the general situation?

PRIVATE SECRETARY: We Arabs hope for the victory of Germany and are convinced that Germany will be the victor over England, even though difficulties will naturally still have to be overcome and it perhaps might take another year.

STATE SECRETARY: I fully share your opinion that there is no doubt of Germany's ultimate victory. Naturally I cannot yet name a date; with regard to the date, however, I am more optimistic than you.

PRIVATE SECRETARY: The Arabs have always felt sympathy for Germany, and in the present war also their sympathies are entirely on the side of Germany. At the outbreak of the war they were in a predicament. There were English troops in Iraq, the Orient Army in Syria; and in the north the Arabs were threatened by the Turks. For these reasons, the Arabs have thus far not been able to make their real views known. Now they can do so, however, and they have therefore taken the first opportunity that offered to get in touch with Germany. The enemies of the Arabs and Germany are the same, namely, the English, the Jews, and the Americans who favor the Jews. There is no conflict of interests between the Arabs and Germany.

STATE SECRETARY: Germany, too, has always felt friendly toward the Arabs and watched with sympathy their efforts to achieve independence. In order clearly to demonstrate German interest in the Arab cause, I now wish to read to you a statement that we shall also broadcast on the radio.

The State Secretary then read aloud the following statement and gave the text of it to the private secretary on a sheet of white paper:

"Germany, which has always been animated by sentiments of friendship for the Arabs and cherishes the wish that they may prosper and be happy and assume a place among the peoples of the earth in accordance with their historic and natural importance, has always watched

¹Pol. VII 3111 g.: Not found.

with interest the struggle of the Arab countries to achieve their independence. In their efforts to attain this goal Arab countries can count upon Germany's full sympathy also in the future. In making this statement, Germany finds herself in full accord with her Italian ally."

PRIVATE SECRETARY: While fully appreciating Germany's good intentions expressed in this statement, I must state that the Arabs expected more, namely, a German statement regarding the recognition of the independence of the Arab countries. I infer from the words of the State Secretary that it is Germany's desire that the Arabs should become free and independent. The Arabs would therefore appreciate it if this were expressed unequivocally in the statement of the German Government by adding the words, "recognition of independence." In this way the wind will also be taken out of the sails of English propaganda which, after publication of this statement, will work with the argument that it is vague and full of mental reservations.

STATE SECRETARY: A German statement on the recognition of the independence of Iraq and Saudi Arabia is superfluous, since we have sent our representatives to both countries and thereby given practical recognition to their independence. We are also prepared to do so again. We can only recognize the independence of other countries after they have themselves declared their independence. I do not understand, moreover, how the Arabs could assume that Germany was somehow exercising reserve² in making this statement.

PRIVATE SECRETARY: The Arabs have had bad experiences in the World War. England solemnly promised them independence and yet, through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, ceded Arab regions to the French. The Arabs now fear that there is a similar secret agreement between Germany and Italy. English propaganda asserts that this is the case.

STATE SECRETARY: I can assure you that no such agreement exists. The statement I made demonstrates the real attitude of the German Government toward the Arab question.

PRIVATE SECRETARY: I believe then that I understand the State Secretary to mean that this statement is intended to be of fundamental nature for future German policy toward the Arabs. Through the exchange of Ministers it will be possible to develop and strengthen this policy for the purpose of bringing about German-Arab cooperation.

STATE SECRETARY: The statement is intended entirely in that sense.

PRIVATE SECRETARY: I realize that it will not now be possible to add anything to the statement as formulated. I would ask, however, that Ambassador von Papen be authorized, when he communicates this statement to Naji Shawkat, the Iraq Minister of Justice, to supplement

² Weizsäcker substituted these words in handwriting for the original passage which read: ". . . had any mental reservations."

it by saying: This declaration is only the first step on the path of collaboration between Germany and the Arab countries. The further development of these relations is to be the subject of future conversations between the Ministers of Germany and Italy in Baghdad and the Iraq Government.

STATE SECRETARY: This supplement will be communicated by Herr v. Papan to the Iraq Minister of Justice.³

The private secretary took his leave with words of thanks for the reception and the good will that was shown.

The Secretary of State wished him a pleasant journey to Rome and success in his conversations there.⁴

GROBBA

³ Instructions to that effect were sent by Weizsäcker to Ambassador Papan in Therapia by telegram No. 534 of Oct. 19 (2361/488207-08).

⁴ In telegram No. 1488 of Oct. 23 (2281/481610-11) Woermann informed the Embassy in Italy of the State Secretary's conversation with the Mufti's private secretary, of the latter's impending arrival in Rome, and of the instruction to Ankara (see footnote 3). Furthermore, the Embassy was told that the statement given to the private secretary would be broadcast over the radio in the Arabic language that day and for several days thereafter, and that "broadcasting of the same statement over the Bari radio station would be desirable." The matter would not be dealt with in the press. In telegram No. 1906 of Oct. 24 Mackensen replied that the statement had been broadcast over Radio Bari the previous day (2281/481612).

No. 191

2281/481688-90

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET

ROME, October 18, 1940.

No. 473 g

Subject: Italian-Greek relations.

Although the subject of Greece has not been mentioned to me lately by official Italian quarters, there appears to be no doubt according to the information I have received that the question of a showdown with Greece, which was put aside for the time being last August, still engrosses the attention of the minds here, and that powerful forces, including Count Ciano, are working to reach a solution of the Italian-Greek problem. From the information furnished by a reliable informant it appears that Count Ciano, with a view to advancing the matter, has called the Governor¹ and the Commander of the Italian forces in Albania² to Rome, in order to learn their views.³ Both men, it is known in the Palazzo Chigi, are *for* action.

¹ Francesco Jacomoni.

² Sebastiano Visconti Prasca.

³ For the minutes of a meeting on Oct. 15 presided over by Mussolini and attended by Ciano, Badoglio, Soddu, Jacomoni, Roatta, and Visconti Prasca, see *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti* (Rome-Milan, 1946), pp. 61-71. See document No. 477.

The discussions to date between Count Ciano and the two men are said by my informant to have resulted in approximately the following picture:

"Much precious time has been lost. One or two months ago, military action against Greece from Albania would have been an easy matter. Today, however, the Greek forces deployed at the Albanian border are already so strong that many difficulties and obstacles, which did not exist before, must be reckoned with. The reason why the right moment was missed really rests with Badoglio, who holds back everywhere and avoids taking any initiative.

"Nevertheless it is not yet too late. Perhaps the last favorable chance is still at hand and should be utilized. Count Ciano agrees with Jacomoni and Visconti-Prasca, i. e., he is for action against Greece, which should be carried out by the Army from Albania, and, to the extent that the Ionian Islands are to be occupied, by the Navy. The plans are ready. At the present time, however, there is still a certain divergence between the Palazzo Chigi and the Palazzo Venezia, where the final decision, of course, rests with the Duce. Although he seems to share Badoglio's view for the present, the possibility cannot be ruled out that he might decide for action; such action would then perhaps be started or carried to its conclusion in late October or the early half of November. In support of his thesis Ciano argues on the one hand that Turkey would not interfere at the present time, while later on, that is, following the elections in the United States, some complications and surprises would have to be expected from Turkey if Russia, also under the influence of the American elections, should decide on a rapprochement with England and the United States; such a development would relieve Turkey's position with respect to Russia and consequently also in the eastern Mediterranean."

If at the Brenner meeting ⁴ the subject of Greece was not considered from new points of view—and I cannot be certain it was—we have reason to continue to believe that the Duce—and everything depends entirely on him—though still wishing to settle accounts with Greece, but also wishing to avoid any dissipation of his strength, will not deem the time ripe for settling this matter until the power of England has been broken. The report of my informant nevertheless appears important enough to me to convey it to Berlin, because it seems to prove, if nothing else, that forces of some importance are at work to sway the Duce toward a different course. It would be hard to say how much influence is exerted—perhaps also on Count Ciano—by the desire to make up in the popular mind for the loss of prestige which, as many people here believe, Italy has suffered as a result of her nonparticipation in the sending of military forces to Rumania.⁵

V. MACKENSEN

⁴ See document No. 149.

⁵ In telegram No. 1883 of Oct. 19, 12:08 p. m., Mackensen reported hearing that Italian officers close to the Ministry of War were mentioning Oct. 23 as the date for the beginning of an operation against Greece, its objectives being Salonika and Athens (449/222805).

No. 192

124/122523-25

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

TOP SECRET

ROME, October 18, 1940.

St.S. No. 183 g. Rs.

DEAR FRIEND: As you know, I am always of the opinion—and I know we agree in this—that in the interest of our Axis policy it is necessary to inform the Italian Government as promptly as possible of our intentions in the field of foreign policy. I got the impression recently that we had perhaps not quite paid sufficient heed to this requirement when we dispatched German troops to Rumania. Although Count Ciano was informed of such possibilities on the occasion of the visit of the Foreign Minister to Rome¹—whether this question was again discussed with the Italians during his visit to Berlin² on the occasion of the signing of the Tripartite Pact and of the last Brenner Pass meeting,³ I do not know—the Italians first learned through the press, the radio, and their own sources of information of the dispatch of German military units to Rumania. Both Bismarck, who while I was in Padua made the first official report to Count Ciano of the impending dispatch of an advance party and some units of the Luftwaffe, and I, when I brought the supplementary information to Count Ciano yesterday, received the impression, from the manner in which he accepted our communications without comment, that we had touched him in a sore spot (see telegraphic reports No. 1830 of October 10⁴ and No. 1860 of October 16⁵).

This impression is borne out by reports from my absolutely reliable informant, whom you know and who enjoys the best relations with the Palazzo Chigi. Although according to his information Ciano appears outwardly calm on this question, it is said in the circles close to him that German handling of this question might rankle somewhat in Rome. The German action was perhaps correct from the standpoint of timing, but was enacted outside the common framework of Axis policy. "A shadow of resentment might easily remain." According to my informant, Count Ciano is supposed to be still trying to bring about the appearance of certain Italian troop units, if only small ones, beside the German troops in Rumania. If so, that is probably being done through Zamboni, for nothing has been said to us here about it. It is argued in this connection that it will be all the easier for the Germans to accede to Italy's wish since the German occupation is after

¹ Sept. 19-22; see document No. 73.

² See document No. 124.

³ See document No. 149.

⁴ See document No. 167, footnote 3.

⁵ Not printed (2281/481671).

all only temporary.⁶ Count Ciano attaches the greatest significance to such a gesture for it would tend to prevent certain objections to German hegemony in Italian political circles both in and outside of the Ministries from being nurtured or spreading. In other words, he would like by such a gesture to save face in regard to the joint policy of the Axis and with respect to Italian public opinion.

I considered it proper to inform you of these impressions; at the same time I wish to state expressly that the Italians give no external indication of ill feeling of any kind, but on the contrary are doing everything they can "to save face elegantly." I refer particularly to the article with which you are doubtless familiar in the newly founded Italian "*Diplomatische*,"⁷ the so-called *Arois*.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

MACKENSEN

⁶ Weizsäcker underlined the word "temporary" and put a question mark on the margin.

⁷ This refers to the *Deutsche diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz*, an official publication of the Foreign Ministry.

No. 193

182/85498-99

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1823 of October 18

BUCHAREST, October 19, 1940—6:00 a. m.

Received October 19—12:05 p. m.

I. I called on General Antonescu today and began by telling him that Rumania could count on Germany's positive attitude and assistance in the reconstruction program. I pointed to the position taken by the Foreign Minister¹ and the Reichsmarschall. I informed him in this connection that the price of iron and coke had been reduced.

II. I informed the General that the question of economic advisers for Rumania was up to the Reich Foreign Minister, and that the required experts would be attached to my staff and work under me.² I emphasized especially the immediate need of bringing in experts on foreign exchange legislation, investigation of foreign exchange violations, price control, raising agricultural production, and Aryanization. The General agreed to this program and asked that we begin at once. He took note that Valer Pop too had requested that no further steps be taken in Berlin until everything had been cleared up between him and me.

¹ See document No. 179.

² A memorandum of Dec. 13, 1940, by Clodius (2192/472910-11) described the steps which had been taken to establish a staff of economic advisers in Bucharest.

III. The General and I are in accord that the further price developments on the market must not determine the fixing of the price for grain.

IV. With reference to the exchange rate for reichsmarks I explained to the General that our efforts were aimed at creating stable conditions for international trade in Europe. In conformity with Clodius' discussions I pointed out to him that in view of the movement of Rumanian prices it would be impossible to settle the difference in the exchange rate solely by lowering the dollar. I assured him that the question would be dealt with in Berlin in a friendly spirit taking account of Rumania's needs; additional preparation here would be desirable. The General insistently pleaded this necessity with a view to the success of his regime.

V. I assured the General that the cost of the military mission would be adjusted to Rumania's capacity to pay.

VI. Upon my inquiry regarding demobilization, the General informed me that he had discharged 300,000 men, keeping 500,000 still under arms. The strain placed on the means of transportation to bring supplies for the winter, especially fire wood for Bucharest and other cities, had delayed demobilization until now, but demobilization would be continued now. The General told me in this connection that according to his information the Russians had nine corps in line from northern Bucovina to southern Bessarabia. He believed that new progress had been made in the rapprochement between England, Russia, and Turkey.

NEUBACHER
FABRICIUS

No. 194

449/222806

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, October 19, 1940—1:00 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 19—1:10 p. m.

No. 1884 of October 19

During a conversation in some other connection Ciano broached to me the subject of the telegram of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow about his conversation with Molotov, which was sent to me yesterday upon his instruction, and which will be brought to Berlin in translation by the courier due to be dispatched tonight.¹ He remarked on this

¹ Not printed (100/65183-95). After describing an interview with Molotov on Oct. 15 the Turkish Ambassador referred to Soviet distrust of German intentions and favorable prospects for more friendly Turkish-Soviet relations.

point that the Duce did not believe that Turkey would strike in the event of Italian armed intervention against Greece. He added to it the usual comments on Greece's persistently unneutral attitude, which had caused Italy substantial naval losses. This could not be allowed to continue indefinitely. To my question whether, in these circumstances, Italy was contemplating a reaction in the near future, he shrugged his shoulders saying that Italy had complete freedom of action with respect to Greece, as the Führer had indeed conceded to the Duce. This statement appears to me very noteworthy in the light of my report in telegram No. 1883 of October 19² and my report No. 473 g. of October 18.³

MACKENSEN⁴

² See document No. 191, footnote 5.

³ Document No. 191.

⁴ See document No. 302.

No. 195

F5/0427-0428

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2209 of October 19

Moscow, October 19, 1940—3:20 p. m.

Received October 19—6:00 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 1878 of October 18.¹

I handed Molotov the letter intended for Stalin after careful examination of the factual and personal situation here. After I had informed Molotov, in accordance with instructions of some time ago, of your intention to address a letter to Stalin and of its probable contents,² a proposal on my part to hand the letter directly to Stalin would have caused serious annoyance to M. Molotov. It seemed to me imperative to avoid this, in view of the fact that Molotov is the closest confidant of Stalin and that we will have to deal with him on all great political issues in the future.

In addition, Stalin has recently shown a strong reserve in public, and I was therefore justified in assuming that he would avoid a personal meeting with me on some pretext or other. In this connection, I may recall the statement in the Soviet press of September 7, according to which Stalin had not seen me for more than 6 months. Insistence upon a reception by Stalin might easily have been construed on the Soviet side as a reaction to this published statement.

¹ Document No. 187.

² See document No. 109.

That the letter was not delivered until October 17 is explained by the fact that I did not arrive in Moscow until the evening of October 15, because the plane was late. Before the letter was handed over, we first had to translate it into Russian, since we know from experience that translations made by the Soviets are bad and full of inaccuracies. Considering the extraordinary political significance of the letter it was extremely important to transmit to Stalin a translation that was flawless as to form and content lest the letter convey an inaccurate impression. Because of the length and importance of the letter it was not possible, despite the most strenuous efforts, to translate it into Russian and to prepare a final copy in Russian in a shorter space of time.³

SCHULENBURG

³ In telegram No. 1890, dispatched Oct. 21, Ribbentrop replied as follows: "Your procedure regarding the letter is approved. Please deliver Stalin's answer as soon as possible since I shall be away for a few days and the letter will have to be forwarded." (F5/0425)

No. 196

2110/456752

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 19, 1940.

W 4814 g.

The Foreign Minister would not like the Petsamo question to become a controversial point with the Russians at the present moment.¹ In the forthcoming conversations between the Chairman of the Finnish Government Committee, M. von Fieandt, and myself² it is to be suggested to the Finns that the question of the concession be included, without, however, our committing ourselves to the Finns any more than we have so far.

The question is not to be raised with the Russians for the present. The Foreign Minister reserved the right to examine the matter again in about 10 days.³

To be submitted to the State Secretary via the Director of the Economic Policy Department and the Under State Secretary, Political Department.

Then to be resubmitted to me.

SCHNURRE

¹ See document No. 162.

² See document No. 232.

³ Cf. document No. 344.

No. 197

B19/B003798

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, October 19, 1940.
e. o. Pol. I 1157 g. Rs.

In reply to my request for exact figures regarding transit of troops through Finland,¹ General Jodl informed me today as follows:

1. The one infantry division destined for Kirkenes and the vicinity, which was previously mentioned in connection with the transit, has not touched Finland at all. These troops were brought in part by ship, in part overland, through Norway to their destinations.

2. Accordingly only troops of the Luftwaffe have been transported through Finland; to wit, 4,800 men, 587 vehicles, and numerous other items of equipment (an antiaircraft artillery battalion, headquarters of an airfield, etc.). Of the 4,800 men, 3,000 have marched through Finland; 1,800 men are at present still in Finland on the communications route (truck columns, truck repair shops, a supply company). These 1,800 men are to be reduced to 100 as soon as only the current supplies remain to be brought up.

RITTER

¹ On Oct. 12 Blücher had reported that Molotov had asked the Finnish Minister in the Soviet Union for the exact figures of German troops transported, or to be transported, across Finland (telegram No. 650: B19/B003793).

No. 198

136/74396-400

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 19, 1940.

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS PENDING WITH SPAIN

(For economic conversations during the Suñer visit, see special memorandum¹)

1) German claims against Spain arising out of the Civil War.

The bills for military deliveries by the Reich to Spain during the Civil War were studied by a Spanish delegation and found to total 378 million reichsmarks. During the Suñer visit, the Spaniards were

¹ This refers to a memorandum by Wiehl of the same date, not printed (324/193929-31). It is a somewhat shortened version, with slight variations, of Wiehl's memorandum of Sept. 28, printed as document No. 125.

promised a generous settlement of the debt by deduction of English and French assets in Spain that are to pass into German possession. The Spaniards rejected such a settlement, however, first because they want as far as possible to avoid altogether such a transfer of enemy assets in Spain to Germany, and also probably because they hope to obtain some more favorable settlement should the war be liquidated. The Spanish representatives merely noted, for transmittal to their Government, our proposal that negotiations regarding recognition of the amount of the debt and its liquidation take place as soon as possible.² (Already last year the Spaniards concluded a debt agreement with the Italians.) It would be desirable to press for the early opening of such negotiations. The claims for compensation, totaling some 45 million reichsmarks, of Germans who suffered losses during the Civil War in Spain should also be settled in these negotiations.

2) Compensation for *private* deliveries during the Civil War by impending purchases of oranges.

Besides the deliveries by the Reich mentioned under 1), there are claims against the Spanish Government in the amount of 15 million reichsmarks arising out of private deliveries during the Civil War; these are long overdue and are recognized by the Spanish Government. At present negotiations are in progress in Madrid regarding the purchase of the Spanish orange crop by Germany in the amount of 50 to 60 million reichsmarks.³ The Embassy is instructed to try to obtain liquidation of the 15 million reichsmarks of private claims as mentioned above by a portion of these orange deliveries. It is possible that this matter might be mentioned by the Spaniards. The German claim is justified, since the purchase of so large a quantity of oranges, for which the Spaniards have no other buyers, represents a considerable accommodation on the part of Germany.

3) Military deliveries to Spain.

Implementation of a treaty whereby the Reich delivers war material, principally aviation equipment, to Spain, in the amount of about 30 million reichsmarks, in return for Spanish raw materials. No difficulties have as yet arisen, so that a conference is unnecessary.

4) Deliveries from Spain to England.

The substantial deliveries of Spanish raw materials, particularly iron ore and iron pyrites, to England were continued into the war and are continuing even now, though on a reduced scale, because of the fact that it is getting harder and harder for the English to provide shipping space. The Spanish Government has not as yet given a formal promise to prevent these deliveries, as our Embassy has sought

² This matter was taken up in the conversations of September. See document No. 126, footnote 1.

³ Signing of such an agreement was reported by the Embassy in Spain in telegram No. 3589 of Oct. 21 (324/193928).

since June of this year. It wants, to be sure, to curtail such deliveries as much as possible, but has pointed out that the supplies that are vital to Spain—grain and gasoline, for example—depend on the goodwill of the English, and that to this extent Spanish deliveries to England also had to be continued. It referred in this connection to Italy's procedure before her entry into the war.

5) Removal of enemy assets in Spain.

We have requested the Spanish Government, as well as most of the other neutral governments, to prevent the transfer of enemy property in Spain for the purpose of preventing seizure of this property by Germany. This request has not yet been complied with. On the contrary, according to reliable reports, such transfers have been taking place increasingly just recently. The matter was discussed during the Suñer visit.⁴ The need was recognized by the Spanish representatives, who wanted to propose to their Government that measures be taken at once in this respect. Despite this fact, reports have reached us again only today regarding the sale to the Spaniards of precisely such British and French enterprises as were, according to the lists delivered to the Spanish representatives here, to be earmarked for transfer to mixed German-Spanish ownership. It would be desirable to reiterate most emphatically our demand for a ban on such changes of ownership.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

WIEHL

⁴ It was dealt with in Draft C; see document No. 126, footnote 1.

No. 199

F9/0416-0420

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

Il Duce del Fascismo.

Capo del Governo.

ROCCA DELLE CAMINATE, October 19, XVIII [1940].

FÜHRER: Ever since our meeting at the Brenner on October 4,² I have given much thought to some of the problems which we reviewed together, and reached conclusions which I feel I ought to communicate to you.

I begin with France: Our informants—and, I believe, with very good reason, yours too—are unanimous in affirming that the French hate the

¹ Translated from the Italian. The German translation, the last page of which is missing, is filmed on F9/0402-0409.

² See document No. 149.

Axis more than before, that Vichy and de Gaulle have divided their roles, and that the French do not consider themselves beaten because, as they say, they did not wish to fight. Vichy is in contact with London through Lisbon. The overwhelming majority of them place their hopes in the United States which will assure Great Britain's victory. With this *Stimmung* [in the original] one cannot think of their collaboration. Nor should we seek it. If that were to happen—the French, after having denied their defeat, would believe and cause to be believed that the victory over Great Britain was due to them, and to them only, and they would be capable of presenting us with the bill. While dismissing, therefore, the idea of French adherence to a continental anti-English bloc, I nevertheless believe that the moment has come for defining the shape of metropolitan and colonial France of tomorrow, reduced, as you justly wish, to proportions that will prevent her from beginning again to dream of expansion and hegemony. Let us begin with the population. The census of 1936 indicated a population in France of 41,950,000 of whom 2,700,000 were foreigners, and 2,300,000 naturalized inhabitants of recent or remote date. There are 5 million non-French nationals. Of the 850,000 Italians, who form the largest single group among the foreigners, I shall arrange repatriation at the rate of 500 per day, and so hope to reach a total of at least 500,000 within a year. I calculate that your and my territorial accessions will detach another 4 million inhabitants from France. The peace treaty consequently should and will reduce France to a population of 34 to 35 millions, which will tend to diminish further because I believe that a demographic recovery of the French people is quite improbable. The metropolitan and colonial acquisitions claimed by Italy are, as I have told you, rather modest: They are limited to Nice, Corsica, and Tunisia. I do not mention Somaliland, which is pure desert country. These are demands that could have been discussed even before the war if the impudence of Daladier had not replied with its "*jamais*,"^a and which were offered to me—by way of a basis for discussion—in return for the maintenance of nonbelligerence on the part of Italy. If then the financial and economic questions incident to the war are taken care of, Italy does not have any nor will she advance any further demands in regard to France.

The problem now is to see if one can consider the time ripe for such a clarification of the relations between the Axis and France. And on this essential point I should be very glad to learn your opinion.

The English positions on the Continent. In case the war should be prolonged I believe you would be in accord with me on the absolute necessity of getting rid of the remaining English positions on the European Continent. This is another condition of the victory. These

^a The reference is to a radio address by Daladier on Mar. 29, 1939.

positions are as follows: Portugal, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, and Switzerland. As regards Portugal, her attitude is neutralized by Spain. We ought not be under any illusions about the true *Stimmung* of Yugoslavia toward the Axis. It is unalterably hostile. I am enclosing for you a report of my police which demonstrates the mentality and criminal activity of the Yugoslavs toward Italy.⁴ Yugoslavia is a bad neighbor with a bad conscience. She cannot live as she is. The Serbs and Croats are today farther apart than ever. The experiment tried by Maček⁵ has failed completely. For the moment I do not intend to modify Italy's attitude toward Yugoslavia, which is one of watchful vigilance.

As regards Greece, I am resolved to end the delays, and very soon. Greece is one of the main points of English maritime strategy in the Mediterranean. The King is English, the political classes are pro-English, and the people are immature but trained to hate Italy. Greece has ordered the mobilization of her armed forces and, as early as last May, has made air and naval bases available to Great Britain, as is revealed by the documents which von Ribbentrop has had the kindness to send me after the discovery at Vitry-La-Charité:⁶ English officials have recently taken virtual possession of all [air]fields in Greece. In short, Greece is to the Mediterranean what Norway was to the North Sea, and must not escape the same fate. I believe that Turkey, another pawn in the English game, will not move if you should, as you certainly will, augment your occupation forces in Rumania. As regards Egypt, the resumption of operations is dependent on a formidable effort of logistical preparation, comparable to the one you had to carry out in preparation for the landing in Great Britain. In any event, I hope I shall be able to launch operations simultaneously on the Greek and on the Egyptian front. Following the conclusion of this second phase of the offensive, which will seize the strong point of Mersa Matrûh (230 km. from Alexandria), it remains to face the decisive battle of the Delta. It is for this phase that it is necessary to take under consideration the support by your armored forces. General Toma [*Thoma*], who has gone to Cyrenaica, will report to you.⁷

I feel sure that you will experience no surprise in seeing Switzerland included among the remaining continental positions of Great Britain. By her incomprehensible attitude of hostility, Switzerland herself poses the problem of her existence.

I should now like to say a word with respect to Spain. The taking over of the conduct of foreign affairs by Suñer affords us assurance

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See vol. x of this series, document No. 121.

⁶ See *ibid.*, document No. 73.

⁷ See Editors' Note, p. 462.

that the tendencies hostile to the Axis are eliminated or at least neutralized. On the other hand I do not feel that the internal economic situation has improved. Again I express my conviction that Spanish nonbelligerence is more advantageous to us than her intervention. We ought to keep intervention as a reserve: It is a card that we ought to play at the most opportune moment in accordance with the given circumstances, such as prolongation of the war through 1941 or an overt intervention of the United States. Meanwhile Spain will have the time necessary to prepare herself.

I have written you a long letter contrary to all my habits, but I could not refrain from passing in review for you my thoughts on the numerous questions which were the subject of our meeting at the Brenner.

I beg you, Führer, to believe sincerely in my comradely friendship, which our common trials and experiences render ever more profound, and to accept my most cordial regards.⁸

MUSSOLINI

⁸ Documentation regarding the receipt of this letter has not been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry, but Michele Lanza, an official of the Italian Embassy in Berlin, recorded in his diary that it was brought to Berlin by a "colleague of the Ministry" on Oct. 24; Leonardo Simoni (pseud. for Lanza), *Berlino, Ambasciata d'Italia 1939-1943* (Rome, 1946), p. 177.

According to Erich Kordt, who was on the Special Train, Hitler learned the contents of the letter on Oct. 25 at Yvoir, south of Namur, on the return trip from the meetings with Franco and Pétain; *Wahn und Wirklichkeit* (Stuttgart, 1947), p. 266. See document No. 228 and footnote 5.

No. 200

F5/0426

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2223 of October 19

Moscow, October 20, 1940—3:45 a. m.

Received October 20—4:50 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 2209 of October 19.¹

Molotov asked me to see him tonight at 11 and told me that I will receive Stalin's answer to the Foreign Minister's letter probably on Monday, October 21. The reply would be "favorable," and particularly, he, Molotov, would accept the invitation to Berlin. The date to be considered for his journey would be right after the Soviet state holidays, which come November 7 and 8.

¹ Document No. 195.

I shall send Stalin's reply immediately with special courier by plane to Berlin.²

SCHULENBURG

² See document No. 211.

No. 201

711/262224

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2224 of October 19

Moscow, October 20, 1940—3:45 a. m.

Received October 20—4:50 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2207 of October 18.¹

Molotov conveyed to me today the attitude of the Soviet Government on the Danubian question.

The Soviet Government agrees to the German proposal and to Italy's participation in the new, unified commission of the Danube which is to be created.

The Soviet Government is prepared, until the formation of this new commission, to accede to the "provisional agreement" of September 12, 1940.²

The Soviet Government is also prepared to participate in joint conferences of the authorized delegate experts of the Soviet Union, Germany, Rumania, and Italy in Bucharest in order to discuss in the form of a provisional settlement the functions which have heretofore been performed by the European Danube Commission.

Molotov proposed October 24 as the date for the commencement of the meeting in Bucharest and asked for our early concurrence. Molotov said one of the immediate tasks was to bring about an understanding regarding the details of the accession of the Soviet Union to the provisional agreement of September 12.

In conclusion Molotov asked to be informed whether we were prepared to publish the foregoing in the press.

Please wire instructions.³

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 188.

² See document No. 53 and footnote 4.

³ An agreed communiqué was published on Oct. 26. The conference opened in Bucharest on Oct. 28. See document No. 249.

No. 202

9324/E661096-97

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2228 of October 20

Moscow, October 20, 1940—4: 56 p. m.

Received October 20—6: 50 p. m.

W IV 5888.

With reference to your telegram No. 1867 of October 17.¹

In reply to my pressing representations in the indemnification question,² Molotov stated that he must explain and clarify his previous statements as follows:

1. His promise concerning postponement of the application of nationalization measures to the property of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche had been fulfilled.

2. Indemnification for property subject to nationalization was something completely new in the practice of the Soviet Government and was applied only as a special concession to German interests in the Baltic States.

3. In the Soviet memorandum of August 7³ there was no mention of 100 percent indemnification, but of the fact that the mixed commissions would have to agree on the *extent* of the indemnification payments.

I made it very plain to Molotov that the foregoing interpretation of his statement of July 29 would evoke great disillusionment in Germany and was irreconcilable with the sense of our other agreements and the spirit of our relations.

I also protested energetically to Molotov against the arbitrary taxation of the resettlers from Bessarabia.

After some hesitation Molotov promised to study all these questions again and to give his reply.⁴

On October 18 the *démarche* was repeated to Secretary General Sobolev. He admitted that petty administration of the indemnification question was irreconcilable with the character of German-Soviet relations. With respect to the taxation of the Bessarabia resettlers, it was pointed out to Sobolev with all emphasis that application of the tax laws in force in Russia for individual peasant pro-

¹ Not printed (9324/E661087-88). This telegram instructed Schulenburg to emphasize to Molotov that the attitude of the Soviet Government in the question of indemnification for German property interests in the Baltic States was contrary in particular to Molotov's statement of July 29. See document No. 168 and vol. x of this series, document No. 251.

² A more lengthy memorandum of this conversation was sent as a report by Hilger on Oct. 22 (9324/E661102-06).

³ See vol. x of this series, document No. 307.

⁴ A further statement by Molotov, with some modification of the Soviet position, was reported by Schulenburg in telegram No. 2575 of Nov. 26 (9324/E661152-53).

prietors was absurd, since these laws served the purpose of destroying the individual peasant proprietors in the Soviet Union. Sobolev replied that the taxes had recently been reduced by 25 percent, which was not accepted by us as a solution.

In the whole matter I am continuing to bestir myself.

SCHULENBURG

No. 203

35/23019-21

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1940—3:02 p. m.

No. 2262 of October 20

Received October 21—7:20 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

In special reports, especially in telegram No. 1992 of September 18,¹ I reported that lately the ever-widening hate campaign against National Socialist Germany was concentrating on attacks on the official Mission of the Reich and its members. Carried along by a public opinion whipped up by the press, the Congressional Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities, the so-called Dies Committee, notorious for its sensationalism and the unreliability of its findings, devotes itself mainly to the investigation of the propaganda activities of the Embassy and the Consulates, as well as to the alleged espionage and sabotage activities of the official representatives of the Reich. About the incredible accusations showered quite publicly on the members of the Embassy and the Consulates I have also reported in No. 2036 of September 24² and No. 2240 of October 17.³ In the course of these developments the following new situations have emerged:

(1) Yesterday the Dies Committee served notice on the Riggs National Bank to produce all papers, ledgers, and vouchers, etc., of the accounts kept for the German Embassy. I immediately and emphatically protested to the State Department such a violation of diplomatic immunity and demanded that the notice to produce be immediately set aside. The State Department thereupon obtained a provisional cancellation of the measure. Today in a new note addressed to Secretary of State Hull I demanded that the measure of the Dies Committee be immediately and definitively set aside and I shall report further on the outcome.

(2) Today's newspapers play up prominently with headlines such as "Obscure Consul Hitler's Gauleiter in U. S." etc., the news that the Dies Committee had discovered the existence of an illegal secret Na-

¹ Document No. 71.

² Document No. 99.

³ Not found.

tional Socialist party organization in the United States whose leader was Consul Draeger in New York; Consul General von Spiegel and Consul Gyssling were also named in that connection. This "obscure Consul" was issuing orders and supervising the activities and loyalty even of the official representatives of the Reich who were his superiors in the Service and was the head of the fifth column in the United States. The Dies Committee had transmitted to the State Department voluminous material on this subject which was so incriminating that it was likely to lead to the expulsion of the German Foreign Service Officers in question. It contained evidence that the German Foreign Service in the United States was out to destroy American democracy by all conceivable means, including subsidies, bribes, propaganda, blackmail, and espionage. The existence of officials of the Auslandsorganisation had been confirmed, apart from other sources, by the testimony of Dr. F. E. Auhagen, who has hitherto been a friend of Kreisleiter Draeger and who was lately arrested for German propaganda activities.

On top of all this the news agencies are circulating the report that according to an unofficial German source here (presumably also Dr. Auhagen) Consul Draeger was Kreisleiter of the Auslandsorganisation for the United States. The membership of this Reich German party organization amounted to about 1,000. Draeger was collecting from these members contributions of 5 to 8 marks monthly and a similar amount for the German winter relief and the Nazi party rally [*Reichsparteitag*].

The discovery of active officials of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP inside the United States may lead to complications, since in 1933 Ambassador Luther, on instructions from the Deputy of the Führer, had officially assured President Roosevelt that the then existing local branches of the Auslandsorganisation had been disbanded and that in the future no party apparatus of any kind, whether for Reich Germans or for Volksdeutsche, would exist in the United States.⁴ We must be prepared for the possibility that the American Government will take the matter up in this connection, and confronting the Embassy with documentary evidence, will demand an explanation, especially since, because of the question of the obligation of party members to register, the question of the existence of a party apparatus of the Auslandsorganisation in the United States will in any case probably come up for discussion in negotiations with the State Department in the next few days (cf. telegraphic dispatch No. 2026 of September 23⁵ and telegraphic instruction No. 1099 of September 29⁶). I therefore request telegraphic instructions as soon as possible as to how I should react to a question about the existence of Kreisleiters of the Auslandsorganisation in the United States, if it should come up.⁷

THOMSEN

⁴ Cf. Series C, vol. II, documents Nos. 5 and 259.

⁵ Document No. 90.

⁶ See *ibid.*, footnote 4.

⁷ See document No. 216.

No. 204

5896/E433399-414

*Memorandum by Léon Degrelle, Belgian Racist Leader*¹

PARIS, October 20, 1940.

I. The Responsibilities of National Socialist Germany.

1) National Socialist Germany, whether she wishes it or not, will hereafter be responsible for Europe. Either she will build a stable peace, an order not only material but moral, or Europe will be plunged into anarchy.

2) National Socialist Germany will have immense tasks in the future.

Even if one confines oneself to the countries at present occupied, Germany will have to find hundreds of thousands of technicians who will be the sinews of Europe and Africa.

3) National Socialist Germany will for one or two generations encounter underground opposition outside the Reich:

(a) from the masses, long blinded;

(b) the old democratic, plutocratic, and Masonic forces, whose creatures hold innumerable posts of command.

4) It is even very probable that Germany will have to face struggles of the greatest scope, outside of Europe, particularly from the direction of the United States, which will rapidly become the supreme bastion of Jewish power, and will try ceaselessly, like England in 1940, to promote unrest on the Continent of Europe.

Conclusions:

1) National Socialist Germany should prepare, beginning immediately, a complete plan for bringing order to Europe.

2) This order is not conceivable unless the German Army assures it throughout the extent of European territory. These troops of the Third Reich may be small in number and stationed only at certain bases. But they are indispensable, at least during the first years of peace.

If Germany withdrew militarily from the former parliamentary countries, still terribly riddled by British democratic propaganda, revolution with anarchy would inevitably follow.

3) Aside from this military aspect, there is the political aspect.

National Socialist Germany, while assuring to each civilization its proper development and permitting each people to retain, spiritually, its personality, must take certain precautions of a political kind. If not, she would rapidly decay.

¹ The original of this memorandum in French is in Degrelle's handwriting. It is from the files of the German Embassy in Paris.

4) If National Socialism is not an article of export, it is nevertheless indispensable that the institutions of the countries of the new Europe be coordinated and harmonized.

5) The question of men will be especially acute. Germany, because of the extent of her mission, risks running short of cadres. She will have to try, therefore, wherever she can, to find local collaborators, and only post her men where she cannot find local collaboration.

II. Dangers which await National Socialist Germany.

1) Allowing herself to be overwhelmed by difficulties:

If National Socialist Germany wants to do everything alone, she may be deluged by the material difficulties, the lack of understanding and the mediocrity of the organization which has become unduly swollen;

2) Not placing sufficient confidence in her friends abroad:

Each country has its psychology and must be directed with due regard for its characteristics.

On the other hand, if Germany does not make sufficient use of her friends abroad, she will have to create such an extensive new organization, strictly German, that it will finally be composed of men of doubtful value, who might have serious weaknesses.

3) Allowing herself to become corrupt and bourgeois:

In her contacts with the occupied countries, National Socialism must take care to remain pure, hard, fundamentally revolutionary.

Too many contacts (meetings, receptions, dinners) now occur with the corrupt elements of the old parliamentary, plutocratic, and Masonic oligarchies. The fact that thousands of notorious individuals of the old regime are being permitted to remain in positions of authority in the occupied countries and are, therefore, in constant contact with the German authorities, is extremely dangerous. Friendships form. A kind of unhealthy tolerance is born. The National Socialist ideology might become insipid and debased by this detestable promiscuity.

On the other hand, National Socialist Germany must, with the pretext of suppressing opposition, guard against "watering down its wine" and making National Socialism a bastard. The new Europe must be harshly controlled.

The war must not end with an ideological compromise which would cause National Socialism to rot, but in the total victory, without sterile concessions, of National Socialism and the identical movements of the new Europe.

Conclusions:

1) National Socialist Germany must unburden herself, outside the Reich, of all work where a strictly German operation is not indispensable.

2) National Socialist Germany must invite the honorable and fraternal collaboration of her friends abroad.

3) National Socialist Germany must be careful to maintain the revolutionary intransigence of the Hitlerian spirit, and guard against corrupting rapprochement with the democratic and plutocratic elements.

4) Outside the Reich National Socialist Germany must depend not on the politicians now converted from motives of self-interest, but on her proven friends who, in the heroic times, fought hard for the same ideas as she did.

It is only they who have stood the test, have shown intellectual and physical courage.

The others, who are now so suddenly becoming great admirers of National Socialism, are doing so from self-interest, in order to remain near the high places of political influence, of power. It is a new form of their hypocrisy and their baseness of spirit.

National Socialist Germany must be very cautious with regard to these over-rapid conversions.

Abroad National Socialist Germany should place her trust in and give the responsibilities of power to her comrades-in-arms in the days of trial, to those whom she could judge in the hour of struggle, of conquest, or of persecution.

III. Military order in the occupied countries.

1) It is perfectly normal that the Military Command should have exclusive power in the occupied territories, as long as the operations against England last.

But one should not imagine that this apparent order is order pure and simple [*l'ordre tout court*]. It derives more from police order than from political and especially social order. It is negative (no troubles) and not constructive.

2) Indirectly, the present order in the occupied countries in the West is of much more service to the old political forces than to the national and social movements ideologically allied with National Socialism.

(a) The old democratic, plutocratic, Masonic, and even Jewish clans had powerful organizations. They use them today, in the absence of a political power, to conduct immense underground activities.

(b) The national and social forces, which do not have these multiple and secret ramifications, are, basically, the only ones to suffer from the present political inaction, not being authorized to have the powerful contacts with the masses (radio, meetings, etc.) which would enable them to persuade the public at large and to prepare psychologically for the new regime.

3) This activity of the old parties, of the lodges, of high finance, has brought about a revival of anti-Hitler sentiment in Paris, as well as in Brussels. The men of the old regime, seeing that nothing is changing, are becoming more and more insolent and daring.

On the other hand, the pioneers of the new ideas outside of the Reich are, after years of struggle and months of imprisonment, reduced to isolation and almost complete inactivity.

4) This deep-rooted disorder is of no great importance if an end is put to it with the military defeat of England. But it will be necessary then not to lose time, because

(a) the prestige of National Socialist Germany is at stake: The state which represents order cannot create disorder;

(b) the interests of National Socialist Germany demand it. Political anarchy in the occupied countries might have repercussions in the Reich itself.

IV. Belgium and the Greater Reich.

1) Belgium may play a very important role in the Europe of tomorrow and resume her great tradition of a "country at the cross-roads," where the civilizations, the men, the material products of the countries of the East and the South meet. Such was Belgium under the Dukes of Burgundy and under Charles the Fifth, when she was *Germania Inferior*, taking the oath of fealty to the Holy Germanic Empire. Her intellectual and economic influence was considerable.

2) A strong Belgium, augmented by the return of the north of France and the liberation of the Scheldt, and working in close collaboration with National Socialist Germany, can render the greatest services:

(a) Her southern frontier and the northern coast, under the military control of the Reich, would guarantee peace in the West.

(b) Economically, she can augment powerfully the network of the Greater Reich, especially by being a very important jetty toward the American markets.

(c) Intellectually, because of her geographic situation, she would be a chosen land for exchanges between Germany and the Latin civilization, as Antwerp was in the days of humanism.

3) Germany, in order to build a united Europe, needs "turntables" (like in the railway stations). Belgium is the ideal "turntable" from all points of view.

Conclusions:

1) Belgium must continue to live in accordance with her own personality.

2) Belgium must be strengthened in order the better to fulfill her role and resume her great historic tradition as *Germania Inferior*.

V. Political forces in present-day Belgium.

A. The Past

1) The old parties (Catholic-Conservative; Catholic-Democratic; Liberal-Masonic; Socialist-Marxist) were formerly very powerful.

They still have thousands of their people everywhere, in the administration, the police, the judiciary, the Haute-Banque.

2) The plutocracy dominated the democratic state. It still tries to dominate occupied Belgium and to get control of the principal social elements: Labor Camps, Youth, Winter Relief, etc. It is just as strong, just as intriguing as before the war.

3) The politically active Church is extremely busy, still owns large dailies (*Algemeen Nieuws*, *Het Nieuws van den Dag*), conducts a campaign against National Socialism and Rexism ("every sacrifice that you make is a bomb that falls upon Germany," a priest of Antwerp has proclaimed). These old parties, this high finance, this political power of the Church must be ruthlessly crushed.

B. The Future

Aside from these unhealthy forces, there are:

1) REX, extended over the entire territory, in Flanders as well as in Wallonia.

REX has kept up a difficult struggle for 6 years; has assembled, thanks to its dynamism, immense numbers. REX has also experienced severe set-backs, due to the coalition of all the democratic, plutocratic, clerical, Masonic, and Jewish forces. For the democratic countries (England and France), for Jewry and Masonry, the victory of REX would have been a fatal blow, because they wanted Belgium to serve for them as a dagger at the back of Germany. Fantastic sums were spent by these international forces to crush REX, which was forced to withstand their assaults incessantly. The Church joined in these campaigns and the Cardinal of Malines condemned REX.

In spite of the blows, the persecutions, REX still kept up the struggle, overthrew particularly Van Zeeland,² the man of British and Jewish finance, made desperate efforts to turn Belgium away from the democratic countries.

Every advance made by National Socialist Germany (Austria, the Munich Pact, the occupation of Prague, etc.) meant for REX fierce enmities. The last months before May 1940 were particularly hard. But REX held its own.

² Following the defeat of Degrelle by Premier van Zeeland in a by-election in Brussels in April 1937, Degrelle and the Rexists attacked Van Zeeland charging him with improper conduct during the period in which he served as Vice-Governor of the National Bank. On Oct. 25, 1937, the Van Zeeland Cabinet resigned. Van Zeeland declared that he took this step in order to leave himself more free to defend himself against these charges.

On May 10, 1940, the majority of the Rexist leaders were jailed, delivered over to the French, subjected to frightful tortures. Several were assassinated.

Since the liberation of the Chief of REX, the Rexist movement has resumed its activity. Its French language daily, the *Pays Réel*, has reappeared and enjoys great popularity. Its shock troops, the *Formations de Combat*, have been re-formed everywhere and are ready to assure order in a new Belgian state.

REX asks only to act and assume the most complete responsibilities.

2) The v. n. v.

Besides REX, there exists, but only in Flanders, the v. n. v. (*Vlaamsch Nationalist Verbond*).

This movement, by origin democratic and parliamentary, has shown an authoritarian orientation by coming to terms with REX in 1936.

Its relations with REX are good, but REX goes further than the v. n. v.:

(a) The nationalism of the v. n. v. is rather narrow and is based on a withdrawal into Flanders—it is almost regionalism.

REX wishes a much more expansive nationalism and a union of the nationalisms of Europe.

(b) The v. n. v. is interested only in the Flemish question and particularly in the linguistic question.

For REX, there are other very important problems, especially the social problem. REX, which is, above all, a workers' and peasants' movement, is much more revolutionary than the v. n. v.

(c) REX believes in the need for a strong Belgium. The breaking up of the West would produce only anarchy. There never was a Flemish state and a Walloon state, but a collaboration of Flemish-speaking and Flemish [*French?*]-speaking westerners in the heart of the old Belgian provinces. Before being mutilated by Louis XIV and Louis XV, the county of Flanders was composed of Flemings, half of whom spoke Flemish and half who spoke French.

The same was true of the Duchy of Brabant.

The same was true of the Principality of Liège, which comprised 11 "good Walloon cities" and 11 "good Flemish cities." REX *does not want artificial political creations.*

Instead of breaking in two a Belgium which is already too small, REX desires:

(1) to give, in a common and strong state, the largest measure of linguistic and cultural autonomy to the Flemings and the Walloons;

(2) to substitute for the present particularist mentality, a Greater Belgium and Greater Europe mentality, as in the times of *Germania Inferior*.

(d) Final remark: The v. n. v. has no chief who can create unanimity around him, who has a real and personal prestige, and who wins the adherence and the affection of the masses.

With REX, on the other hand, the question of a chief has been arranged ever since the creation of the Rexist movement, the work of *one* man, whose authority is absolute.

Conclusions:

1) REX wishes, from the Flemish standpoint, the same as the v. n. v., but REX wishes more than the v. n. v. from the social and European points of view.

2) A definitive accord between REX and the v. n. v. is desirable and perfectly realizable.

3) Nevertheless, REX, being distributed evenly throughout the country, in Flanders, in Wallonia, and in Brussels, being more authoritarian, having the greater vision, being for Europe the symbol of the national and social revolution in Belgium, should be central element of Belgium in the event that Germany decides to maintain Belgium as a state.

C. Additional Organizations

Small reactionary groups still exist outside of REX and the v. n. v., but their influence has waned. They are the Verdinaso and the Légion Nationale.

1) The Verdinaso wants the reunion of Belgium and Holland. Its leader, Joris van Severen, was assassinated by the French, at Abbéville. He was replaced by a good but queer man—M. Thiers.

The Verdinaso movement is friendly to REX. It numbers, at most, a few thousand members.

2) The Légion Nationale, a small reactionary group, is ill-regarded by the workers. Its chief, Hoornaert, is anti-German and maintains an attitude of reserve. Its membership is only a few hundred. The young people are, for the most part, anti-British, and are ready to pass over to REX.

D. Other Personages

1) M. Henri de Man, former president of the Socialist party, which he himself dissolved in June 1940; professor at the Freemason University of Brussels. He controls certain elements of trade unionists. With the working masses, however, his influence is weak. He is a technician rather than one who can attract the masses.

2) The world of the universities, of commerce, of industry, contains strong personalities favorable to the Rexistists who could play an important role in a strong and durable state.

E. The King

The entourage of the King is detestable.

M. Frédéricq, the King's *Chef de Cabinet*, is one of the highest ranking personages in Freemasonry. He is a 39th-degree Mason.

Several high dignitaries of the Court have strong connections with the Haute-Banque and have even received directorships by this means.

At the moment, the Palace is a veritable nest of Masonic and plutocratic intrigue.

In the event of the restoration of the monarchy, a cleanup should take place and rigid safeguards be imposed.

LÉON DEGRELLE

No. 205

1379/357906

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1891 of October 21

BERLIN, October 21, 1940—4: 35 p. m.

Received October 21—9: 00 p. m.

[e. o. Büro RAM 304.]¹

For the Ambassador personally.

The Foreign Minister has reserved for himself the notification of the Italian Government about the letter to Stalin. Please observe therefore, in this respect, greatest restraint toward third persons, even toward your Italian colleagues.²

After several inquiries by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires here regarding your instructions in Moscow, the existence of a letter to Stalin has been admitted to him.³ It was said in this connection that the letter contained a review of the military-political events which have taken place since the last meeting of the Foreign Minister with Molotov and Stalin. The Foreign Minister was expecting an early reply and would then inform personally the Italian Ambassador here.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The file number is from another copy (104/112792).

² Marginal note in Schulenburg's handwriting: "Is being done!"

³ Marginal note: "!"

No. 206

F12/104-100

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission*¹

ON THE TRAIN, October 21, 1940.

PROPOSALS FOR CONCESSIONS TO THE FRENCH

1) The two départements, Pas de Calais and Nord, have been assigned to the Military Administration for Belgium. Since economic

¹ Marginal note: "Memorandum by Minister Hemmen prepared on the journey to Hendaye. E[rich] K[ordt]."

sovereignty follows military sovereignty, this means that the important wheat production of these areas will be delivered to Belgium and that the French people will therefore be deprived of this sustenance. On the other hand, this military separation is extremely disquieting to the French Government. Making the two military administrations conform to the old political border would therefore very certainly be recognized as an important concession.

2) As we know, the French are ready to agree to a customs control by us of their external frontiers in return for a relaxation of the demarcation line. As a result of the Clodius-Giannini agreement,² the Italians are to take over the control of the important Mediterranean coast, with Marseilles as the most important port of embarkation and entry in unoccupied territory. The French, as we know, have definitely refused to concede such participation to the Italians and would be willing to let the entire negotiation collapse over this issue.³ In a private letter to Field Marshal Keitel, General Huntziger protested against this and at the same time referred to the negotiations at Compiègne.⁴

Meanwhile it appears that the domestic authorities, so far as the control of goods and foreign exchange is concerned, are prepared to dispense with the establishment of a regular border guard. The preparation of a mobile control unit of some 250 men, equipped with cars and detailed by the Paris commissioners to make spot checks, would suffice.

With the dropping of the contemplated establishment of a guard on the outer borders, Italian participation would also naturally be eliminated and the wishes of the French would thereby be met. If necessary, the Italians could participate in the spot check unit, particularly if it is in civilian clothing.

Since counterintelligence naturally has special requirements, this would have to be delegated to the military control commissions. According to a list that has reached the Foreign Ministry, however, the Italian military control commissions in France are already extremely numerous on the Mediterranean coast, so that they could undertake these controls, possibly with reinforcements. The French could raise no more objection to these than to the commissions themselves, which

² Vol. x of this series, document No. 360.

³ French refusal had been expressed by General Huntziger to Minister Hemmen on Sept. 12. Minutes of this conversation are in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 267-273. There is an account of the conversation also in Hemmen's telegram Del. No. 115 of Sept. 14, 8:40 a. m., to the Foreign Ministry (368/206948-52).

⁴ The letter from Huntziger to Keitel has not been found. From a memorandum by Kramarz of Sept. 19 (368/206992-93), it is evident that it was written sometime between Sept. 12 and Sept. 19.

On the discussion at the armistice negotiations, see vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 513 and 522. For General Huntziger's statement of what he told Field Marshal Keitel at the signing of the Armistice Treaty, see *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, p. 270.

were expressly stipulated in the Italian-French Armistice Agreement.

3) Occupation costs. An accommodation would be possible in two ways: first, with regard to the amount, possibly by promising to reduce to half, that is, to 10 million reichsmarks per day, the installment payments to be made for a definite time. Since we already have a balance of 38 billion francs at present, a temporary reduction of the installment payments would be supportable, and would also correspond to the reduction in our army of occupation in France, which has actually taken place.

A second extremely important concession, which might be envisaged at least to a certain extent, would be a promise to the effect that we would undertake not to dispose of our balance with the Bank of France without regard to the existing currency situation. With regard to the precise wording of this clause, I would propose making reservations, however.

4) It would be a very important concession to France if, above all, we would obligate ourselves to handle in future the economic and military requisitions in France, with special regard for providing employment in France, particularly in connection with the extensive reconstruction work—bridge-building, reconstruction of cities, road work. Instead of the direct removal of the raw materials, arrangements could be made for starting up French industries that are based on such raw materials, so that we take over the manufactures produced from such raw materials (rubber—automobile tires).

The labor question should be handled from the same standpoint and this would necessarily lead to the release of a considerable number of prisoners of war, in so far as they are needed for particularly urgent work (mining, lumbermen, foresters, and armaments workers).

Submitted herewith most respectfully to the Foreign Minister and Under State Secretary Gaus.

HEMMEN

No. 207

F12/094-091

Unsigned Memorandum

[Undated.]

DRAFT OF A LETTER OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE FRENCH MINISTER PRESIDENT [SIC] LAVAL¹

Referring to the conversation between the Führer of the German Reich and the French Chief of State held on October 24, 1940, I have

¹ An accompanying notation initialed by Erich Kordt on Nov. 8 (F12/079) states that this draft of a letter and a protocol for signature were prepared on the journey to Montoire but were not placed before the French (see document No. 227). There is also a draft of the letter in French (F12/080-084).

the honor to confirm to Your Excellency the following as the outcome of that conversation :

1. The Führer, in agreement with the Duce, has expressed his intention that France should occupy her rightful place in a reorganized Europe and that the French people should participate in the cooperation that will be imperative among the European peoples in the future.

2. The French Government is firmly resolved to resist with all its resources the current attempts to seize control over the French possessions in Africa. It will publicly and formally declare itself to be in a state of war with England, which instigated and actively participated in these attempts, not shrinking even from armed attack against France at Oran and Dakar, and will take action accordingly.

On this condition Germany is prepared to authorize France to employ for her military measures in Africa certain military contingents over and above the Armistice Agreement and the agreements entered into for its implementation. The details shall be arranged between the Armistice Commission and the French delegation.

3. The Axis Powers and France have a common interest in seeing England defeated within the shortest time. With this in view the French Government, on the request of the Governments of the Axis Powers, will make available certain military resources for participation in the struggle against England.

4. The Führer informed the French Chief of State that in a general settlement at the conclusion of peace following England's defeat and the return of the German colonies, it would be necessary to effect a redistribution of the colonial possessions on the African Continent, which within the framework of a balancing of mutual interests would take account of the political necessities and economic requirements of the European nations involved. This would in particular concern the four Powers of Germany, Italy, France, and Spain. In case this reorganization in Africa entails territorial changes in the present colonial possessions of France, the Axis Powers undertake to see that at the time of conclusion of peace with England France shall receive territorial compensations and that in the final outcome France shall have a colonial domain in Africa substantially equivalent to her possessions today.

5. Both parties are agreed that this exchange of letters shall be treated as top secret.

6. The Reich Government undertakes to secure the Italian Government's immediate agreement with the foregoing points and will ask it to inform the French Government accordingly.

M. Laval would have to acknowledge the foregoing letter of the Foreign Minister by a corresponding reply.

No. 208

F10/160-164;
F12/097-096*Protocol*¹

Draft

The German Reich and its ally Italy did not want the war against France and England. Contrary to the sincere desire of the German Government to live in a durable peace with England and France, France and England declared war on Germany. Subsequent efforts of the Government of the German Reich to put an end to the needless struggle, were shattered by the resistance of the former French and the present English Governments:

It is obvious that, once the struggle is terminated, either France or England will have to bear the costs, territorial and material, of this struggle.

In recognition of the overriding continental interests of the principal European Powers, Germany, Italy, and France on the basis of the conversation held between the Führer of the German Reich and the Chief of the French State on October 24, 1940, have agreed in this Protocol on the following:

1. The Führer, in agreement with the Duce, has expressed his intention that France should occupy her rightful place in a reorganized Europe and that the French people should participate in the cooperation that will be imperative among the European peoples in the future.

2. The Axis Powers and France have a common interest in seeing England defeated within the shortest time. The French Government will therefore support the measures of the Axis Powers to this end within the framework of its resources. The particulars of this practical cooperation shall be established separately in a specific agreement between Germany and Italy on one side, and France on the other.

3. On this condition Germany and Italy are also prepared to authorize France to employ for her military measures in Africa certain military contingents over and above the Armistice Agreement and the agreements entered into for its implementation. The details shall be arranged between the Armistice Commissions and the French delegations.

¹ Unsigned marginal note: "Original with Abetz. Not presented."

A French text of the draft protocol is filmed on F10/155-159; this French text differs in many particulars from that printed in *Pétain et les allemands: Mémoire d'Abetz sur les rapports franco-allemands* (Paris, 1948), pp. 23-25, the presumable reason being that the latter text was a new translation from the German original.

4. The Führer informed the French Chief of State that in a general settlement at the conclusion of peace following England's defeat and the return of the German colonies, it would be necessary to effect a redistribution of the colonial possessions on the African Continent which within the framework of a balancing of mutual interests would take account of the political necessities and economic requirements of the European nations involved. This would in particular concern the four Powers of Germany, Italy, France, and Spain. In case this reorganization in Africa entails necessary territorial changes in the present colonial possessions of France, the Axis Powers undertake to see that at the time of conclusion of peace with England France shall receive territorial compensations and that in the final outcome France shall have a colonial domain in Africa substantially equivalent to her possessions today.

5. Both parties are agreed that this Protocol shall be treated as top secret.

6. The Reich Government undertakes to secure the Italian Government's immediate agreement with the foregoing points, and to request it to sign the Protocol also on its part.

Done in three authentic copies in the German, Italian, and French languages.

MONTOIRE, October 24, 1940.

For the German
Government:

For the Italian
Government:

For the French
Government:

ANNEX TO SECRET PROTOCOL

Germany declares herself prepared to institute the following relaxations of the present armistice terms:

a) The départements of Nord and Pas de Calais, which are at present under the German Military Administration in Belgium, shall be placed under the German Military Commander in France.

b) Germany waives establishment of a frontier guard system for the control of the French outer frontiers. Such control shall be effected, subject to adequate provisions for protecting military interests, by a mobile control detachment.

c) The periodic payments toward the occupation costs shall be reduced in an amount yet to be determined. Germany is also prepared, in drawing upon the occupation cost account with the Bank of France, to give consideration to the currency situation at the time.

d) In effecting requisitions of an economic and military nature and the release of prisoners of war, special consideration shall be given to the requirement of providing employment in France.

No. 209

100/65197-98

State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Mackensen

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, October 21, 1940.

St.S. No. 183 g. Rs.

DEAR FRIEND: We are in complete agreement regarding the need for handling the other end of our Axis with care. That this view prevails even in the highest places, at least in principle, I again found to be the case yesterday when I conversed with Herr v. Ribbentrop on the subject of Greece before his departure.¹ You will notice that on this point we are for the present sending you no instructions of any kind and are not even directing you to make official inquiry as to whether there is some truth to the story or not.

In the said conversation, incidentally, I also mentioned the ideas contained in your letter of October 18.² As regards the dispatching of German troops to Rumania, Herr v. Ribbentrop believes that he spoke plainly and precisely enough to Count Ciano in Rome. Consequently, he has no guilty conscience on that score. On the other hand, his reaction when I spoke to him of the Italian desire for a symbolic participation in the Axis military representation in Rumania was entirely favorable. So far nobody from the Italian Embassy has broached this subject here. We ourselves will probably not bring it up.

I also wish to mention that since the change of Ambassadors here, Zamboni has made it a habit to come to Woermann every day. In so far as no specific limitations are placed on him, Woermann treats Zamboni very open-handedly.

For the rest, your reference to the sore spot in our relations has done no harm; for example, you are to keep our friends regularly informed, also during the coming interesting week. Let us hope it goes well.

With best regards and

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

WEIZÄCKER

¹ For France. See document No. 212.

² Document No. 192.

No. 210

35/23025

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, October 21, 1940.

The Japanese Counselor of Embassy gave me the following information today from a telegram from the Japanese Ambassador at Washington:

The Ambassador considers it possible but not certain that the United States will enter the war after the presidential elections. In any case two factors might delay her entry into the war: namely, either a speedy capitulation on the part of England or a compromise between England and her opponents.

The Tripartite Pact had resulted in a considerable deterioration of the feeling toward Japan, both among the people and in the Government. There are two opinions in America: one to the effect that the United States must now first deal with Japan, the other and much more prevalent one, that the United States should first turn against Germany. The American Government, to judge from the state of its naval armament, is not in a position to wage war simultaneously in the Pacific and in the Atlantic Oceans.

The Japanese Ambassador at Washington also reported that the statements on the monthly deliveries of planes to England did not agree, but that the number of 300 to 400 planes delivered monthly is the most optimistic estimate for England.

WOERMANN

No. 211

F5/0431-0432

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 22, 1940—5:02 a. m.

No. 2236 of October 21

Received October 22—7:35 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1890 of October 20.¹

Tonight Molotov handed me Stalin's sealed answer together with a copy. The form and style of the letter leave no doubt that the letter was composed by Stalin personally.

Literally translated, the letter reads as follows:

"My Dear Herr von Ribbentrop: I have received your letter. I thank you sincerely for your confidence, as well as for the instructive analysis of recent events which is contained in your letter.

"I agree with you that a further improvement in the relations between our countries is entirely possible on the permanent basis of a long-range delimitation of mutual interests.

"M. Molotov acknowledges that he is under obligation to pay you a return visit in Berlin. He hereby accepts your invitation.

"It remains for us to agree on the date of arrival in Berlin. The time from the 10th to the 12th of November is most convenient for M. Molotov. If it is also agreeable to the German Government, the question may be considered as settled.

¹ See document No. 195, footnote 3.

"I welcome the desire expressed by you to come to Moscow again in order to resume the exchange of ideas begun last year on questions of interest to both our countries, and I hope that this wish will be realized after M. Molotov's trip to Berlin.

"As to joint deliberation on some issues with Japanese and Italian participation, I am of the opinion (without being opposed to this idea in principle) that this question would have to be submitted to a previous examination.

"Yours, etc."

Molotov added orally that he planned to arrive in Berlin on the 10th, 11th, or 12th of November. No decision has yet been reached concerning the duration of his stay. It was to be made dependent upon the exigencies of the situation.

Hilger will arrive in Berlin Thursday morning,² will bring along Stalin's original letter³ and discuss further details of the visit there.

Molotov requested that the whole matter be treated in strict confidence for the time being.

SCHULENBURG

² i. e., Oct. 24.

³ The Russian original is filmed on 1379/357907-08.

No. 212

F14/190-211

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

MONTOIRE-SUR-LE-LOIR, October 22, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, LAVAL, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, AT THE RAILWAY STATION OF MONTOIRE-SUR-LE-LOIR, IN THE WORK COACH OF THE FÜHRER, ON OCTOBER 22, 1940

M. Laval first thanked the Führer for the opportunity of having this conference. He had thought at first that he would speak only with the Foreign Minister and had learned only a little while before that the Führer would receive him.

He intended to speak to the Führer with absolute frankness and to stress the hope which he placed in German-French cooperation. He regretted that he had not visited the Führer several years ago, for the sad events which had befallen France could perhaps then have been avoided.

He had stated before the National Assembly that France's declaration of war on Germany was the greatest crime that had ever been committed in the course of French history. Even before the war he

had been an advocate of German-French cooperation and of a methodical organization of Europe and could therefore pursue the same political policy again now without any restraint. His only regret was that he had to do so at a moment when France was so severely prostrated. He was of the opinion that the policy of France must be based on cooperation with the Reich. Germany had won the victory. If she so desired, she could misuse it, for France was not capable of the slightest physical reaction and would have to bear any hardships. He, Laval, doubted, however, whether in such a case (i. e., if she misused her victory) Germany would be able to assure for herself all the moral and material advantages that she rightly expected from her incomparable victory.

He was not neglecting any opportunity, moreover, to point out repeatedly to Marshal Pétain, who shared his views, that sincere and unreserved cooperation with Germany was France's only salvation.

The Führer replied that he had considered it advisable to hold the conference with M. Laval at a time when other important international conferences of decisive moment were held or about to be held. It was obvious that this first conference could not go into any great detail on German-French relations, which after all could not be treated exhaustively in a couple of hours, but would rather have to seek a clarification of fundamentals. This was necessary, not only because a basic clarification was the prerequisite for the treatment of details, but because it was important for the further steps which he (the Führer) was about to undertake.

One point had to be emphasized: The war between France and Germany was really, as far as its beginning was concerned, a totally unjustifiable crime. As late as September 2, 1939, he had tried to prevent this war, for which he could not see any reason. Germany had not made any demands either on England or on France that justified any action so monstrous as a declaration of war. Nevertheless war had been declared and Germany had waged it in her manner. If it were now concluded, it would now be possible to consider a definitive settlement of the problems to be solved. Against the wish of the Führer, however, the war was still going on. When it would end was perhaps not entirely certain, but its military outcome was absolutely beyond doubt. He (the Führer) said this even at the risk of being called an optimistic prophet, pointing out in that connection that much of what he had prophesied had come true. The bad weather which was favoring England might indeed delay the final settlement, but could in no wise change its outcome, just as the bad weather during the past winter had merely delayed settlements which the Führer wished to bring about as early as last fall, without affecting their consummation in the slightest.

It was clear that the Führer intended to end the war as quickly as possible, for he was not waging the war for the sake of war but only in order that he might resume his peaceful work as soon as possible, since each additional week cost further sacrifices of a material nature.

It should be obvious to Laval that someone had to take the responsibility for the costs of the war and bear their consequences. Each additional month increased the totally unproductive expenditures for the war. It could not be expected, however, that these war costs would be charged to a country which had not wanted the war and had neither started it nor lost it.

The Führer then called attention to certain currents in France which were nourished by the hope that if the war should last for some time there would be a change in the military situation that would benefit France. The future would show that these hopes were completely unfounded and that the expectation based on them was absolutely false.

Militarily the war would be decided either by a series of lightning blows by Germany or by the gradual destruction of the will and the ability of the British to resist. The Führer expressed his firm conviction that the time would come when Germany would enforce peace in one way or another. He had no doubt that there would then be a revision in the calculation of those circles in France which imagined that in 4, 6, or 8 months the situation of their country might be improved, or which perhaps assumed that from a certain moment on England would not in any circumstances conclude peace with Germany at the expense of others.

For Germany the question of who was finally to bear the costs of the war was decisive. The blood that had been sacrificed could not be compensated for, since the dead would not arise again and the cripples would not be healed. For the material sacrifices, however, she had to demand compensation. Germany's goal in the matter of material compensation was determined by military and purely material factors. From the military point of view France was the first country conquered and consequently an enemy to be held primarily liable. From the material point of view it was a matter of helping to cover the essential needs of the German people in the same way. Germany was not seeking a peace inspired by arrogance or vengeance, but was acting under the hard compulsion of necessity. It was also conceivable that the destruction of England would offer him other opportunities as well.

Basically he (the Führer) personally approached this question without passion, for he had tried for many years, unfortunately without success, to bring about cooperation between Germany and France. In the future, too, he would choose this way of cooperation between

the two countries, provided that the necessary conditions for it were present.

Laval replied that he had already emphasized in the statements he had made in the beginning that in his opinion France's declaration of war on Germany was a crime committed against France. The war had also been far from popular in France; the French had not known why they should fight. He saw proof of the correctness of this view *inter alia* in the figure of 2,000,000 prisoners of war. A country which was capable of fighting and had also shown in the course of its history how it could fight gave proof by this number of prisoners that its people did not want the war.

He (Laval) understood perfectly well that the time had not yet come for speaking about the details of a joint German-French policy. He therefore understood the Führer's wish that today's conversation be limited to fundamentals. He willingly conceded, to continue along the line of the Führer's thought, that the war had been totally unjustified and that the former French governments had made a mistake in not seizing every possible opportunity for a rapprochement with Germany. He also realized that there could be no final settlement between Germany and France as long as the war was still going on. About the outcome of this struggle he did not have the slightest doubt: England would be defeated, and as a Frenchman he could only add that he desired the defeat of the British with all his heart. England had done everything to plunge France into the war and had then done nothing to support her in this struggle. Since the conclusion of the armistice she had proceeded against France in such a way that this desire for her defeat by Germany had become stronger and more sincere than ever. He (Laval) also realized that someone had to bear the costs of this struggle, that they increased from month to month, and that consequently it was desirable in the interest of all to bring about as early an end of the conflict as possible. He also readily understood that Germany, which had neither desired the war nor lost it, could not bear the costs. He hoped, however, that in the discussion of the details of this German-French cooperation he would have an opportunity to defend the interest of his country.

The Führer had referred to certain currents in France which were quietly hoping that a prolongation of the war would bring about an improvement in the situation of France. He could only say that to him such thoughts seemed very foolish. Besides, he would like to point out that it would be unjust and wrong to assume that all the French were of this opinion. The Popular Front people, who could not reconcile themselves to the new regime in France, the Jews, and many rich people who hoped that the pleasant life of prewar days could sooner or later be resumed, probably held this view. But even among the representatives

of this trend there were many of perfectly good will who suffered only because of the occupation of their fatherland and saw no glimmer of hope for the future in any other direction. He could state with absolute certainty, however, that if this conference and the further conversations that would perhaps follow should show that the idea of German-French cooperation was possible and if France should be offered an honorable peace or such a peace could be accepted by Germany, this Anglophile tendency in France would disappear. He knew his own country very well and could therefore state that certain, incidentally very discreet, manifestations of the same tendency were of no significance. If the Führer would take the hand extended to him by France, and Germany would cooperate with France, the French people would all, with the exception of a few who never learn, be strongly in favor of it. In this connection Laval called the conversation with the Führer an act of great political importance that would arouse strong hopes in France. He was aware that before the war the Führer had frequently offered France cooperation and during the war had repeatedly offered her peace. Although France had permitted herself to be led astray at that time, she could now return to the right road and had in fact already found her way back to it. If, as the Führer had just stated, Germany did not desire a peace of vengeance—which for that matter Laval had never expected she would—everything was possible. If the Führer, in view of France's long historical development—and he had previously shown that he was able to appreciate it—would grant France an honorable place, in keeping with her history and genius, in the new order in Europe created by him (the Führer), everything could be achieved.

The Führer said in this connection that it could be stated unquestionably that a positive form of some kind or other for German-French relations could not be definitely established as long as the war was not actually over. As long as the war was still undecided, the question of who would pay the costs remained open, and if Germany should happen to find an opportunity at some later time to make a reasonable settlement elsewhere, no one could expect that she would fight on merely in order to spare France. This had to be stated in all soberness and thereon the future relations between the two countries ultimately depended. He (the Führer) had learned that Laval personally was no friend of the English and desired their defeat. Many Frenchmen, however, naturally took a different view and cherished other hopes.

The Führer emphasized that he was determined, if necessary, to mobilize everything humanly conceivable against England. It would perhaps become evident even in the very near future that this was not merely empty talk. The question whether France intended to take a positive attitude toward this general mobilization against Eng-

land or thought that an attitude of waiting promised greater advantages for the future was of extreme importance for the relations between the two countries. The question was also decisive for the reason that the general extension of the front against England would obviously be determined or at least essentially affected by consideration of French interests or disregard of these interests, depending on the attitude France took. He (the Führer) believed that basically even the best peace between Germany and France, which would necessarily have to be concluded at the expense of England, could only be a peace that took general account of certain German interests in Europe and Africa, and furthermore would in general have to lead to a more European concept of the representation of the legitimate interests of a number of nations in Africa. In principle it was conceivable to him that France not only would not have to endure the suffering which she herself inflicted on Germany in 1918 and which she would, according to certain publications, inflict on Germany again in case of victory, but would receive consideration commensurate with her importance, both in Europe and in Africa. But if the war should last longer and Germany should find a settlement in another direction, the Reich would also be forced to indemnify itself in some other way.

The Führer added that of course he did not expect M. Laval to make any general statement in reply to these explanations. He only asked him to convey the substance of the conversation to Marshal Pétain. Perhaps it would then be possible to hold a personal conference between the Marshal and the Führer. He (the Führer) would have a conversation with Franco tomorrow,¹ and if Marshal Pétain accepted his invitation to a personal conference, it might perhaps take place thereafter.

Laval said immediately that the Marshal would accept any invitation of the Führer and that he could therefore accept it in his name at once.² For the rest, he (Laval) agreed with the Führer on almost all points. He spoke only for himself personally, however, and his only interest was to secure a peace that was least bad for his country. He saw only one possibility for that: the defeat of England. If the war should go on and a German-English settlement should be concluded, and if France's attitude should have been unclear, German-French relations would naturally be affected thereby.

The Führer had spoken of certain documents and publications revealing the suffering that France would inflict on her if Germany were defeated. He did not know which publications and documents the Führer had in mind in that connection and could only say that the sinister influence and pernicious interference of England in French affairs found expression there too.

¹ See document No. 220.

² See document No. 227.

The Führer had also mentioned that Germany and other countries had legitimate interests in Africa. By other countries he had presumably referred to Italy and Spain. He (Laval) must emphasize in all frankness that France had built up a colonial empire in Africa with pain and a vast amount of patience and considered it an inalienable part of her own flesh and blood. He believed and hoped that it was possible to find a form of cooperation that would assure Germany and the other interested countries of their legitimate share of raw materials without thereby affecting France's sovereignty in her colonial empire.

To this the Führer replied that Germany, too, had acquired colonies through hard work, but in 1918 they had simply been expropriated, as was then the order of the day. He believed that the principle of coordinating economic interests with political possession was correct. This did not mean that if peace were concluded at the expense of England, France would have to suffer any considerable diminution of her total holdings in Africa, even if the territorial interests of third countries should be taken into account—in which connection he was not speaking of the German colonies.

He considered it necessary to point out that Africa complemented Europe and that the European possessions in that continent belonged to Europe. A settlement would have to be found here that would give the most lasting protection to the interests of the continental European nations in this African continent and a territorial arrangement would have to be established that would do justice to the interests of all. This settlement would have to ensure cooperation in the maintenance and possible defense of this possession even in peacetime. This was a proposal essentially different, at least with respect to the colonial question, from the settlement which was forced upon Germany in 1918.

Laval continued his remarks on the colonial question by referring to the feelings of the natives. He would refrain at this time from giving any detailed description of these feelings toward certain countries. It was certain, however, that the natives loved France and admired Germany. He considered it his sacred duty to protect the French native population no less than the white Frenchmen. If one approached the plan for an active cooperation courageously, loyally, and frankly, as France was doing, it should be possible to find an arrangement that would spare the legitimate interests of France. Nothing ought ever be done that would injure French honor or affect French sensitivity and French racial pride. If the Führer shared this view, he (Laval) was certain that German-French cooperation was not only possible but would bear rich fruit and that out of the great misfortune of the war all Europe would perhaps reap the benefits of German-French cooperation.

In reply the Führer merely stated that the sensitivity of French racial pride could be spared only if peace were concluded at the expense of England.

It was then proposed that the conference between the Führer and Marshal Pétain should be held the day after tomorrow—October 24—at the same place.

During the entire conversation Laval took close written notes of the Führer's statements, the French translation of which he had dictated for recording almost verbatim.

SCHMIDT

No. 213

2110/456753

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, October 22, 1940.

e. o. W 4836 g.

Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens, who, by order of the Reichsmarschall has in recent weeks conducted the negotiations with the Finnish Government authorities on deliveries of arms,¹ informed me yesterday as follows:

Minister President Ryti and Field Marshal von Mannerheim had said to him that Germany might decide the fate of the Åland Islands by occupying them. Finland would agree entirely to such an occupation. If this could not take place at once because of the political situation, Germany should select for it a time convenient to her.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary.

SCHNURRE

¹ See documents Nos. 140 and 162.

No. 214

35/23031

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1940—6:52 p. m.

No. 2284 of October 22

Received October 23—5:20 a. m.

With reference to your Multex No. 316 of October 1.¹

All German official, semi-official, and camouflaged propaganda publications so far distributed in America were either printed and pub-

¹ Not printed (9919/E694613). This circular inquired about local procedures in publishing German official, semi-official, and propaganda material and difficulties which were encountered in this connection.

lished here by the Information Library in New York itself, by the German publishing agency of the Information Library (Veritas Press), or by suitable American firms, since experience has shown that propaganda material utilized here must be revised and edited for American use. These publications, if not camouflaged, carried the imprint "Published by the German Information Library, New York" or "Veritas Press", while in the case of pronounced anti-British propaganda an American publisher could always be found who would bring out the publication under his name.

About the negative effect of anonymous leaflets [*Streupropaganda*] I have reported repeatedly. Besides, because of British censorship, these shipments must be routed via the Far East, whereby the material becomes obsolete by the time of its arrival; moreover, the American post office has lately been seizing these shipments. This telegraphic dispatch has been destroyed at this end.

THOMSEN

No. 215

35/23034-36

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1940—11:40 p. m.

No. 2286 of October 22

Received October 23—11:55 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2262 of October 19 [20].¹

Draeger to State Secretary Bohle:

"In view of the lying and sensation-mongering press reports regarding my alleged activities as director of a National Socialist party propaganda, sabotage, and espionage organization I am reporting on my actual party work to date as follows:

"Since taking office, in October 1937, as Kreisleiter for the consular districts of New York, Chicago, Boston, and Cleveland, I made an effort, as directed, to prevent party members living here in my charge from appearing in any way as an organization. I have constantly enjoined on fellow party members, individually and collectively, that the party organization does not exist here and that they are not to engage in political activity here under any circumstances. No party member was ever entrusted by me with any office or task. The correspondence I had with fellow party members was always of an innocuous, nonconfidential nature and included invitations to comradeship meetings, decisions regarding membership dues or other matters of that sort. The outward form of the letters was such that no conclusions could be drawn as to the alleged existence of the organization in the United States. The official party designation of Kreisleiter

¹ Document No. 203.

I used only when necessary for reasons of authority or to preserve discipline, and even then never in the form of Kreisleiter for or within the United States, but always in general as Kreisleiter of the A. O. of the NSDAP.

"Since taking office I have regularly arranged comradeship meetings once a month by special written invitation, which without exception were held in the same hall and of which the competent authorities were duly notified by its proprietor. American police, especially representatives of the alien police [*Fremdenpolizei*], attended every one of these functions, for the protection of the meeting. These policemen repeatedly commended to me the correct conduct of the participants in the meetings and the impressive proceedings. I insisted on keeping a sharp distinction between our meetings and those of the German-American Bund. I have avoided any kind of relationship with the Bund since I took office as Kreisleiter; I have imposed the same attitude on the party members. Since the outbreak of the war and the growth of anti-German sentiment I have put the comradeship meetings on the broadest possible basis by inviting interested Reich Germans who are loyal to the fatherland, but not members of the party, whereby the meetings gained the outward appearance of routine Reich German gatherings. Since May, because of the furious agitation in New York, meetings have been suspended to protect the party members (cf. report of August 29 to Gauamtsleiter Menche²). During the summer, in view of the shameless agitation, I again issued instructions to party members regarding their conduct, especially with respect to noninterference in American affairs. The material concerning my party activities which the Dies Committee sent to the State Department can therefore be only of an unimportant and long-known nature. Should the American Government nevertheless take action in the matter, it might be pointed out that Kreisleiters, while in the United States, are to be regarded as staff members of the Auslandsorganisation on special assignment, whose main task in taking charge of the party members here is to see to it that they, in complying with the assurance given earlier to the American Government, as party members without organization here refrain from all political activity."

Added by the Embassy :

I confirm Draeger's account which accords with my own as given in telegram No. 2026 of September 23.³ As I am informed it is not likely that the American Government will take any steps at present on the basis of the Dies Committee's action. Should I, perhaps in the course of the impending conversations about the registration law, nevertheless be asked by the State Department about the activities in the United States of Auslandsorganisation Kreisleiters, I shall take the above account of Draeger as a basis. Please wire instructions.⁴

THOMSEN

² Not found.

³ Document No. 90.

⁴ The instructions requested have not been found.

No. 216

35/23022-23

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 1195

BERLIN, October 22, 1940.
e. o. Pol. IX 3274 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 2262 of October 20.¹

On item 1. Fully in accord with your action. Should an attempt be made to carry out the directive of the Dies Committee, we shall reserve the right to take suitable countermeasures.

On item 2. Please point out emphatically if necessary that Ambassador Luther's promise of 1933 was fulfilled in every respect. The local branches [*Ortsgruppen*] were immediately disbanded at the time and have never been re-established. No party apparatus exists; the customary organizational structure with a *Landesgruppenleiter*, other officials [*Hoheitsträger*] and political leaders is lacking.

If alleged evidence should be presented to you and the charge be made that Draeger and other consular officers were designated as *Kreisleiters*, please reply that these consular officers carry the title only in Germany, but do not have the functions of *Kreisleiters* and their activities are expressly limited to look out for party members, as well as other Reich Germans, as set forth in telegram No. 1099 of September 29, 1940.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 203.

² See document No. 90, footnote 4.

No. 217

F17/035-039

The King of Bulgaria to Adolf Hitler

SOFIA, October 22, 1940.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The feelings of sincere admiration that I cherish for Your Excellency, the memory of the momentous and, for me, unforgettable conversations which I was able to have with you several times, Chancellor, as well as the great good will you have always shown the Bulgarian people, have made it easier for me to take the decision to write you personally at a moment that is decisive for Bulgaria.

My Government must in the next few days reply to the friendly proposal of the Reich Government in which Bulgaria is invited to accede

to the Tripartite Pact of September 27, in order to counteract the extension of the war and hasten the restoration of world peace.¹

In these fateful times I consider it my duty, in view of the present situation, to submit to Your Excellency my views on the possible effect of this proposal on the political situation in the Balkan area.

In the first place, I should like to stress that the old comradeship-in-arms between Germany and Bulgaria has not remained an empty word and that the interests of Bulgaria, both today and in the future, coincide and will coincide with those of the Greater German Reich. Bulgaria has so far been forced to pursue a cautious policy which it is a pleasure to me to know has always met with your approval. This policy has enabled my country to assert with dignity her position in the center of the Balkans without making difficulties for her friends, and to counteract effectively those tendencies directed at organizing the whole of the Balkans in a bloc under the leadership of Germany's enemies.

I have the feeling that in this way we shall best and without complications accomplish another important task of our common policy, namely the preservation of peace in the Balkans, whereby this area will not lose its economic importance and can effectively and successfully perform its economic tasks. There is one thing I should not like to neglect mentioning at this point, namely, that the policy referred to has met with the deepest approval in the hearts of the Bulgarian people and has even strengthened their sympathy for Germany. For this reason and also from the standpoint of Balkan conditions, it would, to my mind, be better for Bulgaria to continue the present policy for a while longer. Otherwise I fear premature complications that might not be favorable for either Bulgaria or Germany.

The proposal of the Reich Government serves the noble purpose, to be sure, of limiting the war and hastening the peace. How will our neighbors interpret the new situation thereby created, however, and how would they react to it? We fear that they will feel themselves directly threatened and will try within the shortest possible time to render us harmless before we have mobilized. We know definitely that they have repeatedly taken this possibility into consideration. To realize such a purpose would be a welcome and easy affair for our neighbors since even today there are 23 Turkish and 7 Greek divisions at our southern border on a full war footing. Facing them we have an Army which is brave, to be sure, but incompletely equipped; it possesses only four anti-aircraft batteries, little heavy artillery, only obsolete field artillery dating back to the Balkan War, almost no armored vehicles, and ammunition for only a few days of fighting. Even if we assume that the danger of a surprise attack by our neigh-

¹ The invitation has not been found.

bors could be avoided, an alarming situation could arise for us here on the Black Sea and in the Straits area through a new rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

I would be deeply grateful to Your Excellency if you would reconsider the question whether it is absolutely necessary to subject the present unequivocal and imperturbable policy of Bulgaria, which has heretofore kept our and your enemies in check, to a revision which might result in immediately exhausting our modest forces, aside from the fact that full mobilization would bring to a standstill our entire economic life and the country's production. If Your Excellency deems it necessary that all these questions be given more thorough study, my Minister President and my Foreign Minister are always prepared to go to Germany in order to confer with the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In conclusion, I apologize to Your Excellency for detaining you so long with my cares. I did so in the sole desire to be as useful as possible to my country and to her friend, Greater Germany.

I send Your Excellency my most cordial greetings and wishes, together with feelings of the most friendly esteem, and remain, etc.²

BORIS, Rex

² On Oct. 25 Weizsäcker recorded a conversation with the Bulgarian Minister, Draganov, in which the latter stated that King Boris' letter did not imply a flat refusal in the matter of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact. For this reason, he wanted Weizsäcker to transmit the letter to Hitler right away, with the understanding that he, Draganov, would have an opportunity to give additional explanations in a conversation with Hitler himself (585/242745-46). No answer to this letter has been found, but see documents Nos. 378 and 384.

No. 218

941/299415-22

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

COPENHAGEN, October 22, 1940.

D. Pol. 3/624

Subject: Assumption of power by the Danish National Socialists.

I

On April 9, 1940, Denmark did not offer any resistance to the entry of our troops, but reconciled herself to the inevitable. It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that the Danish Government and the Danish people are willing of themselves to draw the consequences in both foreign and domestic policy which arise for Denmark from the power relationships in Europe. To be sure, Scavenius, who was made Foreign Minister at the beginning of July under the in-

fluence of our successes in France, attempted to introduce a policy of close alignment with Germany on the economic side; however, his program broke down under the resistance of the leading political and commercial circles against the customs union. Whereas in the first months of the occupation the feeling with regard to us was still relatively friendly, it has deteriorated a great deal in recent months. The Government cannot be absolved of responsibility for this change; on the contrary, it can be blamed for having done nothing decisive to influence the public opinion of the country in a positive way, although there was no lack of reminders on our part. Of course not only the Government but also the Danish radio and the press have always complied with our wishes in the final analysis. At the same time, however, one could read between the lines only too often that it was not a case of voluntary wheeling into a new line but of fulfilling German demands. Moreover, whispering and handbill propaganda that was inadequately opposed by official Danish agencies was responsible for enhancing this impression with the people. It is significant that the Stauning Government tolerated, as a member of the Cabinet, such a man as the former Minister of Commerce, Christmas Møller, who pursued an unconcealed anti-German policy, and that he was only removed in response to pressure by us. In general this Government failed to carry out a thorough-going reform in appointments to the leading political posts of the country, as was absolutely necessary if they intended to undertake an honest orientation toward Germany. On the whole the Danish Government, in spite of its assurances to the contrary, is pursuing an opportunistic policy directed toward avoiding basic commitments as long as the German victory does not yet seem absolutely sure in their eyes.

A change in the attitude of the present Danish Government is not to be expected, for it suffers from an inner contradiction in that on the one hand it has a certain understanding for the necessity of an accommodation to the German Reich in the field of foreign policy, but on the other it does not display any real readiness to bring the political life of the country into accord with the principles prevailing in Germany. In my opinion, as long as the present government is in power there exists no possibility of attaining a sincere, close alignment of Denmark with Germany.

II

Among the existing political organizations of the Danish people it is only the National Socialists led by Dr. Frits Clausen who are swimming against the current with energy and a sense of responsibility, and in recognition of German leadership are openly advocating Denmark's alignment in the Greater German sphere. They have

undoubtedly been successful of late in winning greater importance in numbers and also politically. But they are nevertheless not yet strong enough today to attain power without decisive help from us. Dr. Clausen has now turned to me in the last few days to request this help, for he is afraid that his party might be smothered by the growing anti-German feeling if the present governmental system is not overthrown before long. He feels that the economic difficulties on the one hand and the official weakness in regard to the underground propaganda on the other must inevitably lead to a further deterioration of the general feeling against Germany and thus also against the Danish National Socialists. A delay in the assumption of power would involve a crisis for the Danish National Socialist party, the results of which could not be predicted at the present time.

With this Dr. Clausen is departing from the political line followed heretofore. This, as is known, was directed toward seizing the power only when the economic and social development had arrived at a low point and thus the failure of the present regime could no longer be concealed. Then the prospect would have been offered the new National Socialist government of bringing about a decisive change with German help, which would have assured it the gratitude and sympathies of the broad masses. Now Dr. Clausen considers it better to take over the government as soon as possible. He is confident that he can cope with the doubtless serious economic difficulties better than the present Danish Government is able to do, by means of a series of emergency measures accompanied by intensive propaganda. Dr. Clausen is convinced of success even if, owing to the exigencies of war, Germany should not be able to provide Denmark with immediate and effective economic aid.

I agree with Dr. Clausen that it is desirable for him to assume the power at the earliest possible moment. The installation of a National Socialist government by us, however, in view of the present conditions in Denmark, is a serious measure, and one which involves the assumption of great political responsibility on our part. I am therefore of the opinion that in any case adequate economic support must be guaranteed the new government *in advance*, for in the coming winter months an emergency situation is going to develop in Denmark during which no Danish Government will be able to continue without help from outside. This is particularly true of a government which has first to win a firm footing in the country and which comes to power more owing to the pressure of international conditions than because of an organic development in internal policy. A National Socialist government will be able to count on understanding among the majority of the agricultural population, if it is able not only to keep the higher prices for the farmers but also in return to deliver to them, even though the war is in progress, the goods which they

vitally need. On the other hand the laboring population, which has heretofore had a privileged position under the Stauning regime, will at first regard the National Socialists with reserve and skepticism, even in part with hostility. It will be possible to win them over, however, if they are freed of the fear that their employment opportunities will be restricted and their social achievements endangered. Dr. Clausen must expect to be rejected by the conservative circles of the country, especially the nationalist bourgeoisie. Here factors such as the question of North Schleswig, preservation of the external sovereignty of the country and its symbols, especially its own armed forces, will play a decisive role.

III

In my opinion it follows from the situation described above that certain political and economic conditions must be fulfilled before Dr. Clausen can take over the power in Denmark. Our future tactics will have to be determined by whether we are able or, depending on the political conditions, are willing to bring about these conditions sooner or later.

For an immediate seizure of power by the Danish National Socialist party—and I take it for granted that the National Socialists would not take over the government by means of a coup d'état but by legal means—it is necessary to have the cooperation of the King, who is an essential factor in this political game not only in his capacity as Chief of State but also thanks to his recently enhanced personal prestige. As is known, the King today rejects the National Socialists and particularly the person of Dr. Clausen. It is possible, however, although not certain, that he would give in to strong German pressure as soon as he realized that he would otherwise jeopardize his throne and his dynasty. But we must also be prepared for the possibility that he might refuse to entrust Dr. Clausen with forming a government and might risk a state crisis.

A démarche with the King should be preceded by an action to shake the position of the present government. This should be accomplished in part by suitable propaganda, but mainly by a definite stiffening of the official attitude of the Reich in regard to the Stauning Government, if necessary increased to the point of a formal withdrawal of confidence. The more strongly the Stauning Cabinet is made conscious of the fact that it has lost our confidence and therefore also cannot count on our effective support in remedying Denmark's difficulties, the sooner will the Minister President be willing of his own accord to withdraw from the government. Our demand of the King to entrust Dr. Clausen with formation of the government would then be supported by the statement that the past political system in Denmark did not fulfill the conditions which were the natural basis for the assurance of

sovereignty and integrity given on April 9, and that this could be maintained only if the direction of government affairs were placed in the hands of a man whose ideological and over-all political attitude guaranteed to us that the close, friendly alignment of Denmark with the Reich would now be carried out energetically and loyally.

IV

If in connection with the events of the war or for other political considerations there should be a reason for not proceeding to an instant solution, then an intermediate course would have to be taken. In such connection there would be the possibility of continuing to tolerate the Stauning Government until a time convenient to us without, however, giving it the opportunity of improving its position with the people. Another course would be to form an interim government—naturally without official German cooperation—in which certain key positions would be occupied by National Socialists. This idea has already been suggested to the Danish National Socialist party a number of times by Danish political circles. Whether an interim government or toleration of the Stauning Cabinet or another government without National Socialist participation should be given preference is a question that cannot be answered in advance.

Since internal developments are pressing for clarification, I request a basic decision as soon as possible on what political line should be followed.

I should like to stress that it goes without saying that no matter how domestic conditions in Denmark may develop there can never be any endangering of the interests of the Wehrmacht. We have at our command at all times the necessary means of pressure and power to effect our purpose.

V. RENTHE-FINK

No. 219

4420/E083973-74

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. [1201]¹

BERLIN, October 23, 1940.

e. o. W IV 5937.

According to a report of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* the Institute of Pacific Relations was said to have found in a recent analysis of the development of Soviet-American trade since the outbreak of the war, that the Soviet Union, because of the war in Europe, had to

¹The number is evident from the reply, document No. 230.

an increasing extent switched her raw material purchases to the United States. This applied especially to the purchase of materials essential for war such as copper, as well as to American re-exports of tin and rubber which were shipped during the first half of 1940. The *New York Journal of Commerce* was also said to have reported early this month a considerable increase in freight bookings from the west coast of the United States to Vladivostok.

As the Soviet Union has undertaken, in secret agreements, to deliver to us part of the raw materials bought by her in third markets, we are very much interested in reliable figures concerning the purchases by the Soviet Union of the commodities mentioned, especially since the beginning of this year.

Please therefore investigate in detail, if necessary with the help of the San Francisco Consulate General. Report by wire.²

RITTER

² See document No. 230.

No. 220

F18/284-295;
F6/053-054

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE CAUDILLO, IN THE FÜHRER'S PARLOR CAR, AT THE HENDAYE RAILROAD STATION ON OCTOBER 23, 1940

At the beginning the Caudillo expressed his satisfaction at now being able to make the personal acquaintance of the Führer and to render to him Spain's thanks for everything that Germany had previously done for his country. Spain has always been spiritually allied with the German people without any reservation and in complete loyalty. In the same sense, Spain has at every moment felt herself united with the Axis. In the Civil War the soldiers of the three countries had fought together and a profound unity had arisen among them. Likewise, Spain would in the future attach herself closely to Germany, for historically there were between Spain and Germany only forces of unity, and none of separation.

In the present war as well, Spain would gladly fight at Germany's side. The difficulties which were to be overcome in that case were well known to the Führer. A war would necessitate preparations in the economic, military, and political spheres. Within the framework of her limited capabilities, Spain had begun these preparations, but was,

¹ The memorandum was probably prepared by Paul Otto Schmidt. Cf. Schmidt's *Statistik auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-45* (Bonn, 1949), pp. 500-502.

of course, coming up against difficulties which were being made for her by anti-Axis elements in America and Europe. Therefore, Spain must mark time and often look kindly toward things of which she thoroughly disapproved.

Franco then came to speak of Spain's growing provisioning difficulties and in this connection mentioned that the United States and Argentina apparently were precisely following orders from London, for there had been cases in which the channel through the English Embassy immediately removed difficulties in both the above-mentioned countries. The difficulties already existing would be more intensified by the bad harvest. In spite of this, Spain, mindful of her spiritual alliance with the Axis Powers, had assumed the same attitude toward the war as had Italy in the past autumn.

The Führer replied that he was glad to see the Caudillo personally for the first time in his life after he had so often been with him in spirit during the Spanish Civil War. He knew precisely how difficult the struggle in Spain had been, for he himself since 1918-19 had had to go through similar grave conflicts, until he had helped the National Socialist movement to victory. Spain's enemies had been his enemies too. The struggle which was raging in Europe today would be decisive for the fate of the Continent and of the world for a long time to come. Militarily, this struggle as such was decided. Germany had established a front against the British Isles from the North Cape to the Spanish border and would no longer allow the English a landing on the Continent. Military operations were now taking place right in the English motherland. In spite of that, England still had certain hopes: Russia and America. With Russia, Germany had treaties. Aside from this, however, he (the Führer) immediately after conclusion of the French campaign had undertaken a reorganization of the German Army so that, beginning with March of the coming year, the latter would appear in the following strength: of a total of 230 divisions, 186 were assault divisions. The rest consisted of defense and occupation troops. Of the 186 assault divisions, 20 were armored divisions equipped with German material, while 4 additional armored brigades possessed captured material in part. In addition to this there were 12 motorized divisions. With this army strength Germany was ready for any eventuality. He (the Führer) believed that England was wrong in placing her hope on Russia. If the latter country were aroused at all from her inactivity, she would, if anything, be active on the German side. It was therefore a matter of miscalculation on the part of England.

With respect to America, there was no need to be afraid of an active intervention during the winter. There would therefore be no change in the present military situation. At least 18 months to 2 years would pass before America's military power was fully armed.

There would arise, nevertheless, a considerable danger if America and England established themselves on the islands lying off Africa in the Atlantic Ocean. The danger was all the greater because it was not certain whether the French troops stationed in the colonies would under all circumstances remain loyal to Pétain. The greatest threat existing at the moment was that a part of the colonial empire would, with abundant material and military resources, desert France and go over to de Gaulle, England, or the United States.

Meanwhile, the war of Germany against England was continuing. The difficulty was that the operations had to be carried on across an ocean on which Germany did not have naval control. She had only air supremacy, and of course over the Channel the weather for exercising this had, so far, been extremely unfavorable. Since the middle of August there had not even been 5 fair days, and the major attack against England had as yet not been able to begin since an attack against the British naval forces, on the part of Germany, could only be carried out from the air; according to previous experiences when atmospheric conditions were good, the British fleet had always been forced to yield to such attack. On the basis of meteorological forecasts which predicted with certainty a period of fair weather for 7 to 8 days, a great air attack had been started on a fixed day. After half a day it had to be broken off again, to be sure, because of a sudden change in the weather.

So far Germany had won very great victories. But for this very reason, he (the Führer) wanted to guard against suffering a failure by some thoughtless move. In this connection, the Führer mentioned as an example of his tactics, the events of the great offensive in France. Originally he had had the plan of striking the great blow as early as last October, but had constantly been hindered from doing this by the weather. He had suffered at not being able to act but he had been really determined not to begin the offensive in bad weather, but on the contrary had preferred to wait until the weather conditions became better. When the meteorologists had then reported to him that on May 10 the normal period of clear summer weather would begin, he had, on May 8, issued the order for attack. The result of this attack was known, and in the battle against England he would act precisely as in the case of the French offensive. He would begin the great attack only when the weather conditions permitted absolute success. In the meantime England, and especially London, was being bombarded day and night. On London alone, 300,000 to 500,000 kilograms of bombs had been dropped. Many harbor installations, factories, and armament works were thus being shattered; England's approaches were being mined; and an increasing U-boat activity was contributing to the further isolation of the island. At the moment, the number of U-boats being finished every month was 10. In spring, it would rise

to 17; in July to 25; and after that up to 34 per month. He hoped the concentrated activity of the air arm, minelayers and destroyers, U-boats, and speed boats would do so much damage and harm to England that in the end attrition would set in. In spite of this, he was lying in wait in order to carry out the great blow during fair weather, even if this could not happen until spring. It is self-evident that the time during which such vast masses of troops were lying inactive would continue to be exploited.

Naturally Germany had an interest in ending the war in a short time if possible, since every additional month cost money and sacrifice. In the attempt to bring about the end of the war as soon as possible and to render the entry of the United States into the war more difficult, Germany had concluded the Tripartite Pact. This Pact was compelling the United States to keep her Navy in the Pacific Ocean and to prepare herself for a Japanese attack from that direction. In Europe as well, Germany was attempting to expand her base. He could confidentially report that several other nations had announced their intention of joining the Tripartite Pact.

To guarantee her petroleum supply, Germany has sent pursuit squadrons and armored troops to Rumania upon the request of the Rumanian Government and in agreement with it.

The great problem to be solved at the moment consisted in hindering the de Gaulle movement in French Africa from further expanding itself and thereby establishing in this way bases for England and America on the African coast. A danger in this direction actually existed. The Pétain Government was in the deplorable condition of having to liquidate a war for which it was not responsible, for the consequences of which, however, its opponents blamed it. It was now a matter of preventing de Gaulle from receiving an increase in power from this difficult position of the French Government, something which moreover would lead France to complete collapse. Finally, the attempt had to be made to bring France herself to a definite stand against England. This indeed was a difficult undertaking because there were still two tendencies in France: a fascist one represented by Pétain and Laval, and an opposition one which wanted to carry on a double-dealing game with England. Moreover, it was particularly difficult to stir the French to a clear stand because they did not know how the peace would look. On the other hand, nothing could be said about the peace as long as the war was not completely ended, for one of Germany's opponents certainly had to pay for the war. Were England soon overpowered, Germany would then be ready without further ado to grant France easier peace terms. Should the war continue, however, and should the English as a result offer Germany a compromise, she (Germany) would certainly not continue to fight only to spare

France. Moreover, Germany needed France as a base as long as she was fighting against England. Yesterday he had, in all frankness, informed Vice President Laval of this view and he would, on the morrow, speak with Pétain in precisely the same manner.²

The purpose of this conference in Hendaye was the following: If they succeeded in effecting quite a large front against England, then the struggle would be substantially easier for all the participants and could be ended sooner. In setting up this front the Spanish desires and the French hopes were obstacles in the path. Were England no longer participating in the war and if there were no de Gaulle, one would not have to think of relinquishing demands on France. France would then have to submit and, in case she did not want to cooperate, she could be occupied by the military within 12 days without any difficulty. More difficult would be the solution of the administrative problems and the economic problems. To occupy North Africa would of course be difficult and would not be possible without a strong military effort. The French knew that they had to sacrifice something in the peace treaty. They expected to lose the German colonies and Alsace-Lorraine; they knew that border rectifications would be undertaken and that Nice, Corsica, and Tunis would be lost to them. In the latter case, they would of course be very downcast over the loss and would prefer to make an arrangement which would, in another fashion, assure access to the raw materials there. Such an arrangement would be a fraud, however, for he who no longer had the country would no longer at the suitable moment be given the raw materials. There was the danger that, if the French were explicitly told that they would have to get out of certain African areas, the African possessions would perhaps desert France even with the concurrence of the Government of Vichy. In order to meet this danger, he had worked up a general formula which he had explained yesterday to M. Laval. In doing this he had not involved himself in any concrete statements regarding the territorial changes which were to take place after the war. He had merely assured M. Laval that changes in France's African holdings were unavoidable and told him that it was up to France herself, by cooperating in defeating England, to create her own possibilities of compensation for territorial losses—these could not yet be indicated—so that ultimately through such compensations France would retain a highly valuable colonial empire. He would present the same ideas tomorrow to Marshal Pétain and in this connection wished the Caudillo to consider the following: If cooperation with France proved possible, then the territorial results of the war might perhaps not be so great. Yet the risk would be smaller and success more readily attainable. In his personal view it was better in so severe a struggle to aim

² See documents Nos. 212 and 227.

at a quick success in a short time, even if the gain would be smaller, than to wage long drawn-out wars. If with France's aid Germany could win faster, she was ready to give France easier peace terms in return. Moreover the Führer was convinced that Germany, Italy, and Spain would emerge from the war as allies, and there would still be opportunities for rectification later. As a concession, even the German demands on France were being partially abandoned since a rapid end to the war would constitute a greater success for all the participants than a victory after a longer struggle, even though Germany could still continue the war for an unlimited time. But on top of the military burden was the economic burden, and it might be that the greatest success could not be reckoned an economic gain.

The purpose of his trip to Hendaye was to examine the possibility of cooperating with France on this basis, without running the danger that the French might suddenly inform us that their African possessions had separated from them. To be sure, it was not clear whether . . . [The record of this conversation is incomplete.]

No. 221

F18/272-280

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 37

HENDAYE, October 23, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND SERRANO SUÑER, IN THE PARLOR CAR OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, AT THE HENDAYE RAILROAD STATION ON OCTOBER 23, 1940

Serrano Suñer noted at the outset that the Caudillo had not exactly understood the concrete questions dealt with in the conversation with the Führer.¹

The Foreign Minister replied that in the circumstances it would be a very good idea for him to discuss these concrete matters once more with Serrano Suñer so as to gain a better over-all view. Referring to the last part of the conversation, the Foreign Minister remarked that the Caudillo had been of the opinion that any kind of publication of the accession of Spain to the Tripartite Pact would cause England to take military action via Portugal, and this could only be dangerous to Spain. Therefore he wanted to explain once more in brief form the basic ideas in the German proposal, namely, that it was a case of preserving joint interests, and in this respect, too, the special position of Spain should be taken into account. If Spain were invited to accede to the German-Italian-Japanese Pact, she should

¹ See document No. 220.

know that this Pact was a preventive measure against further expansion of the war and was directed against warmongers and kindlers of a world conflagration. As the Führer had confidentially stated, a number of countries had applied to Germany, Italy, and Japan for accession to the Pact. These three countries would also be very pleased if Spain would accede in principle to the Pact. The same thought was also expressed in a telegram that had just arrived from the Duce.² In consideration of the Caudillo's misgivings, the time of publication would be postponed to coincide with Spain's entry into the war.

Furthermore, accession by Spain to the German-Italian Treaty of Alliance³ should be considered, and finally there was the question of investigating whether France could be aligned with an anti-English front.

The Foreign Minister then outlined once more to Serrano Suñer the German arguments concerning the French possessions in Africa, emphasized the danger of an English landing and of American influence, as well as [of] the creation of an additional government, and stressed that the Führer had undertaken this trip in order to ascertain whether the Spanish claims and the French hopes were compatible with one another.

The German proposal was that a secret protocol be drawn up, to which Italy would later give her signature.

The Foreign Minister then told Serrano Suñer the main points of the German proposal for a protocol and then gave him a Spanish translation of it,⁴ to which he added a number of comments.

² This telegram has not been found. However, in telegram No. 1881 sent from Rome on Oct. 18, Mackensen had reported that, according to Ciano, Mussolini had given instructions to propose to Germany that Spain be asked to join the Tripartite Pact (2366/489241). In reply, Ribbentrop told Mackensen that Germany was already considering such an invitation to Spain; he then instructed the Ambassador to inform Ciano confidentially that Hitler was going to meet Franco in the course of the following week and would use this opportunity to ask Spain to join the Tripartite Pact (telegram No. 1462 of Oct. 19: 2366/489242-43).

³ Vol. vi of this series, document No. 426.

⁴ Copies of neither the protocol nor of the preliminary drafts have been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. Nor is the protocol to be found in any of the editions of Ciano's papers, although at one time a copy of the protocol, in either the Italian or Spanish language, evidently was with papers of Ciano; for among certain translations, made by a person in the employ of the German Government, of Ciano papers seized during the German occupation of Rome, is a German translation of the protocol. This translation, together with copies of other translations of Ciano papers retained by the translator, is now deposited with the Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. Although this version of the protocol bears the date "Hendaye, October 23, 1940," it contains a change in the wording of article 5 known to have been made by Ciano at his meeting with Ribbentrop on November 4, and it was filed with Ciano's memorandum of the November 4 meeting. This document appears therefore to date from November 4 and is printed at the Editors' Note of that date, p. 466. It bears the signature of Ciano, but not of Ribbentrop and of Serrano Suñer.

Serrano Suñer in his reply expressed his surprise that evidently a new course was to be followed in the African questions and that Germany's attitude toward France had changed. He understood, to be sure, the reasons which the Führer and the Foreign Minister had given for this new attitude, but had to state with regret that this would render void Spain's maximum demands.

The Foreign Minister stressed once more that the Führer wanted to try in this new way to attain something that was otherwise entirely unattainable. It was a question of utilizing Pétain so as to prevent the African possessions from being lost to Pétain and thus also to Spain and Germany, in which case they could be reconquered only in heavy fighting against French and English troops.

Serrano Suñer repeated that he understood the reasons which motivated the Führer in taking this new course, but that the Caudillo had also had a plan for Spain's entry into the war and for assuring his claims with regard to French Morocco and Oran, which he wanted to discuss with the Führer. This plan took account of the danger that could arise if the French learned of the German-Spanish agreements. In order to cope with this danger he had thought not of a protocol but of an exchange of letters in which the Spanish demands would be set down (inclusive of French Morocco and Oran) in strictest confidence.

The Foreign Minister said he was willing in principle to accede to the method of an exchange of letters. Moreover, he repeated once more the Führer's arguments on the treatment of the African question, stressing that in order to facilitate the creation of this European-African bloc Germany would be satisfied with more modest demands than if France should prove to be unreasonable up to the last minute. The Foreign Minister stressed in this connection that this policy would also be a wise one for Spain herself.

Serrano Suñer, after repeating his earlier position, stated that in spite of certain misgivings Spain was willing in principle to agree to this new basis, but wondered what reward she would receive in return. Referring to point 5 of the protocol he stated that the formulation employed there treated matters very vaguely, after all. Perhaps, he added smilingly, the compensation for France might even be greater than the Spanish territorial increase. However, Spain, in order to justify the entry into the war to her own people, had to be able to define the rewards of her victory more exactly. He would therefore take the liberty to suggest changes in the draft protocol,⁵ which would not, however, greatly modify the Führer's plan.

⁵ Details concerning the German-Spanish exchanges about the wording of article 5 have not been found. See, however, document No. 224 and footnote 2.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was always best to present matters as they really were. If today a French government dependent on England, or if the English and French together should get the French possessions in Africa into their hands, everyone's aspirations would be injured thereby. For this reason Germany wanted to follow a course that would, with the assistance of France, secure both the interests of the latter and the territories that would one day fall to Germany and Spain. It was clear that in order to keep the French in line one had to open the prospect of an acceptable place in Europe for them, because otherwise they would not go along. The Führer was willing to reduce his demands in Europe and Africa, and intended at the conclusion of the peace to recompense France in some way or other at the expense of England to the extent that this was possible.

On the other hand he understood the Spanish demands very well. Since no one knew, however, how the peace would be concluded, nothing concrete could be said as yet about the final allocation of the French possessions. It was also not yet known what effect the fact that the British Empire might have heirs—of which the Caudillo had spoken—would have on conditions in Africa. Germany herself could not give an exact answer to the question about her future possessions in Africa. Therefore it was very difficult to make an exact definition of the areas that would in all circumstances be allotted to Spain. Germany hoped to conquer the English in the fight and then let them pay the bill. If the French were reasonable they would be able to make good their losses through compensation. In any case the inclusion of France would facilitate and accelerate the victory.

Serrano Suñer then brought up a few objections to places in the text of the draft protocol, among others to the different formulation used in points 2 and 3 regarding accession to the Tripartite Pact and to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Germany and Italy, respectively. These objections were removed by changing the text.

Serrano Suñer took his departure, expressing his intention now to inform the Caudillo exactly concerning the German position. Previously he had replied to the Reich Foreign Minister's desire for greatest secrecy to the effect that Spain surely had a greater interest in this secrecy than Germany, since if anything about the pact should leak out Spain would have to reckon with English refusal to permit passage of 100,000 tons of corn and 150,000 tons of meat she had contracted to purchase in Canada.

SCHMIDT

No. 222

2174/471380

German-Spanish Supplementary Protocol to the German-Spanish-Italian Secret Protocol

[Draft]

HENDAYE, October 23, 1940.

The German and Spanish Governments agree as follows:

Since it is impossible to conclude a detailed treaty on economic relations between the two countries at the same time as the Protocol is signed to which this is a supplement, Germany and Spain shall at once open negotiations, particularly in regard to raw material deposits in the French Zone of Morocco, which is later to belong to Spain, as well as in regard to German participation in mining companies in Spain, which until now have been English or French property.

Regarding the manner in which Germany—in accordance with article 4 of the Secret Protocol between Germany, Spain, and Italy¹—will render economic assistance to Spain, and regarding the Spanish debts to Germany arising out of the Spanish War, an agreement will likewise be negotiated as soon as possible pursuant to the preliminary conferences that were held in Berlin by the experts of the two contracting parties.

This Supplementary Protocol shall likewise remain secret unless both parties decide otherwise.²

For the German Government:

For the Spanish Government:

SERRANO SUÑER

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 466.

² A memorandum by Wiehl of Nov. 5, 1940 (136/74442-43) stated that German ratification of this protocol, signed by Serrano Suñer and delivered by the Spanish on Oct. 24 at Hendaye, did not occur because of the passage: "in the French Zone of Morocco, which is later to belong to Spain."

No. 223

3579/E024490-93

The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service to the Foreign Ministry

VI G AZ: 5766

BERLIN, October 23, 1940.

D II 80 g. Rs.

For Minister Luther.

Subject: Initiation of unofficial peace negotiations with England.

Enclosed herewith is a report on the initiation of unofficial peace negotiations with England, forwarded for your information.

By order:

JOST

SS-Brigadeführer

[Enclosure]

Subject: Initiation of unofficial peace negotiations with England.

Through our Swedish connections, we learned that the English Minister in Stockholm ¹ had expressed himself unmistakably in a most intimate circle to the effect that his Government might possibly be prepared to ascertain unofficially whether Germany was prepared for peace negotiations.

At this conversation, it was stated that previous efforts of all parties had always failed because mediation through diplomatic personages of neutral countries had each time been attended by premature publicity, and because in all cases special interests of the countries concerned had caused a considerable number of disturbances and therefore caused the premature collapse of each attempt to make contact.

The Security Service sent a confidential agent ² to Sweden to look into this report and to ascertain whether it was correct or not.

This agent first learned that the above-mentioned statement was known to the Finnish Minister in London as well as to Dr. Ekeberg, the President of the Swedish Supreme Court—the highest judge in the country and the political confidant of the King.

Since Dr. Ekeberg is a personal acquaintance of our agent, the latter obtained renewed confirmation of the statements made, and told Dr. Ekeberg that he was interested in a private capacity in finding out about this matter and learning more details in this connection.

Dr. Ekeberg thereupon conferred with the English Minister in Stockholm.

The result of this conversation was the discovery that the attitude of the English Government is divided on this point. The statement originally communicated by the Finnish Minister in London actually reflected the views of a number of the British Cabinet members. Churchill was endeavoring, however, to continue the war with all the means at his command until next spring.

In the conversations which followed between the English Minister in Stockholm and Dr. Ekeberg, the English Minister intimated that

¹ Victor Mallet.

² A further note of Oct. 23 from the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service read as follows: "The confidential agent mentioned in the report on the initiation of unofficial peace negotiations with England is the attorney, Dr. Ludwig Weissauer of Berlin.

"Dr. Weissauer is an official of the Security Service and, on the basis of his former political activity as well as his many good connections abroad, offered the best guarantee that the necessary inquiries would be made with the requisite carefulness and caution." (3579/E024489)

he had consulted his Government and received from it permission to converse on such questions in an unofficial capacity with Dr. Ekeberg, the private citizen, on condition that the strictest secrecy was maintained on both sides.

The inquiry of the English Minister in Stockholm is supposed to have been discussed at a secret session of the Cabinet in London.

Churchill, who was hard pressed by some of the Cabinet members, expressed himself to the effect that a bridge of understanding and a covering of a possible retreat might perhaps be found in the fact that Germany was refraining from a total destruction of English prestige by promising certain formalities to Poland, which was, indeed, outside the war zone.

According to this statement, England would be satisfied with as little as cultural autonomy for Poland.

England is attempting to create for herself a similar retreat with respect to the other European countries—to which she promised the restoration of autonomy—by intimating that here, too, she might accept concessions on the part of Germany in the cultural field as a solution.

Above all, the question as to how Germany visualizes the future position of the occupied countries is, as Dr. Ekeberg states, of interest to the English Government as a starting point for a contact.

In the colonial question, England was prepared for the greatest concessions.

This applied to the French as well as to the Belgian and Dutch colonies.

To all appearances, Churchill wishes to achieve a peace, which would save the face of the British Empire as much as possible.

The Security Service calls attention to the fact that the work so far has involved findings of a purely intelligence nature which, to be sure, could be directed into certain paths and activated by giving a definite assignment of objectives to the confidential agent.³

³ Marginalia on 3579/E024489 (see footnote 2) indicate that this document was submitted to the Foreign Minister, and that subsequently, on Nov. 11, Brigadeführer Jost received instructions to keep in touch unobtrusively with the situation and to report in the event of further developments. After being reconsidered several times, the document was sent to the files on Mar. 25, 1941.

No. 224

136/74421

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, October 24, 1940.

No. 3624 of October 24

Received October 24—1:55 p.m.

Decipher immediately:

Please transmit immediately, by telephone en clair the following telegram for the Foreign Minister at the Führer's train:

For the Foreign Minister, to be given to him the moment it arrives: [Spanish] Foreign Minister states in writing¹ that the Spanish Government early today agreed to the proposed new version of article 5.²

STOHRER

¹ Suñer's letter to Stohrer of Oct. 24 is not printed (F18/257), but see document No. 235.

² Cf. document No. 235. The agreed new version of article 5 was transmitted by Stohrer to Berlin in dispatch No. 1673 g. of Oct. 29 (F18/254-258). It was signed by Stohrer and Espinosa de los Monteros, Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, and read as follows:

"5. Apart from the reunion of Gibraltar with Spain, the Axis Powers state that in principle they are ready to provide, in the course of a new general settlement in Africa, such as is to be carried out in the peace treaties after the defeat of England, that Spain be ceded certain areas in Africa in precisely the same extent to which France can be compensated by other cessations of territorial possessions in Africa of equal value. The claims to be made on France by Germany shall not be affected thereby."

Cf. Editors' Note, p. 466.

No. 225

449/222808

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, October 24, 1940—7:16 p. m.

No. 1904 of October 24

Received October 24—7:40 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1883 of October 19.¹

General von Pohl² called on me yesterday afternoon—hence before the arrival today of telegraphic instruction No. 1488 of October 23 (Pol. VII 3111 g.)³—and stated that personally there was no longer

¹ See document No. 191, footnote 5.

² Lt. Gen. Ritter von Pohl was head of the German liaison staff with the Italian Air Force.

³ Not found.

any doubt in his mind that Italy would launch military action against Greece within the next days. This view coincides with a number of [other] entirely reliable reports [which I have] received.⁴ The Italian Government itself has so far intimated nothing to me about its plans regarding Greece. Nor have the armed forces Attachés been put into the picture to any greater extent.⁵

MACKENSEN

⁴ The words in brackets, garbled in transmission, are from the Rome copy of the document (2281/481692).

⁵ In telegram No. 1913 of Oct. 25 Mackensen reported that according to Anfuso, the *Chef de Cabinet* to the Foreign Minister, action against Greece would begin as early as the coming weekend (449/222811).

No. 226

449/222809

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 514 of October 24

ATHENS, October 24, 1940—9:00 p. m.

Received October 24—11:35 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 514 of October 24.¹

Mavroudis, with whom I talked before I received your telegram, expressed the view that England's diplomatic effort was concentrated on Bulgaria. He denied any new closer relationship between Greece and Turkey. Mavroudis showed no sign of any increased alarm over the threat from Italy. Italian troop concentrations in Albania, however, constituted a continuous threat. He took a less serious view of the press campaign launched in Tirana, which is consistently broadcast by the Italian radio and so acquired a more dangerous character.

Mavroudis stated for the first time that Greece might possibly give sympathetic consideration to a demand to obtain bases in connection with operations against Egypt. Any Italian aggression aimed at the conquest of Greek territory, however, would be resisted by Greece. I took advantage of this opportunity to advise the Greeks with utmost earnestness to revise their wait-and-see attitude, by which they were forfeiting their last chance.

ERBACH

¹ A notation indicates that the reference probably should be to telegram No. 517 of Oct. 23 (Pol. VII 979). Neither Berlin telegram No. 514 nor No. 517 has been found.

No. 227

F8/0140-0161

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

MONTTOIRE, October 24, 1940.

CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND MARSHAL PÉTAİN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, LAVAL, IN THE FÜHRER'S SPECIAL TRAIN, AT THE RAILWAY STATION OF MONTTOIRE-SUR-LE-LOIR, ON OCTOBER 24, 1940

The Führer began by expressing his regret over having to receive Marshal Pétain under such distressing circumstances. He would have been glad if he had had the opportunity before of making the Marshal's acquaintance. Today's talk would at the same time be a reply to the letter which the Marshal addressed to the Führer some time ago.¹

The Marshal replied that he was very gratified by the Führer's welcome, despite the painful atmosphere pervading the whole situation. He was especially impressed by the Führer's understanding for the difficult position in which he (the Marshal) found himself. His position was truly a tragic one. He had at all times been an opponent of the war with Germany. In consequence, past French Governments had sent him as Ambassador to Spain. When the crisis approached in 1939, he had twice requested to be allowed to return to France and to resume his functions in the War Council. He did so because the information reaching him indicated that France was on the point of plunging into a disastrous adventure. That was a very painful time for him and when he finally learned that France had declared war on Germany, he was barely able to restrain his grief. This declaration of war he considered an act of great folly. He, who had been throughout against this war, was now called upon to atone for the errors of past Governments.

M. Laval had reported to him the conversation he had with the Führer day before yesterday.² He understood that the subject of that conversation was the question of cooperation between the two countries. He was sorry that such cooperation had not been begun before, in the years before this war. But there was perhaps still time to regain what had been lost. The English were affording the best opportunity for that. As France's allies their conduct toward that country had

¹ See vol. x of this series, document No. 208.

² See document No. 212.

been exceedingly bad since the Armistice. France would not forget the events of Oran and the attack on Dakar. This latter action, upon England's instigation, had been headed by a bad Frenchman, a French general, who had denied his country. Today's France no longer tolerated things of this kind and this officer accordingly was promptly condemned to death, to the confiscation of his property, and perpetual banishment from France. Justice had thus taken its course against him.

The English, however, were continuing their attacks on France, principally against her colonial empire and especially in Africa. France had effectively resisted at Dakar. He (Pétain) had sent an officer to the African colonies with the mission of restoring the disaffected to the cause of France. In this respect, and since the Führer had done France the honor of speaking of cooperation, a field might be found where its realization between the two countries was a practical possibility. He did not wish to go into details, but he could give assurance for his own person that as far as matters depended on him everything would be done in order to secure these colonial territories for France.

Replying to the remarks of Marshal Pétain, the Führer sketched very briefly a picture of the present and the future, as he saw it. He was aware that Marshal Pétain did not belong among those men who had favored declaring war on Germany. If this were not the case this talk could never have taken place. Putting this to the side, there remained the historical fact that the war had been imposed upon Germany in spite of the Führer's ceaseless efforts to avert a new bloody conflict and although Germany was not pressing France with any demands. The war had been conducted by France for motives which he (the Führer) recently analyzed for [Vice-] President Laval. He had no doubt but that in the event of a German defeat, France would have inflicted upon Germany sufferings far worse than in 1918. He was happy that fate had permitted him to lead his nation and its armed forces in this war, and so avert all misfortune from the German people. He believed moreover that this development might perhaps prove fortunate for the future. He was dealing with France as a man who, like Marshal Pétain, had not wanted the war and now wished to preserve a clear view of the future, transcending the present situation.

One thing however was obvious: It would not do for a nation to declare war without any objective causes and later on be relieved of any responsibility for the consequences of that action. It was therefore natural that France should be made to share in bearing the costs of the war in so far as they could be compensated for in territorial and material terms. If he (the Führer), together with his ally Mussolini, was considering the question as to the direction the final

political orientation was to take, he was doing so now at a moment when the war was already decided from a military point of view.

He was addressing himself to the soldier of great stature, which he knew Marshal Pétain to be, in expounding from the military standpoint the basis of this view. The military operations thus far had resulted in destroying England's continental position. He was resolved to carry this struggle forward to the annihilation of the island center of the British Empire. Military operations against England could now be affected only by meteorological conditions, similarly as in the autumn of 1939 the immediate final decision planned by the Führer in the west had to be postponed owing to bad weather. This delay, however, which lasted 7 months, did not in any way change the final outcome of those operations. And while it was entirely conceivable that weather conditions might compel Germany to put off a direct assault on England for weeks or months, England would in the meantime be attacked from the air on a mounting scale and would be hurt increasingly on the sea front through the continuously increasing U-boat activity and the intensified mining of ports. British propaganda since the beginning of the war was operating with partly silly and partly outrageous lies. He (the Führer) could assure Marshal Pétain that there was not a true word to British reports of German losses in submarines and aircraft. The German Luftwaffe unremittingly continued its fight over England, and the losses of U-boats since the beginning of the war totaled 28. Besides, the U-boat construction program, calling at the present for 10 ships a month, would constantly expand and provide 14 in December 1940; 17 in March-April; 24 next July-August; and 30 to 34 at the beginning of 1942.

England was being bombarded in steady day and night attacks, and, including London, 5,000 to 8,000 tons of explosives had been dropped. Weather conditions permitting, the all-out attack on England would be launched at once.

England had lost her continental position and also her insular position had become untenable. Only she refused to admit this. She was still putting her hope in America and Russia.

America, however, considering her present state of armaments, could play no significant role prior to 1942. By that time England would either be occupied or turned into a waste of rubble. The notion of an American landing on the Continent, viewed from the military standpoint, was completely illusory.

Russia was bound to Germany by treaties. But all treaties aside, he (the Führer), in order to elucidate his views, would give Marshal Pétain the following figures:

By March, 1941, Germany would have 230 divisions, including 186 combat divisions of outstanding quality. Of these combat divisions,

20 were armored divisions with German equipment. To these must be added 4 armored brigades with partly German and partly captured equipment, and 12 motorized divisions.

Aircraft production next winter would be more than double the previous production. Beginning next April, the Luftwaffe would be numerically stronger than it was on May 10 of this year, and its fighter and pursuit units would be supplied with new equipment. Together with her ally, Germany constituted a military power which could not be attacked, let alone defeated, by any coalition in the world. The hope entertained by the English that Germany might disintegrate internally was childish, as was their talk of Germany's economic difficulties. This was the picture of the military situation today as it presented itself to the sober-minded observer, without indulging in fantasy.

Despite this favorable military situation he entertained the sincere desire to end the war as quickly as possible, for he saw war not as a condition worth pursuing, let alone as a desirable permanent state. Every additional month of the war increased perhaps not so much the number of victims as the material costs which at a later date would bear heavily on the nations. There existed no undertaking less profitable than war. This conviction motivated his (the Führer's) endeavor to shorten the war by every conceivable means of a military, political, and economic nature. In so doing he was aware that prolongation of the war not only inflicted a burden primarily on Germany but was to the disadvantage of all of Europe, and that it would increase exorbitantly the final reckoning that would have to be faced some day. This final account would have to be settled, on the one hand, by satisfying the vital demands of some peoples in Europe, which had not been met or out of which they had been cheated in the past. On the other hand, this final account would also call for payment of the material costs of the war. It was his personal opinion that England was chiefly to blame for the war and that England accordingly would have to bear the chief burden of the costs of the war. Each month by which England's collapse was brought nearer would bring the war to an earlier end and relieve the Continent of its troubles, difficulties, and sacrifices. Each month by which the war was prolonged raised the total of Europe's victims, deferred the time of restoring orderly and tolerable living conditions, and increased the guilt that would have to be atoned. He therefore believed that all European countries having an interest in terminating the conflict ought accordingly to form a natural continental community. He was acting at the present time to organize a European and in part extra-European community against Britain, the enemy of the Continent. He had exchanged ideas with the French Government with a

view to ascertaining whether France was prepared to join and cooperate with this community. It was imperative to study the possibilities of ending this war that might result from such a cooperation between Germany and Italy, on the one side, and France on the other.

Marshal Pétain, in his reply, broached the question of the Franco-English war aims which, if he understood the Führer correctly, were supposed to have culminated in the dismemberment of Germany. He had never seen such a plan and if it had been drawn up at all, it had never been put before him. Nevertheless it was clear that the associated powers of France and England would have to assume responsibility for the damages caused by the war they had declared. He hoped, however, that the future peace treaty would be no treaty of oppression, because such a treaty would prevent the growth of harmonious relations among the nations. He held, besides, that distinctions ought to be made in apportioning responsibility, so as to give encouragement to those who, filled with better intentions, wished to make a new start.

The Führer's plan was designed to accomplish the encirclement of England on all seas and all countries facing her shores. If the community, which the Führer had spoken of, could be achieved, it would probably mean a quick end for England.

He (Pétain), however, was in no position at this time to define the exact limits of French cooperation with Germany. All he could do was to express himself in favor of the principle of such cooperation. Vice-President Laval had already given similar assurances in his first talk with the Führer, which he (Pétain) now expressly confirmed. As regards the conditions of cooperation, however, he could enter no binding undertakings without consulting the French Government. Upon his return he would inform the French Government that he had agreed to the principle of cooperation with Germany without making any further commitments, but that it opened for France a window, as it were, on her colonial empire.

Laval emphasized the importance of the declaration just made by Pétain, which was in full accord with the spirit of the conversation conducted between the Führer and himself (Laval) the day before yesterday. In accepting the principle of cooperation with Germany, Marshal Pétain had pointed to the larger military possibilities open to France in Africa, where England was the aggressor. But generally, in taking further action, it would be necessary to take account of the state of public opinion in France. The talk between the Führer and Laval had given rise to hopes for a better future, which would be tremendously enhanced by today's conversation between the Führer and Pétain. Until now the French had faced a wall, as it were, with no way out and without hope. The fact that the Führer had assented

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to having that talk and had offered cooperation with Germany, would make a deep and favorable impression on French public opinion and go far in counteracting English propaganda. But if France were to commit herself today as to the conditions of that cooperation, this would not advance the relationship to Germany but on the contrary have a detrimental influence. Besides, Marshal Pétain had signed a law by which—and Laval held that this had gone to an extreme—the right to wage war was made dependent on a vote in the Parliament. If Pétain wished to declare war on England, he would have to convoke Parliament, that is, a Parliament dating from the past era, which he felt not the least inclination to do, for obvious reasons. But there existed other possibilities for giving effect to cooperation with Germany. France could offer resistance, which would have certain repercussions in the country itself as also in England, and this could in the final account accomplish the same results as those produced by actual cooperation.

In any event, what Marshal Pétain desired to achieve, as he had already indicated, was to obtain the least onerous peace for France. If Germany, in contradistinction to France's attitude in 1918, and after a victory much more brilliant than France's victory in the World War, now even extended the offer of cooperation, France not only accepted but acknowledged such an offer with gratitude. In the beginning, however, as Marshal Pétain had pointed out, it was necessary to proceed slowly and with caution.

Pétain gave eloquent expression to his admiration for the German armament program. He characterized as fantastic the organization that was necessary to carry out the program, and displayed particular interest in the procurement of the raw materials required for its execution, which must involve "astronomical" figures since these raw materials, which were not available in unlimited amounts, were at the same time being used by other countries as well. To be sure, Germany could resort to substitutes in her own country and the territories subject to her control. The Führer interjected at this point that up to the day when war broke out he had spent 92 billion reichsmarks for the armament of Germany. Marshal Pétain then asked what the cost of the new armament program would be since raw materials had become still more costly, and guessed that the cost would now be twice what it had been for the first German armament effort. However, thanks to the monetary system introduced by Dr. Schacht and Germany's autarkic organization much would prove easier than before, especially with respect to financial matters.

In conclusion he also expressed his admiration for the Führer personally. He had never known anyone possessing so much self-confidence and confidence in his people, and accomplishing such gigantic achievements as did the Führer.

The Führer pointed out that first of all he had mobilized the total energy of the German nation, employing it in work days of not merely 8 hours, but sometimes running to 9, 10, and even 11 hours.

The Foreign Minister remarked at this point that this was the real secret of the Führer's success, Schacht's monetary system was much less important; this observation was received by both Laval and Pétain with understanding mirth.

The Führer next spoke about Germany's raw materials position. She had coal in abundance. Her iron production, too, was sufficient to meet requirements and the supply was assured by the construction of large works and blast furnaces, among which the largest was the Salzgitter works with a capacity of 40 million tons of ore and 10 million tons of iron. In addition, Germany had called into being the world's largest light metal industry to make up for copper. Certain textile staple fibers replaced cotton and a fabric of remarkable quality was being produced from the fibers of potato plants.

The conversation then turned to the American aircraft industry. The Führer mentioned in this connection that for the 60,000 workers in America in 1939, Germany employed 480,000 in that industry in that year. Today the figure in Germany was doubled.

Laval emphasized America's unreliability as a supplier of war material and cited in this connection a talk with Bullitt, in which Bullitt admitted to him as late as last March that America had no more than 130 planes herself. Asked when the Allies could in that case count on substantial support from the American aircraft industry, Bullitt had vaguely mentioned 1940 or 1941; this had led Laval to conclude that all the statements of the past French governments about American aid were wholly based on illusions and compounded of dreams and lies. America had only a small number of skilled workers, not enough manufacturing models and no plants. France had been prepared to invest considerable funds in such plants in America and had failed to achieve any results; and when he (Laval) was hearing all this new talk about the supposed American aid to England, he felt that the English were being taken in just as much as the French had been last summer.

The Führer finally mentioned the difficulties of building up an industry and spoke of his experiences in this regard in Germany, and then he summed up the result of the conversation as follows:

Marshal Pétain says that he is prepared in principle to consider cooperation with Germany as outlined by the Führer. The conditions of this cooperation would be established and settled in detail and from case to case. Marshal Pétain anticipates from this a more advantageous outcome of the war for France. The Führer declares that he is in agreement.

Laval had the Führer's comprehensive statement taken down for himself in a word-for-word French translation. This brought the conversation to its conclusion.

SCHMIDT

No. 228

F1/0510-0515

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*¹

Telegram

TOP SECRET
No. 1500

BERLIN, October 25, 1940.²

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.

I have just informed Count Ciano briefly by telephone about the results of our conversations with the Spanish and French statesmen. To supplement this information please communicate to him at once the following details which I have already told him you would transmit to the Duce and to him.

I

The negotiations between the Führer and me on the one hand and General Franco and Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer on the other were in part rather difficult. Although the Spaniards permitted no doubts to arise as to their basic decision to stand fast at the side of the Axis Powers, the discussion of details with the Spanish Foreign Minister nevertheless frequently revealed a lack of sufficient understanding for the fact that the realization of the Spanish aspirations depends exclusively on the military successes of the Axis Powers and that therefore these aspirations must be subordinated to the Axis policy of attaining final victory. In particular it had to be made clear to Señor Serrano Suñer that Spain would not be in a position to fight off with her own forces the efforts, aided by England, of General de Gaulle in Africa, and that if these efforts should be successful, Spain would, for example, receive nothing at all of French Morocco. But it was finally possible after all to establish the basic principles of the cooperation between the Axis Powers and Spain in pursuing the ideas discussed at the Brenner and at Berlin and Rome; this was done in the form of a se-

¹ Marginal note: "The Führer approves the telegram. Hewel."

² This telegram was sent from Ribbentrop's special train to the Foreign Ministry at 6:50 a. m. and was transmitted from Berlin to Rome at 8:00 a. m. (136/74419-20).

cret protocol,³ the signing of which is to be carried out, if Italy agrees, by the three partners via chancellery channels by special secret courier. I am transmitting the protocol to Count Ciano in a letter sealed by me personally.

II

The preparatory discussion with M. Laval on October 22 and likewise the conference with Marshal Pétain and Laval on October 24 were limited to the discussion of general and basic matters.⁴ The French side was quite clear about the fact that if England should offer the Axis Powers a compromise peace France alone might have to bear the burden of the lost war, and that consequently the Axis Powers and France have an identical interest in the speedy defeat of England. Accordingly, Marshal Pétain and Laval expressed their desire in principle to the effect that they are resolved to cooperate with the Axis Powers against England, but that naturally they must first discuss such cooperation within the French Government and then come to an agreement on it with us. They envisaged beginning discussion of these details in the near future.

III

Please tell Count Ciano that strictest secrecy regarding the outcome of the conversation has been agreed upon with both the Spanish and the French statesmen; in particular it was arranged with the Spaniards that the protocol is not to be made known to anyone besides the Führer, the Duce, and the two Foreign Ministers, who are to take charge of it personally.

Please also tell Count Ciano in strict confidence that the Führer will soon write the Duce a personal letter concerning further details of the two meetings, and that he also intends to pay the Duce a visit in Italy—probably northern Italy would be best—in the near future,⁵ for the purpose of a new discussion of the problems connected with the visits.⁶

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 221, footnote 4.

⁴ Documents Nos. 212 and 227.

⁵ At 7:00 p. m., Oct. 25, a telegram was sent from Ribbentrop's special train for transmission to the Chief of Protocol, who was in Paris, informing him that Ribbentrop had arranged with Ciano for a meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Florence on Oct. 28 (B14/B002311). See also *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Oct. 25, 1940. This action presumably followed receipt by Hitler of Mussolini's letter of Oct. 19. See document No. 199 and footnote 8.

⁶ A memorandum, in French, containing the substance of the text of this telegram is in the file of the Embassy in Rome (2281/481730-32). With the telegram itself, it was filed in a sealed envelope with the notation: "To be opened only by me or by Prince Bismarck. M[ackensen]." (2281/481733)

No. 229

675/258407

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 777 of October 25

BELGRADE, October 25, 1940—6:30 p. m.

Received October 25—9:55 p. m.

The Foreign Minister informed me that the Italian Minister upon the instruction of Ciano delivered to him yesterday a declaration that the Italian troop concentrations in Albania were in no way directed against Yugoslavia, but exclusively against Greece, whose political attitude had to be clarified.

Cincar-Marković said that he had thanked the Italian Minister for the declaration, from which he gathered that Italy would maintain her friendly relationship with Yugoslavia.

At the same time, however, he had voiced his hope and conviction that the Italian-Greek disagreement was amenable to a peaceful settlement. Otherwise the possibility of complications was to be expected, which might threaten peace in the Balkans, an outcome in which only England had an interest.

The Foreign Minister added to these statements that he was not quite clear in his mind whether the declaration of the Italian Minister was intended merely to reassure Yugoslavia about the troop concentrations in Albania, or else as the announcement of imminent Italian action against Greece. He was afraid it was the latter. Knowing that Germany was in the greatest measure interested in seeing peace preserved in the Balkans, he believed that he should inform me of this fear.

To my question whether Yugoslavia would feel directly affected by an Italian-Greek conflict, the Foreign Minister replied in the negative adding, however, that no one could foretell the course of such a conflict.

There would always be the danger that nations not directly concerned with the conflict might become involved, as might happen in the case of an Italian demand for passage, which Yugoslavia would have to refuse. It appeared quite clear to him, in any event, that an Italian action against Greece might end by setting the whole Balkans in motion, which would be only in England's but surely not in Germany's interest.

HEEREN

No. 230

2001/442179-80

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1940—8:25 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 26—7:45 a. m.

No. 2306 of October 25

With reference to your telegram No. 1201 of October 23.¹

1. I am trying to obtain the analysis of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

2. The reports about a substantial increase of Russian freight bookings from the United States West Coast to Vladivostok in the last few months are correct. Not only has the Russian Government since July chartered about 12 American tankers and freighters, but also more and more other neutral vessels are sailing from ports of the Gulf of Mexico and the West Coast to Vladivostok with cargo for Russia. So, according to a press report of October 5, two Greek vessels were loading cotton for Russia at Houston and Galveston. According to a press report of October 23, Amtorg recently bought 58,000 bales of cotton, of which 18,000 bales had been shipped by that date. According to a press report of October 8, Amtorg was eager to charter more American cargo ships.

3. According to publications available and to confidential information, Russia bought in the first year of the war from the United States chiefly the following raw materials: copper, oil products, rubber, cotton, wheat, tin, steel, and bearing metals.

4. The total United States exports to Russia in the first year of the war, September last year to August this year, were valued at \$87.8 million, compared with \$46.9 million for the same period of 1938-39. This is an increase of 87 percent, due to the war.

5. Concerning the total orders placed by Amtorg in the United States, Gross, the New York correspondent of the Reich Foreign Trade Office [*Reichsstelle für den Aussenhandel*], has reported regularly to the competent Wehrmacht office, through Senior Counselor Heyden-Rynsch.

6. About the quantity and value of United States exports to Russia the Embassy can furnish exact monthly data, divided into all commodity groups of importance, e. g., (a) raw rubber, reclaimed rubber, rubber scrap (b) copper and copper products (c) cotton (d) grain (e) tin and tin-plate scrap (f) oil products. I refer to the monthly

¹ Document No. 219.

telegraphic reports of the Embassy relating to American exports to England, France, Canada (Senior Counselor Bisse in charge). Please cable instructions whether similar monthly cable reports regarding exports to Russia are wanted and for which products. Supplementary data can also be furnished for the exports since January of this year.²

THOMSEN

² Marginal note on the first page of this telegram: "What has been done? W[iehl], [Nov. ?] 2."

No. 231

8569/E023706

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 778 of October 25

BELGRADE, October 25, 1940—9:10 p. m.

Received October 26—1:55 a. m.

Pol. IV 3577.

Rumors which are again circulating regarding plans by Serbian generals to make a Putsch in order to set up a military dictatorship—if necessary, by replacing the Prince Regent with the young King—are characteristic of the profound dissatisfaction in the Army and in Serbian circles in general with Yugoslavia's present situation. The reason for this is the growing criticism directed against the Prince Regent's policy of conciliation toward the Croats, which is considered as weakening and endangering the unity of the state; and there is also the concern over the deterioration of Yugoslavia's military and political situation because of Rumania's new course, also because of the impenetrable character of Bulgarian, and above all Italian, intentions with respect to Macedonia. The view is widely held that this danger can be mastered only by a strong policy which neither the Prince Regent nor Minister President Cvetković is capable of conducting; to establish a military dictatorship and have the King who is already 18 years old ascend the throne before the appointed time undoubtedly seems to some elements in the Army the best way out. I therefore do not consider impossible an evolution in this direction, particularly in case of a further aggravation of military and political tension.

HEEREN

No. 232

2110/456754-55

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 25, 1940.

zu W 4814 g.¹ Ang II.

The conversations of the German-Finnish Government Committee, which took place in Berlin in the last few days, also afforded opportunity for discussion of the Petsamo question with former Minister Fieandt, Chairman of the Finnish Government Committee. In reply to my question as to how the Petsamo question was regarded in Helsinki, M. von Fieandt replied about as follows:

It was desired to continue to resist Russian pressure for annulment of the Canadian concession and transfer of the concession to Russia and to keep the matter in abeyance. As heretofore, the following three reasons would be given the Russians for noncompliance with the Russian demands:

1) For constitutional and political reasons, Finland could not annul the Canadian concession. Even apart from the constitutional reasons which carried much weight with the Finnish Government, such an annulment would cause a breach between Finland and the Powers interested in the concession, namely, Canada, England, the United States.

2) Finland had an agreement with Germany for an indefinite period for the delivery of nickel ore, in return for which Germany was furnishing large amounts of machinery and equipment for Petsamo. The transfer of the concession to Russia would make it impossible for Finland to fulfill this contract, particularly since the Soviet Government had stated that it would consent to the Finnish deliveries of nickel ore to Germany only for the year 1940.

3) Earlier (April-May), before the Soviet Government had participated in the conversations regarding Petsamo, Germany had likewise made a demand for transfer of the concession. The Finnish Government had also refused to agree to the transfer of the concession to Germany for the reasons given under 1).

I did not go into the individual Finnish arguments with M. von Fieandt and confined myself to telling him that I considered it proper for the Finnish Government to keep the question of the concession open as long as possible.

In view of the extremely great interest which the Russians take in the Petsamo question, it may be expected with certainty that the Soviet Government will take the question up with us at the opportunity shortly to occur. In view of the great interest also at stake

¹ W 4814 g.: Document No. 196.

for us, it would be very desirable if we succeeded in keeping the Russians out of Petsamo.

SCHNURRE

No. 233

4469/E087657-65

Vidkun Quisling to Stabsleiter Schickedanz

OSLO, October 25, 1940.

DEAR HERR SCHICKEDANZ: I thank you very much for your kind letter.¹ In the enclosure I am sending you a memorandum about the adjustment of relations between Norway and Germany.

I should be very grateful if you would let me have your opinion on this as soon as possible.

Hagelin, and possibly I myself as well, will be very glad to come over to discuss the matter in detail, but it might be helpful if you were first to sound out the views held there and also inform us of your personal reaction.²

For the rest, things here are progressing not unfavorably, yet somewhat awkwardly, since Nasjonal Samling and I are already encumbered with the full responsibility for the conduct of the government, without having corresponding freedom of action, and also without even constituting a government. Moreover there is the additional fact that four important ministries, among them Finance, Economy, and Commerce, are beyond the scope of our influence.

Yours, etc.

QUISLING

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING SETTLEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
NORWAY AND GERMANY

The goal of the new order created between Norway and Germany is the establishment of the greater Nordic federation. Norway's key position makes settlement of the relations between Norway and Germany the very basis for the creation of such a federation. It is therefore, as has repeatedly been stressed, of the greatest importance to arrive as soon as possible at peace and normal relations between Germany and Norway, in order to create thereby the very basis for the Pan-Germanic federation.

¹ Not found.

² See Editors' Note, p. 814.

In view of the stupendous change in the accustomed manner of thinking which such a new order requires both in Norway and the other Scandinavian countries and in the world, it is absolutely necessary to create a transitional order which meets with the full approval of both the Norwegian people and the other Scandinavian countries.

Such a transitional order would have to be created by the following measures:

(1) There must be formed an independent Norwegian Nasjonal Samling Government, with the leader of Nasjonal Samling as Chief of State [*Riksforsstander*] (*Reichsverweser*).

(2) The position of the Reich Commissar, as previously agreed with the Führer for that situation, must be replaced by the appointment of a Plenipotentiary Extraordinary or a special representative of the German Reich.

(3) Norway's neutrality must be restored and recognized by Germany.

(4) For the duration of the war with England Germany retains the right of taking the necessary military dispositions and measures in Norway, by reason of the violation by England and France of Norway's neutrality.

(5) Peace negotiations and negotiations about the creation of the Pan-Germanic federation are to be begun immediately behind closed doors, so that an agreement will be reached before official negotiations open.

We have reason to believe that such a procedure would undoubtedly greatly hasten the achievement of the final goal. The effect in Norway and the Scandinavian countries would be most favorable.

It will also greatly contribute to the final liquidation of the influence of the deposed King and the deposed government and make it possible to gain influence with the Norwegian merchant fleet abroad, which now is removed from any influence emanating from Norway. As of October 7, 1940, more than 3,600,000 tons were outside of the areas controlled by the Axis Powers.

Repercussions with the very influential Norwegian and Scandinavian population in America, several million strong, would also be great and advantageous.

The immediate establishment of a Nasjonal Samling Government and of a regency [*Reichsverweserschaft*] is all the more necessary as Nasjonal Samling even today is regarded as the decisive power factor in Norway, and the Norwegian people fervently desire the withdrawal of the German civil administration, which limits the full effectiveness of the national movement.

In the opinion of the people Nasjonal Samling now carries the whole responsibility without having corresponding freedom of action.

It is therefore our opinion that the interim arrangement mentioned must be established as soon as possible and that in connection with it consultations regarding peace terms and the establishment of the Pan-Germanic federation must be started simultaneously.

In what follows we wish to outline briefly the main points about the federation:

(1) Norway shall remain a free, indivisible, and independent state, joined with the Greater German Reich in a Pan-Nordic federation. The territorial integrity and national freedom of Norway are to be guaranteed by the Greater German Reich.

(2) A common line in foreign policy.

(3) The High Command of the German Wehrmacht shall function as the High Command of the federation.

The Navy and Luftwaffe shall be kept in common. A Norwegian national Army is to be established for home defense within the structure of the federal armed forces.

(4) The federation shall have a common federal flag; the Norwegian merchant flag and national flag shall remain.

(5) The German Führer and Chancellor shall be the Federal President.

(6) The Federal Government shall be formed by the smaller [*engere*] German Cabinet, reinforced by one or two ministers for Norway (Norwegians).

(7) A German envoy shall come to Oslo as federal commissioner [*Bundeskommissar*].

(8) Norway shall be governed by a Norwegian regent and an independent national Government (all Norwegian nationals).

(9) Norway shall constitute her own Norwegian national assembly, based upon the national economic and cultural life.

(10) Close collaboration of the German and Norwegian national movements (NSDAP and Nasjonal Samling).

(11) Stabilization of the Norwegian currency on the basis of the reichsmark with Berlin as multilateral center of accounting (clearings center).

(12) Gradual relaxation of customs frontiers with economic cooperation.

(13) Common regulation and development of interstate traffic.

(14) Reciprocal right of movement, domicile, and work for nationals of both countries, but German nationals might not acquire real property in Norway without permission from the Norwegian Government.

(15) Norway shall be free to collaborate with other Nordic countries, so far as not contrary to the federation agreement.

No. 234

121/120087-88

Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, October 26, 1940—4:00 p. m.

MOST STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Received October 26—4:30 p. m.¹

No. 977 of October 26

For the Foreign Minister by way of Senior Counselor Likus.

Laval, who spent yesterday in Paris, departed early today for Vichy where a session of the Council of Ministers under the chairmanship of Pétain will be held this afternoon. Before his departure Laval told me that he planned to implement France's alignment against England, which had been decided in principle, by taking the following actions:

1. At the Council of Ministers today the Cabinet members will be requested to give to the policy of cooperation the same unqualified consent as that which Marshal Pétain and he himself had expressed to the Führer.

2. The Ministers refusing to make such a declaration will be immediately replaced. Laval will in any event take over the Ministry of Interior personally in order to keep firm control over the country in behalf of the policy decided upon. In this reshuffle of the Cabinet the present Minister of Interior² would probably take over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs³ and receive jurisdiction over one of the economic ministries.

3. After the Council of Ministers, Laval will summon the chiefs of the three armed forces branches, War Minister Huntziger, General Bergeret, and Admiral Darlan, for a conference in order to receive their reports on the strength of military forces in the French and English possessions in Africa.

4. On Tuesday of next week, Laval will come to Paris with General Huntziger and Minister of Finance Bouthillier, so as to be available for discussions on military cooperation in Africa and the broader integration of French industry with the German armament program.⁴ I request instructions on what may be said to Laval about the prospective place, procedure, and German negotiators for such discussions.⁵

Laval feels that the best moment for a declaration of an open state of war with England would be the time when English armed forces offered resistance to offensive operations of French units in the revolt-

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 95 to Special Train. Heinrich, Oct. 26, 5:25 p. m."

² Marcel Peyrouton.

³ Cf. document No. 241.

⁴ See document No. 259.

⁵ The instructions requested have not been found.

ing colonies, or English fliers bombed French armament factories working for Germany.

Laval also informed me that Giobbe, the chief editor of the Italian language paper in France, *Nuova Italia*, one of Ciano's trusted men, had asked him yesterday whether he had any communications which he wanted him to convey to Mussolini. Laval before taking any such step would like to reassure himself of Germany's consent and requests a statement on the German position in this respect.⁵

ABETZ

* The statement requested has not been found.

No. 235

136/74422

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, October 26, 1940.

No. 3650 of October 26

Received October 26—6:15 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Spanish Foreign Minister added the following postscript to the letter in which he communicated to me on the 24th of this month the new wording of article 5 of the Protocol:¹

"I would not like to pass up this opportunity of expressing the bitter feeling produced in both the Caudillo and myself by the fact that in spite of our friendship the trivial changes which we had suggested—and which, without encroaching at all on the core of the problem or on the Führer's possibilities for negotiation, gave us a somewhat greater measure of security—were rejected."²

I immediately pointed out to the Spanish Ambassador, who had brought me the letter, that the assertion that the Spanish version constituted no substantial change was incorrect, as he himself had to admit.

The original letter in Spanish and translation will follow by the next safe facility.³

The Spanish Ambassador to Berlin expressed the hope that we would at least sign the economic protocol, also prepared by the Spanish Foreign Minister, without any change.⁴

STOHRER

¹ See document No. 224.

² Cf. documents Nos. 221 and 228.

³ They were sent as enclosures with Stohrer's report No. 1673 g. of Oct. 29 (F18/254-258).

⁴ See document No. 222.

No. 236

711/262216

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV

BERLIN, October 26, 1940.

Today at 6:25 p. m. the Attaché Branch OKH (Captain v. Pritt-witz) transmitted by telephone the following message sent by the Military Attaché in Bucharest by telephone at 6:20 p. m. today:

Incident on the Danube:

1) On October 26 at 1:00 a. m. Russian troops occupied three Russian [*Rumanian*] ¹ islands in the Kiliya branch of the Danube 20 km. east of Ismail. The Soviet troops disembarked from warships.

2) A Rumanian monitor which was in this area on patrol duty was chased by three Soviet monitors.

3) The Rumanian Government has ordered all Rumanian monitors to avoid the vicinity of the three islands until the conflict has been settled.

4) The operation carried out by the Russians is characterized by the Rumanian Government and General Staff as an attempt to seize the entire Kiliya branch from Rumania and create a fait accompli before the Danube Commission has begun to operate.

According to further reports as yet not confirmed, shooting is said to be in progress in the area in question and the action is supposed to be not yet concluded.² Military Attaché, Bucharest.

HEINBURG

¹This correction was made in a subsequent note by Heinburg of Oct. 27 (711/262215).

²In telegram No. 1931 of Oct. 30 from Bucharest, Fabricius gave an additional account of the incident based on an official Rumanian statement (711/262209) and on Nov. 2 further statements by Antonescu to the Italian Minister in Bucharest, regarding Soviet intentions to broaden the scope of the action, were reported to Woermann by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin (711/262206). See also document No. 376.

No. 237

449/222812

The State Secretary to the Legation in Greece

Telegram

No. 522

BERLIN, October 26, 1940.

Anlass Pol. VII 990.¹

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 514 ² and 517.³

¹ Pol. VII 990: Not found.

² Document No. 226.

³ Not found.

You are requested to observe utmost reserve there in conversations and especially in offering advice respecting the Greek-Italian relationship.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 238

35/23061-62

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1940—4: 54 p. m.

No. 2311 of October 26

Received October 27—6: 20 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to your telegram No. 1195 of October 22.¹

The Consulate General at New York reports:

“Today five postal parcels were delivered to the Consulate General, all of which had been opened by breaking the seals and tied up again with string. The parcels were addressed to the Consulate General, and the German Embassy in Tokyo was plainly indicated as the sender. Four large parcels contained passports, the fifth and smaller parcel contained two letters; one was addressed to Consul Draegar, from ‘The State Secretary and Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry’ as sender, the other a closed letter, inscribed as printed matter, from the German Institute of Foreign Policy Research [*Deutsches Institut für aussenpolitische Forschung*] to the Information Library. The second letter was unopened, but the letter for Consul Draeger was opened.”

The letter of the Auslandsorganisation which has come to the knowledge of the American authorities as a result of this incident reads as follows:

“NSDAP, Headquarters of the Auslandsorganisation, Office VI-Schf. Berlin-Wilmersdorf, September 2, 1940.

“Districts [*Kreise*] I. and V. U. S. A. Consul Draeger, New York

District II U. S. A. Consul von Spiegel, New Orleans

District III U. S. A. Consul Gyssling, Los Angeles

District IV U. S. A. Consul General Wiedemann, San Francisco

Landesgruppe China

Landesgruppe Japan

Landeskreis Manchukuo

Ortsgruppe Manila, Philippines

Ortsgruppe Bangkok, Thailand

“*Subject*: Monthly newsletter of the foreign section of Reich Youth Headquarters.

“Enclosed you will find one copy of the monthly newsletter *This is Germany's Youth*. W. Prang.”

¹ Document No. 216.

From the point of view of the American Government this letter reveals the existence of five party districts in the United States, the presence of four Kreisleiters, as well as the existence of a local unit in Manila, besides Ländergruppen in China, Japan, etc. The arguments contained in the telegraphic instruction already mentioned regarding the attitude to be adopted here, to the effect that the party units have been disbanded and that the Kreisleiter designations are merely titles in Germany, will in the present circumstances hardly be accepted as valid by the American Government. I have vigorously protested the opening of the shipment.

Meanwhile the Department of Justice is pressing the charge against Dr. Manfred Zapp, manager of the Transocean Bureau, before the grand jury in Washington, which functions as the indicting authority. The charge is violation of the registration law, but is really intended, by well-publicized court proceedings, to bring home to the public the propaganda, and allegedly subversive, activities of the German Foreign Service and its affiliated agencies, and also to warn the German Government that such activities are no longer tolerated in the United States. The material seized at Zapp's place and partly published today in the daily press consists, among other things, of purely routine correspondence with individual members of the Embassy and also of papers (invitations to comradeship meetings, requests for payment of party dues and others) from which, from the American point of view, the existence and activity of a party organization in the United States might allegedly be inferred.

THOMSEN

No. 239

35/23064-65

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 1221

BERLIN, October 26, 1940.
e. o. Pol. IX 3290 g.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Freytag.

For the Chargé d'Affaires.

With reference to my telegram No. 1195 of October 20 [22].¹

We observe with apprehension the growing hate campaign against our official representatives in the United States, which jeopardizes the prestige of the Reich, the position of our officials, and our relations with the United States alike. We particularly regret the passive attitude of the State Department, which not only does nothing to stop the campaign, but actually lends it aid and comfort by its passivity.

¹ Document No. 216.

We are considering whether the American Government should not, through diplomatic channels, have its attention drawn to this situation and be asked to redress it. We are thinking of a personal and emphatic appeal, on your part, to leading officials of the State Department. Such a public hate campaign against accredited foreign representatives was intolerable; the Government should *either* lodge a complaint in the manner customary in international intercourse and which would always receive attention in Germany, *or* the Government was obligated to speak out publicly against the campaign and to give protection to the foreign representatives who are being assailed.

I request your prompt reaction as to the advisability of such action and the prospect of success. In case of such a procedure, we would support your step at this end by emphatic representations to the American Chargé d'Affaires.²

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 244.

No. 240

2281/480781

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Special Security Handling

ROME, October 26, 1940.

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 1921 of October 26, 1940

For State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker personally.

As you will have seen from my telegraphic report No. 1913 of yesterday,¹ which I again urgently request you to treat with the greatest secrecy, we have to expect that Ciano will shortly go to Tirana. I should consider it very unfortunate if he should find P[annwitz] still there (see my secret report No. 472/40 October 16²),

¹ See document No. 225, footnote 5.

² Not printed (2281/480772-77). According to this report, Ciano, acting on instructions from Mussolini, personally, formally complained about the anti-Italian attitude displayed by Eberhard von Pannwitz, German Consul General at Tirana, who had been German Minister there from 1936 up to Italy's annexation of Albania. To support his charges, Ciano gave Mackensen copies of intercepted telegrams from foreign diplomats in Tirana who had reported various indiscreet statements by Pannwitz. Weizsäcker forwarded Mackensen's report to Ribbentrop's special train on Oct. 25 and urged that Pannwitz be recalled at once so that Ciano could be informed of this upon his arrival in Berlin on Oct. 28 (116/66215). Thereupon Ribbentrop sent Pannwitz telegraphic instructions to return to Berlin immediately (116/66217).

and would recommend that if this has not yet been done you instruct P. to leave Tirana at once, either summoning him to Berlin or placing him on leave status until a decision is reached regarding his future employment elsewhere.

MACKENSEN

No. 241

121/120092

Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, October 27, 1940.

No. 987 of October 27

Received October 27—1:20 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister by way of Senior Counselor Likus.

The French Council of Ministers in Vichy this evening concurred unanimously and without qualifications in the outcome of the talks with the Führer as conveyed by Marshal Pétain and Laval. Minister Baudouin also concurred but announced his resignation for personal reasons.² The offer of friendship by the King of England, announced on the London radio, which carries with it the promise that France would be allowed to share in the fruits of English victory, actually came to Marshal Pétain the day after he was received by the Führer, but was recognized as a clumsy maneuver.³ The French Council of Ministers after its session issued the following communiqué:

“The conference held on October 24 between Reich Chancellor Hitler and Marshal Pétain in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop and Pierre Laval, took place in an atmosphere of perfect courtesy. The Marshal was received with the honors due his rank. The subsequent conference between the two Chiefs of State afforded opportunity for a general review of the situation and especially of the possibility of a reshaping of the peace in Europe. The two conference partners agreed on the principle of cooperation. The details of its practical implementation remain reserved for subsequent consideration.”

ABETZ

¹ Marginal note: “Transmitted as telegram No. 101 to Special Train. Heinrich, Oct. 27, 10:40 a. m.”

² Baudouin was succeeded as Foreign Minister by Laval.

³ For the text of this message of Oct. 25, see Great Britain, Cmd. 6662, France No. 2 (1945): *Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris regarding relations between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Vichy Government in the Autumn of 1940*; regarding Pétain's reply of Nov. 2, see document No. 259 and footnote 6.

No. 242

449/222816

The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry and to the Special Train of the Foreign Minister

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, October 27, 1940—10:55 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received in the Foreign Ministry

No. 1945 of October 27

October 27—11:45 p. m.¹

Ciano received me tonight at 9:00 o'clock in order to inform me that the Italian Minister at Athens will during the night deliver to the Greek Government an ultimatum announcing the occupation of Greek territory and calling upon the Greek Government to offer no resistance. Ciano added that in any event military operations would start tomorrow morning at 6:00 o'clock.

Ciano requests strictest secrecy.

Telegram detailing the content of the conversation and with verbatim text of note follows immediately.²

BISMARCK

¹ Transmitted as telegram No. 109 of Oct. 27 at 11:20 p. m. to the Special Train of the Foreign Minister.

² In telegram No. 1946 of Oct. 27, 11:30 p. m., Bismarck transmitted the text of the Italian note in German translation and further reported that Ciano had told him that the principal reason for the Italian action was the unneutral conduct of the Greek Government in furnishing air and naval bases to the British. He said that, in addition to the areas and islands (Corfu, Cephalonia, Leukas, and Zante) to be immediately occupied, it was intended to occupy as bases Salonika, Athens, and Lepanto, but that the course of military operations would determine when these last-named places would be occupied. (2032/444999-445002)

No. 243

265/172438

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 852 of October 28

ANKARA, October 28, 1940.

Received October 28—4:55 p. m.

Although the Italian action has been expected, a difficult situation has again arisen for the Turkish Government. As long as Bulgaria does not intervene actively and operations keep away from the Turkish border there is no necessity for Turkish intervention.¹ This is

¹ On Oct. 29 Weizsäcker recorded: "The Turkish Ambassador here has told his Bulgarian colleague that if Bulgaria kept quiet, Turkey, too, would keep quiet." (265/172445)

confirmed by the fact that no position whatsoever was taken regarding the conflict in the radio address which has just been delivered by the Minister President² on the occasion of the national holiday.³ The Chief of the General Staff of the English Army in the Orient arrived here today. While the situation is being dealt with here with every possible caution, the measures to be taken in the event of Turkish intervention are undoubtedly being discussed.

PAPEN

² Refik Saydam.

³ Oct. 29.

No. 244

35/23074-75

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT WASHINGTON, October 29 [28], 1940—10:35 p. m.
No. 2323 of October 28 Received October 29—11:15 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to your telegram No. 1221 of October 26.¹

In the matter of the systematic defamation of the members of the Embassy and of our Consular Missions who, as I previously reported, are being publicly branded, with mention of their names and publication of their pictures, as criminals, murderers, spies, saboteurs, and fifth columnists, I have already so often and emphatically intervened with high officials of the State Department that I do not anticipate any worthwhile results from any further steps. I have repeatedly and most insistently requested the State Department to afford the members of our Missions protection from these insults, a protection to which we are entitled according to the principles of international law and on the basis of ordinary international courtesy; I have repeatedly stated that I am ready to take up with my Government any case of a member of our service who should have abused the rights of hospitality in the opinion of the Americans, if I am informed of such an alleged breach in the forms of international usage. I have repeatedly protested in the sharpest terms and served notice that I would bring this persecution [*Kesseltreiben*] to the attention of my Government. In no case has the State Department taken any concrete action, or perhaps it has been unable to do anything because it would seem that the driving force is less the State Department than Roosevelt himself and his immediate entourage (especially Attorney General Jackson and Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau), who deem it expedient for reasons of domestic and foreign policy, to hold up the National Socialist Government of

¹ Document No. 239.

the Reich and its official representatives as Public Enemy No. 1 to American public opinion, and heighten the already prevailing hysteria.

I would request, however, that the untenability of this policy be pointed out in all earnestness to the American Chargé in Berlin on the highest appropriate level.

Only recently I have called attention to the fact that under the degrading conditions I have described, the members of our Foreign Service in the United States without exception have joined in the fight in the foremost line of the diplomatic front, and with gratifying self-control endure the hail of personal abuse. The promotion in rank of a number of our co-workers, which I have suggested on various occasions with a view to strengthening the position of our officials, would not only be a recognition of their work, but also show to the American public that our Foreign Service Officers, proscribed as they may be here, enjoy the recognition and protection of the Reich Government. This would in my opinion be an additional effective answer to the hate campaign that has been launched here against the Foreign Service.

THOMSEN

No. 245

F18/259

The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, October 28, 1940.

TOP SECRET

No. 1846

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1 of October 25.¹

Concerning point 1: When the text is in final form, the signing of the agreement is going to take place via Chancellery channels, and it is intended that the German, Italian, and Spanish versions will be signed first by the Reich Foreign Minister and the Italian Foreign Minister, and then be sent to Madrid for signing by the Spanish Foreign Minister. After the signing by the Spanish Foreign Minister the signed original designated for Spain would be retained there, while the signed originals for Germany and Italy would be returned.²

¹ This telegram from Stohrer reads as follows: "Would be grateful for instructions: 1) how the signing of the final text of the Hendaye agreement is going to take place; 2) whether the Spaniards should retain the first text; 3) to what extent I can orient the Military Attachés concerning Hendaye." (F18/260)

² In a telegram dated Oct. 30 Ribbentrop informed the Embassy in Spain as follows: "For the Ambassador personally. I have agreed with Count Ciano that after the three Foreign Ministers sign the secret protocol, they should keep the protocol in their personal safes. It is urged that the Spanish Foreign Minister do this. The protocol will presumably be signed early next week by Germany as well as by Italy, and sent to you at once by special courier for signing by the Spanish Foreign Minister." (F18/253)

See, further, Editors' Note, p. 466 and document No. 294.

Concerning point 2: There is no reason for the return of the first Spanish text. If the Spanish should bring up the question, please report about it.

Concerning point 3: The Foreign Minister urgently requests that the strictest silence be maintained concerning the negotiations, and that no one be oriented about them.

GAUS

No. 246

F20/072-103

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

FLORENCE, October 28, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE DUCE, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AT THE PALAZZO VECCHIO IN FLORENCE, ON OCTOBER 28, 1940¹

The Führer opened the conversation by saying that he had come to Florence to inform the Duce of his conversations of the last few days with Laval, Franco, and Pétain,² and in order to speak with him on the question of Greece. He mentioned on the latter point that Germany could make available for the military operations against Greece, especially for the protection of Crete against occupation by the English, a division of airborne troops and a division of parachute troops, for which North Africa would be the proper starting base.

Turning to the conversations of the past few days, the Führer remarked that the relations of the two Axis Powers to each other had not been changed by them and would not be changed. He referred to the difficult situation that could arise for the African territories lying opposite Gibraltar if the English, possibly as the vanguard of America, established themselves in Morocco. It was possible that because this territory did not belong to them, they would hand it over to the United States. The defense of these North African territories, however, depended on France. If Morocco broke off from France, the Spaniards would surely not be in a position with their own resources to conquer the French Zone of the Sultanate. On the contrary, if the English committed strong forces there, there would even be the danger that the Spaniards would also forfeit Spanish Morocco. Besides, he (the Führer) had often wondered whether there were not some secret connection between Pétain and de Gaulle. After the French defense of Dakar, however, it looked as though there were actually deep-seated

¹ The Italian record of this conversation is printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 601-607.

² See documents Nos. 212, 220, and 227.

opposition between the Vichy Government and de Gaulle. He had also gained the impression from the films on the naval battle of Oran, that this had been a serious battle, although he had at first entertained inner doubts on this score. In his conversation with Pétain, the latter had in strong terms expressed his aversion for de Gaulle.

According to reports from Ambassador Abetz, the intellectuals, bourgeoisie, Jews, and Communists in France were on the side of de Gaulle, while the petty bourgeoisie and workmen, who at heart had always been enemies of England anyway, were for Pétain.

The important thing now was to prevent the secession of Morocco from France, for since Spain could not on her own resources take a stand against it, such a procedure would force the Axis Powers, despite insufficient preparation, to press for Spain's immediate entry into the war, since that country was needed as a bridge to Africa in order to conquer Gibraltar, protect Spanish Morocco, and, if possible, anticipate the English there with such celerity that they could not seize any more air bases. Since the Axis Powers did not have naval supremacy, in carrying out these operations they would have to rely largely on the Luftwaffe. In these circumstances it was clear that it would be best for the Axis Powers if the North African territories were defended by the French themselves. The French air forces stationed there were commanded by an officer who was thoroughly hostile to England, and in the French Navy, also, sentiment was anti-British. The Army would stick to Pétain as long as it believed it could still save something for France. As soon, however, as the necessity for a cession of certain regions of North and West Africa leaked out, they would secede, and the young officers in particular would mutiny. Some inducement therefore had to be held out to the French to defend the territory themselves.

There was no doubt that France expected considerably harder peace terms than the modest demands made upon her by Italy and Germany, but had had quite other things in store for the latter in the event of a victory over Germany. He had also reminded Pétain and Laval very plainly of France's plans to dismember Germany. As recently as May 11 of this year, the French military weekly had spoken of partitioning Germany. In these circumstances, the modest peace terms of Germany and Italy were a tremendous concession to France. If these two countries acted today against France in the way France herself had planned to act against Germany, they would, for instance, demand the independence of Normandy. France therefore did not deserve a peace so comparatively favorable as that contemplated by Italy and Germany, and she must first prove herself worthy of it by rendering special service, namely, by making herself available for the fight against England.

In addition, there were the continual concessions that France requested on specific points, as, for instance, in the question of those French prisoners of war who were interned in Switzerland, or more properly speaking, were quartered in empty Swiss hotels for a charge of 12 Swiss francs per day, and whose return to France the Pétain Government desired. Germany was not averse to complying with this request, since she had no interest in making France pay out such large sums to Switzerland. But on this question, just as on the question of occupation costs, she would make concessions only on a quid pro quo basis, in return for corresponding services rendered by France. The occupation costs were undoubtedly fixed high, but in this way they functioned as a means of pressure on France, since she was therefore interested in as speedy an end to the war as possible.

He (the Führer) would not ask France for any direct military aid. Germany and Italy had enough resources of military power. France was only to make available bases for the Luftwaffe and commit parts of her fleet, above all, submarines, particularly from West African ports, against the English.

He thought the principal effect of the integration of France into the front against England, however, would be in the psychological field. For actually the whole of Europe, including the former ally, would thereby be solidly arrayed against England. He considered that the psychological effects of this fact on Great Britain would be all the greater since the English in their desperate military situation could still maintain their domestic front only psychologically, by all kinds of mendacious maneuvering, and it might therefore hit them in a particularly sensitive spot.

The Führer then described in detail the uninterrupted air attacks on England and particularly London, indicated the quantities of bombs that had already been dropped, mentioned the new tactics of letting long-range fighters and fighter planes serve as bombers, since both before and after release of the bombs they could defend themselves successfully against the English fighter planes. He also pointed out the devastating effects of a new German air bomb with a 2,000 kg. bursting charge.

In order to determine the possibilities of integrating France into the European front, he had begun discussions with the French Government and had spoken first of all with Laval. He personally considered Laval a typical democratic politician, who at heart probably did not believe a word of what he had told him (the Führer), but was prepared only under the pressure of necessity to cooperate with Germany. He had held it up to Laval that France for no cause had declared war against Germany, had lost, and now had to pay. The German troops would remain in France until the war was over,

so this country had an interest in a speedy end to the conflict. Another reason for this interest was the costs, which were rising from month to month, and which were also being charged to the account of France. The hope of a possible change in the English situation he had dismissed as ridiculous and pointed out that in a military respect the war had long since been decided. He had also stressed the fact in speaking to Laval that materially the German-Italian war potential was unlimited and that the food situation was also assured. In no event would Germany and Italy starve, and if someone had to starve, it would not be they. He had also, in his conversation with the Vice-President of the French Government, dismissed as absolutely illusory any possible hopes in America, since the United States would not have completed her military preparations before 1942. In this connection the French had made interesting statements regarding the inability of America to deliver planes. Laval had spoken of a conversation with the warmonger, Bullitt, in which the latter had replied in a completely negative way to the question of American plane deliveries for the French Army, pointing out that the American Army itself had only 120 to 130 modern planes at present. The Führer interrupted to say that it was clear to him as a specialist in rearmament that the Americans would make but very slow progress with their program, particularly since these things went much more slowly in a democracy than in an authoritarian state.

He then reported further on his conversation with Laval, in which he had referred to the marked growth of the German and Italian air forces, and to some representative figures which showed the rise in German submarine construction. He had then, in conclusion, also referred to the treaties that linked Germany with Russia and stated that in addition there were, as security, 186 German combat divisions, whose composition and equipment he indicated in detail. He had concluded these remarks with the statement that Italy and Germany represented a combination not to be surpassed in power by any other combination in the world, and had finally stressed his determination to pit everything humanly possible against England.

Laval had shown understanding for the situation of France, and it seemed to him clear that his country would have to suffer fully and completely the consequences of her defeat. He was absolutely prepared to join in the fight against England, but asked only for a few weeks' grace in order to make the leap. Laval had observed that the Vichy Government would first defend itself against de Gaulle in Africa and that incidents resulting therefrom would provide possibilities for extending the war against the English themselves. He (Laval) had expressed his hatred for the British and had, to be sure, again tried, at the conclusion of peace, to get off more cheaply in

Africa by reviving the old raw materials nostrum of supplying, through economic cooperation, raw materials to countries poor in them. The Führer had, however, rejected this idea at once, remarking that this was a problem of Lebensraum and that all the ownership rights had to be settled anew in Africa, and that in this connection France would be given a free hand to compensate herself with English possessions. Spain's wishes had to be satisfied too, however. The redistribution of colonial possessions would have to be made in such a way that all concerned obtained their rights and that Europe and Africa would grow into a community of interests, like North and South America. Laval had given him to understand that if France could hope to retain the main part of her colonial empire, she would be prepared to help drive the English from their possessions.

The Führer here added a short comment on the bad impression that he had gained of conditions in France on his journey through that country. Farming had impressed him as being very neglected, unlike what he had seen that morning from the train in Italy, which had seemed to him like a cultivated garden.

He then spoke about his conversation with Franco.³ The latter certainly had a stout heart, but only by an accident had he become Generalissimo and leader of the Spanish state. He was not a man who was up to the problem of the political and material development of his country. The Spaniards, moreover, seemed to have no feeling for the limits to their own strength and would be easily inclined to begin undertakings which they then could not carry through. In the negotiations with Germany they had, on the one hand, requested her to assume very concrete obligations, such as, for instance, the delivery of grain, gasoline, etc., but had always been very vague about what *they* would do. Thus they had, for example, reserved entirely for their own decision the important question of the time of Spain's entry into the war. If, on the other hand, they complained that nothing precise and concrete had been promised them in response to their colonial demands, this was so if only because in case such assurances became known, the danger of a secession of Morocco would be very great. Since Franco had declared, however, that he needed such assurances to justify to his people Spain's entry into the war, publication of these assurances was surely to be expected, and particularly because reticence was hardly one of the outstanding qualities of Spanish official quarters.

In this connection the Führer repeated the promise already made to the Duce in the last conversation at the Brenner Pass,⁴ that he would

³ See document No. 220.

⁴ See document No. 149.

on no account conclude peace with France if the claims of Italy were not completely satisfied. Naturally he could not give Spain such an assurance, for then Africa would secede from France and it would take severe battles to reconquer it and to protect the Spanish Zone.

The Foreign Minister then explained the technical development of the negotiations with the Spaniards and the present situation, and presented the Spanish text of the secret protocol,⁵ which the Spaniards had promised ultimately to sign. At the same time he described in particular the difficulties that Serrano Suñer had made with regard to point 5, that is, the formula envisaged for the solution of the colonial problem.⁶

The Führer then spoke of his conversation with Marshal Pétain who, in contrast to Laval, had given the impression of a very decent, reliable character. The words of the Marshal to the effect that he had always been opposed to the English and to the entry of France into the war, he (the Führer) had believed at once. Pétain, who had previously seen to it that the English observer was ousted from the French Defense Council, had, as he had indicated, been shunted over to Spain as Ambassador by the French Government, and had not been allowed, despite several requests, to return to France and resume his old seat on the Defense Council.

The Führer mentioned that he had told Pétain essentially what he had told Laval and had only emphasized the military aspect of the situation more strongly. Pétain, who was certainly no opportunistic politician, had expressed himself with the greatest indignation about de Gaulle, and called his behavior a blot on the honor of the French officers' corps; this blot had been erased at once by the death sentence against de Gaulle. Pétain had pointed out that it was difficult at the moment for France to declare war upon England. He had cited psychological reasons for this and referred to the constitutional necessity for convening the Chambers, which surely would lead to internal political difficulties for the Vichy Government. He had been prepared, however, to defend energetically at once the French position in Africa and had spoken of the possibility that a further action against England might perhaps develop from it. He (the Führer) had told Pétain nothing about the arrangements with Spain and had stated, moreover, that the modalities of collaboration were to be determined by the Armistice Commission or commissions to be established.

If France were brought into the anti-English front, then French West and North Africa would be secured, new bases against England acquired, and Gibraltar could be taken with a very small force; and with her help, the one gateway of the Mediterranean could be sealed

⁵ See document No. 221 and footnote 4.

⁶ See *ibid.* and footnote 5.

off, while the other exit, the Suez Canal, could be just as effectively closed by means of the new German [mines?] already mentioned in the last conversation, which had proved in practice to be very effective and heretofore not clearable.

This procedure in the west, together with the action in the Balkans, particularly in Rumania, would have a favorable influence on Russia.

With this the conversation turned to the subject of Russia. The Führer pointed out that Italy and Germany were natural allies, while the partnership with Russia had sprung purely from considerations of expediency. Just as mistrustful as Stalin was toward him (the Führer) so was he also toward Stalin. Molotov would now come to Berlin (this communication was received by the Duce and Count Ciano with evident surprise and great interest) and it would perhaps be possible to divert the activity of the Russians to India. There was a danger that they would again turn to their old goal, the Bosphorus, and they had to be kept away from it. It had become necessary to point out to them that they might not step beyond certain definite boundaries.

. . . to speak.⁷ This country [Finland], which owed her existence to Germany, had in Geneva and elsewhere in the past never shown herself very grateful and had often taken a position opposed to Germany. She had, however, defended herself with extraordinary bravery in the war against Russia and it would therefore also be difficult for Germany, as a matter of sentiment, to stand by idly in the event of a second Russian attack upon Finland. Germany had, moreover, great material interests in the Norwegian territory around Kirkenes adjacent to Finland. There were iron ore deposits there of 85-90 percent iron content, which were needed as an admixture to the Swedish iron ores for producing high-grade steels. Germany had, therefore, already stationed two mountain divisions and one SS Death's Head Brigade in the Norwegian territory in question, and had built airports and roads. Nevertheless the safest way to Kirkenes lay through Finland, and so on the basis of a special agreement,⁸ transports for the German Army in Norway had been routed in this way. Mainly involved were anti-aircraft gun supplies, munitions shipments, and food for a year. Germany had delivered to the Finns the arms which she still owed them on the basis of former agreements. Five shiploads of arms, moreover, stated to be for Finland and seized in Bergen—they surely were originally sent to Bergen for other purposes—had been released. Germany could also never admit that Petsamo had become Russian.

With regard to Rumania, the Führer observed that he had not been able to send more troops to that country than Antonescu was willing to receive. He had seen to it, however, that these troops were not dis-

⁷ The foregoing line is illegible.

⁸ See document No. 86.

persed in small detachments throughout the country, but stayed together in regiments at least as units ready for action.

In this connection, stressing again the existing Russian danger to the Bosphorus, the Führer spoke once more of the visit of Molotov to Berlin on November 10 and 11, and stated that it must be made clear to the Russians that there was little sense in their seeking expansion in areas where they would collide with Italy's or Germany's interests and finally gain nothing but an outlet to inland seas. It would doubtless be better for them to expand in other directions. Stalin was shrewd enough to realize this and then, if possibly a world front against England was formed from Japan via Russia to Europe, the effect upon the island empire, which was in desperate straits and still living only on hopes and psychological considerations, would be shattering.

The Führer then described again the military measures against England, which would be carried out even if a landing were not possible. If England were bombarded from the air for 100 days as destructively as Germany was now planning and in part already doing both day and night, the moral effect upon the English would be extremely severe and their last hopes would be destroyed. Moreover, the effectiveness of the submarine force would become more and more noticeable since Admiral Dönitz had developed a new system of committing 8 or 9 submarines against a single convoy. In this way very important results had very recently been achieved against England's supplies. The Italian submarines conducted themselves very bravely. Crews and material were excellent, according to the reports of the German Admiralty. They still had only to get used to the special methods of fighting in the northern waters as well as to the Dönitz system in order to be completely successful. If England's last hopes were dashed by both air and submarine operations, a worse collapse than France's would come.

The Duce replied that he inferred from the communications of the Führer that the latter wished to bring about a coalition of all Europe against England. He (the Duce) entirely approved of this plan and believed that it was necessary in order to guarantee ultimate victory. On the specific questions that the Führer had raised, the Duce took the following position:

Italy had a particular interest in France. The country which had wanted and lost the war had to pay the costs, particularly since in many speeches the Führer had repeatedly sought in vain an understanding with France. The Duce recalled in this connection publications of Charles Maurras, who had advocated a dismemberment of Germany, as in the Peace of Westphalia, into 23 single states, whereupon the Führer remarked that this would probably also still be the program of France after the present war. Continuing, the Duce

stated that the Pétain Government was undoubtedly the best government in France for Germany and Italy, and that it was therefore in their interest to support it. In order to attain this goal, France had to be told precisely what was desired of her. The Duce again emphasized the moderation of the Italian demands: Nice, Corsica, Tunis, and Somaliland.

If France appeared amenable to the wishes of Germany and Italy for integration into the anti-English front, she must be given the means to defend the colonial territories remaining to her. She had to cooperate in a passive way and when peace was concluded, be indemnified for possible losses of colonial territory. The question arose whether a settlement with France should be made at once or reserved for the future.

The Führer replied to the effect that the final settlement could wait until the war was ended. So long as the fight against England continued, the German Army had to stay in France, and so long as the war lasted, France must retain the feeling that she was interested in getting it over quickly. It was difficult, for example, to satisfy so soon some of the French wishes mentioned earlier. Germany absolutely needed the prisoners of war as laborers and it was already necessary to have a pledge in one's hand against certain eventualities, for one could never be too cautious toward France.

The Duce remarked that even now many Frenchmen did not grasp that they had been conquered and spoke of a *fausse défaite*.

The Führer supplemented this remark by referring to Laval's statement to the effect that the number of two million French prisoners showed that the French people had not desired the war and had therefore not wanted to fight.

Regarding further handling of cooperation with France, the Führer proposed negotiations between the Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and Laval, at a place in Germany yet to be determined, so that France might from the very outset get the impression of unity between Germany and Italy.

In reply to another question from the Duce as to how the Pétain Government could be supported, the Führer replied that this could best be done by giving Pétain the assurance that Germany and Italy had only moderate demands to make on France and did not intend, moreover, to destroy the French Empire but even wished to give France the opportunity for compensation at England's expense. If France knew this, this knowledge would mean the end of de Gaulle. Pétain's position would be eased if he were not given too concrete assurances, for then Pétain could give only general answers to all-too-curious questioners from his own ranks. Moreover, certain small concessions could be granted him step by step such as the return of the French prisoners

of war interned in Switzerland, for whom France had to pay 140 million French francs per day, or 12 Swiss francs per head to Switzerland; the liberation from captivity of an old French general, whose return to France Pétain was especially anxious to effect; the reduction of the occupation costs and the return of the Government to Paris or Versailles.

In reply to a question by the Duce as to what should be done with Spain, the Führer replied that the Spaniards claimed for themselves French Catalonia, a rectification of the Pyrenees frontier, Oran, French Morocco, enlargement of the territory of Rio de Oro to the twentieth degree of latitude and an enlargement of Spanish Guinea. The Foreign Minister observed that the Spanish demands were as unreasonable as the German and Italian demands were modest, and he referred again to the protocol which had been previously submitted, and stressed its extremely confidential nature. Only six statesmen and their closest assistants knew of it. He then once more informed the Duce regarding the significance of the colonial formula in point 5 of the protocol and the difficulties that Serrano Suñer had made in this connection.

To a question from the Duce as to what the Spaniards should be given, the Führer replied that they could not get any more than a substantial enlargement of Spanish Morocco. At the same time he stressed the fact that Germany had to have bases on the African coast and that he would prefer to lay claim to one of the islands off the coast of Africa for this purpose. If this were not possible, bases would have to be found on the African coast.

As far as Spanish accession to the Tripartite Pact and the German-Italian Alliance was concerned, it could not be announced until the military preparations for the protection of Spain were concluded. At a remark from the Duce to the effect that the announcement of possible agreements between Italy, Germany, and Spain might be very dangerous to Pétain's position, the Foreign Minister again stressed the need for secrecy, but emphasized that if something should nevertheless leak out, it would be better if nothing too definite had been awarded the Spaniards and they had merely received vague promises. The Spaniards themselves had told him that because of their current food imports from the British Empire, they were perhaps even more interested than the Axis Powers in keeping it secret. They also knew that upon its becoming known that they had joined the Axis, Churchill would not hesitate to attempt the seizure of the Spanish islands and bases in the Atlantic.

To a question from the Duce as to the exact time of the intervention of the Spaniards in the military operations, the Führer replied that Franco had been very vague here and had stated only that he would intervene when the military preparations were completed.

The Führer then spoke again of Gibraltar and stated that, according to studies by German experts, the operation, if well prepared and executed with lightning speed, could go off well with very few troops and certain prospects of success. According to the Spaniards, they had already put the Canary Islands in a condition of defense. They could, moreover, be supported by heavy batteries, by dive bombers, long-range guns, and special troops.

To a question from the Duce as to whether it would not be well if the English found out that they could no longer put hope in Spain, the Führer replied that, in his opinion, the announcement of Spain's joining the Axis must be postponed until it was absolutely certain that the English could not land in Spain and on the islands. The Duce mentioned in this connection that it would perhaps also be advantageous to the internal situation in Spain if the firm alignment with the Axis Powers could be announced. The Führer then proposed that the three Foreign Ministers make all the preparations with Spain that were necessary for her entry into the war, as well as settle all other details still pending, and that a meeting then take place in Florence between the Führer, the Duce, and Franco, at which the participation of Spain in the Tripartite Pact and the German-Italian Alliance could be announced with full publicity.

With regard to Russia, the Duce remarked that bringing her into the general front would be very advantageous. The very visit of Molotov would mean a violent blow to England and the foes of the Axis. It would perhaps be advisable to publicize the fact of this visit even before the American presidential election. The Foreign Minister replied that negotiations had already begun with the Russian Government, which had requested that this visit be kept strictly secret.

The Duce observed in conclusion that Germany and Italy were therefore, as always, in accord on all points, to which the Führer agreed. Shortly before the close of the conversation, the Führer again stressed the fact that he did not construe the entry of Russia into the common front, as meaning that an alliance would be concluded with Russia but, as the Foreign Minister stressed, that a special form of agreement with Russia and the partners to the Tripartite Pact would be found. The Führer also mentioned that Rumania, Hungary, and Slovakia wished to accede to the Tripartite Pact, while Bulgaria was apparently afraid of the Turks. The Foreign Minister called the breaking of the alliance with England by the Turks a very desirable goal and stated, in reply to a question from the Duce as to how this goal was to be attained, that in case of an agreement between the Axis Powers and Russia, Turkey would probably be very much more accessible, and that finally it would also be possible to bribe the Turkish statesmen.

The conversation was continued at a luncheon for four and in a series of separate conversations between the Führer and the Duce, the Foreign Minister and the Duce, as well as the Foreign Minister and Count Ciano in the course of the afternoon.

SCHMIDT

No. 247

449/222830-34

The State Secretary to the Special Train of the Foreign Minister

Teletype

No. 123

OCTOBER 28, [1940].

Sent October 29—4:45 a. m.

The Greek Minister handed me tonight a note and an enclosure. The text of the note is as follows:

Your Excellency: I have the honor to present to you for your information the enclosed copy of a telegram which I have just received from His Excellency, the Greek Minister President Metaxas.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

A. Rizo-Rangabé
Royal Greek Minister

End of note.

The enclosure has the following text:

“Athens, October 28, 1940—6:50 a. m.

“At 3:00 o'clock this morning the Italian Minister handed me in person a note in which the Italian Government accuses the Greek Government of having tolerated the use of its territorial waters, its coasts, and its harbors by the English fleet in the course of its belligerent operations; of having facilitated the supplying of the British air forces; and of having permitted the organization of a military intelligence service against Italy in the Greek Archipelago.

“The Italian Government, the note continues, was constrained to remind the Greek Government of the provocative actions directed against the Albanian nation as shown by the terroristic policy which it adopted toward the population of Tsamouria, and by the persistent efforts to create disturbances on the other side of the border. The note added that all this could not be tolerated henceforth by Italy. Greek neutrality was and always had been nothing other than pure and simple pretense. The Italian Government had therefore decided to demand of the Greek Government, as a guarantee for Greek neutrality and as a safeguard for the security of Italy, the right of occupation by its armed forces, for the duration of the current conflict with England, of certain strategic points in Greek territory. The Italian Government was asking the Greek Government not to resist this occupation and not to interfere with the free passage of the troops intended for that purpose.

"The Italian Government was asking the Greek Government to issue immediately the requisite instructions to the military authorities so that this occupation might be accomplished in a peaceful manner. In case the Italian troops encounter resistance, such resistance will be crushed by force of arms, and the Greek Government would have to bear the responsibility for all consequences resulting from it.

"In reply I told the Italian Minister that I viewed this note both from its content and its form of an ultimatum as a declaration of war by Italy on Greece. The Italian Minister then answered that the advance of the Italian troops would start at 6:00 o'clock in the morning."

End of enclosure.

Since the enclosure contains the word "war," I told the Minister that the present legal situation between Italy and Greece was a matter that naturally would have to be settled between Rome and Athens. I had reason to believe, however, that as of noon today Italy did not yet consider herself at war with Greece. The enclosure to the note moreover gave an account of the Italian step slightly at variance with what I know of it.

Since the Minister in an ensuing brief conversation cast doubt upon one of the occurrences to which exception was taken by the Italians, I replied to him that we placed full reliance on the information supplied by our Italian ally.

The Minister did not say a word about his own position in Berlin and the relationship of Greece to Germany.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 248

449/222849

*Memorandum by an Official of the News Service and Press
Department*

BERLIN, October 29, 1940.

According to reports from Athens just coming in (1:00 p. m.), Germans in the whole of Greece have not been molested in any way, contrary to various reports received to that effect, but have been correctly treated. Occasional instances of jostling by half-grown ruffians occurred to which, however, no importance need be attached.

There are no polemics against Germany in the press. Nor, since yesterday morning's bombings, has any Italian aircraft reappeared.

The position of the Greek Government regarding the English guarantee is as follows:

Greece is not officially calling on England for assistance; rather, she is appealing *to all* who are of good will to help her. The Greek

Government counts above all on German help and German mediation.

Submitted to the State Secretary through Minister Braun von Stumm.

SCHWÖRBEL

No. 249

3941/E053647

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1917 of October 29

BUCHAREST, October 29, 1940—8:00 p. m.

Received October 30—1:00 a. m.

[W XII 6952].¹

Last night I had my first conversation with Sobolev² which lasted 3 hours. Russia's goal, it appears, is a mixed Russo-Rumanian administration of the waterways for the whole Danube delta, including the Russian part, with subsequent control by a new commission over the whole Danube. Their specific demands for the transition period appeared to be limited to having a Soviet delegate assigned to the executive boards of autonomous Rumanian authorities and to having a few pilots. This does not seem to be unacceptable. Sobolev promised to ask the Soviet Government whether he may accept, for a transition period, the continued existence of the Commission of Four with German and Italian participation, which heretofore has been taken for granted by the Rumanians and Italians.³

Please notify the Embassy in Moscow of this and instruct it to urge the Russians to drop the idea of an uncontrolled Russian administration during the transition period in case the Soviet Government should discuss its plans with the Embassy.⁴ Even so, it will be difficult enough to convince Rumania that the basic Russian plan cannot be rejected outright, in view of the common Russo-Rumanian interests in navigation and the Rumanian desire to have the Russian part of the Danube delta included in an international settlement.⁵

¹ This file number is supplied from another copy of this document (711/262210-11).

² Arkady Sobolev, Secretary General in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, was the chief Soviet delegate to the International Danube Conference. See document No. 201 and footnote 3.

³ Marginal note in Wiehl's handwriting: "Also by us."

⁴ Marginal note in Wiehl's handwriting: "Out of the question."

⁵ The instruction proposed by the Legation in Bucharest was sent to the Embassy in Moscow on Oct. 30 (3941/E053644-45). The Legation in Bucharest was informed by telegram No. 1593 of Oct. 30, sent Oct. 31 (3941/E053646) that the Embassy in Moscow had been so instructed. At the same time the Legation in Bucharest was informed that Germany, as well as Italy and Rumania, considered it a matter of course that the Four Power Commission should remain in operation.

No other basic difficulties from Russia have been observed so far. Basis of discussion proposed by Rumanian chairman with German-Italian agreement is on its way by courier.⁶

MARTIUS
FABRICIUS

⁶ For a published German text see Peter (pseud.), "Die Sowjet-Regierung und die Donaumündung Ende 1940," *Auswärtige Politik: Monatshefte für Aussenpolitische Forschung*, edited by Friedrich Berber (Leipzig, 1944), p. 25.

No. 250

265/172443

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, October 29, 1940—8:00 p. m.

No. 1918 of October 29

Received October 30—1:00 a. m.

The Turkish Ambassador here,¹ who recently returned from Ankara, told Foreign Minister Sturdza at the end of last week that in case of an Italian attack on Greece, Turkey would observe friendly neutrality toward its ally; a Bulgarian attack on Greece, however, would be followed by Turkish entrance into the conflict.²

FABRICIUS

¹ Bay Suphi Tanriöer.

² In telegram No. 1957 of Oct. 31 (2236/476136) Fabricius reported that the Turkish Ambassador had made a further statement to the Rumanian Foreign Minister, and to Fabricius as well, and had modified his language to say that in case of Bulgarian entrance into the war, "a new situation would arise which would have to be re-examined by Turkey." Fabricius attributed the changed wording to new instructions.

No. 251

205/142576-77

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, October 29, 1940.

St.S. No. 788

In his conversation with me today the Finnish Minister brought up the question of Finnish-Swedish relations. He mentioned the well-known attempt in the spring of this year to conclude a defensive military alliance between Finland and Sweden, which, however, Russia had thwarted.¹ Now, as Minister von Blücher who is at present in

¹ Documents concerning these Finnish-Swedish negotiations in March 1940 are filmed on: 171/134892-95; 103/112081-82; B19/B003574; 205/142054, 142060; 1544/375879-86.

Berlin had also already indicated to me, efforts have recently been made to achieve a far-reaching Finnish-Swedish rapprochement on terms which amounted to a Finnish-Swedish union.² The Minister described these efforts as the last attempt which Finland intended to make in this matter.

Already by way of introduction the Minister had remarked that he was not speaking on instructions of his Government. He emphasized in the course of the conversation that he was expressing quite exclusively his own personal opinion. He himself had no real confidence in these efforts. For such a union would involve Finland in burdensome ties, the most important of which would be renunciation of a revision of the Finnish frontier with Russia. To effect such a renunciation now would in his opinion only be tolerable for Finland if the entire new arrangement were placed under German guarantee. Kivimäki went on to say that Finland could not, he was convinced, remain isolated; he would prefer, however, to give up dependence on Sweden and to have, instead, dependence on Germany.

The Minister then went on to say that the whole thing was in a very early and entirely preparatory stage. Presumably his Government would soon instruct him, Kivimäki, to bring up the matter here officially. Then his question would be: What does Germany have to say about this whole plan.

During this conversation I kept buttoned up [*zugeknöpft*] and merely replied that, according to my observations, Finnish policy toward Russia had recently been understandably cautious. I asked the Minister what attitude Russia would take toward this new tack. Kivimäki thought that Moscow wanted to be accommodating, contrary to what was the case last spring.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister. I reserve taking a position in the matter.

WEIZSÄCKER

² In a memorandum of Nov. 1 (B19/B003832-33), Blücher briefly summarized the position respecting the main aspects of the Finnish situation. The memorandum contained the following paragraph on Finnish-Swedish rapprochement:

"The Finnish Government has initiated unofficial negotiations by private intermediaries with the Swedish Government in order to establish a closer political tie between the two countries. The Finns are disposed to go as far as complete union. At the moment the attitude of Germany and Russia toward this problem very much preoccupies the few Finnish statesmen who have been initiated into the matter."

Blücher's memorandum was transmitted to Ribbentrop by Weizsäcker with a covering memorandum of Nov. 2 (B19/B003831).

A notation of Nov. 5 by Woermann records a decision of Ribbentrop that "complete reserve should be maintained in respect to this question." (B19/B003814)

No. 252

449/222840-43

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, October 29, 1940.

Pol. I 1219 g. Rs.

Submitted herewith is a report of the Military Attaché at Rome, dated October 28, 1940, relative to the Italian-Greek situation.

KRAMARZ

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Report of the Military Attaché at Rome.

Marshal Badoglio informed me on August 23 that Italy would not undertake anything against Greece unless compelled to do so by actions of the Greeks or the English. The political move against Greece planned for the beginning of September was not carried out, but in the course of September the three divisions marked for reinforcement of the XXVI Corps were transferred to Albania.¹ For the moment it seemed, however, that no military measures of any sort were planned against Greece, even though the press recurrently referred to the Greek question.

The issue became acute again in the middle of October when the movement of German troops to Rumania became known. From that time on, intensified military preparations against Greece could be noticed. General Roatta denied to me on October 23 that there was any intention whatever of taking military action against Greece, while Marshal Badoglio told me on October 24 that all preparations had been completed for an offensive against Greece in the event that the English should violate Greek neutrality. Obviously the highest authorities had given orders not to tell the German military authorities anything about the move which, it became increasingly evident, was to be taken at the end of the month. To divert attention, the press reported in the last few days that the offensive in Egypt was to be resumed at an early date; in fact, the *Messaggero* of October 27 even published a picture of the Thoma Commission at the Egyptian front.²

On October 27, 9:00 p. m., Foreign Minister Ciano officially notified the Chargé d'Affaires, Prince Bismarck, that an ultimatum would

¹ See document No. 107.

² Gen. Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma had headed a German military mission to the Italian forces in North Africa to obtain information required in connection with proposed German military cooperation with the Italians there.

be delivered to the Greek Government on October 28, 3:00 a. m., setting forth the demand for military occupation of strategic points, and that in any event the invasion would be launched from Albania at 6:00 a. m.³

Italian political circles appear to have counted on the Greeks to yield. No picture is available up to this time of the extent of the resistance.

The following are given as the objectives of the invasion:

Corfu, the three Ionian islands outside the Gulf of Patras, Lepanto, Athens, and Salonika. The offensive is to all appearances based on the plan of operations which I submitted on June 15, 1939, under No. 87/39 g. Kdos.⁴ It provided for the following:

1. Occupation of the island of Corfu from Santi Quaranta (now Porto Edda).
2. Advance of a column from Argyrokastron via Jannina to the Gulf of Patras at Lepanto, and occupation of the three islands of Leukas, Cephalonia, and Zakynthos, situated outside the Gulf of Patras.
3. Advance from the region of Korçë on Salonika and Larissa.

The conduct of operations is in the hands of the Commanding General of the XXVI Corps, General Visconti Prasca.

Since two of the nine divisions present in Albania are needed to cover the border against Greece, Italian superiority is probably not sufficiently great to warrant expectations of a quick Italian success if the Greeks put up serious resistance.

The Navy seems to play a minor part, but air force contingents were transferred to Albania in the last few days. The weather is very unfavorable.

I have received no official information so far either from the General Staff of the Italian Army or from the Armed Forces General Staff.

RINTELEN

³ See document No. 247.

⁴ Not found.

No. 253

4545/E146179-80 -

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, October 29, 1940.
e. o. W 4955 g.

I) In the conversations between Schnurre and Ryti in May 1940 only the *delivery* of nickel ore from Petsamo was discussed.¹

¹ See vol. IX of this series, document No. 16 and footnote 4; and document No. 293, footnote 1.

II) In the economic negotiations in June 1940² we first brought up the wish for a transfer of the concession. When the Finns stated that they had no legal basis for that and feared serious difficulties with England from any action by force, we contented ourselves with the Finnish commitment regarding delivery. What led us to make this decision was the consideration that we could have the concession ceded to us in the peace treaty. We therefore then informed the Finns that the concession must *not* be transferred to anyone else without our consent.

III) We restated this view with special emphasis in our telegram No. 312 (W V 2550) of July 10 to Helsinki.³

IV) From the beginning Russia laid claim to this concession from Finland. According to telegram No. 416 (W V 2616) of July 11, 1940,⁴ from Helsinki, she then likewise contented herself for the time being with a share in the production, but maintained her interest in the concession in principle.

In view of this, the Moscow Embassy received an instruction (telegram No. 1200, W V 2616 I, of July 13, 1940⁵), in which we made known our interest in participating in any new disposition with respect to the concession.

According to telegram No. 1399 from Moscow (W V 2710)⁶ Molotov objected to this, whereupon we, by telegram No. 1310 (W V 2832 of July 30, 1940) to Moscow,⁷ waived participation in the concession and at the same time stated with respect to our negotiations with Finland that we had not negotiated about the concession but had presented our claim to participation in the event of a change in the status of the Canadian *concession*.

V) In the conversation of the State Secretary with Minister Kivimäki (telegram to Moscow and Helsinki, W V 3533, of September 21, 1940⁸) our position was formulated in this sense, that we would not take up the question of a German concession now that we had been informed of the legal position by the Finnish side, and we had stated this also in Moscow. There could be no question of a waiver in favor of Russia.

VI) In his conversation with M. von Fieandt on October 25, 1940, Minister Schnurre told him that we had an interest in the Finnish Government's leaving the concession question open as long as possible.⁹

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 24, footnote 2.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 136 and footnote 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, document No. 150.

⁵ See *ibid.*, document No. 150, footnote 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, document No. 182.

⁷ *Ibid.*, document No. 259.

⁸ Not printed (B19/B003759-60).

⁹ See document No. 232.

VII) In treaty V¹⁰ it was stipulated that Germany was to have the right of pre-emption on all concessions in Finland.

VAN SCHERPENBERG

¹⁰ Evidently a reference to the Veltjens contract. See document No. 139.

No. 254

265/172448

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 860 of October 30

ANKARA, October 30, 1940.

Received October 30—1:00 p. m.

The President¹ expressed many thanks for the Führer's congratulations.² The fact that these telegrams were exchanged has received special attention in view of the tense situation as a result of the action in Greece. Following the military review, the Foreign Minister asked me to have a conversation with him which lasted an hour. As a result of a steadily increasing encirclement, Turkey was today experiencing the feeling of discrimination which Germany experienced a year ago as a result of the English effort at encirclement. The hope of being able to preserve peace had almost completely vanished. The Italian operation, if it should approach the border of Thrace and occupy the islands in the Aegean, would be directed against vital Turkish interests. No nation with a sense of honor could have complied with the Italian request that bases should be ceded. I explained to the Foreign Minister the Italian point of view that England was making Greece more and more her base of operations. Saracoglu replied that England would certainly do this now, and he pointed to the air base against the Rumanian oil fields. After all, the Italian action would have made sense only if important bases had been occupied at once; nothing of this sort had been reported so far. Up to now it is certain that Turkey will not take any steps whatever, as long as Syria and Greek Thrace are not threatened. The Foreign Minister concluded by stating that it was now solely up to the Axis Powers to act in such a way that the Turkish Government would be able to maintain peace with honor.

I shall depart Wednesday³ morning.⁴

PAPEN

¹ İsmet İnönü.

² On the occasion of the Turkish national holiday on Oct. 29.

³ Oct. 30.

⁴ Nothing on the background of Papen's trip to Berlin has been found in Foreign Ministry files. For Papen's own account of the reasons why he was called to Berlin, see Franz von Papen, *Memoirs* (New York, 1953), pp. 465-468.

OCTOBER 1940

431

No. 255

527/238280-81

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1940—5:24 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 31—7:45 a. m.

No. 2348 of October 30

D II 1085 g.

For the State Secretary.

The Consulate General in New York reports:

"Today there appeared here Felix Jahnke, born in Breslau on December 6, 1902, a naturalized U. S. citizen since 1930, unmarried, and stated the following: I was at one time trained as radio operator at Signal Battalion II, under Captain Kersten, at Stettin, and later became intercepting and monitoring operator in Hammerstein. Here, I am friendly with Axel Wheeler-Hill, the brother of the German Bund official, who is now under indictment. Axel Wheeler-Hill was trained as a radio operator in Germany and at the present time operates a transmitter here, which sends ciphered information to the Abwehr Headquarters Bremen.

"Being an exceptionally well-trained radio operator, I have become aware that Wheeler-Hill does not possess sufficient technical skill for the efficient operation of the transmitting and receiving station. He has as a matter of fact received no signals from Germany for several weeks now and does not know whether his radio messages reporting ship movements, military information, etc., were actually received over there. I should gladly make myself available and if requested make recommendations on how to reorganize the service."

Jahnke further stated that eight special vehicles are constantly cruising around New York to locate any secret transmitters.

If this transmitter were discovered, a connection would at once be inferred between the Bund and German military authorities. The tremendous damage that would result from this surely does not need to be drawn in detail. I would therefore suggest that in consultation with Abwehr Headquarters Bremen, the activity of this transmitter be stopped immediately and all connection be severed with Wheeler-Hill. Request instruction or notification of action taken. End of report.

I have time and again in full accord with the armed forces Attachés pointed out most emphatically the tremendous danger for German-American relations arising from such connections if they should be discovered, especially with the tension as it is now. I would recall again that the American Government cited such connections as one of the reasons for entering the World War and on the strength of this won public opinion over in favor of intervention. The armed forces Attachés and I are fully aware of the military value of an intelligence organization; but an agent who has become known to all Embassies

does not seem to be suitable for such purposes. The American Government, as indicated in our report No. 1574 of October 14,¹ has meanwhile set up 100 radio monitoring stations for the purpose of national defense. Considering the technical deficiencies of the agents who have become known to us, we cannot imagine that their activity could be of such value as to compensate for the grave risk of jeopardizing the German-American relations. I would therefore ask that the appropriate authorities be requested to discontinue this radio connection.²

THOMSEN

¹ Not found.

² Marginal note: "To D II immediately. Please find out jointly with Pol. I M for whom the transmitter is working. Luther, Nov. 11."

In a memorandum submitted to Luther on Nov. 2, Attaché Pusch of D II recorded having been told by Counselor Kramarz that the secret transmitter was a purely military matter. Kramarz promised to take up the subject with Admiral Canaris who had been away on a trip. (4656/E210166)

There is an unsigned, undated, and only partly legible note appended to the document printed which reads as follows: "Settled among the parties concerned. Straightened out with Ritter-Canaris." (527/238282)

No. 256

F5/0422

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, October 30, 1940—8:34 p. m.

SECRET

Received October 30—10:30 p. m.

No. 2287 of October 30

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Based on the instructions brought by Hilger.¹

1. The proposed communiqué on Molotov's trip appears to me appropriate in content. I shall take up the matter with Molotov immediately upon receipt of instructions on the subject.² Difficulties might be expected to arise solely from the prevalent reluctance here to publicize in advance any trips of prominent Soviet figures.

2. In view of Molotov's impending visit I believe it would be better if the announcement of the proposed accession of Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria to the Tripartite Pact were to be made by you personally during Molotov's visit.³

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 211.

² See document No. 262.

³ On Nov. 17, following Molotov's return to Moscow, Ribbentrop directed Schulenburg to inform the Commissar for Foreign Affairs that Hungary, Rumania, and Slovakia would shortly join the Tripartite Pact (telegram No. 2094 of Nov. 17: 104/112649). See also Editors' Note, p. 208.

No. 257

111/116281-83

Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department

BERLIN, October 30, 1940.

Pol. VIII 1342.

Japanese Counselor of Embassy Kase informed me today as follows:

1. The new Japanese Minister, Mitani, appointed to Bern, had arrived in Berlin. He had informed the Japanese Ambassador that Foreign Minister Matsuoka intended to take a personal and direct step with Chiang Kai-shek in order to bring about a settlement of the Japanese-Chinese conflict. The Embassy did not know whether this step had been taken in the meantime. Mr. Kase asked whether we had received information on the subject. I replied that the Japanese Foreign Minister had also informed our Ambassador of his intention but that we had not received further communications in the matter.¹

Mr. Kase thereupon said very emphatically that Ambassador Kurusu was anxious to inform the Foreign Ministry that he personally wanted to lend his support to this intention of the Japanese Foreign Minister's with all the means at his command. He, the Ambassador, and the Counselor of Embassy were both convinced that a settlement of the Japanese-Chinese conflict was urgently desirable, not only in the interest of Japan and China but also in the interest of the Axis Powers. Mr. Kase asked whether we had any sort of news regarding the Chinese attitude in the matter. I denied this and added that according to my impression the members of the Chinese Embassy here had shown great reserve on this question in the past few months.

2. Thereupon Mr. Kase read me a Domei report from Hong Kong of which I had not known previously. According to this, on October 24 the Chinese Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, and Paris had sent a joint report to Chungking regarding the European situation and joint proposals for Chinese foreign policy. On October 27 the Chinese Ambassador [in Berlin] had sent a separate report with his own proposals for Chinese foreign policy to Chungking, which were in conflict with the opinions prevailing in Chungking and which were based on the view of the Reich Foreign Minister regarding the Chinese-Japanese conflict. Mr. Kase now wanted to know what the facts were with regard to this report by the Chinese Ambassador.

¹ See document No. 161.

I replied that I could naturally not know what the Chinese diplomats report to Chungking, but it seemed to me highly improbable that the Chinese Ambassador should have been in a position to wire home the views of the Reich Foreign Minister on the conflict in East Asia.

I had the impression that Mr. Kase, who takes every occasion, as does the Ambassador, to speak to me about our views on a settlement of the East Asiatic conflict, was disappointed with this answer. I did not have the impression that the gentlemen simply wanted to sound me out, but believe rather that they wish to draw our attention repeatedly to our interest in the settlement of the conflict. A few days ago the Japanese Ambassador spoke of the increase in prestige for Japan as a result of the Tripartite Pact, and the good example that the German-French cooperation, now agreed upon, also offered for the Far East.

Mr. Kase did not speak today of a possible mediation on the part of Germany, but his entire way of speaking indicated that the Japanese Embassy here would very gladly, through us and the Chinese Embassy here, join in Matsuoka's efforts to settle the East Asia conflict. He carefully avoided giving the impression that the Embassy had received any instructions at all in this matter from Tokyo.

Submitted herewith through the Deputy Director, the Director of the Political Department, and the State Secretary, to the Foreign Minister.

KNOLL

No. 258

B19/B003818-21

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 30, 1940.

REGARDING THE PETSAMO NICKEL CONCESSION

1. The Finnish Minister spoke with State Secretary Weizsäcker on October 29¹ about the so-called Veltjens agreement granting Germany the right of pre-emption on the Petsamo nickel concession.² The agreement concluded on October 1, 1940, by Herr Veltjens as "Special Deputy of the Greater German Reich" with the Finnish Government, represented by the Finnish Minister of Defense, for the delivery of arms to the value of more than 50 million reichsmarks contains the clause that Finland grants the Greater German Reich

¹ The memorandum recording this conversation, St.S. 787 of Oct. 29, is not printed (B19/B003807).

² Document No. 139.

a right of pre-emption on all concessions in Finland that are of interest to the Greater German Reich, in so far as the Finnish state intends to offer these concessions to any foreign country and in so far as the Finnish state is not bound. This right of pre-emption is valid until October 1, 1945.

The Finnish Minister mentioned further that it was evident from the agreement that Germany would intervene in Moscow if Russia maintained her demand for the Petsamo nickel concession. As far as is known, there is no such provision in the Veltjens agreement.³

The Finnish Minister told the State Secretary in conclusion that the Finnish Government did not intend to yield to the Russian insistence on the concession, for the reason that Finland could not take the concession away from those who had held it thus far, and that Germany had already given notice of a claim to the concession in the spring of this year and, above all, had recently acquired an option right to it. The State Secretary replied to the Minister that he was not acquainted with what Herr Veltjens had discussed in Finland and reserved a reply, especially with respect to the said option right.

2. It will be necessary in the future also to try to prevent the Finns, if possible, from transferring a concession to the Russians, without letting this become evident to the Russians. In any case the Finns must be prevented from making any mention to the Russians in connection with Petsamo of the right of pre-emption granted us on October 1, because Ambassador von Schulenburg was instructed by a telegram of July 30, 1940, to inform M. Molotov that we waived participation in the Petsamo concession and would limit ourselves to fulfillment of the agreement for the delivery of 60 percent of the nickel ore yield.⁴

Because of this situation it will be advisable for State Secretary von Weizsäcker, in his reply to the Finnish Minister, to limit himself to approximately the following: We too, in view of our delivery agreement concluded with the Finnish Government, would deem it advisable for the Finnish Government to leave the concession question open as long as possible. What justification the Finnish Government would have for resisting further Russian pressure for the concession, must be left to it. It seems to us, however, that a sufficient reason would be that the Finnish Government cannot nullify the Canadian concession. We do not consider it advisable for the Finnish Government to make any mention to the Russian Government of German intentions with respect to the concession. In no case, it seems to us, should the Finnish Government point out to the Russian

³In a subsequent memorandum of Nov. 4 (B19/B003833-40) Wiehl records that he received specific confirmation from Veltjens that his agreement with the Finns did not comprise the obligation for Germany to intervene at Moscow in case Russia maintained its demand.

⁴See vol. x of this series, document No. 259.

Government that Germany recently acquired a right of pre-emption. The so-called Veltjens agreement is not known in detail to the Foreign Ministry;⁵ in any case, however, such an agreement is by its very nature to be regarded as secret and therefore cannot be disclosed to a third party.

3. In the recent German-Finnish discussions of the Government Committee⁶ the Finnish chairman, Fieandt, also mentioned to Minister Schnurre that the Finnish Government did not intend to give in to the Russian pressure for the concession, on the grounds that it could not nullify the Canadian concession and last spring had rejected a German demand for transfer of the concession for the same reason. In reply Herr Schnurre merely said that he considered it right for Finland to keep the concession question open as long as possible. The Veltjens agreement had not as yet come to play any part in that discussion. If the Finnish Government makes a statement to the Russians similar in substance to that formulated by M. Fieandt, without any reference to the Veltjens agreement, the Russians will presumably reply that the Finnish rejection with respect to Germany in the spring of this year has been superseded by the German waiver announced to Russia in July. That chance will have to be taken.

4. A communication to the Finnish Minister in accordance with section 2 above should if possible be postponed a few more days, since a Finnish communication to Russia in this matter might give the Soviet Government occasion to bring the matter up again with us at some suitable opportunity in the near future.

Herewith to be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

⁵ A typewritten marginal note opposite this line reads: "Instead one could also say 'is a separate matter.'"

⁶ See document No. 232.

No. 259

121/120099

Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1043 of October 30

PARIS, October 31, 1940—4:25 a. m.

Received October 31—9:50 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister through Senior Counselor Likus.

Laval, Huntziger, and Bouthillier arrived in Paris yesterday in order to take up contact with us after the Montoire conversations¹

¹ See document No. 227.

and to report on the impression made on the French Cabinet and the French people of the unoccupied area by the reception of Pétain by the Führer. I invited Laval, Huntziger, and Bouthillier to a conference for tomorrow² and asked them to state at that time whether the French Government already had in mind proposals regarding the details of the cooperation which had been agreed upon in principle at Montoire. I would thereupon submit them to the Foreign Minister. When I inquired what measures the French Government intends to take against the pro-English propaganda in the unoccupied area, Laval, Huntziger, and Bouthillier replied that the following steps would be taken:

1. Severe punitive measures against listening to English radio broadcasts in restaurants and other group-listening to such broadcasts.

2. Close cooperation with the German Security Service in ferreting out and arresting English propaganda agents in the occupied and unoccupied areas.

3. A sharp reply to the letter from the King of England to Marshal Pétain,³ stressing the contradiction existing between the assurances of friendship in this letter on the one hand and the attacks on Marshal Pétain in the English press and radio as well as the raids on Mers-el-Kebir⁴ and Dakar⁵ on the other.⁶

ABETZ

² See document No. 272.

³ See document No. 241 and footnote 3.

⁴ See vol. x of this series, document No. 93.

⁵ See document No. 92.

⁶ Pétain's reply is printed in *République Française, Haute Cour de Justice: Procès du Maréchal Pétain* (Paris, 1945), pp. 327-328.

No. 260

174/136451

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2297 of October 31

Moscow, October 31, 1940—5:17 p. m.

Received October 31—9:35 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2188 of October 16¹ and to instruction Pol. VIII 1302 of October 22.²

The Japanese Ambassador informed me that he had visited Molotov today to inform him that he had instructions and full powers for the immediate conclusion of a treaty similar to a nonaggression pact; all pending specific questions between the Japanese and Soviet Governments could be settled afterwards in the resulting improved at-

¹ Not printed (104/112593). This telegram reported that Soviet-Japanese negotiations which had been carried on in Moscow since the middle of August were about to be concluded; subjects of those negotiations were said to be a neutrality pact, a fisheries agreement, and cessation of Soviet support for Chiang Kai-shek.

² Not found.

mosphere. (This procedure evidently contrasts with that previously followed by Ambassador Togo.) Molotov had replied that the Soviet Government preferred first to take up the pending specific questions and then settle them simultaneously with the conclusion of the treaty. According to the Ambassador, Molotov cited as an example of this method the German pact signed the year before. I have not yet been able to learn from the Ambassador which specific questions the Soviet Government wishes to settle, and shall reserve for later a further report with respect to this.³

SCHULENBURG

³ See document No. 311 and footnote 2.

No. 261

449/222867

The State Secretary to the Legation in Greece

Telegram

MOST URGENT
No. 550

BERLIN, October 31, 1940—7:10 p. m.

Until further notice the Foreign Minister requests you not to undertake any overt preparations for the departure of the Legation, of our consular establishments, and of Reich Germans in Greece, and especially not to take any steps in this regard with the Greek Government.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ In telegram No. 600 of Nov. 6 (449/222890), the Ambassador in Greece reported that, in view of the prevailing situation, it was no longer justifiable to keep the entire German colony from leaving. He therefore asked for authorization to permit departure of women, children, and sick people on a train taking Italian diplomatic personnel out of Greece. Authorization was given by Weizsäcker in telegram No. 584 of Nov. 7 (449/222893).

No. 262

F5/0419-20

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
No. 1976

[OCTOBER 31, 1940.]¹

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 2287.²

¹ The telegram is undated, but bears the marginal note: "The telegram is to be sent without the Foreign Minister's initial but with his signature. Gaus, Oct. 31."

² Document No. 256.

Please take up with Molotov, along the lines discussed here with Hilger, the question of publishing a communiqué regarding Molotov's journey. The conversation might be introduced by saying that all sorts of things are already being related in Moscow regarding the forthcoming journey and it appeared to us to be advisable to anticipate the likelihood that the journey will be announced, and indeed in a perverted form, in the English and American press.

Please propose the following text for the communiqué:

"At the invitation of the German Government and in return of the visit to Moscow last year of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, will shortly make a visit to Berlin."

If the course of the conversation should indicate it to be possible, it would be desirable to include in the communiqué an additional statement concerning the purpose of the journey. In this case, a portion of a sentence along the following lines should be added to the above text: "in order to continue and intensify the current exchange of ideas by renewed personal contact within the context of the friendly relations between the two countries." I request you, however, not to force such an additional statement on M. Molotov if he gives any indication of a negative attitude.

I consider it especially important that the communiqué be published in the morning papers here and in Moscow on November 2 or November 3. Please reply as soon as possible by telegram.^a

RIBBENTROP

^a Schulenburg replied in telegram No. 2311 of Nov. 1 (F5/0418) that he had discussed the matter with Molotov who apparently had no objections to the proposed text, including the additional statement, but wanted to study the question further before giving a final answer. Molotov had insisted, however, that the communiqué should not be issued until very shortly before he started on his journey. In a memorandum of Nov. 2 (F5/0416), Gaus recorded telling Schulenburg by telephone, at Ribbentrop's direction, not to insist on an early publication date. After further delay in obtaining final word from Molotov (Schulenburg telegram No. 2823 of Nov. 3: F1/0255; Gaus telegram No. 2004 of Nov. 6: F1/0256), the communiqué in the text originally proposed by Ribbentrop was accepted by Molotov (Schulenburg telegram No. 2365 of Nov. 8: 104/112803) and announced over the radio in Moscow and Berlin on the night of Nov. 9 (Tippelskirch report A 4953 of Nov. 14: 273/177484-90).

