

68

Select Writings

OF

THE LATE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE

M. G. RANADE,

M. A. LL. B.,

ADVOCATE, C. I. E.

ON

INDIAN STATES



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Editor,

Vasudeo Waman Thakur,

B. A.

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The late
Honourable Justice M. G. RANADE,
M. A., LL. B., ADVOCATE, C. I. E.



1842-1901 A. D.

श्रीदत्त.

A Biographical Sketch

OF

THE LATE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE

M. G. RANADE, M. A., LL. B.,

ADVOCATE, C. I. E.

(1842-1901).

The late Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madhaorao Govind Ranade was born on the 18th of January 1842, at Niphad (Dist. Nasik, Bombay Presidency). His great-grand-father named Bhagwant Appa was an ambassador of the Sangli Chief in the Court of the Peshwa and the East India Company. He served his master well and was honoured with a hereditary jahagir by his Chief. He died at the age of 95, all hale and whole. His son named Amritrao (grand-father of Just. Ranade) served the East India Company and rose to the position of a Mamlatdar and died at the ripe age of 80. Amritrao's son Govindrao was the father of the hero of this sketch. He had served the East India Company, and latterly rose to the position of Khasgi Karbhari at the Court of Kolhapur.

Just. Ranade, it will be thus seen, was born of a well-to-do Bramhin family in the Deccan of the last century.

2 Just. Ranade completed his vernacular education at Kolhapur and proceeded to Bombay for further study. He stayed in Bombay from 1854 to 1871, and became M. A., L. L. B., and Advocate. He also worked as Junior and Senior Fellow, assistant Professor and Professor in the Elphinstone College of which he was a student in his early career. In all his examinations he won brilliant success, winning all the available scholarships as well as prizes.

3 In 1871 he was appointed First class subordinate Judge whence he rose to the post of the High Court Judge of Bombay in 1893 which post he held till when he breathed his last on the 16th of January 1901. He was respected, nay, revered, by all those who came in contact with him in the Judicial service. He tried to modernize Hindu Law, and Equity had always a high estimate in all his thoughts.

4 But Ranade is, to-day, remembered more for his varied public service than Government service. He was a man of deep erudition and intense patriotism. His profound study of European History and Economics were always at

his service to search ways and means for the elevation of his mother-country holy and hoary.

5 Ranade's public life commenced in 1871, and ended with his life in 1901. These thirty years can, conveniently, be divided into two equal parts 1871-1885, and 1885-1901. During the former period he tried to educate the public by his his articles on political, industrial, agricultural, educational and economic questions of the day. This work he did through the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha, and its Quarterly.

6 The year 1885 saw the birth of the Indian National Congress. Ranade took advantage of these large national annual gatherings, and launched sister-institutions like the Social Conference, Industrial Conference and exhibitions. He was, so to say, the soul of all these movements meant to educate, agitate and organize. All this work he continued to the last with the co-operation of the young and old who could see eye to eye with him.

7 All his writings and and speeches in English on the various topics of the day number nearly 3000 printed pages. The following verdicts of eminent authorities on the different sides and aspects of the papers will be found interesting.

(I) The Times of India says 'The late Justice Ranade's contributions on Political, Eco-

nomical and Industrial subjects are model essays : We call upon his younger friends to edit them and rescue them.

(II) Lord Reay (Governor of Bombay)
 " Your Association has, during my tenure of office, given me the benefit of your criticism. I consider it useful, and I shall mention to Lord Harris that in continuing these friendly relations he will find the task of Government made lighter.

III William Digby:—These volumes of the Poona Sarvajanic Sabbha's Quarterly Journal constituted a useful and a most important record, which must be valued by every student of Indian Politics.

(IV) The Hon'ble Mr. Macdonald:—These addresses delivered at the Social Reform Conference have been revelations to me. Justice Ranade exhibits all the qualities of an ideal reformer : a profound sympathy with the victims of social injustice, sobriety of statement, enthusiasm, energy, above all, a spiritual fervour, and along with it a persuasive reasonableness which must strangely move his hearers. These speeches are a mine of ideas, and absolutely essential to every one who would know the India of to-day in its higher aspirations."

(V) Professor Selby (Principal Deccan College):—He had made a profound study of our English system of Political Economy. He had realized the logic of it, that is, he had seen the pre-suppositions on which it rests, and he had pondered deeply how far these pre-suppositions hold good in this country, and consequently with what modifications and limitations it is necessary to apply its deductions here. He had a definite and connected theory of the conditions of economic progress in India, and of the functions of Government and society in relation to it.

(VI) On his religious discourses says Dr. Selby:—"He had a profound belief in the reality of a Providence in Nature and in History—a moral government of the Universe—and this, I think, is the secret of his unwearying perseverance and his unconquerable optimism. He took the constitution of the society, and with his eye fixed upon the ideal, he would insert a feature here and a feature there, until he had made the ways of men, so far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God."

(VII) On his Historical, and States' writings says Sir C. Ollivant:—"It is given to few men to be as free as Ranade was from deteriorating limitations, and yet be absolutely loyal to the best traditions of his race and faith."

8 These testimonials—unsought and spontaneous as they are,—will speak volumes on the inestimable and educative value of the writings of late revered Justice Ranade.

With this biographical sketch together with the nature of the valuable legacy left to us by our "Guide, Friend and Philosopher" I offer this the first volume of Rishi Ranade's select writings to all the lovers of "Indian States".

INDORE.

V. V. THAKUR.

18 th January 1942.

Ranade's own list of
 articles in the "INDU-PRAKASH" of Bombay. (1862-3 A. D.)

(1) ... 23 Jan
 Bombay University - 18 December
 (Summary)
 Summary of Law Dispute (22 Dec
 Debhatkaraj's case {Read it along
 with the
 Law Commission
 26 Dec
 29 Dec
 ...
 Retrospect - 5 January 1863
 before the Council ...
 ... 12 January
 ... 19 January
 ... 26 January
 ... 16 February
 ... 23 Feb
 ... 19 March
 ...
 ... 16

INTRODUCTION.

The Late Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madhaorao Govind Ranade, M. A., L. L. B., Advocate, C. I. E. breathed his last on the 16th of January 1901. The Times of India, in its obituary note called upon his younger friends to edit Ranade's writings and rescue them.

2 This sacred work was entrusted by the late Hon'ble Professor G. K. Gokhale, B. A., C. I. E. to the present editor with a plan well-chalked to bring out all the writings of Justice Ranade in Volumes on the lines of "Burke's Works." The materials were collected numbering three-thousand printed pages on various subjects. But alas ! that was not then to be. The revered Professor died a premature death brought on by hard work and harder worries.

3 Of these three-thousand pages, nearly 1250 cover political and administrative topics of the day, History takes up 400, Social matters equalling the same number. Indian States engage 300 pages, Indian Economics and Industries run over 250, while Education, Religion and miscellaneous topics are satisfied with 400.

4 On the general nature of these writings. The Times of India has remarked "Different Government measures are very freely criticized, and the criticism is very thorough-going and effective, but we do not see any where evidence that the right of the Government, to the obedience and support of the population is called in question. On the contrary that right is implicitly recognized throughout, and the British Government is credited as the one Government which is capable of raising India in the rank of nations".

5 If then India as a whole is to rise in the rank of nations, Indian States, being an integral part thereof, have also their responsibilities and duties to discharge, as well as the British Paramount Power has its. The work is of co-operation all round. Ranade commenced his "Public Life" in 1859, when he was only seventeen years old, by his paper on "The duties of the educated Indians." In 1860 he compared the work of "Bengal Zamindars with that of the Deccan Chiefs." In 1863 appeared his article on "Maharaja Scindia" in the "Indu-Prakash" of Bombay. He was, thus, closely observing the position and attitude of the Princely class in India, from the time of his entry into "Public Life."

6 The trial of Maharaja Malharrao of Baroda brought matters to a crisis, involving as it did,

a number of constitutional questions. The memorial of the Poona Sarvajanic Sabbha submitted to the Viceroy clearly enunciated the position thus: "It is consonant with Justice that the integrity of an Indian State in alliance with the British Government is not bound up with the personal good behaviour of the ruler for the time being of that State. The State survives a succession of rulers that live and die. The State (Dowlat) does not belong of private right to the Chief."

7 In 1877 the said Sabha presented an address to the Queen-Empress of India, expressing a hope that "an effort would be made to associate the great Indian Princes in the practical work of administration of British India, and that the system of keeping Political Agents and military camps in Indian territories will give way to more cordial association of them in the Councils of the Empire, through some organization of a recognized *diet* or assembly, where they could meet one another and the great officers and statesmen, who rule India and discuss all Imperial questions. The time has arrived for such a change. The paramount claims of British Power are unquestioned. An Imperial Government can-not be imagined without a constitution, regulating its relations with dependent sovereigns. Questions regarding the policy of small frontier-wars with barbarous tribes,

boundary disputes between Indian States, and similar differences between British and Non-British territory, the measures to be adopted with respect to rulers who misgovern their territories, questions of adoption, extradition, coinage and of Imperial legislation might be referred to a Council that may be evolved out of Durbar gatherings which take place from time to time." This was Ranade's idea of a Confederated India.

8 He saw nothing came out of all this petitioning. Undaunted he persevered, and took up each question of Foreign as well as Home policy concerning the Indian States as they arose from time to time.

The Afgan war sprung up out of the Imperial Policy then hotly pursued. The question of the "Armies of the Indian States" was being thrashed from different, yet, interested points of view here and elsewhere. Ranade took up his pen and replied to the various views with his persuasive reasonableness. Pages 13-174 of the present volume are devoted to this subject. All the seven articles of this volume are selected from the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha Quarterly. I am greatly indebted to the Sabha and its Secretary Mr. Sadashewrao Bapat.

9 The disputes of inter-relations of Indian States and the way in which they are generally handled form a subject of treatment in the first

article of the volume : the remedy suggested is "We want the help of a well-informed public opinion, intelligent Indian sovereigns, honest advisers to them, and great perseverance in all, in ventilating this grievance so as to reach the ears of the authorities in India and in England. There is no wrong without a remedy."

10 The topic of "Fresh Taxation" circled round a number of Indian States (specially in the Bombay Presidency) and it involved many a basic and constitutional principles. Ranade's treatment of the subject is full and many-sided. In his own words it may be fitly summed up—"The new opium policy of British Government is a wide departure from the fiscal policy hitherto maintained by that Government, while its expediency has been most questionable, its injustice and unfairness are stamped on its very face."

11 Ranade is not content with mere criticism—and that too on inter-state administration and constitutional issues. He has something constructive to give. His articles on Sir Salar Jung and Raja Sir T. Madhwarao have instruction to impart both to Indians and the British. They are, more or less, hints suggested based on facts. The essence of his experience and erudition is, however, all to be discovered in his "Constitution for Indian States" (Pages 175 to 221).

12 This "Constitution" may again be summed up in Ranade's words coupled with that venerable Rishi's blessings too:—

"With a prince brought up as His Highness the present Maharaja of Indore (His Highness Maharaja Sri Tukojee Rao II) assisted by a responsible and respected Minister, with a council of officers representing the heads of all departments and the leaders of the non-official classes, with the land-revenue and other sources of income settled on moderate and fixed principles, with a careful separation of the Khasgi from the State Department, and a proper distribution of the civil and Military, Judicial and Executive functions in separate hands, carefully selected from among the subjects of the State after due examination, with written laws, and annual publication of accounts, with a policy of conservation of the rights and distinctions of the Sardar and privileged classes, and of strict regard to keep up their connection with the soil, with every care taken to associate people in the work of practical administration as Local Justices, Jurors, Municipal and Taluka councilors, &c. &c., what is there to prevent Indian States from becoming models to British India for the quiet contentment of their subjects, and the great school of self-education and progress in political emancipation?"

22-1-42
INDORE.

V. V. THAKUR.

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भारत.

INDIAN STATES



BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONS

(*Poona Sarvajanic Sabha Quarterly*

1879 April, Vol. 1, 3)

The British Government in India has now definitely assumed to itself all the prerogatives of the sole Paramount Power in India. About three years ago, a rather sharp controversy arose in this connection suggested by a very thoughtful article in the *Indu Prakash*, which, while according to the British Government a *De facto* supremacy over the Native States in their relations with one another and with foreign powers, contended with some reason that this supremacy had no foundation *De Jure*, and that it resembled the hegemony claimed by the leading power in several of the conglomerate states of modern and ancient Europe, more than the claim put forth of feudal suzerainty over vassal states. This suggestion was denounced more in England than in India as a seditious declaration, but the warmth and violence of these denunciations showed but too plainly the weakness of the case

which the high-handed advocates thought themselves bound to make out. At any rate this controversy disclosed the necessity of a formal enunciation of the true character of the supremacy claimed for the British Government in India, and the Durbar at Delhi with its gorgeous pageant was intended to remove all doubts on this point. As all the great Chiefs who were invited to that assemblage accepted the new order of things with a readiness which surprised everybody, and as even Sir Salar Jung representing the oldest ally and the first native power in India, has yielded the point no question can now arise in this respect to distract the minds of the authorities. We only wish that the Paramount Power, so firmly seated in its supremacy, will now feel better disposed to give effect to the responsibilities entailed upon it by its position.

As far as we can see, there are no signs of an intention to give full effect to these legitimate expectations of the great and small states, which are now protected by the strong arm and the stronger faith of the British Government. The subject is a vast one, and there are many side-views of it which we cannot take up at present. Our attention, however, has been forcibly directed to one aspect of it, represented by the arrangements and rules which at present obtain in regard to the settlement of boundary disputes between the native states in Rajputana and Central India. The last

Administration report of the Indore Territory contains the latest edition of these rules, copies of which were sent by the Viceroy's Agents in those parts to all the states in Central India and Rajaputana for their guidance. We cannot afford space to extract the whole body of the rules, but a glance at them suffices to show that *these rules are essentially one-sided, and unduly favour the smaller states, and Thakurs, Girassias, Bhumiahs and Bhayads*, in the settlement of their disputes with the greater Chiefs. The same complaint has reached our ears in regard to the working of the Boundary Settlement Commissions in Kattiawar and Kutch, and in the Baroda territory. The native officer appointed by the Dewan of Baroda to confer with the British officer, who has been specially deputed by the Government of India to settle the Girassia disputes, has frequently found reason to complain of his utter helplessness to secure the interests of his state against the unjust encroachments which seemed to find favour with the other member of the Commission. The fault, of course, does not lie with the individual officers so much as with the *radically defective rules* they have to follow in the investigation of these claims. In the absence of any official information regarding the details of these Baroda rules, we cannot take upon ourselves to judge how far these complaints, which come from so many quarters, may be well-founded or otherwise. If, however, they resemble in their general

features the rules sanctioned by the Government of India for the guidance of its officers in Central India and Rajaputana, we can readily understand the grounds of the general dissatisfaction of the authorities in the larger Indian states with the procedure adopted by the Boundary Settlement Commissions.

The great fault we have to find against these rules is, that they do not recognize the rival and contending parties as Plaintiffs and Defendants in an ordinary civil suit relating to boundary disputes. This radical defect disastrously interferes with the fairness of subsequent proceedings. Boundary Settlement Officers are not expected to be masters of the law of evidence, but it is not too much to expect of them that they should observe the principles by which ordinary courts are regulated in fixing the burden of proof upon the proper party, and in giving due weight to legal presumptions. The party who asserts his right to a disputed boundary is the proper person to be called upon to support his claim. Boundary Settlement Officers, however, but too frequently over-ride this rule, and call upon the Defendants, who in most cases are represented by the larger states, to prove their title to continue in undisturbed possession. Of course the general rule in regard to the burden of proof is qualified by certain exceptions based on presumptions of facts which, though not conclusive, are irrebuttable, and make out a *prima facie* case for the Plaintiff, and

thus shift the burden on the Defendant. The Indian Evidence Act in its sections 101 to 110 embodies the rules and exceptions noticed above. These rules, however, are not attended to by Settlement Officers, and the course of procedure adopted by them may be briefly described as follows:—


Any person residing in a village belonging to one State, complains that some plot of land, which is being used by a neighbour of his as belonging to a neighbouring State, is within the boundary of the village belonging to the former state. The person using the land demurs to this statement. The former reports to the Durbar to which his village belongs, that the neighbouring village of the other State is encroaching on its state lands. The Durbar communicates the same to the Political Officer attached to the Durbar. This Officer sends a Chaprasee or Ameen to prevent the disputed land or tract from being used by any one. This Chaprasee or Ameen determines at his discretion how much land is in dispute, and prevents its being used. It should be here noted that the complainant almost invariably gives no particulars of the land in dispute, nor furnishes a map showing the same. The decision of the Chaprasee determines, therefore, the land in dispute preliminary to the official inquiry which often takes years to be finally settled. He often includes in the disputed tract lands which have been in the peaceful possession of parties for years. If it is arable land, some-body who is put in by the

Chaprassie cultivates it, and the whole produce, not the assessment thereon, is taken away and deposited in the Treasury of the Political Department. Years roll away before such disputes are taken up for settlement. When a junior Officer of the Political Department is deputed to settle such cases, which is often the case, he calls upon not only the private complainant and the alleged trespasser, but both the states to prefer claims and produce evidence to substantiate them. It is at this stage of proceedings that the complainant, instigated by the encouragement he receives from his state, begins to think of giving a shape to his claim. He claims not only the land, the use of which he objected to originally, but also a large slice of the territories of the other state. Howsoever long this may have been in the peaceful possession of the party complained against, and howsoever adverse to the complaining party this possession may have been, the party and the state complained against is required to shew his title to the whole tract in question.

No regular hearings are held. The pleadings are not read in the presence of the parties, and no call is made for "such explanations from them as may be necessary, to enable the Court to ascertain the precise points in dispute." The well-known rules of procedure in disputed cases are not enforced. These are, as our readers well know, that admissions made on either side shall be noted down so as to

lead the parties to the narrowest possible issues; that the Court shall then proceed to subjoin on the same paper the points in issue, whether relating to matters of law or of fact, subjecting the same before placing them on the record to discussion by the parties in order that any error or omission therein that they may be able to indicate may be rectified; that the points in dispute, thus to be placed on the record, shall embrace only such primary material allegations as go to form the Plaintiff's claim, or on the other hand, such as may serve to demonstrate its untenability; and lastly, that no evidence, oral or documentary, shall be received but such as may be relevant to some point in dispute as recorded by the Court for establishment.

While the aforesaid rules of procedure are not adopted, the parties are called upon to submit sketches unprofessionally drawn showing the extent and directions of the tracts claimed disputed by each. When these sketches are put together, they generally look like the following diagram.



A's claim extends to X, Y, while B's to R, S. The Officer rides over the disputed tract, and generally decides that as both parties have failed to substantiate their respective claims, each party should have a portion of the tract; for instance, the crooked line R. Y. O. P. should be the boundary. Very often in fixing such imaginary lines, natural limits such as ridges, canals, &c., even if they happen to be very close to these imaginary lines, are not accepted as boundaries.

A decision to this effect is drawn out by the Boundary Officer in English, whenever he is a European gentleman, which is generally the case, but its copy is not given to the parties. A Persian translation is supplied as containing the decision of the case. Now, the Persian is not the Vernacular language of the Judge, nor is it the State language now. These Persian decisions, when received, have to be translated into the Vernacular or State language of the Durbar. Thus the real meaning and force of the language of the decision becomes, if not perverted, at least vague and obscure in many places. The decision, moreover, of the first Settlement Officer is generally final. It is true that the 31st para of the Boundary Settlement rules lays down,—“ Appeals shall be in the form of a Memorandum which shall set forth, concisely, and under distinct heads, the grounds of objection to the decision appealed against, without any argu-

ment or narrative," but these rules prescribe no procedure for the hearing of appeals. This rule is evidently taken from the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code of British India.

Para 52 of the Madras Rules of 1855 lays down:—"The grounds of objection shall be stated distinctly and concisely without any argument or narrative of facts."

Section 334 of Act VIII of 1859 and Section 541 of Act X of 1877 say,—“The Memorandum of appeal shall set forth concisely and, under distinct heads, the grounds of objection to the decision appealed against, without any argument or narrative.”

These Acts, however, do not stop here, but lay down what should be done with such appeals when filed. Para 55 of the Madras Rules of 1855 goes on to say,—“On the hearing of appeals, oral pleadings are to be allowed.”—Section 344 of Act VIII of 1859 adds—“A day shall be fixed by the appellate Court for the hearing of the appeal.” Section 349.—“The Appellate Court, after hearing the appeal, shall proceed to give its Judgment in the manner hereinbefore prescribed for giving Judgment in Courts of original Jurisdiction”—that is (Section 183). “When the exhibits have been perused, the witnesses examined, and the parties heard in person or by their respective pleaders, the Court shall pronounce its Judgment.”

The same provisions are laid down in Sections 552 and 571 and 198 of Act X of 1877.

As the aforesaid boundary rules are silent upon these points, the contending parties are refused oral hearings, and they are told that on a boundary matter in appeal, the Court of appeal can or will hear nothing.

Now we ask why should Native Potentates be refused those rights which are allowed by law to the meanest of British subjects? Why should bad law be administered to them with the certain result that it leads to general discontent? Neither party is satisfied with these boundary decisions. Both go on complaining, till they are finally told that their complaints can proceed no further in India, when they seek the protection of some agitator in England. If he undertakes to ventilate their grievances, the India Office looks down upon him as a hireling. The whole Ministerial weight is brought to bear upon the subject in support of the decision, and after a few years' fight, nothing is gained, leading the disappointed combatants to believe that no justice can be had under the British Government.

Let us examine and see whether the Government is really so arbitrary and ill-intentioned. We know that it is just the reverse. We know that our Government is the best intentioned and

most severely honest on the face of the earth. In no Government of any part of the world justice is more valued than in England. Even Royalty is not beyond its pale. Simply to clear a doubt, or to prevent an encroachment, H. R. H. the Heir to the British throne had to seek remedy in courts of justice. Any subject can sue Government, and can command the same conveniences for obtaining justice that the Government possesses. No other nation loves greater fair play than the British. The British nation is roused easily and feels angry at injustice where-ever and by whom-soever done, and if it can, avenges the sufferings of the innocent, or at least sympathizes with the sufferings, and denounces the conduct of the cruel and unjust. In short, the British power and supremacy and the British constitution itself are inherently based on, and revere, justice, wish justice to be done even to their enemies, advocate justice, always proclaim that justice shall be done and do justice whenever they can.

If so, the question arises whence does this injustice proceed to Indian States? The only answer to this question is that the fault lies with the defective organization of the Foreign Department of the Government of India. We ask with some impatience if the time has not arrived when such a system should be changed. Of course, any change, however welcome, will never come from within

the Department. We want the help of a *well-informed public opinion, intelligent Indian sovereigns, honest advisers to them,* and great perseverance in all, in ventilating this grievance so as to reach the ears of the authorities in India and in England. Unfortunately for India, and unfortunately for the British name, we are sadly in want of all these. Hence the *common law maxim, that there is no wrong without a remedy,* has been so often falsified in British India.

We earnestly hope that these few observations will attract the notice of the philosophical and deeply sympathizing Mr. Lyal, the present Secretary in the Political and Foreign Departments, and that he will exert himself, as he alone can effectively do, to find a remedy for this disorder.

“ THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA AND
THEIR ARMIES. ”

(A REJOINDER TO THE LONDON TIMES)

EDITOR.

(*P. S. S. Quarterly, Vol. 1, 4, April, 1879*).

The departure of one Viceroy and the incoming of another as his successor in office are events which naturally create an immense flutter of excitement among all classes of people, both here and in England. This feeling of intense excitement and eager expectation of a change in the Viceroyalty, leading necessarily to a change of policy, can alone account for the periodical re-appearance of old controversies, and the untimely revival of many exploded fallacies of extreme partisans, who resemble the old village schoolmaster depicted by the humour of *Oliver Goldsmith*

“ For e'en though vanquished
(they) could argue still. ”

Lord Ripon's just and beneficent rule gave no scope to the re-actionary crotchets of those who pride themselves on being the advocates of a so-called imperial policy, and who seek, under cover of misplaced philanthropy, to *disintegrate all the vital forces and the centres of historical continuity*

in the country, regardless of all the repeated pledges given by Parliament, and the binding force of treaties. As the bats and owls of the Indian forest come out when the sun goes down, these croaking prophets of evil raised their cry of lamentation and warning against dangers which exist only in their dreams, as soon as the change in the Viceroyalty was announced. Just 5 years ago, under the Viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, the cry of danger to the British Empire from the over-grown armies of native states was raised here in India. Fortunately at the time the Afgan war broke out, it diverted official attention from this supposed danger, and, much against their wish, the Military Authorities in India were led by the course of events to utilize for garrison duties and services these same armies of the frontier Sikh states. The question was thus allowed to sink into oblivion, and during the last 5 years nothing was heard about this insidious suggestion.

As soon, however, as the announcement of Lord Ripon's early retirement was made in England, the *London Times* gave prominent place to a series of articles on the subject of "the Native States and their Armies." From the manner in which this correspondent of the *Times* has handled this subject, and the acquaintance he shows with the most recent occurrences in some of the Indian States, we may reasonably infer that he is in all probability a high

official himself, or at all events a gentleman inspired by the Indian Foreign Office. His chief object, in reviewing the history of most of the Native States in India, is professedly stated to be the suggestion of a better re-arrangement of the relations of these states with the Paramount Power. He makes no secret of his conviction that the large armies maintained in some of these states are a source of danger to the empire, and a burdensome exaction to the subjects of native states, in whose interests their reduction on a large scale is justified. In a more covert manner, the text of the "inherent incapacity" of Asiatic races for ruling independently is advocated in a spirit which brings to our mind the fearful days of the annexation policy of Lord Dalhousie. It appears that this view of the matter has recommended itself to the *London Times* which of late years has made itself the mouthpiece of the repressive school of Anglo-Indian statesmen, and has lost touch of the genuine public feeling of the great English people. At the time when the subject was first started, we discussed it at length in this *Journal* for April 1879, and we were inclined at first to pass over this second edition of an exploded fallacy in silence, but as the affairs of India and of its States are now viewed with reference chiefly to a new condition of things that did not exist before to any appreciable degree, we mean the near approach of Russia to the Indian frontiers on

one side, and that of France on another, and as the views that have lately found so much place and favour with the *London Times* are advocated publicly by some persons holding high posts in the "political" service under the Government of India, and secretly by others of distinction in the military service of the Empire, and as it is believed, (with what truth we know not), that the opinions of these latter gentlemen have found expression in some book or pamphlet privately, but extensively circulated, and that a journal of some weight and importance was recently carried away by these representations to write the most alarmist articles on these supposed dangers to the stability of British rule in this country, it will not be amiss to review what the advocates of this new policy, if it indeed be a new policy, have to say in support of their contention. Besides, it is in the fitness of things that a disease or malady, which shows itself so often, needs be castigated and put down as often as it raises its head.

That there is *something* sinister in the motives, which prompt the writers and correspondents of the stamp of those of the *London Times* to undertake this crusade, is obvious not only from the many sins both of omission and commission they wilfully commit for purposes of misrepresentation and distortion of facts and things, but also from their tendency, which their best

endeavours at concealment but ill disguise, of catching, like drowning men, at every straw that may float above the surface, and of enlarging upon and making the most of every trifle that can, by hook or crook, be pressed in the service of their argument against the "Native rulers and their so-called armies." The "inherent incapacity" of Africans and Asiatics in general—at *all* times, and under *all* circumstances, to rule well, is, in the estimation of these writers, proved, nay made as clear as noon-day sun, if a petty Indian prince, in one of the least civilized and least known parts of Central India, is shown to have hesitated, under the pressure of strong religious sentiments that have in this country survived the lapse of ages, openly to sanction the execution of a rascally Brahman, or if, under the accumulated force of the "despotism" of centuries on the one hand, and of the demoralising effects which invariably set in in most cases from the system of supervision by the British Political Agents in the "protected Indian States" on the other hand, he is shewn to have on certain occasions blown hot and cold, and betrayed some inconsistency of conduct; or if, living himself in a house of glass, he is shewn to have indulged in the certainly not very dignified or useful pastime of throwing stones at those that were similarly housed. Conduct such as this may be really contemptible and pitiable in an independent ruling chief, and possibly may not merit the approval and

admiration of honest, right-thinking men. Yet it must be clear that this cannot suffice to condemn a whole nation, or even a class of people, as it would be difficult to name any large body of people in which some, if not many, of the ordinary individuals composing it, may not be exact counterparts of the unhappy specimen of humanity above portrayed. What may be common enough in any society is, by the very conditions of their existence, commoner still in the case of the hereditary rulers of Indian States. Apart from this consideration, we have to remember that the above picture is drawn by a British Resident of a "Native Rājāh," and that we have yet to see how a Native Mahārājāh like that of Travancore, or an Indian Rājāh and statesman like Sir Dinkar Rao, or Sir T. Madhawa Row, or the late Sir Salār Jung, would paint a British Agent or Resident at a Native court. We have yet only before us the man painting the lion; but we have still to see how the painting of the man by the lion (supposing of course that the lion could and would venture to paint truth-fully) would be like. Though we have not come across a sketch of a British Agent at the court of an Indian potentate drawn by an Indian Writer, yet we have read much about him in the columns of an English contemporary, and that does not help us to present him before the world in any very loveable or enviable light. There possib-

ly may be some little exaggeration in those writings we speak of. But we believe we are within the mark, and not very far from the truth, when we say that it is impossible to be favourably impressed not only with the rank and file of the Indian political service, but even with some of those who occupy the very highest posts in it. The whole system of British political Agencies at the courts of Indian States, being entirely unsuited to the altered circumstances of the British Indian Empire in these times, is now rotten and vitiated to the core, and has become so demoralized that it cannot but exercise the most injurious effects on the administration of the country. It necessarily makes the Indian States, subject to its control, effete and inefficient, and the British political service itself inconsiderately despotic, and incapable of properly dealing with questions which may require from its officers tact and temper, and a keen perception of the fitness of things. It is true that at one time this service gave the Government some of its most trusted and valuable officers. We know that Elphinstone, Malcolm, Munro, and Metcalf &c., had all at some period in their career received training in its ranks. But the conditions then prevailing in the country were, we believe, favourable to the development, in some measure, in its political officers of those virtues which men value and admire in their administrators. Those

conditions have now entirely changed, if they have not ceased to exist altogether. The political officers in those days had to do with real states, i. e. with states that still retained sufficient vitality to shape the course of their own policy, and determine the march of events. Now all these conditions are changed. *The chiefs and the states are not what they then were.* And yet Government has never thought of organising its political service to suit the requirements of this new state of things. The Residents are no longer ambassadors and military commanders, they partake more of the character of spies and Police watchmen, and yet their actions do not see the light of day to the extent it would now be not only safe, but necessary, that they should; nor are complaints about their actions investigated and scrutinised as those of the officers of other services, from the now wholly absurd fear of weakening what is called their "prestige." Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that the British Political Agents have become the "spoilt children" of the English rule, and that the relations which they maintain with the Indian states are preeminently unsatisfactory, and require to be early re-adjusted in the interests of good policy and justice alike. Every one must expect to reap the consequences of his actions. None can be tyrannical and thoughtless, dishonest and indifferent to the real good of those under his charge,

without being himself dragged down and injuriously affected by the consequences of his conduct. Man cannot even tyrannize over women or children or over even dumb cattle, without making himself in his turn a slave by the very force of his own actions. This is a universal principle, and no crooked plans—never so cunningly devised—shall avail in any degree that may have been based in contravention of this Divine law. No sane man can expect to reap anything but the whirl-wind after having sown the wind, and no one can expect to earn confidence unless he has first given confidence. Viewed in the light of these natural truths, we are decidedly of opinion that the relations of the paramount English power in India with the semi-independent Indian States, as they have been hitherto carried on by the “Political Officers” of the Government of India, whom we have advisedly called the “spoilt children” of the English rule, (unrevised as the numbers, the rules, and the traditions of their office have ever remained since the establishment of the English power in India), must be re-adjusted, if the good will and gratitude of the Indian Princes and their subjects is to be reckoned on, as an active factor in the defence of the Empire against a powerful European invader. The Political Agent at an Indian Court must be now above all a sympathetic but firm friend and philosopher to the Indian administrations under his charge, and not the

cunning and insincere diplomatist, or the spy and the covert enemy he often is—one who laughs in his sleeves when the Indian ruler commits mistakes, or is led astray, and after giving him a sufficient rope at it were to hang himself, comes down upon him as an avenging hangman—it may be to prove his preconceived and oft-repeated ideas about the “inherent incapacity” of any but the officials of the English Government to rule well. It is indeed high time now that the necessary task of the readjustment of the conduct of the relations subsisting between the “*feudatory*” *Indian states* and the ‘*paramount*’ English Government, should be undertaken in a spirit of deep loyalty to the throne of Her Majesty the Queen of England and the Empress of India, and in a spirit of practical benevolence to Her Majesty’s subjects in British and Indian India. We firmly believe that this readjustment is possible without unduly, if at all, encroaching upon the independence of the Indian administrations, or any unlawful interference in their affairs. We have before this shewn in this Journal in our article on the “*Constitution for the Indian States*” how this reform could be achieved. That such a reform will be now not a day too early is what we freely concede. Here we are on all fours with the correspondent of the *London Times*, whose utterances about the Indian States we mean to criticise further on, and before concluding we

shall suggest a plan of our own which, we hope, will achieve the desired success, and which we confidently believe will be alike just and advantageous to all the parties concerned.

The protection and the preservation of the British Empire in India is a matter of vital importance to the Indians of India as much as it is, or ever can be, to the majority of the Natives of the British Isles themselves, and, notwithstanding what the *Pioneer* and people of that class may be pleased to say about the value and the usefulness of the efforts of Indian gentlemen—even of Sir T. Madhwarow's extensive experience, learning, and ability—in this direction, we must put our shoulders to the wheel, and contribute our humble mite towards the extrication of this question from the mire of vague fear, unreasoning mistrust, mystery and jealousy in which it has been involved.

A hundred years ago, India was divided against itself, and was a prey to disorder of every sort, and subject to the worst passions of every adventurer—Native and foreign—who could bring together a body of armed followers, and there seemed apparently no near prospect of the termination of her miseries, when God in His wisdom confided her destinies to the strong protecting and organizing hand of England, and ever since,

both the nations have been so much benefitted and have derived so much strength from the union, one with the other, that it would be sheer wantonness not only to wish to disturb it, or to endanger it in any way by mutual jealousy, ill-will or self-seeking, but also not to bestow our best thoughts on the ways and means of cementing this union, and placing it beyond the reach of the dangers which selfish and short-sighted people might for a time succeed in involving it in. Each of the two countries, we believe, cannot too well remember that its lot without the other would be very much worse than it is at present. Without England's strong protecting hand—but especially without her wonderful organizing capacity—India would probably fall once more into that condition of internal strife and consequent insecurity of person and property, and threatened danger from without, which she was able to escape only, it may be, by yielding to the power of England, and helping in its establishment. Without the vast resources of India, which is not inaptly styled the brightest gem in the Empress' diadem,—without the help and hearty co-operation of her teeming, industrious, loyal, and gifted populations, England would soon lose her proud position amongst the nations of the world. The' union of England with India being thus fraught with such happy and important consequences to *both* the parties concerned, it is,

we think incumbent on them that *both* the countries should, if the crisis contemplated ever come, be prepared to undergo the necessary sacrifices in a spirit of self-abnegation, and secure not only the maintenance, but the progressive improvement, of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. There should be no attempt to shirk responsibility, or to shift it on to the weaker shoulders of those who may be already sufficiently heavily burdened, or whose responsibility to bear any additional burden could not be clearly established. It is in connection with this aspect of the question that we have to pick-not one, but we presume, many-bones with the correspondent of the *London Times*, whose utterances about the Indian States are characterised, we are obliged to confess, by a spirit which is anything but fair and statesmanlike.

There are within the vast British Indian Empire many so-called feudatory states, some ancient as ancient could be, others more modern, but representatives of great national uprisings, all in *de facto* possession of vast territories, and whose rulers have mostly within the last century entered into definite "Treaties and Engagements" with the English Government. By these each party has bound itself peacefully to abide for the future. Writers like the one in the *Times* mostly ignore the existence of these Treaties with the Indian

Princes, or if they ever mention them, it is to advise their being thrown, as it were, to the wind—without,—be it remembered, the consent of one of the parties—and that the weaker—to the violation of the engagements. It is not only these parchments of paper called Treaties and Engagements that these high-souled and truthful writers make most light of, but their leading representative has gone so far as to set down the promises of the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, as of no higher worth than the paper on which they are written. They deny that the little patches of territory left to the Indian Aristocracy and the Indian Princes, serve any useful purpose in the economy of the British Indian Empire, by acting as safety-valves to the legitimate aspirations and independent ambition of the sons of the soil, or by stemming or otherwise breaking the force of the torrents of disaffection and discontent that may take their rise within the British Indian territories, or by otherwise being useful and necessary to the dignity and stability of the Empire, and they therefore think that these territories should not be given over to the worst passions of the Indian Princes. The fact is however beyond dispute, that but for the existence of the Indian States, the Mutiny of 1857-58 would have in all probability assumed the magnitude, importance, and gravity of a national struggle for independence, which would have tasked the energy and

resources of Enland far more severely than it did to quell, and that the Indian Princes, with their small tetritories and so-called armies, are far less liable to work any mischief, or to cause any troubles to the paramount English Government than would otherwise be possible. During the troubled times of the mutiny, neither Scindia, nor Holkar, neither the Nizam of Hyderabad, nor the Begum of Bhopal —nor any of the numerous representatives of the old Houses of Rajputana, or Central India, nor the Sikh rulers of the Panjab, nor the Maratha Chiefs of this Presidency, were the cause of any anxiety or troubles to the English Government, while on the contrary, the disinherited son of the last Peshwa, and the heirs to the already shorn glories and honors of the House of Delhi, or the Begum of the unjustly deposed Nabob of Oude, or the widowed Rani of Jhashi, who was more than any threatened with the extinction of her House and principality, armed with the courage of despair, were found in the ranks of the enemies of the British Government, and gave it the most serious trouble it had ever encountered since the establishment of its power in India.

It must be borne in mind that those who raise this alarm are constitutionally least entitled to speak with authority on this subject. It is the English official classes, or their supporters in the Press, with whom this cry of "Perish Indian

States and their armies" originates. The commerce of England is so great, her excellence in arts and manufactures is so unrivalled, *that the trading and labouring classes, who necessarily form the majority of her population,* may, in all probability, be none very much the worse, whether Indian states retain their *integrity or independence*, or are shorn of both. The independence of America *has not in the least* historians and political economists maintain, *affected the prospects of the British people injuriously*, and though the case of India is a little different, in so far as it could not afford to take in the surplus population of the British Isles, it is certain *that the greatest gainers by an aggressive policy, such as is foreshadowed by the correspondent of the London Times, would be the classes who have the monopoly of furnishing members to the "services."* As it is, the lion's share of the enormous tribute which this country, year after year, is called upon to pay to England for the government of this *impoverished country falls to the lot of these gentlemen*, and they are the very *men who fatten, so to speak, on the cream of the land.* To these gentlemen, the Indian world mostly exists, or they think ought to exist, only to supply them, in ever-increasing proportions, with fat appointments. *This is their ideal of an Indian Government.* It would be enough, these people imagine, if the Natives of the country, the so-called

children of the soil, are only allowed to remain, in peace, for ever the hewers of wood, and drawers of water. In fact there is, in the opinion of these writers an "inherent incapacity" in the Indian races for any higher governmental functions, and therefore the gratitude of this "inherently incapable" people ought, in their view, to know no bounds for thus being kept to the level proper to their understanding and natural aptitudes. These "gentlemen" of the "services" with, of course, a few and far between exceptions, are ever ready to kill the golden goose of India for their aggrandisement, and the immediate gratification of their insatiable appetites. These are the men on whose lips the cry of "Perish Indian India" is the most frequent. Fearing the loss of the monopoly of the high offices in the state, which perhaps the peculiar contingencies of their early rule required, but which has now become an anomaly, these men are the greatest opponents of any measures of reform which have as their object the cementing of the union of the two countries by ameliorating the condition of the Indians, or admitting them to a due share in the government of their own country and affairs. Under the costly rule of the "services," the revenues and resources of the extensive territories they rule over are soon exhausted, or prove inadequate to bear any new or sudden strain, and then the first object with these "gentlemen" is

to point out the ways and means for meeting the crisis by shifting the burden on to the weaker shoulders of others, whose liability for the same can never be satisfactorily proved. By such means, and at times by airing their so-called "grievances," these gentlemen hope effectually to divert public attention *from their extravagantly high emoluments and privileges.* The *London Times* has unfortunately become the mouthpiece of these men. Extravagant and high-flown praises of the English "services," and a cynic contempt of Indian Statesmanship meet us in every line of these long *tirades* against Indian Princes, and along with it there is a studied effort to hide their own unhallowed greed under specious covering of apparent good intentions, and an anxiety for the good of the subjects of the Indian states.

