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Topics of the Week

The Muslim League and War

IT is impossible to congratulate the Muslim League Working Committee on its war resolution passed on the 18th inst. at Delhi. It is difficult to find a more lamentable display of communal selfishness and sacrifice of national interests and spiteful hate. As regards the Muslim League's attitude towards England in the war situation, the Committee said that the Muslim League should be acknowledged as the only organisation that could speak on behalf of all Muslims in India, that the League should be taken into the Government's confidence and that the Government should create a sense of security and satisfaction among Muslims. For the rest, it was a bitter tirade against the rule of the Congress, which the League accused of being Hindu, in the majority of Provinces, "where to-day their (Muslims') liberty of person, property and honour are in danger and even their elementary rights are most callously trampled upon." These complaints by their very violence of language seriously discount their validity. The Committee then bitterly complained that the Governors were not using their special powers to protect the rights of Muslims and asked that the Governors should be urged to use them.

THE Committee then referred to the constitution of India and the principles which should not inform them. It disapproved of the democratic parliamentary system as unsuited to India, which was not a nation but a bundle of nationalities, because such a system would mean the permanent domination of the Hindu majority and the vassalage of the Muslim minority. The Committee

not only asked for the abandonment of the federal scheme but also of the "federal objective" affirmed by the Viceroy. And the opposition to the federal objective was based on the same thesis that the Hindu majority would rule over the Muslim minority.

THE Committee has not offered a constructive suggestion as to what the new constitution should be like. All its suggestions are negative. The constitution should not be democratic and parliamentary for the reason that a permanent communal Hindu majority will rule. Since the Hindus are likely to remain the majority of the population for as long as we can foresee, the Muslim League would rule out democratic parliamentary government for all that time. We, too, realise the undesirability, nay, the undemocratic character, of an unchangeable communal majority rule. The solution for it is to substitute a mutable political majority rule by means of the common electorate, which takes no notice of one's religion or community, but only of one's political opinions. But that is the very change that the Muslim League has all along opposed with all its fanatic zeal and strength.

AND yet the Committee professed that the League stood for a free India. We wonder what kind of free India the Muslim League envisages. In any event, the claim of the League to be the sole representative of all the Muslims in India is as preposterous as it is unfounded.

Control of Markets and Prices

AS a result of almost universal agitation against the order sanctioning an increase of 20 p. c. in the prices of important food materials, the Bombay Government have now revised it in certain respects. The most important modification of the order is the reduction in the permitted margin of increase from 20 p. c. to 10 p. c. in case of food grains, meat, til oil and sugar. The modification is welcome as far as it goes. But it leaves the many questions we raised in the article two weeks ago still unanswered and unsolved. Has the Government any machinery which is competent to advise it in the business of a detailed control of prices and has it any organisation to prevent a wholesale evasion of orders regarding price control?

THE grounds on which the Publicity Officer of Government tried to justify the first order, the haphazard and highly unscientific manner in which statistical data were published by him and the subsequent revision of the order under pressure of public opinion, all indicate a lack of policy, information and organization. Such a state of affairs will

lead to greater and greater difficulties as the war drags on. The control of retail prices is both a vital and a complicated business. The control of organised markets is comparatively much simpler. Government's order last week prohibiting "options" in cotton followed on consultation with the chief organised authority—the East India Cotton Association. This order will be generally welcomed. The course of events on the Bombay stock and produce exchanges has always given grounds for doubting the value of the service supposed to be rendered to society by the speculator. In times of stress the Bombay speculators have always shown a tendency of getting out of hand and this restriction of the sphere of forward business should prove useful in putting a check on pure gambling.

THE proper course in the control of retail prices is, however, not so readily determined or put into effect. Government must get into touch with bodies of trades, it must organise a service for obtaining information regarding supplies and market conditions, it must have an expert organisation which can impartially interpret these data, and it must put itself in a position to enforce the orders. It is highly likely that in course of time Government may find it necessary to interfere with and control all kinds of economic activities to a greater and greater degree. What we have said above regarding the directions of necessary Governmental action applies not only to the control of retail prices but to all control by Government of all economic activities. We would, therefore, strongly urge on Government the need for immediate and systematic action in this behalf. If Government begins to act immediately it will be ready for progressive action as occasions arise, and it may not find itself again in a position to have to face universal criticism or, if criticised, to resort to the frantic and fantastic efforts of a Publicity Officer.

Reservation of Posts for Minorities

THERE was a noisy debate in the Bihar Legislative Assembly on a resolution recommending the introduction of competitive examinations for the purpose of recruitment in public services.

AN immediate clamour arose for reservation for minorities on behalf of Muslims, depressed classes, Momins (a backward community among the Muslims) and non-Christian aboriginals. The Bengali-Bihari controversy, the running sore in Bihar politics, again came to the fore. In a spirited reply, the mover, Babu Ramoharitra Singh, vainly appealed for a better sense for the good of all.

THE attitude of the Government is worth noting. The Prime Minister gave a long-winded apology for the Government's policy of supporting the excellent proposal in theory though not in practice. The original resolution, he said, represented the high ethereal atmosphere, while the amendments represented the earth with all its realities. Mr. Krishna Ballabh Sahay, Parliamentary Secretary, repeated the plea of the old bureaucrats that Governments cannot advance far ahead for popular opinion. They cannot be blind to realities, "cannot bury their heads in sand like the ostrich." Indeed, they must not blind their eyes; they must maintain a stern vigil for the country's good, exploring

with bold eagle eyes all avenues of progress, without fear or favour.

IN fact, it was clearly the duty of Government in this instance to educate backward public opinion in healthy principles of public life by giving it an undaunted lead. Fissiparous tendencies, of which the Bihar Assembly presented such a sorry spectacle the other day, are the inevitable result of unfortunate policies that have created vested interests. Unity is not a vague idealistic dream; it is the first fundamental necessity in a free country. And those possessing power should use it towards the creation of an atmosphere that will foster unity.

I. M. S.

THE resolution in the Council of State, moved by Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru last week, recommending to the Governor-General in Council to take immediate steps to Indianise the Indian Medical Service, was rejected by 22 votes to 6.

PRIMARILY meant for military service, the I. M. S. has greatly predominated in all superior medical posts in the country, civil and military. I. M. S. officers are in charge of hospitals and medical departments of jails, of sanitary and bacteriological institutions, and are professors in medical colleges. As recently as 1923, 89 p. c. of the appointments of the whole Service, civil and military, consisted of British officers. Though the number has been greatly diminished since then, because of the policy of progressive Indianisation, the maximum number of 166 laid down for employment of Europeans on the civil side is an unnecessarily too great burden for a poor country. And, besides, it limits the opportunities of Indians for service in the medical sphere in their own country, making them, as has been said time and again, "only hewers of wood and drawers of water." On the military side, only 40 p. c. of the regular cadre of officers are Indian.