No. 263

183/86249

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 804

BERLIN, October 31, 1940.

The Swiss Minister mentioned casually during a conversation with me today that a meeting had taken place in Munich of persons who

seemed to be concerned with the internal political revival of Switzerland. General Haushofer, who is active in a prominent position in the VDA, allegedly delivered a speech there in which he stated it to be necessary that Switzerland be partitioned among her neighbors.

I did not indicate that I knew of the Munich meeting¹ and told M. Frölicher, moreover, that I did not believe General Haushofer had made such statements.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Nothing further relating to the Munich meeting has been found in the Foreign Ministry files.

No. 264

121/120103

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, October 31, 1940.

Minister Hemmen reported the following from Paris by telephone:

Today there was a meeting in Paris at Ambassador Abetz' office. On the French side, M. Laval, General Huntziger, and Minister of Finance Boutellier [*Bouthillier*] participated. Ambassador Abetz will report by telegraph to the Foreign Minister concerning the results.¹ Minister Hemmen is leaving Paris this evening for Berlin; he will arrive here Friday evening² in order to report orally and to receive instructions for continuing the talks.

Minister Hemmen reported the following by telephone regarding today's meeting:

a) Laval proposed that further conversations concerning military questions should take place in Paris between General Huntziger and the new Head of the German Military Administration in Paris, General von Stülpnagel (brother of the Head of the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden); and concerning economic questions between Minister Hemmen and Minister of Finance Boutellier [*Bouthillier*]³—in particular, concerning occupation costs, relaxation of the line of demarcation, the exchange relationship of the reichsmark to the franc, the subordination of the two northern départements of France to the Military Commander at Paris.

b) General Huntziger promised Minister Hemmen as a special concession to have two French military planes fly from Kayes near Dakar to Marseilles, each with three tons of Belgian gold.³ The rest

¹ See document No. 272.

² Nov. 1.

³ See document No. 114. A Franco-Belgian agreement regarding return to the Belgian National Bank of gold deposited with the French had been signed on Oct. 29. The text of the agreement is filmed on 4450/E086734-40, and is printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. III, pp. 168-173. For supplementary papers on this subject including an additional protocol signed by Hemmen and Boisanger on Dec. 11, 1940, see *ibid.*, pp. 163-168 and 173-184, respectively.

of the Belgian gold is to be brought by truck to Dakar, from there by rail to Oran, and from there by plane to Marseilles.

c) M. Laval promised Minister Hemmen that, following this, the entire amount of French gold at Kayes will be brought back by the same route to France.

Herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

No. 265

64/44375-78

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, October 31, 1940.
zu Pol. IX 2231.¹

According to a telephone communication from the Reichsführer SS, there are at present a total of 53 Uruguayan citizens in Germany, including Austria, the Sudetenland, and the Protectorate. Twenty-nine of these are Volksdeutsche. Accordingly only 24, including women and children, would come under consideration for possible reprisals.² It must be expected, however, that even these cannot all be used for possible retaliatory measures because most of them are pro-German and will be utilized for our economic and propaganda work abroad. Because these considerations do not apply to Uruguayan citizens in the occupied territories and in the General Government, the Plenipotentiaries and representatives of the Foreign Ministry at Paris, Kraków, Brussels, and The Hague, as well as Reich Commissar Terboven, were asked on September 25 to submit lists of the most prominent Uruguayan nationals that might be considered for a retaliatory action. Since encroachments by other American Governments, too, with respect to Reich Germans are to be expected in the future, the offices mentioned above have at the same time been asked to set up lists of nationals of the other American Republics against whom, if need be, retaliatory measures could be taken.

To be sure, it will be possible to use the weapon of reprisals only with the greatest caution with respect to citizens of the Latin American countries, since the number of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche in these countries exceeds by more than a thousand times the number of Latin Americans that can be reached by us. For example there are 2,500 Reich Germans, and 4,000 Volksdeutsche living in Uruguay;

¹ Pol. IX 2231: Not found.

² In telegram No. 179 of Sept. 21, Minister Langmann had reported from Montevideo that eight Germans, who had recently been arrested were now being indicted for offenses against the security of the state and attempted conspiracy (64/44340-41). In the subsequent telegram, No. 182 of Sept. 22, Langmann expressed his opinion that the indictment was clearly aimed at the National Socialist party of Germany and its Auslandsorganisation (64/44342-43).

that is, 6,500 persons whom the Uruguayan Government could reach if we take action here against the few Uruguayans that we can get hold of. Since our countrymen in the Latin American countries are in many cases heads of large commercial enterprises, leading industrialists, and employees in key positions, the Uruguayan Government would be able to paralyze our entire economic relations through further arrests. I have no doubt that the Uruguayan Government would gladly grasp an opportunity, offered by our side through reprisals and arrests, to do further injury to German interests. Its actions would not be influenced by consideration for the Uruguayans in our power.

It therefore appears desirable to let the trial involving the German community in Montevideo go on for the time being. The arrest of the eight Germans, however regrettable it is, will have to be taken into the bargain. I assume that our Legation in Montevideo has already examined the question as to whether a provisional release on bail is permissible, but I shall direct the attention of the Legation once more to this point. Perhaps it will be possible in this way to effect the release of some of the less incriminated defendants. It must be stressed in this connection, however, that, for example, Fuhrmann, the Volksdeutscher mentioned in the second paragraph of telegram No. 200 of October 24,³ had worked out a plan for the partitioning of the Uruguayan state, which fell into the hands of the Uruguayan authorities. Any attempt to get him out of jail would, in these circumstances, be doomed to failure.

In the past few years we have experienced various trials in Latin American countries in which—as in the trial of the German community in Uruguay—Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche were accused of high treason. These trials benefited us in their final outcome in so far as the charges brought against the German community were proved to be unfounded. A prediction regarding the outcome of the trial in Montevideo cannot yet be made. The defendant Fuhrmann will in all probability be convicted of high treason unless we succeed in having him declared insane. First-class defense counsel has been made available to the defendants at the expense of the Reich. Also, Consul General Barandon, for many years Deputy Director of the Legal Department in the Foreign Ministry, was assigned to the Legation in Montevideo for the purpose of dealing with

³ Not printed (64/44373).

legal questions in connection with the trial.⁴ The indictment by the Prosecuting Attorney, several hundred pages in length, will be answered in the same detailed manner. Thus all precautions have been taken by us to bring the trial to a favorable conclusion for us.

In these circumstances I would propose first awaiting the further course of the trial. Should it develop that miscarriages of justice are involved, the question of possible retaliatory measures against Uruguayan nationals who live in the territories occupied by us could be re-examined.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister pursuant to the instruction of October 26.⁵

FREYTAG

⁴ Barandon, Consul General at Valparaiso, Chile, received instructions regarding this assignment with telegram No. 26 sent by Weizsäcker on Sept. 29; the Legation in Montevideo was notified of Barandon's assignment in Weizsäcker's telegram No. 185 of Sept. 29 (64/44364-65).

⁵ Not found.

No. 266

35/23090

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 799

BERLIN, October 31, 1940.

I took advantage of the new American Chargé's¹ initial visits to remonstrate with him pursuant to Herr Thomsen's suggestion regarding the defamation of the members of our Embassy and our Consular Missions in the United States. I followed almost entirely the text of telegram No. 2323 from Washington,² and I asked the Chargé to report to Washington on our conversation. As to the particulars I reminded Mr. Morris that the State Department was acquainted with all that was requisite. When he raised the argument of the so-called freedom of the press in the United States, I interrupted Mr. Morris to point out to him that such an excuse was inconsistent with the rule of international law and order constantly stressed by the United States.

I conducted the conversation with outward calm but with great earnestness and emphasis.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Leland B. Morris, former Consul General at Vienna, was introduced by Alexander Kirk on Oct. 3, 1940 (35/22934).

² Document No. 244.

No. 267

4378/E082872

*Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs*BERLIN, October 31, 1940.
zu D III 157 g.¹

Subject: Removal of Jews from the Gaue of Saarpfalz and Baden.

By order of the Führer all Jews from the Gaue of Baden and Saarpfalz were deported to unoccupied France on October 22 and 23, 1940, in nine special trains. The Gestapo headquarters in Karlsruhe, Neustadt a.d.H. and Saarbrücken were ordered by the Reichsführer SS to prepare and to carry out this operation in secret. The Jews were awakened at 6:00 a. m. on the morning of the 22nd; they had an opportunity to eat and to take 50 kilograms of baggage with them. In 9 special trains, 7 from the Gau Baden and 2 from the Gau Saarpfalz, the Jews were deported via Alsace and Lorraine. A total of 6,504 Jews were involved. The action went off smoothly and almost unnoticed by the public.

As SS-Hauptsturmführer Günter of the Reich Main Security Office told me, they considered notifying the French Government. This was not done, however—for what reason is not known. All of the trains went by way of Chalon sur Saône.

The Armistice Commission has requested instructions as to what attitude they should take with respect to the French, who have asked for information.²

Submitted herewith to Minister Luther.³

Referat D III
TODENHÖFER

¹ D III 157 g.: Not printed (4378/E082866). This was a memorandum of Dec. 7 by Rademacher of Division D III, restating the Foreign Minister's decision in this matter, as laid down in the marginalia, printed in footnote 3.

² The French inquiry had been reported in telegram No. 207 of Oct. 28—from Wiesbaden (368/207184). A subsequent French inquiry about Germany's intentions in the matter combined with a request that these "6,000 German nationals" be sent back to Germany was reported by Hencke in telegram No. 245 of Nov. 19 (368/207287-88). Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. II, pp. 244-245.

³ Marginal notes:

"To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request for instructions by the Foreign Minister regarding the last paragraph. Lu[ther], Oct. 31."

"Treat in a dilatory manner. R[ibbentrop]."

"The Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Armistice Commission and the Embassy in Paris have instructions to treat the matter in a dilatory manner. R[ademacher], Dec. 6."

No. 268

136/74430

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division .

BERLIN, October 31, 1940.

Pol. I M 1184 g. Rs.

The Naval War Staff states that it is necessary, in connection with naval operations in the Bay of Biscay, to be able to supply German destroyers with fuel in out-of-the-way bays of the Spanish coast. For this purpose German tankers would be sent there; filling up would be done at night in order to make sure that it was kept secret. The Naval War Staff has noted, in this connection, that the Spanish Government has already shown an accommodating attitude with respect to the supplying of German submarines.

The Naval War Staff requests an expression of view and that the Spanish Government be accordingly informed.¹

Herewith submitted to Ambassador Ritter.

KRAMARZ

¹ See document No. 450.

No. 269

182/85547-48

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 1948 of October 31

BUCHAREST, November 1, 1940—1:40 a. m.

Received November 1—6:25 a. m.

The first major conflict between Horia Sima and General Antonescu has broken out. Both told me in confidence about the incident. It is a matter of differences [set forth] in a handwritten letter addressed by Sima to the General—to whom he otherwise remains loyal and whom he regards as a deliverer at a decisive moment—demanding total power for the Legionnaire movement. In the letter, which was read to me by a confidant of the General on the latter's instructions, Sima criticizes the General's interfering with the activities of the Legionnaire police, his inadequate suppression, and even tolerance, of the activity of old politicians such as Dinu Bratianu and Maniu, the publication in the press of notices about discussions with former Liberals; and he [insists] that the Legionnaire economic order must at last be established. This is discussed in broad outline: The Guard needs conspicuous proofs, for example also in the field of price structure, etc.

Some of the criticisms directed against the General are, from the

point of view of the Legionnaires fully justified; others, especially with respect to the direction of the economy indicate naive conceptions about a transformation of the Rumanian economy. Since Horia Sima asked me to do so, I gave the General my views and will presumably have another intimate talk with him on Sunday. In many questions the General still adheres to old views and does not act with the necessary vigor against the intrigues of former party leaders and professional politicians who are constantly harassing him. In the economic sphere, on the other hand, we must in our own interest, if for no other reason, oppose the plans of Sima and his youthful advisers. In view of the close connection between our economy and the (one group missing) and the carrying out of our extensive plans for investment, we cannot permit any economic experimentation. Minister Neubacher is assisting me by concurrent discussions with Sima and Antonescu; for continued smooth cooperation between these two men is necessary, 1) because the Guard alone is too weak to restore Rumania's badly shaken economic and political system, and the General is our guarantee of tranquillity and order in Rumania; 2) a failure of the machinery of the state and the economy to function would be blamed on Germany.

Therefore it is necessary that we support and encourage Antonescu and Sima, but not one against the other.

FABRICIUS

No. 270

2366/489244-47

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, November 1, 1940—3:00 a. m.

SECRET

Received November 1—3:40 a. m.

No. 1557 of November 1

With reference to your telegram No. 1836 of October 11.¹

According to a telegram from the Embassy in Tokyo dated October 30,² the Japanese have now made a new proposal regarding the formation of the commissions provided for by the Tripartite Pact, which, surprisingly enough, is entirely different from their own original proposals. According to the new proposal no main commissions at all, but only military and economic commissions, are to be estab-

¹ This telegram sent by Bismarck reported Italian proposals regarding the organization of the commissions provided for in the Tripartite Pact (2366/489244-27). See document No. 153.

² Not found.

lished in Tokyo as well as in Berlin and Rome. These commissions would submit their proposals to the Governments. Only when their subject matter had to do with political affairs would the proposals be taken up by the Foreign Ministers.

Evidently this change in the original Japanese position is related to the internal discord between the military authorities and the Foreign Ministry in Japan.

I do not consider the new Japanese proposal acceptable. The Tripartite Pact is a highly political treaty, application and implementation of which must be without restriction in the hands of the responsible political authorities, i.e., the Foreign Ministers. The Japanese interpretation would result in depriving the Foreign Ministers to a large extent of the initiative in the application and implementation as well as of constant supervision over it. Furthermore, the point of departure must be the fact that the questions to be dealt with by the technical commissions will almost without exception have foreign policy significance.

I therefore consider the only practical conception to be the formation of a main commission for Tokyo on the one hand and one for Berlin and Rome on the other, each under the chairmanship of a Foreign Minister and with representatives of the Foreign Ministries as the sole remaining members. Thus the main commission in Tokyo would be composed of the Japanese Foreign Minister and the German and Italian Ambassadors there. The European main commission, which should meet alternately in Berlin and Rome, would consist, when meeting in Berlin, of the Reich Foreign Minister as well as the Italian Ambassador and Japanese Ambassador here and, when meeting in Rome, of the Italian Foreign Minister and the German Ambassador and Japanese Ambassador there. It should be left to the chairmen of the main commissions whether they wish to call in military or economic experts to their discussions.

The military and economic subcommissions would convene only by instruction of the main commission, would deal only with the questions referred to them by the latter, and would then have to submit their proposals to the main commission. The military subcommissions would be composed of representatives of the military departments, the economic subcommissions of representatives of the economic, transportation, and finance departments. It would be expedient, however, to attach also representatives of the Foreign Ministries to the subcommissions. The armed forces Attachés in Tokyo and officials of the two Embassies there with experience in economic matters would come into consideration as German-Italian members of the subcommissions. For Europe only *one* military and *one* economic subcommission would be set up which, like the main commission for Europe, should meet

alternately in Berlin and in Rome. Their composition would correspond to the composition of the subcommissions in Tokyo.

This conception would also have the advantage that the two Axis Powers could easily arrange for a unified stand.

In so far as the military authorities of the three Powers wish to deal jointly with matters of a purely technical military nature which do not require or are not suitable for deliberations in committees, they could get in touch with one another in such matters in the usual way through the armed forces Attachés.

Please discuss the matter at once with the Italian Government and ask it, if it agrees with my foregoing proposals, to give appropriate instructions immediately to the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo.³

RIBBENTROP

³ In telegram No. 1975 of Nov. 1 (2032/445005), Ambassador Mackensen reported that Ciano fully concurred with Ribbentrop's views and had instructed the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo to support the German conception in the question of the commissions for the Tripartite Pact. On Dec. 10, Weizsäcker informed Mackensen in telegram No. 1833 (2366/489269-71) that a Japanese memorandum had been handed to the Ambassadors of Germany and Italy in Tokyo which was substantially in accord with the German proposals. The German Ambassador would be authorized to sign the Japanese memorandum even though it contained some changes with respect to the setup of the military and economic commissions. In telegram No. 2278 of Dec. 12 (2366/489272), Ambassador Mackensen reported that Count Ciano expressed full concurrence with the German proposal.

No. 271

121/120107-08

Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, November 1, 1940.

No. 1049 of October 31

Received November 1—4: 15 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister through Likus.

Today SS-Oberführer Dunker accompanied by SS-Gruppenführer Bergemann and Professor Dr. Lürer, the head of the economic department under the chief of the civil administration in Lorraine, came to see me on instructions of the chief of the civil administration in Lorraine, Gauleiter Bürckel, in order to let me know that on Monday morning there would take place the evacuation of pro-French Lorrainers to unoccupied France, with Lyon as the assembling point. Altogether, the evacuation of 100,000 persons, mostly of peasant origin, was anticipated. There are to be four trains daily, each carrying approximately 1,000 persons. Gauleiter Bürckel is asking me to inform the French Government. I replied that such an official communication could be made only by the Armistice Commission in

Wiesbaden, which so far had not been informed at all about the matter. In my view, I could only take the question up unofficially with the French Government, and then only if I received the appropriate instructions from the Foreign Minister. Representatives of Gauleiter Bürckel told me day before yesterday that they had received by telegram the Foreign Minister's assent to the operation.

In the situation which has developed between the German and French Governments following Montoire, such a sudden, unilateral scheduling of the evacuation appears to me politically objectionable. The evacuation needs intensive propagandistic preparation among the French population of both the occupied and unoccupied territory by means of emphasis on the voluntary resettlement of her own fellow-nationals by the victorious Power, Germany. It needs, further, technical preparation on the part of the French officials who have the responsibility for receiving and taking care of the people who are evacuated. Also the question of the dispossession and indemnification of the evacuated persons has to be clarified by the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden from the legal point of view. Unless these preparations are made, it is certainly to be anticipated that the evacuation will give English inflammatory propaganda a great impetus and will compromise most severely the propaganda initiated by the French Government after Montoire.

I therefore request postponement of the evacuation to a time more favorable from the political point of view, when the operation may find its natural place within the framework of a general settlement between Germany and France. Such an appropriate moment might perhaps be at hand when the French public can be informed of a relaxation of the line of demarcation and of other economic and political concessions.

ABETZ

No. 272

121/120110-12

Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

No. 1051 of October 31

PARIS, November 1, 1940—3:40 a. m.

Received November 1—4:30 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister through Senior Counselor Likus.

Today there was a luncheon at the Embassy and a subsequent conference attended by Laval, Huntziger, and Bouthillier,¹ as well as the new Military Commander in France, General von Stülpnagel, Admiral Saalwächter, Quartermaster General Wagner, General of the

¹ See documents Nos. 259 and 264.

Luftwaffe Hanesse, various experts with the Military Commander in France and, as representatives of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, Minister Hemmen and Lieutenant Colonel Speidel. In accordance with instructions the German participants maintained a noncommittal attitude during the conversations. Laval, as spokesman for the French, expressed appreciation of the Führer's decision to take the road of cooperation with the defeated opponent, and stated once more on behalf of his Government that all of the members of the Cabinet had given their consent without reservation to the policy adopted by Pétain at Montoire. The offer of cooperation on the part of the German Reich Chancellor represented a generous gesture that was unique in history. The Reich Chancellor had not demanded of France that she declare war on England. He had demanded of France that she join a European coalition against England and within the framework of this coalition carry out military cooperation primarily in Africa. If public opinion in France could speedily be given some information regarding the first steps of carrying out the policy of cooperation, the political climate of France would change very quickly. Everything that facilitated cooperation made England's situation more difficult; everything that impeded it gave an impetus to English propaganda. He wanted to express once again what he had stated several times before in the Council of Ministers: England dragged us into this war; she did nothing to help us win it. When we were beaten she betrayed us and gave us notice that from her point of view we were nothing but mercenaries in her service—to say nothing of the subsequent events at Mers-el-Kebir, Alexandria, and Dakar. Therefore all good Frenchmen must hope for a German victory, since only this would make possible a peace which would guarantee European cooperation also for the future. As practical matters requiring urgent solution Laval mentioned the necessity of a stronger military effort to reconquer France's rebellious colonies and the granting of economic concessions which could be held up propagandistically to the masses of the population as resulting from the policy decided on at Montoire. In regard to the first point General Huntziger handed over a memorandum meant for the Armistice Commission, that will (one group evidently missing) in Wiesbaden tomorrow.² In this memorandum Huntziger asks for the following:

1. The right to recruit volunteers for the armistice army in occupied France, too.

²The text of this memorandum was communicated to the Foreign Ministry by telephone on Nov. 2 (368/207203-05).

2. Increase of the North African army to 120,000 men and the French Navy to 65,000 men and 2,600 officers.

3. Release from captivity of a number of professional soldiers of the colonial army, among them General Carles, who held a command in French Equatorial Africa shortly before the war.

4. Increase in the military forces in French West Africa so as to increase the possibilities for defense and to carry out offensive counterblows.

5. Rearmament of a number of units of the Navy, in particular the submarine arm.

6. Facilitating transportation in the Mediterranean.

General Huntziger stated that an active military operation against the rebellious colonies would be effective only if German and Italian consent to the necessary reinforcements of troops and material could be given as quickly as possible in each case. He as Chief of the French Army, Darlan as Chief of the French Navy, and Bergeret as Chief of the French Air Force were on hand at Vichy in case the Germans and Italians desired conversations regarding a speedier procedure. In the economic field Laval raised the question whether direct conversations could not be started in Paris next week between Minister Hemmen and Finance Minister Bouthillier on the possibility of a reduction in the occupation costs, a relaxation of the demarcation line, and a changed ratio between the value of the franc and that of the reichsmark. He also termed it important to detach the two northern départements of France from the Belgian Military Administration and to place them under the Military Commander in France.³ The Montoire meeting had caused tremendous excitement in France. The danger existed that the exaggerated pessimism would be followed by an exaggerated optimism, which could all too easily change into a feeling of disappointment. France knew that the damage caused by the war could not be done away with in a few days or weeks, not even in years. But precisely for this reason it was necessary to give public opinion the impression that the policy of Montoire represented a beginning in the recovery of France.⁴

ABETZ

³ See document No. 208, annex.

⁴ For a French account of this meeting, see Yves Bouthillier, *Le Drame de Vichy*, vol. 1: *Face à l'Ennemi: Face à Vallié* (Paris, 1950), pp. 204-205. For a memorandum by Hemmen in French giving an account of this conference which is in parts more detailed than the document printed here, see *ibid.*, annex No. 3, pp. 293-296. This memorandum by Hemmen has not been found in Foreign Ministry files.

No. 273

136/74436

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 3712 of November 1

MADRID, November 1, 1940.

Received November 1—3: 15 p. m.

Also for the Chief of the Security Police, Zimmerstrasse 16.

Today I gave diplomatic visa No. 207 (Spanish passport No. 1763 issued by the Civil Governor of San Sebastian on October 26, 1939), and frontier recommendation No. 12 to the Spanish citizen Señorita Maria Carmen Fernandez de Heredia of the private secretariat of the Spanish Foreign Minister. This person is leaving here today by Lufthansa plane, flight K22, and should arrive in Berlin via Stuttgart on Sunday afternoon.¹ She is traveling at the official direction of the Spanish Foreign Minister in order to bring a letter to the Führer. The Spanish Embassy in Berlin is informed. Contents of the letter are so far not known.²

STOHRER

¹ Nov. 3.² In telegram No. 3718 of Nov. 2 (136/74437) Stohrer gave the following additional information:

"The Foreign Minister told me that the letter of the Caudillo to the Führer deals with certain matters which were discussed at Hendaye and respecting which Franco had promised more specific statements."

Weizsäcker noted in his memorandum of Nov. 4 (136/74440) that the Spanish Ambassador had delivered the letter on Nov. 3 and had stated that the person who had brought it would remain in Berlin for 2 or 3 days and could take back Hitler's reply if it were ready.

No copy of Franco's letter has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. Regarding Hitler's reply, see documents Nos. 352 and 398.

The Halder Diary for Nov. 4 contains the following entry concerning the letter:

"2:30 p. m. meeting with the Führer (Present: Keitel, Jodl, Deyle, Schmundt, Engel, the Commander in Chief of the Army, myself)

"(2) Spain. In a letter to the Führer, Franco has promised that he will seriously carry out the agreements which he has made orally—i.e., enter in on our side.

"The Führer now intends to press for Spain's entrance into the war. Possible English reactions: English landing on the West Coast of Africa. English landing in Morocco, Spanish, and Portuguese islands.

"France wants, and is able, to defend her territory herself. In case of necessity Spain must be helped in the defense of her islands."

No. 274

B19/B003834-36

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 1, 1940.

The Finnish Minister, who had made an urgent appointment with me today, began by saying that presumably I knew about his last

conversation with State Secretary von Weizsäcker on the Petsamo matter¹ and the so-called Veltjens agreement.² I replied that I knew about the conversation, but not the details of the agreement, since the Foreign Ministry had not participated in it.

The Minister then made the following statement, on the basis of a telegram that he had received from Helsinki:

"On October 30 the Finnish Minister in Moscow³ had a conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky. Vyshinsky referred therein to the statement of English Ambassador Cripps on the Petsamo concession. (M. Kivimäki believed that this referred to Cripps' statement of last July to the effect that England concurred in the transfer of the concession to Russia—a statement which in Kivimäki's opinion had since then proved to be a misunderstanding.) The Finnish Minister replied to Vyshinsky that: 1) the Canadian nickel company had categorically and in writing rejected a transfer of the concession; 2) the English Minister in Helsinki⁴ had stated to the Finnish Government that the English Government would not agree to a transfer of the concession; 3) the Finnish Government could therefore do nothing in this question and proposed instead a long-term agreement on nickel deliveries. Vyshinsky replied with the question whether Finland was, then, an English colony. The matter was serious; Finland had month after month postponed a definitive statement. If the reply of the Minister was the final answer of the Finnish Government, the Soviet Government would be compelled to take the appropriate measures. Vyshinsky added that he would wait another 2 or 3 days for the final reply. Deliveries and concessions were two different questions."⁵

M. Kivimäki thereupon repeated the request he had already expressed to Herr von Weizsäcker that the German Government now inform the Soviet Government in Moscow that in the event of a withdrawal of the concession of the Canadian nickel company Germany had a right of pre-emption on the concession. He added that the German option right was based on the fact that Germany had first laid claim to the concession as early as last May in the Schnurre negotiations and had subsequently concluded an express agreement (Veltjens agreement) with the Finnish Government. At this point M. Kivimäki read to me the text of the pertinent section of the Veltjens agreement, which he had copied in his notebook. He remarked that the Veltjens agreement had been concluded in accordance with the instructions of Reichsmarschall Göring. He, Kivimäki, had received the impression from a social conversation with Colonel Veltjens that in the opinion of the Reichsmarschall Finland should not

¹ See document No. 258 and footnote 1.

² See document No. 139.

³ Juho K. Paasikivi.

⁴ George Gordon Medlicott Vereker.

⁵ Paasikivi's telegram of Oct. 30 to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is printed as document No. 37 in *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941*, p. 73.

give the concession to Russia. In view of the seriousness of the situation M. Kivimäki asked whether he might receive a reply tomorrow.

I promised him that I would attend to the matter with the utmost dispatch.

In my memorandum of October 30 regarding the conversation between Weizsäcker and Kivimäki I made a proposal on page 3 for a reply to M. Kivimäki.⁶ I still consider this reply advisable, but after the sentence, "It seems to us that a sufficient reason would be that the Finnish Government cannot nullify the Canadian concession", I recommend the following addition:

Since the Canadian nickel company has categorically and in writing rejected a transfer of the concession and the English Government has likewise declared through its Minister in Helsinki that it is opposed to a transfer of the concession, the Finnish Government cannot modify its position because the British Ambassador made apparently informal statements to the contrary to the Soviet Government. Such statements by the English Ambassador in Moscow have not created any new situation in the relations between Finland and England that makes it possible for the Finnish Government to modify the position it has hitherto taken on the question in accordance with civil and constitutional law and political considerations.

Herewith to be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for instructions as to whether the Finnish Minister here may be given a reply of the foregoing content.⁷

WIEHL

⁶ Document No. 258.

⁷ In a subsequent memorandum of Nov. 5 (B19/B003845-46) Wiehl recorded learning that the Finns agreed on Nov. 1 to transfer the concession to a Russo-Finnish corporation, on the condition that the Soviet Government secure the consent of the British Government and of the Canadian company, and a renunciation by Germany of its claims. (Cf. document No. 38, *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941*, pp. 73-74.)

Wiehl considered that Kivimäki's request was therefore superseded. Germany should wait to see if the Soviet Government would apply to it for a renunciation.

No. 275

104/112629

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, November 2, 1940—12: 50 a. m.

No. 2310 of November 1

Received November 2—5: 50 p. m.

Also for State Secretary Landfried and Admiral Witzell.

At today's session ¹ Mikoyan vigorously demanded agreement re-

¹ See document No. 170 and footnote 3.

garding the 38-cm. turrets and the armor plate and made it the condition for any further concession by the Soviets in other important matters. Referring to the low prices for Soviet products, particularly grain, which are considerably below the prices obtained by the Soviet Union in other countries, Mikoyan demands agreement at the price of 85 million reichsmarks compared with the price of 90 million reichsmarks last demanded in Berlin. In the statements of Mikoyan, the displeasure of the Soviet Government was expressed at our no longer wanting to carry out the deliveries of war material promised in the economic agreements.² In the interest of the success of the negotiations here it will be necessary to dispel this distrust by a quick agreement regarding turrets and armor plate.³

Please send Schottky⁴ and Navy experts here as soon as possible so that final statements may be made on both issues.⁵

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

² See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 607.

³ See document No. 318.

⁴ Of the Ministry of Economics.

⁵ A draft reply signed by Walter (2097/453287) stated that Schottky was leaving for Moscow on Monday, but that it seemed inadvisable to send Navy experts until it was evident what technical details needed to be cleared up.

No. 276

182/85553

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1971 of November 1 BUCHAREST, November 2, 1940—1:45 a. m.
Received November 2—7:50 a. m.

I request that the most drastic action be taken to stop the highly undesirable invasion by representatives of German private industry seeking business. There are increasing reports that (one group garbled) of German industry are making their appearance in Rumanian firms and factories, indicating their interest and announcing that they will acquire them or participate in them. The instances of bad behavior show that plunderers with no standing have set out in order to make their fortunes in allegedly occupied Rumania. For political reasons I propose vigorous intervention by the Foreign Minister.

NEUBACHER
FABRICIUS

No. 277

104/112626

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, November 2, 1940—2:30 a. m.

No. 2313 of November 1

Received November 2—7:50 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to my telegram No. 2310.¹

In today's discussion between Schnurre and Mikoyan, Mikoyan complained in a tone of obvious annoyance that we were not willing to undertake the delivery of war material desired by the Soviet Government, yet we were delivering war material to Finland and other countries.

This is the first time that our deliveries of arms to Finland have been mentioned by the Soviets.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 275.

No. 278

368/207216

The Director of the Legal Department to Ambassador Abetz

Telegram

No. 1168

BERLIN, November 2, 1940—10:30 p. m.

To be submitted at once to the Ambassador in person.

With reference to your telegram No. 1049 of October 31.¹

In spite of the misgivings which you expressed, the Führer decided after the matter was presented to him by the Foreign Minister that the evacuation of the Lorrainers is to be carried out at once. The Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Armistice Commission is being informed of this at the same time.² You are authorized to inform the French Government in an unofficial and friendly manner that the operation is underway without, however, entering into any sort of negotiations with it on the subject. In doing so you can point out that the French themselves have made radio appeals inviting the people to return, and that the people to be resettled for their part wish voluntarily to return to France.³

GAUS

¹ Document No. 271.

² This information was transmitted to Wiesbaden by teletype on Nov. 2. The file copy is in the form of an unnumbered telegram (121/120125). Cf. document No. 282, footnote 1.

³ See, further, document No. 282.

No. 279

35/23097-98

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, November 2, 1940.

It would be a good idea, as I already told Minister Schmidt on the telephone yesterday, if we settled in our own minds even before November 5, what position Germany ought to take on the outcome of the elections in America. For we must anticipate that as soon as the definitive result of the presidential election is known, the eyes of the world will be turned on Germany above all, and that if we do not come out promptly with a clear-cut statement, enemy propaganda will claim that the Germans have been made speechless, that they are embarrassed over the outcome of the election, etc.

1. If Roosevelt is elected with a large majority, I would suggest we say that the outcome of the election was not surprising in view of the hysterical hate campaign and election propaganda. It was only to be hoped that the American people may not have to regret its choice later on as bitterly as it did Wilson's election in 1916, which despite the previously given promise regarding the United States' entry into the war, led to the killing and maiming of many American soldiers and the loss of billions of dollars. An especially interesting feature of the election contest had been that both candidates promised the electorate in solemn declarations that they would not lead America into the war, a fact which proved that the good sense of the American people abhorred entering into war in all circumstances. It now remained to be seen whether Roosevelt would keep this promise or whether, taking Wilson as his model, he would break his word and push his people into the war.

2. If Roosevelt is elected with only a bare majority, I suggest we should take the same position as under 1., with the addition, that the victory was won by only a narrow margin and that this indicated that the President had not, by any means, the vote of the entire people. This bare majority obviously quite clearly reflected the fact that the American people had no desire to be pushed into the war.

3. If the election, while ending in Roosevelt's victory, results in strengthening the Republican opposition in the House of Representatives and the Senate, this would be the fact to point out. I suggest we should say in that case that Germany was wondering, in view of the growing opposition in Congress, whether the President would be able henceforth to pursue his warmongering policy as he had in the past.

4. If Willkie is elected, I suggest we say that this outcome caused no surprise in Germany. The election proved the good sense of the

majority of the American people, who had definitely divorced themselves from the warmongering of Roosevelt and his followers (Morgenthau, Ickes, Jackson, Bullitt, etc.). Roosevelt bore a great measure of the responsibility for this war by reason of his meddling with European affairs; the disappearance of this troublemaker was a welcome development. For the rest, the German people were calmly waiting to see what political course the newly-elected President would take. Germany was ready to cooperate with any American Government that did not take a hostile position toward her.

DIECKHOFF

No. 280

2141/468335-36

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1978 of November 3

BUCHAREST, November 3, 1940.

Received November 3—12:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1593 of October 31.¹

Serious conference crisis. Just before today's plenary session, Sobolev told me that his instructions, received this morning in reply to the question suggested by me, were to the effect that he should insist on the creation of a Russo-Rumanian Danube administration as the sole international institution on the maritime Danube and to reject a retention of a four power commission (Germany, Italy, Rumania, Soviet Union).

In pursuance of his instructions, he proposed that the first three articles of the Soviet draft be discussed.² In order to exhaust all possibilities of reaching an accord, I read aloud a prepared statement regarding the status of the unofficial exchange of views, which is now being telegraphed separately.³ The Italian, who had previously declared himself in agreement with the text of the statement, and the Rumanian, briefly stated their assent.

In a further discussion held by the four leaders of the delegations and lasting over 3 hours, the attempt was made in vain to reach an agreement on the above procedure that would make possible the dissolution of the present European Danube Commission and the

¹ See document No. 249, footnote 5.

² For a published German text of the Soviet draft, see Peter, "Die Sowjet-Regierung und die Donaumündung Ende 1940," *Auswärtige Politik*, January-February 1944, pp. 26-27.

³ Transmitted in telegram No. 1979 of Nov. 3 (711/262198-200).

continuation of negotiations. Attempts are (one group garbled) being continued. The Russian is willing, to be sure, to have a short adjournment in order to request instructions once more; he has stated, however, that he did not think he would be authorized by the Soviet Government to participate in an agreement for dissolution of the European Danube Commission if there should be insistence in any form on retention of a four power conference and the mixed administration proposed by the Russians were not accepted as the basis of future negotiations. He had likewise received instructions to insist on acceptance of the Russian position on the question of warships.

Proposals for further handling of the matter will follow⁴ after another talk tomorrow.

MARTIUS
FABRICIUS

⁴ See document No. 283.

No. 281

182/85554

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT BUCHAREST, November 3, 1940—1:45 p. m.
No. 1983 of November 3 Received November 3—7:30 p. m.

Obstinate adherence of the Russians to their proposal in the maritime Danube commission (cf. today's telegram from Martius¹) shows that they:

1. want to push Germany away from the mouth of the Danube;
2. do not want to pursue a policy of reasonable understanding with Germany in the Danube and Black Sea area but at best one of blackmail. It is widely assumed here that the Russians are already firmly bound to our enemies; or, in any case, that they want to create political, perhaps not economic, difficulties for us in the Balkans. Concern among members of the Legion, who as Sima tells me are completely pro-German, is very great. Communist agitation is on the increase. Communists try to infiltrate the Legionnaire movement. The situation calls for attention.

FABRICIUS

¹ Document No. 280.

No. 282

368/207215

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

WIESBADEN-HWIX, November 3, 1940—4:20 p. m.
 No. 214 of November 3 Received November 3—4:45 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 284 of November 2¹ and to my telegram No. 212 of November 2.²

1. After having first consulted Gauleiter Bürckel, I today informed the representative of the French Foreign Ministry about the evacuation operation from Lorraine to France which will begin on November 4.³ As arranged with Gauleiter Bürckel I referred in this connection to the statements contained in his telegram of November 2 to General Stülpnagel (cf. telegram of November 2).

Counselor of Embassy de Saint Hardouin⁴ promised that he would notify his Government at once.⁵

2. Ambassador Abetz informs me by telephone that as early as yesterday he notified Count de Brinon unofficially of the impending evacuation operation, stating in this connection that the French delegation would receive official notice from the Armistice Commission.

HENCKE

¹ Presumably this is the same telegram as that referred to in document No. 278, footnote 2.

² This telegram transmitted to the Foreign Ministry the text of a telegram from Gauleiter Bürckel to General Stülpnagel stating that, "several tens of thousands of the population in Lorraine have opted for France, i.e., have requested to be permitted to emigrate to France." The operation was to begin Monday, Nov. 4. It was desirable that the French authorities be informed before these people arrived at the line of demarcation. (368/207210-11)

³ The date for the beginning of the operation was subsequently postponed to Nov. 11. See document No. 331.

⁴ Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. II, pp. 354-355.

⁵ Chairman of the Subcommission on Foreign Affairs of the French delegation in Wiesbaden.

⁶ Cf. the account of this conversation in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. II, pp. 319-321.

No. 233

2141/468352-53

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1986 of November 3 BUCHAREST, November 3, 1940—8:30 p. m.
Received November 4—12:30 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1985.¹

I. There is no longer any doubt that the cleverly directed Russian delegation has instructions to put through the Russo-Rumanian administration of the maritime Danube, without any German-Italian participation and with retention of Russian special privileges in the Kiliya arm, and to assure to Russian warships and military transports full freedom of movement in the purely Rumanian Sulina arm. Until these instructions are changed, all further negotiations must remain futile. On the other hand, dissolution of the present European Commission of the Danube, of which France and England are still members, cannot well be postponed.

II. The Rumanian Minister, Gafencu, sent a telegram from Moscow last evening reporting that the Russians are expecting Germany to yield (confidential communication from Pella²).

III. Possibilities for further procedure:

1. Representations in Moscow, in which case we run the danger of more evasions or other delays.

2. Recall of the delegation so that it may give an oral report. In this case a decision would have to be made as to whether or not the secretariat is to stay here.

3. After adjournment of the conference sine die, which could take place on Wednesday, a German-Italian, Italian-Rumanian special agreement on dissolution of the European Commission of the Danube, accompanied by an invitation to the Soviet Government to join. The draft for this, prepared with Pella and the Italians, will follow separately.³

The Russian reaction to this is certainly not to be ignored. I request telegraphic instructions.⁴

¹This earlier telegram of the same day reported the failure of attempts to break the deadlock in the Bucharest negotiations (2141/468354-55).

²Minister Pella, Rumanian delegate to the Danube conference.

³The French text of this draft was sent from Bucharest in telegram No. 1987 of Nov. 3 (711/262188-89), while a German version was sent later that day in telegram No. 1988 (711/262190-91).

⁴See document No. 288.

IV. The German Vice Consul and the Italian chief pilot on the Sulina [channel] yesterday delivered material on improper maintenance of the Sulina channel together with an explanation to the German and Italian delegations. Conversation between the German and Italian members of the present Engineers' committee with the Rumanian authorities is necessary. Arrival in Bucharest arranged for Tuesday evening. I request telegraphic instructions⁵ as to whether or not there will be objections to the trip to Sulina for the purpose of ascertaining conditions on the spot.

MARTIUS
FABRICIUS

⁵Not found.

[EDITORS' NOTE. The Commander of the 3d Armored Division, General Ritter von Thoma, who had been sent to Libya in connection with the possible dispatch of German armored units in support of the Italians (cf. document No. 199) reported to Hitler on November 3, 1940. The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (August 1–November 30, 1940), contains the following entry for November 4 regarding Hitler's reaction to the report.

"After the report of the Commander in Chief of the Army and of General Ritter von Thoma, the Führer decided not to do anything for the present about sending an armored unit to Libya. He came to this decision for the following reasons:

"1. The lack of readiness of the Italians, as reported by General Ritter von Thoma, to continue the offensive against Egypt, for which reason the Italian leadership also shows no inclination at all to use a German assault unit in Egypt.

"2. The unsatisfactory impressions which General Ritter von Thoma received of the Italian leadership at the headquarters of the Italian army group committed in Libya as well as at the Italian Tenth Army.

"3. The meager results of the previous battles in Egypt, the unfavorable prospects for continuing the offensive at increasing distance from the base, the difficulties of water supply in spite of the measures previously taken by the Italians in this regard, and the marked decrease in the efficiency of the motors of the vehicles employed in Libya and Egypt."]

No. 284

35/23107-08

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1940—4:18 [p. m. ?]

TOP SECRET

Received November 5—7:55 a. m.

No. 2384 of November 4

With reference to your telegram No. 1236 of October 30¹ and our telegram No. 2376 of November 2.²

The Irish-owned *New York Enquirer* published Sunday with big headlines on page 1 the text of Potocki's report on Roosevelt's preparations for America's entry into the war.³ This newspaper is the only New York Sunday evening paper. Yesterday's issue was brought out in a greatly enlarged edition of 250,000 copies. New York, which has the largest number of electors, holds a decisive role in the presidential election, and publication in New York on the eve of the election may therefore be regarded as especially effective.

The precautions taken in launching this item will, as far as is technically possible, ensure concealment of the [role of the] Embassy. This is all the more necessary because in the present situation the publisher of the newspaper and our go-betweens must be prepared, on account of the publication of the documents alone, to endure harassing interrogations and punitive measures. If in this connection the part played by the Embassy should be revealed in any way, such interference in American internal politics and direct personal attack by us on Roosevelt and his foreign policy, which this would prove, might furnish the desired occasion for rupture of diplomatic relations.

¹ Not found.

² In telegram No. 2376 of Nov. 2 (35/23096) Thomsen reported that he was arranging for publication, word for word, of Potocki's report (see footnote 3) in the *New York Enquirer*.

³ This was an alleged report of Mar. 7, 1939, from the Polish Ambassador in the United States, Count Jerzy Potocki, to his Government (5111/E295505-09). Ribbentrop had enclosed the document with a memorandum submitted to Hitler on Oct. 25. The text of the memorandum indicates that he had taken up the matter with Hitler even earlier. In the memorandum Ribbentrop informed Hitler of his plan to have the Polish document published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* (5111/E295504). It was published there on Oct. 28. The draft of a German press communiqué in connection with the publication of this document is also in the files (5111/E295510-12). Further documents on the background of the publication of the Potocki document are filmed on serial 5111.

See also vol. ix of this series, document No. 492.

In this context, I should report that when the American edition of the Bullitt documents⁴ was distributed, the persons publicly connected with it were watched and investigated by the American secret police, so that new intermediaries had to be employed this time.

Other leading isolationist newspapers, especially in the Middle West, which were also approached by intermediaries, turned down (group garbled) Potocki report for two reasons.

First, it would be unpatriotic and treasonable for Americans to use Nazi propaganda material and, besides, Potocki's report contained nothing new and nothing sensational in comparison with the Warsaw documents published some time ago. The Republican election committee [*republikanische Wahlkommittee*] likewise held on similar considerations that it could not make use of the report.

All materials here relating to this matter have been destroyed. Statement of expenses for this exchange of telegrams will follow.⁵

THOMSEN

⁴ See vol. IX of this series, documents Nos. 24, 26, and 31.

⁵ The words "exchange of telegrams" may be the result of an error in transmission. In telegram No. 2538 of Nov. 23 (84/62130) Thomsen reported expenses of \$7,000 for dissemination of the Potocki report. The Washington copy of this telegram was destroyed in the Embassy.

No. 285

3485/E019439

Ambassador Ritter to Ambassador Abetz

Telegram

Special Security Handling BERLIN, November 4, 1940—5:33 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received November 4—5:45 p. m.

No. 1177 of November 4

To be decoded by the Chief of Mission personally.

For Ambassador Abetz in person.

With reference to your telegram No. 1051 of November 1, 1940.¹

The Foreign Minister has instructed me to inform you, for the present only for your own information, that he himself intends to meet with Laval in the very near future for the purpose of continuing the conversation between the Führer and Pétain. Prior to this no one is to undertake separate conversations regarding the subjects for negotiation suggested by Laval on November 1, 1940. The High Command of the Wehrmacht and Minister Hemmen have been informed to the same effect.

¹ Document No. 272.

It is the purpose of the planned meeting to open the eyes of the French Government to the fact that the Reich Government is not going to accept one-sided conclusions in favor of France, such as Laval evidently has in mind. Any additional negotiations subsequent to this will then have to be arranged along general lines and not for the purpose of carrying out technically the Armistice Agreement; nor will they therefore be conducted by the Armistice Commission. Rather, the meeting between the Führer and Pétain is meant to usher in a new period in the relations between Germany and France, of the greatest significance for foreign policy; therefore the negotiations must remain in the hands of the Foreign Ministry, of course with the participation of the various military authorities concerned.²

RITTER

² On Nov. 8, Ritter told General Jodl that the date for the meeting between Ribbentrop and Laval was not yet set and that it might take place in 10 days or even later. On this occasion Ritter explained the Foreign Minister's position regarding negotiations with Laval, saying that the French must be told that "negotiations" were not involved, since "negotiations in the proper meaning of the term could be conducted only after a prior general political settlement [Klärung]." (368/207231)

No. 286

77/58183

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, November 4, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received November 4—9:45 p. m.

No. 3737 of November 4

With reference to my telegram No. 3735 of Nov. 4.¹

The fact that the Spanish Government did not inform either the Italian Ambassador² or me in advance of the incorporation of the Tangier Zone is probably due to a certain feeling which has spread here after Hendaye and has suggested to the Spanish Government that it should act independently in order to assure itself of "Tangier at least."

The incorporation of Tangier may lead to difficulties immediately, since, as the Naval Attaché reported by telegraph this morning,³ a damaged Italian submarine entered the harbor of Tangier last night.

STOHRER

¹ In this telegram (77/58182) Stohrer had sent the text of a decree by the Spanish Commander in Tangier announcing that he was taking over as Governor of the Tangier Zone. (Spanish forces had been in Tangier since June 14.)

² Francesco Lequio.

³ Not found.

No. 287

449/222887

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 817

BERLIN, November 4, 1940.

The Greek Minister, who called today on current business, again omitted to speak about the diplomatic relations between Greece and Germany. But he tried to give our conversation a personal note. He mentioned the strong sympathies Germany had gained in Greece during the last two decades and which were now in jeopardy. When Rangabé said he felt he knew where we Germans were with our hearts, I curtly told him that we stood with our allies, the Italians.

WEIZSÄCKER

[EDITORS' NOTE. On November 3 and part of November 4 Ciano visited Ribbentrop at Schönhof in the Sudetenland. No German record of their conversations has been found, but a memorandum by Ciano, dated November 4, is printed in his *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pages 608-611; English translation in Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London, 1948), pages 405-408. Ciano records that on this occasion Ribbentrop produced for signature the Secret German-Italian-Spanish Protocol (see document No. 221 and footnote 4). "At the actual moment of signing," Ciano noted, "I requested and obtained a modification of article 5, which I shall take the liberty of explaining verbally to the Duce. The document will be sent to Serrano by air so that the Spanish representative may add his signature."

The text of the Protocol, in the form modified by Ciano at Schönhof and translated back into German after 1943 (see document No. 221, footnote 4) is as follows:

SECRET PROTOCOL

HENDAYE, October 23, 1940.

The Italian, German, and Spanish Governments have agreed-as follows:

1. The exchange of views between the Führer of the German Reich and the Chief of the Spanish State, following conversations between the Duce and the Führer and among the Foreign Ministers of the three countries in Rome and Berlin, has clarified the present position of the three countries toward each other as well as the questions implicit in waging the war and affecting general policy.

2. Spain declares her readiness to accede to the Tripartite Pact concluded September 27, 1940, among Italy, Germany, and Japan and for this purpose to sign, on a date to be set by the four Powers jointly, an appropriate protocol regarding the actual accession.

3. By the present Protocol Spain declares her accession to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Italy and Germany and the related Secret Supplementary Protocol of May 22, 1939.

4. In fulfillment of her obligations as an ally, Spain will intervene in the present war of the Axis Powers against England after they have provided her with the military support necessary for her preparedness, at a time to be set by common agreement of the three Powers, taking into account military preparations to be decided upon. Germany will grant economic aid to Spain by supplying her with food and raw materials, so as to meet the needs of the Spanish people and the requirements of the war.

5. In addition to the reincorporation of Gibraltar into Spain the Axis Powers state that in principle they are ready to see to it, in accordance with a general settlement which is to be established in Africa and which must be put into effect in the peace treaties after the defeat of England—that Spain receives territories in Africa to the same extent as France can be compensated, by assigning to the latter other territories of equal value in Africa, but with German and Italian claims against France remaining unaffected. [Type-written footnote on the document at this point reads: "The original text reads: 'thus protecting any German claims to be made against France,' and was corrected as above by the hand of his Excellency Minister Ciano."]

6. The present Protocol shall be strictly secret, and those present undertake to preserve its strict secrecy, unless by common agreement they decide to publish it.

Done in three original texts in the Italian, German, and Spanish languages.

For the Italian
Government:
CIANO

For the German
Government:

For the Spanish
Government:

See also document No. 294.]

No. 288

2141/468343-46

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department
to the Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

No. 1623

BERLIN, November 5, 1940.
zu W XII 7029¹ Ang. 1.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1978,² 1979,³ 1983–1989.⁴

1) For Fabricius and Martius. For your personal information only.

¹ W XII 7029: Not found.

² Document No. 280.

³ *Ibid.*, footnote 3.

⁴ Telegram No. 1983: document No. 281; telegram No. 1984: not found; telegram No. 1985: see document No. 283, footnote 1; telegram No. 1986: document No. 283; telegrams Nos. 1987 and 1988: see document No. 283, footnote 3. Telegram No. 1989 of Nov. 3 (711/262187) was a commentary on the proposed draft for a special German-Italian-Rumanian agreement, reported in telegrams Nos. 1987 and 1988.

It is necessary to avoid an open conflict with the Soviet Government at the conference there and to continue the conference for the time being. Recall [of the delegation] for an oral report and adjournment of the conference is, therefore, not to be considered, still less a German-Italian-Rumanian special agreement.

2. For Martius.

Assuming that there is no objection to it there, please present the following to the Soviet representative, after having consulted the Italian delegate:

Germany, as a principal riparian country, can not let herself be excluded from a settlement for the Danube delta, which is what the Russian proposal would amount to, at least with respect to the temporary settlement. We can not believe that the Soviet Government intends to exclude Germany in such a manner, since according to its own proposal, Germany is to participate in the final settlement and there is no visible reason for treating Germany differently in the temporary and in the final settlement. We must leave it to the Soviet Government to amend its proposal in such a way as to take into account Germany's interest. While we do not want to prejudge such a supplement to the proposal, it would seem to us that a possible way out might be to have the functions of the European Danube Commission performed temporarily after its dissolution by a committee consisting of the members of the present conference and the remaining riparian countries. In the event that the Soviet Government should consider a solution of this kind, we would deem it advisable first to explore the idea at the present conference before the rest of the riparian countries are invited.

3. Please conduct the conversation in such a manner that, in any case, the Soviet representative will request new instructions regarding this suggestion; and then, please, avoid further talks with him and the other members [of the conference] on this issue until his reply has arrived so that the atmosphere of crisis may disappear, if that is possible.

4. At the same time, the Embassy in Rome will receive instructions to inform the Italian Government of number 2 above and to see to it that its own representative there receives immediately similar instructions with respect to an Italian participation in a temporary settlement.⁵

5. As for the Russian demand concerning warships and also transports of arms and ammunition, we agree, for the time being, with

⁵ Such instructions were sent to Rome with telegram No. 1582 of Nov. 4 (711/262181).

the position which you took there according to telegram No. 1966,⁶ namely, that this a political and military question, not within the jurisdiction of the present conference which is limited to questions of navigation. Please report by wire,⁷ however, as to what the situation has been heretofore with respect to warships and the transports mentioned, since this can not be established here in a reliable manner. Further instructions will then follow.

6. With reference to your telegram No. 1984, Director of Waterways, Plate, is leaving by train Tuesday.

WIEHL

⁶In this telegram of Nov. 2, the Legation in Bucharest discussed sections of the Soviet draft which proposed that transports of arms and ammunition on the maritime Danube should be subject to joint Russo-Rumanian approval (2141/468337-38).

⁷Bucharest telegram No. 2004, sent on Nov. 5 in reply to this question stated that up to the cession of Bessarabia, foreign warships navigating the maritime Danube needed permission from the Rumanian Government (2141/468358).

No. 289

77/58185

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain

Draft Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, November 5, 1940.
zu Pol. III 3348 g.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 3659 of October 27.²

Please inform the brother of the Caliph³ in an appropriate manner that his trip to Berlin would be inadvisable at the moment. You may tell him further as your personal opinion that it is in the very best interest of the Moroccans themselves to keep peace. Attempts at a revolt would only lead to unnecessary bloodshed and be suppressed by force of arms. The future of Morocco could only be compromised thereby.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. III 3348 g. : Not found.

² Not found.

³ Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 135 and footnote 2.

No. 290

2141/468359-60

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, November 5, 1940.

The Rumanian Minister, Valer Pop, called on me today and, acting on instructions, referred to the difficulties that have arisen in con-

nection with the Danube negotiations in Bucharest. The Soviet Russian proposal to place the present functions of the European Danube Commission and further additional functions exclusively in the hands of the Soviet Union and Rumania, seemed to the Rumanian Government completely unacceptable, even though the Russians called this solution only a temporary one. In view of the relative strength of the Soviet Union and Rumania, not a condominium but Russian predominance at the Danube estuaries would be involved. Rumania was endeavoring to cooperate with the friendly Powers, Germany and Italy, and did not wish to submit to a unilateral Soviet Russian control in this matter either.

I told M. Pop that we were of the opinion that this question should be treated in Bucharest not as a great political problem, but rather as a technical one, and that it should not be dramatized. We agreed with the Rumanian Government in the matter and had also given Minister Martius instructions accordingly.¹

M. Pop further termed the Soviet Russian demand to the effect that Russian warships should have free entry into the branches of the Danube which are situated in Rumanian territory and into the Sulina channel unacceptable. I said on this point that we were still examining the legal aspects of this matter. M. Pop explained these as follows: There was no regulation of this issue in the Statute of the European Danube Commission. This had at all times been interpreted to mean that foreign warships had no right of entry. Accordingly the practice here had been: Foreign warships had never entered. In the Belgrade agreement of the riparian states of April 1940,² this existing practice had been expressly made the subject of an agreement.

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 288.

² A conference on Danube questions took place in Belgrade Apr. 19-22, 1940. A memorandum by Martius, dated Apr. 23 on the results of this conference is in the files (2141/468211-19).

No. 291

612/249371-70

*The Consul General at Milan, Temporarily at Bolzano, to the
Foreign Minister*

CONFIDENTIAL

D Kult 5 S Bozen-3825

BOLZANO, November 5, 1940.

Pol. IV 3718.

Subject: Impressions of the situation in the South Tirol.

It may be stated without reservation that the situation in the last few months has quite generally deteriorated, both as concerns the

morale of the migrants and the work itself. The principal causes of the change are as follows:

1. It has thus far not been possible for German officials to announce a new area for settlement. The population has naturally heard that Burgundy has been selected;¹ they also know that the region has been inspected by prominent South Tirolese, but they do not know where they stand because there has been no official word on the subject and also no measures have been taken here in preparation for the resettlement. As we know, rumors of possible areas for resettlement have several times in the past occupied the minds of the South Tirolese. About a year ago the Beskids and the Warthe Gau were the talk of the day and were considered, so to speak, as definitely in prospect, but then they did not materialize after all as areas of resettlement. For a while it was said that Alsace was being considered for the South Tirolese; then it was Burgundy, and for a time also Western Switzerland. The people themselves would have been very pleased with the area of Burgundy. As is said, however, they are groping in the dark. One naturally cannot explain to every individual that, in view of the momentary state of affairs and policy, there is no possibility of speaking publicly of Burgundy as a new area of settlement. It would be desirable if this were possible in the immediate future or if some other opportunity could be found to designate Burgundy to the South Tirolese unofficially or semiofficially, so to speak, as a future area of settlement.

There is great insecurity noticeable in the country, and on the basis of this insecurity the opportunity is created for all possible rumors, which are circulated by the Italian officials and the "stay-putters." The churches, too, do their part in increasing the uncertainty and sowing all manner of doubt in the hearts of the South Tirolese. Prayers are offered up in the churches for the enlightenment of the people. More people join the processions than formerly. In every tavern and everywhere else where people congregate, there is talk. Everywhere doubts are expressed and foolish statements made. The reports that come in from South Tirolese who have already migrated, are also in part not such as to stimulate the desire to migrate.

For the last few days the rumor has been circulating that Burgundy has been dropped as a possible area of settlement, because it does not fit into the special peace treaty soon to be concluded between

¹ Burgundy was advocated by Himmler's principal executive officer for the resettlement of the Volksdeutsche, SS-Obergruppenführer Ulrich Greifelt, Chief of the Staff Main Office of the RKFDV. His memorandum of July 10, "Ideas regarding resettlement of the South Tirolese national group in a compact area of settlement," is found in the Himmler files, EAP 161-b-12/172, filmed by the joint microfilm project of the American Historical Association and the General Services Administration, T-175, roll 53, frames 2, 566, 711-719.

France and the Axis Powers. As a result of this rumor the insecurity of the migrants has again increased.

Counterpropaganda, which is still rife, cleverly exploits all these circumstances. Leaflets are distributed throughout the country, more clever in form and content, to be sure, than those distributed during the period of the option,² and more effective because they are more purposeful.

The Prefect³ is also taking advantage of the situation in that, on the visits that he makes to the various villages and which, as a new Prefect, he naturally must make, he speaks to the South Tirolese who have opted for Italy and paints the future in very rosy colors. The treatment of the "stay-putters" by the Italians is at present very courteous, and so it is no wonder that these simple people, who have such strong love for their native region as do the South Tirolese farmers, reason with themselves that there is no sense in migrating if everything is going to be as nice in the future as the Prefect paints it to the "stay-putters." Pains are also taken then in devious ways to nourish the doubts that beset other farmers and other South Tirolese, also, up to the point where the people petition the Italian authorities or their assistants and ask that their options for Germany be canceled. The Prefect told me recently of approximately 50,000 petitions of this kind. This is naturally greatly exaggerated, but it is entirely possible that some thousands of such petitions will in time be submitted to the Italians.

Since it is clear to every one familiar with the conditions here that after the departure of the farmers the economic decline of the South Tirol is certain, the Italians have been intent from the start on inducing the farmers to opt for Italy, with the result that the farmers who despised the Prefect, Mastromattei, and believed none of his words, for the most part opted for Germany. The present Prefect is much too clever and practical a man not to foresee the bad economic future of the South Tirol after the departure of the volksdeutsch farmers. Consequently the present mood of the optants for Germany is not distasteful to him, and he is exploiting it very cleverly and impeccably, for no one can prevent him from traveling around and becoming acquainted with his province. I have the impression that the Prefect is collecting as many applications for change of option, particularly from farmers, as possible (he himself recently said that he is doing so), in order to be able one day to say to the Duce:

"Here are applications from approximately x South Tirolese who prefer to stay. They opted for Germany at the time because of strong propaganda emanating from volksdeutsch groups,

² Regarding the option see vol. VIII of this series, document No. 382, footnote 5.

³ Agostino Podestà.

probably partly, also, in the belief that it was only a matter of declaring themselves Germans and that migration as such would never become a fact. What these people really mean is that they do not wish to leave their homes, and consequently it is desirable to enable these people to remain here by canceling their options for Germany."

If the Italians understandably give no outward indication of these intentions and repeatedly stress the fact that a re-option will not be possible, too much importance should not be attached to this statement by any one familiar with the Italian mentality. The best example of the Italian attitude, however, is the fact that the former Prefect never intended to carry out the "radical ethnic solution" desired by the Führer and Duce, although he naturally gave it official recognition. The former Prefect, as we know, on the day immediately following the signing of the various agreements, simply ignored the text and the spirit of these agreements and tried to induce as many South Tirolese as possible to remain. The present Prefect is also indirectly or directly putting pressure on the South Tirolese farmers who declared themselves for Germany, more cleverly, to be sure, than his predecessor, so that it is hard to reproach him with anything. To the Italians the South Tirol is and remains a problem—principally an economic and military matter. If it were possible, so to speak, to deliver the South Tirolese over to Germany naked at the Brenner, it would probably be easier to be more generous than at present. They would like best, even today, to get rid of only the disagreeable elements as cheaply as possible, but at the same time to hold on to the farmers as a whole if possible, in order later to trample on all of them.

This unofficial attitude of the Italians which deviates so radically from the idea underlying the entire resettlement is the second reason for the unrest and uncertainty existing in the South Tirol today.

Everything possible is being done by the leaders of the national group to counteract the low morale and offset the counterpropaganda. It is necessary, however, to proceed very cautiously, because freedom of movement in this direction is restricted. It would be best if a beginning could soon be made of moving the propertied people or at any rate if plans could be made for them in the new settlement area. Thus far some 60,000 persons have migrated to Germany, including some 6,000 who enlisted in the Army, 27 of whom have fallen. By far the greater number of these migrants owned no real property here so that their migration could ensue without difficulties.

There is a change to be noted in the attitude of the Prefect. He no longer makes the fresh and vigorous impression that he did formerly; he is no longer full of plans and ideas for expediting and facilitating the migration; he is also no longer so ready to help in individual cases. His whole appearance conveys an impression of

fatigue and dejection, so that I have the impression that he has been curbed by the elements around Senator Tolomei (the rabid anti-German and hater of all South Tirolese), who were opposed to his former attitude. The reason is perhaps to be found also in a certain annoyance over the fact that his ideas have got him nowhere and that he has not been able to report to the Duce the great achievements he had in mind in the matter of the migration, when he came here. In the long discussions that I had with him, he repeatedly stated that he foresaw difficulties with the entire migratory operation in the ensuing period. He also stated in one of the talks that with all his proposals and ideas he was coming up against a stone wall. Many a time he did not know where he was, because so many agencies had something to say in the matter of the resettlement. He did not explain whether he meant by this the German or the Italian agencies. I tried to make it clear to him that the war must naturally be prejudicial to the migration and that the South Tirol, by and large, was not as important as it appeared to be locally, and that first of all it was important for Germany and Italy to win the war. He admitted this, but remained troubled—this may have been in part a pose—but the Prefect would like to see things speeded up. What the relations are today between the Prefect and Under State Secretary Buffarini⁴ I am unable to state from personal observation, since I have not seen the two persons together. But they may very well act in mutual agreement.

On one occasion the Prefect also told me what he had observed the sentiment in the country to be. His observations coincide in general with what I have said on the subject above.

In the circumstances, it is neither in the German nor the Italian interest, nor in the interest of the migrants themselves that the resettlement should be protracted until 1942. I am of the opinion that as soon as an area of settlement can be decided upon, the question will arise as to how the resettlement can be expedited and effected as smoothly as possible, and then the German authorities have to be prepared. As to the technical execution of this expedited resettlement, I adhere to the view I previously expressed, that this is more a General Staff function, which should properly be left to men who have accumulated a large store of experience in the war.

Then one must also be prepared for the economic phase. On my brief visit 2 months ago I therefore gave orders that a census of the assets of all migrants should be ready by December 31, 1940. (See my report of July 1940⁵.) This work is in full progress.

⁴ Guido Buffarini-Guidi, Under State Secretary in the Italian Ministry of the Interior.

⁵ Not found.

There is also the appraisal of assets for the cases heretofore proposed by the ADEuRST (Amtliche Deutsche Ein- und Rückwanderstelle) [Official German Agency for Immigrants and Repatriates]. Thus far about 500 cases have been definitively decided and settled, with a total valuation of approximately 26 million lire. For some 2,500 cases the estimates were submitted by the migrants themselves. They are at present being processed by the German-Italian subcommittees. The work in these subcommittees is very difficult and tedious. The Italians are very petty and squabble about the value of each square meter of ground.

It has not as yet been possible to carry out everywhere the object of establishing unit or standard prices for all immovable assets for the sake of expedition, because here, too, the Italians show a sort of passive resistance. The Prefect is pressing hard and tries to make the German commissions appear in the wrong, and if one examines the matter objectively, one can note that the disposition of the approximately 2,500 cases in the subcommittees is really proceeding slowly, but only because of all the Italian haggling.

I do not consider it at present to be in the German interest for very many appraisals to be made by the property owners, since the Italians then require them to leave, while at present no migration opportunities exist for these owners.

Aside from the cases being processed and already disposed of, approximately 4,000 owners have been asked to turn in their own appraisals and are at present working on them. It naturally takes a good deal of time to compile these estimates since the asset values must be given as specifically as possible.

By the end of this year, however, these additional 4,000 estimates or so will be in the subcommittees for processing.

The tempo of the assessment work is at present still slow, for the filling out of the DUT (Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft) [German Resettlement Trust Company] forms, considered urgent by all concerned because of the plans for the assignments to new settlement areas, which are to be based on them, is at present a priority matter for us. Should there not in the course of time be an over-all settlement of accounts, it will naturally be necessary to expedite in some form or other the liquidation procedure now prescribed.

It was clear from the outset, indeed, that the application of the appraisal procedure in accordance with the established directives, etc., would be very tedious. Since we had no experience in this field, however, and did not want to protract endlessly the negotiations with the Italians, we finally put into force the present agreements and directives and administrative provisions, with the object of deriving from practice the experience necessary for suggestions for expedition.

The property owners concerned are, I understand, entirely satisfied with the results of the approximately 500 valuations made to date.*

BENE

* For further documents on the South Tirol, see vol. XIII of this series.

No. 292

35/23115-17

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1940—12:32 a. m.

No. 2397 of November 5

Received November 6—1:30 p. m.

I. Roosevelt's re-election for a third term of office took place under circumstances which have for the present seriously impaired his authority and prestige with respect to the American people.

While in 1936 Roosevelt was re-elected with a lead of 11 million votes, he has come out of the final round of the election campaign as winner with only a small, as yet undetermined, majority. This proves that his claim to leadership has been challenged and that in taking any important decision on domestic and foreign policy he will henceforth have to give more consideration to the opinion of the opposition, especially in Congress, than he had to in the past.

The fact alone that contrary to his expectation Roosevelt had to fight hard to win and in order to accomplish this had to accommodate himself to giving explanations of his policies and solemn assurances that he will conduct the foreign policy in a prudent manner, proves that the assumptions which he thought he could rely on in entering the election campaign, are no longer absolutely true.

A major factor contributing to this was the fact that his election tactic of representing America in an alarmist manner as being under the imminent threat of war has proved a dangerous boomerang; while Roosevelt sought to blame the totalitarian powers for this threat, Willkie and the Republicans turned the tables on Roosevelt and placed upon him and his methods the responsibility for the danger of war.

Roosevelt's foreign policy thus became in the last stages of the election campaign the target of attacks of the opposition party to such a degree that his attempts at appeasement failed to prevent the desertion of sizable blocs of voters.

The Senate majority remains Democratic after the election, it is true, but it includes many Democrats who are among the most determined opponents of Roosevelt's foreign policy, and the House of Representatives, while not achieving a Republican majority, has nevertheless received a sizable increase in Republican votes.

II. From the standpoint of domestic politics, neither the opposition to a third term of office nor that to the New Deal proved sufficient to prevent Roosevelt's re-election. Nevertheless, the closeness of the election returns shows, however, that the nation is not completely convinced of Roosevelt's inviolability and of the benefits derived from his experience. The fact that the Republicans, at the last hour, as it were, nominated an opposing candidate who is Roosevelt's equal, has likewise contributed to undermining his popularity. Be that as it may, we must look forward to another 4 years of Roosevelt's pump-priming program and a spending economy swollen by armaments expenditures. There is a possibility of a Cabinet change (resignation of Hull and Stimson), but otherwise the American domestic political picture will not change.

III. From the standpoint of the foreign policy it would be erroneous to assume that Roosevelt, having been freed from all restraints, will now strive for America's immediate active participation in the war. He is too well aware of the limitations of America's armaments and capabilities for fighting on two fronts to do that. Through his re-election he has attained the goal which is the most important for him, namely, to retain power, especially to conduct foreign policy. As to the whole American people's determination to come to the aid of England with all means, there can be no doubt; this was clearly expressed in the course of the election campaign. There are differences in emphasis inasmuch as the Willkie followers give priority to defensive preparations and reject active participation in the war, while the Roosevelt party is prepared to supply England even at the expense of America's own armament and possibly by putting that armament to use. For the time being, however, it is in England's as well as Roosevelt's interest not to change the existing state of affairs and to avoid creating an entirely new and unpredictable situation by declaring war on Germany (or Japan).

Roosevelt is going to conduct his foreign policy as before, within the framework of his preconceived notions and in response to the actualities of the moment. In his pledges and declarations, formulated with extraordinary caution during the election campaign, he guarded against prejudicing himself and kept all doors open for autocratic decisions. He counts now as before on the easily excitable character of the American people, an instrument on which no one can play as well as he. The supreme law of his actions—and we shall have to adapt ourselves to that during the coming 4 years—is his irreconcilable hostility to the totalitarian powers. His supreme goal is to play a decisive part in forcing these powers to their knees or, in the event that the last bulwark of democracy in Europe is overrun, to take up the fight and continue it in some form from America.

No. 293

B19/B003849

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, November 6, 1940—10:40 p. m.

SECRET

Received November 7—1:15 a. m.

No. 1638 of November 6

With reference to report V.S.A. 127 of November 2 and telegram No. 1629 of November 5.¹

In referring to the journey of the Swedish Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Bagge, who went to Helsinki on the 6th of this month to represent the Swedish Government at the "Swedish Day," the head of the political division in the Foreign Ministry, Söderblom, explained to Counselor of Legation Dankwort that the planning of closer collaboration between Sweden and Finland with the aim of consolidating the Finnish position was a natural and permanent theme of Swedish foreign policy. Nevertheless, one could not at present speak of concrete agreements. Indeed, such things were scarcely opportune in view of the Finnish-Russian peace terms.

For my part, I have desisted so far from speaking to the Foreign Minister about this matter, in order to avoid any possible interpretation of such an inquiry as being, perhaps, a German warning.²

WIED

¹ Neither found.

² In telegram No. 1276 of Nov. 7 (B19/B003850), Woermann sent the following instructions to the Legation in Sweden: "The Foreign Minister requests you to keep entirely aloof for the time being from all plans for a Finnish-Swedish rapprochement."

No. 294

F18/243-46

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

No. 1926

BERLIN, November 6, 1940.

RAM 314.

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.

I am forwarding to you by special courier, due to arrive in Madrid on November 9, the German-Italian-Spanish protocol in triplicate, which was signed by me and Count Ciano while on a hunting trip.¹

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 466.

I request that you transmit it to Señor Serrano Suñer so that he may likewise execute it in triplicate. To assure, as agreed, that the execution of the document is kept highly secret and that the documents themselves are kept out of the usual channels, I request you to handle this through a personal visit to Serrano Suñer and to ask him to execute the documents as soon as possible—preferably in your presence. Will you then please send Germany's and Italy's copies to Germany by the same courier.² Spain's copy is to remain in the hands of Serrano Suñer. Further, tell Señor Serrano Suñer that you are expecting shortly to receive from me further information regarding proposals for the furtherance of the matters agreed upon in the protocol.

Will you also please on this occasion tell Señor Serrano Suñer that I desire to inform him of the course and results of our conversations with the French statesmen.³ The Führer has explained the situation clearly to Marshal Pétain, pointing out that France has lost the war and has to pay for it. On the other hand, France has an opportunity to ease her lot by adopting a clear-cut attitude of cooperation with the two Axis Powers during the final conquest of England. Marshal Pétain as well as Vice President Laval have declared themselves in agreement with this principle. During the conversations in France, it was agreed that the elaboration in detail of France's stand against England was to be reserved for further conversations. The discussions in France concerning Africa and all other matters were naturally kept within the framework of the German-Italian-Spanish agreement of Hendaye.

RIBBENTROP

² In telegram No. 3323 of Nov. 11 (F18/247), Stohrer reported that Serrano Suñer had signed the three copies, and that the copies for Germany and Italy were being sent back by special courier.

³ See documents Nos. 212 and 227.

No. 295

585/242760-61

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 744

BERLIN, November 6, 1940.

e. o. Pol. I 1269 g. Rs.

1. For your information. English military aircraft are reported to have landed on the airfield on the island of Lemnos. It must be

feared that from that base or subsequently also from other Greek airfields air attacks will be made on the Rumanian oil field region, which will involve flying over Bulgarian territory and violation of Bulgarian sovereignty. The defense against such air attacks, if they should materialize, could no longer be adequately served by the air raid warning system already established along the Rumanian-Bulgarian frontier. Rather, it will be necessary to establish such a system inside Bulgaria, along the Bulgarian-Greek frontier. We intend therefore to send members of the German Wehrmacht trained as specialists in this activity.¹ According to preliminary estimates this will require about 200 officers and men. Every possibility for camouflaging these members of the German Wehrmacht in collaboration with the Bulgarian Air Force must of course be employed.

2. The Legation is directed, in accord with the High Command of the Wehrmacht, to communicate this in suitable form to the Bulgarian Government and secure its consent and cooperation. The matter, it goes without saying, must not be given the build-up of a significant political event, but should be treated as a military-technical matter devoid of any political significance. It is therefore advisable that the talks at your end be conducted not by the Minister himself with the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, but confidentially by the Air Attaché² with the responsible Bulgarian military authorities. In so doing it is necessary to emphasize that the practical execution of the operation is to be carried through in close accord and cooperation with the Bulgarian Air Force. Although the talks may be left to your Air Attaché, the handling and reporting of the matter should rest with the Legation.

3. You are further advised, for information purposes only, that the chief of the Bulgarian counterintelligence service, Colonel Georgiev, who happens to be here, was approached in this matter by the High Command of the Wehrmacht; it was suggested to him that Bulgaria, in her own interest and to maintain her neutrality, must see to it that English planes do not fly over her territory, and that she ought to take the necessary measures to that end.

4. Please send immediately a telegraphic report by the Legation.³

RITTER

¹ See document No. 323.

² Lieutenant Colonel von Schoenebeck.

³ See document No. 345.

No. 296

2281/481616-17

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2005 of November 6

ROME, November 6, 1940.

With reference to my telegram No. 1785 of October 2.¹

The Foreign Ministry today handed me a memorandum informing me of the result of the communications which the Italian Minister in Baghdad addressed to the Minister President of Iraq, to the effect that the Reich Government agreed to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq and expected a concrete proposal of the Iraq Government. The text [of the memorandum] in German translation reads as follows: ²

"The Italian Minister in Baghdad reports that he transmitted to the Minister President confidentially the communication regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations between Germany and Iraq.

"The Minister President of Iraq had replied to the Minister that he was prepared to submit to the Parliament the proposal for resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany. He added, however, the following: In order to be able to counter the inevitable resistance of the British Embassy in Baghdad and to overcome the difficulties which Nuri as-Said and his supporters were expected to raise, it was necessary for him to set his country at rest about the guidelines of German policy with regard to the future political shape of the Arab nations in the Near East. This would certainly contribute also to giving support to his own political position and to strengthening the attitude of his Government, the orientation of which was anti-British in all circumstances.

"The telegram of the Italian Minister in Baghdad was dispatched before the statement of the Reich Government about its position regarding the aspirations of the Arab countries for independence had been issued over the radio.³

End of the Italian memorandum."

Since the issuing of the statement mentioned above, the Italian Foreign Ministry has received no other report from its Minister in Baghdad about the question of a resumption of German-Iraq diplomatic relations.⁴

MACKENSEN

¹ Document No. 143.

² An Italian text is filmed on 2281/481618.

³ See document No. 190, footnote 4.

⁴ In telegram No. 1633 of Nov. 9 (2281/481619), Woermann instructed the Embassy in Rome to inform the Italian Government that Germany would welcome it if the Italian Minister in Baghdad would again approach the Minister President regarding a resumption of diplomatic relations, now that the German statement with respect to the Arabs had been issued over the radio and in Ankara. In telegram No. 2054 of Nov. 11 (2281/481620), Bismarck reported that he had carried out these instructions and that he was promised at the Italian Foreign Ministry that the Italian Minister in Baghdad would receive telegraphic instructions at once to approach the Iraq Minister President in that matter.

No. 297

265/172474-75

*Note by the Ambassador to Turkey*BERLIN (temporarily),¹ November 6, 1940.

NOTE

The Turkish Ambassador² had invited me to lunch with him today and afterwards drew me into an exhaustive discussion of the situation. It was evident from his statements that he had noted with great satisfaction the publication of part of the speech of the State President³ and of his own address in the German press and that he tried to interpret this as expressing a desire on the part of the German Government to bring about a gradual improvement in German-Turkish relations. He seemed to consider the present moment in particular as highly favorable for making a new attempt on both sides to bring about a fundamental change in the relationship. For that purpose he would go to Ankara in about a week and discuss the situation with the State President. It would be of the utmost value to him if he could be given an authoritative statement from the Führer for the State President—a statement designed to dissipate much of the distrust that still existed. In reply to my question whether Turkey could not make up her mind to cooperate in the creation of the new Europe, or at least to follow the work of the Axis Powers objectively and sympathetically, M. Gerede said that he thought the time for this would arrive as soon as the intentions of the Axis Powers were more clearly defined and the role which Turkey was to play could be discerned. Whereas the German views were largely in accordance with the Turkish point of view, voices had been heard from Italy proclaiming this principle: The small nations (and Turkey considered herself one of them) would in the future no longer be able to lead lives of their own.

The Ambassador also brought up the Syrian question and expressed his great satisfaction with the statement of the German Government, which supported the aspirations of the Arab states in the Near East for independence.⁴ It was absolutely necessary, M. Gerede believed, to cooperate along that line. When I interposed the remark that the obligation toward England under the alliance might possibly make the gentlemen in Ankara feel that it would not be permissible to cooperate with us in the Arab question, M. Gerede said that "if it cannot be done openly, it must definitely be done in secret."

¹ See document No. 254 and footnote 4.

² Hüsrev R. Gerede.

³ A foreign policy address delivered at the opening of the Turkish National Assembly. The most important parts of this address dealing with foreign policy were reported in telegram No. 876 of Nov. 2 from Ankara (265/172459-60).

⁴ See document No. 190.

From the statements of the Ambassador I received the impression that he was encouraged by Ankara to initiate some step toward improving our relations.

PAPEN

No. 298

F10/429-40

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division X

SECRET

BERLIN, November 6, 1940.

THE TERRITORIAL DEMANDS ON FRANCE REGARDING COLONIES WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TOTAL DEMANDS

I

The demand to be made of France for the return of the old German colonial possessions and for cession of additional colonial territory is only part of a total demand to be made, in addition, of Great Britain, of three of her dominions (South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand) and of Belgium, the enemy states in the present war. The territorial demands on France can be definitely formulated only when it will be possible to see what additional areas can be demanded from Great Britain in particular. Nevertheless, a part of the colonial demands to be made of France can be formulated even at this time.

Temporary
character of the
proposals.

II

The German demand made of the present enemy states in the first place is in principle for the return of the old German colonial possessions and is therefore addressed

Former German
possessions.

to:
France

Belgium
Great Britain

Australia

New Zealand
Great Britain, Australia,
New Zealand, jointly
Union of South Africa

for the return of:
East Togo, East and South Cameroons,
and New Cameroon, which was separated by treaty in 1911 and then re-annexed on the basis of article 125 of the Versailles Treaty
Ruanda-Urundi (German East Africa)
West Togo, West Cameroon, German East Africa (with the exception of Ruanda-Urundi)
The German South Sea possessions south of the Equator (with the exception of Samoa and Nauru)
Samoa
Nauru.
South-West Africa.

In addition, there are German claims against Japan on account of the German South Sea possessions north of the Equator and against Portugal on account of the annexation of the small Kionga triangle (East Africa). These claims can be settled by an understanding with the two countries.

Whether the old German possessions in the South Seas are to be retained after having been returned is a matter to be dealt with in accordance with predominantly political and strategic viewpoints.

Since there is no intention of acquiring French colonial territory outside Africa, the following statements are limited to the African Continent, where additional colonial space is primarily to be looked for.

South-West Africa will best be handled separately in connection with the settlement of our future relations with the Union of South Africa, and will therefore not be mentioned in the following statements.

III

In formulating the territorial colonial claims the point of departure must be the necessity of supplying, following the establishment of the new order in Europe, from the supplementary colonial area [*Kolonialen Ergänzungsraum*] a territory comprising besides the Greater German Reich also Scandinavia, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Hungary, Slovakia, and other European areas. These countries will be incorporated in or affiliated with the Greater European economic sphere and will have to orient their economies in accordance with the German economy. They will therefore be permitted to lay claim to being supplied with colonial products from a colonial area under German leadership. On the other hand, economic planning in the German colonies will have to take account of the needs of about 150 million persons.

The final objective to be aimed at is to bring as large a part of the available colonial area in Africa as possible under German influence in such a manner that in a joint effort with the other colonial powers it will be possible to explore, cultivate, and exploit in a unified way all the economic possibilities of the African Continent for the benefit of all of Europe; particular attention will be paid to making sure of Greater Germany's own needs.

A prerequisite for attaining this objective is the acquisition of a sufficiently large German area in Central Africa, as compact as possible, within which can be instituted a large-scale German effort to open up the area, with appropriate care being taken of the native population; this is bound to point the way to the neighboring areas

Ultimate objective: providing for 150 million people; a compact colonial empire in Central Africa.

and induce them even without compulsion to participate in the joint opening up of the African Continent and to cooperate in an over-all program.

IV

Some parts of the area which we seek fall to us as it is, on the basis of our original claim to the return of our old colonies: the Cameroons,

Key position: German East Africa, and Togo are the areas around
Belgian Congo. which the new German colonial possessions must be grouped.

The natural connection between the Cameroons and East Africa is the Belgian Congo. No matter what may be Belgium's future form of government, it is indispensable that the Belgian Congo be taken under German control in its entirety. This area of 2.3 million square kilometers which, though thinly populated, is richly endowed by nature with mineral resources, valuable stands of timber, natural transportation routes (rivers), and sources of energy (water power), will have a key position in any large-scale planning for Central Africa. Its rich mineral deposits can satisfy an essential portion of German requirements: Germany's requirements in copper amount to about 300,000 tons annually; Katanga has at present a capacity of 200,000 tons, which can be increased to 300,000 tons. In the Belgian Congo is located the largest deposit of industrial diamonds in the world. Heretofore Germany has had to dispense almost entirely with the use of diamonds in the working of hard steel, for reasons of foreign exchange. Germany's requirements of tin amount to about 12,000 tons annually. The tin reserves so far discovered in the Belgian Congo (with Ruanda-Urundi) amount to 300,000 tons. Germany needs cobalt urgently as a catalyst for synthetic oil production by the Fischer drop method and for the manufacture of extra-strong (i.e., light) magnets. Forty percent of the world's production of this metal comes from the Belgian Congo, which supplies about 1,700 tons. Moreover, in the Belgian Congo there are also found iron ore, high-grade manganese ore, rich radium ore, and gold. In addition to this mineral wealth there is the abundance of water power, which will be of great economic importance in the future in the production of electricity. The timber supply in the Belgian Congo will be valuable for supplying the German economy with wood, the abundant stocks of oil palms can help to close the gap in our fat supplies, and it is possible to increase the cultivation of cotton.

Moreover, through the acquisition of the Belgian Congo the Navy would gain possession of the harbor of Boma which it desires as a base.

V

Not only the southeastern part of the Cameroons belongs to the geographic Congo basin, but also the greater part of French Equatorial Africa, which forms in the north the natural hinterland of our old colony, the Cameroons, and in the southern districts of which there extends the Cameroon belt of primeval forest, with its gigantic stands of valuable woods of the most varied kinds, of greatest importance for Germany's supply of lumber. The districts Gabun, Central Congo, and Ubangi-Shari form an inseparable whole with the whole area of Cameroons-Belgian Congo. The Chad area can be reached only by way of the Cameroons or Nigeria. It can be exploited for agriculture and may acquire in later times a significance similar to that of the Sudan as an area for the cultivation of cotton on irrigated land around Lake Chad.

For these reasons the demand is to be made that France cede all of French Equatorial Africa. In this connection, the fixing of the northern border with the Italian colonial area can be reserved for an agreement with the Italians. This border, however, should not run further south than from the northern bank of Lake Chad parallel with the 15th degree of latitude, so that the feeder area of Lake Chad which can be considered for irrigation projects is not divided; otherwise a unified planning of the irrigation system would become more difficult.

Via Libya-Chad a German-Italian air connection with East and West Africa as well as with the Congo can easily be established without touching on alien territory.

VI

French Equatorial Africa is little developed and thinly populated. It is a task for the future to open it up. In order to obtain territory that can be immediately put to use it would be advisable to strive to supplement this Central African bloc by the acquisition of at least a part of the thickly-populated, economically well-developed and therefore especially valuable British colony of Nigeria. In case not all of Nigeria should be acquired, consideration should be given, in drawing the border, to the fact that the southern areas of the colony would be particularly valuable as palm oil producers for the German economy; the latter's most vulnerable point is the deficiency in the supply of vegetable fats. Moreover, Nigeria has considerable deposits of tin on the Bauchi plateau; these reserves are reputed to be not so plentiful as in the Belgian Congo, to be sure, but Germany should nevertheless secure them for herself. Finally, the populous peanut area along the north-

ern border of Bauchi with the large trading center of Kano is important, as is the sole anthracite mine on the entire west coast of Africa, located at Udi in the south and government-owned. Its coal is used for the railway and as bunkering coal for ocean shipping. The shipping route of the lower Niger and the Benue (in the rainy season navigable as far as the Cameroons) is a valuable approach to the northern Cameroons. The border should therefore be drawn—taking into account the existing administrative districts—up the Niger to the Benue estuary (with the mid-channel as border), then up the Benue to the western border of the province of the same name, then following the western and northwestern borders of the provinces of Benue, Plateau, Bauchi, and Kano to the northern border of Nigeria.

The border could then continue in the area of the French Niger colony in a straight line toward the northeast up to the point where the 15th degree of latitude crosses the Italian Chad border, so that all of Lake Chad is included in the German area. In the acquisition of Nigeria or part of this colony it should not be [about 2 words illegible] that the British administration left the natives very considerable freedom with regard to their self-government. In this area inhabited by a relatively highly cultured, numerous, and very independent population the transition to the stricter German colonial administration will doubtless not be easy.

VII

Moreover, along with the return of East Togo, France should also be asked to cede the neighboring colony of Dahomey. The two colonies belong together and form a unified economic area which in its southern districts is inhabited by peoples of the same group (Ewe). Palm oil, palm seeds, cocoa, and cotton are the exportable products cultivated by the natives. Togo without Dahomey is of little economic value. Moreover, the German Reich can also insist on the cession of Dahomey as a reprisal for the shameful treatment which the Germans had to endure there in the World War 1914–18. (Forced labor under the supervision of blacks, flogging, thumbscrews, etc.)

As compensation for the areas to be ceded, France could be given Western Nigeria (with the Niger, navigable as far as Jebba, to provide access to French Nigeria and Sudan) and the valuable British Gold Coast colony.

The demand should be made of Great Britain that she return West Togo, the border of which must be rectified as has always been desired, namely: the mid-channel of the lower Volta as far as its mouth, inclusive of the town and harbor of Ada (Gold Coast).

VIII

More worth aspiring to than further acquisitions of territory in West Africa is a rounding out of German East Africa by the acquisition of Uganda and Kenya from the British. These three colonies form a unified cultural and economic area, to which also the offshore islands of Zanzibar and Pemba belong; they must not remain in foreign possession if only for strategic reasons. Uganda is desirable owing to the density of its population, its fertile soil (cotton culture), and its mining possibilities (tin, gold). However, it is only of restricted value without the important transportation bridge of Kenya, which possesses the excellent harbor of Mombasa as well as the valuable railway network. The latter establishes the connection between the Indian Ocean on the one hand and Uganda, Lake Victoria, and also the northern part of German East Africa on the other. The four East African regions of Uganda, Kenya, German East Africa, and Zanzibar have always been considered a racial unit (Bantu race, Swahili language, etc.). They contrast with Italy's empire in north-east Africa, with its Nilotic peoples, from which they are also naturally separated by barren steppes and deserts.

The hinterland of German East Africa could perhaps be enlarged to the southwest by Northern Rhodesia and the northern part of Nyasaland. The rich copper deposits of Northern Rhodesia naturally belong to Katanga. Nyasaland is a labor reservoir for Rhodesia. The size of the Northern Rhodesian ore deposits is shown by the fact that more than 20 million tons of copper metal have already been found there. The present production capacity (mines and foundries) amounts to 300,000 tons and equals Germany's annual requirements. The large ore reserves in the lead, zinc, and vanadium deposits at Brokenhill assure this place of great economic importance in the future. However, one must not fail to mention that very considerable American interests are involved, especially in the copper mining in Northern Rhodesia, and that access to Northern Rhodesia at present is through foreign territory (South Africa, Angola, Portuguese East Africa). It would therefore be necessary to secure [for ourselves] the British shares in the Benguela railway which passes through Angola.

IX

Only for the sake of completeness it may be mentioned here that from the standpoint of production for military purposes Southern Rhodesia is the most important area of the African Continent. A great deal of iron and excellent coking coal is found there in huge deposits. Southern Rhodesia is the largest

producer of chrome ore in the world. There are reported to be evidences of deposits of nickel and tungsten; the asbestos of Southern Rhodesia is of the best quality for industrial use and occurs in very large deposits. Southern Rhodesia is one of the few African areas in which it would be possible to establish a large-scale industry for steel production.

The copper foundries in Katanga and Northern Rhodesia obtain the greater part of their coking coal from Southern Rhodesia (Wankie).

But Southern Rhodesia does not form a part of Central Africa. The Europeans who settle on the healthy Rhodesian plateaus, which are suitable for agriculture, find second homes there; they do not return to Europe as do the planters in the tropics. Therefore Southern Rhodesia, like the greater part of South-West Africa, belongs to the area of South Africa space where the European has become a permanent inhabitant alongside the native.

X

The High Command of the Navy wishes to acquire a number of naval bases along the West African coast; Dakar (French West Africa), Conakry (French Guinea), and Freetown (British Sierra Leone).

Naval bases along the west coast: Dakar, Bathurst, Conakry, Freetown.

The densely settled, immediate hinterland of Dakar, where there is cultivation of the peanut as a single crop, cannot provision a garrison in Dakar. If we do not wish to acquire a relatively large portion of Senegambia and thus cut the most important part out of French West Africa, it is sufficient to demand the cession of the harbor, the city and the environs of Dakar. Even this by itself is a very serious demand:

Dakar is the best and most important harbor in French West Africa. From here the transportation network extends far into the Sudan. Dakar is the most important point of transshipment for trade with America in tropical products. The loss of Dakar could only be compensated to some extent by giving the French the neighboring British colony of Gambia with the good harbor of Bathurst. The question therefore arises, whether Germany would not better take Bathurst as a base and leave Dakar with France. A part of the British colony of Gambia with the Gambia River could be left to France as a partial compensation for territory to be ceded at other places. Bathurst is an excellent natural harbor located about 11 km. up the Gambia River, and prior to the outbreak of the war has already served the German Lufthansa as a base for its South American service. As hinterland for the base the territory known as North Bank Province and South Bank Province (as far as about 16°30'

west longitude) could be considered. A base at Bathurst would also have to be supplied from the outside.

The city of Conakry is located on a peninsula along the entire length of which (about 30 km.) there runs a large vein of iron ore containing chrome (estimated at 1.5 to 3 billion tons). In case the harbor is acquired this deposit should come into German possession.

One might be tempted to acquire a part of the hilly hinterland of Conakry in French Guinea, so as to have the possibility of solving the supply and labor problems at least in part. Mine workers are hardly to be found in French Guinea. We would have to recruit them elsewhere, and we might try to create a local labor force through settling them there. For this we could consider an area consisting of the city and harbor of Conakry along with the off-shore islands (Los Islands) as well as the districts of Conakry, Kindia, and Forécariah. This, however, would leave the most valuable part of Guinea, the fertile and healthy Fouta Djallon highlands, still in French possession; for developing these the French are dependent on the railway to Conakry and its harbor. They would therefore have to be offered a free port zone.

The acquisition of French Guinea, at least the western half as far as the border of the Dabola district, would be desirable. In return Togo, Dahomey, and West Nigeria could be left to the French. French Guinea is a very valuable colony. If it were acquired the Fouta Djallon highlands above all would come into German possession. In this way, besides the Cameroons and the Bauchi plateau (Nigeria), the third of the three highland blocs in West Africa would also be in German possession. This fact deserves attention from the standpoint of providing the Europeans living in these colonial areas with fresh meat, vegetables, and fruit, as well as because of the opportunities for recreation offered in the country itself. This fact is also important for military reasons, since it is only on these highlands that compact European military units can be stationed without their members having to be relieved at short intervals.

It is furthermore logical to lay claim also to the northern province of British Sierra Leone which borders on French Guinea. Its harbor of Freetown, which is desirable as a naval base, is the best natural harbor on the whole West African coast. Across from it is the modern ore harbor of Pepel, which is connected with the important iron ore deposits at Marampa by a narrow gauge railway 80 km. in length. It is planned to extend this railway to the other probably still larger iron ore deposits at Tonkolili near Bumbula. With the northern province of Sierra Leone we would thus obtain in French Guinea a valuable colony with two important naval bases (Conakry and Freetown) and three immense iron ore deposits, and could in return dispense with Togo, Dahomey, and West Nigeria.

It would not be advantageous to acquire small parts of colonies on the West African coast; the administration would be more difficult and expensive, and the small areas would in any case be dependent on neighboring areas in foreign possession for their supplies of workers and foodstuffs.

If we should not desire the acquisition of a larger area in Guinea, the following demand could be considered: Of France, Conakry, with a hinterland in a radius of 50 km.; of England, Freetown, with the peninsula Sierra Leone. The exploitation of the iron ore deposits could be assured by concessions and transfer of the ownership rights to the deposits.

XI

Madagascar should be acquired by the German Reich, not for reasons of colonial policy but for the purpose of settling the Jews.

Since the island would be under German supreme authority, the necessity of securing a naval base on Madagascar would be complied with. Likewise for strategic reasons the High Command of the Navy requires the cession by France of the island of Réunion and the Comoro Island group.¹

Madagascar,
Réunion,
Comoro.

DR. BIELFELD

¹ A note by Senior Counselor Erich Kordt at the top of this document indicates that the clean copy was put into the special portfolio where Ribbentrop kept documents which he intended to show to Hitler (Führermappe).

No. 299

111/116284-85

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

VERY URGENT

TOKYO, November 7, 1940—3:55 a. m.

SECRET

Received November 7—12:30 p. m.

No. 1224 of November 7

With reference to my telegram No. 1065 of October 8.¹

The Deputy Foreign Minister² asked me to call on him today and informed me that on November 5 the Foreign Minister had instructed Ambassador Kurusu to present the following request of the Japanese Government to the Reich Foreign Minister:

Would the Reich Government advise Chiang Kai-shek of its impression that recognition of Wang Ching-wei by Japan was imminent? German and Italian recognition would follow in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, so that the position of the Wang Ching-wei government would have a strong foundation. In order to

¹ Document No. 161.

² Chuichi Ohashi.

forestall this development, it would be advisable for Chiang Kai-shek to arrive at an understanding with Japan regarding termination of the conflict.

The Deputy Foreign Minister requested that any steps taken by the Reich Government should avoid the appearance of being inspired by the Japanese Government. The Japanese Ambassador at Rome³ had been informed but an approach to Italy was not contemplated for the time being, unless the Reich Government should suggest it.

I did not commit myself with regard to the Deputy Foreign Minister's statement but requested that I be given a general picture of Japanese conditions in order to enable my Government to form a better judgment as to the practical value of using its influence with Chiang Kai-shek, provided such action should be intended at all.

In reply, the Deputy Foreign Minister gave me the following as his *private* opinion:

1. Conclusion of peace with Chiang Kai-shek personally would be acceptable for Japan. The future position of the Marshal would have to be settled between him and Wang Ching-wei. The latter had repeatedly declared on behalf of himself and his followers that personal considerations would be subordinated in the widest measure to the interests of Sino-Japanese peace.

2. Japan had no territorial claims. She would recognize China's sovereignty over the entire territory of China, including Inner Mongolia, Northern China, and the Island of Hainan, but would ensure for herself special rights in specific areas, concerning which the Deputy Foreign Minister can not give any details at present.

3. To my question regarding the Japanese Government's stand on Chiang Kai-shek's alleged principal demand, that of withdrawal of Japanese troops from occupied areas, the Deputy Foreign Minister replied that it was clearly useless and a waste to leave troops "in the interior of China." The Army was gradually shortening the front, as evidenced by the evacuation of Nanning. Furthermore, successful bombing of the Burma Road had proved that there were other effective methods besides permanent occupation.

4. The extent of Japanese concessions naturally was limited by the necessity of avoiding at any cost the impression in Japan that the heavy national sacrifice had yielded unsatisfactory results or had even been in vain.

5. The Deputy Foreign Minister closed by referring to the probable deterioration of the general situation as a result of Roosevelt's election, which made a speedy termination of the Sino-Japanese conflict an urgent matter in the interest of all the parties to the Tripartite Pact. He emphasized that Germany, for the time being, was not yet asked to mediate but merely to exert pressure on Chiang Kai-shek,⁴

³ Zembel Horikiri, Ambassador in Italy, Sept. 1940–Nov. 1942.

⁴ Weizsäcker referred to this passage in a memorandum submitted to the Foreign Minister on Nov. 8. From talks with the Chinese Ambassador and members of his staff, Weizsäcker had the impression that they considered Chiang Kai-shek's need for peace to be hardly less than that of the Japanese; he expressed doubt, however, "that they would be available for exerting pressure on Chiang Kai-shek." (111/116286)

and he confirmed the earlier confidential communication by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that secret Japanese feelers had been extended to Chiang Kai-shek.

OTT

No. 300

91/100424-25

The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Minister

Telegram

URGENT

DUBLIN, November 7, 1940.

No. 713 of November 7

Received November 7—5:55 p. m.

The discussion of the Irish ports in the English House of Commons session of November 5, particularly the relevant remarks of Churchill,¹ as well as the simultaneous treatment of this subject in the English press, has created understandable anxiety here. Walshe told me yesterday that it was his present opinion that the matter was probably to be interpreted less as an indication of British intentions to attack Irish ports in the near future than as an internal political diversionary maneuver on account of British shipping losses through German submarines; this was also indicated by the pointed allusion to Chamberlain, who had at the time surrendered the Irish ports.² The actual value to England of the possession of the Irish ports in view of the lack of strong fortifications (particularly Berehaven), and their vulnerability to German air attacks from the French coast, was disproportionate to the disadvantages to be expected (war with Ireland, repercussions in the United States). In reply to my remark that Churchill's thrust directly after the presidential elections in the United States,³ aroused the suspicion that England was now shedding her fear of unfavorable repercussions in the United States, Walshe observed that Roosevelt, despite his attitude, which was absolutely pro-British also with respect to his conduct toward Ireland, was and continued to be strongly dependent on the Irish-American element to a greater degree than Willkie. The weight of this dependence was but increased as a result of the large vote that Willkie received. A similar view was expressed to me by persons in radical-nationalist circles, who for their part are said to welcome the

¹ In his review of the course of the war Churchill had made the following statement:

"The fact that we cannot use the South and West Coasts of Ireland to refuel our flotillas and aircraft and thus protect the trade by which Ireland as well as Great Britain lives, is a most heavy and grievous burden and one which should never have been placed on our shoulders." See *Parliamentary Debates*, fifth series, H of C, vol. 365, col. 1243.

² By an agreement between the United Kingdom and Ireland signed Apr. 25, 1938, the coast defense stations at Berehaven, Cobh, and Lough Swilly were transferred to the jurisdiction of Ireland.

³ See document No. 292.

influence brought to bear on Irish sentiment against England as a result of the debate in the House of Commons. I am reporting these comments only as preliminary, first statements, and I would mention that the optimistic view expressed to me by Walshe may also have its cause in the intention to play down the matter, in order for the time being to cause as little unrest as possible. The comments in the British press after the debate in the House of Commons indicate, in my opinion, that at least attempts are being made or are yet to be expected, to put pressure on Ireland in order to obtain certain concessions. With respect to the attitude of this Government, Walshe told me at this time merely that de Valera would presumably take the opportunity to give a negative reply.⁴

HEMPEL

⁴ A speech on this matter which de Valera delivered in the Irish Parliament on Nov. 7 was reported in Dublin telegram No. 721 of Nov. 8 (91/100426-28).

No. 301

F10/145-46;
F10/150-51

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*¹

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, November 7, 1940.

The conclusions in the memorandum of September 3, 1940²—submitted previously—concerning the liaison between the French and Swiss Armies have been confirmed and supplemented by the discovery of new documents that were submitted by the High Command of the Wehrmacht with the letters of September 10³ and October 31⁴ of this year.

The picture as a whole is now as follows:

Already during the World War military contact had been established through secret discussions which General Weygand carried on in 1917 with Colonel Sprecher, then Chief of the Swiss General Staff.

After the Italo-French tension in 1937 this contact was renewed and gradually intensified. From October 1939 on direct military cooperation can be detected. Under the newly-appointed Commander in Chief of the Swiss Army, General Guisan, who immediately puts through a reorganization of important command posts along French lines, the liaison, which is maintained on the French

¹ Marginal note: "Has been submitted to the Führer. Hew[el], Nov. 22, 1940."

² Document No. 11.

³ This letter itself has not been found, but a memorandum of Sept. 11, summarizing its contents for the Foreign Minister, is filmed on 121/119871-74.

⁴ Not found.

side by Colonel Garteiser, becomes closer and closer: plans of deployment and fortifications are exchanged; agreements are reached on the evacuation of Basel in case of a German attack; the texts of telegrams to be sent by Switzerland in case of complications are agreed upon.

The establishment of a Swiss "Liaison Division," about which there is precise information in a document of February 11, 1940,⁵ places the military cooperation on a firmer basis.

The Liaison Division has the task of covering the deployment of the French troops, making contact at once with the French Army as it enters and placing itself under the latter; it has the strength of a division, but does not possess artillery. The artillery is to be provided by the French troops entering; Switzerland is preparing fortified positions for this purpose. Swiss liaison officers await the French troops at the border. In accordance with these preparations, on the Swiss side, numerous French orders contain corresponding instructions by the French Army Command for establishing contact with the Swiss troops and occupying the combat areas agreed upon. In these orders and General Staff studies there are often to be found remarks indicating that the desires of the Swiss High Command have been taken into account or that the latter adjusted itself to the French suggestions. Repeated mention is also often made to promises made to Switzerland which must be kept.

In the end, under the pressure of the German offensive the Swiss are left in the lurch after all. On May 17, 1940, the army standing ready for possible entry into Switzerland is withdrawn, but "as secretly as possible" and with a few divisions left behind so that the Swiss would not notice anything.

The documents show that on the part of the French the greatest importance was attached to camouflage and discretion in their cooperation with Switzerland. According to one order, no document may contain instructions "which could be construed as the result of preparatory agreements between the French and Swiss General Staffs." And furthermore it is stated in an order of March 29, 1940:

"Owing to secrecy that is easily comprehensible for diplomatic reasons, the term 'possible intervention in Switzerland' may no longer be reproduced in the text of drafts, orders, etc. In its place, the term 'Maneuver H' will be used, which includes the totality of the operations arranged for in this regard."

Switzerland, too, proceeded with all necessary caution. "They are preparing very precise agreements"—thus it is stated on November 26, 1939—"but do not wish to issue them before the start of hostilities." The "Liaison Division," too, is given a less suspicious name. Ar-

⁵ Not found.

rangements are made only orally. Colonel Garteiser, too, evidently meets only with a liaison man, and everything is dealt with in such a way that official quarters can at any time deny cooperation. However, the adjustment of the Swiss General Staff to French wishes—and vice versa—is too evident to leave any doubt about the collusion. The documents are entirely convincing in this regard.

On the other hand, even the newly-discovered documents do not indicate that the French had any intention of entering Swiss territory for *offensive* purposes. Rather, it is clearly evident from a considerable number of documents that the French "intervention" was provided for only in case of prior entry of German troops into Switzerland.

Finally, it should also be pointed out that according to information from the High Command of the Wehrmacht the discovery of the documents on Franco-Swiss General Staff talks seems to be known to the authorities in Switzerland.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

MOLTKE

No. 302

449/222895-96

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, November 7, 1940.

Pol. I M 14695 g.

Proceedings prior to the Italian action in Greece.

1. On October 18 a teletype message of October 17 from the liaison staff with the Italian Air Force was submitted to me; it is appended as annex 1.¹

2. I thereupon submitted on October 18 through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister at Sonnenburg the draft telegram attached as annex 2.¹

3. On October 19 the Foreign Minister telephoned to me from Sonnenburg and said that we could not restrain the Italian Government with such a strong *démarche* as was proposed in the final paragraph of the draft telegram. We could, however, authorize Herr von Mackensen to address a "friendly question" to the Italian Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister directed me to send such a telegram.

4. Before I had carried out this instruction the two telegrams Nos. 1883² and 1884³ of October 19 from the Ambassador in Rome—attached as annexes 3 and 4—were submitted to me.

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 191, footnote 5.

³ Document No. 194.

I then telephoned the Foreign Minister at Sonnenburg and called his attention to these two telegrams. I told him that in the meantime there had been received from the liaison staff with the Italian Air Force a further teletype message of October 18 which reinforced the first message of October 17. At the time of my call only the first telegram of the Ambassador—No. 1883—had reached the Foreign Minister; the second telegram of the Ambassador—No. 1884—had not yet reached him. I thereupon read telegram No. 1884 to the Foreign Minister. After the words in this report: "Italy had complete freedom of action with respect to Greece, as the Führer had indeed conceded to the Duce," the Foreign Minister interrupted me and said that I should hold up the telegram concerning the "friendly question." The matter must now be submitted to the Führer. Herr von Steengracht would follow through on the matter.

5. A short time afterwards Herr von Steengracht called me up from Berlin and said that he had seen to it that telegram No. 1884 was submitted to the Führer. Approximately an hour and a half later Herr von Steengracht called me again and said the Führer had decided that no question should be addressed to Rome. Herr von Steengracht returned to me on October 21 the draft telegram and the minute attached as annex 5.⁴

RITTER

⁴Not found.

No. 303

111/116287

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, November 8, 1940—9:30 p. m.

No. 2030 of November 8

Received November 8—10:00 p. m.

Japanese Ambassador Amau, in a conversation with Prince Urach,¹ stated that Japan would extend formal recognition to the Wang Ching-wei government in the near future. The Italians had given abundant assurance that they would also recognize the new government. Germany's special position in the Far East was recognized by Japan but no immediate recognition by Germany was expected. Since Germany still held a position of influence with the Chungking government, Japan would consider it desirable if Germany were to initiate talks regarding a settlement between Chungking and Nanking, the more so as it was known in Japan that conclusion of the Tripartite

¹Albrecht Prince von Urach, an official of the Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry.

Pact had split the domestic front of the Chungking government into two camps. The group that is inclined toward an understanding and which expected nothing from any American intervention in the Far East would, according to the Japanese plan, be given a large share in the future organization of the Nanking government. Amau said that Italy, which was, after all, much less interested than Germany in Far Eastern questions and had not learned of the preparations for the Tripartite Pact until a very late date, has not yet been informed of the plan. He suggested that the proposal be transmitted to Berlin.

MACKENSEN

No. 304

104/112638

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2372 of November 8 Moscow, November 8, 1940—11:05 p. m.
Received November 9—4:30 a. m.

At the reception given yesterday by Molotov on the occasion of the anniversary of the Revolution, among those present in addition to all Deputy Commissars for Foreign Affairs and high officials of the Foreign Commissariat were Foreign Trade Commissar Mikoyan, Marshal Timoshenko,¹ Chief of the General Staff Meretskov,² as well as a large number of celebrities in the worlds of science and the arts.

Following the usual arrangement, only the Chiefs of Missions were seated at tables and I and the representatives of the states friendly with the Soviet Union received definitely preferential treatment by being seated at the main table with Molotov and Mikoyan; the representatives of England and France and other countries were seated at side tables, which was noted and commented upon by the diplomatic corps. Furthermore, Minister Schnurre was seated with his delegation at a separate table together with the Deputy Foreign Trade Commissar, Stepanov, and other prominent officials of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

Marshal Timoshenko drew General Köstring and Colonel Aschenbrenner into a lengthy conversation. The other Soviet representa-

¹ Semion Konstantinovich Timoshenko, People's Commissar for Defense.

² Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov, Chief of the General Staff, August 1940–February 1941; Deputy People's Commissar for Defense, August 1940–June 1941.

tives present were notably friendly and genial to the members of my Embassy.

SCHULENBURG

No. 305

35/23131-32

*Circular of the State Secretary*¹

Telegram

Multex 410

BERLIN, November 8, 1940.
e. o. Pol. IX 2297.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Freytag.

For information and guidance in your conversations.

1. Roosevelt's re-election caused no surprise here. One deciding factor in the results of the election was the fact that from the beginning the President was tactically in the stronger position and at such a critical time the voters did not want to entrust the leadership of the country to a newcomer.

2. What was interesting about the campaign is that the two candidates stood for almost the same program in foreign policy. Because of Willkie's vigorous campaign the President was forced, contrary to his original intention, to intervene personally in the campaign and to stress the peaceful character of his foreign policy more than he originally wished to do.

3. We expect the President, who has doubtless gained in prestige in America and abroad through the great election victory and through breaking the third term tradition, and who, in the future, too, will have at his side a Congress with Democratic majorities in both houses, to continue the present foreign policy with the same energy.

4. If you should be addressed concerning Roosevelt's election, please say with cool reserve that the outcome was expected by us and we have reckoned with it for a long time. ~~The victorious outcome of the war for the Axis Powers will not be changed through the election.~~²

5. Same text to be sent to all Missions.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹This circular was addressed to all Diplomatic Missions.

²The words scored through were deleted before the telegram was sent.

No. 306

3485/E019424-29

*The Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Abetz*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, November 9, 1940.

To be forwarded immediately to Ambassador Abetz through Dr. Schwarzmann of the [Foreign] Minister's Secretariat.

The conversation of the Reichsmarschall with Laval lasted 2 hours. The Reichsmarschall recalled the meeting at Kraków.² France's relations with Germany in the past had been under the sign of the Treaty of Versailles. Such terrible mistakes [would] not [be] repeated. This had already been demonstrated at Compiègne. The armistice terms state that nothing would be done that might affect France's honor. Just as it had been impossible to wipe out Germany, so France could not be wiped out. The Führer let himself be guided solely by reason. Now was the time to settle and clear up everything that divided the two countries. Failure to do this would lead to new bloodshed. Nothing of real substance divided us. The division was purely psychological and was based on differences of opinion and past history. In the practical sphere the two countries were complementary. The only substantial issue was Alsace-Lorraine. Here, too, the Führer let himself be guided solely by reason in order to avoid bloodshed. The danger came from English influence on French policy. Now, however, a new order was coming into being, which must lead to an understanding and to cooperation. Even now the Führer let himself be guided solely by reason and he would always be guided by reason alone. Conclusions could be drawn from this as to the future. When reason speaks, the mistakes of the past will not be repeated.

Laval's reply: [He had] the very best memories of Kraków. His state of mind was the same today. He was viewing France's present situation with courage. There was no better policy than that of collaboration. He was also convinced that a new order was coming

¹This telegram, the file copy of which is unsigned and without number, is written in a particularly condensed telegram style resulting in certain ambiguities with regard to tenses and moods in a number of passages. In making the translation, reference has been made to a supplementary memorandum found with the document printed in the files of the Paris Embassy. This supplementary memorandum, which is also unsigned and is dated "Paris, Nov. 9, 1940," is in French and has the heading "Résumé of the conversation with Reichsmarschall Göring" (3485/E019430-36). It records Göring's statements in some instances with greater clarity and detail than the document printed, but it merely lists the occasions when Laval replied to Göring without indicating the nature of Laval's statements.

²Laval and Göring had met in Kraków on May 19, 1935, on the occasion of the funeral of Marshal Pilsudski.

into existence, that political forms would be discovered which would make possible a collaboration between Germany and France, in which France would be assigned the place due to her. The Reichsmarschall's language regarding Versailles was clear. He was grateful to the Reichsmarschall for stating that the mistakes of 1918 would not be repeated. He was convinced, and had always been, that nothing divided France and Germany. It was inexplicable what intellectual confusion hitherto kept the French Governments from grasping this fact. Collaboration was easy; economically the two countries were complementary. English influence had been a menace and had dragged France into the war. England had made no contribution to victory, had deserted France and, moreover, had behaved in an incredible way toward France. Yet there were still many who believed that France could be relieved of the consequences of the defeat in case England should be victorious: [they were the] supporters of the Popular Front, Freemasons, Jews, the rich who thought that after the war they could continue to live the way they had lived before the war, but also naïve people, who saw no future ahead. To them, hope again had been restored by the talk between the Führer and Pétain and the prospects of collaboration. Laval was convinced that the policy which he pursued was unanimously approved by the French Government; he hoped that it was being understood, and it was beginning to be understood even now. Collaboration was difficult in the beginning, particularly since the basis for it was being disturbed by the occupation. He appreciated the conduct of the German troops, who were received without hatred. Exaggerated pessimism was being replaced by excessive optimism. Public opinion was expecting immediate success in the following questions; prisoners of war, line of demarcation, occupation costs, départements of Nord and Pas de Calais,³ food supplies, and transport. The question of Lorraine: deportation of about 100,000 inhabitants who had voted for France.⁴ This was an extremely delicate question and it gave aid to British propaganda: 1. Result of collaboration, expulsion of 100,000 Frenchmen. Laval asked the Reichsmarschall to intervene with the Führer and have this matter postponed until the peace treaty. At the least, results must be achieved which caught the general attention so that public opinion would be influenced. Furthermore, [there should be] cooperation with respect to the colonies in order to regain control of the colonies and drive out de Gaulle. Such collaboration must above all be in good faith and sincere. Laval had this to say

³ The départements of Nord and Pas de Calais had been placed under the German Military Administration in Belgium.

⁴ See documents Nos. 271 and 282.

to the Reichsmarschall: It must not be a war, it must be a European revolution. If the Führer shared this view, a long-lasting peace could be achieved. There was no analogy with Versailles. It would be difficult to imagine Poincaré going to Germany to extend the hand of peace. In 1940 the Führer did just this, an act that was not in the tradition of conquerors. It was the beginning of a new era, and France would contribute whatever she could. Laval was prepared to build the peace on France's defeat, as France did not have a reason to go to war and French youth would be offered an ideal different from the idea of revenge.

Göring realized Laval's difficulties. It must not be forgotten that Germany was still at war with England. The Führer had made offers time and again, but they were interpreted as bluff. At that time Europe had an opportunity of getting collaboration cheaply. The war with England was the alpha and omega of all German decisions. All measures were dictated by military necessity. France would remain occupied to serve as an extended base of operations against England. He was pleased with the excellent relations between occupation forces and population. There were always some criminals. Yesterday he had signed two death sentences against two German soldiers and pardoned a 16-year old French boy. The question of the prisoners of war was a difficult one, because they were an important guarantee for Germany. Pétain was old and the French Constitution offered no sufficient security for the stability of the French Government.⁵ The question of the occupation costs could not be understood by anyone better than by Germany, which had been forced to pay until bled white. He had not heard anything before about the Lorraine question. He supposed that it involved Jews. He would look into the matter and talk to the Führer. The question of transport was difficult. He had ordered Stülpnagel to do all that was necessary. It had been caused by the war operations and the needless demolitions by the French troops. As regards the

⁵ In the French "Résumé" referred to in footnote 1, this statement of Göring is more detailed and reads as follows:

"As for the question of the prisoners of war, the Reichsmarschall hopes for an understanding. Precisely here, however, it is a question of a tremendous amount of confidence; Germany would, in fact, part with a pawn of exceptional importance. No doubt the Führer has absolute confidence in the person of Marshal Pétain, just as he has confidence in the person of President Laval. But the Marshal is an old man and the French Constitution does not allow for all the security one would want. If the Marshal should die and if the President should not retain his power, then the pawn with which Germany had parted could work against Germany through force of propaganda. It is an act of unprecedented confidence to release prisoners of war in a period of armistice. Our own were released long after peace was made."

radio stations, France could be granted relief; this would have to be studied.⁶

Africa: The Führer shared Laval's view regarding the fleet and the colonies. It was in Germany's interest that France should be master of her colonies. Presumably it would soon be possible to show accommodation in this question. England would have to be recognized as the common enemy. A French declaration of war on England would probably be unnecessary. But de Gaulle would have to be ousted if France expected any concessions. France would also have to take vigorous measures against British encroachments. To be sure, if France took active steps against de Gaulle, a clash with England became probable. If Germany today demanded bases on the west coast of Africa there was no intention to seize the colonies but only a desire to broaden the bases of operations against England. This was a sphere in which the idea of having England as the common enemy could best be expressed, and in that case accommodation could be shown by Germany. We, too, had to consider public opinion, which had to see that the idea of England's being the common enemy was held in France as well. Rebuilding of industry had to be speeded up. France was not to starve, the troops are helping out in agriculture, but work along these lines would also have to be done in the unoccupied territory. Every bit of acreage must be under cultivation. The farmers will receive machines from us, the beet crop is to be assured, but agriculture in the unoccupied zone, too, must make an effort. Industry: The mistakes of the past are not to be repeated, no one is to suffer cold.⁷ But the mines had been destroyed by the French. A large-scale economic plan; meeting of the experts on both sides. By way of an example: development of the aircraft industry, both in occupied and unoccupied territory. This would be also to the benefit of France, because France would then have the best aircraft industry. French industry in occupied and unoccupied territory must fill German orders; after all, they would be paid for. In that case the German people would have confidence and it would be possible to grant relief. It would be possible to release prisoners. But action was necessary, reconstruction must be undertaken, and the French

⁶ The relevant passage in the "Résumé" reads as follows:

"This question ought to be easy to solve on condition that the broadcasts do not help the English Air Force.

⁷ The German original reads here "fragen" but this is obviously a typographical error and ought to read "frieren"; this is confirmed by a comparison with the "Résumé" in French mentioned in footnote 1.

Government must induce the French people to do this.⁸ The Führer will then take the French wishes into consideration. One point needs to be touched upon. We are not alone, we must consider our allies. We have already convinced them that France must be master of her colonies. The Treaty of Versailles has struck deep wounds which are not easily effaced. But there must be a foundation of confidence, the young tree must grow rapidly. Göring will study and support every legitimate French wish, but France must understand that we are still engaged in a struggle. A rapprochement will be easy after victory has been won. Intensification of the war against England can be only to the benefit of France, and France must therefore make a contribution and act vigorously against encroachments. Confidence will then grow.

Brief reply by Laval: The Law of July 10⁹ has vested Pétain with powers which assure the stability of the French Government; parliamentarianism is practically abolished. The succession is assured. In the event of Pétain's leaving the scene Laval has been appointed his successor, and if Laval should leave the scene, the successor is determined by the Council of Ministers. Laval has great authority, his position is secure. Both [his] authority and position will be enhanced if collaboration is put into effect. The legal arrangements could be changed only by a revolution. France is doing everything to resume work. But there is a lack of raw materials, [means of] transport, etc. Collaboration with Germany is essential also in this respect. Prisoners could be released for industry and agriculture. The questions must not be handled bureaucratically, however. This conversation enabled him to take the appropriate measures with his ministers and administrative departments. He had received with gratification the statements regarding the colonies. He had always maintained that England was the common enemy. The peace to be concluded would be determined by France's attitude toward England. There was considerable French influence in the English colonies. Liberation of the colonies and the crushing of de Gaulle, however, must not depend on military collaboration with Germany, since this would support the English propaganda which asserts that de Gaulle is defending the French colonies against Germany. Boisson, the defender of Dakar, had always been in favor of collaboration with

⁸ According to the "Résumé" cited in footnote 1, Göring's statements on this point were as follows:

"Far too many people have returned to the occupied territory and do not do anything. One must rebuild towns and villages. The French Government must make the population understand that it must apply itself to the task and not expect that the work will be done by the soldiers."

⁹ The Law Authorizing the Promulgation of a New Constitution. For the text, see *Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets*, 1940, No. 167, p. 4513.

Germany. Agreement would have to be achieved as to the goal and the means to be employed. He had the best memories of Kraków and only regretted that the hopes of those days did not materialize.

Concluding remarks by Göring: He hopes that other talks will follow.

Laval thanks him. He expresses the same hope, as this would eliminate misunderstandings.

*Proposed communiqué for Vichy:*¹⁰

A talk was held today in Paris between Reichsmarschall Göring and M. Pierre Laval, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, in the presence of Generals Bodenschatz and Hanesse, and M. Fernand de Brinon, French Ambassador.

The Reichsmarschall, Marshal Pétain, and the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers had previously met in Kraków, in 1935, at Marshal Pilsudski's funeral.

Today's meeting, which is a natural sequel to the historic meetings at Montoire, lasted 2 hours and enabled the two statesmen to develop the principal problems of the day in a spirit of cordiality and mutual understanding.

¹⁰ The text of this proposed communiqué is in French.

No. 307

2401/500520

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, November 9, 1940.

e. o. Pol. I 1283 g. Rs.

Herr von Steengracht passed on to me on November 8 the instruction to notify the Naval War Staff of the Führer's directive that the *Admiral Scheer* be given strict orders not to extend its operations into the "American security zone."¹

I have informed Admiral Fricke of the Naval War Staff of this. He told me that he fully appreciated the view taken by the Foreign Ministry from the *political* standpoint. Grand Admiral Raeder, however, will nevertheless probably reserve to himself calling the Führer's attention for purposes of information to the difficulties on the *military*

¹ The reference is to a closed zone to keep warlike activities away from the Americas as proclaimed in a resolution of the American Governments at the Panama Congress in October 1939. For the text, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 331-333. On previous negotiations regarding this zone, see vol. VIII of this series, document No. 306 and footnotes 1 and 3.

side. The "American security zone," he says, covers so large an area of the Atlantic Ocean that, for example, the capability of the *Admiral Scheer* for operations would be seriously curtailed. The "American security zone" includes nearly one-half of the Atlantic Ocean between South America and Africa.

RITTER

No. 308

104/112831-33

Unsigned Memorandum

SECRET

BERLIN, November 9, 1940.

W 5099 g.

REGARDING PETSAMO NICKEL¹

I. In the spring of this year we tried to get the concession for the Petsamo nickel deposits, now held by a Canadian corporation.² In July of this year, when M. Molotov informed us in unequivocal terms that the Soviet Government considered this region as its domain,³ we informed the Soviet Government that we would do without the concession and would be satisfied with 60 percent of the output.⁴ We therefore, on July 24 of this year, concluded an agreement with the Finnish Government, according to which 60 percent of the output is promised us without time limit.⁵ In September of this year, the I. G. Farben concluded a corresponding agreement for delivery and credit with the Finnish Petsamo Nikkeli Corporation (a subsidiary of the Canadian concessionaire), which cannot be terminated until December 1, 1947.⁶

Independently, on October 1 of this year, a German option on all Finnish concessions—which was kept strictly secret and is not known to the Soviet Government—was agreed upon in the so-called "Veltjens agreements."⁷

II. At the end of October, the Soviet Union demanded of Finland, in the form of an ultimatum, the transfer of the concession to a mixed Finnish-Russian corporation, claiming that the English Government had informed the Soviet Government of its concurrence.⁸ On Novem-

¹ See document No. 317.

² Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 24, footnote 2.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 182.

⁴ *Ibid.*, document No. 259.

⁵ *Ibid.*, document No. 221.

⁶ The terms of the agreement concluded by I. G. Farben are summarized in a letter of Nov. 5 from the Reich Minister of Economics to Wiehl (2111/456778-80).

⁷ See document No. 139.

⁸ See document No. 274.

ber 1 the Finnish Government, which doubted the English concurrence, agreed to the transfer on condition that the Soviet Government procured the consent of England and of the Canadian nickel trust as well as Germany's waiver of the concession.⁹

On November 6 Vyshinsky told the Finnish Minister in Moscow that the Soviet Government could see no occasion for negotiating with the German Government. The German Government had long ago renounced the concession and had declared itself satisfied with receiving 60 percent of the output; on the other hand, the English Ambassador, Cripps, had declared that the trust was prepared to transfer the concession temporarily—until the end of the war. Vyshinsky was of the opinion that this time limit was of no importance, but that the matter was settled as regards England.¹⁰

Inquiries of the Finnish Government in London revealed that on November 2 the Foreign Office issued an instruction to Cripps "to negotiate with regard to any form of settlement which would offer a guarantee that no nickel will be brought to Germany." According to information given by the Foreign Office to the Finnish Minister in London,¹¹ Ambassador Cripps made his statement, which apparently did not contain the restriction that no nickel must be imported into Germany, on his own initiative and without instruction from London.

III. Since the Soviet Government, by reason of our renunciation of July of this year, sees no need for taking the matter up with us, M. Molotov on his part presumably will not broach the subject. However, if no new viewpoints result from the report of Minister Schnurre, who is expected to return by November 12, it seems urgently necessary on our part to approach M. Molotov regarding this matter. On this occasion it should be pointed out that Germany cannot in any circumstances forego receiving 60 percent of Petsamo's production, which will presumably amount to from 6,000 to 12,000 tons yearly and with which Germany will be able to satisfy a considerable portion of her nickel requirements, which would otherwise have to be procured overseas. Our renunciation of the concession in July of this year—as the Soviet Government itself admits—was on the condition that this 60 percent of the output is assured to Germany even if the Soviet Government receives the concession. Confirmation would therefore have to be requested of M. Molotov that 60 percent of the nickel output will be at our disposal for an unlimited time, in accordance with our agreement of July 24, 1940, with the Finnish Government, and

⁹ See document No. 274, footnote 7.

¹⁰ Cf. document No. 42, *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940—June 1941*, p. 76.

¹¹ Georg Achates Gripenberg.

that, in view of our large investments, the new Finnish-Russian concessionaire will enter into the agreement for delivery and credit concluded between I. G. Farben Industrie and the Petsamo Nikkeli Corporation. These promises are all the more necessary since at an earlier stage of the affair M. Molotov made an attempt to restrict the promise of 60 percent to the year 1940 and since it is possible that the English actually gave the Russians their approval only on the condition that Germany must not obtain any nickel.

If M. Molotov gives the above-mentioned promises, our renunciation of the concession may be renewed toward him.

Respectfully submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

No. 309

292/133883-89

*Draft*¹

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE THREE POWER PACT, GERMANY, ITALY, AND JAPAN, ON THE ONE SIDE, AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE OTHER SIDE

The Governments of the states of the Three Power Pact, Germany, Italy and Japan, on the one side,

and

the Government of the USSR, on the other side,
motivated by the desire to establish in their natural spheres of influence in Europe, Asia, and Africa a new order serving the welfare of all peoples concerned and to create a firm and enduring foundation for their common labors toward this goal, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE I

In the Three Power Pact of Berlin, of September 27, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan agreed to oppose with all possible means the extension of the war into a world conflict and to collaborate toward an early restoration of world peace. They expressed their willingness to extend their collaboration to nations in other parts of the world which are inclined to direct their efforts along the same course as theirs. The Soviet Union declares that it concurs in these aims of the Three Power Pact and is on its part determined to cooperate politically in this course with the three Powers.

¹ This draft (Entwurf) is from the secret files of the Moscow Embassy. The date of Nov. 9, 1940, was written in by hand in abbreviated form in the upper right corner of the first sheet. See documents Nos. 329 and 404.

ARTICLE II

Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to respect each other's natural spheres of influence. In so far as these spheres of interest come into contact with each other, they will constantly consult each other in an amicable way with regard to the problems arising therefrom.

Germany, Italy, and Japan declare on their part that they recognize the present extent of the possessions of the Soviet Union and will respect it.

ARTICLE III

Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to join no combination of powers and to support no combination of powers which is directed against one of the four Powers.

The four Powers will assist each other in economic matters in every way and will supplement and extend the agreements existing among themselves.

ARTICLE IV

This agreement shall take effect upon signature and shall continue for a period of ten years. The Governments of the four Powers shall consult each other in due time, before the expiration of that period, regarding the extension of the agreement.

Done in four originals, in the German, Italian, Japanese, and Russian languages.

Moscow, 1940.

Draft

SECRET PROTOCOL No. 1

Upon the signing today of the Agreement concluded among the Representatives of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union they declare as follows:

1) Germany declares that, apart from the territorial revisions in Europe to be carried out at the conclusion of peace, her territorial aspirations center in the territories of Central Africa.

2) Italy declares that, apart from the territorial revisions in Europe to be carried out at the conclusion of peace, her territorial aspirations center in the territories of Northern and Northeastern Africa.

3) Japan declares that her territorial aspirations center in the area of Eastern Asia to the south of the Island Empire of Japan.

4) The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

The four Powers declare that, reserving the settlement of specific questions, they will mutually respect these territorial aspirations and will not oppose their achievement.

Moscow, on

Draft

SECRET PROTOCOL NO. 2 TO BE CONCLUDED AMONG GERMANY, ITALY,
AND THE SOVIET UNION

On the occasion of the signing today of the Agreement among Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union, the Representatives of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union declare as follows:

1) Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree in the view that it is in their common interest to detach Turkey from her existing international commitments and progressively to win her over to political collaboration with themselves. They declare that they will pursue this aim in close consultation, in accordance with a common line of action which is still to be determined.

2) Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union declare their agreement to conclude, at a given time, a joint agreement with Turkey, wherein the three Powers would recognize the extent of Turkey's possessions.

3) Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union will work in common toward the replacement of the Montreux Straits Convention now in force by another convention. By this convention the Soviet Union would be granted the right of unrestricted passage of her Navy through the Straits at any time, whereas all other Powers except the other Black Sea countries, but including Germany and Italy, would in principle renounce the right of passage through the Straits for their naval vessels. The passage of commercial vessels through the Straits would, of course, have to remain free in principle.

Moscow, 1940.

No. 310

3941/E053653-54

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 10, 1940.

THE QUESTION OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN
DANUBE COMMISSION

The negotiations at present being conducted between representatives of Germany, Italy, Rumania, and the Soviet Union regarding the dissolution of the European Danube Commission had at first bogged down because of the intransigent attitude of the Soviet delegate. Germany, Italy, and Rumania took the position that for the transition period until the establishment, as planned, of a commission for the whole Danube, supervision of the administration of the maritime

Danube should be exercised by Germany, Italy, Rumania, and Soviet Russia. The Soviet delegate, on the other hand, took the position that for this period a purely Russo-Rumanian administration for the maritime Danube should be established to the exclusion of Germany and Italy. After long negotiations the attitude of the Soviet delegate became more accommodating in so far as he proposed on November 7¹ that a provisional agreement on the maritime Danube be confined to the four following points:

- 1) Dissolution of the European Danube Commission;
- 2) Formation of a liquidating committee consisting of the Plenipotentiaries of the four countries at the conference;
- 3) Establishment of a Soviet-Rumanian administration for the maritime Danube;
- 4) Common desire that a new conference should convene within a month after conclusion of the work of the Bucharest conference for the purpose of establishing a single commission for the entire Danube.

On November 8, instructions² were sent to the German delegate stating that we agreed to the proposed limitation to the four points, provided that the administration for the maritime Danube should in the future have the same functions as, previously, Rumania alone had had when she was the only riparian state of the Danube estuaries, and that the relationship of the subsequent new commission for the entire Danube to the administration of the maritime Danube should be the same as was formerly the relationship of the European Danube Commission to the Rumanian administration for the maritime Danube. On this condition we agreed that a Soviet-Rumanian administration for the maritime Danube should now be installed and incorporated into the later agreement on the commission for the entire Danube. As long as the commission for the entire Danube was not yet in existence, the committee of the four countries at the conference had to have the same rights with respect to the administration for the maritime Danube as the European Danube Commission previously had had.

If M. Molotov does not happen to bring up this question on his visit, it would hardly be advisable for Germany to broach it. Germany's interest in any case lies in preventing, even for the period of the transition, the establishment of a purely Russo-Rumanian maritime Danube administration.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

(Submitted directly for the sake of speed.)

¹ This proposal had been reported in Bucharest telegram No. 2026, sent Nov. 7 (2141/468356-57).

² Not printed (711/262164-67).

No. 311

174/136459-61.

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, November 11, 1940—10:05 a. m.

No. 1236 of November 11

Received November 11—7:05 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to telegrams No. 1224¹ and No. 1228² of November 7.

The Deputy Foreign Minister informed me that at the news of Molotov's trip to Berlin, the Foreign Minister had instructed Ambassador Kurusu to ask the Reich Foreign Minister to use Germany's influence in favor of the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Republic. Ambassador Kurusu had been informed in broad outline of the status of the Japanese-Russian negotiations, to the effect that Japan had proposed a nonaggression pact on the German-Russian pattern, but one which is to become effective upon signing, and to be followed by settlement of individual questions. The Soviet Government had desired a prior settlement and had reserved its position regarding a nonaggression pact.

The Deputy Foreign Minister emphasized the outstanding political success for Germany implicit in Molotov's very decision to come to Berlin, and urged that I, too, transmit to the Reich Foreign Minister the Japanese Foreign Minister's request for the good offices of the German Government. To that end he gave me the following general picture:

The political leaders of Japan, together with the Army and the Navy, were striving to attain the fullest combat readiness to carry out the Tripartite Pact. The most important means of accomplishing this were an understanding with Russia and settlement of the Chinese conflict. It was the joint view of the Foreign Minister, of the Army, and of the Navy that it was in Germany's interest, and within her power, to cooperate.

The Deputy Foreign Minister then summarized the Japanese requests as follows:

1. To bring influence to bear on Soviet Russia to accept the proposed nonaggression pact.
2. To bring influence to bear on Soviet Russia to stop supporting Chiang Kai-shek.
3. To bring influence to bear on Chiang Kai-shek to make peace with Japan.

¹ Document No. 299.

² This telegram reported information supplied by the Japanese Foreign Minister regarding the Japanese-Soviet negotiations in Moscow (see document No. 260). According to this telegram Japan had proposed to Molotov conclusion of a nonaggression pact patterned after the German-Soviet Pact followed by settlement of individual questions such as claims regarding oil and fisheries (174/136457).

The Deputy Foreign Minister added in strict confidence:

The Japanese Government is willing to come to an understanding with Russia on generous terms, but requires prior conclusion of the nonaggression pact in order to overcome the strong resistance to the planned understanding by influential circles of the opposition. In this connection, the Deputy Foreign Minister restated the main points of the understanding and of the ideas which the Foreign Minister communicated to the Reich Foreign Minister through Minister Stahmer,³ especially Japan's agreement to a Russian sphere of influence in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, if Soviet Russia could come to an understanding with the Chinese Government on that point. In the event of more extensive cooperation with the partners of the Tripartite Pact, Japan would raise no objections against the creation of a Russian sphere of interest in British India, notwithstanding her own considerable economic interests there. With respect to the understanding with Chiang Kai-shek, the Deputy Foreign Minister referred once more to Japan's main conditions, reported in telegram No. 1224, underlining Japan's extraordinary spirit of accommodation.

The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that Ambassador Kurusu had not been informed in detail of the subjects outlined above, so as to ensure secrecy regarding the present Cabinet's great desire for an understanding, which was not without danger to the latter. In case the Reich Foreign Minister should be favorably inclined toward the request to use his influence, Japanese policy would be best served if the foregoing ideas were presented to Soviet Russia and Chiang Kai-shek as being German suggestions.

OTT

³ No record found.

No. 312

F5/0414-15

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

IMMEDIATE
No. 1970

BERLIN, November 11, 1940—12: 00 midnight.
RAM 323.

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.

I request you to call at once on Señor Serrano Suñer and tell him the following:

I should like to invite Señor Serrano Suñer and Count Ciano¹ to the Berghof on November 18 for political discussions with the Führer.

¹ The invitation to Ciano was sent by telegram No. 1645 of Nov. 11 to the Embassy in Rome (2366/489252-53).

I should be especially pleased if Señor Suñer could come to this conference of the three countries on that date. I assume that he for his part too would consider it desirable at this time to continue the discussion of the questions already dealt with at Hendaye. Because of our other commitments only November 18 could be considered, and I hope very much that this date will be agreeable also to Señor Suñer.

If, as I definitely hope, Suñer gives you an affirmative reply, I request that you arrange the details of the trip with him. In order to be at the Berghof on the morning of November 18 he would probably have to leave Madrid on the morning of November 15. As soon as I get an affirmative reply from you I will send a parlor car for him to the Spanish border. I hope that this will still be possible.

I request an answer by telegram as soon as possible.²

RIBBENTROP

² Stohrer reported by telegram No. 3834 of Nov. 12 (136/74454) that Serrano Suñer accepted with pleasure the invitation to the Berghof. He had not yet discussed the matter with Franco but had no doubt that he would approve the journey.

No. 313

2401/500521

Minute by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, November 11, 1940.

zu Pol. I 1283¹ II g.

Herr von Steengracht telephoned me on November 8, 11:00 p. m. to inform me on instruction from the Foreign Minister, as follows:

The Foreign Minister is in full accord with the proposal submitted to him that the *Admiral Scheer* be given strict orders not to cruise in the "American security zone" for the purpose of attacking British shipping.

The Foreign Minister had the matter put before the Führer through Herr Hewel. The Führer then decided that the *Admiral Scheer* should receive strict orders to this effect. The word "strict" is to be emphasized in this.

I have conveyed this to Admiral Fricke.²

RITTER

¹ Pol. I 1283: Document No. 307.

² See *ibid.*

No. 314

265/172485

Memorandum by the Ambassador to Turkey

BERLIN (temporarily), November 11, 1940.

On the occasion of the luncheon which the Bulgarian Minister gave for me today the Turkish Ambassador discussed with me his visit with the Foreign Minister yesterday.¹

M. Gerede seemed exceedingly pleased with the general course of the conversation, which—as he emphasized—lasted almost an hour and was conducted in the friendliest manner by the Foreign Minister. He was happy to be able to state upon his impending return to Ankara that the Reich sincerely desired to improve its relations with Turkey. Herr von Ribbentrop had stated that he saw no difficulties in Turkey's entering again into close and friendly relations with the Reich, while maintaining the English connection. Unfortunately he, Gerede, had not had time to ask the Foreign Minister for cooperation in the Arab question. I might take that up later at some convenient opportunity.

Upon my impending return to Ankara, it would be of decisive importance, according to the Ambassador, if I brought with me personally a statement from the Führer for the State President. The State President, after all, made the decisions on Turkish policy on his sole responsibility.

PAPEN

¹ No memorandum of Ribbentrop's conversation with Gerede has been found.

No. 315

F3/0162-65

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, November 11, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER WITH THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, CHEN CHIEH, ON NOVEMBER 11, 1940

In response to a request by the Reich Foreign Minister, the Chinese Ambassador, Chen Chieh, appeared this afternoon at 6:30 p. m. The Foreign Minister first explained to the Chinese Ambassador in detail his opinions on the world political situation, and emphasized that he considered final victory by Germany a matter of course.

Germany's economic power was far superior in every respect even to American industry. Practically the entire resources of Europe were at the disposal of Germany, and a threat from the United States would to all intents and purposes be ineffective, since she could never land troops in Europe. The Tripartite Pact now concluded between Germany, Japan, and Italy had the purpose of consolidating the world in general, and first of all of preventing an extension of the existing conflict. The relations between Germany and China had been very good for a long time and were still good today, as the presence of an Embassy representative in Chungking showed. For years, however, the German Government had been entirely aware of the fact that England was systematically working for the destruction of Germany and was trying to encircle her. For this reason Germany had sought strong friends in the world who were in a situation similar to her own, and for this reason she had also strengthened her friendship with Japan; this had now resulted in the Tripartite Pact. The English idea of an encirclement of Germany had been a complete failure and England had herself now been encircled and could not escape destruction in any circumstances. Firmly convinced of a German victory, he (the Foreign Minister) took a purely personal interest in the situation in the Far East, including in the first place the prospects of a termination of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The Foreign Minister emphasized expressly, and once again at the close of the conversation, that the Japanese Government had not made any request of any sort of him, and that Germany also did not intend to intervene as a mediator in this conflict in any way, but that he simply was personally interested in learning the views of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict. The real reason for this conversation was for him (the Foreign Minister) the fact that the Japanese Government would probably recognize the Wang Ching-wei government in the near future, which would presumably result in recognition of that government by Germany, Italy, etc. However, if Marshal Chiang Kai-shek still believed in an English victory there was probably not much sense in the Ambassador's informing him. But if this should not be the case it would interest him (the Foreign Minister) purely personally to learn the Marshal's views; he considered the basic problem to be whether or not there was really any possibility of a compromise.

The Chinese Ambassador thanked the Foreign Minister very cordially for his extremely interesting statements, and said that in his opinion his Government would certainly be interested in a speedy conclusion of this conflict, that had already been going on for 40 months, and that he felt there was no use in fighting any longer. However, for the Marshal the prerequisite was the unconditional evacuation of

Japanese troops from Chinese soil. When the Foreign Minister interjected that in his opinion, though he did not know the details of the situation in China, this was hardly the basis for a solution, the Ambassador left the matter open.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister pointed out once more that he did not intend to assume the role of mediator if he were not expressly asked to do so by both sides. He would have to deny immediately and vigorously any statement to this effect that might appear in the press, whereupon the Ambassador said he had entirely understood the Foreign Minister's statements.¹

STAHRER

¹ For a reaction to Ribbentrop's statements in Chinese Government circles, cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1955), vol. iv, pp. 436-437.

[EDITORS' NOTE. In the Foreign Minister's files there is an unsigned notation of November 11 with the following text: "Discussion between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador, see under Japan, top secret material." (F3/0166)

No record of such a discussion has been found.]

No. 316

1447/364973-77

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 38

BERLIN, November 11, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE THAI MINISTER OF STATE, COLONEL PRAYURA MONTRI, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE MINISTER OF THAILAND,¹ ON NOVEMBER 11, 1940

Minister of State Prayura Montri began by presenting on behalf of his Government a silver box to the Foreign Minister, as a complimentary gift. The Foreign Minister expressed his thanks and then inquired about the life and career of the Minister of State. It turned out that the latter had been born in Berlin, where his father had been Siamese Military Attaché and Chargé d'Affaires, and that he had made frequent visits to Germany, the last time in 1937 for a 1-year command assignment with the German Army.

¹ Prasasna Bhidhyayudha.

The Foreign Minister then gave in broad strokes a picture of the present military and political situation. The Führer no longer would permit any Anglo-Saxon to set foot on the European Continent and to interfere in European affairs. From the military standpoint, Germany had already won the war. Sooner or later England would collapse. This could possibly happen in the course of the present winter, however the war could drag on into next year. Germany was prepared for any eventuality and could wage war for a further 5 years or more, if this should be necessary. If the English had showed common sense, they would have made peace in order to salvage at least something. However, since they were unreasonable they would refuse to do so even at a time when every rational person could see clearly that they were merely aggravating their collapse by continuing the struggle. Moreover, the Führer today would no longer enter into a compromise with them but was firmly resolved to crush England and once and for all settle matters in accordance with German interests.

The Foreign Minister then took up the two hopes entertained by England for an improvement of her position. As a result of the visit of Molotov to Berlin, people in England would surely recognize that wooing the Soviet Union had been in vain. In the United States, President Roosevelt had been re-elected, to be sure, but with a very slim majority over a candidate who up to recently had been totally unknown. This showed that among the American people the feeling was instinctive that Roosevelt's policy boded ill for them. The possibilities that America would come to the aid of England must be considered as slight, particularly in view of the fact that Japan lay in wait in the Pacific, and that the United States fleet was inferior to that of the Japanese. Also, the deliveries by America of war materials to England would be increasingly restricted by German naval measures. So far, Germany had only been toying with its submarine weapon, and only now the measures which the Führer had pursued over a long period of time for strengthening this arm were beginning to show results. The world would still be in for some surprises in this regard. As a result of the establishment of an anti-English front on the Continent, which France, too, would now join, and in view of the many friends the Axis Powers had outside of Europe, the situation for America, politically speaking, would be such that it would virtually have to declare war on the entire world if it should intervene directly in favor of England.

In these circumstances Germany was able to face the future in full serenity and confidence.

After these remarks on the general situation, which Minister of State Prayura Montri had endorsed, partly with great vigor, espe-

cially as regards the defeat of England and the elimination of this international troublemaker from Asiatic politics, Minister of State Prayura Montri brought up also the question of Indochina. In consideration of the friendly relations between Thailand and Germany and in view of the fact that Germany had occupied a large part of France, Thailand did not wish to undertake anything against Indochina before first getting in touch with Germany. Nevertheless she felt compelled to win back in some manner or other those parts of Indochina which had formerly belonged to Thailand and which were inhabited by a Thai population. If no other solution were left, Thailand would take back these territories by force.

The Foreign Minister replied that he was not briefed in detail on conditions in Indochina, and was therefore unable to take any final position on the question just raised until he had studied the situation, which he would do forthwith. However, he called attention to the meeting between the Führer and Marshal Pétain, in the course of which a basic policy line had been laid down with the French, which was embodied in the theme of "cooperation against Britain." France would turn away from England and in concert with Germany would pursue a strictly continental policy. This was something entirely new. However, it was of importance for Germany to consolidate the position of the Vichy Government so that the French colonial empire would not fall into the hands of General de Gaulle who was now giving himself airs as conqueror of Africa and who in any event was working solely in the interest of the English. Territorial changes could perhaps be envisaged at a peace settlement, but if France now behaved reasonably, Germany would have no interest in taking away colonies from the French and thus committing the same mistake which the Allies made with respect to Germany in 1918. The Führer's thoughts in these matters ran along more modern lines, and he knew that a country like France had need of raw materials and foodstuffs from its colonies. Germany therefore wished to preserve peace and tranquillity in the French colonial empire and in this way prevent the French colonies from passing over to de Gaulle and thus to England; this of course left open the possibility of territorial changes to be made at the time when peace would be concluded, since it was surely clear that the French would somehow have to pay for the war. Once England was vanquished, however, there would be certain possibilities of compensation, whereby French losses in territory could be compensated for at English expense.

The Foreign Minister emphasized once more that he could not express a definite opinion on the question raised by M. Prayura Montri because he would first have to study the details, but that nevertheless

he wanted to indicate in a very general way Germany's interest in preserving peace and quiet in the French colonial empire. He believed that peace would be concluded in the course of the next year at the latest; and he could imagine that on this occasion there would be possibilities for reaching a peaceful settlement also of the question broached by Colonel Prayura Montri.

To the question of the Foreign Minister whether there were any prospects for a peaceful settlement, Minister of State Prayura Montri replied that reasonable Frenchmen recognized the need of making cessions of territory in Indochina to Thailand, but that the entire problem had become a matter of prestige, especially since the defeat of France, and thereby had become more difficult. To a further question of the Foreign Minister he declared that the territories involved were not of any vital importance for France nor of great economic significance, but that Thailand attached great importance to these territories for reasons of nationalism, since they were inhabited by a Thai-speaking population.

The Foreign Minister answered that while he did not wish to give advice to the Thai Government, he nevertheless wished to point out that the experience of history had shown that when an outside country attempted to profit from the difficult position of a country in defeat, greater disadvantages often ensued, and that it would be better in any case to study carefully all possibilities for a pacific settlement before resorting to force.

Minister of State Prayura Montri stated that he fully and completely grasped the point of view of the Foreign Minister, and that he only wanted to add a plea for support of Thailand's claims.

The Foreign Minister asked further whether the matter was very urgent, and when the Thai emissary stated his anxiety about a possible intervention by England or America he replied that England would hardly be in a position to undertake anything in this respect, while the Japanese would surely not permit the United States to gain a foothold in East Asia. The Japanese fleet would in such a case certainly defeat the American Navy. He did not believe, therefore, that the problem raised by the Thai Minister had to be solved in haste.

Furthermore he would be glad to see the emissary again at a later date, after he himself had studied the problems.²

Upon leave-taking the Thai emissary also asked for German intercession with the Soviet Government. Since Thailand maintained no diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, he (Prayura Montri) wanted to make an official visit to Moscow following his stay in Germany, and

² No record of a further conversation between Ribbentrop and Montri has been found. See document No. 484.

he asked the Foreign Minister to use his good offices with the Russians regarding this visit. The Foreign Minister agreed to do so.³

SCHMIDT

³ A copy of this memorandum was sent to Schulenburg on Nov. 23 with the instruction to inform the Soviet Government regarding Montri's projected visit (1447/364972). According to Schulenburg's telegram No. 2565 of Nov. 25, the Soviet Government asked for more personal data regarding Montri and inquired about the purpose of his trip (1447/364978). In telegrams No. 2162 of Nov. 25 and No. 2180 of Nov. 27 (1447/364979-81) sent by Woermann, Schulenburg received additional information about Montri and was told that the purpose of the latter's visit to Moscow would be negotiations about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and the Soviet Union. In telegram No. 2611 of Nov. 28, Schulenburg reported that the Soviet Government agreed to the visit (1447/364983).

No. 317

104/112815-16

Memorandum by the State Secretary

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, November 11, 1940.

TOP SECRET

St.S. No. 189

To the Foreign Minister, with the following summary regarding special questions which might come up for discussion with Molotov.

I

Besides the questions of high policy (attitude of Russia toward the war, including the Italo-Greek conflict, attitude of Russia toward the Tripartite Pact alignment, Straits question) the following are suitable for discussion:

The relation of Russia to Afghanistan and Iran;
British attempts at rapprochement with Russia;¹

German relations with Finland (regarding Petsamo a separate memorandum has already been submitted²);

The guarantee of the Axis Powers to Rumania; (see annex 1 for a separate memorandum on this subject³).

II

Economic Policy:

The status of German-Soviet economic negotiations is satisfactory at present (see annex 2⁴).

¹ The Political Department on Nov. 11 submitted to the Under State Secretary a brief memorandum dealing with Soviet policy in Asia and with British attempts to effect a rapprochement with the Soviet Union (104/112819-22).

² See document No. 308.

³ Not found.

⁴ See document No. 318.

The strip of Lithuanian territory is tied up with an "appropriate compensation" of an economic nature (see annex 3⁸).

Lapse of the Memel Free Port Treaties.⁹ If the Soviet Government recognizes the lapse, the settlement of property rights can be negotiated without difficulty. (See annex 4.⁷)

III

Resettlement from the Baltic States, Bessarabia, and northern Bucovina:

In the matter of indemnification, Molotov should be reminded that on July 27 [29]⁸ and August 12⁹ he expressly promised to safeguard all German property interests of German citizens and of Volksdeutsche in the Baltic States. Thus far, indemnification negotiations are progressing very unsatisfactorily in the Baltic States as well as in Bessarabia and northern Bucovina.¹⁰

The option for German nationality must alone determine the right of resettlement from Lithuania. (The Soviet negotiators demand documentary proof of nationality.)

In Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, 160 prisoners entitled to resettlement have not yet been released. (Cf. annexes 5 and 6.¹¹)

IV

German and Soviet Russian Missions abroad:

The German Missions in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn, are liquidating their business as consular authorities by certain dates. It would be worth while retaining Riga as a permanent Mission. (We still tolerate the Soviet Consulates in Oslo and in Brussels. A similar privilege is enjoyed only by the Italians.) (See annex 7 for details.¹²)

If the occasion arises, it might be mentioned that Mme. Kollontay in Stockholm is in the habit of making anti-German remarks to third persons.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁸ See document No. 319.

⁹ See document No. 24, footnote 5.

⁷ Not printed (104/112827-28).

⁸ See vol. x of this series, document No. 251.

⁹ This evidently refers to a statement made in a Soviet memorandum of Aug. 12 (1379/357775-78). Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 332 and footnote 2.

¹⁰ See document No. 202.

¹¹ These annexes have not been definitely identified. One of them might be a memorandum of Nov. 11 by Schliep concerning the return of German citizens who had been arrested in the Soviet Union (104/112835-39).

Regarding the documentation on the resettlement problem in Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, see vol. x of this series, document No. 50, footnote 4.

¹² Not printed (104/112829-30).

No. 318

104/112823-24

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 11, 1940.

GERMAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS¹

The present economic negotiations in Moscow² involve first of all an examination of the way both sides have carried out deliveries during the first treaty year, in which there was a deficit of 82 million reichsmarks in the contemplated German deliveries. Besides, deliveries for the second treaty year are to be agreed upon. At the commencement of the negotiations the Soviet representatives showed great reserve both with regard to further Russian deliveries, which are so important to us, of raw materials and food, particularly grain, as well as regarding the acceptance of German deliveries with which we wished to balance the deficit. They put the main emphasis on German deliveries—with terms as short as possible—of machine tools, for example, which at present are particularly difficult for us, but appeared to want to defer action on the particularly large, long-term German deliveries which had been previously discussed, such as plant installations.

In the last few days a change has taken place in the Soviet attitude. The Soviet side has definitely promised 1.2 million tons of grain and will consider the delivery of another million tons (German wish: 2.5 million tons). Furthermore, an agreement in principle was reached on the delivery of 38-cm. armored turrets³ in the amount of 85 million reichsmarks, on which account the Russians want to make a down payment of 20 percent, or 17 million reichsmarks. The Russians have also declared their willingness to accept payment in gold instead of particularly valuable machinery which we are unable to deliver at present. Agreements regarding armor plate, pipe, railroad material, merchant ships, dredging machines, cranes, etc., are pending.

Subject to the report of Minister Schnurre, we might express to M. Molotov, if he touches upon the status of the economic negotiations, our satisfaction at the course they have taken lately, as well as the hope that an agreement satisfactory to both sides will soon be reached.

To be submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

¹ See document No. 317.² See document No. 170.³ See document No. 275.

No. 319

104/112825-26

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 11, 1940.

THE STRIP OF LITHUANIAN TERRITORY ¹

In the note of August 12, 1940, the Soviet Government offered for the strip of Lithuanian territory a compensation of 3,860,000 gold dollars, payable within 2 years in gold or merchandise, at the option of the German Government, i.e., half of the sum which was paid to Russia by the United States for Alaska.²

A note has been prepared, according to which a German renunciation of the territory could be considered against "appropriate compensation." Following presentation of the matter by Minister Schnurre on October 19, the Reich Foreign Minister gave orders that the note should not be sent for the time being, because he would submit it again to the Führer and then would report the decision.³ Until then the matter was not to be discussed with the Russians during the resettlement negotiations in Kaunas or the economic negotiations in Moscow.

Immediate grain deliveries valued at 13 million gold dollars would be considered "appropriate compensation" in the sense of the draft reply. The 13 million gold dollars are computed according to the land valuation of the area concerned, on the basis of Lithuanian land values. On the basis of East Prussian land values it would amount to approximately 42 million gold dollars.

In the note the Russians were to be further asked to satisfy German grain requirements for the second treaty year to a total amount of 2.5 million tons. In the meantime, at the negotiations in Moscow, the Russians have already promised grain in the amount of 1.2 million tons—the issue of the strip of Lithuanian territory not having been mentioned. M. Mikoyan wanted to consider further the possibility of delivering another million tons. The question as to how the Russian grain deliveries are to tie in with the issue of the strip of Lithuanian territory therefore requires re-examination after the return of Minister Schnurre.

To be submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

¹ See document No. 317.

² See vol. x, document No. 332 and footnote 2.

³ See document No. 43 and footnote 2.

No. 320

230/152349-50

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

BERLIN, November 11, 1940.

zu Pol. I M 14676 g.¹

Subject: Yugoslav claims to Salonika.

Although the Yugoslav Minister of War, Nedić, has in the meantime resigned from his post,² the démarches made on his instructions by the Yugoslav Military Attaché³ here with the Attaché Branch of the OKH on November 4 and 6 are of political interest.

The Yugoslav Military Attaché, Colonel Vauhnik, stated both times on instructions of General Nedić that the question of the free port of Salonika was vital for Yugoslavia. He stressed that he was under instructions to put out feelers with the highest German military authorities to find what steps would be appropriate to secure Yugoslavia's interests in Salonika.⁴ Direct negotiations with Italy were out of the question. He intimated that in return for mediating in favor of Yugoslavia Germany might perhaps be able to make certain demands on Yugoslavia, which the War Minister (the War Minister who has resigned in the meantime) wished to explore through him.

After the resignation of General Nedić, Colonel Vauhnik stated briefly on another occasion that he had very definitely pigeonholed the entire matter and would probably have nothing more to do with it.

A draft telegram for the information of Minister von Heeren is appended.⁵

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through Ambassador Ritter and the State Secretary.

VON GROTE

¹ Pol. I M 14676 g. : Not found.

² General Nedić resigned as Minister of War on Nov. 6 and was replaced by General Pešić.

³ Col. Vladimir Vauhnik.

⁴ These instructions were apparently drafted by Cincar-Marković and General Nedić as a result of decisions taken in a conference at Prince Paul's palace on Oct. 28, 1940, which was attended also by Cvetković, Cincar-Marković, Nedić, General Kosić, Chief of the General Staff, Milan Antić, Minister of the Royal Court. Portions of the minutes of this conference have been published in a Yugoslav magazine in London. See, R. L. Knežević, "Kako se to z bilo: Grčko-italijanski rat, Solun i Jugoslavija," *Poruka*, Nos. 4 and 5 (London, October 1951); see also, R. L. Knežević, "Hitler, Prince Paul and Salonika," *International Affairs*, vol. xxvii (1951), pp. 39-44.

⁵ Not printed (230/152351).

No. 321

368/207238-39

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 227

FRIEDENS-HWIX, November 12, 1940—10:35 a. m.

Received November 12—10:55 a. m.

With reference to my report—VAA 3536—of November 2.¹

The OKW has made the following interim decisions regarding the handling by the Armistice Commission of General Huntziger's military proposals:²

1. The Chief of OKW approves, in connection with the negotiations with the French, the immediate initiation of studies on the following subjects:

- a) Scope and effects of the French demands presented in the memoranda in specific terms.
- b) Precise data and explanations regarding the French demands.
- c) Amount of the war material which they wish to dispatch from metropolitan France.

The negotiations are to be conducted on a noncommittal basis so that final decision on French wishes would be left open in principle.

2. The following questions are not to be discussed at this time:

- a) Occupation costs.
- b) Reservations regarding the war economy.³
- c) Reinforcements for Indochina (a negative decision will be forthcoming).
- d) Line of demarcation.
- e) Northeast line.

3. Additional political negotiations with the French are in prospect. It is the task of the Armistice Commission to continue the negotiations with the French, although no final decisions have as yet been made, and in doing so to maintain the impression on the French side that the talks now in progress are not intended to be broken off.⁴

HENCKE

¹ Not found.² See document No. 272 and footnote 2.³ The point at issue in this connection had been spelled out in telegram No. 218 of Nov. 5 from Wiesbaden (368/207220-21).⁴ The Armistice Commission further reported on Nov. 14 (telegram No. 232: 368/207253) the following:

"On the basis of the decision of the Führer, the Armistice Commission has now informed the French delegation of OKW's agreement that the following measures proposed in General Huntziger's memorandum can be carried out:

"1) Formation of a mobile unit for French West Africa equivalent to a reinforced infantry regiment, as well as release of the necessary matériel

No. 322

B19/B003854

Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department

BERLIN, November 12, 1940.

Pol. VI 3531 g.

The Finnish Counselor of Legation, Lundström, substituting for Minister Kivimäki, who is ill, wanted to give me a memorandum this noon. After conferring with Under State Secretary Woermann, I sent him to the latter. Herr Woermann will receive Counselor of Legation Lundström this afternoon at 5:00 o'clock.

The memorandum had the following content:

The Finnish Legation assumes that political conversations regarding continental Europe are under way at the present time. In case these conversations also affected Finland, Finland would appreciate it if Germany could strengthen Finland's position in the course of them. At the same time the Finnish Legation wanted to give assurance that Finland was on the one hand eager to strengthen and deepen the relations with Germany and on the other wanted nothing else in connection with Russia but to be able to live and work in peace within the area belonging to her after the last peace treaty.

GRUNDHERR

No. 323

8589/E602763-71

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 12, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
WFSt/Abt. L(I) No. 33 356/40 g. K. Chefs
By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 18

The measures of the High Commands which are being prepared for the conduct of the war in the near future are to be in accordance with the following guiding principles:

1. *Relations with France*

The aim of my policy toward France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future prosecution of the

for it from stocks in the mother country in so far as such matériel is not available in the North African depots.

"2) Replenishment of the stocks of ammunition for all armed forces in West Africa from depots in North Africa and the mother country.

"3) Formation of a fourth bomber unit in French West Africa.

"4) Formation of two units of large unarmed transport planes for the transport of troops and foodstuffs."

war against England. For the time being France will have the role of a "nonbelligerent power" which will have to tolerate German military measures on her territory, in the African colonies especially, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their African possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) against England and the de Gaulle movement. From this task the participation of France in the war against England can develop in full force.

Except for the current work of the Armistice Commission, the discussions with France which tie in with my meeting with Marshal Pétain¹ will initially be conducted exclusively by the Foreign Ministry in cooperation with the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

More detailed directives will follow after the conclusion of these discussions.

2. *Spain and Portugal*

Political measures to induce the prompt entry of Spain into the war have been initiated.² The aim of *German* intervention in the Iberian Peninsula (code name *Felix*) will be to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean.

For this purpose:

- a) Gibraltar should be taken and the Straits closed;
- b) The English should be prevented from gaining a foothold at another point of the Iberian Peninsula or of the Atlantic islands.

For the preparation and execution of the undertaking the following is intended:

Section I:

a) Reconnaissance parties (officers in civilian clothes) will conclude the requisite preparations for the operation against Gibraltar and for the taking over of airfields. As regards camouflage and cooperation with the Spaniards they are bound by the security measures of the Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Department.

b) Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Department in disguised cooperation with the Spaniards are to take over the protection of the Gibraltar area against English attempts to extend the outpost area or prematurely to discover and disturb the preparations.

c) The units designated for the action will assemble in readiness far back of the Franco-Spanish border and without premature explanation being given to the troops. A preliminary alert for beginning the operation will be issued 3 weeks before the troops cross the Franco-Spanish border (but only after conclusion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic islands).

¹ See document No. 227.

² See documents Nos. 220 and 312.

In view of the limited capacity of the Spanish railroads the Army will mainly designate motorized units for the operation so that the railways remain available for supply.

Section II:

a) Directed by observation near Algeciras, Luftwaffe units at a favorable moment will conduct an aerial attack from French soil against the units of the English fleet lying in the harbor of Gibraltar and after the attack they will land on Spanish airports.

b) Shortly thereafter the units designated for commitment in Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish border by land or by air.

Section III:

a) The attack for the seizure of Gibraltar is to be by German troops.

b) Troops are to be assembled to march into Portugal in case the English should gain a foothold there. The units designated for this will march into Spain immediately after the forces designated for Gibraltar.

Section IV:

Support of the Spaniards in closing the Strait after seizure of the Rock, if necessary, from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well.

The following will apply regarding the *strength* of the units to be committed for Operation *Felias*:

Army:

The units designated for Gibraltar must be strong enough to take the Rock even without Spanish help.

Along with this a smaller group must be available to support the Spaniards in the unlikely event of an English attempt at a landing on another part of the coast.

For the possible march into Portugal mobile units are mainly to be designated.

Luftwaffe:

For the aerial attack on the harbor of Gibraltar forces are to be designated which will guarantee abundant success.

For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive bomber units are to be transferred to Spain.

Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be allocated to the army units including its use against ground targets.

Navy:

U-boats are to be provided for combating the English Gibraltar squadron, and particularly in its evacuation of the harbor which is to be expected after the aerial attack.

For support of the Spaniards in closing the Strait the transfer of *individual* coastal batteries is to be prepared in cooperation with the Army.

Italian participation is not envisaged.

The *Atlantic islands* (particularly the Canaries and the Cape Verde Islands) will, as a result of the Gibraltar operation, gain increased importance for the English conduct of the war at sea as well as for our own naval operations. The Commanders in Chief of the Navy and of the Luftwaffe are to study how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.

I likewise request examination of the question of occupation of Madeira and of the Azores as well as of the question of the advantages and disadvantages which would ensue for the naval and for the aerial conduct of the war. The results of this examination are to be presented to me as soon as possible.

3. *Italian Offensive against Egypt.*

If at all, the commitment of German forces comes into consideration only when the Italians have reached Mersa Matrûh.⁹ Even then the commitment initially of German air forces is envisaged only if the Italians make available the requisite air bases.

The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for commitment in this or in any other North African theater of war are to be continued within the following framework:

Army:

Holding in readiness of an armored division (composition as previously provided for) for commitment in North Africa.

Navy:

Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible units either to Libya or to Northwest Africa.

Luftwaffe:

Preparation for offensive operations against Alexandria and the Suez Canal in order to close the latter against use by the English High Command.

4. *Balkans*

The Commander in Chief of the Army will make preparations in order, in case of necessity, to occupy the *Greek mainland* north of the Aegean Sea, entering from Bulgaria, and thereby make possible the commitment of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially against those English air bases which threaten the Rumanian oil area.

In order to be equal to all possible missions and to hold Turkey in check, the commitment of an army group of an approximate strength of 10 divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the

⁹ See Editor's Note, p. 462.

calculations for strategic concentration. It will not be possible to count on the railway leading through Yugoslavia for the strategic concentration of these forces. In order to shorten the time needed for the concentration, a prompt reinforcement of the German Army mission in Rumania is to be prepared on a scale which is to be proposed to me.

The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe will, in harmony with the intended Army operations, prepare for the employment of German Luftwaffe units in the southeast Balkans and for establishment of an aircraft warning service on the southern border of Bulgaria.

The German Luftwaffe mission in Rumania will be reinforced to an extent to be proposed to me.

The wishes of the *Bulgarians* for equipping their Army (deliveries of weapons and munitions) ⁴ are to be given favorable treatment.

5. *Russia*

Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the coming period. Regardless of what results these discussions will have, all preparations for the East which already have been orally ordered, are to be continued.⁵

Directives on this will follow as soon as the outline of the Army's plan of operations is submitted to, and approved by me.

6. *Landing in England*

Because, with changes in the over-all situation, the possibility or necessity may arise to return in the spring of 1941 to Operation *Seelowe*,⁶ the three branches of the armed forces must earnestly try in every way to improve the groundwork for such an operation.

7. *Reports of the Commanders in Chief*

Will be expected by me regarding the measures envisaged in this directive. I shall then issue orders regarding the methods of execution and the synchronization of the individual actions.

In order to guard secrecy, special measures are to be taken for restricting the numbers of the working staffs. This applies particularly for the operation in Spain and for the plans regarding the Atlantic islands.

ADOLF HITLER

⁴ See document No. 384.

⁵ See vol. x of this series, Editors' Note, p. 370. For the subsequent planning, see Helmuth Greiner, *Die oberste Wehrmachtführung, 1939-1943* (Wiesbaden, 1951), pp. 288-312. The text of the OKW directive of Aug. 7, 1940 (Aufbau Ost) concerning the preliminary expansion of military facilities in the East is filmed on M294/M012560-62.

⁶ See Editors' Note, p. 105.

No. 324

5114/E295518-19

Note by the Director of the News Service and Press Department

BERLIN, November 12, 1940.

For the Foreign Minister.

As I have already stated in a note,¹ Gregorić, the political director of the Yugoslav newspaper *Vreme*, is at present staying in Berlin.² Since the departure of Stojadinović,³ he has actually been the leading spirit of the pro-German political tendency in Yugoslavia and has been brought into *Vreme* as Commissar and political director at our instigation. He is a very intelligent man, of personally irreproachable character. For a considerable time he had wished to come to Germany, but I have always treated the matter in a dilatory fashion. I did not see any possibility of further delaying his visit. At the very beginning of his visit he expressed the wish to call on the Foreign Minister. I told him at the outset that I saw only a very slim possibility of his wish being fulfilled. The State Secretary has received Gregorić, and while exercising great reserve he had a conversation with him in which general questions were discussed.⁴ Several times during this conversation Gregorić tried to bring up matters which, as he emphasizes to me all the time, he wants me to bring to the Foreign Minister's attention. Gregorić who admits that prior to his journey he had talked at length with Cvetković and Cincar-Marković obviously has instructions to explore the German attitude toward the Yugoslav question. His ideas which he expressed to me and to the State Secretary and which, as he states, he would like to present to the Foreign Minister, are as follows:

Yugoslavia would like to seize a suitable opportunity to align herself more closely with Germany. Domestic political developments were increasingly in this direction. The so-called unreliable elements, as he calls them, are going to meet with disaster in domestic politics. He visualizes the rapprochement in the form of an intensive development of economic relations such as building projects (road building,

¹ Not found.

² In telegram No. 795 of Nov. 3, Heeren reported that Gregorić had told him he was going to Berlin the next day; the purpose of his journey, apart from business matters, was to gather information on Germany's present attitude toward Yugoslavia. Gregorić had requested that a meeting with the German Foreign Minister be arranged. Heeren assumed that the journey of Gregorić was inspired by the Minister President (230/152332). For Gregorić's own account of his conversation with Heeren and the background of his visit to Berlin, see Danilo Gregorić, *So endete Jugoslawien* (Leipzig, 1943), pp. 95-98.

³ Milan Stojadinović, Yugoslav Minister President, June 1935-Feb. 1939.

⁴ No record found. There is, however, in the State Secretary's file a memorandum by Wiehl recording a conversation with Gregorić on Nov. 7 in the course of which the latter suggested that Germany participate in existing projects of Italo-Yugoslav economic cooperation for the development of Yugoslav resources (230/152338-40).

bridge building, etc.). In the background, of course, as he hinted time and again, the question of Salonika becomes very large. An Italian Salonika is the rope around the neck of Yugoslavia; that is his position. Gregorić also hinted cautiously that Yugoslavia was prepared to make territorial concessions to the Italians; his main trump card is that Yugoslavia is prepared to demilitarize the entire Aegean [*Adriatic?*] coast.⁵ In so doing he presupposes, as a matter of course, a German-Italian guarantee of the Yugoslav state. In all these conversations with Gregorić, I was very anxious to keep my distance and I confined myself to listening to his ideas which purposely I regarded as an expression of his private opinion.⁶

In case I do not receive different instructions I intend to inform Gregorić tomorrow noon in a definite way that the Foreign Minister is unable to receive him because he is busy.⁷

DR. SCHMIDT

⁵ See document No. 417.

⁶ For Gregorić's account of his conversations with Schmidt, see Danilo Gregorić, *So endete Jugoslawien*, pp. 99-102.

⁷ Marginal note: "I want to receive him some time later on. Ribbentrop." According to Gregorić, he was again invited to Germany on Nov. 21 and had conversations with Ribbentrop on Nov. 23 and 24. See Danilo Gregorić, *So endete Jugoslawien*, pp. 108-116. No record of these conversations has been found in German Foreign Ministry files. See, however, document No. 392 and footnote 3.

No. 325

66/46290-313

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 41

BERLIN, November 13, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE USSR AND PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, V. M. MOLOTOV, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEKANOZOV, AS WELL AS COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY HILGER AND M. PAVLOV, WHO ACTED AS INTERPRETERS; HELD IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 12, 1940

After some introductory words the Reich Foreign Minister stated that since the two visits which he had made to Moscow last year much had happened. Referring to the talks which he had had in Moscow with the Russian statesmen,¹ and supplementing what he had recently written in the letter to Stalin,² he now wanted to make a few

¹ See vol. VII of this series, document No. 213; vol. VIII of this series, document No. 152.

² Document No. 176.

more statements regarding the German view of the general situation and on Russo-German relations, without thereby anticipating the Führer, who would talk in detail with M. Molotov in the afternoon and would give him his considered opinion, regarding the political situation. After this discussion with the Führer, there would be further opportunities for talks with the Reich Foreign Minister, and it might be assumed that this German-Russian exchange of views would have a favorable effect upon the relations between the two countries.

Molotov replied that the contents of the letter to Stalin, which already contained a general review of events since last autumn, were known to him, and he hoped that the analysis given in the letter would be supplemented by oral statements of the Führer with regard to the over-all situation and German-Russian relations.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that in the letter to Stalin he had already expressed the firm conviction of Germany, which he wished to stress again on this occasion, that no power on earth could alter the fact that the beginning of the end had now arrived for the British Empire. England was beaten, and it was only a question of time when she would finally admit her defeat. It was possible that this would happen soon, because in England the situation was deteriorating daily. Germany would, of course, welcome an early conclusion of the conflict, since she did not wish in any circumstances to sacrifice human lives unnecessarily. If, however, the English did not make up their minds in the immediate future to admit their defeat, they would definitely ask for peace during the coming year. Germany was continuing her bombing attacks on England day and night. Her submarines would gradually be employed to the full extent and would inflict terrible losses on England. Germany was of the opinion that England could perhaps be forced by these attacks to give up the struggle. A certain uneasiness was already apparent in Great Britain, which seemed to indicate such a solution. If, however, England were not forced to her knees by the present mode of attack, Germany would, as soon as weather conditions permitted, resolutely proceed to a large-scale attack and thereby definitely crush England. This large-scale attack had thus far been prevented only by abnormal weather conditions.

On the other hand, England hoped for aid from the United States, whose support, however, was extremely questionable. Regarding possible military operations by land, the entry of the United States into the war was of no consequence at all for Germany. Germany and Italy would never again allow an Anglo-Saxon to land on the European Continent. The aid which England could get from the American fleet was also very uncertain. Thus, America would confine herself to sending war material, primarily planes, to the British. How much

of this material would really arrive in England it was difficult to say. It might be assumed, however, that as a result of the measures taken by the German Navy, shipments from America would arrive in England only in very meager quantities, so that in this respect, too, American support was more than doubtful. In these circumstances, the question of whether America would enter the war or not was a matter of complete indifference to Germany.

As to the political situation, the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that now, after the conclusion of the French campaign, Germany was extraordinarily strong. The Führer would probably give M. Molotov further information on this point. The course of the war had brought neither losses of personnel—as regrettable as the sacrifices might be for the families directly afflicted—nor material losses of any importance. Germany, therefore, had at her disposal an extraordinarily large number of divisions, and her air force was constantly growing stronger. The submarines and other naval units were continually being augmented. In those circumstances, any attempt at a landing or at military operations on the European Continent by England or by England backed by America was doomed to complete failure at the start. This was no military problem at all. This the English had not yet understood, because apparently there was some degree of confusion in Great Britain and because the country was led by a political and military dilettante by the name of Churchill, who throughout his previous career had completely failed at all decisive moments and who would fail again this time.

Furthermore, the Axis completely dominated its part of Europe militarily and politically. Even France, which had lost the war and had to pay for it (of which the French, incidentally, were quite aware) had accepted the principle that France in the future would never again support England but would line up in the fighting front against England and against de Gaulle, the quixotic conqueror of Africa. Because of the extraordinary strength of their position, the Axis Powers were not, therefore, considering how they might win the war, but rather how rapidly they could end the war which was already won.

As a result of this whole development, i. e., the natural desire of Germany and Italy to end the war as rapidly as possible, both countries had looked around for friends who pursued the same interest, that is, who were against any extension of the war and aimed at a speedy conclusion of the war. The Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan had been the result of these efforts. The Reich Foreign Minister could state confidentially that a number of other countries had also declared their solidarity with the ideas of the Tripartite Pact.

In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that during the talks on the Tripartite Pact, which were concluded very rapidly, as he had already stated in the letter to Stalin, one idea had been paramount in the minds of all three participants, namely, that the Pact should not in any way disturb the relationship of the Three Powers to Russia. This idea had been advanced by the Reich Foreign Minister and had been at once spontaneously approved by Italy and Japan. Japan, in particular—whose friendship for Germany, in view of the warmongering agitation in the United States, was of special importance in the interest of preventing a spread of the war—had given it her backing. Relations with Russia were clarified in article 5 of the Tripartite Pact of Berlin and had actually been the first subject settled.³

The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that from the very first moment of his Moscow visit he had made clear his view that in the basic foreign policy of the new Germany, friendship with Japan (as expressed in the Tripartite Pact) and friendship with Russia were not only absolutely consistent with each other but could be of positive value in the realization of this foreign policy so far as the desire for a speedy end to the war is concerned—a desire which was surely shared by Soviet Russia. Molotov would recall that the Reich Foreign Minister had stated in Moscow that Germany would very much welcome an improvement in relations between Russia and Japan. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) had taken with him to Germany Stalin's concurrence in the idea that it would also be in the Russian interest if Germany would exert her influence in Tokyo in favor of a Russo-Japanese rapprochement. The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that he had consistently exerted this influence in Tokyo, and he believed that his work had to a certain degree already been effective. Not only since his Moscow visit, but even seven to eight years ago, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) in conversations with the Japanese had always advocated Russo-Japanese accord. He took the position that just as it had been possible to delimit the mutual spheres of interest between Soviet Russia and Germany, a delimitation of interests could also be achieved between Japan and Russia. With regard to her Lebensraum policy, Japan now was oriented not toward the east and north, but toward the south, and the Reich Foreign Minister believed that by his influence he had contributed something to this development. Another reason why Germany had striven for an understanding with Japan was the realization that England would some day go to war against the Reich. Therefore, in good season Germany had adopted an appropriate policy toward Japan.

³ See document No. 118.

The Führer now was of the opinion that it would be advantageous in any case if the attempt were made to establish the spheres of influence between Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan along very broad lines. The Führer had considered this question long and thoroughly, and he had reached the following conclusion: By reason of the position which the four nations occupied in the world, a wise policy would normally direct the momentum of their Lebensraum expansion entirely southward. Japan had already turned toward the south, and she would have to work for centuries in order to consolidate her territorial gains in the south. Germany had defined her spheres of influence with Russia, and after the establishment of a new order in Western Europe she would also find her Lebensraum expansion to be in a southerly direction, i.e., in Central Africa in the region of the former German colonies. Similarly, Italian expansion was to the south in the African portion of the Mediterranean, i.e., North and East Africa. He, the Foreign Minister, wondered whether Russia in the long run would not also turn to the south for the natural outlet to the open sea that was so important for Russia. These were, the Reich Foreign Minister stated in conclusion, the great concepts which during recent months had frequently been discussed between the Führer and himself and which were also to be presented to Molotov on the occasion of the Berlin visit.

To a question by Molotov as to which sea the Reich Foreign Minister had meant when he had just spoken of access to the sea, the latter replied that according to German opinion great changes would take place all over the world after the war. He recalled the fact that he had declared to Stalin in Moscow that England no longer had the right to dominate the world. England was pursuing an insane policy, for which she would some day have to pay the cost. Germany believed, therefore, that great changes would occur in the status of British imperial possessions. Thus far, both partners had benefited from the German-Russian Pact, Germany as well as Russia, which was able to carry out her rightful revisions in the west. The victory of Germany over Poland and France had contributed considerably to the successful achievement of these revisions. Both partners of the German-Russian Pact had together done some good business. This was the most favorable basis for any pact. The question now was, whether they could not continue in the future also to do good business together and whether Soviet Russia could not derive corresponding advantages from the new order of things in the British Empire, i.e., whether in the long run the most advantageous access to the sea for Russia could not be found in the direction of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and whether at the same time certain

other aspirations of Russia in this part of Asia—in which Germany was completely disinterested—could not also be realized.

The Reich Foreign Minister further brought up the subject of Turkey. Thus far that country had outwardly had an alliance with France and England. France had been eliminated by her defeat, and England's value as an ally would become more and more questionable. Therefore, Turkey had been clever enough in recent months to reduce her ties with England to a level that amounted really to nothing more than the former neutrality. The question arose as to what interest Russia had in Turkey. In view of the imminent end of the war, which was in the interest of all countries, including Russia, he believed that Turkey should be induced to free herself more and more from the tie with England. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) did not want to pass final judgment on details, but he believed that with the adoption of a common platform by Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan, Turkey ought gradually to be steered toward these countries. Thus far, he had not discussed these matters with the Turks in any concrete way. He had only stated in a confidential talk with the Turkish Ambassador that Germany would welcome it if Turkey, by gradually intensifying the political course pursued up to now, would arrive at absolute neutrality, and he had added that Germany did not make any claims whatsoever to Turkish territory.⁴

The Reich Foreign Minister further declared that in this connection he understood completely Russia's dissatisfaction with the Straits Convention of Montreux. Germany was even more dissatisfied, for she had not been included in it at all. Personally he (the Reich Foreign Minister) was of the opinion that the Montreux Convention, like the Danube Commissions, must be scrapped and replaced by something new. This new agreement must be concluded between those powers that were particularly interested in the issue, primarily Russia, Turkey, Italy, and Germany. It was clear that Soviet Russia could not be satisfied with the present situation. Germany found the idea acceptable that in the Black Sea Soviet Russia and the adjacent countries should enjoy certain privileges over other countries of the world. It was absurd that countries that were thousands of miles away from the Black Sea should claim to have the same rights as the Black Sea powers. The new Straits agreement with Turkey would, moreover, have to secure certain special privileges to Russia, on the details of which he could not yet comment at the moment, but which would have to grant to the warships and merchant fleet of the Soviet Union in principle freer access to the Mediterranean than heretofore. Russia was entitled to that. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) had

⁴ No record of Ribbentrop's conversation with the Turkish Ambassador has been found. Cf. document No. 314 and footnote 1.

already discussed these matters with the Italians,⁵ and the arguments which he had just indicated had received most sympathetic consideration in Italy. It appeared advisable to him that Russia, Germany, and Italy should pursue a common policy toward Turkey in order to induce that country without loss of face to free herself from her ties with England; these could hardly be pleasing to the three countries. Turkey would thereby not only become a factor in the coalition of powers against the spread of war and for an early establishment of peace, but she would also be prepared to scrap the Montreux Convention voluntarily and, in conjunction with these three countries, to create a new Straits convention which would satisfy the just demands of all and give Russia certain special privileges. In this matter they might consider jointly whether it would not be possible to recognize the territorial integrity of Turkey.

The Reich Foreign Minister summed up the matter by stating that the following issues were involved—

1. To consider jointly how the countries of the Tripartite Pact could reach an agreement of some kind with the Soviet Union, expressing the Soviet Union's solidarity with the aim of the Tripartite Pact, namely the prevention of the spread of war and the early establishment of world peace.

Moreover, other common issues could be designated on which the countries wished to collaborate and, finally, mutual respect for one another's interests might be agreed upon. These were approximately the guidelines for such a contemplated agreement. The details would have to be discussed further. If these arguments appeared acceptable to the Soviet Government, a joint declaration by the Soviet Government and the powers of the Tripartite Pact pledging the early restoration of peace would in effect result.

2. Joint examinations as to whether in some way the interests of the four countries could be clarified for the future on a very long-range scale.

3. The issue of Turkey and the Straits question were also involved.

On all these points, it was to be kept in mind that the Reich Foreign Minister did not yet wish to make any concrete proposals; he had only presented a summary of the ideas which the Führer and he had in mind when the letter to Stalin was sent. If, however, these ideas appeared feasible to the Soviet Government, the Reich Foreign Minister would be quite ready to come to Moscow himself and discuss the matters personally with Stalin. He wondered whether the simultaneous presence of his Italian and Japanese colleagues, who, as far as

⁵Ribbentrop had discussed these matters with Ciano at Schönhof, Nov. 3 and 4. See Editors' Note, p. 466, and Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 608-611.

he knew, were also prepared to come to Moscow, could be of advantage in the matter. Of course, the relationship of Russia to the Axis, as well as relations between Russia and Japan, would first have to be clarified through diplomatic channels.

At the end the Reich Foreign Minister added another remark regarding his recent conversation with the Chinese Ambassador.* He had not been prompted from any direction to hold this conversation, but he had had indications that the Japanese would not have any objections to it. In line with the efforts to bring about a speedy end to the war, he had asked himself whether there was not the possibility of reconciling the differences between Chiang Kai-shek and Japan. He had not, by any means, offered Germany's mediation, but, in view of the long and friendly relations existing between Germany and China, had merely informed Marshal Chiang Kai-shek of the German view. Japan was about to recognize the Nanking Government; on the other hand, reports were current to the effect that Japan as well as China desired to seek a compromise. Whether these reports were based on fact could not be definitely ascertained. It would undoubtedly be well, however, if a compromise between the two countries could be found. For this reason he (the Reich Foreign Minister) had summoned the Chinese Ambassador in order to communicate to him the German position on this question, since he did not consider it impossible that something was being initiated between Japan and China of which he wished to inform Molotov during this exchange of ideas.

Molotov agreed with the remark concerning the advantages of a Sino-Japanese accord and replied to the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister by saying that they had been of great interest to him and that an exchange of ideas regarding the great problems concerning not only Germany and Soviet Russia but also other states as well might, indeed, be useful. He had well understood the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister regarding the great importance of the Tripartite Pact. As the representative of a nonbelligerent country, however, he had to ask for a number of explanations in order to ascertain more clearly the meaning of the Pact. When the new order in Europe and the Greater East Asian Sphere were mentioned in the Treaty, the concept of a "Greater East Asian Sphere" was quite vague, at least for a person who had not participated in the preparation of the Pact. Therefore, it would be important for him to obtain a more accurate definition of this concept. Moreover, the participation of the Soviet Union in the actions envisaged by the Reich Foreign Minister must be discussed in detail, and not only in Berlin, but also in Moscow.

* See document No. 315.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the concept of the Greater East Asian Sphere had been new to him, too, and that it had not been defined to him in detail either. The formulation had been suggested in the last few days of the negotiations, which, as already mentioned, had proceeded very rapidly. He could state, however, that the concept of a "Greater East Asian Sphere" had nothing to do with the vital Russian spheres of influence. During the pact negotiations, as already mentioned, the first matter discussed was that nothing aimed directly or indirectly against Russia might be included in the Pact.

Molotov replied that precision was necessary in a delimitation of spheres of influence over a rather long period of time. Therefore, he had asked to be informed of the opinion of the authors of the Pact or, at least, of the opinion of the Reich Government on this point. Particular vigilance was needed in the delimitation of the spheres of influence between Germany and Russia. The establishment of these spheres of influence in the past year was only a partial solution, which had been rendered obsolete and meaningless by recent circumstances and events, with the exception of the Finnish question, which he would discuss in detail later. It would necessarily take some time to make a permanent settlement. In this connection, in the first place, Russia wanted to come to an understanding with Germany, and only then with Japan and Italy, after she had previously obtained precise information regarding the significance, the nature, and the aim of the Tripartite Pact.

At this point the conversation was interrupted in order to give the Russian delegates time for luncheon in a small circle before the conversation with the Führer began.

SCHMIDT
(Minister)

No. 326

F3/0281-259

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 32 g. Rs.

BERLIN, November 16, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MOLOTOV, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR, DEKANOZOV, AS WELL AS OF COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY HILGER AND M. PAVLOV, WHO ACTED AS INTERPRETERS, ON NOVEMBER 12, 1940

After some words of welcome, the Führer stated that the idea that was uppermost in his mind in the conversations now taking place was this: In the life of peoples it was indeed difficult to lay down a course

for development over a long period in the future and the outbreak of conflicts was often strongly influenced by personal factors; he believed, nevertheless, that an attempt had to be made to fix the development of nations, even for a long period of time, in so far as that was possible, so that friction would be avoided and the elements of conflict precluded as far as humanly possible. This was particularly in order when two nations such as the German and Russian nations had at their helm men who possessed sufficient authority to commit their countries to a development in a definite direction. In the case of Russia and Germany, moreover, two very great nations were involved which need not by nature have any conflict of interests, if each nation understood that the other required certain vital necessities without the guarantee of which its existence was impossible. Besides this, both countries had systems of government which did not wage war for the sake of war, but which needed peace more than war in order to carry out their domestic tasks. With due regard for vital needs, particularly in the economic field, it should really be possible to achieve a settlement between them, which would lead to peaceful collaboration between the two countries beyond the life span of the present leaders.

After Molotov had expressed his entire agreement with these arguments, the Führer continued that it was obviously a difficult task to chart developments between peoples and countries over a long period. He believed, however, that it would be possible to elaborate clearly and precisely certain general points of view quite independently of personal motives and to orient the political and economic interests of peoples in such a manner as to give some guarantee that conflicts would be avoided even for rather long periods. The situation in which the conversation of today was taking place was characterized by the fact that Germany was at war, while Soviet Russia was not. Many of the measures taken by Germany had been influenced by the fact of her belligerency. Many of the steps that were necessary in the course of the war had developed from the conduct of the war itself and could not have been anticipated at the outbreak of war. By and large, not only Germany but also Russia had gained great advantages. On further consideration, the political collaboration during the one year of its existence had been of considerable value to both countries.

Molotov stated that this was quite correct.

The Führer declared further that probably neither of the two peoples had realized its wishes 100 percent. In political life, however, even a 20-25 percent realization of demands was worth a good deal. He believed that not every wish would be fulfilled in the future either, but that the two greatest peoples of Europe, if they went along to-

gether, would, in any case, gain more than if they worked against each other. If they stood together, some advantage would always accrue to both countries. If they worked against each other, however, third countries would be the sole gainers.

Molotov replied that the argument of the Führer was entirely correct and would be confirmed by history; that it was particularly applicable to the present situation, however.

The Führer then went on to say that proceeding from these ideas he had again quite soberly pondered the question of German-Russian collaboration, at a time when the military operations were in effect concluded.

The war had, moreover, led to complications which were not intended by Germany, but which had compelled her from time to time to react militarily to certain events. The Führer then outlined to Molotov the course of military operations up to the present, which had led to the fact that England no longer had an ally on the Continent. He described in detail the military operations now being carried out against England, and he stressed the influence of atmospheric conditions on these operations. The English retaliatory measures were ridiculous, and the Russian gentlemen could convince themselves at first hand of the fiction of alleged destruction in Berlin. As soon as atmospheric conditions improved, Germany would be poised for the great and final blow against England. At the moment, then, it was her aim to try not only to make military preparations for this final struggle, but also to clarify the political issues which would be of importance during and after this showdown. He had, therefore, re-examined the relations with Russia, and not in a negative spirit, but with the intention of organizing them positively—if possible, for a long period of time. In so doing he had reached several conclusions:

1. Germany was not seeking to obtain military aid from Russia;
2. Because of the tremendous extension of the war, Germany had been forced, in order to oppose England, to penetrate into territories remote from her and in which she was not basically interested politically or economically;
3. There were nevertheless certain requirements, the full importance of which had become apparent only during the war, but which were absolutely vital to Germany. Among them were certain sources of raw materials which were considered by Germany as most vital and absolutely indispensable. Possibly M. Molotov was of the opinion that in one case or another there had been a departure from the conception of the spheres of influence which had been agreed upon by Stalin and the Reich Foreign Minister. Such departures had already occurred in some cases in the course of Russian operations against Poland. In a number of cases, on calm consideration of the German and Rus-

sian interests, he (the Führer) had not been ready to make concessions, but he had realized that it was desirable to meet the needs of Russia half-way, as, for instance, in the case of Lithuania. From an economic point of view, Lithuania, it is true, had a certain importance for us, but from a political point of view, we had understood the necessity of straightening out the situation in this whole field in order thereby to prevent in the future the spiritual revival of tendencies that were capable of causing tension between the two countries of Germany and Russia. In another case, namely, that of the South Tirol, Germany had taken a similar position. However, in the course of the war, factors had arisen for Germany which could not have been anticipated at the outbreak of the war, but which had to be considered absolutely vital from the standpoint of military operations.

He (the Führer) now had pondered the question how, beyond all petty momentary considerations, further to clarify in bold outline the collaboration between Germany and Russia and what direction future German-Russian developments should take. In this matter the following viewpoints were of importance for Germany:

1. Need for space. During the war Germany had acquired such large areas that she would require one hundred years to utilize them fully.

2. Some colonial expansion in Central Africa was necessary.

3. Germany needed certain raw materials, the supply of which she would have to safeguard in all circumstances.

4. She could not permit the establishment by hostile powers of air or naval bases in certain areas.

In no event, however, would the interests of Russia be affected. The Russian empire could develop without in the least prejudicing German interests. (Molotov said this was quite correct.) If both countries came to realize this fact, they could collaborate to their mutual advantage and could spare themselves difficulties, friction, and nervous tension. It was perfectly obvious that Germany and Russia would never become one world. Both countries would always exist separate from each other as two powerful elements of the world. Each of them could shape its future as it liked, if in so doing it considered the interests of the other. Germany herself had no interests in Asia other than general economic and commercial interests. In particular, she had no colonial interests there. She knew, furthermore, that the possible colonial territories in Asia would probably fall to Japan. If by any chance China, too, should be drawn into the orbit of the awakening nations, any colonial aspirations would be doomed to disappointment from the start in view of the masses of people living there.

There were in Europe a number of points of contact between Germany, Russia, and Italy. Each one of these three countries had an understandable desire for an outlet to the open sea. Germany wanted to get out of the North Sea, Italy wanted to remove the barrier of Gibraltar, and Russia was also striving toward the ocean. The question now was how much chance there was for these great countries really to obtain free access to the ocean without in turn coming into conflict with each other over the matter. This was also the viewpoint from which he looked upon the organization of European relations after the war. The leading statesmen of Europe must prevent this war from becoming the father of a new war. The issues to be settled had, therefore, to be settled in such a manner that, at least in the foreseeable future, no new conflict could arise.

In this spirit, he (the Führer) had talked with the French statesmen¹ and believed that he had found among them some sympathy for a settlement which would lead to tolerable conditions for a rather long period and which would be of advantage to all concerned, if only to the extent that a new war did not again have to be feared immediately. Referring to the preamble of the Armistice Treaty with France, he had pointed out to Pétain and Laval that, as long as the war with England lasted, no step might be taken which would in any way be incompatible with the conditions for ending this war against Great Britain.

Elsewhere, too, there were problems such as these, but ones which arose only for the duration of the war. Thus, for instance, Germany had no political interests whatsoever in the Balkans and was active there at present exclusively under the compulsion of securing for herself certain raw materials. It was a matter of purely military interests, the safeguarding of which was not a pleasant task, since, for instance, a German military force had to be maintained in Rumania, hundreds of kilometers away from the supply centers.

For similar reasons the idea was intolerable to Germany that England might get a foothold in Greece in order to establish air and naval bases there. The Reich was compelled to prevent this in any circumstances.

The continuation of the war in such circumstances was of course not desirable. And that is why Germany had wanted to end the war after the conclusion of the Polish campaign. At that time England and France could have had peace without personal sacrifices; they had, however, preferred to continue the war. Of course, blood also creates rights, and it was inadmissible that certain countries should

¹ See documents Nos. 212 and 227.

have declared and waged war without afterward paying the cost. He (the Führer) had made this clear to the French. At the present stage of developments, however, the question was which of the countries responsible for the war had to pay more. At any rate, Germany would have preferred to end the war last year and to have demobilized her army in order to resume her peacetime work, since from an economic point of view any war was bad business. Even the victor had to incur such expenses before, during, and after the war that he could have reached his goal much more cheaply in a peaceful development.

Molotov concurred in this idea, stating that in any case it was vastly more expensive to attain a goal by military measures than by peaceful means. The Führer pointed out further that in the present circumstances Germany had been forced by wartime developments to become active in areas in which she was politically disinterested but had at most economic interests. Self-preservation, however, absolutely dictated this course. Nevertheless, this activity of Germany—forced upon her in the areas in question—represented no obstacle to any pacification of the world which would later be undertaken, and which would bring to the nations working toward the same end that for which they hoped.

In addition, there was the problem of America. The United States was now pursuing an imperialistic policy. It was not fighting for England, but only trying to get the British Empire into its grasp. They were helping England, at best, in order to further their own rearmament and to reinforce their military power by acquiring bases. In the distant future it would be a question of establishing a great solidarity among those countries which might be involved in case of an extension of the sphere of influence of this Anglo-Saxon power, which had a more solid foundation, by far, than England. In this case, it was not a question of the immediate future; not in 1945, but in 1970 or 1980, at the earliest, would the freedom of other nations be seriously endangered by this Anglo-Saxon power. At any rate, the Continent of Europe had to adjust itself now to this development and had to act jointly against the Anglo-Saxons and against any of their attempts to acquire dangerous bases. Therefore, he had undertaken an exchange of ideas with France, Italy, and Spain, in order with these countries to set up in the whole of Europe and Africa some kind of Monroe Doctrine and to adopt a new joint colonial policy by which each of the powers concerned would claim for itself only as much colonial territory as it could really utilize. In other regions, where Russia was the power in the foremost position, the interests of the latter would, of course, have to come first. This would result in a great coalition of powers which, guided by sober appraisal of realities, would have to establish their respective spheres of interest

and would assert themselves against the rest of the world correspondingly. It was surely a difficult task to organize such a coalition of countries; and yet, to conceive it was not as difficult as to carry it out.

The Führer then reverted to the German-Russian efforts. He understood thoroughly Russia's attempts to get ice-free ports with absolutely secure access to the open sea. Germany had enormously expanded her Lebensraum in her present eastern provinces. At least half of this area, however, must be regarded as an economic liability. Probably both Russia and Germany had not achieved everything they had set out to do. In any case, however, the successes had been great on both sides. If a liberal view were taken of the remaining issues and due regard were taken of the fact that Germany was still at war and had to concern herself with areas which, in and for themselves, were of no importance to her politically, substantial gains for both partners could be achieved in the future, too. In this connection the Führer again turned to the Balkans and repeated that Germany would at once oppose by military action any attempt by England to get a foothold in Salonika. The former still retained unpleasant memories from the last war of the then Salonika Front.

To a question of Molotov's as to how Salonika constituted a danger, the Führer referred to the proximity of the Rumanian petroleum fields, which Germany wished to protect in all circumstances. As soon as peace prevailed, however, the German troops would immediately leave Rumania again.

In the further course of the conversation, the Führer asked Molotov how Russia planned to safeguard her interests in the Black Sea and in the Straits. Germany would also be prepared at any time to help effect an improvement for Russia in the regime of the Straits.

Molotov replied that the statements of the Führer had been of a general nature and that in general he could agree with his reasoning. He was also of the opinion that it would be in the interest of Germany and the Soviet Union if the two countries would collaborate and not fight each other. Upon his departure from Moscow, Stalin had given him exact instructions, and everything that he was about to say was identical with the views of Stalin. He concurred in the opinion of the Führer that both partners had derived substantial benefits from the German-Russian agreement. Germany had received a secure hinterland that, as was generally known, had been of great importance for the further course of events during the year of war. In Poland, too, Germany had gained considerable economic advantages. By the exchange of Lithuania for the Voivodeship of Lublin, all possible friction between Russia and Germany had been avoided. The German-Russian agreement of last year could therefore be regarded as fulfilled, except for one point, namely Finland. The Finnish ques-

tion was still unsolved, and he asked the Führer to tell him whether the German-Russian agreement, as far as it concerned Finland, was still in force. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, no changes had occurred here. Also, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, the German-Russian agreement of last year represented only a partial solution. In the meanwhile, other issues had arisen that also had to be solved.

Molotov then turned to the matter of the significance of the Tripartite Pact. What was the meaning of the new order in Europe and in Asia, and what role would the USSR be given in it? These issues must be discussed during the Berlin conversations and during the contemplated visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow, on which the Russians were definitely counting. Moreover, there were issues to be clarified regarding Russia's Balkan and Black Sea interests with respect to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. It would be easier for the Russian Government to give specific replies to the questions raised by the Führer, if it could obtain the explanations just requested. It would be interested in the new order in Europe, and particularly in the tempo and the form of this new order. It would also like to have an idea of the boundaries of the so-called Greater East Asian sphere.

The Führer replied that the Tripartite Pact was intended to regulate relationships in Europe in the sphere of the natural interests of the European countries and, consequently, Germany was now approaching the Soviet Union in order that she might express herself regarding the areas of interest to her. In no case was a settlement to be made without Soviet Russian cooperation. This applied not only to Europe, but also to Asia, where Russia herself was to cooperate in the definition of the Greater East Asian sphere and where she was to designate her claims. Germany's task in this case was that of a mediator. Russia by no means was to be confronted with a *fait accompli*.

When the Führer undertook to try to establish the above-mentioned coalition of powers, it was not the German-Russian relationship which appeared to him to be the most difficult point, but the question of whether a collaboration between Germany, France, and Italy was possible. Only now that he believed this problem could be solved, and after a settlement in broad outlines had in effect been accepted by the three countries, had he thought it possible to contact Soviet Russia for the purpose of settling the questions of the Black Sea, the Balkans, and Turkey.

In conclusion, the Führer summed up by stating that the discussion, to a certain extent, represented the first concrete step toward a comprehensive collaboration, with due consideration for the problems of Western Europe, which were to be settled between Germany, Italy,

and France, as well as for the issues of the East, which were essentially the concern of Russia and Japan, but in which Germany offered her good offices as mediator. It was a matter of opposing any attempt on the part of America to "make money on Europe." The United States had no business either in Europe, in Africa, or in Asia.

Molotov expressed his agreement with the statements of the Führer regarding the role of America and England. The participation of Russia in the Tripartite Pact appeared to him entirely acceptable in principle, provided that Russia was to cooperate as a partner and not be merely an object. In that case he saw no difficulties in the matter of participation of the Soviet Union in the common effort. But the aim and the significance of the Pact must first be more closely defined, particularly because of the delimitation of the Greater East Asian sphere.

In view of a possible air raid alarm the talk was broken off at this point and postponed until the following day, the Führer promising Molotov that he would discuss with him in detail the various issues which had come up during the conversation.

SCHMIDT

No. 327

233/156367-68

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

BUENOS AIRES, November 13, 1940—7: 14 p. m.

No. 1314 of November 13

Received November 14—4: 15 a. m.

Details regarding North American-Uruguayan negotiations with respect to military bases in Uruguay, which have become known by publication in the press during the last few days, have caused a strong sensation with the public here, too.¹ Foreign Minister Roca, who told me in a conversation yesterday that the Argentine Government so far had not received an official communication about negotiations with Montevideo and was waiting for the outcome of the interpellation in the [Uruguayan] Senate, was obviously trying to assess the situation calmly, pointing out especially that apparently no infringement of Uruguayan sovereignty was intended. Nevertheless, there is unmistakable worry in authoritative circles here, since the

¹ For the text of a communiqué concerning these press reports issued by the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry on Nov. 11, see World Peace Foundation, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, edited by S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers (Boston, 1941), vol. III, p. 136; for a statement by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles regarding this subject made in a press conference held Nov. 13, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. III, p. 432.

carrying out of the measures planned by Uruguay would constitute an infringement of Argentine rights at the estuary of the La Plata River. This could compel Argentina to engage in an extensive reorganization of her defense system. The impression here is that Argentina—at least at the present—is not prepared to imitate the example of Uruguay; this was indeed intimated by the Foreign Minister in the conversation yesterday.

In contrast to the concern in official circles, the Argentine press, especially the morning papers, *Prensa* and *Nacion*, essentially are in agreement with the Uruguayan-North American plans although with far-reaching reservations. Only the evening paper, *Pampero*, sounds a cry of alarm and points to the great threat to Argentine sovereignty.²

Same text to all Missions in America as cipher letter.

THIERMANN

² In telegram No. 1345 of Nov. 20, Thiermann transmitted additional details about Argentine reaction to the reported negotiations between the United States and Uruguay and cited the statement made by the Under State Secretary of the Argentine Foreign Ministry "that in no circumstances would the Argentine Government permit the establishment of bases in Argentina." (233/156372-73)

No. 328

F18/154-190

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 33

BERLIN, November 15, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS, MOLOTOV, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEKANOZOV, AS WELL AS OF COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY HILGER AND M. PAVLOV, WHO ACTED AS INTERPRETERS, IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 13, 1940

The Führer referred to the remark of Molotov during yesterday's conversation, according to which the German-Russian agreement was fulfilled "with the exception of one point: namely, of Finland."¹

Molotov explained that this remark referred not only to the German-Russian agreement itself, but in particular to the Secret Protocols too.

The Führer replied that, in the Secret Protocol, zones of influence and spheres of interest had been designated and distributed between Germany and Russia.² In so far as it had been a question of actually taking possession, Germany had lived up to the agreements, which

¹ See document No. 326.

² See vol. VII of this series, document No. 229.

was not quite the case on the Russian side. At any rate, Germany had not occupied any territory that was within the Russian sphere of influence.

Lithuania had already been mentioned yesterday. There could be no doubt that in this case the changes from the original German-Russian agreement were essentially due to Russian initiative. Whether the difficulties—to avoid which the Russians had offered their suggestion—would actually have resulted from the partition of Poland, could be left out of the discussion. In any case, the Voivodeship of Lublin was economically no compensation for Lithuania. However, the Germans had seen that in the course of events a situation had resulted which necessitated revision of the original agreement.

The same applied to Bucovina. Strictly speaking, in the original agreement Germany had declared herself disinterested only in Bessarabia. Nevertheless, she had realized, in this case too, that revision of the agreement was in certain respects advantageous for the other partner.

The situation regarding Finland was quite similar. Germany had no political interest there. This was known to the Russian Government. During the Russo-Finnish War Germany had meticulously fulfilled all her obligations in regard to absolutely benevolent neutrality.

Molotov interposed here that the Russian Government had had no cause for criticism with regard to the attitude of Germany during that conflict.

In this connection the Führer mentioned also that he had even detained ships in Bergen which were transporting arms and ammunition to Finland, an action for which Germany had actually had no authority. Germany had incurred the serious opposition of the rest of the world, and of Sweden in particular, by her attitude during the Russo-Finnish War. As a result, during the subsequent Norwegian campaign, itself involving considerable risks, she had to employ a large number of divisions for protection against Sweden, which she would not have needed otherwise.

The real situation was as follows: In accordance with the German-Russian agreements, Germany recognized that, politically, Finland was of primary interest to Russia and was in her zone of influence. However, Germany had to consider the following two points:

1. For the duration of the war she was very greatly interested in the deliveries of nickel and lumber from Finland, and
2. She did not desire any new conflict in the Baltic Sea which would further curtail her freedom of movement in one of the few merchant shipping regions which still remained to her. It was completely in-

correct to assert that Finland was occupied by German troops. To be sure, troops were being transported to Kirkenes via Finland, of which fact Russia had been officially informed by Germany.³ Because of the length of the route, the trains had to stop two or three times in Finnish territory. However, as soon as the transit of the troop contingents to be transported had been completed, no additional troops would be sent through Finland. He (the Führer) pointed out that both Germany and Russia would naturally be interested in not allowing the Baltic Sea to become a combat zone again. Since the Russo-Finnish War, the possibilities for military operations had shifted, because England had available long-range bombers and long-range destroyers. The English thereby had a chance to get a foothold on Finnish airports.

In addition, there was a purely psychological factor which was extremely onerous. The Finns had defended themselves bravely, and they had gained the sympathies of the world—particularly of Scandinavia. In Germany too, during the Russo-Finnish War, the people were somewhat annoyed at the position which, as a result of the agreements with Russia, Germany had to take and actually did take. Germany did not wish any new Finnish war because of the aforementioned considerations. However, the legitimate claims of Russia were not affected by that. Germany had proved this again and again by her attitude on various issues, among others, the issue of the fortification of the Åland Islands. For the duration of the war, however, her economic interests in Finland were just as important as in Rumania. Germany expected consideration of these interests all the more, since she herself had also shown understanding of the Russian wishes in the issues of Lithuania and Bucovina at the time. At any rate, she had no political interest of any kind in Finland, and she fully accepted the fact that that country belonged to the Russian zone of influence.

In his reply Molotov pointed out that the agreement of 1939 had referred to a certain stage of the development which had been concluded by the end of the Polish war, while the second stage was brought to an end by the defeat of France, and that they were really in the third stage now. He recalled that by the original agreement, with its Secret Protocol, the common German-Russian boundary had been fixed and issues concerning the adjacent Baltic countries and Rumania, Finland, and Poland had been settled. For the rest, he agreed with the remarks of the Führer on the revisions made. However, if he drew up a balance sheet of the situation that resulted after the defeat of France, he would have to state that the German-Russian agreement had not been without influence upon the great German victories.

* See document No. 142.

As to the question of the revision of the original agreement with regard to Lithuania and the Voivodeship of Lublin, Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Union would not have insisted on that revision if Germany had not wanted it. But he believed that the new solution had been in the interest of both parties.

At this point the Reich Foreign Minister interjected that, to be sure, Russia had not made this revision an absolute condition, but at any rate had urged it very strongly.

Molotov insisted that the Soviet Government would not have refused to leave matters as provided in the original agreement. At any rate, however, Germany, for her concession in Lithuania, had received compensation in Polish territory.

The Führer interjected here that in this exchange one could not, from the point of view of economics, speak of adequate compensation.

Molotov then mentioned the question of the strip of Lithuanian territory and emphasized that the Soviet Government had not received any clear answer yet from Germany on this question.⁴ However, it awaited a decision.

Regarding Bucovina, he admitted that this involved an additional territory, one not mentioned in the Secret Protocol. Russia had at first confirmed her demands to northern Bucovina. In the present circumstances, however, Germany must understand the Russian interest in southern Bucovina. But Russia had not received an answer to her question regarding this subject either. Instead, Germany had guaranteed the entire territory of Rumania and completely disregarded Russia's wishes with regard to southern Bucovina.⁵

The Führer replied that it would mean a considerable concession on the part of Germany, if even part of Bucovina were to be occupied by Russia. According to an oral agreement, the former Austrian territories were to fall within the German sphere of influence. Besides, the territories belonging to the Russian zone had been mentioned by name: Bessarabia, for example. There was, however, not a word regarding Bucovina in the agreements. Finally, the exact meaning of the expression "sphere of influence" was not further defined. At any rate, Germany had not violated the agreement in the least in this matter. To the objection of Molotov that the revisions with regard to the strip of Lithuanian territory and of Bucovina were not of very great importance in comparison with the revision which Germany had undertaken elsewhere by military force, the Führer replied that so-called "revision by force of arms" had not been the subject of the agreement at all.

Molotov, however, persisted in the opinion previously stated: that the revisions desired by Russia were insignificant.

⁴ See document No. 319.

⁵ See document No. 81 and footnote 4.

The Führer replied that if German-Russian collaboration was to show positive results in the future, the Soviet Government would have to understand that Germany was engaged in a life and death struggle, which, at all events, she wanted to conclude successfully. For that, a number of prerequisites depending upon economic and military factors were required, which Germany wanted to secure for herself by all means. If the Soviet Union were in a similar position, Germany on her part would, and would have to, demonstrate a similar understanding for Russian needs. The conditions which Germany wanted to assure did not conflict with the agreements with Russia. The German wish to avoid a war with unforeseeable consequences in the Baltic Sea did not mean any violation of the German-Russian agreements according to which Finland belonged in the Russian sphere of influence. The guarantee given upon the wish and request of the Rumanian Government was no violation of the agreements concerning Bessarabia. The Soviet Union had to realize that in the framework of any broader collaboration of the two countries advantages of quite different scope were to be reached than the insignificant revisions which were now being discussed. Much greater successes could then be achieved, provided that Russia did not now seek successes in territories in which Germany was interested for the duration of the war. The future successes would be the greater, the more Germany and Russia succeeded in fighting back to back against the outside world, and would become the smaller, the more the two countries faced each other breast to breast. In the first case there was no power on earth which could oppose the two countries.

In his reply Molotov voiced his agreement with the last conclusions of the Führer. In this connection he stressed the viewpoint of the Soviet leaders, and of Stalin in particular, that it would be possible and expedient to strengthen and activate the relations between the two countries. However, in order to give those relations a permanent basis, issues would also have to be clarified which were of secondary importance, but which spoiled the atmosphere of German-Russian relations. Finland belonged among these issues. If Russia and Germany had a good understanding, this issue could be solved without war, but there must be neither German troops in Finland nor political demonstrations in that country against the Soviet Russian Government.

The Führer replied that the second point could not be a matter for debate, since Germany had nothing whatsoever to do with these things. Incidentally, demonstrations could easily be staged, and it was very difficult to find out afterward who had been the real instigator. However, regarding the German troops, he could give the assurance that, if a general settlement were made, no German troops would appear in Finland any longer.

Molotov replied that by demonstrations he also understood the dispatch of Finnish delegations to Germany or receptions of prominent Finns in Germany. Moreover, the circumstance of the presence of German troops had led to an ambiguous attitude on the part of Finland. Thus, for instance, slogans were brought out that "nobody was a Finn who approved of the last Russo-Finnish peace treaty," and the like.

The Führer replied that Germany had always exerted only a moderating influence and that she had advised Finland and also Rumania, in particular, to accept the Russian demands.

Molotov replied that the Soviet Government considered it as its duty definitively to settle and clarify the Finnish question. No new agreements were needed for that. The old German-Russian agreement assigned Finland to the Russian sphere of influence.

In conclusion the Führer stated on this point that Germany did not desire any war in the Baltic Sea and that she urgently needed Finland as a supplier of nickel and lumber. Politically, she was not interested and, in contrast to Russia, had occupied no Finnish territory. Incidentally, the transit of German troops would be finished within the next few days. No further troop trains would then be sent. The decisive question for Germany was whether Russia had the intention of going to war against Finland.

Molotov answered this question somewhat evasively with the statement that everything would be all right if the Finnish Government would give up its ambiguous attitude toward the USSR, and if the agitation against Russia among the population (bringing out of slogans such as the ones previously mentioned) would cease.

To the Führer's objection that he feared that Sweden might intervene in a Russo-Finnish war the next time, Molotov replied that he could not say anything about Sweden, but he had to stress that Germany, as well as the Soviet Union, was interested in the neutrality of Sweden. Of course, both countries were also interested in peace in the Baltic, but the Soviet Union was entirely able to assure peace in that region.

The Führer replied that they would perhaps experience in a different part of Europe how even the best military intentions were greatly restricted by geographical factors. He could, therefore, imagine that in the case of a new conflict a sort of resistance cell would be formed in Sweden and Finland, which would furnish air bases to England or even America. This would force Germany to intervene. He (the Führer) would, however, do this only reluctantly. He had already mentioned yesterday that the necessity for intervention would perhaps also arise in Salonika, and the case of Salonika was entirely sufficient for him. He had no interest in being forced to become active

in the north too. He repeated that entirely different results could be achieved in future collaboration between the two countries and that Russia would after all, on the basis of the peace, receive everything that in her opinion was due her. It would perhaps be only a matter of 6 months' or a year's delay. Besides, the Finnish Government had just sent a note in which it gave assurance of the closest and friendliest cooperation with Russia.⁶

Molotov replied that the deeds did not always correspond with the words, and he persisted in the opinion which he had previously expressed: that peace in the Baltic Sea region could be absolutely insured, if perfect understanding were attained between Germany and Russia in the Finnish matter. In these circumstances he did not understand why Russia should postpone the realization of her wishes for 6 months or a year. After all, the German-Russian agreement contained no time limits, and the hands of neither of the partners were tied in its sphere of influence.

With a reference to the changes made in the agreement at Russia's request, the Führer stated that there must not be any war in the Baltic. A Baltic conflict would be a heavy strain on German-Russian relations and on the great collaboration of the future. In his opinion, however, future collaboration was more important than the settlement of secondary issues at this very moment.

Molotov replied that it was not a matter of war in the Baltic, but of the question of Finland and its settlement within the framework of the agreement of last year. In reply to a question of the Führer, he declared that he imagined this settlement on the same scale as in Bessarabia and in the adjacent countries, and he requested the Führer to give his opinion on that.

When the Führer replied that he could only repeat that there must be no war with Finland, because such a conflict might have far-reaching repercussions, Molotov stated that a new factor had been introduced into the discussion by this position, which was not expressed in the treaty of last year.

The Führer replied that during the Russo-Finnish war, despite the danger in connection with it that Allied bases might be established in Scandinavia, Germany had meticulously kept her obligations toward Russia and had always advised Finland to give in.

In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that Germany had even gone so far as to deny to the Finnish President the use of a German cable for a radio address to America.

Then the Führer went on to explain that just as Russia at the time had pointed out that a partition of Poland might lead to a strain on German-Russian relations, he now declared with the same frankness that a war in Finland would represent such a strain on German-

⁶ See document No. 322.

Russian relations, and he asked the Russians to show exactly the same understanding in this instance as he had shown a year ago in the issue of Poland. Considering the genius of Russian diplomacy, ways and means could certainly be found to avoid such a war.

Molotov replied that he could not understand the German fear that a war might break out in the Baltic. Last year, when the international situation was worse for Germany than now, Germany had not raised this issue. Quite apart from the fact that Germany had occupied Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium, she had completely defeated France and even believed that she had already conquered England. He (Molotov) did not see where in these circumstances the danger of war in the Baltic Sea should come from. He would have to request that Germany take the same stand as last year. If she did that unconditionally, there would certainly be no complications in connection with the Finnish issue. However, if she made reservations, a new situation would arise which would then have to be discussed.

In reply to the statements of Molotov regarding the absence of military danger in the Finnish question, the Führer stressed that he too had some understanding of military matters, and he considered it entirely possible that the United States would get a foothold in those regions in case of participation by Sweden in a possible war. He (the Führer) wanted to end the European war, and he could only repeat that in view of the uncertain attitude of Sweden a new war in the Baltic would mean a strain on German-Russian relations with unforeseeable consequences. Would Russia declare war on the United States, in case the latter should intervene in connection with the Finnish conflict?

When Molotov replied that this question was not of present interest, the Führer replied that it would be too late for a decision when it became so. When Molotov then declared that he did not see any indication of the outbreak of war in the Baltic, the Führer replied that in that case everything would be in order anyway and the whole discussion was really of a purely theoretical nature.

Summarizing, the Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that:

(1) The Führer had declared that Finland remained in the sphere of influence of Russia and that Germany would not maintain any troops there;

(2) Germany had nothing to do with demonstrations of Finland against Russia, but was exerting her influence in the opposite direction;

(3) The collaboration of the two countries was the decisive problem of long-range importance, which in the past had already resulted in great advantages for Russia; but which in the future would show advantages compared with which the matters that had just been discussed would appear entirely insignificant. There was actually no

reason at all for making an issue of the Finnish question. Perhaps it was a misunderstanding only. Strategically, all of Russia's wishes had been satisfied by her peace treaty with Finland. Demonstrations in a conquered country were not at all unnatural, and if perhaps the transit of German troops had caused certain reactions in the Finnish population they would disappear with the end of those troop transits. Hence, if one considered matters realistically, there were no differences between Germany and Russia.

The Führer pointed out that both sides agreed in principle that Finland belonged to the Russian sphere of influence. Instead, therefore, of continuing a purely theoretical discussion, they should rather turn to more important problems.

After the conquest of England the British Empire would be apportioned as a gigantic world-wide estate in bankruptcy of 40 million square kilometers. In this bankrupt estate there would be for Russia access to the ice-free and really open ocean. Thus far, a minority of 45 million Englishmen had ruled 600 million inhabitants of the British Empire. He was about to crush this minority. Even the United States was actually doing nothing but picking out of this bankrupt estate a few items particularly suitable to the United States. Germany, of course, would like to avoid any conflict which would divert her from her struggle against the heart of the Empire, the British Isles. For that reason, he (the Führer) did not like Italy's war against Greece, as it diverted forces to the periphery instead of concentrating them against England at one point. The same would occur during a Baltic war. The conflict with England would be fought to the last ditch, and he had no doubt that the defeat of the British Isles would lead to the dissolution of the Empire. It was a chimera to believe that the Empire could possibly be ruled and held together from Canada. In those circumstances there arose world-wide perspectives. During the next few weeks they would have to be settled in joint diplomatic negotiations with Russia, and Russia's participation in the solution of these problems would have to be arranged. All the countries which could possibly be interested in the bankrupt estate would have to stop all controversies among themselves and concern themselves exclusively with apportioning the British Empire. This applied to Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan.

Molotov replied that he had followed the argument of the Führer with interest and that he was in agreement with everything that he had understood. However, he could comment thereon less than the Führer, since the latter had surely thought more about these problems and formed more concrete opinions regarding them. The decisive thing was first to be clear regarding German-Russian collaboration, in which Italy and Japan could be included later on. In this

connection nothing should be changed that had been started; rather, there should be in prospect only a continuation of what had been begun.

The Führer mentioned here that the further efforts in the sense of the opening up of great prospects would not be easy and emphasized in this connection that Germany did not want to annex France, as the Russians appeared to assume. He wanted to create a world coalition of interested powers which would consist of Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Soviet Russia, and Japan and would to certain degree represent a coalition—extending from North Africa to Eastern Asia—of all those who wanted to be satisfied out of the British bankrupt estate. To this end all internal controversies between the members of this coalition must be removed or at least neutralized. For this purpose the settlement of a whole series of questions was necessary. In the West, i.e. between Spain, France, Italy, and Germany, he believed he had now found a formula which satisfied everybody alike. It had not been easy to reconcile the views of Spain and France for instance, in regard to North Africa; however, recognizing the greater future possibilities, both countries finally had given in. After the West was thus settled, an agreement in the East must now be reached. In this case it was not a matter of relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey only, but also of the Greater Asian sphere. The latter consisted not only of the Greater East Asian sphere, but also of a purely Asiatic area oriented toward the south, that Germany even now recognized as Russia's sphere of influence. It was a matter of determining in bold outlines the boundaries for the future activity of peoples and of assigning to nations large areas where they could find an ample field of activity for fifty to a hundred years.

