

GREAT BRITAIN IN EGYPT



CITADEL AND MOSQUE OF MEHEMET ALI, CAIRO

GREAT BRITAIN IN EGYPT

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TO
THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT
AND TO THOSE BRITISH AND EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS
WHO, BY THEIR COMBINED ENDEAVOURS, HAVE
BROUGHT PROSPERITY TO THE BANKS OF THE NILE

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INTRODUCTION

BELIEVING that it is mainly by a close study of past policies, and especially of past mistakes, that the way can be found to a satisfactory solution of the Egyptian Question, I have endeavoured in the following pages to give a reliable and unprejudiced account of Anglo-Egyptian relations from the days of Ismail Pasha to the present time. Having been enabled to draw upon certain official documents hitherto unpublished, as well as valuable private diaries, letters, and notes of reputable eye-witnesses, both British and Egyptian, I feel that I am in a position to throw some new light upon events which must be taken into consideration in shaping the future relationships of the two countries.

To many I am indebted for generous and valuable help : especially to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for permitting me to have access to the archives of the Foreign Office for certain periods covered by the book, and for other valuable facilities ; to Ali Fouad Toulba, English Redacteur to H.M. the King of Egypt, for information regarding the Arabi movement, in which his father, Major-General Toulba Ismet Pasha, took a prominent part ; and to Mr. R. H. Goodsall for placing at my disposal the personal diary of the late Captain Walter Goodsall of the Eastern Telegraph Company, and for permission to reproduce certain photographs taken by him in Egypt. I further have to express my appreciation to Baron Sir Rudolf von Slatin Pasha, to Ibrahim El-Helbaoui Bey, and to Fodlo el-Kassis for substantial assistance in various ways, and to Abdul Rahman Fikry Bey of the Royal Egyptian Legation in London for help in Arabic translations. My grateful thanks are also due to Lord Cromer, to the Dowager Lady Dufferin, and to Mr. A. Forbes Sieveking for their kindness in lending photographs for reproduction ;

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while I am indebted to *The Times* for permission to use their map of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

Lastly, I must express my gratitude to General Sir John Maxwell for kindly writing a Foreword, and to my wife for her most valuable help throughout all stages of the manuscript.

London,
June, 1928.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN,
Major.

FOREWORD

BY

GENERAL THE RT. HON. SIR JOHN G. MAXWELL

P.C., G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.

I GLADLY comply with Major Polson Newman's request to write a Foreword for his book, although I do not feel I can claim any special qualifications or can do justice to what I consider an important contribution to Egyptian literature. Since 1882 I have, perhaps, had better opportunities than most, because I was in a very minor way behind the scenes, and therefore knew what was happening. Lord Cromer, Lord Milner, and others of less importance have published books on the so-called Egyptian Problem. Most, if not all, of these have recorded what occurred from the writers' point of view. Major Newman has had the courage to envisage the problem from a different angle, and acknowledges that the Egyptians themselves have some right to their point of view. He has, I think, been successful, and it will repay all those interested in our work in Egypt to study that point of view, for it is, perhaps, more important now than ever it was that we should endeavour to placate Egyptian mentality. It is difficult, because the East and West do not and never will think alike, yet in carrying out our obligations to Egypt it is of importance that we should try to understand their mentality. We may have made many mistakes, but no fair-minded Egyptian can contend that since 1882 the British occupation of and political supremacy in Egypt has not been beneficial. We have, in spite of opposition and obstruction, removed grave abuses and carried through reforms resulting in amelioration of the lot of the fellahin. It is as well to consider that

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because we know that a reform is good it does not always follow that the Egyptian thinks so too. It is like forcing a sweetmeat on a child, whether the child wants it or not : it is no use telling the child it is good, it will cry all the same.

Lord Milner calls Egypt the land of anomalies ; it is surely the land of complexities, too ! This book will give the reader an insight into the curious mentality of the Egyptian and will help him to appreciate the really serious difficulties our administrators have had to contend with ; and they are by no means over yet. The more we sympathize with and try to understand them the easier our task will be.

Major Newman's criticisms are so just and broad-minded that I hope some one will undertake to make a good Arabic translation of this book, so that the Egyptians may learn that the faults are not wholly on our side.

Queen Anne's Mansions.

May 28th, 1928.

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CHAPTER I

THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT

"EGYPT is the most important country in the world," said Napoleon. While this *dictum* is, of course, very open to question, few countries have consistently attracted so much wide-spread attention as Egypt has done during the last half-century. Certainly, so far as the British Empire is concerned, Egypt has played, and is destined to play, a rôle the significance of which was not imagined when the caravans supplied the only means of communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was an important turning point in the history of Egypt, and Disraeli's astute move in acquiring, on behalf of the British Government, the Khedive Ismail's shares in the Suez Canal Company was a clear indication of Great Britain's attitude towards the new waterway. From that time forward British policy with regard to Egypt has been dictated mainly by Imperial considerations, and, although many constitutional, political and administrative changes have since taken place, these fundamental considerations have remained the same, and will continue to do so as long as the Suez Canal maintains its political, strategical and commercial importance in the well-being of the British Empire.

The Egyptian situation of 1882, which led to the British occupation of the country because no other Power would undertake the task, and the way in which the Egyptian national movement was handled by the British Government of that time, gave rise to what is known as the "Egyptian Problem," which has ever been a thorn in the side of its successors in

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office. Yet every effort has been made to reconcile British Imperial interests with the national aspirations of the Egyptian people. The energy, tact and resource of a notable succession of able administrators have been applied to the solution of this question, and, during these eventful years, Egypt has been raised from bankruptcy to a remarkable degree of prosperity. British help and advice have enabled the people of Egypt to benefit from the result of their labours. Yet the main problem remains unsolved.

But the passage of nearly half a century makes it now easier to judge in their proper perspective the events leading up to the British occupation, and to put a more accurate interpretation on the significance of the Arabi movement of 1882 than has hitherto been found possible. During the last forty-six years both Great Britain and Egypt have suffered from blunders made in 1882, and the effect of these blunders is to be found in the Egyptian reaction to a policy which, though perhaps sound in itself, has been based on a faulty conception of the Arabi movement and, consequently, on a course of events which were the outcome of misjudgment. Had the Arabi movement been recognized at the outset as a national movement instead of a purely military revolt, and had this expression of Egyptian national aspirations been guided instead of being suppressed, I think I am safe in asserting that these two countries would have been saved all these years of pain and perplexity, and that there would never have been an "Egyptian Problem" at all.

Unfortunately, at the time when Egypt earnestly called for the closest consideration of the British Government, there were other grave issues at stake demanding the urgent attention of ministers; and at the very moment when Egypt was clamouring for a sympathetic hearing in a crisis of the first magnitude, Mr. Gladstone's eyes were fixed on Dublin rather than on Cairo. Again, forty years later, history repeated itself and a patchwork constitution was given to Egypt at a time when the attention of the British Foreign Office was absorbed with momentous international questions arising out of the greatest war in history. Now, happily, Egypt seems destined to receive the consideration which she deserves, and there seems to be a genuine desire on both sides to bridge over difficulties and

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arrive at a lasting agreement. Yet the events of 1882 cannot be obliterated and their effects forever dog our footsteps. In order to appreciate these effects, it is necessary to know something of the people of Egypt—that heterogeneous mass of human beings who compose the dwellers by the banks of the Nile.

* * * * *

The visitor to Egypt cannot fail to be struck by the extraordinary divergence of type which is characteristic of the Egyptian people. As you walk along the streets of Cairo, Port Said or Alexandria, you naturally look at the colour, features and dress of the native passers-by, and, from their outward appearance, you are inclined to imagine that they form a great cosmopolitan population drawn from every corner of the Asiatic and African continents. No two individuals seem to bear any striking resemblance to one another. Yet the vast majority of these Orientals are Egyptians. Again, in the towns of Upper Egypt there may be rather more similarity in dress, owing to the common influence of agriculture, but in colour and features the people differ so widely that they might have emerged from a huge international clearing house. Yet these people also are for the most part Egyptians. To the casual observer the people of Egypt appear to be a very mixed mass of individuals with very little in common. That the population is heterogeneous owing to racial influences throughout the centuries is undoubtedly true, but to imagine that for this reason the different elements have nothing in common is to make a grave mistake. Egypt and the Nile have made their mark on these people, and, although they are sprung from different origins and show the fact in their outward appearance, they belong to one definite type with many fundamental characteristics in common. The Egyptians are a definite race capable of expressing a considerable degree of genuine national sentiment.

For thousands of years the banks of the Nile have been occupied by the Egyptians and, in spite of the interminable series of immigrations and other changes affecting the character of the inhabitants, the Egyptian type has predominated throughout the ages with a uniformity which is most remarkable.

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There is little doubt that the Nile has done much to influence the character of those who dwell by its banks. No country in the world is so dependent on its river as Egypt, and no river possesses physical characteristics so exceptional as the Nile ; there is also no race of people in existence which possesses so marked and unchanging an individuality as the Egyptian. It is, therefore, more than probable that this unvarying type is the product of the soil itself, and that the character of the peoples who settled at different periods on the banks of the Nile—whatever that character may originally have been—has in the course of the centuries been moulded to the same constant form by the mysterious influences of this great river. In all countries, indeed, national characteristics are regarded as the natural outcome of soil and climate, and in this connexion few countries afford so striking an example as Egypt, with its sharply defined boundaries of sea and desert and in its complete isolation from the rest of the world.

This fidelity to type, which is shared by other Oriental races, is not in accordance with the theories put forward as to the decline and degeneration of the East. Indeed, these races seem to possess an innate capacity, which is absent from Western nations, of permanently preserving the original type. In Egypt this tendency may be partly assisted by the universal practice of early marriage, by which the succession of generations is accelerated, while many children are born of parents still unaffected by any physical deterioration. Although the country has at various periods been overrun by Hyksos, Ethiopians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs and Turks, and although the people were subjected to tyranny and ill-treatment, and in most cases compelled to intermarry with these foreigners, the Egyptians have for thousands of years retained the same unvarying physical types, while their character has been but slightly modified by the introduction of Christianity and Mohammedanism. When it is realized that these foreigners generally invaded the country in the form of an army, that they formed only a small body compared with the mass of the population, and that they either married native women or found wives in other countries, it is obvious that they would either continue to exist for a time as a foreign caste, a condition apparently repugnant to nature and necessarily

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transient, or that they would gradually succumb to the never-failing influences of the soil and be absorbed in the great mass of aboriginal inhabitants. An excellent example of this process is afforded by the Arab invasion. With the exception of the Beduin tribes, which are entirely distinct from the Egyptian population, genuine Arabs are now found only in the towns, where merchants, pilgrims and other members of that race form a class quite distinct from the natives—a class that is only maintained by reinforcements from abroad. Another proof of the transforming influences of the Egyptian climate is to be found in the uniform character of the domestic animals. The oxen, in particular, although they have repeatedly been exterminated in a single century by murrain, and have been succeeded by foreign stock from every corner of the globe, almost invariably after a few generations assume the well-known Egyptian type represented on the walls of the ancient temples.

The conditions of the prehistoric dwellers in the Egyptian Nile valley may be described as the result of a union between the native inhabitants and the Hamitic tribes which, advancing from the Red Sea, entered the country from regions to the south and south-east of Upper Egypt. After a long interval of time the ancient dwellers on the Nile were subjected to new modifications, arising from the predatory attacks of a race that had attained a higher level of civilization. This latter race must have started from the valley of the Euphrates, or it would not have been able to introduce into Egypt the knowledge of wheat and barley, and the art of cultivating them with the plough, the knowledge of copper, bronze and various metallurgical processes, and perhaps, also, a religious system of its own and even the art of writing. The net result of the whole historical process was Egyptian civilization as it existed under the Pharaohs.¹

Of this vast period of pomp and splendour the great monuments of Egypt have their own story to tell, but I must now pass on to the different elements which go to make up the population of Modern Egypt. There are ten distinct elements in Egypt, apart from the European community, and they may be classified as follows: The Fellahin, the Copts,

¹ My authority for this is Dr. G. Schweinfurth.

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Beduin, Arab dwellers in the towns, Nubians, Sudan negroes, Turks, Levantines, Syrians, etc., and Armenians. They all come under the general heading of Egyptians.

The Fellahin, or cultivators of the soil, with whom must be reckoned the Coptic peasants of Upper Egypt, form the great bulk of the population and should be regarded as the foundation of the Egyptian nation. The Egyptian peasantry have a much darker complexion than their compatriots in the towns, and their colour deepens as we proceed southwards, from the pale brown of the inhabitants of the Delta to the dark bronze hue of the Upper Egyptians. There is, however, a difference between the tint of the Nubians and that of the Upper Egyptians, even where they live in close contiguity, the former being more of a reddish-brown. The common fellah's home usually consists of four low walls formed of crude bricks of Nile mud, and thatched with a roof of durra straw on which the poultry roost. Inside are a few mats, a sheepskin, several baskets made of matting, a copper kettle, and a few earthenware pots and wooden dishes. He lives almost entirely on vegetables, millet bread, beans, lentils, dates and onions. Some of the sheikhs, on the other hand, are comparatively wealthy and have large houses built of crude brick and whitewashed with lime, with a courtyard, many apartments and quite good furniture. It must not be imagined that the miserable hovels, which offend the eye of the traveller passing through the Delta between Cairo and Alexandria, are typical of Egypt's housing system. In Central and Upper Egypt conditions are much more favourable. The fact is that, beneath an Egyptian sky, houses are not of the same fundamental importance as in more northern countries, and the only requirement is shelter for the night. The day is spent in the open air, in the small court in front of the hut, shaded by acacia trees with pigeons cooing in the branches. Here the fellah spends his leisure, yarning with his neighbours and spinning wool from a spindle that he turns in his hand.

In early life the Egyptian peasant is remarkably docile, active and intelligent, but at a later period this freshness and buoyancy are crushed out of him by care and poverty and his never-ceasing task of supplying the wants of the insatiable

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cotton market. He ploughs and reaps, toils and amasses, but he cannot with certainty regard his crops as his own, and the hardly earned piastre is too frequently wrested from him by the none too scrupulous tax-gatherer. His character, therefore, becomes like that of a gifted child who has been harshly used and brought up to domestic slavery, but at length perceives that he has been treated with injustice, and whose amiability and intelligence are then superseded by sullenness and obstinacy. In his own fields the fellah is an industrious labourer, and his work is more continuous than that of the peasant of more northern countries. He takes no rest during the winter, and the whole of his spare time is spent in drawing water for the irrigation of the land. He never makes any endeavour to better his position or to improve his system of farming. Year in and year out his lot remains the same ; he is truly a hewer of wood and drawer of water. As soon as he has accomplished his essential tasks he rests and smokes ; the rest he leaves to Allah.

The Egyptian fellahin are described as a wonderfully cheerful and contented people, which is quite true so long as they are left alone by political agitators. They are quick of comprehension, of ready wit, dearly loving a joke, even if directed against themselves, usually blessed with a retentive memory, light-hearted, kindly, and very hospitable. At the same time they are very emotional, highly strung, most inflammable, very ignorant, and nearly always conspicuously lacking in self-control. Hence, a man who is normally of a quiet, gentle disposition, may suddenly rise up and commit the most brutal murder. The murder of unarmed British officers and soldiers in the Asyut-Minia train in 1919 under circumstances of the most revolting savagery is an example of this characteristic. Their love of money tends to make them very avaricious and is the cause of the most serious troubles among them. Sometimes their avarice makes them very far-seeing. Thus the story is told of a *ghaffir* (watchman), who, in the middle of the month realized that he could not possibly live for more than a few days. Before death overtook him, however, he had the foresight to send a message to his master with a request for a month's advance in wages.

The wealth of Egypt is solely derived from agriculture,

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and to the fellahin alone is committed the all-important task of tilling the soil. They are, in fact, neither suited nor inclined for any other work, a circumstance which proves how completely the stationary character of the ancient Egyptians has predominated over the restless Arabian blood which has been largely infused into the native population ever since the valley of the Nile was conquered by the armies of Islam. The ancient Egyptian racial type has been preserved in extraordinary purity in many fellah families, especially in Upper Egypt. Even among the Nubians, between the First and Second cataracts, faces occur that might almost lead us to think that images of the Pharaohs had come to life, so similar are the expression and features. I will never forget travelling in an Egyptian train with a fellow passenger whose face and expression, or rather want of expression, was identical to that of a mummified Pharaoh whom I had seen in a glass case at the Cairo Museum a few hours before. In Lower Egypt, however, and especially in the Delta, the Arab type has sometimes prevailed over the African in consequence of the steady stream of Arab immigration that has now been flowing for more than a thousand years.

The modern Egyptians, moreover, resemble the ancient in character and in the lot to which they are condemned. In ancient times the fellah, pressed into the service of the priest and the princes, was compelled to yield up to them the fruits of his toil, and his position is little changed at the present day, except that his masters have changed and he has obtained some relief owing to the abolition of compulsory work and other measures introduced by the British administration.

By nature the fellah is unwarlike. Born in the valley of a great river, he resembles in many respects the Bengali who exists under similar conditions ; but the Egyptian is of sturdier build and can undergo greater exertion. At Tel-el-Kebir he stood steady after Arabi Pasha and all his officers had fled, and only gave way when decimated by the British guns firing case shot. All the troops present in the surprise fight, when the Dervish force was defeated at Firket in June, 1896, had covered long distances, and the 10th Sudanese covered 90 miles in 72 hours, including the march back to railhead immediately after the action. Another example of the qualities

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of the fellahin soldiers was the occasion of an attack in line, when an Egyptian battalion was halted to stop a rush from the rear. The front and rear ranks were simultaneously engaged firing in opposite directions, yet the fellahin stood their ground, shot well and showed no signs of fear. After their well-earned victory these soldiers were quite unmoved. But military service is distasteful to the fellahin, and has been so ever since the arbitrary conscriptions of Mehemet Ali. In former times, voluntary mutilations to avoid service were exceedingly common, the usual method being to place a small piece of nitrate of silver in one eye, which was then kept tightly bandaged until the sight was completely destroyed. Battalions were then formed of one-eyed men and of soldiers who, having cut off their right fingers, were made to shoot from the left shoulder. Although happily these conditions are things of the past, the prejudice against military service still remains, but there is little doubt that the fellahin of Egypt possess certain valuable military qualities when they are under the control of skilful leaders.

When the reorganization of the Egyptian army was undertaken in 1883, the task before the small corps of British officers was beset with many difficulties. First of all, it was essential that the fellah should be taught that discipline could be strict without being oppressive, that pay and rations should be fairly distributed, that brutal treatment by superiors should be checked, that complaints should be thoroughly investigated, and impartial justice applied to soldiers irrespective of rank. In the old army, of pre-Occupation days, these qualities formed no part of a corrupt and tyrannous military régime. In the summer of 1883 an epidemic of cholera gave the British officers their first chance of gaining the respect and confidence of their men, and the opportunity was nobly utilized. While the patient fellah, quite resigned to the fate decreed for him by Allah, saw the ruling Egyptian class scuttling out of Cairo as fast as they could go, he also saw his stricken comrades tenderly nursed, soothed in their death-struggles, and in many cases actually washed, laid out and buried by their new self-sacrificing yet determined masters. The regeneration of the fellahin army dates from that epidemic of cholera.

In order to appreciate the good qualities of the Egyptian

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fellah it is necessary to study his relationships with his own people, and in these he is kindly, helpful and generous. The foreigner he regards as an intruder and a "pigeon" to be plucked. Many visitors to Egypt get the idea into their heads that the fellahin are Arabs and that they are, therefore, a manly race. They are not Arabs, except in so far as they speak Arabic, but they are "men" all the same. For politics they care little, and their outlook is restricted by their own local interests. What happens in Cairo is not their concern, and the only consideration which really affects them is the attitude of the tax-gatherer towards the scanty contents of their usually tattered pockets. Any political agitation which has shown itself amongst the fellahin has usually been the work of political agitators belonging to an entirely different class, who have gained their support by pressure and misrepresentation. Yet the fellahin have produced two notable figures in Egyptian political history—Ahmed Pasha Arabi and Sa'ad Pasha Zaghlul. They followed the former as leader of a movement providing an opportunity for the expression of deep-rooted grievances; the latter they obeyed owing to his powerful influence and personality. In the Arabi movement the grievances of the fellahin were genuine and, by following the lead of the army, they saw their only chance of self-expression and redress. In the Zaghlulist movement, on the other hand, their grievances were for the most part imaginary, but seemed very real as presented to them by the professional propagandists of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, who preached complete independence for Egypt and antagonism to the very people who were doing their utmost to ease the burden of the down-trodden cultivators of the soil. In both cases, however, the fellahin blindly followed their leaders, quite ignorant of the significance of their action but with a vague hope that they were pleasing Allah, who in turn would reward them with protection from the tax-gatherer and usurer.

Writing of the fellahin in 1876, Mr. Wilfred Blunt says, "The Egyptians are a good, honest people as any in the world—all, that is, who do not sit in high places. Of these I know nothing. But the peasants, the fellahin, have every virtue which should make a happy, well-to-do society. They are cheerful, industrious, obedient to law, and pre-eminently

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sober, not only in the matter of drink, but of the other indulgences to which human nature is prone. They are neither gamblers nor brawlers, nor licentious livers; they love their homes, their wives, their children. They are good sons and fathers, kind to dumb animals, old men, beggars and idiots. They are absolutely without prejudice of race, and perhaps even of religion.¹ Their chief fault is a love of money, but that is one political economists will readily pardon. . . . It would be difficult to find anywhere a population better fitted to attain the economical end of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. In politics they have no aspirations except to live and let live, to be allowed to work and keep the produce of their labour, to buy and sell without interference and to escape taxation. They have been ill-treated for ages without losing thereby their goodness of heart; they have few of the picturesque virtues; they are neither patriotic nor fanatical nor romantically generous. But they are free from the picturesque vices. Each man works for himself—at most for his family. The idea of self-sacrifice for the public good they do not understand, but they are innocent of plots to enslave their fellows. . . . In spite of the monstrous oppression, of which they are the victims, we have heard no word of revolt,² this not from any superstitious regard for their rulers, for they are without political prejudice, but because revolt is no more in their nature than it is in a flock of sheep. They would hail the Queen of England, or the Pope, or the King of Ashantee with equal eagerness if these came with the gift for them of a penny less taxation in the pound.”³

If this estimate of the Egyptian fellah was fairly accurate in 1876, as I think it was, it is equally accurate to-day, and there is little reason to believe that it will be any different a hundred or even two hundred years hence. The great mass of the Egyptian people are, therefore, a stable and a comparatively known quantity. It is the other elements which provide the perplexities with which Egypt is for ever beset.

Over ninety per cent. of the population of Egypt are Moslems

¹ This is incorrect. The fellahin are not without prejudice of religion.

² This was written before the Arabi movement.

³ “Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt,” W. S. Blunt. New York, 1922.

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of the Sunni rite, and most of the fellahin follow the doctrines of Islam. Lord Cromer describes the Moslems as consisting, first, of Turks and Turco-Egyptians ; secondly, of Egyptians ; and, thirdly, of Beduin. In 1882, at the time of the British occupation, the Turco-Egyptians occupied the chief government positions, were the chief landowners in the country, and formed a definite ruling caste. Their families, who formed a sort of aristocracy, have amassed large fortunes out of their properties chiefly owing to the enormous rise in the price of cotton, and this class is now mainly composed of absentee landlords. These were the real tyrants of the fellahin, and they naturally disliked the English whose intervention was destined to help the oppressed. The second category of Egyptian Moslems may be divided into three headings—the hierarchy, the squirearchy, and the fellahin. The hierarchy is composed of the Ulema of the El-Azhar Mosque, a distinct religious corporation which is officially recognized by the Government. The three chief Ulema are the Grand Mufti, the head of El-Azhar University, and the Grand Kadi. The Grand Mufti is the chief law-doctor of the country, whose duty is to pronounce *ex cathedra* opinions (*Fetwas*) on any doubtful points of the Sacred Law. He is a spiritual magnate whose authority the temporal rulers of the country cannot afford to ignore. The head of El-Azhar University exercises a certain degree of control in temporal matters over those of the Ulema who lecture in the mosques, and occupies a position in the world of learning approximately corresponding to the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford or Cambridge, although his influence over his students both past and present is vastly greater than that of his counterpart in England.

Probably the most important of the Ulema, however, is the Grand Kadi, who pronounces final judgment on all subjects which come within the domain of personal law. He formerly possessed also criminal and civil jurisdiction, but these powers he had to drop along with other ancient customs which have enhanced the prestige of these venerable gentlemen all too long. These patriarchs of Islam are a most striking feature of Oriental life, and in Egypt they wield a powerful influence for good or evil. In the Islamic sense they are exceedingly learned men, they are refined to a degree, but they

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are for the most part unpractical. Their knowledge of the Koran and Moslem traditions is profound, their verbosity and circumlocution is magnificent, but one practical question or suggestion is sufficient to ensure instant silence. But the Ulema of Cairo are, indeed, great gentlemen whom no man, Moslem or Christian, Jew or Gentile, can fail to hold in the highest respect. They have their failings. So have we.

One of the most remarkable Alim was Sheikh Mohammed Abdu, who was one of the leading influences in the Arabi movement. Lord Cromer, who knew him well, writes of him as follows: "Sheikh Mohammed Abdu was a man of broad and enlightened views. He admitted the abuses which have sprung up under Oriental Governments. He recognized the necessity of European assistance in the work of reform. But he did not belong to the same category as the Europeanized Egyptian, whom he regarded as a bad copy of the original . . . he was a somewhat dreamy and unpractical but, nevertheless, genuine Egyptian patriot: it were perhaps well for the cause of Egyptian patriotism if there were more like him. But, regarded from the point of view of possible politicians of the future, there were some weak points in the armour of Mohammed Abdu, and of those who follow his teaching. Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole remarks that an upper-class Moslem must be a fanatic or a concealed infidel. This dilemma, in a somewhat different form, has presented difficulties to those Christians who look to the letter rather than to the spirit of Christ's teaching. It presents far greater difficulties to the strictly orthodox Moslems, who look almost exclusively to the letter rather than to the spirit of their faith. I suspect that my friend, Abdu, although he would have resented the appellation being applied to him, was in reality an Agnostic. His associates, although they admitted his ability, were inclined to look askance at him as a 'filosouf.' Now, in the eyes of the strictly orthodox, one who studies philosophy or, in other words, one who recognizes the difference between the seventh and the twentieth centuries, is on the high road to perdition.

"The political importance of Mohammed Abdu's life lies in the fact that he may be said to have been the founder of a school of thought in Egypt very similar to that established in

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India by Syed Ahmed, the creator of the Alighur College. The avowed object of those who belong to this school is to justify the ways of Islam to man, that is to say, to Moslem man. They are the Girondists of the Egyptian National movement. They are too much tainted with a suspicion of heterodoxy to carry far along with them the staunch conservative Moslem. On the other hand, they are often not sufficiently Europeanized to attract the sympathy of the Egyptian mimic of European ways. They are inferior to the strictly orthodox Moslem in respect to their Mohammedanism, and inferior to the ultra-Europeanized Egyptian in respect to their Europeanization. Their task is, therefore, one of great difficulty. But they deserve all the encouragement and support which can be given to them. They are the natural allies of the European reformer. Egyptian patriots—*sua si bona norint*—will find in the advancement of the followers of Mohammed Abdu the best hope that they may gradually carry out their programme of creating a truly autonomous Egypt.”¹

The changes which are now taking place in the world of Islam give special significance to these words of Lord Cromer, and there are definite indications in Egypt to-day that the teaching of Sheikh Mohammed Abdu is slowly penetrating into the minds of the more responsible Egyptians. For centuries the world has progressed, while Islam has stood still. If only the doctrines of Islam can be applied to a changing world instead of to an imaginary one, which is imperious to time and has gathered cobwebs since the flight of Mohammed from Mecca, then the true awakening of the East is no visionary dream, and millions of human beings will be freed from the tenets of hoary antiquity to take their place in the movements of modern times.

In order to appreciate the nature of the squirearchy, it is as well to know something of the system of local administration which is carried out in Egypt. The village is the administrative unit, and the *Omdas* and *Sheikhs* form the lynch-pin of society throughout the provinces. Politically, Egypt is now divided into fourteen provinces or *Mudirieh*, while certain important towns, such as Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailia, Suez, El-Arish and Damietta, are presided over by

¹ "Modern Egypt," Earl of Cromer. London, 1908.

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Governors or *Muafiz* and are independent of the provincial administration. The chief official in each province is the *Mudir*, who is assisted by a *Sub-Mudir*, a Commandant of Police and an Engineer for irrigation and building purposes. The interior economy and financial procedure are subject to investigation by Inspectors from the Ministries of the Interior and Finance, while representatives from the Ministry of Public Works and the Health Department control the technical work. Formerly these inspectors were usually British officials, but in late years their work has been taken over by Egyptian personnel. The provinces are then sub-divided into districts or *Markaz*, the chief officials of which are known as *Ma'mur*, who are directly responsible to the *Mudir* and have their official residences in the more important towns. The districts are further divided into communes or *Nahiyeh*, which include the chief village, certain landed estates, various hamlets and settlements of fellahin. The *Omdah* or village headman is directly subordinate to the *Ma'mur* and, in the case of the larger communes, is assisted by the *Sheikh* or mayor. These *Omdas* and *Sheikhs* really form the squirearchy, and they play a very important part in the political affairs of the country. They act as buffers between the Pashas and the fellahin, and in former times had to take their share of the former's tyranny. But they also took their share of the fellah's payments. Many of these officials are straightforward men and worthy of respect, while others make use of their official positions for their own benefit and to the detriment of those under them. The objectionable practice of bullying the unfortunate fellahin is now, however, rather a memory than a fact, but it is altogether due to British reforms that this burden has been lightened.


Prior to the British occupation the situation was roughly as follows. The Pasha held the Sheikh responsible for all that happened within his area. The Sheikh, in his turn, rounded on the fellahin. When a crime had been committed in a certain village, the Sheikh was simply ordered to produce the delinquent. If he failed to do so, he either had to submit to summary punishment or he was heavily fined until he handed over the criminal. The consequence was that he instantly made for the line of least resistance and laid hands on the first fellah he could find. The characteristic story is told of how

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Mehemet Ali visited a certain village, and ordered the Sheikhs to produce two robbers who were supposed to be hiding in the neighbourhood. The Sheikhs stated that they were unable to do so. In a moment all six Sheikhs were lying, face downwards, on the ground, being soundly beaten by His Highness's attendants. However, before the thrashing process had proceeded to any great lengths one of the Sheikhs said that he knew where the criminals were. Two men were accordingly produced, and hanged on the spot. But what the Sheikh lost in one way, he gained in another. The head of the village was responsible for the assessment and, to some extent, for the collection of the taxes; he had to provide forced labour (the *corvée*) to work on the Khedivial domains and the estates of the Pashas; and he had to obtain recruits for the army. All these duties furnished ample opportunities for unscrupulous dealings and were, more often than not, fully exploited. Therefore, although the Sheikhs feared the Pashas and cringed to them, they owed to their superiors a position full of opportunities for personal gain, with which they were loath to part.

When the British came to Egypt, they were faced with a peculiar mixture of antagonisms tempered by a certain degree of approval of a purely mercenary kind. The Ulema and their satellites were more or less hostile to the work of the British reformer, and this hostility was shared by the Pashas. Both these classes had long enjoyed and misused privileges which they feared to lose. Pecuniary interests were at stake, and that was sufficient to cause considerable alarm. The Pashas feared lest they should be deprived of their privilege of enslaving the fellahin, while the Ulema disliked the idea of any inquiry into the appropriation of *Wakf* (Pious Foundation) funds. The misappropriation of funds is, up to a certain point, not regarded as dishonest in the East, and to accuse a high ecclesiastical dignity of embezzlement would be much the same as to accuse a Scotsman of being mean. The Scots are mean (although I am one myself) and the Ulema do embezzle, but both are characteristic of the race or class in question, and very little attention is paid to it. There are those who imagine that European influence can change the character of the Oriental. It may be possible to alter him superficially,

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MAP OF THE KINGDOM OF EGYPT

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but it will take a very great deal of influence to change characteristics which are ingrained into his very nature. The Sheikhs regarded the British occupation with mixed feelings. On the one hand, they welcomed the English as protectors from the tyranny of the Pashas ; on the other hand, they foresaw an end to their own tyranny over the peasants. The Sheikh class as a whole formed the nucleus of the Arabi movement, and regarded Arabi chiefly as a champion of their particular class, but the intervention of Great Britain shattered their wildest dreams—the overthrow of Pashadom and the rise of Sheikhdом to a high pinnacle of power, with unlimited scope for exploiting the fellahin. The crash of this little fantasy of the Sheikhs naturally rather embittered them against those who brought about its downfall. But in recent years the Sheikhs have come to realize that relief from the clutches of the Pasha is more to them than their right to bully those who harmlessly work in the fields. The attitude of the peasants to the reformer was peculiar, but it was not to be wondered at. People who for centuries have been brought up on the “ cat ” and have known no work other than forced labour can hardly be expected to appreciate relief from these evils, when taxation, their greatest evil, was in no way diminished. Relief in this direction was not possible in the early days of the Occupation, when the bailiff was knocking at the gates of Cairo, but the ignorant masses could not understand this, and I honestly believe that the Egyptian fellah would prefer a daily beating to the exaction of a single piastre.

Of the lesser elements of the Moslem population it is only necessary to say a few words in passing. The Nubians or Berberin are the inhabitants of the Nile valley between Aswan and the Fourth Cataract. The Nubians are inferior to the real Egyptians in industry, energy and in their capacity for agricultural work, and they are more fanatical, but in cleanliness, obedience and honesty they are superior and are often employed as servants. Berberine servants are to be seen daily outside Shepheard's Hotel in Cairo, looking for new masters and willing to go anywhere from Mosul to Khartum and beyond. Sudan negroes are usually conspicuous as waiters in the hotels and restaurants, but most of the older negroes were originally brought to Egypt as slaves and are now

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employed by their masters with a status of their own choosing. Of the Beduin it is unnecessary to say much. They are people of the desert, whose interest lies in their sheep and camels. They are a noble race with some very fine characteristics, but they belong to all desert lands and have no influence whatever in the political life of Egypt. The Syrians and Levantines are chiefly noted for their control of the Egyptian Press, from which they succeed in amassing considerable sums of money. They are good men of business and, by playing one political party against another, they sell the columns of their newspapers to the highest bidder. This is not a very high form of journalism, but it is by no means unprofitable. So much for the Moslems. Now let us turn to the Christians. Not that the Christians are in any way superior to the Moslems; in fact, it is rather the other way round.

The nearest racial descendants of the ancient Egyptians are the native Christians of the Coptic religion, and there is little ground for the assumption that their ancestors were foreign immigrants who embraced Christianity after the conquest of the country by the Moslems. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that, allowing for the changes wrought by time and the innovations brought about by Egypt's many conquerors, the old Coptic language was derived from ancient Egyptian. This tongue, however, was not merely modified but entirely replaced by Arabic towards the end of the fifteenth century, so that only a few stray words of real Coptic origin remain in the present dialect, and the old language is now reserved solely for religious services and ceremonies. Christianity was introduced into Egypt at a very early date,¹ too early for a historical record of its coming, and its rapid adoption throughout the country is a remarkable fact in the history of the Christian Church. But, although remarkable, it was quite understandable for several reasons. To a people which through the ages had firmly believed in a future life—a belief which had stood out clear through a confused conglomeration of deities and devils—but saw little hope of happiness hereafter except through riches amassed in this world, Christianity came as a welcome relief. The morality of the ancient

¹ A Coptic Church is known to have existed prior to A.D. 250.

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Egyptians, which was ever an outstanding feature of their religious teaching, also prepared the way for the doctrines of the Gospel. As, therefore, it is certain that at the time of the Moslem invasion Egypt was a Christian country, and that the term Copt applied to religion and nationality alike, it must not be for one moment imagined that these Egyptians have been converted to Christianity by the efforts of British and American missionaries. They were converted by some of the earliest preachers of the Gospel who ever carried Christ's teaching into foreign lands.

Although the Moslem conquerors were at first lenient to these Christians, the Coptic arrogance, which is still a characteristic of the race, brought about their downfall, which was followed by repeated persecution. Many, through fear, or in hope of personal gain, forsook their old religion and embraced the tenets of Islam, and intermarriage always led to the survival only of the Moslem religion. Hence, although their numbers decreased, their race remained pure, but the same cannot be said of their faith, character, habits or mode of life, which have become deeply imbued with the usages of the Moslems. The Coptic character cannot be regarded as superior to that of the Moslem, but it produces greater accuracy of thought, which has enabled the Copts to rise to the lower grades in government offices and to act as clerks, accountants and notaries. Yet, although the Copt is not fettered by the religious bonds of the Moslem, he has not benefited in any degree by Christianity and is as "Oriental" stagnant as his Moslem contemporary. Except for their difference in form of worship, the Coptic and Moslem fellahin are identical.

The Copts, who may be distinguished by their blue or black turbans and dark-coloured clothes, are most numerous in the towns of Upper Egypt—near the ancient Koptos, at Nakadeh, Luxor, Esna, Dendera, Girga, Tahta, and particularly at Asyut and Akhmim, where a large percentage of the people is Coptic. They form approximately one fourteenth of the total population of Egypt.

I do not intend to enter into the doctrinal intricacies of the *Monophysite* religion of the Copts. Suffice it to say that their faith teaches that Christ possessed two natures, the human and the divine, indissoluble, separate, but inseparable,

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a teaching which to us seems a mere confusion of ideas, but is as typically Egyptian as the obstinacy with which the Copts have clung to it throughout the ages. Probably the most interesting feature of this Eastern Church is to be found in its services and ceremonies. "The most holy pope and patriarch of the great city of Alexandria and of all the land of Egypt, of Jerusalem the holy city, of Nubia, Abyssinia and Pentapolis, and all the preaching of St. Mark," as he is still called, had originally jurisdiction of all the places included in his ecclesiastical title. His authority over Abyssinia still remains, but from Nubia and Pentapolis not only the Coptic religion, but Christianity itself, has entirely disappeared. The patriarch is elected from among the ignorant monks of one of the desert monasteries, and no bishop is ever eligible for election. The candidate is brought from the desert in chains and, if of one of the lower orders of priesthood, is immediately advanced through the higher grades, except of course that of bishop. As may be imagined, a procedure such as this scarcely contributes to the intellectual qualifications of the leaders of the Church, so that profound ignorance has become one of the most notable of their characteristics. The Coptic rites and ceremonies have remained unaltered since the earliest times. The services are interesting and picturesque, but in many cases seem almost interminable. On Good Friday one service lasts for eleven hours, and until quite recently no seats or benches were provided. The "Washing of the Feet" and "Blessing of the Palms" are among the more spectacular functions, and on certain important festivals the process of washing is applied to the whole congregation. Church music is provided by the use of triangles and cymbals, but the use of church bells has long been forbidden by the Moslems, except in the desert. The Copts form a remarkable community, but their achievements are distinctly commonplace. Yet there have been a few among them who have risen to high places. Boutros Pasha Ghali, a Copt of considerable ability, performed with some distinction the duties of Foreign Minister.

Of the other Christian communities in Egypt little need be said. They are chiefly Armenians and Syrian Christians, the former of whom are distinctly intellectual and cannot be

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neglected as a political factor in the country. Ever since the dynasty of Mehemet Ali was founded a certain number of Armenians have occupied high positions under the Egyptian Government, and such men as Nubar Pasha, Yacoub Pasha Artin, and Tigrane Pasha—all Armenians—have distinguished themselves in the service of their country.

In pre-occupation days Egypt was socially similar to Russia, or to Ireland. The population consisted of the aristocracy and the peasants. There was no middle class. But during the years which have elapsed since the British set foot in the country an entirely new class has developed out of the Europeanized Egyptians, who now show the definite characteristics of a well-defined middle class. From this professional class spring politicians and agitators in large numbers, many of whom have discarded the best attributes of the Moslem and have adopted the worst qualities of the European Christian. In Egypt they are inclined to dislike European Christians, and often to detest them, for the simple reason that they occupy positions coveted by themselves. Their smattering of European education leads them to imagine that, as long as they are European on the surface, have European institutions, and follow the social customs of Europeans, they are every bit as good as any Christian from Europe. It never occurs to them that European civilization has been the growth of nearly two thousand years, and cannot be acquired in a day. They cannot see why their characters cannot be changed by outward and visible alterations. But this is typical of the East. The Turk discards the Fez in favour of a squash hat, and thinks himself a European. The Egyptian puts on a lounge suit and drinks whiskies and sodas at Shepheard's; he then thinks that he is the equal in culture of an Englishman, a Frenchman, or an Italian. Moreover, the European culture, which has made most headway in Egypt, is essentially French. Mehemet Ali encouraged French influence in Egypt, and the results of that influence still remain. "The first impress of civilization given to Egypt was through the medium of the French language. . . . For half a century prior to the British occupation . . . no effort was spared to propagate a knowledge of French in Egypt. The agents for the accomplishment of this object have been mainly Catholic priests. The great apostle of

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anti-clericalism in France, M. Gambetta, was careful to explain that his anti-clerical ideas were only intended for home consumption; they were not meant for export."¹ And France's policy was by no means repugnant to the Oriental, whose mentality much preferred the affable attitude of the Frenchman to the cold, calculating, and often rude manner of the Englishman, and was strongly attracted by the French woman, who impressed him as no English woman could hope to do. In fact, the Egyptian easily adopted French methods and mode of life, and he has maintained them ever since.

It is, therefore, scarcely surprising that this class of Egyptian disliked the British occupation, and his dislike was not discouraged by Frenchmen in Egypt. Moreover, it continues to play an important part in Egyptian politics to-day, although there are indications that it is being subdued by time and other considerations which will be enumerated later. But this middle class in Egypt has formed a formidable stumbling block to peace. We repelled the fellahin, the true people of Egypt, in 1882. Now we have to deal with a much more complicated organism, which demands complete independence and protection, an inconsistency typically Egyptian in character. Whereas the fellahin in 1882 merely wanted a say in the affairs of their own country, their successors to-day clamour for all the advantages of an independent sovereign state without any of the disadvantages and responsibilities. Yet, far in the background, the fellah remains, tilling and toiling for a few honest piastres, and utterly unconcerned whether Egypt is an independent kingdom, a vassal state or a Soviet republic, provided that the piastres he has earned are left for him to spend or hoard.

Although 98 per cent. of the country is nothing but desert, the cultivable area in the Nile region amounts to about 12,000 square miles and is very densely populated. Since the British occupation the population has increased both in numbers and in density to a remarkable degree. In 1882 the population of Egypt was 6,813,919, with a density of 570 to the square mile, while in 1925 there were 14,000,000 people in the country and the density had increased to 1,170 to the square mile. With an area closely corresponding to that of

¹ "Modern Egypt," Earl of Cromer.

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Belgium, the cultivated area of Egypt now supports very nearly twice the population, and is probably the richest and most densely populated country of its size in the world.

As a description of the people of Egypt, I know that the foregoing pages are quite inadequate, but restrictions of space make it impossible to go deeper into a question which is fundamental for any serious study of the Egyptian question. I only hope that such impression as I have been able to convey to my readers may give some idea of the complex population with which British administrators have had to deal, and may arouse some sympathy for those who try to guide the affairs of Egypt from the precincts of the British Residency. How these affairs have been guided, and sometimes misguided, since the early days of British control will be dealt with in the chapters which follow, but it is as well to consider what goes to produce the Egyptian's standpoint before examining their actions too closely through European spectacles.

CHAPTER II

EGYPT UNDER ISMAIL PASHA

ALTHOUGH the misgovernment of the Khedive Ismail precipitated the crisis in Egypt which finally led to the British occupation, and the actions of this particular ruler were the determining factor in the production of Egyptian chaos, his reign was merely the continuance of a pernicious system which had existed since the days of Mehemet Ali. But Ismail surpassed his predecessors. His whole régime pointed to a catastrophe, and that catastrophe came in due course. If his headlong dash to destruction was an evil in itself, it had the one redeeming feature that it created a situation which needed drastic treatment, and which made European intervention compulsory. Before Ismail became Khedive, Egypt was politically diseased, but the summoning of a physician was not a vital necessity. Under his guidance that disease rapidly developed into a question of life and death, and the patient could no longer remain unattended. First the local physician tried his remedies and failed. Then the specialist was called in. What happened? The specialist, instead of helping and guiding the local physician, turned him out of the house although he was the patient's best friend. Thereafter, the specialist worked single-handed with a dying man. He did good and he made mistakes, but the hands of all the local physicians were against him. Yet he was patient and determined, and gradually the sick man began to revive. Gradually the local physicians came to realize that this European specialist knew what he was doing, but they resented his interference—a breach of etiquette but beneficial all the same.

The system prevalent at the time of Ismail was inaugurated

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under Mehemet Ali, who did more than any other ruler to introduce European ideas into Egypt, and to bring the country into line with European progress. Although he devoted much of his attention to military campaigns, he laid the foundation of modern Egypt. He was responsible for the beginnings of the cotton industry, he constructed the much needed Mahmudiyeh canal, and he laid, in 1847, the foundation stone of the great barrage across the Nile at the beginning of the Delta. Yet, when it is considered that the canal at Alexandria was built by the forced labour of the fellahin with 20,000 casualties, and that Mehemet Ali was with difficulty prevented from using stone from the Pyramids for the construction of the barrage, some idea will be gained of the way in which good and evil were blended together. While many of the Pasha's improvements were real, others were quite imaginary. He squandered vast sums on forming large armies and building unnecessary fleets ; he built arsenals and factories at immense cost ; he created huge trading monopolies which were utterly unsound ; and he constructed magnificent buildings and public works to adorn his capital at Cairo. And all these works were carried out by unpaid labour driven by the whip. It was slavery, pure and simple, but it formed the crude foundation of Egypt's prosperity to-day. Trade and commerce were encouraged, a stimulus was given to European education, and although his exactions were ruthless and cruel, Mehemet Ali spent no money on luxury. Under his rule, nearly all the lands belonging to private individuals were confiscated, and the owners were forced to accept inadequate pensions. In this way Mehemet Ali became proprietor of nearly all the soil of Egypt, whereupon he introduced the system of internal administration, the general principles of which exist to the present day. He absorbed much that was good from France, who was anxious to extend her influence in Egypt, and he encouraged Europeans to Egypt to trade and to travel. Such was the beginning of the great foreign communities which have played so important a rôle in the commercial and financial affairs of the country.

But, in order to meet the expenses incurred in his military enterprises and grandiose projects, Mehemet Ali had to squeeze money out of the fellahin, and this he did by methods as

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merciless as they were irregular. The subordinate officials in the provinces had to resort to the same devices as their predecessors under the Mamelukes. Recruitment for the armies, forced labour, and the lash were the daily lot of the unfortunate fellah, while the tax-gatherer emptied his pockets to add injury to insult. In a report drawn up in 1838, Colonel Campbell, the British Consul-General, draws a vivid picture of the condition of Egypt at this time. "The Government," he wrote, "possessing itself of the necessities of life at prices fixed by itself, disposes of them at arbitrary prices. The fellah is thus deprived of his harvest and falls into arrears with his taxes, and is harassed and bastinadoed to force him to pay his debts. This leads to deterioration of agriculture and lessens the production. The Pasha having imposed high taxes has caused the high prices of the necessities of life. It would be difficult for a foreigner now coming to Egypt to form a just idea of the actual state of the country as compared with its former state. In regard to the general rise in prices, all the ground cultivated under the Mamelukes was employed for producing food—wheat, barley, beans, etc.—in immense quantities. The people reared fowls, sheep, goats, etc., and the prices were one-sixth, or even one-tenth, of those at present. This continued until Mehemet Ali became viceroy in 1805. From that period until the establishment of monopolies prices have gradually increased; but the great increase has chiefly taken place since 1824, when the Pasha established his regular army, navy and factories."

Mehemet Ali made use of such European civilization as he had acquired, but the effect of this on his Oriental character was such that it was a pure "toss up" whether his projects would be for the real benefit of his country. There was no judgment and no consistency. Some of his shots hit the target, others hit and killed passers-by. He was using a European weapon the working of which he did not understand. Yet, with all its faults, his reign was a notable epoch in Egyptian prosperity, and his name will go down to history as the deliverer of his country from the direct control of Turkey and as the creator of that spark of patriotism which was later to burst forth into the flame of Egyptian Nationalism. His successor, Abbas, did his best to undo such good as was

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done by his predecessor. He disliked foreigners and everything European. He posed as a devout Moslem, and lived as a recluse. Unintentionally, he benefited the fellahin by abolishing the commercial monopolies and closing the factories, while his reduction of the army and abandonment of public works, begun by Mehemet Ali, were welcomed for the consequent relief from conscription and the *corvée*. Abbas had no constructive policy. He only hated European innovations, otherwise he had no policy. If the fellahin found temporary relief in his régime, it was through no effort on his part. It was purely by chance. He fell by the hand of the assassin, and left an almost blank page in the history of Egypt. Said, who succeeded him, inherited the European ideas of his father, Mehemet Ali, and furthered his policy of progress and enterprise. Fifteen years of external peace were beginning to have their effect on the natural prosperity of the country. There was no public debt; a revenue of about £3,000,000 more than covered expenditure; the first railway in Egypt between Cairo and Alexandria had just been constructed at the instigation of the British Government; and there were great opportunities for further development. Said recognized where these opportunities lay. He extended the railway system and developed the canals for transport and irrigation purposes; he secured the land as freehold to the fellahin instead of belonging to the crown; and he granted concessions to the promoters of European enterprise. To the British he made two notable concessions, to the Eastern Telegraph Company and to the establishment of the Bank of Egypt. To the French, who had a strong influence over him, he granted the concession for the construction of the Suez Canal. But his generosity led him to extravagance, and his starting of the national debt was the beginning of a financial policy which landed Egypt in bankruptcy. Mr. Walne, the British Consul-General at Cairo, referred to Said as rash, flighty and conceited, and spoilt by the flattery of the foreigners who surrounded him. "They tell him, and he believes them, that he is a universal genius."

Ismail's reign began during a time of considerable prosperity, when the fellahin enjoyed proprietary rights in their land and were accumulating a certain degree of wealth. Indeed,

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the greater part of the Egyptian population was more prosperous at this time than at any other time in their history, and this period was long known as the "Golden Age of Ismail." The revenue was easily collected, the cost of administration was small, and the public debt amounted to not more than three millions. Even Said's extravagances only led to light taxation of the people. Moreover, the Egyptian revenue was greatly increased by the rise in the value of cotton, which took place as result of the American Civil War, the crop being worth about £25,000,000 instead of £5,000,000. Ismail had just returned from the glamour and luxury of various European capitals and he found in Egypt a financial situation which lent itself to exploitation and to the creation of an Egyptian Court modelled on those of the wealthy European capitals. He had acquired extravagant tastes, and lost no time in launching out on a policy of expenditure on a grand scale. He had also discovered during his travels in Europe that, when Western nations ran short of money, they raised loans freely, and he saw no reason why he should not do the same. He, therefore, not only made no attempt to limit his expenditure to his revenue, but turned over his private debts as liabilities of the state. He increased the annual tribute payable to Turkey from £376,000 to £720,000, in order to secure the succession to his son instead of to the eldest male representative of the family, according to Turkish law, and so that he might assume the more distinctive title of Khedive in place of the more humble designation of Pasha of Egypt. He spent vast sums on the extension of his dominions in the Sudan. Lavish hospitality was freely dispensed at all times at the expense of the state, notably on the occasions of his visit to Constantinople in connection with the succession firman, and at the opening of the Suez Canal, which was celebrated with brilliant functions in honour of the many royal and other distinguished guests present. This expenditure was covered by a loan of nearly £12,000,000 which doubled the amount of the funded debt at that time. Even the Sultan protested, but his protest merely resulted in another ruinous journey to Constantinople.

Before coming to the throne Ismail was regarded as a careful landowner who counted every piastre, and, so far as comparatively small sums were concerned, this thrifty side

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of his nature clung to him. But, when he came to deal with large sums of money, he seemed to lose all sense of money value. While he managed his own private estates with a certain degree of skill, he lost all idea of proportion when larger matters were at stake. Ismail was a man of undoubted fascination, with a keen sense of humour, and he possessed a remarkable faculty of sizing people up and dealing with each according to his characteristics. He never failed to encourage or ingratiate those who might prove useful to him, but was utterly unscrupulous with all who stood in his way. In his opinion, Egypt existed for his own personal benefit and aggrandisement, and he set his heart on the Europeanization of the country. It was his ambition to outshine the Western monarchs as the head of a highly modernized and efficient state. Although this ambition was very different from having at heart the ultimate welfare of his people, many of his reforms served both objects. He spent vast sums of money and devoted much energy and resource to the reconstruction on European models of many of the administrative services. The Customs system and the Post Office were entirely reorganized. A telegraph service was instituted throughout the country, even up to the Sudan. Irrigation was extended, adding considerably to the cultivable area, and railway and harbour construction was carried out. He gave a considerable stimulus to trade and created a sugar industry. But, at the same time, he devoted equal attention to the building of gorgeous palaces, lavish entertainments, and the maintenance in Cairo of a European Opera. Of all the money Ismail spent on these and other projects, apart altogether from the Suez Canal, only about ten per cent. can be regarded as spent on works of permanent utility.

In his projects and profligacies Ismail left the financial factor entirely out of his reckoning. Hence, his financial policy, if it can be called a financial policy, consisted of continually raising further loans to pay off the interest of previous debts, and even this procedure was often only carried out in so far as it suited the Khedive's convenience. By following this pernicious system, and by falling into the hands of the army of unscrupulous financiers which hovered about his court, Ismail saw the finances of Egypt sink deeper

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and deeper in the mire until finally, in 1876, the crash came, and the Khedive suspended payment of the Treasury Bills. At the time of Ismail's accession the public debt of Egypt only amounted to £3,293,000. In 1876 it had risen to over £94,090,000, of which £68,110,000 was funded and £26,000,000 floating. Lord Cromer estimates that Ismail Pasha added, on an average, about £7,000,000 a year for thirteen years to the debt of Egypt, and it is safe to conclude that the whole of the borrowed money was squandered, with the exception of £16,000,000 spent on the Suez Canal. In 1875 Ismail had only one security left to pledge—his Founder's Shares in the Suez Canal—and these were purchased by Disraeli, under dramatic circumstances, for the sum of £4,000,000.

If this financial situation was disastrous to Egypt, it also held out a gloomy prospect for the European bondholders, who were chiefly to be found in Great Britain and France. These creditors became more than uneasy, and naturally looked for means to protect their interests. As early as December, 1875, Mr. Stephen Cave had been sent to Egypt by the British Government to inquire into the situation, and the Cave Report, published in the following year, disclosed a thoroughly bad state of affairs. During Mr. Cave's work of investigation the Khedive provided a notable example of his extravagance by entertaining the members of the Commission to a luxurious banquet at the Pyramids, and extended to them profuse hospitality. But he was not so generous when he came to disclose the facts of the financial position. Like most people in such circumstances, he withheld many important considerations. The Report stated that Egypt suffered from "the ignorance, dishonesty, waste and extravagance of the East" and from "the vast expense caused by the hasty, and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilization of the West." The debtor and creditor account of the state from 1864 to 1875 showed receipts amounting to £148,215,000, of which over £94,000,000 had been obtained from revenue and nearly £4,000,000 by the sale to Great Britain of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. The remainder was credited to : loans, £31,713,000, and floating debt, £18,243,000. The cash which reached the Egyptian Treasury from the loans and floating debt was far less than the nominal amount of

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these loans, none of which cost the Egyptian Government less than 12 per cent. per annum. When the expenditure for the same period was examined, the extraordinary fact was disclosed that the sum raised by revenue was only three millions less than that spent on administration, tribute to Turkey and public works, including a sum of £10,500,000 described as "expenses of questionable utility or policy." The whole proceeds of the loans and floating debt had been absorbed in payment of interest and sinking funds, with the exception of £16,000,000 debited to the Suez Canal. In other words, Egypt was burdened with a debt of £91,000,000, funded or floating, for which she had no return. Even from the Suez Canal she derived no revenue, owing to the sale of the Khedive's shares.

As result of the Cave Report, which recommended that the foreign Powers should intervene in order to restore credit, the Khedive had to agree to the creation of an International Commission of the Public Debt. This led to international control over a large part of the revenue, and was the beginning of the institution known in Egypt as the *Caisse de la dette publique*. The French, Austrian and Italian Governments were represented on the Commission, but at first the British Government declined to select a Commissioner. Later, however, the Khedive asked Lord Goschen to appoint a British Commissioner of the Debt, and the appointment fell to Sir Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer), who in 1877 entered the arena of Egyptian affairs. Other commissions of inquiry followed, and there was a general tendency to internationalize the affairs of Egypt. In October, 1876, came the mission of Mr. (afterwards Lord) Goschen and M. Joubert on behalf of the British and French bondholders, and this led to the Dual Control by which the revenue was controlled by an Englishman and the expenditure by a Frenchman. According to the Goschen-Joubert Decree of the 18th November, 1876, the funded debt was rearranged as follows: Unified Debt, £59,000,000 at 6 per cent. with a one per cent. sinking fund; 5 per cent. Preference Stock, £17,000,000; Daira Debt, £8,815,000; and 1864, 1865 and 1867 loans, £4,293,000. Certain definite sources of revenue were devoted to the payment of these debts, the annual payment amounting



STREET SCENE IN CAIRO

Photo : R. H. Goodsall

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to about £7,000,000. But at the time when this arrangement was made it was obvious that the system of accounts was faulty both in theory and in practice, and that the provisions of the Decree would have to be modified sooner or later. The difficulties with which the Commission was beset may easily be imagined, but the disclosures resulting from its investigations were almost unbelievable. The figures on which calculations were based were afterwards found to be almost valueless. For example, the revenue was estimated at £10,500,000, and the revenue for the year 1875 was quoted as having been £10,800,000. Even in 1883 the revenue, which was collected with great difficulty, only amounted to £9,000,000 and it was not for another decade that the figure quoted was actually reached. Again, the net receipts of the railways, as submitted to Lord Goschen, amounted to £900,000, of which at least one third was utterly fictitious, partly on account of the special trains freely ordered by the Khedive's family and friends, who merely signed a paper intimating that the cost was payable by Ismail. These documents were entered as if they were receipts, although the money was never paid. Shortly after the Commission of the Debt was established in 1876, it was found that the customs receipts at Suez had diminished, and it was noticed that a new local director had been appointed. By the Khedivial Decree of the 18th November, 1876, it was arranged that all the revenue from the Customs should be paid direct to the Commissioners of the Debt, but inquiries revealed that the former official had been exiled because he refused to obey an order from the Khedive to pay the Suez Custom House receipts direct to himself. This unfortunate but honest government servant had been arrested and sent to some remote part of the Sudan, and it was some months before he could be produced.

Up to the year ending in July, 1877, instead of £4,800,000, only £3,328,000 was produced by the revenue devoted to the debt, while in 1878 it was discovered that, out of £2,000,000 due as interest on the debt by the 1st May, only £500,000 had been paid in by the 31st March. This left exactly one month in which to collect the balance of £1,500,000. Meanwhile the French, believing that Ismail was in possession of hidden wealth—not an unreasonable assumption—brought

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pressure to bear, and Lord Vivian, the British Consul-General in Cairo, was instructed to support this action. In December, 1876, Lord Vivian had reported that "it was impossible to account for the disposal of the very large sums of money over which the Egyptian Government have had control during the last year; £4,000,000 for the Suez Canal shares; £5,000,000 advance from the French, and nearly a year's revenue have disappeared, while the payment of the coupon of the Unified Debt has been deferred, all the public employees are in arrears of pay, and heavy debts remain unsettled." The result of Anglo-French pressure was exactly what was to be expected. Two iron-fisted Pashas were sent into the provinces, accompanied by money-lenders who were prepared to buy the crops in advance. In this way the fellahin were frequently forced to sell at one half of the price realized a month later; and the extent to which pressure was brought to bear was shown by the great variations in coinage produced and by the masses of silver coins, strung together as women's ornaments, which were handed in. Nevertheless, the balance was produced within a few hours of the specified time!

The Goschen-Joubert arrangements failed for a number of reasons. Ismail worked against the Commissioners all the time. The winter of 1877-78 was one of extreme misery in Egypt. The last two Niles had been exceptionally bad ones, and there was famine in the land, in both Upper and Lower Egypt. Many thousands of the villagers, men, women and children, had died of starvation. The Russo-Turkish war, with its consequent trade depression, was not without its effect on Egypt. Dishonesty was rife throughout the government departments. In the matter of taxation the future was being sacrificed to the present by collecting taxes in advance, and taxation in general was stifling the future prospects of the country. Government employees were not receiving their salaries, and huge debts to contractors, etc., were rapidly accumulating, so that creditors were suing the Government in the Mixed Tribunals. In fact, Egypt's productive power was being killed in order to satisfy the immediate demands of the bondholders.

The state of the country at this time was deplorable, and almost surpassed description. It was rare in those days to

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see a fellah with a turban on his head and more than a shirt on his back. Even if they possessed such articles of clothing, they dared not wear them, as such an indication of wealth would have instantly brought the tax-gatherer to their doors. Few of the country Sheikhs had a cloak to wear, and the provincial towns on market days were full of women trying to sell their clothes and silver ornaments to Greek usurers. Every dodge and device was used to extort the uttermost piastre from the people, in order to satisfy the clamourings of the European bondholders, and the methods used were those of time-honoured brutality. "The half-starved fellahin were dragged away from their own fields to work on the huge estates which the Khedive and his favoured Pashas had filched from them; the forced labour of the *corvée* was applied under the ever-present menace of the whip, to keep the perennial canals running for the benefit of others; the press-gangs were employed to drive into the dépôts the army recruits who were too poor to buy exemption from what they regarded, too often rightly, as an irrevocable sentence of death in the far-away Sudan; the miserable mud villages were frequently deserted because even the *curbash* applied to the soles of the fellahin's feet could no longer wring a piastre out of them to meet the taxes often levied three or four times over, and so even their land was taken away from them in payment; crowds of wailing women and emaciated children begged for a husk of maize; there was misery and despair up and down that incomparable valley of the Nile, while Ismail held his court in Cairo, and those who preyed upon him, Egyptians and Europeans alike, battered on his profligate extravagance."¹ The International Tribunals were so administered that a fellah, having once signed a paper for money borrowed, could be sued before foreign judges, by a foreign procedure and without any defence for an impecunious defendant. Indeed, the figures indicating the amount of the debt were often changed, and the wretched fellah was deprived of lands and possessions without any means of redress. A good deal of sentimental nonsense was written at the time about the state of Egypt under Ismail, and much of this was of a fantastic nature, but there is no doubt whatever that conditions

¹ "The Egyptian Problem," Sir Valentine Chirol. London, 1921.

