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Topics of the Week.

Congress President.

A MAJORITY of the Congress Committees have elected Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to be President of the next Congress session, which is to be held in Lucknow in Easter week. Mr. Nehru has already expressed his willingness to accept the Presidentship if it be offered to him, and now that his election has formally taken place it may be expected, his wife's health permitting, that his leadership will be available for the Congress at a session which will probably be the most crucial in the history of that body.

MR. NEHRU is probably the most radical politician in India today, and it is significant that he should be called to guide the destinies of the Congress at a time when conflicting opinions have been expressed as to what the future Congress policy should be. It admits of no doubt that under his advice the Congress, which for some time has been showing rightist tendencies, will make a move to the left. The most important question before the Congress will be what is to be its attitude towards the new constitution. On this question Mr. Nehru's views have appeared at length, by a happy coincidence, in the very issues of the papers in which his election has been announced.

SPEAKING to press representatives in London, Mr. Nehru said that the Government of India Act was "a trivial affair"; that it would inhibit all social and economic reform, for under the Act "every single

vested interest in India was protected and could not be touched by any legislature"; that the Act "had mortgaged India to a number of vested interests, thereby converting India into a magnified Indian State." We must confess that this is the shrewdest commentary that has yet been made on the India Act. By maintaining its hold over the States unimpaired and by making British India join its lot with the States, the British Government has just made another Indian State of British India, keeping the whole of India under its control. For the rest, the little measure of self-government allowed under the Act will be dominated everywhere by vested interests, all depending upon the British Government in the last analysis. From Direct British Rule we come to Indirect British Rule, which in many ways is worse than Direct Rule. This is the net outcome of the Act.

WHAT will the Congress do about it, Mr. Nehru was asked. He said: "As far as Congressmen were concerned, there was not the shadow of a doubt that the constitution could not be worked, and nothing would be gained by working it. *The only question was how to oppose it best.* He thought it highly likely that the Congress would put up candidates for the elections, but with the definite idea in their minds of opposing the constitution." The left wing of the Congress will probably get the upper hand at the next session, but if it does not it will at least have the satisfaction that it had the best possible chance.

Protection to Wool.

WE find ourselves in entire agreement with the decision arrived at by the Government of India on the report of the Tariff Board on the Wool Textile Industry. The Government, following the Tariff Board, has treated the three branches of the industry—woolen, worsted and handloom—separately. They have referred the claim for protection of the woolen industry back to the Tariff Board, chiefly on the ground that evidence from the most important producers in this branch was not available to the Board. The Board, in its report had itself expressed the opinion that when a large part of the industry—in this case a part responsible for half the total production in India—refuses to lead evidence to establish its claim to protection the Board would be entirely justified in refusing to consider the matter further. The Board, however, did not adopt this view and proceeded to an estimation of the costs of production etc. on the material placed before them by the other mills. In the absence of information regarding

the oldest established and presumably most efficient producers of woollen goods in India these calculations cannot be considered trustworthy and Government are entirely justified in referring the matter back to the Board. Government will, however, have now to take steps, as suggested by the Board, to see that the units which abstained are induced or compelled to place all the relevant information at the disposal of the Board.

THE claim of the worsted branch of the industry has been rejected outright by Government. The main reason given for this rejection is that one of the conditions necessary for protection as laid down by the Fiscal Commission—a home supply of raw materials—has in this instance not been satisfied. We can imagine instances of important industries in which this ground by itself would not justify rejection. But considering other factors in this case such as the smallness of the home market, the seasonal character of the demand, the fact that already the industry is built up to capacity and that this branch does not compete with the handloom industry, and the comparatively unimportant character of the industry we feel that the worsted industry has been unable to prove its case. Protection for either the woollen or worsted branch being out of account, Government has done well in putting forward a proposal for direct help by a series of annual grants spread over five years to the handloom branch of the industry. The cotton handloom industry is already in receipt of such assistance. The details as to how these grants are being administered are not yet known to the public and their utility will depend essentially on the uses to which they are put. But we frankly confess to a preference for such direct modes of assistance to industry over the levy of tariff duties.

Abyssinia—Egypt—India—??

LOUIS FISCHER recently discussed with Signor Rossoni, Italy's Minister of Agriculture, the question of the possibilities of intensive development of land in Italy, and the discussion revealed the real reason why Italy went to war with Abyssinia. Signor Rossoni told Mr. Fischer that he contemplated putting 2,000,000 hectares under cultivation in the next five years, which would give occupation to 400,000 families. This led to the inquiry why then Italy should prefer external expansion to expansion at home. For anyhow the scope for colonial expansion is limited. For only last month did the Government of Italy approve of schemes for the economic development of the old colonies of Libya and Eritrea, and "the whole Italian overseas empire contains only 3,000 Italian peasants."

WHEN asked why, instead of conquering Abyssinia in the hope that it will absorb surplus population, Italy does not attempt to accommodate this population at home by introducing a land reform, Rossoni replied:

The war perhaps has economic reasons. But chiefly the reasons are moral and political. France did not acquire colonies because she was overpopulated. Nor did England. Economic problems are important, but nations cannot live solely on economic considerations. Italy can make a new contribution to civilization. A new regime could certainly improve conditions in Abyssinia. Mussolini has created a new nation which has a right to contribute towards civilisation.

The Fascist regime thus says to Italians, remarks Mr. Fischer in the *New Statesman*: "War dignifies"—

war for its own sake. "We have a right to an empire."

ON this Mr. Fischer's comment is: "With or without Abyssinia Italy must still face internal problems. It must seek new goals—Egypt? India? If England were to yield Abyssinia with little resistance, Italy might assume that less time and effort would be required to take the Nilelands than to convert Abyssinia into an asset." And he says that some of Mussolini's followers have indeed thought as well of Egypt and of India as of Abyssinia. "It is a fact that Italians have endeavoured to win over and organise the Indian students in Europe. The Zionist Fascists under Jabotinsky urge an Italian mandate for Palestine. Italian authorities have given them concrete encouragement. Italians have had their eyes on Syria, and Roman attempts to get a foothold in Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula are well-known. The ambitions are not modest."

Chaos and Mutiny in Italian Army.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL CROZIER, its military expert, gives in the *Reynolds's* the substance of the confidential reports that the newspaper correspondent for whom the British Government has arranged as its own observer with the Italian forces has sent to Whitehall.

These are that the Italians are in a state of chaos behind the lines, owing to the appalling difficulties of transport in supplying highly mechanised forces; that the native levies are defaulting in large numbers, and will in all probability turn on their Italian officers in the end; that nothing like law and order has yet been established in the occupied territories, the necessity for big "police" contingents being a heavy drain on the Italian fighting strength; and that the Italian officers are not "thrusters," and lack the military spirit.

Summing up, the observer gives it as his opinion that the Italians cannot hope to reach Addis Ababa this year, and that their chances of ever taking the capital are remote. He confirms my own opinion, stated in these columns a week ago, that when the rainy season sets in after March the Italian Army will find itself no further forward in a military sense than it was when it started last October.

