

DISAFFECTION IN THE NATIVE ARMY.

A MINUTE WRITTEN

BY SIR THOMAS MUNRO,

THIRTY FIVE YEARS AGO.

MINUTE IN CONSULTATION.

12th April, 1822.

A GREAT deal has of late been said, both in England and in this country, regarding the liberty of the Indian press; and although nothing has occurred to bring the question regularly before the Board, yet as I think it one on which, according to the decision which may be given, the preservation of our dominions in India may depend; and as it appears to me desirable that the Honourable the Court of Directors should be in possession of the sentiments of this Government at as early a period as possible, I deem it my duty to call the attention of the Board to the subject.

2. I cannot view the question of a free press in this country, without feeling that the tenure by which we hold our power never has been, and never can be, the liberties of the people; I therefore consider it as essential to the tranquillity of the country, and the maintenance of our government, that all the present restrictions should be continued. Were the people all our countrymen, I would prefer the utmost freedom of the press; but as they are, nothing could be more dangerous than such freedom. In place of spreading useful knowledge among the people, and tending to their better government, it would generate insubordination, insurrection, and anarchy.

3. Those who speak of the press being free in this country, have looked at only one part of the subject; they have looked no farther than to Englishmen, and to the press as a monopoly in their hands for the amusement or benefit of their countrymen; they have not looked to its freedom among the natives, to be by them employed for whatever they also may consider to be for their own benefit, and that of their countrymen.

4. A free press and the dominion of strangers are things which are quite incompatible, and which cannot long exist together; for what is the first duty of a free press? It is to deliver the

country from a foreign yoke, and to sacrifice to this one great object every measure and consideration; and if we make the press really free to the natives as well as to Europeans, it must inevitably lead to this result. We might wish that the press might be used to convey moral and religious instruction to the natives, and that its effects should go no farther; they might be satisfied with this for a time, but would soon learn to apply it to political purposes—to compare their own situations and ours, and to overthrow our power.

5. The advocates of a free press seek, they say, the improvement of our system of Indian government, and of the minds and conditions of the people; but these desirable ends are, I am convinced, quite unattainable by the means they propose. There are two important points which should always be kept in view, in our administration of affairs here. The first is, that our sovereignty should be prolonged to the remotest possible period. The second is, that whenever we are obliged to resign it, we should leave the natives so far improved from their connection with us, as to be capable of maintaining a free, or at least a regular government amongst themselves. If these objects can ever be accomplished, it can only be by a restricted press. A free one, so far from facilitating, would render their attainment utterly impracticable; for, by attempting to *precipitate* improvement, it would frustrate all the benefit which might have been derived from more cautious and temperate proceedings.

6. In the present state of India, the good to be expected from a free press is trifling and uncertain, but the mischief is incalculable; and as to the proprietors of newspapers, as mischief is the more profitable of the two, it will generally have the preference. There is no public in India to be guided and instructed by a free press; the whole of the European society is composed of civil and military officers, belonging to the King's and Honourable Company's services, with a small proportion of merchants and shopkeepers; there are but few among them who have not access

to the newspapers and periodical publications of Europe, or who require the aid of political information from an Indian newspaper.

7. The restraint on the press is very limited ; it extends only to attacks on the character of Government and its officers, and on the religion of the natives ; on all other points it is free. The removal of these restrictions could be of advantage to none but the proprietors of newspapers ; it is their business to sell their papers, and they must fill them with such articles as are most likely to answer this purpose ; nothing in a newspaper excites so much interest as strictures on the conduct of Government, or its officers ; but this is more peculiarly the case in India, where, from the smallness of the European Society, almost all the individuals composing it are known to each other, and almost every European may be said to be a public officer. The newspaper which censures most freely public men and measures, and which is most personal in its attacks, will have the greatest sale.

8. The laws, it may be supposed, would be able to correct any violent abuse of the liberty of the press ; but this would not be the case. The petty jury are shopkeepers and mechanics, a class not holding in this country the same station as in England,—a class by themselves, not mixing with the merchants, or the civil and military servants, insignificant in number, and having no weight in the community. They will never, however differently the judge may think, find a libel in a newspaper against a public servant. Even if the jury could act without bias, the agitation arising from such trials in a small society, would far outweigh any advantage they could produce. The editors of newspapers, therefore, if only restricted by the law of libel, might foully calumniate the character of public officers, and misrepresent the conduct of Government. They would be urged by the powerful incentive of self-interest to follow this course, and they would be the only part of the European population which would derive any advantage from a free press.

