


The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

By

JOHN M. CABOT

*A Discussion of the Conflicting Claims of Rumania
and Hungary to Transylvania, the Banat,
and the Eastern Section of the
Hungarian Plain*



1926

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**THIS BOOK IS AFFECTIONATELY
DEDICATED TO
FRANCIS J. MOORS**

PREFACE

THIS essay was originally written as a thesis for a degree with distinction at Harvard, and won the Philip Washburn Prize, 1923. Entirely revised, rewritten, and improved with material gathered in Rumania, it was used at Oxford as the thesis required for the degree of Bachelor of Literature. Slightly revised again and brought up to date, it is now published.

The material used in this dissertation comes from many sources. A great deal comes from the Bodleian Library, and from the libraries at Harvard, Boston, and New York. For some exceedingly important works, however, I am indebted to Count Teleki (ex-Premier of Hungary), Count Széchenyi (Hungarian Minister to Washington), Dr. Louis C. Cornish, M. Ciotori, (Secretary to the Rumanian Legation at London), Prince Bibesco, (Rumanian Minister to Washington) and others.

There is no lack of written material on these subjects, but unfortunately, almost all of it is untrustworthy. A great many works, chiefly propaganda pamphlets, could be discarded without a second glance. But even after a careful sifting of evidence, the author felt uncertain upon a great many points, and there-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

fore, he went to Rumania to find out, if he could, exactly what the facts were in cases about which he was uncertain. During the trip he tried to hear all parties. He talked with rabid Rumanians and fanatical Hungarians, not to mention two Saxon leaders. He met all classes from the Queen of Rumania to the humble door-keeper of a Bucharest Legation. Chapter V, and parts of other chapters, have been written largely from the information obtained during this trip. No one is more conscious than the writer that this work must contain a great many errors. When three quarters of the material on this subject is written with intent to deceive, when nine-tenths of the people who know the facts are willing to tell but one part of the story, and when even the most fair-minded writers are often misled by unscrupulous partisans, it is not surprising that a student of this question faces great difficulties in getting at the truth. The writer hopes, however, that by a careful sifting of the evidence, and by asking each side their explanation of almost every important point, he has reached an approximation of the truth.

The material used naturally varies a great deal in reliability. Some works are by authors of unimpeachable honesty, yet even here errors creep in; in this category belong the works edited by Prothero and

Preface

Temperley, Dr. Cornish's and Dr. Seton-Watson's books. Several others even though they tell but one side of the story, are nevertheless very valuable; in this class belongs "The Hungarian Peace Negotiations." Finally come the propaganda writers, and the creatures of foreign governments. The statements in their works have been very greatly discounted.

The author would be ungrateful if he did not express his thanks to Dr. Blake of Harvard and to Professor Dawkins of Exeter College, Oxford, his supervisors; to Dr. Seton-Watson, Dr. Cornish, and Count Teleki, to some others whose names, at their own request, must not be mentioned; and to all those who have assisted him in preparing this dissertation.

Unfortunately, much information thus acquired was given on condition that its source be kept strictly secret. If therefore many points which would seem to demand an authority are not footnoted, it is generally because of this. The writer has also deleted from this book all footnotes giving sources only for unimportant or uncontroversial facts. For the abbreviations in the footnotes, reference should be made to the bibliography at the end.

THE RACIAL CONFLICT IN TRANSYLVANIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
<i>Preface.</i>	V
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION	3
The importance of the Transylvanian question. The present situation no solution.	
CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	7
The Roman period. Original immigration of present inhabitants. The wars against the Turks. Racial conflicts since 1780. Magyarization. Rumania and the Great War. Her defeat.	
CHAPTER III. THE PEACE SETTLEMENT	22
Union of Transylvania with Rumania. War between Rumanians and Hungarian Bolshevists. The peace settlement. Differences between Rumania and the Peace Conference. The Treaty with Hungary.	
CHAPTER IV. THE FUNDAMENTALS INVOLVED	36
The will of the people—how determined? The ability to rule. The economic situation. The geographical condition. Historical and strategic considerations.	
CHAPTER V. A COMPARISON OF HUNGARIAN AND RUMANIAN RULE IN TRANSYLVANIA	49
The Hungarian law of Nationalities. Cultural standards of Hungarians and Rumanians. Corruption of Rumanian administration. Question of officials. Education of	

Table of Contents

minorities. Ecclesiastical interests. The Rumanian Agrarian Law. The judicial systems of Hungary and Rumania. Political charges—the elections in Transylvania. Freedom of press and assembly. Minor grievances—requisitioning by Rumanians. Reasons for Hungarian and Rumanian policies. Question of future.

CHAPTER VI. THE QUESTION OF TRANSYLVANIA 106

Description of province. Arguments of both sides—historical, geographic, economic. The ethnographical situation. The sentiments of the three major races. The Hungarian Census of 1910. Question of Székelys.

CHAPTER VII. THE RUMANIAN DISTRICTS OF THE HUNGARIAN PLAIN 127

Preliminary discussion. The frontier drawn at Paris. The injustice of it. Another possible boundary.

CHAPTER VIII. THE PROBLEM OF THE BANAT. 142

Description of province. Arguments against division. Magyar and Rumanian claims. Objections to them. Serbian claims. The frontier drawn at Paris. Possible improvements in it.

CHAPTER IX. CONCLUSION 172

Present situation unstable. Possible ways of conciliating the Hungarians. The present state of things must not and cannot continue. Conclusion.

APPENDIX 181

BIBLIOGRAPHY 199

CHAPTER I

Introduction

AMONG the many difficult problems created by the Great War, those of Western Europe have received the major share of the attention of the English-speaking world. Eastern European questions, however, have by no means been ignored. It is therefore not unnatural that the problem created by the taking over of a vast tract of territory from Hungary by Rumania should have received a considerable amount of attention. This tract is sometimes called, for convenience' sake, Transylvania; but it includes not only the ancient Hungarian province of Transylvania, but also another strip of territory equal in area to that province.

This problem is not one of recent growth—its beginnings may be traced back at least into the eighteenth century. Still, though the Rumanians issued much cunning propaganda, the Anglo-Saxon world seems scarcely to have realized, until early in the twentieth century, that any question existed. When the war broke out, everybody's mind turned toward a peace settle-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

ment which should make such a thing impossible in the future. Then it was discovered that all the enemy nations had for many years grievously oppressed peoples of other races, and that, in particular, the subject races in Austria-Hungary, numbering over half the population, were clamoring for liberty. Both idealism and expediency seemed to demand that this polyglot empire be broken up. The nationalities which would profit by such a change fanned the spreading sentiment by a propaganda campaign. And when the Austro-Hungarian armies were crushed, a series of revolutions among the subject nationalities appeared to solve these problems without any intervention on the part of the victorious allies.

Never was public opinion more mistaken than at this time. So long as the subject nationalities seized only territory belonging to ex-enemies, all was well; but once they fell to squabbling among themselves, the people in the allied countries realized that any settlement in Europe meant simply an exchange of new problems for old. And when diplomacy used the apparent dictates of idealism in such a way that many frightful injustices were committed, the last hope of permanence in the settlement was gone. The non-Magyars promptly adopted more than Magyar methods in oppressing the

Introduction

Magyars. The Hungarians started a noisy, deceitful, and undignified propaganda campaign. The Catholic, Presbyterian, and Unitarian churches discovered that their flocks were being oppressed, and their indignation, expressed in many reports, was deftly turned to use to aid the Magyar cause. Finally, many people, for personal or political reasons, have rallied to the Hungarian side. And if the Hungarians have many friends to help their campaign for the restoration of their lost provinces, the Rumanians are by no means bereft of supporters. It is surprising how much difference of opinion exists upon this subject. Very few seem to realize that there is much right and much wrong on both sides. Controversialists have carefully sorted out all the facts favorable to their particular theories, and with equal care have eliminated all facts which do not fit in with their arguments. It is therefore difficult for the casual reader, and even for the student, to get any clear ideas in regard to this subject. Things have indeed come to a sorry pass when churches and schools are used for political ends, when professors no longer speak the truth, and when noblemen have lost their dignity. The person who delves into this matter not only has many unpleasant shocks awaiting him, but he will also get much amusement out of it, on account of the absurd argu-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

ments and glaring inconsistencies to be found in every propaganda pamphlet.

It is clear, however, that a very serious problem exists here; that the war and its aftermath have tended to aggravate rather than to solve it; and that the present settlement is no solution at all. A lasting solution of so difficult a problem can be reached, if at all, only by considering all the factors involved; by stating all facts, and discussing all arguments of importance, regardless of whether they point conveniently to some conclusion or not. And obviously the first factor which must be discussed is the history of the territory in dispute.

CHAPTER II

Historical Background

THE early history of Transylvania and the other lands recently ceded by Hungary to Rumania is of little importance to the student of the present Transylvanian problem. Originally inhabited by savage tribes, these lands were conquered by the Romans under Trajan in 106 A. D. Trajan formed the province of Dacia from the lands between the Dniester and the Tisza, and colonized this province with Latin settlers, chiefly ex-soldiers. A century and a half later, in 274, the Emperor Aurelian, pressed by the Goths, was forced to abandon Dacia. Thus ended the brief Roman era.

For six hundred years, the history of this territory is virtually unknown. A series of barbarous races passed over it and vanished. Finally came the Magyars, who broke across the Carpathians in 896 and settled in the great Danubian plain. Since then, the history of Transylvania proper has been very different from that of the rest of the lands recently won by Rumania from Hungary. The latter have at all times

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

shared the fate of Hungary.¹ Conquered by the Magyars in the ninth century, they remained Hungarian until the Turkish conquest.

Transylvania, on the other hand, has had a history of its own. The Magyars did not finally conquer it until the eleventh century.² Unable to guard it single-handed, King Giza II invited a host of immigrants from Flanders and the lower Rhine to come to Transylvania, and to these immigrants he granted many privileges (1141-1161). Thus we know the exact origin of the "Saxon Nation" as these German settlers soon came to be called. But we do not know when the forbears of the other three races which now inhabit Transylvania originally came to this province. The Székelys probably arrived about 830³, and the Magyar settlement seems to have proceeded slowly from the eleventh century onward. At least in regard to the original immigration of these two nations there is no very serious dispute. Less simple is the question of the Rumanians. It is unfortunate that a matter which should be of interest chiefly as an historical question should be the cause of a violent altercation in the political arena. The Rumanians insist that they are de-

¹Except 1699-1718, when the Banat alone was Turkish, Prothero, p. 24.

²Prothero, p. 10.

³Xenopol, *Histoire des Roumains*, Vol. I, p. 154; Prothero, p. 10.

Historical Background

scended from the original Roman settlers. The Magyars choose to argue that the Rumanians, driven from the south of the Danube by Byzantine armies, first entered Transylvania about 1200.¹ Inasmuch as the evidence supporting both arguments is decidedly weak, it is impossible to say which is right. One early Hungarian writer puts the Rumanians at the time of the Magyar conquest in the same place that their descendants now occupy, but the Hungarians throw doubts upon his trustworthiness.² On the whole, however, the weight of evidence rather seems to favor the Rumanian argument.³ But the only real importance of this argument is the proof it affords that the four races have been living together for some eight hundred years. This has been the vital factor in Transylvanian history ever since.

The heroic part played by the Hungarians in the war against the Turks is well known. From the battle of Kossovo in 1389 until the disaster of Mohács in 1526, the Magyars regularly parried every assault. The names of the great Hungarian leaders, John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus rank with Charles Martel, Leo the Isaurian, and John Sobieski as warriors against the

¹Prothero, p. 12.

²Neg. Vol. I, p. 187.

³See Xenopol, *Histoire des Roumains*, p. 148 ff.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Crescent. It is not so generally realized, however, how large a part the Rumanians played in saving Europe for Christianity. Mircea the Old (1386-1418) took the field against the Turk before the Hungarians had first met the latter in battle. Stephen the Great of Moldavia (1457-1504) was as successful against the Turks as Hunyadi. For fifty years he stemmed their onrush. Finally Michael the Brave of Wallachia (1593-1601) drove out the Turks, seized Moldavia, and even conquered Transylvania for a brief period (1599). The kingdom of Michael the Brave thus included all the Rumanian territories; and as a result, the Rumanians naturally point to him as one of their greatest national leaders. The exploits of Mircea, Stephen, and Michael show that we owe very nearly as much to the Rumanians as to the Hungarians for stopping the Turk.

In 1526, the Turks finally crushed the Hungarians on the fatal field of Mohács. This disaster marks the beginning of a new era for Hungary, Rumania, and Transylvania. For Hungary, it meant complete subjection to the Turk. For Rumania, it meant a subjection almost as complete and quite as humiliating. But for Transylvania, this disaster was the opening of a glorious chapter. While all the rest of the Magyars were subject to the Turk, except for a fragment who fell

Historical Background

to the Austrians, the Magyars of Transylvania kept alive Hungarian independence. A series of able rulers, such as Stephen Bocksay, Gabriel Bethlen, and Francis Rákóczy, administered Transylvania so well that this is often called the golden age of Transylvanian history. Their ceaseless bickerings and constant wars with Turk and Austrian need not detain us.

At the same time, one or two points in the internal history of Transylvania during this period are of importance. At the time of the Turkish invasions (1437) the three privileged nations—Székelys, Saxons, and Magyars—had formed a union for mutual protection. As a matter of fact, none of them held faithfully to this union when it was contrary to their interests to do so. The principles of the Reformation were early introduced into Transylvania, and profoundly influenced all three "nations." After much strife, an edict of toleration was proclaimed in 1564. The Greek Orthodox church, however, to which almost all the Rumanians belonged, was not "received" under this edict.¹

In 1683, the tide finally turned against the Turk. Defeated before Vienna, the Ottoman armies were quickly rolled back into the Balkans. By the Peace of Karlowitz (1699), the suzerainty of Transylvania was shifted from the Sultan of Turkey to the Emperor of

¹"New Europe," Vol. I, p. 21.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Austria; and by the Peace of Szatmár (1711), Transylvania became an autonomous province in the Austrian empire, with certain rights and privileges guaranteed, including that of religious toleration.

The Austrian government did not dare openly to flout this agreement, and therefore, Transylvania pursued the even tenor of its way till 1848. But two events during the eighteenth century merit attention. The Austrians, shocked to find that the Rumanians were all Greek Orthodox, persuaded a large number to recognize the suzerainty of the Pope. This is the origin of the Uniate church in Transylvania. A sprinkling of Magyars, and about half the Rumanians in Hungary, particularly those to the north, belong to it.

The second important event of the eighteenth century in Transylvania was the revolt of Horia. This revolt was apparently both national and social in its aims. It was the first time that the hatred between the Magyars and Rumanians had flamed into open rebellion. The terrible atrocities committed by the rebels discredited their cause, and the Magyars crushed it, albeit with great cruelty. Ever since then, the bitterest feeling has existed between the two races; and even today, Horia is regarded by the Rumanians as a martyr to the national cause.¹

¹Dr. Vaida, after recounting briefly to the author the chief events of this rebellion, showed him some rare old prints of it.

Historical Background

The reader should not imagine that "Magyarization" is a new idea.¹ Although it has been pursued as a systematic policy only since 1867, it was a moving force much earlier. During all the early years of the nineteenth century, the Magyars made every effort to force the non-Magyars to give up their language. It is essential that this fact be remembered if the part played by the Rumanians in the Hungarian Revolution is to be understood.

The heroic part played by the Magyars in the Revolution will always be famous. Their passion for liberty, their gallant struggle against overwhelming odds, cannot fail to arouse our admiration. But the obverse of the medal is sadly tarnished. The Magyars desired liberty for themselves only; for the subject races they seemed to desire the liberty only to Magyarize them. The Rumanian Assembly at Blaj in May, 1848, was a signal for the Magyars to rush through the Transylvanian Diet, in defiance of Rumanian and Saxon opposition, a measure to unite Hungary and Transylvania. The legality of this ordinance was decidedly questionable; it certainly did not represent the will of the Rumanians and Saxons, who formed a great majority of the population, for they promptly revolted. Once again a series of frightful atrocities were committed on

¹For following facts and for a full history of the Magyarizing movement see Seton-Watson: *Racial Problems in Hungary*, pp. 92 ff, 132. ff.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

both sides; the terrible excesses of the Rumanians at Nagy Enyed, Alvincz, and other places were avenged by the execution of 4834 Rumanians and Saxons by the Magyars, virtually without trial.

The failure of the Hungarian Revolution did not greatly ameliorate the condition of the Rumanians, in spite of the aid they had brought to the Austrians. They were no longer serfs; and they had received a certain amount of land; but they obtained no special political rights until June, 1863, when the franchise in Transylvania was revised in a way highly favorable to the Rumanians, and the number of non-elected members of the Diet reduced to 40. The Magyars, realizing that they would now be a minority, refused to attend the Diet, which was left to declare the Act of Union (1848) illegal, and to pass laws favoring the Rumanians. But these advantages were quickly lost when the Diet of November 1863 was convoked under the old franchise.

Thus the last chance of saving Transylvanian autonomy vanished, and with it the last hope of saving Transylvania from a system of unrelenting Magyarization. The Franco-Austrian war had convinced the Austrian government that something must be done to propitiate the Hungarians; and the war with Prussia made some agreement absolutely essential. This is

Historical Background

the origin of the Ausgleich of 1867, by which each nation received the right to run its own internal affairs, but agreed to join with the other in respect to certain common interests.

The Ausgleich gave the Hungarians an opportunity to do as they would with Transylvania. The Union, voted in 1848, now became an accomplished fact. For a moment, it seemed as if the Magyars had gained wisdom at the same time that they had obtained power, for one of the early laws passed by the new government was the Law of Nationalities (1868), by which the subject races were guaranteed certain privileges. This law was a model of liberality, but unfortunately, it was never really put into effect. The Rumanians were subjected to an unrelenting system of Magyarization from 1868 to 1918, regardless of any liberal laws. Even the Saxons found that all their old privileges had been taken away.

In 1881, the Rumanians organized their National Party, hoping by parliamentary action to gain the rights denied them. A series of press prosecutions, etc., did not deter them from their purpose. In 1892, however, they addressed a "Memorandum" to the throne, recounting their grievances. At the same time, the Rumanian University students of Bucharest issued

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

a pamphlet telling of the wrongs endured by the Rumanians of Transylvania. To this pamphlet the Hungarian students of Budapest formulated a reply; and then the Rumanian students of Transylvania, unable to control themselves any longer, issued the famous "Réplique"—an able, but bitter denunciation of Hungarian rule.¹ As a result, the members of the executive committee of the Rumanian National Party, together with the students who had written the "Réplique," were given a series of savage sentences; and a month later, the Rumanian National Party was dissolved by ministerial order.

Such a course naturally did not tend to quiet the anger of the Rumanians, but they were helpless. Fifteen years passed, and then once again a new step was made by the Hungarians in the Apponyi Laws of 1907, which apparently were designed partly to curb disloyalty, but partly also to Magyarize the denominational schools. The Rumanians had no opportunity to fight such acts, for at the elections (particularly those of 1896 and 1910) their candidates, except for a handful, were all defeated by force and corruption.

It was quite natural that the Rumanians of Rumania proper could not remain wholly unmoved by the

¹ "La Question Roumaine—Réplique" Vienna, 1892.

Historical Background

oppression of their kinsmen at the hands of a foreign power, nor by a similar oppression in Bessarabia under the Russians. As a result of the anti-Russian feeling engendered when the Rumanians were compelled to retrocede southern Bessarabia in 1878, the anti-Russian party succeeded in concluding a defensive alliance with Austria in 1883. But the people of Rumania seem from the very first to have cared more for their Transylvanian than for their Bessarabian brethren, perhaps because the former were not only far more numerous, but also seemed more willing to help themselves, and therefore incurred more acute oppression. Still, the Rumanian government at all times preserved a strictly correct attitude toward its ally; and even the Rumanians of Transylvania loudly disclaimed any disloyal intentions.

It would be well now to go back and to discuss the bitter dispute between the Rumanians and the Magyars as to the exact numerical proportion of the various races of Transylvania in earlier times. Not only does each side try to prove that the other was the interloper, but each tries to show that until recent times the number of the other race in Transylvania was insignificant. It is at least reasonably certain that the Rumanians from early times occupied approximately the same territory that they now occupy. It also appears that

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

the Hungarians, originally insignificant in numbers, steadily filtered in until in the sixteenth century, probably as a result of the conquest of Hungary by the Turks, they became decidedly the preponderating element.¹ The Székelys and Saxons, on the other hand, seem to have remained relatively stationary in numbers. In the early eighteenth century, with the liberation of the Hungarian Plain, many Magyars emigrated from Transylvania to repopulate the desolate region left by the Turks. Many Rumanians, fleeing from the Phanariote régime in Moldavia and Wallachia, came to take their place.² It was at this time, apparently, that the Rumanians won the decided numerical majority that they have held ever since. But for at least the last seventy years (till 1918) the Magyars have been gaining proportionally much faster than the Rumanians.

There has been a similar ebb and flow of immigration in the Banat and the other lands to the west of Transylvania. Here the original population was Slavic, but the Magyars drove them out in the ninth century. The Rumanians appear in this region at a very early date. The Serbs, however, apparently did not begin

¹See Neg. I, 43, 51. Thus Kolozsvár was originally the German settlement of Klausenberg, and the beautiful fourteenth century church there was originally built by the Saxons (Baedeker, Austria-Hungary, 452.)

²Neg. Vol. I, p. 193.

Historical Background

to colonize the Banat until they were invited to do so by the Hungarian kings during the first half of the fifteenth century. But the real colonization of the Banat started directly after the Turks were driven out. Many Serbs were called in, and many Rumanians emigrated thither. The energies of the Austrian government, however, were directed toward filling the land with German (and a few French) colonists from the Rhine Valley. The Magyars, on the other hand, have for the most part come in in comparatively recent years. It is this systematic colonization by the state that explains the curious mixture of races not only in the Banat, but also, to a smaller extent, in the regions to the north of the Maros.

The outbreak of the Great War gave Rumania the long awaited opportunity for fishing in troubled waters. The pro-Entente party was from the first the stronger, both in Parliament and among the people; King Charles, therefore, was unable to persuade the Crown Council to sanction a war against Russia. After his death (October 10th, 1914) M. Bratianu, the Premier, busied himself for two years in negotiations with the Entente allies; and when he had wrung from them the utmost concessions he felt that they could make, he signed with them a secret treaty, on August 17th, 1916.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Only two provisions of this treaty concern us; one promised to Rumania almost all of Hungary east of the Tisza; the other pledged Rumania not to make a separate peace.

Rumania declared war on August 27th, 1916. For a month her troops had a series of easy successes, and a considerable section of Transylvania was overrun. But by October the Central Powers had concentrated their forces for a mighty offensive against Rumania. The defensive position of Rumania was excellent, for the great ranges of the Transylvanian Alps and the Carpathians seemed to afford an impregnable line against Austria; and to the south, in spite of Mackensen's early successes in the Dobrudja, the Danube seemed impassable. Nevertheless, Russian treachery¹ accomplished what German valor could not; the Rumanians, lacking ammunition, were unable to hold the passes, and, within two months all Wallachia was overrun. The capital, Bucharest, fell on December 6th, 1916. The Rumanians retreated to the line of the Sereth, and here they held their ground until July, 1917. In that month, they gained a brilliant success at the battle of Marashti; but the collapse of the Russian armies following the Russian Revolution not only

¹Current History Magazine, Vol. VII, p. 167 for proof of this.

Historical Background

neutralized this advantage, but also placed Rumania in an impossible situation. As a result, she requested an armistice of the Central Powers, and peace was signed at Bucharest on March 5th, 1918.

The terms of this treaty were crushing, for the protecting mountain passes were surrendered to Hungary, and Rumania was all but enslaved economically, not to mention other humiliating conditions. There was no quality of mercy in the German exploitation of Rumania following this treaty. Rumania found her fondest hopes tumbled in ruins, her very national existence dependent upon the will of mortal enemies.

CHAPTER III

The Peace Settlement

FOR two generations the Year of Revolutions has had but one significance—1848. For many generations to come, however, 1848 will pale before that far more portentous year—1918. Before the October and November Days, the Days of February and March dwindle to insignificance. The year 1848 saw many revolutions, both political and national, but few were successful; in 1918, revolutions took place from Alsace to Armenia, from the Bosphorus to the Baltic; and in the mad turmoil of that year we saw the rebirth of oppressed nations, the reunion of long separated races. Until the history itself of this age shall be blotted out, the year 1918 will spell for many nations the fulfillment of cherished aspirations. Three mighty empires, which for more than a century had saddled Europe with despotism, were shattered to fragments; and from their ruins have arisen a group of new states, governed in the name of long enslaved races, dedicated to freedom, to democracy, and to the rights of peoples, and destined to become the units of a new world order.

The Peace Settlement

None the less, among all the momentous events of that extraordinary year, the reunion of Rumania with her unredeemed provinces must forever be accorded an important position; and the story of that achievement should be an inspiration not only to Rumanians, but also to all the free peoples of the world:

Rarely in history do we see a nation double itself in area and population in the space of three years; even more unprecedented does it seem that a State utterly defeated and crushed should meet with this good fortune in that same short period; and it certainly must fill us with amazement when we behold Rumania rising phoenix-like from its ashes to receive the territory not only of its enemy, but also of its former ally. Nevertheless, in the cauldron of Europe at the end of the Great War, all these strange things happened to Rumania—her fondest hopes were realized, her greatest aspirations attained; the age-long golden vision of a România Mare (Greater Rumania) became a reality.

The fortunes of Rumania reached their nadir in the spring of 1918. But this very fact meant that they could go down no farther; and soon they began to rise. The first step was made when the province of Bessarabia was annexed. But the clouds were not ready to lift until the Central Powers began to suffer a series of

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

military reverses. Hammered on every front, they fought on desperately for two more months, when the first signs of collapse became apparent. Within another month, Austria-Hungary had not only been forced to beg for peace, but had also ceased to exist.

The Rumanians of Hungary early in the war had been moderately loyal. The declarations of loyalty made by their leaders prove nothing, to be sure, because they were made at the advice of the Bucharest government, and under pressure from Hungary. But as the war continued, it became evident that the success of the Entente Allies would provide an opportunity for the union of the Rumanians of Hungary with Rumania. Early in October, 1918, the war had obviously reached its final stage. The Rumanian leaders met together at Nagyvárad (Oradea Mare) on October 12th, and agreed that the time had come to strike for freedom.¹ On October 18th, Dr. Vaida announced in the Hungarian parliament that the Rumanians of Transylvania would thereafter "direct their own welfare". On October 27th, a National Council was set up at Arad to carry this decision into effect. The Hungarian government of Count Károlyi ordered the Rumanian officers to take the oath of allegiance to this govern-

¹Dr. Vaida.

²Neg. Vol. I, p. 368.

The Peace Settlement

ment, but later claimed that they considered the council merely autonomous, not independent. As the rank and file of the Rumanians realized that the time to strike for freedom had finally come, they rebelled, overthrew the Hungarian authorities, and seized the power.

The stage was now set for the most important act of a great drama. On December 1st, 1918, a huge Rumanian convention assembled at Alba Julia (Gyulafehérvár, Karlsburg). There the union with Rumania of Transylvania and the other lands in Hungary inhabited by Rumanians was proclaimed. At the same time there were passed a series of resolutions in which were laid down the principles to be followed in governing Transylvania, particularly in regard to the rights of minorities. These principles are extremely liberal and democratic, and if they had been followed, they might have furnished a real solution of the Transylvanian question. But they were not.

