

War Problems

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# THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY

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# THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY

AN INTERIM REPORT  
BY A CHATHAM HOUSE STUDY GROUP

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## FOREWORD

THE Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs some time ago invited a number of qualified people, representing a balanced variety of experience and outlook, to form a Study Group on questions connected with the treatment of Germany after the war. The Report of the Group is here published. It does not purport to say the final word on these vast subjects, for there can be no finality, not even when the pattern of victory grows far clearer than it is to-day. If it serves to stimulate and assist practical thinking, to dispel illusory ideas, to lay bare the crucial questions, and to indicate what kinds of results must be expected to flow from particular kinds of action, the labours of the Group will stand justified.

The Council hopes before long to publish separate studies on economic problems affecting the post-war world and the future of Europe. That is why no detailed examination of economic issues is contained in this Report. Neither has the Group been misled by the nature of its subject into imagining that the treatment of Germany will be the sole major political problem after victory. One of its conclusions, indeed, is that the German problem cannot be wholly or lastingly solved in entire isolation from wider matters of international policy.

No summary of a Report such as this can do justice to its argument. Briefly, it proceeds by analysing the two extreme hypotheses of total permanent domination over the whole of German life, and total co-operation with defeated Germany on a basis of equality. For reasons fully set out, both these extreme courses are rejected. A realist policy is sought, which will be both practicable and effective to prevent a renewal of German aggression, and will have good likelihood of commending itself to the British people, on whom no small part of the responsibilities of persisting in it will fall.

The relative power factors affecting Britain and Germany in years to come are listed and assessed. Questions of Germany's future frontiers are surveyed, and endeavour is made to bring out general principles on which they may need to be answered if hopes of security and prolonged peace are to be fulfilled. But it is recognized that no particular case will be determinable according to simple general principles; each will be affected by complex factors special to itself. The merits of different attitudes which might be adopted towards the continued political unity or the internal frag-

mentation of the German Reich are weighed, as are the possibility and the wisdom of essaying to influence its future form of government, and the civil or political rights which might be secured to the people of Germany. It is at this point especially that the German problem is seen to be bound up with wider questions of European order.

A clear risk of conflict is detected between the economic and the disarmament clauses of the Atlantic Charter, as soon as their practical application comes to be envisaged; a dilemma between prosperity and security might present itself. The risk may be diminished if methods of disarmament are properly thought out, but there will be need of constant Allied firmness if the disarmament of Germany is to be maintained through periods when relaxation of disarmament will certainly be demanded, not from within Germany only, in the name of European prosperity. The main lesson which the Report draws from examining the history of disarmament after the last war is that technical difficulties in preventing Germany from re-arming are not insuperable; the real danger-point is a weakening of the Allied will to prevent it. In the considered opinion of the Group, prevention of re-armament is the only measure of coercion against Germany on which Britain should insist unconditionally.

But there is a challenge of ideas to be met, as well as a challenge of arms. Ultimate security cannot be attained, until a co-operative mentality, truly and not in mere appearance, has developed, not only in the German individual but in the German State. The final chapter of the Report searchingly inquires into the chances of this, and into the part (if any) which British policy and conduct may play in furthering and securing it. There are objectives open to Britain and the other victorious nations to pursue, which may and can serve to bring before the German people a better answer than any that Nazi ideas can offer to the gripping problems of the modern world. We can take the Four Freedoms as the clearest and finest goal of common action, pointing a way towards the hope of practical co-operation between nations. Yet we must never forget that security must underlie all.

The Institute is an unofficial and non-political body, precluded by its Charter from expressing a point of view on any aspect of international affairs. Responsibility for opinions expressed in the Report rests solely with the members of the Group invited by the Council of the Institute to conduct this particular study.

I am glad to take this opportunity of thanking on behalf of the Council the members of the Group for giving so much of their time to the preparation of this report.

ASTOR  
*Chairman of the Council.*

Chatham House,  
10 St James's Square,  
London, S.W.1.

*May, 1943.*

## I. OUTLINES

**T**HIS is a study, undertaken from the point of view of the security of Great Britain, of what we believe are likely to be the main problems affecting Anglo-German relations after Germany's defeat. We have tried to select those issues the crucial character of which will be least affected by the passage of time, rather than those (such as the punishment of guilty persons and the reparation of war damage, or immediate problems of order and reconstruction) which belong more especially to the clearing-up process. The steps taken and the attitudes adopted during that process will indeed have a most important bearing on the sequel, but should themselves be directed by longer views.

An unofficial inquiry such as the present cannot dogmatically recommend particular solutions, but it can help to uncover the practical implications of various possible alternatives. Our method is to examine each question from both of the standpoints which are, as it were, the poles around which all discussion in Britain of post-war Anglo-German relations turns—the policy of force, and the policy of non-force or co-operation. Naturally, actual decisions on policy will be taken not according to the requirements of one selected principle of action, but in the light of the whole concrete situation as it will be when the need for each decision arises. Thus, of the principles which we have chosen as the two best vantage grounds from which to survey the field, the actual policy towards Germany will almost certainly rely on the one in some cases, on the other in others; the practical problem will be to decide which is the more appropriate in a given case. To some extent, though without precision of detail, this decision has already been taken, in the declaration of principles known as the Atlantic Charter, and in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of May 26, 1942.

### THE GERMAN PROBLEM IN ITS WORLD SETTING

The question of Anglo-German relations can be considered in isolation only if the provisional character of this procedure is fully realized. German aggression has threatened other Powers than Britain, and Britain has found herself threatened, though less immediately, by the aggression of other Powers than Germany. After the defeat of the Axis, the eyes of China, of the United States, of the greater part of the British Commonwealth, and perhaps even of Russia, will be turned towards Japan at least as much as towards Germany. With the



extension of the effects of aggression the circle of those who will claim a voice in the settlement also extends, and the Rio de Janeiro Conference of January, 1942, by imposing on Latin-American countries the duty of defining their position in the conflict, removed the last possibility that any important group of states could fail to be directly interested. The policy to be adopted towards Germany will, therefore, owing to the circumstances of the war itself, be of general concern, and will be worked out jointly with the Dominions, the principal Allies, and the other United Nations. However, Britain's own policy towards Germany will be an essential thread in the skein, and provided we remember that it is but one thread, to follow it up should in our view be a useful contribution, both in itself and as a way of approaching wider questions of international order.

Recognition of the truth that the security of Britain is bound up with that of other countries is no guarantee that a sufficiently broad basis of security will in fact be provided. So far as military support is involved states have hitherto concerned themselves but reluctantly with the security of other states, even on a close calculation of interest. In the inter-war period it proved impossible to build up a defensive situation on the basis of common resistance to aggression, in spite of formal commitments both general and particular. In the present war, apart from the intervention of the British Commonwealth and France on behalf of Poland, and by the Dutch East Indies and Central American countries after Pearl Harbour, no state made common military cause with a victim of aggression until itself attacked. At a time when strategic and technical factors render a neutral position ever more precarious, the determination to remain neutral or non-belligerent as long as possible has actuated the policy of great and small Powers alike, and even one of the major belligerents, France, withdrew from the fight. It is hoped that the time is coming when France can and will be fully in the fight again, but the mere fact of this withdrawal by the former leader of European politics is significant. On the one hand, therefore, states have been unwilling to increase their immediate risks by collective action; on the other, experience seems to show that security is not to be won in a cramped and passive attitude of isolated self-defence. A country which aims merely at national security, in the narrow sense, is likely to fail of its object. It must aim at this, it is true, but it is more likely to attain its purpose by reaching forward also to wider objectives.

It may be suggested that changes in the political structure of Europe, or in its social systems and ruling ideas, would allow us to by-pass the present inquiry. Though nationality may, in time, lose something of its sovereign significance, there are no signs at present that Britain and Germany will cease to be independent states, or be fitted into a federal system. Even if there were to be federation, the American Civil War is a reminder that federation is not necessarily a guarantee of peace. It has often been stressed that we are in the midst of a revolution, and that revolutions cut across the vertical divisions of nationality by horizontal alignments of common class interests, or sympathies of ideas. We do not know what the impact of such a situation on Anglo-German relations is likely to be in the long run, but hitherto it has merely accentuated the conflict, as the religious revolution of the sixteenth century accentuated our conflict with Spain, and the political revolution of the eighteenth century our conflict with France. The essential point is that Britain and Germany are tough power structures. Only on the assumption, which nothing authorizes us to make, that their fundamental purposes will in future necessarily be harmonious, can the problem of their relations be relegated to the background.

Can we, for the moment leaving on one side all questions of moral and political consistency, nevertheless foresee some position of Britain's affairs which would enable her virtually to ignore Germany's continental ambitions?<sup>1</sup> Might we, for instance, look forward to a mutual reinforcement of British and American sea and air power—should we add land power also?—so massive and unconditional as to permit us to observe the European scene with the same security of mind as we enjoyed in the nineteenth century? In great affairs, policy cannot be based on a mere possibility, however attractive it may seem to many. Incidentally, the reliance by Britain on American aid may cause some to ask whether this whole problem should not be regarded as fundamentally German-American rather than Anglo-German. It is imperative, however, that British people should think out their own position in a matter so vital to their country's existence.

Nor is it possible to base policy on the assumption that Russia, however important her part in the defeat of Germany, will be willing or, until her industrial development has proceeded further, able to act as a complete counterweight to German aggressive

\* <sup>1</sup> The case for is argued by T124 in *Sea Power* (Cape, 1941); the case against by E. H. Carr in *Conditions of Peace* (Macmillan, 1942).

designs. The Anglo-Russian Treaty officially confirms this view. In these circumstances Britain cannot rely on the existence of an equilibrium of continental forces of a kind which would enable her to maintain an attitude of comparative detachment. Still more precarious would be an equilibrium resting on a combination of a liberated France with Germany's other European neighbours against Germany. Quite apart from the insufficiency of the industrial basis for such a combination, the clear lesson of recent events is that France must not again be counted upon, without massive aid on land from the very beginning, to take the first shock of a German westwards drive. It is, of course, possible that in time there will be not only recovery in France but such rapid progress in Europe's politically and socially depressed areas as to render them a less easy prey to German exploitation and intrigue; but only if Britain is amongst those who aid the process. It is the intuition of this possibility which lends force to Hitler's appeals for the "expulsion of Britain from Europe."

If, therefore, force is again required to restrain German aggressiveness, it will be for Britain to help in supplying it, and to pay the price in material and moral effort which the use of force will exact. If, on the other hand, we were to rely on trust and co-operation, Britain must, with the others, accept the risks of failure. We may, of course, discover that owing to events independent of our will the cycle of German aggressiveness is closed—as might be the case if the strain of the two world wars were to lead to a failure of German vital energies, or if the Germans themselves were unmistakably to shatter the frame, and renounce the doctrines, of militaristic statecraft. But emphatically we cannot build on these uncertainties.

While the war is in progress and German power bears down upon us, there is little likelihood of minimizing the dangers which it carries for the future. But for some time after Germany's defeat it will be easy to forget that the momentary power ratio between Germany and ourselves does not express the permanent facts. We shall become increasingly aware of preoccupations of internal policy, as well as of other tensions which will at that moment seem to concern our security more nearly than the possibility of renewed German aggression. Public opinion on Germany is likely to be bounded by two extremes: those who would have a settlement in which passion replaces calculation, and those who, having failed to realize what the German attempt to dominate Europe really meant, allow themselves to be persuaded by reasons of self-interest

or of intellectual fashion to deny the existence of a German problem.

The danger, however, will remain that Germany may again unloose a cataract of evil upon the world. However complete may be her military defeat, and however completely that defeat may be demonstrated,<sup>1</sup> there will almost certainly survive in Germany: (a) a nucleus determined to re-create, openly if free to do so, but otherwise secretly, Germany's military power; (b) a population still susceptible to war enthusiasm in spite of disillusionment, loving military action and display, discipline and comradeship, and deriving much of their sense of personal significance from their service with what they will continue to regard as the greatest of armies. Part at least of that population, even if for a while it revolts against the purely military view of life, will probably retain its arrogant persuasion of German racial superiority and perhaps much of its reverence for Hitler, and will be liable, in certain conditions, again to be shaped by the war party to its own design. If precedent is followed, the psychological preparation will begin immediately, and will consist in keeping the masses indoctrinated with the various beliefs<sup>2</sup> required to resist any tendencies to build international life on a co-operative basis. Above all, it will be necessary to show by the appropriate myths that the German army was not, in spite of all appearances, defeated in the war. Economic and military preparations belong to a later stage. We must be prepared to find that even after defeat the Second World War will appear to the German war party to have been on balance a favourable operation. What will be remembered will be not so much the actual defeat as the nearness to victory, leaving as ultimate result: (a) the conviction that for the future all continental European countries west of Russia may be eliminated as serious deterrent factors; (b) the hope that Russia may be neutralized; (c) the hope that Britain will have no more heart to resist a third attempt than France the second; (d) the hope that the United States may be so worked upon as to meet a third attempt unprepared. This all-embracing will to mastery, and the latent responsiveness of the German people, are the heart of the matter.

<sup>1</sup> "(Les allemands) avaient vu les soldats de Napoléon passer sous la porte de Brandebourg, et chacun sait qu'à Leipzig ils l'avaient oublié!" Clemenceau, *Grandeurs et Misères d'une Victoire*, p. 98 (Paris, 1930).

<sup>2</sup> "The leaders of the German people saw to it that the necessity for and inevitability of war as the outcome of an immutable natural law should become an axiom of faith among the German people." E. Muller-Sturmheim: article on "The Spiritual Problem of Germany," *The Fortnightly*, March 1941.

This preface calls for two final observations. First, our provisional concentration on the German problem carries with it the risk, which must be guarded against, of forgetting not only the threat represented by other aggressors, but also the claims and interests of allies and neutrals. A special concern with Germany, even if to begin with it is of a defensive nature, could in time become a preferential concern, as happened to some extent in the inter-war period. Next to success, nothing would suit dreamers of pan-German dreams better than that the thoughts of other countries should be held to Germany as to a magnet. It is, therefore, essential that those whose duty it is to consider the protection of their country from German designs should feel their real objective to be that there may be secure, lawful, and decent living throughout Europe and beyond. Secondly, a study which examines a number of theoretically possible solutions may seem to imply that the freedom of choice for those who make policy is greater than it will actually be. Even after victory the situation will not be wholly plastic; but it will be more plastic than at any other time.

#### OLD AND NEW ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM

We have set forth in Appendix I what seem to us the chief assumptions responsibly made, including some made by Germans, regarding the causes of Germany's renewed resort to war. Political action is not likely to be based on the clear and general acceptance of any set of assumptions as valid, and we do not even make such a choice in this study. There is a measure of truth in several of them. We think it a first step to clear thinking to bring these assumptions to the surface, so that those discussing a remedy may at least know what the various diagnoses are. A policy which relied entirely on force would probably be found to rest on the assumption that Germans are for all practical purposes incorrigible: a policy of pure non-discrimination on the assumption that they do not differ in any important aspect from other nations. While we discuss assumptions regarding Germany, the question at once arises: "What of Britain?" Are we amongst those that are whole, and need not a physician? What Britain is to do to herself may be a more pressing subject than what she is to do to Germany, but it is not the theme of this study. The method of treating Anglo-German relations provisionally as a problem in itself has at least the advantage that it forces us to inquire concerning any proposed solution, not only whether we and our friends should like it, but also whether we for

our part should be prepared to pay the price. There is hardly any policy worthy of the name, especially any implying the use of force, but will require a high degree of unity, determination, perseverance and strength.<sup>1</sup>

Many books have been written explaining the historical developments and the teachings which have fostered aggressiveness in the German people. It is the phenomenon of the "soft"<sup>2</sup> Germany, ready to support its leaders in their aggressive designs, which is the more interesting; the leaders themselves—the "hard" Germany—are a ruling group not essentially dissimilar from ambitious groups to be found in several other countries, whose actions can be explained by plain love of power rather than by any special characteristics or conditioning. We shall not attempt to traverse the ground covered by these writings; but it may clear our vision if for a moment we look at the general background with the eyes of the last generation. The first of the following extracts was written in 1910, the second in 1916:

"... from the moment of the breach with free trade in 1879 ... the alienation of the German mind from all English sympathies was complete."<sup>3</sup>

"... It is, surely, evident that Germany is now so formidable a foe, and one that so profoundly requires defeating, not directly because a false doctrine peculiar to herself possesses her, her devotion to this conviction being just what the Allies would give to any conviction of theirs; but because a spirit of sheer money-making and boundless commercialism, which more or less dominates and vulgarizes us all, and which we ourselves rather than they began, has, in the German, found a lodging within an incredibly vehement and concentrated, systematic and visionary soul."<sup>4</sup>

These quotations reflect the outlook of an age predominantly commercial in its interests. But the commercial system of the time

<sup>1</sup> A general objective for national policy is given by Sargeant and West in *Grand Strategy*, p. 157 (Cape, 1942): "the turning of national energy to sustaining such a high pitch of efficiency, and therefore of both actual capacity for the arts of peace and of potential capacity for the most modern form of war, that few would wish, and none readily dare, to risk the military challenge." An attempt to analyse the elements of power is made in the next chapter.

<sup>2</sup> F. W. Foerster: *Europe and the German Question*, p. 334 (Allen and Unwin, 1941).

<sup>3</sup> Quoted by Philip Kerr, afterwards Marquess of Lothian; article on "Anglo German Rivalry," *The Round Table*, November 1910.

<sup>4</sup> F. von Hügel: article on "The German Soul and the Great War," *The Quest*, January 1916.

did not generally favour the concentration of power within the hands of the State. How modern technical conditions favour this concentration, with consequences scarcely imaginable to the last generation, is illustrated by the following quotation from a contemporary writer:

"The whole structure of modern society is governed by the fact that new technical inventions (such as aeroplanes, bombs, railways, the telephone and wireless) and the large-scale organization of industry, finance, administration, education and other means of influencing public opinion have created key positions which make it possible for those who hold them to dominate society. This offers a strong temptation to the ambitious to seize these centres of power and, when they have embarked on this course, they are driven on to gather into their hands all remaining positions of control. Even those who are naturally averse to such a course may be forced into it by the fear that their opponents may act first."<sup>1</sup>

It seems to be the part of Germany to reflect with special clearness and on a magnified scale certain features of contemporary society as a whole. Thus Germany has mirrored in herself what, for a time at least, appeared to be all Europe's failing concern for freedom; the subordination of economic to political purposes; and the growing centralization of power which science facilitates. One observer<sup>2</sup> describes a condition in which a "rage of technics" has taken possession of the younger and stronger elements in Germany, to whom, thanks to the new means, nothing seems impossible.<sup>3</sup> If divorced from any humane purpose, this rage can have no issue except in destruction on the one hand or tyranny on the other. As it necessarily communicates itself to the like-minded in other countries, it throws into vivid relief the urgency of thinking out the ends for which modern organization and technique are to be used. This issue is directly raised in the appeal of President

<sup>1</sup> K. Mannheim, in *The Christian News-Letter*, May 27, 1942.

<sup>2</sup> H. Rauschning: *Makers of Destruction*, p. 68 (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1942).

<sup>3</sup> *cf.*, also, this passage: "From the origins of its greatness Prussia has been imbued with the conviction that, given sufficient effort and pressure, sufficient 'Prussian efficiency,' anything can be made out of everything, that the human material can be formed, and transformed, *ad libitum*. It was a natural viewpoint for a power wholly founded upon a *tour de force*, hence contemptuous of traditions, and adoring efficiency as its God. The Nazi idea of creating an entirely new human type by terrorism, propaganda, transplantation of populations, wiping out of the recalcitrant, is in the line of this Prussian tradition, the most Prussian feature of this otherwise so profoundly un-Prussian Nazi movement."

Franz Borkenau: article on "The Myth of Prussia," *Political Quarterly*, April-June, 1942.

Roosevelt to the whole world to acknowledge the Four Freedoms as valid objects of policy. It is significant that Hitler claimed to speak for the German people in rejecting the President's "new and detestable alien world."<sup>1</sup>

More fundamental than differences of political purpose are differences of belief concerning the actual nature of things. Much instability of judgement in regard to the German situation is due to misunderstanding in this sphere. We shall attempt in a later chapter to disentangle some of these differences, and will not at this stage offer any assessment of their political influence. There is, however, one which seems to us to be of cardinal importance in practice. It appears to be fixed in the mind of most Germans, both of the ruling élite and of the masses, that power inevitably asserts itself to the uttermost: that those who possess a giant's strength cannot but use it as a giant. People brought up in the western tradition no less firmly believe, or unconsciously assume, that the exercise of power can and should be limited by respect for the rights of others, however weak, and that growth and development can and do take place on this basis. Obviously, it is a matter in which self-deception is easy, and if we were to give as concrete examples the omission of Britain and the United States to force Eire and various Latin-American States into the war, the Germans would show to their own satisfaction that both omissions were tactical. Yet would Germany, in a similar position, have accepted the strategic disabilities which this respect for the position of militarily weak neighbours has entailed?

