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Topics of the Week.

The Munshi Secret Circular.

AN adjournment motion was proposed by Mr. Jamnadas Mehta on the first day of the Legislative Assembly in Bombay to discuss the secret circular of the Home Department which ordered Government patronage to be given to the *Lokashakti*, a Congress newspaper and printing press, and cast an aspersion on other Marathi newspapers that they were flirting with violence. The Speaker, however, disallowed this motion, as he did other motions on questions like the application of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 144 of the Cr. P. C., on the ground that, since debates on these questions could be raised by moving resolutions, adjournment motions would not be permissible. It was pointed out to him that if in every case members must take a chance of the ballot, many questions of urgent public importance involving serious aspects of Government's policy, the legislature would, in effect, be deprived of a valuable right by exercise of which Government could be criticised and censured. The Speaker promised to give further consideration to this point and after about a week's profound cogitation stuck to his former ruling that Mr. Jamnadas's adjournment motion could not be moved!

AFTER the ruling was given, the Premier asked for permission to offer the Ministry's explanation about the *Lokashakti* circular, to which very properly Mr. Jamnadas raised an objection. The adjournment motion being disallowed, the circular was removed out of the scope of discussion, and neither justification nor condemnation of the circular was then possible. Mr. Jamnadas pointed out that an explanation by the Ministry would be contrary to the Speaker's ruling,

and in any case that if an explanation was to be permitted, criticism of it also must in fairness be permitted—a perfectly valid and irrefragable argument. The Speaker, however, in spite of his ruling that the adjournment motion was not in order and that, therefore, by implication, the House was not seized of the question, allowed the Premier to make an explanatory statement, but at the same time forbade other members to criticise it. A more flagrant breach of the rules cannot be imagined. The ruling not merely made it possible to hush up a scandal, but enabled a one-sided explanation to be offered, preventing any criticism from being made on the floor of the House. The Speaker fell into a similar error when he allowed the Premier to move a motion on federation this session to the same effect as an amendment which had been discussed in the previous session and which, by an inexcusable discretion on the part of the Premier, was voted down by the Congress members. But here the fault, consisted in permitting a discussion on a subject which had been discussed before, and the members did not much mind it; on the present occasion however the fault consisted first in preventing discussion and then allowing it only on one side, resulting in gross partiality to the Ministry.

THE Premier's explanation itself was most disappointing. We know that he had to atone for the sins of Mr. Munshi and had to do vicarious penance, as it were, but being in the same Ministry with him, we had a right to expect a full expiation from Mr. Kher. However, in fencing on this most unseemly affair as he did, he gave a dodging reply which failed to do justice to his own generous nature. He made it appear as if objection could be taken to the phrasing of the circular and not to its intention. Even in regard to the phrasing, while admitting that it was unfortunately worded, he threw the blame for the clear implication it conveys not on Mr. Munshi—there is internal evidence to prove that he was the author of the circular and not the Home Secretary whose signature it bears—but on the "hostile critics" who have read into the circular a different meaning. Instead of casting a reflection on "a number" of Marathi newspapers, "hostile critics" made out that the Ministry cast a reflection on all Marathi newspapers and thus were guilty of a "sweeping generalisation." This is the charge which the Premier makes against "hostile critics," while whitewashing a circular of such a vile character that he should have promptly revoked and expressed the Ministry's unreserved regret for it. Is it justifiable for the Ministry to cast a serious reflection on "a number" of Marathi newspapers instead of on "all"? And if the *Lokashakti* is not "the only exception" but "a notable exception" to newspapers flirting with violence, how does it become deserving of Government patronage to the exclusion of other papers? If Mr. Munshi did not "single out" the *Lokashakti* as a newspaper devoted to non-violence,

how could he single it out as a paper to which Government advertisements and Government printing work should be given?

THE principle on which the Kher Ministry gives official advertisements to newspapers and official printing work to printing presses was not as much adverted to in the Premier's explanation, but it does require explanation. For the Ministry's press communique of 28th August last on the subject says:

They (the Government of Bombay) have directed that in future the insertion of official advertisements in newspapers and the entrusting of Government work to printing presses should be regulated *entirely* by considerations of the value received for the money paid.

In the open communique the Ministry says that Government will be guided in the matter only by commercial considerations, and that the policy of the editors of newspapers or of the owners of printing presses will not enter as a factor in the distribution of patronage. In the secret circular (we can well understand the reason for secrecy) it says that it will give weight primarily to whether the editors and owners are addicted to non-violence or not. Mr. Kher did not feel called upon—and by the obliging nature of the Speaker was not compelled—to explain the discrepancy in the policy proclaimed in public and the policy practised in secret. Is even the secret policy adhered to? If non-violence is to be the criterion, Government patronage should be distributed equally (subject to the rule of value to be received of which mention is made in the communique) between all editors of newspapers and owners of printing presses who are devoted to non-violence. Or does the Ministry consider the *Lokashakti* paper and press to be so non-violent *par excellence* that others may for all practical purposes be called violent? If so, the "hostile critics" are not far wrong in reading in the circular a meaning which Mr. Kher so hotly repudiates. So far as Mr. Munshi is concerned, the only manner in which he has shown his predilection for non-violence is by violently suppressing workers, lawful movements and by his violent partiality for Congress papers and presses in the distribution of official patronage.

MAKING full allowance for political exigencies, we must say that Mr. Kher has very much lowered himself in the estimation of the people. Irrespective of political affiliations, all regard him as one who stands unflinchingly for a clean Government. It is not wise of him to fritter away this great moral asset which he commands, as, very much to our surprise and regret, he has done on the present occasion. The reputation of his Government is now tarnished.

Local Option for Muslims.

THE action of the Muslim Leaguers in the Bombay Legislative Assembly in walking out on the 22nd inst. is most deplorable and unwarranted. The Bombay Local Boards Act of 1923 provided for separate communal electorates for the Muslims. In the draft bill to amend the Act, the present Congress Government of Bombay proposed to retain the separate electorates for Muslims, but to insert at the same time a clause to give the Muslims in a constituency, if they so chose, the right to abolish separate electorates and have joint electorates with reservation of seats. According to the Government, some prominent Muslim Leaguers, who had been consulted at an early stage, had consented to the proposal. But, later, the Muslim Leaguers in the Legislative Assembly walked out in protest against the proposal.

IT was open to the Government to have proposed in the first instance to abolish separate electorates and institute joint electorates. Constitutionally, they were free to propose it. It would not have contravened the Communal Award, which did not refer to the local bodies. The Congress was deeply committed to joint electorates and it was returned to power by a large majority. The present Acts relating to local bodies in Bengal and Madras provide for joint electorates; the Muslim Premiers of the Punjab and Sind are attempting to introduce joint electorates in their respective Provinces, and there are not a few Muslims who favour joint electorates not only in local bodies but in the legislatures as well. The local bodies dealt with matters which do not affect the religious rights of the communities. For all these reasons, the Government would have been perfectly justified in abolishing separate electorates altogether. It is unlikely that the Governor would have vetoed the provision on the ground of his special responsibilities to the minorities. If he had, there would have been a deadlock and the Ministry might have resigned, and in view of the Congress majority in the legislature, the Governor would have found it difficult to form another ministry which enjoyed the confidence of the legislature. The Governor would have been put in the wrong in sustaining separate and undemocratic electorates.

THE Government, however, took a different line and started with a compromise, in the sense that the voters themselves were to determine whether they should vote in joint or separate electorates. The Government's compromise proposal is unexceptional. The Government felt that here was a proposal to which nobody who cherished democracy would object, and they were encouraged by the consent given in advance by some prominent Muslim Leaguers. But in the end the Muslim Leaguers would have none of it; they insisted that even those Muslims who were opposed to separate electorates should be compelled to submit to them.

THE Government have retained the optional clause. In view of the intransigence of the Muslim League, the clause will not be an agreed measure. When it is brought into operation, the communalists and the nationalists will fight bitterly to persuade the Muslims to retain or abandon separate electorates. Will the consequences of the optional clause, so far as displeasing the Muslims is concerned, be any different than if the Government had themselves abolished separate electorates altogether? The Muslim League's agitation would not have been more bitter, but the right thing would have been done, and that would have been some compensation. As it is, with the optional clause, the likelihood of separate electorates giving place to joint electorates seems somewhat remote. There will be all the agitation and estrangement, but without compensation. For, if Muslim agitation succeeds, the optional clause would become inoperative, and the separate electorates would be maintained in their integrity.

Federal Scheme in the U. P. Assembly.

A MEMBER of the Muslim League, Mr. Mubashir Hussain Kidwai, moved in the Legislative Assembly of the United Provinces the following resolution which was accepted by the Ministry, supported by Sir Maharaj Singh on behalf of the Indian Christian community and passed unanimously:

This Assembly recommends to the Government to intimate to the Central Government its firm resolve to be no party to the inauguration of the proposed federation.

This Assembly further recommends that no money should be spent out of the provincial revenues and no arrangements should be made by the Provincial Government in connection with the inauguration of the federal scheme, whether in the matter of holding elections to the Federal Legislature or in any other matter connected therewith.

* * *

ALL the speakers who took part in the debate condemned the federal scheme in unmeasured terms, and they went through the whole gamut of objections: dyarchy in the Central Government, the wide range of the Governor-General's special powers, virtual denial of control over finance and currency, commercial discrimination, indirect elections to the Assembly, co-equal powers of the Council of State and what not, but special stress was laid on provisions concerning the States. The mover said:

Though the official bloc had been removed a very reactionary bloc, the States, had found a place in the legislature. He pointed out that the Muslim League had definitely passed a resolution that only States having a representative form of government should be represented on the federal legislature.