HE further says that no advance seems likely in the near future.

Their prospects of a further advance in the north during the next few weeks are not rosy. The Abyssinians have grasped the offensive, and are likely to hold it. Nature is all on their side. Although the weather is dry at this time of the year, heavy banks of clouds form over the highlands, with a kind of Scotch mist only a few hundred feet from the average level of the ground over the major portion of the battle front.

This means that the Italian Air Force is blinded. Not only bombing, but reconnaissance, which is much more important, will be undertaken only at the greatest peril to the airmen. It will not be possible to direct and control heavy artillery fire.

The Abyssinians, being essentially close-quarter fighters, will welcome the advent of the mists. They may not be able to see far when meditating their raids, but one does not cut throats at 400 yards.

Racial Discrimination.

SWAMI BHAVANI DAYAL has submitted a representation to the Government of India in which is given a connected account of the anti-Indian measures

adopted by the South African Government to bring about their economic ruination and social degradation. The latest engine of oppression is the Slums Act passed in 1934. The underlying principle of this measure, viz., the removal of slum conditions leading to better housing, is of course unexceptionable. And though Indians were not free from misgivings as to its possible abuse for encompassing the expropriation of Indian property, they cordially blessed the legislation and offered their hearty co-operation to the Government in its working. They did not keep the misgivings to themselves; but brought them to the notice of the Minister concerned, who characterised their fears as unfounded and promised that the law would be strictly applied for purposes of slum clearance. So far so good.

IN actual practice, however, the fears entertained by our countrymen have proved true, the Minister's assurance notwithstanding. Mr. Bhavani Dayal cites as an instance of the prostitution of the law the action of the Durban municipality in regard to the Mayville slums, about sixteen acres in extent. The Act empowers a municipality to declare any area a slum and the discretion vested in it is unhampered by any judicial or other checks. After such declaration, it may either ask the owners of the property to carry out the necessary repairs to it, or pull it down, or expropriate it. In this case, however, without giving any opportunity to the owners to repair the property so as to make it conform to health regulations, the municipality summarily decided upon the expropriation of the properties concerned, which, after proper development, are going to be sold to none but Europeans. Mr. Bhavani Dayal adds that the Europeans of the locality had set their heart upon securing this area of sixteen acres for their use; and thanks to the co-operation of the Durban municipality, will have their heart's wish soon fulfilled. It is amazing that even when the facts were placed before the Minister, he failed to secure any relief. The *Pioneer*, whose Editor testifies from personal first-hand knowledge to the reactionary and anti-Indian prejudice of the Durban municipality, does not appear to us to use too strong language in characterising the whole affair as a "scandal". If this is not racial discrimination under cover of slum clearance, we do not know what is.

Women as Hostages for Tax Payment.

WE have heard of attachment of property as an extreme remedy for the recovery of Government or other dues; but never of attachment or detention of women for the purpose. But the fertile brain of Kenya officialdom has given birth to that novel method of bringing pressure to bear on the party concerned for paying off Government dues. It would appear that in Kenya the recoveries of the hut and the poll tax from the natives have not been coming up to official expectations. This cannot be said to be a phenomenon peculiar only to Kenya. Those who live on land have everywhere been hard hit by the phenomenal fall in prices, so much so that far from agriculture being a source of income, debts have often to be incurred for finding the wherewithal to satisfy the Government demand. The Kenya native can be no better off in this respect and in any case no contumacious refusal to pay Government dues has, to our knowledge, been alleged against him.

BUT officialdom is apparently not concerned with a man's ability to pay. It is concerned only with making recoveries, whether the party is or is

not in a position to satisfy its demand. It is the overzeal of the tax-collecting authorities, whether white or black, that has led it to resort to the detention of native women as hostages for unpaid taxes in Kenya. This has caused deep resentment among the natives and has made Archdeacon Burns who represents native interests in the Kenya Legislative Council to raise his voice against it. "I urge most solemnly," said he in the Council, "that women be not touched, be not taken or arrested by the order of any chief or sub-chief and held in custody until their husbands or brothers come to pay the poll tax for them and set them free. I am speaking facts. While these men should have all authority brought to bear on them to pay their poll tax in a lawful way, the women of their families and villages should not be forced to be a bait whereby the men folk are drawn to pay their poll tax." The device is thoroughly detestable and it makes no difference whether the agency for its enforcement is the official of the British Government or a tribal chief or headman entrusted with collection of the tax. The sooner the obnoxious practice is put an end to, the better for all concerned.

Indian Education in Fiji.

PEOPLE having even a nodding acquaintance with conditions in Fiji need not be told that Indian education in Fiji is in a very backward condition. But the year 1934, for which its educational report has lately come into our hands, did not witness any improvement worth the name in that respect. The number of boys at school rose only by 375 to nearly 4,000 and that of girls by about 100 to the neighbourhood of 1200, the total coming up to about 5,000. The number might perhaps appear imposing to the unwary; but it represents not even half the total number of children that will have to be brought to school if there is to be compulsory education. As it is, the percentage of male scholars to the population does not exceed even 8, while the corresponding proportion in the case of the fair sex is 3.5, so that the general level of literacy stands at 5.5, which is obviously very low. We would urge the Fijian Government to make more vigorous efforts for the diffusion of education among our countrymen so as to make better citizens of them.

WE know that the Fiji Government will plead paucity of funds as an excuse for its inaction in the suggested direction. We are however equally sure that the excuse will be generally regarded as wanting in force. The European population in the colony is not even 8,500; but the total amount spent upon such a handful is £6,600; while in the case of the Fijian and Indian populations which, roughly speaking, number nearly 12 and 8 times as much, the educational expenditure, instead of being proportionately higher, is, strangely enough, much lower. In the case of the Fijian population it is £5,643, while in that of the Indian it is even less than half the amount spent on European education or £2,962, to be exact. We need not be understood as pressing for a reduction in the expenditure on European education but for a rise in the case of the other two races. This is specially necessary, in view of the fact that while every European boy or girl of school age is already at school, the other two races are nowhere within sight of that ideal. We do hope the Fijian Government will decide to reach that consummation within a reasonable time limit and direct their attempts accordingly.

THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT.

III.*

Pig lead:—(Rs. lakhs 1,30; 85) All the most important suppliers of lead to U. K. are Empire countries and hence it was not clear from the beginning how preference was going to improve the position of Indian lead in the U. K. market. Actually there has been a definite deterioration in the position since 1932. Australia and Canada have both made considerable advances. It is expected that the former was helped to do this by the exchange advantage that it had obtained. It is clear from the figures given in the Government of India report that the imports of Indian lead into U. K. have declined both in absolute volume as well as in their percentage to total imports. This decline which is clearly noticeable in the 1933 and 1934 figures seems to have continued still further in 1935, as the following figures will show.

Imports into U. K. of pig lead for the first nine months.