In the meantime, Rumania had reëntered the fray. On November 9th, alleging as an excuse an infraction of the Treaty of Bucharest, Rumanian troops once again were sent into Transylvania. At first they advanced only to the Maros, the line fixed by the armistice concluded by General Franchet d'Esperey with the Hungarians at Belgrade. On December 17th, the

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Rumanians received permission to occupy in addition the rest of Transylvania and all the other Hungarian lands inhabited by Rumanians, with the exception of the Banat. Rumanian troops entered Kolozsvár on Christmas Eve. That night saw the last of Hungarian dominion—the last of a dominion which had lasted for nine centuries. And with the fall of Hungarian power began the rule of the despised and hated race. The Rumanians continued their advance until they had reached the newly assigned limits of their occupation. Such was the military and political situation when the Peace Conference assembled—the Conference which had the ostensible intention of bringing order out of this chaos, and of arranging a just and lasting settlement of this knotty problem.

Quite naturally there was a good deal of negotiation between Rumania and the neighboring powers before the Conference assembled. Take Jonsescu, Rumania's ablest statesman, in particular tried to reach an understanding with Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Greece, in order that the small nations of Central Europe might unite on a program and use their collective influence in its favor before the Peace Conference. But the opposition of Bratianu and the Liberals prevented an agreement with Jugoslavia over the division of the Banat,

The Peace Settlement

and the negotiations came to nothing. "Mr. Bratianu, rightly or wrongly, preferred another method which he believed was more suited to the dignity of his position, but the effect of which was that, disunited, the South-east European Powers appeared before the Conference rather in the light of quarrelsome and helpless children."¹

We need not burden ourselves with a general history of the Peace Conference. The subtle background, the secret negotiations, the constant intrigue, are all very interesting, but quite beyond the scope of this essay, except as they concerned Rumania. It was, however, in regard to Rumania that a great deal of intrigue was carried on, a great many invisible forces were at work. It was fortunate, therefore, that Rumania sent as the leader of her Delegation M. Bratianu, who, although not distinguished for his statesmanship, had at least the courage of his convictions. Two other notable members of the Delegation were M. Misu and Dr. Vaida, the leader of the Transylvanian Party. It was unfortunate that M. Take Jonsescu did not accept the position offered him, for his diplomatic skill might have won for Rumania terms as favorable as those Professor Masaryk and Dr. Benes won for Czechoslovakia, or Venizelos obtained for Greece. Still, considering how

¹Institute, Vol. IV, pp. 223, 24.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

the two latter countries are suffering from over-large minorities, possibly it is as well that Rumania diplomacy was not too "successful." At the same time, the Rumanians were rightfully angry that their Delegation received but two seats in the Conference, in spite of a provision of the Treaty of 1916, and in spite of the fact that Belgium and Serbia—smaller states—each received three. But the Rumanians were soon to find many other things about which they might have felt justifiably annoyed.

M. Bratianu was first asked to come and state his claims before the Council of Ten on February 8th. He apparently considered that his case really rested on the Secret Treaty of 1916, and therefore his other arguments, although skilfully put forth, were not stated with force. At the same time, a series of pamphlets were handed in, which were sketchy, sophistical, and unconvincing. The Council referred these claims to a Commission on Rumanian Territorial Claims, which was given one month (later two months), in which to complete its report. But while the Commission busied itself with maps and statistics, momentous events were happening on the Hungarian Plain.

As we have seen, the Rumanians had occupied all the territory up to the linguistic frontier. By the end

The Peace Settlement

of March, the position of the Károlyi government in Hungary was desperate; and finally, unable any longer to maintain themselves, they surrendered the government to Béla Kun, the leader of the Hungarian Bolsheviks. Béla Kun, to retain his popularity, determined to drive back some of the invaders of Hungary. An attack on the Rumanians was repulsed, and they promptly advanced to the Tisza. But against the Czechoslovaks Béla Kun was more successful, for his troops succeeded in advancing far into the Slovak highlands. At these points both the Rumanians and the Hungarian Bolsheviks halted, partly at the behest of the Peace Conference. Immediately they were ordered to retire behind the new frontiers, and inasmuch as they could scarcely retire behind frontiers which had not been announced, the new boundary between Rumania and Hungary, with several others, was published on June 13th, 1919.

The Commission on Rumanian Territorial Claims had not been given an easy task. One thing, however, the Great Powers had already decided—that the Secret Treaty with Rumania was null and void, because Rumania had withdrawn from the war. The Commission, therefore, had only to consider ethnographic, geographical, and economic factors in the fixing of the new frontiers. Even after they had finished, however,

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

their troubles were not over, for France intervened at the last moment, and insisted that the town of Versecz should be given to Serbia. The exact reason for this action is as yet unknown. It was this revised frontier of the Commission's which was made public on June 13th, 1919.

If the Peace Conference hoped that the publication of the new boundaries would bring peace to Central Europe, it was profoundly mistaken. No sooner were the frontiers announced than all sorts of trouble broke forth. Bratianu positively declined to accept the new frontiers, and furthermore indicated that he had no intention whatever of ordering the Rumanian troops to retire behind them, at least until Hungary was disarmed. The Council of Three then proceeded to send a telegram to "the Government at Bucharest," ordering the withdrawal of the Rumanian troops—and this without notifying M. Bratianu, the Premier of Rumania, who was in Paris! The Rumanian Government naturally refused. Then Béla Kun saw a new opportunity, and on July 20th, he again launched an attack upon the Rumanians, driving them back from the Tisza, and winning a considerable victory. The Rumanians now decided that the time for half-measures had passed. An offensive was ordered against the Hungarians, who were

The Peace Settlement

quickly defeated; and, on August 4th, the Rumanians entered the capital of their ancient enemies. The Bolsheviks having fled, a "White" government was set up under Rumanian protection.

In the meantime, the Peace Conference was decidedly upset by the refractory behavior of the Rumanians. That a small nation should dare to defy such an august body had apparently never occurred to anybody. The impotence of the Conference was vividly revealed. At the same time, the other small nations of Central Europe were vastly pleased at the turn of events, for they could see what the Conference did not see—that Rumania had saved Central Europe from Bolshevism. Furthermore, both Rumania and these nations were now informed that they must sign Minorities Treaties before the Peace Conference would ratify their accessions of territory. Such treaties were of course infringements of the sovereignty of the small States, and as such, they were bitterly resented by all. It is a pity that the Conference was not more tactful about them, for all the chauvinists of Central Europe made great political capital out of this interference by foreign powers. Bratianu, having found defiance to his liking, and having returned safely to Bucharest, now proceeded simply to ignore the frequent telegrams, notes, and expostula-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

tions of the Conference. Finally, the bill for telegrams to Rumania running up out of all proportion to the results obtained, the Supreme Council determined to send to Bucharest Sir George Clerk, the new British Minister designate to Prague.

Sir George Clerk arrived on September 11th, and on that day M. Bratianu resigned, as a political manoeuvre. The new Vaitoianu cabinet being mere puppets of Bratianu's, it was with him that Sir George entered into negotiations. Bratianu showed himself not unreasonable in regard to such questions as the requisitioning of Hungarian property, and the withdrawal of Rumanian soldiers from Budapest, but he absolutely declined to sign the Minorities Treaty.

At this point matters rested, in spite of many angry messages, until the results of the Rumanian elections showed a way out of the *impasse*. The Liberals, Bratianu's party, were badly defeated by the Peasant Party and the Transylvanian Nationalists. The Vaitoianu Government continued in power, because nobody wanted to incur the odium of signing the Minorities Treaty, until at length the Peace Conference sent an ultimatum to Rumania, demanding immediate satisfaction. The Vaitoianu Government resigned, and its place was taken by a cabinet of Transylvanians,

The Peace Settlement

Peasants and Socialists, under Dr. Vaida. The latter ordered the Rumanian Delegate at Paris to sign the Minorities Treaty, and the Treaty with Austria, which was done, December 9th, 1919. Thus ended the long struggle between Rumania and the Peace Conference. Although the latter in general had its way, Rumania at least was able to secure some modifications of the most objectionable sections of the Minorities Treaty.

The Hungarians were still to be heard from. Because of the Bolshevist revolution they were unable to send a delegation until November, when the old reactionary elements in Hungary had once again seated themselves firmly in the saddle. The leader of the Hungarian Delegation was Count Apponyi, known even outside Hungary for his acts designed to oppress the subject nationalities. Other distinguished members included the two famous geographers, Count Teleki and Professor Cholnoky. This delegation found it impossible to obtain any modification of the harsh terms meted out to Hungary for her part in the war. The Allies had already made their promises to the smaller states of Central Europe, and from those promises they could not withdraw. And so although the Hungarian Delegation succeeded in showing, in a series of admirable notes, the utter absurdity of the new

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

frontiers, it did them no good. For all their blustering, they were forced to sign the Treaty of the Trianon on June 4th, 1920, and to ratify it November 13th.

It was quite evident, even before the signing of the treaty, that the Hungarians would never willingly accept it. That such a proud nation should refuse to give up what it considers its historic rights is possibly not surprising. When there is added to one injustice a series of others,—when, for instance, such a nation finds a third of its brethren subjected to hated and despised foreign powers,—it is clear that that nation will go to war to recover its own at the first favorable opportunity. So far, no opportunity has presented itself; but come it must, all Magyars believe—and who can say that they are wrong?

Nor have the actions of the Rumanians tended to allay Hungarian resentment. Although it may be an exaggeration to say that the Rumanians have attempted to pay back with interest in five years all that the Magyars have done in fifty, it is perfectly certain that the Rumanians are grievously oppressing the Magyar minorities. The Hungarian complaints to the League of Nations, and the reports of American and English churches have laid stress on three things—the agrarian law; the policy of the Rumanians toward minority

The Peace Settlement

religious, educational, and charitable institutions; and actual atrocities committed by the Rumanians. In fact, if the statements of the Magyars (and of the more rabid of the church reports) are to be believed, the Rumanians are absolutely incapable of giving Transylvania a satisfactory administration, and therefore this province should be returned to Hungary. But before we jump too hastily at conclusions, it is necessary to lay down the principles which are to guide us in the discussion of the problem.

CHAPTER IV

The Fundamentals Involved

IN writing about any recent historical event, it is seldom easy to approach it from a strictly impartial point of view. When this event is the shifting of a large territory from the jurisdiction of one power to that of another, naturally even the most unprejudiced, honest, and painstaking students of it may radically disagree. It would appear best, therefore, to establish some firm foundation on which to build this discussion. This foundation must be a foundation of principles; for until we decide by abstract discussion exactly what relative weight we are to assign to various types of arguments, we shall get nowhere. Thus only can we avoid any question of partisanship.

Immediately before and after the armistice, practically the only principle enunciated by Entente leaders as a basis for fixing the new boundaries in Europe was that of self-determination. But exactly how this principle was to be turned into practice was not explained. Apparently it was considered that the will of the people in all parts of Europe was so well known

The Fundamentals Involved

that there could be no question about it; and that dividing Europe among the many claimants would be as easy as dividing an orange among small children. But when it became evident that there would be many disputes, difficulties began to multiply. Immediately there was a great cry for plebiscites. Plebiscites would appear to be the most obvious way out of the difficulty, but the Peace Conference declared that it was unable to furnish the troops and the officials essential for success.

But is it certain that plebiscites should really furnish the basis for a settlement? In the first place, they cannot take into account the many other factors which must be considered before a boundary can be fixed. Much more serious is the question of whether a plebiscite accurately reflects the will of the people. In a case like North Schleswig, probably a plebiscite is quite fair, for here we find a compact block of highly intelligent people ground beneath a foreign yoke, as the result of a notorious robbery. But in most of the territories which were hotly disputed before the Peace Conference, the situation was quite different. The regions were generally inhabited by a mixture of races differing widely from one another in many ways, and frequently one race, at least, was of rather inferior intelligence. In all such cases, the plebiscites were in favor of the nation

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

which had possessed the territory in pre-war days, regardless of racial majorities. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that plebiscites really prove anything among such backward nations. Something—fear, habit, or possibly precedent,—seems to have prevented any true expression of the will of the people. Again, how are we to tell whether the results of a plebiscite do not represent the temporary whim of the people rather than their mature judgment? The United States was once split in twain between two groups of warring states. There can be no question that the people of the South then favored secession. Nevertheless, it would be absurd to suppose that the Southerners are not today among the most patriotic citizens of the United States. It follows that plebiscites do not necessarily show us the real will of the people. We must base our conclusions not upon transient whims, but upon some fundamental principle.

What is this fundamental principle by which we may determine the will of the people? It would appear not to be ethnography, for several instances might be mentioned when a fragment of one race prefers the rule of another. Nevertheless, there are very few highly civilized countries, containing large, compact, and long-established bodies of essentially different nationalities,

The Fundamentals Involved

which have been able to combat the centrifugal tendencies of those races. Even in Belgium and Switzerland there is a certain amount of racial friction; and surely in their cases strong external motives cause the common patriotism of their component races. It should be noted that in neither of these two countries is one race dominant and the others subservient—common hatred of outside oppression originally united these fragments on a basis of freedom and equality; and the same feeling has in each case tended to make this union permanent.

If there are but two racially heterogeneous states in Europe, with a common patriotism among all the races comprised in them, there is but one race which is divided by its own free will: the Anglo-Saxons. Even in this case, it would be absurd to suppose that both Americans and Englishmen do not recognize their strong natural affinities. The case of Austria is even more instructive. Here a nation with an honorable history of nearly a thousand years' duration has expressed in no uncertain terms its desire to join another nation, simply because that other nation is of the same blood.

The destruction of the national sentiment of a race can be caused only by exceedingly weighty considerations. As a nation becomes more enlightened, as it develops its own peculiar culture and civilization, and

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

with them its own peculiar problems, it tends to become self-conscious, it realizes its own peculiar tendencies, and its nationalistic sensibilities first become aroused and then steadily become more intense. The number of exceptions to this rule are a vanishing quantity compared to the number of examples adducible. Who, a century ago, could have foreseen how the frontiers of Europe would run in 1920? Only he who foresaw the rise of this nationalistic sentiment—only he who realized that this feeling, born of the overthrow of Napoleon, would in the span of four generations grow mighty enough to disrupt three great states, and even to shake the fourth and most powerful of the alliance which finally overcame that greatest of modern conquerors. Unless all signs are false, Rumanians everywhere will continue more and more to realize their common destiny. It would be fatal for Europe to tamper materially with racial boundaries today, without positive good cause. National sentiment has steadily waxed stronger for a century, and at no time faster than during the last ten years; why, then should we think only of the present situation, and entirely disregard the future? Human passions are not now fixed for all time; if we cast them down today in their weakness, will they not insensibly grow stronger until they can rise and overthrow us in one vast cataclysm?

The Fundamentals Involved

The fundamental flaw in plebiscites is that they at best reflect but the whim of the moment. Among highly civilized races, this is as it should be, for in such matters they have generally but one mind. Among backward peoples, however, plebiscites are unreliable. Neither is ethnic principle by any means always to be blindly followed in establishing frontier lines. In every case, all the arguments against the use of it must be carefully considered. But if there is no very positive evidence to the contrary in any particular case, experience shows us that only by the use of ethnic principle may a lasting frontier be drawn.

A nation which has absolutely no ethnic claim to a given region may yet have an unassailable right to rule that territory. Even though a race is very numerous, and even though it inhabits a compact territory, it may not have a right to self-government, let alone the right of governing others. It would be monstrous to allow the negroes to rule the sections of the United States in which they have a majority; and it would be wicked to grant Central Africa self-government. The enlightened nations of the world have a right to rule over more backward sections because they can govern these sections so much better than can the inhabitants themselves. It is in virtue of this right that the British hold

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

India, the United States the Philippines, and the French Algiers, even though these nations have no other possible right to their possessions than the right of conquest.

But in Europe itself there are no races which are obviously incapable of forming a stable national government. The Balkan countries have by no means reached so high a stage of political development as the north-western nations. There is a gradual lowering of standards from the northwest to the southeast. But nowhere is there a sharp line where we can say definitely, "Here Western civilization and political development is divided from Balkan." We cannot label any one nation as "Balkan" and therefore unfit to rule over neighboring territories. All that we can do is to balance the actions of one nation against another, and thus to discover which has ruled better. We must examine in detail all charges of misgovernment and of oppression; and then, by comparing the records of the two nations point by point, we may be able to decide which has administered the disputed territories with greater ability and impartiality.

It should particularly be pointed out that two wrongs never make a right. For almost every act of oppression committed by Hungary, there is a corresponding act by Rumania, and vice versa. The fact

The Fundamentals Involved

that they are often mentioned in juxtaposition does not mean that the author is trying to justify such acts.

These two principles appear to be far stronger than any others. If men have a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, there is but one way in which they may achieve these ends. Liberty they can have only in a state toward which they have the strongest sentiment of loyalty. The pursuit of happiness, and even life itself, depends upon the existence of some measure of good administration. The will of the people and the ability to rule are the two factors upon which must be based the foundations for any real territorial settlement. They concern human rights; all other factors really concern but property rights. These two principles must determine in a broad way any boundaries which are to be drawn; other principles may alter such a frontier only in detail.

Apparently a government which depends on the hegemony of one race is incapable of ruling people of other races so successfully as it rules its own people. All the most advanced nations of the world illustrate this point. For instance, imperial Germany provided for her own subjects the most efficient administration in the world; but we all know how sorely the Poles in Germany were oppressed. When a highly civilized nation rules

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

barbarous races, oppression is of little moment compared to the vast benefits which usually ensue. But in Europe there is never a great gap between the civilization of neighboring races. It follows, therefore, that ethnography is of double importance in settling disputes in Europe, for not only can we use it as a permanent expression of the will of the people, but it also has a very important bearing on the kind of administration a given people may expect from each of two governments.

The relative standards of culture of the claimants of a given territory must also be taken into account. Intellectual preëminence should tend toward better government, and therefore, the nation with the higher culture almost always provides the better administration. We must discuss all proofs, both direct and indirect, of the intellectual supremacy of this race or that. If this supremacy is very marked, and if it has been produced by natural causes, then the nation possessing it has a very strong argument in its favor.

The other principles upon which claims may be based are by no means so important. Third in the scale of merit would appear to be the economic conditions in disputed regions. Pleas founded on this principle should not be granted if they overstep broad racial lines; but in specific cases conditions which are based

The Fundamentals Involved

upon economics may justly induce considerable deviations from ethnographic frontiers. Boundaries should be drawn to cut as few railways (particularly "lateral" roads) and other lines of communication as possible; manufacturing towns should not be cut off from their source of raw material; and distributing centres must be allowed to retain their normal markets. In fact, frontiers should be so fixed that the natural course of trade and industry is no more deflected than is absolutely necessary. That economic factors may lead to intricate ramifications is well shown by a number of pleas made by the Hungarian Delegation in behalf of irrigation companies whose lands are crossed by the new frontiers.

Geographical considerations should probably rank next as a basis for the mapping of new frontiers. Possibly they should rank even higher than economics, for they certainly rest on a more permanent foundation than economics, or any other principle. Economic ties may snap, races may revert to barbarism or become civilized, and whole nations may be utterly swept away; but mountains and rivers belong virtually to all time. It is therefore necessary to consider geographical factors carefully, both in the fixing of any proposed frontiers, and in the discussion of existing boundaries.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

History always bulks large as a basis for claims in every propaganda pamphlet, and therefore it may seem a trifle presumptuous to assign to it this relatively low position. Nevertheless, such an action is quite justifiable. We meet with two difficulties connected with any historical claim: the major arguments of each party, however important they may be *per se*, frequently balance each other, or else are greatly overbalanced by other factors; while local claims are too numerous and generally too controversial to be discussed seriously. The Peace Conference was willing to condone injustices by use of historical arguments, and then completely to forget that history ever existed in settling other questions. Almost all propaganda writers were naturally led to adduce reams of historical facts, regardless of their significance. Finally, it is clear that almost every nation of Europe can point to some period when it held all the territory it now desires—in fact, most nations have held at some time so much more than they now want that they can even refer to their noble moderation. So although for a time the disregarding of historical associations may cause a great uproar, they will probably not be long remembered unless accompanied by some other definite grievance. It seems therefore only right to skim off much of the historical froth which the propa-

The Fundamentals Involved

gandists of all nations seem to consider so important; and it is to be hoped that such a cursory treatment of historical considerations is justified.

The last, and deservedly the least, position must be awarded to strategical considerations. Strategy, after all, is, in most cases, but a corollary to geography. Its position is further undermined by the fact that the one thing the Conference declared it wished to obviate in the future was war; so surely the fixing of the frontiers in accordance with the strategical requirements of this or that nation would be a remarkable bit of hypocrisy. On the other hand, no nation by an unstrategical boundary should be placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous neighbor.

Unfortunately, the Commission which fixed the boundaries of Rumania was obliged to consider yet another factor, the actual military situation. This could scarcely be overlooked, and the decisions were bound to be somewhat affected by it. Rumania's military position was in fact such that she was able to refuse any but the most generous treatment.

Although it would seem that all arguments can be included under one or the other of these principles, it is by no means certain that the principles are discussed according to their real relative importance, for any con-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

clusions on such a subject must rest on very debatable grounds. Again, it must be pointed out that in each specific case to be discussed, the claimants almost always have some argument under every category. Some of these arguments are good, some bad. Every argument has but relative weight. A strong geographical argument, for instance, should outweigh a weak ethnographical one. On every occasion, each side, of course, laid great stress upon the principle according to which its claims appeared strongest, and decried all other factors. As a result, everyone, including the Conference itself to a truly unbecoming degree, was led into demonstrable and ludicrous inconsistencies. One of the most amusing things in all the peace discussion is the manner in which the nations accused each other of inconsistency, regardless of their own shameless sins in this connection in similar controversies. Only by a preliminary discussion of principles can we avoid the danger of being inconsistent ourselves.

We come, then, to the conclusion that six principles must be considered in the fixing of just frontiers. These principles are, in the order of their importance, self-determination, the "ability to rule," economics, geography, history, and strategy but; in specific cases, the weight assigned to each of these principles must be entirely relative. Unless such principles are to be followed, there will be no end to war.

CHAPTER V

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule in Transylvania¹

A NATION which is incapable of giving some measure of good administration to a territory is obviously unworthy to be entrusted with the exercise of sovereign powers over that district; and similarly, a nation which has been guilty of gross misrule in a given region deserves to lose it, if any more worthy claimant appears. Both Hungarians and Rumanians have used these points for bases on which to rest important arguments in favor of their claims to Transylvania. It is quite proper that they should do this. For, other things being equal, economic, geographical, historical, and strategic claims may be applied only to limited areas. A great many cases might be cited to prove this point,

¹This is the only chapter in which the facts adduced by the author are likely to be seriously disputed. For the pre-war situation the writer's authority is generally one of Dr. Seton-Watson's books, although the "Réplique" is more circumstantial. For the post-war situation the various church reports, such as "The Religious Minorities in Transylvania," are the best authorities. But in discussing this, the most controversial phase of the whole question, the author has used much information given on pledges of secrecy as to origin.

In this chapter, "Transylvania" means all the lands which Rumania received from Hungary in 1919-20.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

were it not self-evident. But the ability to rule is more fundamental; if either Hungarians or Rumanians can prove that they can govern the disputed territory much better than the other, then their claims are almost unassailable, however weak on other scores. What other possible right has the United States to the Philippines, or Great Britain to some of its distant possessions?

Both Rumanians and Magyars agree upon the importance of good administration, as their arguments show. Before the war the world heard much of the methods of Magyarization. Today we read of the crudities of Rumanian administration, together with an occasional defence of it. We can see today what both sides do when they get the power. It is, however, somewhat early to express opinions in regard to the Rumanian administration. Unfortunately, there does not yet exist a fair appraisal of the Rumanian rule, let alone a fair comparison between it and the Hungarian pre-war government.

It is necessary first of all to free ourselves from the prejudices induced by propaganda. There has been a certain amount of deliberate falsification in regard to the situation in Transylvania, both before and after the recent conflict. In general, however, it is from books and pamphlets which tell the truth, but not the whole

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

truth, that we obtain our erroneous impressions. To take an imaginary case: suppose someone says, "We have never received a farthing from the State for our churches." This is literally true, because subsidies are paid not in English currency but in lei or crowns. This is an extreme example, but statements scarcely less misleading can be found in almost any propaganda pamphlet.

We must also rid ourselves of the prejudices induced by catchwords. There is nothing inherently wrong, for example, in "Magyarization"—in fact, it corresponds very closely to the "melting pot," so dear to American politicians. If the ideas of Széchenyi and Deák had been carried out, the minorities of Hungary would have had no more to say than have the immigrants to America. But it was with the *methods* of Magyarization that the civilized world quarreled.

It would be absurd to consider this question only in relation to the situation immediately before and after the armistice. Properly to understand it, we must pass in review the actions of the Hungarian government for at least fifty years before 1918, and furthermore, we must take into account what has happened since the signature of the peace treaty. The former was naturally weighed by the Peace Conference in handing down

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

its judgment; and upon the latter must stand or fall the justice of the Conference's decision.

Following the Ausgleich of 1867, the Hungarian government gave early proof of its temper. Although the Transylvanian Act of Union had pledged to the Saxons the continuance of most of their privileges, this promise was quickly broken. One by one, these rights were abolished. The judicial rights fell with the Act of Union; the "University" was converted into a weapon against the Saxons;¹ and finally, the last vestiges of autonomy were rudely snatched away in 1874.

But one liberal act on the part of the Magyars must now claim our attention. Deák and Eötvös saw that the "subject races" would never be Magyarized by force, and as a result of their enlightened ideas, the famous Law of Nationalities was passed in 1868.² This law emphasises the supremacy of the Magyar race in the Hungarian State (Sec. 1); but it contains provisions which ensure to the subject races the right to use their own language before the courts (Secs. 7-13), in communicating with government officials (Secs. 2-6), and in ecclesiastical matters (Secs. 14-16). Sec. 17, after giving the Minister of Education the right to pre-

¹Racial Problems, p. 145. The University was the autonomous representative body of the Nine Sees and two districts of the Saxon country.

²For following, see Racial Problems, Appendix III, or Neg., Vol. I, p. 239 ff.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

scribe the language of instruction in the State schools, goes on to say: "But since from the standpoint of general culture and well-being, the success of public instruction is one of the highest aims of the State also, the State is, therefore, bound to ensure that citizens living together in considerable numbers, of whatever nationality, shall be able to obtain instruction in the neighborhood, in their mother-tongue, up to the point where the higher academic education begins." Secs. 20-25 safeguard the rights of the minority languages in the communal assemblies, and virtually guarantee the right of petition (Sec. 23); Sec. 26 grants to churches, private associations, and private individuals the right to maintain schools; while Sec. 27 is a vague promise to employ non-Magyars in the administration.

If this law had been administered in the spirit in which it was passed, the chances are that the subject races would soon have become loyal subjects of the Crown of St. Stephen. But from the day the law was promulgated, it has remained mere attractive window-dressing, to hide from the casual observer what was really happening. Ever since 1867, the craze for Magyarization has steadily been pursued by all parties. Law after law has been passed undermining or absolutely annulling essential provisions of the Law of Na-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

tionalties. As the Norwegian poet Björnson so neatly put it: "Magyarization has become the chief national industry."

