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Topics of the Week.

Late Mr. Shaukat Ali.

THE death of Moulana Shaukat Ali removes from the Indian scene a personality big in many ways. He and his more intellectual and erudite brother, the late Moulana Muhammad Ali, came to prominence over the Khilafat agitation, and they owed not a little of their all-India status to Mahatma Gandhi who had made the Khilafat cause his own for a time. The Ali Brothers were then in the forefront of the national struggle and did much to promote Hindu-Muslim unity. But latterly, when the Khilafat itself was abolished by the Turks, the Ali Brothers broke away from the national institution, the Congress, and became ardent supporters of the Muslim League. Moulana Shaukat Ali was a Muslim first and an Indian afterwards, and consistently so.

The Press Act.

A full Bench of the Lahore High Court delivered an important judgment on the 23rd Nov. interpreting Sec. 4 (h) of the Indian Press (Emergency) Act of 1931. The *Vir Bharat*, printed at the *Nani Press*, published on the 30th March last a letter from a correspondent giving a detailed account of a Hindu-Muslim riot at Hissar, including its causes, its incidents and its handling by the authorities. The Government of Punjab thought that the report had a tendency to create feelings of enmity between Hindus and Muslims, and therefore offended against Sec. 4 (h) of the Press Act, and consequently forfeited the security of Rs. 1,000 deposited by Mr. Parmanand, the owner of the *Nani Press*. Mr. Parmanand petitioned the High Court against the action of the Government. Their Lordships accepted the petition and set aside the order of forfeiture.

Mr. Justice V. S. Bhide, who wrote the judgment, held that mere publication of news of a Hindu-Muslim riot was not penalised by the Press Act. If the Government's interpretation were correct, it would lead to the "startling result that any newspaper that publishes an item of news such as the burning of a temple by Muslims or the desecration of a mosque by Hindus would run the risk of having its security forfeited. For, according to the Advocate General, such item is bound to have a tendency to promote feelings of hatred and enmity between Hindus and Muslims. If this be the correct legal position, many newspapers are probably bringing themselves within the clutches of the law by publishing news of Hindu-Muslim fracasces which unfortunately are common in this country." His Lordship declined to accept this interpretation. "I am, therefore, of opinion that the publication of mere authentic news of a riot without any comments cannot be said to fall within the purview of this Section."

His Lordship, however, added two reservations. The publication of even a news item the words of which *per se* have a tendency to create hatred and enmity will fall within the purview of the Section. "In such a case the words themselves have a tendency to promote class hatred." Similarly, if a news item is accompanied with a comment having such a tendency, that too will come under the Section. The criterion is the *intention* behind the publication of the news. His Lordship thus concluded his judgment:

After considering the question carefully in all its aspects, I am of opinion that clause (h) of section 4 of Act XXIII of 1931 was never intended to and does not cover the mere publishing of news relating a Hindu-Muslim riot by a newspaper in the ordinary course of business, as in this case where the authenticity or the good faith of the report is not challenged and when there is nothing else to show any intention to promote class hatred thereby.

The Better Way.

SPEAKING in Madras on the 21st inst., Sir R. K. Shanmukham Chetty, the Dewan of Cochin, revealed one of the motives which inspired him when he advised the Maharaja of Cochin to liberalise the administration of his State. Sir Shanmukham said:

Let me frankly say that one of the considerations that weighed with me to advise His Highness to take this step was to protect the interests of the Maharaja and the Ruling Family. I realised that the greatest asset which existed in an Indian State is the loyalty of the people to the Throne; and that whatever the Constitution that you may build in the State, it must be built around the solid foundation of loyalty and devotion of the people to the Ruler. Once you let loose the elements that will weaken

that spirit of loyalty to the Ruler, you will create elements that will endanger the stability of the Ruler and the Ruling Family itself. It is, therefore, as much in the interests of His Highness the Maharaja and the Ruling Family as that of the subjects that I advised His Highness the Maharaja to associate his people effectively in the administration of the State. The time had come when he had to take his people into his confidence if he had to retain his prestige and the affection of the people for him.

We wish that these observations of Sir Shanmukham will be universally followed in all Indian States that the Rulers and their ministers will realise that the interests of the Rulers themselves require that they should increasingly associate their peoples in the administration of their States. If they have no faith in liberalism as such, let enlightened self-interest prompt them to adopt it and that too quickly, while yet there is time.

* * *

'Public Interest.'

IN the central Legislative Assembly the other day, Mr. Avinashlingam Chettiar asked the question whether the Government of India had made any progress in the matter of negotiations with the Provinces with regard to Federation and whether any suggestions to amend the Government of India Act had been made by any of the Provincial Governments. Sir N.N. Sircar, the Law Member, is reported to have declined to answer the question on the ground that the information asked for was confidential and that it would not be in the public interest to disclose it.

* * *

THE Government of India may not be carrying on any negotiations regarding the Federation with the Provinces in the sense in which negotiations are being carried on with the States. If so the Law Member could have in a straightforward manner told the House either that no such negotiations were actually in progress or that negotiations were in progress but could not be disclosed at this stage. Instead of doing so, he refused to answer the question at all for reasons of "public interest." Unfortunately the tendency to treat the Legislature almost with contempt is growing among the members of the Government of India. A greater amount of straightforwardness and a greater desire to take the House into confidence by giving it whatever information can be given would be in the interests of all concerned.

* * *

Constitutional Crisis in Ceylon.

A MOST piquant and intriguing situation has arisen in Ceylon as a result of the Bracegirdle affair. It will be recalled that Mr. M. A. Bracegirdle was ordered to be deported from Ceylon. The Ceylon High Court, however, invalidated the order, and criticised the action of the Government. There was then a difference of opinion as to who was responsible for the deportation order. The Inspector-General of Police, Mr. P. N. Banks, contended that he had taken the consent of Sir Baron Jayatilaka, the Minister of Home Affairs, as well as that of the Chief Secretary. Sir Baron denied that he had consented to the deportation, and accused Mr. Banks of having compromised him. The Council of Ministers expressed loss of confidence in Mr. Banks and asked the Governor to remove him from his office. The Governor appointed a commission to enquire into the whole

affair. The Board of Ministers acquiesced in the appointment and suggested changes in the terms of reference to the Commission, and Sir Baron gave evidence before it. The Commission, which consisted of Sir Sidney Abrahams, the Chief Justice, Sir Stewart Schneider, ex-judge of the High Court, and Mr. Stanley Obeyesekere, the Solicitor General, gave a unanimous report in which they accepted the version of Mr. Banks and rejected that of Sir Baron regarding their parts in the Bracegirdle affair. In view of this opinion, the Governor declined to accede to the wishes of the Board of Ministers to dismiss Mr. Banks. A section of the public, particularly the British, demanded the resignation and retirement from public life of Sir Baron. On the other hand, the Ceylon Legislative Council, which was to have considered the Report of the Commission on the 22nd, Nov., passed, by a majority of 38 to 11, a preliminary vote of confidence in Sir Baron on the 11th Nov. Sir Baron himself has so far declined to resign.

