

The Servant of India

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Topics of the Week.

The All-India Political Conference.

THE exploration of the possibilities of joint action by different political parties with a view to bringing pressure to bear on Government for the improvement of the proffered political advance which was set afoot in Bombay last month has resulted, as our readers are aware, in a decision to hold an All-India Conference. The organisers have not yet been able to secure a suitable person to preside over it; but there is reason to believe that Mr. Jinnah may be persuaded to guide the deliberations of the Conference. In this case the lead which the Conference will receive from its president may be trusted to be more radical than if any other Indian politician had been occupying the presidential chair. For it is well known that Mr. Jinnah is strongly opposed to the constitutional scheme which is at present being hammered out in London. In fact he looks upon it as nothing short of an attempt to bamboozle the Indian public. It may very well be that holding the views he does about the White Paper he may frankly advise the Conference to reject the constitutional proposals. This would no doubt gladden the hearts of a certain section of our publicists who stand for an abandonment of the White Paper scheme; but will this course of action be feasible and, what is of far greater consequence, conducive to India's interest? In his recent Calicut speech Mr. Kunzru seems to have dealt with this point at some length. He pointed out that while public opinion is united in branding the White Paper as unsatisfactory, disappointing, and inadequate inasmuch as it fails to transfer real power to the people, there is no power in their hands "to compel the British Government to drop the measure." Even supposing it was dropped, it would not, he remarked, achieve our object which is to obtain swaraj at the earliest possible date. Proceeding, he said:

"Our progress would depend entirely on the unity that exists among us. Let us also consider whether we are not also responsible for the situation due to the difference that exists among different races, the difference between the Hindus and Musselmans, between one class of Hindus and another, and the difference between the subjects of British India and Indian States. If we would like to achieve freedom, if we wish to raise our heads among the other nations of the world then we must create a sense of national consciousness amongst the people. We must also forget our own little differences and should work for the achievement of full Dominion Status."

But to go back to the Conference. If owing to the limited objective of the Conference of suggesting essential modifications to the proffered constitution Mr. Jinnah should refrain from exhorting it to reject the White Paper scheme lock, stock and barrel, but content himself with making suggestions for its improvement, will his suggestions receive greater consideration from the Government than have, e. g., those which have proceeded from quarters avowedly friendly to the scheme? Will not the amendments he or the Conference under his guidance may put forward stand every chance of being unceremoniously brushed aside as proceeding from a hostile quarter and not meriting consideration? But whether the Government are disposed to profit by the doings of the Conference or not, there is no gainsaying the fact that its educative value is a priceless asset. When should it be held?

WHEN should the Conference be held—before or after the publication of the Joint Select Committee's report? Commonsense seems to dictate the adoption of the latter course. During the ten months that the White Paper has been before the country, it is no exaggeration to say that it has been discussed threadbare. The Conference will therefore have hardly anything to say about it which has not already been said and said a hundred and one times. In these circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of money and human energy for the Conference to tread on ground already traversed. On the other hand, if it met to consider the recommendations of the Linlithgow Committee, it would be called upon to deal with living realities instead of being engaged in the futile task of flogging what is at this distance of time a dead horse, viz. the White Paper. Even if the Conference met earlier, next month as seems to be proposed, it will not dispense with the necessity of its being assembled together for the purpose of passing its considered verdict on the Linlithgow report. If it should not do so, it would lay itself open to the charge of having failed in the performance of a manifest duty.

That the other parties in the country are no longer thinking in terms of the White Paper but of the Joint Select Committee's report is obvious from

the resolution passed by the National Liberal Federation of India on the subject of common action. This resolution authorises the Federation's Council to join hands with other parties in fighting the new constitution only after the Joint Committee has reported.

It is said in justification of an earlier session of the Conference that its proceedings may be able to influence the decisions of the Committee itself. Everybody knows that the Committee has been fully and authoritatively placed in possession of India's reaction to the White Paper by the Indian delegates who collaborated with it. If its recommendations now fail to come up to our expectations, it cannot be for want of knowledge on its part of the Indian view of the White Paper. Would it not be more prudent therefore for the organisers to conserve their energies for a determined onslaught on the report of the Select Committee? This would be a more practical and perhaps more fruitful proceeding. Incidentally a later Conference gives the organisers greater time to ensure its success. We do not know what the plans of the president-elect may be: but surely in national interest it should be easy enough to induce him to extend his stay in this country by a few weeks.

Condition for Congressmen's Co-operation.

THE attitude of the Congress towards this plan of common action has so far remained a mystery. But in a recent press interview Dr. Mahmud, ex-General Secretary of the Congress, lifts the veil sufficiently for us to have an idea as to how Congressmen view the idea. For one thing they are afraid that their participation in such a plan may lead to a further division in national ranks; and for another it is their experience that any condemnation of the White Paper by non-Congressmen is invariably accompanied, if indeed it is not preceded, by an equally strong condemnation of the civil disobedience movement, in other words indirectly of the Congress itself, so that Congressmen have to prepare themselves for such rebuke as a preliminary to making common cause with other parties. So far as the proposed Conference goes, however, Dr. Mahmud's apprehensions appear to be perfectly groundless, for it will deal only with the constitutional question and not with the political situation in general. Any fear of the Congress coming in for censure at the hands of the Conference is thus effectively ruled out. If the Conference were to concern itself with the apportionment of blame for the present political stalemate, Dr. Mahmud's fear may have had some excuse. But that is no part of the Conference's task. Why should then Congressmen have any scruples in lending a helping hand in making the Conference a success? Dr. Mahmud's reply does not mince words on the point. He said:

"The Congress will be glad to take part in any common action, provided there is general and sweeping condemnation of the White Paper scheme. But if it is intended to criticise it clause by clause, with a view to effecting some slight alterations and improvements here and there, the Congress cannot naturally be party to such a condemnation."

Though it is common knowledge that hardly any of the Conference promoters would be in the least sorry if the White Paper scheme was dropped, it is really asking too much of them to expect them to commit themselves as also the Conference, in advance, to a definite course of action. It is for the Conference itself to decide what view to express about the White Paper. No body of individuals, however eminent, can usurp that right which is legitimately that of the Conference itself. Its object has been clearly

defined. It is two-fold: (1) to make it clear to the Government that the White Paper does not satisfy the people of this country and (2) to suggest essential modifications in it. This aim is sufficiently comprehensive for the needs of any Congressman.

Mr. Jayakars' Misgivings.

