

RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

By the Late

SIR WILLIAM HAYTER, K.B.E.

LATE LEGAL ADVISER TO THE
EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT

SECOND IMPRESSION

CAMBRIDGE
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THE two lectures here printed were prepared by Sir William Hayter for the Local Lectures Summer Meeting at Cambridge in 1924. Illness prevented his travelling and the first lecture was read to a large audience on Saturday, August 2. It was so able and impressive that the author was asked to allow both lectures to be published. Before the answer could come the sad news of his death on August 5 was announced, but Lady Hayter at once gave the required permission. The second lecture was read on August 7, some hundreds of students again being present from many countries including Egypt. The importance of such a pronouncement is obvious, coming as it does from one who had held high office for so long. No one can read it without regret that such a sane, impartial, and sympathetic statesman is no longer at hand to help in the solution of the difficult problems in Egypt which still have to be faced.

D. H. S. CRANAGE

SYNDICATE BUILDINGS,
CAMBRIDGE
7 August 1924

RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

FIRST LECTURE

I

IF anyone sets about to describe the Constitutional development of a country, he will soon find that it serves very little purpose to enumerate and expound the relevant political and diplomatic documents. Fifty years ago Egypt was nominally a province of Turkey; in fact it was despotically ruled by a hereditary Viceroy, with the title of Khedive, whose obligations to Turkey consisted of little more than the payment of an annual tribute. For most of the interval Egypt has been occupied and closely controlled by the British Government. She is now a sovereign and independent State, governed by a Constitutional King, assisted by responsible Ministers, and by a Parliament chosen, though indirectly, by manhood suffrage. The suzerainty of Turkey has disappeared. How have these radical changes been brought about? The official documents would give you very little information, and, in especial, you would find that the name of England was hardly mentioned. And yet the whole, or nearly the whole, of this great transformation has been effected by the British Government, which has developed with regard to Egypt a policy which has been, in the main, consistent; has, up to now, been successful; and is now coming to its natural fruition.

This policy was epigrammatically expressed by Lord Palmerston nearly seventy years ago. The Emperor Nicholas, before the Crimean War, had put forward proposals for the partition of the Ottoman Empire,

under which Egypt would have fallen to the share of Great Britain. Lord Palmerston's comment is well known. "I want," he said, "a well-managed inn to serve as a half-way house on the way to my country place: but I don't want to buy the inn." Egypt lies right across our line of communication with India and the far East, and it is of real importance to us that it should be peaceable and well governed, but it is not in our interest to take the responsibility of maintaining peace and good government in the country, unless they can be assured in no other way.

A suggestion of Bismarck that we should annex Egypt was rejected by Disraeli, practically on the same grounds. The Gladstone Cabinet in 1882 refused to annex the country, and gave the most formal undertakings that our occupation was purely temporary, and would come to an end as soon as peace and good government were reasonably assured. Lord Salisbury, a few years later, did his best to evacuate Egypt, and was only defeated at the last moment by the refusal of the Ottoman Government, under pressure from France, to ratify a treaty which provided for the return of British troops to Egypt in case of a serious emergency. In 1904, when we settled all our outstanding difficulties with France, the British Government made no attempt to convert our occupation of Egypt into a permanent annexation of the country. But the most crucial case of all occurred in the autumn of 1914. It then became necessary to take some definite action to regularize our position, since Egypt was still, at least in theory, a province of the Ottoman Empire, with which we were at war. We had so great an army in Egypt that all resistance would have been hopeless; we should presumably have met with no

difficulties from our allies; the sovereign of the country, the Khedive Abbas Hilmy, was absent from the country and had definitely thrown in his lot with our enemies; and annexation seemed to be the simple and obvious solution of all our difficulties. But even then the British Government refused to annex the country, and contented itself with the abolition of Turkish suzerainty, the deposition of the Khedive, the proclamation of a British Protectorate and the appointment of a Prince of the house of Mohammed Ali as Sultan. It is betraying no secret to say that the annexation of Egypt was considered, but it was decisively rejected. There was no question of preparing the way for it; if it had been considered desirable, it would have been effected at once. We did not annex Egypt in 1914 because we did not wish to annex it, and for no other reason.

Since the Armistice, the British Government has been furnished with numerous pretexts for the annexation of Egypt. The murders of isolated British soldiers in 1919, the murder of eight British officers in the railway-station of Deirout, the Alexandria Massacres of 1921, and the systematic assassination of British officials in later years might well have caused the British Cabinet to despair of any friendly settlement with Egypt, and to cut the Gordian knot by annexing the country. But the old policy has still been maintained. The Protectorate has been abolished, and Egypt, subject to certain reservations, has been recognised as a free and independent state. The national aspirations of the great mass of peaceful and law-abiding Egyptians have not been crushed as a punishment for the crimes of a small but unscrupulous minority.

Thus it has been, for nearly seventy years, no part of

the policy of the British Government to annex Egypt: it may even be said that it has been the consistent policy of Great Britain for the whole period not to annex Egypt, however favourable the opportunity, and however great the provocation. This policy has been openly proclaimed throughout our occupation of Egypt: an eminent Egyptian statesman has counted fifty-eight separate declarations made by responsible British authorities of our intention ultimately to evacuate the country. It may well be asked how it has come about that a policy so consistently followed and so frequently proclaimed has been so generally misunderstood. There are probably two main reasons. In the first place, foreign journalists in Egypt have always treated our promises to evacuate as without serious meaning, and their Egyptian colleagues have followed their example. "C'est de blague, tout ça," would be the ordinary comment; and the Egyptian has been called upon to mark a typical instance of English hypocrisy. In the second place, we had, in recent years, built up so large and solid a British Civil Service in Egypt that it may well have seemed improbable that we had any serious intention of leaving the country. Englishmen in advisory posts, or in technical posts for which no qualified Egyptian candidate could be found, would not have given rise to any particular suspicion; but when half the Under-Secretaries of State and all the Directors-General and Assistant Directors-General were Englishmen it may well have seemed likely to the intelligent Egyptian that our occupation of the country would be permanent. In this respect, it can hardly be doubted that the natural desire of the British authorities in Egypt to secure greater efficiency in administration has to some extent obscured

the settled policy of the British Government. But there can be no reasonable doubt what that policy has always been. As has been shown, successive British Cabinets of all shades of political opinion have all come to the same conclusion.

These considerations show how completely irrelevant are the adjurations frequently published for a firm hand in Egypt, and the maintenance of British prestige. We shall best maintain our prestige by following a consistent policy and keeping our promises; and what is the good of a firm hand in seizing something which you have already decided you do not want?

II

If it be true that it has long formed part of the policy of Great Britain not to annex Egypt, why, it may be asked, did we ever occupy the country? The answer seems to be, according to the Palmerston formula, that it is necessary that the half-way house to our estates should be well-managed, and that in 1882 Egypt was and had long been very ill-managed indeed. A legend to the contrary has recently sprung up in Egypt; and the ingenious editor of one of the French papers published in Cairo recently committed himself to the statement that the reign of the Khedive Ismail Pasha was for Egypt the age of gold. In a somewhat restricted sense, the statement is true; for foreign adventurers and especially for blackmailers it was an age of gold in the most literal sense of the word: the Egyptian Government was commonly known in those circles as "The Milch-Cow," and the milkers were many and very expert. But it was the Egyptian, and especially the Egyptian fellah, who eventually had to pay for the golden stream; and

the evidence is conclusive that he paid very heavily indeed. Many were conscripted for the hated service in the Sudan, but very few of them returned. Those who escaped this danger spent a great part of their lives in unpaid labour on the *corvée*; they were over-taxed and under-supplied with water for the irrigation of their land; and they were continually flogged. The State was insolvent, its creditors were pressing urgently for payment and the *kourbash* (flogging-whip) was the main instrument for raising money. A cheerful rhyme was then current which proclaimed that the fellah was of no use without a flogging; no effort was spared to make him useful.