Mr. Zahirul Husain Lari said:

It was a federation of democratic provinces and autocratic States, which was indefensible in theory and wrong in practice. Representatives of Indian States were to be selected by the Rulers who were under the thumb of Political Department officials. In the two Houses the States would have in all 229 representatives. They would serve the purpose of the official bloc.

* * *

MR. ALGU RAI SHASTRI (Congress) said:

The Federation scheme was designed to strengthen the reactionary elements in the country. There was no doubt that the representatives of the States would be more reactionary than the present nominated bloc in the Central Assembly. Among the present nominated members one could expect a man of the type of Mr. Joshi who would take a progressive view of things. But he could say with certainty that without one exception all the representatives of the States would be reactionary.

The federal scheme evolved ostensibly for unifying India was in fact devised to create disunity amongst the Indian nation by means of creating vested interests and thus to establish foreign rule on a sounder and more permanent basis.

Acharya Narendra Deo (Congress) said:

The federal scheme was designed to strengthen the reactionary forces in the country. There were States who would always retard the march of progress. The forces of nationalism were getting too strong in British India. So they had brought in the Indian States to combat the forces of nationalism.

The Premier, Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, said:

A federation presupposed equality of citizenship. So far as British India was concerned there was a sort of equality of citizenship. But in the Indian States there was no equality of citizenship. Therefore, the combination of Indian India and British India could never be justified. ... The British Government could not have created a stronger machinery to strengthen the reactionary forces than the present one.

* * *

NEVER was so much rancour exhibited on the floor of a legislative house over a matter about which there was complete unanimity. This was due to the Muslim League and the Congress vying with one another in denouncing the scheme and fending it off, and, in

the event of its being imposed, resisting it. The members of the Muslim League said: "The Congress is no doubt pledged to combating federation, but there is widespread fear that the Congress would combat it only in the way in which it was combating so-called provincial autonomy. In order that no room should be given for any possible weakening on the question of federation, the Ministry ought to undertake that no arrangements should be made in the province for holding federal elections or for a similar purpose." The Congress members said in return: "We are firm and shall continue the fight, but can we count on the Muslim League's support?" Mr. Pant said that federation could not be combated merely by not voting provincial supplies for federal purposes or by not holding federal elections and so forth, but stronger measures were required. Acharya Narendra Deo assured the Muslim Leaguers that the Congress would resort to civil disobedience if it became necessary to prevent federation. Mrs. Uma Nehru said that the Congress was prepared to fight to the finish.

* * *

IN spite of these exchanges, all the members were agreed that, as Mr. Zahirul Husain Lari put it, the federal scheme was the graveyard of India's hopes and aspirations, and that it was a trap, deep and ingenious, laid by the British Government to catch and imprison all nationalist elements.

* * *

Home Reactions.

The Congress Socialist has some pretty plain things to say about the official Congress attitude towards the Kisan Sabhas in Behar. With the acceptance of offices, the Congress Socialist says, the dominant section in the Congress has ceased to go forward against imperialism with a militant mass movement. On the other hand, their position as members of Government compels the Ministers to suppress any such militant movement. The paper accuses the Congress not only of open hostility, but of subtle moves to sabotage the Kisan movement. "Eager to ignore class differences and class-conflicts these 'true Congressmen' seek to confuse national and class organizations. The capitulatory policy implicit in the present parliamentary 'line' of the Congress demands the curbing, ultimately the crushing, of the peasants."

* * *

THE Congress Socialist's article gives point to the recent declaration of Mr. Jaiprakash Narain, a leading light of Congress socialism, that if events continue to shape in the direction which the present official Congress attitude indicates, he may have to go out of the Congress. The Behar Kisans have brought matters to a head, and the fundamental contradictions between the ideology of the Congress mass movement and its position as the Government of the country are revealed by the schisms which threaten to disrupt its solidarity. The official organ of the Congress Socialist Party does not only protest against the persecution of the Kisan Sabhas, but asks that the parliamentary security of the Congress must not be allowed to destroy its spear-head, viz., the Kisan agitation.

* * *

Says the Congress Socialist:

The Congress has suddenly made a volte face, and decided to launch an offensive against the Kisan Sabha, because the Congress policy of office-acceptance has been interpreted by the influential section of Congressmen as one of settling down to work the Constitution. The mass pressure and extra-parliamentary activities that are vigorous

to a Ministry bent on wrecking tactics become inconvenient to a Cabinet eager to "govern."

Mass pressure is welcome for a forward policy. If the Congress Ministers were anxious to usher radical measures and dare a clash with imperialism if need be, they would have welcomed, perhaps organised, such a pressure. But the Ministers prefer to tinker with ameliorative measures—measures which compel the holding back of the masses. The Kisan Sabha wielding the lever of mass mobilisation thus becomes obnoxious. The Congress to-day can avert a fight with imperialism, can ignore the growing abyss between the classes only by liquidating extra-parliamentary activities.

* * *

EVEN Congress papers realise that the split between 'orthodox' Congressmen and the radicals in its ranks is inevitable. But they desire that 'for expediency's sake' both the wings should stick together for the time being. Thus the *Amrit Bazaar Patrika* says:

But we say it is only *probable*, for in our opinion the difference between them does not rest so much on the issue whether the Kisan leaders are actually preaching violence which is against the very creed of the Congress, as on a divergence in outlook and ideology of the parties. And so long as this will remain the case, friction between them will occasionally arise even on the flimsiest of grounds. It is, therefore, necessary in the real interest of the country which both the Kisan and orthodox Congress leaders hold dearest to their hearts that both the parties should realise that expediency requires them to work together from the same platform at the present stage, even though they feel a tendency to move apart from each other. The Congress is the most influential political organisation in the country commanding the allegiance of the maximum number of our people. Its ideal and programme may not be to the entire liking of the most radical elements in the land. But it is unquestionable that they are infinitely more anti-imperialistic than those of any other influential organisation. Political wisdom, therefore, demands that everybody who wants to strengthen the forces against imperialism should sink his minor differences with the Congress and rally round its banner without weakening it in any way.

Where the *Patrika* misses the point is when it considers the differences between the Kisan and the Congress officials as minor differences. Had they been so, Babu Rajendra Prasad would never have been so vehement in his denunciation of them.

* * *

Minority Representation in the Cabinet.

AN important pronouncement was made by the Governor of Bombay, Sir Roger Lumley, when replying to an address presented to him by the Anjuman-e-Islam of Bijapur who objected to the inclusion in the Bombay Ministry of Mr. Nurie who, though a Mahomedan, is not selected by the Muslim League or by the Mahomedans generally. The Governor's reply was:

You have stated that the appointment of a Muhammadan Minister who is not a selected representative of the Muhammadan community is contrary to the spirit of the Government of India Act and the Instrument of Instructions. I am glad you have raised this point as I believe that the view is held by many of your community, and I welcome this opportunity of stating the facts.

Your view is not correct and there is nothing in the Act or in the Instrument which enables the Governor to insist that the Minister who represents a minority is to be a person selected by that minority. I have authority to require that a person belonging to the minority community shall be one of the Ministers, but I have no authority to insist that the community shall have voice in the selection.

That is the position, and I should be going counter to the injunction contained in the Instruction to encourage joint responsibility of the Ministry, if I were to insist upon the appointment of one who might not be willing to work harmoniously with them.

* * *

Ceylon Governor's Special Powers.

WHILE the people of Ceylon have been carrying on a ceaseless agitation for the substitution of responsible government for the system of committee government installed by the constitution of 1931 and while the whole question of constitutional reform is under consideration, an Order-in-Council has been issued giving to the Governor larger powers of overriding the State Council than he possesses at present. Under the existing constitution the Governor could normally intervene in all matters affecting defence, external affairs, the interests of British subjects outside Ceylon and the rights of the public service. These were, so to say, reserved subjects, but in addition the Governor was given power to secure the passage of any bill or a vote of supply by declaring that such passage was "of paramount importance." In the event of the Governor's declaration, to be made by a message to the Speaker, the subject-matter of the declaration was to have precedence over all other business, and irrespective of the attitude of members of the State Council, the declaration was to take effect. But a discussion in the State Council was unavoidable.

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THE special power of the Governor was not exercised with due restraint. A liberal interpretation was given to matters of paramount importance, and on questions like the abolition of minor posts the Governor used his certification power. The former Governor, Sir Edward Stubbs, sought to certify increases of salaries to subordinate police officials. In order to circumvent the exercise of this sweeping arbitrary power, members of the State Council repeatedly raised points of order on the subject, thus thwarting the reading of the Governor's message. The British Government, without paying attention to popular objections to the unjustified use of special powers, has now strengthened these powers by issuing a new Order-in-Council under which the previous requirement about reading the message is obviated. The Governor's declaration that a bill or a vote of supply is necessary in the interests of "public order, public faith or other essentials of good government" (a wider and more elastic formula now substituted for "paramount importance") shall take effect as soon as the message relating to it is delivered at the State Council, whether it is actually read or not.

* * *

PUBLIC opinion in Ceylon is hot with indignation at the promulgation of this Order-in-Council. The Board of Ministers is entirely at one with non-official opinion, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the State Council could be dissuaded from passing a resolution "not to transact any business until the Board of Ministers has the Order-in-Council repealed." The debate on the resolution has been postponed for a month, and the Board of Ministers has already recorded its protest against the Order and asked for its revocation. There is no reason why Mr. Ormsby-Gore should not consent to a re-examination of the special powers of the Governor along with other features of the constitution, but it is really too much to expect that the Colonial Secretary will be willing to show even this slight regard to popular wishes.

