DILEMMA IN FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE MODERN WORLD

NO. 25

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"Kale Memorial Lecture, 1968"

GOKHALE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS & ECONOMICS, POONA 4
ASIA PUBLISHING HOUSE
BOMBAY • CALCUTTA • NEW DELHI • MADRAS • LUCKNOW • LONDON • NEW YORK
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Chairman and friends:

I am grateful to the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics for their cordial invitation to me to deliver the Kale Memorial lecture this year. The Gokhale Institute is the pioneer research institution in our country in the field of social sciences, and when its distinguished Director, Professor Gadgil, who is also, by common consent, the doyen of social scientists in India sent me an invitation to deliver the Lecture in memory of the founder of the Institute, the invitation was, to me, equivalent to a command, and I readily accepted it.

While selecting the topic for the lecture, may I say, I had the limited objective of placing before you the outline of a complex problem, viz. discovering the foundations of peace and not attempting to find a solution. Wise men all over the world are engaged in this most important task; as yet a talisman has not been found. It occurred to me that even posing a problem before an enlightened Poona audience would be useful: Poona has a long and fine academic tradition, and the thinking of its scholars would, I feel, be helpful in resolving the dilemma, sooner or later.

I

THE DILEMMA

There has been well-informed, and I would say partly justified, criticism in India of our foreign policy that while India’s prestige has increased in the world’s chancelleries, that policy has not always helped to achieve India’s national interest, more specially in relation to our neighbouring countries, Pakistan, Burma, Nepal, and Ceylon. Some ascribe this ineffectiveness to the policy of non-alignment which India has followed, others to its unskilful diplomacy. The facts on the basis of which this criticism is made are correct: the continuing occupation of one-half of Kashmir by Pakistan, of several square miles of our territory by China, the unfriendly attitude of part of the Nepali Press to India and the unwillingness of the Ceylon Government to accept India’s arguments in respect of citizenship for persons of Indian origin, now Stateless in Ceylon, may be cited as evidence.
But why has that policy been ineffective? Is non-alignment, or the unskilful implementation of it the reason for the ineffectiveness? Either seems to be a superficial explanation. If non-alignment were the reason, it would imply that aligned countries and countries like Britain, with more mature diplomatic skill, should have been able to be more confident in securing their objectives than they appear to be. International history since 1945 bears witness to the fact that Britain, the U.S.A., France, China, Portugal, the Netherlands and the Soviet Union—all aligned countries, some of them with centuries of acknowledged diplomatic experience have also had cause for concern. Suez, Formosa, Korea, Vietnam, Palestine, Algeria and Berlin have all caused, or are causing, concern to one or more of them.

I suggest that the international situation is more complex: there is a dilemma in modern foreign policy. 1945-49 is a dividing line in diplomatic history. The use of force, which had been the core of international politics before 1945, while still important, has in the nuclear age lost its primacy among factors shaping decisions on international issues, and nothing effective has taken its place, and hence the dilemma which policy-makers are confronted with, viz., whether to use force, or not to use force to gain a national objective, for either decision may lead to unfavourable consequences and it is difficult to calculate them. As we know, a dilemma is a position that leaves only a choice between equal evils. If a decision is taken to use force—which may involve nuclear weapons, it may involve destruction for all; if a decision is taken not to use force, the injustice of the status quo may continue, your decision not to use force may be taken as a symbol of weakness, and the enemy may be encouraged in his aggressive tendencies with consequent disastrous results to your national interests—both undesirable.

II

FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON BALANCE OF POWER

To understand this dilemma, we must go back a little into the diplomatic history of the two centuries before 1945, and find out what was the basis of foreign policy and international relations. Morgenthau is right in his view that not morality or law but power used to secure national interest was its basis. This theory, known as the realistic theory, was true of the period before 1945. Foreign policy had then two basic principles; it was used as a lever to secure national interest, whatever that interest might be; and, two, foreign policy had to be so framed that commitments were to be equal to the capacity for fulfilling them. If Britain, e.g. committed herself to go to the rescue of France when France was attacked by Germany, or to help Turkey
in case she was attacked by Russia, such a commitment was made with the knowledge that Britain had the means to assist France or Turkey and that such assistance was in the national interest of Britain herself, as the undue predominance of Germany or Russia was detrimental to the world-wide British interests. This leads us to another aspect of the international history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The security and other national interests of the great countries — Britain, France, Spain, Prussia (and later Germany), Austria-Hungary and Russia were sought to be protected by the military strength of the country concerned, and if that was not adequate, by alliances with other countries. Further it was also to the interest of any one country that no one among the group became so powerful that its power constituted a threat to its security: hence the policy known as the Balance of Power.

The principle was first stated by Francis Bacon in his essay Of Empire:

First, for their neighbors, there can no general rule be given (the occasions are so variable), save one which ever holdeth — which is, that princes to keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do overgrow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like,) as they become more able to annoy them than they were .... During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry VIII of England, Francis I, King of France, and Charles V, emperor, there was such a watch kept that none of the three could win a palm of ground; but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war, and would not in any wise take peace at interest; and the like was done by that League (which Guicciardine saith was the security of Italy,) made between Ferdinando, king of Naples, Lorenzius Medices, and Ludovicus Sforsa, potentates, the one of Florence, the other of Milan.

