

United States.
81st Congress. 2nd Session.

Background Information on the
Soviet Union in International
Relations :

Report of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs

Pursuant to H. Res. 206

~~SECRET~~
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
ON THE SOVIET UNION IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

U. S. Information Library
REPORT Bombay.

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 206

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH
STUDIES AND INVESTIGATIONS OF ALL MATTERS
COMING WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF SUCH COMMITTEE



SEPTEMBER 22, 1950.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1950

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN KEE, West Virginia, *Chairman*

JAMES P. RICHARDS, South Carolina	CHARLES A. EATON, New Jersey
JOSEPH L. PFEIFER, New York	ROBERT B. CHIPERFIELD, Illinois
THOMAS S. GORDON, Illinois	JOHN M. VORYS, Ohio
HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS, California	FRANCES P. BOLTON, Ohio
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana	LAWRENCE H. SMITH, Wisconsin
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania	CHESTER E. MERROW, New Hampshire
LAURIE C. BATTLE, Alabama	WALTER H. JUDD, Minnesota
GEORGE A. SMATHERS, Florida	JAMES G. FULTON, Pennsylvania
A. S. J. CARNAHAN, Missouri	JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
THURMOND CHATHAM, North Carolina	JOHN DAVIS LODGE, Connecticut
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin	DONALD L. JACKSON, California
A. A. RIBICOFF, Connecticut	
OMAR BURLESON, Texas	

BOYD CRAWFORD, *Staff Administrator*
IRA E. BENNETT, *Staff Consultant*
SHELDON Z. KAPLAN, *Staff Consultant*
GEORGE LEE MILLIEAN, *Staff Consultant*
JUNE NIGH, *Staff Assistant*
WINIFRED OSBORNE, *Staff Assistant*
DOBIS LEONE, *Staff Assistant*
MABEL WOFFORD, *Staff Assistant*
MARY G. CHACE, *Staff Assistant*

CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword.....	1
I. Soviet violations of treaty obligations.....	1
A. Germany.....	1
B. Austria.....	4
C. Eastern and Southeastern Europe.....	5
1. Poland.....	5
2. Hungary.....	6
3. Bulgaria.....	8
4. Rumania.....	10
5. The peace treaties.....	12
(A) Hungary.....	12
Direct responsibility.....	12
Indirect responsibility.....	13
(B) Bulgaria.....	15
Direct responsibility.....	15
Indirect responsibility.....	16
(C) Rumania.....	17
Direct responsibility.....	17
Indirect responsibility.....	18
(D) Korea.....	19
(E) Iran.....	21
(F) Japan.....	22
(G) Manchuria.....	23
II. Soviet failure to cooperate in solution of international problems.....	24
A. The Allied Control Council for Germany.....	24
Examples of Soviet obstructionism in the ACC.....	24
B. The Austrian treaty discussions.....	25
Chronology of Austrian treaty negotiations.....	25
C. The Joint United States-U. S. S. R. Commission on Korea.....	26
D. The United Nations.....	27
III. Use of the veto in the Security Council of the United Nations.....	28
A. Meaning of the term "veto".....	28
B. Origin of the veto.....	29
C. The General Assembly Resolution of April 14, 1949.....	30
D. The record.....	33
1. The Syria-Lebanon case.....	33
2. The Spanish case.....	33
3. The Spanish case.....	33
4. The Spanish case.....	34
5. Membership of Trans-Jordan.....	34
6. Membership of Portugal.....	34
7. Membership of Ireland.....	34
8. Second Greek case.....	34
9. Corfu Channel case.....	34
10. The third Greek case.....	35
11. Membership of Trans-Jordan.....	35
12. Membership of Ireland.....	35
13. Membership of Portugal.....	35
14. The third Greek case.....	35
15. The third Greek case.....	36
16. Membership of Italy.....	36
17. Membership of Austria.....	36
18. Second Indonesian case.....	36
19. Third Greek case.....	37
20. Membership of Italy.....	37

	Page
III. Use of the veto in the Security Council of the United Nations—Con.	
D. The record—Continued	
21. Membership of Finland.....	37
22. Membership of Italy.....	37
23. The Czechoslovakian case.....	37
24. The Atomic Energy Commission.....	38
25. Membership of Ceylon.....	38
26. The Berlin Question.....	38
27. Membership of Ceylon.....	38
28. Membership of Republic of Korea.....	39
29. Membership of Nepal.....	39
30. Membership of Portugal.....	39
31. Membership of Trans-Jordan.....	39
32. Membership of Italy.....	39
33. Membership of Finland.....	39
34. Membership of Ireland.....	40
35. Membership of Austria.....	40
36. Membership of Ceylon.....	40
37. Conventional Armaments Commission reports.....	40
38. Regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.....	40
39. Regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.....	40
40. Second Indonesian case.....	41
41. Second Indonesian case.....	41
IV. United States acts evidencing desire for cooperation with Soviet Union, and Soviet response.....	41
A. War aid.....	41
B. Postwar aid.....	42
C. Decisions made at meetings of heads of states.....	43
1. Yalta.....	43
2. Potsdam.....	43
D. Peace treaties.....	44
E. United Nations.....	44
F. International organizations.....	46
G. Berlin.....	46
H. Danube Conference.....	47
I. Repatriation.....	47
J. Departure of nationals.....	47
K. Cultural.....	48
L. Civil aviation.....	48
M. Propaganda.....	48
V. Soviet territorial expansion.....	49
A. The Communist world.....	49
B. Soviet territorial acquisitions of World War II.....	49
General.....	49
Finnish provinces.....	50
Polish provinces.....	50
Rumanian provinces.....	51
Baltic States.....	51
Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg) area.....	51
Czechoslovakian areas.....	51
Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.....	51
Tanna Tuva.....	51
C. The non-Communist world.....	51
D. Comparisons of Communist and non-Communist worlds.....	52
Map—Soviet imperialism since 1939.....	53
Map—Soviet imperialism in Europe since 1939.....	54

Union Calendar No. 1082

81st CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPORT
2d Session } { No. 3135

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SOVIET UNION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 22, 1950.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. KEE, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the
following

REPORT

[Pursuant to H. Res. 206]

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SOVIET UNION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
August 25, 1950.

FOREWORD

Following is a compilation of material, based on published documents, on the record of the Soviet Union in international relations. This data has been prepared, on my instructions, by Mr. Sheldon Z. Kaplan and Mr. George Lee Millikan, consultants on the staff of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The material assembled herein indicates some of the main currents of Soviet policy, such as treaty violations, obstructionism in the solution of international problems, and territorial expansion.

It is hoped that this compilation will serve as background information on the trends of the Soviet Union in international relations.

JOHN KEE, *Chairman.*

I. SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS

A. GERMANY

AGREEMENTS

1. Final delimitation of German-Polish frontier should await the peace settlement (Potsdam protocol, VIII, B, August 2, 1945).

2. Payment of reparations to leave enough resources to enable German people to subsist without external assistance. Reparation claims of U. S. S. R. to be met by removals of capital goods and appropriation of external assets. Economic controls in Germany to be limited to those essential to curb German war potential and insure equitable distribution of essential goods among zones (Potsdam protocol, II, B, 15, 19; III, 1).

VIOLATIONS

1. U. S. S. R. has repeatedly maintained that the Oder-Neisse line constitutes the definitive German-Polish frontier and has approved incorporation of territory east of this line into Poland. On July 6, 1950, the Soviet-controlled Governments of Poland and eastern Germany signed an agreement to this effect.

2. U. S. S. R. has taken large amounts of reparations from current production, has absorbed a substantial part of German industry in Soviet zone into Soviet state-owned concerns, and has otherwise exploited and drained German resources in a manner not authorized by Potsdam protocol or other agreements.

U. S. S. R. has refused to submit detailed report on any reparation removals from its zone.

AGREEMENTS

3. Germany to be treated as a single economic unit (Potsdam protocol, II, B, 14).

4. All democratic political parties to be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany (Potsdam protocol, II, A, 9).

5. Control Council agreed to prevent German political leaders or the press from making statements criticizing allied decisions or aimed at disrupting allied unity or creating hostile German attitude toward any occupying powers (Control Council Directive No. 40, October 12, 1946).

6. Allied Control Authority authorized free exchange of printed matter and films in the different zones and Berlin (Control Council Directive No. 55, June 25, 1947).

7. Freedom of speech and press are guaranteed (Potsdam protocol, II, A, 10). Germany is to be prepared for eventual reconstruction of political life on democratic basis (Potsdam protocol, II, A, 3).

VIOLATIONS

3. U. S. S. R. has consistently obstructed all attempts to implement this principle. It has followed a unilateral economic policy in its own zone. In particular it has refused to cooperate in establishing a common export-import program for Germany as a whole, and in permitting "equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy through Germany and reduce the need for imports."

4. Soviet authorities have restricted freedom of action of non-Communist parties by depriving them of facilities equal with the Communist-dominated Socialist Unity Party (SED); by interfering in their internal affairs, coercing their leaders, and dictating party actions; and in general by denying them the autonomy essential to democratic political organizations. The Social Democratic Party has been denied the right to operate in the Soviet zone as an independent organization.

5. Soviet authorities have permitted and encouraged scurrilous propagandistic campaigns by the Soviet zone press and political leaders directed against the western powers, and particularly the United States.

6. Soviet authorities have repeatedly barred from the Soviet zone or Soviet sector of Berlin such materials originating in other zones.

7. Soviet authorities have nullified any genuine freedom of speech and press through a system of suppression, intimidation and terrorism by military, police, and party authorities. A totalitarian police system is being built up which suppresses basic human rights and legal processes and in-

AGREEMENTS

8. German external assets in Finland, eastern Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, to be vested in the German External Property Commission (Control Council Law No. 5, October 30, 1945).

9. Quadripartite legislation has been enacted to provide tax uniformity and stabilization of wages in all zones (Control Council Laws Nos. 12, February 11, 1946, and 61, December 19, 1947; Control Council Directive No. 14, October 12, 1945).

10. All German prisoners of war to be repatriated by December 31, 1948 (Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, March 10-April 24, 1947).

11. By Four-Power agreement supreme authority was to be exercised by an Allied Control Council, consisting of the four commanders-in-chief (statement on control machinery, June 5, 1945).

12. By Four-Power agreement administration of Berlin was to be conducted by a four-power *Kommandatura*, consisting of the city's four commandants (statement on control machinery).

VIOLATIONS

dulges in arbitrary seizures of property, arrests, detentions, deportation, forced labor and other practices contrary to democratic principles.

8. U. S. S. R. has directly appropriated German external assets in these countries without unvesting and assignment by the German External Property Commission as required by Control Council Law No. 5.

9. Soviet authorities have permitted the Land governments of Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt to grant partial tax exemptions to large groups of wage and salary earners in violation of this legislation. This move is intended to stop the exodus of skilled workers to the western zones, to encourage qualified workers to take jobs in Soviet-owned factories, and to make propaganda for improving the living standards of Soviet-zone workers.

10. U. S. S. R. did not return all German prisoners of war by this date but announced a new deadline—January 1, 1950. On May 4, 1950, U. S. S. R. declared in a TASS announcement that all German PW's had been repatriated—although large numbers still remain in the U. S. S. R.

11. On March 20, 1948, the Soviet commander unilaterally adjourned a meeting of the Council and abruptly walked out, thereby precipitating a rupture of its operations.

12. On June 16, 1948, the Soviet representative walked out of a meeting of the *Kommandatura*. On July 1, 1948, Soviet authorities announced that they would no longer participate in any meetings. These acts finally destroyed the quadripartite control machinery of Berlin. The Berlin blockade, which became total on July 2,

AGREEMENTS

13. Each occupying power shall insure the "normal functioning" of transport between Berlin and the zones as well as between the Soviet and western zones (par. 5, Paris CFM communiqué, June 20, 1949).

14. On repeated occasions during and after the war, U. S. S. R. agreed that demilitarization of Germany should be one of the cardinal aims of the occupation. (Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945; Berlin, June 5, 1945; Potsdam protocol, Four Power agreement on additional requirements to be imposed on Germany, September 20, 1945; Control Council Law No. 34, Dissolution of the Wehrmacht, August 20, 1946, etc.)

VIOLATIONS

1948 and was not lifted until May 12, 1949, was a further effort to destroy the quadripartite status of the city.

13. Since January 13, 1950, the Soviet authorities have intermittently interfered with traffic between Berlin and Western Germany.

14. U. S. S. R. has created in eastern Germany a "police force" of approximately 50,000. Because of its training and equipment, this force is actually military in character.

B. AUSTRIA

1. Obligation of Allied Council (United States, United Kingdom, France and U. S. S. R., the occupying powers) to insure the removal of all restrictions on movement within Austria of persons, goods, or other traffic; economic unity to be promoted (new control agreement of June 28, 1946, art. 4, a).