WHILE details regarding the All-India Conference are being discussed in the country, like the time when it should be held and the president under whose guidance it should meet, Mr. Jayakar in the interview given by him on his return after the completion of arduous labours in London, has raised doubts about the advisability of the Conference itself. His main points are two: first, that the Conference must be representative not only of nationalists but of communalists and that it must arrive at agreed conclusions. If it does not fulfil these conditions, he would rather not summon the Conference. Any diversity of views that may be disclosed at such a Conference would, he fears, only mar the exceedingly favourable impression that has been formed in England by the presentation of a Joint Memorandum subscribed to by communalists as well as nationalists. The conditions that Mr. Jayakar lays down imply that the Conference must not attempt to go beyond the Joint Memorandum, for if it does either the communalists at the Conference or the nationalist members of the British Indian delegation will object and a difference of opinion will arise. If unanimity at the Conference is a *sine qua non*, all demands not included in the Joint Memorandum will have to be left out. But this will militate against the intention of the promoters of the Conference to include Congressmen and States' people among the invitees; for it is very likely these will press for demands which were not included in the Joint Memorandum. We are thus in a dilemma. If we want to ensure unity, we cannot make the Conference fully representative; we must cut out either the Congress or the communalists. If we want to make a demonstration of progressive thought, we must be prepared to go beyond the Joint Memorandum. But we do not believe that we can resolve this dilemma only by dropping the Conference. That would be a great pity and would be a proof that unity did not prevail in India. Will it not be possible to let the Conference pass resolutions going farther than the Joint Memorandum, if such is the decision of a Conference representative of all sections of opinion, leaving it to the authors of the Memorandum to explain to the British Government that absolute unanimity obtains in India so far as the demands in the Memorandum are concerned and that large sections of opinion ask for even larger reforms? If Indian delegates at the Round Table Conference will not look upon the demand for larger reforms as a reflection upon themselves but will use them to reinforce the demands that they have made, then there should be no harm in having a really representative Conference and allowing it to adopt a far-reaching programme.

Elective Representation in States.

IN the leading article of last week it was said that the Sapru Memorandum made no demands upon the Princes and that all its demands were addressed to the British Government. This is true enough as a general statement, but to the memorandum are appended certain reservations, one of which, by Mr. N. M. Joshi, is as follows on the subject of elective representation in the States:—

As a matter cognate to the main subject of these notes, I suggest that, without doing any violence to the sovereignty of the Rulers of Indian States, recognition of the

principle that their representation in the Federal Legislature should be popular or representative of the people should be secured. If this is done through the Treaties of Accession no violation of sovereignty is involved, as these treaties will provide for voluntary surrender of some sovereignty on the part of the Rulers of Indian States for the purposes of the Federation.

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Need for help to Indian Women's University.

IN a recent issue we drew attention to the attempt originated by the Bharat Sneha Samvardhak Mandal of Bombay to organise a collection in aid of the Indian Women's University with which Prof. Karve's name will for ever remain indissolubly associated. The institution is now in great financial distress owing to causes which are too well known to need any mention and stands badly in need of financial assistance if its work is not to suffer any contraction. A committee of influential Bombay citizens representing all communities and classes with Dr. Mrs. Malinibai Sukhtankar as President is at present busily engaged in enlisting the practical sympathy of the generous public of Bombay City and is being very assiduously helped in its none too easy a task by the workers of the Mandal. The idea is to push on the collection with vigour and to hand over to Prof. Karve whatever funds are collected between now and April 18th next, which is his 76th birthday, and of course no effort is being spared to garner as rich a harvest as possible. The present difficult times no doubt do not encourage the hope that the proposed collection will be on as high a scale as the importance of the cause or the great name with which it is associated merits; and the Committee, too, to judge from its appeal, is under no delusion on the point. Whatever that be, it is unthinkable that the well-known philanthropic spirit of Bombay which has stood many a public cause in such good stead will refuse to come to the rescue of an institution which, instead of treading the beaten track, has chalked out a line of its own in the field of female education.

* * *

Rural Health in Madras.

IT appears from the Public Health report of Madras for 1932 that the registration of vital statistics, especially in rural parts, is still as unsatisfactory as ever. Considerable improvement is no doubt noticeable in the bigger towns; but so far as the rural towns are concerned, the problem is very far from solution. In a large number of these the rates of birth and deaths recorded during the year were so abnormally low that the matter could not well escape attention. The phenomenon was, with perfect unconcern, ascribed by district officials to natural causes, though why these natural causes should work unnaturally only in some parts and not in others was a matter which could not be as easily disposed of. The real cause was, it need hardly be stated, defective registration. This is conclusively shown by the fact mentioned in the Government resolution itself of as many as 63,000 unregistered births and 19,000 unregistered deaths being brought to light by the staff of the Public Health Department. Even so the registration of vital statistics is said to be more efficiently done in Madras than in any other Indian province! If even with such admittedly unsatisfactory registration Madras can carry the palm, the state of affairs in other provinces can be easily imagined. The real remedy is the willing co-operation of public opinion with the registering authorities, which will be forthcoming only in proportion as education advances. In the meantime an improvement in the situation may be expected as a result of the employment by rural local bodies

of sanitary inspectors who, besides their usual sanitary duties, may be held responsible for the proper registration of any additions to or subtractions from the local population. The experiment seems to have been tried in one panchayat area apparently with excellent results and there is no reason to suppose that it will not be attended with equally satisfactory consequences elsewhere.

How is the problem of rural sanitation being tackled? On this point the report furnishes much useful information which is valuable to all those who take any interest in the problem of village uplift. As elsewhere, the supply of pure drinking water and latrines is a crying need. Latrines have been found to be an important means of controlling the spread of the hook-worm infection and it is in the fitness of things that Panchayats are being encouraged to spend more and more on the provision of latrines with a view to the prevention of the indiscriminate pollution of the soil. The Village Improvement Fund constituted under the District Local Boards Act has been found to be greatly helpful in the promotion of such activities. It is seen from the report that in 1932, 1884 bore-hole latrines were constructed and 66 were either reconstructed or repaired. It may be added that these figures do not include the considerable number for which municipalities and local boards made themselves responsible. Squatting slabs are also supplied to house-owners gratis in order to encourage them to build latrines for themselves in their houses. Improvements in the bore-hole latrine with a view to its adaptation for public use are being considered.

* * *

Problem of Illicit Distillation in Punjab.

THE general tendency of provincial excise administration reports is in the direction of exaggerating the extent of the evil of illicit distillation. The Punjab report published during the last few days is no exception to the rule. While no normal person can at all object to measures designed to put a stop to such irregular practices, these cannot at the same time be allowed to be used as an excuse for action on the part of the authorities which is calculated to encourage the spread of the drinking habit. It is not intended to imply that this is what is immediately contemplated; but if all these official attempts to magnify the evil are designed with that end in view, the object is bound to arouse strong public resentment.

The Government resolution on the report piteously describes the handicaps under which the Government labour in fighting this evil. The producer of illicit liquor sells the article at such a low price that Government finds it difficult to compete with him. And even if they could do so, their policy of doing nothing to popularise the consumption of alcohol forbids such action. If on the other hand they decide to cut the ground from under the feet of the illicit distiller by the starting of new shops in areas in which the evil is specially rampant, vendors are not readily available on account of their unwillingness to risk their capital in competition with a long established illicit trade. But apparently this difficulty is not as serious as the Punjab Government would have us believe. For the same resolution also informs us that the Government were going ahead with their policy of opening new shops. Only care was taken to restrict it to villages believed to serve as dumping ground for the illicit produce and to work the shops in a manner which, while reducing the gains of the illicit trade, would not encourage drinking. It is to be hoped that this last requirement will be ineffaceably impressed on the minds of the excise staff.

Articles.

THE INDO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT.

