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CONTENTS

	Page
TOPICS OF THE WEEK	461
ARTICLES :	
Congress Statement on War	463
Indians in South Africa.—Repatriation and Colonization. By P. Kodanda Rao	466
Economic Planning in India. By N. G. Abhyankar	468
REVIEW :	
Portuguese India By Rev. Fr. Candes	470
MISCELLANEOUS :	
India And The War.—Mr. H. N. Kunzru's Speech	471
BOOKS RECEIVED	472

Topics of the Week

Purse to Malaviyaji

MOST heartily do we commend the proposal which has been made, among others, by Mahatma Gandhi, that a purse of not less than Rs. 15 lakhs should be presented to the venerable Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the occasion of his 79th birthday in December next. It is not necessary to dwell at any length on the great services that Panditji has rendered to India during the last half a century in various fields of national activity, and in particular, the foundation and development of the Benares Hindu University, of which he has been Vice-Chancellor and which position he now relinquishes in favour of Sir S. Radhakrishnan. The purse will go to wipe off the debt which the Benares Hindu University has accumulated these many years, and it will be a great solace to the venerable Pandit to see the University rid of its debt before he hands it over to his successor. We trust that the sum, and more, will soon be forthcoming.

Dyarchy in the Provinces

WITH the recent amendment of the Government of India Act by the British Parliament and the large and somewhat indefinite encroachment on provincial autonomy, the provincial Governments are at best dyarchy, if not wholly merged in the "irresponsible" Government of India. If the Ministries responsible to the provincial legislatures should continue to function, it is very desirable that the public should know, in the interests of all concerned, the responsible authority for each action of the Governments. The public

should be made aware whether a particular action was being taken by the Governor on the advice of his Ministers, or on the authority of himself under the orders of the Government of India. Under the Montagu constitution Government orders were issued in the name of the Governor in Council, or Governor on the advice of his Ministers, as the case might be. Such a practice should be revived in those rare cases which will happen if, as we hope will be the case, the Government of India will secure the complete co-operation of the Provincial Governments in the prosecution of the war.

* * *

Punjab Land Revenue Committee's Report

THE report of the Committee appointed by the Punjab Government under distinguished and able chairmanship of Sir Maurice Darling, to enquire into the methods of giving relief to agriculturists, and particularly small holders, from the burden of land revenue has been published. One of the questions referred to the Committee was whether it was practicable to apply the principles of income-tax to the assessment of land revenue. The Committee answers the question in the negative on the ground that the introduction of the system would involve either an impossible loss of revenue or an impossible number of assesseses. The Government seems to accept this recommendation, but the matter certainly needs further exploration and cannot be left here.

* * *

THE question that the Committee next considered was whether any class of small holders could not be altogether exempted from the payment of land revenue. On this question also the Committee comes to a conclusion which is unfavourable to the smallest landowners. Over 50 per cent. of the landowners pay on an average less than Rs. 2 a year, and those who pay Rs. 10 or less (on an average Rs. 3) account for 70 per cent. of landowners. The exemption of these would seriously cripple the resources of the State and its ability to help them increase their income. Besides, the Committee says: "The ownership of land in the Punjab carries with it important privileges, and it is only reasonable that those who enjoy these privileges should pay something to the community because the privileges derive their very existence from the community." Further, the Committee points to the danger of such an exemption, if given, accentuating the evil of fragmentation of holdings by an increase of partitions.

* * *

THE introduction of the sliding scale system of land revenue in certain districts, the grant of remissions, the consolidation of holdings and the enormous sums in cash received every year from

the army" have combined to save the Punjab from the economic depression in larger measure than most other parts of India. Yet the Committee thinks that the smaller holder needs further help, and to this end it recommends both a permanent and a temporary reduction in land revenue only for small self-cultivating owners. The temporary reduction which is to be in force for five years will entail a loss on the Government of about Rs. 35 lakhs a year. The permanent measure of relief that the Committee recommends is that at future settlements the assessment of an owner paying not more than Rs. 25 should be reduced by a quarter in respect of all land cultivated or farmed by himself or his family for at least four years before the settlement. The loss in which the Province would be involved by this proposal cannot be computed, but it is suggested that the total loss that would arise if both the recommendations are carried out should be partly recouped by imposing a temporary surcharge for five years rising from 6¼ per cent. on those paying over Rs. 250 to Rs. 25 on those paying over Rs. 5,000.

THE Committee, however, thinks that such assistance as might be afforded to the small owner this way would not solve his economic and social problems, unless measures are adopted to help to increase his income and raise his standard of living. For this purpose the Committee has recommended that a substantial sum, starting at Rs. 10 lakhs and rising to Rs. 25 lakhs, should be set aside every year to be spent on schemes calculated to increase the net income of the small holders (including the tenants) and provide proper amenities for them. The Committee describes this as "our most important recommendation". Two-thirds of the fund, it is pointed out, should be spent upon schemes to which the people themselves contribute not less than one-third of labour, produce or cash. The general aim should be a development grant of Rs. 5 crores to be spent over a period of 25 years.

THE Punjab Government has caused the Darling Committee's recommendations to be examined by an official committee, but has not yet formed any definite conclusions thereon itself. The recommendations of the Darling Committee, it says, concerning particularly the relief of small land holders, are linked with and dependent on problems which have been referred to other committees, especially the Resources and Retrenchment Committee, and final decisions thereon can be taken only when that Committee's report is available. It is not known when this will happen.

Berar Land Alienation Bill

THE Bill introduced in the C. P. Legislative Assembly by Mr. D. D. Rujurkar for the protection of the agriculturists of Berar is sent round again to individuals and public bodies for eliciting further opinions on it. It is a Bill for restricting alienations of land to non-agriculturists and is modelled for the most part on the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, which was the first of its kind in this respect. But it differs from its prototype in some of its features, the most important being that the proposed restrictions are not based, as in the Punjab, upon "caste distinctions" (to borrow the words used in the statement of objects and reasons) or upon a division of the community between members of agricultural tribes and others. In Berar there are no well-defined tribes who may be said to follow almost entirely

the hereditary profession of agriculture, and if restrictions are to be imposed on the transfer of land in Berar, it is obvious that the example of the Punjab or Sind cannot be followed, even if this course were justified in these provinces, even as it could not be followed in Burma.

