

The Servant of India

Editor : S. G. VAZE.

Office : SERVANTS OF INDIA SOCIETY, POONA.

VOL. XVIII, No. 10. } POONA—THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1935. { INDIAN SUBSN. Rs.6.
FOREIGN 15s.

CONTENTS.

	Page
TOPICS OF THE WEEK	117
ARTICLES :—	
The Princes in High Dudgeon.	120
Indian Budget.	122
Sparks from the Commons' Anvil.	123
Provincial Budgets.	127
MISCELLANEA :—	
Indian India in the Federation— Miss Rathbone's Speech	130
The Future of India—Mr. Brailsford's Speech	131
The Princes' Veto.	132
CORRESPONDENCE :—	
"An Appeal to the Princes." By S. Stayamurti, M.L.A.	132
BOOKS RECEIVED	132

Topics of the Week.

Do Indians Want the Bill Killed ?

IN the speech which Miss Rathbone made in the Committee of the House of Commons on 19th February and which is reproduced on a later page of this issue she expressed a doubt whether, when Indians spoke of rejecting the Bill, they would in fact welcome its withdrawal. Alluding to this speech, Mr. Isaac Foot asked the next day :

"I wonder whether, if this Bill rested entirely upon her decision, she would kill it. It is one thing, of course, to vote for an Amendment to express one's disapproval of some parts of the Bill, but if the lever were in her hands—if the decision rested solely with her, would she destroy this Measure, with very little prospect of any agreed Measure being brought before this House ?"

To this question Miss Rathbone replied :

"If I had a lever in my hand I would kill this Bill if I believed the majority of the Indian people would rather have no Bill than this Bill. It is only on that part that I feel very grave doubt; I cannot feel certainty in any way."

THE doubt Miss Rathbone feels is natural. Very often politicians say far more than they mean; they bluff; they strike up an attitude. But may we assure Miss Rathbone and those who, like her, entertain an honest doubt on the matter that an overwhelming majority of politically-minded Indians would like to go on under the present Constitution rather than submit to the new one? Indians themselves often find it difficult to say how the majority vote would go in India on any question, but they could never be more certain about any political issue than about this one. Political India certainly does not want this Bill and would honestly prefer the *status quo* to

it. If the measure depended upon Indian opinion, it would have no chance whatever.

WE would earnestly request Miss Rathbone (in spite of the extended franchise the Bill gives to women—and we are free to acknowledge that this is the best feature in it) to oppose the measure at every stage, and we would similarly request all other Members of Parliament who care for democracy to do so. We know that they will be in a minority in Parliament and that their voice will be drowned. But nothing will help to win the heart of progressive India to England so much as the knowledge that, when England was plotting India's permanent enslavement by allying herself with all the reactionary elements in Indian life, there were at least a few Englishmen and Englishwomen who refused to join the devilish conspiracy but boldly took up the cause of the downtrodden in India. England will be in sore need of such good-will on the part of India, for the Bill, when passed, will unleash all the revolutionary forces in Indian politics, nothing less than a revolution being needed to change a constitution which is deliberately closed against all democratic changes. And among the noble sons and daughters of England whose help will then be remembered, none will have a greater claim upon India's gratitude than one who spoke up in Parliament for the people of the Indian States, who are the most neglected of all sections of the Indian people.

Federation and Secession.

THE *Manchester Guardian* is clear that, after the assurances given by the Secretary of State and the Attorney-General, there is no reason for Indians to fear any longer that Great Britain has a desire to repudiate her past pledges in regard to Dominion Status. These speeches, it says, "have looked and bolted the door against any prospect of British repudiation." The paper would have still preferred to see the pledge incorporated in the Bill, but that is only "because of a suspicion that though the solemnity of these declarations may be obvious to the British mind it may not be equally obvious to the Indian." Assuming, however, that the Indians will not be very sticky, this appears to it to be a matter of no importance.

On one point about the pledge the *Guardian* expresses a decided opinion, viz. that Dominion Status will not confer upon India, under federation, the right of secession. It says :—

The phrase Dominion Status, in some parts of the Empire, has been constructively interpreted to include the right to secede. But the Indian Princes stand, and must continue to stand, under the new reforms in direct relationship to the Crown. A mere British-Indian intention to secede, should such ever come about, could not invalidate the separate treaties and engagements between the States and the Crown.

Like Sir Thomas Inskip, the Liberal paper too thinks that discussion of the right to secede is, for all Dominions, academic, but it says that the bringing of the States into the constitution makes, for India, the right of secession wholly impracticable, even if its exercise were at any time desired in India. "Less than any other Empire unit," it says, "is an Indian Federation likely to consider seceding, since secession would itself mean the disruption of the Federation."

* * *

Stabilisation of Autocracy.

BRITISH opinion is awakening quickly to the evils that will result in India by the introduction of the Princes—with their autocracy kept intact—into the new constitution. In an article in the *New Statesman* of March 1, Miss Eleanor Rathbone, Independent M. P., writes:—

In the past, the Indian Princes have been buttressed upon the British Government in India. The future Indian Government will be buttressed upon the Princes.

British citizens, before they assent to the Government of India Bill, must ask themselves two questions. They are:

How will the India Bill affect the eighty-one million subjects of the Indian States, and may it result in shackling their fetters permanently on their limbs?

It is granted that many of the subjects in some States are happy and contented. Yet has not autocracy been a potential tyranny and should democracy assent, by its own act, to the stabilisation of some five hundred autocracies?

Secondly, does the proposed Federal Legislature sufficiently guarantee the welfare of the British Indian masses, or will it result merely in the substitution of brown autocrats for the white bureaucrats when the nominees of the Princes take the places of the official bloc in the present Indian Legislature?

* * *

Princes would be Dictators in India.

INDIAN opinion, too, is awakening; rather slowly but surely. Who could have expected the *Madras Guardian*, the exponent of the Indian Christian point of view, to write so sternly about the Princes' demands? It now says, with the utmost bluntness, that British India stands to lose by the proposed reforms, and that they would make the Princes the dictators of India, and that they would only result in the perpetuation of mediaeval autocracy! Its comments on the resolution passed by the Princes at their recent informal meeting in Bombay are as follows:—

The Indian Princes have reason to feel flattered that one cable of theirs has made the House of Commons and the British Press anxious about Parliament's most carefully planned Bill, the most important one of the year. Nothing that British India said and did in the last three years evoked such hurried replies and explanations as have been offered to the Princes in the course of a few hours. It is even reported that Sir Samuel Hoare has invited Princes' representatives to discuss the matter with him in London. Not more than 20 of the Indian Princes have an annual income of Rs. 20 lakhs and over. The vast majority of the 500 can boast only of an income of about Rupees one lakh per year. That is the measure of the importance of the men who demand to be placated. But they play at a dangerous game. From a position of obscurity and insignificance in Indian life, the Reforms Bill proposes to lift them to the position of dictators of the rest of India. They stand to gain immensely by the reforms. British India stands to lose. They, not British India, will therefore have to mourn the withdrawal of the Bill, if that should come about.

Their claim now is in substance to enter the Federation to enjoy the powers that it would confer, without any subtraction of their power except such as they would be pleased to surrender, whether that surrender is adequate for the working of the Federation or not. They object also to the reversion of federal powers to the Governor-General when a breakdown is declared. They protest that the Governor-General's special responsibility for the maintenance of peace is too extensive and might lead to his intervention in the internal affairs of the States. The list of objections includes several others.

The final impression that is left upon the public is that the Princes refuse to face the full implications of Federation and would grab only at some powers they can get, through participation. The internal sovereignty that they demand is synonymous with undiminished mediaeval autocracy which they practise now, whereas from the point of view of the people of the States, such powers as the Federal Government would exercise, would be beneficial to the States as a whole.

The reply to British Indian fears has been that by healthy conventions, democracy would get all the powers which it is possible to get from the new constitution. The reply to the Princes seems to be amendments to satisfy them. In other words, make the constitution more rigid.

* * *

Freedom for Germany—

THE following is from the *Manchester Guardian*. It need hardly be said that it is wholly in keeping with the traditions of the great Liberal paper.

With regard to the Eastern Pact, this country is rather indifferent. If Germany joins it willingly, so much the better. If she feels that she cannot do so, it will be a great pity. But the worst thing of all would be if she were to join it against her own will and under pressure, whether it be the pressure of moral obloquy or of political and military "encirclement." The European order which is, happily, consolidating around Germany remains, and should remain, open to her. It is desirable that she should rejoin the League of Nations, but not under pressure. She should neither be enticed nor pushed into the League, but should join it because there can be for her no foreign policy except through the League; in other words, because she cannot remain in her present isolation but must also become an organic part of the European order. To say this is to say that she is—or eventually will be—under a certain compulsion to rejoin the League. That is true, but this compulsion is a different thing from enticements or pressure deliberately administered. It is a compulsion inherent in the organic development of a United Europe.

* * *

—and Compulsion for India.

BUT this opposition to coercion on the part of the *Guardian*, curiously enough, melts away when it comes to apply these principles to India. In regard to the Indian constitution, too, it should say to the British Government: "We entirely agree with you that India's salvation lies in federation, and we have no doubt that India will come to realise this fact sooner or later. But just now, like Germany in regard to the Eastern Pact, India seems a little sceptical of the good that federation will do to her. Circumstances will inevitably lead her, in course of time, to welcome federation. But until that time comes we must leave India to make her own choice. It is true we can coerce India into federation as we cannot coerce Germany into the Eastern Pact; but we must say, equally emphatically, in both cases, that we must scrupulously abstain from exerting any coercive influence or power that we may be capable of doing. In both cases this course will but entail a little delay, for India will by the force of circumstances be drawn into a federation, as Germany into the Eastern Pact."

United India and United Europe are such obviously desirable objectives that India and Germany will soon see the error of their ways and effect a change in their present policy. But this change must come voluntarily. It must not be forced on either country." It is very sad to reflect that the *Manchester Guardian's* Liberalism is often to be found asleep in regard to India.

