

THE
HISTORY
OF
GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S
CONQUEST
OF
SCINDE.

BY
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR W. F. P. NAPIER.

DEDICATED
TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE.

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NOTICE.

SOME repetitions, and passages having a prospective reference, will be met with in the first and second portions of this work, because they were originally published separately, at long intervals. They are retained however as indicating the persevering enmity of men in power towards Sir C. Napier.

Alterations in the original text have also been made, touching the character and actions of Sir James Outram and Colonel Jacob of the Scinde horse; because subsequent knowledge has furnished proof that the merit attributed to them rested for the most part on their own assurances, which are not to be credited, inasmuch as both men have since shewn themselves to be systematic vaunters.

LIST OF PLANS.

- No. I.—Central Asia.
- No. II.—Scinde.
- No. III.—Scinde.
- No. IV.—Battle of Meeanee.
- No. V.—Hydrabad and its vicinity.
- No. VI.—Battle of Hydrabad.

APPENDIX.

I.

THE trustees of the British Museum, through their secretary Mr. Forshall, have denied ever giving directions to cut the statue of Sesostris, or any other statue in Egypt, for the ease of transport. Such directions may however have been given without their knowledge by subordinates—my statement was derived by Sir C. Napier from Dr. Abbot of Cairo, whose collection of Egyptian antiquities is so well known to travellers.—W. NAPIER.

II.

LETTERS FROM SIR C. NAPIER.

16th January, 1843. I found the Ameers and our Government in the position which a treaty made by Lord Auckland placed them. I had no concern with its justice, its propriety, or any thing but *to see it maintained*. I found that all the politicals had gone on, from the beginning, trifling; sometimes letting the Ameers infringe the treaty without notice, at others pulling them up, and then dropping the matter: in short I saw it was a long chain of infringement, denial, apology, pardon, over and over. I therefore resolved not to let this, which old Indians call "*knowing the people*," go on; and I wrote to the Ameers, saying, I would not allow it to continue; they of course continued their game and I, as I had threatened, reported the infringements to Lord Ellenborough, who agreed with me, that their irritating, childish mischievous secret warfare and intrigue should not continue. And as letters from the Ameers were

intercepted, proposing to other powers to league and drive us out of Scinde, Lord Ellenborough thought, and I think justly, that a new treaty should be entered into, which he sent me. I had laid before him the proposal, and I think my treaty was a more fair treaty, at least a more liberal treaty than his; but I do not, as far as I have been able to consider it, think his unjust. Mind, I always reason upon affairs as Lord Ellenborough and myself *found them*. I cannot enter upon our right to be *here at all*, that is Lord Auckland's affair. Well! I presented the draft of the new treaty. The Ameers bowed with their usual apparent compliance, but raised troops in all directions. These I was ordered by the Governor-General to disperse. To disperse irregular troops, they having a desert at their back and four hundred miles of river to cross and run up the mountains; and all this with their chiefs swearing they submitted to everything to get me into the *hot* weather, when I could not move, and thus cut off all our communications at their ease, was no trifle. In short it was to attack a "*Will-o'-the-wisp*." Every man is armed to the teeth, and armies of great strength could assemble and disperse like wildfire.

Sukkur, 16th and 17th December, 1842. I am ordered to take a considerable portion of the territory which belongs to the Ameers or Princes of Scinde, who have been plotting to turn us out by a simultaneous attack in concert with various allies: there are many of these princes, some are with us, some adverse. *My object is to save bloodshed.*

I have cut off the communication between the Ameers and the ceded districts and their town of Roree. So I shall effect what I am ordered to do, and, unless they attack me, no blood will be spilled. I can produce a war in two hours if I like it, but I want to prevent it and trust in God I shall. I am the only man in camp who does not wish for war with the Ameers, and their own peasantry detest them and are longing for us. But still they collect great numbers of Beloochees and other warlike tribes of the mountains: these robbers form their armies, and their deserts are difficult, and there are great jungles in the deserts. So it is necessary to

be careful. A very little rashness might invoke disaster for my small army: and as it is, I have near nine hundred sick with fever. I shall move across the river in three days. I am only waiting to arrange the defence of my camp here against the tribes from Larkaana, who, it is said, mean to attack it the moment I move over to Roree and am engaged with the Ameers. If they do it will be worse for them! I feel I am their master in every thing but numbers. How our troops got defeated by these tribes is to me inconceivable!

March, 1842. I mourn over the whole thing. I hate bloodshed. I did all I could to prevent it as my conduct will prove, and as every officer in this army knows; for they used to say, "The General is the only man in camp who does not wish for a battle." The Ameers are the greatest ruffians I ever met with, without an exception; however I have only obeyed my orders.

III.

ON THE AMEER ROOSTUM.

Sir C. Napier to Major Outram, 11th February, 1843.

Roostum's plea of being sent to Ali Moorad by me is a shallow affair, because, in the first place, he sent a secret message (by Moyadeen, I think Brown told me) to say he was to all intents a prisoner in Kyrpoor, and that he tried to send away his family, and was obliged to bring them back after they were on the road, and that he would escape and come to my camp. Brown knows all this matter. The messenger said, he, Roostum, would do whatever I advised. My answer was, "Take your brother's advice — go to him, and either stay with him, or *I will escort you to my camp.*" His flying from his brother's camp proves that he was not a prisoner. His not flying to mine, proves either his *duplicity* or his *imbecility*. I believe the latter, but imbecility is not a legitimate excuse for Rulers! I have only to deal with his acts. He played you the same trick. He even now stands

out! He cannot say Ali Moorad still influences him! I believed he did at first, but he does not *now*; and I am half inclined *now* to doubt the former fact, though I did not do so at first. But as I said, the intrigues of these people are nothing to me; only I will not let his cunning attempt to cast his conduct on my advice pass. He went *contrary* to my advice, and now wants to make out that he went *by it*.

December 1843. Outram told me what a fine fellow Ali Moorad was; how frank and open, and a thorough friend of ours; adhering to his treaty honestly, as indeed he has done up to this moment. Well! I was quite new to them all, and one night, 18th of December, 1842, a secret message came to me from Roostum, to say, he was a prisoner among his family, and they forced him to act against the English; he begged of me to receive him in my camp, for he was helpless. I wrote to him the above letter [given in the text, chapter VI, advising him to go to his brother, &c. &c.] He did go to his brother, and then would not see me! I really know not what I am found fault with for. He did not take my advice, he only took a part. Now if I advised him to take a seidlitz powder, and he drank only the *acid* powder, he could have no right to complain that I gave him a pain in his belly. But this is exactly what Roostum did. He went to Ali Moorad as I advised; but he neither remained with him as I advised, nor came to me as I advised. He made over everything to Ali Moorad and then fled, and proclaimed that he was forced! The formal way in which he made all over to Ali has been proved in detail, and is in the hands of Government: it was also submitted to the Mahomedan College by order of the Governor-General, and the College pronounced it perfectly correct in all particulars.

Now, why did not Roostum meet me? If he was forced as he pretends, why not tell me? "Oh!" said Outram, "he was afraid. Ali Moorad made him think you were going to put him in prison." My answer was, "Why should he think so? There was not the slightest motive; but if he did fear it at Dejee, that was no excuse for his not meeting me when I overtook him on the march to

Emaum Ghur. When I had force to seize him and all that were with him; and when instead of doing so I sent you, Outram, his friend of four years, to invite him to come to my tent, and you returned with his two sons, and brought me a message, that he was so *tired* he could not come himself. He could have no fear then." To this Outram said, "Oh! Ali has bribed all about him." This was nonsense; he had humbugged Outram.

Well! after Emaum Ghur, Outram again met him on the road to Kyrpoor, and he agreed to meet Outram there the next day to discuss the treaty, but was again *so tired* that he advised Outram to ride on and he would follow early next morning. Off went Outram, duped; and the moment he was out of sight, Roostum ordered his baggage to be packed, and marched that night with all his treasure and seven thousand men, who he had kept out of sight of Outram, and also two pieces of cannon; and he never stopped till he got to Khoonhera, sixty miles from Hydrabad, where he had land, and a fort, which he held until I captured him! Here you see my conduct was all clear.

I wished to have *one* man to deal with instead of a *dozen*, and that dozen in the hands of an old fox, Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, the sworn enemy of the English, and working to form a coalition to fall on us with Beloochees, Affghans, and Seiks united, to the number of two hundred thousand men; I having but seven thousand in Scinde, and those divided between Kurrachee and Sukkur, five hundred miles asunder! I wished the younger brother to be the minister of the other, the Mayor of the Palace, the King being an imbecile old fool, full of useless cunning and in the hands of a clever knave and some six or seven violent young men. When I found Roostum had resigned the Turban to his brother I was opposed to it; because, at first, I thought it would produce war, and I sent to Ali Moorad to advise him not to take it. His answer was, "he could not give it up; that it had been solemnly given by his brother with all legal formality, and he neither could nor would give it back." I had in the mean time reflected upon the matter, and was convinced Ali was right. It made the matter a decided one,

whereas the old idiot would constantly, by his cunning tricks, prevent Ali doing what was necessary. Thinking it was voluntary, I offered no opposition, but sought a meeting with old noodle to ascertain from his own lips that it was voluntary.

I never advised him to give up the Turban, I consented to it because I thought it would prevent bloodshed; indeed, it mattered little whether I consented or not, for it was done before I knew of it, and Ali Moorad refused to undo it at my request. He proved right; for, as the sequel shewed, Roostum would have bolted, and used his power as "*Rais*" against us with some appearance of justice. I mean, that holding the Chieftaincy he could have sanctioned acts which might have embarrassed us; for the Mahomedans think much of whoever holds the title. . . . The more this question is discussed about Roostum the better, because my conduct was quite honest. I advised Roostum to be *guided* by Ali Moorad. I never forced him to do anything. I never advised him to give up the Turban, when I heard he had I tried to prevent it, and when I could not prevent it I sought an interview with him, to be certain the old man had not been forced or ill used by Ali. But he fled of his own free will. This is the whole story.

I was very much afraid of the old man being killed in the attack of Kyrpoor if the people defended it, and I knew this would be vexatious, and give a handle for abuse of all sorts from the infamous Indian press, than which the whole world cannot produce one more rascally. Besides, I pitied the old man. I thought he was the victim of his son, who wanted to get the Turban against all law and right, and who, for aught I knew, might kill him on purpose in the row! They are capable of this, any one of them.

Ali Moorad to Sir C. Napier, October 9th, 1843.

Meer Roostum Khan, a week before he granted me the Turban and territory, importuned me to accept them, saying, that none of his sons appeared qualified to possess

the Turban and rule the country; and that I should therefore take possession of the Turban and territory from him. He deputed to me at Kote Dehuj, his eldest son Meer Mohamed Hoossein, Meer Nusseer Khan, Futteh Ghoree, Peer Ali Gohur, and certain other confidential persons to solicit me earnestly to accept the Turban and territory. At last he came in person, bound the Turban with his own hands and of his own accord around my head, made the entry in the Koran of his having granted me the whole of his country, sealed it and ratified it with his seal and signature, and thus distinctly made over his country to me.

How is it possible then that I should have used coercive measures to obtain possession of the country, since I had not even preferred a request to obtain it?

*Note by the Secretary to the Government of India,
August 30th, 1843.*

Sir C. Napier adverts to the legal bearing of the deed under which Meer Roostum abdicated in favour of Meer Ali Moorad.

It had been represented to Sir C. Napier, that every chief is master of his own property, none of which can be entailed; that the will of the possessor decides who is to have the land; that if he gives it to his children, he may, in virtue of his paternal power, revoke that gift; but that if he gives it to a chief who is his equal, and over whom he has no paternal power, the deed is final.*

It is quite correct that every person is master of his own property, and that there can be no entail:—he may give it to whom he chooses. The gift, when possession has been obtained by the donee, is complete. It can, however, be cancelled, under certain circumstances; but one of the barriers to cancelling a gift, is relationship within the prohibited degrees. A gift therefore to a son cannot be cancelled any more than to a brother.* If made to a person

* Vide Macnaghten's *Principles of Mahomedan Law*, chap. v. par. 13, p. 51; Hamilton's *Hedaya*, vol. iii. p. 302.

not a husband or wife, nor within the prohibited degrees, it may in certain cases be cancelled.

Sovereign power is not however considered property according to the Mahomedan law, nor is it regulated by the laws which govern the transfer of property, whether real or personal, for there is no distinction between the two. The legal title to sovereign power amongst the orthodox Mahomedans of the Soonee sect, rests upon the election of the chiefs or people; but, as there are few Sovereigns who could bear to have their titles subjected to this test, much ingenuity has been exercised by lawyers to accommodate their system to modern usage. The accompanying opinions by the doctors of the Mahomedan college of Calcutta are a fair specimen of the kind of arguments which can be brought forward. There is no reason to suppose the opinions to be otherwise than sound and correct. It is customary to refer to the law officers of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, when a legal opinion is wanted; but there is only one such officer now entertained in the court, and the post happens at the present time to be vacant. By referring to the college, the unanimous opinion of ten doctors has been obtained: some of them are very able men, and all of them are well informed on the subject.

It will be seen that the opinions given lead to the same result as was represented to Sir C. Napier, though there is no ground for the possible distinctions which were supposed to exist. The abdication of Meer Roostum is complete and irrevocable; the assumption of the power by Meer Ali Moorad is also complete, and recognized by law.

J. THOMASON.

Questions and Answers respecting the legal effect of the transactions between Meer Roostum and Ali Moorad.

Ques. 1.—The ruler of a country died and left his country and forts to his sons. They divided the country and forts amongst them, and each obtained full possession of his own portion. After a time, one of the sons gave,

and made over to his brother, his country, forts, and power. In this case, can the donor recall his gift of country, forts, and power?

Ans.—The donor cannot recall his gift, because, when he has once removed the country, and power, and forts, from his own control, and made them over to his brother, he is necessarily divested of all authority, and becomes one of the subjects of the state. Thus no option of recalling his gift remains. Such is ruled in the books, but God knows what is right.

Ques. 2.—What proof do you adduce that the ruler of a country cannot legally retract his gift to his brother, of his forts and country, and that he becomes thenceforward one of the subjects of the Government?

Ans.—There are two foundations of all authority and kingly power,—

1st. The consent of the nobles and chiefs to the supremacy of any one.

2nd. Obedience to his orders, in consequence of the establishment of his power and his supremacy. It is thus laid down in the *Buhur-oor-rayik*, in the chapter on Judicial Decrees, and in the *Kazee Khan*, in the chapter on Apostacy. “A king obtains his power by two means:—first, by consent to his accession, and this consent must be on the part of the nobles and chiefs of the nation; and, secondly, by the obedience of the people to his orders, from fear of his power and superiority. But if men consent to his accession, and yet no obedience is paid to his orders, from his inability to enforce them, he does not become a king. If, on the other hand, he become king by common consent, and then turn oppressor, still, if his power and authority be confirmed, he cannot be deposed, for if sentence of deposition were passed, he would yet remain king by his power and strength, and the sentence would be ineffectual; but, if he have no power and authority, then he would be deposed.” Now, since in these troublous times discord is the common practice, and union is seldom procured, therefore the learned men of later times have agreed upon this, that in the present day, power and supremacy is the test

of kingly authority. It is thus laid down in the *Fatawa-i-Alumgiri* and the *Khuza-nutool-Mooftiem*, in the chapter on Judicial Decrees, "and in our time authority depends on superiority; and we do not inquire whether kings be just or unjust, because all of them seek after temporal power."