FROM this point of view the definition of "agriculturist" assumes importance. The Bill defines an agriculturist as "a person who by himself or by his servants or by his tenants earns his livelihood wholly or principally by agriculture carried on within the limits of Berar to which this Act extends or who ordinarily engages personally in agricultural labour within the limits of Berar and who does not hold more than 200 acres of land." The maximum limit of an agriculturist's holding is thus explained by the sponsor of the Bill: "The intention of the Bill is to keep reasonable-sized farms and not to protect the holdings of large holders, who are invariably rent receivers. Such limit is considered to be 200 acres in Berar, after which limit further concentration of land shall neither be promoted nor protected. This would further avoid the defect found in the working of other Land Alienation Acts, viz. the growth of sackars within the notified classes." As no restriction will be imposed upon transfer of land by non-agriculturists, so no restriction will be imposed upon transfer of land by big holders of land.

SO far as permanent alienation of land is concerned, i. e. sales (including exchanges, gifts and wills), an agriculturist cannot sell land to a non-agriculturist without the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner, but the Bill makes a further provision requiring such sanction even to sale of land by one agriculturist to another "if that alienation would reduce the area of his holding below 25 acres." This clause is thus explained in the statement of objects and reasons:

A reasonable size of an economic holding in Berar is considered to be from 20 to 25 acres. It is intended that no agriculturist shall absolutely be turned out from his lands to be a mere labourer. The growth of rent-receivers and concentration of land have always caused serious trouble; on the other hand, the reduction of peasantry to a landless class is equally disastrous. So provision is being made to keep with an agricultural family the minimum amount of land to support a family and capable of economic cultivation with one pair of bullocks. The provision does not exist in other Acts, but has been taken from the Sind Land Alienation Bill, which was framed after a careful review of the defects of the administration of all these Acts.

AS to temporary alienation, the Bill provides for all the three forms of mortgage of land to a non-agriculturist for which the Punjab Act makes provision, viz. a usufructuary mortgage for the maximum period of 20 years, in which the usufruct extinguishes the mortgagee's claim for principal and interest; a usufructuary mortgage for an unlimited period, in which the mortgagor reserves the right of occupancy at a rent agreed upon; and a collateral mortgage, which, if the mortgagor fails to pay principal and interest in accordance with the terms of the contract, is converted into a usufructuary mortgage for a maximum period of 20 years. As in the Punjab Act, there is a clause in the C. P. Bill which limits the duration of a lease by an agriculturist to 15 years, though the

limit in the Punjab Act is 20 years. The Bill also forbids the sale of land in execution of a decree.

A POINT of very great departure from the Punjab Act consists in the period beyond which an agriculturist will have to take the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner for hypothecation of his crops. A restriction on a mortgage of land must be followed by a restriction on a mortgage of its produce. In the Punjab Act and similar other Acts the period prescribed is one year; but in the present Berar Bill it is 15 years. No further justification is vouchsafed in the statement of objects and reasons than that "it is recognised that the practice of agriculture always necessitates credits; this is an alternative method in which an agriculturist can raise money such as is required from time to time." But in other Provinces where such restrictive measures are adopted it is found that borrowing on the security of the next two harvests meets the need. It cannot be understood why Berar should follow a different path.

U. P. Tenancy Bill

THE Legislative Council passed the third reading of the United Provinces Tenancy Bill last week. A clause in the Bill provides that in fixing rent the rent-rates officer should have regard to the value of the produce with a view to seeing that the assessment of holdings at the proposed rates should not exceed one-fifth of such value. Zamindar members moved amendments to the clause with the object of increasing the rate, one proposing that the rent-rate should "generally" be one-fifth of the value of the produce, and another proposing that the maximum rate should be one-fourth of the value of the produce. The Government opposed these amendments and obtained a majority for the original clause. The plight of the tenants was now such, said the Parliamentary Secretary, Dr. Jung, that the clause could not be allowed to be modified in favour of the landlords.

ON the question of *nazrana*, the new clause now stands at present:

No land-holder shall take a premium for the admission of a tenant to a holding, and it shall not be a condition of any tenancy that the tenant render any service to or do any work for the land-holder, whether for wages or not.

To this clause several amendments were moved, one allowing zamindars to take premium up to

five years' rent and another allowing them to accept premium for some concession shown to the tenant like reduction of rent. The Minister pointed out that the system of *nazrana* had been grossly abused in the past and no loopholes could be left in the Bill. Attempts were similarly made to reduce the penalty prescribed in the Bill for illegal exactions and refusal to give receipts, etc., on the part of the zamindars. The Bill provides for the penalty of a fine of Rs. 500 and three months' imprisonment for second and later offences. The Revenue Minister showed that in the Sugar Factories Control Act the corresponding penalty provided was a fine of Rs. 5,000 and six months' imprisonment and added that he saw no justification to discriminate in favour of landlords, particularly because the penalty was intended to come into force only in cases of habitual refusal to grant receipts.

THE clause relating to ejection also led to the moving of several amendments. The Bill provides that when a tenant is ejected from the whole or part of his holding his entire arrears will be deemed to be wiped off. To this an amendment was moved to the effect that unrealised arrears from an ejected tenant should either be allowed to be realised from his other saleable property or that Government should refund proportionate revenue collected from the zamindar. The Parliamentary Secretary pointed out that the Bill gave an option to the proprietor either to sue the tenant for arrears of rent or to eject him. The zamindars could thus have no grievance and could not certainly ask to be reimbursed by Government if they chose the more aggressive method of filing an ejection suit.

THUS the Bill has successfully stood the racket of the upper chamber, which it was feared would prove a lethal chamber for it. The final success was due to the compromise which was negotiated by the Government with a section of the zamindars. In order to prove the hollowness of the charge that the Government was "rapacious, vindictive and expropriatory" in pushing on with a revolutionary measure, Mr. Chandra Bhal, a Congress member, pointed out that before the 1926 Act the total *sir* amounted to 36 lakhs and that the Act had increased it by 20 lakhs. Thus though the amount of *sir* land was at present 56 lakhs, the Bill would reduce it only by seven lakhs. The Government, he said, would be amazed at their own moderation.