IN fact, in spite of repeated demands for Indianisation of the Service, the policy underlying its regulations has been most unfair. To quote a passage from Pandit Kunzru's speech, "till 1914 recruitment to the service was by open competition. Although Indians were at a considerable disadvantage, primarily because they had to compete with British candidates in Great Britain, they were able to secure 40 p. c. of the vacancies. Under the system of nomination introduced by the Government after the war, the ratio of Indians to Britishers was fixed at one to two. Another innovation introduced was that certain stations were reserved for I. M. S. people." A further argument in favour of the employment of Britishers was that British officers and their families desire to be treated by people of their own race. This is a most discreditable piece of evidence of racial discrimination in spite of the assurances to the contrary by Sir Jagdish Prasad in the Council the other day that "there is no racial discrimination in the I. M. S."

IT must be plainly said that the arguments advanced from the Government side are most unconvincing. The principle of nomination, the validity of which is questionable even for the appointment of backward communities in their own country, was defended and advocated to support

backdoor admission to these posts of Britishers of second-rate qualifications.

THE statement by Col. Hind about the proposal under consideration, viz. suspension of recruitment of British officers to permanent commissions in the I. M. S. during the time of the present emergency—to meet war-time requirements of the British Army—has been taken by some as a matter for satisfaction. The stiff and uncompromising attitude of the Government of India is unmistakable from the tone of the debate. It is unwilling to make even the slightest concessions to Nationalist opinion, which asks but for justice and fairness to Indians in their own country.

Posts Reserved for I. C. S.

THE Retrenchment Committee appointed by the Bihar Government has made a very practical suggestion regarding appointments to certain posts in the Provincial Service. If brought into effect, it would help to increase efficiency as well as be a good measure of economy.

THE Committee has recommended that certain posts, hitherto reserved for appointments to be made from the I. C. S., should be thrown open to officers belonging to other Services. According to this suggestion, the Bihar Government has already decided to recommend to the Secretary of State that posts like those of the Commissioner of Excise and Salt, of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, and of the Under Secretaries to Government in the Political and Finance Departments should be taken out of the reserved list.

THE wider field of choice would no doubt help to remedy a long-felt grievance of the Provincial Service, and would help to bring out men of ability in the Province who have not had the good luck to belong to the 'heaven-born service.' This would help to bridge the unnecessary and unhealthy division of services in India, such as was recommended by public opinion many a time before this as a piece of reform for its own sake. With proper precautions that this measure may not degenerate into undue provincialism, it should be followed all over India.

Fee Concessions for Harijans

WE are glad to note that the Rt. Rev. Bishop Azariah of Dornakal has supported our oft-repeated plea that school-fee concessions, as all other economic concessions, should be based on economic, rather than social and religious, considerations. In the *Dornakal Diocesan Magazine* the Bishop characterised the fee concessions offered to Harijans but not to Christians of the same economic status, as an unfair discrimination, unworthy of a Government which professes to be national, and urged that it should treat the Brahmin and the Harijan, the Christian and the Hindu, impartially and give fee concessions on the strength of poverty certificates rather than of communal affinities. With righteous indignation he enquired if it was right that the child of a Harijan Cabinet Minister should get concessions which the son of his poor Christian peer did not. We suggest, with the Bishop, that economic remedies should be applied to economic ills and not to social ills, which need social remedies. Poverty of parents should be the only

justification for fee concessions, as long as fees are levied at all in educational institutions.

THE present concessions are based on other considerations than economic status. Harijans and Muslims have been given concessions on the ground that, as communities, they are *backward* in modern education and have to be induced to come up to the level of other communities more advanced in education. In the case of Harijans the concessions are also a part of the "conscience money", as it were, which the other communities are paying as a compensation for past neglect and oppression. It is part of the economic compensation for social injuries inflicted on the Harijans in the past, even as in the case of a social wrong like defamation the retribution takes the form of money compensation. That is the reason why such concessions were not extended to the caste Hindus and to the Christians, who are educationally more advanced and have not suffered like the Harijans. If the Bishop of Dornakal will consistently stand by his present thesis, concessions now given to the Muslims and Harijans will have to be withdrawn and be hereafter based solely on economic status. It would mean also that the concessions shown to the Europeans and Anglo-Indians will also have to be withdrawn, and one single economic criterion adopted for all.

WE fear, however, that our Christian friends have not been as consistent as, presumably, the Bishop is. Instead of taking their stand unequivocally on economic status, they have taken the communal stand also when it suited them and asked that for school concessions Indian Christians should be treated as Harijans. Now the Christian is not a Harijan. Or what is the change worth? The Bishop admitted that it was a humiliation to call the Christians Harijans for the sake of the concessions. And Christians, as a community, are among the most educationally advanced in India. Their only claim for fee concessions is that they are of "Harijan origin." For that matter, all Christians have had non-Christian origins, if we go far enough. The Madras Minister of Education, the Hon. Mr. Varkay, himself a Roman Catholic Christian, suggested that in three generations the stigma of Harijan origin should have disappeared. The Bishop agreed. In which case, it would mean that for three generations, Christians should, for purposes of concessions, be treated as Harijans!—a proposition which the Bishop said was humiliating. The fact is that some Christians wish that they should have the privileges of Harijans and Christians at the same time, without the disadvantages of either. They want to keep the cake and eat it too. We suggest that they should join us and the Bishop in urging that economic concessions on the basis of religious and social causes are an unmitigated evil, and that they should be based only on economic considerations and none other and in every case.

THE Bishop, however, watered down his thesis when he complained that the fee concessions to Harijans penalised conversions. It is amazing for a Bishop to speak so damagingly and cynically of the springs and motives of religious conversions—be it to Christianity or Islam or Arya Samaj. In so far as such concessions put a premium on the Harijan community remaining Harijan, it must follow that all attempts to abolish untouchability and assimilate the Harijans with the

rest of the community must be handicapped. But we have yet to hear of the Arya Samajists complaining that the school fee concessions were a handicap to their work of religious conversion.

Rent Restriction in Lahore

THE Punjab Government has framed a Bill for the purpose of preventing landlords passing on to their tenants the tax imposed on buildings and lands within the limits of the Lahore Municipality. The Government feels that the landlords themselves must absorb the tax, and that it would be unjust to make the tenants pay the tax through an increase in rent. The Bill, therefore, forbids the landlords to increase rent on premises of which the monthly rent did not exceed Rs. 400 at the beginning of April this year. The landlords would, of course, be allowed to increase rent in consequence of payment by them of a municipal rate, cess or tax other than a tax on buildings and lands, provided "the amount of such increase does not exceed the amount of rate, cess or tax so paid." But "no landlord shall recover from his tenant the amount of any tax on buildings and lands which is or may be from time to time imposed in respect of any premises occupied by such tenant by an increase in the amount of rent payable or otherwise."