9. Every military officer who was dissatisfied with his immediate superior, with the Commander-in-chief, or with the decision of a court-martial, would traduce them in a newspaper. Every civil servant who thought his services neglected, or not sufficiently acknowledged by the head of the department in which he was employed, or by Government, would libel them. Every attempt to restrain them by recourse to a jury, would end in defeat, ridicule, and disgrace, and all proper respect for the authority of Government would be gradually destroyed. The evil of the decline of authority would be sufficiently great, even if it went no farther than the European community; but it will not stop there, it will extend to the natives; and whenever this happens, the question will not be, whether or not a few proprietors of newspapers are to be enriched, and the European community to be amused by the liberty of the press, but whether our dominion in India is to stand or fall. We cannot have a monopoly of the freedom of the press; we cannot confine it to Europeans only; there is no device or contrivance by which this is to be done; and if it be made really free, it must in time produce nearly the same consequences here which it does everywhere else. It must spread among the people the principles of liberty, and stimulate them to expel the strangers who rule over them, and establish a national Government.

10. Were we sure that the press would act only through the medium of the people, after the great body of them should have imbibed the spirit of freedom, the danger would be seen at a distance, and there would be ample time to guard against it; but from our peculiar situation in this country, this is not what would take place, for the danger would come upon us from our native army, not from the people. In countries not under a foreign government, the spirit of freedom usually grows up with the gradual progress of early education and knowledge among the body of the people. This is its natural origin; and were it to rise in this way in this country while under our rule, its course

would be quiet and uniform, unattended by any sudden commotion, and the change in the character and opinions of the people might be met by suitable changes in the form of government. But we cannot with any reason expect this silent and tranquil renovation; for, owing to the unnatural situation in which India will be placed under a foreign government with a free press and a native army, the spirit of independence will spring up in this army long before it is ever thought of among the people. The army will not wait for the slow operation of the instruction of the people, and the growth of liberty among them, but will hasten to execute their own measures for the overthrow of the Government, and the recovery of their national independence, which they will soon learn from the press it is their duty to accomplish.

11. The high opinion entertained of us by the natives, and the deference and respect for authority, which have hitherto prevailed among ourselves, have been the main cause of our success in this country; but when these principles shall be shaken or swept away by a free press, encouraged by our juries to become a licentious one, the change will soon reach and pervade the whole native army. The native troops are the only body of natives who are always mixed with Europeans, and they will therefore be the first to learn the doctrines circulated among them by the newspapers; for, as these doctrines will become the frequent subjects of discussion among the European officers, it will not be long before they are known to the native officers and troops. Those men will probably not trouble themselves much about distinction, regarding the rights of the people, and form of government; but they will learn from what they hear, to consider what immediately concerns themselves, and for which they require but little prompting. They will learn to compare their own low allowances and humble rank, with those of their European officers,—to examine the ground on which the wide difference rests,—to estimate their own strength and resources,

and to believe that it is their duty to shake off a foreign yoke, and to secure for themselves the honours and emoluments which their country yields. If the press be free, they must immediately learn all this, and much more. Their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments will render it easy for them to consult together regarding their plans; they will have no great difficulty in finding leaders qualified to direct them; their patience, their habits of discipline, and their experience in war, will hold out the fairest prospect of success; they will be stimulated by the love of power and independence, and by ambition and avarice, to carry their designs into execution. The attempt, no doubt, would be dangerous; but when the contest was for so rich a stake, they would not be deterred from the danger. They might fail in their first attempts, but even their failure would not, as under a national government, confirm our power, but shake it to its very foundation. The military insubordination which is occasioned by some partial or temporary cause, may be removed, but that which arises from a change in the character of the troops, urging them to a systematic opposition, cannot be subdued; we should never again recover our present ascendancy; all confidence in them would be destroyed, they would persevere in their designs until they were finally successful; and after a sanguinary civil war, or rather passing through a series of insurrections and massacres, we should be compelled to abandon the country.