Even as late as 1936 that most distinguished statesman, Sir Winston Churchill testified to the fact that, so far as England was concerned, the balance of power had been the guiding principle of her foreign policy for four centuries. I will read a paragraph from his famous speech and then we can pass on to the next point in our discussion. He said:

For four hundred years, the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent, and particularly to prevent the Low Countries falling into the hands of such a Power. Viewed in the light of history these four centuries of consistent purpose amid so many changes of names and facts, of circumstances and conditions, must rank as one of the most remarkable episodes which the records of
any race, nation, state or people can show. Moreover, on all occasions England took the more difficult course. Faced by Philip II of Spain against Louis XIV under William III and Marlborough, against Napoleon, against William II of Germany, it would have been easy and must have been very tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he led. Thus we preserved the liberties of Europe, protected the growth of its vivacious and varied society, and emerged after four terrible struggles with an ever-growing fame and widening Empire, and with the Low Countries safely protected in their independence. Here is the wonderful unconscious tradition of British foreign policy. All our thoughts rest in that tradition today. I know of nothing which has occurred to alter or weaken the justice, wisdom, valour and prudence upon which our ancestors acted. I know of nothing that has happened to human nature which in the slightest degree alters the validity of their conclusions. I know of nothing in military, political, economic or scientific fact which makes me feel that we are less capable. I know of nothing which makes me feel that we might not, or cannot, march along the same road. I venture to put this very general proposition before you because it seems to me that if it is accepted everything else becomes much more simple.

Observe that the policy of England takes no account of which nation it is that seeks the overlordship of Europe. The question is not whether it is Spain, or the French Monarchy, or the French Empire, or the Hitler regime. It has nothing to do with rulers or nations; it is concerned solely with whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant. Therefore we should not be afraid of being accused of being pro-French or anti-German. If the circumstances were reserved, we could equally be pro-German and anti-French. It is a law of public policy which we are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by accidental circumstances, or likes and dislikes, or any other sentiment.

We need not enter into a discussion of the adequacy of the balance of power for the maintenance of security and for the prevention of war in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The statistics of war from 1600 to 1941 collected by Quincy Wright, the distinguished historian of war (he is now my colleague and still, at his advanced age an indefatigable worker), show that during this period there were 278 wars; of these, he calculates, one half were balance-of-power wars, i.e. wars intended to see that no one power grew stronger than other
powers in the combination. I do not want to tire you with more statistics; it is a fact that the balance of power did not prevent war; on the contrary it contributed to so many wars. One of the reasons why it contributed to wars was that when peace was made at the conclusion of a war, the idea of a stable peace and security did not occur to the peacemakers. Many historians have taken the view, for instance, that one of the causes of the Second World War was the Treaty of Versailles which concluded the First World War.

You may well ask me, at this stage, Had war then no political function to fulfil? I would not say so; I would rather say that in the pre-atomic age wars did fulfil some useful political functions. To give one instance. As a student of History, and judging post facto, I would not say that the American War of Independence had no political function to fulfil. That function was to secure the independence of the 13 American colonies. It is also clear that they would not have resorted to force if they thought that independence could have been gained without fighting. Wars have, with all their evils, contributed to national independence, the formation of new States, the integration of older States and, above all, to some settlement of international disputes. But the point now for consideration is whether such functions as war performed then could be performed in the atomic age assuming that the balance of power continued to be the working principle for statesmen in the formulation of their foreign policy.

Before we pass on to this crucial question, we must briefly sketch how from 1919, the balance of power was coupled, in an uneasy alliance, with the concept of collective security: the principle of one for all and all for each wars attempted as an additional means for achieving national security and found institutional expression in the League of Nations and the United Nations. If the principle had been tried honestly, the experience so gained would have been most valuable in our analysis of the problem of power and of the factors in the shaping of foreign policy. As it is, we know, sanctions for ensuring collective security included in the League of Nations Covenant — including economic and military sanctions — were never seriously tried. In the classic case, the Italian aggression on Abyssinia, when it came to the application of oil sanctions, Britain and France desisted, as Mussolini used his trump card, viz., if oil sanctions were applied, he would attack France with the help of Germany — enough to prevent oil sanctions from being applied. The United Nations Charter is admirable; theoretically it contains the essential principles of collective security which can be applied in a system of sovereign States: member States agree to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and further they will refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Apart from providing pacific means of settling international disputes — negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration, the Charter in Articles 45 to 47 provides also for supply to the Security Council of armed forces to enable it to enforce its decisions for the maintenance of international peace and security. We all know that it has been impossible to implement these Articles on account of the Cold War: in fact the basic principle behind the Charter, viz., that only if there is unanimous agreement among the big five can any effective action be taken under the Charter has been found to be a serious obstacle to the implementation of the purposes of the Charter. Serious students even ask whether the makers of the Charter at San Francisco believed such unanimity ever possible. It is sufficient to say that collective security arrangements have broadly proved unworkable, and that in some form or other the balance of power seems still to be considered by statesmen an uneasy substitute for collective security as evidenced by the many military alliances, the NATO, the SEATO and the Warsaw Pact.