It is gathered from the drift of the question, that the ruler in question was actually possessed of power and supremacy; and whereas he gave over to his brother his country and power and forts, and divested himself of his supremacy and dignity, with all their attendant circumstances and pomp, and made these over to the donee, it follows that this gift and transfer could not have been made, without the deposition of himself. Thus necessarily the donor becomes completely deposed, and this may be gathered from a remark of Hunavee upon a passage in the *Ushbah*. The passage in the *Ushbah* is to the following effect: "A king died, and the people consented to the succession of his minor son. It is necessary that the affairs of the administration be made over to a regent, and that this regent consider himself a dependent on the son of the king, on account of the superior rank of the latter. Now the son is the king ostensibly, but the regent is king in reality." Upon this passage Hunavee has remarked, "The object of this arrangement is to meet the necessity for a renewal of the administration after his coming of age, for this cannot (legally) take place, except when the ruler has effected his own deposition, because a king cannot (legally) be deposed, except by his own act."

The ruler who makes the transfer, and is thus deposed, becomes one of the subjects of the realm: and this is established by a passage in the *Hedaya*, on the resignation of a judge,—“On account of the resignation, the power reverts to the people, and therefore he no longer retains the option of recalling his resignation.”

MOOHUMMED WUJEEB, *First Professor, Mahomedan College.*

MOHUMMUD BUSHIRUDDIN, *Second Professor, Mahomedan College.*

NOOROOLLUCK, *Third Professor, Mahomedan College.*

MAHUMMUD IBRAHIM, *Fourth Professor, Mahomedan College.*

ABDOORUHREM, *Professor of Indian Law and Regulations.*

GHOOLAM HOOSSEIN, *First Assistant.*

MAHUMMUD MUZHEER, *Second Assistant.*

HUBEEB-OOL-NUBBEE, *Third Assistant.*

UJEEB AHMUD, *Moulvee of the Law Examination Committee.*

HUMUD KUBEER, *Secretary to the College Committee.*

IV.

Sir C. Napier on conversations between himself and Major Outram.

Outram.—"Ali Moorad is by far the best of the Ameers. I wish you knew him. He is good looking, a frank open manner that you cannot help liking. I wish you could see him, you would be pleased with him. At first he was quite opposed to us, and would have made war against us if the other Ameers had joined him, however seeing it was of no use to oppose us, he joined the alliance with us, and is the only one who has never given us cause of complaint. I am sure you will like him."

Napier.—I believed all that Major Outram said as far as a certain point; that is to say, that Ali Moorad was a superior description of barbarian; but I had too much experience of barbarian chiefs to have much confidence in the best of them. They may be naturally very superior men, but the best of them is, and must be under control of the petty chiefs who surround them; and however strong their own minds may be, the physical force which these

petty chiefs command is too powerful to be resisted, and consequently, however naturally honest the great chief may be, you can never be sure of any engagement you enter into with him being fulfilled; unless that engagement involves the good wishes of the minor chiefs, or that you have power to force both him and them to a steady line of conduct. I therefore could not altogether confide in Major Outram's admiration of Ali Moorad: but it so far influenced me as to make me believe that he was the best among the Ameers of Kyrpoor to hold the rule in Upper Scinde.

Outram.—"The great agitator and cause of all opposition to the English is a scoundrel named Futteh Mohamed Ghoree. I have tried to catch this old villain, but he is such a cunning fox, that there is no discovering any fact which I can lay hold of. But allow me to put you on your guard against him, for he is the secret mover of all the breaches of treaty and insults that we have received from the northern Ameers: the Syud Mohamed Shurreef whom I caught with so much trouble was merely one of this old villain's emissaries."

Napier.—These observations of Major Outram, I considered as the result of long experience in the petty politics of Scinde. I scarcely knew Major Outram then, but his public character and position gave me a right to confide in his opinion. I therefore assumed upon his authority, that Ali Moorad was the man to look to, and Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, the man to be watched in any transactions I might have with the Ameers. *It is curious, that within a month or six weeks of this time, Ali Moorad being then Rais, and Futteh Mohamed Ghoree a prisoner, there was no term of abuse too strong in Major Outram's opinion for Ali Moorad! and the Major asked me to let Futteh Mohamed Ghoree loose! having himself before told me that this man ruled Meer Roostum; that he was the bitter enemy of the British, the most intriguing and dangerous man to our interests in all Scinde!* This dangerous man he would have had me let loose at the most critical juncture of affairs that ever existed between us and the Ameers; namely, at the moment of my return from Emaum Ghur, when I had summoned a general meet-

ing of the Ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde, personally or by their vakeels, to discuss the new treaty: the question of peace or war being in the balance! Futteh Mohamed ruled the majority of the Ameers of Kyrpoor, and yet Major Outram wanted me to let him loose! If Major Outram wanted to secure our having war, such a step was likely to accomplish it. I positively refused to agree to it, and was in utter astonishment at Outram being so shortsighted as to propose it, which he did at the request of Meer Roostum!

Now let us consider how the elevation of Ali Moorad to the Turban took place.

First, I will give two extracts from Major Outram's letter to the Government of India, dated 21st April, 1842.

1st Extract. "Even were not right so clearly in Ali Moorad's favour, I should have been loth to advise the attempt to dispossess him in favour of any other party of what he now holds; for it could only be done at the risk of considerable disturbance, Meer Ali Moorad being by far the most powerful, influential, and able of all the Upper Scinde Ameers; on which account, so far from wishing to weaken his power, I would consider it politic to strengthen him, at least by our countenance and guarantee to such a degree as will induce his assuming the chieftainship in Upper Scinde without opposition on the demise of Roostum Khan."

2nd Extract. "My opinion is that it would be both just and politic to support Meer Ali Moorad: the public recognition of whom, and investiture with the Turban, by the British representative when Meer Roostum dies, most probably would at once put an end to the intrigues of other parties for that distinction; and at any rate Meer Ali Moorad would not be likely to require further support, than merely the countenance of the British Government. Whereas, as he would not under any circumstances relinquish what he deems his right, and is powerful enough to maintain his own cause against the power of the other party, we should have to support the latter with troops did we espouse their cause."

Major Outram here speaks of the death of Meer Roostum, but his resignation of the Turban, whether to Ali

Moorad or to his son Hoossein Ali, was the same thing: it was the cessation of Meer Roostum's wear of the Turban.

My mind being imbued with the substance of this letter and Major Outram's conversations, made me accept with pleasure an invitation from his Highness Ali Moorad, to meet him at Roree. After some time had passed in general conversation in the Dhurbar, his Highness invited me to retire with him and his vakeel into a private apartment of the tent. Lieutenant Brown was with me, and the following conversation took place:

Ali Moorad.—"My brother Meer Roostum is about to give the Turban to his son Meer Mohamed Hoossein. By the laws of Scinde, if he dies, I inherit the Turban. If he abdicates he can only legally do so in my favour—he has no right to pass me over, and place the Turban on the head of my nephew. I am willing to obey him, but I will not allow him to give the Turban to any one else—what I want to know from you General, is, if we quarrel, do you mean to assist Meer Roostum or not? I am determined to assert my right. I have force enough to do so if you will be neuter, but at any rate—I am determined to maintain my right by force of arms whether you agree to it or not."

Sir C. Napier.—"I will certainly give you assistance to take the Turban from your *nephew*, but not from your *brother*. By treaty we are obliged to support the Ameers in their respective rights, one against the other. My duty here is to maintain the treaties, and you may be sure of my doing so in your case in all lawful rights.

Ali Moorad.—"That is all I want. I wish my brother to keep the Turban, and I will obey him; but I will not allow him to give it to any one else.

"I have great affection for my elder brother. I am ready at all times to obey him, and I always have obeyed him, but he has become so weak and vacillating that if you go into his room and make any arrangement with him, however important it may be, he will change it all, if the next person that goes in thinks fit to propose another scheme. Now, as Futteh Mohamed Ghoree is always with him, and always making war upon me, I am obliged to de-

fend myself, not against my brother but against Futteh Mohamed Ghorce, who controls him in every thing. I am determined not to let Futteh Mohamed wear the Turban, and I will not obey his orders. I am much stronger than my brother's family. I beat them lately in battle. Every body knows I can take the Turban if I choose by force, but I don't want it: I wish my brother to remain chief."

Embued by Major Outram with a good opinion of Ali Moorad, of whom all the English with whom I conversed at Sukkur held the same opinion, I gave credit to what he said, because I knew the mischievous character of Futteh Ghoree, and the imbecility of Roostum was proverbial. Soon after, a message arrived from Roostum, claiming my protection against the intrigues of his own family; this offered an opportunity of having one man to deal with, instead of a faction with which it was impossible for a civilized government to deal, and into whose intrigues, with due respect to Major Outram and his predecessors, I considered it undignified for a great government to enter, and from the first I determined not to enter into them. I was resolved, when there was a breach of treaty, whether great or small, I would hold *all* the Ameers responsible, and would not be played off like a shuttlecock, and told *this* was done by one Ameer, *that* by another, and so have a week's inquiry to find out who was responsible for aggression; for I at once saw, on arriving at Scinde, that this hide and seek, shifting responsibility, was the game which the Ameers had been playing. The proposal of Meer Roostum to come into my camp offered me an easy remedy for this evil, and having adopted the high opinion of Ali Moorad entertained by Major Outram, I had no hesitation in recommending his brother to seek his protection and be advised by him: but it must be borne in mind as a matter of first importance, and one upon which the gist of the thing depends, that, while advising Roostum to be guided by his brother, I, having suspicion, despite the high character given by Major Outram of Ali Moorad, that some intrigue *must* be going on, gave Meer Roostum not only the option of coming, but an invitation to come to my camp, and to put himself under my protection. I use the word *must*, because it is

utterly impossible for me to believe that any Eastern divan can act without intrigue.

By my advice to Roostum, which was not given until asked, I offered to him the honourable and powerful protection of the British Government. This he did not choose to accept. He went to his brother, and then he fled from that brother with his usual vacillating imbecility, an imbecility I believe to have been produced by his long habits of drunkenness; for he is said never to be sober after mid-day. That this flight was caused by Ali Moorad, as Major Outram affirms, I do not now believe. I have neither seen nor heard of any thing to make me believe it. He deceived Major Outram twice in the same manner, if not oftener. Thus, when he promised to meet Major Outram at Kyrpoor next morning, but walked off to the south with a large armed force and his treasure, he could not have been influenced by Ali Moorad, who was then far off with me in the desert. He had played me the same trick on my first arrival at Sukkur, long before there was any question of a new treaty and when Ali Moorad could have no interest to prevent our meeting.

When I heard he had resigned the Turban to Ali Moorad I disapproved of it, and Mr. Brown will recollect my sending Ali Moorad's vakeel back to him with this message. I even recommended him to return the Turban and act as his brother's Lieutenant. His answer was the deed had been executed in due form, before all the Moolahs or Priests, and it was impossible to alter it. I had nothing to reply. I had no business to interfere with the private arrangements of the Ameers. I was authorized to give advice when asked. I was obliged by existing treaties to give protection to any Ameer whose rights were invaded by another; but I was not called upon to originate a complaint when none was made to me, and especially in a case, which, whether originating or not in family intrigue, had a result so favourable to my own Government and useful to that of the Ameers. I therefore did not interfere between Ali Moorad and his brother. The proofs that he was voluntarily elected by Roostum were laid before me. I sought to have an acknowledgment that it was

a voluntary act from Roostum's own lips, but he pertinaciously avoided meeting me; nor was Major Outram able to bring about a meeting afterwards. I believe it was his own family prevented the meeting; they were afraid he would confess to having voluntarily given up the Turban. Evidence of their complete power over him from beginning to end are not wanting in every transaction that I have had with him since I have been in Scinde.

As to Ali Moorad's conduct, I do not believe Major Outram can give proof of any thing he alleges against him; all his allegations are general, there is nothing specific. If the not joining his family in their breaches of treaty be betraying his family, it is clear that he has betrayed them; but I know of no other act of treason against them. Ali Moorad may be any thing Major Outram chooses to accuse him of being, but there must be something specific and accompanied by proof. I have heard of neither. We will even suppose, what I do not admit, though I suspected it at the time, that Ali Moorad bullied his brother into ceding the Turban and his estates; he, Ali Moorad, guaranteeing a due and dignified maintenance to Roostum. We will suppose this, and change the position of the individuals. Suppose Roostum an English gentleman of a large fortune, eighty-five years of age, perfectly imbecile, incapable of managing his estates. Ali Moorad is his legal heir; those who are not his heirs try to deprive him of his inheritance. What would the law of England do? I imagine it would give him the guardianship of the estate and of the old idiot, under certain restrictions. Well! what the law of England would have done for him Ali Moorad did for himself and by his own power!

However upon these matters Major Outram, or Major anybody, may form their own opinions, they are indifferent to me; but Major Outram had not a right to tell Sir George Arthur, that I had given power and riches to Ali Moorad, and had caused the war, because there is no foundation for such an erroneous assertion; and by giving his notes of a conversation with Meer Roostum and the other Ameers at Hyderabad, in which I am represented, and certainly by implication made to have forced Roostum into his brother's

power, and to the surrender of the Turban and all his territory, without accompanying such notes with my denial of the circumstance, I do consider Major Outram to have acted very unjustly towards me, if Major Outram did so; of which however I have no proofs, except hearing of his notes being in the hands of high and influential authorities without any notice being taken of my contradiction. All this I am determined shall be cleared up.

V.

The falsehoods published by Outram, and ignorantly repeated by Lord Jocelyn in the House of Commons, as to Roostum's cession of the Turban, are peremptorily disposed of in the following letter written by Roostum to his son at the time he resigned the Turban. It was only made known in 1850 before a Commission appointed to inquire into a charge against Ali Moorad. Roostum here acknowledges that he was a free agent, for he speaks only of *persuasion* not of force, and if he could have withheld any territory he could have retained all.

Meer Roostum Khan, to Meer Mohamed Hoossein. 17th Zekaght, 1258. A. D. 20th December, 1842.

[*After compliment*].—According to the written directions of the General (Napier), I came with Meer Ali Moorad to Dejee-ka-kote. The Meer above-mentioned said to me—“Give me the Puggree (Turban of Rais) and your lands, and I will arrange matters with the British! By the *persuasion* of Meer Ali Moorad Khan I ceded my lands to him; but your lands, or your brothers', or those of the sons of Meer Moobarick Khan, I have not ceded to him; nor have I ceded the districts north of Roree. An agreement to the effect, that he will not interfere with those lands, I got in the handwriting of Peer Ali Gohur, and sealed by Meer Ali Moorad, a copy of which I send with this letter for you to read.

Remain in contentment on your land, for your districts, those of your brothers, or of the heirs of Meer

Moorarick Khan (according to the agreement I formerly wrote for you), will remain as was written then, and Meer Ali Moorad cannot interfere in this matter.

Dey Kingree and Bashapore I have given to Peer Ali Gohur in perpetuity; it is for you to agree to it. My expenses and those of my household are to be defrayed by Meer Ali Moorad.

• [*True Translation.*] (Signed) JOHN YOUNGHUSBAND,
Lieutenant Scinde Police.

Sukkur, 14th May, 1850.

• The letter, of which the above is a translation, was given to me by Meer Mohamed Hoossein.* It bears the seal of Meer Roostum.

(Signed) JOHN YOUNGHUSBAND.

Sir C. Napier to Ali Moorad, December 1842.