Two anecdotes have come down from those times which well illustrate the hardships of life under these conditions. The first is told by an English engineer, who afterwards rose to high office in the Ministry of Public Works. He first came to the country in the employment of a French pumping company in the Delta and began by accompanying his chief in a sailing *dahabeeyah* from Alexandria to the pumping-station. When the wind failed, two heavily-armed Turks, who were in the service of the company, blew their whistles, upon which all the fellahin within hearing hastened to the canal-bank. The reason of their haste was soon apparent: the last two to arrive received twenty lashes apiece from the Turks. A sufficient team was then harnessed to the tow-rope and hauled the *dahabeeyah* for some miles, when they were graciously released, though without any payment whatever. The process was then repeated in all its details. The Englishman made some protest, but was assured that it was the common custom of the country. It should be remarked that the party had no

official status whatever, and owed their power to conscript labour solely to armed force.

The other story is told by an Egyptian ex-Minister, whose father was a land-owner in the Delta, with outlying property at Beni Souef in Upper Egypt. This last land was leased to a substantial farmer, who at the expiration of his lease demanded a reduction of rent. The future Minister was sent by his father to look into the matter, with a letter of introduction to the Mudir (Governor) of Beni Souef. The Mudir received the young man with great kindness, sent for the tenant and ordered him to renew the lease at the old rent. Upon the tenant objecting that he could not possibly pay it, the Mudir ordered him a hundred blows on the soles of his feet, which were then and there administered, after which the lease was duly renewed. "As you see," said the Mudir, "I am always ready to oblige your respected father." And the tenant was a man of substance, and something of a notable.

It was the desperate grievances of the fellahin which gave force and substance to the revolt under Arabi Pasha. That revolt was well justified, but unfortunately Arabi was quite unable to make anything of the government of the country when he had attained to power. He was probably quite guiltless of the Alexandria Massacre, but he could do nothing to prevent or to stop it. The whole structure of Egyptian civilization was dissolving into chaos.

Here there seems to emerge a general principle, which is likely always to remain applicable. Egypt is and always must be the victim of her own geographical position. Her territory lies right across the main line of communication between England and her Eastern

Dominions and possessions, between France and her Eastern colonies, between Italy and Eritrea. It is not only a matter of keeping open the Suez Canal: the demands of aviation and of wireless telegraphy have nowadays to be considered. Thus not only England, but France and Italy, Australia and New Zealand, India and French Indo-China are all directly interested in the maintenance of stable and orderly government in Egypt, while the other European Powers, China and Japan, are concerned in a less degree. If an Egyptian Government can provide a regular and peaceable administration for Egypt, so much the better; but, if not, it is as certain as anything can be that some Power or group of Powers will always be obliged to intervene to restore order. Bulgaria or Greece may be allowed a revolution or so without interference, but not Egypt.

From our point of view it seems clear that the occupation of 1882 was fully justified, though it is hardly to be expected that any Egyptian would either accept the validity of the principle enunciated above, or approve of our action in occupying his country. Forty years ago there must have been very many Egyptians who welcomed a British occupation which delivered them from conditions which had become intolerable; but these are now "old, unhappy, far-off things," and the patriotic Egyptian has forgotten the kourbash and the corvée and regards our presence in Egypt as simply an unjustifiable usurpation.

There seems, indeed, to be a growing tendency in Egypt to re-write the history of the last forty years, even in the matter of material progress. An Egyptian Minister has assured me that the Assouan Dam was designed in all its details by an Egyptian engineer in the

reign of the Khedive Ismail, and that Garstin and Willcocks merely adopted the design and carried it into effect; the original plans are, it appears, unfortunately lost. The improvements and reforms commonly attributed to Lord Cromer and his assistants were, we are now told, really the work of enlightened Egyptian Ministers, with perhaps some slight technical assistance from the English. All this is not to be taken too seriously. It is a matter, in the last resort, for the verdict of history, and we can agree to differ with the Egyptians as to the credit to be given for past successes. The really important thing is to come to some working arrangement for the future.

III

The Cromer régime in Egypt consisted chiefly of Lord Cromer. The real difficulty of giving any convincing account of that great man lies in the fact that he really possessed all those admirable qualities which laudatory biographers are in the habit of attributing to eminent statesmen, whether they had them or not. Perhaps the most valuable quality which he brought to the consideration of Egyptian affairs was his great sense of the realities of things; there was much in Egypt that was mere "facade," like the Nile Barrage below Cairo, which was admirable from almost every point of view, but was unfortunately not strong enough to hold up any water. Hard-working, sagacious, intensely practical, with a great instinct for judging popular feeling and a keen sense of humour, he really was one of the very best of men, and about as unlike Mr Lytton Strachey's sketch of him as it is possible to imagine.

He came to Egypt to put Lord Dufferin's scheme for

the government of the country into force, and to restore stable and orderly government; no one imagined that this would take more than a very few years. But the difficulties were immense; there was no solid foundation anywhere, and it soon became apparent that, if any permanent organisation of Egypt were to be established, it would be necessary to begin at the beginning. It was one of Lord Cromer's favourite sayings that you could not drive six coaches abreast through Temple Bar; and his practice was to take up only one or two big schemes at a time, but never to rest until he had put them through. He found more and more need for recruiting British assistants, as more and more branches of Government came under examination; almost without exception, they had to be completely remodelled, and that could not be effected without a considerable British staff.

During his early years in Egypt, Lord Cromer worked in very close co-operation with the Khedive Tewfik and his Ministers, some of whom were men of considerable experience and exercised a great influence over public affairs; but during his last ten years or so he had to deal with an unsatisfactory Khedive and somewhat lethargic Ministers, some of whom hardly even pretended to take any interest in the affairs of their Ministries. It cannot very well be denied that during that period Lord Cromer was the effective ruler of Egypt, and that he worked through the English Advisers and Under-Secretaries, rather than through Egyptian Ministers. Nor can it be denied that he was something of a despot, but he was certainly a very benevolent and a very able one, and he conferred immense material benefits on Egypt. The restoration of financial order, which has allowed Egypt to grow from one of the poorest to almost the most

prosperous of states; the re-modelling of the whole irrigation-system, which enables the country to support in comfort at least twice the population of forty years ago; the abolition of the kourbash and the corvée; the equalisation of the land-tax and the wide remissions of taxation; these and a hundred other reforms constitute a record of solid achievement which can seldom have been equalled in a like period.

