Registered B.—308.

The

Servant of India

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OFFICE : SERVANTS OF INDIA SOCIETY'S HOME, POONA 4.

VOL. XIV No. 42. | POONA—THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1931. | INDIAN SUBSN. Rs. 6. FOREIGN 15s.

CONTENTS.

Topics of the Week.

Divide et Impera.

ON August 17th the Governor of the Straits Settlements, in his capacity of High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States, held a brilliant *darbar* of the Chiefs of the four federated States, the occasion being the investiture of one of them with the Grand Cordon of the order of the St. Michael and St. George. Sir Cecil Clementi took this opportunity for making a startling declaration of new policy, which is to be nothing less than the undoing of the federation entered into 35 years ago. This federation really amounted to a unification of the four little States, the four "Sultans" being left as shadow-kings without a scrap of power and provided with only a very modest salary. The total area of the four States put together is 27, 500 sq. miles (about the size of Gwalior), but the population is only 13 lakhs (against 32 in Gwalior). Of this population the Malays aggregate 39 p. c., Chinese 38 p. c. and Indians 23 p. c. and culturally, financially, materially, administratively or in any other way, the Malays were negligible and neglected. This state of affairs was deliberately changed after the Great War waged to make the world safe for Democracy. For the Chinese obviously have a very good claim that, if Malaya is to be somebody else's "colony", it surely ought to be a Chinese Colony in law, as it very largely is in fact already : a claim which as obviously does not quite fit into the British Imperial scheme of things. Hence there has been for the past fifteen years or so a rediscovery of the Malays as the real owners and rulers of Malaya, for whom obviously the British were exercising a sacred trusteeship. "Their Highnesses" were henceforth the only people who mattered, since the original treaty had been made with them, whilst Chinese and Indians of course were mere outsiders. Sons of Malay chieftains were suddenly educated with much gusto and drafted into the Civil Service—hitherto the close preserve of the White Man. And now that the process has gone far enough, the whole country is to be broken up again into four little chieftainships; ostensible power is to be vested in each little Sultan, complete with State Umbrella, Advisory Council and Postage Stamps of his own ; the Civil Service is to be done by Malay marionettes—the wirepulling by the British being thus effectively "safeguarded" for another generation. If ever there was a policy of *divide et impera*, this dividing up of the Federated Malay States should be a classical example. Peahaps a timely one too for us in India, where so many have gone Federation-mad, and where more than ever we are in need of remembering that only Unity spells Power, and that giving it up, is only playing the game of the Imperialists who rule by dividing.

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"Akin to Election."

THE Princes apparently think that the demands of democracy are fully met if into the selection of their representatives in the federal legislature an element of some kind of election enters at one stage or another. Col. Haksar therefore made a great point of the fact that the representatives of the smaller States, though nominated, would be truly popular inasmuch as a sort of election must needs be introduced in their choice. These States must be grouped together for the purpose of representation, and "when the grouping has been effected the various groups will naturally constitute electoral colleges. In so far as each group will probaly nominate only one representative, it has therefore to be appreciated that the selection of one representative will involve, perhaps necessarily, a process akin to election. I think the final selection will necessitate preceding selections by each member of the group, and from amongst the various persons thus selected there will have to be found ultimately one person probably by election." This process "should go some way towards salving the doctrinaire conscience, even though the electors involved in this process were

originally nominees of the individual States forming the group."

We have no doubt that Sir Tej Behadur Sapru's "conscience", if it could be called "doctrinaire" would not be salved by this expedient. He would dismiss it as nomination, pure and simple. And so it is. But we would beg to point out to Sir Tej that the full-blooded election which he recommends to the States for the choice of their representatives to the lower house would, in the case of most States, be no better than the election to which Col. Haksar refers here. The legislative councils in the States consist for the most part of nominated members, and election by them would suffer from the same defect as that which Sir Tej would detect in the election of the smaller States' representatives. For here too the "electors" would be "originally nominees" of the States concerned. We wonder if Sir Tej had fully realised what the consequences of the adoption of his recommendation, viz. indirect election through the legislative councils, would be. This would be election only in name, but nomination in fact. It would in practical results be worse than nomination.

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Second Chamber's Powers.

THE views of the entire Indian States' delegation on the relations between the two chambers of the federal legislature were voiced by Sir Akbar Hydari at the Federal Structure Committee on 25th September in a speech which is a model of lucid and clear exposition. Sir Akbar would prefer to have one chamber—or rather a small committee—to consider the few "administrative and technical matters" that are alone to be retained in the federal list, but if two chambers are insisted upon he would accept them only on condition that they shall be of absolutely equal powers. Of course legislation will have to pass both houses, but even in respect of money bills the lower house must not be assigned a position of advantage. It will be possible, under the Princes' scheme, to introduce a money bill in the upper chamber and it will be possible for this chamber to amend it as well as to reject it. The power of rejecting a money bill gives an indirect control over the expenditure policy of the Government, but the Princes require that the upper chamber of the legislature shall have direct control of this policy and therefore they insist that the demands for grants shall be submitted as much to the upper as to the lower house. In order to resolve deadlocks between the two houses a joint session of the two houses is usually suggested. The Princes favour this suggestion, but they hold that the session shall be composed of an equal number of representatives from each house, and that the decision shall be taken by a majority vote of such a session. If the scheme of federal finance that may be evolved proves satisfactory, the Princes may consent to refer the differences between the two chambers on a money bill or on a demand for grant to the joint session of the full strength of the two houses, but in every other case the deciding voice shall be that of a joint session consisting of an equal number of represesentatives of the two houses. This will give an idea of the way in which the second chamber, as envisaged by the Princes, will block our progress.

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"At the cost of my Life."

WE confess we are not much impressed by the agitation that has been engineered in this country against Dr. Ambedkar, who it would appear asked for special electorates for returning representatives of the depressed classes to the federal legislature. We hope that no one will attach any importance in England to the protests that are being sent in heaps to the members of the R.T.C. The thoughtful sections of the depressed classes have full confidence in Dr. Ambedkar, who faithfully voices the sentiments of the suppressed communities. So far as Dr. Ambedkar's own position is concerned, we belive it is this: he believes in joint electorates; he prefers reservation in such electorates to a proportion of seats being set apart in communal electorates. This, he thinks, is clearly in the national interest. But he says if special electorates are granted to any community, they should be granted to the depressed classes too. One can well sympathise with him in this position. Mahatma Gandhi however is prepared to give special electorates to the Moslems and Sikhs, communities which are very well organised, but refuses them to the depressed classes, who are not organised at all. Between them, the depressed classes surely stand in far greater need of protection through special electorates than Mahomedans and Sikhs. But Mahatma Gandhi's logic works in a curious fashion: he is generous to the strong, but hard to the weak. He not only refuses special electorates to the depressed classes, but says he would fight their claim at the cost of his life. Mahatma Gandhi's life is much too precious to be wasted in such an unjust cause.