CONGRESS STATEMENT ON WAR

IN essentials the statement issued by the Working Committee of the Congress on war is such as will meet with the approval of all progressive sections of the Indian people. It leaves no one in doubt as to where its sympathies lie. The statement says: "The Working Committee must, therefore, unhesitatingly condemn the latest aggression of the Nazi Government in Germany against Poland and sympathise with those who resist it." The Congress, like all other political bodies in India, had to condemn British policy of recent years as it encouraged and certainly did not resist acts of aggression by Fascist powers in the past. If

now the Congress gives sympathy to Great Britain it is because of the change that has come about in British policy. Some Congressmen profess to see a departure on the part of the Congress from the policy which it enjoined hitherto on its members of keeping away from war. There is no foundation for this charge. The Congress declared itself opposed to an imperialist war and refused to be entangled in any hostilities calculated to strengthen British imperialism, which lent it support indirectly to fascist countries in the last few years. That is the burthen of all the resolutions passed by the Congress and the statements issued in its behalf.

In the matter of Spain the Faizpur Congress resolution (December 1936) declared; "The Congress realises that this struggle between democratic progress and fascist reaction is of great importance to the future of the world and will affect the future of imperialism and India. The Congress has noted without surprise that in this struggle the policy of non-intervention followed by the British Government has been such as to hamper in many ways the Spanish Government and people in fighting the fascist rebels and has thus in effect aided these rebels who are being openly backed and helped by the fascist powers." In conclusion, the resolution assured the Spanish people "of their solidarity with them in the great struggle for liberty." The All-India Congress Committee in October 1937 also assured the Chinese people on behalf of the Indian people "of their solidarity with them in their struggle for maintaining their freedom." Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as Congress President, in calling for the observance of the China Day as a protest against Japanese aggression said: "Britain, one of the principal League powers, does not even protest and gives its indirect support to fascism. India, though not in a position to take any effective action, cannot remain a silent spectator of this tragedy, which might affect it considerably." The Congress in its session of Haripura (February 1938), after referring to the deterioration in international relations on account of fascist aggression, said: "British foreign policy, in spite of its evasions and indecisions, has consistently supported the fascist powers in Germany, Spain and the Far East and must, therefore, largely shoulder the responsibility for the progressive deterioration in the world situation. That policy still seeks an arrangement with Nazi Germany and has developed closer relations with rebel Spain. It is helping in the drift to imperialist world war. India can be no party to such an imperialist war and will not permit her man power and resources to be exploited in the interests of British imperialism." The Working Committee in October 1938, referring to the attack by Germany on Czechoslovakia's independence, affirmed that "India cannot but be deeply interested in the protection of the Czechoslovakian freedom." The Tripuri Congress, in March of this year, condemned British foreign policy culminating in the Munich Pact, the Anglo-Italian Agreement and the recognition of rebel Spain and said: "The Congress dissociates itself entirely from British foreign policy which has consistently aided the fascist powers and helped in the destruction of democratic countries."

There is nothing in any of these utterances which pledge India's neutrality in all wars, or even in wars in which England is engaged as a belligerent; on the contrary, these utterances give a kind of pledge for India's participation within the limits of her capacity in a just cause. The Congress, however, invariably found England in

the past few years on the wrong side: she either abetted fascist aggression or did not interest herself in it and even sought her own imperialist ends in this aggression. The position has now apparently changed; she seems to have taken her stand against fascism. But are these appearances deceptive? Will she not be tempted at a suitable opportunity to perpetrate another Munich? Past experience raises doubts in the mind of the Congress and it asks for an authoritative exposition of Great Britain's war aims. The doubts may appear to some to be unreasonable. However justifiable Congress criticism may be—and it is a criticism shared by all—against British foreign policy in the past, Britain is now (to judge from the declarations of her statesmen) hell-bent on the overthrow of fascism. Even if Poland suffers the worst fate—and Soviet Russia is contributing its own share to it—Britain and France are preparing themselves for a war of three years' duration, thus setting their face against any kind of patched-up peace which will enable aggressors to get away with their victory in a lightning war. Will the war enable Britain to consolidate her strength as an imperialist power as a result of the war? The *Tribune* says: "There is no conceivable manner in which victory in this war can strengthen British imperialism. However the war may end, there is not the least likelihood that anyone can see Britain being able, as a result of it, to add to her possessions even if she is anxious to do so. Nor is there any chance of her being able to improve her position *vis-a-vis* either the self-governing Dominions or those parts of the Commonwealth that are yet to become self-governing. So far as India herself is concerned, it is unthinkable that as the result of her participation in the war her position *vis-a-vis* Britain will become worse than it is even if it does not get better, as in all human probability it will. . . . So far from believing that British imperialism will receive an impetus as a result of the war, Pandit Jawaharlal thinks that it will receive its death-knell from it. That is the view which we ourselves share fully. As a result of the last world war British imperialism definitely disappeared from the self-governing Dominions, which virtually became independent States. As a result of the present war, if we know how to play our cards well and successfully, India is bound to be added to the list. . . . But this result will not be achieved by India following a policy of sullen aloofness. It can only be achieved by her co-operating actively in bringing about the new order without in any way abandoning or abating by a jot or tittle the struggle for her own freedom."

Even if the Congress is convinced that the war in which Britain is engaged is not an imperialist war, in so far as Britain herself is concerned, and that it will not indirectly help British imperialism but on the contrary will weaken it, there is another principle for which the Congress has stood. The

Haripura resolution, while declaring that India can be no party to an imperialist war and will not permit her man-power and resources to be exploited in the interests of British imperialism, also enunciated another principle: "Nor can India join any war without the express consent of the people," and made a declaration to the effect that "in the event of an attempt being made to involve India in a war, this will be resisted." When the Government of India in August 1937 sent two Army units to Shanghai professedly for the purpose of protecting Indian interests in China, Pandit Jawaharlal as the then President declared his belief that the real interests to be protected were British imperial interests. Then he added: "And even if Indian interests have to be protected, it is for the Indian people to decide what steps should be taken. . . . In the Far Eastern conflict our sympathies are inevitably with China, and we wish her people success in maintaining their freedom against imperialist aggression. But in this international game we cannot allow our man-power and resources to be used as pawns by others." India has now reached such a state of political consciousness and has attained such a political status that she cannot allow her Government to shape her foreign policy without her consent even in a war which is just. Of course, she cannot, consistently with her view of the requirements of the international situation, hamper war measures which, in her own opinion, are required to resist aggression. For instance, the All-India Congress Committee on its own initiative called upon the Indian people, in the matter of resistance to Japan's aggression in China, to refrain from the use of Japanese goods as a mark of their sympathy with the people of China. If the Government of India were to take some such retaliatory action now against the aggressor which the Congress thought was feasible and justified, it cannot oppose such action merely because it was ordered by the Government without taking the previous consent of the people. But it is clear that if the people of India are not to be mere passive instruments in the prosecution of the war but are to be active and enthusiastic participators in it, they must be taken into consultation and their consent secured for the measures to be adopted.