SIMILARLY, landlords would be permitted to increase rent at a rate not exceeding five per cent. per annum on the amount expended by them on any improvement or structural alterations of any premises (not including expenditure on decoration or ordinary repairs). If, however, landlords so alter the terms of tenancy that, without increasing the amount of rent payable by the tenants, the new terms are less favourable to the tenants, the landlords would be regarded as increasing the rent and would thus come within the mischief of the proposed Act. No tenant can be made to vacate the premises so long as he is willing to pay rent at the rate in force on 1st April 1939 and so long as he is not guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance. On the other hand, landlords are allowed to recover possession of the premises let to tenants if they require the premises for the bonafide purpose of the erection of buildings or for their own occupation. If, however, it is found that the premises are not used for the purpose within three months of the date when possession has been obtained, the tenants would be placed in occupation of the premises on the original terms.

Prohibition in C. P.

FROM the report of the Excise Department in C. P. for the calendar year 1938 one learns that prohibition is working satisfactorily in that Province. The policy of prohibition was first put in force on 1st April 1938 in the whole of the

Saugor district, the Narsinghpur sub-division of the Hoshangabad district, the Akot taluq of the Akola district and the industrial towns of Hinganghat, Badnera and Katni, thus affecting a population of 14 lakhs who consumed in the previous year 22,000 proof gallons of country spirit and 73,400 gallons of toddy. The Prohibition Act penalises all traffic in, and consumption of, liquor except the use of spirit for medicinal, scientific and industrial purposes. Accordingly, when the Act came into force all country spirit, foreign liquor and toddy shops were closed, except two foreign liquor "off" shops to cater for Europeans and permit-holders. To protect the dry area against smuggling and to reduce temptation to visit liquor shops just across the border, a five-mile shopless belt was created around the dry areas. The revenue from excise in the last wet year was Rs. 3.5 lakhs, and the Province stood to lose the whole of it on account of the policy of prohibition.

The report says:

It would be too optimistic, however, to assume that all this money was saved by consumers. In Saugor district some of the ex-liquor addicts took to charas and bhang. Charas is totally prohibited from 1st January 1939, but it is reported that bhang is gradually being given up. In the Narsinghpur sub-division, except for a small rise in bhang consumption, there was nothing to indicate that previous liquor consumers had taken to other intoxicants. Reports from Akot taluq were encouraging, there being no diversion to drugs or denatured spirit. In Hinganghat town some ex-addicts took to denatured spirit for some time, but soon gave it up.

It is too early to gauge the effects of the prohibition policy on the moral and material condition of the people. So far, however, the district reports indicate that the policy is attended with a large measure of success and has considerably benefited the drinking classes. Although some liquor addicts visited adjoining States or British Indian shops, the large majority cheerfully acquiesced in the new order of things. There was considerable saving at marriages at which liquor was formerly served, sweets having now taken the place of liquor. Women everywhere welcome prohibition as a great blessing. They appreciate the fact that closure of liquor shops has brought money and peace into their homes. It is now reported that quarrels and fighting which usually accompanied drinking, particularly on bazaar and festival days, have almost ceased. The operatives of the Hinganghat mills, the majority of whom drank liquor in the past, now work longer hours and earn more wages. Enquiries further elicited that labour is more regular and punctual and there is less demand for advances. Occasional visits to the cinema, now enliven what was formerly a monotonous existence, and it is reported that the income of a cinema which never exceeded Rs. 484 a month in pre-prohibition days, rose gradually to Rs. 2,510.

"IMPERIALIST WAR"

OF all the grounds on which refusal of any help by India to Great Britain is urged in this country, the one that Great Britain is engaged in this war for imperialist purposes seems the least well-founded. That Britain is an imperialist country and that India has carried on and will have to carry on a struggle against

her for her own political freedom is, of course very true. Nor need it be denied that, although Britain's primary object in declaring war is to defend Poland against Germany's brutal attack and, in the event of this defence proving unsuccessful, to revive Poland as an independent country, Britain will undoubtedly, in achieving

this object, help to avert a possible attack later by Germany on herself. Her present action cannot thus be regarded as wholly disinterested, and British statesmen have fully admitted that they would be serving their national interests also in going to the aid of the victim of aggression. In the interests of world peace it is well that it should be so. Indeed, the whole basis of collective security consists in the fact that modern inventions have made the world such a single unit that aggression in any part of it, however remote, will ultimately affect every other part. Every country is, therefore, urged to make it its own concern, within the limits of its opportunities and resources, to unite with other countries in resisting aggression wherever it may take place. This broad concept of collective security has certainly broken down completely. But it would be an evil day for world peace if a victim of aggression was helped perhaps only by a country which is marked down as the next victim and all other countries stood away. It is certainly in the interest of the world at large that in this grim international crisis help is available to Poland of such a powerful country as Great Britain, even if this help is rendered partly or even mainly with the motive of self-interest. So long as we are sure that British interests will be preserved in so far as they are consonant with and subserve the larger interests of humanity, British help is something that we must all heartily welcome. We cannot quarrel with a man who preaches the simple doctrine that honesty is the best policy on the ground that if honesty is generally practised it will benefit him as well as others.

Will British resistance to the Nazi attack on Polish independence so benefit Britain as to tighten her hold on the countries subject to her rule? It is difficult to understand how it can possibly have this effect. At the end of the war there will very likely be such an upsurge of feeling in favour of freedom all over the world that Britain, whatever be her own inclinations, will be compelled to make some concession to that feeling. It is right for the subject peoples in the British Empire to urge on Great Britain, while she is making a stand for peace and freedom, that, like peace, freedom too is indivisible. She cannot, when calling upon her colonies to fight for Poland's freedom, refuse freedom to them and should, therefore, in asking for their help, assure them that their own position within the Empire will be reconsidered in conformity to the very principles on which an appeal for active co-operation on their part is based if their co-operation is at all to be adequate to the needs of the perilous situation that is in front of us. Britain should have carried out the principle of the Mandates in her colonies when she joined with others in depriving Germany of her colonies. The time for doing so has certain-