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were exceedingly bad during the last three years of Ismail's reign.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian Government was unable to settle the claims of its creditors and, further borrowing being out of the question, judgments were obtained in the courts. The non-execution of these judgments produced a crisis, which led to the interference of the Powers under whose auspices the Mixed Courts had recently been established. The German Government "considered that the Khedive was acting in a manner which should not be allowed in refusing to pay claims when required to do so by the Courts of Law"; and the German Ambassador in London informed Lord Derby that "Prince Bismarck wished for united action on the subject by all the Powers, if only to avoid the possibility of separate action on the part of some of them." This precipitated the demand for a full inquiry into the financial state of Egypt, but it was not until after much quibbling and hedging on the part of Ismail that a Khedivial Decree was finally issued on the 4th April, 1878, appointing a Commission with the fullest powers of inquiry. The Commission was presided over by M. de Lesseps, and consisted of Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Rivers Wilson, M. de Blignières and Riaz Pasha.

The task which confronted this Commission was of a highly complicated nature, and the obstacles to progress were as varied as they were numerous. The state of affairs revealed was almost incredible. Waste in the Departments was prodigious. The Chief of the Ordnance Department, for example, would hear of some new type of cannon and, thinking that Egypt should be up-to-date in her artillery, would order, for experimental purposes, not one but two dozen. He purchased pieces of ordnance much in the same way as most people order bottles of beer. Money was found to be due to all manner of contractors and tradesmen, even to barbers, camel-drivers and donkey-boys. One Egyptian princess had run up a bill for £150,000 with a French dressmaker. There had been dabbings on the Stock Exchange, financial jugglery with the nominal and actual value of securities, and bonuses granted on the renewal of bills. Large sums were owing with nothing to show, and extravagant sums had been paid for work actually carried out. The harbour works at

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Alexandria cost over £2,500,000, when, according to a trustworthy estimate, they should have cost about £1,400,000. In one case it was discovered that the Egyptian Government, being in want of immediate cash, sold a quantity of grain which they did not possess and were not likely to possess. The purchase money was paid at once, and the grain had to be delivered by a specified date. When the time came for delivery, a certain amount of the grain was handed over, while the remainder was bought back at a price 25 per cent. higher than that paid by the original purchasers. It was also found that the Government had laid hands on the funds belonging to the Wakfs, the Department dealing with Moslem religious endowments, and had forcibly borrowed from an institution which administered the estates of orphans and minors. In the latter case the loan was without any security, the capital was never repaid, and no interest was ever received by the institution. Another glaring example of the Government's methods was found in the application of the Law of *Moukabala*, by which landowners could redeem one half of the land tax to which they were liable by payment of six years' tax, either in one sum or by instalments. No receipts were given for payments made under this law, so that there was no means of checking the claims. Hence, many genuine claimants lost their money altogether, while numerous adventurers became possessed of funds to which they had no conceivable right. In these circumstances it was not surprising that the Commission became unpopular with the fellahin. It had to make the best of a bad job, and the result could not possibly be altogether satisfactory. In 1878 the outstanding claims amounted to £6,276,000, with a deficit of £3,440,000, but by the following year the deficit was reduced to £381,000.

The chief result of this inquiry was the extension of international control to the enormous estates of the Khedive, on which a loan of £8,500,000 was to be raised in return for a fixed "Civil List," and the adoption of the principle of ministerial responsibility. Making a virtue out of a necessity, Ismail offered to give up two-thirds of his estates, but it was found that the remaining third was by far the most valuable. The Khedive defended himself to the last, but he finally had

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to part with the whole of his property and to accept a constitutional ministry under Nubar Pasha, with Sir Rivers Wilson as Minister of Finance, M. de Blignières as Minister of Public Works, and Riaz Pasha Minister of the Interior. For a time this took the place of the Dual Control. But, although Ismail professed satisfaction with this agreement, he soon felt the position to be intolerable. The new Ministry, composed as it was of Christians and foreigners, did not even possess the elements of success. Nubar himself was an Armenian, who could not even speak Arabic, and who carried no weight in the country. Moreover he was regarded as a foreign adventurer who had enriched himself as an agent of the European usurers, and was repugnant to the fellahin as the author of the International Tribunals. The prestige of the Khedive, with all his faults, still stood for much in the eyes of the Egyptian people, and he and Nubar were continually in opposition to one another. No serious attempt was made to secure the Khedive's co-operation, but it is doubtful whether any such attempt would have been successful. Then a further disastrous failure of the Nile flood made the task of the Ministry still more difficult and, instead of giving his support to his ministers, the Khedive strove to divert the popular hatred from himself to them, and to rid himself of their control. To this end he set himself to intrigue against them, and made use of the dissatisfied state of the army in the hope of regaining his old rôle of an autocratic ruler.

For some time there had been much discontent among the officers of the army owing to the fact that their pay had been withheld and, although the new Ministry decided to pay a part of what was owing to them, a large number of Egyptian officers was placed on half-pay, and much distress was caused to them and their families. At this time there were about 500 officers in Cairo, and another 2,000 were most unwisely called up from all parts of the country to receive an instalment of their arrears of pay. Hence there were as many as 2,500 discontented officers present in the capital, as well as the Cairo garrison of 2,600 troops who were all more or less sympathetic. Now, there had been in existence for some time a secret society of Egyptian officers which aimed at the deposition of Ismail, and the removal of the Circassian officers,

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who held all the higher ranks and wielded all the power in the Egyptian army. The time seemed favourable for the execution of their plan, and so, as a preliminary step, they approached a member of the Cabinet, Ali Moubarek, to whom they confided their scheme—to place him, Ali, at the head of the movement, and to demand by force of arms the deposition of Ismail. Ali, seeing no prospect of success, disclosed the whole plot to Ismail, who saw in it the very means he required for overthrowing the Ministry. Accordingly he sent for the leaders of the secret society, amongst whom was Ahmed Arabi, who was destined later to play so important a part in the movement which led to the British occupation of Egypt. “There happened then what happened almost invariably with those whom Ismail cared to charm. They entered as his enemies, they came out as his allies. Seventy native officers were in one day made lieutenant-colonels, Arabi was among them, and received in addition the high honour of one of the Khedivial harem slaves as his wife. A few days after there was enacted a little comedy at Cairo. Nubar and Rivers Wilson, while driving to the Ministry of Finance, were stopped and assaulted by soldiers; the scuffle assumed the dignity of a riot, the Khedive was sent for, and showed presence of mind. Received with cheers by the soldiers, he promised them redress, ordered them to their homes, and posed as the restorer of order. Then he sent for the Consuls, pointed out to them the unpopularity of Nubar, said he could only guarantee order if Nubar were dismissed, and gained his point. The threat of a repetition of the comedy sufficed for him to get rid of the other Ministers and, as the head of a National Party, he again ruled alone.

“And of all this Arabi was a spectator; the lessons sank deep into his mind, and bore dangerous fruit. Is it necessary to ask how Ismail, generally so astute, committed the blunder of showing the army their power? The explanation is not difficult. Ismail’s policy was invariably one of the hour—the obstacle of the moment must be crushed at any cost; that once done, the tool, if it became dangerous, could be crushed too. Ismail wished to get rid of European supervision, and he used Arabi and his friends as the readiest means of doing so. He was far too clever a man not to see that he had

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created a Frankenstein Monster, far too unscrupulous a one to allow it to exist after it had served his purpose. The too-hurried deposition of Ismail that followed saved him from another crime, saved Arabi's life, and necessitated our intervention three years later."¹

By means of this little drama, carefully staged and not without its elements of humour, the Khedive Ismail succeeded in posing as the guardian of public security and placed his Ministry in such a position that Nubar's resignation was inevitable. Efforts were made to reinstate Nubar but without success, and so the British and French Governments secured the appointment of the heir apparent, Prince Tewfik, to preside over the Cabinet. Ismail, however, had other reserves on which to draw. Although the Governments of Great Britain and France had so far acted in co-operation, Ismail saw that there was a certain amount of feeling in both countries against the policies of their respective Governments, behind which he saw a hope of appealing to public opinion in the two countries. A little further pressure on the Egyptian people, he believed, would produce enough money to meet the demands of France, whereas he regarded a democratic exhibition as likely to deceive the British public.

So, although the Khedive had agreed to co-operate with the new Ministry under Prince Tewfik, he continued in spite of repeated protests to intrigue against his Ministers, and finally produced a financial project, said to have been submitted to him by the Chamber of Notables and signed by representatives of all classes. It was urged that the nation protested against a declaration of bankruptcy and demanded the formation of a purely Egyptian Ministry for "the preparation of electoral laws on the model of those which existed in Europe," for the election of a parliamentary assembly, "in conformity with the exigencies of the internal situation and the aspirations of the nation." Superficially, this democratic "geste" had the appearance of an important concession on the part of the Khedive to the people of Egypt, but, when it was realized that this Chamber of Notables, which so zealously gave expression to the so-called national aspirations was nothing more than an assembly of Sheikhs, who saw the

¹ "Khedives and Pashas," C. F. Moberly Bell. London, 1884.

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prospect of avoiding certain increases of taxation by complying with Ismail's wishes, the real significance of the move began to become apparent. Prince Tewfik was replaced by Chérif Pasha, the European Ministry was dismissed, and the new Ministry included the two Pashas who had succeeded in screwing one and a half millions from the fellahin in the short space of one month !

As soon as the new Ministry came into power, there was an immediate return to the old abuses. Sir Frank Lascelles reported that " Shahin Pasha, the Minister of War, had gone to Behera, probably for the purpose of collecting money ; his former position as Inspector-General in Lower Egypt having secured for him an unenviable notoriety as one of the harshest and most successful tax-gatherers in the country." And, a few days later, the British Vice-Consul at Zagazig wrote : " You ask how is the new régime working ? Worse than before. Three-fourths of the taxes and one-half of the *Moukabala* are now exacted by means of the usual oppressions. The fellah, having no crop of cotton or grain to realize, is obliged to have recourse to usurers for money, which he gets at some 4 to 5 per cent. per month. He has no alternative if he would avoid the *curbash*. The Zawats (aristocracy), meanwhile, only pay the " Mal " (land-tax proper) at their pleasure, and, therefore, see everything *couleur de rose*. . . . Omar Pasha Lutfi, Inspector-General of Lower Egypt, has been here of late, and has given stringent orders for the collection of money by all possible means."

The position was rapidly becoming quite impossible, and the end was approaching. The Commissioners, being unable to associate themselves with the ridiculous proposals of the Khedive for the settlement of the Debt, tendered their resignations and sent in their second report, disclosing the deplorable state of affairs. Meanwhile, the German Government addressed a protest to the Khedive, and was supported by the other European Powers, which led to the following communication from Sir Frank Lascelles, acting under instructions from Lord Salisbury : " The French and English Governments are agreed to advise Your Highness officially to abdicate and to leave Egypt. Should Your Highness follow this advice, our Governments will act in concert in order that a

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suitable Civil List should be assigned to you,' and that the order of succession, in virtue of which Prince Tewfik will succeed Your Highness, should not be disturbed. We must not conceal from Your Highness that if you refuse to abdicate, and if you compel the Cabinets of London and Paris to address themselves directly to the Sultan, you will not be able to count either upon obtaining the Civil List or upon the maintenance of the succession in favour of Prince Tewfik." The Khedive referred the matter to Constantinople, where he hoped to be able to buy support, but the reply which he received from the Sultan was the result of European pressure which had been brought to bear on the Porte.

"On the 26th June, 1879, at about 10.30 a.m.," writes Mr. Moberly Bell, "there was a curious little drama proceeding in the Abdin Palace at Cairo. Upstairs was Ismail Pasha vigorously remonstrating with a newspaper correspondent, who was trying to induce him to abdicate, to escape that deposition which the correspondent knew to be imminent. . . . While this was going on upstairs, there was much excitement below, for ministers and courtiers were busy examining the envelope of a telegram inscribed, 'Ismail Pasha, ex-Khedive of Egypt.' Each one, as he took it, dropped it like a hot cinder, and found that he had important business elsewhere. 'Oh, Kairy Pasha,' said the Master of Ceremonies to the Keeper of the Seals, 'it is clearly your business to take this telegram to His Highness.' 'I,' said Kairy Pasha, 'it is manifestly a matter which pertains to the Ministry,' and he shuffled off. At last came Chérif, a bluff, blunt old man, with no great intelligence, indeed, but caring as little for Khedives as for Commissioners of Inquiry. With a little hesitation he took the telegram, and entered the room as the correspondent left. Ismail's face changed very slightly as he read it; the two eyes closed for a moment, then he opened it and repeated, 'You will obey his august Majesty the Sultan by resigning the Khedivate into the hands of Mohammed Tewfik, Khedive of Egypt.' He folded up the telegram very carefully, and placed it on the table by his side. 'Send for His Highness, Tewfik Pasha, at once,' was all he said, and he sat still and waited.

"Meanwhile, at the Ismailia Palace in Cairo, where Tewfik

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lived in quiet obscurity, another telegram had arrived, addressed, 'Mohammed Tewfik, Khedive of Egypt.' To be sure there was no hesitation in delivering this telegram. It had been brought full pelt from the office, and the competition had been as to who should present it. (The bringer of good tidings merely got his ears boxed.) . . . When Chérif came with his message, the carriage was already at the door, and the two started for Abdin. . . . Ismail was waiting in the long north room of the Palace of Abdin, seated moodily at the end farthest from the door. As the door opened, he rose, walked across the room to meet him, raised Tewfik's hands to his lips, and said, 'I salute my Effendina.' Then placing his two hands on his shoulders, he kissed him on both cheeks, with the words, 'That he may be more successful than his father,' and, without another word, he crossed from the room to his harim, and Tewfik I, Khedive of Egypt, stood alone." Ismail Pasha was the first to call and inscribe his name in the book of the new Sovereign of Egypt, and that same evening a royal salute on Prince Tewfik's accession was fired from the Cairo citadel.

On the 30th June of that fateful year Ismail left Egypt on board his yacht *Mahroussa*. At Naples the King of Italy had placed a residence at his disposal, and thither he repaired with his baggage—loose cash and valuables, amounting, it is said, to three million sterling. As the *Mahroussa* slowly glided out of Alexandria harbour, the curtain fell on the first act of the Egyptian drama of the nineteenth century.

Ismail found Egypt in prosperity and he left it in bankruptcy. His reign cost the country something like forty millions. All the savings of the fellahin during many prosperous years, and nearly all their agricultural stock, were gathered in ; and the people were in debt to Greek and local usurers to the extent of about twenty millions. Yet, it is a mistake to be too severe in criticizing the actions of Ismail. His ambition was to introduce European civilization into Egypt, and he did much towards the achievement of his object. But he lacked knowledge and experience. In many ways he was like a child. If he wanted a thing, he must have it. His ignorance made him the prey of flatterers, and he succumbed to the persuasion of all manner of financial adventurers who loitered about his

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Court. With the interests of his country so closely allied with his personal ambitions, there were great possibilities before him, in spite of his purely selfish motives. But he had a formidable weakness to overcome—that of an uneducated Oriental in possession of wealth and a tinge of European civilization. Egypt has suffered immense harm from these years of lavish extravagance, which was unknown in the days of Mehemet Ali. Ismail taught Egypt extravagance, a quality only too easily acquired by Orientals, and that extravagance still prevails in some degree in the Egyptian Court of to-day.

Now let us turn to the new Khedive. Although the eldest son, Tewfik was not given a European education, but was left to grow up in his native country, where his early years were devoted to the quiet and rather uneventful life of managing his country estates. This, however, had the advantage of bringing him in close contact with his fellah tenants, and aroused in him a certain sympathy for their precarious circumstances. In character Tewfik was a man of no great ability, with little sense of humour, some of the quickness of his father, but none of the conspicuous bad qualities of his predecessor. He lacked strength of character and experience, had no presence of mind, but possessed an ample supply of passive courage. When the cholera epidemic was rampant in Cairo, and frantic efforts were being made to isolate the pestilence-stricken people, Tewfik calmly announced that he was going into the city. His suite were horrified, thinking that they would have to follow his example, but there was no fear on the part of the Khedive or the Kediviah, his wife. "I am going," said Tewfik. "Arrange among yourselves who shall accompany me." The first to volunteer was the gallant little Egyptian lady, who inspired the whole suite with courage. Tewfik was heavily built and rather lacking in expression, though not without dignity, and at times he was like a great big boy. His sense of the ridiculous led him to tell innumerable stories of his casual meetings with the British guards posted round the palace. He always got up early, and usually was at work by 5 a.m. "One morning he had slipped out into the gardens of Ghezirah at sunrise, and was returning to the palace when he was stopped by a sentry. 'Yer can't go in 'ere, yer know,'

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said the British private, with good-natured contempt for the ignorance of an evident foreigner. 'But I belong to the palace,' said the Khedive in his broken English. 'Oh, do yer—well, what sort of a place 'ave yer got?' 'Very good.' 'Ah, fine times, I s'pose; nothin' to do and plenty to eat, from the look of yer. Wouldn't mind servin' this chap meself, if 'e'd give me six shillin' a day; what sort of feller is he?' Just then the sergeant coming round, saluted the Khedive, who passed in, to the horror of the sentry recognizing his mistake. Another story is told of Tewfik giving the sentry a few piastres, and receiving the reply, 'Thank you, Johnnie.' The Khedive then produced a silver coin, and got, 'Much obliged, sir.' Finally, the sight of a gold coin led to, 'Guard, turn out; present arms.'"¹ But these are diversions, and are scarcely in keeping with the serious state of Egypt which confronted Tewfik on his accession to the Khedivate.

A Ministry had to be formed and this was entrusted to Chérif Pasha, who began by submitting a proposal for a constitution unacceptable to the Khedive, and followed it up with his resignation. Thereupon Tewfik determined to retain the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in his own hands, as he considered himself responsible for the government of the country and had no intention of "sheltering himself behind an unreal and illusory constitution." Yet the arrangement could not be considered as satisfactory, so Riaz Pasha was summoned to take office, although the Khedive reserved to himself the right to preside at the meetings of the Council if he thought it desirable. Sir Evelyn Baring and M. de Blignières were appointed Controllers-General, and a Commission of Liquidation, mainly composed of the Commissioners of the Debt, was instituted with full powers to regulate the financial situation.

The situation with which the Egyptian Government of that time had to deal was, to say the least of it, distressing. The Treasury was bankrupt. Discontent permeated all classes of Egyptian society: the poor because of the oppression of their late ruler; the rich because they were threatened with the loss of their time-honoured privileges; the Europeans because their debts were not paid and on account of the

¹ C. F. Moberly Bell, *op. cit.*

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natural trade depression. The country was at the mercy of international rivalries. The Egyptian hated and mistrusted the Turk, who in his turn abominated the European. European assistance was necessary, but it was no more popular for that reason. Fortunately, the Ministers had become reconciled to the unpalatable fact that a considerable measure of European control was essential, and in this they had the loyal support of the Khedive. But Tewfik had inherited from his father a legacy which was destined to all but overthrow him—the deplorable state of the Egyptian army, the discipline of which had been severely shaken by Ismail's intrigues to bring about the downfall of the Nubar Ministry. This combined with Ismail's introduction of large numbers of foreign concession-hunters contributed greatly to the national movement under Arabi Pasha, which led to the British occupation.

Few personages of such humble origin, with so few attainments, and with a character so purely negative, have used up as much limelight as Ahmed Arabi has done. Authors and journalists, old ladies and amateur politicians have gone into rhapsodies about this Egyptian fellah, whom they have raised to the high eminence of a national hero. They have shrouded him in a mist of romance, they have praised his ideals to the skies, and they have swallowed his utterances as if they were morsels from the Book of Wisdom. Others have been unduly severe in their criticism of Arabi, have accused him of every possible evil and denounced him as a common rebel. History has, indeed, been kind to him. He has been compared with some of the most eminent men of the nineteenth century and before, and he has been classed with celebrities whose qualities he entirely lacked. His claim for comparison with Garibaldi, put forward recently by a writer of contemporary history, can only be justified in that both led national movements. But one might as well compare Mussolini and De Valera, or Robespierre and Zaghlul Pasha. Arabi possessed none of the qualities of a great leader. His only education was in his ability to read and write, and recite certain passages of the Koran; he had none of the qualities of a soldier; and his power of perception was negligible. In fact, he was endowed with none of the qualities of leadership. At the same time, he knew how to appeal to the fellahin of Egypt.

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He was a fellah himself, he had a certain gift of oratory, and he was honest in purpose. One might say that he possessed personality, but not in the Western sense of the word. He had moral courage, while the physical counterpart was utterly lacking. His grievances in the army were similar to those of his comrades, but he had the courage to air them while his comrades were too afraid to speak. In the country he obtained a following, mainly among the Sheikh class from which he himself came, as the people saw in the attitude of the army their only chance of redress by joining in a common cause. Arabi promised them relief from the yoke of the Greek usurers, a burden which lay heavily upon their shoulders, and this, perhaps more than anything else, made him a hero in their eyes.


Arabi belonged to a family of Beduin origin, which was settled by Mehemet Ali in the village of Heyha, in the province of Sharkieh. It was a typical village of the Delta, with a small mosque, a water-wheel and a few huts, a few miles from Zagazig. His father was the village Sheikh, who owned some land and introduced a form of compulsory education in the village school. There Arabi received the beginnings of his education before proceeding to El-Azhar University in Cairo. It is said that he went to El-Azhar in order to avoid conscription, but, even if this surmise is true, he did not succeed in his effort. On his return to his village after four years in Cairo he was seized and drafted into the Saidiyeh Regiment, where his promotion to the rank of officer was very rapid. Said Pasha, the viceroy of Egypt in those days, favoured the promotion of Egyptian officers as opposed to those of Turkish or Circassian origin, and it was he who first encouraged Arabi to make in this respect public expression of the complaints of the Egyptians. Arabi spent much time in the study of military law and regulations, and soon became a typical "barrack-room lawyer." He was the spokesman on all occasions, and was always ready to offer himself for examinations when his comrades feared the wrath of the senior Turkish and Circassian officers.

When Mehemet Ali first organized the Egyptian army, Turks, Circassians and Albanians had filled all the officers' ranks, and it was impossible for an Egyptian to rise higher

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than the rank of a non-commissioned officer. Then gradually the situation changed so that Egyptians could obtain officers' commissions. But the old Turkish caste, still very powerful in Egypt, continued to regard the higher ranks of the army as its own preserve, and, while Egyptian officers rarely rose to these ranks, they were always the first to go when measures of economy were introduced. While Said was sympathetic to the attitude of the Egyptian officers, Ismail supported the position of the Turkish officer class. During his reign mutual hatred increased, but the personality of the Khedive held it in check, although he himself was the author of the first grounds for revolt. On the death of Said, Arabi was a captain, and was among the officers of the guard at the palace in Cairo. Like all "barrack-room lawyers" he was inclined to be noisy and argumentative, and on one occasion incurred the displeasure of the Khedive by creating a verbal disturbance under the palace windows. Ismail explained that he made more noise and was less useful than the big drum, and ordered him to be dismissed on the spot. This, though apparently an unimportant incident, was the first grounds of complaint which Arabi had against Ismail, and as an insult made a lasting impression which contributed in no small degree to Arabi's attitude afterwards. Shortly after, another incident brought about Arabi's court-martial for insubordination to a Circassian officer, and his accusing the court of tyranny and favouritism led to his dismissal from the army altogether. Such a combination of circumstances was more than sufficient to arouse, in an Oriental, a feeling of deep resentment towards Ismail and a hatred for Circassians as a race; and it was in this frame of mind that Arabi joined the secret society of Egyptian officers to which I have already referred.

When war broke out between Egypt and Abyssinia, Arabi was reinstated and was put in charge of the transport at Massawa, where he got into further trouble, probably as result of intrigue, and was again dismissed. This was a cause of still further resentment against Ismail and the Circassian officers, and led Arabi to resume his connexion with the secret society and to make patriotic speeches, exciting the Egyptians against the Circassians. In a year Arabi became head of the secret society, and made use of such religious



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learning as he possessed to rouse his audiences at El-Azhar to support his national sentiments. He soon obtained a very considerable influence over them.

It has been argued by many that the Arabi movement was purely a military revolt, and that the national aspect was a mere afterthought. I am convinced that this was not the case. While it is certainly true that the first agitation took place in the army, I think it is fairly obvious that the dominant feature was the resentment felt by Egyptians against officers of foreign origin, and that the genuine grievances which existed were mainly due to antagonisms of race within the regiments. Moreover, in the country in general, the feeling was directed against the Turco-Circassian Pashas, the same caste from which the senior officers were drawn, and the people were only waiting for a lead to express their national aspirations. For this they had long looked in vain, and, when the spokesman did appear, it so happened that he was an army officer. I cannot help thinking that this was the only reason why the Arabi movement had the semblance of a military revolt. The army was rotten, the country was rotten, everything in Egypt was rotten. Whether the first word of complaint came from the army, from the civil service or from the fellahin, seems to be a matter of little consequence. But the fact that the army spoke first was the cause of much misunderstanding, and probably contributed more than anything else to the attitude adopted by Great Britain to the movement in general. Whether Arabi really appreciated what his movement represented, it is difficult to say, but on certain fundamentals his object was perfectly clear. He wanted to rid both civil and military Egypt from the unbearable yoke of the Turco-Circassian ruling class, and of any ruler who gave his support to that class. For this reason he plotted to get rid of Ismail. He launched an attack on Tewfik on the same score. He encouraged the Egyptians, down-trodden and whip-driven for centuries, to assert their rights as human beings instead of beasts, and to claim their say in the affairs of Egypt, their own country, which had hitherto been exploited for the wealth and benefit of aliens from the Bosphorus and the Black Sea.

It is difficult to examine Arabi's outlook from a European standpoint. He was a simple fellah, sunk in the depths of

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ignorance except for a slight smattering of education as useless as it was antiquated. He was an Egyptian and, therefore, a subject of the Khedive, who in turn recognized the Sultan as his suzerain. He was a Moslem, and a devout one, and therefore recognized and respected the Sultan as Caliph of Islam. While he had no dislike for the Turks as a race, he detested them in Egypt, and so, as far as Egyptian affairs were concerned, he disliked the Sultan and all that emanated from the Porte ; but when it was a matter of religious belief Arabi was as faithful to the Caliph at Stambul as any Moslem in Baghdad, Damascus or Mecca. This situation in itself made for complications, but, when the time came that Arabi was involved with the Sultan, the Khedive, his own followers, and the British and French Governments, most of whom were intriguing with one another, the complexity of the situation became, to say the least of it, intense.

I have no doubt whatever that Arabi's motives were absolutely sincere, and that, at the beginning of the movement, he had no other motive than to further the interests of his own countrymen. He had a firm belief in the righteousness of his cause, and he regarded himself as destined to deliver Egypt from the hand of the oppressor. He put forward his best efforts on behalf of his cause, but he lacked the qualities to achieve success. He had not even the elements of success in him, and he was soon out of his depth. As a young man he had no virtues and no vices. He was a mere child of nature, but therein lay the very side of his personality which won the hearts of the sentimentalists in England. Arabi's face is the index to his character—honest, stupid and kind-hearted, susceptible to injury and without personal ambition, though jealous of his rights and liable to lose his head in fantasy. He was far from being a historical character ; not a single statue to his memory adorns the land of Egypt. He failed, and in the East failure spells oblivion. I think the best description of Arabi is embodied in the title of his own choosing, that of " Ahmed Arabi, the Egyptian."

CHAPTER III

THE ARABI MOVEMENT

BEFORE Ismail left Egypt he spent a whole night alone with his son, Tewfik, in whom lay the only hope of the Khedivial family being permitted to retain the throne. On this occasion the ex-Khedive dispensed such advice as he could, and among his warnings he drew Tewfik's close attention to the power recently acquired by the army. Riaz persistently asserted that there was nothing in the Arabi movement, but Tewfik, with his father's warning fresh in his mind, was not to be deterred by smooth-tongued optimism. The Khedive, fully recognizing the danger and importance of the movement, but shrinking from the radical remedies suggested by Ismail, took the view that his best policy lay in conciliation and in gaining the sympathy and gratitude of Arabi and his friends. He, therefore, determined to bury the past and to begin again with a clean sheet by promoting Arabi and others to the rank of full colonel. In principle this was the right policy, and if properly carried out might have saved Egypt from what was to follow. But Tewfik, out of pure weakness of character, yielded to the pressure of the foreign consuls, who were strangely misinformed as to the true nature of the Arabi movement and regarded the whole affair as a military revolt. Tewfik had previously pledged himself that, if ever he came to the Khedivial throne, he would govern on strictly constitutional lines, and this pledge would have been carried out by his supporting Chérif Pasha's constitutional proposals.

The consuls, however, were determined that he should retain his power and become a puppet for the execution of their policy, and Tewfik fell into their clutches. He was placed

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between two opposing forces : on the one hand, those who could achieve some small beginning towards the satisfaction of the people's national aspirations, though probably not acceptable at the time to Arabi and his followers ; and, on the other hand, those who wanted to support the Khedive in an attempt to repress a movement which they little understood and in which they saw nothing but evil. Tewfik, weakling that he was, threw in his lot with the side which he considered the stronger, betrayed his Ministers who knew the people with whom they were dealing, and consented to the policy of those who were groping in the darkness. This action of the Khedive's was typical of Tewfik's character, and lost him the opportunity of gaining the support of the more moderate reformers in Egypt. He had his chance to take hold of the helm and to steer Egypt through troubled waters. He shrank from the responsibility, preferring to lean on others, who knew neither the tides nor the currents, and he was nearly overwhelmed by the storm which overtook him.

That foreign control over the financial affairs of Egypt was necessary, goes without saying. It was in the best interests of the bondholders, and was essential for the economic future of the country. But, when it came to urging the Khedive against what proved to be a purely national movement of his own people, sections of whom favoured constitutional government, the foreign controllers were adopting a policy suicidal to themselves as well as contrary to the interests of Egypt as a whole. Orientals may resent the actions of a ruler or a ruling caste, and they may become deeply embittered on account of their sufferings, but, when the perpetrator of these wrongs is supported by Christians and foreigners, embitterment gives place to hatred, and fanaticism dissipates reason. If Arabi was an obstructionist (and he certainly was one), he was ignorant and lacking in balance ; he scarcely knew what it was to be consistent ; and he was driven to an unreasonable line of action by the mistaken policy of others. If Tewfik had, at the outset, remained loyal to Chérif and the Constitutionalists, he might have secured the respect of the people of Egypt, even if he had to wait for opposition to abate. In the East, strength of purpose usually wins in the end, and there is reason to believe that, had the Khedive adopted this course,

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he would soon have received consular support and guidance, with the prospect of coming to terms with the leaders of the movement in a combined effort to set his Egyptian house in order. Chérif's proposals may have been utterly impractical, but in circumstances such as these it is the principle that matters, not the actual policy put forward. Riaz, on the other hand, was of Circassian origin and his Minister of War, Osman Pasha Rifki, was a Turkish Pasha of the old school. This was the Ministry which had the support of the Governments of Great Britain and France, and which contained all the elements calculated to stir up the antagonism of Arabi and those who had espoused his cause.

In addition to the innate resentment aroused in the Egyptian officers against the Turks and Circassians in the army, new elements of discontent had been introduced. The disastrous campaign in Abyssinia had shaken the confidence of the men in their superiors ; financial difficulties had led to the irregular payment of the men ; and systematic robbery deprived the soldiers of their due share of rations. If Arabi obstructed the inquiry into these and other irregularities, and the implication of his friends, Abd-el-Al and Ali Fehmi, roused him to fury against Osman Rifki, I think it may be assumed that his attitude was due to his utter want of reason. He was labouring under a grievance, and in his eyes Turks and Circassians were the source of all evil. In this, as in many other matters, Arabi was a fool, but it must be remembered that he was also a fellah. Altogether too much has been expected of this man. He was a simple man of the soil, yet he was expected to show the qualities of Napoleon, Garibaldi and George Washington.

The large numbers of officers who were placed on half-pay in 1878 were, for the most part, Egyptians, and, while considerable efforts were made to improve the civil administration of the country, nothing was done to reorganize the system prevailing in the army. Riaz Pasha was a typical example of the very class which had for centuries regarded the fellahin as beasts of burden, whose only one function in life was to answer the crack of the whip. He was, therefore, hostile to the Egyptian officers of fellah origin, who had to give place to his Turkish and Circassian friends in matters of pay and promotion. Moreover, the former deeply resented

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the fact that their men were forcibly employed outside their military duties on the digging of canals and agricultural work for the benefit of the Khedivial estates. It was, in fact, for refusing to allow his men to be employed for such purposes that Arabi first found himself at loggerheads with Riaz, and this led to a petition on the subject of army grievances, submitted to the Prime Minister by Arabi and two other colonels, Ali Bey Fehmi and Abd-el-Al.

In this petition complaint was made that Osman Pasha Rifki, Minister of War, had adopted an unjust attitude towards the Egyptian officers in the matter of promotion, and that officers had been dismissed from the service without any legal inquiry. Demands were also put forward that the Minister of War should be removed and that the qualifications of the promoted officers should be examined. Riaz Pasha tried to persuade the colonels to withdraw this petition, but, although promises were made regarding an inquiry into their grievances, all efforts to secure its withdrawal were without success. Meanwhile, Arabi continued to stir up agitation against the Minister of War, and made much capital out of Osman Rifki's proposed Conscription Law, which was said to be directed against the Egyptian officers in particular. In fact, the three ringleaders did all they could to defeat this measure and to find means of securing equality between the Egyptian officers and the Turco-Circassians, who were then their superiors. Each colonel went to his regiment and encouraged resistance to the existing military régime; and the oath was taken on the sword and the Koran that all would work as one man in furtherance of the common cause. The petition was received with disfavour by the Khedive and his Turkish *entourage*, with the result that a meeting of the Council of Ministers was held and, in the absence of the Controllers-General, it was decided to arrest the colonels and to try them by court-martial. An inquiry into their grievances would then follow. But, although these proceedings were confidential, the colonels were secretly informed¹ of this decision and were, therefore, able to take precautions against treachery. So, when they were duly summoned to appear at the Ministry of War on the 1st February, they arranged a relay of messengers between the Kasr-el-Nil

¹ It is alleged that Mahmoud Pasha Sami was the informer.

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Barracks and their regiments to facilitate the transmission of messages in case of need. A message was also sent to the regiment stationed at Toura, about ten miles from Caïro, asking for co-operation in an emergency.

On the 1st February the colonels were summoned to Kasr-el-Nil on the pretext of making arrangements for some military ceremonial, but on arrival they were immediately arrested and put on trial. The news spread like wildfire and rescue parties were quickly on the scene. In fact, before the proceedings had passed the initial stages, a turbulent mob of soldiery burst into the Ministry, upset chairs and tables, chased the Minister of War through a back window, and carried off the three colonels who led the troops, with drums beating, to the Khedive's palace. There they demanded the dismissal of Osman Rifki, and the Khedive, having no means of resistance, was forced to give way and to appoint as Minister of War Mahmoud Pasha Sami. This was the second occasion on which the army had gained its point, and the officers and men had by this time discovered that they had only to assert themselves to obtain what they desired. But, although the colonels were pardoned and a truce was established between them and the Khedive, the officers feared treachery as the consequence of their recent action. They were terrified of what might be their ultimate fate, and proceeded themselves to intrigue against Riaz Pasha with the support of Baron de Ring, the French Consul-General, in the hope of bringing about a change of Ministry. Baron de Ring's conduct on this occasion was most regrettable, and ultimately led to his recall from Egypt.

In a dispatch to the Foreign Office Sir Edward Malet wrote as follows: "It is openly asserted on all sides that he (Baron de Ring) has been actively endeavouring to upset Riaz Pasha, and I cannot but concede that his conduct has given colour to such an accusation. The fact of his receiving the secret visits of the chief of the insurgent colonels, without making any communication on the subject to the Khedive or his Ministers, and his visit to Prince Osman Pasha to ask him if he would accept the Presidency of the Ministry, are acts on which only one construction is likely to be put by the public."

When one considers the circumstances in which the colonels

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were put on their trial and the futility of trying them without any means of enforcing the sentence of the court, one cannot but condemn the attitude of Tewfik and his Ministers. The Khedive lost what he deserved to lose—the confidence of the people of Egypt—and Sir Edward Malet, the British Consul-General, expressed the opinion at the time that the officers were treated “in the way best calculated to destroy all confidence in the Khedive and his Government, although it was in harmony with the traditions of Oriental statesmanship.” But Arabi was not really the prime mover in these disturbances. It was to abler and more unscrupulous men that the initiative was due. Arabi was the mouthpiece and, as words count for much more than deeds in Egypt, he became the figure-head behind whom others could work in greater security.

But it was Arabi's prestige that rose in the country at this time. A man who could defy the Government and bring about a change of Ministers was regarded as a small god among the simple people of the land. In a very few weeks his position became one of considerable power. Petitions of all kinds poured in upon him from those who had suffered injustice and sought redress from their grievances. He was acquiring a reputation as a champion of the fellah against the tyranny of the Turkish ruling class. He was the friend of the fellah in the army. Why should he not be his friend and supporter throughout the country in general? Rapidly his popularity spread to the country Sheikhs, and from them to the fellahin themselves. His good looks, his pleasing smile and his dignified eloquence made a favourable impression on all with whom he came in contact. For hundreds of years no fellah had dared to raise his voice against the oppression and tyranny of his master. Now this son of a village Sheikh had voiced the grievances of the fellah in the army, had stood up to the highest in the land in defence of fellah rights, and had been successful in his endeavour. The Egyptians began to realize that the situation in the army was precisely the same as that which prevailed from the desert to the Red Sea and from Alexandria to Aswan. To them Arabi became an idol. He was one of themselves, and yet he had risen to an important position in the land of Egypt. Men's minds naturally turned to this new prophet, who offered them hopes of relief from

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the bondage of centuries, and encouraged them to rise up and resist as the fellah had never even dreamed of before.

For a time there was a lull in what Sir Edward Malet was at first pleased to term "military insubordination," but it was merely the lull before the storm. Reporting on the events, of the 1st February, the British Consul-General wrote to Lord Granville: "It may be said in its mitigation that, considering the general lax nature of discipline in the Egyptian army, an occurrence of the sort is not to be regarded as seriously as it would be elsewhere, and that the general character of the people, which is gentle and good-humoured, reduces the gravity of the incident to the rank of a school-boy outbreak." On the 9th September, 1881, Arabi's regiment was ordered to Alexandria, and the regiment of Abd-el-Al to Damietta. This provided an opportunity for a military demonstration, and led to the dramatic scene staged in the forecourt of Abdin Palace. Arabi, with 2,500 men and 18 guns, paraded before the Khedive's residence. Tewfik himself was at the Ismailia Palace, about a quarter of a mile away, when he received news of what had happened, but he lost no time in sending for Sir Auckland Colvin, the British Controller-General, and in proceeding with him to the scene of action. A competent eyewitness describes what happened as follows:

"It was a singular sight. Around three sides of the square stood Arabi's troops, themselves utterly indifferent to, and ignorant of, what was going on, chatting, laughing, rolling cigarettes, and eating pistachio nuts. 'These are not rebels,' said a British officer who happened to be present, and who had been through the Indian Mutiny. The fourth side, against the palace, was lined with the household troops, supposed to be loyal, but all alike were neither loyal nor disloyal; they were at that moment simply there, in obedience to different orders, interested and amused spectators. Inside this square were two groups: that to the south consisted of a group of officers on horseback, with Arabi at their head, his drawn sword in hand; that to the north of the Khedive, Sir Auckland Colvin, Sir Charles Cookson (the Acting British Consul-General), the Austrian Consul, Sir Frederic Goldsmid of the Daira, and a few more who had joined the group.

"As I watched and wondered what was to come next,

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what was to be the opening scene of this drama—for all that had preceded was simply the prologue—I could not help imagining how little would have hesitated two of Tewfik's predecessors. Not once but twenty times, his great-grandfather, Mehemet Ali, had found himself in such a position ; with him there would have been a quick summons, followed by, if not coincident with, the report of a pistol. Arabi would have rolled lifeless from his horse, a sharp ring of musketry would have ruthlessly scattered terror among soldiers and civilians alike—the incident would have been over. With Ismail, father of the hesitating Tewfik, I can see the bland smile, the winning courtesy with which he would have received the rebel, the *bonhomie* with which he would have listened to his complaints, promised redress, and taken him by the arm into his palace—from which he would never have returned. But Tewfik was incapable both of ferocity and treachery, or shall I say courage and diplomacy ; it was not on such occasions as these that he showed courage and presence of mind. 'What shall I do ?' he said to Sir Auckland, who had immediately acquired that ascendancy which a strong man can gain so rapidly over a weak one. Arabi, meanwhile, was slowly advancing on horseback. 'Tell him to dismount,' was the reply. '*Iniz il*' (dismount), called the Khedive, accompanying it with a gesture still showing a certain power of command. Without a word, almost with undignified haste, Arabi fell to his feet, but his sword was still drawn ; the Khedive pointed to it significantly, and Arabi stopped and sheathed it, but it was observed his hands trembled as he did so. At that moment the battle might have been won with a word ; Arabi, with plenty of moral courage, lacked the physical courage necessary to induce him to proceed to extremities. Face to face with the supreme monarch, uncertain of all but a few of his officers, and knowing how easily his impressionable soldiers could be influenced by a word from the 'Effendina,' he felt he had failed. He had expected to be able to address the Khedive from a distance, he had expected to find him in his palace, his soldiers well out of hearing of any words which their Effendina might address to them ; and, as he stood, pale and trembling, he seemed almost to be awaiting his sentence in the next word.

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"Alas that the man he faced was as little fit for prompt action as himself. Sir Auckland, indeed, saw the opportunity and would have seized it, but his was not the voice that could speak the word; it could only come with authority from one man. 'Demand his sword,' he whispered. Had it been done, there is not a doubt that it would have been obeyed. Could Tewfik have said it, handed the disarmed rebel to his Circassian guards and, mounting his horse, have called to the regiments to follow him through the town, Egyptian history would have been very different; but he cast a look at the glittering bayonets of the 4,000 men¹ on every side of him, and said, 'What can I do? We are between four fires.' Arabi saw the moment's hesitation; he drew himself up, a new man. 'Then Your Highness must go into the palace,' said Sir Auckland. The Khedive entered, and the game was lost."²

In the negotiations which followed Arabi had to deal with Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir Charles Cookson, who acted as intermediaries between him and the Khedive. The demands of Arabi were threefold: 1, that all the Ministers should be dismissed; 2, that a Parliament should be convoked; and 3, that the strength of the army should be raised to 18,000 men. The Khedive consented to the first of these demands, on the understanding that the other two should be referred to the Porte, and Arabi agreed to these terms, but it was not until after several hours of haggling that Chérif Pasha was nominated President of the Council and the troops withdrew to their respective barracks. At first Chérif was reluctant to form a Ministry under such conditions, but was eventually persuaded, to yield by the Chamber of Notables, who offered their personal guarantee that, if he consented, the army should engage to absolute submission to his orders. Subject to two conditions, one that Mahmoud Pasha Sami should be reinstated, and the other that the Military Law recommended by the Commission should be put into immediate execution, Arabi and his followers tendered their absolute submission to Chérif. To both demands the new Prime Minister was compelled to yield, but with regard to the second demand he reserved to himself

¹ This number does not agree with that given in the official dispatches.

² Moberly Bell, *op. cit.*

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the liberty of omitting the most important article, which proposed to raise the army to 18,000 men.

This last proposal led Lord Granville to write to Sir Edward Malet a long dispatch on the subject of the army, which duly reflects the misapprehensions underlying the policy of the British Government, and indeed shared by the Queen and Mr. Gladstone, who saw and approved this document. The Foreign Secretary proposed the adoption of "some well considered scheme, which, whilst reducing the number of officers in the standing army, would absorb some in an improved and well paid police force, would offer to others, who may be qualified for civil duties, employment in the various branches of the Public Service, and would grant to these, who may not otherwise be provided for on retirement, a liberal scale of pension." He then referred to "the conviction which Her Majesty's Government have acquired from various sources of information that the spirit of insubordination lately evinced is due solely to the influence of the officers, and the men, instead of opposing to the constituted authorities, would if they followed only their own inclinations prefer to return to their homes rather than be made the instrument in a movement from which their officers alone and not they themselves could hope to derive any personal benefit."

This memorable demonstration at Abdin Palace on the 9th September, 1881, has been the subject of much controversy. Some writers maintain that Tewfik stage-managed the whole affair in order to free himself of Riaz and consular control; others say that the Sultan was intriguing with Arabi for his own purposes. But, whatever intrigues may have been wrapped up in these events, there is little doubt that Arabi demanded at Abdin the charter of Egypt's liberties. Although the demonstration was essentially military in character, it was the nation, with Arabi as its mouthpiece, demanding from Tewfik the Magna Charta of Egypt, just as the barons of England demanded theirs from King John at Runnymede. This was the third occasion when the army asserted itself and gained its point, and the effect of this on the country may well be imagined. Arabi's name became a household word throughout Egypt, he was acclaimed as a national hero, and it was recognized that his efforts were made, not only in

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the interests of the Egyptian officers but on behalf of the Egyptian people. Yet Arabi's motives cannot be regarded as wholly impersonal, and there is reason to suppose that fear played an important part in the development of his policy. His success had been strangely rapid and, although his position was strengthened daily and his success gained him a sort of blind confidence among the people, yet his fear and want of foresight led him to act unwisely. He knew what he wanted in a vague sort of way, but he had no knowledge of how best to achieve his object. His success merely carried him out of his depth and he fell victim to praise and flattery. But that was not his fault. He acted with an honest purpose, and where he acted unwisely he did so through dense ignorance. That his true motives were misunderstood and that the national aspect of his movement were not realized by the British Government is evident from the dispatches of that time. Sir Auckland Colvin wrote as follows :

There seems to me no reason to believe that anyone but the officers themselves are concerned in the movement. I do not think that any outsiders are deliberately engaged in a political intrigue, though there may have been sympathy and encouragement from persons opposed to the late Ministry. It was a purely military demonstration, the work of men who think they hold the country in their own hands.

I do not believe there is anyone in the country (who is at all likely to accept office) capable of influencing the ringleaders. It is hopeless to appeal to their self-interest. Nothing so much impressed me yesterday as the profound unconsciousness on the part of all the officers of the immense danger to themselves which they are incurring. They spoke like men convinced that they would be allowed to settle their own disputes with the Government, that Europe had neither the right nor the wish to interfere. This makes it impossible to work on the instinct of self-preservation. They are blinded to the consequences of their acts. They believe they are engaged in working out the liberties of their country ; and that the method they have adopted is justified by the circumstances in which the country is placed.

Chérif Pasha, therefore, whether as Minister or mediator, will, I fear, be powerless to influence them for good. They may set up one or more other leaders, but I think they will not be undeceived except by their imminence of danger and the certainty of forcible opposition.

It seemed to me also evident that the more moderate among them are already losing weight. They were divided yesterday among themselves, the more violent having a hard struggle for the mastery.

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The movement at present seems to me more likely to gather force than to spend itself.

There seems no animus at present against Europeans; but if the officers are left to themselves owing to no man of weight and position being willing to take office, as disorder and dissension increase, I think it probable that some feeling against Europeans may show itself. Their failure to procure leaders will be attributed to local European influence; and should they learn that chastisement is about to fall upon them, they may connect it with Europe. I am not, however, uneasy on this score. The chief danger seems to me at present to be the risk of anarchy in the town population, owing the absence of any legal and recognized control, should the country remain in the hands of the army, and especially should dissension arise among the officers themselves. Also, the fear of reprisals may drive the officers, at any moment, to some impulsive measure which may compromise internal peace.

Finally, in spite of all that has occurred, I do not think the officers are evilly disposed. They are children, and they do not see the gravity of what they are doing. Also, they are Orientals, unaccustomed to the severe ideas of Europe or military discipline. They are smarting under a strong sense of injustice and the oppression which their relatives and friends suffered in the days of Ismail Pasha. If a bridge of retreat could be made for them, which at the same time secured the Viceroy from a recurrence of violence, I would not by any means advocate recourse to extreme measures. The negotiations in which Chérif Pasha is now engaged with them *may* give some such opening, if the officers should become alarmed at what they have done on hearing from him and on all sides how much it is disapproved, and on finding that no man of character will consent to put himself at the head of the Government.

(Signed) A. COLVIN.

Sept. 10th, 1881.

A few days later Sir Charles Cookson, Acting Consul-General, forwarded to the Foreign Office a dispatch in the following terms:

Cairo.

12th Sept. 1881.

The Earl of Granville, K.G.

MY LORD,

... 1. As to the real origin of this military movement, I agree with Mr. Colvin that it sprang from the Arab officers themselves who, previous to the 1st February, felt themselves injured by the almost exclusive command given to Turks and Circassians. Since then, they have been influenced chiefly by fear of vengeance being taken on them for what they did on that day; and they unfortunately have never trusted the assurances either of the Khedive or of Riaz Pasha. But, in order to secure themselves, there is reason to believe that they have been in correspondence with other parties

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both in Egypt and elsewhere, who have suggested to the more intelligent among them, and especially to Arabi Bey, to make use of the power of which they find themselves in possession to secure other objects—the chief of which is the limitation of the absolute power of the Khedive by something like a representative assembly. Whether some of their most trusted allies are not to be found in Constantinople is doubtful. The confidence they express in their impunity, if Turkish troops are landed, would seem to render it very probable that they have been buoyed up by information, possibly given with every intention of deceiving them, received from Constantinople, of a favourable view of their conduct being entertained at the Porte itself. At the same time, there are no doubt many others who have encouraged them merely from disaffection to the present system of Anglo-French Control, and with the specific intention to overthrow the Riaz Cabinet.

2. The manner in which they have shown their confidence in Chérif Pasha proves strongly that they desire above all things to have a guarantee of safety from someone in whom they have faith. Fortunately, in all the events of a long political career the name of Chérif Pasha has never been tainted with the least suspicion of disloyalty or intrigue, and when Orientals find such a man, his very rarity secures him in their almost unlimited confidence. I therefore hope that he may be able to convince them of the utter ruin which will befall them, their families, their comrades, and their country, if they do not retreat from the perilous position they have assumed.

3. I agree with Mr. Colvin that Arabi Bey, at any rate, is not without even some high motives by which he justifies to himself his conduct. He is a visionary, and respect for his high personal character is one of the greatest holds which he has in the allegiance of his followers. It is, therefore, most necessary not to force him either to despair or to betray his comrades. In either case the more violent and ignorant officers will overpower him, and probably the almost regular succession of revolutionary events will lead to anarchy with all its consequences.

4. As to the danger of an attack on Europeans. Mr. Colvin's remarks are, I believe, quite correct and it would be useless for me to add more than this—that, seeking earnestly not to exaggerate the dangers of the position, I feel bound to warn Your Lordship that, in my opinion, the embarkation of European troops might provoke a most terrible catastrophe. Arabi Bey has, I hear on good authority, declared that, if this event occurs, he will not be answerable for the safety of foreigners; and he spoke of his being able to raise a force of 1,000,000 Moslems with the aid of the Beduins, who had already promised their assistance to resist a foreign invasion like that of Tunis. It is humiliating to think that his is the only protection in which we can for the moment trust. If circumstances cause him to be replaced by another less scrupulous leader, any guarantee given for the public safety will of course be of less value.

(Signed) CHAS. A. COOKSON.

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It was now realized by the Khedive that he had two parties with which to deal : a discontented army, whose leaders were in daily fear of punishment for their past deeds, and a constitutional party with but vague glimmerings of what constitutional government really implied. Both parties were distasteful to Tewfik, while the Constitutionalists were definitely opposed to a military dictatorship. Moreover, there was always the danger of the civilian National Party, supported by the Notables, using the army as a means of attaining their political aims ; and there was reason to believe that the Notables were influenced more by personal motives than by any sense of national patriotism. It, therefore, seemed advisable to maintain separation between the two parties, on the grounds that there was a radical difference between them. This, I maintain, is where a great mistake was made. It was through the army that Egyptian nationalism was expressed, and the army was the power of the moment. It should, therefore, have been recognized as such, and accepted as a concrete expression of national aspirations, of which the Constitutionalists were only another example. Arabi was the man of the hour in Egypt. If Tewfik, supported by the Powers, had received him as the representative of the people and had showed a genuine desire to guide the new movement, in spite of its irregular inauguration, I feel sure that the Khedive would have been acclaimed in the streets of Cairo. Resentment, fear and bitterness would have ceased to stimulate Arabi and his followers to greater extremes, and a suitable atmosphere would have been created for the beginnings of constitutional government in easy stages. I do not for one moment think that such a government would have been satisfactory—indeed it would have been rather the reverse—but by an attempt to attract the extreme nationalist elements to his side and by making himself a rallying point of political movement, I feel that the Khedive might have prevented the more moderate Egyptians from joining forces with Arabi against him later on. Such a policy would have been a bold move, but it would have strengthened Tewfik's position even if it failed. Tewfik, however, was not the man to carry it out, and the Consuls-General clung tenaciously to their view that they were merely dealing with a military mutiny, although



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even the Sultan remarked to Sir Edward Malet, in an audience given at Constantinople, that "the fall of Ministries before the popular expression of the feeling of the country was not an unusual event, and that in this case that popular feeling had apparently found its mouthpiece in the army." It must, of course, be admitted that the Powers used such influence as they thought best at the time, and the difficulties of judging the situation must have been great indeed, but looking back on this glorious muddle of forty-six years ago it seems that the course adopted was not calculated to yield satisfactory results in years to follow. No monarch can afford to oppose the will of the people fully expressed in a national movement, and this is precisely what Tewfik did with European support. The consequences were inevitable. The more extreme elements became masters of the situation, carried the moderates with them, and directed their antagonism against European influence as well as against their own ruler.

Meanwhile, the Sultan saw an opportunity for asserting his authority and strengthening Turkish influence in Egypt. Arabi had written to Constantinople stating that Egypt was falling into the hands of Christians and foreigners, and urging Turkish intervention. While it was not considered desirable to suppress Arabi altogether, it was entirely contrary to Turkish policy to introduce constitutional government into any part of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan's first idea was to occupy the country with Turkish troops, but this proposal met with strong opposition from the French Government, and the British Government lent their support to France. Lengthy negotiations—all negotiations with the Porte are lengthy—resulted in a compromise by which two Turkish envoys were dispatched to Egypt with no particular function to perform, but rather to represent the Sultan's acknowledged right to interfere in the country which recognized him as its suzerain. Everyone recognized that the Sultan had a technical right to interfere, some regarded his interference as the least of necessary evils, while others were anxious to exploit Turkish rights in order to further their own interests. Meanwhile, the British and French Governments, fearing disturbances, sent warships to Alexandria.

The visit of the envoys had no practical result and only

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led Arabi superficially to transfer his antagonism from Turco-Circassian power to European influence, and to endow the movement under his leadership with some pretence of Mohammedan fanaticism. The chief trouble in connection with the envoys was to discover a suitable means by which to get rid of them, and a considerable amount of diplomatic skirmishing took place over the method of their departure and that of the British ships. But in this episode there was involved an important principle as to who, as a last resort, was to be responsible for the maintenance of order in Egypt. The British Government favoured Turkish intervention, while the French Government, with an eye to their newly acquired possessions in Tunis, raised strong opposition to any such proposal. Yet there was an honest desire on the part of both Governments to act in unison, and this further complicated a situation which came to a crisis just prior to the British occupation of the country.

The task before Chérif Pasha was no easy one. He believed in the desirability of separating the National Party from the army, and he declared "his intention later on to convoke the Chamber of Notables, which he hoped would by degrees become the legitimate exponent of the internal wants of the country, and by this means deprive the army of the character it had arrogated to itself in the late movement. . . . The Notables would be a representative body on which the Khedive and his government would be able to lean for popular support against military dictation." Sir Auckland Colvin, who supported Chérif Pasha, reported at the time that he did not think that it was at all his duty to oppose himself to the popular movement, but to try rather to guide and to give it definite shape. But his conception of the popular movement was that represented by the Chamber of Notables, in other words, the selfish interests of a council of Sheikhs, who were every bit as efficient in the oppression of the fellahin as the Turco-Circassians against whom the real popular movement was directed. Meanwhile the civil population were being excited by the local Arabic press, which referred to Great Britain and France as watching for a favourable opportunity to realize their own designs hidden under a deceptive policy. By this time the civil population was becoming distinctly agitated,

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and the movement which originated in the army was rapidly gaining the support of large numbers of Egyptians, who recognized the justification of the officers' complaints, which were similar to those of the great mass of the people in the country. The Khedive had lost all authority, and was trying to regain it in vain. Arabi had the army behind him and was in fact the real ruler of Egypt. In January, 1882, he was appointed Under Secretary of State for War, on the principle that he was safer inside the Government than out of it—a step in a policy which might well have been adopted at an earlier stage—but by this time the Governments of Great Britain and France had decided on a move which was calculated to change the direction of Egyptian hostility to the powers who were trying to preserve peace in Egypt.

On December 15th M. Gambetta told Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador in Paris, that "he considered it to be extremely important to strengthen the authority of Tewfik Pasha. . . . Any interposition on the part of the Porte, M. Gambetta declared emphatically to be, in his opinion, wholly inadmissible. . . . He thought the time was come when the two Governments should consider the matter in common, in order to be prepared for united and immediate action in case of need." The result of the negotiations which followed found expression in a Joint Note, presented to the Khedive by the British and French Governments on the 8th of January, 1882. It was forwarded to the Consuls-General in the following terms :

"You have already been instructed on several occasions to inform the Khedive and his Government of the determination of England and France to afford them support against the difficulties of various kinds which might interfere with the course of public affairs in Egypt. The two Powers are entirely agreed on this subject, and recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive, have given them the opportunity for a further exchange of views. I have accordingly to instruct you to declare to the Khedive that the English and French Governments consider the maintenance of His Highness on the throne, on the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognized by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee,

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for the present and future, the good order and development of general prosperity in Egypt, in which France and Great Britain are equally interested. The two Governments being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their formal intentions in this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them. They are convinced that His Highness will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and his people."

This draft was approved by the British Government, with the reservation "that they must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary."

As the presentation of this diplomatic document had far-reaching effects on developments in Egypt, it is as well to summarize the situation at the time of this ill-advised *démarche*. Partly guided by previous dispatches from Cairo and partly by other influences, the British Government were convinced that the Egyptian movement was wholly military and, therefore, undeserving of sympathy. Even as late as July, 1882, Mr. Gladstone, speaking in the House of Commons, made this astonishing statement: "There have been periods in this history at which it has been charitably believed, even in this country, that the military party was the popular party, and was struggling for the liberties of Egypt. There is not the smallest rag or shred of evidence to support that contention." But before the presentation of the Note, the Foreign Office had received a dispatch from Sir Auckland Colvin, clearly showing that he had modified his views regarding the nature of the movement. He had warned the British Government that "the movement, though in its origin anti-Turk, was in itself an Egyptian national movement and should in no wise be discouraged." Sir Edward Malet, moreover, had supported the Controller-General in this view, and had deprecated any steps likely to be construed as hostile to the

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national movement. Even Chérif Pasha, himself one of the ruling caste, recognized the significance of what was taking place, and favoured encouragement of the national elements, hidden as they were behind a *façade* of military insubordination. But these words of wisdom fell on deaf ears in Downing Street. Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, failed to appreciate the probable consequences of this action, he misjudged the objects of French policy, and he did not realize that Gambetta's interpretation of the British reservation was not in accordance with his own intentions. France regarded co-operation with Great Britain as a necessary evil, and all the time wanted to increase her power in Egypt; Great Britain, on the other hand, wanted to avoid Egyptian commitments, and favoured Turkish intervention in case of need. The Note was undoubtedly put forward by M. Gambetta with the twofold object of strengthening the French position in Egypt and of supporting the French bondholders, while Lord Granville saw in it a means of consolidating the position of the Khedive and his Government against military opposition. With the idea of Turkish intervention in the back of his mind, he probably saw an opportunity of exerting moral pressure in the hope of eliminating the necessity of having to resort to any more extreme measures. But, although Lord Granville's blunder was a grave one, and produced the exact opposite of what was intended, I am convinced that this step was taken in all sincerity and was not actuated by the ulterior motives suggested by a certain irresponsible writer, who has tried to disgrace his own countrymen in the eyes of the Egyptians.

Before the presentation of the Note, the National Party under Chérif, supported by Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin, was endeavouring to provide a barrier between the National Party, which comprised the more moderate elements of the movement, and the Arabist extremists, who were "straining at the leash." The two parties were in competition with one another, and as such showed a comparatively harmless front. Some effort had been made to recognize national aspirations, although it possessed few of the qualities of success. But this effort was doomed to failure. The effect of the Joint Note was instantaneous. The National

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Party threw in its lot with the extremists, and Arabi's combined forces now directed their hostility against Great Britain and France. Foreign interference was now inevitable.

Mr. John (afterwards Lord) Morley, writing in July, 1882, summarized the effects of the Joint Note as follows: "At Cairo the Note fell like a bombshell. Nobody had expected such a declaration, and nobody there was aware of any reason why it should have been launched. What was felt was that so serious a step on such delicate ground could not have been taken without deliberate calculation nor without some grave intention. The Note was, therefore, taken to mean that the Sultan was to be thrust still farther in the background; that the Khedive was to become more plainly the puppet of England and France; and that Egypt would, sooner or later, in some shape or other, be made to share the disastrous fate of Tunis. The general effect was, therefore, mischievous in the highest degree. The Khedive was encouraged in his opposition to the sentiments of the Chamber. The military, national, and popular party was alarmed. The Sultan was irritated. The other European Powers were made uneasy. Every element of disturbance was roused into activity."¹

But perhaps the most immediate effect was to produce a crisis in the question of the Budget. The Egyptian Budget was at that time divided into two parts, one dealing with the revenues assigned to the payment of the interest on the Debt, and the other with the remainder of the revenues, which were left at the disposal of the Government. The Chamber of Notables claimed the right to vote the second part of the Budget, and this was opposed by Chérif Pasha and the Controllers, on the grounds that by this means they would lose control over the finances of the country. The Chamber protested that the right to vote the Budget was not one for discussion with foreign Powers, and they demanded a change of Ministry, with Mahmoud Pasha Sami as President of the Council and Arabi himself as Minister of War. As the Khedive had no means of resistance, he was forced to yield, and the New Ministry was composed of members of the National and Arabist parties, which were now in fact one and the same body. Arabi was now rapidly rising to the zenith of his power,

¹ *Fortnightly Review*, July, 1882.

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he was receiving support from the Sultan, and he had an energetic band of sympathizers in England.