The suggestions made by the Working Committee for the purpose of enlisting such co-operation of the Indian people are eminently reasonable. Britain's war aims should be made known. Even when a war starts for a just cause, as the war fever rises, the temper of the people actively engaged in it is apt to change. Moreover, world opinion must be convinced that the aims of Britain and France are entirely honourable and worthy. Even Britishers like Sir Arthur Salter have urged the necessity of taking this course if only because it would better the moral position of England and France thereby. The war aims should prove conclusively that while aggression would be resisted,

the *status quo* would not be maintained for all time, but that it would be altered on the basis of justice even if the alteration requires sacrifices on the part of Britain and France. Those who seek equity must be willing to do equity. India would certainly insist on this. If freedom is to be restored to Poland, England cannot refuse freedom to India. And this becomes a necessity even for the Indian people participating in the war on the side of England. If they are to collaborate wholeheartedly in the prosecution of the war, they must feel that they do so "as a full equal," to quote the words of the *Manchester Guardian*. As Dr. Ambedkar's Independent Labour Party has said in its manifesto, Britain must reassure India of the status she is to occupy in the British Empire, the status of equality with the self-governing Dominions. It is only then that India can act as a free agent instead of merely as a dependency of Britain. The I. L. P. has also suggested that the Government of India should take steps to prepare Indians to defend their country. "The most important part" of this duty is, it says, "to introduce compulsory military service in India for all persons within certain ages without distinction as to caste, class or creed. Such a policy alone can succeed in training Indians for the defence of their country. . . . Similarly, recruitment for the Standing Army must be open to all communities, and the distinction between martial and non-martial classes must be done away with. Indianisation of the officers' grade must be worked out sincerely and fairly." These are steps that can and ought to be taken immediately. Similarly, means must be found for consulting Indian opinion in the determination of military measures while the war lasts. On this point the *Tribune* makes the following suggestion: "Let the declaration be made by the Secretary of State on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and let the Viceroy announce simultaneously, that in all matters pertaining to the conduct of the war the Government of India will be guided by the wishes of the autonomous provincial Governments and the elected members of the Central Legislature acting through a small committee at Delhi representing both." It is easy for the Government to meet Indian public opinion on all these points. It is said that the assistance of the Indian people may mean the difference between winning and losing the war. It is also said that India would be involved in ruin along with Britain if the war is lost. If, when the issues at stake are so grave, Britain cannot immediately make up her mind to make India a full-fledged Dominion as soon as practicable after the war and in the meantime to treat her as a Dominion in the prosecution of the war, preparing her to be self-reliant in the matter of defence, it cannot be expected that Britain ever will. But if this is done, the Indian people may be relied upon voluntarily to throw their whole weight into the struggle, because it is a struggle that appeals to their moral conscience.

INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

I

IT was pointed out in the last article that repatriation of Indians from South Africa was not the "kernel" of the Cape Town Agreement, and that the uplift clause in the Agreement was not contingent on the reduction of the Indian population to a "given" or "manageable" number. Even those who thought otherwise have never stated what the minimum was to which the Indian population should be reduced in order to bring the uplift clause into operation. Even in the debates in the Assembly on the Asiatics (Transvaal Land and Trading) Bill there was no mention as to the extent of the reduction. Even Mr. Nicholls failed to mention the figure. It was only the present Minister of the Interior who in the Senate debates on the Bill made any reference to numbers at all. He said:

About 16,000 went, but it would take ten times that number to have any appreciable effect on repatriation as a solution, and even if ten times that number went back, it would not solve the problem.

Considering that the total Indian population in South Africa was about 200,000 and about 80 per cent. of them were born in South Africa, it would mean, if the Minister is to be taken seriously, that 160,000 Indians, including the bulk of the South African born Indians, should leave the country to make repatriation a success, though even that would not solve the problem. It only means that, according to the present Minister of the Interior, the uplift clause was just bunkum and was never seriously meant to be implemented.

This attitude of the Minister is not surprising inasmuch as he referred to the Cape Town Agreement, which has often been hailed as the Magna Charta of the Indians and even of all non-Europeans in South Africa, as "real good copybook stuff" of which the only sensible clause was the one which said that the Union Government could not take action in advance of public opinion, by which he meant, of course, the opinion of the white people alone.

As regards the success of the assisted emigration scheme, it was admitted that during the period 1927-32 nearly 16,000 Indians had left South Africa which Mr. Hofmeyr said was a "substantial achievement," an opinion in which Dr. Malan concurred. If the volume was not larger it was because, as Dr. Malan mentioned, "practically all the Indians who wanted to go or intended going to India had already left and those who didn't want to go to India were going to remain here." After all, it was a voluntary scheme, and if more Indians did not choose to leave South Africa, nobody is to be blame for it.

II

Mr. Nicholls blamed the Government of India however, for what he characterised as the failure of the assisted emigration scheme. He said that the Cape Town Agreement contained two obligations.

The first is one imposed upon the Indian Government to adopt measures to assist in bringing about a speedy diminution in the Indian population.

This is very much of an unwarranted statement. All that the Government of India undertook, according to the Agreement, was "to look after such emigrants on their arrival in India." The Government of India did not promise to take measures to reduce the Indian population in South Africa, but only to look after such as landed in India. Mr. Nicholls quoted a statement by Dr. Malan when the first Conference was announced to the effect that—

In the proposed discussions must be included this particular point, that the Government of India shall be asked to be willing to co-operate with the Government of the Union to assist that Government in making the scheme of voluntary repatriation more effective.

This was in the statement made by Dr. Malan to the South African Parliament. But it was not included in the joint statement issued by both the Governments, which alone is binding on both the Governments and which mentioned only the maintenance of Western standards of living by just and legitimate means as the object of the Conference. Even as it stands, the statement of Dr. Malan merely states that the question of *asking* the co-operation of the Government of India in making repatriation more effective should be included in the agenda of the Conference. In a statement to the South African Parliament after the conclusion of the Agreement, Dr. Malan said in 1927:

The actual kernel of the Agreement between our Government and that of India is that there shall be co-operation in the future between the two Governments for the solution of the Asiatic question in South Africa, in such manner as at any rate the larger part of the population of South Africa regard as the only practical way, namely, along the way of repatriation or assisted emigration of Indians out of South Africa.