III

THERMO-NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Where then do we go from here? Have nations to depend upon the older system of national security — through armaments and alliances, buttressed by the balance of power? I suggest that technological and political developments make such dependence uncertain. To use Winston Churchill's telling phrase, we are actually living under a balance of terror, fearful peace, if that phrase is preferred. The technological and political developments are three-fold: the discovery of the atom, the hydrogen bomb and the international ballistic missile; second, the 'emancipation of former colonies and the consequential increase in the number of sovereign States jealous in the maintenance of their sovereignty, and, third, the increasing impact of world public opinion on those who decide foreign policy in the capitals of the world. The total effect of these is the crippling effect on the decision-making process in the realm of foreign policy, as the variables are so many and a rational calculation of consequences becomes extremely difficult.

The discovery of the atom and the development of thermo-nuclear weapons based on it have affected international relations by differentiating thermo-nuclear wars from earlier wars not only in degree but
in kind. This remark needs elaboration.1

The first atom bombs were dropped against Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and against Nagasaki on 9 August. Each of these weapons gave the energy equivalent of 20,000 tons of T.N.T. Within sixty seconds of the dropping of the bomb against Hiroshima some 80,000 people were killed; when the bomb burst over Nagasaki, the destruction was complete over an area two miles in radius. “It was as though a giant typhoon had swept Nagasaki into the bay leaving no trace of where the streets once stood”, a city of 1,30,000 people was almost totally destroyed. The blast wave, the heat flash and the radio activity resulting from the explosion were responsible for the enormous damage.

Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a whole family of nuclear weapons capable of being carried by nearly any type of modern combat aircraft, equipped with guns as small as five inches in calibre or used as warheads for a variety of missiles have been developed. The hydrogen bomb, it is now clear, can be made with a power equivalent of 20 million tons of T.N.T.: that is 1000 times as powerful as the Hiroshima atom bomb. Its destructive effects are thus summarized by a high authority:2

There is complete destruction out to a distance of 5 miles from the detonation centre; buildings at distances upto 10 miles will be devastated beyond repair; out to a distance of 16 miles damage will be moderate but sufficient to render buildings unusable until repaired, while partial damage will be inflicted out to distances of roughly 20 miles. These estimates show that such a hydrogen bomb would devastate an area of 300 square miles by its blast wave and make it clear that such a weapon would cause almost complete destruction of any metropolitan area in existence today.

A second authoritative statement comes from General Earle E. Partridge, Commander of the Continental Air Defence Command.

We believe that if the Soviets were to attack us at all, that they would do their best to achieve surprise, and that they would attack not only the large metropolitan areas which contain the bulk of our population and industry, but that they would also attack the bases from which we would mount our retaliatory strikes. Fifty-five per cent of the population of our country and about 75 per cent of its industry are concentrated in 170 metropolitan areas. These areas, plus the Strategic Air Command’s bases and the Atomic Energy Commission’s facilities would undoubtedly be considered prime targets by the Soviets. However, even if they successfully attacked only the fifty most important metropolitan areas, they

1 In what follows a few paragraphs have been taken from the author’s Use of Force in International Relations (Bombay, 1959).
would bring under fire approximately 40 per cent of our population
and 60 per cent of our industry.

Thermo-nuclear weapons, according to a member of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission, represent an entirely new kind
of power: "the atmospheric contamination that results from large
thermo-nuclear explosions is serious. In fact it is so serious that it
could be catastrophic. A sufficiently large number of such explosions
would render the earth uninhabitable to man. This is plain fact."
"These explosives", says Baldwin, "range in power from a tactical
weapon designed to sink a ship, destroy a plane, or liquidate a batta-
lion of troops to a strategic weapon with sufficient power to devastate
any city on earth and to poison with radioactivity vast areas of sur-
rounding territory. The power of these weapons and particularly the
radioactivity of the new three-stage 'Supers' are so threatening that
their unlimited use in war would probably destroy civilization, and
perhaps man himself."

Finally we cite the authority of Einstein regarding the destructive
nature of the thermo-nuclear war: Albert Einstein declared on 12 Feb-
uary 1950\(^3\) (when the hydrogen bomb was known to be a possibility).

The H-bomb appears on the public horizon as a probably attain-
able goal ... If successful, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere
and hence annihilation of any life on earth, has been brought within
the range of technical possibilities.