Chief among Arabi's supporters in this country was a certain Mr. Wilfred Blunt—one of those individuals who seem to take a delight in utilizing their ability in the service of any country but their own. In England these people are allowed to carry out their designs with impunity. Abroad they are usually put out of harm's way. Not only did Mr. Blunt openly support Arabi and his followers in their demands, but he tried to create in England the impression that these Egyptian nationalists were of a calibre very much superior to what they were in actual fact. Mr. Blunt was one of those idealists who are capable of doing incalculable mischief in Oriental countries by means which in Europe are merely regarded as the "exhaust" from a rather unbalanced mind. If his efforts on behalf of Arabi later on, at the time of his trial, were justified—and I think they were—there is little doubt that his general attitude on the Egyptian situation proved in the long run to be contrary to the interests of those whom he wished to help. In his writings Mr. Blunt is celebrated for his false deductions; for the almost childish prejudice with which he has championed Arabi as the poor, ill-used patriot, and for the determined way in which he has accused Mr. Gladstone and the British Government of indifference and even of premeditated evil. Arabi was not evil by nature, although he had grave faults owing to the circumstances in which his lot was cast; but he was not the "woolly lamb" that Mr. Blunt would have us believe. When he had risen to power and had set Europe at naught, he might well have set to work to fulfil the object which he claimed for his movement. But the very first item on his programme was to work off his hatred of Circassians by inflicting torture on his enemies. His substitute for a mind could see no further than the self-satisfying prospect of doing Osman Rifki to death; and Arabi sought every foul device for obtaining the necessary evidence.

Great dissatisfaction had been aroused among the Turco-Circassian officers who had been passed over for promotion by their Egyptian colleagues, and Arabi feared their resentment. He, therefore, devised a means by which he succeeded

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in trying Osman Pasha Rifki and forty others by court martial and in getting them sentenced to exile for life to the Sudan. He imagined the existence of a Circassian plot to murder himself and others, and resorted to the most barbarous methods to secure the condemnation of the accused. Osman Rifki, however, was a Turkish general, and his rank was conferred on the authority of the Sultan himself. The Khedive, therefore, referred the matter to the Porte, and the Ministers became openly defiant, declaring that "if the Porte should send an order to cancel the sentence of the court martial on the Circassian prisoners, the order would not be obeyed, and that if the Porte sent Commissioners, they would not be allowed to land, but would be repulsed by force, if necessary." At this juncture M. de Freycinet, who had succeeded M. Gambetta, put forward the view that the Khedive should take action in this matter without waiting for the decision of the Porte, and he was supported by Lord Granville. The Khedive acted on this advice by commuting the sentence of the court-martial on the forty officers to exile from Egypt only, but in doing so he incurred the hostility of his Ministers and the President of the Council tendered his resignation.

Meanwhile, the situation in the provinces was becoming out of hand. The Mudirs were losing their authority, brigandage was becoming general, the banks were refusing to grant substantial loans, usurers were demanding as much as six per cent. for small advances, and there was a slump in the value of land. The attitude of the troops was becoming a danger to life and property, there was great uneasiness in the towns, and people were beginning to leave Cairo. The army leaders declined to accept any responsibility for law and order in the event of a change of Ministry, so the Khedive, unable to move in any other direction, reinstated the Ministry that had just resigned. As there were now grave fears of an anti-European outburst, it was decided to send an Anglo-French squadron to Alexandria, to give moral support to the Joint Note and to safeguard British and French interests in the event of disturbances. This moment was considered opportune "to advise the Khedive to take advantage of a favourable moment such, for instance, as the arrival of the fleets, to dismiss the present Ministry and to form a new Cabinet under Chéri

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Pasha or any other person inspiring the same confidence," and instructions to this effect were sent to the Consuls-General. Sir Edward Malet replied that "until the supremacy of the military party is broken, the Khedive is powerless to form a new Ministry," and he, therefore, suggested negotiating with Arabi and his three chief supporters with a view to persuading them to leave the country. This move produced no result, as Arabi steadfastly refused to consider the proposal. The Council of Ministers, moreover, was indignant, and declared that it did not admit the right of Great Britain and France to interfere, the only authority they recognized being that of the Sultan himself.

By this time French opposition to an appeal to the authority of the Sultan was beginning to bear fruit. The policies of the two Western Powers were being regarded with grave suspicion, and this helped to unite the civil and military elements, which had lately been somewhat at variance, while French jealousy of Turkish intervention strengthened the peculiar *liaison* between Arabi and the Sultan. The situation was going from bad to worse, military preparations were being hurried on, and anti-European fanaticism was being systematically encouraged. All this was the result of a strong belief on the part of the Ministers and people that the European Powers were only bluffing, and that French opposition precluded any action on the part of Turkey. The Joint Note they regarded as a mere diplomatic "geste," and in this they received every encouragement from Mr. Blunt in England. In fact, they held the opinion that they had only to continue their present tactics long enough to dissipate all opposition.

Although it seemed to those on the spot more and more necessary that Arabi should be removed, Sir Edward Malet was naturally reluctant to act without sufficient power behind him. On the 24th May, therefore, Lord Granville proposed to M. de Freycinet through Lord Lyons, British Ambassador in Paris, that "the two Governments should telegraph a circular to the Powers, requesting them to join in asking the Sultan to have troops ready to send to Egypt under strict conditions," and this led to the Consuls-General being empowered to take such action as they considered possible to ensure the withdrawal from Egypt of Arabi and his chief

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supporters. On the arrival of these instructions in Cairo, wild rumours were afloat which were likely to endanger the lives of foreigners, unless some official declaration was made to clear up the situation. An official note was, therefore, handed to the President of the Council, containing the following demands: (1) The temporary retirement from Egypt of Arabi Pasha, with the maintenance of his rank and pay. (2) The retirement into the interior of Egypt of Ali Pasha Fehmi and Abd-el-Al Pasha, who will also retain their rank and pay. (3) The resignation of the present Ministry. The Ministry resigned and addressed a letter to the Khedive, accusing him of accepting the conditions proposed by the European Powers and of agreeing to foreign intervention. Tewfik replied that, in accepting the Ministry's resignation, he was bowing to the will of the nation, but otherwise it was a matter between him and the Sultan. For a short time there was some reason for optimism, but it was found impossible to form another Ministry as long as the military leaders remained in the country, and the Khedive was threatened with his life if he did not reinstate Arabi. Tewfik favoured an appeal to the Sultan for the dispatch of a Special Commissioner, but his position was exceedingly difficult. The religious heads, Moslem, Christian and Jewish, all threatened with death if they failed in their Mission, implored the Khedive to yield, and this he finally did, not through any fear of his own life but rather to safeguard that of others. Arabi was, therefore, reinstated, and the Khedive requested the Sultan to send a Special Commissioner to Egypt.

Arabi was now fast losing his head. He had some vague, visionary dream that he was destined to deliver Egypt from the foreigner. Fear and flattery combined to drive him to extreme and foolish actions; and his dull brain failed to grasp the faintest glimmerings of reality. He lived in the clouds, in words he was an artist, but he knew not how to act. Yet in purpose I believe that he was perfectly honest and sincere. The military party now dominated Egypt, and Sir Beauchamp Seymour, the British admiral, reported that Alexandria was in the hands of Arabi's men. The position of the Khedive was becoming quite impossible, and it was evident that either help must come from abroad very soon or

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he must put himself entirely in the hands of the army. Indeed, the necessity for action had become so urgent that Lord Granville, without even consulting Paris, telegraphed to Lord Dufferin at Constantinople and to the British Ambassadors at the other European courts that "Her Majesty's Government considered it most desirable that no time should be lost by the Sultan, who should send an order to support the Khedive, to reject the accusation of the fallen Ministry with regard to His Highness, and to order the three military chiefs, and perhaps also the ex-President of the Council, to come and explain their conduct at Constantinople." M. de Freycinet agreed to this course, but he did so with reluctance.

By the end of May, 1882, all attempts to liberate the Khedive from the domination of the military party had definitely failed, while the presentation of the Joint Note had only made matters worse. Arabi's political victories came in rapid succession, but his success was due to the blunders of others. France had proved to be a stumbling block and had seriously contributed to a situation in which Great Britain and France were suspected on all sides: by the Sultan, who had been cast in the shade in a matter concerning his own dominions; by the other Powers, who considered that their interests were being neglected; by the Egyptians, who suspected a premeditated attempt to seize their country; and by the Khedive, who was quite unfit to rule by himself and thought that he had been duped by the Powers on whom he had depended for support. The situation had been misjudged from the outset, and no re-orientation of ideas had been able to undo the damage already done. Bare and ugly facts had to be faced. The people of Egypt were becoming panic-stricken, the army was plotting to depose the Khedive, and the whole country was paralysed. Arabi ruled supreme, and nothing but force would shift him. It was into this whirlpool that the Sultan, after much vacillation, finally sent two envoys, not to carry out the mission which the Powers intended, but in order to further the Sultan's interests *vis-à-vis* Great Britain and France. The visit of Dervish Pasha and Essad Effendi was a complete farce. Each Commissioner had his own secret instructions and they were fundamentally different.

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Dervish had orders, if necessary, to arrest Arabi and his chief supporters and to pack them off to Constantinople, to abolish the Chamber of Notables, to curtail the powers of the Khedive in favour of those of the Sultan, and as a last resort to request the dispatch of Turkish troops. Essad, on the other hand, had instructions to thank the Notables of Egypt for their loyalty, and to give assurances that the Sultan had no intention of curtailing the powers of the Khedive granted by the Imperial Firmans. The idea of armed Turkish intervention was to be described as a pure fabrication, as pernicious as it was malevolent. The Sultan, in fact, wanted to increase his influence by assuming the rôle of the defender of Egypt against European aggression. Dervish was a fire-eating Turkish Pasha, with a most unsavoury reputation for cruelty and unscrupulous dealing, while Essad was a religious Sheikh employed by the Sultan for secret missions to his Arabic-speaking subjects. The Commission was acclaimed in Alexandria by members of a paid mob, who for three Egyptian piastres shouted the praises of Arabi and hurled invectives against all Christians. Dervish first showed partiality to the army, and then tried to ingratiate himself with the Khedive. Turkish decorations were lavishly bestowed on both parties, Arabi himself receiving the Grand Cordon of the Medjidieh, while Dervish grew fat with "baksheesh." On the 7th July, the Khedive telegraphed that the Egyptian Ministry disapproved of the arrival of the Turkish yacht *Yesme*, which had that morning brought two aides-de-camp of the Sultan, with two boxes containing 250 decorations of all classes; and that the British and French Governments should ask the Sultan to recall Dervish Pasha, who continued to intrigue.

Meanwhile Mahmoud Sami, a master of intrigue and in this direction quite the ablest member of the Ministry, had arranged that Dervish should receive the Ministers. "Mahmoud Sami entered with effusion, and introduced his colleagues severally. Dervish remained seated, continued his conversation with his secretary, and then made a casual remark to Sami on the beautiful situation of the palace of Gezira. The Ministers looked dumbfounded, but Dervish, continuing his conversation with Lebib Effendi, begged the latter to

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repeat him the story of the massacre of the Mamelukes by Mehemet Ali at the citadel, which he could see from the window at which he sat. When the suggestive story was completed, the Envoy, with one of his pleasantest smiles, remarked to Arabi, 'The one man who escaped was a lucky dog!' and, with a remark on the weather, dismissed them."¹ As the Ministers left, they must have felt their position to be almost desperate. They seemed faced with the prospect either of making their complete submission to the Khedive, or of openly defying the Sultan. But Mahmoud Sami's bright intellect saw a way out. Dervish must be compelled to ask Arabi's assistance. And so it happened that the explosive condition of the populace of Alexandria was used for political ends. On the 11th June, serious rioting broke out in that city, about fifty Europeans were butchered in cold blood, and many others, including Sir Charles Cookson, were wounded. The news of this catastrophe reached Dervish just after Arabi had refused submission, and the Turkish envoy was compelled to admit that Arabi was the only man in Egypt who could restore order. The riot had been encouraged to bring about this very situation, and provided Arabi with a golden opportunity to prove his power and authority. Dervish Pasha was now powerless, and his mission had definitely failed. In a secret report to the Turkish Prime Minister, Dervish Pasha described his abortive attempts to get Arabi off to Constantinople. The following extract shows the means which he employed:

All the devices to which I resorted, in order to induce Arabi to proceed to Constantinople, were fruitless. Even on the arrival of his decoration, when we pointed out to him that it was his duty to go to Constantinople to thank His Majesty for his kindness, he argued that, owing to the crisis through which the country was passing and the aggressive designs of Great Britain, he could go nowhere; but that he would express his thanks and apologies by telegram. Later, after the events in Alexandria, I gave secret orders to the captain of the vessel *Izzeddin*, which was in the port, to hold himself in readiness and, as soon as Arabi set foot on board, to raise the anchor and take him to Constantinople. On the following day I went to see Arabi and, adopting a friendly attitude, turned the conversation to the subject of the *Izzeddin*, and suggested that it would be nice to visit the Egyptian ships in port as well as the

¹ Mr. Moberly Bell, *op. cit.*

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vessel in question. Arabi's ironical reply was to the effect that he was a soldier and had no business on board ships, and that we would be much better employed in minding our own business than wasting time visiting these vessels.

The 11th June was the turning point in Arabi's career. The people of Alexandria looked to him as their only protector, and his troops had to be called upon to quell the disturbances. Arabi restored order and, in doing so, achieved what no other man in Egypt could have done. He had the situation in the palm of his hand, and had he been a man of action instead of a dreamy idealist, he would have won the diplomatic game right out. He would have been in a position to appeal to Europe and to the Sultan with the words of a strong man, and I do not believe that even England would have stood out against him. But Arabi knew nothing of Europe and his only strength lay in his tongue and a certain obstinacy for the achievement of his ideals. He was incapable of rising to the occasion, and the opportunity was gone. Henceforth the Europeans in Alexandria, influenced by the British Residency, which now recognized armed intervention as unavoidable, lost their confidence in Arabi and looked to the British Fleet. Already 14,000 Christians had left the country, and some 6,000 more were eagerly awaiting the arrival of ships to take them away. Even Turkish and Arab families were packing up. Rumours of a European massacre in Cairo were spread abroad, and for ten days the railway station was filled with refugees, while special trains were running to the full capacity of the line and rolling stock. Egypt was waiting in suspense for the first British gun to speak. Arabi had shot his bolt.

I cannot leave this question of the Alexandria riots without reference to the alleged complicity of the Khedive, and even of the British Consul-General and Controller. Mr. Blunt tries to establish a case against the Khedive, on the grounds that he engineered the riots to discredit Arabi in the eyes of the people, and that he collaborated with Omar Pasha Lutfi, the Governor of Alexandria, towards this end. His evidence, however, is weak, and the considered opinions of greater than he have definitely relieved Tewfik of all blame. Yet I am not quite convinced that some agent of Tewfik's

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had not some hand in the matter. The Khedive wanted badly to get rid of Arabi, and it is more than likely that some attempt was made at this juncture. But, even if this were the case, I think that Mahmoud Sami was the man who actually controlled the situation, and that he did so in the interests of his leader. Mr. Blunt also makes insinuations calculated to damage the reputations of Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin, alleging that they were both determined on armed intervention and were using every means in their power to bring it about. I do not think it is necessary to refute such ill-considered accusations, but one can well imagine that by this time the British Agents in Egypt realized that some such action on our part had become necessary, and that delay could merely aggravate the situation. But to say that these two British officials of proved integrity were "getting him (Arabi) to preserve order, while they were preparing the bombardment," is to cast a serious slur on the political honesty of Mr. Blunt's own countrymen—a quality for which British civil servants have ever been renowned in Egypt and in every other country.

CHAPTER IV

THE POWERS AND EGYPT

BRITISH policy in Egypt was well expressed in a letter written by Lord Palmerston in 1857, when the Emperor Napoleon III proposed the partition of North Africa. "We do not want to have Egypt," he wrote; "what we wish about Egypt is that it should continue to be attached to the Turkish Empire, which is a security against its belonging to any European Power. We want to trade with Egypt, and to travel through Egypt, but we do not want the burthen of governing Egypt. . . . Let us try to improve all those countries by the general influence of our commerce, but let us abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call down upon us the condemnation of all other civilized nations." Circumstances had, however, changed since these lines were written and, although the general policy indicated still held good, the method of carrying it out could no longer remain the same.

The internal affairs of Egypt could no longer be ignored, as France had great financial interests in the country, and the financial situation was such that France was likely to act alone if Great Britain adopted a policy of non-interference.

French policy, on the other hand, was the counterpart of British policy. France felt that she could not act alone without incurring the hostility of Great Britain, but she regarded the exclusive action of the British Government much in the same light as we would have viewed exclusive action on the part of France. France's traditional policy in North Africa was hostile to the claims of the Porte in these countries, and the French Government feared that the Islamic influences at

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work in Egypt would have repercussions in the newly acquired French territories of Algeria and Tunisia. Yet it was in the interests of both Great Britain and France that peace should be maintained in Europe, and that Egypt should not become a serious bone of contention between them. In fact both Governments took the view that the surest way of avoiding trouble was to co-operate in Egypt, and by this means to check the abuses which threatened to make further interference necessary. By so doing they hoped to confine the Egyptian Question to the banks of the Nile.

But there were, of course, fundamental principles on which Great Britain and France must always differ. In the case of Egypt, the British Government was sympathetic to the cause of the fellahin. France was chiefly concerned with the interests of her own bondholders. But, in spite of such divergence of views as are the result of racial, religious and other influences, the harmony which animated Anglo-French co-operation in Egypt was well maintained. Not only in London and Paris was there a genuine desire on both sides to work well together, but in Cairo also the representatives of the two Great Powers showed that largeness of view which is the essence of all international understanding. The difficulties of the British Government were great. Communications with India had to be considered, yet there was a strong desire not to add the burden of governing Egypt to Great Britain's already numerous commitments. Egypt was in a deplorable state, and could not be permitted to flounder in the morass. French diplomacy strove to prevent Britain from becoming the master of Egypt, on the assumption that this was the British intention, and at the same time France regarded an Anglo-French occupation of the country as a sure method of producing antipathy between the two Powers. Italy looked on with a vague idea of satisfying her ambitions, but without any definite policy to follow ; Russia thought she saw opportunities in the downfall of a Moslem Government to pursue her Turkish policy elsewhere ; and Germany was not unfriendly to Anglo-French efforts, if they were likely to further the interests of German and Austrian creditors.

Towards the end of 1881, Lord Granville defined British policy in Egypt in a dispatch sent to Sir Edward Malet for

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transmission to the Egyptian Government. As this document was in the form of an official declaration, approved by Queen Victoria and by Mr. Gladstone, I think it as well to give its text in full :

Foreign Office.
4th Nov. 1881.

Sir E. Malet.

SIR,

I gather from the dispatches which I have received from you since your return to Egypt that much misapprehension exists in the minds of the great mass of the population with regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egyptian affairs, and I desire by a clear exposition of our views and objects to obviate the misunderstandings and dangers to which this misapprehension is not unlikely to give rise.

The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan concluding with the Firman of 1879. In our belief the prosperity of Egypt, like that of every country, depends upon the progress and well-being of the people. We have therefore upon all occasions pressed upon the Government of the Khedive the adoption of such measures as we deemed likely to raise the people from a state of subjection and oppression to one of ease and security.

The spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of the land tax on a regular and equitable basis, the diminution of forced labour, have all received our advocacy and support, and have been accomplished through the action of the English and French Controllers-General.

One measure of reform among others remains to be accomplished, which we consider to be even more necessary than those above enumerated—the reform of justice as it is administered to the natives. But in this matter Her Majesty's Government have restricted themselves to instructing you not to relax your endeavours to prevail upon the Government of the Khedive to make the necessary reforms. We have felt that the Ministry of His Highness is alone competent to reconcile Western and Mohammedan Law in a manner which would command the confidence and satisfy the requirements of the native population, and for this reason we have consistently opposed the extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to causes between natives. We should greatly deprecate any attempt to impose upon the Egyptian people a system of jurisprudence which would conflict with that which they have inherited from their fathers.

At the same time the proper administration of justice is the keystone of the well-being of all nations, and it has been impossible for us to regard its absence in Egypt with indifference. We are

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convinced that until it is established, no Ministry will enjoy the full confidence of the country or can be regarded as fitting guardians of the State. It is, therefore, with sincere satisfaction that we have learned that Chérif Pasha, immediately on assuming office, instructed the Minister of Justice to proceed with the organization of Native Law Courts, and we look forward with interest and impatience to the accomplishment of a task of such paramount importance.

You inform me that there was a general impression that Riaz Pasha received the special support of England, and that the Khedive retained him in office in order to avoid giving offence to Her Majesty's Government. It cannot be too clearly understood that England desires no partisan Ministry in Egypt. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government a partisan Ministry founded on the support of a foreign Power, or upon the personal influence of a foreign Diplomatic Agent, is neither calculated to be of service to the country it administers, nor to that in whose interest it is supposed to be maintained. It can only tend to alienate the population from their true allegiance to their Sovereign, and to give rise to counter-intrigues which are detrimental to the welfare of the State. I am glad to be able to bear record to the manner in which you have understood and fulfilled your duty in this respect. You gave to Riaz Pasha that loyal support, which it was your duty to afford to the Minister selected by the Khedive. Had you gone beyond this limit, you would have exceeded the instructions given to you by Her Majesty's Government. The whole tenour of your reports, no less than the course of events, prove that you have kept carefully within them.

It would seem hardly necessary to enlarge upon our desire to maintain Egypt in the enjoyment of the measure of administrative independence, which has been secured to her by the Sultan's Fir-mans. The Government of England would run counter to the most cherished traditions of national history, were it to entertain a desire to diminish that liberty or to tamper with the institutions to which it has given birth. It would not be difficult, if it were necessary, to show by reference to recent events that this Government should be safe from the suspicions which, as you inform me, exist in Egypt with regard to our intentions on this head. On the other hand, the tie which unites Egypt to the Porte is, in our conviction, a valuable safeguard against foreign intervention. Were it to be broken, Egypt might, at no very distant future, find herself exposed to danger from rival ambitions. It is, therefore, our aim to maintain this tie as it at present exists.

The only circumstance, which could force us to depart from the course of conduct which I have above indicated, would be the occurrence in Egypt of a state of anarchy. We look to the Khedive and to Chérif Pasha, and to the good sense of the Egyptian people, to prevent such a catastrophe, and they on their part may rest assured that, as long as Egypt continues in the path of tranquil and legitimate progress, it will be the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to contribute to so happy a result.

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You are authorized to deliver a copy of this dispatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating that it has been written with the object of dispelling any doubts that may exist as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. We have every reason to believe that the Government of France will continue as heretofore to be animated by similar views. It has been easy for the two countries, acting in concert and with identical objects of no selfish character, to assist materially in improving the financial and political condition of Egypt, and so long as the good of that country is alone, the object in view there should be no difficulty in prosecuting it, with the same success. Any self-aggrandising designs on the part of either Government must from its very nature destroy this useful co-operation. The Khedive and his Ministers may feel secure that Her Majesty's Government contemplate no such deviation from the path which they have traced for themselves.

(Initialled) G.

Perhaps the main point of difference between the two Governments was in their relationship with the Sultan as suzerain of Egypt. France favoured a relaxation of the ties which bound Egypt to Turkey, while Great Britain was inclined to oppose any measures tending to break up the Ottoman Empire. As to the occupation of Egypt by Turkish troops, France held up her hands in horror at the very idea. When, in the autumn of 1881, the Sultan proposed to send an Ottoman force to Egypt, the French were the first to object, and the French Government expressed the view that "even the dispatch of a Turkish General to Egypt might lead to further steps, resulting, perhaps, in a permanent occupation of the country by Turkish troops." The fact of the matter was that, although the French were willing enough to co-operate with Great Britain in the interests of their own bondholders, their main object was to prepare the way for French mastery of the country in course of time. The Sultan was clearly an obstacle to French designs, and his influence in Egypt not only stood in the way of France in that particular country, but threatened the French position further west, along the African shores of the Mediterranean. Therefore the Sultan, the Sublime Porte, Turkey and all the paraphernalia of Constantinople were anathema at the Quay d'Orsay. Anglo-French co-operation served France as far as the immediate object in view was concerned—the protection of the French bondholders—but underneath this co-operation with Great Britain



BRITISH GUNBOAT IN THE SUEZ CANAL, 1882

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there was always an undercurrent of anti-British intrigue, calculated to undermine the British position in the hope of eventually rendering it untenable. An instance of this was the attitude of the French Consul-General, Baron de Ring, whose behaviour to the Nationalist colonels was scarcely in keeping with France's declared policy. And there were other Frenchmen in Egypt at this time, not to mention Franco-Egyptians, who were working directly contrary to the professed policy of the French Government. Whether these men were acting on the authority of the Quay d'Orsay or not, it is impossible to say, but certain information at my disposal, when connected with events which followed, lead me to believe that intrigue in Egypt was not confined to Turks and Egyptians.

France said to herself, "We are going to Egypt; we must take Britain with us for peace's sake, but we won't have Turkey at any price. When we have settled things a bit, we will quietly get rid of Britain, and Egypt will be ours." From the French standpoint this was quite as it should be, and France had every right to defend her interests, even at the expense of others. Her methods may be questioned, but France's ways are not our ways, and there the matter ends. But the most convincing argument, to my mind, in favour of what I believe to have been France's ambition in Egypt is the fact that the French themselves accused Great Britain of this very policy.

When the situation became more serious, M. Gambetta wanted an Anglo-French occupation, and when he saw that Turkish intervention was a danger to his policy he tried to further his aims by means of the Joint Note. From that time forward he had in his mind's eye the prospect of a form of intervention, in which Great Britain would demonstrate with her fleet at Alexandria while France would land troops. In other words, Gambetta wanted to hasten France's complete mastery over Egypt. In presenting this combustible document the British and French Governments were not acting with unity of purpose. The French recognized that their partnership with Great Britain was an unfortunate necessity, but above all things aimed at tightening their hold on Egypt. The British Government wanted to avoid the necessity of

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serious interference in Egypt, and thought that this threat would diminish the dangers of such a contingency. Then, whereas Lord Granville's reservation to the effect that he was not committed "to any particular mode of action" was intended to mean that, as a last resort, he would fall back on Turkish intervention, M. Gambetta whole-heartedly favoured Anglo-French occupation. Had Gambetta remained in power, it is difficult to say what course Egyptian affairs would have taken; Gambetta was more than a match for Lord Granville; he had made up his mind that armed intervention of some sort would, sooner or later, become necessary, and he did all he could to precipitate the crisis. Lord Granville, on the other hand, wished to avoid armed intervention, and held the opinion that, if such intervention should become necessary, action should be taken by the Sultan as the lawful suzerain of Egypt. His policy was one of hesitation and possibly of weakness, but there is little doubt that his desire to co-operate with France was the cause which contributed most to this want of strength.

On the 25th January, 1882, a few days before M. Gambetta's resignation, Lord Granville wrote to Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador in Paris, concerning the policy of M. Gambetta. He wrote as follows :

The French Ambassador told me yesterday evening that M. Gambetta had written to him expressing his opinion that it was desirable, in view of the probable crisis in Egypt, that the English and French Governments should come to an understanding as to the course which they should pursue. M. Gambetta, it appeared, had not in his letter given his opinion as to what steps should be taken, but he was desirous to know the views of Her Majesty's Government. Any Turkish intervention was, in M. Gambetta's opinion, the worst possible solution. M. Gambetta's attention had been called to a plan, which had appeared in the press, of calling in the co-operation of Europe. M. Gambetta remarked that the position of England in Egypt, in consequence of her Indian possessions, was unique. That of France, owing to her being a great African Power, and to other circumstances, was of the greatest importance. Besides this normal position of the two Powers, arrangements had been entered into by Egypt, which had been acquiesced in by the European Powers generally. It would, in M. Gambetta's opinion, be most disadvantageous to Egypt and to the two Powers that these arrangements should be in any way weakened.

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This letter showed that it was no longer easy to reconcile French policy with that of the British Government, so Lord Granville took the opportunity of sending a dispatch to Lord Lyons, outlining the policy of the British Government in regard to Egypt :

Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain the rights of the sovereign and vassal as now established between the Sultan and the Khedive, to secure the fulfilment of international engagements, and to protect the development of institutions within this limit. They believe that the French Government share these views. The question remains—If in Egypt a state of disorder should occur which would be incompatible with this policy, what measures should be taken to meet the difficulty ? . . . It is to be regretted, but it appears to Her Majesty's Government apparent, that if such a contingency unfortunately occurred, there are objections to every possible course. The question remains—which of them offers the least inconvenience ? . . . Her Majesty's Government have a strong objection to the occupation by themselves of Egypt. It would create opposition in Egypt and in Turkey ; it would excite the suspicion and jealousy of other European Powers, who would, Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe, make counter-demonstrations on their own part, which might possibly lead to very serious complications, and it would throw upon them the responsibility of governing a country inhabited by Orientals under very adverse circumstances.

They believe that such an occupation would be as distasteful to the French nation as the sole occupation of Egypt by the French would be to this country.

They have carefully considered the question of a joint occupation by England and France, and they have come to the conclusion that, although some of the objections above stated might be lessened, others would be very seriously aggravated by such a course.

With regard to Turkish occupation, Her Majesty's Government agree that it would be a great evil, but they are not convinced that it would entail political dangers so great as those attending the other alternatives which have been mentioned above. . . . The most important point is that the union of the two countries should be real and apparent.

M. Gambetta entertains objections to any further admission of the European Powers to interfere in Egyptian Affairs. Her Majesty's Government agree that England and France have an exceptional position in that country owing to actual circumstances and to international agreements, and they also believe that inconvenience might arise from many Powers being called upon to join in any administrative functions ; but they would submit for the consideration of the French Government whether it would not be desirable to enter into some communication with the other Powers as to the

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most desirable mode of dealing with a state of things which appears likely to interfere with the Firmans of the Sultan and the international engagements of Egypt.

This dispatch, if carefully read, contains much illuminating material. France was the only Power that was opposed to Turkish intervention, but, on the 31st January, M. Gambetta was succeeded in office by M. de Freycinet, who brought about a considerable change in the Egyptian policy of the French Government.

Meanwhile, the Porte protested against the Joint Note, as was to be expected. Russia, Austria, Germany and Italy replied that they "desired the maintenance of the *status quo* in Egypt on the basis of the European arrangements and of the Sultan's Firmans, and that they were of opinion that this *status quo* could not be modified except by an understanding between the Great Powers and the Suzerain Power." This was poor consolation for the Sultan, but it prompted the British and French Governments to get in touch with the other Powers. Great Britain took the lead by inviting the French to join in addressing the Powers, and M. de Freycinet agreed "with the reservation that it be well understood that the French Government reserve their adhesion to any military intervention in Egypt, and that they will examine that question when the necessity for any intervention shall have arisen." On the 11th February, a Circular was addressed by the British and French Governments to Berlin, Vienna, Rome and St. Petersburg, asking whether the respective Governments would be prepared to enter into an exchange of views on the Egyptian situation. All the Powers expressed their readiness to do this, but it was obviously useless to go any further in the matter until the British and French Governments had formulated some proposals to put forward. M. de Freycinet proposed deposing the Khedive and setting up Halim Pasha in his place, on the grounds that any measure was preferable to the dispatch of Turkish troops, but this was rejected by Lord Granville, who considered such a line of action incompatible with the pledges contained in the Joint Note. The British Foreign Secretary then came forward with the proposal of sending special Financial Advisers, but this was also ruled out on the grounds that such a step would neither help the Controllers-

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General in the execution of their task nor provide a suitable means of coping with what was rapidly becoming a military situation. In the circumstances, it is indeed surprising that Lord Granville should have made such a proposal.

On the 21st May, M. de Freycinet, seeing that some definite action in Egypt was necessary, took a step which gave a new complexion to French policy. He went to the length of recognizing the possibility of Turkish armed intervention in the following proposals which he submitted to the British Government :

1. That an Anglo-French squadron should be sent to Alexandria.

2. That the British and French Governments should "request the Porte to abstain for the present from all intervention or interference in Egypt."

3. That the Cabinets of Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy should be informed of the dispatch of the Anglo-French squadron, and that they should be asked to send to their representatives at Constantinople similar instructions to those sent to the British and French Ambassadors.

4. That the French Government agreed to abandon the idea of deposing the Khedive.

5. That "the French Government continue to be opposed to Turkish intervention, but they would not regard as intervention a case in which Turkish forces were summoned to Egypt by England and France, and operated there under English and French control, for an object, and on conditions, which France and England should have themselves defined. If, after the arrival of their ships at Alexandria, the French and English Governments should consider it advisable that troops should be landed, they should have recourse neither to English nor to French troops, but should call for Turkish troops, on the conditions above specified."

6. That the Consuls-General should be instructed "to recognize as legal no other authority than that of Tewfik Pasha, and not to enter into relations with any other *de facto* Government, except for the purpose of securing the safety of their countrymen."

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Lord Granville was only too glad to confirm the new turn which French policy had taken, but he thought it advisable that the Sultan should be led to understand that it was not unlikely that he would hear of further proposals in the matter, and that the other Powers, including Turkey, should be invited to participate in the naval demonstration at Alexandria. The idea he had in his mind was that of Turkish action under international sanction. M. de Freycinet would have no international sanction. He could cope with one competitor in Egypt, but in the presence of other Powers he saw dangers to the French position. In this he was probably right. The British Government, however, took the other view, but, as M. de Freycinet had already made considerable modifications in his policy, it was decided not to press the matter further.

But, although the French had gone so far towards agreeing to Turkish intervention under certain conditions, fear of public opinion in Paris made them very unwilling to publish the concessions made; and this deprived the situation of valuable moral levers. The Khedive badly wanted the moral support of the Sultan to dissipate the impression that the Porte opposed the action of the Powers, and there is little doubt that much general irritation would have been avoided if only the French had consented to an open declaration of policy. It is even possible that the co-operation of the Sultan might have been readily obtained. But, as things were, everyone was irritated; the Sultan, by the general action of the British and French Governments and by the dispatch of the squadron to Alexandria; and the other Powers, because they had not been consulted. All that could be done, therefore, was to send a vague communication to the other Powers, intimating that the British Government, far from contemplating a military occupation of Egypt, intended to withdraw their squadron as soon as calm was restored and the future assured; and that, if a pacific solution became impossible, they would "concert with the Powers and with Turkey on the measures which shall have appeared to them and to the French Government to be best." Lord Dufferin, British Ambassador at Constantinople, also took the opportunity to make it clear at the Porte that, while Turkish obstruction would lead to a

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doubling of the number of British ships at Alexandria, a reasonable attitude in the matter might induce the British Government to countermand the additional ships already under orders.

The Sultan had for some considerable time been endeavouring to regain his hold over Egypt, where he resented the intervention of European Powers, and it now seemed that an opportunity was provided for him to exert his influence at a time when an appeal to him was regarded as the only chance of avoiding military intervention. All the European Powers, except France, favoured the authority of the Sultan as the means by which order should be restored in Egypt, and even French opposition had become less formidable. On the 1st June, M. de Freycinet made a declaration in the Chamber which practically admitted the possibility of Turkish intervention. Yet the Sultan seemed reluctant to take the very action which had been one of the main objects of his policy. Instead of seizing the opportunity of asserting his sovereign rights by sending a Turkish Commissioner to Egypt at the request of the Khedive, he showed his resentment at originally being asked not to interfere by refusing to act when he was approached in the matter. He, therefore, made the withdrawal of the Anglo-French ships from Alexandria a preliminary condition to the dispatch of a Turkish Commissioner.

Meanwhile, M. de Freycinet was coming round to the idea of international action, on the grounds that "there could no longer be any reasonable hope of a pacific solution through the moral influence of the French and English squadrons, and the good offices of the two agents at Cairo." He, therefore, came forward with a proposal for a Conference, which was well received by Lord Granville and by the Representatives of the other Powers. In proposing this Conference, the French saw an easy means of covering their change of policy with regard to Turkish intervention; at least this was the view taken by Prince Bismarck, and there is no reason to think that he was mistaken. The Sultan disliked the idea of this Conference, but the proposal produced the Turkish Commissioner without delay. The abortive nature of that mission has already been described; yet the Sultan informed Lord Dufferin that "Arabi Pasha had made a complete submission,

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and that the *status quo* was about to be established," and Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in London, told Lord Granville that Arabi "had expressed his gratitude and had reiterated his assurances of fidelity and devotion to the Sultan." In point of fact, Arabi had refused to obey the Turkish Commissioner's summons to proceed to Constantinople, and had literally turned him out of Egypt. Lord Dufferin's task at the Porte was not an easy one, but he succeeded eventually in obtaining the admission that Arabi's position was such that something really had to be done.

The riots at Alexandria served to speed up the calling of the Conference, and on the 13th June the British and French Governments proposed that "the Sultan, as Sovereign, shall, in case of necessity, be jointly invited by the Powers united in Conference, to be prepared to lend to the Khedive a sufficient force to enable His Highness to maintain his authority; the Sultan to be requested to give a positive assurance that these troops should only be used for the maintenance of the *status quo*, and that there should be no interference with the liberties of Egypt secured by the previous Firmans of the Sultan, or with existing European agreements; the troops not to remain in Egypt for a longer period than a month, except at the request of the Khedive, and with the consent of the Great Powers, or of the Western Powers as representing Europe; the reasonable expenses of the expedition to be borne by the Egyptian Government." It was proposed that the Conference should meet immediately either in Turkey or elsewhere, but the Sultan refused to participate, on the futile argument that the mission of Dervish Pasha was meanwhile succeeding in Egypt and that, therefore, the Conference was unnecessary. The Sultan was disgruntled, suspicious, and jealous of his rights. He wanted the advice and suggestions of no Power on earth, and wished to achieve his own particular designs by intrigue. This he had been endeavouring to do all along.

Finally the Conference met at Constantinople on the 23rd June, without the Sultan being represented, and it took a stupendous time to reach even the most useless conclusions. But, if the Sultan was not working in the Conference, he

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was certainly exercising his best efforts outside, and the following dispatch from Lord Dufferin is illuminating :

Therapia.

24th June, 1882.

To Lord Granville.

MY LORD,

Just as our first conference was breaking up, Reschid Bey, the Secretary of the Sultan, was announced as wishing to see Count Corti. The object of his visit was to communicate to Count Corti and the other Ambassadors the fact that the Egyptian army and its officers had taken a solemn oath of obedience to the Sultan and to the Khedive.

After having acquainted all my colleagues in turn with this intelligence, Reschid Bey called upon me and intimated that he was charged with a confidential communication from His Majesty.

Reschid Bey prefaced the delivery of his message by observing that, notwithstanding his great intelligence and his many excellent and amiable qualities, the Sultan was possessed by a morbid tendency to suspicion. This tendency would, in a great measure, explain the meaning of two questions he had been commissioned to address to me.

He described His Majesty as eager to persevere in the advances he had already made to England, having been most favourably impressed by the language Your Lordship had authorized me to hold at my last audience. But, notwithstanding the assurances I had then given, His Majesty was still haunted by misgivings in our regard, and would often exclaim in an audible soliloquy : " If only I knew what England really intended." Impelled by this passion of distrust, His Majesty has at last made up his mind to address to Her Majesty's Government two precise and categorical questions, which he begged me to transmit without delay to Your Lordship. The first was, " What are the intentions of England towards Egypt in regard to the present," and the second, " What are the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government with respect to Egypt as regards the future ? " If Your Lordship would answer these two questions, the Sultan would then be in a position to examine how far his own interests and views coincided with those of Her Majesty's Government. If they should not prove reconcilable, he would frankly acquaint Your Lordship with the fact, but if, on the contrary, they appeared coincident, it would be his desire to enter into the most intimate and cordial alliance with England.

I replied that I would certainly put the questions in the categorical form required, because I should be most unwilling to give His Majesty a false impression as to the extent to which England might be prepared to meet his advances. . . . Reschid Bey then proceeded to make me the following extraordinary proposal. He said that His Majesty was possessed by the greatest fear and hatred of

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the French, that he would never be reconciled to them, nor would he cease to oppose them by every means in his power ; that what he desired above all things was to come to an understanding with England about Egypt to the exclusion of France. Of course, he would not conceal from me that, if it were possible, the Sultan would gladly acquire the same direct and unlimited control over Egypt as he possesses over Syria or any other part of his Empire, but he knew that this was impossible. Nay, if only rid of the French, he would be quite prepared to hand over to us the exclusive control and administration of the whole of Egypt, reserving to himself only those modified rights of sovereignty which he now possesses. In fact, what he offered was an Egyptian Convention on the lines of the Cyprus Convention.

I replied that, if the Sultan were to make over Egypt to us as a gift in fee simple, with the approbation of all Europe, I doubted whether the British Government would accept such a burden of responsibility.

(Signed) DUFFERIN.

The British Government wished order to be maintained in Egypt, and they realized that, without the employment of armed force, this was no longer possible. If the Sultan refused to act, some other Power would have to do so, and the following extracts from official dispatches give some idea of the French attitude at this time. On the 26th June, Lord Dufferin wrote, "I have already had several intimate conversations with my French colleague, during the course of which it became quite apparent that the Marquis de Noailles held in the utmost abhorrence the idea of a Turkish occupation, and that I could not really count upon his good-will or effectual support if I made a direct proposition to that effect. On the contrary he appeared to prefer any amount of delay or any solution rather than that ; and he could scarcely conceal his displeasure, when I sketched out the character of the language I was prepared to hold in explanation of the view of Her Majesty's Government." Regarding the activities of Baron de Ring, Lord Dufferin wrote as follows :

Therapia.

6th July, 1882.

To Lord Granville,

The French Ambassador told me that he sent a dragoman to the palace to warn His Majesty that M. de Ring was entitled to make no communication on the part of the French Government, whether official or officious. Baron de Ring makes no secret of his admiration of Arabi Pasha, and the Sultan's change of intention

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may perhaps have been the result of his visit. Up till now the French Ambassador has appeared very hostile to Arabi. . . . It is possible that, in spite of M. de Noailles' warning, His Majesty not unnaturally concluded that any advice he might receive from Baron de Ring could not be out of harmony with the wishes of the French Government.

(Signed) DUFFERIN.

Then, on the 10th July, the British Ambassador describes Baron de Ring as "having intimated to His Majesty that France would desire to see a compromise effected with Arabi Pasha's party," and as "having further suggested that an appeal should be made to Prince Bismarck to interpose his good offices for that purpose," and Lord Dufferin wrote to Lord Granville in the following terms :

Therapia.

3rd July, 1882.

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that I sent Sir Alfred Sandison the day before yesterday to the Prime Minister with a strongly worded message, calling the attention of His Majesty to the newspaper reports of what was passing in England and France, as a proof that public opinion in both countries was becoming very much excited in regard to the Egyptian question, and that the abdication by the Sultan of his obligations as Sovereign would impose upon others the task of restoring order in that country. I further begged him to remark that some of the most influential English newspapers were urging the Government, instead of seeking the assistance of Turkey, to come to terms with the National Party, and by the establishment of an independent Arab Government at Cairo to free Egypt from the domination of the Turks. This programme, I said, was altogether contrary to what Her Majesty's Government desired, but the Sultan's present attitude of hesitating and abstention was only too well calculated to reinforce the influence of those who advocated it. A rival Caliph in Egypt, I hinted, would not suit His Majesty. I have reason to believe that these arguments were not without effect, and Abdur Rahman Pasha is doing his utmost to induce the Sultan to comply with our wishes.

(Signed) DUFFERIN.

The other Powers, while safeguarding as much as possible their own interests, were reluctant to incur any responsibility. In fact, Lord Dufferin wrote that "if a newspaper correspondent had assisted at our deliberations, he would certainly have reported that we were desirous of renouncing the task imposed upon us by our Governments. The Conference was achieving nothing. But in Egypt the situation was becoming

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desperate. Arabi was a power to be reckoned with, and foreign pressure was being brought to bear on the Khedive to form a Ministry approved by the army.

On the 26th June, Sir Edward Malet wrote to Lord Granville that "the decoration of Arabi Pasha by H.M. the Sultan at the moment when his own personality almost alone was in question has immensely increased his prestige, and added further to the confidence and supremacy of the army. Whenever Arabi Pasha appears in public, demonstrations are prepared for his reception and he, alone of the Ministers, is escorted by a body of cavalry such as that which follows His Highness the Khedive. . . . It is not only the personal influence of Arabi Pasha in the Council, but the exclusive ascendancy of the military party in all branches of the administration, which necessitates the intervention of armed force." M. de Freycinet talked about making terms with Arabi, and France was secretly supporting the very elements to which she was officially opposed. Baron de Ring was exerting his influence at Constantinople.

By this time France had no intention of intervening in partnership with Great Britain. She thought that Arabi would gain a bloodless victory, owing to British reluctance to act, and that, having given support to the Nationalist movement, she was preparing the way for the fulfilment of her desires in Egypt. The Khedive, acting under German and Austrian pressure, appointed Ragheb Pasha President of the Council, with Arabi as Minister of War, but the army was more interested in warlike preparations than in making any attempt to stabilize the position. Moreover, Great Britain and France refused to recognize the Ministers, and the British Consul-General was instructed only to communicate with the President, and then only concerning the preservation of the lives of British subjects. British public opinion was coming to the end of its patience. The knot of intrigue had become so tangled that it had to be cut. But Mr. Blunt's assertions that the British Government were all along determined to employ force is not in accordance with fact. They only did so when there was no other alternative and Great Britain was left to act alone.

At the beginning of June information had been received by



MEX FORTS, ALEXANDRIA, AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT, JULY, 1882

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the Admiralty that batteries were being constructed at Alexandria for action against the British fleet and, although this work did cease for a time by order of the Sultan, it was recommenced in July and the garrison was reinforced. Arabi was acting in open defiance of the Sultan and was busy inspiring his followers with the spirit of armed resistance. On the 3rd July, the British Admiral received instructions to prevent further work on the fortifications and, if his orders were not obeyed, to "destroy the earthworks and silence the batteries if they opened fire." The French Government were duly informed of this step and were invited to co-operate, but M. de Freycinet informed the British Ambassador in Paris that "the French Government could not instruct Admiral Conrad to associate himself with the English Admiral in stopping by force the erection of batteries or the placing of guns at Alexandria. The French Government considered that this would be an act of offensive hostility against Egypt, in which they could not take part without violating the constitution, which prohibits them making war without the consent of the Chamber." France could not join in the armed suppression of a movement which she had been instrumental in encouraging. She was now beginning to show her hand.

The other European Powers were also duly informed of the measures about to be taken by the British Admiral, and even Austria, with her special interest in maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, cordially approved the action of the British Government. The Sultan procrastinated and asked that the bombardment should be delayed. He was confident that he could solve in twenty-four hours what the combined efforts of Great Britain and France had failed to do in so many months. The powers of intrigue were paralysing all honest endeavour to find a way out. The Sultan was intriguing with Arabi and with the Khedive; France was intriguing with Arabi and with the Sultan. The Conference was daily losing its *raison d'être* owing to the course which events were taking. One day the Sultan was inclined to join the Conference, and on the following day he had changed his mind.

At Alexandria the position was very serious. Business was at a standstill. All banks and business houses were closed

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the city had a terror-stricken appearance ; and endless streams of people with their baggage were driving down to the port to obtain shelter from some friendly steamer. Over 30,000 people had left Alexandria for all parts of Egypt, and the question of food supply was becoming acute. Natives had assembled round Arabi's house asking for bread, and they had been driven away. Rumours and scares were the chief topic of conversation, and my diarist describes the uncertainty as so harassing that he took two pills ! The British warships, were prepared for action, and the officers and men were just waiting for the signal. Warships of the other European Powers were riding at anchor. The work on the forts and the mounting of guns continued, so on the 6th July Sir Beauchamp Seymour presented his *Ultimatum*, demanding that the work of fortification should cease, or he would bombard the forts after twenty-four hours' notice had been given to the Consuls. On the 9th July the warning was duly delivered to the Consuls, and on the following day Arabi held a council of war, when it was decided to reject the British Admiral's demands. The Khedive gave precise orders to prepare the forts for action and to reply with their artillery, should the British fleet open fire. Instructions were also given to proclaim a state of war and to seize every available man for the formation of new battalions. Tewfik was so arranging matters that he could choose the stronger side as the situation developed, while the electric lights of the fleet showed men to be still working on the forts. But the Khedive thought that he knew better than the ships' lights, so he telegraphed to the Sultan that there was no truth whatever in the reports that the forts at Alexandria had been further strengthened after the receipt of orders to the contrary from Constantinople.

The British Admiral had now had more than enough of Arabi's defiant attitude, and he was determined that, unless his demands were met, he would carry out his instructions without delay. On the night of the 10th-11th July work was in full swing at the forts, new earthworks were being erected, and guns were being mounted in position. The electric lights of the fleet played all night on the fortifications, while to seaward the French squadron was well clear of Egyptian waters.

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The last days of June and the first ten days of July, 1882, were memorable ones for those who were present on this dramatic occasion, and I cannot do better than quote extracts from a valuable diary in my possession, which was kept by the captain of the cable ship *Chiltern*, lying at Alexandria at that time. The following entries are of special interest :

26th June. This being the anniversary of the Khedive's accession to the throne, in honour to him we dressed ship. All warships were also dressed. A very fine sight. During the day three salutes of twenty-one guns were fired. At the Khedive's palace a grand reception was held. Arabi has received from the Sultan of Turkey the Grand Cross of the Medjedieh, which is much commented upon. I hear that troops are being embarked at Malta. People are still leaving, and few shops are now open in the town.

28th June. During the day I heard bad reports from the town and inland, a "Holy War" being preached in Alexandria and murders done in the country. England must act; she is openly insulted every day, and Arabs, I hear, are becoming unbearable.

30th June. Alexandria is quiet, no business doing and only a few steamers now in port. There are wild rumours about. The Canal ships are ordered not to make fast close to the edge at night.

1st July. Went on board the *Helicon* and dined with the Admiral and two other officers. One of the officers trusts we may yet send a few shots into the forts, he having lost his servant on the 11th.

3rd July. This being the anniversary of the Sultan's birthday, we dressed ship at noon. A grand sight was produced by several of the warships firing a royal salute, the natives flocking to the beach from all quarters not knowing what was up. By the telegrams I find the outlook is again becoming serious. England, I hear, intends to act by herself, which she ought to have done at the commencement.

4th July. This being the anniversary of American Independence, all warships are dressed, we doing likewise, and at noon a salute was fired from one ship of each nation now in port (eight) of twenty-one guns each. I hear that last night steel guns were mounted at the Pharos, and that the Egyptians are drilling night and day. Arabi has again returned here from Cairo. We are getting to the beginning of the end. What will it be? War, I fear.

5th July. From the news messages I find that there is a split in the Egyptian Cabinet. Dervish has been ordered by the National party to leave Egypt. The Sultan is very wrath at the forts being built again, and tells the Khedive that he holds him and his Cabinet responsible, should England bombard Alexandria, which Admiral Sir B. Seymour has decided to do unless the works are stopped.

6th July. The press messages this evening are again giving a gloomy view of the situation. Sir B. Seymour is not satisfied

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with Arabi's answer to his note of yesterday in reference to the guns being mounted on the forts.

7th July. Our warships are ready for action. All Greek warships have left, and there are only three English merchant ships now in the inner harbour; the latter will leave to-morrow.

8th July. Last night at 11 p.m. H.M.S. *Alexandra* turned her electric lights on to the forts, and it is stated that she found men working there. Five of our biggest warships are now outside the port, and *Penelope* has arrived in the outer harbour, which is now well filled with various fleets.

9th July. The number of messages received on board this day is large, many being press and Government. From the press we gather that more guns have been mounted and that the Admiral will now act. I hear that all British subjects are to be on board by noon to-morrow, as the notice will shortly be given to commence firing.

10th July. Called at 3 a.m. The Admiral's secretary came on board and left orders that I was to take *Chiltern* outside by noon. At 7 a.m. left for *Invincible*, now the flagship, and found the Admiral in his shirt-sleeves. I received orders to go outside and cut a cable, also that no telegrams were to be sent unless counter-signed by himself or his secretary. When we got under weigh there were no pilots to be got, so I followed in the wake of one of the French warships. All the warships of the other nations were leaving, and the harbour was deserted, except for our warships, a few steamers, and several small sailing vessels. 9.30 p.m. The electric light is playing.

The crisis had come and, as result of the policy adopted towards the national movement in Egypt, the situation had become such that armed action was unavoidable. That Arabi was in part to blame for what happened, there is no doubt. He went to extremes, which were neither in his own interests nor in the interests of anyone else. But I think it must be admitted that Anglo-French policy was also at fault.

The night of the 10th July saw the last hours of Arabi's real power in Egypt which he spent well out of harm's way at Fort Napoleon. Yet he believed that his guns could easily sink the British ships, and that if even a hundred thousand men were landed they would be hacked to pieces by the troops at his disposal. To say that he in any way commanded the Egyptian army would be to infer that Arabi possessed at least some of the qualities of a soldier. He possessed none of these qualities, and yet his troops adored him and followed him until failure discredited him in the eyes of all Egypt.

CHAPTER V

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION

MUCH controversial matter has been written about the bombardment of Alexandria, and this action on the part of the British Navy has given rise to many bitter accusations. I, therefore, propose to quote from the diary of the captain of the *Chiltern* such extracts as throw important light on what actually took place. As these words were written during the course of the action by one who watched every development, although he took no part in the operations, I think his account may be regarded as of considerable value.

Captain Walter Goodsall writes as follows :

Off Alexandria. 11th July, 1882. Day dawned at 5 a.m.; a light air from the W.N.W.; sea smooth. On looking through my glass, all appeared quiet. Last night Ras-el-Tin lighthouse was not lit, which must have caused some anxiety to those making for this port. M. wondered why the "ball had not been opened." We learned later that during the night Arabi had sent a note to the Admiral, and on returning the envoy's boat had lost her way, for there were no lights about the harbour and shore and all was in blackness. The outside squadron is under weigh, and a fine sight it is to see the ships all in order for the expected fray, top-gallant masts down and St. George's ensign flying at the peak. G. tells me that Arabi says that he will not open fire from the forts until he has received three shots from the fleet. I must own that G. and his friend Ninet¹ are all in with Arabi. About 6 a.m. *Alexandra*, *Sultan* and *Superb* are cruising past the forts, from Ras-el-Tin to Pharos. The consulate flags of the different nations are flying on shore. 6.35 a.m. The outside fleet puts round and stands westward along the line of forts, *Alexandra* leading. It is a pretty sight. A signal is run up on board *Superb*, which M. informs us

¹ M. Ninet was a Swiss by nationality, who was a strong supporter of Arabi and was suspected of being a foreign agent.

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means that there are men to be seen at the fort guns. 7 a.m. *Alexandra*, on clearing Ras-el-Tin fort, fired a blank cartridge. Her second shot was in the direction of Fort Oom el Kubebe, and it was answered by shots from various forts, the firing becoming general between ships and forts and the noise from the heavy guns being great. It is a sight to see the turret guns rise and the gunners standing with twiggings in hand. As the object comes into line, we can see the seamen fire the gun, when the recoil causes all to disappear from sight. 9 a.m. Ras-el-Tin lighthouse is hit about half-way up. All the Egyptians are standing to their work. By 8.15 a.m. the inside fleet, composed of *Penelope* and *Monarch* had blown up Fort Marsa-el-Ranat. From what I can see, the forts have not got the correct distance of the ships, their shots falling outside. Many of the shots from our ships ricochet three or four times over the water before striking the forts. 8.30 a.m. *Alexandra*, *Superb* and *Sultan* are keeping up a running fire on all the forts from Esmos Los Point to Pharos Fort, the entrance to the new harbour. *Invincible*, *Monarch*, *Penelope* and gunboats are engaging the Mex forts, with *Temeraire* aground in harbour. The cage of Fort Pharos is knocked completely, and I watched its gradual disappearance. I admired the plucky manner in which the guns were fired from Fort Ada, and the way in which the officer stood alone by the flag-staff and, glasses in hand, watched the action of the shots. He was a capital fellow, braving as he did the number of shots thrown into his fort. *Invincible* is at anchor in the central pass, doing good work with her 8-ton guns. 9 to 10 a.m. Our ships are making good practice, and their shots are telling on all the forts. *Alexandra*, *Superb* and *Sultan* are anchored, and are keeping up a continuous fire on the sea forts. *Inflexible* is causing great havoc with her heavy guns. Gunboats *Condor* and others are steaming westward to Marabout forts to engage them. *Invincible*, *Monarch* and *Penelope* are hard at it on the Mex and other forts. All news for the East must be sent by the Indo-European, for no sooner had firing commenced than our cable to the Alexandria office, connecting with Suez and India, was destroyed on shore by Arabi's men. 11.45 a.m. The firing from the ships is increasing. The gunboats off Marabout fort have silenced the batteries and have ceased fire. They are steaming up towards the Admiral's ship *Invincible*, which is flying "Well done, *Condor*." Fort Ada is firing at intervals of ten minutes, her shots falling short of the fleet. 12.30 p.m. *Inflexible* got underweigh and commenced firing on Fort Ada, her heavy shots telling to some purpose and appearing to undermine the fort foundations. The officer in charge is still sticking to his flag-staff position. 1.30 p.m. A well directed shell or shot from *Inflexible* must have entered the powder magazine of Fort Ada, for an explosion occurred and the fort was destroyed. Many must have been killed, for many were thrown into the air, and the officer who stood so well to his post, and the flag-staff, were hurled into space. 2 p.m. All ships of the outside squadron commence firing into the fort at the Hospital end of the Ras-el-

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Tin lines. The action of one of the guns is very graceful. It rises up, is fired, and the recoil causes it to disappear again. 2.25 p.m. *Temeraire*, which has been out of action for four hours, has now steamed near to the above mentioned fort, which she is engaging along with Fort Pharos, which has opened fire with its Krupp guns. 4 p.m. Great damage has been done to both forts, which have now been silenced. 5 p.m. All ships have ceased firing, and quietness reigns over all. There is very little movement on shore. The appearance of the forts is now grotesque, many of the guns now looking upwards and downwards.

12th July. Dull, gloomy weather, with haze over Alexandria. 10.40 a.m. *Inflexible* opens fire on the Forts Ada and Pharos, and shortly afterwards *Temeraire* joins in. Arabi's men were not idle during the night, for the earthworks have been repaired. 11 a.m. The signal "Cease firing" is hoisted. The white flag is flying near to the Port Office, and a gunboat with the truce flag at the fore is steaming into the inner harbour. 3.30 p.m. *Helicon* sent her gig alongside for telegrams and then steamed in shore as a Turkish despatch-boat was cruising close to Ramleh Palace. This is the vessel which brought over the Sultan's envoy from Stambul. 5 p.m. There is mischief on shore, large volumes of smoke rising in the N.E. portion of the city. I fancy that Arabi, finding he cannot keep the city, has set it on fire. 7 p.m. Several warships have taken up their positions off the New Port; the conflagration is rapidly spreading, and is likely to cover a large area of the city. The Turkish despatch-boat is at her anchorage off Ramleh, and the white flag is still flying. 10 p.m. The conflagration in the city is very grand, and the destruction of property must be very serious.

13th July. As day dawns flags of truce are seen to be flying on Ras-el-Tin lighthouse and from *Helicon* in the inner harbour. 6 a.m. The warships, which anchored off the New Port yesterday, are steaming towards Ras-el-Tin Fort, and *Monarch*, *Invincible* and *Penelope* are making for the inner harbour. 7 a.m. More mischief is brewing ashore, for a big fire has broken out to the east of last night's conflagration. It is reported that Alexandria is evacuated, and the fire is extending. "Off and on" angles taken from the ship show the extent of the fire to be one mile in length. 10.20 a.m. Shells are fired into the town by the ships in the inner harbour, I suppose for practice, for there cannot be many of Arabi's men in the burning city; they having fired the city and bolted off to Cairo.

14th July. The burning of Alexandria is still raging, and is spreading to westward.

17th July. At 9.50 a.m. I left the ship in the gig . . . and rowed over to the landing-place at the Customs House. We had great difficulty in getting through the crowd of starving Arabs. On inspection of the battery room, I found the trousers of poor T., the clerk who was murdered. He had been battered about with dumbbells, and the body had been stripped and thrown into the street. Several houses were burning, having just caught fire.

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E.'s house was set on fire, but the American guard put it out, and were on the look-out for the fellows who had fired it, intending to shoot them down.

18th July. We hear very uncertain news of Arabi's movements. The fire in the town is very nearly out, and all is quiet. The refugees are returning to their homes.

19th July. S.S. *Chiltern* anchored off Ras-el-Tin lighthouse. The troops are now taking over the duties formerly done by the bluejackets. G. is completely knocked up, having heard bad news of Ninet. G. got into his house alright. There was not a single thing touched. Ninet looked well after his friend.

20th July. C. sent word that he would be alongside by 4.30 p.m. for G., who has lately received several signals from the Chairman to return home at once.

22nd July. I hear that some of our troops exchanged shots with Arabi's outposts. The fresh water in Alexandria is failing, the canal having been dammed and cut. Arabi is reported to be only four miles off. A signal is received, asking what strangers we have had on board since our arrival here, and stating that the Admiral had advised G.'s recall. I fear M. must have mentioned the matter of his despatches being opened.

24th July. 10 a.m. I landed with others and drove near to the station. We observed a great improvement in the town, many more stalls being set up and good business being done. In the square many wooden sheds are being built. We heard from G.'s cook that Ninet left the house in a hurry. On the day after the bombardment he was nearly killed by two foot soldiers, and was just rescued in time by two of Arabi's cavalry who took him to one of the forts.

26th July. Called on the Admiral, and asked M. whether he had spoken officially to G. for having opened the Admiral's despatches. He said that he had not done so, and that G. was recalled because of his known friendship with Ninet, who is a great friend of Arabi's.

2nd August. Arabi has been sending to Bern to stop all cipher messages sent to Egypt, on the grounds that he is the head of the Telegraph Administration. The fellow is defying Europe. When I told the Admiral of this, he came out strong, saying, "Ten thousand devils, what next?"

3rd August. At noon a royal salute was fired, a poor effect after the grand bombardment. In town there are many rumours of a rising and an attack. This afternoon D. and I sailed round the shipping, a very pretty sight all dressed with flags. We landed at Gabari Mole and saw two armoured trains leave with 200 marines and bluejackets for the Mex Forts, the Admiral and staff going with them. A letter received on board addressed to M. Ninet was opened by Lieut. M., but it only contained underlined extracts from the *Evening News*.

4th August. This afternoon D. and I sailed over to the Ras-el-Tin Fort and lighthouse, and went over them. The destruction done by the guns of our fleet has been enormous. 18-ton guns have

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been thrown about like cardboard. I counted seven Armstrongs, useless and only fit for old iron.

13th August. I see by a telegram from Hoskins to Seymour that the soldiers at Ismailia are preventing our people from obtaining supplies, and also that at Suez an Egyptian Mail steamer has been seized and several important letters found.

18th August. Lunched early and drove over to Ramleh, obtaining a very good view of Arabi's lines, which are in a capital position. We hold Ramleh heights, overlooking the canal and railway.

19th August. *Calabria* and other transports left. At noon *Helicon* with the Admiral, and *Salamis* with the General, steamed out of port. On arrival outside, the whole of the fleet and the seventeen transports got underweigh and steamed eastward.