AFTER extremely protracted negotiations the Indian and Japanese trade delegations finally reached an agreement, which was formally announced last week. The agreement, it may be said at once, is from the point of view of India a satisfactory one. In the main a cotton trade agreement, it contains initially certain general provisions. The most-favoured-nation treatment is accorded reciprocally to each other's goods by the two countries and both the countries agree to enter into negotiations if it is represented that the trade interests of any one country are adversely affected by the customs duties imposed by the other. India reserves to itself the right to impose special duties on Japanese goods in order to correct the effect of exchange fluctuations and Japan is conceded a similar right in case the rupee-yen exchange moves beyond a certain point. Subject to these general clauses the rates of duty on Japanese piecegoods are fixed at 50 p. c. ad-valorem with an alternative specific duty 5 annas per lb. on greys. The agreement is to run for a period of three years and it is satisfactory to have arrived at a general friendly understanding with a country with which we have such important trade relations.

The main part of the agreement, and the one that obviously took the longest time to settle, concerns the import and export quotas. Unlike other bilateral treaties which have been negotiated by various countries lately, the Indo-Japanese agreement had to deal with only one commodity on each side. The imports and exports of these two commodities have, therefore, been directly connected with each other. From the Indian cultivator's point of view it was absolutely vital that now that the question had been opened up, a minimum normal purchase of Indian raw cotton by Japan should be provided for. The agreement fixes the norms at Japanese imports of one million bales of Indian raw cotton and Indian imports of 325 million yards of Japanese piecegoods. For purposes of calculating the raw cotton quota, the year taken is the calendar year; while the piecegoods quota is to be calculated according to the fiscal year. This will make it possible to adjust the piecegoods quota to the Japanese takings of raw cotton in each year. If the Japanese purchases of raw cotton fall below one million bales the piecegoods imports quota will be decreased in a certain proportion; if they rise above this level the basic quota of piecegoods imports will be increased, so that at one and a half million bales it will stand at 400 million yards. The 400 million yards level is, however, in no case to be exceeded and any purchases by Japan of Indian raw cotton in excess of one and half a million bales will be credited for purposes of quota calculation to the next year. The piecegoods quota is further subdivided into four classes—plain greys, bordered greys, bleached, co-

lowed and others—which are allotted definite percentages of the total; and these percentages can be altered as between the various classes only within very narrow limits.

Clearly the negotiations have achieved all that could have been reasonably expected of them. The terms of the agreement are such as to encourage Japan to purchase a maximum amount of Indian raw cotton. The average annual purchases by Japan of Indian cotton for the three years ending 1930-31 were a little above 1.5 million bales and the figure of the upper limit, 1.5, in the agreement, does not, therefore, seem to be low, as for the next three years. There is little doubt that this makes the position of the cotton-grower much more secure than before. There is also nothing to complain of from the point of view of the Indian cotton industry in respect of the quota of Japanese piecegoods imports and its classification. Indeed we are at a loss to comprehend why the upper limit has been so rigidly fixed at 400 million yards. The imports of foreign cloth into India for the three years ending 1930-31 were on an average annually 1600 million yards, of which the Japanese share was 500 million yards. It is true that lately there has been a considerable increase in home production; but this was brought about by a series of extraordinary circumstances and it is not known what part of it is to be reckoned as a permanent economic addition to the home output. Cloth consumption has again of late years been particularly low and may be expected to revive immediately after trade begins to look up. Thus after a duty to the extent of 50 p. c. had been imposed on Japanese goods, it is difficult to understand why a rigid upper limit at a fairly low level was imposed on Japanese imports of piecegoods.

Another feature of the agreement that is not easily explained is the detailed classification of the quota and the percentages allotted to the various classes. Why was it thought necessary that the quota be split up in smaller classes? Was this done to minimise further the competition of Japanese imports with Indian mill production? But this explanation does not hold good because the specially reduced percentages are for classes of goods which are not produced on any large scale in India. Take the instance of bleached goods, in particular. The percentage allotted to this class is only 8. Thus at the maximum only 32 million yards of Japanese bleached goods could be imported in a year into India. We have no separate statistics of the production of bleached goods in India, but it is known that this production is very small. This is one of those branches of trade which have been the least affected in the post-war decade, and this was until about five years ago an exclusive preserve of Lancashire. Lately Japanese imports of these goods have been increasing by leaps and bounds. They stood in 1931-32 and 1932-33 at 60 and 120 million yards respectively. It is not known why in the case of bleached goods there has been such a drastic restriction of imports, especially as in the important class of greys in which Japanese competition is chiefly felt by the Indian industry; the allotment of the percentage quota does not work out

at much below the average of the last few years' imports. Apparently at least it would seem as if the class percentages were fixed more with a view to minimise competition with Lancashire imports than to afford protection to the Indian industry.

Now that the Indo-Japanese negotiations have been satisfactorily terminated we hope that Government will at the earliest opportunity proceed to deal effectively with the question of the reorganisation of the Indian cotton industry. The first step in this

direction would be the publication of the report of the Tariff Board which was submitted to Government nearly a year ago. It is absolutely necessary that the public is put in possession of all the relevant facts; and that Government does not make up its mind on the question without consulting public opinion. At first thought at least, the measure of protection indicated in the Indo-Japanese agreement — 50 p. c. exclusive of exchange fluctuation additions — seems to us to be very excessive.

BINDING THE FUTURE.

I.

IT would be a disastrous mistake on the part of the promoters of the All-Party Conference if they were to limit the "essential modifications" which it is their object to suggest in the White Paper proposals to those embodied in the Joint Memorandum of the British Indian delegation or in the Memorandum of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. Public opinion goes far beyond these, but the excuse for putting a limitation on them would be that our demands must be such as are acceptable even to the most backward among the progressive groups. Such an excuse seems plausible enough in a conference intended to bring about unity of views and action, but it would be quite unpardonable for any responsible body of politicians to put forward demands intended to secure a larger measure of power from the British Government, while side-stepping or evading issues of no less importance connected with the States as these memoranda do. Even assuming that the demands contained in these memoranda are conceded — and no one in his senses entertains such an illusion — even then, if the rulers of Indian States are allowed to hold all the power which the White Paper proposes to confer upon them, an oligarchy would be established in India, a result which is certainly not desired by our people. The Liberal Party has seen this danger and has very wisely pointed out at its recent session the serious defects that disfigure the White Paper, as well on the side of the States as on that of the British Government. And is it to be contended that the Liberal Party is not supported by public opinion in thus tackling the problem in its twofold aspect? Leave aside a few notabilities who have acquired a certain amount of prominence in the recent constitutional discussions, and the whole country stands as one man in insisting upon a full measure both of self-government and popular government. A demand for elective representation and similar other changes in the States is therefore a demand which is well worth being included in its "essential modifications" by an All-Party Conference, if, that is to say, its purpose is to mend the White Paper instead of ending it. Indeed such a demand is required if the object of the Conference is to be attained, viz. a mobilisation of national opinion and an integration of the collective will and conscience of the people.

It is surely superfluous at this time of day to

enlarge upon the desirability of democratic as opposed to oligarchic self-government, but there is one consideration which will appear to all reasonable persons as conclusive against the possibility of yielding to the Princes. It consists in the fact that by far the largest body of opinion in India, viz. the Congress, is against such yielding, as is clear from the message sent by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to the Rajputana States' People's Convention.

Recent events in India and England have made it clear that all the reactionary forces — British and Indian — are combining together to prevent or delay the freedom of the Indian people. These forces have tried to suppress our freedom movement and the White Paper is an attempt to consolidate the hold of all these vested interests. Nothing is more significant than the utterly reactionary attitude of the Indian Princes and the backing it received from the Government.