* * *

AN APOLOGIA FOR FEDERATION.

THE Marquess of Lothian may well be regarded as a spokesman of the Imperial Government for the most important, and really the only worthwhile, statement that he made before he made his departure from India, viz. that the Government would not be willing to reconsider the situation even if British India was found to be genuinely opposed to the federal scheme. Lord Lothian is convinced—and this may be held to be the view of the British Government also—that “there is real and vehement opposition” to the scheme. In spite of this the Government is prepared to thrust federation upon the country. Lord Lothian has persuaded himself that the federal constitution will be for the immense good of India and wishes to communicate this faith of his to Indians. But, in face of the irrevocable decision that the Government has apparently taken, it seems fruitless to examine the reasons advanced by Lord Lothian why Indians should lay aside their objections and prepare themselves to work the scheme cheerfully and loyally. This is most regrettable, for we had hoped that Lord Lothian’s visit to this country was occasioned by the realisation on the part of the British statesmen, official and unofficial, of the fearful consequences that would befall not only India but the whole Empire in the event of a hated constitution being imposed upon British India and of the necessity of at least holding up the federal scheme till she was reconciled to it. To say to British India, “You are going to have this constitution, whether you like it or not,” is not the best way to get her to like it; and however persuasive Lord Lothian might be, we are sure that in the situation confronting us his advice, well-meant as it certainly is, has no chance of being considered on its merits, and let us add our frank opinion that, on its merits, the advice is totally unacceptable and the reasoning fallacious from beginning to end.

We cannot challenge too strongly the assumption which underlies the whole statement that a federation, however full of anomalies and imperfections it may be, is the only salvation for India. “It is the only method”, he says, “whereby India can escape the calamities and wars which have overtaken Europe through its division into 26 sovereign States.” This observation has not the merit of even a verisimilitude, and yet Lord Lothian made it at so many gatherings and amplified and elaborated it on so many occasions that it must be regarded as something different from a specious argument one uses when one has taken a brief for a hopelessly bad case. Lord Lothian’s reasoning is in short as follows: “The League of Nations, an institution founded for the purpose of preventing war, is unable to achieve its end, because it is only a collection of sovereign States, each free to take its own decision in the event of an unprovoked aggression by one country against another. In the case of an invasion of Abyssinia by Italy, the League could only, after unconscionable delay, decide upon some mild economic sanctions; more drastic economic sanctions were not even

discussed for fear that no agreement could be reached about them, and, if reached, no action would be taken upon them, for military sanctions would perhaps have to follow upon such action. In the Sino-Japanese war the League could not go beyond condemning Japan in measured terms; no kind of sanctions was thought of. The root of the trouble lies in the retention by the State members of their full rights of sovereignty, which makes it impossible for them to take common action against an aggressor. Until these autarchies are swept away and the nations of the world realise the dire necessity for association and companionship by surrendering their sovereignty to a super-State which can take final decisions for all the countries, war will not cease. As Europe and the world must seek international unity in a federation of Europe and the world, so must India seek national unity in an all-India federation. Otherwise, anarchy and war will break out everywhere.” This is no fanciful picture of what Lord Lothian repeated in almost every place. At Aligarh he said: “India will go down to a worse hell than that in which Europe finds itself to-day and for the same reasons. Federation is the essential condition of her ordered progress to whatever goal her inner genius may lead her.”

Why raise such nightmares before India in order to frighten her into accepting federation? The whole military power in the country, both in British India and the Indian States, is controlled by the Government of India. The League of Nations, as he would have it reconstructed, would, we suppose, have an international air force, contributed in certain quotas by all the States, for the purpose of putting down an aggressor country. In India, without federation, the whole defence forces of the country are at the disposal of the Central Government. What change is federation going to effect in this position? The provinces have admittedly no authority in this matter, and the States, whatever degree of internal autonomy, they may enjoy, have all, without a single exception, surrendered their control over defence and external affairs to the British Government. The Government of India is the only authority which takes decisions on matters involving war and has full power, without as much as consultation with any other body, to take action on them. Is there any analogy here between a divided Europe and a unified and centralised India? Where then is the point in saying that unless a federation was hastily patched up, India would be the scene of a more horrible blood-bath than threatens Europe? We think it would give a shock to Lord Lothian if we told him that, even in civil matters, there would be no greater unity in India as a result of federation than at present. For the Indian States are not sovereign States, though they may be so called by British diplomats for courtesy’s sake. They are nothing like what the American States were before they federated together and formed the United States. The most important of the subjects of national concern they have already ceased to con-

trol, and it is these which they are now going to turn over to the federal government. There are some other subjects of all-India importance, control over which has still remained to them, like civil and criminal law and labour legislation; but no State is willing to give up control over these. Whatever sovereignty, therefore, still survives in the States will inhere in them even after federation. To put it in other words, there obtains already, over a large field of matters of all-India concern, a uniformity to secure which federation is usually resorted to. Greater uniformity than in fact now obtains will not be brought about as a result of federation. This clearly proves that, whatever other purpose federation may serve such as weighting the Central Legislature with conservative elements in the Indian community, it will not serve the main and only purpose of a federation, viz. achievement of greater unity. Lord Lothian has only to examine the federal legislative list in order to be convinced of this; it appears quite an imposing list consisting of some 47 subjects which it is possible for the States to give up to the federal legislature. The most important of these are: defence, external affairs, currency, posts and telegraphs, railways and ports, arms, opium, customs and salt. All these subjects have already passed out of the control of the States: they are not theirs to give away. Such of the States as retain a measure of control over some of them propose to retain it even after federation. Broadly speaking, therefore, it may be stated that federation is not required for the purpose of unity, and that if a greater unity is desired federation will not bring it. The Viceroy said on 13th September last in the Central Legislature, and Lord Lothian repeats it in his statement, that the anomalies inherent in this federation like the union of disparate units are "the necessary and inescapable incidents" of an attempt to achieve national unity. Since, however, no appreciable increase in unity can result from federation, we shall only have anomalies to our credit if we insist upon establishing federation.

The anomalies too will be permanent, so far as any constitutional action that we can take is concerned. Lord Lothian devotes a large portion of his long statement to a reiteration of the remark that the constitution, instead of being inelastic to the point of unamendability, is very flexible and fluid. The Indian legislature enjoys no constituent powers; the British Parliament must agree to every change in the constitution. All that Lord Lothian has to say about this is that things will work out very differently in practice. "Alterations in the constitution which a responsible ministry and legislature think necessary as representing the general consensus of the main elements of the people will be passed without serious opposition in Parliament." In the first place, the restrictions on the powers of the ministry will fall into desuetude in course of time by mere convention, and without any change in the constitution being required—"gradualness" in constitutional advance is, according to Lord Lothian, "a good thing" and "in the best interests of India"—and if a constitutional change is required, the British Parliament will not be obstructive but will say, "Go

ahead". With a man of such faith no argument is possible. Will Lord Lothian, who is so alarmed by the distracted condition of Europe, be reassured if we tell him: "All the countries of Europe will be quite prepared when the need is felt to surrender their sovereignty to the League. Of course, it is possible in the meantime to have just a few wars, but it is no use worrying too much about it. Peace will come in the end and war will be eliminated at no distant future"? Nor will the States, according to Lord Lothian, be an impediment. All the anomalies will automatically disappear when the States will be popularly governed, and the progress in that direction appears to his eyes to be very rapid. Will they in the meantime exercise a right of veto on constitutional amendment, rendering even the British Parliament impotent? The Princes, as Lord Lothian reads the constitution, have "no effective veto on the development of the constitution." We must say that this reading of the constitution must have come only recently to him, for on 1st July, 1935, he said in the House of Lords: "*It is clear that unless the States agree to certain kinds of amendments (these amendments extend to the whole sphere of the federal constitution affecting the States) it will be impossible for the constitution ever to develop without infringing the Instrument of Accession. . . . There are certain matters (i. e., all matters which affect the States at all) which cannot be altered without the assent of the Princes.*" If this is not *liberum veto*, we should like to know what it is. Lord Lothian cannot now make out that the Princes' veto does not exist without saying: "We cannot change the federal constitution, it is true, without infringing the Princes' Instruments of Accession, but we are going to infringe the Instruments in order to change the constitution. What will be the result of infringing the Instruments? Will the Princes walk out of the federation? They cannot. We can keep them in by force, and we are determined to do so." Is Lord Lothian really prepared to say so? And will it be playing fair to the Princes, to whom the British Government has promised to apply the Compact Theory of federation? It is neither fair nor possible, and the constitution is in fact not only difficult but incapable of amendment.

The least that the Imperial Government can do in the interest of maintaining peace in British India and securing her good-will is to postpone federation. It is often said that the opportunity which has now come for establishing federation will never recur; much less will a better federation be ever possible. Lord Linlithgow said in the speech above referred to: the anomalies "are the necessary and inescapable incidents, not merely of the introduction of an all-India federation at this movement, but of its introduction at any time within the measurable future." If democratisation of the Indian States is proceeding apace, as we are assured, and will reach fruition within a short time after federation, why not wait for this short time till the process of democratisation, of which we are told the tempo is so quick, is complete and then form federation so that there will be no anomalies in our constitu-

tion such as exist in no other federal constitution? Why are we to be told on the one hand that the Princes will never advance and on the other that they will advance at such a pace that they will give no room for any complaint on our part? The way in which British statesmen argue to whichever side advantage seems at the moment to lie for them is best illustrated by a change in their attitude towards the federation of British Indian provinces as a prelude to an all-India federation. Lord Lothian now discourages it. He points out many formidable constitutional objections to it. But where were these objections when the Simon Commission itself recommended it? We did not hear of them at all either from Lord Lothian or from any other British statesman. At that time that was the only practicable

solution of the Indian question. Now it has become not only a thoroughly impracticable but impossible solution. Why? Merely because the Princes have agreed to join, which did not seem likely then? But if the Princes make unreasonable terms, why should not a British Indian federation be regarded as at least one of the many alternatives that can be considered? However good the present federal scheme may appear to Britishers, it is clear that it appears totally bad to Indians; and this fact alone should be sufficient to make the Imperial Government scrap the scheme or at least hold it up till more Lord Lothians come and disabuse Indians of their misconception. But to impose upon them a constitution which they regard as loathsome and destructive of all their aspirations will have consequences too terrible to contemplate.