20th August. Received a signal from *Pender* that our people had landed at Port Said at 3 a.m. and had taken the town. The soldiers had laid down their arms, and our marines had thrown up earthworks between the European and Arab towns. The message also stated that the fleet and transports were arriving off the port. They have kept their secret well, and the correspondents are well out of it this time.

22nd August. Our Port Said cable is doing good work. Starting news comes from the Canal. There is heavy fighting going on there, the Arabs having lost 160 killed and wounded at the battle of Chalouf.

23rd August. It appears that the white flag on Aboukir forts has taken in the Austrians. The gunboat, seeing the flag flying, sent a boat ashore with three officers and eight men, all of whom were at once taken prisoners.

25th August. Received news from Ismailia that our troops are on the move, and will shortly have some heavy fighting to do, as the General intends to take the dam on the Fresh Water Canal.

26th August. Sailed over to Fort Pharos and visited the whole of the fortifications there. The destruction was terrible, our shots having knocked the place to powder. Guns of 8-inch bore were pitched about like footballs. It has to be seen to be understood.

27th August. Took train to Ramleh, arriving there in time to see the 7-inch Armstrong fired. Our shell pitched fair into Arabi's lines, distance about three miles. The Arabs had been returning shell for shell, but they did not answer the last one. One of their shells fell and burst right on the powder magazine, while another passed over our lines. They must have some good gunners in their camp. *Minotaur* also opened fire on large earthworks to the east of Ramleh, doing good work. Our troops have landed at Ismailia, are gaining ground, and will soon be offering battle to Arabi's force at Tel-el-Kebir.

29th August. We have good news from Ismailia that a great battle has been fought and won, our killed and wounded amounting to 120, the enemy having lost some hundreds. This morning the punishment of "keel-hauling" was carried out on board one of the Egyptian warships. I have never seen it done before. A rope

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was run through a block on each of the yard-arms of the fore-yard. The culprit was then made fast to the fall and drawn up to the yard-arm, then to the water and right under the ship to the other yard-arm. I believe that two out of three died under the ordeal.

30th August. I hear that the men "keel-hauled" were rebel officers, and that it was intended that they should die; also that about 2,500 soldiers are to leave for Ismailia. Our troops here are now only a few thousand. To my mind, the authorities are wrong. Perhaps Turkey will, at the last minute, be allowed to land her troops.

The contents of this diary throw light on certain important points connected with the bombardment. In the first place, it seems quite obvious that the British fleet concentrated its fire on the forts, and only fired a few shells into the town on the day after it had been fired; this rather disposes of the charge that the ships' guns were responsible for setting Alexandria on fire. Secondly, it seems fairly obvious that the fire was the work of Arabi's men, who wreaked their vengeance on European property in Alexandria, while the "riff-raff" of the town exploited the occasion for the purposes of loot and used the fire as a handy means of covering up their misdeeds. Everything seems to point to the fact that Arabi's men actually started the fire, that shells from the fleet may have contributed in some degree, but that the lower elements of the populace were responsible for most of the actual destruction that took place. For this destruction the British Government were in some measure to blame. The Naval and Military authorities recommended the landing of troops, and even the Khedive had urged that the bombardment should be immediately followed by the landing of a military force; but this policy was rejected on political grounds which are difficult to justify. As it was, parties of bluejackets and marines were landed on the 13th and 14th July, after all the mischief had been done, and an attempt was made to restore order. Mr. Hulme Beaman, who himself took an active part in this *nettoyage*, describes the town as "a Dante-esque Inferno, alight from end to end, the flames running riot from street to street without any attempt to check them being made, with wild figures here and there pillaging and looting, and ghastly corpses swollen to gigantic proportions lying charred and naked in the roadways." Drastic methods were employed

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for the restoration of order. Any person found in the act of incendiarism or looting, or with loot in his possession, was immediately shot. "Three graves were kept open on the Great Square as a warning to evil-doers, and as soon as one was occupied another was dug. The culprits were tied to the trees and executed publicly. On arrest a prisoner was tried by drum-head court-martial, and the sentence was executed without delay. For minor offences the 'cat' was applied. Gradually the British reduced the city from the hell it was when they entered into something like quiet, and then it was resolved to give back his rule to the Khedive."

The question whether the bombardment of Alexandria was justifiable has been a subject of much controversy, and has been criticized in much the same way as the French action in bombarding Damascus in 1925. While there is a certain similarity in the policies leading up to these two actions, there is a great difference in their methods of execution. In Egypt, Anglo-French policy was largely responsible for creating the situation which brought about the bombardment, and French policy in Syria was equally at fault. But, whereas Sir Beauchamp Seymour took action against a fortified city, with every preparation for resistance, after the delivery of an *Ultimatum* and twenty-four hours' warning, General Sarrail bombarded an open city under mandate, without presenting an *Ultimatum* or giving any warning to the foreign consuls. Yet, in both cases, it must be admitted that bombardment had become a military necessity.

On the 22nd July, the Khedive formally dismissed Arabi as Minister of War, but it was not until a month later that a new Ministry was formed under Chérif Pasha, with Riaz Pasha as Minister of the Interior. Meanwhile, Arabi's spirits had fallen into deep despondency. The British ships had failed to sink when hit by his guns, so he sulked like a disappointed child. He lost no time in clearing out of Alexandria, not caring what became of the city, and withdrew his troops to a line of defence at Kafr Dawar, which was well out of range of the ships' guns. The Khedive, on the other hand, had remained in his palace at Ramleh during the bombardment to see which way "the wind would blow," and, on finding which side was the stronger, gave himself up to the British

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Admiral. This was the prince who had given precise orders to resist the action of the British fleet and to proclaim war throughout the country. The only loyalty he showed was to those whose support he wanted. He had now deserted his country and, according to Moslem Law, had no more authority over his people. His whole conduct with regard to British armed action had placed him in a position which no man could justify, and dispelled once and for all the charge of rebellion which was made against Arabi and his followers.

The British Government now decided on military preparations, and Parliament granted readily the money necessary for an expedition. Fifteen thousand men were ordered to Malta and Cyprus, and a force of 5,000 men was ordered to be sent to Egypt from India. Lord Wolseley, who was appointed to command the expedition, was to go to Egypt "in support of the authority of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the Firmans of the Sultan and existing international engagements, to suppress a military revolt in that country." Still the British Government persisted in regarding the movement as a purely military rising. The French concentrated their attention on the Suez Canal, which they were willing to defend in co-operation with Great Britain, although they were opposed to intervention elsewhere. The French Admiral at Port Said was, therefore, ordered to collaborate with Admiral Hoskins for the protection of the Canal, but M. de Freycinet was anxious to obtain from the Conference, still sitting at Constantinople, a definite mandate authorizing Great Britain and France to safeguard the interests of this international waterway. This proposal met with no success, while feeling in France was daily growing more opposed to intervention of any kind owing to the situation in Europe.

The Suez Canal Credit Bill met with little support, and the defeat of the Government on this issue led to the fall of M. de Freycinet's Ministry. Significant were the words of M. Clemenceau on this occasion: "*Messieurs, la conclusion de ce qui se passe en ce moment est celle-ci: L'Europe est couverte de soldats, tout le monde attend, toutes les Puissances se réservent leur liberté pour l'avenir; réservez la liberté*"

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d'action de la France." And so ended all question of French intervention in Egypt, although it was clearly in France's interests that British action should be successful. Throughout the events that immediately followed, the French maintained a perfectly cordial and friendly attitude, but it had already become sufficiently obvious that complete harmony could no longer be expected.

Italy was also invited to co-operate, not only to secure the safety of the Suez Canal, but in the land operations which were now contemplated. For some time the Italians had shown jealousy at the course which events had taken, and it was hoped that such an invitation would allay their irritation. But the Sultan chose this psychological moment to express his readiness to send troops to Egypt, and Italy could not reverse her policy under the circumstances. The invitation, however, had the desired effect, and from that time forward Italy was entirely sympathetic to British policy. But it seems more than probable that the real cause of Italy's non-acceptance was a reluctance to co-operate with the French, whom she suspected of hostility. In fact, Count Corti told Lord Dufferin in strict confidence that "it was his personal opinion that, if it were proposed that England should act in Egypt as the Mandatory of the Powers, Italy would be very well satisfied, and that what she (Italy) disliked was the notion of a French intervention, she herself not desiring to send troops thither." At all events, Great Britain cannot be charged with any desire to act alone. She was ready to co-operate with any Powers which showed a willingness to undertake the task. Indeed, Lord Dufferin received definite instructions to state to the Conference that "while reserving to themselves the liberty of action which the pressure of events might render expedient and necessary, Her Majesty's Government would be glad to receive the co-operation of any Powers who were ready to afford it."

Meanwhile, Constantinople was staging a diplomatic pantomime of a high order. A strong element of humour ran through all the negotiations with the Porte, and I think that this was the saving factor of the situation. I have read most of the dispatches from the British Embassy during this period, and their contents are most entertaining. Unfortunately, lack of space only allows me to reproduce some fragments,

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which give but a small idea of the nature of these documents when read as a whole. If the Turk was trying to the patience of the European diplomat, he provided so many humorous incidents that it was difficult to quarrel with him.

Lord Dufferin describes the "extraordinary impediments which affect diplomatic negotiations at Constantinople. Not only are the Ministers themselves unauthorized to negotiate, but they dare not even repeat to the Sultan the communications made to them by Foreign Ambassadors. The Sultan communicates with the foreign representatives, not through his Ministers, but through three or four irresponsible young men who, however trustworthy and intelligent, have no experience of affairs or of the principles upon which business ought to be conducted. Moreover, from their dependent position, they are still less willing than the Ministers to transmit to their master anything that is not calculated to please him. Inasmuch, too, as they derive their sole importance from their connexion with himself, His Majesty does not hesitate to throw them over, and to disavow anything they may have said by his direction which he may find it inconvenient to acknowledge. This has been admitted to me by one of themselves, and it is probably for this reason that they are employed.

"Even if an Ambassador endeavours to reach the Sultan by a written message through his own dragoman, no one at the palace will undertake to deliver it, if it contains any phrases of a strenuous character. If the Ambassador endeavours to get over the difficulty by asking for an audience, which of course it is not desirable to do except under the pressure of a very urgent necessity, the Sultan keeps him waiting with one excuse or another for weeks."

Immediately after the bombardment of Alexandria, the Sultan came forward with his favourite proposal of deposing Tewfik and setting up Halim Pasha as Khedive. He sent for Lord Dufferin and explained to him at great length why he favoured this line of policy; and constantly hinted at an Anglo-Turkish alliance. He was only wasting time by making such suggestions, but after much hesitation on his part and pressure on the part of the Powers, he was finally induced to join the Conference. On the 20th July, Said Pasha and Assim Pasha were duly nominated as the Turkish representatives,

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and the Sultan agreed to send troops to Egypt under conditions calculated to keep Turkish intervention under the control of the Powers. By these conditions, however, the Sultan meant one thing, and the Powers meant another. The British Government urged that the Sultan should first clearly define his attitude towards Arabi in a Proclamation, while the Sultan did not think it advisable to issue a Proclamation until after the troops were landed. In other words, the Sultan wanted to reserve his attitude until he had asserted his authority in Egypt. Eventually preparations were made for sending 5,000 Turkish troops, but the Porte was to submit to the Conference a draft Proclamation denouncing Arabi as a rebel, besides entering into a Military Convention defining the manner in which the troops were to be employed. In fact, the Turkish Government was given clearly to understand that, failing these undertakings, the Turkish troops would not be allowed to land. It is unnecessary to go into the details of the unseemly wrangles indulged in by Said and Assim Pashas over the Proclamation and the Convention, but it is interesting to observe that the suggestion to suspend the Conference was opposed by the Sultan himself, who had been so reluctant to co-operate. That he hoped to profit from the dissensions of others, there is little doubt, but he failed in his attempt to keep the Conference going, and it merely ceased to function. The Porte haggled over the Proclamation and the terms of the Convention; they committed several acts of bad faith; and they actually obstructed the British preparations by refusing permission for the embarkation of mules at Smyrna, and by threatening with imprisonment those who had contracted to supply the British army with certain articles of equipment. Meanwhile, Sir Edward Malet was apprehensive concerning the effect of Turkish troops in the country, and there was reason to believe that the Sultan was intriguing with Arabi all the time. Lord Granville was, therefore, urged to reverse his decision, but, in spite of the information at his disposal, he remained loyal to his arrangement with the Sultan.


Finally, on the 13th September, after a perfect stream of telegrams had passed between London and Constantinople on the subject of proposed changes, Lord Granville informed Lord Dufferin that he might sign the proposed Convention.

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But while this message was in telegraphic transit between the Foreign Office in Downing Street and the summer quarters of the British Embassy at Therapia the British troops in Egypt were driving Arabi's soldiers from the defensive position of Tel-el-Kebir. Lord Wolseley had reached Alexandria on the 13th August, just a month before, and had decided to advance on Cairo by way of Ismailia. Lord Granville, therefore, telegraphed that he "presumed that the emergency having passed, His Majesty the Sultan would not now consider it necessary to send troops to Egypt." But Lord Dufferin did not receive this message until he had already spent eleven hours at the Palace discussing further changes proposed by the Sultan, so it may be imagined with what relief he received instructions to drop negotiations on the Egyptian Question.

The Egyptian force which opposed Lord Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir was one under the command of Mahmud Fehmi, an engineer, who was entrusted with the task of finishing the defences. His capture was the first of Arabi's misfortunes. The second misfortune was the disabling at Kassassin of the two officers who were first and second in command. But where Arabi made his fatal mistake was in failing to carry out his intentions of blocking the Canal. He stupidly relied on certain assurances of M. de Lesseps, and, owing to the consequent delay in his final decision, Lord Wolseley's troops had steamed through the Canal before Arabi's orders to block it could be carried out. The battle of Tel-el-Kebir requires no description, as the military circumstances are a matter of history, but it is a noteworthy fact that Arabi took no active part, and that his leaders failed him at every turn. Some were already *hors de combat*, some were utterly inefficient, and others purposely betrayed their comrades. The result was confusion, and after an engagement lasting little more than an hour the Egyptian army was reduced to a rabble, which suffered severely from the fire of the British guns. The Egyptian force cannot have comprised more than 7,000 trained infantrymen, with, say, 2,000 cavalry and a corresponding number of guns. The remainder were a mob of half-clothed recruits and volunteers, who could dig trenches but were devoid of any fighting value.

The part played by Arabi himself reflects little credit to



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one who had set himself up as a national leader. On the eve of the battle, he spent the night more than a mile in rear of the first-line trenches, surrounded by country Notables and religious men, with whom he passed the time in prayers and recitations. On the sound of the British guns he condescended to dress himself and made some show of approaching the scene of action. He had not gone far, however, before he was met by a mob of fugitives. He tried to rally this undisciplined rabble, many of whom had thrown away their arms, but the desire to seek safety in flight was too strong for him, and he yielded to the persuasion of his servant. Master and servant fled together to Bilbeis, where they left their horses and took train to Cairo. Arabi was finished. He could not even decide whether to defend the capital until his mind was made up for him by the British cavalry occupying the city. On the 14th September, 10,000 troops occupied Abbasieh barracks, and on the following day Lord Wolseley, with the Brigade of Guards under the Duke of Connaught, entered Cairo. Seeing that all was now over, Arabi sank into deep depression and took what was the only course open to him. He drove to Abbasieh and handed over his sword to the British General.

The way in which the Egyptians surrendered is worthy of note, and throws light on the mentality of these simple fellahin. At Kafr Dawar, 10,000 of Arabi's men surrendered to a sergeant of the Shropshires, armed with nothing but a stick. The sergeant had taken off his coat, slipped his braces over his shoulders and rolled up his shirt-sleeves; and past him filed 10,000 Egyptians throwing their rifles, bayonets, pistols and trumpets into some railway trucks drawn up on the siding. At Tanta, a few days after Tel-el-Kebir, 4,000 Egyptians, fully armed, surrendered to Sir Archibald Alison with a single company of Highlanders. At Cairo, the garrison of the Citadel, about 8,000 strong, surrendered to Major Watson of the Royal Engineers at the head of 150 men. This officer calmly entered the fortress alone and politely asked for the Commandant. He was informed that he was asleep. "Then wake him up, and tell him to surrender," was the Major's reply. Eventually, the Egyptian commander came along, rubbing his eyes, and said that he would be delighted,

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and within an hour the keys had been handed over and the Citadel was occupied.

During Arabi's confinement in the Daira Sanieh prison, his time was spent in deep and constant thought, but the cloud of anxiety, which seemed to overshadow him at first, gradually lifted and in the end he became almost cheerful. He gave great care to drawing up a statement for his defence, and wrote many letters to his friends in England, who were exercising all their influence to obtain for him a fair trial. Arabi now had to suffer the dismal penalties of failure in the East. "If you inquire," he said, "you will discover and be able to prove that all Egypt was with me—the Khedivial family, the old men of Mehemet Ali's time, the Ulemas, the army and the peasants, but in the presence of prison, arrest, torture,¹ and threats, who will own me now? Why, I should not be surprised if my very children denied me to my face before the Commission of Inquiry."

In his written statement, Arabi expressed himself at great length, but the following extracts will suffice to indicate the line which he took :

This war has no precedent in history. The present Khedive was the cause of a foreign fleet coming to Egypt; he then himself encouraged us; finally withdrawing from us altogether to side with foreign troops. The Sultan, the real Sovereign of this country, also sided with us, and loaded us with marks of his approbation. His representative concurred in our resistance, and his trusted officer exhorted us to defend the country from what they termed the rapacity of England. The opening acts of the war were carried on in his name. Then we suddenly found the English troops fighting for the Khedive, the Egyptian troops being styled "rebels."

If the Egyptian troops were really the only rebels, and our defence a mutiny, how is it that so many of the Civil Notables, Ulemas, and Members of the Chamber, as well as others, were incarcerated and shared the same fate? On the other hand, I contend that, if the army, and indeed the whole Egyptian nation, has participated in what the Egyptians believed and declared to be a righteous and just cause, England, one of the first nations of Europe, noted for her justice and equity, should not consent to crush our hopes, in order to please one single man—the more so, as by the religious laws of this country this man has no right to rule as a prince over the people.

England having always respected the laws and religious views of

¹ This probably refers to agents of the Khedive who visited him in prison.

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other countries, we cannot understand why she should have followed a course which must appear as a mystery in the annals of nations. Egypt declared no war with England, but defended herself, and now that we trust England will ascertain the real truth, we hope all friendly relations, which have existed for years, will be renewed, she having always hitherto respected the rights and privileges of Egypt. . . . But the truth is, I am no "rebel." I led the nation in seeking the liberty of our country, and employed all honourable means to this end, respecting the laws, not thinking of self, as others say, but for the welfare of Egypt. I became commander of the troops appointed to defend the country in a lawful manner, and by order of the Sultan, the Khedive, the Chamber, and with the sanction of the nation.

(Signed) AHMED ARABI THE EGYPTIAN.

In this statement there was much fundamental truth. Arabi cannot be regarded as a rebel, although his actions possessed many of the qualities of rebellion. While it is true that he revolted against the rule of the Khedive, he undoubtedly had the nation behind him, and this has been acknowledged by the highest authorities. Yet, had the Khedive acted otherwise than he did, and had the Sultan refrained from intriguing with the Egyptian nationalists, there would have been a strong case against Arabi. But the connivance of Tewfik and the attitude of the Sultan dismissed for all time any justification for terming Arabi a "rebel." The fact that he failed supported the charges of his accusers, but the circumstances in which he failed nullify their arguments. Had the Khedive or the Sultan suppressed the movement by force of arms, there would have been good grounds for charging him with rebellion; but to charge an Egyptian with a rebellion, which failed owing to the intervention of a foreign Power, is a very different matter. It has even been said that Arabi deliberately planned the revolt, in order to induce Great Britain or France to occupy the country in the interests of the down-trodden fellahin, and in the hope that, sooner or later, by the active intervention of one or other of these Powers, their lot would be substantially improved. It has also been hinted that Arabi was deceived by one of these Powers, on whose help he had relied. Arabi represented the people of Egypt, and should have been accepted as such, instead of being tried as a "rebel." If this had been done, after he had been taught his lesson, there is reason to think that Egypt would have been

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spared humiliation, and Great Britain would have started her task of reform on surer foundations.

I do not for one moment suppose that any of Arabi's followers were capable of forming an efficient administration (I think they were all quite incapable), but I do strongly maintain that these were the men who represented Egypt and, as such, should have been put in power with strong British control. The Nationalists had the ideas, although they did not know how to put them into execution. If, immediately after their submission, Arabi and his followers had been carefully and seriously taken in hand, I believe that their supporters would have forgotten their failures in the field and would have rallied round them again. The task of reform, undertaken by Great Britain, would then have been free of the charges made against it ever since, and better and more capable Egyptians would gradually have come forward to take the places of those who showed themselves unsuited to hold the positions which they occupied. I have discussed this matter with many Egyptians, and I am told that, had Arabi been supported, even at this eleventh hour, the Egyptian Question would never have developed as it did in later years. A bad beginning on the right lines is better than a good beginning on the wrong lines.

In England opinions differed as to the fate of Arabi and his followers. By some they were regarded as "out and out rebels," while others took the view that their want of success was entirely due to British interference. The former was the view taken by the British Government, who maintained the right to decide on their fate. It was, therefore, decided to hand over the prisoners to the Khedive, who should take no action without British consent. For some time it was doubtful whether permission would be given for the prisoners to be defended by counsel, and it was to the credit of Mr. Blunt that this permission was finally granted, and British counsel was allowed to proceed to Cairo. Mr. A. M. Broadley, who actually defended Arabi, has narrated the circumstances of the trial at considerable length,¹ so it is only necessary here to mention that the trial was one of those farces which only occur in Oriental countries. As usual, miscellaneous "skins

¹ "How we defended Arabi." London, 1884.

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had to be saved." For the sake of the British Government, which had spent millions on crushing a "rebellion in Egypt," it was obviously necessary that Arabi should be labelled a "rebel"; otherwise, England had been busy waging war against the Sultan, the Khedive, and Arabi at the same time. Yet, capital punishment could not be contemplated for political reasons at home. In order to "whitewash" the Khedive, it was also necessary that Arabi should be declared a rebel. The Sultan's Proclamation had only reached Egypt at the close of hostilities, while that of the Khedive had no legal significance in the eyes of the Egyptians.

The trial itself presented a host of difficulties. On the 17th September the Khedive had officially disbanded the army, and now he was proposing to try by court-martial officers of an army which did not exist. By this time Lord Dufferin had arrived in Egypt on a special mission, and it fell to his lot to effect a compromise, which he did with considerable skill. He saw at once that, in the interests of all parties, it was necessary to bring the Arabi proceedings to a close without delay, so it was arranged that Arabi should plead guilty to the charge of "rebellion," that he should be sentenced to death, and that the sentence should immediately be commuted to perpetual exile. This was duly carried out, and Arabi and six of his principal associates left Suez for Ceylon on the 26th December. "The great ladies of Cairo did not forget Arabi at the moment of his going into banishment. Silently and cautiously, for fear of Tewfik, they set about providing him with a goodly outfit; one sent two English portmanteaux; a second contributed a large Koran; another an embroidered prayer-carpet; a fourth a dressing-bag; a fifth a picnic-basket, and so on. . . . The special train for Suez was timed to start from the siding in the middle of the Kasr-el-Nil barracks at nine o'clock on the night of the 26th December. . . . The scene was a very picturesque one. It was bright moonlight, and the train had already drawn up. . . . The arcades of the barracks and the more florid architecture of the palace stood out distinctly in the clear moonlight, which seemed almost to dim the flames of the torches held by some of the soldiers of the Egyptian guard. The train was a very long one, almost stretching across the square from one side to the

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other. In front were the ladies with their children and luggage; behind, the servants, the heavy baggage, and a guard of the King's Royal Rifle Corps. A first-class carriage in the centre was reserved for Arabi and his companions. The order to start was on the point of being given, when Mr. Beaman brought the news that the policeman at Arabi's house would not allow his son's wife and her sister to leave it. It was becoming late, the Cairo station-master deprecated any further delay, and the quarter of the city in which Arabi's people lived was some distance off. Sir Charles Wilson, however, clearly told Osman Pasha Ghaleb with some decision of tone that the train could not leave till the missing ladies arrived, whereupon the Prefect of Police made a virtue of necessity, and sent his own carriage to fetch them. Then followed a long and awkward pause. At last the two women, clad entirely in white, arrived, and quickly disappeared in one of the carriages set apart for the ladies of the party. The door was barely closed upon them when the signal to start was given, and in an instant the train, which bore Arabi and his friends into exile, vanished behind the walls of Kasr-el-Nil."¹ I am informed on reliable Egyptian authority that Arabi's latter days were not irreproachable. In 1901 he was permitted to return to Egypt, and he lived in Cairo in almost distressful circumstances until his death in 1911.

This brings to an end a definite epoch in Egyptian history—an epoch which provides many grounds for reflection. Our real troubles in Egypt date from the time when we destroyed the National Party, which had a much better chance of preserving some kind of order than the weak-kneed Khedive whom we set up once more. We only had to show our sympathy for the needs of the Egyptian people to gain their support. We had numerous opportunities to catch hold of the connecting link, which would bind us to the Egyptian people, and we threw them all away. The only other alternative was to proclaim Egypt as a British Protectorate. That opportunity we also threw away. We preferred to take a middle course or, in other words, to "fall between two stools," and we have been suffering the consequences ever since.

Lord Dufferin's task in Egypt was an impossible one.

¹ A. M. Broadley, *op. cit.*

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He was asked to draw up a scheme for the restoration of the country, which would conform to a policy of withdrawing the British garrison at an early date. The British Government wanted to introduce such reforms as they felt ought to be effected by a civilized European Power, but at the same time they proposed to remove the tools at the disposal of the reformer. Either Great Britain had to embark on a policy of reform, and retain the garrison as long as proved necessary, or she had to clear out of Egypt altogether and leave the Egyptians to their fate. Fortunately, she chose the former alternative, but unfortunately, she still failed to realize the significance of the Arabi movement, and disregarded a political factor on which the success of her policy depended. Egypt's greatest need was good government, and without this no steps towards reform were possible. It was, therefore, essential that the government should be fundamentally British, although Egyptians might hold certain positions of importance in the administration. A direct European administration is naturally distasteful to an Oriental country, as has been proved in countries other than Egypt, but it is absolutely necessary as the first step towards self-government. Until these backward people have seen how their country should be governed, and have grasped the principles and system on which European administrators carry out their work, it is not possible for them even to take a share in the executive administration. On special subjects they can advise, and their special knowledge of the country and its people can be invaluable, but executive authority is a dangerous explosive in their hands. Moreover, they take some time to realize just what it is that characterizes a good government, and they need some experience of the benefits which are the outcome of sound administration. In his report Lord Dufferin said, "I cannot conceive anything which would be more fatal to the prosperity and good administration of the country than the hasty and inconsiderate extrusion of any large proportion of the Europeans in the service of the Government, in deference to the somewhat unreasonable clamour which has been raised against them. For some time to come, European assistance in the various Departments of Egyptian administration will be absolutely necessary." I would go further and say that, at the beginning, British

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administration was essential, with Egyptian assistance, and I feel that this policy provided the safest and surest start on the road to complete self-government.

Perhaps the most convincing argument in favour of appealing to the Nationalists as the representatives of the people is to be found in a comparison between the scheme for the reorganization of Egypt drawn up by Lord Dufferin and a Memorandum drawn up by Arabi Pasha a week before his trial.¹ I think that a perusal of these two documents goes a long way to show that, although Arabi was an idealist and a dreamer, there was somewhere in the Nationalist ranks a more or less accurate conception of the requirements of Egypt. In principle, Lord Dufferin and Arabi were of one mind, yet British reform and Egyptian aspirations were destined to take opposite courses.

Meanwhile, the British occupation of Egypt had caused a break in the Anglo-French *entente*, and the French asked for some definition of our future intentions. France wanted the continuance of the Anglo-French Control, but this was opposed by the Egyptian Government and by public opinion in England, and the British Government declined to agree to its resumption. The French were naturally rather susceptible at this time, and the offer of the Presidency of the Commission of the Debt offended their dignity, so they pursued a policy of comparative hostility to British endeavour in Egypt for the next twenty years.

On the 3rd January, 1883, Lord Granville addressed a circular to the Powers, and defined British policy in the following terms: "Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquility, Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. In the meanwhile, the position, in which Her Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness, imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress."

¹ See Appendix I.

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Lord Dufferin was a diplomat well endowed with the qualities of statesmanship and foresight. He saw that the policy contemplated by the British Government could not be carried out, and that the desired reforms could not be effected unless the British occupation was indefinitely prolonged. His experience of the East told him that no success could be achieved except as the result of slow and gradual development, and he tactfully suggested a course, which he knew to be contrary to British policy. But British policy, fortunately, is not the slave of logic, and is therefore, susceptible to change. The change was a far-reaching one, and on the 11th September, 1883, Lord Cromer arrived in Cairo as British Agent-General.

CHAPTER VI

LORD CROMER IN EGYPT

THE appointment of Lord Cromer to undertake the task of reform in Egypt was a happy choice on the part of the British Government, and the present prosperity of the country is very largely due to the singular perseverance, great thoroughness, and remarkable leadership of this typically British administrator. With his previous experience during the difficult times of Ismail's reign, and his subsequent service in India, Lord Cromer was eminently suited to grapple with the problems which faced the British and Egyptian Governments at the beginning of the Occupation. The difficulties which confronted the British administrator at that time were formidable in more ways than one. Not only had he to cope with the vagueness of British policy, and with situations which were the outcome of international rivalries, but he had to deal with an administrative system which was almost without equal in the complicated nature of its working. To the magnitude and composition of these difficulties no one was more alive than Lord Cromer, who went to Egypt with no false confidence in his powers of achievement but with a determination to do everything in his power to overcome them. He succeeded in his endeavour, but it is not possible to realize the significance of his success without some knowledge of the task which he undertook.

There were three main elements in the administration—British, Egyptian and international. The first two elements comprised the Sultan, the Khedive, the Ministers, the Legislative Council and Assembly, and the senior British officials attached to the various Ministries in advisory capacities of a

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varying degree. The third, or international element, on the other hand, was the result of certain arrangements made between the Egyptian Government and the Powers, and gave rise to institutions which could not be altered without the consent of the Powers concerned. In 1882, these institutions were : (1) The Commission of the Public Debt ; (2) The Railway Board ; (3) The Daira Administration ; (4) The Domains Administration. Justice was administered by the Mixed Tribunals, the Consular Courts, the Native Tribunals and the Mehkemeh Sheraieh.

The relations between the Sultan and the Khedive were regulated by a series of Firmans dating from 1841, and in certain matters Egypt came under the heading of Turkey, and was subject to certain restrictions. Yet in other directions the Khedive exercised his legitimate prerogatives. There was no such thing as Egyptian nationality, nor was there an Egyptian flag ; the Khedive was not permitted to build ironclads, or to allow his army to exceed 18,000 men, except in the case of Turkey being involved in war, when the Egyptian army was to be at the disposal of the Sultan. The Khedive had no right to conclude foreign treaties, although he could make conventions dealing with commercial matters or with those bearing purely on the internal administration of the country. In international conferences, Egypt was usually represented by the Turkish delegate, who often slept through the proceedings. The Sultan's policy was to encroach as far as possible on the rights of the Khedive, while the feeling in Egypt towards the Sultan resembled "a compound of fear, religious sympathy, and political dislike." As the Sultan Suzerain of Egypt he was heartily disliked, but he was loyally supported and respected as Sultan Caliph of Islam.

The Egyptian Administration was then divided into seven Departments under the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Justice, War, Public Works, Education and the Interior. The Wakfs (religious endowments) were under a Director-General—they are now under a Minister—who was subject to the direct authority of the Khedive. In each Ministry there were certain European officials, the chief of whom was officially subordinate to the Minister but in reality the executive authority. It was in this system that lay one of Lord Cromer's

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greatest difficulties. In many cases the Ministers wanted real executive power, while the European advisers were sometimes inclined to assert their influence beyond the bounds of absolute necessity. Friction was the inevitable result, and it was often founded on principle rather than on genuine divergence of view.

Lord Dufferin's mission to Egypt gave rise to the Organic Law of 1883 which provided for the formation of provincial councils and the legislative council and assembly. A provincial council, composed of from eight to three members, was established in each Mudirieh under the presidency of the Mudir for dealing with local matters. The Legislative Council was composed of thirty members, fourteen of whom, including the president, were nominated by the Egyptian Government, while of the remainder fourteen were elected by the provincial councils from amongst their own members, and the others by the more important towns. The Legislative Assembly consisted of eighty-two members, namely, the six ministers, the members of the Legislative Council and forty-six delegates elected by the people. The Government were not obliged to adopt the opinions of either of these bodies, but no new direct tax could be imposed without the approval of the Assembly, which also had to be consulted concerning public loans, railway and canal construction, and certain questions arising out of the land tax. In fact, both the Council and the Assembly were consultative bodies with very little real power. The object of forming these institutions was to give the Egyptian people a chance of having some voice in the affairs of their country without binding the Government to carry out measures which were the outcome of immature political thought. The intention was to create some sort of protection against tyranny and at the same time to provide an opportunity for the European advisers to penetrate into the mentality of the people and such of their needs as seldom rose to the surface in the ordinary way, but it was realized that much time must pass and many obstacles be overcome before free institutions could thrive in Egypt.

The qualities required of a British official in Egypt at this time were many and exceptional. He had to possess certain technical qualifications according to the ministry to which he

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was attached ; he was faced with the language difficulty and also with the mentality of the Oriental, which takes time and experience to understand ; it was essential that he should be a man of high and strong character and that he should be able to adapt principles acquired elsewhere to the particular situation in which he was placed. He needed a marked degree of adaptability and a keen sense of discrimination between the essential and the non-essential. He required tact in all its forms, a power of combining firmness and friendliness, and a power of exercising his authority without making it obvious that authority was being exercised. In fact he had to possess the qualities of a trained diplomat, a sound administrator and a practical Englishman. As may be imagined, it was exceedingly difficult to find men with these qualifications, and when found it was difficult to induce them to accept service under the conditions offered by the Government. Nevertheless, the body of British officials who worked under Lord Cromer, even if they did not fulfil quite all the qualifications desirable for the work which they were called upon to do, were yet formed of such material as to give him the greatest assistance in the carrying out of his reforms. Although they had diplomatic and other support on which to fall back in case of need, it was their own self-reliance which usually had to carry them through, and many of these officials were singularly successful in this respect. In most cases the British official was merely an adviser, and it was only in the event of his advice being constantly and systematically ignored that the British Government resorted to methods of diplomatic or administrative reprisal. Not only had he to decide what was to be carried out, but he had to devise means of inducing his Egyptian colleagues to carry out his wishes in the way in which he wanted them carried out. Furthermore, it was incumbent upon him carefully to study the workings of the Egyptian mind in all its phases and to notice quickly the effect of British policy and methods on Egyptian officials. If the personal attitude of the British official towards the Egyptian was not all that it might have been, it was due rather to the peculiarities of the British race in general than to any individual shortcomings. The lot of the British official in Egypt was not an enviable one. Neither could he carry out his own task,

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nor did he get the credit for what was achieved. In success his Minister got the credit, while in failure he himself got the blame. But, in his own quiet and unobtrusive way, he was helping to guide the Egyptian mind in the right direction, and was performing one of the most delicate pieces of work which any administrative official has ever been called upon to undertake. The average Englishman finds it supremely difficult to "do in Rome as the Romans do," and by this peculiarity he is much handicapped in his dealings with foreigners, but for this very reason the achievements of the British officials in Egypt were all the more creditable.

Of these officials the Financial Adviser naturally took the most prominent place. He was invested with executive powers, and he was present at the meetings of the Council of Ministers. This post was first held by Sir Auckland Colvin, but he was succeeded in the autumn of 1883 by Sir Edgar Vincent, whose work contributed very greatly to the restoration of Egyptian finance.

The duties of the British Consul-General were indefinable. Lord Cromer never received any general instructions from the British Government, and he knew that it was useless to ask for them. He simply had to judge each case according to its merits, always bearing in mind that the objects of a European Agency in Egypt were to supply technical knowledge not possessed by the Egyptians themselves and to remedy those defects in the Egyptian character which had been developed by a long period of misgovernment. But he found himself confronted not only with difficult questions of a political and technical nature, but also with a mass of miscellaneous matters which were scarcely in harmony with his principal duties. Lord Cromer himself describes some of these petty questions, which formed part of his daily task in Cairo. If a young British officer was cheated at cards, he had to get him out of his difficulties. If a slave girl wanted to marry, he had to persuade her master to give his consent. If the inhabitants of some remote village in Upper Egypt were displeased with the local Sheikh, they appealed to Lord Cromer. His correspondence dealt with such matters as the dismissal of the Khedive's English coachman and the tenets of the Abyssinian Church in regard to the Procession of the Holy Ghost. He

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was asked to interfere in order to get a German missionary out of prison, to get a dead Moslem of great sanctity out of his grave, and to get an English maniac out of the English church. He was also invited to use his influence to prevent a female member of the Khedivial family from striking her husband over the mouth with a slipper; and to arrange a marriage between two other members of the same family whom stubborn relatives were trying to keep apart.

Lord Cromer had to deal with a situation which was the outcome of Lord Dufferin's recommendations, and at first at any rate the British Government did not give him the *carte blanche* which he afterwards enjoyed. He was there to assist the Egyptians and not for the governing of Egypt. In his own words he was there "to assist in the government of the country without the appearance of doing so, and without the legitimate authority over the agents with whom he had to deal." The British Government had declared their policy to be one of speedy evacuation as soon as the necessary reforms had been carried out, and it fell to the lot of Lord Cromer to show the British Government and Europe in general that it was impossible to discharge these responsibilities except by a slow and laborious policy of reconstruction. He did not try to convince those at home by mere arguments and persuasion, but relied on the disclosure of facts as they stood to prove the soundness of his convictions.

In addition to the difficulties with which he had to contend, the work of Lord Cromer was scarcely facilitated during the years 1885 to 1887 by the mission of Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff which was appointed to examine into Egyptian affairs in co-operation with the Sultan, and by the proposed Convention which provided for the British evacuation of the country under certain circumstances, with the right of re-entry if events demanded it. After a prolonged discussion in 1887 the Sultan refused to ratify the Convention on account of opposition from the French and Russian Governments, who objected to the clause which permitted to England the right of re-entry. The only practical result of this mission was that the Turkish Commissioner remained on in Egypt, to add to the complications of administration, but Turkey had lost her opportunity although the Sultan retained his suzerain rights.

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The third, or international, element in the Administration gave rise to a host of complications, and has proved a great stumbling-block to progress and reform. It is almost impossible to point to any international institution, and to say that it has been a success ; and those in Egypt were no exception to the general rule.

The Commission of the Public Debt consisted, in 1885, of six Commissioners, all of different nationalities. These Commissioners were responsible for receiving all moneys pledged to the service of the Debt, for exercising an effective control, and for regulating the contraction of loans. They were also empowered, as the legal representatives of the bondholders, to sue the Egyptian Government in the Mixed Courts in the case of any infringement of the Law of Liquidation. This cumbersome piece of inefficient machinery was so organized and administered that, if the Egyptian Government wanted to spend a certain sum in excess of the limit laid down by international agreement, revenue of double that amount had to be collected for the purpose. The consequence was that, as the country progressed and money became more plentiful, there was little benefit to be derived therefrom. I do not intend to go into the financial intricacies of the *Caisse*, but suffice it to relate that this institution, which had in its time proved its utility, now became harmful to British interests in Egypt. It provided a means by which other Powers, notably France, could create obstacles in the way of the policy of the British Government.

The Railway Administration was another example of how progress can be retarded by dividing control among various individuals of different nationalities. The control was vested in three members, whose functions were undefined as regards the different branches of the working of the railway, and no one individual was separately responsible for the general management. The railways certainly progressed along with the general reforms introduced by British influence, but it was in spite of, and not because of, the international control that this took place. In 1904, however, owing to arrangements made with the Powers, the Egyptian Government received full right to administer the railways as they thought fit.

Another form of international administration was the Daira



Photo : Mary Laffan

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Sanieh, or the vast estates which the Khedive Ismail succeeded in acquiring by various illegal methods, and on which he borrowed large sums when the financial situation became acute. They were administered by a Board of Directors, consisting of an Egyptian Director-General and two Controllers, the former being the executive officer and the latter acting as supervisors and legal representatives of the bondholders. In 1898, the Daira estates were sold to a company, which resold them in lots, and the Government share in the profits of the liquidation amounted to about £3,280,000. The debt was paid off in 1905.

The Domains Administration, on the other hand, dealt with the properties given up by Ismail under pressure in 1878, and on which a loan of £8,500,000 was negotiated. These lands were gradually sold to Egyptians in small lots, and the loan was paid off in 1913.

Before dealing with the question of the Capitulations, it is necessary to say something of the judicial system prevailing in Egypt. The International, or Mixed, Tribunals comprise one Court of Appeal and three Courts of First Instance. Egyptian judges sit in these courts, but most of the responsibility rests on Europeans. The European judges of the Court of Appeal are usually selected from subjects of the Great Powers, but all the Powers are represented on the Courts of First Instance. Nominally, the Egyptian Government appoints the judges, but in reality it is only in recent years that they have not been nominated by their respective Governments. The jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts covers all civil cases between Europeans and Egyptians, and between Europeans of different nationalities, or even between Europeans of the same nationality, if the dispute relates to land in Egypt. The judges are not under the effective control of any legislature, and the Mixed Courts cannot recognize any new law until it has received the assent of the Powers. The consequence is that the judges of these Courts have very elastic powers. It is, however, only in exceptional cases that the Mixed Courts exercise criminal jurisdiction over Europeans, as European residents in Egypt are usually tried in their own Consular Courts according to the laws of their respective countries. The Native Tribunals, on the other hand, exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over

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Egyptians, except in cases relating to personal status, which are tried by the Kadi according to the Sacred Moslem Law. The foregoing will give some idea of the complicated nature of the Egyptian Courts, which has been brought about by international administration.

The Capitulations themselves, which have proved to be so obstructive to reform in Egypt, are derived from charters of immunity granted in ancient times by the Turkish Sultans to the subjects of Christian Powers established in or trading with their dominions, including Egypt. As the power of the Ottoman Empire grew weaker and that of the Christian Powers became stronger, these privileges developed into rights, and in Egypt they were exploited to suit the convenience of unscrupulous foreigners and to safeguard the deeds of criminal Europeans. Whereas the Capitulations were originally intended to protect the interests of the European communities against the despotic power of Oriental rule, they eventually became a ready means by which foreign governments could interfere with Egyptian administration, and by which criminals could escape the attentions of the Egyptian police. The following are among the more important privileges conferred on foreigners in Egypt : (1) No new direct tax can be imposed on foreigners resident in Egypt without the consent of all the Capitulatory Powers. (2) All civil and commercial cases and all cases between foreigners and Egyptians, or between foreigners of the same or different nationalities, are tried by the Mixed Courts, which chiefly consist of foreign judges. (3) All criminal charges against foreigners, with a few exceptions, are tried in the Consular Court of the defendant's own nationality. (4) No domiciliary visit can take place in the premises of a foreigner without the previous consent of his own Consular authority, and the Egyptian police cannot, without this authority, enter any foreigner's house, except for the most urgent reasons. These provisions are very far-reaching, and not only entail endless complications and negotiations, but are the cause of much injustice to the Egyptians.

In the first place, the Egyptian Government cannot extend its system of taxation to any degree, when the Powers have the right to reject the imposition of any new direct tax upon the

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foreign communities, which form by far the greater part of the commercial and industrial population. In order to obtain the necessary consent of all the Capitulatory Powers, numbering about fifteen, recourse has to be made to interminable diplomatic negotiations. On paper, the consent of fifteen Powers to a proposal appears to be a mere matter of presenting fifteen Notes and awaiting the answers. In reality, each Note leads to proposals, counter-proposals and haggling on many other subjects, relevant and irrelevant to the point at issue, and does not bring about a final conclusion till months, and sometimes years, have elapsed.

Secondly, the Mixed Tribunals, although they have relieved Egypt of some of the evils of the Capitulations, have provided a useful channel through which European Governments could, and did, exert political pressure on the Egyptian Executive. The judges were appointed by their respective governments, and it was rare that, in such circumstances, they placed their sense of judicial independence before the interests of their employers and paymasters.

Thirdly, the fact that criminal charges against foreigners were tried in their own Consular Courts has given rise to many scandals, which have prejudiced foreigners in the eyes of the Egyptians. Each of these Courts had its own code, its own procedure and its own laws of evidence, so that there was little consistency in the justice administered. Yet the European powers cannot be expected to consent to their subjects coming under the jurisdiction of the native tribunals until these courts have reached a much higher standard of efficiency than they at present possess.

Fourthly, the restriction on domiciliary visits quickly became a source of great abuse. Among the foreign communities in large towns like Alexandria, there are always a considerable number of natives who have succeeded in acquiring the same rights of protection as those enjoyed by genuine residents of foreign nationality, and amongst these are to be found undesirable Levantines who use the Capitulations in order to defeat the law of the land and to escape punishments which they richly deserve. Furthermore, they lend their foreign names to their Egyptian collaborators, who also shelter themselves behind privileges to which they have no

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possible right, so that gambling hells, opium dens, brothels, and kindred institutions often thrive with impunity, not only under foreign management, but even to the profit of Egyptians themselves. And when the Egyptian police do decide to take action against some foreign house of ill-fame or illicit trade, the formalities are so many and the time taken to comply with them so long that the delinquents have "cleared" long before the Consular procession has arrived at their doors. The following examples give some idea of what actually took place.

In 1883, a reputed foreigner, who was a notorious thief and housebreaker, was arrested in Cairo *flagrante delicto* for attempted burglary. The actual result of the Consular inquiry was not known, but shortly after he was set at liberty. The following year he was arrested for participation in the murder of a secret police agent, and was imprisoned at the disposal of his Consul. The case was investigated by his Consulate, and he was sent to his country of origin for trial, the result of which was not officially known, but at the end of six months he was found again at liberty. He was again arrested in Cairo and claimed by his Consul, who stated that he had been acquitted of murder. The Governor of Cairo discovered that he was an Ottoman subject, but on the insistence of the Consul he was again handed over and exiled. On two subsequent occasions he returned to Egypt, was re-arrested, claimed by the same Consulate and re-exiled, although the evidence that he was an Ottoman subject was apparently clear. Nor was this all. Some of his comrades were found committing an act of burglary, and a complete set of burglars' tools were found on them. They were handed over to their Consul and set free next day.

A certain individual was accused of murdering a foreign subject, and the Native Tribunals called on the police to search the dwelling of the accused without delay, to prevent his making away with incriminating objects. The police made an urgent application to the Consulate, but received a reply that "as it was Sunday, a janissary could not be given." On the following day the "bird had flown."

Another case was that of a woman who had established a house of ill-fame in one of the best parts of Cairo. She

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was deprived of protection by her Consul, and the police proceeded to remove her. It was then found that her house was held in the name of the subject of another nationality, whose Consulate declared itself incompetent to take action. Proceedings were threatened for violation of domicile, and the police were powerless to remove the individual.

But the evil effects of the Capitulations were not only apparent in the towns. They also extended to the country districts. In the province of Behera there were a number of farms, owned or rented by Europeans, which served as refuges, not only for the persons employed on the farms but for others living in the neighbourhood, when required by the Mudir to answer for an offence or for some unpleasant duty, such as the conscription. If a Sheikh was wanted on a charge, or for a duty, he retired into the house of a foreign proprietor till the person charged to bring him away, or to serve a notice, had left the locality.

If I have gone into this matter of international administration in some detail, it is in order to show something of the complicated machinery with which Lord Cromer and his British subordinates had to deal, and to draw attention to some of the means by which foreign obstructionists could hamper the reforming policy of the British Government.

From 1882 onwards the British Government gave it to be clearly understood that they intended to withdraw from Egypt as soon as they had discharged their responsibilities, but the significance of these responsibilities did not seem to be realized until time proved that evacuation meant one of two alternatives. Either Egypt would slip back into the morass out of which we were trying to drag her, or some other European Power would quickly take our place. So it became evident that we must remain in Egypt, in order to keep others out and to enable our policy of reform to have sufficient time to bear fruit. The longer we stayed the more obvious it became that we could not leave. As years passed, the necessity of British control became more manifest, and the powers eventually vested in Lord Cromer gave him a free hand to rule the country. That he carried out his task with singular success is all the more creditable because he was not vested in any real executive authority, and enjoyed no official

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precedence over the representatives of the other European Powers. Yet, his word was practically law throughout the length and breadth of the land, and what prestige he did not possess by virtue of official status he more than acquired by his force of character. The Egyptian Ministers held their portfolios at the will and pleasure of Lord Cromer, and although the Anglo-Egyptian officials were nominally subordinate to their Egyptian Ministers, the latter practically had to accept the advice offered or make room for someone else.

The British Government made no attempt to define the British position in Egypt, and it was perhaps as well that they took this course, for in such circumstances precise definitions are apt to bring trouble, and Lord Cromer's hands were full enough already. The fact was that we left the Egyptians in full possession of their executive authority, but we exercised a political influence which enabled us to control the affairs of the country. Even if the British Government had tried to find a formula defining the position, they would have found it exceedingly difficult, and would probably have been compelled to "coin" a special word to express a form of relationship, which existed nowhere else in the world. How often has one heard the question asked, "What exactly is our position in Egypt?" It was very difficult to find an answer, except during the period of the Protectorate. It has often occurred to me that "Influenza" might have served the purpose, if the doctors had not forestalled the politicians in the use of this term. It certainly possesses qualities sufficiently distasteful to appeal to the most fanatical Nationalist, and is un-British enough to soothe his susceptibilities.

Ever since 1882, with the exception of a short period of years, our relationships with the Egyptians have been unreal, and there is reason to attribute to this many of our difficulties in finding a solution of the Egyptian Question. In the early days of the Occupation, this unreality was also the source of many delicate situations. The Egyptian Government had entered into certain international engagements, which had to be carried out, while the British Government, with no official executive authority, had to discharge its obligations to Egypt and to the Powers in spite of what the Egyptians had contracted to do. The character of these engagements I have

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already described, and some of the Powers, jealous of Britain's special position in a country coveted by themselves, saw to it that they benefited, and we suffered, from what had been negotiated before we undertook a task from which every other country shrank at the critical moment. France was especially bitter at the consequences of her own folly, and never failed to show it in her true Gallic style, until danger from another quarter compelled her to work for the friendship of Great Britain. France's hopes of domination in Egypt had been shattered, and she had definitely lost a country which, according to her hereditary foreign policy (which never undergoes any perceptible change), was to form part of the great African Empire of the future. In these circumstances, France's attitude in regard to Egypt is easily understandable, but the form which this attitude took did not facilitate Lord Cromer's task. Where the French found any possible grounds for opposition, they opposed, and they jealously safeguarded their rights under previous treaties to the extent of becoming merely aimless obstructionists.

The Egyptians have talked a great deal of the independence which they enjoyed before the British occupation, but with the suzerain rights of the Sultan hanging over them, with the financial control over their finances in order to pay off the foreign debt, and with the numerous restrictions put upon them by the foreign Capitulations it is difficult to see what constituted that independence.

Lord Cromer succeeded in defeating any attempts on the part of the Sultan to increase his political power in Egypt, and he so regulated the finances of the country that the bondholders became no longer a menace to prosperity, but the yoke of the Capitulations was a matter with which he was not in a position to deal, as they could not even be modified without the consent of the Powers. His financial policy was to cut down expenditure wherever possible without impairing the productive powers of the country, but where he saw opportunities of spending money to a good and useful purpose he even resorted to further borrowing. He had a strong belief in the capabilities of the fellahin and did everything he could to further their interests and to obtain their goodwill, but he had no great liking for the Turkish ruling class who

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were afraid of losing the old privileges which they enjoyed in the bad days of Ismail.

In October, 1884, Lord Cromer reviewed the position. Before withdrawal was possible he considered it necessary to start Egypt on the high-road to good government, though it was difficult to reconcile that with the policy of early evacuation. He realized that, when once a European Power sets foot in a semi-civilized country, it is one thing to talk of withdrawal but a very different matter to put it into practice.

Ever since his appointment Lord Cromer had been struggling bravely with the internal difficulties, endeavouring to produce some definite line of action out of the ever-changing instructions of the British Government, and to raise the administration to a higher state of efficiency. Throughout the land there was a state of unrest, and British effort did not bring popularity to those who exerted it. The introduction of British officials and British influence into all the administrative departments was naturally resented by the Egyptian officials, and the removal of the customary abuses in the distribution of water was a source of grievance to the large landowners, who had been accustomed to use the water supply for their own benefit regardless of the needs of the fellahin. Even the peasants, who had reaped most benefit from the reforms, complained that the defeat of Arabi had enabled the Greek usurers to return and to press for claims, which these simple people thought had been miraculously wiped off by the recent revolt. Moreover, the Government was heading hard for bankruptcy, being quite unable to fulfil its obligations to the bondholders and meet the ordinary expenses of the administration. All departments were suffering from want of funds, and even salaries were in arrear.

The state of the Egyptian finances at the time of Lord Cromer's appointment had not improved since 1880, when the Law of Liquidation was framed. Expenses had been incurred owing to the Arabi rising, and indemnities were due for the destruction at Alexandria. The deficits for the years 1882 and 1883 had to be made up. The Sudan was a source of considerable loss, and was likely to be a continual drain on the financial resources until it was evacuated. The total estimated deficit up to the end of 1884 was £6,368,000. One of Lord

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Cromer's first steps towards reform had been an exhaustive inquiry into the expenditure in all departments. As the Law of Liquidation had been framed on the estimated expenditure of 1880, it was necessary to bring the estimates for 1884 down to this figure.

Staffs were cut down in many departments. The Ministry of Education was abolished, and afterwards became a department of the Ministry of the Interior, the Director receiving the same salary as the former Under-Secretary for that Ministry. Owing to this change alone, the education grant was reduced by £3,977. The Civil Lists of the Khedivial family were reduced, that of the Khedive and the Heir Apparent being cut down by 10 per cent., and it was arranged that, when deaths occurred, the allowances were not to be renewed in full to the heirs. Arrangements were also made for the sale of the Khedivial yacht, *Mahroussa*. Owing to the custom of rewarding long or efficient service by increase of salary, it was found that many officials were being excessively paid; these salaries were gradually reduced, while many highly-paid posts filled by Europeans were abolished. Investigation also showed that expenses for certain railway repairs were not met out of railway revenue, which went to the Commissioners of the Debt, but had to be defrayed out of insufficient administrative funds, with the result that by 1884 the necessary repairs had not been carried out and the railways had fallen into a deplorable condition. This position was amongst those regularized in 1885 by the provisions of the London Convention. Another case of flagrant waste existed in the maintenance of two warships at Alexandria and Port Said for saluting and other purposes, and their suppression saved the Treasury many thousands. A further £1,000 per annum was saved by suppressing the subsidy to the Havas Telegraphic Agency, and £100 per annum by stopping the contribution to the Khedivial Geographical Society, while as much as £10,000 was saved by sending the "Holy Carpet" to Mecca by sea instead of by road. It was also discovered that funds, which were gradually accumulating between payments by the Commissioners of the Debt, were lying idle at the Bank of England, and by utilizing the greater part of this money this deposit was augmented by £10,000 a year. But these are only a few

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examples of the way in which the Egyptians of that time conducted the finances of their country, and the simple methods by which great sums were saved.

Yet, with all the financial reforms that were carried out, the position was still serious, and it required the greatest possible skill to steer clear of bankruptcy with its inevitable sequel of international control.

The Government tried to stave off this financial crisis, but found themselves confronted with international difficulties. On the advice of Lord Northbrook, who was sent to Cairo in 1884 to examine the financial situation, certain revenues, which should have been paid into the *Caisse* for the benefit of the bondholders, were paid into the Treasury for the ordinary needs of the administration. France and Russia, however, protested, and resorted to the Mixed Tribunals, where they obtained judgment against the Egyptian Government. Fortunately for Egypt, the British Government succeeded in negotiating the London Convention of March, 1885, whereby some relief was given under the Law of Liquidation, and Egypt was enabled to raise a loan of £9,000,000. After paying out of the capital the sums required for the indemnities due for the burning of Alexandria and the deficits of the years 1882 and 1883, the Government still had a million in hand, which was wisely invested in the improvement of irrigation and greatly contributed to the country's salvation from bankruptcy and internationalism. The latter evil was much to be feared, for the London Convention provided for the appointment of another international commission if Egypt was still unable to pay her way at the end of two years.

In order to avoid this catastrophe, the British officials set to work with redoubled energy. Something had already been done in the way of economy and reform. The public accounts had been regularized, and the abuses in the collection of the land tax removed. The constant drain of money and men for the Sudan had been stopped. During the four years 1883-1886, the total deficit amounted to £2,606,000; in 1887 there was practical equilibrium; in 1888 there was a deficit of £53,000; in 1889 a surplus of £218,000; and from then onwards a surplus was always maintained. In 1889, Lord Cromer was able to state that, in spite of a bad Nile in 1888,

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(1) there was no floating debt ; (2) a reserve fund, intended to make up deficits in revenue devoted to the Debt, amounted to £610,000 ; (3) the working balance of £500,000, provided by the London Convention, had been increased by £161,000, the amount of the accumulated surpluses of the last three years. He further stated that, so long as the political situation underwent no radical change, it would take a series of untoward events seriously to endanger the stability of Egyptian finance and the solvency of the Government.

In 1895 the surplus amounted to over a million, while the revenue steadily rose to over £11,000,000 in 1897. By the time Lord Cromer left Egypt, the country had gained financial liberty and, although the *Caisse* still existed, its power to hinder Egyptian progress and reform had gone, and its functions were limited to the receipt of funds payable as interest on the Debt.

Once the financial situation of the country was assured, Lord Cromer was able to take steps to relieve the heavy burden of taxation which weighed chiefly on the poorer peasantry. At the time of the British occupation, not only were there innumerable taxes in every conceivable direction, but the collection of these taxes was largely in the hands of the Mudirs, who, for the most part, extorted what they thought fit from whom they thought fit, regardless of their legal rights in the matter. The chief source of revenue lay in the land tax, of which the average rate of assessment was P.T.128 per feddan on Kharadji and P.T.51 to 29 on Ouchouri lands.¹ The tax on Kharadji lands was very high and that on Ouchouri lands low, but what would appear to be the obvious course—to level up these land taxes—was a matter of considerable difficulty. The Ouchouri lands belonged to the influential class, and it was obvious that any such re-assessment would be a tedious and expensive undertaking. It was also found that taxes were being paid on lands which had already been utilized for railways, canals, etc., or had been eaten away by the Nile. Under this heading alone the taxes improperly levied amounted to no less than £100,000 per annum. In Upper Egypt the fellahin had to disgorge

¹ Ouchouri lands were supposed to pay a tithe to the State, while Kharadji lands were taxed at the will of the Government.

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about one third of their gross produce to meet the exactions of the land tax, and it was ascertained that it was just possible to continue at this rate, the financial state of the country not permitting of any immediate relief. But the control of taxation, whereby the peasants knew that they would only be called upon to pay the definite amount due, was in itself a great relief, and, wherever possible, minor taxation of an irritating and unproductive nature was remitted.

Amongst the many evils in the fiscal system was a tax on wells, which Lord Cromer considered objectionable in principle. In this case he did not resort to abolition, but satisfied himself with not pressing for its collection. The professional and salt taxes, which had practically developed into poll-taxes, were the subject of much abuse, but, as in many other cases, relief was to be found in their systematic control. In time, however, the professional tax was regularized, and the salt tax abolished in favour of a Government monopoly. In 1887, the house tax was paid for the first time by Europeans, and endeavours were made to extend to foreigners the taxes on carriages and beasts of burden. But, where taxation of foreigners was concerned, interminable negotiation with the Powers was necessary, and such reforms in this direction as Lord Cromer succeeded in carrying out were the result of no small effort on his part. Yet imposts, such as the stamp duty, were extended to Europeans, and everything possible was done to diminish the anomalous situation of foreigners in regard to taxation, which was not only very unjust but created amongst the Egyptians a very natural dislike for their more fortunate competitors.

The octroi dues constituted another glaring example of the system of taxation prevailing in Egypt. The British Consul at Suez reported that this tax was fixed arbitrarily by the collector, which led to so much abuse that the people of the desert actually drove their flocks and herds to Syria in order to avoid Suez, where 20 per cent. was added to the estimated value of the produce. Other hardships were the tax on fishing and a heavy tax on boats, the latter being only paid by Egyptians, while Europeans obtained most of the trade.

In 1890, provision was made for a remission of taxation

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amounting to £175,000, but the actual relief amounted to as much as £325,000. But efforts to relieve taxation did not always produce the desired or expected result. When the octroi duties were abolished at Cairo and Alexandria, it was expected that prices in these towns would gradually fall. In point of fact the very contrary was the case, and prices rose partly for the following reason. Whilst the octroi system was in existence, neighbouring cultivators having once brought their produce into town were obliged to sell it at whatever prices they could obtain. They could not, even if it were not speedily perishable, take it back to their villages and offer it for sale on some later day, without paying the duty over again. Hence they were, to a great extent, in the hands of the dealers. When the duty was removed, the cultivators refused to sell except on their own terms, with the foregoing result. But the measure was no less beneficial for this reason, as the ordinary law of supply and demand was permitted to operate unchecked. If Lord Cromer found it impossible, owing to the financial state of the country, to lift the actual burden of taxation to any great extent during the early years of reform, he certainly did much to mitigate the hardships of that taxation by exercising strict control over the collection of the taxes and by suppressing the gross irregularities with which the whole fiscal system was beset. This in itself was a notable achievement in an Oriental country where irregularity constituted the regular system of administration. Although reform of the fiscal system had to wait for the financial recovery of the country, considerable progress was made in other departments.

The department in which the most revolutionary changes took place was that of irrigation. The cultivable area in Upper Egypt, between Aswan and Cairo, is about 2,500,000 acres, while in the Delta it amounts to approximately 4,800,000 acres, making a total of about 7,300,000 acres. As the area of all Egypt amounts to over 500,000,000 acres, it will be seen that only a comparatively small proportion of this vast territory can be cultivated from the waters of the Nile. It is, therefore, on the development of irrigation that progressive prosperity mainly depends. There is little rain at any season of the year, and the water of the Nile is wholly responsible for

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great fertility in a land which would otherwise be a sandy desolation. Water supply for irrigation purposes directly affects all sections of the Egyptian people ; and control, in the upper reaches of the river, of the volume of Nile water which eventually flows through Egypt in the lower reaches, is a matter of the highest political importance. Nile water is as vital to the Egyptians as overseas food supply is to us in England. In Egypt the Nile and its water supply are subjects of immense interest and concern to every living soul, from the wealthy cotton merchant to the simple peasant. The question is discussed daily over coffee and cigarettes in every café from Cairo to Wadi Halfa. A "good Nile" brings wealth and prosperity, while a low flood is likely to involve the country in famine as well as in financial disaster. It was only the vast volume of water held up by the various barrages and the gigantic dam at Aswan that saved Egypt from destruction in 1913, when the Nile flood was the lowest for a hundred and fifty years. When it is realized that the Aswan dam now has a capacity of storing 2,400,000,000 tons of water, some idea is obtained of the power of irrigation to supply the water on which the Egyptians depend for their daily bread.