Meer Roostum Khan voluntarily went to your Highness's fortress of Dejee; he there publicly and formally placed the Turban on your head. He then wrote solemnly in the sacred Koran, that he had given to you the Turban of the Talpoors.

When I heard of these things, I asked permission to wait upon the Ameer, to speak with his Highness as to the new treaty, and to hear from his own lips that he had given up public affairs to your guidance. What was the course pursued by his Highness? He abandons your roof, he flies from me, he places himself at the head of those Ameers who have been intriguing against the English, and who have, as you inform me, collected bands for the purpose of resistance to the authority of the Turban. This is strange conduct in the Ameer. The only course for me to pursue is to advise your Highness publicly to proclaim to the Scindians, that you are the legitimate chief of the Talpoors; to call on the other Ameers to obey you as such and to dismiss their armed followers. If they refuse, I will disperse them by force. To

* Roostum's son.

those Ameeris you will preserve their lands, but no fortress shall be held in Upper Scinde but by your Highness's *Killedar*.

To the same, January 14th, 1843.

I understand from Major Outram, that he thinks your Highness has not clearly understood what has been interpreted to you, which makes me greatly regret not being able to speak with your Highness myself, that I might make myself understood by your Highness personally. The next safe thing is to put my meaning into writing. The Governor-General has ordered me to support your Highness as the lawful possessor of the Turban. As Rais, your Highness has certain privileges and certain lands, which appertain, not to the individual, but to the Turban. These must be given to you with the Turban, but the rights and possessions of the other Ameeris must be maintained, as prescribed in the draft of the new treaty; and I endeavoured from the first to have it explained to your Highness, that no portion of their estates can be transferred to you. If they resist the arms of the Company in war, and if a shot be fired by them at the troops under my command, then I have orders to take all their estates, in the name of the Company, and they would not be made over to your Highness; at least such, in my belief, is the intention of the Governor-General. I hope, therefore, that your Highness will explain to your relations, what great loss of power and territory would fall upon the Talpoor family, if any of them commit hostilities upon the troops under my orders.

To the Governor-General in Council, August 16th, 1843.

By reference to my letters and proclamations, it will be seen that I promised to preserve to all the Ameeris their rights. If Roostum had legally bestowed upon his brother Ali Moorad, all his, Roostum's lands, I should have held myself pledged to support that gift in the discussion of the details of the treaty. If Meer Roostum had not done so, then

would his Highness in that discussion have rejected the claims of Ali Moorad, and I should have felt bound to support his Highness Meer Roostum. I more than once repeated to their Highnesses Ali Moorad and Roostum, that all should be supported in their rights and possessions. My letters and proclamations to this effect are before your Lordship in Council; but I never attended to the details of private transactions, the time for which had not arrived.

In one of the letters to Major Outram, I proposed, even after insult had been offered to me by the Ameer Roostum, to receive him with every honour and attention, whenever he pleased to come to my camp. From first to last, I sought a meeting with Meer Roostum. I made every effort to succeed. Once I sent Major Outram into the Ameer's camp, it was close to mine; he persuaded Outram that he was tired, and would not come. This was all a trick, as I well knew at the time. I was always baffled by the Ameer himself, not by the intrigues of Ali Moorad, as the Major believes, but, as I assert, by the Ameer himself, which finally changed the opinion I originally entertained, that Roostum's flight from Dejee was caused by his brother. I became satisfied that his flight was a voluntary act of the old Ameer's concocting. He is full of duplicity. This, subsequent events have proved. He fled in like manner from Outram.

By the above your Lordship and Council will perceive three important things:—

First. That I made every attempt to ascertain from the Ameer himself, whether or not he had voluntarily made over the Turban to his brother, and I was invariably foiled by the Ameer himself.*

Secondly. That I considered the lands given over, exclusive of those belonging to the Turban, as a mere private transaction, with which my Government had then no concern; that it was an affair for after consideration in discussing the details of the treaty.

Thirdly. That I was, without a choice, obliged by treaty to acknowledge Ali Moorad. It was the Ameer Roostum, not I, that had given him the Turban. But I was very glad that it was so, for it was evident, that the Ameer Roostum's con-

duct made it almost impossible to negotiate with him. I could not trust him; and Major Outram, who was his personal friend, was duped by him.

It may be worth remarking, that before Meer Roostum made over his Turban and lands to Meer Ali Moorad at Dejee, he had placed all those lands and the forts in the hands of his son and out of his own power, (see his letter, a translation of which I enclose.) This shews that he was casting discord amongst his relations, for it is evident, that he had virtually made his son the Rais as Ali Moorad averred, and said he would not submit to it; all this shews the duplicity of this Prince.

To the same, September 29th, 1843.

In reply to your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant, I am again obliged to dissect Major Outram's letter. The sentence to which your Lordship refers is contained in the Major's letter of the 24th Jan. I shall take certain sentences and examine them:—

Major Outram.—“Assigning to Ali Moorad what has been pledged to him, viz. one-fourth of the remaining territory of Upper Scinde as his perquisite as Rais, besides one fourth as co-heir of the former sovereign, Meer Sohrab.”

What has been pledged to Ali Moorad? By law Meer Ali Moorad became Rais. By law certain revenues are attached to the Turban. The laws of his family and country are pledged to him, and he is pledged to them to perform the duties of the chieftainship. I know of no other pledges.

When his Highness Meer Ali Moorad told me he would never interfere with his brother's chieftainship, he added, that he would not allow him to place the Turban on the head of his, Roostum's, son. “It is,” said he, “either my brother's during his life, or mine if he chooses to resign it, but it cannot be placed on the head of my nephew. This shall not be, for I have force sufficient to prevent it; what I want to know is, whether you will interfere with me or not?” This is the substance of our conversation. My answer to the

Ameer was distinct. It admitted of no equivocation; it entered into no treaty; it gave no pledge. The substance was—"By the existing treaties of 1839, the British Government is bound to support the Ameer in their rights. You have a right to the Turban; the existing treaty obliges me to support you, and I will support you."

Your Lordship will perceive that I merely assured his Highness that I would support the treaty, and this assurance was in a casual conversation. But Major Outram's words imply that some treaty had been entered into by me with Ali Moorad, and, as I know nothing beyond what I have stated above, I must leave it to Major Outram to explain his own meaning.

Major Outram.—"And as you are bound, I understand, to make good to Ali Moorad his share."

I know not what Major Outram understood, or did not understand, but I was bound to nothing, neither to Ali Moorad, nor any other Ameer.

With regard to the claim of Ali Moorad to part of the territory ceded to Bhawalpore, all that passed between me and his Highness here follows:—

Conversing during the march to Emaum Ghur, the Ameer told me that he possessed one or two villages in the midst of the territory ceded to Bhawalpore, but he added, throwing up his head, "they are trifling things, and the Governor-General is welcome to them." I replied, "if your Highness has any possessions in that territory the Governor-General has not been aware of it, and when the details are arranged any loss of this kind will be made good to you. The new draft treaty does not contemplate depriving your Highness of any part of your possessions." This is all that passed, and as nearly as I can recollect, the interpretation was in the above words. It is not impossible that a similar conversation may have passed more than once between Sheik Ali Hoossein (Ali Moorad's vizier) and myself; indeed, I am sure this must have been the case, for I find a pencil memorandum on Outram's letter, saying, that the moonshee, Ali Ackbar, informed me that the village, or pergunnah, in question, was in value from 40 to 50,000 rupees; and the Secretary of

Government, Mr. Brown, informs me he thinks the value does not amount to more than 30,000 rupees at the utmost.

Major Outram.—"By a late treaty."

What treaty Major Outram alludes to I know not. I have already said that *treaty, pledge, or promise*, entered into by me, *there has been none*. I know that before I arrived in Scinde, Meer Ali Moorad and his family were at war; a battle had been fought, in which he defeated his brother Roostum and the rest of his family. Roostum, I believe, gave himself up to Ali Moorad on the field of battle. The general opinion that I heard at the time I arrived was, that Meer Roostum and his family had behaved ill to Ali Moorad. However, the latter made it up with his brother on the field of battle, and some family compact may then have been entered into, but that such was the case I do not know, nor did I ever hear that any such compact had taken place. I have been driven to this conjecture in my endeavour to account for Major Outram's expression, "*By a late treaty.*"

Finally, my Lord, I never gave, or promised, a farthing of money or an inch of land to his Highness Ali Moorad, although Major Outram seems to think, from his letters, and from what I have since heard of his conversations at Bombay, that I piled riches and power upon the Ameer! I made him one present, it was an elephant; your Lordship confirmed the gift; and to shew your Lordship how very cautious I have ever been in giving what is not my own property, I took a pledge from his Highness that if your Lordship disapproved of my giving the elephant, he was to pay for it, for as I take no presents I am too poor to make them myself. Ali Moorad's conduct appears to have been loyal from first to last, both to his family and to the British Government. It is obvious that this was his interest, but with his motives we have nothing to do. The fact has been as I state, and had the Talpoors been ruled by the advice of his Highness they would now have been in the full enjoyment of their sovereignty.

VI.

TOUCHING OUTRAM'S NOTES OF CONFERENCES WITH THE
AMEERS.

[The notes are to be found in the Parliamentary Papers on Scinde; the substance has been given in the narrative of Outram's diplomacy at Hyderabad.]

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee,
June 13th, 1843.*

These notes I never read until I saw them to-day. I know absolutely nothing of what may have passed between Major Outram and the Ameers, while he was acting as Commissioner under Sir C. Napier for the settlement of the details of the treaty, to which the Ameers had generally given their assent.

Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General.

Hydrabad, July 11th, 1843.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter, dated 14th ultimo, which arrived here yesterday, inclosing notes of conversations held by Major Outram with the Ameers, and with their vakeels, between the 8th and 13th February last.

The notes of the meeting with the Ameers, on the 12th of February, were probably sent to me, but I did not receive them.

The notes of the meeting on the 8th February, I received on the 11th; these I could not forward to your Lordship, because, after the 13th, our communications were intercepted; but the enclosed copy of a letter to Major Outram shews that I intended to do so, although I did not think it necessary, as we were on the eve of a battle, which I knew could not take place if the Ameers were honest and spoke the truth. After the action, the Ameers placed my small force

in so much danger, by their intrigues with Meer Shere Mohamed, that I never thought more of Outram's "minutes," till I received your Lordship's present letter.

Recurring to that period: as it seems that Major Outram has sent his statement to the Government, it is incumbent on me to shew what weight was due to his judgment on that occasion; and what weight also was due to the assertions of the Ameers, that they wanted to keep the peace with us; for upon their sincerity depends any value which may be supposed to attach to their conversations with Outram.

I shall, for the present, confine my remarks to the period between the 8th and 12th of February.

Major Outram had been deceived by the Ameers. On the 10th and 11th February, he sent two letters to me, following each other, by express; these letters contained three important things:—

1. A request that I should halt the troops.
2. A request that I should go in person to Hydrabad.
3. The information that the Ameers had dispersed all their troops.

Now, my Lord, it so happened, that the moment when Major Outram wrote the above, 25,862 fighting men were, a portion of them strengthening their position at Meeanee, about six miles off, and the others were round Major Outram's house, preparing to attack it.

Ten thousand men of the Chandia tribe had crossed the river, and were coming down the left bank of the Indus, in my rear; 7000 of Meer Roostum's men were within thirty miles, in rear of my left flank at Khoonhera, and were about to march on Meeanee; 10,000, under Shere Mohamed, were marching from Meerpoor; and in the mountains on the right bank of the Indus, thousands more were preparing to come; so that I had, as my spies correctly stated, 25,000 men in my front, and 25,000 more marching upon me in all directions, and these without reference to the tribes gathering in the hills, and all these, as the Ameers affirmed to Major Outram, perfectly beyond their control. Yet Major Outram sent me two letters in one day, to assure me that the Ameers

had dismissed all their troops, and asked me to let him give them a pledge that I would not march. Thus, in a most perilous position, would the Major's advice have completely shackled my movements, and placed my small army beyond the power of being saved, except by a miracle.

In examining the foregoing facts, let me draw your Lordship's attention to two very important points:—


1. That the Ameers did not want to have peace, that they were confident of victory, and had accurately calculated the day I should arrive at Meeanee, namely the 17th February; that they knew that they could not assemble their full force of 50,000 men, till the night of the 17th or the morning of the 18th of February. Therefore all their diplomacy of dissimulation, procrastination, and protestation, was put in force to deceive Major Outram and obtain a pledge that I should halt, if only for a day. I think he would have so pledged himself, had I not positively forbidden him to give any pledge without my consent.

That this was the real motive of the anxiety exhibited by the Ameers to suspend my march, if only for a day, is made more apparent by the fact that there was no advantage to be gained by delaying the signature of the draft Treaty. On the contrary, to sign this draft would enable the Ameers at once to discuss and formally to protest against any and every part of it, while it would relieve them at once from the presence of our troops; but they were confident of victory, and wanted to fight. There were 25,000 men to be obtained by one day's delay in my arrival at Meeanee; and if the Ameers could have gained a week, it would have brought us into the hot season, which they thought would paralyze my movements, and finally destroy the troops—they were in a great measure right.

2. Had I been persuaded to believe in the jesuitical protestations of the Ameers, I should have betrayed the British arms.

Now, my Lord, when I considered these matters, I saw that I could place no faith in the truth of the Ameers. Their "conversations" (Outram's) appeared to me to be so much waste-paper.

But this was not all. Outram had asked me seriously to go to Hydrabad alone, and recommended me to send my troops to Meerpoor. My throat would have been cut, of course; and the troops having lost their General, and having been removed forty miles from their line of communication, viz. the Indus, would have been placed as follows:—



From this position they would very quickly have been pushed into the desert, and there every soul must have perished; even victory could not have saved them, they could never have regained the river, harassed by a repulsed but hourly increasing force for forty miles, a force more than twenty times their own numbers before the battle.

As Major Outram seems to have forwarded his notes, I think he ought also to have forwarded my denial of Meer Roostum's assertions.

This does not appear to have been done, so I take the liberty of sending herewith a copy of my letter; being indeed the same letter in which I acknowledged the receipt of the conversation with the Ameers on the 8th of February.

Though much harassed by the unavoidable labour, which attaches to the command of a young and inexperienced force suddenly assembled, I am not aware that I left anything unreported to your Lordship that I considered of importance; but, in case of accident, I have all my letters to the Ameers copied, as well as my proclamations, together with any letters to Major Outram, which bear on the subject; indeed, I believe, all I have do so. These will enable your Lordship to shew the English Government, that I did

all but sacrifice the honour of our arms to maintain the peace, for which I believe that both your Lordship and myself were as anxious as Major Outram or any other person."

The Governor-General in Council to Sir C. Napier.

Calcutta, August 7th, 1843.

We have all read with the greatest interest your Excellency's letter of the 11th ult., communicating certain explanations, with respect to your correspondence with Major Outram immediately before the battle of Meeanee, and with respect to the position of your army at that period.

We cannot but feel that it is to your penetration and decision your army owes its safety.

Major Outram's confidential letter to you, of the 11th of February, he had intended to send by a servant of Meer Roostum, who was then betraying him by a false statement of his force at Khoonhera; yet that letter contained a suggestion, which, if communicated to Meer Ali Moorad, might have added him to the confederacy against us.

