

# THE Servant of India

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## TOPICS OF THE WEEK.

THE direct consequence of the Bengal Legislative Council reducing, under Swarajist inspiration, the budget demand of Rs. 7,46,900 to Rs. 1,11,500 for the inspectoral staff of the Education Department, will be the dismissal, with three months' notice, of nearly all men on that staff belonging to the provincial and subordinate services. Lord Lytton's Government has found it possible to retain only 26 officers—and all of them district officers—and it has been obliged to give notice to no fewer than 357 others. We do not know whether it was the intention of the Swarajists, in thus reducing the grant, to bring about the boycott of Government schools and Government service, which the regular non-co-operation programme so miserably failed to produce, but they are quite welcome to take credit for the result. A deputation of the staff concerned waited on Lord Lytton last week and urged on him among other things the desirability of retaining their services by the exercise of the special power vested in him by proviso (B) of section 72 (D) (2) of the Government of India Act. This proviso enables a Governor to override the decision of the Legislative Council in respect of a transferred subject, in case of an emergency or for carrying on a department. In pointing out that he could not use that special power in the present case, Lord Lytton said:

"If the Legislative Council deliberately, and after due consideration, decide that a school inspecting staff under the Government is not necessary, however much I may disagree with them or deplore their decision, I cannot call that an emergency which would justify me in overriding it."

THE remedy, he said, lay not in his hands, but in the hands of the Legislative Council. It was going to

meet in July and if members expressed a desire "in the form of petition" to reconsider their decision in this matter, his Government would present a supplementary demand. He therefore advised the deputation to utilise the interval between then and the meeting of the Council for getting round the Councillors. We believe Lord Lytton is right in his interpretation of the emergency power under the section mentioned above. And we think it would not be right to say that the department could not be kept running with this reduced demand on inspectoral staff. But we think it is unnecessary for him to insist on a "petition" from the members. The Government could on its own initiative present the supplementary demand, as it did on one occasion in Lord Lytton's predecessor's time, and give the Council a chance to retrace its steps without going through a preliminary humiliating process. It should be matter of sufficient satisfaction to Lord Lytton that to the educational officers of his Government was given the opportunity of educating the refractory Councillors in political responsibility. By insisting on a petition he would only appear vindictive, which we are sure he is not.

THE Chief Whip of the Swarajist Party, Mr. N. C. Kelkar, has issued a statement to the press, denying the existence of disharmony or split in the party over the Tariff Bill. According to him, the diverse views expressed in the debate were not due to any split in the party or breach of party discipline, as the party had decided to make voting on the Bill a non-party affair. What makes this statement unconvincing is the fact that dissensions in the party were reported not only in non Swarajist journals but also in Swarajist papers like the *Hindu*, which thought the situation grave enough for a leading article to be devoted to it. There is also the inconvenient fact, reported in Swarajist papers, that Pandit Motilal Nehru chose to resign his leadership of the party even after receiving an apology from Mr. Patel at a special complimentary dinner arranged in honour of the Pandit. We suggest that these facts do not fit in exactly with the picture of harmony drawn for us by Mr. Kelkar. If he had told us that a party whip had been issued asking the members to abstain from voting, that it was disregarded and therefore Pandit Motilal resigned his leadership, but that afterwards the differences were made up to some extent—he would have been more convincing perhaps.

Redress of  
Injustice.

THE effect of Justice McCardie's judgment in the O'Dwyer-Nair case, like the effect of the shooting at Jallianwala Bagh, can never be entirely removed. But it can be mitigated to a great extent by the recognised representatives of the British nation openly condemning the unjudicial conduct of Justice McCardie. The Liberal and Labour newspapers have no doubt done this, but that does not suffice. If both the Houses of Parliament combined in censuring his conduct it would be excellent, but it is futile to expect the House of Lords to agree to it. The Commons, however, could do it and we are glad that Mr. George Lansbury has already moved in the matter. We hope he will be strongly supported by all Labour and Liberal members who are not only anxious that the traditions of British justice should remain untarnished but want to foster a friendly spirit in the Indian people towards the British.

\* \* \*

Mysore Economic  
Conference.

IN the financial stringency experienced by Mysore two years ago, the State cut down some of its very useful activities, and the application of the axe was in no case more deplorable than in the suspension of the Economic Conference. This Conference was started by Sir M. Visvesvaraya in 1911 for collecting facts, disseminating knowledge and promoting enterprise in the people and it was doing exceedingly good work, though it was subjected to severe criticism by persons ignorant of the nature and cost of popular education. The State, however, soon discovered that the suspension of the Conference was a mistake and with the improvement of its finances, it has now not only revived the Conference but given it permanence by linking it with the Representative Assembly and the Legislative Council; on which action His Highness is to be sincerely congratulated. Great and difficult problems are calling its immediate attention. The State is short of food supply; its imports are far in excess of exports, which means future liability; its exports consist largely of raw materials, for converting which into manufactured articles cheap supply of electric power is available in the State in plenty; and unemployment among the educated classes is steadily increasing. The State has resources in men and materials which can make it industrial and prosperous in a much higher degree than other parts of India and what is needed is an intelligent utilisation of those resources. It is the business of the Conference to show the people how such utilisation can be best brought about and we hope it will receive the earnest co-operation of the best minds in the State.

\* \* \*

Revolution ?

WHEN Mr. Thomas promised to appoint a Committee to investigate the methods of applying the principle of native trusteeship to Kenya, he said that the Committee must not carry out its inquiry in a fault-finding spirit. The remark looks innocuous

enough on the face of it, but one cannot help attaching a sinister significance to it if one notices the workings of his mind as disclosed, e. g., in the following cable from its London correspondent published in the *E. A. Standard*: "I learn on excellent authority that Mr. J. H. Thomas has voiced views which will surprise and hearten settlers in E. Africa. Representations were made to him by influential politicians in South Africa that the policy of 'Africa for the African' was not without elements of danger and that the stress laid upon that phase of development would not encourage settlers throughout Africa whose pioneer work had, in the first instance, made the development of the African possible. It was suggested that the time had arrived when this point of view should be recognised by the British Government. I understand that in reply Mr. Thomas quite agreed with the contention that stressing the 'black' policy was dangerous and that he would take an opportunity of paying a tribute to the part played by white settlers in developing Africa."

\* \* \*

An Indian States  
Journal.