* * *

THE incident has taken a political colour: it has become a struggle between the British and the Ceylonese, between the permanent officials and the elected Ministers, between "King and Parliament." The situation is inherent in the present constitution of Ceylon under which there are Ministers responsible to the electorate and permanent officials responsible to the Secretary of State. It will not be resolved until the permanent officials become wholly responsible to the Ministers. The present situation might, however, have been saved if, on the ground that the Minister for Home Affairs and the Board of Ministers had, rightly or wrongly, lost confidence in Mr. Banks, the latter had been quietly transferred to another colony, perhaps on promotion. Now that a Commission has reported on the whole affair, the better convention would be for Sir Baron, who has been convicted by the Commission, to resign in the first instance, and in view of the vote of confidence of the Ceylon Legislative Council, to come back to office, and for Mr. Banks, who has been exonerated by the Commission but who has forfeited the confidence of the Ministers and the Legislature, to be transferred, on promotion, to another colony.

* * *

The Hockenull Circular.

A glimpse of the mentality of the Europeans can be had from the contents of the Hockenull circular which has had wide publicity. Mr. Hockenull is the leader of the European group in the Assam Assembly, and in the circular referred to above he sets out the reasons which had weighed with the European group in lending its support to the Saadullah Ministry. It seems the Saadullah Ministry had assured its European friends that it would support them against the policies of the Congress members of the Assembly which had assumed a three-fold form—(1) the reduction of the undue European representation in the local bodies; (2) the Freedom of Movement Bill and (3) an enquiry into the conditions of labour in tea estates. These policies of the Congress members are such that no right-thinking man can take objection to them. But the European group in the Assam Assembly felt alarmed at the prospect of a Congress Ministry and rallied itself under the Saadullah Cabinet. But after the resignation of the Saadullah Cabinet, the European group asked for an assurance from the Congress

Ministry that its vested interests would be left untouched. The Bardoloi Ministry rightly refused to give any such assurance. So, the European block in the Assam Assembly is bent on seeing that the Saadullah Ministry is reinstated in power. We think no better testimony could have been found regarding the progressive outlook of the Bardoloi Ministry than this strong disapproval of their conduct by the European group. The Europeans in Assam, as elsewhere in India, belong to a class of exploiters who have been unduly favoured by an alien Government. Indeed, it is their predominance that is responsible to a great degree for the present backward condition of the Assam Province. The sooner the Europeans of Assam are divested of their undue importance, the better would it be for the people and the province as a whole.

INDEED, it would seem that the Europeans of Assam want the reappearance of the government of the East India Company! They would enjoy representations in the local bodies and the legislature out of all proportion to their numerical strength. But nobody should question their right to do so! They would keep their plantation areas a dark continent, regulating ingress to and egress from them. But nobody should interfere with these regulations! They would make use of the tea garden coolies as slaves and serfs. But an enquiry into their conditions of living should not be instituted! We think, no provincial ministry worth the salt should submit to these preposterous conditions. The Bardoloi Ministry may get defeated in its trial of strength with the Europeans. But we hope that if a fresh election is held and its attitude towards Europeans is made known to the public, it will come again to power with a thumping majority. The Saadullah Ministry ruined its chances by entering into an alliance with the European group, and no other evidence would have been more detrimental to its interests than the Hockenull Circular which was apparently meant to glorify its conduct.

The Madras Unemployment Scheme.

WE are glad to learn that the Hon'ble Mr. Giri, the Minister for Industries and Labour in Madras, has formulated a scheme for giving unemployment relief to the textile workers of the Madras Presidency. The textile workers in Madras Presidency number about 64,000, and it has been estimated that the number of the unemployed does not exceed ten per cent. of those in employment. It has been proposed that the unemployed workers should be given relief to the extent of five rupees a month, bringing the total cost of the unemployment scheme, if put into effect, to about Rs. 3,84,000. Mr. Giri's idea is that both the employers and the employees should be asked to contribute towards a fund, which, eventually, will dole out Rs. 3,84,000 every year towards the relief of the unemployed workers. If the contributions of the employers and the employees prove insufficient to build up the fund required for the purpose, the Government will step in and make good the deficit.

THE scheme is a very modest one and we hope that it will be put into effect as soon as possible. Only on one or two points we would

like to make a few suggestions. As regards the relief to be given under the scheme, we think that relief given at a flat rate will not serve the requirements of the different grades of workers. The textile mills have workers of different grades beginning from ordinary labourers to skilled operatives. Naturally, their standard of living would be different. Relief given at a flat rate will not, therefore, prove adequate to the varying needs of the different workers. Secondly, the amount of relief fixed is all too meagre. A working class family living in a town or a city cannot pull on with five rupees a month. We suggest, therefore, that the Madras Ministry would do well to adopt a scheme which will give substantial relief to the unemployed workers and at the same time cater to their varying requirements.

IN this connection we would invite the attention of the Madras Ministry to a scheme for unemployment insurance formulated by Mr. Parulekar in his book on "Social insurance for Industrial workers in India." Mr. Parulekar divides the workers into three groups for this purpose. Firstly, those workers whose monthly earnings are below Rs. 30; secondly, those whose monthly earnings are between Rs. 30 and Rs. 55; and thirdly, those workers whose monthly earnings are between Rs. 55 and Rs. 80. As regards the first group of workers, his suggestion is that the unemployment relief given to them should equal $\frac{1}{2}$ of their monthly earnings, for the second group, the unemployment relief should be $\frac{2}{3}$ of the monthly earnings and for the third group it should be $\frac{3}{4}$ of the monthly earnings. We are sure that this scheme, if put into operation, will enable the workers to pull on better during the period they are out of employment. Anything less than this will be too meagre and will not attain the object for which it has been devised. Taking the average yearly earnings of a textile worker at Rs. 240, we find that the unemployment relief required for 6,400 workers will be nearly Rs. 11,00,000 on the assumption that the amount required under the unemployment insurance scheme will roughly be 70 per cent. of the total wages bill.