The fact that modern techniques permit an extension of the administrative area beyond anything that was possible before, the assumption that those who hold power must exploit its full possibilities, and, lastly, the conviction of being a *Herrenvolk*, converge to produce in the German mind those grandiose schemes for the unification of Europe and beyond against which the world is now reacting. On a German view such reaction is vain, a mere kicking against the pricks; even if it might for a time succeed, on this view no result could follow except the establishment of the hegemony of some other Great Power—Russia or the United States. It is very certain that Europe is not going to accept unification through the German will to power. But it is possible for peoples to reject German claims while sharing in some degree the general outlook which they reflect, and we have been reminded that several Euro-

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in *The Times*, March 16, 1942.



pean countries "have derived their thought on social and political matters largely from German sources."<sup>1</sup> The ideal of co-operation proclaimed by the United Nations as the basis of their common dealings may fail to attract, unless it clearly carries with it an organizing principle sufficiently energetic to meet the real needs of the new European situation.

(a) WHOLLY COERCIVE, (b) WHOLLY CO-OPERATIVE POLICIES

The Atlantic Charter has already afforded a general answer to the questions with which we are concerned. We are there given one main objective (disarmament of aggressors) which depends entirely on force—as also does the fulfilment of the Anglo-Russian Treaty—and various social objectives which are to be sought through co-operation. However, what is important in regard to these and similar aims, such as the Four Freedoms, is not so much the quality of the aims themselves as the power and intention to give effect to them. Great aims—"international co-operation," "international peace and security," "social justice"—were written into the last Peace Treaties, and no mean exertions were made to fulfil them. The fact that similar aims have been put forward twice within a single generation implies confidence that they are intrinsically realizable. It is assumed that it is in fact possible for a group of nations to disarm and keep disarmed another group of nations over an indefinite period, and also that it is both possible and desirable for every one to have more butter on his bread. It seems to us clear that there is no technical obstacle to the realization of these purposes as declared by the leaders of the United Nations. The open question is whether their own and other peoples will endorse them, to the point of action.<sup>2</sup> The failure to realize similar aims in the past has usually been ascribed to a lack of will and of goodwill in the peoples, and especially the Governments, concerned. There is much justice in these charges. But the failure is also due to the fact that the aims themselves can get in each other's way. This possibility is very obviously latent in the Atlantic Charter. That document is certainly not condemned thereby. But the whole policy will be frustrated unless we consider in time where the

<sup>1</sup> F. A. Hayek: article on "Knowledge of Germany," *The Spectator*, December 26, 1941.

<sup>2</sup> ". . . the generality of mankind do not acquiesce, and until their educational level has been raised, will not acquiesce in the organization of a general prosperity. Let us entertain no delusions about that." H. G. Wells: *Guide to the New World*, p. 139 (Gollancz, 1941).

collision between purposes is in danger of taking place, and which should be given right of passage.

The mixed policy of using force for some objects and co-operation for others is naturally difficult to pursue, and one tendency will always be exercising a pull on the other. The Charter foresees this, since it envisages the disarmament of aggressors as limited in time "pending the establishment of a general system of security." For an indefinite period, however, force and non-force are each to be directed towards its appropriate object. There is vast room for difference of opinion as to what is the proper sphere of each. It may therefore be useful to consider for a moment what would be implied in policies of force and of co-operation respectively, if pushed to their logical extremes without regard to the qualifications which the advocates of either policy would admit in practice.

A policy of pure force would consist not in the sum of various measures of repression, but in the conscious, continuous, and total purpose to keep the enemy in subjection. It might well entail, if this were thought necessary for the object in view, the extension of force from one field to another until everything was under its control. The German policy towards Poland affords the best modern model. The adoption of such a policy towards Germany would similarly imply an almost total denial of rights to Germany as a state, and to Germans as individuals. While perhaps avoiding spectacular measures of mass extermination, it would, on this model, aim at a progressive devitalization and reduction of the population. It would imply the detachment from Germany of all contested territories, other interests being automatically preferred to German; the enforced dismemberment of the Reich; complete destruction of the industrial and economic basis of power; destruction of its intellectual basis through the compulsory abandonment of higher education, especially scientific research; transfer of populations; maintenance of servile labour and social conditions; prohibition of emigration and even of travel, lest German military, industrial and scientific experts should acquire influence abroad.<sup>1</sup> These and many other precautions would have to be taken if security against German aggression were to be pursued irrespective of every other consideration.

<sup>1</sup> "Germany's war potential . . . includes . . . an espionage potential, the most extensive in the world, which includes all the Reich diplomatic and consular services, all its foreign commercial agencies, tourist agencies, scientific expeditions, and all its so-called German national minorities in other lands." *Polish Fortnightly Review*, April 1, 1942.

The cost of such a policy would depend largely on what allies were associated with Britain in carrying it out, but it would certainly involve the maintenance of a large permanent army of occupation; loss of trade with Germany, *ex hypothesi* impoverished; prevention by force, if necessary, of trade and other relations between other Powers and Germany; constant inquisition into every aspect of German public and private life; sacrifice of other international interests to the supreme purpose of suppressing Germany; an inflexible pertinacity of purpose, since the slightest relaxation would be fatal. It is doubtful whether such a policy could be sustained by any purely political motive, least of all by so unmasterful an impulse as defensive prudence; to succeed it would need to be the expression of a conviction that we were the *Herrenvolk* and the Germans were sub-men, i.e. our minds would need to become Nazi. For the execution of a policy so greatly opposed to the major Commonwealth tradition only the treatment of Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could produce, on a grossly inadequate scale, the lessons of direct experience.

If a policy entirely depending on force would, so far as Britain is concerned, break down because of its repugnance to the British way of seeing things, thorough-going co-operation would be a political impossibility after the German reign of terror, and would be an even greater impossibility for our continental Allies. It would imply, for Britain, that she was prepared to resume immediately with a defeated Germany, "after the destruction of Nazi tyranny," amicable relations from which all trace of unilateral control had disappeared. This policy need not, it is true, exclude measures of control applied equally to all states, including both Germany and ourselves; but it would prevent Britain, either alone or in partnership, imposing any special disability on Germany. Above all, it would place no restriction on German armaments as such. With frontiers determined according to whatever criteria might be accepted as impartial, and provided afresh with colonies (for anything less would be "inequality"), Germany, it might be argued, would have no sense of grievance; while the advantages of such a settlement, if accompanied by general guarantees in which America and Russia participated, would more than offset the risks involved in allowing Germany full freedom of action. This was the kind of picture which those who supported "co-operation" after the last war doubtless had in mind. The fact that for some time after this war a policy wholly based on co-operation is likely to be as imprac-

licable as a policy wholly based on force is not due simply to the circumstance that war passions must be allowed for. People in all lands would give much for the substance of peace. Fundamentally it is due to the demonstration that an armed Great Germany has refused to limit its ambitions; that it does not recognize that the rights and claims of others are to be balanced against its own; that the tendency to aggression is not merely one varying aspect of state policy, but belongs to the essence of the German army-state as it has developed in history.

In an age in which major decisions on foreign affairs must be known and approved by the mass of the people, simplicity in the main outlines (however intricate the technical details) is an aid to effectiveness. As we have seen, the simple "total" policies raise insuperable difficulties, whether it be total domination over the whole of German life, or total co-operation on the basis of an ideal "equality" between Great Powers. Yet if policy is to be mixed, with one sphere of action reserved for force and another for co-operation, let each so far as possible within its own sphere reign as of right and without apology. The Atlantic Charter says in effect: no Nazis and no arms, but for the rest co-operation. This implies that at the highest political level equality with Germany is not admitted, and so long as that is so no pretence of the contrary should be allowed. If below that level there is to be co-operation, it should be sincere and brought about without qualifications, delays, or pin-pricks. In considering concrete issues of Anglo-German policy, we should remember that a firm purpose in essentials, and the capacity to make it good in unforeseen circumstances, will accomplish more than the ingenious elaboration of particular safeguards.

## II. POWER RATIO

History does not justify the same assumption in respect of Anglo-German relations as governs our thought regarding Britain's relations with some other countries, that in one way or another disputes will always stop short of war. The respective power positions of the two countries therefore require to be examined. This does not mean that relations with Germany must necessarily be conceived in terms of perpetual antagonism, or that the prevention of war rather than the winning of wars when they break out should not be the first concern of British policy; British strength is relevant to both purposes. The power equation includes not only assessable material resources, but largely incalculable factors such as intelli-

gence and will, and changes in the arts of war and peace. No exact solution is therefore possible, but we believe that the factors of power which we select for examination in this chapter will continue to be important.

An essential factor of the war strength of a state is its access to the resources of others. In preparing or waging her various expansionist wars, Germany has been able to subject to her control large areas of "collaboration." Britain, on the other hand, largely depends on her "*alliance potential*." In none of her continental wars has her sole strength sufficed to overcome a major enemy. The final defeat has always been delivered by a coalition in which allies took an important and usually a major share in land operations. Britain, though always contributing to these—in the Four Years' War massively and, at the end, decisively—has above all provided the naval power, the sinews of war, the diplomatic initiative, and an endurance born of an inflexible hatred of tyranny. Thanks to this capacity of making common cause with other states, travestied in the charge that she does not fight her own battles, Britain has constantly within the course of some hundreds of years found herself in the victor's camp over against an enemy intrinsically stronger than herself. To analyse fully the causes of the high "*alliance potential*" hitherto enjoyed by Britain would lead us too far. But basic conditions have indisputably been, first, that the British cause has seemed to others in the main good; second, that her own material and moral strength has been felt to be considerable.<sup>1</sup>

Having allowed for this uncertain factor of "*alliance potential*," we shall rapidly survey the intrinsic power positions of Germany and Britain. The German territorial problem is discussed below; for the purposes of the present comparison we shall not assume in advance great territorial reductions of pre-Nazi Germany, but shall think of a Reich keeping more or less its Versailles frontiers. The other unit is the United Kingdom, except when otherwise stated. The resources of the dependent Empire are at the disposal of the United Kingdom only with qualifications, especially in

<sup>1</sup> One who is not a British subject by birth has made this comment: "I have felt that what much of Europe and the world, and indeed Britain herself, *fundamentally* regard as the basis of British power, prestige, and victories is an amalgam of the Navy and *moral* superiority, or even supremacy. Current party propaganda, both national and international, modesty, an almost masochistic caution in view of the dangers of wishful thinking, all contribute, with many other factors, towards the tendency to ignore or play down this element in past and present alliances for victories, which will probably be still more crucial in future ones."

respect of man-power; the resources of all parts of the Empire which enjoy self-government are rightly regarded as belonging to the "alliance potential."

At the beginning of the war there was a tendency to underestimate the importance of the *population* factor. Numbers have, it is true, lost something of their importance, in the sense that a few mechanized divisions can overrun a country trusting its defence to older arms or to mechanized arms of inferior quality. But the clash of two armies both highly mechanized can, as we see from the Russo-German campaigns, produce losses on the scale of the Four Years' War. The increasing ruthlessness of war, manifested in a scorched earth policy which almost certainly prepares a harvest of death through famine and disease, also places a premium on numbers. It is, however, above all in respect of industrial production needed to feed the war machine, and of agricultural production needed to feed the workers, that advantage in size of population and especially in the proportion of young to old age groups is, given equal quality, decisive.

Consciousness of an increasing population tends to create confidence and boldness, such as has been evident in Russia's bearing under enormous losses; consciousness of a stabilized or declining population, doubt of the future and unwillingness to take risks. This, of course, is not the sole factor of war-willingness, as the relative achievements of Germany and Italy demonstrate, Italy having the larger rate of increase; but it is clearly important. Hitler's claim that the *Blitzkrieg* was sparing of German lives shows that even a German commander cannot risk the reputation of throwing life away; but his professed willingness to sacrifice two million men for an historic objective, and the plain facts of the Russian campaigns attest, whatever their moral hideousness, a will to win notably lacking in the humane boast of the French High Command that it was "*avare du sang français.*" That such a boast could be regarded as ground for confidence illustrates the tragic position of a belligerent threatened by a declining population. The conclusion seems to be twofold. First, though population pressure in Germany is not the cause of the present war, an increasing population will aggravate her existing predisposition to aggression, whereas a stable or decreasing population may tend to induce in the Germans a defensive mentality, similar to that of France. Second, a continuance of the present demographic trends in Britain would reinforce any elements which might, in the event of renewed Ger-

man aggression, counsel a hesitant attitude, while a reversal of the trend would remove an impediment to the exercise of freedom of decision, and to the acceptance of risks deemed justifiable on other grounds.

The unchanging data of geography, and the changing data of invention, give new bearings on our respective *strategic positions*. Disputes heard early in the war concerning the relative advantages in combat of ship and aeroplane already seem somewhat out of date. To be war-worthy a country dependent on sea-borne supplies must possess an adequate air force as well as an adequate navy. It has been argued<sup>1</sup> that with these two arms Britain might once more enjoy that favoured position in which for so long she could permit herself freedom of action on nearly all seas, and freedom of inaction on the Continent. In our view, the possession by a revived and hostile Germany of enormous air power would be a condition from which no possible development of our own sea and air power could remove the sting. We are not to be taken as agreeing that the vision seen by the German geo-politicians of the united power of Asia, Europe and Africa, bursting the bonds of encircling sea power, necessarily discloses the future. To believe this is to surrender to political fatalism. What matters for our purpose is that whereas the development of aviation and of mechanized land warfare conferred on Germany in her central position advantages which she has been quick to exploit, they render any attempt by Britain to isolate herself from the Continent even more precarious than before.

Because of the large areas needed for training in the use of aircraft and mechanized land weapons, Britain's restricted space needs to be compensated by association with friendly neighbouring countries possessing areas of that kind, such as Canada and the United States. Conversely, the United States may be expected to recognize as a major strategic interest that a country occupying Britain's key position on the Atlantic air routes should not be in danger of occupation by an unfriendly Power.

At sea, apart from the new techniques of aero-naval and submarine warfare, the most interesting development is the greatly increased use of the northern routes which the necessities of the war have imposed. Given the probability that Russia is entering upon a phase of exceptional demographic and industrial expansion, that development, taken together with improvements in air communications, may be of great importance for the future. In this respect also

<sup>1</sup> e.g., by T124 in *Sea Power* (Cape, 1941).

Britain occupies a key position. On the technical plane, the use made by the Soviet Government of more and more powerful ice-breakers is noteworthy.<sup>1</sup>

The increasing mechanization of warfare has accelerated the dependence of the war machine on *industry*.<sup>2</sup> In modern conditions no Power can rank as fully war-worthy unless it possesses or can command the use of abundant supplies of the necessary raw materials, as well as the capital equipment and the industrial skill necessary to produce on the required scale an always increasing range of machines of the greatest complexity and precision. The power of the great industrial state is superior to that of the others, not only in degree, but in dimension. No combination of states which does not include a great industrial Power can expect, therefore, to maintain for long a successful resistance.

The *raw material* basis of industry is in constant evolution, as the use of the lighter metals, new alloys and plastics for war purposes increases. However, the chief advantage remains with the Powers which have a large and adaptable engineering industry, based on the control of developed coal and iron resources. The further use of chemical warfare, and indeed the introduction of bacteriological warfare, would merely require ever greater refinement of industrial and scientific processes, without probably reducing the importance of heavy machines, missiles and explosives. The raw material position of neither Britain nor Germany is in itself particularly favourable, except for coal and iron. Since, however, all means must be used to obtain supplies, the internal position is no true measure of the resources which either country may ultimately command.

In regard to the second basic factor of industry—*industrial skill*—both Britain and Germany are well endowed with resources of their own. It is a tragic commonplace that the Germans' power of destruction derives largely from their perversion of this excellent capacity. The trend of modern warfare places an ever-increasing premium on skill, because of its demand for a great output of the highest possible forms of industrial products. Technical advance is likely to continue, and the advantage conferred by high-quality production to become intensified. Moreover, as the pace of research

<sup>1</sup> "Russian Communications in the Arctic Region," *Bulletin of International News*, October 18, 1941. "The Strategic Importance of the North Pacific Area," *Bulletin of International News*, May 2, 1942.

<sup>2</sup> Data regarding some principal factors of economic and industrial strength in Britain and Germany are set out in Appendix II.



increases, so does the need of high-class research apparatus, and the people who are ahead in the race go farther ahead.

The characteristic of Germany's recent and not so recent *economic and financial* policy has been the ruthless exploitation in her own interests, without regard to the interests of others, of every advantage which she possessed; the whole purpose of the policy was manifestly the increase of war strength. A corresponding increase of war strength was, of course, impossible under the comparatively free British economy. On the other hand, the all-important aid given to Britain by the United States is perhaps due in an appreciable degree to the similarity of their economic systems.

In all departments of life, the Germans show a passion for *organization*. The planning of Germany's various acts of aggression has always been a masterly intellectual achievement. The Germans have even, at least in the military sphere, organized against the dangers of organization; commanders of all ranks are to-day encouraged to improvise within the limits of the general plan. However, it cannot be said that the Germans possess, like the British and perhaps even more the French, a natural gift for improvisation. The capacity and zeal for organization, and the experience gained in planning on a continental scale, are an asset to the Germans in an age in which, owing to the opportunities offered by new techniques, large-scale organization is bound to play a big part. The British have no reason to lack confidence in their own power of organization, which is considerable, once the original distaste is overcome.<sup>1</sup>

War capacity depends increasingly on *scientific research and invention*, both for industry and for armaments. The discouragement

<sup>1</sup> A commentator comparing Britain and Germany has written: "What are the factors which make German 'organization' so successful? Its success would not seem to arise from any special imaginative gift denied to the British or Latin races. It is due, so far as the design is concerned, to a rational and exhaustive pre-study of the problem and to 'an infinite capacity for taking pains' in planning the details; and as regards execution, it depends on a chain of rigidly enforced obedience to authority right down the scale, and the subordination of the individual mind and will to the general purpose. Moreover, the rigidity which formerly characterized German methods has in many directions given place to considerable adaptability.

"The innate individualism of the British character is not ideally suited to or attracted by scientific organization although as our (often tardy) improvisations in emergency show, the capacity is there. Where we fail and are more improvident is in taking sufficient pains in studying and preparing the organization before the emergency arises, and in maintaining its efficiency after it has passed; rather than persist we are apt to 'weary in well-doing.' When we do seriously set out to 'organize', as in some of our big industrial concerns, experience shows our capacity to be considerable; but too often we allow our excessive respect for vested interests to interfere. Let us face the fact that love of method is not one of our strongest national characteristics."

of the disinterested search for scientific truth should in the long run lower scientific standards in Germany unless (for which there is no evidence) there is strong resistance by scientists to official control. However, any such deterioration has hitherto been offset by the generous assistance which the state lends to scientific research and invention for power-political purposes. Industry also promotes research with peculiar vigour.<sup>1</sup> The Germans for a long time led not only in the exploitation of the results of scientific discovery for the purposes of war, but in advancing science in general. Of the Nobel science awards given since their institution in 1900, considerably more have gone to Germans than to either British, French, or American scientists. The rate of reception of awards has recently been about the same in Germany, Britain, and America.<sup>2</sup>

These various material and intellectual resources are unavailing unless the will to use them be present. Of this will there has been no lack in Germany, which has thrown up a great wealth of *military leadership*, apparent in the efficiency of the n.c.o.s and regimental officers, the skilled planning and direction of the general officers and staff, and the powerful strategy of a Frederick, a Bismarck, and a Hitler. Two of these three war-lords were not professional soldiers, and Bismarck showed himself capable of calling a temporary halt to warlike ambitions. Nevertheless we use the word "strategy," instead of "policy," which might seem to be more apposite, because it is of the essence of politics that fundamental purposes should be under discussion, whereas for these three leaders conquest was in truth the supreme end. The question "for what purpose" had already been answered; only the question "how" remained.

The call of war leaders of genius has not failed to awaken an

<sup>1</sup> "Perhaps more important than this state-supported science was the practice, which was beginning in Germany before the depression, of linking science with heavy industry in a way that seemed to rival the place of the universities in its development. The prototype of these links were the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft institutes in Berlin and elsewhere. These, though founded before the War by an association of business men, showed from the outset a broad grasp of the need of industry for science. They were devoted to fundamental researches and not tied to the narrow industrial ends as has been the tendency with Research Associations in England." J. D. Bernal: *The Social Function of Science*, p. 200 (Routledge, 1939).

