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## Topics of the Week.

#### Federation Certain.

THE Joint Select Committee's examination of its draft report on the White Paper has commenced. The contents of the draft report are pretty wellknown in India. Our London correspondent, who has exceptional opportunities of ascertaining such facts, informs us on a later page that, while the forecast about all the other reactionary changes-like indirect election for the Assembly, second chambers in the provinces, the truncating of the transfer of law and order, etc.—will come true the size of the federal legislature will not be reduced.

FOR our own part we had never any doubt that the last-named change will not be made and that all the rest will be. It requires no prophet to foretell this. If the federal legislature contained a smaller number of seats, it would be most difficult for the Princes' claims for representation to be satisfactorily met, and we are credibly informed—and the Joint Select Committee and Sir Samual Hoare cannot be unaware of it-that the Princes' Chamber had kept a manifesto signed and sealed, which was to be submitted to the Prime Minister the moment it became known that the seats allotted to the States in the federal legislature would not be as many as are provided for in the White Paper, announcing definitely that the States will wash their hands of federation.

BRITISH Indian leaders have no pull at all with Government, but the States' rulers have an immense pull, and that for the simple reason that the British Government ardently desire federation to be brought about somehow or other. There was perhaps a time when they fought shy of it. But this relates to the federation. Now, however, they are fully awake to its possibilities. They are taking good care to reduce in every possible way the amount of power to be conferred upon the people's representatives in British India. They are devising more and more safeguards to that end. But they know that their best and most infallible safeguard lies in federation itself.

WE in British India wanted federation because we believed that it would amplify our constitutional power, that it would enable us to get wider reforms than would be possible if the demand went forth from British India alone. That belief, however, it would be difficult to justify by an examination of the White Paper. Who can lay his hand upon his heart and point to one single proposal in that document which makes for progress which can be justly attributed to the States coming in? While federation as a source of additional power has failed us, it has succeeded remarkably well in bringing in a conservative element which would have had no place in our constitution, but for the federal plan. And it is this aspect of federation that has so much to recommend to the British Government and to the Joint Select Committee. Even if British India were now to change its mind and try to shake itself free from federation, the British Government would prevent it.

As we have said above, they consider it to be their best safeguard. Why will they forego it? Even if the Princes ask for more seats than the White Paper contemplates, they will get them, if only they make it clear that it is the indispensable condition of their joining the federation. The British Government do not wish to part with real power to any extent; if federation, without enlarging the power of the popular representatives, helps to clip their wings, is it any wonder that the British Government will clutch at it? We are quite prepared to believe, therefore, with our London correspondent, that pro-federationists have no reason to fear, and anti-federationists have no reason to hope for, a reduction in the size of the two chambers of the federal legislature making federation impossible.

#### Nationalism of Nationalist Muslims!

DR. ANSARI, in inaugurating the election campaign in Bombay for the Congress party, was at great pains to show that the dubious attitude which the Congress has adopted towards the communal award was not due in any degree to the importunities of the Nationalist Muslims, but that it was the result of the advice tendered by Mahatma Gandhi and others irrespectively of what the Nationalist Muslims thought on the question. "The decisions arrived at Ranchi," he said, "and those by the Working Committee in Bombay were neither inspired by the period when they had not discovered the virtues of | Nationalist Muslims nor are they framed to help the Muslims or are calculated to injure the cause of the country."

WHAT happens then to the statement made earlier by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel as chairman of the meeting: "It was tried to be impressed upon Panditji (Pandit Malaviya) that the rejection (of the communal award) would lead to a split in the Congress. and Congress would be divided into two camps, one Hindu and the other Muslim. Malaviyaji would not agree"? If, as Dr. Ansari would have us believe, the so-called Nationalist Muslims are "still nationalists to the core," that "their disapproval of everything anti-national remains as firm as ever," and that their dislike of the communal award has not diminished a bit," then why should rejection of the communal award lead to a split in the Congress on racial lines. The only Mahomedans that there are in the Congress are Nationalist Mahomedans. Why should they go out of the Congress if the Congress rejected the communal award, which they so very much loath, and which they themselves are willing indirectly to reject by rejecting the White Paper?

THE conclusion is irresistible, that the Nationalist Musiims at Ranchi or even earlier threatened to leave the Congress if the communal award was rejected, and that Mahatma Gandhi, true to his temporising policy, agreed to give up rejection (which he must have felt was a necessary corollary to the rejection of the White Paper) rather than drive out from the Congress just a handful of Mahomedans that have been persuaded to come in! Whether the Congress should have made this compromise or not in order to keep the Moslem Nationalists in is a different matter, but to say that the Congress decision was not the result of insistence on their part would be about as true as to say that Sir Samuel Hoare has devised financial safeguards, not with a view to conciliate British financial interests, but because India's financial stability, considered in the abstract, requires them.

THE Nationlist Muslims, Dr. Ansari went on to say, "have stood the severest test which any political group in India has been ever put to." We are inclined to think that the country will bear a little enlightenment on this subject.

#### Nationalist Support for Non-Congressmen.

SPEAKING at Allahabad on 4th October, Pandit Madan Malaviya made it clear that, while the Nationalist Party would as a rule select its candidates only from among Congressmen, it would not hesitate to give its support to distinguished non-Congressmen if in its opinion they deserved support.

Replying to a remark from one of the audience, Pandit Malaviya asserted that they should not think that Congressmen only were endowed with intellect. There were others who had been serving the country. Therefore, his party had decided that if any such non-Congressman sought election to the Assembly as had been engaged in the National service his party would support him also. It was in pursuance of that principle, Pandit Malaviya said, that Mr. Chintamani would have his party's full support if he sought election. (Applause.) He said that on some political questions there had been differences between him and Mr. Chintamani, but Mr. Chintamani had a very long record of public service and in the whole country there were few people of the ability, high character and patriotism of Mr. Chintamani.

We are glad to see that the Nationalist Party has, unlike the Congress, a broad outlook on the present situation. If only Mr. Chintamani is well

enough, in point of health, to accept this offer and is returned to the Assembly, the Nationalist forces in the country will receive a greater accession of strength than from any other individual, whether in the Congress or without.

#### A Poor Performance.

MUCH to the dismay of the people of India, the establishment of Indian Sandhurst has carried with it the stoppage of Indian admissions to English Sandhurst and Woolwich. Why the one should be related to the other is a matter quite incomprehensible to Indian opinion. But the Government have gone and done it and all that is open to Indians is to show at every conceivable opportunity their resentment. Such an opportunity presented itself in connection with the debates on the Indian Army (Amendment) Bill which sought to validate the existence of the Indian army officers trained at the Indian Sandhurst. So strong was the pressure of non-official opinion that the Commander-in-Chief. who piloted the Bill in the upper House, could not afford to ignore it. But the way he met non-official contentions seemed to show that he was defending what in reality was an untenable position.