WE would also suggest that the employees' contribution should be only nominal. We are definitely of opinion that the employees cannot make any appreciable contribution. It will be cruel to demand contributions from the workers whose earnings do not provide them with even two meals a day. We therefore, suggest that only the state and the employers should contribute to provide the amount necessary for the unemployment insurance fund. After all, the unemployed workers are not to blame for their unemployment. They are the victims of a system of production of which periodic unemployment is a regular feature. This is not our own view. This view is propounded in the memorandum submitted by the British Trades Union Congress to the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance in 1929. It says "The workers are not the authors of the system (industrial system) but the victims of it, and unless the community so organises its resources as to provide work for every willing worker, the unemployed, as the reserves of industry, are entitled to maintenance."

Articles.

ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT

ON November 2nd the House of Commons passed, by 345 to 138 votes, the resolution moved by Mr. Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, that the Anglo-Italian Agreement which was concluded on April 16, 1938, be brought into operation. Accordingly, the Agreement has been brought into operation on Nov. 16. It will be remembered that, though Mr. Anthony Eden, when he was Foreign Secretary, was himself in favour of an agreement with Italy, he felt that the time and the method proposed by the Prime Minister were inappropriate, and that in consequence of this difference, he resigned the Foreign Secretaryship in February last. The Prime Minister persisted in his policy and concluded on April 16th an agreement with Italy which was discussed in the House of Commons on May 2nd. Though the Agreement was concluded as long ago as April last, it was stipulated that it would be made operative at a future date when the British Government was satisfied that the Spanish question was settled. In the debate on the 2nd November there was radical difference of opinion whether the Spanish question was settled, which in its turn depended on the *bona fides* of Signor Mussolini.

The Prime Minister admitted that he had for long refused to define what he meant by the settlement of the Spanish question. In July last, however, he defined it thus: "If His Majesty's Government think that Spain has ceased to be a menace to the peace of Europe, I think we shall regard that as a settlement of the Spanish question."

By November the British Government had come to think that the Spanish question was no longer a menace to the peace of Europe. One of the tests which the British Government applied was the withdrawal of the so-called foreign volunteers from Spain as elaborated by the Non-Intervention Committee, which included Italy. At Munich Signor Mussolini had volunteered the information to Mr. Chamberlain that he proposed to withdraw 10,000 men, or half the Italian infantry forces, from Spain, which he subsequently did. He had also promised Mr. Chamberlain that he would withdraw the remaining Italian forces of all categories when the Non-Intervention Plan came into operation, and that he would not in the meanwhile send any more forces to Spain and would not send compensatory air-forces in place of the infantry withdrawn. These promises and the performance of Signor Mussolini were, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, a considerable contribution to the elimination of the Spanish question as a menace to peace. Further, both Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini had assured Mr. Chamberlain that they had no territorial

ambitions in Spain. On the other hand, when Europe was faced with the danger of a major war in September last, Gen. Franco had declared his neutrality. These considerations persuaded the British Government to think that the Spanish question was no longer a menace to the peace of Europe and therefore the Anglo-Italian Agreement could be brought into operation.

Even so, much depended on the *bona fides* of Signor Mussolini with respect to the promises he had made. But should they any longer be doubted? Had not Mussolini, at the request of Mr. Chamberlain, interceded with Herr Hitler to gain time for the discussions which led to the Munich Agreement and saved Europe from war?

The Opposition contended that the Spanish question was not settled and Mr. Chamberlain's belated definition of it was inadequate and unsatisfactory. Mr. Arthur Greenwood, who spoke immediately after the Prime Minister, held that a settlement of the Spanish question meant the cessation of hostilities in Spain. Mr. Anthony Eden held it to mean that the Spanish civil war had come to an end, or at least foreign intervention in it had ceased. Mr. Noel-Baker thought that it meant the full execution of the Non-Intervention Plan, which included the unlimited control of the International Commission of the League of Nations. According to any of these interpretations there was no settlement of the Spanish question to justify the bringing into operation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement.

It was also contended that even according to the definition of Mr. Chamberlain, the Spanish question had not ceased to be a menace to the peace of Europe. Members of the Opposition discounted the significance of the withdrawal of 10,000 Italian infantry-men. In the first place, they were the "war-weary, wounded, convalescent" infantry-men, who in any event had to be repatriated to Italy. There was evidence that more troops were being despatched to Spain. Moreover, as Mr. Eden said, the main contribution of Italy had never been in infantry, but in technicians and armaments, and particularly aeroplanes which were going to play an ever more important role in the Spanish conflict. And these had not been withdrawn. Mr. Greenwood quoted figures furnished by the Spanish Ambassador and published in the press, which went to show that there were in Spain some 60,000 infantry, artillery, and tank troops, about 1,000 pilots, 2,000 aviation mechanics, 4,000 radio telegraphists, etc., 10,000 Italian cheuffers, 5,000 engineers, 2,000 police and agents, or in all, about 90,000 Italians, apart from the military, all of whom formed the most important people in modern warfare. These figures were not challenged by the Government.

The withdrawal of 10,000 infantry-men was not proof that Signor Mussolini was serious in

withdrawing his men from Spain. Mr. Chamberlain had stated that it was not the fault of Italy if the plan of the Non-Intervention Committee for the withdrawal of volunteers was not in operation. There was nothing to prevent Signor Mussolini from withdrawing all his men within a week. It was futile to talk of the men being volunteers over whom the Italian Government had no control. If they were volunteers, Mussolini would not have been able to recall even the 10,000 men he actually withdrew.

Even if Signor Mussolini actually withdrew all his men from Spain, there was no assurance that the Spanish question would cease to be a menace to European peace. For there were still the German volunteers to be withdrawn. Thus the essential condition laid down by Mr. Chamberlain for the operation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement had not been satisfied.

It was impossible to place any reliance on the promises of Signor Mussolini regarding the future. Mr. Anthony Eden was as keen as Mr. Chamberlain to come to an agreement with Signor Mussolini, but the latter had broken so many previous promises and so often that he felt that some honest performance was necessary to persuade him to initiate conversations with Signor Mussolini. In fact, even the Anglo-Italian Agreement, which contained eight annexes, had five provisions which were but reassurances of promises which Signor Mussolini had previously given and broken. It was, therefore, absolutely futile and dangerous to place any faith in the promises of Signor Mussolini. Mr. Eden said:

In fact, surely, the honest truth is that the essential condition which we laid down—which the Government laid down—for bringing into force of our Agreement with Italy has not been satisfied; we have waived it; and whether that be right or wrong, nothing is going to disguise that fact from the world.