<sup>2</sup> J. G. Crowther: Speech reported in *The Advancement of Science*, p. 97 (January, 1942). The speaker comments that the curves of the graph of these awards "help to explain the tremendous scientific and technical strength of Germany, the collapse of France, and our own power of recuperation, which has surprised the world. The fact is that the scientific core of British skill is not unhealthy. Our business is to make it expand and grow as rapidly as possible."

answering chord of war-mindedness in the great mass of the people. The *soldierly qualities* of the Germans in actual warfare require no emphasis. What is equally significant is the degree to which thoughts of war appear to obsess the minds of many Germans throughout their life. At least since the series of wars which brought the Second Reich to birth, Germans have displayed, more than any other important people unless it be the contemporary Japanese, a readiness to talk war, plan war, and make war. Not that Germany has wholly escaped the wave of anti-war sentiment and opinion which spread over the rest of Europe. The official propaganda has taken pains to represent Hitler's campaigns of aggression as undertaken for reasons of defence against supposed enemies—pluto-democracies, or Bolshevists, or neighbours "oppressing" German minorities. In 1939, according to the practically unanimous testimony of competent observers on the spot, the prospect of war was far from being generally welcome to the German people.<sup>1</sup> While this reluctance is an important factor, owing no doubt much to memories of the last time, it can quickly lose its force if the war develops in a manner comparatively painless—perhaps even lucrative—to the German people as a whole, as in the campaigns of 1939 and 1940 it actually did. This reluctance to undergo the personal sufferings of war the Germans share with the rest of mankind. What is apparently lacking in Germans is any rejection of war for its own sake.

The Army arouses in Germany, but to an even greater degree, the same feelings of confidence and pride as does the Navy in Britain. There the comparison stops. While the Navy is still the calling of comparatively few, the whole German manhood passes through the Army and never becomes emotionally detached from it. Moreover, the Navy is not a law to itself, but is under political control. Though for centuries it has been the sharpest weapon of British national policy, it has always been understood as exercising in addition a policing function.<sup>2</sup> The German Army, on the other hand, has not only served all too often the purpose of imposing upon others, by aggression, the will of the German state, but also has tended itself to be the ruling power within the state. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, in the eyes of many Germans, the Army is in fact the German state, so that who would destroy

<sup>1</sup> e.g. J. C. Harsch: *Pattern of Conquest*, p. 37 (Heinemann, 1942).

<sup>2</sup> cf., "that we may be . . . a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions." Prayer to be used in His Majesty's Navy.

the Army as a great striking force would for them destroy the state, whatever other powers might be left to it.

The British have been said to be a martial rather than a military nation, in that they can be aroused to effective military action when the need arises. As regards naval and air warfare, this effectiveness is acknowledged. The habit of belittling the British Army is, however, inveterate abroad, and not unknown at home. The real military capacity which Britain displays, as regards leadership, fighting and organization, has indeed almost invariably been rewarded only after a painful initial period of trial and error. She is normally unprepared for massive military effort, is averse from thoughts of war, and regards peace as not only the desirable but the natural order of international relations. In Germany, on the other hand, a far greater proportion of the national energies and a far greater number of the best brains of the country are wont to be devoted to war preparations in the broad sense of the term, and war is extensively accepted as the real and natural state of the relations of nations to one another. Hence participation in a given war does not to the same extent as in democratic countries give rise to discussion whether it be necessary or just, or whether war in general could be made to play a smaller part in human affairs.

Within a period of eighty years Germans have stood behind their leaders for the purpose of five wars. Once only was the *unity* broken, when after a protracted struggle hopes of victory began to fade. What, in the present war, have been the major factors productive of this unity? The devotion of the people to a strong leader, particularly fervent after a period of weak and divided leadership, the initial satisfactions and excitements of war, national ambitions, hopes of loot, have all played their part, as also has the energy released by recovery from defeat; but perhaps above all was, at the beginning, the feeling that it is both inevitable and right that the Germans should conquer and rule inferior people. This sense of mission, buttressed as it is by the doctrine of German racial superiority and the other articles of the Nazi credo, imparts while it endures that special strength and certainty which are the reward of those who feel themselves to be the agents of an inevitable historical process, and not merely the seekers after some perhaps unattainable goal.

Another important contribution to unity and consequently war strength is that a people as a whole should feel the social order to be reasonably just. In Germany under the Second Reich a compara-

tively advanced policy of social security was adopted with this object in view. By the provision of full employment, though with scant wages and with war as the inevitable end of the process, Hitler in his turn banished for a while from the mind of the Germans the chief domestic fear of modern man, and had little difficulty in persuading the German masses of the superiority of their system to that of the "pluto-democracies." By rewards of a non-economic character, such as distinctions of status, promotion in the Army and Party, voyages, pageants, and the drama of the new political methods, he gave for a time to many a lost individual a sense of community. The hollowness of a gift bestowed at the cost of hatred without and tyranny within was to appear only later. However spurious their remedies, the Nazis correctly diagnosed the unemployment problem as having a spiritual centre in the suffering of the economically useless and socially unesteemed individual.

German unity, nevertheless, has a weak spot, in that it is based not on mature and well-established political traditions but on successful military enterprise. The tendency of the Germans to "disperse" in all directions in times of crisis is attested by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*,<sup>1</sup> and Goebbels has written that "owing to its recent birth our young national unity is more exposed to tests and temptations than would be others."<sup>2</sup> Danger approaches as the standards of the civilian population have to be lowered more and more in order to maintain the Army in a state of comparative privilege, and the division of the country into military masters and civilian helots, which the militaristic philosophy engenders, is laid bare. This condition, should it come about, may be momentary. We do not wish here to draw any conclusions as to the compactness of German unity on a long view, of which we shall have more to say in the next chapter.

British unity has again proved strong at a supreme moment of the nation's history, and, because it is a well-seasoned growth which British people take for granted, it is unprofitable to try to analyse its various constituents. But on this basis of confidence it is instructive to note two points, the one admitted to be a danger-signal, the other widely felt as a defect. The first is the persistence, apart from the special war effort, of mass unemployment. The society in which this evil shall be mastered, and where also "wealth shall not

<sup>1</sup> Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf* (translated by James Murphy), p. 332 (Hurst and Blackett, 1939).

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Goebbels: extract from article in *Das Reich*, quoted in *The Times*, February 10, 1942.

prey upon commonwealth,"<sup>1</sup> lies in the future. We have said that from the viewpoint of national unity this is a danger-signal, not that it is a ground for despondency. The fact that in the past the British people have achieved a rate of social progress all the more steady and substantial because effected without revolutionary violence, and under conditions of civic freedom, authorizes the hope that the contemporary social challenge can also be met in ways which will preserve for us those priceless advantages. Secondly, in the realm of ideas, Britain has fought against Nazi Germany, as against revolutionary and imperial France, in a posture of defence. The great ideas of which Britain has been the champion, such as political and religious freedom, economic liberalism, and the belief in progress, have lost, at least in their traditional forms, something of their power of inspiration. It is especially in revolutions that one sees the force of ideas in action, and it is true that not since the time of Cromwell have British arms been impelled by an energy of the mind comparable to that which carried forward the arms of the American, French, Russian, and German revolutions. Yet Cromwell's victories were neither the last nor the most enduring that British soldiers have won, and it would be rash to conclude that revolutionary zeal is the only kind of conviction which counts for war strength.

Although the sense of upholding a general cause was by no means absent, the moral force which sustained Britain's resistance in the crisis of 1940 had as its core plain patriotism, the necessity of defending the national soil and, with it, the national way of life. The fact, frequently stressed, that but a very few states are really capable of modern war renders only more impressive the power of nationalism to inspire determined resistance, as happened not only in Britain (which most gave up for lost), but also in countries where resistance was almost certainly from the first hopeless, such as Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Dutch East Indies. However, since defence of the national soil is a traditional idea, what is perhaps more significant is its failure in several countries, especially in France, the country of defensive patriotism *par excellence*. The weakening of the French patriotic instinct which appeared in the early stages of the war seems to have had two chief causes: first, internal divisions arising out of conflicting social interests and a lack of capable political leadership; second, a pervading state of lassitude produced by the efforts and losses of the Four

Winston Churchill: speech reported in *The Times*, March 28, 1941.

Years' War and by the failure—part of a general failure for which France, like other countries, has her share of responsibility—to solve France's security problem. Whether there was also a more general disorder then at work in Europe—whether, for instance, the positive welcome to ruthless and self-confident power, which to some extent attended the early progress of the *Herrenvolk*, was symptomatic of a growing indifference to personal and national independence—is an interesting subject for speculation. However that may be, the robustness of Britain's resistance<sup>1</sup> would seem to have owed something to the fact that, perhaps more than other western countries, the nation of shopkeepers has preserved in its political, social, and cultural life values of a non-economic character, with the consequence that an international crisis precipitated so largely by economic causes left the essential national structure intact.

The British people will surely make every effort after the war to establish their own and the general security. They will not readily admit failure. But, great lovers of success as they are, the ultimate secret of their strength, as of every healthy nation, is that they do not regard their history as being necessarily a success story. For themselves there is a kind of life which must be lived unconditionally. This life must certainly include those personal and national liberties which were won in past struggles. It must accept the irresistible movement for more social justice. Of its underlying philosophy it is not easy to speak summarily, except to say that it cannot, while remaining itself, sever its links with the Christian view of man's nature and destiny.

### III. FRONTIERS: POLITICAL STRUCTURE

#### A TERRITORIAL NEW DEAL IN EUROPE?

It is sometimes urged that after the war less importance should be attached to political frontiers, and that in consequence an agreement regarding the frontiers of European states should wait until the economic map has been re-drawn. But this argument is surely valid only on the view that the boundaries of political control and of economic opportunity will necessarily coincide. If

<sup>1</sup> It is just to others to remember that the trials of actual invasion are greater than anything which Britain has so far been called upon to endure. Even so, her stand of 1940 was morally great, and (on the assumption of victory) historically decisive.

frontiers are unimportant they might with advantage remain as fixed by the last treaty settlements, except where a good case can be made for a particular change. The effect would be that, instead of facing an indefinite period of uncertainty likely to detach from thoughts of economic reconstruction the minds of those who still think frontiers important, we should start from a political datum-line generally fixed and accepted. The authors of the Treaties of Versailles, St Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, and Lausanne are perhaps justly accused of having neglected, because they did not care about them, certain economic questions. But they performed tolerably well the tasks of territorial delimitation for which they did care. The problem is to bring about an economic rather than to undo a political settlement. There is a great difference between admitting that, of their own will and in their own time, some of the smaller European states might be well advised to unite economically or even politically, and giving currency to the idea that in the eyes of the greater Allies European frontiers are regarded as fluid.

#### THE GERMAN TERRITORIAL PROBLEM

So far as Germany is concerned, it can be confidently predicted that, if a secure and liberal international system such as is intended by the Atlantic Charter is actually put into operation, none of Germany's neighbours will consent to enter a closed political system with her, whatever the economic advantage. The question is: by what territories will the pre-war Reich be diminished?

As regards our Ally Czechoslovakia, H.M. Government have declared that they "would not be influenced by any changes effected in and since 1938"<sup>1</sup>; and have made a similar statement regarding Austria. Controversial issues are likely to arise in the case of border territories of the Versailles Reich, of which East Prussia and the Rhineland are obvious examples. Of Powers other than the presumed claimants, it may be expected that the U.S.S.R. will have a stronger interest in purely territorial questions than Britain or the United States, whose direct concern will be chiefly with the strategic and economic aspects.

In Article 2<sup>2</sup> of the Atlantic Charter there has been reaffirmed the principle of self-determination, though in terms which leave room for diverse interpretations in *concrete cases*, according to the

<sup>1</sup> Mr Eden in the House of Commons, August 5, 1942.

<sup>2</sup> "Second, they (i.e. those who subscribe to the Charter) desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."



meaning to be given to the phrase "peoples concerned." In 1919 this principle was regarded as decisive. Its application consecrated the division, which events had brought about, of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. At the same time it enabled Germany to conserve within the Reich all indisputably German territory, so that the marginal areas in which the final settlement showed some bias in favour of the victors were small. After this war, Germany will be felt by many to have deprived herself of the benefit of the principle of self-determination by her own disregard of it after her temporary victories, and to have provided precedents, in the way of the mass transfer of populations, which may help to solve some of the difficulties in disposing of contested areas. Moreover the principle itself, though still strong, will perhaps not always be applied in full rigour against what the United Nations consider a superior political or economic interest. An appeal may be allowed from President Wilson to President Lincoln. In the case of frontier territories of pre-war Germany the overriding interest would presumably be either that of one of the neighbour states, or a German interest, or a pooled interest, e.g. that of the community of Europe, or the United Nations. Thus the deciding factor in disposing of an area might be not the claims of this or that state, nor even the wishes of the inhabitants of the area, but the extent to which the proposed attribution would assist international arrangements for military, naval, or air co-operation, or European power or transport developments, or new industrial groupings. Such possibilities would naturally depend on the setting up of a much firmer structure of international authority than has existed hitherto, and would not necessarily apply only to contested areas around Germany.

Under a policy which aims at security through the weakening of Germany in every way and at any cost, all the contested territories would presumably be attached to some other claimant. A possible counter-argument, apart from those based on the Atlantic Charter, would be that the inclusion of populations exposed to foreign influences tends to dilute the characteristically German spirit, which otherwise might be even more dangerously concentrated than before. Even if the character of the population of the marginal territories were notably different from that of the most Prussianized parts of Germany (which may be to some extent true of, say, the Rhineland, but is not true of, say, East Prussia), the experience of neither the Bismarckian nor the Hitlerian Reich

supports the hope that Germans in marginal territories absorbed into the Reich can long resist assimilation to the prevailing mentality. *Prima facie* then, the detachment of all marginal territories from Germany to other claimants should serve the purpose of making Germany "unable" to threaten the security of others, provided that there were a reasonable prospect of permanence for the new arrangement. This might be the case if there was no such strong desire on the part of the population to remain with Germany as to make them irreconcilable to the change, and if a stable economic and political future, as good as that which they might expect to enjoy if left in the Reich, was assured them. If, on the other hand, there was disaffection, genuine or factitious, force would be needed to suppress its effects.

To avoid the presence of a disaffected population, the demand would almost certainly be made for the expulsion of the German inhabitants from the whole of a contested area. The vast human uprooting which Hitler has effected would rob German protests of much of their effect. Even so, a policy so plainly discriminatory might yield on balance a deficit of security, first by generating a higher degree of German aggressive energy than might otherwise be the case: secondly, by providing the solid foundation of a real grievance for the array of fancied grievances by which, without that foundation, a better instructed generation is unlikely to be impressed.

What of the alternative policy of "co-operation"? If this meant co-operation with Germany without regard to co-operation with her neighbours, in every doubtful case the verdict would have to be in favour of Germany. Such preferential treatment would be a singular result of the war. Obviously the only co-operation which is worth considering is that by which all legitimate interests can be taken into account. Amongst methods which might be adopted are plebiscites and some degree of sorting out of mixed populations. True, no method of execution or even criterion of judgement that would be fully acceptable to all could possibly be devised. But on this view the overriding factor in doubtful cases would be the needs of Europe as a whole. Thus the occupation of strategic strong-points in the name of the United Nations might be necessary in the interest of security and effective disarmament. General economic considerations might also turn the scale in deciding a particular territorial problem.

So much for questions of general principle, for which, unless we

are to live in a Germanized world of pure snatch and grab, we must show some respect. Naturally no territorial question can in actual fact be wholly decided according to any one principle or set of principles. Each particular case will be affected by a complex of factors special to itself. The crucial territorial issue is that of finding a settlement in east Europe (where the war began), the maintenance of which will be regarded as in the general interest.<sup>1</sup>

#### UNITY OF THE REICH?

Hitherto we have been envisaging a Reich which within its perhaps reduced borders would still be a unit. The "solid bloc" of Germans, in whose unity Hitler saw the permanent assurance of German hegemony, would no longer comprise the 100 million or so racial Germans, but would still remain the largest national bloc in central and western Europe. A policy of weakening Germany, pushed to the limit, would require the dismemberment of the Reich. The Germans' own technique of dismemberment, applied in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and France, was not mere separation into several approximately equal units, all having a more or less equal interest in restoring their unity, but a system of graded servitude and many-dimensional fragmentation. The inherent variety in Germany's national structure is great, and should afford an excellent field for virtuosity in the art of division and of playing off one part against another. Yet it is doubtful whether Britain alone, even if one were to suppose her lastingly capable of the active malice and destructive passion required to sustain such a policy, would possess the necessary physical force. The more extreme the policy, the more important would it be that it should be concerted with the more powerful Allies. But there has been no indication that America would approve a policy of enforced division, nor does it seem to be Russia's intention, to judge from Stalin's reference to the German state in his Order of the Day issued on the occasion of the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Red Army.<sup>2</sup>

The next question is: what ought the British attitude to be, should spontaneous separatist movements occur? The defeat of Germany and collapse of the Nazi regime might be followed by civil strife on a large scale. Such a condition of disorder might be favourable to the assertion of regionally separatist claims, though the separatist spirit would probably be far from the most vigorous

<sup>1</sup> The problem was succinctly stated, a generation ago, by H. J. Mackinder in *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, chapter vi (Constable, 1919).

<sup>2</sup> *The Times*, February 24, 1942.

element in the turmoil of political and social passions unloosed. The problem for the Allies would be whether they ought to assist such centrifugal tendencies, should they become manifest, by ensuring conditions which would not doom them to frustration. An essential condition would be the provision of such economic arrangements between the separate parts of the Reich and neighbouring states as would make them viable and would also ensure equality of status between the German and the other components of the new blocs. Yet even the fulfilment of these conditions, in itself a difficult task when the probable attitude of Germany's neighbours to close association with German nationals is considered, would not suffice to render separation permanent. The Allies could, by the kind of omissions which attended the establishment of Austria as a separate unit in 1919, ensure the failure of separation. If the original impulse were strong and genuine, they could doubtless do much to encourage it, both by material inducements and by offering new fields of cultural and technical activity. But they could not make success a certainty, because success and permanence would depend on whether the Germans themselves resisted the centripetal forces which would be certain to operate as the memory of defeat receded. Then the question for the Allies would be again, as under dismemberment, whether to use force to maintain the unwanted separation.

The real point is whether the convulsions which defeat will bring about will be so great as to destroy the very feeling for German national unity. The desire for unity has been long embedded in the national consciousness. Its apparent fulfilment was a "gift" which the German people regarded as one of Hitler's first claims upon their devotion. How far Hitler himself may have destroyed this feeling through the progressive extension of the *Grossraum*, and how far the strength of the national principle itself may have been dissolved in the general social ferment, are highly speculative questions. The only safe basis for policy is the expectation that the Germans will be determined to preserve their unity, except in so far as they are prevented by force. The possibility would become a certainty should the victors themselves assert a vigorous nationalism.

If it be accepted that the desire for German unity would persist at least until, at some future date, the spirit of nationalism in Europe gives place to a European spirit, and consequently that the forcible dismemberment of Germany, whether by external or

internal forces, would be unlikely to last, yet it does not follow that the political structure of the Third Reich will or should remain unaltered. The process of unifying Germany begun by Bismarck has continued under Weimar and the Third Reich. Particularism in its original form has steadily decreased, though it revived in 1918 and may do so after the next defeat. But side by side with the partly sentimental, partly practical, but historically persistent desire for unity, there has continued a genuine desire for a restoration to the states of some of their former autonomy. Within the framework of a united Germany a definite divergence of state interests and characteristics still remains. This was shown not only in the violent separatist movements after 1918, but also more peacefully during the lengthy negotiations preceding the drafting of the Weimar Constitution. The proposal then made to replace the federation by a unitary state was emphatically rejected, and steps were taken to curb the administrative (though not the military) predominance of Prussia. The smaller states were given more power in the Reichsrat under Weimar than in the old Bundesrat.

It has to be considered whether this decentralizing movement should be encouraged, and how far the restoration of a genuine federal union or confederation of the German states would affect the chances and strength of a revival of aggression. It could not increase them; and it is possible that the decentralization from Berlin of such armed forces—"police" or other—as are in future allowed to Germany, and of certain administrative services, and the establishment of a federal authority with comparatively small powers, seated outside Prussia, might decrease the desire and capacity for aggression. Just how far the decentralizing process should go, and how much freedom should be given to the separate states to choose their own constitutions and legal and educational systems, are mainly matters for Germans to consider. It is doubtful, however, if the decision could be entirely left to them to settle; in any case, it would need Allied approval. A decentralized political system might provide more opportunities for the Germans to obtain practical political experience than is possible in a centralized Reichstag.

To sum up, this is not a matter in which we are necessarily faced by a stark dilemma between the enforced separation of the various regions of Germany and passive acceptance of an undifferentiated political unity. In the interests of European security, certain political guarantees may be required of Germany. But if the

United Nations have a positive vision of the future of Europe which transcends while it includes the watch on German militarism, it is possible that the mass of the German people might come to share it. It is important that Germans should begin to think in political terms which mean something to themselves and are not merely borrowed. Yet these ideas, unlike the militarism which so far has been Germany's chief contribution to political science, must allow the safety of others to stand beyond a peradventure.