RESERVE BANK: FIRST DEPRESSIONS

THE worst fears entertained by Indian critics about the capacity of a pseudo-private corporation to discharge the duties of the premier currency and credit authority are now being realised. Section 55 (1) of the Reserve Bank Act enjoined that the Bank should report to Government not later than 31st December, 1937, as to what legislative measures are called for with a view to extending the provisions of the Act relating to scheduled banks to other persons and firms engaged in the business of banking. By another sub-clause the Bank was called upon to make proposals to improve the machinery of agricultural credit and to effect a closer connection between agricultural enterprise and the operations of the Reserve Bank. The authorities of the Reserve Bank waited almost till the last permissible day to make their proposals, which amount to a recommendation that no action should be taken by the Indian Government and Legislature to secure the ends that were implicit in the provisions of Section 55 above referred to.

In any country possessing either a State Reserve Bank or having a central banking institution whose counsels are decisively influenced by the nationals of the country, such a flouting of the implied, but by no means doubtful, instructions of the Legislature would have been impossible. But the Reserve Bank of India, immune both from the vitalising contact with the people of the country and from the control of a government responsible to the people, could afford to take up an attitude of detachment and superiority. In effect the 'proposals' that the authorities of the Bank have made consist of a good deal of advice addressed both to indigenous bankers and co-operative societies and a conclusion that, pending further reform of both these, nothing need be done by the legislature to facilitate the co-ordination of the activities of the Reserve Bank with these all-important agencies in Indian finance.

It is a matter of common knowledge that in the functioning of the co-operative institutions, especially the primary societies, sufficient caution has not been exercised in the past. The level of knowledge and experience available in most of the rural areas is inadequate for the conduct of what is essentially a

technical service. With the growth of experience and under watchful direction a definite improvement is visible in some of the provinces. The Registrars and their staffs have themselves lacked, in many cases, the necessary special training and experience. The vicissitudes through which the co-operative movement in India has passed since the World War have tried the strength of many more favourably situated banking institutions.

That part of the Reserve Bank's report which analyses the working of the co-operative societies and makes suggestions for their improvement will be welcomed by all co-operators. A greater concentration on short term credit, more caution in assessing the capacity for timely repayment and a more deliberate attempt at charging fair rates of interest so that adequate reserves might be built up, are all necessary reforms. The suggestion to split up the overdues and share their burdens as between the assets of the client, reserves of the society and loans from a land mortgage bank is worthy of more systematic adoption than is at present the case. The advice given to land mortgage banks themselves not to lend a disproportionate part of their total loans for the purpose of repaying old debts is a very pertinent reminder to the authorities of these banks. If in course of time we are not to be 'disillusioned' about these institutions, as we have now been about the co-operative societies, loans must be made primarily for a productive and a readily profitable purpose. Government departments concerned must co-operate by propaganda, advice and inspection. But caution and business efficiency must under no circumstances be sacrificed. If there are cases which no business institution, not even a co-operative society or a land mortgage bank, can meet, other more direct and drastic methods must be found to meet the situation. It is a wrong policy to endanger the solvency of credit institutions by misplaced ideas of sympathy and charity.

With all the sound advice that the Reserve Bank has tendered to them co-operators will concur. The financing of agriculture by ordinary banking institutions is possible only in the sphere of short term

credit. Here a greater development of collective and co-operative marketing is calculated to facilitate agricultural finance. Both cash credits and trade-bills are likely to be more readily acceptable if marketing is well organised. In fact many of these reforms are now being adopted in Bombay. What has now been prescribed by the Reserve Bank has been long apparent to the more watchful co-operators themselves. The Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank and most of the District Co-operative Banks in the presidency have been following a sound and enlightened policy. Nobody expects the Reserve Bank to lock up its resources either in long term or in doubtful investments, though even here the desirability of using a part of the annual profits for facilitating the adoption of a bolder policy might well be considered. For such of the banks as are doing good business and for the comparatively self-liquidating type of their transactions the Reserve Bank might extend its support without any impropriety or danger.

In fact the Reserve Bank of India Act contemplates such action on its part. The Bank is well within its rights in issuing statements as to the conditions under which it is prepared to do business with co-operative banks, and it is also welcome to make suggestions for the improvement of the co-operative banks in general. But by refusing assistance to all co-operative banks because some among them are of doubtful financial strength, the Reserve Bank has frustrated not only a legitimate expectation on the part of co-operative banks, but also the achievement of its elementary purpose of co-ordination of credit. Within the terms of the Reserve Bank Act itself a more helpful policy is possible, and it is to be hoped that the attitude outlined in the statutory report is no more than a friendly incentive to reform. An early co-ordination of Reserve Bank operations and the activities of at least the leading co-operative apex banks is badly needed.

With regard to indigenous bankers the Reserve Bank does well to distinguish between moneylenders and bankers. A registration of the former and a regulation of their practices is to be desired on many grounds. Already some provinces have adopted measures designed to reach this objective, and the rest are making haste to come in to line. The offer of the Reserve Bank, that it will be prepared to rediscount at special rates paper arising out of moneylenders' activity in financing the movement and marketing of produce, may well meet the urgent needs of the situation. With growing contact between moneylenders and the money market and with greater uniformity and regulation imparted to their activities the gulf between rural and urban finance may gradually be bridged.

The most surprising part of the statutory report is, however, that which deals with indigenous bankers. There are well-known difficulties in the handling of this problem. As the indigenous bankers do not primarily depend upon private deposits and as their deposits, such as they are, are not operated upon by cheque, there are obvious difficulties not only in assessing the credit of these agencies but also of influencing their transactions. The non-banking business

which most of them do is also inconsistent with their prospective role of a member bank. The methods of keeping account followed by the indigenous bankers are different from modern methods of accounting. In the absence of public auditing and published balance sheets the financial position of these bankers is always shrouded in some mystery. If we were writing on a clean slate or if we could afford to ignore our responsibilities of co-ordinating and guiding the credit policy of the country we would be ready to acquiesce in the Reserve Bank's conclusion that so long as an appreciable modernisation and improvement have not been brought about in these respects the facilities now given to member banks will not be extended to the indigenous bankers. If it is necessary for its own purposes, the Reserve Bank may, we are told, deal in the open hundi market.

Such an attitude of superiority and negation is open to many serious criticisms. It amounts, in the first place, to an unwarranted and unjustified withdrawal of an offer made to the indigenous bankers. The statutory report itself contains two replies from indigenous bankers to a letter addressed to them by the Reserve Bank. The reply of the Bombay Shroff Association clearly shows that the more enlightened among the old type banking businesses will be ready to regularise and modernise their methods if the Reserve Bank makes it worth their while to do so. Further correspondence, and perhaps a little more personal contact, were clearly indicated. In reporting that no scheme of incorporating the indigenous bankers in the system of organised credit is as yet feasible, the Reserve Bank has let down the more progressive among the indigenous bankers and has placed a premium on the type of banker whose communication is the other one printed in the report. By not taking the normal steps that would have led to a final settlement the Reserve Bank incurs the suspicion of not desiring a settlement except on its own terms.

It ought to be realised that it is at least as helpful to the purposes of the Reserve Bank as it is for those of the indigenous bankers that the gulf between the two should be effectively bridged. From their remarks in the report made to the Governor-General-in-Council it is not seen that they are conscious of this need. Well may Seth Fatichand Gokaldas inquire: "when people are doing business with their own capital, it is not understood why the Reserve Bank should have the entire control over the activities of the bankers alone." The Reserve Bank ought to show a greater appreciation of the position and difficulties of the indigenous bankers than is visible from the report. As regards the prospect of the Reserve Bank dealing in the open hundi market, it must be observed that such a direct operation has always been looked upon as exceptional. For a more effective and helpful co-ordination, established relationships by way of regular loans, discounts and deposits are necessary. The Reserve Bank, moreover, has not the ready access to the large hundi markets except in the principal currency centres. Even here the processes of banking business in the hundi market are not suitable to any large scale dealing by

the Reserve Bank. The urgent need of bringing the indigenous bankers within the scope of organised banking and of developing a more active bill market cannot be met by such doubtful expedients.

The Reserve Bank will be failing in one of its basic duties if it does not bring more sympathy and skill to bear upon its policy in these matters. Further negotiations along lines laid down in the correspondence that has hitherto passed between the Reserve Bank and representatives of indigenous bankers ought to be undertaken without loss of time. If at least the more enlightened among the indigenous bankers, the extent of whose real non-banking business is even now very limited, were made to realise the advantages of modernisation and of membership, a very promising

lead would be given to the rest. Systematic accounts and access to properly audited balance sheets has of course to be insisted upon. In view, however, of the recent tendency of bankers in all countries to expand their commercial investments, a more compromising attitude with regard to the Indian bankers' business might prove justifiable. The statutory report savours in many respects of the oft-mentioned trait of lack of imagination and sympathy from which the bureaucratic Government of India suffers. Partially dislodged from the political field, may not the same unhelpful attitude dominate the economic counsels of the country which are heavily safeguarded under the new constitution? We hope, not.