"Various considerations" he says, such as our *increased responsibility towards the people of India, the cry of justice to India, and the possibility of an external danger from Russia,* compel us to recognise the fact that we must carefully review, and, if deemed wise, *re-arrange the* relations of the Indian States with the paramount power of the English Government in that country." It is curious to observe how these considerations of "increased responsibility to the people of India, and the cry of justice to India" are made out by the writer. He asserts that the Indian Princes, in

all cases, maintain very large, and in some cases, very formidable armies, which, being out of all proportion to their necessities as *protected States*, are not only a source of unbearable hardships and injustice to their own subjects, (in-as-much as they draw away large bodies of men from peaceful avocations and industries, which may be necessary for the proper development of the resources of their States, and tax the other remaining Ryots heavily for their maintenance), but are sources of great discomfort and great wrong to the subjects of the British Indian Empire also, as they have to be necessarily taxed all the heavier, that the Government might be enabled to keep powerful and well-appointed bodies from their own army within the territories of these Indian States in order "to watch and neutralise their armies." Justice alike to the subjects of the Government and of the Indian Princes—these writers represent—requires therefore that these vast armies of the Indian States should be extensively reduced, so that the well-appointed and large garrisons of the British armies they lock up within their Cantonments might be set free to co-operate with the army of the frontier, either to meet the threatened Russian invasion of India, or any other enemy on the frontiers. When this shall be done, the claims of justice will, in the opinion of the *Times'* correspondent, be entirely,

and at the same time most beautifully, satisfied. This is really the gist of his interested argument, though he pretends to beat much about the bush, in order to arrive at it, and, also we fear, to show that his anxiety is widely in sympathy with the real interests of the people of India in British territory, as well as Indian States.

The writer in the *London Times*, we presume, is conscious of the slippery nature of the ground he has taken his stand upon, and, to escape the imputation of inconsistency and mulldiness, he has at the very outset provided himself with loop-holes by declaring that his subject covers a wide field, and involves *so many different considerations &c. &c.*" In his charge against the armies of Indian Princes, he has evidently very conveniently forgotten one consideration in connection with this matter, which puts the whole case in altogether a different light as respects the locking up of British garrisons in the Cantonments located in Indian India. *These garrisons are paid for by the Indian States in most cases as much as their own troops.* This payment is not obvious to superficial observers, because it comes from the revenues of the territories that have been permanently demanded by, and ceded to, the paramount power by the Indian potentates—A consideration of the subsidiary forces which the Government stipulated to keep on behalf, and for the use, of the Indian States in

alliance with it. In most cases it has been stipulated that the contingents of these Indian States should serve with the subsidiary forces. As most of the subsidiary forces and the contingents have been abolished, or more properly speaking, amalgamated with the British Army, without the Indian States being paid back the territorial consideration they had once for all assigned for their maintenance, it follows that the Indian States cannot be said to cause the Government any military expenditure on account of the garrisons posted in their country. The British authorities ought to keep them there simply because they have been very handsomely paid for that purpose. And as the territories given for the maintenance of the subsidiary forces in these days yield a revenue that is at least four times as great as they did when first granted, and as the government is not prepared to remit the increased revenue—either to the rulers of the Indian States, or to the subjects living within these ceded territories, if any body is entitled to have a grievance in connection with this arrangement, it is the Indian States and their subjects. It is easy for writers like the correspondent in the *London Times* to ignore these considerations, and lead the English public to believe erroneously that the Indian States, or their so-called armies, are a drain on the resources of the English Government. No one here in India can for a moment be deceived by such false and malicious misrepresentations.

In order to show the magnitude of the evils resulting from the existence of the Indian States, (we must remember that the writer under review is at heart an annexationist) and particularly of the vast armies they maintain, the Indian States of India have been classed into four groups—(1) the Maratha states, (2) the Mahomedan states, (3) the Hindu states, and (4) the Frontier states. Why the Marathas should have the honour, or it may be the dishonour, of being separately treated from the other Hindus, and thus have a chapter of the communication all to themselves, is what we do not understand. Their territories, unlike those of the frontier chiefs, are scattered in all parts of the country, and are interspersed with the other Hindu and Mahomedan States of India. Hence the reasons, adduced by the *Times* correspondent for the course adopted by him, do not seem sufficient to us to warrant the distinction made. "I place the Marattas first," says he, "both because they possess the greatest military power, and also on account of their having been our most formidable opponents in the past." The Marattas have not only the honour of being placed *first*, but have the honour of being treated *separately* too from the other Rajput and Hindu families. We may be wrong, but an idea crosses our mind that in this arrangement the writer had in view the "political" maxim of "divide and rule." The

Marattas, or the people of the country called Mahârâstra, are, like the Hindus of all the other provinces of India, divided into the well-known castes. Their Brahamans are, perhaps, of all the other Brahamans of India, preeminently the preceptors and leaders of the people. Their warrior caste—who are generally known by the simple appellation of the Marattas—are, as Professor Bhândârkar tells us, the old Rattis, or Rhätodes, a Rajput tribe; while several families amongst them legitimately claim descent from the bluest blood of those Rajput families, whose progenitors are popularly believed to have sprung up from the sacrificial fountain of Bramha at Abu, and who pride themselves upon never having given a daughter in marriage to the “Shak” or the Mahomedan. From very ancient times, these people have often conquered the kings and countries of Northern India, and ruled them for centuries, and they cannot be legitimately stigmatised as up-starts or “parvenues,” as some writers for interested motives are disposed to do. More especially when an Englishman or foreign writer tries to raise odium against the Marathas by styling them aliens and strangers governing a “foreign” population, and looks upon this circumstance as justifying the annexation of their principalities, the height of absurdity is reached. It is the birth-right of these writers to think themselves equally at home in any parts of England

and India, and yet to deny that the Natives of India of one part or district of the country can be anything but foreigners and aliens in the other provinces of it.

The great Marhatta States are three—Gwalior, Indore, and Baroda, under Chiefs who are styled Maharajas. Of these Marhatta Maharajas, those of Gwalior, having been the most distinguished for their fidelity to the Peishwa, and their zeal for the extension of the Marhatta Empire, had been the most powerful among the Marhatta confederacy. After the defeat of the Marathas at Panipat, Mahadaji Scindia devoted himself to the establishment of Maratha sovereignty by employing French Officers to drill his troops and form his artillery. At one time this army was thought scarcely, if at all, inferior to the British Native army either in numbers or in efficiency. Mahadaji had made himself useful to the English in their hour of need, when the Vadgaum treaty was patched up, as an intermediary in their negotiations with the Peishwa. But because he had once been useful as an intermediary, it did not follow that the head of this family was to enjoy the position of a dictator in Central India. The overthrow of Tippu Saheb left the hands of the E. I. Company free, and the whole of its power was directed to the task of humbling Dowlat Rao, (the inefficient successor of Mahadaji), the curtailment of whose power

having become the more necessary as his court afforded the last resort to French adventurers." Consequently Scindia's power was shattered to pieces by General Wellesley on the fields of Assaye and Argaum, and by the treaty of Surjee-Angengaum he entered into the system of subsidiary alliances with the English—a system than which nothing more destructive to the vitality of the Indian States could have been devised. The Gwalior State at this time was also made to cede to the Company, as the price of its alliance, not only most of the places conquered by Mahâdâji, but *even some of those which had been granted to him by English favour for services done with his countrymen.* Matters remained in this state when the memorable mutiny of 1857 broke out, and the present Mahârâja Jayâjee Rao Scindia, ably assisted by his celebrated minister Sir Dinkarrao, with consummate efforts kept the Gwalior forces inactive during the most critical period of the mutiny. If Scindia had not succeeded in doing this service, and if the rebellious army of the contingent stationed at Gwalior had got the upper hand in his principality at this juncture, his territories being interspersed as they were with those of other Indian States in Hindustan and Malwa, including the territories of Indore, Dhar, Dewas, Dholepore and Bharatpore, the rulers of these States per force would have been driven helplessly before the raging storm, and the waves

of the Mutiny carried into Maharashtra and the Deccan. By reason of his fidelity to the English, Jayaji Rao had to submit to the humiliation of allowing the mutineers to loot his city, himself obliged to fly from Gwalior,—giving every thing up for lost. For this conspicuous fidelity to the British cause, “various rewards” were conferred upon Scindia. “But singularly enough,” writes the *Times* correspondent, “Dinkar Rao fell into the greatest disgrace, and became the object of his master’s intense dislike,” and the reason for this conduct of the Maharaja is traced not to the exercise of the ordinary functions of a ruler, but to his supposed change of sentiments towards the paramount power. “It would almost seem” says the writer, “as if the Maharaja had repented of the policy he had pursued, and as if he regretted a lost opportunity.” All the Residents at the Gwalior Court since the days of the Mutiny have given Scindia credit for the possession of the most unreserved loyalty, and therefore we are constrained to denounce this insinuation as a political lie, excusable only as an expression of the unconquerable hatred which Jingo writers, as if it were their very nature, entertain towards the people and princes of India. As a matter of fact, the so-called “various rewards” given to Scindia are altogether neutralised by the occupation of the fort of Gwalior by the Government *since* the Mutiny. “The

various rewards" of course include chiefly many mere verbal additions to H. H.'s already long array of titles. Of the more substantial rewards and assignments of lapsed Jhansi territory, what with amendments of frontiers, allotment of pasture lands to the Cantonment at Morar, and other such "reforms," little remains, one must admit, that can be considered sufficient to counter-balance the loss of power and dignity inflicted upon the State by the virtual annexation of the Gwalior fort. Amongst the losses sustained by Scindia during the mutiny, the plundering by the rebels of his "Gangajali" or treasury which is supposed to have contained some crores of Rupees, must not be forgotten as a set-off against any increase of revenue, which Scindia might have been able to get from the lands given to him by way of reward. Under such a system of rewards, Scindia, or any other man in his place might not well be *quite* satisfied, or *quite* happy, and when H. H., in a spirit of loyalty and humility, urges a request that his case might be reconsidered, and the fort evacuated, that he might not appear to the world in the light of a suspected and watched Prince, his pleadings are resented, and branded as a change of front. We are sure we are not advocates of Scindia's grievances any more than we are so of any other prince. We have written at some length here about them as his case affords the best illustration of the policy followed

towards the Indian States by the Government of India. Colonel Malleon speaks of Scindia as follows:—

“ From the first, with the full concurrence and support of the minister, Jayajirao determined to cast in his lot with the British. Not in vain had Lord Ellenborough in 1814, displayed the prescient policy of a real statesman. Not in vain had he foreborne from the lust of conquest, and restored to the minor Sovereign intact his dominions, with a provision to secure their good administration during his minority. With an opportunity which Mahadaji would have made decisive, and Dawalat Rao even would have clutched at, Jayajirao took upon himself the task, which under the circumstances of the feeling of the country, must have been pre-eminently difficult—the task of being loyal to his engagements to the British, even when British supremacy seemed lowered, and British authority had been shaken off in districts within fifty miles of his capital. Full of these loyal ideas, Jayajirao's first movement was to send his own body-guard to Agra to aid the Lieutenant—Governor of the N. W. Provinces in the suppression of the revolt. They rendered excellent service. His next was to place his entire contingent at the disposal of the same high officer. The offer was accepted. But it soon became evident that the causes which had induced the mutiny in the Bengal

army had infected the sepoys of the Gwalior contingent with the virus of revolt. At Hathras, at Neemuch, at Sagur, Lalpore, and finally on June 14, at Gwalior itself, the sepoys of the contingent rose and massacred many of their British Officers."

"No sooner had these men revolted, than they placed their services at the disposal of Jayajirao, and begged him to lead them against the British in Agra. To give due credit to the loyalty of Scindia at this crisis, it should be remembered that not only were the insurgents in possession of the capital of the Mogul, but the entire country to the North West of Agra was in revolt. British Garrisons were beleaguered at Cawnpore and at Luknow, and it seemed as though one decisive blow would finish the English dominion North of Bengal proper. Had the Maharaja then acceded to the request of the sepoys, it was quite possible that with 20,000 trained soldiers, men who afterwards gave evidence of the excellence of their discipline against General Wylde at Cawnpore, and against Lord Strathnairn after Jhansi had fallen, he might have struck that fatal blow. Not only did the Maharaja not accept the offer of his troops; but by dint of skilful management, by cajoling and by gifts of money, and by pretended difficulties in the way of procuring carriage, he detained them. More than that. When mutinous troops from Mhow and the territories of Holkar passed through his domi-

nions, he restrained his own troops from joining them. He succeeded, in fact, in retaining them in inaction, till after Delhi had fallen, and Cawnpore had been relieved. And finally, when he did let them go, it was only that they might fall into the clutches of Sir Hugh Rose and Sir Collin Campbell "To say that he must have felt his power is only to credit him with ordinary capacity, and his capacity is at least beyond the average. But he was loyal and true. Had the ablest member in the Council of India been at his ear, he could not have inspired him with counsels more calculated to prove beneficial to the British cause than those which he and his minister, with the instincts of loyal natures, followed of their own free will."

It was only some years back that Jayajirao again exhibited his loyalty to the British Government by capturing and giving up to the British authorities the reputed Nana Saheb Peishwa. The *Indian Observer*, a paper then edited by an Englishman of liberal views, thereon expressed his opinion that by this his act, the Maharajah had for ever estranged himself from the sympathy of his own countrymen, the Marhattas. With such instances as these of the Maharaja's single-minded fidelity before them, Jayajirao has a right to expect that his character would be above the baseless imputations of mistrust and infidelity which some irresponsible Anglo-Indians are ever ready to thrust at

the Indian Princes and people of India. However just as the friendly offices of Mahadaji Scindia did not avail his son and successor from being attacked and stripped not only of his conquests, but even of the territory gained by him as rewards from the British Government themselves, so the conspicuous fidelity of the present Maharaja during the terrible crisis of 1857-58 has not been able to save him from being watched in his own palace from under the guns in the fort of Gwalior, which would make short work of his palaces and capital within the space of an hour or two if it were so determined. And as if this were not enough, it is further suggested by the *Times* correspondent, that treasonable inclinations must be natural to a brave and able chief like Scindia, and that, therefore, the Maharaja should be required to disband his army by peremptory, immediate, and wholesale reductions. In fact the policy advocated by the *London Times* and its correspondent is a policy of so pre-eminently blind and unreasoning a mistrust that it ought therefore to carry its own condemnation upon the very face of it with all honest, right-thinking and far-seeing statesmen. So far from being of the slightest use or advantage to the Paramount English Government, it would only furnish the Indian Princes and the people of India, who wish well to these princes, with a fresh and a very just grievance, and weaken the British power itself,—

all in the name of the threatened Russian invasion, and a sense of increased responsibility and justice to the people of India! Well might India call upon Heaven to save her from these her friends!!

It will be interesting to see how the writer attempts to make out his case against Scindia, undoubtedly the most powerful and the most justly trusted of the allies and feudatories of the British Indian Empire. The population of Gwalior, our writer thinks, exceeds 3,000,000 souls, and the revenue derived from them comes to about $1\frac{1}{4}$ million pounds sterling or more than 7s a head of the population. We do not think this estimate is right—it is, we fear, a little over the mark. Be this as it may, yet we would strongly object to one conclusion the writer draws from it. At this rate he thinks the British revenue should exceed 70 millions, without the receipts from opium, railways and other public works. It is, we presume, wrong to compare averages drawn from limited, small, and selected areas with those that are arrived at from large general ones. Scindia's opium-producing lands in Mundosore and other parts of his territory in Malwa and Hindostan certainly can bear the very highest rental, and it would be evidently wrong to compare it with that which the poor soils of our Malwa yield. The incidence of taxation can only be fairly judged if the capacities of those who bear it are taken into consideration. As this

is not done, we think the conclusion arrived at by the *Times* correspondent is a fallacious one. If it were true, we should have seen much migration of the subjects of Indian States into the adjoining British territories. Far from this being the case, as far as we are aware, what little of this sort of movement there is in the community is distinctly in favour of the Indian States. In connection with this view of the case, we must also remember that the revenues of the Indian States are wholly spent in the country, and the ability of the tax-payers is proportionately less strained than by a smaller total revenue one-half of which is sent out of the country. The loss of 20 millions of pounds sterling every year to India, represented by the Home and other charges of the English Rule, is a drain the disastrous effects of which are glaringly apparent to every body but the members of the official bureaucracy, in whose opinion no sacrifice can be ever too great for the people of India to undergo for the blessings which they confer on the country by their services. These gentlemen point at the poverty of Scindia's subjects as justifying the truth of their observations as to the ruinous effects of the Maharaja's policy. We are of opinion that Scindia's subjects in Malwa (thanks to the liberal settlement of Sir Dinkar Row) can bear favourable comparison with any in British India. It may be conceded that the subjects near Gwalior or what is

called Girda Gwalior, are not so well off. But howsoever that may be, we are not sure that the Maharaja's military expenditure is the cause that "there are the descendants of proud Rajputs and high caste (?) Mahomedans compelled to obtain the lowest coolie employment" as the antiquarian Major Keith says. These are, one would think, precisely those classes of people who are benefitted by any extravagance in the military expenditure of the country, and we must confess we fail to see how the case can be different in Scindia's principality. We make bold to suggest that the descendants of the "proud Rajputs and high caste Mahomedans" that excited the antiquarian's compassion were British subjects that had sought refuge in the Maharaja's territory to seek their bread. We must also remark here that poverty—abject poverty more than anything else is the principal characteristic of the subjects of British India, and therefore our officers ought to be the last men in the world who should point the finger of scorn at others on that score. Fault is found also with Scindia for not caring as he ought to, for the architectural monuments in his territory. This is bad enough in all conscience we will admit; but we ask how long since is it that the conscience of British officers has been roused to the necessity of the preservation of the ancient monuments of antiquity in their own territory? Unfortunately we have not by us at present the

gallant Major's report upon the remains of antiquity in the fort of Gwalior; else we should have been able to show that the conduct in this respect of the officers of our government, *till quite recently*, was as bad as, if not worse than, that of Scindia's government. By this, however, we do not mean to say that there are not black spots in Scindia's administration, and that it is not capable of immense improvements. It is true, as observed by the *Times* correspondent, that the Gwalior State does not sufficiently go in for those administrative reforms which are the tax-payer's return and equivalent. Beyond the Imperial railways and roads, to which H. H's. exchequer contributes its just quota, the state is conspicuous by the absence of village roads, bridges, schools, dispensaries and "the other indispensable accessories of even a low civilization." His Highness is remarkably amenable to the advice of the British Officers attached to his Court, and it does not speak well of the zeal and ability of these officers that such accessories of "even a low civilization" should be neglected at Gwalior. And when due weight is given to this undeniable fact, it will, we should think, be admitted that some portion of the blame, in howsoever small a degree, must be cast upon the political officers at the Gwalior Court. It must not be understood that we desire to throw any the slightest cloak over the shortcomings of the Gwalior administration. The principal blame

must, of course, attach to that administration, but we fail to see what justification such an admission furnishes to the conclusions drawn by the writer in the *Times*. The *Times* correspondent, carried away by his blind zeal to see the armies of Indian States reduced, does not scruple to say that if Scindia's reputed military arbour be not early checked, Central India would soon see the revival of dacoity, and Thuggism, and the Pindhari spirit which Government has stamped out with so much labour. We have still to learn that this is likely to be the case. Violent crime in Scindia's territory, as in all the rest of the Indian States, is fast decreasing. Scindia's military system perhaps bears some shadow of a semblance to the policy that now prevails in all the countries of Europe, and history has not yet shown to us that men, who have received some training as soldiers under good and strict discipline, have a tendency to become dacoits or, stranger still, Thuggs. Scindia is next taxed with neglect of the natural resources of his country which is said to be rich in iron ore. This discovery, if true, is indeed so recent and doubtful that H. H. cannot be much blamed for taking his time to see how he can turn it to account. He has already set a good example in the matter of Railways, and has also set up a Paper mill at his own expense. We have now, we hope, noticed all the salient points of the argument urged against Jayajirao Scindia and his administr-

ation by the *Times* correspondent. We reserve the consideration of the advisability or otherwise of the proposed abolition of his army later on as a general question, which we will treat collectively with that of the armies of the other Indian Chiefs.

The next state to which the English correspondent devotes his attention is Indore. The population of the state is said to exceed 10 lacks, and the revenue about 60 lacks of Rupees. Of late the revenue has rapidly increased, and it is said the Maharaja wishes to raise it to a million pounds. The rate of taxation per head, the writer believes, is already 15s. per head, and the Maharajah makes it his boast that before long he will raise it to £1. per head. In some measure this rate may be justified, the correspondent believes, by the nature of the opium producing land and the business habits of the Maharaja with which he is credited, though we think, otherwise. "Holkar" says the *Times* correspondent, "is not such a military enthusiast as Scindia. He only spends about £170,000 a year on his army, and another £12,000 towards the contingent." We are not aware Holkar keeps a body of men called the Contingent. The money with the territories, once for all yielded up, go to the British Government, and from the price paid by Holkar, like the rest of the Princes of India, for the existence of his State in the manner defined by the Treaties and Engagements. The price of

protection being settled by treaty for all time to come, we think, the Indian Princes are not bound to contribute anything further to our Government in the shape of money payments, or to undergo any further sacrifice without an adequate compensation—unless they elect to do so of their own free will, and choice. Whatever irresponsible writers may threaten, we feel sure that the question of their being compelled by force to do so, in spite of the Treaties and Engagements entered into with them, will never seriously be entertained for a moment by the intelligence and morality of the first nation in the world.

It is curious to see that though Holkar's army is not as great or efficient as that of his neighbour, Scindia, this small military strength is put forth as an excuse for quartering a force of not less than 4,500 of our Anglo-Indian army in the cantonment of Mhow, and one thousand men more, both English and Indian, in other places in the neighbourhood of his dominions. There are, besides these, 1500 more troops belonging to the Bheel and Bhopal battalions quite at hand, and in the country.

This arrangement will clearly demonstrate that the question of the location of the British camps and cantonments is dependent on considerations that have only a remote connection with the armies of the Indian States. It may also with

justice be argued that even if these considerations may have dictated the necessity for military camps at Mhow and Mahidpoor and other places in past times, the existence now of a net-work of railways all over the country, to the construction of which the Indian States themselves have freely contributed, demands that the strength of the British garrisons in the Indian States should be reduced, and there can be no doubt that this reduction can be now safely effected. The rulers of Indian States are so conscious of their utter inability ever to measure their strength with that of the English power, they never bestow a thought on the comparative strength or weakness of the English garrisons in their territories. In ordinary times, the Indian States would, and do, keep the peace in their principalities. For exceptional times, they have purchased the services of the paramount power to help them. The paramount power has for a sufficient consideration undertaken to protect the Indian States from internal as well as external enemies, and it cannot well evade this engagement, unless it is prepared to give back the territorial consideration received. It must be remembered that the Indian Princes have already done more than they have bound themselves to do in allowing the Government to amalgamate their subsidiary, and contingent forces with the imperial British Army, and it would be paying good with

evil to ask these states to contribute a rupee more towards the support of the British garrison of the country, and on refusal to require them to reduce their armies peremptorily. They stand on the rights guaranteed to them by Treaties and Engagements, and it is evidently to the advantage of all parties that these Treaties should stand on their solemn footing as mutually binding. It is especially necessary that the weaker parties to the contracts—who are, of course, the Indian States—should not feel that in their dealings with the stronger party, they can not count on that party's gratitude for past services and favours, or that one concession on their part only leads to the demand of a greater sacrifice and ultimately—do what they may—that they are destined to be obliged in all cases to go to the wall. No empire can hope to live long that has inspired such feelings amongst its subordinates and feudatories.

As for foreign invasions, that is a matter wholly without the control of the Indian States. Their own people and their own army have never caused the Government any trouble ever since they accepted and reconciled themselves to their subordinate position. The British army must be maintained at a certain strength, and where and how it is located in different parts of India is not a political, but a strategic question. If stronger garrisons must hence-forth be kept on the frontiers of India,

it can be done by reducing those in the Indian States, with of course the consent of the chiefs, and totally removing some from within the British Khalsa districts, where all the conditions favourable to the safety and happiness of the empire are supposed to exist in their full strength. Some of the military Cantonments are located in the country where there are no Indian States Armies to be watched over and neutralized, and as there are places, like Baroda and the principalities of Katiyawad, where there are these so-called armies without their watch dogs in the shape of British Cantonments in the immediate vicinity, it is clear, we think, that British garrisons in India are not, and need not be, bound down to any particular locality or localities.

Holkar by treaty is allowed to keep an 'army' of 3000 cavalry, 5,000 infantry, and 24 guns. Scindia has a right to maintain an army of 5,000 drilled infantry, 5,000 horsemen, and 48 guns with 480 gunners. The armies of these two great military Maratha chiefs (as they have been called) therefore amount to 19,000 men of all arms and sorts. Many people here have seen specimens of Holkar's army—their arms and accoutrements. Scindia's army, though highly disciplined for parade purposes, is, if possible, still more badly armed than Holkar's. General Daly, who was by no means favourably disposed towards Scindia's military policy, has officially described how the guns and

muskets used by Scindia's forces are, all of them, such as every British officer would at once totally condemn as useless, and dangerous only to those that may try to use them in case of real warfare. These are the opinions of responsible authorities, and yet we are now told by the *London Times* that to watch and neutralise this body of ill-armed, ill-disciplined, ill-officered and ill-paid men, without stores, commissariat, or other appliances, without any reserves to fall back upon, and cut off from all intercourse with their neighbours, it is "deemed necessary" that a British force of 11,000 men, armed and equipped according to the most approved modern science of warfare, and having numerous well-appointed armies to fall back upon, is required. Here we reckon one Indian soldier as equal to one British soldier. History, however, has disclosed the fact that the British armies have often and often completely routed the armies Indian States in their best days, when they had not lost their warlike habits and prestige, that were ten times larger than their own; so that it is now a well-established fact that an Indian sepoy of the British army is considered a match for 5 soldiers of the Indian States, and that a single European soldier is more than a match for a dozen Indian sepoys. According to this estimate, only a force of 1,584 British troops will be necessary if the object were only to watch and neutralize the armies of

these Maratha Chiefs in Malwa and Hindustan. The larger garrisons are, of course, maintained for imperial purposes with which the Indian Chiefs have little concern. The writer in the *London Times* seems to be well-posted in the affairs of our Maratha chiefs in Central India, and it is a matter for surprise, therefore, that he has not noticed the fact that in the recent Afghan War, Holkar and, if we are rightly informed, the Maharajah of Dhar, suggested that the English garrisons within their territories might temporarily be reduced with a view to portions of them being sent to the seat of war, and that they would see that nothing untoward happened in their absence. Several other Indian States also offered to lend their armies to the Government, and the Government thankfully accepted and utilised their offers. After such proofs of mutual good will, we confess we fail to see how with justice it can now be proposed to these very chiefs that their armies should be disbanded.

In connection with his remarks on Holkar, the writer takes the opportunity to condemn him on the score of the high and frequent transit duties which he levies on the trade which passes through his territories. It will be seen that the sentiments of Sir L. Griffin with reference to the policy of the Indian States of Central India in the matter of these transit duties are here simply

reproduced in a more exaggerated form. Bad as both the great Mahratta Central Indian chiefs were pronounced to be in this respect, the Agent to the Governor-General did not declare Scindia to be quite as bad as his more covetous neighbour. The correspondent of the English *Times* has, for reasons best known to himself, obliterated this distinction. He says "in this latter respect Holkar is no worse than his neighbour; the two happening to hold territory which virtually shuts off Bombay from the rest of India on the east, are able by rigorous and frequent transit dues to hamper trade, and in some cases, to make it practically impossible." The large volume of trade at Indore is attributed by our writer to these heavy transit dues, and the present unsatisfactory state of things is said to have been "aggravated no doubt, by the truculence of the younger prince (Balasaheb) who is now relegated, to temporary obscurity "

These transit dues, forming an essential part of the revenues of the Indian States, are, no doubt somewhat higher than they ought to be, or in some cases are higher than it is good for the trade of the country. We should be the first to advocate their reduction all round so that trade and commerce should be free and unhampered. We are at the same time conscious of the fact that the Indian States have a just grievance in this connection

against the policy which the English Government have of late followed, and the treatment which the feudatory chiefs have received at the hands of its officers in furtherance of the said policy. A spirit of utter disregard for the revenue concerns of the Indian States, and the vested interests of their sardars and subjects, seems to be the one idea which dominates the minds of the officers of our Political Department. These gentlemen forget that the rulers of Indian States are neither edified, nor impressed favourably with the honesty of purpose of the paramount power or its officers, when they insist on the reduction or the total abolition of all transit duties in Native territory with a view only to raise the imperial revenues from the same sources.

Indore has a considerable trade with Bombay and China and the prosperity of the local merchants depends more on the state, we presume, of trade in those places than the policy of transit dues which the Maharaja may elect to follow. If we remember right, the merchants of Indore, and not only of Indore alone, some three or four years ago assembled in their "Gyâra panch" to complain loudly of the inordinately heavy and ever-increasing transit duty levied by our Government on the chests of opium they exported every year to China. We also know that no heed was given to their prayer for the reduction of the opium transit duty.

It would not be uninteresting to trace the upward march of this duty which is pre-eminently a transit one. This transit duty in 1835 was originally fixed at 125 Rs. a chest. In 1843, when Sind became a British province, the duty was raised to 200 Rs. and thence to 300 Rs. a chest. After the lapse of two short years, the duty was raised to 400 Rs. This lasted till 1859, when it was raised to Rs. 500 per chest, and to Rs. 600 in October 1868. This rate continued till 1877, when it was raised to Rs. 650, and it now stands, we believe, at Rs. 700 per chest. This rise we presume must be answerable at least in some degree for the 'pressure' of trade felt at Indore. The States of Central India are not only producers of opium, which brings in to our Government its large, but by no means moral, opium revenue, but they also contribute towards the construction of the roads and railways that pass through their territories. They give up the land over which these roads and railways are made, and their jurisdiction over it ceases. Their police protects the trade except on the railways, and they have to make good any loss which the Government and its subjects suffer in their territories from robbers and dacoits. Then they have contributed rather heavily for the general peace and security that prevails in India. Under these circumstances, one would naturally expect that these Indian princes were allowed to secure some, it might be a

small and altogether insignificant, share in the revenue that accrued from the transit duty on opium. Far from this being the case, most of the Central Indian States to our knowledge have only suffered considerable losses of revenue from the extension of the imperial roads and rail roads in their country. More than this, the States of Guzarat and Katiwad are in the most flagrant manner made to suffer extensive losses in order that the English Government may derive an increased revenue from its opium transit duties. The frequent and heavy tolls on carriages, carrying trade in the interior of the country over roads mostly laid out with the local fund money, are another instance of the covetous manner in which our Government try to raise revenues from transit dues that are as oppressive as any in the Indian States. Some of these chiefs have, unwisely as we believe, but not unnaturally we presume, sought to make good their losses by rigid imposts on the trade and industry that may originate in or pass through their territories. Holkar is pre-eminently one of these. The state of his exchequer should surely enable him to rise superior to the temptation of raising small sums of money by means which may be obnoxious to the people. He ought to bear in mind that an overflowing treasury has its advantages as well as dis-advantages—especially for Indian princes. For such contingencies, as famines

and other visitations, "the Sulatani and Asaniâni," as our old statesmen called them, it is generally thought proper by our people that a state should have laid by in its coffers a sum equal to its one or two years' revenue. This limit we think cannot be safely transgressed—as such an act can only call forth into existence conditions of discomfort, misery and humiliation to the possessor of this unnecessary treasure, his heirs, successors and subjects.

The *London Times* correspondent has advanced the mischievous doctrine of the right of the government to insist on the refund of the taxes which our Indian Princes might raise over and above the legitimate requirements of their rule. The absurdity of the suggestion becomes obvious at first glance when we insist that the revenue policy of the British Government should be appraised by the same standard, and all taxes expended or remitted which were levied in excess of legitimate requirements. Who would be considered competent to judge whether the particular requirements of a government are legitimate and just or the reverse. The British Government or its officers are surely the last persons, we should consider to be good judges of the requirements of the Indian administrations. Nor would the English Government, we fancy, be satisfied with Indian Princes, or even their own subjects constituting

themselves judges of the requirements of British rule in India.

Nothing is said by our Reviewer about the attitude of Holkar towards the Government during the mutiny, and how he has been rewarded by the officers of our Government for his fidelity during that trying time. The true story is being told week after week in the columns of the *Statesman*, and one would have wished to hear what a writer who professes to know all about the Indian States of India, like the *Times* correspondent, had to say in connection with it. A guilty conscience, they say, sometimes enforces silence. Be this as it may, we shall here only content ourselves with remarking that Holkar's fidelity to the English at that time was no way less hearty and beneficial in its effects to that of Scindia, though his territory was smaller, and less central than that of his more powerful neighbour. Scindia has been, as it were, mortified by the confiscation of his chief fort, and Holkar has been rewarded for his fidelity by being perpetually stigmatised as disloyal, and denied until very recently even the re-consideration of the hasty opinion passed on him by an officer of the English Government, who did not certainly acquit himself well in that crisis. With these remarks we close our criticism of what the correspondent of the *London Times* has said about Holkar's rule and his military establishments.

The third and the last of the great Marâthâ States is that of Baroda ruled by Mahârâja Gâikawâr. The reviewer's treatment of this part of his communication is, we think, very confused. This may partly be owing to the writer's ignorance about Baroda affairs, or it may be owing to the lameness of the cause he advocates. The Baroda state is one of the very few big States of India which have never crossed swords with the English power. As such it is entitled to great consideration. Before the Delhi Imperial Durbar, it enjoyed, if we are not mistaken, a bigger salute than those fired off in honour of the two other Marâthâ chiefs. The salutes of these latter having been increased at the famous Delhi Assemblage, that distinction no longer exists now. By way of consolation or counter-poise, H. H. the Maharaja, though a minor at the time, received the endearing title or "Farazande Khâs &c." "Our own son" &c. from her Majesty the Empress of India. Every body knows there is not much meaning or sincerity in these honorific titles, and that the fictitious relationships they mark are generally of advantage only to the stronger party. This "son of Her Majesty's Indian Empire" has been very recently made to suffer a loss of revenue amounting annually to some 4 lakhs of Rupees, in the advancement of the policy which the Government of India have thought it necessary to enforce in the interests of their opium revenues.

No more unwarranted interference in the internal management of the affairs of Indian States can be imagined than the enforcement of these measures that have been devised for the development of British Indian revenues from opium, spirits, and salt. It is needless to observe that the Indian States of Rajputana and Guzerath, Malwa and Cutch, that have been made the victims of these high-handed measures, which strike at the very root of their independence and safety, find their mouths gagged. All they can venture to do is to put forth a feeble protest against the iniquity and injustice of the ill-advised measures of Government or their officers, and end by submission to the will of the irresistible paramount power. But as if this were not enough, the "son of Her Majesty's Indian Empire" has been further humiliated in the eyes of his subjects and neighbours and tributaries by the recent arrangements to take over the control of his military contingent out of his hands. In the promotion of the so-called imperial ends, the treaties are not taken into consideration for a single moment. The loss of prestige by the Indian rulers, the heavy losses imposed on their subjects, and the misery entailed on the military classes and other vested interests by these hard measures, count for nothing. Some of these high-handed proceedings are merely of the Resident's initiation; yet there is no use

complaining against the doings of that functionary, for, somehow what is called his prestige covers all his sins. By the traditions of his service, he, to borrow an expression from the British constitution, can not do wrong. This repressive system of Political supervision over the Indian States, so unsuited to the genius of the present times, so diametrically opposed to the spirit of the Treaties and Engagements entered into by our Government with them, has now become quite the fashion. The qualifications and merits of a Political Officer are judged and rewarded according as he is an adept in this art of political adventure. Many are the ways, therefore, which our Political Agents have devised to attain their ends in this direction. The younger race of our Indian Rulers have their time when they sow their wild oats, and on coming into power they are not all remarkable for thoughtfulness or moderation of habits or temper. Many chiefs or their sons manage to estrange the sympathies and good-will of their most trusted, efficient and experienced old officers, and in a few cases they raise to power and honor some utterly worthless favourite. The Resident keeps himself well-informed of the state of parties in the State. He has also by this time set his heart upon getting some advantage over the Indian administration. In the negotiations that follow he finds that the Diwan and the other experienced

officers are not easily over-reached or silenced. Some of the amlah then pay private and secret visits to the chief. Then the crowning piece of the comedy is enacted. Some fine morning, afternoon or evening, the chief rides alone to the Agency house, sees the Bada Saheb, laughs and talks with him in private, signs something, and returns home big with the secret of his trip to the fool's paradise. At this stage the comedy is over, and the tragedy commences. The Diwan and the other experienced officers of the State soon find themselves put out of court everywhere, and soon resign, or retire. The Resident sends in a report to his Government announcing the victory he has gained over the inexperienced young chief. The chief too, free now from every constitutional check, and deprived of the assistance of his experienced councillors, steers on a reckless course of youthful absolutism and folly. As long as the same officer remains in charge of the Residency all things apparently go on smoothly; and the Residency conveniently goes to sleep over the oppressions and shortcomings of the Durbar. Change in the *personnel* of the Agency is the only chance left to the Rayats in such cases for securing a hearing for their grievances. The picture we have drawn above is not the product of our imagination. We have given our best attention for some time past to the affairs of the Indian States, and have found

that something like the above with, of course, slight variations in the case of different states, marks invariably the downward course of not a few of them. In the majority of cases matters are made worse by forcing some totally worn-out and effete favourite of the Agency upon the prince as a *Karbhari*; but, of course, the perpetrators of such sharp and shameful measures take good care that no trace of their jobbery should be found in the records of their office. There one is sure to find that the services of the Resident's creature were expressly asked for by the sinning prince, and that the great antiquity of the notorious relic, the servant elected, were duly pointed out to the chief with the delicacy consistent with official courtesy. In fact the records of the Agency are sure to show, when the time comes for reviewing the propriety and honesty of the measure, that the responsibility of the more than mischievous appointment entirely rests with the incompetent chief himself. It is popularly rumoured that something of the farcical surprise, described above, happened lately at Baroda in connection with the settlement of the Maharaja's contingent body of cavalry. We do not, however, believe in the truth of this particular rumour. The contingent question of Baroda is not of H. H. the Maharaja's creation. It was started in the dark days of Lord Lytton's Government, and the way in which it was to be finally

settled was known before-hand. Indeed, if we are rightly informed, pressure had been brought to bear upon the late accomplished Diwan, the titular Raja, to settle it in a particular way, and that he had yielded to the pressure. As the Gaikawar was then a minor, it was thought proper to wait until H. H. came of age to give practical effect to the settlement. This we understand has been done recently. The apparent great haste with which the Gaikawar has acquiesced in the arrangement proposed, or, to speak more correctly, which has been thrust upon him by our government, and to which successive Gaikawars from the older Sayajirao were extremely opposed, is the fruitful source of the disquieting rumours alluded to above. We presume, therefore, neither Sayajirao, nor the well-meaning Resident attached to his court, can be held responsible for what has lately taken place at Baroda.