	1933	1934	1935
Total '000 tons	208·7	228·1	243·5
India	39·9	31·5	33·0
Australia	107·2	118·2	132·9
Canada	53·0	56·5	67·0

Oilcakes:—(Rs. lakhs 86; 1,36) This is a composite group and detailed figures are not available regarding each of its separate constituents to enable us to judge of the detailed effect of the preference. By far the most important constituent of this group is, however, groundnut cake. From the statistics available (I. E. C. Report on Groundnut products, 1934) it is seen that in 1931 and 1932 the average percentage of Indian imports of the total imports into U. K. was 92. This was maintained in 1933. It is not known what the percentage was in 1934. It is, however, obvious that the competitors of India hold such a small part of the market that the scope for a beneficial effect of preference as such, if any, is extremely limited. The large expansion of Indian exports of groundnut cake in recent years follows naturally on the greatly increased demand in the U. K. and other markets. The point we have noted before that the oilcake trade is one which we need not be anxious specially to encourage is one to be borne in mind in this connection.

Carpets and Rugs:—(Rs. lakhs 57; 74) In carpets and rugs U. K. has been always our chief market and the exports to that country have increased somewhat during the last two years. The percentage share of India in the total imports into U. K. under this head has also increased and this would show that the preference has been of some benefit to us.

Paraffin Wax:—(Rs. lakhs 55; 47) The figures of the imports of paraffin wax into the United Kingdom since 1931 show clearly that there has been no increase in the proportionate share of Indian

imports to the total in 1933 and 1934. On the contrary there is noticeable some decline in that share.

Fodder, Bran and Pollards:—(Rs. lakhs 38; 65) This again is a composite group and in the absence of detailed information it is impossible to comment. The Indian imports into U. K. under this head are almost entirely made up of rice meal and dust and in that article the Indian imports have never met with any significant Empire or non-Empire competition.

Coir manufactures:—(Rs. lakhs 23; 25) This head has to be considered under two sections: coir yarn and coir mats and matting. The U. K. supply of the former has always been drawn almost entirely from two Empire sources—India and Ceylon. Since 1932 the only noticeable change in this trade has been an improvement in the share of the U. K. market by Ceylon at the cost of India. Of coir mats and matting India has always been the predominant supplier to U. K. but Belgium used also to send a substantial consignment. Today the Belgium imports into U. K. under this head have totally disappeared and the market is held entirely by India. It is doubtful, however, how far this result can be attributed to Ottawa as India already took up 98 p. c. of the U. K. market in 1932.

Pig Iron:—Under an agreement supplementary to the Ottawa agreement free entry has been granted to Indian pig iron into U. K. As the standard rate is 33½ p. c. and as there are no other Empire suppliers this has meant that the Indian supply has almost entirely captured the U. K. market. The U. K. market for pig iron is, however, not a large one and it has to be noted that pig iron imports into U. K. are not increasing in spite of the greatly increased activity in the iron and steel industry of that country.

Imports of pig iron into U. K. for the first nine months.

	1933.	1934.	1935.
Total '000 tons	67·9	87·5	64·9
India	60·3	76·4	54·0

Apart from preferential treatment the Ottawa delegation was able to secure free entry into U. K. for some of the articles in which India was specially interested. The most important among these articles are lac (Rs. lakhs 1,32; 1,46), mica (Rs. lakhs 24; 35) and myrobolans (Rs. lakhs 29; 25). In lac and myrobolans India has usually supplied in recent times more than 95 p. c. of the total demand of the U. K. market. In mica also India has always been a dominant supplier and the competing sources are mostly within the Empire. With a mere free entry guaranteed no special movement of trade was expected; neither has any come about.

Raw Cotton (Rs. lakhs. 3,37; 3,42):—There is no preferential treatment accorded to raw cotton and its imports, from whatever source, were never subjected to any duty. The U. K. Government has merely undertaken to encourage the use of Indian cotton in U. K. and has set up a committee to carry on some propaganda and research in this behalf. Apart from the expenditure—whose

* The first two articles appeared in our issues of the 16th and 23rd inst.

extent we are not able to ascertain—in connection with the work of this committee, there is no burden involved on the U. K. producer, consumer or taxpayer in this connection. Hence it is highly misleading to include raw cotton as falling within the scheme of preferences. It is very difficult to gauge how far the work of propaganda and research has been useful in extending the market for Indian raw cotton in England. The consumption of Indian raw cotton in U. K. has always been subject to considerable fluctuations, both in absolute amount and the proportion of the total of raw cotton imported into U. K. The following is the percentage of the imports of raw cotton from India of the total raw cotton imports into U. K. for a number of recent years:—1929: 6.8; 1930: 10.0; 1931: 9.7; 1932: 4.3; 1933: 7.8; 1934: 12.1. It will be observed that the 1933 percentage is less than the average of the three years preceding and even the 1934 percentage is not extraordinarily above the percentage for the years 1930 or 1931. The consumption of Indian raw cotton in U. K., it is well known, depends almost entirely on the relation between the price of Indian and American cotton. Now the parity (i. e. percentage of Indian price on American) between the prices of Middling American and Fine Broach at Liverpool was for the greater part of the year 1932 between 94 and 90; throughout 1933 it tended to come down and varied between 90 and 80 and it remained for the greater part of the year 1934 below 80. This would show that the progressive cheapening of Indian cotton in terms of American was by itself of sufficient magnitude to explain the greater consumption of Indian cotton by Lancashire in recent years. Even if it were claimed that some part of the increase in consumption was due to the efforts of the Lancashire Committee we wish to emphasize the very great difference between a trade advantage obtained in this way and that obtained by preferential tariff treat-

ment. There is, as a fact, not even a theoretical objection to favouring another country's goods by means of disseminating information and conducting research. It was along these lines that the activities of bodies like the Imperial Economic Committee and the Empire Marketing Board were carried on in Free Trade England, and no one could say that the costs of such activities are either excessive, wasteful or even onerous. As a fact they are in the long run advantageous to the country which incurs them. Research and a spread of knowledge of the ways in which Indian cotton can be used is of benefit to Lancashire itself and in the long run all steps that make Lancashire dependent less exclusively on the American supply of cotton are eminently to its own advantage. So that while one may acknowledge the possibility of the activities of the Lancashire Cotton Committee proving of some immediate use to the Indian raw cotton producer it should be made clear that they are of a type that lay no significant burden on the English producer, consumer and taxpayer and that they are of ultimate advantage to the Lancashire industrialists themselves. We, for our part, would never object to the most extensive reciprocity along these lines in favour of British goods. If the Indian Government can undertake activities by which the spread of information among consumers or the conduct of research work by government bodies in India would further the sale of any types of British commodities this should be certainly done in exchange for similar treatment of Indian goods in England. We would not grudge any expenditure along these lines and we do not think that the monies will be ill spent. But we object most strongly to considering the costs of the activities of the Lancashire Committee as on a par with the sacrifices involved to the consumer and the tax-payer by a manipulation of the customs duties.

D. R. GADGIL.

THE REFORMS CALENDAR.