TO the none too numerous papers which concern themselves primarily with Indian States an important addition has been made by Pandit Haribhau Upadhyaya, at one time editor of the Hindi *Nava Jivan*, who has started a monthly magazine in Hindi entitled *Malava Mayura* for the especial behoof of Rajputana and Central India States. The magazine is conducted with conspicuous ability and a full sense of responsibility which we associate with persons trained under the immediate supervision of Mahatma Gandhi. It were to be wished that the magazine dealt more with Indian States than it does at present, but knowing as we do the considerable difficulty one experiences in securing informing articles on States' affairs, we are not disposed to criticise the editor in any way. In the June number of the magazine the editor discusses a very important question: whether in Indian States reformers should employ the orthodox constitutional means or resort to direct action or non-co-operation in bringing about constitutional reforms. The editor is himself a non-co-operator but is emphatically of opinion that in the existing conditions of Indian States, where even the first step in constitutional agitation is yet to be taken, it is altogether wrong to jump over the intermediate steps and take to direct action all at once. It is remarkable that the ground on which disapproval is expressed of the adoption of non-co-operation methods is not the greater responsiveness to public opinion of Indian Princes than of British rulers, but the backward political condition of the subjects and their unpreparedness for stronger action. This of course goes without saying. But the question that confronts workers in Indian States at present is not the one raised by Pandit Upadhyaya so much as whether even constitutional agitation should be vigorously prosecuted in Indian States. In recent controversies the expediency of such agitation is gravely questioned. The annual subscription of this exceedingly well turned-out magazine is Rs. 3-3-0, and the magazine is issued from Benares.

### THE INDIAN DEMAND.

AFTER his recent halting utterance at the Oxford Majlis, in which Lord Olivier expressly repudiated Indians' right to self-determination and recommended to Indian politicians the adoption of Fabian tactics in the attainment of Swaraj, it was of the first importance that Indians as a whole should make an authoritative reply to the Indian Secretary. Such an answer has now been furnished by the prominent Indians who are at present in England. Dr. Besant (who in spirit is more Indian than most who claim Indian birth), Mr. Sastri, Munshi Ishwar Saran, Mr. Rangachariar, Sir Ali Imam and others have submitted a memorandum to the India Office, vindicating India's right to write her own constitution in the same way as Australia and other self-governing colonies wrote their own, and warning England of the dangers of carrying out the "step by step" theory to which Lord Olivier referred in his speech with approval. They say in downright fashion that "the safety of the connexion between Britain and India depends on the establishment of Dominion Home Rule in India as quickly as possible," and that unless this is done the constitutional party will be destroyed and people driven to despair. This Memorandum has already come to be compared to "The Memorandum of the Nineteen," which culminated subsequently in the present Montagu-Chelmsford report and certainly carries at least as much weight as that document, because the signatories to the present memorandum are known to have expressed views which strike a sympathetic chord in most Indian hearts. The present Memorandum has certainly a much larger volume of public opinion behind it than that of eight years ago.

The Indian public will be deeply grateful to Dr. Besant and others for giving such weighty and forceful expression to their innermost feelings. But the Memorandum is still not without its critics. The claim to a right of self-determination is followed by an outline of the demands which India's representatives will in all likelihood make if they are called upon to draft their own constitution, and adverse criticism is passed both on the procedure adopted by the signatories of tacking certain specific demands to the general right to self-determination and also on the supposed backwardness of the demands. Taking the second point first, we believe there are very few indeed in the country who do not admit the need, for a short while, of some clearly defined reservations in applying the principle of India's right to self-government. Among Indian leaders there is no one excepting perhaps Mahatma Gandhi who insists upon the immediate grant of full and unqualified self-government. Lala Lajpat Rai, who is still classed with non-co-operators, has publicly maintained that the establishment of complete self-government without any reservations is at present impossible. In a recent interview to the

organ of the Labour Party, he said :

"India was perfectly willing to negotiate a settlement acceptable to both countries. They were not asking for India to be given full self-government immediately. They were quite aware that in many ways they are not ready. They have been deliberately prevented from becoming ready to take over all responsibilities. The army in India which had no Indian artillery, Air Force or staff, was an instance of this, but they asked that a definite period of time should be fixed by statute at the end of which India would become completely self-governing and during the intervening period all preparations should be made to enable Indians to take over and run efficiently such services as defence and foreign relations, which Indians were content to leave for the moment in the hands of the Imperial Government."

The Swarajists, of course, have never stood out for the immediate concession of full self-government. On the contrary, they go too often to the other extreme and speak only of "the beginning of self-government." Pandit Motilal Nehru has, in expressing his opinion on the Memorandum in question, definitely declared his belief that certain reservations will be necessary in drafting the Indian constitution. There is thus very wide agreement among political parties in this country that some interim restrictions on the exercise by India of her inherent right to govern herself are unavoidable. And the criticism which does not take note of this unanimity of feeling does not merit serious consideration.

But the other objection looks a little more plausible. If India wishes to vindicate her right to self-determination, why should her spokesmen in the next breath proceed, it is asked, to indicate in broad terms the lines which the decision will take if this right is put in force? Pandit Motilal Nehru takes the same objection to the Memorandum: he recognises the need for temporary reservations, and probably the reservations he has in mind are none other than those mentioned in Dr. Besant's Memorandum. But he insists that these reservations should be formulated by a Round Table Conference. Now, it must be clearly understood, in the first place, that the signatories of the Memorandum also want these reservations to be formally drawn up by a body which can legitimately claim to speak for the whole of India. They do not place themselves in the position of such a body. They only give their own anticipation of how India will settle the problem for themselves. But Pandit Motilalji asks, why should any one anticipate India's decision? This question may be answered by a counter-question to the Panditji. If we are to ask for India being allowed to write her own constitution, without going into the details of that constitution, why does Pandit Motilal himself speak of reservations? Why does he say that certain restrictions on India's ultimate right to self-government are necessary, thus prejudicing, so far as he can, the future result of India's self-determination? His motive apparently must be to satisfy those at present in authority in England, that even if India is given the unrestricted right to self-determine, her decisions will not be so ex-

treme after all ; that she will exercise self-restraint and a sense of responsibility in arriving at those decisions. Lala Lajpat Rai had the very same object in saying that India does not demand full self government at once, but is prepared to make reservations in the case of defence and foreign affairs. If India is really prepared to make these reservations it is certainly an advantage to satisfy public opinion in England, which after all has to be reckoned with, that India will choose a reasonable course if she is given the choice. If, without whittling down your real demands, you can win the support of influential men in England by avowing your intentions in advance, prudence and good tactics would dictate such a step. Lala Lajpat Rai is therefore anxious to give an assurance to the British public that these two departments India would consent to reserve to the control of the Imperial Government, and Mrs. Besant's position is identically the same. She along with other signatories says that, in the event of being given the right of self-determination, she would insist upon full autonomy in the provinces, and control over all civil departments at the centre—a demand which the Indian National Liberal Federation made as early as 1921. It will thus be seen that no serious objection can be urged either to the contents of the Memorandum or the method proposed therein of making the national demand. And, it is to be hoped, the British Government will recognise in it the voice of the Indian people and deal with it with such statesmanship as they can command.