2. Obligation to open the way for the Austrian people to find economic security (Moscow declaration, November 1, 1943). Obligation of Allied Council to assist Austrian Government to recreate a sound national life based on stable economic and financial conditions; to assist Austrian Government to assume full control of affairs of state in Austria; to facilitate full exercise of Austrian Government's authority equally in all zones; to promote the economic unity of Austria (new control agreement, arts. 3, c; 3, d; and 4, a).

1. Soviet-instituted system of licensing specified categories of goods for shipment from eastern to other zones (December 1947) impedes free movement of goods and traffic throughout Austria as a whole.

2. Properties seized by the Soviets such as oil, land and industrial plants are in excess of what might reasonably be construed as legitimate German assets under the Potsdam protocol. Removals of equipment and materials have been made under the guise of "German assets" and "war booty." Soviet authorities are engaging in economic practices having a deleterious effect on the Austrian economy and which are outside the application of Austrian law.

AGREEMENTS

4. Obligations with respect to stable economic and financial conditions, free movement within Austria as a whole, and economic unity (new control agreement, arts. 3, c; 4, a).

5. Obligation to assist Austrian Government to recreate a sound and democratic national life based on respect for law and order (new control agreement, art. 3, c).

6. Obligations with respect to law and order, assumption by Austrian Government of full control of affairs of state, full exercise of Austrian Government's authority equally in all zones (new control agreement, arts. 3, c; 3, d; and 4, a).

7. Obligation with respect to full exercise of Austrian Government's authority equally in all zones (new control agreement, art. 4, a).

VIOLATIONS

4. Soviet authorities designate certain rolling stock as "war booty," prohibit its movement from Soviet to other zones, and propose that Austrians "repurchase" this equipment.

5. Soviets interfere with Austrian efforts to maintain law and order through arbitrary arrest or abduction of Austrians.

6. Soviet authorities in the eastern zone and in the Soviet sector of Vienna have confiscated Austrian publications and threatened the distributors of publications.

7. Soviet authorities have sought to intimidate the Austrian authorities by issuing prohibitions against the holding of local elections.

C. EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

1. POLAND

AGREEMENTS

"This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates" (Crimean Conference, February 11, 1945).

"The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-

VIOLATIONS

On several occasions prior to the elections and following persistent reports of reprehensible methods employed by the Government against the democratic opposition, the United States and Great Britain reminded the Polish Provisional Government of its obligations. On January 5, 1947, the British and Soviet Governments were asked to join the United States in approaching the Poles on this subject. The British Government made similar representations to the Soviet Government for Soviet support in calling for a strict fulfillment of Poland's obligations. The Soviet Government refused to participate. The British and American representa-

AGREEMENTS

Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates * * * (Potsdam agreement, August 2, 1945).

VIOLATIONS

tions were summarily rejected by the Polish Government as "undue interference" in the internal affairs of Poland.

Of the 444 deputies elected to the Parliament in the elections of January 19, 1947, the Polish Peasant Party (reported to represent a large majority of the population) obtained only 28 places, thus demonstrating the efficiency with which the Government had prepared the ground. On January 28, the Department of State issued a press release stating that reports received from our Embassy in Poland immediately before and after the elections, based upon the observations of American officials, confirmed the fears this Government had expressed that the election would not be free.

2. HUNGARY

1. Under the armistice agreement an Allied Control Commission was established under the chairmanship of the U. S. S. R. and with participation of the United States and United Kingdom (armistice agreement, January 1945, art. 18 and annex F).

2. The three heads of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and United Kingdom declared their mutual agreement "to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems" (Yalta agreement, February 1945).

1. The Soviet representative on the ACC for Hungary consistently acted unilaterally in the name of the ACC without consultation or notice to his American and British colleagues, thus denying them any semblance of effective participation in the work of the ACC.

2. Contrary to the agreement, the U. S. S. R., acting through the Hungarian Communist Party and its own agencies and armed forces in Hungary, unilaterally subverted the will of the Hungarian people to totalitarianism in negation of fundamental freedoms. For example:

(a) General Sviridov, Deputy Soviet Chairman of the ACC, without consulting the United States and United Kingdom ACC representatives, dissolved Catholic youth organizations, June 1946.

(b) Soviet armed forces arrested Bela Kovacs, member of Parliament and former secretary general

AGREEMENTS

3. Upon the cessation of hostilities, it was agreed at Potsdam that the United States, United Kingdom, and U. S. S. R. would consult to revise the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions for Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to provide for effective participation by the United States and United Kingdom in the work of those bodies (Potsdam protocol XI, August 1945).

VIOLATIONS

of Smallholders Party, February 1947.

(c) General Sviridov precipitated a political crisis enabling the Communist minority to force the resignation of Prime Minister Nagy, May-June 1947.

(d) The Soviet Government refused repeated United States proposals to join in tripartite examination of Hungary's economic situation to assist Hungary to solve its pressing economic problems, 1946.

(e) Discriminatory economic agreements were forced upon Hungary, including the establishment of joint Soviet-Hungarian companies, 1945-47.

(f) The Soviet ACC representative contended that only the occupational forces which control the airfields can permit the Hungarian Government to negotiate air agreements. Notwithstanding, Soviet authorities formed a Hungarian-Soviet civil air transport company. The Hungarian Government was also permitted to negotiate agreements with certain other countries but not with the United States or Britain.

3. Despite repeated requests, the U. S. S. R. declined to discuss the revision of procedures for the Control Commissions as agreed at Potsdam. Instead, it continued to act unilaterally in the name of the Commissions in matters of substance without consultation with, or notice to, the United States and United Kingdom members. For example:

(a) Instructions were issued by the Soviet High Command regarding the size of the Hungarian Army without consulting the British or United States representatives.

(b) Without the knowledge of the United States the Soviet deputy chairman of the ACC

AGREEMENTS

VIOLATIONS

ordered the Hungarian Government to disband certain Catholic youth organizations in June-July 1946. He also recommended dismissal of certain Government officials.

(c) In the fall of 1946 and without consulting the Americans or British, the Soviet element of the ACC gave permission to form the Hungarian Freedom Party.

(d) Early in 1947 the Hungarian police were ordered by the Soviet chairman in the name of the Allied Control Commission to suppress the publication of Count Ciano's diary.

(e) In early 1947 the Soviet chairman stated he had personally given approval to the Hungarian Government to resume diplomatic relations with certain countries in the name of the Allied Control Commission and without prior discussion with the British or Americans.

(f) In May 1947 the ACC chairman refused the United States permission to visit Hungarian Army units.

(g) Soviet authorities refused to permit free movement of the American element of the Allied Control Commission (also applicable to Bulgaria).

(h) The Soviets refused to transmit to the American representative data on the arrest of Bela Kovacs by the Soviet Army.

3. BULGARIA

1. The armistice agreement established an Allied Control Commission under Soviet direction during the period of hostilities but with United States and United Kingdom participation (armistice agreement, October 1944, art. XVIII).

2. Bulgaria was obligated to restore United Nations property, to

1. The Soviet chairman of the ACC repeatedly took unilateral action in the name of the ACC and without consultation with his United States or United Kingdom colleagues, thus effectively negating United States and United Kingdom participation.

2. The U. S. S. R. has aided and abetted the Bulgarian Govern-

AGREEMENTS

make reparation for war damage as later determined, to restore all United Nations rights and interests, and to make available to Greece and Yugoslavia immediately on reparation account foodstuffs in quantities to be agreed by the United States, United Kingdom, and Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (armistice agreement, October 1944, arts. IX, X, XI, and par. 1 of protocol).

3. The three heads of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and United Kingdom declared their agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe their policies in assisting the liberated peoples to solve their political and economic problems by democratic means. (Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe, February 1945.)

4. The United Kingdom, United States, and U. S. S. R. stated they had no doubt that representatives of the allied press would enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Bulgaria (Potsdam communiqué X, August 1945).

5. The Potsdam agreement provided that upon the termination of hostilities, consultations should be held to revise the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions

VIOLATIONS

ment's failure in varying degrees, to fulfill these provisions of the armistice. The Soviets have refused to consider with the United States and United Kingdom Bulgaria's obligation to restore and restitute United Nations property and interests. While deliveries of foodstuffs were made to the Yugoslavs unilaterally, the U. S. S. R. has blocked three-power consideration of amounts to be shipped to Greece. None has been shipped to that country.

3. The Soviet Government has consistently refused to agree with the United States and United Kingdom on policies to assist the people of Bulgaria to solve their political and economic problems democratically. On the contrary the Soviet Government, through the local Communist Party, has unilaterally subverted representative democratic processes in Bulgaria and assisted in denying the Bulgarian people the exercise of fundamental freedoms. For example, in 1945 Soviet authorities unilaterally interfered in the internal affairs of Bulgaria's largest political party by demanding and obtaining the replacement of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov as Secretary General of the Agrarian Union.

4. The Soviet Chairman of the ACC consistently thwarted American press coverage of Bulgarian developments by negative or extremely dilatory action on United States Government requests for entry permits for reputable American correspondents. However, representatives of the Daily Worker and other left-wing periodicals were permitted to enter Bulgaria without difficulties.

5. The Soviet Government refused repeated United States and United Kingdom requests to consult as agreed. It continued to operate the Allied Control Com-

AGREEMENTS

for Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to provide for effective three-power participation in the Commissions (Potsdam protocol XI, August 1945).

6. The U. S. S. R. undertook to give friendly advice to the Bulgarian Government regarding the desirability of including in the Government two representatives of democratic groups, "who (a) are truly representative of the groups of the parties which are not participating in the Government, and (b) are really suitable and will work loyally with the Government" (Moscow Conference, December 1945).

VIOLATIONS

missions unilaterally without effective participation of or even, on occasion, knowledge of the United States and United Kingdom members.

6. The Soviet authorities, despite the Moscow agreement, sided with and abetted a minority Bulgarian Communist regime in thwarting the implementation of that agreement and prevented the broadening of the Bulgarian Government.

4. RUMANIA

1. The three heads of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and United Kingdom declared "their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems." (Yalta agreement on liberated Europe, February 1945.)

1. Contrary to its agreement the U. S. S. R., acting through the Rumanian Communist Party and its own agencies and armed forces in Rumania, systematically and unilaterally subverted the democratic will of the Rumanian people to totalitarianism in negation of their fundamental freedoms. Major examples are as follows:

(a) By unilateral intervention Soviet occupation authorities and Vishinsky (February-March 1945) effected the overthrow of Premier Radescu's interim representative government and installed a Communist-controlled regime.

(b) Unilateral support of Premier Groza's retention of office in defiance of the King's demand for his resignation and the United States request for tripartite consultation in response to the King's appeal (August 1945).

(c) Direct and indirect unilateral interference by the Soviet occupation authorities in the election campaign of 1946, including the use of Soviet troops to break up meetings of the opposition, and arbitrary exercise of censorship.

AGREEMENTS

VIOLATIONS

(d) Preclusive exploitation of the Rumanian economy, from 1944 onward, through (1) armistice extractions many times in excess of the requirements of the armistice agreement and in large measure unauthorized by that agreement, (2) the establishment of Soviet-controlled joint companies covering the principal economic activities of Rumania, and (3) commercial agreements the knowledge of whose terms was repeatedly refused to the other two Yalta powers.

(e) Rejection of a proposal by the United States and United Kingdom in December 1946 to set up a joint commission to study the economic situation in Rumania.

(f) Unilateral intervention, from March 1945 onward, in Rumanian commercial negotiations with countries outside the Soviet orbit.

2. Agreed at Potsdam that the Allied Control Commission procedure should be revised to provide for effective United States and United Kingdom participation in the work of those bodies (Potsdam protocol XI, revised Allied Control Commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary).

2. Despite repeated requests, the U. S. S. R. refused to consult on the procedural revision and continued unilaterally throughout the armistice period to operate the ACC in Rumania without effective participation by the United States and United Kingdom. Examples are as follows:

(a) Issuance of directives to Rumanian authorities by Soviet element of ACC without agreement of United States and United Kingdom representatives, sometimes in the face of United States and United Kingdom protests, and often without notification or discussion. Many of these directives were prejudicial to United States interests.

(b) Obstructive handling of clearances to enter Rumania for official United States personnel and aircraft.

3. The three Governments stated that they had no doubt that, in view of the changed con-

3. In contravention of this agreement, the Soviet Chairman of the ACC by the usurpation of

AGREEMENTS

ditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the allied press would enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania.

VIOLATIONS

authority, delayed and withheld entry permits to Rumania for accredited United States correspondents, ejected several correspondents from that country on fabricated charges, and censored United States press dispatches. These obstructive tactics, which continued throughout the armistice period, were particularly in evidence prior to the Rumanian elections of November 1946.