It is unofficially announced that the provincial part of the new constitution will come into operation early next year and that the federal part of it some three years thereafter. If this be true there will perhaps be some people to whom this announcement will give a heart-ache, for they seem to think all that is needed to bring peace to this distraught country is the implementing of the federal provisions of the Reforms Act within a year after, if not at the same time as, that of the provincial provisions. For our part we think that the lag of three years may prove exceedingly useful. It would have been better if the interval were one of five years, one full term of the lower houses of the provincial legislatures, but anything less than three years would be grossly unfair to the Princes.

Federation is after all an experiment in India, to be conducted in abnormal circumstances. The Princes are being invited to surrender under it some of their sovereign powers to a federal government in which, as *United India* puts it, "the final power

and the last authority is still the Governor-General responsible to the Crown, which means as hitherto the Secretary of State responsible to the British Parliament." With all the veneer of democracy it will still be an autocratic government. The Princes themselves, it is true, are not wholly unused to autocracy, but their reluctance to substitute for an autocracy in which they predominate another autocracy in which some one else has the sole power may well be understood. They seem at present willing to inaugurate federation, even at the sacrifice of part of their own sovereignty, but as His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala very wisely declared some time ago, they would like to be assured that the sacrifice that they are prepared to make will be appreciated in British India and that it will conduce to the restoration of peace and to the allaying of dissatisfaction in this other unit of federation.

The Princes will certainly not like to be dragged into the maelstrom of British Indian agitation. If the constitution is worked in a friendly

spirit so as to produce a calm atmosphere they will think their self-sacrifice well worth making. But if it is worked in a spirit of hostility difficult situations will be created in which they will be unnecessarily involved in the federal legislature. Disputes will arise between British Indian politicians and the British Government at every step, and the Princes will incur the wrath of politicians in British India for reasons which will have nothing whatever to do with the States. The Princes are ready to enter the federation because they hope thereby to establish friendly relations with British India. If, however, on account of the hostility of British Indians for the new constitution, the Princes will become embroiled in their relations with British India, they will naturally wish to draw back from such a federation.

A sufficiently long interval should therefore be allowed in which the Princes may carefully watch the working of the reforms in the Provinces. This will give them an idea of the frame of mind in which they will find the British Indian representatives in the federal legislature. If in the provinces Indian politicians are in a mood to run the administrative machinery smoothly, probably those at the centre will be in the same mood. If, however, in the provinces Indian politicians show a persistent desire to put grit in the machinery the Princes will very likely find the same temper dominating the politicians at the centre. Deliberate attempts will be made to produce deadlocks, and although British Indian politicians' aim will be to bring the British Government into difficulties the Princes too will necessarily get themselves mixed up in these difficulties. The Princes will consider every problem on its merits, trying to give the reforms an honest trial. In matters where they feel that the British Indian politicians are needlessly intransigent and obstructive they will very naturally vote with the British Government and thus for no fault of their own they will have to encounter the opposition of the Indian politicians.

The Princes of course have difficulties of their own. They will have very carefully to consider the terms of the Instrument of Accession which each one will have to execute. If these Instruments will make too large a demand upon their sovereignty they will not find it possible to join the federation. And in regard to this we should like to assure the Princes in advance that British India will not blame them at all if in spite of all their efforts to come in they have to stay away. But even if all these questions pertaining to the sovereignty of the States are satisfactorily settled the Princes will have to consider the further question of the sort of weather they will encounter in the federal legislature. If it is going to be stormy they will very properly refrain from exposing themselves to the fury of the tempest. This will be to them as important a consideration as the amount of sovereignty which they will be required to give up. And the working of the Provincial Governments for the first few years will give a rough indication as to whether they will meet with fair weather in the Federal Government or not.

It is therefore of the utmost importance that the federal provisions of the constitution should come into force after a reasonable interval since the provisions affecting the provinces are put in force. Some interval is of course unavoidable, and that, in the Government's view, seems to be three years. If necessary it may be extended somewhat. But in any case we hope no attempt will be made by the hot-gospellers of federation to abridge it still further. The Princes must be allowed, in fairness to them, long enough to watch the working of the Provincial Governments, so that if they begin to have second thoughts as to the desirability of entering the federation they should not find that it is too late. The election of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as the next Congress President will, we think, give them much food for thought. They cannot any longer hope to see Bhulabhai Desais guide Congress policy in the central legislature, always side-stepping the question of the States. "Marry in haste and repent at leisure" is never a wise proceeding, but when the marriage in question is of an entirely different kind from the marriages on which it is the wont of the Princes to enter they must reflect deeply and long. Federation is a marriage which can by no possibility be dissolved and thus this marriage falls wholly outside the experience of the Princes. Let no one stampede them into it. We should all respect their susceptibilities if after weighing the pros and cons they cannot bring their resolution to join the federation to the sticking point. Anyway the British Government must give them long enough for mature consideration—and if necessary for second thoughts.

CURRENT COMMENTS.

THE anonymous writer of "India in 1933-34", which is an official publication but for the expression of opinions in which the Government refuses to accept responsibility, seems to have peculiar notions about honesty in public life. He says, rightly enough, that in the Christmas week of 1934 "political organisations all over the country recorded their views on the (J. P. C.) Report in outspoken, and for the most part uncompromising, denunciation." "Since the close of the year," he adds, "the Government of India Bill has been received and considered in the Legislative Assembly, and it is difficult to believe that all the damnatory criticism which greeted the publication of the Joint Parliamentary Committee's Report was entirely honest." It is certainly very strange that in the debates in the Legislative Assembly which called for rejection of the whole basis of the Bill the writer should discern signs of a change of opinion in India on the question of reforms. But that too may be forgiven. Was it, however, necessary for an official report to be free with charges of dishonesty?

THE writer of the report might well have been the editor of the *Pioneer*, who too revels in such charges. The *Pioneer* says, in a recent issue, "The distinction which our contemporary (the SERVANT OF INDIA) now seeks to make between 'co-operation' and 'working the reforms' is disingenuous." What the *Pioneer* really means is that it is disingenuous for any political party not to accept the reforms and then to proceed to work them. This is also the point of view

of the writer of "India in 1933-34". He can see nothing but dishonesty in the Liberal Party not accepting the constitution and yet preparing to work it. Apparently, to the *Pioneer* and to this writer the only possible alternative to accepting a constitution is to practise civil disobedience. Those who cannot do so will be considered by them to have given their consent to the constitution, whatever they may say. If they do not admit giving consent it is only because they are dishonest.

IN truth, however, there is another alternative to acceptance. It is that of working the constitution in a spirit of resentment. The Liberal Party for its part never contemplated civil disobedience, but it always contemplated working the unwanted reforms, if thrust upon the country, in a hostile frame of mind. Does the *Pioneer* find anything to the contrary in the speeches of the Liberal leaders or in the back numbers of the SERVANT OF INDIA which we see it is studying with commendable assiduity? We made a final appeal to the British Government which the *Pioneer* has quoted: "If the constitution cannot be improved in the way India wants, it can at least be put away." We then went on:

But if it is passed, all the progressive elements will take all the measures that it is possible for them to take to make it clear beyond peradventure, that the constitution is imposed upon India. This will necessarily produce in the country an amount of hostility which all rulers would avoid. No one can predict what forms the hostility will take. But whatever they may be, no progressive party in India will for that reason change their opinion and accept or acquiesce in a constitution of which the essential principles offend their moral sense.