When Lord Cromer went to Egypt, the irrigation department was the most inefficient and corrupt in the whole Egyptian service. The necessity for drainage in a successful system of irrigation had been entirely overlooked. Where drains did exist, they had been neglected, abandoned or wrongly used for irrigation. The result was that much of the land of Lower Egypt had become soured and water-logged. Between 1880 and 1884 the number of employees had greatly increased in the Public Works Department, and the engineers in Cairo alone had risen from six to thirty-four in number, most of whom were quite inefficient. When Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff became Inspector-General of Irrigation, he recognized the similarity between the irrigation system of Egypt and that of Northern India. He, therefore, applied for four inspectors from India, to each of whom a definite area was allotted. These inspectors spent much time travelling between the villages, learning the wants and conditions of the people, and, as they quickly picked up some knowledge of Arabic, they succeeded in gaining the good-will of the peasantry. To these

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officials, as well as to their chief, was due the unqualified success which attended reforms in this department.

The first question with which the Inspector-General had to deal was the barrage at the head of the Delta. This great work consisted of two portions, a bridge of sixty-one arches over the Rosetta branch, and another of seventy-one arches over the Damietta branch of the Nile: These works were intended to hold up the low Nile to a height of 4.50 metres. While the Rosetta barrage alone had been used to hold up water to the extent of about 1.20 metres, the flow of ten of the arches of the Damietta barrage had subsided about a foot in 1867, which had apparently led the authorities to condemn the whole structure, and no attempt had been made to use it. The Egyptian Government declared it to be beyond repair, especially Ali Pasha Moubarek, the Minister of Public Works, who had spent most of his life in the Department, but confessed to Lord Cromer that he had not seen the barrage for twenty-seven years! A proposal was made to substitute a system of pumps for the district affected, but Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff was of the opinion that, in spite of its neglected condition, the barrage could be used; and, although everyone prophesied failure, he proceeded to convert his words into action. The behaviour of the barrage in June was to be the supreme test. If it failed, thousands of acres would be dried up. By May the water was held to a height of 2.25 metres and, in spite of frequent accidents to the defective gear, the barrage stood the strain. The relief of those responsible may well be imagined, and their success was instrumental in producing the largest cotton crop yet recorded.


From 1884 onwards the work of irrigation went steadily forward and, before the British engineers had been at work ten years, the crops were trebled, and the country was being gradually covered with a network of light railways and agricultural roads, by which the produce of the land could be brought to the markets. In 1902, the original and low-level dam at Aswan was completed, providing for the annual storage of 1,000,000,000 tons of water from the season of excess waters in the river, to be released again in the following spring and summer. The irrigation system of Egypt has had to withstand the tests of floods and low Niles, and its singular

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success under all circumstances shows the immense benefit conferred on Egypt by the efforts of British engineers.

In the provinces the local administration and the system of justice were deplorable. The Mudirs committed acts of oppression and illegality unrestrained and unpunished by the Central authorities. In their hands lay the power of administering justice, of collecting the taxes, and of providing men for the *corvée* and for the army. The Mudirs were omnipotent in their provinces. They were, indeed, responsible for everything that occurred, but provided that no serious outbreak took place and the taxes came in regularly, no questions were asked and their despotic authority remained unchallenged. The one principle of government was the curbash, arbitrary imprisonment and the application of torture. The police force was recruited from the dregs of the population. Badly officered and irregularly paid, this force was no protection to the country, and caused considerable distress to the village populations by its opportunities for plunder and exaction of bribes.

The three greatest abuses in the government of Egypt were the use of the curbash, the *corvée*, and corruption in the official classes, and one of the first steps taken was the abolition of the use of the curbash. This instrument of corporal punishment was used for the collection of taxes, the extortion of evidence and confessions, and on private estates. It was always used in connection with the *corvée*, or forced labour, and, although the Commissioners of the Debt had never allowed or recognized its use, the curbash was undoubtedly used on estates under their control up to March, 1883. Even after 1883, when it was formally suppressed by Khedivial Decree at the instigation of Lord Dufferin, this form of punishment was resorted to by the Inspectors of the Daira Sanieh, whose powers to punish offenders on estates under their control were grossly abused. The abolition of the curbash was of the nature of a social and administrative revolution, by which a code of criminal procedure was substituted. By 1884 its suppression was almost complete, and its use was mainly confined to secret floggings. Subordinate Egyptian officials fully realized that it was forbidden, but in Upper Egypt, where the new tribunals had not yet been established,



THE PYRAMIDS OF GIZA

Photo : R. H. Goodsall

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they risked punishment in relying on the curbash for the collection of taxes. It also continued to be used for some time in outlying districts, where the poorer peasantry did not dare to complain, and on private estates where its detection was unlikely.

The sudden suppression of the curbash among a people long accustomed to the use of the whip increased, for the moment, the difficulties of governing the country. It was regarded as a sign of Government weakness. The authority of the Mudirs and police was undermined, crime increased, the people failed to pay their taxes, and there was no means of obtaining evidence in criminal cases. Some Mudirs declined to carry out their duties, while others honestly did their best, but were not supported by the Sheikhs and had no longer the power to compel obedience. No respect was shown for the law, while arbitrary power had ceased to exist. In fact, crime was rampant throughout the provinces. To counteract this, Nubar Pasha established brigandage commissions in the provinces, when the use of the curbash was partially reintroduced and the tribunals were virtually in abeyance. A subsequent inquiry into the working of these commissions revealed that, not only were witnesses dispensed with, but proof of innocence was entirely disregarded, and the Minister of the Interior encouraged the use of torture to extract confessions. Even in 1891 Lord Cromer was not prepared to say definitely that the use of the curbash and other forms of torture had absolutely ceased, but only that it was of rare occurrence and was then carried out with great secrecy. This example goes far to show how difficult it proved to reform systems which had become deeply rooted in the administration of the country, and that time must pass before any definite or satisfactory result could be expected.

From the earliest days of Egyptian history the annual work of cleaning out the canals used for irrigating the land, had been carried out by means of the *corvée*, or forced labour. At the time of the British occupation, thousands of men were dragged from their homes every year, and were employed for months on the primitive task of scooping up mud with their hands from the bottom of the canals, often standing up to their waists in water and slush. They were worked from sunrise

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to sunset, with a brief interval for rest at mid-day, under overseers who did not hesitate to resort to the curbash. They had to sleep in the open, without even a sack for covering, and they had no food except what their friends provided. The chief cause of resentment, however, lay in the way in which this labour was requisitioned. While the wealthy landowner succeeded in obtaining exemption for himself and his labourers, the burden of the work fell on the poorer peasants.

Under Ismail, the *corvée* was used, not only for the general welfare of the community, but also for work in sugar factories and on his private estates. With the British occupation, forced labour in the factories and on the estates ceased, but a substitute had to be found for the work of canal-cleaning before it was possible to dispense with it altogether. With the abolition of the curbash, the incentive to work was removed, and it was obvious that the *corvée* must go also. Moreover, *corvée* labour was unsatisfactory owing to its slowness, uncertainty and necessary supervision; and it was clear that the work could be done much more expeditiously by mechanical means, if only the necessary money to provide these means were to be forthcoming. While international wranglings on this subject were in progress, Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff led the way by widely extending the privilege of ransom to important landowners in proportion to their holdings, and with the funds thus obtained he gradually supplied dredgers and paid gangs to do the work. But an annual sum of about £400,000 was required in order to dispense entirely with this form of *corvée*, and the administrative expenditure had been strictly limited by the Law of Liquidation. The foregoing efforts could not, by themselves, solve so great and comprehensive a problem.

After prolonged discussion, the annual expenditure of £250,000 was authorized by a Decree approved by the Commissioners, and Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff's action in reducing the *corvée* was in anticipation of the Powers' sanction, which was unexpectedly withheld by France. At one time the only alternatives were bankruptcy and a return to the *corvée* system. As the latter was obviously the lesser of the two evils, a public notice of its revival was issued in the hope of arousing public opinion in Egypt and in England. A fortnight later France

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agreed to the Decree, provided that all Public Works expenditure was virtually placed under the control of the Commissioners. To this the British Government refused to consent, but arranged that, if necessary, the payment due to the British Treasury in respect of the Suez Canal shares should be suspended. By this means the £250,000 was assured, but it was not until the death of Tewfik Pasha in 1892 that the final abolition of the *corvée* was brought about. The accession of the new Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, was celebrated by devoting to this purpose some of the money resulting from loan conversion, and even then French consent had to be bought by the abolition of the Professional Tax, which, when extended to foreigners, had become very unpopular with the Capitulatory Powers. By this means the *corvée* was abolished for dredging purposes, and was only applied in the case of watchmen during the Nile flood-time. This work was of such vital importance to the country that, although the workers were eventually paid, the undertaking could not with safety be handed over to contractors.

Native justice was in a pathetic state. The Kadis, or religious judges, dealt with all questions relating to marriage, guardianship, property, etc., while the Native Tribunals, which were gradually developing, had jurisdiction over other matters of a civil or commercial nature. At first the judges had no special legal training, and there was no fixed code nor any definite scale of fees, so that bribery and corruption were general. In the Department of Justice it was more a question of building up than of reforming the system, and here Lord Cromer met with unexpected opposition from Nubar Pasha, the Prime Minister, who as result of the conflict retired in June, 1888. Riaz Pasha succeeded Nubar, and remained in office till May, 1891, during which period much progress was made in the work of reform until a difference of opinion arose over the appointment of Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Scott as judicial adviser to the Khedive. Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, however, who followed Riaz, worked well with the British officials and co-operated with British policy. It was then that the reform of the Native Tribunals was seriously undertaken. The existing procedure was simplified and accelerated; the work of the Courts was much improved by a

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carefully organized system of inspection and control; the incompetent judges were replaced by men of better education and higher moral character; and for the future supply of well qualified judges, barristers and law officials an efficient school of law was established.

Other Departments of the Interior were in a condition which is almost unbelievable. The prisons, which were full of people who had been in custody for months, or even years, awaiting trial, were greatly overcrowded. Not only was the food wholly inadequate and the general suffering very great, but the bastinado was frequently applied, and stocks and even torture were not unknown. The condemned criminal and the innocent man awaiting trial were herded together, without sufficient clothing and with no certain prospect of release or trial. For months the mass of the prisoners lived like wild beasts, ignorant of the fate of their families, and bewailing their own. From the moment of entering prison, even on the most trifling charge, they considered themselves lost. The one power that could release them was money, and that they did not possess. They had no idea when the cases in the district would be cleared off, or when the slow march of administration would finally reach them. It might be weeks, it might be months, and it might be years; many of them had long ceased to care which.

No less urgent was the need for reform in matters of sanitation. The miserable mud huts, without any ventilation, were surrounded by heaps of manure, which the fellah apparently preferred to keep as near to his dwelling-place as possible. His hut usually contained his family, his live-stock, and an indescribable odour. There were no latrines in the villages, and the bank of the canal, from which drinking water was obtained, was used for the performance of the functions of nature, for the reception of all manner of filth, and for the slaughtering of animals. Mosques, both in town and country, are all provided with a basin for ablution, and in those days the water was only changed once in three months. Around this basin were placed a number of foul latrines communicating with a common drain, which in most cases ran into the tank or canal from which the drinking supply of the neighbourhood was obtained. The sanitary condition of the towns and

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villages was bad beyond description, and was the cause of great mortality. The hospitals were overcrowded, and the patients suffered from want of ventilation, from want of cleanliness, and from want of efficient medical assistance. The state of the lunatic asylums was even worse. The unfortunate inmates were kept half-starved, half-naked, and sometimes fettered and manacled more like animals than human beings. The native doctors in government employment were for the most part grossly ignorant, while the number of European doctors was quite insufficient for the work which had to be done.

The reform of the prisons was undertaken by Coles Pasha, who saw that the old buildings were gradually improved and that proper sanitation was introduced. The prisoners were divided into grades, were supplied with proper food and clothing, and many abuses were suppressed. As soon as funds were available, new prisons were constructed, a special institution was provided for women, and a reformatory for juvenile offenders was set up. It was found, however, that with the improvement of the prisons and the abolition of the curbash the fear of imprisonment diminished, with a consequent increase of crime. To remedy this a system of hard labour and solitary confinement was instituted, and many of the prisoners were taught trades.

With regard to the Medical Administration, the progress made was at first slow, owing to political reasons, but British perseverance had its reward. The School of Medicine in Cairo was put on a sound basis ; the hospitals were improved, increased in number, and gradually supplied with the necessary equipment. Dispensaries were opened in several centres ; vaccination and other methods for dealing with epidemics were carried out amongst the Egyptian population ; a vigorous campaign was commenced against the ravages of ophthalmia ; the lunatic asylum in Cairo was placed under a British specialist and was entirely reformed. In fact, by 1889, the hospital and lunatic asylum in Cairo could be said to compare favourably with similar institutions in Europe, and the native doctors were gradually becoming more proficient. As was to be expected, sanitary reform could not be a rapid process in an Oriental country, and the proper sanitation of large towns

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could not be undertaken until funds were available. But, meanwhile, much was done to improve existing conditions. The water supply of the principal towns was taken in hand ; the mosque latrines were no longer allowed to drain into the Nile or the canals ; and in most towns the mosques themselves were put in a satisfactory state of sanitation. A beginning was made to improve the conditions of the villages, and, as funds became available, the Government extended its activities in this direction.

A subject of very special importance in Egypt was that of education. If a policy of " Egypt for the Egyptians," in the truest and only practicable sense of the term, was to be carried into execution, it could only be done by gradually educating the rising generation of Egyptians to a standard which would enable them to occupy, with advantage to their country, the numerous administrative posts then held by Europeans. Moreover, if the Moslems, who constituted the majority of the population of Egypt, wished to hold their own against their Christian fellow-countrymen, they would only be able to do so by raising their level of education to that of their competitors. During the early days of the Occupation the Education Department was crippled through want of funds and by the inconsistent policy of the Pashas. In twenty-nine years the Minister (or Director-General) of Public Instruction changed twenty-nine times, and these frequent changes in policy proved a great obstacle to progress. The Pashas realized that in education lay the only means by which Egypt could throw off the yoke of foreign control, but their prejudices and ignorance of educational administration prevented them from realizing their own desires.

At the time of the British occupation there took place an intellectual awakening in Egypt, chiefly owing to the fact that government employment was much sought after by a large section of the upper and middle classes, and for this a certain standard of education was now necessary. For this reason the British reformer was fortunate in the material with which he had to deal. Even the villages of Upper Egypt were clamouring for schools, and parents were found to be willing to pay for their sons' tuition. By 1906, 4,554 village schools were either directly under government control or under depart-

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mental inspection for grants-in-aid. The quality of instruction improved year by year, and the personal influence of European teachers steadily raised the general level of the schools. Good progress was also made in technical education, and in 1898 even the authorities of El-Azhar University applied for the services of thirteen professors from the government schools, to give instruction in mathematics, geography, history, etc. In the same year Lord Cromer reported that evidence was forthcoming of the capability of the Egyptian schools and colleges to turn out a number of young men who would be able to take a useful and honourable part in the administration of their own country. But the question of most importance was whether the Egyptians were developing in character as well as in the acquirement of knowledge. That they benefited in this direction from the influence of British officials, from the suppression of abuses, and from an atmosphere of European morality and justice there is no doubt, but in an Oriental country one has to wait a long time for results. Some of these results are only now beginning to show themselves.

In the space at my disposal it has only been possible to touch on a few of the more important reforms carried out by Lord Cromer, and to give a short account of the changes which were brought about. His task was a colossal one, and throughout he upheld the finest traditions of the British race. On his arrival in Egypt, he first concentrated his attention on the essential and urgent question of finance, realizing that on the restoration of the financial position all future progress depended. He then turned to irrigation, and spent freely, even to the extent of borrowing, in order to increase as soon as possible the productive powers of the country. He wisely took the view that without money and without sufficient water little could be done to set Egypt on her feet, but that such matters as the reform of the systems of justice, education, and the administrative services were not determining factors in the immediate fate of the country as a whole. To the latter he gave his careful attention from the outset, but it was not until funds became available that his more significant reforms could be carried out in these departments, although a gradual but solid improvement was noticeable from year to year.

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In the essential matter of irrigation his reforms were radical ; in the other departments they represented a happy blending of European solidity with the slow and gradual processes of the East. Egypt is a country with a strong recuperative power, and in this Lord Cromer had nature on his side, but the chief instrument in his hand was the presence of the British garrison. Quick to notice opportunities for reform, yet slow to interfere with systems based on time-honoured customs or traditions, Lord Cromer cautiously moulded Egypt after his own fashion. His personal example was among the greatest benefits with which he endowed the people of Egypt. Personality counts for much in the East, and in the circumstances of Lord Cromer's tenure of office it was a most prominent factor. It was Lord Cromer, not the British Agent-General, who ruled Egypt.

Although his work was finished in 1907, some of its results are only now becoming apparent, while others may not show themselves in the character of the Egyptian people until the next generation, or even the generation after that. But the seed sown by Lord Cromer on the fertile banks of the Nile will continue to bear fruit, sometimes slowly and at other times more rapidly, until Egypt gradually awakens to a new consciousness in which the political principles underlying his policy are reproduced in the Egyptian mind. No words of mine can convey the significance of Lord Cromer's work in Egypt. Examples of it stand out in bold relief throughout the land, from the great dams and barrages of the Nile to the humblest village of Upper Egypt or the Delta. But Lord Cromer was the first to acknowledge the valuable services rendered by others. Not only must the credit for the regeneration of Egypt be shared by the fine body of British officials who worked as his subordinates, but also by many Egyptians, whose helpful co-operation contributed in no small degree to the success of the undertaking. Although Lord Cromer supplied the master mind which guided Egypt through those times of distress and anxiety, it should not be forgotten that a vast amount of honourable and useful work was done by the Egyptians themselves, both in the Ministries in Cairo and among the hard-working people of the Nile valley.

CHAPTER VII

LORD CROMER AND HIS SUCCESSORS

THE reforming policy of Lord Cromer and the activity of the British officials naturally caused some reaction among the Egyptians, and gave rise to definite opposition in certain quarters. Nubar Pasha saw the necessity of a British army of occupation to maintain order, but, as Prime Minister, he resented the fact that the administration of the country was not in his own hands. He liked the personnel of the British army, but he was constantly opposed to Lord Cromer and to the British civilians in the Egyptian service, whom he regarded as intruders in what he viewed as his own preserve. He chiefly objected to direct interference in the provincial administration and the native tribunals, and for a time his opposition was successful. Riaz Pasha, on the other hand, was a strong Moslem, who looked upon European and Christian intervention as an evil from which no good was likely to come. Yet he honestly tried to co-operate with Lord Cromer, although his conservative character made it difficult for him to conform to the changing conditions of his country. These two Ministers represented two very different schools of thought. While Nubar recognized that European civilization was the only true one, Riaz was a firm believer in the system of Islam, and almost believed in the regeneration of Egypt without European assistance at all. But although Egyptian ministers such as these I have mentioned possessed qualities that made it difficult to establish mutual confidence, they possessed certain administrative attainments which were of considerable value. It was not, however, until Mustapha Fehmi took office in 1895 that Lord Cromer found an Egyptian Prime Minister who was statesman-like enough to realize that the best interests

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of his country lay in co-operation with the British officials instead of opposition to them.

During these years the Khedive Tewfik could be counted upon for loyal support, and, although he was lacking in initiative, he often displayed a good deal of shrewdness and common sense. He disliked responsibility and preferred to transfer burdens to the shoulders of others, but he honestly wished to do his duty to his country. But if he did not actively further British efforts to lay the foundations of prosperity in Egypt, he did not place obstacles in the way of reform. Tewfik allowed Egypt to be reformed in spite of the Egyptians, of whose characteristics he had a profound and valuable knowledge. His death in 1892 came at a time when Egypt was just beginning to benefit from the British administration, and in these circumstances was a loss to Egypt.

Tewfik Pasha was succeeded by his son Abbas Hilmi, who was educated in Vienna and returned to Egypt with Austrian ideas of military autocracy, and perhaps Lord Cromer made a mistake in his early treatment of Abbas, who was very young and, so to speak, straight from school. Lord Cromer told the new Khedive that he was there to help, if ever he wanted advice, and then left him to himself, with the result that he soon fell under the influence of foreign and other intriguers and resented British guidance of any sort. Had Lord Cromer been more considerate, sympathetic, and helpful, it is possible that our subsequent troubles with Abbas might have been averted. At first he failed to appreciate the peculiar situation in which he was placed as the ruler of a country under British protection, and his desire to free himself from foreign control caused him to dismiss Mustapha Pasha Fehmi and to appoint in his place Fakhri Pasha, who was not a *persona grata* at the British Agency. This high-handed action on the part of the young Khedive could not be overlooked by the British representative, who saw in it dangerous symptoms of an intention to return to an autocratic system of government. Abbas Hilmi was, therefore, made to understand that he must not make such changes in the administration without a previous agreement with the representative of the protecting Power, and a compromise was effected by which Fakhri Pasha retired and was succeeded

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by Riaz. But this was not the end of Abbas Hilmi's opposition. For some time he continued his attempts to liberate himself from all control, and secretly encouraged a Nationalist and anti-British agitation in the local press. Having no sympathy with the democratic tendencies of this movement, he tried with some success to divert it into anti-British channels, and to increase his own personal authority at the expense of his Ministers, who were regarded as instruments of British control. Gradually he realized his mistaken policy, and accordingly refrained from actions likely to invite complaint or protest. In the same way relations between British officials and their Egyptian colleagues became more cordial, so that it was at last found possible to reform the local administration in the provinces in accordance with the recommendations of Mr. (afterwards Sir) Eldon Gorst, who had been appointed Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior.

Meanwhile, international affairs in Europe were taking a turn which was to bring great and far-reaching relief to Egypt. The natural irritation in France resulting from the British occupation of the Nile valley and our failure to withdraw the British garrison from Egypt, which had become modified with the passage of time, had burst out afresh at the time of the Fashoda incident,¹ and had been augmented by the Boer War of 1899-1902. But, during the year 1903, a great change came over Anglo-French relations with the inception of the Entente Cordiale, so that the statesmen of both countries were enabled to complete negotiations settling many points in dispute between the two nations. On the 8th April, 1904, a "Declaration" was signed by the representatives of France and Great Britain which virtually recognized the dominant position of France in Morocco and of Great Britain in Egypt. The chief provisions concerning Egypt were :

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation, or in any other manner.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of treaties, conventions and usage, enjoys in Egypt.

¹ *Vide* Chapter VIII.

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Similar declarations and arrangements were made by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy; and annexed to the Anglo-French Agreement was the text of a proposed Khedivial Decree, altering the relations between Egypt and the foreign bondholders, while the British Government agreed to put the Suez Canal Convention of 1884 into force, thus guaranteeing its free passage in peace or war to all vessels, without distinction of flag.

The combined effect of the Declaration and the Khedivial Decree was greatly to extend the facilities enjoyed by the British and Egyptian Governments for securing the material, if not the moral, development of Egypt. The Agreement put an end to an anomalous situation and practically legalized the presence of Great Britain in Egypt, removing all ground for the reproach that she was not respecting her international obligations. It was in fact a European recognition that Britain was the protecting power in Egypt. It closed a question which had long embittered the relations between England and France, and in Egypt it stopped the systematic opposition of the French to everything tending to strengthen the British position. Scarcely less important were the results of the Khedivial Decree, by which Egypt secured financial independence. The power of the *Caisse de la Dette*, which had virtually controlled the execution of the international agreements concerning the finances, was swept away, and of the fifty-two Khedivial Decrees relating to the Egyptian Debt forty-six were wholly or partially repealed. To all intents and purposes it could be said that the whole of the law regulating the relations between the Egyptian Government and the holders of Egyptian Guaranteed, Preference and Unified Stocks was contained in the Khedivial Decree of the 28th November, 1904, which was published with the consent of the Powers, and came into operation on the 1st January, 1905. For the first time since 1875 Egypt was free to control her own revenue. In return she pledged the greater part of the land tax to the service of the Debt, and the functions of the *Caisse* were confined to the receipt of the funds necessary for this service. It could no longer interfere in the machinery of government, and about £10,000,000, consisting of accumulated surpluses in the hands of the *Caisse* after meeting

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the charges of the Debt, were handed over to the Egyptian Treasury. The Egyptian Government were, therefore, free to take full advantage of the financial prosperity of the country.

Lord Cromer's tenure of office was now drawing to a close, and slow but steady progress had been made on the road towards self-government. The Legislative Council had passed through three distinct stages. For the first few years of the British Occupation it attracted little notice. The country was in danger of being throttled by bankruptcy, while the affairs of the Sudan occupied so prominent a place in Egyptian politics as almost to monopolize the attention of the Government and the public. The second phase began about 1892, when the Council drifted into an attitude of hostility to the Government. This phase, however, was of short duration, and gave place to a third phase which promised well for the future. The members of the Legislative Council showed a hearty desire to co-operate with the Government in the cause of Egyptian reform, and their advice was frequently sought and readily given. Whereas the opposition policy of the Council created a tendency to ignore the views which it expressed, the abandonment of that policy led to its increased influence in connection with the various subjects which came under discussion. In fact, in 1906 most of the recommendations made by the Council were adopted either in whole or in part, while the remainder were either postponed on financial grounds or reserved for future consideration.

But one of the most encouraging features was to be found in local self-government, which Lord Dufferin regarded as "The fittest preparation and most convenient stepping stone for anything approaching to a constitutional régime." The creation and extension of municipalities in the provincial towns was arousing the interest of the inhabitants, but the Capitulations, which made it practically impossible to impose municipal taxation from which foreigners could remain exempt, barred the way to further progress. Hence, in most cases it was only possible to create municipalities where the inhabitants voluntarily imposed taxes on themselves. The important town of Mansourah was the first to adopt this system in 1896, and by the year 1906 five other important towns had followed the example of establishing mixed Municipal

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Commissions, on which Egyptians and foreigners sat together, the Central Government making certain contributions to their expenditure. In 1906 the estimated expenditure in these towns was in the aggregate £E77,900, of which £E21,500 was contributed by the Government. The remainder constituted the receipts derived from local taxes, collected by the Municipal authorities with the consent of the taxpayers. The Municipal Commissions in these towns were made up of the Mudir as President, and of four European and four Egyptian members who were elected. At the same time, Local Commissions, which had the same powers as the Mixed Commissions, except in regard to municipal finance, were introduced in twenty-seven smaller towns with the object of stimulating their interest in the management of their own affairs, but in all these cases the Government had to defray all expenditure. The Mudir was the President of these Commissions; an Inspector of the Public Health Department, one of the Ministry of the Interior, and another of the Ministry of Public Works, were *ex officio* members; and four other members were elected.

The departure of Lord Cromer on the 6th May, 1907, after having occupied the position of His Majesty's Agent-General in Egypt for twenty-four years, marked an epoch in the annals of modern Egypt. The achievements effected during this period are among the most remarkable in history, and Lord Cromer's work was suitably acknowledged at an enthusiastic and representative meeting held in the Opera House at Cairo, when he delivered his farewell address to an audience representative of all sections of the community.

Sir Eldon Gorst, who succeeded Lord Cromer, had not the authority required to exercise the same close supervision and personal influence over a system which was beginning to split up into groups often divided by personal antagonisms. His predecessor had shouldered the heavy burden of administrative reform, and had chosen as his subordinates men amongst whom Sir Eldon Gorst had worked. The new Agent-General, therefore, found himself at the head of a body of officials imbued with the principles and methods of their former chief, and he had not enough prestige to manage the machine single-handed as Lord Cromer had done. Yet his tenure of office,

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though short, was marked by important events in the advancement of Egypt.

In 1907, the British Government held the opinion that, with the end of Anglo-French rivalry, the Egyptians might be granted greater freedom of action in matters of policy and administration. While it was admitted that there would be less efficiency, it was argued that, by relaxing British control, the Egyptian people would be enabled to assume a certain degree of responsibility as a definite step towards self-government. But it seemed to have escaped the memories of the authorities in England that European control had been imposed a few years before the Occupation, in order to check the autocratic power of a former Khedive, and that any relaxation of that control was playing into the hands of Abbas Hilmi, who was only too anxious to regain the form of despotism which was the privilege of his predecessors. Too much faith was placed in the powers of the representative bodies, which had been set up on Lord Dufferin's recommendations and were as yet insufficiently developed to exercise any control. They succumbed to the assaults of Egyptian Nationalism, a force which the Khedive found very useful as a means of intriguing against British supervision.

But Sir Eldon Gorst, following the British Government's liberal policy, earnestly applied himself to a scheme for the development of local self-government. He held the view that, if anything was to be done to meet the desire of certain sections of the population to participate more fully in public affairs, it should be carried out by modifying the composition and functions of the Provincial Councils, with a view to enlarging their scope. He considered that the country was not ripe for constitutional government, but that the gradual development and extension of Municipalities and Provincial Councils would provide those who aspired to autonomy with a suitable outlet for their activity, and prepare them for the exercise of more responsible functions later on. These Provincial Councils were the outcome of the Organic Law of 1883, and their principal duty had been to elect from amongst their own members representatives for the Legislative Council ; but the fact that they were only to meet when summoned by decree prevented them from exercising any continuous

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influence over the affairs of the province. In order to meet the most reasonable demands for reform, the property qualification was halved for those who held higher education certificates, the official element was reduced, and although the Mudir was to remain *ex-officio* President of the Council, he henceforth had to summon meetings on the requisition of one-third of the members. The powers of the Councils were enlarged, most of all in regard to elementary education and trade schools, in which the people were now taking a considerable interest, and they were enabled to make representations on questions of agriculture, irrigation, public health, etc., occurring within their own provinces. In the matter of finance the Capitulations proved an obstacle in the way, but certain tentative powers were conferred upon the Councils. Subject to the control of the Ministry of Education, they could establish or take over schools, and could make grants-in-aid to those already established. The measure was undoubtedly a step forward, and it was finally promulgated in June, 1908, after discussions lasting nearly two years.

But, although steady progress had been made in the gradual development of the Legislative Council and General Assembly, and the suggestions of these bodies had always received careful consideration at the hands of the Government, which had adopted many of their proposals, they were by 1910 showing an increasing tendency to become mere instruments of the Nationalist agitation against British control. Their repeated demands for full constitutional government, the acrimonious attacks on the Government in connection with the Budget and the Sudan, and the unreasonable hostility and suspicion displayed in the discussion of other matters, were simply outbursts of anti-British sentiments stirred up by the Nationalist party. The main idea of that party was to bring the Occupation to an end by making its task impossible, and the chief methods employed consisted in undermining the influence of the Anglo-Egyptian officials by constant abuse, insulting all Egyptians who were not antagonistic to British control, and inciting to disorder whenever an opportunity offered. In the execution of this programme the General Assembly and Legislative Council lent their aid, with the result that their newly acquired importance was used as a weapon against

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those to whom they owed these benefits. Instead of contributing to the work of government through reasonable discussion by partisans of various views, the Legislative Council was animated by a violent hostility to the Council of Ministers and their British advisers, and deliberately set itself to thwart and impede them, and to render the business of government impossible. The moderate minority, if indeed there was one, allowed itself to be dominated by the extremists, and the Legislative Council ceased to perform the function allotted to it in the constitution devised by Lord Dufferin. In February, 1910, Boutros Pasha Ghali, the Prime Minister, was murdered for political reasons; and the Nationalist party not only paid for the defence of the assassin but tried to arouse sympathy for him among the lower and middle classes. For this outrage the leaders of the Nationalist party were morally responsible, as they have also been responsible for subsequent outrages of a similar nature.

Since the beginning of the Occupation, British policy had been based on the fundamental idea of preparing the Egyptians for self-government, while helping them in the meantime to enjoy the benefits of good government. During the earlier years, Lord Cromer's attention was taken up with rectifying the disastrous results of misgovernment, but latterly he had been considering what steps were possible to associate the Egyptians more directly with the conduct of their own affairs. At this stage in the evolution of political Egypt setbacks were to be expected, and it so happened that Sir Eldon Gorst had to bear the brunt of what must be regarded as a natural turn in the course of events. Many have attributed these setbacks to shortcomings in his policy and administration, but I think that this is an erroneous view. The difficulties which faced him in the execution of the policy of the British Government were calculated to cause a temporary check in the advance of reform. Sir Eldon Gorst faced these difficulties and overcame many of them, often in the most adverse circumstances, and much of his work was unrecognized. But it was none the less valuable. Egyptian Ministers and officials were encouraged to take more responsibility and initiative in the affairs of the country; the Legislative Council and the General Assembly, though not really representative of the country, were given an

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opportunity of making their voice heard in matters of importance ; and the Provincial Councils became a real factor in local government. But the new Agent-General was confronted with a new power in Egyptian affairs, which had not really developed before his arrival. Egyptian Nationalism had asserted itself in such a way that the policy of ruling the country in co-operation with Egyptian Ministers became incompatible with that of encouraging the development of so-called representative institutions. So far as the Legislative Council and General Assembly were concerned, the liberal experiment was a failure. The adoption of this policy was attributed both by the Egyptians and by the Europeans to weakness, to an attempt to pacify the Nationalist agitation by ill-timed concessions, and to an intentional diminution of British authority. The general acceptance of this idea was, of course, fatal to the success of the experiment. British policy was misinterpreted, and led those who demanded the immediate establishment of full representative government to suppose that their interests would be furthered by agitation against the British Occupation. This delusion was mainly the outcome of two entirely different points of view. In the first place, the Nationalists tried to justify their political existence by pretending that every concession was directly attributable to their efforts ; while certain sections of the local European press proclaimed each successive step as a sign of weakness and an attempt to pacify the extreme partisans of Egyptian autonomy both at home and in Egypt. Yet Sir Eldon Gorst realized that it was perhaps inevitable that an attempt to bring about more sympathetic relations between the occupying Power and the Egyptian people would at first be mistaken for weakness ; and he rightly regarded this failure in the light of its future value. If it removed similar misunderstandings in the future, it would be the means of helping the Egyptians through a necessary stage in their political education.

Before going any further into the events of this important phase of Egyptian affairs, it is as well to realize the nature of Egyptian Nationalism as manifested at this particular period. Egyptian Nationalism may be regarded as an expression of two definite ideals, that of Pan-Islamism and that of purely

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national aspirations. The two movements were, in fact, merged into each other, and it is difficult to say where one began and the other ended. Pan-Islamism is generally considered to mean a combination of all the Moslem Powers to resist the advances of the Christian Powers, but in reality it cannot be regarded as having much material substance, owing to the doubtful possibility of Moslem co-operation and cohesion when once it becomes a question of passing from words to deeds. Moreover, it is a convenient phrase for conveying a number of other ideas more or less connected with its primary meaning, but often indefinable in themselves. One characteristic feature of Pan-Islamism generally is that it seldom, if ever, stands alone. It is usually brought into play in support of some other ideal, and often provides a powerful backing to movements which would otherwise lack substance. Although Pan-Islamism is always at hand as a stiffening agent in case of need, it cannot be regarded as a self-contained power of serious significance in the East. In the first place, it meant in Egypt more or less complete subserviency to the Sultan of Islam, in marked contrast to the sentiments that animated the Arabi movement, which was in its essence directed against Turkey and the Turks. In the second place, it meant a revival of racial and religious animosity. While many of its adherents were inspired by genuine religious fervour, others, from political and opportunist motives, or from having assimilated modern ideas on the subject of religious toleration, would have been willing to separate the political from the religious and even from the racial issues if this were possible. But unless they could convince the Moslem masses of their militant Islamism, they could not arrest their attention nor attract their sympathy. Appeals to racial and religious passions were, therefore, a necessity in the interests of the political programme. In the third place, Pan-Islamism signifies an attempt to regenerate Islam on Islamic lines, or in other words to revive in the twentieth century the principles laid down more than a thousand years ago for the guidance of a primitive society. These principles involve a recognition of conditions which clash with modern ideas, and have done so much to arrest progress in those countries whose populations have embraced the Moslem faith. It is for these reasons,

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independent of any political considerations, that Pan-Islamism finds no favour in the eyes of those who are interested in the work of reform in an Oriental country. It is not at all an easy matter to separate the Pan-Islamic element from the purely national element in Egypt, as one might almost say that the one is the complement of the other.¹

The rise of political Nationalism was due to a variety of causes, and differed from the Nationalism of the Arabi movement in that the latter represented the demands and aspirations of the fellahin, while the former expressed those of a new class of *intelligenza* which was rapidly growing up in Egypt. Nationalism had been revived in a new aspect, partly as result of the policy adopted towards its original manifestation. Whereas its original form was essentially Egyptian, its second edition was largely of European extraction. The recollection of past abuses was rapidly fading away, and the people failed to realize that they could under any conditions return. Education had naturally awakened ambitions which were formerly dormant. The most humble fellah now knew that in the eye of the law he was the equal of the Pasha. A spirit of independence, which had formerly been conspicuous by its absence, was being created. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the youth of the country, which was gradually being impregnated with Western ideas, should begin to clamour for a greater share in the government and administration. While in principle these sentiments were worthy of encouragement, any attempt to give general satisfaction to the Nationalist demand for constitutional government would have been to invite disaster. It was more than absurd to suggest that a country that had for centuries been exposed to the worst forms of misgovernment and in which, ten years previously, only 9·5 per cent. of the men and 3 per cent. of the women could read and write, was capable of suddenly springing into a position which would enable it to exercise full rights of autonomy with advantage to itself and to others interested in its welfare. In the form in which it was expressed Lord Cromer saw little or no hope in Egyptian

¹ The French attach undue importance to Pan-Islamic influences, which may account to some extent for their misjudgment of certain Oriental situations.

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Nationalism, and he considered that the only possible Egyptian Nationality which could ever be created must consist of all the dwellers in Egypt, irrespective of race, religion or extraction. So long as the régime of the Capitulations existed in its present form, it was evident that not only must the Egyptians and the foreigners resident in Egypt continue to be divided from one another, but no thorough solidarity of interests could be established between the various communities of Europeans. Lord Cromer held the view that cohesion could only be secured by the creation of a local International Legislative Council, and that this would be the first step towards the formation of an Egyptian national spirit in the only sense in which that spirit could be evoked without detriment to the true interests of the country. Even at the time of writing this question remains unsolved, and the future may prove that Lord Cromer's view was the right one. In a previous chapter I have referred to the teaching of Sheikh Mohammed Abdu which aimed at the reform of various Moslem institutions without shaking the main pillars on which the faith of Islam rested. The late Mufti's followers were truly Nationalists in the sense of wishing to advance the interests of their countrymen and co-religionists without being tainted with Pan-Islamism. Their programme, moreover, favoured co-operation with Europeans in the introduction of Western civilization into the country. In this party Lord Cromer saw the main hope of Egyptian Nationalism, and this is what led to the appointment of Sa'ad Pasha Zaghlul as Minister of Education. With his undoubted attainments, it is to be regretted that this notable Egyptian did not continue to follow the course of this moderate and practical school of Nationalist thought, but became a leader of the most extreme opponents of British policy, only to return to his more moderate ways of thinking a few months before his death.

By 1908 the general movement against autocratic government in the neighbouring Moslem countries had its effect on public opinion in Egypt, which was more especially impressed by the revolutionary changes which had occurred within the Ottoman Empire itself. Although the great mass of the Egyptian population was unaffected by political issues and was entirely engrossed in agricultural pursuits, there

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existed amongst the better educated sections of society a limited but gradually increasing class, which took an interest in the government and administration of the country. While the aspirations of this class to hasten the time when Egypt would be able to govern herself without outside assistance was perfectly healthy in principle, certain enthusiasts went to the length of insisting that the country had already reached the stage when parliamentary institutions could be introduced without endangering the reforms achieved in the last twenty-five years. Although the conditions of Turkey and Egypt were entirely different, the fact that parliamentary government had been peaceably established in the former country gave considerable encouragement to those in the latter, who believed that Egypt was ripe for a similar régime. The idea rapidly spread that a constitution would bring about the millennium, but these people were quite unable to grasp that further constitutional advances could not be made until it was sufficiently proved that the institutions already created were working in a satisfactory manner. But although the extreme Nationalists made a good deal of noise they did not represent a large body of opinion in the country, and the hostility of the Nationalist press towards the Khedivate tended to reduce their numbers to the student class, who tried to make up for their youth and inexperience by a display of political activity. Much harm was done by the less reputable Arabic newspapers, which had a great influence among the less educated and more fanatical sections of the population.

The virulence of a certain section of the Arabic press had greatly increased, and false news and misleading comments on the actions and motives of the Government were disseminated, greatly adding to the difficulties of administering the country. Many of the articles published in these newspapers were calculated to arouse the passions of the mass of the people, who were far too ignorant to realize the absurdity of what was read out to them daily in the villages. Egyptian youths at school or college eagerly devoured this form of literature, and were rapidly becoming demoralized by the violent nonsense which was daily poured into their ears. The respectable middle class, who were otherwise disposed to support the policy of gradual administrative reform, were

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terrorized into outward political hostility by the abuse which was showered upon any who did not energetically oppose the Anglo-Egyptian administration ; and the Egyptian officials found it very difficult to carry out their duties conscientiously in view of the intimidations to which they were constantly exposed. The Oriental is exceedingly sensitive to press criticism, and is very credulous of what he reads in the newspapers. In fact, a personal attack in a local newspaper may cause social life to become intolerable. The lower class newspapers indulged in scurrilous abuse of the highest dignitaries in the country, both in their public and private lives, and appeals calculated to rouse racial and religious fanaticism were becoming all too frequent.

In reviewing the character of Egyptian Nationalism, one must admit that, in principle, its ambitions were perfectly legitimate and natural. But, when one considers the proposals for realizing these ambitions, one cannot but regard them as wholly inconsistent. The combination of Pan-Islamism and pure Nationalism meant a policy of standing still with the East and advancing with the West, which was typical of Oriental inconsistency. In Egypt the practice of advocating two separate programmes, mutually destructive of each other, was the rule rather than the exception. The Nationalists wanted to secure all the advantages of the British Occupation without the Occupation itself. Education and contact with European civilization had created the utmost confusion in their thoughts, and this confusion still remains in some degree. But, considering the stage of their political education, it was not surprising that events took this turn, and I am inclined to think that less resistance to British control during this early phase would have deprived the Egyptians of valuable experience, which will bear fruit in years to come. In Egypt of all countries it is necessary to take the long view. The Egyptian nearly always takes the short one, and what may seem detrimental at the moment may prove the greatest benefit later on. Sir Eldon Gorst was not the one to be dissuaded by temporary failure. He had a strong faith in British policy, and he looked to the future to prove that it was right. He was accused of partiality to the Nationalists, but this accusation was more than dispelled by the tone of the Nationalist press, which

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denounced him as a Machiavellian destroyer of their party. Nor was their dissatisfaction without reason, for the strong personal friendship between Sir Eldon Gorst and the Khedive deprived the Nationalists of many of their followers. It is doubtful whether the policy of an *entente* with the Palace was Sir Eldon's own idea or whether it originated at the Foreign Office, but the Khedive was genuinely fond of the British Agent-General, apart from what he thought he could get out of him from a political point of view. His Highness travelled all the way to Wiltshire to say good-bye to Sir Eldon when he was dying, and his visit was entirely unexpected. Coles Pasha relates how the family were at luncheon when the butler suddenly announced, "His Highness the Khedive of Egypt is in the stable yard."

Gorst has been the subject of much criticism. From the first he was content to feel his way and to follow his instructions, cheerfully accepting blame when his policy met with the disapproval of less competent Anglo-Egyptian officials, and amply satisfied with the continuous approval of the Government which he so loyally served. But honesty proved his undoing. In 1907, there was a severe financial crisis in Egypt, due to over-trading, excessive credit, and the building mania, induced by the rapid economic progress of the country, and aggravated by the unfavourable monetary conditions existing in Europe and America during the latter part of the year. Credit was low and the banks needed money. Great pressure was, therefore, brought to bear on the Egyptian Government to grant a loan of two millions to steady the market. Gorst set his face resolutely against such an uneconomical proposal, and in doing so let loose upon himself the bitter resentment of important financial influences, which from that time forward never ceased to revile him in the local and European press.

Gorst's policy with regard to Anglo-Egyptian officials was little understood. His own loyalty of nature made him only too apt to assume that his subordinates would give him the same credit for honesty of intention that he allowed them. His principle was to have as few British officials as possible in the Government, but to have them as efficient as the exigencies of the service permitted and demanded. Perhaps

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his system of obtaining young men from the universities may be open to criticism, and it has been adversely criticized by men with much experience in India and elsewhere, but there is little doubt that Gorst had an eye to the future and was prepared to sacrifice the present to that end. He possibly wanted to create an Egyptian type of official, who could deal with the unexpected and unprecedented situations which were constantly arising, and would not, like the Indian civil servant, be hide-bound by precedents and cramping regulations. But a change of policy cut short his supply of young men, and shortly after Gorst's appointment as Agent-General it was announced that Egypt was to be for the Egyptians.

As it was, the relationships between the British and Egyptian officials were, in some respects, unsatisfactory. Young Englishmen spent the first years of their official lives wandering about the Provinces, inspecting and reporting on the work of others who were old enough to be their fathers and had long experience in work which was comparatively new to the young Englishmen. Moreover, when the day's work was done, the Englishman retired to his exclusive recreations of polo, tennis and golf, in which the Egyptian took not the slightest interest; and the former rather despised the latter for his negative attitude towards these forms of sport. It almost amounts to a national failing that we British find it difficult to live in sympathy with foreigners. We are bad "mixers," and we make little effort to improve in that respect. We take our sports and games with us wherever we go, and that forms the centre of our activity during our leisure hours. I think there is no doubt that our system is a good one, provided that it is not carried too far. But, unfortunately, it often is carried too far in foreign countries, to the detriment of our relations with the people of the country in which we are living. In all Oriental countries there are difficulties and barriers which hinder community of interest, but a great deal can be done with tact and perseverance. The attitude of the Moslem to his womenkind is one of these barriers, but even this can be partly overcome by a sympathetic interest on the part of the wives of British officials. At the time of which I am writing, the British officials in Cairo were more or less concentrated round the Sporting Club at Gezira, where the Egyptian official felt

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that he was not wanted. What could be more detrimental to good relations between the two sets of workers in the administration? If men who work together can find mutual interests in their leisure, there is far more chance of friendly co-operation in their work than if they go in different directions as soon as they leave the office door. The state of affairs which I have described has been one of the chief causes of difference between British and Egyptian officials in Egypt, and has hindered co-operation in no small degree. With his new-born ideas of Western civilization, the Egyptian was susceptible and needed sympathetic encouragement. This he seldom got, except from one or two notable Englishmen who made it their business (and it was their business) to cultivate the Egyptian officials and to study their mentality and outlook. These Englishmen had their reward. They earned the friendship and respect of their Oriental colleagues, and their influence was thereby greatly increased.

Meanwhile, Gorst was rapidly declining in health. What he suffered from the beginning of 1911 will never be realized by the public, who imagined that because he stuck to his work his condition could not be really serious. Indeed, that masterly, though now pathetic, document, his last Annual Report, was written at a stage of his disease when the patient is usually kept under the stupefying influence of some merciful drug. The proofs not yet read, his pain increased to an extent which rendered the performance of his duties quite out of the question. He hurried to Italy for a cure, but nothing could be done, and in July, 1911, he died at his home in Wiltshire.

By many Gorst was regarded as a failure, but in reality he succeeded. He took over control of affairs in Egypt at a time when he could expect little praise. His task was devoid of all glamour, and most of his work was not ostentatious. But it was none the less valuable and contributed its full share to the regeneration of Egypt. When he arrived in the country in 1907, his path was beset with pitfalls of every conceivable description. The Khedive had been alienated; the Palace was a hot-bed of intrigue; the Copts were temporarily pacified with general assurances whose redemption could hardly fail to cause recrimination; public feeling was embittered by the

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Denshawi incident ; and the country was passing through a severe financial crisis. Four years later, the prospects in Egypt were more hopeful than they had been for many years.

Significant is the last paragraph of the last report he ever wrote. Sir Eldon Gorst concluded his Report for 1910 as follows :

In conclusion, I would impress upon the critics of the present régime that the task of one race controlling the destinies of another race of entirely different qualities is one of extreme delicacy and complexity and cannot, unfortunately, be solved by copy-book maxims and high-sounding platitudes. Success can only be obtained by unceasing perseverance in the endeavour to base the relations of the two on a spirit of mutual confidence and goodwill, even when circumstances are most unfavourable. To abandon the present system because a small section of the population have taken up an attitude of violent hostility to the Occupation and to rule the Egyptians with a rod of iron, as has been suggested by some whose knowledge of the country and of the difficulties of the situation was, to say the least, extremely superficial, would be a sad confession of failure. The adoption of such a course would indeed enormously simplify for the moment the task of those who are endeavouring to carry out the wishes of the British Government in this country, but I venture to think that it would be discreditable to Great Britain, and fatal to all hope of true progress in Egypt. Upon the maintenance and development of sympathetic relations between the agents of the occupying Power and the Egyptians depends the ultimate realization of the great undertaking upon which Great Britain entered over a quarter of a century ago.

In the late summer of 1911 Lord Kitchener was appointed to carry on the work in Egypt. As the victor of Omdurman and as Sirdar of the Egyptian army, he had a high prestige in the country, and it was thought that his strong personality would have a good effect at this particular time, especially in view of the character and proclivities of the Khedive Abbas.

On the very day of his arrival at Alexandria, Italy was presenting an *ultimatum* to Turkey, and there is little doubt that Kitchener's presence and his prestige contributed largely to the safe conduct of Egypt through the critical period of the Italo-Turkish and Balkan wars, and that his influence went far to maintain peace among the nationals of the belligerent countries who were resident in Egypt. His policy was to provide the country with plenty of material for internal advancement, and so to distract the minds of the people from

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international differences elsewhere. With this end in view he initiated a policy of economic reform of which the effects were to be enduring. Lord Kitchener concentrated his attention on the questions which interested him most deeply, and none did so more than the welfare of the fellahin. With true soldierly instinct he attended first to the wants of the rank and file. He travelled a great deal throughout the country, visiting the rural districts and investigating the conditions of the people, with an eye to agricultural interests. In so doing he tried to restore a contact between the British official and the peasants, which was slowly disappearing. In the early days of the Occupation British officials used to spend weeks, or even months, riding round the country districts and getting in close touch with the fellahin, who came to regard them as friends. But, as the older type of officials gave place to a younger generation, this practice gradually died out, and control became much less personal and more centralized at the headquarters in Cairo. Changes in the form of transport also had their effect, and in many ways the advent of the motor car has deprived Egypt of many benefits. As long as the British official was content to ride round on a horse or donkey and camp in "any old place," and was pleased to spend a certain proportion of his time living under primitive conditions, there was ample opportunity for a good understanding between him and the inhabitants of the outlying Egyptian villages. But when the young Englishman made his provincial visits as a strict sense of duty and with such rapidity that he had no time to obtain anything approaching the confidence of the people, a very valuable opportunity was being thrown to the winds.

Perhaps the most far-reaching measure which Lord Kitchener introduced for the benefit of the fellahin was the "Five Feddan Law," which gave protection to the small cultivator of five feddans and under against expropriation for debt of his land, house and farming utensils. The protection of the poorer fellah in this way was rendered necessary by the action of the small foreign usurers who, scattered throughout the country and financed by various banks, were able with the support of the Capitulations to lend money on mortgage at exorbitant rates of interest, 30 to 40 per cent. being not unusual

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charges. Unfortunately the inducements held out to the fellah to take the first step into debt were temptations which few could resist, with the inevitable consequence that once in the clutches of the money-lender there was no escape for the victim until the whole of his property became so involved as to bring about his expropriation.

For the financial benefit of the fellahin Lord Kitchener also introduced savings banks, so that every fellah could deposit his savings in the bank without leaving his village, and established cotton markets under Government control throughout the country in order to safeguard the peasants from being defrauded by the small merchants to whom they sold their cotton. He was also responsible for creating a special Ministry of Agriculture, and he took a supreme interest in the heightening of the Aswan dam, which was completed in December, 1912. By means of these structural alterations the storage capacity was increased from 980,000,000 cubic metres to 2,420,000,000 cubic metres of water, but unfortunately Sir Benjamin Baker, who designed the scheme of the dam, did not live to see the completion of his work, which formed a very lasting and brilliant example of his genius as an engineer. Realizing the immense value of communications, Lord Kitchener advocated the construction of new roads, including the highway from Cairo to Alexandria, in order to meet the increasing motor traffic, and encouraged the development of light railways. He was deeply interested in town planning, and he did not spare expense when he considered that reform was needed. If, however, a subject did not interest him it was left to others. Such departments as education, prisons, etc., did not appeal to him, and it was only in these matters that the old system of strict economy was maintained. He could hardly be persuaded to enter a prison, yet he would insist on getting out of his car and walking some distance in the blazing sun to see a small cotton market or landing stage for grain ; and he was never happier than when at Sakah, an estate of the Domains in Lower Egypt, seeing for himself the results of the drainage schemes which were being carried out.

Lord Kitchener's administration was more personal even than that of Lord Cromer, and with the Egyptians he was

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more popular than any of his predecessors. The afternoon garden parties at the Agency were well attended by Egyptian army officers, who seldom if ever were seen among the guests either of Lord Cromer or Sir Eldon Gorst, and they were well looked after by Kitchener in person. He was really fond of Egypt and the Egyptians, and specially of the fellahin whom he had trained to be efficient soldiers. His success in making the Egyptian army out of the apparently poor material at his disposal gave grounds for hope that he would be equally successful on the political side. His name had never been associated with failure. His arrival in the country had a distinctly sobering effect on the elements of political unrest, and the comparative calm which followed led him to believe that a further step forward could be made in constitutional reform. He considered that the constitution of the Legislative Council and the General Assembly was in many ways defective, and that the election of members of Provincial Councils to the Legislative Council was neither logical nor adapted to the needs of the country. The functions of the two bodies were very different, and it was quite conceivable that a man who was very suitable as a provincial councillor might be equally unsuitable for assisting the Government in its general legislative programme ; while one whose opinion on provincial matters would be very inferior to that of his companions might well be of great assistance in the shaping of legislation.

The new Organic Law of 1913 laid down the principle of separating the Provincial Councils and the legislative body, while securing a direct representation of the people in the latter. The existence of two Councils, one slightly larger than and differing not very greatly from the other in composition, and performing practically the same functions, seemed to Lord Kitchener to have no justification in practice. They were therefore fused into one body, the Legislative Assembly, which was given the powers of both the old bodies, with certain important extensions. The more prominent of these were : (1) The power of the Assembly to delay legislation ; (2) The necessity for the Government to justify its persistence in passing any legislation, should it be disapproved ; (3) The power to initiate measures and decrees on its own responsibility ; and finally (4) The establishment of machinery by

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
which the Government could directly consult the electors on any proposition to which the Assembly was opposed. This new body consisted of a much larger proportion of elected members (sixty-six) returned by indirect suffrage, and of a much smaller one of members (seventeen) nominated by the Government, and nominated only for the purpose of securing the representation of minorities and of interests which might otherwise have been unrepresented. It remained, however, essentially a consultative and deliberative body, with no power over the executive except in that of checking any increase of direct taxation, while questions connected with foreign relations and the Khedive's Civil Lists were added to the subjects hitherto excluded from discussion. The introduction of this measure entailed a very considerable extension in the representative principle, but its success depended entirely on the spirit in which it was carried out.

Lord Kitchener hoped to create a moderate party out of the smaller land-owning classes whom he had helped in their financial difficulties by instituting the Five Feddan Law, but the first session of the Legislative Assembly was scarcely encouraging. The true nature of the Khedive was becoming apparent, and Kitchener realized that much of the political trouble in Egypt had been due to the revival of autocratic power by Abbas II,* who had been too much humoured by the British Agency. When Lord Cromer left Egypt the Nationalist Party was divided into two sections, one of which consisted of the more moderate representatives of the newly educated classes, and of notables and landowners who were followers of Sheikh Mohammed Abdu. This element of Nationalism was prepared to resist a revival of the old autocratic methods, and to this extent they accepted British control, although they demanded a larger share for Egyptians in the conduct of public affairs. This section was known as the Popular Party. The other section, which was known as the Patriotic Party, was a great deal more aggressive, was bitterly anti-British, and in some degree imbued with the doctrines of Pan-Islam. Its press conducted a relentless campaign against the British Occupation. The Khedive began by playing off these two sections of the Nationalist Party against each other, and then proceeded to play them both off against

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the British representative. The result of the Khedive's first manoeuvre was that the Popular Party fell to pieces, some of its members retiring from politics altogether and others joining the more extreme followers of the Patriotic Party. Amongst the latter was Zaghlul Pasha, who entered the first Legislative Assembly elected under the new Organic Law, and was chosen to be its only non-official Vice-President. Some of this more advanced party, including Zaghlul, were opposed to the Khedive rather than to the British control, and any opposition which they showed to the latter was based on the complacent attitude of the Agency towards the revival of Khedivial autocracy. Meanwhile, the Patriotic Party had split up into two factions owing to the action of the Khedive, who, having used it to overthrow the Popular Party, became somewhat perturbed at the close relations between its more extreme members and the more advanced elements of the "Young Turk" movement in Constantinople. In 1911 a crisis had been reached, and the above mentioned split had produced a "Khedivial" faction of those who made their submission to Abbas instead of fleeing the country.

This breaking up of a collective community, based on fixed social laws, into parties and factions of a political character met with the disapproval of Lord Kitchener, who saw in it an unnatural proceeding likely to lead to national weakness. The Khedive, who was mainly instrumental in bringing about this system of political factions, knew that whatever his conduct had been in the past he now had to deal with one who would stand no nonsense. Lord Kitchener, on the other hand, did not intend to show his hand unless some important interest were at stake. When, however, Abbas proposed to sell the Mariut railway to an Italian bank, Kitchener's attitude immediately stiffened and the project was abandoned. To the strict neutrality of Egypt in respect to the Italo-Turkish war he devoted his closest attention. He even prevented Egyptian officers and men from going to help the Turks, and refused to permit the Turkish armed forces in Palestine to cross Egypt into Tripoli, thereby preventing the Sultan from marching his own troops through the territory of which he was suzerain. But the war roused Islamic sentiment, and in 1912 an extremist plot was discovered, which aimed at the assassination of the



THE ASWAN DAM

Photo : R. H. Goodsall

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Khedive, the Prime Minister and Lord Kitchener. Even this was treated with indifference, but when the Khedive created an outrageous scandal by appropriating funds belonging to the Wakf Department, Kitchener insisted on the revival of a separate Ministry to administer that department, which had come under the Khedive's control. Abbas was an intriguer of the worst description, and there was little to be said in his favour. In some ways he resembled the Khedive Ismail, but he was an astute though unscrupulous man of business. Much of the wealth which he amassed by questionable means was devoted to his ceaseless intrigues against Great Britain, whom he regarded as a formidable obstacle to his autocratic ambitions. But if he was an enemy of British control, he was also an enemy of his own country. Under his rule Egypt could not advance in her political evolution, and it was becoming increasingly obvious that he would have to go.

Meanwhile, the first session of the new Legislative Assembly was a great disappointment to Lord Kitchener, who had every confidence in the common-sense of the people of Egypt. A large majority consisted of respectable landowners, while the opposition was in the hands of Zaghlul Pasha and Abdul Aziz Bey Fehmi, another distinguished lawyer, so there was reason to hope that the purely factious spirit of the old institutions would be eliminated. Unfortunately this was not the case, and the proceedings resolved themselves into heated discussions between the Prime Minister, Mohammed Said Pasha, who was one of the tools in the hands of the Khedive, and Zaghlul, who disliked the Khedive almost more than any other man in Egypt. Zaghlul carried the Assembly with him, but he displayed his inability to discriminate between essentials and non-essentials which was afterwards so characteristic of his leadership. The Assembly failed to introduce or pass any important legislation, and proved the undoing of Mohammed Said, who fell into disfavour with the Khedive for communicating the distasteful information that Lord Kitchener was coming to the end of his patience. He was succeeded by Hussein Pasha Rushdi, a most capable Egyptian Minister, who remained in office throughout the Great War, and whose recent death has been a great loss to Egypt.

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Lord Kitchener now realized that a man like Abbas Hilmi, with all the despotic characteristics of a Turkish Sultan, and essentially a Turk by nature, who was prepared to intrigue with any political force by which he could further his own ends, was an insuperable obstacle on the road to Egyptian self-government. He, therefore, went home on leave in the early summer of 1914 with the fixed determination either of getting the Khedive's powers curtailed or of having him removed altogether. With the outbreak of the Great War Abbas Hilmi was in Constantinople, and he realized that his only hope of retaining the Khedivate lay in the victory of the Central Powers. Having been educated in Vienna, all his sympathies were on the side of Turkey and her allies, so he lost no time in throwing in his lot with our enemies. In the Khedive's absence the Prime Minister, Hussein Pasha Rushdi, acted as Regent, while Lord Kitchener became Secretary of State for War at Whitehall, and was destined never to return to Egypt.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUDAN

AS the affairs of the Sudan are so intimately bound up with those of Egypt, and with British policy in regard to that country, I propose in this chapter to give a brief account of the events which led up to the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899, and of the regenerative work since carried out south of the Egyptian frontier at Wadi Halfa. By this means I hope to supply my readers with an outline of Sudanese affairs, in so far as they directly affect the situation in Egypt. Indeed, owing to the paramount influence of the Nile waters, which are controlled in the Sudan before flowing through Egypt, it is scarcely possible to consider the two countries as politically apart.

In ancient times Egyptian influence made itself felt in the Northern Sudan from the period of the Old Empire, and there are records of repeated invasions of Nubia by the Egyptians and of Southern Egypt by the Nubians, with territorial occupations of varying duration. At one period Ethiopia was effectively occupied by the Egyptians for about a thousand years; but from about 1000 B.C., when the Egyptians were finally driven from Ethiopia, until A.D. 1820, when Mehemet Ali decided on the conquest of the country, the history of the Sudan was quite distinct from that of Egypt. The Roman conquest scarcely extended south of Wadi Halfa, and Diocletian recognized the First Cataract as the real southern boundary of Egypt. Nor did the Moslem invasion of Egypt affect the Sudan. While it is true that both countries were invaded by the forces of Islam, these invasions took place at different periods and from different directions. While the invasion of Egypt came from the direction of Syria and

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penetrated southwards from the Delta, that of the Sudan was later in date and was carried out from Arabia, across the Red Sea, and south-west through Suakin. In spite of frequent incursions, the Moslems from Northern Egypt were unable to obtain a foothold in the Christian kingdoms of Dongola and Aloa, which continued to flourish until the fourteenth century. A more successful Moslem invasion, however, was penetrating from across the Red Sea, and the Moslem state of Funj, which had become powerful and had extended its conquests to the Egyptian frontier, succeeded in cutting off the people of Dongola from their fellow Christians in Abyssinia. The speedy collapse of Christianity was then inevitable, and independent Moslem states took the place of the old Christian kingdoms. Amongst these states, Sennar attained for a time a position of considerable importance, and many visits to the court of its Sultan were paid by learned and celebrated men from India, Arabia, Egypt and Baghdad until this kingdom was finally broken up, towards the end of the eighteenth century. When Mehemet Ali undertook to conquer the country, there was no organized force to oppose him.