MADRAS DEBT RELIEF BILL.

THE TAMIL NADU CONFERENCE.

ABOUT 4,000 delegates met at Batalgundu last week and formulated an economic programme, which we hope the Congress Ministry will put into force. The Conference welcomed the Debt Relief Bill, but, finding many snags in it, urged on the Government, first, provision for easy repayments; secondly, sale of land at a fair price when sold through courts; and, thirdly, the provision for exempting a subsistence holding from sale in the case of owner-cultivators. The meaning of the provision for easy repayments is not clear. If it is meant that Land Mortgage Banks and the State should pay off the creditors and collect the debts scaled down in easy instalments, it will be applicable only to such agriculturists as have got surplus produce over and above what is required for the maintenance of their family. The court ought to grant instalments on the application of the debtor at the time of passing a decree or revising it, both in respect of money decrees and suits for closure and sale. The instalments should be revisable in years of scarcity. The instalments should be so fixed in the case of the subsistence holder that it will not encroach on the margin of produce necessary for his subsistence and cultivation expenses till the next harvest.

This takes us to the problem of the maximum payment that should be expected from an agriculturist holding a subsistence holding and less. Repudiation of past debts in his case is not immoral and therefore not legally improper. But because such a procedure may have a marked reaction on the credit system in the country, the measures of pre-Congress Ministries have provided only for nominal repayments. The earliest legislation of this type was the Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act, which provides, in the case of insolvents, for repayments from the produce, after setting apart minimum produce necessary for the maintenance of the judgment-debtor and his family. The Whitley Commission recommended, in the case of unsecured loans of industrial labour, that what could not be repaid from surplus in two or three years by a worker should be written off. The Central Provinces Liquidation of Industrial Workers' Debts Act goes further than this recommendation by including even

secured debts in the scheme of liquidation. The Royal Commission on Agriculture recommended that debts which could not be repaid in 20 years should be written off. Consistently with this recommendation, the Bengal Debtors' Relief Act has provided in the case of insolvents that not more than half the produce necessary for the maintenance of the judgment-debtor should be set apart and that instalments not exceeding twenty should be realised from the balance of the produce only. In the Punjab, according to the Debtors' Protection Act, temporary alienation of land cannot exceed 20 years and when making such an alienation due provision is made for the maintenance of the judgment-debtor. The U. P. Temporary Execution of Decrees Act provides for only five instalments, each instalment not exceeding an amount more than two or three rentals. The debt conciliation officers in the C. P. exert themselves to their utmost to obtain for the debtor a small minimum holding. Some such formula is necessary in the case of the subsistence holder, viz. that he need not pay more than twenty annual repayments and that a single repayment should not exceed the amount equivalent to the land revenue on the land. Otherwise he will have precious little for raising future credit.

The present Bill scales down debts but, except for those who have paid up to twice the principal, the debtors will have to pay the shortage up to twice the principal or the principal, whichever is less. It gives no relief to the poor agriculturists in dry areas who have borrowed at usurious rates as their demand will not be calculated at a reasonable rate of interest and the excess payment set off against the principal. The problem of rural debt is mainly a problem of insolvency. How does the Bill help to liquidate the debts of those who can repay little and who form a large proportion of agriculturists? The Congress Ministry in Madras have failed to go the length of the pre-Congress Ministries in the matter of liquidation of debts. We await an answer as to whether they expect the huge majority of insolvents, small and uneconomic holders, to repay the debt scaled down by the proposed Bill. Does the Tamil Nadu Conference expect easy repayments by these holders of land?

Easy repayments are possible only for those who have larger holdings than a subsistence holding? The problem of freeing the insolvent holder from debt has been buried by the present Ministry in Madras. There is no legal provision to write off irrepayable debts, nor does the method of moral suasion that is implied in conciliation find a place in the present formula adopted in the Bill.

Another resolution of the Tamil Nadu Conference urges the fixing of an upset price by courts when a land is brought to sale. This will no doubt be a healthy preventive provision for the future. The scaling down of debts proposed in the Madras Bill generally annuls the interest to be paid, for the transactions, in which the repayment exceeds double the principal, will not be many. If the basis for scaling down debts is the slump in prices, then every debt incurred before 1930 should be reduced by half. The Tamil Nadu Conference passed a resolution of this nature in November, 1936, at Vellore. That resolution has been given the go-by. A large number of agriculturists have been helped in the United Provinces to pay off their debts by transferring land at the pre-slump value, according to the provisions of the Regulation of Sales Act. Will the Congress Ministry in Madras respect the resolution of the Tamil Nadu Conference at Vellore and give an option to the debtor of adjusting his debts by a transfer of land at the pre-slump value?

The third resolution of the Tamil Nadu Conference urges on the Ministry the provision of a minimum holding for an owner-cultivator to be declared non-saleable in attachment for debts. We do not exactly understand the significance of the word "cultivator". Is a portion of the holding to be exempt from sale in the case of all agriculturists? If it is restricted to owner-cultivators, every agriculturist will declare himself to be one such. If the idea is that absentee landlords should not get the benefit of this provision, the better method would be to have land legislation preventing sub-lease and putting whoever is the cultivator in possession of the land. The complete selling off of the lands of a big landholder or an absentee landlord possessing large holdings at the top and a nominal agriculturist holding tiny bits of land at the bottom will hardly affect agricultural economy. The holding may be made exempt from sale by courts in the case of small holders who pay a certain land revenue.

But suppose the holding is made non-saleable for debts through courts, as the Tamil Nadu Conference urges. The experience gained in the working of Land Alienation Acts shows that where lands are not saleable, mortgages with possession for long periods become very common. In this manner lands will pass to non-agriculturists. The subsistence holder will still be desperate and helpless unless a portion of his produce is also exempted from attachment, as has been already done in many provinces in India. Also there should be some limit to the period of possessory mortgages. Private sales too should be restricted to bonafide agriculturists.

The Madras Relief Bill brings only the tenants of ryotwari holders who hold leases under them. But

waram tenant is not a lease holder. He is considered a partner in cultivation. In areas of unsteady incomes he forms a very large class of cultivators. He is not a labourer either. The position of this class of tenants should be legalised by fixing the share of the waram and reducing to writing the terms of partnership. The Conference has resolved that debts owing by cultivators to mirasdars be cancelled. It is doubtful whether waram tenants are included under cultivators. Let us assess the value of cancellation of the debts of a labourer due to his employer. The latter does not generally mean to recover it. It is intended to keep a hold over labour. The labourer too, owing to want of employment and his consequent economic subjection, may give another bond for the same amount which has been cancelled. The problem of liquidation of the debts of landless labour should be tackled along with a scheme of providing employment for them and giving them economic independence.

A larger exemption of moveables from attachment may help a labourer more than cancellation of his debts. All implements and tools and materials used in husbandry should be exempt. The cattle and the dwelling house of a labourer should be exempt. His produce should be exempt. Civil arrest should be stopped except when a debtor has refused to pay what he can pay. In fact, even with the recent amendment of the C. P. C., warrants of arrest are granted liberally by courts. It should be noted here that neither the Conference nor the Bill has considered the case of landless labourers who are paying heavily for the Government loans taken by them for purchasing house sites.

The other resolution of the Conference relates to the living conditions of agricultural labourers. Their wages should be statutorily fixed. The wages should be paid regularly. Where a cultivator works under an agreement with a landlord, he should have assured work for a fixed number of days in the month, and four holidays in the month with wages, and he should not be dismissed from service after the harvest. Considering the casual and unsteady character of agricultural labour, it is doubtful how far it can be fixed for different kinds of work. It should be noted that family labour and exchange labour are quite common and one cannot insist on any wage in these cases. Wages can certainly be fixed for plantation labour and the workers engaged directly or through contractors by the departments of State. Regarding farm servants engaged under agreements, it is possible to insist on certain defined contracts of minimum wage, holidays with pay and minimum period of service. But this again will hardly be applicable to small holdings of cultivating owners. It is only in the case of big estates that a minimum wage and period of service could be insisted on and that too only in the case of whole-time farm servants.

Another resolution of the Conference relates to land revenue and tenancy. It is certainly a great back-sliding from the Faizpur resolution which urged the abolition of land revenue on small holdings for the Tamil Nadu Conference to express the opinion that land revenue at a low rate should be collected from all agriculturists. The resolution uses the word:

"quit-rent" to denote the low flat rate to be levied on lands. It is doubtful how far it is possible to reduce land-tax to the figure of quit-rent. A certain reduction may be made in the case of small holdings of a defined size so as to increase the credit of a small holder. It is also necessary that tenancy legislation should precede any reduction in land revenue. What use is it to reduce the land-tax of a landholder while there is no legal limit for his collection of rents?

The other resolutions of the Conference relating to a reasonable levy for irrigation facilities and a graded tax on agricultural incomes are proposals on which we hope the Congress Ministry will take early action.

The Conference also passed resolutions favouring the abolition of zamins if possible, or, in the alternative, the fixing of rents as in ryotwari areas and their collection by the Local Government. We only hope that the Congress Ministry will realise that the evils of landlordism are no less rampant in ryotwari areas and that legislation for fixity of tenure and fair rents will be none too soon in these areas for the purpose of arresting these evils.

We congratulate the Tamil Nadu Conference on its bold attempt to formulate an economic programme and wish it every success.

K. G. SIVASWAMY.

Reviews.

PARTIAL HISTORY.

CHARACTERS OF THE REFORMATION. BY HILAIRE BELLOC, (Sheed and Ward.) 1937. 342 p. 7-6-0.