ly arrived now when once again Germany's vaulting ambition has to be checked; and if Britain is willing to do so, she cannot but place India, with the progress India has already made, among countries to which full political freedom should be accorded at the earliest practicable moment. It is thus her clear duty to declare at once that India will be enabled to enjoy unrestricted powers of self-government after the war is over and to treat her as a self-governing Dominion even while the war lasts. In this way alone will the Indian people be put in the position of giving wholeheartedly all the help of which they are capable. If Britain is moved to a big effort only when the growing power of Nazi Germany threatens her own position, there is no shame in confessing that India will be moved to a full participation in this effort only when she becomes convinced not only that the Nazi danger in Europe will be removed but that her own position will be greatly improved as a result of the effort succeeding. There is no question here of making sure of the reward. India recognises fully that the war in which Britain is engaged is a righteous war and that it is her duty, as well as of every other peace-loving country, to extend every assistance to the limit of her capacity. But the Indian people are like every other people. It is impossible to expect that they will be persuaded to make the huge sacrifices that will be required of them unless they are assured that these sacrifices will be used for the attainment of a wider objective than is now proclaimed. Resistance to Nazi aggression is a worthy object, which has a claim on the moral support of all freedom-loving people. But it is still a narrow object of a war of the dimensions which it is going to assume. If it be true as is alleged that the war will determine the issue between civilisation and barbarism, between international order and chaos, the question that the British Government will necessarily have to address itself to will be how to bring the British Empire itself into conformity with the principles underlying the waging of war and to extend to the non-self-governing colonies that freedom which it is the purpose of war to restore to Poland.

While it is morally incumbent upon England to shed her own imperialism when she sets out on this adventure, it would be wholly wide of the mark to assert that she does so to expand or strengthen her imperialism or even that the adventure, if successful, would result incidentally in expanding or strengthening her imperialism. The case was not quite so clear when she took up a strong attitude (in fact it was none too strong) towards Japan in the matter of the Tientsin Concession. There the question was one of preserving her own imperialist rights, though for the moment such preservation worked for the victim of aggression, viz. China, and against the aggressor country, viz. Japan. Concessions and Settlements in China

like Tientsin and Shanghai are after all small islands of foreign sovereignty on Chinese soil, and if justice is to be done to China it is necessary not only to stop Japan's march in that country but also to liquidate these enclaves of foreign sovereignties. It so happens at present that China's resistance to Japanese aggression will be strengthened if the foreign Concessions maintain their rights and privileges intact, though these rights and privileges are of an imperialistic nature, and Britain is in the happy position of being able to claim that, in retaining her own rights, she is helping China's resistance to the invader. In fact, when the British and Japanese Governments arrived at an agreement at Tokio, the news sent a thrill of horror and dismay throughout China, because China, although she desires elimination of the foreign Concessions, does not naturally wish them to be surrendered to Japan, who is her immediate aggressor. As Nathaniel Peffer says in *Asia*, "As a matter of logic the Japanese cannot be refuted when they say that East Asia must be freed from western encroachments which make it a spoils ground. But there is a crucial difference between freeing East Asia from western encroachments so that it will

no longer be an international battlefield for spoils and freeing it so that it will be the spoils exclusively of Japan." And the Chinese Government ardently hopes now that Great Britain, France and U.S.A. will preserve their own interests in China so that it would be itself able to maintain and stiffen its resistance to Japan. If the Shanghai Settlement is maintained, it would serve as a refuge for the Chinese which would be somewhat free from the danger of Japanese attack. Here is a case in which, by a curious turn of events, Britain's imperialism throws a shield over the Chinese people. Britain has declared her willingness to abandon her extra-territorial rights in China, and the negotiations in this regard were suspended only on account of the outbreak of war. In present circumstances the last thing China would desire is for Britain to walk out of the Chinese territory. In the war against Germany that is now going on there is no such complication. In no case would the war help to consolidate British imperialism. There are so many valid arguments on which we in India can base our claim for freedom at this juncture that it is unnecessary to urge arguments which certainly appear to be untenable.

THE CHATFIELD DESPATCH INDIA YOKED TO THE IMPERIAL CHARIOT

THE Chatfield Despatch on the defence organization in India marks a new epoch in the defence policy of India and as such deserves close study. In fact, the Secretary of State, in the concluding paragraph of his Military Despatch No. 5, dated August 16th, 1939, and published in India on September 5, 1939—two days after the declaration of the Anglo-German war—invited the Government to secure "informed appreciation" of the Despatch in India. If appreciation is dependent on information, the authorities both in India and England have taken good care that full and frank information shall not be available to India. India has been kept at arm's length because of Britain's distrust of her, and that acts as a psychological bar to a proper appreciation of the subject. Because of the lack of frankness on the part of the authorities, the defence policy of India has always been a matter of controversy, even of prevarication.

The Chatfield Committee was appointed to consider the defence organisation in India; but it was appointed, not by the Government of India, but by the British Government, and what is more, it did not include a single Indian on it. The text of its Report has not been published, but only the conclusions of the British Government thereon. The Government of India declared, rather pompously, that they agreed with the conclusions of the British Government, as if they could do other-

wise, considering not only the subordination of the Government of India to the British Cabinet, but also of the Commander-in-Chief in India to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

It is impossible to take seriously the pretensions of the Government of India that they have an independent view in such matters. It is true that in the Indian Legislative Assembly in 1921, in the palmy days when the late Mr. E. S. Montagu was Secretary of State for India, the Government of India protested their autonomy and independence of the British War Office. Indeed, the Government of India repudiated the recommendation of the Esher Committee which would place the army in India under the control of the British War Office. Nonetheless, the contrary was true, as was revealed in the *Life and Diaries* of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, since published. The Government of India had decided to reduce some British troops in India. The then Commander-in-Chief, Lord Rawlinson, who was opposed to it, appealed to Sir Henry Wilson over the head of the Government of India. Sir Henry says in his book :

I have wired to Philip (Sir Philip Chetwode) to go to Montagu and to find out whether I am, or am not, his military advisor; and I told Philip not to be put off by being told that this was a matter of internal economy to be decided by the Viceroy in Council, because the internal security in India, the protection of her frontiers, the power to send troops

to countries outside her frontiers such as Mesopotamia, Burma, Singapore and Hongkong, and finally the obligation on the Home Government to reinforce India in case of necessity were all matters interwoven in Imperial strategy and therefore come under me.

This leaves precious little autonomy for the Government of India to talk about, except to obey the orders of the British War Office. All the same, as recently as 1934, the Commander-in-Chief in India protested that he was not taking orders from the British War Office. Speaking on the Report of the Capitation Tribunal on March 19, 1934, he said:

I merely quote these few instances in order to show that we are not run by the War Office as has so often been told me in this House and elsewhere.

