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Topics of the Week.

The States Subjects.

IT will be remembered that one of the objections —fundamental objections—which the Princes take to the India Bill is that, in clause 6 (1 *b*), it is provided that federal laws will be made applicable, *proprio vigore*, to the subjects of the States.

The matter was discoussed in Committee on 27th February, when Mr. Donner drew attention to the fact that the Princes do not accept the position that "the central legislature at Delhi can come between them and their subjects" and that "they are unwilling to allow federal laws to apply in any State except at their own discretion and even then with their own machinery."

Sir Donald Somervell, the Solicitor-General, held out no hope to the Princes on this score. He said:

> It must be obvious to everyone that you do not make laws for a mere piece of territory. The bulk of laws applying to agriculture and land have a special relation to the soil, but I think it will be very difficult to find a law which does not apply to persons. It is quite obvious that the State, by joining the federation and agreeing that it shall make laws as to certain subjects, is to make laws for the State and the people in it. ... By acceding to the federation the State is saying: 'We agree that the federal legislature shall make laws which shall run and be applicable in our States with the subjects of our States.'

* * *

The Laurels.

"It is futile to minimise the implications of the Assembly vote rejecting Mr. Bhulabhai Desai's motion virtually refusing the Executive Council grant by 67 votes to 65. Victory by a majority of two votes may be a source of temporary relief but cannot be regarded with any degree of complacency", says the *Pioneer*. We cordially agree, although we cannot quite subscribe to its deductions therefrom. The heavy cost of administration of India, the first point made by Mr. Desai, has been the subject matter of comment and criticism for decades and yet the Government have not only not moved its little finger in the matter but under the new constitution would further add heavily to the intolerable burden. The disparity between the paltry grant of a crore of rupees for rural uplift—a matter long pending and quite urgent—and that of 86 crores for the services is so ludicrous that any other Government would be laughed to ridicule over such a Budget.

Scant courtesy for the Assembly's resolutions was the gravemen of the second charge. Strangely enough, Sir Joseph Bhore could only point to a new design for third class compartments as one in which the Government have moved to meet the Assembly's criticism. It is however something that Sir Joseph Bhore promised that the Government would not be in the way if next year in the light of the judicial assessment of the operation of the Ottawa Pact the House decided to give it notice of termination. Although Sir Joseph Bhore will not be there, we trust that a reminder will be unnecessary.

A difference without a distinction between suspension and abandonment was the defence of the Home Member to Mr. Aney's cut motion in the Home Department grant. Fight against terrorism is a thing to which no objection can be taken, but seeking the all-embracing provisions of section 124-A of the Penal Code, technically avoiding the Ordinances, to imprison men like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr. Satyapal and Mr. Abdul Gaffar Khan, certainly does not bear out the Government's plea that the hand of repression has been withdrawn. Deservedly has the Government been censured over this policy.

The laurels in the two debates, the result in the one notwithstanding, certainly are not with the Government.

* * *

Frank.

CONSIDERING the plausible lines of argument by which the Secretary of State justifies every clause in the Bill and Sir Austen Chamberlain seconds him saying that Parliament must give India what she considers best for it irrespective of Indian wishes, frankness as we saw the other day on the floor of the Assembly is more welcome than sugared diplomacy leading nowhere. In picturesque, inimi-

table words the Army Secretary tells us that at the present rate of Indianisation the Army will never be completed. Costly Commissions and Committees, composed of experts, military and civil, European and Indian, may examine the question any number of times and arrive at the invariable conclusion that Indianisation of the Army is feasible in a generation. The Government however knows better. It knows that the Indian Army will really never be Indian !

* * *

Thanks.

"AS Secretary of State for India, I hold very strong views with regard to the justice of certain Indian claims. In view of past history it is necessary to let the future Government of India negotiate its own treaties with the Empire. If we deprive India of the instrument of negotiations, she will be without a lever in dealing with questions such as emigration." In these words Sir Samuel Hoare justified his opposition to Sir Donald Somervell's amendment to extend to the Dominions the benefit of the discrimination and penal treatment clause in the Bill. He however justifies such a clause in favour of Britain in view of the history of British trade in India. "It was so extensive and has existed so long and conferred so many benefits on India that it undoubtedly had a claim for special treatment." We are afraid the logic of the argumsnt strikes us the other way. The first part is an irrefutable argument why commercial relations between the two countries must be on a voluntary basis rather than appear forced by statute. Mr. Butler argues that Indian trade would not at all be discriminated against in Britain to need the reciprocal provisions suggested by Mr. Hall, although he consented to make suitable provisions in the Instrument of Instructions. Such protection for British trade in India will, we believe, be quite adequate for British interests as well.

* * *

After Zanzibar.

KENYA, of course. The Morris Carter Commission on Land in Kenya was requested to define the area generally known as the Highlands within which persons of Eupropean descent are to have a privileged position defined by Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister as meaning that "no person other than a European shall be entitled to acquire by grant or transfer agricultural land in such area or to occupy land therein." In its report in conformity with the definition of the Colonial Minister, the Commission recommends the reservation of an additional area of 6355 square miles in addition to the already existing 10,345 square miles by means of an Order-in-Council "so that the European community may have the same measure of security in regard to land as we have recommended for the natives."

Superficially harmles as the report appears to be, it vitally cuts into the at least theoretical right that Indians have at present of acquring land therein with the sanction of the Gevernor, and crowds out some 39,000 Indians and 12,000 Arabs from the best lands in the country to make room for 16,000 Europeans. In defence of the proposed Order-in-Council the specious plea that it only legalises the present administrative practice is trotted out. As the *Manchester Guardian*—to which and to Mr. McGregor Ross our thanks are due—points out, by the new Order "the door is slammed and bolted against the chance of Kenya's 39,000 Indians, whatever standard of living they may attain to, ever obtaining a place in this enormous European Reserve." We believe that the Government of India, and the Secretary of State as well, have already bestirred themselves on behalf of our countrymen in Kenya.

The *Manchester Guardian* has it that the Minister's definition of the privileged position is not warranted by the terms of reference to the Committee and has not been sanctioned by Parliament afterwards either. We wonder whether, in recommending the additional reservation in the Highlands, the Committee has not exceeded its instructions.

"NO FEDERATION RATHER THAN THIS."

MR. GEORGE LANSBURY'S SPEECH.

Mr. Lansbury wound up the debate on Mr. Churchill's motion in a speech containing clear declaration of the Labour Party's attitude towards federation. He said :

BUT there is another and a much more important reason why I shall vote for the Motion. The time of this House and the propaganda of the Government and of the Opposition within the Government's own camp is devoted exclusively to the position which the Princes are going to occupy in the Federation. We all desire that the Princes should come in on fair and equitable terms, but the masses of the people who are to live under this constitution, reside in British India, and our complaint is that they have never been consulted. The reason that we want the Bill to be rejected is because we know that those people have far stronger objections to the proposals of the Government than have the Princes, but those people are not listened to at all.

A statement was signed by all those representatives of British India who came to be consulted by the Joint Select Committee, but almost every proposition put forward by the Indians has been rejected. There is not one organisation of any worth in British India which has accepted or said one word in support of these proposals. But the Government take not the slightest notice. I will not say that they treat them with contempt, but they treat them as though they were of no consequence. We resent that. We think that they have an equal right with the Princes to be considered. I know it has been said in a jeering sort of way that they disagree among themselves. Yes, but you do not give them the chance, which you have given to the Princes, to formulate their demands and requests, You just brush them on one side, and say, as the Secretary of State said to-day in relation to the Princes, that it is for us in this House to lay down the terms and conditions. We dissent from that altogether.

We do not want there to be any misunderstanding about our position. If there is going to be this kind of federation, we would rather have no federation at all. This kind of federation is the worst that could have been proposed. I do not think that the Attorney-General did my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) justice in his reply to him. For these reasons, I have risen to tell the Committee and everybody concerned that if we had our way and had the power we should throw out the Bill and consult British India in the same manner as the Government are consulting the Princes. We cannot understand the logic of the Government in taking so much trouble about the Princes, whom we want to see in a federation, and at the same time refuse to consider and consult the representatives of British India. However difficult it may be to arrive at a conclusion, we think that any constitution imposed upon the people of India is bound to fail, and that to go on with the Bill at this time, when British India is against it and without knowing exactly the attitude of the Princes, is a sheer waste of public time.

PRINCES' VETO ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

AN important debate was raised in the Committee of the House of Commons on 27th February, which shows clearly that, on account of the manner of the Princes' accession to federation, a condition would be created which, as Mr. Herbert Willams who initiated the debate put it, would be "practically unalterable for all times." We are not concerned here, in considering this point, with the denial by the Joint Select Committee of even the miserably small constituent powers that the White Paper had proposed to confer upon the federal legislature. We are concerned at present only with the power which the Bill gives to the Princes in vetoing even such measures of constitutional development as Parliament might sanction. The debate arose on Clause 6 (4), which says that the States' accession to federation will not be affected by any changes in the provisions of the Act mentioned in Schedule 2. This Schedule could not be debated in detail on Mr. Williams's amendment which was for the deletion of the Clause, and the far-reaching character of the Princes' veto power could not be brought out in its full gravity in the debate that occurred, but the admissions made by the Secretary of State and the Solicitor-General are already such as to fill all Indians with serious alarm.