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Indecent Haste.

THE Railway Board proposes to discharge 10,000 employees of the different Indian railways. As must have been clear to it by now the proposal is open to more than one objection. In the first place, it presupposes a desire on its part to prejudge the findings of the Court of Inquiry which is at present going so exhaustively into the whole question of retrenchment. In the second place, it violates one of the important terms of the understanding arrived at in July last with the Railwaymen's Federation that all recognised unions would be given a month's notice about any contemplated retrenchment. But apart from this, the hurry with which they wish to proceed to effect this retrenchment cannot but be regarded as very indecent. It is the Federation's contention which we think is quite reasonable and which is endorsed even by the *Times of India* that the appointment by Government of the Court of inquiry was an invitation to both parties to the dispute, viz. the Railway Board and the railway employees, to observe the period of the Court's inquiry as a period of truce, necessitating the suspension of all activities on the part of either party which, may be likely to embarrass the other. Unsatisfactory as were the terms of reference of the Court to the Railwaymen's Federation, it yet decided to postpone the strike ballot until the results of the Court's inquiry were available. The Railway Board on the other hand seems to be unwilling to stay its hand but has betrayed an anxiety to precipitate matters. This is very unfair to the Federation which, rightly upset by the Board's proposal, has lodged an emphatic protest against it with the Court. It should be noted that an important part of the Court's inquiry is to examine the possibilities of the various alternatives to the Board's methods of

retrenchment that have been suggested. It may be that the Court will come to the conclusion that the discharge of low-paid railway employees is not the most suitable method of reducing railway expenditure and will suggest other means more acceptable to public opinion. The least the Board can do to facilitate the Court's none too easy a task is to await the conclusion of its labours before launching upon further action designed to fire a large number of poor and low-paid employees. This after all is nothing but giving the fullest scope to the method of negotiation as a means of settling differences. In the word of the paper already referred to, "There is, therefore, no justification whatever for the Railway Board's action which should at once be repudiated by the Government of India if the Board itself is unable to see reason."

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Railway Retrenchment.

THE Railway Retrenchment Committee whose report was published last week has been able to recommend economies to the tune of three crores of rupees in the different branches of railway activity under the Government of India. It expects a further saving of Rs. 2¼ crores if cuts in the salaries of railway employees on the scale suggested by it are carried out. The feature of these proposals that is sure to encounter stout resistance from public opinion is the one under which not even the lowest salary is exempted from the proposed cut. It proposes a graduated scale of reduction in salaries which varies between 3⅛ per cent. for salaries below Rs. 30 and 20 per cent. for those above Rs. 1500. The consideration which induced the Committee to apply the axe to all salaries, however low, was the fact that out of the total salary bill of Rs. 32 crores, as much as Rs. 14 crores was taken up with salaries which were less than Rs. 50 and Rs. 8 crores by those below Rs. 30. If the Committee had followed the example of other retrenchment committees in not expecting the lowpaid employees to sacrifice a part of their salaries the amount of its suggested economies would obviously have been smaller. Even as it is, the Committee has not been still able to recommend measures which would make both the ends of the Railway budget meet. There is still a deficit of Rs. 8¾ crores which remains to be met. Its justification for its action is of course the present national emergency. While nobody will deny that the Government is fully entitled to co-operation from everybody in its efforts to get over the present crisis care must be taken to see that its demands for assistance do not press with needless harshness upon the poor and the low-paid. It is one thing to deprive those drawing fat salaries of their superfluous income and it is another thing to deprive the low-paid railway employees of a part of their meagre income which hardly ensures them an adequate supply even of the necessaries of life. Equity demands this. But it may be pointed out that even without the proposed cuts the low-paid servants are already bearing more than their fair share of sacrifice by making indirect payments to Government in the form of increased taxation even on some necessaries of life like salt, kerosene, etc. This should have dictated to the Committee the desirablity of excluding salaries below Rs. 50 from its attention. Its better plan would clearly have been to suggest even a steeper scale of cuts in the salaries above Rs. 1500 than a uniform reduction of 20 per cent. in those above that figure. This would have obviated the necessity of taxing the poor employee beyond his capacity, which is virtually what its proposals, if carried out, would amount to. We hope the Government will find it possible to take a more equitable view of the matter.

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Articles.

FEDERALIZATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW.

IF there is one subject which ought to be placed on the federal list in our new polity it is the civil and criminal law; but such is the disdain in which political theory is held by members of the R.T.C. that not one member cared to hint at it even remotely in the Federal Structure Committee last year. Expediency was to them the ruling consideration, and they had persuaded themselves that expediency demanded that they should keep their counsel on this subject as well as on the subject of the election of the States' representatives. Even an appeal to the Princes to consider the advisability of federalising the civil and criminal law was taboo last year. The first member of the Federal Structure Committee to ask the Princes to give up this subject to the federal government in the common interest of us all was, we believe, Mr. Joshi, even as he was the first member to ask for the election of the States' representatives to the federal legislature. We can well imagine how this suggestion must have been laughed out of court by our "practical statesmen" and "constitutional experts", of whom there is no lack in the Committee. But weighty support was soon forthcoming for Mr. Joshi's plea for the federalization of the civil and criminal law in an unexpected quarter. Would it be believed that Sir Mahomed Shafi fully endorsed the suggestion that the Princes should be willing to assign this subject to the federal government?

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru could not believe his ears when he first heard the suggestion made. As soon as Sir Mahomed Shafi argued for the elimination of the central subjects by federalising some subjects left to the States and by provincialising some others left to the central government, Sir Tej Bahadur concluded in his own mind that Sir Mahomed must be arguing for giving up the body of civil and criminal law to the provinces in British India, and asked excitedly: "What does Sir M. Shafi mean? Does he mean that there should be provincialization of civil law and criminal law?" Sir Mahomed coolly replied: "I do not intend to provincialise that." "For the sake of uniformity I am prepared to federalise that subject." It must have taken Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's breath away, this exhibition, not indeed of ignorance of constitutional law, but of inexpediency and impolicy. If even such a responsible and conservative politician as Sir Mahomed is not to pay heed to the feelings of the Princes, how is the federation to be brought into being? Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and a number of his colleagues must have thrown up their hands in despair.