It would profit us little to pursue in detail the history of Magyarization from 1868 to 1918; it is better to take it in one block rather than to divide it chronologically. We must compare in detail the administration of Hungary in Transylvania with that of Rumania, for thus only can we hope to reach any definite conclusion.

First of all, it is necessary to point out that the standards of culture of the two nations are by no means equal. The Hungarian Delegation laid great emphasis upon this point at Paris, and submitted elaborate statistics to the Peace Conference to prove the essentially higher level of culture of their race. In proportion, not only did more Hungarians attend schools, both primary and secondary, but also, the higher the grade of education, the more favorable became the proportions to the Magyar element. Furthermore, Magyars of intellectual and business pursuits, and in the professions, far out-numbered their Rumanian competitors. Finally, in Transylvania, the Magyars owned and ran most of the mines, the land, and the financial and commercial organizations, and almost all the State officials belonged to the dominant nationality.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

The Hungarian Delegation attempted to prove that this higher cultural level was due to the natural difference in the ability of the two races, and in no way to oppression. Undoubtedly there is much to be said for this plea. The Hungarian churches have maintained schools for a very long time. The Hungarian nobility has always been renowned not less for its culture than for its chivalry. But it is also true that the Hungarian State has always favored the Magyar element. We shall see that the Hungarian educational policy made higher education for a Rumanian in his mother-tongue almost an impossibility. And the path of the faithful Rumanian, once he had acquired his education, was still a thorny one. Nor is it fair for the Hungarians to comment on the small number of Rumanian newspapers in Transylvania. Dr. Seton-Watson declares it to be his belief that the Hungarian government deliberately tried to bankrupt Rumanian nationalist newspapers and even though this is somewhat fantastic, it is evident that Rumanian journalistic efforts in Transylvania must have been unprofitable if not dangerous. There again, the Hungarian census is probably even more grossly at fault in regard to its cultural statistics, than in its racial figures. It would be difficult to call a Rumanian who knows not a word of Magyar, a Magyar

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

but the Rumanians who know Magyar—the townspeople and cultured class generally, and those whose nationalistic sensibilities are most acute—might easily be classified as Magyars. Thus, while accepting many of the Hungarian cultural arguments, we must bear in mind that they do not represent the whole story.

The most important factor in the government of a country is obviously the administration. If the administration is corrupt or incompetent, then it is quite evident that the laws will not be properly carried out.

There can be little doubt that from the material point of view Hungary gave to Transylvania a good administration. The progress in Hungary since 1867 has been little short of marvelous. Railroads, canals, and roads were built, lands were drained; the methods of agriculture were improved. Education advanced; the State rid itself of many ancient anomalies; and Hungary was transformed from a mediaeval to a modern commonwealth. Furthermore, very little has been said against the officials in regard to honesty and efficiency. An occasional scandal occurs in every country, and Hungary is no exception; but the administration does not suffer in comparison with that of the neighboring States.

Rumania, on the other hand, has given to Transyl-

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

vania a thoroughly bad governmental service. The officials are corrupt, and their inefficiency is appalling. This, of course, is a very serious charge against the Rumanians. If, in England or America, the trains always arrived from one to five hours late, letters were delivered in a haphazard fashion (if at all!), and everything else with which the government was concerned was invariably bad, what should we think? Could our highly complex civilization survive under such a system? Could our industries continue to operate at a profit if every stationmaster demanded a tip before he would let freight pass his station, and if all other activities were run on the same principle? It has been justly remarked that "Transportation is civilization." The faulty means of transportation in Rumania is to a certain extent both the cause and the effect of the low level of civilization in that country, and it is a severe indictment of Rumania's fitness to rule Transylvania.

It is possible, however, to exaggerate the bad qualities of the Rumanian administration. Scandalous cases of corruption appear everywhere, but the honest official gets no credit for his honesty. For instance, one is seldom compelled to use money for bribery, though, as a rule, both companies and private individuals have discovered that it pays to do so. "Money talks" must

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

have been translated from the Rumanian. It is difficult, however, to blame the officials. As a result of the dislocated exchange, they literally cannot exist on their salaries. This is slowly being remedied; and simultaneously, corruption seems to be lessening. The Rumanian administrative system before the war was not notorious for its dishonesty, nor was the train service particularly poor. It seems only fair to ascribe much of the corruption and inefficiency of today to the post-war problems left to Rumania. A nation cannot double its size overnight, and expect to have a perfect administrative system in the new territories the next morning.

Possibly the greatest difficulty is the fact that the Rumanians, in regard to corruption, are not so immoral as they are unmoral. They regard it much as Englishmen of the upper class regard violations of the automobile regulations. They think no more of it than some Americans think of disobeying the liquor laws. And in regard to the inefficiency so prevalent in Rumania, it must be pointed out that the country is sadly handicapped by lack of capital, largely due to her treatment of foreign capitalists. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that in the Rumanian service are still many Hungarians who are said to be as corrupt as the Ru-

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

manian officials. The fact remains, however, that the Rumanians have been inexcusably slow in getting their administration back to normal. Unless reform proceeds faster in the future than it has in the past, the progress of half a century will be wiped out, and the Hungarians will then have a strong argument indeed for the restoration of their lost territory.

The Rumanians point out that there were very few Rumanians (1388 out of 13,626 officials in Transylvania¹) employed as officials by the Hungarian government. The Hungarians claim that this is due solely to the lower level of the Rumanian culture, and declare that it is a proof that the Rumanians are not competent to govern Transylvania. But it is then rather difficult to explain why the Rumanians were ever considered competent as officials, as they unquestionably have been in the past. It is somewhat of a contradiction that the proportion of Rumanian officials should steadily have decreased since 1867,² while the cultural level of the Rumanians has rapidly become higher. The Hungarian assertions about Rumanian incompetency thus seem to be a damning indictment of their own rule, rather than a point in favor of its continuance. The

¹Neg. Vol. I, p. 32.

²Racial Problems, pp. 153, 154, 317.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Hungarians of Transylvania are suffering today from the consequences of their selfish policy, and the pity of it is that the Saxons and Rumanians are suffering, too.

A further charge made by the Hungarian government is that Rumania had no right to demand an oath of allegiance from the Hungarian officials in Transylvania until the Treaty of the Trianon had been signed. This introduces a nice point of law which the writer does not feel himself competent to discuss. It is certain, however, that the Hague Conventions forbid a state to extort oaths of allegiance from the inhabitants of a conquered territory. But exactly what was the status of Transylvania from December, 1918, till June, 1920? Was it still legally Hungarian territory? Or did the Assembly of Alba Julia (December 1st, 1918) make it legally Rumanian? It is impossible to deny that a revolution occurred at the end of 1918, and that the Rumanians seized the power without help from the Old Kingdom. As we have already seen, the Rumanian Nationalist Party, as early as October 12th, 1918, had decided that the Rumanian sections of Hungary should separate from the rest of the kingdom, and on October 18th, Dr. Vaida announced this decision in the Hungarian Parliament, while Maniu took command of the Rumanian regiments in Vienna the same

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

day. The Rumanian army did not enter Transylvania till November 9th, and reached Kolozsvár only on Christmas Eve. The Revolution was not a single movement; it broke out in different parts of Transylvania at various times in November and December. But however much this movement may have resembled a comic-opera revolution, it is still entitled to consideration.

The Conciliul Dirigent, as the governing board created by the revolution, certainly could not be bound by any convention to which it was not a signatory. So although we may sympathize with the Hungarian officials in preferring patriotism to position, yet we can be by no means certain that their discharge was legally unjustified. At any rate, it would have been somewhat absurd for the Rumanians to have waited for the ratification of the Treaty of the Trianon before demanding the oath. The boundaries had been fixed and announced on June 13th, 1919; and from then on, any intractability on the part of the Hungarian officials was simply due to their desire to hamper the Rumanians. They may be honored for their patriotism, but Rumania is not dishonored in their discharge. The conditions laid down by the Conciliul Dirigent were mild in the extreme;—for instance, the Hungarian officials were given three years to learn Rumanian. But it is

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

difficult for the Rumanians to explain why they exempted the postal and railway officials from the order. The uneasy suspicion must remain that not only did they follow the dictates of prudence rather than of principle, but that they also desired that their actions should not seem too violent, and preferred this round-about method to direct discharge.

As "the child is father of the man," so then education obviously is one of the most sacred cares of the State. Everywhere today this fact is admitted; and everywhere we have seen as a result the vast strides made during the last century in wiping out illiteracy. Both in Hungary and in Rumania, this process has been very rapid. In the former country, all races have advanced at an astonishing pace. Unfortunately, there is a dark side to this roseate picture.

The schools in Transylvania are of two types, State and denominational. The former are run exclusively by the State. The latter have been, since time immemorial, the property of the churches, to be run as they see fit. We have seen the pledge made in 1868 by the Hungarian government in regard to its educational policy. This pledge has been scandalously broken—far more frequently in the case of the Slovaks than in that of the Rumanians; but the plight of the latter in

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

recent years has been bad enough. There has never been a State school in which the language of instruction was Rumanian.¹ The most that the Hungarian government would do was to subsidize the denominational schools;² and in return for the subsidy, they imposed certain onerous conditions. The Greek Oriental Church, as a result, has refused, whenever it was possible to do so, all State aid. But the chief charge against the Hungarian educational system is concerned with the scandalous laws introduced in 1907 by Apponyi. Curiously enough, the major provisions of these laws are not so oppressive as anti-Magyars are ready to say. A nation certainly has the right to insist that the national language should be taught in all schools under its jurisdiction; and furthermore, it has the right to see that no subversive propaganda is carried on in the schools. If one examines the provisions of the Law, it is quite evident that it is designed in view of these facts. But, like so many other Hungarian laws, it contains the possibility of tyranny. For instance, if the subsidy is over 200 crowns, the Minister of Education may refuse to ratify the selection of a teacher, and

¹ Racial Problems, p. 218.

² Rumanian schools in Transylvania proper received 992,865 crowns in 1914 (about \$200,000 or £47,000) (Neg. III, p. 98). The Hungarian schools received almost as much, and in addition there were 726 State schools (Neg. III, p. 87).

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

then, if the alternate be not acceptable, he may appoint his own candidate. Obviously, this gives the Minister almost unlimited power over the denominational schools.

It is thus the administration of the educational laws, rather than the laws themselves, which constituted the chief Rumanian grievance. In the first place, we must realize the shocking lack of educational facilities with which the Rumanians were confronted. The primary schools were entirely inadequate; and the Rumanians had but five gymnasia in all Hungary!¹ As a result, in 1910, only 27.9% of the Rumanians of Transylvania could read and write, against 36% in Rumania,² although all observers agree that the former are far more progressive, and the latter had a more disheartening situation to begin with. But it is the opposition of the Hungarian government to all self-help on the part of the Rumanians that rendered the situation particularly annoying. Permission was repeatedly refused to the Bishop of Arad to erect a gymnasium at Karansebes; and, according to Rumanian accounts, the fund collected to build it was confiscated—there is a similar case in regard to the Slovaks which has been proved, and

¹Neg. Vol. I, p. 177.

²Neg. Vol. I, p. 176. The figures are made on a slightly different basis.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

this is therefore quite plausible. This is not the only case that might be cited. But it is not necessary for us to probe further into unpleasant details: of how the hours of instruction in Magyar in the non-Magyar schools were artfully arranged to take three-quarters of the pupils' time; of the expulsion of school children for using their mother-tongue; and of countless other petty outrages. Enough has been said to show that the Hungarians had gone about as far as they dared in arranging the school system for purposes of Magyarization.

The last and most obnoxious act of the Hungarian government toward the Rumanian schools still remains to be recounted. In 1917, on charges of disloyalty (which apparently were well grounded), all Rumanian schools within 30 kilometres of the Rumanian border were arbitrarily closed. It may be replied that this was purely a war measure; but aside from the inherent improbability that this was the only reason, we have much outside evidence to show that in addition the act was carried out in accordance with a well-considered plan to establish a "cultural zone" around the entire frontier of Hungary, in which Magyar schools alone would be permitted. If the Rumanian schools were centres of disloyalty, then their closing was justified;

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

but the Rumanians had a right to schools in their mother-tongue, and Hungary had pledged herself to provide them.

But the Rumanians, too, must do a good deal of explaining in regard to their educational policy. It is high time that the screen of decorative propaganda which hides their treatment of the Hungarian denominational schools should be torn away. The Rumanian attitude toward Hungarian schools has been very vacillating, and it is almost impossible to discover just what is going on today. The Conciliul Dirigent showed marked toleration toward the Hungarian schools. Although many State schools were Rumanized—an act of elementary justice to the Rumanian school children¹—and although some denominational schools contracted to the State were also seized,² the denominational schools were not even compelled to introduce Rumanian as a subject. At the same time, no obstacle was placed in the way of the Hungarian denominations when they desired to found new schools; as a result, the number of Hungarian denominational schools suddenly doubled. But it should be noted that the denominational schools received no governmental support. On the other hand,

¹“In 1912 out of 69,886 pupils of the State schools, only 28,183 were Rumanians”! (Neg. I, p. 175.)

²“Religious Minorities,” pp. 132, 141.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

the Rumanian government in 1922 spent 87,000,000 lei (\$430,000 or £100,000) on nearly 600 Hungarian State schools. This was too good to last. During the last years, the Rumanians have introduced a system more strict in many ways than that of Apponyi. The teaching of Rumanian was to take so long that it left little time for anything else. Hungarian school children of one denomination cannot go to the school of another denomination, so that many are forced to go to the State school (usually taught in Hungarian).¹ Many schools contracted by the churches to the Hungarian State have been seized.² Worst of all, many confessional schools, particularly the new ones, were closed on a variety of pretexts³—lack of equipment, incompetent teachers, lack of authorization,⁴ etc. Some of these pretexts were probably legitimate grounds for taking action, but others were mere quibbles. The Rumanian government in its educational policy seems to have slipped dangerously close to the easy path of Rumanization.

But it is not altogether fair to judge the Rumanian

¹ "Religious Minorities," p. 66-72.

² "Religious Minorities," p. 150.

³ The Calvinist church has lost 35 schools out of 640, the Unitarians, 9 out of 45. See Neg. I, 175, for a similar example of Magyar violence to the Rumanian schools. These figures may be padded. "Religious Minorities," pp. 74-106.

⁴ This although the Conciliul Dirigent had authorized them all.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

educational system in the light of present-day events. The most chauvinistic party is in power in Bucharest, while the Transylvanian party, once so liberal to the Hungarian schools, is now in opposition. Furthermore, the Rumanian government is making great efforts to improve its educational system;—thus, 26 teachers' training colleges have been established, and 3,000 new schools are being built, but mostly in the Old Kingdom. Finally, the more oppressive provisions of the system are all founded upon ordinances, and at least one of these has been materially modified.¹ If the new law now before the Rumanian Parliament is passed, the Rumanian educational system will be somewhat liberalized. It is a notable fact that, in spite of the closing of many Hungarian secondary schools, their total number is still greater than that of the Rumanian institutions. Although the Rumanians never let pass a good opportunity or excuse to persecute the Hungarian denominational schools, evidently they at least have as yet no concerted plan of Rumanization. This persecution is also spurred on by a not ill-founded

¹ At one time, the Rumanian government insisted upon an hour a day in Rumanian for every pupil, the first two years—after that, two hours a day plus geography, history, and constitutional law, to be taught in Rumanian. This was modified to none the first two years—then one hour a day, plus the three subjects (which take another six hours) the next two. The new law still further modifies this to one hour a day, in which the three subjects are to be taught.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

suspicion that the denominational schools are centres of irredentist intrigue.' Whether laudable or not, it is apparently the purpose of the Rumanian government to bring up Hungarian-speaking children as patriotic citizens—to Rumanize their feelings, but not for the moment their speech.

Ecclesiastical interests must always bulk large in man's affairs; and they too must be dragged into this discussion. Fortunately, we find here considerable moderation on both sides. The Magyars, whatever else their faults, are noted for their religious toleration; and as a result, the Rumanians have long been able to shield themselves behind their church autonomy. It is true that the Hungarian government occasionally interfered; but not until 1912 was a real attempt made to use the church as a political weapon against the Rumanians. In that year, a Greek Catholic Magyar Bishopric was erected at Hadjudorog, ostensibly for the Greek Catholic Magyars. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful if any considerable body of them exists, and the observer has the unpleasant suspicion that the Bishopric was created partly to quiet the growing scandal of the census returns, but chiefly as a new means of Magyarization. It is interesting to note in this connec-

¹ See "Religious Minorities," pp. 71, 77, etc.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

tion that the Hungarians are willing to admit that Magyar Greek Catholics are largely of non-Magyar origin; but the idea that there are any considerable numbers of Catholic, Calvinist, or Unitarian Rumanized Magyars is never suggested, though the Hungarians claim that many Magyars have been Rumanized.

Since the war, the Magyars have continually protested against what they were pleased to call the Rumanian religious persecution. A few charges we may quickly dispose of. One Calvinist church has been taken over—because there are no parishioners—and that, so far as the writer could discover, was the only case of that nature. A Calvinist Synod has been refused permission to assemble; but six cases of this occurred with the Greek Orthodox Church under Hungarian rule. Several cases of alleged violence have occurred recently, but scarcely more than would occur in any country under the given conditions.¹ It was charged that in the first three years of Rumanian occupation, a great many Hungarians were beaten and imprisoned. This has been proved beyond all doubt; and it is admitted by honest Rumanians. None the less, in a good many cases it is certain that the victim was justly accused. Many Hungarian pastors and

¹ "Religious Minorities in Transylvania." Cornish, pp. 46-65.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

priests were unquestionably guilty of irredentist talk; and against others, the Rumanians thought they had proof, which was later shown to be unfounded. It would obviously be fruitless to catalogue here the painful list of these crimes of terrorism and violence, which have brought on Rumania so much well-deserved obloquy¹. It does not speak well for the control of the central government over its minor officials who are responsible for these acts: and they constitute a grave indictment of the Rumanian administration.

Other charges often leveled against the Rumanians are that they require copies of sermons in advance of their delivery, and censor them; that they forbid the singing of popular hymns, and the carrying out of time-honored rites; and that every meeting of Hungarians, even for church service, is watched by the Siguranta (the Rumanian secret police). The first charge is no longer true. The second is true; the Rumanians have very properly forbidden everything irredentist, but inasmuch as they used their own judgment they also excluded many things of perfectly innocent purport. The third charge is only partly true; the Siguranta now attend Hungarian meetings only occasionally. Al-

¹ A list of specific atrocities may be found in "Religious Minorities" op. cit. p. 45 ff.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

though perfect freedom of assembly certainly does not exist under the present Rumanian régime at least it appears that violations of it are sporadic rather than usual.

To balance these persecutions we have the guarantee of the Rumanian constitution; we discover that the Rumanian government seems to be really concerned in the welfare of the minority churches; and we note that the state is subsidizing the churches, as did the Hungarians before the war. The minority churches in 1923 received nearly 40,000,000 lei (\$200,000 or £47,000); even they themselves make no complaint on this score.

One very serious grievance of the Hungarian churches still remains to be discussed. This is the agrarian law. Agrarian reform for Transylvania was first demanded in the Rumanian Assembly at Alba Julia on December 1st, 1918; and the original law was passed by the Conciliul Dirigent in 1919. This was consolidated into the Agrarian Reform Act, which passed the Rumanian Parliament in 1921.

This law forms the basis of innumerable charges against the Rumanians. The Hungarians assert that it is designed almost exclusively to ruin their educational, ecclesiastic, and charitable institutions, as well

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

as all their landowners; while even the Saxons, usually so moderate, characterize it as "a racial, not a social reform." Almost all the great landowners of Transylvania were Hungarians, while the few Saxon farmers generally have moderate-sized farms. Let us see then to what extent these charges are justified.

First, as to the necessity of agrarian reform. The Hungarians claim that the distribution of land in Transylvania was not sufficiently inequitable to justify reform. Both they and the Rumanians adduce figures upon this point, but, unfortunately, they do not agree. Each set is so carefully arranged that it proves little.¹ But even supposing the land distribution were not flagrantly inequitable, it was nevertheless necessary for the Rumanian government to carry through a reform. The preliminary steps toward reform in Old Rumania had been taken in 1914; the King had promised reform to the soldiers in 1917; and so either reform or revolution faced the government at the end of the war. Now, if there had been reform in old Rumania and none in Transylvania—especially after the Assembly of Alba Julia—it is obvious that trouble would

¹ See Rubinek, 21. His map would indicate that land reform was very urgent indeed, for 17.4% to 61.8% of the land in every county was in large estates (over 1,000 jugars)—and this is a Hungarian source.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

have resulted. So we inevitably come to the conclusion that land reform was necessary.

“But why, then,” say the Hungarians, “is there a different and more severe law for Transylvania?” The first part of the question is quickly answered by the fact that the Conciliul Dirigent passed one law, the Rumanian Parliament the other. But it is more difficult to explain the greater severity of the Transylvanian law. The Rumanians say that the land in Transylvania is poorer than in the old Kingdom; that therefore a Transylvanian peasant must have more land to support a family; and that the law was passed to ensure this minimum to everyone. But it is difficult to believe that this was the only motive that inspired the Rumanians.

Then comes the question of compensation. In spite of all the statements to the contrary, the rate allowed by the two laws does not seem to be essentially different. Both agree in giving the unfortunate landowner about 1% of the value of his lands.¹ The Rumanian explanation—that the lei would eventually rise to its pre-war value—is one of the most barefaced sophistries ever uttered. If the Rumanian government had really desired to give the landowners just compen-

¹This is partly due to the depreciation of the lei since the law was passed.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

sation, the bonds in which payment was made could have been made payable, principal and interest, in gold. The Rumanians might at least be honest about it, and say frankly that they had to carry through the reform to prevent revolution, and that the State could not afford to pay any more for the lands. They might point to the Gracchi, among the noblest representatives of the race from which the Rumanians claim descent, and probably the most famous land reformers of history. We never hear of anything iniquitous about them, yet their reforms were almost equally an attack on vested rights. And speaking of vested rights, one passage in the Unitarian report of 1922 is distinctly interesting: After many complaints about the agrarian reform, it remarks briefly: "Our Hungarian State Bonds, worth more than two millions of crowns, give no income since the war" (presumably because interest is paid in worthless Hungarian crowns). It is impossible that 5,000 acres of land can have been worth 2,000,000 crowns. It is indeed difficult to see much difference in morality between a State which virtually repudiates its debt by depreciating its money, and a State which pays for expropriated lands in depreciated money.

* Statement of the Unitarian Consistory to the Commission of 1922, Cornish, p. 147.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Furthermore, the Hungarian landowner really has very little right to protest. He it was who most fervently advocated Magyarization before the war. When the revolution broke out around him, he was lucky to save some of his lands, and to get some compensation for the rest. Revolutions have an unpleasant tendency not to respect persons. And it is to say the least tactless of the Hungarian government to protest at the expropriation of Hungarian landlords who have chosen to remain subjects of Hungary. No matter how explicit the Minorities Treaty may be, it is perfectly obvious that the Rumanian government could not expropriate those who chose Rumanian citizenship, and leave those who chose to remain Hungarians untouched.¹

It is the Hungarian and Saxon churches which have a real right to protest. The lands with which they supported their schools, parishes, etc., have been seized; and as a result the schools and other institutions are threatened with extinction. It has been charged that this is due to a deliberate plan to extinguish Hungarian culture; but such a charge is unfair, because the endowments of Rumanian religious, educational, and charitable institutions, both in Transylvania and old

¹The Rumanian government has apparently promised the League of Nations to give these landowners 700,000 gold francs compensation. *Current History Magazine*, Oct., 1925., p. 133.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

Rumania, have likewise been seized. It is impossible to discover why the Rumanian expropriated these endowments. Possibly it was due to a scarcity of land; or perhaps to a desire to keep the churches from material interests! But whatever the cause, it was insufficient. However wise the seizure of church lands may have been in other cases, it was not a good move here, when the schools are maintained by the churches. The churches have suffered enough losses due to the war. Because of this expropriation, the flower of Transylvanian educational institutions will wither.

If an injustice has been committed in the agrarian reform, the administration of the reform has made the injustice far greater to the Hungarians. Innumerable cases of graft, corruption, and favoritism continually crop up: this Rumanian received more land than the Magyar, under similar circumstances; this Hungarian landlord lost all but 40 hectares, while his Rumanian neighbor saved 200; the Hungarian church will lose everything, while the Greek Catholic church is untouched, and it is a common topic of discussion among the Hungarian landlords, whether it is worth while to pay for immunity. But we should not permit these facts to deceive us. It is perfectly obvious that such a reform, at such a time, was bound to result in a certain

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

amount of corruption. Then, too, a great many of the charges are absolutely false: for instance, the Hungarian government, in its note to the League of Nations, definitely charges that Dr. Vaida was not expropriated. The Rumanians denied this; and Dr. Vaida has also denied it;¹ he also asserted that both his brothers had been expropriated, in answer to a subsequent Hungarian charge. It is to be strongly suspected that the Hungarian assertions do not err on the side of moderation. An American official who had studied the question with some care on the spot assured the author that, everything considered, the law had been administered not unfairly. It is at least certain that a great many Hungarian peasants have received land, even if the Rumanian figures—87,426²—are a gross exaggeration. Thus we may safely say that the agrarian law has been a serious injustice to the Hungarians; but that the assertions of the Hungarians about it are to a large extent clever and wilful misrepresentations.

Nor are the hands of the Magyars altogether clean in regard to agrarian measures. Even if we omit ancient grievances, we must not fail to mention the

¹ Personally, to the writer.

² *Argus*, December 26, p. 3. 396,342 Rumanians and 31,193 Germans received land also.

³ "Hungarian Minorities in Transylvania," pp. 8-9.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

decree of 1917, which forbade the sale of land without permission from the authorities, in thirty-five counties, of which all but one were largely Slovak or Rumanian, and furthermore gave the Minister of Agriculture the right to take over the land, for which permission to sell was refused, at the price mentioned in the unapproved contract. Of course this law merely complemented the school law in the establishment of the notorious "cultural zone." The Hungarians explain that the law was later applied to all Hungary, and that it was aimed at war profiteers, but their own figures prove that it was applied with greater severity in Transylvania than elsewhere in Hungary.²

It was a common charge on the part of the subject nationalities prior to the war that the Hungarian judicial system was unfair to them; and since the war, the Hungarians have made similar charges against Rumania. Under Hungary, all court proceedings were in Hungarian, regardless of the provisions of the Law of Nationalities. On one occasion, when the fulfilment of the latter was demanded, it was considered an aggravation of the offence. It is true that interpreters were allowed; but they were not supplied free, which of course meant that a non-Magyar peasant had to do

² *Memoire présenté par les Hongrois proscrits*, p. 101.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

without their help. Then, too, sentences for "incitement against the Magyar nationality" were often passed against the Rumanians; but the bitterest remarks made by Magyars about the Rumanians naturally caused no court action. Actions were brought against the Rumanians on the most absurd pretexts; and once in court, every conceivable trick was used to convict them. Another favorite charge against the Rumanians was "laudatio criminis." Thus if a Rumanian were sent to jail on any charge, even political, anyone extolling him, sending him messages of sympathy, or hinting that he was unjustly convicted could also be convicted and fined or even imprisoned. Furthermore, the machinery of justice was faulty in many ways. It is naturally difficult for a foreigner to get a judgment against a native before any jury; but here the situation was reversed, and it was difficult for a Rumanian to be acquitted by a Hungarian jury. There were only a sprinkling of Rumanian judges. Thus the whole machinery of justice was used on many occasions for purposes of Magyarization.