12. We might endeavour to secure ourselves by augmenting our European establishment. This might, at a great additional expense, avert the evil for a time, but no increase of Europeans could long protract the existence of our dominion. In such a contest we are not to expect any aid from the people: the native army would be joined by all that numerous and active class of men, formerly belonging to the revenue and police departments, who are now unemployed, and by many now in office, who look for higher situations; and by means of these men they would easily render themselves masters of the open country, and of its

revenue: the great mass of the people would remain quiet. The merchants and shopkeepers, from having found facilities given to trade which they never before experienced, might wish us success, but they would do no more. The heads of villages, who have at their disposal the most warlike part of the inhabitants, would be more likely to join their countrymen than to support our cause. They have, it is true, when under their native rulers, often shown a strong desire to be transferred to our dominion; but this feeling arose from temporary causes,—the immediate pressure of a weak and rapacious government, and the hope of bettering themselves by a change. But they have now tried our Government, and found, that though they are protected in their persons and their property, they have lost many of the emoluments which they derived from a lax revenue system under their native chiefs, and have also lost much of their former authority and consideration among the inhabitants, by the establishment of our judicial courts and European magistrates and collectors. The hope of recovering their former rank and influence would therefore render a great part of them well disposed to favour any plan for our overthrow. We delude ourselves if we believe that gratitude for the protection they have received, or attachment to our mild Government, would induce any considerable body of the people to side with us in a struggle with the native army.

13. I do not apprehend any immediate danger from the press; it would require many years before it could produce much effect on our native army; but though the danger be distant, it is not the less certain, and will ultimately overtake us if the press become free. The liberty of the press and a foreign yoke, are as already stated, quite incompatible. We cannot leave it free with any regard to our own safety; we cannot restrain it by trial by a jury; because, from the nature of juries in this country, public officers can never be tried by their peers. No jury will ever give a verdict against the publisher of a libel upon them, however

gross it may be. The press must be restrained either by a censor or by the power of sending home at once the publisher of any libellous or inflammatory paper, at the responsibility of Government, without the supreme Court having the authority, on any plea whatever, to detain him for a single day.

14. Such restrictions as those proposed will not hinder the progress of knowledge among the natives, but rather insure it by leaving it to follow its natural course, and protecting it against military violence and anarchy. Its natural course is not the circulation of newspapers and pamphlets among the natives immediately connected with Europeans, but education gradually spreading among the body of the people, and diffusing moral and religious instruction through every part of the community. The desire of independence and of governing themselves, which in every country follows the progress of knowledge, ought to spring up and become general among the people before it reaches the army; and there can be no doubt that it will become general in India, if we do not prevent it by ill-judged precipitation, in seeking to effect, in a few years, changes which must be the work of generations. By mild and equitable government; by promoting the dissemination of useful books among the natives, without attacking their religion; by protecting their own numerous schools; by encouraging, by honorary or pecuniary marks of distinction, those where the best system of education prevails; by occasional allowances from the public revenue to such as stand in need of this aid; and above all, by making it worth the while of the natives to cultivate their minds, by giving them a greater share in the civil administration of the country, and holding out the prospect of filling places of rank and emolument, as inducements to the attainment of knowledge, we shall, by degrees, banish superstition, and introduce among the natives of India all the enlightened opinions and doctrines which prevail in our own country.

15. If we take a contrary course; if we, for the sole benefit of

a few European editors of newspapers, permit a licentious press to undermine among the natives all respect for the European character and authority, we shall scatter the seeds of discontent among our native troops, and never be secure from insurrection. It is not necessary for this purpose that they should be more intelligent than they are at present, or should have acquired any knowledge of the rights of men or nations; all that is necessary is, that they should have lost all their present high respect for their officers and the European character; and whenever this happens, they will rise against us, not for the sake of asserting the liberty of their country, but of obtaining power and plunder.

16. We are trying an experiment never yet tried in the world; maintaining a foreign dominion by means of a native army, and teaching that army, through a free press, that they ought to expel us, and deliver their country. As far as Europeans only, whether in or out of the service, are concerned, the freedom or restriction of the press could do little good or harm, and would hardly deserve any serious attention. It is only as regards the natives, that the press can be viewed with apprehension; and it is only when it comes to agitate our native army, that its terrible effects will be felt. Many people, both in this country and England, will probably go on admiring the efforts of the Indian press, and fondly anticipating the rapid extension of knowledge among the natives, while a tremendous revolution, originating in this very press, is preparing, which will, by the premature and violent overthrow of our power, disappoint all those hopes, and throw India back into a state more hopeless of improvement than when we first found her.

17. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has brought to the notice of the Board an anonymous letter, in the Hindostanee language, thrown into the lines of the cavalry cantonment at Arcot, on the night of the——, urging the troops to murder their European officers, and promising them double pay. This letter was brought in the morning by the Soubadar Major

of the regiment of native cavalry, to Lieutenant-Colonel Foulis, the senior officer present in the cantonment. I received a Hindostanee letter by the post some weeks ago, addressed to myself, complaining of the condition of the native army, their depressed situation and low allowances, and exhorting me to do something for their relief. Such letters have been occasionally circulated since our first conquests from Mysore in 1792. I do not notice them now from any belief that they are likely at present to shake the fidelity of our sepoy, but in order to show the motives by which they will probably be instigated to sedition, whenever their characters shall be changed. But though I consider that the danger is still very distant, I think that we cannot be too early in taking measures to avoid it; and trust that the Honourable the Court of Directors will view the question of the press in India as one of the most important that ever came before them, and the establishment of such an engine, unless under the most absolute control of their Government, as dangerous in the highest degree to the existence of the British power in this country.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

SIR HENRY RUSSELL'S EVIDENCE

BEFORE A

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Jovis, 19^o die Aprilis, 1832.

THE RIGHT HON. SIR JOHN BYNG, IN THE CHAIR.

HENRY RUSSELL, Esq., CALLED IN AND EXAMINED.

2227. You have been some time in India?—I have been 23 years in India.

2228. At what Presidency?—I belonged to the Bengal Presidency; but I was chiefly employed in a political situation within the limits of the Madras army.

2229. When did you leave India?—In the year 1820.

2230. What were the situations you held?—I was originally an Assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad; and I afterwards myself held the situation of Resident for 11 years.

2231. It appears that in your evidence before the Political Sub-Committee, you have said that the greatest danger we have to apprehend in India is from our native army; the Committee are desirous to understand from you more particularly your reasons for so thinking?—My reasons for thinking that the greatest danger we have to apprehend in India is from our native army are, that our military force is the sole and exclusive tenure by which we hold the government, and that the fidelity of the troops of whom that force is composed is necessarily precarious; they are foreigners and mercenaries; they are attached to a government that pays them well, and treats them kindly, and they will generally follow wherever their officers will lead them; but we have no hold upon them, through either national honour or national prejudices, and cannot expect from them what we do from English soldiers fighting for English objects. They are peculiarly susceptible of being practised upon,

and may be induced, either by our own mismanagement, or by the artifices of designing persons, to turn against us those very arms which now constitute our only strength.

2232. Will you state what is the particular danger you apprehend, and whether it is increased by any circumstances in our treatment or management of the native force?—We have already had two striking instances to show the nature of that danger, in the agitation among the sepoys in 1806, of which the massacre at Vellore was the principal feature, and in the insubordination of the European officers in 1809. The system which has been pursued towards both those branches of our army has been essentially erroneous: their vital importance to the very existence of our power has not been sufficiently considered. Towards the European officers a short-sighted system of economy has been prosecuted, injurious in the first instance to the army, and in its consequences to the government; and with respect to the sepoys, much of that care which ought to have been bestowed on securing their attachment, and improving the substance of their efficiency, has been wasted in a frivolous, vexatious attention to outward forms. My personal knowledge is chiefly confined to the troops of the Madras Presidency. When I first went to Hyderabad, 30 years ago, there were at that station six battalions of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry. The command of those corps was, at that time, among the best situations that an officer could hold, and it was consequently held by the best officers. An officer commanding a corps was then a person of importance; he had his markets, his commissariat, his artificers, and followers of every description attached to his immediate corps. His allowances were considerable, and enabled him to exercise hospitality towards his officers, and to be liberal to his men. The first of those allowances that was taken away was, I believe, the bazar allowance, consisting of a duty levied on spirituous liquors, tobacco and other intoxicating drugs. This duty, in the general bazar, which belonged to the officer commanding the whole force, produced near 5,000 *l.* a year; and in the battalion bazars, which belonged to the commanding officers of corps, about 1,000 *l.* The reduction of this allowance