Mr. Eden pointed out that England and Italy were talking entirely different languages about Spain.

We meant, and still mean—this country means—by non-intervention, leaving it to the Spaniards to settle their own destiny. Other powers, however, had made it plain by their action that they did not intend to allow the signature of the Non-Intervention Agreement to stand in the way of any military action they might consider necessary to ensure the victory of the party which they championed.

He illustrated his thesis by referring to two of the consequences of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. They were that England should recognise the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and Italy should withdraw from Spain. He feared that in the event England would do her part in the bargain. Italy never meant to honour her obligation.

The recognition of Italian conquest of Abyssinia was bitterly attacked by the Opposition, who produced evidence to show that Abyssinia had not yet been conquered by Italy. Miss Rathbone said that evidence was piling up that

Italy had not yet conquered Abyssinia and that the tribes were still resisting with extra-ordinary success, considering their lack of money, leadership and modern arms. Mr. George Speer, the correspondent of the *Times* during the Abyssinian War, had in a series of articles in the *Manchester Guardian*, shown how effectively the tribes were still resisting and how little of the country was in the complete control of the Italians. M. Pecheral, a French journalist who had visited Abyssinia in April last and again in September, confirmed all that Mr. Steer had said. Lord Lugard had said in May last that there was undeniable evidence that the situation of the Italians was very critical, and the rains were shortly due when it might become more so. "If the Government now recognises the conquest of Abyssinia by Italy," said Mr. Noel-Baker, "they will be betraying a very gallant people who are the victims of a Covenant-breaking aggression which we still condemn." "It is the first occasion" said Mr. Greenwood, "that the British Government have given recognition to a Power still in process of trying to obtain submission of a nation, and my information is that the Abyssinian war is by no means over, and that Mussolini cannot regard himself as the effective master of that country."

England took the lead in moving the League of Nations to disapprove of Italian aggression in Abyssinia and to invoke sanctions for the first time against an aggressor. England's recognition of that very aggression is great triumph for Signor Mussolini and a great diplomatic defeat for England.

INDIANS IN THE TRANSVAAL.

NOTWITHSTANDING the Uplift clause in the Cape Town Agreement, the relentless persecution of Indians in the Transvaal continues unabated. The South African Government have recently appointed an Asiatic Land Laws Commission to enquire whether and to what extent the letter and spirit of any law restricting or prohibiting the ownership, use or occupation by Asiatics of land has been evaded. This new Commission was at first asked not to go over the ground already covered by the Feetham Commission of 1932, but it appears that, under pressure of certain anti-Asiatic Members of Parliament, the Government have since agreed to ask the Commission to go over the whole ground. In fact, Government had to withdraw their resolution to give effect to certain of the proposals of the Feetham Commission, which would have given some relief to a few Indians.

Among the methods of evasion of the restrictive laws which the Commission was asked to investigate were the holding of land by friendly Europeans on behalf of Indians, by companies which were technically non-Asiatic but possibly controlled by

Asiatics, and by non-Asiatic wives of Indians married under civil law or Hindu or Muslim marriage customs.

The Agent-General of the Government of India presented a Memorandum to the Commission in which he admirably summed up the case for Indians. The basic restrictive law was passed in the Transvaal in 1885 by the Boer Republican Government. It provided for the segregation of Indians, to which however the then British Government objected. The Boer Government emphasised that the segregation was proposed for sanitary purposes and in the interest of public health. The law at the same time permitted the Government to set apart areas in which Asiatics could acquire land. The law, both with respect to segregation or to setting apart of land for Asiatic ownership, was never strictly observed, the Government itself conniving at and even instigating its violation. The Asiatic Enquiry Commission of 1921 stated :

Indians were permitted not only to trade but to reside outside locations. They were allowed also to own fixed property through a nominal European trustee. . . . When difficulties occurred regarding transfer to an Asiatic, the land was registered in the name of the Mining Commissioner, a Government Officer, as trustee for the purchasers. This was done with the consent and at the instigation of the Government, and in subsequent cases of a similar nature other Government officers were instructed to adopt the same course.

Thus the Boer Republican Government, which enacted the law, realised its unfairness and actively instigated the evasion of the letter and the spirit of the law. It is futile now to blame Indians if they have subsequently done the same thing.

Apart from the part played by the State in defeating it, the law itself is so iniquitous that it inevitably asks for its violation. As the Agent-General says in his Memorandum :

In Transvaal trade is almost the sole occupation open to an Indian, and the importance to him of security of tenure of his business site is so obvious as to need no comment. An Indian who is threatened with the loss of business site, and thereby threatened with the loss of his trading license, is placed in a terrible dilemma. And if he decides to preserve his livelihood by infringing what he considers to be an unjust law, he is only obeying the laws of self-preservation, just as a motorist, to avoid injury through an accident, will infringe a traffic law. In any case, the small number of evasions of the law that may have taken place has been largely due to the fact that Asiatics have been denied reasonable facilities for the ownership of land, a fundamental privilege and right of any permanent section of the population in any country.

In fact, the surprising thing is not that there were evasions but there were so few of them. The Agent-General drew pointed attention to the fact that but one single evasion of the law by the formation of a company since 1932 had been brought to the notice of the Commission.

He was also able to show that the cry that Indians were acquiring land in the Transvaal through Malay wives was obviously fallacious.

Marriages between Indians and Malays in the Cape Province, where there is no restriction on Indian ownership of land, were more numerous than in the Transvaal. Even in the Transvaal the number of Malay-Indian marriages has not increased. The reason for it was that until recently the Indian population in the Transvaal had more men than women, because more men, migrated from India than women. Some men therefore, could not secure Indian wives. Such of them as were Muslims were free to marry Malay women, who were also Muslims. But in recent years the proportion of Indian men and women in the Transvaal has become increasingly normal, and in consequence, the proportion of Malay-Indian marriages was decreasing. If the acquisition of land had appreciably promoted Malay-Indian marriages, there would have been more of them, not less.