To return from this digression, we feel absolutely certain that many of the short-comings of the Indian States and their administrations are directly to be traced to the advice given to the chiefs by the Agents or Residents of our Government attached to their courts. Interested motives of their own, or the fancied advantage of the Government they represent, are at the bottom of this advice. It would be, we believe, difficult to mention any successful intrigue at an Indian Court in which the

Resident was not only at the bottom of, but the central figure in, the plot. Under these circumstances, we contend that the acts of these officers should be exposed to the light of public criticism as freely as those of any other officers of the Government without any absurd fear about loss of his prestige. The evil results of the secret report policy at present followed have become so great a scandal that some writers have gone; the length of recommending, that there should be independent courts instituted for the proper investigation and decision of such questions as may, from time to time, arise between the British Government and their officers on the one hand, and the Indian States and their Darbaris on the other. Things will surely take some such course in the remote future, but there is little hope at present of finding a welcome hearing for such radical proposals. Meanwhile, what is urgently required is a change in the spirit of the policy that is followed in our dealings with the Indian potentates. As long as the present repressive policy of high-handed authority is to be followed, the institution of these courts of arbitration between the paramount Government and its feudatories is not to be thought of as a measure of practical politics. It will be of the highest advantage to both the parties concerned that there should be a liberal change in the present policy of repression and high-handedness, that is

deemed to be the most correct fashion to follow in our dealings with the Indian Chiefs—such a change in fact as has been lately inaugurated by our late accomplished Catholic Viceroy in the internal or domestic policy of the Indian Empire. It is to be deeply regretted that the shortness of His Excellency's stay amongst us prevented him from bestowing that attention to the conduct of our relations with the feudatory and protected Indian States, which the importance of the interests at stake deserve, and imperatively demand. We have, before this, been at some pains to point out the ways and means by which this most desirable consummation was to be, in our humble opinion, attained. It may possibly be remembered by some of the readers of this *Journal* that in our article on a "Constitution for the Indian States," we had proposed the adoption of some constitutional checks upon the personal nature of the powers and authority of the Indian rulers by the institution of responsible councils, composed of the great officers and Mahajans of the state, who were to be associated in the Government with the chiefs, and who were to carry on the affairs of the state according to the opinion of the majority in connection with the subject. After the publication of that article, we had an opportunity of reading a Blue Book in connection with the rendition of Mysore to its ancient Hindu ruling family, in which some of our

thoughts and suggestions on the subject were anticipated by high authorities. But we are sorry to say that no further progress has been made in the direction indicated. It is sad to feel that the subject of a Constitution for Indian States is looked upon as no body's concern. None of our Indian chiefs have the necessary education, experience and foresight to perceive that, in the present political and social condition of India, their safety lies in giving a constitutional Government to their subjects. One by one, the most cherished rights and privileges of the states they rule over are taken away from them as being merely personal to them, and which they can, as it were, barter away at their pleasure. The Agents and Residents of our Government, who are ever bent on gaining more power in their hands, encourage the idea of a personal despotism with a view to gain their ends easily by playing upon the vanity, greed, timidity, or imbecility of one individual, as it may suit their purpose or the temperament of their victim. As for the big officers, Sardars and noblemen, and the elders of the Sanwasthnan or the State, where are they? Echo answers "where?" Placed between Indian rulers who are only bent upon the furtherance of their personal whims and pleasures or those of some worthless favourite on the one hand, and the Resident who is bent upon humouring the prince that he may gain mastery over him on the other, the

big officers and Sardars of the Indian administrations are nowhere. They not unnaturally, therefore, assume the *role* of the merest trimmers, and only care to secure their own emoluments and Jahagirs. In this state of things the poor Sardars, officers, and the generally well-to-do subjects of the state are often made to suffer grievous wrongs. If they carry their complaints to the Residency, they are told that the Resident cannot interfere. The mal-administration is increased by these answers, and at last a crisis comes such as over-took the ill-fated Malhar Rao Gaikwar. It is curious to observe, however, that the excuses of non-interference never hinder the Agents of our Government from forcing any measures they like upon the Indian Princes in contravention even of the most solemn Treaties and Engagements with them. They only come in their way when the real improvement of the administration is likely to be the result of the Agent's action or good offices, or when the infatuated prince is likely to be stopped in his downward course.

We know it is often very difficult for the Residents to advise the Indian Princes, even when some good is likely to be the result of such a step on his part, unless he stands on the best of terms with the Indian Rulers. We also know that it may not be within the power of every Agent or Resident to command such a combination of good manners,

tact, and discretion as are requisite for this task. The fault is not altogether all on one side, and is not the fault of individual Princes or Political Agents. The safety and integrity of the Indian States cannot be, and should not be, made to depend upon the personal inclinations of their Chiefs or the tact of the Agents. It is for these very reasons that we hold it to be incumbent upon all that the relations of the paramount power with the Indian princes should be based on broader grounds than the personal inclinations of the Indian Rulers, or those of the Political Officers of the British service. If the rulers of Indian States themselves care for their true freedom and dignity, and desire to secure the well-being of their States beyond the reach of the dangers of personal caprice, incompetency, or misconduct, which every now and then subject them to the loss of their rights and privileges, they cannot do it better than by resting their authority on the solid foundations of a constitutional monarchy, or a government with self-acting internal checks. It is obviously to the advantage also of our English Government that it should encourage the Indian Chiefs to grant such a constitution to their subjects, as it will simplify the task of their supervision of their administration and obviate the necessity of vexatious or unnecessary interference in the affairs of the Indian States. They will besides gain the eternal gratitude of their

own subjects. The preservation of the Indian States in the full enjoyment of their strength, rights, and privileges is a necessary condition of the preservation and proper development of the British Indian rule itself. For centuries past, India has reconciled herself to the existence within its midst of a foreign paramount power, provided that power left free scope in the shape of Indian States for the ambition and independent action of the Indian races, and provided also that the paramount power displayed by its acts complete freedom from a conceited exclusiveness in religious and political matters. The history of the Mahomedan Empire in Hindustan under the first five monarchs of the House of Timur affords the best illustration of this peculiar national temperament. As long as the Princes of Rajasthan lost not an iota of their authority, they loyally entered the service of the Imperial Court at Delhi, and as long as by their connection with the Imperial Court they added to their former dignities that of being also the Arkane Doulat, i. e. the pillars of the then greatest monarchy on Earth, they ensured the Empire of India its proper limits. This wise and liberal policy of Akbar and Shahâ Jahan was stupidly abandoned by Aurungzeb, who attempted to revert to the narrow, crooked and intolerant methods of Islâm as interpreted by the so-called orthodox Mullas, and shattered the Empire to pieces in the ill-

considered attempt to centralize or rather brutalize power. The whole history of the Mogal Empire in Hindustan points to a moral which our Government should certainly lay to heart. In the interests of the preservation of their splendid Empire in India, the British Government ought to conserve the integrity of the Indian States and their armies, and ought to see that they prosper and sub-serve great national ends under the shadow of their paramount power in conformity with the Treaties and Engagements. They should teach and encourage by precept as well as by example the growth of constitutional internal checks in place of the personal check of Political Officers acting from without and always with conflicting interests. This consummation so devoutly to be wished for can only be compassed by encouraging the Indian Chiefs to grant a constitutional government to their subjects, and by the Government looking well after the conduct of their own Agents and Residents at the courts of the chiefs, and adopting a more just and conciliatory tone in their policy towards the Indian States. Sayâjirâo Gâikawar, by the education and training he has received, is one of the princes who may be justly expected to pave, if not lead, the way in this direction. Holkar too for evident considerations should heartily endeavour to bring about the reform we have so often recommended. We earnestly invite their attention

to the remarks we have here offered for their consideration and that of our Government. The highly educated Maharaja of Travankore, the favourite pupil of such an accomplished scholar and statesman as Sir T. Madhawa Ray, ought, we fancy, to devote his certainly great powers towards the elucidation of some such plan, whereby the administrations of the Indian States may be improved; and their vitality and power secured to the advantage alike of their subjects, and of the benign paramount power. The attempts made to set up joint administrations in Kāthiawād, and Councils of Regency at Kolhapoor and Cutch, as also the Mysore Council, are beginnings in the right direction, and are good auguries for the future. The separation of the Khasgi from the Doulat, the creation of departments under different heads, the constitution of executive councils under the presidency of the Diwan with a guaranteed position; these are the leading features of the reform we would press upon the attention of the authorities. The *Times* correspondent closes his first paper with his review of the Gaikawars' rule, and we must also stop here for the present. Our only apology for noticing his criticisms on these leading Marātha States at some length is, that these states have for obvious reasons been an eyesore to politicians of the Annexation school, who would, if they had the power, soon make short work of them. The

Times correspondent himself has let the cat out of the bag, for in his subsequent review of what he is pleased to call the Hindu Principalities, he states that in regard to them (as distinguished from the Maratha States noticed in the first communication) it is rather the reform and increased efficiency of their administrations, *than the wholesale disappearance of these States*, that is in the highest degree desirable," obviously suggesting that he would prefer to see the wholesale absorption of the leading Maratha States. Fortunately this wish is one which is never likely to be realized, but it makes all the more incumbent on us to be watchful of the interests of these States, and adds to the responsibility of their present rulers to arm themselves against the dangers of any reactionary measures by leading the van progress in well-ordered and constitutional rule.

THE MAHOMEDAN STATES.

Next after the Maratha States, the Mahomedan Indian States come in for their share of attention at the hands of the correspondent of the *London Times* whose opinions about the armies of the Indian States we are reviewing. There are twenty-two Mahomedan States within the limits of British India; but of these not more than three

or five can claim political importance. The *Times* correspondent dwells at some length on the armies and affairs of only three of them—Hyderabad, Bhopal and Bhawalpore. We think Tonk in Rajastan, Rampore in Rohilkhand and Junagad in Katiyawad may well have claimed individual descriptions at his hands; for their prestige, resources and military retainers are not very far behind at least those of Bhopal or Bhawalpore.

This writer has not the same high opinion of the military strength and capacity of the Mahomedan principalities of India that he has of the Maratha States, though we must confess, in the present state of the country, we think him greatly mistaken in this his estimate. Hyderabad alone has an army which does considerably out-number the armies of the three military Maratha chiefs taken together. Then we must remember the fact that part at least of the Nizam's forces are recruited from independent Mahomedan tribes beyond the limits of India proper, like the Arabs and Pathans—who, as warriors, wherever they have been found in considerable numbers, have always given a good account of themselves. It is true the Maratha chiefs have behind them a comparatively compact nation which, taken all in all, has shewn itself to be one of the most capable of the nations of this vast country. But in the present circumstances of the country and the all but total isolation

in which the Indian States—particularly the Hindu ones—have been placed—no importance, we fear, could be assigned to the fact above alluded to; while the community of religious ideas and fanaticism which bind together the Mahomedan nations of the world becomes, *at times* a very real source of power which though it has only the elements in it of being able to work efficiently by fits and starts, has, for the time being, brought about great combinations and sometimes great results. The existence of powerful independent Mahomedan kingdoms, beyond the bounds of the British Indian Empire, both in Asia and Europe, is a circumstance which cannot be *entirely* ignored, even in their present tottering condition, in any estimation of the military strength of the Indian Mahomedan States. In the last century at Panipat, they were able—for a short time though it be—to shew such a united front. The history of the Hyderabad State furnishes instances of foreign Mahomedan kings trying to find allies there for their projected invasions of India. It is on record that Zuman Shah, the Amir of Cabul, made two abortive attempts to induce the Nizam to join him in his plans against the Marathas which, indeed, never came to a head. The mutiny too of 1857-58 is not without its lessons in this connection. It must, however, be said in justice to the Nizams of Hyderabad, and their responsible ministers, that

they have never sympathised with, or made common cause with, the barbarous and savage Mahomedans beyond the confines of India. Not only this. We presume it would be difficult to mention any more faithful allies of the English Government of India than the Nizams of Hyderabad. Yet this writer in the *London Times* has little, as the sequel will shew, good to say of them, whom we think and look upon, by the best of all rights—that of long alliance—as one of the best friends of our Government.

The greater portion of the communication which this writer has devoted to the Mahomedan Indian States is taken up with a description of the Hyderabad State, a perverted narrative of its relations with the English Government, its army, and that useful body of troops known as the “Hyderabad Contingent,” the character of its Government and the alleged tastes and inclinations of its nobles. This portion of the writer’s performance is typical of the sort of writings that constantly find their way in public prints of the lowest sort, and, we must confess, we are at a loss to comprehend how an influential, and usually dignified paper like the *London Times* could have stooped to ventilate such views as are here disclosed, and that from the pen of one who, though he purports to write to the “Thunderer” as a correspondent, is, in fact, a member of its editorial staff.

As humour is discovered in every sentence in some of Oliver Goldsmith's writings, so ill-will, a total disregard for truth, and an extreme prejudice towards the very existence of the Indian States, are to be found in every line of this communication as far as it refers to the Hyderabad State. Were we, therefore, to attempt a systematic refutation of the various opinions expressed in this portion, the task would be unusually tedious, and, perhaps, as useless as tedious. We will, therefore, try to give from well-known sources as meagre a sketch of the history of the relations of this state with the paramount power as possible—for the greater part merely contenting ourselves with specifying the dates of such events as seem necessary for our argument and then simply giving extracts from the correspondent's own writings in the *London Times*. This will serve a double purpose, in as much as the extracts, besides carrying their own refutation, will conduce to justify what we have been hitherto compelled to say as characterising the correspondent's writings.

The Nizams of Hyderabad have no pretensions to antiquity, the Subbelari of the Deccan having been raised over the ruins of the proud kingdoms of Bijapore and Gowalkonda about the year 1710 A. C. Ten years later, Asof Jah, the first Nizam, threw off his allegiance to the Emperor at Delhi, and though the Nizams have ever since

been in the possession of extensive territories, the comparative barrenness of their achievements is conspicuous and does not lend itself easily to the lofty pretensions of the family. The Nizams of Hyderabad have come in possession of extensive territories which they had never laboured to conquer, and consequently they have always been forced to lean on foreign support for the maintenance of their authority. Asof Jah was only able to hold what he had usurped, against the Delhi Emperors on the one hand, and the Marathas on the other, by a secret understanding with the latter whose attacks he often skillfully diverted towards the plains of Hindostan and Delhi.

Hyderabad may be said to have entered on its long friendly career with the English power in India even from this early period of its history, since Asof Jah, at the request of the English, sent an expedition to Madras to take it from the French and restore it to the English. In this enterprise, however, his officers were not successful. Asof Jah died in 1748 A. C. The immediate descendants of Asof Jah were his sons Gazioodin, Nasir Jung, Salabat Jung, Nizam Alli (the youngest, in whom the dynasty was finally established) and Muzaffer Jung, a grandson of Asof's favourite daughter. On the death of Asof Jah, Nasir proclaimed himself Subhedar of the Deccan, giving out at the same time, that Gazioodin had renounced his right

to the Musnad. But his pretensions were at once opposed by Muzuffer who pretended that a testamentary arrangement had been made in his favour by the last Nizam. Both these rivals being, each in his turn, supported and deserted by their respective French and English allies, perished ignominiously in some petty actions. Salabat Jung now assumed power, but his claims were disputed by Gazioodin, aided by the Marathas. Gazioodin, before he had progressed far in his enterprise, fell a victim to poison. Thus ended the second contest for the Nizamate between the sons of Asof Jah. But the struggle for power between their English and French allies was destined to a more prolonged duration. Salabat Jung now became Nizam, but having been obliged to engage in some distant enterprises from his capital, his younger brother, Nizam Alli, engrossed to himself all the power of the state and in 1761. A. C. deposed him. Nizam Alli reigned long enough to contract most of the important treaties and stipulations which have regulated the relations of our English Government with the Hyderabad State. In 1765 A. C. he came into collision with the British power by a ferocious invasion of the Carnatic, the Nawab of which was then in alliance with the English.

Except on this single occasion, the soldiers of Hyderabad have never placed themselves in actual opposition to the troops of our Government.

The Nizam, indeed, was making preparations for a renewed attack on the Carnatic, but the English sent General Cailliand to Hyderabad to make peace, whereby they agreed to pay an annual tribute or Pesh Kash of 5 lacs of Rupees to the Nizam, in return for some territory ceded to them, and the contracting parties further stipulated to assist each other with troops when required.

It seemed after this as if the Nizam were about to break this engagement and make common cause with Hyder Alli. But he soon saw his error and the negotiations between the Darbars of Hyderabad and Mysore fell through. There-upon on the 1st of September 1798, a new treaty was concluded by which it was stipulated that Subsidiary force should be made permanent and increased to Six (before it was two) battalions of Infantry with a proportion of Artillery, at an annual charge to the Nizam of 24, 17, 100 Rs. The French corps which was in the Service of the Nizam was to be immediately disbanded and their officers made over to the English to be transported to Europe as prisoners of war. The importance and utility of this stipulation to the English Company will be evident when it will be remembered that, besides the big territorial cession it brought, it enabled them in the war with Mysore which soon followed, instead of leaving at Hyderabad a disciplined body of 15,000 troops, accustomed to war and officered

by foes, to distract their movements, to avail themselves of large supports from the Nizam's own army. The Contingent itself mustered 6,500 men who were placed at the Company's disposal, with an equal number of the Nizam's infantry and a large body of irregulars. After the death and defeat of Tippu, the districts of Gutty and Goorum-Cunda were included in the portion of Tippu's territories made over to the Nizam as his spoil in the war. On the 12th of October 1800 by a subsidiary treaty made with the Nizam, the British Government further engaged "that no state or power what-so-ever should, with impunity, commit an unprovoked hostility or aggression upon the territories of the Nizam. To enable the Company to fulfil efficiently this engagement, two battalions of Sepoys and a regiment of Indian Cavalry were permanently added to the Subsidiary force to be maintained by the Hyderabad State; and to secure the regular payment of his augmented force the Nizam ceded in perpetuity to the Company all the territories which he had acquired by the treaties of Shrirangapatan and Mysore in 1792 and 1799 respectively.

In August 1823 Nizam Ali Khan died and was succeeded by Secundar Jah. We have now reached a point in our narrative when Chandulal was virtually at the head of the Hyderabad administration. The treatment the state was

subjected to for some time hence in connection with the appointment of its responsible minister, shows how impossible it is for the high officers or Karbharis of Indian States to pull on for any length of time unless they are totally subservient to the political officers of the paramount power accredited to their courts and how difficult it is for them to initiate an original, or a comprehensive policy, however beneficial it may be to their states if sanction be withheld from it, even from private and questionable motives, by those officers.

In 1823 owing to the heavy debts with which the Hyderabad state was encumbered, our Government induced it to relinquish the "peshuns" paid to it by the Company in perpetuity in exchange for the sum of 1, 16, 66, 66, 6 Rs.

Sekunder Jah died in 1829 and was succeeded by his eldest illegitimate son Nasir—oodowla. This was thought a fit opportunity to revise the style of correspondence with Hyderabad hitherto followed. The imperial phrase "Mabu Dowlah" (royal self,) used by the Nizam, and the term of inferiority "Najar mund" used by the Governor General, were discontinued, and the correspondence has since been conducted in terms of perfect equality

The payment for the contingent became at this time irregular, and the English Government, who had an eye to the acquisition of territory

advanced the Nizam sums of money for the payment of that body. This had the effect in time of greatly embarrassing the state in financial difficulties. At last these difficulties became so great that the Governor-General thought a fitting opportunity had arrived for fixing a definitive period within which the debt due by H. H. must be paid in full. The Resident thereon was instructed to demand that the whole debt should be discharged by the thirty first of December 1850. On the fourth of January 1851 the time for the payment having expired, the Nizam was required to pay the large debt. But at his request the time was prolonged to 31st October ensuing. By the 15th of August, the Hyderabad State had paid so much of the debt that only 32, 96, 702 Rs. remained to be paid. The English Government at this time again thought it necessary to advance large sums of money to the Nizam and, in about three months' time, the Nizam's debt had again risen to upwards of forty-five lacs of Rs. In April 1853, therefore, the Resident was directed to submit to the Nizam a proposal for a new treaty on the basis of ceding *in perpetuity* to the British Government a territory to the value of about thirty-six lacs per annum. In return he was to be relieved from his present debt and from all future payments to the Contingent.

As the Nizam's repugnance for a perpetual

cession of territory was great, it was concluded, by treaty, that in lieu of the present Contingent, the Honorable Company should maintain an auxiliary force of five thousand infantry, 2,000, Cavalry and four field batteries of artillery to be styled 'the Hyderabad Contingent'; for the regular payment of which the Nizam agreed to assign (not cede permanently) districts, yielding an annual gross revenue of 50 lacs of Rs., to the exclusive management of the British Resident, who was to account to the Nizam's government for the revenues he received and to pay over any surplus after the legitimate disbursements had been met with. We will here only draw the attention of our readers to the hitherto total cost of this Contingent to the Hyderabad State as compared to the trifling cost to our Government with which it may be possible now to secure the active services of the proposed supplementary contingents from the armies of the Indian States.

Six days after the conclusion of the business above alluded to, Suraj-ool-Moolk, the Nizam's Dewan died, and his nephew Salar jang was appointed to that office.

In 1857 the Nizam Nasir-oo-Dowlha died and was succeeded by his eldest son Afzul-oo-Dowlah. This was a little before the mutiny. During the mutiny the Nizam and his illustrious minister remained faithful to our Government.

Nor was this faithfulness of the Hyderabad State through all the occurrences of 1857 and 1858 so much a matter of course as some would seem to believe. It was subject to severe trials. Rumours of disasters in the North-West of English arms often gained credence and the prevalent feeling seemed to be one of shame that while the "faithful" in the North-West had dared the chances of an open war with the Caffir English, the City of Hyderabad was at peace. It is but an act of bare justice to the Nizam to say that his personal fidelity to his alliance with our Government was beyond doubt. The services also of the troops he lent were brilliant and deserve to be noticed in view of what the correspondent of the *English Times*, under review, says about them by way of disparagement.

Instead of joining in any conspiracy against the British Government, or opposing the wishes and inclination of the Nizam, the gallant soldiers of the Hyderabad Contingent marched for fifteen months, and after the termination of a glorious campaign returned to the Nizam's country. The far-famed "Nizam's horse" gave the first blow to the rebellion in Central India, by the capture of the stores, guns and ammunition carried away from Mahitapore by the mutinous contingent there, and the garrison of Dhar that had escaped. This together with the famous engagement at

Rawal saved the Neemuch garrison from the fate that befell the British garrison at Cawnpore. So satisfied was Colonel Durand with the work performed by the Hyderabad Cavalry, that he took upon himself the responsibility of authorising the payment of an extra five Rs. per month to each horseman. These services were rendered with "the first Malwa column." Those rendered with the second column were equally notable. Great assistance was rendered by the Hyderabad troops in the capture of Zanshi and in the victorious battles before Koonch, Kalpee and Gwalior. For these services rendered by the Nizam, his nobles and troops, in the July of 1860, the Governor-General requested the Nizam's acceptance of presents of English manufacture, valued at one lac of Rupees and also made over to H. H. in full sovereignty the lapse petty State of Sholapore and cancelled a debt of 50 lacs of Rs. with interest, and restored to H. H.'s Government the districts of Raichore and Dharases which had been assigned for the maintenance of the Contingent together with the Berars, which are still in the management of our Government. Besides these rewards to H. H. khillats of the value of 30,000 Rs. each were awarded to the Nizam's uncle Shumsh-ool-oomrha and H. H.'s Dewan Mookhtar-ool-moolkh Salar Jang Bahadur.

We presume every one of the readers of this Journal is well aware of the glorious results of the

late Sir Salar Jang's administration and the efforts he made for the restoration of the Berars to the Hyderabad State—offering at one time to capitalize the expenses of the Contingent. We are sure every body has read something about the manner in which he was treated by some of the officers of the Government of India for making these exertions in favour of the Hyderabad State whose servants he and his ancestors have been for many generations past. But here we feel we shall have to tread on live embers, and we will therefore let the veil drop over the narrative.

As observed before, we will merely now give extracts from the correspondent of the *London Times* to show what his sentiments are about the State owned by our faithful ally the Nizam, his people and the Hyderabad Contingent whose brilliant achievements in the cause of our Government in the critical times of the mutiny we have tried very briefly to enumerate above. Comments on these extracts, we presume, after the very brief outline we have given of the history of the state will be superfluous.

Here is what our writer says about the Hyderabad state:—"Hyderabad has long been a hot-bed of intrigue and self-seeking machinations both among natives and *non-official Europeans*. It is the one place in India where corrupt Englishmen (only *non-officials* we suppose) have been found

The snares of the Nizam's court have availed to tarnish the spotless reputation in pecuniary matters which the men of this country have gained in every other state of India.

“There are several peculiarities in connection with the Nizam's dominion. Nowhere else is the dominant caste more obtrusive and nowhere else has it less real hold on the soil. The rulers and the officials are Mahomedans; but the people are Hindus. The latter have no share in the administration whatever; the former do not possess the sympathy or attachment of the subjects by whose thrift and labour they enjoy the pleasures of the town***or the mild excitement of plotting against each other, varied by the discussion of the still more attractive theme of what they will do when the hour of those English has passed away. “He (the Musalman of Hyderabad) must be a soldier, and administrator, or one of those idle politicians of Indian capitals who rearrange the map of India to their fancy and speculate on the consequences of Russia's advance in Central Asia and of England's embarrassment in Egypt.”*** The Nizam's authority is maintained as the most intensely fanatical and self-seeking Mahomedan administration in the Peninsula over 10,000,000 Hindu subjects in the upland of the Deccan”.

Here is the opinion of our writer about the Hyderabad Contingent:—

“ The Hyderabad Contingent is a survival of a state of things that has long passed away, and it should be re-organised or abolished, and its duties transferred to the Madras or Bombay armies. In Hyderabad, we have lavishness of expenditure side by side with inefficiency in the results typified in a more striking form than anywhere else in India; and this criticism applies with equal force to the Nizam’s army and that antiquated organization termed the Hyderabad Contingent.” * * * “ The force called the Hyderabad Contingent, numbering 8,000 men, occupies the Cantonment of Secunderabad and eight other places in the province. But there would not be much ground for surprise if the very generally accepted view as to the doubtful fidelity of this force, *if turned against the Nizam*, were to prove the correct one; for the Hyderabad Contingent is nominally an army of the Nizam paid out of the revenue of the English-governed province of Berar, and notwithstanding that it is officered by Englishmen. ”

“ If the Nizam ever could have the courage to unfurl the green flag of the Prophet, which I admit is doubtful, there would be small thought of opposing his decision among the Contingent at Secunderabad. In this particular the Nizam enjoys a superiority over his neighbours, the Maratha Chiefs, and possesses a mark of independence which they have not retained; for the garrisons of Mhow

and Morar are composed of the regular Anglo-Indian army, with a large proportion of Englishmen and an exclusively European artillery."

Here is what our writer proposes should be done with such a state:—

"Few will be so sanguine as to suppose that the Court of Hyderabad can be purified by *any process short of abolishing it*; but the main points will be attained by *a reduction of the Nizam's army, the removal of the 16,000 mercenaries; and the substitution of an Anglo-Indian garrison for the Hyderabad Contingent.*"

Here are extracts which show how easily this has been attempted before and how it could be done now:—

"Notwithstanding treaties recognising 'the sovereignty' and 'the independence' of the Nizam, English officers were employed shortly before Nasir's accession in settling the amount of revenue to be raised in different districts, while it was by means of troops led by English officers that some degree of security was restored to the high roads of his state." "Although the Nizam has been allowed by official consent not only the premier place among the Indian Feudatories, but even a position of quasi-independence, there is no state in India wherein our interference has been more often rendered necessary by internal discord and carried into effect in complete disregard of the Nizam's

sovereignty. *The Nizam's sovereignty is a mere fiction, a hollow pretence that, but for us, should never have possessed any meaning.*”

Below we quote the concluding para of our writer's communication regarding the Mahomedan states of India:—“ Our interference in Hyderabad, despite the flattering fiction of independence, has been more marked and more inquisitorial than anywhere else; but the results have been spasmodic and irregular, because we have left the duty of carrying out our suggestions and requirements of experience and knowledge to the Nizam's own Agents. *No certain amelioration will be effected until we apply the Berar system to the rest of Hyderabad, and succeed in inducing the Nizam to diminish his army, to banish his mercenaries and to acquiesce in the substitution of Madras regiments for the Hyderabad Contingent.*”

“Practically” says our writer, “the question of our relations with the Mahomedan states of India resolves itself into the difficult problem of our relations with the Nizam.”

The italics in the above extracts are our own; and we invite the particular attention of the reader to the same, as illustrative of the propriety and justice of the general observations we have deemed it our duty to make regarding the character of these contributions. We presume after the perusal of these extracts, our readers will come over to

our opinion and think that a writer or a publicist who should needlessly cause irritation, dissatisfaction, or alarm in the hearts of the feudatories of this vast British Indian Empire, their subjects and well-wishers should be considered as the greatest sinner against propriety as those who should needlessly bring about such results in connection with our enlightened English Government of India itself.

The second Mahomedan State of which the correspondent of the London *Times* has given an individual account is Bhopal. It is fortunate our writer, as in the case of Patiala, has nothing provoking or unkind to say about this Indian state. "The name (Bhopal) suggests," says he "so many memories of loyalty and devotion, that the reader will be prepared to find criticism dis-armed and the strictures passed on more famous and powerful principalities absent from my review of this Indian territory." Notwithstanding these sentiments the writer insists on the reduction of the small army this state maintains.

Like Hyderabad, Bhopal, too has no pretensions to antiquity, the principality having been founded by Dost Mahomed, a fellow-soldier with Asof Jah. Dost Mahomed's successors, for the whole of the 18th Century, were weaklings. Bhopal at the beginning of the present century, found a ruler of energy and capacity in Vazir

Mahomed. He died in 1816 and was succeeded by Nuz-zur Mahsmmed, who accepted the protection of the English Government of India. The Pindharis, who had made Bhopal their home, were soon expelled from it; but Nuz-zur was accidentally killed by his brother. The widow of Nuzura Mahomed, the Khodsia Begum, became regent and set aside her husband's successor, Mooner. Another successor was chosen. His death which took place in 1844, however, brought the old Begam and her daughter, Sikandar Begam who had views of her own, again to the front. The latter in 1859, as a reward for her conspicuous loyalty to our Government in the Mutiny, was recognised as ruler of Bhopal in her own right. She was also rewarded with the gift of certain districts, one of which belonged to Dhar and ought properly to have been restored to that principality. The Begam was also granted the honours that would have been her due if she had belonged to the stronger sex.

In Bhopal the subjects are less taxed than in British India, the taxation per head being only 3s. 6d. "This should be the case" says our writer, in all Indian States But it seems he would not care what the taxation in the Indian states was "*if they were obliged to take a larger share in the imperial obligations.*" We have already shewn in a former portion of this paper that the Indian States

very fully bear their share of all responsibility in this matter and could not, in justice, be called upon to contribute anything more unless they chose to do so of their own accord for new favours and privileges.

The Bhopal army, according to the correspondent of the London *Times* contains 2,200 infantry, 700 cavalry and nearly 60 guns, and the State pays two lacs of Rupees a year in support of the Bhopal Battalion, which is under the control of English officers and which represents the old contingent. Our writer seems to assert that *this* arrangement, which he would see followed in the case of Hyderabad, has enabled three successive Begams to work wonders in the administration of their territories. How come then the present troubles in Bhopal, one might naturally ask. We fear only the establishment of something like a constitutional rule, in place of the entirely personal rule of the chiefs and the Political Agents that obtains now, can put the administrations of the Indian states on firm foundations which will not be shaken or affected by personal caprices and personal defects. The countries of Europe have long achieved this end and are prospering, and the States of India will never fare well otherwise than by following in the foot-steps of their more enlightened brethren of the West. Such being our faith, we cannot sufficiently condemn the measures which are often

not only tolerated but encouraged and even forced upon the Indian states, and which are totally at variance with the aims which our wise government follows with such exemplary strictness in its own administration. How wide-awake, for instance, is our Government in the choice of their own servants, and how rigidly it sticks to the limit of age in their case. That regulation has two objects to accomplish; not to clog promotion, and to secure the efficiency of the service. In most Indian states there is only one place in the disposal of which the officers of our Government have no inconsiderable hand. This is the post of the Minister or *Karbhári* in the Indian states. It is curious to see how our Political officers exercise this patronage. Go from one end of the country to the other if you please; you will find this moral patronage mostly abused by our officials wherever they had a finger in the matter. You will find their choice has mostly fallen on mere boys or old effete pensioned off men who were thought unfit for British service any longer. We know, Mr. Gladstone is a very grand old man, and that William Pitt was a very grand youngman, and that both of them had been Prime Ministers of England. But, we presume, as a rule, few men can be grand at the ages when those remarkable men became so. This is an instance of a measure which is codemned in one administration but thought to be quite good enough for another. We

are reminded of it in connection with Bhopal as the state seems to be suffering at this time by a similar shortcoming which is to be laid at the doors of our officials. Readers of English history must be aware what precautions are deemed necessary to be taken when there happens to be a queen on the throne of England and when it is thought desirable she should marry. The queen and the woman are scrupulously viewed apart. But in the case of Bhopal a different "bandobasta" was thought to be the most correct thing. Some years ago the present Begam lost her consort, and whenever our Political officers happened to have seen Her Highness in this bereaved condition, they were struck with commiseration at her loneliness. She appeared to them as amorous Kalidas would describe a female in a similar condition of destitution. "Like the budding Malati willow, without her blossoming supporter the majestic Amra tree," the Begam Saheba seemed a desolate object to them, and they, like Dr. Primrose, the Vicar of Wakefield, began to preach matrimony to her. If Her Highness would take a new consort, they told the Begam, he would be of immense help to her in relieving her of much of the burden of her administration. The new consort did this thoroughly and effectively. He enforced the rights of the Mahomedan husband against his royal lady and put her behind a Parda. In fact he made her invisible. Disorder is soon

said to have become rampant in the state, and our Government is at present engaged in endeavours to mend matters in Bhopal; in other words, undoing that which they were so anxious to do but a few short years ago. Here once more we beg leave to observe that it is not the individual men, but the system, that we find fault with.

As there is at present at the head of the Central India Agency such an accomplished and unprejudiced a statesman as Sir Lepel Griffin we are led to hope that Bhopal, one of our best allies, will pass safely through the crisis that has come over it.

The third Mahomedan state described at some length by the correspondent of the *London Times* is Bhawalpor~~o~~, which lies to the south of, but immediately contiguous to, the Panjāb, with only the Sutlaj between. It is a state which once owned allegiance to the Durani monarchy of Afganistan; but which has survived the Sikh revival. The population of the state numbers 5,000,000 and the revenue is 2,000,000 Rs. It maintains an army of 360 cavalry, 2,500 infantry and "not fewer than 80 guns." This force, as that of a frontier state, does not seem excessive to our writer who further says it should be only made more efficient and allotted a place in the defence of our North-West frontier. For once we are here in complete accord with our writer, ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~state~~ ~~is~~ ~~to~~ ~~remain~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~present.~~

The next group of Indian states to which the correspondent of the *London Times* directs his unfriendly attentions are what he calls "The Hindu States", from which, as observed before, he has in a malicious manner, marked off the three Maratha states. The writer, however, is only a degree less hostilely inclined towards the majority of these states than he is towards those of the Marathas, in as much as he does not propose to do with them exactly what, in the plenitude of his power and wisdom, he proposed to do with the great Maratha Feudatory states—their total effacement from off the face of Indian India. It seems our writer, for the present at least, would be satisfied to allow these Hindu states to exist if they were only rendered harmless by the abolition of their armies. This comparative indulgence, however, he is anxious to show he has not extended to these States without carefully considered reasons; for, he says of their chiefs that they are *the natural rulers of their states and are at one in sympathies of race, religion and caste with the people they govern.* This preference claimed for the rulers of these States is, as we have before pointed out, misleading, and has perhaps been advanced by the writer to cast a sort of slur on the Marathas. We must confess, that though high caste Hindus ourselves, we have still to learn that the people of Mysore or Rajputana are free from the fourfold system of caste that obtains

in India everywhere, and that they are all, or profess to be all either of the race and caste of the Shalivahans of old or Rajputs, and that they all interdine and intermarry, which they must, if they be members of the same race, religion and caste. No one, we fear, would more strongly renounce, if not resent, the honour and distinction thus attempted to be thrust on them by the writer in the English *Times* than the chiefs and the people themselves of the principalities in question. Indeed, we firmly believe, they would sooner fly to arms than submit to be dubbed with the honours which this ignorant correspondent of the London *Times* would seem to confer on them with such exemplary fairness and generosity. Sir John Malcolm somewhere in his *Memoirs of Central India* says that the bulk of the inhabitants and cultivators of Central India, Malwa and Hindustan—especially the Jats and the Sikhs—greatly sympathised with the Maratha leaders and invaders, and secretly invited and assisted them to come into their country and helped them in many other ways, because they looked upon the Marathas as their Kith and Kin, as people who occupied the same position with themselves in society. The writer in the London *Times*, living as he does on the banks of the Thames, may well be ignorant of the fact that the Bhats or bards of the Jats and the Sikhs on the banks of the Jamanah and the Sutlaj are never

tired of singing of the heroic deeds of the "Arre Raws and Bhale Raws" of the Deccan, mounted on their best mares and chargers that had been reared on the historically famous pastures in the country irrigated by the Bhima and the Neera—in their contests against the hated tyranny of the infidel Moslems. So popular is the theme with the people that often times the only stock of folklore and popular song possessed by these "Northern Bards" is the song in honour of the fearless deeds of the fearless old Maratha horsemen. We cannot and must not, however, dwell any longer on this and similar topics—even for fear of seeming to catch the bait so cunningly thrown out to us by the hostile and foreign writer in the *English Times*. It is obvious now, even to the most superficial observers, that sectional and caste prejudice (if they ever were very strong *Politically* in this country) are now dying rather fast, and that now they would scarcely offer any safe handle for the evil-disposed with which to work upon the feelings and prejudices of the people of India—one against the other, and by such sort of management to find reason or excuse for the short-comings of any administration. Every day now the people of India, like the American peoples, are fast training themselves, under the benign British rule, to look upon themselves as Brother Indians more than anything else. Apart from these considerations,

however, the interested lucubrations of the correspondent of the *Times* under examination, at this time, do not deserve any very detailed refutation. We were prevented, owing to the limited space at our disposal being until now otherwise required for the elucidation of other matters of a more pressing, though temporary, character, from continuing our criticism of the *Time's* correspondent's absurd utterances about the Indian States and their armies. We are now gratified to find that the march of events in the interval has helped to render our task comparatively easy. Not only have the *Time's* Correspondent's thousand and one faults, — both of omission and commission — his false and baseless alarmist conclusions that he has drawn from his perverted facts and figures — not only have all these been amply exposed by men of greater authority and ability than ourselves, but some of the views which this journal has ever been at the pains of expounding and bringing prominently to the notice of Government, have been confirmed by men whose knowledge and authority to speak decisively on the subject can not, by any means, be lightly estimated. It would, indeed, be difficult to point to any recent writings that have been more authoritatively refuted and condemned all round than "these communications" of this correspondent of the London *Times*. And yet a noted firm of publishers has thought these communications

deserving of a permanent place in English literature, and has given them to the world in the form of a handsomely printed volume !!!

Sir Lepel Griffin from his higher post in Central India has hurled his powerful literary bolts unmercifully against the writer in the *Times* and almost demolished him. But calamities, they say, seldom come singly. Scarcely had the unhappy writer time to hide his diminished head than that irrepressible veteran writer on Indian topics—that inexhaustible repository of varied official knowledge and experience concerning subjects Indian—the famous author of the one pound ration theory, and the redoubtable champion of our notorious system of forestry—we mean, in short, Sir Richard Temple—took this writer in hand and thrashed him thread-bare. Such was the logic of facts and such the extremity to which our prolific writer in the *Times* was reduced that he was glad to withdraw the calumnies that he had recklessly launched against the Indian States and their so-called armies. He had literally, so to speak, to eat his own words. He had, with one stroke, as it were, of his mighty pen called into existence several hundreds of thousands of well-drilled and well-equipped warriors and several hundreds of batteries of mighty artillery. It has been proved now by persons who know the Indian States well, that there is not a single serviceable battery of artillery in the whole

of Indian India. The several lakhs of formidable infantry and cavalry have dwindled down to a few thousand sorry battalions. In fact, every position that was advanced by the correspondent of the *English Times* under notice, has been proved false and utterly untenable, if not extremely mischievous and untimely also. Sir Lepel Griffin, if we remember right, has gone so far as to say that the armaments of the Indian Chiefs, far from being too numerous, actually fall short of the numbers they have contracted to maintain with the Paramount Power. We must confess we were not prepared to hear this sort of contention just now, unimpeachable though it is. Sir Richard Temple has followed the attack on nearly the same lines; and many more, less known to fame, have done the same. But we think the unkindest cut of all has come from that forlorn hope of unscrupulous Anglo-Indianism—Mr. J. M. Maclean, formerly Editor and now the London Correspondent of the *Bombay Gazette*. He has, with rare ingenuousness, and frankness denied that the writer in the *English Times* did not know or did not understand the subject well that he had undertaken to enlighten the English public upon. He has denied that the writer was unconscious of the untruthfulness of the facts and figures he had based his apparently ignoble argument upon. Mr. Maclean maintains that the writer in the *London Times*,

being actuated with high motives of patriotism and philanthropy, only wanted to terrify the Indian chiefs and the people of India, like children, by wrongly representing their toy military establishments as really very formidable and fearful ones, and then urging their total abolition, to threaten the Indian Chiefs into making those loyal offers of service and aid that they have lately made with scarcely a single exception. In other words, Mr. Maclean admits that the whole affair, from beginning to end, has been a cooked affair, and that it has succeeded very well and completely answered the expectations formed of it by the alien writer. No condemnation of the correspondent of the *London Times*, under examination, could be more complete. This is ignoring, however, Lord Ripon altogether. A fly seating itself on the top of a carriage, says the fable, once boasted how its presence there created all the speed, the noise and the dust! The poor creature, ofcourse, altogether ignored the horses and the vigorous coachman. After such a defence as that set up by Mr. Maclean, or the condemnation of the whole thing, it is scarcely necessary at this hour to enter into any lengthy refutation of the sophistries so studiously strung together in the *London Times* by its correspondent. It would be only slaying the slain over again. If, therefore, in what follows, we notice at all his arguments

against the Indian states and their armies, it is only to preserve the line of argument we had previously chalked out for ourselves, and thus in some measure to enable us to bring into bold relief the lines of policy and the measures of National defence we wish to advocate, and which we very strongly recommend, in the loyal spirit of loving subjects, for the adoption of our Government.