SPEAKING of honesty, which is more honest for the Liberals to say? Either that they do not accept the constitution and that, therefore, if it be imposed upon the country against its wishes, they will show hostility in its working, or that they accept it and will yet prevent its working smoothly? So far as honesty goes, we think everyone will admit that the only straightforward course for the Liberal Party was the one it actually did take. Anyway, the Liberals never lost sight of the elementary fact the *Pioneer* points out that the country could not possibly "ignore" the reforms. They always said that they would work the reforms; only their manner of working would depend upon the nature of the reforms. If the reforms were good, they would work them in a spirit of good-will and contentment; if bad, in a contrary spirit. The *Pioneer* airily says that would make little difference; but the rulers would, we think, be inclined to take a slightly different view. To them the question of paramount importance would be in what spirit Indian politicians would go into the Councils.

IF it be true, as the *Pioneer* says, that "the question of acceptance or rejection, impressive though it might appear, does not arise (since the reforms cannot be ignored)", may we not ask "Why then did the *Pioneer* advise the Liberals to give conditional acceptance to the reforms?" If non-acceptance is out of the question, conditional acceptance has certainly no meaning. Assuming that the Liberals had followed the *Pioneer's* advice then, how foolish would they have now looked if, when all the conditions which it wanted then to lay down had been rejected, they had still acquiesced in the reforms, as the *Pioneer* wants them to do? The *Pioneer* also suspects that the attitude of flat non-acceptance which the Liberals assumed in the negotiations stage strengthened die-hard influences, which resulted in stiffening the safeguards. This is

of course possible, but we are inclined to think that the die-hard element in British politics had already been strengthened by the Sapru-Jayakar Memorandum, and the sneaking sympathy which the *Pioneer* showed for the Memorandum must have finally decided the British Government to make the reforms completely watertight. If the *Pioneer*, the British Government must have thought, could go so far in supporting Indian demands, obviously there is no body of central opinion left in India, and the only thing to do was to proceed on the basis that Indians are unfit for self-government. The *Pioneer* too cannot escape its share of blame in this respect.

WE do not think the *Tribune* has improved its case for non-acceptance of office on the part of Congress by the explanation which it has offered in its issue of 23rd January. It says that it is not for all progressive parties refusing office; but that it is for the Congress refusing it in any case and all progressive parties refusing it if they are in a majority, which is much the same thing. For the question of accepting office arises for a party in normal circumstances only if it is in a majority. The Congress is likely to be in a majority, and the *Tribune's* decided advice to the Congress is not to accept office. Other progressive parties are not likely to be in a majority anywhere, but if they should obtain a majority the *Tribune's* advice to them is just the same—not to accept office. The *Tribune* would certainly desire the Liberal Party and other parties which hold progressive views to join the Congress. Their reluctance to do so is, in the *Tribune's* opinion, a matter of reproach against them. Let us assume that these parties for once rise to the level of patriotism which the *Tribune* expects of them and join the Congress. Who then would be available for holding office and for getting the maximum from the beneficent portion of the constitution by which our contemporary sets such great store?

BUT the *Tribune* may say that such a contingency, for good or ill, need not be contemplated at present. A merger of all the progressive parties into the Congress is not feasible, and the country may well capitalise this unfortunate circumstance by allowing non-Congress progressives—the weaker vessels—to utilise the constitution constructively for public good. This puts these progressive parties which are outside the Congress on a lower pedestal than the Congress. These parties have not the patriotic fervour and the spirit of utter self-sacrifice which the Congress has. The temptation of office is too strong for them. Let them take office, then, from which they cannot be kept in any case. The Congress, however, must hold itself severely aloof. While others will be enjoying the sweets of office, the Congress will be in the rough and tumble of politics, holding the enemy valiantly at bay. This seems to be the *Tribune's* reasoning and is wholly unsound. Non-Congress progressives too will be allowed by the *Tribune* to accept office only if they can be trusted to stand four-square to the attacks of Government in the form of the use of safeguards. If they satisfy this test they will be doing all that the Congress can do in this matter. Why then this discrimination between Congressmen and other progressives? If by working the nation-building services in a constructive way the latter do not lose their capacity for fighting for self-government, how would the former do so? They are, if anything, compounded of sterner stuff, in the *Tribune's* office. Why should office be tabu to Congressmen and not to others? What is good for the gander is good for the geese.

Office cannot be more demoralising to Congressmen than to others.

THOSE who are against acceptance of office by nationalists, whether they belong in the Congress or not, are prepared to sacrifice the constructive good that office may yield. Their position is like that which the Swaraj party held when the party was first established. This party stood for uniform opposition to Government, and Pandit Motilal Nehru declared that even if a resolution for the release of Mahatma Gandhi came up in the Assembly he would vote against it. The good that would be done by the release of the Mahatma would, he thought, be more than counterbalanced by the harm that would be wrought by the weakening of public opposition to Government. Similarly, those who oppose office acceptance argue that the constructive good that exercise of ministerial responsibility may possibly do will be far outweighed by the evil that will be done by the spirit of resistance being broken. Apparently the *Tribune* also thinks likewise. If it does it must be prepared to make the sacrifice which other opponents of office acceptance are willing to make. It wants to make the best of both worlds, which it cannot.

FOR our part we would not like the Liberals or other progressives to hold office on the sufferance of Congressmen. It is one thing to form a United Front with a united programme, every party in the group bearing its share of responsibility. But on the basis proposed by the *Tribune* acceptance of office by non-Congressmen when Congressmen are in a majority is impossible. It looks very much like the Congress Party winning the battle and other parties running away with the spoils. If the Congress Party is in a majority let it either accept office and run the administration or refuse office and bring the administration to a standstill. We would like it to accept office, not because we hope much in the way of constructive work will be possible, but because we feel that the conviction of the best organised party failing to achieve substantial results will help to produce the condition which both the *Tribune* and we have in mind. But if the Congress chooses to stay away from office let other parties who will *ex hypothesi* be together in a minority stay away too, thus forcing the Congress to face the consequences of its action which somehow the *Tribune* dreads.

DEFENDING the States' representation in the federal legislature by nomination, *United India* and

Indian States reminds us that the choice for British India lies between two courses: federation with the States on the terms that the Princes may choose to lay down or abandonment of all hope of attaining self-government. We were roundly condemned by some of our contemporaries when we spoke of the Princes' blackmail. But *United India* now puts it very frankly. It says:

The States will come into the federation on their own terms or not at all, so that the choice for British India is between a federation, pure and simple, of the British Indian provinces or the more sophisticated kind of federation which is provided in the India Act of 1935. What is clear is that the first kind of federation will bring no responsible government in the centre, because the entry of the Indian States was the condition under which alone the British Government was prepared to introduce any element of responsibility in the centre. We confess that in the circumstances we are inclined to think that no other kind of federation than that now introduced is feasible... We cannot blame the Indian Princes in their attitude re the form of representation, nor we believe is it patriotism to require the Princes to make the sacrifice representation by election involves.