Leave the Princes Alone.

THE Assembly resolution on the reforms must not be interpreted as committing India to the rejection of federation as such. It only means that it condemns out of hand the particular scheme of federation that is embodied in the Government's Bill. How is India to get the kind of federation she would like to have, we are often asked. Will the Princes ever modify their own "impossible" demands, which, if granted, will only stabilise autocracy? Certainly. Leave the Princes alone for some time, and the force of circumstances will lead them to moderate their demands and bring them into harmony with the spirit of democracy which animates British India. The *Tribune* writes as follows on this point in a recent article:—

Not that political India has gone back upon its ideal of an all-India federation. That ideal still holds the field and we know of no Indian patriot who does not fervently look forward to the day when the whole of India will become one self-governing political entity. But the general belief is that the advent of that day, while it will be accelerated by the establishment of a properly constituted federation of self-governing Indian provinces alone, can only be retarded by the establishment of a spurious all-India federation like the one contemplated in the White Paper, the J. P. C. Report and the India Bill now before the British Parliament. This belief found pointed expression both at the meeting of the Liberal Federation and in the debate on the J. P. C. Report in the Assembly.

The terms on which the Princes are at present prepared to enter the Federation are both impossible in themselves and wholly unacceptable to the people of India. They will not budge an inch from their present position as long as they have reason to believe that they hold the key to Indian self-government in their hands. The first essential thing, the starting point in the initiation of real self-government for India, is to destroy this rooted belief in their mind. The moment they find the feet of India firmly set on the path of self-government they will find it to their own interest to speedily come to terms with it. The absurdity of their claim to have direct dealings with the Crown, as distinguished from the Government of India, will be revealed to them immediately in all its nakedness and within a period of months rather than years the Government of India under the new constitution will inherit all the powers of the present Government of India.

Nor will the people of the States be inactive. With the example of the Indian Provinces before them, they will put all the constitutional pressure in their power on the Princes both to introduce self-government in their own territories and to enter into definite political relationship with self-governing India. Under this double pressure, which the Princes will find it impossible to resist, an all-India federation of the right sort, with all its component units self-governing and animated by the same ideals, will be ushered into existence sooner than perhaps the most sanguine among us expect to-day.

Reduction of British Troops

IT will be remembered that the Defence Sub-Committee of the first R. T. C. enunciated the principle, universally accepted at the time, that with the

development of the new political structure, Indian defence should increasingly be the concern of the Indian people. As in the case of the declaration about Dominion Status, attempts to have it incorporated in the India Bill have so far come to naught. But the principle has not been repudiated in terms by Government and must be regarded as still commanding their allegiance. In strict consonance with it was the demand recently voiced in the Council of State for a substantial reduction in the strength of British troops in India.

APART from the political considerations involved in it, the demand has economic grounds to support it. A British soldier, as is well-known, is three times as costly as his Indian counterpart, the cost being Rs. 850 and Rs. 285 respectively. If in response to the Indian demand, runs the argument, the Government finds itself unable to reduce the personnel of the Indian military forces, let it at least employ as much more of the less expensive agency as possible. The demand is eminently reasonable and should, if acted upon, lead to considerable saving in military expenditure. If, as suggested in the Council of State debate, the present number of British troops, viz. 60,000, is reduced by one-half, the saving would be in the neighbourhood of Rs. 1½ crores, which will be joyously welcomed by the Indian tax-payer.

IF the British Government's Indian military policy had not been actuated by a distrust and suspicion of Indian loyalty and capacity, the suggestion would have presented little difficulty in being acceptable to the authorities. At any rate it would have been considered worthy of their sympathetic and serious consideration. But from telegraphic summaries of his speech the Commander-in-Chief seems to have dealt with it as if it merited no attention. He virtually told the Council that the question of the reduction of British soldiers had been recently gone into by an expert committee, which had laid down the proportion of 2:1 in the case of the Indian and British personnel of the Indian army, that the Government of India had agreed to the proportion, and that there was nothing further to be done. All this is a matter of common knowledge, but if Sir Philip Chetwode expects the Indian public to look upon the ratio as sacrosanct, his expectation is not likely to be satisfied. He spoke volubly of his sympathy with Indian aspirations in the matter of army Indianisation, but could not bring himself to accept even the principle involved in the demand for reducing the strength of the white garrison! What is needed is not mere lip sympathy, but practical action designed to translate the Indian demand into effect. From this point of view the Commander-in-Chief's speech did not carry us even one step further.

HE strongly repudiated the suggestion that the Committee of Imperial Defence was the dictator in these matters. Those who are at all familiar with the history of Indian military policy will have great difficulty in accepting the repudiation at its face value. If, as he tried to make out, he was a free agent in regard to India's military policy it is a little difficult to understand his unwillingness to forward to the British Government the demand for the reduction of the British personnel in the Indian army with his own endorsement.

THE PRINCES IN HIGH DUDGEON.

A MOMENTARY hope was excited in the breast of the Indian nationalist by the somewhat sensational resolution that was adopted by an informal gathering of Princes in Bombay last week, which pronounced the federal scheme to be unacceptable to them. It was felt that at last the Princes were not altogether oblivious of the conditions which they themselves had laid down as essential to their entry into federation. It was not merely that they had required responsibility—real and effective responsibility—to be attained by the federal government that was proposed to be established. They had further required that British India's whole-hearted consent to federation be obtained. The Princes' meeting which appeared to reject the federal scheme followed so soon after the Assembly's famous resolution which declared, first, that the scheme afforded no responsibility at the centre and, second, that British India was totally opposed to federation such as was contemplated in the scheme, that it was widely felt that the Princes had decided, in response to British Indian opinion, to stay out of the federation. This feeling, however, did not last long, for it became clear when the Princes' demands were discussed in the Committee of the House of Commons that, whatever decision the Princes might finally take, it would be wholly without regard to the British Indians' view of federation.

An attempt is being made to put a good face upon the Princes' amendments, it being represented that the main objection which the States take to the scheme is the same as that which British India takes to it, viz., that the powers with which the federal government will be endowed under the scheme are insufficient and that too much power is being proposed to be vested in the Governor-General. But an examination of the report of the Ministers' Committee presided over by Sir Akbar Hydari shows that what the Princes object to is that the States are not being given adequate protection as against the federal government. Take, first, Clause 2, which says: "All rights, authority and jurisdiction exercisable by him (His Majesty the King-Emperor of India) by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise, in or in relation to any other territories in India (i. e. other than those of his territories) are exercisable by His Majesty except in so far as may be otherwise directed by His Majesty." The Hydari Committee takes this to mean that the Clause "enables His Majesty to assign paramountcy powers to anyone whatsoever." Of course the framers of the Bill do not mean anything of the kind, and they certainly do not want the federal government to exercise those powers as British India desires, but it shows how anxious the Princes are to circumscribe the powers of the federal government within as narrow limits as possible. The Princes want the words "except in so far as may be otherwise directed by His Majesty" to be deleted from the Clause so that no delegation of paramountcy rights to another authority would be possible. We have no doubt that the Princes will receive complete

satisfaction on this point as on most others, but if they do, it will not improve the scheme in the eyes of British India.

There is a good deal of feeling among the Princes against Clause 6, which deals with the manner of the States' accession to federation. The Clause has a provision which in Sub-Clause (1) (b) "specifies which of the matters mentioned in the federal legislative list he (the ruler of a State) accepts as matters with respect to which the federal legislature may make laws." This, one would think, gives a Prince sufficient guarantee that federal authority will not be exercised in regard to subjects which he does not specifically agree to cede to the federal government in his Instrument of Accession. But the Princely order is not satisfied with this. They would have the limitation introduced in every Clause and Sub-Clause of the Bill so that by no possibility would the federal government make an inroad upon the sphere which they reserve to themselves. Here also, without a question, they would receive entire satisfaction from the British Government, but when this happens, as surely will, it will not lessen British India's objections to the scheme. There is another objection of the Princes to this Clause which is worth more than a passing notice. They object to federal legislation, even in the region which is considered accepted by them as federal, being applicable to their States *proprio vigore* or in its own strength. This means that, if the objection prevails, the laws passed by the federal legislature will not be made directly applicable to the States' subjects, but through the States' rulers in some way or other. The one thing which distinguishes a federation from a confederation is that the government of the former operates directly and immediately upon all the inhabitants of the territories included within its jurisdiction. The Indian Princes, however, although pretending to come into a federation, do not wish to part with this power and if they will not do so the federation becomes a farce. The Clause requires the ruler of a State to declare that he accepts the Act "as applicable to his State and his subjects" and that he accepts certain specified matters "as matters with respect to which the federal legislature may make laws for his State and his subjects." The Princes are unwilling to admit that either the organic Act or the laws passed by the federal legislature under it will be applicable to their subjects merely because they have joined the federation or accepted as federal matters in respect to which the federal legislature has enacted. They contend that they must by some act or other on their part make the Act and the laws applicable to their subjects, and it is only then that the subjects should come thereunder. The commands of the federal government must not be directly addressed to their subjects, but through their medium. One had hoped that the Princes had at least realised so much of the implication of federation as to give up finally the claim they had once made in the Round Table Conference that even in the new dispensation

they must be allowed to exercise sovereign powers of which the very act of joining federation spells renunciation. The British Government will go a long way to meet the wishes of the Princes, but even they, we are inclined to think, will shrink from going to this length.