Wars have always been destructive; but the possibility inherent in
the thermo-nuclear war of annihilation of man makes it, I suggest,
different in kind from earlier wars. The object of earlier wars, Harris
points out,\(^4\) was to destroy, not so much the enemy as his power to
resist, and it was a commander's aim to do this with the minimum of
loss not only to his own troops but also to those of the enemy. What
he sought to do was to reduce the enemy's forces of men and material
just so much as to make him surrender or withdraw. To continue
to kill the opposing forces beyond what was necessary for victory
was regarded as wasteful and barbarous. Moreover, the conduct of
war in earlier days was based upon the customarily accepted distinc-
tions between combatants and non-combatants, between belligerents
and neutrals and between the activities of governments and the activi-
ties of their subjects. But now war has become truly total — a
mobilization of the total resources of the nation with a view to achiev-
ing total victory and war would affect every one in a way which he
had not known before.

\(^3\) *New York Times*, 13 February 1950.

\(^4\) Harris, Errol E., *The Survival of Political Man* (Johannesburg, 1950), p. 3; see also the joint declaration of 18 of Western Germany's leading scientists on 12 April 1957, *Kessing's Contemporary Archives*. 
I have said enough, I believe, to bring out the destructive nature of thermo-nuclear war. A point may well be made at this stage which it would be helpful to consider. The discovery and the application of new weapons have been going on through ages, e.g. gunpowder, and every new invention is thought to be a revolution; why make much of thermo-nuclear weapons? The point is well taken; but, as I said earlier, expert opinion up to date tends to take the view that, with the evidence cited above, earlier revolutions in military history brought about only differences in degree but not in kind. Further, even remembering the limitless potentialities of science, experts also take the view that a weapon has been produced against which no defence whatever is possible.

IV

IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY

I said earlier in my analysis that the main effect of the development of thermo-nuclear weapons, taken together with two important political developments since 1946, viz. the increase in the number of sovereign States following the emancipation of former colonies and the increasing impact of world public opinion on those who decide foreign policy, has been to introduce a crippling effect on the decision-making process in foreign policy. Evidence there is in plenty; it is sufficient to cite the patent fact that there are truces and stalemates at several trouble-spots from East to West — Korea, Vietnam, Kashmir, Palestine and Berlin, instead of peace and settlements of the question at issue. It would be a fair historical guess to say that these questions in the pre-atomic age would have been settled, if necessary, by a threat of war, irrespective of the justice of the war; but such a solution has obviously been found too costly by the parties concerned.

One of these, viz., Korea maybe discussed in some detail, so that the uncertainties which beset policy makers may be laid bare.

It will be remembered that in August-September 1950, when North Korea had suffered a military reverse, the question arose whether the United Nations forces should stop at the 38th Parallel in pursuit of North Korea's troops. India pleaded that the North Koreans had been adequately defeated for the time being and had been prevented from achieving their original aim of unifying all Korea by military means and that at the hour of United Nations success moderation should be shown and resort should be had to peaceful means for achieving the unification of Korea. India also warned that the crossing of the 38th Parallel by UN forces might have the unfortunate effect of bringing China into the war. On December 6, 1950, Nehru said in Parliament:
We consulted our Ambassador in Peking and our representatives in other countries about how the various Governments were viewing the scene. We had perhaps a rather special responsibility in regard to China, because we were one of the very few countries represented there . . . . The Chinese Government clearly indicated that if the 38th Parallel was crossed, they would consider it a grave danger to their own security and that they would not tolerate it.

The warning was disregarded; an eight-power resolution virtually authorizing United Nations troops to enter any part of Korea and create conditions for the unification of Korea was passed (October 7). On October 9, the United Nations forces crossed the 38th Parallel and Chinese volunteers joined the forces of North Korea.

The militarist approach embodied in the resolution resulted in a stalemate. Truman's memoirs give an insight into the circumstances that led to the stalemate. The story is too long to be told here, but its essentials may be recounted. The far East Commander, General Mac Arthur, had taken the view that to continue to take action against the Chinese in Korea only — i.e. no air attacks on bases in Manchuria, no naval blockade against the China mainland etc. would be equivalent to surrendering, and a decisive result could not be attained. He advised on a blockade by the United Nations of the coast of China and the bombing of the Chinese mainland.

"The anxiety of our Allies" records Truman "became even more pronounced after a highly secret report was received from Peiping on November 15th, stating that a top Russian diplomat there had said that if Manchurian airfields were bombed by United Nations planes, the Soviet Air Force would strike back in force.

Just how sensitive and on edge the world had become, was demonstrated when the words 'atom bomb' were mentioned at my Press Conference on November 30th.

At that conference I made the remark that "we will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have".

"Will that include the atomic bomb?" one of the reporters asked.

"That includes every weapon that we have," I replied.

"Mr. President," the questioner shot back, "you said 'every weapon that we have'. Does that mean that there is active consideration of its use," I told him. "I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used."

To make quite sure that no one would misunderstand my words,

5 Years of Trial and Hope 1945-1955, pp. 418-441.
6 Truman, op. cit., p. 418.
I authorized Charles Ross, my Press Secretary, to issue a separate note clarifying statement after the Press Conference:

"The President wants to make it certain", this reads, "that there is no misinterpretation of his answers to questions at his Press Conference today about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat.

"Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon."

"However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon."

The final decision of the President was

"General MacArthur was ready to risk general war. I was not."