5. THE PEACE TREATIES

Upon the ratification of the treaties of peace with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania on September 15, 1947, the armistice period and the authority of the Allied Control Commissions came to an end. On this date the treaties entered into force and the three Governments regained a type of nominal sovereignty. In fact, however, the U. S. S. R. continued to exercise tutelary powers over them. In consequence the implementation of the treaties was characterized by subservient fulfillment of obligations toward the U. S. S. R., but by evasion, delay, and violations of obligations to the Western Allies. The Soviet Union condoned and in many cases abetted these infringements and, as the tutelary power, must bear responsibility for them. As a result of this peculiar relationship between the U. S. S. R. and these Governments, it will be necessary to distinguish between treaty violations, for which the U. S. S. R. bears direct responsibility, and other infringements, committed by the Soviet-sponsored governments but for which indirect responsibility must be ascribed to the Soviet Government.

(A) HUNGARY

DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY

Under article 40 of the "Treaty of Peace" any dispute over the execution of the treaty, not settled by diplomatic negotiations should be referred to the heads of the United States, United Kingdom, and U. S. S. R. missions in Budapest.

On May 31, 1949, the United States requested the United Kingdom and U. S. S. R. to hold a meeting of the three heads of mission in Budapest to settle the dispute over Hungarian noncompliance with article 2 of the treaty—the so-called human-rights clause. The Soviet Union, in its note of June 11, 1949, refused to participate in the meeting. A second United States note, delivered on June 30, 1949, expressed regret for the Soviet Union's disregard for the provisions of the treaty, and asserted

that the existence of a dispute between the United States and Hungary could not be questioned. In a memorandum dated July 19, 1949, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its contention that no basis existed for a meeting of the three heads of mission. Since that time the Soviet Union has consistently refused to participate in such a meeting.

INDIRECT RESPONSIBILITY

1. Under article 2 of the Peace Treaty the Hungarian Government has undertaken to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.

1. (a) Freedom of expression, and of press and publication, no longer exist. All nonconformist and oppositionist press organizations have been suppressed or terrorized; editors and publishers have been imprisoned or driven into exile; foreign correspondents have been expelled; hundreds of arrests and convictions have taken place on charges of spreading information prejudicial to the Government.

(b) Freedom of worship has been interfered with time and again, either through such subtle methods as the substitution of collaborationist for existing church leaders or through such drastic procedures as those which resulted in the imprisonment of Lutheran Bishop Lajos Ordass (September 1948), Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty (February 1949), and hundreds of Catholic priests.

(c) Freedom of political opinion has been violated in Hungary by the forceful elimination of the entire Hungarian political opposition to the Communist-controlled government.

(d) After a process of gradual extermination freedom of public meeting totally disappeared almost simultaneously with the entry into force of the treaty. Since 1948 no political party outside the Communist-dominated coalition has been allowed to hold public meetings anywhere in Hungary.

(e) The judiciary has been subverted and now serves only the group in power. Through the establishment of the so-called people's and workers' courts, the resuscitation of summary courts, the abolition of existing courts and the abrogation of the right of free choice of legal counsel, both Hungarians and foreigners have been deprived of the due process of law. Imprisonment, torture, deportation, and forced labor have become common practice.

2. Under article 10 of the treaty Hungary undertook to honor its prewar bilateral treaties with the allied and associated powers, provided that the other contracting party, within a period of 6 months from the coming into force of the treaty, notified the Hungarian Government of its desire to keep in force or revive the bilateral treaty in question.

3. Under article 23 of the treaty Hungary undertook to pay \$100,000,000 as reparations to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

2. Among the prewar treaties coming under the provisions of this article was the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation of 1925 between the United States and Hungary. Although the United States Government duly notified Hungary within the prescribed 6-month period that it desired to keep in force this bilateral treaty, the Hungarian Government has evaded and refused to fulfill its obligations in at least two instances. It seized United States property. It arrested two United States citizens, Vogeler and Jacobson, and held them incommunicado without access to United States consular officers.

3. On February 27, 1949, the Yugoslav Minister to Hungary delivered a note to the United States Legation in Budapest stating that the Hungarian Government had failed to abide by article 23 of the treaty and that, as a result of the ill will of the Hungarian Government the enforcement of article 23 could not be carried out by direct negotiations between the two Governments. The Hungarian Government has to this day failed to comply with article 23 of the treaty. The Soviet Government has refused to participate in a meeting of the three heads of mission in Budapest, as provided by article 40 of the treaty.

4. Under article 26 of the treaty Hungary undertook to restore all legal rights and interest of the United Nations and their nationals as they existed on September 1, 1939, and to compensate such persons for property loss and war damage.

5. Where a dispute arose between Hungary and another contracting party over interpretation of the execution of the treaty, which was not resolved by the three heads of mission in Budapest, Hungary, undertook in article 40 of the treaty to appoint a delegate to a three-member commission composed of one representative of each party and a third member selected by mutual agreement by nationals of a third party.

4. The Hungarian Government has given no indication that it intends to compensate American citizens for property loss and war damage. On November 8, 1949, the United States Legation in Budapest transmitted to the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs 4 new claims and additional evidence on 116 previous claims. Although receipt of the note was acknowledged, no action has been taken by the Hungarian Government to fulfill the 120 claims.

5. On August 1, 1949, and on January 5, 1950, the United States Government requested the Hungarian Government to designate its representative to a commission to be established for the settlement of a dispute arising under article 2 (the human-rights clause) of the treaty. On January 17, 1950, the Hungarian Government declared the formation of a commission to be unfounded and unnecessary.

(B) BULGARIA

DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY

Under article 36 of the peace treaty with Bulgaria any dispute on the interpretation or execution of the treaty not settled by direct diplomatic negotiations, should be referred to the three heads of mission in Sofia.

On May 31, 1949, the United States requested the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. to convene a meeting of the three heads of missions in Sofia to settle the dispute over Bulgarian noncompliance with article 2 of the peace treaty. The Soviet Union in its note of June 11, 1949, refused to convene the three heads of mission on the grounds that it "did not see any grounds for convening." The U. S. S. R. in the same note declared that "not only are the measures (of the Bulgarian Government) concerning which the United States of America has expressed its dissatisfaction not only not a violation of the peace treaty, but on the contrary are directed toward the fulfillment of the said treaties which obligate the

said countries to combat organizations of the fascist type." The United States note of June 30, 1949, confirmed the existence of a dispute between Bulgaria and the United States over the peace treaty. The Soviet memorandum of July 19, 1949, reaffirmed the Soviet contention that no basis for a meeting existed. The Soviet Union has consistently maintained its obduracy on this matter.

INDIRECT RESPONSIBILITY

1. Under article 2 of the peace treaty the Bulgarian Government has undertaken to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms.

2. By the terms of the peace treaty with Bulgaria the armed forces of the Bulgarians are limited to 55,000 land troops, including frontier troops, 1,800 anti-aircraft personnel, 90 aircraft including reserves, of which not more than 70 may be combat types, with a total personnel strength of 5,200. Bulgaria is prohibited from acquiring any aircraft designed primarily as bombers with internal bomb-carrying facilities. Also personnel in excess of these provisions must be disbanded within a period of 6

1. The U. S. S. R. has aided and abetted the Bulgarian Government in failing to fulfill article 2 of the peace treaty. In its note of June 11, 1949, Bulgaria specifically violated article 36 of the peace treaty by refusing to convene the three heads of mission to discuss the problem and work out a solution on the grounds that the "U. S. S. R. does not see any grounds for convening." The U. S. S. R. in its note of June 11, 1949, declared "that not only are the measures (of the Bulgarian Government) concerning which the Government of the United States of America expressed its dissatisfaction not only not a violation of the peace treaty, but on the contrary are directed toward the fulfillment of said treaties which obligate the said countries to combat organizations of the fascist type."

2. The U. S. S. R. has openly aided and abetted the Bulgarian Government in failing to fulfill completely and in completely ignoring these provisions of the peace treaty (articles 9, 10, 11, and 12) in various ways.

The Soviet Union has openly aided and encouraged the Bulgarian Government to ignore the numerical limitations on the Bulgarian armed forces by supplying arms, ammunition, and equipment in excess of that needed for the force established by the treaty.

months after the treaty enters into effect. Personnel not included in the Army, Navy, or Air Force shall not receive any form of military, naval, or military training. Construction to the north of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier of permanent fortifications where weapons capable of firing into Greek territory can be emplaced is forbidden. Construction of permanent military installations capable of being used to direct or conduct fire into Greek territory is also forbidden. (Articles 9, 10, 11, 12, part III, section, Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.)

In addition, the U. S. S. R. has by negative and extremely dilatory acts tolerated Bulgarian failure to disband these forces as required by article 10 of the peace treaty. The U. S. S. R. by the use of negative and obstructionist tactics aided and abetted the Bulgarian Government in the formation, maintenance, and training of paramilitary organizations, i. e., the militia, and the use of these organizations by the Bulgarians to violate both the spirit and the letter of article 2. The Soviet Government has also refused to participate in any conventions provided for in article 36 of the peace treaty to settle disputes over the interpretation or execution of the treaty. When the United States Government requested information on the Bulgarian armed forces (Note 263, March 5, 1948), the Bulgarian Government with the tacit consent of the Soviet Union was encouraged to deny the information. This was a violation of the right of the United States and United Kingdom under the treaty to request the information and confirm it by investigation. The Soviet note (No. 056 of February 16, 1948) declining the United States/United Kingdom invitation for a Soviet representative to participate in a proposed survey of the Greco-Bulgarian border is further evidence on this point. Moreover, the Bulgarian Government was encouraged by the Soviet Union to reply that, under the terms of the peace treaty, the matter should be referred to the United States, United Kingdom, and U. S. S. R. diplomatic missions.

(C) RUMANIA

DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY

Articles 37 and 38 of the Rumanian Peace Treaty, provided that the "Heads of the Diplomatic

Contrary to these provisions the Soviet Government has consistently refused to cooperate with

Missions in Bucharest of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, acting in concert, will represent the Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Rumanian Government in all matters concerning the execution and interpretation of the present treaty" and that "any dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the treaty which is not settled by diplomatic negotiations shall be referred to the three heads of the mission."

the American and British chiefs of mission in Bucharest and has in consequence reduced the treaty, repeatedly violated by the Rumanian Government, to a dead letter.

On May 4, 1948, the American Minister to Bucharest requested that an early meeting of the heads of the diplomatic missions in Bucharest be arranged to consider the implementation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Rumania. Both the Soviet and British chiefs of mission agreed to the meeting, which was scheduled for May 18, 1948. However, the Soviet Ambassador canceled the scheduled meeting because he was indisposed. On May 26, 1948, he informed the American Minister that there was no necessity for the proposed meeting and no grounds for putting the proposal into effect.

INDIRECT RESPONSIBILITY

Under article 3 of the peace treaty the Rumanian Government has undertaken to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights and the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, political opinion, and public meeting.

On April 2, 1949, the United States charged Rumania with a violation of article 3 of the peace treaty. As Rumania denied that it had violated the treaty and indicated its unwillingness to adopt the requested remedial measures, the United States informed Rumania that in its view a dispute had arisen over the interpretation and execution of the peace treaty. The United States invoked article 38 of the treaty providing for the settlement of such disputes by the heads of the diplomatic missions of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. On May 31, 1949, the United States chief of mission in Bucharest requested his Soviet and British colleagues to meet with him to consider the dispute. In a note of June 11 to the United States, the Soviet Union declined to authorize its representative to

discuss the matter, stating that Rumania was fulfilling exactly its treaty obligations and that the United States was attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of Rumania. On June 30, the United States sent a further note to the Soviet Government declaring that the attitude of the Soviet Government showed its unwillingness to act in accordance with treaty procedures and represented an obstacle to the settlement of dispute. It asked the Soviet Government for reconsideration. In a note dated July 19 the Soviet Government refused to reconsider its position.

The Soviet Government refused to cooperate in the execution of the peace treaty and even encouraged Rumania to defy America in its requests for the implementation of the treaty. Thus the Rumanian Government has systematically and willfully violated nearly all articles of the treaty, especially those dealing with human rights and military matters.

(D) KOREA

1. In the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China pledged their determination that Korea would "in due course" become free and independent. This pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, and was subscribed to by the Soviet Union when it declared war against Japan on August 8, 1945. The defeat of Japan made it possible for Korea to look forward to independence.