Mehemet Ali never stated the reasons which led him to order the occupation of the Sudan, but it is probable that he desired to obtain possession of the mines of gold and precious stones which he erroneously believed to exist in the country. He also realized that the revenue of Egypt was falling through the diversion of the caravan routes from the Nile to the Red Sea ports, and may have wished to recapture the trade, as well as to lay hold on a country from which large numbers of slaves could be extracted. It must also be remembered that the remnant of the Mamelukes had established themselves at Dongola, and that Mehemet Ali's desire to crush them fitted in with his wish to find suitable employment for the numerous Turks and Albanians in his army, of whose fidelity he was somewhat suspicious.

In October, 1820, Mehemet Ali's son, Ismail, set out from Wadi Halfa at the head of 4,000 men and reached Dongola without opposition, the Mamelukes fleeing before him. He engaged and defeated the nomad, Shagia, who supplied him with mounted troops for the rest of the expedition, while the meks (kings) of Berber, Shendi and Halfaya surrendered

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without opposition on his approach to their territories. In February, 1821, Ismail established a camp at Ras Khartum, the foundation of the present city, whence he continued his advance southwards and received the submission of the king of Sennar. On his further advance into the mountainous regions of Fazokl, in search of gold, the Egyptians encountered formidable opposition from the negro inhabitants; and further reports of risings induced Ismail to return to Sennar and Dongola in February, 1822, and to Shendi in October of the same year. In spite of the fact that little resistance was offered, the Egyptian soldiery carried out this invasion with ruthless savagery, and left behind them a trail of wanton destruction. The mek of Shendi had been compelled to follow the Egyptian forces as a hostage, and on Ismail's return he was required to produce 1,000 slaves within two days. The mek, therefore, invited Ismail and his senior officers to a feast in his house, round which he had piled heaps of straw. While the Egyptians were feasting, the mek set fire to the straw, thereby disposing for ever of Ismail and his companions. Hearing of the murder of Ismail, Mohammed Bey, who had been occupied in the conquest of Kordofan, marched on Shendi with another army of about 4,000 men, defeated the forces of the mek, and massacred the inhabitants of Metemma and Shendi with indescribable brutality.

Having completely conquered Nubia, Sennar and Kordofan, Mehemet Ali appointed a Governor-General with almost unlimited powers, and leased from the Sultan the Red Sea ports of Suakin and Massawa, thus controlling the trade routes of the Eastern Sudan. He did not, however, succeed in obtaining control over the slave trade, which continued to flourish and became a vast "industry." In fact, annual raids for this purpose were made on the negro tribes living on the borders of this conquered territory, and Sir Samuel Baker reported in 1870 that, while the Khartum Government seemed nominally to lease out the country to traders, the trade pursued was in reality that of slave-hunting. The abolition of slavery was formally declared by Said Pasha on the occasion of his visit to the Sudan in 1857, but it continued to flourish unchecked in spite of the subsequent efforts of Ismail Pasha to suppress it.

The Sudan, which was a source of financial loss to the

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Egyptian Government, suffered the utmost oppression under Egyptian rule. The Governors-General and leading officials were all Turks, Albanians or Circassians, and the welfare of the people played no part in their activities. There were, however, two exceptions to this general rule. Khursid Pasha, who was Governor-General from 1826 to 1839, gained a reputation for straightforwardness and vigour, and did much to counteract the misgovernment of his predecessors. He conducted successful campaigns against the Abyssinians on the Sennar frontier, and taught the inhabitants of Khartum the use of bricks in building. Abd-el-Latif Pasha, who only remained in office for a year, also made a noble attempt to rectify the defects in the administration, but after his short tenure of office conditions went from bad to worse.

In 1865, although the Sudan was every year costing Egypt more money than its revenue produced, Ismail Pasha attempted to extend his dominions in this direction, and embarked on a succession of wars in which the Abyssinians were usually victorious and Ismail squandered large sums of money. Four years later, Sir Samuel Baker became Governor of the Equatorial Provinces, and in 1874 was succeeded by Colonel (afterwards General) Gordon. Both Baker and Gordon devoted much energy to the suppression of the slave trade, but they received little support from the Khartum Government. In 1877, Gordon was appointed Governor-General of all Egyptian territories outside Egypt; namely, the Sudan provinces proper, Darfur, and the Red Sea and Somali coasts. During his tenure of office he did much to give the Sudanese the benefit of a just and considerate government, besides working for the advancement of agriculture and the abolition of the slave trade; but his successor, Raouf Pasha, did not continue his work in the same spirit, and abuses of the previous Egyptian Government re-occurred in certain parts. It was in these circumstances that schemes for the better organization and administration of the country were prepared, but were never carried into effect owing to the revolt in Egypt under Arabi and the rising of the Mahdi in the Sudan.

The Sudan was, therefore, one of the most urgent questions claiming the attention of Lord Cromer when he arrived in Egypt in 1883. The British Government, ignoring the fact

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that the Sudan was an integral part of the Khedive's dominions and, even in normal times, entailed a deficit of £200,000 to the Egyptian Treasury, had begun by excluding it altogether from the question of Egypt, and had declared that they must not be held responsible for events in these outlying territories. The responsible authorities in London actually thought that the Egyptian Government, which was quite incapable of managing the affairs of Egypt, might do as they pleased in the Sudan, where the internal situation was even worse than it was in their own country. The army was in a deplorable condition, the officers being inefficient and many of the troops being quite ignorant of the use of the rifle. The financial position was no better. The Sudan revenue for 1882 was estimated at £E507,000, and the expenditure at £E610,000, leaving a deficit of £E103,000, but even this was an optimistic statement of the situation in a country where the real revenue was an unknown quantity. Moreover, the Sudan was in a state of open rebellion, stirred up by a religious fanatic who proclaimed himself to be a Mahdi of Islam. In these circumstances the attitude of "limited liability" assumed by the British Government soon proved to be quite untenable.

The Mahdist movement, which aimed at the complete overthrow of Egyptian rule, derived its strength from three distinct causes : (1) the religious fanaticism of a courageous people ; (2) the hatred resulting from oppression and a long course of misgovernment ; and (3) the measures taken to prevent slave-trading. With the departure of Gordon, corruption and the extortion of the tax-gatherer had again become general, while the weakness of his successors produced in the Baggara (cattle-owning Arabs) a contempt for the authority which denied them the pursuit of their most profitable trade. When Mohammed Ahmed, a Dongolese, proclaimed himself to be the long expected Mahdi (guide) of Islam, he first gained a following amongst the superstitious villagers of Kordofan, to whom he preached universal equality and a community of goods, while denouncing the Turks, Albanians and Circassians as unworthy Moslems on whom Allah would execute judgment. In the Mahdi the Baggara found a means of shaking off Egyptian rule, and their support gave considerable significance to his movement. Mohammed Ahmed at once became the leader

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of the Baggara, amongst whom he had previously found Abdullah, who became his chief supporter. The first armed conflict between Egyptian troops and the Mahdi's followers took place in August, 1881, and in the following year the Mahdi gained his first important success. The capture of El Obeid in January, 1883, and the subsequent annihilation of an army of ten thousand men under an English officer, Hicks Pasha, who had been sent to quell the revolt, gave the Mahdi absolute control over the province of Kordofan and decided the fate of the Sudan. In the following month Slatin Pasha was forced to surrender in Darfur, whilst at the beginning of 1884 Osman Digna, the Mahdi's Emir in the Red Sea regions, utterly defeated a force of some four thousand Egyptians at El Teb near Suakin. In April of the same year Lupton Bey, governor, of Bahr-el-Ghazal, whose officials and troops had joined the Mahdist movement, also surrendered and was sent as a prisoner to Omdurman.

On hearing of the reverse at El Obeid, the Egyptian Government were anxious to make an attempt to recover the lost provinces, and this desire was shared by the ruling class in Egypt. Lord Cromer, however, opposed the project on the grounds that Egypt had neither soldiers nor money to carry it out. The Treasury was exhausted; the army was unpaid, undisciplined, untrained, partially disloyal, and therefore worthless as a fighting force. Such conditions were far from propitious for the suppression of a formidable rebellion remote from the headquarters of the Government and entailing great difficulties of communication. The proposed operations would have taxed the resources of energetic and experienced military leaders in command of well-disciplined and efficient troops, but it was not a task to be undertaken by the Egyptians, who had just themselves emerged from an internal revolution. The Khedive and his Prime Minister, Chérif Pasha, threatened to resign, and Chérif actually carried out his threat, but Lord Cromer remained firm, and it was decided, for the moment at any rate, to leave the Sudan to its fate. Nubar Pasha, although equally opposed to the policy of abandonment, agreed to take office and reluctantly accepted what he described as "the administration of Egypt under the government of Baring." By this time the Mahdi controlled the greater part

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of the Sudan, but Khartum and some other fortified points still held out against his fanatical followers.

On hearing of the disaster to Hicks Pasha's army, the British Government, having no intention of employing British or Indian troops in the Sudan and deprecating the expenditure of Egyptian money on operations which, even if successful, would be of doubtful advantage to Egypt, insisted that the Egyptian Government should evacuate such parts of the Sudan as they still held. Not only was the British Government very reluctant to extend their commitments to the Sudan, but they were strongly opposed to the financial resources of Egypt being utilized in order to retain under Egyptian control territories which had been a source of financial embarrassment and which the Egyptians had proved themselves utterly unable to govern.


General Gordon was therefore dispatched, with Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, to Khartum to arrange the withdrawal of the Egyptian civil and military population. Gordon's instructions, based largely on his own suggestions, were not entirely consistent. He was vaguely told to establish some form of stable government in the place of Egyptian authority, and he was granted a firman creating him Governor-General of the Sudan. Gordon reached Khartum on the 18th February, 1884, and at first his mission, which had aroused great enthusiasm in England, had prospects of success. To prepare the way for the retreat of the Egyptian garrisons and civilians, he issued proclamations to the effect that the suppression of the slave-trade was abandoned, that the Mahdi was sultan of Kordofan, and that the Sudan was independent of Egypt. He enabled some thousands of refugees to escape to Aswan, while at Khartum he collected troops from some of the outlying stations. But by this time the situation was getting worse, and Mahdism was gaining a foothold among tribes in the Nile Valley which had hitherto been hostile to its influence. Gordon then thought that the only method of maintaining authority at Khartum, and thus of securing the peaceful withdrawal of the garrison, was to hand over the government of the country to Zobeir Pasha, a Sudanese Arab, who was probably the only man capable of dealing with the Mahdi. He, therefore, telegraphed repeatedly to Cairo, asking that

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Zobeir should be sent to the Sudan, but, owing to Zobeir's reputation as a slave-raider, Gordon's request was refused. This removed all hope of a peaceful retreat of the Egyptians. The Mahdist movement now spread northwards, Berber was captured, and Khartum was cut off. From that time forward the energies of Gordon were devoted to the defence of the town, and it was not until after many months of delay, due to the vacillation of the British Government, that a relief expedition was sent up the Nile under the command of Lord Wolseley. The delay was fatal, the expedition started too late to achieve its object, and the 25th of January, 1885, saw the fall of Khartum and the death of Gordon.

The failure of Gordon's mission cannot be altogether attributed to its leader, but was due rather to the action of Great Britain in selecting Gordon for this particular task in face of Lord Cromer's opposition. Gordon was essentially an aggressive soldier, who regarded death and defeat as synonymous terms. While no doubt a gallant and successful leader in offensive operations, he was not endowed with the qualities needed for the evacuation of a country under difficult and inglorious conditions. The main object of British policy was to avoid being drawn into military operations in the Sudan, and for that reason it was most unwise to send any Englishman on this mission; and it was still more unwise to select an Englishman of Gordon's undoubted popularity. For those seeking to avoid further commitments, this action was tempting Providence. Moreover, the task entrusted to Gordon was one which demanded the greatest coolness of decision. Gordon's chief failing lay in his impulsive imagination, which enveloped his qualities of common-sense and political instinct. Lord Cromer describes receiving some twenty or thirty telegrams from Khartum in the course of one day, those of the evening being in direct contradiction to those dispatched the same morning; while Lord Northbrook admitted that his judgment was excellent, although he said all the foolish things that passed through his head. He was clearly not the man for the Sudan under existing conditions, but public idealism in England overrode common sense with disastrous results. It was not in sending Gordon that the British Government incurred censure. Public opinion

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[By courtesy of "The Times."]

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was too strong for them. It was for the delay in sending an expedition to the relief of Khartum that Mr. Gladstone's conduct was rightly condemned.

The fall of Khartum led to the withdrawal of the British expedition, Dongola being evacuated in June, 1885. Kassala capitulated shortly afterwards, but, at the time when the Mahdi had practically destroyed Egyptian power in the Sudan he died and was succeeded by the Khalifa Abdullah, who continued to rule over the Sudan till 1898. The Mahdi had liberated the Sudanese from the tyranny of the Egyptians, but the people soon discovered that his rule was even more oppressive than that of his predecessors. After his death the position of the Sudanese peasantry became so bad that neither life nor property were safe. Abdullah set out to stamp out all opposition to his own power, and soon all chiefs not of the Baggara tribe were suppressed, with the exception of Osman Digna. His rule was a military despotism attended by agricultural and commercial ruin. He fought with the negro tribes of the south ; with the people of Darfur ; with the Abyssinians ; with the Italians, Egyptians and British ; yet the Khalifa and his black troops succeeded in maintaining their position. For some time Upper Egypt was constantly under the threat of invasion, and it was not until the Khalifa's forces were held up at Ginnis by a small Anglo-Egyptian force that the Dervish advance was definitely checked. The frontier was withdrawn to Wadi Halfa, and the Khalifa's only serious attack on this position led to the total defeat of the Dervish army at Toski in 1889. Emin Pasha's position in the Equatorial Provinces became untenable and he finally evacuated Wadelai, when the greater part of that region relapsed into a state of complete barbarism. The Bahr-el-Ghazal, a province about five times as big as England, shared the same fate, as well as other territories which were remote from the coast : those regions which were less remote were greedily seized by various European Powers, which were at that time competing for possessions in the African continent. In this way fell to pieces the empire which Ismail Pasha had tried to build up with rotten materials. Sooner or later its fall was inevitable, but it was hastened by the destruction of General Hicks's army as result of the inaction of the British Government.

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For over ten years Wadi Halfa remained the Southern frontier of civilization, beyond which African barbarism ruled supreme. It was not until 1896 that steps were taken to reconquer the Sudan, as the result of an urgent appeal on the part of Italy, after the Italian disaster at Adua in Abyssinia, for an Anglo-Egyptian diversion on the Nile, to mitigate the danger of a Dervish attack on the rear of the Italian position in Eritrea. On the part of the Egyptian Government there was a natural desire to recover lost territory, and there was an equally natural desire in Great Britain to regain her prestige and to avenge the death of Gordon, but the most powerful argument in favour of reconquest was the necessity of re-occupying the Sudan in order to control the waters of the Blue and White Niles for the irrigation of Egypt in which the great dam at Aswan was soon to play a prominent part. Before the end of 1896 Dongola had been retaken, and by 1897 the Dervish forces had been pushed back as far as the junction of the Nile at Atbara, and Kassala, evacuated by the Italians, had been reoccupied by a small Egyptian column. Finally, on the 2nd September, 1898, the Khalifa and his Dervish hordes were utterly defeated by an Anglo-Egyptian force under Lord Kitchener at Omdurman, and the British and Egyptian flags were hoisted side by side on the ruins of the old palace at Khartum where Gordon met his death.

This important victory of the Anglo-Egyptian forces practically put an end to Mahdism in the Sudan, which in sixteen years had reduced the population from over eight to under two millions and had wiped out of existence most of the large towns with the exception of Omdurman, which had grown into a religious centre. Thousands of villages had ceased to exist. The campaign itself was most efficiently carried out, and the fact that the new Egyptian army, even with the support of a large British force, was able to withstand the fierce attacks of the Dervishes, who had so often overwhelmed them in the past, reflected great credit on the training and discipline of the Egyptian troops as well as on the re-organizing powers of Sir Evelyn Wood. But the actual operations only represented one aspect of the difficulties experienced in the reconquest of the Sudan. Although great economy was exercised in the carrying out of the expedition,

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financial burdens were placed on the Egyptian Treasury which it could still scarcely afford. In fact, the British Government had to come to its aid on an occasion when, under cover of the international control over Egyptian expenditure, France and Russia, out of jealous opposition to British policy, entered a suit in the Mixed Tribunals, which they won, restraining the Egyptian Government from devoting certain financial reserves to the purposes of the Sudan Expedition. But what constituted a dangerous threat to Anglo-French relations lay in the expedition of the French Colonel Marchand, who crossed from the Congo and hoisted the French flag at Fashoda on the White Nile. France was endeavouring to establish her authority on the river between Khartum and Gondokoro, and it was only the wisdom of the respective Governments, combined with the personal tact of Lord Kitchener, that averted war between Great Britain and France. In fact, Anglo-French relations became so strained as a result of the Fashoda incident that active hostilities were nearer at that time than was ever realized by the British public.

As the Sudan had been reconquered by the "joint military and financial efforts" of Great Britain and Egypt, the British Government claimed "by right of conquest" to share in the settlement of the administration and legislation of the country, and to meet these claims the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of the 19th January, 1899, was signed, establishing the joint sovereignty of the two states throughout the territories evacuated by the Egyptians as result of the Mahdist rising, and reconquered with the help of the British army under Lord Kitchener. As the organization and leadership of the campaign rested with Great Britain, without whose help the expedition could never have been carried out, and in view of Egypt's peculiar position at that time, it was obvious that Britain must assume the leading rôle in the administration of a country which was in a deplorable condition as a result of Egyptian misgovernment and the subsequent activities of the Mahdi. Moreover, it was inadvisable that the Egyptians should have the opportunity of repeating their misgovernment of the past or that the Sudan should fall under the yoke of internationalism, which was so much hindering reform in Egypt. Hence a form of government was brought into

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existence known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The British and Egyptian flags were to be used together throughout the Sudan. The supreme military and civil command was vested in one officer, termed the Governor-General, who was to be appointed by Khedivial decree on the recommendation of the British Government, and to be removable only by the same dual authority. The Governor-General was invested with full legislative power ; and, unless promulgated by him, no Egyptian legislation was to apply to the Sudan. Alien residents in the Sudan were not to enjoy special privileges, and the previous consent of the British Government was to be required for the appointment in Sudanese territory of Consular officers by other Governments. There were to be no import duties on goods entering the Sudan from Egypt, and the jurisdiction of the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals was not to extend to, or be recognized in, the Sudan. The slave trade was prohibited, and the Sudan was to remain under martial law at the discretion of the Governor-General.

The four principal links between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Egypt were community of religion, community of language, the geographical and economic bond created by the waters of the Nile, and a political connexion which was older than the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899. The strongest link of all was the Nile water, which was equally vital for the existing irrigation of Egypt and for the potential irrigation of the Sudan. This water question, together with the closely allied question of the extension of cotton growing in the Sudan, was destined to become one of the most important factors in the relations between Great Britain and Egypt. The secure possession of a sufficient supply of Nile water is as important for Egypt as security of transit through the Suez Canal is for the British Empire ; and the Egyptians are as sensitive about the control of their water supply by a foreign Power as we are regarding any foreign command of the sea. This feeling in Egypt regarding the Nile water is not only genuine, but ancient, deep-seated and widespread ; and one must admit that the Nationalists have rightly based their claims to the Sudan on this question of water. But when they try to strengthen these claims on historical grounds they considerably weaken their case. It was only from the time of Mehemet Ali's invasion until the

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Egyptians were driven out by the Mahdi (a period of about 60 years) that there was any political connexion between the two countries, and the hatred of the Sudanese for the Egyptians as a result of their misrule has more than counter-balanced the memories of Mahdist tyranny. It is obvious to all except the Egyptians that even now they could not themselves hold the country, and that any attempt on their part to do so would be to invite a repetition of past history.

In the matter of reconquest, Great Britain contributed (1) The financial and administrative reconstruction of Egypt, without which the campaign of reconquest could never have been carried out; (2) The reorganization of the Egyptian army, which enabled it efficiently to co-operate with British troops in stopping the advance of the Mahdists at Wadi Halfa and then taking the offensive against them; (3) The planning and direction of the campaigns of 1896-8; (4) The reinforcement of the reorganized Egyptian army by British troops, which took the chief part in most of the fighting, and bore the greatest proportion of casualties; and (5) a financial contribution, which covered about one-third of the total cost of these campaigns, amounting to just over three-quarters of a million pounds sterling. Egypt, on the other hand, contributed financially rather more than two-thirds of the total cost and the greater part of the man-power, although the military value of this Egyptian man-power was largely dependent on British leadership and reinforcement.

Under the Condominium established by the Agreement of 1899, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was administered and reconstructed. To this task Great Britain contributed not only the successive Governors-General, but the small and highly efficient body of civil servants who gave the new administration its character through the influence of their personalities. The British Government also maintained one infantry battalion and a small detachment of artillery at Khartum, and paid £200,000 yearly towards the total annual expenditure of £1,200,000 on the joint military occupation. Egypt, on her side, made contributions which, while less effective upon the character and standards of the Sudan Government, were quite as indispensable to its efficient working and maintenance. Egypt supplied all but the highest and the lowest public



Photo : R. H. Goodsall

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employees ; for, although the Sudan Government made praiseworthy and increasingly successful efforts to train the Sudanese themselves for public service, the level of culture in the Sudan was so low at the time of reconquest that it was impossible to organize a civilized government without the importation of Egyptian as well as British personnel. Equally indispensable was the annual financial contribution from the Egyptian Treasury to cover the deficits in the Sudan Budget during the first thirteen years of the Anglo-Egyptian administration. During the years 1899 to 1912 inclusive, Egypt contributed a total of £E5,353,215 under this head, and from 1899 to the evacuation of the Egyptian units towards the end of 1924 she contributed another annuity of a million towards the joint military expenditure of the two parties to the Condominium. Egypt also made advances to the Sudan Government for capital expenditure on such public works as railway building or the construction of Port Sudan. In fact, Lord Curzon declared in the House of Lords in 1924 that "the Sudan would be bankrupt at this moment if it were not for the financial expenditure undertaken by Egypt." The first Governor-General was Lord Kitchener, the Sirdar of the Egyptian army, but his tenure of office was cut short by the South African War, and he was succeeded by Sir Reginald Wingate. The country was divided up into provinces based on physical and tribal boundaries ; and under a just and firm administration, which was essentially civil, although the principal officials were officers of the British army, it was surprising how the Sudan recovered from the troubles through which it had passed. The provinces had British Governors, and at the head of every *Mudirieh* was placed a British official, although many of the subordinate posts were filled by Egyptians. An exception was made in the case of Darfur, which before the battle of Omdurman had thrown off the rule of the Khalifa and was again under a native sovereign, who was recognized by the Sudan Government on the condition that he paid an annual tribute. Restoration of public order was the first task that confronted the new administration, and this was accomplished with little opposition, although certain tribes in the more outlying districts at first disputed the authority of the Government.

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The inhabitants of the Sudan cannot be regarded as a nation. The Arabic-speaking tribes of the North are to some extent bound together by community of language, religion, customs and interests, but they have little in common with the pagan peoples of the South with their great variety of race and language. Yet the waters of the Nile are common to both and both are under the same laws. The welfare of the people received every consideration. Existing native law and custom contained valuable, if rudimentary, principles which were moulded and adapted to a code based on the more enlightened systems of the civilized world, and no attempt was made to Egyptianize or Anglicize the Sudanese. Every effort was made to revive agriculture and to establish sound systems of justice and education, and although the task of the Sudan Government was by no means an easy one, it was free from all the international difficulties that hampered the administration of Egypt. The Arabic-speaking and Moslem population found their language and religion respected, and soon recognized the justice of the new order of things. Their desire to profit by Government help, together with confidence in the good intentions of the new rulers, produced a friendly attitude which was an important factor in the work of reconstruction. Under conditions of peace and a certain degree of prosperity normal village life was re-established, while the patriarchal system of the nomads survived, with their ancient customs and tribal form of government. In the South, on the other hand, progress was at first slow, and the negroes had, in most cases, to be taught the very elements of civilization. The work of missionary societies was therefore encouraged, although proselytizing among the Moslems found no favour with the Government. The problem of creating an administrative and judicial system satisfactory to every tribe was one of many difficulties, and recourse was had to a modified form of the Indian penal code, which was successfully introduced.

In their general policy the Sudan Government adopted a system of very light taxation, which was more than justified by the results obtained. In 1899 the revenue was £126,000, while in 1909 it had risen to £1,040,000, which showed the growing prosperity of the country. This prosperity was effected by improving the water supply,

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and thus bringing more land under cultivation, by the creation of new industries, and by the improvement of communications. Lord Kitchener built a railway from Wadi Halfa to Khartum. As a shorter route to the sea than that through Egypt was essential for the commercial development of the country, a railway from the Nile at the Atbara junction to the Red Sea was built in 1904-6, thus shortening the distance from Khartum to the nearest seaport by nearly a thousand miles, and enabling Sudan produce to find a profitable outlet in the markets of the world. Three years later Port Sudan was opened for shipping, and in the following years railway lines were extended to the more productive districts of the West, and bridges were built over the Blue Nile at Khartum and over the White Nile at Kosti. At the same time river communications were improved, the number of wells on the caravan routes was increased, and steps were taken by means of irrigation works to regulate the Nile floods and those of the River Gash. With the spread of education, especially in the North, and the gradual development of the cruder principles of order and justice, the Government have felt justified in granting to the chiefs and notables a large share in the control of their own tribesmen, and the formation of native courts has been attended with popularity and success. In fact, a kind of "native aristocracy" is now developing, which is definitely recognized by the people themselves and is encouraged by the Sudan Government. As a result of the light taxation and expert supervision and advice, village industries revived, and the activities of British, Greek and Syrian merchants helped to stimulate the growth of trade.

So rapid was the progress made that in ten years the recovery was complete, and the exports had risen to a value of over a million pounds. From then onwards the Sudan went rapidly forward; the increasing prosperity of the country and its future possibilities attracted European capital, and the various industries developed until, in 1926, the exports were estimated at £5,000,000. Indeed, the regenerative work of Great Britain in the Sudan has been even more remarkable than in Egypt, especially in view of the fact that a great part of this work was accomplished by army officers whose previous experience was chiefly confined to military duties. Civil

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servants, however, have gradually replaced the military personnel of the Sudan administration, and much credit is also due to the Egyptian officials for their efficient collaboration with their British colleagues. It is a remarkable fact that in 1909, only eleven years after the battle of Omdurman, Sir Eldon Gorst was able to state that he did not suppose that there was any part of the world in which the mass of the population had fewer unsatisfied wants.

In more recent years progress in the Sudan has been no less marked. Further railway extensions have been carried out, roads have been built or tracks cleared in all the provinces, and motor traffic is general on the more important routes. Nile steamers ply between Khartum and the South, and connections are maintained with the systems of Uganda and Kenya. The Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile and the canalization of the Gezira plain has enabled the Government to develop a large and profitable area for the cultivation of cotton ; and it is hoped in the near future to bring 500,000 acres of this area under cultivation. But I am going ahead rather too fast.

After the reconquest of the Sudan, the control of the Nile water above and below Wadi Halfa was placed exclusively in the hands of the Irrigation Service of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works. At that time this arrangement seemed reasonable, as the Nile water was then used almost wholly by Egypt, while the Sudan was derelict and depopulated ; and the fact that some of the leading officials in the Egyptian Ministry were British was a guarantee that this control would not be exploited unfairly by Egypt to the disadvantage of the Sudan. During the five years following the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium over the Sudan, a comprehensive reconnaissance of the Upper Nile basin was carried out by Sir William Garstin, the Under-Secretary of State for Public Works in Egypt ; and his official reports dealt with all the major problems, which later became subjects of controversy, as well as with those schemes of irrigation which have since been carried out either in whole or in part. In 1904, Lord Cromer remarked that, broadly speaking, the whole plan was based on the principle of utilizing the waters of the White Nile for the benefit of Egypt and those of the Blue Nile for the benefit of the Sudan—a formula which exerted an

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important influence upon successive proposals and negotiations. Effect was immediately given to a recommendation by Sir William Garstin that a separate Sudan Branch should be organized in the Irrigation Service; but the execution of irrigation projects in the Sudan had to wait until certain preliminaries were completed. A land survey and registration of ownership had to be carried out, the skeleton of a railway system constructed, and the annual deficit in the Sudan Budget overcome, while it was also necessary to ascertain by experiment the best methods of cotton cultivation under local conditions. By 1913 all these conditions had been realized, and in that year, on the initiative of Lord Kitchener, then British Agent-General in Egypt, the Sudan Government, in co-operation with the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, embarked on the project of irrigating the Sudanese Gezira with gravitation water to be obtained by constructing a barrage across the Blue Nile in the neighbourhood of Sennar.¹

Simultaneously with the starting of the Gezira scheme under which the Blue Nile was to be drawn off for irrigation in the Sudan, another scheme was launched—in this case at the Egyptian Government's expense—for the construction of another dam at Jebel Aulya on the White Nile, about forty miles above Khartum, which, although it lay in Sudanese territory, was intended to store water for use in Egypt. The Egyptian Ministry's proposals also included a barrage at Nag Hamadi in Egypt, which was an exclusively Egyptian concern, and a second dam on the Upper Blue Nile, above Makwar, which was to store water partly for the Sudanese Gezira and partly for use in Egypt.

Another scheme for the cultivation of cotton by irrigation in the Sudan related to the utilization of the flood water of the River Gash in the Kassala Province, but the execution of this scheme involved the linking up of Kassala by railway with some point on the Atbara-Port Sudan sector of the Sudan State Railways. A Kassala Railway Company and a Kassala Cotton Company were accordingly formed, and the scheme was launched by a series of interlocking agreements between

¹ The cost of this work, and the advance made to the Syndicate for certain permanent works of its own, were financed by three Sudan Government loans, the interest on the bonds being guaranteed by the British Government.

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these two companies, the Sudan Government, and the Sudan State Railways. The Gash scheme did not affect Egypt, since this water did not in any case flow into the Nile but lost itself in the desert, so that the volume of Nile water in Egypt could not be diminished by the utilization of Gash water for irrigation in the Sudan. On the other hand, the Gash rose in the Italian colony of Eritrea, and the Eritrean authorities had initiated an irrigation scheme in their own territory, which involved the erection of a dam across the Gash at Tessenei, about twenty-five miles above Kassala. The question between the Eritrean and the Sudan Governments concerning the utilization of these waters, which flowed from the one territory into the other, was a small edition of the similar question between the Sudan and the Egyptian Government concerning the waters of the river Nile ; but in the latter case, unfortunately, agreement proved far more difficult than in the former.

In recent years the politically conscious elements in the Egyptian people have felt some sort of anxiety regarding the control of the Nile water by any foreign power, and this anxiety is due to several factors of comparatively recent occurrence in Egyptian history. The first factor is that, since the time of Mehemet Ali, Egyptian agriculture has ceased to be solely dependent upon the Nile flood, which no engineer could cut off, and had come to rely in addition upon irrigation from the summer water supply, the volume of which could easily be controlled from the Sudan. The second factor is that, since the reconquest of the Sudan, the upper basin of the Nile, for the first time in history, had come under the partial but paramount command of a civilized foreign power, which possessed the skill and resources to control the Nile water, and might desire to promote the economic development of the Sudan as well as Egypt. This situation was brought about by the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium over the Sudan. Its importance was increased by the fact that Great Britain was a cotton manufacturing country, and that certain parts of the Sudan as well as Egypt were capable under irrigation of producing good cotton crops of the Egyptian variety. Moreover, a great deal of British capital had been sunk in the country. A third factor was the increase of

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population in Egypt under the British occupation. This increase had begun as result of successive extensions of cultivation in Egypt itself ; but by the close of the year 1924 it was estimated that out of a total potential area of about seven million feddans, 5,200,000 were already under cultivation. It was argued that, at the average rate of increase of the Egyptian population during the previous forty years, the remaining 1,800,000 feddans would be taken up within the next thirty years ; and that, for the possible future overflow of population after the limit of cultivation in Egypt itself had been reached, the line of least resistance would be the Sudan. The Sudan, to the Egyptian mind, was an annex of Egypt which should be utilized in Egypt's interests. In fact the instinctive Egyptian policy towards the Sudan was that its economic development should be postponed until that of Egypt had been completed ; and that thereafter the Sudan should only be developed so far as this could be done without detriment to Egyptian interests, and primarily as an outlet for any overflow of the Egyptian population.

Although the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899 has been the instrument under which the government and development of the Sudan have been carried out by the two respective countries, important changes have since taken place in the political situation, owing, firstly, to the gradual increase in British influence as the Sudan advanced in prosperity under British management, and, secondly, owing to the development of the Nationalist movement in Egypt in 1919. From that time onwards Egyptian political leaders have insistently demanded the integral incorporation of the Sudan in a sovereign independent Egyptian state ; and in the Sudan itself a number of individual Egyptians started an anti-British agitation which, although it did not affect the Condominium at law, made it almost unworkable in practice within less than five years. Yet it must be admitted that the British attitude towards the Sudan contributed in no small degree to the extreme attitude of the Egyptians. Englishmen had fallen into the habit of thinking, speaking and acting as though the Sudan were not subject to an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium but were an integral part of the British Empire, and this caused much irritation and alarm on the part of the Egyptians, who regarded

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it as an indication of a change in British policy since the signing of the Agreement. But while Egyptian irritation on this account was very natural, no less natural was British pride in the remarkable work of reconstruction which was carried out on British initiative and under British direction. Hence Englishmen were as much exasperated at the extreme form of the Egyptian claim as Egyptians were, when they found this claim dismissed off-hand by Englishmen as preposterous.

I do not propose to carry the isolated question of the Sudan any further, as from this point Sudanese affairs are included in the main body of my narrative. But I cannot conclude this short account of the Sudan without emphasizing the fact that, although the claims of Great Britain and Egypt are justified by contentions of considerable weight, the Sudanese themselves have no small right to a say in the destiny of their own country.

CHAPTER IX

WAR AND PROTECTORATE

TO the outbreak of the Great War in August, 1914, Egypt maintained a sphinx-like attitude, and the rapid succession of events in Europe had little or no counterpart on the banks of the Nile. In the absence of the Khedive, Rushdi Pasha acted as Regent, with a fairly strong Cabinet mainly composed of men who were more or less sympathetic to the controlling power of Great Britain. At the British Residency affairs were in the hands of the Counsellor, Mr. (afterwards Sir Milne) Cheetham, who had been in charge since Lord Kitchener's departure from Egypt on leave and continued in this capacity until the arrival of Sir Henry MacMahon as High Commissioner after the Proclamation of the Protectorate.

There was much less excitement in Egypt at this time than might have been expected, and Egyptians were much more concerned with the possible effects of the war on their produce markets and the prospective curtailment of trade with Europe than they were with the international differences of the Great Powers. A great wave of prosperity had suddenly been checked, and there was nothing to indicate that the existing economic depression would, as result of the war, give place to a period of untold wealth in Egypt. Yet anti-British feeling was noticeable enough in certain directions. The more aggressive Nationalists maintained their previous attitude, while Moslem sympathy was inclined to favour the German Kaiser, who had exerted so much energy to attract the friendship of the Sultan Caliph of Islam. Although the Egyptians had become accustomed to the presence of Great Britain as a controlling power, they had never contemplated the possibility

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of Egypt's anomalous position involving her in war. It was indeed an anxious time for the Egyptian Prime Minister and his colleagues, who had no quarter from which they could expect support or advice. The Khedive was in Constantinople; the Legislative Assembly was adjourned; and the country in general was quite indifferent to the greater issues at stake. Hussein Rushdi Pasha did not excel in strength of character, and his qualities of tact and resource did not make up for this deficiency at a time when Egypt was badly in need of a strong leader. In fact, the Regent's character was largely responsible for the position forced upon Egypt as result of the outbreak of the Great War. As far as Great Britain was concerned, the dominating feature of the Egyptian situation was the safety of the Suez Canal, and the British Government was prepared to make great sacrifices in order to maintain intact her Imperial line of communication.

To Egypt, on the other hand, maritime considerations were of little interest, and Egyptians quite naturally saw no reason why they should become mixed up in a quarrel over the Canal, which meant little or nothing to them. But Rushdi Pasha realized that circumstances were such that Egypt must either go hand in hand with Great Britain or resist by force of arms. Distasteful as the British Occupation was to the Egyptians, the second alternative was unthinkable. Open defiance to Great Britain held out no prospect of success and could only involve the country in untold suffering, so there was no choice but to yield to British pressure. The Prime Minister, therefore, signed a document on the 5th of August, 1914, practically committing Egypt to a declaration of war against the enemies of Great Britain. It was provided that no resident or visitor in Egypt might conclude an agreement with subjects of any country at war with His Majesty's Government, or contribute to a loan issued by such a country. Nor might he undertake to insure the property of enemy subjects, or enter into any description of business with them. No vessel flying the Egyptian flag might enter an enemy port, or communicate with such a port. British Naval and Military Forces were authorized to exercise in Egyptian ports and territories all the rights of war, and persons in Egypt were commanded to lend all possible aid to Great Britain. This Declaration of the Council of Ministers

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evoked no public protest from the people of Egypt, who were in fact committed to nothing. Such assistance as was promised to the Allies was of a purely negative character, and very few of the restrictions embodied in the agreement affected the people to any appreciable extent. But although the Egyptians had no immediate grounds of complaint in the actual terms of this document, they might well have resented the fact that the Prime Minister made no attempt to obtain concessions for them in return for the assurances given. The Egyptian Council of Ministers had it in their power to create a situation involving Great Britain in two alternatives : either quickly to declare some form of annexation, which would be an arbitrary act likely to create an unfavourable impression in neutral countries ; or to appease Rushdi Pasha and his colleagues by making Egypt a generous offer in the matter of self-government. As the former alternative would have been contrary to British interests at that time, and as the latter would have entailed considerable risk from a military standpoint, it was fortunate for England that Rushdi Pasha adopted the attitude which he did.

From this time forward the Egyptian Government, realizing that the presence of the British Army of Occupation rendered Egypt liable to attack, acted as though the country were practically part of the British Empire and, therefore, at war with Germany. As Turkey, on the other hand, had declared her neutrality, Egypt's action in siding with us amounted to a repudiation of Turkish suzerainty. During the first few months of the war everything seemed to work smoothly, and Egypt fitted in to her place by the side of Great Britain. There were no apparent signs of increased animosity towards us on the part of the population, which remained perfectly calm. There was no reaction to the policy of the Prime Minister and his colleagues, which was dictated by force of circumstances. Great Britain had obtained her object without difficulty ; she held the Suez Canal, and controlled the ports of Alexandria, Port Said and Suez. Moreover, Rushdi Pasha had made a favourable impression on the British authorities, and in consequence had been granted more extensive powers, which he never misused. But the forthcoming meeting of the Legislative Assembly was likely to bring forth questions

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regarding the war legislation of the Council of Ministers, and it was advisable that this should be avoided in present circumstances. Rushdi Pasha's wishes in this respect met with the approval of the British Residency, with the result that the meeting of the Assembly was adjourned for a further two months. In the interval, however, martial law was proclaimed, and the Egyptian Legislative Assembly was destined never to meet again. Yet, in view of the action of the Council of Ministers in sacrificing national interests in favour of Great Britain and their seizure of all executive power, it was not likely that the members of the Assembly would tamely submit to this procedure ; so legislation had to be introduced forbidding public meetings. Even this measure was received without protest, which gave encouragement to responsible British officials in their feelings with regard to the future.

The Egyptian attitude at this time was most instructive. Egypt knew full well that Great Britain meant business, and that the British Government was inflexible in its purpose. She knew that she must bow to circumstance or pay the penalty, and she knew what that penalty was likely to be, financial disaster, misery, and possible starvation. Egypt further knew that no amount of protest or agitation would alter the position in the smallest measure. She, therefore, accepted it as it was without a word of remonstrance. Yet this object lesson of 1914 was ignored in the years to follow, and both countries had to suffer the consequences.

Meanwhile, Lieut.-General Sir John Maxwell had been appointed to command the troops in Egypt, and for this task he was eminently suited both by his personal qualities and by his past experience. As an able administrator, with careful determination and a calm but cheerful disposition, he was able to face external and internal difficulties of no mean order, while his knowledge of Egypt and his personal friendships among the Egyptians gave him a prestige of considerable value. By this time the British Government foresaw further complications in the relationship between Egypt and the Occupying Power. The declaration of war by Turkey was almost regarded as a foregone conclusion, and an attack on the Suez Canal from the direction of Syria was to be expected. While it was impossible to say how the people of Egypt would

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react to hostilities between a Moslem and a Christian Power on their own territory, the necessary precautions had to be taken ; and the need of such precautions was increased by the hostile attitude of the Khedive, who was still the *de jure* ruler of Egypt. It was, therefore, decided on the 2nd November to declare martial law over Egypt, in order to prepare the way for such action as might become necessary. By this means administrative measures could be enforced without reference to the Legislative Assembly, and, where foreign subjects were concerned, without obtaining the consent of the Capitulatory Powers. Five days later war was declared with Turkey, and the declaration was accompanied by a statement defining the causes which had led to a breach between the two countries. In making this announcement, Sir John Maxwell referred to the military preparations in Syria which could only be directed against Egypt, the violation of Egyptian territory in the neighbourhood of Sinai, and the unprovoked attack on Russia by the Turkish Navy under German direction. Great Britain, he declared, was fighting firstly to protect the rights and liberties of Egypt won on the battlefield by Mehemet Ali, and secondly to secure the continuance of the peaceful prosperity which for thirty years Egypt had enjoyed from the British Occupation. But this was not all. The British Government went to the length of solemnly declaring that Great Britain accepted the sole burden of the war, and that she would not call upon the Egyptian people for military aid. At the time this assurance was given it was impossible to say whether it could be carried out, and no British Government had any right to make such an assurance. In point of fact, its execution was quite impossible in the circumstances of the military situation. Not only were Egyptian troops used in the defence of the Canal, but the Auxiliary Egyptian Corps, in which the fellahin were forcibly enrolled, played an important part in this theatre of war.

As the Egyptians were nominally subjects of the Sultan, the declaration of war with Turkey produced an impossible situation. From a military point of view, Great Britain had to strengthen her position in Egypt, while from a political standpoint she had to establish new relations with the Egyptians which would prove satisfactory in time of peace. She had to

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meet the demands of the immediate situation and at the same time to consider the interests of the future. There were several courses open to the British Government : (1) Annexation ; (2) The incorporation of Egypt as a self-governing Dominion within the Empire ; (3) The granting of complete independence and the conclusion of a treaty of alliance ; and (4) The proclamation of a Protectorate by which Great Britain assumed the position formerly occupied by Turkey. If the war had been the only consideration, annexation would have been the most obvious course ; but arbitrary action of this sort would have been in direct contradiction of the declared policy of Great Britain in regard to Egypt, and would have excited distrust among the Allied and neutral Powers. At the same time there is little doubt that it would have been accepted by the Egyptians with the same composure as the other war measures which had been imposed upon their country. For similar reasons it was undesirable to give Dominion status to Egypt, and it was far from being a suitable time to embark on political experiments of this nature ; while the risks involved in granting complete independence were far too great to justify its serious consideration. In order, therefore, to meet the political interests, which were somewhat at variance with the military situation, it was decided to declare a Protectorate over the country. The Proclamation, issued on the 18th December, 1914, was worded as follows :

His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty, and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate.

The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated, and His Majesty's Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt and protect its inhabitants and interests.

A further Proclamation, issued on the following day, announced that His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha had been deposed from the Khedivate on the grounds of adherence to the King's enemies, and that Prince Hussein Kemal, the eldest living prince of the family of Mehemet Ali, had accepted the succession and would bear the title of Sultan of Egypt. The new status was introduced without disturbance, if without enthusiasm, under the direction of Sir Milne Cheetham, and

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the British Representative took over control of Egyptian foreign affairs. But underneath the superficial calm there was a considerable amount of discontent. The economic position of the country was disturbed, there was a good deal of unemployment, and the censorship of the press stifled the natural outlet for grievances. In fact, the discussion of political subjects was almost entirely suppressed. Yet there were a few Egyptians who went to the length of expressing their views to the British Agency, and the Prime Minister sympathized with their contentions in favour of an independent Egypt, provided the country remained loyal to its pledges to Great Britain. The Proclamation of the Protectorate, however, led to the withdrawal of Rushdi Pasha's support of these views, and for a time no more was heard of Egyptian independence.

With the Proclamation of the Protectorate, Egypt ceased even nominally to form part of the Ottoman Empire, and the relationship between her and Great Britain was at last defined. No actual change in the relationship took place, except that a name was given to a state of affairs which had really existed since 1882, and Turkey had definitely lost what small control she once had. But it cannot be said that the Protectorate was by any means an ideal solution of the question. In a difficult situation it was the solution calculated to be least harmful to the various interests at stake. But it was in our military relationships with the Egyptians that we seemed to have lost the most valuable opportunity. The Egyptian army was ready to do anything or go anywhere we wanted, and the people of Egypt contributed very substantially to the Allied victory in that particular theatre of war, yet they have never even had the satisfaction of being associated with the Entente Powers as a partner in the united effort. They did a great deal of valuable work which was never recognized, and they have been denied that share in the glory of victory which would have meant so much to them. If only the Egyptian military effort had been recognized as an integral part of the Allied fighting machine, and had been so regularized that Egyptian soldiers and British soldiers became real comrades-in-arms, Egypt would have emerged from the Great War with an enhanced prestige due to her association with the British

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Empire. She would have shared with Britain's Dominions and Allies the credit of victorious achievements in the greatest war in history, and this could not but bind her closer to those who had guided her destinies. As it was, we declined Egyptian assistance one day and made use of it the day after. We, in fact, depreciated its value, and then utilized it, because there was no better available. A position of inferiority was forced upon the Egyptians, and it has had its natural results. If the Protectorate introduced an element of reality into the Egyptian situation, this was more than counterbalanced by the fiction maintained with regard to the employment of Egyptians on war service. Fiction has been the curse of all our dealings with Egypt, and we seem to be unable to introduce anything in the form of permanent reality which is essential for any satisfactory settlement of Anglo-Egyptian relations.

On the day on which the Khedive was deposed, the Acting Agent-General addressed to Prince Hussein a communication, in which he set forth the reasons which had induced His Majesty's Government to declare a Protectorate over Egypt. After recounting the hostile acts of which Turkey had been guilty, the document concluded with a statement that Great Britain accepted full responsibility for the defence of the country; that His Majesty's Government bound themselves on the conclusion of hostilities to secure the revision of the Capitulations, to promote the spread of education, and to associate the governed with the task of government. Egyptians were urged to believe that Great Britain had been influenced by no spirit of hostility to the Caliphate, inasmuch as history proved that Egyptian loyalty to that spiritual Power was independent of political ties between Egypt and Turkey. Sultan Hussein at once requested Hussein Rushdi Pasha, hitherto Regent, to remain in office, which he agreed to do, and there is little doubt that at that time the Prime Minister and his Cabinet loyally accepted the Protectorate and were anxious to do everything possible to help in the prosecution of the war. Sultan Hussein's character was in great contrast to that of Abbas Hilmi. He had led a blameless life, and had carefully avoided the snares of political intrigue. He possessed great physical and moral courage, and regarded his nephew with supreme contempt. As a ruler he was universally re-

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spected, while among the fellahin he had gained a great reputation as a good landlord and experienced farmer. Prince Hussein was the first ruler of Egypt who insisted that the private lives of Ministers and Officers of the Household should be entirely free from reproach ; and one of his first actions on assuming the Sultanate was to demand the instant resignation of two high officials whose conduct failed to reach his required standard of morality. Over his immediate entourage the Sultan exercised despotic power, and on accepting the offer of the British Government he insisted that certain restrictions on the prerogatives of his predecessor should be removed. He demanded a substantial addition to the existing Civil List, but he was of a generous disposition and his knowledge of the value of money insured the funds at his disposal being economically administered.

In the early days of the war there was some degree of excitement amongst the Egyptian population, who knew that the Turkish army was concentrating in Syria for an attack on the Suez Canal in the hope of cutting our communications with India and Australia. Indeed, there were certain sections of the people who believed in the victory of the Central Powers and in Turkey's promises to grant Egypt complete independence at the termination of hostilities. As long as this threat of attack was hanging in the air the country remained in an unsettled state, and it was felt that the sooner the attack came the better. At the beginning of February, 1915, the attack was delivered, and the manner in which it was repelled is a matter of military history. An important part in the defence was played by the Egyptian Artillery, and on the whole the Egyptian posts on the Canal remained loyal, although there were one or two isolated cases of desertion. As soon as the attack had failed and the Turkish Expeditionary Force had retreated from the Suez Canal, the excitement and unrest subsided. Moreover, when the Egyptians saw bodies of Turkish prisoners being marched through the streets of Cairo and the country being rapidly transformed into a great military base, into which poured troops from all parts of the British Empire, they began to lose faith in the prospect of a Turkish victory. Gradually the country came more and more under military control, and it fell to Sir John Maxwell to guide

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Egypt through a very critical period. Under his courteous and tactful yet strong administration, the dread of martial law was to some extent dispelled and much of the bitterness against Great Britain was forgotten.

Towards the end of 1915 the shattered remnants of Sir Ian Hamilton's Army in Gallipoli were evacuated into Egypt and, with what was known as the Levant Base, became the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. In February, 1916, General Sir A. Murray was appointed General Commanding-in-Chief of this Force, with orders to establish his headquarters at Ismailia, and to reorganize the army whilst watching the Canal front. Sir John Maxwell was left with a diminished force to watch the Western frontiers, maintain law and order and administer martial law in Egypt. His position was a difficult one, but in the interests of the service he continued to perform duties which must have been distasteful to him, until the outbreak of the rebellion in Ireland in 1916 provided another opportunity for the exercise of his administrative attainments. He left Egypt amid expressions of universal regret, and is one of those who, by his personality, has drawn the Egyptians closer to the British way of thinking.

Meanwhile, the prestige of the Sultan increased, and his personal qualities enabled him to overcome the unpopularity which he had at first incurred by accepting the title of Sultan from the hands of a Christian Power. He had a firm belief in the ultimate success of the Allied cause, and, believing that the Protectorate was only a war measure, he intended to proceed in person to London as soon as the war was over, in order to bring about a settlement acceptable to the British Government and to the aspirations of the Egyptian people. At the end of 1916, General Sir Reginald Wingate, Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan since December, 1899, was appointed to succeed Sir Henry McMahon as High Commissioner. Sir Henry McMahon had come to Egypt with no knowledge of the country at all, while Sir Reginald Wingate returned to conditions which had fundamentally changed since last he was in Cairo. As both these officials were working in a country where the military authority was more or less supreme, and owing to their want of diplomatic knowledge failed to receive the full confidence of the Foreign Office,

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their periods of office were somewhat featureless from an administrative point of view. Unfortunately, at this time the declining health of the Sultan gave rise to the question of a possible successor, and on his death on the 9th of October, 1917, his brother Ahmed Fuad, the sixth son of Ismail, was chosen to be the ruler of Egypt. While it cannot be said that Prince Fuad had any particular qualifications, he was not likely to create obstacles in the way of British policy, but was more likely to lean on the British Government for support. The death of Sultan Hussein was a great misfortune for Egypt, and there is no saying what he might have achieved, had he lived, towards the settlement of the Egyptian question.

The chief effect of the proclamation of a Protectorate over Egypt was greatly to stimulate Egyptian Nationalism. While the new title of Sultan was no doubt meant to indicate Egypt's independence of Turkey, the deposition of the Khedive by proclamation, after and not before, the British Protectorate had been proclaimed, suggested that Great Britain was the real ruler of the country and that the new Sultan was wholly dependent upon the British Government. Moreover, the establishment of a Protectorate placed a Moslem people under the authority of a Christian Power, which was resented as a blow directed at the spiritual rights of the Turkish Sultan as Caliph of Islam. The establishment in Egypt of a base for new operations on a great scale in Palestine and Syria was soon to prove the value of the British assurance that the Egyptian people would not be called upon for aid in the war. New railway lines had to be laid across the desert in rear of the advancing armies ; the troops had to be supplied and fed from the base in Egypt ; and transport and animals had to be produced from somewhere. Egyptian labour was the only labour available ; Egyptian produce was the nearest source on which to draw ; and Egyptian transport was specially suited to that particular theatre of operations. The burden of producing these essential needs of the army, therefore, fell upon the Egyptians. While it must be admitted that at first the British authorities had every intention of paying adequately for all that was requisitioned from the people, and of encouraging the system of voluntary contributions, the needs of the army grew enormously as the British forces advanced

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into Palestine, and the burden placed upon Egypt grew in proportion.

The Egyptian Labour Corps was formed of Egyptian non-combatants, who relieved the troops of a great deal of unskilled labour. According to regulations they were paid, fed, and clothed, and their service was entirely voluntary, but the means by which they were recruited developed into a virtual conscription, and gave rise to all the old corruption and abuses formerly practised by the Mudirs and their subordinate officials. At first the fellahin responded readily to the call, but as the army advanced into Palestine the Egyptian attitude towards the war changed, as there was no longer any question of operations in their own country. In Palestine they had nothing to gain and nothing to lose. But simultaneously with the falling off in recruitment the needs of the army increased, and the demand for labour became extremely urgent. During 1917 and 1918 pressure on the fellahin was more and more rigorously applied as the army advanced north and the lines of communication grew longer and more complicated. The British military authorities cared little how the men were produced as long as they materialized. To them the urgent needs of the moment were all that mattered. The Mudirs, the Mamours, and the village Omdahs carried out the wishes of the military authorities, but such an opportunity of lining their own pockets was too good to be missed. Many of the old methods of tyranny crept into use, and the recruitment of the Labour Corps developed into little less than a forced levy under the fiction of voluntary service. It was scarcely surprising that, in such circumstances, the corps got a thoroughly bad name, and that our failure to keep our word created a feeling of hostility among the whole population. If we found it necessary to resort to forced levies, we should have admitted the fact, and formally announced our intention to conscript men for the Labour Corps. Nothing could have been more detrimental to British interests in Egypt than the course which we adopted, while a candid confession of our inability to continue without conscripted labour would have ensured peaceful submission.

This now famous body of men made a most valuable contribution to our success in the Palestine Campaign, where Lord

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Allenby's forces were always accompanied by detachments of Egyptian labourers. They took a considerable part in the construction of the military railway across the Sinai desert, one of the greatest achievements of the war. This colossal task was completed in less than four months, and the railway track was laid at the rate of three miles a day, so that no man can say that these Egyptians did not pull their weight. In 1916, 10,463 men of the Egyptian Labour Corps were sent to France, and 8,230 to Mesopotamia, while at the termination of hostilities there were about 135,000 employed in connexion with the operations in Syria. A further grievance lay in the requisitioning of camels and donkeys for the Camel Transport Corps, another fine body of men who did magnificent work under the most trying conditions of wet and cold, to which they were quite unaccustomed. To the average fellah the beast of burden is a sacred belonging, so the fact that requisitions were legitimate in no way modified the hardship or redressed the grievance. The same applied to the matter of army supplies, which practically became forced contributions as the extent of the operations increased. It is in the nature of war that such should be the case, but it was no reason why the British Government should assure the Egyptians that they would not be called upon for any aid in its prosecution, and should persist in the maintenance of this fiction. As usual, the heaviest part of the burden had to be borne by the poorer fellahin, who were swindled by unscrupulous contractors and taken advantage of by their richer neighbours; and the remarkable tide of prosperity resulting from the war did nothing to modify their bitterness. What happened during these days of the war shows how quickly old abuses creep back as soon as the controlling hand is withdrawn, but this knowledge was little consolation for the people of Egypt. When one looks back at the solid worth of the burden shouldered by the Egyptians during the war, and considers the meagre recognition given for the untold services rendered, there seems little doubt that we owe Egypt some recompense for her loyal effort. In order fully to appreciate the value of these services, it is necessary to picture what would have happened if Egypt had risen in revolt and adopted towards us an attitude of active hostility.

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There seems to be no doubt that the recruiting for the Egyptian Labour and Camel Transport Corps, the requisitioning of animals and goods from the fellahin, and even the collection of subscriptions for Red Cross funds from a Moslem population, were carried out by Egyptian officials in a manner which gave rise to all sorts of intimidation and corruption. As these measures were intended to aid Great Britain in the conduct of the war, it was only natural that she should be blamed for what occurred ; and this seemed to the Egyptians to justify their fears regarding the sinister significance of the Protectorate. Hence the politically-minded section of the people let loose an insidious propaganda, in order to persuade the ignorant fellahin that all their new grievances were the direct result of the Protectorate, and they were thereby destined to the bonds of slavery at the hands of the ever-increasing numbers of affluent Englishmen which the necessity of the war brought to Egypt. And it was not surprising that these ignorant peasants, who contrasted their own poverty with the outward and visible signs of wealth which accompanied the vast numbers of Englishmen in their midst, should be ready to believe that they were being reduced to bondage by the coming of the British and the establishment of the Protectorate. Nor was it surprising that they thought their only chance of deliverance lay in joining the clamour for national independence, by which their country would be rid of the British altogether. By the end of the war we had not only failed to gain the sympathy and confidence of the educated classes in Egypt, but we had actually earned the dislike of the great masses of peasants who form the foundation of the Egyptian people.

All this gave stimulus to the Egyptian Nationalist agitation against British rule in Egypt. This agitation was based partly on the inevitably growing discontent of a native population with a foreign ruler, partly on the dislike of Moslems for Christians. It received a notable encouragement from the theory of self-determination proclaimed by President Wilson. It derived much also from the Anglo-French Declaration of the 7th November, 1918, which stated that the objects of France and Great Britain in the East were the "establishment of national governments deriving their authority from the



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initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations," and declared their intention to be "to recognize these governments as soon as they have been effectively established." The example of King Hussein of the Hedjaz, the exploits of Lawrence and the Emir Feisal brought home to the Egyptians the conviction that the long-expected hour of deliverance was at hand, and that they had every right to share the benefits offered to the much more ignorant people of the Arabian Desert. Moreover, the Egyptians had in Sa'ad Pasha Zaghlul a leader of great personality and considerable accomplishments, who was ready to champion their cause and to make the best use of the opportunity to further the interests of Egyptian independence. To him, more than to any other man, Egyptian Nationalism owed its rapid adoption by the people, the energy which its policy exhibited, and the success which ultimately attended the movement.

Zaghlul, a lawyer of fellahin origin, had been a Nationalist from youth, and as a young man had taken part in the Arabi movement, for which he had suffered imprisonment. Later on, he entered the National Assembly, and as Minister of Education had done good work. With the party divisions brought about by the Khedive Abbas II, Zaghlul had been driven into political isolation, where he formed the centre of admiring satellites inferior to him both in intellect and capacity, to emerge eleven years later as a small god who expected nothing but unqualified support. It was in this frame of mind that he launched his active Nationalist campaign towards the end of 1918, and exerted his personal qualities to attract the sympathy and support of the uneducated masses to which he himself had originally belonged. The history of Egypt during the last half-century is mainly the life-story of Zaghlul Pasha. In early life he was the simple fellah until his marriage introduced him into the select circles formed of the Turkish, Armenian, Circassian and Albanian families from which most of the executive officers of the administration were drawn. These were the men amongst whom he was destined to live and work from the time when his personality began to make itself felt in Egypt. But their outlook on life was different from his, and their worldly attainments were greater. They had a certain *finesse*, a quick and perhaps rather subtle

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intellect, and a worldly adaptability, which contrasted with the crude common sense and open speech of Zaghlul. This great Nationalist leader—for Zaghlul was a great man—never tried to dominate his followers. He nursed them, as a parliamentary candidate nurses a constituency, and the leader and the led influenced each other in a way that can only be the outcome of mutual devotion. They never failed each other. Although Zaghlul rose from the humblest origin to a high position in the country, he never suffered thereby. In sympathy he was always the fellah, and he was proud of the fact. He shared the interests of the peasants, he enjoyed their jokes, he was of a simple and homely disposition, and he earned the devotion of the people of Egypt. Further, he was an honest man who strove for what he believed to be right, although in his political isolation he became a fanatical idealist who believed in the principle that the end justified the means. While it was at times quite impossible to approve of his policy or the means employed to carry it out, there were occasions when Zaghlul was undoubtedly right, although we were reluctant to admit it. His character and personal charm made him liked by average Englishmen, amongst whom he had a large circle of friends before the war; and even after 1924 he began to make a new circle of acquaintances to replace those who had left the country. His honesty of purpose and straightforward speech appealed to the British mentality, although what he said and did was often the subject of wholesale condemnation. Even at the times of his bitterest attacks on Great Britain he was always “Zaggers,” and he filled a very important position in both the hearts and minds of a great number of Englishmen in Egypt. Lord Cromer saw in Zaghlul a man of considerable promise, and his accomplishments were such that we should never have allowed him to become our opponent. Even assuming the attitude which he did assume, he made a notable contribution to the political evolution of Egypt, and, although there were serious relapses, a solid accumulation of progress will always stand to his credit. Future generations will be in a better position to judge Zaghlul than we are, but even to-day it is certain that he did a great work in Egypt in spite of his periodic indiscretions. He was a true Egyptian patriot, and he devoted his life to

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what he considered to be the interests of others. Zaghlul stood for Egypt, and Egypt worshipped Zaghlul.

On the 17th November, 1918, the Nationalist campaign, stimulated by an incident in which Great Britain exercised sovereign rights over Egyptian soil,¹ began in earnest. Zaghlul Pasha, with two of his chief supporters, visited the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, and put forward a demand for the complete independence of Egypt. They further demanded that they should be permitted to go to London in order to put forward the Nationalist claims, and urged that Egypt's substantial contribution in men and supplies to the British forces had earned a generous reconsideration of her political status. Sir Reginald Wingate, who had proved himself to be a soldier-administrator of the first rank and had gained the affection of people of all classes both in Egypt and the Sudan, advised the British Government to receive the deputation, but his advice was rejected on the grounds that "no useful purpose would be served by their coming." Again a deaf ear was turned to the national aspirations of the people of Egypt. This refusal on the part of Great Britain even to consider the political position of a country which had given valuable help to the British Empire in time of need roused bitter feelings amongst the Egyptians. The High Commissioner, realizing the changed attitude which had been brought about by British indifference to Egyptian interests, pressed His Majesty's Government to reconsider their decision, but they refused to listen to his counsels. With all the conflicting interests resulting from the war and the early prospect of the Peace Conference in Paris, it was only too natural that the affairs of Egypt were pushed into the background. The same misfortune had befallen Egypt in 1882, when Mr. Gladstone's eyes were all for Ireland, and the result was of a similar nature. Zaghlul and his party opened a campaign of agitation which rapidly became a national movement, dangerous in its intensity, for the abrogation of the British Protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as a Sovereign State. In the towns and villages a skilful campaign

¹ On the 19th August, 1918, the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt issued a Proclamation requisitioning land at Aboukir, near Alexandria, for the construction of a permanent air station.