The Princes' objection to Clause 8 which defines the extent of the executive authority of the federation has already been met by the Secretary of State. The Clause is understood by the Princes to imply that the federal government would have the power of enforcing in a State through its own agency all the laws passed by the federal legislature on subjects accepted by the State as federal. But it is open to the Princes to specify certain limitations as to the enforcement of federal laws in addition to the limitations as to the scope of the laws. They may insist that certain federal laws would be enforced, not by the federal agency, but by their own agency, or even not to the full extent but to a limited extent. On this point Sir Samuel Hoare has already promised to leave no ground of complaint to the Princes. He said: "The intention of the Clause was that such conditions (as they might lay down) would be applicable not only to legislative powers...but correspondingly to the executive authority of the federal government. My amendments to this Clause are in part designed to make this interpretation perfectly clear." It would thus be seen that the sole anxiety of the Princes on the score of this Clause is to limit the scope of the federal government's power. The only other exception which the Princes take to this Clause is with respect to "the raising in British India on behalf of His Majesty of naval, military and air forces." They fear, as Sir Samuel Hoare said, that the Clause "does not make it sufficiently clear that the executive authority of the federation extends to placing the military means of implementing the Crown's obligations to protect the States." On this point, it is needless to say, the Princes have received completely satisfactory assurances. It will be seen at once that here too they only ask for a strengthening of the guarantees for themselves.

The next objection of the Princes is to Clause 12 (1) (a) which makes "prevention of any grave menace to the peace and tranquillity of India or any part thereof" a special responsibility of the Governor-General. Under this Clause the Governor-General may deem it necessary to intervene in the internal affairs of the States. They know well, of course, that the Viceroy under the paramountcy powers can intervene on this ground whenever peace is endangered in States, and therefore their objection only is to the Governor-General interfering with their administration "without the utilisation of diplomatic action to be initiated by the Viceroy." The objection is puerile, for, as Sir Samuel Hoare says, the Clause only mentions the special responsibility without defining how it is to be discharged. Another such special responsibility of the Governor-General is "the protection of the rights of any Indian State." The Princes are not satisfied with such a bare mention of responsibility. They want a specific guarantee

for its fulfilment. This will show how wrong it is to think that the Princes are intent upon limiting the Governor-General's powers. They are intent upon extending such powers.

To Clause 45 which enables the Governor-General to suspend the constitution and assume the powers of the federal government in case of the breakdown of the constitutional machinery the Princes raise an objection. They urge that "any of their powers should not be subtracted." Then what is the alternative that they propose? The alternative is that "the powers they agree to delegate to the federation at the time of accession should be given back to them when the contingency arises to suspend the constitution." When will the Princes realise that they surrender no powers at all, or next to none? The powers that, according to this demand, will be restored to them will come into the possession, not of the States, but of the paramount power, and what difference will that make to their position? And do the Princes also propose that all the customs revenue collected during the period of the suspension of the federal government will accrue to British India alone, and that they will not benefit by it? But the proposal is too ridiculous to deserve any serious consideration.

The Princes object to Clause 99 (2) which extends the applicability of a federal law to State subjects in respect of matters in regard to which the State under the Instrument of Accession has agreed that the federal legislature may make laws. This objection is again on the ground that federal laws must not be made applicable *proprio vigore* to State subjects. As we have said already, this cuts at the very root of the federal structure. The truth is that the Princes are not prepared to assume obligations which every federation is supposed to cast upon a federating State. This will become still more clear from their objection to Clause 127 (2), which they demand should be "totally omitted." This Clause is as follows:—

If it appears to the Governor-General that the ruler of any federated State has in any way failed to fulfil his obligations under the preceding subsection or has failed to maintain a system of administration adequate for the purposes of any Act of the federal legislature, the administration of which has been entrusted to him or to his officers, the Governor-General, acting in his discretion, may issue such directions to the ruler as he thinks fit.

It should be noted that the objection is not to the effect that the Clause is drawn in too wide terms, or that it gives the Governor-General too large a power; the objection rather is to the Clause itself. The Princes undertake to administer federal laws efficiently in their States, but will not submit to any authority which enforces fulfilment of the undertaking. This is a wholly unreasonable objection. It is not urged in the national interests; it is urged in the selfish interests of the Princes.

The truth is that, although the Princes profess to be in favour of a real and effective federation, the federation that they are seeking to bring about is of the loosest character in history. If it comes into existence, it will be a purely nominal federation. Such a consistent supporter of the federal scheme as the

Hindu is at last forced to complain bitterly that the Princes' objections betray "a persistent refusal to acknowledge the implications of the federal idea if it is to have any value at all", and that, "if accepted, must make federation a sham and central responsibility an impossibility." Even so, we are inclined to believe that the British Government would accept the major part of the Princes' demands, for the British Government wish to make an impossibility of central responsibility. Sir Austen Chamberlain's words are very true.

I remain of the opinion, he said, that this great development in the Indian Government would be much more safely undertaken, if it was accompanied by the establishment of a federation of all India than if the reforms were confined to British India alone.

I believe the interests of the Princes are intimately associated with the British Empire. Similarly our interests are intimately associated with their interests. I believe that they and we alike shall find safety for ourselves, security for what we hold dearest in their entry into the great federation, which for the first time will consecrate the political union of all India.

The interests of the Britishers and of the Princes being so bound up together, the Princes will be given all that they want. Only so can the British Government keep up their end in India if they cannot welcome democracy. But at any rate let British India know well the what and the why and the wherefore of the Princes' demands.

THE INDIAN BUDGET

THE speech in which Sir James Grigg introduced his first budget in the Legislative Assembly had the supreme merits of brevity and lucidity. And the budget itself was remarkable as being the first fairly balanced budget for a number of years. It may be said that the accumulated and the estimated surplus and the ways in which they are to be disposed of are the main points of interest with regard to this budget. The surplus is a result of a better working-out of revenue receipts for the year 1933-34 and for the current year than was anticipated. The bettering of receipts is not confined to any particular source of revenue but extends to customs, to income-tax as well as to the post office. This fact taken together with the indications given by the Railway Budget may be held to show that the depression has at last slowly but definitely begun to lift. We may thus expect to have reached the end, for the time being, of the process of tax burdens being increased in variety and weight by the Central Government. Last year excises were made a novel and prominent feature of the Indian financial system and a small windfall surplus indicated as being available for earthquake relief and other special capital expenditure. The actual results are, however, better and Sir James Grigg has been concerned with the disposal of the accumulated balance remaining on his hand. The major portion of it is to be spent in two directions: (i) Rural development grants to provincial Governments and (ii) Grants to the Road Fund and to road building in the N. W. F. Province.

There is nothing in principle that can be said against these two ways of utilising the balance. Both rural development and road building are objects which eminently deserve the attention of Government. But it may be doubted whether the small sums to be distributed among the various provincial Governments can really do anything to further them. The grant for rural development will be an isolated block grant made to a provincial Government. No Government could get more than a few lakhs to its share and these few lakhs are merely in the nature of an isolated windfall. It is in the nature of windfalls to be extravagantly and unremuneratively used; for, their use can never be correlated to the normal financial situation. A number of provincial Governments to-day are in the most serious financial straits. They are having recurrent deficit budgets and have had to reduce their nation-building department activities to the barest minimum. The position of the Bombay Department of Industries is a good illustration of what we mean. Where the ordinary activities of the education, public health, agricultural, and industrial departments are being ruthlessly cut down for want of funds, how can a few lakhs spent on some isolated so-called rural development scheme help? Is rural reconstruction some separate activity by itself or the result of proper co-ordinated effort of all the nation-building departments? These are questions which the Finance Member may well have asked himself before suggesting the use he has of the sum at his disposal. As it is the Government lays itself open to the charge that the proposal is really in the nature of an advertising stunt.

In fairness to the Finance Member it may, however, be said that it is the fundamental financial arrangement that is chiefly at fault. We have often pointed out that a balanced budget at the centre in India tended to present a false picture of the financial situation. The centre has immense resources available and comparatively narrow responsibilities, and its scope for spending funds usefully is of the narrowest. The provinces have huge responsibilities and no funds. But as no mutual adjustment can be brought about the Indian Finance Member is free to congratulate himself on a balanced budget, say that the evil days are over, restore pay-cuts and force bankrupt provinces to restore them (for, even Bengal which has to be helped from grants from the centre must restore them) and indulge gloriously in the vicious and wasteful pleasure of giving out doles. Other items also show how these central surpluses are improperly utilised. Last year there was the expenditure incurred on the New Delhi buildings account, this year there are other non-remunerative capital schemes such as that of the transfer of the Pusa Institute, whose cost is also to be defrayed out of the accumulated surplus. It is satisfying to note that even Sir J. Grigg is not personally satisfied with this procedure.

The Finance Member expects that the position in some respects will still further improve during the ensuing year. Even if the sugar and textile customs revenues, which were unexpectedly large owing to

special circumstances this year, do not yield the same income, with the general return of better times the other customs and the income-tax receipts will improve considerably. The budget on the basis of existing taxation becomes definitely a surplus one. The procedure followed by the Finance Member in the situation thus created fully exhibits the inherent character of our financial arrangements noted by us above. The Finance Member looking only to the central budget knows he cannot do anything useful with the surplus and therefore restores fully the pay-out and lessens the tax burden in some directions. At the same time his manner of doing this does not help the provincial Governments in any way. The tax remissions do not make it easier for the provincial Governments to find additional monies and the restoration of cuts policy actually further increases their embarrassment. For this latter step the explanation given by the Finance Member is very short and simple. It is in his judgment merely a question of standing by your pledges. But why were such pledges given? And if the financial improvement of the Imperial Government justifies the restoration, does not the financial embarrassment of provincial Governments justify maintenance of the cut? But one suspects that this is neither a question of finance nor of pledges; it is bound up with the larger issue of the policy to be adopted towards the all-India services and the salaries to be guaranteed to them.

