

# The Servant of India

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## CONTENTS.

	Page
TOPICS OF THE WEEK. ....	225
ARTICLES :—	
Liberal Non-Co-operation. By the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, P.C., C.H. ....	227
Liquidation of War. ....	228
Primary Education in Bombay Presidency.—II. By R. P. Paranjpye, D.Sc. ....	230
Reparations and War Debts.—I. By Madame L. Morin. ....	231
OUR GENEVA LETTER. ....	233
OUR LONDON LETTER. ....	234
MISCELLANEA :—	
New Reforms Procedure. ....	236

## Topics of the Week.

### Mr. Joshi Resigns.

MR. N. M. JOSHI has addressed the following letter to the Viceroy in resigning his seat on the Consultative Committee of the Round Table Conference: "I have given my careful consideration to the announcement made by the Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons on June 27, and I have been forced to the conclusion that the variation now proposed in the procedure is not slight, but so marked as to alter the fundamental basis on which efforts have hitherto been made to settle the Indian constitutional question. In the circumstances, it seems to me that I shall not serve any useful purpose by continuing to be a member of the Consultative Committee. May I beg of Your Excellency by means of this letter to resign that membership?"

### Mr. M. D. Shahane.

ONE of the junior and promising members of the Servants of India Society, Mr. M. D. Shahane, sails to-day from Bombay for Europe en route to Canada. He was attached to the Nagpur Branch of the Society, and was an active member of the Nagpur District Council, in which capacity he interested himself greatly in the promotion of Panchayats. Recently, he was awarded the Vincent Massey scholarship for post-graduate studies in the University of Toronto for the year 1932-33. On his way to Canada, he proposes to visit Europe and hopes that on his way back he will be able to visit Japan and China. With the broadened outlook and varied experience that his travels and studies will give him, he will come back to India to serve his Motherland all the more efficiently. We hope the numerous friends of the Society will extend to him all possible assistance and enable him to obtain the maximum of benefit by his sojourn abroad. We wish him *bon voyage* and all success and a safe return to India.

### Reversion to Simon Procedure.

SIR Samuel Hoare in a speech at the Central Asian Society on the 7th inst. emphasised two features in the new procedure announced by him which, in his opinion, go to show that the R. T. C. method of co-operative consultation was not to be departed from in any essential. One is that the Joint Select Committee of Parliament which is to sit upon the Government's proposals will examine these proposals before they are introduced in Parliament. And the second is that the association of Indians with this Committee will not be merely as witnesses, but as collaborators participating in the discussions of the Committee.

The second point has not made much impression upon Indian opinion, for even under the procedure that was to be followed after the publication of the Simon Commission Indians were invited not simply to give evidence before the Simon Commission but to confer with it. Lord Birkenhead on 8th November, 1927, said in the House of Lords: "It is intended to facilitate the presentation to that Committee (the Joint Select Committee) both of the views of the Indian Central Legislature, by delegations who will be invited to attend and confer with the Joint Committee, and also of the views of other bodies whom the Joint Parliamentary Committee may desire to consult." On 24th November, 1927, he said: "We invite the Central Government to appoint a Committee to come and sit with our Joint Committee." Explaining this part of the scheme, Lord Irwin said to the Indian Legislature on 2nd February, 1928: "To suggest that in these circumstances the effect of Indian opinion, if it avails itself freely of its opportunities, will be no greater than that which might be associated with the rôle of witnesses, and will not indeed be such as to influence the course of events throughout every stage, is to advance a proposition that no political experience can support, and that I should have thought no one who was versed in the process and management of public affairs would seriously maintain." This status did not admittedly confer upon Indians then the position which they now occupied as members of the Round Table Conference, viz. that of joint authors of the constitution, and the maintenance of it at present will not do so either.

The first point, however, viz. that the constitutional bill will be referred to the Joint Select Committee of Parliament *cum* a select body of Indians before it is introduced in Parliament, seems to have appeared to public opinion as somewhat attractive, though of course not fully satisfactory. "This unprecedented proposal," says Sir Samuel, "is definitely intended to meet the Indian desire to be consulted before any irrevocable decision is reached." A proposal is not adequate merely because it is unprecedented, and this particular one is unprecedented only in its outward form. It is to be valued merely for the reason that it ensures consultation of Indian opinion

before decisions are taken by Parliament which cannot later be altered. The same result was however promised to Indians in the Simon procedure although the bill was to be referred to the Joint Committee after its introduction in Parliament. For Lord Irwin, in announcing the appointment of the Statutory Commission, observed as follows on this point in his statement: "Not only will they (Indians), though representatives of the Indian Legislature, be able to express themselves freely to the Commission itself, but it will also be within their power to challenge in detail or principle any of the proposals made by His Majesty's Government before the Joint Select Committee of Parliament and to advocate their own solution. It should be observed, moreover, that at this stage Parliament will not have been asked to express any opinion on particular proposals and therefore, so far as Parliament is concerned, the whole field will still be open." This makes it perfectly clear that the proposals of Government as they would emerge from the Select Committee were intended to be no less open to amendment, and even drastic amendment, in the Simon scheme than in the present scheme, though in the former they were to have been previously introduced in Parliament and in the latter they are not to be. And for the same reason for which the Simon scheme was unacceptable to Indian opinion the present scheme also must be.

It was unacceptable then because though it afforded full opportunities to Indians to ventilate their views and thus influence the views of the Government, it did not pretend to give them a share in the framing of the Bill itself as the Conference method did, for the chief merit of this method lay in the Government's promise to make the agreements arrived at in the Conference the basis of its own legislative proposals. In the absence of such a promise Indians cannot be co-operators and partners in the work of constitution-making, as they desire, and on this ground they cannot but reject any method which only provides for consultation with them. This is a fundamental change from the Conference method, and Sir Samuel Hoare's protestations to the contrary only show that he is going back to the Simon method as an escape from which the Round Table Conference was convened.

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#### Mr. Chintamani on New Policy.

At a luncheon given by the Welfare of India League in Bombay on Monday last, Mr. Chintamani brought out the implications of the new policy that Sir Samuel Hoare was pursuing. He said to all appearances His Majesty's Government had now made up its mind that India should be content with what was called in popular parlance "provincial autonomy" though in his own view what was intended to be conceded was a travesty of it. The position that the Liberals had taken up was that there should be a single Act providing for an all-India federation, but an Act drawn up in such a manner that, concurrently with autonomous provincial governments, a responsible Central government for British India might also come into being, every endeavour being made thereafter to make federation an accomplished fact by enabling the Princes to come in the moment they desired to do so. Apart from his quarrel with the new procedure itself, Mr. Chintamani felt no doubt that Sir Samuel Hoare was more concerned with the retention in British hands of the maximum of power than to see India a self-governing country. The renewal of the Ordinances was in his eyes further evidence of such a policy.

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#### Depressed Classes Conference.