### OPIUM POLICY.—II.

THE opium policy in India and the British Colonies in the East stands on a different footing ; for, in these countries, the British Government is responsible, ultimately, if not immediately, not only for the production or import, but also for the consumption of opium. Miss La Motte roundly charges Great Britain of deliberately victimising her subject peoples with opium just for the sake of the revenue from the opium monopoly or for luring cheap Chinese labour for British planters ; and of instituting a double standard in her opium policy: one, of opium consumption for her subject peoples in the East and another, of opium prohibition for her self-governing peoples in her homelands. "For over a century opium has been used as a money-getter, to swell the revenues of certain European countries with possessions in the East. . . . Labour, the cheap and plentiful labour of China, has been lured by opium to certain colonies, where native labour is not obtainable. . . . Human life has been utterly disregarded. . . . And opium has been called upon to waste this human life by destroying its value and efficiency, in order that Europeans might prosper." And "throughout the whole fabric of this indefensible business runs British influence, direct and indirect," not only in the lands directly governed by England but also in

her Protectorates, where "British 'advice' generally means Indian opium." A very strong indictment, indeed! But when we find in the Government Blue Book on Kelantan, one of the Unfederated Malay States, a British Protectorate, the statement that "the revenue accruing from the sale of *Chandu* (i. e. smoking opium) forms at present a considerable proportion of the total revenue of the State, and if it is intended to abolish the sale at any near date, the results will be serious," followed immediately by the statement that "Speaking generally, 'chandu' seems to do very little harm in Kelantan"; again, when we find in the authoritative book on British North Borneo by Owen Rutter, with an Introduction by the Rt. Hon'ble Sir West Ridgway, the President of the British North Borneo Chartered Company, the statement that "70 per cent. of the total revenue of the territory comes under the heading customs and excise.—It is from the shareholders' point of view, the most important branch of the service; without it, there would be no dividends" and "Apart from the point of view of persons interested in stamping out opium smoking, there is not very much to be said against the Company's trade in the drug"; again when we find in the Annual Report for 1918, of the State of Brunei, the statement that "A good deal can be done in Brunei, as has been done in British North Borneo, to attract and retain coolies by providing means of recreation"; we can understand why Miss La Motte puts her charge so strongly. We may, however, note in passing that none of these three countries is governed directly by the British Government; they are Protectorates.

One is, however, impelled to doubt if the British opium policy in the East is quite as diabolical as all that, and if the picture has not been overdrawn, with a view to propaganda ; to enquire if these statements are typical and represent the situation correctly ; and if there are any considerations to which Miss La Motte has failed to give sufficient weight.

Let us first enquire if there are any relieving features in the situation. We have the classic example of India consenting to forego her not inconsiderable revenue from the opium trade with China. As long ago as 1908, the drastic recommendations of the Ceylon Opium Commission in favour of prohibition were all, except one, accepted by the Governor of Ceylon and approved by the Colonial Secretary, and Miss La Motte notes with satisfaction the "steady improvement in" the situation and is convinced that there is a sincere desire to end it in Ceylon. In Mauritius, she records that "the imports of Indian opium have greatly decreased during the past few years and it would seem that serious efforts are being made to abolish it." Prohibition has been the accepted goal in Burma and all the measures in that direction, which Miss La Motte herself favours, are in operation with regard to the Burmans. Again, as long ago as 1908, the Colonia<sup>1</sup>

Under-Secretary had ordered that "steps must be taken to close opium dens in Hongkong" and the last dens were closed in 1910 and legislation introduced to restrict the importation of the drug. In one instance, viz. Hongkong, the Imperial Government actually gave financial aid to that Colony to speed up the reform. Miss La Motte admits with evident satisfaction that "Honkong is ready and willing to co-operate in the suppression of the traffic and it will have no hesitation in accepting any financial sacrifice that may be entailed in making suppression effective." Sale of opium to the Malays is prohibited in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States.

The fact mentioned above are likely to create the impression that Britain has, not a double standard, but a multiple standard of opium policy. The theory of callous victimisation of foreign subject peoples with opium cannot account at once for the prohibition of opium in Ceylon, Burma and Malaya and for the absence of it in other countries. Miss La Motte would have us believe that where the opium revenue was not large, Great Britain accepted an anti-opium policy, but not otherwise. The opium policies in Ceylon and Burma do not square with this theory either. Ceylon derived about 10% of her revenue in 1920-21 from opium and her budget would not balance, the expenditure exceeding her revenue by as much as 30%. These facts must in some measure discount the sweeping charge of Miss La Motte about the dark and unrelieved opium policy of Great Britain towards her helpless subject peoples.

A more dispassionate review of Great Britain's opium policy, making a due allowance for the circumstances of the case, might reveal a more accurate and less infamous story. On the 10th of April, 1891, the House of Commons carried, by a majority of 30, a resolution condemning as "morally indefensible" the raising of revenue from opium in India and the production of opium for other than legitimate medical purposes. Again, on 30th May, 1906, the House of Commons carried unanimously a resolution that the Indo-Chinese opium traffic was "morally indefensible" and that it should be dropped. Yet again on the 6th May, 1908, the House unanimously adopted another resolution welcoming the action of Government in agreeing to abandon the Indo-Chinese opium traffic and asking the Government to close opium dens in the Crown Colonies, particularly, Hongkong, the Straits Settlements and Ceylon. In 1909, Great Britain was a party to the International Opium Commission at Shanghai; and in 1913, to the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention advocated the control of raw opium and the suppression, immediate or ultimate, of prepared opium used for smoking. Great Britain signed this Convention on behalf of India, Ceylon, Straits Settlements and Hongkong. During the last three years, in the League of Nations Great Britain and India have refused to accept the American contention, viz. that the Hague Convention contemplated that opium eating was *illegitimate* and should,

therefore, be suppressed and the production of opium should be limited to strictly medicinal and scientific purposes.