The Chatfield Despatch is another refutation of the pretensions of the Commander-in-Chief. As will be shown more clearly later on, the Chatfield Despatch is an organic part of the new policy of the *organization and distribution of Imperial forces*, initiated by the present British Secretary of State for War, Mr. Leslie Hoare Belisha, in 1938. In the course of his speech on the Army Estimates in the House of Commons on the 10th March 1938, Mr. Hoare Belisha asked:

Would a commander today, having our Regular Army under his single control, and surveying the Imperial field at large, dispose his forces in exactly their existing proportions? Would he not, having fixed his garrisons so that each one of them, where its communications could be interrupted, should be maintained in peace at a strength adequate to discharge its defensive duties at the outbreak of war, aim at holding strategic reserve in a zone whence it could be directed most rapidly to those alternate places where security is most likely to be threatened. The location of such a reserve would not be fixed, but would be liable to change in the light of changing conditions and requirements.

He then proceeded to dilate on the relation between his new scheme and the Army in India:

A commander endeavouring to operate on these principles would find himself at present confronted with a rigidity, namely, that the number of units to be stationed in India is predetermined. This rigidity does not only affect the number of units, but their establishment cannot be altered without India's consent. Any change in their equipment must be similarly approved. As it is an essential feature of our distribution that units should be interchangeable with units in India, the pace of the re-adaptation of the rest of the British Army is influenced by the speed at which the Government of India find themselves able to proceed.

What is the need for interchangeability? Mr. Hoare Belisha said:

It must at the same time be recognised that the Government of India have never been, and let us hope never would be, less willing than we ourselves in the converse case to despatch forces beyond their frontiers on occasion of need.

It was because of this organic unity of Imperial defence that Mr. Hoare Belisha secured the appointment of the Chatfield Committee by the British Government, and not by the Government of India, either independently or jointly with England. The Army in India is part of the Imperial scheme

of organisation and distribution of Imperial forces.

After stating that the previous consent of the Government of India was necessary to re-organise even the Army in England and after securing the appointment of the Chatfield Committee, Mr. Hoare Belisha did not, however, feel it necessary to wait till the Committee reported and the Government of India gave its consent even if it was only a formality. He said:

Without delaying until the outcome of the inquiry which I have outlined, we shall proceed to achieve for that part of the Army which is outside India the best attainable form of organisation.

He went ahead with his scheme.

This precipitate conduct can only mean either that he anticipated the recommendations of the Committee and the consent of the Government of India, or that they concerned only subordinate and consequential matters which did not affect his scheme, as, for instance, the speed with which the Government of India could be ordered to carry out the implications of his scheme, its application to the Indian units of the Army in India, and the finding of money necessary for these projects. Mr. Hoare Belisha told the Commons on the 10th March 1938:

Indeed, the Government of India have represented the serious effect upon the Indian budget and the increase in the cost of the British troops in India which must necessarily result from the various measures I shall today propose for the purpose of improving the conditions of service in the Army.

The defence autonomy of the Government of India would suggest that the organisation and distribution of *all* defence forces in India would be related solely to the needs and means of India and not be dictated to by the British War Office. Even if it be granted that the autonomy is limited with respect to the *British* units, which, under the Cardwell system, have to be interchangeable with the British units in England, the Government of India ought to be free to organise the *Indian* units of the Army in India according to India's needs and means. That was a matter which the Chatfield Committee was free to consider, unhampered by Mr. Hoare Belisha's decisions. But even in this matter the Committee preferred to conform to the Imperial scheme, obviously under Imperial inspiration. The Despatch said that the Committee had considered a suggestion that a separate specialised force might be maintained for frontier watch and ward and internal security purposes, and that such a force would be cheaper, simpler and more effective. But they disapproved of it.

They noted that the personnel of separate specialised forces would not be *interchangeable*, and consequently great practical difficulties would be met with as regards the reliefs and the training of units in the various components, while the constitution of forces of which the component parts cannot readily be interchanged is in itself unsound from the point of view of elasticity and economy of force. Moreover, such forces

would almost certainly prove more costly than general purpose troops. Specialisation of this nature would involve the conversion of a large part, if not the whole, of the regular Indian Army, at any rate, into groups of forces which would be incapable of operating anywhere outside their local spheres. On the other hand, the *British units* which now form an integral part of the Army forces in India must in any case be maintained in such a state that they are readily interchangeable with units on the Home establishment, and it would clearly be detrimental both to efficiency and morale if any portion of the *Indian Army* were organised and equipped on a markedly lower basis. The Committee concluded that in the interest of Indian defence the whole of the Army forces in India should be modernised with only such minor variations as would not affect the general level of efficiency. (Italics ours.)

It will be noticed that the Committee demanded uniformity of the standard of efficiency for the sake of interchangeability and pitched the standard at that of the British units in England. It is not for laymen, particularly Indians, to question this thesis. It is interesting, however, to recall what the Commander-in-Chief in India said on the subject not long ago. Speaking in the Council of State on the 19th March, 1934, on the resolution on the Capitulation Tribunal's Award, he answered some questions which Dewan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar (now Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, Commerce Member of the Government of India) had raised in the Legislative Assembly.

He (Dewan Bahadur Ramaswami Mudaliar) asked three questions. Does it mean that any further commitments are involved because we have received £1,500,000 from His Majesty's Government? Does it mean that the Indian Army is to be put to a certain standard of efficiency? Does it mean that the programme of mechanisation should be so adjusted that if the army is taken to Europe for Imperial purposes it must have that efficiency which is required for that purpose? Does it mean that we are thereby guaranteed that these troops will be equipped merely to the extent that is necessary for Indian defence purposes, whether that defence arises in India or in England, or could it be used for a European war apart from defence? *I can answer all these questions, categorically, "No" The Indian Army and the Army in India is maintained at a standard of efficiency necessary for the defence of the Indian frontiers and for internal security and not to the standard of European war. I will give you a few instances. . . . I merely quote these few instances in order to show that we are not run by the War Office as has often been told me in this House and elsewhere.*

Mr. Hoare Belisha said in his speech introducing the Army Estimates on the 10th March 1938: "The first purpose of our Army is home defence." In introducing the Army Estimates on the 8th March 1939, when he had already seen the Chatfield Report, he said: "I recognise that this year the question uppermost in the mind of the House is to what extent we should be prepared, in the event of war, to intervene with land forces on the Continent of Europe." If, then, the British Army is being reorganised on the basis of "Home" defence and "Continental" action, and if not only the British units but also the Indian units of the Army in India are put on the same

uniform standard with a view to interchangeability, it must follow that even the Indian units are being organised for a Continental war in Europe. The Commander-in-Chief's plea that the needs of India alone determined the organisation of the Army in India and that the standards of efficiency of the Indian Army could, therefore, be different from those of the British Army, falls to the ground. Either there has been a *large and definite change of policy* since the Commander-in-Chief spoke in 1934, or he was—well, bluffing.