HILAIRE BELLOC is a great name in the world of history, but in the book before us the Catholic Belloc is more evident than the historian Belloc. Books on Reformation are a legion and some have been written from a Catholic point of view and some from a Protestant perspective. But that is no excuse for an historian of Mr. Belloc's standing to put his religious fervour before sound historical sense. Mr. Belloc regards the whole movement with an intense dislike. We have looked through his volume carefully, and can find scarcely a place in which he speaks even tolerantly of the Reformation, or Revolution as he prefers to call it. All the principal actors come in for some bitter and stinging blows. Mr. Belloc takes pains to prove that the principal characters of the Reformation had no character! Henry VIII, "the majestic Lord that broke the bonds of Rome," was a descendent of Henry V's widow who had secretly taken a lover of low birth, a Welshman employed about the Palace, called Tudor. Thomas Cromwell, "the Hammer of the Monks," was the son of a petty beer house-keeper in Putney and was a vagabond in early youth. Thomas Cranmer, who gave England her splendid Prayer Book had before taking Holy Orders, a disreputable adventure with a servant-girl at an inn. Queen Elizabeth in whose reign Reformation became an accomplished fact was a woman of scandalous character. An historical writer, if he design to give a true and instructive picture of the times of which he treats, should not pick up every scrap of gossip to defame the actors whom he does not like. But it is rather amusing to find the learned author ignoring the scandals about the Catholic actors. Take for instance the case of Mary Stuart.

Mr. Belloc attempts to justify her change of husbands rather frequently. "It was her misfortune to be married first to a sickly boy even younger than herself who died before she was eighteen, and next by her own judgment and error to her cousin, Darnley, a debauched and worthless character.....It was her temperament again that made her fall a victim to Bothwell." If Mary Stuart could in this manner be justified for her change of husbands, Henry VIII could also be justified for his change of wives. At any rate he could be justified in seeking the divorce of Catherine, for he had no male issue and he was troubled about succession. We are sorry that such an eminent historian as Mr. Belloc should apply one standard to Catholics and another to Protestants. Again while, as we pointed above, he makes use of all the scandals of the age against Cranmer and Elizabeth, he does not make use of any scandal against Mary Stuart. Mary's affection for her Italian Secretary, David Rizzio was an open scandal. It was that scandal that made Darnley Kill David Rizzio in her very presence. Again James I of England was nicknamed by Due de Sully, Minister to Henry IV of France as "the wisest fool in Christendom", and as "British Solomon" implying that just as Solomon was the son of David, James was the son of David Rizzio. So the Rizzio. Mary Stuart scandal was an open one at the time and yet the author does not mention it. Far be it from us to say that scandals should be made use of. To make use of them in a scholarly production like the one before us is bad, but to make use of them against one set of persons and give immunity to others is reprehensible.

The Catholic bias of the author is also seen in his attempt to justify the papal dispensation for the marriage of Catherine and Henry. Mr. Belloc says that the marriage of Catherine and Arthur could not have been consummated, she being only 16, and he being 15, and that she was therefore a "nominal widow"—mark the words! Again on page 118 he says that it was not due to pressure from Emperor Charles V. Catherine's nephew, that he refused to grant the divorce. If only justice and ecclesiastical law were his guides, why did not Clement tell Henry VIII straightway that his marriage with Catherine could not be annulled? The very hesitancy displayed by the Pope showed that he was trying the case not according to its merits, but was trying to please both the "Defender of the Faith" and Emperor Charles.

Again we feel that in his hatred of Elizabeth the author has overemphasised the part played by Ceoil and has ignored the contribution made by the Queen by her will and intelligence.

There are certainly very serious drawbacks in the book before us, but we are relieved to find certain interesting things in this volume. In the first place, the learned author, with a felicity of expression, proves that history is made by individuals, and is not a mere interplay of superhuman or sub-human forces. Secondly, the author is right in drawing repeated attention to the fact that the strength of Protestantism was due partly to the spoliation of the Church property and to the support given by the 'new nobles' to the Reformed Church. Thirdly, we are glad that the author pays a high tribute to the literary skill and artistic power which helped Cranmer in giving England a splendid Prayer Book.

On the whole, though we find much lively reading and some good things in this volume, it is not in our judgment, a serious and candid work. It is too full of gibes and mockery, and it does not impress the reader with the fairness of its narrative.

M. V. SUBRAHMANYAM.

INDIA'S POLITY.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. By K. V. RAMASUBRAHMANYAM. (Raja & Co., Madras.) 1935. 22cm. 439p. Rs. 5.

THE book, as the author tells us, is a historical and analytical treatise on the system of political government in India, in the past, at present and as proposed under the Government of India Act, 1935. The author has also written an exhaustive and critical introduction and given a tabular statement, comparing the system of government in the Indian Federation, with the Canadian, Australian and American Federations. In the treatment of his subject the author has shown such rare ability and learning that careful students of Indian administration cannot afford to miss taking notice of what he has said on the subject. The material published through official reports is so vast that it is no easy matter to sift and digest it with a view to present an evolution of the existing Government of India Act by co-ordinating the remarks on various topics made by the successive Commissions, Conferences and Committees. This is what the author has done. One is able to see the picture with its background and therefore in its proper perspective. Nor is it simply a matter of collection and co-ordination. There is criticism of the scheme and a comparison of it with the existing federal constitutions. The author has laboured somewhat under a disadvantage because he had to write his book before the Government of India Act had been passed. Had he delayed the publication of his book by a few months he would have been able to refer to the relevant sections of the Act in his treatment of the subject.

In the course of a lengthy introduction, extending to over 96 pages, the author puts the reader in possession of many points of view which, as Mr. Jayakar says in the foreword, "render the scheme more intelligible than through an unaided study of its details." Dealing with the subject of Dominion Status vs. Independence, the author traces the historical growth of the conception of Dominion Status, down to the Westminster Act and points out the danger of India accepting Independence and standing isolated in the midst of several foreign powers close at hand, including Japan, the greatest naval power in the East. He, therefore, hopes that "Indian readers will realise this point of view and the Indian National Congress may feel quite contented with the grant of Dominion Status as detailed above" (page 31). In this connection, the champions of Dominion Status often overlook the sequence of events. The Indian National Congress accepted the goal of Independence in 1929 and the Westminster Act was passed, full two years later i.e. in 1931. The critics have nowhere, proposed that even without the provisions of the Westminster Act, the goal of Dominion Status could be preferred to that of Independence. It is, therefore not justifiable that the Congress should be criticised because she accepted in 1929 what was obviously the better of the two goals at that time. Whether the Congress should have proceeded to change her creed and goal in the light of the Westminster legislation is a different question. If the word Dominion Status is such a taboo to the British Imperialists in all their discussions about India, is it any wonder that the extremist section of Indian nationalism should show no willingness to make adjustments and a compromise? To our mind, the assertion of complete Independence is a fitting tit for tat to the Imperialist's studied silence over the question of Dominion Status.

While admitting that the constitution makes no provision for its automatic development and agreeing that on account of the peculiar position of the Princes in the Federation "there is no knowing when India

can hope to have complete self-government, nor the steps along which it has to pass before reaching it" (page 49), the author believes that if but communal discord is got over, the solution of the Indian problem lies in the hands of Indians themselves. On page 90 he quotes the statement of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that a "large British force is necessary to keep Indians from each other's throats" and remarks that "we must hang down our heads in shame at this tirade". The line of thinking indicated above is full of fallacies. Does the author seriously believe that the British soldier stands on the Indian soil to keep Indians from each other's throats and that he has no other Imperial interest to serve? Does he think that if and when communal tension is got over those that are in the possession of power today, will quietly hand over the charge of Indian affairs to Indians and will not hide themselves behind the excuse of the protection of the vested interests and Princes among them? Learned as the author is as a constitutionalist, he has, as a politician, endorsed, fondly and fervently, views that are antiquated, old-fashioned and long exploded.

Mr. Jayakar, who has all along looked optimistically towards the new Federation of India, strikes the same note in his foreword. "It is no doubt true", says he, "that modern political thought in some quarters has condemned such a political union (between Indian States and British India) as an unnatural and heterogeneous amalgam, but it is equally true that this condemnation is the outcome of many political misgivings and pre-conceptions, which will disappear as the true nature of an all-India Federation is better understood". More than two years have passed since Mr. Jayakar wrote this, but, unfortunately for him, there are yet no signs on the horizon that this condemnation will either cease or slacken in vigour. Is this condemnation then, we may ask, only an outcome of many political misgivings and pre-conceptions and has it nothing to do with certain inherent characteristics of the Indian Federation itself?

R. V. OTURKAR.

SHORT NOTICE.

RURAL WELFARE IN INDIA, 1936. BY C. F. STRICKLAND. (Oxford University Press.) 1936. 16cm. 54p. As. 9.

PANCHAYATS IN INDIA. BY J. G. DRUMMOND. (Oxford University Press.) 1937. 17cm. 60 p. As. 8.

"Rural Welfare in India" is a review of the reports of the various provincial Governments, Native States and some non-official organisations pertaining to rural welfare work. The provinces are treated one by one and their activities reviewed and constructive suggestions given. The activities of Y. M. C. A., the Servants of India Society, the Harijan Sevak Sangh receive due recognition and appreciation at the hands of the author. The author lays proper stress on carrying on the work permanently, co-ordinating the varied activities of the various Government departments and non-official institutions. The author insists on the proper training of the personnel who are to do this rural welfare work, and cautions against undue expenditure of this work.