This group of Indian states styled "the Hindu States" comprises by far the large portion of what is understood by the expression "Indian India;" for, out of a total population of 50,000,000 people that own the sway of the feudatories of the British Indian Empire, it contains no less than 21,000,000 inhabitants. The chiefs of these states, with a few insignificant exceptions, are mostly either Rajputs or Sikhs—two of the most warlike races of this country. The Rajput Chiefs and their followers were the very incarnation of courage and truthfulness not many centuries ago. Being trusted by the Mogul Emperors, they were one of the staunchest defenders of the Empire. Some of their leaders conquered and held for the Delhi Emperors some of the districts and countries beyond the natural confines of India. Yet the *Time's* writer can only see the necessity of entirely demartializing these noble races by the abolition of their military forces, which he thinks is the

only way in which they can conduce to the stability and security of the British Indian Empire!

One of the states comprised in this group has merited the entire approval of our writer. That state is Mysore. Of all the Indian States under the British Empire, Mysore is after the Correspondent's own heart. There are reasons for this preference. Mysore was a strong military power only in the latter part of the last century—next only, if at all, to the Marathas. Under Hyder Alli in 1780 A. C. Mysore had waged a war with the English, the issues of which were sufficiently doubtful to justify the hope that, had his life been prolonged, Mysore would have made a very protracted resistance to the whole of the available power of the Company and exacted equal terms from them. This military power of the State is now annihilated, and the people completely disarmed and demartialized—a state of things which writers of the stamp of this correspondent of the *London Times* think the best for the feudatories, if not the people, of their greatest dependency, which is figuratively not inaptly often styled “the brightest gem in her Majesty's diadem. This state of utter helplessness these writers wish to see established every-where in this country. The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army may complain that in a country where Hyder was able raise valiant troops by the thousands and tens

of thousands, Government now find it difficult to get indifferent recruits for the small numbers of their Indian battalions from the disarmed country around; but what are such considerations to such self-sufficient people like the writer under review? It has been well remarked that peace has its insidious dangers far more tempting to the pride of a dominant and aggressive people than even the stern realities of war. The almost unbroken internal peace of something like the period of a generation now in India, has inspired some of the more thoughtless Anglo-Indians with the pride that they can undertake the defence of the Empire, against any enemy whatsoever, without the aid of the more warlike of the Indian races. We have only to say to these arrogant writers that we very much doubt their ability to be able to do so—not that we undervalue the valour or the more physical powers of endurance of the British people, but we must frankly tell them that our scepticism is excited by our well-grounded belief that our Government could not possibly find the money that would be necessary for the maintenance of the very large European army that would be necessary. They could no more defend this Empire against a really powerful foe than they were able to conquer or acquire it without the aid and active sympathy of its people. It seems our tall-talkers of the stamp of this English writer are

entirely oblivious of the significance of this great fact. As, however, we shall have to dwell on this aspect of the case later on at some length, we will not enlarge upon it here.

The other reason of our writer's preference for Mysore is the fact that in his opinion it affords "the best precedent of intervention and of the assertion of our official authority." After the death of Purnia, the misgovernment of Mysore by the restored Hindu Ruler was so great that it provoked a mutiny amongst his own troops and subjects, and our Government thereupon assumed the practical control of the Government of the country in 1831. A. C., and this it retained till 1881, when the State was handed over to the present young Maharaja. The population of Mysore, according to our writer, exceeds 5 millions, and the revenue does not exceed £ 1,250,000. So the taxation per head of the population is not more than what it is in British India. This lenient taxation we are told we entirely owe to that "assertion" of the powers of interference of the British officers of our Government in the management of the affairs of that Indian State. We fear the people of Mysore owe something more to these officers than our writer, in his moderation we suppose, has been disposed to disclose. This assertion of the birth-right of British Indian Officers has also enabled to impose upon the Mysore State an increase of several lakhs

of Rupees to its annual tribute to the Paramount Power, and the people of Mysore now may congratulate themselves for possessing exactly the same diminished ability to pay their taxes as the subjects of the British Indian Government. The Hindu administration of Mysore are at their wits' ends to make the two ends meet and to pay the enhanced tribute to our Government even in ordinary years. How they are to pay this tribute and to carry on efficiently the administration or help their subjects to tide over the calamity in years of scarcity or famine (to which Mysore unhappily is but too often subject) is more than what we can undertake to say. Perhaps the subjects of the State may then have the happiness of further strengthening their dependence upon our Government by again practically becoming their subjects. Here, no doubt, is a glorious result of the "assertion" of the powers of our English Officials. At present the Indian administration pinch themselves and their subjects, and our Government, which is absolved from all trouble and responsibility of governing the Mysorians, reaps the advantage of those economical measures. This is certainly out-Russianing the Russians themselves. It is this State of things which the philanthropic correspondent of the London *Times* wishes to see enforced in every Indian State that he would suffer to exist. That it is the one wish nearest his heart is

glaringly apparent throughout his tediously long tirades against the Indian States and their armies. The Mahomedan chiefs and their retainers, being a "foreign domination" in the opinion of our alien writer, ought to be summarily pensioned off their kingdoms and principalities and the revenues of them applied to the "assertion" of the purely benevolent and philanthropic work of the English Official class, and the defence of the country, through them alone, against foreign invasion. In fairness, however, to the little regard for fair play and for the legitimate rights of the Indian Princes, which still claims and finds a place in the heart of the London *Times* correspondent, we must say that at times his object is only to be got at by reading correctly between the lines of his communications *i. e.* his heart is not as yet sufficiently hardened to be able to face the odium of his disreputable opinions quite openly by eschewing all ambiguity of language. We have been at the pains of dwelling longer on our writer's strictures and remarks about Mysore than we should have otherwise cared to do, had not the sort of treatment which Mysore has received at the hands of the officers of the Paramount Power recommended itself to several Anglo-Indian writers as the one which our Government ought to adopt in the case of all the Indian States—so to increase their tribute as to leave them scarcely anything beyond

the bare necessities of an administration maintained as it were on half pay and to appropriate the remainder for imperial purposes—all the solemn Treaties and Engagements in the world notwithstanding. This is the way they assert Russia is reigning and prospering in Central Asia, and this is the way in which this British Indian Empire, with its numerous feudatories, ought to be managed and held by England. Whatever might be the other favourable or compensating conditions of Russian rule in Central Asia that might go to sustain the white Czar's rule there in this fashion, it is clear that the Empire in this country could never be maintained on the above conditions. England's moral superiority over Russia, on all points, must be strictly maintained here, and on no one point more than on that of strict and honourable observance of the solemn pledges she has entered into with the Indian States. So deep is the love of the people of India to their remaining Indian States that it cannot be too often repeated that the healthy preservation of the Indian States is the *sine qua non* of the stability of the British rule in India. We have, therefore, instanced the case of Mysore as one which our Government must not follow under any circumstances in respect of any other State.

It will be observed that in the case of most of the "Hindu States" the rate of taxation per

head is lower than what it actually is even in the British Indian territories. It has also been pointed out by Sir Lepel Griffin that the expense the Indian States incur on their so-called armies, so far from being wasted, is the only practicable means, under the existing circumstances of the country, by which so many of the inhabitants of the country are placed above want and in a condition of moderate usefulness. In many of these States, notably so in Jeypore and Patiâlâ, the arts of peace are greatly encouraged and developed, and education is making rapid strides; and one would have thought that in these "Hindu States" at least, which constitute the majority of the Indian States, the reasons advanced by the correspondent of the *London Times* for the disbandment of the Indian State armies fall to the ground altogether, and that the writer would not have been audacious enough to advance them. But our readers have seen that it is otherwise.

There is one State, however, which the correspondent of the *London Times* has mentioned in connection with the "Hindu States," where the condition of things seems to call for attention. Our attention has been drawn to the affairs of this petty Central Indian State by the very numerous letters that have, from time to time, appeared in most of the Vernacular papers of this presidency for the last three or four years, complaining of the management

or rather extraordinary mismanagement of the State by an officer who apparently, it seems, has been forced upon the petty State by the officers of the Indore Agency. The writer of the letters in the Vernacular papers affects a style so mysterious and so full of allegorical allusions to local matters that an outsider, like ourself, may be easily pardoned if he fails to grasp the real significance of the situation. This little State, called by the writer "the Rajput principality of Dewas" is a petty Maratha State in Central India. Of this State the correspondent of the *London Times* says that it has a population of 25,000 inhabitants and a revenue of £ 42,500 *i. e.* more than 30s. a head of the population, and that it has its 750 so-called soldiers. If this description be true, it would not be difficult to realise the misery of the subjects of the State who seem further (if the reiterated allegations in the Vernacular papers be true) to have been handed over by the officers of the Indore Agency to the tender mercies of an old and effete administrator whose pay alone is stated to be Rs.1400 a month besides numerous other perquisites, allowances and Nemanukas to members of his family! This officer, we are told, is above 80 years of age or thereabouts and is thoroughly incapacitated for carrying on the administration of the State. This officer, it is alleged in the Vernacular papers, has arbitrarily increased the taxes and so

mismanaged the revenues that the horses and elephants of the little State have sometimes to be starved of the usual allowance of gram and fodder! Many are the complaints that are said to have been preferred to the Agency, but as their own creature is the subject of those complaints, the Agency officers, it is said, with what truth we know not, lend a deaf ear to the complaints of the unhappy Rayats and others who, therefore, suffer hopelessly from the laxity and corruption which is the inevitable result of such an administration. Such is the picture that is given in the Vernacular papers of the administration of this principality, and the description is such as would correspond in many points to the one given in a former portion of this paper of the sort of work that is not infrequently carried on by the creatures of the Agency, under sanction, implied or express, of its officers. We, however, are slow to give credence to the allegations contained in the Vernacular papers against the officer at the head of the Dewasa administration, as we feel sure that were the affairs of the state as above described, they would not have escaped the notice of the Agent to the Governor-General, Sir Lepel Griffin, whose ability and probity are well-known. The ambiguous, if not mysterious, language employed in this instance by this correspondent of the Vernacular papers, is in itself suggestive either of exaggeration of facts or of despair to get

redress by any other method. In either case, we think, it would not be amiss for the Agency authorities to look after the doings of its nominee with a view to mend matters. We have been at the pains of looking into the administration reports of Central India for an explanation of the seemingly absurd and ambiguous statements in the Vernacular Press for several years past, but we regret to say, scarcely any mention is to be found in them of this small *Maratha* principality. That such a petty State in Central India should have attracted the attention of the correspondent of the *London Times* shows how diligent and industrious he has been in finding out materials for his perverted argument.

We believe it must be evident to our readers from what we have said above in connection with the important Hindu Principality of Mysore that the writer in the *London Times* holds forth for the adoption of our Government the system which, if Professor Vambray has described accurately and truthfully, Russia is following in the countries and principalities of Central Asia that she has lately subjugated. In Khiva, in Bokhara and other countries, we are told, the Russians take a pretty large portion of their revenues to themselves and leave the chiefs in other matters very much to themselves to shift as they please. Professor Vambray seems to think well of this method of acquiring territory and influence,

as he mentions this circumstance in Russia's Central Asian policy among the causes that have conduced to its very rapid progress in that part of the world. We presume it is not necessary to point out that totally dissimilar conditions prevail and hold good in the two cases of the countries or nations of Central Asia and the Indian States of India, which socially and geographically are parts and parcels of the adjoining British territories and are inhabited by the same peoples. Naturally enough, therefore, the people of British India resent any ill or illiberal treatment which may be intended to be meted out to their brethren beyond the artificial frontier as strongly as they would resent similar conduct towards themselves. In the policy that our Government may pursue towards the princes and people of the Indian States, the people are apt naturally to look for and find the real motives by which the English Rulers of the country are affected towards the people of India as a whole. Such being the case, we once more beg to remark that the sort of treatment lately given to Mysore, by which the tribute of that State has been increased, is one which the British Government must scrupulously avoid at any cost. It cannot be seriously said or maintained that the Treaties and Engagements which our Government has entered into with the Indian States were or are more favourable to the Indian States than they were or are to the

Paramount English Power who, after defeating and humbling the Indian potentates, dictated to them as conquerors. Whatever may have been the advantages once gained the people of India wish our Government to remain satisfied with them and not to make new encroachments on the remaining rights, privileges and territories of their weaker brethren in the Indian States, the advantages of which they share with them. They also wish that the policy of our Government towards the Indian States should be such that while it will conserve and protect the rights and dignity of the Indian States, it will also bring about in them a humane and enlightened administration. Such a task it must be confessed, affords little scope for clever "diplomacy," as it is commonly understood, or for political surprises, and that to execute it with credit and profit to all the parties concerned, one must possess qualities of the head and heart of no mean order. The people of the Indian States judge of the success or otherwise of the careers of the Political Agents or Residents of our Government by this one standard of excellence alone. This, no doubt, is a high measure of excellence to be expected of any people, but we make bold to assert that no other will suit the exigencies of the British Empire so well, or be in harmony with the free and liberal instincts of the English people into whose hands a far-seeing Providence has confided the destinies

of the teeming millions of India. It is cheering to think that our present accomplished and experienced Viceroy seems to have grasped clearly the conditions of the problem before him, and that he will be able to initiate a policy regulating the relations of our Paramount Government with its feudatory Indian States which will conduce to the stability of the British Indian Empire and the welfare of the Indian States in subordinate alliance with it. The Viceroy's speech at Gwalior, on the occasion of restoring the Gwalior fort to the Maharajah Scindia is an important declaration of his Lordship's policy towards the feudatory States. It is a policy which, by marking a necessary departure from the haphazard policy hitherto pursued, comes very near the policy which we would advocate and which must be, no doubt, gratifying to all real well-wishers of British and Indian India.

We have observed before that the Correspondent of the London *Times* under review is not so hostilely inclined towards those States which he is pleased to call the Hindu States as he is towards the Maratha and Mahomedan States. The first, in his omnipotence and supreme wisdom, he would totally abolish the face of the Earth; the chiefs of the second he would allow to exist as so many Government pensioners like the titular Nawabs of Moreshedabad and Arcot. Of the "Hindu States," though the writer includes under the designation

some of the Sikh States of the Punjab, those that are ruled over by Rajput chiefs, as being under their national leaders, he would suffer to exist much as they are at present but with their armies greatly reduced, if not abolished altogether. There is a class of chiefs included in this group who have the rare good fortune to be altogether in the good graces of this Correspondent of the *English Times*. These are the Sikh States of the Panjab. With these States and their armies, says our writer, "an exception might be made with justice and on political grounds also." Though the total of the armies this group of petty States maintains comes up to the respectable figure of 18,370 men and 200 guns, our writer is bold enough to assert that these armies do not detract to any appreciable extent from the material resources of the States. There are diverse other reasons advanced by the writer not only for the retention of these armies but for the increase of their efficiency which must go to prove him to be no mean adept in the art of special pleading. One might think whatever was good food for the goose might be so for the gander too. But this is evidently not the doctrine of the writer in the *English Times* we are dealing with. We do not deny that in the case of at least one of these Panjab states, there is a special reason why it should be specially trusted; and that is the state of Patiala. This state, says the *London Times*

Correspondent. "served us well in the war with Nepaul in 1814-15, attached itself to our cause in both the struggles in the Panjab, and stood by our side in the most valiant and noble-minded manner in the darkest hours of 1857." It is something to be able to read such good words about any Indian State from writers of the stamp of the one under reply as it shows that they are not entirely incapable of gratitude. Owing to the geographical position of this state it was enabled to be of such signal services to our Government. The virus of the mutiny of 1857 was not able to penetrate that latest acquisition of the British Indian Empire—the Panjab. It was, therefore, easier for the chiefs in the Panjab to help our Government in its hour of dire difficulty. Of course, we do not under-value the aid that was so ungrudgingly rendered, but what we contend is that the assistance rendered to our Government by other Indian States at, if possible, a greater sacrifice to themselves should not be lost sight of as is done by this our partizan writer. We have, before this, shown by extracts from the writings of well-known English authors, how admirable and loyal in this respect was the conduct of Maharajah Scindia and his illustrious Dewan. The Maharaja Gaikwad too rendered excellent services notwithstanding that some of the more active leaders in the mutiny had penetrated to territories near his

own, and when the turbulent tribes of Waghers and others in his own state were not in the best of moods with his Government. Holkar too, in his way, as Sir Lepel Griffin has lately pointed out, was of service to the Government. It is, however, no secret that H. H. affects, and not quite unjustly it is thought by persons competent to give an opinion in the matter, to have a grievance in connection with the treatment that he has received at the hands of the Government after the mutiny. What was given as reward for their services to their Highnesses the Maharajas Scindia and the Gaikwar with the one hand was attempted to be taken away by the other. But Patialâ has received a quite different treatment at the hands of our Government. That principality covers 5,419 square miles of territory. Much of it is the direct grant of the English Government in acknowledgment of faithful services. The revenues of the state fall short of half a million sterling. In fact, the state of Patialâ might be well considered to be a Jahâgir or saranjam granted to its chief by the British Government, and as such, it is no wonder that the active loyalty of its chiefs should be conspicuous. As we have mentioned the case of Mysore as the one which our Government ought not, under any circumstances, to follow; we cite the instance of Patiala as one which the Government will always do well to make the basis of their policy, towards the subordinate and

feudatory Indian States of the Empire. Without the *reciprocity* of service and reward no system of paramount sovereignty is, in our humble opinion, long possible. Nor shall the establishment of such a policy cost the Government any sacrifice worth mention. Most of the Indian States are, by this time, in one way or another, beholden to the English Paramount Power. At all events the chiefs individually have had an accession of despotic power and they are now convinced that they can, under present circumstances of the country, only hope to rise or be useful through their subordinate co-operation with the English Government. Therefore their co-operation can be effectively secured by a little more fair play than they can at present hope to obtain and by a little more regard for the real interests of their States and subjects. Such a policy Lord Dufferin seems to have lately inaugurated at Gwalior; a little more extension of it, and strict adherence to it always, is all that is necessary to make the Indian Feudatories of the British Empire its *Arkane Dawalat* in a military point of view as they are so from the political point of view.

As it is, there are clear signs that our Government will change their present policy of repression and distrust for one of enlightenment and confidence, and admit the subordinate Indian States, that have been so long in alliance with

it, to an honourable fraternity of arms with itself for the necessary military purposes of the vast British Indian Empire by devising a plan of action which, while it will encourage and confirm into the hearts of the chiefs and people a proper sense of the security and integrity of the subordinate Indian States and of the rights and privileges guaranteed to them by solemn treaties and engagements, will at the same time create and sustain in them a spirit of emulation to do their best on the field of battle for, and on behalf of, the Paramount British Power. As we have ventilated our opinions about the utility and the necessity, for many purposes of usefulness, of the armies of the Indian States and have in a former number of this Journal attempted to shew that from their existence, even as they are at present, no sort of danger was to be apprehended to our Government, we shall content ourselves here only by referring our readers to that number of our Journal and at once proceed to formulate a scheme by which the efficient subordinate co-operation of the Indian States Armies may be secured for the imperial purposes of Indian defence and just commercial development.

It is evident that a comprehensive and abiding system of co-operate action, which necessarily will require considerable sacrifice from the contracting parties and which may be fraught with important

results and new responsibilities, should be based on the only firm ground of reciprocal advantages and made to revolve on those two powerful hinges on which all government and management rest—an inexorably and immutably just code of rewards and punishments. The British Government, as we have shewn before—notably in the States of Patilā, Hylerābād, Bhopal and even Gwalior—has followed this natural course whenever there was an opportunity of so doing.

The relations of our Government with the Indian States having been regulated and settled by Treaties, and the rewards and penalties by which they were enforced having been long meted out and become accomplished facts, it is only just that new responsibilities and liabilities must be made to rest on new rights and new privileges, and that these chiefly must, in the present instance, come from the stronger and the more capable of the two parties concerned; in other words, from our Government. We are, however, to use mercantile language, bound to see that we strike the bargain at a comparatively reasonable price, and that the same should be so clearly defined and worded and drawn out in black and white that it should in the future lead to no sort of disputes or untoward complications. This, we know, is no very easy task. Toward its accomplishment our Government must labour hard and exercise a conscientious

control over the baser and the more selfish instincts and propensities of itself and its officers.

The want of good faith and feelings in our dealings with our feudatory Indian Chiefs has been sufficiently well-marked a feature of our policy to make the Indian States rightly hesitate a little in undertaking to put their military forces under any sort of control of the officers of the British Government. This hesitating attitude of the Indian Princes to enter into any systematic plan of military co-operation by which their own armies shall be permanently subjected to the interference of the officers of any Government other than their own is not to be confounded with any want of loyalty or any unwillingness to help our Government to the best of their humble powers whenever our Government may require it. Nothing could perhaps be more loyal and genuine than the offers which the different Indian chiefs have, from time to time, made to our Government to place all the military resources of their States at its disposal on certain crises as they arose. Nor is there the least reason to doubt that the chiefs would always act in the same spirit of loyalty and helpfulness. The question that should now interest us more than any other is how to utilize effectively these offers in view of the possibly prolonged Russian and other troubles that loom on the Northern and Eastern frontiers of the

British Indian Empire without weakening the integrity and true friendship of the Indian States and the people of India generally.

However brave or of a martial spirit the soldiers of the Indian States armies may be supposed to be, they could not, out of sheer humanity, be placed in the field against a well-armed and disciplined enemy. The discipline, the drilling, the arms and accoutrements of these armies shall have to be improved a great deal before their assistance can be really effective, and this shall have to be done without any obtrusive interference from the officers of our Government—likely to weaken the hold of the princes on the armies of their States. If due precautions are not taken in time, by one excuse or another, it is feared the Indian Chiefs would become strangers to their own armies, while their States would be saddled with the expense of not only maintaining them—but maintaining them in a high state of efficiency. It is this very natural fear that has prevented many a Indian thinker from formulating a plan for the utilization of the armies of the Indian states for imperial purposes. This is especially the case with the princes and their ministers. In their minds the fates of the contingent troops they maintained in the service of the British Government must be ever present. The moral, too, of one of the fables of Aesop in which the wolf and other

inferior beasts of the forest leagued themselves in some subordinate alliance as it were with the lion, the paramount lord of the forest, to hunt in common for their more easy subsistence, may suggest itself to their imaginations. Under these circumstances, a scheme free from the faults above hinted must come from our Government and it must be in time submitted to a thorough discussion in the public press of the country. We propose in the scheme we formulate below to set the ball arolling as far as that can be done by an independent writer in a native journal. We are aware our plan is not complete in all its details and we, therefore, only advance it as a tentative one with a view to the subject matter of it being thoroughly and freely discussed.

(I) No State, whose administration of its territories is not decently well, or whose administration of its public affairs is marred by extortion, extravagance, injustice or oppression, should be honoured by an admission into a fraternity of arms with our British Government, whose zeal for the proper administration of the country and the progressive welfare of their subjects are so conspicuous. Petty oppressors and small contemptible despots, we humbly think, would be unnatural companions of such a power.

(II) New rifles, after the pattern of those which are supplied to the Indian Regiments of our

Government, should be granted by it to the infantry portion of what is called in the Indian States their "Regular Army." The Indian States should return as many of the old Muskets into British arsenals as may have been thus replaced by the new rifles.

(III) The Indian States themselves should furnish the regular portions of their Cavalry with their own arms.

(IV) Half a battery of modern artillery should be supplied by our Government to the Indian States to one thousand troops of their "reformed regular army" We mean this should be the proportion of their ordnance to their troops. The Indian States to return into the Government Arsenals as many of their first class cannon as may be thus replaced. For the draft, cattle or horses may be employed as the Indian Chiefs thought proper or convenient.

(V) The portions of the "regular army" thus reformed should pass the drilling season in the nearest British Cantonment where they must be drilled and paraded along with the Indian Regiments of our Government.

All prizes and matches, open to the members of the Indian British Army, should be thrown open to these "Reformed Indian States armies."

The Indian States themselves should defray all the necessary expenses of their forces in

connection with this drilling—except the pay of the officers of our Government that may be employed in the work—unless the services of these officers should be required by the Indian Chiefs at some distance in their territories beyond the time for the season.

(VI) These reformed armies of the Indian States should be considered in the light of a kind of 'Second Reserve.'

And whenever called out to serve in the imperial interests of the country, they should get their rations from our Government after they have once crossed the frontiers of their own States until the time they return within them.

These armies should be allowed to participate, along with the Indian British army in all the customary loot and prize money of any war or battle in which they might be employed.

They may also receive the customary medals.

The widows and orphans of those who may fall in the active service of our Government should receive the same pensions and other allowances from our Government that their own troops may receive in accordance with the regulations that may be in force for the time being.

Pensions for good services and rewards to be paid to the men and officers of the Reformed Indian States armies through their respective Durbars who must account to our Government for the sums they may thus receive for disbursement.

(VII) While on active service, all expenses incurred beyond the usual pay of the officers and men of these armies should be borne by our Government, who must also, for special services reward the Indian States with grants of land or money or any other suitable marks of Imperial favour as has been hitherto done.

(VIII) Except as herein set forth, in matters connected with the armies of the Indian States the provisions of the Treaties and engagements entered into by the British Government with them to remain in force as before.

We may generally remark here that the "Reformed armies" of the States should be regarded by our Government very much in the light of Volunteer Corps and should be regulated, as far as possible, by their analogy and the way in which the old Mogal Emperors of Delhi utilized the armies of the Rajput Principalities in subordinate alliance with the Empire.

We have now reviewed the opinions of the Correspondent of the *London Times* regarding the Maratha, Mahomedan, and Hindu States of India and their so-called armies, and indicated our points of difference with him. We have also formulated a tentative draft of a scheme of subordinate military co-operation by the Indian States with the Paramount British Power in India. This scheme, we presume, will meet all the nice exigencies of the case.

and will be found just to their subjects and sufficiently liberal to compensate the Indian Chiefs for the new responsibilities they thereby undoubtedly incur and the sacrifices they may have to undergo. We have, for want of space, left the Chapter which our writer has devoted to the armies and affairs of the "Frontier Indian States" unreviewed, as, at present, our knowledge of their armies and their politics is so scanty that we do not feel ourselves warranted to deal justly with them. The matter of our relations with the Indian States beyond the ordinary boundaries of the British Indian Empire, and some of our independent neighbours, is such an important subject that their conduct will soon form the subject of another article in this journal. Attention may be then turned to the part now left unnoticed.

We scarcely need, we trust, say that we have been actuated all along in what we have hitherto written with a sense of gratitude towards the English Nation and the British Government under which we live and which has done so much for our country and which is destined, in the goodness of Providence, still more to raise us in the scale of nations and civilization. There is a school of Anglo-Indian writers whose opinions are calculated, we humbly yet firmly believe, to disturb the harmony that should and does exist, in spite of the mischief of such writers tempt to do with a persistence

worthy of a better and nobler cause, between the rulers and the ruled of this vast Empire. Under these circumstances, we ask our enlightened British Rulers and the great English Nation to be righteous and to fear not. As pointed out by a high official of the Government of India in connection with the ovation our late beloved Viceroy received at the hands of the millions of this grateful country, the only policy which the British Government of India should persistently follow should be one of progressive improvement. So help them, God, Thou who art the Ruler and disposer of Nations !

“THE ARMIES OF THE NATIVE STATES.”



(*P. S. S. Quarterly, Vol. 1, 4, April, 1879*).

It has been wisely observed that Peace has its insidious dangers far more tempting to the pride of an aggressive domination than the stern perils of War. The Inam Commission and the Annexation policy were both born of the long peace that India enjoyed previous to the mutiny. The fires of that terrible commotion burnt up with the first blaze these noxious weeds of unresisted self-aggrandizement, and the land had a breathing-time of rest and contentment for the last twenty years. This long-continued peace has, however, revived the aggressive spirit, and the so-called question of the disbandment of the armies of the Princes of India has been started by irresponsible officials and their inspired organs to disturb the quiet of the loyal princes and the people of India. We had hoped that, after the emphatic and cordial greetings of royal satisfaction which were communicated to the Indian Princes by Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen-Empress on two memorable occasions during the last year, and after the equally emphatic utterances of His Excellency the Viceroy on the occasion of

the great Review he held of the Indian Contingent now serving in the Afgau War,—we had hoped that this ugly nightmare would have been allowed to lie in the limbo of oblivion as a forgotten dream. From recent indications it appears, however, that it is likely to be one of those unpleasant surprises which under the present rule have become the order of the day, and that, as soon as the Afgau troubles are over, this proposal about the disbandment of Indian armies will become the blazing question of the day. It is time, therefore, that Indian public opinion should make itself distinctly heard in the counsels of the Empire upon a matter which concerns such vital interests. We accordingly propose in the following observations to expose the hollowness and insincerity of the cry which has been raised, and to demonstrate that any officious intermeddling in this direction will be most wanton and purposeless, and cannot fail to seriously shake that confidence in treaty obligations and in the words of the great Proclamations of 1858 and 1877, upon which rests the fabric of the great confederation of the British Empire in India. We shall present below in parallel columns all the arguments pro-and-con which may be urged on both sides of this question of the compulsory disbandment of the military organizations in Indian States.

FOR DISBANDMENT.

AGAINST DISBANDMENT.

1 The Indian armies

1 The Indian armies in

are proportionately larger than they may well be allowed to be in the interests of the dominant power, and they constitute a danger to the State.

all the larger States distinctly rest on treaty obligations which are binding upon the Paramount Power, which has repeatedly admitted the force of these obligations. Such obligations cannot be dissolved without the free and mutual consent of both parties.

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| <p>2 They require an augmentation of the British garrison in India to watch them, and they make retrenchment of expenditure impossible.</p> | <p>2 This appanage is the last privilege left to the royal houses. Measures of forcible disbandment cannot but cause dissatisfaction among the Indian States.</p> |
| <p>3 Their maintenance imposes unnecessary burdens upon the subjects of Indian States.</p> | <p>3 These armies are not a source of danger to the British government. Their strength and numbers are overrated. Badly armed, badly officered, badly disciplined and wholly</p> |

- disunited they have no power for mischief.
- 4 As the British Government protects the States from outside violence, these forces are useful only for the purposes of show, and their large numbers have a tendency to turn the heads of the Indian Princes.
- 5 These armies in Indian states are mercenary, and cost a great deal as compared with their efficiency.
- 4 They are at the same time very useful auxiliaries especially as against Asiatic powers on the frontiers of our provinces, in respect of whom the use of the regular British army involves a needless waste of money and strength.
- 5 They have rendered important services in the early wars, as also in the mutiny struggle, and have proved valuable auxiliaries in the present Afgan war.
- 6 Their loyalty and insignificance renders jealous watchfulness unnecessary, and if more confidence were placed in them, they would render a considerable reduction of

the British garrison possible.

- 7 They are beyond all comparison a cheap agency and good material to rely upon as a recruiting ground for the British Indian forces.
- 8 The whole population being disarmed and demartialized, the Indian armies are the only available militia and reserve force to fall back upon.
- 9 The British Indian force is *par excellence* a mercenary body. The sepoys require to be counter-balanced by these Indian armies, which are for the most part national and not mercenary, and which, at all events, will never make common cause with the sepoys.

- 10 In the present state of India, when the whole of Central Asia may be expected with Russian help and propulsion any day to come down upon us, it is not safe to trust to the single support of the regular British Indian forces alone. There should be many small centres and foci of dependent authority, scattered over the country, with their opportunities of education in military habits, and in the higher art of leading and controlling men.
- 11 In many Indian states, society rests on a feudal or military basis. This state of things cannot be disturbed without affecting the integrity of the states. The Sirdars and military classes, for whom British India offers no field, are usefully provided for in these Indian armies.

- 12 The purposes sought to be accomplished by forcible disbandment can be equally well achieved by a policy of greater trust and confidence. If the armies of Indian states are badly armed and officered and disciplined, these defects may be removed by the help of British officers lent to these States to effect these reforms, and improve the race of Indian officers.

We shall now discuss at some length a few of the points summarized above:—

It is argued by some of those writers, who advocate the abolition of the armies of Indian Princes, that the British Government is responsible for the military defence of the whole country, and that beyond the requirements of the Police service of their respective territories, the Rajahs and Chiefs need not spend a single pie in keeping up military establishments. This, we submit, is an utterly wrong view of the question. Every Indian

Prince, who is bound in treaty to the British Government, is in himself an individual factor of the Indian Empire, and is bound, and has a right, to render all assistance in his power to, and co-operate with, that Government in time of need. If he is not to be called upon to render such service, it is impossible to understand what is meant by recognising him as a link of this great political body. Whatever position we may suppose the British Government to occupy, the right and the obligation of these Princes to uphold their status within the bounds of their treaties, as subordinate confederates of the Empire, are unquestioned. Unless it is meant at one stroke to nullify all treaty obligations, the Indian Princes can not justly be called upon to dismiss or reduce their military establishments. Any one who reads the several treaties that have been concluded from time to time with the Indian Princes will see that sufficient care has already been taken to prevent all possible harm arising from the establishments which they were allowed to maintain. Under existing treaties, not a single Indian Prince is allowed to keep any political or military communication with any brother chief, or with any foreign power; he is not allowed to keep a single foreign, or even British, officer in his civil or military service without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government. This is undoubtedly a

sufficient guarantee that no harm whatever can possibly result to the security of the British Government from the existence of these armies. There are several other circumstances too which make such a contingency utterly impossible. It is well known that the only arms and weapons of offence which exist, and which can be manufactured in India, are of a very rude kind, and utterly unsuited to cope with the superior productions of European science and art. Besides, the British Government, which commands the whole coast line, has it in its power, under the Indian Arms Act, not to allow a single cap or a musket or a pound of gun-powder to reach India without its sanction, and this enormous power has been already most stringently enforced. No fear whatever need, therefore, be entertained of the least danger from any military establishment, howsoever large or efficient, of the Indian States. If a few of the Indian Princes, and it is notorious how very few they are, show some desire to pay more or less attention to their small and ill-supplied armies, is there any the least reason for the British Government to interfere with the innocent pleasure or the legitimate ambition of the Princes? Is it not its duty and its highest glory to conserve and encourage such laudable interest, and assist the subject Princes to be its towers of strength? Some of these princes are so bound to the traditional

ways of the States they represent, that they will consider any change in the existing state of things as a sacrilege. There are a few others, who will regard themselves highly disgraced, if what they are accustomed to call their forces were reduced by a single unit below the scale laid down by the treaties.

But keeping out of sight for a time the feelings with which, and the purposes for which, these military establishments are retained, let us see what is the strength of these so-called Indian armies, which are magnified into a source of danger to the permanency of the British rule. They are represented to be as under:—

Name of the State.	Guns.	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Oodepur.....	538	15100	6240
Jaipur	312	10500	3530
Jodhapur.....	220	4000	5600
Bundi	68	2000	200
Kotha	119	4600	700
Jhalawar. ...	90	3500	400
Tolk. ...	53	2288	430
Karanli ...	40	3200	400
Krishnagar...	35	2000	150
Dholapur. ...	32	3650	610
Bharatpur. ...	38	8500	1460
Alwar...	351	5633	2280
Bikanir. ...	53	940	670
Jasalmir. ...	12	400	500

Name of the State.	Guns.	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Sirohi... ..	0	350	375
Dongarpur... ..	4	632	57
Banswada	3	500	60
Pertabgad	12	950	275
Gwalior	210	16050	6068
Indore... ..	102	5500	3000
Bhopal... ..	39	4766	1194
Dhar.	4	790	370
Dewas.
Rewa.... ..	35	2000	905
Other States in Bun-			
delkhand	421	22163	2677
Bawda... ..	30	11000	3098
Kolhapur	258	1502	154
Kutch	38	600	300
Kattiawar	508	15306	3033
Hyderabad	725	36890	8202
Mysore	6	1000	35
Travancore	6	1211	60
Cochin	3	300	..
Cis-Sutlaj States... ..	141	7185	3191
Kashmere	96	18436	1393
Trans-Sutlaj States.	27	3275	300
Bhawalpur... ..	80	2484	360
Petty States... ..	302	18000	4000

At first sight, these numbers would seem to be a rather formidable array. But those who have any knowledge of the Indian States and their

armies will at once see that but a small fraction of these have any title to be regarded as fighting men. Taking even the best of these, such as the army of His Highness the Nizam, it will be seen that, with the doubtful exception of the newly-organised Regular Troops, the rest of the army is but a rabble, and that with their rude and antiquated implements of war they are not fitted for undertaking any military work of aggression. A correspondent of the *Bombay Times*, who was present on the day when, according to the custom of the Hyderabad State, the whole army was brought out in the state of its highest preparation, describes it most comically, yet most truthfully, when he says that it would require no small amount of courage to fire most of the ponderous tubes which pass for muskets in the Hyderabad Army, and that it would require no small amount of tact and strength to separate in most cases a blala from its rusty scabbard. The writer has no desire to depreciate the efficiency of the Nizam's Army generally, as he gives full credit to the fine cavalry that has been newly organised, and he may, therefore, be trusted in his description of the Irregular Troops. Such being the case with the first and the most warlike State in India, in the case of the other States, the proportion of a really serviceable force to the show-figures on paper must be much more unfavourable. To judge from the appearance which probably the

best selected of these present when they accompany the Princes on State-occasions, it will be doing them no injustice to strike off two-thirds of the number as military only in name, and only to count a third as possibly available for any military operations. As regards guns and artillerymen, even this proportion, we are sure, will be too high. In the foregoing estimate, Kolhapoor is credited with the possession of 258 guns. This number evidently includes the old and mostly useless pieces, the strength of which is not known to any body in, or connected with, the State.

A third of the cavalry and infantry of all the Indian States put together amounts to about 20,000 horse, and 80000 foot soldiers. This serviceable force is trained and commanded by hundreds of equally illiterate officers, who know nothing of each other, and who have no *esprit de corps*. They are separated by large tracts of provinces, and have no means of communication but through the Imperial Government. Add to this the difficulty of getting any ammunition and arms worth the name, and the difficulty of co-operation caused by diversities in language and habits and military discipline, and the very doubtful feelings of amity which exist among the masters of this motley of troops, and we may get some idea of the capability of these Indian armies for any combined action likely to endanger the stability of the British rule. The

British Government keeps a military establishment, which, though by no means out of proportion to its needs, is more than sufficiently powerful to keep all the Indian armies put together under check. Its little finger is bigger than the arm of this whole motley host. The effective British force is at least 152000 Infantry and 23000 cavalry with a monopoly of the artillery. It will be thus seen that, even in point of numbers this is sufficiently in excess of the armies of Indian States. Besides they are most admirably trained and equipped. Their arms of precision are after the most scientific and refined patterns. A perfect uniformity of discipline prevails throughout. Their means of communication are most efficient. With all these advantages, the Paramount Power might certainly defy all the armies that Indian Princes could possibly put into the field on any occasion.

But there is really no occasion why British India should thus try to measure its strength as against the Indian States. For the last thirty years there has been no single instance in which any of the Indian Chiefs or Princes have ever shown a desire to present any military opposition to the British arms. On the contrary, whenever we have had any occasion to go to war, all the Indian Princes, great and small, have ever shown their readiness to assist the Paramount Power. The sense of the obligation to assist the British Govern-

ment on all such occasions is so keenly felt, that even the small chiefs in the Deccan, Kattiawar, and the Panjab loyally offered their services in the present Afghan war, though undoubtedly they must have been conscious that their weight taken singly could very little affect the balance. These cordial offers on the part of the Princes, and their hearty acknowledgment by Her Majesty's Government and His Excellency the Viceroy, show that the Indian Princes are as conscious of their duty to help the British Government, as the latter is conscious of its right to receive it from them. In the very trying times of the mutiny in 1857, all the reigning sovereign chiefs stood firmly loyal, and the military establishments of most of them rendered excellent service, when the mercenary Indian British forces proved untrue to their allegiance. It is true that the vitiating contact with the mutinous soldiery did not fail to affect the constancy of some portion of the contingents of Scindia and Holkar, yet the Chiefs could not be held responsible for this mishap, for they were commanded by British officers, and the fact of their having been in the service of those Princes materially abated the mischief which they might have done, had they been under direct British control. The Indian Princes generally stood firm, and checked the surging tide of rebellion at great personal risk, and the Panjab Princes and the

Nepalese ruler sent their contingents to fight before Delhi and Lucknow. Let us see what testimony is borne to H. H. the Maharaja Scindia's loyalty and usefulness to the British Government on this trying occasion. Col. Malleon in his Treatise on Indian States has the following:—

From the very first with the full concurrence and support of the minister, Jayajirao determined to cast in, his lot with the British. Not in vain had Lord Ellenborough, in 1844, displayed the prescient policy of a real statesman. Not in vain had he forbore from the lust of conquest, and restored to the minor sovereign intact his dominions, with a provision to secure their good administration during his minority. With an opportunity which Mahadajee would have made decisive, which Dowlatrao even would have clutched at, Jayajirao took upon himself the task, which under the circumstances of the feeling of the country, must have been preeminently difficult,—the task of being loyal to his engagements to the British, even when British Supremacy seemed lowered, and British authority had been shaken off in districts within fifty miles of his Capital. Full of these loyal ideas, Jayajirao's first movement was to send his own body-guard to Agra to aid the Lieutenant-Governor of the N.W. Provinces in the suppression of the revolt. They rendered excellent service. His next was to place his entire contingent at the

disposal of the same high officer. The offer was accepted. But it soon became evident that the causes which had induced the mutiny in the Bengal Army had infected the sepoys of the Gwalior contingent with the virus of revolt. At Hatras, at Neemuch, at Augar, at Lalatpore, and finally on June 14, at Gwalior itself the sepoys of the contingent rose and massacred many of their British officers.