It is probable that free India will be a federation but it is quite certain that nothing even remotely resembling freedom can come out of the federation that has been suggested in the White Paper. This proposed federation is merely meant to prevent India's growth and enchain her still further to feudal and out-of-date systems. It is quite impossible to progress from this federation to freedom without breaking the federation to pieces.

It seems to me, therefore, that all of us, whether in the Indian States or the rest of India, must appreciate this position clearly and realise that our only course is to reject utterly any such bogus federation. We must stick to the completest form of independence, which means complete absence of foreign control as well as a fully democratic form of government. The Indian States system, as it exists today, must go root and branch.

At one time the Congress attitude on the subject of Indian States was doubtful on account of Mahatma Gandhi being overtender to the Princes. Even then indications were forthcoming that the view propounded by him at the second Round Table Conference in the name of the Congress was repudiated by the average Congressman; but now that Pandit Nehru has spoken, and spoken in such decisive terms, there cannot be a shadow of doubt that the Congress will hold fast, not only while the Mahatma is out of politics, but even after his re-entry into it, to this more radical view. The Congress will be wholly uncompromising to the Princes as it will be to the British Government, and it will reject the White Paper *incontinenti* on the score of the States' terms alone, even if otherwise it were entirely satisfactory. This decision, I know, will be considered very unwise by a large number of politicians, but whether they like it or not, it is one with which they will have to reckon. And what, in face of such a deci-

sion, final and definitive as it is, should be their own attitude towards bringing the federation immediately into being? They ought to insist that the federal plan be dropped. It may be the best plan imaginable, but even so, they must refuse to lend any help in putting it into force. Our federation, if it comes about, will be a compact, and a permanent compact, between British India and the Indian States, and if the people of both reject it, or even have misgivings about it, it must go—for the time being at any rate. The treaty of federation, being of an irrevocable nature, must be a free-will covenant between the peoples concerned, and since the present federal scheme is as nearly as possible the reverse of this, there is no help for it but to abandon it, most regretfully if you please. It will of course be quite possible, in the present state of Indian politics, to impose a federal constitution by force upon the country, in spite of the united opposition of the States' people and of large sections of British Indians. But the only result of it will be that for many a long day the Congress and similar other bodies will be engaged in smashing this forced federation, and as a consequence chaos and anarchy will prevail in the land. For this result those Indian politicians who want to press on with federation, even though it does not meet with general acceptance, will have to share responsibility with the British Government.

II.

The most striking instance in recent history of the spirit of revolt generated in a people by dragooning them into a constitution of a cast-iron character is afforded by Ireland. Great Britain first compelled the Irish people in 1922 to enter into a treaty in which she secured for herself all that she cared for, and then gave such freedom to Ireland as was consistent with the provisions of the treaty. The whole of Ireland's future political development was limited by the terms of the treaty, for Article 2 of the Irish Free State's Constitution Act says: "If any provision of the said Constitution or of any amendment thereof or of any law made thereunder is in any respect repugnant to any of the provisions of the Scheduled Treaty, it shall, to the extent only of such repugnancy, be absolutely void and inoperative, and the Parliament and the Executive Council of the Irish Free State shall respectively pass such further legislation and do all such other things as may be necessary to supplement the Scheduled Treaty." The constitution was thus made subordinate to the treaty for all time, and since the treaty could be modified only by mutual agreement, it was, in the opinion of the Irish, a perpetual barrier to the full growth of the constitution. And what were the "limitations and fetters" (to use the late Mr. Asquith's words) which were put upon Ireland's political power in the treaty? First, by imposing an oath upon members of her Parliament—an oath, as Mr. Churchill admitted, "far more precise and searching than the ordinary oath which is taken elsewhere"—her allegiance to the Crown and membership of the Empire were secured. Secondly, the army which she could use for keeping internal order was limited to something like 40,000, care

being taken, again to quote Mr. Churchill, that "any force which is raised by Ireland will not be a force beyond the military power of the British Empire to control." Thirdly, it was provided that in case of war Great Britain should have free access to all the Irish harbours and creeks. So far as the security of the British was concerned, therefore, every possible precaution was taken, and in the famous phrase of Mr. Lloyd George who was then Prime Minister, "nothing was left to chance."

What more could British statesmen do? They inserted into the treaty, while giving Ireland dominion status, all the safeguards they could think of, such as were not imposed upon any other dominion, and further they took steps to bind the future to the extent to which it is humanly possible to do so, so that even if other dominions grew in status and power, Ireland could not do so beyond the limits set by the treaty—unless Great Britain allowed her to grow. The Statute of Westminster, for instance, which enlarged the bounds of freedom for other dominions, was of no avail to Ireland, in so far as relaxation of any of the reservations contained in the treaty was concerned. For instance, other dominions could withdraw from the Empire, but Ireland was chained to it permanently. One would think, therefore, that England had done all that any country could do to secure herself against any possible danger from her mutinous neighbour. Events have proved on the contrary that the danger from that quarter has now grown enormously, just because England forced a treaty upon Ireland and sought to confine her future development within its limits. England thought she had bound Irishmen by shackles of forged steel, but Irishmen are breaking them now as if they were a frayed cotton thread. If the treaty were a voluntary agreement, Irishmen would have given it a willing obedience; but as it was against the general wishes, they have been using all their wits to find out a hundred different ways in which to burst its bonds. It is true that many eminent politicians like Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, Kevin O'Higgins and others accepted the treaty, but they too, be it remembered, accepted it under duress. In view of the widely prevalent opinion to the contrary on this subject, it would be well to quote the following words from the speech of the late Mr. O'Higgins. He said:

"The fact that war stood as an alternative is undeniable—the fact that war was explicitly presented as an alternative to one of the signatories...It was a question of comparison and undoubtedly, in the face of the alternative, war, that treaty was signed." (25th September 1922.)

When therefore President de Valera said in his statement of 29th November, 1933, to the British Government, "They (the Irishmen) submitted to the treaty because they were presented with the alternative of immediate war," he was speaking the literal truth. It is not suggested here that the treaty such as it was should not have been accepted by Irishmen or that the Republican party was right in holding out against it. All that we are concerned to show is that, a large party being opposed to it, the

treaty ought not to have been entered into. As it is, it has only served to stiffen the resistance of Irishmen, notwithstanding all the efforts of the moderate party, of which Cosgrave is the leader, to get them to abide loyally by the treaty and to work the constitution founded on it.