But it must be admitted that Egyptians had very little voice in the affairs of their own country. As one Egyptian Minister has said: "Theoretically Egyptian Ministers governed with English advice. Practically Lord Cromer and ten or a dozen Englishmen did all the important work, with thousands of Egyptians standing by to advise them!" Towards the end of Lord Cromer's time, Egyptians became naturally and reasonably impatient with this state of affairs, and began to demand with some insistence a really effective part in the government of their country. This was, in fact, obtained, under Lord Cromer's successors, by the appointment as Ministers of a succession of able judges from the Native Court of Appeal. It is, perhaps, not generally realised that for nearly the last twenty years most of the Egyptian Ministers have been drawn from the Judicial Bench. Saad Zaghloul Pasha, Mohammed Said Pasha, Hussein Roushdy Pasha, Abdel Khalek Saroit Pasha, Tewfik Nessim Pasha and Yehia Ibrahim Pasha have all been Prime Ministers and all came from the Native Court of Appeal. Youssef Wahba Pasha, also Prime Minister, was for many years a judge of the Mixed Court of Appeal; and of recent Prime Ministers only Adly Yeghen Pasha has not been an ex-judge.

It may, perhaps, be conjectured that the special con-

ditions of work in the Native Court of Appeal were particularly favourable to the development of Ministers capable of holding their own effectively with the British Agency, their British Advisers and their British subordinates. The main part of their work was to go on circuit as assize-judges. A Court of Assize was ordinarily composed of two Egyptians and one Englishman, and the relations between English and Egyptian judges have always been particularly friendly. An Egyptian judge had thus ample opportunities of becoming thoroughly acquainted with the English point of view; he was accustomed to sit with Englishmen and discuss cases on terms of complete equality; and when he became a Minister he was prepared for the same friendly co-operation from his Adviser or English Under-Secretary as he had habitually received from his English Colleagues on the Bench. However that may be, there can be no doubt that the new Ministers took a greater and greater part in public affairs as time went on. The forms remained unchanged, and the general public did not much realise that anything was altered; but men like Zaghloul Pasha, Said Pasha, or Roushdy Pasha were not in the least disposed to accept without protest advice with which they did not agree, and for about seven years before the war Egyptians were managing their own affairs to a much greater extent than most people, both in England and in Egypt, at all suspected. This tendency was much strengthened by the institution of the Legislative Assembly in 1913. Its proceedings were conducted in Arabic; the Minister could address it, while his Adviser could not; with the result that the final decision on measures to be put forward rested more and more with the Minister. Right up to

the outbreak of war, everything seemed to point to a natural evolution of autonomous Egyptian institutions, and to the steady diminution of British intervention in purely Egyptian affairs.

There is good reason to believe that Lord Kitchener was strongly in favour of such a development. He is known to have been in favour of the abolition of the posts of Adviser, and his habit was to deal directly with the Egyptian Ministers as much as possible. He was very much in favour of the institution of a Legislative Assembly, and took a personal part in preparing the necessary legislation. He kept his thoughts and plans very much to himself and was naturally inarticulate; but no one who had to deal with him could doubt the real and strong liking which he had for the Egyptians, and especially for the fellaheen. It is believed that to the day of his death his one personal ambition was to get back to Egypt.

IV

If one looks back at the working of the British Administration in Egypt, its main defect seems to be that it was carried on too much with a view to immediate exigencies, and without sufficient regard to the main principles underlying British policy. This is, perhaps, most clearly shown in the recruiting of foreign officials. It recently became necessary to ascertain the precise number of foreign officials in Egypt, and it was found that there were about three thousand of them, of whom about half were British. To take another classification, about half were permanent and pensionable, the other half being engaged on contract. The number, especially of permanent officials, seems excessive; but it must be remembered that a large proportion of them occupied

purely technical posts in the State Railways, Telegraphs and Telephones; that there was a very large scientific staff, especially in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Survey Department; and that the numbers were swelled by skilled artisans and by the men in the Light-house and Marine Services, for whose posts it would not be easy to find Egyptian candidates. It should also be remembered that no European could be appointed to a new post, or to a post formerly held by an Egyptian, without the express consent of the Council of Ministers, so that a good case had to be made out for every nomination. But a good case could always be made out, from the point of view of immediate efficiency. The Ministry of Agriculture, for instance, was obliged to engage a large staff of entomologists, mycologists, botanists experienced in plant-breeding, and other scientific experts when the Egyptian cotton-crop was threatened with destruction by the Pink Boll-worm; no qualified Egyptian candidates could be found, and the posts were all filled by appointments from England. There was not at any time, on the part of the British authorities in Egypt, any desire to increase the number of British officials; but the pressure from Heads of Departments was strong and the necessity often obvious, and Egyptian Ministers found themselves obliged, in the interests of the country, to agree to the appointments. The fault was that no proper provision was made for the future. When twenty scientists were engaged from Cambridge, twenty young Egyptians should at once have been sent to Cambridge to study the same branches of science, with a promise of posts under Government if they could obtain satisfactory degrees. Once qualified, they would have come out as the assistants of the Englishmen, and

would have eventually succeeded to their posts. In the same way, when a Department was going to rack and ruin it was, in many cases, really necessary to put a hard-hearted Englishman in charge as Director-General, with another as Assistant Director-General. But a third post should always have been created for a promising young Egyptian, who would have been trained up to take charge of the re-modelled Department when the Englishmen retired or were promoted. These measures would have cost some money, but it would have been money well-expended. The great development of prosperity which Egypt has enjoyed during the last twenty years has necessarily involved the formation of new scientific and technical services; posts in those services had to be given to Europeans, so long as there were no qualified Egyptians; but steps should at once have been taken to supply qualified Egyptians. An excessive number of European officials would not have mattered, if the excess had been merely temporary and Egyptians had been in training for the posts.

Education in Egypt is commonly mentioned as one of our failures, and it is considered disgraceful to us that, according to the census-returns, only eight per cent. of the population can read and write. It is, however, certain that a very much larger proportion have received some education; there is an elementary school (kuttab) in almost every village, where children get about the same education as that given by the old dame-schools in England. It must be remembered that it is very much more difficult to learn to read and write Arabic characters than Roman characters; it would be interesting to know whether in any country using Arabic characters any large percentage of the population can

read and write. Egyptian children are very quick to learn; and if Egypt would adopt Roman characters for everyday use, it is probable that in a couple of generations nearly every Egyptian would be able to read and write quite well.

Apart from the charge of general illiteracy, it is alleged that the whole system of Primary and Secondary Education which we have instituted is too mechanical and formal and consists too exclusively of preparation for examinations. There is, perhaps, some truth in the charge; but in this as in other matters we have only been able to lay foundations. It will be for Egyptians to build on these foundations a system of national education which will suit their own needs. It may at least be said that the present system, such as it is, has produced of late years a crop of very intelligent young Egyptians.

Another charge commonly brought against the agents of the British Occupation is that they lacked sympathy with the Egyptians and their aspirations, that they lived isolated at Gezira or Maadi and did not live with the general population, and that they held themselves too much aloof from Egyptians from a social point of view. No doubt this was true in some cases; in others it was emphatically untrue. There have been many personal friendships between Englishmen and Egyptians, and there has been a good deal of mutual entertaining. But is it not rather a large assumption to suppose that Egyptians desired the social relations between themselves and the English to be any closer or more intimate than they actually were? They liked some Englishmen, and saw a good deal of them; they disliked others, and saw as little of them as possible. There were some ill-mannered Englishmen, though not many; but there

were also some ill-mannered Egyptians, though most of them were courtesy itself.