The thesis, professed by the Commander-in-Chief in 1934, that the defence organisation of India could not, and therefore need not, be the same as that of England, is not without support or justification. Writing on "The Army in Imperial Defence" the *Round Table* of December 1936, said:

While an army for continental warfare must be highly mechanised, that is not necessarily true of an army in India, Egypt or Colonial stations. . . . It is not merely a question of different terrain or different weapons to counter, but also, most probably, one of a totally different objective of fighting—not to compel the submission of the Government of a highly organised enemy State, but to quell factional disorder, or to keep turbulent tribesmen beyond an unsettled frontier, or essentially to defend rather than to attack (as in garrisoning of island strongholds). Different conditions and different objectives dictate different kinds of arms and armour. An army trained and equipped for continental warfare in Europe is ill adapted for controlling the North-West Frontier, stemming communal riots, or garrisoning Cairo, Ismailia, Cyprus or Malta. An army trained and equipped for service in India is ill adapted for European mechanised warfare. This conclusion is obviously an indolence of the Cardwell system, which assimilates the Indian and other overseas units of the army with the home units—the potential expeditionary force (p. 32).

The *Round Table* quotes General Sir Edmund Ironside, no mean authority on the subject, to say:

As mechanisation goes on, as air warfare becomes more severe, the British Government will find itself forced to maintain special units at home, which are not 'feeders' for the main foreign garrison, that in India. . . . They will have to be maintained altogether outside the Cardwell system (p. 33).

Captain Macnamara, speaking on the Army Estimates on the 22nd March, 1938, thus expressed the truth of the matter:

India does not need an army which is trained for Europe, and India knows perfectly well that if there is a European war India will lose all that army because we shall have to take it away.

The organisational needs of India's defence are different from those of England's, and yet the organisation of the Army in India is organically assimilated to that of England. All the same, the Government of India pretend that they have a policy of their own in consonance with India's needs and that they are not dictated to by the British War Office.

In this connection it is interesting to note the policy of South Africa, which is not dictated to by the British War Office. The *Round Table* for June 1939, says:

Proposals for mechanisation have been dropped. After extensive review, the Government has concluded that the thick and difficult nature of the bushveld country, where land fighting might be expected, and the absence of proper roads, make the development of mechanised units unwise—a remarkable conclusion.

Apart from the merits and the limits of mechanization, South Africa has her own policy in the

light of her needs which are not necessarily the same as those of England, but India, whose needs also are different from those of England, has been obliged to have the same policy as England's.

P. KODANDA RAO

(To be continued)

CAPE TOWN AGREEMENT: UPLIFT

I.—ACHIEVEMENT

AS was pointed out in the last article, it was said during the debates on the Asiatics (Transvaal Land and Trading) Bill that, while India failed to fulfil her part of the Cape Town Agreement, South Africa fulfilled hers. Some of these critics who considered that repatriation was the only immediately operative part of the Agreement and that the uplift part was a remote obligation, contingent on a reduction of the Indian population to an undefined minimum and the development of a sufficiently favourable opinion among the white people in South Africa, naturally confined their attention to the statutory and administrative arrangements made by the South African Government to give effect to the assisted emigration scheme and shut their eyes to the uplift part of the Agreement. Others, like Mr. J. H. Grobler, who are more interested in showing up Dr. D. F. Malan's change of front than in disapproving of his erstwhile actions, enumerated the pro-Indian measures that he had taken in consequence of the Agreement. Mr. Grobler said that Dr. Malan had condoned the evasions of certain restrictive laws by Indians, advocated better educational facilities and old age pensions for Indians and the relaxation of restrictions of the grant of trade licenses to Indians. Mr. Grobler did not approve of these measures in themselves, but approved of them because they were the obligatory consequences of the Agreement, as long as it was operative.

Mr. Hofmeyr examined the achievements of South Africa with respect to the specific points the uplift clause of the Cape Town Agreement. With regard to Indian education in Natal, the Natal Provincial Government was spending less than it received from the Central Government and was still making a profit out of it. No hostel for Indian students had yet been started at the Fort Hare Native College. So far only fifty houses had been built for Indians in Durban out of the Central Housing Fund. The colour bar in the Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts had not been eliminated. And far from relaxing the Provincial Licensing Laws regarding trading rights of Indians, there had been a tightening of the Laws, and the Bill under discussion only added to their disabilities. The reference to this aspect by Mr.

Hofmeyr, who has since become a member of the Cabinet, is so significant that it is worth reproducing:

When those charges are levelled against the Government of India in regard to the first part of the Agreement, it is well to remember that we ourselves are not without spot or blameless in regard to the second part. It is not for us to throw the first stone. I say this unwillingly, for I recognise that some of the responsibility for this fact is my own. But where these statements have been made on the one side, it is only a matter of fairness and justice that a statement should be made on the other side. I read during the second reading debate the main clause of the upliftment agreement. It went on to specify certain individual points, and it referred firstly to the point which the hon. member has referred to, namely the question of education in Natal. What has happened there? The Agreement was made in 1927. In 1933 I found that in Natal the Provincial Council was still spending considerably less on Indian education than it was receiving by way of a subsidy for Indian education from the Union Government. The rate of subsidy was fixed by a commission, of which I was a member, on the basis of the bare minimum cost of education. The Natal Provincial Council, six years after the Agreement was made, was spending less than the bare minimum cost on Indian education. The hon. member for Piquetberg (Dr. Malan) had done nothing about it. After 1933 representations were made to Natal, and the expenditure on Indian education was increased. Since then, however, Natal has fallen back, and the old position has come about once more. According to the latest available figures of the Natal provincial auditor, that province is spending on Indian education at the rate of £4 16s. per pupil per annum. The subsidy is £5 5s. per pupil per annum. The difference is £10,000. I will not call it profit, but it is something very like profit. The Cape Province gets £5 5s. per head for coloured education, and the Cape Province spends no less on coloured education than £6 11s. per head. Natal spends £4 16s. per head on Indian education. May I suggest that this particular reproach against the Government of India would have come more fittingly from an hon. member who did not represent a Natal constituency? In the second place, this Agreement spoke of the establishment of a hostel for Indian students at the South African Native College at Fort Hare. That hostel has not yet been established. In the third place, it spoke of the sanitary and housing conditions in and about Durban. Everyone who knows anything about Durban knows how serious Indian housing conditions are there. Twelve years have elapsed since the Agreement was made, and yet according to the last report of the Central Housing Board, only fifty houses have been put up for Indians out of the Central Housing Fund, at a cost of £13,000. That is what we have done to implement that part of the Agreement. Then the Agreement spoke of the

maintenance of no colour bar in the Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts so far as Indians are concerned. We have maintained that. Then it spoke of the relaxation of the Provincial Licensing Laws in regard to trading licenses. No single province has relaxed its trading license laws as it affects Indians. On the other hand, the Transvaal has definitely tightened up its law and the hon. member opposite approved of it. And now we have clause 2 of this Bill imposing further restrictions. The matter is as distasteful to me as it is to the House, and I shall say no more about it. We shall, however, do wisely in the future to be careful in throwing stones at another Government in regard to what it has done, or what it has not done, in giving effect to the spirit of this Agreement.