Molotov replied that the Führer had raised a number of questions which concerned not only Europe but, beyond that, other territories too. He wanted to discuss first a problem closer to Europe, that of Turkey. As a Black Sea power, the Soviet Union was tied up with a number of countries. In this connection there was still an unsettled question that was just now being discussed by the Danube Commission.⁷ Moreover, the Soviet Union had expressed its dissatisfaction to Rumania that the latter had accepted the guarantee of Germany and Italy without consultation with Russia. The Soviet Government had already explained its position twice,⁸ and it was of the opinion that the guarantee was aimed against the interests of Soviet Russia, "if one might express oneself so bluntly." Therefore, the question of revoking this guarantee came up. To this the Führer had declared that for

⁷ See document No. 310.

⁸ See document No. 81, footnote 4 and enclosure.

a certain time it was necessary and its removal therefore impossible. This affected the interests of the Soviet Union as a Black Sea power.

Molotov then came to speak of the Straits, which, referring to the Crimean war and the events of the years 1918-19, he called England's historic gateway for attack on the Soviet Union. The situation was all the more menacing to Russia, as the British had now gained a foothold in Greece. For reasons of security the relations between Soviet Russia and other Black Sea powers were of great importance. In this connection Molotov asked the Führer what Germany would say if Russia gave Bulgaria, that is, the independent country located closest to the Straits, a guarantee under exactly the same conditions as Germany and Italy had given one to Rumania. Russia, however, intended to agree beforehand on this matter with Germany and, if possible, with Italy too.

To a question by Molotov regarding the German position on the question of the Straits, the Führer replied that the Reich Foreign Minister had already considered this point and that he had envisaged a revision of the Montreux Convention in favor of the Soviet Union.

The Reich Foreign Minister confirmed this and stated that the Italians also took a benevolent attitude on the question of this revision.

Molotov again brought up the guarantee to Bulgaria and gave the assurance that the Soviet Union did not intend to interfere in the internal order of the country in any circumstances. "Not a hairsbreadth" would they deviate from this.

Regarding Germany's and Italy's guarantee to Rumania, the Führer stated that this guarantee had been the only possibility of inducing Rumania to cede Bessarabia to Russia without a fight. Besides, because of her oil wells, Rumania represented an absolute German-Italian interest, and, lastly, the Rumanian Government itself had asked that Germany assume the air and ground protection of the oil region, since it did not feel entirely secure from attacks by the English. Referring to a threat of invasion by the English at Salonika, the Führer repeated in this connection that Germany would not tolerate such a landing, but he gave the assurance that at the end of the war all German soldiers would be withdrawn from Rumania.

In reply to Molotov's question regarding Germany's opinion on a Russian guarantee to Bulgaria, the Führer replied that if this guarantee was to be given under the same conditions as the German-Italian guarantee to Rumania, the question would first arise whether Bulgaria herself had asked for a guarantee. He (the Führer) did not know of any request by Bulgaria. Besides, he would, of course, have to inquire about the position of Italy before he himself could make any statement.

However, the decisive question was whether Russia saw a chance to gain sufficient security for her Black Sea interests through a revision

of the Montreux Convention. He did not expect an immediate answer to this question, since he knew that Molotov would first have to discuss these matters with Stalin.

Molotov replied that Russia had only one aim in this respect. She wanted to be secure from an attack by way of the Straits and would like to settle this question with Turkey; a guarantee given to Bulgaria would alleviate the situation. As a Black Sea power Russia was entitled to such security and believed that she would be able to come to an understanding with Turkey in regard thereto.

The Führer replied that this would conform approximately with Germany's views, according to which only Russian warships might pass freely through the Dardanelles, while the Straits would be closed to all other warships.

Molotov added that Russia wanted to obtain a guarantee against an attack on the Black Sea via the Straits not only on paper but "in reality" and believed that she could reach an agreement with Turkey in regard thereto. In this connection he came back again to the question of the Russian guarantee to Bulgaria and repeated that the internal regime of the country would remain unaffected, whereas on the other hand Russia was prepared to guarantee Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea. He was again addressing to the Führer—as the one who was to decide on the entire German policy—the question as to what position Germany would take with regard to this Russian guarantee.

The Führer replied with a counter-question as to whether the Bulgarians had actually asked for a guarantee, and he again stated that he would have to ask the Duce for his opinion.

Molotov stressed that he was not asking the Führer for a final decision, but that he was asking only for a provisional expression of opinion.

The Führer replied that he could not in any circumstances take a position before he had talked with the Duce, since Germany was interested in the matter only secondarily. As a great Danubian power, she was interested only in the Danube river, but not in the passage into the Black Sea. For if she were perchance looking for sources of friction with Russia, she would not need the Straits for that.

The talk then turned again to the great plans for collaboration between the powers interested in the British Empire's bankrupt estate. The Führer pointed out that he was not, of course, absolutely sure whether these plans could be carried out. In case it was not possible, a great historical opportunity would be missed, at any rate. All these questions would perhaps have to be examined again in Moscow by the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Italy, and Japan together with M. Molotov, after they had been appropriately prepared through diplomatic channels.

At this point in the conversation the Führer called attention to the late hour and stated that in view of the possibility of English air attacks it would be better to break off the talk now, since the main issues had probably been sufficiently discussed.

Summarizing, he stated that subsequently the possibilities of safeguarding Russia's interests as a Black Sea power have to be examined further and that in general Russia's further wishes with regard to her future position in the world would have to be considered.

In a closing remark Molotov stated that a number of important and new questions had been raised for Soviet Russia. The Soviet Union, as a powerful country, could not keep aloof from the great issues in Europe and Asia.

Finally he came to speak of Russo-Japanese relations, which had recently improved. He anticipated that the improvement would continue at a still faster pace and thanked the Reich Government for its efforts in this direction.

Concerning Sino-Japanese relations, it was certainly the task of Russia and Germany to attend to their settlement. But an honorable solution would have to be assured for China, all the more since Japan now stood a chance of getting "Indonesia."

SCHMIDT

No. 329

F18/136-153

*Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union*¹

SECRET

MOSCOW, November 18, 1940.

RM 42

RECORD OF THE FINAL CONVERSATION BETWEEN REICH FOREIGN MINISTER VON RIBBENTROP AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE USSR AND PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, M. MOLOTOV, ON NOVEMBER 13, 1940

Duration of conversation: 9:45 p. m. until 12:00 midnight.

Because of the air raid alert that had been ordered, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop and M. Molotov went into the Reich Foreign Minister's air raid shelter after the supper at the Embassy of the USSR at 9:40 p. m. on November 13, 1940, in order to conduct the final conversation.

¹ This memorandum was transmitted to Berlin in a letter of Hilger to Schmidt in which Hilger, on behalf of Ambassador Schulenburg, asked for copies of Schmidt's records of the other conferences held with Molotov in Berlin (292/183890-91).

The Reich Foreign Minister opened the conversation with the statement that he wanted to take the opportunity to supplement and give more specific form to what had been discussed thus far. He wanted to explain to M. Molotov his conception of the possibility of establishing a joint policy of collaboration between Germany and the Soviet Union for the future and to enumerate the points which he had in mind in this connection. He had to stress explicitly, however, that this was merely a matter of ideas which were still rather rough, but which might perhaps be realized at some time in the future. By and large, it was a matter of achieving future collaboration between the countries of the Tripartite Pact—Germany, Italy, and Japan—and the Soviet Union, and he believed that first a way must be found to define in bold outlines the spheres of influence of these four countries and to reach an understanding on the problem of Turkey. From the very beginning it was clear in this connection that the problem of the delimitation of the spheres of influence concerned all four countries, whereas only the Soviet Union, Turkey, Italy, and Germany were interested in the settlement of the Straits question. He conceived the future developments as follows: M. Molotov would discuss with M. Stalin the issues raised in Berlin; then, by means of further conversations, an agreement could be reached between the Soviet Union and Germany; thereupon the Reich Foreign Minister would approach Italy and Japan in order to find out how their interests with respect to the delimitation of spheres of influence could be reduced to a common formula. He had already approached Italy as to Turkey.² The further *modus procedendi* between Italy, the Soviet Union, and Germany would be to exert influence upon Turkey in the spirit of the wishes of the three countries. If they succeeded in reducing the interests of the four countries concerned to a common denominator—which, given good will, was entirely possible—it would undoubtedly work to the advantage of all concerned. The next step would consist in attempting to record both sets of issues in confidential documents. If the Soviet Union entertained a similar view, that is, would be willing to work against the extension, and for the early termination of the war (the Reich Foreign Minister believed that M. Molotov had indicated his willingness in the previous discussions), he had in mind as the ultimate objective an agreement for collaboration between the countries of the Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Union. He had drafted the contents of this agreement in outline form and he would like to inform M. Molotov of them today, stressing in advance that he had

² Ribbentrop had discussed this with Ciano at Schönhof, Nov. 3 and 4. Cf. Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 608-611; also Editors' Note, p. 466.

not discussed these issues so concretely either with Japan or with Italy. He considered it necessary that Germany and the Soviet Union settle the issues first. This was not by any means a matter of a German proposal, but—as already mentioned—one of still rather rough ideas, which would have to be deliberated by both parties and discussed between Molotov and Stalin. It would be advisable to pursue the matter further, particularly in diplomatic negotiations with Italy and Japan, only if the question had been settled as between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Then the Reich Foreign Minister informed M. Molotov of the contents of the agreement outlined by him in the following words:³

The Governments of the states of the Three Power Pact, Germany, Italy, and Japan, on the one side, and the Government of the USSR on the other side, motivated by the desire to establish in their natural boundaries an order serving the welfare of all peoples concerned and to create a firm and enduring foundation for their common labors toward this goal, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1

In the Three Power Pact of September 27, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan agreed to oppose with all possible means the extension of the war into a world conflict and to collaborate toward an early restoration of world peace. They expressed their willingness to extend their collaboration to nations in other parts of the world which are inclined to direct their efforts along the same course as theirs. The Soviet Union declares that it concurs in these aims and is on its part determined to cooperate politically in this course with the three Powers.

ARTICLE 2

Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to respect each other's natural spheres of influence. In so far as these spheres of influence come into contact with each other, they will constantly consult each other in an amicable way with regard to the problems arising therefrom.

ARTICLE 3

Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to join no combination of powers and to support no combination of powers which is directed against one of the four Powers.

The four Powers will assist each other in economic matters in every way and will supplement and extend the agreements existing among themselves.

The Reich Foreign Minister added that this agreement was intended for a period of ten years, with the provision that the Governments of the four Powers, before the expiration of this term, were to reach

³ See document No. 309.

an understanding regarding the matter of an extension of the agreement.

The agreement itself would be announced to the public. Beyond that, with reference to the above-mentioned agreement, a confidential (secret) agreement could be concluded—in a form still to be determined—establishing the focal points in the territorial aspirations of the four countries.

As to Germany, apart from the territorial revisions to be made in Europe at the conclusion of the peace, her territorial aspirations centered in the Central African region.

The territorial aspirations of Italy, apart from the European territorial revisions to be made at the conclusion of the peace, centered in North and Northeast Africa.

The aspirations of Japan would still have to be clarified through diplomatic channels. Here too, a delimitation could easily be found, possibly by fixing a line which would run south of the Japanese home islands and Manchukuo.

The focal points in the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union would presumably be centered south of the territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

Such a confidential agreement could be supplemented by the statement that the four Powers concerned, except for the settlement of individual issues, would respect each other's territorial aspirations and would not oppose their realization.

The above-mentioned agreements could be supplemented by a second secret protocol, to be concluded between Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.⁴ This second secret protocol could perhaps read that Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union, on the occasion of the signing of the agreement between Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union, were agreed that it was in their common interest to release Turkey from her previous ties and win her progressively to a political collaboration with them.

They declare that they would pursue this aim in close contact with each other, in accordance with a procedure to be established.

Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union would jointly exert their influence to the end that the Straits Convention of Montreux, at present in force, would be replaced by another convention which would accord to the Soviet Union the unrestricted right of passage through the Straits for her warships at any time, whereas all other powers except the other Black Sea countries, but including Germany and Italy, would renounce in principle the right of passage through the

⁴ Ribbentrop had discussed such a protocol in his conversations with Ciano at Schönhof; see footnote 2.

Straits for their warships. Transit through the Straits for merchant ships would, of course, have to remain free in principle.

In this connection, the Reich Foreign Minister stated as follows:

The German Government would welcome it if the Soviet Union were prepared for such collaboration with Italy, Japan, and Germany. This matter was to be clarified in the near future by the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, and the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin. In conformity with the statement contained in M. Stalin's letter, that he was not averse to a fundamental examination of the question, which had been confirmed by M. Molotov during his stay in Berlin, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Italy, and Japan for the purpose of signing such an agreement might be envisaged as the ultimate goal. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, was of course aware that such questions required careful examination; he did not, therefore, expect any answer from M. Molotov today, but he was happy to have had the opportunity to inform M. Molotov in this slightly more concrete form of the thoughts that had recently been motivating Germany. Furthermore, he wished to tell M. Molotov the following:

As M. Molotov knew, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) had always shown a particular interest in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. He would appreciate it if M. Molotov could say what the state of these relations was at the present time. As far as the German Government was informed, Japan was anxious to conclude a nonaggression treaty. It was not his intention to interfere in matters which did not directly concern him, but he believed that it would be useful if this question were also discussed between him and Molotov. If a mediating influence on the part of Germany were desired, he would be glad to undertake this office. To be sure, he still clearly recalled M. Stalin's remark, when M. Stalin said that he knew the Asiatics better than Herr von Ribbentrop did. Nevertheless, he wished to mention that the willingness of the Japanese Government to come to a broad understanding with the Soviet Union was known to him.⁵ He also had the impression that if the nonaggression pact materialized the Japanese would be prepared to settle all other issues in a generous manner. He wished to stress explicitly that Japan had not asked the German Government to mediate. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, was, however, informed of the state of affairs, and he knew that, in case of the conclusion of a nonaggression pact, Japan would be willing to recognize the Russian spheres of influence in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, provided an understanding with China were reached. An agreement could also be reached on

⁵ See document No. 311.

possible Soviet aspirations in the direction of British India, if an understanding were reached between the Soviet Union and the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Government was disposed to meet the Soviet wishes half-way in regard to the oil and coal concessions on Sakhalin Island, but it would first have to overcome resistance at home. This would be easier for the Japanese Government if a non-aggression pact were first concluded with the Soviet Union. Thereafter, the possibility would undoubtedly arise for an understanding on all other points also.

The Reich Foreign Minister concluded by requesting M. Molotov to inform him of his views on the issues presented by him.

M. Molotov replied that, concerning Japan, he had the hope and conviction that they would now make more progress on the road to understanding than had previously been the case. Relations with Japan had always been fraught with difficulties and reverses. Nevertheless, there now seemed to be prospects of an understanding. The Japanese Government had suggested the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty to the Soviet Government—in fact, even before the change of government in Japan—in which connection the Soviet Government had put a number of questions to the Japanese Government. At present, the answer to these questions had not yet been received. Only when it arrived could negotiations be entered into—negotiations which could not be separated from the remaining complex of questions. The solution of the problem would therefore require some time.

As for Turkey, the Soviet Union assumed that she would have to reach an understanding with Turkey on the Straits question first of all. Germany and the Soviet Union were agreed that the Convention of Montreux was worthless. For the Soviet Union, as the most important Black Sea power, it was a matter of obtaining effective guarantees of her security. In the course of her history, Russia had often been attacked by way of the Straits. Consequently paper agreements would not suffice for the Soviet Union; rather, she would have to insist on effective guarantees of her security. Therefore, this question had to be examined and discussed more concretely. The questions which interested the Soviet Union in the Near East, concerned not only Turkey, but Bulgaria, for instance, about which he, Molotov, had spoken in detail in his previous conversation with the Führer. But the fate of Rumania and Hungary was also of interest to the Soviet Union and could not be immaterial to her in any circumstances. It would further interest the Soviet Government to learn what the Axis contemplated with regard to Yugoslavia and Greece, and, likewise, what Germany intended with regard to Poland. He recalled the fact that, regarding the future form of Poland, a

protocol existed between the Soviet Union and Germany⁶ for the implementation of which an exchange of opinion was necessary. He asked whether from the German viewpoint this protocol was still in force. The Soviet Government was also interested in the question of Swedish neutrality, and he wanted to know whether the German Government still took the stand that the preservation of Swedish neutrality was in the interest of the Soviet Union and Germany. Besides, there existed the question of the passages out of the Baltic Sea (Store Belt, Lille Belt, Öresund, Kattegat, Skagerrak). The Soviet Government believed that discussions must be held regarding this question similar to those now being conducted concerning the Danube Commissions. As to the Finnish question, it was sufficiently clarified during his previous conversations with the Führer. He would appreciate it if the Reich Foreign Minister would comment on the foregoing questions, because this would facilitate the clarification of all other questions which Herr von Ribbentrop had previously raised.

In his answer the Reich Foreign Minister stated that he had no comment to make on the Bulgarian question, other than what the Führer had already told M. Molotov; that, first, it would have to be determined whether Bulgaria desired a guarantee at all from the Soviet Union, and that, moreover, the German Government could not take a stand on this question without previously consulting Italy. On all other questions he felt he had been "queried too closely" [*"überfragt"*] by M. Molotov. As to the preservation of Sweden's neutrality, we were just as much interested in it as the Soviet Union. As to the passages out of the Baltic Sea, the Baltic Sea was at present an inland sea, where we were interested in the maintenance of the free movement of shipping. Outside of the Baltic Sea, however, there was war. The time was not yet ripe for discussing the new order of things in Poland. The Balkan issue had already been discussed extensively in the conversations. In the Balkans we had solely an economic interest, and we did not want England to disturb us there. The granting of the German guarantee to Rumania had apparently been misconstrued by Moscow. He wanted to repeat again, therefore, that at that time it was a matter of averting through quick action a clash between Hungary and Rumania. If he, the Reich Foreign Minister, had not intervened at that time, Hungary would have marched against Rumania. On the other hand, Rumania could not have been induced to cede so much territory, if the Rumanian Government had not been strengthened by the territorial guarantee. In all its decisions, the German Government was guided solely by the endeavor to preserve peace in the Balkans and to prevent England from gaining

⁶ See vol. VII of this series, document No. 229, and vol. VIII of this series, document No. 159.

a foothold there and from interfering with supplies to Germany. Thus our action in the Balkans was motivated exclusively by the circumstances of our war against England. As soon as England conceded her defeat and asked for peace, German interests in the Balkans would be confined exclusively to the economic field, and German troops would be withdrawn from Rumania. Germany had—as the Führer had repeatedly declared—no territorial interests in the Balkans. He could only repeat again and again that the decisive question was whether the Soviet Union was prepared and in a position to cooperate with us in the great liquidation of the British Empire. On all other questions we would easily reach an understanding if we could succeed in extending our relations and in defining the spheres of influence. Where the spheres of influence lay had been stated repeatedly. It was therefore—as the Führer had so clearly put it—a matter of the interests of the Soviet Union and Germany requiring that the partners stand not breast to breast but back to back, in order to support each other in the achievement of their aspirations. He would appreciate it if M. Molotov would comment on this matter. Compared to the great basic issues, all others were completely insignificant and would be settled automatically as soon as an over-all understanding was reached. In conclusion, he wished to remind M. Molotov that the latter owed him an answer to the question of whether the Soviet Union was in principle sympathetic to the idea of obtaining an outlet to the Indian Ocean.

In his reply Molotov stated that the Germans were assuming that the war against England had already actually been won. If, therefore, as had been said in another connection, Germany was waging a life and death struggle against England, he could only construe this as meaning that Germany was fighting “for life” and England “for death.” As to the question of collaboration, he quite approved of it, but he added that they had to come to a thorough understanding. This idea had also been expressed in Stalin’s letter. A delimitation of the spheres of influence must also be sought. On this point, however, he (Molotov) could not take a definitive stand at this time, since he did not know the opinion of Stalin and of his other friends in Moscow in the matter. However, he had to state that all these great issues of tomorrow could not be separated from the issues of today and the fulfillment of existing agreements. The things that were started must first be completed before they proceeded to new tasks. The conversations which he—Molotov—had had in Berlin had undoubtedly been very useful, and he considered it appropriate that the questions raised should now be further dealt with through diplomatic channels by way of the Ambassadors on either side.

Thereupon M. Molotov cordially bade farewell to the Reich Foreign Minister, stressing that he did not regret the air raid alarm, because he owed to it such an exhaustive conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister.

HILGER

No. 330

91/100432-33

The State Secretary to the Legation in Ireland

Telegram

URGENT
No. 385

BERLIN, November 13, 1940.
zu Pol. II 3530 g.¹

Drafting Officer: Consul Koester.

With reference to your telegram No. 726 of November 10.²

If there is a suitable opportunity at the social meeting with de Valera which you mention, there is no objection to your saying in the course of a conversation that the determined resistance, which we definitely assume that Ireland would offer to any attempt by the English to violate her neutrality, would naturally lead to Ireland's being in a front with us. After England was finally crushed by us, Ireland could then expect in an entirely altered situation to be able to realize her national goals.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. II 3530 g.: Not found.

² In this telegram Hempel had reported that he expected to have de Valera as his luncheon guest on Nov. 14 and inquired whether and in what form he might indicate to de Valera Germany's willingness to render effective assistance to Ireland in case of a British attack (91/100429-31).

³ See document No. 419.

No. 331

587/243355-56

The Office of Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

SECRET
No. 1196 of November 14

PARIS, November 14, 1940—5:50 p. m.
Received November 14—6:40 p. m.

To be brought to the immediate attention of Ambassador Abetz through Dr. Schwarzmann, Secretariat of the Foreign Minister.

Laval telephoned Brinon about the session of the Council of Ministers that dealt with the Lorraine question.¹ The negotiations were

¹ See document No. 282.

extremely difficult. A communiqué was decided upon, which was released after conclusion of the session.² Its text is as follows:³

"The German authorities in Lorraine have given notice to the French-speaking inhabitants of Lorraine to choose between removal to Poland or departure for nonoccupied France. Our fellow-countrymen have chosen France. Their expulsion has been going on since Monday, November 11, 1940, at the rate of 5 to 7 trainloads a day.

"It has been stated, surely by unauthorized persons, that this measure is in accordance with an agreement entered into between the French Government and the Government of the Reich.

"The French Government most categorically denies this imputation. A measure of this kind has never been considered in the Franco-German conversations.

"As to the facts themselves, the French Government has placed the issue before the German Armistice Commission."⁴

I have ordered that publication of this text in the press of the occupied zone be prohibited.

SCHLEIER

² Cf. Paul Baudouin, *Neuf mois au gouvernement* (Paris, 1948), p. 395.

³ The text of the communiqué is in French in the original.

⁴ See document No. 354 and footnote 2.

No. 332

129/121000

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1467 of November 13 LISBON, November 14, 1940—10:33 p. m.
Received November 16—12:45 a. m.

Minister President Salazar received me today for the first time since my return from my official journey¹ for a prolonged conversation. He acknowledged with admiration the description I gave him of German morale and stated that he had time and again received the same picture, lastly from Minister Nobre Guedes in Berlin. He considers Spain's territorial demands to be fully justified, but in repeating previous statements pointed out the unsatisfactory food situation of the country, which would be aggravated to catastrophic proportions by the anticipated English blockade, and which made it advisable to put off Spain's entry into the war as long as possible.

¹ See document No. 184. While in Berlin Huene gave Weizsäcker an oral report on the situation in Portugal. At Weizsäcker's request, Huene put his report in writing. Weizsäcker transmitted Huene's report to Ribbentrop on Nov. 2 with a covering memorandum (129/120994-97) noting that Huene had meanwhile returned to Portugal and had been instructed to pay particular attention to the attitude of the Portuguese press and to reports concerning Great Britain.

He did not think that America would enter the war after Roosevelt's election and presumed that the present state, which he characterized ironically as *intervention pacifique*, would be maintained. He ruled out the possibility of American occupation of Portuguese islands, unless the front of the Axis Powers should be moved further westward.² On the basis of the reports of the Ambassador in London³ (group garbled), who is here now, he characterized England's will to resist as solid and not likely at this time to be broken by German air attacks alone, to which the population moreover had become adapted. He believes however that the continued weakening of the country as regards shipping space and port installations, is the decisive factor. A victory by England was in any event no longer possible. At the conclusion of the cordial conversation Salazar said that he was following our struggle with sympathy and expressed satisfaction that the two countries were linked by the same ideology.

HUENE

² In telegram No. 1676 of Dec. 17 (129/121013) Huene reported having talked to the Spanish Ambassador, Franco, who had just been received by Salazar. According to Franco, Salazar said that there were no indications of any foreign aims directed against the Portuguese islands or the mainland. If any such intentions were discovered, Portugal would warn Spain in accordance with the supplementary protocol of the Portuguese-Spanish treaty of friendship.

³ Dr. Armino Rodrigues de Sstau Monteiro.

No. 333

1005/307564-65

*Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter*¹

BERLIN, November 14, 1940.
e. o. Pol. I 1319 g. Rs.

General Warlimont spoke to me about the fact that, according to reports from Dublin,² the Reich Government perhaps would have to expect the Irish Government to direct a question for assistance to Germany, if Ireland were attacked by England. For this reason and without having received an instruction he had tried to get a preliminary idea of the extent to which such help might possibly be given. He had come to the conclusion that the assistance would consist only of the following:

1. Concentration of German submarines around the Irish ports occupied by England.
2. Extension of Luftwaffe attacks to Irish ports, occupied by England.

¹ This copy is not signed, but has Ritter's letterhead.

² See document No. 330, footnote 2.

He saw no further possibilities. In particular, the commitment of air landing troops was out of the question, since the absolutely necessary supplies could not be assured.³

As General Warlimont recalled, German personnel was supposed to have been employed some time ago in Ireland for the meteorological service. He was not precisely informed about this at the moment. Apparently it had involved only the dispatching of some civilian meteorologists.

In the conversation, passing mention was made of the question as to whether in this connection the staff of the Legation was to be increased by an official or officer experienced in military reconnaissance.⁴

³The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Aug. 1–Nov. 30, 1940) in a passage for Nov. 14 records the following statement from this conversation between Ritter and Warlimont: "Ambassador Ritter believes that in this case the Führer will demand the utmost of the Wehrmacht."

⁴Marginal notes:

"1) Foreign Minister has been informed orally. R[itter], Nov. 14."

"2) Warlimont: Definite view Monday, Tuesday. Is it not better to decline (abzuwinken)? R[itter], Nov. 15."

No. 334

230/152356-57

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

BELGRADE, November 14, 1940.

Received November 19.

zu Pol. IV 3857.¹

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Serbian claim to an outlet to the Aegean.

The outbreak of the Italo-Greek conflict which, as is generally assumed here, opens up the question of the future territorial shape of Greece, has reawakened in Serbian circles and especially in the Army the old Serbian desire for a free outlet to the Aegean through Salonika. Justification of this claim, as is known, rests on the fact that Yugoslavia—like Bulgaria—borders only on a sea the exit from which is in foreign hands, and that the possession of the valley route Morava-Vardar-Salonika has from time immemorial been of vital importance to the Serbian people. This old political objective has been passed over in silence heretofore only because it is in contradiction to the attitude, anti-revisionist in principle, which has always been taken publicly by Yugoslav foreign policy, and also because it after all appeared

¹ Pol. IV 3857: Not found.

tolerable to have Salonika in the hands of the Greek partner in the Balkan Entente; here lies the explanation for the present concern over a development which could end in Italy's taking possession of Salonika. For this would be regarded not only as the end of the Serbian dream of an outlet to the Aegean, but also as the completion of the military encirclement and a direct threat to southern Serbia, i.e., precisely to that part of the country where the historical shrines of the Serbian nation are located. There is no doubt that they would be ready here without further ado to oppose such a development, even with force of arms, if necessary, and if this should appear possible without calling Germany on the scene. They will hesitate, to be sure, to voice their own desire for the possession of Salonika and even more so to carry it out, as long as Salonika remains in Greek hands. But they would certainly be inclined to become completely disinterested in the fate of Greece if they knew that the inheritance claim of Yugoslavia to a Salonika separated from Greece would be recognized by both of the Axis Powers. An assurance in this respect could in some circumstances have the effect of a decisive step on the road to a lasting pacification in the relations of the Serbian people with their Italian and Bulgarian neighbors.

VON HEEREN

No. 335

136/74456-58

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Cipher Letter

TOP SECRET

MADRID, November 14, 1940.

No. 1722 g.

[Received November 22.]¹

For the Foreign Minister.

The internal situation in Spain has grown considerably more critical during the last few weeks.

Recent estimates of the amount of grain that Spain must import present a still more unfavorable picture than at the time of the visit of Serrano Suñer to Berlin. According to the latest findings of the Ministry of Agriculture the 1940 harvest amounts to only 2,300,000 tons. This amount is reduced immediately by 500,000 tons for seed grain and 550,000 tons which the grain farmers will withhold from the outset for their domestic needs. Over against the 1,250,000 tons available from the harvest are the 2,500,000 tons needed for the rest of the population, so that there is a deficit of 1,250,000 tons. In the meantime Spain has been able to import about 200,000 tons of grain.

¹ The receipt date is supplied from another copy (2174/471383-85).

In the Berlin discussions the Spaniards asked us, in case of war, for 600,000 tons of grain until the new harvest (beginning of June).² Under the present rationing Spain would therefore need in addition about 450,000 tons of grain from other countries. It would of course be possible with stricter rationing (which could not have any effect now for more than half a year) to make some further saving; but the success of such measures in Spain is rather uncertain.

The Foreign Minister, with whom I discussed the serious situation a few days ago, said that he was trying to get a larger amount of grain from the United States immediately; if it should be possible to import 300,000 to 400,000 tons before any further complications arose, much would be gained. The negotiations with the United States had proceeded favorably.³ The attitude of the American Embassy now seemed to have stiffened, however, after the re-election of Roosevelt; but he would presumably obtain a certain amount.

How much grain will be imported from overseas before Spain's entry into the war, or before there is a total blockade, cannot be foreseen. For that reason I urgently recommend that we grant the Spanish request for the transfer of 100,000 tons of grain destined for Switzerland which are now in Lisbon, in the manner proposed in telegraphic report No. 3818 of November 11.⁴

The Spanish food problem is at the same time a transportation problem and hence a fuel problem. Because of a shortage of gasoline and faulty organization, but also as a result of withholding of grain, corruption, and so forth, the poorer people in certain parts of Spain are even now going without bread again for days and sometimes weeks. In several parts of Spain there is downright famine as a result of the simultaneous scarcity of oil (bread and oil constitute the main part of the Spanish diet). There is sufficient meat available.

In these circumstances discontent has greatly increased during the last few weeks. Constantly increasing numbers of people previously favorable to the regime are joining the Red element.

On account of the lack of foreign exchange the importation of foreign raw materials (cotton) is also decreasing constantly. Unemployment is increasing to a threatening degree.

A strong increase in political unrest is therefore unmistakable; it expresses itself not only in an increasingly vehement criticism of the regime but also in sharp opposition to entry into the war. Certain military and Falangist circles are the only exception. Hand in hand therewith is a pronounced tendency to hold Germany responsible, be-

² See document No. 125 and footnote 1. The Spanish request for 600,000-700,000 tons of grain had been discussed at the meeting at the Foreign Ministry on Sept. 18 (324/194006-12). See also vol. x of this series, document No. 355.

³ See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. II, pp. 803-834.

⁴ Not printed (136/74450). See document No. 340.

cause of her predominant influence in Spain, for the present situation (shortage of food owing to alleged exportation to Germany) and the political complications. This situation will have to be taken into consideration in the proposed action. Unless military action leads soon to control of the Straits and the possibility of a supplementary provision of food and other necessary raw materials for Spain from the Mediterranean areas, we would have to take into account that Spain may become a heavy burden to us.

VON STOHRER

No. 336

184/137587-88

The Embassy in China to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 73 of November 15

PEIPING, November 15, 1940—7:30 a. m.

Received November 16—10:45 a. m.

Pol. VIII 1418.

Chungking wires:

In wide circles, including government politicians [in Chungking],¹ there exists the desire to exploit Japan's present inclination to peace and [conclude] a peace with Japan that would be favorable for China. [This desire] is supported by fear of a Russian-Japanese understanding at the expense of China, as well as fear of domestic political difficulties.

Opposing this with increased activity are pro-American groups and their supporters, pro-English groups. The main argument is Japan's alleged weakness as proved by the evacuation of Nanning,² also the reopening of the Burma Road, as well as the hope for stronger support on the part of America owing to the re-election of Roosevelt, which has given these circles a powerful impetus. I also refer to the telegram from Chu Chia-hua³ to Roosevelt.

The American Ambassador⁴ is upholding English interests by lively social activity and has had repeated lengthy conversations with the Foreign Minister.

However, a personally well-informed and reliable source denies that he has taken steps against a possible alignment with the Axis on the part of China, which in any case is out of the question. Ac-

¹The words shown in brackets in this document are not parts of the typed original decoded message. They were interpolated in longhand in the Foreign Ministry, mostly in places where words had been garbled or omitted in transmission.

²The Japanese evacuated Nanning on Oct. 31, 1940.

³Chinese political leader, former Cabinet Minister, and official of the Kuomintang.

⁴Nelson Trusler Johnson.

ording to information from a good source, the American Ambassador is of the opinion that the Marshal, who has held his ground militarily for over 3 years, would not conclude peace now, since he could count on stronger support by the U. S. A., and even on the possibility of an American-Japanese war. Also there was indeed no danger⁵ for the Marshal that he might miss the favorable moment for peace with Japan owing to the agreement between Russia and Japan which is here generally regarded as imminent. Russian support of China has in any case been slight heretofore. It is not in the interest of the Soviet Union to pursue an active policy directed against China, and this therefore is not to be expected even in case of a basic understanding between Russia and Japan. This opinion is often expressed also in the Foreign Ministry.

The Deputy Foreign Minister⁶ characterized an agreement between Russia and Japan as probable. At the least, neither of the two desired a worsening of relations. He pointed to the difficulties of a possible peace with Japan: exaggeration of Japanese demands, lack of unity and continuity in Japanese policy, and the difficult question of the form of an understanding.

The Propaganda Ministry, following the Anglo-American lead, is in the meantime zealously beating the drums of war. I call to mind the *Takungpao* editorial of November 4 regarding repudiation of rumors concerning peace and German mediation. Since the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, Transocean has been almost completely supplanted by Central United and Reuter.

A decisive stand by the Marshal, however, is not evident. He is clearly trying to cultivate good relations with all powers. Hence the dispatch of General Kuei⁷ and Robert Chi⁸ to Germany, as well as the projected dispatch of Sun Fo⁹ to Moscow. For the rest, pro-German circles are on the defensive. I am not counting on any change in China's [waiting] attitude until the European situation is further clarified and the effects of Roosevelt's re-election can be discerned.

NORTHE
ALTENBURG

⁵ The original decoded text of this passage read: "Auch bestehende krisenhafte Gefahr". This was crossed out and the following substituted: "Auch bestehe keine krisenhafte Gefahr". A marginal note questioned the reading "krisenhafte" and suggested a different text. As a result, the following which was presumably to be the definitive reading of this passage was inserted in pencil: "Auch bestehe nicht etwa krisenhafte Gefahr".

⁶ Dr. Hsu Mo.

⁷ Maj. Gen. Kuei Yung-ch'ing, Chinese Military Attaché in Germany.

⁸ Robert Chi Tsun, Economic Counselor in the Chinese Embassy in Germany.

⁹ President of the Legislative Yuan of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

No. 337

121/120163-65

Gauleiter Bürckel to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

Telegram en clair

No. 647 of November 15

Gauleitung Saarpfalz,
 NEUSTADT AN DER WEINSTRASSE,
 November 15, 1940—1: 50 p. m.
 Received November 15—2: 50 p. m.

DEAR HERR MINISTER: It has just been brought to my attention that the French Government has addressed a note to you, or rather, that it has issued a statement asserting that it had not been informed of the impending evacuation.¹ Regarding this the following has to be stated:

I informed Herr Abetz myself in Paris as long ago as November 1 that the evacuation was scheduled to begin on November 3. After my departure from Paris I received a teletype message asking me to receive M. Laval, who no longer wanted anything changed in the action decided upon, but merely wished to exercise some influence regarding the date and the pace. Meanwhile the excitement among the population had reached such a pitch as a result of French propaganda that promptest action had to be taken. In spite of this I felt prompted to send the following teletype message to the German Embassy in Paris on November 7:²

"I am unable to keep the appointment this evening because I have to be in Munich very early tomorrow and flying by night is impossible.

"Will you therefore please take note that

"1. Upon M. Laval's request I have postponed the action by 8 days. It will start on Monday, November 11.

"2. The number of trains arriving at the demarcation line will not be 12 per day, but at first 5 and 7.

"3. The responsible border authorities will be kept constantly informed.

"It is impossible for me to wait even one more day because the postponement has caused conditions which have become absolutely intolerable. The action will therefore begin on November 11."

In addition, the Reich radio station Saarbrücken broadcast every 2 hours for several days an announcement to the French in French giving notice of the impending action and pointing out that the necessary preparations, such as provision of shelter, etc., had been made.

Moreover, the situation is characterized by the fact that the *Marseillaise* is sung and even the tricolor is displayed in nearly all of the departing trains. Moreover, it was found that in a large number of villages farmers, who could freely remain on their homesteads and

¹ See document No. 331.

² Not found.

would not even be subject to resettlement within the Reich, declared: "We are going to France, because we are French."

I had in the meantime sent a teletype message to you, informing you of everything.³ Finally, I telephoned to you to ask you to decide whether I should have the talk with Laval. You advised against it—I believe, rightly—because diplomatic conversations might otherwise result in the matter dragging on indefinitely. From an earlier telegram which I received from you it appears that you approached the Führer once more for a decision and that he directed me to set the action in motion immediately. I was thus put in a position to proceed without any further considerations. I still did not do that but informed Herr Abetz once more that the action would irrevocably start on Monday morning, November 11, 1940. I communicated the same to the Armistice Commission, both by telephone and teletype.³

If the French Government now claims that no one got in touch with it, this is untrue, if for no other reason than that M. Laval indeed requested postponement as a result of the contact which had been established.

In regard to the other technical matters, I may say that the persons scheduled for resettlement were asked whether

- a) they wished to remain in Germany, or
- b) wished to go to France.

If, however, they should decide in favor of Germany they would be resettled within the Reich because the linguistic frontier must be eliminated once and for all.

Moreover, Herr Minister, the apartments becoming available will be allocated exclusively to those who have become homeless in the war-damaged areas under my jurisdiction.

I would ask you therefore to reject the French note most categorically. The evacuation is in full swing now and will be definitely concluded in about 10 days. I may also add that a teletype message from Paris was just brought to me,³ in which Laval again asks for a talk. The message states that Laval does not ask for any concessions but that he was merely interested in having a talk.

Heil Hitler

BÜRCKEL
Gauleiter

³ Not found.

No. 338

121/120166-67

The Office of Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, November 15, 1940—11:50 p. m.

No. 1212 of November 15

Received November 15—11:55 p. m.

To be brought to the immediate attention of Ambassador Abetz.

This morning I had a long talk with Laval after his return from Vichy. In the course of our talk he stated the following on the subject of the deportation of the Lorrainers:

Laval declared that the Marshal was very much offended by the assertion made by the Germans to the expellees that this measure was carried out with the concurrence of the Marshal. That assertion was confirmed by several mayors and clergymen. The Prefect of Lyons reported that deep anger against Pétain and the Government was felt among the arriving Lorrainers.

Pétain is planning to go to Lyons on Monday in order to obtain a first-hand view of the situation.

As matters stood, he, Laval, had been unable to prevent the communiqué,¹ whose unfriendly tone he did not deny when I confronted him with it, because the situation of the Government, faced with the de Gaulle propaganda in the country, would otherwise become too difficult. The communiqué was drafted by Alibert.² The clause that these assertions were made "surely by unauthorized persons," had been suggested by him, Laval. He had moreover issued strict orders to the press, the radio, and, correspondingly, the censorship office that the communiqué must be published without any comment. In the *Action Française* there were white censored gaps below the communiqué. He was gratified that the communiqué was not being published in the occupied territory or in Germany. It was important not to dramatize the issue and, in the interest of a brighter future for Europe, to support with greatest vigor the policy of Montoire, which required a basis of good faith and trust, which naturally would not be helped by the Lorraine affair. Laval urgently requested that if it was at all possible the transports should be suspended for 2 to 3 weeks, and that subsequent deportations be at a slower pace. In this connection he indicated clearly that such a gesture would be of particular value to his personal position and would also favorably impress the Marshal.

At the economic negotiations conducted by Professor Lüer, the Economic Plenipotentiary of the Reich Commissar for Lorraine, re-

¹ See document No. 331.

² Raphaël Alibert, French Minister of Justice.

garding the delivery of food products and clothing for Lorraine, the French Ministers and Government authorities concerned have, upon Laval's instructions, shown the greatest cooperation.

SCHLEIER

No. 339

273/177500-01

*Circular of the State Secretary*¹

Telegram

Multex 425

BERLIN, November 15, 1940.
e. o. Pol. V 10101.

The conversations between the German and the Soviet Russian Governments on the occasion of the presence of Molotov in Berlin were conducted on the basis of the treaties concluded last year and resulted in complete agreement regarding the firm determination of both countries to continue in the future the policy inaugurated by these treaties. Beyond that, they served the purpose of coordinating the policy of the Soviet Union with the policy of the Tripartite Pact. As already expressed in the final communiqué regarding the visit of Molotov, this exchange of views took place in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and resulted in agreement by both sides on all important questions of interest to Germany and the Soviet Union. This result clearly proves that all conjectures regarding alleged German-Russian conflicts are in the realm of fantasy and that all speculations of the foe as to a disturbance in the German-Russian relationship of trust and friendship are based on self-deception.

This is particularly stressed by the friendly visit of Molotov in Berlin.²

Same text to all Missions.

Please acknowledge receipt.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹This telegram was addressed to all Diplomatic Missions and to the Offices in Paris and Brussels.

²This sentence was added in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

No. 340

3882/E047640-42

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 15, 1940

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS PENDING WITH SPAIN

1. According to the attached telegram (No. 3818 of Nov. 11) from Ambassador von Stohrer,¹ the Spanish Minister of Commerce² has very urgently requested that we deliver 100,000 tons of wheat to

¹Not printed (136/74450).

²Demetrio Carceller.

Switzerland so that a wheat shipment in the same amount which has arrived in Lisbon for Switzerland may be taken over by Spain. The Reich Food Ministry (Ministerialdirektor Walter) has taken the view in the preliminary, strictly confidential consultation that the promise which Minister Darré gave the Foreign Minister before the visit of the Spaniards to Berlin to the effect that up to 400,000 tons of grain could be delivered to Spain, applied only in case Spain entered the war. A grain delivery such as requested by the Spaniards could be made now only with the approval of the Reichsmarschall or the Führer.

No reply has as yet been sent to Ambassador von Stohrer's telegram, in order not to anticipate a possible exploitation of the Spanish request at the impending conference with Spanish Foreign Minister Suñer.³

Of interest in this connection is the attached DNB report of today from New York, according to which Spain has asked the U. S. A. for food but the U. S. A. wants to wait for a clarification of the Spanish position in the European conflict before making a decision.

2. On the economic questions discussed with the Spaniards on the occasion of the Suñer visit to Berlin,⁴ namely, 1) German economic aid for Spain in the event of her entry into the war, 2) mining rights in French Morocco, 3) French and English mining rights in Spain, 4) settlement of the Spanish debts from the Civil War, no progress has been made since then. In a supplementary protocol discussed in Hendaye⁵ it was to be stipulated according to the German proposal that these four questions were to be handled in accordance with the result of the Berlin discussions, while according to the Spanish proposal the negotiations on the four questions were to be continued as soon as possible. The protocol was not signed; since then the questions have remained in abeyance.

The Embassy in Madrid has been asked to review the figures mentioned by the Spaniards for the German economic assistance most urgently needed in the war.⁶ A request has been made for the result and, if necessary, will be submitted subsequently.⁷

³ Cf. document No. 357.

⁴ See documents Nos. 125 and 126.

⁵ See document No. 221.

⁶ By telegram No. 1957 of Nov. 10 (2174/471381-82).

⁷ In a teletype message of Nov. 17 (3882/E047655) Wiewl informed Ribbentrop that the Embassy estimated Spain's requirements as follows:

1. Grain. 700,000 tons rather than the 550,000 tons previously requested for the period December to July;

2. Motor gasoline 45,000 tons; diesel fuel 12,500 tons; fuel oil 3,000 tons; lubricating oil 6,000 tons; and illuminating oil 1,500 tons monthly—figures which, the Embassy estimated, were not exaggerated, but if anything were strikingly small for diesel fuel and fuel oil.

3. Spain asked 8,000 tons monthly of airplane gasoline, but the Air Attaché estimated that the need would be 17,000 tons for 600 military and 300 training planes.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

No. 341

174/136463-87

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

CONFIDENTIAL

[NOVEMBER 15, 1940.]¹

[Pol. VIII 1423.]²

BRIEF REGARDING ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

I. About 3 weeks ago, the Japanese Government, invoking the Tripartite Pact, proposed in Berlin and Tokyo the conclusion of large-scale economic agreements between the yen bloc (Japan, Manchukuo, North China), on the one side, and Greater Germany and the territories controlled by her, on the other.³ Germany should deliver primarily arms, ammunition, machines, airplanes, refined steel, etc., and grant credits to Japan and aid Japan's industry with technical advice, patents, etc. To negotiate such agreements, the Japanese Government requests that German representatives be sent at the earliest possible date.

It will be difficult to satisfy these Japanese wishes. We ourselves can hardly spare the goods mentioned; even the delivery of such goods to Russia is meeting with the greatest difficulties. Besides, the entire trade with Japan at the present time is dependent on the capacity of the Siberian railroad. Nevertheless, these Japanese wishes will have to be given the greatest possible consideration. We intend to give the Japanese Government a reply along these lines, expressing at the same time our willingness to send a delegation to Tokyo after completion of the necessary studies here at home, presumably late in January 1941.

II. Independent of the foregoing plans are our wishes for obtaining raw materials from third countries via Japan. Ambassador Kurusu offered very extensive aid in that respect even before conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.⁴ Our wishes for raw materials from

¹ A subsequent memorandum by Wiehl of Nov. 18 (174/136469) refers to this document as a memorandum submitted on Nov. 15.

² The file number is from another copy (4079/069147-51).

³ In telegram No. 1164 of Oct. 30 (174/136445-46), Ott had forwarded a proposal along such lines which had been given to him by the Director of the Economic Department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

⁴ A memorandum by Wiehl of Aug. 22 (2316/485080-81) recorded assurances given by Kurusu that the Japanese Government would do everything to facilitate the movement of goods from Germany via Russia to Japan and via Japan to other countries. According to a memorandum by Wiehl of the day before (2316/485079) similar assurances were given on behalf of the Ambassador by the Counselor of Embassy, Kase.

the *Netherlands Indies* in the value of 4 million reichsmarks, communicated to him in response thereto,⁵ have as yet received no reply. Our Embassy in Tokyo was instructed on October 17 to inquire whether Japan was prepared to transport for us from Indochina 2,000 tons of tungsten and 40,000 tons of rubber which the French had offered us at Wiesbaden.⁶ This request, too, has not been granted to date. Rather, the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister has sent Ambassador Ott a rather massive written reply explaining that the German Government in accordance with the Tripartite Pact should not make agreements of any kind with the French Government regarding Indochina without prior consultation with the Japanese Government (telegram No. 1217 from Tokyo⁷). A communication of the same tenor, although couched in more courteous and less precise terms, was made by Ambassador Kurusu to State Secretary von Weizsäcker on October 30.⁸ According to telegram No. 1218 from the Embassy in Tokyo⁹ "in the opinion of Japan, purchases from *Indochina and the Netherlands Indies, countries which in accordance with article 2 of the Tripartite Pact must be considered as forming part of Greater Asia*, are to be agreed to in advance through negotiations between the Governments concerned." To sum up, Japan's attitude, in the opinion of the Embassy, betrays the intention to use all questions of transit trade as subjects for negotiations in the coming economic talks with Germany. To these communications from the Embassy must be added the information from confidential sources that the French Government has already promised Japan preferred treatment in Indochina over all other foreign countries, ourselves included.

Desirable as it is to avoid any discussion with Japan at this time regarding the scope of the Tripartite Pact, just so little do our vital interests in obtaining raw materials permit us to accept this procedure of the Japanese. I recommend that at the earliest opportunity State Secretary von Weizsäcker hold a conversation with Ambassador Kurusu approximately along these lines: he should first tell him that we were prepared to give the most positive consideration to Japanese wishes for a new large-scale settlement of economic relations in the

⁵ A memorandum by Wiehl of Oct 8 (2316/485093-94) records that he told Kurusu on Oct. 4 that Germany would gladly avail herself of Japan's offer to purchase raw materials in the Dutch East Indies on Germany's behalf and to forward them. A list of specific requests for rubber, tin, and spices was handed to the Japanese Ambassador who promised to transmit them to his Government.

⁶ The instruction of Oct. 17 to Tokyo has not been found nor is there a record in the files of the specific French offer made at Wiesbaden. There is, however, Wiesbaden telegram No. 157 of Oct. 17 (368/207152-53) which reported French willingness for economic cooperation with Germany including the export to Germany of products from French colonies. Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol II, p. 162.

⁷ Sent Nov. 6 (2316/485099-100).

⁸ Weizsäcker memorandum (174/136448).

⁹ Not found.

spirit of the Tripartite Pact, and would send a delegation to Tokyo to conduct negotiations after requirements and possibilities on both sides had been clarified. Independent of this, the Ambassador should be requested to bring about at the earliest possible date a decision regarding our wishes stated some time ago with respect to Japanese aid in carrying out and transporting our purchases of raw materials from the Netherlands Indies and Indochina. At the same time, our economic interests in these two areas, which remain unaffected by the Tripartite Pact, should be stressed and it should be emphasized that our requests for supplies are urgent and have nothing to do with the contemplated negotiations. As for Kurusu's earlier communication concerning our tungsten and rubber purchases in Indochina, we should be quite prepared to give due consideration to Japan's requirements. Our Embassy in Tokyo would be instructed to submit to the Japanese Government a proposal regarding the distribution of the quantities available. Following this conversation between Weizsäcker and Kurusu, the Embassy in Tokyo would have to be instructed to convey an identical communication to the Japanese Government. The political situation at that time permitting, an explicit reservation would have to be entered on that occasion with respect to the Japanese suggestion that we should always consult the Japanese before entering into any agreements and business transactions in the Netherlands Indies and Indochina.

III. The difficult negotiations (section I) require detailed preparations here at home, which must be started immediately, if for no other reason than to demonstrate our positive attitude to the Japanese. I discussed these matters yesterday with State Councilor Wohlthat, the permanent leader of the delegation for negotiations with the Japanese. He thought he would be able to make himself available for this activity as of December 1, provided he could take steps soon to secure authorization from the Reichsmarschall for release from his activity in Holland; he would do this as soon as the Reich Foreign Minister had approved the proposed negotiations.¹⁰

State Councilor Helfferich,¹¹ in view of the new Japanese proposals, has made the telegraphic request for an early decision on his recommendations contained in his economic report to the Reich Foreign Minister (appointment of a special economic plenipotentiary and of

¹⁰ According to Wiehl's memorandum of Nov. 18 (see footnote 1) he asked State Secretary Körner of the Four Year Plan if Göring could release Wohlthat from his duties in the Netherlands because Ribbentrop intended to appoint him leader of the delegation to conduct economic negotiations with Japan. Körner replied that "the Reichsmarschall would surely release Herr Wohlthat from his activity in Holland."

¹¹ Emil Helfferich, a German businessman with large interests in Southeast Asia, member of the board of directors of a number of companies in Germany and in the Dutch East Indies.

an economic committee for Japan).¹² He plans to call on me personally in a few days. I do not consider the appointment of a special plenipotentiary necessary if Herr Wohlthat can give his full time to preparation and conduct of the economic negotiations with Japan. Arrangements will be made for ample participation in these negotiations and their preparation by German business groups here and in Japan. Whether, in addition, it would be necessary to create an economic committee, perhaps under the chairmanship of Herr Helfferich, would have to be discussed with the competent agencies. I would inform Herr Helfferich accordingly.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister through the State Secretary, with the request for instructions on the proposed plan of action.¹³

WIEHL

¹² This report has not been found. A Wiehl memorandum of Oct. 30 (174/136450) refers to a letter from Helfferich to Ribbentrop of Sept. 4 containing these suggestions.

¹³ For subsequent developments, see document No. 424.

No. 342

2361/488264-65

The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

No. 271

ROME, November 15, 1940.

Pol. VII 3615 g.

Subject: Visit of the Secretary of the Grand Mufti to the Italian Foreign Ministry.

With reference to our telegram No. 1918 of October 25 of this year.¹

Minister Anfuso today gave me a memorandum by Ambassador Buti, the head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry here, regarding the conversation which the private secretary of the Grand Mufti had with him some time ago, as reported in the telegram cited above.

I enclose a translation of the memorandum.

The private secretary of the Grand Mufti has meanwhile left Rome to go to Baghdad by way of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. He expressed himself as very well satisfied with the reception that he had met with in the Italian Foreign Ministry and said that any prejudices existing in Iraq with respect to Italian policy in the Arabian question were unfounded.

¹ This telegram reported that Ambassador Buti had received the private secretary of the Grand Mufti, who was introduced to him by the Embassy when he had called the previous day (2281/481613). See document No. 190.

I am delivering the letter enclosed,² with the request that it be forwarded to Minister Grobba.

BISMARCK

[Enclosure]

ROME, November 15, 1940.

M. Tewfik al-Shakir, who had arrived in Rome from Berlin, was received in the Italian Foreign Ministry.

He stated how advantageous a collaboration between Italy and the Arab countries would be, of the kind discussed in the conversations conducted in Berlin, and he placed particular emphasis on the request that the Nationalists in Palestine be supported with money, arms, and ammunition.

Tewfik al-Shakir indicated his intention to remain in Rome for the time being in order to wait for a definite reply to his proposals. After the outbreak of the Italo-Greek conflict he preferred to depart in order to avoid possible travel difficulties.

He was assured that the attitude of the Italian Government toward Iraq and the other Arab countries continued to be based on complete understanding and sympathy for their aspirations for independence. A detailed reply was reserved for diplomatic channels through the Italian Legation in Baghdad.

The Italian Foreign Ministry is in contact with the Italian Legation in Baghdad with regard to the granting of financial assistance. The possibility of assistance by means of arms and ammunition is, on the other hand, still being studied. This applies particularly to the question of transportation, which is being dealt with sympathetically, but is naturally not easy to solve.

² Not found.

No. 343

121/120168-70

The Office of Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

No. 1216 of November 15

PARIS, November 16, 1940—12:32 a. m.

Received November 16—1:30 a. m.

To be brought to the immediate attention of Ambassador Abetz.

During our conversation today Laval brought up among other matters the following political problems:

I. France's relations with England. Laval stated that in order to eliminate any doubts on our side of his absolute sincerity and loyalty,

he was willing to keep us constantly informed in detail of any conversations that might be held with English officials and to make France's attitude conform with our wishes. Laval then described what happened at the Franco-English talks in Madrid, as presented in the memorandum made available to us confidentially by Brinon, which I reported by telegram No. 1157 of November 11.¹ Supplementing this, Laval said that Sir Samuel Hoare had stated in one of the talks with de la Baume² that if France were to proceed against de Gaulle by force of arms, such action would "almost inevitably" provoke a conflict with England. Laval remarked in this connection that he had used this phrase to convince Pétain that a French declaration of war against England, to which Pétain objects for reasons of honor, would probably not be necessary since the English would of their own accord declare war on France. In any case, Pétain was firmly resolved to restore the integrity of France's colonial empire by driving de Gaulle out of the insurrectionary territories. Laval then read to me the instructions regarding the answer to be given to Sir Samuel Hoare, which he had communicated to the French Ambassador in Madrid a few days ago. These instructions are in substance as follows:

1. France did not, nor will she attack Great Britain.
2. France protests most vigorously against the aid extended to the rebel de Gaulle by Great Britain and is determined in all circumstances to restore and secure the integrity of her colonial empire.
3. France's policy is independent, and the conversations with Germany do not in any way change her position defined in points 1 and 2.
4. France notes with satisfaction that England has so far taken no steps interfering with the movement of supplies from the French colonies and expects that this will be the situation in the future, too. Laval also stated that the English, again through Sir Samuel Hoare, have given France to understand that if the French fleet should leave its present bases, the English would take belligerent action against the French vessels and would bomb Vichy besides.

II. In the course of the conversation Laval also brought up the subject of Morocco. Spain has concentrated 150,000 men at the Moroccan border. When he inquired of the Spanish Ambassador;

¹ This telegram gave the contents of two memoranda of the Political Department of the French Foreign Ministry dated Nov. 5 and 6, which had been received "through confidential channels" and which gave "a complete picture of Anglo-French negotiations" conducted through the Ambassadors of the two countries in Madrid since September (121/120153-56). For published accounts of those negotiations, see Great Britain, Cmd. 6662 France No. 2 (1945), pp. 12-25; Paul Baudouin, *Neuf mois au gouvernement*, pp. 287-288, 321-322, 329, 343, 367-369; also, F. Charles-Roux, *Cinq mois tragiques aux affaires étrangères (21 mai-1^{er} novembre 1940)* (Paris, 1949), pp. 347-356.

² Renom de la Baume, French Ambassador in Spain.

Lequerica, what the reasons for this step were, he was told that it was done for protection against any action the English might take. Laval stressed that the French were in a position to assure the defense of Morocco by themselves, and every intervention by the Spanish would have a disastrous effect on the native population. He had sent word to the Sultan, with whom he is on friendly terms, that France would defend Morocco with the same determination as she would defend metropolitan France. He had recently summoned General Noguès to Vichy in order to check on the General's political attitude. Laval informed Noguès of the talks which Pétain and he had had with the Führer and had explained to him in detail the reasons for the policy of cooperation with Germany desired by him. At the end he asked General Noguès point-blank whether he accepted that policy. For if he did not, he must for the sake of decency hand his resignation to the Marshal. General Noguès, he said, thanked him for this confidential talk and emphasized categorically that he, too, was convinced that cooperation with Germany was the only possible policy for France. After having originally summoned Noguès with the mental reservation that he might possibly not permit him to return, he, Laval, now had full confidence in the General, who was popular in Morocco, and was convinced that Noguès would offer the most vigorous resistance to any plot against the authority of the Pétain Government.

III. Syria. Laval read to me the telegram from Puaux, in Beirut, stating that according to consistent reports from various sources a move against Syria by the English may be expected in the near future. He, Laval, would at once dispatch the newly-appointed High Commissioner, Chiappe, who enjoyed his complete confidence, with instructions to offer the most vigorous resistance to any English attack.

IV. Laval finally said that he had intended to show me the text of his note in reply to Roosevelt,³ but regrettably had left it behind among his papers in Vichy. The tone of the note, he said, was very sharp because Roosevelt had characterized the French Government as captive. In its substance it presented a definition of the French policy based on the same arguments as those in the reply to Sir Samuel Hoare.⁴

SCHLEIER

³ Roosevelt's personal message to Pétain, handed to the French Ambassador in Washington on Oct. 24, and Pétain's reply are printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. II, pp. 475, 480-482.

⁴ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Verify whether Laval's story is in accordance with the one known to us from other sources."

. No. 344

104/112881-82

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, FUSCHL, November 16, 1940.

No. 2 of November 16

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, November 17—1:30 a. m.

No. 2087 of November 16

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent November 17—2:25 a. m.

[e. o. W 5183 g.]¹

For the Ambassador and Schnurre.

1. In the conversations in connection with Molotov's visit it was not possible to talk much about pending economic questions. Count Schulenburg spoke with Molotov about the Petsamo question and renewed our waiver of a concession, on condition that our claim to the delivery of 60 percent of the yield be upheld without any limitation as to time and that the Soviet side recognize or take over the official and private agreements we have concluded with the Finns. On the other hand, there was no possibility of discussing questions of Russian grain deliveries and our property claims in the Baltic States.

2. The Foreign Minister requests that Minister Schnurre follow up the aforesaid questions (Petsamo, grain, and property rights in the Baltic States) in Moscow. With respect to Petsamo, in addition to 60 percent of the yield for an unlimited period and the assumption of official and private agreements, assurances should also be obtained that payment for the nickel ore can continue to be made through the German-Finnish clearing. The Foreign Minister requests that, if necessary, the Ambassador support Minister Schnurre along these lines in the further handling of the Petsamo question.

3. With regard to the content of the conversation of the Reichsmarschall with Molotov it has not been possible as yet to learn anything except that allegedly the question of Russian grain deliveries did not come up there either. Whether the Petsamo matter was mentioned has not been clarified. Please send a telegraphic report on any further particulars that Counselor of Embassy Hilger can give on the content of the conversation.²

4. We now intend to inform the Finnish Government that we have signified to the Soviet Government our waiver of the Petsamo concession, on the conditions mentioned in paragraph 1; in that connection we intend to state that we expect the Finnish Government

¹ This telegram was drafted in Berlin on Nov. 14 and 15 and the file number is supplied from a draft copy (104/112883-85).

² See document No. 348.

likewise to ensure those two conditions in any agreements it may make with the Soviet Government. Please send a telegraphic report about the attitude there on this question.³ A statement to the Finnish Government is urgent in view of Vyshinsky's conversation with Paasikivi on November 12; a telegraphic instruction regarding this will follow.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

³ See document No. 405.

⁴ See document No. 355.

No. 345

585/242767-68

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 783

BERLIN, November 16, 1940.
zu Pol. I 1330 g. Rs.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 540 of November 7.²

The Bulgarian Minister³ here called upon the Foreign Minister in connection with another matter and in the course of the subsequent conversation informed him, on instruction of the Bulgarian Government, that it was prepared to supply special Bulgarian units for the organization of an air raid warning service at the Bulgarian frontier. The Bulgarian Government would also be agreeable to having several German instructors sent to Bulgaria to cooperate with the air raid warning service and instruct the special Bulgarian units in conformity with German objectives. The Bulgarian Government asked, however, to refrain from sending German Luftwaffe communication troops, because the stationing of German military personnel in Bulgaria could not be kept a secret from the English intelligence service.

This statement made by the Bulgarian Minister here is in evident contradiction with the Legation's telegram No. 540 of November 7, which indicated that Bulgaria had already concurred in principle in our proposal telegraphic instruction No. — of —.⁴ We regard the statement made there by the Bulgarian Government as authoritative in the matter. The proposal advanced here by the Bulgarian Minister to send only "a few German instructors," is not adequate for effective organization of the air raid warning service. We shall therefore insist that the necessary German special units be sent from here. On the other hand, we are prepared to camouflage these special troops to

¹ Pol. I 1330 g. Rs. : Not found.

² Not found.

³ Parvan Draganov.

⁴ Thus on the file copy. The reference apparently is to document No. 295.

the greatest possible extent in cooperation with the Bulgarian air raid warning service. They would therefore appear in civilian clothes, and not in uniform.

3. I request the Legation, working together with the Air Attaché, to give this matter the closest attention in order to avoid any controversies with the Bulgarian Government. I also ask the Legation to keep us currently informed by telegraph.⁵

RITTER

⁵ No further reports from Sofia regarding these negotiations have been found in Foreign Ministry files. However, the draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Aug. 1–Nov. 30, 1940) for Nov. 25 records the statement by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff that: "The air raid warning system on the Bulgarian-Greek border, as had been planned, is now being set up."

See also document No. 384.

No. 346

182/85628

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 1725

BERLIN, November 16, 1940.

With reference to your telegram No. 2074 of November 12.¹

Upon his return please question General Antonescu about his discussions in general in Rome, and in particular about any agreements he may have made with Italy regarding the dispatch of Italian training units to Rumania. We are especially interested in the strength and nature of these units. You may in that connection casually remark that in your own opinion the Soviet Union in view of its Black Sea policy would presumably be very sensitive to the appearance of Italian naval units in Rumania, let alone Rumanian ports. You may furthermore point out that if such a possibility should arise, it would not be advisable to station Italian units in the very same places where there already are German troops.² I request, however, that you avoid giving

¹ This telegram dealt with the topics which Antonescu was planning to discuss during his visit in Rome, Nov. 14–16. It also mentioned Antonescu's wish to ask Italy to send a small detachment of *Alpini* as instructors for radio operators and to let Italy participate in reforming the Navy "in order to remove Italian sensitivity." (182/85627)

² It appears from a memorandum of Nov. 16 by Ritter (182/85628) that the references in this instruction to Russia's reaction and to the stationing of German and Italian troops in the same places were prompted by apprehensions expressed by General Warlimont, after Ritter had informed him of the relevant passages in Bucharest telegram No. 2074.

the impression that we would raise objections in general to the dispatch of Italian troops to Rumania.

A telegraphic report is requested.³

RITTER

³ In telegram No. 2131 of Nov. 19, Fabricius reported a conversation with Antonescu about the latter's conversations in Rome. According to Antonescu, the *Alpini* detachment requested was to be at company strength at the most; for the naval mission he was to have 2-3 officers only. The Duce was inclined to send these also but he would consult the German Government in this matter. (182/-85649-50)

No. 347

2931/567027

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in China

Telegram

No. 249

BERLIN, November 16, 1940.

Sent November 17.

zu Pol. VIII 1405.¹

Drafting Officer: Counselor Knoll.

With reference to your telegram No. 67 of November 12.¹

We have the impression that Japan is circulating reports of an early recognition of the Nanking regime with the aim of exerting pressure on Chiang Kai-shek. It cannot be predicted here with any certainty whether this recognition will actually follow if this aim is not attained.² It is apparently recognized now in Japan that termination of the conflict will be difficult without an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek.

Please avoid in your conversations anything that might arouse doubt about the impending conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Wang Ching-wei, and instruct all officers under your jurisdiction accordingly.³

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. VIII 1405: Not printed (2931/567026). This Peiping telegram forwarded a report from Nanking of confidential information about the impending conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Wang Ching-wei.

² The passage scored through was deleted before the telegram was dispatched.

³ In telegram No. 1322 of Nov. 29 (174/136481-82), Ott reported having been informed by the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister that Japan would the next day recognize the Wang Ching-wei government. The Deputy Foreign Minister handed Ott the texts of four treaties which would be signed with the new Chinese Government and added that Japan was grateful for Germany's efforts to induce Chiang Kai-shek to come to terms with Japan.

No. 348

104/112886-88

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

Moscow, November 18, 1940—5:02 a. m.

No. 2481 of November 17

Received November 18—6:40 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 2087 of November 10 [16].¹

Regarding point 3. Regarding the substance of the conversation between Reichsmarschall Göring and Molotov,² Hilger gives the following information on the basis of his notes:

After Reichsmarschall Göring had stated that the English air raids against Germany were ineffective, he turned to the question of German-Soviet economic relations, on which subject Minister Schnurre had reported to him shortly before.

By way of introduction, Göring declared that fulfillment of reciprocal obligations was a measuring rod for confidence among statesmen and nations. The new orientation of German policy with respect to the Soviet Union was definitive and of long duration. On this basis, a fruitful economic relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union was bound to develop.

In the negotiations between delegations it is natural that views based on special interests should come very much to the fore, causing bottlenecks and differences of opinion. In such cases it was the task of the leading statesmen to assert their authority in order to remove difficulties. He, Göring, had several times intervened successfully in the course of the trade negotiations, and was grateful that Molotov and Stalin had done the same. The difficulties were conditioned by the fact that the Soviet wishes were concentrated on a narrow sector. It would be desirable if a wide platform could be found, since Germany was at war and the fulfillment of certain Soviet Russian wishes in the domain of armament created difficulties. He could not spare the Russian negotiators the reproach that in many cases they had for a long time left Germany in uncertainty as to their wishes. An attitude of trust on Russia's part was desirable and would prove advantageous. He was asking the leading men of the Soviet Union to disregard trifles and to plan economic relations on a broad basis, for the broader the

¹ Document No. 344.

² The conversation took place at 10:00 a. m. on Nov. 13. Immediately afterwards Molotov had a brief conversation with Hess. No minute of the conversation with Hess has been found, but in a letter of Nov. 18 to Schmidt (292/183890-91) Hilger noted that the conversation had been confined to a reply by Hess to Molotov's question about the function of the liaison staff which Hess headed and to a mutual orientation concerning the relations of State and party in Germany and the Soviet Union.

basis the closer and firmer would the relations be. Germany, for her part, would not fail to do her utmost to balance accounts and to fulfill the obligations assumed.

Molotov answered that German-Soviet economic relations had proved their viability and were also, in his opinion, entirely capable of development, inasmuch as they were based on mutual interests. However, the Soviet Government could not understand that after occupation of large areas which placed additional resources at Germany's disposal, she should not be in a position to fulfill the wishes of the Soviet Government quickly. Germany was also hesitant in granting technical assistance. He, Molotov, would admit that there was bureaucracy and clumsiness in the Soviet Union. He would cooperate in eliminating the consequences thereof and looked upon the prospects for German-Soviet economic relations with justifiable optimism.

Reichsmarschall Göring replied that Germany's economic situation had indeed improved as a result of the utilization of European resources; however, the occupied areas had been taken over in a state of disorganization and destruction. In proportion to their rehabilitation, it would become (group apparently missing) to fulfill Soviet wishes. It should not be forgotten that Germany was at war and that enormous demands were being made on highly developed industries. He, Göring, was nevertheless convinced that in time conditions would improve. With respect to technical assistance, Soviet wishes were often very far-reaching and in many cases practically meant the revelation of German industrial secrets.

Soviet deliveries to Germany consisted mainly of grain and oil. These products were, to be sure, very important to Germany, but supplying them was relatively easy for the Soviet Government, since it was a matter of natural products. Germany, on the other hand, was forced to deliver high-cost manufactured articles, for which there was a great demand in Germany as well.

In his reply, Molotov declared that the Soviet Government had meanwhile withdrawn a part of its requests regarding military equipment (armor plate) and had not intended asking for the disclosure of state secrets. For the Soviet Union it was important to know what it could get from Germany. An agreement regarding the delivery of grain and oil would easily be reached. The most important thing was to bring about a general accord on all decisive questions.

The conversation was concluded with thanks from Molotov for the friendly reception and with Göring's renewed promise to do everything possible to eliminate difficulties arising in economic relations.

The Petsamo question was not touched upon, and deliveries of grain only to the extent mentioned above.

SCHULENBURG

No. 349

84/62100

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1940—4:07 p. m.

No. 2495 of November 18

Received November 19—3:00 a. m.

For the Press Department.

With reference to your telegram No. 1311 of November 16.¹

The Reuter report summarizes the situation from the standpoint of what would be useful and desirable for England. At the moment I have no data which, in an evaluation of the situation as a whole, would lead to the conclusion that there will be a further deterioration or that a break is imminent.

1. Stimson and Knox are known to be warmongers. Their utterances therefore do not always have the character of speeches of responsible Cabinet members.

2. Up to now Dies, as reported, has given in to the State Department all along the line and not vice versa. He has:

a. called off a public hearing;

b. dropped a subpoenaing of the Consuls, and both on the insistence of the State Department;

c. postponed again for the time being the heroic report that had been announced.

The "disclosures" of the Dies Committee could lead to a break in relations only if the State Department should act on them. Considering the tense relations between Dies on the one hand and the White House, Ickes, the State Department, the Justice Department, and the F.B.I. on the other, it is not to be expected that Dies will be asked to participate, for all practical purposes, in the shaping of German-American relations.

THOMSEN

¹ Telegram No. 1311 (2422/511964-65) explained that reports of an intention of the American Government to break off diplomatic relations with Germany had recently increased. Reuter dispatches had pointed to the speeches of Knox and Stimson, and to the State Department's consent to the actions of the Dies Committee. The Chargé d'Affaires was asked for his opinion.

No. 350

65/45244

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 539 of November 18 TEHRAN, November 18, 1940—8:09 p. m.
 Received November 18—9:45 p. m.
 [Pol. VII] 1094.¹

Since Molotov's Berlin visit, British propaganda here is operating with the slogan "Iran sold by Germany to the Soviet Union."

The transparent purpose of this propaganda is:

1. To trouble the good relations between Germany and Iran;
2. To sow new mistrust between Iran and the Soviet Union in order thereby to disturb anew relations between the two countries.

This propaganda has succeeded in disturbing official Iranian circles and in exciting the Iranian merchants. The Minister President² spoke to me about it. I replied to him in accordance with Multex No. 425 of November 15,³ and added that I knew nothing of the alleged conversation in Berlin about Iran. Because of the great anxiety in Iranian circles, please send me instructions⁴ for guidance in my conversations. A statement that Iran was not discussed on the occasion of Molotov's visit would suffice to bring about a tranquilizing effect.

EITTEL

¹ This number is only faintly visible and it is not entirely clear whether it is the file number or whether the number was put there for reference purposes. Cf. document No. 364.

² Ali Mansur.

³ Document No. 339.

⁴ See document No. 364.

No. 351

205/142583

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 836

BERLIN, November 18, 1940.

Sven Hedin called on me today,¹ since he had not succeeded this time in speaking to the Foreign Minister personally. He referred to his letter of October of this year² and finally put the questions broached there to me once again, namely:

¹ Sven Hedin's account of this conversation is printed in *Sven Hedin's German Diary, 1935-1942*, translated by Joan Bulman (Dublin, 1951), pp. 155-161.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 131, where Aug. 25 is given as the date when this letter to Ribbentrop had been sent. No copy of the letter has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. A translation of a letter of Nov. 9 from Ribbentrop, acknowledging receipt of Sven Hedin's letter is printed in *ibid.*, p. 132.

a. What attitude would Germany take if in a Finnish-Russian conflict Sweden should come to the aid of Finland. I replied that this question did not appear to me to be of present importance, I had no worries over Finland. At any rate the assertion circulated by Sweden in the recent Finnish-Russian war was incorrect—namely, that Germany had stood in the way when Sweden wished to rush to the aid of Finland.

b. What would Germany say to a Finnish-Swedish military alliance? I replied that as far as I knew the peace treaty of last spring between Finland and Russia contained a provision opposing a military alliance.

c. What would we say to a union of the Nordic states, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, under Swedish leadership? I replied that such conceptions for the future seemed to me to be premature.³

WEIZSÄCKER

³ See, further, document No. 449.

No. 352

66/46245-75

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

No. 36

BERCHTESGADEN, November 19, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER, SERRANO SUÑER, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, AT OBERSALZBERG ON NOVEMBER 18, 1940

The Führer started with a reference to the situation which had resulted from the most recent events and which made it imperative to act as quickly as possible—not because Germany and Italy were in a military situation which had essentially deteriorated—but because psychological effects of certain events would add new strength to the enemy's will to resist, if they did not successfully intervene somewhere. During her operations in Greece, Italy had made the mistake of proceeding without regard to atmospheric conditions and seasonal factors. She had therefore started the attack without being able to employ her Air Force fully. Her heavy ground weapons could not be used either because of the soft ground. Italy had done what Germany had refrained from doing last autumn when she postponed her offensive against the English and French, though she thereby enabled both foes to increase their military strength until spring. He (the Führer) had been convinced that for a successful offensive a suitable season was more important than superiority in material. Thus, he did not have to regret the waiting either. On the other hand, however, he was also convinced that it was imperative to act swiftly and decisively, if the

conditions required it. In the present circumstances it was absolutely necessary to shut off the Mediterranean. This blockade could be easily accomplished in the west at Gibraltar. It was also possible in the east to close the Suez Canal to enemy shipping.

In connection with the closing of the Straits in the west the problem of Spain's general preparedness arose, particularly, however, her preparedness for the defense of the Canary Islands, because there threatened the only danger: an attempt by the English to gain a foothold on the Canary Islands. Everything else was militarily no problem.

Regarding the economic situation the Führer declared that he did not believe that the conditions in Spain would improve by waiting. There was no doubt that all these problems would have been settled if Spain had already entered the war in the summer.

The Führer then described Germany's general military situation. Of her 230 divisions, 186 could be called first-class. They were available for any operation, because they had nothing to do at the moment. Germany's position regarding material was also strong and did not cause any difficulties. In the air Germany was attacking England every day depending on weather conditions. One armament center after the other was being obliterated. Nevertheless, the real large-scale attack against England had been impossible as yet on account of the weather conditions. By large-scale attack he meant the combined employment of 3-4,000 planes, which would then also create the possibility of a landing in England. However, the main thing was that the attacks on England would not be decreased in the least until the time when such a large-scale operation would be possible. Germany, however, had the aim of deciding the war as quickly as possible, and therefore wanted to attack the English vigorously also in the Mediterranean.

Serrano Suñer replied that he had not known exactly what the Führer wanted to talk to him about, and therefore could present only his personal opinion on the questions raised. This was made easier for him by the fact that he had already suspected what the conversation with the Führer would touch upon, and that he therefore had already prepared himself mentally for it. In connection with certain recent events he too had been able to note indirectly through the reaction of the Spanish Anglophiles a strengthening of morale among Germany's enemies. In view of the difficulty of dealing a decisive blow against England he understood that the war could probably be shortened by a Mediterranean operation.

Here the Führer interjected that Germany would begin the attack even in winter, if there were a prospect for 3-4 weeks of good weather. The cold would not matter since it was not as intense anyway in England as in Germany. Only a clear sky and a calm sea were necessary.

Serrano Suñer resumed his argumentation with the remark that, if Spain were to play the important role which would be assigned to her in any warfare in the Mediterranean, two problems would have to be examined: the economic situation and the public morale.

The closing of the Mediterranean and Spain's entry into the war would mean for that country the same as the closing of the Atlantic Ocean. At the present time, after many difficulties which arose from England's distrust because of the Spanish attitude toward the Axis, Spain had succeeded in getting the first shipment of 400,000 tons of wheat from Canada.

To an incidental question of the Führer as to when Spain would have imported the total amount, Serrano Suñer replied that this would be with 1 to 1½ months, and mentioned Spain's extraordinarily serious food situation. Shortages and hunger were great. Therefore Spain tried to maintain the illusion in England that she would not enter the war. In this manner Spain wanted to secure at least a minimum amount of wheat from the areas controlled by England, and therefore he as Foreign Minister had to tuck with extraordinary cleverness. However, he must point out that even when the 400,000 tons of wheat had arrived in Spain, this quantity would still by no means be sufficient, but would represent only a minimum supply without which an entry of Spain into the war would be absolute folly. Besides, Spain needed 600,000 tons, in order to cover her production deficit of more than one million.

Moreover, the Spanish Government would be greatly pleased with German technical advisers, because in this manner it could also be established by competent German authorities that the food distribution in Spain was after all not so bad as was occasionally claimed by nonexpert Germans in Spain. Besides, these advisers could of course suggest improvements in the Spanish system and accurately report to their own Government on the real distress of the country.

In a recent conversation with Franco the latter had complained to him (Serrano Suñer) that Germany did not send either food or war material. In this connection Serrano Suñer mentioned material deliveries for a Heinkel airplane factory in Seville, which, despite the conclusion of the contracts for supplies and the making of the payments, had not been carried out by Germany, whereupon the Führer answered him that these deliveries would really have no sense any more, since they would come too late for this war. They would weaken Germany and would not strengthen Spain, since experience showed that it took 1½ to 2 years before such a plane factory could really start production.

Serrano Suñer replied conciliatingly that it was only a question of a "friendly complaint" (*queja afectuosa*) that Germany did not send the things necessary for Spain.

The Führer replied that Spain was not a belligerent country and Germany used all available material for the conduct of the war. If Spain were also a belligerent power Germany would supply her with material in the same way as was done very amply during the Civil War. Both countries would then be linked together for better or for worse.

In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister mentioned that Germany was delivering 1 million tons of coal to Italy. If Italy were not waging war, not even 200,000 tons would be delivered.

Serrano Suñer remarked that after the Hendaye conversation the British and American Ambassadors in Spain had demanded information on the contents and subject of the talks between the Caudillo and the Führer. When he (Serrano Suñer) had talked about the strengthened solidarity of Spain with the Axis Powers, a shipment of 30,000 tons of wheat from the United States was stopped as an answer to it. Upon Roosevelt's orders the American Ambassador¹ had even had the insolence to demand a public declaration from the Caudillo that Spanish foreign policy would not change and that Spain would not enter the war. Of course, he (Serrano Suñer) had refused this demand.²

To an incidental question of the Führer whether Serrano Suñer believed that Spain could put her economy in order if she did not enter the war, Serrano Suñer replied that in Spain the opinion generally prevailed—which was very strongly supported by the English propaganda—that if Spain did not enter the war the delivery of Canadian and Argentine wheat would be extraordinarily facilitated through the grant of English navicerts.

The Führer refuted this view. England and America certainly would not grant any relief, but would only seek to cause further difficulties for the Spanish regime by continued strangulation under ever new pretexts and finally bring about its fall.

In this connection Serrano Suñer mentioned the propaganda carried on by England or Anglophiles in Spain against Germany. It was rumored among the people that the shortages were only a result of the fact that all available food and other materials were being sent to Germany, and he stressed once again the widespread public opinion that the food supply of the country from Argentina and Canada would be secure if it stayed out of the war. If Spain were to act only according to this point of view she would certainly not enter the war. Above supply problems, however, stood history in which Spain wanted to participate this time too.

¹ Alexander Willbourne Weddell, Ambassador in Spain, May 1939–October 1942.

² Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. II, pp. 824–826.

The Führer replied that if this was Spain's idea he would give the friendly advice that she enter the war as quickly as possible, since in that case the total conflict would be ended so much more quickly and peaceful work could be resumed. If the general preparations for the entry into the war were finished within 1 to 1½ months, the most opportune time for strong help by Germany would be at hand. Regarding the climate, German soldiers would find it easiest to fight on Spanish soil in December, January, and February, whereas later on they would be handicapped by excessive heat. Besides, in March or April the German troops would also probably have to be available again for other tasks.

Serrano Suñer then turned to the psychological factors. In all sincerity he would have to point out that a war was always unpopular, particularly in Spain, however, where a war had just been ended. The sacrifice caused by a new war would hit the Spanish people harder than the Italians and the Germans, since both these peoples had been better prepared. In Italy and Germany, moreover, the domestic situation was absolutely consolidated, which was by no means the case in Spain.

The Führer replied that the unsettled domestic situation was one more reason for Spain's quick entry into the war.

Serrano Suñer on his part also declared his belief in the historical dogma that a domestic revolution needs some enterprise in foreign policy in order to consolidate domestic conditions.

To this the Führer remarked that if Germany fought together with Spain—and he requested that Germany alone be drawn in for help—a big success was certain. He had also addressed the same request already to Italy, because the Germans and Spaniards could cooperate well. Germany would also leave the entire glory of the success to the Spanish ally, just as she had been very reserved on this point in the Civil War. She had achieved enough glory elsewhere. As to the conditions regarding material and personnel, the best material and the best soldiers would be put at the disposal of Spain. The Spaniards had already become acquainted with the military qualities of Germany during the Civil War.

Serrano Suñer replied that he did not doubt in the least the efficiency of the German Army or the success of its military operations, but had to call attention to the domestic difficulties of Spain again and again.

Besides, after their return from Hendaye Franco as well as he himself had been quite depressed and worried about the Secret Protocol, because Spain's demands were treated, especially in article 5, in a form which was much too vague.* If the Spanish people learned

* See Editors' Note, p. 466.

with what vague uncertainty the Spanish aspirations in Africa had been treated in this Protocol, they would be all the less inclined to enter the war. The Spaniards were a sentimental people. After the difficulties and sufferings which they had gone through they would be prepared to fight only if they were given a great aim in Africa.

The Führer replied that this aim would be very nearly achieved the moment Gibraltar had been conquered and German divisions had marched upon the opposite African coast and into French Morocco. A defection of Morocco, possibly on the basis of a secret understanding among Pétain, Laval, and de Gaulle, would then not have to be feared any longer.

Serrano Suñer pointed out that if the Protocol of Hendaye had become known it would undoubtedly have caused a certain bitterness in Spain, since most likely it would have been generally interpreted to the effect that Germany had sacrificed the demands of a "friend of yesterday, today, and for the whole future" to a very doubtful rapprochement with the old hereditary enemy.

The Führer replied that he had in no way sacrificed Spain's friendship to the rapprochement with France. However, it would be unwise to make demands whose publication would unfailingly cause Morocco's defection to de Gaulle. He (the Führer) stated emphatically that he would not sacrifice a friend in order to woo a definitely irreconcilable enemy. He (the Führer) had taken cognizance of Franco's letter⁴ and would also make use of it, but not before the public, because otherwise Morocco would be lost. He could, to be sure, occupy France proper in case of a recalcitrant attitude on the part of the Pétain Government, but not Morocco. At the proper time he would send Franco a satisfactory answer to his letter.

Serrano Suñer then mentioned his conversation with Laval and spoke of him in a very unfavorable manner. He was one of the most hated men in France, because he had openly advocated a rapprochement with Germany. This showed what the real feelings of France were. The majority of the French were still Anglophile and still hoped for a victory of the English. Whether in these circumstances agreements with France would be of long duration appeared to him (Serrano Suñer) extremely doubtful.

The Führer replied that he would even be satisfied if the agreements with France lasted until the conquest of Gibraltar. Then the danger of the defection of Morocco would in any event be considerably decreased.

To this Serrano Suñer remarked that according to information received in Spain the French in Morocco played a double game and that the real successor of de Gaulle would be General Weygand.

⁴ See document No. 273 and footnote 2.

The incorporation of Tangier⁵ was in accordance with a decision which Serrano Suñer had made in connection with a démarche of the French representative with the Spanish High Commissioner in Tangier. The latter had declared that France, because of Spain's changed foreign policy, had no confidence any more in Spain, and suggested therefore that the neutrality of the Tangier Zone be guaranteed jointly by French and Spanish troops. France, which allegedly was now Germany's friend, had considered the new Spanish attitude toward the Axis as inadmissible.

Serrano Suñer again turned to the Hendaye Protocol and complained that the fulfillment of the Spanish demands in this Protocol was made dependent upon the possibility of finding compensations for France.

The Führer replied that Germany alone would have to determine the value of such compensations and that moreover he had not notified the French of the Protocol in any way. If Franco had been upset about the Hendaye Protocol he (the Führer) could only declare emphatically that in no circumstances would Germany's friends emerge from this war dissatisfied and the enemies satisfied, but that on the contrary Germany's friends would be satisfied and Germany's enemies destroyed. Spain's future would be safeguarded, and both countries would remain friends for 300 years and longer.

Serrano Suñer replied that the Spanish Government had signed a written protocol which could be used only with great difficulty as a weapon for the defense of its claims.

The Führer replied that the Protocol of course could not be published, since otherwise Morocco would immediately break away and the conquest of Gibraltar would have no sense any more. He pointed out that a written agreement could only be justified in case it could be shown to others. In the case in question it would be impossible in these circumstances to be specific, since it would lead to the loss of the object of the agreement.

When Serrano Suñer again criticized the making of the fulfillment of the Spanish demands dependent upon possibilities of compensating France, the Führer declared that a precise statement would lead to an endless dispute and to the loss of North Africa. He would then prefer that Gibraltar remain in English hands and Africa with Pétain. The Spanish gentlemen would have to believe his words, and should not insist on a precise written statement.

Serrano Suñer replied that he had of course absolute confidence in the words of the Führer, but feared that eventually other friendly powers would claim certain territories which Spain wanted for herself, such as Oran, for example. For this reason he would like to make article 5 of the Protocol concrete and clear.

⁵ See document No. 286.

The Führer replied that a claim on these territories by third countries would be entirely out of the question. When Germany had reached her aim, Spain could be satisfied in Morocco. Germany would then only claim for herself a base there. The longer, however, that Spain waited, the more difficult it would be to conquer Gibraltar, and the hesitancy of politicians could easily cost the lives of thousands of brave soldiers. Spain could rely on not being left in the lurch.

At this point the Reich Foreign Minister interposed that the first great success that Franco would achieve before his people would be Gibraltar—and that within a short time—and that then Morocco would follow.

These statements of the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister on Gibraltar and Morocco appeared to dispel the objections raised by Serrano Suñer. At any rate he did not revert to them later, but turned to the subject of the military commissions. The Führer called it their task to fix the dates for action. In this connection the following points were to be considered :

1. The quicker the action was undertaken the less bloodshed it would require;

2. The earlier it was started the surer the success would be;

3. The earlier the attack was started, the quicker the Mediterranean could be shut off;

4. The earlier Spain entered the war, the quicker it would be ended—which was of the utmost interest to everybody, above all from an economic point of view;

5. The earlier Spain decided, the more suitable the season would be for the German soldiers;

6. The earlier Spain decided, the fewer German troops would be needed in other theaters of operation, where they would be employed only later;

7. The earlier Spain began the military operations, the less effect American intervention could have.

On the other hand, Spain would naturally have to have a certain time for preparation. Military preparations would have to be very carefully made, and finally the attack could not be started before there was absolute certainty that the Canary Islands were firmly in the hands of the Spaniards. Artillery, ammunition, and antiaircraft artillery could be procured from Germany. One or two airports on the Canary Islands could be provided with dive bomber squadrons to repel enemy ships. Finally, a number of the heaviest batteries would have to be installed in the vicinity of Gibraltar.

Serrano Suñer replied that Spain herself had already stationed artillery on the Canary Islands, that she was installing machine gun nests and assembling fighters. Besides, new military command posts had been established and staffed with officers who had proved themselves in the Civil War and in Africa, so that each individual island would defend itself as the Alcazar did at the time of the Civil War.

Toward the end of the conversation Serrano Suñer also mentioned that upon his return to Madrid he would tell the English Ambassador

in reply to the question that was certainly to be expected from him concerning the content of the Berchtesgaden talk, that upon Serrano Suñer's request Germany had declared her willingness to supply wheat. In this manner he believed he could rouse the English to make deliveries possible on their part also, in order thereby to keep Spain out of the war.

To a question of Serrano Suñer regarding Turkey the Führer replied that this country was extremely uneasy because of the general development in the Mediterranean, and added that when the Italians had conquered Mersa Matrûh, the English fleet could be chased out of Alexandria by planes.

Serrano Suñer bade farewell with the remark that he would utilize the time of preparation in the military field to get as much Canadian, American, and Argentine wheat as possible into Spain.

SCHMIDT

No. 353

F14/466-77

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

SALZBURG, November 19, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND COUNT CIANO, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AT THE OBERSALZBERG ON NOVEMBER 18, 1940¹

The Führer, with the aid of a map, outlined to Count Ciano the situation as it presented itself in the light of the latest developments in the Mediterranean. The English, according to reports received in Germany, had not only occupied Crete and other Greek islands and constructed air bases there, but were now also going to construct airfields in three places in Thrace and two others near Salonika.

Upon Count Ciano's remark that English air bases had existed on Greek territory even before the Italo-Greek war, the Führer replied that there was a great difference between clandestine and open bases. Under present war conditions the English could go about building up their air organization on Greek soil at their leisure and with full publicity and do so much more effectively than if they had to proceed in secrecy. In any case, the whole of southern Italy was now as much within the range of English bombers as were the Albanian seaports.

A matter of the greatest gravity, however, was the fact that the Rumanian oil fields, to which the English had previously been unable

¹ Ciano wrote an account of this interview in a letter to Mussolini of Nov. 18, printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 612-616. See also *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for Nov. 18 and 19, 1940.

to penetrate at all, were now brought within 500 kilometers of the English air bases. The English were thus not only able to carry heavy bomb loads to Rumania, but they had the additional advantage that the weather would probably be the same over the entire distance of the relatively short route of 500 kilometers, so that taking the weather alone flights were much easier to organize than they were over other routes where the same weather conditions prevailed over the whole distance only on rare occasions. Oil fields were actually very hard to protect also for the reason that they were easily set on fire by incendiary bombs dropped from high altitudes, a situation in which effective counteraction by anti-aircraft artillery would not be possible. If this happened the loss of oil refineries would be especially hard.

It was also difficult, on the other hand, to destroy the English airfields from the air, for German experience in air warfare over German and English territory had shown that airfields were very quickly restored unless it happened that important hangars or other installations were hit. This notwithstanding, he would recommend that the Italian air raids be directed in the main against military targets, since retaliatory raids on Athens or other cities had probably little effect. The English would remain entirely indifferent to them and the experience Germany had gained in the air war against England indicated that it did not pay to bomb purely civilian targets. During the winter it would moreover be impossible because of weather and terrain conditions to attack the English in Greece by land. Furthermore, Germany would be unable for these same reasons to contribute any assistance, apart from the fact that it would first be necessary to transport the required troops to the Balkans. If he (the Führer) were to launch an operation against the English in Greece, he would do so only if he had abundant military forces at his disposal for the purpose. Concentration of these forces, however, would take some time.

While in the circumstances the military consequences of the situation were grave or at least could become so, the psychological repercussions were the most felt at the moment. They had a prejudicial effect on the diplomatic preparations for the establishment of a grand coalition. In several instances a resurgence of reserve in certain countries toward German plans for a coalition had been noted. Bulgaria appeared less inclined than ever to join the Tripartite Pact. Russia, whose expansion Germany wishes to divert to the south, had shown considerable interest in the Balkans at the Berlin talks with Molotov. The developments in Greece, too, would scarcely tend to influence Turkey toward a rapprochement with the Axis. Yugoslavia's reaction has so far been impossible to determine. It was necessary in all circumstances to prevent these psychological conse-

quences from creating obstacles to the further actions of the Axis Powers or, worse, from causing a spread of the war as a result of the unfriendly attitude of some of the heretofore undecided countries.

In order to counteract these psychological consequences it was imperative to deal England and its fleet in the Mediterranean a severe blow. To accomplish this the Mediterranean must be sealed off at Gibraltar and at the Suez Canal, i.e., Spain must be brought around to enter the war as soon as possible. Gibraltar and the territory opposite would be taken, and Spanish Morocco would be occupied by several German divisions. This would be the best insurance against French Morocco's defection from the Pétain Government. It had all along been agreed between Germany and Italy that such a defection must be prevented at all costs because establishment of the English in North Africa would have disastrous consequences, especially for military operations in the Mediterranean. The closing of Gibraltar would moreover force England to route her transports around Africa, as a result of which the existing shortage of shipping space would be even more severely felt. Efforts must be intensified to divert Russia's aspirations from the Balkans and to orient them to the south. An understanding must be sought also with Turkey. Hungary must permit the transit of additional German forces to Rumania, and Rumania would have to assume maintenance of the German troops. If the English should actually establish themselves in Greece, Germany would advance against them with decisive forces from Rumania through Bulgaria. But nothing could be done in this respect either before spring because of the weather and terrain conditions and the absence of suitable roads. In fact, only three north-south routes were available for passage through Bulgaria, with one of them passing the Yugoslav border at a distance of 10 kilometers, so that here moreover the possibility of moving transports depended on Yugoslavia's attitude.

In this connection the Führer asked Count Ciano directly what Italy was prepared to give to neutralize Yugoslavia, adding that that country would have to be offered a guaranty of its territory and promised Salonika. In return it would have to acquiesce in demilitarization of the Dalmatian coast.

Count Ciano, who had only little to say to the Führer's remarks and merely attempted to explain the lack of success against Greece by a tactical mistake of the Italian operational command, appeared to be deeply impressed by this proposal. He immediately expressed his personal agreement, merely adding that the final decision would depend on the Duce's reply. He implied that yielding to Yugoslavia would not come easy for the Duce, because he "could not suffer" the Yugoslavs. To this the Führer remarked that he, too, was com-

pelled to cultivate relations with countries which were uncongenial to him at heart.

Count Ciano mentioned in this connection that Belgrade had already extended secret feelers. An emissary of Court Minister Antić, a Yugoslav lawyer, had come to Italy and sought to arrange a talk between him (Count Ciano) and Antić.² The Duce had authorized him (Count Ciano) to talk with Antić, from which he inferred that Mussolini would be amenable to the Führer's recommendation about how to deal with Yugoslavia. He would in any event keep the Führer informed of the further development of the negotiations with Yugoslavia. If no contact with Belgrade resulted, it would be up to Germany to get in touch with Yugoslavia on her own account.

The Führer stated that he was prepared to do so and said that the occasion for putting out such a feeler would be a German inquiry with Yugoslavia as to what attitude it intended to take in the Italo-Greek conflict, particularly what meaning was to be attributed in this connection to the mobilization measures of the Yugoslav Army. The liquidation of the Greek affair would at any rate be greatly advanced if Yugoslavia were to cooperate.

In the further course of the conversation, the Führer came to speak of the military measures in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition to the closure of the western exit at Gibraltar, operations must be launched against the Suez Canal. This required that the Italians capture Mersa Matrûh so that Alexandria and the English fleet anchored there could be effectively attacked by bombers with fighter protection. It would also be possible for the new German long-range bombers to infest the Suez Canal to such a degree with the new mines already mentioned in Florence, that the Canal could be practically regarded as closed. When the English fleet was driven from Alexandria, it would have to be subjected to continuous attacks on the high seas until it was completely destroyed. This would require the heavy use of German fighter units from bases in North Africa. These units would have to watch the Mediterranean day and night and bomb every enemy vessel. In order to have a maximum of air force units available for operations in the Mediterranean, it would be necessary to order the Italian air force units now stationed on the Channel coast, where the unaccustomed weather conditions had hampered their operations, to return to the Mediterranean area. Germany could provide a squadron of Ju. 88 airplanes for operations in the Mediterranean. To this could be added a number of reconnaissance and long-range fighter aircraft. While the Italian air force units could be employed in the western Mediterranean, in the waters around Italy,

² Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Nov. 11, 1940.

Albania, and Greece, the German long-range bombers would operate primarily in the eastern Mediterranean. This would certainly make it possible to destroy the English Mediterranean fleet in the course of the winter and then to drive the English out of Greece in early spring. The destruction of their position in the Mediterranean would mean an extremely severe blow and cause a tremendous psychological shock to the English. The plans concerning Egypt would in these circumstances obviously have to be put off to the autumn of next year pending the capture of Mersa Matrûh.

Count Ciano was greatly impressed also by these remarks of the Führer and fully concurred with them personally. While saying nothing specific on the various points, he seemed generally relieved by the prospect of a successful liquidation of the Greek campaign by the method proposed. He promised, on taking his leave, that he would get in touch immediately with the Duce, and expressed his personal conviction that the Duce, too, would surely agree with the Führer's proposal.

The Führer finally told Count Ciano that he would write a letter to the Duce outlining the ideas just discussed, and perhaps give it to Count Ciano even before November 20.³

SCHMIDT

³ See document No. 369.

No. 354

368/207273

The State Secretary to an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Teletype

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, November 19, 1940—3:20 p. m.
zu Pol. II 3801.¹

For Sonnleithner, Hotel Imperial, Vienna.

I wish to express my approval of the view taken in telegram No. 242 of November 18² from Minister Hencke in Wiesbaden that the French note transmitted by this telegram protesting the expulsions in Lorraine is unacceptable to the German Armistice Commission because of inadmissible wording and improper tone. Of the two possibilities for further treatment of the matter indicated by Herr Hencke, alternative A, whereby the note should be abruptly sent back to the French delegation after the arrival of General von Stülpnagel in

¹ Pol. II 3801: Not found.

² Not printed (368/207269-72). The text of the French protest, which was transmitted in this letter, is published in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. II, pp. 383-386.

Wiesbaden, seems to me the right one.³ Please let me have a decision as soon as possible as to whether Minister Hencke is to be instructed to this effect.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

³ The other alternative suggested in Hencke's telegram was that the French delegation be induced to retrieve the note.

⁴ See document No. 367.

No. 355

B19/B003872-74

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Finland*¹

Telegram

No. 679

BERLIN, November 19, 1940.

e. o. W 5285 g.

With reference to my telegram No. 677.²

Please make the following statement to the Finnish Government: "The German Government has no objection if the Finnish Government wishes to transfer the Petsamo nickel concession to a mixed Finnish-Russian company, provided that 1) the German claim to 60 percent of the yield for an unlimited period is upheld, 2) the Soviet Government recognizes the existing agreements between the German and Finnish Governments with respect to these deliveries, 3) the payments for these deliveries may continue to be made through the German-Finnish clearing, 4) the Finnish-Russian concession company assumes the place of the Petsamo Nickel Company in the existing agreements between the latter company and the I. G. Farben Industrie.[""]

This statement may also be given to the Finnish Government in writing, in accordance with the wish expressed by the Finnish Legation here, as stated in telegram No. 677 of November 19.

Please inform the Finnish Government further that in the conversations now being held in Moscow by our Embassy and Minister Schnurre, we are treating the matter in the same sense with the Soviet Government. We are insisting on a binding, written commitment from the Soviet Government to accept the above-mentioned four conditions. We expect that the Finnish Government will also insist on

¹ The text of this telegram was sent to Moscow on the same day as telegram No. 2117.

² A typewritten marginal note specified that this telegram number was to be supplied from W 5230 g. of Nov. 19. Zu W 5230 g. of Nov. 19 (4416/E083891) was the draft of a telegram to Moscow and Helsinki stating that the Finnish Government had requested the German Government to express its views in writing regarding the Soviet demand for the Petsamo concession. The Finnish request was recorded in memorandum e. o. W 5230 of Nov. 16 by van Scherpenberg (B19/B003864).

such a written commitment from the Soviet Government and not transfer the concession or let it become effective until it has obtained such a commitment.

Please send a telegraphic report on the reply of the Finnish Government.³ Minister Schnurre will then receive instructions to keep in touch with the Finnish Minister in Moscow in the further handling of the matter there.

WIEHL

³ Blücher replied in telegram No. 736 of Nov. 22 (B19/B003878) that the message had been delivered. Although the Finnish Foreign Minister mentioned that his Government would have preferred German participation in the concession, he accepted the four conditions stipulated by Germany. He would insist on written Russian assurance to observe them. He expressed the fear, nevertheless, that difficulties might arise with Britain which might deny navicerts for overseas imports which Finland required.

No. 356

66/46216-33

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*¹

No. 37

BERLIN, November 21, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND KING
LEOPOLD OF BELGIUM AT THE BERGHOF, NOVEMBER 19, 1940

The Führer greeted King Leopold and expressed his regret about the circumstances in which his visit to the Berghof was taking place. He first inquired of him as to whether he had any wishes for himself personally. The King thanked the Führer for his words of welcome and emphasized his satisfaction at their meeting person to person. At the same time he thanked the Führer for everything which he had done so far for the country of Belgium, especially that he had permitted Belgian refugees in France to return to their homeland. He also expressed his thanks for the numerous courtesies which had been shown him personally, especially for the return of his children from Spain. He had no personal wishes to express.

The Führer replied that conditions as they existed at the moment were determined by the fact that Germany was at war, war which had been forced upon her contrary to her wishes, and that a considerable portion of the territory from which war was being waged was Belgian territory. As a result of this it was not only impossible for the moment to establish a state of peace with Belgium, but there were also many painful burdens for the Belgian population and numerous attacks on Belgian territory. All these matters could not be discussed since the solution of these questions did not depend upon Germany, but was

¹ This unsigned copy is from the file of Minister Schmidt who was the interpreter at this conversation and also drew up the minutes. Cf. Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923-45*, (Bonn, 1949), pp. 507-511.

dependent on the end of the war in general. Nevertheless, the Führer of course wanted to avoid all painful burdens which could be avoided without affecting the conduct of the war. To be sure, he had to emphasize from the outset that the extent of these conceivable alleviations could be but small.

Fundamentally he was much more concerned about the question of the form of the future relationship between Germany and Belgium. He was therefore asking King Leopold whether he had thought about the future relationship between Belgium and the Reich and whether, in that connection, he wanted to express certain wishes with regard to the future of his country. The King replied that he was above all anxious to learn what Germany intended to do with Belgium and whether she would guarantee Belgian independence in the coming period of peace.

The Führer replied that Germany was determined to continue the war until English influence was finally eliminated from the Continent of Europe. The duration of the war and sacrifices would in no circumstances change anything concerning this goal. Germany was further determined to undertake a general reorganization of the European Continent. The latter would embrace the countries belonging politically and economically to the German sphere of influence. In this European area the Reich would set up an economic and political system which would permit a larger integration of European power than had previously been the case. Also Germany would see to it that any interference by noncontinental states in the affairs of the Continent in the political field or with respect to military security was made impossible for all time. Within the framework of this broad general principle Germany would seek to organize the political and economic life, and the future of Belgium, too, would lie within that framework.

When King Leopold requested that the possibilities of Belgian independence be defined more precisely, and in this connection attached special importance above all to independence in domestic affairs, the Führer replied that the internal political independence of Belgium would be the greater, the more clearly and unequivocally she aligned herself with Germany in foreign policy and military matters.

It was clear that this war would not have occurred if Western Europe had not regarded Belgium and Holland as a glacis. Because of their geographical position, any European conflict became a disaster for both of these countries. It was not possible for them to escape from the course of events.

To be sure, Belgian governmental circles, as it appeared from the documents discovered,² had been in collusion with England and

² See vol. ix of this series, document No. 214, footnotes 2 and 3; cf. German White Book No. 5, *Weitere Dokumente zur Kriegsausweitungspolitik der Westmächte: Die Generalstabsbesprechungen Englands und Frankreichs mit Belgien und den Niederlanden* (Berlin, 1940).

France. In no circumstances would Germany permit Belgium to be used again as a springboard for an attack on the Reich or on the European Continent. The struggle for which the Western democracies had been preparing for years had been forced upon Germany. In these circumstances the Reich had to hold all of the Western democracies responsible for that which had happened, i.e., the people of those countries must answer for the consequences of the policies pursued by their governments.

He wanted to anticipate the objection that Belgium was not responsible by remarking that in Germany a distinction was made between the will of the King and the actions of the Belgian Government. The Belgian Government had not been really neutral. It had willingly played the role which had been assigned to it by England and France. It had been prepared to simulate neutrality until the concentration of the British and French Armies was completed and to defend itself during the attack of these two Armies on Germany until all of the Allied units were at their assigned positions.

Emphasizing again his numerous efforts on behalf of peace the Führer declared that the new order to be established by Germany would prevent the recurrence of war within 20 years and in this way would render a service to Europe and particularly to the smaller states like Belgium and Holland, because it would eliminate those ever-recurring tensions, threats, and intrigues once and for all.

King Leopold asked the Führer whether he could assure him that Belgium's political independence would be restored. He realized that Belgium in return would have to conclude certain agreements in the military field and in foreign policy. The Belgians loved their independence above everything and they wanted above all to choose their own rulers by themselves. He (Leopold) had looked forward to this meeting with the Führer full of confidence because he was able to appreciate the great work which the Führer was engaged in carrying out and because he realized the latter's efforts to grant Europe a durable peace on the basis of justice, cooperation, and the solidarity of peoples. The Belgians would certainly support such a goal.

However, one would have to avoid anything that might make them resentful. The Führer knew from his own observation Belgium's tragic memories of the War of 1914-1918. The reaction of the Belgian population to the German invasion in 1940 had been entirely different from that of 1914. In Belgium there had been the impression that the morale of the new German Army was entirely different from that of the Army of the World War. Since the 28th of May, however, a change had been noticeable in public opinion. Not being a diplomat, he wanted in all frankness to call things by their right names. The change in public opinion had been produced,

for one thing, by the fact that some doubt had been raised on the German side regarding the preservation of Belgian independence. The Belgians had a very keen sense of this attitude. In the second place, certain extremist elements who unfortunately were serving only their own personal interests and in no way represented the country had been favored by Germany. They did not even possess the confidence of the Flemings. Furthermore, in spite of the difficult food situation, food had been shipped out of Belgium. Also, war contributions of considerable proportions had had to be paid. Finally, the influence of the Belgian refugees from France, all of whom had been adherents of the old regime, had been a very unfavorable one. The situation which had been thus produced disturbed him a great deal. If any assurance could be given to the Belgians regarding their independence, their mood would change at once. In that case the desire for cooperation with Germany on a voluntary basis would come to the fore. This could be obtained from the Belgians without any further difficulty by guaranteeing their independence. Besides, he would point out that British propaganda in Belgium was actively exploiting the uncertainty with regard to the question of independence. It was only natural that the Belgian people should follow more willingly those who guaranteed Belgian independence in the case of their victory than those who were silent upon this point.

The Führer replied that he considered the following to be the real reason for the change in Belgian public opinion: In Belgium, as in all of the Western democracies, propaganda lies about Germany and the German soldiery had been spread for years. These lies had increased more and more, particularly since 1933. Thus the German soldier had been described as a subhuman beast who senselessly destroyed everything in his lust for blood. Then when the German troops advanced into Belgium they had conducted themselves in an exceedingly disciplined fashion and had thereby surprised the inhabitants very much. Subsequently, however, this restraint was interpreted in Belgium as weakness and a certain refractory attitude was shown the German authorities. The occupation authorities merely issued such orders as were absolutely necessary, and if one compared their conduct with the behavior of the Allied occupation authorities in the Rhineland, in the Saar, and in The Palatinate *after* the end of the war (whereas the war was still going on now), the treatment of the population by the German authorities was far better than the treatment meted out to the German population at the time by the Allied authorities in the occupied area and by the Allied commissions in unoccupied Germany. For example, there had been some 17,000 cases of rape in the Rhineland alone. Probably not a single such case had occurred in Belgium this time. By all means,

however, the perpetrator would have been immediately shot. War naturally brought hardships along with it. But Germany had not wanted this war and was fighting it only in order to eliminate any English influence from the European Continent in the future. Instead of yielding to English propaganda the Belgians ought to have understood that England was principally to blame for all of their difficulties.

King Leopold replied that of course public opinion was never governed by mature consideration. He admitted that, just as in other countries, public opinion in Belgium, too, was subject to the most ridiculous influences. It was a fact, however, that if anyone heard over the radio from England the assurance that Belgium's independence would be secure after a British victory this would have a very definite influence on him and on all others who heard it also. Therefore the clarification of the question of independence was of extreme importance for the attitude of public opinion.

As for the food situation, the Belgian people were absolutely able (and they had indeed proved this in the past) to endure privations. But they quite naturally objected to injustice. The difficulties arose from the fact that the rations given the Belgians were much smaller than those issued in Germany and that the whole rationing plan to a large extent had a purely fictitious character, since often nothing was available for distribution on the basis of the ration cards. Furthermore, in spite of the want prevailing in the country, food and raw materials were constantly being exported.

The Führer replied that in the area occupied by Germany, from the North Cape to the Spanish border, certainly no one was going to go hungry. The carrying out of a rationing system, however, was a matter of national discipline for both the buyers and sellers. Penalties alone did not do much good in that respect, it was the general discipline which was decisive. Just recently similar difficulties had confronted Spain and in that country, too, the lack of general discipline had presented an almost insuperable difficulty for the rationing system. The exports from Belgium affected only raw materials which were necessary for the conduct of the war, materials which were requisitioned from the German public as well. The Führer pointed out that he himself had delivered up his utensils made of copper and other metals important for the war.

Furthermore, during the rapid war of movement, while the roads were still mostly in a state of disrepair and were needed for urgent transport of munitions, the troops had had to be supplied locally. The German soldiers had also won a certain right to live off the land itself, inasmuch as they had rescued the larger part of the Belgian cattle which they had found wandering about in the fields unguarded.

Besides, there had to be a certain amount of adjustment between the different countries. Thus, for example, Holland had a surplus of fats, while Belgium had a more favorable position with respect to vegetables and agricultural food products.

The Führer then again spoke of his efforts on behalf of peace. He mentioned the various peace offers and emphasized that Germany had made no demands on the Western Powers. When American Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, on the occasion of his visit to Germany, had asked him about Germany's war aims, he had replied that those aims consisted in the restoration of peace.³

In the further course of the conversation King Leopold brought up a proposal for an economic organization. The present situation was not very satisfactory from the administrative point of view. The departments were being administered by secretaries general, who had no leading official over them, but were all operating as equals. As a result, there was a lack of unity and leadership in the whole administration; effects of this were increased by the fact that there was no economic expert among the secretaries general. Accordingly he (Leopold) was proposing that an economic council be organized in Belgium which would be composed of Belgian experts representing the various branches of the economic life of the country as for example, agriculture, industry, labor, commerce, and banking. This economic council would be in a position to exercise a unifying influence in the economic field. It would have three main tasks to fulfill:

1. To develop the Belgian economy within the limits of its possibilities;
2. To take care of the food supply;
3. To act as a sort of link between the Belgians and the occupying power. Such an economic council, which would be nominated and chosen by the Belgians, could exercise an extraordinarily favorable influence on the development of the general situation.

In response to a question interjected by the Führer as to the method by which the members of this economic council would be chosen, King Leopold replied that the nominations should be made by the secretaries general. The Führer promised to consider the matter.

Next King Leopold brought up the question of the prisoners of war and he asked whether their release could not be considered and he recalled that on the occasion of the visit of his sister, the Crown Princess of Italy, the Führer had expressly reserved this matter for a discussion with King Leopold.⁴

The Führer replied that Germany urgently required the labor of the prisoners of war. In the German Reich there was a grave deficiency in

³ See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 649; cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. I, pp. 43-50.

⁴ See document No. 183.

manpower, in contrast to Belgium, where unemployment was beginning to become a serious problem. The prisoners of war were indispensable for getting in the old harvest and for cultivating the fields for next year. Since Belgium, too, was dependent on the production of German agriculture for her food supply, the Belgian prisoners of war were in this way working indirectly in the interest of their own country also. Perhaps it would be undesirable for reasons of domestic politics, too, to release the prisoners of war all at once. In France the Pétain Government would certainly encounter major political difficulties if the French prisoners of war were released. In Belgium their return would at least be felt in an increased unemployment figure, with all the resultant disadvantages. It was being envisaged, however, to release a certain number of Belgian prisoners of war, specifically those who were known even earlier to have adopted a favorable attitude toward Germany. This would primarily involve Flemings.

To a question from King Leopold as to whether something could not be done for the captured Belgian officers, the Führer replied that they would have to remain in captivity until the conclusion of peace.

King Leopold then advanced the idea of setting up in Belgium, for the maintenance of internal peace and order, a small army of from 10 to 15 thousand men who would be armed with rifles only, so that it would be available to the Belgian Government as a ready instrument at the conclusion of peace. To this the Führer replied that as long as the war lasted, this idea could not be taken into consideration.

In conclusion King Leopold summed up again the three proposals which he had brought forward, namely, the declaration with regard to independence, the food supply, and the return of the prisoners of war. Regarding the first point he repeated the view which he had previously expressed, that it would be well if some kind of reassuring statement were made to the Belgian people and English propaganda counteracted in this way. He stated in this connection that the Dutch had obtained such a statement from Seyss-Inquart and that the lack of such a statement in Belgium was therefore of course the more disquieting.

The Führer declared that there must be some misunderstanding on that point, for so far as he knew the Dutch had been given no statement of that kind. He could only refer to the possibility that Belgium would occupy a position of some sort within the framework of economic and political cooperation with the German Reich. Such a statement, however, could not be issued before the public at large, since it would certainly be interpreted as a sign of weakness. In establishing the new order in Europe, Germany did not have the intention of standardizing everything that could be standardized, but wanted only to bring into a unified system what was absolutely

required for the necessary cooperation. In any event there should not be regulations about everything under the sun.

In conclusion the Führer emphasized how gratified he had been with the decision of the Belgian King to put an end to the struggle and thereby prevent the annihilation of the Belgian Army. It had also been a good thing that the King had remained with his Army and in the country. The King of Norway and the Queen of the Netherlands would certainly not return to their thrones anymore, while he could assure King Leopold that Germany would not undertake anything against the existence of the Belgian royal house.

At the conclusion of the conference they had tea with Minister of State Meissner, Ambassador d'Avignon,⁵ and the rest of the King's entourage.⁶

⁵ Vicomte Jacques Davignon, Belgian Minister, later Ambassador in Germany, 1936-1940.

⁶ Accounts of the meeting at the Berghof by the King himself and by Ambassador Davignon are printed in *Recueil de documents établi par le Secrétariat du Roi concernant la période 1936-1949*, pp. 406-409. For additional documents dealing with the Hitler-King Leopold meeting and with the accuracy of the accounts of this meeting, see *ibid.*, pp. 409-429.

No. 357

66/46234-44

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 45

[Undated.]

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER, SERRANO SUÑER, ON NOVEMBER 19, 1940, AT HOTEL BERCHTESGADENER HOF IN BERCHTESGADEN

Referring to the detailed discussion with the Führer,¹ the Reich Foreign Minister again emphasized how important it was to act as quickly as possible. He assumed that Serrano Suñer would get in touch with Franco immediately after his return, and he proposed that the result of the conversation with the Spanish Chief of State be communicated to Berlin via Ambassador Stohrer in order that preparations could be begun immediately. The problem in its details had been clarified in yesterday's conversation with the Führer. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) merely wished to emphasize again his conviction that the future cooperation between Germany and Spain would be a great success for Spain and would bring the gratification of her wishes.

With regard to the delivery of grain and raw material to Spain, the Reich Foreign Minister proposed to Serrano Suñer that he send a representative to Berlin to arrange the details. Furthermore, he

¹ See document No. 352.

urged that Ambassador von Stohrer on his return to Madrid telegraph a code word to Berlin, which would in effect signify that Franco was in agreement with the ideas of the Führer, i.e., was prepared to enter the war at the moment Germany gave notice that she had concluded the necessary military preparations.² In the next few days the military authorities would promptly begin the required preliminary study, which could then be supplemented by negotiations between the authorities concerned on both sides. The goal to be sought in so doing would be to block off the Mediterranean completely during this winter and to destroy the English Mediterranean fleet. Germany would see to that.

It was of great importance that the Canary Islands remain firmly in the hands of the Spaniards. This question also would still have to be considered in consultation with the military experts.

The Reich Foreign Minister then gave Serrano Suñer a picture of the general political situation with special reference to the Molotov visit. Germany was at the present time engaged in forming as big a coalition as possible, a kind of world coalition against England, on the basis of the Tripartite Pact. The development in this direction was proceeding favorably and rapidly. In the next few weeks a number of other states would join the Tripartite Pact. It was conceivable that within a reasonable space of time Russia would also in an outwardly unmistakable form declare herself in agreement with the goal of the Tripartite Pact, i.e., against extension of the war and for the re-establishment of peace. It had not yet been determined specifically in what form this would occur. Molotov had, however, declared in Berlin that Russia by and large was entirely sympathetic toward this policy.³

In the German view the war was already won and the Reich could no longer be deprived of victory. The English would continue to be bombed day and night, and in the course of the next weeks and months Germany would weaken England wherever she could. As a practical matter it was merely a question of forcing England as quickly as possible to admit that she had lost the war. In order further to shatter England's morale she would in ever-increasing measure be politically isolated from the world. Either England would collapse this very winter, thus ending the war, or she would continue to resist, and then the Führer was prepared, as soon as weather conditions permitted, to deliver the decisive blow, which had hitherto not been possible because of the bad weather. It was not out of the question that this might still happen in the course of the winter.

England had two hopes: Russia and America. Russia was completely eliminated as a factor of support for England. He was firmly

² See document No. 420.

³ See document No. 326.

convinced that Russia would not join any combination in favor of England in this war. Stalin was too shrewd to permit Russia to be hitched to the English wagon and knew that this would mean the final destruction of the Soviet Union and his regime. The Russian Army, which was not very strong, could in no case withstand the strongest concentration of military power, such as Germany had assembled in her hands. Therefore, Stalin had embarked on the only sensible road and arrived at an understanding with Germany. Germany, who had nothing against Russia, was glad to meet him halfway on this road.

Concerning America the following could be stated: The Navy could offer no substantial support, since the principal part of it had to be stationed in the Pacific Ocean, and the completion of the so-called two-ocean project would require at least 10 years. The Army was of no consequence, since Germany would not even permit it to land in Europe. In the air America was already furnishing England aid by sending pilots and airplanes. No very great change would be brought about here by a more active participation in the conflict on the part of America, since the completion of the airplane program would require at least 2 to 3 years. Therefore the aid to England by means of American airplane deliveries caused Germany very little worry. She would, moreover, take the necessary steps to prevent as many ships as possible from arriving in England. On the whole the U-boat program was just beginning to operate. Most of the U-boats had thus far been used principally for training purposes. Henceforth, however, the number of U-boats sent against the enemy would increase from month to month. Terrible blows would be dealt English shipping, so that not much material could reach England from America by way of transport. Germany was watching developments with supreme calm. It was a matter of complete indifference to her whether the United States entered the war or not. Regarding the outcome of this war, i. e., German victory, nothing could now be altered. Whether the Americans would really take an active part in the war was, moreover, uncertain, for, in view of the world coalition which Germany was gradually assembling, the United States would, upon active intervention in the war, practically have to declare war on the whole world. This would be difficult even for Roosevelt.

A number of other states would join the Tripartite Pact. A way was being found by which Russia could also be enrolled in the combination. If this succeeded there was hope that Turkey, too, could be drawn into the sphere of this world coalition. These questions would be further clarified in the course of the winter and Serrano Suñer would be kept currently informed by Ambassador von Stohrer.

Since the conclusion of the alliance with England and France,⁴ Turkey had undergone a certain evolution in her foreign policy. After her ally, France, had dropped out as a result of defeat this summer, Turkey became more and more insecure, especially after the hard blows which Germany dealt England. According to the letter of the treaty of alliance, Turkey ought actually to be in the war against the Axis Powers already. She had, however, not taken this road, but had withdrawn step by step from the alliance with England and France. Although Turkey had often stressed her loyalty to the alliance outwardly, she had really returned to a kind of neutrality. In this connection it was significant that Mr. Eden, who in conjunction with his trip to Egypt⁵ had also planned a visit to Ankara, had plainly been rebuffed. There was reason to suppose that this evolution of Turkish foreign policy would be strengthened and that in the course of the next few months the members of the Tripartite Pact and their friends would be drawn closer to Turkey. In this manner Turkey would be led back completely to her old neutrality. This would also neutralize the Anglo-Turkish alliance. Without wishing to make any definite predictions, he believed that during the winter the strategic and political situation in the Mediterranean would develop in such a way that Turkey would gladly embark on the road to absolute neutrality.

Within the framework of this policy, the closing of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar was of great importance and would hasten the formation of the world coalition. England would thereby be completely isolated, and the hopelessness of the struggle would be made perfectly plain to America, with the result that a quick ending of the war would be assured. But this meant a great future for Spain.

Serrano Suñer thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for his statements concerning the general situation, which he did not wish to discuss any further because it was late and since, moreover, most of the points had already been discussed in the conversation with the Führer.

He merely wished to remark that Spain had different reports from those of Germany concerning the possibilities of the delivery of American aviation material to England. According to them, the aid that England was receiving in this field was very considerable and would increase more and more with constantly decreasing periods of delay. For that reason he rejoiced all the more over the increase in German U-boat warfare.

The Reich Foreign Minister characterized the figures generally used regarding American airplane production as propaganda data and stressed that the real production in America, according to the information which Germany had in regard thereto, was considerably below

⁴ See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 287 and footnote 1.

⁵ Eden had arrived in Cairo on Oct. 15. He returned to England Nov. 8.

these figures. As a countermeasure against America's aid, Germany had expanded her own production program on a gigantic scale—in fact, many times her former productive capacity—and was from day to day attacking the motor and airplane industry in England more vigorously. Finally Serrano Suñer turned to the grain question. He understood why Germany made the supplying of Spain with grain dependent on the code-word telegram of Ambassador von Stohrer, in which the latter would inform Germany of the agreement of the Caudillo to Germany's plan. He (Serrano Suñer), however, wished to utilize the time of military preparations in order to import from England and America the greatest possible amount of grain to cover the deficit in the supply. In this manner Germany's situation would also be indirectly alleviated, since she would be required to place correspondingly less grain at the disposal of Spain, which in view of Germany's other obligations in the Netherlands, Belgium, and in other areas occupied by her, would be very advantageous. There was, consequently, a mutual German-Spanish interest in the importation of quantities of grain from the democratic countries. For this reason he wished to make the following proposal: Germany should deliver 100,000 tons of grain to Switzerland in exchange for the amount imported by Switzerland from overseas via Portugal. These 100,000 tons of grain in Portugal would instead be delivered to Spain.⁶ At the same time, a token quantity of grain of about 5,000 tons would be brought in over the French-Spanish border from the occupied French area. Thus, for a long time, trains and trucks hauling grain would be seen by the Spanish public rolling into the country over both the Spanish-Portuguese border and the Franco-Spanish border. This Serrano Suñer wished to utilize in two ways:

- 1) as an antidote to the anti-German propaganda, carried on by England and Anglophile circles in Spain, which sought to convince the Spanish people that the prevailing famine and shortage were due to exports of foodstuffs from Spain to Germany;
- 2) as an inducement to England to facilitate grain deliveries on her part, too, since the neutrality of Spain was a matter of exceedingly great importance to her. In 1 or 2 months he (Serrano Suñer) hoped in this way to import 400,000 tons from the sterling countries. The Reich Foreign Minister admitted the correctness of Serrano Suñer's reflections and promised to consider with the proper officials of the Reich Food Ministry the practicability thereof, after he had obtained in principle the consent of the Führer to this arrangement.

The conversation was ended in a friendly atmosphere and the Reich Foreign Minister thereupon accompanied Serrano Suñer to the railroad station.

SCHMIDT
Minister

⁶ See documents Nos. 340 and 444.

No. 358

121/120174

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN; November 19, 1940.

General Thomas, Head of the War Economy and Armaments Office of the OKW, today had Colonel Hünemann¹ explain to me the great interest of the OKW in an early conclusion of the political conversations pending with the French Government. The capacity of industry in unoccupied France must be utilized to the fullest extent possible for German armaments orders, for example, for anti-aircraft guns, airplane engines, chemical warfare agents, etc. The French Government, which by the Armistice Agreement was under no obligation to do so, had agreed in principle to the voluntary acceptance of such orders, but, since the beginning of the political conversations, was holding back regarding the actual closing of the contracts, with the express intention of waiting for the outcome of the political conversations. If production could not soon be got underway, execution of this portion of the armaments program according to schedule would be called into question.

Submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request that the Foreign Minister be informed of the memorandum by teletype.

WIEHL

¹Chairman of the subcommission for war industries of the German Armistice Commission.

No. 359

84/62136-39

*Memorandum by an Official of the Information Department*¹

Inf. 380 g.

BERLIN, November 19, 1940.

Subject: Propaganda toward America.

The re-election of Roosevelt and the ever-increasing support of England by the President's policy to be expected in the future makes necessary a fundamental re-examination of the German propaganda toward America.

¹This memorandum was submitted to the Foreign Minister and to a number of leading officials of the Foreign Ministry by Minister Altenburg on Nov. 21 with a cover note pointing out that the memorandum had been prepared by the U. S. A. Division of the Foreign Ministry's Information Department on the basis of the experience of the past year and after consultation with authoritative experts on conditions in the United States (84/62135). The document is unsigned but shows the name of Dr. von Trott zu Solz of the Information Department at the top.

Large-scale actions (Tripartite Pact, visit by Molotov and the like) will not fail to have a striking effect on American public opinion in the future too, even if the German voice in the United States continues to be suppressed. It is necessary, however, in order constantly to undermine the American will to go to war, to supplement the effect of such large-scale actions on public opinion by untiring, appropriate propaganda.

Direct propaganda actions in America of recognizably German origin exclude themselves for tactical reasons. The attempts so far repeatedly made up to this time without success, to make Germany the object of increased mass hatred because of her propaganda activity in America, have confirmed again and again the correctness of the restraint and objectivity observed so far. Moreover, the fact that the U. S. A. has been practically ignored in German journalism has only increased the interest there in the strictly factual informational activity (documentary publications, periodicals, pamphlets, and current special activities) of the German Embassy and the New York Library of Information. Therefore this informational activity work should be continued as long as at all possible and should be expanded qualitatively and quantitatively by increased support and supply of material.

Beyond this narrow framework of exerting direct influence, however, it seems most necessary to undermine, by indirect and camouflaged actions, the psychological bases of the Anglo-American efforts to form a union. Changes in mood calculated to hamper warlike tendencies that can be effected in neutral spheres of interest of America (East Asia, South America, Europe)—*if at all possible without the German origin being recognizable*—register on the nervous American mass psyche via the world press, hungry as it is for sensation, more effectively than the best-planned direct propaganda.

In order to avoid a scattering of the propaganda effort it is necessary to state clearly the suitable slogans for the struggle against an Anglo-American expansion of the war and to have all of the offices concerned with propaganda for America and overseas utilize them in a uniform way in the three above-mentioned areas.

The following proposals are an attempt to define the general framework within which worthwhile separate actions could be started:

I. *Military propaganda*: The obvious weakness of the developing Anglo-American bloc is in the military field. The inadequacy of the land Army and Air Force of the United States, compared with the possibilities for employment of the German Wehrmacht in Europe, is in glaring disproportion to the idea of "inexhaustible reserves" which is disseminated by the Anglo-American war propaganda.

In contrast to the presumed Anglo-Saxon naval supremacy, the American fleet, as is known, is not adequate either in quality or in quantity for the simultaneous defense of the eastern Asiatic and southern Atlantic danger zones, as long as the Japanese fleet exists and the British fleet is tied down by Germany and Italy. According to observations which have been confirmed again and again, an entirely false picture exists on this score, especially in overseas countries. Therefore the inadequate military power of the U. S. A.—particularly the irremediable gap in Anglo-American “naval supremacy”—must be hammered into the world consciousness through neutral radio stations and authors especially in East Asia and South America (and the Iberian peninsula) by word, picture, radio, and caricature with constant repetitions and variations. Through an increased utilization overseas of American publishers and agencies, etc., for pictures and articles and through scientific and informational operations directed toward circles which study international politics, and toward large firms in America that are still in correspondence with Europe, we can most effectively strengthen and disseminate doubts as to the Anglo-American war potential.

II. *Social propaganda*: In contrast to the reactionary democracies, their unemployment, the distress of their farmers, etc., the new anti-capitalist Europe represents progress. Whereas in Germany the problem of the industrial worker is approaching a new solution and a progressive social and labor order will be developed in Europe under German leadership, stagnation and confusion with respect to these questions reigns in the Anglo-Saxon democracies. Thus American and other mercenaries of the British who are sent overseas do not die for progress but for reaction.

At least overseas we can hardly do without this social-propaganda slogan for the reason that the Anglo-Saxon ideology of liberty all over the world, especially with respect to the colored peoples, refers to the belief in liberal and social progress, and for the time being still with success.

III. *Cultural propaganda*: In contrast to the intellectual snobbery of Anglo-Saxon and Jewish authors, who are still able to influence the attitudes of neutral countries to a large degree, the European struggle for a free, new organization represents the central cultural fact of our time.

Every visible success of a constructive participation of the old European nations in this cultural reorganization breaks the presumed exclusiveness of the Anglo-Saxon cultural claim, in the eyes of the world overseas—especially of the non-British elements in the Western

Hemisphere. In view of such successes the Anglo-American war aim does not represent a liberation but a suppression of European culture.

IV. *Church propaganda*: In the face of the most dangerous slogan of enemy propaganda, especially in America which tends toward religious hysteria, namely a "crusade" against Germany proclaimed in the name of Christianity, we must point again and again to the highly un-Christian method of the food blockade. In particular it probably remains advisable not simply to reject church and other relief operations the propaganda of which in America is directed against the impenetrability of the British blockade (Ecco, Quakers), and to a certain extent to have intermediaries from the churches exert influence on church circles in neutral countries, which still impede the expansion of the war. The possibilities of exerting influence through Italian and Irish Catholicism should also be utilized in this connection.

V. *Economic propaganda*: The strong emotional antagonisms, both political and in particular economic, between the two Anglo-Saxon Powers must be watched constantly and exploited in a suitable manner. A systematic exposure, particularly via East Asia and South America, of the latent Anglo-American conflicts of interest in matters of currency, markets, etc., could result in undermining effectively the political credit of the union aspired to.

Among the most effective influences in opposing the war is that of the plutocratic opposition to Roosevelt, which fears that he, like Churchill, will while prosecuting the war destroy democratic capitalism and let the socialists play an important part in the government. Objective presentations of the inevitability of such a development will provide water for the mills of these opponents of the war in America, with whom contact should be kept so that influence may be exerted to such effect.

VI. *Atrocity propaganda*: The experience of the first war year teaches that in contrast to 1914-18 an effective propaganda for America cannot be carried on with the methods of atrocity campaigns, moral phrases, etc., used at that time; rather, only an objective discussion of the facts in the manner mentioned gives promise of success. In making use of all of the points of view mentioned in the propaganda in East Asia as well as in the propaganda in South America which is to be increased by way of the Iberian Peninsula, we should proceed from the principle, already stressed, that no German intention to exert influence on the U. S. A. become recognizable, in order to produce a maximum effect.

No. 360

2274/479696-98

Minister Neubacher to Minister Clodius

BUCHAREST, November 19, 1940.

DEAR FRIEND: I have just dictated a lengthy encoded telegram in which I am reporting on my activities to consolidate conditions in the field of the Rumanian economy.¹ The time has come to put a stop to the anarchists and experimenters of the Guard. I discussed these matters yesterday with the Minister of Justice,² with General Antonescu and Cancicov³ today, and today I shall also have a conversation with Cretzianu.⁴ Tomorrow I shall begin to discuss the problems with the leaders of the Guard.

From within the Guard there was a romantic and amateurish attempt at a Putsch by the old Codreanu and a few persons got accidentally killed.⁵ In a number of incidents Sima's authority proved to be incomplete. For example, Caranfil was forced to resign (city gas and waterworks) by youths who kept up a clamor for hours. Sima's intervention was of no avail; the revolutionary band invoked orders from other comrades.

Only the General can restore order. Sima must help him do so and risk a split with his extremists.

Krenner⁶ told me today that the long absence of Dimitriuc⁷ is already becoming unpleasantly noticeable in the oil fields. The Ministry of Economics is being filled with young men who talk confusedly and do not have the faintest idea of economics and administration. All they have is good will, which in difficult times is not enough. I recommend that you conclude the negotiations of the government committees as quickly as possible and give up working out in detail the individual credit operations. I think that the only right course politically is to publish the result of the negotiations of the government committees shortly after the visit of the General⁸ and leave the execution to current transactions. Perhaps Cancicov can remain a few days longer in Berlin and sign the final protocol. Dimitriuc and

¹ This was Bucharest telegram No. 2138 dispatched Nov. 20 (271/177245-46).

² Mihai Antonescu.

³ Rumanian Minister of Economics.

⁴ Rumanian Minister of Finance.

⁵ Bucharest telegram No. 2090 of Nov. 15 had reported an armed attempt of members of the Iron Guard led by the father of Codreanu to seize a building in Bucharest (182/85637-38). See document No. 41, footnote 3.

⁶ Ernst Krenner headed an office in Bucharest which dealt with the technical side of German petroleum imports from Rumania.

⁷ Under State Secretary in charge of petroleum questions in the Rumanian Economics Ministry.

⁸ The reference is to Antonescu's forthcoming visit to Berlin. See documents Nos. 380, 381, 387, 388, and 389.

Rasmirita⁹ are to return soon. Dimitriuc's room was prudently occupied by M. Petra, whose friends are announcing the removal of Dimitriuc. General Antonescu promised me today that he would be retained.

My main pedagogical task consists in making it clear to the Guardists that there is no place in the new Europe for an isolated revolutionary laboratory and that the Guard will be working in a vacuum unless it finds its way to the nascent Greater Reich and recognizes the law of development of the new Europe. The Guard must at the moment be protected from itself; otherwise it will soon lose its already severely impaired credit.

I expect that with my cooperation the growing disorder will be suppressed in the next few weeks; otherwise I should have to propose the immediate suspension of all economic advisory activities. In that case no other course would be left to us than waiting for the moment when we no longer advise here but command.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

NEUBACHER

⁹ Chairman of the Rumanian Government committee for economic negotiations with Germany.

No. 361

64/44383

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

RIO DE JANEIRO, November 20, 1940—1:59 a. m.

No. 1263 of November 19

Received November 20—11:40 a. m.

The Foreign Minister¹ told me in reply to an inquiry that I made in the course of conversation with regard to rumors of the cession of bases by the Uruguayan Government to the United States² that he could not believe that such an agreement would materialize. The Brazilian standpoint was, in any case, that the naval and air bases now existing or to be built would *in case of war* be available to all American countries on the basis of Pan-American agreements. There could be no question, therefore, of a cession to one country, in this case, the United States. Just as little would Brazil suffer another power to establish or finance bases on her soil in times of peace. He knew that Argentina shared this viewpoint. The Uruguayan Foreign Minister³ had on his last visit in Rio de Janeiro expressed the same view.

¹ Oswaldo Aranha.

² See document No. 327 and footnote 1.

³ Alberto Guani.

Conversations between the Brazilian and North American military were of an informative and contingent character.

Simultaneously by airmail to all American Missions.

PRÜFER

No. 362

104/112658

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, November 20, 1940—8:57 p. m.

SECRET

Received November 20—9:45 p. m.

No. 2506 of November 20

M. Molotov had me informed today that the Soviet Government has decided to recall Shkvartsev from his post and appoint Dekanozov in his place as Ambassador of the USSR in Berlin. The Soviet Government requests the agrément for Dekanozov.

Vladimir Dekanozov is personally known to the Führer and the Foreign Minister through Molotov's visit to Berlin. Dekanozov became Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs in June 1939, shortly after Molotov took over the Foreign Commissariat. By nationality Dekanozov is a Georgian, that is, a fellow countryman of Stalin, whose confidence he obviously enjoys. During the preparations for the annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government sent Dekanozov on a special mission to Kaunas. Dekanozov is married to a good-looking Caucasian woman with a pleasing personality.¹

Dekanozov has apparently been designated to continue the diplomatic negotiation of the problems discussed with Molotov in Berlin.²

We have here no reservations about giving the agrément for Dekanozov. I would appreciate if I were enabled to inform Molotov of Germany's consent at the earliest opportunity.³

SCHULENBURG

¹ Additional biographical material on Dekanozov was submitted by Schulerburg in report A 5120 of Nov. 26 (104/112718-19).

² A confidential report of statements made by the Tass representative in Berlin to the *New York Times* representative in Berlin concerning the significance of the Dekanozov appointment was transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow on Nov. 29 (instruction Pol. V 1410 g. Rs. : 1447/364987-88).

³ The agrément for Dekanozov was granted in telegram No. 2134 of Nov. 21 (104/112659).

No. 363

265/172495

The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, November 20, 1940.

No. 945 of November 20

Received November 21—12:30 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 936 of November 18.¹

The political situation here, which had become somewhat calmer as a result of Germany's keeping out of the Italian-Greek conflict, has again become very tense owing to the alleged Papen interview and the trip of King Boris.² The Turks see in the Papen interview an ultimatum designed to make Turkey line up with the new order in Europe and declare that they would rather fight than submit to such a demand. They are, moreover, greatly alarmed at the possibility that the Russians in order to get to the Persian Gulf may choose the shorter route via Turkish territory and Iraq. The Turkish press, in so far as it expresses any opinion at all on the interview, takes a very negative attitude. In connection with the trip of the King of Bulgaria the Turks fear that Germany will force Bulgaria to intervene [in the war].

The well-known deputy, Esmer, who is one of the most radical supporters of Anglo-Turkish cooperation, told a confidential agent that in certain circumstances the Turks were willing to cooperate amicably with Germany, but must reject categorically any alignment with Italy.

KROLL

¹ This telegram had forwarded to Berlin the text of a news report from Berlin published by a Turkish news agency about a speech made by Papen before a gathering of representatives of the foreign press in Berlin. The agency report cited various statements allegedly made by Papen regarding Turkey's relations with Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia. (265/172493-94)

On Nov. 19, an official of the Turkish Embassy asked the Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry's Press Department for a copy of the speech. He was told that Papen's statements had been made off the record in an informal meeting with the foreign journalists and were not intended for publication; besides the published version contained a number of errors. (Braun von Stumm memorandum: 265/172491)

² See document No. 378 and footnote 2.

No. 364

65/45660

The State Secretary to the Legation in Iran

Telegram

No. 435

BERLIN, November 20, 1940.
zu Pol. VII 1094.¹

Drafting Officer: Counselor Melchers.

With reference to your telegram No. 539 of November 18.²

The Iranian Minister here³ and Sayah, the Director General of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, have expressed similar concern to me.⁴ I replied that I knew nothing that would justify this concern. It was correct, however, that there was complete accord between us and Soviet Russia, and it was a fact that English intrigues against a policy of the Russians parallel to the policy of the Tripartite Pact were fruitless.

I suggest that at your post you refer to my conversation and use it for guidance in your conversations.⁵

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. VII 1094: Cf. document No. 350, footnote 1.

² Document No. 350.

³ Moussa Noury-Esfandiary.

⁴ This was recorded by Weizsäcker on Nov. 18 (65/45242).

⁵ In telegram No. 550 of Nov. 23, Ettel reported that he had carried out this instruction which had "a calming effect" on the Iranian Minister President (65/45661).

No. 365

66/46204-15

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

No. 39

BERLIN, November 26, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE HUNGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT, COUNT TELEKI, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT CSÁKY, IN VIENNA ON NOVEMBER 20, 1940

At the beginning of the conversation, the Führer expressed in warm terms his satisfaction with the accession of Hungary to the Tripartite Pact.¹ He then gave a short survey of the world situation. The war had undoubtedly been decided in favor of Germany. It was only a matter of when England would concede her defeat. Russia and America were Great Britain's only hope. American shipments, however, could not get completely under way before the winter of 1941-42.

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 208.

The American aviation industry could not be developed so rapidly. Moreover, armaments industries in England were being destroyed to such an extent by the Luftwaffe that very considerable losses were sustained in that field which could hardly be compensated for by America.

Germany had treaties with Russia; nevertheless, he (the Führer) relied more on instruments of actual power. In the spring the German Army would have 230 divisions, 186 of which would be first-class assault divisions, 20 armored divisions, 4 armored brigades, and 12 motorized divisions. He saw in this military power the best guarantee that nothing could be changed in the situation as it existed today.

Despite the German-Russian treaty one had to realize that Russia's conduct was either Bolshevik or Russian nationalist, depending on the situation. She always hoisted the flag that was at the time the most effective. With Slavic countries, such as Yugoslavia, for example, Russia would pose as a Slavic nationalist power, while with non-Slavic countries she would present herself as the champion of the proletariat. Nevertheless he would try in some way or other to bring her into the great worldwide coalition that stretched from Yokohama to Spain. For, in contrast to Imperial Germany, he did not subscribe to the principle of "many enemies, much honor" [*Viel Feind' viel Ehr'*] but was of the opinion that the soldier should be aided by politics and that Germany should win as many friends and allies as possible.

In connection with the settlement of interests with Russia, the Führer mentioned confidentially that he had to inform the Russians with regard to Finland, that another war in the Baltic would be intolerable for Germany, that from the psychological standpoint, too, Germany could not look on if Finland became involved in a war.² The latter was, moreover, an important supplier of nickel and lumber, and the Baltic, as one of the few available commercial seas, together with the countries that border on it, had to be kept quiet.

In connection with the Balkan problem, the Führer mentioned the question of the Straits. A revision of the Montreux Convention³ was necessary, and Germany would welcome an arrangement between Russia and Turkey on this question. The Black Sea, as an inland sea, had to be made into a kind of gigantic harbor for the adjacent countries, in which these states would have free and unimpeded entry and egress.

In this connection the Russians had expressed the desire to give Bulgaria a guarantee.² Germany had an important interest here:

² See document No. 328.

³ For the official text of the Convention, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXIII, p. 213.

to secure her supply of petroleum from Rumania. She not only had to supply her own needs of this fuel, but also those of the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Belgium, France, and Spain. Russia hung like a threatening cloud on the horizon and, as he had said, assumed either an imperialist, Russian nationalist appearance or appeared in Communist international guise, depending on the countries involved. But since the Russians could, on the other hand, think realistically, it would perhaps be possible to divert them to the South Asiatic continent as a Russian sphere of influence. All this had been made more difficult as a result of Italy's war with Greece. Italy had, unfortunately, taken this enterprise too lightly and had begun the attack in a very unfavorable season. The setback was unimportant in the light of the situation as a whole and would soon again be offset. In no case would Germany tolerate England's gaining a foothold in Salonika. Here there was still the memory of an unsettled account from the World War. The moment might therefore come when Germany would be forced to resort to armed intervention in order to relieve Italy and drive the British out of Greece. Here they were all in the same boat, which no one could leave. If the Germans left the Balkans, Russia would march in, just as happened in the Baltic. Any vacuum that might develop would be filled immediately by Russia. It was Germany's aim to keep southeastern Europe European. Germany therefore had to do everything to make Italy's situation easier. In terms of strength, the coalition now fighting on Germany's side could not be beaten. Germany and Italy together had 300 divisions. Sixty or seventy more divisions were being supplied by Hungary, Spain, and other friendly countries. Japan had 100 divisions. Against this strength of 500 divisions, the British had only very little to show.

In connection with the Egyptian question, the Führer remarked that the British fleet must be expelled from the Mediterranean. He was happy to be able to help the Duce in all these tasks now, since the latter by his attitude had been extraordinarily helpful to Germany. If one wanted to be just, Germany and Hungary especially ought to be very grateful to the Duce. It would be very dangerous if, as a result of a moment's weakness, Russia should actively enter the conflict. England would undoubtedly do everything to induce her to do so and perhaps even offer her the whole of the Balkans in return.

Count Csáky here recalled that in the year 1916, when England's situation, after all, was much better than at present, she had offered Constantinople to the Russians.

After a few remarks about the quantitative and qualitative improvement in the German submarine arm (monthly production of up to 35 boats, torpedo expulsion which leaves no wake, torpedoes which

cause no bubbles, ignition by magneto), the Führer turned to the subject of France. From higher considerations, he had felt impelled to act in moderation with regard to France. He was trying to interest the French, too, in the reconstruction of Europe and to integrate them into the general framework.

There had been no conflict of interests between England and Germany. He had therefore tried repeatedly to come to an understanding with England by peaceful means. After the failure of all these attempts, he had decided, however, to carry the fight through to England's total defeat. Nevertheless, he was sorry for the many fine people and the beautiful cities that were being demolished in England in this way—sorry, especially, because everything was happening only because of a few incompetent politicians.

In connection with some words regarding the good relations between Germany and Hungary, the Führer emphasized how pleased he was that Hungary had accepted the settlement of her disputes with Rumania in the Vienna Award. He was glad that revision could be effected in this way, since otherwise there would have been chaos in the Balkans and the Slavic tide would have engulfed everything.

Thus Germany could await further developments with sovereign calm. She was sure of her victory and knew that the war would end, sooner or later, with England's defeat.

Count Csáky replied that the war would have to be ended as soon as possible, since the smaller states would not be able to sustain it for long economically.

Count Teleki brought up the Jewish question and said that when peace was concluded the Jews would have to be moved out of Europe.

The Führer replied that he regarded the solution of the Jewish question for Europe as one of the biggest problems of the peace. It was his intention in the future peace treaty to give all states wishing to participate in his solution the possibility of doing so by forcing France to make some of her possessions available.

In the further course of the conversation, the Hungarians brought up the subject of Rumania. Count Csáky declared that Hungary aspired to have the "best possible relations" with Rumania. General Antonescu, however, apparently did not wish to bring about any permanent state of peace with the Hungarians. He had made very dangerous speeches in Rome.⁴ Here Germany could act as a factor of compromise. The Yugoslavs, too, if they had not been afraid of Germany, would have attacked Italy long ago in connection with the Greek war.

The Führer answered that he wished for this reason to strengthen his military units in Rumania and was deliberating whether he really

⁴ See document No. 380.

should not speak with Yugoslavia. Count Teleki answered this question in the affirmative and then turned again to the subject of Rumania. He remarked that Rumania would probably complain bitterly about Hungary. But he could assure us that Hungary by no means wished to carry out reprisals in Transylvania and that the military there had been urgently requested to exercise restraint.

Teleki admitted, however, in lengthy, somewhat tortuous statements, that there had been excesses on the part of the Hungarian authorities. Thus he mentioned, among other things, a "clumsy" Colonel in Cluj, who, on the basis of an incorrect list, had had Rumanians, among them women of 70, expelled in the middle of the night. He also admitted "atrocities" in the form of stabbings, beatings, and the like, which he explained by saying that there was always fighting and stabbing at a real wedding.

The Führer replied that he would immediately head off any possible complaints from Antonescu with the remark that for 20 years the Hungarians had been badly treated by the Rumanians and that in the last analysis their present behavior was only a reaction to the wrongs they had had to suffer for many years.

The Reich Foreign Minister remarked in this connection that now, at any rate, tranquillity had to be restored and conditions had to return to normal, in order that peace in this section of Europe might not again be disturbed.

Count Csáky vigorously concurred in this and declared that everything necessary had been done by the Hungarians to prevent further incidents.

Toward the end of the conversation, the subject of Yugoslavia was again taken up. In this connection Count Csáky mentioned monitored telephone conversations from which the aggressive attitude of the Yugoslavs had been plainly apparent. In any event, the situation had been quite serious.

The Führer thereupon replied that it would perhaps be profitable to communicate these facts to the Italians in order to draw their attention to the whole military and psychological gravity of the situation.⁵

SCHMIDT

⁵ A memorandum by Ribbentrop of Nov. 21 recorded briefly discussions with Csáky on the subject of the German and Rumanian minorities in Hungary and of German military transports to Rumania. With regard to the latter Csáky stated that Hungary was prepared to comply with all German requests concerning transports over Hungarian railroads or roads. (F16/0024)

No. 366

F16/0019-21

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

VIENNA, November 20, 1940.

RECORD OF A BRIEF RECEPTION OF COUNT CIANO BY THE FÜHRER, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA, ON NOVEMBER 20, 1940

Count Ciano reported that the Duce has expressed his unqualified agreement with the Führer's proposals concerning Yugoslavia.¹ He gave on this occasion renewed emphatic expression of his gratification over this possibility of bringing about a solution of the Greek undertaking. If it proved possible to get the Yugoslavs to cooperate, it would be an easy matter to liquidate the Greek affair within a few weeks. He mentioned in this connection that Prince Regent Paul would certainly take an affirmative stand on cooperation. His regency would run out at the end of 8 months, after which King Peter would officially assume the conduct of government. Paul's interests lay with Italy. A portion of his fortune was invested in Italy, he had bought a villa in Florence, and planned to live in Italy entirely dedicated to his artistic interests. He would therefore surely avoid risking a conflict with that country. The feeler, moreover, which had been extended to Rome probably was initiated by him, since it is unlikely that Antić would have sent an emissary to Rome without his knowledge.

The Führer pointed out that Prince Regent Paul would go down as a great statesman if Yugoslavia were to acquire Salonika under his regency. He might possibly even acquire such stature as to give up any thought of stepping down. Princess Olga was known to be very ambitious and surely would like to become Queen of Yugoslavia. He wondered whether it would not be advisable to support such aspirations.

Count Ciano concurred with these ideas with great animation and stated in addition that the Duce had told him on the telephone that the situation in Greece had improved. The Italians would be able to hold their positions. He would not, at any rate, need any military assistance from Germany except the trucks, which have already been a subject of negotiations between Germany and Italy.

SCHMIDT

¹ See document No. 353.

No. 367

368/207281.

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, November 20, 1940.

Today, November 20, Ambassador Abetz asked me to transmit the following instruction of the Foreign Minister to Minister Hencke in Wiesbaden.

"The French note regarding the resettlement of the Lorrainers¹ is to be returned to the French delegation with the statement that the German Armistice Commission is not in a position to accept such a note."

The instruction of the Foreign Minister was issued by order of the Führer.

I have transmitted the instruction cited above at once to Minister Hencke by telephone and teletype.²

H. SCHWARZMANN

¹ See document No. 354, footnote 2.

² In telegram No. 246 of Nov. 20, Hencke reported that the French note had been returned to General Doyen "who was greatly disconcerted." (368/207286)

The end of the evacuation operation was officially announced by Bürekel at a National Socialist mass meeting in Saarbrücken on Nov. 30. On that occasion he also announced Hitler's decision to amalgamate the existing Gaue of The Palatinate, Saar, and Lorraine in a new Gau Westmark. (DNB report of Nov. 30: 121/120206-09)

No. 368

121/120252

Decision by the Führer

VIENNA, November 20, 1940.

In view of the increased importance of the political questions in the present stage of Germany's relations with France, the present "Office [*Dienststelle*] of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in France," is given the designation "German Embassy in Paris."

Ambassador Abetz is responsible for dealing with all political questions in occupied and unoccupied France.

Inasmuch as military interests are affected in carrying out the tasks assigned to Ambassador Abetz, he is to act in accord with the responsible military authorities. If political interests are affected by decisions of military authorities, they [the decisions] are to be taken in accord with Ambassador Abetz.¹

¹ In a memorandum of Dec. 7, Ritter referred to a discussion of this decision with General Jodl who stated that the wording of this paragraph had been chosen in full agreement with the High Command of the Wehrmacht (121/120256).

The present relationship of the German Embassy in Paris to the French Government² is not affected by this ruling. The Mission will not be officially accredited until conclusion of the peace; however, it has the assignment to keep in touch continuously with the French Government and to supervise the political relations of the latter with third countries.

ADOLF HITLER

² Cf. vol. x of this series, document No. 282.

No. 369

F9/0390-401

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

VIENNA, November 20, 1940.

DUCE: Permit me at the beginning of this letter to assure you that for the last 2 weeks my heart and my thoughts have been with you more than ever. Know also, Duce, that I am determined to do everything that may be of relief to you in the present situation.

1) When I asked you to receive me in Florence,¹ I began my trip in the hope that I might be able to present my views to you before the beginning of the threatening conflict with Greece, concerning which I had been informed only in a general way.

I wanted to ask you in the first place to postpone the action a while longer, if possible until a more favorable season of the year, but in any event until after the American presidential election.

In any case, however, I wanted to ask you, Duce, not to undertake this action without a prior lightning-like occupation of Crete, and for that purpose I also intended to bring you practical proposals for the commitment of a German parachute division and an additional air landing division.

The situation which has now arisen has very grave psychological and military repercussions which it is important to understand clearly.

I am citing the individual factors, because they indicate the counter-measures which in my opinion are urgently required:

A) *Psychological consequences:*

The psychological effect of the situation is unpleasant in so far as it renders more difficult the diplomatic preparations now in progress. In general we feel the consequences in the form of a strengthening of the tendencies not to make any premature commitment in our favor in the conflict but to await further developments.

Bulgaria, which showed little desire intrinsically for accession to the Tripartite Pact, is now completely averse even to considering such a step.

¹ See document No. 228 and footnote 5.

With Russia, too, it is more difficult to bring about an agreement on interests and to divert Russian ambitions toward the east.

M. Molotov showed, on the contrary, an increased interest in the Balkans. The impression on Yugoslavia cannot for the time being be ascertained from here. But even in France the position is undoubtedly being strengthened of those who advocate and affirm that possibly the last word has not after all been spoken in this war.

But whatever the psychological consequences may be, it is of decisive importance that they should not place obstacles in the way of our further operations, and in particular that they should not give rise to unfriendly attitudes on the part of those countries which, like Yugoslavia, might cause, if not a catastrophe, at least an unwelcome extension of the conflict.

Especially important is the attitude of Turkey, because its attitude is decisive for that of Bulgaria as well.

B) *Military consequences:*

The military consequences of the development of this situation, Duce, are very serious.

England is now obtaining a number of air bases which bring her into close proximity to the oil fields of Ploesti, and likewise also within striking distance of all southern Italy and especially of the ports of embarkation and disembarkation, both in the Italian mother country and in Albania.

Whereas the Rumanian oil fields were previously entirely inaccessible to English bombers, the latter have now approached to within a distance of less than 500 km. I hardly dare think about the consequences; for, Duce, one thing must be realized: there is no effective defense for oil fields. Even one's own antiaircraft arm may as a result of unexploded shells become just as dangerous to such an area as the attacking enemy. The damage would be quite irreparable if large oil refineries should likewise suffer destruction.

Southern Italy, its ports, and all of Albania are now within very easy range of English bombers. It is obviously a matter of complete indifference to England whether Italy destroys Greek cities in reprisal raids. The attack on the Italian cities will be decisive. I consider the chance of a successful land offensive from Albanian territory against the new British bases before the beginning of March as quite hopeless.

According to the experiences in the air war thus far, destruction of the British air bases through air attacks is likewise excluded. Anything can be destroyed more easily than airfields. The fact is that England, as I feared, has now occupied Crete and is about to gain a foothold on numerous other islands and establish air bases in a number of Greek localities, including two near Salonika and two others presumably in Thrace. Rhodes, too, is now within range of British

long-range fighters, and if, as seems likely, the British establish air bases in western Greece as well, all the coastal localities of southern Italy, too, will soon be most seriously threatened.

From the military standpoint this situation is threatening. From the economic standpoint, as far as the Rumanian oil fields are concerned, it is downright ominous.

In the face of the foregoing I now propose :

I. Political measures :

a) Spain must be prevailed upon immediately to enter the war. The earliest date we can assume is in about 6 weeks. For us the purpose of Spain's entry must be to seize Gibraltar and close the Straits and to bring at least one or two German divisions to Spanish Morocco in order to secure guarantees against a possible defection of French Morocco or North Africa from France. For, Duce, such a defection would assure an Anglo-French air force of a take-off area which would inevitably be disastrous for all Italy. This must be avoided and it cannot therefore be left in any circumstances to hope, much less to chance. By the fall of Gibraltar, however, the Mediterranean will be closed toward the west. England will then be forced to send all her transports around South Africa. Thereby the pressure in the eastern Mediterranean will be relieved and in addition French North Africa will as a result be most securely retained for the Pétain Government.

b) Every attempt must now be made to draw Russia away from the Balkan sphere and orient her toward the east.

c) An attempt must be made to reach some sort of understanding with Turkey in order to relieve Bulgaria of Turkish pressure.

d) Yugoslavia must become disinterested and if possible must collaborate even with a positive interest in our sense in the settlement of the Greek question. Without an assurance from Yugoslavia the chance of a successful operation in the Balkans cannot be taken.

e) Hungary must consent to the transportation of large German units to Rumania, which will begin immediately.

f) Rumania will have to accept this increase in the German armed forces for her own protection.

I am resolved, Duce, at the moment the English attempt to consolidate a real position in Thrace to take counteraction with decisive forces—at any risk.

Unfortunately I must point out, however, that it is impossible to conduct a war in the Balkans before March. Any threatening pressure on Yugoslavia would therefore be useless, since the Serbian General Staff is well aware of the impossibility of actually carrying out such a threat before March. Yugoslavia must therefore, if at all possible, be won over by other ways and means.

II. Military measures :

The most important military measure seems to me to be, first of all, closing off the Mediterranean Sea. For this purpose I shall try, as already stated under I, to induce Spain to make an early entry into the war in order, first of all, to block the western outlet.

However, I consider it necessary still, Duce, that you try, as the preparations [permit], to reach Mersa Matrûh in order to establish an [air] base there, which will make it possible by means of dive bombers to drive the British fleet from Alexandria for good and all and, secondly, to mine the Suez Canal by means of long-range bombers so that it will for all practical purposes be closed to actual traffic.

I also consider it necessary to undertake the strongest systematic concentration of our united air forces in relation to the objectives to be attacked. The war thus far has shown beyond question that attacks on civilian localities are entirely ineffective. Only an attack on positions that are militarily or economically important gives promise of success. The most important goal in the Mediterranean, however, is first of all to expel the British fleet. Apart from the direct support of the troops fighting in Albania, the force of our joint attack should in my opinion be directed toward that end. It is necessary to start a continual surveillance of, and a constant attack on, all vessels sailing the Mediterranean under an enemy flag. That this is possible, Duce, is shown by our battle in the North Sea, where [British] ships do not venture to sail except under the protection of [naval] forces confined to the coast.

For this purpose I therefore propose, Duce, that you recall the Italian forces detailed to us in the west, except for the submarines, whose effectiveness is constantly increasing, and send them to the sector which is now the most important. They are now on the Channel in the most unfavorable season of the year and suffer from the weather conditions, which are just as hard for them as, for example, the southern climate would be for us in summertime. In general I am also of the following opinion: The Mediterranean question must be settled this winter, since German forces can also be employed most advantageously during that time, whereas, conversely, any employment of Italian forces in western or northern Europe at this time of the year appears impractical for climatic reasons alone.

In the spring, by the beginning of May at the latest, I should like, however, to get back my German forces, so that this alone indicates the suitable time for our action.

For this collaboration of our air forces in the Mediterranean I should like especially to detail a wing of Ju. 88's, as well as the requisite reconnaissance planes, long-range fighters, etc.

I have not yet discussed this question in detail with the Reichsmarschall and would therefore let him make the final decision as to the forces which he considers necessary. There would then, Duce, be mainly two large air-operation areas in the Mediterranean region: the Italian, which would in general dominate the air in the Italian-Albanian-Greek, as well as the Egyptian, area, and a German opera-

tional area, which in view of our long-range bombers would include principally the eastern Mediterranean. If we commit our air force properly, the Mediterranean will in 3 or 4 months become the grave of the British fleet, and this is the decisive prerequisite for the military operations, which in my opinion cannot set in before the beginning of March, in so far as Greece herself is concerned. But I consider this period necessary also because it would not be possible for me before then to concentrate such forces in Rumania as would in all circumstances assure a clear [success]. The concentration of sufficient Italian forces in Albania also requires at least 3 months. Only then can a speedy success be expected.

The question of Egypt may for the time being be left entirely open, for after mature consideration I have come to the conclusion that an attack on the Nile delta before next autumn is quite impossible. It seems to me that the most important thing now is to gain a position near Mersa Matrûh, or thereabouts, from which the British fleet in Alexandria may be attacked by dive bombers with fighter escort.

But also from the psychological point of view, these are the measures which are likely to relieve pressure and again [create] a positive attitude toward the Axis.

These, Duce, are the thoughts I wish to convey to you [illegible words] heart of a friend, who [illegible words] fanaticism to help overcome this crisis in the shortest [time], and from a [illegible words] all the more force a final [defeat of the enemy].

With the most cordial greetings in faithful comradeship,

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

No. 370

230/152359-60

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 20, 1940.

The Yugoslav Minister¹ has made representations here regarding the delivery of the following aviation material to Yugoslavia:

1. 42 airplane engines from captured Polish stocks; private delivery contract concluded; authorization so far not issued;
2. 115 airplane engines from captured Belgian stocks;
3. 60 airplane engines from captured French stocks;
4. Material for the construction of 40 Do. 17 airplanes;
5. 60 Gnome-Rhone airplane engines which have already been removed and paid for, but the delivery of which has not been authorized;
6. 50 Fieseler-Storch airplane engines and 50 Arado airplanes from German reserves.

¹ Ivo Andrić.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires here² raised objections some time ago to the delivery of aviation material, especially airplane engines and material for the Do. 17 model, and he asked that such an increase in Yugoslavia's armaments be prevented.³ Thereupon these deliveries were stopped.

Of other war material there are still Yugoslav orders amounting to 41,000,000 reichsmarks, most of which have been cut off on account of our own German requirements, and the Yugoslavs have accepted this.

The military authorities were actually willing to fulfill part of the airplane orders if there were no political objections. Consul General Neuhausen,⁴ Belgrade, advocates the delivery to Yugoslavia. There is no economic necessity for the deliveries, since even without them we are receiving the raw material deliveries from Yugoslavia that are important for us.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for a decision. I suggest in consideration of the Italian request that we continue to halt the airplane deliveries objected to by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, and other important deliveries, and that we inform the Italian Chargé d'Affaires to this effect.⁵

WIEHL

² Giuseppe Cosmelli.

³ This request was the subject of a démarche with Woermann on Oct. 29 (230/152330).

⁴ Franz Neuhausen, special representative in Yugoslavia of the Four Year Plan.

⁵ See document No. 471.

No. 371

174/136474-75

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, November 21, 1940—11:10 a. m.

SECRET

Received November 21—9:20 p.-m.

No. 1286 of November 21

With reference to telegram No. 1236 of November 11.¹

The Deputy Foreign Minister informed me today that Molotov had told Ambassador Tatekawa on November 19 that Russia, in pursuance of her general policy directed toward the recovery of lost territories, was constrained to raise the question of the return of South Sakhalin and a portion of the Kuril Islands before any nonaggression pact

¹ Document No. 311.

could be concluded with Japan. Since any such negotiations would probably not be acceptable to Japan, the Russian Government would prefer a neutrality pact, but would have to insist at the same time on a special protocol by which Japan would renounce its oil concessions in North Sakhalin. In order to make up the resulting loss of oil, the Russian Government might possibly be prepared to consider selling Japan 100,000 (one-hundred thousand) tons of Russian oil a year.²

This Russian reply had caused very deep disappointment and annoyance in the Cabinet, and especially in the Navy. Tatekawa had received the new instructions yesterday, that he should propose to Russia the purchase of North Sakhalin by Japan. The Deputy Foreign Minister does not believe that Russia will accede to this proposal, but hopes that the Russian Government will put off the question of the oil concessions in Sakhalin for the time being and agree to the conclusion of a pact not encumbered by specific agreements. Japan prefers the un hoped-for nonaggression pact, but would be satisfied with a neutrality agreement (an assurance of neutrality in the event of an attack on Russia or Japan by a third power).

The conclusion of a neutrality agreement had been proposed once before, by the Yonai-Arita Cabinet, which at that time had not dared to go as far as proposing a nonaggression pact, for fear that there would then be general unrest in Japan, and that the large armament appropriations continuously necessary could no longer be obtained.

The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that Ambassador Kurusu had been informed accordingly today and been given instructions again to request the Reich Foreign Minister to use his good offices to induce Russia to accept an unqualified nonaggression pact or, if necessary, a neutrality pact leaving specific questions for later settlement. The Deputy Foreign Minister added that the Reich Foreign Minister had mentioned to Ambassador Kurusu a plan on a grand scale;³ if it were carried through, Japan would be willing to hold in abeyance her own negotiations with Russia, since the Greater German solution of the Reich Foreign Minister took account of Japan's wishes.

The Deputy Foreign Minister once more stressed the common interest of Germany and Japan in a Japanese-Russian accord, which alone would make the Tripartite Pact a powerful instrument of the policy of the Allied Powers in regard to England and America. The Deputy Foreign Minister finally pointed out that the opposition within Japan was severely attacking the Japanese Government on account of the policy of understanding inaugurated toward Russia. At the moment, one of the Soviet opponents had joined the propa-

² The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had informed Schulenburg of this conversation with Molotov (Moscow telegram No. 2501, sent Nov. 20: 174/136470).

³ No record of such a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kurusu has been found. See Editors' Note, p. 517.

ganda campaign against the Government by the Anglo-Saxon oriented opposition to the Tripartite Pact.⁴

OTT

⁴ Marginal notes:

"Herr Siegfried: I promised Kurusu to discuss this matter with him. Please ask him when it would be convenient for him. W[eizsäcker], Nov. [25?]."

"Arranged for Friday, 2:00 o'clock. S[iegfried]."

The date of "Nov. 29" is also written at the bottom of the first page in Siegfried's handwriting. See document No. 423.

No. 372

174/138473

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

Tokyo, November 21, 1940—11:10 a. m.

No. 1285 of November 21

Received November 21—10:15 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1272 of November 19.¹

1. The Deputy Foreign Minister informed me today regarding the situation in Thailand that the Thai Minister President² as well as the American Government have denied the alleged negotiations for an alliance. Nevertheless the British³ and American⁴ Ministers in Bangkok continue energetically striving to win Thailand over for the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

The Japanese Government has today proposed to Thailand that it restrict its territorial demands toward Indochina in some points, and [indicated that it] would then be prepared to mediate between her and Indochina. Should the occasion arise, Japan will request the support of the Reich Government in dealing with the French Government.

2. The Deputy Foreign Minister informed me in strict confidence that the Japanese Government intends to send warships to Saigon. The French Government will be notified that this will be a friendly visit, but its purpose will be, in fact, to make a demonstration against Thailand.

3. In the view of the Deputy Foreign Minister the shift of Thailand into the Anglo-Saxon camp would not result in any weighty military disadvantages for Japan. The shift could be answered by the occupation of Saigon and thereby be counterbalanced.

OTT

¹ Not found.

² Field Marshal Pibul Songgram Luang.

³ Sir Josiah Crosby.

⁴ Hugh Gladney Grant.

NOVEMBER 1940

647

No. 373

585/242773-74

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOPIA, November 21, 1940—7:00 p. m.

SECRET

Received November 21—10:15 p. m.

No. 569 of November 21

The Foreign Minister¹ informed me that the Minister in Moscow² was summoned to Molotov, who told him the following:

He was in doubt about Bulgaria's present position. Whenever the talk in Berlin turned to Bulgaria, the answer was that the Italians also would have to be asked.³ He was now asking the Bulgarian Government: Did Bulgaria have a treaty with Italy or an Italian guarantee? If a guarantee was given to Bulgaria, Russia must also insist on giving a guarantee. Molotov then went on to say that it was reported that Hungary, Slovakia, and Rumania were joining the Tripartite Pact; what was Bulgaria going to do? Molotov finally said that Russia could not tolerate Bulgaria becoming a "Legionnaire state." The Foreign Minister is uncertain as to the meaning of this phrase.

In any event, the Foreign Minister is greatly impressed by the Russian inquiry, which the Minister merely conveyed and to which no reply has gone out as yet (possibly they are waiting for Draganov's return; he flew to Berlin this morning), and he has once more become dubious.⁴ He raised again the question whether it would not be preferable to time Bulgaria's accession so as to coincide with that of Spain.⁵ I replied to him that this very inquiry gave Bulgaria an opportunity to forestall any subsequent awkward demands by the Russians and clearly demonstrate Bulgaria's position by prompt accession to the Tripartite Pact.

RICHTHOFEN

¹ Ivan Popov.

² I. Stamenov.

³ See document No. 328.

⁴ See document No. 217.

⁵ See document No. 221, footnote 2.

No. 374

183/86267-68

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division II

SECRET

BERLIN, November 21, 1940.
zu Pol. II 3830.¹

Brief regarding telegram No. 1124 of November 20 from the German Legation in Bern.²

Counselor Rademacher,³ who recently returned from a journey to Switzerland, expressed to me his view of the political background of the banning of the NBS as follows:

1. The banning of the NBS is not a very considerable setback for the entire movement of revival in Switzerland. Activity will be continued by the members in subversive form. The weekly *L'action nationale* belonged to the French-Swiss wing of the NBS.

2. As a result of the vacancy of the two positions in the Federal Council (Minger⁴ and Baumann⁵) Freemasonry (Alpina) feels called upon to bring its influence to bear in order to make its candidate (Veltmann⁶) prevail as a successor of Minger. For this purpose it [Freemasonry] wishes to eliminate the influence of the NBS before the latter might become active along these lines. The publication in the Social Democratic newspaper *Volksrecht* has been launched in all probability with the approval of Swiss government circles with similar leanings.

3. The banning of the NBS is undoubtedly a blow directed against Germany; the telegram of the Minister indeed points explicitly to this fact. According to special information available to Counselor Rademacher the Italian Minister⁷ is said to have drawn the attention of the Swiss Government to the fact that the NBS was objectionable to him, as it was advocating a purely German program. Attempts are still being made to ascertain whether such a step has actually been taken by the Italian Minister.

¹ Pol. II 3830: Not found.

² In this telegram Köcher had reported the banning of the "National Movement of Switzerland" (NBS) and its weekly *L'action nationale* by the Swiss Federal Council. According to Köcher the immediate occasion for this measure was the publication in the Social Democratic paper *Volksrecht* of the alleged bylaws of the "National Movement". (183/86265-66)

³ Of the Department for German Internal Affairs in the Foreign Ministry.

⁴ Rudolf Minger, Chief of the Military Department.

⁵ Johannes Baumann, Chief of the Justice and Police Department.

⁶ Presumably Marcus Feldmann, member of the Swiss National Council and editor-in-chief of the *Neue Berner Zeitung*. Actually the Swiss Federal Assembly in its session of Dec. 10 elected Eduard Steiger to succeed Minger as Chief of the Military Department. On Dec. 14 Köcher reported a conversation with Swiss Federal President Pilet-Golaz regarding the results and significance of these elections to the Federal Council (2235/476091-92).

⁷ Attilio Tamaro.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary through the Director and Deputy Director of the Political Department.⁸

KOESTER

⁸ Marginal note: "Herr Siegfried: I have asked Herr Luther to come and confer with me about Switzerland. W[eizsäcker], Nov. 22."

No. 375

205/142585

Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department

BERLIN, November 25, 1940.

Pol. VI 3672 g.

During my farewell visit on November 21¹ the Swedish Foreign Minister, at the close of the conversation, brought up the subject of Swedish-Finnish relations. He said that on both the Swedish and the Finnish side there existed the tendency to come closer together. In this he was not exactly thinking of Anschluss in the Austrian fashion but nevertheless of a formal, closer union. Today the plans were still in an entirely preparatory stage, but even in this stage he did not want to leave us in ignorance of this or do anything behind our backs. Whereas last spring it had been a question of a Scandinavian defensive alliance against which the Russians, as was known, had protested,² he considered it possible that perhaps this time Russia would not object to a Swedish-Finnish alliance which recognized the present situation. In any case, he knew nothing definite about that. M. Günther said he did not want to ask us any questions, but a prerequisite for the implementation of these plans was that Germany was not opposed, and therefore it was natural that it was important for him if, for example, Minister Richert could inform him of the German view at the proper time.

In accordance with the instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister I maintained an entirely noncommittal attitude during this conversation.

GRUNDHERR

¹ Minister Grundherr, who was in charge of Scandinavian and Baltic affairs (Pol. VI) in the Foreign Ministry, visited Stockholm Nov. 14-Nov. 22. Grundherr's memorandum of this visit is filmed on 205/142593-96.

² See document No. 251 and footnote 1.

No. 376

711/282150

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, November 21, 1940.

Among the questions which at the moment greatly agitate the Rumanian Government is the Russian action at the Kiliya branch of the Danube.¹ The Soviet Government in fact has claimed and militarily occupied a portion of the estuary of the Kiliya branch, which does not lie within the historic borders of Bessarabia. The same applies to several islands in the Kiliya branch.

In spite of repeated Rumanian requests that we make this matter the subject of friendly discussions in Moscow, we have not taken any action so far. The Foreign Minister had decided that we ought not to make ourselves the spokesman of such individual Rumanian requests in Moscow.

A map of the Kiliya branch is enclosed (I, II).²

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 236.

² Not found.

No. 377

3784/E041968-69

The Chief of the Economic Delegation in the Soviet Union to the Director of the Economic Policy Department

Moscow, November 21, 1940.

MY DEAR HERR WIEHL: I am sending you enclosed the copy of a letter of November 18¹ to Mikoyan, which contains in precise form our proposal for the second contractual year. The list of commodities has been compiled with due regard to the data which General von Hanneken² sent me before my return to Moscow, and which were confirmed by Bergemann.³ As duration for the second contractual year we do not use the calendar year but a period of 15 months, and have increased the volume of trade correspondingly.

The atmosphere here in Moscow has been quite cordial since our return, but whether this will have any positive effect on the progress

¹ Not printed (2108/455972-78).

² Maj. Gen. Hermann von Hanneken, Under State Secretary and Chief of Raw Materials Division, Reich Ministry of Economics.

³ Ministerialdirigent Bergemann, Reich Ministry of Economics.

of the negotiations remains to be seen. Mikoyan wants to go through the whole series of questions relating to the second contractual year in a single working session of 5 to 6 hours on Saturday.⁴ Let's hope something comes out of it.

I plan to ask for an appointment with Molotov as soon as I have the definitive instructions regarding Petsamo. I also hope I receive, in time for my talk with Molotov, the authorization from the Foreign Minister, which I have requested, to make use of the territorial issue regarding Lithuania in connection with our demand for grain. I have telegraphed directly to the Foreign Minister about this (telegram No. 2484 of November 18⁵).

The morale of my numerous delegation, I am glad to say, is keeping up. The very substantial work load and the rather considerable entertainment program provided by the Russians have a stimulating effect. With the new arrivals this week (Reich Grain Office, Reich Fat Office, Steel Tube Industry Association), we'll easily number more than 40.⁶

With best regards,

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

SCHNURRE

⁴ i.e., Nov. 23.

⁵ Not printed (104/112653). In telegram No. 2171 of Nov. 26 (104/112674) Schnurre received instructions from Ribbentrop not to negotiate for the time being on the possibility of using deliveries of grain as compensation for the Lithuanian strip of territory. As soon as he returned to Berlin, Schnurre might remind Ribbentrop of the matter.

⁶ Wiehl replied in two letters of Nov. 28 (2108/455988-91) and Nov. 29 (2108/-455992-94). Concerning his letter of Nov. 28 see document No. 406, footnote 3.

No. 378

585/242775-76

The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOFIA, November 22, 1940—4: 50 p. m.

SECRET

Received November 22—10: 00 p. m.

No. 570 of November 22

Ambassador von Papen¹ has asked me to transmit the following telegram to the Foreign Minister:

King Boris, advised of my arrival, asked me to come for a talk yesterday evening. He began by saying how deeply the visit to the

¹ Papen, who had been called to Berlin earlier in November, was passing through Sofia on his way back to his post. See document No. 297. See also, Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, pp. 465-468.

Führer² had impressed him and that it was an excellent move to invite him immediately following the Russian visit. As I knew of Moscow's inquiry regarding the intentions of the Bulgarian Government,³ I asked the King what reply he intended to give, outlining to him in accordance with the Reich Foreign Minister's views the dangers which Bulgaria might incur as the result of a guarantee forced on her by Russia, if Bulgaria did not make it plain to the Russians at this time that she had chosen to join the Tripartite Pact. If the military situation later on should make accession to the Pact imperative, any evasive answer [given now] might well furnish the Russians with a pretext for imputing insincerity and cause serious resentment, which we would like to preclude in the interest of Europe's reorganization and Russia's collaboration. The King, however, tried to convince me that there would be no such danger if he were given time to play the game in such a way that Bulgaria would not become the apple of discord between Germany and Russia. The Russians had summoned his Minister only a few hours after his visit to the Führer became known and seemed to be rather in the dark about Germany's intentions toward Bulgaria. They held out to him the promise of the boundaries as laid down in the Peace of San Stefano,⁴ and of support for all demands against Rumania, Greece, and Yugoslavia. But he, unlike his predecessor, would not be taken in by this Russian tune. The boundaries of San Stefano were of no interest to him. He had no St. Stephen's crown, as the Hungarian friends had, which was too big for one head. He would most warmly thank the Russians for their exceedingly kind offer, but say that he felt threatened by no one and needed no guarantee; that would reassure the Russians and also have a beneficial effect on the policy of the Axis toward Turkey. For if Bulgaria, whose friendship toward Germany had been known to the world for years, were officially to join the Tripartite Pact now, it would not amount to very much for the Axis, but might have an effect in the undesirable direction of a Russo-Turkish

² No record of Hitler's conversation with King Boris on Nov. 18 has been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry. Cf. Paul Schmidt, *Statistik auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-45*, p. 572.

The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Aug. 1-Nov. 30, 1940) contains this passage at Nov. 19, 1940:

"In connection with the conversation with General Speidel, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff [Jodl] informs the Chief of the National Defense Department [Warlimont] of the following: King Boris paid a visit to the Führer at the Berghof on Nov. 18. On this occasion the intended German-Bulgarian attack operations against Greek Macedonia and Thrace were discussed. King Boris indicated that the condition of the roads in this area do not allow the commitment of large units before the beginning of March; he further explained that it is of decisive importance for Bulgaria not to be put in an unfavorable position by German preparations on Bulgarian territory until the very last moment."

³ See document No. 373.

⁴ The treaty of San Stefano, concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1878, provided for a Greater Bulgaria including all of Macedonia.

rapprochement. If I should succeed in attaching Turkey closer to the Axis, he would have no hesitation about joining the Pact.

The King also pointed out that by his quiet and unobtrusive collaboration up to now he had made the Bulgarian people pro-German, without their being aware of it and without arousing the opposition. That had not been possible even during the World War. The military situation probably would not require his official accession to the Tripartite Pact until next spring, and he would certainly manage to stand off the Russians without getting them disgruntled in any way.

At a soirée at Herr von Richthofen's home I saw the Minister President⁵ and the Foreign Minister, who share the King's view but are of the opinion that the reply to the Russians must leave no room for doubt as to Bulgaria's ultimate alignment.

PAPEN
RICHTHOFEN

⁵ Bogdan Filov.

No. 379

1447/364966-67

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, November 22, 1940—9:30 p. m.

No. 2138 of November 22

Received November 23—4:35 a. m.

For the Chief of Mission.

It has been learned from a most secret source here that the Bulgarian Minister, Stamenov, was asked to see Dekanozov on November 18. During the visit, Molotov appeared also and made the following statements:¹

He had the impression that the situation in Bulgaria was very tense. Accusations against the Government and the Tsar had been made in the Sobranje. The economic situation, too, was difficult. During his visit to Berlin he was told that Italy had to be consulted in Bulgarian matters.² According to rumors which were circulating, Hungary, Slovakia, Rumania, Spain, and Bulgaria would accede to the Tripartite Pact. In Berlin allusions had been made to the effect that several states would accede to that Pact. He had now precise information that Hungary, Slovakia, and Rumania would accede. Molotov asked whether Bulgaria would do the same. The fate of Bulgaria was of interest to the Soviet Government which, in view of historic obligations, desired a strong Bulgaria. In the opinion of the

¹ See document No. 373.

² See document No. 328.

Soviet Government, Bulgaria must achieve her national goals against Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece. He had stated this also to Hitler. The Soviet Government was prepared to make available to Bulgaria any kind of national assistance [*Nationalhilfe*]: food, petroleum, any kind of foreign exchange, loans, and anything at all which was necessary to the normal development of Bulgaria. The Soviet Government was giving its support also to the present Bulgarian regime and the Tsar whom it considered to be intelligent and honorable. The Bulgarian Government, however, must inform him of its commitment toward Italy and Germany, as the Soviet Government did not approve the establishment of a Legionnaire state. He had told this also to Hitler. If a guarantee came into question, it would be given by the Soviet Government, too.

At the end, Molotov alluded to the step taken by Antonov³ in the matter of the guarantee and Kiosseivanov's⁴ answer at the time which was to the effect that, in case of need, a guarantee by the Soviet Government could be requested.⁵

Molotov spoke vigorously, but in a friendly way. After he had left, Dekanozov emphasized that the moment which Kiosseivanov had talked about possibly had arrived now.

Absolutely no use is to be made of this in view of the source.

WOERMANN

³ Nicholas Antonov, Bulgarian Minister in the Soviet Union, 1936-1939.

⁴ Georgi Kiosseivanov, Bulgarian Minister President and Foreign Minister, 1935-February 1940.

⁵ See vol. VIII of this series, documents Nos. 247, 415, and 454.

No. 380

F5/0208-28

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM No. 47

BERLIN, November 23, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE RUMANIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT, GENERAL ANTONESCU, IN BERLIN, ON NOVEMBER 22, 1940

After a few words of greeting the Foreign Minister stated that he would like at the very outset to mention a point which Germany had noted with surprise and regret. He referred to the statements which, according to Count Ciano, Antonescu had made in Rome about the Vienna Award.¹ In the interest of future relations between Ger-

¹ Antonescu visited Rome, Nov. 14-16. See document No. 346.

In telegram No. 2082 of Nov. 15 (2281/481721-24), the Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, Bismarck, reported that Antonescu had also stated, in a conversation with him, that Rumania would never give up her claim to the territory taken away from her by the Vienna Award.

many and Rumania he wished to make absolutely clear to Antonescu what Germany's position was. He understood that it was painful for a country to have to give up something to which it had become accustomed. It was a good thing, however, especially in foreign policy, to look at matters very soberly. If Rumania did this, she would come to the conclusion that she had been rendered a great service by the Vienna Award. For the situation in which the Führer had decided to make an arbitral award was such that without the German and Italian guarantee Rumania would probably have ceased to exist as an independent country. Hungary had in any case been firmly determined to carry through revision at any risk. A Hungarian attack on Rumania had been imminent. As a soldier, General Antonescu could perhaps judge better than the Foreign Minister what chances Rumania would have had in a military conflict with Hungary. It would have to be taken into consideration, however, that the conflict would by no means have remained isolated. Soviet Russia would undoubtedly have intervened, and that would have spelled the end of Rumania. When the Award was to be made in Vienna, the situation was such that on the one hand Hungary was firmly determined to march against Rumania and had already notified Germany officially,² while Russia was concentrating strong forces on the Rumanian border. On the other hand, Rumania had not been inclined to concede to Hungary those minimum revisions that would have satisfied the latter's claims. In that situation Germany had told Hungary in unmistakable terms that on account of the threat to the Rumanian oil fields it did not in any circumstances want a war in the Balkans;³ likewise it called on Rumania to agree to a generous revision, emphasizing its interest in peace in the Balkans and pointing out the danger threatening Rumania from Hungary and Russia. In return it had offered Rumania the German-Italian guarantee.⁴ Contrary to certain rumors, the Rumanian delegation had been told the plain truth before the Vienna Award was made. The Urdareanu communiqué, which had been issued at the time concerning this matter, had represented things in a completely false light. The situation at the time indicated, however, that a prompt decision was urgently necessary. Therefore an assurance had to be demanded in advance from both parties that they would accept the Award unconditionally. If this had not been done and if one had entered into a lengthy palaver, 6 months would have passed without any agreement having been reached. War would have broken out and Rumania would have ceased to exist. With respect to the territories to be ceded, the Award itself had taken a position approximately halfway between the last Hungarian demands

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 400.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 410.

⁴ See *ibid.*, document No. 408.

and the last Rumanian concessions. Manoilescu and Pop had been informed of this in advance. They should also have known that the Szekler area would fall to Hungary, since they had been told that an old, established Hungarian national group could not be transplanted.

If, according to statements by Count Ciano, Antonescu told the Duce that the Award did not conform very closely to the ethnographic realities in Transylvania because the arbitrators had been impressed by a red, Hungarian map, this was a great mistake.⁵ The arbitrators were very accurately informed about the nationality situation. It was a question, however, of finding a synthesis between the Hungarian demands and the Rumanian concessions, as well as a synthesis between the ethnographic and historical realities. Antonescu would have to admit that the picture would have changed very much to Rumania's disadvantage if the decision, perchance, had been made according to purely historical points of view. It was clear that in the life of nations it was generally historical considerations, only rarely considerations of nationality, which were determinative. Hungary had lost Transylvania to Rumania at a time when Germany had suffered a severe defeat, and had been the ally of the German Reich. This, too, had of course been taken into consideration by Germany. Moreover, the Award had been very carefully weighed according to geographic and historical points of view. Hungary received only two-fifths of its lost territory, while Rumania retained three-fifths of what it had gained from the World War. With this the question was settled once and for all. That it was psychologically difficult for Rumania to reconcile herself to this was understandable. He (the Foreign Minister) was asking Antonescu, however, to refrain from any criticism of the Vienna Award, just as he had asked the Hungarians to refrain from any propoganda for further revision. After the serious nationality struggle tranquillity and order would now have to be restored.

With reference to the incidents accompanying the surrender to Hungary of the territories to be ceded, the Foreign Minister said he had seen from the report of the Altenburg commission⁶ that "in some places the Hungarians had done things which were incomprehensible and ought not to have happened." On the other hand, various things had occurred on the Rumanian side, too, which it would have been better to leave undone. Germany knew, on the basis of her experiences in the nationality struggles with the Poles, Czechs, and other foreign peoples, that changes in the territorial possessions of nations

⁵ Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Nov. 14, 1940.

⁶ See document No. 179, footnote 5. The German-Italian Commission had visited areas on both sides of the new Hungarian-Rumanian border in Transylvania Oct. 15-29. Extracts from the final report of the Commission dated Oct. 31 are filmed on 271/177318-27.

were always accompanied by the settlement of old blood accounts, and often a certain bestiality [*Untermenschentum*] came to the fore. But these things were unavoidable in such upheavals. One ought to forget the past, however, and look toward the future.

Germany and Italy were prepared to use their influence so that the situation of the minorities may settle down. In only a few days recommendations designed to prevent further incidents and insure tranquillity for the future would be sent to the Rumanian and Hungarian Governments. He (the Foreign Minister) did not want to go into details. He merely wanted to assure Antonescu in a general way that Germany and Italy were willing to work toward this goal: that the fair treatment of the Rumanian minority in Hungary provided for in the Award would be guaranteed just as corresponding conduct by Rumania toward her Hungarian minority would be guaranteed.

Turning to the subject of German-Rumanian economic negotiations, the Foreign Minister remarked that, on the basis of a report by Minister Clodius,⁷ he could state that Germany was willing in principle to cooperate in the extensive economic program that had been agreed upon. The negotiations on this matter could not be in better hands than those of Minister Clodius, who, like Minister Neubacher, would report currently about them. The outcome of these negotiations was satisfactory both for Germany and for Rumania. It fulfilled the purpose of placing economic relations on a completely new basis and of reaching fixed arrangements on the longest possible terms.

The Foreign Minister then took up the general political situation and remarked that Germany had already won the war; nothing could now alter that fact; it was merely a question of when England would finally concede that it was defeated.

Militarily Germany was carrying the war to England day and night. He (the Foreign Minister) believed that the blows against Great Britain thus far by the Luftwaffe, but especially those which had been struck during the last few days against the armament centers, had made a very serious impression on England. It was not possible to foresee whether England would soon sue for peace or whether the British Government would succeed in holding the people in line for a while longer. The Wehrmacht would in any case hit England wherever it could. Either England would be compelled by the constant attacks of bombers and the increasing activity of submarines to sue for peace or she would at the proper moment when the weather

⁷The reference apparently is to a memorandum by Clodius of Nov. 21 (2192/472891-94). In it he summarized points which he had discussed with Antonescu at Bucharest Nov. 3-5. In these conversations Antonescu had expressed the desire to continue talks concerning long-term German-Rumanian economic collaboration during his forthcoming visit to Berlin. See document No. 351.

was suitable be defeated directly. Within a year there would certainly be some period of good weather for 2 or 3 weeks, and then it would be possible to strike the big annihilating blow.

Politically Germany was on the point of bringing together a great coalition against England. He (the Foreign Minister) believed that in a very short time only a few powers would remain outside this world-wide coalition and not belong to it in some form or other.

The Foreign Minister then brought up England's two hopes: Russia and America. After Molotov's visit to Berlin he could state that England's hope with respect to Russia was unfounded. Stalin was too clever to make Russia England's cannon fodder. He very well realized that a conflict between Russia and the German, or rather a combined German-Japanese, Army would have a serious outcome for the Soviet Union. For the rest, Germany believed that it was in her interest as well as that of Rumania if German-Russian relations continued to develop favorably and Russia was incorporated, in some form or other, in the great coalition. Germany did not love the Bolsheviks and on her own territory was taking the sternest measures against them. The converse was also true. With a realistic attitude the Führer had done the right thing, however, when he established a sensible relationship with Russia, which in the last analysis would also have a favorable effect on Germany's friends.

America's future attitude was difficult to foretell, since much depended on the well-known American hysteria. It would not be easy for America to enter the war; for not only was every military basis for this lacking, but the fact that in such a case she would have to declare war on almost the entire world would also act as a deterrent. Moreover, an official entry by America into the war was largely a matter of indifference to Germany. The United States could not harm Germany much more than she was already doing at present. Germany and Italy were completely uninterested in the American Army, since the Führer and Mussolini would not let any more Anglo-Saxons land in Europe. The Navy was not strong enough to operate in two oceans and would in the main have to be stationed in the Pacific. Ten years would elapse before America would complete her program for a two-ocean navy. In a clash with the Japanese fleet the American Navy would undoubtedly prove to be the loser. Hence there remained as the main contribution to the war American deliveries of planes and pilots to England. But these deliveries were being made anyway. Numerically they were greatly exaggerated in the press. The United States had 60,000 workers employed in the airplane industry to begin with, then 150,000, as compared with 700,000 in Germany. In the spring Germany's air power would be

manifoldly increased, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, by the introduction of new types. During the winter, moreover, the Luftwaffe would cause greater damage to the airplane industry of England than could be compensated for by American deliveries. The effect of the British air attacks on Germany was insignificant. About the submarine warfare, the Führer would undoubtedly give further details. Hitherto only a very few submarines had been in operation. In the next few months this would change, however, and blows would be struck against the American deliveries in this way, too. Most of the submarines were now used for training cruises. In the year 1941, 35 submarines a month, that is one submarine a day, would be completed. Thus, England would be isolated from all sides, and it was merely a question of time until she would give in.

With reference to the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, the Foreign Minister remarked that he was especially gratified by the impending accession of Rumania.⁸ He saw in this a great symbolic act signifying that there would never again be war between Rumania and Germany; instead, the two countries would for all time be bound by friendship, perhaps even by comradeship in arms. Other nations would join the Tripartite Pact. In this way the Axis would remain the decisive factor in Europe.

With France, too, the Führer had found a basis on which that country would in some form or other be incorporated into the European family of nations. In the discussion between the Führer and Marshal Pétain⁹ the principle had been laid down that France would never again in any way cooperate with England. Germany had to see to it that this promise, too, was kept.

With Spain, Germany had friendly relations, just as she had with some Balkan countries, while relations with other Balkan states still remained to be clarified. As mentioned, Russia also took a positive attitude, so that for the time being at least there was no cause for concern. The weight of this combination was, to be sure, not decisive for the war, but it was a strong factor that would contribute to forcing England to her knees.

On the question of the Italian-Greek war the Führer would undoubtedly state his position in the afternoon. It was a matter of minor difficulties, which, however, would represent only a passing episode. The Führer and Mussolini could never permit England to threaten the Rumanian oil fields from Greece, and also for general strategic reasons they were bound to try to keep the English from establishing themselves in Greece. In any case the matter would be put in order very shortly. The Mediterranean problem, too, would

⁸ See Editors' Note, p. 208.

⁹ See document No. 227.

be settled in the very near future. In a few months the Führer would have driven the English fleet out of the Mediterranean. It was Germany's aim to settle the Mediterranean problem definitively and expel the English from the Mediterranean area before the winter was over.

In the spring the German Army would be 230 divisions strong. Of these, 186 were excellent first-line divisions, including 20 armored divisions, 4 tank brigades, and a large number of mechanized divisions. Being a soldier, General Antonescu could on the basis of these figures form an idea of Germany's real strength. Germany and Italy were in a position to meet any conceivable enemy combination and smash it with lightning speed.

In summary he (the Foreign Minister) was therefore able to state that Germany, because of her military strength and in view of the success of her foreign policy in creating a grand coalition, could face the future with sovereign calm. She was prepared for a long war, but hoped to win quickly, for in contrast to the years 1914-18 she had the advantage this time.

General Antonescu thanked the Foreign Minister for providing enlightenment on the general situation. He personally wished to state his views on the political, economic, and military questions of direct interest to Rumania. He spoke neither as a politician nor as a diplomat but as a soldier who would be happy to die on a battlefield. He had entered political life against his will and had undertaken the difficult task of leading the state only because he believed that he had a historical obligation to fulfill toward his country.

Politically he was of the opinion that Rumania had been punished too severely for the mistakes of a single generation. The Rumanian nation was eternal, but the generation which had committed the mistakes was to such an extent only a passing phenomenon that some of those who were very largely responsible were no longer there. Today an entirely new Rumania had arisen which had nothing more to do with the old one and was not responsible for the mistakes committed in the past. The present regime and he personally in particular had had to suffer much because they tried to prevent the mistakes even before the assumption of power. Sinister forces, namely the Soviets and the Jews, had hidden behind the old regime. Between the today and the yesterday there was an impenetrable wall. Rumania was now marching unreservedly with the Axis. It went much further than merely acceding to the Tripartite Pact. Rumania was prepared to shed her blood for the Axis on the fields of battle.

So far he had had only a short time in which to reorganize the internal forces of the country. He wished to recover internally what he had lost on the frontiers. As soon as he had completed this reorganization, he was prepared to march with the Axis. In view of

America's probable entry into the war he believed the war would still last a long time. Therefore Rumania could still be of use.

Russia, too, could not be trusted 100 percent. The Rumanians knew how little reliance could be placed in the words of the Slavs.

In order to be able to reorganize the country, however, he needed help. When he assumed power the situation had been disastrous. The Army had been demoralized especially because it had been forced to give up without a struggle territories which belonged to Rumania. As for the financial and economic situation, that was well known to Germany.

He had taken over the government just a few days after he had been released from detention. He had already on a previous occasion after a conversation with King Carol written a letter asking him to abdicate and had almost been shot for it.

The help which he needed for the reorganization of the country was along two lines: security on the frontiers and protection for the minorities.

He had succeeded in carrying out the revolution in Rumania without the slightest bloodshed. He would also have those guilty punished in a perfectly orderly manner. Political crimes were being investigated, especially the Codreanu trial. Although he did not intend to punish outside the law, he would proceed all the more ruthlessly within the law.

Passing on to questions of foreign policy, Antonescu remarked that the Russians were presenting increasingly greater demands. They were expelling multitudes of Rumanians from Bessarabia and were constantly putting off the fixing of the boundary so that they would be able gradually to push further into Rumanian territory and influence the drawing of the boundary more and more in their favor. They intended to force Germany and Italy completely out of the delta and the mouth of the Danube. They demanded that the problem of the maritime Danube be settled with Rumania alone.¹⁰ Obviously, if Rumania faced Russia alone, she would have to yield on every question. Therefore, she would in no case agree to the idea of such a condominium. Moreover, the Russians intended to deny Rumanian ships passage through the Kiliya branch and would attempt, as they had already done before 1914, to cause a silting up of the other branches by means of hydraulic construction changes in order to block the outlet from the Danube to the Black Sea.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that sole jurisdiction by Russia and Rumania over parts of the Danube was out of the question. The Führer had told Molotov very plainly that as a great Danubian state Germany was interested in all questions concerning the river.¹¹

¹⁰ See document No. 310.

¹¹ See document No. 328.

At the close of the conversation, which had to be broken off because of the impending reception by the Führer,¹² Antonescu also mentioned his plan of thwarting the Russian design by building a canal from Cernavoda to Constanța, and spoke of the Russian proposal for having the maritime Danube administered by a mixed Rumanian-Russian commission. He called such a commission a permanent source of disturbance and an opening for the infiltration of Bolshevist ideas into Rumania.

SCHMIDT

¹² See document No. 381.

No. 381

66/46182-203

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

No. 40

BERLIN, November 23, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE RUMANIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT, ANTONESCU, IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 22, 1940, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

Antonescu first delivered the greetings of the Rumanian King and people to the Führer. He himself was among those who regarded the great work of Adolf Hitler with complete admiration and had the most complete confidence in the Führer.

The Führer replied that he was pleased to be able to greet the Leader of the new Rumanian state. Because of the similarity of Weltanschauung he had been following with sympathy the internal political struggle of the Rumanian people during the last few years.

When the new Rumanian Minister presented his credentials,¹ he (the Führer) had described to him the circumstances which had brought him (the Führer) in close touch with the events connected with the murder of Codreanu.²

As for the future, he believed in close cooperation between Rumania and Germany. This would not only be of advantage for the direct relations between the two countries, but was also necessary for general political reasons in view of the powerful ethnic and ideological attack that threatened all Europe. This compelled all nations whose orientation was different from that of the western democracies—hence also Germany and Rumania—to stand together and defend their interests jointly.

Antonescu referred to the fact that in his conversation with the Foreign Minister³ he had already stressed the complete change that

¹ Minister Constantin Grecianu presented his credentials on Nov. 22. No record of his conversation with Hitler has been found.

² See vol. v of this series, documents Nos. 260 and 261.

³ See document No. 380.

had occurred in Rumania. Between the past and the future there yawned an unbridgeable abyss. Supported by the national Legionnaire movement he was the representative of the Rumanian future and was speaking to the Führer as a soldier—whose statements meant what they said.

He had sought adherence to the Axis since his assumption of power, which had been brought about under conditions which had probably never at any time been more difficult for a politician. His goal was to reorganize the country and strengthen it—in the economic sphere as well as in administration, politics, and the intellectual and military life. He had one goal in view—namely, to contribute to the victory of the Axis in this war and to help in bringing the war to an end as soon as possible. He would seek to regain internally what he had lost externally. The reconstruction of the Army, strengthening its morale and its material power, was his first task, in order that Rumania might be prepared as soon as possible to carry out its proper mission in the military field, too.

Rumania had the most glorious past of all peoples living in the region of the Danube and the Balkans. It was the oldest nation in this area and traced its origin back to the time before Christ, when an empire founded by the Romans extended over the [area of the] Danube, the Carpathians, and the Dniester (with a boundary line as it existed before the cession of Bessarabia). It was a historically unique case of a language and an administration coming into being as a result of 200 years of Roman rule and remaining more or less unchanged until this very day. In the 1800 years following the Roman rule Rumania had retained her language, customs, and the same racial type. This also was unique in history. In this connection it was particularly noteworthy that for ten centuries Rumania had watched one wave of barbarians after another go by on the great highway of the European nations. Owing to their power of resistance, the Rumanian people had, however, survived it all and even kept their language intact to such an extent that from the North to the Dobruja, from Bessarabia to the Banat there was no dialect whatever, but the same Rumanian was spoken everywhere. The Rumanians were the first people to emerge from the Middle Ages with a political organization.

For 500 years they had fought against the Russians and stopped them at the Danube. The struggles against the Tartars who had been stopped at the Dniester, had lasted from 3–400 years. Rumania had also had to fight against Austria-Hungary, and then again for 200 years against Russia. In spite of rather small forces and the lack of a strong army, the power of resistance and the bravery of the Rumanian people had for 2000 years withstood all onslaughts, and during those 2000 years of development they had arrived where they

stood only a few months ago, when, through the misfortune of their most recent history, so much was again lost. Rumania would never abandon her struggle; the Rumanians were the first in these regions and they would be the last to leave them. The mistakes of a single generation had been very severely punished. Rumania had lost the fruits of a 2000-year development. But she would struggle for another 2000 years to achieve the position to which, in her own opinion, she was entitled. For the first time in her history she had been defeated without having fought. The domestic disorder, however, had been so great that Rumania had been unable to fight, and faith in the leadership of the state had completely vanished. She had found no outside support either and her inner moral power of resistance had therefore collapsed. All this had happened because behind the old regime the dark forces of Bolshevism and Jewry had brought about the disorganization of the country on purpose, in order to drive it into the arms of Bolshevism.

On assuming power after the third coup d'état, he (Antonescu) had had no armed force in back of him on which he could have depended; for he had not wanted to use the Army for the domestic settlement, since he had considered this dangerous to the future of his country. Nor had he had any political connection with the Iron Guard, but merely sympathized with it spiritually and supported it in its struggle for justice and international recognition. On that account he had been persecuted by the former King and threatened with death. Upon the assumption of power he had had to accept the severe consequences of the previous period of boundless demoralization. Thus the evacuation of Bessarabia and Bucovina under Russian pressure had taken place under very painful attendant circumstances. There had been border skirmishes for months in these regions which had cost numerous losses in officers and men. Now, to be sure, the situation was more quiet, but the stream of refugees from Bessarabia and the Dobruja was taking no end. These refugees, whose number Antonescu put at 300,000, represented a great burden to the Rumanian state, which had to house them, feed them, and provide them with money.

Since the Vienna Award, his policy rested on two pillars: the boundary guarantee and the protection of the minority of 1,350,000 Rumanians remaining in Hungary, whose life, property, and freedom were guaranteed on the basis of this Award. The Hungarians, however, had immediately violated the obligation which they had assumed with respect to Germany and Europe. Forty-five thousand refugees had left the Hungarian part of Transylvania. They had been mistreated and robbed of their belongings. Women and children were murdered by the Hungarians and many of the refugees had appeared in Rumania with their eyes gouged out, tongues cut off, and fingernails

torn out. He (Antonescu) had taken no measures in retaliation, but the unrest in Rumania was exceedingly great. There was, besides, the disastrous condition of the country in general, the disorganization of the administration and the police and, finally, the economic crisis, which was the first one since the World War. It was to be attributed to the fact that Rumania had just experienced a crop failure by which the harvest yield had been reduced 30 percent and the effect of which had been further intensified by the commitments for deliveries to the Axis, which had been strictly carried out. The national Legionnaire movement, on which he based his support, had to be reorganized, because all its leaders had been imprisoned by the former rulers.

In these circumstances he was turning to Germany with the request for help in the political and economic sphere. He could reconstruct the country politically only if there were peace on the frontiers. He requested economic aid in the development of production; this would redound not only to the benefit of Rumania but also to Germany's and Italy's advantage. For the development of the Rumanian economy he needed long-term credits at a low rate of interest. In view of America's presumable intervention and the uncertain attitude of Russia, Germany had to count on a long war, and it was therefore also in Germany's interest, by developing Rumanian industry, to make increasingly available to herself the products of the country. In addition to industry as such, the transportation system would also have to be improved. He was giving special attention to the development of a domestic food products industry, in order in this way also to render all unnecessary transportation superfluous.

In conclusion, Antonescu declared that he would join the Tripartite Pact the next day; however, he would not let it go with a mere act of joining, but would also be prepared with weapon in hand to fight alongside the Axis Powers for the victory of civilization.

The Führer replied that he had the most profound understanding for the difficult situation in which Antonescu had found himself. When the Vienna Award was made the situation was such that a conflict between Rumania and Hungary was threatening to break out, which could have led to a general catastrophe. In Germany's view, such a development would have led to a military and political vacuum. Since, however, everywhere in nature vacuums were immediately filled, it had to be expected that the collapse of the Rumanian state would bring Bolshevism into the arena. Now, however, he was convinced that Rumania, in spite of all difficulties, would again be put on her feet. If Bolshevism had come to Rumania even temporarily it would have entirely eliminated the intellectuals of the nation, and murdered them or deported them to Siberia, as had oc-

curred in other areas occupied by Russia. Rumania's future would have been destroyed for an incalculable time.

Germany would have been unable to do anything about it. Historical questions were for the most part settled by force and not by phrases. Germany was not in a position at that time, however, to use force. Not till the end of the military campaign in France did she begin to withdraw her troops from the far advanced positions in the west. Political pressure, however, was significant only if it could be automatically supported by military means. Otherwise it was useless, being a pure bluff. He (the Führer) never undertook a measure unless he was convinced that he could also support it militarily.

For this reason he had stated his willingness to render an arbitration award in the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute. It was clear in advance that both parties would be dissatisfied; the one, because it had obtained too little, and the other because it had been compelled to make too big concessions. It had been necessary to balance ethnic rights against political and historical reminiscences, taking into consideration the sensibilities of both parties. In history such decisions were for the most part made on the basis of strategic, economic, or dynastic considerations and only very seldom were ethnographic factors taken into account, especially since the ethnographic and geographic boundaries almost never coincided. He (the Führer) could appreciate the full weight of the sacrifices that Rumania had had to make. He believed, however, that it was better to make heavy sacrifices and thereby save the substance of the nation, than that the entire people should be lost.

What had subsequently happened in the ceded areas, Germany could likewise understand very well. Germany had experienced many nationality struggles and in Poland alone lost 60,000 dead among the German minority; this number was increasing from day to day through the discovery of more corpses and might easily rise to 100,000 to 120,000. There were simply times in which, not reason, but passion and hate gained the upperhand. But he did not doubt that it would be possible to bring to an end this period in Rumanian-Hungarian relations and to calm the passions. Probably the perpetrators would then be shocked themselves at their misdeeds. In contemplating all these terrible events, one should, however, not turn one's eyes away from the danger still threatening.

Germany's losses in personnel during the war were insignificant; in material, practically nil. In March she would have 230 divisions. Of these, 20 were armored divisions with exclusively German material, 4 armored brigades with a certain amount of captured material, as well as 12 motorized divisions. It was the strongest and the best equipped Army that Germany had ever had. Since it was no longer

engaged in the west, and at most a few more divisions would be needed in Norway, it was now available for all other necessities.

Nevertheless, Germany was determined to end the war as soon as possible and to exclude England from the Continent once and for all. England, in her present desperate situation, would abandon all Europe to Bolshevism in order to save herself. Naturally she would do the same with the Balkans.

The relations between Germany and Russia were governed by treaty. But, besides, he could depend on a strong army and air force for all eventualities. Germany had no territorial interests in the Balkans. She wished to concentrate on the development of more closely situated, compact areas, to obtain bases on the Atlantic coast, and to develop her colonial territory.

Economically, however, Germany was very much interested in the Balkans and did not wish, as other countries did, merely to export her own goods there, but, being Europe's biggest consumer, she wanted also to become a big buyer of the latter's products, so as to make up her own shortages. Germany herself could deliver all necessary technical articles, chemical products, machines and, in normal times, any war material and wished to procure raw materials in return. For this reason, she had no interest in having the Balkans sink into a sea of blood and tears, and had been prepared, in spite of the severe military burden, to give Rumania a guarantee. The latter was no empty phrase: it was backed by 180 divisions, not counting 50 divisions for the west. He (the Führer) was in this regard prepared for everything and determined to do everything.

Unfortunately there was a minor setback to be noted in part of one area, though not in the total military situation, to the extent that the English had established bases in Thrace from which they could advance further north by air and would arouse the covetousness of other states. He (the Führer) was absolutely determined to bring these English attempts to naught, whatever the costs. He asked that Rumania facilitate this. This, however, would not involve participation in the struggle.

Subsequently the Führer again turned to economic questions and emphasized the interest that Germany had in a prospering Rumanian economy. In view of the close ideological affinity between the two regimes, the same fundamental principles that were in force in the domestic economy could be applied to the economic relations, i.e., long-term measures and price stability. Germany considered concluding long-term commercial treaties with Rumania to run from 10 to 20 years, within the framework of which Rumania's total surplus production would be taken over at fixed prices for years to come.⁴ Germany herself could, within the framework of her large-scale econ-

⁴ See document No. 387.

omy, easily arrive at a balance between large and small export surpluses, varying in according with the yields of the harvest in the various years. The prices would, as mentioned, always remain stable. In this way the disadvantages of the liberalistic system would be offset for the producers.

In order to be able to carry out this plan in a new Europe, he (the Führer) was determined to continue to fight until England was finally excluded from the Continent. Those countries in particular which, to be sure, had no common boundary, but ethnically had a common interest in stemming the Slavic tide, must cooperate in this matter. In his conversations with Molotov he had attempted to bring about a change in the direction of Russian expansion and hoped that he would be successful in the matter. The discussions had taken place in a friendly atmosphere. He had, however, left Molotov in no doubt that Germany was in earnest about its guarantee to Rumania and had also told him that a war in the Baltic in connection with Finland was not to be countenanced. Molotov had sought to determine whether the guarantee given Rumania was directed against Russia. Naturally the answer to this had been merely that the Reich could not tolerate any violation of Rumania's territory, no matter by whom this violation might be perpetrated.

The Führer then turned again to the Greco-Italian conflict. Here "a momentary shadow in the general picture" was to be noted, since Italy had not sufficiently taken into account the geographic and seasonal factors. Developments could lead to attempts by the English to obtain bases in Thrace. Germany would oppose such attempts with all her might. In so doing she would not demand any military aid from Rumania, but merely the cooperation of the General Staffs, which would not constitute any burden for the Rumanian state.

In this connection, the Führer also called attention to a Russian attempt to give Bulgaria a guarantee⁵ and stated in regard thereto that Bulgaria had requested no guarantee and that Germany did not view this question favorably either.

In conclusion, he expressed his conviction that General Antonescu would succeed in reorganizing the Rumanian Army and making it an effective instrument of national defense. He expressed his satisfaction at the accession of Rumania to the Tripartite Pact and emphasized that Russia would never oppose a power bloc such as was represented by Germany and her friends. Stalin did not wish to risk anything, but merely to gain. It would therefore be made clear to him that he should not direct his expansion into areas in which Germany or Italy were interested, but that he must turn elsewhere. He hoped that it would be possible to divert Russia toward these other directions.

⁵ See documents Nos. 373, 391, and 403.

He understood thoroughly General Antonescu's difficulties, as he himself had entered upon a difficult inheritance in Germany. A strong party which was absolutely devoted to him (Antonescu) was important for the work of reconstruction. Then the process of political reorganization would bring a new prosperity to the country; and, after all, the history of the world did not end in the year 1940.

Antonescu expressed his thanks for these last words of the Führer and again explained to him at length the details of his reconstruction program, calling attention in particular to the technical discussions with Minister Clodius. He then repeated his remarks about the role that Rumania had played as a Latin island in the Slavic sea, as a result of the capacity for resistance of the Rumanian people. He described his domestic difficulties in the reconstruction of the country and again mentioned the question of credits and the rate of interest. He also mentioned the difficulties with the Russians in regard to the mouth of the Danube and repeated the plan which he had already proposed to the Reich Foreign Minister of constructing a canal from Cernavoda to Constanța within 5 years, at an expenditure of 2 or 3 billion lei, in order to frustrate the Russian plan of causing the branches of the Danube belonging to Rumania to become silted up within 15 years. In addition he called attention to the Russian efforts to exclude Germany and Italy from the Commission for the maritime Danube.⁶ In this connection Antonescu also mentioned the Russian demand to be permitted to sail warships as far as Brăila, i.e., behind the Rumanian defense line for Moldavia. Because of Moscow, Rumania could not really attain tranquillity, particularly for the reason that the Russians did not want to fix the boundary in a definitive fashion.

Antonescu then complained in statements of considerable length about the treatment which the Rumanian minority had received from the Hungarians and reported details in regard to mistreatment and the like. If it had been stated by the Germans that considerations of nationality were less important in historic decisions than considerations of history, he was in entire agreement, because historically, too, Rumania could without further ado claim Transylvania, since this land had belonged to Hungary only approximately 50 years and had never yet in its history been divided. He supported this thesis with some historical data and in this connection also denied that the Szeklers could be considered Hungarians. He stressed that Rumania, to be sure, would keep quiet now, but that at the conclusion of a general peace she would immediately raise her voice again to obtain justice, and he intimated that he considered a satisfactory solution possible on the basis of an exchange of population between Hungary and Rumania. With great vigor he argued in

⁶ See document No. 310.

favor of the Rumanian thesis, i.e., strict observance of the Vienna Award and, in particular, its obligations with respect to minorities, and taking up the entire question anew at the conclusion of general peace.

The Führer replied that naturally no ideal solution had been found in the Vienna Award, but in the very same manner as Antonescu had set forth the justification for the Rumanian claims in statements lasting for hours, Hungarian representatives had also spoken in favor of the Hungarian thesis. The time had not yet come to view matters in retrospect. He could, however, assure General Antonescu that he fully understood his feelings, his indignation, and his grief. Besides, history would not come to a standstill in the year 1940.

After Antonescu had very vigorously pleaded his point of view with the same arguments several times more, the discussion ended in a friendly atmosphere.

SCHMIDT

No. 382

1036/310990

*Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German
Internal Affairs*

BERLIN, November 22, 1940.

zu D II 1248.¹

Counselor Baron Steengracht no longer recalled the decision which the Foreign Minister made in the matter of a reply to the Consulate General at Lourenço Marques regarding the message of the leader of the Ossewa-Brandwag. He referred me to Political Division X, Senior Counselor Bielfeld.

Political Division X does not have a very favorable opinion of the Ossewa-Brandwag. It is not believed to be in a position to achieve anything without considerable German assistance. The matter is therefore being handled in a dilatory manner. The interim reply to the Consulate General, approved by the Foreign Minister, states that Germany is watching the liberation movement with great sympathy and assumes that it will not undertake anything with inadequate resources. As far as the question of the sending of arms is concerned, definite information is first of all requested as to what kind of arms these are to be. The OKW, moreover, is concerned with the matter and has been asked for its purely military opinion on whether and in

¹D II 1248: Telegram No. 289 of Nov. 6 from the Consulate at Lourenço Marques (1036/310989). This telegram transmitted a message received from the leader of the South African nationalist para-military organization Ossewa-Brandwag, offering Germany military and political cooperation and inquiring whether Germany would be prepared to supply arms. See vol. x of this series, document No. 385 and footnote 2.

what form there would be a possibility at all for assisting this movement. Until we have been informed of such an opinion the Foreign Ministry is to take no further action.

Submitted herewith to Minister Luther with the request that he take cognizance of it.

PICOT

No. 383

F9/0387-89

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

NOVEMBER 22, 1940.

FÜHRER: I regret keenly that my letter of October 19, that is, 9 days before the outbreak of hostilities, did not reach you in time² to permit you to give me your opinion, which I would naturally have considered in all its importance.

After a promising and rapid start the advance of the Italian troops in Greece came to a standstill and permitted the Greeks to take the initiative, for the following reasons:

a) A veritable flood irreparably blocked with torrents of mud the armored division which was on the point of breaking through at Janina;

b) The desertion of almost all the Albanian troops, who threw away their arms and went over en masse to the enemy. The command has had to gather and disarm fully 7,000 Albanian soldiers;

c) The attitude of Bulgaria, which permitted Greece to withdraw almost the entire eight divisions which she had in Thrace and employ them all against the nine Italian divisions, which were weakened by the desertion of the Albanian elements.

This is now all a matter of the past. I am naturally aware of the unfavorable psychological repercussions which these events have caused, but I believe that these are passing phenomena. I am preparing a sufficient number of divisions (30) to annihilate Greece and am not worried about bombings of the southern cities, where there are no important industrial plants.

There are two factors to which you call my attention: Spain and Yugoslavia.

I am of the opinion that the Spanish card can be played at the present moment. I do not know the results of your conversations with Suñer, but I am prepared to meet with Franco in order to exert the pressure necessary to make him enter the field on the side of the Axis.

Perhaps the Yugoslav card is still more important. I am ready to

¹The official German translation is filmed on F1/0503; F9/0382-83. The Italian copy, which bears the seal of the Embassy in Berlin, differs in phraseology and word order at several points from the version printed in *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti*, pp. 78-79.

²See document No. 199 and footnote 8.

guarantee the present boundaries of Yugoslavia and to recognize Yugoslavia's right to Salonika, on the following conditions:

- a) that Yugoslavia adhere to the Tripartite Pact;
- b) that she demilitarize the Adriatic;³
- c) that her military intervention be agreed on; in other words, that it occur only after Greece has received an initial blow from Italy.

By this letter I am therefore giving you my agreement with whatever you wish to do in order to reach this goal as quickly as possible.

With regard to an intensification of our collaboration in the air in the Mediterranean, I consider it indispensable. It is necessary that the two General Staffs of the air forces meet as soon as possible in order that all technical decisions may be made.

I, too, have had my black week, but my spirit is calm. The Italian people are prepared to bear the heaviest sacrifices and, goaded by failure, will give everything that is asked of them.

On the other hand, all the reports received from Great Britain describe the situation of Great Britain as extremely serious.

Please accept, Führer, my greetings of faithful comradeship.

MUSSOLINI

³In telegram No. 1758 of Nov. 28 (B14/B002395) Ribbentrop directed the Ambassador in Rome to request of Mussolini an explanation of what was meant by Yugoslav demilitarization of the Adriatic, and of the reasons which prompted this Italian wish. Mackensen replied on Nov. 29 that Mussolini canceled that stipulation (telegram No. 2179: B14/B002396).

No. 384

F5/0232-44

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, November 23, 1940.

CONVERSATION OF THE FÜHRER WITH THE BULGARIAN MINISTER,
DRAGANOV, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1940, FROM 1:00 TO 1:50 P. M.

Draganov first presented the King's greetings to the Führer and his renewed thanks for the hospitality shown him at the Obersalzberg.¹ He [Draganov] was instructed to transmit a communication to the Führer and would say beforehand that the King, as suggested to him at the Obersalzberg, was considering a meeting with the Führer at the frontier.

As a result of consultations among the Minister President, the Foreign Minister, and the War Minister,² the Bulgarian Government was in principle prepared to accede to the Tripartite Pact; it only

¹ See document No. 378 and footnote 2.

² Gen. Theodorossy Daskalov.

requested that the date of signing be deferred. For this there were a number of reasons, which he was instructed to set forth to the Führer.

When the King returned from Berchtesgaden to Sofia, a telegram had been received from the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow concerning a conversation with Molotov.³ The Führer here interrupted Draganov to say that he was informed of that conversation and that he could show to his Bulgarian visitor an extract from the record of his own conversation with Molotov,⁴ from which it was evident that the facts were not what Molotov had told the Bulgarian Minister they were. He would also say so to Molotov. The truth was that the Russians had asked *us* whether we had any objection if Russia were to give Bulgaria a guarantee like the one Germany had given Rumania. No harm should come to the King, nor would there be any attempt at changing the regime in Bulgaria. The Russians were contemplating military assistance of the same kind as the assistance rendered by us to Rumania. Molotov kept coming back to this subject and gave no answer to the Führer's question whether the Bulgarians actually wanted to have such a guarantee. The Führer then told the Russians that he would first have to discuss this question with his allies, because Germany's political interest in the Balkans was less than Italy's. For the rest, it was his, the Führer's, personal opinion that all difficulties, especially with Russia, would have been readily overcome if Bulgaria had joined the Tripartite Pact from the very beginning.

Draganov remarked that the Russians were a treacherous people. Molotov had told the Bulgarian Minister that Russia wanted a strong Bulgaria and that Russia therefore stood prepared to extend every assistance of a financial and material nature; he added that the Soviet Government wanted to see Bulgaria achieve all her national aspirations in relation to Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece. But Russia could not agree to the establishment of a "Legionnaire state." At the opening of the conversation Molotov had said that Russia wanted to give this guarantee jointly with other countries, but toward the end of the conversation he spoke only of a Russian guarantee.

The Bulgarian Government had in the meanwhile replied to the Russians that Bulgaria did not feel herself in any danger and that she would therefore have to decline the guarantee. Certain precautionary measures however had been taken on the Black Sea: troops had been sent to that area; and preparations had been made for laying mines. But they still had no mines. The Führer remarked here that Bulgaria could have as many mines as she wanted. Draganov

³ See documents Nos. 373 and 379.