But we should remember that such injustice did not regularly occur, even though it was very common. It is wrong to generalize on a few cases out of many; and further proof is necessary before we shall become con-

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

vinced that patriotic injustice was the rule and not the exception.

No careful study has yet been made of the Rumanian judicial system. As a result, it is difficult to decide exactly how unfair it is to the Hungarians. The latter complain loudly enough; "There is no law" seems to be a common remark among them. But this is natural when we consider the complete change in the relative political positions of the Rumanians and the Hungarians. It is certain that the resolutions of Alba Julia have been violated quite as shockingly as the Hungarians have violated their law of Nationalities. As yet, no regular rules of procedure in regard to certain points seem to have been adopted by all the Transylvanian courts. The Hungarians assert that it is useless for them to appeal to the law, for it always goes against them; and it is impossible to say to what extent this charge is justified. It is, however, perfectly certain that a great many Rumanian judges accept money.¹ This cannot be too strongly condemned. It would be better almost to have no courts of justice at all than courts in which justice is bought and sold. It is, however, to be hoped that this is a purely temporary condition. Before the war, the Rumanian judiciary had a distinctly

¹ "Transylvania in 1922," p. 48.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

high standard; and when normal conditions return, the standard may again rise to the former level. Finally, it must be pointed out that the laws, institutions, and traditions of Transylvania are very different from those of Rumania; that it will take a long time to synthesize them in fact as well as in form; and that Transylvania is likely to suffer in the process. It seems, therefore, that the Rumanian judicial system, while possibly not used for Rumanizing purposes, is decidedly worse than the Hungarian.

Probably the most prolific grounds for charge and counter-charge lie in the political field. It is impossible to catalogue all the charges of the Rumanians against Hungary in this respect. Dr. Seton-Watson fills an entire chapter with them in one of his books, and takes great pains to prove his points. It is essential to mention some of the chief.

Most serious of them, probably, was the use of the military, and of force, pure and simple, at the elections. The Hungarian government has officially admitted that "only" 194 battalions of infantry and 114 squadrons of cavalry were used at the 1910 elections,¹ while many cases have been adduced where voters were forcibly

¹ "The New Europe," No. 1—article "The Rumanians of Hungary" (Vol. I, p. 20 ff.)

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

prevented from casting their ballots. It is no excuse to say that these soldiers were needed to preserve order and that they were used as much against the Hungarian opposition parties as against the nationalities. To admit that soldiers were necessary is to admit that the system of running elections was fundamentally wrong. The Magyars would not change because the system favored them. For instance, in every constituency, there was but one polling place, usually in the chief town. As a result, all the voters had to assemble there the day before; and the candidates generally vied with each other in giving them liquor. Disturbances were bound to follow. The Magyars almost always predominated in any considerable town, and so had a great advantage over the non-Magyars. At every election, there was bloodshed somewhere; usually it was due to the attempts of the military to prevent the peasants from voting after they had come a long way.

But it was not so much the direct use of violence at the elections that made it almost impossible for the Rumanian candidates to be elected. To begin with, only 6.1% of the people, on an average, could vote; and not content with this, the Magyars in 1874 introduced a special franchise for Transylvania, by which but 3.2% of the people could vote. This was repealed in 1912.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

At almost every election, frauds of the most unblushing sort were committed. Non-Magyar voters were excluded for mispronouncing their candidate's name, putting his Christian name first (the Magyar practice is to put it last), or not answering properly the questions put to them. Voting rolls were altered, miscopied, or otherwise falsified. Votes were wrongly recorded, or annulled. In addition, all the voting was open, which naturally gave unlimited opportunities for fraud and intimidation. Bribery, direct and indirect, was a regular feature of elections. And all this occurred under the Western civilization and constitution of which the Magyars are so proud.

But if the Hungarian elections set a high standard for force, jobbery, and corruption, the Rumanians have improved on them. Their methods lacked the refinement of the Magyar tricks; the Rumanian Liberal Party simply stole the ballot boxes, or stuffed them with false votes! It is admitted on all sides, even by Rumanians, that the Rumanian elections were decidedly worse than the Hungarian.

The election results in both countries were deplorable in the extreme. In 1910, 3,000,000 Rumanians returned but five representatives to the Hungarian Par-

¹Seton-Watson, *Rumania and the Great War*, p. 53. The Rumanians returned 14 members in 1906.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

liament, while 10,000,000 Magyars returned over 400.¹ In 1922, 1,600,000 Magyars returned two members to the Rumanian Parliament, while 13,000,000 Rumanians returned 350.¹ Such elections are only a farce. The excuses for them are pitiful.

The Hungarians say that the Rumanians were not sufficiently educated to be trusted with the vote. But, leaving aside the questions of why they were not educated, it is fair to say that a distinct part of the population—for the Rumanians had common interests, both racially and socially,—should have something like adequate representation. Nor is it right to say that the Rumanian members of the Hungarian parties (of which there undoubtedly were a sprinkling) were true Rumanian representatives. One of the most prominent of them, Peter Mihály, is now a Rumanian Liberal (i.e. a member of the most chauvinistic Rumanian party). Similarly, there are three Magyar Liberals in the present Rumanian parliament. Such men do not represent their constituents; they represent only the party that buys them.

¹ Memorandum from secretary to Minister of Arts and Religion. It should be pointed out, however, that the Saxons, due to an agreement with the Liberals, returned 6 representatives and 3 senators, and are therefore more than adequately represented. According to Rumanian accounts (see *Les Rumains et le plebiscite demande par la delegation magyare*, p. 19, an official memorandum to the Peace Conference) the Magyars returned 9 members, and the Saxons 8, to the Constituante of 1920.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

It should be noted in passing that the Rumanian bishops used to hold seats in the Hungarian Chamber of Magnates. Today, not only the six Hungarian bishops of Transylvania hold seats in the Rumanian Senate, but the Hungarians have also elected three members of that body, which consists of somewhat under 200 persons.

The chief Rumanian excuse—that the Rumanian minority parties suffered equally with the Magyars—is, of course, exactly the same as the old Hungarian excuse, and is entitled to just as little consideration. The Rumanians also assert that the Hungarians abstained from voting; but the chief reason for this seems to have been that the Rumanians abstained from putting them on the roll of electors, which was compiled in 1919.

If the Hungarian elections were bad, their methods of political persecution were worse. Campaign meetings were forbidden, or speakers prevented from attending them. The non-Magyar candidate might be imprisoned on the flimsiest pretexts. In 1894, the executive committee of the Rumanian National Party was dissolved by Ministerial Order. Every possible means was taken to harass non-Magyar political activity.

Most flagrant of all was the Hungarian treatment of the Rumanian press. The press law of 1878 con-

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

tained two particularly stringent provisions: Sec. 172, which prohibits "direct incitement of one class of the population, one nationality, or religious denomination to hatred of another," which, being interpreted, meant that the Rumanian newspapers could make no criticism of Hungary without danger of court action, but that the Hungarian newspapers could say what they liked about the Rumanians, and yet never be brought into court; and Sec. 174, which prohibits the glorification of a criminal act (*laudatio criminis*). Not content with this the Hungarians left the old Austrian press law, which was particularly stringent, in force in Transylvania only. The special jury-courts before which press offences were to be tried were set up in Kolozsvár, Maros Vásárhely, and Hermannstadt. When the German jurors in the latter city proved unexpectedly liberal, that court was abolished. It is not necessary to recount the series of press actions brought against the Rumanian newspapers. Dr. Seton-Watson figures that in ten years sixty-six Rumanians were condemned before Hungarian press juries, to serve terms of imprisonment amounting in all to fifty-three years, and to pay over 18,000 crowns in fines. Such figures alone are a sufficient indictment of the Hungarian press policy.

The Rumanians, on the other hand, seem to have

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

treated the Hungarian newspapers of Transylvania with comparative leniency. Although these newspapers would doubtless be suppressed if they said anything very vituperative, they certainly say things which the Rumanian papers never could have said under the Hungarian régime. At first there were undoubtedly cases of press persecution by the Rumanians, but at present it has apparently been stopped. It seems reasonably certain that the Hungarians would have complained if it had been very bad, for they certainly have overlooked few grievances. The author noticed eleven different Transylvanian newspapers in Hungarian for sale at one news-stand in Bucharest. It appears, therefore, that here we must give the Rumanians credit for moderation.

Furthermore, it does not seem that the Rumanians have adopted the other means of political persecution so dear to the Hungarians. In the beginning, it is true, a good many Hungarians were imprisoned and beaten, but almost always for direct disloyalty. It does not appear that there are any considerable number of Hungarians now in jail. There was an exchange of political prisoners between Rumania and Hungary on November 18th, 1923, and among the people released by the former were some political suspects. Among them, it is interesting to note, were the men convicted of the at-

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

tempted assassination of the King and Queen of Rumania in 1922. It seems thus reasonable to suppose that although the Rumanian elections are worse than the Hungarian, they do not otherwise oppress minorities politically so much as the Hungarians once did.

Possibly the closest parallel to the Hungarian pre-war political system is the political system of England prior to 1832. We find the same narrow, complicated franchise, the same "rotten borough" evil, the same corruption, the same manipulation by a small clique of landed gentry. If we carry the comparison further, we discover that the Hungarian treatment of the subject nationalities corresponds very closely to the treatment which the Irish received before 1832. But properly to understand the old régime in Hungary, it is necessary to point out that the Magyars not only hated and despised the subject nationalities, but also feared them, for these nationalities were equal in numbers to the Magyars, and therefore could not be so lightly regarded as the Irish. And it must not be forgotten that the Magyar system, though almost the last survivor of an era now long past, was steadily gaining strength rather than losing it. The surprising vitality of this system is illustrated in no better way than by the fact of its survival even of the war and the Bolshevist rising.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

In addition to the above major grievances, both sides adduce countless minor ones. The Rumanians, for instance, were denied the right of petition. The famous Memorandum Trial of 1894 illustrates this point. The leaders of the Rumanian National Party in 1892 brought a memorandum to the Emperor-King at Vienna, recounting their grievances, and calling into question the legality of the Union of Transylvania with Hungary. As a result of this the entire executive committee of the Rumanian Party was brought to trial, and fifteen members of the committee were sentenced to jail for periods ranging from two months to five years! It is interesting to note that nothing has been done by the Rumanians as a result of the Appeal of the Three Bishops to the League of Nations (September, 1919)—a petition of much the same type as the Memorandum.

The right of assembly was also occasionally denied the Rumanians of Transylvania. Not only were political meetings often forbidden, but permission was refused for the formation of societies for the most harmless purposes. While these cases seem to be more isolated than regular, it also seems that the right of assembly was somewhat more disregarded in Hungary than in Rumania at present. Another old Rumanian complaint was the violation of postal secrecy. But a State

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

surely has the right to see that one of its own agencies is not used for subversive purposes. Then all official notices were drawn up in Hungarian only; a non-Magyar who did not address an official in Magyar was likely to be rudely treated; and in 1898, a law was passed Magyarizing all place names. These charges are very amusing now, for at present exactly the same charges are leveled against the Rumanians. Thus Dr. Seton-Watson remarks, "The visitor to the famous mediaeval town of Hermannstadt will search in vain for any sign save Nagy-Szeben." But today the traveler would be equally annoyed to discover that the same town was known only as Sibiu, would be quite as badly treated if he used Magyar with Rumanian officials, and would be much puzzled by official notices if he did not read Rumanian.

But if the Rumanians have their minor grievances, so have the Hungarians. Most striking among these, possibly, is the forcible requisition of houses, particularly in Cluj (Kolozsvár). This injustice, as a matter of fact, has been greatly exaggerated, but it is bad enough. So far as the writer could discover, very few people had been absolutely turned out in the street.¹ The Rumanian officials, with their underlings, have been

¹ It is claimed that the Hungarian officials were, after refusing to take the oath.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

provided with living quarters, and that seems to be all. Unquestionably there has been discrimination against the Hungarian families; unquestionably it is very annoying for them to be restricted to a few rooms each; but the Rumanians, too, have suffered. Possibly the most irritating, and certainly the most demoralizing feature of this requisitioning is the fact that the rents fixed are utterly inadequate, so that it pays no one to build. As a result, the situation is as bad as ever, though the Rumanians have now ruled Transylvania for seven years. Such actions betray a woeful degree of misgovernment.

The Hungarians have many other grievances. One of the most notorious is the seizure of Kolozsvár University, which even such a moderate work as the "History of the Peace Conference" characterizes as "in flagrant contradiction to the securities afforded by the Minority Treaty." But in the light of the true facts of the case, it is difficult to agree with this conclusion. Kolozsvár was a State University, and as such, became the property of the Rumanian State when Transylvania became legally Rumanian. We have already seen that there is doubt as to when this occurred. But it seems as if the most that can be said is that the Rumanians acted with unseemly haste. On May 8th, 1919, they demanded that the University faculty should take an

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

oath of allegiance. The faculty refused; and on May 12th, the University was seized and promptly Rumanized. Since then permission to found a Hungarian denominational University has been refused. But it is evident that an education exclusively in Hungarian would be of little use in Rumania. The Law of Nationalities, even, promised no University to the Rumanians. It is likewise true that Hungarian students are practically prohibited from studying in Hungary. This seems to be a precaution against irredentism, and rather a foolish one. But the Hungarians before the war used to put difficulties in the way of Rumanians desirous of studying in Rumania. Hungarian students are allowed to go to England and America to study.

Not only the Hungarian University, but also several other institutions were seized by the Rumanians. The Rumanians assert that they were State institutions; but this is doubtful. One example is the theatre at Kolozsvár, seized by the Rumanians because it "belonged to the State." As a matter of fact, the money had been donated privately, and the land given by the city. But before we judge this act too harshly, we should remember that under Hungarian rule, performances in Rumanian were virtually forbidden, and so of course the Rumanians had not a single theatre

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

in Hungary, whereas the Rumanians have left a fair proportion to the Hungarians for Hungarian performances.

The reader will doubtless obtain a most unfavorable impression of both Magyars and Rumanians from the above. Such an impression is not wholly justified. Thus Dr. Seton-Watson's works are generally my authority for anti-Hungarian arguments. He has been accused of wilful misrepresentation (and of receiving money) on more than one occasion. It is notable, however, that few of the facts he mentions have ever been denied, and that few of his arguments have been proved unsound. Other men, like Björnson, have testified to much the same things. Dr. Seton-Watson takes great pains to give copious references, and a full bibliography.¹ Finally, such standard works as the "Encyclopaedia Britannica" and "Baedeker" would scarcely refer to a book which was notoriously incorrect, nor would the University of Oxford confer a D.Litt. on its author. Of course, there are inaccuracies in Dr. Seton-Watson's writings. There are bound to be misstatements in any considerable work on such a subject. Even though the Hungarian Peace Delegation claimed

¹ Racial Problems, p. 513 ff.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

that their memoranda were an exception to this rule ("we can vouch for the truth of every fact registered in it"¹) we can but smile at such a statement.

It seems certain that Dr. Seton-Watson has honestly tried to tell the truth as he sees it. Unfortunately, he is unfair at times to the Hungarians. In too many cases, he has taken isolated grievances and generalized upon them. For instance, just because a voting roll was lost in one constituency in one election, and in another constituency during another election a bridge was declared unsafe, it does not follow that Hungarian elections were corrupt, or that the Rumanians were badly treated. There is too great an inability to differentiate between merely trivial grievances and really fundamental ones. Even agreeing that Dr. Seton-Watson's facts are correct, there is still a good deal to be said for the Hungarians. What would Americans say if we were forced to provide instruction in the mother-tongues of the forty-odd races which inhabit our chief cities? How do the Southerners feel when they are told that it is unjust virtually to exclude negroes from politics? Yet the standard of literacy of the negroes of the South is not only higher than that of the Rumanians, but also than that of the Hungarians!

¹ Neg. Vol., I, v.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Similar cases might be cited against Great Britain, France, and Germany. Furthermore, there is no question that a considerable amount of disloyalty existed among the subject races. A great many measures were designed simply to stamp out this disloyalty; and no one can blame the Hungarians for doing that. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that Hungary was menaced by Pan-Slav and Austrian intrigues. It is doubtful whether any Western nation, if placed in Hungary's position, would have done much better.

But if the pre-war policy of the Magyars is quite natural, so is the policy of the Rumanians today.¹ If Dr. Seton-Watson's books are biased, so are all the books, pamphlets, letters, and reports written recently about Transylvania. A few are decidedly pro-Rumanian. But the great majority are violently opposed to the present régime. Take, for instance, the reports of the various church missions to Transylvania. They should represent a moderate view of the situation, yet they have fallen into the same error as did Dr. Seton-Watson. The members of these various missions went out to discover whether or not there was persecution in Transylvania. They discovered that pastors and pa-

¹ The writer defends here the Rumanian course at greater length than the Hungarian, not because he believes that the Rumanians have acted any better than the Magyars — for he does not — but simply because the Rumanians at present are the more maligned.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

rishioners had been beaten and imprisoned, schools and lands seized, and that the Hungarians had been subjected to countless other annoyances and persecutions. But the 600 State schools, in which Hungarian is the language of instruction, seem almost to have escaped the notice of the various commissions, a fact which impairs their worth as impartial witnesses, though it makes them useful to Hungarian propagandists. It never seemed to occur to these observers that the Hungarian churches and schools were centres of disaffection; and no one seems to suspect that the Hungarians may be as clever in the gentle art of misrepresentation as the Rumanians have proved themselves to be. These missions naturally were interested only in the post-war situation; and this tends to prejudice their statements.

The key to the situation in Transylvania is the attitude of the Magyars, both there and in Hungary. The cry of the whole Hungarian nation is: "Nem, nem, soha" ("no, no, never"), and the creed of the race is: "One God, One Fatherland, one eternal divine truth, and the resurrection of Hungary." They speak words for the Hungarian reputation as a proud, courageous nation, but they display little common sense or statesmanship. For how can the Rumanians live and let live, when they know that the only object of the Hungarians

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

from now on will be a *revanche*? If it were certain that the Hungarians of Transylvania did not approve of this attitude, then the Rumanians could afford to take no notice of it. If the Hungarians were content merely to remember their lost territories, and to take no action, then once again the Rumanians would not be justified in worrying. But as a matter of fact, not only were the Transylvanian Magyars bitterly irredentist in spirit, but the Hungarian government did everything possible to encourage them in that attitude. Hungarian ministers and priests constantly preached about the reunion of Transylvania with Hungary, and when that was forbidden, they resorted to subterfuges such as the "Regnum Marianum." Is it surprising that pastors and priests were imprisoned and sometimes beaten for such offences? It should be remembered that almost all of these occurrences took place in 1919-20, when Rumania was still at war with Hungary—and, incidentally, at war to save the world from Bolshevism. How many Western nations treated invaded territories more mercifully? Was Germany's conduct any better in Belgium, or did France treat the population of the Ruhr more leniently? And how about the Italians in Dalmatia, the Japanese in Korea, the Americans in Haiti, and the British, until recently, in Ireland, Egypt,

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

and India? It should be noticed that with the single exception of the Germans of the Ruhr, these oppressed peoples have really done nothing to their oppressors. But for a thousand years, the Rumanians have been ground beneath the Magyar heel. As long as human nature is what it is, it is too much to expect that an oppressed nation, having suddenly gained ascendancy over its oppressor, will act with any marked moderation. The Hungarians apparently did not when they reconquered the parts of Transylvania taken by the Rumanians in 1916.¹ There is absolutely no doubt about the sentiments of the average Hungarian. "Just wait and see what happens to them when we get our next chance" one Hungarian lady said to the author, and more or less similar sentiments might have been expressed by almost any Hungarian leader, whether in Transylvania or out. Of course such expressions of feeling are natural; but they do not help to produce stable conditions, nor will they reduce Rumanian oppression.

But the most ill-considered and insidious of the present-day Hungarian actions seems to be their dissemination of propaganda. This propaganda is of three kinds. The first is designed to keep the irredentist spirit alive in Hungary proper. This is excusable,

¹ Enc. Brit. 12th ed., Vol. XXXII, p. 307.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

provided the Hungarians deceive themselves only. The second type attempts to capture the sympathies of the civilized world. The quantity of it is simply astonishing, but if the Hungarians deserve sympathy—and they really do, even if they are suffering from their own folly—and if this propaganda aims to get only the facts of the case before the bar of public opinion, then possibly it is justified. But the facts of the case are not sufficiently conclusive; therefore, in almost every bit of propaganda, the situation is woefully and wilfully misrepresented. As a result the Succession States find themselves condemned in foreign countries, and given no credit for the good they have done, while honorable Englishmen and Americans champion a cause expressly designed to lead to further chaos and confusion.

The most insidious of the Magyar propaganda is that which is disseminated through the territories which Hungary has lost. No one would credit the Rumanian assertions of the lengths to which the Hungarians have gone. But an admission of the Secretary of the M.O.V.E.¹ (a Hungarian propaganda organization) verifies two of the wildest of these assertions: that fake Bibles have been sent to Transylvania, filled with irredentist propaganda, and that schoolbooks have also

¹ Dr. Sandor Krisztics: to author.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

been sent decorated with "nem, nem, soha," irredentist maps, etc. The Rumanians have a whole set of such schoolbooks, but some of them are not so bad as the Rumanians make out. Does this not help to explain the harsh treatment of pastors, the closing of confessional schools, and the exclusion of printed matter coming from Hungary?

The reader must not forget that in all the above we have been comparing pre-war conditions in Hungary with post-war conditions in Rumania. The administrative system of the former country has not broken down, which makes it a shining example today compared with the latter country; but still, even in Hungary, corruption is not uncommon. During the post-war period in Hungary (1919-21), the violence of the White Terror seems to have exceeded anything perpetrated by the Rumanians in Transylvania.¹ Nor are the small minorities left in Hungary apparently much better treated than the large minorities of pre-war days. Such conduct gives us a hint of what to expect if the Hungarians ever reconquer Transylvania.

Again, we must examine the common assertion

¹ See "The White Terror in Hungary," Report of British Joint Labor Delegation. Also Dr. Seton-Watson's article in the "Contemporary Review" for February, 1922. They are doubtless exaggerated, but Hungarians have admitted to the author the truth of many of the assertions.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

that the situation has been radically altered since the war by the signing of the Minorities Treaty in December, 1919, by Rumania. This, too, will scarcely bear up under criticism. In the first place, the treaty was crammed down the throats of the Rumanians by the Great Powers, a fact which destroys much of its value, both moral and legal. Then the clauses of it are so vague that the Rumanians could quibble out of almost anything. The greater part of the "violations" so far adduced are of spirit only, but the letter has also been shamefully broken in two or three cases. Furthermore, neither the Minorities Treaty nor any other agreement can force on Rumania conditions which endanger the safety of the state. Finally, we must examine the common plea that the Minorities Treaty was one of the conditions on which Rumania received Transylvania. But is it not true that the conditions on which Rumania received Transylvania were the resolutions voted at Alba Julia on December 1st, 1918, by the free will of the representatives of a majority of the Transylvanian people?¹ The Rumanian state has made a sacred pledge in its Constitution to observe these conditions,

¹ "The Wallachian people at the meeting of Gyulafehérvar bound themselves to much more in favor of the minorities than the Peace Conference wished to bind Rumania to," *Neg.*, Vol. I, p. 147.

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

and yet it has disregarded them, both in letter and spirit, more grievously than it has the Minorities Treaty. It is scarcely necessary to add that to the Magyars, the Law of Nationalities should have likewise been a sacred pledge; and yet it was violated quite as shamefully as the resolutions of Alba Julia have been. The Hungarian actions before the war do not, however, excuse the Rumanians. It should forever be a source of shame and humiliation to the Rumanians that their nation has broken not only a treaty signed by other powers, but also a solemn pledge to its own people.

It is evidently very difficult to decide which nation has the worse record in Transylvania. Certain it is that the Rumanian administration suffers greatly in comparison with the Hungarian. On the other hand, it is not possible to prove that Rumanization is a policy of the Bucharest government, whereas it is perfectly obvious that ever since 1867, one of the chief policies of all the Hungarian cabinets has been Magyarization. On the whole, it is probably safe to say that the old Hungarian administration was more deserving than that at present provided by Rumania; but that a return of Hungarian rule would be a decided misfortune for the Transylvanians, taken as a whole. Thus the Saxons are now very doubtful which government has

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

been for them the less bad. The whole question is, which is preferable: Hungarian chauvinism or Rumanian clumsiness and corruption?

The future for Transylvania is dark indeed. Probably it will remain a battleground for the Rumanians and Hungarians, and it thus seems doomed to corruption, persecution, and war. Hungary can do nothing for many years, and the Rumanian administration as at present constituted does not look particularly hopeful. Yet there is a certain amount of hope for the future in the rule of the Rumanians, for they at least admit their faults, which is, of course, the first step in any improvement. Under Hungarian rule, the lot of the Rumanians grew steadily worse, until it reached a climax in the decrees of 1917. And yet Hungarians still assert that there was *no* oppression of the Rumanians. "According to my opinion and experience, there was no oppression of the Rumanians by us," writes an ex-premier of Hungary, and then, as if to emphasize it, he later remarks: "If you ask my personal conviction, I must tell, we were really injudiciously liberal,¹ and I must say I could not find a better term to characterize our nationality politics. We were some-

¹ The author took exception to the remark (Neg. Vol. II, p. 66) "for Hungarians were always injudiciously liberal in their dealings with the nationalities."

A Comparison of Hungarian and Rumanian Rule

times not liberal enough in matters of appearance, and most negligent in more serious matters." Even the Hungarian delegation to the Peace Conference declared that "only certain" of the provisions of the Law of Nationalities had been broken. More truly than of the Bourbons, it may be said of the Magyars that they never learn anything and never forget anything. But it is only fair to mention the words of probably the most important of the "Magyarizers": "I do not mean to say that the nationality policy of Hungary, and mine, too, has been unobjectionable in every detail, that no mistakes have been made." The reader will have to judge for himself under what régime there is more hope of progress toward a better government.

CHAPTER VI

The Question of Transylvania

HUNGARY made little distinction among provinces in her Magyarizing tendencies; and the Rumanian régime has been almost equally oppressive in all the disputed territories. But in other respects these territories differ widely, so we must consider each province as a separate problem. The region in dispute falls naturally into three sections: Transylvania, the Banat, and the Rumanian districts west of Transylvania. Transylvania is in every way the most important of these provinces.

Transylvania in 1914 was the easternmost province of Hungary, its area was 57,243 square kilometres;¹ its population in 1910 was 2,673,367. The frontiers of Transylvania lay almost entirely along mountain ranges; to the east the Carpathians, to the south the Transylvanian Alps, and to the north and west such broken ranges as the Rodnas and Bihars. These mountains almost entirely encircled the province; only three important streams have cut their way through

¹ For a complete material description of Transylvania, with statistics, see Prothero "Transylvania and the Banat."

The Question of Transylvania

them—the Szamos to the northwest, the Maros to the west, and the Olt to the south. The mountains not only cover a considerable area, the ranges being in places fifty miles wide, but they are also quite high; the loftiest peaks sometimes rise to a height of 6,000 or 8,000 feet. Most of the province is an interior plateau basin, well drained by innumerable small streams.

Transylvania was a distinctly prosperous province, and therefore an excellent system of communications had grown up. In 1912 there were 2,372 kilometres of railways. The main lines in the province are those from Nagyvárad to the Gyimes Pass via Kolozsvár and Maros Vásárhely, and from Arad to Brassó and the Predeal Pass. These railways were well supplemented by an admirable system of state roads. Navigable water ways, however, are scarce, owing to the hilliness of the country.