#### IV. LIBERTIES

##### PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY

The "destruction of Nazi tyranny" having been proclaimed as one of our war aims, we are led to inquire whether victory should be used so to influence the internal policy and institutions of Germany as to prevent, in the interests of security, the growth of a new Nazism. Without entering upon a theoretical discussion of interference by states in the internal affairs of others, there are a few points on which to take our bearings.

Though the Allies in the years after the last war did not intervene in order to support the maintenance in Germany of a democratic form of government and free institutions, they did in effect so intervene during the war itself. The establishment, before the armistice, of a Government responsible to the Reichstag, while it represented the apparent victory of domestic forces which for many years had agitated for free institutions, certainly owed something to the refusal of President Wilson to grant an armistice to a non-democratic Government. Moreover, the framers of the Weimar Constitution itself, largely borrowed from western sources at it was, cannot but have been fortified by the hope that its liberal character would find favour in the Allies' sight. In this sense the Allies may be said to have influenced, though without exercising direct pressure, the political development of Germany.<sup>1</sup>

Article 3<sup>2</sup> of the Atlantic Charter reaffirms the doctrine

<sup>1</sup> cf. Hugh Wilson, *Diplomat Between Wars*, p. 122 (Longmans, New York, Toronto, 1941): "... Cuno's attitude toward the President typified that of thinking Germans toward their Government. They were willing to give it a try, the Allies seemed to like this sort of thing, but they watched the Government's efforts with feelings that varied from friendly amusement to contempt."

<sup>2</sup> "Third, they (i.e. those who subscribe to the Charter) respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

of non-intervention, as regards the "form of Government" of others. The liberty to choose presumably applies not only to the choice of a particular constitutional form, but also to the choice of the Government itself. It is not clear, however, that as regards Germany this permission is unqualified, since the condition set forth in Article 6,<sup>1</sup> "the final destruction of Nazi tyranny," would not be fulfilled if Germany were free to re-create Nazi Governments. It is of course highly unlikely, even apart from the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, that the Allies would attempt to dictate to Germany that she should have a Government of a given kind, e.g. parliamentary government after the British model, or a Soviet form of government, and would insist on the maintenance of that form under the sanction of force. On the other hand, passively to acquiesce in the re-formation of a near-Nazi Government would be inconsistent with a vital security policy. It would appear the natural course to inspect such horses as appear in the paddock, and back our fancy. Such an attitude of prudent temporization may, however, not prove adequate. The problem is not merely that there must be negative limits (i.e., a near-Nazi Government will not be tolerated); it is that the Germans may need, in the conditions of defeat, not only freedom to choose, but guidance as to how to employ that freedom usefully.

We cannot make a real peace with a Government which rejects the principle that the rights of other states must be respected and international compacts observed. Subject to the observance of this principle, the particular form of government should not necessarily concern us overmuch. It may be a democratic Government; the conflict about democracy has in the past played an important part in German public life. The choice, however, will be determined less by an abstract preference for one form of government over another, than by the people's judgement of its capacity to handle social and economic problems and problems of public order in face of restrictions (particularly any which may be economic in character) laid upon Germany by the victors. How far we ourselves can effectively assist particular efforts at government organization will depend on our assessment—from the point of view of authenticity, effectiveness, and staying power—of various constructive elements in the pre-Nazi German tradition and, above all, in the

<sup>1</sup> "Sixth, after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

new forces which will be released with the decomposition of Nazism.

## FREE ELECTIONS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

A specific problem is whether it is a possible or a useful guarantee of our security that the German Government, of whatever character it may be, should from time to time submit itself, under conditions which ensure freedom of speech and vote, to the judgement of the people. It may well be that the German people will wish in the future to control the actions of their Government, but they will be the less willing to do so if it must be done at the bidding of others. Confidence in the value of a guarantee of freedom of discussion and vote rests on the assumption that under those conditions the German public would overthrow a Government whose policies were manifestly leading towards war. Certainly if Hitler had submitted to the free judgement of public opinion his decisions regarding the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, there might have been a turn-over of votes, but to suppose that it would have been sufficient to undo the effect of those popular achievements is to attribute to a notoriously unpolitical people an unusual capacity to balance ulterior dangers against immediate satisfactions. Under the Weimar Constitution freedom of speech and vote did exist, and it is significant that the Governments of the Weimar period, though they had promoted actively or by acquiescence the preparations for Germany's rearmament, were displaced by more militaristic successors. There is, therefore, no certainty that free elections in Germany would check the development of aggressive designs; we might even have to intervene ourselves to suppress freedom used for the working of the propaganda of revenge. On the whole, however, freedom of vote, if combined with freedom of access to facts, should have a sobering effect<sup>1</sup>, provided it is certain that renewed aggression or attempts to rearm will be met by resolute opposition from outside, and provided the means of influencing opinion are not left in the hands of the German war party.

The question of free elections leads on to that of the exercise of what have been called passive rights, i.e., those elementary civic

<sup>1</sup> In the Free City of Danzig a liberal constitution was guaranteed by an outside body, the League of Nations. For some years after the suppression of freedom in Germany a large measure of freedom continued to exist in Danzig, to disappear finally only when it became quite clear that the Powers represented on the League Council would not intervene to make the guarantee effective. With all allowance for the difference in scale, the experience is worth noting.



rights which, according to our conception, any citizen should enjoy: freedom of access to information, already referred to; freedom of speech and criticism in general, not only for electoral purposes; freedom of worship; freedom of assembly; freedom from arbitrary arrest. According to such evidence as we have, the average German citizen has felt more keenly than the irresponsibility of his Government his deprivation of some of these personal rights, especially his lack of access to a free press and to uncensored literature, and his defencelessness before the Gestapo. Yet the same considerations as those which have been set forth above in regard to political rights apply also here. The suppression of personal freedom in a powerful country like Germany naturally represents a fearful danger for her neighbours, since violence against the rights of the individual citizen is apt to be a preparation for external aggression. Perhaps there is ground for hope that the Germans will not again willingly forfeit those elementary rights which they enjoyed, even under the Second Reich; but they undoubtedly will forfeit them if that is the price which has to be paid in order to attain ends which seem important, such as social security, efficient government and, should the chance reappear, military strength. It is therefore important that the first two should be attainable by the way of freedom, and that the way to the third should be barred.

The whole matter assumes a different complexion if Germany is not singled out as the one country which is compelled to maintain, for the tranquillity of others, a constitutional rule of a particular kind. If it were agreed, e.g., by all the European states, that in the general interest it was necessary to guarantee free elections and the rights of the individual, Germany might, if still opposed to freedom, dislike and seek to evade the obligation, but would lack the direct incitement of discrimination. Whether on its merits such a measure should be proposed to all Europe, perhaps in a manner which links the obligation to the enjoyment of the advantages of co-operative political association, is a matter for further discussion. But one thing is clear. Unless there is to be in Germany some definite guarantee of personal liberty, whether unilateral or general, Jews and other racial or political minorities will risk incurring again a fate similar to that which befell them under the Third Reich.

## V. ECONOMIC POLICY

### ATLANTIC CHARTER AND THE GERMAN ECONOMY

In this chapter we are concerned not with the positive purposes of economic policy, but only with its relation to the problem of security from future German aggression. The choice between force and co-operation has in this field already been made by the Atlantic Charter, of which the relevant clauses read:

“Fourth, they (i.e., the countries which subscribe to the Charter) will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.”

“Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security.”

The principles of the Charter have since been endorsed by the U.S.S.R. and by the other United Nations, and on the assumption that they will be translated into concrete programmes of action it is obviously more profitable to work out the implications of the accepted policy of collaboration than the rejected policy of coercion. A few words should, however, be spared to describe a coercive policy, as a means of focusing the whole picture more clearly. The exercise is not wholly academic, because some measure of coercion even in economic and social matters may be required, owing to the possible conflict between the provisions of the Charter promising equal treatment to all states in these matters, and those which stipulate that the aggressor states shall be unilaterally disarmed.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, it would be a neglect of the lessons of experience not to realize that, to whatever extent the security promises of the Charter may fail of realization, the states which feel themselves most threatened by Germany will seek to compensate themselves by

<sup>1</sup> “Eighth, they (i.e., those who subscribe to the Charter) believe all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.”

whatever measures they are able to take, without regard to the integrity of the economic promises. The converse argument also holds good. The purposes of the Charter form a whole, and stand or fall together.

What would be meant by a policy of thorough-going economic imperialism carried out by the United Nations may be inferred from a study of the Germans' own "New Order." It would be necessary merely to reverse the process; the Germans, instead of deciding for all the territories under their direct or indirect control what is to be produced, and how much, and where, and similar questions affecting the whole of the economic process, would find these matters determined by other powers regardless of German interests or desires. Under such a system no obstacle would be encountered by any measure which the Allied planning authority decided upon—the destruction of heavy engineering or shipbuilding industries, the transfer of labour and plant, the withdrawal of financial and commercial autonomy. German working conditions and standards of living generally would be sacrificed wherever that seemed beneficial to others, or for the positive purpose of keeping the German population in a state of poverty, servitude, and ignorance.

A brief glance at this prospect is enough to show that to be an agent of such a policy would be strongly repugnant to British traditions, and its maintenance would be beyond her strength. Deliberately to ruin German productive capacity, both industrial and scientific, would involve the further depression of the standards of living of other European countries; for even the most thorough-going development of production elsewhere might not suffice to keep European standards on a high level if Germany were to be a depressed area. British employment would certainly suffer to some extent from the impoverishment of Germany as a customer; it is doubtful if this loss would be offset by her elimination as an export competitor. Moreover, to keep Germany in this position would not only involve a vast expenditure by Britain of military and other coercive effort, but also would bring her into conflict with nations desiring to trade with a prosperous Germany. She would then have either to carry through the policy by force of arms if necessary, or give it up.

We may then dismiss for practical purposes the idea of Britain's using military and political power in order to exercise a complete control over the economic life of Germany. Such a phantasy would

become real only in the event of Britain and others succumbing to a "chosen people" mania such as has taken possession of the mind of the Germans themselves, driving them to treat the rest of mankind as the mere raw material of their own purposes. It is true that great industrial states such as Britain and the United States have various means of imposing their wills on economically weaker states without resorting to anything like German methods. The signs are, however, that, even if they would, such nations cannot easily escape the net of economic co-operation which they have woven for themselves, but must work out policies which regard the welfare of other peoples as an end in itself.

Co-operation with Germany in the economic and social field, on the other hand, would mean that no discrimination is made against the Germans of a kind to affect their prosperity as individuals; more positively, that the economic welfare of Germans as individuals, as of their neighbours and ourselves, is an object of our policy. It is obvious that on a short view this will not be possible, and that comparative German living standards will suffer from the necessity to think first of the relief and reconstruction of the countries which Germany has victimized. This is a tremendous problem, because the purpose and effect of that victimization has been to rob European peoples on a vast scale of their present vigour, wealth, and culture, and of the means of its increase. In considering methods of compensation, so far as compensation for such losses is feasible, it might be wise to think in terms of enforced restitution of loot and payment in service and kind in the immediate post-war period, rather than of indefinite long-term financial obligations. There is also the possibility of the use of German labour for reconstruction, which in its turn, as the experience of France after the last war shows, raises the question of the willingness of the creditor nations to receive it.

As a matter of long-term policy, the principle of non-discrimination implies that in any higher organization of economic life in Europe (e.g., raw material controls, establishment of joint European utility services, etc.) German interests will be treated on a level with those of others. To state this principle is, of course, not even to begin to solve the practical problems to which it will give rise. The skill which the Germans have long shown in manipulating large combines and monopolies, and their experience during the war of organization and planning on a European scale, will place them in a strong position. It will require a very firm resolution and

high capacities on the part of those who make welfare rather than power the end of economic policy to prevent the reappearance of the familiar pattern of the subordination of European resources to German political ends. If, on the other hand, the movement for a more rational organization of European and world economy and for the co-operative adjustment of national economic needs fails, non-discrimination will mean little but the recognition of the right of each unit to make the most of its position in a competitive scramble. As Germany is the most powerful economic unit in Europe, and has developed highly the art of subordinating the economy of others to her own, the reintegration of most of Europe into her system is in that event to be expected, unless Britain, America, and Russia take steps to relieve the weaker states of their dependence on Germany as "sole buyer". This might involve, for the British Commonwealth, substantial changes in the policy of imperial preference; for America, the lowering of protective tariffs; for Russia, more extensive external trading.

From all points of view, therefore, the problem is seen to be one of co-operation not so much with Germany as with the economically weaker states of Europe, and of a sustained endeavour to improve their position. Only so can those means of developing the economic resources of Europe be found which will allow full use to be made of German industrial skill and will afford to individual Germans their share of the ensuing prosperity, while preventing the relapse of Europe into a state of economic servitude to Germany. Unless we can meet the German will to economic mastery with some purpose different in kind but equally vigorous, "co-operation" is likely to slide into acquiescence in the fact of German hegemony; then into the progressive subordination of our own resources to Germany's politico-economic ends.

The thought behind the economic clauses of the Atlantic Charter, as applied to ex-enemies, is not merely an abstract objection to measures of economic penalization, but the conviction that poverty will breed war. It is an obvious fact that the misery of the German masses was a major element in the conditions which allowed Hitler to seize power, though the converse proposition, that a prosperous Germany would necessarily be a harmless Germany, is not proven, as the situation of 1914 showed.

Apart from the German inclination to mobilize all her productive, commercial, and financial resources for purposes of economic war, there are three special factors deserving mention even in the

present summary review. First, German prosperity has depended to an exceptional degree on her heavy industry. The slump which began in 1929 caused heavy industry to demand orders for armaments, so as to occupy idle plant and absorb unemployed labour; this circumstance provided particularly favourable conditions for military leaders intent on rebuilding the war machine. Reference is made below to the possible internationalization of heavy industry; the point here is merely to emphasize the special European danger which trade depressions affecting such industry represent, and the advantage consequent on converting it in large measure to the production of consumers' goods. Secondly, there is the constant German claim to a monopoly position in south-eastern Europe. To recognize that claim would be both unjust and dangerous; and to lessen its pressure it might be necessary not only to provide the countries of that area with other outlets in Russia, Italy, and the west and to invest capital in their greater industrialization, but to ease Germany's trade relations with oversea countries. A substantial trade between Germany and south-eastern Europe, in capital goods as well as other goods, is indeed highly probable and should be mutually advantageous, provided it forms part of a regulated multi-lateral exchange under which the weaker countries are not tied down to Germany. Thirdly, the possibility that Germany or parts of it might become Communist raises a number of important issues, in which it is especially difficult to separate economic aims from their social, political, and ideal context. In their economic aspect these issues demand the examination (which the prospect of increasing trade between Russia and the rest of the world and the possible emergence or continuance of state-controlled economies other than the Russian would in any case render necessary) of the general technical problem how commercial relations between free and state-controlled economies should be conducted. However, there seems no reason to believe that any measures of control of the German economy which it might be necessary to take in the interests of security would be more difficult to carry out under a communistic economy than under a system of private trading.

It is clear that if either of the two objectives held in balance in the Atlantic Charter—economic advancement for all, including Germany, and the disarmament of aggressors—were to be pursued absolutely, a conflict between them might arise. To follow out the logic of disarmament completely might entail the virtual destruction of the industrial basis of Germany's economic life; to place

no conditions at all on Germany's freedom to develop her economic resources might entail her speedy restoration to a position in which she could re-create without difficulty an all-powerful military machine. Certain limitations on German economy regarded as a war potential may, therefore, be necessary. What should they be?

#### CONTROL OF GERMANY'S WAR POTENTIAL

Two possible measures for the reduction of industrial war potential are often mentioned; the control of the machine-tool industry, and the rationing of key raw materials. The advantages of these two measures are felt to be, first, their effectiveness if thoroughly carried out, and second, the fact that neither need involve a large-scale reduction of Germany's general productive capacity. It is a commonplace that Germany's machine-tool industry and the multitude of her skilled machine-tool operatives are essential factors of her war potential, and that the rapid expansion of the manufacture of war-machines would be rendered enormously more difficult if Germany lacked this resource. The means of ensuring this control are, therefore, well worth study, though it would be imprudent to trust entirely to a method of control which would be largely stultified if the Germans found the means of concealing and perfecting the necessary types, even in small quantities.

In order that a policy of depriving Germany of raw materials necessary for armaments, all of which are also needed for peace production, should succeed, it would be necessary also to prevent re-exportation by other countries. This does not mean that rationing of supplies of nickel, special alloys, etc., to Germany's presumed peace-time needs might not be a useful additional safeguard. But to rely on it exclusively would be dangerous.

Does it follow that the only course would be to limit drastically the capacity of the industries themselves? It is a fact that the same engineering plant can make both guns and high-pressure boilers; the same chemical plant both explosives and fertilizers; the same factory can make watches for ordinary use, and precision instruments the manufacture of which is increasingly important in conditions of mechanized war. Though these plants, at least for the heavy industries, cannot be hidden, the purposes for which they are ultimately to be used can be hidden. If at all costs control must take place at the beginning of the manufacturing process, the disarmament of Germany seems to require some limitation on the lines suggested, which would *pro tanto* be a reduction of the

capacity of German industry for peace production, and also of the prosperity dependent on that capacity.

A serious disarmament policy might, therefore, require that the largely artificial and politically directed concentration of industry in the Reich should be loosened. But the preventive destruction of German productive capacity on a wide scale, and the maintenance of the ensuing disability, would both be contrary to the Charter and impose a very heavy burden. Nevertheless, the controlling Powers should reserve the right to follow, through constant inspection of factories and laboratories, the development of industry in Germany as part of the control of disarmament, and to order reductions, including scrapping of plant, when suspicions were aroused.

Another department of Germany's economic life which would come under strict observation in the exercise of military control is the system of communications, transport, and power supply. "The military profession has become a transport industry,"<sup>1</sup> a German expert is reported to have said. To stimulate transportation developments is a primary concern of every country under the spur of war, but of Germany at all times, precisely because peace has been so largely regarded by the controllers of policy as a preparation for war. An effective military control might insist on obstructing transport improvements which it suspected of being intended to serve military ends. Power supply is even more important, because while transport would be of use to a recalcitrant Germany only if she succeeded in re-starting armament production, power supply is an essential pre-condition to such production. In the case of transport (especially civil aviation) and of power supply the conflict between "security" and "welfare" considerations might well become sharp. On the other hand, it does not seem to arise in the case of possible interference in the development of German *Ersatz* industries or of agriculture. The restriction of uneconomic production and the encouragement of the import of cheap raw materials from oversea should at the same time raise the living standards of the individual and lower the war potential of the state.

The "internationalization" of heavy industry, especially in the area comprising the coal and iron deposits of western Germany, northern and eastern France, Luxemburg, Belgium, and Holland, is sometimes put forward as a sure solution of the industrial problems of rearmament. Such plans obviously deserve careful con-

<sup>1</sup> H. Rauschnig: *Makers of Destruction*, p. 65 (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1942).



sideration in any survey of European economic reorganization. But the mere fact of amalgamation on the industrial and financial plane would not offer a short-cut to security. The productive power so re-grouped and rationalized would inevitably be harnessed to the political purposes of some state or states, or of an international organization. During and even before the war Germany has already made much progress towards the merging of these interests under her control. If the new control is weak, the temptation to turn a system devised as a guarantee against German rearmament into its main instrument will be obvious. What matters, therefore, is that the chief power-lever of the Continent should be in the hands of those whose purpose is welfare rather than domination, and who can manipulate it without fumbling.

The dilemma between prosperity and security becomes less sharp if the main reliance is placed on the denial to Germany of the finished products of the armament industry—aeroplanes, tanks, naval craft, etc. Under this method the task of control is simpler, because mass manufacture of such weapons could not easily be concealed given an efficient system of inspection. The alleged inadequacy of control of the product, as the essential basis of disarmament, is inferred mainly from two considerations: first, the speed with which a highly industrialized state can convert war potential into armaments; second, the proved failure of the former method, which was the method of Versailles. Yet even if we exaggerate the actual speed of past German rearmament so greatly as to suppose that it began from scratch when the Nazis came into power early in 1933, and was sufficiently advanced for purposes of large-scale war when the Rhineland was reoccupied early in 1936, the process took three years, in the last of which rearmament and training were carried on quite openly. The salient lesson of the past is not that Germany rearmed so fast that it was impossible for the Allies to intervene in time to prevent it, but that the Allies lacked the united will to intervene. In a later chapter, something will be said of the reasons. Here, we are content to affirm that the method of control of the product was abandoned not because of intrinsic technical imperfections but for political reasons; and, failing proof that other methods would be more workable, we consider that controllers in the future will have to rely principally on that method, with such auxiliary control of the process as may be necessary. In the economic sphere, as in the military, the actual measures to be taken would presumably be decided upon by experts fully authorized and enabled,

within the limits laid down by political direction, to ensure their execution.