THE tenth session of the All-India Depressed

Classes Conference held in Bombay on Sunday last under the Presidency of Rao Bahadur M. C. Raja was emphatic in its condemnation of the Minorities Pact entered into on behalf of the depressed classes by Dr. Ambedkar with the Muslims, Europeans and other minorities at the time of the Round Table Conference, and support of the Moonje-Raja Pact arrived at recently in this country. That is to say, the depressed classes as an organised body may be said now to have definitely withdrawn their support from the policy adopted by Dr. Ambedkar in London of pressing the claims of his community as an independent entity distinct from the Hindus as a whole, and cast in their lot with their co-religionists and put forward their legitimate claims as part of them. Starting from this basis they naturally and quite properly disapprove of separate electorates and ask for a reservation of an adequate number of seats for themselves through mixed electorates. And this they do, be it noted, in the interests of their own community as well as in the wider interests of the nation. With Dr. Ambedkar now in London and having the ear of the India Office it was felt necessary that the other view strongly held by a large number of depressed class persons should be voiced by their own leader and arrangements are being made to organise such a delegation. The Prime Minister will now have no excuse for supporting an anti-national policy, so far at any rate as the depressed classes are concerned, when he gives his decision on the communal question. Whatever the British Government may do in this matter, it is the most sacred duty of the advanced classes in the Hindu community now to see that in their every day conduct they will meet out equal treatment to the depressed classes so that no cause be given any longer for an Ambedkar among them to run to a third party begging for intervention on their behalf. The depressed classes have chosen to rely upon the advanced classes; let nothing be done which will make it appear that they have made a bad choice.

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#### Handbook on Disarmament.

AT a time when in the Disarmament Conference proposals of the various Governments are being discussed in great detail, we would strongly recommend to the student of this question John W. Wheeler-Bennett's "Disarmament and Security since Locarno, 1925-1931" published by Messrs. George Allen and Unwin at 2/6d. The purpose of this handbook is to supply, as its sub-title shows, "the political and technical background" of the Conference now in progress. It first passes under rapid review the attempts made in this direction from the Treaty of Versailles to the Locarno agreement (1919-1925) and then gives in sufficient detail, without however confusing the reader, the results of all subsequent attempts from the Geneva Conference to the London Conference and the Franco-Italian conversations that followed thereupon. In particular it gives a very full description of the Draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission, which forms the basis of the discussions that are now going forward at Geneva under the chairmanship of Mr. Henderson. The student will derive from this volume all the assistance that he needs, not only in following the reports of proceedings of the Conference, but in forming a judgment of his own thereon. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, as the reader knows well, is the chief of a staff of research workers who bring out the exceedingly useful semi-monthly *Bulletin of International News* published under the auspices of the Royal Society of International Affairs, and is the author of several such handbooks, all of them equally helpful in making men knowledgeable.

## LIBERAL NON-CO-OPERATION.

By V. S. SRINIVSA SASTRI.

**N**EITHER the members of the Round Table nor those of the Liberal Party who decided last week-end to non-co-operate with Government in the further stages of constitution-making forgot for a moment the distinction between procedure and substance which the expounders of Government action emphasised. The departure in procedure is admitted, although its motive and purpose are only partially disclosed. The purpose is expedition. For argument's sake we shall grant this to the full. The motive remains behind. We believe that it is to remove Indian leaders from the vantage-ground of equality that the Round Table gave them and to obviate the necessity of basing the final proposals for legislation on such agreements as were reached at the Round Table. It does not matter whether the agreements covered the whole or only a part of the ground: what agreements there were had to be accepted. The many expositions that have tried to clear up the misgivings caused recently in the Indian mind leave this question of motive alone. The plea that the British statesman, lacking the gift of imagination, fails to foresee the workings of the oriental mind, which to him is a standing mystery, will not avail in this instance. The British statesman may lack imagination, but he does not lack memory. The episode of the Simon Commission is quite recent. It is its sinister consequences that were to be remedied by the Round Table procedure as well as by the promise of Dominion Status. The Indian mind took the two together and supposed that the procedure was devised both to soothe the wounded pride of the Indian politicians and to be a fitting herald of the era of self-determination. For who could doubt that if a constitution were really to be a settlement, it should have been previously agreed to by both sides? If proposals of reconstruction are embodied in a White Paper, if the Joint Parliamentary Committee are good enough to give wide latitude to the representatives of Indian opinion who appear before them, and the Parliamentary draftsman is not called in till this discussion is over, there will no doubt be a wide departure from precedent. But how does it bear on our point? Where do the ideas of *equality* and *agreement* come in? Perhaps the Indian representatives will be styled assessors, instead of witnesses, and may sit in a group together instead of singly before the Parliamentary Committee. There may also be free interchange of thought between the groups. But such facilities, perhaps even more, were afforded to the Indian Committee at the time of the Simon Commission. They did not satisfy.

Is it conceivable that, if the Parliamentary Committee, upon which the Conservatives will have a clear majority, decide what is to go into the bill, it will be anything like what it would have been under the old procedure under which the three British Parties had each the same numerical strength? Will Dominion Status be discernible in its provisions? Will the safeguards be as few and as slight

as they should be if they were to be entirely in the proved interests of India? As men of affairs and students of British history, we fear, now that the outward activities of Congress have been more or less completely brought under, that the Conservative Party wish to use the opportunity to conserve and consolidate what remains of British domination both in the political and the economic spheres. He must be rash who asserts that this fear is ill-founded and unjust.

But it may be asked, were the Liberals true to their own principles in adopting the extreme course of abstention? Was it not their duty to set aside emotion and follow reason? Knowing that the Conservatives had the strength of a giant and would use it like a giant and knowing further that it might be long before this strength was dissipated, should they not have been realists enough and patriots enough to get the best terms they could for their country? These considerations were fully present to my mind. I was also oppressed by the probability of a combination, open and avowed, of the minorities and the British with the attendant risks of chronic and acute communal warfare. But I could not blind myself to the fact that, even if there were a possibility of effective service, it was blocked by the humiliating conditions. The authorities who changed procedure and certainly meant to change policy must have made up their minds that they could do without the help of persons who, while carefully disavowing the methods of Congress, were always supporting the main part of its aims and pleading for its being conciliated and brought back to the counsels of Government. The proceedings of the Round Table Conference in its last days produced the suspicion that the India Office might feel relieved if its dubious allies dropped out and left it with those "friends" with whom it could not break, and who would not break with it. It is difficult in such conditions to offer co-operation. And when Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar, with whom the Liberal Party had collaborated fully, found themselves reduced to impotence and despair, only one course was open.

Much is made of the declaration that the provisions for the political reconstruction of India would be embodied in one bill and considered by Parliament at one and the same time. The point has also been made clear that no province in British India will be allowed to canvass the wisdom or unwisdom of an All-India Federation. Taken together, these two statements go far to allay apprehension. But they do not go far enough to remove it altogether. Nobody denies that logically provincial autonomy and responsibility at the federal centre are separable ideas. But if their inter-dependence is recognised to the extent of including them in one bill and if they were premised together by the British Cabinet towards the end of last year out of deference to the susceptibilities of a considerable section of the Round Table Conference, why is such emphasis laid on the necessity

of bringing one part into operation before the other? What is the need for an interval at all? How long will it be? It is true a faint demand for a fully responsible administration is heard from certain people in certain provinces. But it has the appearance of being an artificial stimulation rather than a spontaneous desire. Nearly everyone that asks for it admits his anxiety that federal responsibility should follow and follow quickly. Now provincial autonomy before federation comes into existence and provincial autonomy after federation has come into existence are, both from a constitutional and a practical point of view, different things, and the transition from the one to the other cannot be effected without disturbance to the administration. The passage from the present condition into provincial autonomy must also be of a very considerable character; otherwise it would not be so much desired. Is it wise, unless it were an absolute necessity, to effect two disturbing changes of the kind within a short interval? The unwisdom is so apparent that one cannot resist the feeling that the advocates of this double change have something else in their minds. Some may fear that the second step will be indefinitely delayed and desire to go ahead with what is immediately feasible. Others perhaps hope that, once the second step is delayed, it may be frustrated altogether. The Simon Commission argued that units of federation must be some time on their feet before they could prove themselves. Many men now in high office really think that provincial autonomy is itself a big experiment and that it is the height of political unwisdom to take in hand another equally big experiment like federation along with it.