⁴ See document No. 328.

now mentioned the war material which Bulgaria urgently needed from Germany. Bulgaria's request for two coastal batteries had been declined as late as last summer.⁵ On this point the Führer replied that probably nothing else could have been done at the time, but that because of the large war booty, plenty of batteries were available now despite the enormous coastline from Kirkenes to the Atlantic which Germany had to defend today.⁶ Draganov continued by saying that Bulgaria urgently needed, for mine-laying purposes, two or three more patrol vessels such as Germany had on the Danube. He added that it would be preferable also for that reason if Bulgaria were not to join the Pact as yet. If these materials were to be supplied before Bulgaria joined the Pact, Russia and Turkey would view this as being in the normal course of affairs. But if they were delivered after accession to the Pact, it would excite the gravest suspicion in both Russia and Turkey.

A further reason for Bulgaria's hesitation to join the Pact at this time was the fact that the Balkan Pact⁷ was still operative and that undoubtedly the three countries Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, were still cooperating, which was evident from certain troop concentrations on the Bulgarian frontier. The Führer asked Draganov what Bulgaria might do if Yugoslavia were to join the Tripartite Pact. Draganov thought that Bulgaria would greatly welcome this, but, as he just said, the three countries were still cooperating with each other, and one was concerned about the danger of a Salonika front.

Bulgaria's chief worry was Turkey. Turkey was not to be trusted, and a critical situation had arisen because Bulgaria had not yet mobilized while the Turks were already on the border. Moreover, the Turks intended to impose a stage of siege in Thrace now. The Turkish Government had declared that it would not tolerate any pressure designed to swerve it from its policy, that is, from the English line. Even if there were any prospect of making Turkey change her present political course, that is, if Ambassador von Papen upon his return to Ankara⁸ were to report a swing toward neutrality, it would still be necessary to gain time until such a development had taken effect.

⁵ In telegram No. 364 of Aug. 27 (585/242705) Richthofen had reported from Sofia that the Bulgarian War Minister expressed complete understanding upon being informed of the impossibility of receiving, for the present, coastal batteries from Germany.

⁶ A memorandum of Nov. 21, from Wiehl to Ribbentrop (585/242771-72), noted that Keitel had recommended giving an affirmative answer to the urgent Bulgarian requests for war material, but that Hitler had reserved a decision pending further development of the political situation.

⁷ The Balkan Pact was signed on Feb. 9, 1934, by Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey and provided for mutual guarantee of frontiers against aggression by any Balkan state. For the text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1934*, vol. cxxxvii, p. 496.

⁸ See document No. 378, footnote 1.

If Bulgaria were to sign the Pact today, this would in any event disturb present relations with Russia and especially Turkey. The Russians themselves, to be sure, would not attack, but would push the Turks into action, as they did with the Rumanians in 1913. The Führer expressed the view that the Turks would not dare to attack. They were only too well aware that if they were but to put on a threatening expression, it would be the end of Constantinople. This virtually unprotected city would be wiped out in an instant, just as Coventry and Birmingham had been. Moreover, the Turks were poorly prepared militarily.

As additional reason for postponing accession to the Pact, Draganov stated the following: England was acting with circumspection at this time, because she did not care to disturb needlessly the relationship with Bulgaria. Thus, no English planes had passed over Bulgaria in the direction of Rumania. If they were to do this, however, before Bulgaria had joined the Pact, public opinion in Bulgaria would view this as an unwarranted encroachment and take a stand against it, while in the other case the Bulgarians would feel that this was the natural consequence of accession to the Tripartite Pact.

The Führer remarked that the question foremost in his mind was whether Bulgaria's argument concerning Russia was correct. To be sure, he was convinced that Russia was pushing toward the Straits and, since she did not care to attack Turkey directly, was planning to do so through Bulgaria. This had been apparent in his talk with Molotov. (The Führer added here that Draganov was not authorized to discuss this elsewhere, and he was telling him this only so that he might convey it to his Government.) It was his opinion that the Statute of Montreux⁹ ought to be changed in favor of the Russians. The Black Sea ought to be converted into an inland sea of the riparian countries and it would be the business of Turkey to bar foreign ships from entering it while, conversely, the vessels of the riparian states ought to be able to sail out of it at all times, since the Black Sea was fundamentally no more than a big harbor. Molotov wanted to have guarantees for this and surely intended to push ahead through Bulgaria in order to exert pressure on the Straits from that position. He planned to do this in a manner similar to what had been done in the Baltic States, and it was essential to divert Russia's interest to the east. Stalin was too shrewd a businessman not to change his course once he had recognized that no more was to be gotten here. He would rather do that than become embroiled with the strongest military power in the world.

⁹ The Montreux Convention on the regime for the Straits was signed July 20, 1936. For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213. For Germany's earlier attitude toward the Convention, see vol. v of this series, chapter VII.

He thought it was absolutely right for Bulgaria to be on her guard in every respect. Draganov remarked that Russia had a great store of sympathy in Bulgaria. If Russia were to interfere in Bulgarian affairs today, Bulgaria would go to war with Russia because she would consider such interference unjustifiable. But if Bulgaria were to join the Pact, people there would feel that Russia's interference was somehow justified. The Führer asked Draganov whether he really believed that Russia would embark on such a course of action. The Russian Army would in that case be finished within 3 months, for the Russian Army scarcely existed except in name. He was on the contrary convinced that Russia and Germany would develop an even closer relationship and conclude a pact, but he preferred to create accomplished facts, especially with respect to Russia, and it was his firm conviction that Russia would then try to do business elsewhere.

Draganov expressed the view that Russian propaganda, which at present was cautious and restrained, would also strike an entirely different note after Bulgaria's accession to the Pact. Casting aside all restraints, the Russians would exploit all arguments, make believe that they were the champions of peace and stir up the people against the Government.

Another argument advanced by Draganov was that Turkey would undoubtedly take action as soon as she learned that German troops were passing through Bulgaria. The Greeks, on hearing that the Germans were at the Danube, would undoubtedly seek to assure themselves of certain bases within Bulgaria; the forces necessary for this were already concentrated. But once fighting had broken out between Bulgaria and Greece, it was certain that Turkey would act; this had been unequivocally indicated by the Turkish Government on several occasions.

Bulgaria wanted first to make all preparations, because she had no desire to be compelled to beat a glorious retreat in English style before the Greeks or the Turks. For that reason Bulgaria needed time. The Führer remarked that Bulgaria would be given that time, because he was not the man to do things by halves, as did the Italians. When he embarked on an enterprise, he did so after thoroughgoing preparations and with maximum resources. Draganov mentioned some of the most important preparations and said that German General Staff officers had already arrived for that purpose. Above all it was necessary to improve the roads and strengthen many bridges. He regretted Germany's great reluctance in the past to deliver war material, although he could appreciate the German standpoint. For instance, Bulgaria had ordered, and already paid for, essential materials for airfields, but had not received them. Bulgaria had also ordered cable, furnishing even the rubber needed for it, but no

delivery had been made of this, either. The same had happened with an order for 10 pneumatic floats and the bridge to go with them. Antiaircraft artillery had also been ordered and not delivered, and shipments of ammunition had also failed to arrive. Bulgaria had to be well prepared before she took any further steps. The Minister of War especially had stated that these considerations were basic to his consenting to signing the Pact, and for these reasons had recommended that signing be postponed. The Führer promised Draganov that Bulgaria's wishes would now be met and that this would be done in the most generous manner. Draganov now went on to say that he was very anxious for Germany to understand that Bulgaria's hesitance did not signify that she had changed her policy. Bulgaria had always stood by Germany and worked long for the idea of German-Bulgarian collaboration. This desire did not date only from yesterday. In this war, again, Bulgaria had not remained neutral. Only a few days ago visas were issued to 300 Germans, who were commissioned to construct 15 air observation stations in Bulgaria.¹⁰ For a year now three or four German radio stations have been operating in Bulgaria. If Bulgaria had reservations now, this meant not that she was deviating from her principles, but only that she was circumspect because she did not want a breach in her common front with Germany, which she would then have. Bulgaria intended to sign, but only when the moment favorable for it had arrived.

He wished also to point out another difficulty—namely, that signing of the Pact would have to be submitted to the Parliament, which would ask what promises Bulgaria had received. At the present time the Parliament would only raise difficulties, but once Russian troops, or else German troops, were on the spot, evasions would be no longer possible. Be that as it may, the Parliament had to be reckoned with. With the aid of a map he had brought he then discussed some military questions with the Führer, pointing out to the Führer what Bulgaria was demanding from the Greeks. The Führer brought the conversation to an end by promising him that Bulgaria would receive it.

In taking leave, Draganov asked the Führer what message he wished to give to him for the King. The Führer said first that he wanted him to convey his greetings to the King and that he was pleased with Bulgaria's reply to Russia. Once Russia were on Bulgarian soil, she would pay no attention to all her promises and, as had happened in the Baltic States, would soon permeate the country with propaganda and terror, and finally drop all consideration for the King and the regime. A few months of terror would then shape Bulgaria according to Russia's wishes. Second, the Führer was very

¹⁰ See documents Nos. 295 and 345.

pleased that Bulgaria was taking precautions against surprises, although personally he did not think that there was any present danger. Russia just tried to get what she could get, and she was, after all, entitled to that. It so happened that it was one of her most cherished designs to push to the Straits through Bulgaria. He [the Führer] was therefore very pleased that Bulgaria was protecting her coast. It would be much easier now for Germany to help her in this, because a great deal of material was available from the large war booty. He would give immediate instructions that this matter be attended to in a generous manner and that Bulgaria be supplied with mines and patrol vessels for mine laying purposes.

The decision not to sign the Pact as yet was Bulgaria's concern. There were arguments pro and con. It was up to Bulgaria, who was best able to assess her own situation, to make the decision. The arguments advanced, also as regards England, were not without merit. However, he wished to repeat that it would have been best in his opinion if Bulgaria had joined the Tripartite Pact at the beginning.

HEWEL

No. 385

121/120178

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, November 23, 1940—1:10 p. m.

No. 1282 of November 23

Received November 23—1:30 p. m.

Immediately to Ambassador Abetz through Schwarzmänn, so that it may be submitted to the Foreign Minister.

In the course of a lengthy conversation with Laval, the latter stated that at the direction of Marshal Pétain, upon whom he had urged the need for speedy action, War Minister General Huntziger, Minister of the Navy Admiral Darlan, and Air Minister General Bergeret had drafted a plan of operations for an intended action against the rebellious territories in Africa and that this plan was now completed. He saw two possibilities for proceeding:

1. He could submit the plan at the conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister which had been envisaged and have it explained by Colonel Lacaille, General Huntziger's *Chef de Cabinet*, as well as air experts, whom he asked permission in this case to bring along.

2. General Huntziger or the *Chef de Cabinet*, as well as Admiral Darlan, could come at once to Paris at any time desired, in order to clarify the matter with a German military man designated by us.

Laval asks for the decision of the Reich Foreign Minister.

I should be grateful for telegraphic instructions so this office may keep the matter firmly in hand.¹

ACHENBACH
SCHLEIER

¹ See document No. 410.

No. 386

265/172498-99

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

ANKARA, November 23, 1940.

No. 954 of November 23

Received November 23—8:40 p. m.

I just had my first detailed discussion with the Foreign Minister. In reply to my question about the nervousness, which went beyond any past precedent, and the proclamation of a state of emergency in certain areas, including blackout measures, the Foreign Minister told me that this was a result of the uncertain situation in which Turkey now found herself. The surprising trip of the King of Bulgaria, in particular, had caused the greatest apprehension here. It was assumed that Germany would have to recoup Italy's loss of prestige in the Mediterranean and one was therefore prepared for everything.

My reassuring statements to the Minister brought visible relief. He assured me that Turkey was now as ever determined to defend only her own interests. In accordance with instructions¹ I informed him that the conversations of the last few weeks had dealt with the consolidation of Europe, especially in agreement with Soviet Russia. The Axis was prepared to respect the possessions and sovereignty of Turkey and, in some circumstances, to give guarantees to that effect if Turkey could make up her mind to cooperate in the new order in Europe. When questioned what the effect of the Italian-Greek war would be on us, I replied that this was primarily Italy's affair and that we were sure Italy would solve the task in the Mediterranean with her own means of power. I wished to make it absolutely clear to him, however, that if England should by chance intend to open an English front in the Balkans, that would create an intolerable situation for the Reich.

Since the Minister did not question me any further, I have not said anything so far about the role which Bulgaria would play in such a case and have merely stated that in any event we will end the war

¹ This apparently refers to oral instructions given to Papen in Berlin. No written instructions have been found. Cf. Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, p. 468.

soon. I pointed out to him most earnestly that Turkey should not fail to seize the great opportunity offered to her by the Axis at a moment of historic decision for Europe. The Foreign Minister received my statements with special thanks, and will shortly get an appointment with the State President for me. Details of the conversations will follow by courier.²

After studying the general situation here I recommend that accession be postponed in accordance with the view of the King of Bulgaria.³

PAPEN

² Report No. 5531 of Nov. 23 (265/172503-507). See document No. 396, footnote 1.

³ See document No. 378.

No. 387

F16/0047-51;
F5/0203-07

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, November 25, 1940.

RM 46

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND GENERAL ANTONESCU, IN THE PRESENCE OF MINISTER CLODIUS, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction at Rumania's accession to the Tripartite Pact.¹ For the rest, he believed that most of the questions had been discussed in the previous conversations, especially in the discussion with the Führer,² so that it was now merely a matter of going over the state of affairs once more by way of recapitulation.

Economically, Germany was fully in accord with the idea of drawing up a 10-year program.³ Eliminating speculation, she would act as buyer of agricultural products at fixed prices for long periods. Minister Clodius had reported that agreement had been reached also on the agricultural loans and the question of the rate of exchange. He had likewise reported that upon settling the transportation question, 3,000,000 tons of petroleum could be delivered annually. Clodius would continue to deal with all these economic problems and keep the Foreign Minister regularly informed.

As for military matters, Field Marshal Keitel would in a subsequent conversation state his views on all questions in this field.⁴ The

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 208.

² See document No. 381.

³ See document No. 380, footnote 7.

⁴ See document No. 388.

Foreign Minister himself had already discussed with the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel the problems connected with rebuilding the Rumanian Army so as to utilize German war experiences. Germany wanted Rumania to create for herself as strong an Army as possible, since no one knew the demands that the future might bring in this respect. He (the Foreign Minister) had also spoken with the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel about supplying the Rumanian Army with material. Since Germany herself was organizing new units there were certain limits to this, but Germany would do whatever was possible to aid Rumania.

Politically, all points had been discussed. Germany had re-emphasized her strong interest in the Danube, which was a river of vital importance to Germany.

In the minority question it had been possible to put a stop to further expulsions from Hungary, beginning November 24, on the basis of an assurance from the Hungarian Minister, so that in any event no new incidents would occur.

Furthermore, in the next few days recommendations would be submitted to both the Rumanian and the Hungarian Governments providing for the establishment of a commission to study the problems. Moreover, the more peaceful elements among the Rumanians expelled from Transylvania were to be readmitted to the land of their birth, while in other cases compensation would have to be paid. It would still be desirable for direct negotiations to be conducted for the purpose of concluding a minority agreement between Rumania and Hungary. He (the Foreign Minister) had, moreover, received the Hungarian Minister's⁵ and would have a message on these questions transmitted to Count Csáky.⁶

As for grand policy, all questions had likewise been discussed. Rumania was now allied with Germany. The existence of a Rumanian movement having the same structure as the corresponding movement in Germany was a guarantee that this alliance was not merely an alliance on paper. Everything would develop under the most friendly conditions and he could only repeat what the Führer had said in yesterday's conversation—namely, that history would not come to a standstill with the year 1940.

⁵No record found.

⁶This might refer to instructions which were sent to the Legations in Budapest and Bucharest on Nov. 26 on the basis of the findings of the German-Italian investigation commission (see document No. 380, footnote 6). The German Ministers in these two capitals were instructed to present, together with their Italian colleagues, the following recommendations of the Axis Governments: all acts of violence and expulsions to cease; press and radio campaigns to cease; the interrupted Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations about border questions, etc., to be resumed; start of negotiations on a Hungarian-Rumanian minorities agreement; prior to the entering into effect of such a minorities agreement, establishment of a German-Italian commission to prevent further expulsions and acts of violence. (271/177214-16)

General Antonescu thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for these statements and emphasized that in grand policy there was complete agreement between the two countries. Rumania would always be found on Germany's side and was keenly aware of the common interests of the two countries in the East.

With its rich soil and numerous natural resources the country would seek to further its economic development in cooperation with Germany.

For the rest, he was grateful for the efforts of Germany to put an end to the present Hungarian ways of dealing with Rumania by halting the expulsions and establishing a commission. As for the 43,000 Rumanians expelled from Hungary, of whom only the more peaceful elements would be readmitted, he was compelled to state, however, that this involved exclusively peaceful elements, which in reliance on the obligations which Hungary had undertaken under the Vienna Award had remained where they were. They were an intellectual elite which absolutely had to return to the Rumanian minority since otherwise this minority would be without any leadership. Rumania was striving, moreover, to obtain a statute of minorities such as that from which the Germans in Hungary now benefited.

With regard to the Danube problems Antonescu emphasized again his determination not to join any commission having jurisdiction over the maritime Danube with the Russians alone. In no circumstances would he sign such a convention.

Economically, it would be a question of developing the immense wealth of resources of Rumania. Here there was above all a lack of organization. To be sure, Rumania had carried out an agrarian reform, but the peasants lacked skills, machines, and credits.

Credits were necessary not only for agricultural machinery but also for the development of the network of roads, which was of great strategic importance, as well as for the development of a food industry, in contrast to the nonnative industries such as heavy industry, which would gradually be dismantled, since in the future there would be an adjustment based on German deliveries. The Foreign Minister promised the support of Germany on these points.

Antonescu then spoke again about the draining of the swamps of the Danube, which would make available 200,000 hectares of the richest soil, as well as the river control plans, by means of which the seasonal floods would be checked. In this connection he mentioned the possibilities of cultivating cotton and rice. He spoke of irrigation plans and sluice constructions as well as of the building of a pipeline from the petroleum fields to the Danube and a second pipeline extending into the Banat to the Iron Gate, since the Danube froze much oftener and longer in its lower course than above the Iron Gate, so that by means of this pipeline the transportation of petroleum would be assured even under bad weather conditions.

With regard to the timber question he remarked that large forest areas and sawmills in Transylvania had been transferred to Hungary as a result of the territorial cessions, so that Rumania could now export only her timber reserves and thereafter nothing more. There was a plan, however, to assure Bucharest of the necessary supply of fuel by means of deposits of methane gas found 60 km. from the capital. The project itself had already been in existence for some time, but had been assigned to two private companies that were quarreling with each other. He had already intervened and intended now to carry out the plan directly. He would obtain the pipes needed for the gasline by a barter transaction in return for timber.

The most important questions, however, were the rate of interest for the credits and the question of the rate of exchange of the mark. Basically, he agreed to the higher rate of exchange for the mark, but needed a certain time for technical preparation, so that he would have no difficulties with the Rumanian price level, which he wanted to keep low like the wage level. The 5 percent rate of interest for the credits was too high, however. If it were reduced, the loss would be compensated for by a greater volume of business. Psychologically, too, a reduction to $4\frac{1}{2}$ percent, as a quid pro quo, so to speak, for the increase in the rate of the mark, would be very welcome to the Rumanian Government from the viewpoint of its standing with the country.

Minister Clodius remarked on the credit question that an amount of 60 millions had been provided for machinery, pipelines, and railroads, as well as an additional amount of 40 millions for road construction, irrigation, and the food industry, that is, a total of 100 million marks of constantly renewed credits.

In conclusion Antonescu also brought up the economic significance of the Jewish question. The elimination of the Jews from the economy had produced a certain vacuum there. Neither capital nor trained manpower was available. In this way the Germans were given an opportunity to enter the Rumanian economy as well as to take over certain tasks in heavy industry. It would be better, however, if all these negotiations were conducted between the governments and were not left to the often rather undisciplined initiative of individuals. If for no other reason, this was also desirable because the competition of the Italians, which was naturally making itself felt, could thereby also be directed into regular channels.

Minister Clodius also pointed out with regard to the credit question that a 5 percent rate of interest was in itself a considerable concession in view of the fact that other countries such as Bulgaria had to pay higher rates. Except in the case of agricultural machinery, where it was possible to count on $4\frac{1}{2}$ percent, it was extremely difficult

to make any further reduction, since the reactions in other countries would be very strong.

Antonescu nevertheless asked for a reduction of interest and the Foreign Minister promised to study the question with sympathy.⁷

SCHMIDT

⁷ See document No. 402 and footnote 1.

No. 388

66/46171-79

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, November 24, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FIELD MARSHAL KEITEL AND GENERAL ANTONESCU ON NOVEMBER 23, 1940, IN BERLIN

General Antonescu first conveyed the greetings of the Rumanian Army and the Rumanian people to the great heroes of the war which Germany had been so victoriously waging. Since he (Antonescu) had assumed power in Rumania, he had, above all, been trying to reorganize the Rumanian Army, for the morale of which the developments of the past months had been exceedingly harmful. It had been compelled to give up without a struggle territories that rightfully belonged to Rumania, because the King and the statesmen at the helm had so mismanaged the country domestically that it was in a position where resistance was no longer possible. Like the whole country, the Army, too, had lapsed into a state of disorder. Much money, it is true, had been spent on armaments, and it had been stated that the Rumanian Army was equal to every possible emergency. When the moment came, however, when this Army was to have defended the honor of the country, the order was given to retreat without battle and to surrender Rumanian national territory. This was the reason why the retreat had taken place under such catastrophic conditions. This had occasioned very serious doubts abroad and probably in Germany, too, as to the quality of the Rumanian Army. As a soldier, however, he could assure the Field Marshal that the real value of the Rumanian Army was quite different and that it would be entirely capable of occupying an honorable place on the battlefield.

His first task since the assumption of power had therefore been to raise the morale of the country again and to reorganize the Army on a modern basis. He was now in the process of carrying out this task and will have concluded it by next spring. Then 39 well-organized, well-trained, and well-led divisions would be available. The peace-

time strength of the Rumanian Army was 29 divisions, 10 of which had 2 cadres and could, in case of mobilization, be doubled immediately.

Almost all the material necessary for the reorganization of the Rumanian Army was available. Only motorized reconnaissance units and motorized supply services were lacking. Should a political situation develop in the spring, in which a mobilization of the Rumanian Army became necessary, it would only be ready for action if the supply services of the divisions could be motorized, since feed for the necessary draft animals was not available as a result of the poor oats and barley crop and particularly because Rumania, despite her own difficulties, had fulfilled its commitments for deliveries to Germany which previous governments had assumed. In the spring he would need 38,000 carloads of oats for the supply services. In part, he would supply his requirements in Turkey. But if Germany wanted to count on the Rumanian Army, motorization had to be carried out.

Field Marshal Keitel replied that Antonescu's aim of setting up a mobile army of 39 divisions had been a surprise to him. Germany had considerable experience in this field, since it had developed its present Army from 7 divisions, which only a few years ago represented the whole Army. The danger existed that a continued development of this kind would be carried out at too great breadth and insufficient depth with regard to armaments and supplies. General Hansen would surely be glad to place his own experience at the disposal of the Rumanian Army. In Germany model divisions had first been set up, which were doubled and trebled until there were 21 divisions in all. The next phase had ended with 36 divisions. Consideration had to be given each time to the necessary organization in depth with regard to supplies and the weapons and instruments of military importance. In the case of the Rumanian Army, this question was even more significant since there was relatively little time until spring for the reorganization to be effected. He (Field Marshal Keitel) did not wish, however, to elicit a reply from General Antonescu. The reorganization of the Rumanian Army was a matter for his own decision, and the Germans only wanted to make the results of their own experience available to the Rumanians. It would be well, in any case, if General Antonescu talked this point over with General Hansen once again, for the latter had been the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Army and had acquired extensive experience through his work on the General Staff, in the course of which he had had to request [*forderm*] the organization of a large Army for any operations that might become necessary. At the same time Field Marshal Keitel had been the organizer of this Army and as such had always seen to it that organization should not proceed too much in breadth but that

depth was considered above all, because otherwise the need might later arise of consolidating units, making one battery out of three, a regiment out of a division, etc.

On the question of the motorization of the supply services, Field Marshal Keitel remarked that during the Polish campaign, the German Army had in part reconverted the motorized supply services into a horse-drawn service, for in view of the condition of the roads and bridges, the latter had proved more practical. With horses, light pontoon bridges and other emergency construction could still be used where 3- and 4-ton trucks would not get through. In Poland even the normal troop transports had often been too heavy and therefore the lighter horse-drawn vehicles customary there had been requisitioned and employed.

Antonescu interjected here that this had, of course, been possible only because Germany had had air superiority in Poland. Otherwise the long columns of the supply services would have become an easy target for enemy air attacks.

Field Marshal Keitel continued with the remark, that despite the large, well constructed network of roads in Belgium and France, it had developed there, too, that it was better at least to employ in the supply services of the normal division teams of horses; in this connection a certain motorized reserve was provided for only for armies and army groups, so that in certain cases the necessary materials could be rapidly transported to the desired spots.

Antonescu replied that in accordance with the Field Marshal's statements, he had already reduced the number of the divisions of the Rumanian Army from 45 to 29 (peacetime strength). This reduction by 16 divisions had enabled him to strengthen the cadres of officers and noncommissioned officers in the remaining units, and, at least as far as the infantry and artillery were concerned, not only to equip them generously but even have material left over. He had also submitted the plan of organization of the new Army to General Hansen, and the latter had approved it. He was particularly anxious to motorize the supply services—only in part, by the way—because the Rumanian horses could pull only about one-fourth as much as German horses, so that with an entirely horse-drawn service, the columns would be extremely long, which, in view of the Russian Air Force, could be a considerable disadvantage. Also, because of danger from the air and the possibility that individual Russian units could penetrate deeply into the communications zone, he had constructed his rear camps rather far from the front lines, so that, for this reason too, a rapid, motorized service was desirable.

Field Marshal Keitel emphasized once more his arguments against too much motorization, and pointed out in this connection that the matter of tires was an obstacle to possible assistance from Germany.

in the efforts for motorization. Not until 1941 would Germany be so far along with her own rubber production that this difficulty, too, could to some extent be resolved. If Rumania could obtain tires or rubber through some sort of barter, the supplying of trucks by Germany would be facilitated. Germany herself had lost more trucks than she had expected, while, on the other hand, the vehicles obtained as booty could not be used to the extent anticipated, since the procurement of spare parts of foreign make was naturally very difficult. He would, however, consider the question of possible German assistance and asked only that the Rumanian Military Attaché provide detailed data on Rumanian wishes.

Further on in the course of the conversation Antonescu reported on his defense measures against Russia in Moldavia. Since the Russians, with their motorized units, might possibly advance fairly rapidly on both roads running through Moldavia from north to south, he had organized centers of resistance in the forests of central Moldavia on both sides of the roads referred to; from there he intended to disrupt traffic on the roads and the railroads running alongside them. If the Russians advanced farther, the Rumanian Army would withdraw to the Carpathians. Since in this case, however, it would have the new Rumanian-Hungarian border at its back, it would be necessary to appeal to Germany to secure communications to the rear through Hungarian territory, since otherwise the position of the Rumanian Army would become untenable.

Field Marshal Keitel replied at once that Germany would do everything that was necessary, and that the Rumanian Army would have behind it not the Rumanian-Hungarian border but the German Army.

In this connection Antonescu also mentioned that he would extend also in depth the existing line of defenses running from east to west between Moldavia and Walachia. He spoke rather disparagingly of the Russian Army, which, he said, consisted merely of a cordon extending along the Russian frontier from the Baltic to the Black Sea, with nothing behind it but a dissatisfied people awaiting their liberation. Moreover, the communications zone of this Army was completely unorganized, as far as transportation was concerned, particularly on the Bessarabian front, so that any large movement of troops from one place on the front to another would be impossible. In any case, he wanted to try to hold Moldavia in all circumstances in the manner indicated, since he needed it as a base for an offensive against the Russians. For he was convinced that with two motorized divisions he could, if necessary, break through the Russian front and advance in the direction of Kiev.

Field Marshal Keitel replied that he did not believe Russia would attack. The Russians would, in view of the new situation, take care

not to plunge into adventures. Better than any purely offensive measures, however, would be the dispatch of another German division to be added to the training units stationed in Rumania, which could be stationed in an area to be specified by Antonescu.

Antonescu replied that he would very gladly accede to this plan, only he feared difficulties with respect to food, since it was hard for him as it was, in view of the bad harvest, to supply the Rumanian population adequately. Moreover, difficulties of a purely psychological kind would also arise if the people had the opportunity to compare their own meager sustenance with the rations of the German soldier.

Field Marshal Keitel replied that, of course, no burdens with respect to food or finances would accrue to the Rumanian Government as a result of the dispatching of this other division. Germany would absolutely see to that.¹

Antonescu thereupon agreed to the plan for dispatching another division.

In this connection Field Marshal Keitel mentioned that the Führer had given him the order to study what German forces should be launched from Bulgaria and Rumania in the event that the English should finally gain a foothold in Greece. Germany was determined in all circumstances and by military means to prevent the English from gaining a foothold in Greece. This was not a matter only of the defense of Germany's own interests but of those of Rumania as well. As long as the English were not in Greece, Russia and Turkey would remain quiet. In case of an English advance from the south, however, the danger of Russian and Turkish action in the Balkans would immediately be very great. Thus the more rapidly and radically Germany proceeded against the English in Greece, the sooner would the dangers arising therefrom be eliminated. With regard to the troops to be stationed in Rumania for this contingency, Germany would, of course, impose no impossible burdens on Rumania. The Rumanian Government would only have to permit the troops to be quartered. Germany wanted, in any case, to make sure even at this time of Rumania's attitude.

¹In a memorandum of Nov. 25 Ritter recorded receiving information from Keitel about the decision to send an additional division to Rumania. "At this opportunity," Ritter states, "I informed Field Marshal Keitel about the very accommodating arrangement for payment for the troops now in Rumania. If a further division should be sent at this time, in my opinion no payment at all should be demanded. We would only have to ask for lei to the amount which would have to be spent within the country itself. For this, however, another form could be found than actual payment by Rumania. Field Marshal Keitel was very much in agreement and asked me to carry on the negotiations in this direction with the OKW, with the other German authorities concerned, and with the Rumanian Government." (182/85666-67)

A memorandum by Clodius of Dec. 12 lists the expenditures for the German troops in Rumania on the current scale as well as in case of a doubling of troop strength on the basis of figures supplied by the OKW (272/177372).

Antonescu took a favorable position on this also. He only called attention to the fact that no more permanent barracks were available and that emergency barracks could not be constructed so rapidly, either; however, at the Field Marshal's request he expressed his willingness to furnish the necessary lumber in case barracks might be erected by the Germans on Rumanian soil.

At the last point Antonescu mentioned the shortage of materials in the Rumanian armament factories, particularly some airplane plants which were by and large supplied with raw materials but which lacked small quantities of some key materials. In order to assure the further production of war material he was therefore turning to Germany.

Field Marshal Keitel promised to examine this point with the appropriate authorities as soon as the Rumanian Military Attaché had furnished the data, whereupon the conversation, which had taken place in a very friendly atmosphere throughout, was closed.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 389

66/46168-70

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, November 25, 1940.

No. 41.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND GENERAL ANTONESCU, IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 23, 1940

During the farewell audience which he had expressly requested of the Führer, General Antonescu said that he wished before his departure to thank the Führer for the honor he had shown him by the invitation to Berlin as well as for the kindness with which he had been met everywhere during his stay.

He had discussed political questions with the Reich Foreign Minister¹ and had come to an agreement with him on all points. He was especially grateful for the German efforts to settle the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute. He was repeating, however, that Rumania would have to have her say on this point when peace was restored. The Rumanian nation was prepared to fight for its rights. As the leader of this nation and as a soldier he had to emphasize this point.

He had also reached an agreement with the German officials on the economic problems. Antonescu again brought up Rumania's need for credits. He had also reached an understanding with the Ger-

¹ See documents Nos. 330 and 337.

man authorities about this, except for the question of the rate of interest. At this point he again advocated $4\frac{1}{2}$ percent and repeated the arguments he had used in his conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister to the effect that the greater volume of business at this lower interest rate would more than compensate for the possible loss of one-half percent.²

He had discussed the military questions with Field Marshal Keitel and there, too, agreement had been reached on all points.³ He would energetically continue organizing the Rumanian Army, and it would be ready for action next spring. Rumania was not asking for the restoration of her boundaries without having fought for it.

The Führer replied that he had been highly pleased to meet, for the first time, a man who pleaded his country's cause with great ardor. He could assure him that he (the Führer), being a fanatical National Socialist, understood very well the feelings, tasks, and aims of which General Antonescu had spoken. World history had always shown understanding whenever a nation pursued its goal in idealistic faith and fanatical devotion. The great historical revisions had mainly originated in a change in the spirit of the nations concerned. To Rumania, which was now an ally, he could give the assurance that Germany would stand up for her in every respect, in the political as well as the economic field. From now on the existence of the Rumanian state would be backed by the entire German Wehrmacht.⁴

SCHMIDT

² See document No. 402 and footnote 1.

³ See document No. 388.

⁴ According to a memorandum of Nov. 26 by Minister Altenburg, who accompanied Antonescu on his return trip as far as the border, the Rumanian leader told him that he was determined to go with the Axis "to the end," but that Rumania expected to find, at some later date, appreciation for her present sacrifices. "Of course, a revision of the Vienna Award could not be considered at the moment. In every respect, however, Transylvania represented a unit. In the long run, Rumania was unable to accept the boundary line decided at Vienna. He, the General, had indeed explained this at length to the Führer." (182/85668-69)

No. 390

4359/E080126

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 23, 1940.

CONCERNING ARMS DELIVERIES TO PORTUGAL

Our imports of strategic raw materials (tungsten, tin, sardines in oil, oils) from Portugal are encountering obstacles in that we are unable to pay for them adequately by normal exports. In order to remove the difficulties it will be necessary to deliver arms, which

Portugal has been seeking for a long time. German raw material purchases in Portugal should serve not only to meet our own requirements, but also to disrupt the increasing English purchases of the same raw materials.

Field Marshal Keitel has in these circumstances put aside his former objections and given his consent to negotiations for armament deliveries, subject to approval in each individual case.

Italy, as has been learned from a reliable source, has recently delivered to Portugal 750 heavy machine guns, 20 mm. rapid fire guns, and 40 mm. antitank guns.

Herewith submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister, with the request for authorization of negotiations for the delivery of arms to Portugal subject to later approval of contracts in each individual case.¹

WIEHL

¹ Marginal note: "The Foreign Minister agrees to negotiations for the delivery of arms to Portugal subject to later approval of contracts in each individual case. Negotiations about the details are underway at this time. [Unidentified initial], Jan. 8."

Another copy of this memorandum (4364/E081402) bears the notation: "The Führer will discuss the matter with Field Marshal Keitel. The War Economy and Armaments Office will investigate what can be delivered. [Unidentified initial], Dec. 7."

No. 391

585/242778

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOFIA, November 24, 1940—4:10 p. m.

SECRET

Received November 24—7:55 p. m.

No. 575 of November 24

With reference to my telegram No. 569 of November 21.¹

The Minister President informed me that the instructions to the Minister in Moscow are to go out today. The reply would be briefly as follows:

Bulgaria does not feel threatened and there is therefore no need for giving a guarantee. As to the Tripartite Pact, Bulgaria is considering accession to it.

Apart from this the Minister President informed me that as a result of the interest manifested by the Russians and the state of siege²

¹ Document No. 373.

² This probably refers to Turkey's imposing a state of siege in the province of Thrace, mentioned by Draganov in his conversation with Hitler. See document No. 384.

imposed by Turkey, Bulgaria has stepped up her military measures of precaution against any landings the Russians might attempt from the Black Sea. He would not let himself be talked out of the notion that a Russian threat was possible.

RICHTHOFEN

No. 392

230/152366

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, November 24, 1940—11:50 p. m.

No. 845 of November 24

Received November 25—2:00 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 876 of November 24 (RAM 336).¹

Cincar-Marković with whom I carried out the instructions as soon as they were received, reserved his reply to the invitation until he had spoken with the Prince Regent and the Minister President; this he is to do as soon as possible. However, he was able to say right away that he personally would greatly welcome it, if the plan for a meeting with the Reich Foreign Minister for the purpose of an exchange of views should materialize. To be sure, it seemed doubtful to him whether this would be possible as early as Wednesday November 27 in view of the shortness of time.²

For the rest, the Foreign Minister emphasized that Gregorić³ had not been entrusted by him with any mission.

HEEREN

¹ RAM 336: Not found.

² In telegram No. 851 of Nov. 25, Heeren reported that Cincar-Marković would leave Belgrade by train on Nov. 26 at 11:00 p. m.; for reasons of secrecy, however, he intended to cross the border by automobile and he therefore requested that the German border officials be instructed to let his automobile pass without inspection (230/152370-71).

³ Gregorić states in his book that Ribbentrop told him during a conversation of Nov. 24 (cf. document No. 324 and footnote 7) that he would send a telegram to Minister Heeren the same evening, telling Heeren that on the basis of conversations with Gregorić he had come to believe that Belgrade desired to talk about German-Yugoslav relations, and instructing Heeren to convey to Cincar-Marković an invitation to see the Foreign Minister. See Danilo Gregorić *So endete Jugoslawien*, pp. 113-114.

No. 393

F5/0245-53;
F6/0456-60*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*

RM 44

BERLIN, November 26, 1940.

RECORD OF THE VISIT BY THE SLOVAK MINISTER PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER, PROFESSOR DR. TUKA, TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON NOVEMBER 24, 1940

Opening the conversation the Foreign Minister expressed his pleasure at being able to welcome President Tuka to the capital of the Reich. "I believe," stated the Foreign Minister, "that the act of accession to the Tripartite Pact executed by you on behalf of your country today,¹ will not only have a favorable effect on the general policy directed against extension of the war, but also will increasingly strengthen the friendship between our two countries. I believe that matters in general have gone well so far. Wherever there are still minor difficulties, we are gladly willing to do our share in eliminating them, just as we are gladly willing to assist you in your reconstruction. If it is advice you need, our people will be at your disposal as heretofore, until you will have organized the machinery of your state."

Minister President Tuka expressed his thanks for the friendly words. But before passing on to discussing several matters which were on his mind, he would like to ask permission to look around a little in the rooms where world policy was being made. He then said that he had just talked to Mach,² from whom he heard that there was tremendous enthusiasm in Bratislava and the whole of Slovakia over accession to the Pact. The people intuitively felt the great significance of the step just taken, and he wished to express thanks once more on behalf of this nation that this had been made possible for him. Otherwise he wished to discuss only a few "key words," which he had jotted down for himself. On the subject of "advisers,"³ all he had to say was that they had made an excellent record for themselves and aroused the greatest satisfaction in the country. It had been feared in certain circles that after acquiring her independence, Slovakia might turn into a protectorate. However, the gentlemen were so nice in all their ways, never giving any orders, that their conduct had at once dispelled these fears. Particularly Minister Killinger's whole manner was very adroit.

The Foreign Minister remarked that this would please the Führer. He had even before Salzburg⁴ proposed to the Führer that Killinger

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 208.

² Sano Mach, Slovak Minister of Interior.

³ See vol. x of this series, document No. 263.

⁴ See *ibid.*, document No. 248, footnote 7, and document No. 263.

be sent to Bratislava, so that the country would have someone to lean upon.

Minister President Tuka stated that he would say at home that he had asked for these advisers. His country needed an even greater number, especially for the Army, where the officers were still partly pro-Czech in the sense of the Beneš⁵ system. General Otto had tried to get things done by kindness but he [Tuka] himself was afraid that these were conflicts which could be settled only by surgical methods or else from above. He was therefore asking that a number of German officers be sent, if this were possible.

The Foreign Minister thought that there was a possibility of detaching a few officers, but reserved it to himself to discuss this with the military experts (cf. enclosure, point 1⁶).

Minister President Tuka now touched briefly upon the relationship of Slovakia to Hungary, which was cool but correct, and the problem of minorities. Eastern Slovakia contained three Slavic groups: Ruthenians, Russians, and Ukrainians. Which of these should be favored? That depended on the regime in power. Under the Czechs a pro-Ukrainian policy was instituted. These groups were reported to communicate with each other in Hungarian.

To the Foreign Minister's question about the size of these groups, the Minister President replied that eastern Slovakia had a total population of 120,000, of whom the Slovaks constituted one-half. The others were the Slavic minorities referred to who lived in the easternmost part, in the sub-Carpathian Ukraine. The Hungarians had favored the Ruthenians, claiming that they belonged with them.

The Foreign Minister noted that it was the policy of the Reich Government always to have the very best national elements at the frontiers.

Minister President Tuka promised a memorandum on these nationality questions (cf. enclosure, point 2), and then continued: Several Croats had recently come to Bratislava and were seeking to establish contacts with the Slovaks. The experience with the Czechs appealed to them, for their position in Yugoslavia was comparable to that of the Slovaks when Czechoslovakia existed. He asked the Reich Foreign Minister, whether or not his Government ought to take a cool attitude toward these Croats.

The Reich Foreign Minister thought that it would be best not to respond to the approaches of the Croats so as to avoid raising difficult problems at the present time.

Minister President Tuka: "Thank you, one word is sufficient." But how was he to handle the Russians? Their Legation was proceed-

⁵ Edvard Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia, December 1935–October 1938.

⁶ The enclosure to which frequent references are made in this document has not been found.

ing very cleverly now. Originally he had every person coming out of the Legation arrested and taken to police headquarters, where they were subjected to close interrogation. But this provoked difficulties with Moscow. Now things took place in the following fashion: Two officials would leave the Legation in a hired car at night, drive out into the country to some village or another, where they changed to another car, sending the first car back to Bratislava as signal that nothing had happened. In the meantime they distributed Communist leaflets from the second car. Despite the fact that his Government had enacted a law punishing Communist activities with 15 years in prison, there were many who had been caught. What action should be taken?

The Reich Foreign Minister: "Put a stop to it by drastic measures. How is the police?"

Minister President Tuka stated that the process of organizing it on National Socialist lines was continuing. Were they then to proceed ruthlessly against communism?

The Foreign Minister: "Ruthlessly!"

Minister President Tuka then explained that there were still 24,000 Czech officials working for the Slovak state, and that they were still needed. But where there were Czechs, there were also pro-English cells. If it was agreeable to the Foreign Minister, he would present a memorandum also on that subject (cf. enclosure, point 3). These officials would have to be gradually removed and replaced by new elements. He believed, however, the Protectorate did not care to have them back, either. In any case, they were confirmed pro-Beneš people and still had their underground connections with London. The Czech state had in the past maintained a large force of Czech officials in Slovakia, who had for the most part returned to Czech territory, where they were now living in retirement. They all demanded pensions now, for which the Czech Government was presenting large bills. However, such a demand was absurd considering how the Czechs had sucked dry the country in the past. He was going to draw up a statement setting forth what the Czechs had done for Slovakia economically (cf. enclosure, point 4). He now wished to present a few matters of a sentimental nature. There was a little village named Theben⁷ (Slovak Devin), which is three-quarters German and at present under German occupation. Once upon a time, a thousand years ago, however, it was the seat of the Slovak sovereigns. When it came under occupation Marshal Göring assured the Slovaks that the locality was to be turned over to them when they became free.⁸

⁷ See vol. iv of this series, document No. 46 and footnote 4.

⁸ See *ibid.*, document No. 112.

The Foreign Minister promised that this matter would be looked into (cf. enclosure, point 5).

Continuing, Professor Tuka said that he had yet another sentimental request. Whereas western Moravia was inhabited by Czechs, some 400,000 to 500,000 Slovaks were living in eastern Moravia, and a movement there was agitating for union with Slovakia. Although these Slovaks had been separated from Slovakia for a thousand years, they were still speaking a Slovak dialect today. The intellectual class, to be sure, went to Czech schools, but the people had remained Slovak in its core. Now the Germans were telling them that they belonged with Germany. He was asking that he be permitted to present a memorandum on this question, too (cf. enclosure, point 6).

Minister President Tuka then stated that, like Mach, he had recently received an invitation to Rome. "Should I go, Herr Reich Minister?"

The Foreign Minister: "Why not?"

Minister President Tuka: "I am finished now."

The Foreign Minister then inquired exactly what Sidor was doing now. He was still Minister to the Vatican, wasn't he? Didn't they want to recall him from there? *

Minister President Tuka replied that Sidor himself would certainly not object to this, because he wished to finish the second half of his book on Hlinka¹⁰ and had requested half a year's leave of absence for that purpose. Consul General Wüster,¹¹ however, wanted him to remain at the Vatican and establish closer contacts with the Germans there.

To the Foreign Minister's question whether it was not true that Sidor was anti-German, Tuka replied that Sidor was related to Hlinka and then, when the moment for action arrived, had proved a failure as a leader. But it would not be without danger to recall him now because those people who were still living in their old world of dreams would not allow him to settle down.

The Reich Foreign Minister remarked in this connection that Sidor should henceforth leave politics alone.

Minister President Tuka suggested it might perhaps be possible to place him under amicable internment. Tiso and Sidor have been rivals for years, and Tiso would therefore not be offended by it.

Sidor's reporting, the Reich Foreign Minister continued, was unfavorable. Besides, his personal attitude was equivocal. Minister President Tuka remarked that he rather thought that he [Sidor] was simple and could not but cause difficulties if given the opportunity of becoming active before the public.

* See vol. x of this series, document No. 263 and footnote 2.

¹⁰ Monsignor Andrej Hlinka, leader of the Slovak People's party in the Czechoslovak Republic; died August 1938.

¹¹ Cultural Attaché at the German Embassy in Rome.

The Reich Foreign Minister closed these observations with the remark that Sidor would have to be watched for a while longer.

Minister President Tuka stated that as he was now returning home he could make the promise that there would be no more upsets. The President was a shrewd man and in line with our policy.

The Reich Foreign Minister remarked on this point that Tiso certainly had some inhibitions, but that on the whole he was very likable.

Minister President Tuka confirmed this by saying that Tiso was after all a Catholic priest and was only able to reach decisions slowly. But it was important to show him that he was taken seriously. Incidentally, the Catholic Action was making an appearance again. What really ought to be done about it?

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that it must be suppressed radically to prevent it from infiltrating. Political catholicism must not be tolerated, because it had a devastating effect. To be sure, there were nationalist-minded priests, like Tiso, but there were also international Catholics, and Sidor was their liaison man. Now that the Slovaks were organizing themselves, international catholicism was taking an active interest in them. But this was dangerous, particularly since Tiso was unaware of it. Slovakia had room for both, the Church as well as the Slovak national idea. A danger would come only if Rome and international catholicism in the entourage of the Pope were to be brought into the picture. Even though the renewal of the state was the work of the People's party, now that independence had been achieved, this party was a danger. Formerly, the priests had had a real function: to act as counterpoise against exploitation by the Czechs. The situation today was fundamentally changed. The priests therefore must no longer be allowed to occupy a leading position, or the ground would become perilous.

To the Foreign Minister's question as to the strength of catholicism, the Minister President replied that about one-sixth or one-seventh of the country was Protestant. Why then, continued the Foreign Minister, could the country not find its leaders among the people as Germany had done, leaders who would be politically independent of the Church, but who could very well be Catholics. It surely ought to be possible to find such leaders among the young generation. In any event, the Catholics tied to international catholicism through the Catholic Action must not be allowed to take over the leadership. In that case one would be dependent not on the Pope, to be sure, but on the [Cardinal] Secretary of State or some pro-English cardinal.

Tuka agreed that the Foreign Minister saw the situation as it really was. Under Czech rule, a large portion of the clergy were in opposition because the Czechs, who were freethinkers, although well educated ones, had been brutal in their conduct toward the Church.

The political activities of the clergy were of great value at that time. Today the necessity for this no longer existed. The members of the clergy, accordingly, should transfer their activities to the social sphere. But that they were still unwilling to do because now they had become accustomed to their role as leaders. The younger clergy, however, were already ardent National Socialists.

Minister President Tuka, in conclusion, said that he was aware that the Foreign Minister had still many other matters to attend to and that he wished to thank him once more for the assistance he had accorded to Slovakia.

The Foreign Minister took leave from his guest by saying that probably still other powers would follow Slovakia in signing the Pact. That would further broaden the front against England and finally lead to England's downfall.

NOACK

No. 394

84/62131-34

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, November 24, 1940.

The nomination of a new Ambassador to the French Government just made by President Roosevelt deserves our attention.¹ It is the first important foreign policy move of the President since his re-election, and it shows that Roosevelt is resolved to continue to take an active part in the European game.

We know that from the beginning and especially since Munich the President has attached particular value to bringing strong influence to bear on French policy and therefore to a close cooperation with the French Government. In Paris there was Bullitt, Roosevelt's most active Ambassador; the American frontier lay at the Rhine; the Maginot Line was the "first line of defense" of the United States. This policy collapsed on June 16, 1940. In spite of the urgent telegraphic appeal which Roosevelt directed to Reynaud on June 16² and in which he made great promises to France if she would only continue the resistance to Germany, Reynaud was overthrown on the evening of June 16, Pétain took over the Government, and during the night of June 16 to 17 there came the request for an armistice. From this moment there began a complete about-face in American-French relations. Washington considered the French Government from this time on as a nonindependent, foreign Government under German

¹ The appointment of Adm. William D. Leahy as United States Ambassador to France was announced on Nov. 23.

² For the text of this message which was actually released to the press on June 15, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 639.

domination, immediately froze French assets in the United States, detained the French ships in American ports, assumed a threatening attitude toward the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and seemed on the point of breaking off diplomatic relations with France. During the weeks after June 17 there were open discussions in the American press about whether relations to Vichy should not be broken off and the men in the de Gaulle movement recognized as the French Government. A statement which Sumner Welles issued to journalists at the time was purposely kept vague and left all doors open. At the same time Mr. Bullitt left France and also the Counselor of Embassy returned to America, so that only a rump Embassy was left in Vichy under the direction of a secretary. Thus the relations had arrived practically at the freezing point during the month of July. However, the Vichy Government was not deterred by this. From the first day it tried to prevent the wires to Washington from being broken off, and finally after a lengthy back and forth it achieved Roosevelt's statement of willingness to issue the agrément for a new French Ambassador in the person of Henry-Haye. To be sure, upon his arrival in New York in August Henry-Haye was rudely assailed by a part of the American press as a Germanophile, and in Washington, too, he was received coolly at first; however, he went to work undismayed in spite of great difficulties—at first without visible success. His scope was limited, especially since émigrés such as Mme. Tabouis² were agitating against Vichy; in the way of funds he had only the small amounts available from the State Department which were released grudgingly from the frozen French assets; the attitude of the American Government toward the French possessions remained unclarified if not threatening; and the press held consistently to its hostile attitude. Not until October did a certain détente begin to become evident. The defeat of de Gaulle before Dakar made a deep impression in America; they saw that Vichy was stronger than they had thought. To be sure, in the second half of October when the reports were received of the discussions of Laval and Pétain with the leading German statesmen coolness developed again, because it was feared at first that the Vichy Government had now sold itself entirely to Germany and would engage in operations against England in military and colonial matters in the near future in concert with the Axis Powers. But these fears were evidently soon allayed. Henry-Haye immediately protested that all such rumors were untrue, and that the French Government continued as in the past independent and not tied to the Axis. At the same time—as we know—there came reports from occupied and unoccupied France that anti-German feeling was increasing, that incidents were occurring and that the Laval policy of

²Geneviève Tabouis, French Journalist, chief diplomatic correspondent of *L'Oeuvre*, 1932-1940.

rapprochement with Germany encountered little support in his own country. In addition after Roosevelt's re-election on November 5 there were conspicuously friendly French statements addressed to America, particularly articles in the press of unoccupied France praising Roosevelt. These factors probably contributed to a revival in Washington of the question whether it would not be well to enter into a closer relationship with Vichy, and to a positive answer to this question. Then they acted rather quickly in recent weeks; in the first place Counselor of Embassy Murphy was ordered back to his post, at the same time large amounts of the frozen French assets were released, the blockade of Martinique was softened and a food ship set out from New York to Saint Pierre, and finally a new Ambassador was appointed for Vichy. Thus in the last few weeks there has been a tangible détente between Washington and Vichy.

The aim which Roosevelt is pursuing with this new course is clear. As Counselor of Embassy Thomsen has reported correctly today,⁴ the President's intention is not to help France but to injure Germany. Bullitt's former policy is being resumed, though adapted to the changed circumstances. The President has recognized that English—and by the same token American—policy in eastern Europe has almost entirely played out, and that there are no longer many places there where a new policy of encirclement and resistance against Germany can be initiated. Therefore he is again concentrating on France. Ambassador Leahy's task will consist in intervening wherever possible and obstructing cooperation between Germany and France; in particular he will warn against any cooperation in military or colonial matters. At the same time he will keep America's prime influence constantly before the eyes of the French, as did Bullitt in the past. He has several good trumps in his hand. On the one hand he can operate with the release of the French assets and ships in the U. S. A., respect for the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, the preservation of the French colonial possessions in East Asia as against Japan and in Africa against Spain and the Axis Powers, as well as with a relaxation of the English hunger blockade; and on the other he can threaten with support for de Gaulle. Finally, he will develop the American Embassy in Vichy into an important information center for American, and therewith English purposes.

The new Ambassador entrusted with this task was not badly chosen and is probably more suitable than old General Pershing, who was considered at first but who had to decline for reasons of health. Admiral Leahy, whom I know personally, enjoys the confidence of the President, is a man of 65, an intelligent, experienced naval officer,

⁴Not found. Washington telegram No. 2532 of Nov. 23 which was received Nov. 24 discusses the appointment of the new United States Ambassador to France but does not contain the passage referred to in the document printed (84/62124).

who has traveled about in the world a good deal, and has been recently "Chief of Naval Operations" and since 1939 Governor of Puerto Rico. His personality will probably be agreeable to Marshal Pétain, and professional knowledge in the naval field will be very useful to him in an important part of his work.

DIECKHOFF

No. 395

449/222940-41

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 718 of November 25

ATHENS, November 25, 1940.

Received November 25—9:45 p. m.

The rumor circulating here that the Greek Government had rejected a suggestion from the English to attack from Greek territory the Rumanian oil region, or other targets of interest to Germany, is said by the Greek Foreign Ministry to be without any foundation. The English had never demanded anything of the sort, nor could they demand it. There was no need, therefore, for the Greek Government to take a position on the matter. It was added with great decisiveness that it was solely in defense against the Italian aggression that English help had been requested and rendered and that its scope was limited to that. Greece did not want to become involved in the German-English war. In this connection I also refer to the reporting by the armed forces Attachés regarding Lemnos.¹ With respect to the recent wave of arrests, the Minister of Public Security has told certain pro-German Greeks that there has not been a single case where a Greek was penalized for his pro-German attitude. In every one of those cases certain punishable actions were involved. For the rest, like other Greeks, he was basing his attitude on

(1) the philhellenism of the Führer;²

¹ Not found.

² The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941 (typescript, MS C-065k, of the U.S. Army, Historical Division, European Command, filmed on serial 9936) records the following statement of Dec. 5 by Hitler in the course of a survey of the over-all situation:

"... The effect of the German threat that attacks from Greek soil against German spheres of interest would lead to countermeasures has been that hitherto no such attacks have occurred. This will continue to be the case also during the next few months. Nevertheless, German intervention against Greece is necessary in order to clarify the situation once and for all, unless the Greeks end the conflict with Italy on their own initiative and compel the English to abandon the Greek bases. In that case German intervention would be superfluous, since the hegemony over Europe will not be decided in this area. The concentration of troops for Operation *Marita* is therefore absolutely essential..."

See document No. 511.

(2) the fact that, so far, Germany had not supported Italy, which made the victory of Korçë³ possible;

(3) the pro-Greek attitude of the German public, admittedly with the exception of radio and press.⁴

ERBACH

³ On Nov. 22, Greek troops in the course of an offensive had entered the town of Korçë (Koritsa) in Albania.

⁴ Referring to this telegram, Weizsäcker sent Erbach the following instruction on Nov. 30:

"I expect that members of the Legation will not make German-Greek relations the subject of discussions with Greeks." (449/222947)

No. 396

265/172508-09

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 958 of November 25

ANKARA, November 25, 1940—9:15 p. m.

Received November 26—11:00 a. m.

The concluding remarks in yesterday's written report on the conversation with the Foreign Minister,¹ which was sent by plane, are confirmed by a long conversation today with Numan. The reverses of the Italians have entirely altered the situation here psychologically. That Greeks, who at one time were defeated by exhausted Turkish troops, were able to inflict defeats on Italy increases the considerable lack of respect for Italy, whose aspirations and demands, as Numan told me, are altogether out of proportion to her accomplishments. Turkish policy is concerned all the more strongly with the decision of the Reich. Numan summed this up in the remark that Turkey was asking Germany not to see relations with her through Axis spectacles, just as Turkey would not be bound in her decisions by England.

¹ See document No. 386, footnote 2. The concluding remarks of this report were as follows:

"In conclusion, I should like to think that the statements which I made today, even though they were not very explicit, the situation being what it is, nevertheless left a very favorable impression. I must emphasize, however, that the Italian defeat which was not expected to be of such proportions, has created an entirely new situation with respect to the Mediterranean problem, especially from the psychological point of view. I was told: 'Germany has great accomplishments behind her, and apart from these military accomplishments, the Führer has displayed a great deal of skill as a statesman. We would align ourselves with such accomplishments in a new Europe if our interests were safeguarded. We cannot be asked, however, to align ourselves with the Axis, within which Italy's participation is 50 percent. So far, Italy has no accomplishments to point to; and even if Greece or Egypt are conquered with German help, it would not signify to us any change in the state of affairs. As far as we are concerned, if a new order is to be established in the Mediterranean, we will recognize it only on the basis of accomplishments.'

"This leads to the conclusion that the decisions of the Reich alone will play the decisive part for setting the course of Turkish foreign policy in the immediate future."

I left no doubt that the Greek adventure would play no role in the final outcome and that we would end the war in the Mediterranean in the quickest way, just as we had done in France. Numan repeated that the Turkish security measures had been taken exclusively because it was felt that Germany, though contrary to her original intention, would have to go to war in the Balkans in order to render assistance to Italy. In this connection he asked for specific replies to the following questions:

1) The Turkish General Staff considered it quite possible that the Greeks would succeed in driving Italy out of Albania. What attitude would Germany take in that case? Reply: That is out of the question. Italy has sufficient forces available to redress the situation.

2) If Italy should not succeed in redressing the situation, will Germany move troops through Yugoslavia or Bulgaria and will Bulgaria take this opportunity to enforce her demands for Thrace?

Reply: My knowledge of the Bulgarian view and my conversation with the King of Bulgaria² had convinced me that Bulgaria had no aggressive attitude whatever and, on the contrary, felt threatened only by the Turkish mobilization. I knew nothing of German intervention through Bulgaria. If the formation of an English front in the Balkans should require taking action, Turkish interests would even in such a case be protected by the Axis Powers.

When asked about Turkey's intentions, Numan repeated that Turkey would act only to protect her own interests and that my statements to the Foreign Minister yesterday³ had relieved the situation considerably.

At the luncheon which I just gave on the occasion of the presence here of Gerede, Numan told me he realized very well that the war situation might force Germany to intervene in the Balkans. In such a case Turkey would act according to whether she felt threatened or not. This statement is in accordance with my repeatedly expressed view that we will keep Turkey out of the conflict if I am given sufficient time for diplomatic preparation in each case that may arise. Whether Turkey will respond positively to the offer I have now made, I cannot as yet say. The President will undoubtedly decide that. Gerede will work in the same direction, however, and I have advised him not to return until he is able to take with him to Berlin a positive reply to my offer.

Numan also tried to find out details of the conversations with the Russians and whether the question of the Straits had been discussed in that connection. On the latter point I replied in the negative.

PAPEN

² See document No. 378.

³ See document No. 386.

No. 397

230/152393-94

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 850 of November 25

BELGRADE, November 25, 1940—11: 10 p. m.

Received November 26—4: 20 a. m.

The present political position of Yugoslavia can be summarized as follows:

1. Very large sections of the population including the Army are completely under the impact of both the Italian defeat in Albania, which is considered a confirmation of the small regard here for Italian fighting power, and of the provocative debate in the Sobranje¹ which is causing the old, deep mistrust of Bulgaria to flare up once more. Under the impact of these two [events] the determination to resist, if necessary by force of arms, any threat from Italy and Bulgaria to vital Yugoslav interests has increased to an extraordinary degree, particularly among the Serbian people and in the Army. Through this development the feeling with regard to Germany is also being unfavorably affected.

2. Within the Government the attitude toward Italy and Bulgaria has also stiffened, though out of consideration for Germany it retains a purely defensive character. The attitude toward Germany is unchanged. As in the past it is determined by unqualified recognition of Germany's military supremacy on the Continent, growing realization of the senselessness of Russophile tendencies, and, not of least importance, by the hope that for economic reasons Germany is really interested in an unimpaired and pacified Yugoslavia. To be sure, the resulting wish for a closer alignment with Germany is still today being weakened by doubts as to the outcome of the war and the suspicion that Germany has promised her Axis partner a preferred position in settling Yugoslav questions.

3. Yugoslavia's foreign policy, in which the decisive influence continues to be exercised by the Prince Regent and which, because of the weakness of the Government, must take account of the mood among the Serbian people and in the Army, will therefore try to adhere in the future, too, to a formal neutrality in the present pattern. A voluntary, clear choice in favor of the German camp would at the most, be desired [*wäre höchstens dann erwünscht*] if, as a quid pro quo, a guarantee of Yugoslav integrity in the newly ordered Europe could

¹In telegram No. 843 of Nov. 24, Heeren had reported that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister had complained about recent Bulgarian propaganda efforts regarding Macedonia. He had referred in particular to a statement made in the Bulgarian Parliament by a deputy of the Government party which amounted to a Bulgarian claim to southern Serbian territory. (230/152364-65)

be given or perhaps if a prospect of an outlet to the Aegean were offered.²

HEEREN

²On Nov. 25 Weizsäcker submitted to Ribbentrop a copy of a report of Nov. 20 by Hassell, then representative of the Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag, about his conversations with leading Yugoslav figures in Belgrade and Zagreb on the occasion of a visit to Yugoslavia in November 1940 (230/152381-90).

In the files is also a memorandum of Nov. 16 by Hassell dealing with Yugoslavia's economic situation and her problems of domestic and foreign policy (230/152372-80).

No. 398

136/74466-67

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, November 25, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received November 26—12:15 a. m.

No. 4022 of November 25

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Spanish Foreign Minister informs me that immediately after his return he gave the Generalissimo a report on the Berchtesgaden discussions and that Franco was in agreement with the position he took there.¹ Franco immediately called the armed forces ministers together for a secret consultation, which will be continued tomorrow.

The Minister hinted that at this first consultation certain objections had been raised to the limited period of only 2 months proposed for the preparation of the action and questions had been asked about what Spain had been promised in return for her sacrifice in entering the war—a sacrifice that would be especially great on account of the economic distress and the unpopularity of a new war. For this reason an early reply to the last letter of the Caudillo to the Führer would be very desirable.² When I objected, in accordance with the instruction given, that Spain apparently wished thereby to bring about a far-reaching commitment of our promises to writing, which in the given circumstances we were unwilling to agree to, the Minister replied that Franco, as well as he himself, fully understood why we rejected any written promise, protocol, or the like, for the reasons discussed at Berchtesgaden, but the Führer himself had promised at Berchtesgaden to reply to the letter in question.

Since I know the content of the Caudillo's letter only from indications given by Suñer and was not present at the conversation at the Berghof, I promised to transmit this wish. For the rest, the Foreign

¹ See documents Nos. 352 and 357.

² See document No. 273 and footnote 2.

Minister emphasized repeatedly that the Generalissimo's reply, which would be given immediately after the conclusion of the military consultations, would naturally be in the affirmative and that our preparations could then begin.

In conclusion Suñer repeated with special urgency his request that the 100,000 tons of grain stored for Switzerland in Lisbon be made available immediately to Spain by our promising to supply Switzerland with a corresponding amount, and that at the same time additional grain deliveries—even though quite small—be initiated via France.³ In that way it would be possible to counteract the agitation about Spain's sell-out by Germany, which was being conducted by the English and by dissatisfied Spanish elements with a violence that caused concern, and to facilitate a development of Spanish foreign policy such as Franco and he desired. He also hoped in this way to prevail on America or England for their part to be still more accommodating toward Spain in grain deliveries, at least for a short time. As previously at Berchtesgaden, I support this request most warmly, since the position of Suñer, who is doing all he can to bring Spain into the war, will thereby be greatly strengthened in the Spanish Government and in the eyes of the public.

I should be grateful for a decision by telegram.⁴

STOHRER

³ See document No. 357.

⁴ No reply has been found. See document No. 444.

No. 399

F6/0461-67

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry

BERLIN, November 25, 1940.

RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE ITALIAN MINISTER OF JUSTICE, DINO GRANDI, IN THE PRESENCE OF STATE SECRETARY DR. MEISSNER AND OF MINISTER OF JUSTICE DR. FRANK, IN THE REICH CHANCELLERY ON NOVEMBER 25, 1940¹

After the Führer's words of welcome, Minister of Justice Grandi remarked that this visit filled him with joy and pride and it had a quite special significance for him for as a soldier and old campaigner he had for years wished for once to see the Führer personally. Unfortunately he had for years been a parachute jumper in hostile territory. It was only owing to his friend, Frank, that he was having

¹ In telegram No. 1962 of Oct. 30 Mackensen reported receiving a private letter from Grandi stating that he had accepted an invitation to attend sessions of the Academy for German Law in Munich Nov. 22-24; Grandi expressed a desire also to be received by Hitler (B14/B002327).

this visit. At the same time he was also fulfilling an obligation toward his Chief who was bound to the Führer of the Greater German Reich by an indissoluble bond.

The Führer replied that Count Grandi had been known to him for many years. He had heard that he [Grandi] had made a visit to the Academy for German Law in Munich and had admired the spirit of the new Germany in the buildings of Munich. This Germany now found itself in a severe struggle on whose outcome no doubt could arise. He greeted the visits of Italian statesmen because thereby the close bonds of the two friendly nations were shown to the eyes of the world. If he remembered correctly Count Grandi had already spent some time in Germany as a guest several years ago.

Grandi replied that this had been in the year 1931. On entering the Reich Chancellery he had just spoken with his friend Frank about the visit at that time and drawn comparisons with that of today. The objective occasion for this was the new Reich Chancellery which was a splendid expression of the new Germany. It had awakened in him memories of the old Reich Chancellery which he had visited 10 years ago, and if one compared the two, their symbolic significance was clear as an expression of the old and the new Germany. He had had the honor of serving his Duce for a period of 8 years as Foreign Minister and for a length of 15 years as Ambassador. For a length of 8 years he had represented Italy at international conferences. It had been his task alongside the representatives of the Germany of that time, to defend the equality of rights of both countries as against the victor states and to commit himself with Germany for the fulfillment of certain clauses of the Versailles Treaty such as the disarmament clause. It had thereby always filled him with a special sadness that that Germany was represented by men who were enemies of his own Weltanschauung. It gave him occasion for special pride to have been the first ambassador to have had "physical contact" with a nation whose ideas of that time had indeed been different from those dominant in Italy, but which nevertheless already indicated a change. As a matter of fact, after his visit with Löbe,² who made unkind remarks about the Duce, he had gone out to the street and there he found the new Germany in which he foresaw the comrades of the future. On his return to Rome he declared to the Duce that in a short time there would be a radical change in Germany. "The revolution is on the march and can no longer go bankrupt. In Germany we will find comrades for our cause." Scarcely 2 years later his prevision was proved to be true and therefore today's visit filled him with a quite special pride.

² G. Paul Löbe, former President of the German Reichstag.

The Führer declared that those had been years of very serious struggle, but the National Socialists had had very good luck, because it was only a Löbe who stood opposed to them, not a lion [Löwe] which might have been dangerous to them. And as regards the masses on the streets, it had been the great task of Minister Frank to provide the rather unruly revolution with firm legal principles. If he remembered correctly, Grandi had already worked with the present Reich Foreign Minister in London.

Grandi remarked in this connection that for 2 years they had jointly deceived the English by false assertions that no Italian or German soldier fought in Spain, and perhaps it was a particular sign of the downfall of the democracies that they satisfied themselves with mere words. It did not dawn on them that Germany and Italy could also be serious until they were confronted with an accomplished fact.

The Führer interjected here: "Until the general society of non-interveners had clearly demonstrated the intervention."

The Führer remarked further that he hoped that the war would be at an end in a foreseeable time. For the democracies a war was perhaps useful for it brought a change in the life of the state and it filled up the numerous gaps in the leadership of the state. These in themselves did not really work but they turned over everything to civilian initiative and economics. Thereby the problems were not only not solved, but they were directly ignored. We on the other hand would have worked diligently to bring our problems to a solution, and regarded the time which was lost to us through the war as time stolen from us. In any event we would be happy if we could soon return to normal activity. Social, cultural, economic, and not last juristic work was awaiting, and this work would not be easy to carry through. It was the task of Comrade Frank, without shattering the state apparatus, society, and economic life, to carry out a revolution in these areas also, a revolution which would extend and supplant the principles of hitherto existing law by the principles of the new Germany which is based on the idea of the national community.

In conclusion the Führer asked Count Grandi to bring the most cordial greetings to the Duce and on his part he accepted the greetings of the Duce.³

NOACK

³ Cf. Enno von Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse* (Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1951), pp. 122-123.

No. 400

M295/M012635-36

The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the German Armistice Commission

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 25, 1940.

High Command of the Wehrmacht
WFStb/L IV (z.b.V.) No. 33 371/40 g.Kdos. Chefs

Attention: Colonel Böhme

Subject: Talks between Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Badoglio.

For the information of the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission the following is transmitted in regard to the talks which were conducted between Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Badoglio on November 14 and 15 at Innsbruck:

The talks took place with the best mutual understanding and frankness. The wish was expressed for a close and enduring exchange of military ideas in the interest of the *common* conduct of the war.

*In particular:*1. *Syria.*

The Italian Armistice Commission has received the instruction to let the French keep 50-60,000 men in Syria so that they will be in position to defend themselves.

2. *Relationship to France.*

Marshal Badoglio fully shares our views regarding the military advantages of the new policy toward France which the Führer has initiated.

But the mistrust toward France is stronger with the Italians than with us.

For the Italians it is desirable that Germany reach clear agreements with France as promptly as possible, and that the Italians receive security in Libya from being threatened in the rear.

Marshal Badoglio declared that he will immediately instruct the Chairman of the Italian Armistice Commission in this sense and will direct him to make demands of the French only after previous agreement with the German Armistice Commission.¹

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order:
WARLIMONT

¹ The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Aug. 1-Nov. 30, 1940) contains this passage at Nov. 19:

"On the occasion of the talks between Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Badoglio on Nov. 14 and 15 at Innsbruck it was decided to establish closer contact between the two Marshals and to get in direct touch in future in con-

No. 401

121/120219-21

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, November 25, 1940.

Submitted to the State Secretary with the enclosed memorandum in accordance with instructions.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]

PROPOSALS OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH LAVAL

A. Laval will probably bring up the following questions, which we will not need to refuse to discuss:

1. The placing of the two French départements, Pas de Calais and Nord, which have heretofore been under the Military Commander in Brussels, under the German Military Commander in France.

The request might be granted in view of the great economic significance for France, particularly of the central and southern portions of the two northern départements. (The question of the future territorial disposition of the northwestern portions of the two northern départements which are important to us for reasons of military policy (Channel coast), would not necessarily be prejudiced thereby.) The concession would be extremely valuable to the French Government.

2. Question of moving the seat of Government from Vichy to Versailles or Paris.

Should Laval again express this wish, he should be urged to keep the seat of the French Government in unoccupied territory if only for the reason that by moving the seat of Government to Paris, more

(Footnote 1—continued)

nection with all matters concerning the armed forces of both countries. Exchange of information should take place via the German General at the High Command of the Italian Armed Forces and via the Italian General at the German OKW. Among the matters to be settled immediately by the two Marshals are the disruptive activities of the Italians within the sphere of the Armistice Commission, particularly the general embargo ordered by the Italian Armistice Commission on Nov. 13 for all French sea transports in the Mediterranean and the recently demanded withdrawal of the French land forces stationed at Bizerte and Oran.

"With regard to the support of the Italian offensive against Egypt by German forces, the commitment of German air forces against Egypt has been envisaged, as soon as the Italians have captured Mersa Matrûh. The commitment of an aerial mine squadron against Alexandria and the Suez Canal is not planned for the time being, unless the situation of the Italians in the Mediterranean should deteriorate. Otherwise the commitment will follow in connection with Operation *Feliz*. Marshal Badoglio raised no objections against the German plan not to have participation of Italian forces in Operation *Feliz*."

Cf. Pietro Badoglio, *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale: memorie e documenti* (Milan, 1946), p. 57.

substance will be given to the assertion that the French Government is the prisoner of Germany. In a practical respect, however, the transfer of the technical services to Paris and additional concessions with regard to travel of the French ministers and leading officials between Paris and Vichy could be granted.

B. Questions that may possibly be broached by Laval, but which cannot be the subject of discussion, are the following:

1. The question of the expulsions from Lorraine.

Since the operation has been completed and we have refused to take cognizance of the French note of protest,¹ a reopening of this subject is out of the question.

2. The removal of 6,000 Jews from the Gau Baden to unoccupied France.²

Since a return of the Jews to Baden cannot take place, this question, too, is not suitable for discussion. At most M. Laval can be told that further transportations of this kind were not to be expected. On this point, to be sure, prior contact would still have to be made with the Reichsführer SS.

3. Territorial and boundary questions.

It will not be possible to discuss this matter in detail. What can be considered, presumably, is to repeat merely the general assurance already given by the Führer to M. Laval at Montoire with respect to the French colonial empire.³

¹ See document No. 367 and footnote 2.

² See document No. 267.

³ In the files there is a memorandum of Nov. 25 (121/120216-17) by Wiehl regarding German-French economic questions. It defined Germany's demand as "future close cooperation" of the two economies, "especially participation in French colonial products and sources of raw materials." Also in the files is an unsigned memorandum of the same date (121/120186-87) regarding "topics of conversation for the meeting with M. Laval." It lists German demands on France and French requests with respect to Germany, dividing the latter according to whether or not they could be subjects of discussion.

No. 402

182/85673-74

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, November 25, 1940.

CREDIT FOR RUMANIA

In the various credit agreements which, with the participation of the German Government, have been concluded with a great number of states—and, indeed, with the states of southeastern Europe especially—interest rates of 6 percent, 5½ percent, and 5 percent have been agreed upon. If now a rate of interest very much lower than

the above-named rates is granted to Rumania, it is going to put us in an awkward position with respect to the other countries. This applies particularly to such states as Bulgaria which are also on friendly terms politically with us. In the agreements with Bulgaria rates of 6 percent have been agreed upon.

The Reichsbank rate is $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent. If the rate of interest is not at least somewhat *over* the Reichsbank rate, the participation of private banks is not possible and credit must be granted as credit by the state. It can be done that way, but it is preferable, also for the period after the war, if the banks stay in the business.

The domestic German treasury bills bear an interest of 4 percent. As long as this rate of interest is maintained, it is not desirable for credit abroad to be arranged at a lower rate of interest.

The general tendency is doubtless in the direction of a lowering of interest rates. Such lowering in the long run is unavoidable. The Reich Minister of Finance and, above all, State Secretary Landfried, who represents Reich Minister Funk, are of the opinion that this development should not be too much accelerated, and that it is therefore preferable not to reduce the rate for the Rumanians to $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent, but only to 4 percent. From the political point of view a rate of interest of 4 percent is to be regarded as a special concession and exceptional treatment.¹

CLODIUS

¹ A "Protocol Concerning German-Rumanian Collaboration in Carrying out a Ten-Year Plan for the Reconstruction of the Rumanian Economy" was signed in Berlin, Dec. 4, 1940. The texts of the Protocol and related agreements are filmed on M209/M006666-727.

The Credit Agreement (M209/M006710-17) specified that "in order to take account of the special situation in which the Rumanian economy finds itself at present, the German Government is charging for this credit the exceptional rate of interest of $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent."

No. 403

585/242780-81

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOPIA, November 26, 1940—2:00 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received November 26—6:30 a. m.

No. 578 of November 25

With reference to my telegram No. 575 of November 24.¹

The Minister President had me called this evening in order to inform me of a Russian and, following it, a Turkish *démarche*, which were made to him as the Foreign Minister had fallen ill.

¹ Document No. 391.

1. Secretary General Sobolev of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, who arrived from Moscow by special plane yesterday en route to the Danube Conference in Bucharest,² requested to be received so as to carry out a "special mission." It consisted in conveying a proposal, which he read verbatim, without leaving a copy.³

According to it Soviet Russia "renewed" the proposal of mutual assistance made last autumn.⁴ If it is accepted, Russia will raise no objection to Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact, which Russia herself "very probably, almost certainly" will also join. Besides, the proposal stated anew Russia's sympathy for Bulgaria's national aspirations. The Minister President replied, as he told me, that the proposal was entirely new to him, he knew nothing of a concrete proposal having been made on a previous occasion, and he could now only receive it and promise to study it. For the rest he referred the Russian to the reply which meanwhile was being sent to Moscow. He told me that the proposal would, of course, be rejected. The difficulty lay in finding a formulation (text en clair apparently missing) that would not offend the Russians.

2. The Turkish Minister⁵ urgently wished to speak to the Foreign Minister already yesterday evening "before his [the Foreign Minister's] departure for Berlin." On being told that nothing was known here of a trip to Berlin, such as was reported in the foreign press, he stated that he would be satisfied if he were received by the Minister President this afternoon. He conveyed the following communication: Ambassador von Papen had given Ankara the assurance that Germany had no intention of attacking Turkey.⁶ Turkey was making the statement to Bulgaria that if the latter had no intention of attacking Turkey, Turkey was prepared to give "guarantees" that she would not attack Bulgaria, "provided Bulgaria did not engage in any hostile acts." In this instance, too, the Minister President merely received this statement and promised to examine it.

He is not sure whether the Turkish proposal was made in order to accommodate our wishes, or perhaps upon English instigation in order to restrain Bulgaria from joining the Tripartite Pact. Is Turkey going to consider Bulgaria's accession as a hostile act and in that case perhaps attack Bulgaria? This is a fixed idea here, which I am constantly battling, but which seems to be indestructible.

I explained to the Minister President, who also weighed the possibility of giving the Russians the answer that Bulgaria did not wish to tie herself to any side, that now was the time, which would never again be as favorable, for telling the Russians and the Turks that

² See document No. 249, footnote 2.

³ Document No. 438, enclosure.

⁴ See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 247.

⁵ Ali Sevki Berker.

⁶ See document No. 386.

while Bulgaria had not yet formally acceded to the Pact, she had already promised to do so in principle. The Tripartite Pact now provided the cover behind which Bulgaria could protect herself.¹

RICHTHOFEN

¹ In telegram No. 581 of Nov. 26, Richthofen reported that Sobolev had read his statement to the King and the Foreign Minister also; the latter had told Richthofen of individual points taken up in the Soviet statement (585/242786).

No. 404

104/112689-70

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, November 26, 1940—5:34 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received November 26—8:50 a. m.

No. [2562] of November 25¹

For the Reich Minister personally.

Molotov asked me to call on him this evening and in the presence of Dekanozov stated the following:

The Soviet Government has studied the contents of the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister in the concluding conversation on November 13² and takes the following stand:

“The Soviet Government is prepared to accept the draft of the four power pact which the Reich Foreign Minister outlined in the conversation of November 13, regarding political collaboration and reciprocal economic [support] subject to the following conditions:

- “1) Provided that the German troops are immediately withdrawn from Finland, which, under the compact of 1939, belongs to the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. At the same time the Soviet Union undertakes to ensure peaceful relations with Finland and to protect German economic interests in Finland (export of lumber and nickel).
- “2) Provided that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease.

¹ This telegram was somewhat garbled in transmission to Berlin where the number was recorded as 2362. The correct telegram number and the words of the text enclosed in brackets have been supplied from the Moscow Embassy draft. (292/183876-81)

² See document No. 329.

- "3) Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.
- "4) Provided that Japan [renounces] her rights to concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin.

"In accordance with the foregoing, the draft of the protocol concerning the delimitation of the spheres of influence as outlined by the Reich Foreign Minister would have to be amended so as to stipulate the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf.

"Likewise, the draft of the protocol or [*beziehungsweise*] agreement between Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union with respect to Turkey³ would have to be amended so as to guarantee a base for the [land]⁴ and naval forces of the USSR on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease, including—in case Turkey declares herself willing to join the four power pact—a guarantee of the independence and of the territory of Turkey by the three countries named.

"This protocol would have to provide that in case Turkey refuses to join the four Powers, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree to work out and to carry through the required military and diplomatic measures, and a separate agreement to this effect would have to be concluded.

"Furthermore there would have to be agreement upon :

- "a) a third secret protocol between Germany and the Soviet Union concerning Finland (see point 1 above).
- "b) a fourth secret protocol between Japan and the Soviet Union concerning the renunciation by Japan of the oil and coal concession in Northern Sakhalin (in return for an adequate compensation).
- "c) a fifth secret protocol between Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy, recognizing that Bulgaria is geographically located inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union and that it is therefore a political necessity that a mutual assistance pact be concluded between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which in no way shall affect the internal regime of Bulgaria, her sovereignty or independence."

In conclusion Molotov stated that the Soviet proposal provided for five protocols instead of the two envisaged by the Reich Foreign Minister. He would appreciate a statement of the German view.⁵

SCHULENBURG

³ See document No. 309.

⁴ The word "land" was garbled in transmission. The passage as decoded in Berlin reads: "leichte-und Seestreitkräfte."

⁵ See document No. 669.

No. 405

B19/B003883-84

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2571 of November 26 Moscow, November 26, 1940—9:10 p. m.
Received November 27—3:50 a. m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 2087 of November 16,¹ 2117 of November 18 [19] (W 5285 g.),² 2132 of November 22,³ 2145 of November 23.⁴

Yesterday, in connection with other questions,⁵ I discussed the Petsamo question with Molotov, in the presence of the Ambassador and with his support, following the line of the above-mentioned telegraphic instructions. Molotov replied that our position was not clear. In the summer we had waived the concession and had now confirmed the waiver once more in Berlin. The Soviet Government had believed that it could consequently consider the question settled. The Soviet Government was willing to promise Germany 60 percent of the nickel yield until the end of the war or for the years 1941 and 1942, if we so desired. Molotov repeatedly rejected the taking on of obligations arising from the German-Finnish agreements on the grounds that the Soviet Government had no knowledge of these agreements. The Soviet Government would negotiate with the Finnish Government about the concession question. It wanted to conclude an agreement with us on the delivery of nickel ore.

When I pointed out several times that we insisted on the fulfillment of the German-Finnish agreements and did not need to conclude a new agreement on the delivery of nickel ore, Molotov replied by repeating that the Soviet Government could not assume obligations under German-Finnish agreements.

Further discussions between Molotov and me will not be able to change Molotov's position. It cannot be expected that our wishes will be granted unless the Finnish Government refuses categorically to transfer the concession before the fulfillment of the German-Finnish agreements is assured.

The Finnish Minister here called on the Ambassador and me yesterday before our conference with Molotov. It was evident that he was accurately informed about the conditions laid down by us (telegram No. 2117 of November 19⁶), but had not as yet received any instruction to take the question up with the Soviet Government. He

¹ Document No. 344.

² See document No. 355, footnote 1.

³ Not printed (4416/E083392-93).

⁴ Not printed (B19/B003879).

⁵ Cf. document No. 406.

⁶ See footnote 2.

was obviously relieved that the question was to be brought up by us with Molotov. I shall inform Paasikivi today about the outcome of our conversation yesterday with Molotov.¹

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

¹This telegram was forwarded for information to Helsinki on Nov. 27 as No. 697 with the instruction to inform the Finnish Government of its contents in general terms, and to insist that Finland maintain its pledge not to transfer the Petsamo concession without previous written guarantees by the Soviet Government to recognize the four conditions stipulated by Germany. The Moscow Embassy at the same time received a copy (as No. 2179) of the instruction sent to Helsinki. (4416/E083906)

No. 406

104/112678-79

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2575 of November 26 Moscow, November 26, 1940—10:30 p. m.
Received November 27—6:25 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 2087, paragraph 2, of November 16.¹

I discussed the German property claims in the Baltic States at great length with Molotov yesterday. Molotov replied that he had not promised full compensation at the time and that determination of the period, nature, and amount of the compensation had remained reserved to negotiations by the delegations. In its proposal the Soviet Government acted on the assumption that the German Government would prefer the shortest possible terms for reimbursement. To the German objection that the proposed percentage is too low, he was constrained to oppose the argument that reimbursement for assets acquired over a period of many years cannot take place within a single year. Upon my proposal to consider compensation in a lump sum in order to speed liquidation of the whole matter, Molotov replied that the Soviet Union would raise no objection to that. When on Molotov's question I thereupon informed him of the estimate of German property claims communicated to me by Consul General Benzler's telegram of November 19,² that is, around 215 million reichsmarks for Latvia and Estonia, and about 100 million reichsmarks for Lithuania, Molotov declared that it was the first time these figures were mentioned by Germany and that they would have to be examined by the Soviet Union.

¹ Document No. 344.

² Not found.

Molotov further stated that the Soviet Government was prepared to make a concession over and above the proposals presented to our delegations in Kaunas and Riga, namely, that in the case of ethnic Germans reimbursement would be 15 percent after 1 year, 25 percent after 3, 35 percent after 6, and 40 percent after 10 years; and in the case of Reich Germans, 25 percent after 1 year, 35 percent after 3, 45 percent after 6, and 50 percent after 10 years.

I described this proposal also as unsatisfactory and inconsistent with Molotov's earlier statements. The present interpretation of these statements by Molotov had caused grave disappointment in Berlin and did not satisfy Germany's expectations that German property interests in the Baltic States would be safeguarded.

Present also at the conference was Dekanozov, who is thoroughly familiar with the subject matter as former chairman of the Soviet delegation in Kaunas. Since Dekanozov comes to Berlin on Thursday, I would suggest taking the matter up with him.³

Repeated to Riga.

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

³ In a letter of Nov. 28 to Schnurre (2108/455988-91), replying to Schnurre's letter of Nov. 21 (document No. 377), Wiehl also informed him that his suggestion that the matter be taken up with Dekanozov in Berlin had been viewed with some skepticism at the State Secretary's conference that morning. It was doubted that Dekanozov was authorized to discuss it at his new post, although he had been in charge of the negotiations at Kaunas. Wiehl added that he would nevertheless try to see to it that, when Dekanozov made his introductory visits, the matter would be brought up by someone at the highest possible level.

No. 407

91/100443-44

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Ireland

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, November 26, 1940.

TOP SECRET

No. 402

Exclusively for the Minister personally. To be decoded by the Minister himself.

I gather from your recent telegraphic reporting that political circles in Ireland are now really seriously reckoning with the possibility of a British attack and are also beginning to speculate whether in such case they may expect help from Germany or should request such help. Please report as soon as possible on the present situation in this respect and at the same time also inform us whether de Valera

expressed himself on this subject at the luncheon mentioned in your telegram No. 726.¹

In order, so far as possible, to get a clearer idea regarding the views and the intentions of the Government there, I consider it desirable for you to discuss the matter again within the next few days with influential persons, preferably with de Valera himself, but cautiously and without letting on that you are acting on instructions. You might at the same time point out that the English intention to use this war as an occasion for the violation of Ireland and for the final destruction of her freedom was, indeed, very obvious, and, referring to the statement of Boland mentioned at the end of your telegram No. 729,² you might subsequently ask whether the Irish would consider it appropriate if you inquired in Berlin how Germany viewed the possibility of assistance for Ireland with material, etc., in the event of a British attack. In this connection you can again give the most definite reassurance that Germany naturally has no intention of violating Irish neutrality on her own initiative. But if a British attack came, you could personally very well imagine that the Reich Government would be in a position to give Ireland vigorous support and would be inclined to do so.

If the tenor of your conversation permits it, you might perhaps develop the theme even further—always speaking only for yourself—discussing primarily how, and particularly toward which ports, and by which ships German aid might best be sent, and whether the Irish Government intends, if need be, to appeal to Germany for assistance.

In any case I would point out with regard to your telegram No. 764,³ that you must in all circumstances keep your radio transmitter and cipher material always ready for use, since they would be of decisive importance in the event that any German operations were initiated.

Please report by telegraph as soon as possible.⁴

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 330, footnote 2.

² In this telegram of Nov. 11 Hempel had reported as conclusions from his latest conversation with Irish Minister of Justice Boland that "in the event of a British attack, a request for help addressed to Germany seems to be actually under consideration." (91/100434-35)

³ In this telegram of Nov. 23 Hempel had discussed what the Legation would do if the Irish Government and the Foreign Missions should leave Dublin in the event of a British attack on Ireland (91/100438-39).

⁴ See document No. 419.

No. 408

121/120188

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, November 26, 1940.

e. o. Pol. I 1402 g. Rs.

In connection with the telephone conversation this evening¹ General Jodl informed me as follows:

Yesterday (November 25) a luncheon took place in Paris. He had not yet been able to ascertain exactly who had attended the luncheon. Apparently it was attended by the representative of the French Foreign Office, de Brinon and Lieutenant Colonel Speidel, the Chief of Staff of the Military Commander in Paris.

On this occasion the French expressed the wish to speak with German military men about the military situation in Africa. The Germans had replied that such a conversation could not be conducted by the German military men in Paris but only by the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, presumably, therefore, by General von Stülpnagel (Wiesbaden).

He (General Jodl) had given instructions that such conversations must not take place now.

On this occasion General Jodl informed me that there is a written instruction of the Führer which reads approximately as follows: "For the present the talks resulting from my meeting with Pétain—apart from current technical questions of detail—will be conducted exclusively by the Foreign Ministry in conjunction with the OKW."

RITTER

¹ No record found.

No. 409

2108/455984-85

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 2582 of November 26

Moscow, November 27, 1940—3:20 a. m.

Received November 27—7:45 a. m.

Status of negotiations here:

I. Import plan.

The Russian counterproposal, like the German proposal,¹ is based on an import volume in the value of 600 to 610 million reichsmarks over the period from January 11, 1941, to May 11, 1942. This includes, among others, the following major export offerings of the Soviets:

Grain 1,500,000 tons; oil seeds 120,000 tons; hogs 100,000 head; butter 3,000 tons; cotton 95,000 tons; flax 22,000 tons; Estonian shale

¹ See document No. 377.

oil 70,000 tons; petroleum and petroleum products 970,500 tons; manganese ore 200,000 tons; chromium ore 50,000 tons; asbestos 12,000 tons; platinum 2 (group garbled) kg.

Independent of this import plan, the import of Soviet commodities on the basis of the credit agreement will continue as before. The import plan also includes lumber in the value of 51 million reichsmarks, which had been stricken out from the preliminary estimate.

I asked for promises of larger Soviet deliveries of grain (special report is following), oil seeds, Estonian shale oil, and manganese ore. Nothing definite has as yet been settled regarding nonferrous metals, rubber, alumina, and seeds.

II. Export.

The Soviet counterproposal regarding German exports during the second contractual year, similarly running to May 11, 1942, is based on a sum of 218 million reichsmarks in orders already placed and looks to orders for military supplies in the amount of 110 million reichsmarks within the framework of the previous lists. This takes care of over one-half of the proposed import plan. To be added to this is the German offer to supply coal according to the trade agreement, and the Drohobycz agreement, in a total amount of 60 million reichsmarks. If the new Russian requests for imports are approved, machine tools would again head the list with a total of about 92 million reichsmarks. Since we are in no position here to make any final decisions on the Soviet import requests, especially where machine tools are concerned, Ministerialdirigent Schlotterer will leave today for review of the matter in Berlin, to return with the result at the earliest opportunity.

III. In return for transit freight (group garbled) the Soviet Union also demands advance commitments for industrial equipment, especially machine tools. This item, too, must be considered in Berlin.

IV. It will depend on the outcome of the review in Berlin whether the proposed big Soviet import plan can be taken as a basis. Should cuts be made in the German export plan and no substitutes be found acceptable to the Russians to take their place, the scope of the agreement will have to be decreased correspondingly. I pointed out in yesterday's conference with Molotov that the Russian requests were much too narrow in range. Molotov repeated word by word Mikoyan's counterargument that we are now in control of a large portion of Europe's industry and should be able to meet the Soviet requests. The Soviet Union only desired to buy from us the things which it urgently needed.

Please make sure that Schlotterer returns with the results of the review as quickly as possible.

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

No. 410

121/120189

*An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
to the Embassy in Paris*

Teletype

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, November 27, 1940.

No. 1397

For Consul General Schleier.

The Führer has decided that a meeting in accordance with point 2 of your telegram No. 1282 of November 23¹ is to take place, under the direction of the German Embassy. For this purpose General Warlimont, Chief of the National Defense Department in the OKW, will come to Paris. Ambassador Abetz is asking Consul General Schleier to inform Laval, Huntziger, and Darlan through de Brinon accordingly. The time will be 8:00 p. m. on Friday, November 29, 1940, at the German Embassy.²

In case of a question the information may be given that General Warlimont will probably be accompanied only by an officer from the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden.

SCHWARZMANN

¹ Document No. 385.² See document No. 428.

No. 411

4416/E083907-908

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in the Soviet Union*

Cipher Letter

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, November 27, 1940.

No. 2172

e. o. W 5394 g. Rs.

For the exclusively personal information of the Ambassador and of Minister Schnurre.

Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens flew to Helsinki on November 23 by order of the Reichsmarschall in order to continue discussions with Finnish military leaders in connection with the agreements concluded by him. He is also expected to speak with the most influential of these leaders about the visit here of Molotov and about the Petsamo question, discreetly and approximately along the following lines:

"The Finns should not be too greatly worried. Nothing emerged in the course of the discussions here with Molotov which would make requisite an unseemly compliance by Finland. Nothing was said on the German side about our pre-emption right in the concession in

Finland, and as hitherto the Finns should say nothing about it. As regards the nickel in Petsamo, Germany has reserved for herself the right to the unencumbered purchase from Finland to the extent of at least 60 percent of the product. Our official declaration to the Finnish Government that we would have no objection if the concession were transferred to a mixed Finnish-Russian company has left the decision to the discretion of the Finnish Government. This declaration naturally did not signify that we would not also agree if the Finnish Government retained the concession for itself, if it considered this right and were able to carry it through as against the Russians. Furthermore the Russians naturally realize that in the present situation we wish no new complications in the north.¹ Finland should remain calm and firm in her negotiations and not get nervous, but she should also avoid provocations."²

These guiding lines for discussion were approved by the Reich Minister.

WIEHL

¹ State Secretary Weizsäcker, who happened to meet the Finnish Minister on Nov. 30, said he believed that the Russians took full account that Germany wished no new disturbances in the north (St.S. 868, Nov. 30, 1940: B19/B003892).

² By telegram No. 29 of Nov. 29 from special train, Fuschl (No. 704 of Nov. 30 of the Foreign Ministry) the Minister in Finland was directed to observe the same guiding lines for discussion, and to bring out that the Russians were fully aware of the German wish that no new complications arise in the north (B19/B003889).

No. 412

1139/324870-71

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, November 28, 1940—6:49 a. m.

SECRET

Received November 29—11:15 a. m.

No. 2607 of November 28

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to our telegrams Nos. 2575,¹ 2582,² and 2583³ of November 26.

Molotov summoned the Ambassador and me to see him this evening and in Mikoyan's presence delivered to us the Soviet Government's reply to the questions brought up by me on November 26:

1. Grain.

People's Commissar Mikoyan has gone to the limit of the commercial possibilities available to the Soviet Union in offering 1.5 million

¹ Document No. 406.

² Document No. 409.

³ Not printed (104/112683).

tons. The Soviet Government, however, recognizes Germany's vital interest in enlarged grain deliveries and has therefore decided to go all the way in accommodating Germany in the question of grain deliveries. It will therefore fully meet the request of Germany for delivery of 2.5 million tons within the period ending May 11, 1942. To this end the Soviet Government would withdraw an additional quantity of 1 million tons from the national reserves of the USSR in order to supplement the already promised 1.5 million tons.

2. Broader basis of German counterdeliveries.

The Soviet Government is willing to take account of the German request for widening the basis of German deliveries. People's Commissar Mikoyan will present the respective proposals.

3. Baltic States.

The Soviet Government is prepared to comply with the German proposal for a lump sum compensation for German property claims. It believes that the figures named by me, i.e., 215 million reichsmarks for Latvia and Estonia, and 100 million reichsmarks for Lithuania, are excessive and recommends fixing the total German claims relating to all three States at 200 million reichsmarks. They are limiting their own counterclaims to 50 million reichsmarks although they are actually substantially higher. This yields a balance of 150 million reichsmarks in favor of Germany, which the Soviet Government would pay over from a Soviet special account in Berlin in the course of 2 years, 1941 and 1942.

I expressed to Molotov my thanks regarding paragraphs 1 and 2, and stated with respect to 3 that I considered his offer as a practical basis, and that I would forward it to Berlin, requesting my Government for instructions.

In view of the present status of the negotiations here, Molotov's statements today must be viewed as a surprising indication of good will on the part of the Soviet Government. Molotov's proposal regarding compensation for property claims in the Baltic States considerably exceeds our expectations. Request telegraphic authorization to inform Molotov of the Reich Government's agreement to his proposal.

Consul General Benzler in Riga has been informed from here.

SCHNURRE -
SCHULENBURG

No. 413

585/242791

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, HEINRICH,
November 28, 1940—10:00 p. m.

No. 25 of November 28 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, November 28—10:25 p. m.

No. 826 from the

Foreign Ministry

Sent November 28—10:45 p. m.

With reference to number 3 in your telegram No. 580.¹

I believe it would be advisable for the Bulgarian Government to reply to the Turkish proposal with an offer to conclude a Bulgarian-Turkish nonaggression pact. By such an offer Bulgaria would have demonstrated beyond any doubt that she has no aggressive intentions toward Turkey.

RIBBENTROP

¹Not printed (585/242783-84). This telegram contained the Bulgarian Foreign Minister's detailed account of the statements made by the Turkish Minister to Bulgaria which had already been briefly reported in document No. 403. Number 3 of this telegram dealt with a Turkish proposal that the two countries ought to take measures to avoid being drawn into the war.

No. 414

136/74476

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, November 28, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received November 28—11:45 p. m.

No. 4069 of November 28

For the head of the office or his representative; to be deciphered by him personally. Top Secret. Reply by courier or secret code.

The Spanish Foreign Minister just told me that the Generalissimo has agreed to the starting of the preparations which were contemplated.

A detailed telegraphic report with our recommendations, that is, wishes of Franco is to follow [*Ausführlicher Drahtbericht mit eigenen Empfehlungen bezw. Wünschen Francos folgt.*]¹

STOHRER

¹ See document No. 420.

No. 415

585/242793-94

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOFIA, November 28, 1940—11:30 p. m.

No. 585 of November 28

Received November 29—6:30 a. m.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 575 of November 24,¹ and 581 of November 26.²

The reply to the first Russian inquiry was given to Dekanozov on the day before his departure³ by the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow. Dekanozov accepted it without any comment. On November 26 Molotov had him [the Minister] summoned in order to inform him of the step taken meanwhile in Sofia.⁴ Molotov affirmed in so doing that Russia had no desire to interfere in Bulgaria's internal affairs. England had a powerful fleet and bases in the Mediterranean, and this made it imperative for Russia to see to her security in the Black Sea. He also declared that Russia was ready to satisfy Bulgaria's territorial demands.

Meanwhile, this morning, handwritten leaflets have publicized Russia's proposal of a mutual assistance pact and the declaration of her readiness to support "the return of the area from Adrianople to the line Enos-Midia, and western Thrace including Dedeagach, Drama, and Kavalla," and join the Tripartite Pact together with Bulgaria.⁵ The leaflets closed with the demand for the immediate acceptance of the Russian offer by the Bulgarian Government. Public reaction cannot be assessed as yet. An investigation is now seeking to ascertain whether a deliberate or accidental indiscretion of the Russian Legation is involved; one Russian source is said to have characterized the leaflet as the act of provocateurs. Sobolev himself, before leaving Bulgarian territory in Ruse last night, gave an interview which is reported to have contained the following statement:

The situation in the Balkans was moving toward clarification; Bulgaria valued her neutrality; Turkey did not want any war. Publication of the interview has not been permitted here because Sobolev also said that the Russians considered the Bulgarians a brother nation, and that the Soviet Union would always support Bulgaria.

The deliberations on the reply to the Russian proposal have not yet been concluded, because the Minister President is suffering from

¹ Document No. 391.

² See document No. 403, footnote 7.

³ See document No. 362.

⁴ See document No. 403.

⁵ Telegram No. 2202 of Nov. 30 forwarded to the Embassy in the Soviet Union a DNB report from Sofia of Nov. 30 which asserted that these leaflets had been distributed by the Bulgarian Communist party (380/210245-46).

a severe gall bladder attack, while the Foreign Minister is not yet fully able to resume work. The Foreign Minister told me this evening that the tenor of the reply would probably be the following: Bulgaria desired to remain at peace and was therefore considering accession to the Tripartite Pact because she wished for a reorganization of Europe and hoped that the injustices of the past would be redressed by peaceful means. Immediate accession to the Tripartite Pact, which I continued to urge upon both the Foreign Minister and the Minister President would, he believes, be viewed as provocative in Moscow. Nor is it possible to convince them that the Turks would take no action if Bulgaria joined the Pact.

The Foreign Minister, in informing me of the measures of protection taken in the Black Sea, brought up again the subject of Bulgaria's list of requirements which he had handed to Field Marshal Keitel at the Berghof.⁶ In particular, several coastal batteries were now needed for Varna and Burgas.⁷

RICHTHOFEN

⁶ See document No. 384.

⁷ Draft telegram e. o. W 5508 g. I from Wiehl to the Legation in Bulgaria (4542/E144364) listed the war material which Germany would furnish in response to the requests of the King of Bulgaria. This included one heavy and one medium coast artillery battery.

No. 416

91/100446

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, November 28, 1940.

e. o. Pol. I 1418 g. Rs.

General Jodl informed me that in a conversation with the Führer on November 26, the Foreign Minister had expressed himself regarding Ireland as follows: The repercussions in the United States from an attack by England on Ireland would be tremendous. He was convinced that the Irish would defend themselves to the utmost against England. Prior to this, however, de Valera would not expose himself with respect to us.

The Foreign Minister had said on the occasion that he would instruct the German Minister in Dublin to sound out de Valera about his intentions.¹ Hempel might begin the conversation by saying that he was somewhat concerned about the fate of the Legation. In order to make the necessary preparations he would like to ask de Valera whether he considered an English attack on Ireland probable.

General Jodl informed me also on this occasion that they were considering in the OKW whether in the event of assistance being

¹ See documents Nos. 407 and 455.

given to Ireland captured English war material might be brought to Ireland from the French coasts in Irish ships. Since the Irish Army was equipped with English weapons, this captured material was most suited to Ireland's needs.²

RITTER

²The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941), for Dec. 3 records the following statements by Raeder and Hitler in a conference which was also attended by Keitel and Jodl:

"As for the question of support for Ireland against England, the dispatch of an expeditionary corps and the occupation of the island of Ireland are impossible in the face of the superior enemy naval power, the unfavorable geographic conditions, and the impossibility of bringing up supplies. Without supplies of food, armament, or ammunition, any troops which were landed in Ireland would be annihilated sooner or later by an opponent whose steady reinforcement cannot be prevented. As long as England and Ireland are not at war and provided the Irish are prepared to cooperate, it will be possible to send individual blockade-runners with arms and ammunition to Irish harbors and bays during the winter months.

"The Führer approved this review of the situation and declared that any support of Ireland could only be considered if Ireland requested German assistance. First of all the German Ambassador in Dublin ought to find out whether de Valera desired assistance, as, for example, a strengthening of his military equipment by means of the captured English arms and ammunition, which would be transported to him aboard separate ships. As a base for attacks on the northwestern ports of England, Ireland was important to the Luftwaffe. Possession of Ireland could have the effect of ending the war. First of all, inquiries should be made."

An abbreviated account of this conference and an appendix "The Question of Supporting Ireland against Britain," which is apparently a briefing paper on which Raeder based his statements, are printed in "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*, pp. 156-158.

No. 417

F6/0463-88

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*¹

BERLIN, November 29, 1940.

[Füh. No. 43.]²

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER, CINCAR-MARKOVIĆ, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, AT THE BERGHOF, NOVEMBER 28, 1940

The Führer began by giving an account of his plans for the consolidation of Europe and the creation of a world-wide coalition from Yokohama to Spain. The time had now come when every European state had to take a stand with regard to these plans. This was one of the reasons why he was receiving the Yugoslav Foreign Minister for a conference.

¹ According to notes taken by Counselor Eitzdorf, the Foreign Ministry's representative with the High Command of the Army, Cincar-Marković had a conversation in Fuschl, presumably with Ribbentrop, the day before the meeting at the Berghof with Hitler (1247/337535). No record of the Fuschl conversation has been found.

² The file number is supplied from another copy (66/46147-67).

On the other hand a situation had recently arisen which enabled him (the Führer) to speak in greater detail with Count Ciano in Vienna about consolidating the Balkans,³ although countries like Yugoslavia came essentially within the sphere of Italy, since they were Mediterranean countries.

The Führer emphasized that the existence of Yugoslavia was important for Germany. There were no political differences between the Reich and Yugoslavia. Certain matters relating to nationality were being settled in a friendly way. For the sake of the balance of power in the Balkans, Germany was in favor of a strong Yugoslavia. Of very special interest, however, were the economic relations between Germany and Yugoslavia, which had become one of the largest trading partners of the Reich. The economies of the two countries—predominantly agricultural on the Yugoslav side and industrial on the German side—supplemented each other excellently, so that a favorable exchange between industrial and agricultural products was possible.

He (the Führer) had not just adopted the aforementioned political policy in 1940, but had been pursuing it for many years, as Cincar-Marković would remember from his Berlin days.⁴

Germany had no territorial ambitions in the Balkans. The successes which she had achieved so far in the war, as well as her future colonies, would claim all her energy. Therefore she was not aiming at imperial conquests. It would be 100 years before the newly acquired grain regions in the East could be so developed as to produce the yield that Germany was striving for.

In her present position of power, Germany had no foe of consequence to fear. In the spring she would have a total of 230 divisions, 186 of which could be called first-class. This represented at the present moment the greatest "inactive" military power in the world—that is to say, not employed in war operations and available for all eventualities.

A situation had now arisen which would never, or at least not soon, return, and which would enable Yugoslavia to create for herself a position which would be unalterable in the future. If this opportunity were used to consolidate the position of Yugoslavia in agreement with Germany's Italian ally, then Germany would always be able to insist thereafter that Italy abide by this consolidation: For exactly in the same way that she was faithfully fulfilling the obligations of an ally, Germany could insist on the observance of agreements entered into with respect to Yugoslavia, especially since the Reich was not dependent on help of any kind from other countries. Hence

³ See document No. 366.

⁴ Cincar-Marković had been Yugoslav Minister in Germany, Dec. 1935–Feb. 1939.

she had not pressed Italy into the war, and with respect to Russia, too, she had from the outset renounced military help. Just as in domestic politics he (the Führer) had always relied on his own party and not depended on coalitions, so it was also his aim in foreign policy to carry out all operations alone and independent of foreign help.

Once a common line of policy with regard to Yugoslavia was established in accord with Italy, this policy could no longer be changed even if it no longer suited Italy for the future. It was now possible for him (the Führer) to urge Italy to accept the Yugoslav policy which he had always advocated, but which he had not so far been able to get his ally to adopt. This possibility had been created by the military events in Greece, which in the total picture were unimportant, but could in certain circumstances cause Germany to intervene. The course of the Italo-Greek war was a classic example of the recurring case, occurring in history time and again, of a big power underestimating a smaller nation's ability to resist. Thus the English had underestimated the strength of the Boers; the Austrians in 1914, Serbia's power to resist; Italy, the war-like qualities of the Abyssinians; and Russia, the fighting power of the Finnish Army. Italy had started the Greek war with criminal frivolity and altogether inadequate preparation. Moreover, Greece herself was not the cause of the conflict. The real cause lay in Anglo-Greek collaboration, for which there was also documentary proof. Because of Greek support of the English, Italy, in fact, had already lost a considerable number of submarines and other vessels. Prior to the beginning of the [Italo-Greek] war, the Greek Archipelago had actually played the same role as had certain Swedish islands during the German operations in Norway. However, Germany had not at that time lost her nerve because she was better able to defend herself with her fleet than Italy could do against the operations of the English fleet covered by Greece. Thanks to the blood relationship between the Greek royal house and England, numerous English bases had been established on Greek territory, and the support of England by Greece had gradually assumed such forms that the Italians finally became indignant to the point where they went to war. Basically, the Duce would certainly not have sought any new adventures if these emotional factors had not been present as well.

Italy had then suffered the reverses which he (the Führer) had always feared. Five or six divisions were too few for such an undertaking, and the preparations had not been carried out well. To be sure, individual troops units, such as the Alpine troops, had fought very bravely, but it had been too late to save the situation.

This situation had given him (the Führer) the opportunity to touch on the problem of Yugoslavia in his conversation with Count Ciano and to discuss with him its political aspect, emphasizing the

German economic interest. It should be regarded as a real disposition of Providence that the exuberance of certain Italian patriots and public opinion had been somewhat dampened as a result of the events in Greece, and that those Italians who had the same views about the treatment of Yugoslavia as the Führer had always advocated would again step into the foreground more actively. In a conversation with Count Ciano in Vienna and in a letter to the Duce,⁵ he (the Führer) had discussed the old line of policy which he had always pursued with respect to Yugoslavia. He had based the justification for it, with respect to his ally, on the events in Greece. He had again emphasized the interest of Germany in settled conditions in the Balkans and he would remark in this connection that Germany for this reason had always been in favor of a strong regime. In the present circumstances, he had thought that he could assume the responsibility of informing his ally of his view on these matters. The situation was unique. Germany's position was clear and had always been so; only that of the ally had been vacillating. If it should now be possible to induce the Italian ally to accept definitively the idea of consolidation, and to undertake the consolidation, it would be secure for all time. He (the Führer) took the view that the present moment was most suitable for speaking with Italy about these matters, since Italy probably realized herself that a consolidation in the Balkans was advantageous and understood more clearly than before the incalculable consequences of nonconsolidation. Moreover, in view of the military situation, Germany would perhaps have to intervene. This gave him (the Führer) the right to make his view regarding a definitive consolidation of the Balkan situation prevail.

In the event of intervention Germany would be taking action not against Greece, but against the English in Greece and would expel them from this territory, too, just as she had expelled them from Norway, Belgium, Holland, and France.

The Führer stressed vigorously his determination to drive the English out of Greece in all circumstances. For this purpose he would probably use 20—if necessary, 60, 80, or even 180—divisions. This decision, however, gave him an opportunity to assert certain rights with regard to Italy. He did not want to demand any increases in territory, but asked only that the German interest in the general tranquillity of the Balkans be satisfied.

This interest in maintaining tranquillity in the Balkans was so strong that Germany in another case had taken on the heavy burden of a guarantee with respect to Rumania. Germany gave few states guarantees, but back of these guarantees stood the entire German Wehrmacht. Rumania had been saved by it.

⁵ Document No. 369.

He thought he could persuade the Italians—taught by their experiences in Greece—to adopt the ideas of the Führer for a definitive consolidation of the Balkans.

Germany did not want in any case to be drawn into a limitless struggle and did not desire that as a possible result of German military successes a situation should be created which represented the exact opposite of what Germany was striving for, that is, by placing Yugoslavia in a weaker position than previously. It would be terrible if the war should be still further extended. He was already very sorry for the Greeks and would rather go to their country as a peaceful traveler to see the Acropolis than to organize a military action against the English there.

In any case he was advising Yugoslavia to take quickly advantage of the situation thus created, before the iron die was cast. He emphasized, moreover, that if he now carried through a consolidation approved also by the Italian ally, no further change would be made in the future. His help to Italy gave him the right to demand this.

To be sure, it had to be realized that a consolidation without rectifications was impossible. Thus, certain Bulgarian demands had to be satisfied.

In reply to a question of Cincar-Marković about the meaning of the rectifications in favor of Bulgaria, the Führer said that the rectifications for Bulgaria had to be made at the expense of Greece.

Hungary was as satiated by the recent increases in territory as a boa constrictor. She already had a bad case of indigestion and had to settle her Jewish question and social problems domestically.

The Führer emphasized in the further course of the conversation that he wished to take Yugoslavia into the European coalition. This was not done in order to obtain help of some kind from that country. The English would probably in a similar case immediately ask how many divisions Yugoslavia could make available. Germany did not ask for anything, not even the right of passage for troops. She merely thought that the moment had come when she could make her ally agree to having Yugoslavia included in the European consolidation.

This consolidation was especially necessary in the Balkans, because Russia seemed to be pursuing a Balkan policy borrowed from the testaments of Peter the Great and the Empress Catherine. Russia had declared that she wanted to give Bulgaria a guarantee⁶ under the same conditions as that given by Germany and Italy to Rumania. Characteristically, the Russians had emphasized at the same time that they would not do anything against the King and the internal regime of Bulgaria. This was rather a strange accom-

⁶ See documents Nos. 403 and 415.

paniment to an offer of a guarantee. Regarding this suggestion by the Russians, he (the Führer) had asked the Russians in turn if Bulgaria herself had solicited a guarantee, as Rumania had solicited it at the time from Germany; and he had further remarked that he would have to consult Italy respecting a definitive position in the matter.⁷ Within the framework of this proposal for a guarantee the Russians had told the Bulgarians that they would support Bulgaria's wishes for revision with respect to Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. They wished to use Bulgaria as a springboard for the establishment of bases on the Dardanelles. These Russian encouragements had given rise to the well-known Bulgarian demands. Italy was not backing them, but it was clear that the Bulgarians would have to get something.

On the other hand, Italy had objections on military grounds against having another power on the Adriatic inland sea looking into her window, in a military sense, as it were. Therefore if Yugoslavia obtained another outlet to the sea at Salonika, this would result in a relaxation of the tense situation in the Adriatic. Yugoslavia could then perhaps also make the gesture of establishing her main naval port at Salonika.

In reply to a question interposed by Cincar-Marković as to what the demilitarization of Dalmatia was actually supposed to mean, the Führer said that it was essentially a gesture. By the [Yugoslav] occupation of Salonika, an attack on Yugoslavia would become impossible, since it was possible, to be sure, to close off the Adriatic, but not the Aegean Sea at the same time. In domestic politics, too, the acquisition of Salonika would bring with it advantages for Yugoslavia.

In summary, the Führer stated that Yugoslavia could now obtain a secure position in Europe. Between Italy and Germany on the one hand, and Yugoslavia on the other hand, a nonaggression pact could be concluded; in certain conditions one could even go further in order to consolidate Yugoslav security. In addition, Yugoslavia would obtain an outlet to the Aegean Sea. In this way the Yugoslav problem would be settled permanently.

Germany would in any case carry out the measure she had planned regardless of Yugoslavia's attitude toward these proposals. In 3 months the situation would possibly be less favorable for Yugoslavia; therefore, he (the Führer), as a friend of this country, advised prompt action if Yugoslavia wished to acquiesce in these plans.

In an incidental remark, Cincar-Marković tried to represent the establishment of an English front at Salonika as a rumor not to be

⁷ See document No. 328.

taken seriously. Without the French, the English were not in a position to carry out such an operation.

The Führer again emphasized in this connection that the time had now come for Yugoslavia to move away from her uncertain position. At the moment when Yugoslavia held in her hand Germany's signature regarding her independent existence, she could be indifferent to everything else. If Germany now intervened, she had the right to make certain demands on her ally. She would be able to point out that she had no desire always to act the part of the fireman who was called out to extinguish blazes that had started. Germany would be able to demand that steps be taken to prevent the start of other fires. Furthermore, the Duce would without doubt be glad if certain Italian hotheads were confronted with accomplished facts.

If, however, the critical situation after some time changed in favor of Italy, as a result of the intervention of Germany, Rome would be less inclined to acquiesce in these ideas. Germany now had a right to demand this; she was not interfering in the sphere of influence of her ally, but was called there by the course of events. Neither Yugoslavia nor Bulgaria ought herself to intervene in the conflict in any manner. He (the Führer) merely wished to have a clear understanding in advance as to what was to be done with what was won by German blood. It was to the interest of Germany, especially for economic reasons, that both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia should obtain certain regions. It seemed advantageous to Germany for Yugoslavia also to be accessible through other than Adriatic ports.

For all these reasons, the conversation with Count Ciano in Vienna had taken place, and the letter had been sent to the Duce, who in the meantime had indicated his agreement.

The sooner order was brought to the Balkans, the sooner it would be possible to reach an agreement with Russia on this point. Stalin was a shrewd statesman, and, being that, he wanted to do business. He was attempting it first along the traditional Russian roads. If, however, he saw that he was not making any progress there, he would certainly shift his expansion in other directions.

In conclusion, the Führer stated once more that if Yugoslavia fell in with these ideas, she would obtain not only territorial improvements, but would also become politically secure. The decisive factor in this matter was not what Italy might probably think in a year, but what Germany promised today. Furthermore, Germany would be able within the framework of long-term economic agreements to take over the entire export surplus of Yugoslavia at fixed prices and furnish the latter with all the necessary finished goods.

The Reich Foreign Minister also pointed out that the weight of the new center of power in Europe would prevent any conflict and bring about a kind of Golden Age of peace, in which the nations could

devote themselves to their constructive work in peace. Germany was pursuing a policy of tranquillity and in this way was rendering a great service especially to the smaller states, in contrast to England, which had pursued a policy of balance of power—that is, of eternal unrest among the continental European states—because she needed this European unrest in order to be able unhindered to promote throughout the world the interests of her global empire.

Cincar-Marković did not express himself regarding the substance of the questions put by the Führer. He merely stated that he had clearly understood everything and said he intended to return to Belgrade at once and report to the Prince Regent.

The Führer on his part stated that, if there should be further inquiries he was ready to receive Cincar-Marković or the Prince Regent in Berchtesgaden or, in a somewhat larger compass, in Vienna.

With words of thanks to the Führer, Cincar-Marković took leave and arranged with the Reich Foreign Minister to inform him through a special intermediary of further developments in the question.³

SCHMIDT

³ In telegram No. 27, sent from the Special Train on Nov. 28, Ribbentrop instructed Heeren in Belgrade to forward any statements made by Cincar-Marković to Ribbentrop personally. Strictest secrecy was to be observed. (230/152397)

On Nov. 28, Weizsäcker informed the Yugoslav Minister in Berlin of Cincar-Marković's visit. The Minister did not know about the visit. Weizsäcker limited himself to saying that the conversations had been concluded "in a spirit of good understanding." (230/152399)

On Dec. 5 Heeren reported (telegram No. 873: 230/152407) that the Prince Regent had that day met with the Minister President, the Deputy Minister President, Maček, the Foreign Minister, and Minister of Public Instruction Korosec to discuss Hitler's proposal. The Foreign Minister had said that he would be able to give the Yugoslav reply 2 days hence. See, further, document No. 467.

No. 418

121/120190

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, November 28, 1940.

Minister Hencke reports the following by telephone from Wiesbaden:

The Chairman of the French delegation with the Armistice Commission has informed the German Armistice Commission in a note¹ that Marshal Pétain will transfer the seat of Government to Paris or Versailles in the period between December 10 and 15. General Doyen has given General Stülpnagel the additional explanation orally that the diplomatic corps is to remain in Vichy and that Marshal Pétain

¹ The French note of Nov. 27 is printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. III, pp. 24-25.

will return there from time to time. Most of the authorities would remain in Vichy and only Marshal Pétain with a staff of assistants would take up quarters in Versailles. General Stülpnagel has requested that these somewhat unclear oral statements be defined in writing. Herr Hencke will transmit the statement with additional comments by teletype.²

WOERMANN

² Hencke gave the background and his own evaluation of the French note in telegram No. 268 of Nov. 28 (121/120191-93). Further developments were reported in telegrams Nos. 271 of Nov. 29 (368/207334-35) and 276 of Nov. 30 (121/120210) from Wiesbaden. See, further, document No. 421.

No. 419

91/100447-50;
91/100453-54

The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

DUBLIN, November 29, 1940.

No. 774 of November 29

Received November 29—11:50 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 402 of November 26.¹

I have received no further reports which (group of text in clear apparently missing) to English invasion plans, and up to my last visit on the 22nd of this month I found, as previously reported, a calmer atmosphere prevailing at the Foreign Ministry here. This impression has also been confirmed to me by my Italian colleague. Recent illness made it impossible for me for 3 days to have any further discussions. Supplementing earlier reports, I have this to say:

I. The luncheon invitation to de Valera provided no opportunity for any substantial conversation. But I took advantage of my next talk with Walshe, while speaking merely for myself, to approach him along the lines of the instructions of telegram No. 385 of November 13.² Walshe then made the following remarks: There were many voices in Ireland expressing anxiety that Germany might sacrifice Ireland to England at the eventual conclusion of a peace. He, Walshe, usually replied in such cases that this was unlikely on account of Ireland's strategic importance, if nothing else.

II. The views held here regarding the probability of an impending British attack are widely divergent. But anxiety is growing since Churchill's thrust in the question of the Irish ports.³ The reasonings of pessimists run approximately like this: British fear of the reaction which acts of violence against Ireland would arouse in the United

¹ Document No. 407.

² Document No. 330.

³ See document No. 300 and footnote 1.

States, a decisive factor so far, has grown less since Roosevelt's re-election, despite continued evidence of intensive Irish-American activities. It is moreover very doubtful whether the British still think that defeat can be avoided and whether, for that reason, they attach as much importance to the reaction in the United States as they did before. Proceeding on this assumption it would be obvious, on the other hand, that, reckoning with the impending loss of their position in Europe and the Mediterranean, they would attach special importance to having possession of Ireland when the future new order is established, and they would attempt to make sure of that before the war ends, for the purpose of having a bridge to Canada and the United States, of having control of the Atlantic, and also in case of any possible ideas of a future war of revenge.⁴

Ireland's neutrality is felt by Great Britain as a "deep sore in her side," and the freeing of Ireland some time ago in the hope that Ireland would adopt a subservient attitude toward England, is now regretted as having been an error.

The strategic value of Irish ports, especially Berehaven, Lough Swilly with its airfield, (two letters missing) ynes (mouth of Shannon), for England is considered by people here to be very high. These considerations are balanced, however, by the strong opposition, on general principles and practical grounds, which is said to exist within the British Cabinet to any policy of force against Ireland. Reports about supposed preparations for an attack by England must for this reason, I believe, also be received with great caution because they might quite easily be spread by the British counterespionage for the purpose of inducing us to make the first move.

III. On the basis of reliable information, I assume that the military situation is as follows:

1. Preparations for the defense of Ireland against a surprise attack have been and continue to be carried out vigorously and in great detail.

2. Irish resistance⁵ unquestionably would be conducted with every available resource of total warfare by the nationalist elements, known to be ready for any sacrifice. The Army, including the recently incorporated armed security forces, is now approximately 150,000 strong. The Irish feel very confident, despite a lack of sufficient heavy weapons, that they would be able at first to hold their own even against superior British forces by guerilla warfare or by operations with mobile columns which would probably launch simultaneous attacks on Northern Ireland.

3. Even the Irish Army evidently considers avoidance of any first move by Germany of such fundamental importance that, referring to the possibility of holding out in the beginning with its own resources,

⁴ The subsequent portion of this telegram was dispatched on Nov. 30 and was received at 12:15 a. m. that day.

⁵ The original reads here "Widerspruch" which is obviously a typographical mistake or an error in transmission and ought to read "Widerstand".

it apparently envisages coordination with the hoped for German assistance only after an English attack has taken place. Obviously, what seems to be primarily expected is early effective action by the German Luftwaffe if the British should attack.⁶

4. The Irish have recently received arms shipments from the United States.

5. Regarding the tactics of a British attack, the possibilities considered are those of a simultaneous thrust from Northern Ireland and English landing attempts at small unfortified ports on the east and southeast coast of Ireland.

6. I assume that the Irish would request German assistance.

IV. Concerning the additional discussions requested in your telegram No. 402, I should like to say that de Valera is exercising special circumspection precisely because of the most recent statements directed against England in his speech after the raising of the issue of the Irish ports by Churchill. In his Press Association interview, which is available to you,⁷ he once more gave a very detailed explanation of the situation for purposes of propaganda in the United States, stating particularly that only an attack would dislodge Ireland from its neutrality and that even the possibility of the return of Northern Ireland would not change this situation. At the same time, however, he made a special point of stressing, once more, that this was not on account of a fundamentally anti-British attitude. Especially now he will avoid anything that might be construed and exploited by England as a departure from strict neutrality, and with his well-known caution he will avert even the remotest possibility of exposure in this delicate matter. Now I shall therefore seek the requested further clarification by other means and at the same time continue exploiting the terrain to find out whether a talk with de Valera himself would be advisable even at this time. I believe that in about a week, I shall be in a position to make a further report. I should add in this connection that it is persistently asserted in I. R. A. circles, as before, that Germany would attack Northern Ireland in March or April; that despite the opposing view held by the Foreign Ministry, the German High Command would then also attack the Irish Free State and support Ireland [the I. R. A.] in order to overthrow de Valera; that Ireland [the I. R. A.] knew all this through its continuous contact with the German High Command. Since the Irish Government is also likely to be aware of these assertions, it is to be expected that while it is convinced of the Foreign Ministry's intention to respect Ireland's neutrality, it may question that this assumption applies to the High Command and react with the appropriate apprehension and distrust.

⁶ The remaining portion of this telegram which was sent separately was apparently garbled in transmission (91/100451-52). The text printed here is the corrected version as sent on Dec. 4.

⁷ This apparently refers to an interview which de Valera gave to Wallace Carroll, an American journalist, on Nov. 20.

V. Of at least equal importance to the early arrival of German aid in the event of an English attack is in my opinion a simultaneous German declaration, at all events when the Irish request for aid is received, that we will champion the complete independence of a united Ireland from England at the peace negotiations to come. The Irish determination to resist would thus be greatly strengthened from the outset by us, too.

HEMPFEL

No. 420

136/74485-87

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, November 29, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received in Berlin, November 29—2:25 p. m.

No. 4078 of November 29

(Forwarded as No. 220 to the Special Train, Fuschl).

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 4074 of November 28.¹

For yesterday's discussion of Franco's position on the questions discussed at Berchtesgaden the Spanish Foreign Minister had made written notes which he read to me.² The passages below which are in quotation marks are given verbatim.

1) "It is agreed that the preparations for Spain's entry into the war are to be speeded up as much as possible."

2) "The time required for this, however, cannot today be definitely determined, because in connection with the G[ibraltar]-action the man who orders this must also reckon with the possibility of other important military actions which he has to face fully prepared."

3) "For this purpose Franco requests the dispatch of German military experts who would get in touch with the Spanish ministries of the armed forces. Franco would be especially gratified if, in addition, an officer enjoying the Führer's special confidence, with whom it would be possible to discuss all questions frankly, were attached to them and sent to Spain."³

4) For economic questions (deliveries, distribution of food) as well as transportation questions Franco likewise requests that experts be sent.

¹ The decoded text reads 4075, but was corrected to read 4074. Telegram No. 4074 (136/74478) reported opposition to Serrano Suñer among various Spanish generals and the possibility of changes involving the Minister of War and the High Commissioner for Morocco.

² See document No. 414.

³ See document No. 448.

5) Franco is of the opinion that simultaneously with the G-action another action should be carried out in the eastern Mediterranean for the purpose of closing the Suez Canal.

Further consideration, partly in response to inquiries from me, also brought out the following:

Regarding 1) and 2): Spain would be prepared even now for the beginning of the G-action; however, the Spaniards fear English counteractions against the Galician coast (Vigo, La Coruña, etc.), Bilbao, Cadiz, the Canary Islands, the possessions in West Africa, and to a lesser degree against the Balearic Islands, which counteractions they do not wish to face unprepared. The Spaniards have little fear of English action against Portugal, because the Portuguese Government is determined not to permit any landing and would immediately request Spanish (and hence German) aid. Nicolas Franco, the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon, who happened to be in Madrid for a short while yesterday, emphasized this view of the Foreign Minister's to me, pointing out that Portugal had promised full information on any English designs against Portugal or Spain that came to light. Portugal will, however, do everything possible to remain neutral toward both sides.

The Spaniards feel that they especially need anti-aircraft artillery for defense against enemy air attacks on the above-mentioned areas (except the West African possessions, which would be lost in any case).

Regarding 3): Since it would be quite impossible to keep visits of numerous German military missions secret, the Minister requests that only individual picked officers be sent. Their visits, too, would become known to the enemy but would not have such an alarming effect and would give England less justification for premature economic, not to speak of military, countermeasures. The high military personage that Franco requests be sent should if possible come here under an assumed name, well disguised as the private guest of some German personage; otherwise, *only* officially with some mission to Franco (proposals reserved).

Regarding 4): The question of tires for trucks is causing special concern; those available are already very worn and there are no reserves. For personnel carriers, requisitioned tires of private cars laid up for the time being for lack of gasoline would suffice.

Regarding 5): The Spaniards fear that the pressure from England will be too strong unless the English fleet and other military means in the Mediterranean are partly tied down in the eastern theater of war.

The Foreign Minister finally called attention again to the immediate aid requested for Spain in the form of grain made available via

Portugal and the French border (cf. my telegram No. 4022 of November 25⁴). I consider accommodation in this matter extremely desirable and request an early decision.⁵

STOHRER

⁴ Document No. 398.

⁵ See document No. 444.

No. 421

3699/E036187

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris

Telegram

No. 1429 of November 29

BERLIN, November 29, 1940.

Received November 29—6:10 p. m.

With reference to the telegram of November 28 from the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden,¹ an identical text of which was sent to Ambassador Abetz, regarding the French note of November 27 on transferring the seat of the French Government to Versailles.²

It is the intention here to propose to the Foreign Minister that General Doyen be told by General von Stülpnagel that in consideration of the forthcoming conversations with Laval a decision on the matter taken up in the note is being deferred for the time being.

Please wire your opinion at once.³

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 418, footnote 2.

² See *ibid.*, and footnote 1.

³ No reply has been found. See, further, documents Nos. 441 and 446.

No. 422

265/172517-20

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, November 29, 1940—11:30 p. m.

SECRET

Received November 30—4:00 p. m.

No. 971 of November 29

I just had a long conversation with the State President in the presence of the Foreign Minister, in which I told him the following:

The Führer's conversations in recent weeks regarding the organization of a new European order on the broadest possible basis had met with the most extensive cooperation everywhere. In contrast to the

English efforts to minimize this statesmanlike activity, one had to note the decisive diplomatic success of the Powers of the Tripartite Pact. We therefore desired to win over Turkey, too, to cooperation in these objectives. It was our desire that the present tense situation of Turkey, in which because of English machinations she felt threatened by alleged German operations in the Balkans or through Asia Minor, should be replaced by a complete clarification of our intentions, in order to win Turkey over to cooperation in a new order in the Near East. By way of precaution I wanted to state that this accommodation on our part was not a result of the situation in Albania or of Bulgaria's refusal to accede to the Tripartite Pact as was asserted by England. Our political course was by no means affected to any decisive degree by the events in Greece. The war was not being decided in Greece; it would be decided by us in the near, foreseeable future and for this reason we had discussed the situation in the Near East in detail with our Russian friends. The assurances which I was in a position to offer Turkey would be entirely compatible with Turkey's commitments toward England. According to repeated statements by Turkey these commitments were entirely defensive and referred only to Turkey's possessions. If the assurance of the Axis Powers were now added to this assurance, the President's policy, which had always been directed only toward the preservation of Turkey's possessions, would meet with 100 percent approval within the country, too. Therefore there would then no longer be any reason for Turkey to consider an English victory as the only acceptable solution; rather, Turkey would in her own interest be able to determine with us the position which she wished to preserve at the conclusion of the peace for the protection of her rightful interests.

In a series of questions the State President then tried to get an exact definition of my offer:

What was the position of the Reich with respect to peace in the Balkans, in which Turkey was vitally interested? When, in what circumstances, and in what way would Germany be forced to come to the aid of her ally, Italy? While ironically criticizing the intensified mobilization measures recently undertaken, I explained to the President that Italy would redress the situation in Albania entirely with her own forces, and that there would be reason for us to intervene only in case an English front were created in the Balkans. (I should like to remark in this connection that the Foreign Minister, following my conversation with him in this matter, has already taken steps to inform the English friends that Turkey did not desire the creation of an English front in any circumstances.)

The State President asked further what I understood by the "creation of a front." Answer: "Landing of operational forces." The State President remarked thereupon that England would not be in a position to do this for a long time, that Turkey did not desire it and would not participate. It was being asserted, however, that we would nevertheless attack in the spring in order to relieve Italy. I said: "If we are not given any reason for intervention, we will not as soldiers proceed to an operation that could not be of any advantage for the final outcome of the war. Moreover, I could assure him that even in the case of an English operation in the Balkans, which he considered remotely possible, we could give Turkey the binding assurance of the protection of her interests." As for Bulgaria, the State President said that she was continuing her war preparations; but I could give him the assurance from the mouth of the King that Bulgaria was not thinking of undertaking any action whatsoever on her own initiative.

In the long discussion on the character of the assurances offered by us the State President again spoke of the deeply rooted distrust of Italy and how little one could depend on Italian assurances. I countered this reproach with the statement that as far as the policy of the Axis was concerned Turkey had to accept us as the guarantors for the observation of joint obligations. "With us," replied the President, "there have never been any differences," and there were a thousand reasons why Turkey never wanted to come into conflict with Germany. I reminded the President that although the war was not yet over we were at a turning point of European policy where it was also important for Turkey not to miss the boat, and I asked him to give thorough consideration to the suggestions of my Government. When he asked whether I could give him something in writing concerning my proposals, I said that my Government wanted first to know the general reaction toward the ideas I had put forward before it could make any further statements. Thereupon the State President ordered the Foreign Minister to get in touch with me concerning the further handling of the matter (group garbled) immediately after making a serious examination of the matter.

I should be grateful for instructions¹ as to whether in the meantime the Russians have reverted to the conversation regarding Turkey. From the dispute [sic] here I hear that Moscow continues to take a very intensive interest in the Bulgarian attitude. The Bulgarian Minister here has been called to Sofia.

PAPEN

¹ See document No. 443.

No. 423

174/136478

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 864

BERLIN, November 29, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador called on me today¹ in order to repeat in outline what he told the Reich Foreign Minister on his last visit.² As regards the peace feelers between Japan and China, it would be necessary to wait and see what instructions the Chinese Ambassador would now receive from Chiang Kai-shek. Kurusu indicated that the simplest general solution with respect to a settlement between Japan and Russia (but which apparently had not been suggested to him by his Foreign Minister) would be the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian neutrality pact, simultaneous with Japan's renunciation of her oil concession in North Sakhalin, in return for the guaranteed export to Japan of 200,000 tons of Russian oil. Territorial questions should remain quite outside the discussions. The publication of the neutrality pact and the oil agreement would have to be timed in such a manner as to avoid resentment by the Japanese people.

Kurusu presented conclusion of the two pacts—the Japanese-Chinese pact and the Japanese-Russian pact—as the desirable and at the same time the essential conditions for a Japanese advance through the territories south of China (including Siam); it would hardly be possible to capture Singapore without having the use of these. This, too, Kurusu characterized as his own private strategy.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 371, footnote 4.² No record found. Cf. Editors' Note, p. 517.

No. 424

174/136479-80

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 865

BERLIN, November 29, 1940.

I informed the Japanese Ambassador today in a general way of our ideas regarding our forthcoming economic talks with Japan.¹ I told the Ambassador that we were now in the process of settling matters internally with respect to Japan's wishes for a large-scale revision of our economic relations. A delegation of German negotiators would be dispatched to Tokyo as soon as we had a picture

¹ See document No. 341.

of each other's requirements and possibilities. We were thinking of setting the beginning of next year as a date.

This was quite independent, I explained, of our request for Japan's assistance in carrying out and shipping our imports of raw materials from the Netherlands Indies and Indochina. Germany's needs for the latter were quite urgent. Combining this problem with that of our general economic relations referred to above could not be considered. These two matters had nothing to do with each other. However, we would gladly take into consideration Japanese needs as regards the previously mentioned shipments of tungsten and rubber from Indochina. Further details would be taken up by our Embassy in Tokyo.² Nevertheless I was asking Kurusu to take steps in that direction on his own part even at this time and to press the matter.

On receiving these statements the Ambassador again took up the subject of coordinating our purchases of raw materials in the areas mentioned with those of Japan. Confusion would necessarily result if we competed against each other there in our purchases.

I replied to the Ambassador that such competition did not seem expedient to me, too, but that I had to make it clear to him that even under the auspices of the Tripartite Pact we could not agree to have German economic relations with the countries of southeast Asia re-

² In telegram No. 1071 of Dec. 2 (174/136486-89) Wiehl informed Ott of this conversation between Weizsäcker and Kurusu, instructing him at the same time to communicate the following to the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister in reply to his letter which Ott had transmitted to Berlin in telegram No. 1217 of Nov. 6 (see document No. 341 and footnote 7) :

"Germany fully understands that Japan, when the new order in Europe is established, would want to see her economic interests preserved as well as the right independently to make arrangements regarding these interests with areas where political authority is not exercised by German organs and to effect business transactions in these areas. Germany, on the other hand, expects that when the new order is established in the Greater Asiatic sphere her economic interests will be preserved as well as the right independently to make arrangements regarding these interests with areas where political authority is not exercised by Japanese organs, and to effect business transactions in these areas. It goes without saying that it is in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact that Germany as well as Japan takes into consideration the interests of the other party to the Tripartite Pact.

"As for the planned German imports of rubber and tungsten from Indochina, negotiations with France about these were begun immediately after the armistice with France, and thus prior to the Japanese measures in Indochina and prior to the Tripartite Pact. The German Government hopes that Japan will not use the measures which she took in accord with the French Government in Indochina for the purpose of liquidating the China conflict as an occasion to make it difficult for Germany to import critical war materials; the more so since exports from Indochina into third countries, even enemy countries, are not being impeded.

"In consideration of Japanese requirements, the German Government proposes to share with Japan the planned imports of 40,000 tons of rubber and 2,000 tons of tungsten from Indochina. In view of the fact that with respect to rubber and tungsten other markets, too, are available to Japan in which Germany at present is unable to make purchases or can do so only with difficulties, the German Government considers it equitable that in a division the larger portion, that is, three-fourths of the amounts should fall to Germany.

"Japan would receive one-fourth and would state her willingness to have the amounts falling to Germany transported as far as Manchouli by Japanese public or private organs at Germany's expense."

stricted or made dependent on Japan. Ambassador Ott, who had received a written communication on the subject from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, would be instructed to make a similar clarifying statement in Tokyo.

Finally, in connection with the matter dealt with previously, Ambassador Kurusu reopened the subject of constituting the commissions provided for by the Tripartite Pact.³ As Kurusu was hinting that those commissions would be well adapted to handle our purchases of raw materials in the Far East, I immediately replied that these commissions had a different function and could not be considered for that purpose. Their function was to discuss the broad lines of economic strategy of the three Powers in pursuance of the provisions of the Tripartite Pact, but not to handle details of German economic requirements and transactions in the Far East.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ See document No. 270.

No. 425

1139/324865-69

The Head of the Economic Delegation in the Soviet Union to Ambassador Ritter

CONFIDENTIAL

At present Moscow, November 29, 1940.

DEAR HERR RITTER: The outcome of yesterday's conversation with Molotov¹ was for once a genuinely pleasant surprise. Following the very tense conference which had preceded it 3 days earlier,² I had really not expected any such result. I would be grateful to you if you would look after my telegram to the Foreign Minister and see to it that copies are sent to the Reich Ministers concerned and particularly to the Reichsmarschall.

Tomorrow afternoon I am again going to see Mikoyan, who also showed his most agreeable side at the Kremlin conversation yesterday, and I hope that he will give me some material that can be used to enlarge the list of goods the Soviets could order. Up until now it has been impossible here to solve the question of German deliveries despite the great mustering of forces by the Reich Economics Ministry. For one reason, this is due to technical difficulties, for the Russians have so far persisted in demanding an unjustifiably large number of machine tools from us. But it is also due to the inadequacies of the people assigned with this work. In the case of Herr Schottky I cannot help feeling that he is inwardly pleased by every setback and certainly does not consider the conclusion of big armaments deals as a goal to be achieved in all circumstances. My hope of finding support against these tendencies in Lieutenant Commander Koch, the emis-

¹ See document No. 412.

² See document No. 406.

sary of General Thomas, has, I am sorry to say, not been fulfilled. For all his pleasant manner and personal charm, Koch has not succeeded in making any impact anywhere, so that Schottky, together with his rather disagreeable Herr Immisch, have the whole field to themselves and find in me their only opponent. Schlotterer's activity in Moscow has been a great disappointment to me. He is not candid and he is not loyal. In technical matters he is flighty and superficial. The statements he made here have been proved totally wrong at crucial points and have given rise to difficulties which will take a long time to clear up. I am rather worried about how Schlotterer is doing on the job I have given him in Berlin of making sure that the full amount is supplied. With the Reich Economics Ministry on the scene here with such an impressive array of people, I had hoped this whole Berlin interlude would be unnecessary, but unluckily Schlotterer and his colleagues have no more been able to make decisions and answer questions than was Ter-Nedden last year.³ It has been particularly bad luck that Lange, the only man with authority and ability, had to drop out because of illness right after the negotiations started. As a result the whole machinery sector here, too, is only most inadequately taken care of.

I am writing you this to let you know at first hand that the personnel difficulties of the delegation are actually greater than the naturally inherent technical difficulties. If you could find the time, I should be most grateful to you if you would check up on what Schlotterer is doing in Berlin and see to it that he is really provided with adequate German offers when he appears again on the scene here.

It also seems that the Reichsmarschall's order to classify all Russian deals in Group I A no longer carries any weight. According to numerous reports, especially from the machine industry, it appears that the military authorities have so filled up the special priority category that Group I A is now only of secondary importance. As a result there are not available sufficient production capacity and the necessary manpower to fill the Russian orders on schedule. I have instructed Lieutenant Commander Koch, whom I am sending back tomorrow, to make this emphatically clear once more to his chief, General Thomas. Perhaps you could remind Colonel General Halder of the talk we recently had with him at the Kaiserhof and ask him to support our Russian deals for the sake of his own military interest.

I am going to stop now. Otherwise the letter will get too long. It is my aim to put the big Russian treaty for 1941/42 under the Christmas tree in Berlin. This will be done if our efforts regarding German

³ Oberregierungsrat Ter-Nedden was the chief representative of the Reich Economics Ministry on the Economic delegation sent to Moscow in October 1939. See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 237, footnote 1.

exports for Russia are more successful than heretofore. Please, do call to the attention of the Foreign Minister and the key military figures the tremendous advantages which Germany would derive from such a treaty with 2.5 million tons of grain as its core.⁴

With best regards,

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

K. SCHNURRE

⁴In a further letter of Dec. 12 to Ritter (1139/324817-19), Schnurre described the difficulties which had developed regarding several subjects under negotiation.

No. 426

2274/479704-11

Minister Neubacher to Minister Clodius

BUCHAREST, November 29, 1940.

DEAR FRIEND: Yesterday I wrote the report of which I am enclosing a copy, and I am sending it to you directly for your information.

You can imagine that the middle class society in this country is in a state of great excitement and would like best to see our troops putting a horrible end to these atrocious revolutionaries. Quite a few common friends have called on me imploring me to clean things up here thoroughly, and it is especially touching to watch how Franco-ophile capitalists would like to see all the streets of Bucharest filled with German soldiers. As an old revolutionary I am enjoying these outbreaks of anxiety and fear for money and life with a kind of grim humor. For decades this crowd did not care about the misery of the masses, and probably had feelings of sincere gratitude for a wise and noble king when the [Iron] Guard was massacred.

I continue to view with calm the further developments, although there is no doubt that there are extremist groups who are concocting their plans without bothering about the leadership of the Legion.

I believe that I will be in Berlin again week after next at the latest in order to settle my personal affairs once and for all.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

NEUBACHER

[Enclosure]

BUCHAREST, November 28, 1940.

MEMORANDUM OF MY CONVERSATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF THE
RUMANIAN CRISIS ON NOVEMBER 27, 1940

The Jilava incident led on the morning of November 27 to a serious crisis between the General and the Guard.¹ At 3:00 p. m. the Legion

¹In the night from Nov. 26 to Nov. 27, members of the Iron Guard had forced their way into the prison at Jilava, near Bucharest and killed a number of political prisoners. This was followed by other political assassinations such as that of former Minister President Jorga.

press chief, Medrea, called on me by instruction of Horia Sima and informed me that the situation was extremely precarious because the General was demanding the immediate resignation of Sima and was laying claim to the leadership of the movement himself. There were also efforts being made to induce the General to form a government with generals and set up a military dictatorship. Sima asked me to take a position and to mediate in this serious crisis.

In the morning I had harmonized my views with those of Minister Fabricius, and first of all gave the following statement: From a political and moral point of view the revolutionary action in Jilava was, in my opinion, by no means such a great tragedy that it had to shake the time-tested foundations of the government and bring about a change in system. The revolutionary execution of the main culprits for the massacre of the Guard would not have offended the sense of justice of the public in any way during the first days of the revolution; this late revenge, however, represented certainly a serious violation of the authority of the Leader of the State, who was entitled to receive satisfaction from the Legionnaire movement; this could take the form of having the latter guarantee the cessation of illegal actions in all spheres of public life and the economy.

I was willing, I said, to point out to the General that the assumption by him personally of the direct leadership of the Guard was neither necessary nor useful. According to the unwritten law of every revolutionary hierarchy this would necessarily lead to the disorganization of the movement and to an anarchistic split.

From 5:00 p. m. on I had a number of conversations with General Antonescu, Horia Sima, Minister of Labor Jasinschi (Guardist), State Secretary Biris (Ministry of Interior, Guardist), Mihai Antonescu (Minister of Justice), State Secretary Papanace (Guardist), and several members of the Government and generals who were assembled the whole day in the anteroom and the office of the Leader of the State. During these 2½-hour long conferences Minister Fabricius, too, called on General Antonescu, so that there was again an opportunity for establishing agreement on the kind of influence to be exerted with respect to the solution of the crisis.² The first effect on General Antonescu of the incidents in Jilava and other acts of violence on the same day was an absolutely depressing one. He had seriously considered resigning, and felt that in view of the Berlin visit that had just taken place and the Führer's appreciative words about the bloodless execution of the revolution in Rumania his honor as a responsible statesman was badly impaired. In the course of the day the General's energy naturally reasserted itself and found expression in reference to the Guard and by his demand for Sima's

² Fabricius reported on these matters in telegram No. 2194 of Nov. 29 erroneously numbered 2594 (182/85695-97).

resignation and the assumption of the leadership of the Legionnaire movement.

I took the following position in my conversation with the General:

1. His resignation was entirely out of the question.
2. The responsible leaders of the Guard recognized more than ever the authority and the historic mission of the General.
3. The incident of Jilava belonged rather in the category of revolution than in that of criminality.
4. The arbitrary abductions and murders of prominent representatives of the old multiparty state should be taken more seriously than the revolutionary revenge of Jilava.
6. The incidents of November 27 were a favorable point of departure for the clear delimitation of authority in the state. The leaders of the Guard are willing to recognize that they must be satisfied with influencing the administration and the economy through their Guardist ministers, state secretaries, Prefects, and other high government officials and put an end to the revolutionary initiative of individual groups.
7. All the incidents of November 27 by no means justify a basic change in the leadership of the state, and I was still convinced that the previous cooperation of the General and the Guard must be continued.

In my conversations with Horia Sima and the other leading representatives of the Guard I stressed the following points:

1. The incident of Jilava represents delayed revolutionary justice. The public's sense of justice will not be offended by the execution of the main culprits in the massacre of the Guard.
2. The arbitrary arrest and execution of citizens by uncontrollable revolutionary groups affects dangerously the authority of the leadership of the state and of the Legionnaire movement.
3. A continuation of the incidents of November 27 must be prevented in the most drastic manner; the Legionnaire movement owes it to the Leader of State to make amends, both for the sake of the discipline of the Legionnaire movement and of its public reputation. The Legionnaire movement must renounce undertaking, outside the framework of the Legionnaire state in which it is represented by the most important people, arbitrary interference with administration, economy, personal liberty, and security. As long as the Legionnaire movement recognizes the historical mission and the national significance of General Antonescu it is duty bound to concede this man full authority.
4. General Antonescu's plan to take over the leadership of the Legionnaire movement himself is politically wrong. I am willing to use my own influence to support the justifiable resistance of the Legionnaire movement against this plan.

Finally, I recommended to both parties that they should not draw any conclusions straight away about the extent of the revolutionary action on the basis of the manifold rumors of this evening and perhaps should postpone until the next day the plan for a reorganization of the government.

On the occasion of this serious crisis I have noted that the moral authority of the General with all the responsible leaders of the Guard is much stronger than 3-4 weeks ago. At that time the relationship of confidence between the General and the Guard took a very critical turn. Before the General's trip to Italy,³ open discussions between him and Sima improved the atmosphere decisively. After his return from Berlin the General's position was extraordinarily strengthened. During the crisis on November 27 the responsible leaders of the Legion never thought of ending the serious conflict with the General by ousting him. I could note throughout the sincere desire to placate the General and save the cooperation with him from this crisis.

I therefore wish to state in conclusion that in the last analysis the events of November 27 will have a favorable effect on the consolidation of the political and economic conditions in Rumania.

³ See document No. 346.

No. 427

84/62163

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1940—3:03 a. m.

No. 2594 of November 29

Received December 1—8:30 p. m.

I have learned from a reliable source that Roosevelt, in his long conversation with Lothian after the latter's return from England, made no secret of his annoyance over the English propaganda pressure. He did not wish to be put under pressure by the English. He had assured the American people that he would not lead them into the war and he intended to keep his word. America was prepared on the present scale to give England the most extensive assistance. He would, moreover, see to it that:

- 1) England obtained additional American destroyers of old types (the figure was not mentioned);
- 2) the purchase of American merchant tonnage by England went off smoothly;
- 3) the employment of American volunteers in British and Canadian units (including pilots) was connived at;
- 4) the American Navy took over the observation of German commerce destroyers and raiders, in other words a partial patrol.

Beyond that, England should not cherish any false hopes.

Lothian is said to have been greatly depressed by the conversation, especially since the question of credits was not discussed. From the

expression used by Roosevelt, "aid on the present scale," it is to be concluded that the granting of American credits to England is by no means imminent. From the same source I have heard that both Baruch¹ and Morgenthau have urgently advised the President not to follow the example of 1915-1916 in this respect but make the British pay until they have exhausted their available funds.

THOMSEN

¹ Bernard M. Baruch, American financier, Chairman, War Industries Board, 1918-1919.

No. 428

121/120201-02

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, November 30, 1940—5:45 a. m.

No. 1349 of November 30

Received November 30—6:05 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister through Ambassador Ritter.

Communication by General Huntziger and Admiral Darlan to General Warlimont of the French plan of operations in Africa took place this evening in the Embassy in the presence of Laval and of a representative of the French Air Ministry.¹ Pending a longer report to follow tomorrow,² the French plan of operations can be summarized in three points:

1. Strengthening of the means of defense in order to protect the integrity of French North Africa, French West Africa, and Syria.
2. Organization of an offensive operation through the Chad colony against rebellious colonies in Equatorial Africa.³
3. Carrying out this offensive operation.

For these three steps the French military consider the concessions requested of the Armistice Commission, and in part already granted, to be adequate.⁴

If large parts of the English fleet continue to be contained, as in the past, by the German operations against the British Isles and by the operational situation in the Mediterranean, Admiral Darlan considers that after the requests advanced by the French Navy have been complied with he will be able to safeguard militarily the sea route from Toulon to Dakar. By means of bombers stationed at Oran he hopes to be able to hold in check English attempts to interfere off Gibraltar.

¹ See document No. 410.

² See document No. 434.

³ Libreville and other points in French Equatorial Africa had been occupied by forces of General de Gaulle, Nov. 10-15.

⁴ See document No. 272 and footnote 2, and document No. 321, footnote 4.

In Huntziger's opinion, the preparations for organizing an offensive action against the rebellious colonies in Equatorial Africa, mentioned in point 2, would have to be made along the northern border of the English colony of Nigeria. However, they could not be completed before April 1941. On account of the subsequent rainy season, no major operation could thus be undertaken before the autumn of 1941; all that would be possible would be to conduct patrol actions and influence politically the rebellious French as well as the native tribes in the Chad colony.

Laval reported on a conversation between Samuel Hoare and French Ambassador la Baume in Madrid,⁵ in the course of which Samuel Hoare had stated that if the French fleet should leave its present bases England would open fire on it, and that offensive action by France against the French colonies adhering to de Gaulle would make a conflict with England almost unavoidable. Laval intimated that in this case an entirely new strategical situation would of course be created, and a direct attack on colonial possessions such as Bathurst, Freetown, and Nigeria would be possible.

ABETZ

⁵ See document No. 343 and footnote 1.

No. 429

233/156378-81

The Embassy in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET BUENOS AIRES, November 30, 1940—2:10 p. m.
 No. 1390 of November 29 Received November 30—11:55 p. m.
 [Pol. IX 2498.]¹

With reference to your telegram No. 927 of November 5 and my telegram No. 1349 of November 20.²

Substance of the results and suggestions from the discussions held here by the Chiefs of Mission to Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay and with consideration of the standpoints of the Ministers in Bolivia³ and Paraguay:⁴

I. *Foreign policy:*

In the above-named countries, the main effort of the agitation against South American neutrality is gradually being shifted from England to the U. S. A. Desire for neutrality exists in the Governments concerned. As long as the U. S. A. does not break relations

¹ The file number is supplied from another copy (233/156412-14).

² Neither found.

³ Ernst Wendler.

⁴ Hans Carl Büsing.

with the Axis Powers or intervene in the war, in these countries also a corresponding critical turn in foreign policy is scarcely to be expected. Development is dependent mainly on the attitudes of Argentina and Brazil. In general, the situation is most difficult in Uruguay, and relatively most favorable in Peru. Obscurity of the domestic situation in most countries affects adversely the clarity of direction of foreign policy which is greatly influenced by artificial Pan-Americanism, grafted on by the U. S. A.

An official declaration from an authoritative German source, emphatically stated and better usable for propaganda purposes, on the folly as well as the technical and military impossibility of the allegedly planned invasion of the American Continent might effectively contribute to preservation of neutrality (cf. telegram No. 515 of May 18, 1940⁵).

The Führer's interview with Wiegand of June of this year⁶ as well as similar declarations of the Reichsmarschall later did not have the hoped-for effect because of the journalistic manner of reporting them.

Cooperation with diplomatic representatives of friendly powers is in general good, but could still be considerably enhanced, especially as far as Spain is concerned. A suggestion from Berlin to the respective governments for increased and also practical cooperation with us would be desirable.

II. *Military affairs:*

The escape of members of the crew of the *Graf Spee* from internment causes serious difficulties in all the neighboring countries. It is intended, in agreement with Naval Attaché Niebuhr,⁷ to terminate the escape operation after the officers and specialists who have already fled have been moved out.

It is desired that the American 300-mile security zone be respected.⁸

Acts of sabotage in South American countries are absolutely pointless because the political harm resulting from them would be way out of proportion to the success.

Definitely recommended is the early resumption of transoceanic Lufthansa traffic as a basis for the maintenance and expansion of Lufthansa service in South America as well as for reasons of prestige, on account of enhanced import possibilities and of the safety of the postal route. (Cf. telegram No. 1391 of Nov. 29.⁹) The consideration that some continental lines under German influence are endangered by North American intrigues is of decisive importance.

⁵ Vol. IX of this series, document No. 269.

⁶ See *ibid.*, document No. 473, footnote 3.

⁷ Naval and Air Attaché at the Embassy in Argentina, simultaneously accredited to the Missions in Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

⁸ See document No. 307 and footnote 1.

⁹ Not found.

III. *Questions of the German community:*

In the framework of all the anti-German machinations the trials concerning German activities now pending in Argentina¹⁰ and Uruguay,¹¹ represent a serious liability for political relations. In Peru and Bolivia, possibility of prohibition of the party can be ruled out in spite of relatively good treatment so far of the German community; under certain conditions it may appear necessary for it to disband itself in time.

In the countries of the eastern coast there is a strong inclination on the part of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche to return to Germany, which presumably can be settled at the end of the war only by international treaties; in this connection provisions must be made fully to clarify re-emigration in order to prevent foreigners from getting control of German economic enterprises.

IV. *Propaganda.*

Official German propaganda, besides treating further the important war guilt questions, soon ought to be shifted more and more to the transmission of material on constructive ideas with regard to reconstruction of the Continent and to a picture of the political future of Europe. Most far-reaching adaptation of German propaganda writings to South American peculiarities and most rapid transmission of pamphlets to be translated are requisite.

For the expansion of important film propaganda, establishment of independent branches of German film producers in South America is absolutely necessary, as well as increased adaptation to the South American public taste of film productions to be imported.

In accordance with detailed reports of all Missions concerned improvement of short-wave broadcasts from Germany is urgently requested. English radio is so far technically superior: In Peru, German radio programs can no longer be heard at all since the new allocation of wave lengths on November 1. German and Spanish news service of the Berlin short-wave transmitter is in need of improvement as regards timeliness and diction, with the exception of Fritsche and Don Juan.

V. *Press.*

Among the Missions concerned, increased exchange of information of interest to South America was agreed upon. Excessive reporting of Transocean about South America from Germany should be curtailed to avoid duplication.

Besides D. N. B. the following is desired: Transocean news service in need of further improvement to fight the competition of enemy

¹⁰ A number of Reich Germans had been arrested in the Misiones district of Argentina in July 1940 and had remained in jail pending trial (Woermann memorandum of July 31: 233/156289-92).

¹¹ See document No. 265 and footnote 2.

agencies; in this regard the Missions represented agree with the content of report G 657 of the Embassy at Buenos Aires of March 5, 1940.¹²

VI. *Economics.*

With regard to storage purchases there existed difficulties in the selection of the kind of goods and advance payments, therefore the extension of the full powers of Reich Missions for such negotiations is very important, in view of the decisive importance of economic problems for exercising political influence.

VII. It is suggested that a Chief of Mission be asked to go to Berlin by air in order to give a detailed, oral report and to transmit common suggestions, especially on how to oppose the advancing influence of the United States in South America, as well as to receive detailed instructions.¹³ Detailed report will be sent by airmail.¹²

THERMANN
SCHOEN
LANGMANN
NOEBEL

¹² Not found.

¹³ In telegram No. 1015 of Dec. 5 (233/156388) Weizsäcker transmitted to Buenos Aires, Ribbentrop's instructions that Thermann should fly to Berlin to report about the subjects dealt with in the document printed. Thermann was received by Weizsäcker in Berlin on Dec. 23 and was told that the various topics treated in his telegram were now being taken up by the departments concerned in the Foreign Ministry. (Weizsäcker memorandum of Dec. 27: 233/156416)

There is in the files an undated memorandum by Freytag discussing the action taken so far by the various departments of the Foreign Ministry regarding the subjects to be dealt with during Thermann's visit with special reference to the contents of the document printed (233/156409-10).

No. 430

585/242796-97

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOFLA, November 30, 1940—11:00 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received December 1—6:20 a. m.

No. 592 of November 30

[Pol. IV 3765 g.]¹

With reference to my telegram No. 585 of November 28.²

This afternoon the Foreign Minister asked the Russian Minister³ to call on him in order to give him the reply of the Bulgarian Government to the offer of November 25.⁴ He informed me that he had told

¹ This number is supplied from another copy of this document in the files of the Embassy in Moscow (292/183874-75).

² Document No. 415.

³ Alexander Lavrishtchev.

⁴ See document No. 403.

him the following orally: Bulgaria desires to foster friendly relations with Russia and has pursued this policy since the end of the World War. She has suffered so much in two wars that were lost and in the postwar period that it is the duty of the Government to protect the country from a new war. To be sure, the Bulgarian people have their national ideals, but precisely the Dobruja [issue] shows that these can be realized in a peaceful manner. As long as Bulgaria tries to achieve peacefully her revisionist claim to the western part of Thrace, there exists no Turkish danger. The Turks have repeatedly given peaceful assurances here and most recently on the very day of the Russian offer. If Bulgaria should conclude an assistance pact with Russia, Turkey would regard it as directed against herself.

Bulgaria must avoid anything, which (one word in the text missing) could involve her in problems of grand international politics. The question of the Straits does not involve Bulgarian interests directly. If Bulgaria were to take an interest in it, she would always have to be on the alert. The people, therefore, would see in the treaty a permanent danger of war.

There is also another obstacle. Bulgaria is negotiating with Germany regarding the Tripartite Pact; to be sure, she has not yet signed it, but basic agreement in principle had already been reached before the Russian offer was made. If Bulgaria should now enter into negotiations with Russia, this would reflect on Bulgaria's honesty with respect to a state which is friendly to Bulgaria and Russia. The fact that the Russian Government itself is considering the possibility of acceding to the Tripartite Pact proves that Bulgaria has not done anything contrary to Russian interests. He hopes that this sincere presentation of the Bulgarian point of view will meet with understanding in Moscow.⁵

The Russian Minister received this statement, which as Popov tells me, was unanimously accepted by all the Ministers yesterday, with the remark that it would be transmitted to Moscow. Moreover, the Minister expressed astonishment at the leaflets which had been distributed here,⁶ and, as it were, reproached Bulgaria on that score. The [Foreign] Minister rejected this categorically. Only a few individuals knew of the proposal and what is more they were only informed yesterday. To the Minister's remarks that in no case had there been an indiscretion on the part of his Legation, the [Foreign] Minister replied that undoubtedly the publication originated with the local Communists and asked for an investigation as to where they had received their information.

RICHTHOFEN

⁵ A German text of the Bulgarian reply to the Russian proposal is in the files (F6/0502-05). See document No. 438, footnote 4.

⁶ See document No. 415.

No. 431

73/52907-08

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 819 of November 30 BUDAPEST, November 30, 1940—11:50 p. m.
Received December 1—4:10 a. m.

The Foreign Minister, to whom I spoke about the conspicuously friendly statements on Yugoslavia in his address,¹ said that on the basis of the suggestion the Führer made in Vienna to relieve Hungary's southern flank and strengthen the good relations with Yugoslavia² he had given appropriate instructions to the Hungarian Minister in Belgrade.³ Now the Yugoslav Minister here⁴ had suggested to him that the frequent exchange of visits during recent months between Yugoslav and Hungarian Cabinet Ministers, mayors of the capital cities, etc., be climaxed by a visit of the Hungarian Foreign Minister in Belgrade. Csáky had replied that he was willing in principle to do this; he considered it desirable, however, that these be not merely courtesy visits. On this occasion they could, for example, conclude a treaty of friendship. Hungary did not want to assert her territorial claims against Yugoslavia at the present time, to be sure, but could not expressly renounce them.⁵ A treaty of friendship on the pattern of the German-French Treaty of 1938⁶ would go too far, since it contained a waiver of territorial claims. The Italo-Yugoslav Treaty,⁷ too, was out of the question because of its results with respect to frontiers. On the other hand, one could conclude a treaty of friendship on the pattern of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Treaty.⁸

Csáky will keep me informed about further developments.⁹

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament on Nov. 27.

² Cf. document No. 365.

³ George Bákach-Besseney.

⁴ Svetozar Rasić.

⁵ On Oct. 3 Woermann recorded asking the Hungarian Minister about negotiations between Yugoslavia and Hungary respecting Hungary's territorial aspirations. Sztójay admitted that there had been certain unofficial contacts between Hungary and Yugoslavia in this matter and the Yugoslavs had been inclined to make certain concessions "although much too modest ones;" after the Vienna Award, however, the Yugoslav attitude had stiffened and the talks stopped. (73/52789)

⁶ Apparently a reference to the Franco-German declaration of Dec. 6, 1938. For a text, see vol. IV of this series, document No. 369.

⁷ Political and Economic Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia, signed Mar. 25, 1937. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1937*, vol. 141, p. 1119.

⁸ Signed Jan. 24, 1937. For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXVI, p. 221.

⁹ Copies of this telegram were sent on Dec. 2 to the Legation in Belgrade and to the Embassy in Rome (1213/332514-15).

No. 432

121/120203

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, November 30, 1940.

e. o. Pol. I 1729 g. Rs.

One point brought up in an informational discussion with Admirals Schniewind¹ and Fricke² concerning the present and future military situation in North and West Africa is worthy of note.

The two Admirals consider it necessary that, if the occasion arises, the *entire French naval forces* should be deployed against de Gaulle and England, and that with this in view France should be given the necessary exemptions from the stipulations of the Armistice Treaty.

This will probably be met with objections at first by Italy. However, in view of the total military situation the two Admirals do not consider such possible Italian objections justified.

RITTER

¹ Chief of the German Naval War Staff.

² Chief of the Operations Division of the German Naval War Staff.

No. 433

585/242799

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOFIA, December 1, 1940—2:40 p. m.

SECRET

Received December 1—5:00 p. m.

No. 593 of December 1

With reference to your telegram No. 826¹ and my telegram No. 584.²

The Foreign Minister asked me to convey his thanks. Unfortunately, the Turkish Minister³ had meanwhile indicated Ankara's real objective, which was something he had been afraid of from the beginning. He would in any event decline issuing the declaration suggested by the Turks on the grounds that such a declaration could only be construed as referring to German or Russian troops, and that Bulgaria must not cast suspicion on these two Powers and arouse their resentment.

Having just declined the Russian offer of a pact,⁴ the Foreign Minister sees at present no possibility on his part for proposing a pact to

¹ Document No. 413.

² Not printed (585/242788-89). This telegram reported that the Turkish Minister in Sofia had intimated to the Bulgarian Foreign Minister that Turkey would like to see a statement by Bulgaria that she would not tolerate foreign troops on her territory.

³ Ali Sevki Berker.

⁴ See document No. 430.

Turkey without causing extreme resentment in Moscow.⁵ He was therefore considering the possibility of proposing a mutual declaration of nonaggression to the Turks.⁶

The Bulgarian Minister in Ankara⁷ reported on November 29 a conversation which he had before his departure for Sofia with the Turkish Foreign Minister, who said to him that Turkey would not let herself be lulled "by vague statements." Germany's intentions regarding the Balkans were suspect and Turkey must stand ready to meet any threat.⁸

RICHTHOFEN

⁵ On Dec. 13 Weizsäcker recorded that the new Soviet Ambassador, Dekanozov, during his first visit "made intensive inquiries as to the negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey which supposedly are taking place at present." (265/172536)

⁶ In telegram No. 617 of Dec. 12, Richthofen reported that the Turkish Minister had talked about the matter with Foreign Minister Popov, without making any concrete suggestions. Popov however had suggested certain steps to the Turkish Minister for improving Turkish-Bulgarian relations, such as better press and economic relations, a declaration on mutual nonaggression and a mutual withdrawal of troops from the border. (585/242817-18)

See also document No. 714 and footnote 1.

⁷ Sava Kirov.

⁸ Marginal note: "Transmitted to Fuschl as No. 242. Telegram Office, Dec. 1, 1940."

No. 434

121/120211-13

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 1361 of December 1

PARIS, December 1, 1940—5:50 p. m.

Received December 1—7:40 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister through Senior Counselor Likus.

After the French plan of military operations had been presented to General Warlimont,¹ I had discussions of a general nature with Laval, Huntziger, and Darlan, and with Laval alone.

1. Huntziger: I told Huntziger that I had the impression, without having spoken with General Warlimont, that the plan of operations for the land forces against the rebellious colonies in Equatorial Africa was very disappointing because of the length of the preparations and the resulting late date of operations. By autumn of 1941 the war with England would doubtless be concluded and the territorial questions in Africa would long since have been decided by the German peace terms for the English. It might even be the case that under these conditions the Foreign Minister would no longer have any interest at

¹ See document No. 428.

all in continuing conversations with the French Government. Huntziger answered: He himself realized the inadequacy of his plan; nevertheless, he could not justify it to his military conscience to present Germany with the prospect of more extensive and quicker operations than were possible. In case of immediate German and Italian consent to the requested increase in French effectives north of Nigeria and to an adequate supply of fuel for the airplanes, smaller actions against the Chad colony would be possible even earlier. However, it would be difficult to carry out effective bombing of Fort Lamy, the main base in the Chad colony, because of the fact that the closest operational airport at the present time was 1,500 kilometers distant. The importance of the political actions that would begin at once should not be underestimated, and still less the defensive value of reinforcing the French forces in the northern part of Nigeria, because they could prevent the rebellion from spreading to French West Africa and to French Sudan. He had been told that 30,000 white Englishmen from Australia and New Zealand were en route to Nigeria to strengthen the British forces.

2. Darlan.

Darlan likewise stressed the defensive value of the operations planned by the French Navy after permission had been obtained for the requested reinforcements. However, the idea of an offensive operation against the English and de Gaulle was much more in the foreground with him. He is convinced that England would not acquiesce in the sailing of the French Navy for Dakar and the blockade of Gabon by French submarines without offering resistance, and expects that this will result in a state of open warfare at sea. In view of England's already perceptible lack of cruisers and large battleships, owing to the many naval theaters of war and the losses that have already occurred, a concentrated operation by the French fleet would seem to have very good prospects of success. It might even be possible to interrupt from the direction of the sea the present very lively activity (ca. 150 planes a month) of supplying the English Sudan and the British bases in the eastern Mediterranean with British and American war material via the Chad colony. In reply to my question regarding the morale in the French Navy, Darlan said that in spite of former personal friendships between French and English naval officers, the entire officers' corps, since Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar, was as determined as he was to return blow for blow. There was likewise no doubt about the anti-English attitude of the enlisted men. Out of 18,000 French sailors who were in England after conclusion of the armistice hardly 500 went over to de Gaulle, in spite of tempting British offers of bribes.

3. Laval

Laval stated that he, too, found the statements of the Minister of War disappointing and had not concealed this from General Huntziger.² According to the reports received from his Foreign Missions he was convinced that the preparations for organization north of Nigeria, the acceptance of German armament orders by plants in the occupied area, and the putting out to sea of the French fleet would unavoidably lead to an armed conflict with England. What he feared was not that such a conflict might fail to develop, but that it might occur before the French armed forces were in a position to respond successfully to British attacks. It would also be desirable to continue intensively for a few more weeks the transports of food from the colonies to the mother country, which at present were moving without hindrance. To my question as to what direct reprisals the French Government intended to take against the British attacks, which in Laval's opinion were to be expected, Laval replied that he would report very urgently to Pétain on this matter, the significance of which he fully appreciated; he would tell about the results immediately upon his return to Paris. He recognized the historical importance of the chance which Germany, the victor, was giving France, by providing her with the opportunity of military action against England. He would exert all his influence to ensure that the French Government utilized it to the fullest extent.³

ABETZ

² The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941) contains this passage at Dec. 7:

"Lieutenant Colonel Speidel, the Chief of Staff of the Military Commander in France, transmitted to the Chief, National Defense Branch, an account of his conversation with Premier Laval on the evening of Dec. 4. In the course of this conversation, Premier Laval expressed his dissatisfaction with the arguments of General Huntziger at the Nov. 29 conferences in Paris and informed him (Speidel) that Marshal Pétain also did not agree with the plan of operations presented by the Minister of War. Once the mitigation of terms promised by the Armistice Commission had come about, France's resources for active conduct of war in Africa would probably be sufficient. The fuel supply alone would make difficulties. Laval further announced that he would declare to the Minister of War and the Commander in Chief of the Navy at the Cabinet meeting of Dec. 5 that the question at issue was not whether to draft a plan to retain the colonies which would be practicable 6 or 12 months from now, but rather whether to attack de Gaulle and thus Great Britain in order to reconquer the lost colonies."

³ This telegram was forwarded to the Foreign Minister in Fuschl as telegram No. 241 of Dec. 1. On Dec. 5, Abetz reported by telephone that General Warlimont had presented the French plan of operations to Hitler. Abetz also asked that the conversations with Warlimont be continued on Dec. 10 rather than on Dec. 9 as originally planned. (Schwarzmann note of Dec. 6: 121/120250)

See document No. 490.

No. 435

B19/B003894

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

HELSINKI, December 2, 1940—4:55 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received December 2—10:10 p. m.

No. 753 of December 2

The beginning of the presidential election campaign shows a marked splintering:

Candidates of the IKL:¹ Svinhufud, Kivimäki; of the Academie Karelian Society: Kivimäki; of the Coalition party: Svinhufud, Paasikivi, Tulenheimo; of the Socialists: Ryti, Pekkala [sic];² of the Agrarians: Oehkonen [sic],³ Hywninen [sic].⁴

In all parties one hears the motto: The candidate must have good relations with Germany and must not be hated in Russia.

In the present state of affairs, Ryti has fine prospects, especially since his supporters are spreading the word that he is persona grata in Berlin.

In case we want to try to forestall Ryti's election, because of his sympathetic attitude toward England and high degree in Freemasonry, we will have to let it be known by confidential talks with electors that we do not desire to see him elected.

So far, I have merely answered questions about the German judgment of the candidates by saying that Svinhufud and Kivimäki enjoy great prestige in Germany; I have declined to make any statement about other candidates.

I request a decision by telegraph whether I should go further in the direction indicated.⁵

The matter is urgent, for the election takes place before Christmas.

BLÜCHER

¹ Abbreviation for Isänmaallinen Kansan Liike, or National Patriotic League, a rightist authoritarian party.

² Apparently a decoding error for Tekkala.

³ Apparently a decoding error for Pehkonen.

⁴ Possibly a decoding error for Heikkinen.

⁵ In telegram No. 710 of Dec. 4 (B19/B003895), Blücher received the following instructions:

"The election of Kivimäki as president would be the best solution from the German point of view. The election of Ryti would be less desirable to us. You are authorized to make this known at the proper time in confidential conversations."

No. 436

265/172524-26

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, December 2, [1940]—11:50 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received December 3—5:15 a. m.

No. 977 of December 2

With reference to my telegram No. 971 of November 29.¹

In accordance with the order of the Chief of State, the Foreign Minister opened the discussion of my proposals with me today in the presence of Numan. He made the prefatory statement that these negotiations should be carried on entirely in secret by both sides with no communication of any sort to third parties, and that if they did not achieve their objective they should be considered as not having been held. Economic questions are to be given as the reason for our conversations in the near future. I agreed to this.

The Minister stated as a basis that the Turkish Government had not yet been informed, to be sure, but that in principle it accorded full sympathy to my suggestions presented on instructions of the Axis Powers. Since Turkey, however, felt the strongest distrust toward Italy, she did not wish to negotiate with Italy. I answered that all the decisions of the Axis Powers were reached jointly, but that I would suggest that negotiations be conducted exclusively by us. I shall specify the points in our conversation regarding which an agreement appears possible:

1. Turkey is sympathetic toward the new order in Europe in accordance with the ideas of the Axis and is willing to take an active part in it, particularly in questions relating to peace in the Balkans and the Near East.

2. Turkey undertakes to keep out of England's war against the Axis Powers.

3. Turkey's obligations toward England, which are purely defensive and concerned only with the preservation of Turkey's possessions, are not affected by point 2.

4. The Axis Powers undertake not to attack Turkey (Saracoglu desires in addition a guarantee of the Turkish zones of interest).

5. The Axis Powers will include Turkey in discussions on the new order of Europe, particularly in so far as the Turkish interests in the new order in the Balkans and the Near East (one group is evidently missing).

To Saracoglu's question whether we would be willing in certain circumstances to accede to the Montreux Convention² as a signatory,

¹ Document No. 422.

² For the text of the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, on the regime of the Straits, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXIII, p. 213.

I replied at once in the negative, putting off the settlement of the Straits question until peacetime. In the discussion of Bulgaria's position, the question of a Thracian port and settlement of the old border of Edirne was touched on academically. Saracoglu denied the justice of the Bulgarian demands on ethnic grounds and said that Turkey, being an ally of Greece, could not enter into this question any further. But he did not seem disinclined to leave the settlement until the time peace is concluded.

Please give me instructions³ on continuing the conversation, particularly as to how the agreements could be formulated. The treaty text which I propose follows with tomorrow's courier.⁴ If it is true that Russia offered Bulgaria an alliance and agreed to all demands, and is even willing to join the Tripartite Pact in return for a settlement of the Straits question,⁵ I should like to point out that any question concerning a weakening of Turkey's sovereignty could at present be decided only by force of arms. However, if there is a German-Russian agreement a new settlement of the Straits question will easily be possible at the conclusion of peace.

Conclusion of this agreement between the Axis and Turkey in accordance with the above proposals would not prejudice the Russian interests in this case in any way, but would necessarily have extraordinary psychological repercussions on England.

PAPEN

³ See document No. 454.

⁴ This draft was sent on Dec. 3 enclosed with a personal letter from Papen to Ribbentrop which dealt with the negotiations, internal conditions in England, and the attitude of the French Ambassador in Turkey (2361/488258-63).

⁵ See document No. 404.

No. 437

1139/324860-63

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

No. 1

BERLIN, December 2, 1940.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA¹

I. The sudden and surprising Russian compliance in various important questions of the pending negotiations (grain deliveries, broader basis for German counterdeliveries, property compensation in the Baltic countries, payment for the gun turrets according to our wishes, telegrams Nos. 2607² and 2630³) will presumably make it possible to bring the economic negotiations in Moscow to a close earlier than expected, and thereby to settle most points in a manner satis-

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request for immediate dispatch by teletype to the Foreign Minister."

² Document No. 412.

³ Not printed (3734/E041976).

factory to us. The questions still open are Petsamo, the border strip in Lithuania, the Memel Free Port, property rights in Volhynia, Bessarabia, and Finland, as well as the Danube Conference in Bucharest. Owing to the Russian compliance mentioned at the start it will now probably not be necessary for us to consider giving in on our part in these questions that are still open. We have likewise shown special cooperation by releasing additional military air material for 7 million reichsmarks with especially shortened delivery periods. We should adhere to our standpoint regarding Petsamo; the question of the border strip will, according to instructions, not be discussed until further notice; the further Russian attitude should be awaited regarding the Memel Free Port, property rights in Volhynia, Bessarabia, and Finland as well as at the Danube Conference in Bucharest.

II. Separate points of the economic negotiations.

a. Grain.

Our wishes, which were last concerned with 2.25 million tons, will be more than fulfilled with 2.5 million tons. If on the basis of the resultant alleviation of our food situation deliveries to Spain are now considered, these should be kept out of sight of Russia as much as possible.

b. Broader basis of the German counterdeliveries (telegrams Nos. 2607, paragraph 2, and 2627⁴).

The Russians had earlier rejected a large number of offers of German deliveries (such as printing machines, trucks, industrial installations) as uninteresting. Now they are willing to have them included in the delivery program. The Russian wishes according to telegram No. 2627 can in large part be fulfilled.

c. Property rights in the Baltic countries (telegram No. 2607, paragraph 3).

The lump sum damages of 150 million reichsmarks promised by Russia amount to only about half of what we asked, to be sure, but go considerably beyond our expectations. It should be accepted in principle. Nevertheless, the attempt should be made to attain an appropriate increase in the lump sum damages, in view of our property claims arising from the resettlement in Volhynia and Bessarabia and our property losses in the Russian war against Finland, which together amount to about 500 million reichsmarks, though probably rather excessive estimates are involved here. Also we must be certain that the amount of 50 million reichsmarks deducted from the lump sum damages by the Soviet Government for Russian counterclaims really includes all the Russian counterclaims including those in connection with the Memel Free Port.

d. Aluminum and cobalt (telegram No. 2609⁵).

The amounts of 30,000 tons of aluminum and 150 tons of cobalt desired by the Russians have been promised. Subsequently the wish was expressed that the Russians furnish alumina for the production of aluminum. With the Russians not being able to comply with this request, the original promise to deliver aluminum is being maintained; we are looking into the question of where else the alumina can be obtained.

⁴ Not printed (9323/E660920).

⁵ Not printed (2108/455995).

e. Armor plate (telegram No. 2613 *).

The Russians have refused the proffered delivery of armor plate to the amount of 20 million reichsmarks. Since the delivery would have been difficult for us, the rejection is unobjectionable. The 20 million reichsmarks thereby eliminated from our delivery program can doubtless be compensated by other army deliveries without special difficulty.

WIEHL

* Not printed (104/112691).

No. 438

F6/0489-0501;
F6/0506-0508

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, December 3, 1940.

SECOND CONVERSATION OF THE FÜHRER WITH BULGARIAN MINISTER DRAGANOV ON DECEMBER 3, 1940, FROM 1:30 TO 2:00 P. M.

Draganov reported to the Führer that following the conversation of November 23¹ he had immediately gone to Sofia in order to report there. Yesterday he had again returned to Berlin and he was instructed by the King to apprise the Führer of the developments up to this time and of the decisions of the Bulgarian Government.

When he arrived in Sofia, a rumor was circulating there that two Bulgarian ministers were to go to Berlin. That very night the Turkish Ambassador [*Minister*] had called on the Foreign Minister, as he had some urgent suggestions from his Government to communicate to him "before his departure." Russian Special Ambassador Sobolev, too, had on the same day announced his visit to the Bulgarian Government on instruction from the Russian Government.²

Draganov next read the Russian proposal (see enclosure 1)³ and then . . .⁴ specialists, who could advise the Bulgarians about the erection of coastal defenses and the laying of mines.⁵ The Führer promised this to Draganov. Draganov went on to say that King Boris suggested that Germany should send her troops not only to Rumania but also into northern Dobruja. If German troops were sent to Constanța, it would make the Russians angry, whereas in the above-mentioned case the Germans would already be south of the Danube and would have a railroad line for provisions and supplies at their disposal.

¹ See document No. 384.

² See document No. 403.

³ See p. 772.

⁴ The following page of this memorandum is missing. It is probable that it dealt with the Bulgarian reply to the Russian proposal. A German text of this reply is in the files next to the Russian proposal printed as enclosure. See documents Nos. 430 and 486.

⁵ Marginal note: "Already arranged through Field Marshal Keitel. Hew[el]."

As far as Turkey was concerned, it had been suggested that a nonaggression pact be concluded with the Turks, but the Turks did not want this. The Führer was of the opinion that Turkey would do nothing at all, because there was nothing she could do. The attitude of the Turks was stupid and provocative and there was nothing behind it. To utter threats was simply crazy from her point of view. He could summon the Turkish Ambassador and call him on the carpet for this insane conduct. The Turks knew full well that the Bulgarian attitude was guided only by self-defense against the Russian danger and that they certainly would not be better off if Bolshevism took over. They were playing a silly game. What, indeed, would happen if he went to Moscow today and there with one final stroke divided up the spheres of influence with Stalin? Turkey would then fare just as the Balkan countries fared; the Turks knew that full well. Bulgaria could today do some plain speaking with the Turks, as she really had nothing to fear from them. What could the Turks do anyway? They were aware that if they got into a conflict, it would mean the end of their control over the Straits. He would like to see how the Turks would take on a few German armored divisions. The only thing that Bulgaria might concede to the Turks was the assurance not to permit the passage of any foreign troops *against Turkey*. For the rest, he repeated once more that if Bulgaria had adhered to the Tripartite Pact at once, all these problems would not have arisen. It was all a psychological and tactical mistake. This could be easily proved by the developments in Rumania. Russia had looked upon Rumania, too, as her domain; there, too, she had wished to advance by Bolshevization through the Balkans in the direction of the Straits. Antonescu had made an unequivocal decision, and the minute the German guarantee was signed Russia withdrew, even though angrily. Germany stood back of her guarantees with all the mighty force of her arms and he would just like to see what country, especially in the Balkans, would today dare to range itself against the strongest, the best-equipped, the best-led army in the world. Draganov stated that now, after the Bulgarian reply, it was plain to the Russians that Bulgaria stood by Germany. They now had it also in writing. The Führer agreed with this statement. Once more reverting to the subject of Russia, he depicted the Russian attempt to get at the Dardanelles. He described the fury of the Russians when Germany gave her guarantee to Rumania. At his visit, Molotov had started in on this subject right away. He then related once more how Molotov had asked him what he thought of a Russian guarantee for Bulgaria (memorandum of first Draganov-Führer conversation, page 2^e). The Russian proposal was, inciden-

* Document No. 384.

tally, rather a funny proposal of a guarantee, as it contained the assurance that there was no intention of removing the regime and the King. He had told Molotov that the Rumanians had appealed to us, and asked him whether the Bulgarians had actually appealed to the Russians. He [Molotov] had not replied to this.

The Führer then depicted the consequences of a Russian guarantee, as they could be observed abundantly in the Baltic States. The guarantee was the beginning, and presently a few divisions were installed. Propaganda was carried on recklessly, and in a very short time everything was Bolshevized. In the final analysis it made no difference to Germany who was sitting at the Dardanelles, as she could not in any event sail into the Black Sea, and if someday there should be a war with Russia he would not attack the Russians across the Black Sea but wherever it suited him along the 2000 kilometers of common boundary. He was concerned only:

1. because he was convinced that Italy certainly did not wish to have Russia sitting at the Straits, and,

2. because he did not want to see the whole Balkan Peninsula Bolshevized. He wanted to trade with the Balkans and for this he preferred a Rumania, a Bulgaria, etc., to a Bolshevized desert such as the Baltic States were today.

Formerly we had carried on a brisk trade with the Baltic States; today this had stopped completely, as there was just nothing left there. Not even a pencil could be had there any longer; everything had been carried away. All who had risen above the masses, the intelligentsia and the middle class, had been exterminated and replaced by incompetent commissars who were unable to take any positive action whatever. He [the Führer] described in strong words the conditions of terrorism, the shootings, the deportation of the intelligentsia in trains which never reached their destination. To European minds the situation there was simply dreadful. It had been the same in Galicia. We had an excellent picture of conditions there, because we had our commission there. In Bessarabia, too, even while our people were still there, landed proprietors and other members of the ruling classes had been caused to be slaughtered by their own people—who had been stirred up and were under the leadership of Jews—and the same was in store for the Balkans. In this respect, he was not even prompted by humane considerations. If the people themselves wanted the Russians to come there, it was not his business. But he considered the Balkans a region of vital economic importance to Germany. Rumania, too, was in Germany's sphere of influence. Antonescu had taken an unequivocal decision and declared himself for Germany and thereby saved his country from Bolshevism. The Russians were trying to push forward in the Balkans as far as they possibly could; but if they saw that they

could not accomplish anything, they would withdraw, even though furious and grumbling. There was indeed nothing else they could do, as they did not have the means or the power to attain their wish by force.

Draganov said that Bulgaria had indeed not wanted to disturb the relations between Germany and Russia, to which the Führer retorted that Bulgaria could not disturb the relations between Germany and Russia at all. The relationship of Germany to Russia rested on quite sober considerations. Their collaboration was good business for him and good business for Stalin, who could earn a great deal by it. Germany knew very well that the Russian Army was no more than a joke. Stalin was clever and out to do business wherever he could. He had also tried it in Rumania, but now German divisions stood there and so he was now trying it with Bulgaria.

The Führer, continuing, asked Draganov to convey to the King the following:

As long as the Russians knew that Bulgaria was not a member of the Tripartite Pact, Russia would try to blackmail Bulgaria in every conceivable way. One must confront Russia with accomplished facts. If Bulgaria adhered to the Tripartite Pact, Russia would automatically take her hands off Bulgaria. To Draganov's objection that Russian propaganda would thereupon be intensified, the Führer retorted that he could easily have Russian propaganda stopped in the countries guaranteed by him. He would summon M. Dekanozov and tell him bluntly that we were carrying on no propaganda against Russia and that he could therefore not tolerate Russian agitation within his sphere of influence. In any case he remained of the opinion that as long as the Russians had the hope of gaining something in Bulgaria they would not leave the Bulgarians alone.

Draganov proposed: Would it not be possible to confer with the Russians and the Turks regarding the Straits? In reply, the Führer asked, whether he really wanted the Russians at the Straits; this idea Draganov rejected with horror. The Führer was of the opinion that while the Convention of Montreux had to be revised, it was neither in the Bulgarian nor in the Turkish interest to have the Russians at the Straits, for the Russians were not only interested in bases but wanted to carry on with their Bolshevization from the bases. The Turks would never grant these bases to the Russians. There was no such thing as bases merely on one side of the Straits. Against modern long-range artillery and a modern air force they could not be held. The Russians knew this also, but they wanted to Bolshevize the interior from the bases. "Believe me," continued the Führer, "if you had joined [the Tripartite Pact] at that time, nothing would have happened." Draganov was of the opinion that if Bulgaria had

acceded to the Tripartite Pact at an early date, the English would have interfered even sooner in the Balkans and the problem of an English landing would have become acute sooner. The Führer denied this absolutely. The English threatened wherever they could, but for all that, they could do nothing; they did not even dare to break off diplomatic relations with Rumania.

Draganov next took up the subject of Greece. The Führer characterized the difficulties which the Italians were meeting there as a fact which had often occurred in history, whenever a powerful state, underestimating the enemy, attacked him without adequate forces. The English experienced this with the Boers, the Austrians with the Serbians, the French in 1919 in the campaign against Abdel Krim in Morocco, the Russians with the Finns, etc. In each case, they took a beating at first but in the end they gained the victory all the same. It was one of the principles of German strategy never to attack with insufficient forces. Here we had one of the usual initial successes of small nations, which could not be sustained, as other divisions would follow. The English bases would be burned out. It was his unshakable principle that, wherever an Englishman set foot upon the European Continent, he would throw him into the sea, overcoming all intervening obstacles. This applied to the North Cape and down the entire coast to Greece. In a military sense it was no problem for him. The English also intended to establish themselves in Salonika, in order to attack the Rumanian oil fields from there. That was a ridiculous attempt. He could employ as many divisions there as he liked. Whether there were 15 or 60 divisions he would still have 100 more with nothing to do. Draganov nevertheless was of the opinion that if Bulgaria had joined the Pact earlier the English would also have begun their action earlier. The Führer was convinced of the opposite and thought that in that case Greece would not have admitted the English at all. It was possible to condemn very strongly the Italian action. But he refrained here from any criticism and was only sorry that the Duce had had no better advisers. Moreover, the Italians had actually not failed at all, the men had fought courageously and the report that some brigades had crossed over into Yugoslavia was a plain lie. If the Italians had only had as many brigades as certain reports said had crossed over into Yugoslavia, they would have beaten the Greeks already. Only the command would now have to change its tactics.

Draganov then reverted to the question which the Führer had asked him at the last conversation, as to Bulgaria's attitude toward the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact. He had said at that time that Bulgaria certainly would welcome it. On this subject,

however, he had something more to add personally for which, to be sure, he had no instructions, but which in his opinion he absolutely had to mention; in Macedonia there were one and one-half million Bulgarians, who could not simply be left there. The treatment of these Bulgarians by Yugoslavia was exceedingly bad. While in Bulgaria one could read Yugoslav newspapers everywhere, in Macedonia even the Gospel in Bulgarian was prohibited. The problem of the minorities was a burning one and had to be solved. Half a million Bulgarian refugees from that region were now in Bulgaria, and if Germany now arrived at an accord with Yugoslavia this would undoubtedly arouse an unpleasant reaction in Bulgaria and he was afraid that feeling against Germany might ensue. The Führer said on this subject that a basic distinction had to be made between two problems. On the one hand there was the settling of boundary lines, in which the minority problem played a great role, but which could not, of course, be solved in a hurry; on the other hand there were the measures which had to be taken immediately to eliminate the danger. The latter was at the moment the more important. The problem of minorities had, of course, to be solved throughout the Balkans. But a final solution could not be expected today, or tomorrow, or even next year, for as long as the earth revolved around the sun, as long as there was cold and heat, fertility and sterility, storm and sunshine, there would be conflict—among men and nations as well. Only the gentlemen in Geneva had been able to imagine that it could be definitely abolished. The belief that anything definitive could be done about it was ridiculous. After all, conflict was not so regrettable, for if men lived in the Garden of Eden, they would degenerate. What mankind has become, it has become only through conflict.

In conclusion he mentioned once more that the danger in the Balkans was great. If it came to a crisis without Bulgaria having taken a clear position, Bolshevism would force its way in, and M. Dragánov knew what this meant. Again he emphasized that in his opinion adherence to the Tripartite Pact was the only possible way for Bulgaria to free herself from her pressing problems.

HEWEL

[Enclosure]

SOVIET RUSSIAN PROPOSAL TO BULGARIA

1. Bulgaria and the Soviet Union maintain friendly relations with each other which are to the advantage of both parties and have frequently been put to the test (as an example one may recall the settlement of the Southern Dobruja question).

2. The Soviet Union has full understanding for the interests of Bulgaria in western Thrace and is prepared to cooperate in their realization.

3. There are authentic reports that Turkey will oppose by military means the advance of Bulgaria toward the south and that she will prevent the realization of Bulgaria's plans with all available means.

4. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is vitally interested in the security of her Black Sea border at the Straits and cannot permit a repetition of the threat constantly directed against southern Russia through the Straits.

5. In view of the community of interests of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, the Soviet Union repeats its proposal of September 1939 to conclude a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria,⁷ which would be helpful to Bulgaria in realizing her national aspirations not only in western but also in eastern Thrace.

6. The Soviet Union is opposed in principle to unilateral guarantees, which stress the inequality between the two partners; therefore it proposes to Bulgaria a mutual assistance pact.

7. Under the terms of this pact the Soviet Union undertakes to render every assistance, including military assistance, to Bulgaria in case of a threat of attack on Bulgaria by a third power or a coalition of powers.

8. Bulgaria undertakes to render assistance to the Soviet Union in case of a real threat to the interests of the Soviet Union in the Black Sea or in the Straits.

9. The pact of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria cannot in any circumstances affect the internal regime, the sovereignty or the independence of Bulgaria.

10. If Bulgaria should be threatened by an attack, or be attacked by Turkey, the Soviet Union will assist Bulgaria with all available means and support her in the realization of Bulgaria's well-known claims in the European part of Turkey.

11. The Soviet Union is prepared to render Bulgaria suitable assistance in the form of a loan of money, food, arms, and material, if Bulgaria should need them. At the same time the Soviet Union is prepared to expand its purchases of Bulgarian goods.

12. The objections of the Soviet Union to the accession of Bulgaria to the well-known Tripartite Pact will be dropped, on condition that the mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria be concluded. It is entirely possible that in that case the Soviet Union will join the Tripartite Pact.

⁷ See vol. VIII of this series, documents Nos. 247, 415, and 454.

No. 439

B19/B003896

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

HELSINKI, December 3, 1940—2: 27 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received December 3—4: 40 p. m.

No. 756 of December 3

General Talvela, who is going to Berlin with instructions from Mannerheim, is expected to sound out the Reichsmarschall as to how he regards the presidential candidacy of Mannerheim.

I may remark in this connection that so far Mannerheim has slight prospects, that he would put a heavy burden on Finnish-Soviet relations, and in the past his attitude toward Germany has wavered.¹

BLÜCHER

¹ See document No. 461.

No. 440

1447/364989

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, December 3, 1940—2: 45 p. m.

No. 2214 of December 3

Received December 3—7: 10 p. m.

e. o. W 5550 g. Rs.

For the Ambassador and Minister Schnurre.

With reference to my telegram No. 2171 of November 27.¹

The Foreign Minister has directed that the supplementary resettlement from Estonia and Latvia and the resettlement from Lithuania including the border strip be begun as soon as possible.² Negotiations on the resettlement of persons are accordingly to be carried forward promptly in Tallin and Kaunas and brought to a conclusion as soon as possible. In the matter of property rights, reference is to be made to the negotiations in Moscow regarding lump sum compensation. The question of the border strip is not to be touched on by us in Moscow and Kaunas, and if the other side brings it up it should be kept open by referring to lack of instructions.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Not printed (3784/E041972).

² A minute of Dec. 2 by Counselor Bruns of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat records Hitler's decision that the movement of the Volksdeutsche from the Lithuanian tip could begin (9321/E660852).

³ In a minute of Dec. 4, Bruns recorded a decision of Hitler "that the question of how the Russians should compensate for the Lithuanian strip is to be left open for the time being." (9321/E660922)

No. 441

8699/E036185

*The Deputy Director of the Political Department to
the Embassy in Paris*

Telegram

MOST URGENT
No. 1466- DECEMBER 3, 1940.
Received December 3—3:40 p. m.

For Ambassador Abetz.

According to a report from Vichy, the official communiqué about the latest session of the Council of Ministers speaks of the imminent installation of the Chief of State at Versailles, and states that there will be a communiqué concerning the date of the move. The report states further that the Marshal will go to Versailles in about 2 weeks. The Foreign Minister requests you to inform the French Government at once of the following in this matter: It is not at present possible for the Chief of State or the French ministers to move to the occupied territory, as the entire area is still a zone of operations. Additional statements in this matter will be made by the German Government at the appropriate time.

RINTELEN

No. 442

121/120236-37

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

URGENT
No. 1381 of December 3PARIS, December 3, 1940.
Received December 3—6:50 p. m.

For Dr. Schwarzmann.

With reference to your telegram No. 1458.¹

The Commander of the Propaganda Department, France, Major Schmidtke,² already stated several weeks ago that, according to information by the Reich Minister of Propaganda, the Führer had given instructions that the French fashion industry was to be destroyed and the fashion center transferred to Berlin.³ It was not possible to obtain confirmation of this alleged order by the Führer. However, at the instigation of the Propaganda Ministry and of the Labor Front,

¹ Not found.² Schmidtke was head of the Propaganda Department of the German Military Administration in France.³ The matter had been mentioned earlier in teletype No. 132 sent from Paris by Counselor Rahn on Oct. 12 (2143/468450).

a number of French fashion institutions were totally or partially confiscated, lists of addresses copied, and samples of material taken away. Special agents of the Propaganda Department in German officers' uniforms have copied models in French fashion shows, and in one case finished dresses to the amount of 2 million francs have simply been carried away. Simultaneously the Propaganda Department has prohibited publication of the most well-known French fashion magazines, such as *Femina*, *Marie Claire*, and *Vogue*. With regard to this matter the Embassy takes the following position:

1. The economic reorganization in Europe under German leadership requires limitation of most branches of production of French heavy industry which compete with the Reich economically or are undesirable to us on military grounds. In view of the present unemployment in France a certain freedom of movement and even possibility for development must however be left to those areas of production which have always been France's most special domain if the mood of the French working masses is not to turn against us. In this sphere fall, besides agriculture and winegrowing, the French luxury industry and its most important branch, fashion.

2. The creation of a native, genuinely German fashion industry must be encouraged by every possible means and the extension of its influence into third countries must be assured. This goal, however, cannot be attained by a mechanical and necessarily temporary destruction of the French fashion industry, but only by the development of the creative power and the artistic taste of the German fashion industry.

3. The French fashion and luxury industry is diffused to such an extent and furthermore has such a large number of contacts and branch stores abroad that its repression in occupied territory would not result in its definitive disappearance but only in its temporary displacement. French fashion centers would then emigrate into the unoccupied territory and into foreign countries, primarily the United States. To be sure, it is necessary to assure the German fashion industry, while it is being built up, of extensive protection against French competition in third countries. Such protection, however, can be achieved in all states in which German influence predominates—e.g., today on almost the entire European Continent by political and economic measures. Prevention of the export of French fashion and of French cultural propaganda is assured by the mere fact that the (apparently one word missing) necessary for the export of its products and magazines are refused.

No. 443

265/172530

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

No. 653

BERLIN, December 3, 1940—10:55 p. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 234.¹

I have taken note with interest of your report on your conversation with the Turkish State President. In further discussion of the question of the circumstances in which there would be a reason for Germany to intervene militarily in the Balkans, I consider it advisable not to use the term "creation of an English front," but instead of this to use the expression "English forces gaining a foothold on Greek soil, which would represent a threat to German interests."

Regarding the position of the Soviet Union on the Turkish question I am reserving a later communication.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ Internal evidence suggests that the reference is to document No. 422. The reference to telegram No. 234 could be the result of a clerical error; what is more probable, telegram No. 971 from Ankara was given a different number before it was forwarded to Ribbentrop.

² See document No. 548.

No. 444

136/74498

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

MADRID, December 3, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received December 3—11:20 p. m.

No. 4142 of December 3

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 4090 of the 29th.¹

I am informed confidentially that for psychological reasons the Americans and the British are now again showing an inclination to deliver grain to Spain. If this happens, the propagandist action contemplated by the Spanish Foreign Minister would lose its effect for us if our consent with respect to the Swiss grain now in Lisbon

¹ In this telegram (136/74489) Stohrer had reported that, if the grain in Lisbon were released to Spain as the Spanish Government had requested (see document No. 357), Serrano Suñer intended to make it the occasion for pro-German public demonstrations.

and some importation of grain across the Franco-Spanish border should be made only after the American promise.² A propagandist exploitation of our willingness to give aid appears more necessary every day in view of the increasing agitation of the Red elements and the elements dissatisfied with the Spanish regime among the hungry, undernourished population.

The food shortage is now actually so great in some cities such as Barcelona and Valencia that if there is a further deterioration the party is thinking of requesting that a large number of German fellow countrymen be sent home.

STOHRER

² No foreign Ministry reply has been found. See document No. 702.

No. 445

889/290787-90

*The Minister in Rumania to the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

BUCHAREST, December 3, 1940.

DEAR HERR LUTHER: The visit of Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach and of State Secretary Gauleiter Bohle, who were in Bucharest on the occasion of the funeral rites for Codreanu,² went off in general very well. Upon arrival, the gentlemen called with me on Leader of the State General Antonescu and on Horia Sima. The conversation with the Leader of the State revolved around his visit to Berlin,³ with General Antonescu also commenting on the Hungarian maps showing the nationality of the inhabitants in the ceded Transylvanian territory. At the conversation with Sima the incidents of the last few days and the execution of political prisoners in Jilava⁴ were briefly discussed. In the name of the Deputy of the Führer,⁵ Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach extended an invitation to Horia Sima, which he accepted for January. Sima's stay was fixed for 3 days; he could not be absent from here any longer. I assume that the directive for this invitation was discussed by the responsible authorities in Berlin and that the Foreign Minister is acquainted with the details.⁶

¹ This letter is unsigned but bears the letterhead of Fabricius.

² The body of Codreanu had been exhumed and reburied with elaborate ceremonies on Nov. 30, the second anniversary of his death. Cf. document No. 41, footnote 3.

³ See documents Nos. 380, 381, 387, 388, and 389.

⁴ See document No. 426 and footnote 1.

⁵ Rudolf Hess.

⁶ See document No. 631.

In the course of the conversation Gauleiter Bohle recommended to Horia Sima and to Jasinschi, Minister of Labor, who also was present, to use in the building up of the Iron Guard party the services of Landesgruppenleiter Langenecker, with whom he was well acquainted and who could furnish good advice. Horia Sima replied that he was grateful for all assistance and that he had already discussed with me the problem of sending some advisers here.⁷

I should like to ask you to let me know as soon as possible how the Foreign Minister feels about injecting the Landesgruppe into these matters. Out of consideration for other countries, it does not seem to me well advised to entrust the counseling of a foreign party organization to the Auslandsorganisation, whose chief task is that of looking after Reich Germans abroad. Political influence thereby is exerted all too easily. This influence can be directed centrally only through the Legation. That is why I find it advisable for the individual advisers to be in some way attached to the Legation, so that persons unacquainted with Rumanian conditions, for example, do not advise the Iron Guardists to take a stand against General Antonescu and his leadership. In my opinion it is absolutely necessary that these experts collaborate in the same way with General Antonescu as with Horia Sima, and that we keep an eye on the usefulness of this work. Herr Wüster⁸ met today with a very good reception from General Antonescu, as well as from Horia Sima and the Minister of Propaganda, and I believe his work will bear fruit. I expect the same from the activity of Oberstarbeitsführer Müller-Brandenburg, who will arrive tomorrow.

Gauleiter Bohle spent the evening with the political leaders of the Landesgruppe. I do not know what in particular was discussed on that occasion. On the next day the long funeral march took place and only in the evening did the gentlemen again meet Horia Sima at dinner at my house. On leaving, Gauleiter Bohle told me that Horia Sima had fixed his visit in Berlin for January 15. He, Gauleiter Bohle, intended to have Sima accompanied on the journey by party comrade Langenecker. Please inform the Foreign Minister of this and let me know whether he fully approves this journey and the escort, or whether another person should be assigned to accompany Horia Sima, who, after all, is now also Deputy Minister President. Incidentally, I see no reason why Horia Sima could not be accom-

⁷ The question of sending National Socialist functionaries to advise the Iron Guard regarding such activities as Labor Service, Youth, Propaganda, etc., was discussed in telegrams Nos. 1726 of Oct. 7 (182/85430) and 2107 of Nov. 16 (182/85644-45) from Fabricius to the Foreign Ministry. The Legation in Rumania had been notified of Ribbentrop's approval of the dispatch of such advisers in telegram No. 1592 of Oct. 31 (182/85431).

⁸ Consul General Walther Wüster, Cultural Attaché at the Embassy in Rome, was a propaganda expert.

panied by one of his Rumanian gentlemen who speak German well. But as the deputy Landesgruppenleiter is in any case very often away on trips in Germany, it would be difficult to avoid an encounter between the gentlemen there. Actually, I know of no serious objection to it.

I am giving this letter to Obergruppenführer Lorenz, who has expressed willingness to speak to you about it.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

No. 446

121/120242-43

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, December 4, 1940—6:35 p. m.

No. 1392 of December 4

Received December 4—7:20 p. m.

Through Dr. Schwarzmann. For Minister von Rintelen.

With reference to your telegram No. 1466 of December 3.¹

Yesterday I informed the French Government orally and today in writing that the move announced in the Vichy communiqué was not at present possible.

On this occasion it developed that Laval, whom I had told personally of the German position in this matter as early as November 30,² does not himself welcome the move in the form planned and disapproves of the communiqué. Nor was Laval, because of his sojourn in Paris, informed of the note of November 27 to the Armistice Commission.³

As matters stand Laval would consider the following arrangement the most expedient:

1. The official seat of the Chief of State and of all the ministries would remain in Vichy. In this way the question of the Diplomatic Missions accredited to the French Government would pose no problem either.

2. Ministries with administrative and economic functions would set up technical offices in Paris, as has already been done in the case of several ministries.

3. Travel between Vichy and Paris would be facilitated for the ministers who set up technical offices in Paris.

4. Marshal Pétain would receive permission to have a residence at Versailles where he could stay at his own discretion, though he would not undertake any official, governmental acts from there.

¹ Document No. 441.

² No record found.

³ See document No. 418, footnote 1.

In my opinion, making it possible for Pétain to travel regularly to Versailles would have the advantage that:

- 1) Pétain would be more frequently removed from his very disagreeable environment at Vichy and we would thus have a direct opportunity of influencing his decisions;
- 2) his presence at Versailles could result in the recall of the General Delegation of the French Government in Paris, whose Chief, General de La Laurencie, and his closest assistants have a position in occupied France which is politically undesirable for us.

ABETZ

No. 447

B19/B003898-99

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 760 of December 4

HELSINKI, December 4, 1940—11:07 p. m.

Received December 5—3:00 a. m.

1) Paasikivi had a long conversation with Molotov yesterday. He communicated the conditions in question ¹ and proposed the formation of a mixed commission.

Molotov used the following arguments in reply:

- a) He did not know the German-Finnish agreements; he would first have to see the texts.
- b) Cripps had said that no nickel must be delivered to Germany.
- c) The Finnish Government had concluded an agreement with Germany but during five (group missing) had blocked the conclusion of an agreement with Russia.

Molotov asked whether he could now assume that another Finnish Government would now definitely be willing, without reservation, to conclude an agreement on the exploitation of the mines. Paasikivi answered evasively that it would first be necessary to wait for the stand taken by London. Molotov replied that the trust had not fulfilled its obligations and that Finland had a right to nullify its agreement with the trust and conclude an agreement with Russia just as well as with Germany.

Paasikivi pointed out that two different questions were involved here: possession—presumably concession is meant—and deliveries. That was disputed by Molotov.

Paasikivi then stated that Finland also had to take navicerts into account. Molotov does not acknowledge this.

¹ See document No. 355 and footnote 3.

Molotov then said in a firm manner:

Russia had returned Petsamo to Finland and still Finland was now raising these difficulties. The manner in which Finland was acting was not good for Russian-Finnish relations.

Finally, Molotov stated that Russia was willing to agree to a mixed commission, although it did not seem to interest him. Molotov will announce the names of the Russian delegates in the next few days.

2) The Finnish Foreign Minister intends to send Ramsay and Wrede² to Moscow. A complication has arisen in that L. G. Farben urgently requested that an authoritative representative of Petsamo Nikkeli come to Berlin for discussions and only these two men come into question.

3) Söderhjelm³ signed the delivery agreement in Moscow in the name of Petsamo Nikkeli. The Russian representative (group garbled) reserved his signature, however. The Foreign Minister is not certain how to interpret this. Söderhjelm is returning today.

BLÜCHER

² Rabbe Axel Wrede, Finnish jurist and politician.

³ Johan Otto Söderhjelm, Finnish industrialist and politician, Minister of Justice, 1939-1940.

No. 448

F5/0407

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

No. 2191

BERLIN, December 4, 1940.
Sent December 5—12:30 a. m.
Pol. I 1462 g. Rs.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 4096¹ of November 28 and 4078 of November 29.²

I request you to tell the Spanish Foreign Minister on my behalf that the Führer has learned with satisfaction of the Generalissimo's decision. The Führer has directed Admiral Canaris to go to Madrid as soon as possible to discuss more about the preparations and about the execution of the action. Canaris will arrive in Madrid on Sunday.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ Evidently a clerical error for No. 4069; see document No. 414.

² Document No. 420.

³ i.e., Dec. 8. See document No. 476.

No. 449

F13/517-27

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

DECEMBER 6, 1940.

CONVERSATION OF THE FÜHRER WITH SVEN HEDIN ON DECEMBER 5,
1940, FROM 1:15 TO 2:00 P. M.¹

Sven Hedin stated that he had just taken a long trip through Germany and he thanked the Führer effusively for receiving him a third time, after having already received him twice during the war.² The situation had changed considerably since his last visit. The establishment of an English front in the north, which had threatened at the time, had been frustrated, and Finland and Russia were at peace. Also, the friendly relations between Germany and Finland had become stronger; this was documented by the course of the tristate contest in Helsinki³ and the transit of German troops to Kirkenes. For Finland and Sweden this was an especially happy development. The Führer had also probably changed his position, for he had at the time maintained a cold neutrality in the Finnish conflict. The Führer replied that at the time no other attitude had been possible. Now, however, that the possibility of England's setting up a front in the north on the pretext of helping Finland no longer existed, and now that the war in the west was ended, the basis for his decisions had also undergone a complete change. He was simply not the sort of person who made statements that he could not back up later on. At the time he would not have been able to back up any sort of declaration. At the time he had not yet given any thought to Norway at all, but in the west he had found himself opposed by 160 divisions. And it had been necessary first to dispose of this danger. Today the situation was an entirely different one. He had told the Russians unequivocally that he considered a continuation of the war in the Baltic inappropriate. He thought this war up there had been definitely stopped, although he was convinced that the Russian command had it in mind. This war would not recur. Sven Hedin thought likewise. But he asked the Führer what Germany would say to it if the Russians attacked the Finns again and the Swedes helped the Finns. The Führer replied that he did not think that this war would start again.

¹ Cf. *Sven Hedin's German Diary, 1935-1942*, pp. 175-188.

² See vol. VIII of this series, documents Nos. 263 and 654.

³ German, Swedish, and Finnish athletes had competed in a sports fest in Helsinki in September.

Russia would not plunge into a venture whose outcome was unpredictable. As already stated, he had no intention of rattling swords and making declarations whose consequences he would not be in a position to take on. At the time he had not been able to help and if Russia had taken the field against Germany, it would have seriously complicated the battle that was before him at the time. Today this was all different. Sven Hedin again asked where Germany's sympathies would lie if Sweden gave the Finns armed assistance. The Führer repeated that this war would not come; the case did not even arise; so one did not need to talk about it at all. He had informed the Russians in due form that he could not use a war in the Baltic. Psychologically, too, it would not be tolerable for us, for he had also to take into account the morale among his people.

The lesson of the Finnish-Russian conflict for all European states was the realization that their existence was dependent on the interest of Germany in their existence.⁴ The Finns had taken this lesson to heart, but there were other nations also that did not want to understand it; one of these was Turkey.

He was still involved in a very hard fight and wanted no complications of any kind. For this reason he wanted to keep his rear free, and he would therefore like to avoid a conflict with Russia; but on the other hand he was also not afraid, for he had the largest army at his disposal that the world had ever seen. The English were military simpletons if they really wanted to establish bases or even to land on the Continent of Europe. If, as they once stated recently, they were preparing for an offensive, he would find this highly convenient. He would be glad to place a large territory, preferably Holland, at their disposal for this purpose, only to be able to thrash them all the better afterwards. He spoke of his divisions, of the high quality of the German Army, which had suffered no losses at all of any consequence, of the splendid officers' corps, and the war-tried generals, who were all still young, and finally, of the tremendous modern equipment and the supplies of ammunition. He could deal with any problem, with any conceivable combination in the world, but he was not seeking any squabbles, for he wanted peace. It was for this reason, too, that he had given the Russians to understand that he desired no war in Finland.

Sven Hedin asked the Führer what he had to say regarding the plan of a union between Sweden and Finland with a common foreign policy. The Führer was afraid that this would unnecessarily arouse the Russians. This question had better be allowed to rest until the

⁴This is a rather free rendering of a passage which reads in the original: "Die Lehre aus dem finnisch-russischen Konflikt sei, wie für alle anderen europäischen Staaten, die Erkenntnis, dass sie einsehen müssten, dass ihre Existenz von dem Interesse Deutschlands an ihrer Existenz abhinge."

end of the war. Sven Hedin suggested that this union be effected in the form of a secret treaty. The Führer replied that there were no such things as secret treaties. We had repeatedly been reproached with secret diplomacy, but this reproach was nonsensical. In the government offices today there were persons of all shades of opinion and as soon as a secret agreement was reached, it would straightway be leaked out even from the most intimate circle and become known.

Returning to the Finnish problem, the Führer stated that the Finns, in their peace treaty with Russia, had committed themselves to something, and he could only advise them to be faithful to these commitments. This would also be the most satisfactory to him. He did not care to operate with empty talk and bluff and had to be able to answer for his actions with respect, also, to his own people. It was not simple to issue statements that could lead to wars. He therefore observed moderation and preferred to make no statements at all.

If a conflict were now provoked through the fault of Russia alone, the German people would follow him without question; if the blame were not clearly on one side, it would be more difficult. For the people would ask him why they had to fall in line because of the mistakes of others. It was all very fine to speak of war, to celebrate victories, and to read of heroic deeds in the newspapers, but, in the last analysis, the war would still be fought out on the battlefields, and there things looked different. Only if there were no other way, one had to resort to fighting. He repeated that Finland's best safeguard lay in her faithful observance of her agreements. The Finns should, at the same time, bear in mind the fate of the Baltic States; they too had thought that they could protect themselves by a secret pact. This secret pact had of course become known immediately and the Russians had made use of it by representing it as a violation of good will and as a provocation. Without provocation nothing further would happen up there. He also had an interest in Finland, since he was carrying on a valuable trade with the Finns. He had now indeed also given them war material. Sven Hedin interjected that the Finns could be happy about this. The Führer asked Sven Hedin not to mention to anyone what he had told him. Any of these remarks of his might cause him difficulties and entail consequences. Sven Hedin (apparently somewhat disappointed) gave his promise, but asked if he could at least inform the Swedish King of it. The Führer did not consent to this.

The Führer went on to say that he was thinking of the time after the war. He saw before him the tremendous mass of the Russian people on the one side and on the other the German Reich which, together with the Low German peoples, formed a bloc of nearly 100 million; in addition to these, the states that had to go along with

Germany economically. They all had to live and rebuild. War was a great consumer and after the war's end, the economy had to be restored. Sven Hedin asked the Führer what role Sweden could play in this great reorientation of Europe. The Führer replied that it was necessary to proceed beyond friendship to collaboration. One difficulty lay in the political structure of Sweden as a democracy. Again and again groups might form that might poison the atmosphere by means of the press and in other ways. Thus one was exposed to constant disturbances. Sven Hedin was of the opinion that things would improve more and more in this respect. Sweden was the only country in Europe that had never been conquered. In her heyday she had performed tremendous deeds of heroism. Two of her kings had fallen on the field of battle. The wars at that time had been brilliantly waged, and Stockholm possessed a collection of war trophies larger than all the other collections of Europe put together. Four thousand flags alone had been captured on the field of battle. Stockholm was the only capital of Europe that had never been occupied. This had given the Swedes great self-confidence and a definite urge toward liberty. Every farmer, although he thought of himself as a democrat, was in reality an aristocrat. A nation with such a history had to play an important role in the Führer's new order, and he was convinced that it would play such a role, if one knew how to persuade it and did not alarm it by coercion or overly strong ideological methods of persuasion. Then Sweden would be ready for anything. It was his great desire that Sweden could [word or words illegible]. The negative attitude of the press would gradually disappear. There were still a number of lunatics who believed in an English victory, but they were becoming fewer and fewer and more and more cautious. Gradually, also, the realization was spreading in Sweden that a victory for England would mean death for the whole of Scandinavia. For Scandinavia would then undoubtedly be overrun by Bolshevism. The Führer confirmed this. Sven Hedin described the Swedish farmer as very shrewd, as slow but correct in his thinking. Thus, the mood in Sweden was gradually becoming more optimistic as the Führer would wish it to be and ultimately he might be satisfied with Sweden. The Führer was convinced of this and expressed the hope that he could soon bring the war to an end. It was already won, that was absolutely certain. He did not write the World War down as a victory for the English, but as a failure of German policy. The Führer also made some statements about pre-war policy, about war on one and on two fronts, about the strength of the German Army, and about the complete misjudgment by England of Germany's military and economic situation.

As for Greece, it was his view that the twaddle about English troop landings was of no importance at all militarily. He would look on

until it began to grate on him and then he would act, and with thoroughness. It was *his* principle never to underestimate the opponent. No general had ever yet been reproached for putting too large a force in the field. Thus, in the Polish campaign, he might have been able to commit perhaps 20 divisions fewer, in the west perhaps 50 divisions fewer, but he had not done this. Wherever he fought, he always kept a third of his forces in reserve, and of the troops that he committed, only a portion really came into action.

It had been clear to him from the start that England would lose the war. Before the beginning of the air war, he had again extended his hand to the English, but the English potentates were living in another world; they were living in the past. The concept of the British Empire was utopian, for this world empire ended, on the one side, where America began, and, on the other side, where Japan began. Only together with Germany could these two Germanic peoples have been able to develop a worldwide power, but the English had, to be sure, not understood this. They had forgotten that Germany for 1,000 years had been a great empire, superseding Rome. Then, to be sure, Germany had slept for a few hundred years exhausted by religious strife. Perhaps this also had a biological reason. But at that time there was already a Prussia, and it was through this Prussia that Germany had arisen again. Also, Germany had at the time been ruled by princes, while today it is upheld by the nation. Germany today was a country of 85 million people, and, to these the Low Germans were later to be added. He was in the act of building up a great empire. This was his aim and this aim he would pursue with all his might. The English put a veil over their eyes. English achievements in the past 300 years were tremendous. They had secured for the white race a world-wide area. But Europe today was the Reich. After this war, Germany would take the position to which, because of her population, her qualities, her industry, and her genius, she was entitled. As a soldier, the German could not be excelled. The war against England had not been necessary, but now it had come and the English had to realize one thing: they had no more business to be in Europe.

HEWEL

No. 450

2174/471389

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 4179 of December 5

MADRID, December 5, 1940.

Received December 6—1:35 a. m.

For the officer in charge or his representative only. Top Secret. To be deciphered personally. Answer by courier or secret code.

With reference to your telegram No. 1999 of November 14 (Pol. I M 1290 g. Rs.).¹

In reply to the request made by the Embassy in accordance with instructions, the Foreign Minister has now stated that the Spanish Government has agreed to the disposition of German tankers in remote bays along the Spanish coast for refueling German destroyers. The Foreign Minister strongly urged that the utmost discretion be observed in carrying out these operations.

STOHRER

¹ Not found. See document No. 268.

No. 451

2141/468371

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2229 of December 5 BUCHAREST, December 5, 1940—9:15 p. m.
Received December 6—6:10 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 2195.¹

I) Difficult separate negotiations about the Russian proposal for joint Russo-Rumanian administration of navigation in the Danube delta time and again reveal the intention of the Russians to undermine, through the new Russo-Rumanian administration which is to be established, the former system of control in which Germany and Italy participated, in spite of its being formally retained. The Soviet Union wants to have the full say on the Sulina mouth and with Rumania alone on the Kiliya branch. They also demand that the autonomous Rumanian administration should totally disappear as an independent administration, particularly for the technical development of the Danube estuary, and that the same treatment apply to the Sulina mouth and to the Russian-Rumanian river course between the mouth of the Prut and the Kiliya branch.

II) I, therefore, suggest that you consider whether the time has not come to let Moscow know that the agreement reached last autumn regarding the dissolution of the European Danube Commission cannot be postponed past the middle of the month, even if agreement cannot be reached by then on a joint institution of the riparian states of the Danube estuary. In that case, I request instructions as to

¹ This telegram of Nov. 28 reported that Sobolev agreed to the German proposal for preparations for a Danube conference and that he had repeated an earlier statement that the Soviet objections to continuing a temporary four power administration for the Danube would be dropped, provided the Soviet proposals for a Russo-Rumanian administration were accepted (711/262147).

what changes are desired in the draft (see telegram No. 1987 of November 3²) prepared for this situation.

III) A further telegraphic report will be made at the end of this week.³

IV) Request telegraphic instructions with respect to II if occasion arises.⁴

MARTIUS
FABRICIUS

² See document No. 283, footnote 3.