It will thus be seen that as far back as 1891 British Parliament passed perhaps the most radical resolution on opium. It condemned, not merely the most infamous trade with China, not merely the universally abhorred habit of opium smoking, but also of all kinds of opium consumption other than medicinal; anticipating, as it were, the American proposals of 1923 at the League of Nations. Why has England failed to stamp out even opium-smoking from her Far Eastern Colonies? "Like an episcurean ascetic," replies the cynic, "the Administration derives pleasure from its profession of a virtue, and a profitable revenue from the toleration of a vice." But is that the sole explanation?

Miss La Motte is at considerable pains to assure the reader that constitutionally India is not free to determine its own opium policy, that the new Reforms have made no change in the situation, that England is supreme and the "control of the British Government over the opium situation in India" and we may add, the Crown Colonies as well—"is well nigh absolute." Failure of England to put down opium in these countries can only mean that England consents "to encourage the use of opium." After the salt tax certification, we, in India, need no argument to convince us of the supreme autocratic power of the British Government over us. It must, however, be recognised that in certain matters this power has been subjected in practice to a good deal of commendable self-restraint. The Britisher values more than any other the personal liberty of the citizen and is reluctant to allow the State to interfere with the citizens' indulgence in long established habits of the people—an outlook which he instinctively carries with him to other lands.

As for having instituted a double standard, it may be noted that a new invading vice is more dangerous, and at the same time more easily eradicated than a long and well established one. The introduction of opium in Burma and of alcoholic liquors in Africa worked havoc on the native populations whom prolonged experience had not drilled into moderation and comparative immunity. The Berlin Conference forbade the export of alcoholic liquors to Africa. It would sound a little strange if it was contended that the Western nations, who were parties to the Berlin Conference, were guilty of adopting a Machiavellian double standard, that they felt solicitude for the African native and deliberately victimised their own peoples at home!!

It has been the prevailing policy of England to interfere as little as possible—consistently however, with humanity—with the personal and social habits and customs of her peoples, who are politically subject and culturally very different. It is this saving characteristic of the otherwise domineering British genius that has enabled it to knit together the widely diversified peoples of the

British Commonwealth. It would be an undemocratic and even a dangerous move to invoke the autocratic power of Great Britain to impose a policy that touches the social and personal habits of her subject and culturally different peoples, without their consent.

Nor should the financial consideration be overlooked. Rightly or wrongly, many of these British territories in the East have been deriving revenue from opium varying from 3 to 50 p. c. of their total revenues. The suppression of opium would not only mean a loss of this revenue, but also involve extra expenditure in preventing smuggling from China, Persia and Turkey. This unpleasant fact must be faced; and how was the British Government situated in this matter? The China trade was a source of considerable revenue to the Government of India when the anti-opium reformers pressed the British Government to stop the trade. Both the then Government and the reformers knew that the step would involve the loss of the opium revenue to the Government of India, and both felt that they were not justified in imposing on the Government of India, without its voluntary consent, a policy, however righteous, which would involve it in a loss without offering to make good the loss from the British exchequer; for, the alternative was further to tax the already overtaxed people of India; to which both were opposed. The reformers advocated such financial help from Britain, while the Government thought that the British people would not accept the proposal. In fact, Lord Morley asserted in the Commons in 1908 that "if they (the Government) were to say that they would ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer for £3,000,000, that would be worth discussing but he did not think the discussion would take long." And this assertion was greeted with cheers by the House. Even the anti-opium reformers felt that it would be the height of cynicism to impose a policy on India, not initiated and widely supported by the Indian people or the Indian Government, and then ask them to find the money for it. It would have considerably strengthened Miss La Motte's plea if America had offered to compensate the loss that the acceptance of her policy would entail on other Governments. The British Government were unwilling to subsidise the Indian Government to the tune of £3,000,000 per year and this, very naturally, weakened their hands in forcing a vigorous anti-opium policy on India. The same may be said to apply to the Crown Colonies also. That this argument was not a pretext for a pro-opium policy is borne out by the fact that when the British Government ordered the Hongkong Government to speed up opium reform, they actually subsidised the Hongkong Government for the purpose.

As for Indian public opinion, so representative and responsible a statesman as the late Mr. Gokhale declared, that while in the interest of humanity this wretched traffic had got to be abolished, he would neither ask for a contribution

from England nor agree to any "extra taxation to meet the loss of the opium revenue." It was only after Sir Edward Baker, Finance Secretary of the Government of India, had told the Chinese statesman, Tong Shao-yi, in 1905 that "the Indian Government could well dispense with the revenue they got from opium," and assured the British Government that the sacrifice could be made without resort to extra taxation that the British Government negotiated the ten-year agreement with China.

These, then, are some of the considerations which must have retarded the actual realization of the anti-opium policy of Great Britain and which compelled her to take up an attitude more of benevolent neutrality than of an anti-opium crusader, and leave it to the subordinate Governments and their citizens to take the initiative in the matter. Thus, when the people and Government of Ceylon wished to do away with opium; when the Burmans agitated against opium and offered to tax themselves to make good the loss of opium revenue; when India agreed to drop the China trade and not mind the loss; when the Government of Hongkong undertook to put down opium and grudge no loss of revenue; the British Government gave their cordial support. This decentralized local autonomy in determining opium policy explains why there is no uniform policy in all the British territories in the East, and it also shows on whom lay the responsibility for these policies—not on England, but on the Governments of India and the Colonies. It is very far from the truth to say that "the control of the British Government over the opium situation in India (and in the colonies) is well nigh absolute;" it is in theory, but not in practice, and for many good reasons.