Clause 6 (4) is itself designed with the very laudable object of giving some amount of flexibility to the constitution and making it possible at least for British India to move forward without giving the States any cause for complaint that British India's contract with them is broken. And Mr. Williams moved for the deletion of the Clause only with the view of drawing the Government's attention to the wide sweep of the exceptions allowed in Schedule 2 which would be regarded by the States as compromising and nullifying their Instruments of Accession. These Instruments are supposed to be in the nature of treaties, and no change can be introduced in the terms and conditions mentioned therein except with the consent of the Princes. It becomes necessary therefore to lay down clearly what changes in the constitution are to be considered as involving changes in the Instruments of Accession and requiring the consent of the Princes and what changes do not impinge on the Instruments of Accession and do not need the consent of the Princes in order that they should take effect. The broad principle of demarcation adopted by the Government is that Parliament should be free to introduce such modifications in the constitution as affect exclusively British India, and Schedule 2 purports to do nothing more than to sort out all matters that concern British India alone and that do not concern the States. Sir Samuel Hoare, in giving an explanation of this Schedule, said: "If hon. Members will look through that very formidable Schedule they will see that it contains all the provisions of the Act, or most of them, that affect only British India. Questions of that kind obviously should be amenable to future amendment without endangering the basis on which the Princes have made their accession." The States can have no ground of complaint if the British India part of the constitution is altered, provided that it is made clear, as is done in Clause 6 (4), that these alterations are not made applicable to the States.

Clause 6 (4), therefore, is on right lines, so far as it goes; the real trouble is that the savings in Schedule 2 are drawn in such wide terms as to make it impossible even for British India to take any significant step forward. Take, for instance, the question of the restoration of direct election to the Assembly. This question obviously affects British India alone. It does not affect the States, for the States' representatives in the Assembly are, under the provisions of the Bill, to be nominated by their rulers. If the mode of selection of the British Indian representatives is altered from indirect to direct election, it should not be a matter of grievance to the States, but it figures among the exceptions in Schedule 2, affording a ground to the States to say, after the introduction of the system of direct election in British India, that their accession will not stand, and that the federation must be abrogated. Among the savings in the Schedule occur the words, "the number of the representatives of British India and of the Indian States in the Council of State and the Federal Assembly and the manner in which they are to be chosen." Mr. Isaac Foot drew attention to this, and apparently the Liberal Party has no complant against the Bill about anything else than the substitution of indirect for direct election. The Party now finds that not only is direct election not retained in the new constitution, but that its re-introduction at any time in future will be prevented by the Schedule, as it will give a legitimate ground for the States to say that they will no longer remain in the federation. It is no use arguing that no ruler of a State will actually think of secession because of direct election in British India; for, as was rightly observed by Sir Stafford Cripps, Schedule 2 will afford "an opportunity for someone who has some other matter to complain about to make a difficulty with the Government of India and the federation." A Prince wanting to come out of the federation will make this an excuse, and, from the constitutional point of view, it will be a good excuse.

When this point was put to Sir Samuel Hoare, he replied as follows:—

> I can reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Issac Foot) at once. We must make the provision in the Schedule clear on the point. It is not our intention to exclude a question like indirect election from Amendments on the line that we have been discussing. What we are anxious to do and must do is to safeguard the position that is guaranteed to the States. When we come to the Schedule we can make that position quite clear.

The Secretary of State seems to think that this particular exception in the Schedule has been unintentionally couched in too wide terms and that the defect can be cured later. If it does happen, well and good. But, so far as one can judge, the wording has been intentionally adopted. For the very next exception mentioned is "the disqualifications for

membership of the Council of State and of the Federal Assembly in relation to the representatives of the State." Here, it will be seen, the disqualifications for membership of the British India representatives are excluded from the exception, thus bringing them within the Schedule and making them subject to amendment by Parliament without reference to the States. The exception as to direct election in British India has therefore been deliberately inserted. If, however, as Sir Samuel has promised, this exception is removed, it would be to that extent a gain; but it would still be a small gain, which will hardly satisfy any other than the easily satisfied British Liberal Party.

For, even so, the savings in Schedule 2 remain far too extensive. Everything connected with the conferment of larger powers upon the federation comes under the savings and will require the Princes' consent for amendment. For instance, all the special powers vested in the Governor-General by the Bill, which must be removed if the federation is to make any advance towards self-government, come under the savings. Sir Stafford Cripps particularly asked the question whether these powers are excluded from the savings and the Solicitor-General said "no." In fact there can be no doubt about it, for these powers are specifically included in the savings, as "the discharge of his (Governor-General's) functions by or under the Act in his discretion or in the exercise of his individual judgment" has been expressly saved in the Schedule, which means that any change therein will be held to affect the validity of the States' Instruments of Accession, giving any or all of them the constitutional right to terminate the federal union. Or take the question of transferring the subjects, which are now reserved under the Bill, like defence, to the control of the federal government. Sir Samuel Hoare said in the Joint Select Committee, and repeated in the Committee of the House of Commons, that complete popular control over questions like defence can take place "only by subsequent amendment of this Act", but "the functions of the Governor-General with respect to external affairs and defence" are excepted from Schedule 2. Therefore, any amendment in regard thereto will impinge upon the Instruments of Accession, the States thus acquiring the right, if they wish to exercise it, of bringing the federation to an end.

The Bill is supposed not to contemplate secession from the federation in any circumstances. This is true in the case of British India, but certainly not in the case of the Indian States. For what is to happen when an amendment is made in that part of the constitution which is not covered by Schedule 2? The question was asked of the Government by several members, but the Government is very shy of giving a plain answer. The Solicitor-General said: "If the structure were to be altered in fundamental respects, of course the States would clearly have the right to say, 'This is not the federation to which we acceded.'" The Secretary of State said: "If Parliament decides to make a change in the Bill which alters the conditions under which the Princes accede, then, obviously, the contract with the Princes is broken." But what else can be the result of a such a breach of contract than the States' secession from federation? Clearly thus secession is comtemplated by the Bill—only for the States it is true, not for British India as well—but it is contemplated all the same, however carefully British authorities may avoid the word 'secession'. The whole object of Schedule 2 is, as Mr. Foot observed, to distinguish between the provisions of which an amendment would justify secession and others of which an amendment would not justify secession. When the Government members were asked whether secession from federation on the part of the States would not follow on certain amendments being made they contented themselves with saying that such amendments would not be made. Sir Samuel Hoare replied to Mr. Herbert Williams's question as follows: "An amendment will have to be made by this House, and I cannot conceive of an amendment of the kind he fears being made." The implication of this House is clear. It is that Parliament will never consent hereafter to make an amendment in other than the permissible field without previously obtaining the consent the Princes—and all the Princes. The important thing to remember here is that the consent of all the federated States must be taken, whether they be large or small, for any State that withholds its consent will be afforded ample justification, under the Bill for secession. And if secession is to be avoided on the part of any State, it follows that all the States must give their consent to any amendment in, may we call it?, the forbidden area. And since all future growth of the constitution lies within this area, it clearly means that even a single State, however tiny it may be, has, under the provisions of the Bill, the power of veto on the future growth of the whole of British India.

This is such a tremendous consequence flowing from the Bill that even some Conservative members were appalled by it, and they made suggestions with a view to mitigating somewhat the evil result of the Princes' veto power. Mr. R.P. Croom-Johnson, for instance, who, from the observations made about him, appears to be somewhat of an authority on constitutional theory and practice, suggested that, instead of the consent of all the Princes being required for any amendment in provisions excepted from Schedule 2, the consent of only a certain specified majority be required, as in fact is the case in all other federations. He said:

> But there is then this other point of view, which is perhaps worth a little consideration, as to whether we might provide in the Bill that if an Amendment is needed in the constitution as affecting the native States, we need not be obliged to get the assent of every one of the rulers of the States. To provide for that in the Bill we might fix a majority of these native States and say that if they assent to some fundamental change—we might make the majority a high one—all native rulers would be bound by it. I am only suggesting that as a way out of the difficulty if the idea of the Government is that the difficulty is a real one. But I cannot think that any British Government is going to make a fundamental

change without having taken steps beforehand to ascertain the opinion of the other parties to the Treaty.

Mr. Annesley Somerville: Does my hon. and learned Friend imply that if a majority of the Princes accept an Amendment the minority must accept?

Mr. Croom-Johnson: Yes.

Mr. Somerville: Would not such a provision in the Bill infringe the Instrument of Accession of those Princes who have not accepted?

Sir S. Hoare: It cannot be a question of majorities and minorities. Each agreement has been entered into by a Prince on the one hand and the Crown on the other. You cannot force any majority decision on a minority.

Sir Samuel Hoare's reply shows clearly that the difficulty to which Mr. Croom-Johnson referred is a real one, and that the consent of all the States will be necessary.

It is no use saying that the contingency of a State's secession will never arise and that we need not consider it. It will definitely arise unless Parliament itself wants to stop all progress. The Solicitor-General said:

> One can always contemplate possible difficulties especially in constitutional matters. We have been engaged—quite rightly and I make no complaint about it—in what my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General the other evening, quoting from Lord Balfour, described as considering the grounds of divorce before entering upon the problems of matrimony. In regard to all these constitutional questions one can always imagine difficult questions arising, but as I think my hon'ble and learned Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Croom-Johnson) said, it is difficult to imagine any Parliament in this country making any fundamental change without thoroughly exploring the matter with the States first and arriving at a workable solution having proper regard to the rights of the States under the Instrument of Accession.