A Mussalman meeting held recently in Bengal demands that the Crown must devolve powers in the first instance on the provinces and that subsequently these provinces should judge for themselves what part of these powers should be entrusted to a federal centre. The Princes do not seem even yet to be decided as a body about the wisdom of federating with British India, while some, who grant the wisdom, make demands which are so extravagant as to be impossible. The big All-India services, whose influence is unseen but only the more potent for that reason, are naturally averse to a scheme which would circumscribe their functions and their prestige. Once Parliament sanctions the precedence in time of provincial autonomy, many important details necessary for the introduction of the second step will be left to be determined in the interval. For if they could be determined before the enactment of the Act, there would be no reason for the postponement of central responsibility. Now, how could these essential details be settled, while wholly autonomous provinces were functioning, except at a meeting or convention at which their duly authorised delegates conferred together? It would then be in the power of any single province to defeat in detail what the Government now precludes it from defeating on principle. Moreover, the fear is not idle that during the interval acute trouble will arise or be made to arise

which will drive constitutional advance out of people's minds. These are the powerful considerations that made the Council of the Liberal Federation resolve that the two parts of the scheme of reconstruction should be matured and introduced simultaneously as one whole.

### LIQUIDATION OF WAR.

WHAT Sgr. Mussolini called "the tragic book-keeping of war" has at last come to an end. A final and definitive adjustment of the reparations problem has been reached by agreement between Germany on the one hand and the creditor powers on the other, and thus the ground is prepared for the removal of the barriers which so long prevented world recovery. It would of course be wrong to say that the reparation payments which Germany had to make constituted the sole cause of economic depression and political disturbance in the post-war world, but it is unquestionably one of the most potent causes of the present breakdown in the machinery of commerce and industry and the poisoning of political relationships between nations. The settlement of the reparations problem is thus, as the preamble to the Lausanne agreement declares, only a prelude to and "an earnest of further international co-operation which must be applied to economic and political spheres and rejection of all possibility of resort to arms and violence." The new spirit of concession and co-operation which has been generated in bringing to a successful issue the economic question of reparations cannot but be developed and extended later to the politico-economic question of tariffs and other purely political questions like that of overgrown armaments. The solution now reached may thus be expected, if the present temper continues, to the beginning of a new world order, both economically and politically.

The solution is as satisfactory as might have been desired. The token payment which Germany is called upon to pay is 2,700 million marks net. Under the Dawes Plan she was to pay 2,500 million marks every year for a period which was left indefinite and was apparently meant to be interminable. Under the Young Plan the number of annuities was fixed at 59, and the average amount of the annuity for the first 37 years was 2,050.6 million marks. Roughly, therefore, Germany is now asked to pay, in complete discharge of all her reparation debt, what would have been due from her in 16 months on the basis of a 59-year liquidation. She is to issue bonds when market conditions are favourable and she is in any case to make no payment for three years from now. The agreement is to come into force after it is ratified by the various governments concerned, and after the United States revises her debt settlements with them, and all reparation payments are to be suspended till this is done. What must be even more satisfactory to Germany than a drastic scaling down of her debt is the fact that the debt will no longer be designated as reparation debt. The sole-war-guilt theory of the Treaty of Versailles has gone to the discard, and the future payment by Germany

will be regarded as her contribution to the restoration of world economy in general and the reconstruction of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in particular. The sense of injustice, under which Germany has been rankling ever since the Treaty was forced on her will thus be removed, and she will be enabled to take her place as an equal among nations, which is the one ambition which she has been cherishing since the termination of the war.

The Lausanne settlement inevitably entails sacrifices of a varying amount upon Germany's creditors. Even the nominal sum which Germany is to pay will not be distributed among them, but is to go into a Reconstruction Pool of which they will not be the beneficiaries. The arrangement so long in force was that of the sums payable by Germany, a part was passed on by her creditors to other creditors under the war-debt agreements and the rest was retained by them for their own use. Thus France was to retain last year \$98 million, Great Britain, \$20 and Italy \$9. Under the new arrangement, till the inter-Allied debt agreements and the agreements with the U. S. A. are reviewed, these countries will not only have no net surplus, but their outpayments will exceed their receipts, and the net losses to them will be: France \$103 million, Great Britain \$67, and Italy \$36. When the principle of the clean slate will be applied not only to reparations but also to war debts, all these powers will of course have nothing to pay and nothing to receive; but the United States to whom no part of reparations are to go will be a clear loser. Her total receipts from European countries amount annually to \$239 million and it would be a dead loss to her when the war debts are wiped out.

Indeed the United States is in a very difficult position. What she did when she lent money to the European countries was to sell bonds to the American public and to apply the money thus raised to the purchase of bonds of the European governments. Thus the American loans were to be self-supporting and never a burden to the American taxpayers. Already the United States has made large concessions in the funding of the debts contracted by the borrowing nations, so that these debts now represent a much smaller amount than when they were first entered upon. If on top of this both reparations and war debts are now cancelled, while European countries would obtain relief, the entire cost of cancellation would fall upon the American people, and that too on account of a European war in which the United States never had any direct interest. Would she then agree to have an additional charge of nearly \$250 million a year be thrown upon her budget, which even as it is she finds such serious difficulty in bringing into balance? That is the crucial question which faces the world at this moment, and unless a satisfactory answer is found for it, the solution now proposed at Lausanne cannot be put through. On this point conflicting news is being sent to this country. The latest news contained in a Washington telegram dated the 9th inst. is extremely disconcerting. It runs thus: "The State Department

announces that there is no change in the United States Government's attitude regarding war debts from the views outlined by President Hoover in June, 1931, when he declared that he did not approve of further cancellation of debts." This cannot, however be regarded as a considered opinion, and we may still hope that it may undergo revision.

After all, the choice which confronts the United States is, as has been well said, whether the debt settlements are to be readjusted by agreement or through default. Germany at present is unable to pay reparations and even what she paid in better times was derived largely from the loans advanced privately by American citizens. When these loans stopped after 1929 Germany found that she had no resources left to pay off her reparation debt with. The ultimate source of the payments made by European countries to the United States on account of their borrowings is thus in large measure the American loans. It will therefore make very little difference in substance whether the United States Government cancels the war debts of the Allied countries and levies upon its citizens an additional burden of taxation to the tune of \$250 million a year, or whether Germany defaults the loans made to her on private account in order to enable her to pay her reparation debt. But cancellation by the creditor is infinitely better, both morally and politically, than a default by the debtor. Nor can it be ignored that reparations and debts are the principal causes of the depression and distress which has led to the collapse in commodity prices and therefore to higher taxation. The enlightened American citizen will therefore prefer paying larger taxes at a time of business recovery to paying smaller taxes at a time of business recession. It is thus ultimately to the advantage of the United States herself that she should forgo 250 million dollars a year and thus help in the advent of world recovery.