We have not mentioned these considerations just to exonerate the British Government of her responsibility for failing to carry out its international obligations. We blame Great Britain for not having taken a bolder and more determined anti-opium policy and for having tolerated great abuses in certain of her protectorates. One might even urge that she should have offered to compensate the loss of revenue by grants from the Imperial Exchequer; or that she should even have imposed extra taxation on her subject peoples,—if only to rid them of opium. That would be fair. But to go to the length of accusing Great Britain that, because constitutionally she had the power to suppress opium in her eastern territories but did not use it as a steam roller for the purpose, she was guilty of the most diabolical designs on her helpless foreign subject peoples, is, to say the least, very like propaganda—of doubtful utility. It is well to remember that the genius of the British people will not permit, and the awakened self-consciousness of eastern peoples will not tolerate, any ukase from London to interfere with the social and personal habits of the peoples, without their active consent. We must look to enlightened public opinion in these countries and its influence on their Govern-

ments, whether by vote, or public meeting and memorial, to determine their opium policies.

P. KODANDA RAO.

SEPARATE RAILWAY FINANCE IN PRACTICE.—II

DEALING now with Statement B, *ante*, the differences appearing therein are due to the Government figure of net contribution having been calculated otherwise than in strict accordance with the terms of the resolution on the subject of the separation of the railway from the general finances. This resolution lays down that the net contribution to the general revenues is to be calculated on the actual results of the penultimate year's working; but the Government's calculation of this net contribution has been based on the estimated results of the last year's working, as stated in the foot-note to Statement II accompanying the Budget speech referred to above, the only reason assigned being that the year 1924-25, for the benefit of which the results are worked out, marks the inception of the new system, as though there is some peculiar propriety or auspiciousness in celebrating the inception of the new system by immediately violating the basis of that system. If the net contribution had been calculated on the penultimate, instead of on the last, year's working, the result would have been as follows:—

( Figures in thousands of rupees. )

		Actuals for 1922-23.
A.	(i) Capital at charge, all lines ... ..	6,22,20,27
	Deduct—	
	(a) for strategic lines ... ..	25,32,51
	(b) for capital contributed by	
	Indian States and Railway Companies 74,94,47	1,00,26,98
	(ii) Capital at charge, commercial lines ... ..	5,21,93,29
	(iii) Contribution at 5/6ths of 1 per cent. ... ..	4,34,94
B.	(i) Gross traffic receipts, all lines ... ..	93,92,14
	Deduct—Receipts, strategic lines ... ..	1,55,26
	(ii) Gross traffic receipts, commercial lines... ..	91,66,88
	(iii) Working expenses, all lines ... ..	65,96,16
	Deduct—Expenses, strategic lines ... ..	2,22,34
	(iv) Working expenses, commercial lines ... ..	69,73,82
	(v) Share of surplus profits paid to Indian States and Railway Companies ... ..	69,40
	(vi) Net receipts, commercial lines [(ii) minus (iv) and (v)] ... ..	27,23,66
	Add—Subsidised Companies, Government share of surplus profits ... ..	26,41
	(vii) Total net receipts ... ..	27,50,07
	(viii) Interest on capital at charge, all lines ... ..	16,34,47
	Deduct—Interest, strategic lines ... ..	95,29
	(ix) Interest on capital at charge, commercial lines ... ..	15,39,18
	(x) (a) Interest portion of annuities in purchase of Railways ... ..	3,33,50
	(b) Interest on capital contributed by Indian States and Railway Companies... ..	3,35,56

(xi) Total interest charges, commercial lines.	22,08,24
(xii) Land and subsidy ... ..	2,43
(xiii) Miscellaneous Railway expenditure ... ..	21,00
(xiv) Total (xi), (xii) and (xiii).	22,38,67
(xv) Net gain from commercial lines (vii) minus (xiv) ... ..	5,11,40
(xvi) Contribution at 5/6ths of 1 per cent. on capital at charge ( A (iii) ) ... ..	4,34,94
(xvii) Surplus profits ... ..	76,54
(xviii) 1/5th of surplus profits... ..	15,31
(xix) Total contribution [ (xvi) plus (xviii) ] ... ..	4,50,25
(xx) Deduct—	
(a) loss in working strategic lines 67,08	67,08
(b) interest on capital at charge, strategic lines ... ..	95,29
	1,62,37
(xxi) Net contribution ... ..	2,87,88

( This figure has been worked out on the figures in Statement No. 25 A of the Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Government of India for the year 1922-23 and on page 9 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Railway Budget for 1924-25. )

It will be seen that, had the contribution to the General Revenues been arrived at on the basis of the actual results of the penultimate year's working as contemplated in the resolution, instead of on the basis of the estimated results of the last year's working, the General Revenues would have received only Rs. 2,87,88,000 instead of Rs. 4,27,30,000 and the Railway Reserves Rs. 2,72,90,000 instead of only Rs. 1,33,48,000.

From the analysis made by us the conclusion is irresistible that according to the figures in the comparative statement appended to the Finance Member's Budget speech the General Revenues receive more from the Railways than they are legitimately entitled to, viz., Rs. 1,55,00,000 more under the non-separation system and Rs. 1,39,42,000 under the separation system. This means a corresponding surrender by the Railway Administration.

It must be remembered that railway revenues in the future will have to provide a reserve not only for future depreciation of the existing stock, but to make good the depreciation reserve that should have been built up from their revenues of past years. Further, the railways, for some years to come, will have to be meeting from current revenues the heavy arrears of maintenance and repairs which could not be carried out during the war. The deficient expenditure on maintenance and repairs during the war not only led to a large increase in the amounts required for these purposes in subsequent years but also accelerated deterioration of the wasting assets of the railways, with the result that much of the rolling stock, machinery and plant will now have to be replaced long before the end of their normal life. The railways will not only require to spend the whole of any reserves but may even have to borrow money temporarily to meet expenditure for which such reserves should have been in existence. (Paragraph 13 of Appendix I to the Memorandum dated February 21, 1924, by the Chief Commissioner and the

Financial Commissioner for Railways on the Separation of the Railway from the General Finances.) In the face of these outstanding heavy liabilities, the surrender referred to above is not calculated to encourage confidence in the capacity of the present Railway Administration to run the railways on truly business lines. In fact, we begin seriously to doubt whether, after all, we have succeeded in securing a Railway Administration possessing a new and independent soul and in putting a definite end to the old era of "One soul doth in two bodies dwell." If the separation of railway finance is to have any real substance and is not to be a mere show, the separation must be not *vis a vis* the Legislative Assembly but *vis a vis* the Finance Department, and a clear line of demarcation must be drawn between the Railway Administration and the Government of India as two separate entities, so that the achievements of the former may be clearly seen. The absence of such a clear line has to a very material extent been responsible in the past for the growth, development and non-detection of the evils brought to light by the Indian Railway Committee of 1920-21 and the Indian Retrenchment Committee of 1922-23 and the removal of this defect must precede the separation of the budgets.