2. The Soviet Union and the United States agreed to reestab-

1. Every effort to give effect to this provision has been thwarted by the U. S. S. R. North of the 38th parallel, which has become a part of the "Iron Curtain," the Soviet Union established a Communist regime. The formal creation of this regime, the so-called "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," claiming jurisdiction over the entire country, was proclaimed on September 9, 1948. This aggressor regime has lived, as it was created, in complete defiance of the United Nations.¹

2. The Soviet command in North Korea has since 1946 re-

¹ A full account of this situation will be found in the report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Background Information on Korea, H. Rept. 2405, 81st Cong.

lish movement of persons, motor, rail transport and coastwise shipping between the zones of North and South Korea (agreement of Joint United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Conference, January-February 1946).

3. The Moscow Agreement provided for consultation by the Joint United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Commission with "Korean democratic parties and social organizations" in the preparation of proposals for the formation of a provisional Korean government (Moscow agreement, December 27, 1945, III, 2).

4. The Joint United States and U. S. S. R. Commission agreed to consult with political groups "truly democratic in their aims and methods," who would declare their willingness to "uphold the aims of the Moscow decision," "abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in * * * the formation of a provisional Korean government * * * " (Joint Commission communiqué No. 5, April 18, 1946).

5. A signature of communiqué No. 5 (later included in decision No. 12) will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow agreement and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for consultation by the Joint Commissions. Such signatories who, after signing the communiqué, foment or instigate active opposition to the Joint Commission, the two powers, or the Moscow agreement, can be

fused to discuss or implement the agreements reached on these matters, resisting efforts toward re-establishing the natural economic unity of the country. Concessions to economic coordination have been made only on a barter basis. No regularized movement of persons or transport has been established beyond that allowing the limited supply by the United States of its outposts accessible only by roads through Soviet-occupied territory.

3. The U. S. S. R. delegation on the Joint Commission consistently refused to allow such consultation except under unilateral interpretations of the phrase "democratic parties and social organizations," which, in each case, would exclude all but pro-Soviet political groups.

4. The U. S. S. R. delegation refused to consult with groups adhering to communiqué No. 5 if the representatives of the group had ever expressed opposition to the provision for placing Korea under the period of trusteeship envisaged in the Moscow agreement.

5. The U. S. S. R. delegation refused to adhere to the agreement when an attempt was made to schedule the party consultations. Despite the signature of communiqué No. 5, assurances of cooperation with the Commission, and a pledge to refrain from fomenting or instigating active opposition, the U. S. S. R. delegation unilaterally asserted that the members of a so-called antitrustship committee could not be consulted by the Joint Commission.

declared ineligible for consultation only by mutual agreement of the two delegations on the Joint Commission (exchange of letters between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister Molotov, May 2 through May 12, 1947, citing the November 26, 1946, December 24, 1946, exchange of letters between the Soviet and American commanders).

(E) IRAN

1. Article IV of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship stated: "In consideration of the fact that each nation has the right to determine freely its political destiny, each of the two contracting parties formally expresses its desire to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other."

2. Article IV of the 1942 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United Kingdom-Iran Tripartite Treaty of Alliance stated: "It is understood that the presence of these forces [Soviet and British] on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the populations, and the application of Iranian laws and regulations."

3. The Declaration of Tehran of December 1, 1943, stated: "The Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran."

1. The Soviet Government admitted in a note to the United States on November 29, 1945, that Soviet forces in Iran had prevented Iranian troops from taking action after the outbreak against the Iranian Government in northern Iran. This action constituted at least indirect Soviet aid to the Azerbaijan separatists and interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

2. Under the terms of the tripartite treaty, the U. S. S. R. pledged itself to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran, and to disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, and the application of Iranian laws and regulations. Violations of these pledges occurred both before and after the end of hostilities.

3. The U. S. S. R. expressed a desire in the Tehran Declaration for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. By supporting the Azerbaijan separatists, while occupying Iran, and by its refusal to evacuate its troops except under United Nations pressure, the U. S. S. R. violated its commitment.

4. United Nations Charter, article 2, paragraph 4, states: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

5. Article II of the 1927 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship stated: "Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from any aggression and from any hostile acts directed against the other party, and not to introduce its military forces into the territory of the other party."

6. In article IV of the same treaty it stated that the U. S. S. R. and Iran undertook: "not to encourage or to allow in their respective territories the formation or activities of: (1) organizations or groups of any description whatever, whose object is to overthrow the Government of the other contracting party by means of violence, insurrection or outrage; (2) organizations or groups usurping the office of the Government of the other country or of part of its territory, also having as their object the subversion of the Government of the other contracting party by the above-mentioned means, a breach of its peace and security, or an infringement of its territorial integrity."

4. The Iranian appeal to the Security Council in January 1946, was based upon charges of Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

5. The U. S. S. R. has on repeated occasions violated this article by sending Soviet armed forces into Iranian territory.

6. Soviet broadcasts to Iran have repeatedly attacked the Iranian Government on false grounds, incited the Iranian people to violent action against it, and supported the illegal Tudeh Party.

(F) JAPAN

1. Potsdam declaration defining terms for Japanese surrender (July 26, 1945).

The Potsdam declaration stipulates that "Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with an oppor-

On April 22, 1950, TASS announced that the Soviet Government had completed the repatriation of Japanese "prisoners of war" from its territories, except for 2,467 men charged with war crimes or under medical treatment. However, Supreme Com-

tunity to lead peaceful productive lives.”

2. Geneva Prisoners of War Convention signed on December 8, 1949, by U. S. S. R.

This convention sets forth the rights and obligations of countries holding prisoners of war.

mander Allied Powers (SCAP) and Japanese Government figures show that as of that date 369,382 Japanese prisoners of war and civilians remained under Soviet control still unrepatriated or unaccounted for. The discrepancy is explicable either by continued detention of Japanese prisoners or an abnormally high death rate.

(G) MANCHURIA

1. “The high contracting parties agree to render each other every possible economic assistance in the postwar period with a view to facilitating and accelerating reconstruction in both countries and to contributing to the cause of world prosperity” (Sino-Soviet Treaty and agreements of August 14, 1945, art. VI).

2. “* * * In accordance with the spirit of the afore-mentioned treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the U. S. S. R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China. * * *

“In the course of conversations * * * the Government of the U. S. S. R. regarded the three eastern provinces [i. e. Manchuria] as part of China” (note of V. M. Molotov, August 14, 1945, relating to the treaty of friendship and alliance).

3. “The administration of Dairen shall belong to China” (agreement concerning Dairen of August 14, 1945).

1. Department of State press release No. 907 of December 13, 1946, citing Pauley report, stated that: “Industry * * * (in the three eastern provinces, also known as Manchuria) * * * was directly damaged to the extent of \$858,000,000 during Soviet occupancy * * *. The greatest part of the damage to the Manchurian industrial complex * * * was primarily due to Soviet removals of equipment”

2. The Chinese Government failed to receive from the U. S. S. R. the promised military supplies and other material resources called for by the treaty of 1945. On the other hand when Soviet troops left Manchuria, there is strong evidence that they allowed the Chinese Communists to take over substantial quantities of Japanese arms and assume control over the area. Chinese Government troops attempting to enter Manchuria subsequent to the Japanese surrender were denied the right to land at Dairen by the Soviet authorities there and were forced to use less advantageous landing points.

3. Due in large part to Soviet obstructionism, China was unable to establish a Government administration at Dairen.

II. SOVIET FAILURE TO COOPERATE IN SOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

While the record of Soviet intransigence in the solution of international problems can be seen in the over-all statistics of postwar international conferences, it is especially evident in the discussions of (1) the Allied Control Council for Germany, (2) the Austrian Treaty Commission, and Foreign Ministers' deputies (3) the Joint United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Commission for Korea, and (4) the United Nations.

At six prolonged meetings since 1945, conferences involving ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have required some 225 sessions and consumed 198 working days of innumerable officials. Former Secretary Byrnes has stated that out of 562 days in office he spent 350 at international conferences in argument with Soviet representatives. Brigadier General Howley's diary indicates that while in Berlin he spent a total of 2,000 hours in the same way. Debate on the Italian treaty lasted 11 months. The Austrian treaty has so far involved 256 sessions.

The record of the following bodies speaks for itself.

A. THE ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY

Between July 30, 1945, and March 20, 1948, the Allied Control Council met 82 times. During this period the United States repeatedly sought to achieve the implementation of Big Four agreements on Germany. After an initial period of relative harmony, the U. S. S. R. consistently obstructed these efforts and used the Allied Control Council as a propaganda forum to deliver vitriolic attacks against the Western Powers. The accomplishments of the Allied Control Council, therefore, were mostly nonconstructive. It registered success mainly in the punitive and prohibitive aspects of control.

EXAMPLES OF SOVIET OBSTRUCTIONISM IN THE ACC²

1. On December 6, 1945, the United States and the United Kingdom proposed that foreign consulates be reopened in Germany. The U. S. S. R. objected on the grounds that the Allied Control Council was not competent to decide this question.

2. On December 17, 1945, the United States and the United Kingdom advocated free movement for Germans throughout Germany. The U. S. S. R. agreed in principal but refused to implement in fact.

3. On July 20, 1946, the United States repeated the offer made earlier by former Secretary Byrnes to combine its zone economically with those of other occupying powers. The United Kingdom accepted but the U. S. S. R. refused.

4. From May 1947 to January 1948 the U. S. S. R. repeatedly frustrated the efforts of the Western Powers to implement the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers' directive that the Allied Control Council draw up a plan to repatriate all German prisoners of war.

5. On March 20, 1948, the Soviet representative unilaterally adjourned a meeting of the Allied Control Council called by him to

² For a more detailed treatment see Gen. Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, New York, 1950.

discuss the talks held at London by the Western Powers on problems relating to Germany and walked out. Since then the Allied Control Council has not met.

B. THE AUSTRIAN TREATY DISCUSSIONS

The history of the Austrian treaty negotiations presents an amazing record of Soviet noncooperation. For nearly 4 years the United States has patiently and persistently sought to achieve agreement; the deputies of the Foreign Ministers alone have met 256 times. Although the U. S. S. R. joined with the United States and the United Kingdom at Moscow on November 1, 1943 (France adhered to this declaration later), in solemnly affirming that Austria was to be reconstituted as a "free and independent" state, it has repeatedly tried to frustrate American efforts at every step of the negotiations. In order to delay the conclusion of the treaty, the U. S. S. R. is resorting to the flimsiest of pretexts.

CHRONOLOGY OF AUSTRIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

1. *April 25-July 12, 1946.*—The United States repeatedly attempted to induce the Council of Foreign Ministers, then meeting in Paris, to start working on the treaty. Because of Soviet obstruction this was not done.

2. *November-December 1946.*—The Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in New York, agreed to appoint deputies.

3. *January 14-February 25, 1947.*—The Foreign Ministers' deputies met in London. Whereas the western deputies submitted complete proposals for each treaty article, the Soviet deputy submitted only a few.

4. *March 10-April 24, 1947.*—At the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, a Soviet claim to "German assets" emerged as the principal issue. The Western Powers sought unsuccessfully to obtain a clear Soviet definition of what actually constitutes "German assets." Also the U. S. S. R. supported Yugoslav economic and territorial claims notwithstanding prohibitions contained in Potsdam agreement and Moscow declaration. The Austrian Treaty Commission was established.

5. *May 12-October 11, 1947.*—The Austrian Treaty Commission held 85 separate meetings; 24 disagreed articles and annexes were considered. Full agreement was achieved on only one article and then only because the United States withdrew its previous objections.

6. *November 25-December 15, 1947.*—The Council of Foreign Ministers and their deputies, meeting in London, registered no progress.

7. *February 20-May 6, 1948.*—The deputies, meeting in London, were able to agree on only one article. Negotiations broke up on the issue of Yugoslav claims.

8. *Spring of 1949.*—The deputies discussed 18 outstanding articles, but reached no agreement.

9. *May-June 1949.*—At a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, general agreement appeared to have been reached and the U. S. S. R. abandoned support for Yugoslav territorial and economic claims. Subsequent meetings showed this appearance of general agreement to have been illusory.

10. *July 1-September 1, 1949.*—The deputies held 47 meetings. Agreement was achieved on 13 of 22 outstanding articles. No final agreement, however, was reached because the U. S. S. R. went beyond the terms of the Council of Foreign Ministers' agreement reached at Paris.

11. *September 23-December 14, 1949.*—During this time the deputies met intermittently. Article 35 (German assets) was finally agreed as a result of western concessions. Despite Soviet assurances that once this article was agreed no further obstacles remained, another deadlock resulted.

12. *January 9-January 24, 1950.*—The deputies met. All progress was delayed by the insistence of the Soviet deputy that further discussions depended on the outcome of the Soviet-Austrian financial negotiations in Vienna. These talks are likewise stalled.