HE tried in the first place to twit Indian opinion on what appeared to him a glaring inconsistency in its attitude. It first cried itself hoarse, he said, with the demand for a military college being started in India; and when one was actually in being, a keen desire was voiced "to go back to the old practice." It is difficult to see where the inconsistency comes in. Does Sir Philip Chetwode mean to imply that Indians, when they pressed for the creation of an Indian Sandhurst, agreed in advance to forego the seats reserved for Indian cadets at the English Sandhurst as soon as the Indian military academy was in working order? On no other hypothesis is his contention intelligible. If so, it is permissible to inquire what his authority for this kind of supposition is. He cannot be unaware of the strong dissatisfaction existing in this country at the disproportionately small capacity of Indian Sandhurst as compared to the requirements of the Indian demand for complete army indianisation within the shortest possible time. Is it possible that Indian opinion would agree to a course which on the face of it can have no other effect than that of delaying the substitution of British by Indian officers in the Indian army? The supposed inconsistency has obviously no foundation except in the imagination of the Commander-in-Chief.

HE also tried to make capital of the fact that none of the Dominions except New Zealand are allowed to send their young men for training in the British Sandhurst, and New Zealand, he added, was allowed to do so because it had no military college of its own. The corollary is plain. If India is aspiring to be a Dominion as she is doubtless doing and has already been furnished with a military college, it is unbecoming of her to cast longing glances at the institutions for military training maintained in England. A little reflection however will show that this reasoning is grossly fallacious. While the Dominions have military colleges adequate to their requirements, the one set up in India can satisfy no more than a fraction of our needs in the matter of the supply of military officers. When India has a military college big enough to turn out military officers in sufficient numbers, she may be expected not to avail herself of the facilities for military training provided in England. Till then there appears to be no particular point in holding up before her the

example of the Dominions as being worthy of emulation by her. It has no applicability in her present situation. If the Commander-in-Chief thought that this argument would out any ice with Indian opinion, we are sure he has by now been disillusioned.

#### Prevention of Educational Wastage.

IT is interesting to inquire why, in spite of the existence of compulsory education acts on the statute books of the different provinces for more than a dozen years, nowhere the results are found to be satisfactory. In the first place, the initiative for the introduction of compulsion is vested under these acts in local bodies which, owing to the proverbial meagreness of their resources, are none too eager to avail themselves of their provisions. A desire to do so also involves an imposition by them of an education tax which only helps to add to their unpopularity. But even as things are, the enactments would have been productive of better results if only the attendance authorities had meant business and had received a proper measure of co-operation from the magistracy. The persons charged with the duty of enforcing attendance of the school-age children are generally found to be unwilling for various reasons to prosecute parents and guardians for their failure to send their children to school. If and when they do so, the fines imposed by the magistrates for such default are as a rule anything but deterrent. No wonder that in most provinces such education laws have virtually remained a dead letter.

SOME of these defects would be at least partially remedied if the amendments now proposed by the Madras Government to their Compulsory Education Act are passed by the legislative council. Under this amending legislation, an attempt is to be made to tackle the problem of what is commonly understood as educational wastage. This consists in spending public funds on the education of boys and girls who do not remain in school sufficiently long and are therefore liable to lapse into illiteracy. It is easy to see that any expenditure incurred on their education is sheer waste. The proposed legislation in Madras seeks to make it penal for a parent or guardian to withdraw his or her child from school during the school-age period. This is a form of compulsion which, though of an unusual nature, should, if strictly enforced, go a long way in putting a stop to the educational leakage to which reference has been made. It will be generally agreed that it is by no means less important to prevent children from relapsing into illiteracy than to promote their education by bringing them compulsorily to school.

THE legislation also makes another welcome departure. Whereas under present arrangements it is the magistrates who are empowered to inflict panalties upon parents for the non-attendance of their children, the power will under the proposed law be transferred to the Chairmen of Municipalities and Presidents of District Boards. They will be statutorily required to impose penalties on parents whose children having once gone to school do not remain there until the termination of the school-age period.

#### No War for a year!

THIS is the announcement that Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel made in a recent speech. What exactly it signifies we do not pretend to know; we are, however, inclined to interpret it to mean that Mahatma Gandhi will not court imprisonment for a year.

IT may be recalled, though one is apt to forget it that civil disobedience has been suspended for all except one person, Mahatma Gandhi. People not versed in the language of diplomacy jumped to the conclusion that, though others were no langer free to offer civil resistance, Mahatma Gandhi was under a moral obligation to do so after the year was over in which he had kept himself aloof from politics.

BUT the year is now out, and no one yet knows what Gandhiji is going to do. When his last statement was issued from Wardha, people had expected to hear about his future programme—whether he was in future to concern himself with Harijan work as before and, by way of a change, with the Parliamentary work of the Congress, or whether he was to disobey some law and find himself in prison as a civil resister. They are surprised to find that Mahatma Gandhi does not take them into his confidence and reveal his future plans himself.

DOES he then want to make it known through the mouth of the Sardar that for a year he will be out of prison perfecting his preparations for war and that he will declare war thereafter? Anyway it seems that civil disobedience has been suspended both for himself and other Congressmen for an inderterminate period of time. He does not stand in a different case from the rest, though stoppage of the movement for all except himself had produced a contrary impression on the public mind. He, like all other Congressmen, is in a state of passive belligerency towards the British Government!

### REACTION OF THE BRISTOL CONFERENCE.

it is obvious, is going from strength to strength on the White Paper issue. The percentage of votes against Government policy as compared to those for Government policy has been steadily rising from 30 in June, 1933, to 32 in October, 1933, to 43 in March 1934, and to 49 now at the Bristol Conference. The margin between the votes cast by the supporters and opponents of the White Paper this time was only 23, out of a total poll of 1,063. And what, after all, does the Government's victory amount to? It means nothing more than that the Conservative Party will refrain from an expression of opinion on the reform proposals of the Government

till the Joint Select Committee has reported on them. It may well be that among those who voted for the Government there are several who would vote with the die-hards on the merits of the proposals, but who think that they must hold their hands, in accordance with the pledge previously given by them, till the Joint Committee's report is available. What the number of such members will be no one can tell with certainty. But while the ranks of Government's supporters will be thinned to some extent, large or small, at a later date, those of Government's opponents will suffer no diminution. Possibly they will increase. The India Bill is thus in a position of great danger. This fact must be fully realised by

Indian opinion. For a long time the public in this country were inclined to think that the Government's position was secure; that the Churchill faction carried no influence and commanded no votes; and that the White Paper scheme, unsatisfactory as it was, did not run the risk of being whittled away still further. We must all confess now that we had grossly under-rated the diehard strength; and that this section is capable not only of emasculating the reforms measure but even of killing it.

In a sense the Churchill-Lloyd group has done a great service to India. For we shall now learn to look at the Government's reform proposals in a right perspective. So long as we thought that what the Government had offered was already ours, and that we stood only to gain, but not to lose, even if we belittled the offer, there was no chance of the proposals being correctly appreciated in the country. In these circumstances there could only be one solid block of opposition, the variation being merely in the amount of the ridicule and contempt that different groups chose to pour upon it. No wonder therefore that so far hardly a good word has been said about the White Paper in any quarter in this country. Some have attacked it from one point of view, and some from another; some very bitterly and some perhaps a little less bitterly; but throughout it has been one long story of a non-official onslaught on the Government's proposals. It cannot be that, in such a wide country, splitting into different factions on the slightest excuse, there would really be one view held on such a complex issue as the White Paper. The fact is that different views are held on this issue as on others; but they do not come out into the open, for so long there was no need. But now that Indian opinion realises that the whole of the White Paper is likely to be scrapped, unless it is shown that there is a good measure of support for it in India, we have no doubt that large groups of politicians, so long engaged in decrying the White Paper, will now array themselves in its defence. It is true that no Indian group likes the White Paper as it is; every one requires some amendment in it or other. But now it must be clear even to the dullest intellect that while retrograde changes have a good chance in Parliament, no change in the progressive sense has the slightest chance. And the immediate question is, not what amendments are desired by Indian public opinion, but whether on the whole Indian opinion will accept, not merely the White Paper on its present level, but even if its level be reduced still further, for that is all that is now practicable.