Our conclusion is that the prevention of German rearmament could be ensured by methods which do not necessarily involve wholesale interference with the capacity of German industry for peace production. Certain specific limitations of that capacity might be required—for example, if a prohibition to manufacture or fly aircraft were extended to civilian aircraft. In general, however, the German economy would feel the curb only if it again set out on the rearmament track. Restrictions of any kind would naturally be resented and opposed in Germany. The test of Allied statesmanship will be whether, having decided the degree of control necessary for its purpose, it has the firmness to maintain it in the face of opposition not only in Germany but also in the Allied countries themselves. In the latter part of the inter-war period, it was no secret that Germany was actively putting herself in a position to fight a war. However, so greatly was the economic recovery of Germany desired by other great trading nations, as a means of reducing unemployment and raising the level of prosperity throughout the world, that the threatening steps by which the recovery was being attained were largely ignored. There was a general failure to face the fact that the economic and trading benefits derived from co-operation with Germany under the Nazi regime were patently liable to be short-lived and, if so, ruinous of long-term prospects. Thus the German rearmament programme was actively assisted by foreign nations through the operation of industrial, commercial, financial, and labour interests, all of which were glad to see Germany in a position to purchase their goods, pay for their labour, and foreshadow by her recovery the prospect of repayment of her debt. In addition, passive assistance was rendered by those same nations through the advantages offered by their comparatively free economy to those working under a closely controlled economic system. To avoid a repetition of this situation it will be necessary that the political interest of security be asserted, when need arises, against all rival claims.

## VI. ARMS

### GERMAN DISARMAMENT A QUESTION OF WILL RATHER THAN SKILL

The hard core of the measures which may be set on foot to render Germany "unable to threaten our security" will be military disarmament in the strict sense. It is the one domain in which force is surely capable, given the determination to apply and maintain it, of reaching its object. Certainly it is more practicable forcibly to prevent Germany from possessing masses of bulky weapons of war such as tanks, aeroplanes, and naval craft, and thus to limit training in the use of those weapons, than forcibly to perpetuate political and industrial weakness, or create a pacific habit of mind. Conditions affecting Germany's political, economic, or cultural life which will render her less of a danger can indeed only to a limited degree be secured by force; success will largely depend on the extent to which the Germans themselves willingly accept the conditions. Unilateral disarmament, however, demands the plain exercise of force. The policy will in any case meet the inflexible opposition of the professional military caste, now much wider than the socially-selected military caste of the Wilhelminian era, as well as of all whose personal ambitions are tied up with German military predominance. The attitude of the people as a whole will doubtless be largely affected by the question whether the conditions prevailing in other departments of life are such as they find tolerable. It is prudent to assume that there will be a widespread feeling of resistance, which will not be mollified by any relaxation of the military measures imposed. The ultimate cause of resentment, as after the last war, would be not the severity of this or that measure, but the fact of having lost the war.

It has been argued that the last disarmament of Germany, by compelling her leaders to think out new methods of war, conferred on her a great military advantage. The suggested inference is that a defeated Germany should this time be left with full freedom in the matter of armaments. But in any case the value of the advantage last time derived from the fact that the Allies not only lagged behind in military technique, but also failed to assert the manifest superiority in actual armed power which, for all their military conservatism, they long continued to possess. Even the most complete intellectual and technical preparations in Germany would have come to nothing had she been prevented from making, as-

sembling, and exercising the tanks, heavy artillery, submarines, and aircraft which she was denied under the Treaty.

Though Germans, first through being disarmed themselves and then through disarming others, have necessarily mastered the techniques of evading inspection and control, evasion dependent on concealment is not possible beyond a certain point so long as striking power demands the mass production of conspicuous armament and the large-scale training of effectives. Much, no doubt, may be effected through concealed mass production of separate parts which could rapidly be converted into actual weapons. But military training will remain a problem, for it requires movement, easily detected, over wide areas and for a considerable period. Even a successful attempt to train forces among German communities abroad cannot suppress the time interval required for the creation of a large army, ready for action, in Germany herself.

Should the Allies show greater determination in enforcing disarmament than last time, it will therefore be necessary for the German war party to discover methods of warfare which will dispense with the need of large quantities of conspicuous armament, at least for the beginning of a war. Previous experience does not furnish much evidence as to the possibility of such methods being discovered, because owing to the collapse of the will to control armaments it was not necessary for Germany to discover alternatives. In the early stage concealment was indeed required, and all that could be done was to prepare the cadres, types, and tools for the day when the large-scale training and equipping of the great army could be taken in hand openly. In 1927 the last Allied commission of control<sup>1</sup> in Germany was withdrawn; and with the renewal of military aggression in China in September, 1931, providing evidence of the unreality of the danger which Germany most feared—namely, collective resistance to aggression—she could carry out the last stages without caring much whether she was seen or not. In all essentials, therefore, Germany was enabled to prepare for this war with the weapons of the last. The interest which, accor-

<sup>1</sup> There were three control commissions in Germany: the Air Commission, withdrawn in February, 1922, leaving the whole question of the future of German civil aviation unsettled; the Naval Commission, reduced to three officers at the beginning of 1923, and withdrawn in September, 1924; the Military Commission, withdrawn on January 31st, 1927. But from the French occupation of the Ruhr in January, 1923 onwards, there was no longer any active control, except for a so-called "general inspection" by the Military Commission in the last three months of 1924. Even this was a face-saving device; its scope was limited, and there were practically no surprise visits, which are essential for success.

ding to one witness,<sup>1</sup> the possibilities of bacterial warfare had for Hitler, offers a clue as to one direction in which a new departure might yet be made.

However, technical methods of evasion are a small affair compared with the vast possibilities opened up by suitable political action. To enlist allies in all countries and to obtain the virtual control of at least one of the great productive areas of the world are the obvious goals of the war party's ambition. Similarly for the Allies the root of the matter is political. To carry through disarmament with the certainty of success will require a high degree of common agreement on general policy, at least among the more powerful states. Such a policy, it should be emphasized, must be the expression not of a fearful fascination by the German danger, but of a continuous will to life and strength in those who practise it.

The technical military problems involved in the disarmament of Germany, like the supporting measures in the industrial and other fields, will be for experts to consider; certainly there is no reason to doubt that disarmament is technically possible and cannot easily be circumvented, if the will to enforce it be present. Among factors tending to weaken that will are, naturally, unwillingness to bear the costs of all kinds required by a policy of enforcement; the desire to pursue objects of policy which conflict with the policy of enforcement, and which may attract in proportion as the danger of renewed aggression seems to diminish; inequality of interest among the controlling Powers. The last factor is specially important. None of them will act powerfully when the memory of the war is fresh and when Germany is weak from defeat, but they will operate with increasing effect when, perhaps imperceptibly, she is regaining strength—that is to say, in the very situation which control is designed to meet.

#### FRUSTRATION OF FORMER ATTEMPT

We cannot afford, however convinced we may be that history does not exactly repeat itself, to neglect the lessons of the recent experience of Germany's disarmament. Last time, as now, a large coalition came into being in order to bring about her defeat. At the moment of the defeat, the principal Powers which had contributed to it had no difficulty in agreeing that the unilateral disarmament of Germany to a low level ought to be effected and maintained,

<sup>1</sup> H. Rauschnig: *Hitler Speaks*, p. 14 (Butterworth, 1939).

pending a general agreement on reduction of armaments. There was one major exception, Russia. Though she had been a principal belligerent for the greater part of the war, Russia neither desired nor was desired, and in any event was not at the time able, to assume the rôle of one of the guarantors of the settlement. Indeed, she was in greater danger from her former allies than from Germany, and in 1922 made a compact with Germany which actually assisted the German war party in overcoming the disarmament provisions of the Treaty. But Britain, France, Italy, and the United States all agreed to the policy of disarmament, and (except Italy) shared the initial burdens of the military occupation of German territory which was designed as a guarantee for the execution of the provisions of the Treaty.

For one only of the principal Allies—France—was the continued disarmament of Germany the supreme object of policy. France had not, it is true, been able to buttress disarmament with all the supports which she herself desired, Clemenceau having sacrificed claims such as that for the Rhine frontier, pressed on him by his military advisers, to the necessity of maintaining a common Allied front. As a reinsurance against a Germany grown strong in spite of the Treaty provisions, he obtained the Anglo-American guarantee. This guarantee having lapsed, and the reinsurance afforded by the League Covenant appearing to France to be of small importance, it remained to her (while building up alliances with Germany's other neighbours, none of them Great Powers) to insist on the strict observance of the military clauses. The first great breach in the system was the rejection of the Treaty by the United States, which in its separate treaty with Germany, while reserving many of the rights which the Treaty of Versailles conferred on the other Powers, renounced the duties of common obligation. The withdrawal of the American forces of occupation, completed in 1923, clearly proclaimed that the Allies could not count on parallel American action if they were to use force in order to ensure obedience. The limited interest of Italy and Britain in the fulfilment of the military clauses of the Treaty became evident almost as soon as that of the United States. The chief reason, no doubt, was that both these Powers had secured the destruction of that which they had severally felt to be the menace immediately concerning them, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and German naval power respectively. Nevertheless, none of the major European Allies gave any sign of formally condoning Germany's rearmament until after

Germany had left the Disarmament Conference (October, 1933) and the process of massive rearmament had begun. Thereafter, Italy came to regard the growth of German power with an ever more contingent disapproval, and finally to accept and promote it. Britain, though conscious that German rearmament would menace her, greatly underestimated its possibilities in relation to her own total armed strength, as if imagining that, so long as Germany's sea power was not comparable with her own, danger would threaten her only in the second degree. In her official policies she kept in line with France, though tending to drag the step.

During the time that Germany remained theoretically disarmed, the war party was working behind the scenes, so that when Hitler came to power preparations for the initiation of large-scale rearmament were well advanced.<sup>1</sup> But by 1933 the mass production of conspicuous armament had not begun. Britain and France still possessed an enormous security balance in their favour; within five or six years it had turned into an enormous deficit.

Germany's disarmament may conveniently be regarded as falling into two periods of approximately seven years each, divided by the admission of Germany to the League. In the former period, the Allied commissions of control of the state of Germany's armaments operated to some extent in Germany under the provisions of the Treaty. Early in the latter period, the last of these commissions was withdrawn,<sup>2</sup> the Council of the League of Nations retaining the right under the Treaty to order investigations by a majority vote.

The conditions governing the entry of a new Member to the League required that it "shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval, and air forces and armaments." In the case of Germany the Assembly was

<sup>1</sup> Major Wurtsiedler, in a talk given on the Deutschlandsender on May 26, 1941, said: "The Versailles Treaty stipulated the almost 100 per cent scrapping of German armaments of the last war, and the almost complete destruction of German armament industry. But one thing the enemy forgot to forbid to Germany, the mental occupation with a new armament and its spiritual preparation. Germany's will for defence they could not enslave, and thus, in the early times of the collapse, the bases for a new rearmament were laid in spite of all commissions and supervision. Military development in other countries was carefully studied, officers were trained, and following the experiences of the World War, a new military research, construction, and testing activity began. As very little support could be obtained from the country itself, the Armoury Department of the Army had to carry out most of its measures on its own initiative and responsibility. Therefore, when the Fuehrer came to power in 1933 he found the basis for the further increase of armament already laid."

<sup>2</sup> See footnote, page 51.

content to note that her armaments were regulated by the relevant provisions of the Treaty. The Allies were parties to this decision, though it was common knowledge that their military experts were far from agreeing among themselves that the disarmament imposed by the Treaty had been carried out effectively. Even if it be conceded that the measure of material disarmament actually achieved was substantial enough to justify the Allies (moved as they were by strong political inducements) in accepting it as for practical purposes sufficient, it was clear to those who knew the real situation that there had been little moral disarmament among the military and other ruling groups. However, it was hoped that regular association with the other Powers on a basis of equality (except for armaments) would render Germany peace-minded, especially as the general reduction of armaments to which the disarmament of Germany was to be the prelude was expected to be accomplished within a very few years.

To draw lessons from this experience would be to re-write much of the inter-war history, but we may perhaps indicate some of the crucial issues. It is clear that under a policy of ostensible trust, in which the responsible political leaders of Germany were to meet those of the Allies frequently and on cordial terms, the maintenance of unilateral disarmament would be felt both by Germany and by all those who had not directly suffered from her aggressions as an anomaly. True, there were other Members of the League—Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria—whose armaments were also limited by treaty, but they were not in a position where their inequality of rights could weigh much upon the proceedings. Germany was a permanent member of the Council—that is, one of the prefects of the system. It ought therefore to have been obvious that Germany would value her position at Geneva largely as a means of pressing for the removal of “discrimination” and the attainment of “equality.” We do not wish to raise at this point such important questions as whether German membership of any future political association should wait until her associates are prepared to lift all the special precautions; or whether all thought of creating a political association should be laid aside because of the embarrassment which, under conditions of unilateral disarmament, it is likely to provoke. Experience does, however, suggest that the fundamental matter of Germany’s disarmament, or its merging in a general system as envisaged in the Charter, should always be discussed on real security grounds, without pretence; above all, that Germany’s



entry into or continued membership of an association should not be bought by tacit connivance at her rearmament.

However slight their real means of action, the presence of the commissions of control referred to above was to some extent a guarantee against clandestine rearmament inside Germany, while not affecting arms manufacture on her behalf in other countries. The same results could hardly be expected from the mere possession by the Council of the right to require an investigation to take place. Under this system some Government had to take upon itself the onus of reporting infractions. The only case in which that happened while Germany was still an active Member of the League concerned a small Power, Hungary, and no actual investigation took place. Many of the facts of Germany's preparations were certainly known to the Allies through their military attachés and other sources of information, but there was no automatic procedure by which they could be officially noticed, much less acted upon. The situation might have been considerably different if that most passive of the League's Commissions, the Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval, and Air Questions, had been instructed to report to the Council on these matters. While, then, the Locarno-League policy set in motion forces tending to shorten the period of discrimination against German armaments, but was theoretically compatible with the maintenance of strict technical control so long as that period lasted, the abolition of the commissions of control was a breach in the technical efficiency of the control itself.

The Allies possessed another powerful weapon in the occupation of parts of German territory. To obtain the evacuation of these territories was the principal aim of German policy in the early years of her League membership, and her success was such that the last troops were withdrawn five years before the period fixed by the Treaty came to an end. The expectation that by this concession Germany would be wholly won over to a co-operative policy was a sentimental error; it was obvious that the Germans would regard the evacuation merely as a very limited restoration of their undoubted rights, and in no way as a favour. Two lessons seem to emerge: first, that the length of time of an occupation of German territory should lie within the discretion of the Allies and should not be the subject of a contract with Germany; second, that the guarantees of unilateral disarmament should not be reduced piecemeal, but only when the time may come to remove all dis-

crimination against Germany—that is, when a “general system of security” is on foot.

Even though guarantees such as military occupation and inspection by commissions of control had been abandoned, it was still possible, so long as the Rubicon of the open manufacture of the forbidden weapons had not been passed, to hope that German armaments would be kept at or near the Treaty level through a general agreement. The crucial test came when all hope of agreement failed and Germany proceeded unmistakably to recreate her war machine. Then the choice lay between preventive war and acquiescence, the second choice of course implying that all the precautions taken previously were vain as well as costly. Such a situation obtained between October, 1933, when Germany's refusal to form part of a co-operative system was manifest (if the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference had been mere tactics, it would not have been accompanied by withdrawal from the League) and March, 1936, when the last opportunity occurred of employing an armament still in many respects superior, as well as a superior strategical position.

By that time, however, the original inequality of interest which had underlain the outward acceptance of a common policy towards Germany had developed into the most violent conflict of cross-purposes. Already in September, 1931, Japan had inaugurated the series of military aggressions which led to the present war. Italy took a year to digest the lesson of Germany's defiance and of the passivity of the other Powers, and then, in the beginning of 1935, raised the curtain on the Ethiopian drama. British opinion throughout this period never seriously contemplated intervening against Germany by force; it was convinced that France had contributed at least as much as Germany to the failure of the Disarmament Conference, and for a long time after he had made the break Hitler held out hopes that perhaps disarmament might after all be saved. France remained in the same position as in 1919, imbued with a purpose which still seemed inflexible to prevent the military resurrection of Germany. In March, 1935, Germany officially and openly repudiated the Treaty disarmament clauses, assisted by the diplomatic diversion caused by Italy's now openly aggressive intentions. In the following month the League received from France a denunciation of Germany's violation of the Treaty clauses, but even from France no proposals for coercive action. In June,

Britain concluded the Anglo-German naval agreement. This agreement shattered that which all the Anglo-French disputes during the inter-war period had left intact, the common front in regard to the disarmament provisions of the Treaty. The enormous difference in the public appreciation of the event in the two countries—the French public dismayed beyond measure and finding in it a justification for their dissident Ethiopian policy, and the British public quite unaware that anything important had happened—is indicative of the different order of importance which the two countries attached to the Treaty arrangements. From Germany's viewpoint the situation was wholly satisfactory. Twenty-one months previously she had rightly calculated that, in the then temper of the Powers, her withdrawal from the League would weaken and not (as the simple-minded might have expected) reinforce the will of the threatened nations to resist collectively. She now succeeded in turning the obstacle presented by a common Anglo-French front on disarmament, first by proclaiming with impunity unlimited rearmament by land, next by mollifying the naval power through self-limitation at sea.

#### REFLECTIONS ON FRANCE'S EXPERIENCE

Apart from other causes tending to frustrate the Versailles attempt to keep Germany disarmed, we can see that the inequality of interest of the controlling Powers was important in proportion as the most interested Power was compelled to pay attention to the views of the others. It is therefore particularly instructive to examine carefully the former position of France, not in criticism, nor in forgetfulness of the changed circumstances, nor with the thought that misunderstandings with France are intrinsically more important than misunderstandings with the United States, or Russia; but because France, alone of the principal Allies, subordinated policy entirely to the objective of keeping Germany militarily weak. Britain was being led to sponsor another policy towards Germany by arguments and feelings of various kinds, fully exploited by German propaganda: an easy view of German intentions; humanitarian resentment against the real sufferings of the German people, regarded as largely the result of the coercive policy; unwillingness to pay for that policy in money and personal military service; the desire to see a good customer prosperous, so that unemployment might be reduced; a long tradition of security. None of these considerations acted powerfully on the consciousness of the French

people, but France had to take account of the preferences of an Ally on whom they did act. She tried to follow two main lines of policy—the prevention of German armament at all costs, and the maintenance of the Entente. When the two lines crossed, she continued to follow the latter, with increasing reluctance, until June, 1940, when a French Government abandoned the Entente in conditions which meant not that France could impose her will on Germany, but the reverse.

To some extent France herself contributed to the unequal interest in Germany's disarmament felt by the former Allies. Fundamentally, she was convinced that German prosperity and her own security were incompatible; but in seeking to weaken Germany economically she touched Britain and the United States on a sensitive spot. They were desirous of restoring trade with Germany, and were coming to the conclusion that not only attempts to enforce reparation payments but the very existence of long-term obligations on a large scale were a major obstacle to commercial stability and prosperity.<sup>1</sup> France, as the chief creditor, was understandably reluctant to forgo her claims. She also, by her coldness towards measures of relief to Germans after the war, offended the powerful forces of Anglo-Saxon humanitarianism, none the less genuine because they were more easily aroused in the case of the potentially dangerous Germans than in that of Allies, such as Yugoslavs or Poles, whose need was greater. Lastly, while demanding that all should be aware of the latent threat to France of German aggression, large sections of French opinion regarded with a singular indifference, in some cases even tended to condone, actual aggression committed by countries other than Germany against countries other than herself. France, of course, felt and expressed corresponding grievances against her critics, but these are not in point here. We are attempting not to decide who was right, but to understand the particular position of France as the country which all were agreed to consider the most exposed.

One may ask whether, by aligning her policy entirely on that of the western Powers (in so far as they agreed), and thus paying an intolerable forfeit to the fate which made her a buffer between them and Germany, France could have induced them to insist on the continued disarmament of Germany, by force if necessary. In the

<sup>1</sup> From 1925 onwards, American lending to Germany temporarily obviated the transfer problem of reparation payments, but meant, in effect, that the American investing public were paying reparations for Germany.

case of the United States, this obviously would not have been so. In the case of Britain also it would be rash to give positively an affirmative answer; but it seems probable that France would have rendered the word "security" less tiresome to British ears if she had given it a less private meaning, and also had been less inclined to expect Britain to endorse all her aims in respect of Germany. In the search for security France might alternatively, while in the fullness of her military strength, have turned her back on Britain altogether. With Poland and the Little Entente she might, for a time, have carried through a policy of vigilant repression towards Germany, far less embarrassed by commercial and sentimental counter-currents than when her policy had to be concerted with that of the Anglo-Saxons. It is not necessary to pursue this idea far to realize that even on the most favourable hypothesis—namely, that the policy towards Germany was offset by a policy towards the rest of Europe so liberal as to keep not only Poland, Belgium, and the Little Entente but even Italy to a common alignment, and by an industrial leadership so effective as to compensate in some measure for the dwindling of the German market—the net result might have been a high degree of sympathy and understanding between the western Powers and Germany.