But surely the central subjects cannot continue to be central for ever; they must disappear at some time or other. Sir Mahomed Shafi, Mr. Zafrullah Khan, Dr. Shafaat Ahmed Khan, Mr. Joshi and Dr. Ambedkar must therefore be congratulated upon bringing to the notice of the Conference the grave

complications that will necessarily arise by retaining the central subjects and upon pressing for their elimination, if not now, in course of time. The Moslem members and Mr. Joshi and Dr. Ambedkar are supposed to be favouring the process of elimination for contrary reasons, the former because they want to exalt the provincial governments at the expense of the federal government, and the latter because they want to exalt the federal government at the expense of the States' governments. Sir Mahomed Shafi has shown however that this suspicion is not entirely just, because, in the matter of the civil and criminal law, he too like Mr. Joshi and Dr. Ambedkar asks, not that the provincial governments be placed in charge of civil and criminal law in British India, but that the States' governments be deprived of it and the federal government be put in control over the whole of the country. It remains to be seen whether at a later stage some of the members of the Federal Structure Committee revise their ideas of expediency and support Sir Mahomed's appeal to the Princes to make some sacrifice of their power in the interest of the nation. It is more than a little doubtful whether Sir M. Shafi will receive support. The probability is that most members will convince themselves that he is in some unknown way really manœuvring for a communal advantage, and that the manœuvre must be countered by supporting the Princes!

But the practical difficulties of keeping two sets of subjects—central and federal—in the Government of India are enormous, and Sir Mahomed in his speech pointed them out very clearly. He was speaking on Federal Finance, and had to bring his remarks into relation with this subject. Therefore he particularly referred to the budget; but his remarks hold good in respect of other matters equally well. He said:

> Now, there will be the central executive. We are all agreed that with the exception of the Crown subjects there will be joint responsibility of the Cabinet. This Cabinet will have on it at least one representative of the Indian States. Now, when the question of the annual budget is first discussed in the Cabinet, will this representative of the Indian States have a right to take part in the Cabinet discussions relating to the budget connected with the central subjects? If the reply is Yes, I say that it is absolutely inconsistent, from a constitutional point of view, with the position that you are creating. What right has he, from a constitutional point of view, to enter into a discussion of central subjects? But if he is not to take part in those discussions what about your joint responsibility? The position thus created is in the highest degree anomalous, I venture to say.
>
> The Chairman: Quite right.
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> Sir. M. Shafi: Now let us come to the discussions in the legislature. Where are you to draw the line? It will be very difficult indeed to draw the line, for the repercussions of some of the decisions taken by the legislature in connection with some measures of central legislation on the Indian States may well entitle the representatives of the Indian States to claim in the legislature that they have the right to take part in legislative discussions during the discussion of certain subjects, while the representatives of British India will say that these subjects being central subjects concerning mainly British India, the representatives of the Indian States have no right to take part in those discussions. You will create for yourselves, if I may venture to say so, by the recognition of this central group, neither fish nor fowl nor good red herring (as I call it). You will land yourselves into difficulties which I submit are in the highest degree detrimental to the best interests of India.

The logic of this reasoning cannot be challenged, and the conclusion to which it leads cannot be resisted, viz. that the retention of the central subjects for all time in the federal government is "in the highest degree detrimental to the best interests of India". Since Sir Mahomed Shafi's proposal on the subject of the civil and criminal law is for expanding the federal instead of the provincial list, why should not others who are in favour of federalisation join with him in pleading with the Princes for allocating this subject to the federal government? But, one fears, they will not.

THE PRINCIPLE OF WEIGHTAGE.

WE showed last week how Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru invoked political theory to prove that nomination of the States' representatives to the upper chamber was not only defensible on the ground of expediency, but obligatory on the ground of principle. The theory advanced by him is not supported by any political scientist; but it succeeded in creating an impression in the Federal Structure Committee that in the second chamber at any rate the Princes were playing the game. We find that, on the question of weightage also, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru brought in political theory to justify the Princes' demand for weightage and thus did much to mislead his colleagues on the Federal Structure Committee. Here too our complaint is that he supported the claim for weightage on the ground of principle and not merely of expediency. If he had argued that, as a matter of compromise, the Princes might be given overweighted representation in the upper chamber, one would possibly differ from him, but one could at least understand his position. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, however, is not content to base his advocacy on the ground of expediency, but claims to base it on the ground of principle, and that is where we join issue with him. The correct principle in this matter was voiced by Mr. Joshi, who said that the amount of representation should be proportionate to the population. He was the first, we believe, to enunciate a correct doctrine in this respect in the Federal Structure Committee, as he was the first to advocate election of the States' representatives and the federalisation of civil and criminal law.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's part in supporting the Princes' demand for weightage is all the more to be deprecated because he supported it when such prominent delegates as Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Zafrullah Khan and Dr. Shafaat Ahmed Khan had taken the line that the demand could not be justified. The ground on which Sir Tej justified weightage in the upper chamber is the principle of equality of representation for all federated units in the second chamber, irrespective of population or size. But this principle cannot obviously apply here. For the federating units in the present case are not British Indian provinces as a whole on the one hand and the Indian States as a whole on the other. Unless the confederation scheme is accepted, the federating units are going to be British Indian provinces and the Indian States severally. To carry out Sir Tej Bahadur's principle, it would be necessary to give equal representation to all the provinces and all the States, without regard to population and size; or at any rate to give weightage to individual provinces and States. The theory suggested by Sir Tej gives us no warrant for considering the claim of the States as one *bloc* on British India as another *bloc*. This was very well expressed by Mr. Zafrullah Khan, who followed up his argument on the ground of abstract theory by an equally cogent argument on the ground of practical necessity. He said:

> The Federal Structure Committee has made a recommendation that the federating units will be the Indian States or groups of States on one side and British Provinces on the other. Therefore, as I submitted in my very first speech to this Committee, there will be no question of preponderance of any unit in this federation. But let us go further than this theory and let us look at actualities for the moment. Now I realise that if British India were coming into the federation as one unit; if British India as one entity had common interests which might under some possible circumstances come into clash with the common interests of the States among themselves; if British India had one separate culture and the States another; if British India were inhabited by one race and the States by another race; if the people of British India were the adherents of one faith and the people of the Indian States of another faith; if there were any such cleavage or division between British India as a whole on one side and the Indian States as a whole on the other, there would have been the strongest reason for Their Highnesses insisting that, being the smaller partner in the federation, they should be given a certain amount of weightage; and that would have been met generously on the side of Brjtish India. But, happily, there is no such difference. As Their Highnesses have themselves said, very often the division of interests and the question of voting will be decided on the ground of regional distribution rather than on the question of the yellow or the red colour on the map.
>
> That being so, my submission is that, having regard to the fact that matters that are of supreme importance to the States and are peculiar to them are being excluded from the Federation, the Federation relating only to certain matters of common interest between Indian India and British India, and also including the policy, legislation and administration of certain subjects that are entirely British Indian subjects, I would beg Their Highnesses to reconsider this question of weightage."