No one will find it in his heart to blame the United States for insisting that the European countries shall reduce their armaments before she reviews the debt agreements which they have entered into with her. In 1930-31 these countries together paid \$215 million to the United States on account of the war debts, but, it is calculated, they spent eight times as much on armaments, viz. \$1,800 million. If this waste is stopped or at any rate severely checked by the United States' insistence, the world will have much to be thankful for. And after disarmament, the lowering of tariff walls will have to come. *A propos* of this, a private Member repeated in the House of Commons the other day for the benefit of the United States, the old proverb that a man with money is poor but a man with nothing but money is poorer. The United States by her tariff policy is placing herself in this position, and the spirit of co-operation that Lausanne will set into motion cannot but lead to a reversal of this policy not only in the United States, but in Europe as well.

## PRIMARY EDUCATION IN BOMBAY PRESIDENCY.—II.

WHEN the Compulsory Education Act provided that the immediate administration of elementary education should be handed over to the local bodies which should be required to set up special school boards with a prescribed composition and with a competent administrative officer, it was supposed by everybody—it was certainly my intention—that the areas which were to form the units of educational administration should be of some considerable size. This is an absolute necessity if the administration is to be at all reasonably efficient. The administrative machinery is costly, and the overhead expenses of competent and reasonably paid administrative officers, supervisors, etc., would be too much for small units. The cadre of the teachers in the area must be fairly big to allow for opportunities of promotions and transfer and even for the institution of special training facilities for the teachers. Specialisation in some branches and the provision of some kind of vocational training on which the Legislative Council rightly insisted during the passage of the bill would be impossible if the unit of administration is too small. All these and other disadvantages of minute local areas were so obvious to anybody at all conversant with problems of educational administration that in full agreement with the then Director I had intended to make only whole districts and towns over a lakh—or at the most fifty thousand—in population into independent educational authorities. But it appears that this necessary precaution was cast to the winds in the time of Mr. Jadhav, and several small municipalities that asked for it were given the privilege of being independent educational authorities. The natural result was that in these municipalities everything militated against efficiency. The administrative officer was often paid less than a hundred rupees per month. A teacher became an intolerable burden as soon he became senior and earned a few more increments on the time scale, and attempts were made to get rid of him by transfer and employ a junior and less costly man in his place. The members of the school board having to be elected from a limited field, they could not be as well qualified for their work as they should be and offered increased opportunities for intrigue and *khatpat*.

The rules to be prescribed by Government for the constitution of school boards and the qualifications of their members should have been so made as to minimise risks of a breakdown. One of the qualifications of members should have been a reasonable educational status. We occasionally find that some of the members now are even illiterate. I have been told that the post of a member presents opportunities for corruption as a certain premium is paid to some members by teachers who wish to get a desirable transfer or appointment, and an offer of twenty-five or fifty rupees for procuring it presents too great a temptation for some members who have hardly any visible means of subsistence. It has been suggested to me that to avoid such risks of

corruption some evidence of financial independence should be required of candidates for membership, but I can see the difficulties of making any such rule as well as its inherent inconsistency with the democratic principle. Such risks could have been avoided or at any rate reduced if there were adequate and competent Government inspectors in each district who would bring such cases into the light of publicity.

However the elections to the school board may go—and we know that the goddess of the polling booth does not always crown the fittest—the Act provided that the Government can, if they choose, nominate a few members to the board in addition. This provision was intended to fill up any obvious *lacunae* in the representative character of the board or to make it educationally more competent. But if reports that one hears are to be believed these nominations are not always made on these considerations. The nominations have been sometimes used as a way of rewarding friends of Government or dependents of friends of Government without regard to suitability from the educational point of view, just as in olden days illiterate men were occasionally nominated to fellowships of some Universities as if a fellowship was a kind of subsidiary Rao Bahadurship. It is not too much to expect of an educational Minister that he should make these nominations on grounds of merit alone as on an efficient school board depends the efficiency of elementary education in its area. The Minister cannot entirely disclaim responsibility for loss of efficiency and throw it on the school boards or the Act until he can show that he has exercised the utmost care in every respect so far as it is in his power. The Minister and his department have also some say in the appointment of administrative officers, for Government sanction is required for every such appointment and Government veto should be used only to turn down an obviously unsuitable choice and not to further any communal or individual interests.

The want of adequate progress in elementary education in the Presidency is of course largely due to the financial stringency from which it has been suffering for the last ten years and more. I wish to make every allowance for the Ministers on this head and agree that large schemes involving immense outlay were barred from financial considerations. But I cannot acquit them of their responsibility for the dilatoriness in making rules under the Act or under the other Act dealing with local self-government. The Compulsory Education Act received the sanction of the Governor, I believe, early in 1923 and a year would have been quite sufficient to bring it into operation. But it did not actually come into operation for two years when the financial stringency became very severe and all energies had to be directed to retrenchment rather than to expansion. As a matter of fact one or two district boards actually imposed additional taxation and prepared schemes of compulsion soon after the Act was passed. But the proceeds of this taxation remained unused in the bank and the schemes when sent up

to Government remained unconsidered on the office shelves so long that all enthusiasm of those boards necessarily evaporated. If some of the schemes had received immediate sanction before the financial stringency became too acute, these at least would have got going and would have provided valuable

experience for the future. Moreover, when the financial resources were restricted, there was the more reason for seeing that all the money available gave the best return in educational results.

R. P. PARANJPEE

## REPARATIONS AND WAR DEBTS.\*

I

THE Lausanne Conference has made a good beginning. Encouraging comments from the press and generous utterances from prominent personalities are showered like so many blessings upon its cradle stage. "I am happy", said Mr. Herriot for instance, "because the settlement of European problems is henceforth included in a universal frame. It is also a matter of satisfaction to me that the thorny problem of the moratorium has found its most logical solution." The Hoover moratorium, which was due to expire on the 30th June has in fact been prolonged for the duration of the Conference. "An International Conference", further said Mr. Herriot, "ought not to be a merry-go-round, by which I mean that a question should not be allowed to turn round and round and come up again and again for discussion without any solution ever being reached." "If we want peace, we must ask public opinion to help us." In this anxious Europe of to-day still poisoned by the bitter fruits of the last war, is there one single being who does not ardently desire peace? Yet when one passes from the stage of mere enunciation of principles to that of practical detailed negotiation, particular interests and old rancours are awakened and actual agreement proves far from easy.