II.—INTERPRETATION

It was, however, left to Dr. Malan to give an interpretation of the Uplift Clause which is as astounding as it is unfair. He professed to clear up the misunderstandings regarding the Uplift Clause. The Agreement had divided Indians in South Africa into two groups: those who wished to return to India and those who preferred to stay. Regarding the latter, the Indian Delegation was concerned principally with their education. The Indian Delegation has no complaints to make with respect to the Cape and the Transvaal but only Natal. The Union Government pointed out that remedial action was the concern of the Natal Provincial Government and undertook to call the attention of that Government to the Indian grievance which had been admitted by the Superintendent of Education in Natal. And that was all, said Dr. Malan. His speech is worth quoting:

And the question was asked by the Indian Government, "If those Indians return to India, what about the other Indians who remain in the country?" They said then, "We have no grievance so far as their treatment is concerned"—and they particularly had in mind the question of education—"we have no grievance so far as the Cape is concerned and we have no grievance so far as the Transvaal is concerned, but we do have a grievance as regards Natal, because it is clearly stated in the annual report of the Superintendent General of Education in Natal that the state of affairs in regard to the education of Indians in Natal, which should be looked after by the Provincial Council, is deplorable." He had stated that, to his mind, Indians in Natal, so far as educational facilities were concerned, were being deliberately neglected. The implication was that the Provincial Council of Natal was setting itself out deliberately to keep the Indians down, and the Indian Government thereupon asked if we would not do something to try and remove that hostile spirit in Natal, more particularly on the part of the Provincial Council. Our reply was, "These are provincial matters and we, as the Union Government, cannot interfere in them and the furthest we can go in connection with this matter is to place your wishes on the question, your grievances, before the provincial authorities in Natal"—grievances which had been recognised by their own Superintendent General of Education. That is what happened in connection with the so-called upliftment clause.

It is amazing that Dr. Malan overlooked all the other specific matters in the Uplift Clause to

which reference was made by Mr. Hofmeyr. When Mr. Blackwell drew his attention to the more general character of the Uplift Clause, Dr. Malan gave an interpretation of the Clause which is not obvious on its face but which, if correct, stultifies its significance. He said:

I made it clear to the Indian representatives, when they based their appeal on that clause by all kinds of claims, what the intention was. I made it clear, not that the Indians must be placed on a level with the Europeans—those were neither the words nor the implication, but the matter was put in that form because the complaints in regard to the Indians in Natal were not that they were put in an inferior position to the whites only—that was not their grievance because they are not in a position of equality even in the Cape, but in Natal they had been put into a position of inferiority, even in relation to the natives. If hon. members understand those circumstances they will appreciate the meaning of the clause better.

It will be recalled that the Uplift Clause said that the Union Government accepted the view that "in the provision of educational and other facilities, the considerable number of Indians who will remain part of the permanent population should not be allowed to lag behind other sections of the people" (italics ours). The Clause then made specific references to education in Natal, higher education at Fort Hare, sanitary and housing reform in Durban, the industrial laws and trade licensing laws. The Clause gives no support to Mr. Malan's view that the Indian Delegation had only education in Natal in view, or that "other sections of the people" meant only the Natives and not the Whites also. If Dr. Malan's interpretation of "other sections of the people" is correct, it was a deliberate fraud on the people of India and Indians in South Africa. It was neither fair nor honest of Dr. Malan to have signed that Uplift Clause with that mental reservation which robs it of all its significance and "breaks to the heart what was spoken to the ear."

If the Clause meant that Indians shall not be allowed to lag behind the Natives and no more, there is no justification for the proviso to the Clause which said that it was difficult for the Union Government to take action which was considerably in advance of public opinion, by which was meant only White opinion and not Native opinion. Certainly, if it were a case of levelling up the status of Indians to that of the Natives, the reform was not "considerably in advance of public opinion" even in South Africa. The whole problem in South Africa arises from the claim of Indians to be given unrestricted opportunities to rise to their highest and to be treated as inferior to none, either Whites or Natives, and from the denial of that claim by the Whites. The "Indian problem" in South Africa has been one of "Whites vs. Indians" and not "Natives vs. Indians."

The Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, who helped to draft the Uplift Clause and who subsequently went to South Africa as the Agent General of

the Government of India at the invitation not only of the Government of India but of the South African Government themselves and who, won the confidence of the South African Government and also of Dr. Malan for his absolute fairness, was specifically asked by the Natal Education Commission to interpret the Uplift Clause of the Agreement. In reply Mr. Sastri said:

That it meant that the common rule of civilized Governments that they should make no distinction between elements of their population, but that they should deal with all alike impartially as their capacities warrant, is the ideal which is in this paragraph. It is clearly visualised as the goal of effort.

Mr. Sastri's interpretation is borne out by the very terms of the Clause which began as follows:

The Union Government firmly believe in and adhere to the principle that it is the duty of every civilized Government to devise ways and means and to take all possible steps for the *uplifting of every section of their permanent population to the full extent of their capacity and opportunities.* (Italics ours.)

As far as we know, in none of his speeches on the subject before now has Dr. Malan given expression to his mental reservation that the Uplift Clause meant that the Indians should not be allowed to rise to the height they were capable of, even if it was higher than what the Whites were capable of. In fact in his speech in Parliament on the Agreement in 1927 Dr. Malan said:

Is it not the duty of the Government of the country to uplift all portions of our permanent population? I ask the hon. member if it is the policy of his party that a portion of the permanent population of South Africa should not be uplifted, that we should adopt a policy of repression towards a portion of the population. If the hon. member says that that is not his policy, then I ask him what objection he has to the clause in the Agreement where we speak of the upliftment of the Indians who are permanently established in South Africa. A policy of repression would not only be heartless but also short-sighted.

To limit the development of an Indian to that of a Native and not permit him to rise as high as and even higher than a White, if it is in him to do so, is repression, heartless and short-sighted, as Dr. Malan himself admitted.

P. KORANDA RAO

Reviews

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM

THE PARALYSIS OF TRADE. By PERCY G. DONALD. (Allen & Unwin.) 1939. 190m. 254p. 7/6.

THIS is an attempt to examine broadly the defects in the industrial structure of the capitalist democracy of Britain and to suggest remedies to remove its inherent defects, while retaining at the same time its essential democratic principles. Examining the problem from the businessman's standpoint, the author has attempted to indicate that if capitalist democracies are to face the challenge of the new born democratic autocracies,

both in trade and Industry, then a complete re-organisation in the economic system, particularly in technique and method, would be necessary. Since the roots of Britain's present difficulties lie in the very foundations on which she is working, patchwork is not likely to be of great help.