There is a great deal of make-believe, one suspects, in the cry of rejection that is raised by the advanced politicians in the country. The cry is either of rejection or non-acceptance. To the British it is all the same, whether you are in favour of one or the other. For they would not be able to carry their reforms measure through unless some of the groups in India, large and influential, come forward and say: "In the absence of any better constitution, we shall accept this. We want it; we cannot afford to lose it." Some of the rejectionists or non-acceptance politicians will surely now be impelled to say so, for the brought about eventually between the Mahomedans

question as it will appear to them is: "Does the White Paper, taking one thing with another, make for progrese? If it does, even if the progress be ever so small, it would be foolish to go without it because more is not available. If on the contrary, it makes on the whole for reaction, then it would be an advantage to India if the White Paper is thrown out. Does it then make for advance or retrogression?" While some rejectionists no doubt genuinely believe that the White Paper makes for retrogression, there must be others who think that it makes for advance; and now that they know that, on account of the strength of the Tory element in England, the whole reforms measure is in danger, they will undoubtedly separate themselves from the rejectionists and join themselves with its supporters. It would be well to watch the reaction which the Bristol Conference produces upon Indian opinion. If it results in the rise of a party which stands by the White Paper, and if the party is numerically strong, then the British Government will politically be enabled, and morally be justified, in putting their measure on the statute book. If, however, rejectionists still remain rejectionists and those who are in favour of non-acceptance still remain in favour of non-acceptance, the British Government will probably not find it possible to get the measure passed, and it would also be morally wrong of them to proceed with it. Their duty then clearly would be to drop it themselves. The next few months will show what India really desires.

#### NO OUTSIDE INTERVENTION!

N argument on which much reliance is placed by the Congress in defending its neutral attitude towards the communal award is based on its unwillingness to seek Government intervention in solving the communal problem. The argument runs thus: the Congress realises to the full the need of bringing about an agreement with the Mahomedans on this problem; if no agreement is possible now it may come later; the Congress at any rate lives in that hope, for as a self-respecting body it can never seek outside mediation; it can never afford therefore to do anything which is likely to antagonise the Moslem community, whose good-will it is necessary to purchase at whatever price.

THOSE who employ this argument-and it is being frequently employed—assume that the Aney Malaviya Nationalist Party is in a wholly different case; it despairs of an agreement with the Mahomedans not only in the immediate future, but in the remote future as well; it therefore relies upon Government's help in solving the problem on just lines; it is true that it has no great hope of Government giving the necessary help immediately, but ultimately it hopes that such help will be forthcoming; at all events it sees no other way out; it therefore does not mind raising an agitation which is sure to alienate the Moslems still further and to render still more difficult an amicable settlement of the problem, on which the Congress has staked its whole future.

THIS, however, is a sheer misrepresentation of the Nationalist position. Pandit Malaviya has frequently stated that the Nationalist Party, too, like the Congress, does not despair of an understanding being and other communities; that, in fact, it has full faith in the practicability of such an understanding being reached; that it, too, has no desire to go to the British Government with a request to force what it considers to be the right solution on the Moslems. Like the Congress, however, it does not believe that rejection of the communal award will drive the Mussulman community further away from the progressive parties and endanger the solution in any way. On the contrary, the Nationalist Party believes that the solution will become possible only if the country's opposition to the communal award is expressed at the present moment in the most unambiguous manner.

PANDIT MALAVIYA has certainly the best of the argument here. Does not the Congress hope, after rejecting the White Paper in terms, to get Government to agree to the formation of a constituent assembly for drafting a constitution and then to get it agree to the constitution itself? If rejection in this case does not imperil an agreed solution, why should it in the other? It is surely as necessary for the realisation of our political destiny to retain the goodwill of the British Government as of the Mahomedan community, and if in order to the retention of the latter's good-will we may express only disapproval of the communal award but not its rejection, does it not follow that in order to the retention of the former's good-will also, we should express only disapproval of the White Paper but not indulge in the heroics of rejection? Whatever be the right policy—disapproval or rejection, it must be the same both in the matter of the White Paper and the communal award. The Congress has not yet put forward any plausible argument so far why the communal award should be treated differently from the White Paper.

BUT "no outside interference," which is the cry raised by Congress orators, appeals strongly to the patriotic emotions of the average politician. He feels the glow of self-help in his heart and looks down contemptuously upon the Nationalists, who, he conceives, are intent upon invoking British help

in settling our internal quarrels. We have shown above that this is not a fact; for it is common ground between dissident Congressmen and orthodox Congressmen to abjure all British help and to rely exclusively upon our own capacity to adjust our differences. But, apart from it, it is worth while to examine a little more closely into the argument upon which the Congress orator draws so frequently. "We shall solve the communal problem", he says, "not with Government's help, but in spite of its opposition. We wish to give a square fight to Government on all fronts—on the communal question as well as on the political question."

In the present temper of our people, it is a great virtue in any party to appear always as opposing Government. But the Congress is not opposed to Government at all in the matter of tackling the communal award. For it speaks in just the same tones as Governmentitself on this question. Government says: "We have always appealed to the various communities in India to come to a mutual agreement on the question of representation in the legislatures. It was only when they could not do so that we had regretfully to come in and decide the question in our own way. Our decision is not satisfactory to some of the com-munities, but on that account we have purposely left the door open to a revision of it. Get all the communities to agree, now or at any time hereafter, and we shall most readily substitute your internal agreement to our external decision." The Congress too says the same thing.

IT does not like the communal award, but its method of having it altered in future is not in any way different from Government's. A mutual agreement among all communities is the only method left open by Government for a different solution than that contained in the communal award, and it is also the only method contemplated by the Congress. Government and the Congress are at one here. There is no merit, therefore, in the Congress orators saying, "We shall beat Government into submission." for in fact the Congress accepts Government's terms.

#### WHY BLAME POOR LABOUR?

WE were all in an exultant mood when news arrived in India that at its thirty-fourth annual conference to be held in Southport early in October the British Labour Party was to adopt a resolution acknowledging once again India's right to self-determination and that an Indian was to move it. An Indian did move it in fact, but it does not redound in any way to our national self-esteem. For we now learn that Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon was given the task of moving the resolution only because the two Branches of the Labour Party which tabled it "could not find enough enthusiasm amongst their respective ranks to have an English delegate to sponsor the resolution." None of us had any fear till the other day about the resolution having any but a warm reception at the hands of the Conference; our only fear was that, though the Conference was to be in session for six days, it would still have no time to discuss the question. But we were all certain that if the resolution was reached it would be passed by the Conference with acclamation.