There are three changes proposed in the tax-system. Firstly, there is the duty on silver; its reduction is, however, proposed as a purely economic measure, the present level having proved unprofitable to Government and an incentive to smuggling. Next, it is proposed to abolish the duty on raw

skins. This is a wholly welcome step. The only comment on this that may be made is that Government has always followed the policy of raising the duties to higher and higher levels and retracing their steps only after they have long passed the line of diminishing returns. In the case of export duties the procedure is specially harmful as usually by the time Government wakes up the trade is almost killed and is many a time beyond the hope of recovery. By far the largest portion of the surplus is to be used towards granting remissions from income-tax surcharges. The remission is to be one-third of the present surcharge and all classes—the ordinary income-tax payer, the super-tax payer as well as those in the latest class of Rs. 1000 to Rs. 2000 p. a.—are to profit equally. It is obvious that even the Finance Member is not wholly satisfied with this remarkable proposal. He admits the claim of the heavy customs duties for consideration. We may also suggest the new-fangled excises as deserving his attention. Here again he takes shelter behind the pledge of his predecessor. No comment is really needed in connection with this use of the surplus. One may merely note that even among income-tax payers the Finance Member has thought it necessary to give the same remission to super-tax payers as to payers in the lowest class below Rs. 2000 p. a. What value can be attached to the lip-sympathy for the down-trodden masses of a Government which considers as supreme the claims of the well-paid members of the all-India services and which will give relief earlier to the super-tax payer than to the vast mass of the poor consumers pressed under a heavy burden of indirect taxation?

SPARKS FROM THE COMMONS' ANVIL.

19th and 20th February.

LABOUR'S OPPOSITION.

AT the outset of the proceedings in the Committee on 19th February Mr. Lansbury made clear that the Labour Party was opposed to the India Bill *in toto* and that if it moved amendments in detail it was only because it was conscious that its opposition to the very principles of the Bill would be unavailing. He said: "People do not quite understand that if we felt we had the power to stop the Bill we would use that power, but we have not and therefore we propose, with the assent of the Committee and the House, to do our best to amend it in such ways as we think necessary."

"LEAVE THE PRINCES OUT."

MR. COCKS, speaking in support of Lord Wolmer's amendment against federation, said:

The Noble Lord who moved the Amendment spoke a great deal about democratic government, about democracy in the Provinces and at the Centre. We on this side of the Committee do not agree with that. We do not think that even in the Provinces democratic government is being given. We do agree that a step towards it is being

made, but at the Centre we do not think there is any democratic government at all. There is nationalism, oligarchy and wealth, but not democratic government. We on this side of the Committee are not enamoured at all of the scheme for the federation of all India. I think I am right in saying that the Labour party would prefer a federation of British India which left the Princes out. I believe that is the general view in my party, an atmosphere I feel within the party. I am saying that because I have no definite resolution of the party in my mind at the moment, but I believe that that is the opinion of most of those with whom I am associated.

"BOYCOTT RATHER THAN OPPOSE!"

MEMBERS of the Liberal Party are placed in a peculiarly awkward position in regard to the India Bill. Their honest opinion is that, except for indirect election for the Assembly, there is hardly anything objectionable in the Bill, and that at any rate the Bill is such that India should welcome it as a measure of considerable advance, but they find also that India does not accept the measure at all. What is the Liberal Party to do in such a situation? Should it say: Don't bother about Indian opinion; force it upon India, knowing well that it will do her

good? Or should it remain true to the principle of freedom and say: If India does not want the measure it must be withdrawn, however good it may be in our opinion. In these matters Indian opinion should weigh more than British.

Mr. Isaac Foot is too much of a Liberal to say as Mr. Butler said plainly: "We stand by the terms of the Preamble of the 1919 Act, that Parliament is the sole judge of future constitutional development in India. I base myself upon that." He therefore says: England must no doubt be influenced by Indian opinion and that if India would rather have no constitutional change than the one proposed in the present Bill, Indian opinion must be accepted as final. But when he says this Mr. Foot does not mean that, in his view, Parliament should withdraw the Bill. His view rather is that Parliament should pass the Bill in any case and should leave it to India to decide whether she would work it or not. In the Committee of the Commons he said:

If, as a matter of fact, when this Bill has passed through all its stages, and is then submitted to India, and the politically-minded Indians would rather have no Bill than this Bill, they have the remedy in their own hands. They need not work it, and, if they need not work it, there is no power in this country which could force this Bill upon a universally unwilling people, because we depend upon consent.

It is not enough, in Mr. Foot's opinion, that India should vote against the constitution, but that she must boycott it or wreck it. Well, if Indians are led on to this course, Mr. Foot may yet see boycott or obstruction inaugurated in India, but one would have thought that a Liberal would have the policy so shaped as to prevent non-co-operation being adopted by Indians.

"CONSULT ONLY THE PRINCES!"

THE inconsistency in the position of Mr. Foot, in that he sought the acceptance of the Princes but not of the British Indian people for the new constitution, was well shown up by Mr. Raikes. He said:

The hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot) takes the view that this Amendment is impossible because the Princes have laid it down in the past that they would not come into a Council of Greater India. He assumed that that must dispose of the whole matter. It is rather curious that my hon. Friend advances that assumption, but is not prepared to accept also the correlative fact that the Indian politicians have already rejected this Bill. They have already passed an Amendment in the Legislative Assembly in which they have denounced the principles of this Bill, and if my hon. Friend were logical he would say that we must go no further with this Bill now.

CENTRAL RESPONSIBILITY, INDEED!

THE essential irresponsibility of the executive under the federal scheme was very ably exposed by Lord Wolmer, who said that if the Government's argument was that provincial autonomy and central irresponsibility cannot go together the federal scheme proposed by them was not free from that defect at all. He said:

If we accept that argument at the commencement, our first reply to-day is that the Government have not in the least got out of that dilemma by adopting the

Federation which they are proposing in this Bill, for this reason. The powers of the central legislature are not self-governing powers. They are called responsible, but they are, in fact, a very crude and very bad form of dyarchy. No one who has studied this question can fail to be impressed by the report of the Simon Commission on the breakdown of dyarchy in all the Provinces and the reasons which they gave, which showed that dyarchy inevitably must break down wherever it is tried.

Take the question of finance, and this is really fundamental. Of the central budget of 1933-34 of £ 58,000,000, no less than £49,000,000 would be non-votable under this Bill. The cost of the Army was £34,000,000, pensions £ 2,500,000, and debt £12,000,000 which gives a total of £ 49,000,000 out of £58,000,000. What sort of responsible government is it that has two-thirds or three-quarters of the budget outside the choice, scope and authority of the popular Assembly? What should we think in this House of Commons if in our Budget of £800,000,000 or £1,000,000,000, £600,000,000 or £700,000,000 was beyond our control? These items are far more beyond the control of the Indian Assembly than anything like the National Debt is beyond the control of the House of Commons.

I know quite well that Chancellors of the Exchequer in the past have been at pains to show that a very high proportion of our own Budget is settled by matters largely beyond their control, but that is only true in a certain limited sense. For instance, it used to be argued that the Debt services, which form such a large part of our Budget, were quite beyond the control of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but that was never really proved. The present Chancellor of the Exchequer has shown that it was not true, because by his wise administration and sound policy he has reduced the rate of interest at which the Government can borrow and has so enormously reduced the Debt services.

But when you come to an item like £34,000,000 for the Army in the Indian Budget, it is a matter which is absolutely beyond the control of the Indian legislature. I ask hon. Members, and especially hon. Members opposite, who believe in democracy a great deal more than I do, especially democracy in the East, how they think that any such Legislative Assembly could be set up as being democratic, which claims to be democratic, and which has the title "democratic" conferred upon it.

SMELLING THE BUNS!

HE said central responsibility under the scheme was a "great fraud;" the Government set up a Legislative Assembly which claimed to be democratic, but withheld from this Assembly all vital power; it was prevented from taking a responsible share in the government of the country which it was supposed to represent. Lord Wolmer did not in this statement say that the Assembly was really democratic; he merely said that it pretended to be democratic. But even this was too much for Mr. Cocks, who, interrupting, observed that the Assembly was frankly undemocratic. "It is a reactionary Assembly," he said, and the so-called democratic federal centre "an oligarchy." Lord Wolmer agreed, and he continued: "Erecting a federal Assembly, which is not allowed to deal with these (vital) matters, is like putting a boy in a bun-shop and tying him up so that he cannot reach the buns, he can only smell them."

NOT DYARCHY THIS!

IF you asked the British Government whether they were proposing to set up a dyarchy in the centre

they would say no; because they are conscious that the Simon Commission has argued against it. But Mr. Cadogan, who was a member of the Commission, sees no point in refusing to admit that Government were introducing dyarchy in the central government.

He said:

It is true that in the Statutory Commission's Report there is an unequivocal statement with regard to dyarchy. ... I remember warning some of my colleagues that that statement was a rash one. It was too categorical, and I now say frankly that the Noble Lord (Viscount Wolmer) is right that we recommended against dyarchy in any shape or form at the centre. The reason why we did so—rather rashly as I think—was because we thought we had discovered a means by which it could be circumvented. I need not go into that question now, because it is not relevant to this Debate, but I wish to say that when the proposals were examined by the Joint Select Committee that Committee came to the conclusion that, although our proposal was not dyarchy in form, it certainly was so in fact. I admit that we were wrong and that dyarchy at the centre was inevitable.

Mr. Amery too agreed in this. He said:

It is true that that does mean in some sense a system of dyarchy, but the trouble is that, do what you will, you must have a dyarchy somewhere in India to-day. Dyarchy only means a division of functions, a division of responsibilities, and so long as any responsibilities are exercised by this Parliament and controlled from here, and other responsibilities are exercised by Ministers responsible to an electorate in India, you will have a dyarchy.

But the worst form of dyarchy, as experience has shown in every part of our Empire, as well as in America, is when you have a dyarchy between an irremovable executive on the one side and an irresponsible, vociferous majority in the Legislature on the other. There you have the kind of government that creates the maximum of friction and produces irresponsibility on the one side and alternatively creates violence and cupidity on the other. It is a system that has never worked in this country or anywhere in the British Empire.

RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT THE PRINCES.