Apart from the inevitability and the number of evasions of the restrictive laws, such justification as was offered when the law was first passed in 1885 has since lost its significance. It is questionable whether even in 1885 there was any justification for the segregation of Indians on sanitary grounds. In any event, there is no justification for it now on the ground that Indians in the Transvaal are insanitary. The Medical Officer of Health, Johannesburg, in his evidence before the Feetham Committee, had stated that Asiatics "are as amenable to sanitary requirements as the average European of the poor class, and at times are an example to such Europeans." If, instead of being insulted, segregated and neglected, the Indians had been given the same chances of sanitation as the Europeans, there is no reason to believe that they would have been in any way inferior to the Europeans. As a matter of fact, the segregation of Indians has condemned them to a comparatively insanitary life. The Asiatic Enquiry Commission of 1921 had said that "in places where they (Indians) are segregated for residential purposes, their sanitary requirements are neglected by the municipal authorities." Anybody conversant with modern medical knowledge will realise that the condemnation of a part of the population to insanitary conditions and its segregation will not save the rest, but will only increase the danger to the whole. Segregation for sanitary purposes is most futile and dangerous. Segregation for sanitation has no more justification in the Transvaal than elsewhere in the world.

Under the Cape Town Agreement, the South African Government, which then included Dr. Malan, had solemnly undertaken to uplift the permanent Indian population in South Africa. To enforce laws which are restrictive of such fundamental rights as the right to own land and to engage in lawful trade and which were passed as long ago as 1885 and which were never enforced, before, is the very reverse of uplift. If that is uplift, what is persecution? Can Hitler himself beat it?

REPRESSION IN THE STATES.

CONSIDERABLE consternation has been caused among the leaders of the States' peoples by the reported decisions of the State authorities to deal with an iron hand the movement for responsible government in the States and by the willingness of the Paramount Power to come to their aid. Already in the Province of Punjab, the States Protection Act has been applied to certain districts to protect the administration of the Kalsia State, and more recently the Viceroy has directed the application of the same Act to the British administered areas of Hyderabad with a view to crush the *Satyagraha* movement in the State. The Act confers extra-ordinary powers on the Magistrate beginning from prohibiting meetings or assemblies of more than five persons which, in his opinion, are likely to cause obstruction to the administration of the State, to the checking of any act or movement which is likely to disturb public tranquillity. Thus the chorus of sympathy and good-will with which the British Indians were trying to cheer up their fellow-brethren in the Indian States will become more difficult after the promulgation of this Act. The States may indulge in severe repression, may destroy the property and life of their subjects, still it will not be open to British Indians to criticise their conduct, or to express sympathy for the victims of repression. The States' authorities have, time and again, expressed themselves freely both in the press and on the platform about the movements and aspirations of the British Indian People. Their opinions have often times run counter to the cherished desires of the British Indians. Still, the Paramount Power has not thought it necessary to restrain them from carrying on their propaganda. But when it comes to a question of British Indians expressing their opinions about the administration in the States, the Paramount Power at once comes to the rescue of its spoilt children and shields them from any adverse criticism. Any sane man will feel surprised at the illogicality of this procedure. But the Paramount Power has no compunctions in following the same. It would seem from the activities of the Paramount Power that it is interested in maintaining autocracy in the States, though from its previous declarations and formulations of policy it was hoped that it would follow a different course of action. The Butler Committee has stated that where "attempts to substitute another form of government" in the States were due to a "wide-spread popular demand for change, the Paramount Power would be bound to maintain the rights, privileges and dignity of Prince; but it would also be bound to suggest such measures as would satisfy this demand *without eliminating the Prince*" (Italics ours). The Earl of Winterton stated in the House of Commons that the Paramount Power would not act

as a check on the establishment of responsible government in the States. Relying on these two authoritative statements, we would like to know from the Paramount Power what steps it has taken to ascertain "the wide-spread popular demand for change" in the States and how far it has persuaded the State authorities "to satisfy this demand without eliminating the Prince." So far as we know, the Paramount Power has done nothing of the kind. It may be noted that in none of the States, at present, is there a demand for the elimination of the Prince. Each State's people's organisation has as its objective the establishment of responsible government under the aegis of its ruler. Still these organisations have not been allowed to function in the States. Some of them have been declared illegal even before they were born! In Hyderabad and Travancore, for example, the States' people are carrying on agitation to get their State Congress recognised by the authorities. But the States have not thought it fit to do so. Under the circumstances, we fail to see any reason why the Paramount Power should come to the aid of the States. Should it not, as stated in its previous declarations, ascertain whether there is a "wide-spread popular demand for change" and "suggest such measures as would satisfy these demands without eliminating the Prince"? Should it be a silent spectator and indirectly a party to the ruthless repression carried on by the States to suppress the most legitimate demands of their people? Indeed, we thought that the Paramount Power would play a different role. History supplies us with instances where the Paramount Power has intervened for the welfare of the State subjects. In the famous Baroda Case (1873-75) when a Commission was appointed to investigate complaints brought against the Gaekwar's administration and to suggest reforms, the then Viceroy and Governor-General of India expressed himself to the Gaekwar in the following terms "My friend, I cannot consent to employ British troops to protect any one in a course of wrong-doing. Misrule on the part of a Government which is upheld by the British power is misrule in the responsibility for which the British Government becomes in a measure involved. It becomes therefore not only the right but the positive duty of the British Government to see that the administration of a state in such a condition is reformed and that gross abuses are removed." In another case the Court of Directors instructed the Indian Government to intimate to the Nizam through the Residency, that they could not remain "indifferent spectators of disorder and misrule". Yet, what is going on in the states of Hyderabad, Travancore, Rajkot and Dhenkanal, except misrule of the grossest type? Indiscriminate lathi charge and firing have become the order of the day and people are living under