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was carried out, and the people were urged to organize themselves to make a determined effort for the freedom of their country, old rivalries were speedily reconciled, Moslems and Copts joined forces in a common cause, and Zaghlul became the leader of the movement with the full confidence of the people. Nothing less than complete independence would now satisfy the demands of the Nationalists. As the position was becoming serious, Sir Reginald Wingate was summoned to London to explain the situation, but the attention of Ministers was so much taken up with other affairs that he scarcely got a hearing, and he was not even allowed to return to Egypt to deal with a situation which, owing to his profound knowledge of Egyptian mentality, he might yet have been able to manage.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian Government, following the example of the Nationalists, had also desired to send some of their members to London to discuss Egyptian affairs. The contention of the Prime Minister, Rushdi Pasha, was more guarded than that of Zaghlul, and was to the effect that the Peace Conference would consecrate the British Protectorate and that, before this was done, he was entitled to know the exact definition of the Protectorate and what rights it gave to Egypt. Under Turkish suzerainty the Egyptians had certain defined rights, and it seemed only natural that the Egyptian Government should know what rights they were to expect under the protection of Great Britain. This request was submitted just before the assembly of the Peace Conference, at a time when the Foreign Secretary and his chief advisers were on the point of leaving for Paris. As it was, unfortunately, quite impossible to begin discussing Egyptian affairs at that particular time, the Egyptian Government was asked to postpone the visit until the occasion was more opportune. In Egypt the reply of the Foreign Office was misinterpreted as a refusal, and created such a bad impression that the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet resigned. They found it impossible to maintain their influence and at the same time to withstand the growing momentum of the Nationalist movement.

By the beginning of March, 1919, the Nationalist attitude had become threatening, and Zaghlul was warned to abstain

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from rousing further political agitation. He ignored this warning, however, and notice was given to foreign representatives that a delegation had been formed to lay the Nationalist case before foreign countries. At the same time, a strongly-worded and threatening petition was sent to the Sultan, who had refused to receive the members of the delegation. In view of this Nationalist action, the Acting High Commissioner, with the approval of the British Government, arrested Zaghlul and three of his supporters, and deported them to Malta. The immediate effects of this measure revealed the gravity of the internal situation in Egypt, which had probably been under-estimated. Anti-British demonstrations in Cairo were followed by disturbances at Tanta and in the Delta provinces, where British soldiers and civilians were attacked. Railway lines were torn up, telegraph wires cut, the houses of Europeans were burnt to the ground, and the banks of irrigation canals destroyed. By the middle of March Cairo was isolated from the rest of Egypt, foreign colonies were blockaded in Upper Egypt, and at Deirut British officers and officials were brutally murdered in the train by a fanatical crowd. There was no limit to the fanatical ferocity of the fellahin, whose only desire was to destroy life and property. The local authorities were powerless to preserve law and order, and the towns and villages were in the hands of self-elected bodies. At an early stage it became clear that military intervention was necessary, and General Bulfin, who was commanding the Egyptian Expeditionary Force since Lord Allenby's departure for Paris, took the situation in hand. Mobile columns, dispatched to the affected areas, succeeded in re-establishing communications, and punitive expeditions were sent throughout the provinces, so that before the end of March a certain degree of order had been restored. During the disturbances the railways suffered severely. The lines were cut in about 200 places, and 63 stations were damaged. The cost of repairing this damage amounted to about £E44,000, to which must be added some £E22,000 for repairs to telegraphs. Owing to the scarcity of materials, repairs took a long time to carry out, and the actual loss to the railway receipts was estimated at about £E400,000.

There is no doubt that the refusal of the British Govern-

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ment to receive Zaghul was directly responsible for what almost amounted to a general rising, and it was indeed surprising that a policy of repression was again pursued, regardless of the consequences which had attended that policy at the time of Arabi's rise to power. Again the Egyptian attitude had been misinterpreted, and the movement was regarded as purely revolutionary. It was believed that the Egyptians aimed at the overthrow of all authority and were the bitter antagonists of Great Britain, whereas nothing could have been further from the truth. Egypt merely claimed the right to control her own internal affairs, and her war effort gave some justification to this claim, but the British Government, instead of adopting a conciliatory policy, merely provoked resistance, and repeated the great blunder of 1882 all over again. We repressed by force where we ought to have guided and shown sympathetic encouragement. The authorities were determined on the line of action they were going to take, and they only wanted a suitable representative to carry it out. It so happened that Lord Allenby was in Paris at the time when the situation in Egypt was at its worst, and there was no hesitation in appointing him as Special High Commissioner to repress disorder and to restore normal conditions in Egypt.

CHAPTER X

LORD ALLENBY'S RÉGIME

BY the time Lord Allenby reached Cairo on the 25th March, 1919, active insurrection had practically subsided and had given place to a phase of passive resistance. The Nationalist Party, realizing that they could no longer count on the active support of the fellahin, who had already worked off their resentment and were fearing the consequences, turned their attention to the educated middle classes, who were exhorted to co-operate by paralysing the administration of the country. There does not seem to be any doubt that the nation as a whole was behind the movement, but it required the efforts of political agitators to induce the people to give material expression to their sentiments. It was far from being an insurrection to be suppressed by brute force.

In Cairo members of the legal and medical professions absented themselves from their duties as a protest against the deportation of Zaghlul and the three other Pashas, and their example was soon followed by Government officials. An attempt was made to paralyse the communications of the country, and for a time the railway service was at a standstill. Schoolboys and students refused to attend their classes, and devoted their time and energies to demonstrations and political agitation. Many of these lads, ignoring the authority of their parents, travelled throughout the country encouraging officials and notables to co-operate in the general movement of passive resistance. It was also arranged that on a given date the employees of the Egyptian Government should go on strike and thereby bring the administration of the country to a standstill. But they did not realize that the necessary funds

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to provide strike pay would not be forthcoming, and that they were expected to absent themselves from work until England gave in and granted their requests. As usual, the British officials of the Civil Service rose to the occasion, and worked night and day to keep the administrative machine going even at half speed. Although large numbers of Egyptian officials would have much preferred to continue their work rather than face personal financial loss, the careful picketing of the doors of the Government offices led them to take the line of least resistance and remain at home. The staff of the Post Office were a notable exception, and their loyal behaviour was warmly appreciated by the public, especially in the districts affected by the destruction of the railways. No effort was spared to carry on the distribution of mails by every sort of means—water and wheel transport, riding animals, farmers' carts, etc.; and the energy and initiative displayed by the Egyptian district superintendents was worthy of the highest praise. The same spirit animated the Egyptian medical staff, who, although they participated in the National movement and aspirations, were led by humanitarian principles to maintain the continuity of service at hospitals, dispensaries and Public Health offices, at a time when practically every other branch of the service had stopped work as a sign of public protest.

Military operations continued and the country was in the grip of martial law, but Lord Allenby had tried on his arrival to mobilize such law-abiding elements as still existed. For several weeks Egypt had been without a Ministry, and it was not possible to form one, but, as there were no Ministers whom he could consult, he had invited a number of Egyptian notables to the Residency and had informed them that his objects were to restore order, to inquire into the causes of discontent, and to redress justifiable grievances. He had asked for their co-operation in the restoration of order and in calming the passions of the people. The result of this action had been the issue of a circular by some of the most influential men in Egypt, including the Rector of El Azhar, the Grand Mufti, the Coptic Patriarch, several ex-Ministers, and other Moslem and Coptic notables, appealing to the Egyptian nation to return to the ways of peace, and emphasizing the utter futility of trying to press their claims by means of violence.

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By the 31st of March the High Commissioner was in a position to announce that disturbances, outrages and the destruction of property had largely subsided, but unless some solution were found for the approval of the provisions of the new Budget by the following day, the 1st April, it would be impossible for the State to pay either salaries or bills. As no Council of Ministers existed, Lord Allenby made use of his powers under martial law and authorized the publication of the new Budget, requiring the acceptance of the provisions as if they had received the sanction prescribed in constitutional law. Meanwhile, the High Commissioner had been consulting with ex-Ministers and others as to what steps were advisable to restore the normal condition of the country, and had urged the necessity of arriving at some agreement with a view to forming a new Cabinet. The ex-Ministers, realizing that no improvement was possible until the administration of the country was re-established, urged the release of Zaghlul and his confederates as a necessary step towards the resumption of normal conditions. As ex-Ministers and others were prepared, on this condition, to use their best endeavours to break the strike, leaving the larger issues for future discussion, and as the removal of the cause of the upheaval seemed the only means of forming an Egyptian Cabinet, Lord Allenby obtained the consent of the British Government for the release of Zaghlul and the three Pashas. On the 7th April, a Proclamation was issued to this effect, and on the following day Rushdi Pasha, and most of his former colleagues resumed office.

The immediate effect of Zaghlul's release took the form of universal rejoicings, but they were of short duration. It became obvious that Great Britain had no intention of removing the Protectorate, and promises of an inquiry merely annoyed them. The Prime Minister tried to restore discipline in the Civil Service, but false rumours from Paris concerning the future of Egypt frustrated all his endeavours. Moreover, a certain unbalanced element of the population had got the upper hand and, little concerned with the object of their actions, were inciting the crowd to licentious disorder. From the attitude which they adopted it was impossible to distinguish between manifestations of joy and resentment. While some were intoxicated with the small degree of power

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derived from intimidation and threatening behaviour, others merely revelled in the delights of disorder, and others again really believed that such were the only means likely to prevail, where organized resistance was doomed to failure. The troops were called out to restore order in Cairo, but strikes continued and intimidation was used by the extremists to prevent officials and others from returning to their normal occupations. Rushdi Pasha showed the greatest patience in his endeavours to persuade the officials to return to work, but they demanded political guarantees which it was quite impossible for any Egyptian Minister to give. Appeal after appeal was made by the Cabinet, but the agitators merely denounced as traitors both the Ministers and all those who were inclined to show any sympathy with their policy. The arrogant attitude of many of the Effendis was not only unreasonable but extremely objectionable, and, far from helping the interests of the Nationalist cause, merely showed how utterly incapable that particular class of individual was to take any part in the conduct of public affairs. By the 21st of April the Prime Minister, finding that he could make no headway, resigned after twelve days' tenure of office, and Lord Allenby was 'once more left to deal single-handed' with the situation.

On the following day, seeing that there was no longer any chance of Egyptian Ministers being able to govern under existing conditions, and determined that the administrative confusion of the last six weeks should not continue, Lord Allenby asserted his authority as Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, invested with all the powers of martial law, and issued a Proclamation ordering an immediate return to work on the part of Government officials. All Government officials were to return to their posts the following day, and would receive no pay for the period of their absence without leave, while those who failed to comply with the order would be considered as having resigned their appointments. It was further announced that anyone who tried by persuasion, threats or violence to interfere with the compliance with this order would be liable to arrest and to prosecution before a military court. The effect of this Proclamation was almost instantaneous, and as the salaries of the officials were at stake, they presented



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themselves at their Ministries in large numbers on the following morning. While the firm attitude of Lord Allenby was unmistakable, the Nationalist Party received another serious shock from the official announcement that the President of the United States had recognized the British Protectorate over Egypt. Further proclamations threatening to close colleges and schools induced parents to adopt a firm attitude towards their sons, while other forms of pressure urged the lawyers back to their duties in the Courts. The other strikes soon collapsed, and before many days were over violent speeches and literature was all that remained of the recent outburst.

Again the people of Egypt had expressed themselves in a movement which merited a certain degree of sympathy, while the procedure which they adopted to obtain their objects was deserving of wholesale condemnation. Again the British Government had taken up an antagonistic attitude to Egyptian National sentiments, and had refused even to hear a statement of the Egyptian case. They withdrew from Egypt Sir Reginald Wingate, the man who fully understood the undercurrents of Egyptian feeling, and replaced him by another, who had no knowledge of Egypt except as Commander-in-Chief of an Expeditionary Force based on that country. Moreover, Lord Allenby had just returned from conducting a military campaign, and in the circumstances was little suited to apply himself to the political considerations prevailing in a country like Egypt. Owing to the unwise policy of deporting Zaghlul and thereby stirring up active resistance, the British Government placed Lord Allenby at a very serious disadvantage, and in order to rectify this blunder it was necessary to adopt a measure which could not be regarded as other than a sign of weakness. The situation demanded a British Representative whose exercise of tact and sympathy would compensate in some degree for the somewhat rigorous measures which the situation demanded. Lord Allenby was simply sent to Egypt to put down what was supposed to be an ordinary rising, whereas circumstances demanded an administrator of very exceptional qualities.

As Egypt was again without Ministers, the High Commissioner empowered the Under-Secretaries of State to exercise the authorities of Ministers, and chose this rather unsuitable

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opportunity to fill a number of vacant appointments with Englishmen. This action gave another handle to the Nationalist Party in their contention that Great Britain intended to maintain complete control over Egypt. The Rushdi Cabinet had resigned owing to the impossibility of resisting the Nationalist onslaught, which seemed to indicate that Ministers were henceforth to fill the unpleasant position of buffers between the Nationalists and the British Government, and the former having disposed of one Ministry, it was difficult to find another to take its place. Eventually, however, Mohammed Said Pasha was prevailed upon to take office, but any efforts he may have made to withstand the attacks of Nationalist agitation were no more successful than those of his predecessor. But, although the political situation was extremely confused and there seemed little prospect of anything approaching an atmosphere of political peace, Lord Allenby had succeeded in restoring tranquillity throughout the country. Military courts were trying cases of individual Egyptians accused of serious crimes in connection with the recent disorders, and the Administration was once more pursuing its normal course. No sooner, however, had Zaghlul and his associates returned from Malta than they joined forces with some other extremists from Egypt and proceeded to Paris, where the Peace Conference was now sitting. There they regarded themselves as the Egyptian Delegation, although they had no authority whatsoever to represent their country, and devoted their time and energy to intrigue and propaganda.

The British Government now decided to send a Mission to Egypt, under the chairmanship of Lord Milner, "to inquire into the causes of the recent disorders, and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of the constitution, which under the Protectorate will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests." The Mission consisted of Lord Milner, Sir Rennell Rodd, General Sir John Maxwell, General Sir Owen Thomas M.P., Sir Cecil Hurst and Mr. J. A. Spender, with Mr. A. T. Loyd and Captain E. M. B. Ingram as Secretaries. Not only was this a peculiar assortment of personalities, including a distinguished imperialist, an ex-Ambassador of the old school,

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a soldier-administrator, a Member of Parliament, a King's Counsel, and the editor of a Liberal newspaper, but the Mission did not arrive on the scene until after Nationalist feeling had had ample time to develop into an attitude of uncompromising hostility.¹ The Egyptian claims had been so long ignored that, when the Mission reached Cairo on the 7th of December, 1919, it was received with unofficial hostile demonstrations. An attitude of passive resistance was adopted by the Nationalists, who organized a boycott and rejected the inquiry on the grounds that it implied the maintenance of the British Protectorate. As the composition of the Mission was purely British, and as no Egyptians were even co-opted to it, it was not surprising that, under the circumstances, Lord Milner and his colleagues were confronted with many formidable obstacles. The boycott was rigidly enforced, not only against the Mission collectively in Cairo, but against individual members who attempted to penetrate into the provinces. Even villagers in outlying districts were intimidated against co-operating in any way with the work of the Commissioners, and the presence of one of them in a town or village was sufficient to cause fear and dismay. A campaign of wholesale misrepresentation was launched, and the press preached open defiance of the authority exercised by the High Commissioner under the Protectorate. Even the Ulemas of El-Azhar supported the Nationalist programme in demanding complete independence for Egypt. So antagonistic were the political extremists to everything connected with the Milner Mission that capital was actually made out of an alleged intention to curtail the water-supply of Egypt in favour of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In point of fact, the project in question contemplated the construction of barrages at Jebel Aulya and Sennar, on the White and Blue Niles respectively, to create a reservoir which would enable the waste lands of Egypt to be redeemed, and extend perennial irrigation to some 1,200,000 acres, which under basin irrigation produced only one crop a year.

When the Mission left Egypt in March, the Nationalists were under the impression that Lord Milner had failed and

¹ It should be noted that the High Commissioner left Egypt for the Sudan just before the arrival of the Milner Mission.

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that victory was theirs. This was far from being the case. The Commissioners had both seen and heard a very great deal, and had by various means succeeded in getting in touch with those whose views they wished to obtain. At this time the political leaders of Egypt appeared at their worst. Instead of ingratiating themselves with those who were prepared to help them, they concealed the qualities of the movement which merited sympathy under a display of folly which inspired distrust and contempt. If the British Government were slow in offering the opportunity for an investigation into the claims of the Egyptians, the Egyptians were quick to show their unwillingness to reveal the truth, and by so doing they were acting directly contrary to their own interests.

In May, Zaghlul, who was now recognized as really representing the feelings of a great mass of people in Egypt, was persuaded to come to London with several other Nationalist leaders, to discuss with Lord Milner the possibility of arriving at a solution of the Egyptian question. As result of the discussions which took place, a memorandum was eventually drawn up and signed by Lord Milner on the 18th August, 1920, the adoption of which he was prepared to recommend to the British Government, if Zaghlul would pledge himself to urge its adoption on his countrymen in Egypt. The memorandum first suggested that a Treaty should be signed between Egypt and Great Britain, in which the latter recognized the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions. Egypt in turn was to agree to confer on Great Britain "such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests," and to give the necessary guarantee to foreign Powers to secure their relinquishment of Capitulatory rights. In the second place, it provided for a Treaty of Alliance between the two countries, in which Great Britain should support Egypt in defending her territorial integrity, while Egypt offered, in case of war, to give Great Britain all the assistance and facilities in her power "within her own borders." Egypt was to have the right of diplomatic representation in foreign countries, but would undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude inconsistent with the alliance, or create difficulties for Great Britain or enter into agreements with foreign Powers prejudicial to British interests.

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Egypt was to give Great Britain the right of maintaining a military force on Egyptian soil to protect her Imperial communications, but this force was not to constitute a military occupation of the country nor to prejudice the rights of the Egyptian Government. Internally, a Financial Adviser and an official in the Ministry of Justice were to be appointed by Egypt in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, and, finally, Great Britain was to negotiate the whole question of Capitulations. Any reference to the Sudan was specifically excluded.

As Zaghlul and his colleagues were not prepared to commit themselves to any definite agreement without consulting their supporters, four members of the delegation proceeded to Cairo. Zaghlul and his colleagues once more met the Mission in October, 1920, after the return of the four delegates from Egypt but, although they reported that the proposed settlement had been well received, they proceeded to insist on four reservations, the most important of which were that the British troops should be limited in number and should be confined to the area of the Suez Canal, and that Egypt should have an equal share with Great Britain in the administration of the Sudan. No agreement was, therefore, reached, the Egyptian delegation left London and the Milner Mission proceeded with its report, which was forwarded to the Foreign Office on the 29th of December, 1920. This final report, embodying its recommendations, recognized that Egyptian opinion was universally hostile to the British Protectorate, and blamed the errors of the administration. It recommended that for the future the relations between Great Britain and Egypt should not be on the basis of a Protectorate, but should rest on a permanent Treaty of Alliance made by Egypt as an independent State, recognized by Great Britain; and that in the Treaty should be embodied the necessary safeguards for British interests.

Meanwhile, Lord Allenby, instead of being withdrawn when he had completed the task for which he was sent to Egypt as Special High Commissioner, continued to administer the country according to martial law. These were his instructions, and as a loyal servant of the Crown he faithfully carried them out. But it was extremely difficult to reconcile

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the powers of martial law with political questions arising in a country, which was clamouring for self-government and whose officials were very jealous of such independent rights as they possessed. While martial law insured peace in the military sense of the word, it laid up political trouble for the future. On the subject of the Protectorate the Egyptians were quite uncompromising, and, regarding it as essentially a war measure, they saw in its continuance signs of a reluctance on the part of the British Government to put into practice the principles of self-government which they had openly declared to be their policy on the conclusion of hostilities. While most Egyptians recognized the great work done by Lord Cromer and by British officials in the earlier days of the Occupation, they had since then resented the general line on which the system of British advice had progressed. As long as the British official was a man of exceptional qualifications and had prestige in his particular department, they were perfectly prepared to regard him as an adviser and to co-operate with him; but when younger British officials with less experience were appointed to watch over them, and if necessary to control their actions, they regarded this as interference and resented it. Even before the war they complained that too many Englishmen were employed in the Egyptian service, and they saw a tendency to increase the direct control of the British official rather than that of their Egyptian colleagues.

They further saw that the standard of British control was not what it used to be, and that little confidence was placed in the Egyptian officials, who were treated more and more as inferiors. The system had become such that the less personality and initiative shown by the Egyptian, the more acceptable he was likely to be to the adviser, whose duty it was to train him for executive power; and a fictitious balance of responsibility always seemed to be to the disadvantage of the Egyptian. The Legislative Assembly had not met since 1914, and there seemed little prospect of its meeting again. Egyptian public opinion had been ignored, and the rigours of the press censorship during the war had done incalculable harm. The war had indeed been a calamity for British control in Egypt, for at a time when the country needed the most careful guidance, many of the men best qualified for this task were serving as

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soldiers in the trenches. Humiliation was at the bottom of the Egyptian grievances, and our policy of unreality was chiefly responsible for this feeling which had spread throughout the official classes. Slowly but steadily we had been losing the confidence of the Egyptians, and the necessities of war hastened the reaction to our ill-considered policy. Yet, during these eventful years in the history of the world, the resources of Ministers were taxed almost beyond endurance, and, unfortunately, it fell to the lot of Egypt to be squeezed out of consideration at a time when the British Foreign Office had more demands on its staff than at any previous stage in its existence. The Egyptians felt that independence was their right, they felt that this right had been consecrated by their faithful service during our death struggle with the Central Powers, and they felt that they were being deceived by a Power from whom they had reason to expect fair and honest treatment.

At the beginning of 1921, Adly Pasha had a strong following as Egyptian Prime Minister, and Zaghlul's influence seemed for a time to be declining. When the Milner Report was published in Arabic, it was fairly well received and the Moderate Party regained much of its power, but fruitless negotiation over a draft treaty extended over several months, and the attitude of both parties gave rise to considerable difficulties. Egypt declined a draft treaty and absolutely refused to go any further until the Protectorate was finally abolished.

The British Government, on the other hand, after considering the Milner Report, informed the Sultan that in their opinion the Protectorate was not a satisfactory basis of relationship between the two countries, and requested that an official delegation should be nominated to confer with the Government in London. Adly Pasha then formed a Ministry with a programme designed to secure the co-operation of the Nationalists. He invited Zaghlul, who had remained in Europe, to join him in forming a delegation, but the claims which the Nationalist leader put forward for his party, including the Presidency and a majority of the members, were quite unacceptable. As a result of this Zaghlul returned to Egypt, and landed at Alexandria amid scenes of great enthusiasm and rejoicing. No sooner had he reached Cairo than he

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proceeded to attack the new Government by every means in his power, and denounced as traitors all who deigned to negotiate with the British Government. The formation of the delegation was followed by great disturbances in Cairo and Alexandria, and a military court of inquiry attributed responsibility to the attitude of Zaghlul's party. Sixteen of the rioters found guilty were executed, while a large number were sentenced to less severe punishments. The delegation as eventually formed, under the Presidency of Adly Pasha, consisted of members of the Egyptian Government and of Nationalists who were not followers of Zaghlul ; but it was not until six months after the presentation of the Milner Report that this delegation, pledged to demand the abolition of the Protectorate and the maintenance of the reserves formulated, proceeded to London in July, 1921, to negotiate with Lord Curzon, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. While the Prime Minister, Adly Pasha, left for England at the head of the delegation, Zaghlul used all his influence to discredit it in the eyes of the Egyptian people and to render its efforts futile.

The conversations between the British Government and the delegation lasted for four months. All reference to the Sudan was avoided, as it had been in negotiations with the Milner Mission, and the Egyptians seemed less interested than before in the question of abolishing the Capitulations. Certain differences seemed capable of adjustment on a basis of compromise, while others presented greater difficulties ; but the negotiations eventually broke down chiefly on the question of the maintenance of the British force in Egypt and the positions which this force should occupy. The British Government required that the troops should not be confined merely to the vicinity of the Suez Canal, but that they should be free to occupy any part of Egyptian territory ; while, in the view of Adly Pasha and his colleagues, such rights were destructive of any theory of complete independence for Egypt. The claim was also regarded as being contrary to the recommendation of the Milner Report. The negotiations having failed, Adly Pasha resigned on his return to Cairo, and Egyptian resentment at the British proposals regarding the retention of the army in Egypt gave rise to rioting and much bloodshed. Of all the

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various aspects of British influence in Egypt the presence of the garrison is the most distasteful to the Egyptians. The British flag flies from the Citadel in Cairo, overshadowing the great mosque dedicated to Mehemet Ali, the maker of modern Egypt, while the sight of the soldiers in the streets of Cairo and Alexandria never lets the people forget the presence of a foreign garrison. Orientals lay great stress on what actually meets the eye, often neglecting more important matters which are removed or hidden from their daily environment ; and it is only natural that the spectacle of foreign uniforms perpetually in their midst should stir up feelings of resentment at the humiliation thereby incurred. Foreign troops stationed in the smaller towns or in the provinces would be much less objectionable to the inhabitants, and in many cases would be acceptable on account of the money introduced into poorer districts. But the Egyptians are exceedingly proud of their capital, and it galls their national pride to be submitted to this humiliation. For this reason I cannot help thinking that the presence of British troops in Egypt, whether they be necessary or not, must always be productive of a certain degree of disturbance, especially when garrisons are maintained in the cities of Cairo and Alexandria.

On the 17th November, 1921, Lord Allenby had reported to Lord Curzon that his British advisers were unanimously of the view " that a decision which does not admit the principle of Egyptian independence, and which maintains a Protectorate, must entail serious risk of revolution throughout the country." . . . " Unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to give substantial satisfaction to expectations which Egyptians have legitimately formed on the basis of the apparent policy of His Majesty's Government during the past two years, it will be impossible to form any Ministry." " Strong military force " could, of course, be used, but " liberal concessions " were necessary. Lord Curzon suggested that this argument was " to a large extent unsound," but Lord Allenby replied that he wanted to be able to promise the Sultan " a higher degree of independence " than the British Government " are clearly disposed to grant," and he added a few days later that " no Egyptian . . . can sign any instrument which in his view is incompatible with complete independence. Consequently,

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it is necessary definitely to abandon the idea that the Egyptian question can be settled by means of a treaty." Whether Lord Allenby was right in his judgment is a matter of opinion, but there seems reason to believe that his conclusions were not altogether correct. About a month later, Zaghlul renewed his outbursts of verbal violence, and his general attitude became such that the High Commissioner again prohibited him from further political activities, and subsequently deported him to the Seychelles. Again this act of repression provoked serious agitation, and the attempt to form a Ministry under Sarwat Pasha was without success.

On the 12th January, 1922, Lord Allenby asked the Foreign Office for the approval of the following statement to the Sultan of Egypt: Great Britain was prepared to recommend to Parliament, without waiting for the conclusion of a treaty, the abolition of the Protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as an independent Sovereign State, and the re-establishment forthwith of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with consequent diplomatic representation of Egypt abroad. The régime of martial law was to be abolished as soon as an Egyptian Indemnity Act had been passed, and could be suspended "in respect of all matters affecting the free exercise of political rights of Egyptians." After this new state of affairs was established, the two Governments would conclude an agreement on the following four points: (a) Security of communications of the British Empire; (b) defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect; (c) protection of foreign interests in Egypt and protection of minorities; (d) the Sudan. Lord Allenby made it clear that, in his opinion, the country could not be governed any longer without concessions on these lines, and he was, therefore, summoned to London to explain his views. The result of the deliberations in England was that the British Government accepted these proposals *in toto*, except that the *status quo* as to the four points was to be maintained pending the "free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt." Till such time the discretion of the British Government as regards (a), (b), (c) and (d) was "absolutely reserved." By this time it was

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perfectly clear that no progress could be made until some form of settlement assured the co-operation of the Egyptians. While the British Government were anxious not to give up a position of vital importance to the communications of the Empire without adequate guarantees for the future, yet their policy hitherto had given rise to a situation in Egypt which could only be stabilized either by strong military measures or by concessions on the British side. The latter was the course adopted, and the Declaration of Independence,¹ drawn up in the terms indicated, was sent to the Sultan on the 28th February, 1922.

After this Declaration was made Sarwat Pasha was able to form a Ministry with a programme contemplating a democratic constitution, Ministerial responsibility, and the revocation of martial law ; indeed, the prospects of an amicable settlement between Great Britain and Egypt seemed to come within the range of practical politics. As soon as the Declaration had been approved by the British Parliament, the Sultan assumed the title of King and proclaimed Egypt a monarchy. An Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs was once more appointed, and the British Government informed the Powers that :

The termination of the British Protectorate over Egypt involves no change in the *status quo* as regards the position of other Powers in Egypt. The welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt long recognized by other Governments ; and in calling attention to these special relations, as defined in the Declaration recognizing Egypt's independence, we propose to declare that we will not admit them to be questioned by any other Power, that we will regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by any other Power, and that we will consider any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled by all the means at our command.

Referring to the question of the Sudan, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, declared in the House of Commons that :

His Majesty's Government will never allow the progress which has already been made and the greater promise of future years to be jeopardized. . . . Nor can His Majesty's Government agree

¹ Vide Appendix II.

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to any change in the *status* of that country which would in the slightest degree diminish the security for the many millions of British capital which are already invested in its development. Egypt, on the other hand, has an undeniable right to the most ample guarantees that the development of the Sudan shall never threaten or interfere with her existing water supply, or with that which she may require in order to bring her own territory under full cultivation. Such guarantees His Majesty's Government will be ready to afford, and there is no reason why they should in any way hamper or retard the progress of the Sudan.

The Declaration conforms closely to the policy laid down at the Imperial Conference, and fully covers all matters there defined as essential to Imperial security.

The Declaration, together with these pronouncements, made the policy of the British Government apparently clear. The settlement thus outlined had two aspects, internal and international, which when applied together produced a result having little resemblance to either sovereignty or independence. Although Egypt had been granted the right to manage her own internal affairs, her freedom of action was very much limited by considerations arising out of the "four reserved points." By warning the Powers that we would not tolerate any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt, we had to guarantee the protection of foreign residents, and this could not be adequately carried out in many circumstances without some interference in the internal administration. In fact many cases have occurred, where measures introduced into the Egyptian Chamber affecting public security have had to be vetoed owing to the influence they were likely to have on the security of the foreign communities. Moreover, the Capitulations, and certain arrangements enabling Great Britain to interfere in matters of finance and justice were scarcely in accordance with the new *status* granted to Egypt. In external affairs the fiction was equally maintained. Egypt was to have her own Foreign Office and diplomatic representatives at foreign courts, but it was abundantly clear that in all matters of any real significance Great Britain would act as intermediary between her and foreign Powers.

The establishment of Egyptian independence in 1922 was merely carrying our policy of unreality one stage further, and the change from a Protectorate to an Independent Monarchy was mainly superficial. Although the elevation of

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the title of Egypt's ruler from Sultan to that of King pleased the "Palace" clique and a small section of the official classes, the great majority, whose susceptibilities lay in other directions, were far from pacified by this measure. They clearly saw that as far as fundamental considerations were concerned, in which their national pride was at stake, the position was in no way altered. At the same time, certain concessions were undoubtedly made, and the influence of British officials was certainly reduced, but there was not the shadow of a doubt in the minds of the Egyptians that Great Britain intended to maintain a tight grip on Egypt. It was also quite evident that the British Government would not consent to the abandonment of the Sudan and the upper reaches of the Nile, as long as important British interests were involved there and Nile-fed Egypt remained a question of vital importance in British Imperial policy. Hence the Declaration of 1922 was far from being a solution of the Egyptian question, and as result of its conflicting provisions its administration came to rest on the personal judgment of the High Commissioner. Not only was the Declaration impossible to carry out in the spirit in which it was intended, but it created the impression in Egypt that deliberate deception was being practised. Its fictitious nature was even more apparent than in the case of previous régimes, and this produced an even stronger feeling of distrust, which has all along been one of the greatest stumbling blocks to a friendly agreement between the two countries. Ever since 1882 it has been our policy to abstain from making our intentions clear, and to exert our influence under the cloak of an ill-defined system of relationships; and this practice has steadily built up in Egypt a solid impression that nothing we do is sincere. There have been occasions when a straightforward declaration of our determined intentions would have been accepted by the Egyptians, however distasteful, provided that we had seized the right moment to speak. When our prestige was high, we could have been gracious in the hour of victory, and the Egyptians would have accepted any reasonable arrangement expressed with clarity and determination. Instead of this, we drifted and prevaricated, a procedure which is never without danger in the East, and in 1922 we found ourselves in a position from which it was impossible to with-

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draw. As far as the British Government was concerned, independence was bestowed on Egypt, and this confined us to a certain limited line of action in all our future dealings with the Egyptians. Whether this curtailment of our powers of action has been beneficial or otherwise, is a matter of opinion, but the Declaration of 1922 certainly placed the Egyptian Government in the position of an independent negotiator for the future.

The Government of Sarwat Pasha, the first Egyptian Ministry since the abolition of the Protectorate, was faced with many difficulties, among which figured the campaign of murder directed against British officials, which had begun towards the end of 1921. After a short interval these outrages began again in May, 1922, and, although thirteen cases of this kind had taken place, none of the assailants had been found and not one single individual had been brought to justice. It was not that the Government and police neglected their duty, but that, owing to the Nationalist attitude, evidence could not be obtained or was withheld through fear of reprisals. Nor was the handling of other questions by the Government more fortunate. Rushdi Pasha's Commission, which was entrusted with the task of drafting a Constitution for Egypt, was compelled by Nationalist pressure to assert unqualified claims to the Sudan. In the draft presented by the Commission to the Government one article was worded as follows :

The King is to be styled " King of Egypt and the Sudan," and will govern through Ministers ;

and another article :

Although the Sudan belongs to the Egyptian Kingdom, the Constitution does not apply to it, and a special administration will be provided.

Meanwhile the Nationalists had conducted an agitation for the return of Zaghlul from internment in the Seychelles, on the grounds that his health had suffered, and he was transferred to Gibraltar. At the end of November Sarwat's Ministry resigned owing to intrigues against them in which the Palace combined with the Wafd—the political organization created by Zaghlul Pasha to support his Nationalist aims—and another Ministry was formed by Nessim Pasha, who had

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the benefit of being supported by both the parties which had intrigued against Sarwat.

It is significant to note that Egyptian Ministers of every complexion were subject, in their powers of negotiating with the High Commissioner, to irresistible pressure from the political machine of the Wafd, which had been built up since the end of the Great War by Zaghlul. The Wafd had been constituted in order to lay the case of Egypt before the Peace Conference of Paris and, owing to the wave of actively anti-British feeling which had swept over Egypt in 1919, had been able to establish a permanent organization throughout the country, amply endowed with funds. This organization, when once established, enabled those in control to mobilize Egyptian public opinion, to bring this opinion to bear on the Egyptian Ministry of the day, and, by controlling the policy of the Egyptian Government, to embarrass the British authorities in Egypt. Zaghlul was the dominant personality in the Wafd, and his control of this organization, together with the hold which he possessed over the emotions of the Egyptian people, made him the principal political force on the Egyptian side in the conflict between Egypt and Great Britain. It was indeed the pressure of Zaghlul and the Wafd upon the Egyptian Government which had created the *impasse* leading to the unilateral declaration of the British Government. In pressing the policy of the Declaration upon the Foreign Office, Lord Allenby had implicitly acknowledged Zaghlul's power, and had thereby still further increased his prestige and popularity among the Egyptian people. When Zaghlul was deported to the Seychelles, the remaining seven members of the committee retorted by electing a series of substitute committees, which were to step into their place successively as often as the acting members might be arrested and deported. The Wafd, therefore, continued to function as the dominant political force in Egypt, but it was not the only party in the country.

Among the inhabitants of Egypt there was a well-defined national division between the native Egyptians (both Moslems and Copts), who formed the vast majority of the people, and the small but wealthy and influential governing class of Osmanlis. While the Osmanlis were becoming assimilated to the

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native Egyptians of the upper class, many of them still spoke Turkish in their homes and privately regarded the Egyptians as a subject race. They took part in politics as individuals and not as a group, and on the whole their sympathies lay with the Liberal-Constitutional Party founded by Adly Pasha in opposition to the Wafd, on the 29th October, 1922. While the Wafd was supported, passively in any case, by the great mass of native Egyptian Moslems—and Copts were numbered amongst its active leaders—there was also an older Nationalist Party (the Watanists) which had been founded in 1907. At the time of the British Declaration, which nominally gave the Egyptians a free hand in the matter of internal self-government, the Watanists were the only formally organized party, since the Liberal-Constitutionalists had not yet been organized, and the Wafd (originally a delegation for work abroad supported by an organization in Egypt) was not reorganized as a parliamentary party until the 26th April, 1924. Meanwhile, both the Wafd and the Watanist Party sent private delegations to present the Egyptian case at the Peace Conference of Lausanne; and on the 14th November, 1922, these two delegations drew up a common programme of action. Indeed, the declared aims of the several parties were virtually identical, and were almost entirely concerned with Anglo-Egyptian relations to the practical exclusion of internal questions; while the bitter party feuds which nevertheless prevailed, were due partly to disagreement as to the methods of pursuing their common aims, and partly to personal rivalries.

At the end of January, 1923, the question of the Sudan came up again in an acute form. The draft, prepared by the Commission on the Egyptian Constitution, only awaited the signature of King Fuad before being promulgated; and it still contained the objectionable allusions to the Sudan. The situation demanded that the High Commissioner should take action. Lord Allenby, therefore, acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, presented a Note to the Egyptian Government, in which he declared that the British Government could not agree to the promulgation of a Constitution containing the two clauses referring to the Sudan. The Note insisted on the removal of these clauses pending further negotiations between the two Governments, and after long



Photo : R. H. Goodall

THE NILE VALLEY, FROM HILLS ABOVE THE VALLEY OF THE KINGS, THEBES

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consideration the Egyptian Government agreed to this course. But the Nessim Ministry were placed in a most unenviable position. On the one side they were confronted with the pressing demands of their Nationalist supporters for the assertion of Egyptian authority over the Sudan, while on the other side they had to face the insistent demands of the British Government. They had no alternative but to resign.

In these circumstances it was very difficult to find a Ministry to take office at all, but after a delay of over a month a Cabinet was formed by Yehia Pasha, which contained five members of the previous Council of Ministers. The new Prime Minister's professed desire was to make promulgation of the Constitution simultaneous with the passing of a Bill of Indemnity; for without such a Bill martial law could not be revoked without exposing to legal proceedings all who had administered it. The matter was further complicated by the fact that, although the Nationalists clamoured for the removal of martial law, yet Egyptian Governments of all shades of opinion were unanimous in acknowledging the advantages ensured them by its continuance. Their desire to ingratiate public opinion clashed with their interests as governing bodies. Shortly after the formation of the Yehia Ministry, Zaghlul Pasha was released from internment at Gibraltar to undergo a cure at Aix-les-Bains, and four months later he was given permission to return to Egypt on the passing of the Act of Indemnity. Far from returning as a convalescent invalid, Zaghlul had developed a new vitality which he devoted to violent agitation against Great Britain. Meanwhile, Yehia Pasha had got into difficulties with the King, who had made use of Nessim to alter the Constitution in a way that would have greatly increased the authority and prerogatives of the Crown; but it was to the credit of the Prime Minister that their withdrawal was secured and that, on the 19th April, King Fuad signed the new Constitution, which contained the following clause with reference to the Sudan in place of those in the original draft:

The present Constitution is applicable to the Kingdom of Egypt. This clause does not prejudice the rights which Egypt has over the Sudan. The title which the King of Egypt will bear will be established after duly accredited negotiators have fixed definitely the *status* of the Sudan.

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On the 5th July, 1923, the Act of Indemnity was at last promulgated and martial law simultaneously revoked. The Act indemnified all who had taken action under that form of law and provided for the release of many who were imprisoned under its operation. The return of Zaghlul was the occasion of much enthusiasm, and the fact that a General Election was impending added to the significance of the event. No sooner, however, had he set foot in Egypt than he poured torrents of abuse on the Egyptian politicians who had accepted the Declaration, and opened a violent campaign for the complete independence of the country. He travelled throughout the provinces, exciting the wildest enthusiasm wherever he went, and his influence on the electorate was proved in the elections which followed. The Wafd secured 177 seats in a Chamber of 214, so Zaghlul was invited to form a Cabinet and was in a position to pursue his uncompromising policy towards Great Britain.

But Zaghlul expected the happiest results from the Labour Government which had come into power in England. Not only did he know Mr. Ramsay MacDonald personally, but he was on terms of considerable intimacy with him. He, therefore, regarded the time opportune for a settlement favourable to Egypt. Towards the end of April, 1924, the British Prime Minister invited Zaghlul Pasha to visit London to commence negotiations; but, as the prospects of negotiations began to take more definite shape, apprehension arose in Egypt lest even Zaghlul should be induced to compromise. The Prime Minister, however, allayed this apprehension by stating in the Chamber that he rejected the British Declaration of Independence not only as head of the Wafd but as head of the Egyptian Government; that Mr. MacDonald's invitation was entirely unconditional; that his own sole object was to obtain the independence of Egypt and the Sudan; and that if there was no hope of that he would neither enter into negotiations nor remain in office. The Chamber responded by giving him an almost unanimous vote of confidence. Amongst other statements, he declared that the Egyptian Government considered it humiliating that the Sirdar should be a foreigner, and that his residence in the Sudan (as Governor-General) was not in the interests of the Egyptian Army.

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He further contended that the presence of British troops in Egypt was incompatible with Egyptian independence, which led the Government to cut out of the Budget the annual vote of £146,000 towards the cost of the British army of occupation. In England, on the other hand, full expression was given to the attitude of the British Government, and by July the situation was such that it was uncertain whether negotiations would take place or not. Mr. MacDonald, however, gave assurances that no conditions, either explicit or implicit, were attached to the proposal to negotiate, that neither party would be compromised by an exchange of views, and that the negotiations would be entered into on a footing of perfect equality.

Meanwhile, Nationalist propaganda had been active in the Sudan, where Egyptian troops formed part of the garrison. On the 9th and 10th August serious rioting broke out amongst the men of the Egyptian Railway Battalion at Atbara and Port Sudan and amongst the military cadets at Khartum, with the result that severe measures had to be taken. Zaghlul did not hesitate to utilize these events to further the Egyptian claim for sovereignty over the Sudan by demanding a joint Anglo-Egyptian Commission of Inquiry. This, however, was refused, and, while it was pointed out that the British Government regarded the disturbances as the direct result of the Egyptian claim, it was made clear that the Governor-General alone was responsible for order in that country.

Early in September Zaghlul Pasha accepted Mr. MacDonald's invitation to meet him in London, but though much personal friendship was shown the conversations were without result. Zaghlul put forward demands which entirely ignored the existence of British interests in Egypt, and his attitude was uncompromising. While Zaghlul was pledged to a policy of complete independence, his attitude was mainly due to the fact that he had carried his campaign of agitation to such a point that he had become a champion of anti-British agitation rather than of his country's interests. He had gone so far that he was powerless to negotiate without losing prestige with his followers, whom he had roused to a high pitch of fanaticism. But the grant of internal self-government to Egypt automatically compelled the leader of the strongest

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political party to discard the rôle of agitator for that of statesman, and Zaghlul's declared policy precluded him from taking up the duty of constructive statesmanship after he became Prime Minister. He had the full confidence of the country, expressed in an overwhelming majority at the polls, and he had pledged himself to achieve the impossible. He had to take some action. Either he had to admit the impossibility of success, or he must get out of the *impasse* as best he could. Preferring the course which was less damaging to his prestige at home, Zaghlul chose the second alternative and acted as he did in his conversations with Mr. MacDonald. But, although he could extricate himself without apparent loss of popularity, he could not dissolve the situation which he had created in Egypt; and that situation was likely to lead to acts of violence. It was not long before the results of Zaghlul's endeavours took the form of political murder, with grave consequences for Egypt.

On the 19th November, 1924, Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, was driving from the Egyptian War Office to his official residence in Cairo, when he was fired at by seven Egyptians of the student class, and was wounded so severely that he died on the following day. Within an hour of this outrage, Zaghlul Pasha, whose policy was indirectly responsible for what had occurred, called at the Residency, where Sir Lee Stack was lying, to express his sympathy. He was received in the hall by Lord Allenby, was led into the presence of the dying Sirdar and, after seeing the result of his handiwork, was allowed to take his departure. Dramatic events followed each other in rapid succession. The British Government decided to take swift and vigorous action, and naval and military reinforcements were ordered to Egypt and the Sudan. The battleships *Iron Duke*, *Valiant* and *Benbow* proceeded from Malta to Alexandria and *Malaya* was ordered to Port Said, while several regiments from the same station reinforced the garrisons at Cairo and Alexandria. On the afternoon of the 22nd November, after the imposing military funeral of the late Sirdar, Lord Allenby presented two communications to Zaghlul Pasha. The procedure adopted was indeed humiliating to the Egyptian Government. The High Commissioner's

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carriage was escorted through the streets of Cairo, not by the usual military motor-cyclists, but by an entire regiment of British cavalry ; and Lord Allenby did not wear the official dress customary at official interviews, but an ordinary lounge suit and felt hat. When the *cortège* arrived at the offices of the Council of Ministers, the regimental trumpeters received the High Commissioner with a royal salute, while the regiment, in drawing up, blocked the entrance to the Egyptian Parliament House. Lord Allenby read his communications aloud to Zaghlul, and departed within a few minutes. The promptness and circumstances of this action made a profound impression in Cairo, and the Egyptians realized that Great Britain meant business.

The Note stated that the murder was the natural outcome of a campaign not discountenanced by the Egyptian Government, which had proved itself incapable or unwilling to protect the lives of foreigners. It also contained various demands, the chief of which were that the Government should :

- (1) Tender an ample apology for the crime.
- (2) Prosecute an inquiry and bring the criminals to condign punishment.
- (3) Forbid and suppress popular demonstrations.
- (4) Pay forthwith the sum of £500,000.
- (5) Order within twenty-four hours the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers and purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian Army.
- (6) Notify the competent department that the Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated in the Gezira from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need may arise.
- (7) Withdraw opposition in certain directions to the wishes of His Majesty's Government concerning the protection of foreigners in Egypt.

Further demands were that Sudanese units of the Egyptian Army should be converted into a "Sudan Defence Force" and that the Government should consent to certain steps regarding foreign officials still in their service.

Of the demands (1) to (7) the Egyptian Government rejected

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(5) and (6), while to the others they agreed. Thereupon Lord Allenby replied that, in consequence of the rejection of the two more important demands, all Egyptian officers and units of the Egyptian Army would be at once removed from the Sudan; and that the Sudan Government had been informed that they might regard the Gezira irrigation area as subject to no limitation. On the 24th November, Lord Allenby sent a further communication to the effect that he had ordered the occupation of the Customs House at Alexandria by British troops, whereupon Zaghlul tendered his resignation to the King. Ziwar Pasha was called upon to form a Ministry, and finally the Egyptian Government complied with all the demands contained in the British Note. But the trouble was not yet ended, for, as a result of Egyptian intrigues and propaganda, part of a Sudanese battalion stationed at Khartum mutinied on the 27th November, and severe fighting followed in which it became necessary to use artillery and several British officers were killed. The mutiny, however, was suppressed on the following day, and three Sudanese officers who had been instrumental in causing the outbreak were sentenced to death and shot at Khartum.

British action was prompt and severe, and there is little doubt that the events following the murder of the Sirdar convinced the Egyptians that they had overtried the patience of the British Government, and that they had done serious injury to the interests of their country. But it is questionable whether all the demands contained in the British Note were formulated with great foresight. The object of the British Government was to hit quick and hard, and in their anxiety to do so at a time when feelings were deeply roused, it seems that they lost sight of certain considerations involved in their action. There seemed no reason why the indemnity should not have been doubled, while the increase of the irrigation area in the Gezira created the impression in Egyptian minds that Egypt was going to be deprived of water as a punishment—an impression which has now convinced the people that any increase of irrigation in the Gezira must seriously affect the water supply of their own country. Although this is not the case, it is now almost impossible to convince the Egyptians that the Nile, fully controlled, can supply enough water for

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both Egypt and the Sudan. On the other hand, this measure brought home to every Egyptian throughout the land the wrath of Great Britain at the campaign of murder and outrage, and the ultimate powerlessness of their champion, Zaghlul, to defend them from British resentment once this had been thoroughly roused.

The position of the new Ministry under Ziwar Pasha was one of considerable delicacy. They had to face a large body of Nationalist opinion which resented the penalties imposed upon the people of Egypt as result of the Sirdar's murder and the subsequent rising in the Sudan, while it was clearly in the interests of Egypt that they should work in harmony with Great Britain. In the elections which followed, the results clearly showed that, in spite of recent events, Zaghlul had a powerful following in the country, and that his policy would be reasserted as soon as a favourable opportunity presented itself. As the Zaghlulists returned to Parliament numbered 102, as against 108 anti-Zaghlulists, Ziwar Pasha formed a Coalition Cabinet representing all the anti-Zaghlulist parties except the Watanists (Nationalists opposed to the policy of Zaghlul). King Fuad opened Parliament on the 23rd of March, 1925, but a surprising development led to its dissolution within a few hours. As soon as the Chamber proceeded to elect its President, the results of the elections were entirely reversed. The Government candidate for the Presidency, Sarwat Pasha, was defeated by Zaghlul Pasha, the leader of the Opposition by a majority of 40 votes, in a Chamber of 214 Deputies, which tended to show that those, who had been returned as Independents succumbed to Zaghlul's influence as soon as they came face to face with his personality. The King refused to accept Ziwar's resignation, as the prospect of a Wafd Ministry was not to be contemplated under the circumstances. Parliament was, therefore, dissolved, involving another appeal to the electorate, but the need for framing a new Electoral Law necessitated delay, during which the Ziwar Ministry continued to conduct the government of the country.

By this time Lord Allenby definitely wanted to be relieved of a position of great difficulty, for which he felt he was little suited. He had a strong sense of duty and a keen desire to

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carry out the wishes of his Government, but it was not easy for him to see the Egyptian standpoint, and there was a formidable barrier between him and those with whom he had to deal. Partly his personality, and partly the rôle which he had been called upon to play, placed him in a position where mutual understanding was next to impossible. Lord Allenby found Egyptian methods distasteful to his own blunt disposition, and he could not ingratiate himself with the leaders of Egyptian politics. He scarcely knew Zaghlul, and I believe I am right in saying that the only occasion on which the British High Commissioner and the Nationalist leader really came into personal contact with one another was when Zaghlul called at the Residency on that tragic 19th November. Yet for six years this distinguished Field-Marshal performed the arduous duties of a soldier and diplomat combined. Of diplomacy he knew nothing, and he was inclined to despise its methods, but his prestige was high throughout the whole Near East, and when there was need for action the British Government and the people at home had full confidence that British interests would not be allowed to suffer. Lord Allenby resigned in May, 1925, and was succeeded by Sir George (now Lord) Lloyd, who had had previous experience in Egypt and had shown his high powers of administration as Governor of Bombay.

CHAPTER XI

LORD LLOYD AND THE EGYPTIANS

WHEN Lord Lloyd arrived in Egypt, on the 20th October, 1925, he had to face the aftermath of the Sirdar's murder at the same time as the inception of a parliamentary régime, arising out of the Declaration¹ of 1922. These two circumstances produced a situation of some complexity. While the idea of constitutional government following the partial withdrawal of British control corresponded to the desires of the politically conscious portion of the Egyptian people, King Fuad, mindful of the autocratic powers enjoyed by his ancestors yet disregarding their consequences, had not reconciled himself to discarding the rôle of a British nominee for that of an Egyptian constitutional monarch. He had resisted the Liberal-Constitutionalists in the drafting of the new constitution in 1923; and the remarkable success of the Wafd at the first general election may have been partly due to the King having professed to lend them his support, in the hope that they would, in return, give more consideration to his wishes than their predecessors had done. As this expectation was not realized during Zaghlul's tenure of office in 1924, King Fuad can hardly have been displeased when the crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations, produced by the murder of the Sirdar, led to the fall of a national hero who had eclipsed his sovereign. In any case, accusations of disloyalty towards the Crown were levelled against the Wafd in general, and Zaghlul in particular; and in January, 1925, a Palace Party was formed of the King's friends, in which the most active member was a young court official, Nashaat Pasha. The president of this party, Yehia Ibrahim Pasha, entered Ziwar's Government as Minister of Finance.

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During Ziwar's absence in Europe for reasons of health Yehia Pasha had been appointed acting Prime Minister, and Nashaat Pasha made good use of this opportunity to impose a Palace Government upon the country. In September, the Minister of Justice, Abdul-Aziz Pasha Fehmi, who was also President of the Liberal Party, was dismissed by Royal Decree for failing to execute a judgment pronounced by the disciplinary court of El-Azhar against a certain modernist Alim. This dismissal led to the resignation of three Liberal Ministers, including Ismail Pasha Sidki, the strongest personality in the Government, thus leaving the Palace Party in full control. But the ejected Liberals once more joined forces with the Wafd, and Zaghlul Pasha devised a manoeuvre to embarrass the Government and reassert the power of the Nationalist Party. Early in November he proposed that, in order to conform with the terms of the Constitution requiring Parliament to meet not later than the third Saturday in November, the Wafd and Liberal members of the Chamber—which had been dissolved in March—should assemble in the Parliament House on the 21st of the month. To this the Government replied that the proposed assembly would be prevented; and on the arrival of the appointed day the approach to the Parliament House was barred by troops and police. But the members were undismayed. They proceeded forthwith to the Hotel Continental, where they declared themselves a lawful assembly of the Senate and Chamber, and denounced the Government for violating the Constitution. The Opposition also clamoured for a parliamentary government elected upon universal suffrage, and denounced Ziwar's new Electoral Law, intended to reduce the power of the Wafd. Lord Lloyd took the view that it was the duty of Great Britain to see that Egypt enjoyed the benefit of representative government, and that the King maintained the position of a constitutional sovereign. The High Commissioner, therefore, used his influence with King Fuad for the removal of Nashaat Pasha, who had been chiefly responsible for "palace" interference in the details of government, and elections were arranged for late in May, 1926, under Zaghlul Pasha's electoral law of 1924, providing for manhood suffrage. In these elections the Liberals, the Wafd, and the Watanists worked together, and

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the polling ensured the return of 142 representatives of the Wafd, 28 Liberals, 5 Watanists, 18 Independents and 7 Palace members. With the downfall of Nashaat Pasha the Palace Party had collapsed, and Zaghlul had control of an overwhelming majority in the Chamber.

Meanwhile, there had been considerable delay in bringing to justice the assassins of the Sirdar, as the task of investigation was beset with many difficulties owing to a general desire to shield the criminals or through fear of assisting in their detection. The proceedings for the investigation and punishment of the crime had begun with the arrest, during the night of the 26th-27th November, 1924, of three prominent Egyptian politicians, while thirty-three other persons had been arrested on the 28th. The majority of these, including the three politicians, were afterwards released on the ground that the evidence against them was insufficient. More damning evidence, however, was obtained against two students; and with this clue Dr. Shafik Mansur, a lawyer who had twice sat in the Chamber as a Wafd Deputy, and five other persons were implicated. One of the students was identified by Captain Campbell, Sir Lee Stack's aide-de-camp, who had been wounded himself at the time of the outrage. Another of the prisoners confessed his complicity in nine of the murders, or attempts at murder, of a political character which had been perpetrated in Cairo since 1919. Eventually six persons were committed for trial on the charge of having taken part in the actual murder, and two others on the charge of having conspired with the six for the commission of the crime. The two charged with conspiracy were an official in the Ministry of Wakfs, Ahmed Ismail Effendi, and Dr. Shafik Mansur, the latter being the only person of any prominence accused of either crime.

The trial finally began on the 26th May, 1925, with nine prisoners in the dock¹ and three judges on the bench—the President and one of his colleagues being Egyptians and the third an Englishman, Judge Kershaw. The proceedings confirmed the confession of one of the prisoners by establishing that at least eight of the outrages committed since 1919 had

¹ The ninth (a chauffeur who had been waiting to drive the assassins to safety) had been added after the first committal.

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been the work of the same organization, and brought out the fact that the leading spirit was Dr. Shafik Mansur, who had entered upon his criminal activities as far back as 1906. On the 7th June, the eight prisoners originally committed for trial were sentenced to death ; and, after the dismissal of an appeal on the 23rd July, seven of the sentences were executed, while one was commuted to penal servitude for life.

While this first trial had been in preparation, a further series of arrests and rearrests had begun, which resulted, on the 10th February, 1926, in the committal for trial of seven persons of considerably greater standing, including Mahmud Effendi Nakraski and Ahmed Effendi Maher, both of whom had held office in the Zaghul Ministry which fell on the 24th November, 1924. Another of the prisoners was a diplomat, another a professor in the Cairo School of Law. The prisoners were accused of being implicated respectively in a number of crimes committed in 1922, and the trial opened on the 29th March, 1926, before a court consisting of two Egyptian members and a British President, Judge Kershaw. Convictions were expected ; but on the 25th May, the court, after sentencing to death one of the least prominent of the prisoners, acquitted all the others and ordered their immediate release. This judgment produced a sensation ; and a rumour that the British President of the Court had been outvoted by his Egyptian colleagues was confirmed by Judge Kershaw's resignation, on the grounds that, in the case of four of the persons acquitted, the verdict was so contrary to the weight of evidence that it constituted a grave miscarriage of justice. On the same day the British Government presented a Note to the Egyptian Government in which they reserved judgment in respect of the verdict ; declined to accept it as proof of the innocence of the four persons concerned ; and further reserved full liberty to take such steps as might prove necessary in order to fulfil their obligation to ensure the safety of foreigners in Egypt. Meanwhile, the two acquitted ex-Ministers had received a public ovation on their way from the Assize Court to Zaghul Pasha's house ; and the political effect of their acquittal was greatly increased by the fact that it was pronounced three days after a general election, in which the Wafd had once again secured a decisive majority.

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The political situation threatened to give rise to a serious crisis, and the turn of events hinged on what action Zaghlul himself decided to take. Zaghlul's first intention was to refrain from taking office himself and to leave it to Adly Pasha to form a coalition ministry, in which the Wafd would have a numerical preponderance. Considering what had gone before, this decision was a wise one, but his more extreme followers were opposed to a compromise of this sort ; and certain clear indications that the Wafd had recovered its ascendancy in the country prevailed upon him to change his mind. As this decision followed the acquittal of two ex-Ministers and four other prisoners, charged with complicity in the murder of the Sirdar, the situation was serious. On the 30th May, however, the High Commissioner received Zaghlul, and the resignation of Judge Kershaw together with the presentation of the British Note brought the leader of the Wafd face to face with reality, in consequence of which he again changed his mind. Whatever was the nature of the conversations at the British Residency in Cairo, Zaghlul rapidly developed bad health, and consented to the formation of a Cabinet by Adly Pasha, who was assured of the necessary support of the Wafd. When Parliament was opened by the King on the 10th June, 1926, Zaghlul Pasha was elected President of the Chamber by an overwhelming majority, and the two Vice-Presidents were also strong supporters of the Wafd. While a solution had been found for the immediate *impasse*, the situation remained unchanged except that the Wafd extremists were outwardly kept in check by influences within their own party.

The crisis had been dissipated owing to the tactful but firm influence of Lord Lloyd. The High Commissioner was morally justified in putting pressure on Zaghlul, since the general election itself, and the application of the 1924 electoral law, had both been due in part to pressure which Lord Lloyd had brought to bear on the King and Ziwar Pasha. In fact, the Wafd owed their present power to Lord Lloyd's strong support of constitutional government in Egypt. It was, therefore, not unreasonable that he should demand of Zaghlul that he should refrain from making use of this power to compromise Anglo-Egyptian relations. Zaghlul had been faced with an ugly dilemma. If he had returned to office

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and worked in co-operation with the British Government, he would have broken up the Nationalist Party and sacrificed his own position. If, on the other hand, he had resumed power with a great majority behind him and continued his policy of trying to eliminate the British from Egypt and the Sudan, he would have invited trouble with the British Government which might well have defeated the objects of the Nationalist cause. The High Commissioner could easily have availed himself of this opportunity to let Zaghlul bring about his own downfall, but Lord Lloyd considered such a course politically dishonest and contrary to the interests of both countries. Moreover, if he had permitted Zaghlul to become Prime Minister, it would have meant breaking the pledge of Lord Allenby, who promised the British officials and the Mudirs that the Wafd would not be permitted to interfere with the execution of their duties. If the attitude adopted by Lord Lloyd did not produce a political atmosphere favourable for a settlement of the "four reserved points," it certainly surmounted a severe crisis in a manner which was not discreditable to either party.

The deadlock in Anglo-Egyptian relations was due to mistakes on both sides. The violent policy of Zaghlul Pasha and his followers had reached a climax in the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, while the severity of the terms of Lord Allenby's ultimatum proved fatal to those Egyptian statesmen who were patriotic and courageous enough to take office at that critical time. In forcing Ziwar Pasha and his colleagues to accept the terms of the ultimatum with little alleviation, the British Government were making their position impossible and were in fact inviting the return to power of the intransigent forces of the Wafd.