Truth to tell, all countries now realise that the various problems are one, and that it is impossible to isolate one aspect without all the others surging up. But the difficulty comes in exactly because one country would like to take up one point and another a different one. Each acknowledges that a partial solution is impossible, and yet they are not able to agree on any general settlement. Disappointment and nervousness succeeded in Lausanne to the initial optimism, and it is no use denying that the Conference passed through a very critical phase. Agreement, at least on the method of tackling the problems, was earnestly being sought through private conversations as well. But even the talks between Mr. Herriot and Mr. MacDonald did not appear to justify the hopes they had aroused. The chief subject of disagreement was said to be the question of reparations, Mr. MacDonald advocating their complete suppression while Mr. Herriot seemed to consider it impossible, at least without some kind of substantial compensation. Nevertheless the atmosphere of these conversations was absolutely cordial; Mr. Herriot did his best to persuade, and if Mr. MacDonald did not espouse the French cause in the end, he had at least agreed not to ignore it, and to study favourably the memorandum which was to be drafted by the French Finance Minister, Mr. Germain Martin. A further stage of Franco-German negotiations was then entered upon.

### DISARMAMENT.

In the meanwhile, the *coup de theatre* of the American proposal diverted the attention to Geneva. President Hoover suggested that a reaction of one-third in all world-armaments should be introduced. As could easily be foreseen, this proposal has produced many and diverse reactions. On the whole it has been favourably received, not however without re-

serves and discordant notes. Among Americans themselves it has been considered as an electoral manoeuvre in view of the nearing presidential election in America. In some extreme French circles it has been viewed as a manner of aggressive blackmailing against France. Mr. Paul Boncour, in his courteous and documented reply to the American proposal, has recalled a fact worthy of notice, though it is seldom emphasised, namely, that France is the country which has disarmed the most extensively in the course of the last ten years: 56 divisions in 1922 against 24 divisions in 1932. The three years military service has been curtailed to a year and a half and then further to one year. In 1913, there were 810,000 men in arms; in 1930, 522,000 only, among whom 317,000 only are affected to the defence of the mother-country. And France has not got like Germany 150,000 schupos and 200,000 to 300,000 Hitler militants! It has been also pointed out that the practical control of disarmament would meet with considerable difficulties, one of the reasons being the existence in some countries of non-official military organisations whose training and fighting capacity are often superior to those of regular troops. It is simple to proclaim disarmament, it is far more difficult to organise its practical realisation, which alone can ensure peace. Nevertheless, the American proposal will probably act as a very useful stimulus not only in Geneva, but in Lausanne as well, and in linking up the work of both Conferences. The European conception has been to make the question of war debts depend on the solution of the reparations problem. The Americans appear now determined to enforce their own method of attaching the settlement of war debts to the disarmament question. The point can be disputed, but there is certainly common sense in suggesting a reduction in armament expenses as a remedy to countries who are bitterly complaining of economic and financial difficulties. On the whole, under the pressure of the American ultimatum, the European nations will feel still more keenly the pressure of the present economic problems and the urgency of giving them a workable solution. This can only be found through international cooperation.

The Franco-German conversations have had a cordial and hopeful beginning. Mr. von Papen agreed on principle to the right of France to claim compensation. Both he and Mr. Herriot left for the weekend to consult with their respective Governments. Negotiations have been resumed on Monday 27th, but not perhaps with the same success. After having conferred with the Marshal-President and other German leaders, Mr. von Papen seems to have been ordered to return a categorical "no" on behalf of his

\* Information has been gathered from: (a) an article on "Debts and Reparations", in the "Revue de Paris" (1st June 1932), by Henry Berenger (who concluded the Mellon-Berenger Agreement), former Ambassador of France at Washington, President of the Senatorial Commission on Foreign Affairs; and (b) two articles on the same question in "La Republique" (9th and 11th June), by Mr. Emile Roche. Lloyd George's book on the subject can also be referred to.

Government to all proposals for adjustment. Mr. MacDonald has again discussed personally both with the French and the German representatives, and is trying his best to secure an agreement. If the Conference has sometimes appeared to be on the breaking point, it must be remembered that no country has an interest to break it. Even in case disagreement persists, some method shall probably be devised to conceal the fact behind a veil of vague declarations, and the establishment of special commissions which may conduct enquiries and study questions in the quiet manner habitual to such organisations.

The question of Debts and Reparations constitutes such an important factor in the present European unrest that a short retrospective survey may help to understand the problem.

The question of the Reparations due from Germany to the ex-Allied countries is of course intimately connected with the general question of the war-debts contracted between the various countries during and after the war.

Is it possible that nations can continue to live much longer in the face of enormous debts which destroy cordiality of relationship? As soon as any payment is considered, insuperable difficulties arise regarding transfer and production. The production of the paying country becomes a crushing burden for the other producing countries, and their inner economy suffers inasmuch as they receive products in payment of the money that is due to them.

#### REPARATIONS.

*The sums spent by France for the reconstruction of the regions devastated during the war, including the payment of war-indemnities, amount to £859 million, or 103 to 106 milliard francs.*

*Payments asked from Germany:—*The figures have shown a steady decrease on their way through the various conferences which met between 1919 and 1932, up to the Hoover moratorium, the last having perhaps sounded the death-knell of reparation payments, at least in their original form.

The Boulogne Conference (20th June 1919) settles the figure of 269 milliard gold marks, payable by annuities. (These annuities were to be: from 1921 to 1926, 3 milliard gold marks; from 1926 to 1931, 6; and from 1931 to 1963, 7.)

The Paris Conference (29th January 1921) settles the total debt figure at 226 milliard gold marks, to which was added a tax of 12% on the value of German exports for 42 years.

A few months afterwards, the Reparations Commission reduced the debt figure to 132 milliard gold marks, with an annual payment of 2 milliards plus 26% of the value of her exports at Germany's expense.

On the 14th November 1922, Germany begs for a complete moratorium. The Governments, unable to agree on a common policy, decide that each should act for itself. France and Belgium occupy the Ruhr Province.

In April 1924, the Dawes Plan is introduced. It implies annual payments which are expected to increase, from 1924 to 1929, from 1 to 2.50 milliard gold marks (this last figure representing after 1929 the sum for Germany's payments). As will be remembered, the Dawes Plan, accepted by the Herriot Government, was the only one to eventuate in substantial results, previous payments having been, for the greater part, expended on the Ruhr occupation.

In 1928, Germany is admitted into the League of Nations and claims a complete and definitive settlement of the reparations problem. A Commission of financial experts is constituted for that purpose.

Two conferences, held at The Hague in August 1929 and January 1930, study all possible solutions and the Young Plan comes into effect in May 1930. By the agreement reached, payments are distributed over a period of 60 years, according to an ascending curve until 1966, and a descending curve afterwards. The payments which have to be, on the average, 1,989 million gold marks up to 1966, comprise an "unconditional (non-deferable) part," amounting to 660 million gold marks, and a "conditional (deferable) part," amounting to the balance, this latter payment being made postponable for two years.

Thus, Germany's annual payments have been reduced between 1920 and 1929 from 7 to about 2 milliard gold marks.

*Share of payment.*—In what manner have these payments been divided among the various countries? The Spa Conference (in July 1920) fixed the following percentages: 52 for France, 22 for Great Britain, 10 for Italy, and 8 for Belgium. In 1925, those percentages have been modified: France 54.45, Great Britain 23.05, Belgium 4.5.

*How have payments been effected by Germany?*—By means of loans from foreign countries, the amount borrowed from 1924 to 1931 remaining considerably larger than the sums effectively paid (£900 million, against £500 million.)