After a rapid historical introduction which led to the great slump, Mr. Donald develops his criticism and then passes on to his constructive proposals. He thinks that without a major change in the modern methods of production and distribution, trade cycle movements cannot be levelled out and fatal alternation of boom and slump cannot be ended. If trade is to be expanded and if mass production technique arising from labour saving machinery is to secure ordered leisure for all, then the old cherished theories must be recast and it must be recognised that many of the principles which have been regarded as laws, are things of the past. Bilateralism and new restrictive methods like exchange control and quotas have all proved to be largely ineffective. These have only aggravated the situation causing clogged markets, currency wars and national bankruptcy. In order to overcome the short comings of Britain's economic system, the author, therefore, recommends pre-war freedom of trading, settlement of international debts and settlement of colonial and emigration questions. Unless these external problems are settled, internal reorganisation would not be possible.

Mr. Donald is a severe critic of the failure of the English Industry in not adapting itself to the changing conditions. Most of the Britain's new competitors have been her star pupils but she has been always too proud to learn from them. What he regrets most is that these new rivals have been enabled to increase their competitive capacity with the loans presented by Britain. He also deplores the drop of Britain's p. c. share in the world tonnage and the general position of the English agriculture which has hardly become profitable in recent years. The position of both raises grave questions of economic and military safety of U. K.

The author then formulates his own proposals to meet the defects in the economic system of Britain. He proposes, accordingly, a Planning Council and a permanent Currency Commission to bring about the desired changes. The aim of the Planning Council would be to keep the English National economy balanced through a proper control of trade, industry, agriculture, transport and fisheries. The Currency Commission would be entrusted with the work of reorganising the monetary system. For the monetary reorganisation, the author suggests that Britain should adopt a two currency system in which external and internal currencies are kept quite distinct. For industrial reorganisation, he pleads for greater governmental control, planned co-ordination, regulated competition, price control, highest efficiency and adequate protection to the consumers and the labour. Shipping must be similarly better co-ordinated and controlled and improvements in timing and regularity must accompany opening of new routes and improvement of old ones. A more constructive policy towards Colonies, greater control over the expenditure of local bodies and seasonal protection to agriculture are some other measures suggested. So much about proposals. The author then observes that established leaders in the economic life of Britain are so deadly opposed to any departure from ordered routine,

that no new proposal for a change has any chance of being accepted.

THE book is an honest attempt at a very frank discussion on the subject. The author has done the work of diagnosis very seriously and logically. Since 1931, when the Macmillan Committee reported, problems of English trade and industry have been subjected to a close scrutiny. The paralysis of trade is an attempt in the same direction. Though, there has been no general agreement between the experts, it has been recognised by all that in the Britian's economic system, the very basic principles are crying for a change. That change has not come and is not likely to come. The vested interest with its long traditions is so firmly rooted and is so strong that it is determined to resist any change, any new measure or a suggestion—both in politics or in the economic life. It is this interest and the class which the author has justly exposed.

M. R. DHEKNEY

INDIAN LABOUR LEGISLATION

PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF INDIAN LABOUR LEGISLATION. By RAJANI KANTA DAS. (Calcutta University.) 1938. 22cm. 281p. 1938.

THIS small book on principles and problems of Indian labour legislation, a reprint of the Calcutta University Special Readership Lectures delivered in 1937 by Dr. R. K. Das of the International Labour Office, comes at a very opportune juncture. The advent into power of the Congress and the introduction of provincial autonomy have awakened the torpid Indian social conscience in considerable measure and imparted an added momentum to the cause of labour reform.

The social results of these new tendencies are written large in recent legislation. In Congress and non-Congress provinces alike, labour legislation is very much in the air and a concerted attempt is being made to evolve a comprehensive industrial and labour code suited to the new economic and social conditions, precipitated by the emergence of India from a self-sufficing village economy to the plane of social and international economy. While this is all to the good, there is danger that indiscreet reformist enthusiasm and the resultant tendency of doctrinaire insistence on theoretical advances ignoring the objective realities of the social milieu might do more harm than good in the long run.

Dr. Das, while keeping his head in the cloud-land of visionary ideals, takes good care to keep his feet planted on the solid earth. After a painstaking study of the historical back-ground, the book reviews briefly the slow and gradual evolution of plantation, factory, mining, transport and general social welfare legislation in this country, traces the principles of legislative procedure under the old and new Constitutions, enunciates the fundamental social objectives underlying modern labour legislation, and finally attempts a study of the more important of the country's labour problems.

An ardent advocate of international action in the labour sphere, Dr. Das devotes considerable attention to the significant role played by the I. L. O. in stimulating labour legislation and for continuous adaptation of legislative measures to changing social and industrial needs. Altogether, a thought-provoking volume which should find a permanent place on the book-shelves of all social workers.

K. E. MATHEW

JOURNALISM

INTRODUCTION TO JOURNALISM. By S. P. THIAGA RAJAN. Educational Publishing Co., Madras.) 1938. 18cm. 376p. Rs. 3.

NOTHING is so dangerous for our future than the control of the Press by a handful of arch-dictators of public opinion. As has been pointed out even the most optimistic democrat to-day cannot dream of the optimism of Condorcet who went cheerfully to die a short while after he had forecasted a hopeful and happy future for humanity living under democracy. Anyone therefore who warns us against this danger serves society admirably. Considered in this light, apart from its other admirable features, there is no doubt that Mr. Thiaga Rajan's book is one of the very few really good books on journalism published so far in India. The author, whose optimism is still unshaken, is not however blind to the dangers that beset us and whether we talk of the outlook for the future or the exact conditions prevalent in India the author has many important things to say with which we cannot but agree and which every journalist should make it a point to read.

Apart from the literary defect of a too liberal use of Latin and French expressions, there are few Indian writers who can produce such a well-written book as this. Most of the chapters make very pleasant reading and the chapter on "Journalist and the Law" particularly is a very good attempt to explain and dissect the hungry legal lions in the path of the journalist.

It would have been better had the author decided definitely whether he would like for journalism of the future the application of Northcliffian standards or the glory of the pen of C. P. Scott. In the formulation of opinions there is, perhaps naturally, a certain amount of weakness. It is also rather surprising to find that the *Statesman* and the *Times of India* have been as progressive in their attitude towards India as they could be under the conditions imposed on British journalism in this country. The author also forgets to mention The *Kaiser-I-Hind* of Bombay when he talks of special correspondents from India at the Round Table Conference.

The minor defects mentioned above do not however mar the importance of the book. Let us hope Mr. Thiaga Rajan's book will attain the success it richly deserves.

P. N. DRIVER