It is implicit in my view that the main impact of the development of thermo-nuclear weapons has been to lead to a dilemma in foreign policy — viz., whether to use or not to use force and that the possibility of a thermo-nuclear war is not ruled out mainly because such a war is total or so destructive. Two questions may be raised and an attempt made to answer them. First, when, so much is being known and talked about the destructive nature of modern war, is there reason to think that, with full knowledge of certain destruction, man will proceed so far as to destroy himself? And second, is it not likely that limited wars, as distinguished from global wars, may be waged with no possibility of all-out destruction?

To the first question no certain answer can be given. On the one hand, optimists are inclined to believe that man's inventive genius will be able not only to discover effective devices to detect the coming of the airplane or missile before the mischief is attempted, but also to discover effective defence against destruction; exaggerated fears expressed when gunpowder and bacteriological and chemical weapons were invented could be cited by them in support. Experts, however, seem unanimously of the view stated by me earlier that a weapon has been produced against which no defence whatever is possible. Even if this is correct, it is held that the achievement of atomic parity between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. itself is an effective deterrent: either party, certain of having to face retaliation, if an all-out war is begun by the other, is bound to desist from an attempt which is certain to destroy itself. Professor P. M. S. Blackett vigorously supports this stand: "I think we should act as if atomic and

1 Truman, op. cit., p. 441.
hydrogen bombs have abolished total war and concentrate our efforts on working out how few atomic bombs and their carriers are required to keep it abolished.” But this view is by no means unanimously accepted. Quincy Wright, the noted authority on war, thinks that while the fear of retaliation is an important deterrent, it may not suffice to prevent war if political rivalries continue with mounting tensions; it is “a slender reed to lean upon” and “efforts to achieve national security by exclusive reliance on either military superiority or a military balance are likely to achieve ruin for all”. There is, no doubt, logic in this, and, it may be added, “by an ironical but demonstrable law, nations which have armed themselves to preserve the peace have seldom avoided war”. Hans J. Morgenthau indeed argues in a trenchant analysis that nothing in the actual facts warrants the assumption that an all-out atomic war has become impossible; on the contrary, “to the extent that we assume the impossibility of an all-out atomic war and act on the assumption, we increase the very possibility of such a war.” The reason is that an atomic stalemate can be such only so long as two parties who possess the destructive weapons continue always to be equal in their power; such an assumption can be valid only if technology is stable, but we know for certain that weapon technology is far from stable. And we should also heed the warning contained in the Einstein-Russell statement in July 1955: “Whatever agreements not to use H. Bombs have been reached in time of war, and both sides would set to work to manufacture H. Bombs as soon as war broke out, for if one side manufactured the bombs and the other did not, the side that manufactured them would inevitably be victorious.”

This apart, it is admitted on all hands that the possibility of an accident — failure of mechanical installations, or of human beings — must be taken into account. Again, the argument by Professor Blackett cited above does not take adequate account of the play of the irrational in politics made familiar to us by Graham Wallas. In his Human Nature in Politics he argues that in any adequate explanation of political events, due plea must be given to the play of unreason in politics. The following extract from a speech by a Chinese leader P’eng on 22 August 1956 will support this.

America possesses atomic weapons and is threatening us with them. But we are not afraid of atomic warfare. Why? Because China has 600 million people. Even if 200 million people were killed by atomic weapons, 400 million people would still survive. Even if 400 million people were killed 200 million would still survive. Even if 200 million survived, China would still constitute a big

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country of the world. Furthermore, these 200 million people will "absolutely not surrender. Therefore, at the end America will lose the war. Those who say that they are not afraid of atomic warfare are also clearly capable of provoking atomic warfare.

To the second question we raised about the possibility of limited wars, the answer is a clear ‘yes’: Korea and Indo-China have shown that in the absence of agreed settlements on major political issues, and so long as those who have nuclear weapons decide not to use them for solving those issues, we may expect a number of wars locally waged, without developing into global all-out wars. A limited war is fought for specific political objectives, with the consequential relation between the force employed and the objectives to be attained; it does not attempt annihilation of the enemy but aims only at specific objectives, and it ends when it seems to the enemy that continued resistance is less useful than accepting the conditions which may be imposed. Though limited wars offer no guarantee against their expansion into all-out wars, a mutual reluctance to expand the conflict on account of the fear of social disintegration inherent in all-out wars, will be an important factor in preventing them from such expansion. Let us emphasize, however, that this mutual reluctance will be in evidence only so long as the objectives for which such wars are fought are limited. If, for instance, the Soviet Union considers the whole non-communist world as hostile to it, as indeed she has declared several times, and if she attempts to achieve the communization of the whole world as is implicit in Marxism-Leninism and the other States concerned resist her attempt, the objectives become wider and limited wars cannot remain limited. As Eisenhower, the soldier-statesman has said* "War in our time has become an anachronism. Whatever the case in the past, war in the future can serve no useful purpose. A war which became general, as any limited action might, could only result in the virtual destruction of mankind."