Here, again, Dr. Malan did not say that the Government of India agreed that repatriation was the only practical way of solving the Indian problem in South Africa; that was the view of what he professed was the larger part of the population of South Africa, apparently the white minority. All that the Government of India was committed to was in the Agreement itself, and that stated that the Government of India would look after such of the immigrants who landed in India. That was the nature and limit of co-operation.

Dr. Malan acknowledged that the Government of India gave the promised co-operation. He made

no complaint against them, as Mr. Nicholls did. In his third reading speech on the Asiatic (Transvaal Land and Trading) Bill, Dr. Malan said:

Discussions thereupon took place and an arrangement was come to as to the repatriation scheme and the assistance which the Government of India rendered us in order to get Indians out of the country was the result of these discussions. The reason why and how that repatriation scheme came to an end was that there was opposition to the scheme not merely in this country but also in India as well, *although the Indian Government encouraged it.* (Italics ours.)

III

Mr. Nicholls also charged the Government of India with remissness in the matter of the colonization scheme suggested by the second Round Table Conference in 1932. He said, "As far as I know the obligation has been completely ignored by the Government of India." He went further and said that the Government of India "refused to implement the agreement." Dr. Malan did not support the charges of Mr. Nicholls. On the other hand, Mr. Hofmeyr definitely repudiated them, and exonerated the Government of India, though he said that at one stage the Government of India, after reading the report of the Asiatic Colonization Committee, expressed themselves sceptical of the colonization idea, a scepticism which was fully shared by the Union Government themselves. Mr. Hofmeyr read out the relevant clause of the conclusions of the second Round Table Conference, which ran as follows:

The Government of India will co-operate with the Government of the Union in exploring the possibilities of a colonization scheme for settling Indians, both from India and from South Africa, in other countries.

And he rightly pointed out that it was for the Union Government to take the initiative and not the Government of India. He pointed out that the Union Government had not sent a single communication to the Government of India within the stipulated period of one year. When Mr. Hofmeyr appointed a preliminary Committee, the Government of India offered their co-operation, which he had acknowledged in Parliament at the time. The default, if any, was on the part of the Union Government. On this aspect of the matter Mr. Hofmeyr said:

In view of the facts I have stated it must be clear to every one that no case could be made out for the statement made here that this Agreement is no longer in existence, because the Government of India has repudiated it either directly or by implication. No case has been made out for the statement that the Government of India has specifically broken this agreement.

The reasons why the colonization scheme did not catch on were not due to any fault of the Government of India; they lay elsewhere.

Dr. Malan, when he was still in office, had sounded the Government of Brazil. He was told that "the Brazillian Government was not prepared

to receive Indian immigrants from South Africa." He tried British Guiana. He confessed that "it subsequently turned out that the scheme would be impracticable." When Mr. Hofmeyr succeeded Dr. Malan, he found "a good deal of scepticism in regard to the project" of colonization. "The query was raised as to the wisdom of sending a commission all round the world at very great cost in order to find some colony in which Indians could be settled." He, therefore, gave up the idea of inviting the Government of India to set up a joint commission, and, instead, appointed a local committee, the Asiatic Colonization Committee, in South Africa to make preliminary investigations. This Committee, of which Mr. Nicholls was a member, recommended British Guiana, which, as Dr. Malan said, subsequently proved to be impracticable. As Mr. Nicholls himself admitted, the report of his Committee had a bad press not only in India but in South Africa as well. Naturally, the Government of India felt sceptical of the idea. The Union Government was no exception. Mr. Hofmeyr said:

At the same time, because of the nature of that report and because of subsequent enquiries that we instituted, we too had begun to feel sceptical about this colonization scheme.

Further consideration of the subject was by mutual consent postponed till after the inauguration of federation in India which has not yet come about.

IV

In these circumstances, it is unfair to suggest as Dr. Malan and Mr. Nicholls suggested, that the Cape Town Agreement was a failure because of the failure of assisted emigration. As both Messrs. Hofmeyr and Blackwell contended, assisted emigration was not pivotal to the Cape Town Agreement and its exhaustion cannot be said to constitute the failure of the Agreement. As Mr. Blackwell said, the argument that "a cardinal essential of the 1927 Agreement was this scheme of assisted emigration was not correct." The second Conference acknowledged that the scheme had exhausted itself, but renewed the Agreement all the same. The Conference of 1932 expressed the view:

It was recognised that the possibilities of the Union's scheme of assisted emigration to India are now practically exhausted, owing to the economic and climatic conditions of India as well as to the fact that 80 per cent. of the Indian population of South Africa are now South African born.

Nevertheless, the Conference asserted:

Both Governments consider that that the Cape Town Agreement has been a powerful influence in fostering friendly relations between them, and that they should continue to co-operate in the common object of harmonising their respective interests in regard to Indians resident in the Union.

It is true that the Conference proposed that the Colonization idea should be explored, but nothing was to depend on it. Assisted emigration was still to be voluntary, only the destination

would be diverted from India to other countries, if suitable places could be found. Even the colonization idea does not stipulate a reduction of the Indian population in South Africa to any given minimum. All that the Conference agreed

to was an investigation of suitable areas. "As soon as the investigation has been completed, the two Governments will consider the results of the enquiry." This is yet to be.

P. KODANDA RAO

ECONOMIC PLANNING IN INDIA

I

THE objective of Planning has enjoyed such a great vogue in recent years in India that it is necessary to clearly define the meaning of Planning and to discuss the limitation of any large-scale attempt to plan economic life, in the context of the peculiar circumstances and the particular stage of economic and social development in India. The conception of Planning in Western economic literature and practice has become almost synonymous with a planned socialist economy, in which the fundamental function of organising production and distribution is performed by a Central Planning authority, as against a capitalist economic order in which a freely working price mechanism and a system of private enterprise and private property perform the same function. In this connection, it should be noted that a keen economic consciousness, and an eternal vigilance for the preservation of economic rights and privileges, which are as vital to the success of a full-fledged socialist economy as to the success of a Laissez faire capitalist system, are conspicuous by their absence in India. So long as the mass of the economic subjects remain ignorant and illiterate, India cannot be said to be ripe either for the adoption of a full-fledged socialist planning or a return to the Laissez faire capitalist order of the eighteenth century. In the peculiar circumstances of India of the present day, Planning can be adopted for a long time to come in a very limited sense, viz., Planning in the sense of a purposeful direction and co-ordination of all the diverse economic activities and efforts, with a view to bring about the maximum increase in the standard of life of the masses in the country. It is true that the absence of sovereign political power in the hands of a bona fide national government must work as a serious drawback in any attempt to plan economic life even in the limited sense, but it cannot be denied that a time has certainly come when all the possibilities of bringing about a purposeful co-ordination of all the economic activities, with a view to promote the ultimate aim of raising the standard of life of the masses, are explored by an expert body, such as a National Planning Committee.