A witty French Colonel who visited Egypt during the war held forth on the differences between the Colonial ideals of the English and the French; he steadily refused to regard Egypt as anything but a British Colony. "We," he said, "try to make our colonials into Frenchmen, or as near as they can get to it. The young Algerian who gets his clothes from Paris, talks fluent French and can turn out a passable French sonnet is certain of promotion. Your ambition is to make an Egyptian a better Egyptian; you don't want him to imitate you, and you rather dislike him if he tries to do so. Your ideal is the more noble: but our system is more likely to produce practical results."

The sensible view seems to be that social relations, here as elsewhere, are best left to settle themselves. As to sympathy with Egyptian aspirations, it was pretty widely felt among British officials; most of the die-hards were non-officials, though they had a certain number of adherents in the Service.

Lastly, it is said that such benefits as were conferred on Egypt by the British Occupation were purely of the material order. Probably this, in the main, is true, though something might be said of the example given by the lives of such men as Lord Cromer and Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff. But can one country give to another any but material assistance, in a wide sense of the word? We have put their finances and irrigation in order, supplied them with a reasonably good framework of government and remedied crying abuses, but to raise the moral and intellectual standard of Egyptians and to bring Egypt into the forefront of civilization is a work for Egyptians themselves, and for no one else.

V

The outbreak of war checked, like a nipping frost, the promising growth of Egyptian institutions. As has been explained, it became necessary, on the outbreak of war with Turkey, to regularize our position in Egypt; the obvious course of annexation was rightly rejected; and a Protectorate was proclaimed with Prince Hussein as Sultan. The terms of the Protectorate were left rather vague, and the word itself has no very certain meaning; but it may reasonably be conjectured that the British Government only desired to establish a *modus vivendi* for the purposes of the war, and to leave the final settlement of the Egyptian question for later consideration. For that purpose, the Protectorate was amply sufficient, so long as we could count on the co-operation of Sultan Hussein and his Ministers; but if that co-operation had been refused, it seems that there would have been no possibility of avoiding annexation. The exigencies of war are stern; decisions have to be taken quickly; and it would have been impossible to use Egypt as the base for so many campaigns unless our status and authority in the country were established and well recognised. The late Sultan Hussein rendered a great service to his country by accepting the throne, and so did Roushdy Pasha and his colleagues by taking office. It may be doubted whether sufficient credit has been given to Roushdy Pasha for the part which he played in Egypt during the war. He was obliged to co-operate with the military authorities and to accept decisions taken on military grounds under martial law, but he was watchful to protect Egyptian interests so far as possible and especially to avoid the necessity of decisions of principle which might prejudice the future of Egypt. Egyptians owe

to him and to his colleagues a greater debt of gratitude than they seem at present to be prepared to recognise.

During the first three years of the war, there was no serious friction between the Egyptian people and the British authorities. But, as the Palestine campaign developed, the pressure on the population became more and more severe. Farmers are much the same all the world over, and the Egyptian fellah very much disliked the requisitioning of his beasts and his crops and the compulsory sale at fixed prices of cotton and cottonseed to the Cotton Control Commission and the Cottonseed Board. Above all, recruiting for the Egyptian Labour Corps became a burden; towards the end it was very little short of compulsory. Fair and even generous prices and wages were given, but the money paid by the military authorities took a long time to get to the sellers, and did not always arrive intact. A mistake had been made in relaxing the rigorous rule of Lord Kitchener that no administrative official in Egypt should be allowed to take a commission during the war. The younger men naturally fought against this prohibition, and many of them had their way, with the result that Inspectors of Agriculture, Finance and the Interior, who knew the Egyptian provinces thoroughly and would have been worth their weight in gold for organizing and superintending requisitions and the recruiting of the Labour Corps, were serving as subalterns in distant climes. Their substitutes, whether British officers or Egyptian officials, were not altogether satisfactory. The best of the British officers were at the Front with the Divisions; those engaged on the work of requisitioning naturally knew nothing of the country, and could not talk Arabic. The Egyptian officials employed were without the

necessary experience, were frequently arbitrary in their methods and were in some cases dishonest; it is remarkable that when the rising came in 1919 the very first victims were some Egyptian provincial officials who had been especially active in requisitioning and recruiting for the Labour Corps.

These hardships, compared to those suffered by any of the belligerent populations during the war, were really inconsiderable, and were balanced by the great accession of prosperity resulting from the supply at war prices of the needs of a great army. If all had remained quiet, the grievances would probably have disappeared within a year or two after the war; long delayed payments would at last have been made, most of the camels and donkeys would have come back and the men of the Labour Corps would have returned to their villages with their pockets full of money. With the disappearance of the control over cotton and cotton-seed, the last traces of the régime of the war would, so far as the fellahin were concerned, have been effaced. But it was above all things necessary to secure a quiet period after the Armistice for the remedy of grievances and the liquidation of unsettled claims, and for that purpose the cordial co-operation of Egyptian Ministers was clearly essential.

In these circumstances Roushdy Pasha as Prime Minister proposed that he and Adly Pasha, then Minister of Foreign Education, should go to London to lay before the British Government proposals for the future government of Egypt. Sir Reginald Wingate, then High Commissioner, warmly supported their request. Most unfortunately, his advice was not taken, and the Egyptian Ministers were told that, in view of the urgent problems upon which the Foreign Office was engaged, their visit

must be postponed. It is easy to be wise after the event, and there were all sorts of good reasons for postponement, but the effect in Egypt was merely disastrous. The refusal of the British Government naturally entailed a great loss of prestige for Roushdy Pasha, and was considered as a humiliation by the entire Egyptian people, especially as other delegations from neighbouring countries were freely welcomed in London. The Archbishop of Cyprus with six other Cypriot Greeks were actually on their way home when the Egyptian request was refused. The common saying in Cairo was: "They will receive an Archbishop and six bakkals (grocers) from Cyprus but they won't receive Egyptian Ministers."

Logically the British Government was right. It was obviously better in theory to begin by disposing of the urgent problems of a devastated Europe which were crying for an immediate solution, and to postpone what was really the new question of the future government of Egypt until a more convenient opportunity. But logical considerations have very little weight when a whole nation feels itself insulted and humiliated.

Meanwhile Saad Zaghloul Pasha had come forward with his war-cry of "Istiklal el tam" (complete independence), and had gained many adherents. When at last Roushdy Pasha and Adly Pasha were told that they would be received at the Foreign Office, they found themselves obliged to ask that Saad Pasha should accompany them. This again was refused, and Roushdy Pasha resigned office. After a certain interval he consented to form a reconstituted Ministry, but he soon found his position impossible, and resigned again after little more than a fortnight in office.

Thus the system, which had during the war worked on the whole so well, by March 1919 had completely broken down. In view of Roushdy Pasha's failure to get his views considered by the British Government, no other Egyptian statesman would take office. The large and increasing class of politically-minded Egyptians were thoroughly disaffected, while the provinces were simmering with the accumulated discontents of the fellahin.

SECOND LECTURE

I

THE general course of the rising of 1919 is well known. It never had the least chance of any military success, since a population almost entirely unarmed was pitted against a great army of veterans. But there was a real and serious danger, which is perhaps best explained by a statement made to me by an intelligent corporal in a Line Regiment, who was in charge of a picket at the Zamalek Bridge.