13. *February 15-July 10, 1950.*—During this period the deputies met six times but made no progress because the Soviet deputy injected a totally irrelevant issue into the negotiations. Basing his position on the official Soviet allegation of April 20 that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France are violating the terms of the Italian peace treaty with regard to Trieste, he insisted that the three powers must first satisfy the U. S. S. R. on this question as evidence of their intention to implement the Austrian treaty, once it has been concluded.

C. THE JOINT UNITED STATES-U. S. S. R. COMMISSION ON KOREA

The Joint United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Commission on Korea met 62 times. The first meeting was held on March 20, 1946; the last meeting was held on October 18, 1947. The first series of 24 meetings were concluded on May 8, 1946, when the Joint Commission adjourned sine die. The meetings were reconvened on May 21, 1947, and were finally suspended after 38 meetings on October 18, 1947.

In these 62 meetings, the Joint Commission failed to resolve the one issue which divided the Soviet and American delegations at the beginning of the talks, namely the issue of what Korean groups should be consulted concerning the formation of a provisional Korean Government. The U. S. S. R. took the position that only those Korean parties and social organizations which fully supported the provisions of the Moscow agreement on Korea should be consulted. The United States held that this policy would exclude from consultation a large majority of the Korean people and would place a Communist minority, which had not openly opposed the Moscow agreement, in a predominant position in the consultations. After Joint Commission negotiations had broken down on this issue in 1946, an exchange of letters between Secretary of State Marshall and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in April and May 1947 gave the impression that the U. S. S. R. was willing to modify its position on the problem of consultation with Korean groups, and the Commission reconvened on May 21, 1947. However, the Soviet delegation in July reverted to the position it had taken during the 1946 talks, and the meetings were finally suspended on October 18.

Soviet support for the North Koreans in their invasion of South Korea has encouraged them to defy the authority of the United Nations and has prevented the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue.

D. THE UNITED NATIONS

An examination of the Soviet share in the postwar endeavor to seek through the United Nations a peaceful solution to the political, social, and economic problems of the world reveals a record long on protestations of cooperation but short on deeds. The U. S. S. R. has shown its lack of cooperation in three main ways:

1. The U. S. S. R. has obstructed and refused to cooperate with the efforts of the majority to find equitable solutions to problems of international concern.

(a) *Atomic Energy Commission.*—The Atomic Energy Commission which first met on June 14, 1946, suspended operations after 24 meetings on July 29, 1949, owing to the continued failure of the U. S. S. R. to make any concessions to the majority plan. The AEC Working Committee held a total of 49 meetings from the time of its creation on June 19, 1946, to its suspension on June 15, 1949, for the reason above. The 6-power atomic energy talks which began on August 9, 1949, were broken up after 14 meetings on January 19, 1950, when the U. S. S. R. withdrew over the participation of Nationalist China.

(b) *Vetoes.*—The U. S. S. R. has blocked the majority will in the Security Council by casting 43 out of the total of 44 vetoes (if each of the double vetoes is counted as two vetoes rather than one). The veto has been used once by France, which also joined with the Soviet Union in one of its vetoes. No other permanent member of the Security Council has used the veto.

(c) *Commission for Conventional Armaments.*—The Commission for Conventional Armaments which first met on March 24, 1947, transmitted to the Security Council at its nineteenth and last meeting on August 1, 1949, a French proposal for an international census of armed forces and armaments, subsequently vetoed by the U. S. S. R. on October 11. The Working Committee (subcommittee 3) of the CCA, which first met on April 21, 1947, suspended operations after 25 meetings on July 18, 1949.

(d) *Soviet noncooperation.*—This is most clearly shown in the boycott by the U. S. S. R. of the Korean and Balkan Commissions, of the Security Council during its discussion of a threat to the peace in Iran, and of the Interim Committee; in the veto of the Neutrals' plan for a solution to the Berlin impasse; and in Soviet opposition to any study of the veto or of "methods for the promotion of international cooperation," and to the creation of a UN guard force.

2. It has disregarded its responsibility as a major power to support the work of the various UN agencies entrusted with the task of bettering the social and economic conditions of the world.

(a) *Specialized agencies.*—The U. S. S. R. is a member of only 3 out of 11 specialized agencies in being—the International Telecommunication Union and Universal Postal Union and the World Meteorological Organization. The U. S. S. R., Byelorussia, and the Ukraine announced on February 16, 1949, their withdrawal from the World Health Organization on the grounds of excessive expense and dissatisfaction with the agency's program, without even waiting to present their objections to the WHO Assembly in June where the budget and program were to be discussed. Since there is no provision for withdrawal in the WHO constitution, they are still considered as members. Satellite withdrawals in the past year from specialized agencies in which the U. S. S. R. does not participate are clearly

Moscow-inspired. The Soviet opposition to the specialized agencies ranges from vehement attacks in the case of the International Refugee Organization to indifference toward the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Of the specialized agencies to which it belongs, the U. S. S. R. participates in only one of the technical committees where the actual work is performed.

(b) *Statistics.*—The reluctance of the Soviets to reveal statistics on even their usual percentage basis has further hampered discussions of a technical nature.

3. The U. S. S. R. has continued its obstructionism within the United Nations through the tactics of its representative, Jacob Malik, presently the President of the Security Council. This official has been abusing the Presidency of the Council, particularly in vilifying the action of the United Nations, and its supporters, with respect to Korea.

III. USE OF THE VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

A. MEANING OF THE TERM "VETO"

The term "veto" is not found in the UN Charter. It refers to the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council in decisions on questions not procedural in character. Voting provisions permitting a veto appear in one, and only one, of the organs of the United Nations—the Security Council. The Council consists of the five great powers—The United States, The United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China—and six small powers, three being chosen by the General Assembly each year to sit for 2 years.

The veto, in other words, does not apply to decisions of any other organ of the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, or the International Court of Justice. It does not apply to decisions of the numerous subsidiary organs of the United Nations.

Article 27 of the UN Charter reads as follows:

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

That is, under paragraph 3 of article 27 of the Charter, the concurrence of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., France, and China is required for nonprocedural decisions. Thus, any of these states may veto a decision of this nature by voting against it.

In the Security Council itself, the veto does not apply to every decision. Procedural decisions are taken by a vote of any seven members. Furthermore, in a Security Council decision in connection with the pacific settlement of a dispute, a member of the Security Council which is a party to a dispute is required to abstain from voting. Finally a Security Council practice has developed under which, if a permanent member of the Security Council abstains from

voting on a nonprocedural decision of the Council, such abstention is not considered to be a veto.

At the same time, it should be noted that nonprocedural decisions require seven votes, two of which, obviously, must be cast by non-permanent members. There are six such members. Accordingly, if as many as five of these vote "no" on a nonprocedural decision, they can exercise a veto in fact as effective as a veto cast by a permanent member.

B. ORIGIN OF THE VETO

At the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944, which originated the proposals which became the basis of the Charter of the United Nations, there was considerable discussion on the problem of voting in the Security Council. No agreement was reached. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals contained the following note on this subject:

"The question of voting procedure in the Security Council * * * is still under consideration."

In December 1944 and January 1945, in order to resolve the voting question undecided at Dumbarton Oaks, the United States made certain proposals which were agreed to at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 by Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. They were then incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations as article 27. Although it is true that the United States offered the Yalta formula, this proposal was submitted as a compromise and the veto, as provided therein was less stringent than originally desired by the U. S. S. R. which would have extended it even to voting by a permanent member in a dispute to which it was a party.

At the San Francisco Conference in May and June 1945, which adopted the Charter of the United Nations, the proposed voting formula was sharply criticized by many of the smaller states. Such criticisms were of two types. In the first place, the smaller states contended that the formula was ambiguous. They therefore submitted to the Great Powers a questionnaire intended to clarify the ambiguities. In response to this questionnaire the United States, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and China prepared the so-called Four Power statement of June 7, 1945, which was a "statement" by these countries "of their general attitude toward the whole question of unanimity of the permanent members in the decisions of the Security Council." The United States believed that the Four Power statement, in fact, would clarify the voting formula and that as a result of the attitudes expressed in that statement, the veto would not, in fact, present a serious problem once the Security Council commenced its operations. However, the U. S. S. R. has interpreted the Four Power statement in a manner which has resulted in seriously diminishing the effectiveness of the Security Council.

The second objection raised by the smaller states to the Yalta proposals concerned the existence of a veto in connection with Security Council decisions under chapter VI of the Charter (pacific settlement of disputes). At San Francisco, it was conceded by substantially all states, large and small, that a veto was essential under chapter VII of the Charter. The following statement of the Secretary of State, in his report to the President on the San Francisco Conference as to

the basis of the veto was, in fact, the view of practically all states in the conference as well as the United States:

"This war was won not by any one country but by the combined efforts of the United Nations, and particularly by the brilliantly coordinated strategy of the Great Powers. So striking has been the lesson taught by this unity that the people and Government of the United States have altered their conception of national security. We understand that in the world of today a unilateral national policy of security is as outmoded as the Spads of 1918 in comparison with the B-29 of 1945 or the rocket planes of 1970. We know that for the United States—and for other great powers—there can be no humanly devised method of defining precisely the geographic areas in which their security interests begin or cease to exist. We realize, in short, that peace is a world-wide problem and the maintenance of peace, and not merely its restoration, depends primarily upon the unity of the great powers."

However, a substantial number of states felt that the veto should not be extended to chapter VI where the Security Council was not using enforcement measures but was acting rather in a mediating capacity. Australia proposed an amendment to the voting formula which would have eliminated the veto under chapter VI. Despite the opposition of all the great powers, the Australian amendment received 10 affirmative votes—Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Iran, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Panama, making it apparent that even at San Francisco there was strong opposition to the veto under chapter VI. However, it must be emphasized that there was no support at San Francisco for the elimination or restriction of the veto under chapter VII of the charter.

In the Four Power statement of June 7, 1945, the United States, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and China stated (pt. 1, par. 8):

"In other words, it would be possible for five nonpermanent members as a group to exercise a 'veto.' It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members, any more than the nonpermanent members, would use their 'veto' power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council."

It thus was understood that the veto would be used sparingly and only in connection with the most important of issues. Unfortunately, this expectation has not come to pass.

C. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF APRIL 14, 1949

1. *Prior action.*—The Interim Committee of the General Assembly (sometimes called the Little Assembly), after a thorough study of the entire problem of voting in the Security Council, submitted to the General Assembly in July 1948 a detailed report with recommendations. The recommendations included in a general way proposals which the United States had made on March 19, 1948, and also included a number of proposals made by other states.

The Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly during the third session in the fall of 1948 discussed the Interim Committee report and proposed a resolution to the General Assembly which in the main coincided with the report of the Interim Committee. However, owing to lack of time, the General Assembly was unable to take final action and the matter was deferred to the second part of the third session of the General Assembly which took place in April 1949

2. *Adoption of the resolution.*—On April 14, 1949, the General Assembly adopted the following resolution which had been proposed and approved by the Ad Hoc Political Committee:

The General Assembly, having considered the report of its Interim Committee on the problem of voting in the Security Council, and exercising the authority conferred upon it by article 10 of the Charter to discuss any question within the scope of the Charter or relating to the functions of any organ of the United Nations and to make recommendations to the members of the United Nations and to the Security Council thereon,

1. Recommends to the members of the Security Council that, without prejudice to any other decisions which the Security Council may deem procedural, the decisions set forth in the attached annex be deemed procedural and that the members of the Security Council conduct their business accordingly;

2. Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that they seek agreement among themselves upon what possible decisions by the Security Council they might forbear to exercise their veto, when seven affirmative votes have already been cast in the Council, giving favorable consideration to the list of such decisions contained in conclusion 2 of part IV, of the report of the Interim Committee;

3. Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council in order to avoid impairment of the usefulness and prestige of the Council through excessive use of the veto:

(a) To consult together wherever feasible upon important decisions to be taken by the Security Council;

(b) To consult together wherever feasible before a vote is taken if their unanimity is essential to effective action by the Security Council;

(c) If there is not unanimity, to exercise the veto only when they consider the question of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and to state upon what ground they consider this condition to be present;

4. Recommends to the members of the United Nations that in agreements conferring functions on the Security Council such conditions of voting within that body be provided as would to the greatest extent feasible exclude the application of the rule of unanimity of the permanent members.

ANNEX

DECISIONS DEEMED PROCEDURAL

Decision to postpone consideration of or voting on a recommendation of a State for membership until the next occasion for the consideration of applications.

Submission to the General Assembly of any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Requests to the General Assembly that the General Assembly make a recommendation on a dispute or situation in respect of which the Security Council is exercising the functions assigned to it in the Charter.

Consent to notification by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly or to Members of the United Nations of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council.