On the 15th of February, Major Outram observed, that his despatches of the last few days would have led you to expect, that his earnest endeavours to effect an amicable arrangement with the Ameers of Scinde would fail; yet, on the previous day, the Ameers had affixed their seals to the treaty, a proceeding usually viewed in the light of an amicable arrangement, or at least, an arrangement intended to preclude hostilities, not immediately as in this case to precede them.

Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General.

Hydrabad, July 13th, 1843.

I was much vexed at myself for not having sent Major Outram's notes of his interview with the Ameers, because I received them on the 11th of February, and the post was open to the 13th, as I find, by a long letter written to your Lordship on that day.

We were all hard-worked at the time, and I recollect thinking that, as a battle would take place, or peace be made in a few days, (if Major Outram's assertions were correct,) the face of affairs would change. I therefore delayed sending this paper, till I heard of the Ameers having signed the draft treaty. I had however made preparations for sending the notes of Outram's meeting to your Lordship, for I have just found among my papers, a copy of that paper prepared for transmission to your Lordship, and with it I find my private notes made on reading it. I had by that time discovered, that there was a party resolved to support the Ameers through thick and thin.

I received Outram's notes on the 11th, I must have made these notes that evening. The copy, occupied as every one was, could hardly have been ready before the evening of the 12th. I required much time each of those days to be alone in uninterrupted reflection, upon the conflicting information sent me by Major Outram, and the reports of my spies. It was impossible to "*jump at conclusions.*" Major Outram's character and local experience, gave great weight to his assertions, yet they were diametrically opposed to the statements of the scouts. The fate of the force, perhaps much more, depended on my decision; few men could go through more anxiety than I did during those days, lest disgrace should fall on the British arms through my agency. The papers found on the Murree chiefs, and their arrest, had occupied all the 12th nearly, and decided my opinion. There remained little doubt of the way in which Outram had been duped. I thought it essential that the copies of the letters found on the Murree chief Hyat Khan should be sent to your Lordship, in case of any misfortune befalling the troops. I still hoped for the promised treaty, and must have intended to send that and the notes on the interview together. On the 14th all communication was at an end, and my whole time occupied by preparations for meeting the enemy, endeavouring to ascertain where he was, what were his intentions, our proper direction of march, for our guides were either treacherous or frightened to death. The Ameers and their falsehoods passed from my head; their

armies alone occupied my attention. The march upon an enemy of such force, was alone so engrossing, that really if I had thought these papers important, which I neither did, nor do now, I could not have attended to them. If they produce annoyance, or throw difficulties in your Lordship's way, very deeply do I regret that I forgot to send them after the battle.

*The Governor-General in Council, to the Secret Committee,
August 14th, 1843.*

Sir C. Napier has entered at some length into a justification of his proceedings previous to the battle of Meeanee. In doing this, he has placed upon our records a mass of most curious and interesting matter, which we regret that it was not in our power to lay before you at an earlier period. We strongly feel that it was to Major-General Sir C. Napier's penetration and decision that our army owed its safety; and we are astonished at the extent to which Major Outram suffered himself to be deluded by the Ameers.

We transmit for your consideration, certain memorials which the ex-Ameers have addressed to us from Scinde; but we consider it unnecessary to make any observations upon them. Sir C. Napier's indignant refutation of the calumnious charges brought against himself and the gallant troops whom he commands, will be sufficient to satisfy you that the Ameers are without truth.

Remarks on Letter from the ex-Ameers Roostum Khan and Nusseer Khan of Kyrpoor to the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Peel, dated 17th August, 1844.

THE AMEERS WRITE—

“In the meantime Mr. Ross Bell was appointed Resident and arrived at Sukkur, part of our kingdom, and aided my younger brother, Meer Ali Moorad, in seizing four or five inhabited villages of my country, which I had presented to my nephew Meer Nusseer Khan.”

REMARKS.

On the division of Upper Scinde by the deceased Meer Sohrab Khan, he, to prevent future disputes, wrote in his Koran, detailing exactly the shares of his three sons, Meers Roostum, Moobarick, and Ali Moorad Khan. By this deed the villages alluded to were granted to Ali Moorad Khan. During the minority of this Meer the villages were by deceit taken possession of by his brothers in 1838. Ali Moorad assembled a force to recover the villages he had been unjustly deprived of. Roostum Khan persuaded him to disband his force, solemnly promising by writing in the Koran to cause the restoration to Ali Moorad of the villages. This promise Roostum Khan broke. On the British troops being located in Scinde the matter in dispute was, according to treaty, submitted to the Political Agent, Mr. Ross Bell, who after due enquiry adjudged the case in favour of Ali Moorad. That decision has been approved of and confirmed by the Rt. Honourable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed) E. J. BROWN,
Secretary to Scinde Government.

THE MEERS WRITE—

“ After about seven days, on the 16th of Zil Kadur, 1257 Hegira, Captain Brown came to Kyrpoor, and said, ‘ If you agree to seal the treaty good ; if not, the English army, which is now at Pultun, near Roree, will march on Kyrpoor to-morrow and plunder it.’ Under this threat he compelled me to seal (sign) the new treaty ; he also told me I was to be guided in all parts of my conduct by the advice of my younger brother, Ali Moorad, which I would find for my advantage.”

REMARKS.

There is not one word of truth in this. I was deputed on the occasion referred to by Major-General Sir C. Napier

to take a letter to Meer Roostum and Nusseer Khan at Kyrpoor, calling on them to give a direct answer whether they would sign the new treaty, which had previously been offered for their acceptance. They detained me more than two hours, endeavouring to persuade me to enter into a discussion of the details of the treaty. I gave them but one answer throughout, viz. that I had no authority to enter into any such discussion, that I was the bearer of a letter to them, and that I required their reply, yes or no — and that if they would not give it I should leave for Sukkur without it. They eventually gave me a reply stating their willingness to sign the treaty.

I need hardly remark that at this period no British troops had passed the Indus from Sukkur. Ali Moorad's name was not once mentioned in the conversation.

(Signed) E. J. BROWN,
Secretary to Scinde Government.

VII.

OUTRAM'S DIPLOMACY.

Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General.

Hydrabad, July 3rd, 1843.

A private letter from Bombay informs me that a letter received from * * *^(a), says he "considered the destruction of Emaum Ghur, as a more flagitious act than the attack upon the Residency."

As nothing would give me more pain than having done anything which might expose your Lordship to attack, it is necessary for me to furnish proofs that I have not done so.

1. Emaum Ghur, with all other fortresses in Upper Scinde, belonged to the Turban, or "Rais."
2. His Highness Ali Moorad was Rais by the law of Scinde, and Meer Mohamed was in rebellion against him.
3. His Highness accompanied me to Emaum Ghur. On our arrival, he proposed to destroy the fortress, but afterwards seemed doubtful whether he would do so or not.

^(a) Name unknown.

I wrote to his Highness to convince him of the necessity of that measure.

4. He consented, and I enclose to your Lordship his Highness's reply, authorising me to destroy Emaum Ghur.

5. His Highness himself fired some of the guns, and once or twice threw shells into the fort, so that I was fully borne out in what I did by the owner of the fortress. I could legally have done the same thing under the like sanction in the middle of England, and this without advert- ing to the breaches of treaty and preparations for war every- where carrying on by the Ameer's against us.

Another charge against me I find to be, that my "con- tinued march upon Hyderabad, in despite of the advice of Major Outram, was that which forced the Ameer's to war." I certainly did reject Major Outram's advice, because I soon saw that he was grossly deceived by the Ameer's. I had several proofs of this, one or two of which I now feel it right to state to your Lordship.

1. Major Outram, being at Hyderabad, sent me two (three my journal says, but I can find but two) despatches by express, on the 12th, to assure me that the Ameer's had not any armed men except their usual personal attendants, and that these were not more numerous than Indian Princes of their rank would move with in time of profound peace. At that moment the army of the Ameer's was assembled at Meeanee, only six miles from Hyderabad, and were preparing their position! At the moment he was writing these des- patches to me, his house was surrounded by 8000 Belocchees (who had eight pieces of cannon) preparing for their attack on him, the 15th February.

2. Major Outram wrote to ask me to go to Hyderabad alone to meet the Ameer's.

3. He proposed my sending my troops to Meerpoor.

Had I allowed myself to be guided by Major Outram, my own throat and his, and the throats of all with us, would probably have been cut, and the army left without a leader at Meerpoor, forty miles from the river, which formed our line of communication by steam with Sukkur and Bombay, and with the friendly territory of his Highness Ali Moorad

which extended south as far as Nowshera: when thus isolated, the army would have been attacked by 60,000 men, pushed back upon the desert, and there have miserably perished.

As Major Outram had lived many years at the Court of Hyderabad, and every one spoke of his "great local knowledge of the Ameers, and of this country," while I was a perfect stranger to both, I might well have been excused (supposing anything can excuse a general officer for losing an army) had I allowed myself to have been guided by Major Outram; and his advice was pressed upon me with all the zeal inspired by honesty of purpose, added to an ardent disposition. But my spies brought me intelligence that 30,000 men were in my front; some said 40,000. I concluded that these spies exaggerated numbers, but it was clear to my mind that the Beloochees were above 20,000 men, and in sufficient numbers to make them believe that their victory would be certain. Therefore I argued that Major Outram's report was wrong, that he was deceived, and ignorant of what was passing about him. His proposal to march the troops to Meerpoor, made me think he understood very little of war; I therefore paid no attention to his suggestions. I put all my sick and treasure on board a steamer, and resolved to attack the enemy; if we were beaten we had plenty of provisions, and with our backs to the river and the steamers, (for retreat would have been disastrous,) I would have entrenched myself till reinforcements arrived. I had full confidence in the troops, and little feared an undisciplined multitude; but still the game was not an easy one, and I have shewn that, had I taken Outram's advice, as I am reproached for not having done, a second Cabool massacre would probably have taken place.

One would have imagined that the attack on the Residency would have, at least, opened Outram's eyes to the treachery of the characters he had to deal with. Not a bit; he joined me on the 16th at Muttaree, and still wanted me to delay my attack for a day! yet, six hours' delay would have added 24,000 men to the forces of the Ameers at Meeanee. It is true I had no positive information of this at

the moment; but I was sure of it from the letter I found on the Murree chief, Hyat Khan, whom I had seized. In this letter the Amcers pressed the Murrees to join on the 9th. Now, I knew these barbarians would not leave their villages while the feast of the Moharem lasted, it was to finish on the 11th, and therefore I guessed how fast they would gather after that day, and resolved not to lose an hour. If my conduct be attacked in the House of Commons, I think the foregoing statement will be sufficient defence. I am not conscious of having erred in rejecting Major Outram's advice.

Outram's answer will be, "there would not have been war." The Ameers answered this on the 15th; but suppose not; was I to place the army at their mercy, to spare or destroy as they pleased? Their mercy! I have it in proof, that about the time Major Outram kept assuring me of their pacific feelings and disposition towards us, they had sent orders along both banks of the Indus to their people, "to kill every Englishman, woman and child, they could lay their hands upon." We should have received the tender mercies of the Affghans in the Tezeen Pass,—the mercy which Outram would have received himself but for my forebodings, and sending him the light company of the 22nd regiment.

Meer Ali Moorad to Sir C. Napier. January 12th, 1843.

I have received your letter pointing out several reasons why you think it would be better to blow up Emaum Ghur. As far as the value of the property goes, I am quite indifferent; and I fully concur with you in the reasons which make it necessary to destroy it. Therefore, considering me joyfully willing, by all means blow up the fort and consider me always your well-wisher.

VIII.

Sir C. Napier to Major Outram.

Hydrabad, 22nd July, 1843.

My dear Outram,

1. Before I proceed to discuss other things, I shall begin by observing, that in one of your letters, you twice remark,

that you had only received a short note from me. Now the only letters which I have received of yours which I have not answered, are those dated the 8th and 29th of March; the first (with a letter from Lady Napier about the same date, and yours describing your visit to Mahabuleshwar,) I only received a few days ago!!! so it is idle to refer to any letters but those actually received.

2. I could not reply to your letter dated 20th, sooner; that of the 29th, reached me as I was going out against Shere Mohamed; that of the 8th, I have only had a few days. If I had not a sincere regard for you, I should have no anxiety at all! However, I shall state all that has passed, and you must judge how far you consider yourself right or wrong. I am placed in a situation where in my own defence I am obliged to state all that passed between the 3rd and 12th of February. I am attacked both in public papers and private letters, and I am accused of forcing on the war, because I did not allow myself to be advised by you to halt, but am said to have attacked the Ameers after they had signed the treaty; and about four days ago I had a letter from Lord Ellenborough, saying that he had received from the Secret Committee, printed notes of conversations between you as Commissioner, and the Ameers, and asking if I had ever heard of these conversations; and expressing his surprise at now hearing of them for the first time. At the same time private letters have said that I am supposed to have intercepted reports made by you, and which ought to have gone to the Governor-General.

3. How these notes came into the hands of the Secret Committee I do not know, nor do I the least care; but the results are these:—*First.* That Lord Ellenborough evidently attaches importance to them; and as I never sent them to him, I appear, till he gets my explanation, as if I concealed what passed from his Lordship for the purpose of forcing the Ameers to battle. *Second.* That Sir George Arthur also attaches importance to these papers, in consequence of his conversation with you and their own contents, for he sent them to Lord Fitzgerald. *Third.* That the Secret Committee attach importance to these notes because they have

not only sent them to Lord Ellenborough, but caused them to be printed! My position has therefore this appearance, that I intercepted most important papers, which, had they reached Lord Ellenborough, might have prevented the war; or, that even if I had been induced by your advice to halt and act differently from the way in which I did act, the war would not have broken out; and worse, (if any thing can be worse,) that I betrayed Lord Ellenborough who had placed unbounded confidence in me, and given me the utmost possible support in every way. This was the position in which the letters from Lord Ellenborough and Sir G. Arthur must have placed me in my own and their opinion, and this the position in which the printing of those notes, if they become public, must place me in the opinion of the world. Now it is quite clear that if such was the state of the case, I might perhaps be allowed to lay claim to courage, and to some degree of military skill, because success will generally give a man so much credit; but assuredly I could never pretend to honour, to humanity, or to be trusted with the slightest diplomatic transaction: in short, I should deservedly be execrated as a resolute scoundrel, who had sacrificed every thing to military glory, and turned a deaf ear to the supplicating cry of injured and betrayed Princes. This would be my position in face of the public, supposing that there be a word of truth in the whole story. That there is not, it was necessary to shew to Lord Ellenborough and my friends.

4. I therefore directly answered Lord Ellenborough thus. *Firstly.* That I had only received *two* of the conversations, and I believed that the third had been intercepted. *Secondly.* I sent him the copy of those notes, prepared on purpose to send to his Lordship with the probable reasons why they were not. *Thirdly.* I forwarded to his Lordship your demi-official letters, between the 8th and 13th of February, (first examining them to see that they contained nothing private.) *Fourthly.* I told him that my reasons for not halting were, that I knew the assertions contained in those conversations to be false as respected anything. I had done, especially Roostum's assertion, that I had made him give himself up to Ali Moorad; and that I thought, when you shewed that

assertion to Sir G. Arthur, you should also have shewn him my contradiction of it, (perhaps you did?) *Fifthly*. That your wanting me to halt, and twice in one day and once in another, telling me the Ameers had dispersed their forces, when I knew they had not, convinced me you were deceived by the Ameers; that your wanting me to go to Hydrabad without my army added another proof to my conviction that they had deceived you, and finally, that your proposing to me to march to Meerpoor completed the proofs. *Sixthly*. That the important letter I found on the Murree chief Hyat Khan, coupled with my secret intelligence and a comparison with the Ameers' anxiety that I should halt, proved to me, past all hesitation or doubt, that they were only trying to gain a day or two, that they might bring 50,000 men to Meeanee instead of 25,000: our subsequent knowledge of events leaves this a matter of history. Therefore, had I halted I should have lost the army, unless saved by a miracle; and if the force had marched to Meerpoor and lost its line of communication with the Indus, it would equally have been destroyed. Now you, a Major, without much experience of war, may well be excused such errors; but I as an experienced General officer could have no excuse, and should be very justly condemned. For these reasons I stand acquitted for not attending to your advice. *Finally*. I have told his Lordship my reason for being silent, and not keeping him informed on these matters with that exactness which I did on all others. The reason was, I thought it would injure you in his Lordship's opinion; and that I was anxious to avoid. Afterwards I gave that up, because it was evidently out of the question; so that when, not long ago, he wrote to tell me he heard you were going to apply for employment again in Scinde, I told his Lordship I was sure you were not going to apply, for that our ideas of the politics in Scinde were so adverse, that our working together was impossible.