While we have felt constrained thus adversely to criticize certain features of the comparative statement presented by Government, we note with satisfaction that under either scheme the railway revenue account is to be relieved of the illegitimate charge, hitherto made, on account of sinking funds and that portion of the railway annuities which represents repayment of capital. We congratulate Government on this recognition of the impropriety of charging such payments to the railway revenue account and trust that it marks a definite beginning in the direction of purity of railway accounts. In view, however, of this material alteration in railway accounts, it is desirable to invite attention to the fact that in deciding upon the amount of the Central Government's deficit which would have to be made good initially by contributions from the provinces, Lord Meson's Committee assumed that the Central Government would derive a net revenue of no less than 10 $\frac{3}{4}$  crores from the railways, presumably after payment of the charges on account of sinking funds and railway annuities. In judging, therefore, of the approach of the net revenue of the railways to the figure of Rs. 10 $\frac{3}{4}$  crores, it will be necessary in future to allow for this alteration in railway accounts, that is, the figure of Rs. 10 $\frac{3}{4}$  crores will have to be increased by the amount of the payments made on account of sinking funds and that portion of the railway annuities which represents repayment of capital. For 1924-25 this amount is Rs. 231.64 lakhs, so that the figure of Rs. 10 $\frac{3}{4}$  crores will have to be increased to Rs. 13,06,64,000 in ascertaining the deficit remaining to be made up by the railway during 1924-25.

ECONOMY.

## CONTINENTAL LETTER.

BRESLAU, 17th MAY.

THAT the unexpected fall of M. Poincaré should have created boundless surprise all over Europe, is nothing to be wondered at. Although everybody knows to what an extent the French press—as a great part of the German press and most of the 'big' newspapers of the world generally—is in the pay of capitalist interests, it seemed impossible that it should give so inadequate an impression of public opinion in France and its changes as it turns out now to have given during the last few years. The surprise at the sudden discovery is followed by an immense sigh of relief almost everywhere. It is self-evident, that it should be so in England, still more in Germany. But it is curious to notice that even in France, with the exception of a few *chauviniste* voices, the grief for the loss of the leader is remarkably moderate. Even those people who seemed to be his most fervent supporters are evidently very far from prophesying the threatening political chaos, now that he is compelled to put the reins of Government into other hands. This is certainly not solely due to the fatal weakness which the French franc has lately shown: it is rather the return of common sense, in French politics, the disappearance of the war-psychosis and last but not least the antipathy against the thoroughly inhuman and spiteful personal attitude of the former Premier. A reliable French friend told me that this antipathy against the *man* Poincaré and his provoking inhumanity had extended even to his nearest official surroundings. In *Italy* too the feeling as to his fall seems to be pretty unanimous. Even Count Sforza, whose backing of French policy did so much to make Upper-Silesia Polish and to create a new Alsace-Lorraine in this way, is reported to have stated that the unbearable policy of pin-pricks had found its necessary end now. Only in *Poland* people go in political mourning. All bourgeois papers there are seriously troubled by the great change in France. No wonder, for the political spirit in these circles is very much akin to the militarist mentality of the Poincaré clique; only lately the official representative of the foreign politics of this state has, by the frank confession that it is not satisfied yet as to its territorial claims, shown to the world what sort of ambition has been deliberately and successfully kindled in Warsa by the fallen friend from Lorraine. *Roumania* too, it must be owned, seems to be troubled by sad news from Paris. Her conscience is none of the best. She has annexed Bessarabia with the consent of the Allies, who have robbed their old confederate, Russia, of it unscrupulously, and she has now to fear Russia's revenge. Russia demands a plebiscite in Bessarabia. That, after all, does not seem an unfair demand, considering the principles that have been proclaimed during the war. As long as M. Poincaré was in power, however, Roumania felt safe, because everybody knew his practice as to principles of this sort. Now the future suddenly appears to Roumania in less rosy a light, the

Russian request being supported by an army that is not to be underrated.

The German pacifist looks upon the result of the French elections with a mixture of joy and melancholy. How much more easy things would be now if this stage of development had been reached two years before. It is not perhaps too late, but there can be no doubt, that it is very late. The moral damage done by Poincaré's special politics, the Ruhr invasion, is difficult to characterize. Until the 11th of January 1923 the republican government in Berlin enjoyed a sufficient degree of authority to check all those subversive movements that threaten the life of the state. Its absolute impotence towards the foreign foe, however, weakened its position in its own country in a terrible way. In Bavaria, the reactionary stronghold of German fascism, the forces then gathered that were intended to overthrow the republican system and to establish a directorate which would mean the perpetuating of civil war. It is true that the plan miscarried entirely. But it is also true that the Munich law-court acquitted or almost acquitted the conspirators. This would certainly not have happened in all parts of the Reich, but it is bad enough that it was at all possible. It set at any rate a very bad example and encouraged the same sort of anti-republican rebellion everywhere. Since some weeks you notice a curious sort of young people in the streets who give you an impression of it. They wear a special sort of caps with a black-white-red cockade on it. They are without exception very young, mere green-horns grown up during the war, and one seems to discover traces in their physiognomy which these dreadful and inhuman years have left upon the mentality of the rising generation. These are the German fascists—or at least the most conspicuous part of them. Will they be able to achieve what their august Italian prototypes have performed under Signor Mussolini? Up to now the answer may be confidently given in the negative. The last elections too show it, which have not turned out at all so reactionary as one was afraid they would, although the strengthening of the Right they have brought about is already bad enough. Still it would be foolish not to recognise the danger which the German state is exposed to from this side in case the authority of the Government be further weakened and in case its basis in the population be further undermined. The basis of the Republican state, however, is not its bureaucracy, which is only half-heartedly republican or even monarchist, but Labour. Labour, however, i. e., the socialist masses are at present again undergoing a most serious and significant trial. This too is only a result of the Ruhr invasion. The Ruhr invasion has produced the passive resistance movement, this has led to a breakdown of the currency, this breakdown has made the industrialist rich, the working-men and the middle-classes beggars. The end of the Ruhr-fight then saw the working men at the mercy of the employers. The power of capital