a reign of terror. Unheard of tortures are practised by the State authorities to force the people to submit to their administration. Recently Miss Maniben Patel has published an account of the atrocities practised by the Rajkot State. We print below what we have received from the Orissa States' Peoples' organisation regarding the atrocities of the Dhenkanal State "Reliable documentary evidence has reached the Prajamandal from nearly fifty villages where the same tragedy has been enacted, assaults on men and women, looting, destruction of food articles and other property. The *modus operandi* seems to be, to surround the village, bring the men to an open space outside the village, coerce them at the point of the bayonet to sign on blank papers and take loyalty tickets and if the men refuse to do so, to arrest a few and to charge the rest with lathis and when the men run away helter skelter to open fire on them. The two firings on the 17th and 21st October were of this kind. There are several among the wounded who have been fired on their backs. Another cowardly feature of these operations is that while the menfolk are taken outside the village, a section of the armed police force into the houses, outrage the modesty of women, snatch ornaments and money from their persons, help themselves to food articles and scatter on the ground what they cannot carry. Then the armed men come together, and out of fear that the news may quickly spread and large crowds gather, they make a hasty retreat leaving the dead and the wounded in case there has been a firing. The villagers are so terrified particularly regarding the safety and honour of their womenfolk, that on receiving advance information of the approach of these *Kalaphars*, they send their women and children to the midst of the neighbouring forests". Such being the atrocities practised in the States, it is the bounden duty of the Paramount Power to enquire into the causes of misrule in these States and to take prompt steps for the establishment of good government. But curiously enough, the Paramount Power instead of controlling the Princes is trying to restrain the British Indians from criticising the administration of the States. We strongly disapprove this conduct of the Paramount Power. It will completely alienate the sympathy of the British Indians if it persists in following this reprehensible course. No amount of repression will hold back the sympathy of the British Indians from hundreds and thousands of their own fellow-brethren who are the victims of a medieval administration. Repression will only add fuel to the fire of discontent already present. It will goad the British Indians to revolt against the unwarranted interference of the Paramount Power and will bring about a situation for which the Paramount Power may have to repent. Any way, the policy to be followed by British Indians is

quite clear. They cannot remain dumb spectators of the inhuman atrocities practised by the Princes. They must help the States' Peoples' Organisations for the establishment of responsible government in the States and no amount of repression should deter them from this legitimate purpose.

While on this subject, we should refer to another engine of oppression recently set in motion by the Indian States. The States have been issuing extradition warrants against such people residing in British India who, they think, are responsible for agitation in the States. It is understood that both Talcher and Dhenkanal States in Orissa issued extradition warrants against their subjects resident in Orissa under various sections, particularly section 124 (A). The Government of Orissa, it is said, found some legal flaws which militated against the execution of the warrants and returned them to the States concerned. In hot pursuit of this failure, have come the latest sheaf of warrants against the same persons under fresh sections of the Indian Penal Code. This in itself indicates the "Rule of Law" or the absence of it prevailing in these very backward States. Similarly, it is understood that about twenty-five such warrants have been received against Dhenkanal subjects who have taken refuge in British Orissa and the charges against these people are various, from embezzlement of Prajamandal funds to outraging the modesty of women. The extradition laws which are meant for reciprocal benefit, envisage the same high level in the standard of administration in both the States. However, it is well-known that in the Orissa States there is no regular system for the recruitment of officers. One who is a police officer to-day is a sub-divisional officer to-morrow and *vice versa*. Moreover, none of these officers has any opinion independent of the opinion of the Princes. As a matter of fact, under autocratic rule, the executive have to take their orders from the Durbar. The provision, therefore, has apparently been made that the Political Agent is required to judge whether a *prima facie* case has been made out or not. The rules that regulate the procedure of Political Agents for surrender of accused persons to Native States are very definite on this point. They lay down that "the Political Agent shall, in all cases before issuing a warrant under section 7 of the said Act (Extradition Act) satisfy himself, by preliminary enquiry or otherwise that there is a *prima facie* case against the accused person." Similarly there are many other provisions which enjoin on the Political Agent, to take all possible care to see that the accused persons are not harassed. But we have already stated that the recent activities of the Paramount Power have completely identified it with the Rulers of the States. The Political Agent acting under its instructions, cannot therefore be considered as an impartial executive whose warrants the Provincial Governments should respect. The Provincial

Governments are under a dual obligation. Firstly, as autonomous units it is their duty to see that their people are not harassed by the States under the pretext of extradition warrants. Secondly, they must also take care to see that the extradition warrants are not made the instruments for the suppression of popular movements in the States. Most of the Provincial Governments of India to-day want the establishment of responsible government in the States. In fact, their chief opposition to federate with the latter is the absence of responsible government in them. Under the circumstances we have no doubt that the Provincial Governments will fully exercise their power and, as provided by section 15 of the Extradition Act, stay any proceedings taken under the Chapter dealing with extradition and direct any warrant issued under the Chapter to be cancelled, and the person for whose arrest such warrant has been issued to be discharged.

There is, however, another fly in the ointment. Under the Extradition Act, when a warrant for extradition has been issued by the Political Agent, it seems the Magistrates in British Indian Districts can take action without consulting the local Government. Of course, it is provided in the Act that the Magistrate, if he thinks fit, before proceeding further should report the case to the local Government and wait for its instructions in the matter. But a Magistrate may not, if he so chooses, adopt this procedure. Therefore, to be on the safe side, the Provincial Governments should issue instructions to the Magistrates to the effect that they should consult the local Government before taking action on extradition warrants.

This will put an end to the fear and suspicion that have recently been engendered by the extradition warrants. The States people will forge ahead fortified in the faith that the British Provinces are there to help and protect them.

ECONOMIC PLANNING.

IV.

BUT all this planning would be nothing more than a mere palliative, if at the same time it is not supported by an equally comprehensive and vigorous planning of agriculture. For, Indian agriculture at the present moment is a cup without a bottom. Increase in wealth made possible through industrial development will not enable an appreciable rise in the average standard of life, if these are only to liquidate the losses on agriculture. What is the exact nature and extent of this loss is difficult to estimate owing to the paucity of statistical data, and to the absence of a business outlook on the part of the farmer and the consequent enhancement of the difficulty of estimating agricultural costs, which even otherwise is no easy matter. This view need not imply that there are not some sections of agriculture which are very profitable. But it may be safely asserted, on the basis of some very relevant circumstantial evidence, that owing to pressure of population and the discovery of new lands in other continents cultivated by fewer people and with better technical and capital equipment, the margin of cultivation in India has been shifted to, or permitted to remain, at a point far below the level justifiable on the basis of the present demand for agricultural produce. And wherever such conditions prevail (and they seem to prevail not only in the case of our export products like cotton and oilseeds, but also in the purely home-consumed products like rice and wheat) the conclusion is obvious that this part of agricultural industry is run at a loss, which has naturally to be liquidated either by a reduction in wages where it is possible, or by the income of the community from the other channels. Viewed from this angle it should be possible to explain the phenomenon of

agricultural indebtedness, with the exorbitantly high rates of interest at one end of the scale and the losses sustained by the moneylenders and ejections of landowners at the other (the moneylenders on the whole making no more gains than the returns of the ordinary market rate) as an illustration of the fact that the high rates are a premium paid by the community to insure the prosecution of the cultivation on sub-marginal acres. The restoration of profitability of agriculture therefore, is as important a necessity as industrial planning itself.