Whatever be the means and the conditions of a lasting recovery in France, the political and technical circumstances have disappeared under which she could be counted upon to serve as a march, holding up the enemy while Britain under naval cover completed her mobilization. The position of Britain after the present war may resemble that previously held by France, in that she might receive, in whole or in part, the first shock of a German westwards drive. By the same force of things America will be moved a stage nearer the scene of possible danger. For these reasons France's preoccupations are worth meditating upon by those who formerly regarded them with critical detachment.

#### ARMS AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

The principles of the Charter were declared by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and have been endorsed by the U.S.S.R. It may be hoped that the provisions for the disarmament of Germany, when the time comes definitely to formulate them, will be agreed, and will continue to be enforced, by all three Powers, to speak for the moment of these only. It would however be wise to remember the experi-

ence of last time, and to be on guard against the danger that there may be the same waiting upon events and, at the crucial moments, the same spirit of procrastinating optimism as was displayed, not least by ourselves, in October, 1933, March, 1935, and March, 1936. Possibly this time Britain would be for action, and others for delay. The prospect of Germany again successfully reaching out towards rearmament under cover of the "unequal interest" of the Allies is mentioned only because we should see things at their reasonably possible worst, as well as at their reasonably possible best. But Britain must be prepared to face it should it again appear, and must be ready to make, while she is still stronger than Germany, a clear decision between the two alternatives—to carry through the disarmament policy alone if need be and to its last consequence (i.e., preventive war), or to adopt a new policy.

Looking towards the objects of policy attainable by force, we are led to the conclusion that the prevention of German rearmament is the only measure of coercion on which Britain should insist unconditionally. This does not mean that our diplomacy is precluded from urging measures of coercion in other fields; but we must accept the consequences of the fact that, for the execution of all measures of coercion in conditions which would seem to us tolerable, we are dependent on the co-operation of allies. On disarmament we shall presumably insist in view of the joint declaration already made, but on all other matters which may involve coercion we should, while expecting our views to be given full weight, look to the working out between great and small nations of a genuinely agreed settlement which will stand the test of time. We should carefully avoid both the fact and the appearance of expecting a mere endorsement of our own proposals, nor should we allow secondary aims, however important, to interfere with our main purpose. Especially is there a danger that too comprehensive a range and too elaborate a paraphernalia of coercion in other fields may defeat their own object, blunting the edge of the will to maintain the military disablement which is the essential.

Let us now consider what relevance the idea of "co-operation" in this sphere might have, and in what conditions. There is one hypothesis which would not need to be mentioned, were it not that account must be taken of all currents of opinion that have been in evidence in recent years. The idea not only of co-operation but of preferential co-operation with Germany, in military as in other matters, has not wholly lacked support in Britain during times of

peace, whether in the form of the old "together we can impose our will" appeal, or of armed anti-Bolshevism. At the end of the last century the proposal for an Anglo-German alliance encountered Holstein's *Grosses Nein*; but the idea that Britain's connivance at Germany's expansionist aims should be specially cultivated was influential in Germany, and was vigorously expressed in *Mein Kampf*<sup>1</sup> itself. A policy of this kind would inevitably be cast in the German mould of the would-be domination of others. Of the two privileged partners, Britain, having surrendered to German ideas, would soon in other respects become Germany's vassal. It is a safe inference from history that the German war party will propagate the idea either of a close understanding or of a delimitation of spheres of interest with great energy and perseverance, hoping thereby to ensure, should the time come to renew the bid for world power, the "Vichyfication" of Britain. On the assumption that the victory over German militarism is intellectual as well as physical, this endeavour will be heavily defeated. But the war party will be able to rely on certain advantages; and not the least is the tendency to think rather better of one's ex-enemy and rather less well of one's ex-Allies, which belongs to the dialectics of strife.

Together with attempts to divide British opinion, equally great efforts will unquestionably be made to win over feeling in the United States and to estrange it from Britain and her associates in the war. Once the Nazis are destroyed, a large section of American opinion will be watchful for signs of Britain or other European states appearing unduly harsh towards Germany or unduly insistent on their own rights and interests. As we know from previous experience, both in the United States and in Britain, feelings of this kind, while sometimes inspired by a genuine ideal of fair-mindedness, can be muddled and sentimental. They are easily worked upon by a propaganda designed, first, to cancel Germany's obligations; secondly, to represent any opposition to her further aims as selfish and absurd, a Canute-like defiance of the "wave of the future."

There remains co-operation in the sense of neighbourly dealings with Germany as with other countries. Co-operation implies willingness to base relations on free agreement, and in military matters the necessary condition of such an agreement would be the removal of the special measures imposed on Germany under the sanction of force. An agreement, if and when the conditions for it are realized,

<sup>1</sup> Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf* (translated by James Murphy), p. 541 (Hurst and Blackett, 1939).

would presumably take one of three forms: (a) an agreement to admit the right of Germany, as of other states, to the unfettered development of her military strength; (b) an agreed general limitation of national armaments; (c) an agreed international merging of armaments.

For its ultimate goal the Atlantic Charter looks to the "establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security," "pending" which aggressor states are to remain disarmed. No time limit is given within which this system is to be established, just as under the Treaty of Versailles no time limit was prescribed for the "initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations," which the undertaking of Germany to observe the military, naval, and air clauses of the Treaty was to "render possible." Presumably the "wider and permanent system" is to be sought in agreement with Germany if possible, since if this possibility were to be excluded it would be unwise to suggest in advance that the restrictions on German armaments might be temporary. Those who have criticized the Treaty and the Charter on the ground that unilateral disarmament is not regarded as permanent give the impression that the authors of these two instruments committed avoidable acts of folly. However, not only the logic of the Allies' war-time professions, which in the last war proved a powerful agent of the enemy's internal collapse, but the logic of the democratic conception of inter-state relations, forbids them to assume that discrimination must necessarily be permanent. This attitude does not indeed simplify the practical problem. On the one hand, discrimination which might be lifted only after one or two generations is permanent in the eyes of those on whom it is placed; on the other, the security of Europe must be set above questions of feeling.

An agreed "permanent system of general security," the establishment of which will alone justify the cessation of unilateral precautions, will no doubt include the international inspection and control of armaments. Certainly that which opened a free armaments competition to all comers could hardly be called a "system of general security." If this were to be the end, the measures of unilateral disarmament would almost certainly prove to have been nothing more than an obstacle race for the better training of aggressors. Whether Europe in future can rely on co-operation and mutual support, rather than on the enforced subordination of any one or more countries, will depend in the first place on the attitudes of the industrially and militarily powerful states. It is also, however,



important that by arrangements with those Powers, preferably as part of a general system, the states which are intrinsically less strong should build up a defensive position which is not so weak as almost to invite Germany to attempt their subjection.

It is true that a condition of incomplete helplessness in any of Germany's neighbours is very much what Germans mean by 'encirclement'. The 'encirclement' of Germany by strength instead of weakness might indeed introduce a new and hopeful feature into the depressingly familiar picture—namely, that Germany would value the co-operative system as a protection for herself. In the inter-war period, though the war party, aided by the Ruhr adventure, was able to play upon genuine atavistic fears, it was well aware that the small Allies in their weakness, and the big Allies in their various stages of propitiatory penitence, represented no danger. It understood only too well that its own designs, and not the Allied superiority of arms, carried the real threat. A fully co-operative system assumes the immediate and full performance of obligations of mutual help. The war party would doubtless be capable of intriguing with Germany's neighbours to provoke trouble, and thus obtain a pretext for rearmament. To avoid this result, the Powers enforcing disarmament must be prepared to ensure the defence of the disarmed territory, and the responsibility which they incur in this respect will be great in proportion as disarmament is pushed to the point of the denial of all armed power whatsoever.<sup>1</sup>

But is the only practicable "system of general security" one in which all the states of Europe have their independent military establishments, though under conditions of control? The argument for the merging of national forces might derive some strength from the difficulty of maintaining, for an unlimited time, the suppression of national forces in some European countries, and their development in others. The mixing process, if attempted, might be partial at the commencement, beginning with the air force and civil aviation, the navy and the heavy mechanical arms, and applying only to Powers with very great confidence in one another. By the time the war is ended much may have happened to throw light on

<sup>1</sup> Stalin evidently does not expect that the disarmament of Germany, the principle of which he has accepted like the other signatories of the Charter, should proceed to this extreme. "Our aim is not to destroy all armed force in Germany, because any intelligent man will understand that this is as impossible in the case of Germany as in the case of Russia. It would be unreasonable on the part of the victor to do so. To destroy Hitler's army is possible and necessary." (Speech on eve of twenty-fifth anniversary of Soviet Revolution, quoted in *The Times*, November 7, 1942.)

these possibilities. There have already been on the Allied side certain experiments in military internationalism, but they are not conclusive, and it would be unwise to belittle the great strength of nationalistic feeling in this domain. From Britain's point of view it would be important that the merging of military forces, if brought about, should be over a sufficiently wide area. If it were confined to Europe, the danger of an attempt by German militarists or their sympathizers to seize the levers of command would be real. As in the case of the internationalization of heavy industry, it is the nature of the political direction which would be decisive. Should such be the trend of military organization, the world will look to Britain so to use her influence that military power may serve the cause of civilization, and not the reverse; it will look to her political capacity to avert the repetition, on a vaster plane, of the nineteenth-century experiment by which German militarism took possession of a larger unity, which liberal thought had inspired, but failed to consolidate, organize, and control.

## VII. IDEAS: PROSPECTS OF CO-OPERATION

### A CHANGED GERMAN MENTALITY: OUTLINES OF THE PROBLEM

No one can deny that a policy which after victory neglected the challenge of Nazi ideas would be incomplete. Yet the term 're-education of Germany', under which this problem is commonly discussed, requires analysis.

The starting-point is clear. Nazism, carrying to a higher power tendencies which have long been present in Germany, has deeply perverted, in a manner dangerous to the peace of other nations, the mental and moral outlook of those who have come under its sway, especially the younger people. These are brought within a system of ideas designed to make them approve all the decisions of their leaders, which in this war include such horrors<sup>1</sup> as the progressive extermination of one people, the Jews, the enslavement or subordination of others, and the merciless savagery displayed in the occupied countries. The belief in the unlimited right of the

<sup>1</sup> A qualified observer has written: "A study of German propaganda during the war shows that these horrors are carefully concealed from the German people, and that they are consistently told that the German authorities behave with humanity and strictly observe the principle of international law. The propaganda authorities do not wish to strain too much the German attitude of indifference towards the acts of the state." But after a sufficiently long period of the kind of education outlined in *Education for Death* (G. Ziemer, Constable, 1942), would much concealment be necessary?

strong which is at the root of this perversion possesses, it is true, some minds in most countries, and one of the results of the German aggression may well be to spread the infection. However, though this is an evil rooted in the nature of man in general and not of Germans only, we are compelled to give it close attention in a study of the German problem, because modern Germany has been without question its European focus. In Germany, far more than elsewhere in Europe, the doctrines of force have been supported by philosophy, implanted by education, and over a long period of years have appeared justified by results.

There are many unknown factors. We do not know how deeply the specifically Nazi ideology may have sunk in; it would be rash to say that a majority of the Germans had accepted the whole of it, even with the regime still undefeated. We should not think of the Germans as constituting, in respect of the need for a new mental outlook, a homogeneous mass, though in a summary treatment like the present it is not possible to draw all the necessary distinctions, and though certain doctrines current in pre-Nazi days, which still prevail, are as fatal to prospects of a co-operative order as the Nazi doctrines themselves. We do not know what deposit the actual experiences of the war will have left in the minds of the Germans, or in our own minds. We cannot adequately enter into the thoughts of the oppressed peoples, and even less than they can we know what post-fascist Europe will really be like. But these uncertainties, and a temperamental reluctance because of moles in our own eye to focus on a very obvious beam in another's eye, do not excuse us from facing the international issue presented by the mental plague which has overrun Germany. There may be a middle way between the superficial pretension of supposing that one nation, or group of nations, can simply undertake to "re-educate" another nation, and mere passivity. Let us then consider what, if change be possible, we should desire to see changed; how these changes might be imagined as coming about; and what part (if any) foreign nations, especially Britain, might play in the process.

That we may not deem the task to be light, let us first reflect that Germany herself makes great claims—which country more?—to teach others. Moreover, until quite recently, the western world has been an attentive pupil. Germany's strategic, economic, social, even her political ideas made deep inroads, which German policy followed up in order to attain a clear objective, the neutralization of possible opposition to her expansionist aims. In undertaking

the defeat of this political attempt we need not unlearn all the lessons which the process of east-to-west education may have taught us. This kind of assimilation of ideas is inevitable in a prolonged struggle, and is not new in Britain's history. But there are certain positions from which we cannot possibly retreat.

The object which those who stress the need for education to take a new turn in Germany seem more particularly to have in mind is that the individual German's outlook on international affairs may be changed. If, for instance, in school, camp, and barracks he learns that his is a *Herrenvolk*, against whose rights and needs those of other peoples cannot be weighed on any common scale, the foundations of peace, we feel, remain most insecure. To clear the mind of these dangerous notions is naturally the first need, and this might be accepted by some as in itself a sufficient programme. But the difficulty of preserving a vacuum urges us on to the attempt to define the aim more positively. What new beliefs, relevant to his outlook on international affairs, is it purposed that the individual German should acquire? Is it that the German people, so far from being a master-race, is a nation congenitally inferior to the Slavs and Latins that surround it? This is merely German racialism stood on its head. Is it the broader lesson that aggressive war "doesn't pay"? This is indeed a most important lesson to master, but how will its truth be demonstrated to those—and there must be many of them among such as have passed through the Nazi educational mill—for whom no other activity "pays" or has much significance? Is it that aggressive war is morally wrong? In so far as the "education" of Germany was considered after the last war, this was the thought that was uppermost. On this view, the essential task was to bring home to Germans the sense of war-guilt. It is a fact that this sense, accompanied by a certain willingness to make amends, did then exist to some extent, and that Hitler's earliest speeches fastened upon it as an error which it was particularly necessary to uproot from the German mind.

Certainly it is more important to believe that to make war is wrong even if it does pay, than merely to believe that war does not pay. Any policy which condones the moral iniquity of Germany's behaviour will surely be ineffective in creating a healthier outlook. However, it may be doubted if condemnation of the imprudence or wickedness of war is the surest mainstay of positive action. Perhaps we shall come nearer the heart of the matter if we name as being one of the lessons which the Germans might most profitably

learn from their experience the conviction that political leaders who are unscrupulous in their international dealings inevitably act unscrupulously towards their own people as well. The kind of Government which, acting on the view that for a *Herrenvolk* might is always right, treats other peoples as Germany has treated Europe, is also the kind of Government which subjects its own people to the spying and dragooning of the police, destroys the judicial machine, and rules tyrannically. There is a converse lesson to be learned by foreigners. Whether this insight, if acquired, could result in action would largely depend on whether the Germans can abandon their fatalistic attitude towards public life, especially in its international aspect.

For, fundamentally, the issue is whether the Germans are right in believing or assuming—as not only Nazi teaching but the dominant tradition of German political thought generally seems to believe or assume—that this is a dog world in which you must be either top-dog or under-dog.<sup>1</sup> If we believe, as many do everywhere, that this is the truth about international relations, we have no ground for condemning German teaching and practice in this respect. But it is essential to the political thought at least of the democracies that the relations of states can be co-operative and that they are not in their very essence predatory, because man is not only a predatory being (as he obviously is) but actually, and not merely in an ideal sense, a co-operative being also. To consider the conditions on which the co-operative impulse can become master might bring in the whole of politics, ethics, and religion. We have no desire to challenge the Germans to a general metaphysical contest. We merely note that unless the idea of co-operation as a possible and natural state of international relationships finds a lodgement in the German mind, clearing away the lumber of inevitable wars, master and slave races, the rights of the strong, and the like, Germany will continue to be a country alongside which it is impossible

<sup>1</sup> G. Ziemer: *Education for Death*, p. 62 (Constable, 1942): "The teacher pointed out the moral, which I noted: 'This struggle is a natural struggle. Life could not go on without it. That is why the Fuehrer wants his boys to be strong, so they can be the aggressors and the victors, not the victims. Life and nature respect only the strong and big. Germany will be strong. The Fuehrer will make it so strong that it can go out and attack any foe the wide world over.'"

Cf. also H. J. Mackinder: *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p. 232 (Constable, 1919): "Kultur meant that, being obsessed with the idea of competition and natural selection, as finally expressed in Darwinism, and being frightened, the Prussians decided that if, in the end, men must come to man-eating in order to survive, they, at any rate, would be the cannibals! So they assiduously cultivated the strength and efficiency of the prize-fighter."

to live. Though it would be comfortable to take for granted the meaning of the terms commonly used in discussing this topic, we have thought it useful to try to analyse their meaning; and also, in an appendix, to sketch broadly the philosophical background.

A "co-operative mentality," in the sense of a co-operative outlook on international affairs in the individual German, may then be taken as a rough and ready description of what is commonly desired to be the object of a change of mind in Germany. But even more than for the co-operative mentality of the individual the world will be looking in future for signs of co-operative policy on the part of the German state. Even in a democracy, the policy of a Government cannot well be construed as being simply the direct expression of the mentality of the individual citizens at a given time. Be the German individual of the future never so "co-operative," can there be any confidence that the effective rulers of the state will necessarily have the same disposition? Moreover, a Government now commands to an increasing degree the power itself to create a particular state of mind among its citizens. But the mentality of the individual German is still a relevant factor. While it will need a great deal of changing before it becomes such as to render impossible the adoption, in similar conditions and under similar leadership, of policies similar to those adopted in the recent past, the policy of a co-operative Government would in the long run be frustrated if the general disposition remained uncooperative.

How, then, is the desired result to be achieved? There are some who are completely sceptical of the possibility of changing the outlook of any people, and especially the German people. At the other extreme are those who are very confident in the power of education to effect great changes. This confidence is expressed in two quite different ways. The Germans themselves, in some of the occupied countries, have been practising an educational policy which consists in a forceful conditioning of the subject peoples to the belief that they are both compelled by circumstances and destined by nature to serve their German masters. On the other hand, some, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, appear to have such faith in the possibility of a change of outlook as to trust to it entirely for future security. In this they surely over-estimate the power of persuasion no less grossly than the Germans the power of force.

We do not think these extreme positions to be tenable. The essence of the matter is that a new German outlook, though not impossible, will, if it is to endure, be necessarily a slow growth, and

that though it can be promoted or retarded by the acts or omissions of foreigners, it must essentially be a spontaneous German development. Moreover it will be brought about, if at all, less through precept than by the workings of experience and a new environment. The mind of the individual will be impressed, especially in the immediate post-war period when it will be most impressionable, by the answers which the facts supply to questions such as: Do the war-makers appear to 'get away with it'? Do foreigners continue to prefer Germany's former ruling cliques? Are there jobs? Is there food? Is Germany, as such, flattered, as if from fear? Is Germany, as such, apparently outcast for ever? We shall consider later some of these environmental factors in their relation to the state and the community rather than the individual. But teaching, propaganda, and other direct means of affecting the mind of the individual are also important.

#### TEACHING

The educational system of Germany under the Nazis is total in that it aims at giving by suitable training and instruction a particular impress to the whole personality. To the individual whose value according to western ideas is absolute, Nazi education opposes the unconditional supremacy of the *Volk*. In the scale of educational values the acquisition of knowledge comes far behind bodily fitness and will power.<sup>1</sup> Objective truth is secondary and not always to be desired. "Truth . . . is what you wish to be true; false is whatever you wish to be false."<sup>2</sup> Thus science and also art and other forms of culture are to obey the political idea. Religious beliefs attaching to objects outside the time-process are systematically attacked; Hitler is to be enthroned in the mind of the young as the Messiah of the Folkish cult. The immediate didactic purpose of the system is to foster racial pride and aggressiveness in the service of the *Volk* and its Fuehrer.<sup>3</sup>

After the war the state is bound to control in an important measure, if no longer absolutely, the principal means of forming

<sup>1</sup> Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf* (translated by James Murphy), p. 342 (Hurst and Blackett, 1939).