Consent to notification by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly or to Members of the United Nations of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security with which the Security Council ceases to deal.

Request to the Secretary-General for the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly.

Approval of credentials of representatives of members of the Security Council.

Approval of annual reports to the General Assembly.

Submission and approval of special reports to the General Assembly.

Organization of the Security Council in such manner as to enable it to function continuously.

Arrangement of the holding of periodic meetings.

Holding of meetings at places other than the seat of the United Nations.

Establishment of such subsidiary organs as the Security Council deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Steps incidental to the establishment of a subsidiary organ: appointment of members, terms of reference, interpretation of terms of reference, reference of questions for study, approval of rules of procedure. However, the approval of the terms of reference of such subsidiary organs should require the unanimity of the permanent members if the subsidiary organs were given authority to take steps

which, if taken by the Security Council, would be subject to the veto, or if the conferring of such authority would constitute a nonprocedural decision.

Adoption of rules of procedure:

Decisions to adopt rules of procedure and decisions in application of the provisional rules of procedure, not contained elsewhere in the list:

- (1) Overruling of ruling of the President on a point of order (rule 30).
- (2) Order of principal motions and draft resolutions (rule 32).
- (3) To suspend the meeting; to adjourn the meeting; to adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour; to postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely (rule 33).
- (4) Order in which amendments to motions or draft resolutions are to be voted upon (rule 36).
- (5) Request to members of the Secretariat or to other persons for information or for other assistance (rule 39).
- (6) Publication of documents in any language other than the official languages (rule 47).
- (7) To hold a meeting in private (rule 48).
- (8) To determine what records shall be kept of a private meeting (rule 51).
- (9) To approve important corrections to the records (rule 52).
- (10) To grant access to the records of private meetings to authorized representatives of other members of the United Nations (rule 56).
- (11) To determine which records and documents shall be made available to other members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall remain confidential (rule 57).

Adoption of method of selecting the President.

Participation without vote of members of the United Nations not members of the Security Council in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of those members are specially affected.

Invitation to a member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or to any state which is not a member of the United Nations to participate without vote in the discussion relating to a dispute to which it is a party.

Enunciation of conditions for such participation of a state which is not a member of the United Nations.

Decision whether a state not a member of the United Nations has accepted the conditions deemed just by the Security Council for participation under article 32 of the Charter.

Approval of credentials of representatives of states invited under articles 31 and 32 of the Charter and rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Decision to remind members of their obligations under the Charter.

Establishment of procedures for the hearing of disputes or situations.

Request for information on the progress or the results of resort to peaceful means of settlement.

Deletion of a question from the list of questions of which the Security Council is seized.

Decision to consider and discuss a dispute or a situation brought before the Security Council (adoption of the agenda).

Decision whether a state not a member of the United Nations has accepted, for the purposes of the dispute which it desires to bring to the attention of the Security Council, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter.

Invitation to a member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that member's armed forces.

Approval of rules of procedure and organization of the Military Staff Committee.

Request for assistance from the Economic and Social Council.

Decision to avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the Trusteeship System relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Decision to dispense, on grounds of security, with the assistance of the Trusteeship Council.

Request of the Security Council for the appointment of a joint conference for the purpose of choosing one name for each vacant seat in the International Court of Justice.

Fixation of a period within which those members of the International Court of Justice who have already been elected shall proceed to fill the vacant seats by selection from among those candidates who have obtained votes either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council.

Fixation of the date of the election to fill vacancies in the International Court of Justice.

The consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council called for by the resolution took place in the fall of 1949. The Soviet Union has declined to agree to forbear from exercising its veto in connection with decisions on pacific settlement of disputes and the admission of new members to the United Nations.

D. THE RECORD

1. THE SYRIA-LEBANON CASE

The United States proposed a resolution under which the Security Council would have expressed confidence that foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon would be withdrawn as soon as practicable and that negotiations to that end would be undertaken without delay, and would have requested that it be informed of the results of the negotiations (Journal, p. 337). The following vote occurred on this resolution— for: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Mexico, Netherlands, and United States; against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; abstentions: Poland, France, United Kingdom. After indicating approval of the resolution during the discussion, France and the United Kingdom abstained, but did not say they were parties to the dispute (Journal, pp. 346-7, 339, 343)³ (February 16, 1946).

Even though France and the United Kingdom did not specifically concede that they were parties to a dispute, it seems clear that their abstention was not intended to be the equivalent of a negative vote, especially since after the resolution failed of adoption both the United Kingdom and France indicated their intention to abide by its terms. *The President of the Council, after discussion, specifically ruled that the resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.*

2. THE SPANISH CASE

A resolution was proposed to adopt the amended recommendations which the Subcommittee on Spain made after its study of the Spanish question (June 13, 1946) (Journal, pp. 742-743). Nine votes were cast in favor of the adoption of the resolution, with the U. S. S. R. against and the Netherlands abstaining (Journal, p. 795) (June 25, 1946).

3. THE SPANISH CASE

Australia and the United Kingdom proposed a resolution to keep the Spanish case on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized without prejudice to the rights of the General Assembly (Journal, p. 822). All members voted in favor except the Soviet and Polish representatives, who voted in the negative, as they objected to the final "without prejudice" clause (Journal, p. 834) (June 26, 1946).

The President of the Council ruled that the Australian-United Kingdom resolution (Journal, p. 822; see above, pt. III, par. 1) was a question of procedure. This ruling was put to a vote (Journal, p. 841). Eight members voted that the matter was procedural; France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics voted that it was not; Poland abstained (Journal, p. 841) (June 26, 1946).

(NOTE.—*This is the first example of a "double veto." It could properly be counted as two vetoes.*)

³ References are to United Nations documents.

4. THE SPANISH CASE

Australia proposed a resolution to add the "without prejudice" clause to the previously approved paragraphs of the Australian-United Kingdom resolution (Journal, p. 862). All members voted for the inclusion of this clause except the Polish and Soviet representatives, who voted against it (Journal, p. 864) (June 26, 1946).

(NOTE.—*Since this veto presented the identical question as the first part of veto 3, sometimes it is not counted as a separate veto.*)

5. MEMBERSHIP OF TRANS-JORDAN

The application of Trans-Jordan for membership in the United Nations received eight affirmative votes. Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained from voting.

The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried (S/P. V. 57, pp. 178-180) (August 29, 1946).

6. MEMBERSHIP OF PORTUGAL

The application of Portugal for membership in the United Nations received eight affirmative votes. Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained from voting.

The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried (S/P. V. 57, p. 181) (August 29, 1946).

7. MEMBERSHIP OF IRELAND

The application of Ireland for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes. The U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained from voting.

The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried (S/P. V. 57, pp. 178-180) (August 29, 1946).

8. SECOND GREEK CASE

In the second Greek case the United States proposed a resolution to appoint a commission to investigate the situation alleged to exist on the northern frontier of Greece. This resolution received eight affirmative votes, Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained.

The resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V. 70, p. 87) (September 20, 1946).

9. CORFU CHANNEL CASE

A resolution was introduced by the United Kingdom, finding in substance that the minefield in the Corfu Channel which caused the destruction of two British ships with loss of life and injury to their crews "cannot have been laid without the knowledge of Albanian authorities" and recommending that the United Kingdom and Albanian Governments settle the dispute on the basis of the Council's finding. This resolution received seven affirmative votes, Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Syria abstained from voting. The United Kingdom as a party to the dispute under con-

sideration was precluded by article 27 (3) of the Charter from participating in the vote.

The resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V. 122, p. 76) (March 25, 1947).

10. THE THIRD GREEK CASE

The resolution proposed by the United States to adopt the proposals for the maintenance of international peace made by the majority of the members of the Committee of Investigation established by the Security Council received nine supporting votes, with Poland and the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative.

The resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./170, p. 41) (July 29, 1947).

11. MEMBERSHIP OF TRANS-JORDAN

The application of Trans-Jordan for membership in the United Nations, upon submission for the second time to the Security Council on August 18, 1947, received nine affirmative votes, one negative, with Poland abstaining.

The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried (S/P.V./186, pp. 83-85.)

12. MEMBERSHIP OF IRELAND

The application of Ireland for membership in the United Nations, upon submission for the second time to the Security Council on August 18, 1947, received nine affirmative votes, one negative with Poland abstaining.

The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried (S/P.V./186, p. 87) (August 18, 1947).

13. MEMBERSHIP OF PORTUGAL

The application of Portugal for membership in the United Nations, upon submission for the second time to the Security Council on August 18, 1947, received nine affirmative votes, with Poland and the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative.

The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from carrying (S/P.V./186, pp. 102-105) (August 18, 1947).

14. THE THIRD GREEK CASE

The resolution proposed by Australia and amended by the United States finding the existence of a threat to the peace on the northern border of Greece and calling upon the parties involved to cease all acts of provocation and to enter into direct negotiation to relieve the tension, when put to a vote on August 19, 1947, received nine supporting votes with two votes in the negative.

The resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./188, p. 88). (August 19, 1947)

15. THE THIRD GREEK CASE

The resolution proposed by the United States finding that the support given to guerrillas fighting the Greek Government by Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia constituted a threat to the peace, and calling upon Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to desist from rendering further support to the guerrilla fighting and to cooperate with Greece in the settlement of the dispute by peaceful means, received nine supporting votes in the Security Council on August 19, 1947, with two votes in the negative.

It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V./188, p. 106). (August 19, 1947.)

16. MEMBERSHIP OF ITALY

The resolution proposed by Australia that the Security Council find that Italy is a peace-loving state able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, and recommend its admission to membership in the United Nations at such time and under such conditions as the General Assembly may deem appropriate, received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative and Poland abstaining.

It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./196, pp. 82-85). (August 26, 1947.)

17. MEMBERSHIP OF AUSTRIA

The resolution of Australia finding that Austria is a peace-loving state able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter and recommending its admission to membership in the United Nations at such time and under such conditions as the General Assembly may deem appropriate received eight affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative and Poland and France abstaining.

It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./196, pp. 82-85). (August 26, 1947.)

18. SECOND INDONESIAN CASE

A joint Australian-Chinese resolution which ultimately was carried proposed that members of the Security Council that have career consuls in Batavia instruct them to prepare joint reports on the situation in Indonesia for the benefit of the Council. An amendment to this resolution proposed by the U. S. S. R. substituted a commission composed of states members of the Security Council in somewhat broadened terms of reference of the Commission. This amendment received seven affirmative votes with France and Belgium voting in the negative and China and the United Kingdom abstaining.

It failed to carry because of the negative vote of *France* (S/P.V.194, p. 66). (August 25, 1947.)

19. THIRD GREEK CASE

The United States resolution requesting the General Assembly to consider the dispute between Greece and her northern neighbors and to make any recommendations which it deems appropriate under the circumstances, on September 15, 1947, received nine affirmative votes, *but failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.* (S/P.V./202, p. 167).

The United States challenged the ruling of the President that the decision set forth above was one of substance and therefore failed to carry because of the opposition of the U. S. S. R. The United States resolution that the question be deemed one of procedure received eight affirmative votes with Syria abstaining and Poland and the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative.

It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./202, pp. 168-170).

(NOTE: *This is the second example of a "double veto." It could properly be counted as two vetoes.*)

20. MEMBERSHIP OF ITALY

Upon reconsideration of the membership application of Italy on October 1, 1947, nine members of the Security Council favored the admission of Italy with U. S. S. R. and Poland voting in the negative.

The application failed because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./206, pp. 132-135).

21. MEMBERSHIP OF FINLAND

The application of Finland for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes on October 1, 1947, with U. S. S. R. and Poland voting in the negative.

It failed to carry because of the negative vote of U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./206, pp. 136-140).

22. MEMBERSHIP OF ITALY

The reapplication of Italy for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes on April 10, 1948, with U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./279, p. 51).

23. THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CASE

Before a vote was taken on the Chilean draft resolution to establish a subcommittee to hear evidence and testimony in regard to the coup in Czechoslovakia, the President asked for a preliminary vote on whether the vote on the resolution would be considered one of procedure. Eight members voted in the affirmative, two members voted in the negative (U. S. S. R., Ukraine) and one member abstained (France). The President ruled that since a permanent member had voted in the negative, the vote on the resolution would be a substantive vote (S/P.V./303, pp. 66-70). (May 24, 1948.)

The ruling of the President that the resolution should be deemed substantive was challenged. Six members voted to overrule the President's ruling, two members (U. S. S. R., Ukraine) voted to sustain the President's ruling, and three members (France, United States, United Kingdom) abstained. Therefore, the President's ruling that the Chilean resolution was substantive, stood. The President submitted to the Council the Chilean draft resolution. Nine members voted in favor of the resolution and two voted against (U. S. S. R., Ukraine).