No sooner had these men revolted, than they placed their services at the disposal of Jayajirao, and begged him to lead them against the British in Agra. To give due credit to the loyalty of Jayajirao Scindia at this crisis, it should be remembered that not only were the insurgents in possession of the capital of the Mogals, but the entire country to the north-west of Agra was in revolt. British garrisons were beleaguered at Cawnpoor and at Lucknow, and it seemed as though one decisive blow would finish with the English dominion north of Bengal Proper. Had the Maharajah, then acceded to the request of the sepoys, it was quite possible that with 20000 trained soldiers, men who afterwards gave evidence of the excellence of their discipline against General Wyndham at Cawnpoor, and against Lord Strathairn after Zansi, he might have struck that fatal blow.

To say that he must have felt his power is

only to credit him with ordinary capacity, and his capacity is at least beyond the average. But he was loyal and true. Had the ablest member in the Council of India been at his ear, he could not have inspired him with counsels more calculated to prove beneficial to the British cause than those which he and his minister, with the instinct of loyal natures, followed of their own free will.

Not only did the Maharaja not accept the offer of his troops, but by dint of skilful management, by cajoling and by gifts of money, and by pretended difficulties in the way of procuring carriage, he detained them. More than that. When mutinous troops from Mhow and the territories of Holkar passed through his dominions, he restrained his own troops from joining them. He succeeded, in fact, in retaining them in inaction, till after Delhi had fallen, and Cawnpoor had been relieved. And when finally he did let them go, it was only that they might fall into the clutches of Sir Hugh Rose and Sir Colin Campbell."

The services rendered by the State of Bhopal were, if possible, still more effective. They are acknowledged in the same work in equally emphatic terms:—

She was guiding the State vessel in 1857, when the storm of mutiny burst upon her. She was equal to the occasion. True to the traditions

of her country, to her plighted word, to the sentiments of truth and honour, as early as April of that year, she communicated to the British Agent the contents of a lithographed proclamation which had reached her, urging the overthrow and destruction of the English. In the month of June she expelled from Bhopal an Indian whom she found engaged in raising troops for a purpose he did not care to avow. In July she afforded shelter to the British officers who had been driven from Indore by the mutinous troops of Holkar. She did all this under great difficulties. When the contingent, raised in Bhopal and commanded by British officers, had mutinied, when her mother, who had become a bigot, and her uncles, who were weak-minded and priest-ridden, were urging her to declare a religious war against the infidel the Begum never faltered. She was true to the last. She caused the British officers to be conducted to Hoshangabad, then with infinite tact allayed the excitement in her Capital; put down the mutinous contingent with a strong hand, and finally restored order in every part of the Bhopal territory. Then, when the tide turned, and British supremacy began to vindicate itself, she was as prompt in another way with her aid, supplies, soldiers, all that she had that could be useful, she gave with a liberal hand."

The official recognition of these services is also worthy of attention:—

Col. Malleon quotes the following extract from the order of the Government of India, issued on the occasion of the death of the same illustrious lady.

“ Her unswerving fidelity, her skill in the management of affairs at an important crisis, the bold front which she presented to the enemies of the British power, and the vigilance with which she watched over the preservation of Englishmen, were acknowledged by Lord Canning, in open durbar, in terms of well-deserved praise and commendation. * * ”

H. H. the Gaikawar too did his part honestly. He gave no cause of anxiety to the Government in those troubled times, and Lord Canning thankfully admitted that he identified his own cause with that of the British Government.

The friendly offices which the Government received from Hyderabad were equally memorable. The distinguished nobleman, who is still at the helm of affairs there, not only kept the people quiet, but actually took the field in person, and kept the infuriated populace under check. To quote from the same book again:—

“ More than that, they (the insurgents) were attacked likewise by one, who did not belong to any one of the classes I have enumerated—by one who was neither a prince, nor a soldier, nor a

fanatic, nor ignorant. They were attacked by the prime minister, Sir Salar Jung, one of the ablest of living Indian Statesmen, and were dispersed. Guided by the counsels of that enlightened man, the Nizam steered a straight course during the cyclone of the mutiny. "

The assistance which the British Government has from time to time received from the States of Pattiala, Nabha and other Panjab chiefs is thus described, by the same author:—

"Three years later (1814) the British engaged in War with Nepal, and in accordance with the terms of the proclamation of 1809, called upon the Rajah of Pattiala to aid them with troops. The aid was cheerfully rendered, and was, in its way, effective."

"The service rendered by the Maharajah to the British Government during the mutiny of 1857 can scarcely be exaggerated. The prompt action of himself and the Rajahs of Jhind and Nabha had a marked influence alike on the state of affairs in the Panjab and on the march of the British troops to Delhi. It is not too much to say that hostility or lukewarmness on the part of the Cis-Satlej Rajahs at the early stage of the mutiny would have greatly imperilled the position of the British. The gain of their hearty co-operation can then scarcely be over-estimated.

But the Maharajah of Pattiala did something more than aid the British by his troops. Whilst these were usefully employed in keeping open the communication, and aiding in the field, he lent his money freely, a favour in those troublous times most highly to be appreciated."

The foregoing illustrations are more than sufficient to show that the armies of the Indian States did, on the whole, behave in those most trying times in a manner which justifies the entertainment of the most perfect confidence in them on the part of the British Government. The temptation which the mutineers placed in the way of the Indian Princes would have overpowered any but the staunchest friends of the British rule. Danger to their religion and caste for which the Indian populations will willingly sacrifice their lives, was the watchword of revolt, and was turned to all possible advantage by the mutineers by being mixed up with denunciations of the annexation policy. These motives, added to the natural desire of regaining political liberty, must indeed have tried most sorely the constancy of the Princes and Chiefs; but the result, as seen in the extracts above given, gloriously illustrated their good sense and loyalty and confidence in the British Government. It will be a cruel disappointment if now the British Government, in a spirit of undignified reaction, renders such a return for such services, and treats the

Princes with undeserved suspicion, and calls upon them to disband their faithful and hereditary soldiers in whom they have been taught to feel such just pride. Such an unnecessary and uncalled-for affront to the dearly cherished rights and feelings of the most friendly States is inconsistent with the wise policy of magnanimous indulgence which has been hitherto observed towards them by the British Government. Even those that recommend these measures do not themselves see the subject in all its aspects; otherwise they would not recommend such reactionary measures on the flimsy grounds and pretexts put forth. This is our brief answer to the question suggested by irresponsible politicians who urge that they can not understand what useful purpose these armies serve, and how they can be anything but a danger to the State. It must be admitted that in times of peace it is always impossible to answer such questions satisfactorily. Armies professedly are institutions for the insurance of the State against dangers which are not always present except in time of war, but for all that, their organization must be kept up for contingencies, which, though it is impossible to foretell their occurrence, must always be anticipated in considering all political questions. Before the mutiny broke out, who could have answered the question what good the armies of Gwalior, of Hyderabad or of Bhopal could do to the British

Government? But then those troublous times have answered the question for us. And with the present agitated state of politics in Europe and Asia, the contingencies, which may make these armies of vital importance to us, are not difficult to imagine, though we most fervently hope that they may never occur. It is, therefore, a matter of great congratulation that these short-sighted views of irresponsible officials and editors have not found general acceptance, at least among the highest authorities in England and India. Her Imperial Majesty's most gracious acknowledgment of the proffered aid of the Indian Princes shows that the British Government is not insensible, like the self-styled politicians of the Press with whom our contention lies, to the force of the reasons for which the armies of Indian Princes exist, and the Indian authorities have shown no disinclination to turn them to account in the present Afgan War.

We hope our Government will be consistent with itself, and give every assistance to our Princes to keep their armies in a State of efficiency according to their own notions and capabilities. The original proposal of the forcible disbandment of the armies of Indian States, against which we believe we have written at sufficient length, was so revolutionary in its conception that those who suggested it were themselves scarced by seeing it in public print. The monstrous phantom affrighted

those that called it up from the depths of their perverted consciences. Public opinion pronounced itself so strongly against it that the original proposal was reported to have been abandoned, and in its place it was suggested, — that the armies of Indian Princes should be commanded by European officers, and should be thus formed and incorporated into wings and supports of the Imperial Army. Princes and chiefs are much more sensitive on these subjects than we give them credit for, and they will not fail to see and resent the distrust, which dictates such a proposal. Even if no such distrust be meant, the proposal is so open to the suspicion of it that, we feel sure, far-sighted politicians at the helm of affairs will at once discard it. Any attempt to enforce such arrangements is obviously open to be misinterpreted into a precautionary measure reflecting a slur on the good faith of Indian Princes. The only right way to encourage the employment of European officers where they are really needed would be to withdraw the old-world prohibition under which the Princes are shut out from giving employment to European servants. When that restriction is withdrawn, the services of European officers will naturally be entertained in cases where they might be necessary. Besides the injury to the feelings of Princes, which the proposed arrangements involve, there are other evils with which they are

fraught. When European officers are thus forced upon the Indian Princes, these latter will naturally cease to take any interest in their armies, and as a consequence their efficiency will be inevitably lowered. The huge blunder of the amalgamation will be repeated again with the self-same results. To carry into effect the so-called amalgamation of the local Indian and the Imperial armies of England, many changes have of late, though not quite recently, been introduced into the system of officering our own Indian army, which have in a measure ruined their prospects, and sensibly lowered their former status. It is true the sepoy's pay has been increased, but their ranks of late have not been filled with the same class of men, with which they used to be filled before. Employment in the regiments is not as eagerly sought after now as before by the scions of the old Maharatta Sirdars' families, or by respectable Rajputs and Mahomedans. Our present organisation has left no scope for their aspirations, and most of them have turned to other occupations. The armies of the Indian Princes and Indian States generally afford the only available field to this class of men for whom there is now no opening left in British India. Any change in the constitution of Indian armies in the proposed direction will result in depriving these military classes of their accustomed employment. Hundreds of well-descended and brave Sirdars,

who by their education are incapable of adapting themselves to altered circumstances, which require them to be farmers or shopkeepers, will find their occupation gone. It cannot be wise to let loose upon the country such a large stream of discontented people unable to earn their livelihood in worthy and manly occupations. What is very often mistaken for or misrepresented to be political discontent in certain parts of the country is in reality nothing more than the cry for profitable civil and military employment by men who have been thrown out of their usual occupations. If British officers are appointed to supersede Indians of rank in the armies of Princes and Chiefs, the two will never pull on together, and the weaker vessel will go to the wall, and a very great addition will unavoidably be made to this miserable class.

Besides, one can not overlook the fact that the systematic and general appointment of British officers to all posts of command in the armies of Indian States will considerably swell the expense which is at present found sufficient to maintain these military establishments in their old-world fashions and trappings and armours. Indian officers are much more cheap than British officers, and are not necessarily less efficient for the purposes of this irregular force. If it is desired that to a certain extent uniformity of discipline should prevail in all Indian Armies, facilities

should be afforded to the rulers of Indian States by permitting them to send their officers to be trained in the Imperial Army. This will create a healthy rivalry, and will firmly cement the military and feudal relations between the British Government and the Indian States. Princes and chiefs will, in consequence of such facilities, continue to take the same, or perhaps increased, interest in their military establishments, while the efficiency of their armies will be increased without making them more expensive.

Lastly, we shall notice incidentally the question whether the assumption of the Imperial Title by Her Gracious Majesty has any bearing on this subject. No one can conscientiously hold that it has altered the relation of these States with the Paramount Power for the worse. It was authoritatively and expressly declared that the assumption of the title did not, and would not, make the least difference in the relations between the British Government and its subordinated Indian allies, and that the title was assumed simply to give adequate expression to the value which Her Majesty set on her Indian Dependency. If possible, the assumption of the title has strengthened the claims of the Indian Princes to retain their small armies. The discussion which took place on the subject in Parliament resulted in the vouchsafing of many assurances from responsible ministers to the Indian Princes

that their position in the Empire was now legitimized as the civil councillors and military generals of the Empress, and it was owing, no doubt, to the faith which was placed in these assurances, that all the Princes, high and low, vied with each other in bending their knee cheerfully in the august celebrations at Delhi to the sovereign authority then proclaimed. The assumption, moreover, of a title involving the anomaly of its being applicable only to a portion of Her Majesty's dominions, has a significance of its own. The novel title was assumed chiefly with the object of giving expression to the dignity of the position of the Queen of England without making any detraction from the dignity of the Rajahs, Nabobs, Chiefs and Princes &c. of India. If such scrupulousness was shown even in the assumption of a name, what can be more inconsistent with such a policy than the idea that that event can be held to justify any encroachment on the rights of Princes, which would not have been justifiable before that event? It was especially declared at the time that it was not intended to assume any rights which did not before belong to the Crown, and it can not now be held for a moment that the position newly assumed gives the British Government any right to interfere with the internal economy of Indian States, any more than it has before the passing of the Royal Titles Bill.

The plea for disbandment based on the grievous nature of the burdens these armies impose on the subjects of the Indian States need not detain us long. These subjects have never complained about their burdens. On the contrary they glory in the strength of their military establishments. We are not in a position to throw stones at others in this respect; for, the Indian States may well retort and call upon the doctor to "heal himself" before preaching economy to others. This expenditure is not spent on mere mercenary hordes. It is shared in by the nobility and the Raj-manlal, and renders a rich return. Indian Governments are not absentee landlords, and do not drain away wealth by their home charges. The rich nobles and sirdars foster arts, and preserve the national spirit. The proposed scheme, moreover, will not lessen these burdens, for the British Government will step in, and appropriate these resources for its own military purposes. The burdens will remain, and will be stereotyped. The money will be spent upon frontier wars and garrisons from which the subjects of Indian powers can derive little direct benefit. On no grounds, therefore, is any change, like the one proposed by the *London Times* in the political and military relations of the Paramount Power with the Indian Princes and Chiefs, justifiable or salutary. We protest emphatically against the ungenerous, short-sighted, and reactionary policy

which the British Government is urged to pursue towards its best friends and allies. The Political Department must give the lie direct to the charge that it is unable or unwilling to assign a proper place to this class in our administrative economy. The fidelity of Indian Princes has been tried sufficiently, and the Paramount Power may well rely upon the loyalty of its feudatories. We must give the Indian Princes and Chiefs some little credit for common sense. England conquered India, and destroyed its armies in the early part of the century with a comparatively handful of men. Is there any reason why we should accept the taunt of its enemies who proclaim that England's power is already on the wane, and that, in spite of its vastly increased resources, it is afraid of the shadows of those vast military powers which it laid low in the full strength of their life? These unreasonable fears of decayed ruins are unworthy of its strength. The Princes have formed a proper idea of its real power, and the utter inadequacy of their combined strength to offer any serious opposition to its wishes. It is time, therefore, that the Government should take its Indian allies into confidence. Following in the footsteps of the wisest Mogul Emperors, it is its duty to keep up and foster what little martial spirit is yet left in them. It is highly impolitic to paralyze these limbs of the great body-politic, and cut off by the

roots the sources of the nation's life-blood. A truly wise politician would surely strive his best to keep sound every part in its place, and direct all to the desired end, of glorifying England by elevating India to the platform of civilized nations. There is a tradition current among the Marathas, that the great Madhav Rso Peishwa was once asked why he did not fortify Poona, his capital city. He is reported to have said in return that he had living walls and bastions in his greaat Sirdars, Scindia, Holkar and others, and that he trusted more to living than to dead defences. Our Government may indeed safely aspire to this position, and the achievement will by no means be difficult if it condescends to establish a real and sympathetic understanding between itself and the Indian Princes. At present they have no place in the councils of the Empire, and they are never asked to lead its forces. If in place of the formal Durbars now and then held, which at present cause scarcely disguised inconvenience and discomfort to all parties, assemblies of the notables were convened for the consideration of serious questions concerning the mutual relations of the Princes, and their subordination to the British Government, if the Government assured to them the steady continuance of all their rights and privileges, as it has already assured them the permanent enjoyment of their respective territories, a new future will dawn upon India.

At present, the British Government expects concessions without surrendering any of its hold on them. We might make the Indian States the pillars that lend strength to the imperial edifice, rather than objects of fear and suspicion. Their military establishments and their treasures might be, as in fact they should be even now, regarded more as a source of strength to us than as objects to be feared, and to watch whom we must run into an unnecessary expenditure on our own army. The present war with our Afghan neighbour, though it is an evil in itself, is to be thanked as having put to a prompt test the assurances of friendly help, which the Government has been constantly receiving from our Princes and Chiefs. And further if this event has the result of driving away the suicidal mania which prevails among certain people of stifling all military spirit in the Indian subjects, of demartializing the scions of old warrior-families, and reducing them to the status of renters and slothful pensioners; in short if it awakens us to the true dignity of the policy of keeping up and turning to good account the support of our faithful allies, and the traditional hold the prestige of their names still exercises over the people of India, we shall have ample reason to thank the war as a god-sent and a blessing. Good, they say, comes out of evil. And if, besides the military glory, which the war now going on is sure to bring to the

British arms, our relations to the Indian Princes and Chiefs be placed on a more satisfactory footing, and a friendly and cordial understanding comes to be established between them and ourselves, if we learn to look upon their increased strength as an addition to our own, we may well be said to have turned a new leaf in our political history, and the second Affgan War will always be remembered as an era, inaugurating a happy and prosperous future to England and India, united in the bond of mutual co-operation in the labours of peace and in the risks of war.

"CURRENT LITERATURE."



(*P. S. S. Quarterly Journal Vol. 1, 4, April 1879*).

"The forces of the Indian States of India considered in relation to the defence of the Indian Empire" is an anonymous publication by a permanent well-wisher of India and England, who has thought it fit to dedicate the work to Sir R. Meade, the present Resident at Hyderabad. We cannot understand why the author should have shrunk from publishing his name. The question he has discussed is of such importance, and the interests concerned in it are so sacred and national in the true sense of the word, that we think it is almost a sacrilege for persons in the position of anonymous authors to meddle with it, without at the same time distinctly publishing to the world their claim to have a voice in the matter. The author states that he has on previous occasions received encouragement from Sir Richard Meade in the disquisitions and proposals he made referring to the armies of the Indian States. These disquisitions and proposals must have been of a confidential character, and placed at the service of the secret and political department which alone could appreciate their worth. We are not equally privileged

in this matter, and must plead this excuse if we unconsciously commit any injustice to the author in our observations upon his present venture. We cannot bring ourselves to think that the author is a real well-wisher to the permanent interests of India or England. Even Englishmen of the most absolute and imperial instincts have not yet ventured to question the force of the treaties which bind the British power in India with reciprocal obligations towards the Indian States, and yet the author lays it down as a postulate "that treaties are merely the creature of circumstances, and that they should be changed with every accession of strength to suit the interests of the stronger power." Take away these treaties, and we do not know where to seek for the legal force which will guarantee the continuance of the Indian States in their integrity. The author is a Russo-phobist, and has freely indulged his tendency to villify the Russians as if in their aggressive character they are greater sinners than the British nation, which now dominates over half Asia, and Africa, and America. His advice to the Indian States is that, as, in view of the Russian aggression, it has become necessary to increase the British army in India, the Indian States should hand over their own military establishments to the Paramount Power, and provide funds for their maintenance. The Indian States concerned are to require no

guarantees, nor expect any concession of additional privileges for such a surrender of their treaty rights, but are to console themselves with the glorious reflection that armies, paid out of their funds, were employed in the conquest of Afgani-sthan and Persia. We could understand such a proposal if the British Government on their part showed its willingness to open the military service to Indians, organized and armed the Indian militia, and allowed voice to the Indian princes in its councils of war and peace. The Mogul emperors did all these things, and the armies of the Indian States under the Mogul Empire were utilized by the then paramount power to the fullest extent. The British Government in India has not shown any disposition to give effect to these Mogul traditions, and yet Indian patriots of the author's stamp find it in their heart to propose that the Indian States should cease to be self-dependent to the slightest extent. It is argued that the British Government has undertaken the defence of India against foreign and domestic enemies, and that therefore there is no occasion for fear. It is conveniently forgotten that the British army is not a national army, the native portion of it being entirely mercenary. The armies of the Indian States are, on the other hand, for the most part national armies. Bally armed and bally disciplined as they are, they constitute no danger to the

Paramount Power, and as the mutiny of the sepoy's showed strikingly, they constitute the best bulwork of the Indian States as much as of the British power. The whole population of India is disarmed and demartialized with the inevitable effect that there is no spirit of combination or resistance to foreign aggression left in the country. War is a game of chance, mishaps will occur to the best trained armies, and it can never be for the permanent interests of Indian and British India that we should be completely at the mercy of Russian aggressors, the first moment that the frontier army suffers a reverse. The armies of the Indian States stand in the place of the only militia, the country in its present circumstances can afford to keep. They are the reserve of the great British force in India. The author, as is but natural, has no admiration to spare from his worship of the present Government in India and England for the right-minded leaders of the Opposition in Parliament. He out-herods Herod in proposing that the more Anglicized provinces in British India should be carved out into hereditary kingdoms for English princes, and that the sublime Parsee race, to which he apparently belongs, should be allowed under British protection to extend their conquests from the Red Sea to the Caspian, and from the Mediterranean to the Indus, and that ill-fated Turkey should also become the eldest sister of India. It is useless to argue upon

such a great question with a mind so predisposed. Once the Indian States are made to surrender their armies, the entire social fabric of those States, which is essentially feudal and military in its nature, will be shaken with it, and, from one end of the country to the other, there will be a dead level of millions of souls incapable of organization and growth. This will be a calamity greater by far than the dismantling of our forts and the disarming of our population. Parsee writers on politics cannot be expected to understand the force of these considerations, but they have absorbing claims upon the highest sympathies of the Hindu and Mussalman races, who can not but wish that they will be saved from Parsee politicians of the author's type.

“ A CONSTITUTION FOR NATIVE (INDIAN) STATES.”

(*P. S. S. Quarterly* Vol. 2, 3, October 1880).

Now that within a few years more, many of the Indian States, at present under British management on account of the minority or incapacity of their ruling Chiefs, will have to be restored back to Indian rule, it becomes a question of the first importance to inquire whether adequate advantage has been taken of these interim administrations to put the governing machinery in the right order, so as to ensure it as far as possible from being mismanaged and destroyed by the personal caprices and vices of the rulers. Commencing with Punjab, we find Pattiala and Kapurthulla, Nabha and Bhawalpur, Cutch and Baroda, the Kattiawar States of Wadvan, Morwe, Limri, Rajkote, Bhow-nagar, the Central India States of Dewas, Rutlam and Tonk, Kotah, Ulwar and Jodhpur, lower down the Chiefs of Kolapoor, Sawantwadi, Janjira, Ramdoorg, Sawnoor, the Meeraj States, the Itchal-karanji, Bowda, Jat, Mudhol and Akalkote Jahgir-dars, the great State of Hyderabad, and in the south, of Mysore, are at present, or were till very lately, under British management; and in several of these States, the Indian rulers will shortly be installed in

power. Mysore will be transferred entirely into Indian hands next year. Bhawalpur, Dewas and Rutlam will be restored to their Indian rulers this year, while Ulwar, Kotah, Bhawnagar, and Rajkote, have already been restored to their Chiefs during the last year or two, and in all the other States their minorities must cease within the next five or ten years at the most, unless of course, as has happened in several cases, notably at Sawantwadi and Kolapoor, the minors die or become incapable of self-control before their minority ceases. Throughtout all this vast territory, a great experiment is being made to ensure the training up of the Chiefs in those qualifications which their British guardians regard as essential to make them cultivated and polished gentlemen. But we think no amount of mere personal accomplishments in the young rulers will cure the defect of the system of absolute rule which prevails everywhere, and the temptations of which prove in too many cases so overpowering as to wash off the varnish of education in a few years, and leave the state none the better, often much the worse, for the care taken of its Chief during the minority. Our own impression is that at least as much, if not more, care should be bestowed upon the training of the State and the people in the arts and habits of expecting and securing responsible rule and well-ordered power, as is now lavished upon the education of the

Princes, and in teaching them good manners. With the standing example of the British Government before them, no attempt worth mention has ever been made by any Indian Prince to limit the exercise of his own power by constitutional regulations, and the recognition of subordinated authorities. Even the efforts of men like Sir Dinkar Rao, Sir Salar Jung, and Sir T. Madhavrao are directed to keep the machine going in the old groove, and present brilliant statistical results and a heavy cash balance. The personal character of the administration is no whit altered, and no steps are taken to ensure a succession of Sir Salar Jungs or Sir T. Madhavraos and Sir Dinkar Raos. It is no wonder that, under these circumstances, there is no earthly guarantee that the varnish of reform will stick to the State edifice after they are removed from power, and the chances are that, by a spirit of reaction, a Chandulal, or a Nana Saheb Khanwilkar, or a Bhau Sindia will undo in a year all the good accomplished by his predecessor in a life-time. We think the times demand that this uncertainty should cease, and the weal and woe of Indian States placed on a surer footing than the shifting sands of the personal caprices of their rulers. The subject deserves the best consideration of the British authorities, and of the great Indian Rulers and Ministers, and the few suggestions we venture to urge upon their attention will not, we hope, be

without their use if they lead them to take them into their anxious deliberation.

At the threshold of all discussions regarding the advisability of providing a constitution for Indian States, there are a number of popular prejudices and misapprehensions which dispose men to regard it as a dreamy Utopia, and not worthy of any practical claim upon their consideration. It is urged that Paper Constitutions, without the sanction of fear to back them up, will not do any good in India, any more than in other countries. A real work-a-day constitution supposes a background of power in the subjects to enforce its provisions on the part of their unwilling rulers, if need be, by their deposition, and it is asked with some incredulity, where is the power in India, where are the habits and the public feeling which alone can awe a mischievously inclined ruler, and stop him in the race of vice and cruel exactions. We grant that the traditions of centuries of absolutism have removed many of the ancient landmarks of a recognized distribution of power, and of a sense of responsibility for the proper exercise of it on the part of the rulers, and that the subjects of an Indian State cannot be expected or trusted to enforce the observance of any set of rules or reformed institutions which may be set up in the interest of good rule. Fortunately, however, this legitimate function of the people can in India be

usefully discharged by the Paramount Authority, whose representative already wields great power, and has generally the good sense requisite to make him a useful control, and this fear will be efficient as a sanction till the more genuine home growth of Indian public opinion learns to respect itself, and enforce obedience. Even as matters stand at present, the Paramount Power exerts its authority when moved to do so by the subjects of Indian States, often to the length of deposing the incapable rulers. Akalkote and Jat on a small scale, and the State of Baroda on a large scale, recently furnished illustrative examples of such interference of the Paramount Power to the prejudice of the ruling chiefs on the motion of their subjects. We cannot be charged, therefore, with expecting impossibilities if we seek to regulate this same ill-regulated control, and give it a place in the constitution. Before a chief is restored to power, he should be required to take along with his implied oath of allegiance to the Paramount Power, a pledge to respect the constitution in its principal features. Any grievous and long-continued departure from this pledge should, upon the representation of the subjects, be visited after warning by the Viceroy and local Governors representing the Paramount Power with the penalty of deprivation under circumstances in which in a free State, public opinion would have sanctioned and enforced depo-

sition. If the Chiefs once knew well the fatal consequences attendant upon the ill-regulated use of their power, and knew the points of the great Charter which they may not contravene, the mere dread of evil will obviate the necessity of the enforcement of the penalty. At present the Chiefs know, or think they know, that if they are loyal, and stand well with the British Agents, they are secure from harm, unless in very extreme cases of misrule. This impunity should cease, and there should be an intelligent understanding that the rulers enjoy their prerogative for the benefit of their subjects only. So far then as the necessity of a sanction is concerned, we think we have shown that there is no reason to apprehend that the scheme of an Indian constitution will fail for want of one.

Another misapprehension must also be corrected at this stage. It is urged with some plausible show of reason that the British Government in India is itself an embodiment of absolute power, and so long as there is no constitution for British India, it is absurd to expect that the Indian Princes will be disposed to make any such concessions to their own subjects. Our reply to this allegation is that it is not true. However arbitrary at times the British rulers of India may be, it cannot be said that there is no constitution for British India. On the other hand, it is the fact and the sense of its

existence, and the training it gives to the nation, that we regard as a compensation sufficient to reconcile us to the loss of independence. The Government of India, both in India and in England is a constitutional machine, its very aberrations and occasional lapses into absolutism are illustrations of its constitutional restraints. Who among the 200 millions of Her Majesty's subjects in British India knows or cares to know the personal character of its Viceroy or Governor, or for the matter of that, of the Collector or the Judge for the time being of his province? The individual perishes, the type remains all the personal and changing elements are lost in the firmness of the system which guards against the defects of arbitrary rule. This, we believe, is the principal characteristic of a constitutionally governed country. We do indeed at times, between ourselves and our rulers, raise a hue and cry when the Legislature passes all of a sudden any measure like the Vernacular Press Censorship Act, or when the Viceroy overrules the opposition of his Council, as when he remitted the cotton duties. But at the bottom of this outcry, there is a sense that these things are unusual by contrast with, and judged by the standard of, the ordinary constitutional procedure of the government. The thorough and minute regulation and distribution of power between the higher and lower authorities in India and in England, the institution

of Councils and Boards and Corporations for deliberative purposes, the separation of the Civil and Military, of the executive and judicial departments, the necessity of legislative sanction for new taxes and new laws, the independence of the Judges, the free right of petition, the toleration of all manner of opinions, and the free expression of them within the limits of loyalty, the regular publication of State accounts, the equality before the law of all classes of subjects, the careful testing of qualifications for service in all branches, the settlement of the land and other revenues on fixed rules, and the every day increasing incorporation and association of the people in legislation, in the administration of justice, and in the management of local affairs,—these are all so many elements of our constitution which we prize as the very breath of the new life that the nation is breathing and lisping to learn. We cannot of course expect the representatives of the Paramount Power in Indian courts to enforce obedience to any more liberal constitution than what obtains in British India, but for a century or two more the Indian States have work carved out enough to employ all their spare energies in copying the British Indian exemplar with such obvious modifications as will suggest of themselves. The same set of rules and charters will not of course do for all States alike. There are the treaty States with large revenues and extensive territories

and many millions of subjects over whom they have the power of life and death, and there are the smaller and bigger Jahgirdars and Thakoors with restricted powers and revenues. The same distribution of power and responsibility, which may be of use in the treaty States, will be labour lost in the case of the smaller States. While, therefore, taking care not to indulge in the dreamy excesses of republics of the 'mad' patriot's type, the Indian States must endeavour to keep the principal elements of their constitution on a level with the privileges and status of British India, and at the same time in keeping with our own best national traditions, for a too great divergence from these last will have an alien stamp impressed upon the projected reforms, and deprive them of the sympathy and support of the Chiefs, Sirdars, and people, whose training and self-education in the habits of well-ordered rule is the great point to be secured.

Having thus cleared the subject from the confusion caused by these preliminary prejudices and misconceptions, we may now fairly expect our readers to follow us in the detailed suggestions we wish to offer, not so much as a final solution of the intricate problem, but by way of a feeler to provoke a fuller deliberation of it. The first principle of our draft constitution, and the regulating power of all the other reforms, is the nomination of a responsible minister in all the larger

Indian State. We believe that this reform lies at the bottom of all possibility of future improvement. Our own proposal is that each of the greater chiefs should be required to nominate a responsible Minister, Divan, Karbhari, Naib, or Deputy ruler. Such nomination must be made subject to the approval of the representative of the British power, and once nominated, he should only be removed for clearly proved incapacity, disloyalty, crime, or misdemeanour proved to the satisfaction of both the Chief and the British Agent. His tenure of power should not be dependent upon the changing caprices of the Chief, or on the equally shifting temper of the British Agent. We have been thus particular in defining these conditions, because they must be taken as a whole if the reform we propose is to be thoroughly appreciated. Of course, as a matter of fact, no chief governs without a minister, and no minister can long continue in power who is disliked by the British Agent. But it is a matter of history that many chiefs have, in an evil hour, been advised by British Agents that they were supreme rulers within their own territories, and might at their pleasure dispense with the services of their responsible ministers, and manage their kingdoms themselves or through dummies of their choice. Such a permission accorded to the Baroda ruler in Maharaja Khanderao's time enabled him to displace a veteran Divan like

Govindrao Rode, and put in his place a man like Bhao Sindia. We trace the remote cause of all the misfortunes of Baroda to this source. In earlier history, the same unfortunate absence of responsible Ministers at the Indore Court led to the mis-rule and anarchy which preceded the time of His Highness the present Maharaja's accession to power. The confusion at Gwalior on the death of Doulastrao Scindia was traceable to the same source. The British Government wanted the Darbar to get rid of Dada Saheb Khasgiwale, and the refusal to do so led to the troubles of 1842-3. At Hyderabad, before Sir Salar Jung came into power, the same indulgence of the whims of the ruling Chief led to the supercession of a capable Minister by Chandulal, the Peishcar, and lost the Berars to Hyderabad. In Mysore again, the death of Poorneah left the Chief set up by General Wellesley without the help of a councillor, and he became soon involved in troubles. The troubles in Sangli on our own side are directly traceable to the same misfortune. It will be thus seen that the idea of the Chief being able by himself to look to his own affairs is at the bottom of much mischief, and that these evils will never be cured, and a succession of wise and responsible advisers secured, till the minister's position is well assured. No Minister worth having will volunteer his services unless his position and his tenure of power are well guaranteed. The Chief, the

Minister, and the Political Agent, are thus the corner-stones of our proposed constitution. At present this triple authority does not exist. The Chief or the Political Agent is all in all, and thus there is no balance of power, and the uncertainties of personal rule are in no way diminished. We cannot ensure a lineal succession of able chiefs, but we can very well secure the selection of respectable men as Ministers, and the only way to ensure a careful selection that occurs to us is to leave the power of nomination to the Indian Chief, and the power of approval to the British Agent, and after such nomination and approval, to make the minister's position certain beyond all caprice. The present subservient race of men of straw and no position, who rise to be ministers by pandering to their Prince's worst tastes and vices, and by standing well with the Political Agent by anticipating his whims, must give way to a better class of people. The latent force of unrecognized necessity has brought to the front men of first rate talent in all the great Indian States, and we wish it were made a rule that this most desirable state of things should be made the rule everywhere and guaranteed against all mischances.

Having secured a Minister, the next question is how to secure a proper distribution of authority between him and the Chief, so as to preserve and increase the dignity of the one and the usefulness

of the other. This brings us to the second great principle of our draft constitution. In all the large States, we wish to see it established that the Chief in State matters shall only exercise power by way of regular appeal from the order of his Minister or Diwan and not otherwise. There should be no interference with the minister's exercise of delegated power till his order is passed, and any one of the parties affected by it appeals to the Chief. At present, the minister is either all-powerful, and virtually supersedes the Prince, or he is only a Secretary affixing his signature to the dictates of the unacknowledged ministers in the back ground who govern the Prince. There is nothing revolutionary in our proposal. What we propose is only this that the education which the subjects of an Indian State receive during the temporary administration of a British officer should be confirmed by the continuance of the same order of things when the Chief succeeds to power. In this way, and in this way alone can the subordinate independence of the minister and his sense of responsibility be maintained.

In all the larger States, a Council of superior officers, consisting of the heads of all the different departments, assisted also by a few selected representatives of the non-official classes, the great Bhayals, Thakurs, Sirdars, Darakdars, the merchants and traders, and priests, should be, along with

the Chief as their President, and the minister as their active leader, the final authority,—the Darbar proper, without whose sanction no new tax or new law, and no great innovation on existing forms should be sanctioned, and without whose consultation no great questions pending between the State and the Paramount Power should be settled. It might be urged against this third proposal that it is a considerable departure from existing traditions, and that we might as well talk of calling States General, or Parliaments, or Congresses. We, however, think otherwise. When the great Shivaji built his new kingdom, he was fully alive to the necessity of such a council, and he took care in filling it up to associate representatives of all the more intelligent classes in his kingdom, without partiality of race or caste. No Chief, however ill-advised, acts without a Council, but this Council is too often made up not of the heads of the great departments of his State, and the natural leaders of his subjects, but of the panderers and pimps and jesters and bad women who throng his court. The dictates of the old Shastras and *Rajnitis* are quite distinct on this head, and the King without his Council is the archtype of a bad ruler in the old books. Of course the best way to educate the people to appreciate such an institution is to give it a form and power in the interim regency periods. The example of the constitution of British India attests to the

usefulness of a rule by Councils and Boards. They keep up uniformity, they conserve past traditions, and act as buffers against the evil effects of personal changes.

Our fourth proposal relates to the settlement of the land revenue. The uncertainty of the king's rights in land, the greed of power, and the temptations to abuse it, these have been the principal sources of the misrule and anarchy which have ruined the Indian States, both large and small. The Chiefs of Akalkote and Jat on our side lost their power on this account. It is the principal source of the dissatisfaction which mars the otherwise beneficial rule of the Maharaja of Indore. In Hyderabad, before Sir Salar Jung's time, it was the source of all the financial confusion of that State under Chandulal and his predecessors. The want of such a settlement of the land revenue caused the troubles in Nagar which led to the deposition of the late Mysore ruler. In Baroda the same source of mischief led to the troubles of Khanderao's reign, when he screwed up the revenue to the full pitch suggested by the rising prices. In easy or unscrupulous hands, the want of such a settlement soon gives rise to the contract or mamlat system which inevitably drives the State vessel on the rocks ahead of anarchy. The settlement of the land revenue permanently or for long terms on moderate and fixed principles, and the lightening of all other

burdens should be the one recognized condition on which minor Indian rulers attaining their age should have the power of independent rule conferred on them. The settlement may be in corn rent or money rent, but there should be a certain fixity of term and tenure any violation of which should be regarded as a distinct sign of bad rule.

Next only to this reform in importance, is the proposal of a separation between the Khasgi and Doulat receipts and expenditure. The Indian Chief or ruler should be clearly made to recognize an essential difference between his own private allowance and receipts, and the State receipts. This distinction is clearly recognized in the accounts of the best Indian States, but the temptation of all newly rulers is to ignore it, till they come to look upon the State revenues as their private wealth. The chief should be his own unrestricted master in the matter of his Khasgi income, which should be settled upon him with reasonable reference to past traditions and his existing wants. But once settled, there should be no increase of the Civil list except for good cause, and with the consent of the Council and the Minister. The British Government is, to a great extent, responsible for the subversion of this sense of distinction between State and private revenues, for at the time of the great confiscations of Tanjore and Nagpoor, the doctrine was first broached that an Indian Prince is the absolute lord

of all the wealth in his private and State coffers; and that his private jewels and goods were State property liable to confiscation along with the State revenues proper. This mischievous delusion should have been buried with the abandonment of the annexation policy, but the fear of its being revived leads Indian Princes to starve and rob the State Treasury, and store their private Khasgi income with inconvenient savings. We know of instances where a Prince was foolish enough to deposit his own money with a stranger on the condition that he was to advance it to the Doulat at heavy interest, and pay the Chief's Khasgi a smaller rate of interest for the use of the money. H. H. Malharrao stored 80 lacks in bank notes, while his Sirdars clamoured for payment, and the Soucars vainly asked for the return of their jewels. A great deal of the popular odium which attaches to the rulers of the Indore and Gwalior and Cashmere Darbars, arises from this same source. The settlement of the Chief's Civil list should, therefore, be strictly carried out in his minority, and no accession to it be allowed except for good cause shown to the satisfaction of the Minister and the Council.

Next to these two important reforms is the division of Executive and Judicial, of Civil and Military duties, and the bestowal of all offices of position and trust on persons who, besides the qualifications of being subjects of the States, and

of good family connection, also qualify themselves by passing prescribed examinations. In all the larger States this division of functions and careful selection should be based on the lines followed in British India. There is not the same advantage in carrying out such a division of work in the smaller States, but the tendency of all centralized power to abuse is so great that, as far as financial necessities permit, the power of the State must be distributed in separate and co-ordinate departments. The old Indian dynasties and empires mouldered into dust and decay chiefly because this principle of a division of authority was not thought of, and was certainly not carried out. The same man joined Military, Civil, Judicial, and Executive functions in his own person, was in fact a miniature Sovereign for his province. The hereditary principle operating towards the same goal, there was a constant tendency to split up the ill-consolidated empire into fragments. The division of functions, and the bestowal of the offices on qualified men, tested on the British Indian or China plan, ensures their proper exercise by stimulating healthy emulation, and preventing abuse and idleness by a close system of checks and counter-checks. The example of British India has been slowly teaching this lesson to the better regulated States, but we wish to see it embodied as a fixed principle from which there should be no departure.

Again, the principle of having written laws, now so extensively recognized throughout British India has in it a great power of education. As a matter of fact, the laws in British India are made by the Executive, but the Executive feels itself bound by the laws, and if it seeks a departure, changes the law in the first instance. This deference to written law teaches men to obey not personal mandates suggested by the moment's whim, but the deliberate rules laid down for general guidance. The individual sinks in the general, the temporary in the permanent. This aspiration to be governed by a body of written laws passed deliberately beforehand suggested the *Smrutis* and there is, therefore, nothing of an innovation in desiring that the reign of law shall become supreme throughout.