"Panchayats in India" is a review of the organisation and working of the village panchayats in the various provinces and States. After tracing the development of the village governmental institutions from the ancient Hindu and Buddhist days, the author gives a summary of the recent legislation on the subject. Constitution, powers, administrative and judicial, income and the supervision and control of these

panchayats are treated elaborately. The scope and the effectiveness of the panchayats differ in different provinces and the States. The general name panchayat is given to many village institutions with varied powers, and this is apt to create confusion. He suggests a single comprehensive statute dealing with these panchayats. He advocates no new tax to add to the resources of these panchayats but suggests the increase of some existing rates like the French *Centimes Additionnels*. He wants a more responsible and well-

trained set of officers to control these institutions.

Both these reviews published by the Indian Village Welfare Association reveal a good grasp of the Indian problem. But the problem of the Indian village is its poverty, and no suggestions to get rid of this slough is suggested. Though essential, these activities can take the villages nowhere as long as poverty is not driven off.

N. S. S.

CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION'S STATEMENT.

The following is Mr. N. M. Joshi's statement on the promulgation of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act at Ahmedabad presented by him as the spokesman of a deputation appointed by the Bombay Civil Liberties Union to the Hon'ble the Prime Minister of Bombay. The other members of the deputation were Mr. S. A. Brelvi, Mr. N. H. Pandya and Mr. R. R. Bakhale.

THIS deputation appointed by the Executive Committee of the Bombay Civil Liberties Union at its meeting held on 2nd December, 1937, has approached you with the object of

- (1) Placing before you its views on the promulgation of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act at Ahmedabad and obtaining your views on that subject; and
- (2) requesting the Government of Bombay to repeal the Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Act, 1932 (as modified up to the 1st January 1936), and secure the repeal of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act.

The occasion for the promulgation of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act at Ahmedabad was the last strike in the textile industry in that city. The section of the Act that was put in force rendered the offence of intimidation cognizable and non-bailable, thus depriving citizens of their important safeguards which are available against the infringement of their civil liberties under the ordinary law. That the workers had gone on strike for a real grievance is brought out by the nature of the settlement of the strike. During the continuance of a strike peaceful persuasion by means of demonstrations and propaganda is recognised as a legitimate activity of the workers on strike. It is stated on behalf of Government that the methods of persuasion were not peaceful but took the form of intimidation justifying the application of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act.

The Hon'ble Mr. K. M. Munshi has made some statement about the conditions then prevailing at Ahmedabad. At a lecture on Civil Liberty delivered at the Taj Mahal Hotel on 16th December last the Hon'ble Mr. Munshi is reported to have observed that "if 500 strikers with the help of 50 'gundas', by show of force, coerce the remaining 50,000 timid loyal workers from going to work the atmosphere destroys the basis of civil liberty". In a recent statement made on the floor of the Bombay Legislative Assembly Mr. Munshi refers to various forms of intimidation which, he alleges, were resorted to by the strikers to dissuade "the loyal workers" from going to work. These forms include the putting up of threatening posters on gates of mills, abusing women carrying meals to workers, assaulting and stoning of some workers, surrounding the entrance of mills and giving threats to workers, possessing knives, daggers and kirpans, stopping buses carrying workers to their work-places and generally practising intimidation

"on an extensive scale". From these instances Mr. Munshi tries to make out two chief points:

- (1) That intimidation was severe and extensive; and
- (2) That the parties intimidated had not sufficient courage to complain.

Even taking for granted for the sake of argument the accuracy of the statements made above, the Bombay Civil Liberties Union is not satisfied by the grounds given by Mr. Munshi in defence of the use of extraordinary repressive measures at Ahmedabad. If violence had really been resorted to, the offenders could have been called to book without having recourse to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, because the offences in that case would be cognizable even under the ordinary law. Cases under the ordinary law could have been instituted against the offenders and thus the accuracy of Mr. Munshi's statements could have been judicially tested.

Mr. Munshi says, Intimidation was very severe. This can only mean that it was either violent or on a very large scale or both. If it was violent it could be dealt with under the ordinary law, and if it was on a very large scale in some cases the intimidation could be dealt with under some section of the Indian Penal Code and in some cases there could have been no difficulty in finding complainants. In fact there would have been many prosecutions under the ordinary law. It can be hardly in accordance with facts to say that in a city where Mahatma Gandhi had lived, worked and preached and where a strong labour organization which was openly opposed to the strike has been in existence for a long time, there were not even a few men of courage who would come forward to complain that they were being assaulted and beaten and that their wives were being abused and threatened.

It may be admitted that, generally speaking, persons are reluctant to take legal steps against their own fellows and may, to a certain extent, refrain from doing so even at the cost of some inconvenience or slight injury caused to them. In such cases they may prefer to put up with the trouble rather than lodge complaints with the police, though nothing can prevent them from doing so. But people adopt such a course only out of consideration for other people and not because they have not courage enough to make a complaint, and this also they do only to a certain extent and no further. It is difficult to believe that even a few out of the large number of workers at Ahmedabad who were actually being assaulted and beaten and whose wives were threatened with similar treatment and abused in their own houses, could not muster courage even to make complaints about these things to the police.

Referring to the recourse taken by the Home Member to extraordinary measures to deal with the situation at Ahmedabad, the *Prajabandhu*, a popular Gujarati journal of standing and repute which is

practically the organ of the Gujarat Provincial Congress Committee, observes in a contemporary issue: "We are of the opinion that if the Home Member had paid even a flying visit to Ahmedabad he would have seen for himself that promulgation of extraordinary legislative measures was quite unnecessary under the circumstances." This observation of a local paper which is well known for its Congress sympathies must be obviously based on first-hand information of the situation at Ahmedabad then prevailing. This view of the situation taken by a local paper, coupled with the fact that very few or no cases of intimidation were filed against the strikers before the promulgation of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, goes to show that the statement regarding the prevalence of severe and extensive intimidation made by the Home Member requires to be judicially tested.

We may point out that complaints regarding the prevalence of intimidation during strikes had been made even before the passing of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act and the police in those days were able to cope with it under the ordinary law. It may also be pointed out that the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act was not originally intended to be used in trade disputes. It was meant to be used against a political movement and not against an economic movement of the nature of a strike. Congressmen who had then opposed the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill without making an exception in favour of any section of that Bill cannot now approve of the use of this section under any circumstances, much less in the course of a trade dispute.

We were surprised to find that Government were making light of the fact that the section of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act that was used at Ahmedabad only rendered the offence of criminal intimidation cognizable and non-bailable. During the discussion in the legislature on this piece of legislation or outside the Congress Party had never expressed this view about this section of the Act. The Government seem to think that this section, if it is used by them, does not seriously affect the civil liberties of the people. The Bombay Civil Liberties Union do not agree with the Government in this respect. They would like to point out that this section of the Act deprives citizens of two valuable safeguards. In the first place it places in the hands of the police extraordinary powers of taking cognisance of their own accord of offences of which they are not expected to have knowledge without complaints being brought to them, and in the second place the supposed offenders cannot even be released on bail. Bail can ordinarily be refused only if there is a reasonable apprehension that the accused would abscond and evade the provisions of law but this section enables the police to keep in de-

tion people who may be innocent and also to make the arrangements of their defence difficult. The Bombay Civil Liberties Union is of the opinion that under no circumstances whatever should recourse be had to such repressive pieces of legislation. In this connection the comment of the *Bombay Chronicle*, which is admittedly a pro-Congress paper, correctly voices our own views. We may, therefore, be allowed to quote it here:

But resort to an odious repressive legislative measure is a serious matter in its implications. It means that the Congress Government want the law to stand on the statute book for use in emergencies. That view is inconsistent with the declared policy of the Congress to repeal all repressive laws. Moreover, if Congress Governments help to retain a repressive law, there is no hope of other Governments repealing it. They will point at the offending Congress Government who will thus be a help in perpetuating an obnoxious law.

It will perhaps be argued that a Congress Government will make only a most judicious use of the objectionable Act and that, too, in a grave emergency. But that plea is untenable. Other Governments will put forward the same excuse and thereby justify the retention of all repressive laws and even the making of new ones. A vicious weapon, it is well said, may tempt even a saint; and a Congress Government under the influence of a panic, may unwittingly make an improper use of a dangerous law like the one in question. This is essentially a matter of principle and admits of no compromise. The Bombay Cabinet has often assured the public that the repressive legislation will either be repealed or remain a dead letter. The present resort to it is contrary to that assurance. Moreover, we do not think that the use of it is indispensable.

Secondly, the Bombay Civil Liberties Union request the Government of Bombay to secure by their own legislation or through the Government of India the repeal of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. Government also should, without any delay, repeal the Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Act, 1932. A repealing measure cannot require more than nominal time for its passage. This Special (Emergency) Powers Act when it came before the former Bombay Legislature in the form of a Bill was opposed not only by the Congress but by all other parties of a progressive nature. The Congress Government, therefore, will get the whole-hearted support of all the progressive parties in the present Bombay Legislature if they bring in such a repealing measure. The Bombay Civil Liberties Union, therefore, earnestly requests the Bombay Government to act up to the promise given by the Congress Party in its election manifesto and in the famous Karachi resolution and repeal this repressive piece of legislation.

BOMBAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION.

MR. N. M. JOSHI'S SPEECH

The Annual General Meeting of the Bombay Civil Liberties Union was held at the Servants of India Society's Hall on the 22nd instant under the presidentship of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, the President of the Union. More than a hundred members attended the meeting.