No amount of exploration will enable the British Government to arrive at a workable solution if proper regard is to be paid to the sovereign rights of 600 or 700 States. In any case why should Parliament place itself at the mercy of the smallest of States in this matter? Why should it be possible, at least in theory, for one Prince or Princeling to hold up the constitutional advance of such a large country as India? If Parliament itself desires to use the States as a screen for its own denial of self-government, it is another matter. But if this is not its object, it must face up boldly to the problem, and it can only do so by requiring the States, at the very time of accession, to surrender not only the power that is represented by the federal list, but also the further power of which the surrender may in future be called for by the federal legislature by a fixed majority, as Mr. Croom-Johnson suggested. This is done, as we have said above, in all other federations; then why not in the Indian federation? Are the Indian States more sovereign and more independent than the countries which united, for instance, to make the United States of America? The Labour Party refrained from challenging an issue on the motion of Mr. Herbert Williams, only because an opportunity would arise again for the discussion of this question on Schedule 2; but at the moment we must heartily congratulate the Party on the keen fight which it put up on this question, which is of the utmost importance, but which unfortunately is all but neglected in current discussions, not only in England, but in India as well. There are only two alternatives for India if the present notion about retaining Indian States' sovereignty in all its integrity is not to be discarded: either block of all future advance or disintegration of the federation.

GOLD EXPORT FALLACIES.

IT has now become almost a fashionable virtue among our politicians and some of our *soi-disant* economists to come out at regular intervals with whole-hearted denunciations of the Government's *laissez-faire* policy as regards the gold exports. It would perhaps be not altogether unpatriotic to ignore the political sentiment and consider in the spirit of cold logic whether all this scare is justified and whether the gold exports are really a proof of a steadily deteriorating economic position of the country.

THE THREE FALLACIES.

I propose in this article to undertake the perhaps thankless task of analysing the causes and the economic repercussions of these exports and of enunciating what appear to be the right principles of policy. There seems to me to be three main fallacies lurking in the minds of those who have made a grievance out of the gold exports. One, that a high sterling ratio has been wholly responsible for the exports. Two, that the gold exports have helped the authorities to maintain an otherwise untenable ratio. And three, that the exports are detrimental to the ultimate economic interests of the country. Myths and fallacies, once started and not checked early enough, have a facile tendency to pass into currency as accepted doctrines and to cause much unnecessary and confused wrangling.. I believe in not putting any restrictions on gold exports, Government are, whether consciously or not, acting wisely and in the best interests of India and the world. At the same time, I hope, this justification of their gold policy will not be misconstrued as a general defence of their undoubtedly deflationary policy of the last ten years or so. Nor does it follow that it would support the thesis that the 1s. 6d. ratio is the best of all possible ratios or that the Government are to be congratulated on their present unjustifiable and unnecessary practice of deflationary home remittances.

THE PRICE FACTOR.

To all arguments regarding the balance of payments it is always particularly risky to establish causal sequences and draw conclusions therefrom. People who assert that the high ratio has been causing the gold exports neglect some very obvious facts. In the first place, the ratio has been there, in fact if not *de jure*, since 1924 and although it might have been partly responsible for contracting the channels of India's export trade, it is noteworthy that right up to our departure from gold we were substantial importers of gold and that suddenly the tide turned in 1931–32 and gold to the extent of 60 crores began to be annually exported. Secondly, the normal theory of gold as filling the gap caused by a less favourable

balance of merchandise account failing to answer the needs of home charges, capital account and invisible balance, does not provide any answer for these enormous exports. The truth is simply that, owing to our departure from gold, the external price of gold rose out of all proportion relatively to the internal price and it became immensely profitable to send out gold. If this were not the case, both "distress" gold as well as commercial gold would have remained in India. It may be interesting, perhaps, to add that the consequences of a reduction of the ratio would be a tremendous increase in the export of gold, gold being the most mobile commodity.

STIMULATED IMPORTS.

There is, of course, much truth in the contention that India's merchandise balance has dwindled owing to an adverse monetary policy. But a greater cause has been the world depression which has reduced the foreign balances of most debtor and agriculturist nations to insignificant figures and in cases made them decidedly adverse. It should be a matter of grave concern that India's balance should drop from 86 crores in 1928-29 to respectively 79, 62, 34 and 3 crores in the following years. The last two figures are particularly important, as this country went off gold in 1931. It is said that this low balance was caused by the high ratio and that gold helped to fill the gap. This fallacious belief is held by many, but the truth will be realised on reflecting for a moment that a balance can be upset in two ways: by diminution of exports or (and) increase or maintenance of imports of goods. I maintain that the gold exports themselves were responsible for the increased merchandise imports in 1932-33 and for the sustained imports of the previous year and for the consequent fall of the merchandise balance to ridiculous levels. The exporters of gold did not part with their treasure for nothing; in so far as they were "distress" sellers they imported necessaries and in so far as they were commerical sellers they imported other types of durable wealth like, e. g., motor cars. It may be noted that these years were highly satisfactory from the viewpoint of customs revenue. The lie direct to the fallacy, however, is given by the appearance of a favourable balance of 35 crores in 1933-34. If it was merely a question of gold exports being required to keep up the ratio, the Government would not have been in a position to repay, as it has done, substantial portions of its short-term and long-term sterling debts and to strengthen its reserves after meeting its recurrent requirements.

GAIN OR LOSS?

The exports of gold have been compared to the loot of Mahmud of Ghazni and much political capital has been made by popular speakers in want of suitable war-cries out of their being a sign of India's growing poverty and so on. This, to say the least, is sheer nonsense. The export of gold is not a sign of India's growing poverty any more than an unfavourable balance would be such a sign. If we have reduced our foreign obligations, imported other durable forms of wealth, relieved distress in one of the worst depressions that the world has experienced with the help of a dead asset like gold, this is indeed a matter for congratulating ourselves on our being so civilised. Again, for this dead asset we have obtained unexpectedly high prices which have enriched us internationally. It is sheer ignorance born of the *auri sacra fames* which makes us regret the exports. Those who hold that Government ought to have imposed duties on gold exports or prohibited them are indeed begging the question of the desirability of such an action. Others, who believe that this exported gold could have been bought up for the Reserve Bank to serve as its reserves, have not realised the true function of gold reserves. The Government have, in my view, rightly invested the funds made available by the exports in interest-bearing securities. If at any time any crank would have it all in gold, these sterling assets could be converted very easily into gold and at a price which would be more in consonance with normal conditions. For the moment, it is difficult to improve upon the Government's present *laissez-faire* policy. Moreover, if we *must* have an exchange standard of some kind, I should rather have the sterling standard than the expensive luxury of a gold exchange, gold bullion or gold currency standard. But this would lead me into a discussion of an independent standard for India, and I cannot go into that question here.

THE FUTURE.

I firmly believe that the export of gold is only a temporary tendency. When the internal and external prices of gold come into alignment, as they soon must, gold exports must diminish in the near future. It is a good thing that we are selling off gold when its international price is so high and its reputation is fast dwindling. The future of gold is dark, but if at all there is a general return to gold, we can rest assured that there is such a plethora of monetary gold (cf. Keynes's views in the *Economic Journal*, September 1934, p. 515), which is being still further aggravated by increased production of gold, that the world price of gold will fall considerably. When that happens, this country will begin to import gold and re-establish its doubtful reputation as the "Eastern sink for the yellow metal." That must, at any rate, satisfy our gold fetishists.

B. P. ADARKAR.

FEDERALISE LABOUR LEGISLATION!

"ALL-INDIA federation is necessary; we cannot therefore impose any conditions on the Princes; we must admit them on their own terms," is virtually what the British Government says whenever any proposal is made to improve the federal scheme. Precisely this was the answer to the Labour Party's amendment, put forward on its behalf in Committee by Mr. Rhys Davies, that acceptance as federal subjects of matters like factories, welfare of labour, trade unions etc. be made a condition of the Princes' accession to federation.

The case for the inclusion of these subjects in the federal list is overwhelming. In competitive

industries labour legislation must obviously be uniform in the whole area; otherwise industries in areas where such legislation is of an advanced character will obviously be at a serious disadvantage. This in fact is already being experienced in India. Mr. Tom Smith pointed out that the Labour Commission has recorded its opinion that, "except in rare cases, their (the States') labour laws are substantially behind those of British India", and, as a consequence of this, Mr. Raikes pointed out, "we see industries slipping across from British India to the Indian States." And backward legislation in the States becomes a good excuse for British Indian industrialists for resisting advanced legislation in British India. If federation is of any advantage, it must prescribe uniform labour conditions in the whole of India.

But the British Government does not listen to these arguments. If a such a condition were laid down, a federation would become impossible, and a federation we must have at all costs, however thin it may be, it says in effect. It is not even prepared to negotiate with the Princes. It is right in a sense. What negotiation is possible when you have already decided that some kind of federation is necessary? The British Government is prepared to negotiate—even to the point of bringing pressure where its own interests are involved. In such matters it is confident that its negotiations will be successful. In other matters it will not even open negotiations.

But, it says: This is not a matter worth troubling about very much. Industries have not grown up in many States; and where they have, Princes are enlightened enough to adopt progressive legislation without control of a higher authority. If so, asks the Labour Party, why do their Highnesses offer so much opposition to its proposal, and how is it that the Government cannot use persuasion in this matter as it can in several others? All these points were very forcibly put in the Debate.