V

CHANGE IN THE RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON THE ELEMENTS OF POWER*

I have argued so far that the development of thermo-nuclear weapons has, through a revolution in warfare it has brought about, led to a hesitation in the minds of statesmen regarding the use of force to achieve national objectives; it is interesting to reflect that

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9 The Statesman, 23 April 1956, italics ours.
* The point dealt with in this section was only briefly touched upon in the course of the lecture, it has since been developed here.
this hesitation has, in turn, its repercussions on the concept of power in international relations; to this aspect I now turn.

Power, in the theory of international relations, is the ability of one nation to ensure that other nations act in the desired direction through the influence which the former can exercise over the latter; it is a function of three factors, the ability to offer advantages which means a play upon the hope of the nation willing to be influenced, the capacity to make the concerned nation suffer disabilities in the event of unwillingness to act in the desired direction, and in the last resort, to use force (which means a play upon fear); and the appeal to the ideals and the institutions and the common interests for which the two nations stand, or a combination of these. Pakistan might well follow the United States lead because of the hope of getting United States military aid which she could, though not by authorisation, use in getting Kashmir, just as well as India might not like to offend the Soviet Union in the hope of getting continuing Soviet support in the Security Council on the Kashmir question; Hungary might decide to continue in the Soviet bloc for fear of being attacked by the Soviet Union if she followed a different line and Poland might follow the line of the Soviet Union for fear of losing the latter's support in maintaining her present border with East Germany. An open rift between China and the Soviet Union might be avoided even though they have differences if only because both desire to promote the advance of communism in the world. Britain might be willing to follow the lead of the United States as e.g. on the Suez question because of the hope of economic assistance from the latter (as the classic instance of Marshall aid), because of the fear of losing United States support in defending herself against possible attack from the Soviet Union, and because the two nations share the democratic ideal of freedom.

The relative strength of the three elements of power mentioned above, — hope, fear, and love — depends, it is well known, upon a number of factors: geographical (the size and location of a country, its natural resources and the number of its population), political (the efficiency of the government and, in particular of its diplomacy), economic (the optimum use of the country's human and natural resources in production, and in particular the quality of its technological research), military (the strength of the army, navy and air forces) and social (the cohesion among the people).

In this lecture we are primarily concerned with the ability to cause fear as an element of power, i.e. the ability of a nation to influence another by threatening to wage war and, thereby inducing this fear in the latter, to influence it to follow its lead.

The question arises, what effect has the admittedly changed nature of war — not only in degree but in kind — on the content and use
of power?

Alternative ways of maintaining national power — by ways other than a threat to use force — become relatively more important, and in particular by the use of aid (especially economic) and by diplomacy. The first of these falls within the field of the first element of power we mentioned, viz. the ability to offer advantages; the second falls in the field of all the three elements of power, viz. the ability to offer advantages, the ability to create disabilities and the ability to create mutual interests.

The importance of economic aid in the foreign relations of recent years is now common knowledge; the following figures should give some idea of the quantities involved. From 1954 to 1961, Soviet aid to the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and South America amounted to $3,800 million. It has been calculated that between a third and a quarter of Soviet loans are for military purchases, and the balance for industrial, agricultural and other projects in some twenty countries. The United States aid to the underdeveloped countries has been estimated during the same period at approximately eight times this figure. The political implications of aid of such quantities need not be elaborated.

The growing importance of diplomacy in the changing world has been mentioned earlier: it arises essentially from the fact that force, which in an earlier age could be used by most states without danger to survival, cannot today be used by any state without such a risk. To use a phrase of Max Lerner (a former colleague of mine) the super powers have a surplus of power which they are not able to use for fear of destroying themselves. It is the function of diplomacy in the altered circumstances to forge common bonds of interest between States and to stress the means of peaceful change in international society so that there is no temptation on the part of an individual State or of the international community to resort to war. The road is hard, but in the revolutionary age in which we are living there is no short cut to peace, security and justice.

VI

CAN THE DILEMMA BE RESOLVED?

The dilemma having been posed, you may ask me, how can the dilemma be resolved?

In theory it seems to me that the dilemma can be resolved only by wishing away the conditions which bring about the dilemma, viz., the existence of the nation State, and the nation-State’s preparedness to use force to gain national objectives. The existence of the nation-State can be wished away by the suggestion of a World Federation,
and the preparedness to use force by the advocacy of non-violence.