Now, my dear Outram, whether it has been you or your friends that have pushed this matter ahead, I know not; but it has been done, and I necessarily have defended and will defend my conduct. "*It has been done,*" as * * * * * very justly says in a letter to me,

speaking of the attacks of the press, "to attack Lord Ellenborough through you." All this has passed within a few days, except the attacks upon me in the papers (especially the *Bombay Times*). They have long been at work, but I did not condescend to defend myself against them, nor indeed had I time.

Having now told you all that has passed, I shall refer to your letter dated 20th March. You are angry that Lord Ellenborough did not thank you for your exertions during the short time you were Commissioner; and you say you are sure I reported to him all your exertions. My answer is that I did no such thing. I studiously avoided mentioning your name to Lord Ellenborough, as I was well aware that my appointing you Commissioner was contrary to his opinion: from all you had told me I judged this. You were not his selection, and I have heard that he was surprised at hearing that the papers, without contradiction, held you up as having powers in Scinde. If any one had to thank you it was me, and I did so in my despatch. As to your political exertions they failed; my advance is said to be the cause of that failure; to thank you for them would have been to condemn myself. Now I entirely differed with you except in your wish to prevent blood being shed. We even there differed in our motive; I did it from humanity alone, thinking the war policy of Lord Ellenborough perfectly just; you wished to keep the peace because you thought the policy unjust, and, as you said to me, "every drop of blood shed you thought was murder." Of course, in despite of such feelings, you exerted yourself as you were bound to do after accepting the office; but I confess I see nothing in that which particularly calls for public thanks! Suppose that the Ameers had made peace, and no battle taken place, should I have thanked you, or expected Lord Ellenborough to thank *me*? Certainly not; I should have expected no such thing; my view of thanks is that they are only to be given for great success in battle, or for a long series of brilliant civil service. I confess I cannot see how it casts the slightest reflection upon you; but I think your wishing to moot the question is injudicious. I did all I could to avoid the question being brought forward;

but it has now been done, and we must both abide the public judgment, for assuredly I never will allow it to be even hinted at without a flat contradiction that I led Lord Ellenborough into error—that I deceived him, that I was unequal to the high position in which her Majesty had placed me as a General officer. Even the affection of a brother should by me be swept away in a question involving my honour and military character: if you were wrong it was an error of judgment; if I was wrong it was either a criminal sacrifice to a thirst of military glory, or a total ignorance of my profession.

This brings me to another matter. The violence of a party against Lord Ellenborough at Bombay, leads it I hear, to say I made my promised account of the defence of the Residency, and that Lord Ellenborough “burked it.” This is false, I did mean to make it, and I do mean to make it, but I never said when, nor can I *now*! I have not time to devote *at least* two days to make a good dissertation on the defence of outposts, and give the Residency as an example in all its details. You know the heat here, and that the operations I have carried on, military and civil, since the capture of Hyderabad, preclude all work which is not absolutely necessary, but I nevertheless do mean to write the essay on the defence of the Residency when I *can*.

I assure you that this business of defending my conduct has given me more pain and annoyance than anything that has happened to me in Scinde.

Believe me to be, my dear Outram,

Yours truly,

(Signed)

C. J. NAPIER.

I beg of you not to mistake me; I neither do nor have a right to object to your defending both the cause of the Amceers and your own exertions; nor am I at all worried at any one else defending them. I only mean to say that *I must defend myself*; and if the public take a different view, if it pronounces that you were deceived, it has not been my doing, but that of those who have placed me on my defence.*

* Outram's reply to this letter caused Sir C. Napier to renounce his friendship.

IX.

Sir C. Napier's Observations on the Ameers' Memorials.

Hydrabad, June 12, 1843.

The complaints of the Ameers form a tissue of falsehoods. I will answer them seriatim, meeting assertion by assertion, for to send documentary proofs would take up a volume.

1. Complaint of Meer Mohamed Khan.

The Ameer may have, and did acquiesce in, and I believe signed all the treaties with the English; and in common with the other Ameers violated their provisions. The Ameers formed one Government, and must be responsible collectively. The proofs of their violations of treaties are in the hands of the Governor-General, signed by Major Outram.

The Ameer says he submitted to the draft treaty. This is exposed by the answers to three plain questions:—

First Question. Who solemnly signed the new treaty in full Dhurbar?

Answer. Meer Mohamed Khan.

Second Question. Who attacked the residence of my Commissioner, (sent in the sacred character of diplomatist,) with the intention to massacre the said diplomatist and all that were with him?

Answer. Meer Mohamed Khan.

Third Question. Who, in full Dhurbar, insultingly tore the signed treaty to atoms, the treaty to which the traitor had affixed his name and seal, for the purpose of blinding the diplomatist and securing his destruction?

Answer. Meer Mohamed Khan.

“None of the Ameer’s servants went by orders to fight,” but they did fight, and our comrades were slain by those servants. I utterly disbelieve the fact, that he did not order his servants to fight, but he was bound to prevent his troops from fighting against his ally: as he did not do this he must take the consequence.

The falsehoods stated against Lieutenant Brown and Major McPherson, are answered by those officers with the truth and simplicity becoming English gentlemen. Colonel Pattle is away.

Does the Ameer suppose, that when he and his compeers had received their just punishment by force of arms, the lost lives of our soldiers and the cost of the war were to be cast out of sight as matters of no value, and their traitorous Highnesses be allowed to keep all their forfeited treasures? Assuredly not!

The Ameer proceeds, "I have spent my life in serving the Government." I deny the assertion: I refer to Major Outram's letter to Sir John Keane; I refer to Major Outram's book; I refer to a mass of documents against the Ameers that I forwarded to Lord Ellenborough, which were delivered to me as authentic by Major Outram and verified by his signature.

2. Meer Sobdar's complaint.

I always thought Meer Sobdar was a faithful ally. He was greatly favoured by the new draft treaty, and his position among the Ameers raised by the increased revenue he would have received; but the cloven foot of duplicity and cowardice was soon displayed. His Highness' vakeel, named Outrai, met me on the march to the south; he assured me of his master's good wishes; that he would send 5,000 men into battle with the other Ameers, and on a signal turn and traitorously fall upon those troops, while I was so to arrange it, that my soldiers were not to attack those of his Highness. The wretched duplicity of such conduct was disgusting. Had the force that I commanded been worsted in battle, Sobdar's 5,000 men would have been fresh, unattacked and untouched during the combat, and they would mercilessly have cut the British up, to clear themselves from the charge of treason to their friends if secrets should transpire. If, on the other hand, we were victorious, no doubt the troops of Meer Sobdar would have fulfilled his engagements by the merciless slaughter of his flying countrymen. My answer to this insidious and abominable proposition, was, "Tell your master, that my army has no fear of the Beloochees, and does not need the aid

of traitors. I consider his Highness as our good ally, and, as a friend, advise him to keep his soldiers in Hyderabad, for if I should meet his 5,000 men in the field of battle, I would assuredly fall upon them." His Highness sent 4,800 men into the field at Meeanee, where they fought us manfully.

The Ameer Sobdar says, "no sepoy in my service fought in the recent battle by my orders." This hypocritical quibbling is of a piece with that of the Ameer Mohamed. The answer is, "your chiefs lie dead at Meeanee by the side of our men whom they slew: and for this your Highness must answer, or the responsibility of Government for the conduct of its subjects must become a farce and a by-word among men."

Had Meer Sobdar been found in this fortress at the head of his 5,000 soldiers, and that none of them had fought at Meeanee, I should have respected him as an ally. In proof of this, I offer the respect which I paid to Meer Shere Mohamed, whose dislike to us has been inveterate from first to last. I well knew he was our enemy. I knew that he had arrived within six miles of Meeanee with 10,000 men, when the defeat of the Talpoors made him rapidly retrace his steps; and he wrote to me a letter, assuring me that he had never passed his frontier (which was a falsehood), and requesting me to say how he was to be treated. Major Outram, who was with me at the time this letter arrived, assured me that this Ameer would be quiet if I would only shut my eyes upon his premeditated aggression.

By my desire Major Outram wrote to the Ameer, and I consented not to notice his misconduct. I thought Major Outram's knowledge of the man would give a tone to his letter, and insure the best chance in my power of making peace: but my hopes were vain. Major Outram was deceived in the intentions of Meer Shere Mohamed, and the battle of Hyderabad was the result.

On arriving at Hyderabad, I discovered that Sobdar's men had been in the battle of Meeanee, and I saw no good reason, why his hypocrisy should shelter him from the fate which attended the more manly delinquency of Nusseer

Khan: that hypocrisy had not sheltered us from his matchlocks at Meeanee.

Meer Sobdar states that he signed the treaty offered by Lord Ellenborough, and that he has it still. Yes! But Meer Sobdar signed a duplicate treaty, which was put in possession of Major Outram, according to the rules of diplomacy. Meer Sobdar, in dark council with the other Ameers, had resolved to massacre Major Outram, and above a hundred British officers and soldiers that were with him. The Ameers made an ostentatious pretence of protecting him in the evening, knowing that he was to be slain next morning. They had bribed the moonshee of Major Outram to steal and deliver to them the treaty signed in full Dhurbar, and in full Dhurbar they tore it in pieces. Was this an action to restrain, or to encourage their Beloochee chiefs? How absurd then was their assertion to Major Outram the evening before, that they could not protect him. But suppose this assertion to be true, what does it prove? Why, that Princes who cannot protect accredited agents (invited by themselves to their capital) from being massacred by their troops, are mere chiefs of brigand bands, and must be put down by any civilized government that has the power.

The Ameer says, "that from the time the English became masters of India, never was such disgrace, oppression, and tyranny offered to any sincere friend of Government." The answer to this is easy; sincere friends of Government don't send 4,800 men to cut British soldiers' throats. Moreover, no disgrace was put upon him, except that of being defeated in battle, in which it was disgraceful to him that his troops should have joined; no oppression and tyranny except being made prisoners, the natural result of such battle; and as to being plundered, nothing was taken beyond what is the usual prize of the victorious Government; nothing was pillaged, everything is in the hands of the regular prize agents and ready to be accounted for to her Majesty.

3. Complaint of Meer Nusseer Khan.

If friendship be taken into consideration, I beg to say, from the beginning up to the day of the battle of Meeanee everything was wanting on Meer Nusseer Khan's part: and

on arriving at Hyderabad in the month of September, hearing from Lieutenants Gordon and Mylne, then political agents, that the petty insults and breaches of treaty were frequent, my first act was to put a stop to them, and I wrote a distinct letter to the Ameers to that effect. Had they guided themselves by my letter, they would have been, unfortunately for humanity and the Scindian people, still on their thrones at Hyderabad; but they continued to break certain articles of the treaty, and I reported them to the Governor-General, as I told them I would do.

The Ameer says that no attention was paid to his questions relative to shares in the port of Kurrachee. The decision of these minor details was entrusted by me to Major Outram; but instead of meeting Major Outram to enter into the discussion of them, the Ameer endeavoured to cut that officer's throat. It was therefore very natural that no attention was paid to his questions.

The Ameer says, "Meer Roostum Khan was sent to Hyderabad without asking us or our agents." Meer Roostum Khan had promised to meet Major Outram at Kyrpoor. Major Outram mounted his camel, and went to Kyrpoor, and the Ameer mounted his camel and went off the other way to Hyderabad—an insult to my Commissioner, and through him to me, that I am convinced was concocted by the other Ameers, in whose power Meer Roostum was from first to last. The Beloochees of the Murree tribe were seized on the road. "These two things," says the Ameer, "exasperated the Beloochees, and the consequence was slaughter and bloodshed." The last was quite true: twenty-five Murree chiefs were arrested passing near my camp, into which they were brought fully armed; they imagined that I was to be the dupe of a got-up story, that they were going to demand payment of wages due by the Ameers. They were all chiefs of the Murree tribe, and I took the liberty of examining their persons, as well as of taking away their arms. The chief of the Murrees, named Hyat Khan, was one of them. In his pocket I found a letter from the Ameers, summoning the clan to arms; every male that could muster sword, or shield, or spear, or matchlock. They were to meet the

Ameers at Meeanee on the 9th of February; it was therefore, very natural that I should seize the Murree chiefs; and I then gave orders to my outposts if such parties presented themselves, immediately to cut them down. The Ameers are much mistaken if they fancy English officers are so easily duped; and nothing but my determination not to shed a drop of blood before a declaration of war, prevented my ordering these twenty-five Murrees to be cut to pieces, for they gave sufficient provocation to have been charged by Jacob's horse; but that officer, having my orders, saved them.

The Ameer says he fixed his seal to the new treaty; yes, he did so in the evening of the 14th, and in the morning of the 15th, tore it with contumely in open Dhurbar. The Ameer says he sent a guard of favourite nobles to protect Major Outram—it was very evident that there was no occasion to murder Major Outram in the evening, when they intended to destroy him, and all who were with him, next morning. They knew that by murdering him in the evening, his party would immediately retreat to the steamers and get away, and they would have lost the pleasure of murdering upwards of 100 Englishmen by the premature assassination of one.

But the Ameer at last determined to fight, "having become indifferent about life; and he went forth to battle." It seems, however, that when he heard the British guns, his love of life returned, and, instead of rallying his troops, he ran away.

The Ameer proceeds to say, that he had not more than 7,000 horse and foot in the battle; whom they belonged to I don't know, but I have the sealed and verified returns in my possession of 25,862 fighting men on the field of Meeanee.* The words attributed by the Ameer to me, when I returned him his sword on the field of battle, are utterly false. The Ameer proceeds to say, "as long as Major Outram was there, everything went on well;" as if Major Outram had the power in any way to interfere with his treatment. Major Outram

* There were above 35,000 fighting men.

had no power whatever in Scinde, or over the Ameers, and I had given the charge of the Ameers to Lieutenant Brown, the accusation against whom, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Pattle and Major McPherson which immediately follows this sentence, has already been answered by those gentlemen.

Meerza Khoosroo Beg was not beaten, nor was anybody else; but, being in a passion, he seized Major McPherson (who had neither said nor done anything to him) by the throat, and of course, was instantly made a prisoner.

The following falsehoods are again stated by the Ameer: 1st, he says the fortress was plundered. It was not plundered, it was completely protected from plunder. The treasure it contained was regularly taken possession of for the Government by the prize agents. The Ameer is right when he says the fort was neither besieged nor taken by storm; but it would have been both, had not the terrors of the battle frightened its owners into an unconditional surrender. It was not visited under pretence of seeing, it was taken possession of by right of conquest; and it was done gradually and carefully in order to prevent the ladies of the zenana being alarmed or seen by the troops; but for this delicacy I would have entered the fortress at the head of the troops.