"What we all want," he said, "is to go home; we're all due to be demobilized now or soon, and if we're kept other men will get our jobs. We know as well as anybody that, if we were allowed to shoot hard for ten minutes or a quarter of an hour, we should kill a few thousand Gippos and the whole thing would be over. Then we could go home in peace. We've had plenty of provocation, and we get it every day from the crowds; and besides, a lot of unarmed soldiers were caught alone and killed when the trouble began. So that's what we'd all like to do; kill a few thousand Gippos and have done with it. But General Allenby has been round to all the barracks and spoken to us himself. He's asked us to go slow and kill as few as possible; he said it would do a lot of harm in the long run if heaps of them were killed; and said that they'd got their grievances and all that. We're doing it for him, but I don't believe the men would stick it for anyone else. You see we were with him all the campaign, and we used to see him up at the front, taking his risks like the rest of us."

The discipline and forbearance of the British troops in these circumstances were really amazing. The late

Charles de Rocca Serra, the Frenchman who for so many years was the senior Legal Adviser of the Egyptian Government, told an Egyptian audience that if a French army had had to put up with half as much, all Cairo would have been in ashes, orders or no orders. If it had not been for the firmness and clemency of Lord Allenby, the coolness of his officers and the good discipline of his men, the path of progress which Egypt with British assistance had followed for so long might well have ended in a bloody puddle.

There was no great evidence of organization about the rising. Certainly the interruption of railway communications and the destruction of the signalling apparatus must have formed part of a settled plan; but its principal effect was to bring the native population of Cairo within measurable distance of starvation. At one time there was never more than one day's supply of food in Cairo; and that is dangerous in a city with a population of three-quarters of a million. It is conjectured that the systematic damage to the railways was carried out in accordance with an old plan devised to hinder the despatch of reinforcements when the Turks were attacking the Suez Canal; in any case it was an absurdity in the circumstances of the rising.

The movement was directed against the British Government and the Army of Occupation, not against the British Officials. Egyptians at the time were unanimous on this point, and the course of events showed that they were right. It is true that four British Officials were killed early in the rising, but three of these were in military uniform, and the fourth, a railway foreman, was killed by his own men in a private quarrel. It is also true that British Officials in the provinces had

in some cases somewhat alarming experiences, but none of them were, in fact, killed or wounded and no woman or child came to any harm. In Cairo, which was the centre of disturbance, while isolated soldiers were almost certain to be attacked, civilians were quite unmolested. But the great test came with the general strike of all Egyptian Officials. Strong strike pickets were mounted at all the Ministries, and for the first week or so there was no military or police protection; but during all that time the British Officials attended their offices without the least molestation. Among them were some English lady secretaries and shorthand writers, who absolutely refused to be excused from their duties. On one occasion, when a courageous Egyptian Advocate in the Government service tried to force his way into the Ministry of Finance to finish some work, and was being roughly handled by the pickets, two Englishmen from the Ministry came to his rescue; they met with no resistance at all, and the man was at once released. Egyptians generally seem to have taken the sensible view that the British Officials had nothing to do with a purely political strike, and did well to get on with their jobs and earn their wages.

This strike of officials is worth more than passing mention. It is no light thing for steady and responsible officials to risk their posts and their pensions in protest against what they considered an unjust policy. For about three weeks the British Officials carried on as best they could, and learned to attach a new meaning to the saying that you cannot govern without the consent of the governed; they had considered it a moral apophthegm, but they found that it was a simple statement of fact. Then a military order was issued to the Egyptian

Officials to return to work, on pain of forfeiting their posts and pensions. They very wisely obeyed, since their political demonstration had been quite sufficiently made.

All this time there had been no Ministry—Sultan Fouad could not properly be asked to take any action without responsible Ministers to advise him, and all sorts of expedients had to be adopted to keep the government going. The Budget for 1919–20 was put into force by Military Proclamation, and urgent matters of a kind ordinarily referred to the Council of Ministers were made the subject of Military Orders, while Under-Secretaries were authorized to exercise the powers of Ministers. But the situation was becoming intolerable when the Sultan, early in June, persuaded Mohammed Said Pasha to form a Cabinet. There can be no doubt at all that His Highness, from a purely Egyptian point of view, exercised a very wise discretion, and that Said Pasha and his colleagues showed both courage and patriotism in accepting office. As at the beginning of the War, if Egyptian statesmen had permanently refused their co-operation, the British Government would have been obliged to take their own measures for the good government of Egypt, and the only possible measure remaining, when once the Protectorate scheme had broken down, was the annexation of the country. The hope which was entertained by some Egyptian extremists that we might by a policy of pin-pricks be induced to abandon the country altogether was never anything but an absurdity; we could never have left Egypt a defenceless prey to the first comer. But they did entertain this hope, and they very much resented Said Pasha's acceptance of office, with the result that he and his colleagues were in no small danger of their lives.

Attempts were, indeed, made to assassinate them, but happily they all failed, and the Ministry did good work in restoring order to the Country.

II

Immediately after the Armistice, Saad Pasha Zaghloul had put forward his programme of complete independence for Egypt, and had formed an organization to support his views. This body was known as the "Wafd" (Delegation); it was never quite clear whom it represented, though there seems to have been a private meeting of the surviving members of the old Legislative Assembly which purported to give it some sort of authority. It openly defied the military authorities, and early in 1919 Saad Pasha and three of his principal colleagues were arrested and interned in Malta. Their confinement was not to last very long, since Lord Allenby, as soon as some sort of order had been restored, released them from arrest and allowed them to go where they would. They all, in fact, settled down in Paris. Their release was received with rapturous enthusiasm, and ever since Saad Pasha has been the popular hero of most of the Egyptian people.

He was the son of a small landowner in the Delta, said to be of Tunisian origin, though this seems doubtful. He was educated at the great Moslem University of El Azhar in Cairo, became an Advocate before the Religious Courts, and ultimately was appointed a judge of the Native Court of Appeal. He married a daughter of Mustapha Fahmy Pasha, who was Prime Minister for more than ten years towards the end of Lord Cromer's pro-consulate, and a year or two before Lord Cromer left he was appointed Minister of Education. In that

capacity he showed great energy and determination and gained the approval of Lord Cromer, who in his farewell speech specially referred by name to Saad Pasha as likely to play a great part in the future government of Egypt. He afterwards became Minister of Justice, and again showed both energy and capacity; but he was always one of the most frank and outspoken of men, and he found it very difficult to work with the Khedive Abbas Hilmy. He accordingly retired from the Ministry, but in 1913 he was elected a member of the Legislative Assembly, was at once elected Vice-President and took a very prominent part in the deliberations of that body. During the war he took no great part in public affairs. There was at one time a suggestion that he should be appointed to fill a vacancy in the Ministry; in the light of after events, it seems a pity that the appointment was not made.

After his release from Malta, Saad Pasha remained in Paris until 1921, when he returned to Egypt and was received with great enthusiasm.