For instance; Mr. Paling said:

> The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) yesterday pointed out that at a certain meeting (of the Princes in Bombay) certain fundamental objections in his mind to the passing of the Bill had been made manifest. The Secretary of State replied that the objections might be very great, though they were not so great but that they could be negotiated. "If we get these people together, I do not believe there is a single objection that could not be got over." If he is clever and able enough to get over the objections that we discussed yesterday, I think he will be clever enough to get over the objections that might be raised by the Princes to these Amendments. If one lot of objections can be got over, why cannot others, particularly in view of the fact that everyone agrees with the principle that is laid down?
>
> I have heard it said time after time that some of the Princes are very enlightened persons, and that they give better conditions to their people than exist in the Provinces. If that be so, I imagine that it would not need much argument to bring such Princes over to accept these Amendments. If they are putting into operation the principles embodied in this, why should they object to their being put into the Bill? The Under-Secretary says the Amendment is not wide enough and it does not embody all that we want, because the largest part of the States is agricultural, and presumably no provision is made for those people. If these particular Princes are not going to be affected by the Amendments, they will not have much objections to them. There are enlightened Princes on the one hand who are already doing better than we are asking; there are others who will not be affected by it, and there are the persuasive powers of the Secretary of State himself and, in view of all that, why on earth should we not accept the Amendment?

How unfair and partisan the supporters of the Government are in debate was well shown by Lord Eustace Percy, who, in putting the Government case, admitted that the Labour Party's amendment was right in theory but created prejudice against it by quoting the United States' constitution. He said:

> While obviously one would want to see that in any federation all these matters were the subject of uniform legislation, let us consider what this amendment means to the Princes in India. It means that this House is to say to the Princes, "We will not accept your accession unless you will agree that it shall be a closer federation than that in the United States of America." Is that a reasonable proposition to which to ask the assent of the independent Indian States? Any such proposal would be unreasonable in itself, and would wreck the chances of an all-India federation.

To this Col. Wedgwood, rising immediately after Lord Eustace Percy, made a very effective reply. He said:

> The Noble Lord (Lord Eustace Percy) has taken as an example the sole federation which does not include this legislation. Let him look anywhere within the British Empire. We have a union in South Africa, we have a union in Australia and we have Canada, and in all the federations this legislation is central legislation. I should have thought the Noble Lord would have been the last person to bring forward America as an example for us to follow in this matter. The variation of the laws between the different States makes it impossible to get progress. One of the chief obstacles in the way of the President's new deal has been the State legislation in America.
>
> The real difficulty here is not the injury to the inhabitants of the native States left out of factory legislation. The real misfortune is that by leaving out the native States we give a lever to all the reactionary forces in British India to say, "We will not do anything in this matter because if we do the factories will go elsewhere." Consequently, all the workers throughout India will suffer by reason of the fact that no such legislation is possible in the native States.

One uniform reply from the Government benches to all such demands was: It cannot be done. The Princes are unwilling and they cannot be coerced. If the demands are unduly pressed on them, federation itself will be smashed, and no constitutional advance is possible without federation. For instance Under-Secretary Butler said: "The proposal of the amendment is not a practical possibility in the sort of federation which we are considering. If we are to have a federation of the sort which we contemplate, it will be impossible to lay down conditions such as are suggested in the amendment.... (The amendment) would involve coercion of the States to accept what they may not be willing to have." Secretary Hoare said: "If we pass the amendment we shall destroy federation altogether.... It is much better to leave it on that optional line rather than to attempt it by coercion, the only result of which will be to make federation impossible altogether."

The coercion argument was very well answered by Mr. Churchill who said:

The Secretary of State talks about coercing the Princes. There is no question of anyone being coerced. If they wish to come into federation, as we are told they have offered to do, it will be a voluntary act. My right hon. Friend has repeatedly assured us that in no circumstances is pressure to be put upon them to take this step. But, if they take the step, surely we are entitled to press upon them the importance of this class of subject being included in those to which they subscribe. Surely we are entitled to do that. The Imperial power does interest itself in the fortunes of the masses of India and in their well-being, and now Parliament is asked to leave this on one side. The object is to get federation. Surely if we are going to have federation, if this great design is to be carried to completeness, it should be a federation which has as one of its central points a desire to raise and to unify labour conditions throughout India. In the present circumstances the very greatest difficulties will arise.

If the laying down of conditions which in themselves were reasonable would wreck federation it could not be helped, remarked some Members. Mr. Banfield, for instance, said: "This House is more concerned with satisfying the claims of the Princes than satisfying the aspirations of the millions of our fellow-subjects in India." Mr. Churchill joined his powerful voice to this and appealed to the Government at any rate to start negotiations on the matter and not say: "We cannot possibly entertain such a proposal. The Princes will be scared thereby." He said:

The proposal that is put forward is that an effort should be made to clothe the centre also with these functions, and that the Princes who accede to the Central Legislature should place themselves in a great area in which there will be an endeavour to establish uniform labour conditions as far as possible, and it is obvious that if there is not that attempt, all progress is arrested. Here is an opportunity for Parliament to strike this note in favour of not neglecting our duties to the great proletariat of India, and of placing before the Princes the fact that, now that they are coming into this system of federalism, which the Government assure us and them will be so greatly to their advantage, the least the Government can do is to endeavour to negotiate with them and ask them whether they cannot be induced to take on this burden. The most effective way of influencing the Government in that respect is for us to support our opinions by our votes. In all these matters Great Britain is making enormous sacrifices, and if the Princes wish to have this federal system they should, in my opinion, share in those sacrifices too.

In negotiations one always meets at first with a negative reply to any demand that is made, but one does not break off the negotiations there or take that as the final answer. As one goes along, one finds that reasonable demands are accepted in the end, at least partially, if not wholly. But the trouble with the British Government is that it will not start negotiations with the Princes in this spirit in matters in which its own interests are not concerned, but lets the Princes have their own way. Mr. Davies said, on this point:

I have often negotiated with employers of labour and other people, and I know that the first thing the employers say is, "We will have none of it." But, when we negotiate and argue, as we can on this side of the House, the employers are very often convinced that they are wrong and come a little nearer to our point of view. If the India Office would undertake to convey to the Princes the feeling of the House of Commons on the Amendment which we moved to-day, I should not be surprised if some headway were made with the Princes.

Federation is not worth while unless it enables certain essential things to be done. This was the universal cry of Labour. Sir Stafford Cripps said:—

Where one finds vital matters of this sort, it is not, in our submission, a satisfacory answer to say that this may defeat federation. We do not believe in federation for the sake of federation, unless it is going to produce a desirable result in a federated community. One cannot just say that this or that is undesirable, because it may make it more difficult to get the Princes to come in. That is, in our view, a wholly unsatisfactory way of approaching the position. One has to say, What are we out for as the objective of this federation? Are we out for improving the conditions of the masses in India, or are we out merely for setting up a structure and a constitution which will operate despite the masses, and perhaps even adversely to the masses?

We believe that the three matters which are mentioned in the first Amendment are all absolutely vital as regards the conditions of the people in the Indian States, and that a federation which is brought about upon the basis of neglecting these fundamental rights of the inhabitants of those States cannot be a satisfactory form of federation. In fact one can put it in this way, that a Prince who is unwilling to submit these matters to the ultimate decision of the Federal Legislature is not such a person as can be properly, within a federation, entrusted with legislation and supervision on these matters over his subjects uncontrolled by the Federal Legislature. Therefore, we feel that even if it were true—which we do not for a moment accept—in the sense that it was accurate, we do not accept that this would stop the Princes from federating. We do not think that that is any good answer to the argument if one accepts, as I understand the right hon. Gentleman does, the basis of the Amendment in this sense that these are matters which are urgently necessary to be legislated for in India whether federated or unfederated, and it should be an essential part of the basis of federation that matters of this should have very early attention.

Mr. Tinker said:

Whatever may be the fate of this Bill, unless it embodies in it the welfare of the masses as a whole, this House ought to say that we cannot have it for the time being. It is an impossible situation to say, "We will get this Bill through because we must do it this way in order to get the assent of the Princes." I do not put so much value upon them. I really put most value on the working class opinion of India—not on the Princes. I hope that the Committee will recognise the matter in that sense, and that the result of the vote will show their true feelings.

SPARKS FROM THE COMMONS' ANVIL.

26th, 27th and 28th February.

FEDERATION NOT SO ESSENTIAL.

BRITISH statesmen, speaking to the people in British India, say: "Central responsibility for British India alone is quite impossible. It will become possible only under an all-India federation. So quietly accept the Princes' terms." But, in order to drive the Princes into the federation, they say: "If you don't come in, we shall have to give central responsibility to British India; we cannot avoid it. Then it will be so much the worse for you." Which

of these positions is true? Undoubtedly the latter. A federation of the proper kind is desirable; it certainly is not essential to British Indian self-government. Sir Austen Chamberlain said of Mr. Churchill's adjournment motion:

> I believe that to be entering on a fatal course, and I beg both the Princes of India, if my voice can reach them, and Members of this Committee to consider where that will lead. You will create 12 powerful organs of public opinion and at the same moment disappoint all the hopes which they can legitimately hold after the past four years of Indian discussion and conference and passing of resolutions. If you establish those bodies and discontent them and render them your enemies the moment that you establish them, can you find any support for your Government from them?
>
> What will be and what must be their purpose? It must be, of course, to overthrow the Central Government at present established and to substitute a representative system of responsible government at the Centre for British India alone. It is common ground, at any rate, to all of us in these days that responsibility at the Centre can only be granted as part of a federal system including the Indian States. If, by your own act, you refuse to make that federation possible, if you refuse the opportunity to the Princes and British India to join in such a federation, are you certain that sooner or later—yes, and as things move to-day sooner rather than later—you will not be driven to establishing responsible government at the Centre for British India alone; and do you think you will have done a good day's work for the British Empire or for the connection of India with this country if you have reached that result? What will the Princes think? They will have had offered to them such terms as this House is ready to make for them to-day, which secure them in the just retention of their rights and sovereignty.