<sup>2</sup> H. C. Engelbrecht: *Johann Gottlieb Fichte*, p. 48 (New York, 1933).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H. Rauschning: *Hitler Speaks*, p. 247 (Thornton Butterworth, London 1939): ". . . In my *Ordensburgen* a youth will grow up before which the world will shrink back. A violently active, dominating, intrepid, brutal youth—that is what I am after. Youth must be all those things. It must be indifferent to pain. There must be no weakness or tenderness in it. I want to see once more in its eyes the gleam of pride and independence of the beast of prey . . . I shall eradicate the thousands of years of human domestication."

opinion. The primary question, therefore, is whether the dominant influence in a defeated Germany will be such as to set the course of public affairs and instruction in a new and healthy direction, and to overcome internal resistance. We can but speculate on the answer. As the time draws near, no doubt much reliable information will come through concerning the strength of any co-operative-minded elements in Germany, and it will be important that the policy of the democracies should be such as to favour any genuine attempts made by such elements to establish free institutions. If they were to obtain the real and not merely the nominal control of the government machine (a result which presupposes great changes in the distribution of social no less than of political power), the whole character of the public enlightenment which reaches the German individual through the various media of instruction and propaganda would be radically altered. The consequent practical problems would be immense. There is, already, a shortage of teachers in Germany, but, even so, teachers obstinately opposed to the new ideas would need to be weeded out. After the last war, the continued adherence of many teachers, especially in the secondary schools, to the traditional doctrines had an important part in preparing the soil for the Nazi seed. In the universities the task of restoring learning to its former high place in German life would need to be undertaken; the restrictions placed by the Nazis on the numbers of students admissible to universities overcome, and better facilities provided for those qualified on their merits to enter; above all, the anti-intellectualist trend imparted by the Nazis reversed. There would be the problem whether the special establishments set up for the training of a Nazi élite should continue to be employed for any purpose and, if so, on what conditions. It would have to be decided whether some form of organized youth movement should be envisaged, and, if so, whether it should be compulsory, in order to impart a new *Weltanschauung*; or optional, in order to give a chance to confessional or other sectional movements, or to family life, or to youthful freedom. The yoke of Goebbels would be lifted from radio, press, and cinema, but some control would no doubt still be required, especially in the immediate post-war period.

In the case of such a development, the contribution of foreigners would consist chiefly in facilitating the exchanges and contacts likely to assist it. There will doubtless be in Germany after defeat a great eagerness on the part of intellectual workers to acquaint



themselves with the movement of ideas in other countries which has been concealed from them under the Nazi regime. There will be a corresponding popular movement to see the forbidden films and hear the forbidden news, and generally give rein to the genuine German impulse of curiosity concerning the outside world which the orgy of national self-adulation will not have destroyed. To make use of a moment which may be fleeting, it might be a service to prepare in advance translations of representative new books banned from Germany, up-to-date textbooks free of the Nazi *Weltanschauung*, short objective histories of recent events, and the like. The direct propaganda of foreign ideas should be avoided; the Germans will absorb these, if at all, from books written by foreigners for foreigners, and made immediately available in translation. Moreover, we should not expect those elements with which we might wish to make contact, as having resisted Nazism, to reflect our own outlook. For instance, when the story comes to be told, it may well be found that the Christian Churches were citadels wherein many German individuals refused to surrender, and afford as well-trying a bridge as any for an understanding with the West. If this be so, German Christianity will be nearer the Christian mind of the West in that it will, by hypothesis, have refused tribute to the racial idol. But the very experience of being thrown back into something like the mind and condition of the primitive Church will leave it more estranged even than it has always been from the easy and optimistic attitudes characteristic of much of western Christianity.

In this set of circumstances one can imagine British and other foreign scientists, teachers, and psychologists being asked by the Germans to pool with them their ideas as to the best methods of recovery. What these methods might be is a technical question on which we do not feel competent to develop the very general suggestions we have already thrown out. The great issue for British policy would be whether an apparently radical movement in Germany towards co-operation can be reciprocated. Let us suppose that large-scale interchanges of teachers are desired by the Germans as a means of consolidating the new policy, or that a year's study at a foreign university is required for a German degree: shall we be willing to enter into mutual or general arrangements to that effect? If the Germans are willing to allow some powers in these matters to an international educational authority, but only on condition of reciprocity, shall we also accept this condition? If foreign

travel is judged to be an effective means of breaking down German mental isolation, will foreign memories of pre-war German tourism (quite apart from memories of the occupation) allow it to be encouraged? Moreover, discussion of this subject in terms of possible assistance to Germany by her present enemies naturally raises the question whether assistance from perhaps limited resources should not preferably be reserved for those friendly countries where Germany has been busy creating, with malice prepense, an intellectual desert.

Thus, even on the favourable hypothesis that the Germans themselves are ready for a change, the choice is difficult. To assist the change would require that the governments of peoples in whose hearts hatred of the German name will continue to burn should promote, or at least tolerate, a certain degree of close intellectual association with Germany. A moral boycott of Germany, on the other hand, by extending its effects to those who, on our present hypothesis, are trying to make a clean break with the past, might blast any possible first growths of a better mind, and thus spoil a chance of reinforcing security.

If, however, when it is possible to judge the movement of ideas in post-war Germany, no radical change appears probable, especially in policy-forming circles, what is to be done from outside? The belief that the use of sufficient force and "conditioning" will produce any desired psychological result is a German rather than a British illusion; British policy, at any rate, is not likely to espouse such solutions as the taking over, with positive responsibility, of the whole educational system of Germany. Still less will it be seriously believed that good could come of compelling the Germans to promise, in armistice or treaty, to supply a given kind of education. Even if in such instruments wide powers of interference were taken by the United Nations it is doubtful whether they could be usefully employed otherwise than for a limited period, and indeed with a negative and precautionary rather than a creative intent. In the situation now contemplated, our only instrument is force, or persuasion backed by force, and the matter is one which does not in any profound or lasting sense yield to force. Even here, however, a limited degree of force or forceful conditioning may perform a limited but useful service, especially as the real situation will probably not correspond exactly to either of the two extremes we have examined, but will be mixed. Thus, for reasons of immediate military security United Nations control or censorship will pre-

sumably for a time be exercised over the German radio, press, cinema, and other forms of publicity. During this period also, against the will of the German authorities if necessary, the channels of access to foreign literature, films, and the like will be kept clear. Some positive measures might also be taken, such as the preparation and enforced dissemination of a news bulletin of reliable factual information. A commissioner of education might be appointed who, backed by the power of the United Nations, should be able to prevent certain kinds of teaching from being given in schools, and might even, if the attitude of the German authorities is not one of hardened opposition, supply some positive guidance.

All then that seems possible in the way of compulsion by the United Nations are certain limited prohibitions and enforcements, designed to remove the threat to security which the continued open profession of the tenets of aggressive Germanism would represent. A more ambitious programme would probably defeat the main object of policy, namely, to assist possible co-operative elements in Germany herself to gain the upper hand; and it is doubtful whether there could be common agreement among the United Nations upon it. Such deeper and more lasting influence upon German opinion as foreign nations may be destined to exercise is likely to flow from the spontaneous attraction which their ideas and institutions severally possess, rather than from deliberate efforts. Russian influence may be very great in view of the part which Russia is playing in Germany's military defeat, and especially if there is a Communist revolution in Germany. On the other hand, the particular stimulus arising from the novelty of the Russian social and political techniques, which no doubt contributed to the attraction exercised by Russia after the last war, will no longer be so strong. It has been the habit of the Germans to consider themselves as teachers of the Russians, rather than the reverse.

Of the western states the U.S.A. is likely to have the most important influence on the German masses, because of their reverence for productive efficiency and power. The comparative accessibility to American influence, which was noted in Germany after the last war<sup>1</sup> was perhaps due to interest in American industrial and business techniques rather than in American democratic ideals. Yet if there were in the new Germany a revolution of a democratic

<sup>1</sup> "The German accepts an American argument far more readily than that of a European." Viscount d'Abernon: *An Ambassador of Peace*, Vol. I, p.19. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1929).

character it would probably, in so far as it looked outside for inspiration, turn chiefly to the American democratic tradition, as being (unlike the British) expressed in clear and transferable terms.

We must expect the German war party to continue to represent Britain as a decadent country, according to all the rules beaten in the war, to the end that she may not be for the Germans an object of interest or a source of influence. If Britain herself remains unimpressed by these manœuvres, she will continue to command the attention of Germans whatever their professions. She may indeed have less of a mass appeal than the United States or Russia; the Germans will nevertheless be quick to note every sign of renewed vitality which Britain may show in the political, social, and cultural fields.

Britain might therefore contribute appreciably to the desired change in Germany, both by force of example, should that example be one of a renewed democratic faith, and by preparing herself beforehand to make the best use of any educational opportunities. But whatever the possible influence of this or other foreign countries, a permanent new direction can be given to German education only if in Germany herself leaders arise under whom the German masses can learn, in terms which mean something to them, the lessons of democratic freedom, political responsibility, and international co-operation. Undoubtedly this would mean that not only the Nazi party but those who before the Nazi era formed the backbone of aggressive nationalism should be driven from power and kept out of power. In addition to many big landowners and industrial monopolists, this category included leading personalities in the armed forces, the civil service, and the judiciary. Whether the Germans can then develop a political machinery which will enable them to control their rulers, and can learn how to use it, is the outstanding question.<sup>1</sup> The key to the practical problem of re-education in Germany, even in the current sense of the teaching of the individual, is seen to be political organization in the broadest sense.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A point which bears stressing, especially in view of suggestions for the decentralization of power in Germany, is the importance of local government as a school of political responsibility.

<sup>2</sup> Questions dealt with in this sub-section have been recently examined by others in *Education and the United Nations*, the Report of a Joint Commission of the London International Assembly and Council for Education in World Citizenship (Gill, London, 1943).

## LESSONS OF DEFEAT

It is the lessons of actual experience, rather than those conveyed through teaching and propaganda, that will affect the German mind most profoundly. They will affect the thoughts and feelings of the Germans individually. They will affect the impressions which they receive as a *Volk*. Lastly and, for the immediate determination of German policy, principally, they will affect the minds of the rulers of the state, showing what prospects are barred, and what may still be open. The two aspects of the German experience which touch our subject most closely are the experience of defeat and its consequences, and the new European environment. Foreign nations, which can be little more than spectators of the normal educational process, are here actors in chief.

The first great lesson of experience must be the manifest defeat by force of arms of Germany's attempt to destroy the liberties of other nations. If this attempt were to succeed, or if its success were merely deferred, Germany would almost certainly remain under the sway of her present mentality. It is not certain that defeat will have the converse effect; it will not do so if the whole nation should prove to have become so fanaticized by militarism that even so great a shock would not provoke any profound doubt or questionings. This must be expected to be the case with certain groups, perhaps including great numbers of the Nazi youth initiated to mass-murder as a vocation. For the nation as a whole, however, a second defeat will have a profoundly numbing effect, probably more numbing than the first defeat. It should bring the Germans to realize as a matter of brute fact that there are some things which they cannot do, namely, to expand and to dominate at the expense of other peoples. If this conviction takes root in the mind of a people for whom such expansion and domination has been so large a part of political existence, it cannot but result in the overthrow of much of the structure of German society, as well as of many of its master ideas. There will be a time, perhaps short, in which replacement by new materials and fresh designs should be possible. German literature<sup>1</sup> of the period immediately following the last war attests a widespread reaction against the values of militarism. This attitude was not shared by those with a vested interest in militarism, nor can it have been universal among the mass of the people, which in any case did not withstand the subsequent swing-back. However,

<sup>1</sup> e.g., as described by W. K. Pfeiler, in *War and the German Mind* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1941; London, Oxford University Press).

it does not seem that we have had yet a cool appraisal of the extent to which it once existed, or the extent to which it was met by an answering spirit of co-operation on the part of the Allies.

Defeat may again be followed by all the outward signs of a willingness to co-operate on the part of the Germans. What would be more natural in those circumstances than an apparent withdrawal of the former claims of superiority, an apparent eagerness to collaborate in building a new and better order, and an appeal to let bygones be bygones? It would be necessary to examine carefully such a demand: to see where it was an attempt to evade the inevitable consequences of past actions; where it was a feeling after the soft spots of Anglo-Saxon sentimentality; where, under a show of hearty friendship towards powerful ex-enemies, it covered an unchanged mind towards those less powerful nations, such as the Poles and the Czechs, which will always provide the test case for the reality and permanence of a co-operative mentality among Germans. It would be necessary, above all, to look for practical endorsement by the actual makers of policy. There is little hope of a new vision if the groups which have held effective power hitherto continue to do so, whether through direct control of the government machine or, as under the Weimar regime, through the inability of a nominally revolutionary Government to throw off the incubus of the past. Probably Allied policy will be capable of this scrutiny. The real difficulty will arise when it is necessary to decide what response should be given to a change-over to a co-operative mentality, in so far as it is genuine.

The problem does not lie in the severity of the retribution against guilty individuals, or the extent of measures of restitution to which a defeated Germany would be subjected. Obviously, this question of punishment has an important bearing on education, but there is no incompatibility between the two. Some degree of punishment will be necessary that Germany may learn her lesson; it will be the task of statesmanship to discover what degree. Nor does the problem lie in firmness of intention to stop future aggression. Indeed, only on this foundation can we eventually talk peace and co-operation to Germany; on any other, we can talk only appeasement in the worse sense of that word. What would defeat education is a policy of prolonged and deliberate humiliation. The shame and degradation as well as the terror which Germany has imposed on Europe are, it is true, such that in no measurable period of time could atonement be made on an eye-for-an-eye reckoning. In their

individual contacts with other peoples Germans will inevitably be made to feel the effects of their country's conduct. But if the authors of public policy genuinely desire to promote a healthier outlook in Germany they will necessarily renounce all minor triumphs. These will be wholly useless; if the headache which immediately follows Germany's prodigious debauch is not remembered, its artificial prolongation will not avail. The practical conclusion is that such didactic value as may exist in the defeat of Germany must be looked for in the fact of defeat itself, and in those immediate consequences which can be recognized as the just effects of the German war of aggression. The problem of Germany's international conduct bears certain resemblances to that of delinquency in individuals, and no decision is likely to be more difficult than that of the time at which co-operation (joined with vigilance) should be resorted to instead of punishment.

#### A CO-OPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT

Those who would contribute to a change of outlook in Germany will certainly be unequal to the encounter with the German mind unless they can measure the magnitude of the evil to which it has succumbed. At the same time, it is their duty to recognize that this evil is not wholly to be explained in terms of bad choices by the individual, but is also, to some extent, the product of unfavourable environment. An essential method of education towards a better and more co-operative mentality will therefore be to help create an environment in which co-operation is actually the rule. Having seen in the German scepticism as to the very possibility of international co-operation the fundamental obstacle, we are bound to emphasize that those who have co-operation on their lips must practise it towards all willingly co-operative peoples, even when they have the power to do otherwise. But, since co-operation must have a purpose, the problem becomes one of discovering some unifying principle to which, together with ourselves and other nations, the Germans may eventually subscribe.

Apart from unity on a class basis, two new theories of unity have entered the field of international politics within our own time. One is that which the Germans have been seeking to achieve, the common subjection of other peoples to a master-race. The other is that inherent in a general compact to defend against external aggression the political independence and territorial integrity of the participating states. In a world divided into states, a common interest in

their protection is an essential condition of a stable world order. But hitherto it has not proved to be a sufficiently strong bond of unity. The Four Freedoms of President Roosevelt provide the most comprehensive and authoritative new definition of a goal of common action. They have this advantage over other declarations of policy, including the Atlantic Charter, that they are aimed at the individual and not at the state only. Do they supply a basis on which the Germans and the rest of us may co-operate? The event alone will answer this question. But taking freedom as the great dynamic idea which the democracies have to offer, and the Four Freedoms as representing the specific purposes which they would seek to realize, let us consider what the problem involves.

The universality of the Four Freedoms, which are to apply "everywhere," constitutes a specific challenge to the German tendency to interpret ideals in a private sense. Thus freedom from fear might mean that the states surrounding Germany must be kept so weak as to be at her mercy: freedom from want, the extension of Germany's economic *Grossraum*: freedom of thought, freedom for Nazi thought only: freedom of worship, freedom to practise neopaganism. These are some of the strong points which the German mind must surrender if a unifying principle is to be sought in the Four Freedoms. Similarly they may fail to offer such a basis if they seem to require the preservation of certain features of the pre-Nazi society, against which Nazism can be regarded as a protest.

The submission of the German masses to Nazi leadership had a political cause in the attraction of aggressive nationalism, but also a psychological cause in a spirit of revolt against the instability of existence as lived under the conditions of the machine age. Mass unemployment threw into relief the dependence of the individual's livelihood and status on the operation of causes not only beyond his control but also, because impersonal, beyond his understanding. The Germans, while in the vanguard of the technical mastery of machine civilization, have shown themselves particularly conscious of their social and spiritual bondage to the machine, and to the economic values which the uncontrolled development of machine-civilization enhanced. The importance in Germany of romantic back-to-nature movements derives from this circumstance, and one of the chief reasons for the success of the Nazi mass appeal was that the Nazis seemed master of the machine, capable of controlling its social effects while exploiting its full technical possibilities. Emotionally the German masses, even before the Nazi regime, were



imbued with a strong anti-capitalist feeling, and the overthrow of the regime may well, to say the least, accentuate it.

Even in good conditions, it will be no easy task to lead the Germans to care greatly for freedom. Yet that they should do so is the only basis of a tolerable relationship with the democratic countries. We cannot say whether this purpose can be attained; but an indispensable condition is that the democracies should show by example that freedom in society does not necessarily involve certain defects, such as (exploited by Nazi propaganda) induced the Germans to exchange the comparative freedom of the Weimar Republic for totalitarian tyranny. The chief defects which the Germans associated with freedom as they knew it, and which they wrongly supposed to be inherent in freedom as such, were:

(1) It was inefficient. Its very efficiency in producing goods made its inefficiency in distributing the results more glaring. For the mass of the working classes in Germany "freedom" appeared to mean insecurity; for the young men and the young women, no prospects, no horizon and no hope of economic betterment.

(2) It was selfish. The community had lost its sense of belonging together; it had no corporate purpose. Since individuals and groups were largely engaged in a struggle for competitive gain with harsh penalties for failure, there was little room for the sense of partnership or solidarity.

(3) It was unjust. The premium on economic success, coupled with the obstructive survival into an economic age of earlier and now meaningless types of social privilege, all too often blocked the way to talent and ability which existed outside economically and socially privileged groups.

(4) It offered no convincing object to which faith and idealism could attach themselves.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> We think that the part allowed to frustrated idealism in this diagnosis is justified by the evidence. A purely materialistic interpretation of the demands of the masses for a new order is given in the following passage from a recent book: "All forms of State, the Germans say, will in the course of their evolution mould themselves in the near future into shapes similar and historically parallel to those of contemporary Germany, Italy, and Japan. The essential and vital demands of the masses which form the contents of the new States will no longer be influenced by the conceptions and doctrines, the commands and prohibitions, of party-leaders, of priests, of journalists or of intellectuals. The hopes of the masses for a total change and for the order of the New Age are so strong that nothing will henceforward deter them from investing with their strength those men who are supplying the masses with the instruments required for the realization of the socialism of toil; its realization by means of machines and, if need be, by means of wars. The demands of the masses to be fulfilled here and now are the following: (a) Ample work . . . (b) Ample wages . . . (c) Stabilization of prices . . . (d) Recreation and pleasure." Karl Otten: *A Combine of Aggression*, p. 299 (Allen and Unwin, 1942).

The plunge into Nazism was largely an attempt to escape from those inadequacies and contradictions. With defeat in war and the collapse of the regime, the Germans will need no one from outside to tell them that it was a false attempt. But the economic, psychological, and social disorders for which Nazism provided a spurious remedy will continue to offer their challenge to all who would take part in moulding the new social environment in Germany. Moreover, though it must not be left to German needs and experience to dictate the agenda of a new Europe, that experience is symptomatic of tensions which have been widespread in modern industrial society. An important factor in determining whether freedom can furnish the underlying unifying idea for the future will be whether it can be realized or preserved in a society bent on escaping from the four defects and dangers mentioned.