Meanwhile the British Government had determined to send out a Commission of Enquiry, under the presidency of Lord Milner. No better choice of a chairman could have been made, and yet the despatch of the Commission was probably a mistake. Mohammed Said Pasha, the Prime Minister, was strongly opposed to it, as were all his colleagues; in fact, Egyptian opinion was unanimous against the measure. It was feared that the Commission would prescribe the future form of government of Egypt, without consultation with the representatives of the Egyptian people, and every effort was made to boycott the Commission. When it became clear that the Commission was coming, the Prime

Minister resigned as a protest; he was succeeded by Youssef Wahba Pasha, who had long served as Minister of Finance. He was after a few months obliged to resign on grounds of ill-health, much to the regret of his many friends, both English and Egyptian, and was succeeded by Tewfik Nessim Pasha, a comparatively young man, who had only entered the Cabinet for the first time in 1919.

If Lord Milner had been entrusted by the Cabinet with a confidential mission to confer with Lord Allenby on the general situation, it is probable that good results would have followed. He would have been able to engage in informal discussions with the leading Egyptian statesmen without arousing the susceptibilities of the people, and the British Government would then have been in a position to make definite proposals for the future government of Egypt. As it was, the Commission finally published a Report which had not been accepted by the British Cabinet, but which was none the less considered by Egyptians as a definite offer from Great Britain. The Report had one great merit, in that it treated Egyptian aspirations with courtesy and consideration, and so went far to heal the wounded susceptibilities of the Egyptian people; it was at first very well received; but it was gradually realised that the scheme proposed was, in reality, nothing but a veiled protectorate of indefinite duration, and it became more and more apparent that no Egyptian Minister would sign a convention embodying any such scheme.

Adly Pasha Yeghen, who succeeded Tewfik Nessim Pasha as Prime Minister, did his best to arrive at an agreement and in 1921 went on mission to London to submit proposals to the Foreign Office; but negotiations

broke down, and the settlement of the Egyptian question seemed to be further off than ever. Adly Pasha resigned, and no one could be found to form a Ministry. The deadlock appeared to be complete. We could, of course, have annexed the country, and put down all opposition with the strong hand, but that would have been to abandon a policy consistently followed for nearly seventy years, and to give up altogether the process of regeneration initiated by Lord Cromer. Nor would it have been of any advantage to Great Britain. What had we to gain by dominating a cowed and dispirited Egypt? We should have had to maintain permanently a large army in the country; we could have looked for little or no co-operation from Egyptians; and all trade with England or English traders would probably have been boycotted.

And yet throughout Egypt there was a strong desire for some sort of settlement, and the end of political troubles. Even in 1919, as soon as the first wave of excitement began to die down, it was possible to discern a strong under-tow of feeling in favour of a return to normal conditions and a quiet life. Shortly after the Milner Report appeared, an Englishman on his way home from the Ministry of Finance met a fellah with a bundle of sugar-canes on his back who waved his arms as he went and shouted "I am contented; by God the Exalted, I am completely contented." "Why are you so contented, brother?" asked the Englishman. "Because of this Report," he said. "Do you think it a good scheme?" said the Englishman. "Do I know whether it is good or not?" he replied. "I am like one of the cattle, and understand nothing of these things. But they tell me that there will be an agreement, and an end

of all these quarrels and shootings; and so I am contented; by God the Exalted I am exceedingly contented."

III

Up to this point Lord Allenby had contented himself with restoring order in Egypt and maintaining the best administration that was possible under the circumstances, without putting forward any policy of his own for the future government of the country; this was, of course, inevitable, so long as the Milner scheme held the field. But when it became clear that no agreement was possible on those lines, it was considered that the time had come to frame an alternative policy. It was found that there was an almost complete unanimity of view among the senior Englishmen in the service, who were in full agreement with the High Commissioner and his very able staff that a new departure should be made on much more liberal lines.

The Protectorate system, which had worked well enough during the war, depended entirely on the willing co-operation of Egyptian Ministers; in time of peace that co-operation was not always forthcoming, and the system had by the end of 1921 definitely broken down. There was no possibility of return to the Cromer system of government; that stage in the evolution of Egypt was long past, and the system had, in fact, done its work. If the administration of Egypt was still far from perfection, the same may safely be said of the administration of all other countries. The finances were flourishing; there was a good irrigation system; the general administration of the country was probably about up to the general average; and there were a good number of young Egyptians who had shown energy and capacity

and were not afraid of responsibility. If we waited for perfection, we should have to wait for ever. We had exercised for nearly forty years a tutelage over the Egyptian people and their affairs; if we were really acting with a disinterested view to the regeneration of Egypt, the time had clearly come to hand over the management of affairs to the inhabitants of the country.

On the other hand, no system of autonomy, however wide, within the British Empire had any chance of acceptance. What Egyptians unanimously desired was independence, and not inclusion in the Empire, even with the status of a Dominion, if that could have been accorded; incidentally, it may well be doubted whether Great Britain and the Dominions would at any time have been willing to receive Egypt into full partnership in our new Commonwealth of Nations.

We could not evacuate Egypt at once and unconditionally. On the one hand, she would have been left quite defenceless against foreign invasion; the purely Egyptian troops amount to about one weak Division, without modern armaments and quite without experience of war; the black battalions are all serving in the Sudan under British officers, and in any case there are very few of them. On the other hand, there were purely British interests to be safeguarded, notably our communications with the Far East, and our position in the Sudan, over which we have exercised a condominium with Egypt since the Convention of 1899.

In these circumstances, the policy put forward by Lord Allenby was that of satisfying Egyptian aspirations by abolishing the Protectorate and recognizing Egypt as an independent sovereign State, while making the necessary reservations for the protection of purely British

interests. But two difficulties presented themselves. In the first place, how was this policy to be carried out? There was no available Egyptian Minister to sign any agreement; if there had been, it may well be doubted whether at that time any Minister would have had the courage to sign a treaty containing any reservation whatever to the complete independence of Egypt. But Egyptians were accustomed to see the affairs of their country regulated by the Rescripts (Firmans) of the Sultans of Turkey, and it was decided, if the consent of the British Government could be obtained, to proceed by way of unilateral declaration. In the second place, Saad Pasha Zaghoul appeared to be unalterably opposed to anything in the nature of a settlement. It is possible that his views were misinterpreted, but all the information at the disposal of the Residency tended to show that no solution of existing difficulties, except the immediate and unconditional evacuation of Egypt, would have any chance of a favourable reception so long as Saad Pasha took an active part in Egyptian politics.

The Duke of Wellington was confronted with a somewhat similar difficulty when he had decided on the construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras, and the devastation of a broad area of Portuguese territory between those Lines and the Spanish frontier. This measure of devastation was hotly opposed by the Portuguese President Soussa, a man of high character and undoubted patriotism, like Saad Pasha, but unwilling to admit the right of an English general to take so sweeping a decision. Finding that he would not give way, and seeing no other chance of successfully meeting the great concentration of French troops under Massena, the Duke obtained the consent of the home government

to the deportation of President Soussa to Madeira. Lord Allenby adopted a similar policy. He directed Saad Pasha to retire to his country house and abstain from politics; upon his refusal, he ordered him to be deported to the Seychelles, whence he was afterwards transferred to Gibraltar. This action has been much criticized, both in England and in Egypt, but it must be remembered that the success of the very liberal and generous policy which Lord Allenby was putting forward largely depended on the formation of an Egyptian Ministry to carry it out; that Saad Pasha himself would not have formed such a ministry; and that no other Egyptian statesman was prepared to form a ministry so long as Saad Pasha was free to maintain an active opposition. Incidentally, it may be remarked that Saad Pasha, on his release from his first internment and return to Egypt, never paid his respects to the Sultan and never called on Lord Allenby, to whom his release was directly due; it seems probable that this attitude of aloofness was a cause of a good deal of the subsequent trouble.