WHY does our contemporary think that it would be unpatriotic to require the Princes to provide for elective representation in the federal legislature? If it is unpatriotic to require the Princes to abandon their autocracy, how does it become patriotic to require the British Government to abandon its autocracy? If *United India* cannot bring itself to say as much as a word in condemnation of Princely autocracy, why is it so vehement in denouncing the retention of power by the British Government? If it must ask British India to submit to the blackmail by the Princes, trusting that in course of time everything that is now wrong will right itself, can it not summon the same philosophy to its aid in dealing with the British Government? Why does it utter a cry of anguish that the constitution "will not be an experiment in democracy but in the negation of it," and that even the "ultimate development" of the constitution under the scheme will be "not dominion status or full responsible government but a sort of hocus-pocus without parallel in human history or political science"? Why this difference? The explanation is simple. *United India* hopes that by mouthing strong sentiments of democracy in dealing with the British Government it will be able to draw away popular attention from the autocracy of its patrons, the Princes. In this attempt, however, it will not succeed.

THE EGYPTIAN MUDDLE.

MY last letter from here (published in the *SERVANT OF INDIA* of Jan. 2nd) has made clear the crucial importance of Egypt at the present juncture. As the sequence of events is however by no means generally known and in view of certain recent misstatements by the *Havas News Service*, it may be as well to recapitulate them.

The British Occupation of Egypt, then an Ottoman vassal State, began in 1882. To obviate legal entanglement, Britain unilaterally declared Egypt at the outbreak of the World War in 1914 a British Protectorate. The Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, was deposed and another Prince, Hussein Kamil, created Sultan of Egypt. This British-protected Sultan died in 1917 and was succeeded by his brother Fuad.

The war over, Egypt asked for the reward that it had been promised if it kept quiet during the war. A national delegation was sent to Paris to help filling the antechambers of the Allied and Associated deliberators of Peace. The Arabic word, by the way, for "delegation" is *wafd* and from that time dates the designation of the people who stand for the national demand made by that delegation as "Wafdists."

Nothing of course came of this antechambering of the Wafd: so, revolutionary action in the Nile Valley was tried instead. It had its due result in the Wafd's leader, Zaghlul Pasha, negotiating with Lord Milner in 1920 about a *modus vivendi*. It came to nothing; but a fresh attempt was made in the year following by Lord Curzon with a less intransigent

minister of the Sultan, Adly Pasha. As a result Britain made a fresh, again unilateral, declaration in February 1922, ending the "protectorate" and recognizing Fuad as King of a sovereign and independent Egypt. However, four subjects were reserved (Suez Canal, Army, Protection of foreigners and Sudan) which rendered that "independence" a polite diplomatic fiction. Shortly after, in November 1922, the last Ottoman Sultan left Constantinople as exile; and Kemal Pasha Ataturk, President of the Turkish Republic, signed in 1923 the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, whereby he renounced all former Ottoman rights over Egypt.

The British Declaration of February 1922 had left it expressly to the King and the people of Egypt to enact whichever constitution they chose. Such a constitution was in fact promptly drawn up and came into force in 1923. It is one which provides for a parliamentary regime and for popular government, the King being a strictly constitutional monarch.

The following years were spent in an endeavour to dispose of the four reserved matters by concluding a special treaty of alliance with Great Britain. Mr. Henderson's advent at the Foreign Office hastened these negotiations considerably and in 1930 a draft treaty was ready to be signed. It failed solely to satisfy Egyptian intransigents on one point, that of the Sudan, which was claimed as an integral part of an independent Egypt. On this account negotiations were suspended, not broken off, so that they may be taken up again at any time.

After that breakdown the King is alleged to have been worked up by the British High Commissioner against the Wafd, which was represented as altogether unreasonable and irresponsible. At all events he radically changed the constitution in 1930 by a *coup d'état* and Egypt has since been ruled practically at the sweet will of its King and of his favourites of the hour. A couple of years ago King Fuad fell ill and a year ago even his life was despaired of. Much to the surprise of everybody he recovered, however, but has been a changed man since. (It is whispered that there was plenty of room for such improvement.)

This favourable disposition has been hastened by the Italo-Ethiopian complications, which have finally decided the King to abandon an autocracy based on the British High Commissioner, and rather to make common cause with the national forces against British tutelage. The restitution of the Constitution of 1923 was unanimously demanded as an earnest of this new orientation and the King by a rescript dated April 20, 1935, had expressed himself as in favour of that restitution. But before the return to the Constitution of 1923 could be enacted, it was desired to obtain the consent of the British High Commissioner. Negotiations dragged on, the Egyptian Government pressing the High Commissioner "to come to an agreement for the protection of their respective interests and to permit Egypt to collaborate freely in the protection of its frontiers." (I quote from a Memorandum of Nessim Pasha, dated Oct. 18, 1935.)

It will now be understood why the speech of Sir Samuel Hoare at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on Nov. 9 caused such an uproar in Egypt. It was an answer given in definite terms to the joint efforts of King and Wafd to reintroduce the 1923 Constitution, efforts which had continued for more than half a year. The negative reply given by Sir Samuel Hoare was precise: the 1923 Constitution had proved unworkable and cannot be revived. And as an artistic embellishment he added, that Nessim Pasha quite agreed with him on this point.

The fat thus was doubly in the fire: Egypt as a whole of course was mad with impotent rage at Britain's everlasting *non possumus*; but the Wafd was also mad about Nessim Pasha's betrayal. For, since the King's right-about turn, the Wafd had supported Nessim Pasha in a united front against Britain: now, at a great patriotic demonstration held in Cairo on Nov. 13, the Wafd formally withdrew its support of Nessim Pasha.

In its editorial of Dec. 19 the SERVANT OF INDIA has already told its readers of the course of the subsequent events: Nessim Pasha, in fact, had not gone over to the British and Sir Samuel Hoare's statement to that effect was simply not true. If the British Foreign Secretary had by his "terminological inexactitude" expected to split the Egyptian united front, he had sadly deceived himself: Nessim Pasha was soon able to reassure the Wafd, but only at the cost of forcing him and the King to re-introduce the Constitution of 1923 at once and without further *pourparlers* with the British Government. Sir Samuel Hoare had once more proved too clever by half.

The Wafd leader, Nahas Pasha, addressed on Nov. 17 a memorandum to the Assembly of the League of Nations, proclaiming to all the world how matters stood and that "by refusing the demand of the Egyptian Government, backed by the whole of the Egyptian people, Great Britain has once more, by the mouth of Sir Samuel Hoare, emphasized that it would not allow Egypt to revert to its constitutional charter of independence and that it meant to subordinate all Egyptian common interests to its own particular designs and advantages." And when Sir Samuel Hoare, as a consequence of the hornet's nest that he had raised, in the Commons (on Dec. 5, 1935) once more mouthed his usual phrases, which meant exactly nothing, about his "friendliest feelings towards Egypt, entirely misunderstood, as if implying fixed opposition to the aspiration of the Egyptian people, but that he could not be expected to fix a definite date here and now, in the midst of his Abyssinian preoccupations": he apparently was unaware that Nahas Pasha's memorandum of a fortnight before had in advance already met these phrases when he said that "the time is never opportune for Great Britain and that it is not sufficient to assure Egypt once more of its friendliness, as if by such words alone Great Britain could re-establish its *bona fides* at the League of Nations."