Thus the appeal of any system which is held out as a possible ground of common international action must be, first, that it is efficient—that for desirable social ends it knows how to make full use of the scientific and technical possibilities of the new industrial revolution. Secondly, it must be based on an enhanced sense of community, operative not only within but also, in some real sense, outside the frontiers of the state. While each state should seek for its citizens the highest and most secure standards of living it can reach, it follows from the acceptance of "freedom from want" as a general aim that the elementary human needs of food and shelter for all should come to be regarded as a first charge on the world's resources. At a higher level of initiative and adventure, the modern readiness to devise bold schemes of material improvement (of which Turkey, Russia, and the United States afford examples) offers to the workers and technicians concerned the stimulus of conscious participation in a great social purpose. The opening age may witness examples of such achievements on the international as well as the national scale.<sup>1</sup> But most of all it is of the essence of true com-

<sup>1</sup> This matter is important in regard to the German situation. On the one hand, it will be imperative to break down—and correct the German quasi-monopoly of the higher technical skills over a large part of Europe; on the other, it is asking for trouble to leave highly-skilled masses unemployed. If the odium which the German name has earned in Russia and elsewhere in Europe does not prevent it, large numbers could doubtless be employed in reconstructing devastated areas. Others might find an outlet in under-developed parts of the world overseas. But vigilance would be needed to ensure that the technicians did not become the masters of the countries they served. Before German technicians could be drawn upon as an international "pool," all countries would need to find jobs for their own technicians, which implies a high level of economic activity. If the rationalization of certain of the public services in central Europe under international instead of, as at present, German control should prove feasible, opportunities might be created for the co-operation of German technicians and operatives without the risk of German mastery.

munity to afford, to each individual within it, status and some measure of consideration.

Thirdly, awareness that attempts to realize an ideal "equality" have hitherto never failed to throw up new sets of bosses must not obscure the fact that maintenance of privilege unconnected with any useful social function can be a great evil. There is one form of such privilege at least, of which the present generation, particularly in Britain, is increasingly impatient, and that is educational privilege. Only those educational systems are in future likely to meet with general approval which enable talent, integrity, and character to reach a position of leadership wherever they are to be found. Lastly, a society with a quality of living such as we have described would necessarily make great calls on the idealism of its members, though it is not within the social order itself that the ultimate springs of moral action arise.

Indeed, an efficient, prosperous, and comparatively just society, united in a common devotion to its interests, would still be compatible with a gross dehumanization of man, and with the absence of that personal freedom which was to be society's vital spark. An obligation to maintain due process of law and the elementary civil rights should, on the purely political plane, suffice to defeat the acceptance of a "welfare fascism" as the goal. But this does not exhaust the problem. It is an historical fact of cardinal importance that the moral life of Europe is rooted in a view of man which, by affirming his spiritual destiny and his dignity as a child of God, permits him true freedom. Nations nourished in the European tradition cannot without self-disownment accept a system which wholly imprisons man within the social order, however excellent as such. This Christian view of man is on the whole reflected in the moral attitudes which have hitherto prevailed in the West, largely secularized though western society has become. These again have much in common with the ethics derived from the other great religions of the world. But there are specifically Christian insights, such as the set of paradoxes called the Beatitudes, which have had a special place within our systems of social ethics, and which could be expelled from them only at the gravest risk to personal freedom. They are the true antidote to the dehumanizing influence of efficiency, and the principle most noxious to those hostile systems which reserve their fiercest hatred for the unsuccessful and the weak.

Beginning with the German experience, we have thus found

clues to certain objects of policy which may serve to meet the challenges offered by that experience, and at the same time to keep the social environment free and truly human. But if our environment is to offer standing-ground for practical co-operation between many nations, and with the practice promote (as one may hope) the mentality of co-operation, it must be secure.

SECURITY *is* IMPORTANT

It is a new and hopeful thing that emphasis is laid on the possibility of pursuing common human purposes which transcend national frontiers; for this permits good causes (as well as bad) to seek adherents everywhere, in peace as in war. But there are no signs that the state (still, in most cases, a nation-state),<sup>1</sup> will cease to be the basis of international life. It will remain a vital question whether there can be some tolerable conditions on which every state great or small may, if it observes them, enjoy freedom from fear. A better distributed and more securely enjoyed material prosperity is now rightly recognized as an essential condition of peace. But the question is not purely economic. The factor of political ambitions and aggressiveness must still be reckoned with. For the task of restraining an aggressive Germany the specific undertaking of the Anglo-Soviet Pact has come to reinforce the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. All freedom of movement as regards policy towards Germany depends on the reality of this restraint.

But this one purpose is not a wide enough basis for security. "The safety of free systems," it has been written, "is always to look to their own strength and not to measures for weakening their enemies."<sup>2</sup> Where is their strength to be found? In the first place, of course, within each state adhering to the system. But not even the greatest state is militarily self-sufficient. The co-operative use of force is a problem and will remain a problem for all, even for any states which might succeed in increasing in some measure their military strength by federation. Now, if force is to be used co-operatively, the first issue is whether its scope is to be limited, regionally or otherwise, or to be, in principle, universal. There are strong sentiments and influences driving towards military regionalism,

<sup>1</sup> "In the modern world, Nationalism is the strongest political force." W. L. Mackenzie King: *The Defence of Common Liberties*, p. 10 (Cloutier, Ottawa, 1942).

<sup>2</sup> "May it be that the Nation-State, so far from being out of date, has not yet grown up?" G. Vickers: article in *World Order Papers*, p. 173 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940).

<sup>3</sup> Lionel Curtis: *Decision*, p. 16 (Oxford University Press, 1941).

which may in consequence become the prevailing security style of the post-war period. But if, not to mention other objections to regionalism, the strategic lessons of the present war dispose of it, there arises the second great issue whether in its then admittedly world-wide application force will be used arbitrarily, or to support international law and accepted principles of international conduct.

The three principal nations with which we are now at war all began their career of aggression by acts designed to ensure that the system nominally in force for co-operative defence should not be used against them. Having successfully carried (not without assistance from within the lines) the outer ramparts consisting in the defensive union of states, the aggressors attacked the inner fortress—the unity, determination, and preparedness of the state itself. Their terrible success in some cases is the ultimate security lesson, for of the two complementary principles of security—international solidarity in defence of a common order, and national resistance—the latter is logically prior. The condition of obtaining the help of others is that one begins oneself and is ready to carry on “alone if need be.” Things may be moving towards a point lying well beyond the previous concept of the co-operation of independent national forces; a point at which the control of the decisive arms, as also of the major issues of economic policy, will be fused. But even on this radical hypothesis the individual state will retain some military and economic powers. The very fact that certain aspects of policy may lie increasingly beyond its competence makes it all the more important that the state should use to the best advantage the powers it effectively has, whether in the economic, military, social, or cultural fields. The feeling of impotence in regard to public life, which afflicted so many countries before the war and especially exposed them to the machinations of the aggressors, was largely due to the suggestion that nothing at all could be done unless some one else began. Perhaps we shall learn to distinguish between those things necessary to the safety of the state and the well-being of the people in which we must wait for others, and those we can do ourselves, and, as for the latter, to do them.

Amidst the many unknown factors, and ahead of the declared positions of the United Nations, we have not attempted in this study to lay down what the future policy towards Germany should be. Nor, we repeat, can we examine here the wider questions of international order to the threshold of which the examination of the concrete German problem has brought us. Our aim has been

to bring out those points on which decisions will be crucial, and to suggest in each case what results the use of the strong hand, or alternatively, of non-forceful methods, might be expected to yield.

In the hard school to which the world has been put within this generation two lessons seem to stand out for our present purpose. The first is that we may expect military victory to create, not a better state of affairs, but an opportunity to create a better state of affairs. The second concerns the limits which a co-operative attitude to international affairs sets to the realization of the desires of any one nation. It is open to a Hitler to plan vast enterprises years ahead, since his aim is to impose his will on others. Those who recognize that international life must be lived co-operatively and move in perpetual adjustment and compromise must be content with shorter views. They can plan within wide limits their internal policy; internationally, they can do little more than decide the general direction in which they desire to go, and do their best to ensure that the first steps lead in that direction. Peace ended in a slow fading-out, and may return at no less laggard a pace. We shall move not to some grand climax, some static and all-in "solution," but from one stage of the provisional to another. We can but make our best endeavours from stage to stage, inspired by the vision of rendering the world, moulded as it is by many causes and many wills, better, were it by the merest fraction, rather than worse.

## APPENDIX I

## ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE CAUSES OF GERMANY'S RESORT TO WAR

(Note: This is not intended to exhaust all possible assumptions as to the causes or combinations of causes underlying Germany's action. It is merely a graduated list of some of the more common assumptions and explanations currently made in this country or by the Germans themselves. None of the alleged causes has been singled out for acceptance by the group, which finds elements of truth in several of them.)

1. The Germans are a congenitally aggressive people; and it is owing to this inherent aggressiveness that they have remained (as they seem to many) less civilized than other European peoples, and that Christianity has gone less deep. This is a state of affairs which cannot be radically changed in our time. Germans yield only to superior force, so far and so long as it can be asserted.

2. The Germans are, in the first place, human beings and to be understood as such: generalizations which ascribe immutable characteristics to a whole people are misleading. The aggressiveness which as a political unit they have undoubtedly displayed, even if partly due to race, is also due to circumstance and especially to teaching. The teachers to whom Germans have listened most readily have hitherto been groups (Prussian militarists, Nazis), and individuals, to whose various *Weltanschauungen* it has been common that the rights of others could, when convenient, be violently overridden; but it is possible that many Germans already reject this outlook, and that the nation as a whole (except for limited categories of incurables) could be educated into rejecting it.

3. Germany's recent aggressiveness was due in an important degree to the hardships which Germany endured from 1918 onwards. One view is that the chief cause of these hardships was the unnecessary severity of the Treaty of Versailles, and that German policy would have been more co-operative if the Treaty had been less severe. An alternative view is that the terms of the Treaty were not the cause of the undoubted hardships suffered by Germans, but propaganda in Germany, on the whole tolerated or even abetted elsewhere, persuaded the Germans that they were. This persuasion, combined with affronts to Germany's "prestige" and other psychological irritants, was a chief cause of aggressiveness.

4. Though a less severe Peace Treaty and subsequent treatment would not have prevented an aggressive policy, this could have been prevented by recognizing that Germany was a "have not" power, and by granting the possibly large but still limited margin of concessions which would have transformed her into a "have" power.

5. Germany's recent aggressiveness was due to the fact that, after 1918, she was treated too mildly: no victory march, no determined control of armaments, etc. She could have been deterred by suitable measures.

6. Germany's recent aggressiveness was due to the fact that her leaders were bent on purposes that could be fulfilled only through war, or at least were employing methods, as in economic policy, of which war was the natural outcome. The people, or sufficiently important categories of the people, followed their leaders because:

- (a) they desired to fight or at least expected rewards; or
- (b) they accepted war as necessary for the "mission" of the Third Reich; or,
- (c) though they were averse from war, their political immaturity prevented them either from recognizing the danger or, if they recognized it, from overthrowing their leaders; or
- (d) they were prepared to support any one, at any risk, who led them away from mass unemployment.

7. Aggression, such as that to which Germany resorted in 1939, is sufficiently explained as the inevitable product of monopoly capitalism at a given stage of development.

8. Germany's aggressiveness is an attempt to rectify consciously and by force an injustice imposed by accidents of history. While Russia, France, England, and the United States of America were building and consolidating empires, Germany was only a geographical expression. She had not achieved the nationhood, the unity, the metropolitan core, necessary to imperial expansion. By the time she had done so, opportunity for expansion had been very heavily restricted. The German nation and people had less outlet for their industrial, scientific, and even biological potential of enterprise than other (in the German view, less competent) nations.

9. "Aggressiveness" is not a specific trait of German policy. All states assert themselves to the utmost of their strength by the most convenient means, military, economic, or moral. Germany merely happens now to be the most powerful bearer of the aggressive impulse in Europe, as was once Spain, then France. The impulse may fail, owing to causes which cannot be controlled from outside.

10. Germany has not been aggressive. She has defended herself against threats from outside, e.g. encirclement, or the Slav menace.

11. The word "aggression," implying moral condemnation, is not applicable. The Germans have merely asserted their rights as a superior people against inferior opponents. Though there is no criterion except Germany's own judgement of her rights, Europe's feeble first reactions amounted to an admission of them.

12. Germany resorted to war in order to save Europe from Jewish



and Bolshevik influence, and from the secular British policy of division; and to fulfil the task, which the present moment of history commands, of creating European unity.

## APPENDIX II

## SOME FACTORS OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH

(*Note:* The figures presented here are intended merely to demonstrate *trends and magnitudes* of some of the principal factors of economic strength, and are helpful for picturing the future only if the reader keeps in mind the fact that the course of the war, the conditions of the armistice and peace settlement, and post-war domestic policies—all unpredictable to-day—will have significant effects on trends which might have continued undisturbed had war not occurred.)

	POPULATION TRENDS <sup>1</sup>				
	Total population (millions)			Population of working age (millions)	
	1929	1939	1960	1929	1960
Great Britain	46.0	47.7	48.3	21.5	19.3
Germany	72.1	75.8	84.2	30.0	38.1

## NATIONAL INCOME AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

	National Income <sup>2</sup>		Ratio between British & German National Incomes <sup>3</sup>	Real Income per Head of Working Population <sup>4</sup>	
	Great Britain (£ million)	Germany (RM million)		Great Britain	Germany
			Great Britain-Germany		
1925	4,357	59,928	1.46 : 1	1,077	579
1929	4,384	75,949	1.15 : 1	1,133	660
1932	3,844	45,175	1.28 : 1	932	557
1937	5,200	70,972	1.10 : 1	1,275	828
1940	6,454	100,000 <sup>5</sup>	0.80 : 1 <sup>6</sup>	—	—

<sup>1</sup> Colin Clark, *The Economics of 1960* (Macmillan, 1942). The figures for 1939 are taken from the League of Nations *Statistical Yearbook, 1939-40* (Geneva, 1940). The figures for Great Britain include Northern Ireland. The figures for Germany are for the old Reich plus Austria.

<sup>2</sup> British estimates for 1925, 1929, 1932 from Colin Clark, *National Income and Outlay* (Macmillan, 1937); for 1937, *Economist*, April 15, 1939; for 1940, *Economist*, April 12, 1941; German estimates for 1925 from *Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch*, 1933 (Berlin, 1933); for 1929, 1932, 1937 from *Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reiches* (Berlin, 1937); for 1940 from the League of Nations *World Economic Survey, 1939-41* (Geneva, 1941).

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION <sup>7</sup>						
(Index: 1929 = 100)						
					Great Britain	Germany
1925	..	..	..	..	89.8	85.3
1929	..	..	..	..	100.0	100.0
1932	..	..	..	..	83.5	53.3
1937	..	..	..	..	124.0	126.2 (1938)

INDUSTRIAL WAR POTENTIAL, 1939<sup>8</sup>

1. <i>Armaments industries:</i>		Great Britain	Germany
Metal, engineering, chemical, precision instruments			
Value of net output, £ million		900	1,750
2. <i>Steelmaking capacity</i> (million metric tons)		14	24

## APPENDIX III

## GERMAN AND DEMOCRATIC VIEWS OF THE BASIS OF SOCIETY

How far German thought is the cause of, and how far it is merely the excuse for, German practice is uncertain. It is certain, however, that for many generations there have been in Germany authors whose writings form as it were a *corpus* of the philosophy of militarism and expediency. There have been great Germans of another and more humane tradition, but the exponents of the doctrine of force have shouted louder and gained a more attentive hearing. One of the chief aims of educational policy should be to bring the Germans back within the orbit of the European tradition which they have repudiated. Some of the master ideas of the Nazis, such as that of the *Herrenvolk*, are flatly contradicted by that tradition, and with them there can be no compromise. In other respects, the harmful ideas of the Germans are

<sup>8</sup> These figures are roughly calculated from the two preceding columns to facilitate comparison; they are based on the assumption that the purchasing power of £1 in 1925 and 1929 was equal to RM 20, in 1932 and 1937 to RM 15, and in 1940 to RM 12.50.

<sup>4</sup> Calculated in "international units" (=purchasing power in terms of U.S. dollars 1925-9); from Colin Clark, *Conditions of Economic Progress* (Macmillan, 1940).

<sup>5</sup> This figure is for the old Reich plus Austria and the Sudetenland. On the assumption that the increase in territory accounted for an increase in the German national income by 10-15 per cent, the national income of the old Reich in 1940 may be estimated to have been about RM 86,500-89,500 millions.

<sup>6</sup> Taking the figures for the old Reich given in note 5 above, the ratio in 1940 was 0.90-0.93 : 1.

<sup>7</sup> League of Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, 1932-33 (Geneva, 1933); 1937-38 (Geneva, 1938).

<sup>8</sup> Royal Institute of International Affairs: *The Bulletin of International News*, December 13, 1941.

perversions of conceptions which, unperverted, are not necessarily hostile to our own. If it be our purpose to help to create in Germany a lasting disposition towards co-operation with other nations we cannot think in terms of merely imposing our own intellectual system. We must seek any common intellectual ground which will enable us to talk in a way that is not wholly foreign to the best thought in Germany. A preliminary condition of discovering whether there can be any such common ground is to see as clearly as possible the ways in which Germany and the democracies conceive the nature of society.

Roughly, the great division in this sphere is between the classical or rational and the historical or romantic conceptions. The former teaching, ultimately derived from the Stoic and Christian ideas of a natural law of eternal validity and of a common humanity, fastens upon those elements in human life—law, spirit, reason, and ethics—which enable man to transcend the limits of particular communities formed by nature and history. It believes in certain ends common to mankind that embody the purposes in the pursuit of which men find their true fulfilment. It holds that the laws of particular states should be an expression of the eternal moral law (otherwise called the natural law), which states exist to interpret and administer, and which no state can ever be justified in breaking. The formation of this conception was a great achievement, especially as it took place at a time when the dependence of man upon natural and historical circumstances was specially evident. It did not deny the real importance of these factors, which indeed was too obvious to be denied, but laid stress rather on those things by which men, living in widely different conditions and with widely different experience, are united, than upon those by which they are distinguished. In our own times, however, this theory has been widely criticized as abstracting the individual from the concrete factors which most strongly influence his life. For if in one sense it has a unifying effect by asserting the principle of common humanity, in another it can tend, in obedience to the law that affections are intense in proportion as they are intensive, to loosen the roots by which men have status in an actual community.

The historical or romantic view, on the other hand, stresses the importance of history and of natural circumstances (geography, climate, etc.) in the formation of society, and the fact that the present is the result of a long train of irrevocable events. It fastens upon those qualities in man which unite him to the particular national community in which he lives, his devotion to the soil, his loyalty to his race, and his patriotism. It regards the national state as a living being possessing all the attributes of human personality—continuity, a will and a character of its own. It is not, however, incompatible with the recognition of a wider obligation than that by which a man is bound to the historic community of which he is a member. It can indeed act as a valuable qualification to the classical view, by emphasizing the right of com-

munities to develop in their own way so long as they do not deprive other similar communities of the same right. But just as the classical theory, when exaggerated, becomes the enemy of local community strength rather than the friend of true inter-nationalism, so the historical view, when similarly exaggerated, can be made the excuse for ruthlessness, national arrogance, and the denial of universal standards. In this perverse form it is the enemy of religious, intellectual, and artistic freedom, and of all those pursuits which are not directly useful to those who control political power.

The Germans have always shown a particular bias in favour of the historical view, although it is important to notice that this view is in no way their exclusive property, and that its earliest and most distinguished exponents include Montesquieu, Burke, and Comte. The Nazis have distorted the idea by transforming what in its origins was a plea for recognition of the foundations of national communities and of their legitimate rights into what in effect is a claim that no national community save Germany has any rights. They have invented a racial theory which goes far beyond the limits of legitimate pride, by setting forth the claim of Aryan superiority and using it as a pretext for the oppression of other races. Further, they have imported into the historical view a positively alien element by assigning to the Nazi Party powers which are inconsistent with all respect for tradition, with the result that principles which were originally conservative in character have been made the instrument and the justification of revolution. It is now the Party, and not inherited tradition embodied in law, which determines what communities are entitled to exist and by what laws Germany herself should be governed. In their foreign propaganda they have given up traditionalism altogether, and now claim to be the leaders of a great revolution which ignores national boundaries and purports to wipe out all past injustices.

From our attempts to discover points of contact between the democratic and German conceptions of society, one conclusion seems clearly to emerge. The German view is the perversion of a doctrine which, in its original form, is not only necessary but capable of performing a valuable function. That doctrine has had a powerful influence upon western, and particularly upon British, thought, and democracies have suffered at times under the pressure of an exaggerated version of the classical or rational idea. It should therefore be our aim to induce the Germans to purge their doctrine of the perversions to which it is now subject, and to set it in its right perspective, by recognizing the existence of a supreme, everlasting, and universal law which rules out racial and national fanaticisms and demands a proper respect for the rights of all men and all communities. The Germans, who have a strong historical sense, must be induced to give that sense a more than private meaning, and to see that there is nothing necessarily incompatible be-

tween their own historical organic interpretation of community and the idea of a concourse of communities mutually helpful and each retaining its own distinctive excellence. On the other hand, something of this organic sense is necessary to the democracies, if they are to protect themselves against a risk of becoming totalitarian in their own way as collections of uprooted human atoms held together by external controls.

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