was followed by that of the tent contract, and of others of smaller amount, of which I cannot now recollect the particulars, and by degrees the advantages of a command were reduced so low, that no officer would take the command of a corps whose character or pretensions enabled him to procure any other situation. It was in these reductions that the discontent of the army first originated; and in 1803, when the Mahratta war began, that feeling was so strong, that I have no doubt if it had not been diverted by active employment, the same insubordination which showed itself in 1809 would have broken out at that time. The feeling began among the European officers. What may be the case in an European army I cannot say, but in an Indian army it is impossible that discontent can prevail in any great degree, and for any length of time among the officers, without ultimately producing its effect upon the men, though not designedly imparted, it must imperceptibly descend to them. The commanding officers had then lost much of the weight and importance they before enjoyed; they were no longer able to keep up the same appearance, or exercise the same liberality towards their men, and were, consequently, no longer objects of the same consideration in their eyes. A spirit of reciprocal and general dissatisfaction grew up, which loosened the ties that bound the different ranks to one another, as well as to the government. From the beginning of the Mahratta war, the troops were for three years under canvas, they were exposed to unusual hardships, and when they returned to their cantonments, instead of being allowed any indulgence or repose, they were teased and worried with a new, and I must say, a puerile system, which altered everything they had been accustomed to. Their drill was changed, their dress was changed, all the regulations that governed them were changed; everything was to be done in a new and smarter way; and the old sepoy, who had grown grey in the service, had again to undergo the same process that they had passed through when they were recruits. The details of the army had, for the first time in India, fallen into the hands of a school who thought that everything depended on show, and that no sacrifice was too great for the attainment of outward smartness and uniformity.

A single specimen of the new orders that were issued at Hyderabad will enable the Committee to estimate the character of the whole code. When any sepoy on guard wanted to retire for a particular purpose, he was to be detained until a certain number had the same occasion, and they were then to be marched down under a naick or corporal, that even the calls of nature might be answered in military order. They were forbidden to wear their marks of caste on parade; their whiskers were to be trimmed in an uniform manner; a leathern cap* was to be substituted for the turban they had previously worn; and there was no end to the silly compliances that were required of them. The disgust which such a system as this could not fail to excite is manifest. If any of the alterations enjoined were really worth the importance that was attached to them, they might have been accomplished, if the attempt had been made at any other time, or even at that time, with temper and discretion: but it was the fashion of the day to enforce everything with rigour, and the sepoys were already in a frame of mind ill suited to bear the trials they were exposed to. Advantage was no doubt taken by designing persons, who instilled suspicions into the sepoys that our real intentions went far beyond their dress. They fancied that the prick and brush suspended from their belt bore some resemblance to the cross. The tight drawers reaching to the knee, which they had worn for years, were all at once suspected to be breeches; and the leathern cap was only a step in the process of changing the turban for the hat. Unhappily, we seemed to do everything to give a colour to those suspicions; and in spite of various warnings, we persisted in a course of measures by which we spread a general belief among the sepoys that we intended to compel them to become Christians, and by which they were at length irritated to desperation. It was remarked that the fakeers, a class of religious mendicants, who are very numerous in India, and frequent the stations of the army in particular, were at this time unusually active throughout the country. Some were actuated by religious bigotry, and some, no doubt, were

* Not a cap but a new pattern turban and leather cockade, M. C.

employed by our political enemies, and it was afterwards ascertained that they had been busy in inflaming the alarm and discontent of the sepoy, and spreading the disaffection from one station to another. At Vellore, where only any extreme violence was perpetrated, the sepoy were instigated by some of the members of Tippoo's family who resided there, but they only took advantage of the disaffection; they did not create it, the feeling was universal. It showed itself at the same time at Hyderabad, and at various different and distant stations; and if immediate steps had not been taken to rescind the obnoxious orders, and allay the general irritation, the whole presidency would have partaken of the same calamity that happened at Vellore. It is neither easy, nor is it important, to distinguish the particular incident that produced the explosion. Among the variety of causes that were in action, any single one might have been inadequate to the effect. Discontent and disaffection had been growing for a length of time; by degrees the mine was charged and any accidental spark was sufficient to inflame the mass.

2233. Will you state whether, in your estimation, the danger that you apprehend is greater or less now than at former periods?— Since that time our treatment of the sepoy has been more judicious; indeed, I am not aware of anything in our present mode of treating them that requires to be changed. Our danger, I apprehend, is greater now than it was before 1806, inasmuch as it would be more easy to revive the same alarm in the minds of the sepoy than if it had never before prevailed; and the sphere of it is enlarged with every extension of our native army. During our wars with Hyder Ally our sepoy, in addition to other serious privations, were, I believe, a year and a half in arrear of pay. I doubt whether such an arrear now would not produce an insurrection.