Any other person would have been glad of this support in the Moslem quarter for the theory of proportionate representation, which must be maintained unless there are overriding reasons necessitating a departure. Instead of examining Mr. Zafrullah Khan's contention from this standpoint, Sir Tej could not resist the temptation of twitting him with inconsistency inasmuch as he asked for weightage for his community but would deny it to the Princes. Mr. Zafrullah Khan, however, had given his reasons for such disicrimination. Whether the reasons are satisfactory or not is a different matter, but what a real statesman would have done in these circumstances is to take full advantage of the right stand taken by the Moslems on the States' question and plead unitedly with the Princes. Mr. Jinnah too supported Mr. Zafrullah Khan's position. He said:—

> The view that we take is this, that having regard to the fact that the Indian States are coming in for certain specific matters *which are of such negligible quantity* for the purpose of an all-India federation, and having regard to their stake, they do not need weightage. After all, what is the weightage for? The weightage is for the purpose of protecting the interests of a party. What is the interest of the Indian States which will not be protected if they are given representation without weightage. I see no ground that has been put forward yet which can convince us that their interests will be jeopardised unless they get weightage."

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, on the contrary, supported the claim for weightage, and adduced the following reason therefor:—

> I do suggest that the Indian States are most vitally interested in matters which produce revenue, in matters which affect their exchequer, and in matters which affect their subjects. I suggest that so long as there are matters like Customs and Railways, and things of that kind, which produce revenue, and which affect large tracts of territory in British India and the Indian States, they are entitled to see that their views are put forward adequately and by a sufficient number of representatives.

So far everyone will agree. But look at the next sentence:

> On that principle I do suggest that it would be right and fair that they should get weightage in the upper house.

How many fallacies this single sentence contains! Because the States are entitled to have sufficient representation they are entitled to weightage! This would be true only if weightage was absolutely necessary in

order to get sufficient representation. If it be so, British India too should get weightage. British India too must have a sufficient number of representatives, and therefore must have weightage. Again, if the States are entitled to weightage, how does it follow that they are entitled to weightage only in the upper house? If weightage is permissible, why should they not have it in both houses? Sir Tej however would allow it only in the upper house and not in the lower. His reason for this discrimination is:

> There (in the popular house) I would like to ask Their Highnesses why is it that they want a weightage in the lower house? For whose benefit is it, and in whose interest? After all when you bear in mind that there is going to be a provision for a joint session of the two houses, whenever there is a conflict within the two houses on any material question, there does not seem to be any valid reason for weightage so far as the lower house is concerned.

That the final decisions are taken in the joint session is rather a reason for giving weightage to the Princes in the lower chamber. This is the larger and more numerous body; it is therefore clear that, on Sir Tej Bahadur's reasoning, they should have weightage in this house, if in any. If the upper chamber by its own vote could veto the lower chamber's decision, then it could be argued that it would be enough for the Princes to have excessive representation in the upper house. But this house can be overridden by a joint session in which their weightage in the upper chamber will avail them little unless they also enjoy weightage in the lower chamber, which is to be about twice the size of the upper chamber. So much is therefore clear: that Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's theory is all wrong; his contentions can at best be supported by an appeal to expediency. On the latter question opinions will differ. We for our part feel that Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Zafrullah Khan have much the better of the argument in this dispute. But whatever that be, there is no doubt that, judged from the point of view of political principle, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has not a leg to stand upon.

Our European Letter.

ENGLAND'S CRISIS.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

GENEVA, OCT. 9.

WHEN, not so very long ago, Monsieur Andre Siegfried published a book on England under this name, he was much criticised, specially by those who had neglected to notice or attached little significance to the appendage in smaller type, "in the twentieth century". Unworthy motives were ascribed to the reputed scholar and it was loudly suggested that giddy with their momentary triumph, the French were intent on publishing England's misfortunes so as to belittle her credit in the world. Few can now deny that Monsieur Siegfried's analysis has been confirmed in the present crisis in a manner which none would have cared to assert when the book appeared. There were two principal points on which the Professor stressed the vitiation of England's political and economic systems, and in the light of this thesis, it is interesting to examine the manifesto which Mr. MacDonald has just issued and the appeal which he broadcasted to the nation by way of opening his election campaign. "The Government", said the Prime Minister, "has been compelled to ask the country for a mandate and support which can be weakened by no opposition either organized or disorganized" because "world conditions and events in the House of Commons and outside weakened the confidence which the late Government had begun to establish, and when certain incidents in the navy, exaggerated and misinterpreted, were known all over the world, the task for which the Government had been formed could not succeed". But there is also another goal which the National Government will strive to reach.

> For some time the goods which we have been importing have exceeded the value of the goods we have been exporting, including the profit we get from international services like shipping. The man in the street does not notice this, but he will by and by, because unless it is stopped the State will become bankrupt. It is just like a person who is living habitually above his income. For a time he can do it by eating into his capital, and after that by borrowing, but at last he reaches the dead end. He is done for. Therefore we have determined to balance our exports and imports.

The election campaign has just started and it is yet too early to say what are the chances of Mr. MacDonald's appeal being met with the response he desires. Some attempt may, however, be made to indicate the nature of the forces with which he has to deal. While the Conservatives, including the Rothermere-Beaverbrook group, fully support Mr. MacDonald, apparently in the belief that the main issues are firstly, a decisive battle with Socialism and secondly, the inauguration of protectionist regime, with Imperial unity as a corollary, neither the larger part of the Socialists nor a very influential group among the Liberals will have anything to do with this National Government. The *Daily Herald* declares, "we believe that the country will refuse to be bamboozled by insolent appeals for national unity" and the *Manchester Guardian*, "all this talk about 'National' Government is a waste of breath. It is patent nonsense not only because there is no 'National' Government, but because it would be of no particular consequence if there were." Mr. Baldwin has stated in his manifesto that he will continue to press upon the electors his view that "the traffic is the quickest and most effective weapon not only to reduce excessive imports, but to enable us to induce other countries to lower their tariff walls". But Sir Herbert Samuel, the 'National' Liberal, who, if elected, has consented to be Mr. Baldwin's colleague in the new Government, says:—

> We were told that the Prime Minister is working for a doctor's mandate to give the patient whatever treatment he requires. It is proverbial that doctors differ. Our task is to try to arrive at a correct diagnosis and to prescribe an agreed cure. If we do not, our only agree-

ment might be at the 'post mortem' and our only common opinion might be as to the cause of death.

Mr. Henderson said in his closing speech at the National Labour Party's Conference at Scarborough:

> We know now the primary object that this combination had in view when it decided upon a General Election, for we were informed from high authority yesterday that the decision of the Cabinet means that all parties to the decision have realized the overwhelming importance of inflicting upon the Socialist party a crushing defeat. We go forward to the conflict of these next few weeks with a determination more grim and more earnest than I can remember in my political experience, and in the belief that we can emerge the victors.

And Major G. Lloyd George, son of Mr. Lloyd George, who is still confined to his room, in the course of a letter he has written to the Prime Minister, relinquishing his position in the Government as Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, says:

> Your decision to favour an immediate dissolution can mean nothing less than that the Conservatives have been successful in stampeding the country into a rash and ill-timed General Election, from which they hope to snatch a party majority. This will enable them to compel the Government, however national in name, to enact the full Tory programme of protectionist tariffs, including the taxation of food, and to maintain throughout the lifetime of the new Parliament a policy of general reaction.