Cereal crops, potatoes, and sugar beets are the chief farm products of Transylvania. Live-stock is raised in great quantities here, horned cattle, sheep, pigs, horses, and goats being the most numerous in the order named. The forests cover 2,239,776 hectares and are therefore very important; they tend to be thickest along the old Rumanian border. The most valuable mineral products are lignite, salt, iron, and gold; but it is believed

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

that there is also much gas and oil. Next to the metallurgical industry, the manufacture of textiles and the refining of sugar are the most important industries carried on in the province.

Such was the province which the Rumanians demanded; and when a prize like this was at stake, the Magyars were no whit behind the Rumanians; a battle of words, of maps (curious how each side always colored red the lands which its race inhabited!) and of memoranda took place before the Conference.

Probably the least important argument employed by either side was that of strategy. As a matter of fact, neither the Rumanians nor the Hungarians employed this argument to any considerable extent before the Conference; it was left to private partisans to do that.

But if strategy was passed over by the contestants, history was not. It might almost be said that it was an exceptional page of the Hungarian Memoranda which contained no reference to the thousand-year-old Hungary, while Dacia and Michael the Brave figure almost as prominently in Rumanian thought, if not in writing.

There is undoubtedly a great deal to be said for a frontier which has lasted, almost unaltered, for a thousand years. Even the northern borders of Spain

The Question of Transylvania

and Italy, along the Alps and the Pyrenees, cannot claim such a distinction; the boundary of Bohemia is the only possible rival to the frontier of Hungary. It proves nothing to say that they have never been attacked; for this merely shows that no one has ever been sufficiently interested to attack them. The Hungarian Delegation pointed out the emphasis placed by the Conference upon the historical claims of Bohemia, which had in places served to explain considerable divergences from the ethnic frontier; and they proved that such arguments were more valid in the case of Hungary. Moreover the history of Transylvania makes it impossible that Hungary will ever willingly allow it to remain under Rumanian rule. Besides many glorious lesser episodes in this history, the freedom of Transylvania, when the rest of Hungary was subjugated, makes all true Magyars look to this province as the fountain head of their liberty and independence, and its subjugation to any foreign power is to them unthinkable. Furthermore, the Hungarian Delegation decried the part the Rumanians had taken in history, both in general, and specifically in Transylvania. They quoted excerpts from various authorities, from the Greek writer Cacaumenos in 1071 to the German traveler Lehmann in 1785, to prove that the Ruma-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

nians always had been grafters, liars, brigands, savages, and murderers, who were guilty of nearly every sin of which it was possible to accuse them.¹ Finally, there came the favorite argument as to which nation had a prior claim to Transylvania. The Hungarians attempted to prove the fallacy of the argument that the Rumanians were descended from the Dacian colonists; they claimed that the followers of Arpad entered Transylvania nearly four centuries before the first Rumanian had crossed the Carpathians.

The Rumanians, of course, insist that they have been in Transylvania ever since Roman days. But why all this silly arguing? If claims going back a thousand years are still legal, then the Indians have a thrice righteous claim to all the Americas. The only importance that can be attached to this bickering lies in the proof it affords that though Magyars, Rumanians, Saxons, and Székelys have lived together for some seven centuries, time has merely served to intensify their never-ending quarrels. The Daco-Rumanian claim is indeed of little moment, yet even that scarcely puts it in the category of those Magyar fish-ponds of the Bronze Age.²

¹ Neg. Vol. I, pp. 187-193.

² The Hungarians argued that their culture in Transylvania must be more ancient than the Rumanian, because the Rumanian word for "fish-pond" is a corruption of the Magyar.

The Question of Transylvania

Undeniably it is a shame that Transylvania, the shrine of Magyar independence, should at last fall under a foreign yoke; but when we remember how the Magyars have trampled on the liberties of others in that very province, they certainly lose much of our sympathy. And to call the Rumanians sneaks and bandits does not alter the case in the slightest degree;—if we must descend to recrimination, just as scandalous things have been written of the Magyars. Nevertheless, the Magyars have an historical claim to Transylvania which is not to be ignored or lightly pushed aside.

If the historical claims of the Hungarians to Transylvania are good, their geographical claims are better. Hungary is one of the natural units of Europe. From the mountains which surround it on every side except the south, run practically all the rivers of the country, until they converge on the Iron Gate. Inasmuch as transportation and communication tend to follow valleys, it is possibly natural that all the roads and railways of Hungary should converge on Budapest, making that city a more important centre to Hungary than London is to England. Transylvania, geographically speaking, faces the Hungarian Plain, and not old Rumania.

On the other hand, it should not be supposed that

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

the Hungarian geographical claims are by any means so strong as the Hungarians assert that they are. The Rumanians tactfully omit all mention of geography in discussing the question of Transylvania, although they do not scruple to refer to it in claiming the entire Banat. Even the Rumanians can think of no sophistry which will give them any geographical claim to Transylvania. Yet one may doubt the wisdom of the Hungarians in dwelling at great length upon the excellent boundary furnished by the high, uninhabited Carpathians, and then denouncing the Rumanians for considering the "indeed uninhabitable" Rodnas and Bihars as Rumanian on racial maps.¹ They seem to have forgotten that along these mountains lies the boundary of Transylvania; and that were Transylvania alone given to Rumania, this boundary, although not so good as that furnished by the Carpathians, would still be fairly satisfactory. It is worthy of note in this connection that of the three important rivers of Transylvania only two—the Maros and the Szamos—reach the Danube through Hungary, while the third—the Olt—crosses old Rumania. These facts take away much of the force of the Hungarian geographical arguments in regard to Transylvania proper.

¹ Neg. Vol. I, p. 131.

The Question of Transylvania

We must next discuss another strong Magyar argument: the economic position of Transylvania. The Hungarian Delegation pointed out that not only did Transylvanian trade flow toward the Hungarian Plain, but also that this process was quite natural, for rivers and railroads furnish excellent means of intercommunication, and the products of the Transylvanian plateau complemented those of the Hungarian Plain. From Transylvania, the people of the Hungarian Plain received lignite, wood of all kinds, iron, stone, and salt; in exchange they sent foodstuffs and manufactures. To sever Transylvania from its natural markets would be to involve both in economic ruin.

But it is impossible wholly to subscribe to such an argument. In the first place, the circumstances of the case are by no means so favorable to Hungary as the Magyars make out. It is true that but three railways enter Rumania from Transylvania, but only the same number reach the central Transylvanian basin from Hungary.¹ Even though the traffic on the former was only half that on the latter the effect of the customs barrier probably caused most of the difference. It is at least significant that the Predeal line is not now suffi-

¹ Rubinek, 6. It should be noted that a fourth line enters Transylvania, but goes only to Petroseny.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

cient at all times to meet the demands made upon it. This may be due partly to inefficiency, but the fact remains that even the Hungarians admit that the lines entering Rumania from Transylvania are as good as those entering Transylvania from Hungary, and therefore should be capable of handling as heavy traffic.¹ As for the rivers running into Hungary, both are unnavigable except for lumber rafts. The Hungarian government apparently tried to build up Budapest at the expense of the sections which produced raw materials; therefore factories were located in the capital rather than close to the natural sources. Possibly this explains the remark of a Saxon leader that if Rumania pursued a sound economic policy, the economic position of Transylvania would be much better in the future than it had been in the past. It is at least certain that however badly Hungary may need the products of Transylvania, Rumania also can well use them; and she is quite as capable as Hungary of sending foodstuffs (but not manufactures) to Transylvania.

It is evident from the foregoing that Hungary's historical, geographical, and economic claims outweigh to a greater or lesser degree the claims of Rumania. It might almost be said that the Rumanians have no posi-

¹ Rubinek, 3.

The Question of Transylvania

tive arguments on these scores, and can do little but weaken the Hungarian points. The far more important question of which of the disputants is more capable of governing Transylvania, is, as we have seen, doubtful.

But we must now try to discover what the will of the people is. The Rumanians at once point to the ethnography of Transylvania; and the Hungarians promptly retort with much heat that it proves nothing. It is at least fortunate that the ethnography of Transylvania is reasonably clear. If a line is drawn from Kronstadt (Brasov, Brassó) to Maros Vásárhely (Turgos Mures), and then due east to the old Rumanian border, the triangle enclosed between the line and the old boundary includes almost exactly the territory inhabited by the Székelys, a race closely akin to the Magyars. The region between Kronstadt, Maros Vásárhely, and Hermannstadt (Sibiu, Nagyszeben) is very much mixed, but predominantly Saxon. There is another large colony of Saxons around Beszterce. Throughout the centre of Transylvania live many Magyars. The north, west, and south fringes of Transylvania are solidly Rumanian; and throughout the province, except in the Székely counties, they form either an actual majority or a large minority. The Hungarian centres are Kolozsvár (Cluj, Klausenberg), Maros Vásárhely, Szé-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

kelyudvarhely, Torda, and Kronstadt; the German, Hermannstadt, Kronstadt, Segesvar (Sigisoara), and Medgyes (Medias); and the Rumanian, Alba Julia (Gyulafehérvár), and Blaj (Balázsfalva, Bläsendorf). Most of the towns, including Kolozsvár and Maros Vásárhely, were overwhelmingly Hungarian; but the Hungarians formed a plurality only in Kronstadt, and the Germans predominated in Hermannstadt. The Rumanians numbered all together 1,472,021; the Hungarians 918,217, the Germans 234,085, and others 54,044.

Upon this prosaic foundation both Rumanians and Hungarians have constructed the most wondrous arguments. Those of the latter are both more interesting and more important. Their first assertion is that the Saxons were unanimously in favor of a continuance of Hungarian rule. To prove this, they produced Memoranda, etc.; and they pointed out that under a Rumanian régime, Saxon culture would be in danger of subversion. They insisted that the Rumanians themselves did not wish to be subjected to Rumania. This they attempted to prove in two ways: by extracts from speeches of Rumanian leaders, and by casualty statistics. Of course, if even a small minority of Rumanians desire a continuance of Hungarian rule, the Rumanian

The Question of Transylvania

claims absolutely collapse. Plausible as the Hungarian arguments are, however, it is not easy to believe them. To bring in the casualty tables, and to try to prove by them that the subject races were really devoted to Hungary is an unworthy proceeding; for it is well known that the Dual Monarchy used regiments of subject troops for cannon-fodder at every opportunity. The enthusiasm of the troops was stirred by pitting them against old racial enemies—for instance, the Rumanians would be sent against the Russians, the Croats against the Italians, etc. Another trick to which the Hungarians resorted to gain the support of the Rumanians was to tell them that Rumania was co-operating in an attack on Russia. And it would be laughable were it not sad, when the Hungarian Delegation, somewhat further on, remarked: "Rumanians have never had a part in defending the country."¹

Similarly, the sentiments attributed to Rumanian leaders must not be taken too seriously. Let alone the possibilities of pressure and unscrupulous editing, it is certain that these sentiments do not represent the views of the leaders who are said to have spoken them. Thus Dr. Vaida is one of the leaders who is supposed to have favored Hungary. It is somewhat of an anomaly that

¹ Neg. Vol. II, p. 59.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

he, as Prime Minister of Rumania, should have signed the treaty which gave Transylvania to Rumania, and that today he should still be loyal to Rumania, even though his party is out of power, and he himself has been outrageously treated. There is not a Rumanian leader today who would favor a return to Hungarian rule. Even Peter Mihály, once the leader in the Hungarian Parliament of the time-serving element among the Rumanians, has become a Rumanian Liberal! The Saxons laugh at the idea that there are any Rumanians who prefer Hungarian rule. Of course there are probably a good many peasants in Transylvania who do not care under which country they are, provided they have peace and plenty. But a little door-keeper expressed to the author the prevailing sentiment possibly better than anyone else: "We Rumanians of Transylvania love the Magyars as mice love a cat."

But if the Rumanians of Transylvania are almost unanimously in favor of a continuance of Rumanian rule, it is by no means certain that they are the only ones. The Hungarians found it a bit difficult to explain away the Declaration of Medgyes (January 11th, 1919), when the Saxons expressed their desire to be included in the Rumanian state. There are the usual pleas of pressure and illegality made by the Hun-

The Question of Transylvania

garian Delegation. As a matter of fact, there is a certain amount of truth in what the Magyars say. The Rumanians had already occupied Transylvania when the Declaration was made. It does not appear that actual pressure was exerted. But it is evident that the Declaration was made, not out of any particular love for Rumania, but simply as a step in the time-honored Saxon policy of "trimming." The Saxons had early read the writing on the wall, and seized the first opportunity to come to an understanding with the Rumanians, which was the only sensible thing for them to do. Nevertheless, it appears that the Saxons at first favored the Rumanian régime simply because they were glad to get rid of Magyar chauvinism.

Such a conclusion does not wholly satisfy the Rumanians, however. They insist that not only do the Rumanians and Saxons favor Rumania, but that many Magyar peasants, too, have been won over by the agrarian reform. There is a certain amount of plausibility in such an argument, but it does not rest on very solid foundations. Observers who have been among the peasantry differ as to the amount of disaffection existing among the Magyar and Székely peasants, but there seems to be a good deal of it. It is certain, however, that the Magyar landlords are the really bitter and dis-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

contented class. On the whole it is safe to say that the Magyars in Rumania, although some may be superficially loyal, would almost to a man welcome a return of Hungarian rule.

Nor should it be forgotten that the first flush of enthusiasm for union with Rumania has now worn away even among the Rumanians. Magyars and Magyarophiles point out with joy that they themselves criticize Rumanian administration scarcely more violently than the leaders of the Transylvanian National (Rumanian) Party do, and declare that what the Rumanians of Transylvania really want is autonomy. This is a delightfully insidious suggestion. As a matter of fact, there is no autonomist movement in Transylvania today. No leader has expressed himself in favor of such a move; no newspaper favors it, and no bill has been introduced in the Rumanian parliament. Among the Rumanians of Transylvania there is unquestionably bitter dissatisfaction. But the Saxons and even the Hungarians assert that they know of no autonomist movement. On the other hand, if present conditions continue, or if the Transylvanian National Party comes to power and fails to fulfil its promises, then an autonomist movement is almost certain to grow up among the Rumanians. There is no doubt that

The Question of Transylvania

in such a contingency the Saxons would join them, and the population of Transylvania would become a solid block of irreconcilables. The Saxons today are quite as dissatisfied as the Rumanians, if not more so; but so far they are still loyal to Rumania.

It was natural that, in spite of the declarations and resolutions of the assemblies of Magyars and Alba Julia, the Hungarian Delegation should have argued very strongly for a plebiscite. The Delegation pointed with great force to speeches of Allied war-leaders, and in particular to Wilson's famous remark: "Peoples and provinces shall not be allowed to be bartered away from one sovereignty to another, as if they were lifeless objects, or pawns in a game. Nations may be ruled only with their own consent today. Self-determination is no hollow phrase."

On the other hand, we have already seen that the Entente was unable properly to supervise a plebiscite in Transylvania; and we have also seen that there are many objections to plebiscites in general. The Entente could scarcely use these arguments, so they were forced to fall back upon the following: "The will of the people was expressed in October and November of 1918, at the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, when the population, oppressed for so long, united with their . . . Rumanian

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

kindred.”¹ But the Entente may be excused in view of the notorious uncertainty of elections—especially in Transylvania.

Finally, the question of the Hungarian census must be discussed. The Rumanians assert vehemently that the census of 1910 was unfair to them. They point out many flaws and inconsistencies in it, chief among which are the religious statistics. The Rumanians are almost exclusively Greek Orthodox or Greek Catholic; the Magyars are Catholic, Calvinist, or Unitarian; and the Germans are Lutheran. But in Transylvania there is little discrepancy in the religious figures. The Rumanians amount to 55% of the population; the Greek churches to but 57.6%. It cannot be said, therefore, that the religious statistics prove anything very damaging in this particular case. The Czech census of 1921, however, is decidedly interesting; it reduces the number of Hungarians included in Slovakia from 1,084,343 to 775,935. This seems to prove that there is something wrong with the Hungarian statistics. Furthermore, a great many people, including a few Hungarians, have testified to the falsity of the Hungarian census. Finally, there are in every country a number of people who for one reason or another will do

¹ Neg. Vol. II, p. 546.

The Question of Transylvania

lip-service to any one in power; and considering the pressure exerted by the Hungarian government to Magyarize the non-Hungarians, it is not surprising that there were many Rumanians willing to enroll themselves as Magyars.

The Hungarians, however, have some interesting replies to these arguments. They point out first of all that of the 30,650 census takers in 1900, 15,111 were teachers; and inasmuch as there were only 20,970 male teachers in the country, that "in the non-Hungarian regions the census takers were thus—naturally—mostly non-Hungarian teachers and clergymen." Considering the attitude of Hungary toward non-Magyar officials, this does not follow at all. There were only 2,899 Rumanian teachers among 8,706 teachers all together, in the primary schools in all the territory which Rumania received from Hungary,¹ and there are enough loopholes still left so that many Rumanian teachers might have been excluded. Then the Hungarians point out that 400,096 Hungarians knew Rumanian, whereas only 373,822 Rumanians knew Hungarian. Such figures are truly extraordinary, and tend to prove the exact opposite of what the Hungarian Delegation tried to establish. Considering that the

¹ Neg. Vol. III, A, p. 264.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

language of the State was Hungarian, that the Rumanians were compelled to learn Hungarian in their schools, and that the Hungarians insisted upon the use of Magyar whenever and wherever they possibly could, it is certainly odd that there were more Hungarians who knew Rumanian, than Rumanians who knew Magyar. The figures become all the more extraordinary when we consider that in the Rumanian sections of Hungary, there were nearly twice as many Rumanians as Magyars.

It is evident from the foregoing that the Hungarian census is somewhat faulty. Even convenient cholera epidemics do not furnish a sufficient excuse for the Hungarian figures. It would be absurd, however, to suppose that the figures are anything like as faulty as the Rumanians claim. Church lists, religious statistics, and even recent Rumanian statistics all indicate that the Rumanians in Transylvania amounted to just under 60% of the total population. This may be further checked by various indirect methods. It is a pity that we have no official Rumanian figures, but unfortunately, the first Rumanian census in Transylvania has not been taken. Even though this census may be open to more objections than the Hungarian, it will at least offer something to balance Hungarian statistics.

The Question of Transylvania

If the principle of self-determination is to be the sole basis on which to decide territorial disputes, there is no question that Transylvania belongs of right to Rumania. But when we consider the other factors which really should be taken into account in settling such questions, the issue is much beclouded. Nevertheless, it seems that, taking all in all, the claims of Rumania to Transylvania at least are better founded than those of Hungary.

Of course, there always remains the possibility that Transylvania might be divided. When the terms of peace were announced to the Hungarian Delegation, they immediately pleaded that the Székely counties (Csik, Háromszék, Udvarhely, and the southern half of Maros-Torda) be united with Hungary by a corridor, which should include the city of Kolozsvár.

The problem of the Székely counties is indeed a difficult one. Purely Hungarian in themselves, they are a racial islet, surrounded by a sea of Rumanians. Such a solution as the Hungarian Delegation proposed would have been a geographical, economic, and strategic mistake. Nevertheless, the peculiar situation of the Székelys calls for peculiar treatment. It seems possible that a reasonable solution would have been to have given them an autonomy similar to that of a State of the

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

American Federal Union: that is, a right to make their own laws, and to run their local affairs. Special laws would have to be made in regard to national taxation, military service, and certain other things. The Rumanian government would control foreign affairs, the currency, the mails, etc. Of course, neither party would be allowed to levy customs duties, so the boundary would be no economic barrier. Such a solution would give the Székelys a means of guarding their special interests, and yet would be no injustice to the Rumanians. In this Székely state might be included 462,030 Székelys, 27,300 Rumanians, and 8,200 Germans.¹ The Peace Conference, however, would stipulate only that the Saxons and Székelys should have autonomy in educational and religious matters.

It must not be imagined that the decision of the Peace Conference in regard to Transylvania has finally settled the question. It took the French forty-seven years to recover Alsace-Lorraine. If for many times forty-seven years the Hungarians get no opportunity to recover Transylvania, they will still be awaiting the chance to regain their lost territory. The Hungarians may forget and forgive a good many things, but that they should ever willingly allow Transylvania, to remain under the Rumanian yoke—"nem, nem, soha!

¹ My own figures, from (official) Ethnographical Map of Hungary.

CHAPTER VII

The Rumanian Districts of the Hungarian Plain

FAR more difficult even than the question of Transylvania, is the problem presented by the districts inhabited by Rumanians along the eastern sides of the Hungarian Plain (the Alföld). These districts are cut off from Rumania proper by two great mountain ranges, the Carpathians and the Bihars. On the other side, from the peaks of the Bihars the land gradually slopes down into the Hungarian Plain. Absolutely no natural line separates the Rumanians from the Hungarians; on the contrary, the ethnographic frontier, for the most part, runs through a plain as flat as a billiard table. It is thus evident that the Rumanians can have no geographical claim to this region. As a result of the configuration of the country, the eastern part of this territory is not well supplied with railways (particularly north-south lines) and other means of communication, while the western section is excellently supplied. The mountainous region naturally produces minerals, lumber, sheep, etc., while the plain is a great wheat-growing region. Any boundary line drawn through

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

this territory would thus inevitably destroy a natural exchange of products, and would cause great economic confusion. The Rumanians are thus left without economic claims. A map showing the relief and the railways of Hungary demonstrates better than a lengthy discussion the strength of the Hungarian geographical and economic claims to this territory. It is natural, too, considering how intimately this region is connected with Hungary economically and geographically, that it should also have been a part of Hungary at all times in history. Thus any Rumanian claims, even to the Rumanian districts, must start under a very heavy handicap.

Not in the least abashed by this patent fact, a considerable number of Rumanians have actually claimed for Rumania all the territory east of the Tisza. Such demands may satisfy the extreme desires of the Daco-Rumanists, but they are absurd. Practically the only Rumanian claim—ethnography—would be overwhelmed by the vast majority of Magyars in such a territory. The Rumanian Delegation to the Peace Conference were somewhat more moderate; they rested their case on the famous Secret Treaty of 1916. The boundary promised to Rumania in this treaty ran from the western corner of the county of Szatmár to the

Rumanian Districts of the Hungarian Plain

western corner of the county of Csanád, and would have included in Rumania all of the counties of Szilágy and Arad; almost all of Szatmár, Bihar, and Csanád, half of Békés, and small strips of Hadju and Szabolcs. In Ugocsa and Máramaros the boundary promised in the treaty almost coincided with the frontier as it is at present. Such a boundary would also have been a violation of the ethnic principle. But still, there was the treaty. Nevertheless, the Peace Conference claimed that the treaty was null and void, because the Rumanians had withdrawn from the war. The Rumanians protested, but in vain. Whatever the Rumanian quibbles about ratification may have been, the fact remains that they did no fighting for over a year. Moreover, it would have been monstrous to have included in Rumania a purely Magyar territory, containing almost a million Magyars. There can thus be little question that the Conference was justified, both legally and morally, in the action they took.

The frontier drawn by the Commission on Rumanian Territorial Claims was much closer to the ethnographic boundary than to the line promised to Rumania in the Secret Treaty. The Commission's line stretched north and west of the cities of Máramaros Sziget, Szatmár Németi, Nagykároly, Ermihályfalva, Nagyvárad, Nagy-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

szalonta, Kurtos, and Nagylak. Thus a territory of exactly 26,000 kilometres,¹ with a population of 1,605,000 was given to Rumania.

As we have seen, the Rumanian claims to this region start under a heavy handicap. The Rumanians, however, believe that their ethnographic arguments outweigh any other factors. It is therefore necessary to examine in great detail the exact ethnographic situation in this region.

The most northerly county of this territory is Máramaros.² Here the question is not so much between Rumanian and Magyar as between Rumanian and Ruthene. The Magyars found a majority only in the town of Máramaros Sziget; the Ruthenes predominated in six districts, and the Rumanians in four,—Izavölgy, Sugatag, Visó, and Sziget. Fortunately, the ethnographic line between the Rumanians and Ruthenians is reasonably clear; therefore the Commission was able to divide them fairly. Rumania as a result received 77,550 Rumanians, 27,600 Magyars, 26,375 Germans, and 16,020 Ruthenes. In spite of the strongly Rumanian complexion of these districts given to Rumania, it

¹ C. Martinovici "Harta Administrativa a Transylvaniei."

² The following figures are based on the Ethnographical Map of Hungary, made for the Hungarian Delegation to the Peace Conference. They are checked from the Hungarian census of 1910 (see appendix).

Rumanian Districts of the Hungarian Plain

seemed in a way foolish that Rumania should acquire them, for they are cut off from the rest of Rumania by the almost impassable Rodnas. A railway was put through into Bukovina during the war, but it broke down. Recently another railway has been finished, thus partly solving this problem.

The next county in dispute is that of Szatmár. In this county, as a whole, the Magyars formed a great majority; but in five of the thirteen districts,—Avas, Nagybánya, Nagysomkút, Szinérváralya, and Erdöd,—the Rumanians predominated. The towns of Nagybánya and Felsőbánja, though strongly Magyar, had to be included with these districts for geographical reasons. But besides these two towns, a considerable amount of territory beyond the linguistic frontier was given to Rumania. This territory included almost the entire district of Szatmár, a large part of Nagykároly, a corner of Csenger, and the towns of Szatmár Németi and Nagykároly, leaving Hungary but two whole districts. Rumania thus obtained a region containing 286,000 people; of these, the Rumanians numbered 119,520, the Magyars 158,795, the Germans 6,460, and others 1,000.

Directly to the south of Szatmár lies Szilágy; this county is virtually inseparable on a racial basis. The

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Magyars are very numerous in the centre and north-west, but they have a plurality—and that a bare one—in only one district, Tasnád. For the whole county, the Rumanians numbered 136,087, the Magyars 87,312, the Germans 816, and others, chiefly Slovak, 5,925. The entire county was awarded to the Rumanians; but considering the ethnographic situation, this was not unjustified.

South and west of Szilágy lies the large county of Bihar. In this county the total population was 646,301; the Rumanians numbered 265,098, the Magyars 365,642. Of the seventeen districts, six were strongly Rumanian, five were mixed, and six were overwhelmingly Magyar. The Magyars, nevertheless, were deprived by the Treaty of all but three districts and the fragments of six others; the Rumanians received the districts of Köspont, Elesd, Magyarcséke, Belényes, Vaskoh, Bél, and Tenke—all Rumanian in race—Margitta, Nagyvárad Town, and slices of Szalárd, Nagyszalonta, Érmihályfalva, Szekelyhid, Biharkerestes, and Cséffa, all more or less strongly Magyars in race. As a result of this division, 256,250 Rumanians were united with their nation; but to accomplish this result, 216,700 Magyars were torn from theirs.

The southernmost county of this disputed territory

Rumanian Districts of the Hungarian Plain

was Arad. Here the population in 1910 amounted to 414,388, of which the Rumanians comprised 239,755, the Magyars 124,215, the Germans 38,695, and others 11,723. The Magyars formed a majority in the district of Pécksa and the town of Arad; but this did not prevent the Conference from giving to the Rumanians all except a small strip of the district of Elek, containing 8,200 Magyars, 6,500 Germans, 1,600 Rumanians, and 2,000 others.