Mr. Isaac Foot spoke in the same strain. He said:

> I would like the Princes to realise what the danger is. If the scheme broke down, and if the Rothermeres of this country were the people of the country, what would happen then? The demand for Indian reform cannot be gainsaid. No one can suggest that because of a failure of the Princes to co operate the demands of the people of India can be set back. They would be entitled to say, if this arrangement could not be made, that their proper rights must be considered. Let the Princes consider what their position would be if there were established, as there would have to be established in order to meet Indian opinion, self-government in the great Provinces side by side with Princes who could not take their share in the development of their country? We do not ask the Princes to come into a federation for our sake in particular, although we should welcome them, but as a steadying and substantial factor in Indian life. Nevertheless, there are the people of British India to be considered, and if the Princes stood aside the people of India would be entitled to come to this House and ask that their proper claims should be met. If that course had to be taken under some Bill other than this Bill, the Princes might look upon the day when they failed to take their share, following upon the declarations they have made, as the worst day in their history.

ACCEPTABLE IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES.

MR. CHURCHILL quoted in the Committee of the House of Commons on 27th February certain speeches which purport to have been made at the Princes' meeting in Bombay the same day denouncing the Bill. The report is not official, it is true; but no one has said that it is substantially incorrect. Sir Akbar Hydari is reported to have used some very strong words. If the news published in England be true, he said:

> We cannot accept the entire Act as it has been enacted by Parliament. We have always protested against any acceptance of that kind. We have always held that we will be parties to a federation with regard to specific things and specific provisions. Here we are first asked to accept the entire Act, and then we are allowed to make reservations, not with regard to sections of it, but with regard to one particular Schedule of it, and in regard to all other matters we are asked to accept the Act. I think we have all unanimously agreed that this is a position which under no circumstances whatever we shall be prepared to accept.

Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar was even more emphatic in denouncing the Bill, as the following extracts show:

> I appeal with all the force at my command that Clause 6 is a dangerous innovation. It marks the culmination of a process which began in 1930. From then down to 1934 it has been a progressive incline plane and we are now at the bottom of the plane. This Clause is full of danger, and I ask Your Highnesses with all the force at my command not only to disclaim Clause 6, but the spirit underlying this Clause . . . It is fraught with the utmost mischief. I am deliberately and firmly of the opinion that those features to which the Committee of Ministers has drawn attention are fundamental and vital, and unless there is a change in the spirit with which the Act is going to be dealt with hereafter, it would be a thousand pities if your Highnesses should join in a compact of which you know not the end.

CIRCUMSTANCES ALTER CASES.

THE proposed federation is admittedly only voluntary for the Princes; but it is to be forced upon British India. The strangest part of the whole thing is that Liberal members of Parliament agree to such a discrimination against the British Indian people. Mr. Foot said, on Mr. Churchill's adjournment motion:

> I can imagine nothing worse from that standpoint that we should suspend the proceedings of the High Court of Parliament because of a resolution that was adopted yesterday at Bombay by the Princes, as the right hon. Gentleman would if he had his will. He said the other day that we should not proceed unless we asked the present Legislative Assembly what they wanted to do, and that we should not proceed until we knew what the provincial assemblies wanted. Where is the authority of the High Court of Parliament?
>
> *Mr. Churchill*: I did not say anything of the sort. The amendment was that it should not come into operation until the Legislative Assembly had assented.
>
> *Mr. Foot*: The right hon. Gentleman makes it worse now. After Parliament has gone through all the procedure on this Bill and the Bill has received the assent of His Majesty, we are to go to the present Legislative Assembly and say, "Before this Bill can pass into law and before the will of Parliament can be implemented, will you tell us whether we can receive your assent?"
>
> *Mr. Churchill*: That is exactly the proposal which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) has just made with regard to the Princes—we are to carry the whole Bill through notwithstanding what they say, and in the end they have to say whether they want it.

INGENUOUS.

THE diehard Tories proposed in Committee that it should be made obligatory on a Minister in the federal government either to have been previously elected or to get himself elected within six months after his appointment, as the Bill provides. To this Sir Samuel replied that such a provision in black and white would create surpicion in India and begged the diehards not to press their motion as there were other means open to the Governor-General to achieve the same result, without increasing the unpopularity of the Act. Our ingenuous Secretary of State!

> In the Federal Centre there is a Second Chamber. In that Chamber there are a number of nominated members. It is possible for the Governor-General, if need be, to use one of his nominations for an appointment of this kind; I suggest that to the Committee as much the best way to meet a case in which the Governor-General and Ministers require the services of someone who is not already a member of the Federal Assembly. By that method you will be achieving the end which I believe is in the minds of a good many hon. Members this afternoon, and you will not be raising an unnecessary issue that will set against you, quite needlessly, large bodies of political opinion in India. For these reasons I suggest to the Committee that this is not a great question with issues of principle at stake. A Minister has a period of six months before he need become a member of one or other of the Chambers. In the case of the Federal Legislature if he fails to obtain a seat in the Assembly or if he does not wish to stand for the Assembly he can obtain a nomination for a nominated seat in the Second Chamber. That being so, it is better to follow the advice, reached after a long period of investigation, of the Joint Select Committee and not to adopt a proposal, however attractive it may be at first sight, which certainly would not work but would undoubtedly raise up agianst it great bodies of Indian politial opinion.

POOR MR. FOOT!

THE poor Mr. Isaac Foot! He always flits between consent and coercion on the India question. Generally he inclines to coercion, but sometimes he does remember, as a Liberal, the need for consent. And he happens always to be twitted by the Conservatives when he allows himself to remember this, as witness the following conversation in Committee. Mr. Foot said:

> I attach great importance to the opinion of this House and of this country, but the ultimate argument and the ultimate decision surely rests with the people who have to live under the Constitution that we are seeking to set up.
>
> *Viscount Wolmer*: Does the hon. Gentleman now suggest that? He voted against us when we proposed that Federation should not come into force until the Indian Legislature had approved it.
>
> *Mr. Foot*: When I spoke before I clearly stated that in the end, unless you have the consent of the people of India and their will to work it, your scheme can never work. That is the final test. If you can get a sufficient number of people in that country to say that they will work the scheme, that is the final test. If you cannot get that, all your work will come to nothing in the end.

Will not a constitution which does not provide for direct election be worked? It will. Then why introduce direct election?

SIR SAMUEL TRIPPED UP.

WHEN the Labour Party proposed that the Indian Army should not be sent out of India for purposes other than those of the defence of India except with the consent of the Ministers, Sir Samuel Hoare replied that no hard and fast distinction could be made between Indian defence and Imperial defence and yet proceeded to say that in the former case the Ministers would be consulted. Mr. Seymour Cocks fastened upon this. This meant then, he said, that a discrimination could be made; then why not make it as Labour wanted it? The Labour recommendation only was that the Ministers should not merely be consulted, but their approval obtained. It was a neat reply that he made. He said:

> I fancy that the Secretary of State was slightly in error just now. He said that the Joint Select Committee found that they could not make a distinction between the case in which troops were sent out of India for purposes of Indian defence in its widest sense, and the case in which they were sent out of India for purposes altogether unconnected with Indian defence, such as a petty war in Shanghai, which would not involve the defence of India even in its very widest sense. The Committee did make a distinction. They said, in the first place, that they did not recommend that the power of the Governor-General should be limited in this matter. In the second case, that of Indian troops being sent across the sea for some purpose unconnected with the defence of India, we should not agree to do that witout consultation with the Minister.
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> *Sir S. Hoare*: I said so.
>
> *Mr. Cocks*: But of course they did say that the question as to whether the troops were in the one category or the other should be left to the discretion of the Governor-General. We agree with that, because that is what our Amendment states. The Joint Select Committee recommends that in the second case, when it is proposed that Indian troops should be sent out of India for purposes unconnected with the defence of India, the Minister ought to be consulted. Where is that power to be found in the Bill? Does it come within the Instruments of Instructions? I cannot find it in the Bill. I would like the Minister to answer that point. We say that in a case where the defence of India is not involved, not merely should the Minister be consulted but his consent should be given before Indian troops are sent oversea away from the place where they have enlisted and the country which they have enlisted to defend. If they are sent away from India for Imperial purposes not connected, even in the widest sense, with Indian defence it is only reasonable that the consent of Indian Ministers should be granted, and I ask the Government to consider that point also.

INDIANS WILL ASK NO LONGER!

ON the question of Indianisation of the Army, Mr. Rhys Davies said frankly that if the Government did not accede to the demand, now made by Indians on their knees, it will no longer have an opportunity to accede to the demand, because Indians will just take what they want without asking. He said:

> I know that that proposal will not commend itself to some hon. Members on the other side of the Committee: I will tell them why they adopt that attitude. It is because of the spirit of imperialism that imbues them and causes them to think that they are of better clay than anybody else, that they have been gifted by nature or by some supreme spirit with superior intelligence and power, and that they therefore should control the destinies of the millions of the people of India. I want to say quite frankly, and I am now speaking on my own behalf, that unless the proposal that we are now making is adopt-

ed and the Indian people are given the right to produce their own officers for their own Army, the day will come when they will not ask the British Government for that right, but will take it. That stage has been reached in many countries in the past, and I do not think that the Indians are much different from any other nation in that respect.

POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY.