So much for the party politics in Great Britain. Abroad, powerful forces are at work and, as the Prime Minister has himself admitted, the financial situation of the country, as it stands at present, cannot but be affected by the peculiar world conditions prevailing to-day. The situation in Germany is serious. The Cabinet crisis still continues and there is a visible tendency on the part of the Chancellor to move towards the Right. The renunciation of the gold standard by Britain has complicated the German financial problem. If, as a result of the pound crisis, there were a general demand on the Reichsbank when the present agreement lapses in February Germany could not meet it. The alternatives would be an extension of the agreement or the declaration of a moratorium. The subject would undoubtedly form part of the conversations between the American President and the French Premier during the latter's stay in Washington. Reports from the United States in the past few days have deepened the conviction that the American Government will push forward more firmly than ever the view that an extension of the moratorium period is necessary for an improvement of international financial conditions. The French Government, however, is more likely to favour an adjustment of these debts than the continuation of a moratorium which loses much of its efficiency from the uncertainty of its duration, without resolving the question how far, if at all, the present international obligations will be discharged. The French Government's attitude would become obdurate if the Nazis and Nationalists attained power in Germany.

In this world crisis, a united British Government, unembarrassed by acute domestic dissensions, could take the lead in evolving a new order. Will Great Britain emerge from this election strong enough to exercise this initiative? Upon the answer to this question depends her future as one of the world's foremost Powers. That is England's crisis in the present century.

SHORT NOTICES.

RELIGION AND CULTURE. BY T. L. VASWANI. (Ganesh & Co., Madras.) 1930. 14cm. 93p. As. 12.

THIS small book which is well get-up and nicely printed makes fascinating reading. The book embodies the full text of a thesis written by Prof. Vaswani for the Indian Culture Conference held at Kangri in connection with the Gurukul anniversary. Representatives of different religions met together at this Conference and every representative stressed his own religious contribution to Indian culture.

The author says in his foreword that his reading of Indian history has taught him that religion is an important element in the thought and life of India. Only let us be careful, he warns us, not to confound religion with creeds and forms. Sectarianism is the very negation of religion. The author deprecates the present tendency of opposing culture to religion which is evident in Soviet Russia and which is also echoed by many young men in our country. A Godless culture which has for its motto "There is no higher power to save us" is being attempted in Soviet Russia, but in the author's opinion, religion and culture understood in their essence are not rivals. Religion looked at historically and sociologically has made important contributions to culture and civilization. Historically, the great religious geniuses of the race have been saviours of civilizations. Not only the prophets and saints but even many of their disciples have again and again put up a fight against the spirit of religion, which is the spirit of freedom and fellowship.

Humanism in the west turns away from God. Humanism of the Gita and the Upanishads turns to God. Both religion and culture ask for the inner renewal of the individual. This inner renewal is needed to transform our nervous heavy-laden technical civilization into a new civilization of simplicity and strength. To such a civilization the Rishis have borne witness through the ages.

The Rishis belong not to India alone. In every religion, in every age, in the East as well as in the West have they appeared—the true supermen of history. In the Rishis may be found the key to history and in a new creative vital cooperation with the wisdom of the Rishis lies the hope of India. Something better, broader, nobler, richer, something more true to the spirit of Indian history and genius of Indian life is India's need. This small volume makes a vigorous plea for the Hindu religion and culture

V. C. GOKHALE.

RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS SUITED TO INDIA. BY R. S. DESHPANDE. (Author, Saraswat Brahmin Colony, Poona 2.) 1931. 25cm. 299p. Rs. 6/-

THE book contains many valuable hints for those who are contemplating building houses. Comfort and convenience have been kept in view and plans have been given to suit all tastes and purses. Many of the plans are suitable for those with western ideas with regard to the drawing and other rooms in the front of the house, but yet follow Indian modes of life. The convenience of Indian ladies has been particularly catered for in some of the plans. Altogether it is a valuable book for the householder, giving as it does succinct reasons for locating different rooms in different positions.

GUNDAPPA S. KURPAD.

LEGISLATIVE ORGANS.

MR. JOSHI'S SPEECH IN FEDERAL STRUCTURE COMMITTEE.

Mr. N. M. Joshi, M.L.A., made the following speech in the Federal Structure Committee of the Round Table Conference on the 23rd September when speaking on the question of the "Relations between the two Legislative Chambers".

SIR, before I offer any remarks on the particular subjects I would be permitted to make one or two general observations. In his speech His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner yesterday said that some members of this Committee maintained that they had a right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Indian States. I feel that so far as I could follow the proceedings of this Committee there was not a single member who maintained that he would advocate interference in the domestic affairs of the Indian States. What some of us did maintain was that if the Princes desired to enter the Federation the matters which are concerned with that Federation are not domestic affairs of the Indian States, they are matters of common concern; and to that extent the approval of both British India and Indian India is absolutely necessary. If interference in these matters is to be regarded as interference, then we claim that it is a legitimate interference. We feel that the character of the legislatures in India is not a domestic affair of the Indian States; it is a matter of common concern. And when we claim what the character of the Federal legislatures should be we claim that we offer no interference in the domestic affairs of the States, and if that is an interference we again claim that it is a legitimate interference.

May I also say that it was said that there were some members who had imputed selfish motives to the Princes in joining the Indian Federation? Again, Sir, I have not heard any member attribute merely selfish motives to the Princes. I myself referred to this point and I made it quite clear that the Princes are desirous of entering the Federation both out of consideration for their own interests and out of patriotic motives.

H. H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: I think the words you used were "selfish and patriotic reasons."

Mr. Joshi: I maintain that the Princes are desirous of entering the Federation both out of consideration of their own interests, as well as out of patriotic motives. I feel that if the Princes are entering the Federation only from philanthropic motives they are not likely to secure the kind of federation which will be in the interests of the whole of India. I feel that the Federation must serve the interests of British India as well as of Indian India.

The Chairman: I rather want to think of India as India; not as British India and Indian India. Let us drop the adjectives.

Mr. Joshi: His Highness made an appeal to the members representing British India to place greater confidence in the representatives of the States. I felt, on account of the unique position which H. H. the Maharaja of Bikaner holds, that his appeal should have been for greater *mutual* confidence, than an appeal for greater confidence in the Indian States. It is, I believe, a greater measure of mutual confidence that will lead to the proper settlement of this question, rather than one side putting greater confidence in the other.