An annual statement of accounts, in the way of budgets and regular estimates, should also be insisted on as a part of the same obligation. As matters stand, in many States neither the nominal chief nor his minister knows much how he stands in respect of ways and means, or how the money comes and goes through a thousand hands, and there is no audit, no proper system of account such as obtains in British India, or even like what, after the lapse of 80 years, strikes the student of the Poona Daftar as the peculiar glory of Nana Fadnis's administration. The ordinary and extra-

ordinary provisions of the year should be fixed on beforehand, and not provided for as they arise. This periodical publication of accounts will create an interest in public matters in the subjects of Indian States, and enable them to judge of the wisdom or otherwise of new impositions.

We would also press upon the rulers of Indian States the extreme desirability under proper control of fostering the free development of local power such as that of the great Sirdars, village Patels, and the Pargana authorities. The Indian nation was saved from extinction by the solidarity of these local institutions that survived the great inundation floods of foreign invasions which passed over the country. The influence of British example is not worthy of being followed in this respect. British authorities naturally dislike these local dignitaries, for they interfere with centralized power. But the aims and purposes of Indian rulers ought to be to conserve these elements of national strength. The Inam settlement and confiscation operations which propose to take away the land from all the great holders of alienations, and pension them or send them adrift to starve, are in our view conceived in the narrowest spirit. It is a public misfortune that in this respect, the example of British India is being too slavishly followed in all the Indian States. People who have no connection with the land and live on stipends, have no hold, and no status in the

country. They are absolutely at the pleasure of the ruler for the time, who simply silences them by fear of starvation. If these were connected with the land as their source of livelihood, they would secure a following, a union of interests between the people proper and their leaders would result, and their rights and privileges could not be easily set aside. The same observation holds good of the Bhayads and Thakurs in Rajput States. The example of British India moreover should also not be allowed to corrupt Indian States in respect of the encouragement of the litigious spirit. As far as possible, the lower class of offences and civil disputes must be left to the disposal of the Panches, and Daivas, and the village elders. The stipendiary magistrates and judges should be assisted also by these same elders to dispose of the more contested cases. Slowly but surely, the statesmen of British India are perceiving the mistake they committed in overliberalizing India, in abolishing the sanctions of our customary rates of interest, in making land freely disposable by the involuntary attachment of Judicial Warrant in introducing the laws of insolvency and a thousand equally disturbing expedients of western civilization. The Indian States should stand aloof from these mistakes, and in the constitutions they accept for their guidance, there should be no such doors of abuse as settlement or confiscation departments,

the rights of subordinate aliens should be conserved, and the interest and dignity of the elders of the population should be enlisted in their own defence by finding work for their leisure time in volunteer Police duties, and judicial work of Panches and unpaid Justices.

We have thus briefly dwelt upon all the leading features of the constitution we would wish to see introduced in the larger and smaller States. As we have said above, it is providential that there are at present so many States under Regency or interim British administrations. Full advantage should be taken to utilize this rare opportunity by the wise rulers and guardians of the States to start this experiment fairly. At present too much attention is directed to the more showy reforms, reforms which strike the eye or the ear. Extensive Public Works, heavy cash balances, large confiscations, long statistics of Civil and Criminal work, the employment of Europeans on large salaries,—these are thought to be the elements of successful rule. Our own view of the matter is that they are but vanities and deceits, as they exercise no permanent influence for good on the people of Indian States. These do not advance in public spirit, but continue to be children, gratified with *salmories* and huge marriage expenses, and Bada Khanas to European guests. With a Prince brought up as His Highness the present Maharaja

of Indore, or the much lamented Rajaram Maharaja of Kolapoor, assisted by a responsible and respected Minister, with a Council of officers representing the heads of all departments and the leaders of the non-official classes, with the land revenue and other sources of income settled on moderate and fixed principles, with a careful separation of the Khasgi from the State Department, and a proper distribution of the Civil and Military, Judicial and Executive functions in separate hands, carefully selected from among the subjects of the State after due examination, with written laws, and annual publication of accounts, with a policy of conservation of the rights and distinctions of the Sirdar and privileged classes, and of strict regard to keep up their connection with the soil, with every care taken to associate people in the work of practical administration as local justices, Panches, jurors, Municipal and Talooka Councillors, &c, what is there to prevent Indian States from becoming models to British India for the quiet contentment of their subjects, and the great school of self-education and progress in political emancipation, instead of, as at present in too many cases, being the source of annoyance and trouble to their own people and to the Paramount Power, and the laughing stock of the world for utter helplessness

and the most depraved voluptuousness? The time has surely come when we may expect to see the dawn of a better order of things, and the growth of a more correct sense of public needs, the recognition of which cannot fail to be attended with manifold blessings to the whole nation.

A CRITIQUE "ON A CONSTITUTION FOR NATIVE (INDIAN) STATES."



(*P. S. S. Quarterly Vol. II, 3, October 1880.*)

We gladly make room for the following communication from an esteemed friend whose experience of Indian rule and rulers fully entitles him to a respectful hearing on the subject of his communication. We agree in the main with the suggestions contained in the communication of our able critic. We fear that in our first article, the minister's tenure of power was placed on a footing of greater permanency than is desirable under existing circumstances. The plan followed in Travancore in three recent instances of selecting ministers for a term of five years subject to re-appointment will, we trust, answer all present needs. As regards the division of the work between the Chief and his minister, we still hold decided views that in all executive business between party and party, the Chief's interference should be limited to a power of revision or appeal from the decisions, of subordinate officers. The Indian Princes will, of course, have the initiation in legislation and new taxation, in all the great questions of administration, as also in the correspondence with the Paramount

Power. This would leave scope enough for the most benevolent exercise of their great powers. With regard to our correspondent's strictures upon the political service, we must observe that it was from no fear of giving offence that we omitted all reference to the devise of checks upon these authorities. Our own opinion is that if the scheme of a constitution finds favour with the Government of India, the occasions of friction will be minimized, and as a matter of fact the political service will be relieved of most of their onerous duties, and especially of the odium of the secret-reporting system. The scheme, if it is to work at all, will have to be supplemented by the establishment of a court of appeal upon the principle advocated by Lord Stanley of Alderley in his essay read before the East India Association to which we have referred in another portion of the present number.

The *Quarterly Journal* of the Poona Sarva-janik Sabha for January 1880 contains a thoughtful article on the subject of "A Constitution for Indian States" which deserves greater notice than it has hitherto received.

The writer in the *Quarterly Journal* at the outset very wisely remarks that the draft constitution he has proposed should not be viewed so much in the light of a final solution of the intricate problem, as in that of a feeler to provoke a fuller discussion of it.

Though a great difference of opinion is observable in the remedies proposed, yet, we presume, there is but one opinion as to the importance and desirability of securing some suitable constitution for the Indian States. There are also certain points on which there is not, and we fancy, there cannot be, any difference of opinion as to the principles involved, whatever difference of opinion there may be in the details connected with them, and the writer in the *Quarterly* deserves well of the country for having drawn attention to, and brought out together, such points bearing on the subject as cannot be dissented from in the main. He also deserves well for the manner in which he has cleared the subject of some "preliminary" prejudices with which it is associated in the popular mind. Yet it must be observed that the article would have been all the better for a further clearance of such prejudices and further observations to prove the practicability and the very great necessity that exists of a constitution for the Indian States. Had the writer in the *Quarterly* done so, there would have been little or no occasion to notice some of the objections that have been advanced against the practicability of adopting the draft constitution. For instance, there prevails an erroneous opinion that the Government of an Indian State is a pure despotism, unrelieved by a single constitutional check, and that it has been so from

times immemorial. This opinion ought to have been refuted as that would have served the purpose of shewing that in seeking to enforce a constitutional Government in Indian States, we are not innovating but rather insisting on the observance of long recognized rights and cherished usages. Shivaji, the founder of the Maratha Empire, has left a written constitution for the Maratha States, which, if rigidly followed, ought to make all of them "model States." In this way the founders of the other dynasties of India have left rules for the guidance of their people, mostly formed upon the basis of "Niti Shastra" or polity, but so modified as to suit admirably the exigencies of the societies for whom they were intended. These rules or constitutional checks go by the name of "Shirasta," and what strength this word has in Indian States, those only know who are conversant with them. The most self-willed and most despotically inclined prince or minister is not unfrequently stopped in his course of spoliation and mischief, as if spell-bound, by the mere utterance of this word. Let us now then see what the "Shirasta" for transacting official business in the Maratha States is.

In every State there are eight principal officers with the Prime Minister at their head. These collectively are (curiously enough) called the "Asht Pradhans," eight ministers or council-

lors, or the "Panch Bhayas," the five brothers—just as the Queen styles her high dignitaries "Cousins." There are besides 12 minor officers for what is known as the "Dwadasha Kosh," and some more for the "Athara Karkhanas" or the 18 miscellaneous departments. These minor officers are not included in what is known as the Darbar proper, which only includes the principal nine officers of the State, each of whom generally takes up the portfolio of some distinct department, and is responsible for its efficiency and good management. The Karbhari, or the prime minister, is at the head of affairs, and exercises a general control over his colleagues, and advises the king on all important matters of State. According to the ordinances of our Niti Shastra and the provisions of the constitution laid down by the great Shivaji, (at once a great conqueror and legislator), no king can govern without a responsible minister and a council. A king without these is likened to a body without hands, or a head without eyes. Not only is the king not to govern without these advisers, but no order can pass or become legal without the signatures of two or three members of the council or Darbar. Not only is the king's sign-manual in all cases necessary for the legal issue of every order, but the signatures of two, and in the cases of some States, of three and four other members of the council are required before

any order can be obeyed. The Diwan, the Fardis or financial minister, the Chitnis or the Secretary, are entitled to have their signatures affixed to any document before it can legally issue, and be obeyed. In most of the States, the hereditary principle prevails in these offices of Diwan, Fardis and Chitnis, and the king is obliged to appoint a man as Karbhari who, being selected, is a more capable man than any of the rest, and where this is the case, his signature is also necessary to validate any paper relating to State affairs. After these officers have put their signatures to a paper, the king puts his seal over it. This is the "Shirasta" and "Dastura" of the management of affairs in an Indian State, and this is as near an approach to the Darbar or Council proposed in the article under notice as any thing can be. The article only seeks to increase the number of persons to be consulted, which, as a matter of fact, is generally the case. Here then at all events no very great innovation is sought to be enforced.

Now the question arises, if with this arrangement already in vogue, the management of Indian States is a failure, what guarantee is there that a little extension of the very same measure shall prove an efficient check? The reason of failure in the existing system is its inability to secure a succession of efficient and honest ministers and is the same as that which prevents a succession

of good kings. These important offices have become hereditary in certain families, and as in all such cases, the incumbents, except now and then in the case of a selected minister or Kârbhâri, are often the very reverse of efficient and honest. Themselves helplessly involved in debt and pecuniary difficulties, these gentlemen with big jahagirs and equally big debts are at the mercy of every royal favourite and will put their signatures to any wild and reckless scheme of expenditure or extortion as easily and readily as any hireling in the world. Their only care is to secure their large Jahâgirs from injury and to escape the payment of their debts. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that the hereditary ministers have totally lost sight of the original scope and intent of the offices they are entrusted with and they have completely forgotten that subscribing to any document signifies approval of the measure thereby sanctioned. In this sense of irresponsibility, they have been encouraged by the impunity they experience at the hands of Government. For instance, when the mismanagement of a State has reached a stage which suggests and justifies the deposition of the reigning prince, those who subscribed so readily to his follies, those who could have raised their warning voice with effect from their position in the State, if they had only done their duty, are just as well off as before. Their

big Jahagirs and big debts are as safe as ever. It is with a view to meet this difficulty, and to remove this evil of hereditary ministers, that the draft constitution provides that a Darbar or Council be established of the really *working* heads of the different departments, (with here and there a merchant statesman to advise in commercial matters) without whose sanction, (obtained by a majority of votes, the king counting two votes) no extraordinary expense should be incurred, no new law passed, no great innovation enforced in the State, and no new tax levied, or old ones increased. Such a change involves no material departure from the existing principles of Government in Indian States, and no imposition of a new and unknown check is here attempted (as is imagined by some of the English papers) on the kingly prerogative. What we contend for is that the old checks should be more properly enforced than they are at present, and that the ministers ought really to be made to understand and feel their responsibility, and to be in a position to enforce attention to their views. In this way only can the minister be responsible in the true sense of the word and the hereditary and conservative elements in the States harmoniously blended with the intellectual and progressive ones.

We have now reached a point in our discussion which very naturally brings us to the

consideration of the appointment of the minister or Karbhari, the leading spirit of the Darbar, as distinguished from the hereditary Diwan, and as we differ from the writer in the *Quarterly* on some important matters of detail, we beg the reader's special attention to what follows.

The writer of the draft constitution for Indian States proposes the nomination of a responsible minister or Kârbhâri "with the exercise of whose delegated power there is to be no interference till his order is passed, and any one of the parties affected by it appeals to the chief." The minister, according to the *Quarterly Journal*, is to be nominated by the Chief, subject to the approval and confirmation of the representative of the British power, and once nominated he is not to be removed except for *clearly proved incapacity, disloyalty, crime or misdemeanour proved to the satisfaction of both the Chief and the British Agent*. His term of power should not be dependent upon the changing caprices of the Chief, or on the equally shifting temper of the British Agent. The nomination of a responsible minister, upon the conditions above specified, the writer in the Sabha's Journal considers the *sine qua non* of all possibility of future improvement.

Few will deny the necessity of this measure, and the Shâstra is quite distinct and authoritative on the point. In fact the Shâstra knows of no

king without a responsible minister. But unhappily, it seems, there is quite a rage now a days with the present race of Indian chiefs, generally imbecile and incapable though they are, to rule without a minister and council, in other words, to be their own ministers. Now the majority of these princes being at best imbeciles, the result of this is that in trying to manage affairs themselves, they themselves come to be managed by a set of low, designing scoundrels, men of straw and no position, who are not inappropriately styled by the writer of the paper under notice "the unacknowledged ministers in the back ground." However we are of opinion that the confirmation of the minister nominated by the Chief, should rest, at all events, in the case of first and second class States, with the Government of India, and not with the Agent at the Chief's Court. The Indian Government may take counsel of their Agents, but what we contend for is that the power of public confirmation of the minister must be exercised by the Viceroy in Council, or by the Local Governor in Council, the Political Agent or officer being too much of an interested party to ensure a proper selection. This is not the only reason for our proposal. A man to be appointed by the Government of India must be a man of Indian fame, and not only a local celebrity. That such men can be had for these places is now evident. Our proposal is likely, at

times to bring to the front men from outside the local limits of the respective principalities. But we must confess, we see no wrong in this. It is important that the field of choice should not be wantonly circumscribed. Some of the English papers have opposed such nominations as likely to bring in outsiders or "foreigners," by which expression they are pleased to call people of different parts of India. A Maratha Bramhan or Shudra from the Bombay or the Madras presidency cannot be, properly speaking a "foreigner" in any of the Maratha States, whether they be situate in Hindustan, Malwa, Guzarat, the Southern Maratha Country or the Carnatic. Such can not also be the case of a Hindustani gentleman in any of the Courts of India in which the Urdu may be the language of the court. Surely Indians cannot be foreigners in any part of their own country, at least not more so than the British Officers, who according to these writers are at home in every part of India. Fitness to hold the post ought to be the only consideration in the bestowal of such places.

Then again, we do not think that the measures proposed for the permanency of the minister's tenure of office are altogether necessary. As they stand, they would have the undesirable effect of confirming the Chiefs in their unwillingness to have any minister at all. That the man proposed by the Chief for the minister's place should be

approved and confirmed by the Government is a sufficient guarantee that he will not be capriciously discharged, nor any corrupt or incapable favourite appointed in his place. Besides this, it is not expected that capable men of worth will rush into Indian States without securing themselves from the effects of a sudden ejection. The game, therefore, of changing capable and *honest* ministers will be too costly and dangerous for the Chiefs to try their hands frequently at. We can imagine many circumstances, besides the commission either of a capital or a major offence, which can induce a minister to resign, or the Chief and the nation to desire his resignation. All well-governed States pass safely through ministerial crises and changes, and we believe that the establishment of a constitutional Government for the Indian States is meant to impart to them such a measure of strength and solidity as would place their welfare beyond the influence of personal accidents. Travancore may be cited as an instance of an Indian State that has recently passed through ministerial crisis of no ordinary kind. We, therefore, deprecate the restrictions proposed to impart permanency to the minister's tenure of power as disturbing the balance of the constitution. When a minister knows that he cannot be changed, he becomes to all intents a king, and what guarantee is there that he will not use his power to the detriment of the State? We

can, with our experience, easily imagine many combinations of circumstances in which the minister, if his place were made permanent or secure, would be able to beard the king, insult him in his own palace, and render his existence unbearable, and outrage the feelings of the whole Court and nation. The ministers, in fact, would become so many "Mayors of Palaces." Were it not invidious to do so, we can even now point our finger at many States as instances to prove our assertions. To speak the truth, we know of many more States that have been ruined by what we shall, to use a gentle term, call a strong and well-backed minister than of those which have been improved by him.

One word more with reference to the minister's appointment. When once the minister is duly elected, he must be considered as the exponent of the interests of the State, and his confirmation by the Indian Government must not be held to justify any further interference in the internal affairs of the State by the Government or its Agents. The Government interference in the confirmation of the minister is suggested with a view to secure the good administration of the State with the least possible interference and collision from without, as a man of known ability and integrity may be safely left to manage things well. The one object which the Government should keep in view in the appointment of the minister must

be to lessen as much as possible the chances of frequent interference within the internal affairs of the State. This principle must be always kept in sight; for there is a sort of interference likely to come into vogue with such appointments, and that is a mischief the British officers must be ever on their guard against. They will be naturally prone to look upon the man confirmed as *their* creature, who in duty bound must yield to their views without a protest, and be ready to sacrifice to their whims the true interests of the State. It is in order to lessen this danger as much as possible that we have urged above that the power of confirmation of the minister should be, not with the local Agent, but with the Government of India, which will regard this exercise of power by itself as a sacred duty undertaken with the laudable object of getting rid of the necessity of vexatious interference.

While we are on the subject of the minister's appointment and the proper distribution of authority between him and the King, we may *en passant* remark that in providing that the king shall only pass orders in appeal cases, the writer had in view only the judicial business of the State. In other matters there are, and can be, no appeals and the draft constitution has failed to suggest any procedure in such cases which form by far the greater portion of the public business of a State.

One more fault we have yet to find with the "Constitution for Indian States" as laid down in the Journal, and that is its one-sidedness. According to the writer himself, the Chief, the minister, and the Political Agent, are the corner-stones of the proposed edifice. It is proper, therefore, each of them should have his functions well-defined, his power circumscribed within well-considered limits and his actions subjected to proper constitutional checks. All parties concerned must be prepared to circumscribe their discretionary powers, and place themselves under well-considered and well-recognised constitutional checks. It would be unreasonable to hope or to propose that any one single party concerned should be content to subject itself to be constitutionally controlled, while the "despotism of the other parties was left unbridled and unchecked." Besides the show of justice which such a measure should be able to command, it will have the advantage of the very essentials of a good constitution, checks over checks and checks for all. Such an arrangement, indeed, is the very soul of a constitution. The draft constitution has attempted to define the powers of the king, and perhaps those of the minister, but it has left almost untouched the large and delicate question of the relations between the Indian Princes and the Agents of Government accredited to their Courts. It is evident these gentlemen want to be looked

after as much as the Indian Chiefs themselves. It is the nature of despotic power that it turns the head of its wielders, and makes them liable at times to act the tyrant to an astonishing degree. No amount of education and intelligence will make a man proof against the temptations that come in the path of one entrusted with unlimited discretion and irresponsible power, and it is not therefore, surprising that some of the Political Agents cut a sorry figure under the circumstances, and exhibit frailties of human nature which the world would be all the better without. But it is not the individuals of whom we have so much to complain, as of the system that affords opportunities for such exhibitions. It is impossible to be favourably impressed with the rank and file of the British Indian Political Service as at present constituted. It is an anomaly with which it is difficult to get reconciled; it is as behind the spirit of the present times as anything can well be. It allows the British Agents at Indian Courts to cry up or cry down any State or individuals in the dark by means of confidential or secret reports without allowing the parties so cried down any hearing or opportunity of self-vindication. The Government entertains an erroneous opinion about the prestige of these officers and acts upon these secret reports even when it is pretty sure of their falsehood and misrepresentations. Nay more; the Government

allows its pet Political Agents to blow hot and cold in the same breath, without ever thinking of taking them to task for the discreditable performance. No wonder then, this privilege is availed of and abused to the utmost. Under these circumstances, even experienced and old politicals are liable to forget themselves so far as to bring, by their conduct, the political system under which they work into discredit, lower the whole service in the popular estimation and involve the Indian princes and their administrations in ruin and unmerited disgrace.

The want of system in the management of the Political Department has a very great demoralizing effect on the conduct of the Indian Chiefs and their administrations. There is absolutely no principle to guide them. They are not sure that any one way of administration or adherence to any one fixed rule of conduct, however just or beneficent, can save them from uncalled-for interference and unmerited annoyance. Every Political Agent has his own code of the fitness of things, and he is in a position to force his ideas on the States under his political charge with the whole strength of the British Empire at his back. With every coming man, therefore, there is a change in management of the affairs of the State. The Chief and his ministers must mould their rule to suit the whims, likings, and dislikings, of the man for the

time being in power and his favourites. Else the Darbar must be prepared to brave the worst consequences of the wrath of the man in power; it must be prepared to be unfavorably reported to Government as a corrupt and incapable State. When it becomes known that the Rajah and the Agent do not pull on well, a number of petitions, mostly puerile and false, are presented at the Residency by interested parties, and these being magnified into exhibitions of discontent that may threaten the peace of Her Majesty's Empire, exemplary punishment is inflicted on the unfortunate Chief. Owing to these arbitrary changes, it is difficult to induce the princes to think that an enlightened or beneficent mode of Government is always good for them. The princes look upon the good name of their administration as a thing entirely under the influence of chance and their "Kismat," and do not attribute their failures to their own shortcomings, but very plausibly lay them at the door of the shifting whims of the Agent with whom they were not able to accommodate themselves.

We have, we think, said quite enough to shew that rules for the guidance of the British Political Agents and constitutional checks for them ought to be devised. Indeed, it is now high time that the whole service should be placed upon a satisfactory basis. As at present constituted, the

system is not sound, and fails to keep up with the demands of the times. Young men from the Military Department are, owing to an abuse of patronage, drafted into the political service of the Empire. Generally ignorant of the very principles of jurisprudence, ignorant of the Hindu or Mahomedan law and of the procedures prevailing in the Indian State, they avoid all self-improvement in the matter by declaring all law and procedure to be not the "condensed common sense" that they are, but "condemned common sense" which mostly they are not. Not content with this, they declare themselves above all law. Ignorant of the language of the people they hate those who, by their education, are able to use the Queen's language. It is no wonder then that these Munshiridden lords of the "golden Chupprasi," as Sir Ali Baba of the "*Unity Fair*" has wittily styled them and whom we may style "the lords of the princely creation in India," come to be credited by the common people with all the sins of omission and commission of the Amlah whose unhappy victims they not unfrequently are.

To some our strictures on the political service may seem harsh or unjust; but we appeal to the experience and judgment of all who have had anything to do with these gentlemen, from people of Sir Salar Jang and Sir T. Madhawa Raw's calibre to the petty manager of a small Indian

Principality yielding not more than 25,000 Rs. of annual revenue to its master, for the justification of our description. We must, however, again remark that there are many honourable exceptions to the general run of these officers, and that we complain more of the system than of the individuals brought up under it. It is important to avoid all personalities in discussions of this sort where public reform is sought after for the public good. As the Baroda drama has been played out, we shall, therefore, only refer our readers to the Baroda Blue Books of 1875 and to a "statement" in reply to it by Mr. Dadabhoj Nawroji, ex-Diwan of Malhar Raw Gaikwad. The obstructiveness towards reforms therein shewn by the then Resident, the choice expressions used towards the Diwan and his colleagues, and the manner in which he was treated and mis-represented, are typical of their kind, and repeat themselves whenever any reform is attempted by a repentant prince that is not mooted, in the first instance, by the Agent, or carried through one of his favourite creatures. But how many mute and inglorious Dada Bhaïs are there in the Indian States? Their name, we fear, is a legion. If an official opinion about the worth of the system complained of were wanted, we can refer to the opinion of so high an authority as our late lamented Viceroy Lord Mayo. But we refrain.

We have been thus obliged to undertake the ungracious task of writing thus disparagnly, because the writer in the *Quarterly Journal* (perhaps under the sense of the prejudice with which it is received by a portion of the official public) has refrained from dwelling on this subject. If, therefore, we have proved our point as to the necessity for the creation of constitutional checks for the guidance of the Political Agents, along with the Indian Princes and their Ministers, we ought to indicate now the line of reform that we may have to suggest. We are of opinion that the Agents of the British Government ought only to be allowed to interfere in the affairs of the Indian States to which they are accredited in the following three cases:—

(i) When the mismanagement of an Indian State threatens the peace of the surrounding British territory, or of any Prince in alliance with it at that Prince's request.

(ii) When the mismanagement is complained of officially by the council of State and the responsible ministers previously described.

(iii) When any policy of a general nature is to be carried out in the Indian States at the instance of the Government of India. In these cases the Agent may be looked upon as the proper channel of communication between the Darbar and the British Government.

As the Indian States now form a part of the British Empire, and several Chiefs hold titles and honours conferred by the gracious Empress of India and are devotedly attached to the Empire, their welfare deserves to be looked after even by the highest officers, and, therefore, any schemes for the improvement of the Indian States are to be welcomed as much as those that may be designed for the improvement of the British Territories themselves. In this view the above remarks are humbly offered for the consideration of the public and the Government. If the welfare of a third of the entire population of this vast country be a noble object to be striven after, if securing the loyalty and gratitude of such a number of vassal princes be a very considerable political advantage, if enlisting the sympathies of the populations of this country, who take an interest in the prosperity and good government of the Indian States be an object worthy of the attention of the gifted statesmen who rule over the destinies of England and India, here is a fit subject for them to exercise their energies upon,—the establishment of a constitutional Government for the Indian States,—the vassal Empire of her most august Majesty the Empress of India. The present time is the most suitable for the introduction of this reform. We have shewn above that no new principles are involved in its acceptance or enforcement, and that

it would be for the benefit of all the parties concerned. The reform would cost the British Government nothing,—a consideration of great moment in these times of financial stringency. Nay more, it would be the means of effecting a considerable saving in the over-grown political department. The princes would readily agree to this reform, and the people long for it.

As we have over-stepped the bounds we originally proposed to ourselves, we will conclude our communication by enumerating the other items of reform proposed in the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha's Journal, and which have our unqualified approval. Besides the clauses of the constitution for Indian States commented upon already, the article proposes (a) the settlement of the land revenue on some permanent or fixed principle; (b) the separation between the Khasgi and Dawalat receipts and expenditure; (c) the division of Executive and Judicial, of Civil and Military duties; (d) the securing of written laws; and (e) an annual statement of accounts in the way of budgets and regular estimates. The three heads of reforms already commented upon are (i) the nomination of a responsible minister; (ii) a proper distribution of authority between the minister and the Chief, and (iii) the establishment of a council of superior officers for making laws, levying taxes and settling questions pending between the State and the Paramount Power.

SIR SALAR JANG'S ADMINISTRATION.

(*P. S. S. Quarterly Vol. III, 2.*)

His Highness the Nizam's Dominions, though their frontiers are conterminous with those of our own and the Madras Presidencies and the Central Provinces, and their capital town is connected with the principal line of Railway communications, are to a great extent *Terra incognita* in regard to their social, political, and administrative arrangements, and the condition and prospects of the people subject to His Highness's Government. At the best of times, in past history, the Hyderabad Government was noted for its disorderly system of rule. Its debauched but proud nobles; its Arab Janadars, dunning the State ever in arrears for the pay of their nominal roll of soldiers; its motley throng of Arabs, Sillis, Sikhs, Rohilas, and ragamuffins of all nations and climes armed to the teeth with all manner of weapons, and shelling blood in open street fights with perfect nonchalance; its rural population helplessly cowering under the sway of the land-tax farmers and their agents, supported by armed retainers; the country unsafe for travellers, and most of it lying uncultivated, and harassed by the mutual rivalries of the

strong-fisted Mansubdars, Deshmukhs, and other partizan leaders; an empty treasury, with future revenue pledged in anticipation to meet pressing wants; no recognized courts for the administration of justice, the Nizam its nominal ruler confining himself to a solitary seclusion in his vast palace, with no other company than his eunuchs and his seraglio, rarely appearing in Durbar; Moslem fanaticism holding in check the Hindu population, and at times bursting into lawless acts of desecration; such was the picture which has been always associated in the popular mind of the *Moglai* rule at Hyderabad, as it came to be called since the downfall of the Delhi empire. To a great extent this description was neither overdrawn nor exaggerated in so far as it referred to the condition of affairs at Hyderabad a generation ago, before His Excellency Sir Salar Jang first came to power in 1853. The change that has since taken place has been so great, and has been so silently achieved without fuss or disturbance, and under such circumstances of domestic opposition and foreign jealousy as might well have excused a failure, that the renovation of Hyderabad from its condition of hopeless disorder and normal bankruptcy into a first class Indian State, remarkable for its contented rule and prosperous finances, may safely be pronounced to be the one great notable event of the last 30 years of Indian rule.

The recently published Report on the history of the famine in His Highness's dominions, as also the Replies to the questions by the Famine Commission,—for copies of which interesting books we are indebted to the kindness and friendly courtesy of Mr. Moulvi Mahdi Ali, the able Revenue Secretary to the Government of His Highness the Nizam, contain, if we mistake not, the first official account furnished by the Hyderabad Government of the history of this remarkable revolution, and it throws a flood of light upon many questions of great importance to those who feel an interest in the success of Indian Administrations. We are at times tempted to think that the Turkish Government, which has been so hard pressed by European benevolence to reform its administration, might well borrow a leaf from the pages of this Hyderabad story. In Turkey, as in Hyderabad, a small Mahomedan population has to bear rule over many times their numbers of the followers of another religion, and there, as here, their action is closely watched by a powerful Government. There is no reason why the experiment which has so well succeeded at Hyderabad should not equally succeed elsewhere, if only the same class of superior minds which have guided the fortunes of Hyderabad for so many years were secured at the helm of Turkish affairs. We propose to touch briefly upon the leading features of this revolution in the Hyderabad

Administration, and contrast its present condition with the state of things which obtained nearly 30 years ago.

Including the Assigned Districts of the Berars, of which His Highness is still recognized as the legitimate ruler, the Hyderabad Dominions cover the whole extent of what is the Deccan table land proper, from the Satpura range to the Krishna river, leaving two narrow strips of territory on the side of the Eastern and Western Ghauts, which belong to the Madras and Bombay Presidencies respectively. The total area covers in round numbers one hundred thousand square miles. Excluding the Berars, the area is 82,709 square miles, which is larger than the area of the whole Bombay Presidency excluding Sind, and nearly equal to that of the North Western Provinces, or to the area of Great Britain. The country is drained by the river Godavery on the North, and Krishna on the South, and their many tributaries. There are no great mountains, but the tableland is intersected by small hill ranges branching eastward and conducing to the formation of small lakes especially on its southern and eastern slopes in the Tailangan Country. Distinct geological, ethnical, lingual, and political features unite in separating these dominions into two divisions, nearly equal in size, corresponding with the trap rocks of the Northern and Western regions inhabited by the Maratha

race, and the granite of the South and East inhabited by the Canarese and the Tailangu people, the land of wheat, jwari, and cotton, from the land of rice and palm trees, the Aryan from the Dravidian settlements. Of the total area of 82,709 sqr.-miles, nearly one-third or 30,000 sqr. miles appear to belong to the military or personal Jahagirs, Sarfikhas and Paga lands. The rest about 52,000 sqr. miles belong to what is called *Diwani Acla*, which is under the direct administration of the Diwan. One third of this area consists of hilly and jungle lands. The settled country about 34,163 sqr. miles is made up of the Maratha division consisting of ten Districts including the Canareese territory, and the Tailangan division, consisting of seven Districts. Of these divisions, nearly one third of the area is described as unculturable or Inam land, the remaining two thirds being culturable Khalsa lands. Out of this last area, about one-eighth in the Maratha districts, and one-fourth in the Tailangan districts, are described as waste but arable land.

The total area of Government assessed land under cultivation comes to about 107 lacs of acres, of which one in sixty acres in the Maratha districts, and one in 40 acres in the Tailangan districts, represent the proportion of wet to dry lands. To contrast these figures with those of our own Presidency excluding Sind, it is to be noted that

our proportion of Inam to Government land is one to five, of arable to unarable land the proportion is five to two, of occupied to unoccupied land the proportion is five to one, and of wet to dry crop lands the proportion is one to 45. These details will be seen at a glance from the comparative statement given below, contrasting the figures of the Bombay Presidency and the Nizam's territories.

	Bombay Presidency excluding Sind.	The DiwaniAzla territory under the Diwan's direct administration
Area in squar. mile... ..	78000	52000
Number of Districts. ...	18	17
Total number of squar. acres	500000000	35000000
Inam lands.	800000	925000
Unculturable	9500000	20000000
Waste land or unoccupied	4000000	385000
Occupied Khalsa lands ...	21600000	10700000
Wet or Irrigated	527594	350000
Dry crop land.... ..	2100000	1035000
Population.	140 Lacs.	56 Lacs.
Land revenue.	260 Lacs.	190 Lacs.

This comparative statement brings together all the more important statistics contrasting the condition of the Nizam's Provinces with those of our own Presidency. The total population in the Nizam's dominions exceeds the figure noted above by a large margin, for, as we have observed above, more than one third of the country is not under

the direct administration of the Diwan, and its population is not included in the total given above. The average of population for the 17 Diwani Districts is 130 for every square mile. Adopting this rate as the basis for the whole area, the population of the entire territory approaches to the round number of ten millions. The total revenue from land, abkari, customs, and miscellaneous sources, amounted in 1874 to 256 lacs, and was estimated to reach 286 lacs in 1878-79. Of this sum the land revenue came up to nearly two crores.

To note briefly the chief heads of progress accomplished during the last 25 or 30 years, it is to be observed that when His Excellency the Diwan took up the reins of administration, the land revenue of the Diwani-administered Districts in 1854 was about 65 lacs chalni, corresponding to about 59 lacs Halli sicca Rupees, the abkari revenue was $1\frac{1}{2}$ lacs, the customs about four and a quarter lacs, and the miscellaneous revenue $3\frac{1}{2}$ lacs. In twenty-two years the land-revenue was increased nearly 300 percent, the abkari was increased from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $28\frac{1}{2}$ lacs, the customs to 25 lacs, and the miscellaneous to $18\frac{1}{2}$ lacs. The revenue has thus been increased 450 per cent all round. Of the increase in the land revenue, about 75 lacs must be set down to the credit of resumptious of Jahagirs, Inam lands and Tankha Talukas which

account for 50 lacs, and about 27 lacs represent the revenue of the assigned districts restored to the Nizam after the mutiny. After making these deductions, there remains an increase of 110 lacs due to the *bona fide* extension of cultivation and enhanced assessment, and thus represents a clear gain and increase of the material resources of His Highness's Dominions. The increase in the abkari and customs revenue also points in the same direction. The Nizam's Treasury, which was bankrupt in 1853, is now overflowing with its annual surplus balances notwithstanding the increased cost of establishments, and the Public Works expenditure, the contribution made to the Hyderabad Railway, and the 43 lacs and more spent or remitted on account of Famine relief. Even in 1869-70, the Resident at Hyderabad estimated that the annual income of the State exceeded the expenditure by about eight lacs of rupees, which amount must have greatly increased during the last 10 years. The credit of the Government now stands so high that it could easily float a loan in the London Market on the same terms as those of the Government of India, and His Excellency the Diwan feels a just confidence that he can, without straining the finances, redeem the Berars by a capitalized payment of 8 or 9 crores sufficient to defray the military charges in consideration of which the original assignment was made. Out of 1604 deserted villages in the

Nizam's Dominions in 1854, as many as 384 have been re-peopled. The Hyderabad city has extended on all sides, till now the entire distance between the cantonment at Secunderabad and the city walls has been built up by many thousands of houses and noblemen's residences, and the streets of the city have been widened and modernized in a way to surprize all old residents. The population of the Diwani-administered Districts has been estimated to have increased during the last 20 years by about 30 per cent, and the area under cultivation from one to two hundred per cent. In five Talukas of the Aurungabad District, the number of cultivators had risen from 11,000 in 1854 to 17,000 in 1876; in eight Talukas of the Nulrug District the number of cultivators had increased from 19,000 in 1854 to 27,450 in 1876; in four Talukas of the Lingsur District and five Talukas of the East Raichur District, the number of cultivators had increased 20 per cent in 12 years. The increase in the cultivation of land will be seen from the following statement:—

Names of Districts.	Cultivated area in 1850.	Cultivated area in 1874.	Increase per cent.
Talooka Jalna	92195	212873	130
Five Talukas of Inlur ...	72063	182693	111
Two Talukas of Nalgunda	54404	216334	291
Mydak District	43187	137516	218
Tahashil Sharki	149018	288130	93
Gavarai and Ashti	231435	598810	198
Paithan, Vaizapur, and Gandapur Talookas...	243331	621109	155

The average holding of a rayat in the Tailangan districts is about $12\frac{1}{2}$ acres, and in the Maharashtra districts 30 acres, and the average assessment on these holdings is 41 Rs. for the Tailangan, and 33 Rs. for the Maharashtra, districts. The proportion of revenue to gross produce is estimated to be 5.6 per cent in the Tailangan, and 9.5 per cent in the Maharashtra, districts. Out of the whole area of 107 lacs under cultivation, about 80 per cent of the land is devoted to food crops, and it is estimated that the annual surplus of production exceeds the local consumption by about 60 lacs of tons in good years, which is the available margin for export. Even during the famine year 1876-77, about 25000 tons were exported from the Nizam's dominions to the British territory, but a more remarkable fact is that while the number of famine immigrants from the British territory into the Nizam's Dominions was 47,400 in 1876-77 the number of those who left the Nizam's territory was 15,436.

These facts as summarized above afford the most satisfactory indications of the remarkable prosperity which has blessed the country during the last 25 years, and the question naturally arises what were the agencies set at work which have conduced to this striking success of the administration. Upon the accession of the present Diwan to power the first great reform to

the accomplishment of which he exerted himself with a singleness of purpose which has deserved success, was the abolition of the old farming or Guttelari system of collecting the Revenue. The old Talukdars who took the farm from Government were allowed to deduct two annas in the Rupee for the payment of their subordinates and the defrayal of Civil charges. The rest of the money they paid in cash into the Government Treasury by instalments. They never went themselves to the Districts farmed, but stayed at Hyderabad and appointed Nayabs on fixed pay. These Nayabs appointed Chotta Nayabs, Peshkars and other subordinates of their own choice. With every change of the Talukdar, all these subordinates were changed at one sweep. The powers of the Nayabs were absolute in all matters except where they apprehended superior force. Under the Talukdars and their big and Chota Naibs, were the local Zamindars, Desais, and Deshmukhs to whom the Talukdars sublet the farm under what was called Sarbastdar Kaul, and when the same farm was taken by a Patel, it was called Ijara. The Talukdar, the Sarbastdar and the Ijardar had to pay Nazars to the minister and to the great court favourites to secure a renewal or confirmation of their farms, and protection from the competition of adventurers and rivals who were always ready to outbid them. The State and the minister, being both in want

of funds, had strong motives to favour frequent displacements of the farmers, as they secured Nazarana and Bakshis at each change. No rules were imposed by the State for the regulation of farmers and sub-farmers in their dealings with the Rayats, who were squeezed by the Naibs, Chota Naibs, Sarbastdars, and Havaldars and the Ijardars, not only to make good the Government revenue, but also all manner of illegal cesses levied for their private benefit. The Chota Nayab, the Shikedar, and the Mahasuldar constituted the whole of the establishment such as it was, for the administration of justice, Civil and Criminal, and the State had no charges to incur on their account. The consequence of this want of system was that the Treasury of the State was defrauded, and the revenue-paying classes, the Rayats, were looted by a host of functionaries who had little or no interest in the permanent prosperity of the country. When His Excellency Sir Salar Jung succeeded to power, he abolished this Guttedari or Talooka farming system throughout the country, and appointed salaried officers to hear complaints of the Rayats, and administer justice, and supervise the actions of the Sarbastedars and Ijardars. The abolition of the Guttedari system occupied the first ten years of the Diwan's administration. In 1866, the reform was carried a step further by the establishment of what is called the Zillabandi System, that

is the division of the country into five large divisions and 16 Talukas or districts. Each Taluka was sub-divided into a number of Tahsils; each Tahsil was placed under the charge of a paid Tahshildar, each Taluka under the charge of a Talukdar of 1st, 2nd, or 3rd grade, and each division under a Suder Talukdar. When this reform was carried out, it enabled the Diwan to do away with the Sarbastedars and Ijardars to a great extent, and thus the Rayats came into direct contact with the State as represented by its District officials. The third reform which followed in the foot-steps of this organization was the creation of a separate police force as distinguished from the untrained military levies to which this work had been formerly assigned. At the same time, the central administration organized itself into separate Military, Judicial, Public Works, Medical, Municipal, and Educational departments, represented in the districts by a gradation of well-paid and capable officers, responsible to their respective heads at Hyderabad. The fourth great reform which was carried out shortly after, was the abolition of the Batai or payment-in-kind system, which was the prevailing method of collecting the land-revenue in Tailangan, and the introduction of the survey-settlement on the Ryotwari principle in the Maratha Districts. These settlement-operations are now going on throughout large Districts

of the Nizam's Dominions to the great benefit of the Treasury, the revenue having increased from 100 to 200 per cent without any reported increase of pressure upon the Rayats. These successive steps, guided by a firm and wise hand, at once liberal and just, have changed the whole aspect of the country, and ensured its material prosperity to an extent fully commensurate with the best results of successful administration in the British Districts.