It is often thought desirable that a body like the National Planning Committee, which would be entrusted with the task of exploring the possibilities of economic progress, should set before them a specific figure in the standard of life of the masses which they desire to attain during a

given period of time. Clearly, any attempt to lay down a specific figure as the maximum standard of life for an average individual within the country, is bound to be, at best, guess-work. A body like this would be well advised to define that the objective of the work of such a body is to formulate such a comprehensive plan as would bring about the maximum co-ordination of all the economic activities, with a view to secure the maximum possible increase in the standard of life of the masses over their present standards within a prescribed time limit.

On any rational analysis, it would be seen that the only objective which can inspire confidence and evoke the active co-operation of all sections of public opinion in the country is an objective which promises to assure to every man and woman in the country, within the shortest possible time, that standard of life or that minimum command over goods and services, which could, by any stretch of imagination, be called a human and a civilised standard of life. Before we attempt to discuss the various improvements that are necessary in different spheres of economic life, it would be helpful to outline the fundamental economic problem, which we, in this country, have to face, and to point out certain essential conditions which are vital to the success of any broad-based and a large-scale plan. The first and foremost condition which is central to the success of any comprehensive economic plan in India, is the necessity of bringing about an increase in the total available employment and the total effective demand within the country. For example, in every walk of economic life in India today, one constantly hears the same story. The agriculturist complains that he cannot sell his produce profitably in the market, in the absence of effective demand. There are workers and labour resources, who are prepared to work, but they do not find a market for their labour services. The big industrialist protests that he is faced with the phenomenon of relative over-production and he cannot sell his products at a price. Under these circumstances, any attempt in isolation, to increase the efficiency of agricultural production, which would result in an increase in the agricultural output, or an attempt to rationalise the processes of production in established industries which would increase their output, is bound to aggravate the position, viz., the inability of producers to find a market for their products until such efforts are co-ordinated to one central

problem in India, viz., the need of creating an effective demand by increasing the purchasing power and the money incomes of the people.

It is common place of economic life in India that the standard of life of the people in this country is deplorably low and the per capita consumption of even the most elementary necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter, is perhaps one of the lowest in the world. While this is true of consumption, the various productive industries which cater for the satisfaction of these elementary wants, such as textiles, cement, sugar, and so on, are supposed to be either faced with or on the brink of the so-called over-production. We, in India, have a pathetic sight that millions of people are underfed, under-clothed and are without shelter, while the organised and established industries cannot increase their production for fear of spoiling the market; in other words, we have the celebrated dilemma of poverty in the midst of plenty, in the form that while there are masses of people whose elementary wants go unsatisfied, there are large resources which remain unused, unemployed or chronically under-employed. The conclusion is obvious. India has a vast population, majority of which lives in utter destitution. They have wants but they cannot make their wants effective and utilise the available productive resources to their full capacity, in order to satisfy their wants, because they lack the wherewithal to back their wants and turn them into effective demand. The supreme task before the economic statesmanship of this country is to solve this problem of translating the elementary wants of the people into effective demand backed by money. We, in this country, are not faced by a comparatively simple phenomenon of providing employment for resources which are temporarily out of employment, or of reviving demand which has temporarily slackened, but we have to face a much more difficult task of providing employment for resources which were never employed or chronically under-employed, and of creating an effective demand which never existed before. The supreme need of any rational plan for this country is to tackle this fundamental problem of bringing about a net increase in the effective demand by raising the money incomes of the people. Without an appropriate co-relation between a progressive monetary policy which puts more money in the hands of the people and other efforts which tend to increase the efficiency and the output of production, the prospects of success of Planning must be regarded as far from bright.

It will appear from the foregoing analysis that the fundamental economic problem in India today is the need to bring about an expansion of real effective demand for goods and services, through the increase in the money incomes of the population. It should be remembered, in this connection, that measures such as provision of cheap credit facilities or better marketing schemes, through the

elimination of too many middlemen, are sure to increase the money income of the mass of the primary producers in the country. Such an increase may be desirable by itself, and would tend to augment effective demand for goods and services. But it should not be forgotten that such a change merely means a redistribution of incomes, which transfers incomes from the middlemen and the money-lenders to the hands of the primary producers, and, as such, it could not mean a net increase in the total effective money income and the total effective demand in a community. It cannot be too often emphasised that the first and foremost pre-requisite of a successful plan in the country is an increase in the money incomes, which results in an increase in the money demand for the products of various industries including agriculture. It is true that the establishment of new industries, such as a highly developed chemical industry or an aluminium industry, would bring resources into employment, which were not employed before and would mean, to some extent, an increase in the investment which generates an increase in employment, incomes, and a net addition to the total effective demand for the total flow of goods and services. But if the objective of Planning on the scale which is contemplated at present in our country, is to materialise, a re-orientation of the monetary policy would seem to be the first and foremost pre-requisite of successful Planning in India. A bold and progressive monetary policy designed to put more money in the hands of the mass of the people (by adopting, for example, a well thought out Public road-building or Public house-building programme) supplemented by vigorous educational campaigns and rural uplift programmes which, by word of mouth and through the medium of radio and pictures, inculcate in the minds of the people the habit of better living through better spending are measures which alone would generate all the economic forces which are so characteristic of a boom period, and enable the achievement of the ultimate aim of the Planning, viz. rapid increase in the standard of life of our masses from its appallingly low level, within a short period of time.

While considering this, it should be borne in mind that, under the present constitution, the Planning Authorities in this country cannot control the monetary, banking and currency policy. It will be clear from the analysis made above that it is difficult to see how, in the absence of the power to control and manipulate the price level and the money incomes, which are the prime movers in a free economy, the Planning Authority can possibly hope to achieve real results in their schemes.