Adly Pasha's Government came into office on the 6th June, and on the same day terminated the labours of Ziwar Pasha, who had conducted the government of the country with considerable wisdom and tact during a period of great difficulty. His task was a thankless one, but Lord Lloyd saw to it that his services to Egypt received the full recognition of the British Government. Although it was only natural that this action on the part of the High Commissioner should provoke indignation in the ranks of the Wafd, Lord Lloyd

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
was determined that loyal services should be recognized regardless of the immediate consequences. His policy, partly as a result of his experience in India, is one of absolute rectitude and of bestowing honour where honour is due ; and he spares himself no trouble or inconvenience to compensate those who have suffered for their loyalty to the British régime in Egypt. If perhaps he lacks the necessary *finesse* in dealing with Egyptians, he possesses a vast supply of moral courage and is ready to act surely and swiftly according to his political convictions. Lord Lloyd may be accused of being too autocratic, yet one of his first acts in Egypt was to champion the cause of representative government. Of all the distinguished men who have represented Great Britain in Egypt perhaps Lord Kitchener and the present High Commissioner may be regarded as those who most favoured the policy of a strong hand, and yet both these so-called autocrats celebrated their accession to office by supporting Egyptian efforts towards self-government. Lord Lloyd believes in standing his ground every time and on every point, and in trying to carry out the Declaration of 1922 as well as so vague and elastic an instrument can be successfully carried out. As most of the questions arising out of the Declaration and the "four reserved points" call for settlement on their own merits, the personal judgment of the High Commissioner has to play an important part in the conduct of affairs, and on many occasions Lord Lloyd has to exercise his own personal influence to overcome opposition. If he can in any way be termed an autocrat, it is rather due to these peculiar circumstances than to any desire on his part to wield autocratic power.

Since Lord Lloyd assumed office there has been a change for the better in Egypt and a tendency to moderation has begun to make its appearance in the Nationalist Party. Several factors have contributed to this improvement. First, there is a tendency for all Nationalist movements to become less fanatical with age. Secondly, the diminishing influence of religion and the gradual elimination of Pan-Islamic doctrines are depriving Egyptian Nationalism of some of its most acute angles. Thirdly, the Egyptians are reaching a stage in their political education where reason is gaining the upper hand over impulse. Fourthly, the Egyptians are beginning to realize

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that a British occupation is less objectionable than that of certain other Powers, and Mussolini is casting his shadow over the land of Egypt. Italian influence has made great progress in Egypt during recent years, and were we to withdraw our power I think that the Italians would waste no time in substituting theirs. Although many Egyptians take the short view and prefer to await the prophesied arrival of the Italians before crying out, there is an ever increasing number of people in Egypt who realize the danger of our withdrawal. This they will not for a single moment acknowledge, perhaps not even to themselves, but in the back of their minds the idea is steadily growing. Meanwhile they enjoy the game of "twisting the lion's tail," which is comparatively free from vice and is quite a natural form of political entertainment. The Egyptians know perfectly well that we have no intention of withdrawing from Egypt as things are, but the Nationalist leaders wish to maintain their influence over the people, and they find that a periodic anti-British outburst serves the purpose very well. Yet this practice does not exactly hasten the consummation of their hopes in the matter of complete independence, for as long as this mischievous game continues we cannot relax our hold. It would not even be fair to the Egyptians if we did so, and we would not be playing the part of true friends which we hope ultimately to become. It is a peculiarity of nearly all Nationalist movements that not only do the agitators aim at far-reaching ideals, but they expect to achieve their object at once. They are impatient of any delay, and this gives rise to irritation and often to violent outbursts. But in Egypt this phase is passing, and it will be well for the Egyptians when it has passed, for they will then have reached another rung on the ladder which leads to the object of their desire.

During November, 1926, a remarkable change appeared in the tone of the Egyptian press. Wafd and Liberal newspapers alike seemed to have discovered that the British connexion was not entirely disadvantageous to Egypt, and they urged the Government to bring about, without delay, an agreement with Great Britain perpetuating the present constitution. The same spirit was shown at the opening of Parliament, when the Prime Minister expressed special satisfaction



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that the understanding between Great Britain and Egypt daily increased in strength. This sudden change of attitude was the object of much speculation, as it was evidently inspired by the Wafd and was scarcely in keeping with their general policy, which remained unchanged. In judging Egyptian inconsistencies it is always well to bear in mind that we are dealing with an Oriental race, whose mental outlook is altogether different from ours, and that the Egyptians are struggling with a political system which is new and strange to them. When a European enters an Eastern country for the first time and tries to do business he is completely baffled, and it takes a very long time for him to understand Oriental ways of doing things. He thinks everyone is trying to cheat him, simply because his moral code is different. The Oriental feels the same towards the European, and it takes generations for the one really to understand the other. It is only one generation since the British occupation of Egypt, and that is a short time in the life of a nation. In judging the Egyptians, I cannot help thinking that we expect too much understanding on their part, and possibly they expect too much on our side.

The Nationalists are intensely persevering in their methods of clamouring for liberal treatment and in their attempt to undermine the British position. They have opposed the idea of Egypt making any contribution to the cost of the Sudan Defence Force ; they have tried to secure partial control of the Mixed Courts, in which the Egyptian members are a fixed minority ; and the recent bill providing for the election of Omdas was definitely, though indirectly, aimed at one of the " four reserved points," which embody the essential principles of the British position in Egypt. The Omdas fill a position of great importance in the scheme of provincial administration, and it is only through them that the machinery of administration can function effectively throughout the villages and countryside. Hitherto they had been appointed by the Government and had been subject to the control of the Mudirs ; but the draft law proposed that the Omdas should be elected and thus become entirely independent of the Mudirs, who are responsible for maintaining public security. The change suggested would, therefore, have affected public security and hence the foreign interests for which Great Britain has

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assumed responsibility. The object of the Wafd in introducing this draft law was obviously to restrict the election of Omdas to members of their own party, and thereby to increase their power with the fellahin. But it is most unlikely that this measure will ever be passed, as this is one of the many questions in which Lord Lloyd uses his personal influence over legislation, which is both legal and illegal according to the Declaration and the "four reserved points." In this particular case, which is a good example, the Egyptians are quite within their rights, according to the Declaration, to manage their own internal affairs, but they are at the same time bound to submit to Great Britain over matters which affect the interests of foreigners. The decision rests with the High Commissioner, as being the best course to ensure comparatively smooth government.

In the spring of 1927 the political horizon was darkened by another crisis. As result of an adverse vote in the Chamber, Adly Pasha and his colleagues signified their intention of resigning. They regarded the vote as an expression of want of confidence, and a state of dissension between the Cabinet and the Chamber produced an unexpected and sudden issue. The Cabinet represented a coalition of the Wafd, Liberals and Independents, with an Independent Prime Minister, but in reality it was a Wafd Cabinet under a cloak of more moderate elements. More than nine-tenths of the Deputies were members of the Wafd. In theory, therefore, this Cabinet had to face no opposition, but in actual practice it had to submit to the everlasting criticism of its own supporters, who chafed at the moderation required for appearance's sake. Certain acute differences between the Cabinet and the Wafd precipitated the crisis, including the draft law for the election of Omdas and the decision of the Chamber to restore control of educational institutions to the Ministry of Education, although the Cabinet had placed these bodies under the Ministry of Wakfs (Pious Foundations). And yet another source of difference was in the desire of the Wafd to extract from the Prime Minister a pledge that, during the King's proposed visit to London, Anglo-Egyptian relations would not be discussed, and this pledge Adly Pasha refused to give. The resignation of the Cabinet, and especially that of the

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Prime Minister, placed Zaghlul Pasha in a very awkward position. If he accepted office himself, a conflict with the British Government would be provoked, yet there was no one else in the whole of the Wafd who could possibly take his place. Zaghlul used all his powers of persuasion to induce Adly Pasha and his colleagues to remain in office, but without success ; so he had to look for a Prime Minister outside the Wafd, although that party formed nine-tenths of the Chamber. Such was the position forced upon the Nationalist leader by the undisciplined action of extremists. At first the King refused to accept the resignation of the Adly Ministry, but Lord Lloyd's influence and Zaghlul's advice eventually prevailed upon him to send for Sarwat Pasha to form a new Ministry, which proved to be even more Wafdist than its predecessor.

But still further trouble was ahead. On the 23rd May, the Report of the War Committee of the Egyptian Parliament was published, challenging the British position in Egypt and making recommendations in conflict with the principles of the "reserved points." The Report showed the intention of, greatly increasing the armed strength of Egypt, a process that had been gradually and unostentatiously followed ever since 1922. At that date the strength of the Egyptian army stationed in Egypt was 4,800 men ; by 1926 the strength had increased to 10,500, and now the Report of the Committee proposed another general increase of establishment in all arms of the service. It was also recommended that the Budget credit for the Sirdarate should be cancelled, together with the annual grant made by Egypt towards the cost of the Sudan Defence Force. In 1922, when the Protectorate was abolished, the Headquarter and Departmental Staffs were British, and the army was under direct British control. There were then 172 attached British officers, while in 1926 this number had been reduced to nine, of whom only one, the Inspector-General, held an executive command. For some time the Wafd had been trying to use the army as an instrument of party politics, and this was clearly shown in the War Committee's Report recommending the replacement of the Sirdar by the political Minister of War. As British commitments in Egypt do not permit of the existence of a potentially hostile army in that

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country, the publication of this Report was the cause of considerable political tension, which was scarcely relieved by anti-British attacks in the Chamber on the subject of the High Commissioner's credentials and a visit which he paid to Minia, in Upper Egypt, at the invitation of the local notables. The fact was that the wilder spirits of the Wafd were completely out of control. They knew that the hands of the more moderate members of the Government had been forced, and that a crisis on a matter of importance in Anglo-Egyptian relations was approaching. Their present concern was to inflame popular passions to the greatest possible extent, and thus to prepare the way for one of their periodic "twistings of the lion's tail." As, however, the authorities were informed that attempts were being made to stir up trouble, three battle-ships were ordered to Egyptian waters to pave the way for a British Note.

The Note, which was presented by Lord Lloyd to Sarwat Pasha on the following day, stated that, while the British Government were willing to concede the proposed increase in the strength of the Egyptian Army and the improvement of armaments, they attached great importance to the effective command of the army being retained in the hands of British officers. The following essentials were, therefore, demanded : (1) That General Spinks's contract as Inspector-General should be renewed for a period of at least three years ; that he should be given the rank of *Ferik* (Lieut.-General) with supreme authority over the army, and retain full powers as Acting Sirdar ; that he should have right of access to the Sovereign, and of making recommendations for promotion and decorations. (2) That a British officer with the rank of *Lewa* (Major-General) be appointed as the Inspector-General's second-in-command, to act as his deputy when necessary. (3) That the Frontier Districts and Coast Guard remain under the command of British officers. The Egyptian reply was partly unsatisfactory, and the Arabic press urged the Cabinet not to concede to the British demands, on the grounds that the British Government had no right to interfere in Egyptian military affairs. As Lord Lloyd had instructions to insist on a satisfactory reply, there seemed little prospect of a friendly settlement. Fortunately, however, the Moslem

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Feast of Bairam began on the 8th June and lasted for five days. Lord Lloyd's action was therefore delayed, and this provided an opportunity for mediation by an able Syrian official¹ of the Palestine Government, who happened to be in Cairo at that time. The results of this mediation were entirely successful, and Sarwat Pasha, after an interview with Lord Lloyd, sent a reply of a conciliatory and satisfactory nature. This was merely another example of the usual tactics employed by the Wafd. They knew perfectly well that the British Government would never tolerate their proposed action with regard to the Egyptian Army, but the leaders thought it was time to carry out another manoeuvre to justify their position in the eyes of their supporters and to strengthen their power in the country. They felt that they were also making some impression on the world in general in favour of their cause.

But Sarwat Pasha had considerable difficulty in explaining the end of the crisis in the Chamber, and had it not been for the moderating influence of Zaghlul his difficulties would have been still more formidable. Sarwat met the situation with great skill and an acute perception of what was required to surmount his difficulties. The Egyptian Government, he said, could not agree to the demands of the first British Note as presented, because acceptance would have led to the derogation of Egyptian sovereignty, Parliamentary authority, and constitutional powers. But the Government had also been anxious to remove causes of misunderstanding with the British Government. They had, therefore, found a means of doing so by accepting demands that seemed desirable for the good order and administration of the army, or that applied only to individuals such as Spinks Pasha and his second-in-command. Guided by these principles, the Government had agreed to maintain the *status quo* in the administration of the army and of the frontier districts. On the 20th June, the Chamber voted the credits for increasing the strength of the army as recommended by the War Committee, but at the same time voted the sum necessary for the maintenance of the Sirdarate and for the Egyptian contribution towards the Sudan Frontier Force. The passing of this crisis removed all

¹ Mr. G. Antonius, of the Palestine Education Department.

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obstacles in the way of King Fuad's visit to England, which was destined to be an event of some significance.

There had been doubts in Egypt whether the King would be received with the full honours due to the Sovereign of an entirely independent state, but these misgivings proved to be entirely without foundation. From the moment that he set foot in England, the King of Egypt was accorded precisely the same honours as are paid to all Rulers of Great Powers during a State visit. Nor could there be any doubts left in the King's mind as to the interest taken by the British public in his visit or the cordiality and goodwill with which they greeted him wherever he went. He came as the friendly Sovereign of a friendly independent Power in the closest political relationship with Great Britain. But he was recognized also as the Ruler of a State whose rapid growth in political importance and national prosperity the British people had watched with interest and satisfaction, realizing that their own country had made a substantial contribution towards these fortunate developments. The uniform friendliness of their reception was, therefore, an expression of goodwill, not only to the King in person, but through him to the people of Egypt, amongst whom the visit stirred up an interest which was remarkable for its enthusiasm. The press was filled with detailed accounts of the King's reception, his movements, his speeches, and the welcome which he received from the British public; while, with few exceptions, editorial comment endorsed the obvious gratification felt by the Egyptian people, and avoided hostile political criticism. In fact, there is little doubt that the honours accorded to King Fuad, together with the genuine pleasure with which His Majesty was received in England, dissipated certain misunderstandings regarding our attitude towards Egypt, and showed the Egyptians that we hold both them and their country in a high degree of respect. The visit poured oil on troubled waters and created on both sides a more favourable atmosphere for conversations on difficult political subjects.

But a special interest was attached to the fact that Sarwat Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, accompanied King Fuad to London, and had several interviews with Sir Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office. This not unnaturally led

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to the idea that negotiations of an important nature were in progress regarding the relations between Great Britain and Egypt. Such surmises were, however, premature, and it was clearly stated both by Sir Austen Chamberlain and by Sarwat Pasha that there was no intention of concluding any new agreement during the visit, but that a suitable opportunity was provided for an informal exchange of views which would prove useful later on, if definite negotiations were opened for the conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian Alliance. The conversations were entirely private and were carried on in the most sympathetic and friendly manner, while the presence in London of Lord Lloyd gave them a significance which they might otherwise have lacked. There was clearly something "in the air," but it was kept in high altitudes.

Meanwhile, a sad event took place which deprived Egypt of one, who had practically made Egyptian history during the past forty years. Zaghlul Pasha died in Cairo on the 23rd August, at the age of seventy-four, and plunged Egypt into mourning for a statesman who could not easily be replaced. For several years his health had been failing, and latterly it was recognized, by none more than himself, that his prospect of life was very limited. Still, he fought bravely to the end, and it was only within a few days of his death that his condition was recognized to be critical. His funeral in Cairo produced remarkable scenes, showing the affection and admiration in which he was held by all classes of the Egyptian people. The death of no other Egyptian of modern times has evoked such natural and genuine sorrow, such manifestations of truly national mourning, as that of Sa'ad Pasha Zaghlul, whose chief claim to the affections of the people was as a great Nationalist leader. There were not less than 25,000 people in the funeral procession, which comprised representatives of the King and Royal Family, the Egyptian Cabinet, the Acting British High Commissioner, the Diplomatic Corps, the members of both Houses of Parliament, British officers, and Egyptian officers and troops. Included also were delegations from workmen's guilds, public colleges and schools, besides representatives from all the provinces, and from various towns and even villages. All Government offices, banks and places of business were closed, and flags flew at half-mast. Amidst

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such tokens of deep respect and high regard, honoured by a salute of twenty-one guns, the body of Sa'ad Pasha Zaghlul was borne through the streets of Cairo, packed with a quarter of a million mourning spectators, to his last resting place in the Moslem burying-ground of Iman-el-Shafei.

Zaghlul's political career was remarkable, and only death deprived it of what might have been its greatest service to Egypt ; for he died at a time when his attitude was becoming more moderate and when reality was making good headway through the mists of fanatical idealism. Yet we cannot altogether blame Zaghlul for his anti-British views. The changes in his political vision were partly the result of our own doing. In 1910 he became Minister of Justice, and in that position incurred the hostility of the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi. The outcome was that, in 1912, Lord Kitchener, in dealing with an allegation of corruption made against the Khedive by the Minister, found it necessary, unfortunately, to support the former and to call upon Zaghlul to resign. Although it was fully recognized that Zaghlul had right on his side, there was not sufficient evidence in support of the charge. So far Zaghlul had, outwardly at least, supported the British régime ; but he now considered that he had been deserted in a matter in which he should have been strongly upheld, and his attitude changed to one of definite and open opposition. It was only indeed in the last months of his life that this opposition was relaxed, and he exerted a moderating influence on his more extreme supporters ; and this change came at a time when circumstances were bringing to the fore a school of political thought more highly developed than Egypt had ever known before. In this political development Zaghlul's personality was likely to have a far-reaching influence, and could ill be spared from Egyptian politics when the country was literally at his beck and call. While it is still too early to say much on the political effects of Zaghlul's death, it is beyond question that Egypt at present possesses no leader who can be thought competent to take his place. His followers were faced with bewildering possibilities, and were in doubt as to what course they should follow. Not only was their leader gone, but his going had loosened the bonds that held together the Coalition Government. The Wafd was the dominant party in Parlia-

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ment and in the country, and could place in power a Ministry of its own members ; but while a purely Wafdist Government would please the extremists, it could not but alarm the more moderate politicians, who did not want to precipitate a crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations. It was also recognized by all except the extremists that a Coalition Government was in a better position to uphold Egyptian interests than a Government drawn exclusively from the Wafd, and that it provided a not unsatisfactory *façade* behind which Egyptian Nationalism could pursue its policy. Moreover, the Liberal members of the Coalition Government were men whose political weight and experience could not be equalled in the ranks of the Wafd, which now rather resembled a flock of sheep without a shepherd.

By the death of Zaghlul the Presidency of the Chamber, the Presidency of the Wafd, and the Chairmanship of the Parliamentary Committee of the Wafd had all fallen vacant, and these important offices had now to be filled. This could not be done without some declaration of Wafdist policy. The situation was examined at a meeting held on the 27th August, attended by all Parliamentary members of the Wafd who were at that time in Egypt, but it was decided that a full Conference was necessary to deal with the situation which had arisen. As questions involving the existence of the Coalition, the future policy of the Wafd, and the continuance of the party as a body following a definite aim, had to be considered, a full Congress was to be called as soon as absent members could get back to Egypt. But the death of Zaghlul had dislocated the political outlook in another direction. Sarwat Pasha returned to Egypt early in September from his conversations with the British Foreign Secretary, and had intended to confer with Zaghlul Pasha in order to find out how far the Nationalist leader and Egyptian public opinion were in sympathy with the trend of the conversations, and to what purpose and extent they should be followed up. Sarwat Pasha was now without guidance and authoritative support until the Wafd should appoint another leader. It was only after a second meeting, on the 19th September, that a manifesto was issued, declaring that the party would continue its efforts to obtain the true independence of Egypt and would follow the principles and

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aims adopted by Zaghlul. The manifesto also declared that the Wafd desired to maintain the coalition of parties, as being necessary to national unity, and called upon the Egyptian people to support the Coalition. A friendly gesture towards Great Britain was also included, but the question of leadership was deferred until a further meeting on the 26th September, when Mustapha Pasha Nahas was unanimously elected President of the Wafd and Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee.

Much depended on the relations established between Nahas Pasha, the new leader of the Wafd, and Sarwat Pasha, the Liberal Prime Minister, who was dependent on the Wafd for support in the Chamber. From Zaghlul the Coalition Prime Minister had received assurances of support that made his position more or less satisfactory, but Zaghlul was a "power," to whom all deferred, and who could and did compel the obedience of his followers if circumstances demanded it. Of Nahas Pasha much less was to be expected, and the question was whether he could ensure the support of the Wafd for Sarwat Pasha. It was doubtful whether he could control the jealousies and ambitions within the party and deal with the dissatisfaction of the extremists at the guidance of the Government being in the hands of a Liberal. Even in Zaghlul's time the extremists had been troublesome and little inclined to promote unity, and it was difficult to foresee any improvement when it came to delicate negotiations between Sarwat Pasha and the British Government. The outlook was not very hopeful, for Zaghlul's death had removed that one element which might have formed the lynch-pin of the whole process of negotiation. Zaghlul was to have been the determining factor at this juncture in Anglo-Egyptian relations, and there is little doubt that both Lord Lloyd and the British Government had some reason to expect his sympathy. The sympathy of Zaghlul meant the sympathy of Egypt, while Nahas was an uncertain and unknown quantity who was more or less at the mercy of his uncontrolled followers. Yet the unity of the Coalition was complete, and Sarwat Pasha had received assurances—for what they were worth—that the Wafd had complete confidence in him. Relying on these assurances Sarwat Pasha left for Europe, and resumed

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conversations with Sir Austen Chamberlain at the end of October.

These conversations, however tentative and preliminary in character, had as their ultimate aim the placing of Anglo-Egyptian relations on a more definite and satisfactory basis, and were continued daily until the 8th November, when Sarwat Pasha left London for Cairo. Although these conversations were described as "informal and personal," they were obviously of great importance, and their significance was fully realized both in Great Britain and Egypt. They were known to deal with fundamental questions, but it was a matter of conjecture how far each side would be prepared to go in order to arrive at a settlement. That the "four reserved points" formed the essence of the discussions there was no question, and in Egypt the return of Sarwat Pasha was eagerly awaited. In London the Egyptian Prime Minister created a most favourable impression, and the Foreign Office had full confidence in his sincerity. He showed himself to be quite the most advanced statesman that Egypt had yet produced, and his genuine desire to reach a settlement drew forth the sympathy of the British Government and the public generally. His clear grasp of the reality of the situation, together with his friendly attitude and pleasing personality, made British politicians inclined to go as far as they possibly could to meet Egyptian proposals. In a conversation I had with Sarwat Pasha at the Egyptian Legation a few days before he finally left London for Cairo, he told me that the conversations which he was having with Sir Austen Chamberlain were most satisfactory, and were preparing the way for the eventual negotiation of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in the mutual interests of both countries. He said that, although there were extremists in Egypt as in every country, most thinking Egyptians regarded England as their best friend and wanted a more satisfactory settlement with Great Britain, whose interests in Egypt were, in so many respects, similar to those of the Egyptian people. Any foreign influence, other than British, would be intolerable. The Prime Minister then expressed the opinion to me that, although there were many difficulties still to be overcome, the negotiation of a Treaty no longer presented insurmountable obstacles; in fact, he foresaw a settlement at no very distant date.

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Sarwat Pasha's whole attitude seemed to be one of determination to overcome difficulties, in order to bring about a satisfactory solution, and he seemed convinced that the same spirit animated the British Government. There certainly was sincerity in his words, and so moderate and well-considered were all his statements that I had difficulty in remembering that I was not in the presence of a European statesman. But Sarwat Pasha is ahead of his time in Egypt, and the support on which he depended is not sufficiently developed to share his point of view.

The Prime Minister's return to Cairo had been timed to precede the reassembling of the Egyptian Parliament, and it was fully expected that during the coming session Egypt would know the result of the London conversations in the form of clearly defined proposals, which would come up for debate in the Chamber. When the King returned to Egypt in November he received a remarkable welcome. From Alexandria to Cairo his journey was a triumphal progress, which culminated in a lavish display of decoration and expression of popular enthusiasm such as the Egyptian capital has not witnessed for generations. This national welcome was quite unexpected, and may be attributed to various circumstances. Egypt had lost her great Nationalist leader, and the people saw in King Fuad the personification of their national sovereignty, although that sovereignty was not yet up to their expectations. It was what the King represented that appealed so strongly to those thousands of Egyptians, who thronged to welcome him on his return from Europe, where he had received the honours similar to those paid to the Monarchs of first-class Powers. The Egyptians felt flattered, and the object of that flattery was, for the time, a god in their midst. They further knew that important events were impending, and looked to King Fuad to bring them good news in his Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament. Nor were they disappointed in the programme which the King announced in his Speech. Referring to the London conversations, he said :

An object of these conversations was mutual explanations of the points of view of the British and Egyptian Governments concerning the question of Egypt and the Sudan, in order that, if it seemed possible to reconcile these points of view, negotiations might be

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begun for an alliance between the two countries permitting the realization of Egypt's complete independence and defining her relations with Great Britain—an alliance in regard to which Parliament would have the last word.

The Speech also stated that during Sarwat Pasha's recent visits to European capitals he had proposed to the Powers interested that the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts should be extended. The Powers had received the proposal favourably, and as the next step Egypt would convoke an international conference in Cairo to consider and establish the necessary changes. The King also announced that Sarwat Pasha had sounded certain of the Capitulatory Powers on the subject of modifying the Capitulatory régime, and that these Governments had shown a willingness to study the matter and accept the modifications proposed. As soon as all the Governments interested agreed to the principle of reform, the Egyptian Government would call an international conference to elaborate the necessary alterations.

The King's references to the London conversations and their purpose, to the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts, and to reform of the Capitulations, strongly appealed to Egyptian national instincts and were received with great enthusiasm, but the difficulty of carrying out these proposed changes was scarcely realized. It is one thing for the Powers to accept in principle the proposal that changes should be made in these international institutions; it is quite another matter to secure agreement as to the nature of these changes, and it is unlikely that the influential foreign communities in Egypt will surrender their privileges without strong opposition. Of more immediate interest was the outcome of the London conversations, of which no details were available. There was as yet no sign as to how far Sarwat Pasha would be able to carry his Nationalist supporters with him in the direction of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement such as was foreshadowed in the King's Speech; but it was becoming apparent that the Prime Minister was finding difficulty in maintaining the unity of the Coalition. Towards the end of December, Sarwat Pasha was still withholding the secrets of the London conversations, and this delay was causing impatience among members of the Wafd, whom the Liberal members of the Coalition accused of

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hostility to the Prime Minister. But the real fact of the matter was that a powerful section of the Wafd was strongly opposed to making any concessions at all towards an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. The situation was obscure and not very hopeful.

Yet, well as Sarwat Pasha kept his secret, it soon became common knowledge in well-informed circles that the Egyptian Prime Minister had returned from London with British proposals in the form of a draft Treaty. It was hoped in England that he would obtain the support of his Cabinet, and that they would recommend it to the Egyptian Parliament for acceptance and ratification. But such hopes were destined to be premature. After his return to Cairo, Sarwat Pasha conducted negotiations with Lord Lloyd for the purpose of obtaining certain modifications in the text of the draft Treaty. He perhaps found it difficult to harmonize his moderate attitude of London with the political atmosphere of Cairo. Still he kept secret, except from King Fuad and his principal colleagues, the very existence of a draft Treaty until, towards the end of February, 1928, various versions of the proposals were published in the Egyptian press. Sarwat Pasha could do nothing towards obtaining the acceptance of the Treaty until the proposals had been accepted by the Committee of the Wafd. This is where Zaghlul's personal influence might have saved the situation. By this time there was practically no hope. There was no one capable of controlling the extremists of the Wafd, who were strong both in numbers and in influence, and the draft Treaty was rejected on the 28th February. About a week later the Prime Minister handed to Lord Lloyd the decision of the Cabinet that they were unable to accept the proposals, and on the same day Sarwat Pasha and his colleagues resigned.

It may appear at first sight that the British Government were undertaking a hopeless task in trying to negotiate a Treaty with an Egyptian Government which relied on the Wafd for support; but it must be remembered that the conversations were begun in the lifetime of Zaghlul Pasha, with a reasonable hope of success, and that their continuance was calculated to yield valuable results even if success was not achieved on this particular occasion. The Treaty has not been signed, but since July, 1927, an important step forward has

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been made towards a final settlement, and there are more reasons to be optimistic now than there were before King Fuad and Sarwat Pasha came to London. There are, however, many Egyptians who do not share this view, and regard the Chamberlain-Sarwat negotiations as directly responsible for the subsequent ultimatum in regard to the passage of the Bill concerning Public Meetings and Demonstrations. For this reason they consider that the Treaty negotiations have created further difficulties in Anglo-Egyptian relations.

CHAPTER XII

THE PRESENT SITUATION

BEFORE attempting to review the present situation in Egypt, it is as well to examine the recent conversations and negotiations, which constitute the latest guide in the formation of opinion. For the very nature of the draft Treaty, the circumstances in which negotiations were opened, the attitude of the Egyptian Prime Minister, and the cause of its rejection, all provide first-class material for future consideration. Although the negotiations broke down, they were not a political failure; for Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha have shifted Anglo-Egyptian relations on to lines likely to lead to agreement in the future. The achievement of success on this occasion was almost too much to hope for, but the satisfactory progress, which was made in this latest attempt to solve the Egyptian question, was in itself a very important step in the right direction. Those interested in the welfare of Egypt have reason to be encouraged, while the British Government are far from dissatisfied with what has been accomplished.

The chief difference between the Anglo-Egyptian discussions of 1924 and those of 1927-28 lay in the personality of the Egyptian negotiator and in the method of opening negotiations. In 1924 Zaghlul Pasha had come into power as an uncompromising opponent of British influence in Egypt, and his position was such that he could not but adopt the most intransigent attitude towards the British counter-proposals. Sarwat Pasha, on the other hand, agreed at the outset that "there must be friendly collaboration" between Great Britain and Egypt, and that the aid of the former was necessary

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for the security of the latter. In 1924 the initiative was taken by the British Government as the Power having a definite influence in Egypt. But, in the case of the recent negotiations, the first move came from the Egyptian Government as that of an independent sovereign State. Egypt came forward with her first draft Treaty just as any foreign Power would approach the British Government. There was no question of terms or concessions. It was simply a matter of exchanging views, in the hope that a line of negotiation might be found by which the two Governments might meet in agreement. Both Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha made every possible effort to agree, and they made considerable sacrifices to this end. These efforts produced the draft Treaty, which was finally rejected by the Egyptian Cabinet owing to the extreme attitude of the Wafd, but they also showed that agreement was a possibility even if it could not be achieved in present circumstances.

When Sarwat Pasha opened these conversations with the British Foreign Minister, he was frankly told that the rights embodied in the "four reserved points" were vital to Great Britain. "No British Government could afford to ignore them . . . they were, in fact, so essential to the existence of the British Empire that every British Government, in the future as in the past, whatever its complexion, would be obliged to insist upon them. . . . The fundamental requirements of British policy were common to all parties in this State, and a change of Government made no alteration in them." On the 18th July, 1927, Sarwat Pasha submitted to the Foreign Office a draft Treaty on the following lines: An offensive and defensive alliance; "the substitution for the capitulatory régime now existing in Egypt of a régime more in conformity with the spirit of the times and the present state of Egypt," Great Britain having the right of intervention to protect foreigners from inequitable treatment in fiscal matters; Egypt to enter the League of Nations, with Great Britain's support; the recognition of Great Britain's right, by virtue of the first of the "reserved points" ("protection of lines of communication"), to maintain a military force ("in no way having the character of an occupation") on Egyptian soil; after a certain period (Sarwat Pasha in conversation suggested

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from three to five years) this force should be quartered in the region of the Suez Canal, possibly at Port Tewfik. The Egyptian draft further provided that Egypt should not oppose British foreign policy abroad, nor conclude agreements with foreign Powers which might be prejudicial to British interests. As regards financial and judicial relations, the Egyptian Government agreed to appoint, in agreement with the British Government, advisers to the Ministers of Finance and Justice, whose advice and services should be at the disposal of the Government "for all matters in regard to which they may wish to consult" them. The British representative in Cairo was to have the rank and precedence of Ambassador; the question of the Sudan was to be left for further negotiation, but Great Britain should agree to return to the *status quo* prior to 1924 (*i.e.*, before the sanctions applied after the murder of the Sirdar, involving the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers and purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian army).

Ten days later the Foreign Office came forward with a counter draft Treaty, accepting the general principle of an offensive and defensive alliance and the admission of Egypt to the League, but requiring a more comprehensive system of guarantees than was contemplated in the Egyptian draft. In addition to the agreement regarding foreign policy, the British draft provided for "full and frank consultation between the high contracting parties in all matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests." While agreeing to the proposal regarding the Capitulations, Great Britain, under the second and third of the "reserved points," claimed the right to "satisfy themselves that adequate protection is afforded to foreign lives and property." The Egyptian Government was required to maintain a sufficient foreign element in its internal administration to ensure such protection. With regard to the British forces to be maintained in Egypt for the protection of Imperial lines of communication, the British draft provided for the maintenance of such armed forces as should be necessary. After ten years the high contracting parties would consider where these forces should be stationed, "in the light of their experience of the operation of the provisions of the Treaty and of the military conditions

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then existing." In the civil service the Egyptian Government were to employ all foreign officials necessary, with the assistance of Great Britain, with whom an understanding would have to be reached before foreigners of non-British nationality were employed in the position of director or any higher grade. The positions and functions of the financial and judicial advisers were to remain unchanged, and provision was made for the continuance of the joint sovereignty of Great Britain and Egypt in the Sudan. The British draft further contained an annex, explaining the conditions under which the Egyptian army was to operate during the next ten years. The army was to be limited to 12,250 men, the instructional staff was to be trained either in Egypt or in England, and supplies and munitions, not produced in Egypt, were only to be obtained from the British Government. The annex also stipulated for the unmodified maintenance of the European Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior. In a long commentary on the British draft, presented at the end of August, Sarwat Pasha declared that "the British draft, with its mechanism of rigid tutelage and continued control, goes too far," and he repeated later that the British proposals merely reflected a "lack of confidence in Egypt and a desire to keep her in a state of tutelage."

Finally, after some weeks of negotiation a third draft Treaty was actually agreed upon by both Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha, and this Treaty (a copy of which is given in Appendix III) was forwarded to Lord Lloyd in Cairo late in November by the British Foreign Secretary, who described it as "embodying large concessions to His Excellency's (Sarwat Pasha's) own views and to Egyptian sentiment," and as "expressing on the one side and on the other the limit to which each party can advance in his wish to meet the other." Accompanying this draft Treaty were two Notes from the British to the Egyptian Government, which were to form the bases for the negotiations on the subjects of irrigation and the Capitulations.

The formal presentation of the Treaty to Sarwat Pasha in Cairo on the 3rd December marked the beginning of a drawn-out process of negotiation. While at first the Egyptian Prime Minister was optimistic as to the prospects of a settlement,

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he soon became aware of the growing antagonism of the Wafd, without whose support he was powerless, and he became increasingly unwilling to submit the Treaty either to his Cabinet or to Nahas Pasha, the new President of the Wafd. By the 18th January, 1928, however, the only two outstanding points were in connection with the British personnel of the Egyptian army and police force, and the British Government offered to convert the former into a military mission, and proposed, if necessary, to reserve the latter for the decision of the League Council. To the latter proposal Sarwat Pasha made the rather inconsistent reply that "the League meant nothing to him or to Egypt," but the Treaty was at length communicated to Nahas Pasha and the Egyptian Cabinet. In an interview with Lord Lloyd at the end of February, Nahas Pasha refused to discuss the Treaty, on the grounds that it did not provide for the complete evacuation of Egyptian territory by British military forces. While Sarwat Pasha's recognition of the realities of the situation had made the negotiation of the Treaty possible, Nahas Pasha's refusal to recognize them made a settlement impossible.

The British reply to the rejection of the Treaty took the form of a Note, to the effect that the British Government had "for some time viewed with misgiving certain legislative proposals introduced in the Egyptian Parliament which, if they were to become law, would be likely to weaken the hands of the administrative authorities responsible for the maintenance of order and for the protection of life and property in Egypt." As the treaty negotiations had led to nothing, the British Government, having regard to the obligations incurred in the Declaration of 1922, could not be hampered by such legislation as was proposed. Amongst these legislative proposals were amendments to the Public Assemblies Act, which permits the police to break up public gatherings at their discretion, and the proposed amendments were of such a nature as to endanger public security. When Nahas Pasha became Prime Minister, in succession to Sarwat, he tried to force this measure through Parliament in defiance of the British Government, and took this opportunity of showing the world that British forces were necessary in Egypt in spite of his contentions to the contrary. As on former occasions,



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the negotiations broke down chiefly over the question of the British garrison, which the Egyptians regard as incompatible with their independence, but which the British Government consider necessary in order to safeguard British and foreign interests. All along this has been the greatest stumbling-block to settlement, and, unfortunately, the Egyptians are nearly always the first to demonstrate the necessity of maintaining what is most distasteful to them. No sooner had the draft Treaty been rejected than minor disturbances broke out in Cairo, Asyut and Tanta as result of the British Note ; and within a few weeks of Nahas Pasha taking office it was necessary to send a naval squadron to Alexandria to enforce compliance with British demands.

The question of the troops is one which needs a little explanation. The British Government fully sympathize with the attitude of the Egyptians to the presence of foreign troops in their country, and especially in their capital, and regards the evacuation of the British garrison as eminently desirable. But, as things are at present, they do not feel justified in taking the great risk of withdrawal. Great Britain cannot possibly ignore her imperial interests, which are bound up in Egypt ; she is tied by certain international obligations ; and she is responsible for the true interests of the Egyptian people. She cannot, therefore, relax her military power until the Egyptians are in a position to give such guarantees as will render the presence of British troops unnecessary. At present Egypt is not in a position to give these guarantees, as has been proved by the most recent events. It has been suggested that a compromise might be reached by withdrawing the troops to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, but there are formidable objections even to this course. In the first place, the presence of British troops in the neutral " Canal zone " would be calculated to raise trouble with other Powers interested in that international waterway. The neutrality of the Canal is guaranteed by international agreements, and the permanent occupation of the Canal zone by troops of any single Power might be challenged as a breach of that neutrality. Moreover, Great Britain's strategic interest in Egypt is not limited to securing a free passage through the Suez Canal. " The defence of her Imperial communications " means much more than that.

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Egypt is becoming more and more a central point in the complex of those communications by land and air as well as by sea, and her important position is gradually embracing a wider range of interests. But there is another objection from a purely military standpoint. The towns on the Suez Canal are dependent for their water supply on the Fresh Water Canal,¹ which connects with the Nile at Cairo, so that troops stationed along the banks of the Canal would be in a most precarious position in regard to water unless the Fresh Water Canal was fully protected. This cannot be done without maintaining a garrison in Cairo. Other proposals have also been made with a view to meeting the perfectly natural demand of the Egyptians, but it is obvious that Great Britain is at present powerless to give effect to her genuine desires in this direction, and is compelled to maintain British garrisons in Cairo and other Egyptian towns. Then, with regard to the protection of foreigners and minorities, Great Britain is doing the work which European Powers would otherwise have to do, and in present circumstances no change in this policy is possible. Even the withdrawal of the garrison from Cairo city would be a considerable step towards meeting Egyptian desires, but military experts, with whom I have urged this course, are unanimously of the opinion that it is still impracticable. The only power which can be instrumental in hastening the withdrawal of the troops, either in part or whole, is the Egyptians themselves. As soon as they prove themselves capable of doing what we now have to do for them, we will be only too pleased to see them shoulder their own responsibilities and hoist the Egyptian flag over the Citadel in Cairo.

The British Government and the British people are genuinely sympathetic to all true Egyptian advancement, and heartily welcome any forward move which is likely to bring the Egyptians nearer to the consummation of their hopes. For this reason Sarwat Pasha secured a great measure of sympathy

¹ Near Cairo this canal diverges from the Nile to the north of Kasr-el-Nil, and thence traces to the north-east the boundary between the Arabian Plateau and the Land of Goschen. To the east of Abu Hammad it intersects the ancient fresh water canal coming from Zagazig, and then runs to the east, parallel with this, through the Wadi Tumilat, which is over thirty miles in length. At Nefisheh the canal forks, the south arm leading to Suez and the north arm to Port Said.

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in England. He came representing an important advance in Egypt's political evolution, and he proved that there now exist in Egypt statesmen with whom it is possible to negotiate on equal terms. Sarwat Pasha has done a great service to his country, and this is realized by the more far-seeing Egyptians. His moderation appealed to the British Government and to the public in England as no other political quality could hope to do, and it is significant that the publication of the Chamberlain-Sarwat conversations produced in this country a more sympathetic attitude towards the Egyptian standpoint. Nothing is more likely to win favour in England than moderation, while the threats of the Wafd extremists merely tend to harden those from whom they expect concessions. Good and patriotic as may be the intentions of Nahas Pasha and his followers, they are doing everything in their power to defeat their own objects. Yet their attitude must be viewed with understanding, and with confidence that in time they will rise to a higher political plane from which they will be able to view the situation in a truer perspective. If the treaty negotiations were premature, they certainly showed that there exists in Egypt an increasing number of politicians, both within and without the Wafd, who can appreciate the relative importance of things, and there are reasons to hope that, perhaps within the next decade, these elements will command a majority in the Chamber. Time and patience are necessary on both sides, as well as the cultivation of mutual confidence and trust, without which no satisfactory settlement is possible.

An earnest endeavour has been made on both sides to bridge over the gulf separating the British and Egyptian standpoints, and both ends have actually been made to meet; but the juncture was not strong enough to bear any pressure and it gave way. For the first time in history Great Britain and Egypt were negotiating on equal terms, but the body of Egyptian opinion behind the Prime Minister was not sufficiently developed to appreciate reality. The old fantasies of extreme Nationalism still haunt the minds of Nahas Pasha and his colleagues, but fresh ground has been explored with considerable profit, and material now exists for settlement at some future date. What the future may bring forth in Egypt,

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it is quite beyond my competence to forecast. Indeed, I would not attempt to do so. Great Britain wants to gain the true friendship of Egypt—a friendship based on community of interest and goodwill—but there is more than that. The British people have a personal liking for the Egyptians, based on temperament and long association in peace and in war. The Englishman may resent the tactics employed by certain Egyptian politicians, and he may revile the actions of fanatical extremists, but for the Egyptian people he has a kindly respect. The British people want to help Egypt to stand securely on her feet, but they will not tolerate anything that in any way imperils the security of the British Empire, endangers the safety of those under their protection, and which is contrary to the true interests of the Egyptians themselves. Until this truth is realized, and the game of “twisting the lion’s tail” is replaced by some form of recreation less likely to cause trouble, there is no chance of the military forces being withdrawn or of Egypt attaining the most cherished objects of her ambition.

Meanwhile, the Declaration of 1922 and the “four reserved points” must continue to govern our policy until such time as constructive proposals are forthcoming, which show that the Egyptians realize the limitations controlling our action with regard to their country. The Nationalists may possibly hope that, in the course of time the advent to power of a Labour Government will provide an opportunity for further concessions. If this is the case, they are profoundly mistaken. No British Government dare advance one inch further than Sir Austen Chamberlain has gone without some very substantial change in the internal condition of Egypt, with whom the next move rests in the normal course of events. The political development of those, whose standpoint we now find difficult to understand, will be watched with the closest interest, and the more steadily they move forward the better it will be for both countries.

* * * * *

But these questions only interest a comparatively small proportion of the Egyptian people, and cannot be regarded as the fundamental matters on which the happiness of the majority

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depends. As long as there is ample water from the Nile, as long as the cotton crop is good, and as long as taxation is low, there is happiness in the land of Egypt. Political considerations fill the pages of the Egyptian press and provide occasional headlines in the London newspapers, but they are mere superficialities to the ordinary fellah, who thinks that his more politically-minded countrymen are "making much ado about nothing."

APPENDIX I

EXTRACTS FROM LORD DUFFERIN'S SCHEME¹ AND ARABI'S MEMORANDUM

LORD DUFFERIN'S SCHEME FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF EGYPT

February 6th, 1883.

It ought to be no difficult task to endow the Egyptian people with good government. On the contrary, there are many circumstances which indicate the present moment as propitious for the inauguration of a new era.

ARABI'S MEMORANDUM ON EGYPTIAN REFORM

November 25th, 1882.

Although I am in a prison and in the hands of my enemies, I am comparatively little anxious about my present state of humiliation, and I do not think only of what may happen to me in the future. As I have from the very first only sought to ensure the freedom of my country, my constant concern even now is about its happiness, and its rescue from certain venomous and powerful vipers with which it is struggling. One of the greatest of Egypt's difficulties and dangers comes from the usurers and money-lenders, who have sucked the very blood of the peasants, and ill-treat the natives whom they despoil, and whose hardly acquired gains they carry away by handfuls. Another of the lamentations of Egypt is on account of the foreigners, who fill the highest posts, receive the largest salaries, and leave no room anywhere for the natives of the country. The non-Egyptian Moslems who surround the Government on every side seek to keep the Egyptian in the lowest state

¹ Egypt No. 6 (1883).

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of degradation and ignorance, in order that they may always continue to oppress and tyrannize over the free inhabitants of the country, without themselves possessing any real superiority of knowledge, natural talents, or civilization. These, then, are the enemies of progress, always striving, even as serpents, to tear to pieces the body of a defenceless people, who tried in vain to escape from their relentless grasp, and who can now only hope for succour from the champions of truth and liberty amongst the English nation, which, in the past, set herself before the world as the constant defender of every worthy cause.

As a consequence, responsibilities have been imposed upon us. Europe and the Egyptian people, whom we have undertaken to rescue from anarchy, have alike a right to require that our intervention should be beneficent and its results enduring; that it should obviate all danger of future perturbations, and that it should leave established on sure foundations the principles of justice, liberty and public happiness.

I have thus tried to describe in a few words some of the more violent symptoms of the chronic disease under which Egypt is suffering, in order that a wise physician may find an appropriate remedy for it. Now the English nation has taken upon itself spontaneously the special care of Egyptian affairs, which is verily a task of great responsibility before the civilized world, and before the history of this critical age. It consequently behoves the wise men amongst them to devise carefully the means of coping most effectually with the disease. My knowledge of the real state of affairs in my country, and my ardent desire to promote its happiness, have induced me, therefore, even in captivity and surrounded with trouble, to make a few remarks by way of appeal to the calm reflection

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Her actual rulers are still supplied, indeed, from a foreign stock, but the progenitor of the race was one of the most illustrious men of the present century, who proved his right to found a dynasty by emancipating those he ruled from the arbitrary thralldom of an imperious suzerain. His successors have carried the liberation of their adopted country still further, and the Prince now sitting on the Khedivial throne represents, at all events, the principle of autonomous Government, of hereditary succession, and commercial independence.

I would press upon Her Majesty's Government a more generous policy—such a policy as is implied by the creation, within certain prudent limits, of representative institutions, of municipal and communal self-government, and of a political existence untrammelled by external importunity, though aided, indeed, as it must be for a time, by sympathetic advice and assistance. Indeed, no middle course is possible. The Valley of the Nile could not be administered with any prospect of success from London. An attempt upon our part to engage in such an undertaking would

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and impartial judgment of the champions of right in England.

1st. The ruler of Egypt must be an Egyptian, well acquainted with the country, popular amongst the Egyptians, of sufficient influence to impose his authority by moral force, and wholly unconnected with the recent events. The present Khedivial family could give us, I believe, such a ruler, but he must fulfil all the above conditions. If England really desires it she can find such a man. The Sultan of the Osmanlis can never hope to regain his ancient hold over the minds of the Egyptians. He encouraged us in our search for freedom, approved our resistance to invasion (all this, it now appears, from selfish motives), and at last deserted us in our misfortunes. Turkey has never done good to Egypt. The further interference of the Sultan with her internal affairs can only be for the evil of that country.

2nd. The Government of Egypt ought to be a Constitutional one. There should be a Council of Ministers, each of whom must be responsible for his acts towards the whole Cabinet, and the Ministry, as a body, to be responsible to the country.

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at once render us objects of hatred and suspicion to its inhabitants.

Though hitherto Eastern society has only been held together by the coercive forces of absolutism, it must be remembered that, on the one hand, the Mahomedan religion is essentially democratic; and, on the other, that the primitive idea of the elders of the land assembling in council round their chief has never altogether faded out of the traditions of the people. Even the elective principle has been to some degree preserved amongst their village communities. If, therefore, we found ourselves upon what already exists, and endeavour to expand it to such proportions as may seem commensurate with the needs and aptitudes of the country, we may succeed in creating a vitalized and self-existent organism, instinct with evolutionary force. In order to obtain our ends, we must lay the foundation broad and deep.

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SYNOPSIS OF PROPOSED EGYPTIAN INSTITUTIONS

1. *The Village Constituency.*—Composed of representatives of each circumscription, chosen by manhood suffrage, who are the depositaries of the village vote.

2. *The Provincial Councils.*—(Varying in number from four to eight members.)—Chosen by the spokesmen of the villages.

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3rd. There should be an *Elective Chamber* and a *Council of Notables* (or "old men"). All laws and legislative measures should be submitted to them, and they must be allowed full liberty of discussion and criticism. Elections must be free, as in civilized countries. For five years those Chambers might only have a consultative voice, and during that time the Government might not be bound to always act on their advice. I fully believe by that time the Egyptians would learn to deserve more extended powers.

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3. *The Legislative Council.*—Consisting of twenty-six members, of whom twelve are nominated by the Khedive on the advice of his Ministers, and sixteen are elected by the Provincial Councils.

4. *The General Assembly.*—Of eighty members: eight Ministers, twenty-six members of the Legislative Council, forty-six delegates elected by the spokesmen of the villages.

5. *Eight Ministers.*—Responsible to the Khedive.

6. His Highness the Khedive.

It may be objected that the foregoing machinery does not really embody the Parliamentary principle in the true acceptation of the term, both the Council of Legislation and the General Assembly being consultative rather than law-making bodies; but few people would be prepared to maintain that Egypt is yet ripe for pure popular government.

4th. The proceedings of the two Assemblies to be public, and inserted in Arabic and French papers—this would accustom the natives to take part in their own affairs, and prepare them for political life. At the expiration of five years, powers of Assembly to be definitely fixed according to what experience may suggest—and these Ministers would be wholly responsible to the Chamber.

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5th. Political laws ought to be made, determining the powers and special privileges of the ruler, the duties of Ministers—no act of the ruler to be valid unless approved by the Cabinet, or by the special Minister whom it may concern. The ruler shall have no direct communications with Foreign Representatives or their Governments except through his Minister for Foreign Affairs.

There is no doubt that the fact of foreigners in Egypt being exempt from taxation to which its inhabitants are subject is extremely galling to the native mind. The removal of so glaring an injustice would do much towards suppressing the very general feeling that the philanthropy of foreign Governments towards the Egyptians becomes paralysed the moment the pecuniary interests of their own subjects are affected.

The chief requirement of Egypt is justice. A pure, cheap, and simple system of justice will prove more beneficial to the country than the largest Constitutional privileges. The structure of society in the East is so simple that, provided the taxes are righteously assessed, it does not require much law-making to make the people happy; but the most elaborate legislation would fail to do so if the laws invented for them were not equitably enforced.

At this moment there is no real justice in this country. What passes under that name is a mockery, both as regards

6th. Perfect equality between all the inhabitants of Egypt; no difference to be made between foreigners and natives with regard to general treatment, to the payment of taxes, and so on.

7th. A thorough reform of judicial administration being accomplished, a uniform body of laws should be applied in all the Courts of Justice in Egypt; those laws ought to be in accordance with the customs and nature of the inhabitants; the execution and proper carrying out of the law to be accurately watched over, in order to leave no room for undue influence, and the old system of observing the law apparently and evading it in reality.

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the tribunals themselves, and the *corpus juris* they pretend to administer.

It is evident that all our efforts to provide Egypt with appropriate administrative machinery will be in vain unless we can depend upon the various parts of which that machinery is composed performing with efficiency the duties allotted to them. Nor have the Egyptian people a right to complain that the Departments are unduly crowded with foreign officials if it is impossible to find native employes possessing the necessary education and other qualifications for occupying the posts now, through sheer necessities of the case, entrusted to strangers. If this grievance, and it is undoubtedly a legitimate one, is to be got rid of, it can only be by the Egyptian Government taking in hand, in an energetic and conscientious manner, the education of the rising generation.

But there are other radical reforms which will have to be inaugurated before the Civil Service of Egypt can become either efficient or economical. Unfortunately, the introduction of these will occasion much dissatisfaction, and may inflict some individual hardship.

In his Report of the 18th September last, transmitted to your Lordship by Sir Edward Malet, Mr. Fitzgerald has shown that the number of employes in the service of the Egyptian Government is ridiculously in excess of the public needs.

8th. Special care to be taken of national education, and the diffusion of knowledge to all parts of the country—and more particularly the knowledge of the laws and institutions of the land, in order to increase the number of those who are able to apply the laws.

9th. The unnecessary European employes to be dismissed, and only such of them to be kept as may be really useful and necessary; their salaries to be fixed in accordance with the resources of the country, and a proportion to be observed between their salaries and those allowed to natives, in order to avoid jealousy and discontent by undue partiality.

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Nevertheless, it is very desirable that the European staff should be considerably reduced, especially where it has been duplicated for political reasons.

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There is no service in Egypt of which the people have more just reason to complain than that by which the cadastral survey of the country has been conducted, and it is not surprising that it attracted the attention of the Chamber of Notables.

The cost has been excessive, the results small; and the service has been crowded with European employes, whose technical knowledge has not always been of a high order.

I now proceed to call your Lordship's attention to one of the most distressing subjects connected with the present social condition of this country. It is a question of recent growth, namely, the encumbered condition of a considerable proportion of the fellaheen lands, especially in the Delta.

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Unfortunately, the 5,000,000*l.* of mortgage debt above referred to does not by any means represent the whole of the fellah's indebtedness. I am told, on good authority, that he owes at least another 3,000,000*l.* or 4,000,000*l.* to the village usurer, who holds his bond, and is able to sell him up with the same sinister expedition as the mortgagee.

10th. Natives ought not to be kept back from employment, and from occupying any official post, so long as they possess the necessary qualities; persons excluded from Government functions on account of their association with the late events ought also to be allowed to compete for employment, if they are capable enough to do so.

11th. Special attention ought to be paid to the question of usury, and the means of preventing usurers from employing the most unfair means to despoil the nation.

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Having thus satisfied the moral requirements of Egypt by providing her with domestic security, freedom, and justice, we may now turn to consider her material needs. The wealth of Egypt springs from the soil, whose fertility is entirely dependent upon irrigation. Year after year the Nile conveys in its affluent waters richer treasures than did ever the fabled Pactolus.

At the present moment we are labouring in the interests of the world at large. The desideratum of everyone is an Egypt peaceful, prosperous and contented, able to pay its debts, capable of maintaining order along the Canal, and offering no excuse in the troubled conditions of its affairs for interference from outside. France, Turkey, every European Power must be as anxious as ourselves for the attainment of these results, nor can they be jealous of the means we take to secure them.

The very fact of our having endowed the country with representative institutions is a proof of our disinterestedness.

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12th. Care must be taken of the irrigation works and other means of fertilizing the soil. These have been greatly neglected, and they touch the very life of Egypt.

13th. All the foregoing measures under existing circumstances must be adopted and carried out under the supervision and direction of Directors specially appointed by the British Government for a certain time, until those reforms have produced their effect, and the Egyptians become capable of conducting their own affairs.

If these reforms are carefully studied and carried out, the Egyptian people will see the end of the long and painful disease under which it has been labouring, through the wisdom of its medical advisers, and England will have accomplished her task in a manner which will reflect great honour upon her.

(Signed) AHMED ARABI THE
EGYPTIAN.

APPENDIX II

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 28TH FEBRUARY, 1922.

Whereas His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent sovereign State; and

Whereas the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire;

The following principles are hereby declared:

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.

2. So soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on the 2nd November, 1914, shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:

(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;

(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;

(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;

(d) The Sudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements the *status quo* in all these matters shall remain intact.

In the covering communication from Lord Allenby to Sultan Fuad "the creation of a Parliament with right to control the policy and administration of a constitutionally responsible Government" was pronounced to be a matter for His Highness and the Egyptian people to determine; and it was also declared that there was "no obstacle to the re-establishment forthwith of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs which will prepare the way for the creation of the diplomatic and consular representation of Egypt."

APPENDIX III

THE DRAFT TREATY OF 1927-28

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of Egypt,

Being anxious to consolidate the friendship and to maintain and perpetuate the relations of good understanding between their respective countries,

And considering that in order to secure this object it is desirable to give precision to the relationship between the two countries by resolving and defining the outstanding questions at issue which formed the subject of the reservations which His Britannic Majesty's Government considered it necessary to make on the occasion of the declaration of the 28th February, 1922,

Being anxious to eliminate the possibility of interference in the internal administration of Egypt,

And considering that these objects will best be achieved by the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and alliance, which in their common interest will provide for effective co-operation in the joint task of ensuring the defence and independence of Egypt ;

Have agreed to conclude a treaty for this purpose, and have appointed as plenipotentiaries :

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India : for Great Britain and Northern Ireland : The Right Honourable The Lord Lloyd, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., D.S.O., Member of His Most Honourable Privy Council ;

His Majesty the King of Egypt : His Excellency Abdel Khalek Sarwat Pasha, President of the Council of Ministers ;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows :—

ARTICLE I.

An alliance is established between the high contracting parties in consecration of their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations.

ARTICLE 2.

His Majesty the King of Egypt undertakes not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude incompatible with the alliance or liable to create difficulties for His Britannic Majesty ; not to oppose in

GREAT BRITAIN IN EGYPT

foreign countries the policy followed by His Britannic Majesty and not to conclude with a foreign Power any agreement which might be prejudicial to British interests.

ARTICLE 3.

If, by reason of any attack or act of aggression whatsoever, His Majesty the King of Egypt should be involved in war for the defence of his territory or for the protection of the interests of his country, His Britannic Majesty will, subject always to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, come immediately to his aid in the capacity of belligerent.

ARTICLE 4.

Should circumstances arise likely to imperil the good relations between His Majesty the King of Egypt and a foreign Power or threaten the lives or property of foreigners in Egypt, His Majesty will at once consult with His Britannic Majesty with a view to the adoption of the measures best calculated to solve the difficulty.

ARTICLE 5.

In view of the co-operation between the two armies as contemplated in Article 3, the Egyptian Government pledge themselves to carry out the instruction and training of the Egyptian army in accordance with the methods of the British army; should the Egyptian Government deem it necessary to have recourse to the services of foreign officers or instructors, they will choose them from among British subjects.

ARTICLE 6.

In the event of His Britannic Majesty being menaced with or engaged in war, even though such war should in no way affect the rights and interests of Egypt, His Majesty the King of Egypt undertakes to furnish to His Britannic Majesty in Egyptian territory all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes and all means of communication.

ARTICLE 7.

In order to facilitate and secure to His Britannic Majesty the protection of the lines of communication of the British Empire, and pending the conclusion at some future date of an agreement by which His Britannic Majesty entrusts His Majesty the King of Egypt with the task of ensuring this protection, His Majesty the King of Egypt authorizes His Britannic Majesty to maintain upon Egyptian territory such armed forces as His Britannic Majesty's Government consider necessary for this purpose. The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt.

APPENDIX III

After a period of ten years from the coming into force of the present treaty, the high contracting parties will reconsider, in the light of their experience of the operation of the provisions of the present treaty, the question of the localities in which the said forces are to be stationed. Should no agreement be reached on this point, the question may be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations. Should the decision of the League of Nations be adverse to the claims of the Egyptian Government, the question can, at their request and under the same conditions, be reinvestigated at intervals of five years from the date of the League's decision.

ARTICLE 8.

In view of the friendship between the two countries and of the alliance established by this treaty, the Egyptian Government when engaging the services of foreign officials will as a rule give preference to British subjects.

Nationals of other Powers will only be engaged if no British subjects possessing the necessary qualifications and fulfilling the requisite conditions are available.

ARTICLE 9.

His Britannic Majesty undertakes to use all his influence with the Powers possessing capitulatory rights in Egypt to obtain the modification of the capitulatory régime now existing in Egypt so as to make it conform more closely with the spirit of the times and with the present state of Egypt.

ARTICLE 10.

His Britannic Majesty will use his good offices for the admission of Egypt to the League of Nations, and will support the request which Egypt will present to this effect. Egypt for her part declares herself ready to accept the conditions prescribed for admission to the League.

ARTICLE 11.

In view of the special relations created between the high contracting parties by the alliance, His Britannic Majesty will be represented at the Court of His Majesty the King of Egypt by an Ambassador, duly accredited, to whom His Majesty the King of Egypt will grant precedence over all other foreign representatives.

ARTICLE 12.

Nothing in the present treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve or may devolve upon either of the high contracting parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

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ARTICLE 13.

The arrangements for carrying certain provisions of the present treaty into effect form the annex hereto, which shall have the same validity and duration as the treaty.

ARTICLE 14.

The high contracting parties, although convinced that by reason of the precise definitions laid down above as to the nature of the relations between the two countries no misunderstanding is to be anticipated between them, agree, nevertheless, in their anxiety to maintain their good relations, that any disagreement on the subject of the application or of the interpretation of these provisions which they are unable to settle by direct negotiation shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged at as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Cairo, in duplicate, the day of .

ANNEX.

I

(a) In default of previous agreement between the high contracting parties to the contrary, British personnel on the existing scale shall be maintained in the Egyptian army with their present functions and on the conditions of the existing contracts during the period of ten years provided for in Article 7 of the treaty.

(b) The Egyptian Government will not cause the personnel of the Egyptian army to be trained abroad elsewhere than in Great Britain. The Government of His Britannic Majesty for their part undertake to receive any mission which the Egyptian Government may send to Great Britain for this purpose.

(c) The armament employed by the Egyptian army shall not differ in type from that of the British army. His Britannic Majesty's Government undertake to use their good offices, whenever so desired by the Egyptian Government, to facilitate its supply from Great Britain.

(d) The privileges and immunities at present enjoyed by the British forces in Egypt shall continue. The Egyptian Government will continue to place at the disposal of the said forces, free of charge, the land and buildings at present occupied by them until such time as an alteration is made, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 7 of the treaty, in the localities in which the said forces are stationed. When any such alteration is made, the land and buildings vacated shall revert to the Egyptian Government, who

APPENDIX III

will provide, free of charge, in the localities to which the forces are transferred, equivalent accommodation to that provided by the land and buildings vacated.

(c) Unless the high contracting parties shall previously have agreed to the contrary, the Egyptian Government will prohibit the passage of aircraft over the territory situated on either side of the Suez Canal, and within 20 kilom. of it. This prohibition will not, however, apply to the forces of the high contracting parties or to services already established under existing agreements.

II

(a) The Egyptian Government, in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government, will appoint a financial adviser. When it shall be so desired, the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt shall be conferred upon him. He will be kept informed of all legislative proposals of such a nature that, to be applicable to foreigners, they would require in present circumstances the consent of the capitulatory Powers. He shall be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters in regard to which they may wish to consult him.

(b) Having regard to future changes in the judicial organization as envisaged in Article 9 of the treaty, the Egyptian Government will name, in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government, a judicial adviser. He shall be kept informed of all matters concerning the administration of justice in which foreigners are concerned, and will be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters in regard to which they may wish to consult him.

(c) Until the coming into force, as the result of agreements between Egypt and the Powers concerned, of the reform of the capitulatory system contemplated in Article 9 of the treaty, the Egyptian Government will not modify, except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government, the number, status and functions of the British officials engaged at the moment in the public security and police services.

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