The proposals of the world federalists, however reasonably argued, must be considered ahead of the times in which we live. Among the proposals of the kind which I have seen, the most cogent and certainly worth adoption, if only those who govern the destinies of nations will see the writing on the well — are those by G. Clark and L. B. Sohn in their *Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision*. The gist of their proposals is disarmament through law: competitive armaments is the villain of the piece in world anarchy today and the only solution is universal disarmament, complete and enforceable through a rigid system of inspection, only strictly limited and lightly armed forces being permitted to nation-States for internal order only. The revised United Nations will, therefore, be a federation of all nations to enforce compulsory national disarmament and fully equipped to prevent or promptly suppress any wars between any nations. The powers of the Federation would be restricted to matters directly related to the prevention of war, though within this field they would also be adequate; but outside that field, it should have no authority whatever, except to recommend. As I have said earlier, the proposals seem to me to be cogent and well worth adoption as there is no other alternative to competitive national armaments. The fears and tensions engendered in a world armed with modern weapons make negotiation of serious differences between nations highly difficult and often impossible. As experience has shown, partial disarmament is difficult to achieve, as efforts for achieving it bog down in disputes over ‘quotas’ and the ‘needs’ of the Powers. Universal and complete national disarmament not only puts an end to such fears and tensions and thereby makes the settlement of political problems easier but makes possible the diversion of the world’s energy and resources now consumed in the arms race for improving the lot of the millions who now live in poverty. If world public opinion can compel the politically influential leaders to have them accepted by the various countries in a period of fifteen to twenty years within which the authors of the proposals hope to have them accepted, I for one will welcome such a step.

But as I have said earlier, the chances of adoption of such cogent proposals at the present time are not bright.

Non-violence, as a moral alternative to war, was advocated and practised, as we know by Mahatma Gandhi and a number of idealists before him. Gandhi himself thought that it would be a miracle if the great powers accepted his ideas, but he also added that miracles have happened before and may happen again.

“It is open to the great powers to take up non-violence any day and cover themselves with glory and earn the eternal gratitude of
posterity. If they or any of them can shed the fear of destruction, if they disarm themselves, they will automatically help the rest to regain their sanity. But then these great powers have to give up imperialistic ambitions and exploitation of the so-called uncivilized or semi-civilized nations of the earth and revise their mode of life. It means a complete revolution. Great nations can hardly be expected in the ordinary course to move spontaneously in a direction the reverse of the one they have followed, and, according to their notion of value, from victory to victory. But miracles have happened before and may happen even in this very prosaic age. Who can dare limit God's power of undoing wrong? One thing is certain. If the mad race for armaments continues, it is bound to result in a slaughter such as has never occurred in history. If there is a victor left, the very victory will be a living death for the nation that emerges victorious. There is no escape from the impending doom save through a bold and unconditional acceptance of the non-violent method with all its glorious implications.

Time prevents us from examining the implications of the concept of non-violence as a means of harmonizing international relations; it is perhaps sufficient to say in this context that so long as non-violence is not accepted as an effective method of preventing and settling disputes — and the modern trend of opinion does not show that it has been accepted — the dilemma we posed would continue to remain as such.

It is not safe, I suggest, to wish away the conditions which exist, lest disappointment should overtake us. Where then do we go from here?

I am conscious that I am speaking under the auspices of a Research Institute; may I suggest that, in order to resolve the dilemma, more thinking should be done on whether the technique of negotiation and other peaceful methods of settlement are potentially capable of yielding more successful results than they have yielded so far? War has often been resorted to in the past when peaceful means of adjustment failed; under modern conditions, war, it is recognised, cannot be a useful alternative to peaceful means of adjustment. Can we then fall back on the only other alternative available to effect changes of legal rights, viz., peaceful means of adjustment of differences, in order that some satisfaction can be obtained by the parties concerned?

Posing the question in this way may surprise orthodox students of international politics as being against the verdict of history; indeed it may be considered naive, as it would appear to be based on an over-optimistic view of human nature. Such a view, I suggest, would be

10 See in this connexion the author's On Understanding India's Foreign Policy in International Relations, October 1960.
hasty and unhistorical. The world’s attention is unfortunately focussed more on the differences which have arisen between states, and less on the agreements which have been arrived at. It would, historically be correct to say that more differences have been settled by discussion and agreement than by resort to war; the records of the day-to-day activities in the chancelleries of the world, if available to the student, would substantiate this view. To take a few examples from recent history: truces (not peace agreements) have been secured in Korea, Indo-China and Kashmir; some progress has been achieved in nuclear disarmament, the principle of international control and inspection being also accepted by the Soviet Union after years of negotiations, though later the Soviet Union changed its view, the Austrian treaty has been signed. Coming nearer home, France agreed to transfer to India her possessions in India, India agreeing to safeguards for the protection of French culture in those territories. The canal water dispute between India and Pakistan has been settled; the differences between the two countries over border adjustments have also been successfully resolved.11

The question naturally arises, what explains the fact that some success has been achieved by negotiation in these instances? The anatomy of negotiation suggests that when two or more parties disagree on a question, two factors play a part in resolving their differences, one, the fear on the part of any party to the dispute that superior force might be used to settle the difference, and the other, the sense of accommodation which suggests that while its own vital interests must be safeguarded, consideration must also be given to the interests of the other party or parties. It is not easy to isolate these two factors and say which has played the greater part in the final settlement of the differences at issue: there are too many variables to be taken into account in assessing the sources of fear of force on the one hand, and the sense of accommodation on the other. Thus force is a function of several factors: geographical position, economic resources, the strength of the government and the leaders in power, diplomatic finesse, armaments, alliances and the morale of the people of the country in question; the sense of accommodation is a compound of the innate sense of justice, the desire to placate public opinion at home and abroad, and the desire to have some stability in the settlement to be arrived at. These apart, another factor in the situation,

11 There are, of course innumerable instances to illustrate the reverse of the picture, viz. that differences have not always been adjusted: the delay in coming to terms on disarmament, Berlin, the continuing dispute in respect of the treatment of racial minorities especially in South Africa, the vexed question of West Irian, the trouble over the use of the Suez canal by Israeli ships, the failure of the Summit Conference over the issue of America’s sending the U-2 plane over the Soviet Union and so on.
invariably, is conflicting interpretations of the facts in question; this acts as a sort of brake on the willingness to use force, and as an ally to the sense of accommodation.