THE result therefore of conferring provincial autonomy and leaving the centre unreformed must be that British India would compel the Government to grant central responsibility; only the moderating element of the Princes would be absent from such a responsible government. Mr. Amery therefore could not understand why Lord Wolmer, Mr. Churchill and other Tory diehards who are against surrender of any power should object to the introduction of the Princes into the constitution. The Princes only constitute a toboggan slide by which the force of British Indian democracy is rapidly dissolved. Their coming in does not obligate Government to confer responsibility. It enables them to neutralise it. Why then do the diehards object to the Princes? Mr. Amery said:

The only objection to the Princes coming in is the entirely mistaken idea that by keeping them out you will prevent responsibility arising at the centre. You cannot do it. The only difference is that in the one case you will get a system suited to India and more effectively responsible, and in the other case you will get agitation by an irresponsible legislature leading to conditions under which this Parliament, whatever Government is in power, will be forced to make a change. The result of that change would be far less satisfactory than the Measure which is now before us.

WHY then keep out the Princes? How would it benefit the British Government? It will not be discreet to say that the Princes are "a very conservative and reactionary element"; that "their position, their history and their interests bind them to the British Empire and the Crown," and that therefore their help should be sought. It would be more prudent to say that they represent "an indigenous tradition of government and responsibility" and that their introduction into the constitution is in the interests of India itself. This point was very cleverly argued by Mr. Amery, but he incidentally gave an effective answer to those who continually ask us: If the Princes do not come in, how will central responsibility be possible? He says: Central responsibility will come inevitably; only it will be in a form which the Britishers will consider undesirable.

WHY DO THE PRINCES COME IN?

MR. Amery stressed the fact that if federation was in British interests, it was also in the interests of the States. He said:

At present, owing to the purely accidental arbitrary division between British India and the Indian States, the States are more and more affected by the legislation of British India. It was that consideration, not any sudden wave of emotion, which led the Princes at the Round Table Conference to declare that they wished to come into the Federation. It was because by that means alone they could effectively protect their interests.

Mr. Molson quoted the following passage from Mr. Panikkar's book to show that the Princes will be surrendering, by entering the federation, only that power which they have already given up.

In legal theory the States are independent, isolated units; in actual fact they have ceased to be so long ago. ... The Central Government has exclusive authority by treaty in all matters of defence and international relations and by practice exercises jurisdiction in matters affecting all-India currency, posts, telegraphs, trunk telephones, excise and maritime customs, etc. Thus the central authority in India has gradually become an all-India authority in many matters and the legal isolation of the States remains purely theoretical.

Another reason which makes the Princes come into the federation is the alarm at the growth of democracy in British India, knowing full well that "it is impossible to stop ideas at any political frontier." They therefore feel that they will very soon be "in the position of a number of small and scattered autocracies surrounded by the swirl of democratic ideas in British India." Mr. Molson continued:

I believe that is one of the things that weigh very much with the Indian Princes, that they thought it was more prudent in the interests of themselves and their descendants rather to take a share in the government of the whole of the sub-continent and to add a conservative and authoritative (authoritarian?) element to the Government of India in order to make certain that there should not be the unrestricted development of democratic ideas and, at the same time, a deterioration in the standard of administration and rule in British India.

"The deterioration in the standard of administration" is to be prevented by the introduction of what Mr. Amery euphemistically called "an indigenous tradition of government and responsibility" or, as less sophisticated people would call it, autocratic rule.

"ACCEPT THE PRINCES' TERMS!"

SIR SAMUEL HOARE said much the same thing as Mr. Amery. He remarked:

Obviously, we should all of us welcome the entry into the central government of India of a great force of stability and Imperial feeling such as is represented by the Princes. That, in my view, would be a great gain to the central government of India, but I am thinking rather of the Princes' position and their own interests in the matter. If I were an Indian Prince I should be extremely nervous in seeing these great provincial autonomous Governments growing up around me, with popular support behind them, and with the centre remaining in its present unreformed position. I should feel extremely nervous of the constant pressure that the Provinces would be putting on the Centre for provincial revenue. After all, the Indian States are interested in keeping indirect taxation low, and not high. They pay a great part of the indirect taxation of India, but they have no say in the Customs policy. With these great autonomous Provinces constantly pressing the centre more and more, it would put the Princes in a most dangerous position so far as their future is concerned.

Anyhow, if the Princes have, in a detriment to their economic interests and an unfettered growth of democracy in British India in the event of their standing out, such great incentives to enter the federation, why do British statesmen say that the Princes will never agree to better terms of federation and that therefore British India must agree to the terms, however unreasonable, they may choose to make?

AUTOCRATS DEMAND RESPONSIBILITY!

MR. CHURCHILL dealt very effectively with the Government's argument: "You must have federation because the Princes made an offer and said that their offer only held if there was responsible government. Consequently, there is nothing for it but to put the Bill through." He said:

It reminds me of a saying of the Duke of Wellington to a man who accosted him with "I believe you are Mr. Smith?" The Duke said, "If you believe that you will believe anything." Why these autocratic Princes should demand responsible government at the Centre I cannot conceive.

It would be conceivable if the Princes at present could really control the matters which they are supposed to surrender to the federal government. But we are told in the same breath that the reason why they join the federation is because they have no such control at present and hope to get a share in it by means of federation. Sir Samuel Hoare himself said:

They (the Princes) pay a very large share of the customs without having control over customs policy at all. I am convinced that one of the main reasons which have prompted the Indian Princes to insist upon responsibility for an all-India centre is the need that they have felt for having an effective control, not simply an academic voice in a debating society, but an effective control in a policy which so directly concerns them at every turn.

The first part of Sir Samuel's statement contradicts the second. If the Princes have no control over customs they need not and will not object to an arrangement under which complete control over tariff policy is not secured, but just power to advise and an opportunity to influence. And, in fact, the Princes do not

insist upon responsibility, as they are prepared to join a federation in which we all know there is only a semblance of responsibility.

SHAM DEMAND AND SHAM RESPONSE.

WHY do the British Government then agree to set up federation even if it involves grant of responsibility? First, because they know that it is sham responsibility, and secondly because they think, and quite rightly too, as Sir Samuel Hoare admitted, that "from the British point of view it would be extremely dangerous to leave the centre unreformed (which, interpreted, means, unencumbered with conservative elements) and at the mercy of these great autonomous Provinces." It would in fact, he said, "plunge not only ourselves in great difficulties in the future, but make the position of the Indian Princes much more precarious than it would be if they entered the federal government." He warned the diehards therefore that the conferment of nominal responsibility on a government including the Princes, "so far from being the wise and safe course, would be a really dangerous course." He is quite right too!

What Mr. Churchill said is very true: "I thought that the demand of the Princes for responsible government at the centre was a sham. But the response also is a sham. This is not responsibility at the centre; it is a pretence of responsibility. Almost every conceivable function in which responsible government resides has been reserved."

FEDERATION: NOW OR NEVER.

WITHOUT federation, according to the Government's view, not only is central responsibility impossible, but even provincial autonomy. Why? Because it is feared if the provinces were to decide whether they should have federation or not, they would not brook the autocracy of the Princes, and federation would thus never come. Therefore, it has been decided to impose federation before the provinces get the constitutional right to turn down federation. Sir Samuel Hoare said:

We have been gravely impressed with the danger of starting these great autonomous Provinces without a federal link at the centre, with a body of popular opinion behind it, without which there would be the imminent danger of India breaking up into fragments. I go so far as to say that if we started on the road of provincial autonomy, and did not at the same time make the framework of an all-India federation, the result would almost inevitably be that we should never have an all-India Federation at all. The Provinces would grow up with a very strong provincial feeling behind them, and with every kind of centrifugal force at work. We should have the provinces, with popular support behind them, and we should have a centre weak enough now in many respects but immensely weaker with provincial autonomy once started.

All this talk about centrifugal tendencies is bunk; the real motive power in setting up federation is to clip the wings of the British Indian democracy. As Viscount Wolmer said:

The right hon. Gentleman spoke to-day about centrifugal autonomy (sic) if you did not have Federation; how are you going to strengthen this Federation by trying to

force it upon the people of India without their elected representatives taking the slightest responsibility for it? If you try to create centripetal forces to prevent the break-up of the Federation, is it not an elementary precaution to ask the representatives of India in the Legislative Assembly, which this Parliament has created and which the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms brought into existence, if they are prepared to take some responsibility for the Constitution which we propose?

On the question of consulting Indian opinion, as was suggested in Sir Henry Page-Croft's amendment, Sir Samuel Hoare used much "hairsplitting and persiflage," to use Viscount Wolmer's phrase, but he gave it up soon, and then came down with a direct negative. "I am not prepared," he said, "to surrender our responsibility." "I do wish to urge the strongest possible protest against this House (of Commons) surrendering its responsibility as to what it thinks is the best government for India into the hands of anybody in either of those two bodies" (i. e. the two chambers of the central legislature in India).

VINDICATING ELECTORAL RIGHTS.

To force a federation upon Indians, "to persist without their sanction—indeed, in direct opposition to their will as expressed at the recent elections—would be (said Sir Henry Page-Croft) to violate the traditions of British constitutional history, as far as we know it, from all time," and "to depart from the principle of every single federal union we have ever heard of." Furious protests were made by Labour members against the British Government's desire to foist federation upon British India, and what Mr. Morgan Jones remarked about it was typical of the rest. He said:

Let me say that I entirely dissent—and I am sure my hon. Friends do—from the proposition that the Secretary of State laid down, that the only people who should be consulted are those assembled in the British Parliament. I hold an entirely contrary view, and indeed the right hon. Gentleman himself does not take that view in practice, for we have elaborate machinery whereby one section of Indian opinion is being consulted—the least representative opinion—that of the Princes. I ventured to say on the Second Reading that one of the most striking features of the Government's attitude to this problem was the difference of their approach to the Princes and to British India. The Government always takes meticulous care to find out in advance whether the Princes will accept a plan or not. As an example, there is a provision that if this Constitution is altered one jot, then all or each Prince is entitled to withdraw from the federation. When it comes to British India, the right hon. Gentleman who, as Secretary of State, ought to reflect their opinion in this House, takes the view that the people he represents here ought not to be consulted at all, that the whole decision rests with the House of Commons alone. We cannot accept that philosophy. We advanced the contrary point of view in the Statutory Committee steadily and without any faltering. So far as I can see, this may be the only occasion when we shall have occasion to second the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir Henry Page-Croft) in vindicating the electoral rights of the Indian people in the Lobby.