What did the Republican party do? They made up their minds immediately to set aside the treaty; first they tried to dodge it and then if necessary openly to break it. They have done many things which are contrary to the spirit and, as it appears to the layman, to the letter of the treaty. But they still claim to be within its limits, and they have got eminent counsel to support their view, as anyone can get any number of eminent counsel to support any view, provided he has a sufficiently long purse. But there is no doubt that the treaty is being deliberately violated, and the most important point for us to note about the violation is that the Republican party are not in the least ashamed of it. In fact they consider it a point of honour to dishonour a treaty which has been imposed upon the country. They could use the political machinery existing in the State only by taking an oath to be faithful to the Crown. Well, they took the oath. So responsible a politician as the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Mr. Connolly, did not mind openly confessing in Parliament: "We turned the oath into an empty formula and made a complete sham of it." Now they have removed the oath itself from the constitution. Similarly they have done many other things which involve a breach of the treaty at every step. They do so, not so much to achieve any positive results, as to bring into ridicule the so-called sanctity of treaties. They have abolished the right of appeal to the Privy Council. They confiscated the land annuities payments at an early stage and brought on themselves an economic blockade by England, in which market Ireland used to sell ninety per cent. of her exports. (It may be said in passing that this blockade, though it has weakened Ireland considerably, has helped to increase the ranks of the Republican party whose chief strength consists in small farmers, labourers and tenants, and lessen those of their opponents whose strength consists in traders, bankers, cattle-raisers and larger farmers.) They have introduced a measure to abolish the right of the Governor-General to withhold assent to Bills or to reserve Bills for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure. They have changed the status of Governor-General and replaced one occupant by another, "because the Executive Council wanted to make it quite clear that the Governor-General would just do what the Executive Council told him to do." And they are going later to abolish the office of Governor-General altogether. In fact, Mr. de Valera declared in the Dail that "they had in mind to remove every mark or badge of inferiority, everything in the constitution which was not consistent with the sovereign rights of the Irish people. . . . Generally, all those provisions that were inserted in London, and which were inconsistent with the rights of the Irish people to have just that constitution they wanted themselves and

not a constitution which other people might want them to have, would go."

The point that I wish to bring home can best be made by quoting from President de Valera's speech in the Senate on 25th May 1932:—

"It is a silly thing for the framers of constitutions to think that, by inserting in a fundamental law some particular principle which has not general acceptance, such insertion will enable that principle to be perpetuated. It is found to be a failure in France. You cannot bind the future in that particular way. The majority for the time being may like to preserve a sort of continuity of the principles that they stand by into the future. The experience of mankind in its deep commonsense shows that it is a very vain attempt. But cast-iron rules intended to bind the future have always led to explosions of one kind or another of the whole principle which it was intended to maintain."

III.

In India too the forcible imposition of a federation upon the people—a federation which can neither be altered nor ended—would lead ultimately to the explosion of federation. The British Government might compel the people by *force majeure* to submit to it for a time, but the feeling of impotency would itself lay the foundation for the spirit of rebellion which, as Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru says, would eventually break the federation to pieces. Desperation is often the greatest spur to revolt. In Ireland there was at least a large and well-organised party, the party of Cosgrave, which could hold its own for ten years against the party of de Valera. The moderates and extremists there were evenly matched, and the struggle between them was a purely internal struggle into which the British Government did not enter. The Irish moderates were also willing to risk their lives in keeping faith with the British and implementing the treaty; and in fact their most prominent leaders had to give their lives in carrying out the treaty obligations. Now, what is the strength of the parties in India upon which Government can rely for the working of the federation, and what is the amount of self-sacrifice of which they are capable? Government of course have powerful allies in vested interests—rulers of Indian States, landlords, industrialists, communalists; but do they realise what a small fraction of the progressive politicians they have with them, and how feeble and helpless this fraction feels? Its leaders were expected to make a propaganda in India in favour of the White Paper; but how few are their appearances in public? And even if, greatly daring, they do appear in public to speak about the White Paper, they make their speeches nine-tenths denunciatory and one-tenth explanatory. They are afraid to be known as defenders of the White Paper. On the other side are ranged the States' people, the Congress, and large sections of other parties, who will ever be agitating against the reforms and who will at least succeed to this extent that they will make a smooth working of the reforms impossible. Nor can the Government rely upon vested interests; on the contrary these interests will continue to be looking to the Government for support for their very existence, the preservation of peace depending.

unlike in Ireland, upon the Government in the last resort. Thus the struggle between the Government and the people is not going to come to an end with the establishment of federation. In fact, it will, enter upon a more critical phase hereafter, and in this struggle the few stray progressive politicians, upon whom the Government perhaps leans for pulling them through when public opinion will lay siege to administration, will be like broken reeds.

But it is not the Government whom I have in mind in writing this article. I wish to reason with those progressives who, knowing full well that the federation has not the support of public opinion, will still join with the Government in forcing it upon the country. Do they not incur a moral responsibility by this attitude of theirs for repelling any subsequent attacks upon the constitution which may come from the Congress and other parties? And do they feel that they have the strength of repelling such attacks? I am sure they never tell themselves that they have the strength; much less will they tell the Government to that effect. But, in that case, is it not their plain duty to go to the Government and beg them upon their knees to withdraw the federal scheme? For they must say: "We consider the federal scheme to be the best and wish the country had accepted our view. But it hasn't done so, and we don't think it right to force a constitution upon the country against its wishes, particularly a federal constitution which is of a permanent character, inhibiting for all future time the country's advance towards self-determination. Nor are we capable of giving you the support which you have a right to expect of us in fighting the numerous enemies of the constitution. Pray, therefore, take back the scheme for the present, and let us hope that the country will soon change its mind. But at the moment there is nothing for it but to withdraw the scheme." If they do not follow this line, they cannot avoid their share of responsibility for the chronic disorder and unrest that will settle upon the country as a result of foisting the constitution upon it.

OBSERVER.

MADRAS EXCISE ADMINISTRATION.

IT is a matter for surprise that, despite acute economic depression and non-interference with the rates of taxation for a number of years, the excise revenue, which is a fairly accurate barometer of the economic condition of the industrial and labouring classes, remained unaffected in the Madras Presidency in 193-321. There was a slight fall in the consumption of country spirits, which was however counterbalanced by an increased consumption of toddy and hemp drugs. The Excise Administration report is silent as to the causes of the 10% rise in the consumption of ganja. If this deleterious drug is taking the place of country spirits, the matter merits an investigation. If, on the other hand, as it appears to be the case, the renters are pushing sales by reducing the retail price, there appears to be a strong case for an enhancement in the duty on ganja. The revenue from the consump-

tion of toddy exhibited a perceptible rise. Curiously enough, the number of detected cases of illicit manufacture of toddy also went up from 8,598 to 9,222, a fact which tends to prove that the number of cases detected in any particular year is not an accurate measure of the prevailing malpractices and that it is unsafe to draw conclusions from a mere increase in the number of detected cases.

The chief interest in the report lies in the fact that it sketches the results of certain experiments on rationing and prohibition carried on in selected areas. A system of rationing country spirits in the municipal areas of Vizagapatam, Vizianagram, and Bimlipatam was introduced on April 1, 1929 and was extended to the rural areas in five taluks a year later. The details of the scheme are not available in the report under review. We are told that the system has nothing to commend itself, that it has already been abandoned in certain areas and that the question of its final abandonment in the remainder of the area under experiment is under consideration. It appears that, in view of the falling prices, the rationed figures have never been worked up to and that several lessees who took long term leases have been involved in a serious loss. Further, the system of giving out long term contracts is itself of doubtful soundness inasmuch as it is likely to give rise to vested interests. Thus the whole policy of rationing deserves careful consideration. But before it is definitely abandoned the public would like to have further particulars regarding the working of the scheme.

The experiment of closing arrack shops in toddy-drinking areas has been tried for five years in succession with varying success. It is gratifying that in four taluks the scheme has proved to be an unqualified success. In two other taluks, in which local conditions proved unfavourable, Government, after giving it a fair trial, was, so it is stated, compelled to discontinue the experiment. It is hoped that, in view of the success attending the experiment in the four taluks, the sphere of its operations will be extended to other suitable localities.