The Ameer again says, "after granting quarter, making peace, promising satisfaction, and agreeing to restore the fort," &c. That we granted quarter is true, nobody was either injured, or even insulted after the fight was over; but the "making peace" is a falsehood; "promising satisfaction," another; and "agreeing to restore the fort," a third; what remains of the complaint is an accumulation of falsehood.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General in Council.

Kurrachee, October 27, 1843.

I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship some more information relative to the conduct of the ex-Ameers. I hope it may not prove unsatisfactory, because the further the inquiry is pushed the more will the treachery of the

Ameers become apparent. I could have sent this information last February or March, had I chosen to spend my time in the employment suited to a chief of police receiving depositions. But at the period in question I had not the power of drawing up above 1,500 men in order of battle; no reinforcements had yet been received; 20,000 men under Shere Mohamed were within a march of my camp; we were in the midst of an insurgent population, warlike and well armed; I had the magazines and hospitals full of wounded men to guard on the banks of the Indus. I had six sovereign princes in my camp, intriguing as hard as they could to arrange an attack upon my camp by overwhelming multitudes. I had a large fortress to guard; this fortress was three miles from my camp, and I had an immense treasure to guard. I was obliged to respect the zenana in the fortress, to the hazard of the regiment in the fortress (which regiment had suffered greatly in the battle, and could not muster above 400 men); for in these zenanas were about 800 powerful Beloochees, well armed, and the zenanas full of arms. I well knew the treachery of the Ameers, or I should not have been so unjust as to use the terms I applied to them in my despatch after the battle of Meance.

Memorandum of a conversation between Meer Gholam Shah, Meer Fuzzil Ali, Meer Bijjur, and Lieutenant Rathborne, relative to the part taken by Meer Shahdad in the attack on the Residency, on the 15th February, 1843.

Yesterday evening, about half-past five o'clock, I called on Meer Gholam Shah at Gholam Hoossein Ka Tanda. He and his brother, Fuzzil Ali, received me. I mentioned to them that I wished to have some conversation in their presence with Meer Bijjur, their cousin, whose house adjoins theirs. The Meers, Gholam Shah and Fuzzil Ali, are nephews of the ex-Ameer Meer Mohamed, their mother having been his sister; and Meer Bijjur is brother-in-law of the ex-Ameer Meer Shahdad, his sister being Meer Shahdad's wife.

When Meer Bijjur arrived, which was within a few minutes, I requested that we might be private, and then a conversation took place nearly word for word as follows; the parties present being the above-mentioned Meers, my moonshee, Meerza Jan, and myself.

Myself.—Meer Bijjur, you joined in the attack on the Residency; by whose order, or at whose instigation, did you do this?

Meer Bijjur.—I joined in that attack by order of Meer Shahdad.

Myself.—Have you any objection to stating how that business commenced, and what part Meer Shahdad acted in it?

Meer Bijjur.—I will tell you willingly. The way of it was this; but first I must explain how we three Meers, now conversing with you stood. I was in the service of Meer Shahdad; Meer Gholam Shah was in the service of Meer Sobdar; Meer Fuzzil Ali was in the service of Meer Mohamed. Well, as you know, for some days before the attack on the Residency there had been a great deal of unpleasant discussion between the Ameers and Major Outram; but at last, on the evening before the attack, Meer Nusseer Khan moved out with his forces to Meer Futteh Ali's garden, on the road to Meeanee. He moved in the evening, the other Ameers remaining in the fort. The night he moved out a large assemblage of Belooch Sirdars took place at his Dhurbar: but what was done I do not know, as I was not there. The next morning, as I was going as usual to make my salaam to Meer Shahdad, I saw great crowds of Beloochees, and heard they were going to attack the Residency. I went on to Meer Shahdad's. On going into the Dhurbar, Mutakum Moonshee also came in, and said the Beloochees were ready to start and attack the Residency, when Meer Shahdad who was all prepared for battle, jumped up and said he would go forthwith and head them. He desired me to go with him. I had my sword with me as usual, but no shield or matchlock, and was quite unprepared for fighting, but of course I obeyed. I then learned that Ahmed Khan Lugaree had been de-

tached with seven or eight thousand men to attack the Residency, by orders given him the night before by Meer Nusseer Khan.

Myself.—What! By order of Meer Nusseer Khan?

Meer Bijjur.—I understood it was by his order, given overnight at the garden, but I cannot speak positively as I was not there. However, there were the men ready to start. Meer Shahdad was proceeding to put himself at their head, he ordered me to accompany him, and I did so. I had very few men with me, and sent a messenger to Meer Gholam Shah, who was with Meer Mohamed Khan, to tell him what was going on and beg him to persuade Meer Shahdad to desist. Meer Gholam Shah spoke to Meer Mohamed, and he sent a confidential servant, who came to Meer Shahdad, and told him, that the business he was engaged in was a mad one, and prayed him over and over again to desist.

Meer Gholam Shah.—Yes, I was not in Meer Shahdad's service, but living as I did near the Residency, I had had much intercourse with the gentlemen there: I had seen enough of the English to be pretty sure that they would beat us, first or last, if we went to war with them; and I knew, when they did beat us they would deeply revenge the murder of their envoy: besides I thought it disgraceful to murder defenceless people. I therefore begged Meer Mohamed to send an order to stop Meer Shahdad, whose hot-headed proceedings would bring eventual destruction on us all; a confidential person was then sent to Meer Shahdad, but the latter replied, he had sworn to do the business and would go on with it. He added that the attack was all arranged, and that Ahmed Khan Lugaree was going with his followers; that he had sworn to act through thick or thin with Ahmed, and would place himself at the head of the force.

Meer Bijjur.—Well, after this there was an end of remonstrance, and Meer Shahdad, with myself and the rest of the party, started for the Residency, and when we arrived there Ahmed Khan led forward the people to the attack, while Meer Shahdad with myself and other attendants re-

mained on horseback under a clump of trees out of reach of the fire till all was over: we then returned, and joined Meer Nusseer Khan at Meeanee. That is all I know of the matter. The truth is, though I was Meer Shahdad's brother-in-law, I was never consulted by him—his power was lodged in the hands of servants and others.

Meer Gholam Shah.—Meer Bijjur has given a true statement of the transaction.

Meer Fuzzil Ali.—Yes, that is all true.

Meer Gholam Shah.—May I ask why these inquiries are now made? Meer Bijjur has made his salaam, and we hope the past, as then promised, is forgiven.

*Myself.**—I can have no difficulty in telling you. Meer Bijjur has made his salaam and has been forgiven, and there is not the slightest intention of molesting him for what is past. The cause of my questioning him is this:—Meer Shahdad now states that he never headed the party that attacked the Residency, that it was the Belooch Sirdars who insisted on attacking it, and that the purpose for which he went was to remonstrate with them and save the garrison.

Meer Bijjur.—Why this is notoriously untrue; every one who was with the party knows it to be so. What influence the boasting of Beloochees may have had in procuring the order for the attack I know not; I dare say it may have had a good deal, for they talked loudly of what they could do: but Meer Shahdad headed the party as I have said, voluntarily, against the remonstrances and orders of Meer Mohamed; he attended throughout the fight, and after driving out the English, rode with us over to Meeanee, went up to Meer Nusseer Khan, and saluting him said, "Good fortune attend you, I have gained the day."

Myself.—What! said this to Nusseer Khan?

Meer Gholam Shah.—Meer Bijjur speaks truth; Meer Shahdad, on his return from the Residency, rode up, as Meer Bijjur says, to Nusseer Khan's tent, and entering it, said, "*Meer Sahib Moobarick, Meer Futteh Khia.*"

Myself.—I thank you for this explanation.

Meer Gholam Shah.—We have stated all we know and

this truly. I have never spoken an ill word of the Ameers to you, because they were our sovereigns and relations, but as you now question us we have spoken the truth.

Myself.—I have also, as you know, avoided a topic which I thought must be painful to you, but it was my duty to make this inquiry, and I thank you for the readiness with which you have answered me.

After some further short conversation on general subjects I took my leave.

A. B. RATHBORNE,
Collector and Magistrate, Hyderabad.

October 22nd, 1843.

N.B.—The above conversation took place on the 21st inst., I made the original memorandum of it on the 22nd, but on reading it over to the moonshee, he differed as to one point; this was, whether it had been said that Meer Mohamed sent a man to Shahdad to call him, and *himself remonstrated with him*; or, whether the *man* merely conveyed the remonstrance, as now stated. I sent the moonshee to Meer Gholam Shah to ascertain which was the correct version, and in his interview he elicited from him the following important additional admission:—

Meer Gholam Shah, on the morning of the attack, also waited on Meer Sobdar, *who desired him to join in the attack also.* Gholam Shah replied, that he was not going to put himself under the orders of an inexperienced child like Shahdad, especially as he thought the business a bad one; but if Meer Sobdar chose to go himself, he would, as in duty bound, accompany him. *Meer Sobdar then laughed, and said that would never do.*

This morning Meer Gholam Shah and Fuzzil Ali called upon me, and I took the opportunity of reading over to them the above conversation, taken down on the 22nd inst. which they said was quite correct: on this occasion the moonshee was not present, and on both his aid was not required.

A. B. RATHBORNE,
&c., &c.

24th October.

Evidence given by Peer Budroodeen, Moosahib, or confidential servant of the ex-Ameer, Sobdar Khan of Hyderabad.

Question.—On what day did the army of the Ameers leave Hyderabad, and where did it encamp?

Answer.—On the 6th of February, 1843, the troop under the command of Gholam Mohamed Komriewalla and Meer Khan Mohamed Talpoor (Khananie) went out and encamped in the Babool jungle near Meer Futteh Ali Kebah. The two chiefs then returned to Hyderabad, and told Nusseer to get all in readiness for battle. Afterwards the force collected there, and chiefs, as they arrived, remained there. On the evening of the 14th of February, 1843, Meer Nusseer Khan moved out and joined this force.

Do you know what strength the force was?

I did not count them, but it was well known that it amounted to 30,000 strong.

That was on the 14th of February. What did this force do next day?

In the morning an order was issued to plunder Major Outram's dwelling.

Who gave this order?

I know not.

What number of men went to the agency for that purpose?

Nine or ten thousand men.

Who commanded this party, and what chiefs accompanied it?

Meer Shahdad commanded the party, and by him the order was given to plunder the agency. Meer Nusseer of Kyrpoor; Jehan Mohamed; Meer Khan Mohamed; Gholam Mohamed Komriewalla; a Nizamancee chief, whose name I forget; Ahmed Khan Lugaree; Meerza Bakur, and other inferior chiefs, accompanied him.

When this party reached the agency who commanded it, and what orders were given by him?

Meer Shahdad Khan commanded, and he gave these

orders "if the troops fight kill them, but if they run away never mind?"

When Major Outram quitted the agency what did the Scinde troops do?

They plundered all the property left and burnt all the buildings. They then joined Meer Nusseer Khan at the garden, and Meer Shahdad and the afore-mentioned chiefs said, "We have gained a victory; Major Outram has fled, and we have plundered his property; our party have behaved most bravely." Meer Shahdad sent a man, whose name I forget, to give the news of his victory to Meer Sobdar Khan in the fort, and to inform him that Major Outram had fled. Meer Sobdar, on hearing this, answered, "You have done ill: if with 8,000 men you have been unable to destroy 100 men, what will you be able to do in front of the General's army?"

This was on the 15th of February. What then occurred?

On the evening of the 15th of February, Meer Nusseer Khan moved from his garden and took up a position at Lunar, half a coss from it; on the evening of the 16th he reached Meeanee; next morning the battle took place.

In the battle of Meeanee, what was the strength of the Ameer's force?

Some say 40,000, and some say 35,000.

How many of Sobdar's men were in the battle?

With Iktyar Lugaree 4000; with Mohamed Khan Tora 300; with other chiefs subject to Meer Sobdar Khan there were 500 men.

How many men of Meer Mohaed Khman's were there in the battle?

I know not, but every soul he could collect was there.

Was Meer Sobdar in the battle, and what other Ameer's were there?

Meers Sobdar and Mohamed Khan were not in the battle. Except these two all the Ameer's of Upper and Lower Scinde were there.

Such being the strength of the Ameer's force on the 17th of February, had the battle been delayed for two or three days more, to what extent would they have been reinforced?

It would have increased to 50,000 or 60,000 men.

Did Meer Sobdar send information to the General that troops were collecting at Hyderabad?

On the night of the day on which the General reached Sukkurunda, Meer Sobdar called me and said, "Take two days' food and drink and proceed by the jungle to the General's camp; tell him if he comes quickly it is well, but if he delays the force here will greatly increase." Jemada Couza said, "Budroodeen is a great man, if he goes it will be well known, and you will get a bad name, it will be better if some one else is sent." I afterwards heard that orders were given to Syud Abbis Ali Shah, and a Cazeer, to proceed to the General's camp and beg of him to come quickly.*

At this time, the 10th of February, 1843, Meer Sobdar was a friend of the British, when did he become hostile?

I do not know.

When did the Ameers commence collecting troops?

When Meerza Khoosroo wrote from Nowshera to the Ameers, "The General is bent on war, so get ready." When the Meerza returned to Hyderabad the order for collecting troops was given.

Had this collection commenced before Major Outram reached Hyderabad?

The collection of troops had commenced before Major Outram reached Hyderabad.

Had the Ameers gained the victory what would have been the fate of the British troops?

Every soul would have been massacred.

Budroodeen having read over his evidence, declares it to be correctly recorded, and applies his seal to it 22nd October, 1843. Mohamed Moyadeen is witness that Budroodeen gave this evidence, and that he declares it to be correct.

Evidence given in my presence this 22nd day of October, 1843.

E. J. BROWN.

* These men never came to me.—C. J. N.

X.

SECTION 1.

Reply to the Accusations of the Ameers, Sobdar Khan, Nusseer Khan, and Mohamed Khan, by the Officers accused.

Major McPherson, Prize Agent.

The assertion of the three Ameers, that I entered the fort with the view of seeing it, is erroneous on their part. I accompanied the troops to take possession of it, and to see the British standard hoisted on its tower, which was done on the 21st of March, 1843. No outrage was committed, no zenana approached, and sentries were placed to prevent any one approaching them. Notice was given when the men would mount the tower, that the ladies might retire, and not be overlooked; and people were only admitted on the tower at a certain time, lest the ladies should be annoyed. During that day, as prize agent, I collected treasure to a considerable amount, principally in gold. No zenana was ever entered by me, or any British officer, during the time they were inhabited by the ladies; but I have taken treasure from those vacated. No female of any description was ever suffered to be ill used at any time. As for taking the ladies' jewels from them, I positively deny it; in many instances they were sent out for me to take, but I, as well as my colleagues, invariably returned them again, as being their personal property. I have never heard of any of the ladies of the zenana being ill used, or even seen; and I can safely assert, the complaint made is a gross falsehood on the part of the Ameers. That we the prize agents took money, jewels, swords, &c. &c. from the empty houses is certainly the case. To do so was the duty of the prize agents.

(Signed)

P. MCPHERSON.

Captain Blenkins, Prize Agent.