The resolution failed of adoption due to the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./303, pp. 137-140). (May 26, 1948.)

(NOTE: *This is the third example of a "double veto." It could properly be counted as two vetoes.*)

24. THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The United States submitted a proposal to the Security Council to approve the first, second, and third reports of the Atomic Energy Commission and to transmit these reports, together with the record of the Security Council's approval, to the General Assembly and to the member nations of the United Nations. The third report recommended that the negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission be suspended. The vote taken on the resolution resulted in nine members voting for the proposal and two voting in the negative (the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine). The President ruled that the resolution was not adopted due to the negative vote of one of the permanent members, the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./325, p. 37). (June 22, 1948.)

25. MEMBERSHIP OF CEYLON

The application of Ceylon for admission to membership received nine affirmative votes. The U. S. S. R. and the Ukrainian S. S. R. voted in the negative.

The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the application from being approved (S/P.V./351, p. 91). (August 18, 1948.)

26. THE BERLIN QUESTION

A draft resolution calling upon the four governments having responsibility in Germany as occupant powers to take certain steps for the solution of the Berlin crisis was submitted jointly by the representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, and Syria. This resolution received nine favorable votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukrainian S. S. R. voting in the negative.

The resolution was defeated because of the Soviet negative vote (S/P. V. 372, p. 56). (October 25, 1948.)

27. MEMBERSHIP OF CEYLON

On recommendation by the General Assembly, the Security Council reconsidered the application of Ceylon for admission to membership. When put to a vote the application received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukrainian S. S. R. voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V. 384, pp. 137-140). (December 15, 1948.)

28. MEMBERSHIP OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of China, recommending for membership the Republic of Korea in the United Nations, received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V. 423, p. 71). (April 8, 1949.)

29. MEMBERSHIP OF NEPAL

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of China recommending Nepal for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V. 439, pp. 66-70). (September 7, 1949.)

30. MEMBERSHIP OF PORTUGAL

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of Argentina recommending Portugal for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes, with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V. 443, pp. 66-70). (September 13, 1949.)

31. MEMBERSHIP OF TRANS-JORDAN

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of Argentina recommending Trans-Jordan for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V. 443, pp. 71-75). (September 13, 1949.)

32. MEMBERSHIP OF ITALY

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of Argentina recommending Italy for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V. 443, p. 81). (September 13, 1949.)

33. MEMBERSHIP OF FINLAND

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of Argentina recommending Finland for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V. 443, pp. 82-85). (September 13, 1949.)

34. MEMBERSHIP OF IRELAND

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of Argentina recommending Ireland for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V. 443, p. 86). (September 13, 1949.)

35. MEMBERSHIP OF AUSTRIA

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of Argentina recommending Austria for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V. 443, pp. 87-90). (September 13, 1949.)

36. MEMBERSHIP OF CEYLON

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of Argentina recommending Ceylon for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V. 443, pp. 87-90). (September 13, 1949.)

37. CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS COMMISSION REPORTS

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United States taking note of the second progress report of the CCA and approving certain resolutions adopted by the Commission received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The application was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P. V. 450, pp. 47-50). (October 11, 1949.)

38. REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of France approving proposals contained in the working paper adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments at its nineteenth meeting on August 1, 1949, formulating principles for the receipt, checking, and publication of full information to be supplied by member states with regard to their effectives and their conventional armaments, received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The resolution was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./452, pp. 86-90). (October 18, 1949.)

39. REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of France recognizing as essential the submission by states both of information on conventional armaments and of information on atomic weapons

and in addition approving the proposals for the receipt, checking, and publication of full information to be supplied by member states with regard to their effectives and conventional armaments set forth in the working paper adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments on August 1, 1949, received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V./452, pp. 96-100). (October 18, 1949.)

40. SECOND INDONESIAN CASE

The first four paragraphs of the draft resolution concerning the Indonesian question submitted by the representative of Canada noted with satisfaction the special report of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia concerning the successful conclusion of the round table conference at the Hague; congratulated the parties on having reached agreement; welcomed the forthcoming establishment of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia; and commended the United Nations Commission for its assistance to the parties. It received nine affirmative votes with the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The resolution was not approved because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V. 456, p. 76). (December 13, 1949.)

41. SECOND INDONESIAN CASE

The final paragraph of the resolution concerning the Indonesian question which requested the United Nations Commission for Indonesia to continue to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Security Council and in particular to observe and assist in the implementation of the agreements reached at the round table conference and to report thereon to the Security Council received eight affirmative votes with U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative.

The resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (S/P.V. 456, pp. 81-85). (December 13, 1949.)

Because of its absence from the Security Council the Soviet Union has not used the veto in 1950 thus far.

IV. UNITED STATES ACTS EVIDENCING DESIRE FOR CO-OPERATION WITH SOVIET UNION, AND SOVIET RESPONSE

A. WAR AID

UNITED STATES ACTS

SOVIET RESPONSE

1. Military and civilian supplies to a value of approximately \$11,000,000,000 were supplied the Soviet Union under lend-lease.

2. Military and technological information was furnished through United States military mission in Moscow.

1. Grudging Soviet recognition of extent and value of lend-lease aid and long delay in agreeing to begin negotiations for a settlement.

2. Complete lack of reciprocity in exchange of military and technological information.

UNITED STATES ACTS

3. Substantial medical supplies and civilian goods were sent to Soviet Union by American agencies such as Red Cross and Russian War Relief.

4. In lend-lease settlement negotiations United States has asked no payment for articles used up during war and has expressed willingness to settle for "fair" value of residual articles on basis of usefulness to Soviet peacetime economy. The United States position is based on principles used in settlements with other lend-lease recipients.

SOVIET RESPONSE

3. Little publicity given in Soviet Union to nongovernmental aid received from United States.

4. Soviets have failed to present inventory of lend-lease articles remaining at war's end and have refused to accept principles used in other lend-lease settlements. No agreement has been reached on this aspect of settlement.

5. The U. S. S. R. returned eight merchant vessels. In December 1948 the U. S. S. R. agreed to return 31 naval vessels—28 frigates and 3 icebreakers—for which the United States has been making repeated demands since January 1948 and July 1946 respectively, and also other naval vessels. Arrangements were to be concluded by experts of both sides. Although the United States promptly named its group of experts, agreement was reached with the U. S. S. R. only in September 1949 after long delays.

6. Over 4 years after the termination of hostilities the Soviet Government has not taken action to compensate American corporations holding patents on oil refinery processes used by the Soviet Government under lend-lease.

B. POSTWAR AID

1. The United States was prepared to discuss extension of large credit to Soviet Government to assist in postwar reconstruction.

1. Refusal of Soviet Government to discuss settlement of outstanding economic questions between the two countries in connection with credit negotiations. Constant reiteration by Soviet propaganda of theme that United States seeks to extend credits to other countries for purposes of economic and political domination.

UNITED STATES ACTS

2. UNRRA supplies to the value of \$250,000,000 were sent to Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Seventy-two percent of the cost of the UNRRA program was borne by the United States.

3. The Soviet Union was invited to participate in the Committee of European Economic Cooperation, which met in Paris in July 1947 to consider Secretary of State Marshall's proposal to implement European recovery with American aid.

SOVIET RESPONSE

2. Little public recognition was given to UNRRA program or to United States share therein.

3. A Soviet delegation participated in the initial meeting of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation, only to be promptly withdrawn. The Soviet Government thereupon refused to engage in or to allow its satellites to engage in discussions on the Marshall Plan. It launched instead a violent propaganda offensive pronouncing the Marshall plan an imperialist measure designed to enslave Europe, and set up the Cominform with the announced purpose of preventing its realization.

C. DECISIONS MADE AT MEETINGS OF HEADS OF STATES

(Political and Territorial Questions)

1. Yalta:

(a) United States agreed to cession of Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin to U. S. S. R.

(b) United States agreed to recognize paramount Soviet interests in Dairen, Port Arthur, and the Manchurian railways.

(c) United States agreed to fixing of Curzon line as western border of Soviet Union, thereby incorporating in Soviet Union sizable area of prewar Polish territory.

(d) United States agreed to participation of Byelorussia and Ukraine in UN, thereby giving Soviet Union three votes.

2. Potsdam:

(a) United States agreed to the Soviet annexation of northern portion of East Prussia.

1. Yalta:

(a) Soviet Union agreed at Yalta to concert with other signatory powers in assisting liberated countries to solve problems by democratic means, but failed to observe this commitment.

(b) Failure of Soviet Government to observe Yalta commitments for free elections in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

(c) Encouragement by Soviet Union of obstructionism and truculence in Governments of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.

2. Potsdam:

(a) Noncooperation by Soviet Union in implementing occupation policies in Germany, Austria, and Korea.

UNITED STATES ACTS

(b) United States agreed to provisional Polish administration of eastern Germany.

(c) United States agreed that postwar conditions required modification of Montreux convention governing the Straits.

(d) Recognition was given to Soviet claims for preferential reparations from western Germany.

SOVIET RESPONSE

(b) Widespread Soviet removals from Eastern Europe, Manchuria, and Korea, thereby seriously interfering with resumption of industrial production.

(c) Obstructionist Soviet tactics in negotiations for Italian and Balkan treaties in meetings of both deputies and foreign ministers. Following their signature, Soviets delayed ratification for almost 7 months.

(d) Soviet Union has refused to agree to organization of Germany as an economic unit, thereby preventing a more rapid return to a self-sustaining German economy and the recovery of Europe.

D. PEACE TREATIES

1. Secretary of State Byrnes offered the U. S. S. R. a mutual guarantee pact against Japanese and German aggression to extend for 25 or even 40 years. Subsequently, the offer of a 40-year pact was repeated by Secretary of State Marshall.

2. Concessions were made to Soviet claims for reparations from Italy.

3. Compromises were made with Soviet and Yugoslav viewpoints on boundaries and administration of Venezia Giulia and Trieste.

4. Secretary Byrnes publicly recognized special security interests of U. S. S. R. in central and eastern Europe.

1. Soviet Union has rejected proposed guarantee pact against German and Japanese aggression.

E. UNITED NATIONS

1. United States has displayed considerable patience with Soviet use of veto.

By its reluctance to abandon the smallest prerogatives of national sovereignty the U. S. S. R. has hamstrung the UN as follows:

1. The unanimity principle which was designed to save a great power from being forced to comply with measures which it considered were of major detriment to itself

UNITED STATES ACTS

SOVIET RESPONSE

has been utilized by the Soviets as a petty political tool. Through use or threat of the veto the U. S. S. R. has consistently prevented UN action.

Forty-three of the forty-four vetoes passed in the Security Council have been Soviet. The Soviets have likewise exercised an "Assembly veto" in the form of a boycott; thus they have continually boycotted the Little Assembly, the UN Special Balkan Commission, and the UN Commission for Korea, and since January 13, 1950, have boycotted all UN organs in which Nationalist China is represented. They abstained from participation in the Trusteeship Council until April 1948. While utilizing plenary sessions of the Economic Commission to Europe and for the Far East primarily for propaganda attacks on the United States, the U. S. S. R. has participated in the work of only one of many technical groups where the actual details of the work are involved.

2. United States offered to share atomic secrets.

2. By its refusal to make any but token compromises toward the majority view the U. S. S. R. has blocked agreement on control of atomic energy and creation of an international police force. Soviet unwillingness to permit inspection of the U. S. S. R. by an international organ not subject to the Security Council where the veto operates has been a primary obstacle to effective atomic control and disarmament.

3. The U. S. S. R. has shown itself in the UN to be more interested in exploiting for propaganda and political purposes western rejection of obviously unacceptable proposals, notably those on disarmament, than in extending the sphere of international cooperation. American efforts in the UN are consistently depicted as being

UNITED STATES ACTS

SOVIET RESPONSE

designed to convert that body into an American tool for world domination.

F. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

United States has advocated Soviet participation in all specialized international organizations and has made direct efforts to obtain Soviet participation.

The Soviet Union has not only declined to participate but has consistently attacked the majority of the specialized international organizations affiliated with the UN, i. e., the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Refugee Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Bank, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Labor Organization, and the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

It has withdrawn from the World Health Organization and its role in the International Telecommunication Union and Universal Postal Union has in general been marked either by obstructionism or disinterest.

G. BERLIN

The United States together with France and Britain approached the Soviet Government with a request for "frank discussion" between western representatives on one hand, and Premier Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov on the other, to find a basis of settlement for the Berlin problem.