By far the most important experiment undertaken was in respect of the closure of all liquor and toddy shops in two small compact areas in three taluks. From the outset it was recognised that the prospects of success were not very promising. As however a certain amount of successful temperance and rural economic work was being carried on in these areas and as the weavers who constitute one of the chief drinking classes inhabiting the district supported the proposal, all the 11 arrack and 22 toddy shops in these areas were closed with effect from April 1, 1930. It has now been reported that with the waning of the enthusiasm of the temperance workers the movement collapsed within a short period. The report says that petitions were received for the reopening of shops, several women coming forward with the complaint that if their menfolk must drink they preferred them to get their drink at convenient centres after doing a full day's work and earning up to their maximum capacity. An enormous increase in excise offences, particularly illicit distillation, was also

reported with the result that the shops were re-opened with effect from April 1, 1933. The report for 1931-32 furnishes certain statistics showing the degree of the increase in illicit practices. In the dry area of the Namakkal sub-circle the number of detected cases of illicit distillation rose from 9 in 1930-31 to 91 in 1931-32. It should be pointed out, however, that in the wet area of the same sub-circle the increase in the number of detected cases of illicit distillation, though not so striking as in the dry area, was also very large, it rose from 34 to 104; while in the remainder of the Salem District, the number of cases of illicit distillation and kindred offences rose from 176 to 238 and in the whole presidency from 2,579 to 3,301. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that, naturally enough, Namakkal sub-circle received the special attention of the staff, and that the rise in the number of illicit distillation cases, sharp though it has been, is not by itself an adequate reason for abandoning the experiment. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the very fact that such a large number of cases was detected in such a small area is a sufficient proof that the area is not suitable for carrying on an experiment of this type. It is probable that the very smallness of the area selected for the purpose militated against the success of the scheme, but we hope that evidence of a genuine desire on the part of the inhabitants of other areas, suitable for the purpose, will be forthcoming so as to facilitate the renewal of the experiment in the light of the experience gained.

AN EX-REVENUE OFFICER.

Our London Letter.

(BY AIR MAIL.)

(From Our Correspondent.)

London, December 29.

MR. SUBHASH BOSE & SGR. MUSSOLINI.

THE rhetoric of the august and of the well-known may be just as silly and fatuous as that of smaller men. Within a week both Mr. Mussolini and Mr. Subhash Bose have been guilty in the City of Rome, and upon the occasion of the opening of the Asiatic Institute and the holding of a Congress of Asiatic Students, of ridiculous extravagance that we might well have been spared. One can well understand that the latter, a younger man, comparatively inexperienced, in ill-health, but with an unimpaired idealism should talk at large to still younger and still more inexperienced countrymen and fellow-Asiatics upon the inadequacy of Mahatma Gandhi's leadership, and should hold up before their eyes and those of ill-informed but naturally sympathetic foreigners the ideal of a completely independent India. How he hopes to achieve that desirable end within any measurable period of time and in the circumstances that prevail in the country to-day he was, fortunately for him, not called upon to explain. His natural embitterment against the British is partly at least to be explained by the fact that he has been twice refused permission to enter this country. It may be possible for me in the near future to reveal

the circumstances in which the second refusal took place. But why, oh why, must Mr. Bose, who is really old enough to know better think it his duty to place before his countrymen the ideology and the method of Fascism except perhaps out of compliment to the Duce who took the trouble to open the Congress. It may well be that India needs a Dictator, I mean, of course, an Indian Dictator. But in what conceivable circumstances in any future that we can now contemplate can such a Dictator appear, what chances will he have of pursuing his task, and who would recognise and follow him if he did assert his claim?

Mr. Mussolini, however, is old enough to refrain from talking nonsense. He is reported to have said, among other things, that it was the union of the West with the East on the shores of the Mediterranean twenty centuries ago which had been of supreme importance in the history of the world. This union is the fundamental cause of all our history. From it sprang European civilization, and this civilization must once again become universal if it was not to perish. But after many centuries the unity of Mediterranean civilization which was both Eastern and Western had given place to a new civilization built upon a narrow and materialistic basis. Asia came to be regarded as the enemy of Europe, and certain European countries saw in Asia only a market for their goods and a source of raw materials. This civilization, based on capitalism and liberalism, had spread over the whole world, and now that it had failed the repercussion of this failure was felt also in Asia. To-day there was a crisis of an entire system of institutions and ideas which no longer had any breath of life in it, and therefore "we who are Italians and Facists hope to resume the common thousand-year old tradition of our constructive collaboration". We may entirely share the Duce's hope for a restoration of sympathetic relations between the two Continents, and that civilization must gain the attributes of universality (and it may be added spirituality rather than regimentation) if it is not to perish. But his history and his sense of present-day realities are as false and faulty as anything that the present writer has seen for a long time. Alexander and his generals did not invade Western Asia and descend upon India from a sense of universal brotherhood, and in order, as the Oxford Group Movement does, to "share experiences". They did these things out of sheer lust of conquest. So far from there being twenty centuries ago a union of the West with the East upon the footing of a common civilization, at exactly that time there was a Roman pro-consul maintained by a Roman soldiery in supreme control of a conquered Asia Minor. The prototype of Imperial Britain in a subdued and subordinate India was an Imperial Rome in a conquered Syria. Was it not nearly twenty centuries ago that a Roman Governor in Jerusalem delivered over to his enemies and authorised the execution of the great religious teacher whose arch-priest resides in the Vatican City upon the borders of that very Rome in which Mr. Mussolini has talked this arrant nonsense. He speaks as glibly of the wicked Imperialism and exploitation, on the part of other European countries as though he himself had never complained that Italy did not have a place in the sun until the advent of Fascism, and as though the flag of Imperial Italy did not wave over the provinces of Lybia and Istria and Tripoli with all the blatancy, the intolerance and the cruel lack of imagination displayed by other European powers farther East, where Italy had not been able to penetrate and exercise similar domination, not for lack of will but for lack of power. A little less unctuous rectitude and a little greater sense of realities would not come amiss even from the

great Fascist leader. It is quite useful sometimes, as Burns once said, to see ourselves as others see us.

BURMA AND INDIA.

Two issues of records relating to the relations of Burma to India and presented to the Joint Select Committee have been issued this week. They are of very considerable importance and will doubtless be studied with great care and attention in India. I am informed on good authority that during the proceedings the Secretary of State for India with that lack of sensitiveness to his opponents' point of view, of which he appears to be temperamentally incurable, spoke as though the only question to be considered by the Committee was that of separation from India and the circumstances and conditions upon which it should be effected. I am told that the anti-separationists in the Burmese delegation were so offended by this attitude that until they received an assurance from the Committee itself that the question of separation was still an open one and that their views would receive equal consideration, they were prepared to walk out of the Committee-room and refuse to take any further part in the Committee's proceedings. I cannot of course be positive that my informant was accurate in his description of the episode, but I have no reason to disbelieve his statement of what took place, which of course will find no record in the proceedings, even if it did in fact occur.

THE EMPIRE BROADCAST.

In company with millions all over the British Commonwealth of Nations I listened in to the Empire Broadcast on Christmas Day. What was tried as an experiment last year would appear to be becoming a permanent annual event, and there is no doubt of its general popularity. To travel right round the world by wireless gives one a queer feeling and brings forcibly home the steady annihilation that has been taking place in space and time. To listen today to what is taking place tomorrow, as happened with the Australian and New Zealand broadcasts, make one appreciate the statement that time was made for man.