While moving a resolution for the adoption of the report, Mr. N. M. Joshi, Vice-President of the Union, said:

"THE Report read before us shows that the Bombay Branch of the Civil Liberties Union has not altogether been sleeping during the year; but it must be admitted that it also does not show that it

has, either as regards the number of members or as regards its activities, made a notable progress. This may be explained by the fact that since the movement for starting the organisation there has not been a strong wave of political agitation in the country and so there was no particular campaign of encroachment on civil liberties also. A distinct change has been introduced in the country since the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy and especially since the Congress Party assumed offices in seven provinces. In Bombay the interim Ministry made a beginning in removing restrictions on civil liberty imposed by the previous Government and the Congress Ministry followed up the work. Much has been done

by way of removing restrictions on printing presses and newspapers, on books and literature, on institutions and on personal liberty of individuals. It is true that the Civil Liberties Union and some other organisations took prompt steps to urge the Government to do its duty in this respect and it must be admitted that the Government responded on the whole satisfactorily, though some of us may feel that they unnecessarily took longer time. But on the whole we must congratulate the Government on what it has done. We express our appreciation of the work done so far and we suggest that the work be completed. We would have also failed in our duty if we had not observed watchfulness in the matter of what we regard as encroachments on civil liberties that have been made by the present Government. Civil liberties must be protected not from the attacks of the foreign Government only, but from attacks from any Government or from any quarter. We would first suggest that the Bombay Government should complete the work of restoring the civil liberties in the province. There are still a number of books, the ban on which is not yet removed. We would also suggest that they should repeal the emergency legislation passed in 1936 and announce their resolve not to use the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of the Government of India in the Province of Bombay and should either amend the Act themselves or should request the Government of India to do so.

The Civil Liberties Union has to state with regret that it is disappointed at the attitude which the present Bombay Government has taken in its dealing with the working classes. I shall refer to the happenings at Dharavi and Ahmedabad as illustrative of my complaint. At Dharavi during a row that took place between two sections of the employees in tanneries a number of innocent persons were maltreated by the police and one innocent man was fired at and wounded. Government have prosecuted a number of persons from only one side, but I shall not say anything about these prosecutions. I hold that Government has failed in its duty to give justice to those who were maltreated by the police especially to the man who was fired at and wounded. We have asked for a public enquiry, which Government has refused on the ground that prosecutions of some persons alleged to have been involved in that row are yet pending and that they cannot make any public enquiry till the cases under prosecution are disposed of. I am afraid it will take a very long time till the cases are decided and till the appeals, if appeals become necessary, are disposed of. I hold that there is really no connection between the prosecutions and the complaints against the police which are as regards actions which are not a part of the row that has taken place. However, if Government has taken the view that no public enquiry even as regards firing can be made till the prosecutions are disposed of, I feel that Government should have first made an enquiry into the firing and then started the prosecution. I would like the Bombay Government to take a serious view of the case of firing by the police on their own responsibility. The firing was not ordered by a magistrate. The Hon'ble Minister for Law and Order suggests that the man fired on should make out a prima facie case that he was wrongly fired at and then Government may give him permission for prosecuting the police officer or make a public enquiry. I think this is putting the responsibility on the wrong shoulders. I would also like the Hon'ble Mr. Munshi to consider whether it is right to expect a poor working class man first to spend his time and money to make out a prima facie case and then to secure consent of the Bombay Government and in the end to bear the expenses to prosecute a police officer.

As only this afternoon I have placed before the

Prime Minister my views regarding the promulgation of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act I shall not refer to that subject at this meeting. I shall only refer to the prohibition of meetings and prosecutions by the issue of section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Meetings and processions do not lead to violence but they are useful in preventing violence. The object of meetings and processions during strikes is first, by way of a demonstration to draw the attention of the public to the grievances of the strikers and secondly, to persuade workers to remain on strike or go on strike. (Incidentally they give some legitimate occupation to those who are otherwise idle.) If the police care to do so they can be present to watch. Intimidation becomes necessary if only meetings and processions are prohibited. The prohibition of meetings and processions helps the employers by driving the workers to resort of violence and intimidation, thus bringing in further repression by Government.

On account of the criticism to which Mr. Munshi has exposed himself, he has lost his balance and he says, "Some people who have shied at the formation of the Civil Liberties Union have now become champions of civil liberty." I would like Mr. Munshi as a lover of truth to name such persons. Secondly, if there are such persons I would like Mr. Munshi to remember that if some persons have recently become champions of civil liberty, there are others who were champions of civil liberty before and have now become champions of repression. Lastly, I would like to say a word about Mr. Munshi's philosophy of civil liberty. He tells us that civil liberty becomes licence if the exercise of liberty by one encroaches upon the civil liberty of another. I entirely agree with this view and I may tell Mr. Munshi that the criticism levelled against his administration is that, at Ahmedabad, by the use of section 144 and by the use of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act he encroached upon the civil liberty of some citizens who had not encroached upon the civil liberty of others. We do not object to his prosecuting people who had encroached upon the civil liberties of others, of whom, in Mr. Munshi's opinion, there were many in Ahmedabad. Has he proved that all men who would have gone to meetings and processions in Ahmedabad had intended violence or intimidation? Has he proved that the man who was fired upon at Dharavi had the least connection with the committing of violence? If Mr. Munshi adheres to his definition of civil liberty, then in any case he need not prohibit meetings and making of speeches because none of these two things can encroach upon the civil liberty of others. The Hon'ble Mr. Munshi has also on many occasions referred to violence in defence of his policy. Let me assure him that the Civil Liberties Union is as much against the use of violence as he is. Leaving aside the ethics of the use of force or violence in self-defence or in wars or 'affairs', as Japanese would call them, or in open rebellion by oppressed people, on which we may differ according as we are pacifists or non-pacifists, I have no doubt that the Civil Liberties Union will condemn the use of force or violence in our public agitation for self-government or for other purposes. But I agree with Prof. Laski who maintains that it will be wrong to penalise the very idea which some people may entertain and express, that without violence some reforms cannot be achieved. As a matter of fact our faith in non-violence cannot be well founded unless liberty is given to the open discussion on its merits of the method of violence if there are people who believe in the method of violence. There is a danger in the suppression of that discussion itself ending in creating some sympathy for the methods of violence. It is for this reason that some of us have suggested to the Government to legalise

the existence of the Communist Party in India as is the case in Great Britain and other countries."

Mrs. Naidu in her concluding speech observed that she was in complete agreement with Mr. Joshi's views. She also emphasised the necessity of placing the Union on a very broad basis and with a view to doing so, she said the Union must welcome within its fold all sections of the public holding all shades of political opinion from the palest pink to the deepest red.

INDIAN CHRISTIAN CONFERENCE

SOME RESOLUTIONS.

The following are among the resolutions passed at the All-India Conference of Indian Christians held in Calcutta last month:

DISAPPROVAL OF THE FEDERAL SCHEME.

This Conference disapproves of the Federal Scheme as set forth in the Government of India Act of 1935 and resolves to request His Majesty's Government, through His Excellency the Viceroy, to modify the Act on the lines suggested by the national opinion in India and to ensure the application of the principle of election to the representation of the Indian States in the Federal Assembly.

INDIAN NATURALIZATION AMENDMENT BILL.

This Conference is of the opinion that the proposed Indian Naturalization (Amendment) Bill should be dropped and the whole of the Indian Naturalization Act of 1926 should be reconsidered as this Conference is against any piecemeal legislation on the subject which puts India on an inferior status.

JOINT ELECTORATES.

This Conference reiterates its former decision regarding joint Electorates. It appeals to the leaders of all political parties to come to an early agreement on the subject.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- SOUTH INDIAN MAHARASTRIANS. (CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES)** Issued by the MAHARASTRA EDUCATION FUND, Madras, as its Silver Jubilee Souvenir. 1937. 25cm. 167+41p. Rs. 2.
- HISTORY OF BENARES.** By A. S. ALTEKAR. (The Culture Publication House, Benares Hindu University.) 1937. 25cm. 74p. Re. 1-8-0.
- FARM ACCOUNTS IN THE PUNJAB, 1934-35.** By IABH SINGH and AJAIB SINGH, (The Board of Economic Inquiry, Punjab.) 1937. 25cm. 296p. Re. 1-8-0.
- REPORT ON AN ENQUIRY INTO WORKING CLASS FAMILY BUDGETS IN AHMEDABAD.** (Bombay Labour Office, Bombay.) 1937. 24cm. 85p. As. 4.
- ART AND ARCHAEOLOGY ABROAD.** By KALIDAS NAG. (University of Calcutta.) 1937. 23cm. 395p.
- THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF THE U. S. S. R.** Edited by I. B. LASKER and JOHN SWIFT. (Lawrence & Wishart.) 1937. 22cm. 671p.
- HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS.** By C. A. MACARTNEY. (Oxford University Press.) 1937. 22cm. 504p. 25/-
- COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND JAPAN.** By C. N. VAKIL and D. N. MALUSTE. (Longmans, Bombay.) 1937. 22cm. 210p. Rs. 5.
- SOME SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY.** Ed. by CLIFFORD MANSHARDT. (Taraporevala, Bombay.) 1937. 22cm. 141p. Rs. 3-4-0.
- INDIA AND THE PACIFIC.** By C. F. ANDREWS. (Allen & Unwin.) 1937. 20cm. 224p. 3/6.
- GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE.** Ed. by RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL. (Thomas Nelson & Sons.) 1937. 597p. and 520p. \$ 3.75.
- THE GOLD PROBLEM.** By BHASKAR NAMDEO ADARKAR. (Author, 152 Hindu Colony, Dadar.) 1937. 20cm. 174p. Rs. 2.
- THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF ISLAM.** By M. N. ROY. (Vora & Co., Bombay.) 1937. 20cm. 106p. Rs. 1-8-0.

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