On the contrary, such hollow promises only hastened the course of events. Within one week (on December 12, 1935) Nessim Pasha had officially

asked the King to issue a Rescript for the re-introduction of the Constitution of 1923; and on the same day the King issued it. The Constitution of 1923 being thus in full force (without any alteration whatsoever contrary to the erroneous news of *Havas*!), universal and direct suffrage was proclaimed on December 19 and the new elections on that basis are now being actively prepared.

The British retreat in face of these accomplished facts has not yet been officially admitted. Mr. Eden replied to a question in the House of Commons on December 16, i. e. when Sir Samuel Hoare was still Foreign Secretary :

His Majesty's Government still hold, said Mr. Eden, that the restoration of the 1923 Constitution is not in the best interests of the Egyptian people. As, however, a mistaken impression still existed in Egypt, in spite of the assurances given by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in this House, that their advice on the subject amounted to a veto, they instructed his Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo to dispel that impression. Sir M. Lampson has been successful in achieving this object.

As will be noticed, in this answer it is still the Constitution that forms the subject at issue; but, once Mr. Eden had succeeded Sir Samuel Hoare, he only refers to "treaty negotiations" and tacitly drops the question of the Constitution.

"Treaty negotiations" obviously are proceeding, but so far it looks as if once more Great Britain was playing for time. For on December 30 the High Commissioner, Sir Miles Lampson, was instructed by Mr. Eden to assure the Egyptian Government that their request was receiving his careful and sympathetic consideration, but that Mr. Eden had only just taken over his office and that the Abyssinian question was taking up a great deal of his time, but that Mr. Eden had no desire whatsoever for any delay.

The military conversations with Greece and Turkey have meanwhile thrown still more oil into the blazing fire of Egyptian indignation, which asks, if the British need helpers to defend Egypt, why they invite Greek and Turkish troops, instead of allowing Egypt to provide an army of her own for the defence of her own borders?

The want of *finesse* with which the Egyptian question has hitherto been handled by the British Foreign Office is truly appalling. Italy's attack on Ethiopia provided a magnificent opportunity for Britain to rally to itself Egyptian sympathy as defender of Ethiopia's independence: this opportunity has not only not been utilized, it has been thrown away and turned into a new affront of Egyptian aspirations and the question is really not so frightfully complicated as all that. Complete agreement was already reached in 1930 on all points, excepting the Sudan: today Egypt is ready to conclude a Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain after the model of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty even if it would only include the three points agreed upon in 1930 and leave still the question of the Sudan for future settlement.

Will Mr. Eden prove more far-seeing than Sir Samuel Hoare? Will he for once yield gracefully, agreeing with his adversary quickly while it is yet

time to do so: or will the sad, bad and mad precedent of Ireland and of India once more be followed and a natural relationship of mutual dependence and helpfulness be turned into one of bitter hatred and petty spitefulness?

H. C. E. ZACHARIAS.

Geneva, Jan. 9.

Miscellaneous.

THE LATE MR. G. K. DEVADHAR.

SHALL I, in this short article, be able to present a true picture of the late Mr. Devadhar? As I sit down to write this out with pen in hand, memories of the past, memories of varied talks and discussions I have had with him, even the details of every activity which he pursued with such relentless sincerity, crowd upon my mind, scrambling as it were for outlet. To exercise control over this tumult to establish peace, order and sequence in the bewildering multiplicity of details to gain the right perspective and offer a fair and acceptable estimate, can by no means be an easy effort.

Mr. Devadhar, as we knew him, was a man of strong physique and determined will, a man with a passion for work and a genius for organization, withal possessed of a loving heart and an infinite capacity for sacrifice. Where and how did he come to acquire so many of the qualities of head and heart and hand, which by a rare and well-proportioned combination yielded in season, fruits that nourish and sweeten the life of man?

Many of Mr. Devadhar's virtues were nurtured in poverty; this fact is pretty well known. What is less known, however, is that the most important part of his heritage, the one which doubtless gave purpose and direction to his virtues, was his intensely obliging nature, his readiness to assist, his delight in well-doing, the pleasure he found in the service of his fellow-beings. Mr. Sastri has reminded us that he inherited this quality from his father to whom it was a habit in the pursuit of which he had almost neglected his own children, a trait of character which we found well-nigh faithfully descending to his more illustrious son.

It is not enough that a man has many virtues, he must get opportunities as well. Has not the poet sung—

Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.

In Mr. Devadhar's case, however, the story was entirely different. He was not like the tender flower waiting for patronage and withering in its absence, but he was a hardy plant that stuck to any soil, that acclimatized itself to any conditions and found sustenance there necessary to its vigorous growth.

Indeed, Mr. Devadhar was the creator of his own opportunities. There is a saying that while the pessimist finds difficulties in opportunities, the optimist is one who finds opportunities in difficulties. Mr. Devadhar was an optimist of this type. Even in his earliest days when he had nothing else on hand, he quietly went into temples in Poona, and read out and explained the Puranas, so we are told, to the devout women folk that gathered there. He was ever up and doing, never idle or lazy, discovering scope for work and activity in spheres which would not appeal to the ordinary mind. It was thus that he came to found the Aryan Education Society's High School, his

earliest venture in public work. It was thus that he finally came into contact with the late Mr. G. K. Gokhale and found the solace of his life in the immensely enlarged area for the growth of his activities.

It was Mr. Devadhar's conviction that half the man power of India was practically lost to her service by reason of the ignorance of the women folk and their utter helplessness. The uplift of woman was therefore his first concern. He began with classes for married ladies in Bombay and was finally able to start and to develop to its present magnitude the great Seva Sadan institution of Poona, from which now emerge year after year numbers of trained, well-equipped women to meet the many urgent needs of society hitherto neglected.

In like manner, in the field of co-operation, Mr. Devadhar occupied the position of almost an unchallenged leader. His great love for the down-trodden and the distressed was seen in the starting of debt redemption societies for the depressed classes, a venture which it is true ended in failure, but which he alone was capable of undertaking. He took a leading part in starting the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Institute and gave it a permanent habitation by erecting the Sir Vithaldas Thackersey Memorial Building. His authority on co-operative matters was so well recognised throughout India that many Indian States and Provinces sought his advice and assistance in the reorganisation of the movement in their territories.

It is true that Mr. Devadhar met with many criticisms from many quarters, some of which were not entirely undeserved. But he never worried over them nor did he ever waste his breath in replying to them. His one gospel was work, hard work and selfless work by day and by night, work for the down-trodden, the friendless, the distressed. He had little leisure to indulge in controversies, but he conquered his critics by his mighty deeds, and in the presence of such a man, men of mighty words stood powerless like children, submitting to his leadership and ready as it were to do his bidding.