2234. Does this danger in your opinion, arise from feelings peculiar to the army, or common to them with other natives; and does it arise more from the Hindoos or from the Moslems?—To a certain extent, the feelings from which our danger arises are common to the natives of every part of India, but they prevail more among the Mahomedans than the Hindoos, and more among the Madras than

among the Bengal sepoy. The Mahomedans are much more under the influence of religious fanaticism than the Hindoos, and are constitutionally of a more eager and irritable temper. The northern tribes, from which the Bengal sepoy are chiefly drawn, are, both morally and physically, a much finer race than that from which the Madras army is recruited. The Bengal sepoy are born soldiers, the Madras sepoy are taught to be so; and considering what they are in their original condition, it is surprising what their officers contrive to make of them. Among the Bengal sepoy, Hindoos of the better class greatly preponderate. Among the Madras sepoy, there is a much larger proportion of Mahomedans and Hindoos of the lower castes. Mutinies have been of less frequent occurrence among the Bengal than among the Madras sepoy; and even when they have occurred they have been attended with less acrimony and violence.

2235. Can you state whether any symptoms or tendency to this state of things now appear or have lately appeared?—I am not aware that there is any peculiar indication of danger at the present time, or that there is any greater reason to apprehend it now than there must be at all times while we are obliged to rely on one part of the population for the means of keeping the remainder in subjection.

2236. In what way do you think that the danger, such as it is, can best be warded off?—The best means of warding off the danger consist, I apprehend, in a steady, uniform, conciliatory treatment both of the European officers, and of the native soldiers. Towards the European officers, the great error that has been committed has been the reduction to so very low a scale of the allowances attached to the actual command of a corps. The allowances of the inferior ranks are necessarily of minor importance. A junior officer is satisfied if he can live creditably on his pay; and as long as the allowances of the commanding officer are liberal, every subaltern feels his interest in them, and knows that, if he lives, he will enjoy them in his turn. I have always thought, and I still think, that it is an object of first-rate importance, in the treatment of the army, to make the post of the command of a corps so advantageous in point of emolument as to render the best officers in the service willing and

anxious to hold it. In our treatment of the native soldiers we ought, above all things, to avoid the most remote appearance of a desire to interfere with their religious customs or prejudices, and to hold out to them as many objects of ambition as we can with safety. Horse and palanquin allowances; situations such as that of aide-de-camp to general officers; medals, grants of land, honorary distinctions and privileges of every kind, are eminently useful. They are peculiarly gratifying to the natives themselves, and can be attended with no inconvenience to us.

2237. Will you state to the Committee, with reference again to your evidence before the Political Sub-Committee, why you think the native officers are discontented?—The chief cause of the discontent which I think prevails among the native officers is, that when once they have attained the rank of soubahdar, they have, generally speaking, nothing more to look to, having got all that they can get, they have no further inducement to exert themselves; they become first indolent, and then dissatisfied. There ought, as long as possible, to be some higher object kept in their view, to which, by diligence and fidelity, they may still attain. Honorary distinctions, such as I have just spoken of, are one obvious method of attaching them to the service. The employing them more extensively in military command would perhaps have more effect in this way than any other measure. At present no native can reach such a rank in our army as will admit of his commanding an English serjeant. But how far it may be safe to do this is a critical question, and requires most careful consideration. Though it promises advantage, it also threatens danger. There was a native officer on the Madras establishment of the name of Mohammud Yoosuf; who was entrusted, in our early operations, with a considerable independent command, of which he discharged the duties with judgment and fidelity; and if we raise the natives to higher offices in the civil department, it will be difficult to maintain the exclusion of them in the army. But in this as in every other attempt to enlarge the field for the employment of the natives, it must be remembered, that although they are calculated to improve their condition, they are so

many steps towards the extinction of our own authority. If we both give the natives power, and teach them how to use it, they will not much longer submit to our control. On this subject there is a preliminary consideration, which I am afraid we overlook. In what character, and for what purpose do we appear in India? If we are to act as mere philanthropists, and to consider only how we can best improve the moral and political condition of the Indian population, we may govern them as we would govern one another, and the sooner we can make them wise enough and strong enough to expel us from the country, the greater will have been our success. If we go as subjects of England, for the extension of English power and the improvement of English interests, a different course must be pursued. We may govern them as kindly as we can; it is our interest as well as our duty to do so; but we must retain all substantial power in our own hands, and must remember that, be our objects what they may, the natives of India can never stand upon the same level with ourselves; they must be either above us or below us.