³ Document No. 489.

⁴ See document No. 489, footnote 5.

No. 452

F1/0498-502

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

DECEMBER 5, 1940.

DUCE: Field Marshal Milch, who has the honor to be received by you and will deliver this letter, has been instructed by Reichsmarschall Göring to transmit to you, Duce, or to the men of the Italian armed forces designated by you, proposals in line with the suggestions made in my last letter.² Field Marshal Milch is one of the most outstanding officers of the German Luftwaffe. He is qualified and authorized to discuss anything or make any arrangements that come within the scope of his instructions.

The units of the German Luftwaffe which come into question for these tasks would be considered by us as a special command, which I should like to recall after its mission has been accomplished. If it is in any way possible I should like to have it available for use elsewhere at the beginning of February. I hope, Duce, that in spite of the shortness of this period it will be able to make a good contribution toward damaging the English in the Mediterranean.

I note with great pleasure that in the meantime conditions in Albania are being consolidated and that thereby the primary requisite

¹ This translation, except for the part enclosed in brackets, has been made from the German text in the file of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat. Page 4 of this text is, however, missing. The missing paragraphs have been supplied from the Italian text of the letter which was among Italian Foreign Office documents taken to Lisbon in August 1943; later these papers were sent to Washington where copies were made prior to restitution to the Italian Government. See *I documenti diplomatici italiani*, ninth series, 1939-1943 (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1954), vol. I, pp. IX-X. This Lisbon text differs in wording at many points from the text printed in *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti*, pp. 80-83.

² Document 369.

for preparing the systematic counterattack is created. In the meantime I have informed General Antonescu, who impressed me as being a real, nationalistic fanatic, about my view as to the necessity of a future attack by German units on Salonika.³ We reached agreements making it possible in all cases:

- 1) to ensure that Rumania will be protected against all threats;
- 2) to begin preparations for a possible advance of German units through Bulgaria toward Salonika.

The measures necessary for that purpose have already been inaugurated.

Yugoslavia. I had a conversation with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Marković.⁴ I tried to explain to him the unique chance of establishing close, friendly relations with the Axis, which in any case would win the war, and thereby being able to satisfy aspirations whose fulfillment the Yugoslavs hardly dared even dream of, considering the actual state of affairs. For the time being, Duce, I refrained from mentioning a guarantee by Germany and Italy and pointed instead to the possibility of a nonaggression pact. If we could get along merely with this, I believe it would be easier psychologically to explain to Hungary and Bulgaria. Lastly, I was unable to define more specifically the concept of a demilitarization of Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. I was therefore very grateful for the information that this was not an absolute condition for Italy.⁵ Whether it will now be possible for us to win over Yugoslavia, whose attitude of benevolent neutrality is very important, I do not know. As soon as I receive a reply from Belgrade or another discussion is initiated, I will inform you of it immediately, Duce.⁶

Russia. As you probably know, Duce, Russia has intensified its efforts to acquire influence over Bulgaria. If the Bulgarian Government had from the outset adhered to the Tripartite Pact [it would not today find itself exposed to such pressure. The King's delays not only harm us but also Bulgaria herself. Nevertheless I believe that we will succeed in overcoming this crisis also. Only then can one think of re-establishing an entente with Moscow which would be reasonable and useful for all members.

Spain. In view of the circumstances I consider as urgently necessary a definitive decision on the part of the Spanish Government and of the Caudillo regarding entry into the war. The problem today is posed in such fashion that one cannot have full security regarding the attitude of the Government of Vichy. I have always believed that there does not exist a put-up game between the French Government

³ See documents Nos. 381 and 388.

⁴ See document No. 417.

⁵ See document No. 383 and footnote 3.

⁶ See document No. 586.

and General de Gaulle. Nevertheless the circumstances require great prudence. Already the slightest counterstroke could cause North Africa and West Africa to become insecure and—separating themselves from Vichy—they would offer England dangerous bases of operations. The name of General Weygand, who has been sent there to maintain order, does not have a very tranquilizing effect on me. In such circumstances the possession of the Strait of Gibraltar is of the greatest importance. From that moment only can the situation in Northwest Africa be considered as definitively resolved in our favor.] Only then will it be possible to counter from a favorable position and bring to naught any attempt at defection by the French or of a landing by the British. I want therefore to make an urgent appeal to Franco again today to set finally a date for his entry into the war, which will make it possible to begin with the military preparations.⁷ The sooner this is done, the better. Since I cannot scatter all the German forces on the periphery, I should like to have them back from there not later than April in order to be able to face the further conflict with England in a central formation.

As soon as events make it necessary to take final decisions, I should consider it advisable, Duce, for us to see each other again. In that case I should be prepared to go anywhere—perhaps at the Brenner again—in order to discuss orally the problems which can be treated in writing only with great difficulty.

I conclude this letter, Duce, with the unshakable conviction that in a few weeks or, at the most, months, we will by our joint blows have improved our situation further, despite all temporary fluctuations, which can never be avoided in war, and that—whatever may happen—the time will come sooner or later when our main enemy, England, will collapse. And that is the important thing!

With this confidence I greet you in old heartfelt comradeship
Yours,

⁷ See document No. 473 and footnote 1.

No. 453

3056/601295-96

The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

K No. 2721

GENEVA, December 5, 1940.

Pol. II 3887 g.

Subject: News from England.

A member of the English Conservative party, who is obviously a person highly respected in political circles, recently arrived here from

England. Yesterday he talked to my reliable confidential informant and the following emerged: The person mentioned (possibly a certain Taylor who formerly was a member of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, or Lord Darventer) is a boyhood friend of Churchill and is still today on good, friendly terms with him, although he does not quite share the latter's political views. Before his departure he talked with Churchill who told him literally: "I would have only to lift my finger and I could have peace, but I do not want it." In that connection the English participant in the conversation expressed the opinion that Churchill and a large part of the British Government continued to insist fanatically on carrying on the war to the utmost; in this matter he is above all supported by Eden. But in the opinion of the English informant, some members of the English Government hold different views, although they are not allowed to express them in public, and on the contrary are occasionally forced to make warlike speeches which are not quite in accordance with their views (probably Halifax is meant). The whole of the English people, in the opinion of the English personage mentioned, is in no way shaken and, for the time being, firmly backs the Government. At this moment only a few big English industrialists are inclined toward a compromise peace. Allegedly they are still striving to prevent the ties with Germany from being cut completely and, in roundabout ways, to remain in conversation with influential German circles.

The Englishman summed up his opinion of the state and the prospects of the war as follows: Germany cannot win the war because she is not able to make a landing in England, but neither can England, even with full American assistance, win the war against Europe. It was therefore better for Britain to conclude a compromise peace and that as soon as possible.

In connection with the discussion of the question in what form possible peace conversations could be initiated apparently the possibility of letting the Pope act as peace mediator was also discussed. In view of the conflicts between Germany and the Vatican, however, this method was characterized as hardly practicable, especially since Mussolini allegedly has also not encouraged the Pope in that direction.¹

KRAUEL

¹ A report on a further conversation of the German agent with the British person in question was dispatched by Krauel on Dec. 18 (3056/601377-79).

No. 454

265/172531

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

No. 663

BERLIN, December 5, 1940.
Sent December 6—3:10 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 977.¹

Until you receive further instructions please exercise great reserve in your conversations with the Turks. I assume that you have not delivered anything in writing and request confirmation of this fact.² For your personal information it should be added that the question whether formulation of a treaty between Germany and Turkey is at all feasible at the present time is still entirely open, and that the concrete formulation of individual points as laid down in your telegram is inappropriate at this time. For the time being, please do not carry on any further conversations regarding the question of the Straits, either, since this question, too, must remain entirely open for the time being. I reserve further instructions.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 436.² See document No. 459.

No. 455

91/100456-57

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Ireland

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 422

BERLIN, December 5, 1940.
Sent December 6—4:55 a. m.

Exclusively for the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 774 of November 29,¹ I now await your further reports. I would ask you, moreover, at the next opportunity to bring up again, in conversation with de Valera, the possibility of English intervention in Ireland. You may in this connection state approximately the following:

You had information from Germany to the effect that the German Government was naturally interested in strengthening Ireland's

¹ Document No. 419.

power to resist in such an event. At the conclusion of the campaign in France, Germany had come into possession of large quantities of English arms. You considered it not unlikely, circumstances permitting, that the Reich Government was prepared and in a position to give the Irish Government free of charge a considerable quantity of these weapons, the kind and caliber, etc., which were identical with those of the weapons in use in the Irish Army. I shall communicate to you details regarding the arms that are available, as soon as de Valera shows interest. The transportation of these arms would naturally have to proceed under special camouflage. We could visualize transportation in this way, namely, that transport ships would be directed by us toward the Atlantic, and then, coming from there from the west, camouflaged as transports from the United States, they would sail on the familiar navigation lanes to Ireland under the Irish flag. All details would, when occasion arises, have to be arranged with the Irish Government. If de Valera should show interest, you could also discuss this question with him and possibly make proposals. The war material involved consists of artillery and infantry weapons, light as well as heavy, and large quantities of artillery and infantry ammunition. Technically speaking, we have no doubt that, in agreement with the Irish Government, arms shipments of this kind could be carried out in such a manner that in no event and in no way would Irish neutrality be compromised through these matters.

For the rest, the instructions in our telegram No. 402 of November 26² apply to your conversation with de Valera.³

RIBBENTROP

² Document No. 407.

³ See documents Nos. 523 and 576.

No. 456

368/207365-67

*The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions
With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

Del. No. 226

WIESBADEN, December 6, 1940—1:40 p. m.

Received December 6—2:40 p. m.

The Military Commander in France and the Commissioner with the Bank of France inform me that the installment toward occupation costs due on November 30 has not been paid.

In agreement with General von Stüpnagel I immediately sent the appended note today to the French delegation.

Already the week before last, when I informed M. Boisanger that I was going to Berlin, he asked for an appointment last week because, as he told me quite confidentially, he had to hand me a note with regard to discontinuing the payments toward occupation costs and he wanted to be sure that I would be available for this purpose. I warned M. de Boisanger at that time not to transmit such a note before the start of the political negotiations.

When I had my conversation with Laval last week, I used the opportunity to tell him, too, that I would have the most serious misgivings if the payments toward occupation costs were discontinued before the start of the negotiations.¹ M. Laval answered that the Treasury had spoken to him about the necessity for procuring further funds from the Bank of France in order to continue the payments toward occupation costs. He had refused such conferences with the Treasury, pointing out that he was just on the point of having discussions with the Foreign Minister which among other things would also deal with the question of occupation costs. To be sure, he had assumed in so doing that at the time the payments became due he would already be involved in such negotiations. It was his opinion that we should await the results of these conferences and then give instructions that the further funds necessary for continuing the payments toward the occupation costs should be procured from the Bank of France.

The French have so far not handed us a note regarding the actual discontinuance of the payments toward occupation costs, as was their original intention.

I should like to refer in this connection, however, to the note of October 23 of the French delegation,² in which they inform us that within the foreseeable future they will be unable to continue paying the installments in the present amounts. I have so far not answered this note, following a specific instruction of the Foreign Minister. The text of the note is as follows:

"Del. W. No. 2561

WIESBADEN, December 6, 1940.

NOTE FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FRENCH ECONOMIC DELEGATION
WITH THE GERMAN ARMISTICE DELEGATION, M. DE BOISANGER,
GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF FRANCE

"The Military Commander in France and the Commissioner with the Bank of France have informed me that the installment on the

¹ Paris telegram No. 1353 transmitted a report by Hemmen of a conversation with Laval on Nov. 30 in the matter of the Belgian gold (see document No. 264 and footnote 3), but does not contain any reference to the question of occupation costs (121/120204-05).

² Transmitted in Wiesbaden telegram No. 165 of Oct. 24 (368/207177-79). For the text, see *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. II, pp. 213-214.

occupation costs due on November 30, 1940, has not been paid by the French Government.

"With reference to article 18 of the Armistice Treaty³ and my note Del. W. No. 280 of August 8⁴ and the note of the French delegation of August 12, 1940,⁵ I should like to request information on the attitude which the French Government intends to take with regard to the obligations it has undertaken in this respect.

"Vice President Laval informed the undersigned in Paris on November 30 that he had refused to let the Treasury procure further funds for paying the occupation costs, since he believed that by that time he would have entered into negotiations with the Reich Government dealing, among other things, with the question of occupation costs. In my opinion the French Government is obligated to pay the installments on the occupation costs agreed upon until such time as another arrangement has been made between the two Governments. Since, however, such negotiations have not yet been brought about, it is absolutely necessary for the French Government to procure further funds at once and to pay the installments that have become due in the meantime, in order to avoid the finding of a violation of article 18 of the Armistice treaty. Signed: Hemmen, Chairman."

HEMMEN

³ See vol. ix of this series, document No. 523.

⁴ The text of Hemmen's note of Aug. 8 to the French delegation was transmitted to the German Foreign Ministry in his telegram No. 58 of Aug. 8; see vol. x of this series, document No. 309.

⁵ For a published text, see *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 159-160.

No. 457

121/120253

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, December 6, 1940.

No. 1415

Received December 6—5:40 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Former French Premier Flandin, who except for his recent speech in Dijon before French journalists¹ has so far kept very much in the background, has been asked by Marshal Pétain to come today to Vichy for a conference. Flandin, who rarely comes to Paris, but with whom I maintain constant contact through his private secretary even when he is at his country home in the département of Yonne, had me informed as follows regarding his trip to Vichy.

1. He approved 100 percent the policy of collaboration and the necessity to have it firmly rooted with the French people.

2. He shared our opinion that it [cooperation] must be strengthened in the social, economic, and political sphere by joint efforts of all forces

¹ In this speech of Nov. 18, Flandin had attacked England, the Freemasons, and the Jews and had advocated cooperation with the Axis.

of good will. For his part, he would contribute to this by supporting this policy publicly in the future, too, as he had done before in Dijon.

3. For the time being, a personal participation in the business of government did not seem expedient to him. He gave assurance that at the present time he would not attempt to take the place of Laval. He was of the opinion that the negotiations with us begun by Laval should be brought to a successful conclusion by Laval himself, and he would therefore support him by his actions outside the Government, that is, by contributing to an improvement in the psychological atmosphere.

ABETZ

No. 458

218/147630

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1360 of December 6

TOKYO, December 6, 1940—5:55 p. m.

Received December 6—6:25 p. m.

The Deputy Foreign Minister informed me that the Thai Government had gratefully accepted the Japanese proposal to assume the role of mediator in the territorial questions between Thailand and Indochina.

The Japanese Government is trying to keep the Thai claims to Indochinese territory within as narrow limits as possible, and has informed the French Ambassador here ¹ to this effect. Moreover, the Deputy Foreign Minister hopes to be able to persuade the Thai Government to demand the return of portions of present-day Burma which had been ceded to England.

OTT

¹ Charles Arsène-Henry.

No. 459

265/172532

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, December 6, 1940—9:25 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received December 7—3:50 a. m.

No. 992 of December 6

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 663 of December 5.¹

¹ Document No. 454.

In accordance with the instruction given me by you and the Führer I have offered the Turks assurances against German attacks. Of course, I have not delivered anything in writing, but after the conversation with Saracoglu, which I reported in telegram No. 977 of December 2,² I took note of the Turkish request that these oral assurances be put into concrete form. When I asked orally for suggestions as to how to do this, the [Turkish] Foreign Minister said that a formulation of a treaty was desired. I replied that I would obtain further instructions from my Government. I did not carry on any conversation at all about the question of the Straits; rather, when the Turkish Government asked whether we would not want to become signatories of the Montreaux [Convention] I refused to submit this request to my Government.

I hope that it will be possible to continue the conversations in spite of the new obstacles evident from your telegram; for if I should now break them off entirely, without giving a reason, this would certainly drive the Turks completely into the arms of the English.

PAPEN

² Document No. 436.

No. 460

B14/B002415-16

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2234 of December 6

ROME, December 6, 1940—10:35 p. m.

Received December 6—11:10 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Immediately after his visit with Count Ciano,¹ Field Marshal Milch was received at 11:00 o'clock by the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia. In the conversation, which was conducted entirely in German by the Duce, there participated, besides me, Colonel General Pricolo² and, from the staff of the Field Marshal, General von Waldau; also Lieutenant General Ritter von Pohl as chief of the liaison staff. The Duce received the representative of the Führer with the most heartfelt warmth and was in the best of spirits.

He first took note of the Führer's letter³ brought to him by Field Marshal Milch, reading it calmly, and⁴ this reading with the remark, "that is very good and very important." He then took up the main

¹ Mackensen had reported on this meeting of Field Marshal Milch with Ciano in telegram No. 2233 of Dec. 6 (B14/B002413-14).

² Francesco Pricolo, Italian Under State Secretary for Air and Chief of the Air Force General Staff, October 1939–November 1941.

³ Document No. 452.

⁴ Annotation on text: "One group apparently missing."

subject, the use of German air forces by Italy in the Mediterranean and had the Field Marshal explain all the details of this question—frequently interrupting him with supplementary questions—in which connection he repeatedly emphasized the great importance which such employment would have for combating English power in the Mediterranean during the winter months. I had the impression that the thoughts expounded to him by the Field Marshal had his full approval. He emphasized that Pricolo had full authority to settle the details in discussion with the Field Marshal.

In the further conversation the Duce, like Ciano previously, was especially interested in what the Field Marshal was able to report on the situation in England, particularly on the effects of our air attacks on the armament industry, the extent of American aid, etc. He was obviously impressed by the fact that the Field Marshal was often able to document his statements on these questions with positive statistics, as also, in particular, in the question of the losses suffered by us as a result of the English bombing attacks, for which Field Marshal Milch was able to give the Duce (one group garbled) interesting figures, comparing these losses with losses from traffic accidents during the last year, especially, however, the last normal traffic year, 1938.

With regard to the situation in Albania the Duce appeared not to be seriously worried and emphasized the usefulness of the aid given by Germany in transferring, on loan, transport planes, which he would need for only about 4 weeks. All preparations had been made for accommodating them. It was especially gratifying for him to hear that the Field Marshal could report that on his trip over the Brenner he had already met the first ground crew on its way.

The Duce asked the Field Marshal to tell the Führer that he would reply to his letter as soon as possible and thought that he could perhaps send this reply off tomorrow.⁵

MACKENSEN

⁵ Cf. document No. 477, footnote 7.

No. 461

B19/B003897

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, December 6, 1940.

No. 719

With reference to your telegram No. 756.¹

In case the Finnish side should bring up the question of the presidency with you, you are requested to take the following line:

Germany does not of course interfere in the internal affairs of Finland and therefore cannot and does not wish to take any stand in

¹ Document No. 439.

the question of the presidency. The Finns would probably have to consider, however, whether the election of Mannerheim would not be a liability in their relations with Soviet Russia. Moreover, they would also have to consider whether Mannerheim would not be of greater value to them as a military leader than as president.

Foreign Minister

No. 462

4041/E064142

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands

Draft telegram

BERLIN, December 6, 1940.

zu W I 3051.¹

By teletype en clair.

For Minister Bene.

With reference to your teletype message No. 442 of December 2.²

The Foreign Minister has now expressed his agreement to the introduction of a mutual exemption from customs duties for Germany and Holland; he is proceeding from the assumption that the measure will be given small play in the public, the press, etc., both here and in Holland.

By a decree regarding customs revisions, to be published in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*, *Reichsanzeiger*, and customs publications, the Reich Minister of Finance³ will order that goods originating in the occupied territories of the Netherlands, shall as of December 16, 1940, be exempt from duties. A final decision as to the date, however, has not yet been made. The text of the decree will follow by teletype.⁴

The introduction of customs exemption in Holland would, as proposed, have to take place on January 1, 1941.

Please inform the Reich Commissar⁵ and Minister Fischböck.⁶

WIEHL

¹ W I 3051: Not found.

² This report from Minister Bene stated that the Dutch approved the planned abolition of customs between Germany and the Netherlands, as they considered it an economic necessity; consequently Dutch approval was not a result of German pressure (4041/E064145).

³ Count Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk.

⁴ A teletype message sent by Wiehl on Dec. 11 gave the text of the decree as published in an official gazette on Dec. 11 (2862/563229-30). For a published text, see *Deutscher Reichsanzeiger und Preussischer Staatsanzeiger* No. 291 of Dec. 11.

⁵ Arthur Seyss-Inquart.

⁶ Hans Fischböck, Commissar General for Economics and Finance with the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands.

No. 463

141/126692-93

Counselor of Embassy Bargaen to Counselor Siegfried

BRUSSELS, December 6, 1940.

DEAR SIEGFRIED: When I was last in Berlin I told the State Secretary, among other things, that I would consider it desirable if in the interest of the strengthening of my position here, an agreement could be reached with the High Command of the Wehrmacht whereby my sphere of authority would be defined more precisely on at least two points. I had the following formulation in mind:

1. The representative of the Foreign Ministry is to participate in all political decisions, and
2. all the propaganda, press, and radio activities of the military administration should be carried out in close cooperation with the local office of the Foreign Ministry.

The idea of such a defining had occurred to me because I believed that after the meeting of the King of the Belgians with the Führer¹ there would be a new development in German-Belgian relations and the German-Belgian relationship would again assume more of a foreign policy aspect. Meanwhile I now see, however, that developments have presumably not yet advanced so far; for in a directive of November 28 of this year from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Chief of the General Staff,² which was probably drawn up with the consent of the Foreign Ministry, the following is stated: "No change has taken place in the relations with Belgium. There is therefore no reason that we can see for altering the previous directives. On the occasion of the visit of the King of the Belgians to the Führer no promises were made either about the future of Belgium or in the question of the prisoners of war."

In these circumstances, I should like to defer my proposal for the time being. It would have a natural and obvious justification only if one could proceed from the assumption that the political situation had undergone a change. For the time being I shall therefore continue in my activity here without any particular delimitation of sphere of authority and try to make the best of it.

I should be very grateful to you if you would inform the State Secretary of the foregoing.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

W. v. BARGEN

¹ See document No. 356.

² Not found.

No. 464

B14/B002417-18

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, December 7, 1940—12:05 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received December 7—12:40 a. m.

No. 2235 of December 6

For the Foreign Minister personally.

After the reception of Field Marshal Milch the Duce detained me in order to discuss once more in private the causes of the failure in Albania. In contrast to some others here, he refrained from trying to single out those personally responsible. In his opinion they had made the mistake—always serious militarily—of permitting military decisions to be affected by uncertain political considerations, in that a pro-Italian uprising of the Albanians in Greek territory had been included in the calculations as a certain factor. Not only had those Albanians not revolted, but on the contrary the Albanian soldiers employed at the front, through the mistaken appraisal of the internal relationship of the Albanians to the Italians, had deserted to the Greeks in droves. Among the total of about 7,000 (seven thousand) prisoners who had fallen into the hands of the Greeks there were about four thousand Albanians. It had likewise been a mistake for Italian policy, after the occupation of the country, to grant the Albanians entirely the same rights as the Italians. The masses had not been won over by this at all, but at most [only] those Albanians who had been so closely linked with the fate of the Italians that they would have had to fear for their lives in the event of an Italian reverse. The same mistake must not be made in the treatment of the French. At this point the Duce again touched on the letter of the Führer¹ and emphasized how much he favored caution with respect to Weygand, who, although he perhaps honestly sided at present with Pétain, was still a Frenchman who would not fail to take advantage of any opportunities offered. For the rest, continued the Duce, reverting to Albania, he was now reassured about developments there; the necessary reinforcements were coming up and the Greeks seemed in the next [sic] few days to have committed their last available troops. He was also reassured by the fact that recently he had had the direct cable connection with Albania re-established, so that rapid telegraphic communication from the High Command to the front was now ensured and it was free from the danger of monitoring, which had hitherto always existed in radio communication. The Duce then spoke briefly

¹ Document No. 452.

about the personality of the new Chief of Staff,² whose military capacity he rated very highly.

He then touched again on the question of active participation by Spain on the side of the Axis Powers, which he said was of extreme importance because of Gibraltar; if Gibraltar no longer existed as an English base, Italy's position from the point of view of naval strategy would be entirely different and her ships would be offered possibilities in the Atlantic from which he could expect great success. From another point of view, however, Spain's entry into the war was only a limited advantage. He was thinking in that connection of the internal conditions of the country, serious food problems, etc., but also of the fact that the Spaniards might later bring up inconvenient wishes in North Africa. With regard to the idea that he should, in certain circumstances, also personally exert pressure on Franco, he would later write to the Führer. He had thought of a meeting with the Caudillo in Genoa, where there would be an opportunity to give him—also outwardly—an especially good reception.

The Duce emphasized at the close of this part of the conversation how happy he would be to meet the Führer at the proper moment and then turned with warm cordiality to personal matters.

MACKENSEN

² Ugo Cavallero.

No. 465

449/222969

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BELGRADE, December 7, 1940—12:15 a. m.

No. 876 of December 6

Received December 7—2:50 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 916 of December 5 (Pol. I M 1458 g. RS.).¹

The Foreign Minister, with whom I, as instructed, today again took up the matter of the trucks in the most urgent manner and with the greatest emphasis, informed me first that the Italian request, which indeed involved an analogous case—namely, also the import of trucks to an area of hostilities through Yugoslav territory—had in the meantime been definitely rejected by the Yugoslav Government. This had to be done since Yugoslavia must avoid in principle taking sides in the Italo-Greek conflict by giving assistance of importance to the conduct of the war. In the same way several similar Greek requests had already been rejected. He could not share the view which I expressed, that it was a question of the delivery of civilian vehicles

¹ Not found.

for which a transit authorization was not required. The delivery of 1,000 trucks to a war zone obviously served military purposes. Moreover, from his knowledge of the attitude of the Führer and Reich Chancellor and of the Reich Foreign Minister with respect to the position which Yugoslavia ought to take today, he could not believe that Germany really wished to insist on demands of this sort at this particular time; after all, there were other transport routes to Albania which did not touch on Yugoslav territory.

I told the Foreign Minister in conclusion that I would pass on his position; it was clear to me that the evaluation of the whole affair was in the last analysis a question of good will.²

HEEREN

¹ In a memorandum of Dec. 8 regarding "transports of trucks to Yugoslavia," Counselor Kramarz recorded information from OKW that Hitler had given instructions to halt immediately preparations for the dispatch of trucks to Albania (449/222972).

No. 466

91/100462-63

The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

DUBLIN, December 7, 1940.

No. 787 of December 5

Received December 7—11:20 a. m.

As I indicated provisionally in telegram No. 774¹ the question of our future attitude regarding Ireland's independence is also increasingly occupying influential politicians here. They are afraid that we might disinterest ourselves in Ireland or, for considerations of Lebensraum, abandon her to England at the conclusion of peace. In response to such more or less explicit utterances I have so far confined myself to exerting a generally calming influence, pointing to our friendly and understanding attitude as demonstrated by our entire conduct toward Ireland. I believe, however, that the moment has now come for going a little further so far as this is practicable. Perhaps some remarks could be dropped in the course of a conversation indicating that Germany is and will remain interested in the continued existence of an independent Ireland. I request instructions in this regard,² which I should like to have in hand by Christmas at the latest for my talk with de Valera. As for the question whether at

¹ Document No. 419.

² Not found.

the same time the problem of a future return of Northern Ireland ought perhaps to be touched upon in talks with the Government here, I might remark that my view is the following: Neither de Valera nor any official of the Irish Foreign Ministry has ever mentioned to me the possibility of recovering Northern Ireland with German help. Irish nationalist circles hope for such a solution. Even if de Valera should persist in adhering to his past course of seeking peaceful restitution of Northern Ireland exclusively through direct agreement with England, it would be fundamentally in our interest, in my opinion, in view of the favorable effect which this would have on popular feeling here, if restoration of Irish unity were at the appropriate time accomplished with visible German participation. So long as the general situation has not been changed by an English attack on Ireland, it would in my opinion be premature to indicate to the Government here any intentions of this kind that we might have for the future. Above all, we should further avoid giving any appearance of being interested in a continued existence of Irish antagonism even toward a defeated England. A hint on some occasion, however, that we actively desire restoration of Ireland's unity would be desirable in my opinion. I should like to remark that I have reliably learned that de Valera has very favorably noted the absence of German air attacks on Northern Ireland, and is reported to have taken this as a sign that we regard Northern Ireland as a territory lawfully belonging to the Irish State but kept from it merely by force.

HEMPFEL

No. 467

230/152410-11

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, December 7, 1940.

No. 880 of December 7

Received December 8—12: 15 a. m.

Exclusively for the Foreign Minister personally.

The Foreign Minister just handed to me a written statement in German three and a half pages long, which, after gratefully acknowledging Germany's understanding policy and stating that there are close, friendly relations with Germany based on common aims in the southeast, treats in detail the development of Yugoslav-Italian relations since the World War and characterizes the treaty of 1937¹ as the final and permanent basis for the relations between the two countries, also recognized by Italy.

¹ See document No. 431, footnote 7.

The statement then ends as follows :

"In view of the relations with Germany and Italy, as outlined above, the Royal [Yugoslav] Government has given benevolent consideration to the friendly interest of Germany in a new confirmation of the friendly relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. Accordingly the Royal Government states that it is willing to discuss with the Reich Government and the Italian Government the possibilities of signing a nonaggression pact on the basis of the Italo-Yugoslav agreement of March 25, 1937.

The Royal Government is particularly anxious on this occasion to assure the Reich Government of its most sincere thanks and to express its most friendly feelings in discussing this question which it considers to be of mutual interest to both countries."

Conclusion of the statement.

The text of the introductory statements will follow separately.²

HEEREN

² Document No. 469.

No. 468

585/242803-04

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOPIA, December 7, 1940—7:50 p. m.

SECRET

Received December 8—1:35 a. m.

No. 604 of December 7

With reference to my telegram No. 592 of November 30.¹

Yesterday the Soviet Minister,² on instructions from his Government, presented to the Foreign Minister a reply to Bulgaria's rejection of the pact proposal. The statement, as I was told by the Foreign Minister, disputed Bulgaria's assertion that the proposed pact would subject Bulgaria to the danger of war. On the contrary, the proposal was aimed at eliminating the danger facing Bulgaria even now, first through military operations moving closer to Bulgaria's border, and then through the threat of foreign powers that they might in certain circumstances bomb Bulgarian cities. (The Russians, the Foreign Minister thinks, are alluding to the threat made several weeks ago by the English Minister³ to the Minister of War that English planes would bomb Sofia if Bulgaria were to permit entry of German troops.)

2. The objection that Bulgaria was reluctant to be involved in the issues of grand international politics, was accepted by the Russian Government, which would be prepared to confine itself to the issuance

¹ Document No. 430.

² Alexander Lavrishtchev.

³ George William Rendel.

of a "guarantee for Bulgaria and her interests." According to the Foreign Minister, the Russian note on this point contained several other obscure phrases:

In the present situation, "the perspective" was not yet clearly apparent and there would be time later on to study the question of the nature and scope of the obligations on either side and of the *Rayons* (spheres of interest).

3. With respect to the Tripartite Pact, Bulgaria's accession to it would be abandonment of her neutrality, and might thereby actually create a danger of war. It would also be difficult to reconcile with Bulgaria's desire to achieve her national aspirations through peaceful means only.

I have urged anew upon the Foreign Minister that only a straightforward decision in favor of the Tripartite Pact could save Bulgaria from any further unpleasant steps by the Russians. Today he was actually prepared to concede this. He told me that no one has as yet been informed of the latest Russian *démarche*; he would first have to report to the King. At the present moment the reply to the Turks⁴ is under study.

RICHTHOFEN

⁴ See document No. 433.

No. 469

230/152412-15

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 881 of December 7

BELGRADE, December 7, 1940—11:15 p. m.

Received December 8—3:05 a. m.

Exclusively for the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 880 of December 7.¹

The text of the introductory statements of the declaration transmitted with telegram No. 880 of December 7 is as follows: "From the time of her origin, Yugoslavia has felt that her national unification, which is not the consequence of any treaty arrangements but is a natural result of long, difficult struggles of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was correctly understood in Germany.

"Germany has never made Yugoslavia any kind of difficulties. The relations between Germany and Yugoslavia have always been cordial, friendly, and trusting.

¹ Document No. 467.

"Particularly in the course of recent years, when the policy of the German Reich became also much more active in the southeast, Yugoslavia's efforts were directed more and more toward adapting the consular treaty negotiations of the Kingdom to the views of Germany about the ordering of relations in this part of Europe. Thereupon followed the adjustment of our relations with Italy,² the adjustment of our relations with Bulgaria,³ and the complete normalization of our relations with Hungary.

"In this way there developed a community of views between Germany and Yugoslavia, which had very favorable results for the preservation of peace on the Adriatic, in the Danube area, and in the Balkans.

"Yugoslavia has Germany to thank for this favorable development.

"The relations between Italy and Yugoslavia should, from the point of view of the Royal Government, also be considered as definitively settled and consolidated.

"After the War of 1914-1918, Italy and Yugoslavia, in direct negotiations and without any pressure from the outside, settled their relations concerning territorial questions by a special treaty, concluded on November 12, 1920, in Rapallo.⁴ This situation was also confirmed by the pact of January 27, 1924, in Rome.⁵

"Likewise by direct negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia and thanks to the benevolent cooperation of the German Reich, the treaty of March 25, 1937,⁶ was also signed. This treaty confirmed the mutual respect of the common borders as well as of the maritime border on the Adriatic. At the same time very close political relations were established by the treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia. It establishes the obligation to refrain from any action in case one of the treaty partners should come into conflict with a third power. It is also provided that [each of] the two countries will not support any action that is directed against the territorial integrity or against the existing legal order of the other treaty power.

"Certain other questions were also settled by secret protocols that were concluded on the occasion of the signature of this treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia.⁶ In this connection the understanding on Albania, which provided for the preservation of the political independ-

² See document No. 431, footnote 7.

³ See *ibid.*, footnote 8.

⁴ For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xviii, p. 387.

⁵ For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxiv, p. 31.

⁶ For draft texts of these protocols, see J. B. Hoptner, "Yugoslavia as Neutralist: 1937", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. xvi, pp. 156-176.

ence and the territorial integrity of the Albanian state and also for the obligation to confer on any situation which might arise in this respect regarding Albania, was of particular importance for the protection of Yugoslav interests.

"A second secret protocol referred to the concession of certain rights to the Yugoslav minorities in Italy.

"Even before the signature of the treaty of 1937, during the Abyssinian war and the sanctions, Yugoslavia adopted an extremely favorable attitude toward Italy: she performed friendly services for Italy both with regard to supply as well as by the recognition of the annexation of Abyssinia and the foundation of the Italian empire. Yugoslavia took the same attitude toward Italy later, too, in the Spanish Civil War. Particularly by her conduct at the Nyon conference⁷ Yugoslavia greatly eased the situation of Italy. Thanks to Yugoslavia's efforts the idea was discarded of creating an exclusive Mediterranean bloc which was to be aimed directly against Italy. At the express desire of Yugoslavia, France and England were not accorded any rights on the Adriatic, nor were Adriatic harbors placed at their disposal as bases for operations and supplies. For her part Yugoslavia refused to take part in any actions outside her own waters.

"On the occasion of the occupation of Albania, Yugoslavia adopted a loyal attitude toward Italy, although this occupation was contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaty that had been concluded.⁸

"During the present war, too, Yugoslavia had most scrupulously observed the obligations assumed under the treaty of 1937. Italy has not been threatened by Yugoslavia for one moment or in any manner, either when Italy entered the war against England and France or later in the campaign against Greece.

"Italy has always stressed that the treaty of 1937 remains the final basis for the relations between the two countries."

There then follows the conclusion of the statement, the text of which has been transmitted with telegram No. 880 of December 7.

HEEREN

⁷ The Nyon conference was held Sept. 10-14, 1937, and dealt with the attack on merchant shipping in the Mediterranean by submarines of undeclared nationality. Cf. vol. III of this series, pp. 438-448.

⁸ Cf. vol. VI of this series, document No. 191.

No. 470

2236/476127

The Legation in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 51 of December 7

ATHENS, December 7, 1940.
Received December 8—5:30 p. m.

For OKH Attaché Branch.

On December 6 I inquired at the General Staff regarding a report transmitted by the Abwehr of new English debarkations, including army personnel.¹

The Deputy Chief of the General Staff thereupon sent word that I call at the General Staff and be given formal assurances that except for the landing of English air force units with ground crews and auxiliary services in mid-November, no further English landings had taken place; in particular, no landings of ground forces. None of these, as a matter of fact, were expected.

Our own intelligence confirms the foregoing communication. The General Staff also denied the Italian report that the Greeks at the front had been supported by English artillery. On this subject I refer to the detailed report of today.²

Military Attaché³
ERBACH

¹ The Abwehr report has not been found. In telegram No. 666 of Nov. 16 Erbach had reported that "according to reliable information" 5,000 British troops had landed in the Piraeus and that further debarkations were to be expected (449/222911).

² Not found.

³ Maj. Clemm von Hohenburg.

No. 471

230/152408

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

No. 6

BERLIN, December 7, 1940.

Regarding deliveries of goods to Yugoslavia.

As instructed, I am submitting again herewith the memorandum of November 20 regarding deliveries of aviation material to Yugoslavia.¹

The Yugoslav Minister has tried in the meantime to call on the Reichsmarschall regarding the matter, too, and has approached General Bodenschatz.² The Reich Air Ministry will continue to show

¹ Document No. 370.

² Gen. Karl Bodenschatz, Chief of Staff to Göring.

reserve as long as the Reich Foreign Minister has not agreed to the deliveries.

In view of the Italian request that no aviation material be delivered to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav attitude in the question of the transit of trucks bound for Albania,³ we will have to continue to refrain from sending aviation material to Yugoslavia.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

³ See document No. 465.

No. 472

368/207368-70

Ministerialdirektor Wiehl to Minister Hemmen

PERSONAL

BERLIN, December 7, 1940.

SECRET

DEAR HEMMEN: With reference to your telegram No. 226 of yesterday¹ regarding nonpayment of the installments toward occupation costs on November 30, the Foreign Minister just informed me that he thinks that the language used in your note was a little too soft. He referred to the sentence in which you request a statement by the French Government on the attitude it intended to take with regard to the obligations it had undertaken in this respect and also to the sentence that "in your opinion" the French Government was obligated, etc.

I pointed out that at the end of the note you demanded that immediate steps be taken to procure further funds and to pay the installments that had fallen due in the meantime, under the threat that otherwise there would be a finding of a violation of the Armistice Treaty, and that this threat of a finding of a default would probably prompt the French to pay quickly by recalling to them their own threats of this nature in the early reparation period.

The Foreign Minister asked me nevertheless to draw your attention to the fact that the continuous attempts of the French to take for granted possible results of another conversation of the Foreign Minister with Laval (see also the recent instance when the French rushed ahead of events with an announcement of an imminent move of the Government to Versailles²) must in all circumstances be rejected politely but firmly. The Foreign Minister has not authorized any

¹ Document No. 456.

² See document No. 441.

one to talk with French authorities about points which are supposedly going to be discussed between him and Laval, nor even to admit to the French that he intended to discuss such points. If this were done, nevertheless, it could easily happen that M. Laval, if another conversation with the Foreign Minister should take place, might regard such points as having already been conceded on the basis of such preliminary talks, and he might thereupon prepare himself to present the Foreign Minister with new demands going beyond the earlier ones.

The Foreign Minister mentioned that the reports of Minister Hencke and Ambassador Abetz indicated an increasingly overbearing attitude on the part of the French and the tendency to wangle a maximum of concessions even before the political conversations are continued. It is equally evident from the tone of the French complaints about the deportations from Lorraine³ that the French have forgotten their own conduct after the World War.

The Foreign Minister requested me to bring this also to the attention of Minister Hencke, which I shall do at once (omitting the reference to your note about the occupation costs⁴).

Heil Hitler!

With best regards,
Yours,

WIEHL

³ See document No. 354 and footnote 2.

⁴ See, further, document No. 518.

No. 473

136/74512

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, December 7, 1940.

e. o. Pol. I 1487 g. Rs.

General Jodl informed me that he will probably go to Madrid as soon as the news has been received from Canaris that the Spanish agree with the target date set by us.¹ It will be his (Jodl's) task to make arrangements for the necessary military operations. Canaris cannot do this. He (Jodl) will also at the same time act as the officer enjoying the special confidence of the Führer, whom Franco requested.² He will travel in civilian clothes and with the passport of a Ministerialdirektor.

RITTER

¹ At a meeting with the top military leaders on Dec. 5 Hitler had decided to request of Franco that German troops cross into Spain on Jan. 10. See the draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941). See document No. 500.

² See document No. 420.

No. 474

B19/B003900-01

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

No. 8

BERLIN, December 7, 1940.

STATEMENTS OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL VELTJENS REGARDING FINLAND

Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens called on me in order to report on his last trip to Finland:

1) With regard to his statements to the Finnish military authorities concerning the Finnish attitude toward Russia in the Petsamo question, he had adhered strictly to the line approved by the Foreign Minister.¹ The Finnish authorities had been grateful and extremely happy over the statements.

2) The arms contracts which he had concluded with the Finns some time ago had been fulfilled almost completely and without any friction. The Finns had also expressed additional wishes, especially for two or three batteries of long-range heavy artillery. He had not taken these matters up, so as not to anticipate the decision here. They were also hard to meet at the present time; in any case the discussion about them could be postponed until the pending contracts had been completely wound up.

3) Finns had frequently asked about the German attitude toward the various candidates for the impending election of a new Finnish State President, especially Field Marshal Mannerheim. With respect to Mannerheim he had expressed himself to the effect that his election would probably be tantamount to a declaration of war on Russia. For the rest, he had merely stressed that Kivimäki was highly regarded in Germany.

4) Finnish military authorities had informed him confidentially of reports of the Finnish Air Attaché in London² on the effect achieved by our air attacks there; these reports were of great interest to our Luftwaffe.

With reference to section 4) OKW will be requested to communicate the reports to the Foreign Ministry. I have informed Minister von Blücher, moreover, of the statements of Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens and asked him, with reference to the suggestion to that effect which he made when he was here recently, to obtain further reports of that kind from the Finnish Air Attaché in London, if necessary through the German Military Attaché in Helsinki,³ and wire their content from time to time.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

¹ See document No. 411.

² Cmdr. Holger Gründahl, Military, Naval, and Air Attaché, 1935-1941.

³ Col. Horst Rössing, German Military Attaché until October 1941.

[EDITORS' NOTE. The Norwegian Nasjonal Samling leaders, Quisling and Hagelin, visited Berlin during the period December 4-12, 1940 (Reichskanzlei memorandum Rk. 18930 B of December 23, 1940: M225/M007718-19). General von Falkenhorst, Quisling, and Terboven were to meet with Hitler on December 7 (notes by Helmuth Greiner of the Records of Situation Conferences of the Defense Branch, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, August 8, 1940-June 25, 1941, typescript MS C-065 1, of the U.S. Army, Historical Division, European Command, entry for December 7, 1940).

No documentation on conferences which may have taken place between Quisling and German officials during the course of this visit has been found in the files. For a subsequent reference to such negotiations, see the letter of Quisling to Lammers of March 10, 1941, in volume XII of this series.]

No. 475

84/62190-92

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1940—12:31 a. m.

No. 2662 of December 7

Received December 8—1:10 p. m.

For OKW, Foreign Department;

For OKH, Attaché Department;

For RLM, Attaché Group.

Concerning the American armament industry.

The tasks of the armament industry being built up in the United States of America are constantly expanding. In the future its output is to be divided equally between the American and the English armed forces.¹ At the same time it is desired to strengthen the military striking power of China, the Netherlands Indies, Latin America, and possibly Greece, too, by delivery of war material to these countries. Moreover, the capacity of the English armament industry is constantly being reduced by air attacks and shipping losses, which adds to the increasing demands on the American armament industry. It

¹ Another copy of this document from the file of Wiehl (4420/E084002-04) shows the following marginal notes with reference to this sentence:

"Counselor Davidsen. This is news to me. Did we have earlier information about this? W[iehl]."

"There has been information for considerable time and, as far as I remember, there have been also several reports of Herr Bötticher to the effect that the English already have been receiving one half of the 'output.' It was also said in the reports that the American armed forces had opposed this ratio of distribution and would oppose it even more strongly in the future, since otherwise the new 2 million-man Army could not be equipped in time and consequently could not be organized at all. Davidsen, Dec. 11."

is a question whether the Americans will soon be in a position to satisfy these large demands.

The real weakness of the American armament industry lies in its limited productive capacity for war material and planes, especially engines. The weak points of the industry with respect to raw and semimanufactured materials are less important. The beginning of the build-up program of the armament industry was at first retarded by some unsolved problems, for instance, the depreciation and financing of new plants, but after they were solved great activity developed. The mobilization of the great productive capacities of American private industry, especially the automobile industry, facilitated and speeded up the implementation of the program for the armament industry, but has not yet eliminated the lack of machine tools, skilled workers, engineers, and technical draftsmen.

These bottlenecks, which cannot be quickly eliminated, constitute the greatest obstacles to getting the American armament industry under way and are therefore being attacked with all sorts of measures. For example, the production of machine tools is to be increased by means of new state and private shops, and their delivery to the armament industry is to be expedited by export restrictions and preferential handling before other orders. It is planned to shorten the training period for skilled workers through accelerated courses. The far-reaching importance of the problem of engineers and draftsmen has been fully recognized only during the last few weeks in connection with the progressive development of the armament industry. A solution is still being sought. In the foreseeable future other measures may be expected, such as withdrawing machine tools and skilled workers from nonarmament plants, prohibiting freedom of movement, etc. Furthermore, it will soon prove necessary, for the sake of the armament industry, to introduce a certain restriction in the amount of materials vital to armament that is released for consumption. It is possible that American industry will be further mobilized through prohibition of strikes, control of wages and prices, and other measures. Whether their implementation will require that a government committee or the defense committee be endowed with dictatorial powers remains to be seen.

The scope of the armament industry now in the process of development is for the time being designed only for maintaining and supplying about 2 million men, leaving out of account some plants which the British are building in the United States. The expansion of the air industry aims, to begin with, at a maximum monthly production of 3,000 planes by the spring of 1942. With this armament industry the Americans cannot simultaneously meet in full the demands for war material from its own armed forces, England, Latin America, China,

and other countries, even though production greatly increases from the spring of 1941 on. An adjustment is necessary, especially with respect to the war material that will not be produced in sufficient amounts even after the spring of 1941, such as planes, explosives, combat cars, optical instruments, field and anti-aircraft guns, etc. In all decisions the Americans must take these basic factors into account in order that the demands on the armament industry may not be still further increased by an undesired extension of the war. Increasingly noticeable, too, are England's heavy ship losses, which are to be alleviated by the release of American ships. It would hardly be possible to support England if the Americans should precipitate a conflict with Japan in the Far East or embark on some other overseas venture making heavy demands on shipping space for the supplying of fleets, troops, etc. They will therefore probably try to protract the war until an armament industry has grown up which is able to meet the demands of American armament and to supply other countries, especially England. This goal can be attained only after a number of years and definitely not in 1941.

Regarding special new difficulties of the air industry see my telegram No. 2661 of December 7.²

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

² Not printed (84/62188-89).

No. 476

F5/0406

The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

[No. 2224] ¹

BERLIN, December 8, 1940.

For the Ambassador personally.

The results of Admiral Canaris' discussions with General Franco which you know and which were reported on by him today,² are in

¹ The telegram number is not legible on this copy. It is derived from the reply, document No. 479.

² Canaris' report has not been found. The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941) contains, however, the following relevant passages:

"December 8, 1940.

"Admiral Canaris, the Chief, Foreign and Counterintelligence Branch, reports that, in conformity with the directive of December 4, he had most forcefully set forth to Generalissimo Franco in the evening of December 7 the necessity of Spain's prompt entry into the war. Franco had replied that Spain could not enter the war on the deadline demanded by the Führer, because she was not prepared for this. The difficulties in the way were not so much military as economic; food and all other necessities of life were lacking. The deliveries

flagrant contradiction to the Hendaye discussions and also in contradiction to General Franco's position reported by you recently regarding the results of the discussions which we had here with Serrano Suñer during his last visit in Germany. The Foreign Minister requests you to explain in detail by telegram how you account for this situation and what, according to your observations, lies at the bottom of it. The Foreign Minister requests you to refrain for the time being from again approaching Spanish statesmen.

GAUS

of foodstuffs by Germany did not aid very much, because the difficult transport conditions made distribution impossible. Added to this, Spain would lose the Canary Islands and her overseas possessions upon entry into the war. Even if the Canary Islands were sufficiently protected by artillery, they were untenable due to lack of provisions, which would last for only 6 months. The Portuguese islands would certainly be occupied by the British. In conclusion, General Franco emphasized that his refusal took the interests of both sides into account. It was to be feared that, after the conquest of Gibraltar, Spain would prove a heavy burden for the Axis Powers. He asked that the preparations be continued as before with the necessary camouflage.

"At the order of the Chief of the OKW, Admiral Canaris will be requested by telegraph at 1800 hours to ask General Franco for the nearest deadline for executing the attack on Gibraltar."

"December 10, 1940.

"The Chief, Foreign and Counterintelligence Branch, answering the inquiry of December 8, reports that, in the discussion of December 7, he had repeatedly and urgently asked if General Franco were prepared to accept a new deadline for entrance into the war or could suggest an exact time limit for later. General Franco replied that he could not fix such a deadline, since it depended upon the further economic development of Spain, which could not be perceived today, as well as on the future development of the war against England. General Franco made it clear that Spain could enter the war only when England was about ready to collapse.

"Upon receipt of Admiral Canaris' telegram, the Führer decides that Operation *Felix* is not to be carried through, since the necessary political prerequisites no longer exist. Reconnaissance which is in progress should be continued until conclusion, but such other preparations as have been started should be discontinued. The batteries earmarked for reinforcing the defense of the Spanish islands and coasts are not to be delivered."

See document No. 479.

No. 477

F13/529-40;
F14/212-15

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry

Berlin, December 8, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, ALFIERI, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, STATE MINISTER DR. MEISSNER, MINISTER DR. SCHMIDT, AND COLONEL SCHMUNDT

Ambassador Alfieri first thanked the Führer for the honor of this reception, with which he was resuming his work in Berlin after his

illness,¹ and promised that he would devote himself to the tasks of the Axis in genuine friendship for Germany. The Duce had instructed him to convey his most cordial greetings to the Führer and to thank him especially for having at this very moment of political tension given him evidence of his solidarity and friendship. He had the special task of explaining to the Führer the critical situation in Albania. Although the Duce knew that the Führer was well informed, he nevertheless felt keenly the need of explaining to him how the offensive had come about. He had at the time received from his military and political advisers very optimistic reports about the situation, which culminated in the assurance that the occupation of Greece would be only a "military promenade." Then, prior to the first offensive a meeting took place in the Palazzo Venezia between the Duce and the Commanders in Chief of the Army, Marshal Badoglio, General Visconti Prasca, Governor-General Jacomoni, and other leaders.² There the plan drafted by General Visconti was discussed and unanimously approved. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Duce, as was his custom—the Ambassador could confirm this from daily experience over a period of 5 years—had once again questioned the individual Army Commanders as to their needs and wishes. As was his custom even in the Abyssinian campaign, he would have placed at their disposal four divisions if they had asked for two. He had been assured, however, that the Italian troops were sufficient. The offensive had hardly been begun, however, when, after a few initial successes, the numerical superiority of the Greek forces became evident. The mass of the whole Greek Army had been concentrated on the Albanian front. Even two divisions which originally had been stationed on the Bulgarian front had been thrown into the Albanian front. In this extremely difficult situation a very unpleasant and very serious episode had occurred, which the Ambassador deeply regretted having to report. Marshal Badoglio, who had fully approved Visconti's plan in the Palazzo Venezia, had stated that it was to have been foreseen that it would not be possible to hold the positions. He had always made "well-founded objections" to Visconti's plan and considered that the difficulty of the situation was to be sought in the political element of the leadership.

The Duce had regretted this episode most deeply. He had known, to be sure, that Marshal Badoglio had an old passion for France and still cherished the hope that Italy would be able to come to an understanding with France. In any case, Badoglio had not had any appre-

¹ Alfieri, after an illness of some 3 months, had arrived in Berlin on Dec. 7 and had been received that same day at 5:00 p. m. by Ribbentrop. No record of this conversation has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry, but cf. Dino Alfieri's account in *Due dittatori di fronte* (Milan, 1948), p. 107, and, more particularly, Simoni, *Berlino, ambasciata d'Italia, 1939-1943*, pp. 187-188.

² The reference is to the meeting of Oct. 15. See document No. 191 and footnote 3.

ciation for the Duce's plan to form a single unit out of the political power and the military power. Since these views of Marshal Badoglio had been attracting ever-widening circles in his milieu, the Marshal himself had finally felt compelled to ask for his release.

The Duce was not at the moment concerned with discovering the responsible persons, but all his efforts were now directed toward overcoming the difficulties that had arisen. Once again the Ambassador had been able, as in the difficult days in the autumn of 1935, to convince himself of the admirable calm of the Duce. If the Duce had, nevertheless, instructed him (Alferi) to ask the Führer immediately for an audience, he had done so out of a spiritual and emotional need for comfort and understanding, and not to obtain from the Führer any concrete offers at the moment.

The situation was at the moment especially "critical and acute" for two reasons:

- 1) The Italian troops at the front faced superior forces of Greeks;
- 2) The lines of communication between Italy and the front were restricted. By air an average of 600 to 800 soldiers (1,000 at most, however) could be transported daily. By sea only one ship, sometimes two, could travel. Shipping was not in any way curtailed because of enemy submarines, the presence of which had, to be sure, been confirmed, but because of the fact that Durazzo, the harbor situated nearest to Brindisi, was only "so to speak" a harbor. The landing places were so narrow, the harbor itself and its surroundings already so congested with heavy material of all kinds—with trucks, tanks, and artillery—that at the most only two ships could be handled daily. An attempt had already been made to disembark the troops in the open sea at a distance of one kilometer from the harbor and transport them to the land on rafts and in sloops and boats. But this was made very difficult by the open sea.

Sometimes it had been possible to transport 2,500 soldiers by air in 1 day. But this had been shown to result in a decrease in the efficiency of the troops, since they frequently could not be equipped properly, due to a lack of supplies. The battalions had been committed on the front separately and by degrees, exactly as they arrived, and separately had been swallowed up by the enemy forces. The Italian losses were very considerable—which was apparent from the very fact that all the troop transport planes were returning home full of wounded. The reason the Italians had fallen back was explained by the lack of supplies, or rather the delay in the movement of supplies. They had occupied certain lines from which it was easier to organize resistance. The Greeks had succeeded in breaking through the Italian lines in the direction of the Yugoslav border. They had then tried to envelop the Italian strategic concentration, but had been prevented from doing so.

Last Wednesday (December 4, 1940), the day on which the Duce had taken leave of him, the situation had still been extremely critical. The day before, however, and that morning, he, the Ambassador, had already received very encouraging news. General Cavallero hoped to be able to hold the lines now occupied and to concentrate his troops on them. He was directing the movement of supplies by way of Durazzo and Valona and hoped to be able to begin the counter-attack shortly. On Wednesday, however, when the situation was not yet so favorable, the Duce had instructed him (Alfieri) to ask the Führer to hasten the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact. This would, in the opinion of the Duce, produce great unrest in the Balkans and be a serious warning to Greece. Greece would then be compelled to rush some units to the Yugoslav border, as a result of which the pressure on the Albanian front would immediately be lessened.

During the conversation, which Count Ciano naturally also attended, there had spontaneously occurred to the Duce a particular thought, which he (Alfieri) wished to communicate, but which was to be neither a suggestion nor a request. Perhaps it was possible for the Führer, so the Duce had thought, to hit upon a diversionary maneuver, possibly by bringing Bulgaria to a partial mobilization merely for purposes of effect. In this way also the pressure on the front could be reduced. Another possibility of lessening this pressure he (the Ambassador) had already presented to the Reich Foreign Minister the day before. It might be possible, namely, by means of a "journalistic indiscretion" to start a rumor abroad that Germany was concentrating rather large numbers of troops in Rumania. All this would, in the opinion of the Duce, contribute to relieving the pressure and splitting the enemy forces. These were, however, only two hypotheses that had come up during the conversation, which he wished to communicate only for information; his real, specific mission was to request the Führer to bring about a speedy accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact.

The Duce moreover thanked the Führer for the 50 transport planes promised, of which two had already arrived at Foggia. He requested that their delivery be expedited and, if possible, their number be increased. The Duce had dispatched him with the words that, no matter what decision the Führer made, he thanked him in any case for standing by his side in a spirit of friendship at this difficult moment and for getting into direct contact with him.

The Führer replied to the statements of the Italian Ambassador first of all by expressing his deepest sympathy for the difficulty in which the Duce found himself at the moment. He had, to be sure, foreseen that it had to happen that way, but in October had still hoped

to be able to advise the Duce in time about his doubts, reservations, and proposals. Shortly before the offensive he had also sent General Rintelen to General Roatta to ask if some such thing were now really planned, but had received the answer "no".³ It had been clear even then that without an immediate occupation of Crete—even with an Italian success on the Albanian-Greek front—the undertaking would be a military mistake: the harbors of southern and central Italy would then come within range of the British bombers; also the oil region of Ploesti, which was so important for Italy. Furthermore, the transport of oil by way of Corinth, which had just begun, would be blocked off. But unfortunately he had not been able to inform the Duce about this in time.

The present situation was exceedingly serious. Spain was hesitating; France was becoming refractory; and Bulgaria was even more fearful than before of committing herself, even if only diplomatically. A mobilization was quite out of the question.

Here the Reich Foreign Minister interposed that Bulgaria was even demobilizing, since she was now on the point of coming to an agreement with the Turks.

Yugoslavia, continued the Führer, was cool in her attitude and had not permitted the transportation of trucks.⁴ To be sure, a reply had arrived that day saying that she (Yugoslavia) did not wish to break off the discussion about adherence to the Tripartite Pact.⁵

The important thing now was above all to bring order immediately to the front itself by using barbaric means, such as by the shooting of generals and colonels who abandoned their positions and by the decimation of troops. Then the problem of supply had to be solved thoroughly. To that end the transportation of troops and of material were to be basically separated. The soldiers had to be transported in planes and in small boats of all kinds, which could land anywhere, and were not to be dispersed, but sent into action on the battlefields in fairly large units. The material, on the other hand, had to be transported to the harbors in larger ships and from there conveyed immediately to the troops. The Italian Air Force must definitely stop bombing numerous targets, such as Corfu, Malta, etc., etc., at the same time, and concentrate all efforts on the front. And as for the German transport squadron, its entry into action depended not so much on its dispatch from Germany, but rather on the Italian ground organization in Albania. How many machines could be dispatched per day depended, not on the take-off ports, but on the land-

³ See documents Nos. 225 and 252.

⁴ See document No. 465.

⁵ See document No. 467.

ing places. The Italians would receive further relief from the circumstance that Field Marshal Milch had reached an agreement with the Italian Command about the dispatch of the Italian planes.

Still the situation continues serious. For it had to be realized that decisive help could not be given before March because of the weather. For that reason alone, the Italian offensive precisely at this season was incomprehensible to him. But the initial assembly of the Germans required this much time also. The difficulties of transportation in the Balkan countries—poorly equipped with railroads—were tremendous; bridges would first have to be put up for tanks and heavy artillery, and there were other problems. To be sure, he had already started to build up an army in Rumania, and he hoped to be able to hold this Balkan position. But the important thing was to raise the morale of the Italian troops. For that purpose there was need for a man with "iron nerves and barbaric determination," who, furthermore, would not shrink from serious measures and would, above all, mete out exemplary punishment to the elements responsible for the retreat of the Italians.

The Führer then turned briefly to the Reich Foreign Minister and agreed with him that it would probably be best if he met with the Duce as soon as possible—most suitably at the Obersalzberg, because his maps and other military documents were most conveniently available there; but, in case the Duce so preferred, then at the Brenner Pass.

Alfieri replied to the statements of the Führer that it had not been his intention in any way to paint the situation of Italy as desperate. On the contrary, the present phase of developments was regarded as a brief episode. The Duce had been perfectly calm, confident, and cheerful at the time of the last conversation with him. He was convinced with mathematical certainty that in the end the Italians would whip the Greeks thoroughly. Since the Duce had, however, believed that the affair, if much protracted, would necessarily also interest the Axis partner, he had instructed him to inform the Führer about everything. The proposed meeting would undoubtedly get the unqualified approval of the Duce. He (Alfieri) was only wondering if it was possible at the moment, since he knew that there had been talk of an imminent departure of the Duce for Albania. He could not say at present how an immediate departure of the Duce for Germany would be interpreted. In any case he would inform the Duce immediately.

The Führer remarked that he regarded the idea of a flight to the front by the Duce as splendid. To be sure, its execution would mean

a frightful⁶ danger for the Duce, and everything would have to be done to avoid a catastrophe.

December 10, 1940, was envisaged as the date for the meeting.⁷

Continuing, Alfieri again emphasized that the latest reports from the Greek-Albanian front were much more hopeful than on Wednesday. And the Duce would also agree that Draconian measures had to be adopted. The Duce had always shown his determination to resort to them during the Abyssinian campaign. He would not shrink from any means of restoring order on the Greek front, and had already had several commanders court-martialed. However, it also had to be borne in mind that the slight resistance which some units had offered was to be attributed to the numerical superiority of the Greeks, who were twice as strong as the Italians, and then to the fact that the Italian soldiers had already endured cold and privations for over a month. This was not to justify the conduct of these officers and men, but only to explain it.

In conclusion, Ambassador Alfieri, by means of his maps, explained briefly the situation and the front line in the Albanian-Greek theater of war. The Führer in turn outlined a few plans, but refrained, until such time as the Duce and the Italian military experts should be present, from making more detailed statements, and especially from reporting on the German experiences during the occupation of Norway.

NOACK⁸

⁶ The word "ungeheuer" was crossed out in the original.

⁷ No record of the Italian reply to this proposal for a Hitler-Mussolini meeting has been found in the papers of the German Foreign Ministry, but among the Italian papers captured by the Germans and translated into German (see document No. 221, footnote 4) was a minute dated Dec. 8, 1940, containing the following passages:

"With reference to telegram No. 2213 from the Royal Embassy in Berlin [cf. Dino Alfieri, *Due dittatori di fronte*, pp. 108-109], at the direction of the Duce, Ambassador Alfieri was given instructions by telephone to give to the Führer an urgent communication containing the following points:

"(1) Mussolini could not leave Rome at this time because he had to make the appointments to the new Armed Forces General Staff and to the General Staffs of the Army and Navy following the recent changing of the guard;

"(2) Current important and comprehensive military operations made it inadvisable for the Duce to leave Italy at present;

"(3) The Duce would welcome any measure which Germany could take to hasten Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact;

"(4) The Duce was not requesting any military aid other than the dispatch of the 50 German transport planes to Italy;

"(5) The Duce thanked the Führer for the invitation to a meeting, and he thought it would be very useful to hold it later in the month (December);

"(6) The Duce will answer the Führer's last letter tomorrow."

⁸ The document is countersigned by Schmidt.

No. 478

1213/332519

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

No. 1207

BERLIN, December 9, 1940—1:35 p. m.
zu Pol. IV 4038¹ III.

With reference to your telegram No. 833 of December 5.¹

Please tell the Hungarian Foreign Minister, in reply to his inquiry regarding possible suggestions by the Reich Government concerning the planned Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement, that in our opinion the draft contained everything that has to be said in this case. We therefore had no additional suggestions to make.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Pol. IV 4038 (1213/332516-18) was telegram No. 833 of Dec. 5 from Budapest reporting that Csáky would visit Belgrade between Dec. 10 and 15 and forwarding the draft text of the planned Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement. This telegram also reported that Csáky would be glad to receive suggestions by the Reich Government regarding the agreement. Csáky noted that his visit to Belgrade and conclusion of the agreement would provide the Yugoslav Government with diplomatic success. This would be "in accordance with a remark dropped by the Führer in Vienna that in view of the Communist and pan-Slavic propaganda in Yugoslavia, it was advisable to strengthen the present regime there."

No. 479

136/74515-16

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, December 9, 1940—1:54 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received December 9—10:30 p. m.

No. 4215 of December 9

Your telegram No. 2224 of November [December] 8¹ was already answered by my telegram No. 4209 of November [December] -9.² When I spoke in this telegram of the atmosphere in "domestic politics" I wanted to indicate the following:

According to my information, which entirely corresponds with Canaris' impressions from his conversations with Franco and Vigón, remonstrances by a number of influential generals have aroused in Franco the fear that the conflict of personalities and issues between

¹ Document No. 476.

² In this telegram 4209 of Dec. 9 (136/74514) Stohrer reported that the growing famine, which had taken precedence over all other questions in Spain including the question of entrance into the war, accounted for the reply given on Dec. 7 to Canaris.

S. Suñer and the military could become an acute danger for the regime if the grave misgivings of these generals toward immediate entry into the war, mainly on economic though also on military grounds, are not given heed. The attitude of the generals by no means signifies an unfriendly act toward us. Most of the generals desire a war on Germany's side in order to fulfill the national aspirations. Rather, their evaluation of the situation corresponds more with reality than does the opinion which the rather isolated Generalissimo and the Foreign Minister, who is at odds with the military, seem to have had heretofore; the scarcity of foodstuffs has really become quite disastrous in recent weeks. The fact that this was not foreseen in its entirety is due to the lack of any reliable statistics and organization, as well as widespread corruption.

I intentionally refrained from giving full expression to these thoughts in the previous telegram because I wanted to obtain more details on the subject in a conversation with the Foreign Minister. In view of the instruction in the telegram referred to, however,³ I shall not speak to the Minister on the matter until further notice.

STOHRER

³ See document No. 476.

No. 480

8567/E023631

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2264 of December 9

BUCHAREST, December 9, 1940—9:00 p. m.

Received December 9—12:00 midnight.

Pol. IV 4079.

Foreign Minister Sturdza asked me about the significance of the trip of the Hungarian Foreign Minister to Belgrade.¹ His Ministers in Budapest and Belgrade both report that Count Csáky had gone to Belgrade in agreement with Berlin in order to draw Yugoslavia more closely toward a Central European policy; they wondered, however, why the Reich made use of Hungarian mediation, when direct negotiations would surely be more to the purpose. For this reason the interpretation had also been advanced that Hungary was off on her own. I explained that I was without instructions, but that the latter was out of the question. We did not speak about the Hungarian wishes for obtaining the area of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia.

¹ See document No. 478, footnote 1.

I should be grateful for instructions for the guidance of my conversations.²

FABRICIUS

² Senior Counselor Sonnleithner of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat informed the Foreign Ministry on Dec. 10 that Ribbentrop desired Csáky's journey to Belgrade to be referred to as "a purely Hungarian matter" (3567/E023632). See document No. 514.

No. 481

647/255219-22

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII¹

Pol. VII 3862 g.

BRIEF FOR THE CONFERENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE STATE SECRETARY ON
DECEMBER 9, 1940

German Policy in Arabia

I. Even before and after the outbreak of the war, Germany saw in Arab nationalism her natural ally, while Italy finds the latter irksome, as it plainly appeared for the first time on the occasion of the visit of the secretary of the Mufti. Rome informed us that *the recognition in writing of the independence of the Arab countries and of their right to form a union* was out of the question for Italy; she would take care not to go so far because the Arabs were too weak and inexperienced.² All the statements heretofore made in the press and on the radio were merely propaganda.

II. The line of German policy has been determined so as to give Italy in principle the absolute lead politically in the Arab area. On October 18, therefore, in conformity with Italy's wish, we issued only an *oral* statement to the effect that *we were watching with interest the struggle of the Arabs for independence and would continue to sympathize with their efforts to achieve freedom.*³ The publication of this statement in the press took place subsequently on December 5.

The present situation

The sources available to us—agents, Arab liaison people, intercepted messages, reports from the Embassy and Military Attaché in Ankara, and the reporting by Lieutenant Roser⁴—show the situation in the Arab area becoming increasingly tense, particularly in Syria and Iraq.

Syria

1. Antipathy of the Arabs toward the Italians; they prefer the alien rule of the English.

¹ The file copy bears no date.

² See documents Nos. 57 and 58.

³ See document No. 190 and footnote 4.

⁴ Representative of the Abwehr on the Armistice Commission in Syria.

2. Disappointment of the Arabs over the reserve of the Germans on the Armistice Commission. The feeling of having been sold out by them to Italy.

3. Growth of the de Gaulle movement, probable arrival of General Catroux.

4. English activity in Syria. Further pursuit of the prewar plan for the formation of a Greater Syrian empire consisting of Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, under Emir Abdullah. Incitement of the Druses. Putting into circulation of newly minted gold-sterling.

5. Desire of the English to protect rail communication from Basra and Palestine via Syria to Turkey.

6. Concentration of Australian troops on the Palestinian border.

7. Desire of the Italian delegation in Beirut to see us in Syria because they consider their situation untenable.

Iraq

8. The oral statement by the Axis is inadequate as a political instrument for the Iraq Minister President.

9. The English are in contact with the Arab committee formed in Baghdad and are making promises to it.

10. Note in the nature of an ultimatum from the British Ambassador⁵ to Gaylani,⁶ from which it follows that the English are apparently well informed about all that goes on between the Arabs and the Axis and are getting poised for the counterblow.

11. Presumable inability of the Iraq Army to defend itself against the English. Untenable position of the Gaylani Cabinet. Threatened blockade of the ports and embargo on petroleum imports. Rupture to be feared in Iraq-Italian relations.

12. Despite Gaylani's express request, the Italians do not inform us at all of the reports of their Minister in Baghdad.

13. Decline in morale in view of the events in Albania and Taranto.⁷ Complete loss of prestige of the Italians. At the same time stepping up of English activity.

14. Apparently hopeless situation in the Dodecanese; capitulation there within the near future does not appear to be impossible.

Palestine

15. Conditions are entirely peaceful. Jewish-Arab conflict is no longer apparent. The people are in need of tranquillity. The achievements of the Italian Air Force are apparently minimal.

⁵ Sir Basil Newton.

⁶ Cf. Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq* (London, New York, Toronto, 1951), pp. 166-167.

⁷ By a night air raid on Nov. 11, 1940, the British severely damaged 3 of Italy's 6 battleships.

Saudi Arabia

16. The letter from the King's Councilor, Khalid al Hud,⁸ testifies plainly to the King's mistrust of German policy. It is openly asked whether the statements made by the Führer before the outbreak of the war⁹ were propaganda and whether Arabia in the future also had to expect domination and oppression from the European nations.

Egypt

17. The country is entirely in English hands and is occupied by at least 175,000 men, consisting of English, Australian, New Zealand, and Indian troops. The latter, though Mohammedans, are to be considered reliable. The older officials and rich families are for the most part pro-English, the younger officials and officers of the insignificant Egyptian Army probably pro-German. The lower classes are not interested in politics. The goal of Egyptian policy is to keep the country out of war and preserve its outward independence. Resistance through internal strength seems hopeless.

Conclusion

I. In any case, the national, military, cultural, and state-building forces of the Arabs should not be overestimated. We have no reason at all to be sentimental about these people who are basically anti-European and torn by religious, family, and tribal differences. But the Arabs, as inhabitants of the land-bridge and routes leading to southern and eastern Asia as well as to East Africa, and as the foremost representatives of Islam in the world are a tremendously important power factor. Germany must not jeopardize her great prestige here if she does not wish to suffer most severe reverses for a long time to come.

II. The activity of the English and de Gaullists, the defeats of the Italians, and disappointment with Germany could result in a defection of the Arabs to the side of the English, which is bound to affect decisively the conduct of the war in the eastern Mediterranean in a way that is detrimental to us, and may perhaps even create a disastrous situation in the whole of North Africa.

III. Without basically giving up the principle of Italian precedence in the Arabian area, it is possible, in the interest of assuring an appropriate, efficient conduct of the war, to demand that the German military and political authorities establish liaison with those of the Italians; the task would be to plan measures whereby the reverses that threaten in the Arab area may be avoided.

Proposals

1. A written declaration in which the Arabs as well as the Egyptians are assured political freedom and self-determination.

⁸ Not found. There is, however, in the files a letter of Nov. 30 from Woermann to Khalid al Hud which might be the reply to that letter (647/255162-65).

⁹ See vol. VI of this series, document No. 541.

2. The dispatching of a German Armistice delegation to Syria with suitable military and diplomatic personnel and persons acquainted with the country.

3. This delegation must collaborate with the Italian delegation and with Dentz, the new High Commissioner for Syria, in paralyzing at once English and de Gaullist activity and in getting rid of the unreliable officials of the present High Commissioner.

4. Since a reversion to prewar conditions (constitution) does not seem feasible in Syria, a committee must be formed of Arab nationalists, which would take the place of the former Syrian Government, but could then also become the first exponent of the establishment of an independent Greater Syrian state to include Palestine and parts of Transjordan, along with abolition of the League of Nations mandate.

5. The sympathies of Ibn Saud could perhaps be secured by promising that the territories of 'Aqaba and Ma'an, now belonging to Transjordan and always desired by him, as well as the strip of land situated to the east of them would be ceded to him after the close of the war.

6. In general, the Arab world could be promised a solution of the Jewish question that it would find tolerable. As a result of this and the suggestion of the possibility of creating a Greater Syrian state, very great difficulties would probably arise for the English in Palestine.

The suggestion for constructive solutions after the war cannot come from the conference table, but would have to be the result of a close contact with the Italians and the Arabs, as well as of an exhaustive study of conditions by the German Armistice Commission in Beirut. The execution of only some of these proposals would profoundly stir up the entire Arab world (presumably North Africa also) and probably take the wind out of the sails of England and of de Gaulle.

MELCHERS

No. 482

83/61508-10

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, December 9, 1940.

Minister Cosmelli informed me today of two reports from the Italian Minister at Baghdad¹ regarding the very tense situation in Iraq.

I. The first report dated back to November 28. It had arrived in Rome with delay. Minister Gabbrielli reported that the British Ambassador at Baghdad had complained in a note that the attitude

¹Luigi Gabbrielli.

of the Iraq Government was pro-Axis and anti-British, that Iraq had resumed relations with Italy and that talks were now in progress regarding the resumption of relations with Germany and, finally, that telegraphic communications with Italy and Germany had been restored. The British Ambassador demanded in the form of an ultimatum the elimination of the points of grievance. A session of the Cabinet then took place, at which it was decided to reject the demands.

At this stage Minister President Gaylani asked the Italian Minister whether this English maneuver against Iraq could not be denounced over the Bari and Berlin radios in the Arabic language and in this way the will of the people to pursue a policy of resistance to England be strengthened. In these radio broadcasts, according to the wishes of Minister President Gaylani, his own resistance should be especially emphasized and it should be said that this resistance was based on trust in the Axis Powers because these had declared that they wished to respect the integrity and independence of Arabia. (Signor Cosmelli said that the decoding of this sentence was not quite clear.) The Italian Minister countered with the question whether Gaylani's position would not actually be made more difficult by such broadcasts. The Minister President denied this and continued to insist that these broadcasts take place.

Signor Cosmelli stated that the Italian Government had no objection to such broadcasts, but would like to proceed in accord with Berlin. It therefore asked that we take a position in the matter.

II. In a further report of the beginning of December, the Italian Minister at Baghdad stated that the Minister President had rejected the British note. The reaction of the British Ambassador to this had been serious. In a conversation he had threatened that payments for oil would be stopped, that a credit of 57 million pounds (?) would be blocked, and the port of Basra blockaded in order to cut off trade, and he had also spoken of further military measures. (Signor Cosmelli repeated in this connection that the decoding of the two telegrams was not quite clear in some places.) Minister President Gaylani thereupon again conferred with the Italian Minister. He had said that only four of the Iraq divisions were backing him. Armaments were in quite a bad state. Iraq could at best resist for only 1 to 2 months. There was a shortage of ammunition. Anti-aircraft guns and armored cars were available only in inadequate quantities. The Minister President had then asked for German and Italian assistance, which was to consist particularly of the following:

The purchase of Iraq goods (particularly wool, barley (?) and dates), in place of payment.

The granting of credits (?).

Military assistance through the delivery of arms and ammunition, regarding which the Minister President has reserved detailed estimates.

Minister Cosmelli added that the Italian Embassy was instructed to present these requests of the Iraq Minister President in Berlin. The Italian Government saw great practical difficulties in the way of rendering assistance to Iraq. If Gaylani should be strengthened in his determination to resist and then remained without effective assistance, a thoroughly undesirable condition would arise. The Italian Government asked to be informed of the German view.

III. From a confidential source we also have supplementary reports which the Italian Embassy has thus far not communicated to us. According to these reports, the English banks have already been instructed to refuse credits to the Government of Iraq. Furthermore, Minister President Gaylani has most urgently requested a reply from the Axis Powers regarding financial and military aid.

IV. Suggestions for further handling of the matter will follow.

WOERMANN

No. 483

191/138686

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, December 9, 1940.

As directed, I informed Minister Cosmelli today with reference to his inquiry of December 4¹ regarding the question of the recognition of Wang Ching-wei that in the opinion of the Foreign Minister no steps toward the recognition of Wang Ching-wei's government should be taken for the time being.

WOERMANN

¹ According to a Woermann memorandum of Dec. 4 (191/138683), Cosmelli had inquired whether Germany shared the view of the Italian Government that matters should not be precipitated in the Far East since the goal there was a pacification in which Chiang Kai-shek would participate.

No. 484

216/147637

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 876

BERLIN, December 9, 1940.

I received the Thai Minister of State, Montri, this afternoon before he left for Rome, and told him approximately the following as our view in the Thailand-Indochina question: ¹

¹ The next two paragraphs were taken verbatim from a memorandum of Dec. 7 in which Woermann had dealt at some length with Montri's visit and had made the suggestion that he be received by Weizsäcker (216/147631-33).

Since Japan has undertaken the role of mediator, one should first await the results of this Japanese action.

Like Japan, we did not want any solution by force at the present time. It was in our interest to protect the French colonial empire from shocks. We would be in agreement with any solution which Thailand would reach with France directly or through Japanese mediation, and we recognized in principle that Thailand had a claim to certain frontier rectifications.

The Thai Minister received what I told him with understanding, but nevertheless seemed to have certain doubts that developments would proceed entirely peaceably.

There was no difficulty in diverting the conversation to Thailand's claims on Burma. I encouraged M. Montri in this regard.

I also told M. Montri that the Reich Foreign Minister would be glad to receive him after his return from Rome, and for my part invited him to a luncheon on December 19.²

WEIZSÄCKER

²In telegram No. 1838 of Dec. 11 (2281/480799-800) Woermann informed the Embassy in Rome of Weizsäcker's conversation with Montri who had left for Rome on Dec. 9. On Dec. 17 Mackensen reported in telegram No. 2313 (2281/480807) that Montri had been received by Ciano who "took substantially the same position as the State Secretary." After Montri had returned to Berlin, the Embassy in Rome was informed by Rintelen in telegram No. 78 of Jan. 14, 1941 (2281/480808-09), that Weizsäcker had once more on Jan. 9 explained to Montri the German position. In so doing, Weizsäcker took into account that the situation had changed inasmuch as the French Government had meanwhile rejected Japanese mediation in the conflict with Thailand over Indochina.

No. 485

91/100469-70

The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

DUBLIN, December 10, 1940.

No. 802 of December 9

Received December 10—12:40 p. m.

In my latest talk with him, Mr. Walshe stated more definitely than in the preceding talk that he thought a British attack unlikely at the present time and that the English would, if ever, launch it only as an act of desperation; but the moment for that had not yet arrived. In the case of Churchill there was always the danger of a sudden, reckless move, but otherwise the following factors would for the time being continue to operate against any violent British intervention in Ireland:

1. Violent action against Ireland would be met by the strongest possible Irish resistance, which would be most bothersome to the English at this time. The latter could no longer have any doubt on that score.

2. Also, England's desire to have control over Ireland again after conclusion of the peace would hardly be brought nearer fulfillment by an act of violence; such an act would on the contrary drive Ireland again into irreconcilable hostility against England with the house search difficulties known from historical experience.

3. Above all, the vigorous activity of the Irish-American community since Churchill's thrust regarding the Irish ports in the House of Commons¹ had once more demonstrated to the English that the reaction of the Irish-Americans in the United States would be violent and effective. That was a reaction which England could not afford to risk for the time being. I should like to add here by way of explanation that the Irish-American community is reported to be increasingly organizing itself for vigorous action in the event that Irish neutrality should be violated by the belligerents; at the moment one proceeds on the assumption of the threat from Britain which has been revealed. The Irish Minister in Washington² appears to be lending strong support to this movement, also by his actions in public. As regards the danger of any imminent British attack, several other talks which I had with observers competent to evaluate matters during these past days also produced the impression that the situation as a whole is for the moment being viewed with greater calm.

HEMPEL

¹ See document No. 300, footnote 1.

² Robert Brennen.

No. 486

585/242809-11

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, December 10, 1940.

The Bulgarian Minister called on me today and broached several questions, which, I told him, were exclusively handled by the Foreign Minister himself, so that I could do no more than listen to him and forward his communications:

1. He recapitulated the various Soviet proposals to Bulgaria and then spoke of the latest conversation of the Soviet Minister in Sofia with the Bulgarian Foreign Minister. M. Draganov described this conversation, partly at variance with the report of our Minister in Sofia (telegram No. 604 of December 7¹), as follows:

The Soviet Minister had stated that the Soviet Government rejected the arguments which Bulgaria had advanced against conclusion of a pact with the Soviet Union. Besides, it was not impossible

¹ Document No. 468.

that Turkey might attack Bulgaria, e.g., in the event that Bulgaria should join the Tripartite Pact. In that event it was also possible that England might attack Bulgaria. Bulgaria would be protected against that if she had the assurance of Soviet Russia's assistance. The proposed pact therefore did not expose Bulgaria to any danger of war. If Bulgaria were to join the Tripartite Pact, it would be proof that she no longer adhered to the course of neutrality. She could as a result become involved in war with the other group. But even with accession to the Tripartite Pact, conclusion of a pact with the Soviet Union would still be useful for Bulgaria.

M. Draganov added that Bulgaria, now as in the past, held the view that she had no need for a pact with the Soviet Union and that she would join the Tripartite Pact at the appropriate moment. He was instructed to request our advice regarding the reply to the Soviet *démarche* and especially to ascertain Germany's views with respect to the argument that accession to the Tripartite Pact was compatible with conclusion of a pact with the Soviet Union.

2. The Minister mentioned that he had read to the Führer at the second reception the text of the Soviet proposals² and of the Bulgarian reply,³ and that he had subsequently transmitted these texts to the Führer through State Minister Meissner. He begs that the Foreign Minister should not feel that he had been bypassed by this procedure. The background of this development was that the Führer had asked King Boris to send him the reply by a man who had his trust. The King then designated for this role not the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin, but M. Draganov. He had thus discharged this commission not in his capacity of Bulgarian Minister but as the King's personal emissary, a position he had held for 18 years.

3. M. Draganov wanted to know how the talks with Yugoslavia were developing. I told him that I had no information. The Minister then said that the Führer had asked him at the first conversation how talks between the Axis Powers and Yugoslavia would be received in Bulgaria.⁴ Without having instructions, he had immediately replied in a positive manner, and in the second conversation he had confirmed this reply in accordance with instructions. He had at the same time, however, pointed to the importance of the Macedonian question for Bulgaria, and he wanted to repeat this also here in the Foreign Ministry. Macedonia had a Bulgarian population of 1,000,000, and there were 500,000 refugees from Macedonia in Bulgaria. Everything concerning Macedonia agitated Bulgarian public opinion. There were rumors that Salonika was to be given to Yugoslavia. All

² Document No. 438, enclosure.

³ See *ibid.*, footnote 4.

⁴ See document No. 384.

questions could be discussed later in a general settlement. If the Macedonian question and the question of Salonika were brought up now, it would make the position of the Bulgarian Government extremely difficult.

4. The Minister wanted to recapitulate the reasons why Bulgaria could not officially join the Tripartite Pact at this time. He once more advanced the argument that Turkey would in that case go to war with Bulgaria, as Turkey herself had given to understand. I replied that I did not think so at all and closed the conversation on the subject with the remark that he was sufficiently familiar, after all, with the view taken by the Foreign Minister.

Although the Minister, when asked again, stated positively that his request for German advice on the subject of point 1 of this memorandum was made on instruction from his Government, my impression, supported also by information from confidential sources, is that he acted without instructions.

I recommend that only if M. Draganov reverts to the subject, should he be given a reply; namely, that the question of the compatibility of accession to the Tripartite Pact with a pact with the Soviet Union could not arise at all since, as the Minister had said himself, Bulgaria had no desire of concluding such a pact with the Soviet Union.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

No. 487

8589/E602774

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, December 10, 1940.

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

WFSt/Abt. L (IL) No. 33 392/40 g.K.Chefs

By officer only

Subject: Commitment of German air units from Italy.

("Special Operation Mediterranean")

On the basis of the agreements with our allies, German air units in the strength of about one wing are to be committed as soon as possible from South Italian soil to the battle in the Mediterranean (for a limited time).¹

Their most important task is to combat the English fleet, primarily in the harbor of Alexandria, as well as the enemy shipping through

¹ See documents Nos. 452 and 460.

the Suez Canal and through the narrows between Sicily and the North African coast.

The critical situation in the Mediterranean may also, however, make necessary a commitment in the Ionian or Aegean Sea. The commitment should, therefore, be made in agreement with the Italian High Command.

As Germany is not at war with Greece, there should for the present be no operations which are directed unmistakably against Greece.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 488

8589/E602776-79

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, December 10, 1940.
The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L.No. 33 400/40 g.K.Chefsache
By officer only

DIRECTIVE NO. 19: OPERATION ATTLA

1. In the event that a secession movement should get under way in the portions of the French colonial empire now dominated by General Weygand, preparations are to be made for the speedy *occupation of the still unoccupied area* of metropolitan France (Operation *Attila*).¹ At the same time it will then be necessary to secure the French *home fleet* and the portions of the French Air Force that are in home airports, or at least to prevent their defection to the enemy's side.

The preparations are to be camouflaged in order to avoid alarming the French, both in the military and political interest.

¹The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941) contains the following passage for Dec. 8 with reference to information given to Warlimont by Keitel:

"... On the other hand, reports have been received which indicated anew the unreliability of General Weygand and, in that connection, the uncertainty of the development of the situation in North and West Africa.

"If these reports should prove to be true and if the defection of General Weygand and of the North and West African possessions of France from the Pétain Government should occur, the Führer wants to have unoccupied France seized at once and he has ordered that reports be given him in the course of the day as to the following:

"1) The distribution of French troops in unoccupied France together with data, as nearly exact as possible, regarding the manpower situation, material, and the means of transportation.

"2) The airports in unoccupied France.

"3) The distribution of French naval power in the mainland and North African ports with information as to its degree of readiness for action."

According to entries for the same day, the requested data were supplied. An entry for Dec. 9 states that a review of the situation with respect to an occupation of unoccupied France was submitted to Jodl who thereupon ordered that a directive be drafted on this basis and submitted to Hitler.

2. The *entry* should, in the given case, take place so that :

a) Strong motorized groups, whose adequate aerial protection is to be assured, push through along the line of the Garonne or the Rhone as speedily as possible to the Mediterranean, take possession as soon as possible of the seaports (above all, the important naval port of Toulon), and seal France off from the sea ;

b) The units stationed at the demarcation line move in along the entire front.

The time between the order for execution of the operation and the entry of the troops must be as short as possible. For this reason individual units may even now be brought up closer, but without the purpose of their employment becoming apparent.

It is unlikely that the French armed forces will put up a *firm resistance* to the invasion. Should resistance be offered locally, it is to be ruthlessly crushed. For this purpose, as well as for use against possible trouble spots, bomber formations (chiefly dive bombers) of the Luftwaffe are to be provided.

3. In the case of every unit of the fleet the berth, condition, opportunity for seizure, etc., will in the future have to be watched in order to prepare measures against the *French fleet's sailing out* and going over to the enemy. The Commander in Chief of the Navy will, in conjunction with the Foreign Intelligence Department [*Ausl./Abw.*], issue appropriate orders, availing himself in this connection of the opportunities offered through the Armistice Commission.

The Commanders in Chief of the Navy and of the Luftwaffe are to examine how, in cooperation with the invading portions of the Army, they can best lay their hands on the French fleet. There enter into consideration particularly :

Blockades of the mouths of the harbors (above all, Toulon) ;

Air-borne operations ;

Acts of sabotage ;

U-boat and air attacks on the escaping ships.

The Commander in Chief of the Navy is to give an opinion on whether and to what extent the parts of the French fleet are to be withdrawn in return for a liberalization of the terms of the Armistice Treaty.

I reserve a decision concerning the manner of the implementation. *Offensive action* will be ordered only if the French armed forces offer resistance or parts of the fleet move out in spite of German counterorders.

4. Seizure of the French *airports* and of the units of the Air Force which are there is to be settled directly between the Luftwaffe and the Army. Other possibilities (for example, air-borne landings) are to be exploited.

5. The Commanders in Chief will report to me—in the case of the Army this has already been done—concerning their intentions for Operation *Attila* (in writing through the High Command of the Wehrmacht). At the same time, the length of time required between the giving of the order and the measures themselves is to be indicated.

6. The preparations for Operation *Attila* require the utmost secrecy.

The Italians may not receive information of any kind concerning the preparations and intentions.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 489

2141/468373-74

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, December 11, 1940—12:45 a. m.

No. 2278 of December 10

Received December 11—4:40 a. m.

With reference to our telegrams Nos. 2229¹ and 2232.²

1. The Russians yesterday proposed in concrete form (group garbled) an international administration, with its seat in Sulina, for navigational questions for the entire Danube delta. The managing director is to be Rumanian; the deputy director, Russian; six departments, including executive functions, sanitation matters, and collection of tolls under Rumanian direction, with a Russian representative. Moreover, up to 25 percent of the personnel are to be Russian; however, the final authority to make decisions regarding employment as well as regarding disciplinary measures, including temporary suspension from duty, is to rest with the Rumanian director. In this way, some 40 Soviet Russians would come to Sulina.

2. Rumania thereupon read in plenary session this afternoon a formal statement to the effect that she would never accept such a proposal.³ Only with respect to the stretch of the river that was common to [both of] them, was she prepared to collaborate in an investigating committee under the direction of Rumanian and Russian delegates of the four power committee. The Soviet delegate will reply on Thursday.

3. In agreement with the Italians, I intend on Wednesday to present objections to the practically unnecessary and costly Soviet proposal and possibly make a comprehensive German-Italian compromise

¹ Document No. 451.

² This telegram of Dec. 5 (711/262144) supplemented No. 2229.

³ For a partial text of the Rumanian statement in German translation, see Peter, "Die Sowjet-Regierung und die Donaumündung Ende 1940," *Auswärtige Politik: Monatshefte für Aussenpolitische Forschung*, pp. 34-36.

proposal,⁴ which would leave tolls, executive functions, and sanitation matters in Sulina in the hands of the Rumanian national authorities and would confine joint organs, except for the common stretch of the river, chiefly to preparatory and informational functions; its seat is to be at Galați. The underlying idea is that of a joint working organization in an otherwise independent waterways administration.

4. Outcome uncertain in view of the political nature of the Russian basic idea.⁵

MARTIUS
FABRICIUS

* Unsigned marginal note: "See report No. 26 of Dec. 11."

This report from the German delegation contained the text of the German-Italian proposal, a commentary and three annexes (2141/468375-82). For a published German text of the German-Italian proposal, see Peter, "Die Sowjet-Regierung und die Donaumündung Ende 1940," *Auswärtige Politik: Monatshefte für Aussenpolitische Forschung*, pp. 37-38.

⁴ The text of this telegram from Bucharest was forwarded by Clodius to the Ambassador in the USSR in telegram No. 2286 of Dec. 12 (1447/365011-12).

Replying to telegrams Nos. 2229 and 2278, Wiehl informed Martius in telegram No. 1897 of Dec. 11 that the Foreign Minister had given instructions "not to yield in any circumstances to the Russian attempts to exclude us from parts of the Danube." The Foreign Minister was of the opinion "that we must participate in all organs and commissions concerned with the Danube." (3941/E053675)

No. 490

121/120265-66

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, December 11, 1940—6:00 a. m.

No. 1457 of December 10

Received December 11—6:45 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister through Senior Counselor Likus.

In today's conference of General Warlimont with Laval, Huntziger, and Darlan,¹ the Frenchmen presented the new plan of operations for Africa.²

1. Offensive against Chad colony:

Huntziger maintains his position that operations against Chad colony are practicable only from the west, and not from the north,

¹ A detailed record of this conference, drawn up by Counselor of Legation Achenbach was sent to the Foreign Ministry by pouch on Dec. 11 (471/228339-57). This memorandum also listed the following participants not mentioned in the document printed. On the German side, Lieutenant Colonel in the General Staff Dr. Speidel, Major in the General Staff G. Schuchardt, Major Momm, Captains Dr. Kipp and Meyer-Labastille, Consul General Schleier, and Counselor of Legation Achenbach; on the French side, Ambassador de Brinon and Major Stehlin. Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. v (Paris, 1959), pp. 446-462. See, further, document No. 506.

² See document No. 434 and footnote 3.

but believes that action will be possible as early as the beginning of February. The base for all preparations is Dakar, which has been sufficiently reinforced since the last English attack; from this place the first units have already set out for Niamey, on the Niger river. Reinforced French bases on the northern border of Nigeria protect the Niamey-Zinder road. The concentration of troops will be completed by the middle of February. In case the ultimatum asking Fort Lamy to surrender is rejected, bombing by two bomber groups is to follow on March 1. Simultaneously with the bombing, parachute troops will be brought into action as the vanguard of the attacking ground forces.

2. Reprisals against English attempts to interfere:

In the event that the concentration against Chad colony or capture of Fort Lamy should provoke English countermeasures or if the English should attempt new encroachments on their own, air attacks will be launched against Bathurst, Freetown, and the town of Kano in Nigeria, in addition to the immediate bombing of Gibraltar. There will be also an immediate ground attack against Bathurst and Freetown. The plan for the attack on Bathurst is ready, that for Freetown is now being drawn up and will be made available to us as soon as possible. Darlan will support the air and ground operations against Freetown by a submarine blockade and bombardment of the coastal batteries from the sea.

3. Political action:

According to the reports received by the French Government, the attitude of the natives of Chad colony and Nigeria is said to be not at all friendly to the English, so that intensive propaganda already started among the natives could facilitate and speed up the military operations considerably.

Laval, on behalf of Marshal Pétain, stressed France's resolute determination to reconquer the insurrectionary colonial territories as quickly as possible and to meet any attempted English interference by force of arms.³ General Weygand has been summoned to Vichy by

³The memorandum cited in footnote 1 records the following statement made by Laval: "I would like to emphasize to you once more that our only thought in all our measures and our wishes is to be in a position to carry out the steps to which we feel committed as a result of the decision for collaboration in Africa taken by Marshal Pétain and Chancellor Hitler in Montoire. General Huntziger was able to supply you with further specific data this evening. You may perhaps have had the impression at our first conference that it could take very long to put our plans into operation. I am therefore especially gratified that a detailed and thorough examination of the conditions has led to the realization that we can arrive at quicker results. In the conferences which took place with Marshal Pétain in the chair, the determination was emphasized time and again to neglect nothing which would lead to the reconquest of the insurrectionary territories as fast as possible and to meet any new English attack with the greatest possible vigor. If, however, we want to be successful you must help us, and we would be grateful to you if you could help to dispel any Italian apprehensions that might arise. It is impossible to settle the questions of

Marshal Pétain to report. Tomorrow I shall discuss with Laval the necessity, in a given case, of detaining him in France.⁴

ABETZ

Bizerte, Oran, and Toulon in the manner demanded by the Italians. Now in particular we must not leave any opportunities to the English, who in view of their desperate situation are capable of everything. I revert again to my discussion with the American Chargé d'Affaires, Murphy, which was the first discussion in a long time which I was able to conduct with an American having an important position. Mr. Murphy told me the Americans were afraid that Germany wanted to seize the port of Dakar as well as the French fleet. I replied to him without equivocation that our fleet is being re-armed to drive out de Gaulle, and I did not conceal from him that in our interest we desired Germany's victory."

"A publication of German documents in French, *Pétain et les allemands: Mémoire d'Abetz sur les rapports franco-allemands*, pp. 42-43, contains a dispatch of Dec. 12 by Abetz, inquiring whether he should take up the question of the recall of Weygand with the French Government in case the meeting between Laval and Ribbentrop was delayed still longer. Abetz also suggested that, if it should be undesirable or difficult to have Weygand recalled, it might be possible to keep him for a few months in the occupied zone or in Germany "under the pretext of military consultations with the German military." Neither this dispatch nor a reply to the suggestions of Abetz has been found in the Foreign Ministry files.

No. 491

B19/B003916-17

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 774 of December 11 HELSINKI, December 11, 1940—8:20 p. m.

Received December 12—12:40 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 773.¹

The Russian démarche concerning the Finnish presidential election was made as follows. Molotov read a memorandum dated December 6 to Paasikivi. The memorandum had the following content: "We have no desire to intervene or to give any hints with regard to candidates for the presidential election, but we are following the preparations for the election closely. Whether Finland desires peace with Soviet Russia will be judged by us according to who becomes president. It is clear that if such a man as Tanner,² Kivimäki, Mannerheim, or Svinhufvud is elected president, we will draw the conclusion that Finland does not wish to fulfill the peace treaty with Soviet Russia." Paasikivi replied that the presidential election was an internal affair of Finland. Molotov conceded this but remarked: "Of

¹ In this telegram of Dec. 10 (B19/B003904) Blücher reported learning of a Soviet communication to the Finnish Legation in Moscow regarding the Finnish presidential election. The Soviet Government had stated that, in principle, it did not mix in Finnish internal affairs, but that it considered Mannerheim, Tanner, Svinhufvud, and Kivimäki unacceptable as president.

² Väinö Tanner. Finnish Minister of Finance, 1937-1939; Foreign Minister, December 1939-March 1940; Minister of Public Welfare, March-August 1940.

course you may elect whomever you wish as president, but we have the right to draw our conclusions." Paasikivi replied: "We will fully comply with the peace treaty. The president has no influence on that." Paasikivi wired with regard to this that he could not avoid listening to the statement read to him. At his request Molotov left the memorandum with him.

This part of the conversation had been preceded by Molotov's brusque attitude toward the negotiations on a Finnish-Swedish rapprochement, about which I am sending a separate telegram.³

The Foreign Minister was not satisfied with the conduct of Paasikivi, who not only listened to the statements of Molotov but also allowed them to be given to him in writing. I have the impression, however, that he will content himself with the lame replies of Paasikivi. Ryti, who last night informed some of the leading electors of the matter, is said, however, to have called the Russian action a great impertinence which Paasikivi should have rejected in an appropriate manner.

The effect on the electors, of whom only the leaders are informed, is as yet difficult to evaluate. The leader of the bloc which intends to support Svinhufvud or possibly Kivimäki said in the first flush of indignation that they would not let themselves be influenced by the Russians. In order to strengthen the faint-hearted it would be well if I could say to the electors, phrasing it as in the case of Petsamo, that they might proceed on the assumption that Russia was bearing in mind that Germany does not wish any complications in the north. Please send telegraphic instructions.⁴

BLÜCHER

³ In telegram No. 777 of Dec. 11 (B19/B003910-11) Blücher sent the text of a memorandum, handed to the Finnish Minister in Moscow by Molotov on the night of Dec. 6, advising Finland to weigh carefully the consequences of a treaty with Sweden which, in the Soviet view, would subordinate Finnish foreign policy to Swedish and would nullify the Soviet-Finnish treaty of Mar. 12, 1940. For the text of the Soviet memorandum, see *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941*, p. 82.

⁴ See document No. 525.

No. 492

136/74520

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 4247 of December 11

MADRID, December 11, 1940.

Received December 12—12: 25 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 2228 of December 9.¹

Today I spoke to the Spanish Foreign Minister regarding the report making the rounds that Spain had promised neutrality in return

¹ The draft of this telegram is filmed on 3882/E047675.

for the delivery of American foodstuffs. The Minister stated that the report has been invented. However, during the negotiations on grain deliveries the American Ambassador had several times started to introduce the neutrality question; he had even wanted to speak about it with the Generalissimo, but the Foreign Minister had energetically prevented this.²

STOHRER

² Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. II, pp. 839-841.

No. 493

136/74519

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, December 11, 1940.

No. 4246 of December 11

Received December 12—1:25 a. m.

A good source reports that in the negotiations conducted with England regarding grain deliveries Spain had yielded to the condition not to re-export certain foodstuffs and raw materials from Spain to the Axis Powers and not to permit the transit of certain Portuguese goods to Germany and Italy.¹

This report did not appear improbable, for the Foreign Minister told me very frankly a few days ago that in his desperate efforts to control the constantly growing scarcity of foodstuffs in Spain he unfortunately had to show the English some cooperation here and there, and the Political Director in the Spanish Foreign Ministry made almost exactly the same statements to the Counselor of Embassy. I therefore asked the Foreign Minister today very candidly what was true in this rumor. The Minister denied that any assurances of the sort had been given the English or Americans regarding transit from Portugal; however, unwillingly as he had done it, he had had to promise not to re-export grain, phosphate, and manganese ore intended for Spain. The Minister added that after covering Spain's own urgent requirements he would make it possible for us to receive further deliveries in case of urgent need, in spite of this forced promise. The present need recognized no law.

STOHRER

¹ In telegram No. 4152 of Dec. 4 (136/74502), Stohrer reported the conclusion on Dec. 2 of a supplementary agreement to the Anglo-Spanish trade agreement of Mar. 18. England agreed to the transport of 150,000 tons of maize from South America and to supply 100,000 tons of grain from Canada.

No. 494

2281/480825-28

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, December 11, 1940.

TOP SECRET

No. 2271 of December 11

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1834¹ of December 10 and my telegrams Nos. 2233² and 2234³ of December 6 and No. 2240 of December 7.⁴

My general impression about Field Marshal Milch's visit may be summarized by saying that the Field Marshal was received here in exceedingly cordial fashion and that his proposals about dispatch of German air forces were everywhere acknowledged with keen interest.

The talk with Count Ciano must in the main be looked upon as a courtesy visit. The Field Marshal showed him the text of the Führer's letter to the Duce⁵ on the contents of which Count Ciano, as already reported, expressed himself in terms of deep satisfaction.

In the talk with the Duce immediately afterwards, which I reported in detail in telegram No. 2234 of December 6, the Duce, it should be pointed out once more, indicated Colonel General Pricolo to the Field Marshal as his fully responsible representative. Field Marshal Milch, in going into the details of the employment of the German air forces, first told the Duce where they would be based. He indicated that the airfield of Grottaglie, near Taranto, and three or four airfields in Sicily were to be made available. The composition of the German air force contingent would be as follows: 3 fighter groups, 1 dive bomber group, 1 group of long-range fighters, 1 mine-laying squadron, and 1 reconnaissance squadron, together with the related ground organizations, and 1 antiaircraft regiment, and 1 air force signals regiment. The Field Marshal outlined the mission of the German air force contingent as follows:

1. Interdiction of the Channel of Sicily. To accomplish this it would be necessary for the Italian Government to declare a prohibited area, which must be larger than the area which a ship at normal speed

¹ In this telegram (2281/480823-24) the Foreign Minister directed the Ambassador to make another and more comprehensive report on the visit of Field Marshal Milch, and to watch carefully the employment of the Luftwaffe in Italy.

² See document No. 460, footnote 1.

³ Document No. 460.

⁴ In this telegram (2281/480821-22) Mackensen reported that Field Marshal Milch, before boarding the train for Berlin, expressed full satisfaction over his discussions with General Pricolo.

⁵ Document No. 452.

could traverse in a night. The object of this would be to block English traffic between Gibraltar and Alexandria.

2. Commitment against the English fleet, especially in Alexandria, and mining of the Suez Canal. For the purpose of these operations it would be necessary to use North African bases, with airfields in the Tobruk area being the most suitable for this purpose.

An important problem is the question of subordination. In the talk with Colonel General Pricolo, the following agreements were reached on this point, subject to the Reichsmarschall's approval:

The High Command of the Italian Air Force shall have the right to assign operational and combat areas to the X Air Corps within the scope of the missions specified by the High Command of the Luftwaffe, and to regulate the cooperation between Italian and German units in joint operations.

The term subordination has been avoided in this connection, and so the above arrangement constitutes a compromise. For all practical purposes, the Luftwaffe Corps, except for the above restrictions, remains under command of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.

Operational use of the German air force contingent, in the view of General von Pohl, will be possible beginning in the early part of January. The advance detachment will leave Berlin on December 13.

Concerning the foreign policy effects on the countries in the Mediterranean I might say for the present that, as General Pohl confirmed to me once more today, the Führer has strictly forbidden any participation whatever by German air forces in the Italo-Greek conflict, and that Greek territory must be respected. This order apparently applies also to the naval base in Suda Bay which has been constructed by the English in Crete. No political repercussions on Greece should occur in these circumstances. As seen from here, such reactions are not likely to be expected in Turkey, particularly since the Italian bases in the Dodecanese will not be used by the German air forces.

MACKENSEN

No. 495

216/147643

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 878

BERLIN, December 11, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador called on me today regarding the quarrel between Thailand and Indochina. He repeated to me what Ambassador Ott had reported on December 6 (Tokyo telegram No. 1360).¹

¹ Document No. 458.

I informed Kurusu of my conversation yesterday with the Thai Minister, Montri.² Kurusu is entirely in agreement with our stand. He asked only that Vichy might possibly also be advised to keep calm.

I answered this by saying that the French in Indochina would doubtless be glad to keep still if they were not harassed and provoked by the Siamese, as they are at the present time.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.³

² The conversation had actually taken place 2 days earlier. See document No. 484.

³ Weizsäcker's signature does not appear on the file copy of this memorandum.

No. 496

71/50744-45

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII

BERLIN, December 11, 1940.

zu Pol. VII 3845 g.¹

The statement made by the Axis Powers to the secretary of the Grand Mufti as well as to the Iraq Minister of Justice to the effect that they were following with interest the Arabs' struggle for independence and continued to view with sympathy their aspirations for freedom² has met with a vigorous response in the entire Arab world. At the suggestion of Arab circles, the statement has now on December 5 been also published in the German press. This publicity was also the occasion for lively demonstrations of sympathy among the Arabs.

The Iraq Minister in Ankara, a brother of the present Minister President, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, suggested in Ankara³ that the statement issued over the radio and in the press ought also be given to the Iraq Government in writing. The reason for this is, as we know from other sources, the desire of the Minister President of Iraq to have something concrete in his hands that he can submit to his Cabinet. The British Ambassador in Baghdad, at the instance of his Government, recently took steps in the nature of an ultimatum with the Government of Iraq, on the grounds that its attitude was too pro-Axis, in fact, even anti-British, and that it had permitted a debate on the question of the resumption of relations with Germany. Gaylani had previously asked for a written statement in order to be able to obtain parliamentary approval for the resumption of relations.

¹ Pol. VII 3845 g. : Not found.

² See document No. 190 and footnote 4.

³ This suggestion was made in a conversation with Hentig and was reported by Papen in telegram No. 991 of Dec. 5 from Ankara (71/50743).

In view of the splendid effect achieved by the statement and the fact that the situation in Syria and Iraq is becoming much more acute, it seems desirable to comply with the wish of the Iraqi. This might be decisive for the existence of the Rashid Ali al-Gaylani Cabinet.

It is suggested that in a letter addressed to the Iraq Minister in Ankara, Ambassador von Papen repeat the statement made to the secretary of the Mufti and the Iraq Minister of Justice and later issued by radio and press. It is proposed that a telegram be sent to the German Embassy in Ankara with the following text:

"With reference to your telegram No. 991 of December 5.⁴ Ambassador von Papen is authorized to address a letter to the Iraq Minister, stating in addition to a suitable introduction and complimentary close, the following:

'I am glad to be able to confirm to you on instruction of my Government the statement that was recently published by the German press which reads as follows:'

"(The text of the statement follows.)"

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary through Minister Grobba, Minister von Rintelen, Under State Secretary Woermann.⁵

MELCHERS

⁴ See footnote 3.

⁵ Instructions along lines of this memorandum were sent to Papen by Woermann in telegram No. 727 of Dec. 31 (2361/488320-21). See document No. 596.

No. 497

136/74537-40

*The Ambassador in Spain to the State Secretary*¹

TOP SECRET

MADRID, December 11, 1940.

After my already quite pessimistic report in cipher letter No. 1722 g. of November 14, 1940,² the food situation in Spain has become still a good deal worse. From all parts of Spain and from all sources there have come numerous reports on the food scarcity which is constantly growing more acute. Bread and flour in particular are lacking. In many regions, as also in Madrid, there has not been a piece of bread to be bought for days or weeks. The situation seems to be worse at the moment in Barcelona, which is already so full of

¹ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "This dispatch arrived partly in cipher."

The file copy bears no salutation, but is addressed to Weizsäcker. It bears the further marginal note:

"Submitted to the Führer. Hew[el], Dec. 14."

² Document No. 335.

unrest. But here in Madrid, too, it has happened that people have collapsed in the streets because of undernourishment. Added to this is the unemployment; it is constantly on the increase owing to insufficient imports of raw materials, and threatens to take on dangerous proportions.

The consequence of this famine—one can actually use this term today without exaggeration—is a similarly constantly increasing domestic unrest; the dissatisfaction with the Government, or with the regime, is growing dangerously. And “last not least,”³ there is the fight of the military against Serrano Suñer, who is now being accused of advancing farther than he should have, in ignorance of military and economic matters.⁴

Thus the situation today is such that even without any sort of warlike entanglements Spain is heading toward a catastrophe unless the food situation improves. I would even say that such a catastrophe would seem unavoidable if the Spanish people had not become apathetic through their sufferings in the almost 3 years of civil war, and if they were not known to perform astonishing things in enduring misery and suffering.

Now of course after the refusal given Admiral Canaris⁵ I have first asked myself whether Franco or Serrano Suñer perhaps wish to take back certain promises for any personal or political reasons. This would be entirely conceivable if they had become convinced that they have promised too much or if they wanted to withdraw from the obligations entered into toward us as a result of the lengthening duration of the war or perhaps because of too little prospect that the Spanish national aspirations will be fulfilled. I do not believe that, however. I have rather come to the conviction that the reason for the refusal is the above-described food situation that has suddenly become disastrous, and the concomitant domestic danger. I have stated this in my telegraphic reports.

Thus if the Spanish Government can plead force majeure to justify the change in attitude and if Franco can therefore not be brought to revise the statement he gave Admiral Canaris and to set a date, then the question is what position we want to take regarding this new situation. I cannot of course myself judge what role the projected action played or plays in the over-all picture of our war policy and what significance is therefore accorded it.

Perhaps we should waive claim to this and tell the Spaniards that we now for our part, too, consider the former agreements as invalid.

³ In English in the original.

⁴ See document No. 479.

⁵ See document No. 476 and footnote 2.

I could imagine, however, that in certain circumstances a Spain still entirely friendly to us could be useful as a buffer against a threatening Africa.

But if we hold fast to the idea of this action there are a number of courses.

The first course would be to try to eliminate the reasons which have impelled Franco to the refusal. This would, however, entail an economic support of Spain of tremendous proportions, since according to the latest estimate, in order to relieve the famine it is necessary to import still much larger amounts of grain, etc., than we have supposed at Berchtesgaden.⁶ Since in addition the famine here is at the same time a problem of transportation, means of transportation and fuel would also have to be delivered in large quantities—especially in view of a possible later paralysis of coastal shipping. Whether this is possible and whether the action is worth this much to us is something I cannot judge.

Then we could consider—of course I am speaking only theoretically—carrying out the action without the cooperation of the Spaniards; this could be done in two ways: namely, by asking Franco for his consent in advance and suggesting that he protest but comply, or by not doing this and undertaking a surprise action. In the former case the Spaniards would presumably raise the same objections as now; namely pointing out that they cannot guarantee that they could maintain order. Then we would have to place the entire country under our protection not only militarily but also economically and organizationally. An arbitrary, surprise action would, however, be extremely dangerous. Quite aside from the fact that occupying a more or less hostile country is something different from doing this against the will of a previously friendly people, I would not wish to guarantee that the Spaniards, in spite of all their past sympathies for us, would not after all turn against us. This even seems to me to be the more probable reaction.

Therefore only the first-mentioned course seems practicable to me. If we want to take it we probably should, in consideration of the new situation, start new negotiations with the Spaniards and ask them what they need, and for how long, in order to restore their economy and to begin the action at a time to be laid down in writing. In this case, however, we should in particular try, independently of the Spaniards, to obtain a picture of the economic and transportation situation, both in regard to the actual supplies and in regard to the organizational possibilities. For with rationing and the like not much can be done,

⁶ See documents Nos. 352 and 357.

considering the lack of discipline, etc., here. Franco has really already pointed out this course by requesting that an economic expert be sent to investigate on his own account the actual economic crisis in the country.⁷

STOHRER

⁷ In telegram No. 4216 of Dec. 9 (136/74517) Stohrer had reported that Franco, in his conversation with Canaris, had requested that a German economic expert be sent to Spain to report on the current situation.

No. 498

2281/481876-78

The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Italy

Telegram

No. 1843 of December 11 BERLIN, December 12, 1940—1:30 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

In connection with the present difficulties of the Italians in Albania I made the following statement yesterday to Alfieri:

1) The stabilization of the Italian front on the line between Lake Okhrida and the Adriatic in the direction of Corfu is in our opinion of crucial importance. If the Italians can hold this line, German propaganda will succeed without any difficulty in representing the Italian reverse as a passing episode which on the whole is of no basic significance whatever for the actual strength and striking power of the Italian Army.

2) A further withdrawal from this line, however, would in our opinion involve the great danger, in fact almost the certainty, that the Italian troops would then be unable to hold even a line farther to the rear. Albania would then be lost to Italy. Such a withdrawal from Albania, although not decisive for the outcome of the war, would however mean an impairment of Italian prestige that would be difficult to compensate. We therefore believe that everything, down to the last particle, must be staked in order to hold the above-mentioned line during the winter.

3) As a result of the Italian reverse in Albania our diplomatic action has come to a standstill. I should like to tell you in strict confidence and only for your personal information that Spain and also Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have assumed an attitude of obvious waiting. At present it is also impossible for me to make any progress in the negotiations with Russia and Turkey, which had begun favorably. All this of course is also only a temporary check and if the Italians hold Albania, we intend to resume this diplomatic offense immediately.

4) I explained all this to Alfieri in a serious but markedly friendly manner and I request you to follow the same course in any conversations with the Duce and Count Ciano; that is, I ask you to present this view without evasion but to do so in such a way that the sensitivity of the Italians will on no account be wounded by it. I also consider it vitally important that in all conversations of the Embassy with Italian authorities any expression of criticism be contradicted, that the special emphasis be placed on the solidarity of Germany and Italy in life and death, and that toward outsiders the Albanian affair be minimized as a temporary setback.

RIBBENTROP

No. 499

B14/B002427-28

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*¹

Multex 472

BERLIN, December 11, 1940.

Sent December 12—4:45 a. m.

For the Chief of Mission personally.

In connection with Italy's military reverse in Albania, I request you to take the following attitude in your conversations.

1) Italy undertook her action against Greece in order to seize, strictly locally, certain areas which served the English as secret bases against Italy, especially for naval purposes.

2) The operation was started with slender forces and now has come to a standstill, especially because of the season. Since it encountered far superior Greek forces, it led to a withdrawal and Italian losses, which, to be sure, are of a limited nature only.

3) At the moment Italy is engaged in stabilizing her front by newly dispatched forces and intends to improve further the position of her front line during the winter as soon as sufficient forces have arrived in Albania.

4) What is involved in the Italian retreat therefore is a passing phenomenon—that is, a military incident such as often occurs in war. As for the real strength of the Italian Army and of Italy this slight reverse is in no way important, and with respect to the outcome of the war itself it is, of course, of no consequence at all.

It goes without saying that our missions abroad must counter any criticism of Italy and that, on the contrary, the stability of the Axis must be emphasized by using appropriate language with respect to third parties, as well as by a particularly friendly attitude toward Italians.

RIBBENTROP

¹ This circular was addressed to all Missions.

No. 500

136/74523-25

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, December 12, 1940.

No. 4253 of December 12

Received December 12—2:50 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 2246 of December 11 (Pol. I 1532 g. Rs.).¹

The memorandum of General Vigón on the conversation between Admiral Canaris and the Generalissimo (December 7, 1940) reads in translation as follows:²

"The Admiral was received at 7:30 p. m. with General Vigón present. The Admiral presented to the Chief of State the greetings of the Führer and made known the wish of Germany to undertake the attack on Gibraltar within a short time, in connection with which German troops would enter Spain on January 10. He reported that the Führer considered this time the most favorable because troops which were now available for the operation would be committed immediately thereafter for other undertakings and accordingly could not be withheld for an indefinite time. The Admiral stated that as soon as the entry of troops had begun, economic assistance from Germany would commence also.

The Generalissimo in reply declared to the Admiral that for the following reasons it would be impossible for Spain to enter the war on the date mentioned:

1) The English fleet still possessed such freedom of operation that the expected success at Gibraltar—which he considered certain and immediate—would be soon dimmed by the loss of Guinea and later by that of one of the Canary Islands. In addition England and the United States would be given an excuse for occupying the Azores, Madeira, and the Cape Verde Islands.

2) Although the decrease in foreign trade had caused difficulties, the military preparations of Spain were going forward. The defense of the islands and the coasts was being improved as much as possible and the artillery at the Straits was being strengthened. All of these preparations were, however, still under way and incomplete. This was not the actual reason, though, why Spain was prevented from accepting the proposed date.

3) The provisioning of Spain was completely inadequate, both in respect to the present scarcity of supplies, and in respect to their distribution. Two problems presented themselves at the moment:

(a) the deficit in foodstuffs, especially grain, which latter is estimated at one million tons;

¹ Not found.

² In telegram No. 4216 of Dec. 9 (136/74517), Stohrer reported that General Vigón had given Admiral Canaris a memorandum of the conversation which agreed fully with the report submitted by Canaris to the Intelligence Department (Abwehr). See document No. 476 and footnote 2.

(b) the inadequacy of transportation because of the lack of railway rolling stock, and because of the necessary reduction in the use of auto trucks. If one also reckoned on the discontinuance of transportation by sea in consequence of entering the war, the situation of many of the provinces would become intolerable.

4) The Generalissimo and the Government were exerting themselves to remove these difficulties. Purchases of grain had been made in South America and in Canada. The purchase of railway cars and the repair of locomotives were being hastened. Gas units were being secured for auto trucks to provide for the possibility of a complete lack of gasoline. But the approaching exhaustion of supplies and the decrease in foreign trade were preventing rapid improvement in the situation.

5) For these reasons Spain could not enter the war within the immediate future. She could also not carry on a lengthy war without exacting unbearable sacrifices from the Spanish people. A long war would also mean the certain loss of a part of the Canary Islands, which are supplied for a period of 6 months only.

6) In bringing forward all of the difficulties which prevented Spain from accepting the proposed date, the Generalissimo wished to emphasize that he had in mind not only the advantages for Spain, but also those of Germany, for in his opinion, in case of a long drawn out war, the weakening of Spain was sure to become a disadvantage and burden for Germany.

The Admiral asked the Generalissimo whether, in these circumstances, which prevented the date of January 10 from being accepted, it would be possible at this time to fix another later date. The Generalissimo replied that since the removal of these difficulties did not depend alone upon the wishes of Spain, he also could not fix any definite date, such as might be subject to change because of circumstances. In any case, his attention and his efforts would be directed toward hastening and completing the preparations of Spain. These preparations were being pressed forward with such results as would be apparent to the Admiral on his next visit to the zone of the Straits. The Generalissimo also showed the Admiral photographs of the Moersers 240; they were intended to take care of the lack of heavy artillery and air strength, and tests were being made with them at the moment.

The Generalissimo considered it advisable that a German economic adviser should visit Spain in order to examine the present situation and to pass on to his Government an immediate impression.

He agreed with the Admiral that the exploratory studies and preparations which had been begun should be carried on together and in the same discreet fashion as hitherto.

He then charged the Admiral to convey to the Führer his most cordial greetings and the account of the conferences, and expressed again to the Admiral his esteem and his happiness at seeing him again in Spain. (Signed) Juan Vigón, General of Division."

End of the memorandum.

No. 501

104/112714

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, December 12, 1940.

No. 2283

For the Ambassador.

With reference to your telegram No. 2705 of December 11.¹

Please answer Molotov's question to the effect that the credentials have not yet been presented because official appointments have to be set far in advance owing to the great claims on the Führer's time during the war. The Führer, who is not in Berlin at present, will receive Dekanozov after his return to Berlin next week. Since the waiting period for receiving Dekanozov is no longer than what is usual, but on the contrary other Mission Chiefs have had to wait much longer, you can indicate, in an appropriate manner, a certain surprise at the inquiry.

Reception of Dekanozov by me, which in principle always takes place shortly before the reception by the Führer, will take place this afternoon, since Dekanozov asked the Protocol Division once more yesterday to be received. I am leaving this evening and will not return to Berlin until next week with the Führer.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ In this telegram (104/112713) Schulenburg reported that Molotov had sent him a brief letter asking why the German Government had not yet given Dekanozov the opportunity to submit his credentials and to assume his function as Ambassador. Schulenburg had then, following a conversation by telephone with the Chief of Protocol at the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, explained the cause of the delay and stated that Ribbentrop was going to receive Dekanozov that day, Dec. 12.

² In telegram No. 2719 (104/112720) Schulenburg reported that on the evening of Dec. 12 Molotov had again asked about the reception of Dekanozov. Schulenburg explained the causes of the delay in accordance with instructions and stated that the Reich Foreign Minister would that day receive Dekanozov.

No. 502

F14/216-19

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

RM No. 48

BERLIN, December 12, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER
AND THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR, DEKANOZOV, ON DECEMBER 12, 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister received the Ambassador of the USSR, Dekanozov, at 4:30 o'clock. The Foreign Minister told the Ambas-

sador of his pleasure at being able to welcome him in the post of Ambassador in Berlin as a representative of the USSR who was particularly close to Stalin and Molotov, and he said he had not known at the time M. Dekanozov accompanied Molotov to Berlin that he would be appointed Ambassador.

The Ambassador answered that he, too, was happy to be appointed to Berlin, but he, too, had known nothing of the future appointment during the Molotov visit.

In reply to a question of the Foreign Minister, the Ambassador said he came from Georgia, from Carthavelia in the eastern part of Georgia, where Stalin also was born; however, he was 22 years younger than Stalin, so that he had not known him in the Caucasus. Stalin was 60 years old last winter.

The Ambassador then presented to the Foreign Minister in behalf of Stalin the latter's signed portrait, and asked to be excused for having presented it somewhat late; he had wanted to present the picture at the time of his first visit, however.¹

Upon inquiry the Ambassador stated that his wife had not yet arrived because she was ill, but that she and the two children, aged 10 and 14, would come in the near future. After a conversation about the difficulties in the education of their children encountered by diplomats staying in foreign countries for long periods of time, the Ambassador said that he had come to Germany for the first time during the Molotov visit.

The Foreign Minister then spoke of the great plans which were to be realized in Germany after the war, particularly the apartment and housing project and the measures against the flight from the country to the cities, whereupon the Ambassador spoke of similar Soviet plans.

Upon inquiry by the Ambassador the Foreign Minister said he hoped to end the war, which had after all already been won, in the near future. Gradually the English, too, would realize that there was no hope for them any longer.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that our Ambassador in Moscow had stated that it was desired in Moscow that M. Dekanozov present his credentials as soon as possible.² At the present time the Führer was exceedingly busy. It would probably be possible, however, for the audience to take place in the middle of the coming week.³

¹ On Nov. 8, at the instigation of the Foreign Minister, the Chief of Protocol had telegraphed Schulenburg mentioning that a portrait of Stalin had been promised to Ribbentrop on his last visit to Moscow and suggesting that Molotov bring the portrait on his visit in Berlin (1447/364937). In telegram No. 2377 of Nov. 8 Schulenburg had replied that Molotov would bring the picture with him (1447/364938).

² See document No. 501.

³ Dekanozov was received by Hitler on Dec. 19. No minute of this meeting has been found.

The Ambassador said that he personally would not have insisted, but he believed that the Soviet Government wanted him to take over his duties as soon as possible. The Foreign Minister said that there was a telegram from Count Schulenburg according to which Molotov had expressed the wish for an audience in the near future. That would, as he had said before, probably be possible in the middle of the coming week, after which the situation could be discussed with him in several conferences. The Ambassador expressed his thanks and said he would be available, but wanted to ask for information about a political matter.

Mme. Minister Kollontay reported from Stockholm that from conversations with Foreign Minister Günther and the Finnish Minister Vasastjerna she understood that a Swedish-Finnish agreement was being planned, which had as its purpose the subordination of Finnish foreign policy to the policy of Sweden. The Soviet Government would definitely disapprove of such an agreement, because according to the Soviet-Finnish Agreement of March 12, 1940, Finland was never to be a vassal, but independent and entirely responsible.

The Foreign Minister stated that he had heard nothing about such plans and did not believe there were such. In view of the friendly relations between Sweden and Finland it was possible that such ideas were discussed here and there, but it was surely very doubtful that they had taken on any definite form.⁴

The Ambassador said he would pass this on to Moscow and expressed his satisfaction. Mme. Kollontay reported that the desire to free Finland from German influence was the basis of the plans. The Soviet Government took a sharply disapproving attitude.

The Foreign Minister repeated what he had said. Thereupon the Ambassador took his leave.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister according to instructions.

MEYER-HEYDENHAGEN
Counselor

⁴ Cf. documents Nos. 251, 351, and 375.

No. 503

84/62203-04

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 1426

BERLIN, December 12, 1940—8:30 p. m.

Please inform the State Department orally as follows:

The members of the American Embassy at Paris: First Secretary Cecil M. P. Cross, Secretary Hunt, and Mrs. Deegan, are personae

non gratae to the German Government. The American Government is requested to have them recalled from their posts within 3 days.

In explanation of the German request the following may be cited: Cross sheltered Sutton, the British subject and employee of the former British Consulate in Paris, in the building of the American Embassy for months until he was arrested outside the Embassy in October by Abwehr officials. During his stay in the American Embassy Sutton engaged in espionage against Germany. His case is being dealt with by the German court which has jurisdiction. Furthermore, Cross and Hunt saw to it that a British officer who had escaped from captivity received assistance in Paris. Mrs. Deegan entered this officer in the assistance file of the Embassy and accepted the questionnaire filled out by him. By their actions the said officials and employees of the American Embassy would have made themselves liable to punishment according to German laws; moreover, they committed the most serious violation of their neutrality obligations under international law.

Exclusively for your personal information:

The French Government will be requested to prohibit the said Americans from further exercise of official functions in unoccupied France as well.

Please send a telegraphic report on the carrying out of the instruction so that we may inform the press here immediately.¹ If the American Government should not inform the press in a satisfactory manner, you are requested to make the real facts known there immediately.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 512.

No. 504

B14/B002430-31

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, December 12, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received December 12—8:40 p. m.

No. 2279 of December 12

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1843 of December 11.¹

In the course of today's lengthy and very friendly conversation with Ciano following our discussion on the subject of Japan (my telegram No. 2278 of today's date²), I had an opportunity of casually convey-

¹ Document No. 498.

² Not printed (2366/489272).

ing the ideas of points 1 and 2 of the above telegram, mentioning at the same time that the setback in Albania had for the moment caused the Foreign Minister's diplomatic actions to come to a standstill. Ciano quietly listened to what I said and remarked that he was in a position to tell me on the strength of a talk he had had with General Cavallero in Albania over the new cable an hour ago, that the General was taking a confident view of the situation in Albania. One could now assume that the present line (which runs from Lake Okhrida to the Adriatic, but reaching it at a point north of Corfu, near Palermo [sic]) could be held, because supplies to the troops were moving forward properly while the situation on the rearward communications of the Greeks was deteriorating. Cavallero believes that the Greek attacks will slacken in about 5 to 6 days. A much more serious view must be taken of the situation in North Africa caused by the sudden push of the English "for which, certainly, no politician could be held responsible."

Ciano seemed to have no definite reports on the latest state of things. I got the impression, however, that he does not believe in the possibility of an effective counteroffensive by Graziani to free the two native divisions and the division of Blackshirts which are now encircled.

Regarding the conversation with Alfieri (point 4 of your telegram) he said he had received so far only a telegraphic report and that the detailed dispatch was still outstanding.

I have brought the guidance directive (point 4, last sentence of your telegram) to the attention of all Embassy officers and repeated the emphatic reminder of the need for observing the greatest reserve, especially in regard to the rumors which are dealt with in the following telegram.³

MACKENSEN

³ See document No. 505.

No. 505

B14/B002432-34

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Special Security Handling

MOST URGENT ROME (QUIRINAL), December 12, 1940—9:40 p. m.

TOP SECRET Received December 12—10:43 p. m.

No. 2280 of December 12

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Ciano, on whom I called today in connection with another matter, extended our conversation today considerably beyond the scope

customary with him and in the course of it, among other things, brought the conversation around to the rumors of his impending replacement by Grandi, which have been current here in the last couple of days in connection with the developments in Albania. These, like all such rumors prejudicial to his policy and therefore to the policy of the Axis, had their origin in the circles which were not yet cured of their pro-English sympathies and regarded Grandi, with his (reputedly) pro-English sentiment, as the proper spokesman for their policy. He has no intention of leaving the Ministry; his relationship to the Duce is unchanged. He himself was not paying any attention to the rumors but merely mentioned them as being characteristic of a certain type of propaganda still pursued, as for instance the propaganda conducted by the wife of the Spanish Ambassador with her Greek-English-Jewish antecedents (the Jewish part may be an error), but also by the Spanish Ambassador himself,¹ who lately has even rented a house outside the city where he could "unobserved," as he thought, regularly meet the ex-Queen of Spain,² who has always remained an Englishwoman, and to whom he, at the least, surely permits the use of his courier service. He did not think that Grandi himself was trying to make himself his successor, but for all of that he remained the candidate of that clique because of his long-time ties with England.

As far as I am in a position to judge the situation, a factor likely to have contributed to starting this stubbornly persisting rumor, in addition to the incontestable fact that the great mass of the people today holds Count Ciano responsible for the fiasco in Albania, is the fact confirmed to me in reliable quarters that it has come to sharp clashes between the Duce and Ciano. I nevertheless regard it as extremely improbable that the Duce, at this moment, should wish to separate himself from the very man whom he has marked in the eyes of the whole world as his first assistant, who is regarded in wide circles as the Duce's successor and who, finally, is the only man, next to the Duce, who is familiar with Italy's current international political situation and relations. To separate himself in this moment from the man who besides everything else is the husband of his daughter, who is particularly close to him, would mean for the Duce to place himself under a handicap in matters of foreign policy which he would accept, in my opinion, only in the one case that the anti-Ciano movement, which no doubt is already quite considerable today, should assume forms which would force upon him the dismissal of Ciano as the lesser evil compared with the danger of seriously compromising his own so far unimpaired position in the Italian nation. Certain it

¹ Pedro Garcia Conde y Menendez.

² Victoria, Princess of Battenberg, born at Balmoral, married Alfonso XIII May 31, 1906.

is that at the moment morale is worse than feeble. This is less because of the impact of the severe setbacks in the military field than because of the impact of the very extensive rationing of precisely those necessities of life for the broad masses of the people. But in general morale is not yet such as would force the Duce to make a decision of such consequence. In addition, the party, which under Muti's leadership had become slack, is now trying under the Duce's powerful personal impact to resume its task of being the motor of the nation in a critical period.

The development of the situation and consequently of the question of Ciano, however, will of course be greatly influenced also by the turn the military situation takes.

Follow-up telegram to come.³

MACKENSEN

²Telegram No. 2282 of Dec. 12 (B14/B002435-36) added that Anfuso in a conversation with Bismarck named Grandi himself as the source of the rumor that he would supplant Ciano.

No. 506

826/280251-56

*Minute by the Chief of the Department of National Defense in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff*¹

No. 00 11 32/40 g. K FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, December 12, 1940.
Pol. I 1553 g. Rs.

REPORT ON THE SECOND PARIS CONFERENCE ON DECEMBER 10, 1940²
(AS WELL AS PROPOSAL FOR TELETYPE MESSAGE TO THE FÜHRER)

Following several conferences in Vichy headed by the Chief of State and on his explicit instruction, Laval, Huntziger, Darlan, and the representative of the Air Force presented supplementary plans with reference to the questions raised by Major General Warlimont at the first conference:³

1. Measures to strengthen the defensive capabilities of French West Africa are now being carried out. With its present complement of coastal batteries, ships, and aircraft, Dakar could repel attacks even heavier than those last September. The army forces are regrouping to secure everywhere the defense against English attacks. Any future attack in this area by de Gaulle is described as impossible. The

¹ This copy of the document was sent to Ritter on Dec. 14.

² See document No. 490.

³ See document No. 428.

immediate objective of regrouping: protection of the line Niamey-Zinder-Lake Chad. A convoy with about 3,000 men is now en route from North Africa to Dakar. The next transport will be assembled in Casablanca. Assembly of the material from depots in North Africa is now in progress. Full combat readiness of the contingents is attainable only after the required numbers of colonial officers, non-commissioned officers, and men have been released from German captivity.

Detailed data for this, it has been promised, will be supplied to the Armistice Commission, which will begin to study them immediately but will not be authorized to make a decision until the political basis has been established.

2. Operations in the direction of Lake Chad have already been initiated by reinforcing the posts along the route Niamey-Zinder-Lake Chad, and by political action supported by methods of guerrilla warfare in the insurrectionary territories. The necessary means of transport were brought in from North Africa.

Transfer of two bomber groups and one fighter group to the assembly area north of Nigeria is in progress. With these forces, after establishment of the ground organization, a concentrated air attack is planned for the beginning of March against Fort Lamy and the other de Gaulle strongholds in this area. This date is dependent on the achievement of complete combat readiness of the air force and army units even for offensive operations.

3. In view of several English announcements the French anticipate an English reaction to the operation against de Gaulle.

Against this contingency the following countermeasures are planned in West Africa:

a) Air attack on the big native town of Kano, in the northern part of Nigeria, which is expected to have a far-reaching effect on the attitude of the natives disgruntled against England.

b) Capture of Bathurst in British Gambia. This operation is already being prepared at Dakar.

c) Offensive operations for the capture of Freetown by a combined army, air, and naval task force. Ground operations are difficult because of the terrain. Instructions have been given to the Commander in Dakar to submit a plan of operations; it is to be submitted also to us in the very near future.

d) Additional operations outside the West African area, depending on capabilities and opportunities—e.g., repetition of air attacks on Gibraltar.

4. Besides the release of colonial troops held as prisoners of war, the following were noted as essential requirements for carrying out these plans.

- a) Permission to keep the necessary amounts of fuel, especially aviation gasoline (this is being studied by the Chief of the OKW).⁴
- b) Resumption of the most essential production of aircraft, bombs, and ammunition, and adequate training of Air Force personnel.
- c) Removal of Italian opposition.

5. Instances of the latter stressed as being especially intolerable:

- a) Refusal to authorize an obsolete type liaison plane for the French commander of Niamey.
- b) Ban on the repair of damaged aircraft in North Africa, while the assembly of American aircraft by the English in West Africa is proceeding at a mounting rate (200 in November).
- c) Ban on the sending of released war material from France to North Africa. This makes necessary shipment through the hazardous Straits of Gibraltar.
- d) Withdrawal of French troops from Bizerte and Oran, and razing of a number of coastal fortifications in these localities. In Toulon the Italians have demanded withdrawal of the two infantry battalions stationed there.

6. Following the official talks, Huntziger informed Major General Warlimont that the representative of the French Air Force who was present at both conferences had been dispatched to the three Commanders in North Africa, Dakar, and Niamey for the purpose of informing them in detail of the spirit and substance of the talks held in Paris.

Furthermore, General Weygand, on whose conduct Huntziger was receiving special reports every 3 or 4 days, was expected in Vichy very soon.

The supreme command over the French colonial empire has been abolished and divided into three command areas: North Africa, West Africa, and Equatorial Africa, which are now directly subordinate to the French Ministry of War.

7. Laval wound up the presentation by stressing a desire for carrying out at the earliest the measures which France felt to be incumbent on her as a result of the meeting between the Führer and Marshal Pétain. His closing words: "If you help us, we are ready to act, to act immediately."

⁴The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941) for Dec. 12, referring to a conference in which Warlimont reported to Keitel and Jodl about his conversations of Dec. 10 with the French, contain the following statement:

"With regard to the request of the Italian Armistice Commission that France should deliver 30,000 tons of airplane fuel from her stock on hand and the opposite request of the French that they retain the necessary amounts of fuel, especially aviation gasoline, in order to carry out their plans in West and Equatorial Africa, the Chief, OKW decides that, for the present, no more than 15,000 tons of airplane gasoline shall be delivered to Italy from French stocks and that provisions be made for filling the remaining Italian requirements of 15,000 tons from German stocks."

Total impression of the German Ambassador in Paris and the representative of OKW is that French willingness has received a decisive impetus since the first conference, and that there can be no doubt about the sincerity of the political and⁵ military intentions of the Pétain Government.

WARLIMONT

⁵ According to a marginal note initialed by Ritter on Dec. 16 the words scored through were to be deleted.

No. 507

121/120274

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 1496 of December 13 PARIS, December 13, 1940—1:20 a. m.
Received December 13—2:35 a. m.

During a call which the Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Suhard, paid me yesterday at the Embassy, he assured me of the readiness of the French clergy to exert their influence in behalf of French cooperation with Germany. The Church has instructed the French clergy accordingly.

I replied that it had always made a favorable impression in Germany that the members of the French clergy, in contrast to any clergymen in Germany, at all times placed the interests of the nation above those of the Church and always felt themselves to be first of all French, despite the very harsh persecutions by the State. Given the marked national sentiment of the French clergy and assuming that there were appropriate instructions by their ecclesiastical authorities to the effect that France's national interest, today and in the future, lay in close cooperation with, and not in opposition to, Germany, a good relationship between the German occupying power and the French Church could be assured. Cardinal Suhard raised no questions of a practical nature during the conversation.

ABETZ

No. 508

174/136491

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, December 13, 1940—1:22 a. m.
SECRET Received December 13—9:35 a. m.
No. 1389 of December 13

The Foreign Ministry informs me that Ambassador Kurusu has been instructed to request the agrément for General Oshima as Ambassador

in Berlin.¹ Regarding the antecedents, I know that the Foreign Minister has on various occasions offered the post of Ambassador in Berlin to Oshima, who nevertheless declined in order to be able to continue his political activity in Japan on behalf of the Tripartite Pact. After Admiral Nomura's appointment as Ambassador in Washington² renewed pressure was exerted upon Oshima by the Foreign Minister, who thereby wanted to avoid any appearance of a weakening of his Tripartite Pact policy. Simultaneously the Army, assisted by leading naval circles, urged Oshima to accept, in the desire to see the most important Japanese Embassy post in Europe occupied by an absolutely reliable exponent of the policy of alliance with Germany—especially as the newly appointed Japanese Ambassador in Rome,³ being an old parliamentarian chiefly prominent in domestic affairs, has scant experience in foreign policy, and as Suma, the newly appointed Minister to Spain and hitherto chief of the press section, is sufficiently known for his American leanings. Ambassador Shiratori,⁴ at present indispensable here as the leading personage of the pro-German Japanese Renewal Movement, has also taken a vigorous stand in support of Oshima's candidacy.

OTT

¹ On Dec. 13 Kurusu informed Weizsäcker that the Japanese Government was recalling him, and requested agrément for Oshima whom he termed the right man for the post (813/276503).

² This appointment had been announced Nov. 25.

³ Zenbei Horikiri, appointed September 1940.

⁴ Toshio Shiratori, Japanese Ambassador in Italy, 1939-1940, subsequently advisor in the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

No. 509

104/112721-23

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

PRIORITY

BERLIN, December 13, 1940.

URGENT

RAM 366.

No. 2296

Exclusively for the Ambassador in person.

With reference to your telegram No. 2719¹ and my telegram No. 2283.²

1. I do not consider it correct that after receipt of Molotov's letter in which he spoke of a "prevention of the exercise of the functions of

¹ See document No. 501, footnote 2.

² Document No. 501.

the Soviet Ambassador," you treated the matter with Molotov on the basis of your telephone conversation with Minister von Dörnberg as a "delay", that is, as a matter for which we had to give the Soviet Government an explanation or possibly offer an apology. There can in no way be talk of a delay. The Führer naturally receives the newly arriving Chiefs of Mission at the time convenient to him in terms of his other arrangements. As a rule this takes weeks, often even months under the special war conditions. Thus it is a special courtesy which takes account of our good relations with the Soviet Government that the Führer, who is not in Berlin at the moment, intends after his return to Berlin, probably next week, to give Dekanozov an audience before others that were scheduled earlier.

2. Please handle the matter in this sense with the appropriate emphasis toward M. Molotov, and speak in such a way that M. Molotov recognizes that such unusual expressions as "prevention of the exercise of the functions" are entirely inappropriate here. Moreover, you can also make use of the fact that yesterday when I mentioned during Dekanozov's audience that I had heard from Moscow that he had asked that his audience with the Führer be expedited, Dekanozov replied that he knew nothing of this and that he had not expressed any such wish.

3. Please also report what you told M. Molotov in reply to his remark that he would await Dekanozov's report. I can only assume that this expression was not to be understood to mean that he could not immediately accept what you told him as accurate or authoritative; for otherwise you would have been bound to report giving the reply which is called for by a remark that can only be termed a personal affront.

4. Please report concerning the course of your démarche with Molotov which, as I already informed you by telephone, should be undertaken in oral form.³

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 516.

No. 510

M295/M012638

*Marshal Pétain to Chancellor Hitler*¹

DECEMBER 13, 1940.

HERR CHANCELLOR: I am anxious to reply immediately to your message and to thank you for the high-minded thought by which it is inspired.²

In bringing the mortal remains of the Duke of Reichstadt to the vault of the Invalides today, you have rendered an honor to the glory of our arms that will touch the hearts of all Frenchmen.

This gesture is brightly recorded in the cycle of loyal collaboration between our two nations. It marks "the paths of generosity," where they will always be able to meet.

I am animated by this intention as I was in Montoire. I want to make this collaboration more effective with each day.

M. Pierre Laval, who at my side became its fervent defender, no longer enjoys sufficient confidence and authority in the country to carry it out successfully. His methods of work and his mental atti-

¹This letter is in French, as is a cover note from General Doyen to General Stülpnagel also dated Dec. 13 (M295/M012637). The text of the letter was first telephoned to Stülpnagel by Doyen on Dec. 13, 11:15 p. m., and was forwarded by Stülpnagel in a German translation to Hitler at the Berghof where it was received over the telephone on Dec. 14, 12:30 a. m. (M295/M012639). The text of Stülpnagel's message to Hitler was sent to the Foreign Minister by Hencke in telegram No. 302 of Dec. 14 from Wiesbaden (121/120275-76). The original of Pétain's letter to Hitler was handed by General Doyen to the German Armistice Commission on Dec. 16. See document No. 521; cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. III, pp. 221-222.

²This message has not been found. According to testimony given by de Brinon at the trial of Pétain, a letter from Hitler to Pétain was delivered to Abetz "on Dec. 11 or 12;" Abetz then informed Laval that, on instructions from Berlin, the letter had to be handed to Pétain personally by de Brinon and that a reply had to be given without delay. De Brinon further testified that the letter announced Hitler's decision to return the remains of the Duke of Reichstadt, Napoleon's son, to France and was accompanied by an invitation—communicated orally by Abetz—for Pétain to go to Paris on the occasion of this ceremony. See *République Française, Haute Cour de Justice: Procès du Maréchal Pétain*, p. 286.

There is the following reference to this matter in a Foreign Ministry memorandum of Dec. 13 (368/207414-16) about the activities of the Armistice Commission:

"Ambassador Abetz reported on Dec. 12 that the Führer had given his approval to a trip by Marshal Pétain and his party to Paris on Dec. 12 for the purpose of participating in the commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of the removal of the remains of Napoleon I to the Hôtel des Invalides. The Führer has further authorized the removal of the remains of the Duke of Reichstadt from Vienna to Paris.

"The basic question of the transfer of the French Chief of State and of parts of the French Government to Versailles and Paris is not affected by this special authorization, and will for the time being be held in abeyance."

A proposed text of the speech which Abetz was to deliver at the ceremony was transmitted by Schleier in telegram No. 1487 of Dec. 12 from Paris (121/120271). The ceremony was eventually held on Dec. 15 in the presence of Darlan.

tude, as well as the relations which he maintained with certain political circles, render his person too suspect to Frenchmen for the undertaking to which he has addressed himself not to suffer actual damage.

I have therefore decided to part with him and to pursue with the assistance of a new Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Pierre Etienne Flandin,⁸ the policy which we, that is, you and I, envisaged 7 weeks ago.

I attach importance to you being the first to be informed of this decision, which I have taken only after long deliberation, and I would be very grateful if you would accord your best welcome to my new Minister.

Please accept, Herr Chancellor, the assurance of my highest consideration.

PHILIPPE PÉTAIN

⁸ Regarding the background of the French Government crisis, see document No. 531.

No. 511

8589/EG02781-83

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, December 13, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L No. 33 406/40 g.K.Chefs
By officer only

DIRECTIVE NO. 20: OPERATION MARITA

1. The outcome of the fighting in Albania cannot yet be foreseen. In view of the threatening situation in Albania, it is doubly important that English attempts to create, under the protection of a Balkan front, an air base which is dangerous chiefly for Italy, but also for the Rumanian oil region, should be frustrated.

2. My *intention* is, therefore:

a) In the next few months to organize in southern Rumania a force which will gradually be increased;

b) after favorable weather conditions set in—probably in March—to employ this force via Bulgaria for the taking of the northern coast of the Aegean and—should this be necessary—the entire Greek mainland (Operation *Marita*).

Support from Bulgaria can be counted on.

3. For the *assembling of the forces* in Rumania:

a) The 16th Armored Division, arriving in December, is assigned to the Army mission, whose duties remain unchanged.

b) Next a force of about 7 divisions (=I. concentration echelon) is to be brought to southern Rumania. Engineer forces for the preparation of the Danube crossing may, *to the extent necessary*, be incorporated in the transportation of the 16th Armored Division (as an "instruction unit"). Concerning their employment at the Danube, the Commander in Chief of the Army will request my decision at the proper time.

c) Preparations are to be made for the transportation of additional troops up to the maximum allowed (total 24 divisions).

d) For the Luftwaffe, it is a matter of assuring the aerial protection of the assembly, as well as preparing the necessary command post and supply installations on Rumanian soil.

4. *Operation Marita* itself is to be prepared on the following basis:

a) The first goal of the operation is the seizure of the Aegean coast and the Salonika basin. Continuation of the attack via Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth may be necessary.

b) Flank protection against Turkey will be assigned to the Bulgarian Army, but it is, in addition, to be strengthened and secured by the placing in readiness of German units.

c) Whether or not Bulgarian units will in addition participate in the attack is uncertain. Likewise the Yugoslav attitude cannot yet be clearly anticipated.

d) It will be the task of the *Luftwaffe* to give effective support to the advance of the Army in all sectors; to eliminate the enemy's air force and—so far as possible—to take possession of English bases on Greek islands through airborne operations.

e) The question as to how *Operation Marita* is to be supported by the Italian Armed Forces and how the coordination of the operations is to be effected, remains reserved for later decision.

5. The particularly great political consequences in the Balkans of the military preparations require meticulous direction in the execution of all measures of the High Commands taken in this connection.

The bringing up of transports through Hungary and their arrival in Rumania are to be announced step by step by the High Command of the Wehrmacht and are to be explained for the time being on the grounds that they are necessary for the strengthening of the Wehrmacht mission in Rumania.

Conversations with the Rumanians or Bulgarians which hint at our intentions, as well as the informing of the Italians, are subject in the individual case to my approval; so, also, is the sending of reconnaissance units and advance detachments.

6. After *Operation Marita* is carried out, it is the intention to withdraw the mass of the units employed in it, for *further use*.

7. I look forward to receiving reports of the Commanders in Chief concerning their intentions—in the case of the Army, this has already been done. Accurate schedules of the projected preparations are to

be submitted to me; also of the necessary redrafting of munitions workers (reconstitution of furloughed divisions).

ADOLF HITLER

No. 512

84/62215-16

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1940—3:55 a. m.

No. 2722 of December 13

Received December 14—5:45 p. m.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to your telegram No. 1426 of [December] 12¹ and my telegram No. 2659 of [December] 7.²

Before carrying out the instruction given, I feel that it is my duty to call attention to the incalculable consequences that will follow the German demand for recall, *on short notice*, of three members of the American Embassy.

Such an unusually brusque step would undoubtedly offer our enemies in Congress and in the Administration a pretext for breaking off diplomatic relations or at least taking corresponding steps now or later against members of our Foreign Service in the United States, on the grounds that a great power cannot but consider such a demand on short notice an unfriendly act.

As reported, the State Department has frequently been willing, particularly of late, to go against the current of public opinion whipped up by the interventionists and to restrain the agitation against the German Foreign Service unleashed by the Dies Committee in particular. The State Department also confined itself to a warning in the case of Spiegel³ and in the Ried case limited itself to designating him *persona non grata*,⁴ and in other cases where, in the American view, the right of hospitality was abused it has remained silent. Likewise, as related in telegram No. 2714 of December 13,⁵ Secretary Ickes [Hull] personally has just made a statement in writing unequivocally repudiating as untrue the mendacious report circulated by inflammatory propaganda about the "suspicious, unusual increase in the staffs of German Foreign Missions."

¹ Document No. 503.

² This was a report by Thomsen about a Department of State release to the press concerning the arrest of a woman clerk of the United States Embassy by German police officials in Paris (84/62193).

³ See vol. ix of this series, document No. 475 and footnote 1.

⁴ See vol. x of this series, document No. 287, footnote 3.

⁵ Not printed (84/62213-14).

By fixing a 3-day time limit we would moreover furnish the United States a desired precedent enabling the American Government and, under its leadership, all states of the Western Hemisphere quickly and easily to get rid of members of our Foreign Service engaged in "inadmissible propaganda and other subversive activity." The advocates of an interventionist policy, whose aim it is to smash our information policy and propaganda apparatus in the most important news center in the world would be given an opportunity to do so.

If, on the other hand, the *démarche* which has been ordered is to be carried out for other reasons, I should appreciate more detailed information, in order to be able to strike back in an appropriate manner against the American press campaign that is to be expected, especially information about the question submitted by telegram No. 2659 as to whether the Paris branch of the American Embassy is still being granted diplomatic immunity.⁶

THOMSEN

⁶ In a teletype sent to the Foreign Minister on Dec. 16, Ambassador Dieckhoff expressed full agreement with Thomsen's evaluation of the situation and suggested that Germany should not insist on a recall of the three members of the United States Embassy in France on too short a notice. He suggested that Thomsen be instructed to demand that the three Americans leave occupied France "without delay" which was to be understood to mean "within such a period as is necessary for making their departure, that is, a few days." (84/62234)

An instruction along these lines was sent to Washington by Weizsäcker in telegram No. 1449 of Dec. 16 (84/62236-37). In telegram No. 2744 of Dec. 17, Thomsen reported that he had carried out the instruction and that he had been assured at the Department of State of immediate compliance with the German request and was told simultaneously that Mrs. Deegan had been recalled (84/62241). In a further telegram, No. 2756 of Dec. 18, Thomsen reported having received a note from the Secretary of State informing him that "without passing upon the merits of the allegations" the Department of State had ordered the immediate transfer of the two Foreign Service Officers, Cross and Hunt. (84/62245)

Cf. Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. III, p. 586.

No. 513

132/85760-61

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, December 14, 1940—2:40 p. m.
No. 2303 of December 14 Received December 15—7:50 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

On receiving the information about the intended change of Ministers, General Antonescu expressed serious concern that this measure might be interpreted as a change in the policy of the Reich toward

Rumania or toward his person within the framework of Rumanian domestic policy.¹ He stated approximately the following: My departure from this post was a blow and its effect on him was that of a bombshell. I had been his most intimate adviser and constituted a part of him. The relationship had become stronger during that night when I had given King Carol to understand, by the remark dropped to his envoy, that the Reich attached no importance to his staying on and was looking up timetables for him.² In this way, I had participated in the abdication of the King, who without this action of mine would have established a cabinet with General Michael [*Mihail*] and would have had him, Antonescu, executed.³ And so he owed his life to me, too. But in addition to this I was considered here to be the representative of a policy that had led to his success in Berlin. He feared an unfavorable interpretation of my departure in the domestic and foreign policy of his country.

I tried to calm the General by pointing out that my being summoned to the Foreign Ministry was merely an internal action with no significance whatsoever for foreign policy, and neither was there any as regards Rumanian domestic policy. I was leaving with regret, yet with the feeling that I had contributed essentially to the reorganization of German-Rumanian relations; however, he could be certain that my successor, Freiherr von Killinger, who knew Rumania, would continue on the same course.⁴ He should give him his full confidence in the same way as he had given it to me.

In order to give greater emphasis to my assurance that there will be no change in the policy of the Reich toward General Antonescu after my departure, I should like to suggest that a direct communication confirming this be sent by the Foreign Minister to the Leader of the State.⁵

FABRICIUS

¹ Nothing more has been found in the Foreign Ministry files with respect to the background of the German decision to recall Fabricius and to appoint von Killinger Minister to Rumania. For an account of this episode based on statements given by Fabricius in 1953, see Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu* (Wiesbaden, 1954), p. 117, footnotes 39 and 40.

² See documents Nos. 17 and 19.

³ Alleged plans of King Carol to proceed against Antonescu with the help of the Chief of Staff, General Mihail, and other generals loyal to the King were described in the report by Fabricius of Sept. 11, referred to in document No. 21, footnote 1.

⁴ Cf. vol. ix of this series, document No. 346.

⁵ No such communication has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 514

3567/E023635-36

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

[No. 1919]¹

BERLIN, December 11, 1940.
Sent December 14—3:00 p. m.
zu Pol. IV 4079.²

With reference to your telegram No. 2264 of December 9.²

The reports received by the Rumanian Foreign Minister regarding the significance of Count Csáky's trip to Belgrade are based on wrong assumptions. There can be absolutely no question of Hungarian mediation between the Reich and Yugoslavia. Rather, this trip involves a purely Hungarian matter which concerns solely the Hungarian-Yugoslav relationship. However, the Hungarian Government informed us and the Italian Government in advance of its intention.

For your personal information only, I wish to remark that the Hungarian Government also apprised us of its intention of signing, on the occasion of Csáky's presence in Belgrade, a Hungarian-Yugoslav treaty of friendship drawn up in the pattern of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty of friendship.³ This treaty was not to be accorded any deeper significance.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The number is supplied from another copy of this telegram (73/52950).

² Pol. IV 4079: Document No. 480.

³ See document No. 431.

⁴ The Hungarian-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship was signed Dec. 12, 1940. For a text in French, see *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, vol. x (1940-41), pp. 876-877. For an abridged text in English, see World Peace Foundation, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. III, p. 331.

No. 515

265/172537

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 1021 of December 14

ANKARA, December 14; 1940—5:53 p. m.
Received December 14—11:30 p. m.

Numan, whom I went to see for another reason, asked me whether I had still received no instructions regarding the continuation of the political conversation. I replied evasively that my Government probably wanted to await the outcome of the Bulgarian-Turkish negotia-

tions¹ before expressing any further views. Numan said there could be no question of negotiations. Turkey had merely suggested an exchange of views on whether, considering the repeated assurances that neither Turkey nor Bulgaria had aggressive intentions, these statements could not be brought into concrete form. Turkey had indicated at the same time that a change in the preparations for mobilization in Thrace could not be considered. This was not directed against anyone and was a result of the European situation. He hoped that the Bulgarian Minister who was returning from Sofia in the next few days would bring proposals with him. The Turkish Government was especially glad about the Hungarian-Yugoslav treaty of friendship.² It considered this to be a continuation of our efforts to keep the conflict out of the Balkans. I should like to repeat the request expressed in the closing sentence of my telegram No. 992.³

PAPEN

¹ See document No. 433 and footnote 6.

² See document No. 514, footnote 4.

³ Document No. 459.

No. 516

104/112731-32

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, December 14, 1940—7:50 p. m.

No. 2735 of December 14

Received December 14—9:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 2296 of December 13.¹

1) I have from the outset represented the matter to Molotov as not being a "delay" and have strongly emphasized that on the contrary what appears to him as a "delay" is in reality not that, since the Führer generally does not receive recently arrived Chiefs of Mission until some weeks have elapsed. Under the present war conditions and in view of the absence of the Führer from Berlin, it is therefore quite impossible to speak of a delay.

2) By his remark that he intended to wait for a report from Dekanozov, Molotov undoubtedly did not mean any affront but in my opinion merely wished to express his expectation that through the conversation of the Foreign Minister with Dekanozov his anxiety would be dispelled. At the same time Molotov obviously wanted in this manner to ascertain the position of the German Government, which I did not as yet know at the time of my conversation with him.

¹ Document No. 509.

The above-mentioned anxiety of Molotov's is clearly connected with the great value which he attaches to friendly relations between our two countries and which makes him react in this manner to every little thing which in his opinion is not completely in harmony with the nature of these relations.

3) In reply to Molotov's remark that Dekanozov had hitherto been hindered from performing his functions I immediately expressed my surprise, remarking that certainly no one in Berlin would prevent Dekanozov from fulfilling his official duties. To this Molotov replied that his remark had been intended in a more formal sense, because an ambassador did not become a regular ambassador until he had presented his credentials.

4) Dekanozov's report on his conversation with the Foreign Minister has in the meantime been received here—as I have learned from Molotov's *Chef de Cabinet*—and has contributed toward removing most of the doubt that may still have existed.

5) I asked Molotov yesterday for another appointment, but owing to the pressure of his work and the fact that tomorrow is Sunday, it cannot be held until Monday at the earliest.

SCHULENBURG

No. 517

368/207431-32

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German
Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

SECRET

WIESBADEN, December 14, 1940—11:50 p. m.
No. 306 of December 15 Received December 15—12:30 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 304 of December 14¹ and to the telephone instruction of the Foreign Minister.²

At 10:30 p. m. tonight I made the following oral statement to the representative of the French Foreign Ministry: The Reich Government expects that no changes of any kind will be made in the French Government before Ambassador Abetz has talked with Marshal Pétain.

The Reich Government also expects that nothing whatever will be published about changes in the French Government which have taken place or are being planned.

¹ According to this telegram (368/207419) Stülpnagel had informed Doyen on Dec. 14 that Abetz would call on Pétain and Laval in Vichy on Dec. 16 and deliver on that occasion Hitler's reply to Pétain's letter of Dec. 13.

² No record found.

The representative of the French Foreign Ministry asked me whether the wish of the Reich Government applied also to the case of Vice-President Laval who, as it appeared from official French announcements, had resigned from his posts.

I replied that the Reich Government in issuing its instruction to the Armistice Commission doubtless also had this case in mind. For the rest, I would have to confine myself to the statement just made, and could not enter into any discussion.

The representative of the French Foreign Ministry promised immediate transmission to his Government.

HENCKE

No. 518

121/120290

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Paris

Draft Telegram

BERLIN, December 14, 1940.
zu W-Frie. 872.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 172 of December 13.²

Please keep us up to date on the subject of payment of the installments toward occupation costs³ and telegraph us in any event on Monday,⁴ 11:00 a. m., whether payment has been made.

It is intended to propose to the Foreign Minister that on Monday, at 12:00 o'clock, if payment has not been made, an official finding of a violation of the Armistice agreement shall be stated in a note to the French delegation in Wiesbaden, and that certain measures be carried out which are yet to be decided.⁵ Under consideration are, e. g., seizure of French public and private assets equivalent to the defaulted payment, or perhaps the long-intended and urgently necessary establishment of a customs occupation of the hitherto unoccupied Swiss-French border. As soon as possible please send us by telegraph your view of the matter.⁶

WIEHL

¹ W-Frie. 872: Not found.

² Not found.

³ See documents Nos. 456 and 472.

⁴ Dec. 16.

⁵ In a memorandum, also of Dec. 14 (121/120288-89),⁷ Wiehl submitted to Ribbentrop certain proposals which had been adopted in an interdepartmental meeting, but no record of a decision by Ribbentrop has been found.

⁶ No reply has been found. However, in telegram No. 256 of Dec. 17 from Wiesbaden, Hemmen reported having been informed by the Military Commander in France that the payments toward occupation costs due Nov. 30 and Dec. 12 had been made that morning (4382/E0381281).

No. 519

B14/B002443-46

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

ROME, December 14, 1940.

No. 510/40 g.

Subject: Change in the High Commands of the Italian Army and Navy.

1. The outcry against those responsible for the disastrous Greek campaign was heard here very soon after the first Italian setbacks in Greece. The principal blame, as you well know from my reports, was first placed upon the Governor of Albania, Jacomoni, and the Commanding General in Albania, General Visconti Prasca. In addition to this, however, Count Ciano, who had very closely collaborated with these two in preparing this campaign, and assumed the diplomatic responsibility for it, was from the outset regarded as the real instigator and most active advocate of the campaign against Greece. This search for those responsible reached its climax during the very days when Count Ciano went to Germany¹ for the talks with Serrano Suñer and for the signing of Rumania's accession to the Tripartite Pact.² Immediately after his return the Duce appears to have realized that something had to be done to calm down the aroused public, and there appeared in *Regime Fascista* the well-known article by State Minister Farinacci, in which he blamed the military authorities and in particular the High Command for the Greek affair.³ The criticisms which party circles level against Badoglio and Soddu are based on the fact that they failed to make utmost use of all the means in their power to counteract Count Ciano's tendency to strike immediately, and finally gave in. It is pointed out that the Marshal recorded his approval of the program in the decisive session of the War Council,⁴ and he is criticized because later, after the campaign failed, he told anyone willing to listen that he had opposed the move. Following the appearance of these personal attacks, Badoglio went to the country for a few days, but simultaneously addressed himself to the Duce demanding amends for Farinacci's attack. When this was not conceded to him he handed in his resignation, which was immediately accepted. He was once more received by Mussolini in a farewell audience concerning which only a very

¹ Nov. 18-20. See documents Nos. 352, 353 and 366.

² See Editors' Note, p. 208.

³ An unsigned memorandum in the files of the Embassy in Rome (2281/481754-69) states that Farinacci's criticisms as published in the *Regime Fascista* on Nov. 17 and Nov. 23 were mild compared to the actual mood of the people.

⁴ The reference is to the meeting of Oct. 15. Cf. document No. 191 and footnote 3.

small notice appeared in the newspapers; but in contrast to the Naval Chief, Cavagnari, who also resigned, he was dismissed without a letter from the Duce or any other token of recognition.

According to the opinion held in informed circles, a question of Badoglio's responsibility arises only in so far as he had failed to fight out the conflict between General Staff and Foreign Ministry all the way to the end, even at the price of his resignation, or, after yielding, had failed to use every effort to improve the deficient preparations as quickly and on the largest scale possible, which would have prevented so serious a military and moral setback from happening.

Farinacci's attacks on the High Command, as I have learned from a reliable source, have aroused a barely suppressed indignation in all circles involved. These criticisms have not been silenced by the appointment of General Cavallero to succeed Marshal Badoglio. Cavallero, because of his business dealings, has many opponents in the circles of the General Staff and in higher officer circles generally. He was born in 1880, was a member of the interallied delegation to Petrograd in 1917, participated at the peace negotiations in Paris in 1918, and was Under State Secretary of War from 1925 to 1928. In 1935, when president of the Ansaldo Works, he was the center of a great scandal caused by his management practices, and he had to resign from that post. As father-in-law of Governor Jacomoni, whose wife was a close personal friend of Count Ciano, he then succeeded in winning Count Ciano's confidence and in being taken into the Palazzo Chigi as military adviser. Upon Count Ciano's instance he was subsequently, in 1938, given command over the military forces in Italian East Africa, but had to give up this post only a year later upon the demand of the Duke of Aosta, Viceroy of Abyssinia, and was promoted to the rank of full general and taken back into the Foreign Ministry. It is not surprising that his generally known connection with Count Ciano and his circle of friends and the fact that he is the father-in-law of Governor Jacomoni, whose wife was a friend of Count Ciano, has given rise to unpleasant rumor mongering.

In the Palazzo Chigi it is stated, however, that Cavallero is an outstanding general who, on his appointment, immediately left for Albania to restore the situation as quickly as possible.

2. Several days ago, taking the public completely by surprise, the announcement was also made of the change in the High Command of the Italian Navy. The previous Commander in Chief, Cavagnari, and his Captain of the Fleet had resigned and were replaced by Admiral Riccardi, as commanding Admiral, with Admiral Campioni appointed as chief of his staff.

Admiral Cavagnari had long been criticized for being overly concerned with preserving the Italian Navy and in contrast with the

younger naval officers, who are pressing for attacking the enemy, risked action only with extreme caution. The well-known unfortunate episode of Taranto, where three Italian battleships were damaged, seems to have been the overriding reason for Admiral Cavaignari's resignation, which still leaves open the question whether his retirement was voluntary or in response to pressure from above. His successors, particularly the new squadron chief, Admiral Fachino, are generally looked upon favorably.

V. MACKENSEN

No. 520

B14/B002447

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Special Security Handling

ROME, December 15, 1940—1:40 p. m.

MOST URGENT

Received December 15—1:50 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 2299 of December 15

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Count Ciano, spending the evening yesterday with us on the occasion of Tschammer-Osten's visit,¹ talked to me privately with the deepest concern about the situation in North Africa. The situation is extremely serious because almost five divisions were lost. Worst of all, however, no one at the moment sees any way of effectively relieving the situation. Graziani was taken completely by surprise. He had dismissed as contradictory to the observations on the ground, which gave no hint of what was impending, all warnings about distinct indications of an imminent British offensive, which had been conveyed to him from Rome in good time.

The situation in Albania, on the other hand, gave no longer any grounds for concern inasmuch as the line had been held for the past days in the face of Greek attacks. Of course, he added, it is not impossible that fluctuations might still occur in some places. But he was sure that the present line would by and large be held, particularly since resupply of men and material is moving up satisfactorily.

MACKENSEN

¹ Hans von Tschammer und Osten, director of the sports office in the Strength through Joy organization.

No. 521

121/120292

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

SECRET

WIESBADEN, December 16, 1940—10:40 p. m.

No. 312 of December 16

Received December 16—11:45 p. m.

The Armistice Commission today sent the following telegram to the OKW:

"After his return from Vichy in the afternoon of December 16, General Doyen handed to the German liaison officer the original letter of Marshal Pétain¹ for transmission to the Führer. On this occasion General Doyen made the following statements to the German liaison officer: General Huntziger had instructed him to communicate to the German Armistice Commission the explicit statement that the reorganization of the French Government in no way represented a change of the present French policy toward Germany. The French Government continued to adhere fully to the conversations which had been conducted with General Warlimont in Paris.² Laval's resignation had purely domestic political reasons since the person of Laval was no longer acceptable to the French people for a variety of reasons. The continued presence of General Huntziger in the Government should be considered an explicit *guarantee* that the policy of cooperation represented primarily by General Huntziger was in no respect changed by the resignation of Laval. The letter follows by courier."

End of telegram.

HENCKE

¹ Document No. 510.² See documents Nos. 490 and 506.

No. 522

2141/468394-00

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, December 17, 1940—12:30 a. m.

No. 2318 of December 16

Received December 17—4:45 a. m.

With reference to our No. 2312¹ and telephone conversation.²

In today's plenary session the Soviet delegation rejected the German-Italian mediation proposal³ and fully maintained their own proposals. The statements made have the following texts:

¹ This telegram sent Dec. 16 requested instructions regarding the dissolution of the European Danube Commission and adjournment of the conference. It also raised the question whether there would be interest in acceding to the Soviet proposal of Dec. 10 provided Germany and Italy were conceded a share in management and personnel. (3941/E053677)

² No record found.³ See document No. 489 and footnote 4.

1. French translation of the statement of the Soviet delegation :

With respect to the attitude taken by the Rumanian delegation regarding the problem of the mixed Soviet-Rumanian commission for the administration of navigation on the maritime Danube, an attitude which has been clearly expressed in the statement made by the Rumanian delegation at the meeting on December 10, 1940,⁴ and also with respect to the attitude of the delegations of Germany and Italy in regard to the same problem as expressed in their statements at the meeting of the delegation chiefs on December 11, 1940, and in their joint compromise proposal presented at the same time, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to state the following: The compromise proposal of the German and Italian delegations is a repetition, though in a somewhat different form, of the proposal of the Rumanian delegation and contains nothing which could bring the position of the Rumanian delegation closer to the position of the Soviet delegation, and for this reason this compromise proposal cannot be considered as an actual compromise. The statement of the Rumanian delegation referred to earlier, as well as the compromise proposal of the German and Italian delegations are unacceptable as a matter of principle, since they ignore the fact that the Soviet Union has recovered rights as a Danubian state and they lead in the last analysis to a violation of the sovereign rights and national interests of the USSR on the Danube. The attitude taken by the Rumanian delegation is merely susceptible of bringing about the failure of the work of the conference, and the compromise proposal of the German and Italian delegations, as is plain from the foregoing, by no means eliminates this danger. In view of what has been said, the statement of the Rumanian delegation as well as the compromise proposal of the German and Italian delegations cannot be taken as a basis for an agreement regarding the regime of administration and navigation on the maritime Danube. The Soviet delegation is compelled to state that after having made great concessions, especially in regard to the most important problem of the creation of a provisional committee for the maritime Danube on condition of acceptance of the Soviet proposal concerning the Soviet-Rumanian administration, the Soviet delegation is of the opinion that its fundamental position in regard to the problem of administration and navigation on the maritime Danube is definitively fixed and must not be revised.

2. Statement of the German delegation :

The German delegation has heard the statement of the Soviet delegation with astonishment. It is of the opinion that this statement in no way does justice to the past course of the conference and the great

⁴ See document No. 489 and footnote 3.

and active willingness of the German delegation to come to an understanding on a provisional arrangement regarding the maritime Danube satisfactory for international navigation and for the rights and interests of the two riparian countries. Considering the importance that has to be accorded to the purely negative contents of the statement of the Soviet delegation, the German delegation reserves the right to inform the conference at a later plenary session of the conclusions it has drawn from the situation created by this statement, as soon as it has received the instructions of the German Government on the subject.⁵

3. Translation of the statement of the Italian delegation :

The Italian delegation, having examined the text of the statement of the Soviet delegation on the subject of the compromise proposal presented by the Italian and German delegations, has very great reservations regarding certain assertions contained in the said statement; it concurs with the statement just made by the German delegate and reserves the right to make a statement in plenary session as soon as it has received the instructions of its Government.

4. Translation of the statement of the Rumanian delegation :

The Rumanian delegation, while reserving its opinion concerning the statement of the Soviet delegation, considers it its duty to point out that the Italo-German compromise proposal of December 11, with respect to which the Rumanian delegation has not yet formulated its opinion, seems to it on certain points to be quite different from the Rumanian statement of December 10. However, at this time the Rumanian delegation expresses the hope that, while respecting the sovereign rights of Rumania and her vital interests in the Danube estuary, the conference might be in a position, particularly with the positive cooperation of the Soviet delegation, to attain for the maritime Danube a system of administration based on the principles of freedom of navigation and equality of treatment as well as real cooperation between the two riparian states provided there is agreement that such riparian states will be considered as equal and free sovereign states.

MARTIUS
FABRICIUS

⁵ See document No. 524.

No. 523

91/100475-77

The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

DUBLIN, December 17, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received December 17—7:30 p. m.

No. 825 of December 17

For the Foreign Minister or State Secretary only.

With reference to my telegram No. 801 of December 9.¹

The aggravation of de Valera's severe eye ailment, which has been kept from the public, and which required his hospitalization, has made necessary another postponement of my talk which once before had to be put off for a short time. There is said to be hope that, after being under observation for a few days, he will still resume work before Christmas provided the operation which is feared can still be avoided.

My impression, communicated in my telegram No. 801 of December 9, that de Valera would take a negative position in the arms question is based on the following development: In No. 704 of November 1, No. 717 of November 8, and No. 728 of November 11,² I reported Boland's statement that the Italian Caproni concern, which is represented by Edgar Brand, Paris, had offered to the Irish Minister in Rome—incidentally with the knowledge of the Italian Government—to deliver the arms which the Irish Government previously had ordered from Brand. In accordance with your telegram No. 395 of November 19,³ sent as a result of this, I discreetly sounded Boland as to what deliveries were wanted in particular and whether captured armament might perhaps serve the purpose. Boland told this to Walshe, and the latter informed de Valera. Walshe then brought the subject up again in a talk with me, referred to in my telegram No. 801, saying that de Valera and the Minister of Defense were happy and grateful to acknowledge the friendly attitude manifested by us but, having studied the matter, saw no possibility of shipping the weapons unnoticed to Ireland. The hazardous situation of Ireland moreover did not permit running any risk. If the English were to learn of the shipment, they would seize with both hands the welcome opportunity to assert the existence of a German-Irish plot; and, what was particularly dangerous, this would gravely jeopardize the freedom

¹ Not printed (91/100467).

² None found.

³ Not found.

of movement secured in consideration of Ireland's neutrality by the vigorous efforts of the Irish-American community in the United States. The Irish Government therefore had no other recourse at this time but to abandon acquisition of arms until a British attack, which was unlikely for the time being, had become a fact. Walshe made it quite evident, however, that Ireland would ask for German aid if such an eventuality arose. Within the framework of the instructions transmitted in telegrams Nos. 402⁴ and 422,⁵ received since, I intimated to him, without going into details, our readiness to extend assistance, which he has once more conveyed to de Valera.

HEMPEL

⁴ Document No. 407.

⁵ Document No. 455.

No. 524

2141/468392-93

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, December 17, 1940.

No. [1943]²

zu W XII 7745.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 2318 of December 16.³

1. According to the statements made, the Russian and the Rumanian positions on the question of administration of and navigation on the maritime Danube seem irreconcilable, and the conference's possibilities for negotiation seem for the present exhausted. In these circumstances it is desired that the German delegation return here temporarily to examine the situation and obtain new instructions. We accordingly consider it expedient to adjourn the conference to a date to be fixed after the forthcoming holidays.

2. Dissolution of the European Danube Commission, which has become incapable of doing its job, should also, in our opinion, be carried out as soon as possible. It seems advisable not to discuss this subject at the conference any more before adjournment, in order not to prejudge [the result of] the examination here. The matter can, however, be pushed through diplomatic channels even during adjournment.

3. Should the proposed adjournment come about, the press release should mention merely interruption of the conference in view of the

¹ W XII 7745: Not found.

² The telegram number is deduced from a reference in Bucharest telegram No. 2339 of Dec. 19 (2141/468389).

³ Document No. 522.

forthcoming holidays. The press release will have to be approved here prior to final agreement on its text.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ Martius reported on Dec. 20 that at the plenary session it was agreed to adjourn the conference until the second half of January and that a communiqué would be published in the Bucharest press on Dec. 21 (Bucharest telegrams Nos. 2353 and 2354 of Dec. 20: 711/262133-34). See, further, document No. 575.

No. 525

B19/B003918

The State Secretary to the Minister in Finland

Telegram

No. 737

BERLIN, December 17, 1940.

zu Pol. VI 3902 g.;

3912 g.;

3913 g.;

3914 g.;

3915 g.¹ Ang I.

Drafting Officer: Minister von Grundherr.

For the Minister.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 773,² 774,³ 775.⁴

In the given circumstances and since Ryti has recently shown much understanding for German interests, especially in economic questions, the election of Ryti is preferable from the German point of view to the election of some weak compromise candidate or of Paasikivi.⁵ German advice that the Finns should hold fast to a candidate opposed by the Russians is out of the question.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Copies of documents containing these registry numbers have not been found.

² See document No. 491, footnote 1.

³ Document No. 491.

⁴ Not printed (B19/B003909).

⁵ In telegram No. 795 of Dec. 18 (B19/B003927) Blücher reported that Ryti had mustered support assuring him a majority in the election the next day. The Foreign Minister's word that Ryti's candidacy was approved in Berlin was said to have been a decisive factor.

No. 526

121/120297

Consul General Schleier to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1547 of December 17

PARIS, December 18, 1940—1:05 a. m.

Received December 18—1:25 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1613 of December 16.¹

In the matter of the deportation of Alsations,² the Embassy has made no concrete statements so far, because it seemed advisable, in view of the present unsettled political situation, not to bring up the subject with the French. We have before us however a teletype message of December 13 from the Einsatzgruppe Strasbourg of the Security Service to the headquarters of the Security Service Einsatz Paris, the text of which follows:

“Subject: Deportation of Alsations.

1. Evacuation has been ordered by the Führer and is a necessity. The Reichsstatthalter³ has given instructions to complete the evacuation by Christmas at the latest. Gruppenführer Heydrich was urgently notified and saw no objections.

2. The preparations for the evacuation are completed. The number of those to be evacuated is small and is totally insignificant as compared with the mass expulsions in Lorraine.⁴

3. The situation in Alsace urgently requires that those subject to evacuation be expelled now because these [individuals] have naturally caused a considerable tension. This tension must be eased for political reasons.

4. The trains required for the purposes of evacuation have been authorized by the Reich Main Security Office.

5. No order to stop the evacuation has been received. All that the German authorities in Paris can do is to state to the French that the evacuations from Alsace to France will be completed by Christmas. Dr. Scheel, SS-Oberführer.”

SCHLEIER

¹ Not found.

² In telegram No. 299 of Dec. 13 from Wiesbaden, Hencke had reported reception of a note from the French delegation stating that deportations from Alsace and Lorraine into unoccupied France had been under way since Dec. 1 without prior notification of French authorities (368/207409). For the text of the French note, see *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. III, p. 223.

³ Josef Bürckel.

⁴ See document No. 271.

No. 527

174/136493-94

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Tokyo, December 18, 1940—7:30 a. m.

No. 1413 of December 18

Received December 18—5:55 p. m.

The Foreign Minister has told me the following particulars regarding the political situation:

1. The political negotiations with Russia have come to a standstill. Ambassador Tatekawa has been instructed to wait quietly in order not to compromise tactically Japan's readiness to negotiate, and on the other hand not to make the atmosphere more difficult. As a particular question, Japan has just proposed a renewal of the fisheries agreement, if possible for several years. The Foreign Minister expects to obtain the usual prolongation for 1 year. He would direct the press to observe restraint in view of the resurgence of attacks on Russia in the last few days, inspired by the circles working against the Tripartite Pact who are attempting to profit from the vast disappointment over Russia.

The Foreign Minister considers that the reports of a Russian loan to Chiang Kai-shek are incorrect. On the contrary, he has the impression that Russia is demanding a share of the American loan¹ from Chiang Kai-shek in order to obtain payment of arrears owed for Russian deliveries.

2. The confidential negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek have been broken off by both sides for the time being; for Chiang Kai-shek had his hands tied by the loans from America and England. The Foreign Minister expects a resumption of the negotiations in about 2 months, but again stressed his regret that Chiang Kai-shek had not, by accepting certain concrete conditions, made it possible for him to postpone recognition of Wang Ching-wei.²

3. The Vichy Government has welcomed in principle the Japanese offer to mediate between Thailand and Indochina,³ but reserved taking a definitive stand. The Foreign Minister has again asked Vichy for a definitive stand. He intends to exercise a moderating influence upon Thailand with respect to her territorial demands.

¹ A statement by President Roosevelt was released on Nov. 30 announcing that the United States Government was considering granting China a loan amounting to one million dollars. For the text, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. III, p. 521.

² See document No. 347 and footnote 3.

³ See document No. 484.

The native disturbances are inconvenient to Japan and she is very much interested in a peaceful settlement between Thailand and Indochina.

OTT

No. 528

121/120303

The Director of the Political Department to the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission

Teletype en clair

URGENT
No. 346

BERLIN, December 18, 1940.
e. o. Pol. II 4136.

For Minister Hencke.

With reference to your telegram No. 303 of December 14.¹

Ambassador Abetz has received the following instruction as a result of your telegram of December 14 regarding the move of Marshal Pétain on December 17 [sic]:²

"In view of possible French attempts to confront us with a fait accompli the Foreign Minister points out that the move of Marshal Pétain to Versailles is not an acute question at this time."

End of instruction to Ambassador Abetz.³

OKW (Captain Bürkner) was informed of this today. He was told in addition that a written reply to the note was consequently out of the question at the moment, but that General Doyen might be told orally that the matter could not be pursued in the Armistice Commission.⁴

WOERMANN

¹ This telegram (121/120281-82) transmitted the text of a note which Doyen sent to Stülpnagel on Dec. 12 requesting that measures be taken to enable Pétain to move to Versailles on Dec. 19; Pétain was to have been accompanied by the necessary officials and by units of the *gardes mobiles* and gendarmerie.

Hencke added the information that the note, according to Abetz, had resulted from a misinterpretation by people in Vichy of a conversation between Abetz and de Brinon; Pétain would instruct Doyen to withdraw the note as it was based on an error. So far, however, the note had not been withdrawn and the Armistice Commission would therefore ask the OKW for instructions regarding a reply to the French note.

² The telegram of Dec. 14 gave Dec. 19 as the date of the proposed move. See footnote 1.

³ Sent over the signature of Altenburg as telegram No. 1637 of Dec. 17; dispatched Dec. 18, 2:40 p. m. (121/120294).

⁴ A reply to this effect had already been given to the French by Stülpnagel on Dec. 15 (Hencke telegram No. 310 of Dec. 15 from Wiesbaden: 368/207424).

No. 529

121/120298

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, December 18, 1940.

Counselor of Embassy Zamboni gave me the following information from a report of the Italian Ambassador in Washington:¹

While the Americans maintained a very cool attitude toward France during the first 5 months following that country's defeat, they are now pursuing the opposite policy of a rapprochement with the Pétain Government. It was the mission of the new Ambassador, Leahy, to encourage and support France's will to resist Germany. In addition, the Embassy in Vichy had the task of coordinating and supplementing the efforts to obtain information of a military nature from the Mediterranean area. The new Counselor of Embassy, Murphy, was supposed to proceed to Vichy via Morocco, in order to establish contact with Weygand, who was considered the chief opponent of Laval's policy of rapprochement with Germany.²

WOERMANN

¹ Ascanio dei principi Colonna.

² Murphy's movements from Vichy to Algiers and Dakar were reported in Wiesbaden telegrams Nos. 276 of Dec. 22 and 279 of Dec. 23 (121/120332-33). Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. II, pp. 622-623, 627-628, 632, 635, and 636.

See, further, document No. 561.

No. 530

121/120304-08

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Teletype

MOST URGENT

PARIS, December 18, 1940.

SECRET

No. 1550

For the Foreign Minister through Dr. Schwarzmann.

As a result of our conversation yesterday in Vichy¹ and yesterday's session of the French Council of Ministers, Marshal Pétain handed me a letter for the Führer, the original of which will reach Berlin by courier tomorrow evening. The text of it in German translation reads as follows:

"Herr Reich Chancellor: I had the honor today to receive your Ambassador, Herr Abetz, who made the following proposals on your behalf:

¹ See document No. 517, footnote 1. Abetz was in Vichy Dec. 16 and 17 and returned to Paris during the night of Dec. 17 to 18 whence he made a preliminary report to Berlin by telephone (Schwarzmann note of Dec. 18: 121/120299).

"1) Appointment of M. Pierre Etienne Flandin as Minister of Foreign Affairs and appointment of M. Pierre Laval as Minister of Interior.

"2) Replacement of M. Caziot by M. Achard in the Ministry of Agriculture and of M. Bélin by M. Froideval in the Ministry of Production.²

"3) In order that it may be possible to continue the policy of collaboration, replacement of the Vice Presidency of the Council of Ministers by a sort of directorate, consisting of Admiral Darlan, General Huntziger, M. Pierre Etienne Flandin, and M. Pierre Laval.

"4) Recall of General de La Laurencie and his replacement by M. de Brinon.³

"Ambassador Abetz added that the French Government was free to make any decision, but that if these various points should not be accepted, Your Excellency could not guarantee that cooperation would be maintained.

"I examined these various points and then submitted them to the Council of Ministers.

"With regard to the Foreign Ministry there is no problem and I can only be gratified at the complete approval which you gave to my choice.⁴

"As for M. Pierre Laval, I explained to my collaborators, as I had already done this morning to your representative, that my dignity and my authority would be seriously compromised if I should immediately take M. Laval back into the Government.

"I have hesitated for a long time to separate myself from him, for I can appreciate at its true value the role he played in the preparation and the beginnings of Franco-German collaboration. But our differences of opinion regarding the operations of the machinery of government and the methods to be used for cleaning up the administration and the country made inevitable a crisis which showed the impossibility of retaining him as my chief collaborator.

"This crisis came to a head on December 13—a date which to my keen regret coincided with that on which Your Excellency had decided to make a gesture of friendship and good will toward France.

"I am now resolved, Herr Reich Chancellor, to institute immediately a thorough investigation into the actual merit of the complaints which led me to part with M. Pierre Laval.

"If the results of this investigation should indicate to me that I had been deceived by certain outward appearances, I shall not fail to comply with your wish and take M. Pierre Laval back into the Government.

² On Nov. 2 Abetz had reported that Caziot and Bélin had publicly taken a negative attitude toward German-French cooperation and that they had warned French labor unions and farm leaders against close relations with the German Embassy in Paris (telegram No. 1069: 121/120121).

³ A Foreign Ministry memorandum of Dec. 16 (368/207433-34) contained a paragraph stating that the recall of General de La Laurencie had been demanded by Abetz, who had acted at the behest of the Military Commander in France, as well as in his own capacity. The outward reason being given for the demand was the fact that Laurencie had arbitrarily ordered the arrest of Déat, editor-in-chief of *L'Oeuvre*. The real reason was Laurencie's recent attitude of opposition, as contrasted with the efforts of Laval.

⁴ See document No. 510.

"At the same time I intend, without delay, to investigate the intrigues with which M. Peyrouton, M. Caziot, and M. Bélin are charged by Ambassador Abetz.

"If the investigations should bring to light certain acts or attitudes that are contrary to the spirit of cooperation which animates me and which must animate all my ministers, you may be assured that I will immediately appoint new men to the posts held by the persons mentioned earlier.

"I am happy to be able to express my complete agreement on the replacement of the Vice Presidency of the Council of Ministers by a sort of directorate, the composition of which would be that proposed to me, if the investigation which I am instituting with respect to M. Pierre Laval should permit me to take him back into the Government.

"Finally, as regards the functions of the representative of my Government in Paris, I am terminating the commission of General de La Laurencie. Ambassador de Brinon will, in accordance with the wish you have expressed, be accredited with the occupation authorities.

"I should like, Herr Reich Chancellor, to express the wish that the difficulties explained by Ambassador Abetz this morning, which I am resolved to eliminate, may not cause the slightest doubt in your mind as to my firm determination to continue, in the spirit of our conversation at Montoire, the cooperation agreed upon between our two countries.

"At the same time I ask you not to doubt that all my collaborators share this view.

"Accept, Herr Reich Chancellor, the assurances of my highest consideration. Philippe Pétain."

With reference to the text above it is to be noted that it has been arranged with Marshal Pétain, in the presence of German and French witnesses, that the investigations of Laval, Peyrouton, Caziot, and Bélin are only a formality designed to make it appear to his own Cabinet and to the public that the Cabinet changes demanded by us are being made by the Marshal of his own accord, on the basis of subsequent better information.

I opposed very sharply the French attempt to ascribe only domestic political significance to the occurrences in Vichy during the night of December 13. In order that I may prevent any further evasive maneuver by the French, I request authority to close the line of demarcation to all members of the French Government until a report has been received that the Cabinet change has been carried out.

Ambassador de Brinon states that by direction of Marshal Pétain he succeeded to the position of General de La Laurencie today, Wednesday, December 18, at 5:00 p. m.

A report on the background of the crisis, details of the discussions held, and general evaluation of the situation will follow.⁵

ABETZ

⁵ See document No. 531.

No. 531

121/120309-19

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*Telegram¹

MOST URGENT

PARIS, December 18, 1940.

No. 1556 of December 18

Received December 18—7:10 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

1) Background of the French governmental crisis.

The events of December 13 are represented to us by Vichy as a purely domestic political matter. There is no doubt that internal political motives are involved, because Laval, the constitutionally designated successor of Pétain, was very objectionable to the Army, Church, and big business circles. These circles knew very well that he would never countenance carrying out their reactionary program. The immediate occasion for carrying out the plan to remove Laval, which had already been entertained for several days, was the mendacious assertion made to Marshal Pétain that Laval, together with the German occupying power, intended to lure Pétain to Paris for the ceremonial burial of the mortal remains of the Duke of Reichstadt in order to extort from him there the appointment of Laval as premier and the restriction of Pétain to the function of a chief of state in the manner of the former French presidents. Pétain's apprehensions regarding a German objection were dispelled by the proposal to appoint Flandin, who was also known to the Germans as a supporter of a policy of cooperation. The assertion that the intended reconstruction of the Government involved no change whatever in German-French policy is, however, a lie. Pétain himself has told third persons that Laval was not acceptable to foreign governments, by which he can have meant only the Anglo-Saxon governments. The instruction given by Laval to la Baume in Bern and Pietri in Madrid not to enter into any negotiations whatever with diplomatic representatives of England has been condemned by the French Council of Ministers and the way has been paved for a semiofficial contact with the English Government as a preparation for official contact. Laval's vigorous insistence on the removal of Weygand and on taking active steps against de Gaulle and the English in Africa was disapproved by the civilian members of the Cabinet and an attitude of waiting was recommended. The appointment of Flandin to the Foreign Ministry was designed not only to reassure Germany but also to pave the way for neutral relations with England.

¹ Sent by closed circuit coded teletype.

2) The events of the night of December 13: De Brinon gave Marshal Pétain the Führer's letter² at 1:00 p. m. on December 13 and offered him the opportunity to come to Paris to attend the ceremonies of burying the coffin of the Duke of Reichstadt. Marshal Pétain asked Brinon to come again at 3:00 p. m. with Laval to discuss this matter. After Laval had told the Marshal on this occasion, in support of Brinon's suggestion, that a trip to Paris by the Marshal seemed to him advisable, Pétain said that he agreed and merely wished to use the opportunity to visit some cities in the occupied territory on his return trip. Continuation follows.

This was told to us by Brinon at 3:30 p. m. by telephone. Upon inquiry in Berlin, Brinon was given an affirmative reply. During the discussion Pétain was perfectly friendly toward Laval. At 3:45 Laval presided at a Cabinet meeting, which likewise went off normally and at which a reply by Pétain to the Führer's letter was read and approved—the text corresponded to the first half of the letter transmitted to Wiesbaden in the evening³—and it was over about 4:30 p. m. At 4:50, Laval was informed that at 5:00 o'clock there would be a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Marshal Pétain demanded the resignation of all ministers without any further explanation and then stated that he accepted the resignations of Laval and the Minister of Education, Ripert. To the request of Laval for an explanation of this decision Pétain replied that Laval no longer had his confidence; he was going to Paris too often and he, Pétain, did not know what he did there, and he was moreover unpopular. When Laval referred to Constitutional Law No. 4,⁴ Pétain replied that this law had been invalidated by him. However, he still wanted to shake Laval's hand. Laval thereupon went to his office without making any further replies and informed Brinon of his dismissal. At 6:30 p. m. Laval heard from an American journalist⁵ that his chauffeur had been arrested. A telephone call to Peyrouton, who was "not at home," was answered evasively by his *Chef de Cabinet*. From 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on, a considerable number of members of the special political police created by Peyrouton, which is composed mainly of former Cagou-lards, were already beginning to appear in the lobby of the hotel and in the halls of the various floors. Toward 9:00 o'clock in the evening Brinon was asked to leave Laval's room and go to his own hotel room. He was forbidden to leave the room. Laval was informed by the

² See document No. 510, footnote 2.

³ Document No. 510.

⁴ This law of July 12 had designated Laval as Pétain's successor in the event that the latter should be prevented, prior to ratification of a new constitution, from performing the functions of Chief of State. For the text, see *Journal Officiel: Lois et Décrets*, 1940, No. 169, p. 4521.

⁵ Ralph Heinzen, United Press representative in France. Cf. *The Unpublished Diary of Pierre Laval* (London, 1948), p. 84.

chief of the *Sûreté* that an order had been given to take him to his estate at Chateldon and keep him there under surveillance. Laval too was forbidden to leave the house. Brinon remained under arrest until I called the Hotel du Parc toward 11:00 o'clock in the morning of the 14th; Laval's arrest was ended only at my intervention during my first conference with Pétain at 11:30 a. m. on the 17th.

III. The conversations in Vichy. On the forenoon of December 16, when the trip to Vichy was to be made, Admiral Darlan called on me and informed me in the name of the French Government that a rescinding of Laval's dismissal would result in the immediate resignation of Marshal Pétain and suggested that I postpone my trip, which presumably was for the purpose of reinstating Laval. A *démarche* to the same effect was made by the French Air Force Major, Stehlin, with the German Air Force General, Hanesse, obviously for the purpose of bringing about intervention by the military authorities. I replied that I would still start the trip, accompanied by 10 other persons, on December 16 and asked that formalities of a reception be dispensed with. After crossing the demarcation line, where General Huntziger, the Chief of Protocol, Minister Loze, the head of the civilian Cabinet of Marshal Pétain, du Moulin De Labarthète, and the head of the military Cabinet, General Laure, had come to welcome me, I arrived at Vichy toward 9:00 p. m. with an escort detachment of 10 heavily armed SS officers—not members of the Wehrmacht—and took a hotel floor with them. Since the French Government representatives expressed astonishment at the escort, I replied that the band of criminals which the French Minister of Interior had provided for himself as special police and on which the French Government was trying to shift the responsibility for the arrests of December 13, justified these security measures. During the night I had conversations with officers of Pétain's personal entourage, Senator Portmann, and Flandin, who was in bed on account of alleged illness. The language adopted by the French was the same as in the morning in Paris. German intervention in favor of Laval would inevitably lead to Pétain's resignation, and the reconstruction of the Cabinet had only a domestic political significance. Flandin personally regretted that his entry into the Cabinet had taken place in circumstances which had not been known to him previously, but said that he could no longer withdraw. On the morning of December 17, at 10:00 o'clock, I had my first conversation with Marshal Pétain in the Pavillon de Sévigné, where an honor guard with a band had been drawn up to welcome me. The conference was attended by Counselor of Legation Achenbach and Admiral Darlan, in addition to Pétain and myself. In accordance with instructions, I presented to Marshal Pétain our demands for a reconstruction of the Government and informed him that

the Führer considered the conduct of the French Government toward Laval a personal affront. Germany did not want to impair the French Government's freedom of action in any way, but in case of a French refusal would not continue the policy of cooperation which had been made possible by a generous gesture of the Führer's in Montoire. Pétain replied that his decision to remove Laval was irrevocable. If Germany insisted on the reinstatement of Laval, he would have to resign in order not to become the laughingstock of the country. Darlan stated that in the event of Pétain's resignation he would also have to resign. I then arose and asked Marshal Pétain to excuse me from the luncheon arranged in my honor and to permit me to take leave of him. Pétain thereupon urged me to discuss the German demands with him nevertheless once more, most of which were, after all, acceptable to him. The same scene was repeated five times during the conversation. I told Pétain that I had sufficient proof that almost all of his personal entourage and his Cabinet were hypocritical in their assurances of a policy of cooperation with Germany and that it was a very good thing that these gentlemen had now thrown off their masks; for the coincidence with the military setbacks of the Italians in the Mediterranean was after all obvious. As soon as the utter insignificance of the Albanian and Libyan theaters of war had become apparent, however, and England had taken the blows that awaited her, all of these gentlemen would with their usual sincerity again profess their cordial feelings for Laval. France had obviously forgotten completely about the existence of the German Army because, since last winter, it had not been in evidence for a few months. The action of December 12 [13] was a crime against France. If, however, an attempt was now made to assert that Laval was unacceptable from the point of view of domestic politics, the obvious answer was that he was the only minister in the entire Cabinet who was close to his people. If it were not for the presence of the German Wehrmacht in France, the French Government would be swept away in a few hours by the indignation of the people. The esteem in which Marshal Pétain was held among the masses was based not least on the fact that he had proclaimed the policy of cooperation for which the common people were undeniably prepared. Moreover, the sense of loyalty was very pronounced in any healthy people and therefore, presumably, in the Marshal's opinion also among the French. How were the French people supposed to react to the fact that the man who single-handedly put the present French Government in the saddle was treated by it in this manner, and how could Germany have confidence in the loyalty and gratitude of France for the historically unique accommodating attitude shown at Montoire? I could not conceal my astonishment over the fact that I had been in Vichy several hours

and Laval was still under arrest. Pétain thereupon pretended that he had not been informed about the arrest of Laval any more than about the arrest of de Brinon and gave an order for immediate release. At this point in the conversation Pétain said that as regards the question of Laval's return to the Cabinet, Laval himself would also have to be heard. I welcomed this idea, whereupon Pétain had Laval called to Vichy immediately. The conversation between Laval and Pétain was very brief, since Laval insisted on first seeing me alone. The conversation with Laval took place in an adjoining room of the Pavillon de Sévigné. Laval told me about the circumstances of his arrest and expressed his indignation in the strongest terms. He stated as far as the majority of the Cabinet ministers were concerned loyal carrying out of the policy of cooperation was impossible and a radical change was imperative. After this conversation we returned together to Marshal Pétain, who had used the intervening time to compose the draft of a letter to the Führer. In this draft he stated that he was willing, after a certain time had elapsed, to put Laval at the head of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Labor. I replied that this letter was tantamount to a rejection of our demand and said that I would leave immediately. This led to a very lively scene between Laval and Pétain, in which Laval accused Pétain of insincerity and double-dealing with England. Pétain remained noncommittal and urged me to stay for lunch, since he intended to submit the problems for decision to a meeting of the Council of Ministers called for 3:00 p. m. I agreed to this. While the Council of Ministers was in session I visited Laval at his estate in Chateldon and left two SS officers with him as personal guards after my departure, since after the *gardes mobiles* guarding him had been withdrawn there was reason to fear an attempt at assassination. After my return from Chateldon I was again received by Marshal Pétain, who showed me the new letter to the Führer which had been approved by the [Council of] Minister[s].⁶ He stated in the presence of Counselor of Legation Achenbach, General Laure, and Admiral Darlan that the letter contained the acceptance of our proposals. He had made compliance with our wishes conditional upon the carrying out of investigations of Laval, Peyrouton, Caziot, and Bélin merely for the purpose of being able to make it appear to his Cabinet and to the public that in reappointing Laval and dismissing the ministers objected to he was acting on his own initiative. I said that I could not judge whether this letter would satisfy the Führer, but I was willing

⁶ The original here reads "Minister" which is obviously a typographical error for "Ministerrat". Cf. the copy of this document in French translation published in *Pétain et les allemands: Mémorandum d'Abetz sur les rapports franco-allemands*, pp. 44-54.

to transmit it.⁷ In any case the investigations would have to be carried out as soon as possible and lead to the result that we wanted, and Laval and de Brinon would have to receive satisfaction in every way. Since in spite of my objection press and radio announcements of the dismissal of Laval had been made on the morning of December 14, because they allegedly could not be held up in time, I demanded the immediate issuance of a communiqué stating that Marshal Pétain had received Laval for a long conference, in order to prove to the public that reparation of the injustice committed was being prepared. As for de Brinon, I demanded that he be appointed immediately to take the place of de La Laurencie. The Marshal promised to take the necessary action with respect to de Brinon and also to order the desired communiqué on his conference with Laval. Pending the conclusion of the investigation he expected that Laval would refrain from political activity and would take up residence in unoccupied France. I replied that Laval had told me of his own accord that he would not undertake anything for the time being, but would await in Paris the Marshal's announcement of his reinstatement in the Cabinet. The Marshal and General Laure appeared to be very much taken aback by this disclosure but accepted it in silence. I further suggested a number of stylistic changes in the Marshal's letter to the Führer, which were inserted while we were eating supper together. At midnight I, together with Laval, whose car had joined our motor column as a precautionary measure, crossed the demarcation line. The Chief of Protocol, Loze, General Laure, the head of the civilian Cabinet, du Moulin De Labarthète, and a unit of motorcyclists of the Marshal had accompanied us that far.

III. Evaluation of the total situation.

In order to understand the events of December 13, it is necessary to consider the atmosphere in Vichy, where several hundred statesmen, politicians, military men, journalists, and foreign diplomats have been living for months, some of them with their wives, in a few crowded hotels, carrying on intrigues. These people always see the same persons and easily build a dream world which clouds their view of actual power relations and actual happenings in the world at large. In this constricted area rumors purposely disseminated by English agents may create a veritable psychosis, as was the case at the end of last week with the false reports of a popular revolt in Italy and of an assassination of the Duce. One of the charges made against Laval is that of having conceded to the Germans in Paris that he could send several divisions to Italy through southern France in order to protect the Duce. In this atmosphere lives the old Marshal, who is becoming more and more vacillating in his decisions and who, unfor-

⁷ See document No. 530.

unately, is almost exclusively surrounded by persons who only flatter him and are carrying on in his name a policy designed to assure their personal position. After the collapse of France in June the deputies could have called the generals to account fully as much as the generals did the deputies; for from the military point of view it was an irresponsible act to draw the French nation into the war. The guilty generals have not, however, drawn the necessary conclusions from this but are trying to set up a military dictatorship through the prestige of the victor of Verdun, with most willing aid from the Church. A secret report of the *Action Française* which came into our possession shows that it is the driving force behind the scenes and regards the overwhelming majority of the ministers and the entire entourage of the Marshal as its own people. The tendency of the *Action Française* is anti-Semitic, anti-Masonic, and to a certain degree also anti-English. Stronger than all these motives, however, is its traditional hatred of the Germans; and it is only interested in filling all the key positions in the Government, in the administrative organs, and in education with persons who will make France ready as soon as possible for military resistance against Germany. The outward approval of the policy of cooperation is merely designed to deceive us and make us believe that it is a question of a movement of national revival such as Fascism or National Socialism. In reality, however, the *Action Française* has no roots in the French people and no prospect of taking root. During the decades of its existence it has been able to win only a limited stratum of intellectuals and sons of the rich bourgeoisie, in addition to the officer corps. The mass of the people in the occupied and the unoccupied territory watched the government policy of the *Action Française* with increasing indignation and are especially angry at the daily growing influence of the Jesuits. Unless organizations are established which combine the traditional anticlerical and liberal sentiment of the French people with a modern social ideal, it is to be feared that the Communists will capture the opposition currents and that France will some day face Bolshevik disturbances of the worst kind. It is therefore in our interest to give the members of the former Chambers who are close to the people and open to new ideas a greater role in shaping the future French state. Laval is the man who in the name of all constructive forces of the Parliament concluded the pact with the Marshal on the basis of which Pétain was able to assume the absolute position of Chief of State. The dismissal of Laval was a breach of faith on the part of the Marshal with these forces in Parliament. The *Action Française* therefore acted consistently when it had Laval arrested and tried at all costs to prevent his journey to occupied France, for the presence of Laval in Paris enables us to exert very effective internal

political pressure, in addition to military pressures. We must insist on Laval's being officially reinstated at once in his new government posts.⁸

B. It would be well, however, if he did not exercise his functions immediately and first assured himself of a political following in occupied and unoccupied France. Above all, he must create a police force devoted to him and enforce a purge from the Vichy police of the reactionary elements that are now predominant. The only authoritative military man in the Vichy Government who is sufficiently farsighted politically to see the necessity of such a domestic policy is the fleet Commander, Admiral Darlan. He is at the same time the only one who has qualities of leadership. During the critical days of the Armistice not a single ship sided with de Gaulle. Like Laval, he is an honest hater of England and is therefore resolved on close cooperation with Germany, considering it not as a temporary tactic but as a European necessity. Darlan should therefore take over the direction of the original directorate and later replace Pétain as Chief of State, while Laval would be in his right position as French Premier. Some of the *Action Française* are doing temporarily useful work despite their hostility to Germany, because as traditional opponents of the Jews and Freemasons they are proceeding more ruthlessly with the necessary purges than do the elements previously associated with the Left. After the work of mopping up has been completed, however, they too should be eliminated, because they would then only be a liability in the relationship with Germany. In conclusion it may be said of the government crisis created on December 13 that⁹ it permits us to intervene directly in French domestic politics. For that purpose all the means of exerting pressure available to the German occupying power in Paris and the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden must be used ruthlessly during the coming weeks in order to make plain to the gamblers of December 13 the indescribable folly which they have committed.

ABETZ

⁸ On Dec. 20, Laval addressed a letter to Hitler stating that his release from arrest was due to Hitler and assuring the latter that the policy of cooperation had the approval of a large majority of Frenchmen. See, *Pétain et les allemands: Mémoire d'Abetz sur les rapports franco-allemands*, pp. 54-55.

No copy of this letter has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry.

⁹ This passage is somewhat garbled in the original. The words "dass sie uns" translated here are followed by "weil sie uns" which is obviously an error or an omission.

No. 532

8589/E602785-93

*Führer's Directive*¹

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, December 18, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I) No. 33 408/40 g.K.Chefs
By officer only

DIRECTIVE NO. 21: OPERATION BARBAROSSA

The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to *crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign* (Operation *Barbarossa*) even before the conclusion of the war against England.

For this purpose the *Army* will have to employ all available units, with the reservation that the occupied territories must be secured against surprises.

For the *Luftwaffe* it will be a matter of releasing such strong forces for the eastern campaign in support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations can be counted on and that damage to eastern German territory by enemy air attacks will be as slight as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the requirement that the entire combat and armament area dominated by us must remain adequately protected against enemy air attacks and that the offensive operations against England, particularly her supply lines, must not be permitted to break down.

The main effort of the *Navy* will remain unequivocally directed against England even during an eastern campaign.

I shall order the *concentration* against Soviet Russia possibly 8 weeks before the intended beginning of operations.

Preparations requiring more time to get under way are to be started now—if this has not yet been done—and are to be completed by May 15, 1941.

It is of decisive importance, however, that the intention to attack does not become discernible.

The preparations of the High Commands are to be made on the following basis:

¹ The text here printed is from the file of the Naval War Staff. This is the text as issued on Dec. 18. It was signed by Hitler and was initialed by various officers of the Naval War Staff on Dec. 19 and 20.

Although also bearing the date Dec. 18, the text printed as document No. 446-PS in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxvi, pp. 47-52, which is from the file of the OKW, contains two paragraphs in the version in which they were amended on Mar. 22, 1941. These paragraphs are: II, 2, and the seventh and eighth paragraphs under III, A. See vol. xii of this series, directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht of that date.

I. *General Purpose:*

The mass of the Russian *Army* in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented.

In quick pursuit a line is then to be reached from which the Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack the territory of the German Reich. The ultimate objective of the operation is to establish a cover against Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangel. Then, in case of necessity, the last industrial area left to Russia in the Urals can be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian *Baltic Sea Fleet* will quickly lose its bases and thus will no longer be able to fight.

Effective intervention by the Russian *Air Force* is to be prevented by powerful blows at the very beginning of the operation.

II. *Probable Allies and their Tasks:*

1. On the wings of our operation the active participation of *Rumania* and *Finland* in the war against Soviet Russia is to be expected.

The High Command will in due time arrange and determine in what form the armed forces of the two countries will be placed under German command at the time of their intervention.

2. It will be the task of *Rumania* to support with selected forces the attack of the German southern wing, at least in its beginnings; to pin the enemy down where German forces are not committed; and otherwise to render auxiliary service in the rear area.

3. *Finland* will cover the concentration of the German *North Group* (parts of the XXI Group) withdrawn from Norway and will operate jointly with it. Besides, Finland will be assigned the task of eliminating Hangö.

4. It may be expected that *Swedish* railroads and highways will be available for the concentration of the German North Group, from the start of operations at the latest.

III. *Direction of Operations:*

A. *Army* (hereby approving the plans presented to me):

In the zone of operations divided by the Pripet Marshes into a southern and northern sector, the main effort will be made *north* of this area. Two Army Groups will be provided here.

The southern group of these two Army Groups—the center of the entire front—will be given the task of annihilating the forces of the enemy in White Russia by advancing from the region around and north of Warsaw with especially strong armored and motorized units. The possibility of switching strong mobile units to the north must thereby be created in order, in cooperation with the Northern Army Group operating from East Prussia in the general direction of

Leningrad, to annihilate the enemy forces fighting in the Baltic area. Only after having accomplished this most important task, which must be followed by the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, are the offensive operations aimed at the occupation of the important traffic and armament center of Moscow to be pursued.

Only a surprisingly fast collapse of Russian resistance could justify aiming at both objectives simultaneously.

The most important assignment of the XXI Group, even during the eastern operations, will still be the protection of Norway. The additional forces available are to be employed in the north (mountain corps), first to protect the Petsamo region and its ore mines as well as the Arctic Highway, and then to advance jointly with Finnish forces against the Murmansk railroad and stop the supply of the Murmansk region by land.

Whether such an operation with *rather strong* German forces (two or three divisions) can be conducted from the area of and south of Rovaniemi depends upon Sweden's willingness to make the railroads available for such a concentration.

The main body of the Finnish Army will be assigned the task, in coordination with the advance of the German northern wing, of pinning down as strong Russian forces as possible by attacking west of or on both sides of Lake Ladoga, and of seizing Hangö.

By converging operations with strong wings, the Army Group committed *south* of the Pripet Marshes is to aim at the complete destruction west of the Dnieper of the Russian forces standing in the Ukraine. The *main effort* for this is to be made from the area of Lublin in the general direction of Kiev, while the forces in Rumania, crossing the lower Prut, form a widely separated enveloping arm. The Rumanian Army will have the task of pinning down the Russian forces in between.

Once the battles south and north of the Pripet Marshes have been fought, we should aim to achieve as part of the pursuit operation:

in the south, the prompt seizure of the economically important Donets Basin;

in the north, rapid arrival at Moscow.

The capture of this city means a decisive success politically and economically and, beyond that, the elimination of the most important railway center.

B. *Luftwaffe*:

Its task will be to paralyze and to eliminate as far as possible the intervention of the Russian Air Force and also to support the Army at its main points of effort, particularly those of Army Group Center and, on the main wing, of Army Group South. The Russian railroads, depending on their importance for the operations, will be cut or, as the case may be, their most important near-by installations (river

crossings!) seized by the bold employment of parachute and airborne troops.

In order to concentrate all forces against the enemy Air Force and to give direct support to the Army the armament industry will not be attacked during the main operations. Only after the completion of the mobile operations may such attacks be considered—primarily against the Ural region.

C. *Navy:*

The Navy's role against Soviet Russia is, while safeguarding our own coast, to prevent an escape of enemy naval units from the Baltic Sea. As the Russian Baltic Sea fleet, once we have reached Leningrad, will be deprived of its last base and will then be in a hopeless situation, any larger naval operations are to be avoided before that time.

After the elimination of the Russian fleet it will be a question of protecting all the traffic in the Baltic Sea, including the supply by sea of the northern wing of the Army (mine clearance!).

IV. All orders to be issued by the Commanders in Chief on the basis of this directive must clearly indicate that they are *precautionary measures* for the possibility that Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be assigned to the preparatory work at an early date is to be kept as small as possible; additional personnel should be briefed as late as possible and only to the extent required for the activity of each individual. Otherwise, through the discovery of our preparations—the date of their execution has not even been fixed—there is danger that most serious political and military disadvantages may arise.

V. I expect reports from the Commanders in Chief concerning their further plans based on this directive.

The contemplated preparations of all branches of the armed forces, including their progress, are to be reported to me through the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 533

426/218089—92

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET

DECEMBER 18, 1940.

Ag./358

With reference to my telegram No. 2718 of December 12, 1940,¹ I have the honor to transmit a memorandum on the steps taken by the Embassy in the matter in question.

COUNT V. D. SCHULENBURG

¹Not printed (426/218095).

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

MOSCOW, December 13, 1940.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE TRANSIT OF AIRPLANES, SPARE PARTS
FOR SHIPS, AND MEDICINES TO JAPAN

The matter of the transit of an airplane was first brought up by the Ambassador on October 18 with M. Molotov, who asked where the plane was to be brought on a German ship and where it was to cross the Soviet border in East Asia. M. Molotov indicated in that connection that he was aware of the connection between our request and the auxiliary cruiser, concerning the whereabouts of which he inquired (cf. your telegram No. 1873 of October 18² and our telegram No. 2237 of October 21³). On the basis of further telegraphic instructions from the Foreign Ministry (cf. telegrams No. 1962 of October 28⁴ and No. 1969 of October 29⁵) the Ambassador gave M. Molotov an oral and written reply to his questions on November 1 and asked for a transit permit for another plane as well. Since no reply was received from the Soviet side, Minister von Toppelskirch, pursuant to your telegram No. 2050 of November 11,⁶ made an appeal in the matter on November 14 to First Deputy People's Commissar Vyshinsky, owing to the absence of the Ambassador and M. Molotov, but was unable to obtain a decision from him. Subsequently the Ambassador made another *démarche* on November 25 (cf. our telegram No. 2563 of November 25⁷) with M. Molotov, who then promised that the decision would be expedited.

Then when your telegram No. 2227 of December 4⁸ was received, in which the German request for the transit of engine parts for ships and medicines was expanded, the Ambassador presented the whole matter to M. Molotov in writing and afterwards brought it up orally on December 12. The Ambassador emphasized very forcefully that a prompt affirmative decision by the Soviet Government was urgently required in the interest of the further actions of the ship. He could not understand why the Soviet Government raised such difficulties, since it was neither intended to have the German ship in question enter the port of Vladivostok nor were there any reasons whatever to fear an indiscretion.

² This telegram (426/218138) conveyed the information that a German auxiliary cruiser in the Far East was in urgent need of a plane. The only way to send the plane was via the Trans-Siberian railway. The Embassy was instructed to make the necessary arrangements with the Soviet Government.

³ Not printed (426/218135).

⁴ Not printed (426/218128).

⁵ Not printed (426/218127).

⁶ Not printed (426/218123).

⁷ Not found.

⁸ Not printed (426/218103-04).

In his reply M. Molotov said that he could not possibly answer the German questions, since they represented a complete "secret". He was not in a position to make decisions with "his eyes closed," without knowing which airplanes were involved, what their purpose was, and what the spare parts and the medicines were. At first it had been a question of only one plane; that had later been changed to two. It was also incomprehensible to him why it should not be possible to procure the necessary spare parts and medicines for a single ship in Japan.

All the emphatic representations and counterarguments of the Ambassador were shattered against the stubborn rejection of Molotov, who constantly repeated the same thing, namely, that the whole matter was quite incomprehensible to him and that he could not be expected to decide about questions which he could not grasp. The Soviet Government for its part would never approach the German Government with such an unreasonable request.

The protests of the Ambassador to the effect that the German Government would not be so insistent in its effort to obtain transit if there were any possibility of procuring the necessary ship's parts and medicines in Japan, seemed to make no impression on Molotov. In his reply he incidentally made a remark which indicates that the Soviet Government fears an indiscretion on the part of the Japanese and thereby a compromising of its neutral position, especially toward England.

In reply to the Ambassador's argument, supported by Minister Schnurre, that the German Government was accommodating the Soviet Government through the delivery of warplanes and consequently, for its part, expected understanding for its own needs, Molotov said that the delivery of planes was the concern of the German Government and was, moreover, a result of the economic agreement that had been concluded. The German request for the transit in question had nothing to do with the delivery of planes. It would be an extremely thoughtless step on his part if he granted the approval requested of him.

The above-mentioned arguments were repeated several times by both sides in the course of the further conversation without any agreement being reached. In reply to the Ambassador's remark that the position of the Soviet Government was completely incomprehensible to him, since there could be no question whatever of any risk for the Soviet side, M. Molotov said conciliatingly that whereas the Ambassador had no need to be oriented on the background of this entire matter, he himself must in such an unclear situation avoid any decisions whose consequences could not be foreseen.

A report on the outcome of the conversation of the Ambassador with M. Molotov on December 12 has been sent to the Foreign Ministry by wire under No. 2718.

HILGER

No. 534

84/62246-48

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1940—10:17 a. m.

No. 2758 of December 18

Received December 19—11:40 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2757 of December 17.¹

In evaluating the new plan for increased war aid for England announced by the President yesterday² one will have to proceed from the fact that this is not a grandiose whim of the moment, but, as the President himself said, the result of careful thought in which the President was guided very decidedly by American interests. Obviously the President assumes that England, unless she collapses in the next few months, will be able to hold out and that then a war of long duration is in prospect in which England with the help of the United States will steadily gain in strength until the United States has reached the maximum level of armaments and there is then a prospect of the victory of England. His new plan has therefore doubtless been drawn up on a long-term basis; in this connection he is aware that it will still take considerable time for this plan simply to *get under way*.

Decisive for the methods of the new plan—in particular the drastic rejection of all schemes which aim at repeal of the Johnson Act,³ amendment of the Neutrality Law,⁴ granting of credits, loans, or gifts of money to England—it seems to be the determination of the President to keep the reins firmly in his hands in the present European war and not to leave the United States either to accidental employment of force during the course of the war or to other uncontrollable forces. Cynically as the President spoke at yesterday's press conference

¹ Not found.

² At the President's press conference held on Dec. 17. For the record of this conference, see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. ix, pp. 604-615.

³ The Johnson Act passed Apr. 13, 1934, prohibited loans to debtor governments in default to the United States. For the text, see 48 Stat. (pt. 1) 574.

⁴ American legislation embargoing the shipment of arms to nations at war was first enacted in February 1934. It was amended and expanded with related provisions designed to prevent American involvement in war by further laws of Aug. 31, 1935, Feb. 29, 1936, and May 1, 1937.

about the possibilities of using American merchant ships under a foreign flag and of other methods of circumventing the present neutrality regulations, nevertheless he evidently does not wish to have the neutrality laws eliminated as a bulwark against possible arbitrary demands by England and public opinion which has been whipped up. The same is probably also true for his adherence to the Johnson Act. Both laws present the President with the possibility of taking shelter if the occasion arises—particularly with reference to appeals for help on the part of an England that is close to collapse. The simultaneous rejection of loans, credits, and grants of money to England evidently derives from similar considerations. The elimination of the regulations prohibiting credit, of the Neutrality Law, and of the Johnson Act would make it possible to do away with every hindrance to demands for financial aid to England, open the door to arbitrary action, and draw the United States irresistibly with billions of dollars into a war adventure such as 1917, in the course of which the President could become the football of the public passions.

Doubtless a role is also played here by the hope of the men around Morgenthau and Jewish high finance, who are striving to shift the center of world finance from London to New York; to get, in any event, as many assets as possible out of England, burdened as she is with mortgages; to liquidate her assets here in favor of the United States, so that as much as possible may be brought to safety over here in case of England's defeat. In this context the idea was probably not being dismissed that a "Vichy government" could some day appear in England or that the masses might even revolt against the ruling castes.

Presumably, the President made the proposal that the American Government take over all future British contracts in the endeavor always to remain master of all developments in his own country. It is not England that is to determine the amount of American war deliveries, with the aid of American credits of billions of dollars; it is not England that is to build airplane factories, munition factories, and shipyards with billions in American loans, which, after all, will not be paid back in the end, but the United States is to invest its own money in its own country, so that the armament plants built remain its property under its full control. Then, if all the war aid to England should be of no avail, this armament industry can be converted for American rearmament and utilized to the full for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Thus the President obviously hopes in the 4 years of his new term of office to be able to remain master of all future developments.

THOMSEN

No. 535

174/136495-96

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

VERY URGENT

TOKYO, December 19, 1940—11:30 a. m.

No. 1425 of December 19

Received December 19—10:15 p. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister told me that he is considering accepting the Reich Foreign Minister's invitation to Berlin in the very near future.¹ He is thinking of arriving there in the second half of January, paying a brief visit to Rome afterwards, and being back in Tokyo at the end of February following a stay in Moscow if possible. The Minister President is in favor of this plan and would like to obtain the Emperor's consent to the prolonged absence of the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister stressed to me his desire to make a strong gesture in favor of the Tripartite Pact and, if possible, personally to overcome the standstill in the negotiations with Russia and China. The Imperial Diet convening in January could postpone its foreign policy debate until the Foreign Minister had returned.

I have the impression that the Foreign Minister desires to enhance the importance of his policy and person by conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister and possibly through being received by the Führer, and that he hopes, with German support, to resume the stalled negotiations with Russia. His plan, in my opinion, is altogether in harmony with our interests. With respect to the world situation, the journey would make a great impression, increase the importance of the Tripartite Pact with its center of gravity in Berlin, strengthen the Foreign Minister's attitude toward America by the conversation in Berlin and his impression of Germany, and open the possibility of a discussion with Russia. As against these advantages the prolonged absence of the leader of Japan's foreign policy is unimportant, in my opinion, particularly since the armed forces, especially the Army, can be relied upon to safeguard the Tripartite Pact policy in the meanwhile. The Foreign Minister would probably appreciate some German encouragement for his plan. I recommend, therefore, that you authorize me to transmit an appropriate statement from the Reich Foreign Minister.²

OTT

¹ Nothing has been found in Foreign Ministry files to indicate when and in what form this invitation had originally been made.

² In telegram No. 1154 of Dec. 23 (174/136500), Ribbentrop directed Ott to state that a visit by Matsuoka in the second half of January would be most welcome.

No. 536

585/242827

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOFIA, December 19, 1940—7:30 p. m.

SECRET

Received December 20—3:00 a. m.

No. 627 of December 19

With reference to my telegram No. 607 of December 7.¹

Contrary to the view expressed to me by the Minister President only a few days ago that the Russians would keep quiet following Bulgaria's act of rejection, the Russian Minister yesterday called upon the Foreign Minister to express his astonishment that the Bulgarian Government had not yet made a reply to the Russian statement of the 6th.² The Foreign Minister, whom I was to have seen this morning but who was taken ill again, had the following conveyed to me. He had requested the Minister to tell Moscow that Bulgaria placed the highest value on friendly relations with Russia, but did not wish to be drawn into the war and would be able to achieve this only if she stayed away from high policy. He did not go into the subject of the Tripartite Pact. He had asked the Minister to explain Bulgaria's position to Moscow on the basis of his familiarity with the country; this he promised to do.