In addition to these large slices, the Rumanians also received small strips of the counties of Ugocsa, Békés, and Csanád. In the first, they received most of the district of Tisántúl. This acquisition contained 6,000 Rumanians and 14,300 Magyars. The Rumanian share of Békés—a tiny corner of the district of Gyula—contained but a few hundred Magyars. Finally the territory they received in Csanád—small strips of the districts of Battonya and Nagylak—contained 9,000 Rumanians, 6,400 Magyars, 8,850 Slovaks, and 200 Germans.

The Rumanians, therefore, formed a clear majority in this strip of the Hungarian Plain; for they numbered 842,570 to 627,145 Magyars and 126,475 others; but this majority was obviously rather small, and as we have seen, there is a considerable amount of purely

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Magyar territory included in Rumania. The justice of this frontier may therefore well be questioned. The Rumanians allege that to secure communication between the northwestern and the southwestern parts of their new domain, they must have the important Szatmár Németi-Nagyvárad-Arad railway line, for it would be very difficult to build another over the tangled foothills of the Bihars. Moreover, the Rumanians asserted that the Magyar majorities in these three cities were artificially created, and would soon disappear,—doubtless the Rumanian statistics will show a most astonishingly quick disappearance.¹ Finally, the Rumanians claimed that Nagyvárad was a Jewish, not a Magyar city. The Commission agreed with the Rumanians except in one instance—they refused to give Békés Csaba to Rumania. In this case they decided that a new railway line could easily be built between Kisjenő and Nagyszalonta.

It is difficult to see how the frontier as thus demarcated can in any way be justified. It is somewhat doubtful whether any of this region should have been given to Rumania; but the manner in which the matter was finally settled was utterly inequitable.

¹ A Rumanian once remarked to Dr. Cornish that if certain statistics he gave—very favorable to Rumania—were not then correct, they soon would be.

Rumanian Districts of the Hungarian Plain

In the first place, the Rumanians' assertions are not correct. If the Hungarians could build a line from Koloszvár to Nagyvárad, then it should have been possible for the Rumanians to fill in the gaps in a north-south line, say, from Nagybnáya to the Maros. The Rumanians, once they received the territory they wanted, apparently no longer felt the dire necessity for the north-south line, which they had previously discovered, for they have only just finished the railway from Kisjeno to Nagyszalonta. It never seemed to occur to the Commission that Hungary needed the railway almost as much as Rumania did, nor were they able to realize that the importance of the railway as a north-south line was greatly exaggerated, as the Hungarian traffic statistics between Nagyvárad and Érmihályfalva prove.¹ The traffic in this region all runs toward Budapest. Nor is it true that Nagyvárad is a Jewish city, for out of a population of 64,169, there are 58,421 Magyars, and of them but 15,155 are Jews.²

The Rumanians' claim to this north-south line and to the territory through which it runs is thus very weak. The Hungarian claims, on the other hand, are extremely strong. It is not true, to be sure, that the boundary is

¹ Rubinek, VI.

² Neg. III, p. 11, 153.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

a strategic frontier, as the Hungarians asserted; for the rochade railway would undoubtedly be cut if war ever started, and both sides have good defensive lines in the Bihars and the Tisza. It is true, however, that geography and economics were utterly disregarded. In place of a frontier lying along mountain tops, here we see the boundary fixed in a flat plain; therefore it is unjustifiable from a geographical standpoint. But even worse is the violation of the economic principle. The trade of the Rumanian hill country is inextricably bound up with that of the Hungarian Plain; and nothing on earth can make this trade flow into different channels. Even were this diversion possible, it would ruin the Magyar cities along the market line, which Rumania received. Consider also two other disadvantages of the frontier: eleven railways are cut, including two which are completely "beheaded," and the lands of four irrigation companies are crossed.

Finally, as to the ethnography of the region in question. The Rumanians clearly outnumber all the other inhabitants by 89,000, according to the Hungarian census of 1910, and the true figures would probably somewhat increase this majority. But surely this numerical superiority cannot be considered a sufficient excuse for the violation of all other principles of fron-

Rumanian Districts of the Hungarian Plain

tier-fixing. Moreover, it is difficult to see why the Commission was willing to disregard almost every conceivable principle, including that of economics, in order to include in Rumania less than a million Rumanians, and then saw no objections to using an economic argument alone for the further inclusion of a purely Magyar territory, containing over 400,000 Hungarians.

But this was not the only way in which the Commission was inconsistent. It was bad enough that history and geography should have been much stressed in several cases, and then completely abandoned in the case of Hungary. But a little farther south, in the Banat, the dispute between Rumania and Serbia was finally settled, (1) by giving each country its national centres; and (2) by balancing as nearly as possible the number of Rumanians in the Serbs' share with the Serbs in the Rumanian share.¹ Both of these principles are inequitable, but let us see to what they lead. Many Allied statesmen during the war made assertions to the effect that "we must be just not only to the people to whom we want to be just, but also to the people to whom we do not want to be just." If the principles employed in the Rumano-Serb dispute are equitable, let us see how they work out in the case we are discussing.

¹ Institute, Vol. IV, p. 229.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Can we say that Arad, a national shrine to all patriotic Magyars, Nagyvárad, and Szatmár Németi are not "national centres" of the Magyars? Is it not a sorry compliment to the Magyars to balance 1,515,000 of their race against 30,000 Rumanians? And is it not a trifle inconsistent to cut a railway further south at Versecz, for 25,000 Serbs, and yet to refuse to do so for more than 400,000 Magyars? Again, why should the Banat have been divided for 230,000 Serbs if so many more Magyars can be easily overlooked

It would have been difficult, however, to have left nearly a million Rumanians in Hungary. Let us see, therefore, the effect of drawing a line almost along the linguistic frontier. Such a line would pass just to the east of Aranyosmedgyes Erdöd, Tasnád, Margitta, Nagyvárad, Nagyszalonta, Elek, and Arad—that is, it would lie in some cases 30 kilometres from the present frontier. The region then retained by Rumania would have the following ethnic complexion: Szatmár, 100,650 Rumanians, 40,000 Magyars; Szilágy 126,000 Rumanians, 71,000 Magyars; Bihar 228,885 Rumanians, 50,065 Magyars; Arad 217,400 Rumanians, 34,350 Magyars, and 20,700 Germans; and Csanád¹, 9,000 Ru-

¹ I would include the small peninsula north of the Maros, just above Nagylak, because it contains 12,000 Rumanians, 8,000 Slovaks (who would probably prefer Rumanian to Magyar rule) and but 2,000 Magyars and 2,000 Germans. The railroad to the north of the Maros strikes away from the river between Nagylak and Opecksa; while to the south, a railroad runs through Perjamos, on the river.

Rumanian Districts of the Hungarian Plain

manians, 8,000 Slovaks, and 1,500 Magyars. In regard to Ugocsa a treaty between Czechoslovakia and Rumania somewhat improved the frontier (June 2, 1921); Rumania received four villages with 5,500 inhabitants (3,500 Rumanians) and Czechoslovakia received six villages with 5,000 inhabitants, chiefly Magyar. Yet even here, the line was unjust; if it had been fairly drawn, Rumania would have received a territory containing but 10,000 Rumanians, and 2,000 Germans.

Thus, if the frontier had been drawn on this line, Rumania would have received 769,085 Rumanians, 226,065 Magyars, 50,000 Germans, and 40,000 others, chiefly Slovak. Allowing for the bias of the Hungarian census, it is quite evident that the Rumanians would be about four times as numerous as the Magyars in this region. On the other hand, Hungary would retain a territory containing 401,080 Magyars, 73,500 Rumanians, 19,375 Germans, and some 17,000 others; in this strip, no sophistry could go far enough to claim a Rumanian majority. All this merely goes to show how sharp the racial line really is.

But, it may be said, such a line would in every way be even more unfair than the present frontier. No one will assert that there is any peculiar excellence in the suggested line; and yet it may well be maintained that

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

it is much better than the present one. Strategically, to be sure, it gives the Magyars the advantage of the rochade line; but surely Hungary needs some strategic advantage. Geographically, the line runs in part through the foothills of the Bihars, and would therefore be a trifling improvement over the present frontier. The commercial standpoint merits fuller discussion. Let us mention first some positive advantages of this division-line: it cuts but two main railway lines, instead of four, and one more (nine) secondary lines;¹ it leaves the entire lateral railway in the hands of Hungary, instead of cutting it; and it crosses the lands of but one irrigation society. If Rumania really needs a north-south line, one can be built from Nagybánya down the valleys from the Szamos and Almas to Bánffy-hunyad then down the valley of the Körös, then overland to Tenke and Borosjenő, and finally to the Maros about Opálos. This certainly should not be an engineering feat of any great difficulty.

But what will happen to the towns, such as Nagyvárad and Arad, left so close to the boundary? It should first of all be pointed out that these cities are being ruined by the present position, so a change could

¹ Rubinek, 6. It should be noted that the entire branch system to Vaskoh would be "beheaded"; but this system could easily be connected up with the main line east of Nagyvárad.

Rumanian Districts of the Hungarian Plain

scarcely be for the worse. But if a free traffic zone existed, preferably in the entire territory between the Tisza and Transylvania, these cities would probably prosper. Moreover, the ordinary frontier is not an impermeable barrier, as many people seem to think; many great cities, such as Lille, Detroit, Czernowitz, and Geneva, prosper, though practically on a boundary. Such cities will continue to prosper so long as the dictates of common-sense, and even of self-interest, are followed. The Rumanians, however, care much more for the prosperity of the Rumanians up country, and will allow the cities to decline; whereas, if these cities were given to Hungary, it would be to the interest of both countries to allow cross-frontier trade, and the prosperity of the cities would be assured.

At least, such a solution would be really based on the ethnographic principle. The present frontier does violence to the first principles of justice; it is obviously imposed by a victor upon the vanquished. As such it does not tend to alleviate a dangerous situation, but rather to accentuate its dangers. If Allied statesmen find Hungary dissatisfied with the peace, they have largely themselves to thank when they were willing to condone, if not to urge, such an outrage to justice. Hungary never will, never can rest until this boundary has been more fairly drawn.

CHAPTER VIII

The Problem of the Banat

THE last Hungarian province to which the Rumanians laid claim was that of the Banat.¹ This province was roughly a square, bordered on the north by the Maros, on the west by the Tisza, on the south by the Danube, and on the east by the Transylvanian Alps. Its area in 1910 amounted to 28,522 square kilometres; its population, according to the official Hungarian statistics, was 1,582,133. The western half of this province is a plain, while in the centre are many foothills, which rise gradually until they culminate in the Transylvanian Alps. The province's chief river, besides those which border it, is the Temes. In addition to this river, important lines of communication are the Bega Canal from Temesvár to the Tisza, and a network of railways, amounting in all to 1,962 kilometres. The two most important strands in this net are the Arad, Temesvár, Versecz, Danube line, and the old Orient Express route, via Szeged, Temesvár,

¹ For a detailed description of the geography and economics of the Banat, see Prothero. For racial statistics, see Appendix.

The Problem of the Banat

Lugos, and Orsova. These railways are supplemented by an excellent set of roads.

The plain of the Banat is a great wheat-growing region; from it much wheat is exported via the Bega Canal. The centre contains many orchards and meadows; much live-stock is also raised there, particularly pigs and horses. To the east there are many valuable mines; here iron, lead, copper, and zinc are extracted. A financial organization has grown up to permit the exploitation of all this natural wealth, and in this organization many Rumanians participate; but the Serbs seem to be on the whole the more progressive business men.

The decision as to what the status of this province should be was one of the thorniest matters that came before the Peace Conference. Magyar, Rumanian, and Serb all claim at least the two western counties; any decision must rest on many uncertain factors; and when we attempt to decide among them, we merely become increasingly confused.

The ethnography of the Banat is possibly the most confusing in all Europe. According to the statistics for 1910, the Rumanians numbered 592,049, the Germans 387,545, the Serbians 284,329, the Magyars 242,152, the Slovaks 22,131, the Croats 4,872, the

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Ruthenians 2,392, and others 46,663. But consider the statistics for the districts which all three nations claim: Germans 330,000; total Slavs, about 327,000; Rumanians, 305,000; Serbians (alone) 282,000; and Magyars 208,000. Besides these four major races, Bunievaces, Sokaces, Slavonians, Ruthenians, Croats, Bulgarians, Czechs, Moravians, Slovaks, Russians, Poles, Chotzki, Krassovans, Italians, Spaniards, Greeks, French, and Turks, have all settled in the province; and a few representatives at least of all these races still preserve their racial identity. Even this does not tell the whole story. Were the races somewhat segregated, it would be better; but this is not the case. The districts along the Tisza and Danube are in general Serbian; the extreme northwest corner, Magyar; the eastern half, strongly Rumanian; and a considerable section at the north, German. If, however, we consider the quadrilateral between Nagyszentmiklós, Pancsova, Fehértéplom, and Lippa, we find a hopeless mixture, in which no race forms a matrix, but all are disrupted into countless disconnected enclaves. Regardless as to whether a division takes place or not, large racial minorities must continue to exist.

The Rumanians, to prove their claims to the entire Banat, assert that the province is a unit: "The Banat is

The Problem of the Banat

not a geographical expression; it is a reality, a true geographical division, and also, a true political province forming a complete and indivisible whole, today as at every other time of its history.”¹ Upon this theme they enlarge at great length.

The Rumanians insist that, inasmuch as the Banat is a unit, the nation once possessing a part of it will soon go to war to get the rest. A Serbian bridgehead to protect Belgrade would be primarily offensive, and Rumania could never allow it. The Banat should never be divided, even from a racial standpoint, for any division will inevitably lead to war. Historically, too, the Rumanians have strong reason to insist upon the unity of the Banat. Administratively, it has been divided, but politically never.

In this case, the Rumanians for the first time consent to use geographical and economic arguments. The Banat, so they say, is as much of a geographical unity as Wallachia. On three sides, important rivers demarcate its frontiers, on a fourth a mountain range; yet mountains and plains are closely united. Properly to organize the province, one nation must possess all its roads, all its railways, all its navigable waterways.

¹ *La Roumanie, Banat, 3*. This is the authority for all the following Rumanian arguments.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

If the Banat is divided the Serbians will receive the lower courses of every important stream, and of the Bega Canal; this will deprive the rest of the Banat of its usual means of transportation. Even a guarantee of liberty of navigation would be, from many standpoints, entirely insufficient. The natural exchange of products between the mountains and the plains will be stopped; no more will the laborers of the hill country be able to get seasonal employment in the plains; no more will the hill people be able to take their cattle to the plains during the winter.

Nor would it be possible, according to the Rumanians, to divide the Banat, even from an ethnic standpoint. The Serbs are in numbers only the third race in the province: and the districts in which they predominate are such a racial mosaic that any division either would seriously violate the ethnographical principle, or would not give Serbia enough Serbians to make the violation of the Danube frontier worth while. The Germans, and even the Magyars, would rather have Rumania rule the entire Banat, than have it divided.

The Magyars, too, insist that the Banat is a unit. For the most part, they use the same arguments to prove this point; in fact, they quote extensively from the memoranda presented to the Peace Conference by

The Problem of the Banat

the Rumanians. Therefore, we need not particularly concern ourselves with the Magyar assertions on this score.

The Serbs are thus beset from two sides at once; and they have to refute the arguments not only of an enemy, but also of a friend. Nevertheless, they are in no way abashed, although their arguments are not particularly strong. They insist that "the Banat does not form a geographical, economic, or ethnic unit";¹ but they adduce nothing to prove this. Curiously enough, what they say has much truth in it; but it is not true in the manner in which they wish it were. Through the county of Krassó-Szörény run the ranges of the Krassó-Szörény mountains; and if a line were drawn from Lippa along these mountains, reaching the Danube at Omoldova, it would be very nearly as good a boundary as that furnished by the Transylvanian Alps. Such a boundary would cut but two railways (instead of three), and no navigable waterways; and it would be reasonably good from a strategical and geographical point of view; but it has one fatal defect: it is impossible from an ethnic standpoint. True, it would include some 340,000 Slavs in Serbia; but it would also include about 360,000 Germans, 340,000 Rumanians, and

¹ *Délimitation*, p. 3. This pamphlet sets forth the Serbian arguments.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

215,000 Magyars; (i.e. the Serbians, not including other Slavs, would comprise but 22.5% of the total population). West of this line, no boundary could have been demarcated which would have had any positive advantages.

Relying upon the undeniable natural unity of the Banat, the Magyars claimed the entire province,¹ and mustered an imposing set of arguments to prove the justice of their claims.

Strategical considerations the Magyars sedulously avoided; nevertheless, it is clear that the great city of Szeged must have a bridgehead in the Banat. But the Hungarian Delegation lost no opportunity to point out the strong historical claims of Hungary to the Banat. Like the plain to the north of the Maros, the Banat has shared at all times (except 1699-1718) the fate of the rest of Hungary. Furthermore, the Magyars clearly proved that the Serbian Despotates and Voivodinas never amounted to anything as foundations for historical claims. But possibly the best card of the Magyars in this suit was their claim of prior settlement. This enabled them to make some delightfully caustic remarks about "guests in the house."

¹ For authority for the following Hungarian arguments, see Neg. Vol. I, p. 401 ff Vol. II, p. 67 ff.

The Problem of the Banat

The geographical factors were much stressed by the Hungarians here, as elsewhere. The best frontier of the Banat, they pointed out, was that along the high, forested, and uninhabited Transylvanian Alps. To the south, too, the Danube furnished an excellent frontier. On the north and west, however, the Maros and Tisza would never do for boundaries, for they meandered excessively; and one nation must always possess both banks, to protect the lowlands from floods.

Economic considerations, too, bound up the Banat closely with the rest of Hungary. The Hungarian Delegation showed that the Serbians and Rumanians in the Banat were very prosperous, in spite of the charges of Hungarian oppression: on this score, indeed, the Delegation spared few words in berating their opponents. Again, were the Banat taken from Hungary, the milling industry at Budapest would be ruined; Hungary would lose a large part of her maize crop, essential for her live-stock; and she would be absolutely wrecked financially. The Banat was an economic unit with Hungary, and to sever their connection meant the ruin of both.

Then also, the Magyars pointed out, it was their rule that had made the Banat so prosperous—the Magyars had introduced modern farming methods, a

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

great system of land and water communications, and many other public works.

Finally, the Hungarians used several interesting ethnic arguments. It is obvious that the number of Magyars in the Banat (242,000 in 1910 officially, and even with this probably inflated figure, they were so scattered that they formed a majority scarcely anywhere) would give Hungary but a feeble ethnic claim to the Banat; so the Hungarians adopted every method in their power to modify this. They insisted that the Swabians (Germans) were united in desiring a continuance of Magyar rule; and to prove this, they brought in numerous memoranda, etc. Then they adopted an even more cunning plan: they included the Bácska and the Banat together, thus getting a bare Magyar plurality, and explained this by pointing to the intimate economic relations between these two provinces. Lastly, the Magyars asserted that if the Banat were taken from them, its inhabitants, even the Serbians and the Rumanians, would "pine in ceaseless sorrow for a return of Hungarian rule."

The Rumanians had no such lengthy claims to the Banat as the Magyars brought forward; their case rested chiefly on another count. All their remarks about economic and geographical principles in discussing the

The Problem of the Banat

unity of the Banat were apparently pure camouflage to cover the weakness of their claims in these respects to any part of the Banat. They insisted that the Banat must be given to Rumania as a protection for Transylvania and to secure an outlet for goods coming down the Maros from Transylvania. They also had a good deal to say in regard to history, but little of this was important.

It is upon ethnography that the Rumanians laid the greatest stress. They showed that in nearly half of the districts and communes of the Banat, the Rumanians formed pluralities; that only in the three districts in the angle of the Maros and the Tisza did they number less than ten per cent of the total population; and that for the entire Banat, they greatly outnumbered any other race.

Now, it is obvious that even if one does not consider the Serbian claims, there is a serious conflict here. As the situation stood in 1920, the Hungarian Delegation was unquestionably right in bringing out their strong geographical and economic claims; but a somewhat different situation confronts us. We have already seen that Rumania received all the lands north of the Maros from Nagylak eastward; and that they rightfully received everything east of Arad. Similarly, the

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Serbs received virtually all the territory south of Szeged; and had the frontier been fairly drawn, they would have received everything from Obecse (St. Becej) south. Nor have the Magyars much right to make comments about "guests." Even according to Hungarian accounts, these races must have been settled in the Banat (by invitation from the Austrian emperor) at least for six generations; and thus even the Biblical curse for the sins of the fathers can scarcely be visited upon the present generation of Rumanians and Serbs. It is also worthy of note that the Magyars have been known to violate hospitality quite as seriously as does this breach of which they now complain. As a matter of fact, it is probable that both the Rumanians and the Serbs of the Banat are descendants from earlier settlers, on an average, than are the Swabians and Magyars. These facts ruin many of the Magyar arguments; but they may be even further undermined.

The Magyars claim that there is a Swabo-Magyar plurality in the Banat (39.8% of the total population); and, inasmuch as the Banat is a unit, that it should be given to Hungary on the score of ethnography. There are serious flaws in this argument. In the first place, what about the other 60% of the population? Do they count for nothing? They would be almost unani-

The Problem of the Banat

mously opposed to a continuance of Hungarian rule; and Hungary would be confronted in them by a serious and even dangerous problem. Moreover, the "Magyar" plurality includes all the Swabians; but it is by no means certain that the Swabians would desire to be in Hungary. In Rumania they are no longer subject to denationalization. The Magyarized schools have been reconverted into German schools. Swabian peasants, to the number of 13,436, have received land.¹ The Swabians are represented by a senator and three representatives in the Rumanian Parliament. In spite of all the disadvantages of being in Rumania, the Swabians seem actually to prefer their present situation to their past. The Germans in Serbia do not seem to be seriously discontented, either, for they now enjoy much the same privileges, such as representation in the Serbian Parliament, as the Germans in Rumania. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that with one phase of the present situation they are bitterly discontented. They are absolutely opposed to a division of the Banat. Their chief reason for this attitude is the inevitable economic ruin which such a division will produce; but they also presumably dislike the fact that they are split between two nations.

¹ "Argus," Dec. 26, 1923.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Thus here again the Magyars have tried, but unsuccessfully, to use the Germans for their own advantage. It is not exactly consistent for them to denounce on every possible occasion the Austrians and all their works, and then to show the same solicitude in claiming German districts as in claiming those which were purely Magyar. The Hungarian Germans naturally looked to Vienna rather than Budapest. And although there is a certain amount of testimony that the Germans would prefer to be ruled by the Hungarians, there is much evidence to the contrary. It would be unfair to include the Germans in the Rumanian or Serbian totals, but it is absolutely necessary to exclude them from the Magyar. Finally, it is distinctly shameless for the Magyars to confuse the Bácksa and the Banat, which are not claimed entire by either Serbia or Rumania—and the absence of easy means of intercommunication shows that the two cannot be closely connected economically.

Nor can the Rumanian claims be allowed to pass without criticism. The Maros is not navigable above Arad, except for barges, as the Rumanians themselves show; therefore, to give them the entire Banat, on this score, in defiance of the Serbian and Magyar claims, would be foolish. Nor is it consistent of the Ruma-

The Problem of the Banat

nians to state that the food surplus of the Banat is already fully drawn on to meet the deficiency of the eastern Banat and of Transylvania, and then to admit that some 400,000 tons of "merchandise"¹ (chiefly wheat, as we learn from another Rumanian source)² are annually exported via the Bega Canal. Similarly, a plea for German unity is rather a dangerous argument for them to employ, for the Germans might well also prefer to be included in a country with which they are more closely connected commercially and geographically than they are with Rumania—that is, Serbia or Hungary; and therefore, if we accept this argument, it gives the Serbs or Hungarians an excellent claim to the entire Western Banat as far as the Krassó-Szóröny mountains.

Again, we cannot allow the other ethnographical arguments of the Rumanians to pass wholly unnoticed. True, they do form a great plurality for the Banat as a whole; yet in the Western Banat they are an in considerable minority; and it is doubtful whether the Rumanians of the Banat really want Rumanian rule.³ Many of these Rumanians fled from the Rumanian kingdom to escape the agrarian oppression. However, the agra-

¹ *La Roumanie-Banat*, pp. 18, 19.

² *Bocou*, 29.*

³ *Prothero*, p. 39.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

rian reform ought to make for a speedy end to this grievance.

Finally, there is the question of the Secret Treaty. The Rumanians have only to go to this pact to prove their rights to the entire Banat. They back up this argument by pointing to the assistance they rendered and the losses they suffered. We may sympathize with them in this, but we should not let it influence our decision. What the Rumanians did or suffered during the war has nothing to do with the matter, for if these things counted, Serbia's claim would be stronger. On re-entering the war, Rumania alleged as an excuse a violation of the Treaty of Bucharest,¹ which showed that she considered her pact with Germany valid. This rendered her treaty with the Allies null and void. Even though she was betrayed, and compelled to withdraw from the war, here nevertheless was a technical flaw in her rights; and when a fair decision could be rendered only by breaking the Secret Treaty, the Conference was right in disregarding this pact. Another distinct flaw in the Rumanian claims derived from the treaty is the question whether the Allies had any right, without the consent of Serbia, to give the province to Rumania. They never owned it, never had any claim

¹ Institute, Vol. IV, p. 221.

The Problem of the Banat

to it, never even held it by right of conquest. The Serbians finally conquered what they claimed. Furthermore, the United States had never signed the Secret Treaty; and if only on her account, the treaty had to be abandoned. Therefore the Secret Treaty was rightfully disregarded by the Conference.¹

The Serbian claims to the Banat are more modest than those of the Magyars and Rumanians, for they include only the county of Torontál entire; most of Temes; and in Krassó-Szörény, 26 communes in the districts of Jám and Ujmoldova. They show that they must have a bridgehead before their capital, Belgrade, and as a protection for the valley of the Morava. The Magyars object very strenuously to the Czechoslovak frontier, because it comes within 30 kilometres of Budapest, although a straight line from the nearest point would cross the Danube and a small mountain range before reaching Budapest. They seem to think it no injustice, however, that they should have held the river-bank opposite Belgrade ever since the foundation of the Serbian state, nor do they blush in claiming the entire Banat, which would mean that the Danube alone

¹ The Rumanians tried to balance their claims in the Timok Valley against those of Serbia in the Banat. These claims should be considered solely on their own merits. It would be absurd to balance claims, for two wrongs would not make a right.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

would still separate Belgrade from Hungarian territory. And if the Rumanians claim that they still must hold the southern Dobrudja for strategical reasons, (i.e., to protect the Cernavoda-Constantza railway and Bucharest), they must perforce admit that the Serbians have a far stronger right to a bridgehead in the Banat, even were there no Serbs there. The Rumanians, to be sure, had promised to erect no fortifications opposite Belgrade; but this promise was obviously inadequate.

The Serbs laid great stress on history, but their historical claims are almost as trivial as those of Rumania. With far more reason, the Serbians set forth their strong geographical arguments. It is true that the Banat has much better frontiers toward Serbia and Rumania than toward Hungary; but if the convergence of the Slovakian rivers upon Budapest gives Hungary a claim to Slovakia, then the convergence of the waterways of the Banat upon Belgrade (which even the Rumanians point out) must likewise give Serbia a claim on that province. Considering the situation in the territories adjacent to the Banat, Serbia seems to have a rather stronger geographical claim here than either Hungary or Rumania.