After the perusal of three letters respectively from Meer Nusseer Khan, Sobdar Khan, and Meer Mohamed, I beg to

state that the whole therein contained, as far as I have any knowledge, or which relates to myself, or any other of the prize agents, is entirely without any foundation. They, the Ameers, never experienced anything but the greatest kindness and consideration from us. They were repeatedly told that we did not wish the ornaments of their women to be given, or any other property which belonged to them; and in several instances when proffered, I have myself sent them back to their owners; so did the other prize agents: we had no idea of intruding on the ladies, nor did we ever intrude on their zenanas; and we had strict orders from the Major-General to keep perfectly aloof from the dwellings of the women.

W. BLENKINS.

Captain Bazett prize agent, Lieutenant Brown commissioner, and Major Reid commanding the troops in the Fort, made similar statements; the contradictions are to be found in the supplement to the Scinde Parliamentary Papers, together with the Ameers' memorials.

Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General, May 9th, 1843.

The whole of the women of the Ameers refused to accompany them, and are here. They say they have no means of subsistence. This is said to be untrue. I positively forbade their personal ornaments of gold and jewels to be taken from them by the prize agents; but whether they carried out treasure or not, I cannot say.

[They carried away two millions sterling!—W. N.]

SECTION 2.

Contradiction of the falsehoods promulgated by Dr. Buist, of the "Bombay Times."

Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General, May 16th, 1843.

An infamous article appeared in the *Bombay Times* of the 6th instant. The whole is one lie from beginning to end. The officers of this army are extremely indignant. The article is headed "The Ladies of the Ameers' Zenana."

APPENDIX X.

My reason for troubling your Lordship on the subject is, that you might have thought some outrage had been committed, and the case amplified. My Lord, there has not been a single irregularity; nor is there a woman, much less one of the ladies of the zenana, in any officer's quarters, nor do I believe any one of these ladies has ever been seen by an officer of this army.

At a general meeting of the Officers of the Scinde Field Force, stationed at and near Hyderabad, held with sanction of His Excellency Sir C. J. Napier, K.C.B., Governor of Scinde, and commanding the forces in Scinde, to take into consideration the measures that should be adopted to refute a certain calumnious article which appeared in the *Bombay Times* newspaper of the 6th May last, headed, "Ladies of the Ameer's Zenana," it was unanimously resolved:—

That an address to His Excellency the Governor of Scinde be drawn up and circulated for the signature of the officers of this force, expressive of their indignation at the unfounded and injurious calumnies contained in the above-mentioned article, soliciting the protection of His Excellency, and requesting his permission to make their sentiments more generally known, by circulating copies of this address to the Indian press for publication.

The following address was then drawn up and agreed to—

Address of the undersigned Officers of the Scinde Army, stationed at or near Hyderabad, to His Excellency Major General Sir C. J. Napier, K.C.B., Governor of, and commanding in Scinde.

Sir,—We, the undersigned officers in the army, serving under your Excellency's command, have seen with indignation an article in the *Bombay Times* newspaper of the 6th May last, closely affecting our honour, and tending to degrade us in the eyes of our friends and country. The article in question is headed "The Ladies of the Ameer's Zenana," and concludes in the following terms:—

“Where are they now? They, who three months since, were sharers of a palace and in the enjoyment of the honours of royalty, are the degraded lemans of the Feringhi! So it is, the harem has been defiled; the last drop of bitterness has been mingled with the cup of misery we have given the Ameer to drink, the heaviest of the insults Mahomedans can endure has been heaped upon their grey discrowned heads. Let it not be supposed we speak of this in the language of prudish sentimentalism; the officers who have dishonoured the zenana of kings have committed great wrong; but for that, as for the evil deeds attending upon so unjust and cruel a conquest, the Government which ordained it is responsible. We know to our shame and sorrow the evils which flowed from frailties such as this permitted in Cabool; and at Hydrabad we may yet discover the heinousness of our sins in the magnitude of our punishment. If one thing more than all the other wrongs we have inflicted on them could awaken in the bosom of each Beloochee chief, the unquenchable thirst of never-dying vengeance, it must be to see the sanctities of domestic life invaded and violated as they have been; to see the daughters of nobles, and wives of kings, living while youth and beauty last as the concubines of the infidel, thrown aside when their attractions have departed, to perish in their degradation and shame. This is the first of the black fruits of invasion for which Britons must blush. We have avoided explicitness on such a subject: our readers will be at no loss to discover our meaning:—the most attractive of the ladies of the zenana now share the tents of British officers. A series of acts of injustice first introduced to the Scindians the character of the British Government: what has just been related will afford them an insight into the virtues and blessings they may look for from the advance of civilization; the benefits and honours destined them by the most refined people in the world. This contrasts well with the reception English ladies experienced at Affghan hands.”

We beg to assure your Excellency, from our own knowledge and inquiry as to facts, that the grave charges contained in this extract against the officers under your command are utterly without foundation, and that not a single instance of

ill-treatment or disrespect to the inmates of the Ameer's zenana has ever come to our knowledge. Having expressed to your Excellency our deliberate conviction that the whole of the statements in the extract complained of, are unfounded in truth, we respectfully solicit that you will be good enough to take such steps as you may deem advisable to clear our characters thus aspersed in the eyes of our military superiors and comrades, and of our friends and countrymen in India and in Europe; and that, with the same end in view, you will kindly permit us to circulate copies of this address to the Indian newspapers for publication.

We have, &c.

Hydrabad, 10th May, 1843.

(Signed.)

C. Waddington, Comdg. Engr. Bombay Engrs.

P. McPherson, Major, M. S.

Edward Green, Acting Asst. Adjt. General.

E. J. Brown, Lieut. Engrs. and Commissioner.

W. Brown, Fort Major.

A. Gibbon, Assist. Surgeon, Post Master.

M. McMurdo, Lieut. Acting Asst. Qr. Mr. Genl.

H. J. Pelly, Lieut. Persian Interpreter.

F. Cristal, Bt. Capt. A. D. Judge Advocate General.

D. Erskine, Lt. Artillery.

John Lloyd, Major Arty.

H. Gibberne, Bt. Capt. Arty.

J. S. Unwin, Bt. Capt. Arty.

T. F. V. Outlaw, Lt. Madras Sappers and Miners.

J. P. Nixon, Lieut. 25th Regt. N. I.

A. Boileau, 2d Lieut. Madras Sappers and Miners.

T. Studdert, Lt. Fd. Engr.

J. A. Wood, Lieut. 20th Regt. N. I.

D. Carstairs, Capt. 6th Regt. N. I.

C. G. Bazett, Capt. 9th Light Cavalry.

C. P. Leeson, Lieut. 25th Regt. N. I. Supt. of Police.

W. Ward, Assist. Surg. 12th Regt. N. I.

A. B. Rathborne, Lieut. Collector and Magistrate.

W. Blenkins, Capt. 6th Regt. N. I.

J. P. Leslie, Bt. Major, 1st Troop H. A.

G. Hutt, Capt. Artillery.

J. G. Petrie, 2d Lieut. Arty.

D. Gaye, 2d Lieut. Arty.

A. Rowan, Capt. H. A.

W. S. Hatch, 2d Lieut. Arty.

W. J. Whillie, Capt. Arty.

W. J. Milford, Bt. Capt. 9th Light Cavalry.

H. C. Plowden, Lieut. Adjt. 9th Lt. Cavalry.

C. Turner, 9th Light Cavalry.

W. B. Wemyss, Capt. 9th Light Cavalry.

J. R. Snow, Lieut. 9th Cavalry.

A. T. Wylly, Lieut. 9th Bengal Lt. Cavalry.

J. H. Thomson, Cornet, 9th do.

M. B. Stone, Cornet, do.

M. Hyle, Assist. Surgeon.

H. A. Balmoyne, Cornet, 9th Light Cavalry.

J. H. Firth, Cornet, 9th do.

P. F. Story, Major, do.

C. Buckle, 3d Rt. Bombay, Lt. Cavalry.

M. Stack, Major, do.

R. R. Youngusband, Lieut. 20th Regt.

W. Collum, Assist. Surg. 3d Light Cavalry.

T. P. Taylor, Lieut. 3d Light Cavalry.

F. F. Forbes, Lieut. 3d Lt. Cavalry.

R. B. Moore, Lieut. do.

E. F. Moore, Cornet, do.

T. Eyre, Capt. do.

C. Delamain, Capt. 3d Lt. Cavalry.	E. L. Scott, Ensign, 21st Regt.
F. S. Oldfield, Lieut. do.	J. P. Laurie, Ensign, do.
H. Mackenzie, Lieut. do.	G. W. West, Ensign, do.
C. T. North, Lieut. Bombay Engrs.	H. J. Carter, Assist. Surg. do.
T. Pownall, Lieut. H. A.	W. J. Brown, Major, 8th Regt. N. I.
R. Henderson, Bt. Capt. Madras Engineers.	A. Thomas, Capt. do.
A. Woodburn, Major, 25th Regt.	J. McKenzie, Assist. Surg. do.
G. H. Robertson, Lieut. do.	A. S. Hawkins, Capt. 8th Regt.
G. Mayor, Lieut. do.	C. Brasnell, Ensign, do.
T. Follett, Capt. do.	S. J. Dalzell, Ensign, do.
J. Jackson, Capt. do.	R. T. Reid, Major, 12th Regt. N. I.
A. Wright, Assist. Surg. do.	E. J. Russell, Lieut. do.
H. Grice, Ensign, do.	I. Fisher, Capt. do.
E. Glennie, Lieut.-Adj. 25th Regt.	W. Lodwick, Lieut. do.
E. Lowrie, Ensign, do.	W. T. Holbrow, Ensign, do.
A. J. Thompson, Lieut. Provost- Marshal.	A. Y. Bease, Ensign, do.
A. P. Barker, Lieut. 21st Regt.	O. Clarkson, Capt. do.
H. Farrell, Lieut.-Col. do.	Jas. D. B. Forest, Ensign, do
W. C. Wilkinson, Lt. Adj. do.	W. J. Soppitt, Ensign, do.
F. S. Stevens, Capt. do.	J. B. D. Carter, Lieut. do.
E. A. Green, Lieut. do.	C. M. James, Ensign 6th Regiment N. I.
E. S. Leathes, Ensign, do.	J. Dalrymple, Surg. 9th Light Cavy.
M. J. Battye, Lieut. do.	W. Ashburner, Lieut. Adj. 3d Lt. Cavalry.
W. J. Merewether, Ensign do.	E. G. Malet, Capt. do.
J. M. Younghusband, Lieut. 8th Regt.	G. Allender, Staff Surgeon.
H. Fenning, Lieut. 21st. Regt.	James Down, Lieut. 12th Regt. N. I.

(True Copy.)

P. McPHERSON, Major.

Military Secretary.

Hydrabad, July 25th, 1843.

Gentlemen,—Your address has given me great satisfaction. I concur in every word, and confirm every statement it contains.

We are accused by Mr. Buist, the Editor of the *Bombay Times*, of disgracing ourselves, our profession, and our country, by the most infamous conduct towards the women of the zenana; and I am, personally, held up to public scorn as the immediate cause of such scandalous conduct.

You have protected your character, collectively and individually, by exposing this unprovoked and unparalleled calumny; and it is right the public should know that, so far from offering these ladies any insult, no officer of this army has even seen a lady of the zenana.

But the officers whom I have the honour to command, are of the same class of high-minded gentlemen which compose

the rest of the officers of the Queen's and Company's service; the calumny, therefore, applies to the character of the whole military profession—all will feel the insult!

This calumny is intended to make England look down upon her armies with horror and disgust; and when I consider the bad climate in which we are now serving; that dangers and privations surround us; that we have put forth our best energies to serve our sovereign and our country, and to gain the approbation of our friends; that all have served with reputation, and some of us grown grey in undishonoured arms; that many of our comrades have lately fallen in battle, and by disease, and that all are ready to fall; when I consider these things I say I am at a loss to account for the feelings which induced Mr. Buist (if it be true that he is an Englishman, deliberately to make the groundless fabrication which he has put forth to the world.

Gentlemen, your reputation and mine are inseparable, and I assure you that my best exertions shall be united with yours, to defend our private character as gentlemen, and our military character as soldiers.

I have, &c. (Signed) C. J. NAPIER,
Major-General and Governor of Scinde.
 (True Copy.) P. McPHERSON, Major,
Military Secretary.

[This infamous libel was written by Dr. Buist.]

XI.

Names of Officers mentioned in the Despatches as being distinguished in the battles of Meanee and Hydrabad.

Lieut.-Colonels. Pennefather.—Pattle.

Majors. Poole.—Jackson.—Teasdale.—Lloyd.—MacPherson.—Waddington.—Wyllie.—Storey.—Stack.—Leslie.—Reid.—Brown.—Woodburn.

Captains. Garrett.—Meade.—Tew.—Cookson.—Tucker.—Conway.—Whitlie.—Hutt.—Blenkins.—Henderson.—Tait.—Delamain.—Jacob.—Willoughby.—George.—Jackson.—Stevens.—Fisher.

Lieutenants. Smith. — Coote. — Wood. — Harding. — Phayre. — M'Murdo. — Pelly. — Boileau. — Outlaw. — Thompson. — Younghusband. — Leeson. — Brennan. — Brown. — Rathborne. — Hill. — North. — Battersby. — Leeson. — Fitzgerald.

Surgeons. Dalrymple. — Bell.

Moonshee. Ali Ackbar.

Names of Officers killed at Meeanee.

Majors. Jackson. — Teasdale.

Captains. Cookson. — Tew. — Meade.

Lieutenant. Wood.

Wounded.

Lieut.-Colonel. Pennefather.

Major. Wyllie.

Captains. Tucker. — Smith. — Conway.

Lieutenants. Plowden. — Harding. — Phayre. — Bourdillon.

Ensigns. Firth. — Pennefather. — Bowden. — Holbrow.

Officers killed at Hydrabad.

Captain. Garrett.

Lieutenant. Smith.

Wounded.

Lieutenants. Pownoll. — Tait. — Chute. — Coote. — Evans. — Brennan. — Bur. — Wilkinson. — M'Murdo.

Ensign. Pennefather.

Names of men of the 22nd Regiment who concealed their wounds, received in the battle of Hydrabad, and marched with their Regiment the next day, thinking another battle was at hand.

John Durr. — John Muldowney. — Robert Young. — Henry Lines. — Patrick Gill. — James Andrews. Wounds not severe.

Sergeant Haney. Wound rather severe.

Thomas Middleton.—James Mulvey. Severely wounded in the legs.

Silvester Day. Ball in the foot!

Report sent by Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General, of non-commissioned Officers and men who had particularly distinguished themselves at the Battle of Meeanee.

From Major-General Sir C. J. NAPIER, K.C.B., to the Right Honourable LORD ELLENBOROUGH, Governor-General of India, &c. &c.

Hydrabad, 2nd March, 1843.

My Lord,—I beg leave to send to your Lordship reports made by my order; that while the memory is fresh, distinguished deeds may be put on record. The great results of this battle have made me anxious that those who were so conspicuous in the hour of trial should be known to your Lordship. Their devotion to their duty was very honourable to them.

In the case of the brave drivers of the two batteries I am sure your Lordship will do them justice, and I beg especially to recommend them to your Lordship's protection.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, *Major-General.*

From Captain G. Hutt, Commanding Field Battery, to the Adjutant of Artillery, in Scinde.

Camp, near Hydrabad, 23rd February, 1843.