The strength of any administration, whether Indian or European, is, however, never really tested except under the pressure of a great calamity. In times when the seasons are favourable, ordinary prudence can keep the machinery of Government at work in a fairly successful manner, but the weakness of the administration manifests itself most strikingly when the country passes through a succession of bad seasons. The bonds of interest and fear which keep men together under ordinary circumstances, and make them amenable to easy rule, are suddenly torn asunder, when a great calamity like the famine of 1876-78 visits the land with its heavy scourge. If at such a time, the men at the helm lose head or heart, if the District officials prove unfaithful to their trust, if the people feel no confidence in the sagacity and benevolence of their rulers, a panic despair seizes all classes, the fear of law vanishes, the charities of religion are ignored, and the careful work of

decades falls to pieces in a few months. The reformed administration set up at Hyderabad has passed through this trial with a success which proves that it has taken deep root in the soil, and having stood such a test, we may safely expect that it will outlive all present opposition, and never relapse into the old loose methods of public disorder and private speculation.

In this connection, the narrative of the campaign against famine carried on by the Nizam's Government possesses a special and permanent interest. Towards the close of 1876, those districts of the Nizam's territories which border on the famine districts of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies suffered from a deficient rainfall, though not to the same extent as the provinces in British territory. These districts were Birh, Naldurga, Gulbarga, Shorapore, Raichoor, Nagarkarnal, and Nalgunda, covering an area of about 27,000 sq. miles. The first sign of danger which was noticed by the Nizam's Government was the great immigration of famine refugees from British territory in October and November 1876. The Nizam's Government, although it disapproved the distant test which drove so many people from their homes to die on the roadside, yet with a rare large-heartedness refused to prohibit the immigrants from coming into their territory. It was resolved that no distinction was to be made between subjects

and foreign immigrants; these last were to be welcomed and allowed to remain or return as they pleased, and if they applied for waste lands, they were to be allowed to take them up on liberal terms. The State forests were also let free for grazing purposes, and the fees usually levied, as also customs duties, were exempted in the case of these immigrants and their cattle. When the pressure increased at home, the Nizam's Government following the example set in British territory, refused to interfere with the rise of prices by laying down Nirak rates, and left private trade entirely free. In order to find employment for the able-bodied labourers, public works were started in the shape of new roads and new wells in all the affected districts, and with a view to economize funds, the ordinary public works, which were carried on in the more prosperous districts, were suspended. The works suitable for famine relief were first selected, chiefly earth work, in connection with the restoring of old tanks and channels, the digging of wells, and the construction of roads. The Public Works Officers were vested with the control of the works selected, but the duty of making the choice of such works, and of the admission of persons requiring relief, were entrusted to the Revenue Officers. The wage laid down for able-bodied labourers was fixed on the principle that they should have adequate food to maintain

their health. A committee of fourteen official and seven non-official members was appointed at Hyderabad to supervise the administration of famine relief. They met once a week for the disposal of business, when the Secretaries in the Revenue and Public Works departments laid all information before them. Six special commissioners were appointed by this Committee as its agents for the different districts, who were required to proceed to their divisions, and inquire into the condition of the Rayats, and inspect relief works, and suggest remedies. Their reports enabled the Committee to test the correctness of the accounts sent by the District Officers. This central famine committee of officials and non-officials proved of great help to the Nizam's Government. The plan followed in British territory of having a single Famine Commissioner for two entire presidencies broke down, because the task was too great for one man. In British territory, the official element carefully shut out the non-officials from all control of funds which were not raised by private subscription. The great help of intelligent private sympathy and co-operation which the Nizam's Government secured so easily and efficiently was thus entirely wanting in British territory. The Hyderabad committee with its President and Secretary consisted of 9 Mahomedans, 2 Parsees, 4 Europeans, and 8 Hindus, thus representing all classes of the

population. The control over the District Officials, which the committee was able to exercise from the information supplied by the commissioners, created a new sense of responsibility and confidence, and while it checked lavish waste, it also prevented panic. The Hyderabad Government found at an early stage that a pound of grain was not sufficient for an able-bodied man, and as prices rose, they adopted a sliding scale of wages, exceeding the first sanctioned rates of 2, 1½ and 1 anna to every man, woman, and child, sufficiently to allow 1½ pound of food per day for able-bodied men. To meet the wants of those famine-distressed people who were unable to go to the large but distant works, small local works were started such as wells, village roads and drains, to provide relief to the poor people in their own villages. All these arrangements were fairly in hand before the close of 1876, and by the beginning of 1877, the central famine committee had the entire management in working order. Sir Richard Temple, on his visit to Hyderabad having examined into the working of the committee, reported that the arrangements made to meet the distress, and the diagnosis of the coming trouble, were creditable to the prudence and foresight of the Nizam's Government. Sir Richard Meade also wrote officially that the measures adopted by the Nizam's Government were well-adapted to the object in view, and would prove fairly efficacious,

and that the views and measures of the Nizam's Government were based on sound and liberal principles, and were directed with energy and judgment. Up to April 1877, it does not appear that any poor-houses were started in the Nizam's territory. When the want of such houses for the sick and disabled, and for those who were too old and too young, was felt, a special officer was appointed to supervise relief in this form. Nine such relief houses were started accommodating an average daily attendance of 15,173 persons. In the middle of the year, the local stocks having been exhausted, and the grain brought by the Railway coming in too slowly for the wants of the people, the Nizam's Government found it necessary to request the Bombay Government to take steps to have the Railway traffic expedited, and the Bombay Government acceded to this request, and arranged for the daily despatch of 300 tons to Shahabad for the Nizam's Districts. The monsoon rain in 1877, though it was late in coming, fell at last in such quantities that the numbers on famine relief works began to diminish in September, and in November 1877, the Central Committee formally closed all relief works. The highest numbers on the works were found to be 3,34,174 on the 12th of August 1877, and the numbers receiving charitable relief was highest in September, viz, 2,01,766, and in January 1878, the poor houses

were closed, and the famine was officially declared to be over. The grant placed at the disposal of the Central Committee by the Nizam's Government was 10 lacs of Rs. for famine relief works in addition to the ordinary public works. The total sum spent on relief works and the ordinary Public Works for famine relief purposes was about $10\frac{1}{2}$ lacs of Rupees, of which eight and a half lacs were spent by the Committee, and two lacs by the Public Works Department. The charge represented by the poor houses was two and a half lacs nearly, and in addition a sum of about 90,000 Rs. was disbursed in discretionary and special forms of relief by District Officers and others. The amount of remissions and postponed revenue was about $32\frac{1}{2}$ lacs of Rupees. The aggregate loss to Government under all heads on account of famine was thus 46,34,676 Rs. The number of cattle which perished is stated to have been 4,33,000, and the number of persons who died from starvation and distress was 71,658, on a population of 12 and a half lacs. There was no instance of a dacoity or forcible robbery directly traceable to famine distress throughout these two years in the Nizam's territories.

This summary of the way in which the Nizam's Government carried on its famine campaign will show that the whole plan of operation, was well conceived, and energetically carried

out with a success which compares very favourably with the administration of famine in British territory. It must, however, be allowed that the distress was never so great in the Hyderabad territory as in Mysore, Madras or Bombay, where the loss of life has been admittedly much greater. The Hyderabad Government, in following the example set to them by the British authorities, greatly improved upon the model, and avoided all those mistakes which want of sympathy and a too careful regard for economizing the expenditure on famine produced in the British provinces. While the Hyderabad Government treated foreign immigrants and their subjects with equal favour, the Madras Government officially complained of the large number of famine refugees who entered their districts from the Nizam's territories. The distance test was not employed by the Nizam's Government with a view to reduce the numbers on relief works with the rigour shown in British territory. The one pound ration test was also abandoned at an early stage. Remissions were freely allowed, and the sympathies of non-official classes were secured by the formation of a central committee and local boards of charity. The wisdom of the action of the Nizam's Government in all these particulars has been justified by the results, and it may be noted in this place that the report of the Famine Commission appointed by the

Government of India confirms the correctness of the distinctive principles pursued throughout by the Nizam's Government in-as-much as it strongly condemns the distance and subsistence wage tests, as also the hard-hearted policy of collecting the whole revenue from the famine-affected districts.

We have in the foregoing remarks noticed briefly all the leading features of the reforms carried out at Hyderabad during the last 25 years, and the success which has attended the efforts of the Diwan as tested by the over-powering strain of the last great famine. It must not be understood, however, that there are no defects in the system, and that the defects are not of a sort to justify much hostile criticism. As far as we can see, the first great weakness which greatly detracts from the permanent success of the new method of administration at Hyderabad is the fact that the whole machinery seems to be entirely dependent upon the personal and individual influence of the Diwan at the head of affairs. There is, no doubt, an opposition co-regent, who enjoys the support of the Resident, but there is no Council of State, no recognized body of official and non official notabilities consulted on great occasions. By a piece of rare good fortune His Excellency Sir Salar Jang has enjoyed an undisturbed lease of power for nearly 30 years, with the advantage of a long spell of minority. Such good fortune never lasts

so long, and its continuance for another period of 30 years cannot be safely counted upon. When His Highness the present Nizam comes of age, he ought to be in a position to secure at the helm of affairs a minister of equal sagacity and power from among the new generation, if His Excellency the Diwan's reforms are to be maintained and improved upon. Only the education of a responsible State Council and its practical conflicts can train up such men. A hitch may occur, mediocre men may succeed to power, and the State edifice, which has taken years to build, may tumble down in as many months with a Chandulal in power. This contingency ought always to be present before the mind of the members of the Regency. All arrangements now made ought to be as far as possible self-supporting, and the checks devised should be self-acting. This is very difficult to achieve in a State without a recognized constitution, and where the Huzur is all in all, the nobles are courtiers, and the people without voice or power. The great aim of an interim administration must, therefore, be to minimize the sphere of personal Government, and leave as few loopholes as possible for the return-tide of the wave of misrule and disorder.

It is hardly necessary to point out that misrule in Indian States generally assumes the form of an unprincipled disturbance of the system of collecting the land revenue. A permanent

settlement of the land revenue, made once for all, and not liable to periodical interference and enhancement, if established on a firm footing, will remove the chief temptation in the way of Indian rulers to return to the old flesh pots of the Nazarana and short-lived farms. In this view we regarded it as a great misfortune that the Nizam's Government seems to have made up its mind in favour of periodical settlements on the Bombay plan. The reports before us show that at one time His Excellency the Diwan felt some hesitation on this point, and intended to establish a Zamindary system of settlement. We think that the Nizam's Government acted wisely in recognizing the prevailing Ryotwari system as the basis of its settlement, but the real question for far-sighted statesmanship is not represented by the choice between the Ryotwari and Zamindary systems, so much as between the permanent and periodical settlements. Of course a settlement for a term is better than no settlement at all, but a periodical settlement leaves the door open for personal misrule, and this temptation should not be left in the way of absolute power. When the present settlements expire, His Excellency the Diwan may cease to be in power, and the new ruler may easily yield to the counsels of his courtier nobles, and upset all existing arrangements. The loss of revenue implied in a permanent settlement is not

an argument against its adoption any-where, and especially in Indian States, for if a State is properly administered, additional revenues can be easily raised by more legitimate means if they are really needed, which they seldom are except for lavish personal expenditure. It is more difficult even for the most absolute ruler to raise additional money by direct taxation than by screwing up the land revenue, and the temptation to annual land settlements, or enhance the assessments at the revision, proves over-powering. Even at present, we find that talented officers like Mr. Ferdunji Jamsetji and Maulvi Mahdi Ali have so far imbibed the spirit of the Bombay settlement officers as to regard cent per cent enhancements as quite fair, and to justify the levy of six Rupees per acre upon the poor Tailangan soils, and to denounce all popular complaints on this head as unreasonable. It is against this spirit that we protest; for it saps at the root of all possibility of permanent improvement. Under a new ruler, with his temptations, there will be a host of similar advisers eager to fill the Treasury at any cost, and cry down moderate assessments as leading to indolence. As a check, therefore, to this double source of evil and temptation, timely steps should be taken once for all to have the land revenue settled permanently.

Another evil which besets the ways of Indian administrations is the centralization of power

in the same hands. The creation of the different departments at Hyderabad is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, but it is only a rudimentary step. The Tahshildar and the Talukdars are still the chief representatives of the civil power in their districts, and have the entire and sole charge of the Police, of civil and criminal justice, and of revenue administration. These powers should be split up, and there should be distinct officers in charge of distinct duties. Every little functionary should be thus placed beyond the temptation of regarding himself as the monarch of all he surveys. This has proved the bane of all Indian States, and no reform of administration can be permanent which does not provide this natural check of co-ordinate and distinct functionaries. The wiser instinct of the early British conquerors of India fully realized this evil, and though the recently acquired non-regulation provinces are administered on another system, the Indian rulers will do well to avoid the mistake, as it is especially dangerous with the traditions of our past history.

Another point in which a change for the better would be most welcome to our mind refers to the *personnel* of the administration at the head quarters and in the districts. At a time when the British Government is opening its Engineering, Medical, Educational, Account, Judicial, Executive, and even Military services to its Indian subjects,

it strikes us as somewhat strange that the Nizam's Government should fill its Public Works, Medical, Educational, and Account departments with such a large element of European officers. We have no objection to their employment provisionally if they are subjects of the Nizam, or, even if they are strangers, in works which require scientific attainments. But the time has surely come when the resources of Indian talent in and out of Hyderabad should more largely be drawn upon. Officers like Mr. Furlunjee Jamsetjee, Maulvi Mahli Ali, and Mr. Abdulhuk, possess abilities of which any Government may be proud, and it certainly requires an explanation, why when men like these can be had for the asking, so many Europeans should be employed on civil duties at Hyderabad. In this same connection, we may be permitted to express our surprise at the anomalous fact that the Hindu subjects of His Highness the Nizam, forming as they do eighty per cent of the population, should be so poorly represented in its service. We are informed that there is only one Hindu Sadar Taiukdar, and a couple or so are Talukdars throughout the 17 districts. This proportion certainly must be raised. The Hyderabad kingdom has inherited the dominions of the old Bahmani kings, and the Bijapur rulers. The Hindu element in the civil and military service of these historic dynasties was always respectable in

numbers and position, and there is no reason why these noble traditions should now be so outraged in their breach.

The policy of the large resumptions of personal Jahagirs and Inams and Sir lands, which seems to be in favour at Hyderabad, may also be called into question on more grounds than one. We do not here speak of the military assignments and Tankha Talukas, and of districts pledged with the Arab Jamadars for the pay of their soldiers. These assignments were irregular, and as the purposes for which they were originally made have ceased to exist, their resumption may be justified to some extent, but there is no such defence for the resumption of personal Jahagirs and Inams and Varshasan allowances. The holders of these break the uniformly dead level of poverty in a Rayatwari settled district, and their maintenance as a class is necessary for Imperial purposes as they constitute the natural leaders of the rural population, and by their leisure and intelligence are most fitted to help the cause of good rule. The views on this point of British officers can not furnish a safe guide to Indian States. In these States, the absolute power of the chief has to be kept under control by very weak agencies, so as to protect the ruler himself from being tempted into abuse and consequent ruin. There should be, therefore, a large class of people scattered all over the country,

in a position to be comparatively independent of the good wishes of the court. The Jahagirdars and Inamdars are the only existing indigenous agencies fitted for this check, and they should be carefully conserved even at the sacrifice of a small revenue.

We think we have said enough on all these points to suggest with sufficient plainness to the men at the helm of affairs in Hyderabad, the dangerous rocks ahead which, in their guidance of the State vessel, they should carefully avoid. The considerations we have suggested can not be absent from the minds of His Excellency the Diwan and his able advisers. We have, however, thought it to be our duty, in commending so much that is good, to submit our views on those points where in our opinion the policy is mistaken or doubtful. The most distinguishing mark of a successful administration is that its statesmanship and foresight should become a part of the system, and not hang by the thread of an individual life. We cheerfully recognize in His Excellency the Diwan the foremost Indian Statesman in India, and it is our consciousness that such rare talents as his can not be perpetuated that makes us anxious that the noble work he has inaugurated should thrive and flourish, and wax stronger every day, and be cherished as a realized inheritance of wisdom and power for generations to come.

FRESH TAXATION OF NATIVE (INDIAN) STATES IN THE BOMBAY PRESIDENCY.



(*P. S. S. Quarterly Vol. III, 1.*)

AMONGST the political and fiscal measures of Lord Lytton's Government, there are perhaps none which so seriously affect the relations of the British Government with the Princes and Chiefs of India as the arrangements concerning opium and salt recently made or in course of being made with them. Introduced immediately after the assumption of the Imperial title by Her Majesty the Queen, these two measures have had the effect of bringing home to the minds of the Chiefs, in a practical manner, a vivid sense of humiliation and the loss of kingly prerogatives and rights which the ceremonies of the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi were, in a measure, calculated, though faintly, to evoke.

As regards the new opium arrangements, it is the Indian States of Western India that are chiefly affected, and to whom Lord Lytton leaves a legacy which, for entailing a loss of revenue and of political rights, they will cherish in remembrance as long as they have revenue and semblance of political rights to boast of. Taken together, the two measures relating to opium and salt have

tended to bring the subjects of Indian States within the pale of British taxation. These subjects of Indian Chiefs have, for purposes of taxation, been hitherto considered by Government as 'foreign', but in regard to opium and salt they are now placed, by the new arrangements, virtually on a par with British subjects on the pretence of protecting British Imperial revenue derived from the monopolies in the two articles. This is the most serious and important *change* in the fiscal policy of the the Government towards the Indian States which the arrangements mark out. It is a step which knocks the hitherto so-called financial independence of the Indian States on the head, since divested of all pretentious pleas by which it is supported, what is the real meaning of this new departure in the fiscal policy? To those who look upon it in a broad and unbiassed spirit, the true aspect of it is revealed in an instant. The new departure in the fiscal policy in effect declares that the assumption of Imperial power covers the rights of the Government of India to lay the resources of Indian States under fresh contribution to the exhausted Imperial Exchequer; that over and above the tribute payable by the Indian States in virtue of the treaties and engagements entered into with the British Government, they shall be made to submit to such exactions as Government may from time to time think fit to levy; that treaties and

engagements shall no longer bind the Imperial Government in the fiscal policy it considers expedient to pursue but that its fiscal relations with those States shall be regulated by the condition and wants of its exchequer and the exigencies of British Indian Finance. But the evil does not end here. The loss of financial independence is accompanied by a further loss of political rights and prerogatives, the protection of which has been solemnly guaranteed to them by those treaties and engagements. The spell is at last broken. Treaties and engagements are, it seems, not now to be looked upon by the Imperial Government in the light in which they have heretofore been regarded, viz, solemn contracts mutually binding on the two contracting parties. They are to be treated as if they are meant to bring coercion home to Indian States but not necessarily to make the Government of India act up to its own engagements. Their solemnity and binding force on that Government is held to be of far less significance before the pressing exigencies of Imperial finance. In this way the effect of the new departure in the fiscal policy has been to gradually but insidiously undermine the rights of Indian States, to reduce Indian Chiefs to a position of political non-entities—a status little better than that of mere estate agents. This is the out-come of the 'spirited' foreign policy inaugurated by Lord Lytton in India, and the Indian Rulers in

this Presidency have been made so lately to taste its bitter fruits that it may be well to refer to it in greater details before the acts of its Authors,—the departing Viceroy and his henchman—the Finance Minister (Sir John Strachey) became matters of history.

The view here put forth is not drawn from imagination. It is the result of study and observation of actual facts and phenomena. The mouths of the Indian Rulers are gagged. All they can venture out is to put forth a feeble protest against the inequities and injustice of high-handed proceedings. Such protests seldom reach the quarters from which the mandates are issued, and when they do reach there they seldom produce any powerful effect. The result is a feeling of innate dissatisfaction and discontent amongst those Indian Rulers whose good-will and contentment it is expedient for the British Government to secure and which in Royal proclamations it is expressly desired to secure.

Before we proceed to describe in detail what this new departure in the fiscal policy is for which the Indian Rulers have to thank Lord Lytton, and how it has affected their interests financially as well as politically, we would observe that we propose in this paper to discuss the merits of the new policy in respect only of the opium arrangements recently concluded by Government with

the several states in this Presidency, leaving the policy of the salt question for consideration hereafter.

As the new opium arrangements differ with different Indian States, it will be best to begin by stating briefly what they are in the case of each Indian State or group of States in this Presidency.

Taking Baroda as the largest Indian State in this Presidency, we find that, until within the last two years, poppy cultivation in the Baroda Territory was almost unrestricted, no assignable limit having been placed by the Gaikawar Government either in respect of locality or acreage under cultivation, or disposal of juice. The ryots were generally free to cultivate their lands with poppy, to sell the juice to any person they liked, and manufacture it into drug fit for the market. It appears, however, that poppy cultivation was chiefly carried on in the Karri or Northern Division of the Baroda Territory. The bulk of the produce thus grown and prepared was, over and above what was needed for local consumption, allowed to find its way to Bombay or Ahmedabad, where it was weighed and examined at the Government scales, and the usual pass-duty levied on it, before it was permitted to be exported to Bombay. From Bombay it was shipped to China. This was the old arrangement. The new arrangement recently entered into with Government may be described,

in the words of Sir T. Madhava Rao,* the Minister of Baroda, as follows:—

1st.—That the cultivation of poppy in Baroda territories, except in the Karri Division, should be prohibited.

2nd.—That the cultivation in the Karri Division be restricted to licit demand, that is to say, to the demand for local consumption and for export to the British Government scale at Ahmedabad.

3rd.—That the cultivation should be by license.

4th.—That the State should buy all the juice and convert it into opium.

5th.—That the opium for exportation should be in charge of the State till it has paid British pass-duty at Ahmedabad.

As to retail sale of opium for consumption in the Baroda territories, the practice, before the new arrangements, was to farm out the monopoly of the sale in all but the Karri Division, where, owing to the free cultivation of the poppy, no monopoly could obviously be maintained. Under the new arrangements, however, it was decided that the Gaikwar State should establish depots in different parts of the Baroda territories, these depots to supply opium to licensed vendors in different

* Administration Report of the Baroda State for 1877-78 page 129, paras, 502-504

parts of the State, with instructions not to sell opium at a price below that current in the adjoining British district. Again, as British districts intervene between one division of the Baroda territories and another, it has been also arranged that opium for retail sale, imported by the Baroda Government into its different divisions, should be free of duty. Another noticeable feature of the arrangements appears to be that in case of Malwa opium required for internal consumption in the Gaikawar territory it is to be supplied by the British authorities from British Government Depots in quantities of which the total value should not, we believe, exceed five lakhs of rupees during any single year. Since the date of these arrangements, the practice which formerly obtained of importing opium from the Gaikawar territory for local consumption in the Ahmedabad district has been given up, the wants of the district being met by a direct supply of opium from the Government Depot at Bombay.

So far for Baroda. The minor States under the Rewa Kantha and Mahi Kantha agencies, as well as the small State of Palunpore in the north of Ahmedabad, have, under the arrangements made with the Government of India, been permitted to import opium for use in their respective territories *free* of the Imperial pass-duty.

All the Indian States of Kathiawar have for the last sixty years received their supplies of Malwa

opium through Government *free of duty*. The province of Cutch also managed to obtain its own supplies of opium *free of duty*. In fact not a single instance could, so far as we are aware, be shown of Cutch having ever paid duty to the British Government for her opium supplies.

The new policy, however, inaugurated in May 1878 a distinct departure from the practice which obtained heretofore in those States. This departure consists in the Government of India throwing upon Kathiawar and Cutch the onus of obtaining their supplies for home use of opium which has paid full duty, subject, however, to a refund or discount of one-fifth or 20 per cent of the duty in consideration of those States employing an efficient preventive service to check smuggling into their respective territories. This rule, if we mistake not, applies to supplies of opium to Indian States in the central and southern divisions of the Presidency, so that, with one special exemption noticed above, the Indian States in this Presidency are compelled to pay to Government, in addition to the tributes regularly levied from them, in accordance with treaties and engagements, four-fifths of the pass-duty, that is to say *Rs. 500 per every chest of opium consumed within their territories*. This refund or discount of one-fifth or 20 per cent of the pass-duty is the measure of consideration accorded to those States for undertaking, in the

first place, to maintain in efficient order a preventive establishment to guard against smuggling, and preserving British revenue from injury and, secondly, to sell within their territories opium for retail consumption at prices not below those current in the neighbouring British districts.

One of the astounding circumstances connected with this unwarranted departure from the fiscal policy hitherto pursued towards the Indian States remains to be noticed. It is that in announcing the new policy to the States thus brought under the pale of British taxation, they were informed that the policy admitted of no discussion whatever, and that no discussion on the decision of Government would be permitted. The political authorities at the courts of the Chiefs were directed not to receive or entertain any complaints or appeals against it, and furthermore, to allow no discount or refund of 20 per cent to Chiefs who refused to comply with the requirements of the new ruling! The measure was in fact to be forced down the throats of these Chiefs *nolens volens*, with all the rigour of authority of which the political officers were capable. In vain did the Chiefs apply for the necessary official papers bearing on the subject and indicating the grounds on which the resolution involving a sudden inversion of the policy of the Government of India was based; in vain did they implore the authorities to grant their representa-

tions the hearing which the justice of their cause imperatively demanded. Many of the Chiefs in this Presidency applied directly to Sir Richard Temple, the then Governor of Bombay, for personal interview in order to discuss the merits of the question, the decision on which was fraught with such serious consequences to their revenues and their political status. But no. Sir Richard rather than look into the merits of what the Chiefs had complained against, preferred to take up the position of a passive registrar of the decrees of the Government of India. What wonder then, that the prayers of the Chiefs should fall flat upon his ears? Their petitions and memorials met the fate common to documents of that kind on matters to which Government is unwilling to lend its ear. These were dismissed with the usual laconic remarks penned in the shape of Government Resolutions, viz:—‘Government sees no cause to interfere’; ‘Petitioner’s request cannot be complied with’; ‘the request of the Memorialists is incompatible with the policy which is being developed in the public interest’ &c.—texts of which the petitioning Chiefs can make no head or tail. Nothing can be more evasive than these replies. And yet, looking from the petitioner’s point of view, what can be more reasonable, more just, more expedient, more politically honest than the supply of information as to grounds on which their

request cannot be complied with? Can it be said that Government was at all afraid of giving reasons, or that it had no good reasons to give? As to the political officers—the channels through which the grievances of the dissatisfied Chiefs are conveyed,—they may be described, with of course a few notable exceptions, as a race of trimmers. Under the *regime* of Sir Richard Temple, they grew adepts in the art of running with the hare; and stopping with the hound. They knew what would find favour at head quarters and shaped their course accordingly. They perceived what fate awaited those who had had the courage of their opinions and of their convictions. If those of them (few though they were) whose conscience naturally rebelled against the unwarrantable exercise of pressure on the Chiefs, which, in the diplomatic nomenclature, is termed 'advice' but which, in practical affairs, is understood to be little short of 'peremptory orders', suggested a line of policy compatible with justice and fair play, such officers found themselves out of court under a Governor like Sir Richard Temple, himself an arch-trimmer, and a Viceroy who set to the official world in India an example of blind subserviency to his Chief. Such political officers would consider themselves fortunate if they are not summarily snubbed for their advanced or liberal views. Thus the evils of personal Government could go no

further. Such of the officers, civil or military, who could not reconcile their acts with their conscience, whose sense of justice and spirit of independence revolted against the moral servility to which they were subjected, sought solace in long or short furloughs, while not a few, disgusted with the awkward position in which they were placed, preferred retirement from service to selling their conscience.

Under such a rigorous personal government it is scarcely to be wondered at that a deep sense of injustice, disappointment, and discontent should be engendered in the minds of the rulers of Indian States whose resources were being trampled upon and whose political rights were being rudely invaded by means of a repressive measure, for no fault of their own and without being allowed even a chance of hearing. If reason and good sense, they urged, were not on their side, if long previous practice could not be affirmed in favour of the enjoyment of their rights, they could well understand the meaning of the departure from the traditional policy of Government. But when they find they are able to make out as strong a case in their favour as the most unprejudiced mind can conceive, they cannot help finding it most painful, distressing and humiliating to their position as princes and rulers of people to be peremptorily checkmated and called upon to consent to arrangements

though knowing them to be subversive of all good faith and understanding. Here we may take leave to suggest *en passant* that the time has come for seriously considering the question whether, in all disputes involving *vested* political and fiscal rights of Indian States on the one hand, and measures of a *repressive* character on the other, sought to be enforced by the British Government in their relations with the Indian States, the best course which would be at once satisfactory to the States and just to Government, would not be to refer all such questions to an Imperial Court of Appeal, similar in constitution to Her Majesty's Privy Council in England, whose decision in these matter would command the respect and confidence of all Princes and Chiefs that feel aggrieved by reason of repressive acts on the part of British authorities. As it is, the Indian Rulers have to bow and resign themselves to the supreme will and power of the British Government as represented in India by an autocratic Viceroy or a subservient Governor. And they do it with sullen discontent, though they would gladly desire to be released from burdens imposed upon them through pressure provided they do not thereby find themselves or their states exposed to serious consequences arising from the application of more drastic measures which might be adopted by the Government of India, or from the displeasure of Government which their resistance,

however lawful, to the unreasonable demands of Government would be likely to cause.

Now let us consider the merits of the hardship complained of in the new opium arrangements made by the Government of India with the Indian States of this Presidency

No Indian State maintains or can maintain that contraband trade in opium should be encouraged, and that preventive measures, having for their object the protection of the British revenue, should not be taken. Any measures calculated to put down smuggling with a high hand, they would support and support most willingly. But we submit that in view of the cordial assistance given by the Indian States to the stringent efforts energetically put forth by the British Government to put down traffic in illicit opium, in view of these States maintaining a heavy and costly preventive service, and in view of the sacrifices involved in the measures adopted by them to prevent exportation of opium through their ports, they are entitled to a far better consideration at the hands of the British Government than that accorded to them under the new arrangements. How they are so entitled it is our object here to show.

We are free to admit that of all Indian States in the Presidency, Baroda has, upon the whole, much less cause to be dissatisfied with the new arrangements, though the first losses to the State

have been considerable. The Gaikawar retains his right of poppy cultivation and of the manufacture and export of opium, though it is undeniably true that the trade of his merchants and dealers in the drug is gone for ever. The State is, moreover, supplied with *duty-free* opium from Malwa in such quantities as may be needed for internal consumption in the territory. On all main points the new monopoly system introduced into the Baroda territory differs little from that which obtains in British districts where Bengal opium is cultivated, manufactured, and sold. There can be no doubt, however, that the new arrangements are not quite an unmixed good to the Gaikawar. The Minister of Baroda observes:—

‘ I must, however, confess that the new arrangements with regard to the cultivation of opium in the Baroda territory were agreed to by His Highness’s Government with considerable misgiving. We should fain have consented to less drastic measures. As it is, however, we have, in deference to the wishes of the British Government, adopted the scheme indicated above, though it cannot but be distasteful to our ryots and merchants.

The first results of the new arrangements in Baroda have been a marked falling off in the cultivation of poppy. Sir T. Madhava Rao, the Dewan of Baroda, * writing in 1877-78, says:—

* Administration Report for 1877-78.

‘ We do not expect more than 150 Chests from this season’s cultivation, whereas the ordinary out-turn was between 2000 and 3000 chests. I hope better results will be obtained in future years and that this large source of revenue will not suffer owing to the new arrangements. Every necessary effort is made to ensure success in this matter. ’

But the efforts of the Dewan have not, during the past two or three years, been attended with the success anticipated. So far as we are aware, the new system has thus far proved an utter failure, and that this ‘ large source of revenue ’ leaves in the Baroda exchequer a gap of between about three and four lakhs of rupees every year. The Gaikawar Government have organized a new branch of service under the name of ‘ the Opium Department ’ at a heavy cost but its working results so far show that the Department is hardly self-supporting. On the contrary we are not far wrong in saying it is a drag on the other sources of revenue.

In the case of Palhunpore and the minor inland States of Gujarat, comprised under the Rewakanta and Mahikanta Agencies, the right of poppy cultivation is denied to them. They, however, enjoy the advantage of *duty-free* supplies of opium from the Government Depots. These States, therefore, may be looked upon as having, next after Baroda, fared well under the new arrangements.

But it seems to be the misfortune of the Indian States of Kathiawar and the outlying

principality of Cutch as well as of other Indian States in the Presidency of Western India to be not only denied the right of poppy cultivation within the limits of their respective territories, not for export purposes, mind, as in the case of Baroda and the Indian States of Central India but for local consumption, but are, for the first time, burdened with a duty of Rs. 560 or four-fifths of the pass-duty on every chest of opium consumed within their respective territories.

The issues which the new departure in the fiscal policy of the Government of India raises are:—

Firstly.—What has been the policy of the British Government so far in the matter of the Malwa opium monopoly in relation to the Indian States situated on the coast of Western India ?

Secondly.—What is the relative position of the Indian States on the coast of Western India as compared to that of the inland States of Gujarat ?

Thirdly.—What has been the practice hitherto in regard to the supply of opium to Indian States in this Presidency ?

Fourthly.—Is the Government of India entitled to tax certain Indian States in this Presidency for the supply of an article which is not the product of British territory but of other Indian States and on which it levies a

transit duty in the shape of pass-fee, when exported from its place of growth in the Indian States ?

Fifthly.—Is the levy of pass-fee on opium supplied to Indian States just or expedient ?

First, then, as to the past policy of the British Government in respect of opium supplies to Indian States for local consumption. This policy has a history of its own. For our present purposes, however, it is sufficient to refer to its most salient points as briefly as our limits would permit. The East India Company, in opening their trade with India, had been, from the earliest period, intent upon obtaining a complete monopoly of the opium trade with China. This was, however, by no means an easy task. However tempting to the commercial greed of the Company the project was beset with great and serious, if not insuperable, difficulties. On the one hand, the Company had to secure a monopoly of supply and traffic in opium in India—a vast continent in itself,—interspersed with Indian States where opium was grown and whose ports were open to the markets of the world. On the other hand, they had to drive away all foreign competitors in the markets of China by offering their drug to the Chinese at rates at which it would not pay others to sell. To succeed in this two-fold object required all the resources of power, tact, diplomacy, enterprise, and mercantile sagacity

of which, it must be admitted, the servants of the Company were then alone capable. Within its own territories the Company had a monopoly of poppy cultivation and manufacture. Of this monopoly it availed itself to the fullest extent by restricting poppy cultivation in British territory to the districts of Behar, Benares, Patna, and others in the N. W. Provinces and prohibiting, under stringent penal clauses, its cultivation elsewhere. This was, however, not enough, since Malwa opium—the product of Indian States in Central India—competed successfully with Bengal opium in the Chinese markets by reason of its superior flavour. The growth, manufacture, and exportation of this opium could not be stopped. The Company's influence over the Indian States was at that time not so great or powerful. It would not also do to set Malwa opium in antagonism with Bengal opium in the markets of China. The chief care of the Company accordingly was how to make Malwa opium a source of profit, instead of an obstacle, to their scheme of acquiring an exclusive control over the China market. The plan first hit upon was to acquire an exclusive right of purchasing Malwa opium grown in the Indian territory. Accordingly in 1826 agreements were entered into with the Indian States of Indore, Dewas, Ratlam, Jaora, Thota, Sillana, Partab Garh, Amjhera, and Sitamau. These agreements expressly provided for a certain quantity to be reserved for internal consumption.

This system which gave the Company an annual revenue of thirty-one lakhs, had scarcely worked for six months when it was found to be unfair and impolitic and had to be given up for the following reasons:—

1st, That evils of a serious nature were inflicted by the monopoly system upon all who came within the sphere of its operation; 2nd, that it was found impracticable to enforce that part of the original scheme which contemplated a positive reduction of the quantity of poppy cultivated; 3rd, that the measures for controlling the transit and exportation of Malwa opium were vexatious and oppressive to the people, and unpalatable and offensive to their rulers; 4th, that the efficiency of the system was materially impaired by that practice of smuggling, which it had been found impossible to prevent, owing principally to the intervening scattered possessions of Sindhia which could not be included; 5th, that the repeated and desperate efforts made to pass the opium beyond the limits of the restrictions by large armed bands of smugglers, and their open systematic defiance of the local authorities, operated to demoralize and disorganize the country, and to revive the turbulent habits of the Minas, and other uncivilized tribes, in a degree which demanded the most serious consideration; 6th, that the monopoly, if ineffectual, must tend to destroy the internal trade of the

country by depriving it of the most valuable article of commerce; and lastly that a system unavoidably fraught with so many evils could not be really acceptable to the Indian rulers, who had entered into the opium engagements, or be otherwise than extremely hurtful to their feelings and interests.* The monopoly system was accordingly set aside in favour of the pass-duty whereby all opium exported from the central depots in Malwa was subjected to a transit duty or pass-fee levied by the British Government. In 1827 the court of Directors of the East India Company wrote to the Governor-General in Council at Calcutta as under:—

‘One point to which we do not see that you have adverted will present itself for consideration, namely, whether by arrangements with the Governments to which the several ports in the Western Coast belong, a considerable export duty might not be imposed.’

The substitution of pass-duty in place of the monopoly system made it doubly necessary for the British Government to act upon this hint and to enter into arrangements with the Indian States on the coast of Western India with a view to intercept untaxed opium exported from these coast ports to China. How important, in a fiscal point of view, these arrangements with the Indian

* The Chiefs of Central India by G. R. Aberigh Mackay, Vol. I. Introduction page L VIII.

States were to the British Government would appear from the fact that a vast trade in exports of contraband opium was carried on from these ports and that the opium so exported competed with the monopoly drug in the Chinese markets. The most serious danger apprehended at the time by the British Government in the opium trade with China was in respect of those Indian States on the coast which commanded the sea-ports, and where the drug found its way from the interior of Central India and Rajputana by tortuous routes into the ports of Cutch, Sindh, and Kathiawar. Most of these seacoast States were in a position, if so inclined, to prove highly obstructive to the Government. For instance, on the coast of the outlying province of Cutch, the Cutchis were the most dreaded of pirates and adventurers of the time. They had struck terror down the whole coast of Western India as far south as the Malabar coast. Merchants from Rajputana, finding this to be a lucrative trade, had established themselves at the principal Cutch ports. In Mandavi, for instance, we find to this day firms of Gosains and Bairagis—the descendants of those who had settled in Cutch from Jesselmere and other parts of Rajputana. We also find that in those days, bold and enterprising Cutchi sailors carried inland Malwa opium across the ocean to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Ports, whence the drug was carried by other

nations in other bottoms to China. Large quantities of Malwa opium found its way into the foreign settlements of Damaun and Diu from Central India for exportation to India. We know of several Marwari firms at present in Bombay who had agents in those two settlements in those days. It is not surprising that the English merchants and the Government of India of that day should feel dismay at finding that their monopoly opium from Bengal and their duty-paid Malwa opium had to compete with the contraband drug thus brought to the China markets. The Government of India accordingly saw that their best way to deal with Malwa opium was to adopt measures whereby the export of opium through the ports of Cutch, Kattyawar and Sindh and from the Portuguese ports of Daman and Diu might be best prevented. At this period of British history in Western India, however, the Government of India could only exercise a moral pressure on these Indian States. It was, therefore, no small assistance that these Indian States rendered, when, to enable the Government of India to maintain their Bengal opium revenues intact, they sacrificed an important source of their revenue by arranging for the prevention of exports of opium from their ports. Mr. Pritchard himself who negotiated the new opium arrangements, admits the valuable assistance thus rendered by these coast Indian States, though he does not

regard it so valuable as to count for any *substantial* compensation to these States. Though no formal treaties were entered into at the time, it is certain that Kathiawar and Kutch States agreed to prohibit exports of opium, thereby sacrificing a valuable source of income. About 1843 Sind became a British Province and its ports passed under the direct control of the British authorities. The closing of these ports to opium traffic at once enabled the Government to raise their export duty on Malwa opium from Rs.125 to Rs.200 and thence to Rs.300 per chest. As the restriction of exports from the ports on the Western coast became greater and greater, the Government of India was able to advance its scale of pass-duty on Malwa opium. It is noticeable by what gradual steps the duty rose from Rs. 125 at which it stood in 1835 to Rs. 700 per chest in 1878. From 1835 to 1843 it stood at Rs. 125. In 1843-44 it was raised to Rs. 200 and in 1845 to Rs. 300, which rate continued till May 1847, when it was raised to Rs. 400. This lasted till 1859, when it rose to Rs. 500 per chest and to Rs. 600 in October 1868. This rate continued with a few fluctuations till 1877 when it was raised to Rs. 650, and it now stands at Rs. 700 per chest.