The resolution, of which notice was given, was in the following terms:—

"This Conference declares its conviction that it is imperative that the principle of self-determination for the establishment of full self-government for India should be implemented forthwith.

"The Conference therefore supports the demand of the Indian people for a constituent assembly to be elected in India on the basis of an adult franchise, thus empowering the real representatives of the Indian people to draft and formulate a constitution in accordance with their desires and interests of the Indian masses."

The Labour Party has passed a resolution about India's self-determination several times before. But its reaffirmation this year would have had a profound significance, for it would have meant that the most advanced party in England is opposed, like all the progressive parties in India, to the White Paper proposals and would support all attempts that will be made in India to substitute a different constitution for the White Paper constitution. So long the Labour Party's

resolution in favour of self-determination by India was more or less of an academic character and was in the nature of an expression of a pious wish. But now self-determination is being given by the Congress a practical meaning, since it is devising machinery in the shape of a constituent assembly for carrying that principle into effect. And just when steps are being taken in India to carry out the principle, the Labour Party in England refuses to endorse the resolution. Mr. Henderson comes along and advises the executive of the Party not to commit itself to stand by the constitution that the Indian may formulate for themselves. "We have laid down very clearly that we are going to consult, if possible, all sections of the Indian people. That ought to satisfy any-body," and so he "refused to give any undertaking on behalf of the executive to carry out its policy of self-determination for India."

This will no doubt give a rude shock to the people in this country, who had foully believed that the Labour Party at any rate would not join with the Tory Party in imposing upon them a constitution which they did not want but would pledge itself to support a constitution of their own making. The Party, however, has now turned its back definitely upon the principle of self-determination in its application to India, for the resolution moved by Mr. Krishna Menon has been shelved. The disappointment felt by Indians will be all the keener because all this time the Party had held out to them the promise of self-determination, but now it has broken it on the very first occasion when it was called upon to fulfil the promise. All this criticism is wholly just and we sympathise with all the Congress leaders who feel deeply humiliated at the trickery practised upon them by the Labour Party. But these Congress leaders will do well to search into their own hearts at this moment, for I am sure that such selfintrospection will soften the blow for them. Is not the Congress doing to the States' people exactly what the Labour Party has done to the Indian people as a whole? Like the Labour Party, it too fed the States' people for far too long upon promises of self-determination. It said, "All India is one, and we do not recognise any distinction between the British Indian people and the people in the Indian States. We stand for swaraj or complete national independence for both of them alike. That is not our distant objective either; it is our immediate objective. We shall not rest till British Indians and the States' people attain full freedom." All this high-falutin talk, however, had no relation to concrete realities. Time has now come for the test to be applied as to whether these were merely pious hopes or were intended to be translated into actualities. And the Congress has failed to come up to the scratch.

It has put forward its project for a constituent assembly. In doing so, however, it wholly forgot the States' people although the constitution to be drawn up by the assembly is to be a federal one, embracing both British India and the Indian States in its jurisdiction. Look at the election manifesto of the Congress Parliamentary Board. It speaks of the

constituent assembly as if it has application to British India alone. Naturally the States' people got alarmed and started asking: Do you want British India to enjoy self-determination and are you going to force, or will you be a party, to forcing, other-determination upon the States' people? The question has been referred to the Congress leaders. One would have thought that on a reference being made, they would hasten to answer that the States' people will be admitted to the constituent assembly the same as British Indians, and that the States can avail themselves of self-determination the same as British India. But weeks have passed, and yet there is no authoritative answer to the question. They are still thinking about it, and there is good ground to fear that their answer will be, "Self-determnaition for British Indians, but princely determination for the States' people." Why do I say so? Several prominent Congressmen, known to be in entire sympathy with the demands of the State's people, still shrink from committing themselves in writing to the admission at the proper time of the States' people's representatives to the constituent assembly. They say privately: "We have no doubt that they ought to be admitted, but it is not known what Mahatma Gandhiji will say about it. And it is not safe in Congress politics for any lesser Congressman to undertake to do anything to which the Mahatma may be opposed. He has shown often enough before that he does not like to offend the Princes. For the present we shall only give you our moral sympathy; but we cannot give you a definite promise to take practical steps for the principle of self-determination being applied to the States' people for may be you will subsequently hold us to our promise and insist upon our carrying it out, and Mahatma Gandhi may not let us carry it out."

The British Labour Party too is full of vague, intangible sympathy about the political freedom of the Indian people. It turns against them, however, when you ask that the sympathy be translated into action. One is tempted to call this a betrayal, but Congressmen must not cast a stone at the Party. For they are themselves guilty of a worse betrayal. The Labour Party at any rate hopes to ride again to power, if not at the next election, at the election after the next. It must not therefore give any undertakings now which it will be called upon to fulfil about seven years hence. The Congress, on the other hand, is in a happy position of irresponsibility. Prominent Congressmen are themselves declaring openly that there is not the least chance of the White Paper being thrown out and the way being made clear for the setting up of a constituent assembly. Therefore, even if the Congress were to give a pledge to the States' people to admit their representatives to a share in the drafting of the future constitution as members of the constituent assembly, it is not likely to be embarrassed in the least. But Mahatma Gandhi, though he indulges in no end of empty threats against the British Government, is careful not to say one word which may possibly be distasteful to the Princes. And thus his position on the question is: Self-determination for British Indians but coercion. for the States' people. And it satisfies his ethical standards too l

A. V. PATVARDHAN.

## Our Pondon Better.

#### (BY AIR MAIL.)

( From Our Correspondent. )

LONDON, 28th September.

THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT.

HAVE reason to understand that the main outlines of the Report are already in type. The draft, however, has still to be reconsidered, with particular reference to certain points of relatively minor importance. It is still uncertain what form the Labour point of view will take, but it is likely that the Labour members will submit a separate memorandum, in which they will put forward their alternative suggestions. It is likely that many of these will coincide with recommendations for amendment of the White Paper made in the two principal IndianMemoranda, though in some respects it is possible that the Labour recommendations may be in advance of these. As to the line that the Party will take when the Bill is before Parliament, I do not know whether any definite decision has been taken by the leaders. I should imagine that it is improbable that a second reading of the Bill will be seriously opposed. The Labour Party may, however (this of course being subject to correction as a result of further information), propose a series of amendments in committee, based upon the recommendations that they are likely to make in the Memorandum annexed to the Report. By the end of October, I gather, the Report will be completed and signed. The rest is a matter of technicalities and Government dispatch, about which the less said the better, and many factors will come into operation immediately the Report is signed. Notwithstanding the strong rumours that have been prevalent regarding a decision of the Committee in favour of a smaller Central Legislature, I shall not be surprised to find that in fact, whatever may have been an earlier view, more mature considerations have prevailed pointing to the difficulty of satisfying the needs of minorities and also the States, if they are to come into the Federation at an early date, as it is the Government's hope that they will. Most of the other forecasts indicating a departure from the original White Paper proposals in a downward direction are, on the whole, confirmed, and it seems pretty certain that the Report when published will be found to be less progressive than the White Paper scheme,

#### "INDIA FROM A BACK BENCH."

It would appear that the diehard propagandists are not to be allowed to have matters all their own way. For far too long they have been able, both by insidious and by direct propaganda, to terrorise and stampede a considerable section of cautious British opinion, especially in constituencies, on the subject of Indian constitutional reform. They have twisted and distorted facts until they have become almost unrecognisable, and in some cases they have even gone to the extent of inventing them to suit their purposes, so that in the end quite a number of people. well-meaning but not adventurous, have come to dread the very thought of reforms in India and to associate them with the idea of abdication, on the one side, and bloodshed and chaos, on the other. For this some of the members of the India Defence Leag and their colleagues and associates are mainly responsible, but that they are not alone in that responsibility one realises when one bears in mind the attitude of people like Mr. Winston Churchil, whose extravagance of language and amazing irresponsibility ill besit a former Cabinet Minister of high rank and one who expressed the views that he did during the debates leading to the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme, as embodied in the present Government of India Act.