Taking this as the end of agricultural policy it should be planned to be realised through the intervention of the state, firstly in making possible a more rational distribution of the produce of agriculture, secondly by trying to restore a proper quantitative proportion between the factors engaged in agriculture and thirdly by harmonising our agricultural production to the needs of the world market and those of our own industries.

A more rational system of wealth distribution as between rents, interests, profits and wages is an essential prerequisite of agricultural planning. From the standpoint of economic theory, in the existing circumstances, owing to the free working of competitive forces, an increase in population, not in itself enormous, but unaccompanied by proportionate increases in the other agents of production, has tended to reduce the marginal productivity of labour relatively to that of the other factors; and this in turn contributed to a deterioration of the conditions of agricultural wages and made the position of the rent, interest and profit making classes relatively favourable. To the extent to which it is due to this cause, it will tend to disappear with a restoration of proportions appropriate to an optimum.

condition. But pending the realisation of that stage which is undeniably a matter of time some kind of intervention by the State in the matter of controlling rents and interest rates is necessary. The debt legislation schemes of the various provinces and the tenancy legislations are the essential first stages to a system of agricultural reorganisation, although these legislations leave much room for scientific improvement in matters of principle as well as detail. But, at the same time, the amount of pother that is made even in regard to the ridiculously moderate provisions of these bills (e. g. the agitation against the Bombay tenancy legislation) and the frantic search for means of nullifying their effectiveness (e. g. the sabotaging attempts being made against the Madras debt-relief bill, in all probability by the aggrieved "patriots" themselves, belonging to the rentier classes) indicates the amount of probable resistance that will have to be faced by governments that mean business; and this might even enable us to appreciate the difficulties of planning seeking to approximate to the objectives of theoretical analysis through the tortuous slowness of democratic higgling.

Next to this a much more important problem of agricultural reorganisation is the restoration of the proportions between various factors in a manner approximating to conditions of optimum production. In the case of labour as a factor of production the difficulty is that it is much in excess of the probable optimum level, and very inefficient at that and one way of mitigating it is by increasing its equipment with the other factors. But in the existing political and economic circumstances this objective cannot possibly be achieved to the necessary extent; and for this reason the surplus labour problem will have to be tackled through an active population policy; and the problem of its efficiency has to be tackled through a stimulation of the causes contributing to efficiency of which education, general and technical is one. To a small extent, no doubt the same result may be expected to flow from the withdrawing of population from land as a consequence of industrial development. In regard to capital as the next important factor in production, the problem does not seem to be that it is inadequate, as is mistakenly argued some times; on the contrary it is excessive in the sense that capital being shy to enter industry has tended to seek a haven in agriculture, and over-capitalisation in land values has to be tackled both for the relief of agriculture from this incubus, and for ensuring an even flow of capital into industries that await development, through measures modifying the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act in relation to its application to land. If land is made inalienable on account of debt transactions a great attraction for the flow of undesirable

capital into agriculture may be stopped. But the real problem of capital in this industry is its inefficiency, and relatively to this its expensiveness, which adds to the costs of production. The inefficiency of capital and some part of its expensiveness may be avoided by modernising it wherever possible, and by destroying all that exists as surplus to the needs of the industry, as in the case of cattle which are believed to be heavily in excess and are a drag on the efficiency of the useful part of them. But all its expensiveness cannot be done away with so long as agriculture remains a losing concern, because the losses of capital in the maintenance of the loss-sustaining part of the industry will be made good by the expensiveness of its availability in the other channels. Nor should it be expected that such modernisation will not result in fresh problems. The one obvious outcome of it would be a tremendous economy in the quantity of labour that is required; and this might almost become a staggering problem, for it must be admitted that a rationalisation of agricultural equipment and the present scale of employment cannot co-exist. Nor can this modernisation be avoided, without at the same time condemning labour to the present standards of wages. It is a paradox, and the solution for it is to be sought, perhaps not so much in withholding improvements as in improving organisation as a factor in production. Here the improvements in marketing organisation and the stimulation of certain lines of demand which at present either do not exist or exist feebly (for example, the demand for dairy products) will be of some small help. But a more fundamental search should be to evolve an organised system of production (e. g. on co-operative lines) in all its stages, which will enable the use of modern capital without dislocating agricultural employment, to the same extent as under an individualist scheme of production. Suitable incentives for the development of co-operative schemes of production may be offered through concessions in land revenue for co-operatively cultivated areas with some higher rates for other lands.

But simultaneously with all these changes it is also necessary to keep in mind the trends of the international and national market conditions and through a proper system of crop-planning and restriction schemes co-ordinate production with the trends of demand. Wherever possible the co-ordinated development of industry and agriculture should be the aim, as such integration enables a greater stability in the market conditions and offers a great facility in the control of trade fluctuations. Self-sufficiency, to the degree economically desirable should be aimed at, and it should be advocated not on the basis of the sheepish pleading that every pie of our purchase abroad is a loss to us and a gain to the foreigner (a

(fallacious argument of mercantilist superstition) but on the ground that the deliberate choice of the restrictions of the scope of international division of labour is indispensable in the present phase of economic nationalism (as is recognised by the free-trade-minded Britain with all her subsidies for the uneconomic agricultural industries), and on the further ground that stability of market conditions is preferable to prosperity with fluctuations—a principle which is also accepted by Great Britain as being the basis of the policy framed at Ottawa. But with all this for a long time to come, the nature and extent of the foreign trade of India will have to remain as at present and the fostering of this line of our economic activity should form an important aspect of our planning.