I wish now to discuss very briefly the various sub-heads. The first one to which I will refer is the total strength of the two Chambers. My own view is that the larger the number, the better it is for the representation of the various interests in India. I would roughly suggest that the number should be about 600 for the Lower House. My object in stating this number is that for the proper representation of the various interests and communities it is a better plan to be able to secure multi-member constituencies of manageable size. I feel that a constituency for an area of manageable size should not include more than an area equal to the average area of two British Indian districts. A district is a defined term in India. There would be about 125 constituencies. If we are going to have multi-member constituencies there should be on an average 3, if not 4, members for each constituency. I would have on an average between 3 and 4 members for each constituency, so that we may have, out of this number, a representation of the majority population, a representation of the minority communities, and a representation of the major economic interests. I feel that this arrangement is a much better arrangement if we take a longer view of our needs. Therefore, unless we have a sufficiently large number approaching 600 we shall not be able to get a multi-member constituency of a manageable size. For that reason I have suggested the number 600. It is quite possible that when a Committee is appointed, and when we know all the facts as to the number of Provinces, and the method of the representation of the States, we may be able to fix a definite number, but my view is that it cannot be less than 600. I also say that it should not very much exceed 700. I would put the number at between 600 and 700.

As regards the Council of State, I would put the number at about 400, and to make an adjustment in the Provinces, the numbers in the Legislatures, and the representation of various interests, increase that number up to 500. I would, therefore, keep the number between 400 and 500.

H. H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: Is that the Upper House?

Mr. Joshi: That is the Upper House. I feel here again that a larger number will facilitate the proper representation of the various communities and interests.

Sir. M. Dadabhoy: At any rate H. H. the Maharaja of Bikaner will have no grouse if it is 500.

H. H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: I do not know about 500.

Mr. Joshi: Taking it for granted that the election of the Upper House will be by the members of the

provincial legislatures, still, if all interests are to be represented, the number of members to be elected by each provincial council must be sufficiently large. Unless that number is large, many interests will go without representation, or we shall have to find methods of representation which will not be satisfactory to these interests. I feel that if we keep a larger number in view that will also be convenient for the proper representation of the States. I know that it may be said that it is not our business to discuss how the representation of the States should be effected, but it is open to us to say that if we keep in view a large number it will be more convenient for the representation of the States. It is not quite correct to say that it is not the concern of the representatives of British India how the States should be represented. I feel that the settlement of this great issue which is before us depends also to some extent upon how the States are represented. If every State, or the larger number of States, are to be represented only by one member, we shall have to consider how the representation which is claimed by the minority communities is likely to be effected. The minority communities have claimed a representation. The Muslim minority especially has claimed a representation of 33⅓ per cent. of the total Federal Legislature. We are not yet told by their Highnesses whether they propose to reserve any proportion of their representation for, say, the representation of the Muslim interests, or for the representation of the Depressed Classes, or for the representation of Labour. They have not stated anything upon this point. I do not know whether they propose to say anything upon the point, but I feel that unless there is some fair representation of the different communities and interests from the representation of the States also there is not going to be a settlement in this Conference at all. For that proper representation of the various interests, even from the quota of the Indian States, what is really necessary is that the number of representatives should be large, and that there should be multi-member constituencies. It is on that account that I feel that the institution of multi-member constituencies and the largeness of the number will help in the solution of the most difficult questions which are before us.

I shall now, Sir, take up question No. 3, the basis of the apportionment of the total number of seats between the States and British India. On this point my view is that the seats in the Legislatures should be distributed between British India and the Indian States, and even between the Provinces in British India, on the only possible basis, that of population. I feel, Sir, that if all the difficulties that we are likely to meet in this Conference are to be avoided, it is better to accept a principle which will be found by all to be a reasonable principle; then everybody should accept that principle, and then only will there be a settlement. From that point of view I feel that there is no better principle than the principle of distributing the representation according to population. Judging by that principle, I feel, Sir, that the proposal made by His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner is likely to lead to difficulty. He is asking on behalf of the States a representation in the Lower Chamber of 33⅓ per cent.; he is asking for a weightage of 10 per cent. over the population basis. In the Upper Chamber he is asking for a 50 per cent. representation. According to population, the representation should be 23·8 per cent; so that in the Upper Chamber the States are asking for more than double their representation on the population basis. Whatever may be the feeling of the people who are gathered round this Table, I feel that a demand to have a representation more than double the share which is due to that part of the Federation on the basis of population is likely to create difficulty. I therefore feel that the distribution should be merely on the basis of population.

There is, Sir, another justification for that principle. His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner stated that the States will not agree to any other but an indirect tax. If we now take that as a basis, and if you consider the contributions from the various units of the Federation to the Federal Government, you will come to the conclusion that the contributions of the various units of the federation to the Federal Government, will be in accordance with their population. Sir, I am pointing out that if the distribution is likely to be based upon the revenue which each unit brings to the Federal Government then the basis of population is the only basis that will be arrived at. If the taxation is to be indirect, if the taxes are customs and the salt tax, then the taxes are bound to be contributed on the population basis, each State will contribute to the Federal Government revenue in proportion to its population, roughly speaking. Judging the question therefore, on the basis of the contribution made by each unit to the federation in revenue, I feel that the population basis will be found to be the only just and fair basis.

Then, Sir, His Highness on behalf of the States claims that, whatever be the number of States that join the federation, those States must get the total quantity of representation which may be allotted to all the States. I did not hear any argument in justification of this claim. I know that His Highness of Bikaner is going to speak later on, and we shall all be very interested to hear any justification of this. I myself feel, Sir, that so far as I can judge there is no justification for this claim. If the States were one single unit acting on behalf of all, then I could understand that group saying that any one of us can exercise the vote on behalf of all; but if the States cannot do that, I do not think there can be any justification for the claim that even if only a few States join, they should get the full quota of representation which is due to the whole of India India. I am not, therefore, in favour of the claims made on behalf of the Indian States.

I do not wish to speak much on the question of the division of representation between the different Provinces. I again hold that there too the fairest way of distributing the representation in the Federal Legislature between the Provinces is on the basis of

population. I quite realise that there are some Provinces which may have their representation reduced while there are some Provinces which may get more representation; but, Sir, if this question is likely to be settled it must be settled on the basis of justice and fairness. I fully realise that my own Province will lose its representation to a great extent; but I feel that if my Province wants to join a federation, it must accept a principle which is fair and which is just.

Mr. Sastri: Has your Province or any British Province a choice?

Mr. Joshi: Well, the Provinces may not have a choice; but if the Provinces want now to have a federation, and a federation of a right kind, of a just and fair kind, they must accept a principle which is a fair principle. I therefore feel that we should accept the principle of distributing the representation between the Provinces of British India on the basis of population.

Sir, before I close I want to say one word as to this. Some of us who differ from the views of some distinguished leaders in this Committee are told that we do not face the realities. I do not consider it to be a discredit to be an idealist, but, Sir, I hold that the principles which we enunciate and the proposals which we make are made with a full realisation of the realities of the situation. But there is this difference: some people understand some realities but forget the other realities. When we were asked to face realities what was meant was that if we insisted upon certain things, the federation might not come into existence.