has never been so strong as now where the general scarcity of money is so great that in case you have any to lend out, 60 per cent. is just the ordinary and usual interest. This movement is used by the great mine-owners to deal the final blow to the social and political achievements of the working-men. It is true that their position too is threatened just now as it was never before, for M. Poincaré has burdened them with the so called "Micum"—treaties, which represent part of the programme of the *pénétration pacifique* of Western Germany. According to these treaties the great industrialists have to hand over the fourth part of their products to the occupation authorities without receiving any payment for it. At the same time heavy taxes are laid upon them. The state being unable to indemnify the industrialists, they are to a great extent approaching bankruptcy. This however is what the occupation authorities want. If things have developed so far, French capital is intended to step in and to replace German capital. So German competition is going to be ruled out and the centre of German industry to be brought under French sway. It is quite intelligible that the industrialists defend themselves against this policy to the utmost and they would have all sympathies on their side, if it was not the unfortunate miner who was to bear all the encumbrances of the defence. The miner in the Ruhr district gets often not more than 80-100 goldmark a month (£5) for his hard work, while his food costs on the average 120-130 marks, so that he is undernourished—and overworked. If the great strike that is raging at present in the Ruhr district be lost by him, he presumably will be thrown back upon the worst conditions that the life history of labour knows, a reactionary development which will be detrimental to labour all over the world.

A great part of all these difficulties has a common origin. It is M. Poincaré's inheritance. It will be a difficult task to undo all these knots, which have been wilfully tied during his premiership. Still there is hope that the task will be performed, if the French government be taken over by people who stand by the principle of good-will among the nations.

LEVIN L. SCHÜCKING.

### MISCELLANEOUS.

#### INDIA AND DOMINION HOME RULE

##### PROTEST AGAINST LEE REPORT.

(FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.)

LONDON, 27th May.

A WELL-ATTENDED reception was held this evening at the Hotel Rea-Brandt, under the auspices of the British Auxiliary of the National Conference of India. Amongst those present were the Rt. Hon. and Mrs. Josiah Wedgwood (Cancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), the Rt. Hon. John Wheatley, M. P. (Minister of Health), Mr. C. G. Ammon, M. P. (Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty), Sir Thomas Arnold, The Syed and Mrs. Ameer Ali, Sir Edward and Lady Boyle, Mr. B. N. Langdon-Davis, Mr. Graham White, M. P., Dr. L. Haden Guest, M. P., Commander Kenworthy, M. P., Mr. F. W. Pe-

thick Lawrence, M. P., Sir Krishna G. Gupta, Mrs. Douglas Hamilton, Sir Ali and Lady Imam, Major and Mrs. A. E. Powell, Prof. Graham Wallar, Lt.-Col. H. M. Meyler, M. P., Mr. A. V. Alexander, M. P., Mr. V. G. Crittall, M. P., Major L. Ropner, M. P., Dewan Bahadur T. Rangachariar, and Lajpat Rai.

The Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, who was received with applause, said: "I propose to speak not directly on Dominion Status for India but on a subject which is closely allied to it, although the relationship is not always recognised. In this morning's papers you will have seen a summary of the recommendations made by a very important Commission which toured India recently. I am afraid that the publication at this time of that Report in India will only embitter and aggravate the political situation. It is well-known that the appointment of that Commission was not welcomed by the political parties in India, not by any one of them. We objected to it root and branch. We said we were aware that the Services had some real grievances, and that we were prepared to look into them, and to give to the members of the various All-India Services such relief as each case required. We did not want a Commission. I believe the Authorities in India did not want a Commission. The Legislative Assembly definitely voted against a proposal to appoint the Commission. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State for India, over-riding the wishes of the people of India, appointed the Commission. The Assembly refused to provide the money for that Commission, but the Viceroy was directed, from here, to use his extraordinary power of certification and provide the money in the Indian Budget. The previous history of this Commission is, therefore, somewhat unfortunate.

"I am not going to dwell at any length on the fact that not one elected Member either of the Legislative Assembly or the Council of State was appointed to the Commission.

"This Commission's Report has one particular feature which deserves very careful attention. It is a unanimously signed Report, a point in its favour and one which adds, doubtless, a great deal to the weight of its findings and recommendations.

"In the second place, the Report recommends, in very strong terms, the appointment of a Public Service Commission, not exactly identical with your own Civil Service Commission but something on its line. That Commission is provided for in the Act of 1919, but for reasons which it has not been possible for us at any time to find out, the Secretary of State has not up to the present carried out that provision of the Act, although several years have gone by. Lord Lee's Commission has recommended that a body of that sort should be immediately appointed. We think it an exceedingly salutary recommendation, and we hope it will be acted upon.

"Now, when I have said so much in favour, I must mention to you one matter which is intimately connected with the constitutional aspect in India. The position of the British Services in India, their power and privileges, are all connected with the constitutional position in India, which is in transition. We had hoped, and have always demanded, that when this important matter was to be considered, the position of the Civil Services and the future Constitution of India, that the Constitution itself should be examined afresh. That examination, however, which we have come here to press upon the British Cabinet, was not granted, and against our wishes this Commission went out to India. The connection is clearly shewn when we remember that if we became a Dominion, which we wish to be at the earliest possible moment, the regulation of the Services, their recruitment and conditions of service, would be within our power to determine. It may well be that we shall cease to recruit outside our country, except when technical knowledge is required, which we would get from all parts of the world, as any self-governing country does.

The British Services, about which it is difficult to say sufficient in praise for their efficiency, integrity or industry, are a little too costly for India. You know how our finance has been strained during the last few years, and most of you have heard of the Salt Tax, to which very unpopular measure the Viceroy says he was driven through the unsatisfactory state

of the finances. Nevertheless, this Commission recommends the addition of a sum of a crore of rupees, equal to £670,000 per annum. That may seem a bagatelle to those who think in European standards, but I do not know how the Government of India is to find the necessary money. We are prepared to recognise and provide for the grievances of the British Services, but this sum of a crore of rupees a year is much too much and those responsible for Indian finance will wring their hands when it comes to finding the money. Moreover, for some time now, every political school in India has been asking that recruitment in this country should cease. Not that we do not want British people. We are quite willing to engage, on the necessary terms, such technical, scientific and trained service as may be required, but we do not want regular recruitment in this country, that is no longer necessary. We contend that India can provide the necessary talent. Moreover, it is a question of rupees, annas, and pies.