It is, however, difficult to give a precise figure for the total amount of German payments, because of varying estimates on that point. By the Reparations Commission it is evaluated at £1,010 million, contrary to which German's estimate is £2,195 million. The New York Institute of Political Economy arrives at an intermediate figure: £1,505 million. Discussion around those figures has been opened by Germany, and encouraged by Anglo-Saxon nations. Even in France, some people are of the view that these divergent figures ought to be subjected to expert examination. However, the average French opinion has been, up to now, that France had the right to receive the sums mentioned by the Young Plan, since it was meant to be definitive and to commercialise, so to say, the German debt, rendering it thereby unquestionable.

This juridical conception, which views an agreement as definitive because of its contractual character, has often been brought as a reproach against the French. In spite of its evident justice and logic, it has been constantly opposed lately by a different and more supple conception, which, if practical realisations is primarily considered, is perhaps more apt to follow all the fluctuations of life and meet its necessities: this consists in the present instance in taking into account as an essential factor the capacity of payment of the debtor country, whatever its formal engagements may be. It is fair to say that this consideration has long been present in the mind of French statesmen and it can be traced as far as the Mellon-Bérenger and Churchill-Caillaux agreements. But while it appeared bold at that time, it has now been accepted as inevitable by the largest part of public opinion.

Delays and moratoria have become current even between Allied countries, and unemployment provides an excuse too urgent to be questioned, since all are suffering so cruelly under its pressure. Is then the cancellation of payments solemnly guaranteed by contracts to be considered as unavoidable? In any case it is evident that the question of reparations cannot be considered apart from the question of debts between the various countries, and that in some way or other the circulation of money must be stimulated anew to render international exchanges possible.

In fact, all the problems before the Lausanne Conference are subordinate to a settlement between



Europe and the United States. It has been all the more deplored that the Americans so often deliberately remain outsiders to European affairs. As Mr. Bérenger says, the United States have invested their fortune in Europe: 11 milliard dollars on war debts and 10 milliard dollars on private credits. To refuse to take part in European affairs amounts to taking the risk of becoming bankrupt with their debtors. The last American proposal seems to indicate that they have awakened to the fact. Whatever motives may be ascribed to it, in making the question of debts subservient to that of disarmament, it tends to avoid intercontinental conflicts and inaugurates thereby a world-politics.

Paris.

L. MORIN.

## Our Geneva Letter.

( From Our own Correspondent. )

GENEVA, 2nd July.

( BY AIR MAIL. )

### THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL.

THE most outstanding event of the last few days has been President Hoover's disarmament proposal. Of all responsible plans of this nature so far put forward at Geneva, it is undoubtedly the most radical, and coming at a time when the Disarmament Conference was steeped in gloom, it has done much to rouse the hope and temper of the Assembly, which at the present time is engaged on the most important task confronting our generation. The American programme lays down that all the armaments of the world shall be reduced by nearly one-third, by about thirty per cent.; military and aerial forces to contribute their abatements in the same measure as naval. That all armies shall be reduced by one-third, so far as concerns the number by which they exceed the minimum fixed for Germany and the Central Powers under the Peace Treaties, additional requirements for countries with overseas possessions to be allowed for and separately computed. That especially aggressive and destructive weapons, including tanks, all mobile guns of large calibre, all bombing aeroplanes and submarines above 1,200 tons shall be abolished. That the Washington Treaty number and tonnage of battleships shall be reduced by one-third. That the Treaty tonnage of cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft carriers shall be reduced by one-fourth. That the Treaty tonnage of submarines shall be reduced by one-third, and that no nation shall retain a total submarine tonnage greater than 35,000 tons.

These proposals have been variously criticised and it is far from likely that they will be generally accepted. Opinion in Japan is prone to regard them as a scheme based on American requirements and directed specially against Japan. In France, the criticism has been freely expressed that the effect of acting on them so far as that country is concerned would be to make its position particularly vulnerable and France could accept them even as a basis for negotiations only on being provided with guarantees for her security in the shape of pacts. In England, where the declaration has been welcomed as a bold

presentation of the right principles at an appropriate time, it is held that the American plan can hardly be accepted by the British Government in its present form. Sir John Simon has proposed amendments, which the *Manchester Guardian* in an editorial article entitled "Simple Arithmetic" in its issue of 28th June has shown to be little more than demands on "our European friends" to reduce their coastal defences and consequent budgets.

Nevertheless, the Hoover declaration, even if, as it is alleged, it is no more than the usual election tactic, which seems to have become an inseparable part of western democracy, has served a most useful purpose. It has instilled hope into the Disarmament Conference and provided a new approach to the problem. It has served to remind the world and Europe that to the Government and people of the United States, the reduction of armaments is still the most interesting international issue.

This last is a more important consideration than it is apt to appear at first sight, especially in India. When, not so long ago, the world economic blizzard first swept through the American continent, it had the effect of shaking many American conceptions which had come to be considered unalterable. American prosperity, American fundamentalism, the policy of high wages, isolationist politics, prohibition, protective tariffs, restrictions on immigration and cent. per cent. individualism—all these were deemed to be of a piece, entering into the fabric of a civilisation whose material magnificence dazzled the still dreamily and idealistically democratic mind of Europe. In its own way the twentieth century material development of America seemed to open endless vistas and extend into the infinite, as the political righteousness of Victorian radicalism had appeared to a previous generation on this side of the Atlantic. Like with all things in that vast country, the crisis came with gigantic strides, bringing in its train such misery as had seemed to Americans to be possible only in old Europe. The first result of this was that the facile optimism of a youthful people received a rude shock. The next result quickly followed: Europe, for the first time after the War, began to think that she was not so badly off after all and could still retrieve lost ground and retain her leadership. To this feeling must be attributed the atmosphere of hope in which the Lausanne Conference started its work.

Lausanne has now shown that, notwithstanding her ten million or more unemployed and the great shock to her system, the United States still remains the inevitable, unalterable and dominant factor in European politics. Notwithstanding all the accepted facts of the situation France and Germany cannot put a formal end to the reparations or war debts question without the United States also forming party to the transaction, and it is perhaps not without significance that, realistic as ever throughout these negotiations, the British Government has never done anything which can even remotely be interpreted as affecting its relations with the United States, so far as the debts are concerned. President Hoover's

disarmament declaration must be considered an intimation, as plainly stated as one nation can put such a proposal to another in our era of Austinian conceptions of sovereignty, that until the European nations have taken firm decisions with regard to the reduction of armaments, they need not expect any reduction in their debts.

## Our London Letter.

(From our Correspondent.)

(BY AIR MAIL)

LONDON, 2nd July.

### INDIA AT THE CROSS-ROADS.

**T**HERE is at first sight something very attractive in the spectacle of the big resolute man anxious to get things done well, quickly, and decisively, who takes a sword and cuts the Gordian knot. It all looks so easy and simple, and there is nothing left to do but to pick up the frayed ends and deposit them in the rubbish bin. But then unfortunately the strong man's troubles usually begin, and he has to think of what next. There are all sorts of things jostling each other for first position next and his Gordian knot soon reappears to the strong man in some new form, and he then has to decide whether he will repeat the experiment or try the more patient way.