Whether one agrees with them or not in their estimate of what ought to be done in the present circumstances, it is good to know that a certain group of Tory Parliamentarians are determined not to let the diehards have all the best of the argument. It is quite true, of course, that the latter do not depend so much upon argument as upon an appeal to the lower emotions, and they hardly succeed in putting a gloss upon their emphasis of the materialistic aspect of Indo-British relations. Sir Adrian Baillie, M. P., Captain Victor Cazalet, M.P., the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, Wing-Commandar H. W. James, M. P., and Mr. Mark Patrick, M. P., however, have now carried the war into the enemies' camp by issuing a sustantial pamphlet under the above title, in which they carefully analyse the present situation from a progressive standpoint, expose the catchwords, the cliches and the false analogies in which their opponents rejoice, and they conclude, not only that a step forward should be taken, but that " if we are to take a step forward, it would be worse than useless to take one that is too short and hesitant. That would merely ensure that we get the worst of both worlds. Admittedly, we must face some risk. No course of action whatsoever in India could eliminate it entirely. But if we fall back on a policy of negation or reaction, we shall be exchanging the risk of some confusion and difficulty for the certainty of a long conflict from which, whatever its final outcome, we stand to gain nothing.

The first part of the pamphlet, in which the authors study their problem, discusses it upon the lines that the problem of the future government of India is an altogether exceptional issue, that its difficulties are immense, and that the responsibility for the decision as to the course of the future lies upon the British voter and his representatives in Parliament. They consider the present system, that has led up to the existing position, and they then explain the alternatives open to Parliament. They point out that without the co-operation of educated Indians "it would be a delusion to suppose that we could maintain the high standard of government we have always sought," and they examine the question of Indianisation, pointing out that many Indian members of the public services are at the same time convinced Nationalists and convinced Imperialists. Later they examine the White Paper scheme, which, on the whole, they approve. It is interesting to note that in their opinion it is improbable that if something like the White Paper proposal forms the basis of the new constitution for India, it will be generally boycotted, and they do not take too serious a view of the present attitude of the Indian Liberals or of the the Congress in denouncing the White Paper. They also discuss the Fiscal Autonomy convention and trade by consent, and underline the necessity for goodwill, in fiscal, economic, and commercial relations.

Part II of the pamphlet elaborates the survey of the steps taken to deal with the matter during the seven years of investigation, 1927-34, and the pamphleteers successfully retort upon those who have sneered at the membership of the Joint Select Committee as being unrepresentative, inexpert, and unreliable as their critics have so often described them. Part III is a symposium, entitled "The Problem from the Other End," by a number of distinguished writers, who have actually served or resided for long periods in India. General Sir William Heneker writes on the "Army," Sir

Alexander Gibb on "British Industry in India," Sir Maurice Hayward on "Justics," Sir James Crerar on "Law and Order," Sir Henry Lawrence on "Pensions," Sir Charles Stead on the "Police," Lord Goschen on "Provincial Autonomy," Sir Frederick Sykes, on "Rural Reconstruction," Sir Ernest Hotson on the "Services," Sir V. T. Krishnamachari on the "States and Federation," Sir Hugh M'Pherson on "Transport Departments," and Mrs. Whitehead, wife of the former Bishop of Madras, on the "Women of India." In so small a compass, and from this given point of view, it is difficult to imagine a better piece of work, and no doubt the Secretary of State for India will be grateful for this excellent piece of propaganda in favour of the official scheme, which is bound to be widely circulated by the Conservative Central Office in the constituencies where it is most badly needed.

ASIA AND THE LEAGUE

The accession to membership of the League and permanent membership of the Council of Soviet Russia is of the highest importance not only to Europe but to Asia as well, since Russia is, and is likely to be in the future still more, an Asiatic power of the highest consequence. Naturally, too, she has been very anxious that as many of her neighbours as possible should be within the framework of the League, since she had decided herself to enter it, and in consequence she as much as any other country has recommended the application of Afghanistan for election as a member of the League. It was therefore not left to H. H. the Aga Khan alone to express sentiments of gratification at this new accession of strength to Asiatic membership and influence. The consolidation of national life in India's North-Western neighbour has proceeded with rapid steps in recent years, and whilst the modernisation of Afghanistan has gone on at a slower pace since the end of Amanullah's regime, it will probably in the long run be found to have taken place all the more effectively, whilst her new membership of the League will give her an additional sense of security on all her borders. It is a little difficult to believe that in a comparatively short time Japan will have severed her membership, but if the League can maintain its prestige and can retain the respect of the nations by standing fast by fundamental principles, it may well be that Japan will, at a comparatively early date, deem it wise to reconsider her position, and may not in the long run leave the League, or may return to it sooner than is now imagined possible. It must not be forgotten that Japanese self-esteem has never quite recovered from the shock of the defeat of her motion for an amendment of the Covenant recognising racial equality. It is the sort of thing of which the British Empire elements, or some of them, have least cause to be proud of the part enacted

In the meanwhile the business of the League is still complicated by the fact that Germany is not participating in its activities, and that thereby the work of the Disarmament Commission is virtually at a standstill. Nor is it very likely that any substantial advance will be made upon the present situation until after the Saar Plebiscite that is to take place early next year, when the inhabitants will be called upon to exercise their option either to revert to Germany, to come within the French national system, or to remain as they are. In fact there are only two choices open to the Saarois, namely the he third, and the League will watch with anxiety the steps now being taken by the Saar International Commission for the effective policing of the territory, in order that a valid and real plebiscite may be held, in view of the fact that it is known that the Nazis are still on the war-path and may try

to secure by force, with the aid of dissident elements amongst the Saarois themselves, what they may not be able to secure by other methods. The recent attacks upon the Catholic Church in Germany, and the threats made against the Labour elements in the Saar, have not been first-class advertisements for the desirability of the territory coming under the National Socialist regime.

## Beriew.

# DIFFICULTIES OF PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM.

PARLIAMENT OR DICTATORSHIP? By the MARQUES OF LOTHIAN and others. (Methuen.) 1934. 18cm. 58p. 1/-

"Parliament or Dictatorship?" the first in the series known as "The Spectator Booklets", written by several writers, sums up within a short compass, the case for and against the parliamentary system of government. As is to be expected in a work of this kind, no attempt is made to foist any particular point of view on the reader. The purpose seems to be to acquaint the reader with the present-day difficulties confronting the parliamentary system of government and to enable him to arrive at his own conclusion as to the best way out of them. The Editor, who contributes the Introductory and the concluding chapters, however, feels that for the British people democracy is indissolubly linked with Parliament and that what the present situation demands is not the ending, but the mending, of Parliament.