"NEVER CAN WE ALTER IT."

COL. WEDGWOOD did not omit on this occasion to bring to the notice of Parliament that if the autocracy

of the Princes was once let in, it could never afterwards be put out. He said:

If this Bill becomes an Act, as it is, being a treaty between the British Crown and 800 Princes in India who are going into Federation on the strength of this Bill and, in exchange for a share in the Government of India, sacrificing certain rights under the Bill, the drawback is that never can we alter it. It is futile and useless to talk about putting in a Clause about Dominion Status in the future, because we know, as they know, that the Bill cannot be altered once it is passed. Once this Bill goes through in its present state, there is no chance of any further step towards freedom, towards Dominion Status, towards a democratic franchise. All those things are barred out for all time. Even if you had a Labour Government in office consisting solely of the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps), no change could be made.

This Committee does not know that, but everyone in India knows it, and it is because of that that they are so desperately against the Bill. It must have come as a surprise to most people that even the Mohomedans, the special darlings of this Bill, have turned it down in the Assembly, that the Congress party, which is so anxious to be united with the Mohomedans, is also against it unanimously. That is not mere cussedness. It is not the desire to get more either. It is the fear that here is the end for all time of the aspirations for a united India, of the aspirations for freedom, the fear that the Constitution is cast-iron, like the laws of the Medes and Persians and can never be altered.

WHY LET THEM LOOSE ON BRITISH INDIA?

MR. MAXTON'S view is very simple. Let the autocratic Princes stew in their own juice if they like in their States, he thinks, but they must not be allowed to come into British India where everybody wishes to see democracy established. He said:

We are taking the Princes into a partnership and giving them a status in all-Indian affairs and, indeed in the affairs of the British Empire. I take this simple view about the British Empire, that once these men are admitted into a share of self-government they get the same status as the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Isaac Foot) or myself. I do not want to have any monarch, wielding absolute power of tyranny in his own territory unchecked and able to do what he likes in that territory, to have also some say in what I am doing here. That is going rather farther than I care to go.

PROVINCIAL BUDGETS.

Bombay.

THE budget presented to the Bombay Legislative Council last month is a deficit budget. Luckily, the deficit is small, being only Rs. 2 lakhs. It would have been Rs. 29 lakhs but for a windfall of about Rs. 27 lakhs which the Government came by as a result of the sale of certain securities formerly held in various High Court funds, but now transferred to Government. But even if this windfall had not been forthcoming, it would still have been possible to present a balanced budget, if the debt payment of Rs. 16 lakhs had been suspended for another year and the restoration of the cut in the salaries of the all-India services had been delayed, which constitutes a charge of Rs. 14 lakhs on the provincial finances. The cancellation of the cut is accompanied by the stoppage of the practice under which the Governor and the Ministers made a voluntary surrender of their pay to the extent of 5 per cent. last year. It is difficult to applaud the action of the

Ministers in so readily imitating the unworthy example of the Services.

The budget contains some items of expenditure which call for criticism. For example, the provision of Rs. 2 lakhs for the celebration of Their Majesties' Silver Jubilee, as compared to the provision of only one-tenth of the amount in the Bihar and Orissa budget, especially in the present straitened state of the presidency's finances, undoubtedly errs on the side of extravagance. Nor are we able to understand whether the revival of the post of sub-assistant-surgeon on the Governor's personal staff which involves the province in an annual burden of Rs. 3,000 was so urgent as not to brook some delay. While nation-building activities have, in the name of financial stringency, been cut down to the bone, it is surprising that such new items of expenditure should find a place in the budget. The restoration, partial or complete, of the cut of 14 per cent. in the educational grants to local bodies has been long overdue. It is not known whether the Ministers at all pressed its claims.

Bengal.

The financial difficulties of Bengal as revealed in its budget are indeed very formidable. While the Finance Member budgets for an expenditure of Rs. 11,71½ lakhs, all that he expects by way of receipts is nothing more than Rs. 9,44 lakhs, leaving a deficit of about Rs. 2¼ crores. True, more than Rs. 1½ crores of this will be wiped out by half the proceeds of the export duty on jute which is allowed to Bengal by the Central Government. Even so there remains a deficit of about Rs. 69 lakhs which, with the deficits in the past five years or so, brings the total in the neighbourhood of Rs. 5½ crores.

When financial relief in the form of the grant of half the jute export duty was promised to Bengal last year it was on the distinct understanding that she was to do everything possible to reduce the gap between the two ends of her budget. The five taxation measures designed to increase the provincial revenues by about Rs. 25 lakhs which were recently introduced in the Bengal Legislative Council are apparently intended by way of satisfaction of this condition. Whether the Central Government and legislature will be fully satisfied by these attempts on Bengal's part to tap new sources of revenue it is difficult to say. But it can be said with certainty that the sources now sought out by Bengal have served as fruitful sources of revenue in some other provinces for many years now.

In this connection, the important fact that since 1922 no additional taxation has been imposed in Bengal must be prominently borne in mind. Registration fees have no doubt undergone some enhancement and a provincial tax on motor vehicles has also been in force for some years; but its proceeds are earmarked for improvements in communications and cannot be utilised for lessening the gulf between receipts and expenses.

Terrorism constitutes not only a political but also a financial problem in Bengal. In 1934-35 the provincial Government's expenditure for checking its spread came to Rs. 57 lakhs, while next year it would increase by Rs. 5¼ lakhs. If the figures of such expenditure during the last five years are totalled up, the province will be found to have spent Rs. 2,41 lakhs on 'combatting terrorism'. This is unquestionably a very heavy drain on the financial resources of the province; but no alternative solution except that of granting generous political reforms to the people has so far been suggested as a means of weakening the movement. To judge from recent events however this remedy is far from commending itself to Government.

Madras.

There is nothing particularly striking about the Madras budget except the fact that it shows a surplus of Rs. 5 lakhs, upon which the southern presidency deserves to be congratulated. The revenue is expected to amount to Rs. 16,49 lakhs and the expenditure to Rs. 16,44 lakhs. The Finance Member's speech introducing the budget stressed the well-known fact that the usual sources of provincial revenue like land revenue, excise, stamps, forest, registration, etc. afford very little scope for expansion, which may be said to be true not only of Madras but of most other provinces. It is gratifying to be told that hydro-electric schemes have been discovered to be a promising source of revenue. It is to be hoped everything will be done to develop it. The restoration of the cut in the Services' salaries has, as in other provinces, been the subject of much strong criticism by the public.

The inclusion of Rs. 6 lakhs on account of elections to the provincial legislature should set all speculation about the date of introduction of the Hoare reforms in the provinces at rest. If indications are to be trusted, the present plan seems to be to place the Constitution Act on the statute book by August next so that elections to provincial councils could be held by the end of the year. All which points to the probability of the reformed provincial governments being in working order by the beginning of next year.

U. P.

THE recent orders for the restoration of the cut in the all-India Services' salaries were responsible for adding cent per cent to the budget deficit in U. P. But for the restoration of the cut, the deficit would have been Rs. 16 lakhs; now it would be Rs. 32 lakhs. It was open to the local Government to restrict the restoration only to the members of the all-India services in regard to whom they have no alternative but to obey such orders as the Secretary of State might in his wisdom choose to issue. In this case the additional burden on the provincial revenues would have been only Rs. 3½ lakhs and not Rs. 16½ lakhs. But to allow the members of the all-India services to draw their full pay and to continue to deprive the services amenable to the control of the provincial Government of one-twentieth of their salary seemed to the local Government an indefensible proceeding. There is no doubt considerable force in its contention. The other half of the deficit is largely made up of new items of expenditure which could apparently not be postponed.

The gap could be made up either by retrenchment or by fresh taxation. The U. P. Government's expenditure has gone down by nearly Rs. 1¼ crores in four years, from which we are expected to conclude that the limit of retrenchment is already reached. This is making too heavy a demand on public credulity. So long as superfluous posts like divisional commissionerships continue in existence, public opinion will need a good deal of persuasion to come to the conclusion at which the Finance Member has come. Anyway the U. P. Government does not intend to explore any fresh avenues of economy and is thrown back on the only other alternative of additional taxation. This, if the Government is allowed to have its way, will take the form of enhanced stamp duties and a license fee on vendors of tobacco, which between them are expected to yield a revenue of about Rs. 15 lakhs. The effect of the passage of the proposed taxation measures would thus be to reduce the deficit from Rs. 32 lakhs to Rs. 17 lakhs, for covering which no proposals seem to be put forward so far. Looking to the existing economic conditions, it will by no means be surprising if the

Government's proposals for fresh taxation encounter determined opposition at the hands of popular representatives.

Bihar and Orissa.

The fact that the Finance Member of Bihar and Orissa was able to present a balanced budget will come as an agreeable surprise to most people. It was generally believed that the devastation caused by last year's visitation of the terrible earthquake would so disorganise the finances of the province that a balanced budget could not be reasonably looked forward to for a good long time. But fortunately such fears have been belied by the event. No doubt the equalisation of the two sides of the budget has necessitated the use by the Finance Member of about Rs. 9 lakhs of the ordinary opening balance. Even so the result is doubtless creditable to all concerned.

A noteworthy feature of the budget to which attention may be drawn here is that the provision for the restoration of the cut in the Services' salaries has been accompanied by provision for restoration of the cut in the educational grants to local bodies. This cut has been in force since 1932-33 and has resulted in a yearly saving of about Rs. 3½ lakhs to the provincial Government. The local Government is entitled to praise for their decision to recommence giving the full quota of their educational grants to local bodies, especially because its financial difficulties have been aggravated by reconstruction work necessitated by the earthquake.