With the ground thus cleared, Lord Allenby submitted his policy to the home government, which was naturally not prepared to accept so complete a change of policy without further examination. The High Commissioner was summoned home, satisfied the Cabinet as to his policy, and obtained their consent, ultimately approved by Parliament, to the Declaration of February 28th, 1922. By that document the British Protectorate over Egypt was abolished, Egypt was declared to be an independent sovereign State, Martial Law was withdrawn, subject to the passing of an Act of Indemnity, and the following matters were reserved to the discretion

of the British Government, pending an agreement with the Government of Egypt:

- (a) The security of British Communications in Egypt;
- (b) The defence of Egypt against foreign aggression;
- (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt, and of minorities;
- (d) The Sudan.

On the basis of this Declaration, Abdel Khalek Saroit Pasha, who had served as Minister of Justice in the Cabinet of Roushdy Pasha, and as Minister of the Interior with Adly Pasha, formed a Cabinet; and the new policy was launched. It had taken about two months and a first-rate man of action to get it started.

IV

Immediately after the Declaration recognizing Egypt as a sovereign independent State, Sultan Fouad issued a Rescript proclaiming the independence of Egypt and assuming the title of King. He also instructed his Ministry to form a special commission to prepare a Constitution for the new Kingdom of Egypt. A commission of thirty well-known Egyptian statesmen and jurists was accordingly appointed, which in the course of the next few months formulated a Constitution of a modern type, largely based on that of Belgium which has been promulgated since the war.

The King, as Prince Fouad, had been known to a large circle of friends as an amiable and accomplished gentleman, and a patron of the arts and sciences; but he was thought to take no great interest in public affairs. As a boy he had accompanied his father, the Khedive Ismail, into exile, and had been educated entirely abroad. During the reign of his nephew, the Khedive Abbas

Hilmy, he had had no opportunity of taking any part in the government of the country, and he was nearly fifty years old when he ascended the throne in succession to his brother, Sultan Hussein. It is not unlikely that during the first years of his reign he found the duties and obligations of a monarch somewhat uncongenial; but that is certainly no longer the case, and there can be no doubt that he has, of late years, taken a great and increasing part in the government of his country. He is a most indefatigable worker, and is said to consecrate fourteen hours a day to public affairs; he has acquired an immense fund of knowledge on all matters of public interest, and has made the personal acquaintance of almost everyone of any importance in Egypt. Naturally courageous and very shrewd, he has developed with experience a surprising instinct for political affairs; a high authority has said: "I hear a lot of guesses from all you clever fellows about the probable course of events in Egypt, but the only man who always guesses right is the King." If anyone thinks that the future of Egypt can be settled on a satisfactory basis without the full consent of King Fouad, he is very gravely mistaken.

It was inevitable that the terms of the Constitution should give rise to some controversy between the King and his Ministers; but difficulties were all overcome, after discussion, since His Majesty had far too good an instinct for political affairs to attempt to arrogate for himself the position of an oriental despot of the old-fashioned type. But Saroit Pasha found himself obliged to resign in the autumn of 1922, and was succeeded by Tewfik Nessim Pasha as Prime Minister. After renewed discussions, the form of the Constitution was finally settled, except for the clauses relating to the Sudan.

Most unfortunately, the authors of the Constitution had inserted two clauses, of which the first declared the Sudan to be part of Egypt and the second established the title of the King as "King of Egypt and the Sudan." There is some reason to think that these clauses were inserted as a counter-blast to a speech which Lord Allenby had made in Khartoum to reassure the Sudanese Chiefs. However that may be, the clauses, which entirely disregarded the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium set up by the Convention of 1899, constituted, to say the least, a very grave international discourtesy. There is an Anglo-French Condominium over the New Hebrides; what would be thought in France if the British Government issued an Order in Council incorporating the New Hebrides with the Commonwealth of Australia as part of the British Empire? The Egyptian action in this case was precisely analogous, and was quite indefensible from the point of view of international law and usage. If the British Government had wished to exploit the situation, their reply was obvious: since Egypt had seen fit to denounce, at least implicitly, the Convention of 1899, Great Britain would accept the denunciation, would treat that Convention as cancelled, and would forthwith annex the Sudan. But due allowance was made for the complete inexperience of Egyptian Ministers in international affairs, and they were given an opportunity of withdrawing the obnoxious clauses. After some hesitation, the Cabinet of Tewfik Nessim Pasha advised His Majesty to comply with the British demand, and then promptly resigned.

The whole question of the Sudan, which is one of great importance, will be discussed later; but it may be said here that, if Egyptian Ministers did not act with

their usual moderation and good sense in this affair, they were exposed to great pressure from public opinion in Egypt, which is extremely susceptible in all matters directly or indirectly affecting the supply of water furnished by the Nile.

After the resignation of Tewfik Nessim Pasha there was another interval without a Ministry. He was finally succeeded by Yehia Ibrahim Pasha, who was for many years President of the Native Court of Appeal, and had served as Minister of Education in the Cabinets of Mohammed Said Pasha and his immediate successors. A man of admirable character and an attractive personality, he took office with the simple and straightforward programme, of putting the Constitution into force, passing the Act of Indemnity, so as to get rid of Martial Law, settling the terms of retirement and compensation for British officials, and presiding impartially over the first elections for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. He identified himself with no party and was quite without personal ambition; his only desire was to get the new institutions of his country into good working order, and then retire. In the course of the year 1923 he successfully accomplished his programme in every detail. It is probable that the future historian of Egypt will give much greater credit than is now generally accorded to those Egyptian Ministers who, during the last five years, have in the midst of the greatest difficulties carried on the administration of their country and done their best to obtain her independence. They have generally had to work under a storm of vituperation from the native press; but when all this abuse is forgotten it will some day be recognized that all, or nearly all, of them, Saroit and Sedky as well as Mo-

ammed Said and Tewfik Nessim, have rendered wholehearted and devoted service to their country. Certainly not the least of these is the last Prime Minister before the institution of Parliament, Yehia Ibrahim Pasha.

During all this time the course of peaceful negotiation for the settlement of Egyptian affairs was gravely endangered by the systematic assassination of Englishmen, mostly officials, in Cairo. There were some twenty attacks, though not all were successful; the victims were in every case men who took no part in political matters. Typical instances were a Professor of the School of Law, who had not been long in the country, and an elderly official of the Ministry of Education who was on the eve of retirement, after a long career spent largely in trying to get better terms of service for Egyptian schoolmasters. In the middle of this campaign of murder, the Wafd issued a Manifesto, equally foolish and criminal, to the effect that Saad Pasha was being tortured, and that Egyptians should avenge him by every means in their power. It appears certain, however, in spite of this almost incredible performance, that the Wafd and the Zaghloulist Party generally had nothing to do with these crimes. They were all, or nearly all, committed by a small band of criminals, who were finally betrayed by one of their number who turned King's Evidence. The others were hanged, while their accomplices received terms of penal servitude. It appeared from the evidence that they were regularly paid, but their paymaster has not been identified with certainty. It is of the first importance, in the interests of Egypt, that the persons who engaged and paid these professional assassins should be identified and brought to trial. Their object could only have been to exasperate British opinion to such a

point as to make an agreement impossible; their efforts were directed rather against King Fouad and his constitutional Ministers than against the inoffensive Englishmen whose murder they contrived. The case, indeed, was a close parallel to the recent shooting of British soldiers at Queenstown, where the object evidently was to make trouble between Great Britain and the Free State. The ultimate instigator or instigators of the Egyptian crimes desired, no doubt, to make bad blood between England and Egypt, to end all hope of a peaceful settlement, and to leave a world for him, or them, to bustle in. As in the Irish case, they failed completely, and the British authorities refused to alter in any way the liberal policy on which they were engaged.