Although the book is written by eight different writers representing various parties and schools of thought, they all agree (1) that the present parliamentary system is not working satisfactorily (Lord Lothian contends that all governments are working badly owing to international causes); (2) that successful governments must rest in the last resort on the consent of the governed; and (3) that a satisfactory executive must be strong, whether it is dependent on a Parliament or not.

Turning to the individual contributors to the volume, we find that the Master of Balliol sums up the case for democracy on an idealist and a realist basis. The idealist basis is a belief in the worth of personality and of different personalities. The realist argument is the familiar truth "Only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches."

In answering the question whether democracy has failed, Lord Lothian argues that democracy does not necessarily produce more efficient government, but that it produces better citizens. Humanity, he believes, has only progressed and flowered when the democratic spirit has been in the ascendent. Dictatorship only promises temporary stability and order in the trying circumstances of the time. A chief defect to which it is open is that it does not allow government to be conducted under guarantees of freedom of speech and criticism.

Major Yeats-Brown advocates the Corporate State of Fascism as an altenative to democracy. He contends that the Italian Fascism is more representative of the people than any modern democracy. We seriously question this view, as there is little or no freedom of speech and discussion under the fascist rule. The author holds that "Fascism gets things done and democracy doesn't." It may be said in retort that the burglar, too, "gets things done" although for his own selfish good. Major Yeats-Brown is much enamoured of the one-man rule in

industry and wants it to be adopted in the political field, too.

Mr. Sidebotham finds that tyranny in the Greek sense of the term is prevalent to-day and that parliamentary system may be consistent with the dictatorship of committees. Liberty to him does not express itself only through a parliament. Nevertheless, he believes that understanding men are the best counsellors. "Even parliamentary government would not be democratic if its members were bigots and not men of understanding; or if the tyranny of the party machine suppressed the honest expression of opinion; or if faction triumphed over common loyalty."

M. Andre Maurois who writes on "Democracy in France" says that in politics, as in literature and dress, there are fashions and that the fashion to-day is dictatorship. According to this writer, there does not seem to be much danger of democracy being overthrown in France. But even there, he says, it needs to adjust itself to changing conditions. "The fact that a country lives under parliamentary rule is no reason why it should refuse an individual leadership, for a defined purpose and a fixed period." To adjust democracy would not mean opening the door to dictatorship, but rather keeping dictatorship at arm's length."

Lord Eustace Percy and Sir Stafford Cripps advance interesting views on Parliament as it should be. Lord Percy's views are: (1) Parliament should make strong Prime Ministers who would be particularly free from the control of party caucus. (2) It ought not to be a talking shop, but should concern itself mainly with larger questions of policy. (3) Through its committees it should watch the administrative action particular departments, examine departments and regulations before issue, departmental tigate individual complaints and make representations to ministers. (4) An Economic Council should be constituted by Crown nomination, as nearly as possible representative, not of economic opinion, but of economic power. This body should be used by Government and Parliament mainly in the preparation of legislation. (5) A series of committees should be constituted for the same purpose within Parliament itself. (6) The Crown should be given the freedom to create life peers, and the House of Lords should have its full half share of the task of re-planning legislation.

Sir Stafford Cripps outlines "a pian whereby a party that has received a clear majority at the polls for a blank-cheque policy shall proceed to carry out a series of revolutionary measures by the simple procedure of Orders in Council, issued if need be without parliamentary discussion at all." The House of Commons should do the general planning and functional committees should supervise the legislative and administrative activities of the ministers.

The book as a whole is well-written and offers much food for thought and discussion.

E. ASIRVATHAM.

#### SHORT NOTICES.

THE POPULATION PROBLEM IN INDIA. BY P. K. WATTAL. (Bennet, Coleman & Co.,

Ltd., Bombay.) 1934. 20cm. 185p. Rs. 3-8-0. This is an interesting treatise on an important subject. The problem of population is connected with so many other factors like food supply, methods of sanitation and public health, the industrial progress of the country and last but not least, birth control. In spite of the importance that naturally sattaches to the problem, the time and attention devoted

to it are very meagre if not insignificant. The main facts about the population problem in India are the enormous growth of the population within the last few decades, the difficulties of adjusting the country's productive resources to this growth and the methods of controlling the growth so as to keep it within manageable limits. The author points out that statistics of births and deaths are very defective in India, which accounts for various discrepancies. Even from the statistics available some important conclusions can be drawn as such, for instance, that there is a close connection between early marriage and infant mortality, that maternal mortality is great owing to the low child-bearing age of the Indian girl, that fertility is in inverse ratio to the standard of living and intellectual development and so on. The author feels that there is a great need for the limitation of population in India and to that end that there is no alternative to contraceptive methods. Another method which Mr. Wattal advocates for the reduction of over-population in certain areas is inter-provincial migration and emigration to other countries, though he considers that the possibilities of the latter are very meagre inasmuch as the 'British dominions are practically all closed to Indian immigration.' He also finds that 'on abstract grounds there is no justification for a country relying on emigration as an outlet for its surplus population. The last chapter contains an analytical summary of the entire problem and the remedies that he considers useful in tackling it.

C. V. H.

NERJEE. (K. N. Chattrejee, 120/2, Upper Circular Road, Calcutta.) 1934. 20cm. 173 p. Rs. 3.

THOUGH a very readable book written in easy style giving the impressions of a tourist, there is nothing new in this book for the average student of Russian affairs. Its utility lies in this that it will serve as a very good handbook for those who do not have access to better books on the subject. The book is not a study of modern Russia in any sense of the term. The author touches on the same subject in different places, nonetheless the book is readable. The author's experience of the divorce and marriage courts, courts of trial and hotels should prove interesting reading. The book is well got up with a number of illustrations and fully maintains the reputation of the publishers. It may be mentioned in passing that the chapters in this book originally appeared in the Modern Review in instalments. The price is rather exorbitant for a poor country like India.

S. R. V.

MONCETON. (John Lane.) 1934. 22cm. 250p.

CAPTAIN MONCKTON was a Resident Magistrate in New Guinea during pre-War days. This book narrates his experiences and is a collection of many amusing and humorous stories of the lives of the savage people of the island. We are told that cannibalism, head-hunting and inter-tribal fighting still go on in the more remote parts of that land; but aeroplanes, motor-launches, wireless and regular steamship communications have vestly altered the country.

If the Government of India are going to explore the possibilities of Indian emigration to New Guinea, they will be well advised to recommend this book to their prospective explorers.

S. A. W.

# Misrellanea.

#### Mr. SASTRI ON INDIA'S GOAL.

Mr. Srinivasa Sastri addressed a crowded meeting at the Sir Cowasji Jehangir Hall in Bombay on October 8. The following report of his speech is extracted from the Times of India:

R. SASTRI made it clear at the outset that he did not mean to address them on any topic connected with the present electioneering campaign. He recalled the days when the country flattered itself on having unitedly boycotted the Simon Commission. When the Round Table Conference began, matters had gone a little further. Before even Sir John Simon had submitted his report, the then Viceroy, Lord Irwin, made the famous declaration on India's dominion status. The Simon Commission's report made no mention whatever of dominion status, although the Commission had plenty of time to alter the report. On the other hand, there was a good deal in it which would have negatived dominion status. When the Round Table Conference met in 1930, there was such a wave of popular agitation in the country that, much as his friends desired it, they found it

impossible to have Sir John Simon at the Round Table Conference. It looked as if the Conference began under very bright auspices, but as though to punish Indians for their elation, that state of things did not last long.