2238. You seem to lament that the allowances of the European officers in the native corps should have been diminished, and you mention the reduction of the bazar allowance; do you, upon the whole, think it would have been desirable to continue that allowance?—I do. I confine my observation exclusively to the officers in the actual command of corps; and though I have no doubt that the reduction of the bazar allowance, of the tent contract, and of other emoluments enjoyed by the army, was supported by specious reasons, and had, in each case, its specific advantages at the time, I think that the ultimate consequences were not sufficiently considered, and that the attachment of the European officers has been weakened, and the efficiency of the army impaired, by measures directed exclusively to economy.

2239. Did not the profit derived from the bazar arise from the consumption of spirits and opium and intoxicating drugs?—It did, and so it does at present; but the profit does not now go to the officers.

2240. To what purpose does the money now go?—To the government. It passed through an intermediate process: in the first instance, it was thrown into a general fund called the bazar fund,

of which the produce was divided periodically among officers of a certain rank throughout the army, but it was perfectly understood at the time that that was only a prefatory measure to a resumption of the duty by the government themselves; and accordingly, at the expiration of I think about two years, it was resumed, and is now received by the government.

2241. While the profit of the bazar was received by the commanding officers of corps, must not that have operated as an inducement with them to encourage the consumption of spirits and opium, and other drugs of that sort?—In point of fact, I think it did not. I do not believe that drunkenness was at all more prevalent then than it has been since. One strong reason why such should not be the case, was, that the conduct of the commanding officer was open to the inspection of the whole body of officers collectively; and such an abuse would not have been suffered by them to prevail to any extent.

2242. Had you any opportunity of observing the state of any military body while the commanding officer received the bazar allowance?—I lived as the only civil servant at a very large military station for about three years while that allowance prevailed.

2243. Did you reside there after it ceased? I did.

2244. Did you observe any difference? None whatever.

2245. Since when have you observed that the command of a native corps has ceased to be an object of ambition with the European officers?—If it were necessary to draw any line, I should say that the Mahratta war, the operations connected with which lasted from 1803 to 1806, may be considered as the period of the alteration.

2246. Do you attribute the disinclination to be satisfied with the command of a corps to the reduction of allowances?—Principally,

2247. Have not the staff situations to which officers in the army are eligible very much increased in number?—They have, I believe, in some degree; but those situations, in point of value, are not to be put in competition with what the command of a corps formerly was.

2248. At present are not some of the staff situations so advan-

tageous as to make officers prefer them to the command of a corps? The reason of the preference I should rather say is, that the command of a corps is so little advantageous. There is no great advantage attached to the staff situations. Military officers, in some cases, hold political situations; that, for instance, of resident at native courts, of which the allowances are considerable; but the military staff situations are attended with very little emolument.

2249. You have spoken of grants of land to native soldiers, have you ever observed that practice prevailing in any part of India? I have never myself been in the part of India where it has prevailed, but I have understood that in the upper parts of Bengal it was usual formerly, and perhaps still is, to make grants of land to the native officers and sepoy, instead of pensioning them at the expiration of a certain period of service; and I have been told that many prosperous villages were formed of the retired sepoy who had had land so allotted to them.

2250. Should you think it desirable to adopt any such practice more extensively?—I think it is one of the measures that might be adopted with advantage. The great object is to give the native soldier something ulterior to look to, and to make him feel that he has something to lose if he behaves ill.

2251. Then you would make those grants of land in some degree dependent upon the good behaviour of the native soldiers?—Unquestionably.

2252. From your knowledge of the presidency of Madras, do you think there would be any difficulty in allotting portions of land for such a purpose?—I should think none whatever. I should think there are many parts of the territory dependent upon the Madras presidency, where such a practice might be introduced with advantage.

2253. In the case you have mentioned, were the grants of land given to the soldiers as well as to the native officers?—They are given to all persons having served for a certain length of time, and having maintained a certain character, the grant varying in value according to the rank that the individual may have attained before his retiring from the service.