It is necessary to emphasise that if Planning on the scale contemplated by the present advocates of planning in India is to materialise, then the control of monetary, banking, currency and fiscal policy would appear to be inevitable for the success

of any such experiment. In the absence of such control, however, the following measures may prove helpful in the achievement of the same objective, viz. a net increase in the money incomes and in the effective demand for goods and services.

(1) The provincial Governments should so frame the expenditure side of their budgets that the total net effect of the income-raising and expenditure activity of the Government puts more money in the hands of the poorer sections of the community. Clearly, the limitations of such measures must be properly understood. Such measures merely mean a redistribution of income from one section of the community to another, and can, at best, mean a very small increase in the money incomes and the effective demand of the primary producers and poorer people for the total flow of goods and services coming to the market. With these limitations in mind, the provincial Governments should try as much to alter their expenditure side in this direction as possible. Even in the absence of control over monetary exchange and fiscal policy, the provincial Governments can effectively add to the total flow of money through the economic system, by a proper handling of their Loan Policy. For example, the provincial governments can scrutinise some of the schemes for the establishment of new industries within their own areas, which are, on their merits, quite sound, but which, by their very nature cannot be inaugurated without State help. After they are satisfied about the soundness of the scheme, they can encourage the inauguration of the scheme by some such measures as guaranteeing the interest on the capital, necessary for such a scheme, the provision of technical advice and help, and so on. The net effect of such an enterprising Loan Policy would be that the provincial governments would actually, in some cases, bring liquid monetary funds into effective monetary circulation, which, in the absence of such governmental help, are likely to remain idle in the vaults of the banks. It is possible to argue that such a policy of increasing the total flow of money, which is bound to raise prices without effective power to control the imports into the country, or the exchange value of the rupee, would defeat the very purpose of such a policy. It will be seen, however, that this argument is not as strong as it appears at first sight. In the first place, such a Loan Policy, which is far from a progressive expansionist monetary policy, would not result in a very large increase in the total flow of money. Secondly, if other parts of the Plan work efficiently and in conformity with the time schedule, then the total flow of goods and services, through the increase in the efficiency of production and the development of secondary industries, is bound to increase, and hence the increase in prices, as a result of expansion in money demand, would not be as great as would otherwise be the case.

So far an attempt has been made to discuss certain fundamental conditions, the fulfilment of which is vital to the success of a comprehensive Plan in India. It would be clear from this discussion that a wise management of our monetary policy would be by far the most important prerequisite of the successful execution of a broad-based and a large-scale economic plan within the country. Before we discuss the various radical improvements that are necessary in all the branches of economic life in this country, in order to bring about a rapid increase in the total output of goods and services, on the one hand, and a considerable increase in the purchasing power of the masses, which will enable them to command a large amount of goods and services, on the other, it will be helpful to discuss the guiding principles which should shape the management of our monetary policy in a regime of planned economy in India.

N. G. ABHYANKAR

Review

PORTUGUESE INDIA

PORTUGUESE INDIA. (The Goa Congress Committee, Bombay 4.) 1939. 21 cm. 54p. As. 4.

It is said that the wretched find consolation in the misery of others. If so, dissatisfied British subjects will find immense consolation after a perusal of Mr. J. P. Lobo's instructive pamphlet "Portuguese India—A Survey of Conditions after 400 years of Foreign Rule," published by the Goa Congress Committee and priced at annas four. A glance at the contents page promises the reader a comprehensive survey of Goa from all angles of vision and even a hurried perusal will convince him that the author does not sling slime at the rulers, but substantiates with excerpts from valuable sources every one of his seemingly scathing statements. In this carefully studied little book the author has exposed without any bias the existing deplorable conditions in his native land and the conclusion is forced upon the reader that those who characterise British rule in India as "satanic" will have to search their vocabulary for a stronger term to apply to the Portuguese domination in Goa. If there is one country on earth which the white people have used for their profit regardless of the interests of the natives of the land, that country is Goa.

The book opens with a geographical survey of the land followed by a historical review of the last four hundred years. Time has cast a benevolent veil over the beginnings of all empires, and Mr. Lobo has not lifted that veil but just drawn it aside for us to have a glance at the shocking intrigues which brought Goa under Portuguese rule.

The author removes a few misconceptions common among both Goans and non-Goans. The first is the supposed conversion of Goa by St. Francis Xavier. For want of definite evidence the author does not give any credence to this belief. Another is the impression that has gained ground that Goa is predominantly Catholic, while the

census reveals that only 43 p. c. are Christians. A third such belief is that the Goans are the descendants of the Portuguese. There is only a very negligible minority in Goa who can claim Portuguese blood in their veins. Very startling revelations are also made about the conversions of the Goans and the persecutions of the Hindus, every one of these being supported by reference to reliable sources. One among these is the shameful murder of the Turkish officers serving under the Portuguese with the idea of providing wives for the Portuguese officers. The astute politician Albuquerque was responsible for this sin and he alleges that the motive for it was the prevention of sin on the part of the officers.

Coming to the existing conditions the author reviews the administration. The figures adduced show that the revenue is handsome but derived from such unmoral sources as alcoholic liquors, prohibitive stamp duties and court fees; on the other hand, the expenditure, as is only to be expected, is largely for the maintenance of a feeble army that can be swept away by one bomb-shell and in the payment of a large number of unnecessary officers. Goa, which is about a third of an ordinary British district, has five High Court Judges and a host of other such officers. Education, to say the least, is entirely neglected, being allotted only 8 p. c. of the revenue. A greater tragedy is that everything concerning India is carefully excluded from the curriculum, which conforms to that of a century ago. History, Geography and Veranulars have no place in it and instead there is foisted on the people the story of Portugal. Enterprising Goans, taking up the study of English, are forced to undergo a four years course of Portuguese. The author rightly assigns a chapter to what he calls the tragedy of Konkani, which, apart from not being encouraged, is condemned with all the conqueror's fury. The effect of this banishment of Konkani is noticeable in the lives of the better class of Goans who have also banished it from their homes and taken to Portuguese. The chapter on alcohol, the bane of all Christian countries and particularly of those of Goa, is well written. The

chapters on Public Finance, Economic Situation and the Rice Problem all go to show the apathy of the rulers towards the prosperity of their subjects. The myth of the Goa lottery being run for charitable purposes is successfully exploded, as out of the proceeds of the lottery only a very small fraction goes to the benefit of the Indians. The last chapter on Civil Liberties reminds the reader of the days of the Moghuls. Papers and magazines printed in British India and criticising the administration of the rulers are denied entry in the land and those printed in the land failing to mention some event in the family of the President are fined! Those who fail to sing the praises of the Governors and to welcome with approbation the measures they adopt for the supposed improvement of the people are similarly dealt with. It is our sincere hope that this little book will not be banned in Goa.