Similarly, the Serbian economic contentions are somewhat weightier than those of either of the other

The Problem of the Banat

claimants. Although Hungary bound the province to the rest of the country by railways, and has thus since 1867 turned the course of trade toward Hungary, yet prior to that date the trade of the Banat was closely connected with Serbia. It is not Serbia's fault that Hungary built up her milling industry artificially; and Serbia has more need of the products of the Banat than Hungary has, for these foodstuffs are essential to the Serbians to make up for the deficiency of their State in this regard. Both the Rumanians and the Serbians insist that if their tenets are not adopted *in toto*, the economic ruin of the Banat will follow; yet neither Rumanians nor Serbians suggest that it be left in Hungary to assure its economic prosperity. The Rumanians claimed that inasmuch as no bridge spans the Danube between the Banat and Serbia, there is therefore no important economic route linking these two regions, but this is a quibble, for the trade between them flows by water; and in any case, a bridge here would have been destroyed in the war.

Next, the Serbians have some rather important cultural arguments. The Serbs of the Banat are the most cultured of the entire race; and this has been true of them for many generations. Many Serbian leaders of military, scientific, and artistic pursuits have come

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

from the Banat. Moreover, in the districts which they claim (so the Serbs assert), their race owns about eleven times as much land as the Rumanians. It is also worthy of note that the Rumanians in the Serbian Banat have succeeded in sending a representative to the Serbian Parliament, which indicates that they are not being oppressed.

Finally, the Serbians have some interesting remarks to make in regard to the will of the population. In the first place, the Serbians of the Banat have a stronger feeling of nationality than the Rumanians. And there are many thousands of Slavs—Slovaks, Croats, Ruthenians, Bunievaces, Sokaces, Chotzki, etc.—whose national affinities lie clearly with Jugoslavia. Whether the Bulgarians and Krassovans would prefer to be in Jugoslavia or Rumania is not clear, but it seems probable that in general they would prefer the former. As we have seen, there is much doubt which the Germans would prefer, as between Rumania and Serbia; and the same may be said of the Magyars.

It is thus fairly evident that the Banat must be divided. To do so is evidently difficult, for however the province is split up, many principles which guide the demarcation of frontiers must be violated. Geographical considerations can have no weight; for in all

The Problem of the Banat

Torontál, through which most of the frontier must run, the level of the land varies a scant 100 metres; and no important watercourses lie even in a general way along the linguistic "frontiers." Similarly, major economic considerations must be totally disregarded; here the infraction of principles is even more serious than in the case of geography. Many railways, canals, and irrigation works must inevitably be cut by the new frontiers. Yet however strong may be the arguments in favor of keeping the Banat as a unit, the revendications of each of the three claimants to at least a section of the Banat are yet weightier. If the Banat is to be divided, obviously this can be done only along racial lines.

The Magyars form a majority in but one district, Törökkanizsa; and inasmuch as this district lies in the normal economic sphere of the Szeged, the Magyars had a strong claim to it. In spite of this fact, the Commission gave them but the merest strip of the district: this slice contained 8,500 Magyars, and 1,800 Serbians. A considerably better frontier would have been one more or less along the course of the Aranka, the old bed of the Maros. This would have included in Hungary an extra 23,000 Magyars, 15,000 Serbs, 4,000 Germans, and 2,000 Rumanians—of whom all but 2,000 Magyars and

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

1,000 Germans would have come from the territory which Serbia ultimately received—and also, it would have provided a much better strategical, geographical, and economic frontier.

The rest of the Banat remained to be divided between Rumania and Serbia. The Commission which settled this matter did so as nearly as possible along racial lines. In the county of Krassó-Szörény, the Rumanians form a great majority, except in the one district of Ujmoldova where there is a bare Serbo-Czech plurality. Serbia received none of this district, but she did get five communes in the district of Jám.

In the county of Temes, the Rumanians form majorities in the districts of Buziásfurdö, Csák, Lippa, and Temesrékas; and furthermore, they greatly outnumber the Serbians in Delta, Köspons, Ujarad, the greater part of Versecz, and Temesvár Town; therefore all these districts should clearly belong to Rumania. Similarly, the Serbs had a majority in Fehértemplom, a plurality in Kevevára; and they outnumbered the Rumanians in Versecz Town, Fehértemplom Town, and the southwestern part of Versecz district; this territory was therefore rightfully given to Serbia.

Finally, in Torontál, the Rumanians had a majority in but one district—Alibunár. The Serbians have

The Problem of the Banat

majorities in Antalfalva and Törökbecse and Nagykinda town; pluralities in Negykikinda district, Párdány and Pancsova town; and with the other Slavs, pluralities in the town of Nagybecskerek, and the districts of Nagybecskerek and Pancsova. Geographical considerations forced the inclusion of Alibunár in Serbia¹ (in this district, the Serbians numbered 40%) and the division of Párdány. Furthermore, the Rumanians greatly outnumbered the Serbs in Nagyszentmiklós and Perjámos; therefore, these districts were given to Rumania. Lastly, the Germans had at least pluralities in the districts of Bánlak, Csene, Módos and Zsombolya; and neither Rumanians nor Serbs greatly outnumbered the other in these districts; therefore, they were divided.

The lines, as thus drawn, will probably be ruinous to the economic life of the Banat unless great tact is shown by both Rumanians and Serbians. The best that can be said for this frontier is that at least it was impartially drawn, and that from an ethnic standpoint it is fairly successful. In Serbia is included a region

¹ The Rumanian section of this district, and of Pancsova, together with more of the Serb share might have been included in Rumania. This would give the entire Arad-Bazias railway to Rumania, but it would include 41,000 Serbs and other Slavs, 31,000 Germans, and 11,000 Magyars, as well as 45,000 Rumanians, in Rumania. This frontier, however, would be bad from every point of view save the ethnic, and other changes seem preferable (see p. 168 ff.).

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

of 9,000 square kilometers, inhabited by 236,700 Serbians, about 24,000 other Slavs (including 16,000 Slovaks), 127,000 Germans, 111,625 Magyars, 76,500 Rumanians, and 2,000 others. Rumania received a territory of about 19,000 square kilometers containing 515,500 Rumanians, 260,000 Germans, 122,000 Magyars, 52,000 Serbo-Croats, about 38,000 other Slavs (chiefly Bulgarians) and some 5,000 others.

The results of this decision satisfied nobody. In the first place, the frontier is, in a way, grotesquely drawn. Schoolhouses and railway stations are severed from the towns they serve; the frontier cuts twelve railways (and two more were cut by the Serbo-Magyar boundary), four canals, innumerable roads, and the lands of two irrigation companies. The Serbians protested and wanted to fight, because they did not receive Temesvár, in spite of strong historical claims. The Rumanians sent a memorandum to the Peace Conference denouncing the whole business. This memorandum insists upon bringing in geographical and economic arguments—in spite of the fact that they had wholly disregarded them to the north of the Maros, as the Magyars gleefully pointed out. But the ethnographical arguments employed by both the Rumanians and the Magyars are the most amusing.

The Problem of the Banat

The Rumanians claimed that for 224,000 Serbs, 386,000 peoples of other races are subjected to Serbian rule—both figures are absolutely erroneous, as we have seen, even if we count all the other Slavs among the “others.” The Magyars then point out that, none the less, “it is considered justifiable (by Rumania) that she should acquire 990,000 non-Wallachs, besides the 592,000 Wallachs. And on considering the rest of the Wallach claim, we find no nicety of conscience standing in the way of the 2,508,000 non-Wallachs, besides the 2,346,000 Wallachs being subjugated by Rumania.” And again, “The Wallachs consider it a difficulty that the Serbs should rule over two towns of German majority, being Versecz (49.5% German, 31.4% Serb), and Fehértéplom (52.6% German and 17.3% Serb). They themselves would, however, calmly and with a feeling of justice done, annex these Serbian and German towns where they (the Wallachs) form but 3.2% and 15.7% of the population.” It is interesting to note in regard to the first charge that the Magyars do not consider it a difficulty that because of 242,000 members of their race in the Banat, 1,340,000 others should be subjugated by Hungary; and also, we find no nicety of conscience in regard to the 1,760,150 people who, according

¹ Neg. II, p. 68.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

to the Hungarian claim, must be subjugated to Magyar rule, because of 918,217 Magyars of Transylvania. It also seems that in regard to the two towns mentioned above, the Hungarian Delegation should be a little careful in charging the Rumanians with inconsistency, for the Magyars too claim these towns, and yet they form but 10.5% and 14.2% of the populations, themselves. And, once again, it is interesting to note with what solicitude the Magyars guard the rights of Serbian districts, as against the Rumanian claims, and yet when it comes to a conflict between the Serbian and Magyar claims, these same Serbian districts must be handed over to Hungary (in spite of the previous insistence of the Hungarian Delegation that there be plebiscites everywhere) "without any questions being asked."¹

Both Rumanians and Hungarians were thus betrayed into absurdity in their arguments. It is truly unfortunate that the Banat must be divided; and yet what other solution is there? The Rumanian ethnographical claims ruined the Serbian arguments, however well the latter may have been founded in every other way. The Hungarian contentions are well-nigh destroyed because the Germans certainly are not very

¹ Neg. Vol. II, p. 23.

The Problem of the Banat

anxious for a continuance of Hungarian rule. The only solution was to divide the Banat fairly, as the Conference attempted to do. It cannot be said that the Boundary Commission did such a bad job, considering the difficulties with which they were confronted. We have already seen what a hopeless jumble of races the Banat is; yet the Commission succeeded in giving the Rumanians a territory containing a clear Rumanian majority (Rumanians 52%, Germans 25.7%, Serbs 5.2%, Magyars 12.3%, other Slavs, about 4.1% and others .7%); while Serbia received a region containing 40.7% Serbs, 4% other Slavs, 22.9% Germans, 18.9% Magyars, 13.3% Rumanians, and .2% others—all this even according to Magyar statistics.

But there are unlimited opportunities for tinkering with this boundary; and that is precisely what the Rumanians and Serbs have been doing ever since 1919. Finally, on November 24th, 1923, a protocol was signed, in which a definite frontier was at last fixed. By it Rumania gave to Serbia the communes of Párdány, Módos, Surjan, Crivobara, and Nagyaj in exchange for Beba Veche, Pustur Keréstur, Zsombolya, Ciorda, and Jám; and this improved the ethnographical situation in both sections of the Banat. Unfortunately this protocol contains no commercial agreement.

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

Even such a frontier, however, does not seem to be the best that might be drawn. At least four more changes would apparently improve it. Thus the branch line from Nyerö to Nagykikinda is completely "be-headed" by the frontier; Nyero is clearly in the economic sphere of Nagykikinda; and although it contains 911 Rumanians and virtually no Serbs, there are some 4300 Germans in this bit of land who, for economic reasons, would probably prefer Serbian rule.¹ Again, since Zsombolya has been given to Rumania, the frontier between there and Módos seems from every point of view (save the ethnographical) worse rather than better. The Nagykikinda-Módos railway is apparently cut four times by the new frontier; and the people of Klari and Párdány will now find themselves without their usual railway service. If the boundary were judiciously drawn, however, not only would this entire railway be left to Serbia, but such a move would also seem to be justified from an ethnographical point of view, for it would include in Serbia an extra territory containing 16,500 Serbo-Croats, several hundred other Slavs, 15,000 Germans, 9,000 Magyars, and but 6,100

¹ Obesenyo and Bolgartelep, with some 6,000 Krassovans, might also have been included in Serbia: but inasmuch as this would imply the inclusion of Valcany, with 3,000 Rumanians, and inasmuch as the preferences of the Krassovans are unknown, this would have been a questionable proceeding.

The Problem of the Banat

Rumanians. The justification for the fourth possible change lies in geographical and ethnic factors. Versecz is Swabo-Serbian, and to this city the Serbs have such a strong historical claim that the Conference at the last minute allotted it to Serbia; but all around the city, particularly to the east, are Rumanians. Directly to the east of Versecz there rises from the plain a peak with a height of 641 metres, and this peak is almost on the ethnic boundary. Surely it would have been better to have allowed this height to mark the political boundary as well, rather than to have drawn the latter several kilometers further east, in pure Rumanian territory. Such a change would have included 7,500 Rumanians, 400 Serbs, 2,000 Germans, and 200 Magyars in Rumania. Finally, between the Nera River and the Danube in the district of Ujmoldova (and one commune, Lescovita, in Jám) lies a compact colony of 9,700 Serbs and but 2,700 Rumanians; certainly this district might have been included in Serbia, especially as it would make the port of Bazais of immediate use to somebody, and as the mountains directly behind it would furnish a good geographical frontier. It is true that the Rumanians were planning to build a railway down the Nera; but, let alone the fact that they have not yet started it, it would always be possible to build

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

it overland, even though such a line would entail a large expenditure and might involve heavy grades.

To sum up the results of these changes, were they carried through: Hungary would gain a better frontier from an economic standpoint, and also a territory containing 26,500 Magyars, 16,300 Serbs, 3,000 Germans and 2,000 Rumanians; the frontier between Rumania and Serbia would cut railways in but nine instead of fourteen places, would be better geographically, and would include in Serbia an extra population of 20,200 Serbians, about 1,000 other Slavs, 9,800 Rumanians, 9,500 Magyars, and 19,500 Germans; Rumania would lose in addition to all these 2,000 Magyars to Hungary, and would receive 7,500 Rumanians, 2,000 Germans, and 400 Serbs from Serbia; Serbia's share of the Banat would then show a net gain of 3,500 Serbs, about 1,000 other Slavs, 14,500 Germans, and 3,250 Rumanians, and a loss of 14,500 Magyars; Rumania would lose 21,200 Slavs, 17,500 Germans, 12,000 Magyars, and 5,250 Rumanians. The frontier would thus be slightly improved from an ethnic as well as from a geographical and economic standpoint.

The present frontier, however, is not inherently wrong from an ethnic standpoint. Nevertheless, there are two very serious objections to it: (1) that economic

The Problem of the Banat

intercourse across the frontier, which is absolutely essential to the prosperity of both sections of the Banat, has been stopped, owing to the unwise acts of the Rumanian and Serbian governments; (2) that the Germans are divided against their will between Serbia and Rumania. Both of these objections could be quickly ended by the establishment of absolute freedom of trade and intercourse between the two sections of the Banat. It is high time the Serbians and Rumanians forgot their petty bickerings and jealousies, and did something really helpful for the Banat. Serbia at least seems anxious for an agreement, and the sooner Rumania shows a more conciliatory spirit, the better for all concerned. If freedom of economic intercourse between the two sections of the Banat were provided, there is no reason why the province should not eventually become as prosperous as in pre-war days. Only by reaching an agreement to such an end can the Rumanians and the Serbians prove conclusively that the present arrangement is better than the past—that the Banat should not be returned to Hungary, but should be shared between them. It is high time that Rumania and Serbia stopped worrying about microscopic minorities in other countries, and took some interest in the welfare of their own subjects.

CHAPTER IX

Conclusion

The hope was often expressed in 1919 that the treaties of Paris, by providing a just settlement of European questions, would thereby provide a final settlement of them. The case which we are discussing is a good example of the way in which these hopes have been blighted. No question has been settled by handing these provinces over to Rumania; on the contrary the situation since the war is much more acute than that in pre-war days.

It is self-evident that any settlement to be really permanent must be satisfactory to both sides. The present situation obviously does not answer this requirement. We have found it not only flagrantly unjust from a racial standpoint, but also notable for its disregard of geography, economics, and history. However, the treaty settlement is only partly responsible for making the Transylvanian question a festering sore on the European body politic.

The Magyars in Rumania unquestionably have a variety of just complaints to make against the Ruma-

Conclusion

nian rule. The Rumanian bureaucracy contains too large a number of stupid, corrupt, inefficient, vindictive, and cruel officials. The Rumanian judicial system is rotten to the core. To mention but one more of the grave injustices from which the Hungarian minorities suffer, the Rumanian elections are grossly corrupted and unfair to them. The Rumanian government does little but quibble and equivocate; it promises reforms, and then does nothing. Even were it inclined to act, apparently it has not the control or the power over minor officials to enable it to do much. The Rumanian people, tinctured with Turkish tradition, filled with hatred of the Hungarians, and too supine to insist upon reforms for their own benefit, are scarcely likely to demand reforms on behalf of the Hungarians.

The Magyars of Hungary naturally observe every little result of this situation, especially in so far as it affects their kin. They see their compatriots beaten, imprisoned, or fined; they observe the perversion of the educational systems, the bad administration of the agrarian law, the suppression of meetings and of newspapers, the rotten electoral system; they notice the venality and prejudice of the courts, and hundreds of minor ills. They do not stop to consider that Rumania is not wholly to blame for these things. They fail to

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

see that Rumania suffered terribly from the war. They do not realize that they themselves are largely to blame for Rumania's hatred of them, for the lack of trained Rumanian judges and officials, and for many other things. But they do know that the present situation must not continue.

How, then, can the Hungarians be satisfied? The most obvious way out would be to return to Hungary all of her lost territory. But exactly how are these lands to be returned? It is evident that Rumania will never consent peacefully to surrender a third of her population and of her territory to a mortal enemy. It is obvious that the Rumanians of Transylvania would resist such a move by every means at their command. And if the Hungarians enter Transylvania by force of arms, breathing vengeance against the ravishers of their fairest province, who can think that this would be any solution of the problem? Who imagines that the horrors of the Rumanian occupation would not be repeated on a vaster scale? Who supposes that the Rumanians will not await the day when they in their turn can re-enter Transylvania, and avenge their martyred kinsmen with fire and sword? It is impossible that a permanent solution could thus be attained.

Conclusion

If their lands cannot be returned to Hungary, it has been suggested that at least they might be made autonomous to preserve their Western civilization. There are at least three serious objections to this plan. In the first place few people in Transylvania want autonomy, and it would be somewhat presumptuous to force it on the majority. In the second place Hungary would accept it simply as a means to an end. Finally, Rumania would probably object almost as strongly to giving Transylvania full autonomy as to handing the province over to Hungary. The Rumanians of Transylvania will almost certainly never reach the point of open revolt, simply from fear of being swallowed up in Hungary. Therefore this solution too seems impossible.

It follows, then, that if stability is to be reached, Transylvania must remain under Rumanian rule. But this will be no *solution* until some way can be found to reconcile Hungary and the Hungarian minorities with it. How can this be done?

We have seen that in Rumania today there are two pieces of territory of almost solidly Hungarian population. These two pieces of territory give Rumania an opportunity of making a gesture the effects of which could scarcely help being extraordinarily good. Suppose that Rumania were to cede to Hungary a strip

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

of territory, and to grant the Székelys full autonomy. The Hungarians would instantly forget their territorial grievance. Hungary would undoubtedly agree to a treaty which mutually guaranteed the new arrangement. The atmosphere of suspicion and hate which has poisoned for so long the Transylvanian situation would immediately vanish. The Hungarian irreconcilables would perforce cease their intrigues. The minorities would stop hindering and flouting the Rumanian administration, and would try to co-operate with it. The Rumanian officials, freed from suspicion, would act with greater tolerance and leniency.

Such a move would thus instantly clear the air; but would it be permanently satisfactory to both sides? Certainly it would have to be accompanied by a commercial agreement, to smooth out the economic difficulties resultant upon any frontier running through the Hungarian Plain. But even further moves are necessary before the animosity of Hungary will turn to a real friendship. We have seen to what a pass the Rumanian administrative system has come. Until this system is thoroughly reformed, there will be constant acts of oppression committed against the minorities. All the abuses mentioned above,¹ whether administrative, edu-

¹ Chapter V.

Conclusion

cational, ecclesiastical, agrarian, judicial, or electoral, must be investigated, and amends made where possible. The legitimate demands of the minorities must be carried out. More important still, Rumania must see that abuses do not recur. Only when the whole Rumanian system of administration reaches the level attained by that of Western nations will there be as little reason for complaint by the minorities as exists under any human system.

If, then, Rumania should show generosity toward Hungary, and wisdom in internal affairs, we should almost certainly discover that this problem had at last been happily solved. Unfortunately, it is extremely doubtful if Rumania would ever surrender any territory to her hereditary enemy. It would be difficult to persuade the nation that such intangible results as international goodwill would counterbalance so real a loss. However, the Rumanian people must realize that some day they inevitably will be overcome in battle, just as every European nation has at some time been overthrown. It is unlikely that Hungary would be the victor single-handed, but it would not be strange if she were the member of a victorious alliance. Under such circumstances, it seems evident that only if Rumania could prove conclusively that her rule had been satis-

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

factory even to the minorities of Transylvania could she hope to retain this province. But if she were to surrender the lands to which she has no possible right, Hungary would probably think twice before attacking her and world opinion in any case would probably save for Rumania virtually all truly Rumanian territories, just as almost all truly German territories were left in Germany in 1919. It is a case of losing a bit now, or all later. Rumania has the opportunity of doing something the material dividends of which alone will be incalculable.

Even though Rumania's misgovernment does not bring upon her reprisals from her immediate neighbors, yet her hand may be otherwise forced. Many millions of Englishmen and Americans hear constantly of the oppression of their co-religionists. America cannot remain wholly indifferent to the many church reports of conditions in Transylvania. England is yet more directly interested, for she is a member of the League of Nations, and a signer of the treaties which Rumania has broken. The League of Nations, directly appealed to by Hungary, sooner or later will be compelled to do something.

It is also high time that the Hungarians stopped stirring up trouble. Their propaganda is in no small

Conclusion

degree responsible for the present difficulties in Transylvania. Considering also to what an extent their own earlier misgovernment has caused the present situation, it is strange that they do not have the dignity and self-respect to abstain from flooding the world with grossly misleading propaganda.

Rumania today holds Transylvania, and intends to keep possession of this fair and cherished province. But if she continues much further upon her present course, she will but assist in her own disappointment. Her internal policy threatens to bring her into the category of those countries in which revolution is the national sport. Her treatment of minorities will bring upon her the savage vengeance of such hereditary enemies. Her actions are rapidly earning for her the contempt of the whole civilized world. Rumania is on trial now figuratively, and soon will be literally, before the bar of world public opinion.

Romania Mare is no longer an evanescent dream; it has become a reality. Not only have the Rumanians acquired Transylvania, most of the Banat, and even a strip of the Alföld, but they have also recovered the long-lost provinces of Bessarabia and Bukowina. For a score of generations the Rumanians have striven for the two ends which they have now at last achieved:

The Racial Conflict in Transylvania

independence and national unity. The sufferings of countless martyrs, and the blood of Rumania's sons have consecrated this independence and union. Now that they have been achieved, are they to be endangered by deeds and policies which have brought upon Rumania the contempt of the civilized world?

In another five years we can make a better appraisal of Rumanian rule. At the end of that time all excuses of post-war difficulties should be absurd. By that time, too, the Transylvanian National Party should have had a lease of power in which its capacity for reform can be tested. Public opinion would do well to suspend its judgment for a while longer. But if the present situation remains unchanged, then indeed it will be the duty of everyone to assist in wiping away this blot on the face of Europe. Nevertheless, for the present the peace of Europe demands that Rumania be not separated from her new provinces. Even Rumania's ill-wishers will profit little if the trail of United Rumania ends in the divorce-court.

APPENDIX

POPULATION OF TRANSYLVANIA BY RACES ACCORDING TO THE HUNGARIAN CENSUS OF 1910

County, circuit, town	Total Popula- tion	Hungarians		Germans		Rumanians		Others	
		Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%
I. Transylvania									
County of Also-Feher vm. Circuit of									
Alvincz	28,436	1,087	3.8	898	3.2	26,131	91.9	320	1.1
Balázsfalva	24,930	2,737	11.0	2,204	8.8	19,431	78.0	558	2.2
Kisenyed	21,334	861	4.0	2,781	13.0	17,471	82.0	221	1.0
Magyarigen	22,906	1,989	8.7	92	0.4	20,303	88.6	522	2.3
Marosújvár	28,793	9,622	33.4	142	0.5	18,319	63.6	710	2.5
Nagyenyed	23,002	4,352	18.9	16	0.1	18,213	79.2	421	1.8
Tövis	21,538	2,594	12.1	71	0.3	18,628	86.5	245	1.1
Verespatak	23,414	1,734	7.4	14	0.1	21,531	92.0	135	0.5
Township with a reg. council									
Abrudbánya	2,938	1,176	40.1	34	1.2	1,697	57.8	31	0.9
Gyulafehérvár	11,616	5,226	45.0	792	6.8	5,170	44.5	428	3.7
Nagyenyed	8,663	6,497	75.0	163	1.9	1,940	22.4	63	0.7
Vizakna	4,048	1,232	30.4	62	1.5	2,649	65.5	105	2.6
Total	221,618	39,107	17.6	7,269	3.3	171,483	77.4	3,759	1.7
County of Besztercze- Naszód vm. Circuit of									
Besnyő	24,803	2,357	9.5	6,781	27.3	14,308	57.7	1,357	5.5
Jád	31,165	952	3.1	10,172	32.6	18,169	58.3	1,872	6.0
Naszód	29,830	2,366	7.9	1,473	4.9	25,840	86.7	151	0.5
Óradna	28,809	2,238	7.8	1,348	4.7	24,777	86.0	446	1.5
Township with a reg. council									
Besztercze	13,236	2,824	21.4	5,835	44.1	4,470	33.8	107	0.7
Total	127,843	10,737	8.4	25,609	20.0	87,564	68.5	3,933	3.1

County of Brassó vm. Circuit of									
Alvidék.....	19,718	3,481	17.7	8,311	42.2	7,718	39.1	208	1.0
Felvidék.....	19,712	1,905	9.7	10,234	51.9	7,455	37.8	118	0.6
Hétfalu.....	20,713	12,155	58.7	156	0.7	8,132	39.3	270	1.3
Township with a reg. council									
Brassó.....	41,056	17,831	43.4	10,841	26.4	11,786	28.7	598	1.5
Total.....	101,199	35,372	35.0	29,542	29.2	35,091	34.7	1,194	1.1
County of Csik vm. Circuit of									
Felcsik.....	33,936	33,737	99.4	48	0.1	15	0.1	136	0.4
Gyergyószentmiklós....	41,333	34,898	84.4	317	0.8	5,838	14.1	280	0.7
Gyergyótölgyes.....	15,620	5,457	35.0	345	2.2	9,767	62.5	51	0.3
Kászonalcsik.....	21,849	21,756	99.6	17	0.1	36	0.2	40	0.1
Szépviz.....	20,376	17,900	87.8	193	0.9	2,177	11.0	106	0.3
Township with a reg. council									
Csikszereda.....	3,701	3,591	97.0	45	1.2	44	1.2	21	0.6
Gyergyószentmiklós....	8,905	8,549	96.0	115	1.3	155	1.7	86	1.0
Total	145,720	125,888	86.4	1,080	0.7	18,032	12.4	720	0.5