Now Sir Samuel Hoare was never cut out for the part of a strong man, nor does he look the part. He is usually bland and urbane, though he can at times, as when people like Dr. Privat annoy him by their frank and discriminating criticism on the methods and consequences of British administration in India, be waspish with a sort of feminine irritation. He is, therefore, not exactly the right kind of person by temperament to do the bold, audacious and ruthless thing. That is why, when one comes to examine and analyse his speech in the House last Monday, delivered in his usual precise and even prim diction, the lucidity of his argument did not altogether disguise the barrenness of ideas, and the complete absence of imagination and understanding displayed throughout the proceedings by the Secretary of State. The gracefulness of the skating rink performer, the easy movements of the lawn tennis expert, the agility of the political fencer are all of them pleasant to watch as part of a game and as having little to do with the serious things of life, notwithstanding the prominence given to them in the daily Press and the largeness with which they bulk in the life of a member of the Cabinet; but the welfare of a great nation suffering the agonies of extreme poverty and economic depression, as the Labour Opposition spokesmen showed India to be, requires something more than superficial skill in debate and dialectical cleverness.

Examined, therefore, as a serious contribution towards the pacification of India and the re-establishment of concord and confidence between her and Britain, Sir Samuel's analysis of the Indian situation was entirely unconvincing to anybody in close touch with the realities of that situation. He was satisfied to accept the view of the Governments in India that they had gained control over Congress activities, and he naturally preferred to interpret it, assuming it to be true, as evidence that the situation was settling down, that discontent was diminishing, that disaffection was disappearing, and that the way was gradually being cleared for such reforms as the Tory Party in Parliament might permit and authorise the Government to carry through. None of the finer shades of

the psychology of the situation ever at any point seemed to enter into the picture so far as he was concerned. It did not appear to have occurred to him that there might be entirely different explanations more closely corresponding to reality offered to those of a more understanding and discriminating mind.

I can say from very personal knowledge drawn from a considerable number of people who can speak with authority that Sir Samuel is quite impervious to all suggestions of conciliation and negotiation, and that the true interpretation of the Indian situation is a widening of the area of discontent, a deepening of embitterment and suspicion, the driving underground of all normal Congress activities, and a tendency to divert the youth of India from non-violence to its opposite. There was in the speech no real gesture of reconciliation, no hope held out that the Government in the slightest degree recognised the prospect that should the Congress see fit to contest the Provincial elections under the new constitution they would in most Provinces probably sweep the constituencies, in which case they could form Ministries which would in effect thwart the Central Government at every point, thereby producing administrative chaos, or alternatively if they chose to boycott the elections they would probably carry with them such an amount of support as would render the new legislatures sterile and the new Government impotent. In either case the position of the Congress would have become so greatly strengthened that willy nilly they must be negotiated with and conciliated on terms very different and at a price very much higher than need be paid if friendly efforts at reconciliation were encouraged at the present time. The utmost that Sir Samuel was prepared to concede was a welcome back to the Prodigal Son after a diet of husks with the swine. In other words, if Mr. Gandhi and the Congress chose to surrender the door was always open to them. Poor psychology you will say, but then what else was to be expected with the Prime Minister entirely absorbed with international affairs of the first magnitude at Geneva and Lausanne and with his ear to the Washington telephone? It is unfair to suggest, as is sometimes done in Opposition circles, that the Prime Minister has lost interest in India. He is not that kind of man, but after all he is human, the economic world crisis is so vast and immediate that not even he with all his wits can squeeze more than twenty-four hours out of a day, and he is thus left dependent in respect of other grave matters, but not of such emergent importance, upon men of much smaller calibre and more insensitive to the things of the spirit.

### A BREACH WITH THE PAST.

The other points brought out were of course the question of the kind of Bill to be ultimately introduced, the time-table and the scheme of procedure. Sir Samuel Hoare took credit for the decision that there was to be a single Bill dealing simultaneously with Provincial Autonomy and Federal central responsibility, with an intervening period between the coming into operation of the two parts. In reality this situation has been forced upon the Government. It was not in their minds originally and there is no single element of spontaneity about the Cabinet's decision in the matter. The truth is that the Cabinet have been forced into this position by the insistence of the Moderates and the perspicacity of the Prime Minister, who, I have reason to believe, had long ago formed his own conclusions in the matter. Dr. Shafa'at Ahmed Khan's letter to the "Times" made it clear that given a solution of the communal question, the Mohammedans would stand out for provincial autonomy even at the risk of not getting federation at all. That first stile has thus been negotiated. The Government profess to be more

than anxious to proceed with the utmost expedition to the introduction and passage of the Bill. That, too, is all to the good. There, I am afraid, it stops. What Bill? Negotiated with whom and in what circumstances? And what is going to be done to avoid unnecessary delay, after the Bill is passed and provincial autonomy begins, in the bringing into operation of the Federal scheme. It is here that there is room for the gravest anxiety and pessimism.

Every one realises that in announcing the abandonment of the Conference and the decision not even to reconvene in London the Federal Structure Committee, the Government have gone back upon all their promises and pledges in regard to equal consultation and deliberation right up to the end. The summoning here of a few selected persons after the Consultative Committee proceedings are over, in order to consider the Government proposals, both before and after the introduction of the Bill, with a Joint Select Committee of Parliament and in an informal manner, is a device that has deceived nobody. It can, however, be made plausibly to appear as a means of expediting the introduction and the passage of a Bill. There is a lot that is attractive, especially to Liberal thinkers, in pressing on with the introduction of a Bill without the expensive paraphernalia of another session of the Conference, and it has to be borne in mind that nobody here was edified by the proceedings of the last session of the Conference. The prospect of half a dozen men aside sitting round a table, bent upon getting something done, is alluring to them, and it might quite well have been that had a third session of the Conference as representative as it was been held, the final negotiations in regard to the safeguards and other similar matters would have had to be dealt with in this way as a matter of convenience, and brought before the Conference for formal confirmation. That, however, is very different from the proposed procedure where the selected persons will have no representative character, and where their status relatively to the Joint Select Committee will be dubious and equivocal. In the circumstances proposed, there could be no general agreement for a Bill and there could be no certainty that upon its passage through Parliament it would be acceptable to Indian opinion. The Tories were quick to realise the importance of the change, and they heartily supported Sir Samuel Hoare's exposition of the new policy and procedure. Let there be an end of negotiated agreements and conferences. Away with all this talk and pother! Let the Government make up its own mind to do something quickly and let Parliament resume into its own hands its final authority in the matter. Then all that India would have to do would be to accept the constitution that had thus been decided upon, and all would be well. Such was the interpretation placed upon the Government's decision by Mr. Churchill and his partisans. Whatever else one may think of him, he is a realist and ruthlessly tears away the camouflage of glib official spokesmen. The Opposition view was that an end had been made of the conference method, and they thus joined hands with Mr. Churchill in their interpretation of Sir Samuel's statements.