After protracted sessions among Big Four representatives in Moscow during July and August 1948, a directive to the four military governors in Germany was finally agreed upon on August 30. During the ensuing technical discussions in Berlin, however, Soviet commander Marshal Sokolovsky failed to abide by the terms of the directive and thereby brought about the failure of attempts to solve the Berlin issue through negotiations. Despite the willingness of the Western Powers to meet with the U. S. S. R. at the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers (May, June 1949) and Soviet agreement to "normalize" conditions in Berlin, the Soviet authorities in Germany have failed to honor their agreement. In addi-

UNITED STATES ACTS

SOVIET RESPONSE

tion, they have since January 13, 1950, interfered with transport between Berlin and western Germany.

H. DANUBE CONFERENCE

Although realizing that the Western Powers would be in the minority, the United States took the initiative in proposing a conference to work out a new regime for the Danube.

At the conference—the first international conference dominated by the Soviet bloc—English was excluded as an official language and a Soviet draft treaty which replaced international control with control by the riparian powers was pushed through almost unchanged. Western amendments were brushed aside, and Western refusal to accept the Soviet-imposed convention would, it was declared, “in no measure influence its coming into force.”

I. REPATRIATION

Agreement was reached with the Soviet Government at Yalta for exchange of nationals liberated by Soviet and American Armed Forces.

Soviets refused to permit access by American repatriation teams to American citizens liberated by Soviet armed forces. For their part, the Soviets have insisted strenuously that all Soviet citizens, including persons coming from areas incorporated into Soviet Union since outbreak of war, be forcibly turned over to Soviet repatriation authorities regardless of their individual desires.

J. DEPARTURE OF NATIONALS

The United States has facilitated the return to the Armenian SSR of Americans of Armenian stock including 162 in 1949.

Since the recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States only a small number of Soviet nationals married to American citizens have been granted exit visas. No persons in this category have been permitted to leave since February 1947 when marriage between Soviet citizens and foreigners was forbidden. Only a handful of the several hundred persons claimed by the United States as nationals have been permitted to leave the U. S. S. R.

K. CULTURAL

UNITED STATES ACTS

The United States has constantly sought to arrange for the exchange of publications, scientists, artists, students, etc., between the United States and the Soviet Union and has generally sought to establish Soviet-U. S. relations on a firmer basis of mutual understanding.

SOVIET RESPONSE

United States efforts for cultural exchanges have not been reciprocated. On the contrary, the Soviet Government has made strenuous efforts to further isolate the Soviet people from all contact with the world outside the Soviet orbit. Attacks on "cosmopolitanism," laws forbidding marriage with foreigners and channeling relations with foreign officials through the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, and the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts to the U. S. S. R. (as well as to the Satellites) have all had this effect. * * *⁴

L. CIVIL AVIATION

United States has persistently sought to negotiate agreement with the Soviet Union for reciprocal civil air traffic between the two countries.

The Soviets have rejected all overtures directed toward such an agreement.

M. PROPAGANDA

United States information program has adhered to facts in presenting the news.

Since the war ended, Soviet propaganda for both internal consumption and as distributed through controlled outlets around the world, has been violently and abusively anti-American. United States is pictured as imperialistic, reactionary, fascist, and striving for world domination through destruction of the U. S. S. R. in a third World War. The United States Government is alleged to be in the hands of a small group aiming at imposing its will on the world by force and as being entirely out of step with desires and aspirations of the American people.

⁴ For the complete story, see the Department of State publication, Postwar Cultural Relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R.: United States Efforts to Establish Cultural Scientific Exchange blocked by U. S. S. R.

V. SOVIET TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

A. THE COMMUNIST WORLD

Country	1949 area ¹ (square miles)	Population ¹
A. U. S. S. R.—1939 territory.....	8,176,000	170,467,000
B. Territorial acquisitions, 1939-49 ²	264,200	24,030,000
1. Finnish Provinces.....	17,600	450,000
2. Polish Provinces.....	69,900	11,870,000
3. Rumanian Provinces.....	19,400	3,700,000
Bessarabia.....	17,100	3,200,000
Bukovina.....	2,300	500,000
4. Baltic States.....	65,200	6,030,000
Estonia.....	18,300	1,122,000
Latvia.....	25,400	1,951,000
Lithuania.....	21,500	2,957,000
5. Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg) area.....	5,400	1,187,000
6. Czechoslovakian areas.....	4,900	731,000
7. South Sakhalin.....	13,900	415,000
8. Kurile (Chishima) Islands.....	3,000	18,000
9. Tanna Tuva.....	64,000	65,000
C. U. S. S. R. (1949) ³	8,591,700	200,000,000
D. Soviet dominated territories ⁴	4,823,060	552,878,000
1. Occupied areas.....	53,160	21,238,000
Germany.....	42,900	18,807,000
Soviet zone.....	41,400	17,600,000
Soviet sector of Berlin.....	1,500	1,207,000
Austria.....	10,260	2,431,000
Soviet zone.....	10,200	1,931,000
Vienna (Soviet sectors).....	60	500,000
2. European satellites ⁵	351,100	70,540,000
Albania.....	11,100	1,186,000
Bulgaria.....	42,900	7,160,000
Czechoslovakia.....	49,300	12,463,000
Hungary.....	35,900	9,224,000
Poland.....	120,400	24,500,000
Rumania.....	91,600	16,007,000
3. Asiatic satellites.....	4,419,700	461,100,000
China ⁶	3,745,300	450,000,000
Mongolian People's Republic.....	625,000	2,000,000
North Korea.....	48,500	9,100,000
Total, Communist world ⁴	13,415,660	762,878,000

¹ Aside from the U. S. S. R. all area and population data relate to 1949. Except for the 1949 estimated total, the Soviet figures relate to the prewar populations, no later official figures being available. Unless otherwise indicated data were drawn from the League of Nations and United Nations statistical publications. Other sources are as follows: Polish Provinces, *Population Index*, (January 1947); Kaliningrad area, *Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland*, 1949; Czechoslovakia areas and Tanna Tuva, the *Statesman's Yearbook*; South Sakhalin and Kurile Islands, 1940 census of Japan.

² The figures do not include about 350 square miles of territory under Soviet control but which are neither satellite countries nor territories directly incorporated into the U. S. S. R. These are the Porkkala peninsula in Finland (187 square miles), leased by the Soviet Union for 50 years; and Port Arthur, Manchuria (163 square miles). By agreement with Communist China, the area is under joint U. S. S. R.-Chinese administration up to 1952.

³ While no recent census or official population estimate of the Soviet Union is available, election district data indicate a population of approximately 200,000,000. The official Soviet figures for area of the U. S. S. R. in 1939, plus the territorial annexations of 1939-49, do not add to the official Soviet figure for the total postwar area, apparently owing to revised estimates based on more recent surveys.

⁴ Excluding Yugoslavia.

⁵ Excluding Formosa.

B. SOVIET TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS OF WORLD WAR II

General

Post World War I Soviet Russia had an area of approximately 8,176,000 square miles. The only extension of territory before 1939 was the formal annexation (announced in 1926) of all islands in the Arctic which fall within the triangle described by the lines of longitude 32° 4' 31" East and 168° 49' 31" West, the North Pole forming the apex and the northern coast of the U. S. S. R., the base of the triangle. Figures for the area involved have not been issued by the U. S. S. R. Except for this addition, the borders of Soviet Russia remained static until 1939.

At present its territory comprises 8,591,700 square miles. Since 1939 the U. S. S. R. has expanded extensively. A total of 264,200 square miles has been brought under direct Soviet control and 350 square miles are leased or jointly occupied. Territories have been regained which at one time were part of the Russian Empire, comprising 183,700 square miles in all. These include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia and South Sakhalin, as well as large parts of prewar Poland and Finland. In addition, the Königsberg area, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, Northern Bukovina, Tannu Tuva and the Kuriles (totaling 80,500 square miles) have been brought within Russian boundaries for the first time. Not officially part of the U. S. S. R., but temporarily under Soviet control are Porkkala (Peninsula) in Finland and Port Arthur in Manchuria, totaling approximately 350 square miles. Only a small part of these recent additions have been internationally recognized. The new areas have been acquired in a variety of ways but the validity of Soviet claim to them rests principally upon sheer force.

Finnish Provinces

Following defeat in the war of 1939-40, Finland ceded to the U. S. S. R., by treaty of March 12, 1940, the greater part of the province of Viipuri (Viiborg), including the city of Viipuri, the Karelian Isthmus and the shores of Lake Ladoga, and a strip of land in the Kuolayarvi region of Oulu Province. The Finnish Army cooperated with the Germans in the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and reoccupied most of the territory ceded in 1940, but as a result of the defeat of Germany again lost these territories and in addition was compelled by armistice of September 19, 1944, to cede the Petsamo corridor to the Arctic Ocean and a larger territory in the Kuolayarvi region. The Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947, finalized the relationship and included a lease of the Porkkala area (187 square miles) to the U. S. S. R. as a naval base for 50 years. The population of the ceded territories in 1939 amounted to about 450,000, but almost the entire population has been resettled in Finland, leaving a negligible Finnish population in the lost areas.

Polish Provinces

As a result of the German invasion and Soviet-German agreements, Poland was partitioned in 1939. As of November 1, 1939, the U. S. S. R. annexed an area of 75,200 square miles with an estimated population of 12,500,000. The Soviet-German treaties of 1939 were repudiated at the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Following Soviet reoccupation in 1944 and the establishment of a provisional Polish Government in December 1944, the eastern frontier of Poland was established as the Curzon line, ceding to the Soviet Union the old voivodships of Wilno, Nowogrodek, Polesie, Wolyn, Tarnopol, and Stanislawow, as well as substantial portions of Bialystok and Lwow, including the important city of that name. These areas had a prewar population of 11,800,000. The town of Wilno and the surrounding areas were annexed to the Lithuanian S. S. R. The remainder of the Wilno district, Nowogrodek district, and most of Polesie went to the Byelorussian S. S. R., while Wolyn, Tarnopol, Stanislawow, and the city of Lwow and environs were annexed to the Ukrainian S. S. R.

Rumanian Provinces

Following the acceptance of a Soviet ultimatum Soviet troops occupied Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, which were incorporated in the Soviet Union on August 2, 1940. The Rumanian Peace Treaty on February 10, 1947, confirmed these cessions.

Baltic States

On the basis of the Soviet German agreement of August 23, 1939, the U. S. S. R. occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in June 1940; these were annexed by Soviet decrees in August 1940.

Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg) area

In 1945 the U. S. S. R. occupied this area of East Prussia, containing the important cities of Koenigsberg, Tilsit, and Insterburg and following the Potsdam meetings the area was annexed as a special *Okrug* of the U. S. S. R. Permanent title to this area awaits the peace treaty.

Czechoslovakian areas

Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and a small part of Slovakia were added to the Soviet Union by the treaty of Moscow with Czechoslovakia in July 1945.

Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands

Under the terms of the Yalta Agreement with the Allies in February 1945, these areas were incorporated in the U. S. S. R. following the defeat of Japan. Permanent title depends directly upon the peace treaty with Japan.

Tannu Tuva

The list of electoral districts published in the Soviet Press October 17, 1946, disclosed that the nominally independent republic had been incorporated into the U. S. S. R. as the Tuva Autonomous Region.

C. THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD

Region	Area ¹ (square miles)	Population ¹
Europe ²	1,511,000	300,704,000
Near and Middle East ³	3,775,000	500,462,000
Far East ³	3,677,000	282,073,000
Africa ¹	11,360,000	198,253,000
North America.....	9,373,000	214,341,000
South America.....	6,857,000	167,101,000
Oceania.....	3,304,000	12,463,000
Total.....	39,896,000	1,624,473,000

¹ 1949 areas and population as given in statistical publications of the United Nations.

² Including Yugoslavia.

³ There is no universal definition as to what countries should be included in the Near and Middle East. For this study Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan were considered as portions of Africa; Greece and European Turkey, in Europe; Asiatic Turkey through India and including the Arabian Shield, Ceylon, Nepal and Bhutan as parts of the Near and Middle East. The remainder of non-Communist Asia was included in the Far East.

D. COMPARISONS OF COMMUNIST AND NONCOMMUNIST WORLDS

Region	Total		Communist-dominated absolute		Communist-dominated percentages	
	Area (square miles)	Population	Area (square miles)	Population	Area	Population
U. S. S. R.....	8,591,700	200,000,000	8,591,700	200,000,000	100	100
Europe.....	1,915,000	392,572,000	404,000	91,775,000	21	23
Near and Middle East.....	3,775,000	509,462,000				
Far East.....	8,097,000	743,179,000	4,420,000	461,100,000	55	62
Africa.....	11,399,000	198,293,000				
North America.....	9,373,000	214,341,000				
South America.....	6,857,000	107,101,000				
Oceania.....	3,304,000	12,403,000				
World.....	53,311,700	2,377,351,000	13,415,700	752,878,000	25	32