I feel, Sir, that if the members who are gathered round this table make proposals and then insist that unless these proposals are accepted as they stand there will be not federation, this is not facing realities; this is delivering ultimatums, and I hope there will be nobody in this Committee who will confront us with such ultimatums. We have gathered here to discuss different proposals, and nobody should make us feel that unless we agree to certain principles we shall not be facing realities.

MR. SASTRI'S SPEECH.

Following Mr. Joshi, Mr. Sastri addressed the Federal Structure Committee on the 23rd September as under :—

LORD Chancellor, may I begin by making one or two general observations? Last year Federation appeared to most of us as the only solution of the difficulties in which India found herself, and every section of those represented here was willing, in order to make Federation possible, to meet the views of the other sections and agree to as many modifications of their own pet ideas as might seem necessary for the purpose. I was very happy to hear yesterday that the Maharaja of Bikaner, who represents the Order of the Princes with such great ability, was still an adherent of Federation. There could never have been the slightest question on that head, if any single person here drives this coach of Federetion it is His Highness (*Cheers*). Our debt to him is incalculable.

For that reason he appealed to us yesterday—not for the first nor even for the second time—to appreciate the difficulties of the Princes and the Governments of the Princes and to make as large an allowance as possible for their special points of view. I believe, Lord Chancellor, that upon this side there has been in general no inadequate response to that demand. The difficulties of the Princes are only partially known to us, the rest can be guessed from occasional references that occur in the speeches made by their representatives, and I for one am prepared to believe that the task to which the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes and those who work with him have set their hands is by no means easy. I am willing, therefore, to go very much out of the way, as it were, to meet these very special difficulties.

But there is one point of fact which requires, in my judgment, to be put right in this matter. In speaking about Federation and the work of this Committee in India, His Highness of Bikaner and some other members of his order have constantly said that we on this side requested them to enter into a scheme of Federation and that they willingly agreed to meet our request. This statement has been so often made—and it was made again by His Highness yesterday—that it acquires some little importance, for it is made the basis of a request, often repeated, that we on the British Indian side should therefore, for the reason that we were the initiators of this idea, make it easy for the Princes to come in.

My Lord, that is a correct representation of what took place only at the final stage when we met here last year. The real fact is that British India alone was concerned in the political agitation that led to the summoning of this Conference. We always thought that it was British India that was going to have Dominion Status, and for my own part, as you all remember, I admitted that I was a slow convert to the Federation idea.

Lord Chancellor, if I may lift the veil somewhat from the proceedings that went on in my own heart, I became such a convert because of the blandishments of His Highness of Bikaner and others here ("*Hear, hear*"). I listened to him and to other representatives of the order, and especially the able and talented secretariat that have been carrying on propaganda on behalf of Federation. It is therefore the Princes that started the idea of Federation; it is the Princes who drew us in; and it would not be too much to ask, therefore, that from the Princes some consideration is due to us for the difficulties of the British Indian side. And that instead of all the demands proceeding from one side and the concessions from the other, sometimes we might also make requests of Their Highnesses, and they should be willing to listen to our difficulties.

Now, His Highness yesterday mentioned the figure of 250 as perhaps the safest and soundest figure for the Upper Chamber. We all thought last year of a much smaller figure. I remember His Highness of Bikaner always foresaw that pressure would be brought to bear from one side and another and that the number would have to be incre-

ased. I admire his prescience in this as in other matters, but His Highness did not make it clear to us how he arrived at the figure of 250. Apparently 125 is the figure to be set apart for the representation of the princes in the Upper Chamber, and thus he arrives at a total of 250, because he goes in for a 50/50 basis.

Now, how is the 125 arrived at? His Highness again was silent on the point, but I gather that one of their difficulties is that those Princes and States which are in their own right members of the Chamber of Princes desire that they should have at least one member to represent them in the Upper Chamber, and that as that number exceeds 100 by a small figure we have to provide for 125. I think that roughly represents the process of reasoning by which that figure is arrived at. I sympathise very much with that idea. It is impossible, when certain Princes find places in the Chamber in their own right, to go and tell them that they should come into a Federation in favour of which they part with some of their sovereign rights, but that neither in the Upper nor in the Lower Chamber will these weighty and considerable Princes, some of them at least, find representation. I am willing, therefore, that we should take the figure, so far as the Princes are concerned, up to 125. Then what follows? I part company with His Highness as to the 50/50 basis. I adhere still to the proportion which I mentioned last year 40 to 60. In that case the figure in the Upper Chamber would be much larger than 250; possibly it would be something like 350 or 375; and if that is the case, as in this country we shall have the two Chambers nearly equally large numerically. For the Lower Chamber our idea roughly is that there should be one representative to each million of India's population, and as it would be impossible to keep it rigidly at that figure, we must have some higher figure. 400, I should think, would be the least that would satisfy the demands of the situation.

Mr. Joshi apprehends, not without reason, that under pressure from the various interests and communities that ask for special representation, and not only for special representation but for special representation with weightage, it will be necessary to bring the figure to somewhere in the neighbourhood of 600. I do not know; but it is much easier to increase the figure, I am sure, than it is to keep it within bounds. However, about 350 for the Upper and 400 for the Lower appear to me at present to be the figures that we may take as our starting point.

There is one other matter of importance to which, it appears to me that I had better draw the attention of the Committee at once. An idea has been put forward in answer to one of the sub-heads of your questionaire that the States which initially come in, although only a fraction of the total number of States, should get all the representation that we assign to the States as a whole until such time as other States come in when, by prescribed rotation, seats should be surrendered by those that enjoy extra representation. I still do not understand the principle upon which this arrangement is proposed. I have heard in regard to physical nature that nature abhors a vacuum. Is it also to be understood that if certain States should not come in, their seats should not lie vacant for them until they come in but that somebody should snap them up? Let me take Mysore as an instance of a State that chooses to stay out for a time. I take Mysore as an example because it seems to me the least probable. Supposing Mysore had two seats under our scheme, and it did not come in say for 2 years, is it more in the nature of things that the adjoining Presidencies of Madras and Bombay should get that representation, or that Jaipur and Jodhpur and Kashmir should claim it? Is it to be understood that as between the Indian States there is some subtle bond which makes them the residuary legatees of each other? I cannot see why this is put forward. On the other hand, I heard His Highness of Bikaner himself say yesterday that as he foresaw the working of our legislatures in the future there would be regional bonds created rather than bonds upon the question of whether it was British India or Indian India. If that is the case, it is much more natural for these vacant seats to be given to neighbouring British India than to other Indian States. But I am not asking for that, I am only asking that the seats which remain vacant should remain warm for those States to which they naturally belong. I cannot see how States, for instance, like Kashmir or Jodhpur should, relatively to British India, relatively to Mysore, relatively to Madras and Bombay, not only start with an additional representation due to weightage, but, furthermore, receive an accession of strength by reason of some other States standing out for the time. It seems to me that that is an arrangement for which very little justification can be pleaded.