V

With the launching of the new Constitution and the promulgation of the other legislation which was necessary to bring the new régime into working order, there was clearly no longer any justification for the maintenance of the internment of Saad Pasha Zaghloul. He was accordingly first released from Gibraltar, and afterwards informed that there was no longer any objection to his return to Egypt. Upon his arrival he was again received with rapturous enthusiasm, and at once set to work to organize his party for the elections. The Electoral Law, with its system of a primary election of electors-delegate followed by the election of a member by those electors-delegate, made it certain from the first that the best organized party would win the elections. In fact, only the Zaghloulist Party had any serious organization at all. Their opponents were the National Liberal Party, under Adly Pasha, which seems to have

trusted chiefly to the influence of the great land-owners, and the old Nationalist Party, whose only policy seems to have been to out-bid the Zaghloulists. The result was an overwhelming victory for Saad Pasha and his party, who obtained nearly all the seats. As soon as the results became known, Yehia Pasha Ibrahim resigned and Saad Pasha formed a Ministry which included Mohammed Said Pasha and Tewfik Nessim Pasha.

Thus the new Kingdom of Egypt started on its career, with a capable, energetic and popular King, and a Prime Minister enjoying the confidence and support of Parliament and People. There remain to be considered the questions reserved by the British Government by the Declaration of February 28th, 1922. One of these, the protection of Minorities, has probably ceased to be of any importance, since the Copts have very wisely decided to throw in their lot with their Moslem fellow-countrymen; two Copts are members of the present Cabinet, and there seems no reason to suppose that the community will require any special protection. Foreigners, again, are for the most part amply protected by the Capitulations; and the Powers are, generally speaking, perfectly able to safeguard the interests of their own Nationals in Egypt, if they should require to be safeguarded. There is no reason to suppose that foreigners will not live in Egypt in the same peace and comfort under King Fouad as they did under Mohammed Ali Pasha and Ismail Pasha; the events of the last five years of political stress and excitement must not be taken as typical of Egyptian Government. The political necessity of protecting the lives and property of foreigners was amply recognized in the old days before the British Occupation, and will, no doubt, be equally recognized in the future.

The security of British communications in Egypt and the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression may be considered as cognate questions. Can these objects be attained without the maintenance of a British Army in Egypt? This is mainly a military and naval problem; but from the Egyptian point of view it is most desirable that some means should be found by which a continued British Military occupation could be rendered unnecessary. It may be said that an army stationed in Egypt under a treaty with the sole functions of defending Egypt and safeguarding our communications would no longer be an Army of Occupation. But no such considerations are at all likely to appeal to any people that has developed a National consciousness. If Germany had, for the last forty years, occupied England with a military force, and were now prepared to restore our independence, should we contemplate with equanimity a provision that a German Army Corps should be stationed at Dover, to protect us from outside aggression and to secure German Communications by the Straits? It is certain that every Englishman would say that he would take any risk rather than see one German soldier left in England. The Egyptian attitude is precisely the same. It is a matter of National sentiment, against which the material advantages conferred on Egypt by the presence of a British force weigh as nothing.

There remains the thorny question of the Sudan. The Egyptian case is that they conquered the Sudan, and incorporated it with the Dominions of the Khedives; that they only withdrew from the country under pressure from Great Britain; that an Egyptian Army re-conquered it in 1896-98, with some assistance from Great Britain (which they naturally minimize); that the Con-

vention of 1899 was only an arrangement for administration, which could not affect the sovereignty of Egypt; and that the time had come to exercise that sovereignty without British intervention. Some of these arguments are clearly untenable; the Convention of 1899, for instance, quite evidently sets up a new form of sovereignty in the shape of a Condominium, with the flags of the two countries flying side by side; and it may be remarked incidentally that the provisions excluding the Capitulations and the Jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts would have been without effect if the Sudan had remained part of the territory of Egypt. But the matter is really not one so much for legal argument as for political consideration. Rights based on old conquests are of very little value nowadays; otherwise England, France, Italy and Spain would all have very large claims to make. The only matter of real importance is the present needs and desires of the peoples concerned.

The real case for Egypt is that she depends for her very life on the waters of the Nile, which come down from the Sudan. She can never feel free or secure so long as any other Power controls the head waters of the river. If the Sudan should be fully developed agriculturally, without regard to the needs of Egypt, there is reason to fear that Egypt will be starved for lack of water.

If the people of the Sudan were willing to throw in their lot with Egypt, there might be something to be said for the Egyptian contentions; but this is notoriously far from being the case. So far as their opinion can be obtained, the Sudanese are altogether opposed to incorporation in the Kingdom of Egypt. If we were to withdraw altogether from the Sudan, Egypt would be obliged to raise great armies for the conquest of the

country; any competent military adviser would tell them that the conquest of that vast area, peopled by some of the fiercest fighting men in the world, would be a long, arduous and expensive business even for one of the Great Powers. The little Egyptian Army is largely composed of Sudanese, Arabs and Negroes, who could not be counted on for such a campaign. Even if Egypt were victorious, the maintenance of a great army of occupation would ruin her finances. If, as seems more probable, she were to fail, she would be left in a position of extreme danger, with the head waters of the river upon which she depends for her life controlled by a hostile population, which is not now, as in the days of the Khalifa, entirely ignorant of engineering science.

The true policy for Egypt is to bide her time, in the hope of establishing friendly and cordial relations with the Sudan of the future. Under the wise and statesmanlike rule of Sir Reginald Wingate, whose Governor-Generalship of seventeen years constitutes one of the most remarkable achievements of modern times, and of his successor Sir Lee Stack, the Sudan has already made great progress towards civilization and an ordered life. It is to be expected that in time the old animosity against Egypt will die out, and that a settled and orderly people, mainly engaged in the cultivation of the soil, will find it to their interest to enter into close relations with their nearest neighbours. The best solution of the difficulty seems to lie in the renewal of the Convention for a definite but fairly long period, say twenty-five years, coupled with perfectly explicit assurances given by the British Government which would guarantee during that period all the water supply which Egypt could reasonably require.

If these outstanding difficulties can be got over, there is every reason to hope for a prosperous future for Egypt. The people are no longer what they were ten, or even five, years ago; Egypt is no longer the country of opera-bouffe, but must be taken seriously. They have their difficulties, like other people, and will make mistakes, like other people; but there is no reason to suppose that difficulties or mistakes will be more serious there than elsewhere. What the country requires is steady government on moderate and conservative lines to consolidate the position already won, and to establish in the eyes of the world that Egypt is fit to take her place in the community of independent nations.

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