By the time the Round Table Conference reach-

ed its close, the clouds had begun to lower. The Conservative Party had seized the reins of power and the hopes of our first days in London were blasted, and the White Paper signalised the success of the opponents of Indian progress. Sir John Simon had been fully avenged. The chief feature of his report, which, on the whole, went against the idea of dominion status, was the claim that the military forces

in the land were partly an Imperial concern, and only partly Indian. That meant that at no time should India be able to take charge of her own defence. They had made no progress in the matter under the White Paper.

The military position stood exactly where it was. The declaration which now held the field merely promised that the army, the navy and the air force would increasingly be a subject of Indian concern. That was no definite promise. Again, according to the White Paper proposals, provincial autonomy would not reach even the level to which Sir John Simon would have taken it. They had lost ground even in that matter.

In regard to the question of federation and central responsibility, it was a mistake to think that under the White Paper Indians had gained a little over the promise held out in the Simon Commission's report, because the interval between the introduction of provincial autonomy and federation was indefinite. One could not be certain that even five or ten years hence the federation idea would take shape. The question of central responsibility was hedged with safeguards, so much so that some of them, disposed to be pessimistic, would even desire that the Simon Commission's report, which they had derided, might now with advantage take the place of the White Paper proposals.

Mr. Sastri said that dominion status was the subject of a solemn declaration by the Vicercy, who spoke with the authority of the Government of the day. Subsequently, the subject came up twice before Parliament, and on both occasions, almost without a division, the reports placed by the authorities of the R. T. C., which were based on Viceregal declarations, were accepted. The White Paper completely ignor-

ed the dominion status issue. "Our difficulty does not arise," he added, "solely from the unwillingness of the present dominant party in England to grant dominion status. It arises also from the backwardness and mismanagement of the Princes in India. Having given general support to the idea of dominion status, the Princes now proceed definitely to negative the idea."

Where then did the ideal of dominion status stand, asked the speaker. Could they hope to demolish their opponents' case, and go forward towards their political ideal? There were those to whom the first repulse amounted to a complete defeat. There were others who laid down their arms the moment they found that their adversaries were inconsistent. Mr. Sastri, however, was of a totally different opinion. "We wish to go forward until we get what in our opinion is not only our natural due, but what is according to the promise of the authorities our due. Our duty is to stand on this declaration of dominion status, to hold them down to it, and to allow no deductions and no side-issues of a hostile character that they might raise to deflect us from our straight path." They could not afford to be silent over the matter. They must take clear and unequivocal steps to see that what was promised was put in the bill. By that test alone should they examine every one of the promised measures, and if that test did not yield favourable results they must not hesitate a moment in denouncing it as a breach of faith.

There were some people, Mr. Sastri said, who would have all or nothing. Their argument was: "Fight on till you get the whole, lest the small should prove the enemy of the whole." This argument, formidable though it seemed, could be answered in the words of Mr. G. B. Shaw in reference to the Russian revolution. Although he had pronounced a favourable verdict on the revolution, he had said that it was an impressive illustration of the inevitability of gradualness. There were a great many things not yet attained in Russia, a great many things still wrong and misshaped. If that was what Russia got from the most advanced experiment in revolutionary methods, what could be said of other experiments of the kind attempted in India? Was it for them, with the state of disunity in the country and the lack of sound experience, to turn their backs upon graduated attainment of their goal? "Our march towards this goal must be intermittent and by stages. Sometimes we may even have to take a step or two backwards. Humanity has never moved forward and forward for ever." It might now and then be necessary to retrace a false step in order to make more secure that which seemed a little unstable or a little uncertain in its acquisition. "To me who saw the bright skies of 1930 the year 1934 brings sombre and heavy clouds. The sky is overcast, and we must account it a special favour of Providence indeed if before this day is over we begin to see the promise of a bright dawn. That is the position to-day.

Mr. Sastri gave illustrations of the futility of adopting a policy of "all or nothing," and said that even Mr. Gandhi during his South African campaign had to yield on the question of unrestricted migration of Indians to South Africa. If he had not done so, the entire Indian community in South Africa would have been driven out ignominiously. Time after time, in political struggles, with a strong, well-organised and somewhat hard-hearted Government, it was necessary for them to be wise in their day and be prepared for slow fulfilment, and occasionally even for failure of fulfilment. All or nothing would not do. It was not a workable policy in this miserable world.

Mr. Sastri's advice to the people was, therefore, to be patient but firm; to stand behind their states

men whenever they seemed to fall back for a little respite in the ceaseless struggle; and not for a moment to weaken their already weak hands and discourage their already drooping spirits.

Every one who had a moment to spare should, Mr. Sastri said, consider whether, apart from the unwillingness of the British, Indians had brought about all the circumstances favourable to independence. There was a good deal to do before they could ask for the highest. If they meant to serve their country in the extremely difficult situation with which they were now faced, only the best, the wisest, the strongest, the most self-sacrificing and patriotic among them must be at the centre shaping the affairs of the country. They could not, in political agitation, afford to retire in a huff and allow responsible posts in the country to be taken up by those who unfortunately did not have national interests at heart.

#### Mr. SASTRI AND CONGRESS REFORM.

On the morning of the 4th inst. Mr. Sastri addressed a meeting held under the auspices of the Young Men's Hindu Association in Bombay. The following report of his speech is borrowed from the Times of India:

THE recent statement of Mr. Gandhi seeking to amend the Congress constitution and enforce stringent rules on Congressmen was fantastic and misconceived and calculated to close the door of the Congress upon thousands of thinking men.

Mr. Sastri said that the substitution of the words "truthful and non-violent" in place of the existing adjectives "legitimate and peaceful" in the Congress creed would lay upon the ordinary Congressman an obligation of a moral character which he would not be able to discharge, however high-principled he might be. "If each Congressman has to take a vow to be truthful and non-violent in thought, word and deed, we may have to establish confessionals in every street and every one of us should assume the role of censor or a sort of sleepless constable prying not only on the deeds but on the speech and thoughts of our neighbour.

The institution of the spinning franchise would promote hypocrisy rather than minimise it and the proposals were so misconceived that they were bound to defeat the object aimed at, creating instead a body of morbid men who would be weighed down by the consciousness that they were violating the vows which, they knew, they could not carry out.

In the course of his speech, Mr. Sastri said that although Mr. Gandhi's recent statement did not concern him individually, it had aroused wide public interest as it affected the future of the Congress. The

Indian National Congress, he said, was not a religious organisation meant for the purification of the character of its members. It was primarily a political body. The change sought by Mr. Gandhi in the Congress creed regarding the substitution of the words "truthful and non-violent" seemed to the speaker to demand a very high standard of moral character from the members of the Congress. If a man was capable of attaining non-violence in word, thought and deed, he would be entitled to the highest reverence. But it would be wrong to foist these standards on ordinary men, and even if they were made to take such vows they would find ways of disobeying them.