#### WHAT ABOUT THE MODERATES?

One passage, however, in the official statement couched in cautious language and concealed by references to irrelevant matters, has, I think, not received the attention that it deserves, nor am I sure that the Opposition attaches to this the importance that, if my interpretation of it be correct, it undoubtedly merits. As I read it, the passage indicates that if it should be found that this new procedure is likely to have the consequence that the Moderates and their close associates will have no-

thing to do with the new method means will be found to accommodate their views. Sir Samuel Hoare and his colleagues must have known—there were strong indications of this likelihood from Press telegrams received last week-end—that Moderate leaders had indicated their strong dislike and opposition to the new programme and their refusal to fall in with it if it were persisted in. On Monday morning last there reached here a warning from a well-informed Allahabad gentleman, evidently in close touch with local Moderate opinion (it was presumably no different from Moderate opinion elsewhere) that if the conference method were departed from it would involve the resignation of prominent Moderate members of the Consultative Committee, the revival and extension of suspicion of British motives, and a serious set-back to constitutional evolution. This message was at once communicated to the India Office. Doubtless other more formal communications to a like effect had already reached there from Simla. It is for that reason combined with the fact that Sir Samuel Hoare himself admitted that communications were passing between here and India so late in the day that an advance copy of the statement could not be given to the Leader of the Opposition that I am led to the conclusion that at the last moment a formula was devised to enable the Government, if they were hard put to it by reason of Moderate insistence upon a return to the old principle of conference and equal negotiation, to find a way of escape from an impossible position and put the responsibility for consequent delay, if any, in the production and passage of the Bill upon those who were so foolish as to refuse to fall in with the new scheme.

On the following day I obtained curious corroboration for this impression in the course of conversation with a very well-informed personage in close touch with currents of opinion at the India Office. There has evidently been a fluttering of the dovescote there, and subject to the developments that may occur between now and Wednesday week, when I understand, the Leader of the Opposition intends to bring the matter up again for elucidation by the Secretary of State on the 13th instant in the debate on the Appropriation Bill, I am very definitely of opinion that the Moderates will find themselves in an impregnable position if they stand out firmly and make it positively clear that they will in no circumstances take any part in the deliberations of the Consultative Committee or the later proceedings in conjunction with the Joint Select Committee of Parliament unless there is a reversion in some form or other to the formal conference method in as representative a manner as the circumstances can produce. In any case there would be sufficient time for the Moderate leaders to make up their minds as to the action they should take between now and the announcement of the Cabinet decisions upon the communal question. These cannot be reached and announced until the end of this month at the earliest and possibly not until some time in August. The Prime Minister has to wind up the Lausanne Conference and to put the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in a position to carry on hopefully before he can divert his attention to other matters. He will have to put in train preparation for the World Economic Conference that is now certain to meet—under what auspices it is uncertain—either here or in Geneva. A considerable section of the Cabinet will, on the 13th instant, be leaving for the Ottawa Conference. The Irish trouble is at our doors and will require delicate negotiation. The result will be that it will still be some weeks before the communal decision becomes known and the Consultative Committee will be free to continue its task. In that time a good deal of elucidation may be expected to take place, and there is no immediate need for hasty

action on the part of the Moderate leaders until they have probed all the possibilities of the situation.

Mr. C. F. Andrews and other English friends are now of opinion that the time has come for activity beyond official and semi-official circles, and he has been spending the last week at Oxford in close touch with large and influential gatherings of Ministers, with a view to enlisting the powerful help of the Churches in this matter of international reconciliation between Britain and India. He is quite properly of opinion that Geneva and Lausanne are not the only places where these methods should be adopted and where peace should be preached.

## Miscellaneous.

### NEW REFORMS PROCEDURE.

#### PROTEST AGAINST SIR S. HOARE'S STATEMENT.

*A meeting of Round Table Conference delegates held in Bombay on Saturday the 9th inst. unanimously adopted the following statement of views on the change in the R.T.C. procedure announced recently by the Secretary of State:—*

**T**HE undermentioned members of the Round Table Conference, having considered with care the announcement made by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on June 27, and all the statements since made in explanation thereof, including Sir Samuel Hoare's statement of July 7, are constrained to come to the conclusion that the new procedure is entirely different in substance and spirit from the Conference method as expounded by Lord Irwin in October 1929, and July 1930, and by the Prime Minister in December 1931.

They consider that the new procedure is symptomatic of a new policy and cannot produce in the event a constitution at all so satisfactory as that which the Conference method was designed to produce. The result is bound to be a great aggravation of the evils of the present situation. It is the considered and emphatic conclusion of the signatories that the maintenance of the Conference method is, as it was, an essential condition of their co-operation and support.

(Sd.) C. H. Setalvad, V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, M. R. Jayakar, C. Y. Chintamani, M. Ramachandra Rao, Cowasji Jehangir (Jr.), A. Rangaswami Iyengar, N. M. Joshi, H. Shiva Rao, B. V. Jadhav, Phiroze Sethna, S. B. Tambe and T. B. Sapru.

The meeting also authorised the Chairman to convey to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. M. R. Jayakar their full approval and appreciation of their action in resigning their membership of the Consultative Committee.

#### LIBERAL COUNCIL'S PROTEST.

*At a meeting of the Council of the National Liberal Federation held in Bombay on Sunday the 10th inst. the following resolutions were passed:—*

"The Council of the National Liberal Federation of India record their sense of great sorrow at the

death of Rao Bahadur Ramchandra Vishnu Mahajan of Akola, a public-spirited citizen who succeeded a devoted Liberal the late Rao Bahadur K. G. Damal as President of the Berar Liberal League and rendered distinguished public services in various capacities and whose death is a great loss to Berar and the Liberal Party. The Council offer their sympathy and condolence to the bereaved family and the Berar Liberal League."

The Secretary of State's recent announcement in the House of Commons was then considered and after a prolonged discussion in which many members took part, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:—

I "Having given careful consideration to the Secretary of State's announcement of June 27, as well as the subsequent explanations thereof, the Council of the National Liberal Federation are convinced that the procedure is a grave departure from the policy of British and Indian co-operation on an equal footing in the working out of the future constitution of India, on which plan and policy alone the Federation resolved to co-operate wholeheartedly in the work of the Conference.

"The Council protest emphatically against the abandonment of the Round Table Conference contrary to the pledges solemnly given on behalf of His Majesty's Government by Lord Irwin and the Prime Minister, and the substitution therefor of a method of action which cannot be expected to produce an agreed constitution.

"The Council, therefore, resolve to withhold co-operation in all further stages of the constitutional inquiry and make it a condition of renewed co-operation that the Round Table Conference method is fully restored.

II. "The Council are emphatically of opinion that though the scheme of the new Constitution is separable into two parts, viz., Provincial Autonomy and the Responsibility at the Federal Centre, the scheme should be matured and introduced as one whole as the existence of an interval between the introduction of the two parts is attended with serious disadvantages and risks.

III. "While the Liberal Party continues to be opposed to the Civil Disobedience Movement and reaffirms the opinion that it should be stopped in the best interests of the country, the Council of the National Liberal Federation strongly disapprove of the promulgation of the new Emergency Powers Ordinance, as the prolongation of government by executive laws, far from restoring peaceful conditions and confidence in the Government, cannot but have the effect of still further alienating opinion and aggravating the present highly unsatisfactory situation.

"In the Council's opinion, it was a misuse of the emergency power vested in the Governor-General virtually to have renewed the Ordinances after they had been in force for six months instead of the Government seeking sanction from the Legislature in due form.

"The Council have noted with grave concern the uncompromising attitude of His Majesty's Government as expressed by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on June 27 which will do nothing to ease the tension. It is the Council's firm belief that only a policy of conciliation and liberality can bring back peace and contentment to the land."