If this analysis is correct, it follows that where negotiations have been successful, the sense of accommodation has played a greater part than the possession by one side of superior power and that where negotiations have not been successful, the reverse has been the case; the sense of accommodation is itself affected by the extent of the interest that the protagonists attach to the issue in dispute. Equality in power has been more favourable to negotiation than efforts of each to attain superiority in power.

In sum, the essence of an approach to successful negotiation, through history, has been for each party to be prepared to settle the differences in such a manner that none of the parties suffers a significant loss; for only then would the result be stable; this is integral to true negotiation as such. This tradition is explicitly mentioned in the Indian epic, the *Mahabharata*. When Shri Krishna was about to proceed for negotiations to bring about a settlement between the Pandavas and Kurus, he summarised the object of his mission in the following words:

"Yes, I will go to King Dhritarashtra, desirous of accomplishing what is consistent with righteousness, what may be beneficial to us and what also is for the good of the Kurus."

It is remarkable that a distinguished international jurist of the seventeenth century, Gentili should have taken the same approach:

"In general, it may be true in nearly every kind of dispute that neither of the two disputants is unjust."

A distinguished contemporary historian, Herbert Butterfield of Cambridge, has traced the root cause of conflict to the pride and wilfulness of parties which makes them ignore the half-right in the other. He said: "While there is battle and hatred men have eyes for nothing save the fact that the enemy is the cause of all the troubles; but long, long afterwards, when all passion has been spent, the historian often sees that it was a conflict between one half-right that was perhaps too wilful, and another half-right that was perhaps too proud."

We suggest that the tradition referred to above has been the universal tradition not always consistently followed but nevertheless more often followed by negotiators in every country than statesmen are prepared to admit. The willingness to submit a dispute to third-party

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[12] This statement excludes stable results achieved by means of war, e.g. war did settle the relation between Britain and the thirteen American colonies more or less on a stable basis.

judgement, as may be seen in the numerous cases referred to arbitration, can be explained only by the existence in the disputants of that spirit of accommodation and of willingness to see the other man’s point of view which is so essential in order to avoid a breakdown. The Indian emphasis on negotiation as a way to peace only highlights a well-known technique and its utility in the atomic age. Indeed there is room for research on how to improve the techniques of negotiation and other peaceful methods of settlement so that they may yield the desired results. In a remarkable article contributed to Diplomacy in a Changing World, Dag Hammarskjoeld writes that in the diplomacy of world organization, “the quiet work of preparing the ground, of accommodation of interest and viewpoint, of conciliation and mediation, all that goes into the winning of consent to agreed solutions and common programmes, this forms a basis upon which the United Nations can become an increasingly influential effective force to aid governments in pursuit of the goals of the Charter” and again, “we can register efforts to give such diplomacy the support of firmer procedures.” It is true that in the past, negotiation has not always succeeded and hence wars have occurred so often; wars in the modern age must be avoided if mankind is to survive; can we, then, from a study of cases of negotiation both successful and unsuccessful evolve general principles as to the conditions under which negotiation has been successful and can be successful?

14 Hammarskjoeld, Dag, ‘The Role of the United Nations’ in Diplomacy in a Changing World, edited by Stephen D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1959). In support, Hammarskjoeld cites three instances viz., agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy and agreement on the details concerning the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force arrived at by government representatives sitting as members of Advisory Committees to the Secretary-General and discussing in private, and the agreement among the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and Egypt on the Security Council issue in 1956, discussing the issue in private in the office of the Secretary-General.
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* Not published.
† Out of print.
N.B. No lecture was delivered in 1947.
WASTAGE IN COLLEGE EDUCATION

by

A. R. KAMAT
A. G. DESHMUKH

The book consists of two studies regarding students of the Poona University. The first study considers a three-year entry of students to arts and science of the Fergusson College and deals with wastage and stagnation amongst them. The data is also analysed by several important factors such as S.S.C. examination marks, age, caste, and guardian's income and occupation. The second study analyses the failures at the Pre-Degree examination 1961 of the Poona University with a view to indicate broadly the problem areas and possible remedial measures.

NATIONAL INCOME AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN
INDIA : 1900-01—1952-53

by

K. MUKERJI

The book incorporates some derived estimates of national income in India and their backward projections up to 1900. It also seeks to measure the volume of public sector outlay on goods and services from 1900 to 1953 and compare the volume of public expenditure with the national income in an effort to analyse the relation that may be subsisted between the two magnitudes for the fifty-three years under study.