"The Lee Commission have acted, and legitimately acted on the view that the Constitution of India is not going to advance, that it is still to be a transitional Government, under the control of the Secretary of State and his Council here, and ultimately, the Parliament of the British electors. That, however, is not a state of things we wish to be continued a day longer than we can help. We think the time has come when you must meet the demands of India, as you have done of Australia, Canada and South Africa. I am not going to state the reasons, but I am going to assert that if we were a Dominion the arrangement which this Commission has recommended could not come into existence, and I am perfectly certain when these recommendations are published in India there will be an uproar throughout that country, that the Commission has prejudged the larger constitutional issue which we have come here to place before the people of Britain. The publication of this Report at this juncture will embitter an already embittered situation.

"In the year 1919, when our Constitution was first devised, it occurred to some of us that if that Constitution was to confer any degree of self-government at all upon the people of India, if the Government of India was to have a modicum of independence of the Imperial Parliament in internal affairs as was proposed, then the dependence of our country upon the Secretary of State for the recruitment of our Services should be done away with as a mark of degradation. A Government of 300,000,000 people, commanding vast resources, endowed for the first time with so-called independence in certain internal affairs, being, however, under a legal obligation to take into its service such members as the Secretary of State may choose to enlist in this country or elsewhere; that we think a mark of subordination, which was not compatible with the status and dignity of our great Government. Nevertheless, that system was continued unchanged, and to this day the Secretary of State chooses the people, determines their salaries and emoluments, and even their punishment and dismissal are not entrusted to the Indian or Provincial Government, who, however, are expected to control them. This is a serious drawback, and the Lee Commission propose to continue it: they say the method of recruitment and control of these Services shall not be altered. Now, we wish, before the Provinces stand on their own feet, that the place of the Secretary of State shall be taken hereafter in these matters by the Government of India, and no political party in India which wishes to command a modicum of respect from the electors can acquiesce in the continuance of the Secretary of State as the final arbiter over our Services.

"The Secretary of State and his Council have to be deprived of most of the powers they now enjoy. The Secretary is assisted by the dearest grandmamas in the world (Laughter). I have nothing to say against them, but we want the Secretary of State to act on his own individuality, so that we can hold him responsible, so that he cannot hide behind people who retired a fairly good time ago and who are doing work which is not exactly visible upon the surface. We want the Government of India to be erected into its own proper independence, and to be given the power of recruiting for its Services wherever it likes: in India, if the Assembly and

Provincial Councils choose, outside India if they so desire, —we must run our own Services.

"A most extraordinary provision has also obtained in our unwritten code in India, and the Lee Commission proposes to stereotype it: in fact, they now propose, for the first time, that the principle should be solemnly admitted. This is that our Government is bound to provide medical relief for the British element in these Services and their families, and that in order to find such medical assistance a certain percentage of appointments in the Indian Medical Services should be determined from time to time by the Secretary of State and his advisers as a minimum: he will say so many appointments must be given to British people. In a Service which hereafter is properly to be a Civil and Provincial Service, the Secretary of State is to have power to dictate that so many shall be British officers, and other elaborate arrangements are proposed in a certain small section. I am under the disadvantage of having read only a summary of the report, but the matter is so important, and you will hear these things said, and said in much stronger fashion in India, that it is necessary for us to state that we are not going to recognise the principle that it is our duty to provide a certain number of appointments . . . . for officers of a certain class in order that they may be of assistance to the British Services. Surely quite enough qualified English practitioners can be found in India, or if the need is felt others will go over and stay in India. To insist that so many Britishers should be appointed is again a mark of subordination for us, and one which India will deeply resent.

"There are, however, many other recommendations in the Lee Report which I can heartily commend. I am not passing a condemnation upon the Report altogether, and the very brief time which Lord Lee has taken is of itself evidence of the calibre of the people on the Commission, but there are these four points which will make this Report, somewhat unwelcome and which will add their own share to the unpleasantnesses of the political situation in India.

"Just one word more. There is no considerable school of politicians in India, even that over which Mr. Gandhi presides which wishes to take India outside of the British Empire (Hear, hear). There are many reasons, wholly beneficial to India, which, if we were guided by none but selfish considerations, should still induce us to remain within the Empire. There are considerations which rise above mere selfishness, above the Indian standpoint alone, which would counsel our remaining within the Commonwealth, to everyone who speaks with responsibility about the connection of India and the British Empire. This is an asset of superlative importance, which no British statesman should squander. Our desire to remain within the British Empire is to this day a feature of our connection with the Government of India and with her destinies about which you may be proud. I do hope that in the future no political party in this country, no statesman, no British Cabinet enthroned in power for the time being, will, by thoughtless word, by long-delayed action, by bitter remonstrance, dissipate that valuable asset, and reduce the people of India to the status of those who, desiring to maintain the connection, are, however, prevented by short-sighted statesmen from continuing to entertain that laudable feeling. About this I can speak with some amount of inner knowledge. It will take much to drive us out of the British Empire, it will take much, but I am afraid recent actions of Great Britain are going very near the limit. To say nothing but to mention Kenya is, to me, sufficient condemnation of the way Indian affairs are being managed in Parliament. Don't let that sort of thing be repeated. I am speaking as a student of Indian literature and history, as one whom a scholarly and eminent professor taught to value British institutions, to reverence the Mother of Parliaments, and to hope that on the soil of India there would be a system of government built similar to yours but adapted to our needs, touched on the many millions of India and their coming generations something of that material prosperity, that moral elevation, which it is your pride to

enjoy under your own constitution. I know I am not singular in entertaining this desire, and I pray you allow us to continue in this state of mind, allow that state of heart to continue in India. Teach me—I am fairly old now by Indian standards—teach me and the coming generations to honour and cherish the British connection, do not put us in a place in the British Empire that will make us think of that connection with other feelings than of pride. You built the Empire. We helped, though some of you do not like to think it so. We study its place and power amongst the nations of the world, we admire it, and feel gratitude to it, but, believe me, we are no longer proud of it, because you have not yet assigned to us a place in the Empire which alone can evoke that sentiment of pride. That is the work of future statesmen. I hope that this connection, great in history and potent for the benefit not merely of the British Empire but I believe of India will be established on a basis of honourable equality and reciprocal goodwill, so that it may continue to redound to human happiness for ever." (Applause.)

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