A little information about the expenditure incurred on the reconstruction of Bihar may not be out of place here. Expenditure occasioned by the earthquake is of four kinds: (1) additional administrative expenditure involved in the creation of a Reconstruction department, the whole of which amounting to Rs. 4½ lakhs in two years is borne by the local Government. (2) One-half of the cost of reconstructing Government buildings, canals, embankments, etc. will be found by the Central Government, while the other half will be met by the local Government by loans from the Provincial Loans Fund. The cost of reconstruction of this kind in 1933-34 was Rs. 3½ lakhs and is expected to exceed Rs. 36 lakhs in 1934-35. The estimated expenditure in 1935-36 is Rs. 35 lakhs and Rs. 27½ lakhs in subsequent years; in other words, a total of Rs. 102 lakhs. (3) Finance for the reconstruction of buildings, roads, schools, etc. belonging to local bodies and school and hospital committees will be wholly found by the Government of India, who in 1933-34 spent about Rs. 8 lakhs for the purpose and will spend about Rs. 44 lakhs in 1934-35. The estimate for 1935-36 is Rs. 54½ lakhs, which with the expenditure that may be needed in future years is expected to bring the total to Rs. 1½ crores. (4) Under this category fall loans made to private persons for sand clearance, loans to zamindars to help in the re-establishment of their agricultural business and loans to the general public for the reconstruction of their dwellings. The expenditure on this account was Rs. 6½ lakhs in 1933-34 and will be Rs. 61 lakhs next year, while it would be Rs. 5 lakhs in each subsequent year. This, however, is not an exhaustive list of the items of expenditure forced on the local Government on account of the earthquake. To be brief, it may be stated that the Government of India will have to meet a total earthquake expenditure of Rs. 177 lakhs, while, if the money borrowed by the local Government for advancing loans is kept out of account, its own share will approximately be Rs. 70 lakhs, not to mention the loss of revenue amounting to Rs. 6 lakhs which it has sustained.

C. P. and Berar.

The restoration of the cut in the Services'

salaries is found to have played havoc with the finances of C. P., where what would have been a surplus budget was thereby turned into a deficit one. The budget for 1935-36 originally provided for a revenue of Rs. 480½ lakhs and an expenditure of Rs. 475½ lakhs, leaving a surplus of nearly Rs. 5½ lakhs. But, thanks to the abolition of the 5 per cent. cut, which will cost the province nearly Rs. 7 lakhs, the surplus has been converted into a deficit of a little over Rs. 1½ lakhs.

New expenditure amounting to about Rs. 12½ lakhs is provided for. Nearly Rs. 6½ lakhs of this consists of old commitments so that the balance of a little over Rs. 6 lakhs may indeed be said to be new expenditure. About one-quarter of a lakh of such new expenditure will be incurred by the entertainment of special preventive establishment in the excise department and will, it is believed, be more than counterbalanced by the additional excise receipts that may accrue to the province. Education too shares in the increased expenditure to the tune of Rs. 30,000; but the smallness of the amount forbids any hope of its utilisation towards the spread of education, to which public opinion attaches great value.

The budget would appear to an impartial observer to justify the Beraris' complaint that in the matter of apportionment of expenditure between C. P. and Berar, the latter generally fails to secure its due. In spite of the fact that the Sim Committee recommended the division of provincial divisible expenditure between C. P. and Berar in the proportion of 60:40, the percentage reached is, roughly speaking, 68½ and 31½. The balance cannot obviously tilt in favour of Berar unless new items of expenditure connected with it are included in the budget. This, as the Finance Member explained, is impossible so long as the present financial stringency continues and C. P. by itself continues to be a deficit province. The explanation can bring but cold comfort to the people of Berar who are believed to labour under a sense of grievance on this score.

Cannot some action be contemplated by which the stigma of a deficit province will be removed from the brow of C. P.? The easy and comfortable method of a request for a subvention from the Central Government seems to have been generally favoured by non-official members. If Sind and Bihar are to be assisted by the Government of India, why not C. P.? asked they. The reasoning, however faultless, is hardly to be commended from the point of view of the provincial self-respect. The more dignified plan would of course be to think of means of augmenting the provincial income after public opinion is assured that retrenchment has been carried to the utmost limit. If C. P. aspires to the dignity of a Governor's province, it must find the wherewithal to support that status on a basis of self-reliance instead of depending upon doles from the centre.

The Punjab.

A balanced budget which provides for a surplus of Rs. 56,000 was recently presented to the Punjab Legislative Council. But for the eleventh-hour decision to abolish the out of 5 per cent. in Government servants' salaries, this small surplus would have been added to by Rs. 16 lakhs, that being the cost of the abolition of the out in the province. The police expenditure in 1935-36 will be greater by nearly one lakh of rupees while the increase will be twice as much in the case of education which, though utterly inadequate as compared to the needs, must be welcomed as an indication of the local Government's earnest desire to do everything possible to further the educational interests of the province.

In this connection the Finance Member approvingly referred to a suggestion about higher education being made self-supporting so as to facilitate the diversion of larger funds for primary education. If this foreshadows a decision to charge what must in the nature of circumstances be exorbitant fees for high school and college education, it is a decision which is sure to be greeted with strong public protests, as such a course would result in making higher education, already almost unbearably costly, prohibitive to people of moderate means. While in no way belittling the importance of a wider

diffusion of primary education, it seems to us at least a debatable point whether its extension should be secured at the cost of higher education.

The Punjab Government deserves to be praised for its decision to continue the post of the Commissioner of Rural Reconstruction and to provide for a sum of Rs. 1 lakh for being expended on rural development schemes. Agriculture being practically the only rural industry, the increased expenditure of Rs. 3½ lakhs on agriculture provided for in the budget is to be welcomed.

INDIAN INDIA IN THE FEDERATION.

MISS RATHBONE'S SPEECH.

The following is the full text of the speech which Miss Eleanor Rathbone made in Committee in the House of Commons on 19th February in supporting Viscount Wolmer's amendment, of which the object was to turn down federation.

IN the course of this discussion there is one aspect of the subject upon which we have not heard a single word, and that is the effect of this Clause (Clause 6) upon Indian India, not on the Princes but on the people of the Indian States. Many speakers have speculated as to whether the Princes will or will not come in, and several speakers have offered their opinion as to whether it is or is not to the advantage of the Princes to come in, but I have not yet heard any speaker discuss the question of how coming in will affect the people of the Indian States. As I see it, in the past the Indian States, that is, the Princes of the Indian States, have been buttressed upon the British Raj. In the future the British Raj will be buttressed upon the Princes. The relation between the two will be like the two sides of a corn sack, each leaning upon the other.

The extent to which the smooth working of the whole proposal is dependent upon the Princes has been made clear throughout the discussions. Supporters of the Bill have laid stress upon the loyalty of the Princes and argued that the known conservatism of the Princes is a guarantee of stability and order and resistance to subversive and revolutionary forces, but it is not equally clear how that new relationship and intimacy is to affect the Princes' own subjects. I know that it can be argued that it is going to make no difference. Already the dependency of the Princes upon the paramount power has been quite clearly defined. It is defined in Treaties and Sanads. In the words of the Harcourt Butler Report:

"It also depends upon usage and the promise of the King-Emperor to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes."

Elsewhere it is stated that:

"The promise of the King-Emperor to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes carries with it a duty to protect the Prince against attempts to eliminate him and to substitute another form of government."

That has always seemed to me a strange kind of dependency; the dependence of autocratic Princes upon the greatest and most successful democracy in the world.

When on the Second Reading of the Bill the right hon. Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) told us that the ideas which maintain a democracy at home will not maintain any form of tyranny abroad, and that a free Britain and a coerced India cannot go together, he was talking in terms of British India. I wonder whether he remembered that in fact our democracy at home is pledged to defend several

hundred little coerced Indians, in the States. It is true that, by general consent, some Indian States are as progressively governed and as contented and happy as any part of British India. Some who have visited both tell us that the States are happier than British India, but how many of those States, and what about the rest?

I do not pretend to know the answer, but I am increasingly uneasy at the mist that hangs over this great subject and at the small knowledge that a great majority of Members of this Parliament and of the British public have of the conditions of life of these people towards whom we are taking such great responsibilities. From that point of view it may be said that the responsibility is not changed, that we have done it already, that we have set our names to these Treaties and Sanads, but it appears to me that a new situation is being created in two ways, first, that a new relationship is being set up which is, in effect, a reinitiating of Treaties many of which were made generations ago, Treaties of which the effect has been, as the Harcourt Butler Report has pointed out,

"that many States owe their continued existence to the solicitude of the Paramount Power."

That has been so in the past. Under the new arrangement is it to be still more so in the future? It appears to me that the danger is of two kinds, first, that by this new arrangement the Princes may feel that we have given a kind of guarantee that we are in the future, as in the past, going to hold them up on their gaddis, and, secondly, shall we not almost be obliged to maintain the power of the Princes by the very fact that the smooth working of the machine is going to be so dependent upon their good will? That is an aspect of the question that has been increasingly oppressing my mind.

There is another aspect of the question, and that is how far the introduction of the Princes is going to affect the subjects in British India. We know that in the Lower Chamber alone the representatives of the Princes, who are to be their nominees and not the choice of their people, are to be three times as numerous as the representatives of Labour, women, and the depressed classes put together. That is in the Lower Chamber.

Mr. Churchill: What about the British?