A wise law-maker would make the laws gentle and easy and such as to command the assent of the people. It was not also an easy thing to be truthful. One could not help being untruthful the moment one began to speak. Such was the complexity of this world, such was the difficulty of the doctrine of truth psychologically and morally, that it was a sober fact that every one of them made statements which were variations, half variations or fractional variations of the truth.

As regards the spinning franchise, Mr. Gandhi himself had admitted that from the very beginning this was not observed by Congressmen. This rule was laid down, because Mr. Gandhi wished it. The rule had been violated throughout and its stringent application would only promote hypocrisy. In the opinion of the speaker it was fantastic to suggest that a man who wanted to serve his country and assist in its material welfare and political growth should be compelled to turn the spinning wheel. He could not understand it. Mr. Gandhi himself did not understand it for a long time. He sat down at a place and thought and thought and thought and evolved the idea that the spinning wheel was the only living common bond by which the richer classes could recognise the poor classes as belonging to their own species. There were so many other things which could bind humanity besides the spinning wheel.

In conclusion, Mr. Sastri said: "You may ask me why I have feelingly criticised Mr. Gandhi's statement. Supposing tomorrow I forsake my Liberal principles and, finding that there is a call in the country for united action, I make up my mind to join the Congress, will it be possible for me to do so? Now if the Congress wants to represent as large a number of Indians as possible, it ought to make its rules such that a sincere patriot would find it possible to offer his allegiance to it. It is not proper that an organisation for the political development of the country should close its doors upon thousands of thinking men of high quality and great willingness to serve the country by inventing all sorts of fantastic tests."

## CONGRESS AND THE STATES.

WHAT DO THE STATES' PEOPLE WANT OF THE CONGRESS?

In connection with the celebration of the Indian States' People's Week now in progress in the Deccan, the following manifesto signed by the Indian States' people has been issued:

N his speeches at the Round Table Conference Mahatma Gandhi, as the sole delegate of the Indian National Congress, gave a free hand to the Princes in such important matters as the States' representation in the federal legislature and the placing of the fundamental rights of the States' su bjects under the guarantee of the federal constitution. At

any rate his speeches are capable of such an interpretation.

It is the unanimous wish of all the States' people that election of the States' representatives and the insertion of a Declaration of Rights in the federal constitution for the States' people should, among other things, be essential conditions of an all-India federation.

They are absolutely necessary in the interest of the States' people, but we are firmly convinced that they are equally necessary in the interest of the people of British India also. In their absence, what would be established in India, even if the British Gevernment surrendered all the power it now possesses in respect of British India, would be a government still under the control of the British Government though the control would be exercised behind the screen of the Princes; and if the British Government surrendered, in respect of the States also, the power now exercised by it as the Paramount Power, an obligarchy would be established. But in no case would be established the democratic self-government that British Indians as well as the people in the Indian States aspire to.

In this connexion it must be remembered that, under the White Paper proposals, no amendment in the federal constitution will take effect in any State unless that State agrees to it individually, however large be the majority by which the amendment may be passed in the federal legislature. Such a provision reduces the federal legislature, in so far as the States are concerned, to the position of an organ of consultation, like the League of Nations, instead of being an organ of government, as a legislature should be. In the League "the ultimate decision in every case of a dispute rests, not with the whole community, but with the individual State," and this is considered a serious defect even in such an organisation as the League. But no constitution known to history gives to a unit of federation the option either of putting into force or of not putting into force, in its own jurisdiction, an amendment adopted by the federal legislatrue by a certain majority. If this option is allowed, as is proposed in our constitution, it will be impossible for all time to enforce in every State. as must be our ideal, to take but one instance, the replacement of nomination, should it be allowed in the initial stage, by election of the people's representatives. Whatever provisions are vitally essential in a self-governing constitution of a democratic character must therefore be inserted into our constitution at the start.

Fortunately, however, it is not necessary at the present moment to set out in detail what such provisions are from the point of view of the States' people. For the Congress has already adopted the principle of self-determination in regard to constitution-making by announcing its intention to set up a constituent assembly for drafting the future constitution of India. The assembly will consist, as to British India, of representatives of the people elected on the basis of universal suffrage or on a suffrage closely approximating to it. These representatives will be the sole spokesmen of British India. The Congress has not yet made clear, however, who will be the spokesmen in the assembly of the Indian States, whether nominees of the rulers or representatives of the people elected in the same way as in British India. It is of the utmost necessity for the Congress to state clearly that the States' people will be admitted to the constituent assembly on the same footing as British Indians and will enjoy the same rights and privileges, and that therefore an essential condition of a federation being accepted by the Congress must be that the representatives of British India on the one hand and the States on the other agree to its terms.

Further, it is equally necessary that the Congress should declare that the affairs of the Indian States lie within its competence as much as those of British India and that it is its bounden duty to carry on a struggle for the attainment of political freedom in both parts of India, since it already has on its rolls members from the Indian States as well as from British India and has already utilised on an

extensive scale its Indian States' members in its British Indian agitation. To put this matter beyond the possibility of doubt the creed of the Congress should be altered as follows:—

"The object of the Indian National Congress is attainment of Swarajya (complete independence) by the people of India including the people of the Indian States, by all peaceful and legitimate means",

the alteration merely consisting in addition of the italised words to the creed as it stands at present.

#### DRAFT RESOLUTION.

The following Draft Resolution has been recommended for adoption at meetings of the States' people in connection with the celebration of the Week.

This meeting of the people in the
State resolves that, at its ensuing session, the
Indian National Congress declare, in unambiguous
terms,

- 1. That the proposals for constitutional reform embodied in the . White Paper are unacceptable to the Congress on the ground, among others, that they are unacceptable to the people of the States in general;
- 2. That a federal constitution will be accepted by the Congress only if it provides for (a) the election of the States' representatives in the federal legislature and for (b) a guarantee of the fundamental rights of the States' people in the federal constitution, and (c) if it imposes upon all the acceding States the obligation of accepting constitutional amendments passed in the federal legislature by a certain specified majority;
- 3. That the States' people will be given on the constituent assembly an equal place with British Indians and an equal share with them in the task of constitution-making that will be assigned to the assembly; that, in other words, the principle of self-determination will be applied to the States in the same manner as to British India;
- 4. That the Congress will accept no federation, to the terms of which the representatives on the constituent assembly of British India on the one-hand and of the Indian States on the other do not agree; and
- 5. That it is the object of the Congress, representing as it does the people of the Indian States as well as of British India, to attain swaraj for the people of the whole of India, including the people of the States and that it is the moral duty of British Indian members of the Congress to give active assistance in the establishment of popular government in these States as the members have sought and received similar assistance from members of the Congress drawn from the States in their struggle for the establishment of popular government in British India.

#### BOOKS RECEIVED.

FROM WRONG ANGLES. By GAGANVIHARI MEHTA (Author, 70 A, Chakrabare Road-North, Calcutta.) 1934. 21cm. 181p. Re. 1/8.

THE PROBLEM OF RURAL INDEBTEDNESS. By P. J. THOMAS. (The Diocesan Press, Vepery, Madras.) 1934.