MAJOR MILNER made the point that the federal list has not been drawn up on any principle, the only principle being that they appeared to be the subjects in regard to which the Princes would surrender *de jure* the power that they had already surrendered *de facto*. The list was unjust to British Indians in another way. In speaking on this point he said:

> The first 45 subjects mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Samuel Hoare) are not necessarily the most important. I imagine that the subjects which one would require the rulers to accede to are matters which may be considered of common concern to the whole country on the one hand, and on the other hand matters with respect to which complete uniformity is required. Those criteria apply equally to many subjects other than those included in the first 45. It is a rather curious thing that the first 45 subjects are merely subjects in respect to which expenditure will be required, but the remaining subjects included in List I refer to are matters of taxation. One would have thought that it would have been desirable to have insisted that rulers acceded in respect of matters of taxation. Obviously if some provision is not made in the Bill with regard to the matter, rulers who accede, those whose accession is accepted and who sent their nominees to the Federal Legislature, would have power to legislate in regard to those subjects in British India, and the Legislature would not have power to legislate in the rulers' States in regard to subjects not included in the Instrument of Accession. Therefore, it would in one sense be power without responsibility.

"BRITISH INDIA WILL NOT ACCEPT."

MR. EMMOTT showed how unreasonable and unjust to British India were the financial arrangements proposed in the Bill. He said:

> It is perfectly plain that indirect taxation is the only kind of taxation that the rulers of the States are prepared to allow to operate within their States. Not one rupee will the rulers of the States allow to be levied by the Federal Legislature upon their subjects by way of direct taxation. Not one rupee will the rulers of the States allow to be collected by agents of the Federal Legislature from any of their subjects by way of direct taxation. Indirect taxation, it is true, rests on another footing. But is this a situation which British India will accept with equanimity? I cannot believe it. Circumstances may very quickly arise that will necessitate the raising of considerable revenue which will not be made available only by indirect taxation; yet here we have this absolute refusal on the part of rulers of the States to consider the application of direct taxation to their subjects.

"SUBJECTING BRITISH INDIA TO THE PRINCES."

AS was to be expected, Col. Wedgwood made out a formidable case against the federal scheme. He declared himself to be "against federation of every sort", but if federation was to be brought about he would favour a federation of British Indian provinces. He echoed the sentiment of Lord Scone who said: "We have never yet had a proper explanation as to why it was suddenly decided that one could not have federation in India without the adherence of the Princes. That was a complete *volte face*, and one, I submit, which has never been satisfactorily explained." A British India federation would be a democratic federation, but that is precisely the reason why such a federation is rejected and an all-India federation is being formed. The case—"the secret case"—in favour of such federation is that "that way lies safety". But this is a vain hope, for "there is no safety in this method," for safety will be secured only if federation is the result of consent. But the all-India federation of the type that is being forged is a result of sheer coercion. Col. Wedgwood therefore bluntly told the Committee that this federation was an attempt at "preventing India from going forward, subjecting British Indians to the rule of the native Princes and preventing any possibility of any development in a democratic direction for all the inhabitants of the native States."

Our London Letter.

(BY AIR MAIL.)

(From Our Correspondent.)

London, 1st March.

IF I were to be asked who are better as organisers in the sphere of practical life I should unhesitatingly award the superiority to women over men. They have a natural gift for detail and a great loyalty and enthusiasm in response to an appeal for service. The British Commonwealth League showed, by the activities of Miss Daisy Solomon and Miss Helen Todhunter, its organising secretaries, with the help and collaboration of Mrs. Grace Lankester, the liason officer between the British Associations interesting themselves in Indian affairs and the Indian women's organisations, how well British women can manage their affairs. The Friends House was not only packed to overflowing but large numbers of late-comers were turned away from the meeting, convened under the chairmanship of Lord Allen of Hurtwood, to hear from Mrs. Corbett Ashby and Dr. Maude Royden the burden of their impressions derived from their necessarily brief flying visit to India. Lord Allen himself is a sufficiently distinguished figure to attract an audience and, notwithstanding delicate health, is constantly in demand as an expositor and defender of good causes. He criticised strongly the spirit in which the India Bill had been framed and the manner in which concessions had been made to deal with its weaknesses both of technique and of substance. In particular, he made reference to the manner in which the subject of Dominion Status had been handled by the Government.

Mrs. Corbett Ashby and Miss Royden differ widely in temperament, personality and method of approach, but they expressed, in two very different types of speech, a common measure of agreement upon all matters but one. They joined in emphasising the general unanimity with which, so far as they could judge, the present proposals had been denounced in India and in their appraisement of the force and vigour of growing national sentiment throughout the country. But whereas, for a number of good reasons, Mrs. Corbett Ashby, a political realist with wide experience, felt that the only thing to do was to get this Bill passed after making every endeavour to amend it satisfactorily and then to work

it as vigorously and effectively as possible, in order to justify an early appeal to Parliament for a new constitution more acceptable to Indian opinion and applicable to Indian conditions and in whose framing Indians themselves would have had a larger share. Dr. Royden felt that on account of the very hostility with which the Bill had been received, it would be better, even at this stage, not to go on with it but to send out to India a representative group of the most distinguished public men who could gather from Indians themselves on the spot the sort of constitution that Indians would desire. Whereas Mrs. Corbett Ashby was of opinion that there was now nothing for it but to proceed to make and wear a new suit of clothes, since the growing adolescent had entirely outgrown the old one which was now constricting his movements in every direction. Dr. Royden thought that it was much better to continue with the old suit a little longer, notwithstanding its limitations, rather than be compelled to wear a foreign-made suit instead of a home-made one. There was there all the difference between the practical experience of a public woman who had realised how difficult, if not impossible, it would be for Parliament if it failed to enact this constitution to enact any other for years to come and the ardent enthusiast who hoped that by a gesture of generosity, sympathy and understanding such as she now recommended, Britain and India might be kept together in bonds of mutual respect and good-will. It was no wonder that Mrs. Rama Rau, in moving a vote of thanks to the Chairman and to the two speakers, paid a fine tribute to the high qualities of each of the speakers and that Mrs. Lankester in seconding was able to read eloquent tribute to the services of these two distinguished British women from the All-India Women's Federation.

LORD ZETLAND ON INDIA.

In a book entitled "Steps Towards Indian Home Rule", Lord Zetland contributes to the public understanding of the development of Indian constitutional events since 1930. In it he confesses that it is only comparatively recently that he has been able gradually to clear his mind and reach the conviction that central responsibility must accompany provincial autonomy. Sir Frederick Whyte quotes Lord Zetland on the reserve powers as follows: "These reserve powers are very real, but I would lay stress on the fact that they are *in reserve*. I do not picture them as being ordinarily exercised at all. 'It is in exact proportion,' to quote the Joint Committee Report, 'as Indians show themselves to be capable of taking and exercising resp onsibility .... that both the need for safeguards and their use will disappear.'" Sir Frederick Whyte in conclusion says that he would have the Government print in heavy type lines 9, 10 and 11 of paragraph viii and lines 14, 15, 16 and 17 of paragraph ix of the Instrument of Instructions.

LIBERALISATION OF STATES' ADMINISTRATIONS.

Mr. SASTRI'S SPEECH AT NAGPUR.

The Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, in his speech, at the Nagpur Town Hall on 4th March, appealed to the rulers of Indian States to do three things to dispel the suspicions widely felt in British India that the States will only hamper British India's advance in the federal constitution: (1) they should declare that they would stand by British India in its demand for dominion status; (2) that they should ask, along with British India, for the complete withdrawal of the British troops from India and for the complete Indianisation of the officer ranks of the Indian Army within a specified period of time; and (3) that they should modernise their administrations and introduce representative institutions within their territories. On the third point he said :—

NOW I want to make a third request to them. Now, they are angry if you tell them, "You are coming into this federal arrangement just in order to check us. You come here expressly for the purpose of keeping us back. You talk continually of your internal sovereignty, of your old-fashioned methods of governing for the good of the people without consulting or caring for their wishes. That is your one way of dealing with things, and you want to be fortified and protected in this backward administration method." If you tell them so, they get very angry of course. And all that I say is, if this policy is unjust to them, it is quite easy for them to meet in their Chamber and say that, since their people have not been educated politically half so well as the people of British India, it will take them a little time; we and they alike must be patient for a little while, but that they are willing to look forward in this matter of liberalising their administration.

Will they limit their expenditure within limits, declare that they will have a privy purse? Will they give representative institutions by slowly advancing steps to their people? Will they place their judiciary on a swift and secure basis, so that they may really be bul-works of justice against the proof of their authority? Will they, I ask finally, will they declare that their services will have their salaries and their tenures and their privileges and their leave arrangements, all secured by law, so that each man taking office in a State may promise to himself 20 or 25 years of undisturbed work and promotion attending that work step by step.

"COME OUT OF SECLUSION."

Let the Princes come out of seclusion. They are no longer what they were. They are going to be participators in the government of this huge country they are making themselves. They are not the old Princes. They are making themselves responsible for a future Government where there will be a democratic arrangement. How can they keep aloof in their old way?