There is another point to which I would like to draw the attention of the Committee. My friend Mr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, and Mr. Joshi to some extent following him, have pleaded that in both Houses the representation should be determined according to the population of the units represented. Now, My Lord, if we were speaking of a homogeneous India, that arrangement would work very well; but India is not homogeneous politically or racially or by any other criterion that we may think of. It is not possible to apply any one principle rigidly and without qualifications. Population is perhaps on the whole the most just and sound factor to be taken into consideration; but other factors have also to be taken into consideration; so that when we distribute the seats between British India and the Indian States it is not possible to confine ourselves solely to this criterion. I go further and say that even as between the Provinces of British India it will not be possible to carry this test too rigidly into our arrangements. I was a member of the Franchise Committee which settled the proportion in the various Legislatures last time, in the year 1920. As we went round and enquired we found very very different considerations brought to bear upon our work. Population, area, prestige, representation hitherto enjoyed, the enterprise and wealth of the

populations, and so on, and so on. I do not believe that any Franchise Committee that we may appoint in future will be able to reject all these considerations and confine itself to this criterion of population alone. We must be prepared to accept various relaxations of this principle, however sound it may appear to be, and however just and equitable it may appear to be, and to abide by arrangements which an impartial and influential committee to be appointed hereafter may determine. I do not think that we are going round this table to settle this problem altogether. There is one thing to which this last observation naturally leads.

Their Highnesses will allow me for a moment to refer to this question of the distribution of the Indian India quota among the various States. This subject is so important that, although I am unwilling, I feel almost compelled to make one observation. The Indian States, as has been repeatedly pointed out, include a very large number of unimportant entities which have been included in the list. H. H. the Maharaja of Bikaner has pointed out repeatedly that we on this side are wrong to mention the figure of 572 or 600. He says that this large figure is mentioned merely to frighten everybody. That may be the case, but in all his statements I have never yet met with his own figure. What are the criteria according to which he would exclude some of this large number which any Government of India list gives us, and so excluding them, what is the residual figure that he gives? No one has made a pronouncement upon this subject hitherto, and I should very much like that matter thrashed out a little more so that we can see the magnitude of the problem. I am mentioning this only to show that while we are all agreed upon general considerations, no one (not even His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner whose knowledge of this matter is unrivalled) is able to give us a satisfactory solution. The satisfactory solution is very difficult to arrive at. Already this morning the representative of one of the very important States in India not included in the Chamber of Princes (Sir Mirza Ismail) has definitely told us that the distribution of seats as between the Princes is so difficult a matter that it could not be left to the Chamber of Princes, or to any of its representatives, but it should be referred to an impartial Committee. Machinery of that kind it may be necessary to devise, and from this side of the table I wish to make an appeal to Their Highnesses to take the lead in this matter. Do not consider that in giving advice, or in making a suggestion, we are overstepping the bounds of propriety. Your Lordship is never tired when we speak of this subject of reminding us that we must think of India as a whole, and not of this section or of that section of India. The distribution of seats among the Indian States is a matter upon whose settlement so much depends for the safe working of our federal machinery. I would, therefore, beg Their Highnesses to take Sir M. Ismail's suggestion into very earnest consideration, and, if possible, to arrive at some solution of the problem which will make, not only that part of the Indian States which are represented in the Chamber, but those others also which either by their own act or by the arrangements under which the Chamber is constituted do not yet play a part in the deliberations of that Chamber.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE REPORT OF THE CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FOR 1930-31. (Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, London, E. C. 3.) 1931. 22cm. 346p.

MOSCOW HAS A PLAN. A Soviet Primer. Translated from the Russian by G. S. COUNTS and N. P. LODGE. (2nd Impression.) (Cape.) 1931. 21cm. 218p. 5/-.

AMERICAN CIVIC ANNUAL, Vol. III. 1931. ED. BY HARLEAN JAMES. (American Civic Association, Washington, D. C.) 1931. 21cm. 350p. $3.00.

AN INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By ARTHUR BERRIEDALE KEITH. (Oxford University Press.) 1931. 20cm. 243p. 7/6.

MY LIFE. Being the Autobiography of Nawab Server-Ul-Mulk Bahadur. Translated by HIS SON NAWAB JIWAN YAR JUNG BAHADUR. (A. H. Stockwell, London.) 20cm. 342p. About 7/-.

THE PLACE OF PREJUDICE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION (PREJUDICE AND POLITICS). By ARTHUR KEITH. (Williams & Norgate.) 1931. 20cm. 54p. 2/6.

A WORD TO GANDHI. By F. P. CROZIER. (Williams & Norgate.) 1931. 21cm. 142p. 4/6.

THE SNAKE-POISON AND VARIOUS OTHER POISONS HOW TREATED. By P. RAMA KURUP. (The Mangalodayam Press, Trichur.) 1931. 18cm. 133p. Re. 1.

TAXATION OF INCOME IN INDIA. By V. K. R. V. RAO. (Studies in Indian Economics Series.) (Longmans, Bombay.) 1931. 23cm. 327p. Rs. 6.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING OF LIVESTOCK. By EDWIN G. NOURSE & JOSEPH G. KNAPP. (The Brookings Institution, Washington.) 1931. 21cm. 486p. $3.50.

THE THIRD DEGREE. A Detailed and Appalling Expose of Police Brutality. By EMANUEL H. LAVINE. (Vanguard Press, New York.) 1930. 21cm. 248p. $2.00.

THE WORLD IN THE BALANCE. By GLIN ROSS. (Routledge.) 1930. 21cm. 214p. 10/6.

LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN COAL MINES. By LOUIS BLOCH. (Industrial Relations Series.) Russell Sage Foundation, New York.) 1931. 20cm. 513p. $2.00.

THE ECONOMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. By J. A. HOBSON (2nd Edn.) (Allen & Unwin.) 1931. 20cm. 152p. 4/6.

SPIRITUAL REALIZAION. By BEATRICE FERGUSON. (Christian Literature Society for India, Madras.) 1931. 18cm. 246p. Rs. 2.

VEDANTASARA OF SADANANDA. By SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. (Advaita Ashrama, 4, Wellington Lane, Calcutta.) 1931. 18cm. 129p. Re. 1/4.

KABIR AND HIS FOLLOWERS. By F. E. KEAY. (Association Press, Calcutta.) 1931. 18cm. 186, Paper Rs. 2; Cloth Rs. 3.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY ADRESSES. By E. C. DICKINSON & DIWAN CHAND SHARMA. (Macmillan, Bombay.) 1931. 19cm. 252p. 3/6.

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Printed and published by Mr. Anant Vinayak Patvardhan at the Aryabhushan Press, House No. 936/2 Bhamburda Peth, Poona City, and edited at the "Servant of India" Office, Servants of India Society's Home, Bhamburda Poona City, by Mr. P. Kodanda Rao.