Influential circles are concerned over Russia's future attitude on negotiations for the renewal of last year's economic agreement.³ It is expected that in contrast with last year Russia will keep an attitude of reserve and, for instance, shut off deliveries by which Bulgarian industry could be kept going, in order to cause strikes and discontent among labor.

RICHTHOFEN

¹ Not found. An unsigned and undated memorandum which summarizes the Soviet-Bulgarian and Bulgarian-Turkish negotiations in November and December 1940 and refers to specific documents, indicates that telegram No. 607 reported another step taken by the Soviet Minister in Sofia concerning the offer of a pact. The Soviet Minister was reported to have said that the Soviet Government would take into account the Bulgarian objections and was prepared to limit itself to giving "a guarantee for Bulgaria and her interests." (1046/311561-63)

² See documents Nos. 468 and 486.

³ Conclusion of economic talks between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union had been reported in telegram No. 8 of Jan. 6, 1940, from the German Minister in Bulgaria (585/242531).

No. 537

247/164237-38

Memorandum by the Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark

BERLIN, December 19, 1940.

Pol. VI 4014 g.

Upon my oral report which was made yesterday with Minister Luther present, the Foreign Minister expressed his approval that in the Christmas Møller case¹ action should be taken as recommended in telegram No. 1355 of December 13, 1940, from the Copenhagen Legation.² If our request should not be complied with, I was authorized to arrest Christmas Møller and have him taken to Germany, even if that should cause a government crisis. Agitation against Germany was not to be tolerated and was to be fought with the most rigorous measures. It was better to step in vigorously right at the beginning and to nip in the bud any development that could later become dangerous.

On this occasion the Foreign Minister said that my principal task was to provide for the security of the German troops. The next aim which should guide me as the Plenipotentiary of the Reich in Denmark was our interest that the English should not be in a position to say that we were oppressing a small and defenseless country. No difficulties must arise for the policies of the Reich from developments in Denmark. That need not, of course, be understood in such a way that we must put up with everything from the Danes. On the contrary, I was authorized to take vigorous action against any troublemaker and, if necessary, to have him arrested.

Another important task for me was to lend support to all elements willing to collaborate with Germany, especially to the Danish National

¹ On Oct. 3, 1940, Christmas Møller, General Secretary of the Conservative party in Denmark, had left the Stauning Government on German demand. Renthe-Fink charged that he had continued to agitate against Germany and appealed to the Danish Foreign Minister, Erik Scavenius, to expel Møller from his seat in the Folketing and from all connection with the Conservative party (Copenhagen telegram No. 1345 of Dec. 12: 247/164229-30). The German text of the telegram is printed in the Danish Government publication, *Beretning til Folketinget afgivet af den af Folketinget under 25. Oktober 1950 nedsatte kommission i henhold til Grundlovens § 45* (Copenhagen, 1954), vol. XIII, Bilag, pp. 373-374.

² In this telegram (247/164231) Renthe-Fink reported that the Danish Foreign Minister had secured a promise from Møller that he would refrain from speaking in political meetings, but that Scavenius had stated that the demand that Møller give up his seat in the Folketing was contrary to the Danish constitution. Renthe-Fink stated that he would press the demand that Møller be expelled from the Conservative party. The German text of the telegram is printed in the Danish Government publication, *Beretning til Folketinget . . .* vol. XIII, Bilag, p. 497.

Socialists. In this connection the Foreign Minister mentioned the campaign of the Danish press against the Danish National Socialists and was of the opinion that it was necessary to take steps against it.

When the Foreign Minister asked about the prospects of the Danish National Socialists, I mentioned on the one hand the great difficulties which Dr. Clausen³ must overcome and, on the other hand, the decisive influence which the defeat of England would exert on developments in Denmark. I emphasized that it could not be foretold when there would be a possibility of the Danish National Socialists taking over the power. In that connection the Foreign Minister asked whether the leader of the Danish National Socialists would really be willing to agree with us on everything we wanted politically, militarily, and economically. Although Denmark should not be made into a Gau of the Reich, but should retain her independence, we did need military bases for example and other such things. Minister Luther and I assented to this, which induced the Foreign Minister to ask whether Dr. Clausen had his party firmly enough in hand so as to cause his will to prevail. We again replied affirmatively. When the Foreign Minister broached the North Schleswig question, we told him that this was Denmark's national question par excellence and that Dr. Clausen, as far as it could now be judged, might go along with us in certain frontier corrections, but could not cede us substantial parts of North Schleswig without arousing all the nationally-minded circles against himself. It would be a good thing to let the matter rest until it was clear to what extent Denmark would assume a friendly attitude toward Germany.

The Foreign Minister took particular interest in the attitude of the King and let it be understood that a crisis involving the King would be politically inconvenient to him. I replied that the King was still entirely under the impact of the 9th of April and for the present was not inclined to turn the government over to Dr. Clausen; but his attitude might very well change when he saw that the National Socialists were gaining ground and becoming a serious political factor. It was the outcome of the conflict with England that would decide him and the consequent realization that Denmark was completely within the German sphere of influence.

V. RENTHE-FINK

³ Dr. Frits Clausen, leader of the Danish National Socialist party.

No. 538

66/46120-30

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Unnumbered

BERLIN, December 20, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND ITALIAN
AMBASSADOR ALFIERI IN THE REICH CHANCELLERY ON DECEMBER 19,
1940, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

Alfieri, who had requested the Reich Foreign Minister for an audience with the Führer on the grounds that he had to deliver a letter from the Duce to the Führer in person, began by saying that this was a misunderstanding; he (Alfieri) had only received a personal letter from Count Ciano, instructing him to present certain Italian requests for raw materials to the Führer in person.¹ Referring repeatedly to Ciano's letter, Alfieri, who did not appear particularly well informed regarding the details of the Italian requests for raw materials, declared that the Italian armament industry urgently needed certain raw materials and that the Duce relied on the friendship and political solidarity of the Führer in the hope that Germany would make these quantities available to Italy. Alfieri then submitted the enclosed list of Italian requests for raw materials,² adding that the wishes expressed there referred to quantities over and above the deliveries which had already been agreed upon by treaty.

The Führer pointed out that by virtue of agreements already in existence the German and Italian armament industries were even now coordinated in many instances as regards raw materials, and that in some cases Germany herself had already found more easily obtainable substitutes for certain scarce raw materials; these substitutes, however, could not be used by Italy since the latter did not have the necessary machinery. In such cases Germany would prefer to deliver the finished war material to Italy instead of sharing with her raw materials which were scarce. German production was not utilized to capacity in many of the armament fields because the necessary labor was not available. As an example of the above-mentioned cases the Führer mentioned the production of explosives, in which connection Germany had successfully found substitutes for certain raw materials which were previously necessary and which were available only in limited quantities. Another example was the use of nickel or chrome

¹ A letter, dated Dec. 17, from Ciano to Alfieri is printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 618-622. To the letter is appended a list of raw materials.

² A copy of the list was left with State Secretary Weizsäcker by Italian Counselor of Embassy Cosmelli on Dec. 21. Not printed (813/276390-92).

in the production of special types of steel; there, too, other materials had been found which gave the steel the same qualities as nickel or chrome. Copper and brass had also been extensively replaced in the manufacture of shell rings and fuses.

In other cases, where raw materials were available in normal amounts, it was better to send adequate quantities to Italy to prevent the production capacity there from lying idle owing to a shortage of raw materials.

Coordination of the war industries in the two countries on the basis of the above principles could be discussed and carried out by the existing German-Italian economic committees.

The Führer remarked that he would have the list submitted by Alfieri examined at once by his economic experts to find out to what extent it would be possible to fulfill the Duce's wishes.

Alfieri answered that the needs indicated in the Italian list were definitely too urgent to await discussion by the economic committees. He further asked how he was to understand the Führer's remark regarding the labor shortage in Germany, and seemed to interpret it to the effect that Germany wished to have more labor from Italy.

The Führer repeated that certain German armament industries actually could not utilize their full production capacity because of the labor shortage.

He then turned to the transportation problem, which also was of importance in this connection. By taking over Belgium, Holland, three-fifths of France, and Poland, Germany had assumed a tremendous additional burden as regards transportation. For this reason he had regretted very much that transportation of petroleum from Rumania by sea had to be discontinued owing to the Italo-Greek war. That had meant a transport loss of 30,000 tons for which mainly the railroads had to compensate. It was not only a question of the reduced transport capacity as such, but also of the additional difficulty caused by an insufficient number of tank cars. The Führer urged that Italy increase her production of tank cars at the expense of other types of railroad cars.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer summarized his ideas on German-Italian economic cooperation during the war in the following manner: such cooperation must be based on the primary principle of economic soundness. In the cases where Italian production capacity was available and Germany had the raw materials at her disposal, it would be advisable for Germany to help Italy with raw materials. In other cases, however, where Germany had found substitutes for scarce raw materials and Italy did not have the necessary machinery available, it was better to produce the goods in Germany herself and deliver the finished products to Italy. It was always a

question of increasing the total capacity of the Axis to the greatest possible extent.

In conclusion the Führer remarked that, as in the past, he considered it best if he could have a conference with the Duce in person as soon as possible. It would be well if the person responsible for the Italian war plans could participate in these negotiations. Not only could he (the Führer) help Italy with advice, but his own decisions would be facilitated if he were informed of Italian plans, in so far as these were already in existence. In the present circumstances Germany was forced in some places to take up positions which represented a severe strain. The Führer referred here to the difficulties involved in sending an army to Rumania in the middle of the winter, especially if one considered the transportation situation in the countries concerned. He had, however, been forced to do this in order not to lose the Balkans and to protect the oil sources in Rumania. Their loss would be a hard blow which it might not even be possible to avert in spite of these protective measures if the English attacked the oil fields from the air.

Spain had taken a very cool and negative attitude. Considering Portugal, here, too, all possibilities at least had to be kept in mind. Italy and Germany might have expected more gratitude from Franco after what the Duce and the Führer had done for the Caudillo, who in the last analysis owed his whole political existence to them. They would have to remember that attitude.

The Führer informed Alfieri that he would soon send a letter to the Duce regarding the general situation;³ in it he would also take a position on the new situation which had arisen from the fact that Spain had now withdrawn completely and the military operations in this connection could no longer take place.⁴

Alfieri replied that when the Führer first suggested a meeting, the Duce had not been able to leave Rome because of the unclear situation at the fronts and the new appointments to the military posts.⁵ As soon as the military situation at the fronts became more stable it would perhaps be possible for the Duce to travel. The Duce had given strict instructions to the military authorities to hold the Libyan frontier with Egypt at all costs. Graziani confidently expected that they would succeed in doing so. It should not be forgotten that the English attacks were very heavy. They had committed a great number of troops with the most modern equipment against the Italians who, for their part, possessed very little war material, so that the resistance existed mainly in the "hearts of the soldiers." Violent fight-

³ See document No. 586.

⁴ See document No. 476, footnote 2.

⁵ See document No. 477 and footnote 7.

ing was taking place at present in the vicinity of Porto Bardia. Graziani wanted to keep Tobruk from falling in any circumstances into the hands of the English, since the latter would otherwise be in complete control of the line from Tobruk to Crete. The Italians were furthermore forced to keep in mind the defense of the frontier against de Gaullist France; this also involved difficult communications and transportation problems and made it difficult to concentrate a large number of troops against the English.

In conclusion Alfieri pointed out that the Duce had again withdrawn the Italian air divisions from the Channel coast with the exception of a small group of 20 to 25 planes which he intended to leave with the German Army until the general situation permitted Italy again to send larger units to the Channel coast.

The Führer answered that he considered the Duce's decision very wise since the Italian flyers for obvious reasons had not had the necessary training for winter weather conditions at the Channel coast and since their planes were not suited for such weather conditions either. They would no doubt serve the common cause better by operations in the South.

Alfieri further expressed his thanks in the Duce's name for the friendly and understanding attitude of the German press, which had created the very best impression among the Italian and the international public.

The Führer replied that Italy should not take the present setbacks too seriously. Every nation had certain "streaks of bad luck"; Frederick the Great, the greatest general Germany ever had, during some years had suffered nothing but defeats in his campaigns.

SCHMIDT

No. 539

2108/456031-32

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry -

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, December 20, 1940—4:47 a. m.

No. 2775 of December 19

Received December 20—8:40 a. m.

1) In today's concluding discussion with Mikoyan it was possible to solve all pending questions in a manner favorable to us, except for the nonferrous metal question, on which the Kremlin has not yet made a decision but will presumably do so by tomorrow evening. Mikoyan was very cooperative on all questions. The text of the economic agreement, too, is consequently ready for signature.

2) The Soviet wish, already indicated yesterday by Molotov, that the economic agreement and the agreement on a lump sum settlement

for the property of the Balts be signed simultaneously was unmistakably expressed this evening by Mikoyan, who added that the Soviet Government was anxious to decide simultaneously the big economic questions that were now ripe for settlement.¹

3) I opposed the linking together of the two agreements and stated that I could not obtain Germany's view of the Soviet proposal on the question of the Balts by tomorrow evening. I hoped, however, that I would be able to conclude this agreement, too, before Christmas. But for that, there would first have to be a satisfactory settlement of the Kivioli question, especially as regards the securing of shale oil deliveries.² Mikoyan repeated the Soviet position stated yesterday by Molotov, according to which all the German property claims had been settled by the lump sum. As for the shale oil deliveries, he thought that Germany had received a far-reaching concession in his promise of 70,000 tons. In consideration of the Navy's special interests, which I brought up, Mikoyan finally said, upon my insistence, that he was willing to increase this amount to 85,000 (eighty-five thousand) tons. He laid down the condition, however, that these 85,000 tons be fixed in the economic agreement and he very firmly rejected my proposal for a separate treatment of the Kivioli question.

4) The maximum to which the Soviet Government will be willing to agree in the Kivioli question has thereby been reached. The only possibility that I can see of signing the economic agreement Friday evening is for us to accept the Kivioli proposal. I therefore request authorization by telephone to do so.³ Since it is to be feared, however, from Molotov's and Mikoyan's attitude that the linking together of the two agreements will be upheld, I further request authorization as promptly as possible to inform the Soviet Government of Germany's agreement to the Soviet proposal concerning the Balts.

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

¹The Soviet insistence on simultaneous signature of the two agreements was reiterated and emphasized in telegram No. 2776 of Dec. 19 (2108/456034) and telegram No. 2781 of Dec. 20 (2108/456035).

²This involved the interest of the German Navy in certain Estonian oil properties. Schnurre had discussed the question to some extent in his letter of Dec. 12 to Ritter (1139/324817-19). See document No. 425, footnote 4.

³In telegram No. 2781 of Dec. 20, sent at 4:23 p. m., Schnurre noted that he had received instructions which settled the Kivioli question, and he saw no reason why the Soviet draft on the Balt question could not now be accepted.

No. 540

449/222988

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 81 of December 20

ATHENS, December 20, 1940.

Received December 20—3:45 p. m.

The carrying out of the instruction (cf. my telegram No. 80¹) provided the first opportunity of talking to Metaxas, who since the outbreak of the war with Italy normally no longer receives Chiefs of Missions. The Minister President emphasized that in the future, too, no disturbance of the correct relations between Germany and Greece as a result of an English military initiative was to be feared. Despite her favorable military situation in Albania, Greece had no intention of making conquests. To be sure, she must have assurance that in the future she would no longer be exposed to an Italian threat from that side. He was assuming that even if the Greeks did not advance any farther, the Italians would no longer be able to hold out in Albania. As far as he was informed Yugoslavia, which also had no intentions of making conquests in Albania but did not wish to see Albania in the hands of a foreign great power, was not displeased with this development either. Bulgaria was adopting a correct and even sympathetic attitude; however, the Greek point of view in the Bulgarian question, according to which territorial concessions were out of the question while economic access to the Aegean Sea would be offered, remained the same as in the past. On the subject of German-Greek relations I remained, of course, noncommittal, but I took the opportunity to impress strongly on Metaxas that England's defeat by Germany was assured beyond doubt.

ERBACH

¹Not found.

No. 541

B14/B002454

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2330 of December 20

ROME, December 20, 1940—3:40 p. m.

Top Secret Military 315

Received December 20—4:05 p. m.

- 1) For OKW—Foreign Department [*Abt. Ausland*].¹
- 2) For General Staff of the Army, Attaché Department.

¹A typewritten notation at the end of the document reads: "Forwarded by closed circuit coded teletype to the OKW. Telegram Control, Dec. 20, 1940."

General Guzzoni, in the presence of General Roatta, conveyed to me by direction of the Duce the following in confirmation of yesterday's talk with Cavallero, who has already flown back again to Albania.

1. The situation in Albania is threatening again to deteriorate because the Greeks are shifting their reserves from the northern wing, where no major combat activity will be possible from now on because of the advent of winter, to the southern wing, where heavier attacks must therefore be anticipated to which no adequate reserves can be promptly opposed even if all transport facilities are used to the limit.

The Duce requests that pressure be brought upon Greece by stepping up our military and political activity in the Balkans, so as to prevent Greece from concentrating all her forces for a breakthrough to Valona.

2. The Duce has given orders that Bardia, which is already encircled, keep fighting to the last, and that the same be done later at Tobruk and Derna, in order to retard the English advance. Since no corresponding combat contingents can be opposed to the superior English armored and motorized forces, he requests that a large armored force, one to two divisions, be sent to Libya for the defense of its western half.

3. In consideration of the losses already suffered and still to be expected, shipment is requested of artillery, trucks, antiaircraft, and antitank artillery for 10 divisions. Details of the request for material follow by courier.²

RINTELEN
MACKENSEN

² This further report has not been found.

No. 542

B19/B003932

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

No. 15

BERLIN, December 20, 1940.

Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens informed me today regarding the visit of the Finnish General, Talvela, who was sent here by Field Marshal Mannerheim in order to keep up the contact with the Reichsmarschall, as Herr Veltjens had already informed me and as had also been reported by Minister von Blücher.¹ The Reichsmarschall had seen General Talvela twice and in regard to the Finnish attitude toward Russia had spoken along the same lines as had been prescribed for Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens for his recent visit in Finland, lines which had been approved by the Reich Foreign Minister.² Regarding

¹ See document No. 439.

² See documents Nos. 411 and 474.

Petsamo the Reichsmarschall told Talvela that he still hoped at some later time to be able to acquire the concession for Germany.

Regarding the plans for a personal union between Finland and Sweden the Reichsmarschall stated with complete clarity that we did not want such a thing, rather we were interested only in an independent Finland, not in Finland as a Swedish province.³

Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

³ Halder recorded in his diary under the date Dec. 16: "Finnish General Talvela with Attaché Horn: Explanation of the political situation—threat of Finland through communistic propaganda. Exposition of the military situation: Åland [Islands]—Petsamo—Sala; long range guns and airplanes are lacking. Attitude of Sweden dependent on Germany. Sweden can make five divisions free for aid to Finland. Personal union Sweden-Finland. We should help. I ask for information regarding the time requirements for inconspicuous mobilization toward the southeast."

[EDITORS' NOTE. The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (December 1, 1940–March 24, 1941) contains this passage for December 20:

"From a short discussion between the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and the Chief of the National Defense Department about the state of political relations between France and Germany, it appears that the Führer traces the critical sharpening of relations back to General Weygand, and, if only for this reason, he wants the measures which are to be taken in accordance with directive *Attila* to be maintained. Movements of the French fleet outside the training area of Toulon must be prevented. The Armistice Commission has already been instructed accordingly."]

No. 543

121/120323-26

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, December 21, 1940—3:35 a. m.

Air-raid warning!

Received December 21—7:45 a. m.

No. 1577 of December 21

For the Foreign Minister through Schwarzmann.

Ambassador de Brinon received instructions countersigned by Marshal Pétain to make the following communications to me:¹

¹ According to de Brinon, these instructions which were sent to him on Dec. 20, 10:00 p. m., had been drawn up by Flandin. See Fernand de Brinon, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1949), pp. 62-64.

1. After completion of the investigation planned, Marshal Pétain had arrived at the irrevocable decision to refrain for an indefinite period from working with M. Laval. Any new insistence on M. Laval would merely complicate unnecessarily relations between the German occupying power and the French Chief of State who, in accordance with the provisions of the Armistice, had the freedom to choose his ministers.

2. The investigation into the deplorable circumstances attending the dismissal of Laval had shown that Minister of Justice Alibert, rather than Minister of Interior Peyrouton, had been responsible for this and that the former also bore responsibility for the arrest of Marcel Déat in Paris.² The Marshal had therefore decided to replace M. Alibert and to dissolve the special police protection groups.

3. M. Bélin is resigning his duties as Minister of Labor and Production and in the course of a division of this department which is being planned, he will be replaced in the sector of Production by M. Baudoin, in the sector of Labor by the labor union leader, Froideval, proposed by the Germans.

4. The investigation concerning M. Caziot had produced nothing compromising regarding his attitude toward the policy of cooperation with Germany. It was therefore not intended to replace him. On the other hand, the charges brought by the Germans at Vichy against Vallat, the president of the veterans' organization, *Légion des Combattants*, who had been appointed by Marshal Pétain, had turned out to be true. His replacement by General Laure had therefore been ordered.

5. The German proposal for the establishment of a directorate has been accepted by Marshal Pétain. It consists of: General Huntziger, M. Flandin, and Admiral Darlan, who is assuming the presidency. The directorate is subordinate to the Council of Ministers and makes all pressing Government decisions under the supreme leadership of the Marshal.

6. Within the Council of Ministers three committees are being formed; an economic committee, a committee for land defense, and a committee for domestic policy, which do the preparatory work for the decisions of the directorate.

7. Marshal Pétain expects that this reorganization of the Government will give a new impetus in all spheres to the policy of cooperation if the German Government intends to continue with it. The Marshal requests German approval of a speedy publication of these measures and believes that they will convince the Führer of his firm determination to retain the control over the French state in his hands, to pursue the policy of carrying out loyally the terms of the Armistice, and to guide his Government constantly and without vacillation in the sense of a development of the cooperation decided upon at Montoire.

8. Marshal Pétain intends to send the Führer another personal letter, in which he wishes again to express his thanks for transferring to Paris the mortal remains of the Duke of Reichstadt.

Ambassador de Brinon announced his visit for Saturday³ morning at 11:00 o'clock to communicate the information which he received.

² See document No. 530, footnote 3.

³ Dec. 21.

Please give instructions whether I am to receive the communication or not. Formally the refusal to reappoint Laval to the Cabinet is clearly in contradiction to the promise made orally by Marshal Pétain that he would regard the investigation merely as a matter of form, in order to be able to appear outwardly as the master of his decisions.⁴ Regarding the other points in our demands, the present solution is welcome, since, according to the most recent reports, Alibert actually was the driving force behind the events of December 13, and had submitted to the Marshal the mendacious report that Laval, in accord with the German authorities, had wanted to lure Pétain to Paris, on the occasion of the ceremonies of December 15 in honor of Napoleon, in order to force his dismissal there as Head of the Government. The recall of Caziot, proof of whose disloyal conduct is at hand, is no longer urgent politically, since men who enjoy our confidence and not that of Caziot have taken the decisive key positions in the organizations of the French peasantry along corporative lines, which has meanwhile been put into effect. The appointment of Darlan to the presidency of the directorate takes place at my suggestion and is in a positive sense the most important of the decisions made by Pétain, since in this way a man who is a proven enemy of England and personally very well disposed toward Laval moves into the second most important position in the state. With the appointment of de Brinon as representative of the French Government in occupied France, a guarantee is provided for the purge of the administration and of the police in the occupied area of undesirable elements. In the present situation Laval, by his presence in Paris, constitutes an effective means of internal political pressure against the Vichy Government, since at any time he can question its legality and by convening the Chambers form a new government. Within the framework of the Vichy Government, however, Laval would only meet with opposition because of the attitude of the Marshal and for the time being would not be able to exert much influence. The refusal of Pétain to take Laval into his Cabinet now deprives the Vichy Government of the possibility of asking for German concessions in return for the policy of cooperation; in view of the military situation in the Mediterranean it is certain that this would otherwise not have failed to happen. From the point of view of political utility, the regrouping in the French Government that came about as the result of our intervention against the events of December 13 and our practical position with respect to it is therefore to be characterized as favorable. In the event that no considerations of prestige stand in the way, and that the possibility of Pétain's resignation and the consequences that may arise from it for Africa have to be avoided, I propose that for the moment we content ourselves with the

⁴ See documents Nos. 530 and 531.

results achieved and not force the reinstatement of Laval until the moment is more favorable and after Darlan's personal position of power has been strengthened.

In this case, please allow me to receive Brinon's communication and to reply to him as follows:

1. I note with satisfaction the establishment of the directorate with Darlan as the president, the dismissal of Minister Alibert, who was responsible for the events of December 13, the discharge of Minister Bélin, the appointment of Froideval as Minister of Labor, the dismissal of Vallat, and the appointment of Ambassador de Brinon as general delegate of the French Government in occupied France in place of de Laurencie. Publication of these measures may take place in occupied territory simultaneously with publication in unoccupied territory.

2. After the proofs of a policy of collaboration adduced by Laval, I do not believe that the full confidence of the Reich Government in the readiness of the French Government for such a policy can be restored until Laval is appointed to the Cabinet and the directorate. I am convinced that if the investigation of Laval is continued, Marshal Pétain will realize that a great injustice has been done this man who excels through a very high sense of responsibility and patriotism and that at a suitable moment he will be given the place in the Government that is due such a man.

3. I would ask the Government of the Reich, in view of the Cabinet reorganization, which in most points is in accordance with our expectations, to lift the provision closing the demarcation line for members of the French Government.

ABETZ

No. 544

182/85782

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BUCHAREST, December 21, 1940.

No. 2357 of December 21

Received December 21—5:35 p. m.

General Hansen asked me to go with him today to the Leader of State, Antonescu, and announce the dispatch of additional forces. He has informed General Antonescu that the necessity had developed of reinforcing the present division by additional forces.

General Antonescu agreed at once to the dispatch of reinforcements. He connected the reinforcement with an action toward the south; General Hansen refrained from making any statement in this connection. General Antonescu remarked further that he gave his consent because he had an interest in seeing the war end as soon as

possible and because in no case did he want the English to gain a foothold in the Balkans. He was willing if necessary to enter the war himself. Naturally (group garbled) repeat his demands that he had brought forward in Berlin. I replied to him that I was not authorized to conduct any kind of negotiations.

General Antonescu then stated unconditionally that he agreed to the coming of the reinforcements and insisted only that full rations in kind also be supplied; he asked that these be immediately included in the foremost transport trains, since he would otherwise have to reckon with difficulties in feeding the Rumanian population. In conclusion, he agreed to begin technical negotiations with the General Staff at once.

I urgently request telegraphic instructions.¹

Without signature

¹ Not found.

No. 545

F14/234-38

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry

RM 50

BERLIN, December 22, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER
AND THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR, DEKANOZOV, ON DECEMBER 21, 1940,
FROM 7:45 TILL 8:30 P. M.

First of all, Ambassador Dekanozov congratulated the Foreign Minister on the birth of his son.

Ambassador Dekanozov then made the following statement: On August 28 last the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had handed the German Embassy in Moscow a note verbale on the demarcation of the sector from the Igorika river to the Baltic Sea, i. e., the former German-Lithuanian boundary.¹ In this note, a copy of which could be submitted, the People's Commissariat asked that the demarcation be undertaken by the Central Mixed German-Soviet Russian Commission in the same manner as on other sections of the common boundary² and that it be completed if possible before the beginning of winter. Since Germany had not replied to this note of August 28 last, he had been instructed to express the dissatisfaction of the Soviet Government.

¹ In telegram No. 1784 of Aug. 29 (104/112430), Schulenburg had informed the Foreign Ministry that he had received such a note verbale from the People's Commissariat and that he was sending the text by courier. The note verbale has not been found.

² Cf. vol. VIII of this series, document No. 193 and footnote 3.

After Secretary of Embassy Pavlov had translated the text of the note, the Foreign Minister asked why this question had not been brought up before. To this question Dekanozov replied that this section of the boundary had been mentioned for the first time in the note verbale. Since he (Dekanozov) had taken part in the work of the Commission at the time, he was in a position to state in this connection that the time then seemed propitious, since the Commission would have been able to continue its work without interruption. No German reply had been received, however, and meanwhile the Central Commission had completed its work.

After a brief consultation with Under State Secretary Woermann the Foreign Minister replied to M. Dekanozov that the demarcation question was connected with that of the Lithuanian tip, which was to fall to Germany on the basis of the confidential agreement. The Russian Government had, to be sure, proposed cession of this tip in return for a monetary compensation,³ but the Reich Government had not considered that to be its equivalent in value.⁴ He (the Foreign Minister) had asked the domestic authorities to determine the value of the strip of territory to be ceded. He had not as yet received the report regarding the matter. As soon as he had, it would be decided

- 1) whether a cession could be made, and
- 2) if so, what compensation was to be demanded.

Since the question of the Lithuanian tip had not yet been settled, there had so far not been any definitive demarcation. Under State Secretary Woermann would report about this in the next few days to the Foreign Minister. But so long as the domestic authorities had not completed the assessment of the Russian proposal, the Foreign Minister could not make any decision in the question of the Lithuanian tip.

Dekanozov replied that the question of the Lithuanian tip had in his opinion remained unsettled on account of the compensation, but he did not know whether it had any direct relation to the demarcation question. Dekanozov stated that he wanted to report to his Government about it. It was a fact that

- 1) the Soviet note of August 28 last had remained unanswered; and
- 2) the inquiry regarding the amount of the compensation for the Lithuanian tip had likewise remained unanswered, since its form had not been definitively settled;
- 3) the absence of a reply to the note verbale might delay the signing of the economic treaty.

The Foreign Minister emphasized in his reply that he had heard today for the first time that the demarcation had not yet been com-

³ See vol. x of this series, documents Nos. 162, 275, 302, and 332.

⁴ See document No. 319.

pleted. Under State Secretary Woermann had further told him that since the definitive fixing of the boundary was connected with the question of the Lithuanian tip, the intention had been to avoid double work in that respect. As for the question of the Lithuanian tip itself, it had probably receded somewhat into the background as a result of the many things that had happened. The question of compensation would be studied from the point of view of value and he hoped that by the middle of next week he would be able to give Dekanozov a definitive statement from the Reich Government on the proposal which had been made.⁵

After M. Dekanozov stated that he had no further questions, the Foreign Minister inquired in conclusion whether the Soviet Government still desired cession of the Lithuanian tip, to which M. Dekanozov replied in the affirmative.

DR. ERICH SOMMER

⁵ See document No. 575.

No. 546

121/120327-28

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris

Teletype

No. 1690

BERLIN, December 21, 1940.

For Ambassador Abetz by closed circuit coded teletype.

With reference to your telegram No. 1577.¹

You are authorized to receive the new communication from Marshal Pétain, announced by Ambassador de Brinon, the substance of which is already known to you. On that occasion, please tell M. de Brinon in the name of the Reich Government, the following, which is to be transmitted to Marshal Pétain:

1) As a result of the conversation that he had with you at Vichy on December 18, Marshal Pétain addressed a letter to the Führer in which he informed him that he would at once institute a thorough investigation of M. Laval and that if the complaints made against M. Laval proved groundless, he would again appoint him to the French Government.² At the conversation there had been complete agreement about the fact that this investigation was to be of a purely formal nature and was only to serve the purpose of giving suitable form in the eyes of the public to the reinstatement of M. Laval. In order to prepare for this reinstatement, it was also arranged at the conversation that an official communiqué be issued at once stating that Marshal Pétain had received M. Laval for lengthy conversation; this, in fact, was also done.

¹ Document No. 543.

² See document No. 530.

2) The Government of the Reich is compelled to note with the utmost astonishment that Marshal Pétain has not lived up to the agreement reached in the conversation of December 18. M. Laval has thus far not been appointed to the Cabinet. Instead of this it appears from the newly announced statement of Marshal Pétain, the substance of which you had already communicated to the Reich Government, that Marshal Pétain refused to work with M. Laval for the time being.

3) According to his statement, Marshal Pétain intends to send the Führer another personal letter. The Government of the Reich has decided first to await this letter and will not take a definitive stand on the matter as a whole until after it has learned of the contents.

4) The Reich Government expects that before this definitive stand is taken, nothing further will be done with regard to the intended reorganization of the French Government and also that no information on this subject will be given to the outside by the French.

RIBBENTROP

No. 547

B19/B003937-39

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. 906

BERLIN, December 21, 1940.

Pol. VI 4038 g.

The Swedish Minister, on instructions from his Government, called on me today after his return from Stockholm, in order to give a comprehensive account of the steps which his Government had taken with Berlin and Moscow in the last few weeks with regard to a closer bond between Sweden and Finland.

M. Richert's account was as follows: In the autumn secret conversations had been held between Sweden and Finland for the purpose of bringing about closer political collaboration between the two countries. In particular, the aim had been to coordinate the foreign policies and the defense policies of the two Governments. It had been the intention to turn the problem over at a somewhat more advanced stage to the appropriate domestic authorities in Sweden and to make the necessary soundings in Berlin and Moscow for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was reason to fear any objections or misunderstandings on the part of either of these Great Powers.

On November 2, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Stockholm, Herr von Below, had inquired of the head of the political division, M. Söderblom, what the truth was with respect to the rumors of a plan for closer Swedish-Finnish collaboration. Söderblom had replied to Below that conversations were in progress but had not yet led to any result.¹ If they should assume a more concrete form, Germany would

¹ No report of this conversation has been found. See document No. 293.

be informed. On November 5 the Russian Minister, Mme. Kollontay, had told the Swedish Foreign Ministry, allegedly without any instructions from her Government, that she knew from the Finnish side that there were such plans. She wanted to discourage any such plan, which would arouse the greatest suspicion in Moscow. In the middle of November the Swedish Foreign Minister had likewise mentioned the subject to Herr von Grundherr.² Günther had held it to be likely that Germany would probably welcome such a development but he had placed a question mark after the attitude of Moscow. He had said at the same time that the discussions were still in a preliminary stage.

On December 7 (the Finnish independence day) Molotov had asked the Finnish Minister in Moscow to call on him in the evening³ and had read to him a statement in the matter, of approximately the following content:⁴ He had learned from Sweden that a Finnish-Swedish agreement was in preparation which would be tantamount to subordinating Finnish foreign policy to that of Sweden. Russia would consider such an agreement as equivalent to a liquidation of the Russian-Finnish peace treaty of March 12, 1940.

On December 14 the Swedish Minister in Moscow⁵ had made the following oral statement to M. Molotov: Sweden (hence not Finland) had considered inaugurating a political exchange of views with Finland, as a result of which the foreign and defense policies of the two countries would be coordinated. The basis for it would be the status quo of Finland. No concrete proposals had been made, however. Nor had there been as yet any sounding in Berlin. Molotov's reaction to this communication had been mainly negative. Molotov had referred to his statement of December 7 to the Finnish Minister.

On December 18 the Swedish Minister had reported from Moscow that Molotov had again called the Finnish Minister's attention to his statement of December 7 and confirmed it.

End of the Swedish Minister's account.

M. Richert added that for the time being his Government did not intend to do anything further in the matter. It had merely wished to inform the German Government once more, chronologically and objectively, about what had taken place. Apparently the developments had not left any ill feeling in Russia against Finland or Sweden.

In conclusion Richert also said that, although for the time being nothing further would be done in the whole matter, its development did indicate Sweden's positive interest in the future fate of Finland.

I thanked the Swedish Minister for his information.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 375.

³ The anniversary of Finnish independence is Dec. 6, and the meeting with Molotov was apparently on that date. See footnote 4.

⁴ See document No. 491 and footnote 3.

⁵ Wilhelm Winter.

No. 548

265/172533

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
No. 715

BERLIN, December 21, 1940.
Sent December 22—12:30 a. m.
RAM 376.

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 992.¹

I agree, and also for my part consider it appropriate for you to continue your conversations with the Government there so as not to allow the thread to be broken. As already stressed in my telegram No. 663 of December 5,² it is not possible at the moment, however, to put into concrete form individual points of a possible understanding with Turkey. In particular we must avoid at this time committing ourselves more or less to solutions that would prejudice our further negotiations with the Soviet Union. You may, however, state that the Reich Government is still willing as in the past, and also considers it entirely possible, to find the basis for a reorganization of German-Turkish relations. Naturally we would have to confer on this subject also with our ally, Italy. As soon as this had been done, it would presumably be possible to continue the conversations and give concrete form to them in accordance with your previous suggestions.

Best regards for Christmas and the New Year!

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 459.

² Document No. 454.

No. 549

230/152416

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

TOP SECRET
No. 963

BERLIN, December 21, 1940.
Sent December 22—12:45 a. m.
RAM 377.

Exclusively for the Ambassador [*Minister*] personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 880¹ and 881.²

Please call on M. Cincar-Marković and tell him the following in my name:

¹ Document No. 467.

² Document No. 469.

The Führer and I noted with interest the written statement of the Yugoslav Government handed to you on December 7, and we also gave consideration to the proposal, contained in it, that a nonaggression pact be concluded between Germany, Italy, and Yugoslavia on the basis of the Italo-Yugoslav treaty of 1937. The conclusion of such a nonaggression pact would of course not meet the specifications for the strengthening of Yugoslavia's relations with the Axis Powers that we had envisaged in the conversations with Cincar-Marković at the Berghof³ and in Fuschl;⁴ and it would still [leave] open the important question of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact that we discussed in these conversations, as well as the other questions discussed in this connection.

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 417.

⁴ See *ibid.*, footnote 1.

No. 550

34/24403-04

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, December 22, 1940—6:07 a. m.

SECRET

Received December 22—12:00 noon.

No. 2795 of December 21

For the State Secretary.

In order to settle the still pending questions concerning the agreement on a lump sum compensation for the claims of the Balts we called on Molotov this evening. After Molotov had treated the proposed German amendments in a petty and evasive way, he unexpectedly and very positively made the following statement:

The Soviet Government wishes a simultaneous settlement of all questions pending between Germany and the USSR before the end of the year and must therefore insist that the economic agreement, the agreement on the lump sum settlement, the two resettlement agreements being negotiated in Riga and Kaunas, and a boundary agreement confirming the old German-Lithuanian boundary as the present legally established German-Soviet boundary, be signed simultaneously. The last mentioned agreement could be concluded most simply by a section to the effect that a demarcation of the boundary is not necessary, since it is already fixed. If, nevertheless, any technical work should be necessary, it could be done later. The settlement of all these questions did not bring up any new problems. In the view of the Soviet Government they could, and had to be, settled in a few days.

When we protested strongly against the linking together of problems which had nothing to do with each other, Molotov replied that these economic and political problems could not be separated from each other. It was being said that Germany, by protracting the question of the fixing of the Lithuanian boundary, wished to keep open a ground of conflict in order to use it against the Soviet Union. Although he, Molotov, did not think that this was probable, he considered it necessary in the joint German-Soviet interest to bring about a full clarification and thereby put an end to such talk. In the face of our insistent efforts to separate at least the economic agreement from this complex Molotov persisted in his stand, which he finally presented in the very concrete form that the simultaneous signing of all five of the above-mentioned agreements was a condition from which the Soviet Government could not depart.

With regard to the Lithuanian boundary question Molotov added that he had instructed Dekanozov yesterday to make an appropriate démarche¹ and had sent Count Schulenburg a letter regarding this matter today. (Cf. in this connection telegraphic report No. 2794 of December 21.²)

The situation presents itself as follows:

The economic agreement is ready for conclusion now that Molotov this evening gave a positive answer to the nonferrous metals question. The same is also true of the agreement on a lump sum compensation, since settlement of the points still open can be reached by Monday or Tuesday.

I request telegraphic instructions whether the two resettlement treaties can likewise be concluded in Riga and Kaunas by Christmas and whether a boundary treaty such as Molotov has requested can be signed here in the next few days.³ If so, we request telegraphic transmittal of the draft text and full powers for the Ambassador.

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 545 and footnote 1.

² Not printed (34/24405).

³ See documents Nos. 558 and 575.

[EDITORS' NOTE. The United States Chargé d'Affaires in Germany reported on December 22, 1940, that an unofficial but authorized German had recently suggested to the Greek Minister that a Greek request for German mediation could result in an honorable and even advantageous peace for Greece. (See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, volume III, page 572.) Memoranda composed after

the war by the Greek Minister in Spain and the German Military Attaché in Greece, and published in Ehrengard Schramm-von Thadden, *Griechenland und die Grossmächte im zweiten Weltkrieg* (Wiesbaden, 1955), pages 217-221, likewise refer to discussions of German mediation for a Greek-Italian armistice. No relevant records have been found in the German Foreign Ministry files.]

No. 551

230/152428

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BELGRADE, December 23, 1940—8:15 a. m.

No. 907 of December 22

Received December 23—11:00 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 963 of December 21.¹

Instructions carried out.

Cincar-Marković thereupon asked me to convey the following to the Foreign Minister:

Without wanting to prejudice future discussions in any way, he nevertheless believed he ought to state at once that he was somewhat surprised by the communication from the Reich Foreign Minister. The idea of concluding a three-sided nonaggression pact as a means of consolidating the present situation had after all originated with the Führer himself. The Foreign Minister had expressly confirmed this to him after the conference at the Berghof, adding that if Yugoslavia so desired even more could be done. He had interpreted the idea of a three-sided nonaggression pact mentioned by the Führer in such a way that it would still leave open Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact.

End of the statement of the Foreign Minister.

HEEREN

¹ Document No. 549.

No. 552

121/120335

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, December 23, 1940—1:25 p. m.

No. 1581

Received December 23—1:35 p. m.

Brinon has been instructed by his Government to make the following communication: With reference to point 3 of the instructions of

the Reich Government transmitted to him yesterday,¹ Marshal Pétain has written a personal letter to the Führer.² He would like to have this letter delivered by Darlan and asks to be informed when and by what route he may have the Admiral, accompanied by an officer, go to the Führer and deliver the letter to him. The desire of the Reich Government expressed in point 4 of the instructions sent me yesterday is being carried out exactly; for the Marshal had spontaneously prohibited publication of the news of the reorganization of the Government which had been decided upon.

ABETZ

¹ See document No. 546.

² See documents Nos. 564 and 566.

No. 553

B15/B002990

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

STOCKHOLM, December 23, 1940—10:00 p. m.

SECRET

Received December 24—3:00 a. m.

No. 1778 of December 23

1. I have confidentially been informed that a Swedish private person of high standing is said to have recently approached Mallet, the English Minister here, with the suggestion that an early meeting be arranged on Swedish soil between appropriately authorized German and English representatives who should confer, without committing themselves in any way, on the possibility of a German-English settlement.¹ Mallet is said to have forwarded the suggestion to his Government and to have received telegraphically something like the following from Churchill: The German Government had lately indicated that the German aim was the annihilation of England. Consequently such conversations were of no use.

2. I am further told that in the conversations held on this subject at the British Legation here nothing whatever is said to have been mentioned regarding Eastern questions or German internal affairs.

WIED

¹ See document No. 223, enclosure.

No. 554

M305/M013047-50

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Italy*Draft Telegram ¹

BERLIN, December 23, 1940.

For the Ambassador personally.

I. On December 19 the Italian Ambassador handed the Führer an extensive list of requests for deliveries of raw materials of military importance.² The Führer promised expedited study of the matter. After examining the list, the Foreign Minister today informed the Italian Ambassador that we would, of course, help Italy within the limits of possibility. In the case of certain items, this was, to be sure, impossible because of our own supply situation. At any rate, it was necessary to give these matters detailed technical study and then to set up a joint program. The Reich Government requested that Giannini, Favagrossa, and other leading experts be sent to Berlin.

II. Please inform the Italian Government accordingly, and supplement your statement as follows:

At the talks, joint directives for organization and utilization will have to be drafted. It is naturally not admissible that raw materials which we turn over under great difficulties be used in Italy for non-essential purposes or even for export. It is also especially urgent that a program be set up for a division of the work between German and Italian industry in all cases in which a saving of raw materials and labor may thereby be effected and an immediate advantage derived from it while the war is still on. In this connection the question of the further dispatching of Italian laborers to Germany must also be discussed. In view of the great urgency of Italy's requests, it is not possible to postpone the negotiations until January 20. We therefore ask that Giannini come to Berlin as quickly as possible for short conversations with the appropriate policy-making persons. After the guiding principles are formulated and a program set up, subcommittees may meet and prepare material until January 20, in order that definitive agreements may be reached in the governmental committee session from January 20 on. The Wehrmacht is especially anxious for General Favagrossa to come to Berlin. It may also be necessary for Santoro³ to be present. Moreover, Giannini himself must, of course, decide whom he needs, in order to be able to negotiate here with immediate concrete results. We attach importance to the preliminary

¹ The draft telegram is marked No. 1908, but no time of dispatch is given.

² See document No. 538 and footnote 2.

³ Ernesto Santoro, a director general in the Ministry of Corporations.

conference in Berlin in order that, as a timesaving measure, all German key persons may be drawn in directly. Since it is a matter of satisfying Italy's wishes, there can be no doubt that the Italians are ready for the trip. The Military Attaché is being informed simultaneously to this effect by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Please discuss the question with the Government. As soon as we have the consent of the Italians, a detailed program will follow.

Report by telegram.⁴

⁴ Mackensen replied in telegrams Nos. 2353 of Dec. 24 (M305/M013052) and 2355 of Dec. 25 (M305/M013053-54), that he had discussed the proposed conference with Favagrossa and Giannini. Favagrossa would arrive in Berlin on Dec. 29 and a group headed by Giordani would depart for Berlin on Jan. 2 to discuss raw materials requirements, but neither Santoro nor Giannini would attend.

See document No. 619 and footnote 2.

CLODIUS

No. 555

233/156399-400 ;
233/156401-05

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 910

BERLIN, December 23, 1940.

Today the Argentine Ambassador¹ delivered to me the enclosed memorandum after a long-winded oral introduction. This is concerned with the plan for the gradual establishment of a customs union between Argentina and Brazil. The Ambassador asked that it be read and examined, and that the German position be made known, if necessary in another oral discussion.

The Ambassador remarked orally that by an extension of the customs union to "other adjacent countries" they meant the La Plata countries of Uruguay, Paraguay, and also Bolivia. Conversations with Uruguay had already been started and were making good progress, even more rapid than those with Brazil.

The Ambassador also explained what advantages, in his opinion, there could be for Germany in enlarged economic areas in South America. It would also surely not escape us that these ideas of a customs union were quite similar to the arrangement for a Greater European economic sphere planned by Germany. While the British war blockade was on, the whole plan had no great practical significance for Germany, of course. For the coming period of peace, however, Argentina believed she could expect Germany's full sympathy with

¹ Ricardo Olivera.

the plan. Perhaps the Argentine démarche would even provide the occasion for a spontaneous German declaration of sympathy and agreement.

I said that I would examine the memorandum later. Since in his well-known manner of negotiating the Ambassador tried to press me to express an agreement in general regarding the Argentine plan, I told him that because of the German most-favored-nation status in Argentina the latter seemed to me to require legal and also economic examination. Referring to the Ambassador's suggestion of a spontaneous declaration of sympathy I initiated a conversation on the treatment of the Germans in Argentina, regarding which a special memorandum will follow.²

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM³

A review of the economic and financial situation of the Republic indicates the existence of very serious problems. Already in the current year we shall have a deficit in our balance of payments, which it is estimated will reach the sum of 360 million pesos. The prospects for the year 1941 are even more disturbing because the total value of exports will not reach even a billion pesos. To permit a better appreciation of this situation we must recall that our exports reached the sum of 2,290 million pesos in 1937, will amount to 1,350 million pesos during the current year, and were 1,120 million pesos in the worst year of the past depression (1932). Rough estimates of the balance of payments with the other countries lead us to anticipate a deficit of about 600 million pesos for the coming year.

These figures suffice to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation. Considering this decline in our exports, considering the growing difficulties encountered in marketing the production surplus abroad, and considering the problems created by the shortage in foreign exchange needed for transfer payments for imported goods and for the interest service on the foreign debt, the Argentine Republic finds itself faced with the absolute necessity of taking all the appropriate measures calculated to promote the general development of its industries and in particular of those which use domestic products in their manufacturing processes.

² Weizsäcker memorandum of Dec. 23, not printed (233/156406).

³ This memorandum is in German and has the letterhead of the Argentine Embassy.

These plans have met an obstacle in the limited capacity of the country's consumer market, which precludes the rationalization of the industries in accordance with systems applied in other countries to achieve mass production.

As the Argentine Republic finds itself confronted with a problem which has developed in almost identical form in Brazil and other South American countries, the Argentine Government is seeking to achieve an over-all solution by means of agreements which would make possible the pooling of the consuming capacity of their respective markets, thus providing a stimulus for making decisions to establish new industries capable of absorbing the surpluses which cannot be marketed abroad.

In view of a concrete situation which we are unable to resolve, the Argentine Republic entertains the firm desire to coordinate its own economy to the largest possible extent with the economies of Brazil and the other adjacent American countries. This objective has prompted the suggestions drawn up by the Ministers of Finance of Argentina and Brazil at Rio de Janeiro on October 6 last. Their first two clauses read as follows:

"1. Consultation between the Governments of both countries with a view to initiating with the least possible delay the manufacture of goods not at present manufactured by either, in particular by means of the guarantee that within a period of 10 years the commerce in these goods would not be burdened by customs duties established for protective purposes, or made subject to regulations of an internal or external character, calculated to curtail in either country the import of goods from the other; excepted are such measures as are taken by mutual agreement in accordance with the provisions of clause 2. Examination and recommendations by the delegations of both countries regarding the ways and means of applying the foregoing provision to:

"a) Goods now being manufactured in only one of the two countries, exclusive of goods subject to duties of other than protective tariff character;

"b) Goods which are only of slight economic importance in one of the two countries at the present time. As to the industries which are already of economic importance, the possibility will be examined of gradually eliminating or reducing the duties without disrupting current production or injuring the national economy.

"2. To negotiate uniform procedures designed to provide an accurate record of fluctuations and imbalances in mutual trade. Where a deficit appears at the end of periods, which should not be less than 6 months, the country whose exports exceed its imports must upon request of the other country take the measures necessary to establish a balanced condition at an early date, preferably such measures as aim to increase its imports rather than reduce its exports."

Formulation of these principles was not prompted by a desire to pursue a policy of excluding competitors, but rather by a wish of finding a way to cope with the present realities. We believe that these agreements can be reconciled with the liberal policy which we have always pursued in the field of international economy.

Even if the advantages which Argentina, Brazil, and other adjacent countries might grant reciprocally to one another are not generally extended to all other states, they do not constitute obstacles to the intensification of trade with third countries. It can, on the contrary, be stated with assurance that the capacity of the South American countries to consume now and in the future will be in direct proportion to the welfare, prosperity, and living standard of their working masses. It is a well-known fact that the countries with the highest level of industrial development are also the countries with the largest volume of foreign trade which, by the infinite variety of products which they must sell and buy, help create work in the countries with which they maintain a vigorous trade.

The implementation of the proposed agreements is absolutely essential if the difficult problems confronting the Argentine economy are to be resolved in part at least; by the spirit as well as the form in which we propose to apply them, these agreements will have no adverse effect whatever on the volume of purchases which the Argentine Republic ordinarily makes in Germany.

On the contrary, if these agreements accomplish the results hoped for, there is every reason to anticipate a rise in the general demand for manufactured products of those countries which have already reached the peak of industrial development.

The method thought to be best adapted to the practical execution of the plan to coordinate the economies of these countries as well as the economies of the other countries of this part of the Continent, which should wish to associate themselves with the system, would be the creation of a customs union designed eventually to embrace all countries and eliminate any barriers existing between them at the present time; but for reasons of a practical nature, which are readily perceived, and in order to avert any conflicts with powerful interest groups within each individual country, it is felt that the customs union ought to be put into effect only gradually in such way that there would at first be only a partial elimination of the barriers separating these neighboring nations, which are linked among themselves not only by ties of contiguity but also by easily understandable historical factors.

It is indisputable that the agreement which links our nation with Germany does not in any way bar arrangement of a customs union with her neighbors, and it is equally indubitable that in the event of

the consummation of the customs union, the most-favored-nation clause of that agreement should not operate to make applicable to the Reich the elimination of duties in consequence of the [customs] union.

This Government believes that the fact that the proposed customs union would at first be incomplete, cannot affect the relationship of these countries to Germany, just as it would not be affected by the subsequent establishment of new internal barriers within an already existing and complete customs union or within an internationally recognized national economic entity. That, it would seem, is purely a matter of domestic concern and could not raise any international issues; but since the planned agreement with Brazil might at first glance be viewed as an agreement involving the granting of mutual concessions which nations, at present separated, would extend to one another, the Argentine Government wanted to bring the foregoing facts to the attention of the Reich Government, trusting that this would put the latter in a position to consider the planned agreement on the basis of more specific knowledge of the subject.

This Government trusts, on the other hand, that once the Argentine-Brazilian agreement is settled and put into practice the result for Germany will not be a reduction of her trade with these nations but, on the contrary, an expansion of trade—a possibility that could result from our higher economic development—and that the Government of the Reich therefore will interpose no objection to the realization of a project which at the same time would be of such great interest to this part of America.

No. 556

1126/321926-31

*Ambassador Ritter to the Foreign Minister*¹

BERLIN, December 23, 1940.
zu Pol. I 1607² II g. Rs.

1. Enclosed is a timetable that has been worked out for the first stage of Operation *Marita*.³

2. Antonescu has already expressed his agreement to the German Minister in Bucharest. He requests only that provisions be supplied

¹ This letter was sent on Dec. 23 to Hauptsturmführer Schulze, one of Ribbentrop's Aides-de-Camp, with the instruction that it be opened only by the Foreign Minister himself (1126/321925).

Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting at the top of the document: "[For] F[ührer]."

² Pol. I 1607: Not found.

³ Document No. 511.

from Germany, as Field Marshal Keitel had promised him earlier.⁴ This is referred to in telegram No. 2357 of December 21 from the Legation at Bucharest.⁵

Bulgaria. Supplementing the conversation between the Führer and King Boris,⁶ it is necessary to speak to the Bulgarian Government right away, still in December, if possible, regarding the early date and the details. This is necessary because bridge construction, fuel depots, supply depots, barracks, etc., must be started in Bulgaria as soon as possible.

I request instructions as to whether I am to give instructions to the German Minister in Sofia to this effect or whether the Reich Foreign Minister himself, as previously mentioned, will take care of what is further necessary with regard to Bulgaria.⁷

RITTER

[Enclosure]

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, December 21, 1940.

High Command of the Wehrmacht

WFSt. Abt. L(I) No. 33 435/40 g.K Chefs

GERMAN MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN THE BALKANS

The Wehrmacht mission in Rumania consisting originally of one reinforced armored division, some units of the Luftwaffe, and instructors for the war academy and similar courses is at present being reinforced by another armored division. (Transportation through Hungary to Rumania from December 13 to 25.)

The Führer has, moreover, in view of the situation in the Balkans, now ordered the assembling of a large force in southern Rumania, independent of the Wehrmacht mission, and Field Marshal List has been designated as its commander. Its task will be to push through friendly Bulgaria, if necessary, without touching Yugoslav or Turkish territory, toward the Aegean coast—and, depending on the situation, even further, into Greece—thereby eliminating the English in this area. The possibility of such German action was indicated to General Antonescu on his visit to Berlin by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht as early as the end of November.⁸ General Antonescu agreed and asked only that his people be spared considerable material burdens. This was promised to him.

⁴ See document No. 388 and footnote 1.

⁵ Document No. 544.

⁶ See document No. 378 and footnote 2.

⁷ Marginal note: "Bulgarian Minister President is coming Jan. 5-10, 1941; if at all possible [Jan.] 5. R[itter]."

⁸ See document No. 570 and footnote 1.

⁹ See document No. 388.

It is intended that in this operation the Bulgarian Army should take over flank protection against Turkey; military intervention by the latter is considered unlikely, however.

Whether Yugoslavia will join in a German attack by seizing Salonika is not clear.

Specifically, the timetable of the military measures is as follows:

Rumania:

December 21.

The Chief of the German Wehrmacht mission (General Hansen) has been instructed to announce in Rumania at once, jointly with the German Minister, the units that will arrive up to the middle of January.⁹ At the same time General Hansen will state that the reinforcement is taking place as a result of the situation in the Balkans, particularly for the protection of the oil region. The transports which will follow in the second half of January are to be announced in the same manner on January 2; further plans are to be announced step by step.

General Hansen has been authorized to hold conferences and make arrangements with the Rumanian General Staff with the reservation that *offensive* plans (into Bulgaria) are not to be discussed.

End of December—beginning of January.

German engineer formations will appear on the Rumanian bank of the *Danube*. Preparations for crossing the river (bridge construction, etc.)—camouflaged as much as possible at first—will in the course of January become increasingly noticeable. In southern Rumania, German troops (especially tank and motorized units) will arrive continually by rail.

On certain stretches in Hungary and Rumania, because of the increase in the number of troop and supply transports, the military timetable must be introduced as of 12:00 o'clock midnight on January 1, 1940 [1941]. A severe curtailment of domestic commercial and passenger traffic will then become necessary.

The chief of the transportation system of the Wehrmacht has been instructed to discuss the necessary measures in both countries. It seems advisable to support this by appropriate steps on the part of the Foreign Ministry and to have, for this purpose, in addition a close cooperation in Bucharest with the Chief of the German Wehrmacht mission.

End of January.

Apart from the Wehrmacht mission (two armored divisions and units of the Luftwaffe) which are distributed more or less over the

⁹ See document No. 544.

country, 7-8 divisions will be stationed, by this time, in *southern* Rumania. Whether additional large forces will be brought up has not yet been decided.

Bulgaria:

In Bulgaria at present is the "Reconnaissance Staff Sofia," consisting of 15 Army officers, and besides a small reconnaissance group each of the Navy and the Luftwaffe. The most important task of these staffs, dispatched in civilian clothing, is the reconnaissance of road and operational conditions. The chief of the "Reconnaissance Staff Sofia" (Colonel Zeitzler of the General Staff) is instructed to request of the Bulgarian General Staff the reinforcement of some overpasses (by the Bulgarian Labor Service). German financial aid is promised.

The establishment of installations for rations and supplies in Bulgaria has been scheduled for later, depending on how the situation develops.

Reconnaissance activity will presumably increase in the course of January. The closer the time approaches for constructing bridges over the Danube—this can not yet be determined today and is also dependent upon weather conditions—the clearer Germany's intention to move in with troops will become.

To sum up:

The picture emerges that the German concentration of troops in Rumania will create unrest in the Balkans, probably also in Soviet Russia. It is not impossible that the very concentration of German troops on the Danube will produce a yielding attitude on the part of Greece, and it is therefore desirable to strengthen, by appropriate means, the impression of a large concentration of troops.¹⁰

To Soviet Russian inquiries to this effect, which are to be expected with certainty, the reply may be given that Germany could not permit the English to gain a foothold in the Balkans and, moreover, she was obligated as a result of Rumania's accession to the Tripartite Pact, to protect her. The troop concentration effected for these reasons, was, however, by no means directed against Russia; ¹¹ this was indicated by the very fact that the concentration was exclusively in *southern* Rumania.¹²

It will be important for Soviet Russia to know that Germany has no designs of any kind against Yugoslavia or Turkey.

¹⁰ Question mark and marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "This is correct with regard to Turkey. Argument is wrong with regard to Greece."

¹¹ Question marks, apparently referring to the foregoing passage, appear on the face of the original text.

Marginal note: "With regard to such foreign policy instructions to the leading military commanders, Ambassador Ritter must be consulted in advance. R[ibbentrop]."

¹² See document No. 616.

The Italians, for the present, are being informed only in a general way through the Military Attaché in Rome that the German Wehrmacht mission in Rumania is being strengthened by several divisions.

JODL

No. 557

2361/488304-07

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, December 23, 1940.

Subject: Excerpt from the reports of November 26 and 28, 1940,¹ of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow.

I send you herewith an excerpt from a report of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow,² which I have received from a reliable source. The report, to be sure, dates back to the end of November, but is very informative because of its general conclusions. It may be assumed to be correct if the Ambassador writes that the English and Americans are constantly making propaganda with the idea of a combined German-Japanese attack on Russia; presumably they will have some success along this line, too.

PAPEN

[Enclosure]

Moscow, November 26, 1940.

EXCERPT FROM THE LAST REPORT OF THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR
IN MOSCOW

As I mentioned in my last report, the Soviet Foreign Minister is satisfied with the attitude of Turkey. The completely unexpected victories of the Greeks in Albania have been received with great surprise and joy in the Soviet world. The defeats of the Italians in Albania have prevented the strengthening of the Axis Powers in the Balkans. The attitude of Turkey toward the Bulgarians, and the restraint of the Bulgarians, have been very gratifying to the key people in Moscow. As far as the Soviets themselves are concerned, they by no means desire an attack on the Balkans that could only destroy their influence. The feelers I have put out have produced this impression. Just as the Soviets are watching with concern the large military concentrations carried out increasingly by the Japanese in Manchukuo, so they are also greatly alarmed at the heavy troop concentrations which the Germans are undertaking in all secrecy in Poland and Rumania. The English Ambassador and the Americans

¹ The excerpt from the report of Nov. 28 which is in the nature of a postscript is not printed (2361/488308).

² Ali Haydar Aktay.

greatly suspect that the Germans will abandon their air and naval warfare in its present form and in May or June will, together with the Japanese, fall upon the Soviets. Once Germany has realized that she cannot invade the English mother country, she will, in order to prolong the war, try to exploit the untouched Russian areas, which are rich in the necessary raw materials. It is almost certain that, before the Americans are thoroughly prepared, she [Germany] together with the Japanese will want to overthrow the Soviets. This, too, is my own conviction. It is clear as day that both the Japanese and the Germans, in order to make the war with America and England go on, will destroy the Soviets, who have been quarrelsome and cantankerous toward them on every occasion, and then, as undisputed rulers of Asia, East, Central, and even Western Europe, will prolong the war with the Anglo-Saxons and set about to crush them, exploiting Asia's inexhaustible sources of raw materials. I have actually sensed this fear in the Russian leaders and in the Foreign Ministry. The English³ and American⁴ Ambassadors here have probably pointed out these dangers to the Soviet Foreign Minister. The Russians are of the opinion that as soon as the Americans have completed their preparations, they will have a force capable of dealing the Japanese decisive blows. For the time being they treat the Germans and Japanese with cautious restraint. At the moment when the Americans will have driven the Japanese, and the English the Germans seriously into a corner, the Russians, too, will begin to strike against the Germans as well as against the Japanese. The Soviets are deep in major military preparations in order to protect themselves against a joint blow from the Germans and Japanese in the spring. It is my guess that some changes and reorganization will very shortly take place in the Soviet Army. When the English become stronger in the areas of Turkey, of Iran, of Afghanistan, and of Iraq, or, rather, as soon as, together with these states, they have strengthened their military power in the Near East, they will thereby to a large extent create breathing space for the Soviets. A two-front war breaking out in Soviet Russia in the spring may produce grave dangers for that country. Even if it has our help and that of the English, it is still possible, considering the internal situation, that this huge world, which cannot be called healthy, will be more or less shaken. In order to strengthen the morale of that country, it may not be disadvantageous to emphasize in the press again and again that, in such a situation, English and Turkish aid would most certainly be forthcoming. Even though the Soviets for the present hesitate to let any understanding or close friendship with the English or with us become apparent, they nevertheless sincerely applaud the fact that we are the

³ Sir Stafford Cripps.

⁴ Laurence A. Steinhardt.

friends of the Soviets. The Russians, too, understand all these things. It is the opinion of the English and Americans here that the Germans are contemplating war with the Russians in the spring. I cannot assume that the Soviet armies will hold out for long against the German armies, renowned for their speed and mobility. Quite undoubtedly the Rumanians, Finland, and the population of the Baltic coast will also aid the Germans in such a war. From the East the Japanese are able to proceed to large-scale operations. If a collapse, such as in France, comes, it will be very easy to set up a puppet government. It is necessary to keep in mind the advent of such occurrences, which will perhaps not come today or tomorrow. That is my opinion. I view all events relating to affairs of state at close range. I have heard that the Soviets are making extensive military preparations along the German frontiers and are erecting solid fortifications at various strategic points. Mr. Cripps is likewise in close contact with the Soviet leaders, as is also the American Embassy here. The Soviets are very noticeably preparing for defense. Nevertheless they show great fear of angering the Germans. I shall soon submit my report on the questions of trade and frontiers. The last warning of the Soviets to the Bulgarians is very important.⁵ This action taken by the Soviets even at the risk of angering the Germans did not do very much to spread the conflagration in the Balkans. The Soviet contacts with the Germans are veiled in mystery. I assume that the Germans have requested still more extensive economic assistance from the Russians. It is certain that the Russians have complied with this request. As I have indicated above, the Soviets will bide their time until England and America have completed their preparations. Thereafter they might possibly proceed to action, jointly with them.

This ends my report.

HIDER OMKAYI (?) [sic]

⁵ See documents Nos. 373, 379, and 403.

No. 558

859/204166-67

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, December 24, 1940—1:25 a. m.

SECRET

Received December 24—5:20 a. m.

No. 2367 of December 23

Special security handling. Reply by courier or in secret code.

For the Ambassador and Schnurre.

I. The boundary treaty cannot be concluded before the compensation for the so-called Lithuanian tip has been arranged.¹ As the

¹ See document No. 550.

Führer is away from Berlin, the earliest that a decision in this matter can probably be reached is between Christmas and the New Year or in the first part of January, and the "wish" of the Soviet Government for simultaneous settlement of all questions still during the old year will accordingly not be fulfilled. Since Dekanozov likewise brought the matter up with the Foreign Minister on the 21st,² the Embassy here will be informed accordingly on December 24.³

The Foreign Minister is commissioning Schnurre to remain in Moscow and to negotiate all *other* questions conclusively so that the signing can be undertaken as soon as the tip question has been clarified. The text of the boundary treaty⁴ has been prepared here and will be sent to the Embassy. It will probably be possible to reach a quick agreement on the text as soon as the compensation question has been clarified. Nöldeke, and Benzler who returns to Riga this evening, have been instructed to conclude the negotiations and to sign if all the points of difference can be cleared up and the Russians are willing to sign.

II. The Foreign Minister takes the view that compensation for relinquishment of the Lithuanian tip must be provided in gold⁵ or in unmistakably additional deliveries of grain and raw materials in an amount still to be agreed upon, quite independent of the economic agreement. Please report by telegram what sort of additional delivery is in your opinion possible.⁶

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 545.

³ See document No. 560 and footnote 3.

⁴ See document No. 579.

⁵ Marginal note in Schulenburg's handwriting: "The Soviet Government has offered gold. At least that is my understanding of the dollar offer."

⁶ See document No. 560.

No. 559

265/172542

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1057 of December 24 ANKARA, December 24, 1940—6:39 p. m.

Received December 25—2:05 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

I am very grateful for the instructions contained in your telegram No. 715 of December 22,¹ of which I informed the Foreign Minister today.

¹ Document No. 548.

Saracoglu was very glad that it is still our intention to find a new basis for a relationship of greater trust; he said that the Turkish Government unalterably desired the same thing, all the more so, since events have largely eliminated the motive for conducting a pact with England, namely fear of Italian imperialism. The visit of the English Ambassador² with the State President had been exclusively concerned with a discussion of the Karabük smelting works which had been constructed by the English. These works were supplying only half of the capacity contracted for. The President had visited it in the last few days.

The Bulgarian Minister is expected back tomorrow with proposals of his Government.³ Regarding the Churchill speech to Italy⁴ I told the Foreign Minister it showed that England was ready to sell out Turkey tomorrow in a separate peace with Italy. Saracoglu did not contradict me.

I return most sincerely the good wishes for the holidays. May the new year bring rich success to your work.

PAPEN

² Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

³ See document No. 433 and footnote 6. On Jan. 5, Papen reported in telegram No. 12 that Kirov, the Bulgarian Minister in Turkey who had just returned to Ankara, had told him he would explain to Saracoglu the Bulgarian position concerning an improvement of Turko-Bulgarian relations (265/172548).

⁴ The reference is to Churchill's message to the Italian people broadcast over the radio on Dec. 23 in which he stated that "one man and one man alone" bore the responsibility for Italy's involvement in the war against Britain. For the text, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1940-1943*, p. 4378.

No. 560

104/112767-68

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, December 24, 1940—7:50 p. m.

SECRET

Received December 24—11:00 p. m.

No. 2816 of December 24

With reference to your telegram No. 2367 of December 23.¹

I. Compensation for the Lithuanian tip. In our present situation gold is probably not a desirable form of compensation, since we ourselves give gold to Russia within the framework of the economic agreement and we cannot utilize it easily in other ways. Moreover, our gold reserves have increased considerably owing to the addition

¹ Document No. 558.

of Belgian and Dutch gold, so that there can hardly be any need for Russian gold. Whether U. S. dollars are actually desirable for us seems to me doubtful in view of the American financial measures that have been announced.

With regard to deliveries of grain and raw materials I believe that the maximum which the Soviet economy can provide in view of its own needs has been obtained in the economic agreement. Nevertheless, an effort can be made to obtain in addition certain raw materials of particular interest to us, such as grain, flax, manganese ore, cotton, and naphtha products, equivalent to the amount of compensation to be agreed upon. Should this not be successful, I would suggest having the compensation paid out of the special Soviet accounts in Berlin, amounting at present to 215 million reichsmarks, which cannot be adequately covered by payments to Balts and repayments of credits. The repayments from these special accounts would save us further deliveries of goods, the implementation of which would be difficult in the present strained state of our industry.

Since the difference between the last Soviet offer of 3,860,000 gold dollars and our sum of 13 million gold dollars calculated on the basis of the real property values is extremely large,² the best that can be attained, considering the Russian method of bargaining and haggling, is the mean between the two amounts. In view of the precarious situation of the economic agreement, which is ready for signing, and of the Baltic agreement, it would probably be well not to lose any time in completing the bargaining over the amount of compensation and to leave me a free hand as far as possible.

II. We have called off a conference with Molotov scheduled for today, since there were no instructions in the above-mentioned telegram and the text of the boundary treaty is not yet here. On the other hand I shall try today to bring to a conclusion with Vyshinsky the still unsettled questions in the Baltic treaty. We intend then to go to Molotov and tell him that the economic agreement and the Baltic treaty are now ready for signature, that the resettlement treaties can be signed in Riga and Kaunas as soon as the points of difference still open have been clarified, but that because of the still outstanding decision on the compensation question the boundary treaty cannot be negotiated until the next few days or the beginning of January. We shall at the same time put up to Molotov the question whether, in consideration of the fact that the situation has now been largely clarified, he still insists on delaying also the treaties that are ready for signature.

² See document No. 319.

III. I should appreciate your sending me immediately by telegram the text of the German statement to Dekanozov and also the draft of the boundary treaty.³

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

³ In telegram No. 2374 of Dec. 25 (1447/365036-37), the Foreign Ministry sent the substance of statement made to the Soviet Counselor of Embassy in Berlin informing him that Ribbentrop hoped to submit the question of the boundary treaty and of compensation for the Lithuanian strip of territory to Hitler between Christmas and the New Year. "In this case he could perhaps give M. Dekanozov the decision before the New Year. Otherwise it would be decided at the earliest at the beginning of January."

No. 561

121/120334

Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department

BERLIN, December 24, 1940.

With reference to telegram No. 279 of December 23 from Wiesbaden¹ regarding the trip of Chargé d'Affaires Murphy from Algiers to Dakar, the Foreign Minister requests that Ambassador Abetz be instructed at the next available opportunity to speak on his own initiative to General Huntziger about the trip, without indicating that he has instructions—possibly in the form of information from Berlin—and to present him with the following three questions:

- 1) That he, the General, had no knowledge at all of the fact that Murphy wished to visit General Weygand.
- 2) That Murphy had not expressed the intention to visit Weygand.
- 3) Whether he, Huntziger, could give the assurance on his word of honor as an officer that Murphy did not see Weygand, that Murphy also had no intention at all of seeing Weygand.²

Respectfully submitted to Herr Schwarzmann through the State Secretary.

ALTENBURG

¹ See document No. 529, footnote 2.

² In telegram No. 1605 of Dec. 30, Abetz reported that it had not yet been possible to find out anything "about the real objectives of Murphy's trip to North Africa and Dakar." (587/243408)

No. 562

B19/B003941

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2819 of December 24 Moscow, December 25, 1940—1:25 a. m.
Received December 25—4:10 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 2801 of the 23rd.¹

I. The Soviet leader of the negotiations yesterday informed Fieandt of the Soviet position on the Petsamo question, which gives undisguised expression to the Soviet standpoint.

The new Finnish-Russian company is to take over not only the concession but also the management of production. The Soviet Government wants 51 percent of the capital stock and demands a controlling voice in the matter of the persons composing the board of directors and exclusive Soviet business management. They want to furnish financial and technical assistance as well as to take out larger deliveries of material. In Petsamo pure nickel, too, is to be produced in the future.

II. Fieandt stated that he could not agree to this and would have to return to Helsinki to report. The Soviet side agreed to this. Consequently Fieandt and Grönblom are leaving this evening.

III. I told Fieandt that he should not resume the negotiations in Moscow until the German-Soviet economic treaty is signed. Contact should be maintained with the Soviet Government in a cautious and dilatory manner. I did not contradict Fieandt's opinion that execution of the Soviet plan would expose the Petsamo region to Soviet influence and promote Soviet-Communist infiltration from the north, especially since the Russians were obviously trying, under the pretext of technical assistance and expansion of the plants, to bring a large number of Soviet workers and officials to Petsamo.

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

¹ This telegram (M334/M014212-13) described the course of negotiations in Moscow on the Soviet demands with regard to the Petsamo nickel concession at which MM. Fieandt and Grönblom were the Finnish negotiators.

No. 563

84/62281-82

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, December 25, 1940—10:19 a. m.

No. 2813 of December 24

Received December 25—11:00 p. m.

Yesterday's statement by William Allen White, founder and chairman of the interventionist White Committee, which already comprises several million members, in which White for the first time (evidently a word missing) America's entry into the war, repeal of the Johnson Act, and amendment of the Neutrality Law, has attracted a great deal of attention all over the country.¹ The war- (evidently a word missing) of the White followers which has been growing increasingly hysterical in recent months, especially speeches by well-known hot-spurs belonging to the White Committee and a recent speech by White in New York in which he boasted of having used tricks² to extort the greatest possible aid—as for example the sale of 50 destroyers—in closest cooperation with the Federal Government as well as the Navy and War Departments—opened the eyes of many patriotic, noninterventionist Americans and brought about a sharp reaction.

The America First Committee under the leadership of General Wood received a powerful impetus and began, in a way similar to the White Committee, to establish local groups in all the states and cities. Moreover, a new committee called the No Foreign Wars Committee was established in New York under the leadership of Verne Marshall, the excellent editor of the *Cedar Rapids Gazette* in Cedar Rapids, Michigan [*Iowa*], which began a propaganda campaign against White together with the America First Committee and several isolationist Congressmen and Senators, headed by Senator Holt. White and the warmongers standing behind him were so hard-pressed that in recent weeks prominent members of the White Committee began to resign in all the local branches and White was now forced by Howard of the Scripps-Howard press, who put the question openly, to dissociate himself from the radical demands of many of his followers. It must at least have a sobering effect on the prevailing war psychosis when White suddenly states:

¹ On Dec. 23, the Scripps-Howard newspapers published statements by White in the form of an interview with newspaper publisher Roy Howard which denied, among other things, that the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies favored repeal of neutrality legislation or American military intervention in the war.

² The word "tricks" appears in English in the original.

"The Yankees won't come." "America would only play into the hands of Hitler if she should enter the war actively; the shipment of American war supplies to England on American merchant ships and the protection of convoys to England by American warships is not permissible in any circumstances."

The full text of the White statement follows en clair in No. 2814.³ White's retreat is in marked contrast to his own propaganda activity up to now and to British propaganda working for America's entry into the war, which he has heretofore aided and abetted in every way possible. The statement will without doubt have a cooling effect on the warmongers and spur the noninterventionist movement to further activity.

I also wish to mention in strict confidence that we have good relations with both isolationist committees and support them in various ways. In order that this cooperation be not compromised, I request that the work of the committees be passed over in silence in the German press and radio as far as possible.

THOMSEN

³ Not filmed.

No. 564

F14/239-46

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*¹

PARIS, December 24, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND ADMIRAL DARLAN IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADOR ABETZ AND CAPTAIN STEHLIN IN THE FÜHRER'S TRAIN AT BEAUVAIS, DECEMBER 24, 1940²

Admiral Darlan first thanked the Führer for granting him the honor of a reception and then conveyed to the Führer the personal Christmas-greetings of Marshal Pétain. After that he delivered two letters from Pétain and stated with reference to them that in one³ the Marshal ex-

¹ Marginal note: "F[or] F[ührer]."

² Document No. 565 and various subsequent communications from Abetz refer to this conversation as having been held on Dec. 25. A listing of Hitler's day-by-day activities from January 1934 to June 1943 ("Sekretär des Führers, Führer's Tagebuch," Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., Manuscripts Division, captured German documents), contains an entry for Dec. 25 stating that Hitler received Admiral Darlan that day. Schmidt himself in his book *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-45*, p. 512, gives Dec. 25 as the date of the meeting. See also Alain Darlan, *L'Amiral Darlan Parle* (Paris, 1952), pp. 263-267, for a record of the meeting by Darlan, who also gives the date as Dec. 25.

³ Not found.

pressed his thanks for the transfer of the mortal remains of the Duke of Reichstadt, while the other dealt with the matter of Laval.⁴

His personal impressions were that a strong personal conflict had developed some time ago between Pétain and Laval. Only 2 days before, he (Darlan) learned that as early as December 9 Pétain had drafted a letter to the Führer informing him that he was compelled to part with Laval. In consideration of Franco-German relations, he had wished to tell this to the Führer in advance and at the same time inform him that he would replace Laval by Flandin. This letter had already been in the hands of the representative of Pétain in Paris, General de La Laurencie, for the purpose of delivery. At the last moment, however, Marshal Pétain had changed his mind about the matter. Since discussions had been arranged for December 10 between Laval, Huntziger, and Darlan, on the one hand, and Ambassador Abetz and General Warlimont, on the other hand,⁵ Pétain thought that his letter about the matter of Laval would disturb these military negotiations and therefore instructed de La Laurencie not to deliver it. Pétain hoped that perhaps an agreement between him and Laval would still be possible. Subsequently, however, there had been other conflicts between Laval and Pétain on account of a trip of Laval's to Paris, so that Pétain, who was accustomed to considering his decisions carefully, saw himself compelled to ask for the resignation of the entire Cabinet and to accept that of Laval. Pétain had, however, instructed him (Darlan) to assure the Führer that this step was taken only because of the quarrel between him (Pétain) and Laval and in no sense represented a change in attitude toward the promises made by Pétain at Montoire. The policy of the new French Government would remain faithful to the idea of cooperation with Germany.

Darlan then told about the plans of Pétain regarding the reorganization of the Government. The French Government was to be made more homogeneous and harmonious, and the authority of those responsible was to be strengthened. For this purpose, a directorate of three persons under the chairmanship of Admiral Darlan would be formed. This directorate, of which Huntziger and Flandin would be members in addition to Darlan, was to advise the Marshal on general political questions, especially with regard to foreign policy and cooperation with Germany. The other Cabinet members would retain their responsibilities within their departments; they would, however, receive general policy directives from the directorate. Those ministers whose mistakes in connection with the events of December 13 had been pointed out would, if the Führer approved the plan of Pétain for the

⁴ See document No. 566.

⁵ See documents Nos. 490 and 506.

reorganization of the government, be replaced by other men who would offer absolute assurance that mistakes such as those committed on December 13 would not occur again.

The Führer replied that he personally had been very deeply angered by the motives that had been imputed to his gesture when he had the mortal remains of the Duke of Reichstadt sent to Paris. During recent months the Government of Vichy had several times requested that it be allowed to transfer its seat to Paris or Versailles.⁶ After mature consideration he (the Führer) had rejected these requests because he had been convinced that the authority of the French Government would have suffered from the criticism, which could have been made in that case, that it was under German pressure. The fact that the decision of the Führer to send the mortal remains of the Duke of Reichstadt to Paris had been attributed to the motives mentioned previously was an unheard of infamy and would keep him from making such a gesture again.

Fundamentally it could be a matter of indifference to Germany what persons were in the French Government. If relations between France and Germany were to remain the same as before, it was actually quite immaterial who represented the French Government. He (the Führer) had, however, tried to improve German-French relations. This attempt had not been made under any kind of pressure, for even before the war he had—unfortunately in vain—striven for the same goal. During the pre-war years he had been of the opinion that it was senseless for two states of the Continent to live in perpetual, hereditary enmity with each other. Almost every month he had therefore made offers to the French Government for the improvement of German-French relations, and in so doing had gone exceedingly far. This had been interpreted as a sign of weakness on his part and it had been believed that he made far-reaching friendly offers to France because he was not capable of any other policy. The events of the war had taught those responsible for the rejection of the German offers something different and presumably convinced them that these offers had not proceeded from weakness.

Therefore, he (the Führer) had, from the time of the Armistice, again tried to improve German-French relations. He was solemnly stating, however, that this was the last attempt to initiate a policy of cooperation between the two nations. It had not escaped him (the Führer) that this time also a certain segment of public opinion as well as some prominent personalities believed that this was done as a result of weakness or other worries. He believed, however, that if French policy continued in the direction which it now seemed to

⁶ See documents Nos. 418 and 528, footnote 1.

have taken—and he feared that this would happen—developments would teach the much more terrible lesson that this motive of weakness had in no wise been at the root of his decisions.

Marshal Pétain, with whom he had hoped to bring about a long-range change in the relations between the two countries, was invited by him to cooperate because he (the Führer) believed that Pétain as a soldier would still be most likely to have a clear military understanding of the actual situation in contrast to the fanciful views of the politicians.

In the course of years Laval had not been politically active in any way as spokesman of a radical hostility toward Germany in France. After the French collapse he had taken a positive stand on the idea of cooperation, a fact which, incidentally, Pétain confirmed in his letter to the Führer.⁷ If Laval's person was represented as an intolerable element in the Government, as was now being done, he (the Führer) found it rather tactless that a meeting between him and Laval had been permitted to come about at all. It would undoubtedly have been more proper to spare him these conversations with Laval. He (the Führer) did not, however, believe in this reason for Pétain's action against Laval, but saw as the main reason the remark in Pétain's letter "that a further continuation of Laval in the Cabinet would greatly endanger the unity of the empire."⁸ This meant in other words that General Weygand in such an event reserved full freedom in taking a position. He (the Führer) was afraid that the French Government was setting out again on the same road which had led it to Vichy. He regretted this and believed that France would understand sooner or later that this was one of the most regrettable decisions that France had made for a long time, from her own point of view.

Darlan replied that the Marshal had assigned him an important role in the political life of France, and that for this reason he really wanted to explain to the Führer his views about the situation. When the Führer granted France an armistice, he (Darlan), as Commander of the Fleet, had naturally asked himself what position he should take in this matter.

The fact that the Führer granted France an armistice at a time when he could without difficulty have occupied the whole country, had appeared to him (Darlan) as a sure proof of the intention of the Führer to assign to France a quite definite place in the reconstruction of Europe. As a matter of fact, he (Darlan) could have sailed to America of course, also with the whole French fleet; then the Armis-

⁷ This could refer to the letter of Dec. 13 (document No. 510) as well as to the one of Dec. 17 transmitted in document No. 530.

⁸ See document No. 566.

tice would have become void. Since, however, in his opinion the only hope for conquered France rested in cooperation with Germany in the framework of the new European order, he had given the fleet the order to follow Marshal Pétain. This had not been so easy for the fleet, for it had had the prospect of fighting gloriously against the Italian fleet. He had, however, explained the situation to his officers [*seinen Herren*] again and again and pointed out to them that it was entirely wrong to meet Germany in a poisoned and hate-filled atmosphere, from which there resulted only ruins and misery, first in one country and then in another. As Europeans the French had to cooperate loyally with Germany, to an extent which was to be determined by the Führer. France, as a conquered country—and he (Darlan) did not forget this fact for a moment—could cooperate only so far as this was desired and determined by Germany.

Personally he had always, since playing a role in the public life of France, been a supporter of German-French cooperation. Since the Führer had spoken of certain mistakes of French foreign policy before the war, he wished to state in this connection that, during all the 20 years that had elapsed since the last war, no naval chief in France had ever been consulted on foreign policy. If this had been done, events would have taken a different turn.

In the further course of the conversation, Darlan frankly admitted that since December 13 many inept acts had been committed by the French, and that the Führer might feel he was indirectly hit by the replacement of Laval. He emphasized, however, that if Germany desired—and as victor her wish was in effect decisive—France was ready to continue the cooperation in accordance with the meeting of Montoire. The French had merely the one idea of maintaining this cooperation, which now was absolutely necessary for France and could become profitable to both countries in the future. He was fully in accord with a thought occasionally expressed by the Führer: that nothing could be built upon hate. This was also true, in particular, of the new order in Europe.

In conclusion, Darlan remarked with reference to the Laval affair that he had nothing against him personally and, as Ambassador Abetz could verify, had always worked well together with him. On this occasion he also wanted to give expression to the satisfaction with which the French Government was cooperating with Ambassador Abetz. Nevertheless, as matters stood, he felt compelled to say that if Laval re-entered the Government, it would greatly compromise the policy of cooperation in France. English propaganda was still very strong and was striving to create dissension in the French Government. In the interest of France, Laval therefore had first, to “remain in the shadow”—not forever, but still for a certain time. If Laval, as he recently stated, loved France, he would surely himself be willing

to maintain an attitude of reserve for the time being. If German-French cooperation made progress, the future would certainly do him justice. If cooperation did not materialize, the French Government would not thereby render its country any service. The salvation of France lay, according to his firm personal conviction, in seeking cooperation with Germany. For cooperation, however, two were necessary. The victor, who was master of the situation, had to participate. Therefore he requested most respectfully that Germany continue the cooperation with France.

The Führer then closed the conversation with the remark that he would give a written reply to the letter of Pétain.

SCHMIDT

No. 565

121/120338

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1592 of December 25

PARIS, December 25, 1940—5:40 p. m.

Received December 25—6:00 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The letter from Pétain delivered today by Darlan does not contain anything new as regards the last communication from Pétain. In the Laval matter a hardening of position is, indeed, to be noted. The Führer told Darlan that he gave no credence to the reasons advanced for the resignation of Laval. He intended to reply to Marshal Pétain in writing. Text of Pétain's letter will follow by teletype.¹

ABETZ

¹ See document No. 566.

No. 566

121/120339-44

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

Unnumbered

PARIS, December 25, 1940—6:30 p. m.

Received December 25—7:40 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Letter from Pétain to the Führer.¹

Marshal Pétain, Chief of State, to His Excellency Herr Adolf Hitler, Reich Chancellor. Herr Reich Chancellor, I have instructed

¹ The text of the letter is in French in the original.

Admiral of the Fleet Darlan, upon whom I have just conferred the presidency of the directorate of my Government and who, I feel, should succeed me if I pass away, to deliver this personal letter to Your Excellency.

I am anxious, indeed, that all the misunderstandings, if there are any which may have arisen between us on the occasion of the last change in my Government, should disappear.

If Your Excellency could indeed have believed—or if someone could have told you—that the decisions which I was induced to make, particularly with regard to M. P. Laval, were caused by a change in my policy, a sort of going back on my explicit intentions to practice loyal cooperation with Germany, I hope first of all to correct this impression.

In a separate letter,² I am expressing to you my gratitude for the noble gesture made by Your Excellency in returning to the Tomb of the Invalides—where that man sleeps who was undoubtedly the first one to have a vision of Europe and its interests—the remains of a son, deprived of the inheritance of his father by the insular enemy who had laid him low.

I desire, indeed, to avoid this time intermingling my own troubles and the appreciation of a gesture which will be recorded in the annals of history and the importance of which I would wish to see progressively and better understood by the French.

I apologize for being compelled to hold your attention by a rather detailed statement of the facts, but I desire that nothing remain obscure in order that tomorrow, if, as I hope, we should meet again, we might speak as man to man, with absolute assurance of entire good faith.

On December 17, 1940, I handed to your Ambassador, Herr Abetz, a letter,³ in which I explained to you that I would proceed to a re-organization of my Government after having conducted a personal investigation, on the one hand into the exact merits of the complaints which have induced me to part with M. Laval, and on the other hand, into the dealings of which Ambassador Abetz had accused my collaborators, MM. Peyrouton, Caziot, and Bélin.

I had understood perfectly well the interest in seeing to it that the change in the composition of my Government, and particularly the departure of M. Laval, could not be interpreted by public opinion as a sort of repudiation of the policy of cooperation, which I desire to continue to develop with your support.

It was in this spirit that as early as December 20 I had your Ambassador, Herr Abetz, informed by M. de Brinon,⁴ whom I had appointed as successor to General de La Laurencie, that I had decided particularly:

To create a directorate within the Government, composed of Admiral Darlan, as president, General Huntziger, and M. P. E. Flandin, which would take the place of the Council of Ministers for the purpose of making all urgent decisions of a governmental nature;

² Not found.

³ See document No. 530.

⁴ See document No. 543 and footnote 1.

To create three committees within the Council of Ministers, each of them presided over by a member of the governmental directorate, to hasten the solution of all governmental business and assure harmonious action of the ministries, in line with the general policy of my Government.

I trust that this new organization will be able to give a happy impetus to the well-known position of Admiral Darlan, of M. Flandin, and of General Huntziger with regard to this policy of cooperation and that it will leave French public opinion in no doubt as to the desire of my Government to support me in a task for which I have taken high personal responsibility and which I intend to pursue in the true spirit of our Montoire conversations.

The investigation which I had undertaken to make concerning M. Laval and the circumstances which attended his departure have led me to the following conclusions:

My grievances against M. Laval are well-founded. The attitude which he took toward me in the presence of Herr Abetz, subsequent to the conversation which I had with the latter, renders impossible henceforth and for an indeterminate period the participation of M. Laval in the Government which I lead. Even if I wished it, the improper conduct of M. Laval now being largely a matter of common knowledge, I would risk inflicting a dangerous blow to the unity of the empire. I do not have the right to take this risk, either with respect to you or with respect to the French people, who have entrusted me, and me alone, with their destiny.

On the other hand, I have recognized that various unfortunate occurrences had attended the dismissal of M. Laval. I decided, after the investigation and for reasons of principle, to replace the Minister of Justice and to dissolve the groups of protection; the responsibility of M. Peyrouton in these events must be ruled out.

The investigation concerning MM. Bélin and Caziot made it possible for me to secure very pertinent explanations of their attitude toward the policy of Franco-German cooperation which they declare they have loyally followed and which they sincerely wish to see developed.

Nevertheless, as far as other changes within my Government are concerned, and in the case of M. Bélin, in particular, I have asked M. de Brinon to inform Ambassador Abetz that I shall have to take various measures. These measures are of an internal nature and will not fail to affect favorably the development of the policy of cooperation, with regard to which I shall tolerate neither deviation nor half-heartedness on the part of any of my collaborators.

I have faithfully kept the promises that I made to Ambassador Abetz in the interview I had with him on December 17 (and not the 18th, as stated in the communication that Ambassador Abetz was directed to transmit to me and which M. de Brinon actually did transmit to me on December 22⁵).

The letter which I handed to Herr Abetz, at Vichy, on December 17,⁶ for transmission to you, did not, therefore, precede my conversa-

⁵ See document No. 546.

⁶ See document No. 530.

tion with Herr Abetz, and I was surprised to find attributed to me an attitude which is in conformity with neither the texts nor the facts.

I take the liberty of drawing your attention to the following paragraph in my letter of December 17:

"I have hesitated for a long time to separate myself from him (M. Laval), because I appreciated at its true value the role that he played in the preparation and the beginnings of Franco-German cooperation. But our differences of opinion concerning the operations of government and the methods to be employed in cleaning up the administration and the country rendered inevitable a crisis showing the impossibility of retaining him at my side as my principal collaborator."

The first draft of this paragraph had been communicated to Herr Abetz in a more finished form, thus:

"I hesitated for a long time to separate myself from him because I appreciated at its true value the role which he played in the preparation and beginnings of Franco-German cooperation. But our differences of opinion concerning the operations of government and the methods to be employed in cleaning up the administration and the country, his underhanded and continual attacks on the majority of his colleagues, the mistrust which the country increasingly manifested toward him, the risks that his unpopularity entailed for the policy of cooperation, finally his irregular methods of work and the complete ignorance, as it were, in which he left his colleagues and me—even with regard to the result of the negotiations at Paris—rendered inevitable a crisis showing the impossibility of retaining him at my side as my principal collaborator."

At the request of Herr Abetz, I agreed to tone down the expression of my grievances on the condition that they be communicated officially to your Government. Such an attitude on my part was not compatible with the immediate return, or even the return within a short time of M. Laval into the Government.

Please believe, Herr Chancellor, that if, despite the insistent steps taken by Ambassador Abetz, I am unable to decide to give M. Laval a place in the Government, it is not solely from concern over preserving authority and dignity, although these are indispensable to the exercise of my high functions as Chief of the State.

I am anxious to carry out a policy which will draw the French people closer to the German people. The policy of cooperation is easier for the victor than for the vanquished. I need the adherence of all the French for the new course that I am proposing to their minds and hearts. I must retain their confidence and win their consent. The men who surround me and assist me can be useful assistants if they themselves possess the confidence of the country.

I have had to bow to the fact that this was not the case with M. Laval, whose personal unpopularity, which stems from other causes, at the same time endangered the success of the policy of cooperation and of my work of national reconstruction.

With him, in domestic policy, as in foreign policy, the work to which I have dedicated myself: 'The restoration of the material and moral forces of France, in order that she may become, in the new Europe, the useful partner in the cooperation to which you have generously invited her.'

'This sentence is garbled in the original; apparently a passage has been left out.

I am a soldier and know nothing of the wiles of the politicians. The person of this one or that one of my collaborators counts but little with respect to the task which I have assumed and the responsibility for which obliges me and will always oblige me to choose the best ones to aid me.

You must, Herr Chancellor of the Reich, yourself desire that I exercise this choice freely. The responsibility before my people to bring to an honorable conclusion this policy of cooperation between Germany and France devolves upon me alone. Referring to our personal conversations, I remain convinced that you remain as faithfully attached to this cooperation as I myself am. It alone can, for the first time in the history of our peoples, transform a series of wars into an era of lasting peace and fruitful cooperation.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurances of my very high esteem. Ph. Pétain.

Close of the letter.

ABETZ

No. 567

B19/B003940

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union and to the Legations in Sweden and Finland

BERLIN, December 25, 1940.

Pol. VI 4038 g.¹ III.

For confidential information.

The German Legation in Stockholm has been instructed by telegram² to inform the Swedish Government that in our view the Russian Government would react very negatively to a Swedish-Finnish union and that we consider it inopportune to give Russia a chance to take a negative attitude toward Finland.

The German Legation in Helsinki has been instructed³ to tell the Finnish Government that we must advise against prosecution of the plans for a closer alliance between Sweden and Finland, since that would bring about a negative change in the Russian attitude toward Finland and an agreement of that kind would even be considered by Russia as tantamount to a liquidation of the Russian-Finnish peace treaty of March 12, 1940.

By order:
WOERMANN

¹ Pol. VI 4038 g. : Document No. 547.

² Not found.

³ Instructions not found.

No. 568

2219/475197-99

The Head of the Economic Delegation in the Soviet Union to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

At Moscow, December 25, 1940.

DEAR HERR MINISTER: The decisive significance which the new economic agreement, now ready for signature, has for the German war economy and the conduct of the war prompts me to call your attention in this direct way to the dangerous situation which will ensue if the signature is delayed for any length of time. The new economic agreement is the largest that Germany has ever concluded and goes considerably beyond the first agreement with the Russians. It obligates the Russians to make very extensive deliveries of raw materials in the very areas where we have shortages that we cannot cover in other ways. A central position is occupied by 2.5 million tons of grain, 1 million tons of mineral oil products, 100,000 tons of cotton, nonferrous and precious metals, manganese ore, etc. The economic agreement is supplemented by the agreement on the lump sum compensation of the German property claims in the Baltic States which is likewise almost ready for signature and assures us payments up to the amount of 150 million reichsmarks, beginning at once. The German counterdeliveries are calculated for precise deadlines and can only be made on schedule if the treaty enters into force in December and the necessary measures inside Germany are undertaken at once. If signature of the economic agreement is postponed until January all of the deadlines will likewise be delayed. The German promises of delivery will be uncertain and we can start all over again in January to negotiate with the Russians. With this all the advantages which the agreement offers us would be rendered doubtful once more. In addition, my opposites in the negotiations here will in their Armenian-Caucasian way connect every question that comes up in the meantime with the economic agreement in order to obtain every possible advantage from the present situation. I am particularly concerned in this regard with the Petsamo question, which will enter a critical stage in 10 days to 2 weeks at the latest. The Finns will then have to decide whether they will capitulate and turn over the northern part of their country to Soviet Communist influence or whether they will continue to resist the unmistakable demands of the Russians. We have encouraged the Finns to do the latter. Should they continue to comply with our wishes the Russians will blame us for the Finnish resistance and combine this question, too, with the economic agreement. I should also like to point to the political effects of a further delay of the conclusion of the negotiations. It will not be possible to prevent news of the difficulties

that have now arisen from getting out. There will be combinations that are highly undesirable to us.

For these reasons I wish to propose that we have the Lithuanian boundary agreement concluded at once in order to assure us of the great advantages of the economic agreement and to deprive the Russians of the opportunity of extorting further concessions from us. The compensation that we will receive for the strip of Lithuanian territory is in too great a disproportion to the treaty involving billions which is at stake. With the economic agreement and the Baltic agreement in their hands as a means of pressure, the Russians will no longer be willing to pay much more than they already have offered us. Therefore I should like to suggest that I be authorized to conclude the boundary treaty with the best compensation that can be obtained without losing more than 2 or 3 days time in that way. I sent the files to Minister Clodius today¹ but am retaining my personal files here so that it can be assumed in the instruction to me that I am acquainted with the previous material.

I should like to add my most cordial wishes for the year 1941, that will bring you, dear Herr Minister, and your political work further historical success and thereby victory and peace for Germany.²

Heil Hitler!

SCHNURRE

¹ Schnurre's letter of Dec. 25 to Clodius, which served as a covering letter for the files, made the same plea for prompt conclusion of the negotiations (2219/-475200-201).

² In a private letter of Jan. 2, 1941, Weizsäcker told Schnurre that he regretted Schnurre's being held on such a short leash, but that those who had the power of decision were acting on the assumption that Germany, in the last analysis, "held the longer arm of the lever." (124/123106)

No. 569

121/120345-50

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

No. 1595 of December 26

PARIS, December 26, 1940—7:45 p. m.

Received December 26—9:00 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Pétain's letter which Darlan handed to the Führer yesterday¹ shows:

1. Mistakes in the argumentation.
2. A stiffening of resistance.
3. The inclination to make the question of Laval into a test of strength.

¹ Document No. 566.

I. If the Reich Government has the intention of responding at all to the arguments of the letter, which was obviously not written by Marshal Pétain, the following observations can be made:

1. The imputation that any sort of game was played with the date of the 17th or 18th is as inappropriate as it is foolish. We never maintained that the conversation with Marshal Pétain at Vichy and the delivery of his letter took place on different days.

2. Pétain's new letter passes over the decisive point, namely the fact that on December 17 there was an oral agreement to the effect that the investigation of Laval should be given only formal significance. The French attempt to question this oral agreement is a violation of good faith. The change in the passage of the letter regarding Laval which I asked for and Pétain agreed to, had been requested by me on the grounds that the investigation, according to the agreement, was to have a result favorable to Laval, and that it was therefore not expedient at this time also to put down in writing this kind of accusation against him. After Laval had returned to the Cabinet I would some time take the opportunity to inform my Government orally of these accusations, so as to weaken the impression that the action against Laval had involved an affront to the Reich.

3. However, even if one should disregard the oral agreement of December 17, a change in the French attitude is evident from a comparison of Pétain's letters of December 17² and December 23. In the letter of the 17th, Pétain states that his authority would be seriously impaired if he should reappoint Laval to the Government immediately. It had become impossible to retain him as his chief collaborator. He was resolved to institute at once a thorough investigation of the actual merit of the complaints that had led him to part with M. Laval. If the results of this investigation should indicate that he had been deceived by certain outward appearances he would not fail to comply with our wish and take Laval back into the Government. In the letter of the 23rd, however, Pétain stated that "his objections to Laval were justified" and that "the attitude Laval had taken toward him in the presence of the German Ambassador, and this subsequent to the conversation which he, Pétain, had had with the German Ambassador, had made participation by Laval in the Government impossible for an indeterminate period."

Regarding this it should be said that the incident when Laval reproached Pétain for his arrest, and the Marshal's entourage for duplicity in the policy toward Germany, took place before lunch on December 17.

² See document No. 530.

However, the letter in which Pétain expressed his willingness to reappoint Laval to the Government after completion of the investigation was composed in the Council of Ministers during the afternoon and only given me in the evening during another conversation. The communiqué agreed on during this new conversation concerning Pétain's receiving Laval, which was to prepare public opinion psychologically for Laval's return to the Government, did not appear till the next day. If the assertion is now being made that the reason for the Marshal's changed attitude was Laval's unseemly conduct during the conversation with Pétain, this can only be termed a mendacious distortion of the facts. Obviously, with the Marshal this motive was brought into the foreground only because it became evident that the accusations previously made against Laval were utterly untenable.

II. The reasons for the stiffening of resistance. It seemed until Friday, December 20, that the Government crisis in Vichy would be solved along the lines agreed with us on the 17th, but on the afternoon of December 20 there was a sudden stiffening. A trip taken by Major Stehlin, a former aide to the French Air Attaché in Berlin, which was not reported to the Embassy, may have played a part in this connection; he had flown to Berlin on Monday, December 16. Stehlin carried on conversations of a technical nature, but he also tried to have a conference with Reichsmarschall Göring, which General Bodenschatz³ did not arrange for him. Shortly after Stehlin returned from Berlin on Friday, December 20, the rumor spread in Vichy that the German Embassy in Paris was pursuing an arbitrary policy in the question of Laval, which was not at all approved by the whole of the Reich Government and in particular not by German business. The principal advocate of this thesis, Flandin, stated before witnesses who can be named that he was very much in the picture concerning Germany and knew that if the French Government did not comply in this matter there would be no serious consequences.

To what extent this opinion of Flandin's is based on pure fabrication or on false information he has received could not be determined as yet. At any rate, Flandin is the leader of the resistance against a return of Laval to the Government. He reproaches Laval to the effect that the latter's policy of cooperation with Germany has brought about nothing but French concessions, such as the relinquishment of the majority of shares in the Mines de Bor,⁴ the Messageries Hachette, and the Agence Havas⁵ and the dismissal of every minister not ac-

³ Chief of Staff to Göring.

⁴ See document No. 114, footnote 4. The agreement for the cession of the French shares in this enterprise was signed Nov. 6. Cf. Yves Bouthillier, *Le Drame de Vichy*, vol. II: *Finances sous la contrainte* (Paris, 1951), pp. 115-121.

⁵ These transactions are discussed in Paris telegram No. 904 of Oct. 19 (121/120023-24).

ceptable to Germany, but that it has not produced concessions of any kind by Germany. If he, Flandin, should take up negotiations with Germany he would obtain in the bargain advantages for France, thanks to his much "higher" connections. In the case of Flandin only his personal agitation carried on against Laval is so far certain, but statements by other French politicians that have been reported to us, some of them even made before foreign journalists, indicate that Laval was to be overthrown principally because of his unequivocal attitude against England, which did not exclude the possibility of a declaration of war.

III. The question of Laval has assumed the character of a test of strength. In Vichy the thesis is held that the Germans are not even in a position to take military measures against the unoccupied⁶ territory because the occupied territory has been divested of troops to too great an extent.

Another reason for German forbearance is supposedly our concern in regard to repercussions in North Africa. The passage in Pétain's letter to the Führer concerning the endangered unity of the empire proves that this thesis has also found acceptance with the Government. In these circumstances there are three possible German positions:

1. We would insist on the demand that Laval must be called into the Government as Minister of Interior and member of the directorate. If this demand should not be complied with, we could not continue the policy of cooperation. We would leave it to the Marshal to determine the moment when Laval would assume his new governmental functions, but would demand the immediate publication of the new list of ministers which would include Laval.

This course of action involves the danger of a resignation of Pétain and of a possible defection of E. [sic] Weygand.

Personally I do not believe that Marshal Pétain would resign because of this demand, nor do I expect the defection of Weygand. If Weygand is planning to go over to the side of de Gaulle he would in my opinion also take any other convenient opportunity to do so whenever the moment seemed to him to be appropriate.

2. We would state that aside from the question of Laval we would be satisfied with the reorganization of the Government as proposed by Pétain, but that our confidence had been shaken by the events on December 13 and only the return of Laval could restore it.

Until this moment, which would be left to the discretion of the French Government, none of the concessions could be made by Germany which had been planned as a result of the policy of Montoire.

⁶The remainder of the telegram was wired later and was not received in Berlin until Dec. 27, 2:00 a. m.

3. We would limit ourselves to stating that the events on December 13 had shaken German confidence in the good faith of French policy and that Pétain's communications to the Führer were not calculated to erase this impression.

Until the French had shown by deeds that the policy of cooperation was not an empty word for the French Government we could take no further action in conformity with the principle of the policy of cooperation decided in Montoire.

Darlan, with whom every discussion of the matter was avoided after his return from the reception by the Führer, told de Brinon before his departure for Vichy that he had the impression that a great wrong had been done to Laval. If he were given a little time, he would be determined as president of the directorate to work for a return of Laval to the Government.

ABETZ

No. 570

585/242830

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, December 27, 1940—11:50 p. m.

No. 874

RAM 385.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 633 of December 23, 1940.¹

Please inform the Bulgarian Minister President that his visit would be agreeable to me in the early part of January. I would prefer, however, if the Minister President came not to Berlin, but to Fuschl, and then not between January 5 and 10, but during the very first days of the month. I shall be in Fuschl for the New Year in any case, and it would be much easier to hold a meeting there without attracting attention, than it would be in Berlin. Presumably, in the first days of the month, there will also be a chance of being received by the Führer, who will be at the Berghof about that time. A meeting could, after all, also be arranged for later, between January 5 and 10, but this, in view of our other arrangements, would be harder as it is not yet certain that we will still be in the Salzburg area at that time. I am assuming that the Bulgarians also attach importance to

¹ Richthofen reported in this telegram that the Bulgarian Minister President had expressed the wish to be received by Ribbentrop and, if possible, by Hitler to discuss pending questions, including accession to the Tripartite Pact. The most suitable date would be between Jan. 5 and 10. (585/242829)

keeping the visit a secret; we can guarantee this if the meetings are held at the Berghof and in Fuschl.²

RIBBENTROP

² Richthofen replied in telegram No. 636 of Dec. 28 that the Bulgarian Minister President agreed to the proposal and would arrive in Salzburg between January 2 and 4, 1941 (585/242834). See document No. 606.

No. 571

104/112777

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 923

BERLIN, December 27, 1940.

The Italian Ambassador remarked to me again today that the Duce hoped our political relationship with Russia would not deteriorate.

I told Alfieri that Minister Schnurre was in Moscow at the present time. He had almost completed his talks regarding the conclusion of certain economic and resettlement questions.¹ I thought it would not be long before the signing of the respective agreements could take place.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 640.

No. 572

124/122559

Minute by the State Secretary

BERLIN, December 27, 1940.

In a private letter of unimportant content to Herr von Papen I included the following remark:

"My own opinion at the present time is the following: We are in a phase in which we need and must treat with consideration both of the eastern powers, the Turks and the Russians. An option for one of the two would therefore be premature; also an act that would be the equivalent of such an option. Here, in my opinion, lies the limit to which you can go in being accommodating. This is, as I said, my private opinion.

"I do not find the domestic governmental crisis in France particularly interesting. As long as France does not keel over entirely she does not have much of a margin in foreign policy, and until then the name of the Foreign Minister does not signify much."

W[EIZSÄCKER]

No. 573

4248/E074784-86

*The Consul at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry*¹

No. 1732

TETUÁN, December 27, 1940.

Pol. III 48.

Subject: Situation in Spanish Morocco at the end of 1940.

In the political events within the official purview of the Consulate two basic tendencies grew more and more recognizable in the course of the year now drawing to a close:

1. The Spanish inability to do anything positive for Morocco.
2. Spain's systematic fight against any German influence in this country.

Regarding 1: The relationship between the protectorate power and the natives in the Spanish Zone has deteriorated to a serious degree. This relationship was never really good, but Spain was able by means of skillful propaganda especially in recent years to give the impression in Germany of a Spanish-Moroccan friendship. The Moroccans never respected Spain. The country was conquered little more than 10 years ago, and then not by Spain, which had suffered repeated bloody defeats at the hands of the natives, but with French assistance. The natives know this; they keep the peace now only because the country is over-occupied by Spanish troops and they do not have available the technical means for warfare against a European power.

Spanish-Moroccan relations were somewhat better only for an interval during the Spanish Civil War, which was conducted by Franco, especially at the beginning, mainly with Moroccan forces. At that time Spain was dependent on the Moroccans and had to take them into consideration; the extremely skillful High Commissioner at the time, Beigbeder, knew how to dangle happiness and liberty under Spanish rule before the eyes of the natives. Moreover, here, too, Spain obtained advantage from the German aid during the Civil War; the natives respect and love us because we are militarily strong and are the only European Great Power that does not rule over any of their coreligionists in the Arab-Islamic world. Spanish propaganda among the natives during the Civil War was able to exploit the German sympathies of the Moroccans to the advantage of Spain; otherwise it would hardly have been possible to retain Moroccan aid

¹ A notation at the head of the document indicates that it was seen and countersigned by Ambassador Stohrer at Madrid, Jan. 3, 1941.

A notation at the end of the document indicates that on Jan. 17, 1941, copies were forwarded to the Embassies in Italy and France.

for Franco for 3 years. Here the Franco Government went entirely on German crutches.

Now there is general disappointment among the natives regarding what Spain brought into the country: corruption, misery, and famine. These feelings have in some cases already progressed to a dangerous embitterment; Spain is now playing a dangerous game in openly attempting to convert the country to Christianity. They are demanding government real estate free of charge for church buildings; recently I myself was witness when a company of a native regiment had to attend mass. Crusading ideas out of the time of Isabella the Catholic haunt them here.

Regarding 2: The sympathies of the natives for us are known to the Spaniards and drive them to a morbid jealousy of any German influence in the country. The Spanish effort to exclude us systematically from Morocco has been evident in the course of the year on unimportant occasions as well as in matters of principle. The greatest obstacles were placed in the way of exhibiting German war films; permission for Germans to enter Tangier, which could be occupied by Spain in June only as a result of the German victories in France, was delayed for months; the return of the former German-Legation property in Tangier is being postponed beyond reason.

In the French Zone, too, which certainly does not belong to the Spaniards, they do not want any German influence. A shipment from the Madrid Embassy to the Consulate containing Arabic propaganda material, which by reason of its text and sense could only be used in the French Zone, was confiscated by the High Commissioner in a way that I consider to be contrary to international law. Spain has raised protests against the propaganda activity of German authorities in French Morocco. Spain wishes to get this propaganda under her control in order here, too, to utilize our prestige for her own purposes. The Spanish policy here in this country is a bad sign for the future, if Spain should really succeed in gaining possession of the French Zone entirely or even in part. Spain would have only one aim: she would never rest until the last German had left the country—the heart's desire, openly expressed, of the Secretary General of the Alta Comisaria here, concerning whom I have reported elsewhere.

In spite of the two basic tendencies described here—inability to do anything positive and systematic fight against German interests—Spain still cherishes strong aspirations in the French Zone. The disproportionately strong garrisoning of Spanish Morocco is a constant proof of offensive intentions; in June of the year being reported on Spain was close to proceeding to a realization of such plans. In spite of the incontestable bravery of the Spanish soldier the operation could only have ended with a bloody defeat owing to the great technical

superiority and superior training of the French troops. The situation has remained the same and we must follow it with the greatest attention. Should Spain attack French Morocco anew, a dangerous front will develop in North Africa and the whole area will be driven into the arms of de Gaulle. The consequences would be still more serious if the United States should enter the war. French Morocco would then become the base for American operations in Europe.

The German Embassy in Madrid is receiving a copy of this report.

RICHTER

No. 574

368/207477-80

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic
Policy Department*

BERLIN, December 28, 1940.

I. The negotiations about elimination of the line of demarcation which the German Armistice Commission and the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Questions have been carrying on with the French for months have still not led to any results owing to the hesitant and evasive attitude of the French. The French are not prepared to comply with the demands we have made to obtain compensation for giving up the demarcation line. This involves in the first place installing German commissioners with the French Ministry of Finance for the central supervision of French foreign trade and French foreign exchange control, and furthermore establishing a German border control of trade, foreign exchange, movement of persons, and communications at the outer French borders with Switzerland and Spain and along the Mediterranean. At first the French created the impression with our negotiators that they were prepared to comply with our demands if the control were exercised only by Germany and not by Italy, too. However, after the Italians, in a protocol signed by Ambassador Giannini and me on December 3,¹ agreed to have Italian participation in the control measures restricted to a considerable degree, the French have now advanced other reasons for preventing the conclusion of such an agreement. Their latest communication in Wiesbaden was to the effect that they could not resume the conversations until the beginning of January at the earliest since they still had not received any instructions from their Government.²

¹ Not printed (2032/445028-30).

² A communication to this effect from General Doyen had been reported by Hemmen in telegram No. 262 of Dec. 19 from Wiesbaden (368/207451-52).

II. On the basis of the oral instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister, which were passed on to me by Herr Haus [*Gaus?*], I discussed today with the German departments concerned the question of what sanctions we could resort to in case the French should persist in their negative attitude. This conference showed that all the departments concerned, namely the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the Four Year Plan, the Economics Ministry, the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Questions, and the Military Administration in France, take the position that in the present situation elimination of the demarcation line to the greatest possible extent is primarily in the *German* interest. (It is to be assumed that the French know this and that they are therefore less and less inclined, on their part, to make concessions going beyond the Armistice Treaty in return for a relaxation of the line of demarcation.) The extensive armament orders placed in France by instruction of the Reichsmarschall and the High Command of the Wehrmacht make it imperative to relax the line of demarcation to allow goods and people to move. If as a countermeasure against the French attitude we should again hermetically seal off the line of demarcation, this would affect us at the moment directly and more seriously than it would the French. The French, incidentally, argue that the introduction of a German or German-Italian supervision at the outer French borders would lead to England's considering all of France as an occupied area and to her cutting off all imports by sea. Since in recent months quite considerable amounts of vital goods and raw materials have actually been imported by sea into unoccupied France, part of which are sent on to Germany, for example, such a result would likewise affect German supplies either directly or indirectly.

The question of whether purely military or political sanctions can be applied is not within the jurisdiction of the men with whom the matter was discussed today. The representative of the High Command of the Wehrmacht stated, however, that to his knowledge Field Marshal Keitel took the position that purely military sanctions were out of the question at the moment because of the repercussions to be feared on the situation in Africa, and furthermore that they were out of proportion to the point at issue concerning the line of demarcation and the control of the outer borders.

III. Given this state of affairs and in accord with the departments referred to above, I consider the following procedure to be correct:

The negotiations with the French should be resumed in Wiesbaden in the beginning of January. Since the main resistance of the French is now directed against the establishment of supervision of a counter-intelligence nature over the movement of persons and over communications at the outer borders, counterintelligence supervision will be set

up at the demarcation line. We can dispense with constant supervision of goods and foreign exchange at the outer borders in case central supervision through the commissioners with the French Ministry of Finance is established. Thus an agreement with the French should be arrived at on the basis that the French would consent to the appointment of the commissioners and that we would further relax the line of demarcation in regard to the movement of goods and foreign exchange which is in our own interest. There must also be a certain relaxation with respect to the movement of persons at the demarcation line; in this connection the interests of counterintelligence supervision at the line of demarcation must be taken into account.

To be submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister with reference to the oral instructions issued today.

CLODIUS

No. 575

359/204163-65

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

No. 2381 of December 28

BERLIN, December 29, 1940—2:30 a. m.

Received December 29—8:15 a. m.

Special security handling. Reply by courier or in secret code.

For the Ambassador and Schnurre.

With reference to your telegram No. 2816.¹

I. Please inform the Soviet Government as follows concerning the question of the Lithuanian tip:

We are willing in principle to give up the Lithuanian tip in return for adequate compensation. We take the view that payment in gold or commodities is actually not an adequate compensation for relinquishment of an area. Nevertheless we are willing, in order to facilitate a quick settlement of the matter, to comply with the Russian proposal. However, the sum of 3,860,000 gold dollars offered by the Russians does not seem to us to be an adequate equivalent. We concede that it is difficult to find a proper criterion for evaluating an area. A comparison with payments made in other cases, however, especially when these other cases occurred many years ago, as is true of the cession of Alaska, does not at any rate seem to us to be a suitable criterion. A calculation of the real estate value according to Lithuanian prices would result in an amount of 13 million gold dollars. We are willing to consider this sum adequate compensation if the equivalent of this amount is made available in additional raw material deliveries.

¹ Document No. 560.

II. Please make it absolutely clear in the negotiations that the deliveries of raw materials are entirely independent of the economic agreement and thus clearly represent additional deliveries. The corresponding written agreement must likewise be kept entirely separate from the economic agreement. Please adhere to the total amount of 13 million gold dollars.

The following come into question in first place as additional raw materials to be delivered: nonferrous metals, then possibly also naphtha products, cotton, flax, manganese ore. They are listed according to priority. Please, however, insist emphatically on nonferrous metals. Please do not demand grain, since we are afraid that the amount of 2½ million tons agreed upon and the further deliveries contemplated for the occupied areas may exhaust the Russian capacity to deliver so that the special deliveries now designated as additional would in the end be charged to our contingent after all.

III. In the discussion with M. Molotov please add the following to the existing financial proposal:

The negotiations of the Danube Conference in Bucharest were interrupted for a month on December 20.² So far, it has not been possible to reach an agreement at the Conference because the Russian delegate, Sobolev, had taken a very intransigent stand and in particular has refused to have anything at all to do with a mediation proposal made by the German and Italian delegates. In view of our accommodation in the matter of the strip of Lithuanian territory we express the expectation that the Soviet delegate will receive instructions for the continuation of the negotiations in Bucharest which will make it possible to dissolve the old Danube Commission which is rejected also by the Soviet Government, and to replace it with a new international supervisory organization with the participation of Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, and Rumania. In this it is particularly important that the Soviet side should not, as in the past, insist on eliminating the Rumanian national waterways administration from the practical work at the Danube estuary and on replacing it with a mixed Soviet-Rumanian administration on Rumanian territory.

IV. The draft of an agreement between the German Reich and the USSR on the former German-Lithuanian border, along with explanatory remarks, is en route by courier.³ Please do not pass on this draft, however, without obtaining my consent in advance.

RIBBENTROP

² See document No. 524.

³ See document No. 579.

No. 576

91/100502-04

The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 862 of December 27

DUBLIN, December 29, 1940.

Received December 29—12:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to our telegram No. 859 of December 27.¹

In today's conversation with de Valera, I again repeated most emphatically the statements I had already made to Walshe, in accordance with your telegram No. 461,² and also pointed out the gravity of the situation that has arisen through the failure thus far to comply with our request. De Valera for his part also admitted the international obligation forthwith, and in a manner that was calm and indicated an endeavor to be friendly, made approximately the following statements:

It had been recognized as a piece of boldness for Ireland, in the particular political, economic, and geographic situation of this country with respect to England, to have dared to make a neutrality declaration at the beginning of the war. He believed that no other Irish Government would have risked this and he had from the outset been aware of the great difficulties that this bold venture entailed and the prudent and cautious governmental policy it demanded. Neutrality could not, in such circumstances, be administered as a schematic concept of uniform applicability to all countries. It was a matter of having a general policy that could give none of the belligerents even as much as a pretext for intervention. To this he had adhered conscientiously and it had resulted in considerable sacrifices for Ireland. De Valera mentioned in this connection the "bilateral blockade," which seriously threatened Ireland's economic situation. He had succeeded in uniting public opinion in Ireland on the basis of unqualified observance of neutrality despite divided sympathies, with the determination to resist any aggressor. In the context of this policy of prudence he had refused to comply with England's various demands to which no objections could have been raised from the standpoint of the preservation of neutrality in the purely legal sense, but which might have brought about vigorous German intervention because German interests were affected. From the same standpoint he had to regard as a serious dan-

¹ This telegram (91/100499-501) related to a German proposal to send a plane to Ireland with additional personnel for the Mission in Dublin.

² Not printed (1005/307514-17).

ger the plans for sending new Legation personnel on German aircraft. It was his duty toward the Irish people, who would fully approve his attitude, to request us urgently to refrain from pursuing our plan further. He would like today, too, to avoid a (group garbled) negative reply to our request, since he could not imagine that with such vital interests of Ireland's involved, we would want to adhere to a purely legal position in a matter which in his opinion was of relatively minor importance, and to let it become a test case.³

Of course, I vigorously disputed de Valera, adhering fully to our position, and I pointed with emphasis to danger arising from his attitude, which was abandoning a clear-cut legal basis. De Valera's further intimations leave no room for doubt, however, that if we pursue the matter further, possibly even in the form of an ultimatum, he will adhere to his position, with all the consequences which might result. He would then submit the matter to the Cabinet, if necessary, to the Parliament, for a decision. I am convinced that the Cabinet would agree with him; also, he would probably win a big majority in the Parliament, since not only would his own party there be almost solidly in back of him, but also (two groups garbled) inclining toward England, anyway. The opposition of nationalist elements outside the Parliament would make difficulties for him. According to our previous experience, its effectiveness should not be overestimated, however. It goes without saying that German-Irish tension, and even more so a break which would become noticeable on both sides, would create the greatest satisfaction in England and the Empire over Ireland's long-awaited emergence from her neutrality. I likewise assume that there would be strong repercussions in the United States in our disfavor, in so far as I am able to judge the situation from here. In all my statements to Walshe and de Valera I naturally remained strictly within the scope of my instructions; therefore I did not speak about possible concrete consequences of a negative Irish attitude either and avoided urging de Valera to submit the matter now to the Cabinet, which would fix the position of the Irish Government, and, moreover, create the danger of indiscretion.

In explaining de Valera's attitude, one must also consider, in my opinion, aside from the threat of a British attack, the Irish economic situation, which of late is becoming very serious. In view of the dependence on England in this matter, too, it makes imperative the avoidance of further strikes in an already difficult situation.

I would also remark that I consider it appropriate to inform the Italian Minister here of the situation which has arisen, naturally without going into the purpose of the increase in the Legation staff, in

³ These last two words in English in the original.

order that he may adjust his attitude toward the Irish Government accordingly. I request instructions on this point also.⁴

HEMPEL

⁴ In telegram No. 3 of Jan. 4 (1005/307490-91) Hempel was instructed to inform de Valera that while the attitude of the Irish Government was incomprehensible, the German Government was withdrawing its proposal to send a plane to Ireland with additional personnel for the Legation. It was considering instead the transfer of officials from Missions in America who could travel to Ireland by ordinary transportation facilities.

Hempel replied (telegram No. 23 of Jan. 7: 91/100579-80) that he had been informed in de Valera's behalf that the Irish Government would place no difficulties in the way of entry of officials by the ordinary transportation facilities.

No. 577

136/74551-52

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, December 29, 1940.

No. 4456 of December 29

Received December 30—2: 15 a. m.

In a code telegram from Cordell Hull to the U. S. Ambassador here on December 18, the text of which has become known to me,¹ the following is stated:

"In consideration of the political assurances given by the Spanish Chief of State to the U. S. Embassy on November 29, the President of the United States has authorized the immediate loading of grain, flour [*Mehlflocken*], etc., for Spain by the American Red Cross.["] Moreover, the Ambassador is instructed to give the Generalissimo a statement by President Roosevelt at the same time this shipment is handed over.

When a few weeks ago reports appeared in the foreign press that Roosevelt had agreed to the delivery of grain and so forth to Spain after the Spanish Government had promised to remain neutral, I immediately spoke to the Spanish Foreign Minister on the subject.

As reported by telegram at the time, Señor Serrano Suñer categorically denied this report at once, adding that the American Ambassador had, to be sure, tried to obtain political assurances from him and Franco in connection with the grain deliveries, but he had emphatically refused. (Cf. telegram No. 4246 of December 11.²)

The above code telegram, the authenticity of which can hardly be doubted (though this will still be checked), stands in contradiction to these statements of the Foreign Minister. Perhaps the contradiction can be explained by a later spontaneous statement which Serrano

¹ Cf. Hull's telegram No. 350 of Dec. 19, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. II, pp. 848-850, especially p. 849.

² Document No. 493.

made to me, according to which he had felt impelled during the negotiations on the foodstuffs that were needed more and more urgently, in order to eliminate resistance, to make "vague, non-binding" statements to the effect that Spain did not intend to change her present policy. The Minister added at the time, shrugging his shoulders: Considering the danger of the still increasing food crisis one simply had to counter such extortion with evasive, ambiguous replies.

I therefore rather assume that Franco, too, did not give any sort of positive assurance of neutrality to the American Ambassador. This seems probable to me also because quite independent of agreements with us Spain also certainly wants to retain her freedom of action.

The "vague" statements in question clearly show, however, to what extent Spain, which in the present economic crisis and famine is dependent on our opponents for imports, can be placed by them under political pressure.

STOHRER

No. 578

83/61529-30

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, December 29, 1940.

In the matter of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Germany and Iraq, Counselor of Embassy Zamboni told me yesterday the following, from a telegraphic report of the Italian Minister in Baghdad:

The Iraq Minister President has drawn the attention of the Italian Minister to the connection between the question of a resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany and the acute crisis in which Iraq finds herself at the moment on account of the English threat.¹ In addition, the American Minister² has recently handed to the Iraq Minister President a personal message from Roosevelt in which the latter advised Iraq against resuming relations with Germany as the independence of the country could be compromised thereby. Furthermore, the Iraq Minister in Ankara has reported that he has been instructed by the Turkish Government to advise against resuming relations and to advise Iraq to adhere to the alliance with England even if that should lead to a resignation of Minister President Gaylani.

Minister President Gaylani, according to the report of the Italian Minister, has given Washington and Ankara the reply that he knew

¹ See document No. 482.

² Paul Knabenshue.

nothing of a German initiative regarding resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq and that England at the moment was conducting an inadmissible policy of interference with domestic Iraq policy. Minister President Gaylani has furthermore spoken of reports about a British-Turkish plan which provided for an invasion into Syria and into the area of Mosul. In view of this the Turkish step has made a great impression on Gaylani. In these circumstances the Minister President wanted to know which attitude the Axis Powers would adopt in case a Turkish intervention against Iraq should take place.

The Foreign Ministry in Rome added to this communication of the Italian Minister in Baghdad that it was superfluous to point out that Gaylani's reply to the effect that he knew nothing of the German initiative regarding resumption of diplomatic relations had been given merely for reasons of expediency. It was not known to the Italian Government how foreign powers had learned something of the negotiations which were being conducted in that matter. The Italian Government was treating the matter with the greatest possible discretion which was not observed by Gaylani when he approached the Axis Powers with a request, as it so happened, that the matter should be discussed on the radio.

It seems to me that the communications of the Iraq Minister President—above all if report No. 187 389,³ known from a confidential source which is somewhat more accurate in some details, is utilized—are clearly to be interpreted in such a way that for the moment he does not wish the resumption of diplomatic relations and that in any case he is waiting for the time being to see which reply the Axis Powers will give him in the matter of a possible support with war materials. At the moment we are expecting a report of the Italian Minister in Baghdad on this question which was sent to Rome by courier.

WOERMANN

³Not found.

No. 579

84/24408-09

*German-Soviet Boundary Agreement*¹

German Draft

The Government of the German Reich, represented by the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, and the Gov-

¹Marginal note: "Version of Dec. 12. Resubmitted Dec. 29. W[oermann], Dec. 29."

See document No. 575, paragraph IV.

With the draft is an unsigned explanatory memorandum (84/24410-11).

ernment of the USSR, represented by, in consideration of the portion of their common boundary which was created by the inclusion of Lithuania in the territory of the USSR on August 3, 1940, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The line of the boundary between the German Reich and the USSR in this sector runs approximately northwest in extension of the line laid down in the collection of boundary records of August 17, 1940, and is formed:

1. By the former Lithuanian-Polish line of demarcation between the point of contact of Germany-Lithuania-Poland established in the German-Soviet boundary agreement of August 31, 1940, and the former point of contact of Germany-Lithuania-Poland;
2. By the former German-Russian boundary from the former point of contact of Germany-Lithuania-Poland to the Baltic Sea.

Article 2

The boundary line defined in article 1 should, in so far as necessary, be marked in the terrain and sketched in a boundary document to be confirmed by the two Governments.

Article 3

The stipulations of the German-Soviet boundary agreement of August 31, 1940, find appropriate application to the legal situation at the border described in article . . .

Article 4

Both Governments join in the agreements made between the German Reich and the former Lithuanian Government regarding the regulation of boundary waters inclusive of the questions of territorial exchange associated herewith.

Article 5

This treaty shall be ratified. The exchange of instruments of ratification is to take place in Berlin as soon as possible. The treaty enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Drawn up in duplicate in the German and Russian languages.

Done at Moscow,, 19 . . .

Signatures

No. 580

34/24421-22

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, December 30, 1940—10:45 p. m.

SECRET

Received December 31—2:00 a. m.

No. 2838 of December 30

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegrams No. 2381 of December 28¹ and No. 2385 of December 29.²

There was a conference with Molotov yesterday evening lasting almost 2 hours concerning the question of compensation for the Lithuanian tip.

Molotov took the stand from the very start that the German demand for 13 million gold dollars was obviously greatly exaggerated and the method of calculating it was in contradiction to the agreement already reached regarding the lump sum payment of *mutual* property claims. Only 7.3 percent of the population in the area in question were of German stock, and their property was included in the lump sum of 200 million reichsmarks offered by the Soviet Government. If this area had come to Germany, then Germany would have had to pay compensation for the property of the Lithuanian majority (82.3 percent) according to the principles established for the lump sum settlement. Consequently one could not now talk of a property loss of the Reich, particularly since there was no government property in the Lithuanian tip. Therefore all the German property claims in the Lithuanian-German tip were taken care of in the generous lump sum payment.

In spite of our emphatic protests Molotov insisted with quite unusual stubbornness on his negative standpoint. He repeated again and again that the cession of the Lithuanian tip presented a purely political problem for the Soviet Government, that was not to be resolved with the aid of economic calculations. Also the compensation of 3.86 (a group evidently missing) gold dollars offered by the Soviet Government at the time had been considered an attempt at a political solution.

We protested that with its offer of gold and commodities the Soviet Government had itself wanted to solve the compensation question in an economic way. In order to be obliging we had complied with this form of compensation, although we had maintained the

¹ Document No. 575.

² Not found.

standpoint from the very start that gold or commodities were not an adequate means of compensation.

In the end Molotov said he was willing to report to his Government and to find out whether for political considerations and by expressly eliminating every other sort of calculation a sum could be proposed that would satisfy both sides. He assumed that today or tomorrow we would be in a position to communicate to him the German draft of the border agreement. Then he would also be able to communicate the final position of his Government in the compensation question.

In reply to our question whether, in view of the purely political character of the Lithuanian matter, which Molotov himself had emphasized, the trade agreement which had nothing to do with this matter could be signed, Molotov insisted on tying all of the agreements together.

In order to bring the matter to a close we request telegraphic authorization to communicate to Molotov the text of the boundary treaty which arrived here today and to settle the compensation question on the basis of a compromise.³ Every further delay endangers the economic and Baltic agreements, as Minister Schnurre has already explained in his letter to the Foreign Minister.⁴

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

³ See document No. 590.

⁴ Document No. 568.

No. 581

36/25948-49

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Staff

BERLIN, December 30, 1940.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT¹

The confidential agent working in the Soviet Russian Embassy was summoned this evening at 7:30 to Counselor of Embassy Kobulov, who gave him the following four tasks which were characterized as very important and very urgent:

1. M. Stalin has asked the Soviet Embassy in Berlin for the text of the speech which the Führer gave on December 18 before several thousand officer candidates of the Wehrmacht.² Kobulov added that

¹ Marginal note: "Submitted to the F[ührer]. Hew[el]."

² Hitler's speech at the Sportpalast in Berlin on Dec. 18 was closed to the public, but was the subject of news agency reports; the text of the speech was not made public. See the *New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1940, p. 5, col. 4.

this speech, which had not been published by the German press, was supposed, on the basis of several figures of speech and passages that had become known in the Kremlin, to have had an anti-Soviet tendency. M. Stalin was very much interested in this and wanted to convince himself of the tendency of this speech by means of the text. The agent, who works for the GPU, would have to get this text somehow.

2. The agent is to find out what circles are frequented by an alleged actress Baroness Eyck, residing at Kurfürstendamm 46 or 47.

3. The agent is to look into the possibility of going to Switzerland for a week, and obtain the necessary visas for this. Tomorrow he is to give Counselor of Embassy Kobulov a list of his acquaintances living in Switzerland, whereupon he would learn his mission. This mission is not dangerous, but very interesting.

4. The Soviet Embassy desires to learn through the agent the effect and the repercussions which Roosevelt's last speech³ made in official German agencies, particularly in the Foreign Ministry.⁴

L[IKUS]

³ See document No. 585 and footnote 2.

⁴ Marginal notes:

"The F[ührer] wants to have such reports from the Soviet Embassy regularly collected. Hewel."

"We can give the agent such instructions as we wish. R[ibbentrop]."

No. 582

941/299386-88

*Memorandum by the Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark*¹

[DECEMBER 30, 1940.]

The King received me this morning. I explained to him first of all that we, for our part, were trying with all our might to preserve the present good understanding, which was, indeed the basis of the present order. This was also the desire of the Reich Government, as I had ascertained on the occasion of my last conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister before Christmas.² Contrary to the earlier hopes that the war would soon end, it was now necessary to prepare for a rather long duration. We were not surprised at this since we had already taken measures in anticipation of such a case. I viewed developments in Denmark not without anxiety, however. The situation would undoubtedly become more difficult here, even if we tried to help Denmark as much as possible. Ever since autumn sentiment had been drifting dangerously away from us. In its declara-

¹ This memorandum from the files of Renthe-Fink is unsigned and undated. However, Renthe-Fink reported on his interview with the King in his telegram No. 1396 of Dec. 30 stating that it had taken place on the day (247/164242).

² See document No. 537.

tion of July 8,³ to be sure, the Government had promised positive collaboration with Germany, and Minister of State Stauning had in the summer stressed the necessity of adapting oneself automatically to the new times; but nothing important had occurred. We had, on the contrary, been obliged to put pressure on the Government before it had resigned itself to removing anti-German persons like Christmas Møller from key public positions, from which the latter carried on considerable agitation against us. The Government was prevented by party commitments from proceeding energetically against the anti-German agitation. I mentioned in this connection the case of Hedtoft-Hansen (*Folkevilje*).⁴ While individual members of the Government made friendly speeches in the direction of Germany, members of the Government parties laid all the blame for Denmark's difficulties on Germany, instead of realizing that it was only because of England's plans that we had been forced to occupy Denmark and by speedy action had kept Denmark from becoming a theater of war. The parties were trying to advance their interests at the expense of German-Danish relations. I was disappointed with Minister of State Stauning. It was obvious that he could no longer assert himself sufficiently in the Cabinet and in his party. In these circumstances it seemed to me necessary that a government should be formed that was free from party commitments and not under the influence of persons who were politically tainted with respect to Germany.

The King, who was inwardly very agitated, replied that he had heretofore had the feeling that the Danish Government was honestly trying to fulfill all our wishes loyally. He referred in this connection particularly to the economic sphere, where Denmark at sacrifice to her own population was undertaking to render great services to Germany without receiving directly satisfactory equivalents from Germany. He stressed the fact that Minister of State Stauning was a very sensible man. Only the confidence he enjoyed with large sectors of the population had made it possible for the people to put up quietly with the drastic changes and retrenchments. The King also denied that there had been a deterioration in morale. I told him about the case of

³ See vol. x, documents Nos. 155 and 181. The Danish text is printed in *Beretning til Folketinget afgivet af den af Folketinget under 8. Januar 1948 nedsatte kommission i henhold til Grundlovens § 45* (Copenhagen, 1948, vol. iv, Bilag, p. 84 and *ibid.*, vol. v, Bilag, p. 337.

⁴ Hans Hedtoft-Hansen was a Danish Social Democratic leader and editor of the periodical *Folkevilje*. Renthe-Fink had been critical of the anti-German tendencies of Hedtoft-Hansen's writing in this publication (Copenhagen unnumbered telegram of Dec. 7, 1940: 247/164227-28).

Lieutenant Colonel Ørum,⁵ with which he was not yet acquainted, and of the amazing fact that the emigrants' committees, particularly the Matteotti Committee, had not yet been dissolved.

In the course of the conversation the King spoke about the Danish National Socialists, of whom he thoroughly disapproved. He strongly condemned the general behavior of the party and the language of its press and then stated that it had been reported to him that during the World War Dr. Clausen had deserted from the German Army by deliberately letting himself be captured by the Russians. I replied that I knew nothing about this. So many tendentious rumors were afloat that one had to be extremely cautious about crediting them. I considered the information that had reached the King in this regard as base slander. When the King said that Denmark had had to take over in North Schleswig numerous persons like Dr. Clausen, who were not real Danes at all, I objected that I had heretofore assumed on the basis of Danish representations, that there was a majority of genuine Danes in North Schleswig.

The King obviously avoided committing himself in any way and stressed the fact that the people "looked up to him as their protector" and that he could do nothing contrary to the will of the people. He referred also to the memorandum of April 9, in which Denmark was assured her complete sovereignty and observed that a government that was not committed to any party was a violation of the Constitution.⁶ I replied that we did not wish to mix in the internal political affairs of Denmark, but that it was our duty to call attention to the circumstances that might adversely affect the German-Danish agreement and thereby our military interests.

⁵ Lt. Col. T. P. A. Ørum had been arrested in Germany on Dec. 7 on charges that he had engaged in recruiting Danish flyers for service with the British forces. At the time of this interview negotiations were under way between German and Danish authorities concerning enactment of a Danish law which would permit trial of such cases before Danish courts. For documentation on this subject, see *Beretning til Folketinget . . .* vol. VII, *Bilag*, pp. 683-705 and 568.

⁶ See vol. IX of this series, document No. 53, subenclosure 1, and document No. 66, footnote 1.

No. 583

2281/481881:
2281/481887-93

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Italy

ROME, December 30, 1940.

Resubmitted herewith to the Ambassador with the requested annex on the military situation of Italy¹ based on today's discussions.

BISMARCK

¹ The annex is not printed (2281/481883-86).

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

ROME, December 27, 1940.

Since Italy's entrance into the war on June 10, 1940, at the side of her ally, the German Reich, the European war has spread to the Mediterranean area; in the last 2 months, as a result of the action of Italy against Greece and of the military events in North Africa—both of which have for the time being gone against Italy—the war in this area has entered a stage where it is increasingly important in the over-all conduct of the war by the two Allied Powers.

As a result of the geographic situation itself Germany's conduct of the war in Europe north of the Alps and Italy's conduct of the war in the Mediterranean area have thus far been carried on separately by the two Powers. Now the time seems to have come when closer collaboration in the over-all conduct of the war by Germany and Italy is necessary in the interest of a common victory. This view of mine is based on the following facts and considerations:

I. The development of German-Italian military collaboration up to now.

Even before the outbreak of the war in September 1939, there were conversations between the leading German and Italian military offices in connection with the preparation of the German-Italian alliance of May 22, 1939.² On April 5, 1939, Field Marshal Keitel and General Pariani met at Innsbruck to lay the foundations for a closer military collaboration between the two countries. Pursuant to this conference, there were army talks in Rome in May 1939 between General Pariani, Chief of the Italian General Staff, and Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, and air force talks in Rome between Field Marshal Milch and Army General Valle; these were continued in June 1939, in navy talks at Friedrichshafen between Grand Admiral Raeder and Admiral Cavagnari.³

Since Italy did not at once enter the war in the autumn of 1939, the military talks were not pursued further. Even after Italy's entry into the war, military collaboration was confined to increased exchange of information about the course of events. On June 17 a conversation took place in Munich between General Roatta and Field Marshal Keitel, at which Italy's intervention on the French front was the principal subject of discussion. At the same time both governments decided to establish liaison staffs in both Berlin and Rome for the three branches of the armed forces. Experience has shown that

² See vol. VI of this series, document No. 426.

³ See *ibid.*, Appendix I, "Italo-German Staff Talks," pp. 1107 ff.

these liaison staffs perform an entirely useful work in the exchange of military intelligence, but that, as matters stood, they were unable to arrive at a joint policy on military measures to be taken.

As far as the conduct of the war until now is concerned, a collaboration of Germany and Italy in the same theaters of war has thus far taken place only on a very modest scale. German victories in northern and western Europe in the spring and summer of this year were won without the participation of the Italians. A proposal by the Führer before the beginning of the western offensive to commit Italian divisions on the Rhine found no response from the Duce, and the late entry of Italy into the war against France required only to a slight extent a coordination of the measures of the two Armies. A certain military participation by Italy in the German theaters of war took place only in the sphere of naval warfare, through the commitment of some Italian submarines in the Atlantic, and in the air war against England, through the commitment of some Italian air units along the Channel.

Until Italy advanced on Greece at the end of October of this year, Italian warfare against England—with the exception of the relatively simple drive against Sidi Barrâni—was confined to the air and to naval war in the Mediterranean, in which Italy scored no important successes.

Italy's advance on Greece from Albania was prepared equally badly both in a political and military way, and therefore led to the well-known failure, which, aside from the military victories for Greece, made it possible for England to establish bases in Greece and on the Greek islands. This occasion revealed most clearly the lack of a close collaboration between the two Allies. Germany was not informed in advance of Italy's intention to attack Greece—to say nothing of Italy's strategic plans in this respect—by either the political or military leaders of Italy.

A similar lack of collaboration was shown by the events in North Africa. The German offer of October of this year to send a complete armored division to Libya, instead of some tanks as requested by the Italians, was rejected by the Italians,⁴ and at the conversation, which was repeatedly postponed and finally took place on November 15 of this year, between Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Badoglio at Innsbruck, the previous position regarding a separate conduct of the war north and south of the Alps was reaffirmed.⁵

II. Evaluation of the present feeling in Italy with regard to a closer military collaboration.

At the moment, Italy has been forced to take the defensive all along the line, not only at sea, but in the Balkans and in Africa.

⁴ See documents Nos. 149 and 323.

⁵ See document No. 400 and footnote 1.

As a result of this situation Rome is somewhat perplexed at the moment about the further conduct of the war in the Mediterranean area and in looking for support in the conduct of the war, the glances are increasingly directed toward Germany. The dispatch of a German air corps to southern Italy was greeted joyously here and the desire expressed a few days ago that two German armored divisions be sent to Libya demonstrates the growing willingness of Italy to avail herself of German assistance in order to attain final victory.*

From a number of statements of Italian political and military personages that have come to me, I gather that under the impact of Italy's failures, there is a growing conviction of the need for a closer military collaboration between Germany and Italy. Even though such ideas have thus far been expressed only in an intimate circle and not by leading personages, their exponents include, among others, the Chief of the Italian Air Force Operations Staff and one of the highest officials of the Palazzo Chigi. That such views are also held outside of Rome is evident, among other things, from a consular report, in which it is pointed out that as a result of the reverses in Greece and Egypt, one often hears the wish expressed that high-ranking German officers would reorganize the entire military system.

The entire problem must, however, also be viewed from another angle:

Even though one cannot talk of a political crisis at the moment, there is no mistaking the fact that in private very strong criticism is being aimed at Italy's political and military leadership. This is entirely justified inasmuch as leadership and organization have largely broken down. The organization of the rationing measures within the country also leaves much to be desired and accordingly gives rise to strong criticism. A further decline in morale cannot be a matter of indifference to us either, for it is obvious that the pro-English and pro-French elements, which are still very much present in Italy, are again showing increased activity, and that English propaganda, particularly through the radio broadcasts which are listened to by large segments of the population, is taking advantage of the present situation.

III. Proposal for the study of the question of a closer German-Italian military cooperation.

On the basis of the situation described above, it seems to me desirable to undertake as soon as possible the study of the question whether it is not necessary, in the interest of the over-all conduct of the war and

* See document No. 541.

for the strengthening of the power of resistance of the Italian people, to bring about as soon as possible a very much closer military cooperation between Germany and Italy. History teaches that almost always in coalition wars the question sooner or later becomes acute of assistance for the militarily weaker party by the militarily stronger party through the establishment of a joint high command. On the basis of my own view of the situation here, following numerous conversations with the Chiefs of the Liaison Staffs and the Wehrmacht Attachés, I have reached the conviction that stronger German influence on the Italian conduct of the war is absolutely necessary. It is not my task to make proposals regarding the details of the solution of this problem, since they are dependent on the over-all appreciation of the situation. At any rate, it would be wrong, in my opinion, to allow any doubt to exist that the situation in the Mediterranean, produced by the most recent Italian reverses, harbors the definite danger that the war will be lost in the Mediterranean.

In this connection, the impression must naturally not be created that the Italian armed forces are being placed under a German high command, if only in view of the special sensitivity of the Italians on this score and of the prestige of the Duce, which must be preserved in all circumstances.⁷

⁷The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940–Mar. 24, 1941) has the following entry at Jan. 28, 1941:

"The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff transmits a report of Dec. 31 from the Chief of the Navy Liaison Staff in Rome to the Naval War Staff which he received on Jan. 17 from the Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Branch. According to this report the Ambassador in Rome, on the basis of a discussion which he held on Dec. 30 with the Chiefs of the Liaison Staffs of the respective branches of the Wehrmacht, had decided to urge the Reich Foreign Minister that on the German side they exert an influence on the Italian conduct of the war and on the military situation in the Mediterranean.

"The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff stated in this connection that on Jan. 9 the Reich Foreign Minister presented the Ambassador's proposal to the Führer. The Führer, however, declined to undertake anything which might offend the Duce and thereby lead to the loss of the most valuable binding element of the Axis, namely the mutual trust of the Chiefs of State. An influence on the Italian conduct of the war can only be achieved: by coupling to the supplying of German forces definite stipulations for the future leadership in the given Italian theater of war, as in the case of Libya; or by the Führer in a general way making suggestions regarding leadership and tactics on the basis of German successes, as was done for the first time in the discussion with the Duce, Count Ciano, and the Italian generals on Jan. 20."

For Hitler's remarks of Jan. 20, see document No. 679.

No. 584

449/222991

The Legation in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 115 of December 31

ATHENS, December 31, 1940.

Received December 31—4:25 p. m.

For OKH, Attaché Branch. In reply to radiogram No. 63 of December 30, No. 4621/40 g., Attaché Branch.¹

So far there are no indications of any kind of a debarkation of English ground force units in Preveza or elsewhere on the Greek mainland, nor are there indications that this is being expected. Only ground crews from the present English main air base, Eleusitras, have been recently dispatched to the Greek west coast.

Nor is there anything in the report of the arrival of English drivers in considerable numbers.

There are, on the other hand, reports, although still unconfirmed, of the withdrawal of English air units on the Libyan front.

Preveza is the main supply base of the Greek southern group. It is therefore constantly visited by single vessels and convoys. The latest transports include besides personnel and supplies of material mainly light tanks for the Greek tank battalions now being formed, antitank guns, antiaircraft guns and a very great number of trucks for Greek columns and motorized units to be newly formed.

The Greek military successes in Albania were achieved by their own efforts and only in some places with the help of the English Air Force. In view of the favorable military situation and the tendency of the Greeks to avoid closer military and political ties with England, the dispatch of English ground forces is considered as unlikely as long as the boundaries of the country are not altered by something like a Greek defeat or German intervention.

The General Staff likewise vigorously denies the reports of the arrival on the Greek mainland of English reinforcements.

Military Attaché²
ERBACH

¹ Not found.

² Maj. Christian Clem von Hohenberg.

No. 585

84/62300-01

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1940—4:56 p. m.

No. 2845 of December 31

Received January 1, 1941—5:55 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2839 of December 30.¹

On the basis of all the information I have received from well-informed circles and the commentaries which have been made in the meantime in the American press and public, the following additional points have emerged in connection with the Roosevelt speech.² Roosevelt's intention was:

1. To incite American public opinion and instill in the people a panicky fear in order to spur them to a much more intensive cooperation in the armament program. The Government realizes that things cannot go on as they are and that it is almost impossible within the limits of its present democratic powers to speed up the program that has been proclaimed for months with a false pathos bordering on bluff and braggadocio. Because Roosevelt does not wish, or does not dare, to abandon the social achievements of the "New Deal" which he introduced (for example the 40-hour week or the drastic curtailment of the luxury industries in order to release engineers for the armament industry), he tries to attain his objective by way of hysteria and war psychosis, for which the American people, faint-hearted and superficial as they are, are receptive. Skepticism and disappointment with regard to the slow progress has been evident in the past weeks in the speeches of all the leading men of industry. The feeling was excellently characterized last Sunday in a first-page editorial in the *Washington Post*, which proclaimed: "We are a year behind; Hitler had a more correct estimate of us than we had ourselves."

2. To encourage England to continue the struggle. His assertion that the Axis Powers could not win the war should also be evaluated in this light. Without being in a position to offer greater aid immediately, he announces to England: "We are ready to help you with all our strength, but expect that you will hold out to the last man." In order to strengthen the position of the Churchill Government still further, he added that a negotiated peace was out of the question thereby eliminating himself once and for all as mediator of a compromise peace.

3. To place upon Germany's shoulders the decision and responsibility for a possible open outbreak of the war. He probably does not reckon with a declaration of war by the Axis Powers, but hopes that

¹ Not filmed.

² President Roosevelt's fireside chat of Dec. 29 in the course of which he stated that the United States must be "the great arsenal of democracy." For text, see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. ix, p. 633-644.

³ In English in the original.

his insults will provoke Germany and Italy to threats and outbreaks of anger which he can then use to the full domestically for further increasing the war hysteria.

According to the comments of members of Congress and the press so far available, the reception of the speech was overwhelmingly favorable, particularly since as usual it went off in general phrases and contained no concrete proposals; it therefore also contained few points of attack for his opponents. The lies and distortions on which Roosevelt's statements were based, that is, Hitler's alleged plans for world conquest and the threat to America posed by a victorious Germany, are so firmly believed in by the large majority of the people that it would be politically dangerous for Roosevelt's opponents still to cast doubt on them today. Thus it happens that even isolationist members of Congress, such as Representative Hamilton Fish and Senator Vandenberg, preferred to declare their agreement in principle with the basic ideas of the Roosevelt speech.

In spite of the little news value of the speech, the principles laid down by Roosevelt, his unconditional championing of England, his open challenge to the totalitarian states, are being represented in the American public as a proclamation of the greatest historical importance. At the same time the press voices the expectation that the reply to it will be given to Roosevelt by Hitler himself.

THOMSEN

No. 586

F1/0486-97

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

DECEMBER 31, 1940.

DUCE: At the end of this year I feel impelled from the depths of my heart to express to you my good wishes for the coming year. I do so with feelings of friendship that are all the warmer since I can imagine that the recent events will have made you more lonesome in relation to many people who are in themselves insignificant, but in return also more receptive to the sincere comradeship of a man who feels that he has thrown in his lot with you for better or for worse.

Let me make a statement at the start of this letter: namely, that there are innumerable examples in the history of wars and nations of the events that are affecting all of us today. In the majority of all these cases great powers have almost always at the beginning reached too low an estimate of required means for the attack on smaller coun-

¹ Translated from the German copy in the file of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

tries, and have then very often suffered reverses in the initial stages of these battles. German history contains quite a number of examples of this. I therefore consider it necessary, precisely in every case of this sort, to attack with superior forces if it is at all possible, even when there is danger of losing the sympathies of those who consider a balance of forces to be a necessary prerequisite for a fair estimation of the victor.

Since the occurrences in Greece and Albania and in North Africa I have been ceaselessly pondering the really effective countermeasures which could be undertaken, particularly on my part. By "effective" I mean the avoidance of self-consuming expedients and instead of this the launching of really decisive operations, which provide the only real relief.

As regards direct help to Italy, your wishes are known to me, Duce.² They shall be fulfilled—in so far as this lies in our power. In some areas it will not be possible. However, it will be possible to find expedients that will lead to the desired result after all.

Now when I consider the general situation, Duce, I come to the following conclusions:

1. The war in the West has actually been decided. The overwhelming of England requires a powerful final thrust, to the extent that England does not break down under the increased effect of our air and submarine warfare. Therefore strong German forces are none the less necessary in order, when the conditions are right for success, to proceed directly against England for the last decisive attack. The massing of these formations—and particularly of the tremendous stocks of material—requires antiaircraft protection that goes far beyond what could be estimated hitherto.

2. *France.*

The French Government has dismissed Laval. The reasons communicated to me officially are untrue.³ I no longer doubt for a second that the reason is that General Weygand is sending extortionist demands from North Africa to the Vichy Government and the latter does not feel able to proceed against General Weygand without assuming the danger of losing North Africa. I consider it possible that in Vichy itself quite a number of persons are covering the Weygand policy, at least secretly. I do not believe that General Pétain personally is acting disloyally. However, one cannot be sure of that, either. This forces us to maintain a sharp scrutiny of what is going on.

3. *Spain.*

Spain, under the impression of what Franco considers to be the changed situation, has for the time being refused to cooperate with the two Axis Powers. I fear that Franco is committing here the greatest mistake of his life. His idea that he can obtain grain and other raw materials from the democracies, in thanks for his aloofness,

² See documents Nos. 538, 541, and 554.

³ See documents Nos. 530 and 566.

is in my opinion unrealistic naïveté. They will put him off with promises until the last kilogram of grain in the country has been used up, and then the fight of the democratic powers against him personally will start. I regret this, for we had made all the preparations for crossing the Spanish border on January 10 and attacking Gibraltar at the beginning of February.⁴ In my opinion the attack would have led to success in a relatively short time. The troops for this were excellently selected and trained, and the weapons were especially designated and readied for the purpose. From the moment in which the Strait of Gibraltar was in our hands the danger of any kind of untoward behavior on the part of French North and West Africa would have been eliminated. For this reason I am very sad about this decision of Franco's which does not take account of the help which we—you, Duce, and I—once gave him in his hour of need. I have only a faint hope left that possibly at the last minute he will become aware of the catastrophic nature of his own actions and he will after all—even though late—find his way to the camp of the front whose victory will also decide his own fate.

4. *Bulgaria.*

Bulgaria, too, has shown itself to be disinclined to accede to the Tripartite Pact and to assume a clear, resolute attitude toward the outside. The result of this is the increasing pressure exerted on Bulgaria on the part of Soviet Russia. If the King had acceded to our pact immediately no one would have dared to subject him to pressure in any way. The worst thing in this is the poisoning of public opinion in Bulgaria, which is not insensitive to Communist infections.

5. The clearest stand in this conflict is without doubt that taken by *Hungary* and *Rumania*.

General Antonescu has recognized that the future of his regime and also of his person depends on our victory. He has drawn clear and unequivocal conclusions from this, which have increased enormously my estimation of him, also as a soldier; in general my personal impression of him was that of a fanatical nationalist fighter and resolute officer. But in this case the attitude of the Hungarian Government is also no less determined and consistent. Since December 13, German troop transports have now been rolling to Rumania in uninterrupted succession. Besides the armored units already there, by December 25 a new armored division had arrived, and in addition numerous engineer units, Luftwaffe units and transports of material. Hungary and Rumania made their railroad network available to the greatest possible extent, so that the divisions can now get to the assembly areas in quick succession. I cannot say anything as yet about the intended or necessary later operations. They are now in the planning stage. The forces will be calculated in such a way that any reversal or even any oblique threat will appear impossible. It is only necessary, Duce, that your front in Albania be consolidated, so that at least essential parts of the Greek or Greek-English Army are tied down there.

⁴ See documents Nos. 323; 473 and footnote 1; and 476 and footnote 2.

6. *Yugoslavia.*

The attitude of Yugoslavia is at the moment one of watchful waiting. She wants to conclude nonaggression pacts with us in certain circumstances, but evidently does not by any means wish to accede to the Tripartite Pact. I do not think that any further measures on our part would be promising before the psychological situation has been generally improved once more by military successes.

7. *Russia.*

In view of the danger of domestic conflicts in a number of the Balkan states it is, to be sure, necessary to consider also the developments which are ultimately possible and how to guard against them. I do not believe there will be any Russian step to our detriment as long as Stalin lives and no very special crises occur on our side. But the case of Poland is a warning to caution. What Pilsudski would never have done his successors lightheartedly undertook to do. However, it is the soldier's function to anticipate the unexpected in wartime and to take it into account. Therefore, Duce, I regard the existence of a German Wehrmacht that is strong enough to oppose any conceivable eventuality from the East as a prerequisite for any safe conclusion of this war. The more obviously strong this power is, the less will be the likelihood that it will have to be used for such unanticipated contingencies. I would like to add in this connection that the present relationship with the Soviet Union is very good, that we are on the point of concluding a trade agreement satisfactory to both parties, and that therefore the hope is justified that the difficult points still open can also be solved in a reasonable manner. Actually, it is only the questions of Finland and Constantinople that are still separating us. As for Finland I do not see any problem at all, since in principle we do not regard Finland as belonging to our sphere of interest; we simply do not wish to have a new war break out there. As for Constantinople and the Straits it cannot be to our interest to deliver Bulgaria or the Straits themselves to Bolshevism. Here, too, however, it will be possible with a little good will to find a solution that avoids the intolerable and helps what is just and desirable to win out.

The solution will be all the more certain of success, however, the more it is realized in Moscow, too, that we are by no means under compulsion to take any step that does not suit us.

8. *North Africa.*

Duce, I do not believe that any sort of large-scale counterattack can be made here at the moment. The preparation of such operations requires a period of at least 3 to 4 months. Then, however, the season will begin when German units, at any rate, cannot function successfully there at all. Moreover, the tanks, which are not equipped with special cooling devices, can hardly be of any practical service in such heat—at any rate not for far-reaching operations that require commitment for days at a time. There the decisive thing seems to me to be to bring about a reinforcement of antitank defenses even at the risk, in doing so, of divesting other Italian units of them for the time being. I know, Duce, that all commanders object to giving up the weapons and units allotted them. However, I have intervened in this way in my own Wehrmacht numerous times. In the face of the opposition of

individual corps or army leaders I have taken out units, withdrawn weapons, and committed them at places where I considered they would be more useful. Above all I believe—as I recently emphasized—that we must try with all possible means to weaken the British naval position by means of the Luftwaffe, unless it is possible to relieve the troops themselves by committing it on the battle front. Aside from this, Duce, no decisive measures can be taken anywhere before the month of March. Transports that have not been in preparation for a long time also require a very long time to get under way, even with the greatest utilization of all workers. Furthermore, many railroads are so overburdened at the present time that any new transports can be undertaken only at the price of present ones.

In spite of all this I regard the future with calm assurance. Your people, Duce, will only emerge hardened from the first reverses. The British attempt to separate the Italian people from you will lead to their being bound to you more strongly than ever before. The few persons who regard such an attempt with hopeful sympathy are not to be identified with your people in any case, and by no means represent any sort of valuable factor of national resistance. In the most favorable case they are always only passive observers and never hot-blooded fighters. To have them unmasked at an early stage can always be considered only as a gain for a leadership that can all too easily let itself be deceived about the fact of their existence by the fact that these people are temporarily playing dead. I have these people, too!

I can understand, Duce, that you have little time, now, and in particular that you do not like to leave Rome. As soon as you believe you can undertake to do so, however, I cordially request that you let me know. I am at your disposal at any time, Duce, and will be happy to see you again in order to assure you then by word of mouth, too, how much I sympathize with your fight and how much I feel with you. Perhaps I can also give you more information than about the progress of the operations that are now in the planning stage.

Now please accept once again my most cordial wishes for success in the coming year. Everything that is in my power and in the power of my people will be done to make this the year of final victory. That is the best wish that I myself can express at the turning point of this historical time.

In loyal comradeship,
Yours,⁵

⁵ The file copy is unsigned.

No. 587

104/112785

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 925

BERLIN, December 31, 1940.

After conveying his New Year's greetings, the Finnish Minister, whom I saw today on the occasion of the signing of a treaty, expressed hope for his country. He stated that in his homeland people were now reassured, because they thought they knew that in a future conflict with Russia they would not stand alone.

In my reply I used the formula that the Russian Government certainly realized that Germany did not desire any new unrest in the North.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Weizsäcker had made a similar statement in a conversation with the Finnish Minister on Nov. 30 (B19/B003892).

No. 588

221/148994-95

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 1 of January 1

PARIS, January 1, 1941.

Received January 1—2:20 a. m.

By closed circuit coded teletype.

1. It is being asserted in various quarters that, following the return of Darlan to Vichy, a sharp difference of opinion has arisen concerning the policy to be pursued. It is rumored that a number of ministers are trying to induce the Marshal and the Government to go off to Algiers. Darlan, Huntziger, and Minister of Public Instruction Chevalier spoke out against this plan. Marshal Pétain cut off the discussion of this question with the remark that he alone would make the decision in the matter. In a telephone conversation with de Brinon yesterday, Darlan opposed a formal denial of the rumor spread by foreign radio stations that the French fleet was about to sail to North Africa.

2. Almost all the French in Paris who learned of the events of December 13, express themselves in the most vehement form about the mistakes made by their Government. Opposition to the Vichy Government in the ranks of labor and in leftist middle-class circles is growing. Condemnation of the methods of December 13th can also be found, however, in the circles of the Right. The view is advanced frequently that it would be best for France if the entire country were

occupied. If the Germans should accept the events of December 13 without reacting strongly, this would also be construed as weakness, in view of Roosevelt's speech,¹ and would expose the pro-German French to growing terrorism.

3. Since he has been staying in Paris, Laval has refrained from engaging in any official political activity, but he maintains close contact with all persons and organizations which want to see his policy of sincere cooperation with Germany put into effect.

He told us several times that he was resolved to take any step that might serve the cause. Thus, in an open letter to the Marshal, he was prepared to renounce all participation in the French Government, to seek another conference with the Marshal in Vichy, or to form a government in occupied France and declare that it had authority over the whole country [*dieselbe für das ganze Land für verbindlich zu erklären*].²

ABETZ

¹ See document No. 585, footnote 2.

² Marginal note: "In my opinion, Abetz sees the situation too much from his Paris local point of view, hemmed in by circumstances into which he has fallen, not entirely without his own doing. W[eizsäcker], Jan. 1."

This marginal note which is scarcely legible on this copy of the telegram is copied in another handwriting on 221/148993.

No. 589

B13/001292-96

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, January 1, 1941—10:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received January 1—11:12 p. m.

No. 3 of January 1

For the Foreign Minister personally.

I called on the Duce this afternoon, accompanied by Count Ciano, and handed him the Führer's letter.¹ The audience lasted a little over an hour.

The Duce first read the Führer's letter through to himself, and then read it aloud to Count Ciano and me in Italian. He interrupted this reading several times with remarks and comments of approval and concluded it with the statement that it was a very important and interesting document. He was obviously especially gratified by the reference to the fact that it was a phenomenon often observed in history that a great power that had a quarrel with a small state began action with inadequate forces and therefore at the start sustained reverses. He also especially applauded the thought in the Führer's

¹ See document No. 586.

letter that fellow countrymen, not in Italy only, who never got beyond the role of spectators never became valuable comrades in arms.

After he had read the letter aloud, the Duce went into individual subjects without adhering chronologically to the content of the letter.

1. Spain:

After some very bitter words about the heavy losses that Italy, too, had sustained in innumerable dead and wounded, 800 guns, 14 billion lire of unrepaid costs, etc. in Franco's cause, he declared that, with only Gibraltar in mind, whose seizure would have opened for his ships a passage to the Atlantic to what would certainly have been very promising activity, he would have welcomed Spain's joining the side of the Axis Powers. In other respects, above all in view of Spain's demands in North Africa and the effect on France, Spain would be more of a liability, particularly since she had neither an army nor a navy, nor could she supply herself. In the event of America's entry, her joining might have been valuable. He did not expect this entry, however.

2. The United States:

Roosevelt's speech² had hurt more than helped the cause of England. It had brought the anti-interventionists more strongly into action, since, after the speech, intervention seemed a more palpable danger than before, while until then it had been a matter more of general reflections without immediate topical importance. Moreover, the Americans could hardly do more for England than they were doing now.

3. Russia:

He agreed with the Führer's judgment of the situation on all points. The conclusion of the Rome-Moscow conversations, now in progress (concerning which Alfieri had already been instructed for the purpose of informing the Reich Government³ and on the progress of which Ciano is going to inform me in the next few days⁴) would create a new element of security in this direction. It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the Russians had already pocketed a very considerable amount of loot.

4. Bulgaria:

He expected that Bulgaria would accede to the Tripartite Pact, if only to reconcile herself the more easily to the passage of German troops through the country, for it was easier to permit this, as Bul-

² See document No. 585, footnote 2.

³ Such instructions were contained in a letter of Dec. 16, 1940, from Ciano to Alfieri; the letter is printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, p. 617. An excerpt from Alfieri's telegram of Dec. 23, 1940, reporting his conversation with Ribbentrop on the subject of Soviet-Italian talks, is printed in Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, p. 80. No corresponding record of this Alfieri-Ribbentrop conversation has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

⁴ See document No. 599.

garia had, indeed, already done (he claimed to know that several thousand German troops were already in Bulgaria, mostly in civilian clothes; antiaircraft personnel, too, already in uniform) to a country allied by treaty ties, than to another.

5. Yugoslavia:

She would follow the example of Bulgaria in the question of accession, for she had no other choice, if only because of her geographic position with respect to Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and the two chief European Powers of the Tripartite Pact, and as a neighbor of Greece "whose fate was sealed."

6. France:

He could only underscore each word in the Führer's letter. Extreme mistrust and the greatest vigilance were necessary.

The Duce then spoke of his own situation: With respect to North Africa he could now feel easier; he had given the strict order and had also received confirmation of its receipt, that Bardia, then Tobruk, and finally Derna, were to be held to the last man. In Bardia there were stationed about 30,000 crack troops; there were 13 guns to each kilometer of front; there were supplies of ammunition and rations sufficient to last for weeks. The thing that had caused the great setback, namely, the element of surprise, would not be present in the future. Moreover, the problem of supplying the Army, which has heretofore been so unfavorable for the Italians, would now change into the reverse. In a few months would come the heat, which would render the use of the tanks difficult, if not impossible.

In Albania "the wind would soon turn." He already had 20 divisions [there] (including the original 8 or 9), to which 5 more were to be added. Yesterday 8,000 more men had been transported there; communications were unimpaired; in 1500 trips made since the beginning of November, only one single troop transport had been sunk, and 800 out of 1,000 men had been saved; 4 steamers had been sunk empty. A difficult matter was the transportation of the mules, which were indispensable for the troops, but he already had 14,000 of them there, while 8,000 more were ready and waiting at Bari. An absolutely calm sea was necessary for their transportation because the animals could not stand seasickness. Good progress was also being made with the transportation of material. The Duce here made favorable mention of the German air transport command. General Cavallero, who now alone had the supreme command in Albania, had now reported to him about certain promising operations, the commencement of which would not be long delayed, particularly since the Greeks had tremendous losses, which he estimated at 6,000 dead and some 16,000 wounded in November. In reply to my question as

to the English division which apparently had landed in Preveza, the Duce replied that he did not think it was a ground division; they were more likely air force personnel. He also considered Metaxas too clever to turn an Anglo-Greek army loose on the Italians, for this would make of the present Greek-Italian war an Axis war, while Metaxas was, indeed, avoiding everything that might cause us to intervene actively. The Greeks had put forth their utmost strength; the turning point in Italy's favor was imminent. Reverting to the Führer's desire for an oral discussion, the Duce said he still wanted to wait for this turning point, for until then he could not get away from here. Moreover, as he would also say in his reply, he himself attached the greatest importance to being able soon again to talk things over with the Führer.

He welcomed with keen satisfaction the good news about the progress of the Berlin conversations concerning Italy's wishes. He was attaching so much importance to their positive outcome because only then would he be in a position to make full use of the productive capacity of his factories, particularly those engaged in airplane construction. The construction of heavy tanks was proceeding satisfactorily and output would shortly be increased from 70 to about 100 a month.

Of one thing, the Duce said in conclusion, he was absolutely certain: The Axis could no longer be beaten, for that would mean the occupation of the Reich and Italy by English armies and, particularly, the occupation of Berlin and Rome. There existed only the alternative of a negotiated peace, for which London would, however, have to take the initiative, or the total victory of the Axis, going as far as the destruction of England.

All the statements of the Duce exuded the same calm and the supreme assurance that had always been characteristic of him. The question remains whether the data on which his optimistic judgment of the situation in the two endangered theaters of war is based present a faithful picture of the actual situation. He took the extensive figures, which in many respects were still more detailed than what I have given here, from a portfolio of original reports of the Ministry of War that was lying in front of him.

The Duce's behavior toward Count Ciano was entirely as usual; at any rate it gave no support to the story which is continually bobbing up here that the Duce intended to replace him.

No. 590

204/112894

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, January 1, 1941.

SECRET

No. 1

For the Ambassador and Schnurre personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 2838.¹

1. I agree to the transmittal of the boundary treaty.² Please state on that occasion that signature of the treaty is naturally dependent upon a satisfactory settlement of compensation for the Lithuanian tip.

2. In regard to Molotov's statements, we fully maintain our justified standpoint in the question of compensation for the Lithuanian tip. I am entirely in accord with your response to Molotov's statements. Please add that any connection between compensation for the Lithuanian tip and a lump sum to pay off private legal claims in the former Baltic States, such as Molotov is making, is entirely beside the point. The compensation is not a matter of monetary damages for private property interests, but is political compensation for renunciation of sovereignty over an area.

3. Please report at once on Molotov's new offer, so that a decision on acceptance can then be made here.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 580.

² Document No. 579.

No. 591

104/112895-96

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, January 2, 1941—9: 55 p.m.

No. 4 of January 2

Received January 3—12: 45 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 1 of January 1.¹

Molotov received our communications with visible satisfaction.

1. Molotov agreed in principle with the draft boundary agreement.² He suggested, however, investigating whether it would not be well to mention in article 1 of the boundary agreement the three boundary

¹ Document No. 590.

² See document No. 579.

agreements of October 1, 1920, January 22, 1928, and March 22, 1939, concluded between Germany and Lithuania. Regarding article 4, Molotov remarked that the Soviet Government would probably prefer a *pactum de contrahendo*.

2. In the question of compensation for the Lithuanian tip Molotov made a compromise proposal, stating that he was willing to double the Soviet offer of 3.86 million gold dollars; he requested that the German claim be correspondingly reduced. Thus the Soviet offer amounts to 32.4 million reichsmarks payable in 2 years in accordance with the previous Soviet proposal.

3. As regards the goods to be delivered, Molotov said the Soviet Government was willing to comply with the German wishes. However, he pointed out that the nonferrous metals already promised in the economic agreement had to be taken from national reserves and would create difficulties in the delivery of further quantities. Nevertheless he did not intend to exclude nonferrous metals. He would instruct People's Commissar Mikoyan to make concrete proposals tomorrow to Minister Schnurre concerning distribution of the compensation in goods.

Molotov said he agreed to our request to conclude an agreement on this entirely independent of the economic agreement.

Please authorize Minister Schnurre in an open telegram to conclude this special agreement; a neutral designation should be chosen in consideration of the secret character of the agreement.

4. Molotov said he was willing to make the entire agreement ready for signature by Monday, or Tuesday at the latest. He will likewise instruct the Soviet delegations in Riga and Kaunas to conclude their work by this time. In order on our part to be able to meet this deadline, which is very desirable for us, we request instructions in the course of January 3. We propose accepting the offer of the Soviet Government. Minister Schnurre will try during tomorrow's discussion with Mikoyan to reduce the term of payment from 2 years and to obtain as favorable a distribution of commodities as possible.

5. A separate telegraphic report follows concerning treatment of the agreement in the press.³

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

³ Telegram No. 7 of Jan. 2 (104/112897) dealt with treatment of the agreement in the press.

No. 592

8941/E053914

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 5

BERLIN, January 2, 1941.

The Russian Ambassador today handed me the enclosed note,¹ which refers to the accession of the Soviet Government to the "provisional agreement" of September 12 of last year,² regarding the abolition of the International Danube Commission. Attached to the note is the draft of a protocol,³ by which the proposed accession should take place.

Ambassador Dekanozov expressed to me the hope of soon being informed concerning the time and place of the signing of the protocol of accession.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Not printed (3941/E053915).

² See document No. 53 and footnote 4.

³ Not printed (3941/E053916).

⁴ See document No. 620.

No. 593

839/281658-59

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

JANUARY 2, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I 6 g. Rs.

REGARDING THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF THE BULGARIAN
MINISTER PRESIDENT

I do not assume that there is the intention and likelihood of speaking in detail with the Bulgarian Minister President¹ about military questions.

In the forthcoming conversation with the Bulgarian Minister President, it is necessary, however, to prepare for the necessary military conversations. The *earliest possible* military conversations with Bulgaria are necessary, above all, with respect to two principal questions.

1. With respect to passage through Bulgaria. Preparatory initial conversations about this are already in progress.

2. With respect to the fact that, according to the plans of the OKW, it is intended to have the Bulgarian Army cover the left flank against Turkey.² As yet, there has not been any discussion at all about this with the Bulgarian Army Command. This task requires a certain amount of time, however. (Mobilization of Bulgarian army corps and transport to the Bulgarian eastern frontier.)

¹ See document No. 570 and footnote 2.

² See document No. 511.

The OKW wants to have Field Marshal List carry on these conversations with the Bulgarian Army Command.

I therefore suggest that it be arranged with the Bulgarian Minister President that immediately upon his return military conversations take place directly between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarian Army Command. A representative of the Foreign Office should therefore be assigned to the List High Command.³

RITTER

³ See document No. 656.

No. 594

585/242838-39

*Note by the State Secretary*¹

TOP SECRET
St.S. No. 924

BERLIN, January 2, 1941.

BRIEF FOR THE CONVERSATION WITH THE BULGARIAN MINISTER
PRESIDENT²

The politically most important points of the conversation will be:

1) *Turkey:*

Joint instructions for the guidance of conversations with Turkey regarding the forthcoming Balkan operation.

This includes respect for Turkish territory and the legitimate interests of Turkey. Agreement with the Bulgarians to award to the Turks, if necessary, the glacis on Greek soil ending in front of Edirne to the southwest.

2) *Yugoslavia:*

Assurance that the Macedonian question will not be raised by the Bulgarians.

The door must be kept open for Yugoslavia to join the front of the Tripartite Pact. Therefore delimitation in the west of the corridor to the Aegean Sea, later on to be awarded to the Bulgarians, excluding the main part of the Peninsula of Chalcidice.

3) *Tripartite Pact:*

The attempt should be made to obtain Bulgarian accession, but this is not a necessary prerequisite for the entire operation.

4) *Russia:*

The German instructions for guidance of conversations with Russia regarding the Balkan operation should be told to the Bulgarians.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister.

¹ This copy from the State Secretary's file is not signed.

² See document No. 570 and footnote 2.

No. 595

F1/0485

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

JANUARY 2, 1941/XIX.

FÜHRER: I thank you for your very important letter² which was delivered to me yesterday by your Ambassador. I shall send you my reply as soon as possible.³

Meanwhile I pray that you receive my comradely greetings.

MUSSOLINI

¹ Translated from an Italian copy in the file of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. A German translation is filmed on F1/0484.

² Document No. 586.

³ See document No. 610 and footnote 2.

No. 596

2281/482005-06

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

A 5683

ANKARA, January 2, 1941.
Pol. VII 162 g.

Subject: Attitude of the Reich Government on the question of Arab Independence.

I have the honor to send you enclosed a copy of a letter together with a French translation,¹ which in accordance with telegram No. 727 of December 31² I sent the Iraq Minister³ here today through the intermediary of the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires,⁴ and which confirms the position taken by the Reich Government at the time on the question of Arab independence.

PAPEN

[Enclosure]

ANKARA, January 2, 1941.

M. MINISTER: In the conversations of the past few weeks⁵ you had suggested that, in order to enable your Government to resume relations with the German Reich, you receive written confirmation of the position of the Reich Government on the question of Arab indepen-

¹ Filmed on 2281/482006-07.

² See document No. 496, footnote 5.

³ Kamil Gaylani.

⁴ Secretary of Legation Istvan Traub.

⁵ See document No. 496 and footnote 3.

dence, which was broadcast over the German radio at the beginning of December 1940.⁶

I transmitted your suggestion to my Government at once, and I am happy now to be able to confirm to you, on instruction of my Government, the statement that was issued recently on the radio and in the press, which reads:

“Germany, which has always been animated by sentiments of friendship for the Arabs and cherishes the wish that they may prosper and be happy and assume a place among the peoples of the earth in accordance with their historic and natural importance, has always watched with interest the struggle of the Arab countries to achieve their independence. In their efforts to attain this goal the Arab countries can count upon Germany’s full sympathy also in the future. In making this statement, Germany finds herself in full accord with her Italian ally.”

I am transmitting this statement to you, M. Minister, in the expectation that all difficulties thus far impeding the resumption of relations will thereby be removed.

Yours, etc.

PAPEN

⁶ Actually the statement had been broadcast on the radio on Oct. 23, but was not published in the press until December 5. See document No. 190, footnote 4, and document No. 481.

No. 597

F19/251-62

The German General at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces to the High Command of the Wehrmacht

TOP SECRET MILITARY

ROME, January 2, 1941.

No. 4/41

Annex 2 to Report No. 1/41 geh.¹

The serious setbacks which the Italian Army has suffered both in the Balkans and in North Africa after brief initial successes gives rise to the question of what the causes are. Even before the war it was the firm conviction of the German General Staff that not too much could be expected from the Italian Army. On the other hand the Italian Navy and Air Force were rated more highly. After half a year of war, however, it must be stated that the Italian Navy has relinquished naval supremacy completely to the English, both in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea—actually without a fight. The Italian Air Force, too, has been unable to fulfill its tasks com-

¹ Not found.

pletely, since its air attacks achieve only slight effects and reconnaissance is carried out only in a very fragmentary manner.

The failure of the Italian Navy is influencing the whole conduct of the war in the Mediterranean area. It makes it difficult for the Italians to send personnel and material to their overseas theaters of war and makes it possible for the English to shift their reserves almost without hindrance, to form new armies, and to carry on the war vigorously also on land.

After these prefatory observations it must be stated, however, that the Army, too, has failed to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the Duce.

An important reason—especially stressed by the Italians—is the *lack of adequate supplies of weapons and equipment of every kind.*

The fighting in Greece and Albania shows that the Italians are unable to offset their initial numerical inferiority with better weapons.

The course of the operations in Libya furthermore has again confirmed that an army not equipped with tanks or motorized units is inferior to an opponent possessing these means.

The Italian Army does, to be sure, have three *armored divisions*, one of which is in Albania and two in Upper Italy. These cannot, however, be considered modern armored units, since they are equipped only with *carri velocci* (3-ton tanks), which already proved useless for fighting in Spain and should be used only as reconnaissance vehicles.

At present the Italian Army has only five battalions of modern medium tanks (two of 11-ton and three of 13-ton tanks), all of which are now in Libya and for the time being south of Derna, where an armored division is to be assembled. Italian industry is at present able to deliver only forty-six 13-ton tanks a month, that is, approximately enough for one new battalion.

The four Italian divisions stationed in Libya during peacetime were called *autotrasportabili* (motorized). Their motor vehicles have, however, been used mainly for supply and only occasionally for the transportation of troops. The continuation of the Italian offensive against Mersa Matrûh was postponed again and again because not enough motor vehicles were as yet at hand, although the Po army in Upper Italy had already in October turned over a large number of motor vehicles to the Graziani army group. Motorized divisions in the modern sense were not available to Graziani, nor any adequate number of antitank defenses.

Even the normal infantry division's supply of weapons is modest in comparison with other armies.

According to the latest reports of the Italian General Staff a normal infantry division has:

light machine guns	216
heavy machine guns	48
light mortars	108
heavy mortars	10
antitank guns	16
7.5-cm. guns	12
7.5-cm. mountain howitzers	12
10-cm. guns	12
2-cm. antiaircraft guns	12

The weapons of the Black Shirt Legion are not taken into account in these figures.

There is no new information on the strength of the corps troops. How many of them have already been transported from Italy to the two theaters of war, I do not know. Large numbers of them have probably been lost in Albania (Korçë) and especially with the Tenth Army, which had been supplied with more than the average equipment for the attack on Mersa Matrûh.

Only to a limited extent is it possible to release the weapons now lacking at the fronts (heavy artillery, tanks, antitank defenses, trucks) from the army units stationed in Italy, unless it is decided, by withdrawing even the last gun, not to keep the bulk of the Army operational any longer. The long and weakly defended coasts, however, make it imperative to have a mobile reserve in the homeland for defense against landing attempts.

The failures in the two theaters of war, however, are due not only to the poor arms and equipment but also to the leadership.

Just as this failed even in peacetime to take sufficient account of modern views in training, so the operations on the western Alpine front showed already that the leadership was unable to accomplish what could have been done even with limited means. This impression is strengthened by the fighting in Albania and confirmed by the development of the situation in Africa.

On December 6 the Italian intelligence service informed the Graziani army group that reports of a shortly impending attack by the English against the Tenth Army had been received. Nevertheless, the army group and the Tenth Army failed to take any precautions whatever or to undertake adequate reconnaissance. As a result, the thrust of the tank formations on December 9 caused a complete surprise, which led to the encirclement and destruction of four divisions.

In spite of the long pause in operations the Tenth Army was not organized at all for defense but was distributed over an area of 150 kilometers, so that Graziani's attempt to make a counterattack with

the rear divisions in order to support the units fighting at Sidi Barrâni could not be carried out owing to the long distance. The army group reserve at Tobruk (one division with army artillery and the three battalions of medium tanks) was 150 kilometers farther back still and was even less able to intervene.

Marshal Graziani decided to fight a delaying action and halt the advance of the English first at Bardia, then at Tobruk and Derna. For this purpose no attempt was made to withdraw the bulk of the Army first to Tobruk and then to the favorable defensive line south of Derna, leaving a strong rear guard behind; on the contrary, the remnant of the Tenth Army permitted itself to be encircled in Bardia and thereby became exposed to destruction, since no forces are available to come to the rescue of the encircled troops.

Whether these measures were taken by Marshal Graziani of his own accord or whether they were recommended to him from Rome by the High Command, I cannot judge. The conduct of the operations shows how serious mistakes by the Italians facilitated the English attack.

Added to these defects of the Italian leadership is the interference with the military command by persons who understand nothing about military matters, as shown in a shocking manner by the inauguration of the war against Greece.

Another reason for the Italian failures is the deficient resoluteness of the Italian soldier.

Unquestionably, the Italian is ready to sacrifice his life for his fatherland and to perform heroic deeds in an attack, or to endure the greatest privations in the hot sand of the desert; but to hold out in difficult places when alone and to defend oneself to the last cartridge is not for him. This is shown especially by the course of the fighting in Albania, where it is not possible to stabilize the front even after new formations are brought up, although large-scale attacks employing heavy offensive weapons are entirely out of the question on account of the terrain and the season.

The failure hitherto of the Italian armed forces in almost all areas has produced great *disappointment and a crisis of confidence*, not only among the soldiers, but among the people as a whole. The supreme military and political leader, the Duce, is being reproached for having given the Army tasks without providing it with the necessary means for carrying them out.

This reproach is not without justification. For instead of concentrating all forces on carrying out the attack on the Nile delta the Italian High Command embarked on the Greek operation and detailed fliers to the English Channel that were later needed in Libya; it refused the German tank division and did not provide for adequate

motorization of the Tenth Army. As a result, Graziani has been defeated and nothing has been accomplished in Greece.

With respect to the great achievements of the German Wehrmacht, one can now often hear it said by Italians, including officers, although not as yet by responsible authorities, that they *wished there were exercise of German influence* and a German supreme war command.

The Italian High Command has, however, asked for German support in the form of units, weapons, and raw materials.

If this request is granted, we must demand a voice in the conduct of the operations, so that the arms assistance we give is also used in the right way for the achievement of the war aim.

Heretofore the Italians have been unwilling to let us influence their conduct of the war in any way, and the opposition apparently came from the very highest level. In no case have I been informed by the competent authorities about projected operations. In the case of the current operations the information given is sufficient only for forming a general picture of the situation. I had to seek information on the distribution of the forces, the supply situation, the situation of the enemy, and communications conditions from the individual agencies. Thus far I have never been shown any situation maps of the Albanian or the Libyan theater of war.

Consequently it has been, and still is, impossible for me to intervene in any advisory capacity in the conduct of operations. Nor have the Italian authorities asked for any advice or opinion. When I have been able to make suggestions on individual segments of problems, they have been noted without being acted upon. The greatest obstacle thus far in the matter of an influence on operations has been the constantly raised demand for reciprocity.

Lieutenant Colonel Heggentrainer, too, enjoyed the good will of the Commander in Chief as liaison officer with the Graziani army group, but obtained practically no information whatever from the officers of the general staff of the army group command, especially at the critical moments. This shows that good intentions on the part of the higher command are often sabotaged by the lower ranks.

The same situation obtains with respect to the specially assigned German liaison staffs with the Italian Navy and Air Force.

In the last few days a greater willingness to provide better orientation—due especially to the influence of General Guzzoni—has been noted.

In order to be able to exert a real influence, however, the following seems to me to be necessary:

1. The position of the "German General at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces"² must be expanded beyond the task of recip-

² Rintelen had had this title since Sept. 20, 1940.

rocal transmission of intelligence into a position of operational influence.

The office of the "German General" should be expanded; the three liaison staffs should be more closely linked together, and they too should be assured of greater influence.

2. On all Italian fronts to which German troops are assigned some influence with respect to their commitment and command should be assured.

This influence must extend also to the Navy and the Air Force, since in the Mediterranean area the proper collaboration of all branches of the armed forces is important for every operation.²

V. RINTELEN

² See document No. 583.

No. 598

104/112910

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, FUSCHL, January 3, 1941.

SECRET

Received Berlin, January 3—8:30 p. m.

No. 1 of January 3 from Fuschl

No. 9 of January 3 from the Foreign Ministry

For the Ambassador personally and Schnurre.

With reference to your telegram No. 4 of January 2.¹

I agree to the Soviet Government's compromise proposal regarding the Lithuanian tip provided that the amount is paid, not after 2 years but at once, by immediate delivery of nonferrous metals, this to be entirely independent of the raw material deliveries envisaged in the economic agreement. In case delivery of nonferrous metals in the full amount of the sum causes difficulties, I authorize you to accept half of the sum as *immediate* payment in gold. The other half of the sum is to be delivered if possible entirely in the form of nonferrous metals.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 591.

JANUARY 1941

1011

No. 599

B13/001300

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, January 3, 1941—11:25 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received January 3—11:50 p. m.

No. 12 of January 3

For the Reich Minister personally.

Count Ciano asked me to see him this evening in order, in accordance with his promise (figure 3 of my telegram No. 3 of the 1st of this month¹), to inform me about the Italo-Russian conversation. He read me the instruction issued to Alfieri, which was sent to him today,² and on the basis of which he was to inform the Foreign Minister.³ He also read to me the telegram from Ambassador Rosso concerning his conversation with Molotov which is attached to the instruction, and which it is suggested to Alfieri in the instruction that he give the Foreign Minister, if requested.⁴

Count Ciano observed that, in these circumstances, a detailed report from me was, indeed, unnecessary; that he was asking me nevertheless, for my part also, to suggest to the Foreign Minister that he give his reaction as soon as possible, for we knew just as well as he how suspicious the Russians were and that at every delay they at once sniffed intentional procrastination.

In reply to my question whether he had in the meantime authorized Rosso to inform von der Schulenburg, he stated that this would be done at once.⁵

MACKENSEN

¹ Document No. 589.

² Cf. Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 96-97.

³ See document No. 610.

⁴ See document No. 610 and footnote 4.

⁵ Schulenburg sent a memorandum of a conversation on this subject with Rosso with report A 85 of Jan. 6 (366/206805-07).

No. 600

449/222993

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 6

BERLIN, January 3, 1941.

With reference to St.S. No. 4.¹

Sometime after the Greek Minister had left me today he called me once more on the telephone. He wanted to make sure that he had understood correctly my statement regarding the congratulatory telegram from his King to the Führer. He wanted to know, obviously for the purpose of reporting accurately, whether I had conveyed to him merely the thanks of the Führer to the King or in addition had expressed in return congratulations of the Führer to the King.

I confirmed to the Minister that my statement had only referred to the Führer's thanks.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister (by teletype).

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ This memorandum of Jan. 3 by Weizsäcker recorded a conversation with the Greek Minister; at the beginning of the conversation Weizsäcker had made the following communication: "The King of the Hellenes had sent by telegram a congratulatory New Year's message to the Führer. I had instructions to ask him, the Minister, to convey the Führer's thanks to the King." (449/222992)

No. 601

792/273166-67

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, January 3, 1941.

Counselor of Embassy Zamboni gave me the following information today derived from two telegrams of the Italian Minister in Baghdad of the middle of December (the second report is dated December 23).

The Italian Minister reported that Minister President Gaylani felt very encouraged as a result of the statements of the Italian Minister on the friendly attitude of the Axis Powers toward Iraq.¹ He had also shown understanding for the fact that the radio broadcasts that he had suggested had thus far not been made. With regard to the conversations with Japan on the subject of Japanese assistance in the form of arms,² the Minister President had confirmed

¹ See document No. 482.

² According to a Woermann memorandum of Dec. 23, 1940, he was told by Zamboni that the Iraq Minister President had informed Gabbrielli of a request he had directed to Japan for delivery of arms; he had then asked and obtained Italian support for such a step in Tokyo (83/61520-21). On Dec. 31, Zamboni informed Woermann that as a result of the Italian démarche in Tokyo, the Japanese Government had expressed its willingness in principle to comply with Iraq's request, but had pointed out various technical difficulties including the fact that "Iraq wanted to have the arms delivered for almost nothing." (83/61531-32)

his previous statements. The Italian Minister had been promised an aide-mémoire on the financial and economic situation. The Minister President was taking a cautious attitude at present, confining himself to the defense of his position. The Regent³ had likewise suggested to him—evidently at the instance of the English—that he resign. Gaylani had refused to do so, however, and had pointed out to the Regent that he had no constitutional right to make such a request. He hoped that Foreign Minister Nuri Said could be removed in the foreseeable future. The English offensive in Egypt naturally had a certain influence on sentiment in Iraq.

In another conversation Gaylani had characterized his policy as follows:

1. Maintenance of the security of the country, defense measures against possible attacks.
2. Iraq stands by her obligations arising out of the Arabian Pact⁴ and the Near Eastern Pact.⁵
3. Iraq adheres to the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain.⁶
4. Iraq continues to maintain friendly relations with friendly countries.

The Minister further reports that Foreign Minister Nuri Said had not dared to defend his policy in Parliament. He had therefore let an official of the Foreign Ministry take the responsibility in Parliament.

WOERMANN

³ Amir Abdal-Ilah.

⁴ Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, signed first by Iraq and Saudi Arabia on Apr. 2, 1936. For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIV, p. 131. Yemen acceded to the Treaty on Apr. 29, 1937. For the text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1937*, vol. 141, p. 1272.

⁵ Signed on July 8, 1937, at Saad-Abad Palace in Tehran between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, providing for noninterference, nonaggression, consultation, and mutual guarantee of common frontiers. For the text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1937*, vol. 141, p. 712.

⁶ Of June 30, 1930. See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXXXII, p. 363.

No. 602

3941/E053910-13

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

Tgb. No. A 378 g. Ang. II

JANUARY 3, 1941.

Ha. Pol. 59 g.

Subject: Soviet Attitude at the Danube Conference in Bucharest.

With reference to your telegram No. 2381 of December 28, 1940.¹

In the course of the conversation which I had with M. Molotov on December 29, concerning the question of the Lithuanian tip (see tele-

¹ Document No. 575.

gram No. 2838 of December 30²), I spoke also about the attitude of the Soviet delegate at the Danube conference in Bucharest and informed M. Molotov in accordance with point III of telegraphic instruction No. 2381.

M. Molotov took the opportunity to make the following statements:

He had the impression that this matter merely involved a misunderstanding. He therefore wanted to present to me in detail the position of the Soviet Government, in the light of the antecedents of the entire matter. From the beginning we had agreed that a unified Danube commission had to be established that would have competence for the course of the Danube from Bratislava to the mouth of the Danube inclusive. When in the course of the conversations the question of the dissolution of the European Danube Commission was raised and it was suggested that a provisional organization be established which would perform the practical tasks of this Commission until such time as a unified commission was created, the Soviet Government had expressed its agreement,³ although actually it had not considered the founding of a provisional organization absolutely necessary. Germany's interest in participating in all Danubian questions, including those of the maritime Danube, had always been recognized by the Soviet Government, and the Soviet Government had never tried to curtail Germany's claim. At the same time, however, the Soviet Government took the position that conditions on the Danube had changed fundamentally since the summer of 1940. While the Soviet Union up to that time had no longer been a Danubian state, she became one again through the reincorporation of Bessarabia. She could therefore not permit her interests to be ignored in regard to questions of the mouth of the Danube, and had to insist on the protection of her rights in this part of the Danube, just as Rumania did. Rumania seemed, however, still to be living in the past, and to forget that conditions at the mouth of the Danube had changed fundamentally by reason of the fact that the Soviet Union had become a riparian state of the Danube and the Soviet Government was all the more interested in all questions affecting the maritime Danube since the Soviet Union was also a Black Sea state. In spite of this, the German and Italian delegations had taken a one-sided, definitely pro-Rumanian attitude at the conference in Bucharest. Rumania felt that she had the support of Germany and Italy and did not want to understand that she was no longer alone at the mouth of the Danube.

With the help of a sketch of the three branches of the Danube and of the course of the Danube up to Brăila, M. Molotov further explained the Soviet position as follows:

² Document No. 580.

³ See document No. 201.

The Soviet Union bordered directly on the Kiliya branch of the Danube delta and on the adjoining stretch of the Danube going upstream. The Soviet Government was therefore, of course, vitally interested in conditions on this branch of the Danube. International navigation passed through the Sulina branch, while the St. George branch was purely Rumanian. Heretofore a Rumanian administration under international supervision had had the exclusive right to decide on all questions affecting the maritime Danube. In the present altered circumstances, it was out of the question to have the former state of affairs continue, since the Soviet Union was interested in all of the maritime Danube, and consequently had to demand absolutely the establishment of a mixed Soviet-Rumanian administration for the maritime Danube. The Soviet Government expected that in view of the change in the situation, and in view of the friendly relations existing between the two countries, Germany would show understanding for the views of the Soviet Government and would support them. It was completely impossible for the Soviet Government to desist from its demands with regard to a participation in the administration of the maritime Danube.

When I remarked that Germany and Italy were likewise interested in all questions connected with the mouth of the Danube and therefore had to reserve for themselves the right to an appropriate position in the administration of the maritime Danube, Molotov confined himself to stating that such a claim had thus far not been made by Germany and Italy at the conference in Bucharest. He did not dispute the justice of such a claim.⁴

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

⁴In the files is a memorandum of Jan. 7 by Martius commenting on the statements regarding the Danube problem which Molotov made in this conversation with Schulenburg (3941/E053908-09).

No. 603

B13/001301

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, January 4, 1941—12:10 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received January 4—12:45 a. m.

No. 13 of January 3

For the Reich Minister personally.

On the occasion of my evening's conversation on another subject, I asked Count Ciano whether he could tell me more about the operations hinted at to me by the Duce in his presence (telegraphic report

No. 3 of the 1st of this month¹), which had prompted the Duce to state that the tide would soon turn in Albania. Ciano replied that the Duce was a little too optimistic in his judgment of certain possibilities, that there was a report from Cavallero, who "was a great general," to the effect that the Greeks would presently have reached the limits of their offensive power. Cavallero wanted to take advantage of the exhaustion of the enemy, which would immediately follow, to launch a counterthrust with the aid of the units newly dispatched to Albania. This would mean the turning point, even if the Italian offensive could not get under way on a large scale for some weeks yet. Ciano himself did not seem to think much of this idea of Cavallero's. It is certain, at any rate, that the front even at the moment is entirely unstable and at many points crumbling. Thus far the statements repeatedly made both by the Duce and Ciano to the effect that the Greeks had put their utmost effort into the fight and were on the brink of exhaustion have always proved erroneous.

With unmistakable amazement Ciano finally mentioned that just before the visit he had received from the Under State Secretary of the War Ministry news of very heavy assaults on Bãrdia which caused him to fear the worst.

MACKENSEN

¹ Document No. 589.

No. 604

104/112912

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, January 4, 1941—12:23 a. m.

No. 15 of January 3

Received January 4—12:45 a. m.

With reference to your [*our*] telegrams Nos. 4,¹ 7,² and 9³—of January 2.

In the concluding discussion with Vyshinsky today he completely accepted our standpoint in the two big questions of the Baltic agreement that are still open. The Soviet delegations in Riga and Kaunas will today receive instructions from the Kremlin to adjust the re-settlement arrangements to the decision reached here and to prepare them for signature by Monday.⁴ With this the possibility exists of signing all six agreements on Monday (economic agreement, agree-

¹ Document No. 591.

² Not printed (104/112897). See document No. 591, footnote 3.

³ Not printed (104/112903-04).

⁴ i.e., Jan. 6.

ment on lump sum payment, the two resettlement agreements, the boundary treaty with Lithuania, and the compensation agreement on the Lithuanian tip), in case the affirmative instructions requested in telegrams Nos. 4 and 7 arrive here on Saturday.

I wish to point out that Mikoyan's statements today, which were reported in telegram No. 14,⁵ were characterized by great cooperation and that the raw material delivery proposed by Mikoyan represents a valuable supplement to the economic agreement in a most important area.

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

⁵ Not printed (104/112911). See document No. 605, footnote 2.

No. 605

104/112916-17

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, January 4, 1941—7:10 a. m.

No. 16 of January 4

Received January 4—9:00 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 9 of January 3.¹

The above telegraphic instruction to demand immediate full payment in nonferrous metals or gold crossed our telegrams Nos. 14² and 15³ of January 3, in which we reported that Mikoyan had in the meantime shown great cooperation with his proposal for dividing up raw material deliveries, and Vyshinsky fulfilled our demands completely in the questions decisive for us on which the conclusion of the Baltic agreement depended.

We are firmly convinced that with Mikoyan's proposals the Soviet Government has gone to the limits of what is possible for it at the present time. The Soviet Government cannot fulfill the requirement of immediate delivery of even half of the amount of compensation in nonferrous metals in view of the difficulties with which it is confronted at present in this area, particularly since it has to make extensive deliveries of nonferrous metals to Germany within the next 6 months under the new economic agreement.

¹ Document No. 598.

² In this telegram (104/112911) the Embassy in Moscow reported Mikoyan's proposal of supplementary delivery of 6,000 tons of copper, 2,500 tons of nickel, 100,000 tons of manganese ore, and the balance in cotton; with the prices as those fixed in the economic agreement, and with deliveries in quarterly periods over 2 years.

³ Document No. 604.

The Soviet proposal is to the effect that the deliveries, which include 6,000 tons of copper and 2,500 tons of nickel, are to begin *at once*, and will then be continued quarterly independent of the economic agreement. A renewed attempt to bring about immediate delivery of the entire amount promises no success, since yesterday Molotov and today Mikoyan explained to us in detail that with the best will in the world the Soviet Government is not in a position to do this. We would hardly be interested in payment in gold, which Mikoyan today himself proposed, since we ourselves are delivering gold to the Soviet Union within the framework of the new economic agreement to a value of 45 (forty-five) million reichsmarks.

In consideration of this situation we request that it be considered whether the latest instruction should stand. Implementation of the instruction involves the danger that all the results obtained so far, in the speedy realization of which we have a vital interest, will remain undecided on account of a demand whose success will be frustrated by its actual impossibility.⁴

SCHNURRE

SCHULENBURG

⁴In the files is a memorandum of Jan. 4 by Clodius for the Foreign Minister (4972/E277150-51) setting forth his position regarding this telegram. For the Foreign Ministry reply, see document No. 607.

No. 606

F16/0064-88

Unsigned Memorandum

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

Füh. 2/41.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION ON JANUARY 4, 1941, BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND BULGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT FILOV AT THE OBER-SALZBERG, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

Filov first presented the greetings and good wishes of the King of Bulgaria to the Führer. Referring to his conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister in the forenoon,¹ he stated that, as in previous conversations, agreement had been reached on all points, especially regarding Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact, since Bulgaria was determined in principle to join. Only the date of the accession was still open. The Führer was already acquainted with Bulgaria's misgivings about joining immediately. These misgivings related to the effects of such an accession on Russia and Turkey, and the in-

¹A memorandum by Schmidt on this conversation is not printed (67/47550-81).

adequate armament of the Bulgarian Army. For this reason he thought that accession at this time would be premature, since Bulgaria was not yet ready. There was a certain risk involved, although he would concede that there was scant likelihood that Turkey and Yugoslavia would attack Bulgaria.

The Führer interjected at this point that Yugoslavia would never attack Bulgaria. In fact, Germany herself had talked with Yugoslavia and ascertained that that country was willing to enter into closer cooperation with the German Reich. Nor was Turkey a problem. The difficulties lay perhaps with Russia. For the sake of a common front against Bolshevist infection it would doubtless have been better if the Balkan states had joined the Tripartite Pact as a bloc. In that case all grounds for Russian interference in the Balkans would have been eliminated, just as had happened in the case of Rumania, for instance. Stalin was fully aware that he could not touch Rumania. He was no Móscicki² or Smigly-Rydz,³ but one who coolly weighed the realities. If old Pilsudski had been alive, there would probably not have been any Polish war. To be sure, the Germans in Poland had not fared very well even under his rule, but their situation had been at least tolerable. An understanding could have been reached with him even with regard to Danzig, the Corridor, and the connections with East Prussia. But when he closed his eyes conditions in Poland changed fundamentally under his successors. As long as Stalin was alive, it was absolutely impossible that Russia would start anything against Germany, provided the spheres of interest were clearly delimited. Germany was much more powerful today than in the years 1938, 1939, and 1940. Having liquidated the war in the West, and allowing for troops required for the occupation and other purposes, she had between 160 and 170 divisions at her free disposal. He (the Führer) therefore shared the Reich Foreign Minister's view that there would be no danger once accomplished facts had been created. The sooner Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact, the sooner she would be out of all danger. The Russians would not do anything at all about Bulgaria. The Russian Ambassador in Berlin would probably inquire on instruction of his Government what meaning was to be attached to Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact. Perhaps Molotov, too, would ask the German Ambassador in Moscow whether the move was in any way directed against Russia, and he would be given the same answer as in the case of Rumania, viz., that the accession was directed against no one but those who might attack Bulgaria.⁴

² Ignacy Móscicki, President of Poland, 1926-1939.

³ Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz, Inspector General of the Polish Army, 1936-1939.

⁴ See vol. x of this series, document No. 415.

In the process of transformation now going on in Europe no nation could take a disinterested attitude, much as the government might attempt to. Every statesman today was subject to the pressure of events. While he, the Führer, was often referred to as a "man of action," it would be more accurate actually to call him a "man of reaction" for he, too, was the victim of circumstances. He had never thought that one day he would be at the Bug and in Brest Litovsk with his armies, and it was not so long ago that he would have called anyone insane who told him that Germany would some day occupy Narvik. A mere year and a half ago he did not want the war, and it was only through England that he was dragged into it. Likewise he had wished to limit armaments, but the other countries had been unwilling to disarm. Thereupon, to be sure, he had rearmed in a very thoroughgoing way; for in contrast to prewar Germany the new Reich was not walking blindly through the world, but prepared itself in advance against all dangers.

The war had been decided in favor of Germany. The others would first have to reconquer continental Europe in order to vanquish Germany. In much more favorable circumstances, however, they had not been able to achieve that in the World War. Moreover, they had actually been defeated in battle on the Continent.

The war against England would continue without surcease, until one day Germany would thrust home to England's heart. If any power were to land on the European Continent, he (the Führer) would not wait, as had been done in the World War, but would immediately repel the invader, with every possible means, just as he had marched all the way to Kirkenes, a distance of 3,000 km. from Germany, in order to foil the invasion by the English.

He deplored the Greek conflict for a variety of reasons. The English were now landing troops everywhere in that country; not the least of their reasons for doing so was to bring pressure to bear on the Greek Government in case it should wish to yield. Germany would prepare the counterthrust at her leisure and would surely not undertake it with insufficient means. The problem was essentially one of logistics, for Germany had an abundance of troops. As matters stood now, 230 divisions were "unemployed." Germany would therefore apply such strength against the invader in Greece that she would be able to carry out the operation without the slightest risk. Moreover, she would take all conceivable precautionary measures. The Greeks were no problem, nor were such English divisions as had been landed in Greece. Germany had learned from earlier battles with the English how to cope with them, whereas the English had learned nothing, because they had lost the wherewithal upon which to draw for experience. Just the same, he (the Führer) did not want to underestimate

the difficulties of the operation, especially with respect to the weather. If Germany were to go through with her operations against the English in Greece—and he was afraid this would have to be done—precautions would also be taken against Turkey. From 6 to 10 divisions and between 2 and 4 armored divisions had been assembled and a strong force would remain available in Rumania.

As the conversation proceeded, the Führer came to speak of the new developments in Europe, which no one could escape. He pointed out that Bulgaria had already scored considerable success in her revisionist aspirations and would achieve even more in the course of further developments. It had been very wise on the part of Bulgaria not to go all the way to the Danube in Dobruja, for that would probably have induced the Russians to continue their push up to that river. He was aware that Bulgaria had still other wishes, but he thought he should remind them that there was no such thing in history as the complete fulfillment of all one's wishes.

To illustrate this last remark, the Führer cited the example of Hungary. The Hungarians, too, still had quite a number of wishes, but he had always told the Hungarian statesmen that it was not the lot of any single generation to have all its wishes fulfilled; the coming generations, too, would have to find some work to do, and that was why the people had to be trained so that they would be capable later on of achieving the fulfillment of those wishes.

As a result of the operation, which, he was afraid, was sure to materialize next spring, Bulgaria would obtain further revisions in the form of an outlet to the Aegean Sea. That would lead to a strengthening of Bulgaria's regime at home and would overcome the psychological depression which had quite understandably afflicted the country after the collapse of 1918 and its consequences.

But now that Bulgaria thus found herself at the focal point of events, it was unquestionably best for her to join the Tripartite Pact as soon as possible.

Referring to the apprehensions expressed by Filov about the Turkish attitude, the Führer stated that the Turks knew very well that if Germany did not interest herself in the Balkans they would have increasing difficulties with the Russians.⁵ Here the Führer cited the example of the Baltic States. The Baltic States had been very cool toward Germany and had declined an alliance with her. It had even

⁵The part of the sentence following "Balkans" was substituted in handwriting for the original text which read, "Turkey would no longer exist."

The memorandum by Schmidt on the conversation between Filov and Ribbentrop referred to in footnote 1 records the following statement made by the German Foreign Minister: "One word to Moscow spoken by Germany would be sufficient to put an end to Turkey's existence."

been said that Germany was taking too much interest in the Baltic States. In view of that, Germany had declared herself disinterested—and all of the Baltic States were absorbed by Russia. If Stalin knew that Germany was totally disinterested in Turkey, that country, too, would disappear. The only circumstance that kept certain regions out of the grasp of the Soviet Union was Germany's interest in them.

As a result of the landing of English troops and the establishment of air bases, certain Balkan areas might become danger spots. For this reason Germany wanted to take action in time and that was also in the interest of Bulgaria. The sooner Bulgaria adopted a clear-cut attitude toward Germany and the Tripartite Pact, the easier it would be to settle that question. The Führer stressed in this connection that when he wished for a clear-cut attitude he did not mean Bulgaria's inner attitude, about which no one could complain and which had always been favorable to Germany. Especially as far as the Russians were concerned a marked display of interest in Bulgaria on the part of Germany was the only thing that would deter them from any further attempts at interference. These attempts were not directed primarily against Bulgaria but rather were part of an effort to secure a staging area for the Dardanelles.

When Filov interjected the remark that it was precisely this consideration which caused the Bulgarian Government to fear that there would be trouble with the Russians if it acceded to the Tripartite Pact, the Führer replied that the Russians would no longer start anything once 15 or 20 German divisions were deployed at Rumania's border. Passage through Bulgaria was a military necessity; it would be wrong, however, to let the Bulgarians take part in the struggle. Bulgaria should concentrate all her troops to the east and southeast. To protect her from her neighbors, Germany would be able to place 10 infantry and 2 armored divisions at her disposal, if necessary. It was simply ridiculous if the Turks got perhaps the notion that they could become aggressive here in any way whatsoever. Germany had developed excellent techniques of attack on a scientific basis, and "the latest medicines of that kind" had not even been disclosed as yet.

There was no need to be apprehensive about Russian intervention, for the Russians knew that the conflict would then spread over the whole length of the German-Russian border. The only danger was internal subversive activity by the Russians. But the sooner the Bulgarian Government cast the die, the less the Russians would feel encouraged to resort to such methods.

The Führer emphasized that he had no desire to intrude in these matters. It was not he who had brought on the Greek adventure; he had not even been consulted. He would like it best if the Greeks

threw the English out of their country and came to an understanding with the Italians; at any event, however, he would prevent the English from establishing themselves in Greece.

During the World War Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria had wished to prevent the formation of the Salonika front by energetically pushing the Serbian campaign all the way into Greece, yet his proposals, which were entirely practicable, were thwarted by the opposition of the Kaiser, who, for family reasons, did not want to take action against Greece. Some time later the great disaster started at Salonika. He (the Führer) would draw a lesson from these events of the World War and would in Bulgaria's interest as well know how to prevent a second Salonika. For if Germany should come to grief in this war, the consequences for the whole of Europe would be quite different from what they had been in 1918, when there was no big third party in the background ready to profit from the situation, as the Soviet Union would now. A defeat of the Axis would mean the end of Europe, and for that reason all countries of continental Europe had an interest in seeing Europe preserved through a German victory.

As the conversation continued, the Führer spoke of Germany's economic policy, which aimed at keeping open the markets in the Balkans. Germany, in contrast to the United States, was the ideal trading partner, i.e., also a big consumer, and was willing to absorb the export surpluses of southeastern Europe.

It was only with reluctance that Germany decided to give guarantees; because of her faithful observance of her guarantee obligations, such guarantees involved substantial military burdens. However, Germany had studied Bolshevism and its methods, and had again made the observation in the Baltic countries that the Bolsheviks had not learned anything new in the way of constructive effort. Wherever they came, as, for instance, in the Baltic countries, they brought with them nothing but hunger and distress. Culturally, too, they had laid waste everything in the Baltic countries. First, the Bolsheviks installed Jewish commissars, who tortured their former opponents to death. Next came the Russian commissars, who, in turn, displaced the Jews. If the same should happen in southeastern Europe it would indeed be a disaster. He (the Führer) was therefore glad to find a growing comprehension of this situation, especially in Hungary where, in recognition of the fact that Europe's fate was at stake, they were showing the greatest cooperation in helping to transport the German troops to Rumania, while they themselves were under serious restrictions.

Turning to the situation on the Italian front in Albania, the Führer stated that according to the reports he had received the Italian troops had fought very gallantly, but had been poorly prepared and poorly

led. Gradually the fronts had come to a standstill. In any case, Germany was united with the Duce for better or for worse. In the long run, history could be made only by keeping one's commitments.

In Libya the Italians had had bad luck. Here, too, the troops had fought gallantly but had been handicapped by the lack of organization of the armored divisions. The front had also come to a standstill. A few months from now everything would probably have quite a different aspect. From late February or early March the heat would make it difficult to fight with tanks in the desert.

In this situation Bulgaria could speed developments by taking a forthright pro-Axis stand. In that case, the Russians would no longer be able to raise any question about military collaboration with Germany because Bulgaria and Germany would then be allies. At most, the Russian Ambassador, Dekanozov, would make inquiries with the Reich Government as to the meaning of the step, and he would receive the reply that Germany was not attempting any changes in sovereignty in the Balkans, and would take action only against any one who tried to interfere there.

The Turks would be glad to be able to stay out of the conflict. Germany was aware of their deficient armaments, for today no country besides Germany was in a position to supply another one with arms; and that was possible only because Germany had captured so much enemy material.

In this connection the Führer referred to the arms deliveries from America. He cited the magazine *Aeroplane*, which gave 753 as the total number of aircraft which America had delivered to England up to December 15, 1940. Germany had more accurate information about Turkey's armament because of the deliveries of submarines by the Germania Shipyards and of artillery by the Skoda Works, which had been the subject of earlier negotiations with Turkey.

Filov remarked at this point that he had information that England had delivered 700 tanks to Turkey.

The Führer disputed this. England's monthly output was 60 tanks, and there had been 400 old type and 60 modern tanks in Egypt. In these circumstances it was physically impossible for England to supply other countries with substantial numbers of tanks. She was too much in need of them herself. During 1939-40 England had been able to equip no more than 12½ divisions, while Germany had originally reckoned with 20 to 25 (English) divisions. England had consumed only 7 to 8 million tons of ore, while for Germany the corresponding figure was 24 million tons. The American production would not make itself felt until 1942-43.

Filov declared that Bulgaria would join the Tripartite Pact and that she was more consistent in her policy than were some other states.

The only misgivings he had were that accession at this particular moment might create complications which could cause inconvenience to Germany as well as Bulgaria, especially with respect to the operations planned by Germany.

The Führer replied that the plans provided for troops in such strength that complications were not to be anticipated. One corps and one armored division were already in Rumania, and an additional corps and another armored division would follow. Added to these would be engineers, infantry divisions, and motorized divisions, so that every country would think twice before undertaking anything against such a force.

Filov emphasized that the developments of the next few days would be of significance in this connection. To this the Führer replied that Russia would continue her blackmail until Bulgaria had joined the Tripartite Pact.

Filov commented here that Bulgaria had already taken certain precautions against the possibility of Russian intervention so as to keep Bulgaria from suffering the fate of the Baltic States.⁶ Besides, Russia had already been given unofficial notice of Bulgaria's intention of joining the Pact.

The Führer replied that the sooner Bulgaria acceded to the Pact, the easier the execution of the military measures would be. Once German and Bulgarian divisions supported by German long-range bombers stood at the Black Sea and the Chatalja line, there would be no more difficulties.

When Filov stressed again that it would be inexpedient, especially in consideration of the operations planned by Germany, for the Russians, English, and Turks to be alerted by accession to the Pact, the Führer replied that those countries suspected anyway that military cooperation was in progress. As regards the grave warning by the English Minister who, according to Filov, had held up the threat of Turkey and Yugoslavia, the Führer remarked that the Yugoslavs had only one aim, which was to make profit out of this business, but that otherwise they would remain passive.

Filov pointed to the Anglophile sentiments in Serbia, especially in the army, and then turned the conversation to the Macedonian question, emphasizing that he did not propose any immediate solution but merely wanted to call attention to that problem as one of the issues that had to be attended to in the final settlement. Here again, as he had done in the conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, he

⁶ According to a memorandum of Division Pol. I M of Nov. 30, 1940, the German Air Attaché had reported troop reinforcements in the Bulgarian coastal areas of Varna and Burgas which were caused by fear of Russian military action against the Bulgarian Black Sea coast (585/242795).

emphasized the difficult situation of the Bulgarian minority in Macedonia, which was not even permitted to read literary works written in the Bulgarian language; he referred briefly to the refugee problem and added that the question whether Yugoslavia would get Salonika was causing great uneasiness in certain Bulgarian circles.

In reply to this the Führer stated that the crucial question was to win the war. After that it would be possible to settle a great many questions. He doubted, however, that it would be possible to achieve a settlement that would fulfill all wishes one hundred percent. For the moment the important thing was to prevent a collapse anywhere. By collapses in European states he (the Führer) also meant the introduction of Bolshevism. It was significant in this connection that one of the first questions raised by Molotov during his visit to Berlin had to do with Bulgaria. The Russians wanted to give that country a guarantee under the same conditions which Germany had given to Rumania, i.e., Russian troops were to be stationed in Bulgaria, with Russia merely giving the rather odd-sounding assurance that the King and Government would not be touched. He (the Führer), referring to the "same conditions," had immediately inquired whether Bulgaria had expressed a desire for a guarantee, as Rumania had done at the time. Besides, he would have to discuss the matter with Italy and with Bulgaria herself. By the time the die was cast the Russians probably would have joined company with us, not in the Balkans, but somewhere else.

The Russians wanted not only to give Bulgaria a guarantee and station troops in the country, but also to get hold of bases on the Dardanelles.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected here that the Russian bear was trying to stick its paws into the outside world, as it were, through the Dardanelles.

Filov brought up again his old argument, namely, that he anticipated difficulties the moment Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact, to which the Führer replied that at the moment of her accession Bulgaria could have at her disposal as many German divisions as she wanted, together with armored divisions and dive bombers. Filov remarked that it seemed to him rather unlikely that the Russians and Turks would make a move in that event; the Foreign Minister corroborated this, stating that it seemed absolutely impossible to him that anyone would try to take any action against Bulgaria at the very moment when she became associated with the greatest military power.

At the close of the conversation Filov also asked what the significance of the Yugoslav-Hungarian pact⁷ was, that is, whether it was to be regarded as a rapprochement with the Axis.

⁷ See document No. 514, footnote 4.

The Führer answered this question in the affirmative. Filov then stated that Horthy had said that Bulgaria and Turkey should also join the Tripartite Pact later on; to this the Germans responded with a gesture expressing approval. After that the Führer had tea with the Bulgarian guest and those accompanying him.

No. 607

359/204132-33

The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, January 5, 1941—10:10 p. m.

No. 22 of January 5

Received January 6—12:40 a. m.

For the Ambassador and Schnurre.¹

The Foreign Minister is in agreement that at the very most a delivery of nonferrous metals within 3 months be regarded as immediate delivery in the sense of telegraphic instruction No. 9.² The condition is not, however, that the deliveries of nonferrous metals ensue only after 3 months, but that they begin at once and be completed 3 months after conclusion of the treaty. For the amount which cannot be covered within 3 months by the delivery of nonferrous metals, primarily the other raw materials mentioned in telegraphic instruction No. 2381 of December 28³ are to be demanded, in so far as they likewise can be delivered within 3 months. Immediate payment in gold is to be demanded for any remaining balance. Payment in gold should be made at once because there are no technical difficulties in the way of immediate payment in the case of gold. Gold can also be balanced off against any German gold payments immediately due. However, deliveries in nonferrous metals may not in any case make up less than half of the total amount. The second half is to be delivered to the greatest extent possible in the other raw materials named, and only the remainder in gold. You may decide there on the distribution between raw materials and gold within this second half according to the results of the negotiations.

Report by telegram in case a settlement on this basis cannot be obtained.

CLODIUS

¹ See document No. 605 and footnote 4.

² Document No. 598.

³ Document No. 575.

No. 608

104/112929

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 33 of January 6

Moscow, January 6, 1940.

Received January 6—4:25 p. m.

With reference to your telegrams No. 9 of January 4[3]¹ and No. 22 of January 5.²

Your instruction was just carried out with Molotov. Molotov repeated the urgent request that we take account of the present economic possibilities of the Soviet Union as well as of the fact that the metals and raw materials which we require first had to be produced or obtained. The resources of the Soviet Union were limited and the deadlines required by us could not be met, especially since the available reserves had already been earmarked for the large deliveries of nonferrous metals to Germany within the next 6 months under the economic agreement. Molotov asked that this be communicated to the Reich Government with his urgent request that the Soviet proposal with regard to the sum, the time period, and the type of compensation be regarded as a unified whole.

We left Molotov in no doubt that the question had already been decided in Berlin, and asked him to report to his Government in this sense. Molotov said he was willing to do this, and promised an answer from the Soviet Government, but again repeated his standpoint, adding that he had presented it in exact knowledge of the existing possibilities and in agreement with the view of his Government.

SCHNURRE

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 598.² Document No. 607.

No. 609

221/148999-9000

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

URGENT

SECRET

No. 4

WIESBADEN, January 6, 1941—4:50 p. m.

Received January 6—5:30 p. m.

With reference to my telephone report to Minister von Rintelen.¹ Today General von Stülpnagel sent the following secret telegram to the Führer and the OKW: "General Doyen upon his return from

¹ No record found.

Vichy today asked to be received by the Chairman of the Armistice Commission in order to transmit a communication from the French Government. General Doyen stated the following:

1. Supplying France with food was extremely difficult and it was feared that a serious crisis would develop if it were not possible to get through the period until the next harvest by means of imports. In particular there was a lack of grain, maize, and colonial products. The French Government intended to begin negotiations with the British Government regarding the free transport of food to France. It wished to inform the Reich Government of this in advance in order to preclude any misunderstanding. The French Government would likewise keep the Reich Government informed on the course of the negotiations.