Miss Rathbone: If the right hon. Gentleman means the British British, I think that they can feel safe. An Indian writer said only last week that we are taking away the white bureaucrats and putting brown autocrats in their place. As far as British interests are concerned I think that the Princes will take care they are protected, because if we are swept

away they would meet with something far worse from their own people. Consider the kind of powers which are being given to the Princes in this central government. They are to include power to legislate on such questions as marriage—a very suitable question on which to invite the opinion of the Princes—divorce, the custodianship and guardianship of children, factory legislation, and a number of other questions which vitally affect the interests of the poorest and least protected classes of the community in India. Suppose the majority in the Council of State, in which there is not to be a single representative of women, the depressed classes or the Labour party, joined with a minority or majority in the lower chamber of the Federal Government, they would be able, absolutely and for all time, to block any progressive legislation, however much desired by the Provincial Government, and where the views of the Central Government, on any of these subjects, conflict with the Provincial Government, the former has priority.

We shall have an opportunity of discussing the details of this relationship on future Amendments and I merely allude to it now to make this point. Are hon. Members right in assuming, as many of them do, that if Indian politicians are so roundly condemning these proposals as they say, then it is mere factiousness on their part to do, they do so because they are not getting enough and want more. It is difficult from the kind of information which is leaking through to know what is really working in the minds of most of the statesmen in India whose opinion one respects. It seems as if many of them really mean that they would rather have no Bill than this Bill, and if that is the case it is a consideration which should make us pause. To my mind there is all the difference in the world between offering to India a measure which falls short of her national hopes and aspirations, which she yet recognises as a small step in advance, and in forcing upon India a measure which she regards not as a step in advance but as a definite step backwards on a path leading to a morass. It is a doubt of that nature which led me to vote against the Second Reading of the Bill.

I confess I am not certain even yet as to whether I was right or not. I feel at present that it is extremely difficult to judge. When the report of the Committee was discussed a month ago my own opinion was that these proposals represented an advance, certainly for those whose interests I have studied most closely, namely the women, I believed that they represented a considerable advance in the Provinces generally, but the two stops in my mind, to use a Quaker expression, are these. Do those Indians whose judgments we most respect, such people as the members of the Servants of India Society and Mr. Sastri and Mr. Gandhi himself who, whatever faults he may have, really and truly cares for the interests of the poor and oppressed, regard it as an advance? Is it their solemn and considered judgment that this Bill is a step in advance or do they consider that they would rather have no Bill than this Bill? I feel that on that question the evidence as yet is inconclusive.

The second thing which causes a stop in my mind is the question of the effect of the proposals regarding the Princes. Are we solemnly reaffirming a former alliance which is in the long run, an unnatural alliance, an unreal alliance, an alliance to which a democracy ought never to consent if it means that we are pledging ourselves once again to maintain autocracy in its place where there should be freedom, and to resist the aspirations of people "rightly struggling to be free." As I understand our

obligations at present, however justified the people of the Indian States may be in objecting to autocratic rule, however much they may desire democratic institutions, we are pledged to resist that desire. We ought not to be so pledged. Our Treaties with the Indian States should be subject to reconsideration and adaptation to changed conditions. The fear that sticks in my mind is: Are we, instead of making that change more possible, making it less possible by this Measure?

THE FUTURE OF INDIA.

LABOUR PARTY'S DUTY.

WHAT the Labour Party in power ought to do with the India problem was laid down on 10th February by Mr. H. N. Brailsford in an analysis of the India Bill and the policies of the different schools of political thought in England.

Mr. Brailsford was addressing the Socialist League on new forms of imperialism in India and declared that the new Constitution was to be given a bodyguard of Princes who could be trusted to do nothing offensive to the imperial power. Once the Constitution came into operation it would not be possible even for the Parliament at Westminster to alter the arrangement with the Princes, who would be sovereign and equal parties to a treaty. No alteration could be made except by consent of the whole body of Princes.

Asserting that the new Constitution could not be made operative for some time and that meanwhile Labour might become the Government, Mr. Brailsford set out to consider what an "honest Socialist Parliament" might do.

"India," he said, "will not take Socialism or any other set of ideas from white men, but it will be our duty to say that if we offered India self-determination the whole of India must share that right and we should see to it that self-determination came on democratic lines."

"That would not be easy. It would mean freedom of speech and lifting the ban on the press and political organisations. The period of preparation of self-determination should begin with the Labour Government's sending the best man it could find as Viceroy, with a good body of helpers behind him. It should set him to work first of all in starting the transference of real power to the Indian people, and his first step should be to begin to create an Indian army."

The Indianising of the army should be done at what Mr. Brailsford called a quasi-revolutionary tempo. There should be recruiting all over the Peninsula, and he saw no difficulty or objection to the Indian Government's calling in British officers seconded from the British army to help them. It would be necessary also to grant freedom of speech, of the press and of association, and trade unions and peasant leagues should be fostered. The people should be made to understand that in India also the balance of power had swung over and that the power of the British Raj would be used to help the workers in their attempts at education and organisation.

Mr. Brailsford acknowledged that he did not know what the result of all this would be, or whether anything near our Western conceptions would result from that period of freedom, but India would have been shown in that short time of, say, eighteen

months or two years that the views of the workers and peasants did count and would not be submerged under any claim to make property supreme.

It would be for India after that to determine the sort of Constitution she wanted and to accept or reject advice given to her. He hoped it would not occur to any Indian to bring the Princes in without making terms and stipulating that they should come in on the same terms as the British Provinces with a single charter of rights to apply to them all. Probably only a few Princes would come in at first.

"Our conception is that the Constitution should be a Dominion Constitution," he said, "and that agreement should be reached between the Indian Assembly and the British Government over necessary modifications."—The *Hindu*.

THE PRINCES' VETO.

WE have been categorically assured that once a State enters the federation, it cannot secede afterwards. On the other hand we have in this second schedule (of the India Bill) a list of provisions including the most important clauses relating to federation which cannot be amended without affecting the validity of its Instrument of Accession. It is difficult to reconcile the two unless the Act is intended to be the last word for all time on matters specified in this schedule. If the Bill before the Parliament is put on the statute book and the federation comes into being, even the British Parliament would be powerless to transfer defence and external affairs to the Ministers, to alter the proportion of seats in the federal legislatures or the composition of the Railway Authority without giving the right to the federated States to secede.

It may be said that legislation on such matters may be undertaken by the British Parliament with the consent of the States. But it will be a practical impossibility to get the consent of the hundred and fifty Princes, many of whom are steeped in mediaeval superstitions and are too afraid of everything new to agree to the slightest change.

This schedule gives an insight into the nature of the federation that is sought to be imposed on India. It will close up all constitutional means of altering it and prevent future British Governments from tampering with it. Reactionary forces and vested interests will be permanently enthroned and only a revolution can dislodge them.

Sir Samuel Hoare's statement regarding Dominion Status becomes altogether meaningless in the light of this schedule. The army may be completely Indianised, but its control cannot be transferred to the federal Ministry till every federated State, however small it may be, agrees to such transfer. Therefore, the attainment of Dominion Status is made to depend not only on the will of the British Parliament but on the consent of the federating Princes severally.

This is a most intolerable and humiliating situation. British India cannot afford such a price or accept such a condition for any consideration whatsoever. If the States are not willing to be treated like the provinces and submit to such changes which may be necessitated by public opinion or changing circumstances without insisting on prior consent, it is better to leave them alone to plough their lonely furrows. The importance of the Indian States has been exaggerated out of all proportion simply to deprive the people of the whole country of their birthright

of freedom for all time. The future of the country is bound to be dark and difficult unless this Federation is prevented from being born alive.—The *Indian Express*.

Correspondence.

"AN APPEAL TO THE PRINCES."

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SERVANT OF INDIA.

SIR,—I agree with you (*vide* issue of 21st February) that the Indian Princes should enter the Federation only if it is a responsible government. The present one is not. Secondly, they should stand by their condition that they will enter the Federation only if the British India people agree to it whole-heartedly. They do not. Moreover, if the present Bill becomes law in spite of us, at best it will be worked only so as to produce deadlocks and to demonstrate the failure of reforms. The Indian Princes cannot afford to ignore this.

With the coming of the federation the Indian Princes will certainly lose some of their sovereignty. They must get some price for it. They get more now.

I entirely agree with you that by rejecting the proposed federation they retain entire freedom for independent action. At least let the Princes delay the Federation. Your concluding words are profoundly true: "For them to keep out of Federation at present would be very much to our advantage, and to force a Federal Union, an interminable Federal Union, upon British India in face of unanimous and vehement opposition would be nothing short of committing a rape."—Yours, etc.

19, Ferozshah Road,
New Delhi, 2nd March.

S. SATYAMURTI.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- SCOTLAND YARD AND THE METROPOLITAN POLICE (2nd Edn.) By JOHN MOYLAN. (The Whitehall Series.) (Putnam, London.) 1934. 20cm. 398p. 7/6.
- CULTURAL FELLOWSHIP IN INDIA. By ATULANANDA CHAKRABARTI. (Thacker, Spink & Co, Calcutta.) 1934. 19cm. 192p. Rs. 4.
- THE COMING STRUGGLE AND FASCISM IN JAPAN. (4th Edn.) By JOHN STRACHEY. (Gollancz.) 1934. 23cm. 399p. 5/-
- PLANNED ECONOMY FOR INDIA. By M. VISVESARAYA. (The Bangalore Press, Bangalore.) 1934. 22cm. 432p. Rs. 16.
- MILITARISM AND FASCISM IN JAPAN. By O. TANIN and E. YOHAN. (International Publishers, New York.) 1934. 23cm. 320p. \$2.50.
- MOTHER AMERICA. By SUDHINDRA BOSE. (M. S. Bhatt & Co., Raopura, Baroda.) 1930. 22cm. 304p. Rs. 5.
- AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION IN FASCIST ITALY. By FREPPEL COTTA. (King.) 1935. 22cm. 148p. 7/6.
- THE INTELLIGENT MAN'S GUIDE THROUGH WORLD CHAOS. By G. D. H. COLE. (Gollancz.) 1933. 20cm. 680p. 5/-.
- TROUBLE ON THE FRONTIER. By DOUGLAS CHRISTIE. (Rich & Cowan.) 1935. 20cm. 278p. 7/6.