Now ladies and gentlemen, although this is no part of my argument, for the Princes will repudiate every single syllable of it, and that this may not commend itself to them, I add as a sort of supplement, just for your and my satisfaction. Now, our friends of the princely Order are always saying, "We are internally autonomous and independent; nobody shall say a word about the relations of us and our subjects." Theoretically, in law, in constitutional procedure, this is sound doctrine. I accept it. Quite right that the Princes and their subjects should adjust all their internal differences amongst themselves. We outsiders have no business in the matter. But, ladies and gentlemen, this doctrine, which in law is quite sound, and which I am perfectly willing to respect so far as law is concerned, is not, however, in these days of a wide-spread press, perfect; it is not constitutional either. We will make ourselves certain that we are not on false ground. Now, formerly if you re-

member, why even now, in certain backward communities, it is generally felt that a father has complete control over his children. He may or may not educate them just as he pleased. He may put them to school or he may not. He may be teaching them bad ways and manners. He may have them brought up as ruffians. And yet does the law allow this liberty to the father? In the civilized world to-day the law comes in between a parent and his child and says," "The child shall be educated. You dare not keep him ignorant, for although you have a right within limits to keep him so, it is the society, it is the community, it is the general public that will suffer for the boy's being brought up ignorant and useless. Therefore you shall put him into school." We do interfere between a father and his child. Strictly speaking there is no interference between husband and wife (cheers). Who dare do that? And yet while there are some women, I know, brave and strong and capable of defending themselves there are others, and these are the dumb millions, others who cannot defend themselves. Where there is oppression, where there is cruelty, where there is beating, provided, of course, it extends beyond certain limits, the law does interfer even in that sacred relationship. We do not allow that to go on.

And suppose in the midst of Europe, where there are so many mutually independent countries, suppose in the midst of Europe, one country develops revolutionary tendencies and there is bloodshed. The other fellows always do not look round merely; they try to bring a sort of pressure upon that country to get itself within limits of order. Now these things travel outside your political boundary. You cannot keep them within. Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, it is a medieval doctrine that any community or any State can protect itself by means of a ring fence from outside influence of moral or spiritual or, I would say, of political character. How can the people in the States be deaf, while we are crying out for dominion status? I ask that. They are our brethren, they have received the same education as we. Our newspapers travel there. We import into their families all articles of trade, of literature, of science, every item of culture is common to them and us. What folly, I ask, is it to demand that, so far as political and administrative matters are concerned, there shall be maintained a disparity in the year 1935 which existed in the year 1835?

How is it possible? Therefore, while I am perfectly content that no regular pressure of any kind should be put upon the Princes, I only appeal to them most humbly that they out of their own sweet will and accord, recognising the forces all around them and out of the simple desire to meet the inevitable half way, that they would voluntarily make a declaration, each one in his own place, and for his own people, that his future policy would be directed towards making them more and more politically—well, what shall I say, just say efficient, don't put in any other word. Now that it seems to me is necessary. If there is an old mediæval doctrine, it is one of complete seclusion of 580 different States, each within its own wall; this is an idea which is no longer likely to prevail in the modern conditions of India.

THREE REQUESTS.

Well then, I make of our friends, of the Princes, these three requests:—

(i) That they should in those courteous, thoroughly loyal, diplomatic ways open to them support us in our advocacy of continual progress towards dominion status;

(ii) that they will support us as a corollary from this, why as a distinct means to it, of this other position, that the army in India must be completely Indianized within a definite period of time; and

(iii) that they would, without waiting for any outside pressure, of their own sweet will and accord, declare a policy of continuous liberalisation of their administrative and political institutions.

"PRINCES, PRINCES, PRINCES."

MR. MORGAN JONES'S SPEECH ON FEDERATION.

Mr. Morgan Jones, M. P., made in the Committee of the House of Commons on 26th February the following speech on Clause 5 of the India Bill.

I PROPOSE to say one or two words in relation to the question of federation. I have already addressed the Committee upon the matter on the Motion that the Chairman do report Progress, when I studiously avoided speaking upon the particular proposal of federation itself. I think I made it clear to the Committee earlier that we on this side are quite convinced that a form of federation is the more desirable thing to achieve if you can achieve it. It is obvious that it is desirable to get, in the course of time and as speedily as possible, a united India. It has been said over and over again in this Committee that India as yet is not a nation, that it is a congeries of all kinds of people who speak different languages and have different religions. So it is desirable that this great sub-continent should sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, be able to speak with a united voice. The only way to secure that is by some method of federation.

We have kept steadily before our minds, therefore, the desirability of achieving as far as possible a form of federation. I do dot think that I shall be controverted if I say that even those Conservatives who are so consistently opposing this idea are not so very remote after all from the concept of a federation, for they themselves moved last week in the direction of establishing a Council of Greater India, on the line of the recommendations of the Simon Commission. If hon. Members will look at that concept, which was advanced in some detail, they will find there the terms of a federation. I know that the federation was not drafted precisely on the terms of this one, nor on the terms which we desire, but there is a desire, even in their Motion, for a federation. So in point of fact I do not think there is a fundamental difference between any of us in this Committee regarding the desirability of a central organisation which can focus the activity of the States and of the Provinces in one common centre.

Our difference with the Government on this matter arises from the nature of the Federation which is here established. My friends and I, who acknowledge that we strive to retain the democratic outlook not only in our own country but in relation to our Dominions overseas, feel that it is incumbent upon us to strive as far as possible to retain the democratic elements in this central Assembly. No one can deny that there are two quite incongruous elements in this Federation. There is the element of nomination from the States and the element of election from

British India, and it is extremely hard to reconcile them in practice. I do not see how these two hitherto irreconcilable elements, autocracy on the one side and democrcy on the other side, are going to work co-terminously or co-existently at the centre. It might be worked, and I do not say that it is beyond possibility, but my great objection is this : If you feel that you must bring in this nominated element from the States, very good. It is bringing an incongruous element into the structure of the centre. But, in order to do it, do not make the price of federation a price that it is impossible to pay. I suggest that the price that is being paid in order to establish this Federation is a price which British India ought not to be called upon to pay.

That is my simple proposition. What is the price in fact ? I challenge contradiction upon the point that, once this Federation is established, British India has a yoke thrust upon it that it cannot shake off. If you are going to retain federation you can do it only with the acquiescence of the Princes. The moment you sacrifice the acquiescence of the Princes the Federation falls to pieces. Under Schedule 2 of the Bill the Princes' acquiescence can be immediately removed if the Princes are able to argue that you have so altered constitutional development in British India as to prejudice thereby the Instruments of Accession. To enable the Princes to hold a pistol of that sort at the hand of British India is to give them too great a power. I repeat that if you can work the Princes in with British India in any common endeavour to work for the whole of India very well and good. I am not enthusiastic nor optimistic about it. But if you can, please do not do it at the expense of weighting down, not for a period, not temporarily, but so far as this Bill is concerned for all time—weighting down British India to such a degree that it cannot march forward a single step. That is a terrible price to pay. It is an impossible price.

No one can be surprised if we on this side take the strongest objection to any proposal to prevent utterly—that is not an exaggerated word—if the Princes so desire, any single step forward in constitutional progress. Not only that, but let us look at how the thing works in practice. I said earlier this afternoon that we did not know yet on what terms the Princes will join the Federation. There is no common factor to which all Princes must agree. One Prince presumably may accept acquiescence in respect of 10 subjects and another in respect of a different number. We on our side take the strongest possible objection to the idea of federation unless and until we know precisely on what terms this Federation is to be set up. I would like to show that we are entitled to watch the operation of this Clause, the setting up of this Federation, with a considerable amount of suspicion. I cite in support of my case not a statement made by a Labour man, nor indeed by a representative of British India. Hon. Members will have had sent to them copies of a magazine called *the Twentieth Century*. I believe it is an Indian publication. In the January issue there is an article entitled "States and Federation," by Colonel Sir Kailas Haksar, who in a little monograph on the top is declared to be "the brain behind the Princes in India." If this is the brain we understand the nature of the thoughts. This is what the article says :

> **"It seems an implicit irony of the situation that certain provisions of the Joint Parliamentary Committee's Report which have been most strongly attacked by British Indian politicians and almost treated as a betrayal of trust reposed in the elder statesman of the United Kingdom, actually provided more effective safeguards of the rights and interests of the States than any provisions for the specific incorporation of which with the coming Act their imaginative caution or intuitive prudence had led them to ask."**

In other words, we are told by this representative spokesman that there is more presented to the Princes as the price of their acquiescence in this Federation than the most cautious or the most circumspect amongst them had ever expected to receive.

Let me carry this argument a little further. Let us see how this will work in pratice. You have your federal centre, and there is a number of nominees of the Princes in the lower House, and a certain number of nominees of the Princes in the upper House, a very considerable body of them, a fairly high proportion of the total membership of either House. What sort of chance has any progressive legislation got of being passed even through such Houses when there is a solid block of purely nominated people in both Houses ? Let me not be unfair, however. There are undoubtedly Princes whose States in many respects are in advance, to our shame, of Britsih India itself. There are, for instance, States that have a better system of education than some parts of British India. There are States that have better health services than some parts of British India. So I want to make it clear that there are some splendid exceptions ; but exceptions they are, and the exceptions prove the rule.

There is this body of nominees of the Princes who, on the whole, shall we say, are quite reactionary in their outlook. What possible chance is there for any kind of progressive legislation to be carried through a Parliament of that sort ? None whatever. So hon. Members must not be surprised if we look with the gravest possible suspicion upon these proposals. That cannot possibly give us satisfaction. We flatter ourselves, rightly or wrongly, that we are for the time being the custodians of the interests of the great mass of working-class people in India. They have no spokesman of their own here. There is no one here who can directly express ideas on their behalf. If there is anything at all in having a Labour party, surely the first function of such a party is to speak for those who are least able to speak for themselves, and we should be failing in our duty if we did not direct attention to the fact that the instrument which this Committee is in the act of constructing is one which will make progress almost impossible in British India in the future. Hon. Members and right hon. Gentlemen opposite need not be unduly alarmed about the Princes. The Princes are amply safeguarded. . . .