This leads naturally to a consideration of the principles of commercial planning. In this matter as also in the planned control of the trade cycle, the reform of the tax system to effect a more rational distribution of wealth and in the branch of social legislation, the centre and the provinces will have to act as one; and the certainty of the impossibility of this co-operation, naturally, will not make us enthusiastic in the formulation of principles the execution of which is well nigh impossible. Even under a federal scheme one might easily apprehend the possibility of a spontaneous emergence of co-operation between the various conservative elements, so as to prevent much effective reform of this variety, pending the inauguration of a more democratic control on the basis of a widened franchise. Till that time, perhaps it will be necessary that we should keep our planning in this direction in the cold storage. But within certain limits, even in this matter the provincial governments can make some contributions. In the matter of taxation particularly, if taxation is treated by them as a powerful instrument in securing the ends of economic justice and not as a mere source of revenue to the government, they might utilise such direct sources of revenue as lie in their hand like the agricultural income tax and death duties to bring about some kind of distributional reform. Further, if the decree of the federal court in respect of sales taxes were to come out favourably to the provinces, a fair measure of taxation on the sales of all luxury goods may help in the direction of tax reform. But here again there is the other consideration, no less important than that of tax reform, that if too great an element of progression in these taxes were introduced it might affect adversely the rate of capital accumulation, so urgently needed in this country. For this reason the ends of distributional justice may have to be sacrificed temporarily if it is necessary in the interests of future. If, however, there is reason to believe that such accumulation is not freely entering industry, or is not entering those lines of industry that may be sponsored by the industrial plan, there is every justification for such taxes being levied at as high

a rate of progression as practicable, and the proceeds may be made available through state aided industrial banks in the form of loans to industry, instead of being used to subsidise schemes of social welfare.

Similarly the control of the trade cycle and the framing of a uniform code of social legislation are important, but planning here may have to wait and this is bound to be a hindrance in the effectiveness of the other plans. But in the realm of industrial and agricultural planning much preliminary spade work is possible, and the development of some measure of economic strength is in itself an important consideration; for in these matters, strength like weakness is cumulative, and with one step advanced, the achievement of the other would be made easier. It is with this caution in mind, rather than in any great hope, that the task is to be approached. If nothing else, even if we were to succeed in creating a convention for planning and to help to establish a tradition for the creation of an expert body for prior consultation by governments, it would be no mean achievement. After all, it must be remembered that planning in its comprehensive sense is not practicable in the existing conditions of our political life. Still, there is an undoubted advantage in calling it planning, because there is certainly much more in a name than mere noise.

(Concluded.)

P. S. NARAYAN PRASAD.

Correspondence.

VIDURASWATHA TRAGEDY

TO THE EDITOR, THE SERVANT OF INDIA.

DEAR SIR.—My attention has been drawn to your issue of November 24, 1938, where, at page 583, in the course of your remarks on the Viduraswatha tragedy, you have stated as follows:—

"We are surprised that the President of the Mysore Civil Liberties Union should have advocated preventive measures at Viduraswatha."

On the 24th instant I issued a press statement, extracts from which have been published in "The Madras Mail" and "The Hindu" of the 25th instant. In that statement I drew the attention of the public to the manner in which my arguments have been twisted out of their context and how there have been mis-statements of facts in the Report of the Committee. The extract from paragraph 129 of the Committee's Report, on the basis of which the above remarks have been made in your journal, is one such example of how my arguments have been twisted. It is not even a case of the Devil quoting the Scripture; it is the case of the Devil quoting something which is not in the Scripture but alleged to be in the Scripture.

From the way in which paragraph 129 of the Committee's Report is worded, I think you would be justified in making the above remarks and, indeed, have every right to be surprised if the President of the Civil Liberties Union, who ought to advocate and uphold the right and

liberty of persons to congregate, hold meetings and deliver speeches, should be made to appear as though he suggested the contrary.

What really happened is this: In the course of my arguments, as an Advocate for the public, I, basing my inference on unimpeachable documentary and oral evidence, developed a theme to the effect that the tragedy which occurred at Viduraswatha on 25-4-1938, was a "wanton sabotage" and had been premeditated. As part of the arguments in this connection, I drew the attention of the Committee to the fact that the evidence disclosed the placing of police pickets all round the area in the initial stages and that these police pickets were subsequently withdrawn, thereby allowing the crowd to gather in numbers with the object of dealing with the crowd with physical force after the day's business was over. I also drew the attention to the fact that the processions were marching and they were all expressly allowed to gather. I wound up my arguments by remarking that if it was the object of the authorities to prohibit the crowd from gathering in that place at all and did not desire to see that they gathered there with a view subsequently to use physical force against them, why did they not adopt the preventive action of seeing that the crowd did not gather? In other words, by attempting to disperse the crowd before it swelled in numbers? On the other hand, I argued that the evidence disclosed that they purposely allowed the crowd to gather in large numbers, waited till the day's business was over, sent away the Congress leaders and the Congress people and then wantonly inflicted the lathi charge and subsequently opened fire. This, in my opinion, would be premeditation.

It was all, as you will see from what I have stated, a development of an argument and there was no question of the right to hold meetings or the propriety of using preventive measures to curtail such a right. You will understand how my argument has been twisted and, what is

worse, the suggestion of a repressive measure like the Criminal Law Amendment Act has been made as one method of taking preventive action. I do not know whether I should call this kind of twisting ingenuity or disingenuousness on the part of the Committee. I may tell you frankly that I am not in favour (and have publicly stated so) of the retention and application of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in Madras and especially under Congress Ministry.

I endorse what you say regarding the inexpediency of such a measure. I hope the above statement will convince you that what indeed caused and would cause a surprise to you in view of paragraph 129 of the Committee's Report is really due to misapprehension or misunderstanding, if not misreading, of my arguments.

I shall be thankful to you if you can publish my contradiction in your esteemed journal.

Bangalore City,
Nov. 27th 1938.

Yours faithfully,
L. S. RAJU.

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- ELEMENTS OF CIVICS. By R. P. PATWARDHAN. (Oxford University Press.) 1938. 18cm. 102p. Re. 1-4.
- DHARMAKOSA. Ed. By LAXMANSHASTRI JOSHI (Prajna Patha Shala Mandal, Wai.) 1937. 27cm. 598 + 84 + 72p.
- KOLHAPUR ADMINISTRATION REPORT, 1936-37. (Official, Kolhapur.) 1937. 218 + 117p. Rs. 3.
- THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS IN 1937. By WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON in collaboration with William D. Scroggs. (Harper.) 1938. 23cm. 338p. 12/6.
- SLUMPS AND RECOVERY, 1929-1937. A Survey of World Economic Affairs. By H. V. HODSON. (Oxford University Press.) 1938. 23cm. 484p. 10/6.
- MARXISM AND MODERN THOUGHT. By N. L. BUKHARIN, A. M. DEBORIN etc. (Routledge.) 1935. 22cm. 342p. 10/6.

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