The share of the Government given to the people is nil. A legislative body, with mostly nominated members, is really more consultative than legislative. Everything is done to make the subjects realise the fact that they are a subject nation and the 25th of November is always kept as national feast, being the day of the conquest of Goa. In conclusion, the author bewails the lot of his compatriots and sounds a clarion call to them to rally round their brethren in British India and merge with them in a united fight for independence from the yoke of the foreigner.

Mr. Lobo has done a service to his countrymen. Not a day passes without more and more young men awaking to the rude fact that they are members of a slave nation. But the Goan, doped by an overdose by the Portuguese, was yet unconscious of this all-India awakening and was snugly asleep. Accustomed to the Western ways and manners and regardless of political events, he was so far marching forward as a political non-entity. Would that Mr. Lobo's book succeed in removing him from his torpor! We wish the book every success and a well-deserved wide circulation.

(Rev. Father) CANDES

INDIA AND THE WAR

MR. H. N. KUNZRU'S SPEECH

The Hon'ble Dr. Hirday Nath Kunzru made the following speech in the Council of State on the resolution moved by the Hon'ble Sir Jagdish Prasad on the international situation.

THIS is undoubtedly an awful moment. It is a sad commentary on western civilization that practically within twenty years of a great war we should be plunged into a struggle which promises to be more fierce and destructive than even the last one.

One wishes that the questions on which peace and order in the world depend could be settled by reason and negotiation. But unfortunately all the countries of the world have, in their connection with the internal administration of the territories under them, relied on force. It is the result of these internal policies that we see today in the conflagration that has broken out in Europe. In spite of this, India's sympathies, I am sure, will be on the side of those who are fighting autocracy and dictatorship. Notwithstanding our

differences with the British Government, I think anyone who observes what is taking place in the country can feel that, owing to the antagonism created by the Fascist and Nazi political philosophies and methods of government, there is greater support for the democracies in India than there was in 1914. For Poland we feel the utmost sympathy. We who are struggling for our freedom cannot but feel for the brave Poles who, notwithstanding their subjection to foreign rule for a century and a half, have retained their national spirit. They were cynically partitioned by three great Powers in 1772, and it was practically after 150 years that they were able to regain their freedom at the close of the great war. We deeply sympathise with them in their struggle to maintain their newly-won national status and the right to determine the course of their national life in accordance with what they deem best for themselves. In 1914 it was a murder at Serajevo that set a spark to the powder magazines of the world. Today it is the conduct of Germany in respect of Danzig and the Polish Corridor that has set the world ablaze, but in each of these

cases, as we can easily see, behind the immediate events lay principles of great moment which all those who value human freedom and personality must be prepared to defend.

Sir, in expressing our sympathy with Poland we morally bind ourselves to give her what help we can. But such help as we can give can only be given through the British Government, and I am sure that India will be prepared to play her part worthily in the present struggle. But for the realisation of the result that we have in view, namely, the achievement of victory for those principles which we all value and whose reign we want to establish in this country, it is essential that there should be complete co-operation between the authorities and the non-officials. I have no desire to raise controversial questions or to ask for any reward for standing up for principles on which the destiny of mankind depends. But anyone who is interested in the future fate of the world in this country must ask himself as to what are the means by which that co-operation can be achieved which will enable us to carry this struggle to a successful issue. Now, this co-operation that we all want requires in one word that India should be made to feel that her status is equal to that of the other self-governing members of the British Empire. The efforts to create this belief will undoubtedly require a reconstruction of the present Central Government and a pursuit of enlightened policies with regard to the army. The Central Government in its present form is unsuited to the requirements of the times. It should be changed as early as possible. Besides, if we are to put forward our best efforts, it must be primarily in the military domain. It is obvious, therefore, that if enlightened policies are followed in this field it will enable Britain to achieve co-operation to a greater extent than anything else that she could do. I emphasise this point, Sir, because, frankly speaking, I feel that the policies that have been followed in this Department are such as to create want of trust in British intentions towards the development of self-government in this country. The policies of the Army Department seem to me to be resolutely racial and anti-Indian. I speak, Sir, frankly and without bitterness, for there are issues larger than those concerning the fate of the British Empire that are at stake at the present moment. I do hope, Sir, that the British Government will realise that free men are the best defenders of freedom and that they can mobilise fully that feeling which already exists in this country in their favour in order to achieve results which both they and we have at heart only if the principles for which they are fighting in Europe are made applicable to India also.

My Honourable friend, the Leader of the House, who moved the Motion now before us, is concerned with questions relating to Indians abroad. I am sure he will bear me out when I say that in fighting for justice for Indians, for the protection of their elementary rights, we have come up again and again not merely against the Dominions but against His Majesty's Government themselves who, when there is danger, ask us to identify our interests with theirs and to shed our blood freely for the Empire over which they rule. I trust, Sir, that as a result of the present war and the realisation of the fact that its successful

prosecution depends on unity amongst all sections of the people and among the people and the Government, not merely the Government of India but His Majesty's Government also, who are finally responsible for the policies that are pursued in India, will change their angle of vision and will make India a sharer in the freedom which they wanted to establish in 1914 and which they want today to establish throughout the world.

With these words, Sir, I support the Motion moved by the Honourable Sir Jagdish Prasad. I believe in my heart of hearts that there cannot be anything worth living for if human personality is despised, if the rule of force is established throughout the world and if men lose the moral right to think for themselves and to associate themselves freely in defence of opinions on which ultimately the salvation of the world depends. I have no doubt that my country realises this to the fullest possible extent. Looking at the question both from the point of view of the world and of the welfare of the people of this country, Indians will no doubt do the best that they are capable of in this situation to smash those principles which are the foundations of Fascism and Nazism. May it be given to the authorities also to realise the significance of the occasion and their own moral duty to do what is just and right towards the people living in their own territories!

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