In this country the broadcasts came through with surprising clearness and one hopes that the same was true of other countries. It is pleasing to see how quickly advantage has been taken of the opening of the new wireless telephone service with India, enabling us to hear the voice of that country twice within the last three weeks. The programme was carefully designed to work up to its climax, the Address of His Majesty from his country home at Sandringham. It is sincerely to be hoped that not only the Commonwealth but the whole world will take to heart the qualities which the King suggests are the foundations of national, as of personal, life—unshakeable sanity, invincible patience and tireless good-will. Never were these three qualities more necessary and never was it more certain that these three, and especially the last, will take us from our international fears and economic depression to permanent peace and prosperity.

Reviews.

INDIAN RESERVE BANK.

THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND ITS FUNCTIONS. By SHEO KISSEN BHATTER and L. NEMENYI. (The Book Co., Calcutta.) 1933. 24cm. 174 + xxxv p. Rs. 2/8.

THE book under review is, as stated in the foreword, the result of "various drafts of a memorandum prepared (by the authors) for the Joint Select Committee." It consists of three parts. Part I is intro-

ductory and is a treatment of the commonplace principles of money and banking. The authors address it to "such readers as are not versed in" matters of monetary theory, although of course others are not debarred from reading it. Part II examines clause by clause the Reserve Bank of India Bill recently passed by the Assembly, and Part III is designed to consider "the possible working and the problems of the proposed Reserve Bank of India." The concluding chapter gives a summary of the recommendations made in Part II regarding the modifications in the Bill which the authors think essential in the interests of the successful working of the Bank. In an appendix are given the Reserve Bank of India Bill (1933), with all the adjoining schedules, statement of objects and reasons, and notes on clauses.

The book is well planned, its publication is timely, but its execution is not entirely successful or satisfactory. It could have been made more effective with precision and avoidance of repetition. The expression is very often clumsy. But, as they themselves say, the authors had only three weeks at their disposal to complete their task. The defects in the book, however, do not deprive it of its utility. Members of the Central Legislature and the lay public might find it useful reading. The recommendations made by the authors are on the whole commendable although one may not see the wisdom of the reserves against note-issue being lowered to 25 p. c., whatever the force of logic in its favour. Circumstanced as we are financially, it is not for India to lead the world in innovations of this character.

The treatment of Part I is not very satisfactory. 1. The distinction which the authors make between what they call the Primitive Gold Standard, the Full Gold Standard and other variants of the Gold Standard are clumsy, not to say unscientific. The distinction usually made between the Gold Currency Standard, the Gold Bullion Standard and the Exchange Standard should serve all conceivable requirements. On the contrary they fail to distinguish clearly between the Sterling Exchange Standard and a Gold Exchange Standard. 2. The withdrawal of short-term funds should not in itself drive a country off the gold standard if its situation is fundamentally sound. They fail to see that post-war London, although still a long-term creditor, was a debtor on balance on short-term account. Unlike in pre-war period, therefore, as she did for instance in 1907, London could not shift a demand on her reserves to foreign countries in 1931. She had to take recourse to borrowing. It is only because the situation was fundamentally unsound, and not merely because of the withdrawal of funds that the pound was pushed off gold. The latter was a symptom of the former, which was the real disease. 3. The Exchange Equalisation Fund is used not to prevent depreciation or fluctuation in the exchange value of the pound, but to prevent its appreciation. The Fund is utilised to hold the pound under pressure below its purchasing power parity level. There are also other errors of information e. g. the process for increasing the fiduciary limit fixed by law in England (p. 40) and the rate for the sale of sterling by the currency authority in India under the 1927 Act (pp. 5 and 89), which could have been avoided with little pains.

Part II is perhaps the most useful part of the book. The fears of the authors and the remedies they suggest, regarding the probability of the Bank's shares getting into alien hands, deserve careful attention. And they rightly emphasise that the provision that the Governor of the Bank alone shall convene a meeting of the Board of Directors and the fixing of such meetings to a minimum of six in a year and one in a quarter, "will give practically dictatorial powers to the Governor." The Court of

Directors of the Bank of England meet once a week and they should meet as often in India also. But the authors ask for only one meeting a month. This would not be any great improvement upon the provision in the Bill. The Board of Directors would then still be merely a body to endorse the actions of the Governor after the event.

From this and many such provisions in the Bill one can easily see that although a Share holders' Bank in form, it would be a State Bank in fact, under the thumb of the Viceroy and *via* the Secretary of State and Whitehall under the thumb of the City of London and the Bank of England. The Governor who forms the most important part of the management would be a nominee of the Governor-General and would hold office during his pleasure; he is eligible for re-nomination. The mettle of his make-up, therefore, should be super-human, if he is not to be a mere instrument of his master.

For the first four years all the members of the Board of Directors would be nominees of the Governor without any reference whatever to the shareholders. And only at the end of four years more would the Board contain the full strength of the elected Directors. They would then be in a majority, but would they be in a position to influence the policy of the Governor?

I am inclined to be sceptical. By the end of eight years, if not from the start, a good part, if not the larger part of the shares, will have gone into British hands. It would suffice if they got enough to send four (or even three) Directors to the Board. That would give the British a majority. Also, with their help, the more naughty among the remaining four of the elected Directors could be threatened with dismissal by the Governor. This would practically insure against their making noise outside. The nationalistically-inclined Directors, therefore, thus handicapped in several ways, at best can only beat the air within closed doors. And yet the authors of the book attach too much importance to the elected part of the Directorate being in a majority.

The authors have, like many others, slipped into the common error of believing that the currency standard of the 1927 Act was a gold bullion standard in theory and a sterling exchange standard in practice. The option given to the currency authority to redeem rupees in gold, which is responsible for this error, exists only for the convenience of the Bank of England and not because of the anxiety on the part of the Government to place the rupee *in theory* on the gold bullion standard. To redeem rupees in gold relieves the Bank of England when sterling has depreciated to the gold export point from England. Also both in point of law and practice the rupee to-day is on a sterling exchange standard.

Part III contains some useful suggestions. The emphasis laid by the authors on the importance of the practice of rediscount, although somewhat overdrawn, deserves careful attention. Also it is of the highest importance, as pointed out by them, that the community of the indigenous bankers should be drawn within the fold of membership of the Reserve Bank. The Bill, as it originally stood, ignored them entirely, although even to-day as a body they form the more important source of credit supply to the country.

B. R. SHENOY.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

THE MYSTERY OF THE MAHABHARATA,
VOL. II. By N. V. THADANI. (Bharat Publishing House, Karachi.) 1933. 22cm. 371p. Rs. 8.
In this second volume, after giving a resume of the

conclusions arrived at in the first volume, which occupies itself to a great extent with the Mahabharata with the Vedic Gods and the origin of language, the author turns his attention to an examination of the Hindu systems of philosophy and religion. The main argument, which is continued in this volume too, is that "all ideas of the Hindus, including those of the Vedic Gods, are based on the form, structure, development and division of the organic cell." The five great creative energies of life—the super-electric energy of the heart, the energy called heat of buddhi, the lower energy of the brain—which is simple electric energy of the mind—and the twofold magnetic energy of ether, have a correspondence to the creative energies of the cell—the centrosome and the chromosome. These same five creative energies of life constitute, according to our author, the basis of the five great systems of Hindu philosophy—Vedānta, Yoga, Vaiśeshika, Nyāya and Sāṅkhya. Thus it is in the cell that we find an explanation of all the ancient Hindu theories of life. It is on the cell that the ancients have reared the whole fabric of their language, their science, their philosophy, and their religion; and the Mahabharata is a picture of all these systems and religion and so comprehends all that the ancient knew and understood.