ACCORDING TO THE HUNGARIAN CENSUS OF 1910

County, circuit, town	Total Popula- tion	Hungarians		Germans		Rumanians		Others	
		Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%
County of Fogaras vm. Circuit of									
Alsórápás.....	23,333	764	3.3	723	3.1	21,506	92.6	250	1.0
Fogaras.....	21,623	561	2.6	125	0.6	20,694	95.7	243	1.1
Sárkány.....	23,270	964	4.2	933	4.2	20,884	89.7	439	1.9
Töröcsvár.....	20,369	820	4.0	402	2.0	19,088	93.7	59	0.3
Township with a reg. council									
Fogaras.....	6,579	3,357	51.0	1,003	15.3	2,174	33.1	45	0.6
Total	95,174	6,466	6.8	3,236	3.4	84,436	88.7	1,036	1.1
County of Háromszék vm. Circuit of.....									
Kézd.....	38,647	35,323	91.4	37	0.1	3,173	8.2	114	0.3
Miklósvár.....	19,681	16,809	85.4	60	0.3	2,779	14.1	33	0.2
Orba.....	23,734	24,449	82.2	197	0.7	4,451	15.0	637	2.1
Sepsi.....	45,274	32,608	72.0	128	0.3	12,402	27.4	138	0.3
Township with a reg. council									
Kézdivásárhely.....	6,079	5,970	98.3	37	0.6	50	0.8	22	0.3
Sepsiszentgyörgy.....	8,665	8,361	96.5	158	1.8	108	1.3	38	0.4
Total	148,080	123,518	83.4	617	0.4	22,963	15.5	982	0.7
County of Hunyad vm. Circuit of									
Algyógy.....	24,385	1,075	4.4	77	0.3	22,933	94.1	300	1.2
Brád.....	32,653	2,224	6.8	590	1.8	29,263	89.6	586	1.8
Deva.....	34,304	6,077	17.7	523	1.5	27,214	79.4	490	1.4
Hátszeg.....	43,893	2,200	5.0	235	0.7	40,681	92.7	727	1.6
Köröshánya.....	22,558	927	4.1	62	0.3	21,305	94.4	264	1.2
Marosillye.....	39,987	1,817	4.6	215	0.5	37,009	94.1	346	0.8
Petrozsény.....	50,015	20,994	42.0	3,309	6.6	22,878	44.8	3,334	6.6
Púj.....	10,276	806	5.3	84	0.5	14,991	92.1	335	2.1
Szászváros.....	23,936	1,817	6.3	609	2.4	26,071	90.1	349	1.2
Vajdahunyad.....	23,158	2,856	12.4	374	1.6	19,680	85.0	239	1.0

Township with a reg. council									
Déva.....	8,654	5,827	67.3	276	3.2	2,417	27.9	134	1.6
Hátság.....	3,124	1,458	46.0	136	4.4	1,514	48.4	36	1.2
Szászváros.....	7,672	2,145	28.0	1,294	16.9	3,821	49.8	412	5.3
Vajdahunyad.....	4,520	2,457	54.4	187	4.1	1,789	39.6	87	1.0
Total	840,135	52,720	15.5	8,101	2.4	271,675	79.9	7,639	2.2
County of Kis-Küküllő vm. Circuit of									
Diószentmárton.....	30,172	13,497	44.7	2,972	9.8	12,089	40.1	1,814	5.4
Erzsébetváros.....	30,435	6,891	21.3	10,716	35.2	11,961	39.3	1,267	4.2
Hosszúhaszó.....	25,048	3,011	11.5	5,908	22.7	15,985	61.4	1,149	4.4
Radnót.....	20,611	6,080	29.5	67	0.3	13,653	66.3	811	3.9
Township with a reg. council									
Diószentmárton.....	4,417	3,210	72.7	118	2.6	957	21.7	182	3.0
Erzsébetváros.....	4,408	2,813	59.3	498	11.2	940	21.3	359	8.2
Total	116,091	34,902	30.1	20,272	17.5	55,585	47.9	5,332	4.5
County of Kolozs vm. Circuit of									
Bánffyahunyad.....	47,286	14,041	29.7	153	0.3	32,810	69.4	282	0.6
Gyula.....	21,879	6,660	30.6	27	0.1	14,785	67.6	377	1.7
Hidalmás.....	23,150	4,071	17.6	113	0.5	18,339	79.2	627	2.7
Kolozsvár.....	37,448	9,316	24.9	91	0.2	27,380	73.1	961	1.8
Mezőörményes.....	19,355	2,137	10.9	101	0.5	10,887	56.3	240	1.2
Mocs.....	21,451	6,803	31.7	116	0.5	14,676	68.9	555	2.6
Nádiasmenti.....	17,959	9,348	52.1	25	0.2	8,340	46.4	245	1.3
Nagysármás.....	16,076	3,589	22.3	153	1.0	11,713	72.8	621	3.0

ACCORDING TO THE HUNGARIAN CENSUS OF 1910

County, circuit, town	Total Popula- tion	Hungarians		Germans		Rumanians		Others	
		Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%
Teke	23,137	3,079	13.3	5,927	25.6	13,079	56.6	1,052	4.5
Township with a reg. council									
Kolozs	4,138	2,271	54.9	3	0.0	1,808	43.7	56	1.4
Total	225,879	60,735	26.9	6,710	3.0	153,717	68.0	4,717	2.1
Municipal Town Kolozsvár	60,808	50,704	83.4	1,676	2.8	7,562	12.4	866	1.4
County of Maros-Torda vm. Circuit of									
Marosi alsó	38,734	23,927	74.7	133	0.3	8,250	21.3	1,424	3.7
Marosi felső	33,632	18,347	54.6	82	0.2	14,129	42.0	1,074	3.2
Nyárádszereda	36,823	35,279	95.8	98	0.3	1,287	3.5	159	0.4
Régeni alsó	40,545	13,886	34.3	1,478	3.7	24,011	59.2	1,170	2.8
Régeni felső	37,028	11,990	32.4	2,921	7.9	21,204	57.3	913	2.4
Township with a reg. council									
Szászrégen	7,310	2,947	40.3	2,994	41.0	1,311	18.0	58	0.7
Total	194,072	111,376	57.4	7,706	4.0	70,192	36.2	4,798	2.4
Municipal Town Marosvásárhely	25,517	22,790	89.3	606	2.4	1,717	6.7	404	1.6
County of Nagy-Kükül- lö vm. Circuit of									
Kőhalom	30,986	8,097	26.1	8,817	28.5	11,470	37.0	2,602	8.4
Medgyes	30,720	1,741	5.7	14,899	48.5	13,214	43.0	866	2.8
Nagysink	19,298	1,319	6.8	7,535	39.1	9,688	50.2	756	3.9
Segesvár	25,897	2,195	8.5	12,817	49.5	8,880	34.3	2,005	7.7
Szentágota	21,712	720	3.3	8,804	40.5	11,369	52.4	819	3.8

Township with a reg. council									
Medgyes	8,626	1,715	19.9	3,866	44.8	2,729	31.6	316	3.7
Segesvár	11,887	2,687	23.2	5,486	47.4	3,031	36.2	383	3.2
Total	148,826	18,474	12.4	62,224	41.8	60,381	40.6	7,747	5.2
County of Szeben vm. Circuit of									
Nagydisznád	29,512	795	2.7	5,590	18.7	22,385	75.9	802	2.8
Nagyszeben	25,029	206	0.8	11,442	45.7	12,987	52.0	894	3.5
Szászsebes	21,394	131	0.6	2,598	12.2	18,568	86.8	99	0.4
Szelistya	16,055	208	1.3	191	1.2	15,540	96.9	98	0.6
Szerdahely	26,517	265	1.0	5,842	22.0	19,987	75.4	423	1.6
Újgyház	16,441	427	2.6	4,977	30.3	10,403	63.3	634	3.8
Township with a reg. council									
Nagyszeben	33,489	7,252	21.7	16,832	50.3	8,924	26.3	581	1.7
Szászsebes	8,504	875	10.3	2,345	27.6	4,080	48.5	304	3.6
Total	176,921	10,159	5.7	40,757	23.1	113,672	64.8	3,333	1.9
County of Szolnok-Doboka vm. Circuit of									
Bethlen	37,232	8,379	22.5	2,417	6.5	26,020	69.9	416	1.1
Csákiórbó	31,532	1,601	5.1	419	1.3	29,275	92.9	237	0.7
Dés	44,364	8,734	19.7	739	1.7	34,095	76.8	796	1.8
Kápolnakegyháza	12,921	184	1.4	602	4.7	11,999	92.3	137	1.1
Kékes	25,755	7,375	28.7	493	1.9	17,492	67.9	395	1.6
Magyarláspos	30,975	4,863	15.7	872	2.8	24,878	80.3	362	1.2
Nagylónca	21,309	1,164	5.5	327	1.5	19,542	91.7	276	1.3
Szamosújvár	29,539	7,260	24.6	398	1.3	21,361	72.3	530	1.8
Township with a reg. council									
Dés	11,452	7,991	69.8	445	3.9	2,911	25.4	105	0.9
Szamosújvár	6,557	4,630	67.5	190	2.8	1,881	27.4	156	2.3
Total	251,936	62,181	20.7	6,902	2.7	189,448	75.2	5,410	1.4

[137]

ACCORDING TO THE HUNGARIAN CENSUS OF 1910

County, circuit, town	Total Popula- tion	Hungarians		Germans		Rumanians		Others	
		Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%
County of Torda-Aran- yos vm. Circuit of									
Alsójára	17,268	3,180	18.4	37	0.2	13,900	80.5	151	0.9
Felvincz	19,442	6,815	35.1	66	0.3	12,051	62.0	510	2.6
Marosludas	35,987	9,927	27.6	199	0.5	24,360	67.7	1,501	4.2
Topánfalva	34,278	279	0.8	34	0.1	33,735	98.4	230	0.7
Torda	33,503	10,188	30.4	112	0.4	22,515	67.2	688	2.0
Toroczkó	20,442	4,567	22.4	28	0.1	15,718	76.9	129	0.6
Township with a reg. council									
Torda	13,455	9,674	71.9	100	0.8	3,389	25.2	292	2.1
Total	174,375	44,630	25.6	576	0.3	125,688	72.1	3,501	2.0
County of Udvarhely vm. Circuit of									
Homoród	27,377	25,940	94.8	703	2.6	638	2.3	96	0.3
Parajd	15,479	15,411	99.6	26	0.2	28	0.2	14	0.0
Székelykeresztúr	34,193	31,255	91.4	758	2.2	1,847	5.4	393	1.0
Udvarhely	36,880	35,964	97.5	503	1.4	212	0.6	201	0.5
Township with a reg. council									
Székelyudvarhely	10,244	9,888	96.6	212	2.1	115	1.1	29	0.2
Total	124,173	118,458	95.4	2,202	1.8	2,840	2.3	673	0.5
Total of I	2,678,367	918,217	34.3	234,085	8.7	1,472,021	55.0	54,044	2.0

ACCORDING TO THE HUNGARIAN CENSUS 1910

County, circuit, town	Total Popula- tion	Hungarians		Germans		Rumanians		Others	
		Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%
II. This side the Király- hágó, North of the Maros.									
County of Máramaros vm. Circuit of									
Izavölgy.....	27,580	413	1.5	4,080	18.1	22,102	80.1	85	0.3
Sugatag.....	28,218	2,054	7.3	3,175	11.2	22,875	81.1	114	0.4
Sziget.....	43,067	8,309	19.3	7,928	18.4	17,242	40.0	9,588	22.3
Visó.....	44,206	1,815	4.1	13,276	30.1	19,863	44.9	9,252	20.9
Township with a reg. council									
Máramarossziget.....	21,370	17,542	82.1	1,257	5.9	2,001	9.4	570	2.6
Total	164,441	30,133	18.3	30,616	18.6	84,083	51.2	19,609	11.9
County of Ugocea vm. Circuit beyond the Tisza.....									
	46,066	25,105	53.4	1,714	3.7	9,721	20.7	10,426	22.2
County of Szatmár vm. Circuit of									
Avas.....	24,365	5,109	21.3	928	3.8	17,886	73.4	352	1.5
Csenger.....	28,809	27,134	93.9	16	0.1	1,667	5.7	82	0.3
Erdőd.....	31,711	13,526	42.7	3,527	11.1	14,449	45.6	209	0.6
Fehérgyarmat.....	31,631	31,518	99.6	54	0.2	23	0.1	36	0.1
Mátészalka.....	45,191	44,979	99.5	86	0.2	29	0.1	97	0.2
Nagybánya.....	30,584	4,626	15.1	172	0.6	25,008	83.8	178	0.5
Nagykároly.....	43,726	36,588	83.7	303	0.7	6,748	15.4	87	0.2
Nagysomkút.....	30,027	4,404	14.7	343	1.1	24,882	82.9	398	1.3
Szatmárnémeti.....	34,093	29,634	87.0	74	0.2	4,310	12.6	75	0.2
Szinérvárja.....	28,136	7,770	27.6	281	1.0	20,049	71.3	36	0.1

Township with a reg. council									
Felsőbánya.....	4,422	4,149	93.9	19	0.4	230	5.2	24	0.5
Nagybánya.....	12,877	9,992	77.6	175	1.4	2,677	20.8	33	0.2
Nagykároly.....	16,078	15,772	98.1	63	0.4	216	1.3	27	0.2
Total	361,740	235,291	65.1	6,041	1.7	118,774	32.8	1,634	0.4
Municipal Town									
Szatmárnémeti.....	34,892	33,094	94.9	629	1.8	986	2.8	183	0.5
County of Szilágy vm.									
Circuit of									
Kraszna.....	51,480	6,967	22.1	93	0.3	22,200	70.6	2,220	7.0
Szilágycseh.....	42,767	14,279	33.4	349	0.8	27,553	65.1	286	0.7
Szilágysomlyó.....	54,957	15,949	45.6	24	0.1	17,052	46.8	1,332	5.5
Tasnád.....	38,539	19,471	50.1	121	0.3	19,719	48.1	573	1.5
Zilah.....	37,644	12,636	38.6	110	0.3	24,401	64.8	497	1.3
Zsibó.....	29,456	4,503	15.3	50	0.3	24,574	83.4	299	1.0
Township with a reg. Council									
Szilágysomlyó.....	6,885	6,030	87.6	20	0.3	759	11.0	78	1.1
Zilah.....	8,062	7,477	92.7	19	0.2	529	6.6	37	0.5
Total	230,140	87,812	38.0	818	0.4	136,087	59.1	5,925	2.5

ACCORDING TO THE HUNGARIAN CENSUS OF 1910

[132]

County, circuit, town	Total Popu- lation	Hungarians		Germans		Rumanians		Others	
		Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%	Absolute Numbers	%
County of Bihar vm. Circuit of									
Belényes	49,711	8,399	16.9	89	0.2	40,890	82.3	338	0.6
Bél	19,590	1,174	6.0	109	0.6	17,847	91.4	400	2.0
Berettyóújfalú	33,666	31,633	94.0	33	0.1	1,935	5.7	65	0.2
Biharkeresztes	31,551	28,638	90.8	55	0.2	2,824	8.9	34	0.1
Cséffa	30,583	16,949	55.4	7	0.0	12,988	42.5	639	2.1
Derecske	25,468	25,412	99.8	28	0.1	21	0.1	7	0.0
Élesd	51,381	8,278	16.1	249	0.5	39,399	76.7	3,455	6.7
Érmihályfalva	28,068	25,072	89.3	55	0.2	2,928	10.5	13	0.0
Központi	47,516	21,789	45.9	638	1.3	24,465	51.5	624	1.3
Magyarcséke	31,254	2,239	7.2	62	0.1	28,517	91.3	416	1.4
Margitta	41,197	20,540	49.9	422	1.0	16,581	40.2	3,654	8.9
Nagyszalonta	47,486	35,214	74.2	99	0.2	11,794	24.9	379	0.7
Sárrét	23,913	23,836	99.7	7	0.0	68	0.3	2	0.0
Szalárd	26,523	16,683	62.9	92	0.3	9,194	34.7	559	2.1
Székelyhid	33,318	31,674	95.0	30	0.1	1,418	4.3	196	0.6
Tenke	31,614	8,558	27.1	89	0.3	22,666	71.7	301	0.9
Vaskoh	29,368	1,133	3.9	119	0.4	27,959	95.2	157	0.5
Total	582,132	307,221	52.8	2,183	0.4	261,494	44.9	11,234	1.9
Municipal Town									
Nagyvárad	64,169	58,421	91.1	1,416			5.6		
County of Arad vm. Cir- cuit of					2.2	3,604		728	1.1
Arad	39,385	10,374	26.4	8,916	22.6	19,934	50.6	161	0.4
Borosjenő	37,421	5,884	15.6	424	1.1	30,637	82.0	476	1.3
Borossches	36,443	3,783	10.4	306	0.8	32,008	87.9	346	0.9
Elek	34,209	9,405	27.5	9,945	29.1	11,826	34.6	3,033	8.8
Kisjenő	52,536	19,640	37.4	1,700	3.2	29,894	56.7	1,392	2.7
Magyarpécska	30,289	15,020	51.6	2,593	8.6	9,736	32.1	2,340	7.7
Máriaradna	34,453	2,938	8.5	1,334	3.9	29,854	86.7	327	0.9
Nagyhalmágy	21,030	561	2.7	18	0.1	20,322	96.6	129	0.6
Tornova	27,476	2,711	9.9	289	1.1	24,364	88.6	112	0.4
Világos	37,980	7,264	19.1	8,805	23.2	20,941	55.1	970	2.6
Total	351,222	78,130	22.2	34,330	9.8	229,476	65.3	9,286	2.7

[1931]

Municipal Town										
Arad.....	63,166	46,085	73.0	4,365	6.9	10,279	16.3	2,437	3.8	
County of Békés vm.										
Circuit of										
Békés.....	45,810	36,640	80.0	3,222	7.0	87	0.2	5,961	12.8	
Békéscsaba.....	46,930	17,305	36.9	237	0.5	313	0.7	29,025	61.9	
Gyula.....	14,790	10,707	72.4	85	0.6	2,967	20.1	1,031	6.9	
Township with a reg. council										
Gyula.....	24,284	19,808	81.6	1,581	6.5	2,540	10.5	355	1.4	
Total	131,814	84,460	64.1	5,175	3.9	5,907	4.5	36,272	27.5	
County of Csanád vm.										
Circuit of										
Battonya.....	53,750	26,433	49.2	337	1.0	3,168	9.4	3,812	7.1	
Központi.....	23,786	16,167	68.0	111	0.5	1,733	7.3	5,775	24.2	
Mezőkovácsháza.....	26,853	23,289	86.7	131	0.5	138	0.6	3,255	12.2	
Nagylak.....	25,941	8,415	32.5	206	0.8	8,837	34.1	8,483	32.6	
Township with a reg. council										
Makó.....	34,918	34,317	98.4	208	0.6	150	0.4	243	0.6	
Total	145,248	108,621	74.8	1,013	0.7	14,046	9.7	21,568	14.8	
Total of II	2,175,930	1,093,373	50.2	88,238	4.1	874,457	40.2	110,302	5.5	
Sum Total of I-II..	4,854,297	2,012,090	41.5	322,383	6.6	2,346,478	48.3	173,346	3.6	

**DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE BANAT
BY MOTHER TONGUE AND CONFESSION, ACCORDING TO THE
CENSUS OF 1910, BY CIRCUITS AND TOWNS
BY MOTHER TONGUE**

Counties, Circuits, Towns	Total Of Inhabitants	Number of Inhabitants of							Percentage of Inhabitants of								
		Hungarian	German	Slovak	Rumanian	Ruthenian	Croatian	Serbian	Other	Hungarian	German	Slovak	Rumanian	Ruthenian	Croatian	Serbian	Other
		Mother Tongue							Mother Tongue								
County of Krassó-Szörény vm. Districts Circuits																	
Bégs.	23,925	5,626	962	57	16,997	—	19	21	243	23.6	4.0	0.2	71.0	—	0.1	0.1	1.0
Bokaszbánya.	95,458	2,648	4,189	748	27,747	8	9	151	968	7.3	11.5	2.0	76.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.7
Bozovics.	29,795	350	896	7	27,621	1	—	38	1,482	1.2	1.3	0.0	92.4	0.0	—	0.1	5.0
Facsád.	24,895	3,979	724	47	19,952	36	1	32	144	16.0	2.9	0.2	80.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.6
Ján.	35,593	723	655	2	32,226	—	1	1,321	360	2.1	1.8	0.0	91.4	—	0.0	3.7	1.0
Karásnebes.	35,802	898	3,069	338	30,756	41	17	14	670	2.5	8.6	0.9	85.9	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.9
Lugos.	21,084	777	3,378	58	16,037	530	1	45	258	3.7	16.0	0.9	76.1	2.5	0.0	0.2	1.2
Maros.	20,807	749	161	11	19,700	—	5	9	182	3.6	0.7	0.1	94.7	—	0.0	0.0	0.9
Oraviczbánya.	44,608	1,856	12,437	598	27,890	86	59	810	1,372	4.2	27.9	1.9	62.3	0.2	0.1	0.7	3.1
Orsova.	23,237	2,629	2,884	56	19,420	1	101	1,707	1,439	9.3	10.2	0.2	68.9	0.0	0.4	6.0	5.1
Resiczabánya.	49,934	3,031	11,819	373	25,583	43	25	171	8,667	6.1	23.7	1.1	61.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	17.4
Temes.	25,915	1,193	2,364	232	19,242	1,593	26	41	724	4.6	11.1	0.9	74.3	6.1	0.1	0.1	2.8
Teregova.	33,182	436	3,032	5	29,461	9	6	13	220	1.3	9.2	0.0	88.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7
Újoldova.	25,195	604	753	12	13,228	1	19	10,513	3,065	2.1	2.7	0.0	46.9	0.0	0.1	37.3	10.9
Towns																	
Karásnebes.	7,999	1,413	2,419	35	3,916	2	13	67	132	17.7	30.2	0.4	49.0	0.0	0.2	0.8	1.7
Lugos.	19,818	6,875	6,161	127	6,227	5	15	221	197	34.7	31.1	0.6	31.4	0.0	0.1	1.1	1.0
Total	466,147	33,787	55,883	2,908	336,062	2,351	519	14,874	20,143	7.3	12.0	0.6	72.1	0.5	0.1	3.1	4.8

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE BANAT

Counties, Circuits, Towns	Total Of Inhabitants Hungarian	Number of Inhabitants of								Percentage of Inhabitants of							
		Hungarian	German	Slovak	Rumanian	Ruthenian	Croatian	Servian	Other	Hungarians	German	Slovak	Rumanian	Ruthenian	Croatian	Servian	Other
		Mother Tongue								Mother Tongue							
County of Temea varmegye Districts Circuits																	
Buziásfűrűdö . . .	35,702	0,277	5,054	667	22,820	—	5	88	251	17.0	15.8	1.9	93.8	—	0.0	0.2	0.7
Csák	30,479	2,949	8,992	73	17,370	—	8	621	400	9.7	29.5	0.3	57.0	—	0.0	2.0	1.5
Delta	28,495	5,722	9,140	579	9,701	—	58	1,943	1,366	20.1	32.1	2.0	34.1	—	0.1	0.8	4.8
Fehértéplom . .	30,831	909	4,791	42	8,234	—	0	20,987	1,862	2.5	13.0	0.1	22.4	—	0.0	57.0	5.0
Kevevára	35,482	5,355	6,587	42	5,705	2	31	10,795	965	15.1	18.0	0.1	16.1	0.0	0.1	47.3	2.7
Központ	40,372	6,092	22,695	90	10,109	0	0	897	537	13.1	48.8	0.2	34.8	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.2
Lippa	34,833	2,793	10,640	32	21,215	—	4	74	159	7.8	30.0	0.1	60.9	—	0.0	0.2	0.4
Temerékas . . .	35,953	5,402	5,576	600	19,748	5	40	3,144	1,352	15.2	15.5	1.7	55.0	0.0	0.1	8.8	3.7
Újarad	34,117	3,071	19,319	138	9,289	1	3	2,036	260	9.0	56.0	0.4	27.2	0.1	0.0	6.0	0.8
Vercez	30,978	3,422	8,005	194	18,174	—	2	5,531	1,059	9.3	23.3	0.5	49.1	—	0.0	15.0	2.8
Vinga	34,104	4,343	12,670	107	10,408	—	2	3,711	2,863	12.7	37.2	0.3	30.5	—	0.0	10.9	8.4
Town																	
Fehértéplom . .	11,524	1,213	6,062	42	1,800	3	19	1,994	385	10.5	52.0	0.4	15.7	0.0	0.2	17.3	3.3
Total	400,910	47,518	120,083	2,612	100,585	17	164	57,821	11,510	11.9	30.1	0.6	40.1	0.0	0.0	14.4	2.9
Municipal towns																	
Temevár	72,555	28,552	31,644	341	7,500	4	148	3,482	818	39.4	43.0	0.5	10.4	0.0	0.2	4.8	1.1
Vercez	27,370	3,800	13,550	127	879	0	38	8,602	269	14.2	49.0	0.5	3.2	0.0	0.1	31.4	1.0

[197]

County of Torontól vármegye																	
Districts																	
Circuits																	
Alibunár.....	29,292	588	755	988	14,982	—	6	11,793	180	2.0	2.6	3.4	51.1	—	0.0	40.9	0.6
Antalfalva.....	47,044	5,957	1,849	8,623	5,442	—	365	24,530	278	12.7	3.0	18.3	11.6	—	0.8	52.1	0.6
Bánlak.....	27,667	6,885	8,403	823	6,637	—	78	4,503	838	23.1	30.4	2.9	24.0	—	0.9	16.3	3.0
Csene.....	20,036	8,736	16,408	9	3,626	—	714	5,765	618	12.1	53.3	0.0	11.7	—	2.3	18.6	2.0
Módos.....	27,048	4,685	9,905	61	3,877	3	905	6,959	659	17.3	36.6	0.2	14.4	0.0	3.4	25.7	2.4
Nagybecskerek.	64,716	8,573	16,485	3,265	10,581	—	673	14,445	793	15.7	30.1	6.0	19.3	—	1.1	26.4	1.4
Nagykikinda...	35,009	7,296	9,875	5	238	1	4	15,351	237	22.1	30.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	46.5	0.7
Nagyszentmiklós	43,442	10,982	12,921	125	10,239	1	2	2,880	6,342	25.3	29.7	0.3	23.6	0.0	0.0	6.51	4.6
Pancsova.....	47,877	3,148	15,573	1,045	10,735	—	1,277	14,930	1,169	6.6	32.6	2.2	22.4	—	2.7	31.2	2.4
Párdány.....	27,171	6,098	7,153	13	4,007	—	21	9,708	171	22.5	26.3	0.1	14.7	—	0.1	33.7	0.6
Perjámos.....	30,334	1,852	16,692	80	8,218	1	7	3,416	568	4.5	55.0	0.2	27.1	0.0	0.0	11.3	1.9
Törökbecse.....	48,404	14,136	1,054	10	110	1	3	32,938	212	29.2	2.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	68.0	0.4
Törökkanizsa...	47,639	24,961	2,961	294	2,058	1	5	17,099	260	52.4	6.2	0.6	4.3	0.0	0.0	35.9	0.3
Zsombolya.....	46,904	12,026	25,552	50	4,643	—	21	3,687	925	25.7	34.5	0.1	9.9	—	0.0	7.9	1.9
Towns																	
Nagybecskerek.	26,006	9,148	6,311	456	339	1	74	8,984	243	35.2	26.2	1.7	1.3	0.0	0.3	34.4	0.9
Nagykikinda...	26,795	5,968	6,855	52	436	1	13	14,148	322	22.3	21.8	0.2	1.6	0.0	0.1	32.8	1.2
Total	594,343	125,041	156,312	15,809	86,168	10	4,068	191,036	13,809	21.0	26.6	2.7	14.5	0.0	0.7	32.2	2.3
Municipal Town																	
Pancsova.....	20,808	3,364	7,467	244	769	1	135	8,714	114	16.2	35.9	1.2	3.7	0.0	0.6	41.9	0.5
Total	1,682,133	242,152	337,345	22,131	592,049	2,392	4,872	284,329	46,663	15.3	24.5	1.4	37.4	0.1	0.3	18.0	3.0

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