From my close study of Mr. Devadhar's life and career and from my intimate contact with him, I do not feel the slightest hesitation in calling him the "Napoleon of Social Service." He was a man of square intellect, whose power of execution was equal to the power of conception, a man besides, who never cared to count the cost of his campaigns, and was never defeated, nor even owned a defeat. In this respect, it may be said that he occupied in the sphere of social service the same status and position that Mahatma Gandhi occupies in the public life of the country.

He planned on an extensive scale and his planning he fully confided in his own capacity to carry through his plans, whatever they may cost. If we begin to calculate at the start, he seemed to think, we can never hope to undertake anything of importance. Take up the responsibility, be fully alive to it, work at it continuously and with confidence; you will then surely fulfil it. If you become too thoughtful, too prudent, too circumspect, you will only see difficulties confronting you on every side.

There was thus a little speculative instinct in his character, or rather a boldness bordering on rashness. But has anybody at any time achieved anything on a Napoleonic compass in this world without some such boldness of venture? It may be that the Vithaldas Memorial Building as well as the Seva Sadan of Poona are labouring under heavy loads of indebtedness, but a grateful public and appreciating Govern-

ment must render them assistance, considering how genuinely serviceable these institutions are to the country at large.

Even in this short article, I cannot but refer, however briefly it may be, to certain traits of Mr. Devadhar's character, which, because they are little known or were rather eclipsed by those that were dominant, deserve to be recorded with some emphasis. How few people remember that Mr. Devadhar was a journalist and once edited the *Dnyanprakash*? How many, fewer still, that he was an examiner to the University for M. A. students in Marathi? I had seen him at work in both these capacities and I found in him a genuinely literary man at heart. He loved literature intensely and in many discussions I have had with him on these subjects, I observed that he kept himself up-to-date and his remarks were always sound and suggestive.

His was a loving heart and he appreciated warmth of feeling in every quarter. The description that he once gave in a moving Marathi passage of the Ekadashi fair at Pandharpur and of the intense devotional fervour of the pilgrims gathering there from far and near is comparable to any in literature. Mr. Devadhar never proclaimed religion; he only lived it, dedicating every selfless activity to the service of God.

He was a social reformer, and his work in that respect was not based so much on protests against baneful social customs, as on sympathy for the soul in distress. I have never come across a man whose mind was so little tinged with either communal pride or communal jealousy. His heart was pure like that of a saint. It never bore grudge even against those who came in his way. Loving co-operation and complete accommodation formed the breath of his being.

In closing this article, shall we not try to know what was his chief message to the country? There are indeed many lessons that we can learn from his life. We know that he came to occupy some responsible position in many institutions. But did he ever demoralise himself by intrigues and manoeuvres and manipulation of votes? This trait has to be specially emphasized, because we find that at the present day, in many institutions, absolutely worthless people, by reason of one fact that they are experts in begging, and canvassing and intriguing, have come to occupy positions of importance and responsibility. In like manner, Mr. Devadhar was never greedy of retaining positions for too long a time, but gladly retired in time to make way for others.

Mr. Devadhar's chief message, however, to the country was that of Indianisation of social service. While foreign missionaries were monopolising the field of social service in India, were Indians themselves to remain quiet? While the highway of politics was being crowded, should the streets and lanes of social service be deserted? No, said he, social service in India must be Indianised, not 50 per cent., not 75 per cent., but 100 per cent.

I once happened to ask him—it was some years ago—why he did not think of entering the legislature. And what do you think he replied? "Ah," said he, "if I did not go there, would any seat remain vacant? But if I laid aside the work I have undertaken to do, who is prepared to take it up?" That explains the spirit of his work, the underlying principle of all his activities.

Such then was Mr. Devadhar. Shall we look upon his like again? S. G. Warty in the *Bombay Co-operative Quarterly*.

Correspondence.

THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SERVANT OF INDIA.

SIR.—In his first article on the Ottawa Agreement published in your issue of the 16th instant, Mr. D. R. Gadgil has argued that the general expansion of our trade with the United Kingdom in the last two years has no connection with the Ottawa Agreement. In support of this he has quoted figures to show that while our exports in the group of articles enjoying preference has increased by 10% between 1931-32 and 1934-35, the increase in the group not enjoying preference is even greater. "Hence the only conclusion possible on these figures," says Mr. Gadgil, "is that the import trade of the United Kingdom having expanded largely in recent years, all kinds of Indian goods have found a widening market in that country irrespective of preferential treatment."

To quote figures about the *exports* of one country and to make an inference from them about the *total imports* of another country and to regard it as "the only conclusion possible" is indeed a long jump. If Mr. Gadgil wanted to show that the increase in Indian exports to the United Kingdom was due to a general expansion in British imports he should have quoted figures of the total British imports since 1931-32 along with the figures of Indian exports which he has quoted. Even when it is granted that the increase in our exports in the non-preferential group was due to an increase in the total British imports, how does it follow that the considerable expansion which Mr. Gadgil admits to have taken place in the preferential group was due to the same cause? To say so is to rely on a false analogy.

The fact is that so far as the preferential group of articles is concerned, there has been an actual fall in the total imports of the United Kingdom since 1931-32. They amounted to £488 millions 1934 as compared with £625 millions in 1931—a fall of 22%.

In spite of this fall, the exports of these articles from India to the United Kingdom registered an increase of 7.5%—from £29 millions in 1931 to £31 millions in 1934. Thus, so far as the preferential commodities are concerned, it is not true to say that we have increased our sales in a widening market. We have rather increased them in a contracting market. This must have been due to the operation of some special factors as the preference and the stability of the rupee-sterling exchange. Though this fact by itself does not prove the success of the Ottawa Agreement, it creates, in my opinion, a positive presumption in its favour.

Mr. Gadgil emphasises the relatively greater expansion of trade in the non-preferential group. But there is nothing surprising in this. Just because the articles in this group had no serious difficulties in foreign markets and their exports were expected to grow without the aid of preference, no preference was ever asked for on them. It is not quite logical to compare the expansion in the preferential with that in the non-preferential group, because there is a world of difference between the position and prospects of the articles in these two groups. The former are meeting with a much more severe competition than the latter.—Yours, etc.!

B. N. ADARKAR.

Bombay, January 24.

[This letter will receive attention after the whole series is completed.—Ed., S. o. I.]

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- INCOME AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. By HAROLD G. MOULTON. (Brookings Institution.) 1935. 21cm. 191p. \$2. 00.
- THE UNITED STATES AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE, 1919-1933. By M. F. JOLIFFE. (University of Wales Press Board, Cardiff.) 1935. 20cm. 146p. 6/-
- FREEDOM. By J. C. SMUTS. (Alexander Maclehose.) 1934. 20cm. 36p. 2/-
- MERCANTILISM, Vols. I & II. By ELI F. HECKSCHER. Translated by MENDEL SHAPIRO. (Allen & Unwin.) 1935. 24cm. 472p. and 419p. 21/- each.

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