In the chapters which follow, the author endeavours to show a close connection between the five great creative energies of life, the five pairs of principal Vedic Gods who, according to the author, personify the great creative energies of the universe, and the five chief systems of Hindu philosophy. They are all most closely allied and refer to the same idea of the evolution of life in Brahmanda or the universal cell; they are but an attempt to examine the whole problem of the creation, evolution and end of life from different points of view.

Then follows an examination of the Upanishadas and Satapatha Brahmana which, according to the writer, contain all the principal ideas of the various systems of Hindu philosophy; and further the five great religions including Buddhism and Jainism with their schisms are shown to be closely associated with the five systems of philosophy.

Thus all conflict between the various systems and religions is merely on the surface, as each of them represents merely one way of all possible ways of looking at the creation of the universe. As these are all the possible ways of looking at the universe it is not surprising, as our author finds, that all exotic religions—the religion of the Old Testament and of the New—have affinities both in ideas and practice with the five principal religions and systems of the Hindus. Having thus cleared the ground for an explanation of the Mahābhārata as a picture of all systems of Hindu philosophy and religions in story form, the author ends by promising to give the detailed explanation in the next volume.

Here is a wonderful attempt at synthesising the thought of centuries; the author is most dogmatic in his assertions and is probably unaware of historical developments in the elaboration of languages and systems of thought and religion. Everything is there in the Vedas; that is why all systems claim the authority of the Vedas. We regret to find ourselves in almost complete disagreement with the author, for it is very difficult for us to believe, as the author does, that the ancients knew the various stages of cell-development—much less construct all their philosophical and religions structures on the idea of the cell.

C. R. DEVADHAR.

LIFE IN RUSSIA.

SUMMARY OF THE FULFILMENT OF THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF THE U. S. S. R. (Allen & Unwin)

23cm. 296p. 7/6.

THE story of the Russian Five Year Plan as told in this book is a story of a series of successes, a story of achievements and triumphs in various directions. The Five Year Plan is intended to transform the Soviet system into a thorough-going communistic system and what has actually been accomplished surpassed all expectations.

The Report deals exhaustively with the way in which the five year plan has been worked out in regard to agriculture, transport and communications, industrial development and so on. And the impression left on the mind of the reader is that, compared with the condition of affairs in capitalist countries, the conditions in Russia are in every respect much better, the reason being that while in the latter everything is done according to a plan, in the former everything is done in a haphazard way according to the whims of individuals. The ideal placed before themselves by the U. S. S. R. is the transformation of the capitalist system not only in its outer aspect but also in its inner implications into a definitely socialist system; and from what the Report under review contains it cannot be said to have failed. The objects and achievements of the five year plan are set down there in the following words:—

"The task set by the five year plan was successfully carried out in four years and the Soviet Union has definitely and irrevocably entered into the period of socialism. The success has enabled the second five year plan to be set in motion and its business is finally to eliminate the capitalist classes completely and to build up a classless socialist society."

In another place the contrast between Soviet economy and capitalist economy is expressed in the following words:—"The elimination of unemployment, the elimination of the possibility of differentiation among the toiling rural population as between poor and prosperous, the elimination of poverty and pauperism, the elimination in the first five year plan period of the bases and sources of exploitation of man by man, the resulting unprecedented growth of the material well-being of the working class and rural masses of toilers—this is what the Soviet Union puts forth in contrast to the capitalist world with its ever greater exploitation of the workers, dooming half of the working class to long periods of unemployment as a result of the crisis, with its absolute impoverishment of the working class and the ruin of the present masses, with its increased expression of the colonial populations representing two-thirds of humanity still in the position of colonial slaves."

The claims put forward here on behalf of the Russian experiment may have been overdrawn; but even so, nothing can disguise the fact that much, if not everything, has been done in Russia to justify the authors of the Report taking it with legitimate pride.

The experience of the U. S. S. R. has two lessons for other countries: first, that unless there is a willingness on the part of capitalist countries to introduce a definitely socialist bias into the framework of their economic organisations, they cannot be assured of stable and healthy economic conditions,

and secondly, that, instead of an unregulated economy, there must be a regulated planned economy, if the present disorganised world conditions are to be set right.

The Report contains statistics in regard to every aspect of Soviet life, which will be very useful to students of present-day Russian economic conditions.

C. V. HANUMANTHA RAO.

SHORT NOTICE.

ORIENTAL CONFERENCE PAPERS. By JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI (The Author, 211, Pilot Bunder Road, Colaba, Bombay.) 1932. 22cm. 366+xxx p.

THE late Sir Jivanji Modi published, a few months before his death, a volume of about 400 pages under the caption "Oriental Conference Papers" as most of them were read at the Indian Oriental Conferences. Sir Jivanji Modi's scholastic activities were prolific and his vision was wide as even a casual reading of the present volume will show. The Papers cover a very wide field indeed of history, philosophy, philology, sociology and religion, not only of Semitic people but also of Aryans. The present volume is dedicated, rightly, to the Bhandarkar Institute as a mark of appreciation of the Institute's valuable work in starting the movement of Oriental Conferences in India. The dedication was perhaps the last wish of Sir Jivanji and also a blessing as the Institute has now become the permanent headquarters of Indian Oriental Conferences.

This volume contains, besides Sir Jivanji's presidential address to the Fourth Oriental Conference, papers of paramount importance such as Akber and Sanskrit books, Alexander and Zoroastrian literature, the doctrine of Karma from the Zoroastrian point of view, and Huns and their religion. All these Papers teem with mature scholarship of Sir Jivanji, and deserve to be studied with care by every young orientalist.

P. L. VAIDYA

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- PRICES AND PRODUCTION.** By FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK. (2nd Impression) (Routledge.) 1932. 20cm. 112p. 6—.
- THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT.** By BENJAMIN S. KIRSH. (Central Book Co., New York.) 1933. 20cm. 156p. \$2.50.
- THROUGH FASCISM TO WORLD POWER.** By IAN S. MUNRO. (Alexander Maclehose & Co., London.) 1933. 22cm. 420p. 12s.
- A TREATISE ON BIRTH CONTROL.** By AN EMINENT DOCTOR. (Mrs. A. Mathews, Contraception Office, Kuthiathode, Travancore.) 1933. 20cm. 179p. Rs. 3-8-0.
- RAJENDRA NATH MOOKERJEE.** By K. C. MAHENDRA. (Art Press, 20 British Indian Street, Calcutta.) 26cm. 249p.
- JOHN HAMPTON.** By HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON. (Hodder & Stoughton.) 1933. 23cm. 359p. 12s.
- HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL INDIA.** (3rd. Edn.) By ISHWARI PRASAD. (The Indian Press, Allahabad.) 1933. 22cm. 696p. Rs. 8.
- FOOT-LOOSE IN INDIA.** By GORDON SINCLAIR. (Murray.) 1933. 20cm. 370p.
- RELIGION AND COMMUNISM.** By JULIUS F. HECKER. (Chapman & Hall.) 1933. 22cm. 302p.