2. General Doyen also wanted to communicate a statement by Marshal Pétain on the question of the dismissal of Laval, requesting that it be passed on to the Reich Government. In making this statement the French Government was using official channels through the Armistice Commission. The French Government was particularly anxious to stress anew that it was adhering most loyally to the Montoire agreements. In so doing, it wished to eliminate misunderstandings that threatened to develop. The dismissal of Laval had nothing in the slightest degree to do with French foreign policy, but had purely domestic reasons. Laval had found little political response among the French people. His unpopularity had increased of late to such an extent that it threatened to become a serious liability to Pétain. He had pursued a purely personal policy and had informed Pétain so inadequately that the interests of France had been prejudiced. Moreover, Laval had worked for his own financial interests by engaging in certain transactions. Taken to task for this by Pétain, he had replied in an unseemly and insolent manner. Laval was therefore no longer acceptable to Pétain. Independent of this, the French Government adhered to the fullest extent to the policy of cooperation. In order to eliminate the remainder of the misunderstandings that existed, the French Government would greatly welcome a meeting between Flandin and the Reich Foreign Minister or between General Huntziger and other representatives of the Reich Government in case the Reich Government, too, considered this to be expedient. From a long-distance telephone conversation of the French delegation, which was overheard, it appears that the French delegation considers the instruction to make the statement under 1) as a concession to Germany which goes beyond the provisions of the Armistice Treaty."

Conclusion of the telegram.² The same text is being sent to the Embassy in Paris.

HENCKE

² General Doyen later put his statements to Stülpnagel in the form of an aide-mémoire. The text of this aide-mémoire was transmitted to Berlin by Hencke in telegram No. 6 of Jan. 6 from Wiesbaden (221/149001-02). Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. v, pp. 462-467.

No. 610

F19/242-50;
F16/052-54

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 3

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND ITALIAN AMBASSADOR ALFIERI IN BERLIN ON JANUARY 6, 1941¹

Alfieri began by stating that the Duce would be available for a conversation with the Führer during the period from January 12 to 19² and then broached the subject of Italo-Russian relations. Germany had agreed in principle that these relations should be expanded and improved. Now, Molotov had recently had a 2-hour conversation with the Italian Ambassador, Rosso. The Duce does not want Rosso to enter into detailed negotiations before Germany has given her consent. The conversation with Molotov had dealt with the German-Italian guarantee to Rumania, the Danube question, and the question of the Straits and the Black Sea regime. Alfieri thereupon handed the Foreign Minister two documents, which he said were résumés of a letter by Count Ciano³ and of Rosso's report on his conversation with Molotov.⁴ When the Foreign Minister inquired whether these were then real negotiations with the Russians about which he had not heard anything previously, Alfieri replied that it was only a matter of a feeler and that the Duce intended to formulate the conditions

¹ Cf. Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 99-100.

² The following memorandum (F20/448) which would appear to have been left with Ribbentrop by Alfieri, was sent to Obersalzberg at 7:30 p. m. on Jan. 6:

"The Duce and the Führer could meet each other at a date which could be set between the 12th and 19th of the month.

"The Duce would like to have the meeting kept top secret. For this purpose he believes that it would be a good idea for the special trains not to meet at a railway station, but in an open field, either on Italian or on German territory, as the Führer may prefer. In this way all formality and outward display—such as honor guard, photographs, etc.—could be dispensed with."

See document No. 635.

³ See enclosure.

⁴ Not printed (F20/499-452). Cf. Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 85-95.

for the inauguration of actual negotiations in consultation with Germany.

The Foreign Minister read the documents through quickly and made remarks on various points during the reading. He expressed his surprise, for instance, that the Russians had again spoken to the Italians about the Rumanian oil fields,⁵ since this question had already been precisely clarified in the Berlin discussions with Molotov.⁶

In reply to a question Alfieri confirmed that Count Ciano had told the Russian Ambassador that Italy would respect Russian interests in the Balkans and in Asia.

The Foreign Minister replied that pending a more careful study of the two documents he wished to point out now that Germany had given the Russians to understand during the Molotov conversations that the Axis had vital interests—especially economic interests and not territorial—in the Balkans. It was a question particularly of petroleum and grain. Furthermore, Germany had given the Russians to understand that for the duration of the present war she had to take certain measures in order to prevent her interests from being threatened by a landing of the English in the Balkans. After the war the German troops would again be withdrawn. Molotov had very fully understood that the Soviet interests would have to stop at the Danube.

In connection with this there was the Danube question. Germany and Italy had forced England and France out of the Danube Commission. At one time Russia had also tried to eliminate Italy and to take only the adjacent states into account.⁷ It was indicated by Germany, however, that Italy and Germany belonged together and Italy, too, would therefore have to be represented on the Danube Commission. Germany had given notice of her interest in the Danube from the source to the mouth. Therefore Germany had to be represented on all commissions, especially on the commission for the maritime Danube. General Antonescu had expressly asked not to be left alone on this commission with the Russians. Nor would Germany do this.⁸

On the question of the Straits the Foreign Minister remarked that at his suggestion the Duce had agreed to take a more conciliatory attitude in this question. He (the Foreign Minister) had proposed to the Duce that within the framework of the large-scale, comprehensive diplomatic negotiations which he had envisaged at the time and was still planning, although he had had to postpone them because of certain occurrences that Alfieri was familiar with, recognition should be given to the view that the Black Sea was to be considered as an inland

⁵ In the Italian résumé of Rosso's conversation of Dec. 30 with Molotov (see footnote 4), Molotov was reported to have mentioned the Rumanian oil area and Danubian shipping as questions involving the USSR and the Axis, that were still "open and of immediate concern."

⁶ See documents Nos. 326, 328, and 329.

⁷ See document No. 188.

⁸ See document No. 380.

sea of the adjacent states. This would mean that the Duce waived the right to enter the Black Sea with Italian warships, but that the Russians would have the right to sail with their warships from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles without hindrance. He had vaguely expressed this to Molotov by merely stating on this subject that Italy and Germany were agreed on a revision of the Straits Convention to the effect that the Black Sea would be declared an inland sea of the adjacent states.⁹

The importance of the Straits question had now greatly increased because of events in Greece and Albania. It was necessary to proceed with extreme caution and reserve; in no case must any agreement be reached with Russia that might lead to a break with Turkey.

In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister about the concrete goals which Count Ciano wished to pursue in the negotiations with Russia, Alfieri could only say that it was a matter of renewing the treaty of friendship concluded in 1933¹⁰ and that this treaty was to be given a more concrete content. What this signified in detail he could not say.

In this connection the Foreign Minister brought up the question whether or not the time had now come to make any definite agreement whatever with the Russians. One could negotiate with the Soviet Union only if conditions were fully clear.

When the Foreign Minister remarked that the Balkan policy must not be shackled by too hasty an agreement with the Russians, who were putting pressure on the Bulgarians, Alfieri replied that he realized very well that Germany did not want Russia to get into the Balkans again through the window by the roundabout way of an agreement with Italy, so to speak, when she had just been ushered out through the door.

The Foreign Minister then emphasized in conclusion that the Russians themselves would be invited to join the Tripartite Pact, but all these things must not be done too hastily.

Alfieri pointed out, on the other hand, that it was Molotov who had pressed for negotiations.

The Foreign Minister replied that he could well understand that Molotov was in a hurry to obtain Italy's consent to ~~intervention in the Danube question.~~¹¹ It was only too understandable why he brought up all these questions himself. He (the Foreign Minister) did not believe, however, that it was in the interest of the Axis to bring up these delicate problems at a time when the Balkans and Turkey still had an important role to play this year within the framework of general policy.

⁹ See document No. 329.

¹⁰ A treaty of friendship, nonaggression, and neutrality was signed by Italy and the Soviet Union on Sept. 2, 1933. Cf. Series C, vol. 1, document No. 368.

¹¹ Thus on the file copy.

In reply to a question by Alfieri about Filov's visit,¹² the Foreign Minister said that in the discussions with the Führer and himself the general problems of interest to both countries had been discussed and the Bulgarians had been advised to join the Tripartite Pact immediately. Filov had stated that he agreed in principle; he was not yet clear about the time for accession, however.

In the discussions Filov was informed, furthermore, that Germany would never permit another Salonika and was therefore assembling troops as a precaution.

In this connection Alfieri mentioned reports that all Russian Envoys had been recalled from the Balkan countries and that the Russians had stated that they would never permit passage of German troops through Bulgaria. The Foreign Minister did not place much credence in these rumors and said that the important thing was first of all to put an end to the Greek war.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister emphasized in reply to a remark by Alfieri about the fighting for Bardia that Bardia had in the meantime been captured, but that according to some reports received in Germany the Italian troops there and elsewhere had fought very bravely. It was too bad that the Italian Army Command had permitted itself to be taken by surprise by the English and that it did not have enough antitank guns in Egypt. When Alfieri remarked that the antitank guns were scattered along the numerous Italian fronts, the Foreign Minister pointed out that the Po army had numerous guns of this type and that the Army Command should exert pressure to overcome the natural resistance of the individual troop commanders to giving up war material, just as Germany had done in concentrating the antitank artillery where it was most useful.

The Foreign Minister promised Alfieri at the conclusion of the conversation that after he had studied the documents presented to him, he would have a more precise statement to make on the individual questions.¹³

SCHMIDT

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, January 5, 1941.

On December 26 Minister Ciano made the following statement to the Soviet Ambassador in Rome.¹⁴

"Referring to earlier conversations, the fascist Government believes that the time has come to intensify the examination of the rela-

¹² See document No. 606.

¹³ See document No. 646.

¹⁴ Cf. Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 82-83.

tions between Italy and the Soviet Union both in the political and economic spheres. In the opinion of the Italian Government there is no ground for differences of opinion between Italy and Russia. The interests of both countries present no frictions of any sort and can even be regarded in many respects as complementary. This having been assumed, Italy acknowledges and is ready to recognize formally the predominance of Russian interests in the Black Sea as well as the new frontiers attained by the Soviets. On her part Italy demands that the predominance of her Mediterranean interests be recognized. On the basis of these general principles and with the addition of possible questions which the Soviet Government would present as subjects for discussion, Italy is ready to bring the pact of friendship, nonaggression, and neutrality of 1933 up to date and to give to it a more substantial content."

Since the Moscow Government responded favorably to this statement, Ambassador Rosso had a first conversation with President Molotov on December 30 (see attached note¹⁵); from this it was evident that the Soviet Government intended to arrive at a decision about the following three problems in order to proceed to further negotiations, including also those in the commercial sphere: guarantee of Rumania; Italian attitude in the Danube matter; question of the Straits with respect to Russian security in the Black Sea.

The Italian point of view on these three problems can be summarized as follows:

1) The guarantee given to Rumania has no anti-Soviet meaning, but represents instead a compensation given by the Axis to Rumania for the mutilations which she suffered and at the same time sets a limit to Hungarian, and possibly also to Bulgarian, ambition.

2) In view of the gesture of understanding which was made by the USSR,¹⁶ Italy is prepared, within the limits of what is possible, to meet halfway the Soviet demands in the Danube question, since the participation of Italy in supervision of traffic on the river itself has been accepted.

3) The question of the Straits is fundamental. It is therefore necessary that the Moscow Government define the exact outline of the problem; the solutions could vary from simple demilitarization to the annexation of territory—the latter is from the outset to be ruled out.

In this important matter the Italian Government intends to proceed in complete and close accord with the German Government; it would therefore be grateful if it could learn as soon as possible the view of the German Government, and any advice or information which it

¹⁵ See footnote 4.

¹⁶ See document No. 201.

might possibly want to give about the matter, so as not to let the suspicion arise with the Russians that this time too the negotiations are not intended to come to a good end.

No. 611

378/209351

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, January 7, 1941—12:40 a.m.

No. 47 of January 7

Received January 7—1:00 a. m.

Transmission of the statement made today in Wiesbaden in the matter of Laval's dismissal¹ should be refused by the German Armistice Commission, in my opinion, for the following reasons:

1. The communication contains nothing that is not contained in the letter delivered to the Führer by Darlan on December 25² in the matter of Laval's discharge except the lie that, by engaging in certain transactions Laval had worked for his own financial interests and had been taken to task for this by Pétain. Neither in occupied nor in unoccupied France has Laval ever carried out transactions for his own advantage nor has he ever been taken to task by Pétain for doing so.

2. The attitude taken by Flandin in the crisis prevailing in Vichy since December 13 makes it appear inopportune that he should be received by a member of the Reich Government.

3. The new step of the French Government seems altogether incomprehensible, since the Führer, when he received Darlan on December 25,³ stated that he had made the reservation to communicate in writing his attitude regarding the effects of the reorganization of the French Government on the policy of cooperation.⁴

ABETZ

¹ See document No. 609 and footnote 2.

² See document No. 566.

³ See document No. 564.

⁴ Unsigned marginal note: "State Secretary's copy forwarded the following handwritten minute of the State Secretary:

'Urgent! Foreign Minister. In my opinion General von Stülpnagel should be instructed (after the Führer has given his approval), to tell General Doyen that he had not been able to transmit the second, political portion of Doyen's statements since the Armistice Commission had no competence in such matters.

'The foregoing suggestions made by Abetz (1 to 3) are, in my opinion, not suitable for use. Weizsäcker.'

No. 612

104/112930

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, January 7, 1941—5:17 a. m.

No. 37 of January 6

Received January 7—5:30 a. m.

For Minister Clodius.

For personal information.

Under the economic agreement the Soviet Union is to deliver to us in the period from February 11 to August 11, 1941, the following amounts of nonferrous metals:

6,000 (six thousand) tons of copper,
 500 (five hundred) tons of tin,
 1,500 (one thousand five hundred) tons of nickel,
 500 (five hundred) tons of tungsten,
 500 (five hundred) tons of molybdenum.

This promise for delivery is based on a decision of the highest authority here and could be obtained only in the very last stage of the negotiations.

SCHNURRE

SCHULENBURG

No. 613

221/149004-07

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, January 7, 1941.

No. 56 of January 7

Received January 8—12:15 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Ambassador de Brinon called on me at the Embassy today and informed me of the following instructions he had received:

1. Flandin's communication which Brinon received last evening:

"Various organs of the Paris press are publishing almost daily articles dealing with members of the Government. This systematic campaign of defamation aimed at some of his collaborators has not escaped the attention of the Chief of State.

"Because of the supervision which the German authorities exercise over the French press in the occupied territory, it is impossible that such things are published repeatedly without their consent. I should therefore appreciate it if you would speedily call the attention of Herr Abetz and the German military authorities in France to the very serious difficulties for the future of German-French relations resulting from the campaign conducted by a part of the Paris press.

"The Marshal does not, indeed, allow himself to be misled by the distinction which the authors of these articles draw between his person and those of his collaborators whom they attack. Public opinion knows full well that these collaborators were selected by the Chief of State himself and were not forced upon him by a parliamentary majority or by political exigencies independent of the will of the Chief of State himself that, on the contrary, they owe their offices and their authority exclusively to his confidence in them and are responsible to him alone.

"Through such articles therefore the authors touch upon the person of the Chief of State himself and injure his prestige.

"The German authorities cannot fail to notice that it is indispensable to the successful execution of the policy of which the foundations were decided upon at Montoire, that the Marshal should retain his authority and his influence on public opinion unimpaired.

"All those who in France and particularly in occupied France express criticism or reservations that are calculated to cast doubt upon the single-minded determination of the Marshal and his ministers to carry out the policy of German-French cooperation, are helping to divide public opinion, which is particularly sensitive because of the difficult conditions that the country is experiencing. They thereby seriously prejudice the success of this policy, which the Marshal intends to carry out and which, if this should be necessary, he is determined to carry out with his full authority and with the help of the confidence placed in him by public opinion.

"I am certain that Herr Abetz will permit himself to be convinced by the arguments which I am asking you to present to him and will take all necessary measures to have the necessary instructions issued to the authorities charged with exercising supervision.

"I should appreciate it if you would keep me informed of the outcome of your representations. P. E. Flandin, Vichy, January 6, 10:00 p. m."

2. Instruction which reached de Brinon this morning, and which was signed by Darlan, Huntziger, and Flandin jointly.

"Certain Paris newspapers are conducting violent attacks on the Government and accusing it of retaining in its midst elements hostile to cooperation. Such articles cannot have remained unknown to the German Embassy. If it lets them pass it means that they reflect, to a slight extent, the Embassy's own ideas. In reply to an inquiry from Admiral Darlan, you recently established the fact that, in conformity with what he had told the Admiral on December 25, Herr Abetz considered it to be more appropriate that no changes of any kind should be officially undertaken in the organization of the Government before the Reich Chancellor had replied to the Marshal.¹

"Please inform Ambassador Abetz of this and ask him if the Chancellor is waiting with his reply to the Marshal until the latter has made the changes indicated in his letter, or if the Chancellor does not expect these changes to be made until after the arrival of his reply. Dar-

¹ No record of such a statement made by Abetz to Darlan on Dec. 25 has been found. Cf. the last paragraph of document No. 569.

lan, Huntziger, Flandin. (After conversation with the Marshal.) Vichy, January 7, 9:30 a. m."

I replied to de Brinon that I would inform the military authorities responsible for censorship of the press in occupied France of the contents of the two foregoing instructions. As far as the communication delivered by Darlan was concerned, I wanted to ask my Government for instructions.²

I also explained to de Brinon my personal view of the matter. Since, despite my representations made privately on the night of December 13-14 and in the night of December 14-15 in accordance with instructions,³ the radio and press of Vichy made public news of Laval's dismissal, public opinion in occupied France had become very agitated. Contrary to the tendentious reports sent systematically to Vichy by certain government officials, the overwhelming majority of the population were in favor of a policy of collaboration and saw in Laval the man of Montoire. Since December 13th the Embassy had received thousands of letters from individuals and many statements from very large mass organizations expressing their concern and indignation over the removal of Laval. It had been the experience of the National Socialists that the press must not remain too aloof from the worries and demands of public opinion if it is not to lose all credit.

I [said that I] had personally exerted influence with the censorship to the end that the military Cabinet members should not become the object of attacks because I was of the opinion that a conquered people must retain its respect for its armed forces. I could hardly take such a step with respect to the civilian ministers, however, and it was questionable whether the military censorship could for an unlimited time resist the demand of the public and press for a full elucidation of the true causes and deplorable circumstances attending Laval's resignation from the Government.

ABETZ

² In telegram No. 67 of Jan. 9 (221/149013-14) Abetz reported having been informed of a new instruction received by de Brinon in which the latter was asked to tell Abetz that the campaign of the Paris press which Herr Abetz seemed to have difficulties in stopping was compelling Pétain to publish his decisions regarding reorganization of the Government as quickly as possible; however, he would wait another 48 hours before publication. Abetz stated that in replying to Brinon he had again referred to the instructions transmitted in document No. 546 and to Hitler's promise of a reply to Pétain's letter made in the conversation with Darlan on Dec. 24. For the further course of these negotiations, see document No. 645.

³ See document No. 531.

No. 614

104/112934—35

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, January 7, 1941—10:50 p. m.

SECRET

Received January 8—1:45 a. m.

No. 44 of January 7

With reference to our telegram No. 33 of January 6.¹

We have been negotiating again with Molotov today regarding compensation for the strip of Lithuanian territory.

At the start Molotov asked whether the Reich Government's reply to his statement yesterday concerning the Soviet standpoint had been received. We replied that there was no change in the attitude of the Reich Government. We asked that we be informed of the Soviet Government's reply, as promised. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government was willing to comply with the German wishes in certain points, and he made the following final proposal:

The Soviet Government agreed to pay half of the compensation amount in nonferrous metals, the remainder in raw materials, and, in so far as these were not sufficient, in gold rubles. As regards the time limit Molotov said that in view of the burden of the obligations for delivery assumed toward Germany in the economic agreement the Soviet Government was unable to pay the compensation within the time limit of 3 months as requested by Germany. It was willing to shorten the time limit from 2 years to 1½ years with the condition that half of the entire compensation would be paid by the end of 1941 and the other half by July 1, 1942.

Molotov termed this the most the Soviet Union could do, and stated once more that this proposal of the Soviet Government was final. The Soviet Government did not want to assume any obligations which it could not fulfill, and it asked the Reich Government to regard the Soviet proposal in this light.

We request telegraphic instructions on whether we may accept Molotov's proposal, in order thereby to make possible the signing of the economic agreement, the Baltic agreement, and the resettlement agreement.

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 608.

No. 615

104/112936

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union-to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, January 7, 1941—10:50 p. m.

No. 45 of January 7

Received January 8—12:20 a. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

With reference to our telegram No. 44 of January 7.¹

In the matter of the compensation for the strip of Lithuanian territory, I take the liberty of submitting to you the following consideration:

A rejection of the Soviet proposal will not only lead to serious political resentment on the part of the Soviet Government, but also thwart the realization of all other agreements in which we have a vital interest. Upon the conclusion of the resettlement agreements depends the fate of 55,000 resettlers, whose living conditions are deteriorating from day to day. The fact that the economic agreement, which was ready for signature by December 20, has not yet been signed, is already giving rise in wide circles to disagreeable comments on German-Soviet relations which, through the immediate conclusion of all agreements, could be successfully transformed into the opposite.

From my personal working relations with Molotov, I have the definite impression that the Soviet Government in making its offer has actually done its utmost, and that a further compliance with our wishes cannot be expected.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 614.

No. 616

1126/321899-901

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in the Soviet Union and Turkey, and to the Legations in Yugoslavia and Greece*¹

Telegram

To Moscow No. 36²

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

To Ankara No. 12

Pol. I 1650 g. Rs.

To Belgrade No. 11

To Athens No. 81

I. For confidential information of the Chief of the Mission and the Military, Naval, and Air Attachés only.

¹ In the files is an earlier draft for a brief instruction to Moscow in this matter (1126/321913-14). This draft was submitted to Ribbentrop by Ritter on Dec. 31 and bears some correction in Ribbentrop's handwriting. It was marked "canceled" and has the following marginal note: "Shown to the F[ührer]. Is not to be sent. G[ottfriedsen], Jan. 1."

² On the copy in the Moscow Embassy files (426/218083-84) the time of dispatch is Jan. 8, 1941, 3:20 a. m., and the time of receipt Jan. 8, 8:05 a. m.

Since early in January the movement of strong German troop formations to Rumania has been going on via Hungary. The movement of troops is being carried on with the full concurrence of the Hungarian and Rumanian Governments. For the time being the troops will be quartered in the south of Rumania.

The troop movements result from the fact that the necessity must be seriously contemplated of ejecting the English completely from all of Greece. German troops have been provided in such strength that they can easily cope with any military task in the Danubian region and with any eventualities from any side. The military measures being carried out by us are aimed exclusively against the seizure of a foothold in Greece by British forces, and not against any Balkan country, including Turkey.

II. For guidance in conversations, in general a reserved attitude is to be taken. In case of urgent official inquiries, it is to be pointed out, depending on circumstances, that such inquiries are to be made in Berlin. In so far as conversations cannot be avoided, an opinion in general terms is to be given. In this connection, we may give as a plausible reason that we have reliable reports of increasingly large reinforcements of English troops of every kind in Greece and we may mention the Salonika operation of the last World War. Concerning the strength of the German troops, maintaining the present vagueness is desired for the time being. Later on we shall presumably be interested in making known the full strength of the troops and, beyond that, in giving an impetus to fanciful speculations. The cue for that will be given at the proper time.

This instruction also applies, by agreement with the High Command of the Wehrmacht, to the Military, Naval, and Air Attachés. Strict reserve in answering inquiries is to be imposed upon the other members of the Mission.

III. Should occasion arise, please report by wire concerning the attitude of the Government, the public and the press, any inquiries by the Government there, and any démarches of Foreign Missions with the Government there.*

Reich Foreign Minister

* See documents Nos. 624 and 634.

No. 617

1126/321901

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

No. 19

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

Pol. I 1650 g. Rs.

I request that the Japanese Foreign Minister be personally and confidentially informed that at present rather strong German troop

contingents are being transferred to Rumania. The movements are carried on with the full concurrence of the Hungarian and the Rumanian Governments. These troop movements are being carried out as a security measure for an intervention that may become necessary in Greece if English military forces should gain a foothold and make such intervention there necessary.

Reich Foreign Minister

No. 618

378/209354-56

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

Pol. I M 125 g.

Subject: Evaluation by the Armistice Commission of the French attitude toward Germany.

The Armistice Commission sent the following communication to the OKW in No. 14 of January 6:

"The following events of the last few days permit conclusions to be drawn regarding the attitude of the French Government:

"1) Deliveries of petroleum for Italy and Libya. By telegram of December 21 the Italian Armistice Commission requested for military reasons the immediate delivery for Libya of 5,000 tons of automobile gasoline and 5,000 tons of gasoline from French supplies in North Africa. In a note of December 23, evening, referring to the necessity that everything be done to support warfare against England, the French delegation with the German Armistice Commission was asked by the subcommission for Armaments to comply with the request of the Italian Armistice Commission.¹ The French delegation was asked orally to communicate the consent of the French Government to the German Armistice Commission by December 27. On December 27 the French delegation communicated the consent of the French Government to the release of the amounts requested by Italy.²

"Considering the difficult situation of the Italians in Libya this willingness of the French Government can be considered as a positive stand on the question of cooperation with Germany.

"2) Filling of German Wehrmacht orders in occupied France: The filling of German armament orders by French industry in occupied France is not encountering any resistance on the part of the French Government at the present time. One may mention as an example of this that General Huntziger immediately issued the French Government visa required for the French manufacturer when

¹ For a published text of this note, see *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. III, p. 464.

² For a published text, see *ibid.*, pp. 469-470.

200,000 75 mm antiaircraft shells a month was placed with a Paris firm by the Armament Inspection, Paris.

"3) Willingness of the French Government to carry out German orange transports between Spain and French Mediterranean ports in spite of the dangers from the English blockade resulting from this action.

"Unrestricted continuation of the French petroleum transports from North Africa to the mother country; from this, the conclusion can be drawn that the French Government is hardly preparing to resume the struggle in North Africa.

"From these developments and from the incidents of December 19, 1940 (sinking of the submarine *Sfax* and the tanker *Rhone*) and of December 31, 1940 (capture of a French convoy and bringing it to Gibraltar)³ the over-all impression arises that

"a) the French Government is making a point of being accommodating toward us in individual matters in order to prove that the policy of cooperation is being maintained in accordance with the assurances of Marshal Pétain;

"b) there has not been a closer contact of the French Government with England unknown to us.

"The French Government is evidently caught between two lines of fire at the present time. On the one hand, on the basis of English and American propaganda reports it is afraid of German coercive measures against the unoccupied territory, and on the other hand it is being subjected to increased pressure from England in order to prevent it from cooperating with Germany. Rumors about French intentions to resume the fight against the Axis in Africa, and to shift forces and material to North Africa for this purpose, evidently arise as a reaction to the fear of a German occupation of the unoccupied territory. So far there has been no confirmation from any quarter that preparations to this effect have actually been made. Supervisory organs are instructed to examine the matter immediately and to report on it."

GROTE

³ This seizure of a convoy of French merchant ships by British warships, who forced it to proceed to Gibraltar had been reported in Wiesbaden telegram No. 3 of Jan. 3 (378/209341-42).

No. 619

B13/B001307-08

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

As already reported orally, the negotiations with General Favagrossa were concluded yesterday.² The result of the negotiations is

¹ The author, presumably, was Clodius.

² A delegation headed by General Favagrossa had been negotiating in Berlin from Dec. 29, 1940, to Jan. 6, 1941, regarding an increase in German deliveries to Italy and increased cooperation between German and Italian industry. (See document No. 554.) Favagrossa was received by Ribbentrop on Jan. 5 (memorandum by Noack: 67/47541-49).

set forth in the accompanying letter from me to Ambassador Gianini.³ The entry into force of Section III regarding the delivery of petroleum has been made dependent on special approval by the German Government which has still to be granted, because the military authorities had not yet given a conclusive opinion before General Favagrossa's departure on whether it is possible to deliver aviation gasoline and diesel oil to Italy from German stocks.

In the meantime, after General Favagrossa's departure, Field Marshal Keitel, speaking for the High Command of the Wehrmacht, has said that only 20,000 tons of aviation gasoline and 10,000 tons of Diesel oil can be delivered to Italy during the coming 4 months, and not 27,000 tons of aviation gasoline and 30,000 tons of diesel fuel, as was intended.

General Favagrossa stressed time and again most urgently that the amount of 27,000 tons and 30,000 tons provided in the Protocol was the minimum required by Italy in order to be able to carry on the most urgent military activity.

To be submitted herewith through the Director and the State Secretary to the Reich Foreign Minister.

I shall continue to pursue the matter with the military authorities. A final decision must be reached at the latest by the start of my negotiations in Rome on January 20. Since Field Marshal Keitel went to Berchtesgaden yesterday evening, I consider it probable that, in view of its military importance, he will report on the matter to the Führer.⁴

³ Not printed (2032/445041-54).

⁴ A minute by General Thomas, Head of the Office of War Economy and Armaments, records a discussion on Jan. 6 with Field Marshal Keitel regarding the Italian requests for fuel. Keitel was given material concerning the situation of the Italians for presentation to Hitler. (The Thomas minute was introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals as document No. 1456-PS, but not included in the published collection.)

See, further, document No. 728.

No. 620

3941/E053905

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

The position which I take on the enclosed memorandum by Herr Martius on the question of adjournment of the Bucharest conference for the maritime Danube¹ is as follows:

¹ This memorandum of Jan. 7 recommended that the conference be continued until all controversial issues had been clarified. According to the memorandum, the treatment of these controversial issues at the conference had the advantage "that the Rumanian position, too, can be given full consideration and that the real dispute will remain a Rumanian-Russian dispute and not develop into a German-Russian one." (3941/E053906-07)

As a result of the way in which negotiations are carried on at a conference, one is not safe from surprises such as the Russians love. The spectacle of a serious dispute between the Germans and Russians before an international audience cannot with certainty be avoided at a conference.

I suggest (after conclusion of the Schnurre negotiations²), that the convening of the conference be delayed and that this be justified publicly on the grounds that the status of the negotiations has not yet been adequately studied. Privately, the Axis Powers might offer their good offices in Moscow and Bucharest in order to settle the existing Russo-Rumanian differences of opinion before the convening of the conference. The advantage of this procedure would therefore lie in the conference's being withdrawn from public view and relegated to the more slowly moving routine of diplomatic business.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 615.

No. 621

3941/E053903-04

Memorandum by the State Secretary

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

With reference to the draft of a protocol concerning the accession of the Soviet Government to the "provisional agreement" of September 12 of last year, regarding the termination of the International Danube Commission.¹

I agree with the enclosed memorandum by Herr Martius.

Approval of the protocol and its signing by the Danubian countries means simply the formal conclusion of an agreement already reached in principle with the Russians.

German approval of the draft protocol, which as we know, refers to the upper (fluvial) Danube, had, in my opinion, best be combined with the next consultation with the Russians concerning the maritime Danube, which is soon to take place; neither to take place, however, before the conclusion of the Schnurre negotiations.

I likewise consider it desirable to postpone the meeting of the committee for the fluvial Danube from January 13 to February 20.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 592.

² On Jan. 8, Counselor Sonnleithner informed Weizsäcker that the Foreign Minister approved this proposal regarding Soviet accession to the provisional agreement of Sept. 12 and the calling off of the meeting of the committee for the fluvial Danube planned for Jan. 13 (3941/E053902).

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

On January 2, the Russian Ambassador handed the State Secretary the Russian proposal for accession of the Soviet Union to the Vienna agreement of September 12, 1940, concerning the fluvial Danube (the Danube above Brăila).³ From the technical standpoint there are no objections to the proposal.

The proposal has thus far not been transmitted to the other governments concerned in view of the negotiations which are going on in Moscow. As long as these negotiations are not concluded,⁴ it should probably not be transmitted, particularly since the Russians have thus far shown no sign of yielding in the question of the maritime Danube.

It would probably be necessary, however, to call off the meeting of the committee for the fluvial Danube which is scheduled for Monday, January 13, in order to avoid having the Russians interpret the holding of another meeting of this committee without them, at the moment when they are ready to announce their accession, as a breach of the promise given them in October⁵ and a snub. It is technically possible to call off the meeting, since a Yugoslav suggestion not to hold the meeting until February 20, which had thus far been negatively dealt with, might in this way receive consideration. If the various participants are to be spared great inconvenience, it would, however, have to be called off tomorrow, Wednesday, by telegram and telephone.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through Ministerialdirektor Wiehl and the State Secretary, with the request for a decision.

MARTIUS

³ See document No. 592 and footnote 1.

⁴ Unsigned marginal note: "Schnurre."

⁵ See document No. 174 and enclosure.

No. 622

3056/601380-84

The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

K. No. 2799

GENEVA, January 7, 1941.

Pol. II 194 g.

Subject: The talk between the English Consul at Geneva and Dr. Riesser on October 7, 1940.

With reference to my telegram No. 237 of December 17, 1940,¹ and your telegram No. 264 of December 16, 1940.²

¹ This telegram replied to an inquiry from Weizsäcker (see footnote 2) regarding Riesser's talks in Geneva dealt with in the document printed (490/232449).

² This was Weizsäcker's inquiry referred to in footnote 1 (490/232448).

Dr. Riesser, who is presently in Geneva again for several days on business for his German employers, has called upon the Consulate and confirmed that he actually had a talk with the English Consul here on October 7, 1940. A copy of Dr. Riesser's report on this conversation, which was forwarded to Berlin by his military employers, is appended as enclosure 1. Herr Riesser emphasized in this regard that he did not, of course, make the remark regarding the Führer and Chancellor reported by the English Consul. Furthermore, the version reported by the English Consul that he had attempted to find out whether "wishes for peace" were entertained on the English side, was entirely wrong. The conversation in fact had taken exactly the opposite course because the English Consul began the talk on October 7 by referring to the talk on July 18, the contents of which are also appended in copy form as enclosure 2 (cf. report 1790 of July 18, 1940³).

KRAUEL

[Enclosure 1]

OCTOBER 7, 1940.

TALK WITH THE ENGLISH CONSUL, LIVINGSTON

1. *Peace problems.*

L[ivingston] stated: The time does not appear to be appropriate for discussing again the possibility of a peace between Germany and England. A new attempt, to be sure, was recently made at Lisbon.⁴ He has learned from *German* sources that Italy, who would actually like very much to terminate the war, has made utterly unacceptable demands regarding African colonies (especially the Sudan).

2. *Public feeling in England.*

The mood is undoubtedly serious, but the morale is not bad. The women and young people above all are determined to see it through. By and by, as construction of bomb shelters progresses, the life of London will go on underground.

3. *Foreign policy.*

Aid from the *United States* is making itself more felt every day: 500 aircraft a month, 200 to 300 American fliers for the same period. After Roosevelt's election, the whole country will work for England.

The treaty with *Japan* has given recognition to the existing situation.⁵ In Switzerland it is being referred to as "diplomatic winter

³ Not found.

⁴ This may refer to the matter dealt with in document No. 76. Nothing else relating to negotiations in Lisbon has been found in Foreign Ministry files.

⁵ It is not at all clear which treaty with Japan is being referred to. Possibly, the reference is to the British-Japanese agreement announced July 17, closing the Burma Road to transit to China of arms and essential materials for a period of 3 months.

relief." England's political and military situation in Eastern Asia must in any event be described as very serious, with or without a special treaty of alliance. However, it helps England's position in the United States.

Russia is and continues to be the big question mark. A rapprochement with Moscow, of course can not be considered, or at least not at this time. That the Germans themselves entertain no illusions about their friendship with Moscow is proved by the dispatch of about 50 divisions to the East.

France is just now going through a "change." Laval, who proposed to Germany an alliance against England, is losing prestige *everywhere*.

(I should like to insert here that I was told by Minister Frangulis, the Secretary General of the International Diplomatic Academy in Paris, who is in Geneva at this moment, that Laval brought up the idea of a treaty of alliance with Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch bluntly replied that he—Laval—seemed to have forgotten that France was no partner for an alliance, but a defeated country.⁶)

4. *Prospect.*

The war, as it is being conducted now, is directed against the morale of the civil population. Since their morale is still not weakened both in England and in Germany, the air attacks on both sides will become progressively more terrible. By next spring, England will probably be in a position to undertake *large-scale* bombing offensives against German cities. This madness can go on for years without bringing about a decision in the war. Neither England nor Germany can win the war. Together they will destroy Europe.

[Enclosure 2]

GENEVA, July 18, 1940.

Livingston, the English Consul here, asked me today to see him (after he had repeatedly tried to reach me by telephone). Our conversation lasted over an hour.

L. began with the following:

A high-placed Swiss person (*not* Professor Burckhardt⁷) recently returned from Berlin with the statement that Germany—as the Führer had previously told Mr. von Wiegand⁸—had nothing against England and the British Empire. In addition there were reports

⁶ No record of such a conversation has been found.

⁷ Carl J. Burckhardt, former League of Nations High Commissioner at Danzig.

⁸ See vol. IX of this series, document No. 473, footnote 3.

from Italy that Rome had advocated in Berlin that peace be made with London.

He—Li[vingston]—was now in a position to inform me that the British Government also preferred peace to a total destruction (financial and economic) of Europe.

At this point I asked him three precise questions:

- 1) Is that *your own* view or that of your Government?
- 2) If it is the view of your Government, how is Churchill's speech to be explained?*
- 3) On what basis does the British Government envisage such a peace?

With respect to 1), Li[vingston] stated that it was *not* a matter of his own personal view.

With respect to 2), Churchill's speech had no other meaning than that England would fight on to victory *if* she were attacked.

With respect to 3), the basis of such a peace would be in the recognition of the British Empire by Germany and the recognition of Germany's *economic* (not political) living space in Europe.

When I remarked that "economic living space" would of necessity imply Germany's economic *predominance* in Europe, Li[vingston] replied that this went without saying in view of the present situation.

In reply to various questions relating to the former "English war aims" Li[vingston] had this to say:

The struggle against "Hitlerism" would of course have to stop. This would be all the easier for England to do because it appeared certain that the influence of the Army would be extremely great in Germany after the war. Besides, the time for proclaiming "sentimental" war aims was past.

The era of "European guarantees" was over for England. England had to become and act "egotistically."

The former German colonies would have to be returned to Germany.

In conclusion Li[vingston] stated:

The difficulties working against the achievement of an understanding were so great because neither London nor Berlin could officially take the first step. Each would accuse the other of "weakness" and "cowardice."

I replied that I would have to think over whether and in what form I could inform old friends and former colleagues of the substance of our talk.

Li[vingston] asked me to visit him again in 8 days—he is going on vacation tomorrow.

* Possibly a reference to Churchill's radio address of July 14, in which he repeated earlier assurances that Britain would proceed vigorously with the war.

No. 623

201/89124-26

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 27 of January 7

BUCHAREST, January 8, 1941—3:30 a. m.

Received January 8—2:30 p. m.

After the Legionnaire police had made further house searches and perpetrated further acts of violence on the population,¹ involving also well-known people such as Argetoianu² and Cesianu, the (group garbled) member of the National Bank, without legal grounds and without results, General Antonescu finally sent for Sima and called him very sharply to task. Sima admitted that he had known about the excesses. Because of the especially numerous excesses in Transylvania, he wanted to put the blame on the Germans, who, [he said] were trying systematically to gain control of Jewish firms which the Legionnaires wanted for themselves; the economy of the country had to be taken over not by Germans, but by people of Rumanian nationality. General Antonescu, however, demanded that an immediate stop be put to all the excesses; if Germans wanted to take over in too great numbers businesses abandoned by Jews, an equitable distribution could be arrived at on a different basis. It was contrary to his policy for the Legionnaires to stir up hatred of the Germans and thus to aid England and Bolshevism. General Antonescu finally demanded that Sima obey to the full his command for tranquillity and order, which he had guaranteed. When Sima did not agree to this, the General proposed a plebiscite on the following basis: either for the General, who has just reorganized the Legionnaire movement, or for Sima as Leader of the State. When Sima defiantly stated that he wanted to accept this proposal, the General ordered him out of the room. Sima thereupon went to the General's Deputy, Minister of Justice Mihai Antonescu, and asked him to straighten out his relations with the General again. He declared that he could by no means take the responsibility for a plebiscite. He thereupon apologized to the General and brought Prefect of Police Ghika along with him. Both promised the General that they wanted to guarantee order and thereupon asked the General to refrain from dismissing Ghika as he had intended; this he did. Today, on the General's name day, the Legionnaires appeared in order to congratulate him. The General took the

¹ In telegram No. 9 of Jan. 3 Fabricius had reported earlier excesses by the Iron Guard and the beginning of new tensions between Antonescu and Sima (201/89108-10).

² Constantin Argetoianu, former Rumanian Minister President.

occasion primarily to remonstrate with the Legionnaire audience, for which Minister Jasinski acted as spokesman. Assurances of loyalty were made to him. Nevertheless the General's confidence in Sima is badly shaken. He complains that the latter had not known how to raise the Legion in the esteem of the people, and in the 4 months that had elapsed since his assumption of power, he had compromised the movement most severely. Every day complaints from Legionnaire circles were reaching the General, also, about the fact that many Legionnaires were using the movement only to further themselves financially.

The General is determined, if Sima does not soon create order, to have him removed by his own Legionnaires. This would not be hard, since the Legionnaires have split into several groups and Sima's prestige is on the wane.

In this fight between the General and the Legionnaire command, a man plays a role who even earlier played a secret part in Rumanian politics: Carol's former friend and the present financial mainstay of the Legionnaires, M. Malaxa. The Legionnaires let this clever big industrialist finance them. He has in his plants the leader of the Legionnaire labor organization, Gana, and there the green flags of Sima flutter everywhere. Sima and his (group missing) have let themselves be roped in and want to come to an agreement with Malaxa on a settlement, while the General, as the exponent of order and purity, demands that Malaxa hand over all the "property stolen" from the State. Malaxa therefore considers the General his mortal enemy and makes common cause with the Legionnaires against him. Malaxa has even again supplied with arms the Legionnaire police, who had already been disarmed. Yesterday, while the scene between the General and Sima occurred in the office of the Minister President, they established themselves in the Prefecture of Police with machine guns.

The General, whose entourage kept this information from him last evening, is now extremely angry. He would like best to send Malaxa and his family off to Germany in order to get rid of them for a while. In reply to a question from him, I told him that, if he wished it, we would be glad to oblige him by taking Malaxa in, since German industry had always been on the best of terms with him. The General considers this his only chance of getting rid of this troublesome schemer.

General Antonescu described the events to me in detail. He asked me to treat the information in strict confidence.

FABRICIUS

No. 624

104/112942

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 46 of January 8

Moscow, January 8, 1941—4:45 p. m.

Received January 8—6:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 36 of January 7.¹

Numerous rumors are already circulating here concerning the sending of German troops to Rumania; the number of men in the movement is even estimated at 200,000 (two hundred thousand). Government circles here, the radio, and the Soviet press have not yet taken up the matter. Nothing is known concerning démarches by Foreign Missions with the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government will take the strongest interest in these troop movements and will wish to know what purposes these troop concentrations serve and particularly to what degree Bulgaria and Turkey (Straits) might possibly be affected by them.

Please give me appropriate instructions or perhaps inform M. Dekanozov at your end.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 616.

² Marginal note: "It will probably be advisable to tell Schulenburg that Dekanozov has not been informed for the time being and also the reasons for this. W[eizsäcker], Jan. 10."

No. 625

104/112946

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 47 of January 8

Moscow, January 8, 1941—4:45 p. m.

Received January 8—6:10 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 44 of January 7.¹

After we, in speaking to Molotov yesterday, had strongly emphasized Germany's demand for *immediate* payment of compensation for the strip of Lithuanian territory, Molotov sent for us again at noon today, and informed us as follows:

The Soviet Government wishes to comply with the German request

¹ Document No. 614.

for the speediest liquidation of the entire matter, and therefore makes the following offers:

1) Immediate payment of the entire sum in gold, namely, through a charge against our gold payments, which are due after the signing of the commercial agreement.

2) Delivery of one-eighth of the amount of compensation in non-ferrous metals within the next 3 months, and payment of the remaining seven-eighths in gold at once, likewise through a charge against our gold payments.

Request instructions by telegram.²

SCHNURRE
SCHULENBURG

² The requested instructions were telephoned on Jan. 9 to the effect that the Foreign Minister agreed to the proposal contained in figure 2 above. The draft of a telegram dated Jan. 9 confirming the telephonic instructions is filmed on M331/M014112.

No. 626

70/50239-41

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

No. 15

BERLIN, January 8, 1941.

To be handled as secret matter

zu Pol. VII 71 g.¹

Drafting Officer: Counselor Melchers.

For Hentig.

The French delegation informed the German Armistice Commission that the French Government was yielding to our request for the granting of an entry permit for you in order to avoid giving the appearance of ill will, but that it maintained the standpoint that in view of the situation at the moment your coming was inopportune.²

¹ Pol. VII 71 g.: Not found.

² It appears that permission for a journey by Hentig to Syria had once been refused and that a subsequent scheme of providing Hentig with a fictitious assignment from the German Armistice Commission had been opposed by General Stülpnagel, Chairman of the Commission (Woermann telegram No. 333 of Dec. 14 to Wiesbaden: 70/50226-27; Hencke telegram No. 331 of Dec. 16: 70/50229-30).

Instructions to make another direct request for French permission for Hentig's journey to Syria were sent by Woermann to the Foreign Ministry representative at the Armistice Commission in telegram No. 342 of Dec. 17 (70/50232). French compliance with the request was reported in Hencke's unnumbered telegram of Jan. 7 from Wiesbaden (70/50238).

Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. III, pp. 380-381.

The French delegation was informed in reply to its question that you are to be granted an entry permit for 2 months. In this connection we reserved the right to an extension of the visit or to a later entry. The French Government will instruct the French Embassy at Ankara accordingly.

The French Government requests that upon your arrival in Syria, you contact High Commissioner General Dentz personally.

The Foreign Minister requests that in carrying out your assignment you observe the following:

1. Your trip is purely of an informational nature. Its principal purpose is:

a) To report on the political and military situation in Syria and, so far as possible, the neighboring areas. Does England constitute a serious threat to Syria by way of Palestine? Are the resources of France adequate for defense? What progress is being made by the de Gaulle movement? What are the methods with which English propaganda is operating and what success does it have?

b) To gather relevant data for our policy toward the Arab states.

c) To observe Germany's own interests of an economic and cultural nature and to report on them.

2. You are requested to avoid, for your part, anything that might be construed as approval or support of any tendencies directed against the French Government.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 627

136/74568-69

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 62 of January 8

MADRID, January 8, 1941.

Received January 9—12:50 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 58 of January 8.¹

The new Argentine Ambassador² confirmed to me yesterday that negotiations are under way between Spain and Argentina in order to obtain for Spain at least 300,000-400,000 tons of the urgently needed grain. In reply to my question how the English Government would react to this delivery, Señor Escobar said that he had spoken about it to the English Ambassador who personally was not disinclined to favor the transaction. Whether navicerts would actually be given was, however, not certain. In view of the statements made repeatedly

¹ Not printed (136/74566-67). In this telegram Stöhrer had reported a conversation with the Spanish Minister of Commerce who told of negotiations with Argentina for 300,000-400,000 tons of grain.

² Adrián C. Escobar, Ambassador in Spain, December 1940-1942.

by the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Commerce that England and America were trying to impose political conditions for delivery of grain from their countries, it can be said that Spain, in her endeavors to alleviate the present famine in the country, has proceeded politically in an entirely correct fashion. Only after the Spanish Government tried first of all to receive help from us—so far in vain—did it take up the offers made by England and America. Since these countries demanded political assurances, which were not compatible with the friendly relation to the Axis, the Spanish Government is now trying to take care of its most urgent requirements in neutral countries.

In case England should also sabotage this aid for Spain after conclusion of an agreement with Argentina, England and the United States would put themselves in the wrong with Argentina and Spain, and would place in our hands as well as in the hands of Spain a useful instrument of propaganda which perhaps could also be put to good use in South America.

On the other hand, however, we must not leave out of account the possibility, that in case other plans do not work out Spain may see herself dependent on English and American help and compelled to make concessions. For these reasons I regard as absolutely necessary an immediate decision concerning the help in grain and fertilizer which can be given to Spain.

STOHRER

No. 628

221/149010

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

Teletype

BERLIN, January 8, 1941.

POSITION TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO THE LATEST REPORTS FROM AMBASSADOR ABETZ AND TO THE STATEMENTS OF THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION ON GERMAN-FRENCH POLICY ¹

Our almost complete reserve at present toward the Vichy Government can in the long run lead to a political vacuum between us and the French which would benefit English and American propaganda. Since at the present time a conference between the Foreign Minister and a member of the French Cabinet is rather out of the question, I would consider it advisable to renew the thread gradually in another way. We can carry on discussions with the French in such matters as are important to us, i. e., particularly in the economic sphere, and

¹ See document No. 618.

these would serve to fill the political vacuum mentioned above and give the French an opportunity to display their good will.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 629

492/232857

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Cipher Letter

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MADRID, January 8, 1941.

e. o. 1837 g.

The Spanish Foreign Minister asked the Italian Ambassador,¹ who took leave of him before going on a short trip to Italy, to tell Count Ciano that Spain would enter the war even at this time if she had grain to prevent a famine; he keenly regretted this hindrance and still hoped that it could be eliminated.

My Italian colleague asked that nothing be said to Rome about this confidential information before January 20, since he would not see Count Ciano before that time and so could not deliver the message until then.

V. STOHRER

¹ Francesco Lequio.

No. 630

191/138690

The Chargé d'Affaires in China to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 9 of January 9

PEIPING, January 9, 1941—7: 59 a. m.

Received January 9—11: 50 p. m.

According to information from Nanking, the Wang Ching-wei group in Nanking has two aims in mind in its efforts to obtain recognition from Germany:

1. After recognition has taken place, to play off Germany *against* Japan in the expected conflicts. This has already begun.
2. To exercise pressure on Chiang Kai-shek through Germany for the purpose of a settlement and cooperation with Nanking.

The Italians are evidently observing greater reserve at the present time in the question of recognition.

ALTENBURG

[EDITORS' NOTE. The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (December 1, 1940-

March 24, 1941) contains a record of a conference of Hitler with top German military leaders on January 9. The conference began at 12:15 p. m., and at 1:45 p. m. Ribbentrop joined the meeting. The entry by Greiner for the second part of the meeting is as follows:

"When the conference is continued at 1:45 p. m. with the Foreign Minister present, the Führer evaluates the over-all situation as follows: At the time, he had judged the chances for the success of the campaigns in Poland and in the West optimistically, because sober reflection had led him to the conviction that the assertions on the part of the enemy regarding their gigantic armaments could not be true, for economic reasons. For example, Germany's iron production was greater than that of England and France combined. Likewise Germany had produced far more aluminum than these two states and also had a larger labor force at her disposal. Moreover, economic strength could not be increased in democracies in the same manner as in Germany. Reflection on the financial expenditures of the enemy powers had produced a similar result. In addition to all this, the German Wehrmacht had had a decisive advantage in its tactical concepts.

"Such considerations of an economic, financial, and political nature were not deceptive. They should be applied also today in evaluating the situation.

"Norway is firmly in our hands and her protection assured. An English invasion is not to be expected there and merely English nuisance raids are possible.

"The occupied territories in the West are threatened only by the English Air Force. The situation in France is as follows: France staggered into the war and first became disillusioned in the autumn of 1939. The destructive blow suffered in the summer of 1940 was completely beyond anything which the French had visualized and had a corresponding effect. A certain change of mood has now occurred as a result of the Greek successes in Albania. There is only one wish in the occupied territory: the end of the war should come as quickly as possible. In the unoccupied territory, part of the population and also of the military still hope for a change in the situation; among these people there is the will to resist Germany. For the rest, a growing tendency not to commit oneself is noticeable. This is the case to an even greater degree in North Africa. The entire French nation unanimously declines the cession of Nice, Corsica, and Tunisia to Italy. The de Gaulle movement is certainly troublesome for Vichy but it has many sympathizers in France, too. General Weygand is especially dangerous and he has undoubtedly told Marshal Pétain *that he would make North Africa independent if the Government should take up the struggle against England.* The French Government, accordingly, is in a dilemma. At present the attitude of hos-

tility toward Germany is growing, although responsible French military men are thoroughly aware of France's military weakness and impotence. The preparations for Operation *Attila* have not remained concealed; all the more because of this, there is the tendency with the French to wait and see. After the dismissal of Laval Germany has no longer any obligations, and this is just as well.

"Spain's attitude has become hesitant. Although it seems scarcely promising, we shall try again to induce her to enter the war.

"In the Balkans, only Rumania is friendly to the Axis Powers, only Bulgaria loyal. The King of that country has delayed joining the Tripartite Pact because he is afraid. The consequence of this has been Russian pressure with the objective of using Bulgaria as a build-up area for an attack on the Bosphorus. Since then, Bulgaria is resolved to enter the Tripartite Pact. Yugoslavia is cool toward the Axis Powers; she wants to gain without intervening actively and reserves decision.

"In the areas which have been discussed, a sudden change unfavorable to Germany is impossible. Even the loss of North Africa would do no more in a military sense than restore the situation as it was before June 25, 1940. Thus, Germany's position as a whole was much more favorable than on September 1, 1939.

"A landing in England would be possible only if total mastery of the air had been attained and if a certain degree of paralysis had set in in England. Otherwise, it would be a crime. In the last analysis, the English war aim is to beat Germany on the Continent. Her own means, however, are not adequate for this purpose. The British Navy is weaker than ever as a result of its being committed in two widely separated theaters of war, and reinforcing it to any decisive degree is impossible. The bottlenecks (especially aluminum), which exist in England's supply of raw materials as a result of the cessation of imports, and the effects of the German air and sea war against British industry have noticeably worked to the great disadvantage of the British Air Force; the aircraft industry itself has suffered such damage that there has been a decrease rather than an increase of production. The Luftwaffe must continue to inflict damage even more systematically than before. As far as the British Army is concerned, there is no question of its use as an Army of invasion.

"It is only hope in the United States and Russia which sustains England, for, as time goes on, the destruction of the English homeland is inevitable. England, however, hopes to hold out until she has assembled a strong continental bloc against Germany. The diplomatic preparations for this are clearly recognizable.

"Stalin, Russia's master, is a clever fellow. He will not take an open stand against Germany, but it must be expected that he will increas-

ingly create difficulties in situations which are difficult for Germany. He wishes to enter upon the inheritance of impoverished Europe, is in need of successes and is inspired by the *Drang nach Westen*. Also, he is perfectly aware that after a complete German victory Russia's position would become very precarious.

"The possibility of Russian intervention sustains the British. They will not give up the race until this last continental hope is shattered. He, the Führer, does not believe that the British are without "method in their madness" [*sinnlos toll*]; if they saw no more prospects of winning the war, they would stop, for, if they should lose, they would no longer have the moral strength to hold the Empire together. If they could hold out, activate 40 to 50 divisions and if the United States and Russia would aid them, then a very difficult situation would arise for Germany. This must not happen.

"He has up to now acted according to the principle of always destroying the most important enemy positions in order to advance another step. Therefore, Russia must now be smashed. Either the British will yield or Germany will continue the war against England in the most favorable circumstances. The smashing of Russia will also enable Japan to turn against the United States with all her forces. This will prevent the latter from entering the war.

"The question of timing is especially important in the smashing of Russia. Even though the Russian armed forces are a headless colossus of clay, their future development cannot be predicted with certainty. Since Russia has to be beaten in any case, it is better to do it now, when the Russian armed forces have no leaders and are poorly equipped and the Russians have to overcome great difficulties in their armament industry, developed with foreign assistance.

"In spite of this, the Russians must not be underestimated, even at this time. The German attack therefore must be conducted by the strongest possible forces. In no circumstances must it happen that the Russians are driven back along a front. Therefore, the most brutal breakthroughs are necessary for such an action. The most important mission is the rapid isolation of the Baltic area, and the right wing of the German forces which will be advancing to the north of the Pripet Marshes must be especially reinforced for this purpose. The distances in Russia are very great, to be sure, but no greater than the distances which are being mastered by the Wehrmacht even at this time. The annihilation of the Russian Army, the seizure of the most important industrial areas, and the destruction of the remaining industrial areas, especially in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk, will be the objective of the operation; the area of Baku must also be occupied.

"The smashing of Russia will give Germany tremendous relief. Only 40 to 50 divisions will then have to remain in the East, the Army can be reduced and the whole armament industry can be utilized for the Luftwaffe and the Navy. Subsequently a completely adequate antiaircraft defense must be established and the most essential industries moved to regions which are not endangered. Germany will then be impregnable.

"The gigantic territory of Russia conceals immeasurable riches. Germany must dominate it economically and politically although not annex it. Thereby Germany will have all the means possible for waging war even against continents at some future date. Nobody will then be able to defeat her anymore. If this operation is carried through, Europe will hold its breath."]

No. 631

201/89130

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, January 9, 1941—11:00 p. m.

No. 34 of January 9

Received January 10—5:45 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

General Antonescu expressed the desire for a visit with the Führer and Reich Chancellor as soon as possible in order to discuss with him personally questions of Rumania's defense policy and defense preparedness. He would also like to have the Führer's advice regarding domestic policy. Sima has informed the General that he had been invited to Berlin by the Führer's Deputy.¹ If necessary, Antonescu would take him along, but he asked how matters stood with this invitation. I replied that I knew that an invitation had been issued by Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach,² but no official invitation, which had to be cleared by the Reich Foreign Minister and the Legation, had been issued as yet. The relations between Sima and Antonescu continue tense, particularly since the General has found out that Sima's confidant, Police Prefect Ghika, has ordered his people to follow only his own instructions and not those of the General.

FABRICIUS

¹ Rudolf Hess.² See document No. 445.

No. 632

191/138691

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 26

BERLIN, January 9, 1941.

I told the Italian Ambassador today that I knew that the Italian Government took a relatively accommodating attitude toward Japan's pressing for recognition of Wang Ching-wei.¹ However, the German Government had so far not been pressed by the Japanese. It was my personal opinion that Japan did not gain much from the act of recognition by Italy and would therefore do better to wait a while longer. I suggested to Alfieri that this matter might be drawn out until the proposed European trip by Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ On Jan. 2 the Italian Counselor of Embassy, Zamboni, presented a memorandum to Woermann (191/138695-97) indicating that the Japanese Government had inquired as to the Italian Government's attitude toward recognition of Wang Ching-wei. The Italian memorandum referred to an earlier favorable statement of the Italian position regarding recognition (see vol. ix of this series, document No. 36) as still valid; it suggested that the matter be taken up with Matsuoka on his European visit; and it asked for the views of the German Government.

No. 633

84/62340-44

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, January 9, 1941.

One hears the view expressed at times that it is rather a matter of indifference to Germany whether the United States enters the war against us or not; America is already giving the British all the help she can. Her entry into the war would not represent any essential change in this respect.

This view is erroneous.

1) If the United States enters the war, the President and the Government will be given much greater powers than they now have. This will enable them to concentrate industrial production more energetically and more rigidly than is possible in normal times. The ability to help England will thereby be increased considerably, and even though a portion of arms production has to be set aside for the defense of the United States, the quantity of arms, munitions, planes,

etc., available for the Allies, will not be less but greater. This would not be essentially changed by reason of the fact that, if the United States enters the war, Japan will make herself more conspicuous. If America enters the war, she will—this time even more than in 1917-18—strain all her energies in order to help her English ally and to wage war herself.

2) As long as the United States is not in the war, the rest of the Western Hemisphere will also stay out of the war. As soon as the United States enters, we shall have to expect that most if not all the countries of Latin America will break off relations with us and sooner or later likewise enter the war against us. This would have a very unfavorable effect on Germany materially and psychologically.

3) If the United States should enter the war, the view which is being encountered here and there in the world even at this time, that it is doubtful whether Germany can win, would receive a strong impetus. The fact that the great potential of America is again thrown fully into the English scale would influence the uncommitted powers in an unfavorable sense with respect to Germany.

4) As long as England wages war alone, there is a possibility, in the event of an English collapse, of making peace with England and thus ending the war. If, however, the United States is also in the war, then, even if England collapses, the war against the United States will continue, and it will be difficult to arrive at a peace with the United States. At the end of the World War, we concluded peace with England in 1919, but with the United States not until August 1921.

For all these reasons Germany has a considerable interest that the United States not enter the war.

What, then, can be done by Germany to prevent America from entering the war?

1) Sweeping military victories in the European theater of war are decisive. If England can be eliminated by military action, there will be no further question of the entry of the United States into the war.

2) A strong, self-assured, but entirely calm attitude on the part of Germany toward the United States. We must not allow ourselves to be provoked either to diplomatic action or to press polemics or to statements of any kind that might give the impression—or could be construed by our enemies in America to mean—that we have the intention sooner or later of threatening the United States or of attacking the Western Hemisphere militarily or ideologically. In order to push his resisting people into the war, the President requires the creation of an atmosphere of an America threatened by Germany. If he succeeds, he can finally bring into the war the people who are already quite prejudiced against Germany, but 80 percent of whom still desire

to stay out of the war. If we remain quite calm—and express ourselves only as was done in the Danzig speech of the Foreign Minister of October 3, 1939,¹ and in the interview of the Führer with Karl von Wiegand of June 13, 1940²—the President cannot succeed in this, for he will then lack proof of such German threats and aggressive intentions. If, however, we reply in the press or otherwise to the constant provocations issuing from America and strike back with polemics, it will be possible for the President and his entourage to distort our statements in such a way that the American people will feel threatened. The Americans are the most unpredictable people in the world and can—as the Mars [invasion] incident and many others have shown—with incredible ease be put in a mood that precludes sound judgment. The President is a past master at putting his people, partly directly, partly indirectly, in such a mood, but he needs material for it. If we do not furnish him with this material, he cannot achieve the desired effect. I therefore urgently repeat the suggestion that we persist in the tactics which Germany has pursued toward the United States with splendid success from the beginning of the war until December 1940, namely, of ignoring all insults and provocations issuing from America, or at most, of reacting to them very quietly (as in the two statements mentioned above). This is not a weak policy but a clever one, and if we abandon it, we will only be giving the President the pretext he needs for achieving his aims.

Should the President, despite our calm attitude, abandon the present policy of “measures short of war”³ and, of his own accord or with the aid of the terrorized Congress, take measures that are virtually military measures or are bound to lead directly to incidents with Germany (for example, abolition of the danger zone around England, or the escorting of ships to England by American convoys), an entirely new situation will arise and the conflict will then be unavoidable. In that case we will naturally have to draw the logical conclusions diplomatically, militarily, and journalistically. It seems to me highly improbable, however, that the President will succeed in going that far, if we remain ice-cold and calm with respect to America and give him no pretext for such measures, in spite of all his mendacity and all his tricks of misrepresentation.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

DIECKHOFF

¹ This is apparently a reference to Ribbentrop's speech of Oct. 24, 1939. For text, see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1941), vol. VII, pt. 1, pp. 362-381.

² See vol. IX of this series, document No. 473, footnote 3.

³ In English in the original.

No. 634

265/172553-54

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

ANKARA, January 10, 1941.

No. 25 of January 10

Received January 10—6:05 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 12 of January 7¹ and my telegram No. 7 of January 4.²

Troop transports to Rumania are being very closely watched by the State President, who is at the moment with the Minister of War in Thrace, and by the Government. (See also the report by the Turkish Minister in Sofia, which leaves with today's courier.³) As ordered, the press has so far been exercising complete reserve. The Turkish General Staff is spreading the view that any penetration by third parties into the Turkish security zone (Bulgaria) will compel Turkey to armed intervention. My opinion remains unaltered, that, given sufficient diplomatic preparation, Turkey can be kept out of the war, as in the past.

Since, however, one must reckon with surprises and in particular must assume that if the situation arises the English will place Turkey before a fait accompli and will play their last trump as a surprise and with the strongest pressure, I consider it advisable that I be provided with instructions for such a case which would permit me to act without loss of time.

I do not believe that diplomatic assurances that Germany will not attack Turkey are adequate. In order to hold the situation, it would be necessary, in my opinion, to have a treaty instrument in which we pledge ourselves to respect the integrity of the Turkish border, if possible with a protective zone of 50 kilometers, and Turkey pledges herself not to lend armed assistance to England or Greece as long as this commitment is carried out.

Decisive for Turkey's decision, whose political objective today is unquestionably the greatest possible weakening of the Italian position in the Mediterranean, is probably Russia's attitude.

I should therefore be grateful for information on Russia's reaction to the troop transports to Rumania, and on how the present Russian-Turkish relations are being evaluated.⁴

PAPEN

¹ Document No. 616.

² In this telegram Papen reported that Saracoglu had spoken to him about the "very disturbing report of the mass transport of German troops from Hungary to Rumania." (265/172547)

³ Not printed (2361/488334-37).

⁴ See document No. 659.

No. 635

2281/481023-24

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, January 10, 1941—10:00 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 43 of January 10

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Duce, whom I visited at 7:30 p. m. accompanied by Ciano, expressed in most cordial words his thanks for the greetings of the Führer.¹ The Führer could be assured that he [Mussolini] also thought unremittingly of him, and all his wishes were with him.

He was looking forward with much pleasure to the forthcoming conversation and would keep it firmly in view for this Sunday, the 19th of January.² He was choosing this date because he could not get away in the next few days, since certain things in Albania were becoming fluid and would cause the wind there to change, as he had already told me recently.³ The latest intelligence confirmed his hopes. He had also, just today, received good reports regarding the success of the Air Force against the British fleet in the Sicilian Strait which he had every reason to evaluate highly. Moreover, he was now going to publish without restriction all Italian losses in all theaters of war, giving the exact personal identification of every individual. His people should see that life is a serious matter, and that war is the most serious of all. Cotton wool was not an instrument of national education, but relentless hardness was. In any case he would have to talk with the Führer about many interesting questions, and was therefore accepting gratefully the invitation to Berchtesgaden where there would be opportunity for a really leisurely, confidential discussion; one would not sit watch in hand, but could occasionally, as one chose, break off. One could leave it to the course of the conversations whether he would stay over beyond Sunday.

All details of the journey, as well as the question whether he would arrive in the night, and possibly not at Berchtesgaden but at a small out-of-the-way railroad station⁴ could be determined in the next

¹ The message of Hitler to Mussolini has not been found.

² See document No. 672.

³ See document No. 589. In a letter of Jan. 13 to Weizsäcker (124/123000-01), Mackensen enclosed a letter of the German Consul General at Tirana (124/123002-06) and noted that this letter, as well as the report by General Rintelen, who had just returned from Albania, did not support the view that the wind in Albania was shifting.

⁴ Cf. document No. 610, footnote 2.

few days. Today he wanted only to affirm with pleasure that Sunday the 19th he would appear in Berchtesgaden.

Ciano, who accompanied me away from the conversation, volunteered the information that at the time of the journey General Cavallero could scarcely be spared from Albania, but the Duce would consider bringing with him another appropriate general.

MACKENSEN

No. 636

104/112968

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 12 from Fuschl FUSCHL, January 10 [1941]—11:45 p. m.
No. 57 from the Foreign Ministry

With reference to your telegram No. 50 of January 8.¹

I request you not to broach the question of increased German troop shipments to Rumania with the Soviet Government. If you should be approached regarding the matter by M. Molotov or some other leading figure in the Soviet Government, please say that according to your information the sending of German troops was exclusively a matter of precautionary military measures against England. The English already had military contingents on Greek soil and it was to be expected that they would further increase those contingents in the immediate future. Germany would not in any circumstances tolerate England's gaining a foothold on Greek soil. Please do not go into greater detail until further notice.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Not found.

No. 637

34/24251-54

Economic Agreement of January 10, 1941, Between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 10, 1941, CONCERNING RECIPROCAL DELIVERIES IN THE SECOND TREATY PERIOD ON THE BASIS OF THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF FEBRUARY 11, 1940¹

As the result of negotiations concerning reciprocal deliveries on the basis of the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, in the second treaty period the German Government and the Government

¹ See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 607.

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached agreement on the following:

ARTICLE 1

In the period February 11, 1941, to August 1, 1942, commodities specified in List 1A² to the value of 620 to 640 million reichsmarks will be delivered from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Germany. The obligations for deliveries stipulated in articles 2 to 8 of the Economic Agreement are hereby superseded.

ARTICLE 2

In compensation for the Soviet deliveries stipulated in article 1, German commodities as stipulated in List 1B³ to the value of 620 to 640 million reichsmarks will be delivered from Germany to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

It is agreed that the Soviet Government can furthermore during the period of validity of this agreement tender orders with times of delivery going beyond August 1, 1942.

The obligations for deliveries stipulated in articles 5 and 8 of the Economic Agreement are hereby superseded.

ARTICLE 3

The apportionment of the German and Soviet deliveries in the particular periods will be done on the basis of equality between the German and Soviet deliveries in each quarter of a year.

As an exception to paragraph 1 of this article, that part of the deliveries specified in articles 1 and 2 which had been stipulated in the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940—i. e., German and Soviet deliveries each to the value of 225 million reichsmarks—is to be carried out in accordance with the schedule laid down in the aforesaid agreement.

ARTICLE 4

In conformity with article 3, the German and Soviet deliveries which are stipulated in articles 1 and 2 of this agreement are to be completed in quarterly installments according to the following schedule:

<i>Quarterly installment</i>	<i>Soviet deliveries in millions of reichsmarks</i>	<i>German deliveries in millions of reichsmarks</i>
From February 11 to May 11, 1941	115	
From May 11 to August 11, 1941	170	117
From August 11 to November 1, 1941	87	143
From November 1, 1941, to February 1, 1942	86	142
From February 1 to May 1, 1942	86	142
From May 1 to August 1, 1942	86	86

² Not printed (34/24255-57).

³ Not printed (34/24258-66).

The period from August 11, 1941, to November 1, 1941, is reckoned as a quarterly installment.

ARTICLE 5

If the ratio of quarterly German and Soviet deliveries stipulated in article 4 of this agreement is not attained, both parties will take measures to eliminate this faulty ratio at the earliest possible date. The Plenipotentiaries of both Governments named in article 10 of the Economic Agreement will meet at the latest within 15 days after the end of the corresponding quarterly period.

ARTICLE 6

Otherwise, the terms of the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, as well as the Confidential Protocol and the exchange of letters which go along with it, remain in force in their full extent until August 1, 1942, so far as they are not changed by the above terms.

The terms of the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, and of this agreement are also to be applied to orders and deliveries on the basis of this agreement whose fulfillment will possibly not have been completed by August 1, 1942.

ARTICLE 7

This agreement shall become effective upon signature.

Done in two original copies in the German and Russian languages respectively, both texts being equally authentic.

Executed in Moscow, January 10, 1941.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
K. SCHNURRE

With full power of the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
A. I. MIKOYAN

No. 638

F 15/333-34

German-Soviet Russian Secret Protocol

The German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, Plenipotentiary of the Government of the German Reich, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, Plenipotentiary of the Government of the USSR, on the other hand, have agreed upon the following:

1. The Government of the German Reich renounces its claim to the strip of Lithuanian territory which is mentioned in the Secret Additional Protocol of September 28, 1939,¹ and which has been marked on the map attached to this Protocol;

¹ See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 159.

2. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to compensate the Government of the German Reich for the territory mentioned in Point 1 of this Protocol by paying 7,500,000 gold dollars or 31,500,000 reichsmarks to Germany.

The amount of 31.5 million reichsmarks will be paid by the Government of the USSR in the following manner: one-eighth, that is, 3,937,500 reichsmarks, in nonferrous metal deliveries within 3 months after the signing of this Protocol, the remaining seven-eighths, or 27,562,500 reichsmarks, in gold by deduction from the German gold payments which Germany is to make by February 11, 1941, in accordance with the correspondence exchanged between the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation, Dr. Schnurre, and the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR, M. A. I. Mikoyan, in connection with the "Agreement of January 10, 1941, concerning reciprocal deliveries in the second treaty period on the basis of the Economic Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of February 11, 1940."²

3. This Protocol has been executed in two originals in the German language and two originals in the Russian language and shall become effective immediately upon signature.

Moscow, January 10, 1941.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
SCHULENBURG
(SEAL)

With full power of the
Government of the USSR:
V. MOLOTOV
(SEAL)

² Further details regarding the deliveries and payments in gold were outlined in an exchange of notes on Jan. 10, 1941, between Mikoyan and Schnurre (2108/456083-84).

No. 639

136/74571-72

The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 104 of January 11

MADRID, January 11, 1941.

Received January 11—5:10 p. m.

Make no copies.

For Ambassador von Stohrer only (en route to Salzburg).¹

Minister Gamero del Castillo² informed Lazar³ as follows:

The struggle between Serrano Suñer and Franco for control of the government is still undecided, because Franco refuses to take the

¹ Following Hitler's decision of Jan. 9 that another attempt should be made to induce Spain to enter the war (see Editors' Note, p. 1056), Stohrer evidently was recalled to receive instructions.

² P. Gamero del Castillo, Minister without Portfolio in the Cabinet constituted Oct. 21, 1940.

³ Josef Hans Lazar, Press Attaché with rank of Counselor in the German Embassy in Spain.

step of forming a ministry consisting exclusively of friends of Serrano Suñer, which would in effect give Serrano Suñer direction of the government even if he were not formally made head of it. The reason for this unyielding stand, according to Franco, is his desire to bring together various political groups, which is possible only if the government is directly under him; under the leadership of Serrano Suñer it would be out of the question. The view of Serrano, of Gamero, and of their close followers is that Franco's wish cannot be carried out and only means a loss of time; therefore an activist, homogeneous Serrano Suñer government should be formed as soon as possible. Since Franco is not to be convinced by Serrano alone, German intervention with Franco would be of decisive importance. The German Ambassador himself should let it be known that Germany is interested in and desires a realization of the government formula of Serrano; this would be to the advantage of Germany herself, because she could collaborate militarily only with an activist, homogeneous government group and would otherwise have to resort to ruthless intervention, which in any case would be prejudicial to German-Spanish relations. Gamero said that he would be willing to repeat his statements to the German Ambassador.

It is the impression of Lazar, who was completely noncommittal, that they are seeking Germany's help because they cannot seize power alone; after seizing power, however, they would probably be guided solely by their own political interests without any regard for German aid.

HEBERLEIN

No. 640

2108/456085-87

*Circular of Ambassador Ritter*¹

Telegram

Multex No.

BERLIN, January 11, 1941.

e. o. Ha. Pol. V a 67/40.

As is known from the press, a large new treaty complex with the Soviet Union has come into being. The treaty complex contains not only a new economic agreement for 1½ years, but at the same time settles also all other questions pending between Germany and the Soviet Union.²

¹This telegram was addressed to all Embassies except Moscow, and all Legations.

²The treaty complex comprised six instruments:

(1) The Economic Agreement, document No. 637.

(2) The Resettlement Agreement regarding Lithuania (34/24338-49), printed in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1944), vol. ix, pt. 2, pp. 703-717; additional protocol and annexes, not printed (34/24350-80).

In personal conversations with official and nonofficial persons, as well as in the press there, please give fullest emphasis at every opportunity to the new treaty complex and exploit it in two directions.

The first is its economic importance. The new agreement means the final collapse of the English blockade and the English attempt at an economic encirclement of Germany. Germany could hold out economically and from the standpoint of the war economy for an unlimited time even without Soviet deliveries. Without these deliveries, however, Germany would, in the case of some raw materials and foods, probably have to manage rather closely. With these deliveries, Germany has ample supplies to draw on. This applies especially to the matter of bread grain, because, under the new economic agreement, the Soviet Union will deliver many times the amount of grain that was delivered under the first economic agreement of February 11, 1940.

The malicious expectations which our enemies expressed upon conclusion of the first economic agreement, that Soviet promises would exist only on paper, since the Soviet Union, because of lack of supplies and because of transportation difficulties, could not make deliveries, even if she really wanted to, have meanwhile been refuted by the facts. The Soviet Union has delivered everything that she promised. In many fields she has delivered even more than had originally been agreed upon. In the organization of the huge shipments, the Soviet Union has performed in a really admirable manner. Now the trade and transportation channels are operating smoothly. When the new economic agreement is carried out, they will continue to function automatically.

The second is the political importance. Our foes have in the past few weeks again let loose in the world rumors of alleged ill feeling and tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. They have indulged in the hope that the attempts of the new English Foreign Minister, Eden, and those of the United States to ingratiate themselves with the Soviet Union will result in blasting the political

(3) The Resettlement Agreement regarding Latvia and Estonia (34/24297-306), printed in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. ix, pt. 2, pp. 718-729; additional protocol and annexes, not printed (34/24307-37).

(4) The Agreement on Compensation for Property Claims in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, not printed (9393/E665478-486).

(5) The Boundary Agreement (104/112962-963), printed in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik* (February 1941), pp. 132-133;

(6) The Secret Protocol regarding compensation for the strip of Lithuanian territory, document No. 638.

A summary of questions still remaining to be settled between Germany and the USSR was contained in telegram No. 133 of Jan. 20 from Schulenburg to the Foreign Ministry (2108/456092). Molotov had instructed Vyshinsky to take these matters up with the German Embassy and they were currently under discussion.

friendship and economic collaboration between the Soviet Union and Germany. The Soviet Union and Germany have ignored such foolish attempts and proceeded to the order of the day. While England and the United States have thus far had no success in their efforts with the Soviet Union in any field, the Soviet Union is concluding with Germany the biggest economic treaty complex that has ever been concluded between two states.

RITTER

No. 641

3941/E053888-90

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Rumania*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 53

BERLIN, January 11, 1941.

Ha. Pol. 130 g.

For your information.

1. The Foreign Minister desires postponement until the second half of March of the maritime Danube conference scheduled to reconvene on January 20, since it would probably reach a stalemate again immediately; this is to be avoided for political reasons. A German initiative in favor of postponement should not be in evidence, if possible, so that we may be able to continue the role of mediator at the conference. In order that the foregoing intention may be carried out, we are envisaging a statement to be made orally to the Soviet Government by our Ambassador in Moscow of the following content:

"The Rumanian Government has let the German Government know that, in view of the fact that it has unfortunately so far not been possible to conclude the maritime Danube conference in Bucharest in a satisfactory way, it intends as soon as possible to transmit a new proposal with a detailed justification to the other Powers participating in the conference, as a basis for the further work of the conference. In these circumstances the Rumanian Government suggests that it might be advisable to postpone to a later date the meeting of the maritime Danube conference, which was to have taken place in the last third of January and for which the delegates had considered January 20.

"The German Government, too, is very much interested in helping the conference to proceed as smoothly as possible, when it convenes again. It therefore welcomes the Rumanian suggestion and would also like to suggest that the Soviet Government, through as detailed a written statement of the Soviet position as possible, give the other conference Powers an opportunity to examine it in all particulars.

"As regards the time when the maritime Danube conference is to reconvene, the German Government would like to point out that, in setting this date, account should be taken of the meeting of the ad-

visory committee for the fluvial Danube.¹ For the time being this meeting is planned for approximately February 20."

Close of the statement to the Soviet Government.²

2. Martius flew to Belgrade today in order to discuss the matter with Pella, the chairman of the Rumanian delegation, who is there and to suggest to him the procedure referred to above, so that we may take appropriate action in Moscow with the consent of the Rumanian Government. We do not assume that the Rumanian Government, with which Pella will probably get in contact, will have any objections to the procedure.³

3. The foregoing is for your information in case you are approached in the matter; on the other hand, the matter is not to be pursued by us in Bucharest on our own initiative.

WIEHL

¹ See document No. 621.

² Foreign Ministry telegram No. 64 of Jan. 13 instructed Schulenburg to communicate this statement orally to Molotov (1447/365092-93). A further instruction, transmitted in telegram No. 83 of Jan. 14, urged that the statement be communicated to the Soviet Government as soon as possible without, however, making it appear too important; consequently, the statement should not be made to Molotov but "at the most" to Vyshinsky. The Soviet Government must be made to realize, however, that Germany was much interested in the adoption of the procedure proposed by Rumania. (1447/365091)

Schulenburg reported in telegram No. 118 of Jan. 16 that he had carried out his instructions and that Vyshinsky had promised an early statement of the Soviet position (1447/365090). On Jan. 24 the Ambassador reported in telegram No. 172 that Vyshinsky had told him the Soviet Government agreed to the postponement of the maritime Danube conference and expected it to reconvene in the course of February (711/262128). For further developments in the question of the Danube, see vol. xii of this series.

³ Wiehl recorded on Jan. 12 that Martius had reported from Bucharest by telephone at noon that Antonescu fully approved of the proposed procedure regarding the maritime Danube conference (3941/E053887).

No. 642

8589/E602798-801

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, January 11, 1941.

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW/WFSt/Abt. L No. 44018/41 g.K. Chefs

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 22

COOPERATION OF GERMAN FORCES IN THE FIGHTING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

The situation in the Mediterranean area, where England is committing superior forces against our allies, requires German help on strategic, political, and psychological grounds.

Tripolitania must be held, and the danger of a collapse of the Albanian front must be removed. Beyond this the army group

Cavallero should be enabled, in conjunction with the later operations of the Twelfth Army,¹ to go over to the offensive from Albania.

I therefore order the following:

1. The Commander in Chief of the Army is to fit out a blocking unit which will be suitable for rendering valuable service to our allies in the defense of Tripolitania, particularly against English armored divisions. The principles for its composition will be ordered separately.

The preparations are to be scheduled so that this unit can be transferred to Tripoli immediately following the current transport of an Italian armored division and of a motorized division (starting approximately February 20).²

2. The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as a base of operations. Its most important mission consists in combatting the English naval forces and the English sea connection between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean.

Along with this the base is to be created, with the aid of intermediate landing fields in Tripolitania, for immediate support of Graziani's army group by attacking the English unloading harbors and supply bases on the coast of western Egypt and Cyrenaica.

The Italian Government was asked to declare a blockade zone between Sicily and the North African coast in order to lighten the task of the X Air Corps and to avoid incidents with neutral ships.

3. German formations approximately in the strength of an army corps, including the 1st Mountain Division and armored forces, are to be selected and made ready for transfer to Albania. The transport of the 1st Mountain Division is to begin as soon as the agreement of Italy is received by the OKW.² Meanwhile reconnaissance is to be made and clarification is to be achieved with the Italian High Command in Albania to determine whether, and which, additional forces can be advantageously committed in Albania for an attack with an operational objective and, along with the Italian divisions, can be currently supplied.

The mission of the German forces will be:

a) At first to serve as support in Albania in the emergency that new crises should develop there;

b) To help the Italian army group later on to go over to the offensive with the aim:

to tear open the Greek defensive front at a point decisive for a far-reaching operation;

¹The Twelfth Army was charged with carrying out Operation *Marita*. See document No. 511.

²Cf. document No. 683.

to open the pass westward of Salonika from the rear and thereby to support the frontal attack by List's Army.³

4. The OKW will determine with the Italian Armed Forces Staff the guiding principles for the chain of command of the German troops to be employed in North Africa and Albania, and relating to the restrictions to be made regarding the commitment of these troops.

5. The available and suitable German transport steamers in the Mediterranean, so far as they are not already employed in the convoy traffic with Tripoli, are to be counted on for transferring the forces to Albania. The transport group of Junker-52's at Foggia is to be used for transporting personnel.

Effort will be made to conclude the transfer of the mass of the German forces to Albania before the transport of the blocking unit to Libya begins (see item 1) and the employment of the bulk of the German ships becomes necessary for it.⁴

[ADOLF HITLER]⁵

³ i. e., the Twelfth Army.

⁴ In a supplementary order issued by the OKW on Jan. 20 (8589/E602805) code names were designated for the operations outlined in Führer's Directive No. 22. The operations in Tripoli were designated *Sonnenblume* (sunflower); those in Albania *Alpenveilchen* (cyclamen).

⁵ The signature has been verified by another microfilm of the document in the U.S. Naval Records and Library, T223C, PG32019.

No. 643

2226/475638

Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, January 11, 1941.

e. o. Ha. Pol. IIa 171.

Subject: Supplying Belgium with Grain.

In a conversation with Minister Kiewitz the King of the Belgians has expressed himself as follows:

By February 15, Belgium will no longer have any bread and will face a famine. Therefore hurried preliminary negotiations have been opened with Russia for the delivery of 300,000 tons of grain,¹ which must be procured before the next harvest. It seemed, however, that Berlin did not want to hear of this transaction. The Russians demanded gold or foreign exchange. Belgium's gold reserve, which had

¹ In telegram No. 780 of Dec. 12 from Brussels (4055/E065571), Bergen had reported that the Soviet Trade representative had offered to the Belgian Ministry of Economics the delivery of 300,000 tons of grain in return for finished products. Further documents on this subject are filmed on serial 4055.

been in Dakar, had now been removed to the Reichsbank.² Belgium needed the gold urgently, however, in order to ensure her food supply.

Herr Kiewitz informed the Military Commander in Belgium³ of this conversation and at the same time sent a copy of the letter to him to the Presidential Chancellery. The latter forwarded Herr Kiewitz's letter to Reich Minister Darré and Ministerialdirektor Gramsch.⁴

The Reich Ministry of Economics is now holding discussions on Belgium's request, with the Reich Food Ministry participating. The negotiations are being conducted in the Reich Ministry of Economics by State Secretary Landfried and in his absence by Ministerialdirigent Schlotterer. I have not been able as yet to learn any details of the discussions in the Reich Ministry of Economics, since Herr Landfried has been taken ill and it has not been possible to reach him.⁵

Herewith submitted to the Director of the Economic Policy Department for preliminary information.

SABATH

² See document No. 264 and footnote 3. Clodius recorded on Dec. 24 that the first shipment of Belgian gold amounting to 4.65 tons had arrived in Berlin and was being checked at the Reichsbank (141/126699).

³ Gen. Alexander von Falkenhausen.

⁴ Of the Four Year Plan.

⁵ For the follow-up see document No. 653.

No. 644

839/281649

The Head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the OKW to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET MILITARY

BERLIN, January 11, 1941.

No. 10/41 geh. Kdos. Chefs. Ausl III Org.

By officer only

Attention Ambassador Ritter.

Copy of Abt. Landesverteidigung No. 44010/41 g.K.Chefs. of January 10, 1941:

"The Führer approved on January 9 the request of the Commander in Chief of the Army¹ to get in touch with Bulgaria in order to prepare quarters south of the Danube for the troops crossing first.

"Supplement Abt. L:

"1. The start of the Danube crossing is not to be expected before the end of January according to the new decision.

"2. In the following period increasing cooperation with the Bulgarian General Staff will be necessary."

BÜRKNER

¹ Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch.

No. 645

221/149022-24

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, January 13, 1941.

No. 94 of January 12

Received January 13—1:25 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

The Berlin representative of Ambassador Scapini² charged with looking after the French prisoners of war, Baron Benoist-Méchin, arrived in Paris today after a 3-day trip to Vichy, taken in accord with the Embassy.³ Benoist-Méchin had several conversations in Vichy with Marshal Pétain, Flandin, Darlan, and Huntziger, and attended a meeting of the directorate on January 10 by invitation of Pétain. After a second meeting, which Benoist-Méchin did not attend, Darlan gave him a note containing the results of the deliberations of the directorate with Marshal Pétain, and asked him to inform me of its substance. The note, written by Darlan in his own hand, contains the following five points:

1. The French Government asks that we believe its assurance that it in no way had the intention to offend the Führer personally. It regrets that this impression has arisen.

2. The announced publication of the change in the Cabinet will not take place at once,⁴ although this is very upsetting for the business of government.

3. The Marshal would like to know whether Laval's return to the Government is the absolute prerequisite (*condition dirimante*) for the continuation of the policy of cooperation.

4. If so, he is willing to discuss the modalities of Laval's return.

5. In this case could Admiral Darlan come to Paris in order to discuss these modalities with the German Ambassador? Benoist-Méchin has not received any instructions concerning the modalities of Laval's return, which are being considered in Vichy in this case. However, according to information given to Benoist-Méchin, Darlan would present the suggestion that Laval write Pétain a letter assuring the Marshal of his loyalty. Thereupon Pétain would appoint Laval to the Cabinet as Minister of State and subsequently to the directorate. Darlan also informed Benoist-Méchin that Pétain was asking for German consent enabling him to go to Versailles occasionally and to make the first trip after the reorganization of the Cabinet was completed. On the occasion of this first visit he would like to issue two proclama-

¹ Marginal note: "Sent to the Special Train as No. 130 on Jan. 13, 1941, 1:50 a. m."

² Georges Scapini, delegate of the French Government for prisoners of war.

³ Cf. Jean-Louis Aujol, *Le Procès Benoist-Méchin (29 mai-6 juin 1947) : Compte rendu sténographique avec un avant-propos et une lettre de l'inculpé à son défenseur* (Paris, 1948), pp. 87-91.

⁴ See document No. 613 and footnote 2.

tions to the French people. In the one he would want to make a renewed avowal of the policy of Montoire, in the other he would formulate the domestic policy of the reorganized Cabinet. It seems that the domestic political tendencies in occupied France which have arisen in opposition to the machinations of Vichy are causing the French Government a good deal of concern, and the sharp tone of the Paris press which we have brought about has taken its effect. The Vichy Government would like to assign a representative for press matters to the German censor in Paris, and suggests that the Reich Government delegate a corresponding representative to the French Office of Censorship in Vichy. Pétain, Flandin, Huntziger, and Darlan tried to refute to Benoist-Méchin the accusations made against the Vichy Government [as follows]: The directorate was constantly gaining in influence and the dangerous elements in the entourage of the Marshal and the Cabinet members who at heart opposed the cooperation with Germany were thus practically being eliminated. Darlan was planning to combine the Ministries of Navy, Air, and Colonies directly in his hand in the new Cabinet, and to subordinate the Interior and Justice Ministries indirectly to himself. The negotiations with America had the purpose of supplying France with food and were not by any means intended to represent a turn toward the English camp.⁵ Regarding Admiral Leahy, Marshal Pétain had expressed himself to the effect that he had had to receive him in a friendly way; however, he would have much preferred it if he had not come at all. Flandin had stated that he considered the British cause to be lost, but that he wanted to maintain good relations with the United States since perhaps some day France might be able to play the role of mediator between the Reich and America. In the question of cooperation with Germany he attached principal importance to economic agreements. Pétain, Huntziger, and Darlan had expressed themselves with regard to the strategic situation in the Mediterranean; being military experts they were far from according too great a significance to the Italian failures. Huntziger had asserted that a German bomber squadron had landed in Bizerte by mistake and had been supplied there with gasoline by the French military so as to continue the flight. England had protested and had let the French Government know that in case of a repetition the airport of Bizerte would be bombed.

Before his departure Benoist-Méchin had also had a lengthy conversation with Boisson, the Governor of Dakar. Boisson considered French West Africa to be secure. De Gaulle had personally lost prestige in French Equatorial Africa; however, the local leaders of the insurrectionary movement persisted in their attitude.

The statements which were made to Benoist-Méchin do not agree with the other news we have received with regard to the situation in French Africa and the relations of Vichy to the Anglo-Saxon countries. They indicate, however, that the French Government does not

⁵ Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959), vol. II, pp. 90-99.

wish to assume responsibility for a further strain on its relations with Germany.

Please send instructions whether I should let Darlan come to Paris.⁶

ABETZ

⁶ Instructions not found. Darlan eventually went to Paris on Feb. 4. See vol. XII of this series.

No. 646

B13/B001326

Memorandum by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat

BERLIN, January 13, 1941.

Baron Steengracht informed me at 12:10 p. m., by direction of the Foreign Minister, that the Foreign Minister requested the State Secretary to tell the Italian Ambassador, Signor Alfieri, today or tomorrow morning the following:

The Foreign Minister has had to give up his original plan to come to Berlin at this time and it was therefore not possible for him to speak personally with Alfieri about the Italian-Russian complex of questions. Alfieri might therefore let Count Ciano know that we requested the Italians to deal with the matter in a dilatory way for the time being until the meeting which is in view, since on this occasion one wanted to discuss the entire question.¹

SIEGFRIED

¹ In a memorandum of Jan. 14 (B13/B001327) Weizsäcker recorded that he had that day carried out these instructions. Alfieri had indicated that Ciano did not want to put the Russians off any longer, but dropped the subject when Weizsäcker said that nothing further could probably be done until the meeting of Ribbentrop and Ciano which was planned for Jan. 19.

The Italian-Soviet negotiations were discussed at the Ribbentrop-Ciano conversation of Jan. 19 (cf. Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 625-628), but no German record of this conversation has been found.

No. 647

201/89148

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, January 13, 1941—10:30 p. m.

No. 52 of January 13

Received January 14—1:10 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Horia Sima has declined to go along on the journey¹ although General Antonescu yesterday gave his approval in accordance with your

¹ See document No. 631.

wish.² He gives as his reason that General Antonescu and he could not both be away from Rumania at the same time. In a conversation with me Sima intimated that he did not consider himself sufficiently prepared to appear before the Führer.

FABRICIUS

² No instruction expressing such a wish has been found. According to a published account, based on information supplied by Fabricius, the invitation to Germany for both Antonescu and Sima was received on Jan. 12. See Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu*, p. 118.

No. 648

585/242863-64

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOFIA, January 13, 1941—11:00 p. m.

SECRET

Received January 14—6:20 a. m.

No. 14 of January 13

The first conversations which I had after my return with the Foreign Minister and the Minister President today showed that the Bulgarian Government is at heart prepared to sign the Tripartite Pact quickly, although apprehensions about the military consequences that might befall (group missing) between the signing of the draft pact and the first German aid, (corrections requested from Sofia); furthermore, (clear text missing) Minister Draganov summoned here for a conference.

The Foreign Minister asked, and the Minister President later spoke in the same vein, that military discussions of the General Staffs take place as soon as possible. It seems expedient to both that these should take place, not in Bulgaria, nor in Bucharest, where indiscretions are unavoidable, but in Germany. Only in that case would secrecy be preserved. The Military Attaché,¹ too, with whom I discussed the rapprochement with Bulgaria, considers a preliminary discussion in Germany desirable, with himself and the Air Attaché² in attendance. The English Minister called on the Minister President after the latter's return from his trip to Germany in a vain attempt to learn whether the Minister President had conducted political talks in Germany. Since Rendel stated in the meantime³ that if Bulgaria joined the Axis Powers, 1) England would be forced to bombard Bulgarian cities and installations in order to render them unusable for German troops. 2) The Turks would attack Bulgaria with 100 percent certainty.

¹ Col. Hans Bruckmann.

² Lieutenant Colonel Schoenebeck.

³ The beginning of this sentence was apparently garbled in transmission.

3) Perhaps the English Navy would also enter the Black Sea in order to bombard Varna and Burgas. When the Minister President wondered what Russia would say to that, the Minister was silent.⁴

The Bulgarians have still not entirely rid themselves of the fixed notion that the Turks would intervene, although the Minister President and the Foreign Minister now admit that the German forces in Rumania would rob them of their desire for this. Both are inclined to take a more serious view of the English threat of air bombardment, principally for psychological reasons. Both insisted on the possibility that the signing of the Tripartite Pact might give the English a pretext for bombing Sofia and other cities; as a result of the lack of anti-aircraft guns, the effects of this might be disastrous even in the case of very minor operations by the enemy, and the favorable sentiment that existed in Bulgaria at present would at once be changed into the opposite even before a German troop detachment had set foot on Bulgarian soil and before German anti-aircraft artillery could be brought into action. As soon as the question was clarified as to what German protection could be provided Bulgaria during this time, the hour for adherence to the Pact would have arrived.

RICHTHOFEN

⁴ Cf. Sir George Rendel, *The Sword and the Olive: Recollections of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service 1913-1954* (London, 1957), pp. 178-179.

No. 649

585/242853-60

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. 33

BERLIN, January 13, 1941.

Today the Bulgarian Minister called on me, as announced, in order to put in an appearance before leaving for Sofia. In a speech lasting almost an hour and a half he gave me a well-prepared explanation of the military and political considerations which are influencing his Government at the moment, and which, in particular, are decisive for his Government's accession to the Tripartite Pact.

The Minister began his explanation by describing the reaction of several other governments to the German troop movements toward the Balkans:

Turkey had moved first. The Turkish Foreign Minister¹ had had repeated conversations with the Bulgarian Minister in Ankara.² Turkey had first tried to get a commitment from the Bulgarian Government not to permit any alien troops to enter Bulgarian soil. Fur-

¹ Sükrü Saracoglu.

² Sava Kirov.

thermore, the Turkish Government had aimed at obtaining a promise from the Bulgarian Government that it did not have any designs on Greece. Sofia had rejected both. The Bulgarian Government could not enter into any agreements with the Turkish Government which involved third powers or their conduct; Bulgaria was at most willing to promise that both Governments (namely, the Turkish and the Bulgarian) would remain within the framework of their present relationship. What this meant was a kind of renewal or confirmation of the Bulgarian-Turkish treaty of friendship.³

The Russian reaction to the latest development in the Balkans had been expressed on various occasions. Thus Rüstü Aras⁴ had told the Bulgarian Minister in London⁵ that Russia would assist Bulgaria or Turkey if German troops should enter or march through either country against its will. The Russian Ambassador, Maisky, had expressed himself in similar terms to the Bulgarian Minister in London. A few days ago the Russian Military Attaché in Sofia had told the War Ministry that if Bulgaria let German troops pass through her territory it would mean war between Russia and Bulgaria. Draganov added that it was rather doubtful, however, if the Military Attaché had spoken in this way on instruction of Moscow.

Very recently the Turkish Minister in Sofia again displayed to the Bulgarian Foreign Minister an interest in the concentration of German troops in Rumania. The Foreign Minister supposedly turned away the Turk by telling him that he would have to inquire elsewhere than in Bulgaria about this affair.

After the return of Minister President Filov from his trip to Germany, the British Government, through the British Minister in Sofia, made representations with him by stating the following: In case of a change in Bulgaria's policy, the latter had to expect that important Bulgarian points would be bombed by English planes, furthermore that the Turks would intervene, and finally that the English fleet would enter the Black Sea in order to shell Burgas and Varna.

In Yugoslavia, too, confidence in Bulgarian policy did not exactly seem to have increased. Pro-English feeling had grown in Yugoslavia with the recent Italian failures. As a small indication of the lack of confidence it had to be noted that the customary exchange of friendly greetings between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav military at the frontier, usual at New Year's, had not taken place this time.

After this general description of the international atmosphere, which had become worse for Bulgaria, the Minister turned to his real subject—namely, Bulgarian accession to the Tripartite Pact.

³ Concluded Oct. 25, 1925.

⁴ Turkish Ambassador in Great Britain.

⁵ Nicholas Momtchilov.

M. Draganov said that he was well aware that there was a certain ill-feeling in Berlin because this matter was being drawn out over such a long period. In fact, however, Bulgaria was already a member of the Axis and had even behaved like a silent ally as far as German military wishes were concerned. If in spite of this the Bulgarian Government had not yet joined the Tripartite Pact, there were various reasons for it. At the moment when complications occurred, Bulgaria would have to react to any military danger with lightning speed, and return a blow at once. As regards complications at the moment of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact, direct danger from Russia was probably no longer to be expected. Indirectly, however, Russia would increase her subversive activity within the country, and furthermore, in the pattern of 1913, incite Turkey to take action against Bulgaria. In questions such as the present, one had to assume the most unfavorable development. Since Bulgaria could not be one hundred percent prepared militarily in order to offer Turkey adequate resistance, she was simply dependent on German assistance which would have to arrive within 24 hours. Today preparations had not yet advanced that far.

True, Minister President Filov had been told in Salzburg* that one did not count on active military assistance by his country; nevertheless, in proper realization of the necessities, further active measures had been taken to improve the Bulgarian Army technically by deliveries of German war material. For the past week Bulgarian General Russev had been in Berlin in contact with General Thomas. However, during the conferences between Russev and the German firms involved in deliveries, it had developed that the latter were unable to fulfill entirely the promised terms of delivery. He, Draganov, did not want to go into the particulars of this matter; he only wanted to point to the necessity to press even more for acceleration of these deliveries of material.

Draganov then turned to the necessity for purely military conversations between his country and us.

In the first place, by way of a personal suggestion and keeping in mind the British threat mentioned earlier, he requested that a German specialist for air defense should come to Bulgaria at once, travel through the country and discuss with the Bulgarian authorities the necessary defense measures. This specialist should then report about these measures to Germany and see that they were carried out. Such a defense against air attacks, in Draganov's opinion, might also be important for the planned German advance through his country.

On special instruction of his Government the Minister then stated that General Staff conversations between the Bulgarian and the Ger-

* See document No. 606.

man armed forces were necessary. He asked for our consent for two Bulgarian General Staff officers to come to Germany at once in order to make the necessary arrangements.

The Minister then stated that certain preliminary political conversations were just as necessary as such preparatory measures of military security. The accession to the Tripartite Pact was after all supposed to bring his country certain advantages. One ought to gain as much clarity as possible today concerning these advantages. His Government did not want to be pedantic. But in order to make easier its decision on acceding to the Tripartite Pact it was necessary, nevertheless, to define to some extent the Bulgarian territorial aims.

At this point M. Draganov again went further afield in order to expand upon the Macedonian question. In so doing he was reasonable enough not to claim Salonika for his country, for instance, or to raise the Macedonian question as such. He had only a negative piece of advice to advance—namely, that Yugoslavia not be awarded Salonika at this time. At the big final settlement Salonika might very well in certain circumstances fall to the Yugoslavs as a price for good conduct. But if this were clearly stated as early as now, and if such a promise became known in Sofia, then this would be an intolerable burden for any Bulgarian cabinet. Thus the problem of Salonika should be left open at this time with the reservation that it would be settled at the end of the war.

But it was possible and necessary at this time to speak about the question of Thrace. In this connection, the Bulgarian territorial claims in Thrace should be defined at least approximately. It would be sufficient if the Maritsa were fixed as the eastern border, and the Struma or the mountain ridge southwest of this river as the western border.⁷

During his long speech I interrupted the Minister very little; at its close, however, I replied that he surely did not want now to take a step backwards again as against Filov's visit. Filov had said he was contented with the Reich Foreign Minister's statements and those of the Führer himself. I could not explain to the Minister the urgency of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact more eloquently than had been done on that occasion.

The Minister interjected here the remark that from the point of view of the Cabinet in Sofia these conversations of Filov's had been

⁷ In the files is a draft teletype message of Jan. 14 from Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop referring to the territorial problem raised by the Bulgarian Minister in this conversation. In this connection the State Secretary recalled his memorandum of Jan. 2 (document No. 594) and pointed out "that it would be advisable not to award to the Bulgarians immediately the glaxis on Greek soil extending in front of the fortress of Edirne to the southwest. In certain circumstances it may be possible that this territory will yet play an important part as a political gift given to the Turks." (585/242862)

conducted too much on an abstract plane. More tangible data were simply necessary for the Cabinet. He, the Minister, wanted to see to it that the Cabinet made a decision now.

Minister Draganov thus hopes to obtain the assurance that a German air force expert will come to Sofia in the near future, that the General Staffs will meet very soon to discuss the operational questions, and that the two Governments will come to an agreement in broad outline on Bulgarian war aims with respect to Greece. The Minister wants to make the date of his departure for Sofia dependent on the answer which he will receive from me in this regard. He hopes to receive an answer⁸ soon enough to be able to leave here the evening of Tuesday or Wednesday (January 14 or 15).

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.⁹

WEIZSÄCKER

⁸ See document No. 658.

⁹ A shorter memorandum of this conversation was dispatched earlier by Weizsäcker while the document printed was sent by courier on the evening of Jan. 13 (585/242851-52).

No. 650

36/25953-54

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Staff

SALZBURG, January 13, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

At the latest meeting of Kobulov, the Russian Counselor of Embassy, with my GPU informant, Kobulov stated that it was necessary to work even more cautiously now because, since the explosion at the Anhalt railway station, the Gestapo was displaying much greater activity. Kobulov gave the GPU man practical hints for disguise.

Kobulov was still insisting vehemently that the text of the Führer's speech to the young officers be obtained.¹ He also inquired again as to the whereabouts of the Latvian Minister, Kreewinsch, since he still had a score to settle with him.² The GPU man had, as a matter of fact, previously given him a wrong address. He said he was sorry and asked Kobulov if he could drive him there, for he would recognize the house again. For the first time, Kobulov let the informant drive him there. But the man did not find the house and gave the impression of being confused and abashed.

¹ See document No. 581 and footnote 2.

² In a report of Dec. 19 (36/25947) Likus had noted that Kobulov wanted to know the address of Kreewinsch, since "he still had an account to settle with this gentleman."

On the trip Kobulov said to him: "You are a very capable young man. You may be sure that you will get an important position with us when the time comes." In reply to a question from his companion as to when the day would come, Kobulov replied that the entire trend of developments was such that the Soviet Russians would one day play the leading role. Literally, "How it will come about, you will yet see."

Kobulov was interested in an article in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of January 4, and its closing sentence to the effect that the German Wehrmacht was the pace setter for the future of the continent. Kobulov stated that this wording betrayed a difference of opinion between the German military and German diplomacy, and he gave the GPU man instructions to find out how strong the alleged differences were, whether and which military men were opposed to Ribbentrop's policy and which German personages were opposed to collaboration with Russia.

Kobulov got off at Savigny Platz. The informant has the impression that there must be a secret office there in which Russian translators are working. Finally Kobulov inquired once more as to the people who call on the actress, Eyck, residing at Kurfürstendamm 47.*

L[IKUS]

* See document No. 58L.

Marginal note: "The Führer desires that the actress, Eyck, and the house on Savigny Platz be most carefully watched. I told the Führer that this was already being done.

"The Führer further wishes—I have already noted this on the last report—that all such reports be assembled in a special folder. Hewel."

No. 651

174/136506

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 49 of January 14

TOKYO, January 14, 1941—12:40 p. m.

Received January 14—10:05 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 6 of January 3¹ and your telegram No. 35 of January 6.²

The Director of the Economic Department of the Foreign Ministry promised a statement of the Japanese position on German imports of

¹This telegram announced the dispatch to Tokyo of a German rubber expert with instructions and authority to sign contracts (4684/E225061).

²A typed notation added in the Foreign Ministry identified this telegram as Ha. Pol. 125 g., the file copy of which has the date Jan. 10 (4684/E225062). It was an instruction by Wiehl requesting a report regarding Japan's position toward a German proposal relating to rubber imports from Indochina.

raw materials from Indochina probably for this week; it will say that Germany should not make any independent arrangements directly with regions belonging to the Greater Asian sphere, but should negotiate only indirectly through Japan as middleman in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact. The Foreign Minister, to whom I expressed my astonishment at the statements of the Director of the Economic Department, informed me that he had held up the draft of the drafting officer. He wanted to see that we received an accommodating answer in the matter of rubber, without the basic question of German raw material imports from the Greater Asian sphere being raised. Matsumiya is familiar with telegram No. 1120 of December 14.³

OTT

³ This instruction by Clodius (4684/E225059-60) referred to a recent German-French agreement according to which Germany and Japan were to receive 25,000 tons of rubber out of Indochina's estimated total production of 68,000 tons in 1941. Germany was now proposing that her own share should be 15,000 tons and Japan's 10,000 tons, and that Japan should commit herself to transporting to ports on the East Asian Continent the amounts earmarked for Germany, France, and Europe in general.

In telegram No. 74 of Jan. 21 (174/136515-16), Weizsäcker informed the Embassy in Japan of a decision by Hitler that 30,000 tons of rubber must be obtained from Indochina within the shortest possible time and instructed Ott to take up with the Japanese Foreign Minister personally the matter of German rubber imports from East Asia on the basis of the Tripartite Pact. Ott should specifically request Japanese aid in the shipment of 25,000 tons of rubber which Germany had bought in Indochina.

No. 652

67/47509-31

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 5.

JANUARY 16, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE RUMANIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT, GENERAL ANTONESCU, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, FIELD MARSHAL KEITEL, MINISTERS FABRICIUS AND VON KILLINGER, AND GENERAL JODL, AT THE OBERSALZBERG, ON JANUARY 14, 1941

General Antonescu began the conversation by saying that he had come in order to clarify a few questions that had arisen since his last visit to the Führer.¹ Much had changed both in Rumania and in the neighboring countries since November.

With regard to the political situation he had been able to tell the Führer on the occasion of his Berlin visit, that the whole country was behind him. Meanwhile he had achieved substantial improvements

¹ See document No. 381.

in the fields of government, finance, and economy. Thus in the past 4 months, he had, for example, cut expenditures by 7 billion lei and had not increased taxes. He would use the money saved to develop the Rumanian economy.

The Rumanian Army had been reorganized by him. In April it would be ready for mobilization and would then be equal to all situations that might arise.

Likewise, the food supplies on hand both for the people and for the Army would suffice until the new harvest. The administration, too, would be placed on an entirely new basis.

Antonescu then spoke of the Legionnaire movement, which had lost its real leaders in its long and heroic battle against the old regime. Since the change-over in Rumania, the Rumanian Government had given the Legionnaires complete freedom in regard to their organization and had merely advised them to pattern themselves after the National Socialist organizations. But the Guards had made the mistake of shutting out the elite of the country, while admitting inferior elements of the population. Another mistake was their determination to carry into effect all their revolutionary ideals at once, despite the objections voiced by General Antonescu and discreetly also by the German Legation. Here, too, he (Antonescu) had always held up to the Legionnaires the German example of a revolution by stages, for wanting to realize all one's ideals at once led not to constructive goals, but to destruction.

The first mistake of the Legion, the admission of inferior elements to its ranks, had resulted in an infiltration of Communists into the Legionnaire organization. This was in accordance with the new Bolshevik method of penetrating other countries. Communist parties were no longer being established and Communists were entering the existing successful political organizations of the country in large numbers.

The second mistake made by the Legionnaires, that of wanting to realize their revolutionary ideals at one stroke, had had the effect of creating confusion in public administration wherever the Government had permitted the Iron Guards to cooperate. This applied especially to the Ministries of Public Order and Economy.

As a result of these two fundamental mistakes, public opinion, which had been overwhelmingly behind the Legionnaire movement, had withdrawn from it completely. He (Antonescu) had long been trying to lead the Legionnaires back to the right path. He was backed by the great majority of the Rumanian people, from the peasants to the organized professions of the judiciary, the Army, the civil engineers, and the university professors. These groups had often advised him to set up a new government and regime. This, however, was not his

intention at all. He wished to retain the Legionnaire regime. He had to reorganize it, however, in order to be able to govern with it. He had also received the advice to form a military government. That, too, he had rejected and termed unnecessary, for a purely military government was, in his opinion, the last card that a country could play.

Until now he had tried persuasion with the present leaders of the Legion. Speed was imperative, however, in remedying the abuses, and he therefore intended to press for speedy reorganization of the Legion. There was no need to fight the latter, for many in its ranks realized that they were on the wrong track.

In order to attain his goal and enable the government to preserve its absolute freedom of action, there must be first of all a clear-cut division between Government and Legion. Moreover, as said before, a complete reorganization of the Legion was necessary. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to establish contact between the Legion and the National Socialist party at every possible opportunity. It was absolutely essential, however, that these relations should be conducted through him (General Antonescu) only.

He could state, in conclusion, that he himself would take charge of organizing the Legion, since it had become apparent in the past 4 months that the latter was incapable of doing this by its own efforts. The men whom he had wanted to make leaders of the Legion and to whom he had entrusted the task of reorganization, had shown certain weaknesses.

If his wishes with regard to the divisions between the Government and the Legionnaire party and with regard to the reorganization of this party by him personally should be fulfilled, he could guarantee that Rumania would in a very short time become a country capable not only of raising its economic production, but also of playing a role in international politics.

If these two desires could not be realized, he would still carry through the task, assigned to him by history, of saving his country and restoring it again, because he had received that mandate directly from the people, the great majority of whom stood behind him and relied on him. In that case, to be sure, he would have to carry out his task by expending a large portion of his energy on internal political disputes. It was his duty, however, to save his country, and he would do so with the Legion, without the Legion, or even against the Legion. He was convinced, however, that it would never be necessary to carry out this task in opposition to the Legion.

The Führer replied that one could approach Antonescu's statements under two aspects: the general historical one, based on the experience

of several millennia, and the momentary concrete one, inherent in the present situation.

From the historical point of view, it could be said on the basis of a very wide experience that every regime must be founded in the people. History showed that where this foundation was lacking and the regime relied only on force, it did not, at the very best, outlast the life of the outstanding individual by whom it was established. Dangerous tensions developed immediately on the death of its founder. This, however, was a matter that could never be dealt with theoretically, but only in practical terms.

With regard to the second aspect, which was related to the concrete situation of the moment, he had always held that specific organizations with an ideological basis were never equally suited to all countries and peoples. German-Rumanian cooperation was therefore not contingent upon the existence of a Rumanian organization identical with or adapted to the National Socialist party. If that were the prerequisite, cooperation between Germany and other countries would be completely impossible in many instances. If General Antonescu anticipated a favorable result from the severance of relations between the National Socialist party and the Legionnaire movement, that would not be a sacrifice for Germany. The Reich would, of course, be guided entirely by Rumanian wishes and had no intention whatever to interfere in Rumania's internal affairs.

The difficulties with the Legionnaires had already been mentioned by General Antonescu himself when he referred to the losses of leaders during the militant period. The National Socialist party, by the way, had always used its relations with the Legionnaire movement to point out to the leaders of the Legion the historical fact that General Antonescu was the savior of their country and that they must draw the necessary conclusions from that. The Germans had all along tried to make it clear to them how important it was that they should cooperate with the leadership of the state in absolute loyalty.

On the other questions brought up by Antonescu, he (the Führer) could not take any position because it was impossible to have the proper perspective of these matters from Germany. Whether a synthesis between Antonescu and the Legionnaire movement would produce a solution, he could not say. Failing to achieve the synthesis, however, Rumania would be heading for new crises, since the former regime, which was now in the opposition, and the Communists would take heart again, and the Legionnaires, for their part, would also be discontented, so that much energy would be wasted in settling conflicts within the country. These were things, however, that every people had to decide for itself, and in which one could not meddle

from the outside. Force of personality was what decided such matters.

Summing up, the Führer stated that he could not express an opinion on a domestic political settlement with respect to the form of the Rumanian Government; however, the relations between the National Socialist party and the Legionnaires had thus far always been employed only to influence the Legionnaires in accordance with Antonescu's statements. If these relations had failed to produce the desired results and had led, on the contrary, to a stiffening of the attitude of the Legionnaires, they would naturally have to be discontinued. Germany attached importance solely to the official relations with General Antonescu. The relations with the party were less important to Germany.

Antonescu replied that he viewed matters in exactly the same way as the Führer had just presented them. Nor had he asked for a break in relations between the National Socialist party and the Legionnaire movement, but, on the contrary, took the position that these relations had to be made even closer, in order to enable the Legion to profit by the experience of the National Socialist party. He simply attached importance to having these relations conducted through him (Antonescu) alone.

He was also in accord with the Führer regarding the value and the durability of a regime. He would remind the Führer, however, that when he undertook the task of Rumania's rehabilitation after a military career of 45 years, without the help of any party, but with the approval of the great majority of the Rumanian people, he had relied solely on his own moral strength. Since seizing power, he had not lost prestige either with the Army or the people or the professional organizations. The opposite indeed was the case. They continued to depend on him and he, without being immodest, could therefore call himself the only person in Rumania who was equal to all situations.

The Führer remarked at this point that he, too, was fully convinced of this.

Antonescu then stated that Rumania's internal difficulties of the past few months had prompted him to offer Horia Sima the leadership of the government and the country on four or five occasions. He had told him that he (Antonescu) could govern the country only by his own methods, but that he was prepared to yield his place to him. Horia Sima had declined this offer, however, and stated that he was not in a position to assume the responsibility.

In reply to a question by the Führer, Antonescu stated that Horia Sima was by profession a secondary school teacher and that he was 35 years of age. Following this, he passed on to foreign affairs.

With regard to Bulgaria he stated that all difficulties had been overcome and that implementation of the treaty of Craiova² was proceeding in normal fashion.

Relations with Yugoslavia were correct but cool, particularly since Rumania's accession to the Tripartite Pact and the admission of German troops to the country. Yugoslavia's distrust went so far that Yugoslav troops had been concentrated on the Rumanian border.

Relations with Russia were rather bad. It had been impossible to date to draw a final boundary line. The boundary demarcation commission had not been able to convene for 2 months because the Russians had dissolved their delegation. At the border itself there was constant unrest; agents were continually being sent into Rumania and Russia made matters of state out of the smallest incidents. Thus, for example, she had rejected resumption of economic relations for a very trivial reason. The most serious problem, however, was the question of the Danube delta, which Russia wanted to take over for herself. Indeed, she had large numbers of troops concentrated there now, as could be seen from the map which he could show to the Führer afterwards. Involved were seven army corps and five armored divisions with a corresponding number of planes, together with preparations for river crossings.

As regards Hungary, political questions remained open. No progress had been made in the relations with that country since he had been in Berlin last October [*November*]. Only 10 days ago he had proposed resumption of the discussions, but there had been no answer. The situation caused difficulties in Rumania because the people expelled from the part of Transylvania that had fallen to Hungary had expected that they would be able to return to their homes again as a result of Antonescu's visit to Berlin. He (Antonescu) would ask the Führer in these circumstances to do whatever was in his power so that relations between Rumania and Hungary could be developed on the basis proposed at the time in Berlin.

Rumania maintained very correct relations with the United States. Antonescu's impression from numerous conversations with the American Minister in Bucharest³ was that the United States would be very glad if she could find a basis for an understanding in the general conflict and that her attitude was rather anti-Russian.

Relations with Great Britain were all but broken off. Recently the English Minister⁴ had told him (Antonescu) in Bucharest that if German troops crossed the Danube, there was a possibility that the British Air Force would attack the Rumanian oil regions. Antonescu

² See document No. 29, footnote 2.

³ Franklin M. Gunther.

⁴ Rex W. A. Leeper.

added some observations about the particularly exposed position of Constanța and the petroleum stock stored there for Germany. He then emphasized that Rumania, for her part, was prepared to use every means at her command, including the assistance of her Army, to help the Axis Powers bring the present conflict to a speedy and victorious conclusion. He had already made the same statement on the occasion of his last visit to Berlin. In contrast to the situation at that time, the conflict was now approaching the borders of Rumania, while, on the other hand, Russia's attitude was obscure, to say the least. For these reasons it was necessary for him to organize the Army more rapidly so that it would be ready in an emergency. He could make available for the common cause 30 divisions of well-equipped soldiers of good fighting caliber.

Being equally convinced of the necessity of preventing the English from gaining a foothold in the Balkan Peninsula and of enabling the Italians to hold their position, he had immediately given his consent when Germany wanted to send troops to Rumania. He had to call attention, however, to Rumania's difficult supply situation and to ask that arrangements be made for supplying the troops from Germany.

The Führer replied that he had had an investigation made of the cases in question and had found that the demands for food were due to an unusual situation resulting from shipping delays of 4 or 5 days on two occasions. These delays were caused by the snowfalls of the past few days. In principle, the plans absolutely provided that troops would not draw supplies from Rumania. In any case, the soldiers had nothing in their hands to make purchases with, either in Rumania or in Bulgaria.

In the further course of the conversation, Antonescu stated that he had brought with him exact data on the composition of the Army, production, and the economy, as well as on social conditions in Rumania, which he would submit to the Führer, and he finally handed him also an aide-mémoire which he said contained his statements in condensed form.⁵

Referring to the foreign policy part of Antonescu's statements, the Führer replied that he had been very happy about the Rumanian-Bulgarian accord. In view of the state of mind that still prevailed in Yugoslavia, it was not surprising to him that Rumanian-Yugoslav relations were correct and cool, although there were elements even there that saw things differently.

With regard to Hungary, Germany was in a peculiar position. In order to save the Balkans for Europe, which was naturally also in

⁵ See document No. 661, enclosure.

the interest of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, Germany was assembling a large Army. England would act quite differently and calmly leave the whole Balkans to the Russians. The Army that had been mustered to save the Balkans was far from its home country and Germany was therefore dependent on the voluntary consent of the countries in which the Army was assembled, as well as that of the countries through which it had to be transported. Antonescu should just put himself in Germany's position. She was so greatly dependent on the consent of these countries that it was impossible for her to exert any pressure upon Hungary. Nor was the German minority in Hungary faring very well; but it was an achievement that it had been possible to make Hungary understand that facilitating the transit of the German troops was also in her own interest. These circumstances accounted for the somewhat dilatory manner in which the suggestions made at the time for the settlement of the Hungarian-Rumanian disputes were put into effect.

In so far as Russia was concerned, Molotov had on the occasion of his visit to Berlin immediately raised the question of the meaning of the German-Italian guarantee and had tried to find out whether this guarantee was valid also in the case of a Rumanian-Russian conflict. Russia had, moreover, expressed the intention of giving Bulgaria a guarantee and to station troops there.⁶ It was evident from this that Russian ambitions were not satisfied, and this fact had to be taken into account. On the other hand, he would repeat to Antonescu the assurance that the German signature under the declaration of guarantee was an absolutely binding obligation for the Reich and would, if necessary, be honored not only at the Russo-Rumanian border, but also at other borders. He (the Führer) was therefore grateful that Antonescu had reorganized the Army so quickly. Germany did not demand that this Army be used to further German interests, but if Germany should have to take a strong position for Rumania's sake, she would of course be glad to find the Rumanian Army at her side. He stressed, however, that Germany was facing any conceivable coalition with complete calm and with a feeling of absolute superiority.

At this point the conversation was interrupted and the Führer took tea with Antonescu and the other members of his staff. Antonescu turned the conversation once more to the domestic political situation in Rumania and expressed his disappointment with Horia Sima.

The Führer stated that, in his opinion, it was impossible to govern in Rumania against the Iron Guard. In the long run, however, it would be necessary for Antonescu to become also the leader of the

⁶ See documents Nos. 373, 391, and 415.

Iron Guard, and it would be best if this wish were presented to Antonescu from the ranks of the Iron Guard itself. However that might be, he (the Führer) was convinced that Antonescu was the only man capable of guiding the destinies of Rumania.

After tea, the conversation about the internal political situation in Rumania was continued along the foregoing lines. Special emphasis was placed on the role that Minister von Killinger⁷ was playing as [he was] one of the oldest comrades-in-arms of the Führer and a good judge of the difficulties facing a party taking over the government of a country after a revolution.

SCHMIDT

⁷ See document No. 513.

No. 653

4055/E065578-79

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, January 14, 1941.

Dir. Ha. Pol. No. 2.

Today a Belgian delegation, including among others the secretaries general of the Ministries of Economics and Agriculture as well as the head of the Belgian Winter Relief (the former Belgian Minister of Economics, Reymans) and the president of the Belgian Red Cross, arrived in Berlin for the purpose, first of all, of negotiating with us about imports of grain from Germany and possibly also from Russia. Our interest, too, requires that Belgium be supplied with grain, since we have placed large armament orders in Belgium; filling them would be jeopardized if the Belgian workers should have insufficient food.

Belgium's grain requirements until the next harvest amount to 250,000 to 300,000 tons. The Reichsmarschall has approved giving Belgium up to 240,000 tons of grain from German supplies, if necessary.

This grant affects the interests of the Foreign Ministry, since other countries, too, e. g., Spain, have made urgent requests for grain, which it may perhaps be necessary for political reasons to satisfy but which cannot be met if considerable quantities should be delivered to Belgium.

Care has been taken that the Belgians will not receive any promise of German deliveries without the prior approval of the Foreign Minister.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for instructions.¹

¹ Not found.

I intend to tell the Belgians first of all to negotiate with Moscow; in this connection it will have to be made certain that any Russian grain deliveries to Belgium will not be at the expense of our grain imports from Russia. In case earlier deliveries of German grain to Belgium should be found absolutely necessary for reasons of armament production, they would have to be on a considerably smaller scale than that approved by the Reichsmarchall. I would approve such deliveries only after receiving renewed instructions.²

WIEHL

²In a memorandum of Jan. 16, Sabath recorded the discussions held with the Belgian delegation by State Secretary Backe of the Reich Ministry of Food, General Hanneken of the Reich Ministry of Economics, and by Ministerialdirektor Gramsch of the Four Year Plan (1085/317249-50). There is also a memorandum of Jan. 25 by Sabath about a conference dealing with the Belgian-Russian grain transaction held at the Foreign Ministry and in which a member of the Belgian delegation also participated (1085/317243-44). See, further, vol. XII of this series.

No. 654

1002/306238;
1002/306240-44

Minister Hemmen to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl

WIESBADEN, January 14, 1941.

DEAR WIEHL: I am sending you enclosed for your confidential information a copy of the letter I sent the Foreign Minister yesterday regarding the personal communication from General Huntziger to me. This letter was taken to Salzburg yesterday evening by special courier. I received a telephone call from Assessor Ritzert¹ in Salzburg to the effect that the letter was submitted to the Foreign Minister today, but that he had to go to Berchtesgaden in the afternoon to see the Führer and would probably give me an answer tomorrow. Herr Ritzert was asked to stay in Salzburg until tomorrow.

I will wait for this answer here and will telephone you tomorrow to let you know the further developments.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

HEMMEN

[Enclosure]

PERSONAL

JANUARY 13, 1941.

DEAR HERR REICH MINISTER: The Chairman of the French delegation, M. de Boisanger, informed me of the following yesterday evening after his return from Vichy:

¹Heinz Ritzert, an official on the Special Commission for Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission.

General Huntziger, referring to our good personal relations and our cooperation, always based on mutual trust, had instructed him to tell me that he had wished to speak to me in person. Since, however, this was impossible given the present closing [of the line of demarcation] ² (it is known that General Huntziger refused to ask that an exception be made for him on the occasion of the funeral of his father-in-law), he was making use of de Boisanger's good offices to make the following very personal communication to me, with the request that I pass it on likewise personally to the Reich Foreign Minister; for he was very anxious that the Foreign Minister should have a correct understanding of the present situation in Vichy:

He, Huntziger, did not believe that the difficulties between the Marshal and Laval could ever again be overcome. Pétain had lost all faith in Laval and could not bring himself to appoint him again. Huntziger did not therefore believe that it would be in the German and French interest ³ to force the situation.

He, Huntziger, wished to enlist our confidence in him in assuring us that he would continue to cooperate exactly as in the past. This was likewise the case with Darlan and Flandin. Therefore, the present Government was not opposed to further cooperation; rather, all three would work for continued cooperation between the two Governments as in the past.

Huntziger was therefore sorry that the conversations had been broken off politically and that practically relations did not exist any longer. Huntziger was making use of my good offices so that the Foreign Minister would learn about the actual situation in Vichy through these personal channels, and he asked for the forwarding of his urgent request that the discussions to clarify the situation be resumed in the near future.

Boisanger himself told me also the following:

The démarche which General Doyen made with General von Stülpnagel on January 6 of this year ⁴ had been drawn up by Huntziger as Chairman of the Commission for Armistice matters in Vichy; subsequently, Flandin too had explicitly agreed to it. It had originally been intended as a parallel action for informing the two German chairmen in Wiesbaden, ⁵ in order to state to the Armistice Commission too that there was to be no change in the desire for cooperation in connection with the work of the Armistice Commission, in spite of the present political difficulties in Vichy, especially the removal of Laval, which had been decided exclusively for reasons of domestic policy.

² See document No. 530.

³ The following phrase is in French in the original.

⁴ See document No. 609 and footnote 2.

⁵ i.e., Stülpnagel and Hemmen.

Owing to my absence from Wiesbaden he (de Boisanger) had not been able to make the *démarche* with me at the same time. Personally, however, he wanted to add for the sake of explanation:

1. That Doyen had not been instructed to undertake it [the *démarche*] with the German Government in the name of the French Government, even though two Ministers had participated in it;

2. That the coincidence in time of Laval's dismissal with the return of the mortal remains of the Duke of Reichstadt was to be attributed to ineptitude on the part of the French (on the part of the Marshal himself, he hinted discreetly), but that actually there was no causal connection between the two actions.

While carrying out this mission, Herr Reich Minister, which is in the political sphere, where I have no responsibility—because General Huntziger appealed to our good personal relations—I would like to take the liberty of pointing to the opportunities for reviving the work of my delegation that might arise from this appeal to me by Huntziger.

As you know, all efforts of the two Commissions here to relax the line of demarcation and instead to institute German commissioners and controls at the outer borders of France met with failure in the week before Christmas, owing to the resistance of the military circles in Vichy.⁶ Likewise the efforts to bring the French airplane industry of the unoccupied area under our control (order of the Reichsmarschall)⁷ came to a standstill. Moreover, the negotiations regarding the delivery of colonial products and regarding the extensive cession of French shares in petroleum and mining enterprises in the Balkans and North Africa are being handled in a dilatory manner under the influence of the political circles. Finally, the French have begun with the removal of the Belgian gold,⁸ to be sure, but there still remains the transports of the remaining 200 tons—500 million reichsmarks—from the interior of Africa to Marseilles; and I am especially anxious to obtain renewed confirmation now, after Laval's departure, of the promise he gave me previously in the presence of General Huntziger and Minister of Finance Bouthillier, to the effect that after the Belgian gold the French gold (800 tons—2 billion reichsmarks)

⁶ See document No. 574.

⁷ A memorandum of Dec. 19 by Wiehl summarizing reports by Hemmen and statements by Stülpnagel with respect to the difficulties in German-French economic negotiations contains this passage: "General Stülpnagel stated, moreover, that he had received a teletype from the Reichsmarschall urgently requesting that the 60 percent French Government participation in those aircraft plants which are to fill armament orders for us in unoccupied France be transferred to the German Government at once, since otherwise these orders could not be executed with the necessary speed." (368/207447-49)

⁸ See document No. 264 and footnote 3.

will also be brought back from Africa to the vaults of the Bank of France in the mother country.⁹

If, Herr Reich Minister, you should now in connection with the desire expressed by Huntziger himself authorize me to get in touch with General Huntziger, possibly in Paris, then the latter would have an opportunity to give proof of his own willingness and that of the two Ministers, Darlan and Flandin, i.e., the proposed directorate, to cooperate actively with us in the manner envisaged by us.

All the questions enumerated are of the greatest importance, some of them of fundamental importance for the development of future German-French relations. Perhaps a really generous solution of all these questions might also form a bridge toward the solution of the present political conflicts.

I see that the hopes which I place in such a conversation with Huntziger are not entirely unfounded from the fact that yesterday evening—and certainly not without prior consultation with Huntziger—de Boisanger informed me that he was willing, in the matter of occupation costs, to acknowledge officially the necessity of transfer, i.e., payment in gold or foreign exchange assets, of a part of the occupation costs, namely the so-called *external* occupation costs, although there should be simultaneously a reduction in the installments. This would be a step of decisive importance which I have long been striving for, and which opens up for us far-reaching possibilities in return for which a reduction of the occupation costs would be well worthwhile.

Therefore, Herr Reich Minister, I would consider a conversation with General Huntziger at the present time an extraordinarily favorable opportunity for advancing the work of my delegation in the most important matters, without our having to deviate from our over-all line of policy toward France; perhaps even, it would not be without a favorable effect on this policy.

I respectfully request your decision.¹⁰

Permit me, Herr Reich Minister, to express my sincere sympathy in regard to your personal loss,¹¹ and at the same time to add the assurance of my faithful and loyal cooperation in the great tasks of the new year which rest in your hands.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

HEMMEN
Minister

⁹ See document No. 264.

¹⁰ No reply found. See, however, document No. 689.

¹¹ Apparently a reference to the death of the Foreign Minister's father, Richard Ribbentrop, on Jan. 1, 1941.

No. 655

359/204219-20

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

Moscow, January 14, 1941.

A 135

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Tass communiqué concerning rumors of an alleged move of German troops into Bulgaria.

With reference to my telegram No. 80 of January 13.¹

The Tass communiqué published in *Izvestia* and *Pravda* of January 13, concerning rumors of an alleged entry of German troops into Bulgaria, has created a considerable sensation in diplomatic circles here.

This kind of communiqué, which the Soviet Government has for some one and a half years made a peculiar auxiliary instrument of its foreign policy, is not to my knowledge used in this form in other countries. The Soviet Government uses it mostly for certain negative statements or to announce an interest of some kind. The wording of these communiqués is something unusually sharp, and in the case of some of them, experts on conditions here suspect the hand of Stalin. They are calculated to have an effect on the foreign governments and undoubtedly just as much on the Soviet and non-Soviet public. This point of view presumably explains the clarity of their wording, which leaves nothing to be desired and which goes far beyond what one is accustomed to finding in official communiqués. When the first communiqués of this kind were published a year and a half ago, they were a political sensation of the first order. I should like, for example, to call to mind the communiqués that were published at the time the Anglo-French delegation was here.² Meanwhile,

¹ This telegram transmitted the Tass communiqué of Jan. 13 which is the subject of the document printed (585/242849-50). The English text of this communiqué, as published in *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, selected and edited by Jane Degras (London, 1953), vol. III, p. 482, is as follows:

"Referring to certain Bulgarian circles as the source of information, the foreign press is circulating a report that a certain number of German troops have already been dispatched to Bulgaria, that the dispatch of German troops to Bulgaria is continuing with the knowledge and consent of the USSR, and that the USSR replied to an inquiry of the Bulgarian Government concerning the passage of German troops to Bulgaria by giving its consent.

"Tass is authorized to state that:

"1. If German troops really are present in Bulgaria and if the further dispatch of German troops to Bulgaria really is taking place, then all this occurred and is occurring without the knowledge or consent of the USSR, since the German side never raised with the USSR the question of the presence in or dispatch of German troops to Bulgaria.

"2. In particular, the Bulgarian Government never approached the USSR with an inquiry regarding the passage of German troops to Bulgaria and consequently could not have received any reply from the USSR."

² See vol. VI of this series, document No. 764.

through frequent repetition, the communiqués have lost something of their sensational character.

Since one is in general used to seeing such exceedingly sharp and distinct positions being taken, the present communiqué has evoked strong comment particularly in the diplomatic corps here, for it was generally noted that any stand against Germany or Bulgaria was avoided. Nor is there any kind of commitment for the future, that is, in the event that German troops should enter Bulgaria.

The fact that no position whatever is taken has been noted particularly in circles of the Bulgarian Legation. Another very good authority on the Soviet press, in talking with a member of the Embassy, even went so far as to suspect a prior understanding between the German and Soviet Governments on the text of the communiqué. Even if no generalizations should be made from such an extreme attitude, the opinion was uniformly expressed even in circles that are usually quite pro-English, and which on every occasion claim to see rifts in German-Soviet collaboration, that this communiqué was not directed against Germany.

This reception which was given to the communiqué in interested circles here was confirmed by the publication of the DNB report³ in the Soviet press today, which repeated the Tass communiqué.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

³ The opening passages of this DNB report were as follows:

"In view of the numerous rumors and most contradictory confirmations and conjectures regarding an alleged move of German troops into Bulgaria, which were published in the last few days by the world press and foreign news agencies, it is stated in Berlin political circles that there was absolutely nothing astonishing in the fact that the official Russian agency, Tass, considered it its duty to publish a denial in connection with these reports." The remainder of the DNB report then summarized the main points of the Tass communiqué. (359/204223)

No. 656

585/242867-70

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, January 15, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 95 g. Rs.

The Foreign Minister telephoned me as follows at 12:15 a. m. today:

1. The draft telegram to Sofia¹ must be adapted to the change in the situation caused by Draganov's démarche² and telegram No. 14 from Richthofen.³ In the main, however, it can remain as it is.

¹ The reference is to a draft (839/281640-45) of telegram No. 37 of Jan. 15 to Sofia, printed as document No. 660.

² See document No. 649.

³ Document No. 648.

2. We can state our consent to the geographical demand by the following wording "Access to the Aegean Sea approximately in the size of the area of the Maritsa and Struma estuaries."

In this connection a certain locality plays a special part. We should not go into this point in our first reply. If this point should be insisted upon by Bulgaria, we can tell her that Germany will not be petty regarding this point, either. This was not a *conditio sine qua non*. But we must choose the wording in such a way that we will later "in certain circumstances" have a free hand on this point, too. When I remarked that I was not sufficiently informed about that, the Foreign Minister said that Rintelen was exactly informed. It was a question of a small town near Edirne.⁴

No answer is to be given to Draganov's hints about Macedonia.

3. Tripartite Pact.

Bulgaria must state at once that she is fully prepared to accede to the Tripartite Pact at a time to be set by us.

In so doing Bulgaria must leave it to us to determine the moment when the accession will formally take place in Berlin.

We, on the other hand, now obligate ourselves not to set this time until we are able to assume the responsibility toward Bulgaria that there is no longer any danger for Bulgaria because of the contingents of troops ready for commitment.

4. We could consent to the General Staff conferences being held in Germany rather than in Sofia. That should be discussed in detail with the OKW and Field Marshal List. Possibly in Vienna. The German armed forces Attachés in Sofia should attend. The questions of the Luftwaffe (antiaircraft guns) to be discussed with General von Richthofen⁵ could perhaps also be handled at the same time and the same place. But these discussions would have to begin at once, at the latest in 2 or 3 days.

5. Regarding the threats expressed by the English Minister in Sofia, it should be stated casually that these threats have not made the slightest impression on us. England was now trying to bluff with such threats everywhere and the Bulgarian Government should not permit itself to be influenced by that.

Regarding the further practical handling of the matter, the following applies:

The two actions are to be handled separately; that is, first, the conversation between the State Secretary and Draganov, then the Richthofen *démarche*.

1. The State Secretary is to summon the Bulgarian Minister this morning.⁶

The Bulgarian Minister must leave this evening for Sofia.

⁴ See documents Nos. 594 and 649, footnote 7.

⁵ Wolfgang Freiherr von Richthofen, Commander of the VIII Air Corps.

⁶ See document No. 658.

2. The statement to the Bulgarian Minister
 - a) concerning the territorial question
 - b) concerning the Tripartite Pact
 is to be formulated in writing in advance and submitted to the Foreign Minister.⁷
3. The telegram to Richthofen is to be brought into line and possibly also read to the Reich Foreign Minister.⁸
4. The statements under 2 a and 2 b to the Bulgarian Minister are to be communicated to Herr von Richthofen "for his information." Richthofen is not to make use of this in Sofia, however. That is to be reserved to the Bulgarian Minister, Draganov.

R[ITTER]

⁷ In the files is a "text of the statement to be made orally by State Secretary von Weizsäcker to Minister Draganov this morning;" it is dated Jan. 15. This statement contains corrections in Weizsäcker's handwriting; a paragraph discussing the reply to be given to Draganov if he should bring up the question of the territorial delimitation of the promised outlet to the Aegean, bears the notation "canceled." (585/242871-72)

⁸ Document No. 660 and footnote 4.

No. 657

247/164252

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI

BERLIN, January 15, 1941.

Pol. VI 48.

This morning Minister Luther communicated the following information by telephone from Salzburg:

The Foreign Minister had decided that Minister Renthe-Fink should be authorized to make the following statement to the Danish Government:¹

1. A Knutzen cabinet was agreeable to us.
2. We attached decisive importance to the fact that Scavenius should continue to occupy an important post in the new cabinet.
3. We agreed that Stauning should take over the Foreign Ministry in the Knutzen cabinet.
4. The new Government must offer a guarantee that all anti-German agitation will be suppressed and that an adjustment to German policy will take place. The Government is not to proceed against the Danish National Socialists, but is to recognize this as a party with equal rights and rank.

Minister Luther will forward the foregoing at once by teletype.²

GRUNDHERR

¹ Renthe-Fink had reported on various current proposals for changes in the Danish Cabinet in his telegrams No. 28 of Jan. 7, 1941 (247/164246) and No. 56 of Jan. 13 (247/164251/2). In the first of these the name of M. Knutzen, director of the Danish state railways, had been mentioned as a possible Minister President.

² Renthe-Fink reported in telegram No. 114 of Jan. 24 a conversation with Minister President Stauning who stated that he had changed his plans and intended to continue as head of the Government (247/164264-65).

No. 658

585/242865-66

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, January 15, 1941.

St.S. No. 43

This noon I received the Bulgarian Minister in order to give him the answers to the questions he asked me on January 13¹ in time for his departure for Sofia, which is scheduled for this evening. I told him the following, without keeping to any paper, however:

I said that I welcomed the fact that Draganov now intended to report to his Government and settle the question of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact that had dragged on so long. Regarding Bulgaria's territorial objectives I could inform him that the German Government agreed in principle to Bulgaria's receiving the outlet to the Aegean Sea that she desired, approximately between the Maritsa and the Struma estuaries.

As for the General Staff discussions, the Minister would probably find upon his arrival in Sofia that an agreement had been made between his Government and Minister von Richthofen. We were willing to comply with the Bulgarian request, i.e., to hold discussions between members of Field Marshal List's General Staff and Bulgarian General Staff officers somewhere, presumably in Austria. A Bulgarian expert in air warfare could also come to this place in order to confer with a German expert. As regards Draganov's suggestion of a trip to Bulgaria by the German air warfare expert, further particulars could be arranged on the spot on this occasion. As already stated, however, this would already be arranged in the meantime by our Legation in Sofia.

Regarding the Tripartite Pact, I told Draganov the following, with emphasis: Bulgaria must now state her full readiness to sign the Tripartite Pact in Berlin at a time to be set by us. Germany would thus determine the time herself, but taking into account that we would then be in a position to cope with all eventualities.

The Minister did not take any notes on my statements, but repeated them orally; from this I could gather that he had understood me correctly. Pointing to the map, Draganov showed an inclination to take up the territorial question in somewhat greater detail. He said that the future Bulgarian-Turkish border was defined by the Maritsa, to be sure, but that in the west the course of the Struma river should perhaps not be taken as the precise border. But I led him easily back to my previous statement and repeated that we agreed in principle that Bulgaria's outlet to the Aegean Sea should

¹ See document No. 649.

lie approximately between the two estuaries of the Maritsa and Struma. Draganov thereupon interpreted this to mean that the Bulgarian border was not to be narrowed down and reduced in a wedge shape toward the north starting from these two points at the river estuaries. For the rest he acquiesced in my formula.

The Minister is evidently leaving with the good intention of now settling the question of the Tripartite Pact in Sofia.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister (by teletype).

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 659

265/172564-65

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, January 15, 1941—4:45 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received Berlin, January 15—5:40 p. m.

No. 17 of January 15 from the Special Train

No. 25 of January 15

from the Foreign Ministry Sent January 15—5:25 p. m. [sic].

Security classification: For Chief of Mission.

With reference to your telegram No. 25 of January 10.¹

1. For your personal information, I would mention first that the troop transports to the Balkans which are now taking place will in a short time have reached such proportions that we shall be in a position to meet all eventualities with absolute assurance. It is an English bluff when word is spread that, in case German troops move through Bulgaria, Turkey is determined to intervene with armed force. The English are spreading this, incidentally, through all possible channels. Even under very heavy pressure from the English, Turkey will not shut her eyes to a realization of the obvious fact that the German forces which will be in readiness in the Balkans very shortly will be strong enough, if necessary, to sweep the Turkish troops out of Thrace with lightning speed. A Russian action against us because of our impending operations in the Balkans, now as in the past, is to be considered out of the question.

2. For guidance in your conversations with the Turks, please continue in the immediate future, until about January 25, to maintain a certain reserve and to refrain, if possible, from entering into questions relating to our troop transports. From that date on, however, please let your language be very clear and sharp if the Turkish Government should make inquiry, and stress the fact that the deci-

¹ Document No. 634.

sions taken by the Reich Government for the protection of the Balkans against any threat from England are unalterable, and that we have taken all military measures to cope with any eventuality with lightning-like effect. Turkey must fully realize, moreover, that if she should commit the folly of touching off a general war in the Near East by measures of one kind or another, she would presumably call other forces into play as well and thus bring on the grave danger of a total destruction of the Turkish state.

3. On the other hand, you are authorized to state very definitely to the Turkish Government that, now as in the past, we have no intention of attacking Turkish territory, and that we furthermore want to respect absolutely the Turkish frontier in Thrace. Both, of course, hold only so long as Turkey, for her part, abstains from giving any armed assistance to Greece or England. Please, however, refrain from offering a formal treaty to this effect. Please, do not mention, either, the idea of the establishment of a buffer zone along the Turkish border.

4. Otherwise, as a general instruction: If the Turkish Government should desire any more extensive assurances from us, or ask questions, or if it should make any other official statements with regard to its attitude, please reply merely that you will report to the Reich Government concerning the matter.

RIBBENTROP

No. 660

839/281633-39

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 37

BERLIN, January 15, 1941.
e. o. Pol. I M 65 g. Rs.

With reference to your telegram No. 14 of January 13.¹

On instruction of the Foreign Minister I request that you again call at once on the Bulgarian Minister President or Foreign Minister or both.

I. Please reply that the Reich Government agrees to the immediate start of conversations between the two General Staffs. It also agrees to having the conversations take place in any case somewhere else besides Sofia. It was our intention to propose Vienna for this. In the meantime, however, Field Marshal List has left Vienna for Rumania. To be sure, he does not intend to carry on the conversations himself with the Bulgarian General Staff officers, but intends to have

¹ Document No. 648.

them conducted by his Chief of Staff. But he attaches great importance to being able to be kept informed about the General Staff conversations. Therefore it would be best if the discussions were to take place at Field Marshal List's Army Headquarters in Rumania. It is not yet certain today at which place in Rumania the Army Headquarters will be. It will certainly not be in Bucharest, but in some smaller place. As soon as the place has been determined, we will ask the officers of the Bulgarian General Staff to go there, possibly in civilian clothes, in order to avoid attracting any unnecessary attention.

In the meantime the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin has expressed the wish that a German expert in air defense come to Bulgaria at once, travel through the country and discuss with the Bulgarian authorities the necessary defense measures. The Reich Government has agreed to this, too, and the officer of the Luftwaffe to be considered for this assignment could perhaps first participate in the General Staff conferences and then make the suggested inspection trip through Bulgaria. In this case it would be useful if the officer of the Bulgarian Air Force who had responsibility for this inspection trip were also a member of the delegation of Bulgarian officers. The German Military Attaché and Air Attaché in Sofia are also to take part in these conferences.

It is important for the General Staff conversations to begin at once, at the latest within 2 or 3 days. We shall let this be followed immediately by definitive information about the place and time. The Bulgarian Government should in the meantime give instructions for the Bulgarian General Staff officers to be ready to leave at once.

II. Regarding the military questions, the following is passed on mainly for your own information, but also in order that suitable use may be made of it. The exact time for the start of the move through Bulgaria is not yet fixed. It depends on the one hand on the conclusion of the concentration of German troops along the southern border of Rumania; on the other hand, on the weather situation, in particular the ice conditions on the Danube. In any case it is the intention of the Reich Government to begin as soon as possible the movement through [Bulgaria]. Presumably that will be possible in about 2 to 3 weeks. However, the move through [Bulgaria] will not be started until sufficient forces have been assembled along the southern border of Rumania to ensure the military protection of Bulgaria in every respect. In all, the strength of the German troops is provided for in such a way that they will be more than equal to all tasks and eventualities, from whatever quarter they may arise.

As is known, the Bulgarian Army will not participate actively in the military operation in any way. It will be carried out exclusively by German troops.

The German troops are bringing all their provisions, supplies of fuel, etc., with them, so that Bulgaria's own supplies will not be affected by the move through [Bulgaria].

III. As for the threat by the English Minister, you may state that these threats do not make the slightest impression on us. England is trying in her desperate and hopeless situation to bluff the whole world and place it under pressure. The United States is seconding England in this bluff. The Bulgarian Government should not permit itself to be influenced by this.

IV. The following is communicated solely for your own information. The Bulgarian Minister here made a *démarche* on January 13 with the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry,² in which he first presented the view of the Bulgarian Government regarding accession to the Tripartite Pact and secondly stressed the necessity for defining now to some extent Bulgarian territorial aims. Oral statements which ought to satisfy Bulgaria were made today on these two points to the Bulgarian Minister by the State Secretary.³ In accordance with instructions of the Bulgarian Government the Bulgarian Minister will depart for Sofia this evening. He will thus himself transmit the statements on these two points to his Government. In the event that during your *démarche* the Bulgarians should speak to you about these two points, limit yourself to saying that these two questions have been brought up in the meantime in Berlin by the Bulgarian Minister, and that to your knowledge the Bulgarian Minister is already on his way to Sofia with the statement of reply by the Reich Government.⁴ The contents of today's oral statements made by the State Secretary to the Bulgarian Minister will be wired to you subsequently for your own information.⁵

V. According to your telegram No. 14 of January 13 and according to the statements of the Bulgarian Minister here we assume it to be certain that the Bulgarian Government will not make any more difficulties of any sort in the important matters, namely accession to the Tripartite Pact and movement of German troops through Bulgaria. If, contrary to expectation, you should nevertheless still encounter fundamental difficulties in your conversations, or even res-

² See document No. 649.

³ See document No. 658.

⁴ In an unsigned memorandum of Jan. 15 (839/281648), Ritter recorded: "The Foreign Minister told me today, when I read him the telegraphic instructions to Sofia, that in 2 or 3 days, after the Bulgarian Minister had had his first conversations with the Bulgarian Government in Sofia, Richthofen should receive telegraphic instructions to bestir himself again regarding the further handling of the Tripartite Pact. In this way the possibility of the Bulgarian Minister's remaining for some time in Sofia without carrying this question forward should be averted."

Instructions along these lines have not been found, but see document No. 693.

⁵ Telegram No. 41 of Jan. 15 (839/281646-47) conveyed this information.

ervations of a formal kind, such as that Cabinet meetings must still take place or perhaps even that parliamentary committees must be asked, then please push aside decidedly any such tactical attempts at the very outset, and leave no room for doubt that the decision of the Reich Government is unalterably fixed and that the necessary military orders have already been issued. I hope that this resolute attitude and these statements will suffice to eliminate any and all inhibitions on the Bulgarian side. If in spite of this, contrary to expectation, reservations of any sort should be maintained, then I request that you at once on your own initiative point out with the greatest emphasis the grave consequences that may result from this directly for Bulgaria and for her present and future political position.⁶

RITTER

⁶After he had carried out the instructions contained in this telegram, Richthofen reported that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister was "visibly relieved" by the communication which had been made to him (telegram No. 30 of Jan. 16: 585/242878).

No. 661

201/89179-89

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

FUSCHL, January 15, 1941.

On the basis of the telephone conversation with the State Secretary, the Foreign Minister sends enclosed a copy of the memorandum from General Antonescu,¹ with the request that you be good enough to discuss it with the gentlemen concerned: Ritter, Clodius, Woermann, v. Rintelen, and Wiehl.²

With regard to relations with the Legion, the Foreign Minister asks that you do nothing, since Minister v. Killinger has been instructed directly by the Foreign Minister and will, for his part, attend to what is necessary.

Herewith respectfully submitted to State Secretary v. Weizsäcker.

STEENGRACHT

¹ See document No. 652.

² On Jan. 16 Clodius recorded a telephone conversation of the previous evening with Ribbentrop. The Foreign Minister had informed him about the Antonescu memorandum and instructed him to tell the State Secretary that the memorandum should be handled in such a way "that the German offices involved receive only an extract of the part which concerns them."

According to this memorandum of Clodius, Ribbentrop spoke also about the discussions between Hitler and Antonescu on economic matters, particularly the financial questions arising from the stationing of German troops in Rumania. The Foreign Minister also emphasized to Clodius that the most important point in the Rumanian memorandum was the expansion of Rumania's war industry. "The Foreign Minister stated that the Führer himself and he attached particular importance to the absolutely smooth working of German-Rumanian cooperation in all military and economic fields." (201/89191-93)

[Enclosure]

I. Rumania today represents for Germany a strategic center and a base for political supremacy in eastern and southeastern Europe.

In the development of diplomatic and military events in the spring, Rumania may become a center of military operations.

Rumania, which is conscious of her role and her geographic situation as well as of the need for upholding the social order in Europe, is prepared at the same time to cooperate closely with Germany.

It was for this purpose that Rumania acceded to the Tripartite Pact. She permitted the entry of German troops into her territory, thus giving effective reality to her adherence to the Pact.

Rumania is prepared to take military action at Germany's side should this become necessary.

In the event of a possible operation toward the south, Rumania must form the left defensive flank.

Should Russia attack, Rumania wishes to participate in the military operation with all her forces.

Rumania can be put in a position of being effectively at war even if she does not participate in an initial military operation, since she is exposed to the air attacks of enemy forces.

II. Since Rumania, in view of the entry and presence of German troops—who are preparing new operations—has abandoned her neutrality, she is prepared to assume the risk of a defensive or offensive operation.

Rumania is marching at Germany's side not only for reasons of present military and social security, but because she is absolutely aware of an organic unity with Germany for the future.

III. For the defensive or offensive operation, Rumania has to make preparations in four fields:

- a) the military,
- b) the economic,
- c) the diplomatic, and
- d) the political.

a) *In the military field*, Rumania must prepare her forces without delay.

b) *In the economic field*, Rumania has to know the strength of the German troops and the length of their stay in the country in order to be able to organize transportation facilities accordingly and to introduce a war economy.

Rumania must increase the productive capacity of her metallurgical industry at once, and for this she needs raw materials (steel) from Germany.

With a view to increasing transport capacity, Rumania needs material (machinery) to facilitate reconstruction and the expansion of the railroad network in order thus to be able to meet the needs of urgent military operations.

Rumania must know in due time when she must be prepared to organize food rationing.

c) *In the diplomatic field*, Rumania must have an exchange of information on the situation in the Balkans, particularly with regard to the attitude of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.

Rumania needs the help of Germany in the Danubian question for the preservation of the status quo.

The attempts of Russia to exert pressure, and the causing of incidents on the river and frontier prove that Russia is trying to ascertain Rumania's power of resistance.

In order to be able to resist these attempts, Rumania therefore must have a firm position that is supported by Germany.

d) *In the political field*, Rumania must finally put her house in order externally and internally.

Determined to join in any operation at Germany's side, Rumania is convinced that in the future reconstruction of Europe she will meet with complete understanding on the part of Germany and the great Führer—the brilliant architect.

For Rumania will remain for Germany—tomorrow just as today—the focal point of security and activity for the entire area of Europe.

While being linked to Germany by the Danube, Rumania desires also to have a direct overland connection in the north and northwest.

As an agrarian country with industrial potentialities, Rumania's economy supplements that of Germany; in this way, German industry is in a position to establish easily centers for industrial production and marketing for the entire area.

Being in possession of the nearest petroleum reserves and forming a strategic center with respect to the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Straits, and Russia, Rumania will continue to mean in the future what she means today, in terms of Germany's security in the eastern European sector.

As an ethnically autonomous island within a Slavic mass, Rumania, because of her racial structure and proximity to the Slavic world, represents a pillar of ethnic resistance and could form a system for regional hegemony or for penetration.

It is for these reasons that General Antonescu is convinced that Germany—in the new Europe—will recognize Rumania's natural role of regional hegemony.

General Antonescu believes that the commencement of a Rumanian operation will be supported with great enthusiasm and valor by the

Rumanian people since they know that Rumania will play this future role of a vanguard and a factor of security for Germany and civilization.

In the light of his convictions and responsibility, General Antonescu considers it a matter of honor to direct the attention of the great Führer to this role of Rumania in the future.

In the field of internal politics Rumania needs tranquillity and order so that she may carry out a defensive or offensive operation and face the future with certainty.

General Antonescu is prepared to assume full responsibility on condition that he may exercise complete and sole authority with respect to the domestic political order.

Convinced of the role that belongs to the Legion, General Antonescu has based his regime solely and exclusively on the Legion, by excluding all other political groups. Although he is an army corps General, he has officially donned the green shirt to signalize his closeness to the Legion.

He is working for the Legion and for the national Legionnaire revolution.

Untrained elements or elements sent in by the Communists were responsible for the Legion's loss in popularity, for the economic chaos that ensued, and for the growing threat of anarchy, while Communist propaganda is growing apace.

If the General should found a new party today, the whole country would follow him.

He does not, however, wish to have a conventional party with forces in a static equilibrium, but he wants the reforming dynamism of a national revolution.

In order to be able to achieve this, he must exercise in reality the powers granted him by the constitutional decree of September: the leadership of the national Legionnaire regime and sole authority.

He must undertake the reorganization of the state with the help of serious-minded elements, without interference, and organize the Legion, by restoring to it, through a new outlook and organization, the lost elite that succumbed in the struggle.

To be able to achieve this, he would have to exercise complete control in the Government—just as Codreanu would have—in order to replace the untrained, radical, or anarchistic elements of the Legion with other elements of order.

He would have to be the only one to maintain contact abroad.

In the future the National Socialist party of Germany must operate only through General Antonescu so that certain Legionnaire elements will not get the idea that in resorting to direct action they would find assistance for any kind of a revolution or internal revolt.

The Legion must go along with the General in his efforts to rebuild the state and reorganize the Legion, abandoning its mystical basis and secret activities and adopting a serious program [carried on] by followers who have been prepared for this.

On this condition General Antonescu is willing to assume full responsibility.

No. 662

1126/321821

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, January 15, 1941.

The Foreign Minister has agreed that Herr Benzler should depart for Field Marshal List's¹ as soon as possible. If Benzler returns here again in a few days for a temporary stay, he is to report to the Foreign Minister.

Benzler is responsible to the Foreign Minister for seeing that all matters of foreign policy in connection with Operation *Marita* remain firmly in the hands of the Foreign Ministry.

R[ITTER]

¹ See document No. 556.

No. 663

201/89195

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

BUCHAREST, January 16, 1941—1:30 a. m.

No. 73 of January 15

Received January 16—6:45 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.¹

Today Major Troitsch informed me that the Armament Staff here had received the order from the OKW to see that the Malaxa works remain in a position to operate and that nothing happens to Malaxa himself.² My question whether a possible removal of Malaxa from his position of economic power would result in an intervention was answered in the affirmative. Thereupon I explained to Major Troitsch that the person of Malaxa, because of his past, and recently on the grounds of his traditional way of gaining influence with the Guard, was a political factor. General Antonescu, in particular, accused Malaxa of political intrigues and intended to take steps against him. It could not be the business of the Armament Staff to bring influence to bear on a matter of domestic policy. The domestic

¹ A marginal notation recorded instructions of Ribbentrop that this telegram was not to receive distribution in the Foreign Ministry.

² See document No. 623.

policy of this country was, from the point of view of Berlin, foreign policy, and therefore exclusively the affair of the Reich Foreign Minister. I therefore had to request that I be informed, if necessary, about what the Armament Staff was planning in the matter of Malaxa. I pointed out in particular that there was no prospect of Malaxa's prevailing against the authority of the Leader of the State, who enjoys the Führer's confidence; such an attempt would of necessity lead to unpleasantness with the highest Reich authorities concerned, to whom General Antonescu had access at all times. Major Troitsch promised not to take any steps without informing me.³

NEUBACHER
FABRICIUS

³Replying on Jan. 23 in telegram No. 43 from the Special Train, Ribbentrop stated that it was not the business of German military offices in Rumania to interfere directly in Rumanian economic matters or related personnel questions. They should direct any requests and suggestions to the German Legation rather than take steps of their own with the Rumanian authorities. The Legation was to uphold this position absolutely (201/89252).

No. 664

201/89219-20

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 92

BERLIN, January 16, 1941—8:10 p. m.
e. o. Pol. I M 106 g. Rs.

Through the Wehrmacht mission in Bucharest the OKW has sent a strictly confidential communication to Field Marshal List for General Antonescu concerning the total strength of the German troops that are passing through Rumania.

In case General Hansen has not already shown you this communication, please have him inform you about its content.

RITTER

[Enclosure]

General Antonescu has requested information on the strength of the German troops to be transferred to Rumania, so that he may have an idea about the economic measures to be taken.

The Führer consents to Field Marshal List's answering, in case this question is asked, that the strength of the German troops arriving in the course of the next weeks will amount to more than 500,000 men. The troops arriving first, however, would leave Rumania before arrival of the last divisions, so that the strength of the German troops present in Rumania at one and the same time will be considerably less than 500,000 men.

No. 665

285/172567-69

The Embassy in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, January 16, 1941—8:19 p. m.

No. 43 of January 16

Received January 17—6:45 a. m.

For the OKH Attaché Group.

The conversation with the Greek Military Attaché,¹ which took place at his request, resulted in the following:

1. A categorical denial that there are English ground forces on Greek soil except Crete, where there is, however, only a base. English aid is being rendered solely by war material, the navy and air force, and incidentally not by far to the extent promised previously. Aid on the ground is being refused, since it could never be very extensive, but on the other hand would immediately call Germany into action. American aid is also so far not yet effective. Thirty planes have been promised but not yet delivered.

2. Greece is trying to give the war a local character so far as possible. The objective is merely to achieve security against any further Italian threat. The Elbasani area provides such security. The terrain to the north of it makes large aggressive operations impossible for both sides. Italy can hardly deploy more than 10 divisions there. Against them Greek forces would suffice if the conflict remained limited to Albania. One would therefore try to reach the Elbasani area, but then not proceed any further.

3. A categorical denial that the Greeks are taking part in the Turkish-English General Staff conversations now taking place here.² He is also not in touch with English officers. There is strong English distrust of the Greeks.

4. Great anxiety among the Greeks and Turks concerning German troop reinforcements in Rumania; this is being exploited by England. There is great uncertainty about German objectives, however. They are reckoning with the following possibilities:

a. Occupation of the plateau of Sofia in order to be able to strike at once in case of English intervention or to exert pressure on Yugoslavia so that she will permit Italy to move forces through that country against Greece.

b. A vigorous drive via Sofia through the Struma valley toward Salonika, in order to help the Italians directly or in reply to English intervention.

¹ Col. E. Apokoritis.

² Ankara telegram No. 33 of Jan. 13 had reported that representatives of British ground, air, and naval forces had arrived in Ankara for conversations which were also attended by the Turkish President and a "Greek personage" (265/172560).

c. Attack on Greece and Turkey as security against English intervention or to secure the flank in a German advance from Rumania toward Russia if it should come to that, or to create a base for a later operation against Egypt and the Persian Gulf.

5. The Greeks and Turks are confronted with difficult decisions. If the German drive remains confined to the occupation of the plateau of Sofia or [to a move] through the Struma valley toward Salonika and does not touch the area east of the Nestos river, Turkish intervention is doubtful; it is probable, on the other hand, if the drive is also in the direction of the Turkish border areas. For Turkey it would be a proof that Germany is pursuing more far-reaching objectives than merely to support Italy, and that she at least wants to reach the Straits and to defeat Turkey, as she is an English ally. In this case an immediate Turkish offensive against Bulgaria must be expected in order to expand the protective area around the Straits; however, I do not believe in this.

6. The prospects of such an offensive and the extent and possibility of English assistance are evaluated skeptically. The feeling of the leading Turkish circles with respect to the case of German entry into Bulgaria is divided. Whereas some of them consider that this already involves a threat to Turkey and the necessity of entering the war, others want to wait and see whether there will actually be an attack on Turkey. The situation of Greece under Italian attack is basically different from that of Turkey. With respect to Italy Greece had been confronted with the question of losing her national existence. Turkey does not need to fear such a thing from Germany.

7. Uncertainty about Russia's attitude. This is strengthened by renewed reports of Russian troop reinforcement in the Caucasus. Turkey does not want to believe this, however, and is of the opinion that she does not need to fear anything from Russia.

8. He hinted that in case of German intervention there was the possibility of a Greek withdrawal to the Peloponnesus; on the other hand, however, there was also the repeatedly expressed hope that there would not be any English intervention in the Balkans, as well as stress on Turkey's responsibility if she should enter the war, even in case of a threat from Bulgaria. The Greek success is felt to be a miracle, but it is not overestimated in any way whatever.

9. The Military Attaché is close to the former Aide-de-Camp to the King and to both Metaxas and the Chief of the General Staff, Papagos. He is certainly not pro-English. He gave personal reasons as the occasion for the conversation, but it is improbable that it occurred without the knowledge of higher authorities.

10. I request strictly confidential treatment with respect to the source, so that it may not dry up.

11. The Air Attaché requests that the Luftwaffe be informed.

ROHDE
PAPEN

No. 666

84/62352-53

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, January 16, 1941.

With reference to the memorandum of Ambassador Dieckhoff of January 9,¹ regarding the handling of the United States of America, and with reference to telegraphic report No. 74 of January 11, from Washington.²

1. Both documents proceed from the assumption that the official military participation of the United States on the side of England cannot be considered as being absolutely out of the question. If one were sure of the opposite, the political and journalistic handling of the United States would indeed hardly be a problem.

2. An official participation of America in the war would in a certain situation have a very important effect on the course of the war, that is, when the resistance of the British Isles collapses. This would be the great hour for the American isolationists. If America should be a belligerent at that time, however, this group would be paralyzed. It could no longer see to it that America would sacrifice England and withdraw from the affair with her own gains.

3. Propagandistically, our aim must in any case be to widen the rift between the isolationists and the interventionists within the United States as well as on the American Continent on the whole. Best suited to this purpose, in my opinion, is the regular coverage of pertinent facts and events, from which the American reader can draw his own conclusions. We have only few possibilities, to be sure, for providing direct, instructive information. Perhaps still more material than heretofore can be circulated via Madrid, via Lisbon, and via Tokyo.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 633.

² This telegram contained speculations about the time necessary to develop America's military potential and about the way in which the United States might carry on the struggle following a military collapse in the British Isles (84/62345-51).

No. 667

6804/237348-54

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

THE HAGUE, January 16, 1941.

Received January 20.

Ha. Pol. 590.

Subject: The situation in the occupied Netherlands territories.

When the Reich Commissar took office,¹ the war in the Netherlands had just been over for 2 weeks and the population, which had experienced a severe shock through the lightning-like course of the war, lived in a mood of liberation from a nightmare. As a result of the exemplary conduct of the German forces it felt something like affection for Germany, and hardly a thought was given to the future. The predominant feeling was that one had escaped from a great danger and that soon everything would be as it had been before.

The population was further confirmed in this conviction by the swift conclusion of the military operations; this may have produced the general view that there would be peace by the fall of 1940 at the latest and that afterwards some sort of friendly settlement would be arranged with Germany. Very gradually the population began to think matters over and under the impact of influences that were now brought to bear, the mood became more reflective and deteriorated. The special interests which would have something to lose in a National Socialist Netherlands associated with Germany, recovered gradually from their initial shock and began everywhere to sow the seeds of mischief. Foremost among these groups were the Catholic and Calvinist Churches, the Jews with the Freemasons, business and university circles. All of these groups will have to relinquish a great deal of their present influence on the Government and the people if the Netherlands should become National Socialist. Important assistance to these special interests came from the radio station "Oranje" which has meanwhile been established in England. It was at first a purely Dutch station, but it increasingly has come under English direction, and today is purely English-Jewish in its methods, although it is broadcasting in the Dutch language. People are eagerly listening to this radio station. This cannot be prevented although it is forbidden and subject to punishment.

The fact that the invasion of England did not come off in the autumn and the war did not end put the notion in the heads of the

¹ On May 29, 1940. See vol. ix of this series, document No. 334.

Dutch that Germany is incapable of bringing England to her knees and that the war, if it does not end in favor of England, will in any event end in a draw. The natural result was a hardening of the attitude toward Germany and the German authorities in the Netherlands. This attitude further hardened as a result of the setbacks of the Italians in Africa and Greece, and the Dutch appear to be firmly convinced that England will liberate them and that they can now afford to take all sorts of liberties with the Germans. Perhaps one should not take this Dutch view too much amiss for one likes to believe what one wishes to believe. But there is certainly no doubt that the moment England is finally beaten, 80 percent of the population will turn toward the east and seek salvation in cooperation with Germany, not from conviction but from opportunism.

Consequently, a number of unpleasant incidents have occurred in the past weeks, which were dealt with by both the Wehrmacht and the Reich Commissar's office with the appropriate severity. The SD uncovered last November a secret organization operating under the name of "the Gueux."² This movement was organized by members of the so-called intelligentsia and its object was to carry out acts of sabotage. The investigations appear to have been completed to the point where court-martial proceedings will presumably be held by next February, which will surely produce several death sentences. The matter is receiving the special attention of the Reich Commissar, who is keeping in touch with the Führer's headquarters on the subject. Further developments must now be awaited.

Other factors contributing to the worsening of the atmosphere are of course all the measures that had to be introduced as war necessities, e.g., blackouts, restrictions regarding street traffic and the sale of alcohol, introduction of rationing cards for coal, clothing, and food, substantial curtailment of the use of motor vehicles, and the like. All these are things to which the Dutch are quite unaccustomed, and in the light of their wholly liberalistic views, they represent severe encroachments upon their personal liberties. In the distribution of food, the poor organization of distribution in the Netherlands is noticeable as well as the lack of any comprehension of the principle that the interest of the community comes before the interest of the individual [*Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz*]. As a result practically everything can be had on the black market at high prices but of course only by those who are economically well off. People in general, who cannot take advantage of the black market and are under the impression that the poor distribution of food is the fault of the Germans, grumble.

² Nickname given to the Dutch patriots of the 16th century who opposed Spanish rule.

By and large the Netherlands authorities show willingness to cooperate, and where this is lacking, results are obtained by the promptings of the Reich Commissar.

Introduction of the anti-Jewish laws has provoked considerable unrest, owing to the strong influences of the Jews on the intellectual life of the Netherlands, especially in the university cities of Leiden and Delft, where students under the leadership of Jewish students and probably as a result of behind-the-scenes manipulations of the Jewish professors affected, allowed themselves to be carried away to stage demonstrations, which resulted in the closing of the two universities.³

Largely responsible for the worsening of the atmosphere and the hardening of the situation are also the unsettled domestic political conditions in the Netherlands. As in the case of Germany before the [National Socialist] seizure of power, a countless number of party groupings and splinters were active in the Netherlands. The dominant factor was the Church. The National Socialist groups in the Netherlands were subjected to severe persecution prior to the entry of the Germans because, as had been the case in Germany, they were felt to be a threat to the existing arbitrary rule of the big parties. Following the entry of the Germans, the political struggles at first stopped and the parties stepped into the background. The Social Democratic and Communist parties were disbanded by the Reich Commissar. The NSB itself, however, was very weak and hardly had an internal organization so that it was unable to assume leadership right away. The NSB was and still is categorically rejected by 90 percent of the Dutch people on the grounds that it is not a Dutch party and that it had betrayed the Netherlands to Germany. This accusation of treason is still being peddled by the opposition and so remains a serious liability to the NSB. The German authorities initially had to take the position that developments in the domestic political life of the Netherlands must be allowed to run their course so that one might see whether anything of practical value would evolve. Efforts toward a concentration became discernible here and there after last August, and gradually five groups crystallized, namely,

NSB (Mussert movement),
NSNAP (Kruyt),
NSDAP (van Rappard).

These three groups are National Socialist. But all of them are very weak as regards membership and in great need of assistance from the German authorities. The Kruyt movement disbanded of its own ac-

³ The two universities had been closed on Nov. 29, 1940.

cord some 2 weeks ago, and recommended that its members join either of the two other National Socialist groups.

In addition to these three National Socialist groups, there were formed

the National Front (headed by Arnold Meyer), and
the "Unie" (headed by L. Einthoven, J. Linthorst-
Homan, and J. C. de Quay).

Both groups have some basically sound ideas but cannot bring about a solution of practical value to Germany. The National Front, too, can by now be regarded as finished since it has a membership of only about 6,000 and shows no growth. Meyer himself is a very controversial figure in Dutch circles and unusable from the German standpoint.

The "Unie," which had shown promising beginnings and which looked as if it could have developed into something useful, attracted a large membership but the leadership has not managed to maintain discipline among its members and so a larger portion of the "Unie" membership, which came from practically all the old parties, now has a purely reactionary outlook and acts accordingly. It is safe to describe the "Unie" today as the reservoir of all elements opposed to Germany. There is bitter enmity between NSB and "Unie" which occasionally has to be kept in check by Germany.

Mr. Colyn,⁴ who originally was going to join the "Unie," is now working on his own account and without party, by capitalizing everywhere on his considerable influence. He is too shrewd to leave himself exposed, but it is safe to say that he is hostile in attitude and action.

The royal house enjoys great esteem, even though in wide circles this esteem is expressed merely as a means for displaying an anti-German attitude.

If the past months were necessary to give the Dutch an opportunity to clarify matters regarding their domestic politics, such clarification has now been accomplished to the extent that only the NSB appears to be useful to the Germans. The NSB will have to demonstrate in the coming months whether it has the sinew and strength to assume the domestic political leadership in the Netherlands, that is, whether it is capable on its own of making the Netherlands National Socialist. The NSB is today still immature and in the growing stage, and also has to overcome internal quarrels; moreover, there is no relationship of outright friendship between Mussert and Rost van Tonningen. But it looks as if, with appropriate German assistance, something might eventually come of that movement. That will take some patience and the path will have to be smoothed step by step. The fact

⁴ Presumably Hendrikus Colijn, former Dutch Minister President and leader of the Anti-Revolutionary party.

that Mussert and his two deputies were received by the Führer⁵ has demonstrated to large segments of the Dutch people that Germany is betting on the NSB. Membership: 60,000 to 70,000.

The general sentiment and the attitude of the Dutch population is not likely to show any improvement in the coming weeks. The Dutch will, however, become less stiff toward Germany as soon as new victories are scored in the war. The whole effort in the occupied Netherlands territories must naturally be organized on a long-range basis.

The economic life is continuing in its normal course, but a shortage of raw materials begins to be felt. Unemployment has substantially decreased. There are at present about 190,000 unemployed in the Netherlands. Some 100,000 Dutch workers are working in Germany.

BENE

⁵Newspapers in the occupied Netherlands had reported that Mussert, Rost van Tonningen, and Seyss-Inquart had conferred with Hitler in October 1940. According to a publication by the Netherlands State Institute of War Documentation, Mussert was received by Hitler on Sept. 23. See Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, *Het Proces Mussert* ('s-Gravenhage, 1948), pp. 317-319. No record of such a conference has been found in German Foreign Ministry files.

No. 668

104/112984-86

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

SECRET

BERLIN, January 17, 1941.

St.S. Nr. 52

By wire by fastest means to the Foreign Minister (teletype or telephone).

The Russian Ambassador called on me this afternoon. On the basis of a memorandum which he then left with me, he stated the following:

"According to all reports, German troops in great numbers are concentrated in Rumania and are now prepared to march into Bulgaria, having as their goal the occupation of Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits. There can be no doubt that England will try to forestall the operations of German troops, to occupy the Straits, to start military operations against Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, and turn Bulgaria into a theater of military operations. The Soviet Government has stated repeatedly to the German Government that it considers the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as the security zone of the USSR and that it cannot be indifferent to events which threaten the security interests of the USSR. In view of all this the

Soviet Government regards it as its duty to give warning that it will consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the USSR."

End of the remarks of the Ambassador.

Without taking this statement too seriously, in talking to Dekanozov, I replied that I should not like to answer him of my own accord at once, but would prefer first to inform the Reich Foreign Minister of his communication.

I then added that I should like to ask two more questions in order to understand the contents of his communication correctly, namely—

(a) From whom had the Soviet Government received the report that German troops concentrated in Rumania were aiming at the occupation of Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits? Dekanozov replied that his Government's sources were not known to him. He referred to the fact that—as stated previously—all reports are to this effect, to which I replied—without intending to anticipate a later German statement—that it was correct that in no circumstances would we allow England to gain a foothold in Greece and that we were observing this matter closely. Besides, this was certainly nothing new for the Soviet Government, because this had already been stated to M. Molotov some time ago.

(b) Why did the Soviet Government take it for granted that England, forestalling the operations of the German troops, would attempt to occupy the Straits? In this matter, too, Dekanozov referred only to his original communication. His Government did not know that anything of the sort would occur; however, it had no doubt regarding commensurate English measures if the condition mentioned, namely, the advance of German troops on Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits, should materialize.

In conclusion, I again reserved the right to a reply to the démarche.

After I had made a few more remarks concerning German air successes against the British fleet in the Mediterranean, the Ambassador took his leave, hoping for an early reply.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹In a subsequent communication sent to Ribbentrop the next day, Jan. 18 (104/112987), Weizsäcker stressed that Dekanozov both orally and in writing included the area of *the Straits* along with Bulgaria and Greece as the objectives of the German troop movements; that he did not suggest that Turkey might act on her own initiative but referred rather to British initiative; and in no way did Dekanozov indicate the weight which the Soviet Government wished to give to its démarche.

No. 669

104/112981-82

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, January 17, 1941—8:46 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received January 17—11:40 p. m.

No. 122 of January 17

For the Foreign Minister.

1. Molotov asked me to call on him this afternoon and stated the following:

Since the most important economic questions in the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union had been settled by the recently concluded treaties,¹ it would now be in order to turn to purely political issues again. The Soviet Government was astonished that it had not yet received from Germany any answer to its statement of position of November 25 (cf. telegraphic report No. 2562 of November 25)² concerning the issues raised during the Berlin discussions, and he would appreciate it if I would bring that fact to the attention of the Government of the German Reich with the remark that the Soviet Government was counting on an early German reply.

I replied to M. Molotov that there was not the slightest cause for any surprise, since questions were involved which must first be thoroughly discussed with Italy and Japan. As soon as these deliberations had been concluded the Soviet Government would certainly be informed of our position with regard to its reply.

2. Molotov then brought the conversation around to the Balkans and in that connection stated word for word as follows:

“According to all reports available here, German troops in great numbers were concentrated in Rumania and ready to march into Bulgaria with the aim of occupying Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits. There was no doubt that England would try to forestall the operations of the German troops, to occupy the Straits, to open military operations against Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, and turn Bulgaria into a theater of war. The Soviet Government had repeatedly called the attention of the Government of the German Reich to the fact that it considered the territory of Bulgaria and the Straits as a security zone of the USSR and that it could therefore not remain indifferent in the face of events which menaced the security interests of the USSR. Consequently the Soviet Government regarded it as its duty to call attention to the fact that it would consider the appear-

¹ See document No. 640.

² Document No. 404.

ance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the USSR."

Molotov added that he had instructed Dekanozov to make an identical démarche in Berlin.³ In my reply I confined myself to the statements prescribed by telegraphic instructions No. 36 of January 7⁴ and No. 57 of January 10.⁵

SCHULENBURG

³ See document No. 668.

⁴ Document No. 616.

⁵ Document No. 636.

No. 670

813/276505-06

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 54

BERLIN, January 18, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador approached me today on the subject of the attitude of the Government of Indochina. He left with me a note which read as follows:

"The Government of French Indochina has lately shown by various indications that it is seeking to establish relations with England and the United States. For instance, it is now about to buy airplanes in the United States; in the question of maritime traffic between France and French Indochina, it has requested England's consent; in the boundary conflict with Thailand,¹ it is seeking Anglo-American mediation, etc. This attitude is in conflict with the French Government's recognition of Japan's hegemony in the Greater Far Eastern sphere. The Government of French Indochina is striving to establish close relations with the nations which are unfriendly or hostile to Germany; this endeavor has detrimental effects on Japan and in particular on the relations between the German Reich and the Vichy Government. The Japanese Government has therefore earnestly called the attention of the French Government to this attitude of the Government of French Indochina."

I thanked Kurusu for the information and told him that personally I had had no evidence so far that the attitude of the Government of Indochina had detrimentally affected the relations between the Reich and the Vichy Government. It was, however, entirely in our interest that order and calm in Indochina should be assured and preserved as far as possible.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 484.

² On Jan. 20, Ott reported in telegram No. 85 (216/147648-49) about having been told by the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister that on Jan. 17 the British Minister in Bangkok had made a specific proposal of mediation between Thailand and Indochina. The Japanese Government, determined not to permit a British diplomatic success in this area, had thereupon made an arbitration proposal of its own and was now asking the German Government to use its influence with the Vichy Government in this matter.

On Jan. 23, Weizsäcker recorded that Ambassador Kurusu, referring to the conversation between Ott and the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister, had also requested that Germany bring her influence to bear in Vichy to induce the French Government to accept the Japanese proposal (216/147651).

No. 671

221/149051

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, January 19, 1941.

No. 179 of January 19

Received January 19—1:20 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

General Huntziger asked Benoist-Méchin in a conversation on January 15 to communicate the following to the German Embassy in Paris in his name:

1. From the side of de Gaulle rumors of a provocative nature were being spread and false telegrams sent which, in the expectation that they would become known to German authorities, attempted to cast doubt on the good faith of the French Government and Army in the question of North Africa. He, Huntziger, had an absolutely loyal attitude toward Germany and he could also vouch for the loyal attitude of General Weygand and Noguès.²

2. The question of the natives in the North African colonies presented psychological difficulties, since the Arabs respected primarily the power and might of the Europeans who ruled them. The German Control Commission departing to Casablanca on the basis of the agreement in Wiesbaden³ could injure the French position of power psychologically, since there was the danger that the English whispered propaganda among the Moroccan tribes would exaggerate the numbers involved in the 40-man Control Commission and represent it as a German occupation.

3. The strategic situation in Libya confronted neighboring Tunis with a number of technical and legal problems which required joint study.

4. General Huntziger requested an opportunity to discuss these matters with General Warlimont or another military figure.

ARETZ

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded on Jan. 19, 1:55 a. m. to Minister Hewel, Berghof, by closed circuit secret teletype."

² French Resident General in Morocco.

³ On Jan. 14, the subcommission for armaments of the German Armistice Commission had informed the French delegation that the German Armistice Commission was setting up at Casablanca a commission for the control of armaments and petroleum in North Africa and that an advance party would leave for Casablanca on Jan. 21 (Welck telegram of Mar. 25: 77/58232). According to a memorandum of Jan. 15 by Counselor Dumont, the decision to establish this commission had been taken by Hitler at the suggestion of Keitel (1004/307011). Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. III, pp. 448, 475-480.

No. 672

F19/213-32

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

FUSCHL, January 21, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE DUCE, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT CIANO AT THE BERGHOF, IN THE AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 19, 1941¹

The Führer began the conversation with the statement that he had just received a telegram according to which General Huntziger proposed again taking up contact with the German General, Warlimont.² At the same time he gave assurance that France was entirely loyal to the idea of cooperation with Germany, and that Pétain as well as Weygand and Noguès would not deviate from this attitude. He (Huntziger) added, however, that it would be detrimental to the authority of France in North Africa, as far as the Moors and Arabs were concerned, if an alien commission of 40 members—whose dispatch was intended by the Armistice Commission—should appear. He therefore requested that this commission not be dispatched.

The Führer added to this communication that he personally did not trust the French and that even Weygand's and Pétain's declarations of loyalty could not change anything in this attitude. At the same time he did not believe that Pétain, Weygand, and the other French personages already had any definite plan. He believed that they were merely hesitating to place themselves too much on the side of the Axis Powers. Of Weygand, the son of a Hapsburg, however, he believed that he, like all renegades, cherished a deep hatred for Germany. He (the Führer) was absolutely certain that Weygand was keeping Pétain under pressure.

With respect to the difficulties with the French Government which had arisen recently, the Führer remarked that the fact that the Paris press took a violent stand against the Government was evidently gradually becoming somewhat uncomfortable for the Cabinet members, since after all it was a question of three-fifths of all France whose opinion was reflected in this press.

Laval, of course, was a democrat. But one would advise him from the German side not to go to Vichy, since he would perhaps be murdered there. Germany could do nothing further about all of these matters, since the danger existed that North Africa might defect

¹ For Ciano's record of this meeting see *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 628-629. The meeting was preceded by a discussion between Ciano and Ribbentrop. See document No. 646, footnote 1.

² See document No. 671.

from the mother country as soon as she took any energetic steps against the French Government.

In reply to a question interjected by the Duce in a somewhat doubtful tone concerning Laval's political usefulness, the Führer said that Laval would collaborate loyally with Germany if only out of hatred for his opponents in the present French Government. If one threatened the life of a democrat he would always react violently, and Laval would certainly not be very quick to forget the circumstances of his arrest.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer informed the Duce in broad outline about his conversation with Admiral Darlan.³ He stated that he had told the latter that he considered it perfidious infamy for the French to assert that Laval had had the intention to carry out a plot together with the Führer in order to arrest Pétain during his presence in Paris. He (the Führer) had pointed out to Darlan that the French had time and again on their own initiative asked to be able to transfer their Government to Versailles or to Paris. The Führer had always refused these requests in order not to let the impression arise that the French Government was working under German pressure in the occupied area. Darlan had become very subdued in the further course of the conversation. The Führer had treated him extremely coolly and had pointed out to him most emphatically the manifold efforts which he had undertaken even before the present war in regard to cooperation with France.

The Führer then informed the Duce that Marshal Pétain had sent him a letter through Darlan in which, among other things, Pétain stated that he had to part from Laval "for reasons of domestic policy and in the interest of holding the French empire together."⁴ He (the Führer) had told Darlan at once that he interpreted this last reason to mean that General Weygand had made an attempt to blackmail Pétain in order to get him to unload Laval.

In this connection the Führer again came to speak of Huntziger's request not to send the commission in question to Casablanca. It was clear that the French did not want Germans and Italians to look at their cards in North Africa. This did not mean, however, that the French wanted to undertake anything on their own initiative. If things went well for Germany they would certainly continue with their collaboration. But if matters went badly they would call the attention of Germany's enemies to the disloyal attitude they had adopted in various points in regard to German-French collaboration. Darlan had declared, to be sure, that he was absolutely against the English, but one had to regard Huntziger as one of the cleverest and wiliest representatives of the French. Owing

³ See document No. 564.

⁴ See document No. 566.

to his Alsatian origin he was also in a certain respect a renegade. In any case the French Government was playing with divided roles. Some were acting like honest men, whereas the others were disloyal. According to the outcome of the conflict they would then play either the disloyal or the loyal card.

The French had expressed a whole series of wishes, the fulfillment of which he (the Führer) had refused, however. Thus, for example, they had among other things asked for the preferential release from captivity of the colonial officers so as to be able to use them in North Africa. Since, however, the object of using them was doubtful under the conditions which existed there, this wish, too, had been refused.

It was doubtful whether the old Marshal Pétain saw through the maneuvers of his Cabinet members. It was a matter of common experience that generals often possessed an unlimited incapacity in political matters. Besides this, Pétain was 86 years old, and he (the Führer) knew how very much old Field Marshal Hindenburg⁵ had been under the influence of his surroundings and how difficult it had been to get to him. In addition, the hands of the Vichy Government were tied. It was entirely under the influence of the circle around the *Action Française*, the priests, and the reaction, i.e., the same group that had collected around Franco, too.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected here that according to the latest reports even Herriot⁶ had arrived at Vichy again.

In this connection the Führer came to speak of the North African problem. He termed it difficult. If Gibraltar were in the hands of the Axis this would extraordinarily ease the situation relative to North Africa and would put an end to the whole de Gaulle magic, especially if two German divisions could be transferred to Spanish Morocco and a few air bases could be set up there. Unfortunately Franco had entirely failed to recognize this situation. He was only an average officer who, because of the accident of circumstance, had been pushed into the position of Chief of State. He was not a sovereign but a subaltern in temperament. Furthermore, he had not been the first in the Spanish Revolution, but had simply had the most luck, since he possessed a favorable initial position in North Africa and could throw his troops across to the motherland with the aid of German transport planes.

Here, too, it was again evident that generals were often quite incapable in political matters. There was a great difference between military courage and political courage. If a general received an order he showed the greatest courage in carrying it out. Without orders he often did not dare to act in political matters. Recognition of his own lack of productivity seemed, moreover, to have brought

⁵ President of Germany, 1925-1934.

⁶ Édouard Herriot, President of French Chamber of Deputies, 1936-1942.

Franco entirely into the hands of the Catholic Church. Its influence made itself increasingly felt in present-day Spain. Franco himself did not have faith in himself and one could almost feel sorry for him. At the conversation which he had with the Führer in Hendaye⁷ he had frequently agreed to German proposals and then had been interrupted by Serrano Suñer, who had upset everything once more.

In connection with the importance of Gibraltar, whereby all problems in North Africa and in France could be solved at once, the Führer also mentioned that he had to keep a certain number of troops in readiness in southwest France on account of the Portuguese, in case the English should attempt a landing in Portugal. He did not believe the English would undertake this action to be sure, but wanted to be prepared for all eventualities.

Following this the Führer came to speak of the military questions in the Mediterranean area. He mentioned losses of the German Luftwaffe (Colonel Harlinghausen, who wanted to drive directly with his machines against the Suez Canal without fighter protection and had thereby encountered violent resistance and had not returned). In these operations the Ju. 88 had been used as a fast machine, whereas it would perhaps be more favorable, considering bomb-carrying capacity, if one could employ the He. 111 or the Fw. 200.

The Duce remarked on this that in recent days owing to cooperation of the two air forces it was possible to deliver a number of hard blows against the English in the Mediterranean, and pointed to reports about the embarkation of English troops from Alexandria to be used in the area of Salonika.

The Führer replied to this that he would intervene immediately if the English disembarked troops in Salonika. Then the German Luftwaffe would destroy the transport ships. On the basis of the experiences in the Norwegian campaign Germany could proceed here very effectively. He (the Führer) also wanted to use in the Mediterranean the tactics tested over England, namely of bombarding the same objects time and again from the air. He intended to impede the English in this way in the Mediterranean to such an extent that they would finally evacuate the whole area and pull out their fleet.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer came to speak of the position of Japan, whose freedom of action was restricted by Russia, just as Germany, too, had to keep 80 divisions constantly ready for action on account of Russia. In the naval area Japan's position was more favorable, and in a conflict with the U. S. A. she would at all times be able to win out over the American fleet. Eng-

⁷ See document No. 220.

land's position was indicated by a recently discovered memorandum of the Admiralty in which proof was demonstrated that in case the present European conflict continued Great Britain was not in a position to defend herself in East Asia against a serious opponent. The English trembled for fear that Japan would approach closer to Singapore by way of Indochina. However, the fact that a part of the enemy forces was tied up by Russia signified a psychological boost for the English. In the secret sessions of the English Cabinet Churchill time and again pointed not only to America but also to the relieving role which Russia might one day play. For Germany it would naturally be more favorable to discharge the 80 divisions tied up by Russia and employ them in the airplane, antiaircraft, tank, and antitank industries, for the available German material was heavily committed. The heavy railroad artillery had been mounted along the coasts of France. For Bulgaria and Rumania additional batteries were needed for the protection of Varna and Constanța. At his last visit General Antonescu had considered batteries with a range of over 30 to 35 km. necessary for the defense of Constanța, since the latest English ship-based guns could for their part shoot 30 km.

In tomorrow's conference these military questions would be discussed in greater detail in the presence of the military experts. For the moment it was sufficient to point out that Germany had to guarantee the munitioning of a tremendous front. Thus, for example, in Norway alone ammunition and provisions were stockpiled for a year.

Following this the Führer came to speak of the march through Bulgaria and stressed that in his measures he would leave nothing to chance. The transportation question had to be studied with particular care. The Führer explained this by means of several examples, giving the Duce the necessary times calculated for the various transports of divisions and corps as well as the number of trains to be provided. He expressed appreciation in this connection for the willingness with which Hungary had facilitated the transit of the German troops.

Replying to a question by the Duce regarding Yugoslavia's attitude, the Führer said that one had to see that Yugoslavia stayed quiet. For this she had been promised Salonika. It was a question of a dangerous opponent, for if Yugoslavia did not remain quiet, Bulgaria would no longer permit the transit of German troops. Marković was an intelligent Foreign Minister who did not want to take any risks for the sake of the English. Prince Paul, however, belonged to the international lodge of princes among whose members the dynastic interests were absolutely in the foreground.

The Führer illustrated this remark by stories about the visit of the Queen Mother of Rumania to the Obersalzberg;⁸ she had constantly spoken only of how wisely "cousin Christian" was acting in Denmark, how bad the policy of "brother George" was and how careful "brother Paul" had to be, without mentioning even with one word the interests of the peoples ruled by these princes.

On the German part it had been made clear to Bulgaria that in order to prevent the landing of English troops in Greece Germany would march through Bulgarian territory in one way or the other. He (the Führer) had told King Boris⁹ clearly that no power in the world would prevent him from throwing the English out of Greece and that on the basis of the experience of the World War he would not in any circumstances permit a Salonika front to be created. The Bulgarian Prime Minister, Filov, had also been informed in this sense.¹⁰

The Reich Foreign Minister remarked in this regard that accession of Bulgaria to the Tripartite Pact would again be of interest only after several weeks, since at the present moment it would doubtless be evaluated by the English as a signal for the start of the German march through [Bulgarian territory].

Hereupon the conversation turned again to Spain. The Führer described to the Duce the technical military preparations and preparatory studies that had been made by the German side in the most thorough manner possible, in order to seize the Rock of Gibraltar with absolute certitude within the shortest possible time. He expressed his deep disappointment over the fact that Franco had pulled back at the last moment and that all of the laborious preparations as regards both material and personnel, some of which had required months, had been in vain.

The Reich Foreign Minister stated that he had ordered the German Ambassador in Madrid to make one more last attempt to change Franco's mind. He was expecting in these very days the report on the outcome of this action.¹¹

The Führer expressed strong doubts as to whether it would be possible to persuade the Spaniards so quickly to engage in open military collaboration. He underlined in this connection Franco's great in-

⁸ On Dec. 14, 1940, Hitler had received the Queen Mother Helène of Rumania and the Duchess of Spoleto. The visit is listed in the calendar of the Secretary of the Führer (EAP 105/18, copy in the Library of Congress), but no record of the conversation has been found. In telegram No. 7 of Jan. 3 (201/89112) the Minister in Rumania reported that the Queen Mother had spoken to him enthusiastically about her reception by Hitler, and had said that she intended to speak to Hitler about her suit for a German princess for her son, but had not done so because the conversation took "a quite different and, for her, much more interesting course."

⁹ See document No. 378 and footnote 2.

¹⁰ See document No. 606.

¹¹ See document No. 677.

gratitude toward the two Axis Powers, to which he owed his entire political existence. Not without risk to herself, Germany—which at that time was in the midst of rearmament—had sent material to Spain and placed herself at odds with the western Great Powers. From these observations there developed the Führer's proposal whether the Duce could not try one last time to change the minds of the Spaniards by a personal conversation with Franco, referring to all of the aid given him formerly.

After a certain hesitation the Duce said he was willing to attempt this in the immediate future at a meeting with Franco in Genoa. He expressed doubt whether this attempt would be successful.

Count Ciano mentioned at this time a report from the Italian Ambassador in Madrid containing a message from Serrano Suñer to him, in which Serrano Suñer stated that his attitude toward the Axis had not changed in any way. Later in the evening Count Ciano handed over an excerpt from the text of this statement,¹² from which it emerged that Serrano Suñer stated that Spain would long ago have been on the side of the Axis in the war if Germany had provided her with more grain. In the face of this the German side showed the Duce and Count Ciano portions from a report by Admiral Canaris,¹³ in which the Spaniards stated that even if grain were delivered to them they could enter the war only at the moment when England was already in the process of collapse.

In conclusion the Duce promised to invite Franco for a conference next week.

SCHMIDT

¹² Not found.

¹³ See document No. 476, footnote 2.

No. 673

221/149057

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris

Telegram en clair

No. 27 of January 19

SPECIAL TRAIN, January 19, 1941.¹

from the Special Train Received Berlin, January 19—6:35 p. m.

No. 209 of January 19

Sent January 19—6:55 p. m.

sent by teletype from the Foreign Ministry

For Ambassador Abetz personally.

¹ In addition to the date line "Special Train" the document has also a Berchtesgaden date line of Jan. 19 and the telegram number 33. It is not at all clear why this telegram which was sent from the Special Train to the Foreign Ministry and from there to the Embassy in Paris has in addition a Berchtesgaden date line and number. A possible explanation may lie in the fact that on Jan. 19, Hitler and Ribbentrop met Mussolini and Ciano at the train near Salzburg and accompanied them from there to Berchtesgaden.

A marginal note reads: "Forwarded on Jan. 19, 6:55 p. m., as No. 209 to Paris by closed circuit secret teletype. Telegram Office."

According to reports received here certain French circles are planning an attempt on Laval's life in the event that he should go into the unoccupied territory again. I am therefore asking you

1) to draw Laval's attention to this danger in a suitable manner and to deter him from making such journeys into the unoccupied territory in all circumstances.

2) to report to me at once in case Laval should be invited by the Government in Vichy for another visit to the unoccupied territory.²

RIBBENTROP

² Marginal note: "Herr Schwarzmann. Do you know the source of these reports and anything more about them? W[eizsäcker], Jan. 20."

On Jan. 21, Schwarzmann submitted to Weizsäcker a memorandum which stated that according to information from Hewel the telegram to Abetz regarding alleged plans for an attempt on Laval's life had been sent by the Foreign Minister "at the suggestion of the Führer." (221/149058)

No. 674

221/149052-55

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, January 19, 1941—8:45 [?] p. m.

No. 181

Received January 19—9:45 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Laval returned to Paris this noon from his meeting with Pétain.² It was agreed that the conversation should not deal with the modalities of Laval's return to the Government, but should first only create between the two men the personal atmosphere necessary for the clarification of this question. The Marshal, whom Laval found to have aged very much, thanked him for having refrained from all political activity in Paris. It had been reported to Vichy that Laval intended to set up a rival government in Paris, and he was very glad that this had not been true. Laval assured Pétain of his loyalty and asked why the Marshal had withdrawn his trust in him on December 13. Pétain replied that he had never doubted Laval's patriotism. However, there had been three considerations on account

¹ A marginal note indicates that copies of the telegram were forwarded at 10:00 p. m., Jan. 19, to Counselor Sonnleithner of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat and to Counselor Baron Steengracht of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.

² In Paris telegram No. 177 of Jan. 18, Abetz had transmitted the text of a letter sent by Laval to Pétain on Jan. 15 reporting at the same time that Pétain subsequently had invited Laval to a conversation which took place in the afternoon of Jan. 18 in La Ferté between Vichy and the line of demarcation (221/149048-50).

of which he had unfortunately given in to the urging of his entourage that he dismiss Laval.

1. Laval's unpopularity.
2. Laval's insufficient reporting.
3. The fear that Laval's anglophobia would lead to a declaration of war against England.

Regarding the first point Laval stated that Minister Peyrouton systematically submitted to Pétain only those police reports which asserted Laval to be unpopular and in which the passages in question were even marked. The officials who drew up these reports knew that Peyrouton appreciated receiving them. He, Laval, was certainly more popular among the masses than other members of the Cabinet, although he had consciously refrained from making propaganda for himself. As Minister of Information who had at his disposal the radio, press, and news reels, he had always let the other ministers have their say, while observing restraint himself because he took the position that popularity must be reserved exclusively for the Marshal. Regarding Pétain's second objection, that Laval had not reported to him adequately on his negotiations with Germany, Laval reminded Pétain that he had always informed him most accurately about everything orally. The Marshal did not contest this, but stated that he had often forgotten this oral information and would therefore have preferred to have written reports at hand. Laval replied that he had avoided written reports for the reason that there were people who had access to the Marshal through whom such papers would have been brought to the knowledge of Churchill within a few hours. He named in this connection M. Gillouin,³ who frequented Pétain's office, and who was in contact with the English agent, Rougier.⁴ Pétain said that Laval overestimated Gillouin's role with him, and that this difficulty could be overcome by installing a steel safe in which the Marshal and Laval would lock up documents personally. Laval countered the third point raised by Pétain, that Laval's passionate anglophobia could lead to a declaration of war against England, with the statement that he had never advanced such a demand. He had merely demanded that active steps be taken against the French colonies which had gone over to de Gaulle. If England should resist the resumption of the authority of the French Government in these colonies a state of war would result; however, this would not be on account of a French declaration of war, but on account of the provocative attitude of England. Marshal Pétain told Laval that he agreed to this policy toward de Gaulle and Eng-

³ Probably René Gillouin, former official of the Ministry of Public Instruction.

⁴ Professor Louis Rougier of the University of Besançon. On his mission to London in October 1940, see Louis Rougier, *Les Accords Pétain-Churchill: Histoire d'une mission secrète* (Montreal, 1945); also Great Britain, Cmd. 6062, France No. 2 (1945), pp. 3-11, 25-31.

land. Laval stated further that he did not feel any hatred against the English people, but that he would rejoice the day that Churchill, Eden, Cooper,⁵ and Belisha⁶ were lynched. These men had excluded from any political activity the Duke of Windsor, with whom he had prepared the Hoare-Laval Agreement⁷ and who had demanded an understanding between France, Germany, England, and Italy; and by unleashing the present war they had plunged not only the French but also the English people into a great misfortune. Pétain took cognizance of Laval's explanation with satisfaction and stated that this did away with the misunderstandings that were responsible for the events of December 13. In expectation of the Führer's letter⁸ and in accordance with the agreement reached regarding the conversation he did not want to discuss the practical questions of reorganizing the Government until later. However, he agreed to a communiqué⁹ on the conversation held with Laval, by which the public would be prepared for the possible reorganization of the Cabinet.¹⁰ Reports we have received from Vichy indicate that Pétain will proceed to return Laval to the Government and make the other changes in the Cabinet which would then be necessary only if the expected letter of the Führer is explicit on this subject. As a result of the Pétain-Laval conversation of January 18, 1941, the passages concerning Laval in Pétain's letter of December 23, 1940,¹¹ to the Führer have lost their validity and dealing with Pétain's letter of December 17¹² has again become possible. In the letter of December 17, 1940, Marshal Pétain stated that he was willing to appoint Laval to the directorate along with Darlan, Huntziger, and Flandin, and to the Cabinet in place of Minister of Interior Peyrouton, if it should develop in the course of an investigation that the grievances which had impelled the Marshal to part with Laval were not justified. The communiqué published this evening proves that these grievances have not been borne out by an investigation and permits Germany

⁵ Alfred Duff Cooper, British Minister of Information.

⁶ Leslie Hore-Belisha, British Secretary of State for War, May 1937-January 1940.

⁷ The proposal worked out by Sir Samuel Hoare and Laval on Dec. 7, 1935, for a compromise that would end the Italian-Ethiopian war.

⁸ See document No. 564.

⁹ In Paris telegram No. 177 (see footnote 2), Abetz had reported that the following text of a communiqué had been agreed upon in the conversation between Laval and Pétain:

"The Chief of State, Marshal Pétain, had a meeting with President Laval yesterday. They had a long conversation in the course of which the misunderstandings which had led to the events of Dec. 13 were eliminated."

¹⁰ Cf. Laval's account of his meeting with Pétain in *République Française*, Haute Cour de Justice: *Procès du Maréchal Pétain*, p. 200; cf. the account given by Pétain's civilian *Chef de Cabinet*, who was present at the meeting, in H. du Moulin De Labarthète, *Le Temps des illusions: Souvenirs, juillet 1940-avril 1942* (Geneva, 1946), pp. 131-134.

¹¹ See document No. 566.

¹² See document No. 530.

to express the hope that this kind of strain on German-French co-operation will be avoided in the future, that Laval will be reappointed to the Government as Minister of Interior and member of the directorate, and that the elements responsible for December 13, 1940, will be punished and removed. Since Laval's safety in Vichy could not be guaranteed for some time yet, it would be advisable for Germany to grant to the French, as a concession, that he may perform the functions of Minister of Interior from Paris and that the directorate may hold sessions in occupied France if desired. Compliance with the request which has now been made a number of times by Marshal Pétain, that he might travel to Versailles on occasion without prejudice to the fundamental question of his being installed there, would remove from this concession the character of a protective measure for Laval, and would also have the advantage, independent of this consideration, that the Marshal could be influenced directly. It would also be well if Darlan could be mentioned in the Führer's letter as the chairman of the directorate, since his position as the second man in the French state is violently contested by certain elements in Vichy; support of it, however, would be useful for the fight against England.

ABETZ

No. 675

B19/B003955-56

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, January 19, 1941.

Ha. Pol. 255 g.

The Soviet-Finnish negotiations on the Petsamo concession are approaching acute crisis stage. The Soviet Government has demanded immediate resumption of the negotiations which have been suspended during the past 4 weeks and has threatened "to settle the matter by resort to certain measures" if no agreement could be reached.¹

Finnish compliance with the Soviet demands would mean Russian control of the nickel mines and that we would henceforth have

¹ In telegram No. 10 of Jan. 3 (B19/B003946) Schulenburg reported from Moscow that a crisis would ensue if Finland did not capitulate in the Petsamo negotiations.

Blücher reported from Helsinki in telegram No. 18 of Jan. 15 (B19/B003952) that Vyshinsky had demanded of Paasikivi the immediate return of the Finnish delegates to Moscow and had threatened that if Russia and Finland could not agree, "the Soviet Government would find certain means for regulating the matter."

Schulenburg's telegram No. 117 of Jan. 16 (B19/B003953) indicated that the Finnish delegates were expected to arrive in Moscow that day. See also *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941*, p. 89.

to negotiate with the Soviet Union for our nickel supplies. Even the recognition of the previously concluded delivery agreements, which both we and the Finns have demanded from the Soviet Government, would afford little protection because the Soviet side is not likely in the long run to abide by *these* agreements.

Taking up the question with the Soviet Union from our side promises no success because we have twice, in July ² and in November ³ of last year, informed the Soviet Government of our renunciation of the concession, and because the talks which Minister Schnurre had with Molotov after Molotov's visit ⁴ have suggested no prospect of any mutually agreeable solution. Molotov, basing himself on the Ambassador's previous statement, regards this matter as closed as far as Germany is concerned, and merely expressed his willingness to negotiate with Germany on the delivery of nickel, but without taking the German-Finnish agreements as the basis of such negotiations. On the other hand, we have repeatedly advised the Finns, without definitely giving them promises of assistance in the event of difficulties with the Russians, to remain unyielding in the face of the Russians and not to give them the concession.

A choice must now be made: either to continue encouraging the Finns to resist the Soviet demands and try to put off the Russians with some minor concessions, or to advise the Finns positively to yield, and accept the resulting difficulties. My personal inclination is toward the first alternative, which would also be in line with the desire of the domestic authorities to keep for ourselves this important nickel deposit which could supply Germany's entire nickel needs for all foreseeable time. In this case, however, and this is also Minister Schnurre's view, the possibility of military intervention by the Soviet Union in the Petsamo region is not to be discounted, because the Soviet Government, so far as we are involved, would invoke the repeated agreements with us according to which we have renounced the concession in favor of the Soviet Union. In view of this possibility it will naturally be increasingly difficult to induce the Finns to maintain this line unless we give them positive backing against the Russians.

In the other case—that of yielding by the Finns—we shall lose this important resource for the time being and become dependent on the German-Soviet nickel negotiations offered by Molotov.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 259.

³ See document No. 344.

⁴ See document No. 405.

As this question can be decided only from the perspective of overall German-Soviet policy, I request instructions. I suggest that Minister Schnurre, who is to report on Russia at the beginning of next week, should also be given an opportunity at that time to report on the Petsamo matter.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.⁵

WIEHL

⁵The memorandum was forwarded to the Foreign Minister at Salzburg by secret teletype.

No. 676

B19/B003957

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, January 20, 1941—5:50 p. m.

No. 25 of January 20

Received January 20—8:20 p. m.

1. Finnish businessmen have informed the Finnish Government that Russian deliveries of flour, ocher, and oil cake to Finland have been abruptly stopped and that the transit through Russia of Finnish goods for Turkey has been suspended by the Russians. The businessmen surmise that the Russians are stopping all movements of goods to Finland. No official Russian communications have as yet been received by the Finnish Government in this matter.

2. The Foreign Minister, exploring the reasons for Russia's action, considers these possibilities:

- a) Disagreements about the current Finnish deliveries;
- b) A clearing balance in favor of Russia;
- c) Delays in the nickel negotiations by Finland;
- d) An attempt to starve out Finland after Communist propaganda has proved a failure.

3. The Russian Minister¹ has been suddenly called to Moscow.

BLÜCHER

¹Ivan Zotov.

No. 677

136/74586-91

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, January 20, 1941.¹

No. 208 of January 20

Received January 21—12:15—5:00 a. m.

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 197 of January 20.²

As already reported, today I carried out with Franco the instructions given me in Salzburg³ and with the aid of the notes which I made after the discussion in Salzburg explained to him with ruthless candor the view of the Führer and the Foreign Minister on developments in Spain.

I stated that England, supported by the United States, was merely temporizing with her promise of economic aid but had no idea of helping the Spanish Government. The goal of the English Government was clear; it was trying to weaken and to bring about the fall of the present Spanish regime and the restoration of the Republic. The bad feeling against the Spanish Government because of the constantly deteriorating economic situation and the famine was growing; the regime was running into serious danger; everything was moving speedily toward a catastrophe. The situation was made more difficult by the opposition of certain military elements that unwittingly played England's game, held the Spanish Government responsible for the state of distress and through the political unrest created thereby prevented systematic reconstruction and clear decisions. It was our firm conviction that Spain would receive no help whatever from or through England. Spain had therefore reached a crossroads; only on our side would Spain obtain any prospect of help now and in the future.

I also did not conceal from Franco that his reply to Admiral Canaris in December had keenly disappointed the Führer.⁴ An entry into the war by Spain when England was already conquered, so to speak, was of no interest to us; nor would it bring any glory to Spain herself. Only a prompt decision by Spain to align herself openly with Germany could still save the situation; only we could help Spain economically and militarily. Appropriate promises had

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 267 to the Special Train, Heinrich, Jan. 21, 12:45 a. m."

² Not printed (136/74584-85). Ambassador Stohrer had returned to Madrid on the afternoon of Jan. 18, having been delayed 28 hours by snow (telegram No. 182 of Jan. 18: 136/74581).

³ See document No. 639 and footnote 1.

⁴ See document No. 476 and footnote 2.

already been made by us. We therefore did not agree with Franco's opinion that Spain was unable to wage war. For all practical purposes, moreover, the fighting would be done only by our troops; Spain would hardly be called on to make any great sacrifices. A prompt decision by Spain to enter the war would result in an immediate amelioration of the food situation with a corresponding relaxation of domestic tension, restore the authority of the Spanish Government, undermined by English intrigues, and thereby also bring the military leaders back into line.

Furthermore, I told Franco quite openly that his attitude had given us the impression that he and his Government were no longer entirely convinced that we would win the victory. This would be a fatal mistake. The war was already practically won and would in the words of the Führer be the greatest victory in German history. The lull in the military operations was not without a purpose; new, large-scale operations were impending. For Spain, the historical hour had now struck. The Führer and the Foreign Minister had therefore been anxious to present their view of the situation to Franco with comradely candor and give him an opportunity to reconsider his decisions. A decision had to be made at once, however—the Foreign Minister had mentioned 48 hours in that connection. The reason for the demand for a prompt decision was not any desire to exert unfair pressure on Franco, but the situation of Spain, which in our opinion was deteriorating daily, and above all the necessity in certain circumstances of making some other disposition at once of the armed forces and their material which were intended for the Spanish action.

In his reply Franco first expressed his astonishment at the strongly pessimistic appraisal of Spain's situation. To be sure, the economic situation was extremely serious; there was undeniably a famine; but it was wrong to conclude from this that the regime was in jeopardy. Franco then explained at length the reasons why Spain, weakened by the Civil War, had not at the outset, or even yet, entered the war on our side. In this connection Franco put special emphasis on the argument that Spanish policy had undeviatingly followed a straight course. His faith in the victory of Germany was also still the same. The events in Africa had no decisive importance, and he had recently told the English Ambassador so to his face. Consequently, he did not understand how any doubt could have arisen in our minds about his unchanging pro-German policy and his faith in the victory of Germany.

Here the Foreign Minister intervened and emphasized that the criticism of the Spanish Government (by the German radio) because of the negotiations with England and the United States about deliveries of grain was unjustified. In Berchtesgaden the Führer

and the Reich Foreign Minister had been perfectly willing that he should try again to obtain as much grain as possible from abroad before Spain's entry into the war.⁵ These negotiations had no other purpose; any political commitment had been decisively rejected.

Franco emphasized further that as regards food a minimum subsistence level had to be provided for the life of the Spanish people; only then would entrance into the war be possible. He was trying, in spite of the present shortage, to build up a certain reserve of grain.

As far as gasoline was concerned, this was already being done. When he had been forced to refuse entry into the war in the beginning of January, the reason was to be found solely in the catastrophic deterioration in the food situation between the meeting in Hendaye and the discussions in Berchtesgaden. As in other years, too, a definite estimate of the harvest yield was possible only by the middle of November.

There had turned out to be a huge deficit. Without bread it would have been "criminal" to start a war.

Franco and the Foreign Minister stated further that they had no illusions whatever about English and American aid. However, with the little that was imported in this way Spain could perhaps get along, if she had to, as long as there was no war. Entry into the war would entail an immediate increase in requirements and in addition a further aggravation of the transportation problem (loss of coastal shipping, burdening of the railways for military purposes, lack of trucks and fuel, etc.). The present food stores and transportation facilities could not even approximately meet such demands. This view was fully shared by the "Defense Council" convened by him after the discussions in Berchtesgaden, especially by its military members.

Moreover, it was not a question at all of whether Spain would enter the war; that had been decided in Hendaye. It was merely a question of when. He was still [striving] to bring that moment to pass, namely by economic measures, which admittedly had not yet been very successful, and by far-reaching military preparations, which our military men were informed of in detail. Supported by the Minister, Franco then protested sharply against the assumption that he had told Admiral Canaris he would enter the war only when England had already been laid low.⁶ Spain intended to participate in the war fully and not obtain anything as a gift. Admiral Canaris had merely been told that Spain intended to enter only when she

⁵ See documents Nos. 352 and 357.

⁶ See document No. 476, footnote 2.

could intervene effectively and did not have to fear that she would immediately collapse and become a burden to the common cause.

In conclusion, Franco also stated that he fully trusted our word that we were willing and able to help Spain economically. However, this help would come *too late* if it did not start until war began. It seemed that in Germany they underestimated the difficulties of Spain's economic situation.

I took the opportunity to interrupt the Generalissimo's statements at various points and set forth our points of view repeatedly with the utmost emphasis. I also warned that at a later date it would no longer be possible to count on German help and that if Spain held back at the present moment, her national aspirations might be jeopardized, and I pointed out that great historical events were brought about only by decisions of courageous men and not by regard for momentary difficulties or the sentiments of the broad masses, etc. Nevertheless, nothing whatever came of the debate up to this point. Only when the question was raised, in connection with the last-mentioned statement by Franco, whether Germany could not aid Spain even *before* her entry into the war in order to relieve her acutest need, did the matter take on a somewhat different complexion. I therefore replied in accordance with the authorization given me by the Foreign Minister that we might perhaps consider such a prepayment but that it would come into question only if Franco gave the assurance *in advance* that Spain would then enter the war at a time to be determined *by us*. I repeatedly emphasized this, to us self-evident, condition, so that any mistake is precluded.

The Foreign Minister said in reply that this possibility created a new situation that would have to be studied. Franco agreed.

As already reported in the preceding telegram, Franco finally requested a little more time to consider the matter, during which he would call in his closest associates for consultation.

I shall call on the Foreign Minister again tomorrow morning in order to point out to him once more in private, as forcefully as I can, the bearing and importance of the questions to be decided.

The discussions with the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin produced nothing new.

A further telegraphic report will follow.⁷

STOHRER

⁷In telegram No. 213 of Jan. 21 (136/74592-93) Stohrer reported that he had spoken at length with Serrano Suñer who fully shared the German point of view. The only issue for Serrano Suñer was the time for Spain's entrance into the war. Stohrer's impression was that Serrano Suñer would take this attitude in the meeting of the Defense Council.

No. 678

104/112988-89

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

Teletype

SECRET

BERLIN, January 20, 1941.

(To be sent in code)

After further study of the Russian *démarche* in Moscow and Berlin regarding the situation in the Balkans,¹ I should like to make the following comment:

1. From the military standpoint it would be logical for the Russians now to coordinate their aspirations regarding the Straits with our intentions. Foreign observers believe even that a German-Russian parallel action is impending. I do not believe, however, that the Soviet Government is inclined to place itself now in the same front line with us.

2. It would also be conceivable that the Russians might exploit the Balkan situation in order to be compensated elsewhere, for example, in Finland. This, too, does not seem very probable to me.

3. The most probable thing is that the Russians simply want to show us their dissatisfaction and will let us feel this (e.g., in the further treatment of political and economic questions).

I recommend that the Russians not be left without an answer. To placate the Russians this answer could have approximately the following content:

a. The German objective is exclusively to keep England away from the Continent; therefore our attention is turned to Greece. We do not believe that the English will risk advancing over the Straits. Only in this very unlikely case would we have to ward off an attack from that direction.

b. A German action in the Southeast has exclusively military aims. It is purely conditioned by the war and temporary in nature. It does not in any way affect the well-known Russian aspirations, for which the road remains open.

c. We are counting on full Russian understanding and consideration for our necessities, in connection with the war, just as we, too, intend to promote in large measure the Russian aspirations in the spirit of our friendly relations.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See documents Nos. 668 and 669.

No. 679

F7/0341-60;
F11/0116-35*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*TOP SECRET
Füh 7

FUSCHL, January 21, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE DUCE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT CIANO, AS WELL AS FIELD MARSHAL KEITEL, GENERAL JODL, GENERAL VON RINTELEN, AND THE ITALIAN GENERALS, GUZZONI AND MARRAS, ON JANUARY 20, 1941¹

In the course of the conversation, the Führer gave a comprehensive presentation of the military situation at the present moment. He stated that the German forces assembling in the Rumanian area far exceeded the numbers that would be used for direct operations in Greece. At the request of the Bulgarians a military force would be made ready to intercept a possible attack by the Russians from the north in the region of Constanța. A second military force would be assembled in Rumania in order to prevent a possible concentric attack by the Russians from the north and east, aimed at Galați. The transportation of these forces placed a considerable burden on the railroad lines required for that purpose; and yet the entire number of troops which had been transported would not make an appearance in Greece. The crux of the matter was that these forces would be transported through Hungary by shoving them into the normal schedules of the Hungarian railroads and could only be committed in the course of the month of March. The bridge construction necessary for crossing the Danube would require 14 days to 3 weeks. As soon as the crossing of the Danube started, however, the English could be expected to attack the oil fields of Ploesti. The aerial defense had therefore to be organized simultaneously with the assembling of the troops, since the distance from the English bases on Greek territory to the Rumanian oil fields was only about 600 kilometers, that is, not greater than the distance from London to Berlin. Under these conditions, the beginning of open military action would have to be put off as long as possible in order, in the meantime, to make the defenses of the vulnerable points as effective as possible.

¹ This conference was preceded by a strictly military discussion of Field Marshal Keitel with General Guzzoni on Jan. 19. The record of this meeting, together with the OKW record of Hitler's remarks on Jan. 20, is printed as document No. 134-C, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, pp. 462-471; English translation in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), vol. vi, pp. 939-946.

With regard to Albania, the Führer remarked that if a German force were sent there and did not take part in the military action, it would represent a significant psychological burden. It was to be expected, moreover, that the English would attack if German troops participated in the fighting. If the German plans were revealed too early, an English attack on the bridge of Cernavodă and on the preparations for crossing by the German troops had to be expected, with the result that construction of the bridge would be again delayed. The best tactics in these circumstances would therefore be to carry out the concentration of the German troops as far as possible without enemy interference, to cross the Danube as late as possible, and to begin the attack as early as possible after the crossing.

The layout of the whole plan was determined by Russia's attitude. Germany could not at the moment withstand a serious Russian threat in view of the 34 Russian divisions concentrated on the Rumanian frontier. A relief at other places on the German-Russian frontier was not possible until May. The Russians were absolutely clear about this state of affairs. In no circumstances did they want a consolidation of Balkan affairs under Italian leadership.

Germany's difficulties lay in the fact that she had to maintain an army at a great distance from her own territory and was dependent on other countries, being agreeable as regards transportation and supply.

The question whether it was possible to clear out the English bases in the Aegean Sea was hard to answer. By occupying Crete the English had in any case acquired a very broad base. An additional factor was that the new American long-range bombers could travel a distance of 4,500 kilometers, provided only that adequate airfields were available for the heavy machines. Practice had shown, for one thing, that airfields could not be destroyed. The situation was such, therefore, that there could be no real relief before the end of March, but that attacks on the Rumanian oil regions were entirely possible.

As regards Turkey, the Führer remarked that she would not dare to intervene against Germany. It would be worse, however, if Turkey were to make some airfields available to the English.

Turning to the situation in the West, the Führer remarked that he would launch an attack upon England only if its success were absolutely certain, because if it failed no second attempt could be made in view of the gigantic machinery involved. In case of a failure, England would at once be able to release forces which she could, on the one hand, use in her production, and on the other hand, dispatch to other theaters of war. Whether an attack on the British Isles would be carried out depended on whether or not conditions demonstrated that the odds were high on the probability for success. It was Ger-

many's aim to do everything to carry out such an attack, but all the factors coming into consideration had to be very soberly weighed against each other. The weather played an essential role. If there were fine weather for 5 days in succession, the English fighter force could be completely destroyed.

After referring to the huge battery positions which Germany had constructed on the north French coast, the Führer stated that the decision in the air would depend on the quality of the machines which the opposing air forces would put into action next spring. Germany was putting up many new types, whose superiority or inferiority in relation to the new enemy planes was yet to be demonstrated. The German fliers fought courageously, but the English, too, were very brave, for they knew that they were fighting for the existence of a world empire.

The Führer then discussed the German front, which extended from Norway to Biarritz. Kirkenes was important because of its ore exports; Trondheim and other ports, as submarine construction centers and bases; and the North Sea coast down to the Atlantic coast of France, as bases for German airplanes and U-boats.

The Sicilian Strait could, in his estimation, be blockaded from the air, but that was only a poor substitute for the possession of Gibraltar and the African shore lying opposite it, whereby, for example, the rail communications between Morocco and Algiers would be disrupted, and the Axis position in North Africa in general could be strengthened to such a point that all blackmail by the French would cease at once. In the present situation one had to give in to the French on many points in order to prevent a declaration of independence by French North Africa which involved the danger of a French attack upon Tripoli.

In this connection the Führer underlined how important it was for the Duce to make another appeal to Franco. What was at stake was not only the occupation of Gibraltar and the strategic advantages of the African territory across from it, but also the possibility of establishing German submarine bases on the Spanish Atlantic coast, which would be less exposed to English air attacks than the French submarine ports. A period of 20 days was necessary before the German units would stand before Gibraltar, ready for commitment. Difficulties would arise in regard to transporting them and maintaining their ammunition supply because only one railroad line, with a different gauge, was available on the Spanish side; it might be possible, however, in the further course of the operation, to get France to permit the use of the other railroad line to Spain.

He (the Führer) saw no danger in an intervention by the United States. Only the existence of the Russian colossus, which tied up important forces, was disagreeable, just as was the opaque attitude

of the French. For economic reasons Germany would prefer to discharge 60 divisions, in order to use them in production.