Sir,—With reference to Division After Orders of yesterday, I beg permission to bring to the notice of the Major-General, the general steadiness and good conduct of the drivers of the battery under my command, throughout the action of the 17th, particularly of three men (*Drivers*—Uggar Khan, Ba-

hadoop, Mahadoo), who brought up the howitzer first in action on the right of the line, under a very heavy and destructive fire, with a degree of coolness and steadiness that could not be surpassed, though two of their horses were dangerously wounded.

I would not presume to bring these men to notice were they enlisted, or treated as fighting men; but as they are still considered as mere followers, men whose families receive no pension in the event of their death, or themselves if disabled by wounds, I beg to submit the case to the Major-General, as a strong argument in favour of those, on whose courage and conduct the very existence of the battery must often depend.

I have, &c.,
 (Signed) GEO. HUTT, *Captain,*
Com^d. Field Battery.

*From Major P. F. Story, Com^d. 9th Light Cavalry, to
 Lieutenant Pelly, Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Camp, Hyderabad, 26th February, 1843.

Sir,—In forwarding the accompanying Roll, for the information of the Major-General, I have the honour to request you will inform him, that I have had the greatest difficulty in selecting these men, where all behaved so gallantly, and nearly equally well.

I have, &c.,
 (Signed) P. F. STORY, *Major,*
Com^d. 9th Light Cavalry.

Roll of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates of the 9th Bengal light cavalry, who particularly distinguished themselves in action with the enemy, on the 17th February, 1843.

Camp, Hyderabad, February, 1843.

Subadar. Shaik Bekr Ally—Had his horse severely wounded in the chest, led his men in a most gallant manner,

and was very active in re-forming them for a second attack.

Subadar. Shaik Emam Bux—Engaged with two troopers in taking a Standard planted near some guns, and which was most bravely defended by the enemy.

Jemadar. Khoman Sing—Carried the Standard of the 1st squadron (Queen's colour), and was very zealous and active during the whole action.

Havildar. Shaik Emam ' Bux—saved the life of his officer, Shaik Emam Bux, (subadar,) and his conduct was conspicuous during the day.

Havildar. Shaik Golam Hussain — Strongly recommended for great gallantry during the charge.

Naick. Bucktawer Sing — Behaved most gallantly during the whole day.

Troopers. Birma Deen, Golam Russool—These two men were equally engaged with the subadar in taking the Standard, which was so nobly defended.

Trooper. Sewdial Sing—Singly rushed into a walled enclosure and killed one of the enemy, who had several times fired from it with effect.

Trooper. Mootee Sing—Saved the life of his officer, Captain Garrett.

Trooper. Gungah Sing—Killed after a long and severe personal conflict with one of the enemy, when no assistance was at hand.

Trooper. Beharee Sing—After being severely wounded in the wrist, and his horse also in two places, cut down his adversary.

Trooper. Fyzoolla Khan—Behaved gallantly throughout, and cut down his enemy after a severe personal conflict.

Trooper. Hussain Ally—Strongly recommended for great gallantry during the charge.

Trooper. Nasser Ally—Behaved with great gallantry during the charge, and was severely wounded.

(Signed) P. F. STORY, Major,
Com^{dg}. 9th Light Cavalry.

*From Major J. H. Poole, Commanding 22nd Regiment, to
the Assistant Adjutant-General, Scinde Field Force.*

Camp, Hyderabad, 24th February, 1843.

Sir,—In reference to No. 2, After Division Orders of the 22nd instant, I called upon the captains and officers commanding companies, to furnish me with the names and acts of individuals under my command, who had especially distinguished themselves in the action of the 17th instant. The officers generally assert that they feel difficulty in making selections, where the conduct of every man of the companies was so satisfactory. In so general a field of action and persevering exertion, I equally feel at a loss, where to draw a distinction; but it may be proper to mention the names of private James O'Neill, of the light company, who took a standard whilst we were actively engaged with the enemy, and Drummer Martin Delaney, who shot, bayoneted and captured the arms of Meer Whulle Mohamed Khan, who was mounted, and directing the enemy in the hottest part of the engagement. When all the regiment behaved with enduring coolness and intrepidity, I hope the particular circumstances of these two cases will exonerate me from the imputation of doing injustice to all the brave soldiers of the regiment, by particularizing them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. POOLE, Major,
Com^{dg}. 22nd Regt.

*From Major S. Clibborne, Com^{dg}. 1st Grenadier Regt. N. I.,
to Lieutenant Pelly, Acting Asst. Adjt.-Genl., Hyderabad.*

Camp, near Hyderabad, 24th February, 1843.

Sir,—Agreeably to Division Orders of the 22nd instant, I beg to bring to the especial notice of Major-General Sir C. J. Napier, K.C.B., the names of the following officers and men of the 1st grenadiers, who distinguished themselves by zeal and gallantry in the action of the 17th February.

Lieutenant Johnstone, who cut down a Beloochee, and

saved the life of a sepoy who had bayoneted this Beloochee, but was overpowered in the life struggle.

Subadar Major Kooshall Sing, and Subadar Esseree Pursaud, likewise privates Sunkur Misser and Kadaree Powar, who were conspicuous throughout the day for their zeal and gallantry.

I have, &c.

(Signed) S. CLIBBORNE, *Major,*
Com^{dg}. 1st Grenadier Regt. N.I.

From Major N. R. Reid, Commanding 12th Regt. N. I.
to the Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Scinde and Beloochistan,
Hydrabad Fort, 25th February, 1843.

Sir,—With reference to No. 3 of the Division Orders, dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to transmit, for the purpose of being laid before the Major-General, a nominal Roll of non-commissioned officers, naicks and privates, in the 12th regiment, N. I., who have been reported to me by the officers in command, and in charge of the companies to which they belong, as having particularly distinguished themselves in the action of the 17th instant.

I take this opportunity of recording the gallant conduct of the late Captain and Brevet Major Jackson, who fell at the head of the grenadier company, in a personal conflict with several of the enemy. The other officers, Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Meade and Lieutenant Wood, who were killed, were also most conspicuous when they fell, in cheering on their men at one of the most critical periods of the action. To the other European officers I am also much indebted for their gallant conduct and example throughout the day; but to Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Brown, the only mounted officer with me in the battle, in a particular degree I beg to place on record the deep gratitude I must ever feel for the assistance he afforded me, as well as my admiration at the gallantry he displayed in cheering the men

throughout the conflict, at every part of the line where the resistance was most hot and determined.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. REID, *Major,*
Commanding 12th Regt. N. I.

Nominal Roll of those men in the 12th Regiment, N. I., who distinguished themselves in the action of the 17th Feb. 1843.

Fort Hyderabad, 25th February, 1843.

- 1 Havildar Dutram Tewaree,
- 1 Naick Bhowanee Sing,
- 2 Naick Allum Sing,
- 1 Private Shaik Adjum,

Wounded, in gallantly defending Capt. and Brevet Major Jackson.

(Sd.) B. D. CARTER, *Ens. in charge of Gr. Company.*

- 1 Havildar Oomrow Sing,
- 1 Naick Lall Khan,
- 1 Private Mathadeen 1st.
- 2 „ Booree Aheer,
- 3 „ Seetul Lohar.

I heard these men cheering on their comrades after a slight check, and saw them most forward in the action.

(Sd.) G. FISHER, *Capt. Com^d. 5th Company.*

- 1 Havildar Bugwan Sing,
- 2 „ Thackoor Ram,

Behaved gallantly, urging the men on, and foremost in the action.

(Sd.) W. F. HOLBROW, *Ens. in charge 8th Company.*
(True copy.) (Sd.) W. BROWN, *Capt. Adj. 12th Regt. N. I.*
(Sd.) N. R. REID, *Major, Com^d. 12th Regt. N. I.*

From Capt. J. Jackson, Com^d. 25th Regt. N.I., to the Assistant Adjutant-General, in Scinde and Beloochistan.

Camp, Hydrabad, 25th February, 1843.

Sir,—Agreeably to Division Orders of the 22nd instant, I beg to bring to the especial notice of Major-General Sir C. J. Napier, K.C.B., the following officers of the 25th regiment, N. I., who particularly distinguished themselves, by zeal and gallantry, in the action of the 17th of February, 1843.

The whole of the sepoys behaved so well, that I consider it would be invidious to make any distinction.

Lieutenant Marston, grenadier company, who cut down two of the enemy, single handed, in front of the line.

Subadar Major Nund Ram, who, though wounded, remained with his company throughout the action.

Subadar Russall Sing, grenadier company, who shot three men, and cut down one, and shewed great zeal in encouraging and leading on his men.

Jemedar Bappoo Sawunt, light company, who cut down one man.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN JACKSON, *Captain,*
Com^d. 25th Regt. N. I.

From Captain J. Jacob, Com^d. Scinde Irregular Horse, to the Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Scinde and Beloochistan,
Camp, near Hydrabad, 23rd February, 1843.

Sir,—With reference to Division Orders of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to request that you will bring to the notice of Major-General Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B. commanding in Scinde and Beloochistan, that throughout the battle fought on the 17th I received the most essential service from my Acting Adjutant, Lieutenant Russell, whose steady, cool, and daring conduct on the occasion mainly

contributed to the good behaviour of the corps I have the honour to command, especially while it was exposed alone for nearly two hours to a heavy fire of artillery, in a most trying position for an irregular sepoy corps, which, until a few months before that day, had, since it was raised, been always dispersed in small detachments, and the men of which had, with few exceptions, never been engaged in any but skirmishing fights. I am also greatly indebted to this officer for the promptness with which he assisted me in the very difficult task of reforming, after charging through the enemy's camp, when the men were excited to the highest pitch, and when their services were required to repel an unexpected attack on the rear guard.

I also request that you will have the kindness to bring to the notice of the Major-General, the excellent conduct of Russuldar Surferaz Khan, Jemedar Alladad Khan Nawab, and Duffadar Mhobut Khan. The good conduct of these three native officers was most conspicuous throughout the day, and particularly on one occasion, when the regiment was moving over ground rendered nearly impassable by watercourses, hedges, and deep cuts filled with thorns and lined by matchlock-men; in advancing at the gallop over these obstacles so many falls took place, that more than fifty of our horses were lying on the ground at once; this occurred under a very heavy fire from the village and nullahs on the right of the enemy's line, and on this occasion, the native officers above mentioned, re-formed their men, and restored order in a style which was deserving of my highest admiration. I do not mention Lieutenant Fitzgerald, my second in command, as I have already brought that officer's services to the notice of the General.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. JACOB, *Capt. Arty.*
Com^{do}. Scinde Irregular Horse.

XII.


Extract from a private Letter of Sir C. Napier, touching the Operations against Shere Mohamed, in June 1843.

18th July.

I am very ill; I had an apoplectic fit, from the sun, when out on the 13th of June last. I had before had the fever, and was very ill recovered, when I went out, and my tent was 132°. The sun struck me down, and I was, I believe, the only man of many who were so stricken that was not dead within three hours, and most of them in a few minutes. • The doctor was with me in a minute and bled me, put my feet in hot water, wet towels round my head, and so I was got right; but I have never been right since. Such terrible weakness that I cannot write a letter without lying down; a sickening feel comes over me that is quite indescribable. The doctors tell me I must give myself holidays! I ask them how? If I take one day's rest, I must work double tides the next! How can I take rest? That is beyond their power to answer; I *know* I want it as well as they can tell me, but let them tell me who is to answer, perhaps, *one hundred letters* which at times come in at once, from Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, or Agra. In short, it is impossible, without I quit this for ever, to have rest; and I feel unable to go on. Even this letter to you knocks me up! Yet 20 sheets of letters on stupid nonsense await at my elbow! There are two reasons why I cannot get rest. There is no one to do the work. *2nd.* It is impossible to go away, we are locked up for five months by heat and the monsoon. This world is one of suffering, and he who believes it to be only a sojourn makes up his mind to its roughs and smooths; besides, who is to prophecy? I may in a week be quite well! The weather is cooling, the peace of Scinde is secure. I yesterday heard from the north, and the only chief left in arms has fled over the Indus, with a dozen of followers; and his troops dispersed! I think I feel better already. Tran-

quillity is now *certain*, the want of that weighed hard upon me, as I felt my last point of personal strength was to surround Shere Mohamed on the 14th, as I did.

There he was, and though he was a bad soldier to let me pin him up; yet like a good one, he slapt at Jacob, who was the weakest, and tried to get to the desert, where he would not fear me, indeed the few Jacob




had could hardly find water; poor Shere Mohamed's men would not look us in the face. The 24th March* took the heart out of the whole of these wild tribes; and they fled, 4,000 and three guns, before 900 and two guns! Jacob did not fire a shot but with his cannon. I wanted to go north, to rout out Mohamed Ali, but am too weak, and this fretted me; now he is disposed of, and all is quiet, I shall throw as much work as I can upon others, which with the cool weather will, perhaps, set me up.


My position was a terrible one from 17th February to 22nd March. I had hold of river, fortress, and town, three miles off, Ameers prisoners, immense treasure, and 40,000 men as all accounts stated, gathering upon me; a large hospital, and to guard all these 2,500 men at the most, including officers! And besides all this, the anxiety about the brigade which I had at all hazards ordered to push double marches to Hydrabad from Sukkur; and to protect which, had the enemy ventured to march against it, I must have pursued with 2,000 men at most, an awkward number to follow 40,000! as I heard, and then believed. At last my brigade arrived, and at the same time reinforcements from *up* and *down* the river all arrived on the 23rd and joined. At 7 in the evening I manœuvred the whole in divisions, at 2 in the morning I dismissed an ambassador who arrived to demand my surrender, and told him to make haste home for I would be at his heels. I then lay down for two hours, half dead

with fatigue, marched at 4 with 5,000 men, and gave my friend Shere Mohamed such a hiding as he little expected. They will never again fight. All their chiefs have come in and laid their swords at my feet. The whole country is quiet, and rejoicing at being rid of the tyrants. You never saw such a magnificent country, but a wilderness. The collectors have made the calculation, every cultivator paid two-thirds nearly of his produce to the Ameers, rigidly exacted. They have held the country fifty-eight years, and it is nearly ruined. Do not fancy the Belooch is the Scindian. — says, "I wish you had not been opposed to people fighting for their independence." How they do blunder in England! Oh! no, we have fought for the *liberties of the people!* Even the Belooch himself is glad, now he finds he is not dispossessed of his conquest, but has only got a good master for bad ones."

THE END.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE PHIPPS, RANELAGH STREET,
EATON SQUARE.





Beloochistan

Baluch Mountains

Mouths of the Indus

G U J A T A H

Great Western Marsh

Little Desert

Great Desert

SCINDE,
OR
EXPLANATORY SHEET

Scale bar and orientation markers

Arabian Sea

To the Baluch Pats

catch

And River

Indus River

Dry bed of Narra River

Kanabek River

Yakub

D. C. J. N.

Yakub

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
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
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
PLAN
 of the
 CITY and NEIGHBOURHOOD
 of
 HYDERABAD.

Scale of 2800 Yds to an inch
 2800 0 700 1400
 Drawn by W. W. Cole Esq.



ACTION
at
DUBBA
near
HYDERABAD.
March 21st 1843.

Scale 800 Y^{ds} to an Inch
 800 400 0 200 400
 Drawn by J.G. Ferrandis. Colored by W.W. Cole 27th Reg^t



ACTION
 at
DUBBA
 near
HYDERABAD.
 March 24th 1943.

Scale 800 Yds to an Inch
 800 400 0 200 400
 D^d by J.G. Fernandez. C² by W.W. Cole 27th Regt

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