The whole burden of the speeches of hon. Gentlemen opposite has been the Princes, the Princes, the Princes, and how the interests of the Princes are being affected, adversely or otherwise. I do not propose to carry that argument any further because I know that others wish to speak. I do not, however, want to be misundertood. I repeat that the configuration of India justifies our anticipating, even if we cannot immediately realise it, a united India. If the States of the Princes were all contiguous to each other it might be better at first to attempt some sort of federated British India —though there are several agruments against even that proposal. For example, you might create thereby some sort of mutual understanding or federation of the States, and perhaps that might not be desirable either. But the situation is not like that. These States are dotted here and there all over India and problems of customs and inter-communication make it imperative that we should consider some sort of federation. I am very sorry to have to say that it is

impossible for us to give the Government our accord in this matter. I say, honestly and candidly, that I would be glad if I could find it possible to co-operate with the Government in something which would give comfort and encouragement to the Indian people. But there is no comfort and no encouragement to be expected from the instrument which we are now forging. For that reason, my hon. Friends and I will have to vote against the Clause.

FEDERATION NECESSARY? BALDERDASH!

SPEECH OF MR. HERBERT WILLIAMS.

In speaking on Clause 5 of the India Bill in the Committee of the House of Commons on 26th February, Mr. Herbert Williams, belonging to the Churchillian group, exposed the untenability of the Government's position that federation is indispensable, not only for the introduction of responsibility at the centre, but also for the establishment of provincial autonomy.

THE idea of the Princes coming into a responsible centre was never mooted as a serious factor in the situation until the early summer of 1931, and every promise that was made to the inhabitants of British India was made irrespective of what part the Princes might play. Now we are told that you cannot have this advance unless the Princes come in. How do the Government propose to redeem the promises, which they say are binding morally, if the Princes do not come in? There is no plan. It is an amazing situation that the Bill is not a Bill in fulfilment of those promises, but a Bill based on an entirely new position, and if, for some perfectly good reason of self-interest, for example, which may guide the Princes they do not come in, we are now to be told that we have to break every promise we have made. It shows the complete bankruptcy of statesmanship. It shows that they have drifted on until the Government are now in a totally impossible position in respect of this matter, because they have no plan to deal with the situation which would arise if the Princes did not come in. What then happens to all those promises?... We are constructing a constitution to carry out promises, and we have now created such a situation that if certain other people, who were not in contemplation when the promises were made, will not play their part, the promises have got to be broken. That seems to me to be a situation so amazing that I wonder how it is going to be adjusted.

We are told that if, on the other hand, you do not have federation, you cannot have the development of self-governing institutions in the Provinces, because someone suddenly discovered, only three months ago, that the development of self-governing institutions in the Provinces was impossible without federation. Who made that bright discovery, I do not know. It has not the slightest constitutional significance, and it is not a valid argument, though it appears to have converted several right hon. Members, but why, I do not know. Take the comparable cases that we have in the British Empire. The Dominion of Canada was built up out of a number of self-governing Provinces. They existed—self-government was a success—for many years before, in the year 1867, in a room adjoining the office where I worked, which was the old Westminster Palace Hotel, the delegates of the Provinces met and drew up the constitution of the Dominion of Canada, subsequently incorporated in the British North America Act; yet self-governing institutions had worked in Canada, homogeneous in population, without any federal centre at all.

Take Australia. I think Victoria was the earliest State to get full responsible government, though I am speaking from memory, somewhere about 1840.

Sir Charles Oman: It was New South Wales.

Mr. Williams: I thank my hon. Friend. They go back nearly 100 years. Self-governing institutions existed in the six States of Australia for varying periods, all of them substantial, until, in the year 1900, we passed the Act which created the Commonwealth of Australia. There was no federal centre. The only federal centre was the Secretary of State for the Colonies, as he was then, in Downing Street.

Captain Cazalet: Some of the difficulties which Australia is facing to-day, particularly with the railways, are due to the fact that there was not a federation prior to 1901.

Mr. Williams: We are being told that it cannot work. The fact that in Australia they have different gauges did not arise out of the fact that there was no federation, but because, when they started those railways, they never contemplated that they would so develop that it would be necessary to go beyond the boundaries of their own States. It was because they failed to visualise the ultimate links that would develop, just as the Great Western Railway was built on a gauge wider than the rest of the railways in this country.

Now let us take South Africa. The history of South Africa is rather different, because we had two more or less independent republics. I say "more or less" because there was the famous word "suzerainty", which came into the great constitutional struggle. We had Cape Colony and the Colony of Natal. After the war Cape Colony and Natal continued as self-governing bodies, the Transvaal got its constitution, and the Orange River Colony also got self-governing institutions. Nobody suggested that they could not function—they functioned quite successfully as self-governing institutions—but it was seen that there were great merits in having a federal Government, and ultimately they built up a federal Government in South Africa, almost unitary, because in the Union of South Africa, the federal power is relatively much stronger than it is in Australia and Canada. But no one has suggested that self-government in the Transvaal was impossible without a Union of South Africa. Therefore, this analogy has not the slightest validity from the point of view of past constitutional experience and experiment.

Then, at this moment, in East Africa there are Kenya Colony, a protectorate, the Uganda Protectorate, Tanganyika Territory and Zanzibar, all in different stages of constitutional development, all of them having certain common interests and quite a good case, as a matter of fact, for federation, though there are very grave difficulties in the way arising out of treaty obligations; but no one suggests that it is necessary to set up a federation in order that in those Colonies there may be gradually developed a constitutional form of government, a gradual building-up of some form of self-governing institutions, representative in the first place and responsible later on, we hope. Who is the federal centre

there? My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

You can go to West Africa, where you have a scheme of colonies—Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, British Togoland, British Cameroons, Nigeria—six separate units of government without any federal centre. It will probably take a long time to develop self-governing institutions, but no one suggests that these colonies cannot exist without a federal centre. In the West Indies the problem of distance is a serious one, for the colonies are a long way from one another, but from time to time there have been suggestions of a federation of the West Indian colonies, because there is a community of economic interests and from the point of view of defence also. No one suggests, however, that the very considerable development in self-governing institutions which has taken place in the various colonies in the West Indian islands cannot continue because there is no federal centre. Therefore, those who plead, as they have pleaded, that they are supporting a federal centre because there cannot be provincial development without it are basing themselves on arguments which seem to me thoroughly unsound. I have never liked the idea of federal responsibility until we have tried these people out and they have proved up to the hilt their capability. Until that is decided I shall continue to oppose the conception of a federal centre.

BRITISH INDIANS PLACED PERMANENTLY UNDER PRINCES' CONTROL.

MR. MORGAN JONES'S SPEECH.

Mr. Morgan Jones made a powerful speech on Mr. Churchill's adjournment motion, in the course of which he said that if the proposed constitution were brought into force, it would only result in placing the people in British India permanently under the autocratic rule of the Princes. An extract of the speech is given below.

LET me refer to another point. There has been an elaborate effort on the part of the Government to meet the wishes and the tender susceptibilities of the Princes. I understand, and have always understood, that the case of the Government is that in the last resort the British Parliament would have the final word in this matter, that we were the persons to lay down the conditions upon which the future Constitution of India was to be founded. Do we always ask British India with this elaborate care what British India wants? We are almost grovelling on our knees this afternoon to find out what the Princes want. By all means find out what their terms are, but because they state their terms in ever increasing intensity and with ever increasing difficulty for the Government, that is no reason why we should bow the knee to the Princes whenever they choose to raise their terms. I rather suspect that the situation to-day really predicates a position where the Princes are in fact seizing the situation in order to alter the terms, and to make severer bargain terms with the Government than we originally supposed to be the case.

In any case I hope that during these discussions we shall not lose sight of the fact that there are two partners to this Federation, if federation means anything at all—on the one side the Princes and on the other side British India—and I assert that a democratic House of Commons has no right to consider merely the claims and the dictates of autocratic States and Princes, while forgetting altogether the claims and the rights of the more democratic part of India. We are not prepared to accept the view that, as a price to be paid for federation, British India should be subjected for all time to the demands, the opinions, the point of view of autocratic Princes. Therefore, although we do not approach the problem from the same point of view as certain hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite; although we do not entertain the same feelings as they do towards the further development of self-government in India; although we want a much larger measure of self-government than they would be willing to concede; although they obviously wish to arrest development at a certain point much short of that where we would wish to stop—yet all the same we are at one with them in demanding greater clarity in regard to the present situation.

The Secretary of State ought not to ask us this afternoon to allow this development regarding the Princes to proceed further without knowing exactly where we are going to be in relation to it. I suppose that negotiations will take place. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir Samuel Hoare) was speaking to the Princes, who are 6,000 miles away from us, and was trying to remove misconceptions, as he called them, and misgivings which the Princes entertained. We too have misgivings, and they are very strong and increasing misgivings, concerning the implications of this Bill, not merely for the Princes but for the people of British India as well. Every time I read this Bill I am more and more impressed with the fact that we seem to be forging an instrument by which the people of British India are ultimately going to be placed permanently—because there is no provision in the Bill for a change—under the control of the Princes of India. For that reason, and in order that we may have some further clarity introduced into this situation, we support the motion to report Progress.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

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Printed and published by Mr. Anant Vinayak Patvardhan at the Aryabhushan Press, House No. 936/3 Bhamburda Peth, Poona City, and edited at the "Servant of India" Office, Servants of India Society's Home, Bhamburda, Poona City, by Mr. S. G. Vaze.