After a remark about the length of time needed for the training of officers and men for the special tasks of present-day warfare, especially in the Luftwaffe and the tank arm, the Führer stressed the fact that the present war would at a certain moment become exclusively an air war. In view of this, huge quantities of planes and antiaircraft batteries were needed, particularly because antiaircraft guns had to be replaced at a faster rate than ordinary artillery, and also because keeping them supplied with ammunition was more difficult. Production, therefore, had to be concentrated primarily on the antiaircraft arm. The supplying of antiaircraft ammunition was assuming progressively tremendous proportions. If certain parts of Germany were bombed night after night, the demand for antiaircraft ammunition mounted at an extraordinary rate. Naturally Germany was returning the English air attacks eightfold. She was in a much more favorable position with respect to England not only in regard to the number of planes available, but also because of the much shorter distances involved (less use of fuel, larger amounts of explosives). In the last large-scale attacks, explosives were dropped on England at the rate of one ton per plane, in addition to countless incendiary bombs.

Going on to the subject of the battle in North Africa, the Führer remarked that the appraisal of the situation there was essentially a matter for the Italian commanders; he emphasized, however, how extremely important it was that the Italians should hold the position because it might possibly be needed as a point of departure for clearing up the Morocco question. So long as this question remained unsettled, Germany could not take any serious step against the French Government. All she could do was to threaten the French Cabinet through the Paris press. At Vichy the reins were in the hands of the reaction and the Church. Both were foes of Germany. Pétain made declarations of loyalty because he could make no other declarations. It was necessary to be very cautious toward the French. Therefore he (the Führer) was also opposed to releasing more ships to them for their African possessions. According to reports received in Germany, the French, to be sure, had withdrawn their forces in Morocco to the west and had only about 20,000 troops stationed at the border of Tripolitania. In the internal political field there was a certain competition among the individual leading generals, Pétain, Weygand, Noguès, Huntziger, etc. In their inward negative attitude toward Germany, however, they were all united.

Regarding the German-Russian relationship the Führer remarked that Germany was bound to Russia through treaties. Her security, however, was based not on the treaties, but on the troops at her dis-

posal. So long as Stalin, who was shrewd and cautious, lived, Russia would certainly not attempt anything against Germany. But it was not yet known who his successor would be. Therefore Germany had to be strong. The treaties with the Russians all suffered from a one-sided interpretation of their provisions by the Soviet Union. The Führer illustrated this remark with the example of Lithuania, which at first lay in the German sphere of influence, but then was claimed by the Russians as the result of a somewhat one-sided interpretation of the treaty; likewise, Russia's interpretation of the guarantee agreements with the Baltic States as implying the complete absorption of these states represented something unique.

Russia had offered a mutual assistance pact to Bulgaria, too, but had significantly added the somewhat singular sounding assurance that she did not intend to undertake anything against the Bulgarian King. It was necessary, therefore, to be very cautious in dealings with the Russians. They were constantly looking for points in the treaties on which new demands could be based. In their treaty agreements, therefore, like Jewish lawyers, they preferred vague formulations and liked to base their arguments on ambiguous definitions that were capable of various interpretations. In their trade agreements they operated on a big scale, but only a part of these had thus far been realized. Russia was a gigantic state that one could not leave out of sight and which constituted an important factor in all combinations. No operation of a military nature could be undertaken without considering Russia. There was nothing to be feared from the Army, but in the era of aviation the danger of an attack by the Russian Air Force was not to be underestimated. If the Rumanian oil fields, for instance, were attacked not only by the English but also by the Russians, they would in a very short time be turned into smoking heaps of rubble. In Finland the Russians would not undertake anything warlike, for they hoped to become masters of the country through peaceful penetration. Precisely in this point, however, the Finns had considerable power of resistance.

The danger spots of the present situation were Russia and Algeria. The second point, however, would at once be eliminated as an element of danger if Gibraltar came into the hands of the Axis.

The Führer then brought up the subject of Tripolitania. He pointed out that there would be no object in keeping German units there inactive for months. The blocking forces of antitank troops, which were to be sent to western Tripolitania, brought with them their experience of the war against France. They had their baptism of fire behind them and were well trained. And precisely the training of tank troops was a lengthy affair. Even crews whose training had already been completed required from 4 to 6 months of practice to become efficient on new types.

The Führer then discussed at length the problems connected with the armored troops and their employment, particularly the question of transportation and repairs, as well as the psychological qualifications of the crews. The blocking force that was to be sent would have to be sent into action. It must not be a parade unit. For psychological and propaganda reasons that could not be borne. It should not be said of the German units as was said of the English in France, namely, that they let the other partner do the fighting, while they themselves looked on. The unit to be sent to western Tripolitania would therefore have to arrive there at a time when fighting was still climatically possible for German troops.

As for the three English divisions allegedly shipped from Alexandria to Salonika, the report had not yet been confirmed.

The Foreign Minister stated at this point that only Churchill wanted to push the Greek venture more actively, while large groups in England would prefer to do nothing.

Continuing, the Führer inquired about the situation in the Dodecanese. Shipment of gasoline to the islands, no doubt, was possible only by submarine. Anyway, there were a good number of bases for land and sea planes there. Only dive bombers could be used successfully against armed ships. Every time an English ship was damaged or sunk, wherever this might be, it was an advantage for Germany, for she wished to reduce the available tonnage as radically as possible. Dive bombers could fly from the Bulgarian bases to the Dodecanese and from there carry on their operations against English shipping. The Führer demonstrated in detail by means of examples that the sinking of shipping tonnage hit England in her most vulnerable spot. The English might perhaps grow accustomed to living in caves, to having no more windows in their houses, etc., but if the food supply were not assured, they would have to give up the fight. It was therefore important for Germany to sink as many ships as possible, especially refrigerator ships, because their replacement would take a long time.

The sinking of three refrigerator ships in the past few weeks disorganized the meat ration in all England for 14 days.

In conclusion the Führer expressed the firm conviction that Germany would become master of the British Isles.

At the close, the conversation turned once more to the subject of Turkey. The Duce expressed the view that Turkey would remain at peace, and the Führer agreed, saying that active intervention in the conflict was improbable if only because of the armament situation of that country. The Turks knew, moreover, that Constantinople was extremely vulnerable from the air. Incendiary bombs would be enough to destroy the whole city. Explosive bombs were not needed for the purpose. The Foreign Minister remarked that the Turks

would positively not attempt anything and, in fact, would not have stirred if Bulgaria had not pursued such a feeble policy. Bulgaria had only herself to blame for the attitude of Turkey and Greece, and for the blackmail by the Russians.

As the last point in the conversation the Führer discussed Rumania. General Antonescu, who was a real fanatic, had made a good impression on him.

Rumania's difficulties stemmed primarily from the fact that the first team of the present regime had been murdered and the second team was not equal to the tasks. It would be impossible in the long run to maintain the separation between Leader of the State and Leader of the Legion. Hard, cold reason dictated that one or the other must go. The Führer further expressed himself in terms of great esteem concerning General Antonescu and mentioned that on his next to the last visit, he had been given quite plainly to understand in advance that he would not be allowed to criticize the Vienna Award. Nevertheless, out of fanatical patriotism, he delivered a 3-hour criticism of the new territorial order.² The Duce remarked that, in his opinion, Antonescu ought to assume over-all leadership. The Foreign Minister pointed out that he must not, however, rule in opposition to the Legion, but rather in cooperation with the good elements in the Legion, and that Horia Sima could be given a high government office, perhaps the Foreign Ministry. In any case it was necessary to avoid creating the impression that Antonescu was being forced upon the Legion from the outside. Minister von Killinger would also have a part in seeing to it that a movement to make Antonescu the leader sprang up within the Legion itself.

SCHMIDT

² See documents Nos. 380 and 381.

No. 680

41/28171-75

*The Grand Mufti to Adolf Hitler*¹

BAGHDAD, January 20, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: England, that relentless and crafty enemy of the true liberty of peoples, has never tired of forging chains to enslave and subjugate the Arab people, sometimes in the name of a perfidious League of Nations and sometimes by flaunting false and hypocritical sentiments of humanity for the others, but always, in truth, for the most imperialistic designs camouflaged by the principles of democracy and of a mendacious internationalism.

¹ This letter is written in French.

By a geographic coincidence, the Arab people find themselves at the center of the land and sea crossroads, which form, according to the English, the principal hub of "Imperial British communications." For this reason, no means were spared to create perpetual obstacles hampering the freedom and development of the Arab people. One might even say that the relative peace which has lasted for more than a century between France and England has been due in good measure to the tacit understanding between these two Powers to keep the Arab populations under their yoke, thus observing the law of an ignoble division, which in any case established an equilibrium of ambitions without touching the sensitive artery of "sacred" British communications! This division of influence between France and England, moreover, served to break the resistance and the reactions of the Arabs by leaving them to grapple with the various strong powers. But English policy could not for long defy the awakening of Arab nationalism; hence the incessant activity of England in creating new obstacles against the achievement of independence by the Arabs and against their liberty. And so it is the dismal history of the past decades, which offers to the eyes of the world the spectacle of a continuous and desperate struggle.

In Iraq, England, in her traditional policy of divide and rule, conceived the plan of settling several million Hindus brought over from British India side by side with the indigenous Arab population. The plan was foiled by a bloody revolution and so England had to submit to the *fait accompli*, and devote her attention to the immediate exploitation of Iraq petroleum. In a word, King Faisal I, accepted a *modus vivendi* and, despite the opposition of the majority of the people, signed a treaty with England, thus purchasing the relative independence of the country at the price of petroleum concessions. The attitude of Turkey, favoring the annexation of Mosul to her territory, imposed on the late King the need for this policy.

As for Syria, she was handed over to France—this to break her national unity and impoverish her economically in order to be able the better to subdue her nationalist spirit. After 18 years of struggle, she was able to wrest from France the lame treaty of 1936,² recognizing her independence, but at the price of concessions and unilateral reservations. And then England emerged to bar the road to liberty for Syria and came to an agreement with Turkey to neutralize the effect of the Franco-Syrian treaty; this was done in agreement with the Jews who feared an independent Syria next to her sister, Palestine, who was in a state of revolt. It was at this

² Signed at Damascus on Dec. 22, 1936; it was never ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies. For the text, see *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1936* (Paris, 1937), pp. 201-228.

time that the Anglo-French-Turkish agreement against the Axis Powers came into being. Such was the prelude in 1936 to the question of Alexandretta and Antioch, which was to end in the cession by France of the said region to Turkey,³ on the one hand, and the abrogation, sine qua non of the Treaty of 1936 between France and Syria. Thus, it was another "very democratic" maneuver on the part of England at the expense of Syria—this despite the commissions and the reports of investigations of the League of Nations, all favorable to the Syrian thesis.

I pass in turn to Egypt. Now, since 1882, England has established herself there "temporarily!" because the people, in revolt, demanded of the Khedive a national constitution, which was to place a curb on the extravagance of the Prince and organize the budget according to the interests and the needs of the country. But so-called democratic England occupied the country in order to save the throne of the Khedive on the pretext of assuring order in Alexandria, while perfidious Albion with her own fingers spun intrigues and fomented troubles and disorders by means of her own agents-provocateurs. The truth is, what was involved was the Suez Canal and . . .⁴ imperial communications. Egypt waited until 1936 to obtain likewise her lame treaty with the familiar reservations.⁵ This fact was not due to British generosity—far from it—but quite simply to the breakdown of the balance of forces in the Mediterranean, since Italy was taking a stronger and more threatening stand against British "interests."

Now, after so many other countries of the Arabian peninsula, there comes Palestine. Her case, Your Excellency, is well known to you because she, too, has had to suffer from the perfidy of the English. It is a case of creating an obstacle to the unity and independence of the Arab countries by pitting them directly against the Jews of the entire world, dangerous enemies, whose secret arms are money, corruption, and intrigues, in addition, moreover, to the bayonets of the British. For 20 years now we have been face to face with these various forces. Armed with an invincible faith in their cause, the Arabs of Palestine have fought with the most rudimentary means. The question of Palestine, moreover, has united all the Arab countries in a common hatred for the English and the Jews. If a common enemy is the prelude to the formation of national unity, one may say that the Palestine problem has hastened this unity. From the international point of view, the Jews of the entire world have given

³ June 23, 1939; see vol. VI of this series, Editors' Note, p. 777.

⁴ Omission indicated in the original.

⁵ Presumably a reference to the provisions of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance of Aug. 23, 1936, regarding the stationing of British forces in the zone of the Suez Canal. For the text, see Great Britain Treaty Series No. 6 (1937), Cmd. 5360.

their allegiance to England in the hope that, if she is victorious, she will be able to make their dreams come true in Palestine and even in the neighboring Arab countries. If the Arabs are aided in defeating the Zionist aims, the Jews, and especially those of the United States, will be so demoralized at seeing the object of their dream fade into nothingness that they will lose their enthusiasm for aiding Great Britain and will retreat before the catastrophe.

I beg Your Excellency not to be vexed with me for having related in summary fashion the history of Arab antagonism toward England, because it seemed to me necessary to throw into relief the fundamental causes which arouse the Arab world against the English. I have been anxious especially to state clearly that these causes have their deep roots in primordial interests and vital problems and not in futile questions with superficial and transitory effects. The warmest sympathy of the Arab peoples for Germany and the Axis is now and henceforth an established fact. No propaganda can change this truth. Freed from certain material impediments, the Arab peoples are everywhere prepared to act, as is proper, against the common enemy and to take their stand with enthusiasm on the side of the Axis to do their part in the well-deserved defeat of the Anglo-Jewish coalition.

Arab nationalism owes to Your Excellency a debt of gratitude and of recognition for having again and again brought up in ringing speeches the question of Palestine. I am anxious here to reiterate my thanks to Your Excellency and to assure Your Excellency of the sentiments of friendship, of sympathy, and of admiration which the Arab people pledges to Your Excellency, great Führer, and to the courageous German people.

I take this occasion to delegate to the German Government my private secretary⁶ in order to initiate in the name of the strongest and largest Arab organization and in my own name the negotiations necessary for sincere and loyal cooperation in all fields.

I may add resolutely that the Arabs are disposed to throw their weight into the scales and to offer their blood in the sacred struggle for their rights and their national aspirations, provided that certain interests of a moral and material order are assured. It is a matter of taking the necessary precautions against a perfidious and powerful enemy; it is necessary to take into account the means and the strength in order to enter the fight with the greatest chance of success. This foresight is indispensable, especially since England is obliged to act and react with all her might in view of the strategic

⁶ See document No. 342. On Jan. 14, Rintelen recorded that he had been told by Zamboni that the Grand Mufti's private secretary was expected to make another trip to Berlin and Rome in the near future in order to inquire about financial support to the Arabs by the Axis Powers and the latter's attitude toward the Syrian question (71/50747). See also document No. 722.

nature of the Arab countries, which could then endanger imperial communications and paralyze all connections between India and the Mediterranean and Turkey via the Persian Gulf, at the same time bringing about an end to the exploitation and sale of petroleum for the benefit of England.

I conclude by wishing Your Excellency a long and happy life and brilliant victory and prosperity for the great German people and for the Axis in the very near future.

I beg Your Excellency to believe in my sentiments of great friendship, of gratitude, and of admiration.

Grand Mufti of Palestine
MOHAMMED AMIN EL HUSSEINI

No. 681

104/112994-97

The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary

Telegram

No. 38

FUSCHL, January 21, 1941—11:30 p. m.

Teletype through Office of Reich Foreign Minister to State Secretary von Weizsäcker, No. 31.

1. I request that you ask the Russian Ambassador to call on you Wednesday evening and that you give him in oral form the following reply to the statement made to you on January 17.¹ Thereupon the text of the reply is to be handed to him in the form of a memorandum.²

Text of the reply:

1. The Reich Government has not received any reports that England contemplates occupying the Straits. Nor does the Reich Government believe that Turkey will permit English military forces to enter her territory. However, the Reich Government is informed that England intends and is about to gain a foothold on Greek territory.

2. The Führer pointed out repeatedly to Chairman Molotov during his visit to Berlin in November that Germany would prevent by all military means any attempt by England to gain a foothold on Greek soil.

It is the inalterable intention of the Reich Government not to permit English military forces in any circumstances to establish themselves on Greek territory, which would mean a threat to vital interests of Germany in the Balkans. It is therefore carrying out certain troop concentrations in the Balkans, which have the sole purpose of preventing the English from gaining any foothold on Greek soil.

3. Germany does not intend to occupy the Straits. She will respect the territory under Turkish sovereignty, unless Turkey on her part commits a hostile act against German troops. On the other hand,

¹ See document No. 668.

² See document No. 684.

however, the Germany Army will march through Bulgarian territory should any military operations be carried out against Greece. The Reich Government has, of course, no intention of violating any Soviet Russian security interests nor would this by any means be the case if German troops march through Bulgaria.

4. For the action which may have to be undertaken against England in Greece, Germany is carrying on a troop concentration in the Balkans on such a scale that it will enable her to checkmate any English attempt at building up a front in those regions. The Reich Government believes that in so doing it is also serving Soviet interests, which would be opposed to England's gaining a foothold in these regions.

5. The Reich Government—as it indicated on the occasion of the Berlin visit of Chairman Molotov—has an understanding of the Soviet interest in the Straits question and is prepared to endorse a revision of the Montreux Convention at the proper time. Germany on her part is politically not interested in the Straits question and will withdraw her troops from there after having carried out her operations in the Balkans.

6. As to the stand requested by Chairman Molotov concerning the question of continuing the political discussion begun some time ago in Berlin, the following may be stated.

The Reich Government still adheres to the ideas explained to Chairman Molotov during his presence in Berlin. The Soviet Government on the other hand made certain counterproposals at the end of November. At the present time the Reich Government is in touch with the Governments of its allies, Italy and Japan, concerning all those issues, and it hopes that after having further clarified the whole problem it will be able to resume the political discussion with the Soviet Government in the near future.

End of the reply.

2. Ambassador Schulenburg is receiving instructions from here to take corresponding action with M. Molotov on Wednesday evening or Thursday morning.³

3. Furthermore, I request that, after the call of the Russian Ambassador, you hand Ambassador Alfieri a copy of the statement given to you by M. Dekanozov on January 17, as well as a copy of our reply, for the confidential information of the Italian Government.⁴ The Duce and Count Ciano have already been informed by me here.

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 694, footnote 1.

⁴ See document No. 688, footnote 1.

No. 682

136/74594-95

The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Spain

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, January 21, 1941.

No. 36 of January 21, from the Special Train
No. 140 of January 21, from the Foreign Ministry

For the Ambassador personally.

I have read your report.¹ Make an appointment with Franco again as soon as you have received this telegram, stating that you have another message from your Government for Franco personally, and read the following to the Generalissimo verbatim:

1. Without the help of the Führer and the Duce there would not today be any Nationalist Spain or any Caudillo.

2. The English, French, and Americans have one aim: the destruction of Franco and Nationalist Spain. The democracies will couple every aid with political extortion weakening Franco's regime. It is our conviction, moreover, that for technical reasons alone (lack of tonnage, etc.) the shipment of significant quantities of grain across the ocean is out of the question. England herself is already unable to provide for her own needs and is on the road to hunger.

3. The existence of Nationalist Spain and Franco and the great future of Spain are therefore indissolubly bound up with the fate of the Axis and the Powers allied in the Tripartite Pact. Only Germany is in a position to give Spain any really effective aid in her food situation.

4. The war for the Axis is today already won. The Führer and the Duce are convinced that the victory of the Powers of the Tripartite Pact will be definitively assured this year. The closing of the Mediterranean by the capture of Gibraltar would contribute toward an early end of the war and also open up for Spain the road to Africa with its possibilities. For the Axis, however, this action would be of strategic value only if it can be carried out in the next few weeks. Otherwise it will definitely be too late for it because of other military operations.

5. The Führer and the Reich Government are deeply disturbed by the equivocal and vacillating attitude of Spain. This attitude is completely incomprehensible to them both in view of the help which they gave Franco in the Spanish Civil War and in view of the crystal-clear practical political interest of Spain in an alignment with Germany and her allies.

6. The Reich Government is taking this step in order to prevent Spain at the last minute from taking a road which, it is firmly convinced, can end only in a catastrophe for Spain. Unless the Caudillo

¹ See document No. 677.

decides immediately to join the war of the Axis Powers, the Reich Government cannot but foresee the end of Nationalist Spain.²

End of the oral message.

RIBBENTROP

² On receipt of this instruction, Stohrer immediately requested an appointment with Franco. Fearing that the sharp language of paragraph 6 would strengthen Franco's opposition rather than make him amenable to German advice, however, Stohrer proposed in telegram No. 225 of Jan. 22 that the paragraph be recast to read:

"The Reich Government undertakes this step in order at the last minute to restrain Spain from a course which according to the firm view of the Reich Government would end with the breakdown of new Spain and her national aspirations, if the Caudillo does not forthwith decide for adherence to the war of the Axis Powers."

Stohrer's telegram No. 225 reached Berlin at 3:35 p. m. A typewritten notation on the document states that on instructions of Minister Altenburg the telegram had not yet been transmitted to the Foreign Minister. (136/74597)

See document No. 692, footnote 2.

No. 683

M179/M005709-10

Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

CHEFSACHE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, January 21, 1941.

High Command of the Wehrmacht

WFSt/Abt. L (I) No. 44046/41 g.K. Chefsache

By officer only

Reference: Directive 22 of January 11, 1941¹ and OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I) No. 44011/41 g.K. Chefsache of January 10, 1941, paragraph 2.²

The discussions of the Führer with the Duce which were conducted on January 19 and 20³ have led to the conclusion that the promptest possible dispatch of the designated formation to Tripoli (Operation *Sonnenblume*) is greatly desired, but on the other hand the transfer of German forces to Albania (Operation *Alpenveilchen*) in the manner heretofore envisaged is not possible, because, as a result of this, the reinforcement and supply of the Italian divisions would be rendered impossible and thus the Italian preparations for attack would be undone.

To supplement and rectify the previously issued commands the Führer has decided:

1) *Operation Sonnenblume*

The designated formation is to be transferred to Tripoli as soon as possible (beginning approximately February 15). It was laid down as the directive for its employment that it should not be held

¹ Document No. 642.

² Not printed (8589/E602796-97).

³ See documents Nos. 672 and 679.

back available for duty but should be committed in combat wherever the appearance of English armored divisions is expected or, respectively, wherever the final defensive line is established.

The High Command of the Navy is requested to put off the transports for Albania, and, in cooperation with the High Command of the Army, to make such preparations for the transfer of the formation that the requisite transports can be executed in the shortest possible time, beginning about February 12. If the sea transport situation permits it, the advance supply transports are to be fitted into the convoy service of the Italian troops for the sake of greater expedition.

2) *Operation Alpenveilchen*

As a change of previous directives, only *one* mountain division, without heavy vehicles, is for the time being to be designated and assembled. Its equipment is to be determined in accordance with the results of the reconnaissance being carried out at the present time.

The Italian High Command intends to have 10 divisions capable of attack within 8 to 10 weeks in Albania. Whether *one* more German mountain division is to be transferred to Albania will be decided at the beginning of March.

3) *Operation Felix*

Changes that may develop as regards the political conditions make it necessary to change previously issued orders, so as to maintain the state of readiness for *Felix* as far as this is still possible.

The 1st Mountain Division is, therefore, not to be selected for *Alpenveilchen*.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order:
WARLIMONT

No. 684

104/112998-99

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. Nr. 59

BERLIN, January 22, 1941.

I received the Soviet Russian Ambassador late this afternoon and informed him orally of the reply decided upon in answer to his statement of January 17.¹ I then handed him the text of the reply in the form of a memorandum.²

I also told Dekanozov that Count Schulenburg would hand a corresponding communication to M. Molotov either this evening or tomorrow morning.³

¹ See document No. 668.

² See document No. 681.

³ See document No. 694.

Dekanozov then inquired—for his own information, he said—about the purport of certain expressions in the reply given to him. He wanted to find out how soon German troops might be expected to march through Bulgaria against Greece—as mentioned therein—as well as whether this decision was to be considered as definite.

I referred the Ambassador in this connection to the text of paragraphs 1 and 3 of the memorandum.

Thereupon the Ambassador repeated from his communication of the 17th instant that the Soviet Government considered the appearance of any foreign military forces on Bulgarian territory as a violation of its security interests. Our statement at the end of paragraph 3 of the memorandum was not in agreement with that view.

I replied that our view was made clear in paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 of the memorandum. We believed that our plans would actually serve Soviet interests, which are opposed to England's gaining a foothold in these regions. Moreover, I asked the Ambassador to go over the memorandum again very carefully at home. He would then surely reach the conclusion that our answer removed his anxiety.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister (by teletype).

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 685

585/242903-04

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 67 of January 22

SOPIA, January 22, 1941—7: 50 p. m.

Received January 23—1: 35 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 52 of January 20.¹

Donovan, who was yesterday received by the Foreign Minister, intimated at the beginning of the conversation, about the course of which I was informed by the Foreign Minister, that although he belonged to a different party from that of Roosevelt, he was traveling, as it were, on the latter's instructions. He stated that America would do everything so that England would not lose the war. The Foreign Minister replied that according to this it seemed that America wished to prolong the war; he could visualize a different part which America might play. Donovan insisted that America could not permit England's defeat.

Further on Donovan pointed out that Bulgaria today had the key to the situation. What was Bulgaria going to do? The Foreign Minister, so he told me, had evaded this, pointing to the difficulties under which Bulgaria had to labor since winning back her independence,

¹ Not found. Possibly the intention was to refer to Richthofen's own telegram No. 52 of Jan. 20 (585/242888) which reported that Col. William J. Donovan had arrived in Sofia the previous day.

and in this way had diverted him. To a direct question whether Bulgaria felt threatened by the German concentration of troops in Rumania, he gave a negative reply and stated that a German concentration of troops in Rumania as well as in other places in Europe was quite natural. The visit with the Minister President was only quite brief since no interpreter was available and since Donovan thereupon stated he did not wish to take up the Minister President's time.

Planned for today is an audience with the King;² after that departure for Belgrade. Return journey allegedly through Turkey.³

RICHTHOFEN

¹ In telegram No. 71 of Jan. 23 Richthofen reported that Donovan's conversation with the King, according to the Minister President, developed along lines similar to that with the Foreign Minister, "except that the American toned down his language somewhat." In this telegram Richthofen referred once more to Donovan's earlier conversation with Foreign Minister Popov, citing Donovan as saying that his visit to Greece had convinced him that British help was not sufficient and that he had therefore notified President Roosevelt that America must help Greece directly very soon. (585/242913)

See also document No. 713.

² An account of Donovan's visit to Sofia, based on information which the Hungarian Minister in Sofia sent to his Government, was given in Budapest telegram No. 80 of Jan. 24 (585/242920). Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, p. 282; cf. also William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York, 1953), pp. 397-398.

No. 686

4684/E225062/1

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in Japan*

Draft Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, January 22, 1941.

zu Ha. Pol. 171 g.¹

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Voss.

With reference to your No. 49 of January 14.²

I am in agreement with your position regarding the statements of the Director of the Economic Department. Please stress at every appropriate opportunity that notwithstanding the claim to leadership in the Greater East Asian sphere, which was conceded to Japan, Germany retains her own economic interests there and cannot let herself be prevented in any way from pursuing them or become perhaps dependent on Japan. Also, please do not speak of the Greater Asian sphere, as the Japanese obviously do constantly and intentionally and as was also done inadvertently at one point in telegram No. 1071 of December 3,³ but rather of the Greater East Asian area.

WIEHL

¹ Ha. Pol. 171 g.: Not found.

² Document No. 651.

³ See document No. 424, footnote 2.

No. 687

B19/B003958-59

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*¹

BERLIN, January 22, 1941.

Ha. Pol. VI 234.

REGARDING THE PETSAMO NICKEL QUESTION

The Finnish Minister, who had asked for an appointment to deliver an urgent communication, gave me the same information about the Vyshinsky-Paasikivi talk on January 21, as was contained in Minister von Blücher's telegram No. 35 of January 22 under numerals 1 and 2.² He also confirmed Minister von Blücher's report that the Finnish Foreign Minister immediately instructed Minister Paasikivi on January 21 to inform the Soviet Government that Soviet representatives were at all times welcome in Helsinki for a continuation of the negotiations.

M. Kivimäki further informed me that the Finnish Government sent Paasikivi a new telegram this afternoon with the following contents:

The Finnish Government had on a previous occasion informed the Soviet Government that it was not opposed in principle to a transfer of the concession. It had stressed on that occasion that transfer of the concession to a Finnish-Russian company would be possible and desirable. That left open for discussion only the questions of practical implementation of the matter, i.e., 1) What the attitude of the Mond Nickel Company would be, a matter on which clarification was now being sought by M. Ramsay; and 2) What the attitude of the Soviet Government would be with respect to the previously mentioned four points concerning deliveries to Germany.³ The Finnish Government had taken advantage of the period during which negotiations were suspended, to make preparations for new negotiations in order to assure that a solution could be found which would also take account of the Russian demands.

M. Kivimäki was instructed by his Government to inform us of the above communication and to inquire whether we had any comments to make on it. I told him that I would immediately bring this information to the Foreign Minister's attention and let him know if there were any comment on it from the German point of view. In further conversation M. Kivimäki expressed concern anew over

¹ Typewritten notation: "To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. Transmission to Fuschl by teletype requested."

² This telegram (B19/B003960) reported that on Jan. 21 Vyshinsky had summoned Paasikivi and brusquely declared that he wished to hear nothing further of the reasons for delays in the Petsamo negotiations, that the Soviet Government demanded an answer by Jan. 23. Paasikivi's view was that he was compelled to renew negotiations either in Moscow or Helsinki by that date.

³ See documents Nos. 355 and footnote 3; 405 and footnote 7; and 447.

the possibility that the Russians could resort to military occupation of the nickel mines. The big question then was, what attitude the Finns ought to take in such an event. I made no comment on this matter, particularly since M. Kivimäki was himself of the opinion that judging by the two telegrams which M. Paasikivi received yesterday and today, there was probably no immediate danger of such a Russian step. He thought that the Russian negotiators would arrive at Helsinki perhaps on Saturday, January 25, and that M. Ramsay's report on the English attitude telegraphed from London would also be available in Helsinki by that time. A definite decision would then be possible as to the attitude which Finland should take at the negotiations.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister in connection with the memorandum of January 19⁴ and with reference to Minister Schnurre's presentation tomorrow.

WIEHL

⁴ Document No. 675.

No. 688

813/276407-18

Unsigned Memorandum¹

As I² had already told Ambassador Alfieri, it was in principle entirely agreeable to us, and consistent with our policy, for the Italian Government to maintain friendly political relations with the Soviet Union.³ Nothing, however, was mentioned in my conversation with Alfieri about any Italian plan for specific agreements between Italy and Soviet Russia. I had moreover already explained to Count Ciano last summer on the occasion of the initial opening of the Italo-Russian talks that, with respect to certain political questions, especially as far as they concerned the Balkans, it was essential to proceed with caution and avoid if possible any final formulation and commitment.⁴ Count Ciano was fully in agreement with that point of view

¹The substance of this memorandum was communicated by Weizsäcker to Italian Chargé d'Affaires Cosmelli on the evening of Jan. 22. Weizsäcker reported to Ribbentrop by teletype on Jan. 22 that he had arranged the meeting with Cosmelli "immediately after Minister Schmidt's arrival." (813/276406)

It would appear that Schmidt had brought from Ribbentrop to Weizsäcker the memorandum which is printed here with instructions to communicate it to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires at once.

According to a marginal note from Weizsäcker to Woermann (813/276419-21), Weizsäcker had also handed to Cosmelli at the same meeting a copy of the Soviet memorandum of Jan. 17 (see document No. 668) and of the German memorandum in reply (see document No. 681).

² I.e., Ribbentrop.

³ See document No. 610.

⁴ See vol. x of this series, document No. 348.

at the time.⁵ Such caution now appeared to us more necessary than ever in view of the situation that had developed as a result of Italy's action against Greece. Proceeding from this general premise we had the following to say in regard to the three problems raised by M. Molotov and the position the Italian Government proposed to take on them:⁶

1. Guarantee of the Axis Powers in Rumania's behalf.

The formulation of the Italian position contained in Signor Alfieri's note appeared inadvisable to us. Without a doubt, the guarantee had general character and consequently implied the obligation on the part of the Axis Powers to protect the Rumanian state within its present boundaries against any outside aggression from whatever side. Count Ciano would recall that during the conferences leading to the Vienna Award, we had jointly given the Rumanian representatives the unequivocal and definite assurance that the armies of the Axis Powers would take the field in the event of any attack directed against Rumania. The declaration which Italy was going to make to the Soviet Union accordingly ought not be phrased in such a way as to permit the Soviet Government to infer that the guarantee would not apply as regards to Russia. Rather, we considered it essential to let the Soviet Government know in appropriate form that Italy as well as Germany, in view of the vital interests which both countries had in Rumania, would not allow any encroachment upon the territory of the Rumanian state within its present boundaries.

In consonance with the statements in this matter conveyed by us to the Soviet Government through Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg as early as the beginning of September,⁷ we should deem it correct for the Italian Government to formulate its position to the Soviet Government approximately as follows: "The guarantee given to Rumania by the Axis Powers contains no edge against Soviet Russia, as is evident from the circumstances in which the guarantee was given. Italy as well as Germany has a fundamental interest in the preservation of peace and tranquillity in Rumania, an interest deriving primarily from the close relationships of both countries with the economy of Rumania. In particular, the extraction of Rumanian oil and its conveyance to Italy and Germany, along with the unimpeded importation of Rumanian grain, are of enduring and vital importance to the Axis Powers. Therefore late last August, Italy and Germany in the extremely critical situation at that time took the role of mediators and through their Arbitration Award ensured the peace that was threatened in the Danube area. In order,

⁵ See vol. x of this series, document No. 357.

⁶ See document No. 610 and enclosure.

⁷ See documents Nos. 7, 13, 24, and 38.

however, to avert once and for all the easy recurrence of similar disagreements in that area, the Axis Powers undertook to give the guarantee when the Rumanian Government at that time expressly requested that the guarantee be granted. Inasmuch as the Arbitration Award necessarily involved cession of a substantial portion of former Rumanian national territory, it was entirely natural that Rumania would feel that she ought to be able henceforth to regard both her boundary with Hungary and her national territory generally as finally secured against any outside encroachment. Inasmuch as the territorial demands advanced by the Soviet Government against Rumania had then already found their solution, and the peaceful settlement of Bulgaria's demands also appeared to be assured, the Axis Powers no longer had any reservations on these grounds about granting the guarantee."

2. The Danube question.

In this matter, the situation as it affects Italy, it may be recalled, is that the Soviet Government initially took the position that only the riparian states were concerned in the international settlement of the Danube question. The Soviet Government expressed its agreement with us only after we emphatically pointed out that, while we shared the Soviet position in principle, it was necessary to regard the Axis Powers in this respect as a single political entity, and that we therefore had to insist upon Italy's participation. There is no occasion consequently for Italy to show the Soviet Government any particular accommodation in the Danube question by way of gratitude, as it were, for the gesture made by it. From the substantive point of view we regard the position taken by the Soviet Government at the conference at Bucharest as unacceptable. We are determined on our part to insist not only upon completely equal participation of Germany, Italy, Rumania, and Russia in the international supervision of the maritime Danube but will insist also that in the organization to be established for the practical implementation of the program Rumania, on whose national territory the organization would carry out its program, must naturally have the lead. We had also promised this to General Antonescu. The very fact that the Soviet Government was now making a fundamental issue of this question indicated that it was apparently not motivated in this matter exclusively by technical or other purely objective considerations. Still, in order to avoid any fruitless controversy with the Soviet Government regarding this question, we thought that it would be the wisest course for the time being to give some plausible explanation and to postpone the Bucharest Conference, which is set to reconvene on January 20, until next March.⁸ We are asking the Italian Government to

⁸ See document No. 641.

adhere to this and to inform the Soviet Government at this time that Italy first wished to consult with Germany as well as Rumania concerning the future treatment of the Danube question and that she would gladly cooperate in any practical solution mutually satisfactory to all parties.

3. The question of the Straits.

This question, which is also in our view of decisive importance, makes it quite peculiarly necessary to take account of the necessities arising out of the present situation. The development of the military situation in Albania makes the military intervention by Germany in the Balkans probable. Consequently, the relationship of the Axis Powers to Bulgaria and especially to Turkey comes now to the forefront of attention. Bulgaria will shortly join the Tripartite Pact and thereby lay the political foundation of her future policy toward the Axis Powers. It is clear that thereby the relationship of Bulgaria as well as that of the Axis Powers to Turkey will be strained, and what now matters is to restrain Turkey from an unfriendly attitude toward us. If Italy now were to make any concrete promises to the Soviet Government concerning the Straits at Turkey's expense, this would surely become known to Turkey and might decisively influence her attitude in the coming months. We therefore consider it advisable for the Italian Government to confine itself to a statement that the Italian Government is entirely sympathetic to a modification of the Straits statute in favor of Russia; it would, for example, agree that, as regards passage of naval vessels, such passage should be allowed only to naval vessels of states adjacent to the Black Sea. The details of the arrangement would of course have to be left for future negotiations with Turkey.

In general I should like to add that for my part I fully recognize the necessity now stressed by the Italian Government for close coordination of German and Italian policy toward the Soviet Government, and that I welcome Italy's consultation with us. I always in the past secured the agreement of Count Ciano and Il Duce himself regarding all moves undertaken by the German side in relation to the Soviet Government. It is obvious that the questions now raised in the Italo-Russian conversations are inseparably connected with the ideas which were developed by us in agreement with the Italian Government for M. Molotov during his visit to Berlin. We, too, are faced with the problem of resuming shortly the talks already begun with M. Molotov, while conversely it is essential for the time being to observe reserve and prudence on account of the necessities arising out of the present situation in the Balkans. We are fully appreciative of the fact that, with Italo-Russian conversations now having been opened, the Italian Government desires to arrive at some, at least provisionally positive, results. Perhaps it may be possible

to find a formulation for such a provisional result which, notwithstanding its general character, would have some substantive content and still would not ignore the political necessities previously noted. Otherwise some very undesirable complications might arise for the Axis Powers. It would perhaps be politically advantageous if an appropriate communiqué about a preliminary Italo-Russian understanding were then published in the press without giving any details. We would be grateful, however, if the Italian Government would inform us about its proposals regarding such a general political accord with the Soviet Government before communicating them to Moscow.

No. 689

378/209399-401

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*¹

Dir. Ha. Pol. No. 10

BERLIN, January 22, 1941.

After the Foreign Minister had given instructions by telephone that the negotiations of the Hemmen delegation in Wiesbaden could be continued on a purely economic basis without political concessions or pressure, the Commercial Policy Committee yesterday, with Minister Hemmen present, dealt with the further points for negotiation.² Our main wishes are the following:

a. Establishment of supervision of the movement of goods, foreign exchange, persons, and of communications at the outer borders of France and installation of commissioners at the central offices in Paris. This is particularly important for counterintelligence reasons, since there has so far been no supervision of any sort at the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, and the Swiss border, and the line of demarcation has been relaxed to a large extent.

b. Transfer by means of a system of trusteeship of the majority of the shares held by the French Government in French airplane factories. This is particularly desired by the Reichsmarschall in the interest of thorough utilization of these factories for armament orders.³

c. Consent of the French Government to a German acquisition of French shares in enterprises in France and third countries.

d. Consent of the French Government to the dispatch of French workers to Germany.

The Commercial Policy Committee joined in the view of Minister Hemmen that these demands, which go beyond the Armistice Treaty, can be enforced in Wiesbaden only if certain means of pressure are available. The threat of sealing up the line of demarcation cannot be

¹ Marginal note: "To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request that it be transmitted to Fuschl by teletype."

² Wiesel's record of this meeting of the Commercial Policy Committee is filmed on 1002/306215-22.

³ See document No. 654, footnote 7.

used as a means of pressure because it is the predominant opinion of the OKW and of the economic departments that this would run counter to our own German interests. It was therefore decided to give Minister Hemmen the following means of pressure:

1. The threat of introducing compulsory registration for gold and foreign exchange in the occupied territory. This measure was already planned in November, but was deferred at that time when Ambassador Abetz pointed out that the morale, particularly of the rural population of France, would be impaired in a manner intolerable for the French Government.⁴ A few days ago, however, Ambassador Abetz informed Minister Hemmen that he was now withdrawing his objections of that time.

2. Refusal to discuss a request by the French Government to reduce the installments on the occupation costs, which has been announced by the French chief negotiator. The Commercial Policy Committee was of the opinion that in case our demands listed under *a.* to *d.* above are fulfilled, Minister Hemmen could be authorized to negotiate about a reduction of the installments from the present 20 million reichsmarks per day to 15 million reichsmarks per day, with the provision that of this 5 million reichsmarks must be paid in the future in transferable assets (gold, foreign exchange, goods, securities), and the remaining 10 million reichsmarks as in the past paid into the account at the Bank of France.

The representatives of the departments on the Commercial Policy Committee made such an authorization subject to the consent of their chiefs. I myself have made both of the means of pressure envisaged subject to the consent of the Foreign Minister. Regarding point 1: The introduction of compulsory registration for gold and foreign exchange in the occupied area could be agreed to in view of the changed attitude of Ambassador Abetz, in the event that for political reasons it is now no longer necessary to give the same consideration as in the past to the impairment of the position of the French Government. Regarding point 2: The Foreign Minister last November had reserved to himself the right to grant the concession of a reduction in installment payments toward occupation costs for possible further political discussions with M. Laval himself. It would now be urgently desirable to give this authority to Minister Hemmen so that he may use it in the manner proposed, since otherwise it will hardly be possible to enforce the four demands mentioned.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary, with the request for instructions.⁵

WIEHL

⁴ According to a memorandum of Nov. 7 by Wiehl, the initiative for taking this step came from the internal departments, especially from Göring (121/120138-39). Abetz' objections were expressed in Paris telegram No. 1129 of Nov. 8 (121/120141).

⁵ Instructions not found. See, however, document No. 712.

No. 690

221/149066

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, January 22, 1941.

The OKW informed me today that in the last few days the Führer repeated an earlier instruction, namely that until further notice no official discussions may be held with prominent French persons without his explicit instructions.

RITTER

No. 691

201/89229-30

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 165

BERLIN, January 22, 1941.
Sent January 23—3:00 a. m.

For the Minister in person.

With reference to the telephone conversation which has just taken place.¹

We recommend the following action by General Antonescu:

1. Since blood has been shed between General Antonescu and the Legion,² there is no longer any room for half measures. Only drastic measures can now attain the objective.

[General Antonescu as Chief of State should therefore proclaim the seditious Legionnaires to be rebels, and state that he does not negotiate with rebels.

The General should furthermore demand the immediate withdrawal and disbanding of all formations of the Legion. If this is not done he must secure his rule in the capital and in the country by all means of compulsion available to him.]³

General Antonescu should declare at once and still during the night an emergency or martial law and⁴ have all the ringleaders involved in the uprising placed under arrest.

¹ No record of this conversation has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry, but see Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu*, p. 120.

² There had been armed clashes between the Iron Guard and the regular forces of the state on Jan. 21 following Antonescu's dismissal of Minister of Interior Petrovicescu.

The Halder Diary contains the following entry for the evening of Jan. 21: "Report of domestic disturbances in Bucharest and Rumania. The military mission has instructions not to get involved in matters of domestic politics, but in case of necessity to support Antonescu with military power (upon being requested)."

³ The two paragraphs in brackets were deleted before the instruction was sent. According to a telegram sent from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the State Secretary on Jan. 25, these and other deletions in the text of the telegram were made in accordance with telephone instructions from the Foreign Minister (201/89231-33).

⁴ The words scored through were deleted before the instruction was sent. See footnote 3.

2. General Antonescu should immediately⁵ proclaim himself the leader of the Legion.

In such a proclamation General Antonescu should state approximately the following:

He had been Codreanu's friend and knew his political testament. He was resolved to carry it out against any kind of resistance. He had fought and been imprisoned for the Legion. He had forced King Carol to abdicate and had thereby opened to the Legion the road to power under his leadership. He was determined to lead Rumania toward a better future through this period so fateful for the country. He knew that the leading role in this belonged to Codreanu's Legion. Since Codreanu's death, however, the Legion had been practically leaderless. Irresponsible elements had exploited this to plot a revolution against the Rumanian state in the name of the Legion, partly for egotistical reasons and partly in the pay of England.

In order to lead the Legion back on the right path of its leader, Codreanu, he was now placing himself at the head of the Legion. As the leader of the Legion he was calling on all true and decent Legionnaires in this grave hour for Rumania to place themselves behind him and rebuild Rumania side by side with the Axis Powers, Germany and Italy. Long live the Legionnaire state, Rumania!

After General Antonescu is master of the situation and has issued the proclamation, he must form a cabinet in which he may include only the Legionnaires who are entirely loyal to him.

Oral addition: Marxists to be executed. Idealists to be exiled to Germany on condition that they must refrain from all political activity, otherwise they will be extradited.

End of the instruction.

Supplement:

Please keep this instruction to yourself and carry it out only after receiving special personal instructions from me by telephone call or telegraph.⁶

RIBBENTROP

⁵ This passage had read originally: "at the latest tomorrow morning."

⁶ See document No. 696.

No. 692

186/74599

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 242 of January 23

For the Foreign Minister.

MADRID, January 23, 1941.

Received January 23—4:25 p. m.¹

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 330 to the Foreign Minister's special train at approximately 5:00 p. m."

With reference to your telegram No. 150.²

In accordance with instructions I have just delivered to Franco in the presence of the Foreign Minister the oral message of the Reich Government. A detailed telegraphic report follows.³

STOHRER

² Not found. This telegram presumably contained the reply to Stohrer's telegram No. 225 (see document No. 682, footnote 2).

³ See document No. 695.

No. 693

585/242909

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 69

SOFIA, January 23, 1941.

Received January 23—5:10 p. m.

Secret for officer in charge.

With reference to your telegram No. 59 of January 20 (Pol. I M 121 g. Rs. II)¹ and my telegram No. 59 of January 21.²

In the name of the Bulgarian Government, the Minister President expressed to me willingness to sign the Pact as soon as possible. The King and other Ministers were in agreement. Thus Cabinet meetings were not being considered; the Pact would be submitted to the Parliament only at a later time after it had been signed. He protested against the accusation that the Bulgarian Government, which was doing everything to facilitate our move through [Bulgaria] was trying to delay signing. He himself had expressed this willingness even earlier on two conditions:

1. Protection of the country. In order to hasten the accession to the Pact he himself had proposed the immediate start of General Staff conversations. After the return of the Bulgarian delegation and a satisfactory outcome, Draganov would immediately return to Berlin and the signing could then take place within a few days.

2. Settlement of the territorial question; this had been achieved in the meantime through the statement by the State Secretary.³ He would be grateful if this were laid down in some way at the signing of the Pact, possibly in a note or protocol.

¹ Not found.

² In this telegram Richthofen reported arranging with the Minister President for the Bulgarian delegation to the General Staff conversations to depart on Jan. 20; consequently the conversations could begin on the afternoon of Jan. 21 (585/242893-94).

³ See document No. 658.

The return of the armed forces Attachés together with the Bulgarian delegation is to be expected today, or at the latest tomorrow morning. A further report will then follow.⁴

RICHTHOFEN

⁴ Richthofen reported further in telegram No. 77 of Jan. 24 that the Bulgarian delegation, and the German armed forces Attachés had not yet returned (585/242918). In a subsequent telegram, No. 86 of Jan. 26, he stated that he was able to talk only briefly to the Military and the Air Attaché, as they were proceeding to Berlin at once, but that their impressions of the conversations were favorable (585/242929). See document No. 704.

No. 694

104/113003

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, January 23, 1941—9:21 p. m.

SECRET

Received January 23 [24]—12:25 a. m.

No. 161 of January 23

With reference your telegram No. 129 of January 22.¹

Instruction carried out today.

Molotov stated that the Soviet Government would examine and consider our communication, after which he would take a stand, if necessary. He understood the communication of the Government of the German Reich to mean that the transit of German troops through Bulgaria was in itself a matter that was definitely decided on, but only in the event that England should expand her military operations on Greek soil beyond their present scope. On the other hand, an occupation of the Straits was not anticipated, unless an inimical act by Turkey should compel Germany to do so.

For the rest, Molotov stated the well-known argument according to which the Soviet Government considered Bulgaria and the Straits as a security zone of the Soviet Union and that it was opposed to any spread of the war, particularly in the Black Sea, wherein it believed itself in agreement with the Government of the German Reich.

SCHULENBURG

¹ In this telegram (104/112991-93) Schulenburg was instructed to give Molotov the text of the German reply as formulated in document No. 681.

No. 695

136/74600-602

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, January 23, 1941.

No. 254 of January 23

Received January 24—2:50 a. m.¹

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

After I had read aloud the oral message from the Reich Government,² Franco declared that these communications were of extreme gravity (*gravedad*) and contained untruths. When I immediately protested against this Franco very heatedly asserted that he had never taken a vacillating position and that his policy was unswervingly on the Axis side, from gratitude and as a man of honor. He had never lost sight of entry into the war. This entry would come; his feeling of responsibility for his country because of the catastrophic economic condition had hitherto not made possible an actual entry into the war.

When I replied that from a military standpoint the war would be virtually waged by us alone and that we were willing additionally to give Spain economic aid, Franco stated that it wasn't the military aspect of the question which caused him any concern; Spain would bear the necessary hardships of war, without faltering. In an economic sense, however, we still failed to realize the true situation of Spain. In a lengthy discourse the Generalissimo then listed all the long-familiar aspects characterizing his country's economic weakness and distress; in so doing he went into special details about the transportation problem; he also stated that on the basis of information he had gathered he doubted whether the French rail and road network would permit the delivery of sufficient economic aid over and above the necessary war material for the campaign against Gibraltar. I disputed this, stating that (clear text of word missing) had promised us to give Spain economic support and also to see to it that this aid could be furnished. What better employment, I said, was there for the huge vehicle park of our armies, at present not engaged in operations, plus the enormous booty of motor trucks captured in occupied regions, etc.

Franco seemed chiefly to be stung by the reproach of a vacillating policy, because he reverted to this again and again as being an un-

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded to the Special Train by teletype, Jan. 24, 3:30 a. m."

² See documents Nos. 682 and 692.

warranted accusation. From the beginning of the war, he said, he had pursued a policy friendly to Germany. Even today he personally took care of all sorts of details—mentioning a few—in order to promote our interests, despite occasional heavy pressure from our adversaries, and right now, in the face of the current food shortage, he had yet to deviate one millimeter from his Germanophile course; nor had he made any political concessions. Spain had suffered a great deal and had gone through 3 years of civil war, and had been compelled, due to the outbreak of a new war, to start rebuilding without any outside aid, without help from us or from Italy, using only her own feeble resources. Numerous instances of failure naturally have been the result of this, he admitted.

The Generalissimo stressed again that Spain nevertheless had vigorously pushed her military preparations with the aid of her slender technical resources, as our military authorities themselves acknowledge, and had achieved remarkable progress in this respect.

Again and again I tried to steer the discussion back to the essential points. I emphasized especially how important for Spain was the time element, the need to make a prompt decision, and the importance of our promises of military and economic support. In particular I impressed upon the Caudillo that we wished only the best for him; that we did not propose to lead the country down the road to disaster; that it was to our own interest to see Spain emerge strengthened from this conflict, etc. I also stated repeatedly that, subject to the familiar requirement, we were ready to alleviate the country's most acute distress by advance deliveries of supplies.

To this point Franco replied that he had immediately asked the Council of Defense to study this question, with instructions to make an immediate survey of the (clear text of word missing) which Spain needed urgently.³

At this point the Foreign Minister spoke for the first time, saying that during his conferences in Germany he had from the beginning insisted that Spain would need economic assistance even before entering the war, a fact which had become still more clear lately with the rapid deterioration of the situation. We too, therefore, by declining this request so far, were coresponsible for the fact that Spain was still so little ready for war.

When the conference, because of Franco's many digressions into details and nonessentials, threatened to drift off more and more from the point of the matter, I repeatedly reverted to the core of the question and called for a prompt decision and resolve, again emphasizing

³ Ambassador Stohrer briefly saw Serrano Suñer on Jan. 22 and asked whether the discussions in the Defense Council had led to any result. Serrano Suñer replied that they had not. Stohrer's impression was that there were great differences of opinion within the Council. (telegram No. 227 of Jan. 22: 136/74598)

that Spain would have to act in the immediate future, otherwise her action would have no value.

On my taking leave Franco promised to give me an answer as soon as possible, with the renewed assurance that he would continue as in the past to work toward making Spain quickly ready for war.

These exchanges, lasting an hour and a quarter, revealed even more clearly than the long conversation on Monday⁴ Franco's irresolution, and disclosed the difference—which Franco on one occasion had himself mentioned—between him and the Foreign Minister who seems more willing to take the decisive step, once we have delivered the most urgent advance supplies.

I am conferring again with the Foreign Minister tomorrow. A further telegraphic report will follow.⁵

STOHRER

⁴ Jan. 20. See document No. 677.

⁵ See document No. 707.

No. 696

201/89261

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 125 of January 23

BUCHAREST, January 23, 1941.

Received January 24—5:50 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 165 of January 22¹ and telephone conversation of January 23.²

General Antonescu thanks the Foreign Minister very much for the proposals and the interest which they reflect. The proposals were entirely in accordance with his views and were in part already contained in today's manifesto that had been broadcast over the radio. He would release a proclamation in accordance with point 2 (formerly 5)³ in connection with the formation of the Cabinet, which would probably take place tomorrow.

As far as punishment was concerned, he intended to take very drastic action, since unbelievably brutal acts had taken place that were unworthy of Legionnaires. Thus 693 Jews who were interned in Jilava had died under the most shameful torture, soldiers were soaked with gasoline and burned, etc. Aside from this, persons like Sima, if he

¹ Document No. 691.

² No record of this telephone conversation has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry.

³ The numbering of the paragraphs in document No. 691 was changed when passages were subsequently deleted. See footnote 3 of that document.

should release them, would be a constant danger; yet he intended to spare him in particular. He welcomed with thanks the proposal that exiles be taken into the Reich.

FABRICIUS

No. 697

104/113004

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. No. 1

BERLIN, January 23, 1941.

Kase, the Japanese Counselor of Embassy, visited me today and inquired about the political significance of the economic agreement concluded in Moscow and of the other agreements concluded at the same time.¹

I told him that at the commencement of the new German-Soviet friendly relations the Soviet Union had viewed the economic agreement also from the political angle and handled it accordingly. In the interim there had then been certain periods when this political note had receded. The present signing in Moscow and, above all, the great prominence that the Soviet Government had given the agreement in the press, must be considered an indication that in Moscow, too, German-Soviet economic relations were again being handled from the political angle.

WOERMANN

¹ See documents Nos. 637 and 640.

No. 698

189/88534-35

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, January 23, 1941.

e. o. Ha. Pol. IX. b 167.

In the enclosed memorandum¹ transmitted by the Ambassador here the Argentine Government communicated its intention of concluding a customs union with Brazil and several neighboring countries on the La Plata in order to alleviate the economic difficulties in which Argentina along with most of the South American countries finds herself. This would be done by steps, eliminating at first merely a number of customs barriers. The Argentine Government believes that in spite of the most-favored-nation clause agreed upon in the German-Argentine trade agreement it does not need German consent for such a procedure.

¹ Document No. 555, enclosure.

It is correct that a customs union represents a general exception to the most-favored-nation clause which does not have to be especially agreed upon. However, because only a limited number of concessions is to be arranged here for the time being, and the full customs union, for the preparation of which these concessions are meant to serve, is still far off, the legal position can be taken that Argentina needs German consent for the introduction of such concessions. However, the Argentine intention is essentially also in the German interest. Such an economic union of the South American states will make them more capable of resistance to the plans for economic and political supremacy of the United States of America. Such a larger South American economic sphere will provide a more productive and more receptive partner for the future Greater German economic sphere. The fear that such a union might promote the industrialization of South America to the disadvantage of the German export market lies far in the future, quite aside from the fact that we will not in any case be able in the long run to prevent such industrialization. The further fear that such a South American union could prove to be a preparatory step in the formation of a Pan-American customs union is without foundation in fact, since the South American countries can never find their market in North America but only in Europe.

The Argentine memorandum should, therefore, in principle be answered by stating that we do not wish to claim, with respect to any separate customs concessions which Argentina may accord to Brazil or other adjacent South American countries, in preparation of a future customs union, the most-favored-nation treatment to which we are entitled as such under the trade agreement.

Such a waiver should be made dependent on Argentina's likewise making a corresponding statement that she, too, will not claim for herself any customs privileges which Germany might accord to other European countries.

Before such reply is made the consent of the offices concerned with commercial policy should be obtained in the Commercial Policy Committee.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for approval of the proposed course of action.²

WIEHL

² Marginal note: "Herr Moraht: Has the proposal been approved? Cf[odius], Feb. 6." For further documents on this subject, see vol. XII of this series.

No. 699

201/89248-51

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 124 of January 23

BUCHAREST, January 24, 1941.
Received January 24—2:50 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

At 5:30 p. m. I had a rather long conversation with General Antonescu, who views the situation with complete calm and objectivity.¹ Shots at isolated spots are directed against sharpshooters on roofs; they are now proceeding systematically with cleaning up the houses. Those arrested are given a short interrogation and taken to a concentration camp. In this connection it has become evident that a large number of these were recruited from people who were brought to Bucharest in the last few days. From this the General concludes that the plot of the Legionnaires had been prepared. He inclines to the view that Sima's refusal to go to Salzburg is connected with this² and that the latter, assuming that the General would be away for some time, wanted to bring about the uprising and get rid of him. This is also indicated by the occupation of the gendarmerie barracks located next to the office of the Minister President with riff-raff armed by the dismissed Minister of Interior, and quartering of other villas in the immediate neighborhood of this office with Legionnaires from the provinces. General Antonescu considers Minister of Interior Petrovicescu to be a traitor and Sima to be a rebel. He is firmly resolved not to cooperate with either any longer. When I asked how he visualizes the future, the General said: "Only with the Legionnaires as a basis, but without these insincere elements."

He knew enough other Legionnaires who had already expressed their sympathy to him and were willing to part company with Sima. He believes that he will be in a better position to put into effect Codreanu's true idea through them. Among them was also [the] father [of] Codreanu, who had told him that he intends to keep away from politics absolutely and devote himself exclusively to straightening out the Legion. He also places his hope on Labor Minister Jasinschi, whom he had reproached most seriously this morning. He considers him to have been misled by Sima. A compromise was out of the question. If he should find Sima, who was in hiding, he would hold him responsible just as he would Police Prefect Ghika, Minister of Interior Petrovicescu, labor leader Groza, among others, but he would not undertake any executions; if the troops reacted to the terrible acts of brutality that had been committed on their comrades one

¹ See document No. 691 and footnote 2.² See document No. 647.

must not blame them for it. The General said that he could depend upon his troops. He denied that soldiers had been disarmed in any considerable numbers, and even more so that soldiers had defected. Four small tanks were in the hands of the Legionnaires; two of these were police tanks which had already been in possession of the Legionnaires and two came from the Malaxa plant. He now had one and a half divisions in Bucharest and the troops were under central direction. More than 100 tanks were standing ready. He no longer feared any surprises.

In general he had good news from the provinces; in most cases buildings and weapons were handed over by the Legionnaires to the military without fighting; in isolated cases the cooperation between the military and the Legionnaire Prefects was excellent; in such cases he did not interfere.

The leading Legionnaires are very much depressed. They keep coming to me at the Legation to get advice. They ask whether Germany is really going to leave them in the lurch. They see a new period of suffering ahead of them. I tell them that they made a great mistake by not following our advice and placing themselves under General Antonescu, who is a national-minded and pure man who loves his people above everything, stood up for them courageously, and openly espoused the Legionnaire movement. At the same time he had the confidence of the Führer, and we had an urgent interest in tranquillity and order in Rumania. The Legionnaires realize their mistakes, but in spite of their difficult situation they are not willing to part company with their leader Sima. They fear persecutions. I have calmed them in this respect after conferring with General Antonescu. I am convinced that a large part of these Legionnaires will fall into line once more, and we have an interest in this, since they are a guarantee that in the future Rumanian policy will be [conducted] on the side of Germany and Italy.

FABRICIUS

No. 700

201/89287-69

*The Special Representative in Charge of Economic Questions
to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOPIA, January 24, 1941—12:30 a. m.

No. 76 of January 23

Received January 24—6:30 a. m.

Owing to my urgent departure for Sofia ¹ I am reporting from here on the last conversation with General Antonescu:

¹ Neubacher had gone to Sofia to negotiate an agreement on financial aspects of the transit of German troops through Bulgaria. The agreement was signed on Feb. 1. Relevant papers are filmed on 3710/E036655-57; 285/242886, 242921-22, 242928, 242935-36, 242940-41; 274/177632-35.

After having informed Minister Fabricius about the outcome of my conversation with Horia Sima² and after having telephoned that the Guard was calling off hostilities, I visited General Antonescu at 7:00 in the morning. My first attempt to get there had failed for the reason that, by mistake, my car was shot at with machine guns. The General received the more detailed oral information and thanked me for the efforts on behalf of the Rumanian people. Then, in spite of my statements that I had no political mandate beyond the attempt made as a matter of course to end the bloodshed, the General gave a very long explanation regarding the antecedents of the crisis on April 10 [sic] between the General and the Guard. This he dictated to a colonel of his staff for the purpose of having a written record and of drawing up a historic document including my introductory communication, and including his thanks, and my other brief remarks. In this statement the General termed Horia Sima and the responsible leaders of the Guard rebels whom the people and the Army expect him to punish. I pointed out the fact that in influencing Horia Sima and his lieutenants I had used the argument that as recently as yesterday evening the General had formulated demands as a basis for an understanding and strangely enough had shown willingness to negotiate. In this belief I had therefore spoken with assurance about the situation to the Legionnaires a few hours after the latest discussions concerning a basis for an understanding; obviously this situation now no longer prevailed, since the General had just told me that he would have the leaders of the Legion sentenced as rebels. This statement of mine was not a criticism of the General's new position. I was making it solely, for the protection of my honor, in order to establish the fact that in discussing the situation with the leadership of the Legion at the decisive hour, I had not at all wanted to present their situation after cessation of hostilities as being better than I myself had known it to be up to that time. The General answered my statement by pointing out that the question of guilt ought to be dealt with in such a way, and the further evolution so decided that these things could be vindicated by history. While pointing out that I did not have any political mandate, I also recommended to the General that, in connection with the forthcoming political decisions of far-reaching importance, he take advantage of the good advice of Minister von Killinger, who was expected to arrive today.³ I did this in particular because grave decisions regarding measures of atonement were to be expected today.⁴

² See document No. 709.

³ Fabricius reported on Jan. 24 that Killinger had arrived that morning and that he would turn over to him the business of the Legation in the course of the day (201/89254).

⁴ Cf. Hermann Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost, 1940-1945* (Göttingen, 1956), pp. 57-58.

In spite of the chaotic conditions in the city and the great number of street blockades and nests of resistance Sima's order was by and large carried out in the course of the morning.

NEUBACHER
RLNTELEN

No. 701

84/62438-40

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 194 of January 23 WASHINGTON, January 24, 1941—3:39 a. m.
Received January 24—5:35 p. m.

The letter of January 21 from Under Secretary of State Welles to the Soviet Ambassador here regarding lifting of the moral embargo imposed on Russia on December 2, 1939, the text of which was reported by DNB New York on January 21,¹ met in the American press (except for several, in part noteworthy, comments, such as those of Krock in today's *New York Times*) and in the radio with the reaction desired by the American Government.

The repeal of this moral embargo is being hailed as an expression of realistic American foreign policy in the present world struggle and as a skillful move against the Powers of the Tripartite Pact. At the same time one launches into speculations, doubtless officially nurtured, concerning the Russian move in return, and it is emphasized that so evident a political and material concession by America could not have been made without corresponding Russian concessions. According to these interpretations such a move would naturally be conceivable only in the form of the Soviet Union's dissociating itself from the Axis Powers and above all² stiffening its attitude with respect to Japan so that Japan's hands might be tied not only by China but also by Japan's continuing differences with Russia in the Pacific area. Press comments that go even farther see in the lifting of the moral embargo a new step toward friendly understanding of the United States with Russia, and in this way between Russia and England.

Nothing is desired more by the American Government than that this step should be understood by the Powers of the Tripartite Pact and neutrals to mean that Japan senses in it a serious threat from

¹ For the text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. 1, p. 696.

² The first part of this sentence is apparently garbled. The original reads: "Als solche Gegenleistung kommt naturgemäss nach diesen Interpretationen nur Abrücken der Sowjetunion von den Achsenmächten und von aller Versteifung gegenüber Japan in Betracht". This is obviously in contradiction with the remainder of the sentence and it may be assumed that the text should read "Abrücken der Sowjetunion von den Achsenmächten und vor allem Versteifung gegenüber Japan in Betracht".

the Russian camp, and that Russia herself considers it a materially and politically valuable gesture of friendship. The reality, however, looks different.

1. First of all, as far as the material aspect of the lifting of the embargo on planes and airplane material is concerned, the American Government is thereby practically making only an empty gesture toward Russia. To be sure, the moral embargo is being lifted, but compulsory export licensing of the same products, which has become stricter since July 2, 1940, continues. Furthermore, the letter of Under Secretary of State Welles contains no assurance that anything will be delivered or can in the future be delivered, or that export licenses with respect to Russia will be given sympathetic handling. That Russia, in view of the heretofore lagging tempo of American rearmament and of the supplying of England, cannot be supplied by the United States of America with really useful planes, is evident from my telegrams in the matter and those of the Military Attaché. The numerous bottlenecks in production, the demands from her own armed forces, as well as the urgent requirements of England and her allies will simply not permit of the delivery of planes to Russia in appreciable quantities.

2. Psychologically too, the letter of the Under Secretary of State cannot have a favorable effect on Russia, because of its arrogant reference to the "moral" embargo imposed on Russia on the occasion of the Finnish campaign, and to the repeal of this "penalty" which is delivered in the tone of an act of grace by the judge of the world. From this standpoint it merits careful study by the Russian Government.

3. Politically the measure obviously represents a one-sided gesture of the American Government. It must be evaluated within the framework of the conversations held between the Russian Ambassador here and the State Department.³ As Oumansky repeatedly told me, he made, in reply to the American attempts at rapprochement, a number of demands that were a matter of course for Russia, such as: the release of the machine tools ordered and paid for by Russia, but illegally confiscated; the handling of export licenses in accordance with the Russian trade agreement of August 6, 1940;⁴ the unblocking of accounts and the release of ships of the Baltic countries in the United States; the recognition of the union of these countries with Russia; and, in addition to all this, perhaps as the minimum demand, the lifting of the moral embargo. These demands have thus far been met only to a small extent by the American Government. In line

³ Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. III, pp. 244-441; also, *ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 667-768.

⁴ For text of the agreement effected by exchange of notes signed Aug. 6, 1940, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 179, or 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 2366; for text of press release by the Department, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. III, p. 105.

with this development, the letter of the Under Secretary of State represents a further gradual step of compliance with Russia's demands, in return for which Russia scarcely obliged to offer concessions.

Despite this sober evaluation, it will have to be taken into account that the American Government undoubtedly expects a favorable political effect from the lifting of the moral embargo. It is significant that the step followed directly upon the speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister,⁵ who had especially stressed Japan's efforts to arrive at an understanding with Russia, so that the sudden conciliatory American gesture toward Russia might be viewed as a countermove to this speech. It is also significant that it was one of the first measures taken after the inauguration of the President and was thus obviously supposed to assume special importance abroad. The concern over the threat in the Pacific, which was clearly expressed in the President's opening message to Congress⁶ is also undoubtedly behind the lifting of the moral embargo on Russia. Unless Russia unequivocally joins the Powers of the Tripartite Pact, further American concessions toward Russia can probably be expected.

THOMSEN

⁵ For the text of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's address to the Japanese Diet delivered on Jan. 21, see World Peace Foundation, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. III, pp. 260-267.

⁶ For the text of President Roosevelt's annual message to the Congress of Jan. 6, see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. IX, pp. 663-678. Thomsen reported about this address in telegram No. 36 of Jan. 7 (84/62321-22); there is in the files also a commentary by Dieckhoff submitted to the Foreign Minister on Jan. 7 (84/62323-25).

No. 702

136/74605-06

The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Spain

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, January 24, 1941—11:05 p. m.

No. 35 of January 24

from the Special Train Received Berlin, January 24—11:40 p. m.

No. 172 of January 24

from the Foreign Ministry Sent January 24—12:00 midnight.

For the Ambassador personally.

Have read your report.¹ Immediately on receipt of this please arrange a new appointment with Franco and declare to him in the name of the Reich Government (preamble and verbatim) the following:

(1) Only Spain's immediate entry into the war is of strategic value to the Axis and only by such a prompt entry into the war can General Franco still render the Axis a useful service in return. A later entry into the war would be only of minor significance in view

¹ See document No. 695.

of the powerful military operations carried out by the Axis in the course of this year, and would scarcely contribute anything to the ultimate victory of the Axis.

(2) Spain's bad economic situation, in the opinion of the Reich Government, should not only be no obstacle to Spain's immediate entry into the war but should on the contrary be the *motive* for it. Because: England will not and cannot help Spain economically in any case. Only Germany can do this.

(3) If Spain entrusts to the Axis the determination of the date for Spain's entry into the war, Germany, as a preliminary service, is ready to make available to Spain before entry into the war the 100,000 tons of grain stored down there² and to supply further aid shipments out of German reserve stocks after entry into the war. Transportation does not present any insurmountable problems.

(4) If General Franco nevertheless does not enter the war at this time, this can only be ascribed to the fact that he has doubts about the ultimate Axis victory, as revealed also in his remarks to Admiral Canaris.³ Señor Suñer is wrong in saying that because Germany had furnished no economic assistance she was co-responsible for the fact that Spain still was not in the war. Germany has declared herself ready to supply economic aid in advance if Spain would fix a definite date for entering the war. This, however, was declined by Spain. Germany must therefore reject this accusation.

(5) Germany asks General Franco once more for a final, clear answer.⁴

RIBBENTROP

² A reference to the grain stored in Portugal. See document No. 444 and footnote 1.

³ See document No. 476, footnote 2.

⁴ In telegram No. 281 of Jan. 25, forwarded to Ribbentrop as No. 391 of the same date (136/74609), Stohrer reported that Serrano Suñer had been away from his office the whole day of Jan. 24, attending the ministerial Council. Stohrer saw Serrano Suñer briefly on Jan. 25 and requested a new appointment with Franco. Stohrer had the impression that the decision in the Council regarding the reply to Germany had not yet been taken. He urged Serrano Suñer again that it was imperative for Spain to reach a prompt decision.

No. 703

B19/B003964

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

No. 36 of January 24
from Fuschl

FUSCHL, January 24, 1941—11:54 p. m.
Received Berlin, January 25—1:00 a. m.

No. 49 of January 25
from the Foreign Ministry

Sent January 25—3:30 a. m.

Reports from Helsinki and Moscow together with information conveyed by Kivimäki indicate that with the new Finnish offer to nego-

tiate the situation has relaxed, at least for a few days.¹ As regards the progress of the negotiations, we are concerned now as before that Finland should not surrender the Petsamo interest. We share the opinion that a concessionaire company with a Russian majority would become a center of agitation designed to serve as base for gaining influence in Finnish domestic affairs. The Finnish Government should accordingly be advised to continue to negotiate dilatorily and avoid an open rupture by granting minor concessions. It remains still to be seen what answer Ramsay will get in London. In the event, however, that the present concessionaire opposes transfer of the concession or stipulates that no nickel must be delivered to Germany, the Finnish Government should leave it up to the Soviet Government to obtain the unconditional agreement of the concessionaire.

It further appears necessary to us to clarify the question of the Soviet Government's attitude toward the German-Finnish delivery agreements. The Soviet Government has hitherto avoided saying anything to us or the Finnish Government regarding continuance of the German-Finnish agreements.

Please report by telegraph on the progress of negotiations there.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 687.

² See document No. 711 and footnote 1.

No. 704

585/281630

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 64

BERLIN, January 24, 1941.

Colonel General Halder just told me by telephone that the General Staff conversations with the Bulgarians had been concluded. In the conversations the Bulgarians had shown themselves to be willing, but had again expressed their concern about inadequate protection. The Bulgarian Army was not fully ready for action; air defense also had been represented as being inadequate. If one wanted to comply with the Bulgarian wishes to a reasonable extent, the necessary security measures would presumably be taken by about the middle of February. During the conversation the Bulgarian General Staff had expressed the request that we should not schedule the accession to the Tripartite Pact earlier than the start of the military operation.

I understand the communication of Colonel General Halder to be meant only as provisional information. I assume that the official report will reach us through the OKW.¹

Submitted herewith to Ambassador Ritter with the request that he take cognizance of this. Perhaps it would be advisable not to mention this friendly preliminary information to the OKW.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ On Jan. 27, the OKW informed the Foreign Ministry that the report of the Army Commander, List, regarding the conversations with the Bulgarians had been received by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. "As for its contents, of interest to the Foreign Ministry is only the statement that the Bulgarians are entirely willing, but are concerned to a certain extent about the protection of their country, since they themselves are too weak for this militarily. All the other data deal with purely military matters which are probably of no interest to you." (839/281610-11)

No. 705

201/89272

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN, January 25, 1941—3:10 a. m.

No. 38 of January 25 Received Berlin, January 25—3:30 a. m.
from the Special Train

No. 197 from Sent January 25—4:15 a. m.
the Foreign Ministry

For Minister von Killinger personally.

Please have Minister Fabricius inform you at once about the directives which I gave to him regarding our attitude toward the domestic developments in Rumania. In accordance with these directives please employ all suitable means in the effort to bring together the good and useful elements of the Legionnaire movement with the new leaders of General Antonescu's movement. In your conversations please do not leave any doubt as to the fact that the Führer and Germany clearly desire to see Antonescu recognized as the leader of the Rumanian state and achieve success in his efforts. On the other hand please suggest urgently to General A[ntonescu] that he not make the mistake, for example, of relying on the Army in the rebuilding of the Rumanian state; in our opinion, only the Legionnaire movement can be considered at all as a possible political basis of this new state.

RIBBENTROP

JANUARY 1941

1187

No. 706

201/89273-74

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

Special Security Handling

SPECIAL TRAIN, January 25, 1941—3:25 a. m.

No. 39 of January 25

from the Special Train Received Berlin, January 25—4:15 a. m.

No. 198 of January 25

from the Foreign Ministry Sent January 25—5:30 a. m.

For Minister Killinger.

In considering all the circumstances contributing to the recent development in Rumania the question arises as to how it was possible that the Legionnaire movement decided to take action at the very moment when strong German troop units were being concentrated in the country. Since the leaders of the Legionnaires know very well that both the success of their movement and the fate of Rumania as such depend entirely upon Germany, their action would be almost incomprehensible if in this context they had been aware of acting contrary to the intentions and views of the Reich Government, or if they had merely reckoned with that possibility. One must therefore ask oneself whether in spite of the clear and unequivocal directives given by the Führer there were not some other German authorities—whether in Rumania herself or from within Germany—who gave the Legionnaires to understand that in making their Putsch they could count in the last analysis on the approval of the top German authorities. To what extent Communist and English influences might have been involved in this cannot be judged from here.

There is an urgent need for clarifying this question soon in the interest of the straightforwardness of our policy in Rumania and also with a view of not having the blame for the sacrifices now borne by the Legionnaire movement placed on Germany or the NSDAP. I therefore ask you to investigate most carefully the circumstances in question. With this objective in mind, please discuss the matter in detail, first with Minister Fabricius and Minister Neubacher, and get both to submit a precise and detailed written statement regarding their observations and conclusions in this matter, signed by them personally with express reference to their oath of office. Subsequently, please submit these two statements with a comprehensive report re-

garding your own conclusions and observations. I expect as a matter of course that both your own report and the statements of Minister Fabricius and Minister Neubacher will be entirely unadorned and without any consideration for persons.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ See vol. XII of this series.

No. 707

136/74611-15

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 287 of January 25

MADRID, January 25, 1941.¹

Received January 26—4:40 a. m.

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 286 of January 25.²

The text of the oral reply of the Spanish Government reads as follows:

"It would be a serious misconception to interpret Spain's present attitude as a departure from the previous political course. The German Government knows better than anyone else the significance of the negotiations conducted with England and the United States, notice of which was not only given the German Government but which were agreed upon with the latter, in particular during the talks at Berchtesgaden.³ Misunderstanding on this point might conceivably be encountered among persons who are not in a political position, but we repeat that the German Government was apprised in advance to the effect that these negotiations had no other objective but to procure for Spain the greatest possible means, so that when the time for action had come, she would not be merely a burden on her allies. In this respect the Spanish Government has achieved certain successes, within the framework of the plans which Minister Serrano Suñer had explained to the Führer and to Minister von Ribbentrop at the Berghof and at Berchtesgaden. Recently the Spanish Government had to protest in an amicable way against misleading statements about this

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as telegram No. 393 on Jan. 26 at approximately 6:00 a. m. to the Foreign Minister's special train."

² In this telegram (136/74610) Stohrer reported that he had again seen Serrano Suñer, but that he would be unable to see Franco until Monday (Jan. 27). The morrow was Sunday and Franco would be away. Serrano Suñer nevertheless was submitting Spain's reply. He asked Stohrer to consider it as an "oral message" (*mündliche Botschaft*).

³ See documents Nos. 352 and 357.

subject on the occasion of some odious assertions broadcast by the Berlin shortwave radio station and constituting an attack upon the relations between the German and Spanish Governments, which relations, as far as we are concerned, have not changed in the least.

Any assertion which runs counter to this fact that Spain cannot and does not have any other policy except one of solidarity with Germany and Italy, as was agreed upon at Hendaye, indicates a great error and a misconception of the real situation, and could only be explained as resting on erroneous information. In this sense the assertions must be denied which Admiral Canaris may possibly have made in which he ascribed to the Generalissimo a practically negative attitude by a statement that the latter would enter the war only at the moment of the actual conquering of England. The Government regrets that an item of information derived from a basically erroneous interpretation should have given the Führer and the German Government a painful impression.

The Spanish Government permits itself to recall to mind the deep moral grounds and those of self-interest which govern Spain's unaltered attitude toward England. It is quite true that England and the United States wish the end of a nationalist regime in Spain, a regime which was established in opposition to them and which, once it has attained its full development, will bring an end to the galling discrimination of many years.

The Spanish Government has not forgotten the humiliation which Spain has had to suffer for centuries at the hands of England, France, and the United States. If, therefore, the Government momentarily negotiates with some of these countries, this is (as the German Government thoroughly knows), under pressure of decisive necessity and always with a view to preparing for the war, and this has been communicated to the German Government in a suitable manner.

For this reason the Spanish Government, not conscious of having deviated from the course previously adopted, was surprised to be asked to refrain from a course which it is far from ever having wished to pursue. It cannot be regarded as a deviation from that course which the common interests of Germany and Spain prescribe for Spain to have succeeded in recent weeks in having the English blockade of Spain relaxed somewhat, thereby making it possible to import some foodstuffs.

A further reason that may be cited for all these recent negotiations with enemy countries is the slow pace at which the German Government applied itself to study and remedy the difficulties piling up for Spain. Economic cooperation has been under discussion ever since the Berlin talks in September, but so far nothing has even been initiated. In the face of such problems as starvation, lack of grain, of feed, nitrates, fertilizers, and of transportation equipment Ger-

many has still not sent the economic experts whom the Spanish Government requested in September.⁴ It must also be mentioned that certain Spanish wishes for the fulfillment of so-and-so many pressing needs were not understood by some authorities of the German Government. Thus 300 tractors were requested as indispensable, only 25 were offered, and then only in exchange for olive oil which at present we lack. Although we have a flotilla of 12 destroyers ready for sea, lacking only fire-control equipment and other optical apparatus, Germany demanded the opening up of a special clearing account for these deliveries. Consequently, the Spanish Government, true to its word, finds itself compelled to insist on the arrival of economic experts and on the delivery of the essential supplies. Otherwise the Spanish Government could not undertake to call up its people, as in a moment of extreme need this would be gross recklessness.

To sum up, for the same reason for which she undertook her own liberation in the Civil War—which in a certain sense was the opening chapter of the present European conflict—Spain has now no intention whatsoever of quitting the post of honor due her. However, the date of our entry into the war is conditioned by very clear-cut and highly specific concrete requirements, which are not clumsy pretexts for delaying entry into the war until the moment when the fruits of a victory won by others can be garnered. It is therefore clear that, quite to the contrary, Spain wishes to contribute materially to the victory, to enter the war, and to emerge from it with honors. The prerequisite, however, from the time of the original negotiations with the German Government in Hendaye, is the cooperation mentioned above, on which the Spanish Government is again ready to negotiate with the German Government.

On the other hand, for the same reason and because it has always been our wish that the intervention of Spain would have real value, the Government must declare candidly, lest it become a burden on its allies, that the country is not prepared for a long war. Since we do not shy away from any sacrifice, it is requisite that the date for Spain's intervention be thoroughly canvassed and fixed by unanimous voice of the three Powers, as has been agreed upon. Finally, Spain recognizes the absolutely decisive significance of the victories won by Germany and gives full expression to her gratitude for the assistance rendered jointly with Italy during the Civil War. Without this assistance—material, moral, or diplomatic—the reconquest of Spain would have been much more protracted and difficult. The Spanish Government has recognized this without reservation and publicly proclaimed it at

⁴ Cf. document No. 126.

all times. It would, however, be unfair not to acknowledge that without our efforts and perseverance, Spain would have fallen completely into the hands of the Reds, in other words, of the Franco-English system. Then, naturally, the circumstances would have been quite different for Germany so that it can be said that the armistice of June would not have happened if France, with Africa and Portugal, had constituted a solid entity.

The point of view of the Spaniards is that preparations and a certain span of time are needed to alleviate the food shortage among the population and thus improve the internal situation, which should be used to settle the details of the broadest possible Spanish-German cooperation, and by skillful war propaganda to prepare the people for new sacrifices.

It must also be stated that even climatic conditions argue for a postponement of Spanish intervention. For example, the tentative date of January 10 coincided with an unusually heavy snowfall which seriously paralyzed communications and would have blocked the transportation of war material across the passes leading to Andalusia. The February rains flood the airfields all over Spain. In short, the climate of Spain cannot be viewed as subtropical by a generalization of local conditions. Even taking Algeciras on the southernmost point of the Straits as an example, the daily average temperature fluctuates between 16.4 and 9.8 degrees centigrade in January and between 27.6 and 18.1 degrees centigrade in July.

The number of rainy days in that same city is 12 in January, 14 in April, 8 in May and June, and zero in July, August, and September. From January to April there are strong winds of No. 3 and 4 velocity on the scale.

The current winter is marked by particular severity. Rains in the South in the last 3 months have been unusually violent; they have damaged roads and railroads and rendered airfields unusable. In January these phenomena were even more pronounced. To form a clear picture of climatic aspects as seen from the military standpoint one fact may be cited as sufficient—namely, that during our year's war in Morocco, all operations took place in the summer and autumn.

The above explanations show that the Spanish Government has not evaded its obligations and that it reaffirms its readiness to settle, in concert with the German Government, upon the necessary details for entry into the war, which entry, however, as already mentioned, is not governed by such (word apparently missing) limits."

End of oral message.

No. 708

1818/350777-81

*The Chief of the Security Police and Security Service to the
Foreign Ministry*

PERSONAL

BERLIN, January 25, 1941.

VI D 2 Kob/Wr.

Attention: Minister Dr. Paul Schmidt

Subject: Enclosed letter to Minister Dr. Schmidt.

Enclosed is a letter of Danilo Gregorić¹ which he has handed to the DNB representative in Belgrade, Dr. Walter Gruber, with the request that it be transmitted to Minister Dr. Paul Schmidt, Director of the Press Department in the Foreign Ministry.

The letter was given by Dr. Gruber to an agent in Belgrade with the request that it be transmitted to Berlin and handed in personally.

By order:

BEISNER

SS-Sturmbannführer

[Enclosure]*

BELGRADE, January 20, 1941.

DEAR DR. SCHMIDT: From your entire attitude in the matter in question it is unmistakably clear to me that I can speak openly to you as a friend of my country. It is also in line with my efforts, in writing to you today, to work to the best of my ability for the future of my country by ensuring good relations and cooperation between Germany and Yugoslavia.

As is now clear, the talk in Fuschl² did not produce a complete solution. There are many reasons for this. In particular, Italy's succession of failures has given strong impetus here to the Masonic countercurrent. In domestic politics a counteroffensive began here, immediately after Fuschl, based mainly on the situation in the Mediterranean area, which is not very favorable for Italy, and on the British propaganda slogans in connection with it (Roosevelt, naval superiority, the African theater of operations, etc.).

One must know the underlying facts here in order to be able to understand the situation in Yugoslavia. The strongest man of the pro-British and pro-Soviet tendency in the Government is Konstantinović,⁴ a high-degree Mason and former volunteer in the French armed forces. This man, obviously gifted with intelligence in political matters, knows how to achieve great influence. This influence is

¹ See document No. 324.

² Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] Führer."

³ See document No. 417 and footnote 1.

⁴ Minister of Justice.

perceptible not only in the Government but also in the Regency. It arose through the role that K[onstantinović] played in the Serbo-Croat understanding.⁵ At that time he was the jurist who found and clarified the formulae for the new political system and, through direct negotiations with Dr. Maček and the other Croat political leaders himself contributed much to the so-called understanding. In that way he later became a kind of government jurist whose duty it is to examine and draw up the final texts of all decrees of the Government and individual ministers. K[onstantinović] maintains strong connections with British and Soviet circles here.

K[onstantinović] is very ambitious and above all knows how to gain the complete confidence of Maček, whose various wishes he supports in every respect. So now, while Maček is perhaps not in agreement with Konstantinović's plans or political tendencies, he still undoubtedly supports him personally in the same manner. This strengthens the position of K[onstantinović], who, in addition, is the avowed exponent of those Serb intellectual circles which have ties with England and democracy through the lodges or otherwise.

For the reasons given, it is not easy to fight K[onstantinović]'s influence. I know positively that after Cincar-Marković's return from Fuschl, Cvetković was ready to accept in their entirety the suggestions made there and also to back them up. The talks that followed in Belgrade, however, brought to light certain hindrances that are to be traced back to Konstantinović's influence.

Cvetković regretted that he had not himself spoken to the Reich Foreign Minister, and this all the more since C[incar]-Marković is to be regarded as a civil servant, C[vetković], however, as the personally responsible political leader. Regarding Cvetković personally, it may be said that he is a typical southeastern European politician who ruthlessly carries out a policy dictated by the moment when he is convinced of its expediency. At the moment he is without doubt the only Yugoslav political leader who can hold the office of Minister President and who could also carry out a policy of a very close alignment with Berlin if he were convinced of its correctness and if he received the necessary support for such a policy in Berlin.

A hard struggle between the various currents set in after the meeting at Fuschl. C[vetković] himself does not see things clearly, as I am informed, and is convinced that C[incar]-Marković apparently did not convey fully the meaning of his discussions since he probably did not grasp it. C[vetković] told me repeatedly that he himself would have been most happy to talk with the Reich Foreign Minister and possibly also with the Führer.

⁵ The agreement between Serbs and Croats concluded Aug. 24, 1939, which established a new Croatian Banovina (province).

It is my opinion that such a meeting could only be of profit for Yugoslavia—as well as for the policy of your country. C[vetković] is a man of impressions. The impression that he obtains from a conversation is decisive for his actions. To win him over to a policy of full cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Reich is without a doubt of great importance for my country.

For all of these reasons—especially because even C[vetković] is forceful enough to hold his ground *against all* opposition for the sake of an opinion deemed to be correct—I believe that a discussion between him and Herr von Ribbentrop would be most fruitful. I must add that C[vetković] would certainly accept an invitation immediately.

I believe that you, my dear Dr. Schmidt, should bring your influence to bear to this end in order to complete the work that has been started.

I would come with C[vetković] and it would thus be possible to have further exchanges of views on the spot.

I consider this suggestion of the utmost importance. If possible, please take up the matter with your usual energy.⁶

Yours, etc.

D. GREGORIĆ

⁶ See document No. 730.

No. 709

2296/483727-35

Minister Neubacher to Minister Clodius

SOFIA, January 25, 1941.

Received January 31.

DEAR FRIEND CLODIUS: For your personal information I am sending you in the enclosure the copy of an account of the cessation of the street fighting in Bucharest and in the country, which I sent to the Reich Foreign Minister from here.

I have noted that both sides made mistakes which, magnified through nervousness, led to a catastrophe. By inducing Sima to issue his order I did a disservice to the real enemies of the Iron Guard, among whom of course General Antonescu does not belong. These set their hopes on the unyielding attitude of the revolutionaries and on the possibility of finally being able to exterminate the Legion with the methods of civil war. To me it is absolutely certain that now and in the future the Legion is our only unconditionally reliable friend in Rumania; I leave out of account Antonescu personally; I have no doubt about his loyalty. The Legion is not ripe for leading the state alone, because at the present time it has only the revolutionary type of leader and the internal structure of its organization

is very imperfect; however, at present and tomorrow the elite of the country's youth is in the Legion, and its willingness to serve and to make sacrifices is unlimited.

There is no German norm of thinking and acting for this country, heterogeneous as it is, owing to excessive mixture of blood. Here the obese Levantine, corrupt from birth, exists alongside the heroic revolutionary of Macedonian stamp and the clean Transylvanian mountain dweller brought up as an occidental alongside the oriental slave of the Walachian villages. The revolutionary exuberance with its anarchistic outgrowths had of necessity to assume different forms in this country from those with us and so evidently did also the reaction against too much revolution.

It is not easy for this country to achieve happiness.

It is certain that we need tranquillity and I wish to state that this was the most compelling argument with which, referring to the clear attitude of our Führer, I took the weapons from the hands of my Legionnaire friends on January 23 at 5:00 o'clock in the morning.

The next developments will be difficult, but I am convinced that Killinger, our experienced revolutionary, will influence this development favorably. I hope that my role of guest, which I have had to play as a nonrepresentative¹ for political questions in past crises of particular kinds, is terminated.

I shall have to go to Berlin again in the near future.

I send you my best greetings, and please convey my greetings also to the Herren Will [*Wiehl?*], Ritter, Luther, and Schroeder.

I should be grateful to you for information on how you viewed the Rumanian events in Berlin.

Heil Hitler!

Your, etc.

H[ERMANN] NEUBACHER

[Enclosure]

SOFIA, January 24, 1941.

AN ACCOUNT FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE LEADER OF THE LEGION, HORIA SIMA, AND HIS CHIEF LIEUTENANTS, WHICH LED TO THE CESSATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY FIGHTING

On the night of Wednesday January 22 I discussed the revolutionary situation and the necessity of stopping the fighting immediately with the chief confidants of Horia Sima, whom I had brought together for the second time in a private apartment with the aid of

¹In the original, "Nichtbeauftragter", apparently a play on words with Neubacher's official title of "Sonderbeauftragter".

our SD. The following were present: Minister and Commandant Jasinschi, State Secretary Papanace, Commandant Stoicanescu, and others. I had already met the same men at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon at the same place. The Legionnaires wished that the Wehrmacht intervene, and stated, referring to Horia Sima, that every Legionnaire would obey the German soldiers. Naturally the Rumanian Army had to leave the scene. At this time I was already able to tell the leaders of the Legion that such a solution was not desired by the Reich Foreign Minister.

From this conference I went to our Legation and took part in the conversation between Fabricius and Patrascu (secretary general of the movement), who brought word of Horia Sima's rejection of the demands of the Leader of the State, and termed these demands too far-reaching. I had a long conversation privately with Patrascu, in which, referring to my own revolutionary past and experience,² I impressed upon him the absolute necessity of stopping the street fighting. The Leader of State was still willing to negotiate which would make possible further cooperation with the Legion. Continuation of the fighting must of necessity result in the total defeat of the civilian street fighters. At 2:00 o'clock in the morning of January 23 I went home.

Before 4:00 a. m. there appeared at my apartment the representative of the SD in Rumania,³ with whom I cooperated closely during the last few days, and he informed me that it had now been possible to bring Horia Sima to the private apartment where the other Legionnaire leaders were, and that he desired to talk with me. I went at once to the apartment concerned and found Horia Sima with the Legionnaire leaders Jasinschi, Stoicanescu, Papanace, Sturdza, Biris, Patrascu, and others. It was the top leadership of the Legion.

Horia Sima asked me for my advice. Giving the appropriate reasons, I told him that in its own interest, the interest of the country, and that of Germany the Legion had to terminate the street fighting at once.⁴ Horia Sima asked me further whether in my opinion the Legion should retire from the politics of the country. I replied that the Legion existed; by virtue of its past and by virtue of the law of revolution of the 20th century it would continue to exist and would have a decisive part in the renewal of Rumania. It was not now a question of persons and ministerial posts, however, and consequently was not a question of the policy of days or months; the fact was that a tragic and bloody civil war must end at once, since it served only the interests of the enemies of the Legionnaire movement and of Greater Germany.

² Neubacher had been a leader of the underground National Socialist organization in Austria in the period 1933-1938.

³ Von Bolschwing.

⁴ Cf. Hermann Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-1945*, p. 57.

Horia Sima also pointed out that the Legion was deeply impressed by an expression of the Führer's will in regard to the conduct of the members of the Wehrmacht in respect to the matter of the leadership of the state by General Antonescu, and he [Horia Sima] adopted an order formulated by me and addressed to the fighting Legionnaires. This order was written down at 5:00 a. m. by Minister Jasinschi in accordance with my statement of the content, and Horia Sima asked me to inform General Antonescu that he could withdraw the fighting Legionnaires in Bucharest on the basis of this order by 10:00 a. m., and in the rest of the country in the course of the day.

I at once set out with the chief of the SD for the Legation, which I reached only about 6:00 a. m. because I was stopped many times at the barricades of the Legion, always in a perfectly disciplined way, and because of many detours owing to the fact that sections of streets were occasionally under fire by Rumanian troops. (During my trips at night through the barricaded areas of the city I made the following special observation: I was stopped dozens of times by armed Legionnaires. Without exception, when they recognized the [German] national emblem they made a passage, greeting with the Legionnaire salute and sometimes with "Heil Hitler!", and rendered any assistance desired. The Rumanian troops behaved of course absolutely correctly with regard to our automobile. Consequently, I am able to state that during this fighting sinister elements, Communists and plunderers undoubtedly, appeared in considerable numbers, as sharpshooters from roofs and in small combat groups; at the street barricades, however, I have found only disciplined Legionnaires acting under leadership, whose conduct was uniform.)

I woke up the Minister, informed him of the result of my conferences, and was asked by him to call on General Antonescu at once, together with Jasinschi, whom I had brought with me, and inform him. The General wished to speak with me.

Since the regular telephone service was not operating, I used the military line in the office of the Military Attaché and reached first Minister of Justice Mihai Antonescu, the General's chief adviser, at the office of the Minister President, whom I informed, and who asked me to visit the General at once. The SD chief drove me and Jasinschi in his car down the Calea Victoriei, where pools of blood and stucco shot down from the buildings by machine guns could be seen as traces of the recent fighting. A military roadblock stopped us at a distance of 100 meters and we were unable to make ourselves understood. We turned back, which we were most urgently advised to do by Legionnaires posted in side streets and were once more fired at briefly and unsuccessfully by a machine gun.

From the Legation I informed Mihai Antonescu that it would be pleasant, if I were not exposed to erroneous shooting en route to the

General, whereupon, seriously taken aback at the incident, he announced the immediate dispatch of a colonel to this roadblock. Thus I reached the office of the Minister President only at 7:00 a. m. and there I had a conversation with the General that lasted for several hours, occasionally interrupted by the incidents in the fighting that was gradually dying down owing to Sima's order; I reported about it in my coded telegram sent yesterday from Sofia.⁵

I left Bucharest at 3:20 a. m. by special plane in order to go to Sofia, since the urgency of my special assignment here,⁶ as indicated in the instructions of the Foreign Ministry and stressed by military quarters, no longer permitted me to await the arrival of Minister von Killinger.

⁵ Document No. 700.

⁶ See document No. 700, footnote 1.

No. 710

91/100610-11

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States and to the
Consulate General at New York*

Telegram¹

SECRET

FUSCHL, January 26, 1941—1:00 a. m.¹

- 1) To Washington No. 103
- 2) To New York No. 53

Secret for officer in charge.

In view of the numerical strength and political importance of the Irish in the United States, it is to be assumed that the leading Irish there keep themselves accurately informed concerning political conditions in their ancestral land and its relations with England. This is also borne out by the fact that the English Government, in its deliberations as to whether it should militarily occupy Ireland, or at least certain Irish ports, allows itself to be influenced largely by consideration for the Irish in America. The latter therefore are presumably also well informed about England's plans in this respect and likewise about the position which Ireland is taking with respect to such plans.

I request that you report as soon as possible what, according to your observations and the results of your findings, the opinion is in Irish circles there of England's plans with respect to Ireland, as well as of the position that the Irish Government and the Irish people

¹ Sent by closed circuit coded teletype.

would take in the event of military action by England, for instance, occupation of Irish ports or of the whole of Ireland.²

Because of the importance of all reliable information on this question for our conduct of the war, I request also that you cultivate as much as possible relations with the leading Irish there so that you may be able to obtain information from them continuously. The money to be spent for this purpose will be placed at your disposal at once upon request.

Please keep this instruction secret, with respect also to the other members

To 1): of the Embassy

To 2): of the Consulate General

and take it into your personal safe-keeping.

A corresponding instruction is being sent

To 1): to the Consul General in New York

To 2): to the Chargé d'Affaires in Washington.

RIJBENTROP

²For Thomsen's reply, see document No. 721. The reply of the New York Consulate General, telegram No. 78 of Jan. 30 (91/100617-18), indicated that the Irish there did not expect de Valera to make any concession; they did not expect British action, and certainly not while the Lend-Lease bill was pending. In any case Irish influence and attitudes were different from those of World War I.

No. 711

B19/B003976

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, January 26, 1941.

No. 49 of January 26

Received January 26—1:10 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 48 of the 25th,¹ the plan of the Russians to obtain control of operation of the nickel mines is also of significance in the military field. The facilities belonging to the nickel mines lie on both sides of the Arctic Highway. Because all German supply of provisions and munitions for northern Norway has recently been shifted to the Arctic Highway, supply operations

¹In this telegram (B19/B003970-71) Blücher reported a further discussion with the Finnish Foreign Minister and Fieandt: departure of the Finnish delegation for Moscow was postponed until Monday; Fieandt intended again to propose a holding company but offering 50 percent interest to the Russians. If the Soviet Government declined this offer, Fieandt would then bring up the German-Finnish delivery agreement. Fieandt considered that further delaying tactics were impossible and that the Russians planned to get control of the whole concession within a few days. Fieandt considered it impossible for Finland to continue to resist the Russian pressure without German support in Moscow.

would unavoidably become subject to Russian control if the Russians get possession of the mine facilities.

BLÜCHER

No. 712

878/209413-14

*The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions
With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

SECRET

WIESBADEN, January 26, 1941—9:40 p. m.
Del. W No. 41 of January 26 Received January 26—9:55 p. m.

Following today's negotiations with the French chairman, in which I

1. delivered, in accordance with the decision of the Commercial Policy Committee of January 21¹ the note on the German position in regard to the French negotiations with England,² of which we have been notified, concerning French food supplies and the application for navicerts,

2. took up negotiations on the air construction program (Udet)³—de Boisanger informed me that in spite of my admonition neither he nor General Doyen had brought any instructions from Vichy to continue the negotiations regarding relaxation of the line of demarcation in return for installing the German commissioners and for supervision at the outer borders of France. In the opinion of the French Government the matter would have to be postponed until the present political crisis had been resolved.

¹ See document No. 689, footnote 2. The relevant passage in this record of the decision taken by the Commercial Policy Committee reads as follows:

"The French delegation is to be told that German approval is required for negotiations with England regarding application for navicerts, as German interests and the interests of the occupied territory are directly affected by France's submission to the English blockade system."

² Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. iv, pp. 52-53.

³ Telegram No. Del. W 10 sent from Wiesbaden on Jan. 8 refers repeatedly to a letter of Dec. 17 from Generalluftzeugmeister Udet addressed to General Foerster, Chairman of the subcommission for Air of the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, which apparently represented a program of German demands regarding utilization of the French aircraft industry for filling the needs of the German Luftwaffe (1002/306253-55). Udet's letter to Foerster has not been found. There is also in the files the draft of a telegram of Jan. 25 in which Counselor Dumont of the Foreign Ministry informed the Special Commission for Economic Questions of the Armistice Commission of an instruction which Udet had just sent to General Foerster. This instruction requested General Foerster to take steps with the French Government so that the latter would direct the French aircraft industry to draw up immediately the contracts for the deliveries ordered by the German Luftwaffe. (1002/306209)

Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. iv, pp. 55-72.

When I inquired about the reasons for this attitude he added—entirely privately—and with the request for confidential treatment, that the reasons were purely political. In Vichy they rejected today German supervision of the outer borders as a limitation on French sovereignty, in consideration of the position of France toward third countries, especially the U. S. A.; in this connection he intimated that they were afraid in Vichy that Admiral Leahy would leave at once if Germany took over control of the borders of free France.

According to these confidential statements of de Boisanger, who has just returned from Vichy and Paris, there is no doubt that there has been a noticeably increasing obstinacy in the questions of the line of demarcation, of the installing of German commissioners, and of the supervision of the outer borders; for in the months of negotiation on these matters the political argument has never been advanced heretofore. Thus the view which I expressed in the Commercial Policy Committee has been confirmed to an even larger degree than I had assumed, [namely] that the longer we wait the more the French will be determined to sabotage the [installing of] commissioners and the supervision of the outer borders, and that no progress can be made without increased pressure on our part.

Therefore, as suggested in the Commercial Policy Committee protocol of January 21, page 4, the first means of pressure in any case should be to continue the present closing of the line of demarcation until our requests with regard to the commissioners and the supervision of the outer borders have been fulfilled.

Please give me appropriate instructions, also with regard to occupation costs and the threat of introducing compulsory registration of gold and foreign exchange.⁴

HEMMEN

⁴ Instructions not found. On the further developments in this matter, see vol. XII of this series.

No. 713

2984/567333-35

Memorandum by the Director of the Cultural Policy Department

BERLIN, January 31, 1941.

e. o. Kult. gen 2414 geh.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION WITH THE KING OF BULGARIA

During my visit to the German Architectural Exposition in Sofia, King Boris invited me for a conversation, which took place on Sunday, the 26th of this month, and lasted an hour and a half. Whereas in October 1940, the King had set forth to me in detail Bulgaria's difficult

situation as regards foreign policy,¹ this time he merely touched upon it. The following views of the King, which developed during the talk, are of particular interest:

1. France, in the King's opinion, is senile and will no longer be able to play any major political role in the foreseeable future. There is a complete lack of any tendency toward the rise of a new leadership with a clean record. He sees in Admiral Darlan a fanatical enemy of England, on whom we can depend in *that* respect. He is warning us, on the other hand, against Flandin, whom he has known for a long time and who is unreliable.

2. The Soviet Union will hardly risk military intervention in the Balkan conflicts. It is at all times, however, a latent threat to Bulgaria and it could turn the traditional pro-Russian sentiment in the country into a communistic threat to the state in difficult political situations, especially in the event of major setbacks.

3. The Greeks are very much on their high horse at present. Before the campaign was launched he strongly warned Italy against underestimating Greek military strength. But the Italians did not know what the country and the climate were like, nor, apparently, did they study the maps. Italy's loss of prestige in the Balkans is enormous and not undeserved.

4. Some anxiety was shown by the King over the deployment of 145,000 Yugoslav troops along the Thracian border. He asked me on several occasions whether I thought that Yugoslavia might enter the war on the wrong side. I countered this by referring to Germany's complete control of the military situation in Europe.

5. The King spoke derisively about the visit of the American Colonel Donovan,² who demonstrated to him once more how politically naïve the Americans really are. Donovan has not the faintest notion of the political conditions and the history of the Balkans, nor do these matters seem to interest him in the least. Donovan has asked him to remain neutral, to resist by force of arms any attempt by Germany to move troops through the country, and to put his reliance in the liberality of England and America. When the King told him that Bulgaria had had sufficient opportunity to find out about England's liberality and understanding in the past 20 years, Donovan replied that it was Bulgaria's existence that was now at stake, and that Bulgaria would be destroyed if she placed herself on the wrong side. To him, the King, this sending of emissaries and all the talk of these gentlemen were evidence of American weakness. If America were strong, she would act and not threaten.

¹ Twardowski's visit in October had been reported in Sofia telegram No. 483 of Oct. 19 (585/242741).

² See document No. 685. In the original of this document Donovan's name is spelled throughout either "Darnovon" or "Dornavon."

6. The recent speeches in England, especially those by Churchill, have made a very bad impression on him. It is clear that England is growing weak. There can no longer be any doubt of Germany's victory. He was in Germany recently. He had also visited Germany during the second year of the World War and so was in a position to draw comparisons. At that time there was overstrain, nervousness, and confusion on the part of the leading figures; now there is the calmness and supreme confidence of the Führer. He could assure me that the personality of the Führer in this time of war had made the most powerful and lasting impression on him and had convinced him that Germany would win. He was asking me to convey his regards to the Führer, together with his assurance that he believes in Germany's victory. The King also charged me with conveying regards to the Foreign Minister, expressing at the same time his highest respect for the Foreign Minister's energy, vigor, and political vision.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary with the request that the memorandum be forwarded to the Foreign Minister.

V. TWARDOWSKI

No. 714

585/242934

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 46 from the Special Train	SPECIAL TRAIN, January 27, 1941—2:20 a. m. Received Berlin, January 27—2:35 a. m.
No. 95 from the Foreign Ministry	Sent January 27—2:55 a. m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 48¹ and 54.²

Please tell the Bulgarian Government that we would consider it quite useful, in view of coming events, if the friendly understanding between the two countries were expressed in a Bulgarian-Turkish

¹This telegram of Jan. 20 gave the text of a Turkish proposal for a Turkish-Bulgarian declaration of nonaggression on the basis of a report from the Bulgarian Minister in Ankara to his Government. When this text was given to Richthofen by the Secretary General of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, he remarked that this draft text was clear evidence of Turkey's desire to keep out of the war. (585/242889-90)

The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941) for Jan. 25, 1941, indicates that this telegram was submitted to Keitel and Jodl.

²In this telegram of Jan. 20 Richthofen reported that the Bulgarian Government would accept the Turkish draft for the nonaggression declaration, provided Germany gave her consent. The telegram also cited a statement by the Bulgarian Minister President that in signing the declaration, reference would be made to the official communiqué on the meeting between Menemencioglu and the Bulgarian Minister President, Kiosseivanov, which was published on Jan. 13, 1940. (585/242891)

agreement, thus demonstrating to world public opinion from the outset that the neighborly relationship between Turkey and Bulgaria is secure. Essentially this purpose would indeed be served by such a declaration as is now proposed by the Turkish Government. Only in formulating this declaration, care must be taken that it does not conflict with the present status of German-Bulgarian relations. For this reason it appears necessary to omit from the preamble of the new declaration the reference to the earlier declaration with which the conversations between Kiosseivanov and Menemencioglu were concluded on January 15 [13], 1940.³ One could easily justify this to the Turks without arousing suspicion by saying that in order to avoid all wrong and varied interpretations it is better to let the new document speak for itself and not refer in it to the earlier document. The determination of the two countries to refrain from all aggression and the neighborly relations between the two countries were, after all, expressed exhaustively in the new document even without such a reference. Please send a telegraphic report soon about the further development of the matter.⁴

RIBBENTROP

³ See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 564 and footnote 4.

⁴ In telegram No. 91 of Jan. 27, Richthofen replied to this instruction, stating that in the absence of the Foreign Minister he had talked to the Minister President who had full understanding for the German position and promised to discuss the matter with Foreign Minister Popov as soon as he had returned to Sofia (585/242937).

The Turkish-Bulgarian negotiations about the text of the planned declaration continued into the month of February. Finally, Richthofen was able to report in telegram No. 169 of Feb. 14 that the Turks had agreed to omit from the preamble any reference to the declaration of Jan. 1940 and that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister requested German approval for the new text of the preamble. (274/177686)

Ribbentrop gave his approval in telegram No. 55 of Feb. 14 from Fuschl which was sent to Sofia from Berlin as telegram No. 165 (274/177687). The Turkish-Bulgarian declaration of friendship and nonaggression was signed on Feb. 17, 1941.

No. 715

201/89283-84

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 156 of January 27

BUCHAREST, January 27, 1941.

Received January 27—3:05 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Tranquillity reigns throughout the country. The disruptions caused by the attempt at revolution have been eliminated. In the oil (one word missing) everything is normal. All circles of the Legion are depressed. From an investigation which I myself undertook, it developed that the attempt at revolution had been in preparation a long time. Leadership was in the hands of the leader of the Left Wing of the Legion, the labor leader of the Malaxa plant,

Groza. The weak Horia Sima let himself be pushed into making the Putsch which had the aim of eliminating Antonescu by elements that could almost be considered communist. I am of the opinion that the great tension between Antonescu and Sima, the great extent of which was not known to us, was skillfully exploited by English agents, and particularly by Russian agents, who prepared the revolution by propaganda and provocation. Thus, besides other weapons, 85 of the most modern submachine guns of American origin were confiscated. On my advice Antonescu is willing to be lenient to the extent that his authority does not become endangered, and that on the other hand a renewed attempt at revolution is impossible. He intends to issue the following directives regarding the punishment of the guilty:

1. For Sima and the former ministers and state secretaries, except for Petrovicescu, 5 years' imprisonment. The sentence can be served in Germany.

2. Murderers and street robbers will be sentenced by the courts.

3. In case of disobedience to orders of the Leader of the State, sentence will be passed according to law.

4. In case weapons are not given up, sentence will be passed according to law.

5. In case of attempts at assassination immediate execution.

6. Organizers and leaders of the uprising, for example the above-mentioned Groza, will be executed.

7. All Legionnaires who departed from the ethics of the Legion (robbery, theft, corruption, filling their pockets, lack of discipline, inflammatory speeches, etc.) will be punished with 2 years' imprisonment.

All others will be pardoned and, if they wish, will again be employed in the Legion according to their abilities.

I also discussed the following with Antonescu:

All Legionnaires who laid down their arms upon intervention by German officers and were allowed to depart will not again be arrested.

Antonescu intends to form a new government and to include also men close to the Legion. Whether they will accept is uncertain, since they live in fear of being killed by their own people as traitors.

Later, after the Legion has been reformed, he will in any case take leaders of the Legion into the Government.

Through intermediaries I intend to try to approach Horia Sima, who is still at large, in order to induce him to withdraw from his post as party leader and to release the Legionnaires from their oath to him, since fanatical and mystically-minded elements time and again invoke their oath.

I have asked Antonescu whether he would agree to my writing an article for the press section in which I, as the representative of the Reich, would explain my attitude toward the attempted revolution. This could contribute to the general pacification. Antonescu would welcome this. I request that you send me your authorization and views

as quickly as possible.¹ Moreover, I have found out that the leading Legionnaires have no inkling of Horia Sima's invitation to Salzburg, and even now still do not want to believe it.² I believe that Horia Sima intentionally kept quiet about this invitation and that already at that time the plan to attempt a revolt had been decided on.

KILLINGER

¹In telegram No. 52 of Jan. 28, sent from the Special Train, Killinger was given instructions from Ribbentrop not to publish such an article until it had been sent to the Foreign Ministry for clearance (201/89290).

²See documents Nos. 631 and 647.

No. 716

191/138703

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 123 of January 27

TOKYO, January 27, 1941—9:05 p. m.

Received January 27—8:20 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 40 of January 13.¹

During my very private farewell luncheon for Ambassador Oshima² today he and Ambassador Shiratori brought the conversation around to recognition of Wang Ching-wei. Both Ambassadors expressed the opinion that a Japanese inquiry to Germany regarding recognition of Wang Ching-wei was not advisable at the present time, if the possibility of later bringing German influence to bear on Chiang Kai-shek were not to be impaired. Both Ambassadors have met with understanding on the part of the Foreign Minister for this opinion. Oshima expressed the intention after his arrival in Berlin of inquiring of the Reich Foreign Minister whether a special representative of the Reich Government might perhaps be sent to exert influence on Chiang Kai-shek.

OTT

¹Not found.

²See document No. 508.

No. 717

B19/B003974-75

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, HEINRICH, January 27, 1941—8:30 p.m.

No. 48 of January 27

from Special Train Received Berlin, January 27—9:15 p. m.

No. 58 of January 27

from the Foreign Ministry Sent January 27—12:00 midnight.

With reference to your telegrams No. 46¹ and 48² of January 25, and with reference to my telegram No. 49³ of January 24 [25], 1941.

1. The English reply reported in telegram No. 46 can be interpreted by the Finnish Government only as a refusal of the English Government to agree to the transfer of the concession. It is not manifest why, in respect to the Russians, Finland should decline to invoke this English standpoint. If Finland were to violate the rights of British subjects by taking away the concession, she would be confronted with the possibility of reprisals involving her financial interests in the British Empire, and her raw material imports from overseas countries, by which her vital interests would be affected. This furnishes sufficient grounds, as we have suggested, for the Finnish Government to request that the Soviet Government itself now try to obtain an unconditional English consent.

2. The view expressed by the Finnish Foreign Minister, that further dilatory conduct of the negotiations was impossible, seems premature. The procedure envisaged by Fieandt, outlined under numerals 3 and 4 of telegram No. 48 might, in any case, still offer some chances for it.

3. Concerning the form which the future concession arrangements should be given, Finland ought to hold fast to the standpoint that she as a sovereign state could not allow herself to be excluded from so important a concession and consequently could not go beyond the proposed 50-50 relationship in a holding company nor waive appropriate participation in its management.

4. In order to make it easier for the Finns in their negotiations in Moscow to maintain the German-Finnish agreements in force, Ambassador Count Schulenburg has simultaneously been instructed to communicate the following to Molotov:⁴ Reports on the progress of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations regarding Petsamo have made it apparent to us that the Finns are having difficulties in securing recognition by the Soviet Government of the German nickel interests based on the German-Finnish agreements.

We are therefore taking occasion to remind the Soviet Government *once more* that we could agree to modification of the concession arrangement only on condition that the German-Finnish agreements regarding delivery of nickel and nickel ore to Germany would be fully

¹ In telegram No. 46 (B19/B003968-69) Blücher reported that a telegram from Ramsay indicated that the British Government took the legal standpoint and refused its consent to any infringement of rights of English subjects. However, Ramsay had been told that a joint Finnish-Russian corporation was better than war with Russia; a temporary agreement was better than a permanent regulation. Fieandt informed Blücher that he felt that his delaying tactics with the Russians had been played out.

² See document No. 711, footnote 1.

³ Document No. 703.

⁴ Such instructions were sent to Moscow in telegram No. 164 of Jan. 27 (104/-113006-07).

recognized by the Soviet Government and by the future concessionaire company. We could not consent to any impairment of our nickel interests based on these agreements because of the importance of this metal for Germany, and all the more because we had entered our demands with the Finnish Government and made the appropriate arrangements long before the Soviet Government had indicated its interest in the nickel mines.

End of telegraphic instruction to Helsinki [*Moscow?*].

Please inform the Finnish Government of our position in these terms.

RIBBENTROP

No. 718

136/74618-20

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, January 27, 1941.

TOP SECRET

Received January 27—11:15 p. m.¹

No. 303 of January 27

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 286 of January 25.²

Since in the meantime I have received no further instructions, I gave Franco today at noon the new oral message of the Reich Government (telegraphic instruction of January 24, unnumbered).³ The Foreign Minister was again present.

Franco's reply at first was specific only as to point 4 of the message, declaring that he still believed in an Axis victory. He contended further that so far we had never mentioned anything about advance aid deliveries prior to entry into the war, a statement which I of course emphatically disputed.

In the further course of the conversation, lasting about an hour, I said, pointing out that I was speaking only for myself, that I considered the reply given me on Saturday⁴ thoroughly unsatisfactory. It was devoid of anything specific, and I feared that it would be interpreted in Berlin merely as a maneuver to put us off. I particularly failed to note any reference, even in a most approximate manner, to a date for entering the war. Further, there was a lack of specific data as to what Spain, in the light of previous statements of

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 425, Jan. 28 at approximately 1:10 a. m. to the Foreign Minister's special train."

² See document No. 707, footnote 2.

³ Ribbentrop's instruction of Jan. 24 with the new oral message is document No. 702. The Berlin copy bears the number 172 of that date, and number 35 from the Special Train.

⁴ See document No. 707.

the Caudillo and of the Foreign Minister, would consider absolutely essential in the way of advance deliveries and later deliveries. Data of this kind would have brought us much more rapidly forward than the simple declaration of willingness to negotiate on the subject. I would be grateful if Franco would furnish me more precise details on these points, because otherwise I feared that in Berlin they would be very dissatisfied and German-Spanish relations would suffer thereby.

Taking up the question of advance deliveries and other forms of assistance, the Caudillo began by declaring, seconded in this by the Foreign Minister, that surveys on this score were already under way and that pertinent requests would be put forth at conferences, if we agreed to such. With regard to the failure to mention any date, which I had criticized, Franco again plunged into lengthy explanations about the country's distressing situation and the impossibility so far of having made Spain ready for war in military respects and especially in economic ones. The only noteworthy item in this recital was that the Generalissimo did emphasize much more strongly than hitherto that Spain would undoubtedly enter the war. He also stated in this connection that in his opinion even a later entry into the war which, he felt, would still last for many months, would be of use. Franco, however, stressed again that Spain was in no condition to wage a prolonged war. The Canary Islands, he said, had food supplies for 6 months at the most, and the Spanish troops in Morocco for barely 1 month. He refused to accept my contention that the war for Gibraltar would only be very brief and that we would furnish all that was necessary for it. He declared: even if the battle for Gibraltar were to be quite brief, there was no way of knowing what would happen in Africa where France maintained 200,000 troops, at least 600 airplanes, and armored units. When I answered that after the seizure of Gibraltar we would have access to Africa without further ado, Franco declared that besides the Moroccan frontier the Portuguese frontier also had significance. He emphasized in this connection what the Foreign Minister had already told me some time ago, that at the present moment one could no longer reckon with certainty that Portugal would resist an English landing.

Reverting to the Spanish Government's reply given me on Saturday, Franco, seconded by the Foreign Minister, underlined that in view of our manifest doubt about his recital of the country's distress and the difficulties of its economic situation, he was renewing expressly the request he had already made before, to send experts here, economic experts on questions of food supply and transport, and especially also some high military person who had the confidence of the Führer and of the Foreign Minister. He mentioned in this connection specifically Field Marshal Keitel, declaring that a visit by

such a person under any pretext could be very easily arranged, as was done in the case of the visit of the Reichsführer SS.⁵

Recapitulating, I can say of today's conversation that Franco, more clearly than hitherto, showed his injured feelings over what he described as our lack of faith in his statements; on the other hand he feels strongly that Spain's entry into the war, which he himself admits to be necessary, is a matter of course, even if this entry does not ensue immediately. Most important undoubtedly was the emphatically expressed wish that we send outstanding experts here who could personally make a survey of the situation and settle with the Spaniards upon the necessary advance and subsequent deliveries of aid.

STOHRER

⁵ Himmler had visited Madrid Oct. 20-23, 1940.

No. 719

839/281613-16

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, January 27, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 213 g. Rs.

In the next 2 or 3 weeks a number of actions in the field of foreign policy are to be harmonized and synchronized with the military situation and military operations.

The actions in the field of foreign policy are:

1. The renewal of the Bulgarian-Turkish declaration of non-aggression.¹
2. Signing and publication of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact.
3. A possibly more precise and formal German statement addressed to Turkey.
4. German diplomatic attitude toward Greece.

Yugoslavia: Tripartite Pact, nonaggression pact.

General Jodl will be able to tell me something *conclusive* about the tempo of the military operations only after Colonel Bruckmann, the German Military Attaché in Sofia, has brought with him the minutes of the German-Bulgarian General Staff conversations² and has made an oral report about them.

Provisionally General Jodl has told me the following regarding the question of time:

1. The preparations for building bridges across the Danube are being continued, so that the bridges will be ready for use within 3 days starting on February 10.

¹ See document No. 714.

² See document No. 704.

2. On February 10 the *first echelons of an assembly* of seven divisions, the VIII Air Corps and the necessary antiaircraft units will be in Rumania.

3. General von Richthofen intends to begin the entry of the VIII Air Corps and the antiaircraft units into Bulgaria only after the whole *air base* in Bulgaria has been set up. He needs about 100 railroad trains in order to set up the air base. Since only about six trains a day can be processed in Bulgaria, the setting up of the air base will take about 16 days. Accordingly, if Richthofen's view is accepted, the move into Bulgaria can begin only considerably later than February 10.

General Jodl, too, would like a somewhat greater concentration of troops in Rumania, i.e., a somewhat later date.

4. The Führer considers it necessary that Constanța, on account of the oil tanks there, should be protected also against anonymous bombardment from the sea. It is not yet certain when coastal batteries will be brought to Constanța.

5. As for antiaircraft protection in Bulgaria—that is to say, protection for Bulgaria as well as for our own German troops—the only two areas which it has thus far been proposed to protect by antiaircraft artillery are the area around Sofia and that around Plovdiv. At the German-Bulgarian General Staff conversations the Bulgarians considered it necessary, however, to protect also the areas of Varna and Burgas with antiaircraft artillery, since the Bulgarian oil is there.

6. Contrary to the suggestions of the German-Bulgarian General Staffs, the OKW does not consider it practical for Bulgaria to undertake a camouflaged Bulgarian partial mobilization prior to the start of the movement of troops through the country.³ This would not remain secret. It was therefore quite certain that this would result in new mobilizations in Turkey and Yugoslavia. Unless there should be a reconsideration on the basis of Colonel Bruckmann's oral reports, General Jodl believes it better that Bulgaria should be somewhat weaker militarily because of not having mobilized, than to induce countermobilizations. The only thing which matters is the possibility for a *German* military commitment.

7. General Jodl would like to delay the open exposure of our real military objectives as far as possible. He would therefore prefer it if, when the Danube is being crossed, the cards were not yet laid

³ The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940–Mar. 24, 1941) for Jan. 23 refers to a conversation between Hitler and Jodl concerning a report from Field Marshal List which reached the OKW on Jan. 25. The summary of List's report on his conversations contains also the following passage:

"Bulgaria is quite willing but worried that her military defense is inadequate. This anxiety is justified to the extent that the mass of the Bulgarian Army is demobilized in its home districts and only weak security detachments are on the borders. Bulgarian passive air defense is totally inadequate. First of all, a secret Bulgarian mobilization will be necessary, and this will require 15 days."

on the table. He proposes that it be studied whether, in the case of Bulgaria, too, one might not for a week or two play the game of training units for Bulgaria which are being transferred to Bulgaria at the invitation of the Bulgarian Government.

8. As far as matters can be judged today, General Jodl does not believe that the move into Bulgaria can begin before February 20, reserving the question of the ice conditions on the Danube.

These are temporary considerations as of today. They have not yet been agreed upon between the OKW and the OKH and not yet submitted to the Führer.⁴

RIITTER

⁴ See document No. 724.

No. 720

B19/B003979

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, January 28, 1941—3:56 p. m.

No. 56 of January 28

Received January 28—8:30 p. m.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 58.²

1. Instruction carried out.
2. Regarding points 1 and 2:

The Foreign Minister will try to take into account our suggestions although the Soviet Government previously declined to approach the British Ambassador regarding British consent, and although Fieandt is fearful of a Russian ultimatum.

3. Regarding point 3:

Final position of the Finnish Government is not to go beyond 50-50 (fifty).

4. Regarding point 4:

The Foreign Minister welcomes the instruction although three-cornered talks would have been even more to his liking. It was agreed with the Foreign Minister that he was not to let the Russian negotiators know that he had knowledge of the instruction. If the opposite is desired, I request instruction.

5. The Foreign Minister is afraid of a development, in which the Russians would accept the German demands but otherwise remain inflexibly insistent upon a concessionaire company to suit their wishes.

¹ The text of the telegram bears the notation that it was a corrected repetition. A notation at the end indicates that this text was issued from the code room of the Foreign Ministry Jan. 29.

² Document No. 717.

6. Fieandt and Grönblom left for Moscow yesterday.

7. Ramsay was expected to arrive in Lisbon yesterday and will remain in Berlin until January 31. I would suggest drawing him out on the situation in England.

BLÜCHER

No. 721

91/100614-16

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1941—8:28 p. m.

No. 252 of January 28

Received January 29—1:05 p. m.

Secret for officer in charge.

With reference to your telegram No. 103 of January 26.¹

The opposition of the Irish in America to any assistance to England through measures short of war,² or even through America's entry into the war at the side of England, is entirely reminiscent of the attitude of the Irish here during the World War. Although Ireland has in the meantime almost won her independence, the hatred of the Irish-Americans for England has not diminished. On the other hand, their attitude toward Germany is different from that of the World War. At that time they considered Germany the liberator; today as the Power whose warfare against England can place the Irish homeland in a painfully difficult situation. In addition to this is the fact that the Irish Catholics incline, under the influence of their clergy, to join in the propaganda against National Socialism for ideological reasons.

Nevertheless the Irish in America must at present still be regarded as a retarding element, whose conduct the American Government must take into consideration up to a certain point, since, as is well known, the Irish play an important role in politics, from the highest to the lowest positions. If, to be sure, the Irish Americans were not able to prevent the entry of America into the World War on the side of their oppressor, England, they will not succeed in doing so under present-day conditions either. Supposing that America enters the war, the opposition of the Irish to this can play only a minor role. In the mass hysteria that is then to be expected, the majority of the Irish-Americans will probably, partly under pressure, partly from conviction, take a stand against us, although not in favor of England. Nor would this be changed much on the surface by the

¹ Document No. 710.

² These three words are in English in the original.

fact that England previously, by resort to force, took possession of the Irish ports. The press here has for considerable time been preparing the American public for the need of such an act of violence. Even now England is considered justified in doing this and Ireland is being admonished not to oppose the inevitable. The fact that Mr. Willkie wishes to visit Ireland, too, on his Red Cross trip is in accordance with this trend, as are frequent rumors to the effect that the American Government has put the Irish Government under strong pressure to abandon its futile resistance.

At the same time, the Irish here and the Irish Government are repeatedly given to understand that once the war against the common foe is won, the American Government will make vigorous efforts to restore complete independence and sovereignty to Ireland.

Against this the objections and countermoves of the Irish-Americans are, in the end, of little avail, although the dangers to which Ireland is exposed "between Scylla and Charybdis" are described in detail not only in the Irish-American press, but also in the columns of the great American press. The Irish here expect absolutely that Ireland will defend herself against an English act of violence, and they are therefore doing everything in their power to call the attention of the American Government and the Congress to the dangers to which Ireland will be exposed if she should become a theater of war. At the direction of his Government, the Irish Minister here has been similarly occupied.

In this situation, I have made it a particular point, through the Special Attaché for Press Affairs in the Embassy, to cultivate relations with the Irish-American press and Irish-American leaders and their organizations. I am also personally in touch with the well-known champion of the Irish freedom movement in Congress, Senator Murray of Montana.

I have reported currently on various operations over here. For example, by spending considerable sums from the War Press Fund, we make use of the Irish-American newspaper, *The New York Enquirer*, whose circulation and (1 group garbled), we have in various ways greatly increased. Moreover, the *Enquirer* arranges for us cooperation with other Irish newspapers, such as the *Gaelic American* and *The Leader*, which is published in California. Also, through Consul General Kapp,³ we maintain relations with Father Coughlin⁴ and his newspaper, *Social Justice*.

I reserve further reporting.

THOMSEN

³ Karl Kapp, German Consul General at Cleveland.

⁴ Charles Edward Coughlin, Roman Catholic priest of Royal Oak, Michigan, organizer of the Union for Social Justice.

No. 722

71/50749

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 78 of January 28

ANKARA, January 28, 1941—9:40 p. m.

Received January 29—1:05 p. m.

1. The Secretary General [sic] of the Grand Mufti¹ will leave here day after tomorrow, first for Rome, since his visit there has been arranged by the Italian Minister at Baghdad. After a week's stay, he will go on to Berlin. Entry permit has been arranged through the Embassy at Rome.

[According to him] Nuri Said has resigned, with the Cabinet's approval. No announcement of this is to be made in order not to provoke the English unnecessarily. The Iraq Government is now prepared to cooperate with us in every way. In his opinion, it would be best if deliveries of arms were made via Russia and Iran.

2. Donovan² arrives here on the 30th. He is the special deputy of Knox, not of Roosevelt; apparently he is dealing with naval questions.

PAPEN

¹ See document No. 680 and footnote 6.

² See document No. 685.

No. 723

534/239691

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U.St.S. Pol. No. 22

BERLIN, January 28, 1941.

Minister Bene telephoned me today from The Hague and referred to the pastoral letter of the Netherlands Episcopate, reported in the press, which is directed against Social Democrats, Communists, and National Socialists. Herr Bene said that the Reich Commissar regarded this pastoral letter as a very grave symptom of the sentiment in the Netherlands, particularly in view of the fact that the Church is refusing the sacraments, burial, and marriage services, to NSB members, just as the Church did in the period preceding the [National Socialist] seizure of power in Germany. The Reich Commissar had reported on these developments to the Führer directly, and for this reason especially, he, Bene, for his part also wanted to inform the Foreign Ministry about the situation at once. It was not definitely known yet what conclusions the Reich Commissar would draw from this situation. It was certain, however, that he would take action

against political Catholicism. This would be reflected, for instance, in the attitude toward the Catholic workers associations, etc. The Foreign Ministry was concerned in this matter also for the reason that a *démarche* by the Papal Nuncio might be expected.

WOERMANN

No. 724

839/281608-09

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry

No. 10/41 g.K. Chefs

BERLIN, January 28, 1941.

For the attention of Ambassador Ritter.

After the matter had been presented to him, the Führer decided today as follows regarding the military operations in the Balkans:¹

1. The entry of the German troops into Bulgaria is to take place as late as possible.

The moment will be decided by the following factors:

a. The base for the Luftwaffe in B[ulgaria] will have to be prepared in advance as inconspicuously as possible, and the air and coastal defenses for Constanta, Varna, and Burgas assured;

b. On the other hand, the time for the start of the attack (about April 1) will be adhered to;

c. An interruption of the crossing, once it has begun, by ice drift on the Danube is to be avoided.

2. Thus the exact moment of the entry cannot yet be predicted at this time, but will most probably not take place before February 20.

3. The Führer likewise considers a mobilization in Bulgaria to be dangerous before enough strong German troops have arrived there, since such a mobilization in B[ulgaria] can presumably not be concealed.

On the other hand the Bulgarian Air Force units, the antiaircraft artillery, and the civilian air defenses should be ready for action in advance in as camouflaged a form as possible.

4. Announcement of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact is no longer urgent and can be postponed until shortly before the entry of the German troops.

Conclusion prior to this of a nonaggression pact between Turkey and Bulgaria, as well as between Yugoslavia on the one hand and Germany and Bulgaria on the other is militarily desirable.

¹ A record of the circumstances in which these decisions were made is found in the draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941), date of Jan. 28.

Similarly, the possibility of letting supply transports (no war material) pass through Yugoslavia after the entry into Bulgaria would greatly facilitate the transportation situation.

JODL

[EDITORS' NOTE. The Halder Diary has the following entry for January 28, 1941, regarding a conference with the Commander in Chief of the Army:

"Report Abetz (the previous day with the Commander in Chief).

"Führer has made a decision to the effect that he does not want to have Laval in the French Government. He is to remain in Paris and be available as an opponent of Pétain.

"Collaboration is considered as not existing at present. Führer will tell this to Pétain and limit himself to the armistice. Laval will be kept in readiness for formation of a future government in France if Weygand should make common cause with the English and with de Gaulle.

"Darlan is at present the crown prince. He is certainly not pro-English, and besides, he is apparently flattered as the result of the role which he is playing now. He must be supported. For these reasons no major obstacle will be put in the way of giving French marines returning from England leave to go into the occupied territory. (It is interesting that of 18,000 French sailors who were in England, only 600 stayed there.)"]

No. 725

136/74622-23

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

No. 204

BERLIN, January 28, 1941.

Sent January 29—12:25 a. m.

RAM 22.

Secret for officer in charge.

With reference to your telegram No. 122.¹

1) I request a statement as to how the introductory words of your telegram, that in the meantime you had received no other instructions, are to be understood.

2) I further request an entirely precise statement whether you have read word for word to General Franco the two messages of the Reich Government.²

¹ This is evidently an error for No. 303. See document No. 718.

² Documents Nos. 682 and 702.

3) I regret that in the conversation you have given General Franco the opportunity to divert your démarche from its purpose, as I gather from the statements in your telegram that you did, and to shove off on [zuzuschieben] Germany so to speak a further initiative. As you know, from my oral and written instructions, both messages were intended by us to make unmistakably clear to Franco that only an immediate entry in the war by Spain had any strategic value for us and to get from him a clear yes or no whether he was prepared to enter the war immediately. Instead of this, your conversation with him has had the effect that he has come to us with the request to send to Spain economic experts and in addition a military figure like Field Marshal Keitel. In that way General Franco and Serrano Suñer have attempted to gain the position which they obviously want—namely, to be able to say, in reply to a statement of the Reich Government that Spain has not kept the spirit of her agreements with us, that Germany herself had failed to fulfill the necessary conditions for entry in the war. It is in this respect revealing that already in the previous conversation the reproach was made that we had not come through with the promised economic assistance. I request you therefore to state precisely whether General Franco has understood unmistakably from what you said that we expected an immediate entry by Spain into the war, and that only such entry into the war had strategic value for us, and that he nevertheless has rejected plainly and definitely immediate entry into the war.³

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 728.

No. 726

B13/B001383-85

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, January 29, 1941—3:15 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received January 29—4:00 a. m.

No. 184 of January 28

Delegation No. 11

For the State Secretary.

I. On the basis of General Favagrossa's negotiations in Berlin a plan for the supply of petroleum for the first 4 months of 1941 was arranged with the Italian Government by means of the exchange of letters of January 6, pending the final consent of the Reich Government.¹ The plan cannot be followed through, since on the basis of

¹ See document No. 619.

the Führer's decision only 10,000 tons instead of the projected 30,000 tons of diesel oil can be delivered from German supplies, and only 20,000 tons instead of 27,000 tons of aviation gasoline. When the attempt was made to arrange with the Italians a new supply plan for the first 6 months of 1941, taking account of the curtailments ordered by the Führer, it appeared that the situation is now, in part as a result of the recent military developments,² considerably less favorable than it was pictured in Berlin at the end of December. From this it follows that in the Italian view not only is unreduced delivery of the amounts originally contemplated for the 4-month plan necessary, but in addition a very considerable increase. Our attempts to convince the Italians that the minimum figures now cited by them could be further reduced were answered with the statement, made in the most decided way, that all of the responsible Italian military and political authorities were convinced that the Italian requests represented the absolute minimum program for continuing the war even on the past basis. Therefore a decision could be reached only by the highest authority with the participation of the General Staffs.

II. The Italians calculate their minimum monthly requirements in thousands of tons:

aviation gasoline—20
 automobile gasoline—40
 diesel oil—31
 refined petroleum—7
 fuel oil—140 (115 of this for the Navy)
 lubricating oil—9

After all other delivery possibilities have been utilized this minimum requirement can be covered in the first 6 months of 1941 only by the following deliveries from mineral [oils] available to Germany (in thousands of tons), assuming that the indispensable minimum stocks on June 30 are to be 1 month's supply for all types except fuel oil for naval purposes, and 3 months' supply for fuel oil for naval purposes:

aviation gasoline—43, including the 20 already promised
 automobile gasoline—50
 diesel oil—51, including the 10 already promised
 petroleum—26, including the 4 already promised
 fuel oil—384
 lubricating oil—20, including the 3 already promised

III. Fulfillment of the Italian requirements, with the exception of fuel oil, is possible only by seriously handicapping the German military supply. As for fuel oil, in the opinion of experts here, fulfillment of

² In telegram No. 211 of Jan. 31 the Foreign Ministry notified Clodius in Rome of British reports of the capture of large oil supplies at Tobruk. Clodius was directed in tactful manner to urge the Italians to prevent such seizures in the future (B13/B001410/2).

the demand is not possible in view of the German requirements, particularly those of the Navy.

IV. After a renewed detailed review of the Italian situation with the aid of German military authorities here, the experts in the delegation are of the opinion that the Italians must get along with the following monthly consumption (in thousands of tons):

aviation gasoline—15
 automobile gasoline—35
 diesel oil—28
 refined petroleum—7
 fuel oil—110
 lubricating oil—8

With the same reserves at the end of June as cited above this requires in the first 6 months of 1941 the following contributions from mineral oil supplies available to Germany (in thousands of tons):

aviation gasoline—20
 automobile gasoline—15
 diesel oil—30
 petroleum—26
 fuel oil—110
 lubricating oil—13

Even these contributions are considerably higher than they should be for 6 months with a corresponding interpretation of the contributions authorized by the Führer for the 4-month program. However, the question is of such decisive importance politically and militarily that I request that a decision by the highest authorities concerned be obtained at once.

Please wire instructions.³

CLODIUS
 MACKENSEN

³ The instructions requested have not been found, but Clodius was called to Berlin and was received by Hitler on Feb. 6. See vol. XII of this series.

No. 727

B13/B001395-96

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, January 29, 1941—5: 12 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Received January 29—8: 25 p. m.

No. 189 of January 28

With reference to my report No. 131 of January 14.¹
 The Italian Ambassador here told me the following:

¹ Not printed (366/206808-10).

He had called on Molotov yesterday by instruction of his Government in order to explain to him, as follows, the Italian standpoint regarding the questions raised earlier:

1. Guarantee of the Rumanian frontiers.

Italy could not have acted differently if peace was to be maintained in the Balkans. Italy had believed that the Soviet claims were satisfied after the taking possession of Bessarabia and that therefore the guarantee did not violate Soviet interests. Molotov had replied that the way the Rumanian guarantee was handled was still not satisfactory. At the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact Soviet interests had been taken into account by a special clause. He did not understand why that had not also been done in the guarantee of the Rumanian frontiers. Still, the Italian attitude was "clear and understandable."

2. Maritime Danube.

The Ambassador had stated that Germany, Italy, and Rumania sought a solution that would satisfy everyone. Molotov replied that he hoped the Italian representatives would in the future not support the Rumanian standpoint one-sidedly, but would also take account of the Soviet Union's new position on the Danube. The imminent negotiations in Bucharest would give an opportunity of proving Italy's good will.

3. Straits.

The conversation on this point lasted an hour. The question at present evidently concerned the Soviet Government to an extraordinary degree.

The Ambassador had stated that Italy recognized the Soviet Union's particular interests in the Straits, and was willing to cooperate in a change in the Montreux Convention on the basis that only warships of the states bordering the Black Sea would be permitted passage. This signified a change in the Italian policy which in the past had upheld the principle of total closing of the Straits for all warships. Molotov had replied that the Italian position was significant and of great interest to the Soviet Union. Molotov had then asked whether the Italian Government knew how the Turkish Government would regard such a solution. The Ambassador had replied that he had no information about this, but it seemed to him that in the first place agreement ought to be reached between Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Government and then afterwards one should negotiate with the Turkish Government.

Molotov had then spoken lengthily about the threatened entry of German troops into Bulgaria; he had stated that the Soviet Government was not entirely certain, to be sure, but was firmly convinced that in this case Turkey would be drawn into the war whether she wanted to or not. It would be simply unavoidable. The danger of an occupation of the Straits by England would then be great. Even

now the English had a submarine and air base on the island of Lemnos, that is, before the gates of the Straits. Molotov had asked the Ambassador to find out and let him know what position Italy would take if Turkey should really enter the war.

SCHULENBURG

No. 728

136/74630-31

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, January 29, 1941.

No. 331 of January 29

Received January 29—8:25 p. m.

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 204 of January 28.¹

Re 1). With Sunday's telegram No. 286² I announced that I would transmit to Berlin with all feasible speed the Spanish reply, which had just been given to me in writing, in order perhaps to make possible "supplementary instructions" before the reception by Franco which had been set for Monday at 12:00 o'clock. The introductory words of my telegram No. 303 of Monday³ (in which I reported on the reception) referred to this telegram in saying that in the meantime I had received no further instructions.

Re 2). As instructed, I have read both messages exactly word for word to Franco.

Re 3). I did not believe that I should avoid discussing with Franco the substance of his reply; I repeatedly tried—as in the previous conversation (telegram No. 254 of January 23⁴)—to bring Franco back from digressive points of departure to the main point of Spanish entry in the war.

Franco's proposal regarding a conference of economic experts was not made by him for the first time in the conversation with me, but was already contained in the written reply to the message which was given to me (telegram No. 287⁵).

As for the question of military experts, Franco referred to the corresponding request previously made in November (cf. telegram No. 4078 of November 29⁶). The name of Field Marshal Keitel was

¹ Document No. 725.

² See document No. 707, footnote 2.

³ Document No. 718.

⁴ Document No. 695.

⁵ Document No. 707.

⁶ Document No. 420.

merely tossed into the discussion by Franco without any sort of occasion being given for it by me.

The assertion that Germany on her part had failed to fulfill the necessary conditions for entry into the war was contained in Franco's message of reply; it was not repeated in the last conversation.

From the messages which I delivered most exactly, and from my stressing this point repeatedly, Franco must have recognized unmistakably that we expected an immediate entry into the war by Spain, and that only such entry had strategic value for us.

In oral statements in reply to the question whether he was ready for immediate entry into the war, Franco has not answered any more precisely than in the written reply given to me. In his reply he has brought forward so many reasons and objections against immediate entry into the war, that one can regard this as a rejection of immediate entry into the war; perhaps, however, it is merely to be regarded as the attempt to gain as much time as possible and to obtain from us quick economic help, while being in principle ready to enter the war.

Whether therefore the reply given so far by Franco means a clear and final rejection may depend primarily on the question of what is understood by immediate entry into the war—that is, what is the latest date envisaged by us for Spain's entry into the war.

STOHRER

No. 729

7815/E566862-63

*The Foreign Ministry to the Special Representative in Charge of Economic Questions*¹

BERLIN, January 17, 1941.

Sent January 29.

e. o. Ha. Pol. IVb 516.

The increasingly close integration of the economies of the states of southeastern Europe with Germany and the fact that economic problems which concern simultaneously several southeastern European states are arising with increasing frequency require comprehensive reporting on such economic questions as are of interest to several southeastern European states or to the entire economy of southeastern Europe.

¹ Unsigned marginal notes:

"To be submitted to the Foreign Minister for his approval prior to dispatch."

"The Foreign Minister has already given orally his approval of such an assignment for Herr Neubacher (information from Minister Schroeder)."

I direct you therefore to report in the future not only about the Rumanian economy and the commercial relations between Germany and Rumania, but also about all questions which are of interest to the southeastern European economy as a whole. In that connection, please give attention also to the mutual economic relations of these states and take particular note of the problems connected with the economic reorganization of Europe.

You are authorized, subject to prior approval of the Foreign Ministry, and in concurrence with the German Minister in Bucharest, to travel to the other southeastern European countries in order to get information.

This assignment covers Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria.²

(State Secretary's signature in the clear copy)

² Copies of this instruction were sent to the Legations in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on Jan. 31, to the Legations in Rumania, Slovakia, and Hungary on Feb. 2 for purposes of information.

Acknowledging this instruction in a dispatch of Feb. 18, Neubacher requested authorization for making a journey to Budapest, Bratislava, and Belgrade in the near future (7815/E566865). Such authorization was given by Wiehl in telegram No. 764 of Mar. 22 to Bucharest (7815/E566869). See, further, vol. XII of this series.

No. 730

1316/350770

Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, January 29, 1941.

To the Adjutantur of the Foreign Minister
Attention: Baron v. Steengracht

In accordance with instructions, I submitted to the Führer the letter of January 20, 1941, from Gregorić of *Vreme* to Minister Schmidt.¹ After reading the letter the Führer agreed to have Cvetković invited. The Führer has not yet mentioned a date, but he thought it would be better to receive him at the Berghof rather than in Berlin.

I myself assume that the Führer will be again at the Berghof after February 6 or 7. In any case, the Führer wishes to receive Cvetković personally.²

HEWEL

¹ Document No. 708, enclosure.

² For the sequel, see vol. XII of this series.

No. 731

2281/481061-66

*The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*SECRET
No. 23

ROME, January 29, 1941.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Political evaluation of the dispatch of all the leading Cabinet ministers to the fronts.

The further deterioration in Italy's military situation which has occurred in recent weeks in the African theaters of war, the absence of victories in Albania, and the consequently increasing criticism of the political and military leaders in all circles of the Italian population, as well as the defective organization of the war economy within the country, have impelled the Duce to attempt, by means of a measure as radical as it is unusual, to exert a calming influence on the temper of the people. He decided all at once to send to the front as ordinary officers his most important political colleagues, among them a number of Cabinet ministers. Since the start of the new year Propaganda Minister Pavolini, Corporation Minister Ricci, and his State Secretary, Cianetti, Foreign Minister Count Ciano, Education Minister Bottai, Labor Minister Gorla, and the well-known journalist and former party secretary, Farinacci, who is on the left wing of the fascist party, have in that order gone to the combat troops. It is assumed as certain that Minister of Justice Grandi will follow in the near future. Each time after departure of one of the men mentioned there appeared a short notice of it in the newspaper.

There must be weighty reasons that impelled the Duce in a moment so critical for Italian history to part from most of his Cabinet ministers in this way. Although at first one had the impression that the one or the other of those mentioned had volunteered for the front, it has become absolutely certain in the meantime that it was the Duce personally who issued the order for this, and that political reasons were paramount for him in doing so. Nominally the ministers are to retain their posts and will for the time being be represented by their usual deputies. Only in the Propaganda Ministry was a new Under State Secretary, Signor Polverelli, appointed, who significantly has established himself in the room of his minister. It seems doubtful, as already stated in the case of Minister Ricci in report No. 22 of January 24, 1941,¹ whether Signor Pavolini will ever return to his post. As regards the other men mentioned no clear picture can be gained about this as yet.

¹ Not found.

The Duce's decision can only be explained on the grounds that he did not want to undertake an actual Cabinet change at the present moment but believed he was confronted with the necessity of removing a number of his most important ministers from the firing line of public criticism and of finding a form most honorable for them by sending them to the front. Whether the Duce's hope of silencing in this way the present criticism—which predominantly is directed precisely against some of these very men—will be fulfilled remains for the time being to be seen. According to the observations I have made so far the path which he has taken is arousing more criticism than satisfaction, it being pointed out on the one hand what difficulties are involved in leaving the most important ministries unoccupied in such grave times, and on the other hand there are strong doubts about whether the men mentioned are actually being employed at the front as ordinary officers, as intended. In the latter respect, however, the Duce is supposed already to have taken drastic steps. I have heard, for example, that upon learning that Corporation Minister Ricci was greeted at the station by a section of motorcycles when he arrived at his regiment, the Duce criticized this sharply and instructed the military authorities to treat the ministers simply in accordance with their military rank.

As far as Foreign Minister Count Ciano is concerned, I have already reported elsewhere that I gained the impression on the occasion of his departure at the station when he was leaving Rome the night of January 26 that he was psychologically very much depressed.² I had already gained the same impression 2 days earlier when I attended a little farewell dinner which Princess Colonna,³ who belongs to his intimate circle of friends, gave for him. He was depressed, looked bad, and the jollity which he usually exhibits at such occasions was entirely lacking. During the table conversation, remarks which he let fall about two persons made a special impression on me. When the talk turned to Count Volpi, the former Minister of Finance and well-known big industrialist, Count Ciano stated with strong emphasis: "I was wrong about this man." Count Volpi was an outstanding patriot, a great expert in his area, and a man of very high character. Count Ciano repeated this opinion two or three times in the course of the conversation, which is all the more conspicuous since in the past he very unequivocally rejected Count Volpi and wanted to have nothing to do with him. Furthermore

²This was reported by Mackensen in telegram No. 170 of Jan. 27 (B13/B001372-73).

³Isabella Colonna, wife of Prince Piero Colonna, Governor of Rome.

it was noteworthy with what warmth he expressed himself concerning the outstanding political wisdom of Signor Attolico, the former Italian Ambassador in Berlin and present Ambassador at the Vatican. These statements are all the more remarkable since both men make no secret of their grave concern about Italy's present situation; especially regarding the latter it is known to me that even today he maintains the thesis that, because of deficient military preparation in every area Italy's entry into the war was a grave mistake.

It is idle to speculate whether these remarks should be interpreted to mean that Count Ciano has the impression that in the future the Duce wants to fall back on professional ministers instead of purely party ministers, and is therefore trying to line up with these circles in time. For the present it is only certain that, as is clearly evident apropos of the dispatch of a delegation to the funeral of Count Csáky, the Duce does not intend to let his son-in-law play the double role of Foreign Minister and front officer. It is not yet certain whether the Duce intends to include Count Ciano in case the conference with the Spanish politicians should come about. As usual heretofore, Count Ciano is being represented for the time being by his *Chef de Cabinet*, Signor Anfuso, and the rumors that the Duce intends to appoint a new state secretary or under state secretary in the Foreign Ministry have so far not been confirmed. In a conversation today Signor Anfuso also expressed the view that the establishment of such a position in the Foreign Ministry was not contemplated, and he stressed emphatically at this opportunity that the Duce had sent Count Ciano, whom he continued to value very highly as in the past, to the front only in his own interest.

The practical outcome of the above-described measures of the Duce, by means of which he has now to an increasing degree taken into his own hands the entire responsibility for directing the state, remains to be seen. As already stated, they represent an attempt to frustrate the sharp criticism which is being leveled against the Government in all circles in the country, especially, too, within the fascist party. It would be wrong not to be conscious of the gravity of Italy's domestic political situation and to want to ignore the criticism which does not even stop at the person of the Duce. Nevertheless I am of the opinion that his position is untouched, and will remain so if there is no further deterioration of the domestic and international position of the country.

The Ambassador has knowledge of this report.

By order:
BISMARCK

No. 732

4640/E209244-45

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Pol. 2 No. 26a

Tokyo, January 29, 1941.
Pol. VIII 786 g.

Subject: Secret agreement between Japan and France concerning Indochina, of August 30, 1940.

With reference to my preceding report No. 130 of January 28.¹

The Japanese Foreign Minister, requesting strictly confidential handling, gave me on January 27, 1941, the text of the secret exchange of notes between the Japanese and French Governments on August 30, 1940, in which the French Government recognizes Japan's paramount economic and political interests in the Far East and gives its consent in principle to the entry of Japanese troops into Indochina subject to specific conditions.² What is involved is a note of the French Ambassador here to the Japanese Foreign Minister and a reply of the Japanese Foreign Minister, in the Japanese and French languages, which were exchanged on August 30, 1940. The French texts of the two documents are enclosed hereto for your information.³

The French note opens with the statement that the French Government recognizes Japan's paramount economic and military interests in the Far East. The French Government, for its part, the note continues, expects an assurance by the Japanese Government that Japan will respect the French rights and interests in the Far East and in particular the territorial integrity of Indochina and France's sovereign rights over all parts of the Indochinese Union.

In the economic field France is prepared to enter at once into negotiations on ways and means:

1. To promote trade between Japan and Indochina;
2. To assure Japan and her nationals of the most-favored position in Indochina. This position should in every instance have predominance over that of all other Powers.

Concerning the "extraordinary military concessions" demanded by Japan in Indochina, the French Government notes that they are required by the Japanese Government solely for the purpose of bringing to an end the conflict with Chiang Kai-shek, and that they are therefore limited in duration, are to expire with termination of the conflict and to apply only to the Indochinese province adjacent

¹ In this telegram (216/147657), Ott reported having been given the texts of the secret notes exchanged between the French and Japanese which are referred to in this document.

² See document No. 8.

³ Not found.

to China. Subject to these stipulations the French Government is prepared to direct the French High Command in Indochina to negotiate about these military questions with the Japanese High Command. None of the demands presented by the Japanese Government are ruled out a priori. The instructions issued to the French military authorities in Indochina contained no restriction of their powers in this respect.

Following these statements of principle the French note also mentions several specific questions of a technical and financial nature, to which I shall [only] refer here.

The Japanese Foreign Minister acknowledges in his reply the receipt of the French note, repeating it textually and makes the following statements:

1. The Japanese Government intends to respect the rights and interests of France in the Far East, and in particular the territorial integrity of Indochina and France's sovereign rights over all parts of the Indochinese Union;

2. The Japanese Government accepts the proposals of the French Government and expects that the negotiations regarding fulfillment of the Japanese demands will be promptly opened and brought to a swift and satisfactory conclusion.

The exchange of notes in question is significant especially for two reasons, apart from the military agreements regarding entry of Japanese troops into Indochina: For one thing, France as the first European State recognized Japan's hegemony in the Far East, even before conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Furthermore, France expressed her willingness to negotiate about measures which are calculated to assure to Japan a preferential economic position with respect to all other Powers in Indochina.

OTT

No. 733

2119/461763-64

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, January 29, 1941.

A 283

With reference to your telegram of January 25, 1941, Multex No. 37.¹

The procurement of information concerning the situation in England, to which the attention of the Embassy is constantly directed,

¹ This circular, addressed to all Missions (2119/461768-70), expressed regret at the paucity of information forwarded regarding the situation in England, urged greater efforts, and suggested ways and means for procuring political and military intelligence regarding England.

is extremely difficult, precisely in Moscow, as a result of special conditions. There are no longer any travelers en route from England to the Far East, since the route from England to the Far East via the Soviet Union is practically no longer in use. The channel for obtaining news from Soviet citizens returning from England—engineers, recalled officials, diplomats—cannot be used by the Embassy, for intercourse of Soviet citizens with Foreign Missions is confined to an extreme minimum. The members of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs are, moreover, so reserved in their communications that this possibility, too, of obtaining information may be regarded as zero. This reserve on the part of the members of the Foreign Commissariat has, incidentally, the advantage, on the other hand, that complete secrecy concerning possible German communications may be expected with respect to the enemy's intelligence service. I applied to Chairman Molotov on one occasion with a similar request, but M. Molotov has, unfortunately, not reverted to it. A similar suggestion made to the then First Deputy Foreign Commissar was disregarded.

The only channel remaining open, therefore, for the procurement of information is that of the Diplomatic Missions here of the countries, America, Greece, China, etc., that are on good terms with England. This possibility is being exploited by me and the members of the Embassy as much as possible. To be sure, all information that can be obtained in this way must be regarded as having a propagandistic tinge. Furthermore, information regarding developments which are of interest to us is not always present, nor do we always encounter a communicative spirit on the part of the pertinent informants. The latter particularly requires an effort through personal cultivation that is not to be underestimated.

I shall instruct the heads of the Consulates who are under me in Leningrad, Batum, and Vladivostok, orally at a suitable opportunity.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

No. 734

5160/E303751

The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

Multex No. 43 of January 29 BERLIN, January 30, 1941—1:25 p. m.
Received January 30—2:33 p. m.

A single case leads us to consider that propagandistic exploitation of speeches and utterances of prominent Americans who oppose war-mongering may be practiced only with extreme caution. Such utterances, as for example in the case of Lindbergh, must not in any case

be incorporated in the propaganda bulletin and distributed by the Mission because it is to be feared that the isolationist spokesmen will be compromised with the American public as a result of this.

STAHLLECKER

[EDITORS' NOTE. At the end of January General Erik Heinrichs, Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, visited Berlin and had some discussions about possible Finnish cooperation with Germany in case of a Russo-German conflict. The Halder Diary has these notations for January 30:

"1:00 p. m.—Luncheon with General Heinrichs, Finnish Chief of the General Staff. . . .

"4:30 p. m.—Discussion with General Heinrichs: Nine days until war strength at the frontier. Quiet mobilization, but not unobtrusive. Direction of attack, both sides of Lake Ladoga; five divisions to the south, three divisions to the north of Lake Ladoga."

According to the testimony of Erich Buschenhagen at Nuremberg, he had been summoned to Berlin at the end of December 1940 in his capacity of Chief of Staff of the German Army in Norway. He had learned of the Führer's Directive 21, Plan *Barbarossa*; that forces drawn from the German Army in Norway would take part in the operation; that these were expected to cooperate with Finnish troops in the attack against Russia. He also had heard a lecture by General Heinrichs on Russian methods of fighting. Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus also testified that General Heinrichs visited OKH in December 1940. See *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, volume VII, pages 258, 309-310.]

No. 735

174/136538-41

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, January 31, 1941—5:40 a. m.

No. 146 of January 31

Received January 31—5:05 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The sharper attitude of the American Government has heightened the political tension in Japan considerably and has brought conflict with America closer.

The unity of government and people in support of the Tripartite Pact has been unmistakably proved in the deliberations in the Diet; also economic circles are decreasing their resistance.

The Government is trying to scare America from entering the war by a threatening attitude, armament measures, and sharp speeches in the Parliament and press.

In contrast to this, activistic circles demand a preventive attack on Singapore as the key position in the Western Pacific. They expect by a surprise action to deprive America of the possibility of military warfare in the Pacific or to render it difficult. This minority group is under the leadership of Admiral Suetsugu and Ambassador Shiratori, and has the support of the young officers corps and some high leaders of the Army and Navy.

In 2 days' study with the Attachés of the armed forces, and with the political and economic experts of the Embassy, I examined in detail the prospects of an attack on Singapore with the following results:

1. Chances of success of an attack against Singapore, in which case, however, Japan for the first time will encounter a European opponent of full quality, are favorable; it will have to be carried out in stages by occupation of Saigon and landing on the Malay Peninsula. At present British forces of any kind are far inferior to available Japanese offensive forces and cannot be increased decisively in a short time. The same holds true for addition of American forces of the Western Pacific, in case America automatically renders military support. The Japanese Navy does not expect a full commitment of the American Pacific fleet. It could easily be detected on the overly long approach from Hawaii and would be endangered to the point of annihilation.

2. As consequences of the capture of Singapore, Japan can expect:

- a.* Achievement of the claim for leadership in the Greater East Asian sphere. The Netherlands Indies would no longer be able to resist Japanese pressure.

- b.* Rapid conclusion of the China conflict. Chiang Kai-shek's position would be much weakened by Japan's gain of prestige and the breakdown of supplies.

- c.* Acquisition of raw materials necessary for the war economy. However, Japan's well-known wasteful exploitation would limit planned production for a long time.

- d.* Lessening of internal political pressure by taking action at last.

As against these advantages stand the disadvantages of a continual state of war with England and the probable consequent entrance of America into the war. Both states will carry on mostly economic warfare which Japan can face with approximately 1 year's war supplies.

In summary, the advantages for Japan prevail if the war does not last longer than 1 year. Thus there are chances for the idea of a Japanese preventive attack to prevail also in soberly calculating

business circles. Historical experience teaches, however, that Japan will choose as a moment for action least (one group garbled), that is, she, therefore, will try to await the German attack on England which will seek the decision.

3. View from the German-Italian standpoint: All advantages enumerated above strengthen the Japanese partner in the Pacific area and are, therefore, indirectly in our interest. The Netherlands Indies will hardly be able to maintain their independence in the course of the war, and are endangered by the grasp of Japan or America. The Japanese invasion to be mentioned would, therefore, be the lesser evil.

Especially advantageous would be a Japanese pressure from Singapore on the Indian Ocean and India, the main British supply area to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea, especially from Australia and New Zealand. The development of the Italian war situation has raised the importance of Singapore extraordinarily. The main disadvantage lies in an extension of the war, contrary to our efforts so far, by the nearly certain entry of America into the war, which cannot permit Japan's preponderant position in the Pacific. The new theater of war in the Pacific would be largely removed from our influence and would complicate a conclusion of peace.

Furthermore Japan would drop out with respect to transit trade from and to Germany because she herself needs raw materials and would no longer be capable of forwarding to overseas countries.

Whether Russia's attitude would be unfavorably influenced, cannot be judged from here.

If it is a question of concentrating all forces for a decisive blow against England, this attack on Singapore can be useful. The Japanese Government will, in view of the increasing pressure of the minority group, be guided largely by Germany's plans and will have to be influenced accordingly. The role of intermediary between Thailand and Indochina gives Japan (one group garbled) possibility to establish herself in Saigon and militarily as guarantor of peace, as the first politically unobjectionable step toward the action against Singapore. In case the Japanese Government and political circles are to be influenced in the sense of the preventive action against Singapore, I should like to ask for instructions.

Orr

No. 736

221/149075

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, January 31, 1941.

No. 360 of January 31

Received January 31—11:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Brinon informs me that there was a meeting of the directorate in Vichy attended by Peyrouton and Bouthillier, in which there was a violent argument between Darlan and Huntziger on the one hand and Peyrouton, Bouthillier, and Flandin on the other. The civilian ministers had opposed a return of Laval to the Government on the grounds that this was capitulation. Darlan and Huntziger had demanded the immediate reappointment of Laval to the Government, as they could otherwise not assume any responsibility for the further development of the situation. Huntziger is said to have stated in addition, that so far he had never taken a position regarding political events, not even regarding those of December 13; since, however, the fate of France required Laval's return, he was abandoning this restraint today and in so doing was also speaking in the name of the Army.¹

According to information from Baudouin, Pétain is supposedly resolved at the moment to entrust to Laval the chairmanship of the directorate and the Foreign Ministry.

Darlan inquires every day at the Embassy through the office of the Delegate General whether he could not come to Paris and bring to Laval proposals for his return to the Government.²

In case Laval receives proposals of the Vichy Government I have advised him in order to gain time and to exclude any possibility of a compromise settlement, to demand as a minimum requirement the posts of Foreign Minister, Minister of Interior, and of Premier in a Cabinet purged of the former civilian elements.

ABETZ

¹ At the trial of de Brinon it was established that he had reported to Pétain on Jan. 30 about having been told by Abetz the following in a conversation of Jan. 29:

"I had occasion to state to Admiral Darlan on Dec. 15 that the events of Dec. 13 constituted an offense against the Führer and a crime against the future of France. After three conversations with the Führer, I am bound to say today that this point of view is out of date [*dépassé*]. The Führer has waited more than a month for the French Government to realize and correct its mistakes of its own accord. Nothing useful has been done." See *Les Procès de Collaboration, Fernand de Brinon, Joseph Darnand, Jean Luchaire, compte rendu sténographique* (Paris, 1948), p. 96.

No record of such a conversation of Jan. 29 between Abetz and de Brinon has been found in German Foreign Ministry files.

² For further developments regarding Darlan's trip to Paris and the question of Laval's return to the French Cabinet, see vol. XII of this series.

No. 737

B19/B003982-83

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 209 of January 31

Moscow, January 31, 1941—6:38 p. m.

Received January 31—11:50 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 164 of January 27¹ and our telegrams No. 2571 of November 26² and No. 2308 of November 11.³

I yesterday conveyed to Molotov the statements stipulated in telegraphic instruction No. 14 [164²], last paragraph. In this regard Molotov set forth as follows:

The interest of the Soviet Government in the Petsamo region is not merely economic, but predominantly political, as was in fact reflected by the Soviet-Finnish treaties of 1920 and 1940. In the view of the Soviet Government, in which it believes it is of one mind with Germany, an English concession was completely out of place in the Petsamo region. The Soviet Government wants to conclude an agreement with Finland, which will take account of its economic interests and without in any way wanting to restrict pertinent German interests. The Soviet Government is prepared immediately to assume contractual obligations toward Germany whereby Germany would as of now and for the entire duration of the war receive 60 percent of the nickel production of Petsamo. What was to develop after the war could be settled either now or later on. The Soviet Government believed that the German share could be reduced to 50 percent after the war. Germany had not the least cause for fearing any encroachment upon her interest in the nickel ore deliveries. The Finnish Government has now come to understand that it is absolutely necessary to reach an agreement. The Soviet Government holds that an agreement cannot be postponed.

To my repeated and emphatic observations that the German-Finnish agreements regarding the delivery of nickel and nickel ores to Germany would have to be fully recognized by the Soviet Government and the prospective concessionaire company, Molotov merely repeated his statement that the Soviet Government had no intention of encroaching upon German interests. When I brought out that we had entered our demands with the Finnish Government and made the appropriate arrangements at a very unfavorable moment prior to the time when the Soviet Government had indicated its interest

¹ See document No. 717, footnote 4.

² Document No. 405.

³ Not printed (B19/B003829-30).

in the nickel mines, Molotov intimated that to his knowledge the German-Finnish agreements were not concluded until 1940.

Molotov closed his remarks with the request that the German Government should signify its positive desire to come to an understanding with the Soviet Government on this issue. The Soviet Government itself was prepared to enter into such an understanding and believed that it would be in the mutual interest.

I have the impression that the possibility exists of securing in friendly fashion our interests with respect to the delivery of nickel by an appropriate contractual agreement with the Soviet Government, all the more so in view of the fact that in our experience the Soviet Government has always hitherto fulfilled its contractual obligations.

SCHULENBURG

No. 738

839/281601-03

*Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht*¹

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, January 31, 1941.

High Command of the Wehrmacht

WFSt/Abt L (I.Op.) No. 44071/41 g.K.Chefs.

On the basis of new decisions by the Führer² the following applies to the further preparation of Operation *Marita*:

1. Intended start of attack against Greece: beginning of April.
2. Entry into Bulgaria should be as late as is compatible with this date.

Prerequisites for this entry are:

a. Adequate air protection of Rumania while the major part of the Army antiaircraft units now employed there are replaced by the High Command of the Luftwaffe.

b. Protection of Constanța from [attack by] sea at least by means of the first forces intended for this purpose (inclusion of the coastal batteries in the transport moves is urgent).

c. Clearance for supplying the VII Air Corps in Bulgaria, is given herewith and it is to be carried out with the greatest possible camouflage of the purpose (about 40 trains via Cernavoda).

3. Clearance is given for preparations for the construction of bridges from Bulgaria. It is necessary that work start as late as possible (the Commander in Chief of the Army will soon set the date).

¹This was sent to the High Command of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Luftwaffe, to the Chief of the Wehrmacht mission in Rumania, to various sections of the OKW, and to Ambassador Ritter.

²A fuller record of the circumstances resulting in these decisions is to be found in Helmuth Greiner's draft of entries in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941) for Jan. 29 and 31.

4. From the very start of these preparations on the southern bank, the forces stationed in the Dobruja must be ready if necessary to enter Bulgaria even before the main forces.

In accordance with this, the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe is to prepare the quick reinforcement of the antiaircraft and fighter defenses in Bulgaria (especially important: Varna as the harbor for oil imports).

Code word for the corresponding decision by the Führer: *Heerstrasse*.

5. In the General Staff conversations the Bulgarians should be asked not to mobilize before the entry of the German troops. On the other hand, the air force units and all air defense forces are to be made ready for action beforehand in as camouflaged a form as possible.

The arrival of the German coastal artillery for Varna and Burgas is to be accelerated in every way (Wehrmacht Transportation Chief!).

6. In order to ensure that the theater of war is limited, the conclusion of nonaggression pacts will be pursued between 1) Bulgaria-Turkey and 2) Germany, 3) Bulgaria-Yugoslavia.³

Yugoslav railroads will not be available at first for German transports (even of supplies).

The High Commands are requested to furnish data for the new time schedule to be set up on the basis of these Führer decisions.

The Commander in Chief of the Army is requested to propose the time for the Danube crossing and to report regularly about the effects of the weather situation.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KEITEL

³ Marginal note: "So far I did not know about Bulgaria-Yugoslavia. R[itter]."

APPENDICES

Appendix I
ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY¹
AUGUST 1940

THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER
von Ribbentrop

- (a) *Secretariat:* Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul Otto)
Senior Counselor Dr. Kordt (Erich)
Counselor Dr. von Sonnleithner
Secretary of Legation Dr. Bruns

For special assignments: Senior Counselor Bergmann

- (b) *Personal Staff:* Head: Senior Counselor Hewel
Counselor Dr. Baron Steengracht von Moyland

Staff of the Foreign Minister:

Head: Counselor Braun
Counselor Gottfriedsen
Secretary of Legation Schweimer

For special assignments:

Counselor Likus
Consul General Stahmer

THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Freiherr von Weizsäcker

Secretariat: Counselor Dr. Siegfried

**THE HEAD OF THE AUSLANDSORGANISATION
IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY**

State Secretary E. W. Bohle

Attached: Secretary of Legation Dr. Gossmann

STATE SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

W. Keppler

Attached: Minister Dr. Grobba

¹This organization plan has been translated and condensed from a German Foreign Ministry organization circular of August 1940, filmed as serial 293, frames 183945, 183948-84. Similar tables for earlier periods are printed in the previous volumes of this series and of Series C.

AMBASSADOR FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

[Activities of the Foreign Ministry relating to economic warfare: general trade policy, economic warfare against the enemy and defense against economic warfare, blockades, contraband, blacklists, economic relations with neutrals, German property abroad and foreign property in territories controlled by Germany (1780/406615.)]

Dr. Ritter²

Attached: Minister Eisenlohr
Minister Leitner
Counselor Mackeben

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with the Führer and Reich Chancellor, ceremonial, state visits, decorations:
Chief of Protocol: Minister Dr. Freiherr von Dörnberg
Deputy: Counselor Dr. von Halem

DEPARTMENT FOR GERMAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS (D)

Director of Department: Minister Luther

Personal Assistant: Secretary of Legation Büttner

Party Section: Business between the Foreign Ministry and the departments of the NSDAP. The Party Rally. Minister Luther

D II Matters affecting the Reichsführer SS, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, international police cooperation. Counselor Likus

D III Information for Foreign Missions about important internal political events. The Jewish question. Racial policy. Flags and insignia. National hymns. National holidays, etc. Secretary of Legation Rademacher

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT (PERS.)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Kriebel

Deputy Director: Minister Schroeder

Special duties: Minister Schroetter

Director for Budget and Financial Affairs: Senior Counselor Dr. Schwager

² By a directive of Oct. 7, 1940, Ribbentrop further assigned to Ambassador Ritter the handling in the Foreign Ministry of all military questions affecting foreign policy, including those previously handled by Pol. I M. At the same time he was made immediately subordinate to the Foreign Minister or respectively to the State Secretary and personally responsible for keeping the Foreign Minister currently informed on questions of that nature (293/183950).

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Woermann

Deputy Director: Under State Secretary Habicht *

Dirigent: Minister von Rintelen

Pol. I M	Military questions, armaments, national defense:	Secretary of Legation Kramarz
Pol. I Luft	Aviation questions:	Secretary of Legation Schultz-Sponholz
Pol. II	Western Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, British possessions—unless dealt with elsewhere—France—North Africa, Morocco, Tunisia—Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg):	Counselor Dr. Auer
Pol. III	Spain, Portugal, Vatican:	Secretary of Legation Dr. Haidlen
Pol. IV	Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy (Ethiopia, Libya), Yugoslavia, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary:	Senior Counselor Dr. Heinburg
Pol. V	Eastern Europe (Poland, Soviet Union):	Senior Counselor Dr. Schliep
Pol. VI	Scandinavia and Baltic States (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania):	Minister Dr. von Grundherr
Pol. VII	Near and Middle East (Egypt, Afghanistan, Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, India, Iraq, Iran, Sudan):	Secretary of Legation Dr. Melchers
Pol. VIII	East Asia and Australia (Japan, Japanese mandated territories, China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, French Indochina, Siam, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Sea territories):	Secretary of Legation Dr. Knoll
Pol. IX	America (North, Central and South America):	Senior Counselor Freytag
Pol. X	Africa (except Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Italian possessions, Egypt, Sudan), mandate and colonial questions:	Senior Counselor, Dr. Bielfeld
Pol. XI	War guilt questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. von Schmieden

* By a directive of the Foreign Minister of Nov. 21, 1939, Under State Secretary Habicht, in addition to his duties as Deputy Director of the Political Department, was attached to the Foreign Minister personally for special duties and in that capacity was assigned to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. To insure cooperation with the Ministry of Propaganda in the field of foreign propaganda the Information Department and the Radio Section of the Cultural Policy Department were placed under Habicht's supervision (1780/406605).

On Sept. 19, 1940, upon Habicht's entry on military service, these latter functions were assigned to Minister Luther (1780/406584).

Pol. XII	Peace questions:	Secretary of Legation Count von Hohen- thal
Pol. Grenz	Frontier treaties and other technical questions concerning Reich frontiers which are the subject of negotiations with foreign governments:	Senior Counselor Dr. Roediger (Conrad)

ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl

Deputy Director: Minister Dr. Clodius

Liaison Officer with OKW (War Economy Staff):

		Senior Counselor (un- assigned) Dr. Du- mont
W Frie	Economic questions related to the armistice treaties and the negotiation of the treaties of peace:	Senior Counselor (un- assigned) Dr. Du- mont
W I	General section for questions concern- ing economics and finance. Com- mercial and forestry attachés; Ger- man customs law, technical prepa- ration of commercial treaties:	Consul General Doehle
W II	Western and Southern Europe (except Great Britain and Italy): Belgium, including colonies and man- dated territories; France, including colonies, protectorates, and man- dated territories; Luxembourg; Neth- erlands, including colonies:	Senior Counselor Sa- bath Counselor Dr. Freiherr von Maltzan
	Switzerland; Portugal, including colo- nies; Spain, including colonies:	Counselor Schüller
W IIIa	Southeast Europe (except Rumania): Protectorate, Slovakia: Hungary, Yugoslavia:	Minister Moraht Senior Counselor Dr. Hudeczek Oberregierungsrat Dr. Müller
	Bulgaria, Greece:	Counselor Dr. Busse
W IIIb	Italy, including colonies, Ethiopia and Albania; Rumania:	Counselor Dr. Junker
W IIIc	Near and Middle East (Afghanistan, Egypt, Arabia, Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Transjordan, Sudan, Tur- key, Yemen):	Counselor Dr. Ripken
W IV	Eastern Europe (Soviet Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, former Poland):	Minister Dr. Schnurre
W V	Northern Europe (Denmark, Fin- land, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, economic questions affecting the Ant- arctic); whaling:	Counselor Dr. van Scherpenberg

W VI	Great Britain, British Dominions (except Canada), and British colonies. General questions of commercial and economic warfare:	Senior Counselor Rüter
W VII	East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Manchukuo, Philippines, Siam, South Sea territories):	Senior Counselor Dr. Voss
W VIIIa	North America (Canada, United States, Mexico), Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti; also Liberia:	Senior Counselor Dr. Davidsen
W VIIIb	South and Central America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela):	Secretary of Legation Dr. Pamperrien
W IX	Shipping (including care of crews and passengers of German ships in neutral countries):	Senior Counselor Dr. Bleyert
W X	Reich Office for Foreign Trade (economic news and information service; chambers of commerce abroad):	Senior Counselor Dr. Wingen
W XI	Raw materials, war industry, liaison for control for war economy of German ships in neutral ports:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bisse
W XII	Transport (except matters relating to deliveries):	Minister Dr. Martius

LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Gaus
Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht

CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. von Twardowski
Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Rühle
Attached to the Director of the Department
for Special Assignments:
Consul General Dr. Nöldeke

NEWS SERVICE AND PRESS DEPARTMENT (P)

Acting Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Schmidt (Paul K.)
Deputy Director: Minister Braun von Stumm

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Director of Department: Minister Dr. Altenburg
Deputy Director: Counselor Dr. Rahn

Appendix II

LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been derived. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes by the Germans. As documents in these volumes have been microfilmed, each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left-hand corner of each document. By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the German Foreign Ministry or other Archives of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. In some few cases separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (*). A number of serials are given as supplementary to earlier ones: these are cases where re-examination of the file indicated that additional filming might be useful to scholars, or where in the process of editing for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
19	State Secretary: United States.
34	State Secretary: Soviet Union.
	Under State Secretary: Soviet Union.*
35	State Secretary: United States.
36	Dienststelle Ribbentrop: Russia (1940-1941).
41	Reich Foreign Minister: Indian Freedom Fighter Bose.
64	State Secretary: Uruguay, Ecuador, United States of America, Brazil.*
65	Reich Foreign Minister: Iran.
	State Secretary: Iran.*
66	Secret Files of Paul Schmidt.
67	Secret Files of Paul Otto Schmidt.
70	State Secretary: Syria.
71	State Secretary: Arabia, Saudi Arabia.
73	State Secretary: Hungary.
77	State Secretary: Morocco.
83	Reich Foreign Minister: Iraq.
	State Secretary: Iraq.*
84	State Secretary: United States.
91	State Secretary: Ireland.
	Under State Secretary: Ireland (Veesenmayer).*
100	German Embassy in Italy: Mackensen's Papers.
103	State Secretary: Russia.
104	State Secretary: Russia.
111	State Secretary: Sino-Japanese War.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
116	Reich Foreign Minister: Africa, Albania, Danzig, Estonia, Croatia.*
121	State Secretary: German-French Relations.
124	State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service.
129	State Secretary: Portugal.
136	State Secretary: German-Spanish Relations.
141	State Secretary: Belgium.
171	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Northern States.
172	State Secretary: Rumania.
174	State Secretary: Japan.
182	State Secretary: Rumania.
183	State Secretary: Switzerland.
184	Pol. VIII: Political Relations between China and Japan.
189	Economic Policy Department: Clodius Personal Files: Argentina.
191	State Secretary: China.
201	State Secretary: Rumania.
205	State Secretary: Sweden.
216	State Secretary: Indochina.
221	State Secretary: German-French Relations.
230	State Secretary: Yugoslavia.
233	State Secretary: Argentina.
247	State Secretary: Denmark.
265	State Secretary: Turkey.
269b	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: South Africa.
271	Under State Secretary: Southeast.
272	Under State Secretary: Waterways Commission, Military Mission in Rumania.*
273a	Political Department: Russia; Visit of Molotov to Berlin in Novem- ber 1940.
274	State Secretary: Bulgaria.
285	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Political Papers.
292	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Political File.
293	Tables of Organization of the German Foreign Ministry, 1929-1940.
324	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Spain.
359a	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Lithuanian Territory.
365	State Secretary: Peace Negotiations with France.
366	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with Italy.
368	State Secretary: Peace Negotiations with France (September-Decem- ber 1940).
378	State Secretary: Peace Negotiations with France (January-June 1941).
380	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Balkan States.
407	Under State Secretary: Incidents in the relations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the Soviet Union (November 1939-September 1940).
426	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Military Affairs.
449	State Secretary: Greece.
471	D II: German-French Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden.
490	State Secretary: The War (June-December 1940).
492	German Embassy in Spain: Internal Situation in Spain.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
499	German Embassy in Spain: Reports from Spanish Representatives Abroad.
527	D II: America.
534	State Secretary: Holy See.
540	State Secretary: Africa.
585	State Secretary: Bulgaria.
587	Under State Secretary: France.
612	Pol. VIa: Resettlement question in South Tirol.
617	State Secretary: Afghanistan.
647	State Secretary: Arabia, Syria, Iraq.
675	Under State Secretary: Greece.
711	Under State Secretary: Danube Question.
756	Legation Funds: New York Consulate General.
792	Under State Secretary: Iraq.
813	State Secretary: Memoranda on Diplomatic Visits.
825	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland D II</i>]: (Secret Papers) Ireland, Japan.
826	Ambassador Ritter: Correspondence between Ciano and the Grand Mufti and Other Documents.
839	Ambassador Ritter: Bulgaria.
889	German Legation in Rumania: Miscellaneous.
897	Information Department/Cultural Policy Department (Secret Papers): North America.
941	Renthe-Fink: Personal Files; Clausen.
945	Renthe-Fink: Personal Files; Danish Royal House.
1001	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): German-French Armistice Commission—Economic Delegation.
1002	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): German-French Armistice Commission—Economic Delegation.
1004	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): German-French Armistice Commission—Economic Delegation.
1005	Ambassador Ritter: Ireland.
1036	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland II</i>]: (Secret Papers) Africa.
1046	Under State Secretary: Bulgaria.
1053	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Brazil.
1085	Ministerialdirektor Ritter: Belgium.
1126	Ambassador Ritter: Rumania.
1139	Ambassador Ritter: German-Soviet Economic Agreement.
1213	Pol. IV: Political Relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary.
1247	Etzdorf Memoranda.
1316	Minister Paul K. Schmidt: Private Files.
1379	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with Germany.
1447	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Political File.
1544	German Embassy in Belgium: Correspondence with the German Foreign Ministry.
1621	Pol. IV: Political Relations between Rumania and the Soviet Union.
1780	Tables of Organization of the German Foreign Ministry, 1922-1941.
2001	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): America.
2012	State Secretary: Rumania.
2032	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Italy.
2074	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Italy.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
2097	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Russia.
2108	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Russia.
2110	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Finland.
2111	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Finland.
2119	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Files; Miscellaneous.
2133	Supplementary to 1492.
2141	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): The Danube.
2143	Luther Files: Correspondence A-C, 1940.
2174	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Spain.
2192	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Rumania.
2219	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Russia.
2226	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Belgium.
2235	Pol. II: Switzerland: Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
2236	Under State Secretary: Greece.
2274	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Rumania (1940).
2276	Political Department: Secret Papers—Slovakia.
2281	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers.
2296	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Rumania ⁷ (1941-1942).
2316	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Japan.
2361	German Embassy in Turkey: Secret Instructions, Reports, Telegrams, etc., Armament Industry.
2366	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Files.
2401	Under State Secretary: Security Zone.
2422	Pol. IX: Political Relations of the United States with Germany.
2549	Under State Secretary: Equatorial Africa.
2862	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Netherlands.
2871	Political Department: Treaties, 1936-1944.
2931	Pol. VIII: Political Relations between China and Japan.
2934	Cultural Policy Department: Secret Files.
2943	Pol. VI: Åland Islands.
3056	Secret Situation Reports on England (December 1940-March 1941).
3485	German Embassy in France: Secret Political Papers.
3567	Pol. IV: Political Relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary.
3569	Pol. IV: Yugoslavia; Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
3579	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland II</i>]: Top Secret Papers.
3697	German Embassy in France: Secret Files; Armistice Commission.
3699	German Embassy in France: Secret Files; The French Government.
3710	German Legation in Rumania: Secret Files; Military Affairs.
3783	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Russia.
3784	Supplementary to 2108.
3882	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Spain.
3941	Supplementary to 2141.
4040	Pol. VIII: French Indochina.
4041	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Holland.
4055	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Belgium.
4079	Pol. VIII: Tripartite Pact.
4246	German Embassy in France: Spain.
4359	Supplementary to 2205.
4364	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Portugal.
4378	Supplementary to 368.
4382	Supplementary to 1242, 1255, and 1288.
4416	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Finland.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
4420	Supplementary to 2001 and 2030.
4450	Economic Policy Department: Treaties; France and Belgium.
4465	Aussenpolitisches Amt: Norway.
4466	Aussenpolitisches Amt: Norway.
4469	Aussenpolitisches Amt: Norway.
4489	Cultural Policy Department: Secret Files; North America.
4542	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Bulgaria.
4545	Supplementary to 2110 and 4416.
4640	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Files; France and French Colonies.
4656	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland II</i>]: (Secret Papers) America.
4684	Supplementary to 154.
4692	Supplementary to 672.
4972	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Russia.
5111	Supplementary to 1279 and 4127.
5114	Supplementary to 1287 and 4125.
5160	German Legation in Finland: Multex Telegrams.
5896	Supplementary to 4807.
6804	Reich Chancellery: Awards and Papers of Ossietzky.
7815	Economic Policy Department IVb: Rumania.
8589	Navy Archives: OKW Directives.
8745	Pol. VIII: French Indochina.
9321	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland II</i>]: Secret Papers.
9323	Supplementary to 2219 and 4462.
9324	Economic Policy Department V: Eastern Europe; Resettlement Lithuania, Post-resettlement Estonia and Latvia.
9393	Economic Policy Department: Treaties 2; USSR—Economic Agree- ment of January 1941.
9860	Asservat 184: 20th Army; Top Secret Military.
9874	Supplementary to 2074.
9919	German Legation in Hungary: Incoming Multex Telegrams (1940).
9923	Pol. IX: United States; Political Relations with Germany.
9936	Drafts of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehr- macht Operations Staff, 1940-1941.
B13	State Secretary: Italian-German Relations.
B14	State Secretary: German-Italian Relations.
B15	State Secretary: German-English Relations.
B19	State Secretary: Finland.
C109	Letters to and from Professor Albrecht Haushofer (August-October 1940) concerning Hess and his Flight to England.
F1, F2, F3, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15, F16, F17, F18, F19, F20	German Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat. (See the General Introduction to this series which was published in vols. I-IV.)
M179	Supplementary to 8589.
M209	Supplementary to 2192 and 4859.
M225	Reich Chancellery: War; Norway (supplementary to 2240, 3009, and 4171).
M294	German Armistice Commission, Wiesbaden.
M295	German Armistice Commission, Wiesbaden.
M305	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Italy.
M331	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Russia.

Appendix III

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS¹

- ABETZ, Otto**, Ambassador, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in France.
- ACHENBACH, Ernst**, Counselor of Legation, German Embassy in Paris.
- ALBA and BEWICK, Duke of, Jacobo**, Spanish Ambassador in Great Britain.
- ALFIERI, Dino**, Italian Ambassador in Germany; member of the Fascist Grand Council.
- ALIBERT, Raphaël**, French Minister of Justice, July 12, 1940–January 28, 1941.
- ALTENBURG, Felix**, Counselor of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the German Embassy in China.
- ALTENBURG, Günther**, Minister, Director of the Information Department, German Foreign Ministry; head of the German delegation on the German-Italian commission of investigation in Transylvania, October 1940.
- AMAU, Eiji**, Japanese Ambassador in Italy, September 1939–October 1940.
- ANDRIĆ, Ivo**, Yugoslav Minister in Germany.
- ANFUSO, Filippo**, Chef de Cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister.
- ANTONESCU, Ion**, Rumanian General, Minister President from September 4; Leader of the State from September 14, 1940; Minister of National Defense, September 14, 1940–January 27, 1941; Foreign Minister, January 27–June 27, 1941.
- ANTONESCU, Mihai**, Rumanian Minister of Justice, September 14, 1940–January 27, 1941; Minister of State attached to the Minister President's office from January 27, 1941.
- ARANHA, Oswaldo**, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- ASCHEBRENNER, Heinrich**, Colonel, German Luftwaffe Attaché in the Soviet Union.
- ATTOLICO, Bernardo**, Italian Ambassador to the Holy See.
- BADOGLIO, Pietro**, Marshal of Italy, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, 1925–December 6, 1940.
- BAGEN, Werner von**, Counselor of Embassy, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in Belgium and northern France.
- BAUDOUIN, Paul**, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 16–October 28, 1940; Minister of State and member of the Council of Ministers, October 28, 1940–January 1941.
- BAUME, Count Robert Renom de la**, French Ambassador in Spain, June–November 1940; subsequently Ambassador in Switzerland.
- BEIGBEDER Y ATIENZA, Juan**, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 1939–October 16, 1940.
- BELOW, Carl von**, Counselor of Legation at the German Legation in Sweden.
- BENE, Otto**, German Consul General at Milan; Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands.

¹ The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

- BENOIST-MÉCHIN**, Jacques, French writer, appointed Delegate General of the French Government in Berlin for the care of prisoners of war, December 10, 1940.
- BENZLER**, Felix, German Consul General at Amsterdam, 1937-1940; Plenipotentiary negotiating on the resettlement of Germans from Estonia and Latvia.
- BERGERET**, Jean Marie Joseph, French General, State Secretary for Aviation since September 6, 1940.
- BIELFELD**, Ernst, Senior Counselor, Head of Political Division X, German Foreign Ministry.
- BISMARCK**, Otto Christian, Prince von, Counselor of Embassy, later, Minister in the German Embassy in Italy.
- BLÜCHER**, Wipert von, German Minister in Finland.
- BÖTTICHER**, Friedrich von, German General, Military and Air Attaché in the United States.
- BOHEMAN**, Erik, Secretary General in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
- BOHLE**, Ernst Wilhelm, Gauleiter, Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the National Socialist party, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry.
- BOISANGER**, Yves Breart de, Governor of the Bank of France; Chairman of the Economic Section of the French delegation to the German Armistice Commission.
- BOLAND**, Gerald, Minister of Justice of Ireland.
- BOBIS III**, King of Bulgaria.
- BOUTHILLIER**, Yves, French Minister of Finance.
- BRAUCHITSCH**, Walther von, Field Marshal, Commander in Chief of the German Army.
- BRAUN VON STUMM**, Gustav, Deputy Director of the News Service and Press Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- BRINON**, Count Fernand de, French journalist; personal representative of Laval with the German authorities in France, July 1940; given the rank of Ambassador, November 3, 1940; appointed Delegate General of the French Government in the occupied territory December 18, 1940.
- BRUCKMANN**, Hans, Colonel, German Military Attaché in Bulgaria.
- BÜRCKEL**, Josef, National Socialist Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of the Saar territory; Chief of German Civil Administration in Lorraine; Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Gau Westmark, November 30, 1940.
- BÜRKNER**, Leopold, Captain, German Navy; Head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch in the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the OKW.
- BÜSING**, Hans Carl, German Minister in Paraguay.
- BULLITT**, William C., United States Ambassador in France, October 13, 1936-January 7, 1941.
- BUSCHENHAGEN**, Erich, Colonel, Chief of Staff, German Army in Norway.
- CANARIS**, Wilhelm, Admiral, Chief of the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the OKW.
- CARCELLER**, Demetrio, Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce.
- CAROL II**, King of Rumania, 1930-September 6, 1940.
- CATROUX**, Georges, French General, delegate of General de Gaulle and head of Free French forces in the Near East.
- CAVAGNARI**, Domenico, Italian Admiral, Chief of the Italian Naval Staff and Under Secretary of State for the Navy, 1933-December 8, 1940.
- CAVALLERO**, Ugo, Count, Italian General, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff from December 6, 1940.

- CHEN CHIEH, Chinese Ambassador in Germany.
- CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Generalissimo, Leader of the Kuomintang; President of the Executive Yuan (Premier).
- CHRISTIAN X, King of Denmark.
- CHURCHILL, Winston Spencer, British Prime Minister.
- CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO, Count Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini; Italian Foreign Minister.
- CINCAR-MAKROVIĆ, Aleksandar, Yugoslav Foreign Minister.
- CLAUSEN, Frits, Leader of the Danish National Socialist party (DNSAP).
- CLODIUS, Carl, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- COOPER, Alfred Duff, British Minister of Information.
- COSMELLI, Giuseppe, Counselor of Embassy in the Italian Embassy in Germany, with the rank of Minister.
- CRIPPS, Sir Stafford, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- CSÁKY, Count István, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1938–January 27, 1941.
- CVETKOVIĆ, Dragiša, Yugoslav Minister President.
- DALADIER, Édouard, President of the French Council of Ministers, April 1938–March 1940.
- DARLAN, Jean François, Admiral, French Minister of the Navy.
- DARRÉ, R. Walther, Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture.
- DÉAT, Marcel, French journalist, editor of the Paris collaborationist newspaper *L'Oeuvre*.
- DE GAULLE, Charles, French General, Head of the French National Committee and leader of the Free French Forces.
- DEGRELLE, Léon, leader of the Belgian fascist Rex party.
- DEKANOZOV, Vladimir Georgievich, Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1939–1945; Ambassador in Germany, November 1940–June 1941.
- DENTZ, Henri, French General; High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon and Commander in Chief of French forces in the Levant from December 9, 1940.
- DE VALERA, Eamon, Prime Minister of Ireland and Minister for External Affairs.
- DIECKHOFF, Hans Heinrich, German Ambassador in the United States, May 1937; recalled to Berlin for consultation, November 1938 and did not return to his post; on special assignment in the Foreign Ministry, 1938–1943.
- DIES, Martin, United States Congressman from Texas; Chairman of the House of Representatives Special Committee on Un-American Activities.
- DÖNITZ, Karl, Admiral, Commander of the Submarine Arm, German Navy.
- DÖRNBERG, Alexander, Freiherr von, Minister, Chief of Protocol of the German Foreign Ministry.
- DONOVAN, William Joseph, Colonel, American lawyer, unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy in southeastern Europe, December 1940–March 1941.
- DOUGLAS-HAMILTON, Douglas, Duke of Hamilton.
- DOYEN, Paul André, General, Chairman of the French delegation with the German Armistice Commission from September 12, 1940.
- DRAGANOV, Parvan, Bulgarian Minister in Germany.
- EDEN, Anthony, British Secretary of State for War, May 11–December 22, 1940; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from December 22, 1940.
- ERBACH-SCHÖNBERG, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Greece.
- ERDMANNSDOEFF, Otto von, German Minister in Hungary.
- ESPINOSA DE LOS MONTEROS, Eugenio, Major General, Spanish Ambassador in Germany.
- ETZDORF, Hasso von, Senior Counselor, Representative of the German Foreign Ministry with the High Command of the Army.

- ETTEL, Erwin, German Minister in Iran.
- FABRICIUS, Wilhelm, German Minister in Rumania, 1936-January 1941.
- FALKENHORST, Nikolaus von, Colonel General, German Military Commander in Norway.
- FARINACCI, Roberto, Italian journalist and politician; editor of the *Regime Fascista*; member of the Fascist Grand Council.
- FAVAGROSSA, Carlo, Italian General, Undersecretary for War Production in the Ministry of War.
- FIEANDT, Rainer von, Chairman of the Finnish delegation to the Mixed Committee in Moscow to negotiate on the Petsamo nickel mines.
- FILOV, Bogdan, Bulgarian Minister President.
- FLANDIN, Pierre Etienne, French Left Republican deputy, former Premier; Foreign Minister, December 14, 1940-February 9, 1941.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Francisco, Spanish Chief of State, President of the Government, and Generalissimo of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Nicolás, Spanish Ambassador in Portugal.
- FRANK, Hans, Reich Minister, former Bavarian Minister of Justice; President of the Academy for German Law; Governor General of the occupied Polish territories.
- FRANK, Karl Hermann, State Secretary of the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
- FREYTAG, Reinhold, Senior Counselor, Head of Political Division IX in the German Foreign Ministry.
- FRICK, Wilhelm, Reich Minister of Interior.
- FRICKE, Kurt, German Admiral, Chief of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff.
- FRÖLICHER, Hans, Swiss Minister in Germany.
- FUNK, Walther, German Minister of Economics; President of the Reichsbank.
- GABBRIELLI, Luigi, Italian Minister in Iraq.
- GAFENCU, Grigore, Rumanian Minister in the Soviet Union.
- GAMELIN, Maurice Gustave, French General, Allied Commander in Chief, September 1939-May 1940.
- GAULLE. *See* DE GAULLE.
- GAUS, Friedrich, Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- GAYLANI. *See* RASHID ALI AL-GAYLANI.
- GEORGE II, King of Greece.
- GEORGE VI, King of Great Britain.
- GERSTENBERG, Alfred, Colonel in the Luftwaffe, German Air Attaché in Rumania.
- GIANNINI, Amedeo, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with rank of Ambassador.
- GIGURTU, Ion, Rumanian Minister President, July 4-September 4, 1940.
- GÖRING, Hermann Wilhelm, President of the Reichstag; Minister President of Prussia and Reich Minister for Air; Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe; Commissioner for the Four Year Plan; designated successor to Hitler; Reichsmarschall.
- GOBELKIN, Nikolay, Soviet Ambassador in Italy.
- GRANDI, Count Dino, former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs; member of the Fascist Grand Council; Minister of Justice.
- GRAZIANI, Rodolfo, Marshal of Italy, Chief of the Army General Staff; Commander in Chief in North Africa and Governor of Libya.
- GREGIANU, Constantin, Rumanian Minister in Germany, November 22, 1940-January 24, 1941; nominal Foreign Minister, December 21, 1940-January 1941.

- GREGORIĆ, Danilo, Yugoslav journalist, political editor of the newspaper *Vreme*.
- GROBBA, Fritz, German Minister in Iraq until 1939; subsequently on special assignments in the Foreign Ministry.
- GROTE, Otto, Secretary of Legation in Political Division I M, German Foreign Ministry.
- GRUNDHEBB, Werner von, Head of Political Division VI in the German Foreign Ministry.
- GUANI, Alberto, Uruguayan Foreign Minister.
- GUARNASCHELLI, Giovanni-Batista, Deputy Director in charge of European and Mediterranean Affairs, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- GÜNTHER, Christian, Swedish Foreign Minister.
- GUISAN, Henri, General, Swiss Army Chief of Staff.
- GUSTAV V, King of Sweden.
- GUZZONI, Alfredo, Italian General, Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and Under Secretary in the Ministry of War, November 29, 1940–June 1941.
- GYSSLING, Georg, German Consul at Los Angeles; Consul General, December 1940.
- HADDAD, Osman Kemal, private secretary and confidential emissary of the Grand Mufti; used the alias of Tewfik Ali al-Shakir.
- HAGELIN, William, Quisling's representative in Germany, 1939–1940; Minister of Commerce and Supply in Quisling's Norwegian Government of April 1940; Provisional Minister of Interior in Norwegian State Council, September 25, 1940.
- HALDER, Franz, German General, Chief of the Army General Staff.
- HALIFAX, Viscount, Edward Wood, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 25, 1938–December 22, 1940; Ambassador in the United States from January 24, 1941.
- HAMILTON. See DOUGLAS-HAMILTON.
- HANNEKEN, Hermann von, Major General, Under State Secretary and Chief of Raw Materials Division, Reich Ministry of Economics.
- HANSEN, Erich, General, Head of the German Armed Forces mission in Rumania, October 1940–June 1941.
- HAUSHOFER, Albrecht, professor of political geography and geopolitics, University of Berlin; son of Karl Haushofer.
- HAUSHOFER, Karl, retired German General, President of Society for Geopolitics; lecturer at Munich University.
- HAYE. See HENRY-HAYE.
- HEBERLEIN, Erich, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy in Spain.
- HEDIN, Sven Anders, Swedish explorer of Asia.
- HEEBEN, Viktor von, German Minister in Yugoslavia.
- HEINBURG, Curt, Head of Political Division IV, German Foreign Ministry.
- HEMMEN, Hans Richard, Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission.
- HEMPFEL, Eduard, German Minister in Ireland.
- HENCKE, Andor, Senior Counselor with official rank of Minister, Representative of the German Foreign Ministry with the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.
- HENRY-HAYE, Gaston, French Ambassador in the United States.
- HENTIG, Werner Otto von, Near East specialist, on special assignments in the German Foreign Ministry, 1939–1941.
- HERTZOG, James Barry M., South African politician and General; Prime Minister, 1927–1939; Nationalist leader.

- HESS, Rudolf**, Reich Minister, Hitler's Deputy as leader of the National Socialist party.
- HEWEL, Walther**, Senior Counselor, member of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff and his personal representative with Hitler.
- HEYDRICH, Reinhard**, SS-Gruppenführer, Chief of the Security Police and Security Service.
- HILGER, Gustav**, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- HIMMLER, Heinrich**, Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police; Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community.
- HITLER, Adolf**, Leader of the German National Socialist party, Führer and Chancellor, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.
- HOARE, Sir Samuel**, British Ambassador in Spain.
- HOLT, Rush**, United States Senator from West Virginia, 1935-1941.
- HORTHY DE NAGYBÁNYA, Miklos**, Admiral, Regent of Hungary.
- HOWARD, Roy Wilson**, American newspaperman, chairman of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain.
- HOYNINGEN-HUENE, Oswald**, Baron von, German Minister in Portugal.
- HUENE**. See HOYNINGEN-HUENE.
- HULL, Cordell**, United States Secretary of State.
- HUNTZIGER, Charles**, French general, Chairman of French delegation to the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, June-September 12, 1940; appointed Minister of War, September 6, 1940.
- HUSAYNI, Haj Amin, al-**, Mufti of Jerusalem; Arab leader.
- HUSS, Pierre John**, Hearst press representative in Germany; head of the Hearst International News Service in Berlin.
- IBN SAUD**, King of Saudi Arabia.
- ICKES, Harold L.**, United States Secretary of the Interior.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet**, General, President of the Turkish Republic.
- JACKSON, Robert H.**, United States Attorney General.
- JACOMONI DI SAN SAVINO, Francesco**, Italian Viceroy of Albania.
- JODL, Alfred**, General, Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the OKW.
- KAMIL AL-GAYLANI**, Iraq Minister in Turkey, brother of Rashid al-Gaylani.
- KASE, Shunichi**, Japanese Counselor of Embassy in Berlin.
- KEITEL, Wilhelm**, Field Marshal, Chief of the OKW.
- KENNEDY, Joseph P.**, United States Ambassador in Great Britain, January 17, 1938-November 30, 1940.
- KEPPLEB, Wilhelm**, State Secretary for special duties in the German Foreign Ministry.
- KIEWITZ, Werner**, Colonel, German Adjutant with the King of the Belgians.
- KILLINGER, Freiherr Manfred von**, German Minister in Slovakia, July 1940-January 1941; Minister in Rumania from January 24, 1941.
- KIVIMÄKI, Toivo Mikael**, Finnish Minister in Germany.
- KNOLL, Karl**, Counselor, Head of Political Division VIII, German Foreign Ministry.
- KNOX, William Franklin**, United States Secretary of the Navy.
- KÖCHER, Otto**, German Minister in Switzerland.
- KOESTER, Hans**, Consul, official of Political Division II, German Foreign Ministry.
- KÖSTRING, Ernst**, Lieutenant General, German Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.
- KOLLONTAY, Alexandra**, Soviet Minister in Sweden.
- KONOYE, Prince Fumimaro**, Japanese Prime Minister.

- KORDT, Erich**, Senior Counselor, Foreign Minister's Secretariat, German Foreign Ministry.
- KRAMARZ, Hans**, official in Political Division I of the German Foreign Ministry.
- KREEWINSCH, Edgars**, Latvian Minister in Germany, 1938-1940.
- KRÜMMER, Ewald Ludwig**, Counselor of Legation; an official of the News Service and Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- KURUSU, Saburo**, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, December 1939-February 1941.
- LA LAURENCOIE, Benoît Leon de Fornel de**, General, Delegate General of the French Government in the occupied territory, August 17-December 18, 1940.
- LAMMERS, Hans**, Reich Minister, Chief of the Reich Chancellery.
- LANGMANN, Otto**, German Minister in Uruguay.
- LAVAL, Pierre**, Vice-President of the French Council of Ministers, July 12-December 13, 1940; Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 28-December 13, 1940.
- LEAHY, William D.**, Admiral, United States Ambassador in France from January 8, 1941.
- LEOPOLD III**, King of the Belgians.
- LEQUIO, Francesco**, Italian Ambassador in Spain from September 1940.
- LEY, Robert**, Leader of the German Labor Front, Director of the National Socialist party organization.
- LIKUS, Rudolf**, official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop; Counselor, German Foreign Ministry, on special assignment with the Foreign Minister.
- LINDBERGH, Charles A.**, American aviator; Colonel, United States Army Air Corps Reserve.
- LIST, Wilhelm**, German Field Marshal, Commander of the Twelfth Army stationed in southern Rumania.
- LIVINGSTON, Henry Brockholst**, British Consul at Geneva.
- LORENZ, Werner**, SS-Obergruppenführer, Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.
- LOTHIAN, Philip Kerr**, Marquess of, British Ambassador in the United States, August 30, 1939-December 12, 1940.
- LUNDSTRÖM, Edvin**, Counselor in the Finnish Legation in Germany.
- LUTHER, Martin**, Senior Counselor, Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs, German Foreign Ministry.
- MAČEK, Vladko**, leader of the Croatian Peasant party; Deputy Minister President of Yugoslavia.
- MACKENSEN, Hans Georg von**, German Ambassador in Italy.
- MAGAZ Y PERS, Antonio**, Marquis de, Spanish Ambassador in Germany, August 1937-August 1940.
- MALAN, Daniel F.**, South African Nationalist party leader; member of the South African Parliament.
- MANTU, Iulius**, leader of the Rumanian National Peasant party; former Minister President.
- MANNERHEIM, Baron Carl Gustaf Emil**, Field Marshal, Commander of the Finnish Army.
- MANOLESCU, Mihai**, Rumanian Foreign Minister, July 4-September 14, 1940.
- MARIE-JOSÉ**, wife of Prince Umberto, the heir apparent to the throne of Italy, sister of King Leopold III of the Belgians.
- MARKOVIĆ**. See CINCAR-MARKOVIĆ.
- MARRAS, Efsio**, Italian Military Attaché in Germany; Italian General at the High Command of the German Armed Forces.
- MARTIUS, Georg**, Minister, Head of Division W XII in the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry; Chief German delegate to the International Danube Conference.

- MATSUOKA, Yosuke**, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- MAVROUDIS, Nicholas**, Under Secretary of State in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- MEISSNER, Otto**, Chief of the German Presidential Chancellery; State Minister with the rank of Reich Minister.
- MELCHERS, Wilhelm**, Counselor, Head of Political Division VII, German Foreign Ministry.
- MENEMENCIOGLU, Numan**, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.
- METAKAS, John**, General, Greek Minister President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, and Air, 1936–January 29, 1941.
- MIHAI I**, King of Rumania from September 6, 1940.
- MIKOYAN, Anastas Ivanovich**, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union; Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
- MILCH, Erhard**, Field Marshal, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe.
- MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich**, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- MOLTKE, Hans Adolf von**, German Ambassador in Poland, 1934–1939; on special assignments in the Foreign Ministry involving examination and exploitation of captured Polish and French diplomatic documents.
- MONTRI, P. PAMON**, Colonel, Thai Minister of State without Portfolio.
- MORGENTHAU, Henry**, United States Secretary of the Treasury.
- MORRIS, Leland B.**, Counselor and Chargé d' Affaires in the United States Embassy in Germany, October 1940–December 1941.
- MURPHY, Robert Daniel**, Counselor in the United States Embassy in France.
- MUSSOLINI, Benito**, founder of the Italian fascist party; Head of the Government and Prime Minister; Commander of the Armed Forces.
- MUTI, Ettore**, Secretary of the Fascist party, October 31, 1939–October 30, 1940.
- NEUBÄCHER, Hermann**, Special Representative in charge of economic questions at the German Legation in Bucharest.
- NEURATH, Constantin, Freiherr von**, Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.
- NOEBEL, Eduard Willy**, German Minister in Peru.
- NÖLDEKE, Wilhelm**, Consul General, official in the Cultural Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry in special charge of negotiations regarding population transfers and cultural agreements.
- NOGUES, Auguste Paul**, French General; Resident General and Commander in Chief in Morocco.
- NORTHE, Heinrich**, Secretary of Legation in the German Embassy in China in charge of the office in Chungking.
- NUMAN.** See MENEMENCIOGLU.
- NURI AS-SAID**, several times Minister President and Foreign Minister of Iraq; Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, March 1940–January 28, 1941.
- OHASHI, Chuichi**, Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister.
- OLIVERA, Ricardo**, Argentine Ambassador in Germany.
- OSHIMA, Hiroshi**, General, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, November 1938–December 1939, and from February 1941.
- OTT, Eugen**, Major General, German Ambassador in Japan.
- OUMANSKY, Constantine Alexandrovitch**, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.
- PAASIKIVI, Juho K.**, Finnish Minister in the Soviet Union.
- PAPEN, Franz von**, German Ambassador in Turkey.
- PAUL, Prince**, Regent of Yugoslavia.
- PAVLOV, Vladimir**, Secretary in the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Germany.
- PÉTAÏN, Henri Philippe**, Marshal of France; Chief of State.

- PETROVICESCU, Constantin, Rumanian Minister of Interior, September 1940-January 1941.
- PEYROUTON, Marcel, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Interior, August 1940; Minister of Interior, September 6, 1940-February 15, 1941.
- PFEIFFER, Peter, Counselor in the German Embassy in Italy, October 1938-November 1940; in charge of the German Mission at Tirana, November 1940-November 1941.
- PIBOW, Oswald, Minister of Defense of the Union of South Africa, 1938-1939; member of the South African Nationalist party and member of Parliament.
- POP, Valer, Minister, Chief Rumanian delegate in negotiations with Hungary, August 1940; subsequently, special envoy of the Rumanian Government in Berlin.
- POPOV, Ivan Vladimir, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- PRÜFER, Curt Max, German Ambassador in Brazil.
- QUISLING, Vidkun, Norwegian politician and official; leader of the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling movement.
- RAEDER, Erich, Admiral, Commander in Chief of the German Navy.
- RAMSAY, Henrik, Finnish industrialist and politician.
- RASHID ALI AL-GAYLANI, Iraq Minister President, March 31, 1940-January 31, 1941.
- RENDEL, George William, British Minister in Bulgaria.
- RENTHE-FYNK, Cecil von, German Minister and Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark.
- REYNAUD, Paul, President of the French Council of Ministers, March-June 1940.
- RIBBENTROP, Joachim von, German Foreign Minister.
- RICCARDI, Raffaello, Italian Minister of Trade and International Payments.
- RICHTER, Arvid, Swedish Minister in Germany.
- RICHTER, Herbert Georg, German Consul at Tetuán.
- RICHTHOFFEN, Herbert, Freiherr von, German Minister in Bulgaria.
- RINTELEN, Emil von, Minister, Dirigent in the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- RINTELEN, Erno von, General, German Military Attaché in Italy; German General at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces from September 20, 1940.
- RITTER, Karl, Ambassador on special assignment in the German Foreign Ministry.
- RIZO-RANGABÉ, Alexander, Greek Minister in Germany.
- ROATTA, Mario, Deputy Chief of the Italian Army General Staff.
- ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano, President of the United States of America.
- ROSSO, Augusto, Italian Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- RUST, Bernhard, Reich Minister for Science, Education and Public Instruction.
- RYTI, Risto, Finnish Minister President, December 1939-December 1940; President from December 19, 1940.
- SABATH, Hermann Friedrich, Senior Counselor, Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- SALAZAR, Antonio de Oliveira, Portuguese Minister President; also Minister of Finance, Minister of War, and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SARACOGLU, Sükrü, Turkish Foreign Minister.
- SCAVENTIUS, Erik, Danish Foreign Minister.
- SOHERPENBERG, Hilger, Freiherr van, Counselor, official in the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- SCHICKEDANZ, Arno, Chief of Staff of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
- SOHRACH, Baldur von, Reichsleiter of the NSDAP for Youth Education; Gauleiter of Vienna.
- SCHLEIER, Rudolf, Deputy of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in France; given rank of Consul General, October 1940.

- SCHLOTTERER, Gustav, Ministerialdirigent, German Ministry of Economics.
- SCHMIDT, Paul Karl, Senior Counselor, later Minister; Director of the News Service and Press Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- SCHMIDT, Paul Otto Gustav, Minister, interpreter in the German Foreign Ministry; attached to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
- SCHMUNDT, Rudolf, Colonel, Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant with Hitler.
- SCHNURRE, Karl, Minister, Head of Division W IV in the Economic Policy Department, Germany Foreign Ministry.
- SCHOEN, Wilhelm Freiherr von, German Ambassador in Chile.
- SCHOLZ, Herbert, German Consul at Boston.
- SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- SCHWARZMANN, Hans, official in the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, German Foreign Ministry.
- SERRANO SUÑER, Ramón, Spanish Minister of Interior, January 1938–October 16, 1940; Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 17, 1940–September 1942.
- SEYSS-INQUART, Arthur, Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands.
- SHAWKAT, Naji, Iraq Minister of Justice, March 31, 1940–January 28, 1941.
- SHIRATORI, Toshio, Japanese Ambassador in Italy, December 1938–October 1939; adviser to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
- SHKVARTSEV, Alexander A., Soviet Ambassador in Germany, September 1939–November 1940.
- SIEGFRIED, Herbert, Counselor, official of the Secretariat of the State Secretary, German Foreign Ministry.
- SIMA, Horia, leader of the Rumanian Iron Guard (Legionnaire movement); Deputy Minister President, September 14, 1940–January 27, 1941.
- SMUTS, Jan Christian, General, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief of South African Armed Forces.
- SOBOLEV, Arkady A., Secretary General of the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; chief Soviet delegate to the International Danube Conference.
- SODDU, Ubaldo, Italian General; Under Secretary in the War Ministry and Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, June 13, 1940–November 29, 1940; Commander of the Armed Forces in Albania, November 9, 1940–January 13, 1941.
- SÖDERBLOM, Staffan John, Chief of the Political Division of the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
- SONNLEITHNER, FRANZ, Counselor, official in the Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister.
- SPIEGEL VON UND ZU PECKELSHEIM, Karl Edgar, Freiherr, German Consul at New Orleans, with personal rank of Consul General.
- STAHRER, Heinrich, official in charge of Far Eastern questions in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop; assigned to the Embassy in Japan with the rank-of Minister, September, 1940.
- STALIN, Josef Vissarionovich, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and member of the Politburo.
- STAUNING, Thorvald, Danish Minister President.
- STEENBRACHT VON MOYLAND, Adolf, Baron, Counselor in the German Foreign Ministry; member of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.
- STIMSON, Henry Lewis, United States Secretary of War.
- STOHRER, Eberhard von, German Ambassador in Spain.
- STÜLPNAGEL, Karl-Heinrich von, General, Chairman, German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, June 1940–February 12, 1941.
- STÜLPNAGEL, Otto von, General, German Military Commander in France from October 1940.

- STURDZA, Prince Mihai, Rumanian Foreign Minister, September 14–December 21, 1940.
- SUÑER. *See* SERRANO SUÑER.
- SVINHUFVUD, Pehr Evind, President of Finland, 1931–1937.
- SZTÓJAY, Döme, General, Hungarian Minister in Germany.
- TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu, General, Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, September 1940–1942.
- TELEKI, Count Pál, Hungarian Minister President.
- TERBOVEN, Josef, Reich Commissar for occupied Norway.
- TEWFIK ALI AL-SHAKIR. *See* HADDAD, Osman Kemal.
- THERMANN, Edmund, Freiherr von, German Ambassador in Argentina.
- THOMAS, Georg, General, Head of the War Economy and Armaments Office (Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt) of the OKW.
- THOMSEN, Hans, Counselor of Embassy, Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy in the United States.
- TIPPELSKIRCH, Kurt von, Lieutenant General, Deputy Chief for Intelligence of the German General Staff (Oberquartiermeister IV).
- TIPPELSKIRCH, Werner von, Minister, Counselor in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- TISO, Joseph Monsignor, leader of Slovak People's party; President of Slovakia.
- TODT, Fritz, Reich Minister of Armaments and Munition; Inspector General of German highways.
- TOGO, Shigenori, Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1938–1940.
- TROTT ZU SOLZ, Adam von, official of the Information Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- TUKA, Vojtech, Slovak Minister President.
- TWARDOWSKI, Fritz von, Director of the Cultural Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- VELTJENS, Joseph, Lieutenant Colonel in the Luftwaffe, Göring's special representative for negotiations with Finland concerning armaments, 1940–1941.
- VIGÓN, Juan, General, Spanish Minister for Air.
- VISCONTI PRASCA, Sebastiano, General, Commander of Italian forces in Albania.
- VÖRNLE, Janos, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister.
- VYSHINSKY, Andrey Yanuaryevich, Vice Chairman, Soviet Council of People's Commissars; First Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- WALSHE, Joseph Patrick, Secretary General of the Ministry for External Affairs of Ireland.
- WANG CHING-WEL, Chinese political leader, head of a Chinese Central Government at Nanking sponsored by Japan.
- WARLIMONT, Walter, German General, Chief of the Department of National Defense (Abt. L), Wehrmacht Operations Staff.
- WEIZSÄCKER, Ernst, Freiherr von, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry.
- WELCK, Wolfgang, Freiherr von, Counselor in the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, assigned to the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.
- WELLES, Sumner, United States Under Secretary of State.
- WENDLEE, Ernst, German Minister in Bolivia.
- WEYGAND, Maxime, General, French Minister of National Defense, June 17–September 5, 1940; Delegate General of the French Government in French Africa, September 6, 1940–November 1941.
- WHITE, William Allen, editor of *Emporia* (Kansas) *Gazette*; founder and chairman of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.
- WIED, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Sweden.

- WIEDEMANN, Fritz**, Captain, German Consul General at San Francisco.
- WIEHL, Emil Karl Josef**, Director of the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- WILLE, Ulrich**, Colonel, Chief of the infantry arm of the Swiss Army, 1936-December 1940.
- WILLKIE, Wendell**, Republican candidate for the Presidency of the United States, 1940.
- WITTING, Rolf Johan**, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- WOERMANN, Ernst**, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary.
- WOHLTHAT, Helmuth**, Prussian State Councilor; Ministerialdirektor for special assignments in the Four Year Plan; Bank Commissioner in the Netherlands, 1940-1941.
- WOOD, Robert E.**, Brigadier General, chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck and Co.; head of the "America First" Committee.
- ZAMBONI, Guelfo**, Counselor, Italian Embassy in Germany.
- ZECHLIN, Erich Wilhelm**, German Minister in Lithuania, 1933-1940.
- ZIEMKE, Kurt**, Minister, Representative of the German Foreign Ministry in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, September 1939-January 1941.

Appendix IV

GLOSSARY

OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS¹

- AA**, Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Ministry
- Abt.**, Abteilung, department
- Abt. L.**, Abt. Landesverteidigung, the Department of National Defense in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
- Abwehr**, counterintelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the OKW
- Adjutantur**, staff of adjutants
- Alpenveilchen** (Cyclamen), code name for the planned dispatch of German reinforcements to Albania
- Ang.**, Angabe, a designation given when action of more than one sort was to be taken on a paper. In such cases the relevant instructions were usually split up as Ang. I, II, etc., which designations followed the file numbers
- AO**, Auslandsorganisation, foreign organization of the National Socialist party concerned with German nationals living abroad
- APA**, Aussenpolitisches Amt, foreign affairs office of the National Socialist party
- Assessor**, candidate for the higher German Civil Service, serving for a probationary period in an administrative department prior to permanent appointment
- Attila**, code name for a German occupation of unoccupied France
- Aus.**, Ausl., Ausland, the foreign intelligence department of the OKW
- Ausl./Abw.**, Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the office of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence of the OKW
- Barbarossa**, code name for the German military operation against the Soviet Union
- BRAM**, Büro RAM, Secretariat of the Reich Foreign Minister
- Brigadeführer**, SA and SS rank equivalent to Brigadier General
- Chefsache**, top secret military
- D**, Abteilung Deutschland, Department for German Internal Affairs in the German Foreign Ministry
- DeL W.**, telegraphic symbol for the Special Commission on Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission
- Dienststelle Ribbentrop**, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity as foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance after his appointment as Foreign Minister
- DNB**, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, German News Agency, owned by the Ministry of Propaganda
- Einsatzgruppe**, a special task force organized by the Security Police and Security Service
- e. o.**, ex officio; where this precedes the file number, it indicates that there are no previous papers on the subject bearing this number
- Felix**, code name for the intended German operation against Gibraltar
- Friedens-HWIX**, telegraphic symbol used on messages sent from Wiesbaden by the representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Armistice Commission
- g.**, geh., geheim, secret
- Gau**, the largest territorial administrative unit of the National Socialist party
- Gauleiter**, highest official in a Gau

¹ Abbreviations are explained by giving the full German terms. These terms are explained at their proper alphabetical listing.

- Generalluftzeugmeister, chief of the special supply and procurement service of the Luftwaffe
- g. K., g. Kdos., geheime Kommandosache, top secret military
- g. Rs., geheime Reichssache, top secret
- Gruppenführer, SA and SS rank, equivalent to Major General
- Ha. Pol., symbol for the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry
- Hauptsturmführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Army Captain
- Kult., Kulturpolitische Abteilung, the Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry
- Landesgruppe, German National Socialist party organization for a foreign country, controlled by the Auslandsorganisation
- Landesgruppenleiter, leader of a Landesgruppe
- Luftwaffe, the German Air Force of the era of World War II
- Marita, code name for the German military operation against Greece
- Ministerialdirektor, a grade in the German Civil Service, usually the director of a department in a Ministry
- Ministerialdirigent, a grade in the German Civil Service, usually deputy director of a department in a Ministry
- Multex, a circular telegram
- NSB, Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, the National Socialist movement in the Netherlands
- NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, National Socialist German Workers party, the full title of the National Socialist party
- Ob. d. H., Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Commander in Chief of the Army
- Ob. d. L., Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe
- Ob. d. M., Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine, Commander in Chief of the Navy
- Oberstarbeitsführer, a rank in the German Labor Service
- OKH, Oberkommando des Heeres, High Command of the Army
- OKL, Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, High Command of the Luftwaffe
- OKM, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, High Command of the Navy
- OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, High Command of the Wehrmacht
- Pol., Politische Abteilung, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; sub-divided according to geographic areas, Referate, each designated by a Roman numeral, e.g., Pol. IV (see Appendix I)
- R, Recht, Rechtsabteilung, Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry
- RAM, Reichsaussenminister, Reich Foreign Minister
- Referat, division within a department of a German Ministry
- Reichsführer SS, Commander in Chief of the SS
- Reichsleiter, highest rank in the National Socialist party
- Reichsmarschall, Reich Marshal, military rank given to Göring
- Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reich Main Security Office, office of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD
- Reichsstatthalter, Reich Governor, representative of the Reich in a German territory, either a Land or a Reichsgau, with powers of control over its entire administration
- RKFDV, Reichskommissariat für die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums, Reich Commissariat for the strengthening of the German national community
- RLM, Reichsluftfahrtministerium, Reich Ministry of Air
- RM, Reichsminister, Reich Minister
- SA, Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP, Storm Troops of the NSDAP (brown shirts)
- SD, Sicherheitsdienst, security service; intelligence and counterintelligence agency of the SS

Seeloewe (Sea Lion), code name for planned German operation against Great Britain

SKL, Seekriegsleitung, Naval War Staff

Sonnenblume (Sunflower), code name for the dispatch of a German armored unit to North Africa

SS, Schutzstaffeln, elite corps of the National Socialist party, used for police and military purposes

St.S., Staatssekretär, State Secretary
Sturmabannführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Major

U. St.S., Unterstaatssekretär, Under State Secretary

VDA, Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, an organization with the aim of strengthening the German national groups outside the

German borders; in the course of 1933 it fell under the control of the National Socialist party

Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans, i.e., persons belonging to the German cultural community living outside the frontiers of the Reich and not Reich subjects

W, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry

Wehrmacht, designation of the German armed forces after 1935

WFSt, Wehrmachtführungsstab, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, an office in the OKW engaged in operations planning

zu, to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers on the subject have this number

Appendix V

BOUNDARIES OF LITHUANIAN STRIP, 1940

(Document No. 24, footnote 2)