Some idea of the vast growth of the opium trade of British India with China during the present century may be formed from the fact that there were exported to China in the year 1800 about 500

chests and in 1825 and in 1850, 12000 and 50000 chests respectively.

Since 1854-55, the progress of the opium trade every five years may be noted from the following figures:—

	Average number of chests exported.	Average total value.
1854-55 to 1858-59 ...	74,239. ...	£ 7,884,611.
1859-60 to 1863-64 ...	68,119. ...	„ 10,608,542.
1864-65 to 1868-69 ...	81,976. ...	„ 10,898,648.
1869-70 to 1873-74 ...	87,840. ...	„ 11,722,111.
1874-75 to 1878-79 ...	92,797. ...	„ 12,175,696.
In 1879-80 ...	105,507 ...	„ 14,323,314.

Thus, in the course of the past thirty years whereas the number of chests exported to China has more than doubled, their value has advanced three times and a half, or from four crores to fourteen crores of rupees. In the list of Indian exports opium takes the first rank. Cotton contested supremacy with opium but only for a time.

It must be admitted that this amazing expansion of the opium trade with China and of opium receipts to the Government of India is due to the energy, enterprise, and diplomatic skill and achievements of the British authorities in India and of British representatives in China. But it would be almost unfair, we think, to deny that the result is in a large measure due to the cordial assistance so cheerfully afforded to the Government of India by

the Indian States on the Western coast of India, during the early period of British Indian trade with China and when it stood in sore need of such assistance, especially, by those very States of Kathiawar and Cutch who are now most unjustifiably, we think, burdened with four-fifths of the export duty on opium.

The question recurs, What is the consideration accorded by the Government of India to those Indian States for having come forward cheerfully and closed their ports at a time when any indifference or connivance on their part would have endangered British revenue. The footing on which the Government then stood was such that it could only have exercised a moral pressure on the coast States and that these States might fairly have exacted very *substantial* recompense indeed from the Government of India as the price of their assistance,—a price which looking to the magnitude of interests at stake the Government of the day would scarcely, we think, have thought fit to refuse to pay.

The transit of opium through the Western parts having been thus barrelled through the voluntary and self-sacrificing action of the Indian States, the next question is, how were the States to provide themselves with opium for their local consumption? It is certain they could not do without the drug. The intervening States through

which opium used to pass having ceased to be outlets of supply, the question of meeting the wants of these States in regard to internal consumption of opium could not have escaped the British Government of the time. It is true that, as a matter of fact, the States on the Western Coast were left to meet their wants as best they could. That is, however, quite beside the question. The real point is, what was the understanding with the British Government in regard to such supplies? To ascertain this point, we have to refer to the correspondence, and the treaties and engagements of the period. From them we find that both at the time the monopoly system was in force, and since its abolition and substitution by the pass-fee system it has been the anxious desire of the British Government to furnish such supplies to Indian States *free of duty*. The Court of Directors invariably insisted on the authorities in India supplying this opium to Indian States as cheaply as possible. In their letter dated 10th September 1829, they lay down this policy in these most unequivocal terms:-

These rulers (of Indian States) will only be induced to draw cordially with you in the measures necessary to secure your monopoly by being led to think that *they rather gain than lose by doing so*. (The Italics are our own.--Editor.) and this persuasion you must endeavour to establish in their minds, while you must suggest to them such

modes of confining the cultivation of the poppy to the best soils &c. and of limiting the total extent of its cultivation as may be least oppressive, and least forcibly strike the ryot as an *arbitrary* and *injurious* interference with their rights and interests. Vide page 25 of Appendix IV on administration of monopolies of Salt and Opium, in connection with the Report on the affairs of the East India Company, 11th October 1831

Again further on, the Court observes 'the internal consumption should of course be provided for by us at a cheap rate.' (Page 29, *ibid.*) In another communication it is stated, 'another great object is to provide for the internal consumption of the countries to the North-West at the most moderate rate.' (Page 30, *ibid.*) In other place we read, 'the Agent states that he had heard of no dissatisfaction being caused by the system, that so long as internal consumption is fully and cheaply provided for, the ryots will be satisfied, and the rulers will remain contented as long as our compensation to them is fair and liberal which it is at present., (Page 32, *ibid.*) But the strongest presumption that duty-free opium alone was meant to be supplied is furnished by the following in a letter from the Court of Directors, dated the 3rd August 1830:— 'We directed the Agent's attention to the necessity of vigilantly enquiring whether, under the name of local consumption,

the article might not be carried through indirect channels for exportation by sea.* This shows clearly that no enquiry, of the kind would be necessary if opium for 'local consumption was taxed in the same way as that for exportation. But such supplies being untaxed, it is natural that the Court should carefully guard against any opium under the name of local consumption finding its way through the ports of the Indian States.'

With the abolition of the monopoly system the necessity for stricter restrictive arrangements with the States on the coast of Western India became evidently doubly apparent, so that it is hard to resist the conclusion that the British Government supplied opium to such States to meet their internal wants free of duty. The policy of the British Government throughout these opium negotiations at the time of the monopoly system and after it was clearly to supply such opium duty-free.

Secondly:—From their geographical situation it would appear that the coast States of Western India were relatively of greater importance to the British Government than the inland Gujarat States, so far as the intercepting and prohibition of untaxed opium was concerned. The inland States could only prevent the passage of

* Page 43 of the Blue Book on opium and salt monopolies.

smuggled opium through their territory, whereas with the coast States rested the higher responsibility of preventing all exports of opium. To the former it was a small loss of revenue in the shape of a transit duty to perform their part of the duty. To the latter there was the additional loss of extensive export duties. Then it must be remembered that a breach of duty on the part of the inland States to prevent the passing of untaxed opium could be very easily detected when contraband opium passed through their territory, while exports from the ports of a coast Indian State would be difficult to discover. These important considerations go far to show the relative importance of the coast States of Kathiawar and Cutch over inland States, even including the important State of Baroda. They accordingly establish the right of the coast States to a duty-free supply of opium for local consumption far more satisfactorily than that of the inland States.

Thirdly:—But any doubts as to the past practice of the coast States of Kathiawar and Cutch receiving their supplies of opium for home use duty-free is set at rest by the abundance of testimony in their favour. In regard to Kathiawar we have the recorded official statements of the Government of Bombay as to how this Province was, till about a year ago, supplied with opium. In the Administration Report of the Bombay Presidency

for 1873-74, the Government of Bombay authoritatively informs us that 'opium is supplied for local consumption in Kathiawar *free of the Imperial Pass Duty of Rs 600 per chest* under the following special arrangements. The Political Agent informs the Commissioner of Customs and Opium of the quantity required during the year. The Malwa Opium Agency is then authorized to purchase this quantity and it is forwarded from Indore by the G. I. P. and B. B. and C. I. Railways to Kathiawar. It is there distributed *at a rate calculated to cover all expenses* and to leave a small margin of profit over and above the interest on purchase money.' In the report of the following year (1874-75) the following further confirmation is authoritatively made (55):—The supply to this Province (Kathiawar) is *free of the pass-fee* of Rs. 600 a chest under special arrangements.' Further on in the Report for 1875-76, we find the same admission repeated for the *third* time in the following words:—'The opium to this province (Kathiawar) is issued free of pass-fee.' Moreover, in the Administration Report next following, we have the same thing repeated:—'The opium is issued to the Province of Kathiawar free of pass-fee charges.' The authoritative admission, however, ends here. The next official report is silent on the subject of pass-duty. The reason is not far to seek. The proposal to levy the pass-fee was during that year pending the consideration

of Government, for in the next Administration Report, namely that for 1878-79, we have the result of the deliberations of Government,—the new departure in the fiscal policy, for we meet with the following statement.—“In 1877-78, the selling price was regulated on the actual cost, exclusive of pass-fee, *plus* conveyance charges &c., whereas for 1878-77 the selling price is the one fixed by Government, and *includes pass-fee.*” Thus, after the lapse of sixty years for which Kathiawar has uninterruptedly been supplied with free opium, the British Government have, by a single stroke of the pen, thought proper to set aside all previous practice without, as will be seen, any thing to justify so extraordinary a proceeding. The case of Cutch also shows a most flagrant breach of faith on the part of the Government of India. At the time the opium arrangements were first made in 1819 with that State, the affairs of Cutch were administered, as at present, by a Council of Regency, with the Political Resident as President of the Council. The British representative at the court of Bhuj was Captain MacMurdo. He represented a dual capacity. He it was who, with the concurrence of the Regency Council, negotiated the opium arrangements. No formal treaty on the subject was entered into but the understanding arrived at between Cutch and the Bombay Government of the day was, if we are not mistaken, that under

an offer on the part of the British Government to supply annually the quantity that may be required for the internal consumption of the Province, the Government of Bombay accepted the offer of the Cutch Durbar to prohibit not only the export of the article from Cutch, but its transit into it. This understanding, coupled with the fact that the Cutch Durbar has paid no duty to the British Government for the opium it has obtained during the last sixty years, affords the strongest presumption that no such duty was ever intended to be levied on opium so obtained.

Fourthly.—What then are the grounds on which the British Government seek to rely for this novel departure in its fiscal policy, setting aside the practice of the past sixty years, and begin to levy an additional burden on those Indian States of this Presidency especially, which have so largely contributed towards its most cherished desire to obtain a monopoly of opium trade in China by the prohibition of exports from their ports? So far as we have been able to ascertain them, the principal reasons urged in support of the new imposition are:—

1. That opium being a necessary article of consumption in Indian States, the British Government is entitled to levy at its discretion an indirect tax like the pass-fee on the quantity required for home use.

2. That the Indian States and their subjects in this Presidency have, during the past sixty years, received the protection of the British Government without being called upon to contribute anything additional to the Imperial Exchequer in consideration of that protection.

With respect to the first of these positions, we beg leave to state that the relations between the British Government and the Indian States are clearly defined by treaties and engagements entered into with them. These treaties lay down definitely what shall be the amount leviable^o from the Indian States in the shape of tributes and contributions. Any levies not justified by the obligations arising out of the treaties but enforced through the sheer superior power and influence of the enforced British Government are clearly *arbitrary*. Now it cannot be denied that in all matters relating to the taxation of their subjects the Indian Rulers are, to all intents and purposes, perfectly independent, the British Government having eschewed all rights of interference in their internal affairs unless any of their measures assume a character of flagrant injustice and produce or are likely to produce results endangering the stability or peace of the States. The financial independence of the Indian States being admitted, one point of

fiscal policy to be considered in the relations of the British Government with the Indian States is as to how far that Government, even in an indirect manner, may tax the subjects of Indian States for the supply of articles which are either necessities or luxuries of life. That the Government in levying, for purposes of revenue, taxes on commodities which are either produced within their own territory or are imported into British territory for internal consumption, or for re-exports to Indian States place the subjects of those Indian States under an indirect contribution is a feature of commercial intercourse of which no Indian State can have cause to complain. Behind all such intercourse there underlies an implied understanding, a tacit assumption that such States are free to supply their wants either (1) by direct importations from the producing countries, or (2) by themselves producing or manufacturing them within their own territory. In case of direct importation from the producing country they of course pay such duties as are levied by that producing country on exportation. But it is scarcely correct to infer therefrom that the producing country has thereby *a right to tax another country*. It is simply a feature of ordinary trade between one country and another which implies nothing like a right of taxation. Take, for instance, the case of the Sultan of Zanzibar who levies a certain duty on elephant teeth exported to Eng-

land. The English merchant in London who buys elephant teeth pays also the export duty in the price at which he buys the teeth. Can it be said therefrom that in levying this duty on elephant-teeth supplied to England, the Sultan *taxes* or *has a right to tax* England, or can the Sultan be said to exercise a discretionary power in such matters, that is to say, tax elephant teeth supplied to England, while permit France or Germany to obtain elephant-teeth from Zanzibar, free of the export duty ?

But the case with opium is still more different. The British Government would in a sense be justified in levying even discretionarily, and the Indian States would be bound to pay, a duty on opium supplied to them under either of the three circumstances:—

(a.) If Malwa opium was a product of British territory.

(b.) If it could not be imported by the Indian States into their territory direct from the opium-producing districts in Indian territory.

(c.) Or, if the States themselves cannot grow poppy and manufacture it into opium.

Under the first of these conditions, it is clear that opium supplied to the Indian States of Western India is not a product of British territory. The duty which the Government of India levies is

simply a transit or pass-duty on an article grown and manufactured in a foreign State. The British Government, in fact, exercises 'a right of way' in respect of all opium passing through their territory and their ports to China. Whether the Government are justified in levying a *transit* duty upon a necessary article of consumption after pressing Indian States to abolish all *transit* duties on goods passing through their territories is a question into which we do not propose to enter here. But such Indian States as are in a position to obtain their supplies without the intervention of British territory from the opium-producing districts or to grow opium for home consumption within their territory, can no more be bound to pay duty for opium than Indian States that may obtain Manchester goods directly from England without the payment of the import duty to the Indian Government. It is true that the intervening Indian territory through which it is possible to obtain such supplies of Malwa opium, such as Palhunpore and other States, have lately been blocked up by the arrangements made by the Government of India with these States not to permit untaxed opium to pass through their territory, and that these arrangements would now *forbid* the coast States of Kattywar and Cutch from obtaining their supplies for internal use directly from Malwa, but it must be remembered that at the date of these

arrangements no such understanding with the intervening States had existed, and that the consuming Indian States were free to obtain untaxed opium directly from Malwa through the intervening States. Moreover, those States that are now asked to receive taxed opium have not bound themselves by treaties or engagements not to cultivate poppy within their territory and to meet the necessary wants of their own subjects. There is, so far as we can see, nothing in their treaties with the British Government to prevent them from exercising their inherent right of poppy cultivation, when they find they are driven to it by the steady refusal of the British Government to supply untaxed opium which they have for the last sixty years been in the habit of receiving from that Government. It may be asked, Why did not the States exercise that right for so many years? To this we reply, why should they do it so long as they obtained the drug free of duty? Surely their having allowed this right of poppy cultivation to be held in abeyance cannot extinguish that right. It was not exercised because there was no occasion for it. Now they find that they have been most unjustly dealt with in this matter of opium supply. They find that whereas the inland States of far minor importance, such as of those Palhunpore, Mahikanta and Rewakanta agencies are totally exempted from the pass-duty for services which are

comparatively far less significant, they have been called upon to pay four-fifths of the duty, thereby laying down for the first time in the history of British relations with Indian States a most invidious distinction, contrary to all principles of fiscal policy. The inland States, as we have shown, have nothing in the shape of treaties or engagements to entitle them to this exemption. On the contrary, if past services and past practice be any claim upon Government for exemption, then the coast States have a strong, clear case for such exemption. For when to the undoubted right they possess of poppy cultivation within their own territory* is added the fact that the British Government intended the internal consumption of opium in Indian States, to be free of duty even before and after the monopoly system was in use, and during the time the pass-system came into operation; that during an uninterrupted period of sixty years, Government actually supplied Kathiawar with *free* opium and that for that equally long time Cutch paid no duty whatever on the supplies it obtained; that the British Government were under far greater obligations to the Indian States on the coast of Western India than they ever were to the inland States, for the check given to contraband trade by maintaining, in strict operation, the restrictive system of prohibiting exports of opium from their ports, even at the

sacrifice of their own revenue, the case becomes irresistibly strong for the Indian States on the coast, and it becomes abundantly clear that in insisting upon the levy of four-fifths of the pass-duty, the Government of India lays itself open to the charge of having set aside the practice of the past sixty years and adopted a most illiberal and short-sighted policy; of a total disregard of the intentions of the late Court of Directors of the East India Company, to say nothing of want of appreciation of past services, of seeking the furtherance of its interests at the sacrifice of justice and sound policy, and of being actuated by the mere sordid desire of replenishing its exhausted Treasury by bringing under the pale of British taxation subjects of Indian States hitherto exempt from it.

The case would appear to be one of flagrant injustice when it is considered that the pass-duty on opium has been of an ever-increasing character. Within the last forty years the duty as shown above has been raised from Rs. 125 to Rs. 700 per chest. In 1838 the opium receipts of the Government of India, amounted to £ 838,000. In 1879 they amounted to £ 7,250,000. There are not wanting persons who advocate the enhancement of the duty by Rs. 100 or Rs. 200 per chest. Now, every increase in the amount of pass-duty means so much additional taxation of those Indian

States which are made to pay four-fifths of the duty. It cannot but be felt as a hardship by them, partly from the injustice of levy and partly from the invidious distinction sought to be maintained by the Government of India in regard to the States exempted, who have not a tittle of claim to the exemption.

It remains for us now to consider the merits of the argument often brought forward by the Government of India itself as well as by a class of writers in the Anglo-Indian Press in this Presidency, since upon it is founded this claim for additional taxation. Now what does this argument amount to? It is urged, that within the last fifty or sixty years the Indian States of Western India and their subjects have derived the greatest benefits from the protection of the British Government, without their contributing any thing additional to the Imperial Exchequer, and that those who are now made to pay the pass-duty on opium are bound to consider the benefits of this protection. Now if the benefits of this protection are thus to be made the pretext for every additional taxation, over and above the regular tribute or contributions which the States, in virtue of treaty obligations, are bound to pay, well may the States enquire if these benefits are all and exclusively on the side of the protected States and none on the side of the protecting British Government? Again is not this protection the

result of the harmonious and clearly defined understanding come to by the British Government with the Indian States? Is it not the result of the *mutual* obligations arising from the spirit as well as the wording of these treaties? Do the Indian States ask of the British Government to afford them any protection over and above that arising out of, or guaranteed by, the treaty obligations? On the contrary is it not often the case, that under the pretext of affording protection the British Government have interfered in the internal affairs of the States, in a manner scarcely warranted? Under the name of 'protection' have not place and patronage been found in Indian States for the favourite servants of the British Government? But setting these considerations apart, is not peace within the territories of Indian States and immunity from foreign troubles a source of benefit to the British Government and the British nation as well as of comfort and happiness to the people themselves? We tell the apologists of the protectionist argument that peace and prosperity in Indian States mean a greater demand for Manchester goods, and Manchester machinery, for Birmingham and Sheffield hardware, &c. In the heat of this protection argument, it is forgotten to what extent the population and Chiefs of Indian States have contributed directly or indirectly to the revenues and trade of British India and to the ultimate

interest of British manufacturer. While, therefore, unhesitatingly acknowledging the benefits of British protection to the Indian States, we maintain that internal peace, order, and prosperity, brought about by means of that protection, have contributed, in no small degree, to the furtherance of the revenues of the Government of India and through it of the interests of the producer and manufacturer of Great Britain.

The last consideration we have to urge on the attention of the Government of India is that whereas the addition to Government revenue represented by the levy of pass-fee on opium supplied to Kathiawar and Cutch is small compared to the prodigious amount of the annual opium receipts of the Government of India, derived from the trade with China, the evident injustice of the new departure in fiscal policy and the invidious distinctions it seeks to create amongst the Chiefs of Western India are results which cannot have been contemplated by the new fiscal policy. Let us see. The opium trade of India with China amounts to somewhere near 14 crores of rupees; the opium receipts of the Government amount to over 7 crores of rupees. Compared to these enormous sums what is, after all, the gain to the Government by the adoption of the new iniquitous policy? The number of chests of opium consumed by Kathiawar in 1878-79 was, according to the

Bombay Administration Report for that year, 650 while that for Cutch was 50 chests, in all 700 chests. On these 700 chests the portion of the pass-duty leviable by the Government at Rs. 560 per chest would amount to Rs. 3,92,000 or, say, about 4 lakhs. We put it to the Government of India whether, for the sake of a paltry sum of four lakhs of Rupees, they consider it wise, politic, and just to belie all past practice, and past services on the part of those very States which, by the aid they gave to the British Government by the maintenance of the restrictive system in thorough good order, they contributed to the progress of that trade with China which has enabled the Government of India to expand it to its present enormous size.

We trust we have laid sufficient materials in regard to the new opium policy of Government to enable the reader to see that it is a wide departure from the fiscal policy hitherto maintained by the British Government, and that while its expediency has been most questionable, its injustice and unfairness are stamped on its very face.

RAJA SIR T. MADHAV RAO K. C. S. I.



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A great name has passed into history. Raja Sir T. Madhav Rao,—“the Turgot of India,” as the late Mr. Fawcett justly styled him,—has departed, leaving on the sands of time foot-prints deeper and more distinct than have been made by any other Indian statesman of his generation. Outshining his compeers in intelligence and culture, and peering above his contemporaries in administrative tact and political sagacity, Sir Madhav Rao was an imposing figure in the arena of Indian politics. Towards the close of his life he suffered in the estimation of some of his countrymen and was attacked by some as an enemy to reform and was set down by others as but a mediocre thinker. Two circumstances combined to produce this erroneous view,—Sir Madhav Rao’s contributions under the *non des plume* of “A Native Thinker,” and his secession from the Madras Standing Committee of the Indian National Congress. The reflections, which Sir Madhav Rao published under the pseudonym mentioned above, were too cautious, not to say commonplace, for the ardent social reformer; nor were they such as

to please the enthusiastic political reformer of the day in any greater degree. To this cause for dissatisfaction was added Sir Madhav Rao's withdrawal from the Congress Committee. Sir Madhav Rao, as is well known, withdrew because he disapproved altogether of the radical election scheme for the reform of the Legislative Councils in India, which was proposed by the Madras Committee and adopted by the National Congress assembled at Bombay in 1889. Sir Madhav Rao stood up for nomination and not for election, at any rate not for that mode of election which was suggested by the Madras Committee and stamped by the Bombay Congress with its approval. The position which he had taken in this respect brought on him attacks from many quarters. Persons, who ought to have known better and thought better, misjudged him as an enemy of the Congress movement,—misjudged the man, who only a couple of years before had acclaimed the Indian National Congress as "the soundest triumph of British administration and a crown of glory to the great British Nation." Later events proved that Sir Madhav Rao was right in protesting against the Madras election scheme. However, let that pass. We do not intend to examine here Sir Madhav Rao's position in reference to latter-day political movements in India. We propose only to take a brief survey of his remarkable career, and to portray, as faithfully as is

possible within the limits of an article, Raja Sir T. Madhav Rao, the administrator, the politician and the statesman.

I

Madhav Rao was born at Cumbakonam in 1828. He was a Mahratta Brahmin by caste and belonged to one of those adventurous families, which in the palmy days of the Mahratta ascendancy in India followed the national flag to the southernmost corner of this Peninsula, settling at Tanjore and making that city the chief outpost of the Mahratta Empire in the south. During the troublous times of the latter part of the last century, when the British Power was making efforts to assert itself in South India, Venkat Rao, the uncle of Sir Madhav Rao, cast in his lot with the British. Recommended by his official superior to the Resident of Travancore, Venkat Rao entered the service of that State. By his remarkable ability he soon rose there to the post of Dewan. Venkat Rao's brother, Ranga Rao, later on won laurels in the Travancore service. Madhav Rao was the youngest of Ranga Rao's sons. With the advantages of these brilliant family traditions, young Madhav had the rare good fortune to combine the benefit of a careful training under the care of that eminent educationist, Mr. E. B. Powell. The school-career of Madhav Rao extended over only half a dozen years, but during that short time he made

remarkable progress, and, according to Mr. Powell, showed such proficiency in Mathematics and Physics as would have secured him an honourable position even in the University of Cambridge. But Mr. Powell paid him a still higher compliment by getting him appointed to act for some time for himself as Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. Madhav Rao was hardly nineteen when he received this substantial recognition of his merits at the hands of his teacher. To this testimony might be added that of a former Resident of Travancore, who said, "he had never met with a native of India who had obtained so thorough a mastery over the English language and so full an appreciation of English views in regard to political economy." Thus equipped, Madhav Rao began life early in 1849 in the Accountant-General's office at Madras. There he remained for a little over two years, when an offer was made to him to take charge of the education of the Princes of Travancore. Madhav Rao left British service and accepted the offer gladly enough; for the prospect of making his *debut* on the stage, where his uncle and father had played so conspicuous a part, could not but be pleasing to him. Well qualified as he was for the part he had undertaken, he acquitted himself most satisfactorily, and was four years later (in April 1853) appointed by the Maharaja, with the hearty concurrence of General Cullen,

the Resident, to a responsible post in the Revenue line under the Dewan. Two years later the Maharaja recognized his services in the following terms. "The unaffected zeal with which you undertook and satisfactorily succeeded in improving my nephews by imparting to them useful and liberal education, the ardour, interest and integrity manifested by you in the capacity of a public servant and the skill with which you have been conducting the affairs immediately under your guidance to my full and entire satisfaction are services too valuable to pass unnoticed or unrewarded." And the Maharaja promptly rewarded Madhav Rao's services by promoting him to the office of Dewan Peshkar or Naib Dewan,—a post next in importance only to that of the Dewan. The work which Madhav Rao did in his new capacity marked him out as a man possessing extraordinary administrative talents. The State of Travancore at this time was hopelessly rotten. Numerous petitions had been sent to the Madras Government by the subjects of the Raja and by Christian Missionaries, complaining of the misrule which prevailed in the State. The police force, it was complained, was a tremendous engine of oppression; prisoners were confined for very long periods without investigation, and many were acquitted after torture and long imprisonment; the regulations of the State were systematically set aside; appeal to the Resident

brought no relief, since the Dewan was the Resident's *protege*; convicted criminals were suffered to be at large; the Ryot's complaints were unheeded; the system of the forced labour was rampant; incalculable evils arose from the pepper, salt and cardamom monopolies; the higher Government officials were corrupt; men of the worst character were in some cases appointed to responsible offices; every appointment had its price; and, as a consequence, official power was abused, bribes extorted, justice perverted, the weak oppressed, the guilty shielded, and royal favourites amassed large private fortunes. When this distressful tale of anarchy and misrule reached the ears of Lord Dalhousie, he almost made up his mind to annex the State; but a second thought suggested milder measures. Through the Local Government he warned the Maharaja that the contingency of annexation was inevitable, unless averted by timely and judicious reforms. It was on such a scene and at such a time that Madhav Rao began his work of administrative reform. The Peshkars at the time we speak of varied in number from two to four and were all stationed at the headquarters. They did little responsible work and spent their time and energy in intriguing against the Dewan. Madhav Rao was disgusted with this state of things and suggested to the Maharaja that each Peshkar should be given

responsible charge of a separate District, or group of Districts, subject, of course, to the general control of the Dewan. The suggestion was adopted and Madhav Rao was appointed to the Southern Division, comprising the very Districts from which complaints to the Madras Government had been most serious and numerous. And before even a dozen months had rolled by, the hand of a skilled administrator was seen at work in these Districts. The Political Officer described Madhav Rao's work in these words: "Within the short space of a year, Madhav Rao has called forth order out of disorder; has distributed justice between man and man, without fear or favour; has expelled dacoits; has raised the revenues; and his minutes and State papers show the liberality, the soundness and the statesmanship of his views and principles. He has received the thanks of his sovereign; he has obtained the voluntary admiring testimony of some of the very Missionaries, who memorialized to the excellence of his administration." "Now, here is a man," remarked Mr. Norton, "raised up, as it were, amid the anarchy and confusion of his country to save it from destruction. Annexation, looming in the not far distant future, would be banished into the shades of night, if such an administration as he has introduced into two of the Districts were given to the whole kingdom by his advancement to the post of Minister. He is indeed a splendid

example of what education may do for the native." The hope, expressed here by Mr. Norton, was soon realised. Dewan Krishna Rao died in 1857; and though Madhav Rao was then only twenty-nine years old and had a senior competitor in the field, the choice of the Maharaja fell on him. It was approved by the Resident and finally confirmed by the Madras Government towards the end of 1858. Thus Madhav Rao surpassed the traditions of his family by reaching the high position of his uncle and father at the early age of thirty.

II

In most cases thirty would certainly be deemed too early an age for so high a trust as that of a Dewan. But Madhav Rao's extraordinary talents and intellectual attainments more than made up for his immaturity of years. The task he had undertaken was one of rare difficulty;—it was that of rehabilitating a rotten State, of reforming and re-modelling an entirely disorganised administration. The picture that has already been presented of the condition of the districts, which Madhav Rao undertook as Dewan Peshkar to administer, did not represent the State of misrule in only an isolated spot; it applied to the whole State of Tarvancore, as it was at the time we are speaking of. With the public treasury nearly emptied; with payments and collections largely in arrears; with the public service made up, from top to bottom, of

an army of voracious place-seekers; with whom corruption was second nature; with speculation, torture, false accusations and compulsory benevolences on behalf of the Sirkar as matters of every day occurrence; with the courts of justice turned into bazars of corruption; with dacoits and marauders scouring the country by hundreds; and with the so-called Police requiring to be protected against instead of affording protection, the Travancore State was in a perilous plight indeed. When Madhav Rao was placed at the helm, he guided the State bark with such wisdom that it avoided the shoals of danger and entered into the haven of prosperity. How Madhav Rao did this we shall presently describe. Fully as he had imbibed the spirit of western life and western thought, and perfectly convinced as was of the benevolent intentions of the British Indian Government towards the subjects of the Feudatory States, Madhav Rao discerned instinctively what was best in the British administrative machinery, and assimilated it gradually and wisely into the State under his control. In his letter to the Governor-General in Council, dated 9th August 1879, in connecton with the transfer of Mysore to Indian rule, Viscount Cranbrook observed that "the absolute security against internal revolt, which is now enjoyed by Indian rulers, entails upon them obligations towards their subjects which they cannot be allowed altoge-

ther to disregard. It is in the gradual and judicious extension in the Indian States of the general principles of Government which are applied in British territory that their rulers will find the surest guarantee of their administrative independence, and the best safeguard against intervention on the part of the paramount power." What Viscount Cranbrook enunciated in 1879, Madhav Rao practically anticipated in 1853. He saw that the country had entered or was entering upon a new era, and that the old ways of thought and life, the old machinery of administration and the old methods of government were unsuited to the changed circumstances and new requirements of Indian States. And the very first thing that he did on assuming the reins of office showed what high ideal of Government he had set before himself. Travancore, like most other Indian States, was given over to superstition and caste-dominance. The Brahmins had dictated different modes of wearing clothes to the different castes, any deviation from which was jealously watched and checked not only by the Brahmins but by the different castes themselves, whose servile obedience to their selfish dictators affords a pitiful illustration of the depths of slavish degradation to which men can sink and in which they can remain not only without a sigh, but with pleasure and with pride. The Shanars or toddy-drawers of Travancore proved an exception

debasement and servility of the non-Brahmin classes to this spiritual tyranny. The women of these Shanars were, by custom and by Brahmin-made religious ordinances, prevented from covering the upper part of their person. When the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 was declared, the Shanars, encouraged by the Protestant Missionaries residing in South Travancore, protested against the practice and openly disregarded the degrading custom to which they had been subjected. The other superior castes pretended to read the great Proclamation (in the same way in which it has been more recently misinterpreted) as rivetting anew the bonds of custom and spiritual tyranny. They thought the Proclamation guaranteed British non-interference in matters religious under any and every circumstance, and thus gave them the right to do what they liked, provided they did it in the name of religion. Things took a serious turn, and turbulent affrays ensued. Madhav Rao was now on his trial as an administrator. His difficulties were increased by the fact that the Resident and the Maharaja did not favour the cause of the Shanars. But Madhav Rao rose superior to caste-prejudices. He saw that the Shanars were right, and that important principles were at stake in the struggle. At the same time, he saw the difficulty of quieting the disturbed state of feelings. There was serious

rioting, and it was a question how to conciliate the disputants. Madhav Rao went to the scene of the disturbance himself. A detachment of the Nair Brigade had preceded him to the spot. Some of the leaders of both parties were arrested, and without having recourse to extreme measures, Madhav Rao succeeded in restoring peace. The Shanars were granted liberty to dress as they chose, and the Maharaja's consent to this change was secured, though not without pressure from the Madras Government. The Resident, for his want of judgment, was asked to resign, and Mr. Francis Maltby, a man of talents and great official experience, succeeded him in the post. About six months after this appointment, the Maharaja died; and his nephew, Prince Rama Varma, was placed on the *gadi* on the 19th of October, 1860. With this young prince-pupil as his master, and a Resident of high character and enlightened views as his supporter, Madhav Rao began the work of administering the State with vigour and with skill. The most striking feature of the first few years of his administration was his great fiscal reforms, for which he was praised by Mr. Fawcett as "the Turgot of India." The finances of the State, as we have already noted, were in a hopeless condition. The chaotic fiscal policy that was pursued told upon the people very heavily. There were oppressive monopolies and vexatious taxes of various

kinds. The most oppressive of these was the pepper monopoly. Deducting the cost of collection, which was nearly one-half of the gross income, this monopoly yielded a net revenue of a little over a lakh and a quarter of rupees. The proposal to do away with this revenue, when the finances were in a very critical state, was by no means an easy thing, and even the boldest statesman might have hesitated before such a prospect. But Madhav Rao was equal to the task. The monopoly system was abolished and an export duty of 15 per cent. *ad valorem* was imposed to cover the loss in revenue. This duty was afterwards lowered to 9 per cent. and ultimately to 5 per cent. The question of abolishing the tobacco monopoly was next taken up. As a source of revenue, it was to the Travancore State what the opium monopoly has been to British India. "The monopoly system," said Madhav Rao in his report for 1863-64, "was open to objection for the double reason that the mode of deriving revenue was in itself opposed to sound fiscal principles, and that the taxation of the commodity was carried too far in reference to the power of the Sirkar to counteract the operations of the smuggler." The evils of the system were patent, and its abolition was necessary; nay, it became imperative when the monopoly of the same commodity in the adjoining British districts was done away with. Sir T. Madhav Rao proceeded

cautiously in the work of this great reform. Instead of the Sirkar purchasing tobacco from contractors on its own account and selling it by retail to its subjects, Madhav Rao first permitted all dealers to import tobacco on their own and not the State account, provided they paid a certain import duty. The scale of duty was first a little high, and in consideration of its pressure, importers were allowed by the Sirkar the privilege of keeping their goods in hand,—a privilege without which the trade could never have prospered. Some time after, the duty was lowered; and a still further reduction was made later on. These light duties encouraged the growth of the import-trade in tobacco to such an extent that, at the end of 1868-69, the import duty on a little over eight thousand khandies of tobacco brought in, a revenue of Rs. 8,36,684; whereas in 1856-57, the last year of the previous Dewan's administration, only about three thousand and a half of khandies were sold on the State account, and the net revenue realized was 8,48,978 rupees. Thus while an enormous amount of smuggling was stopped and its demoralising effects were removed, the tobacco trade was freed from its fetters, and the loss to the State was represented by the paltry sum of a few thousand rupees. This achievement speaks volumes for Madhav Rao's financial genius. Having done away with these monopolies, Madhav Rao turned his

attention to reforming the system of general taxation. Upwards of a hundred minor taxes were abolished, which, while they yielded little to the State, were vexatious to the subjects. The land-tax in one district, which was found to be excessively high, was reduced considerably. This involved a loss of revenue to the extent of about fifteen thousand rupees annually. In the middle of 1863-64, the export and import duties were reduced all round. In the following year, the commercial treaty between the British Government and the Sirkars of Travancore and Cochin was concluded. By this treaty, State duties on goods imported from and through British India or Cochin Sirkar territories were, with a few exceptions, removed. The relief to trade thus given was estimated at nearly a lakh and a quarter of rupees. The duties, levied in British India and Cochin on Travancore goods, were also taken off. Trade was thus freed from the burden of oppressive taxes amounting to many lakhs of rupees, and as a consequence, it progressed rapidly. Whereas in 1861-62, the exports were under three millions and a half of rupees in value, in 1868-69 they rose to no less than seven millions and a quarter, showing an increase of more than cent. per cent.

These great fiscal reforms in the administration of free trade brought in their train one great evil, namely, the enhancement of the price of salt,

which is one of the necessaries of life in India. The salt tax is really the most oppressive of imposts in the whole fiscal system of British India, and it is a pity that the Government of India, in its anxiety to promote the trade, makes light of this burden and imposes it freely even in independent States. Travancore, as a matter of fact, was lightly taxed in this respect before this agreement was made, and it was owing to the interference of the British Indian Government that the people of that State were subjected to the harshness of enhanced salt duties. Malhav Rao certainly was not responsible for the imposition of this tax, though it is but fair to remark that it was his duty, as it was within his power, to protest emphatically against this measure, despite the small chance he had of making himself heard effectively on the point.

After uprooting oppressive monopolies and reforming the fiscal system, Malhav Rao turned his attention to the improvement of the Public Service. The Travancore Public Service, as we have stated above, was under-paid and, as a consequence, thoroughly corrupt. Malhav Rao removed the main cause of corruption by raising the salaries to a respectable standard. The increase in the cost of the Police establishment was more than cent. per cent. and in the establishment charges of the Judicial Service, it was nearly as

great. Next came the organisation of the Public Works and Educational Departments. Under the former head, the expenditure trebled itself in the nine years, 1861-70, and the expenditure on education was doubled during the six years, 1864-70. Besides the legitimate expenditure of the State on its large departments, Madhav Rao had to provide for a very extravagant expenditure of public money (amounting on an average to something like three lakhs and three quarters per annum) especially on the State charities, for which Travancore has always been renowned, for feeding Brahmans gratis all the year round. Notwithstanding these heavy demands on the Treasury, Madhav Rao managed to pay off the whole of the public debt of Travancore amounting to many lakhs of rupees within a few years. During the reign of the previous Maharaja, the State had been brought to the very brink of bankruptcy, and when Lord Dalhousie warned him that if matters were not speedily mended, the British Government would be compelled to resort to annexation as the only remedy, a sum of five lakhs of rupees was borrowed from the Pagoda to meet the exigencies of the moment. This sum, together with the interest which amounted to half as much, was paid off by the end of 1863. This was no small financial achievement. When Madhav Rao assumed the administration, he started with an empty

treasury, a heavy debt, and a voracious system of fiscal policy, which ate into the very vitals of the ryots. In a few years, the debt was liquidated; oppressive monopolies were abolished; numerous minor taxes were removed; and the customs duties were greatly reduced. All this involved a large sacrifice of public revenue. And yet, except in the case of the enhancement of the price of salt, for which Madhav Rao, as we have stated above, was not responsible, not a farthing was added to public taxation. Salaries were largely increased to improve the tone of the Public Service; large sums were devoted to works of public utility, and to the furtherance of education; a frightful waste of public funds for the purposes of mistaken charity, which Madhav Rao was not free to stop, had to be reluctantly sanctioned; and yet, with all this, State finances were so carefully managed that handsome surpluses were left to accumulate each year in the State coffers. In 1866, the Secretary of State for India expressed himself satisfied with the financial results of Madhav Rao's administration and congratulated him on his "enlightened and able administration of the revenue department." Comparisons are generally odious, but still one cannot always avoid them, and we hope it will be thought excusable if a countryman of Sir Madhav Rao remarks with pride that the great Maratha statesman, in the narrow

field in which he was called upon to work, did with ease and skill what has taxed to the utmost the resources and talents of British Indian Statesmanship, which, again, has achieved no better result than barely to make the two ends meet and this with the public debt and public taxation doubled all round.

The success of the financial policy pursued by Sir T. Madhav Rao was not marred by any inattention to the paramount claims of improving the efficiency of the Public Service generally. The re-organisation of the Police Department was taken up by Sir T. Madhav Rao in the early years of his administration. The wants of the Department were: "First, increased pay; secondly, increased strength; and thirdly, more method and discipline " And all these defects were removed in the course of a few years by a steady and watchful attention to details. The administration of justice was placed on a sound basis. The Civil Procedure Code of British India, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law of Limitation and the Registration Act were introduced one after another with such modifications as the conditions of the State demanded. An experienced Judicial officer from the Madras Presidency was nominated to the Post of Chief Justice. Well-qualified men were appointed as Zillah Judges; qualified Vakils were admitted to plead in their courts, and the

number of Munsiffs was doubled, each Taluka being provided with one Civil court. The jurisdiction of these Munsiffs, as also that of the Zilla Judges, was defined and enlarged and placed under check by a careful system of appeals; and lastly the Munsiffs were invested with powers to decide small causes finally. No less noteworthy was the reform in the administration of the land-revenue. The Travancore Sirkar does not claim to be the sole land-lord of public land. More than half of the cultivated land belongs to private owners and to Pagodas. The remaining State lands are farmed to tenants, and were, previous to Madhav Rao's administration, subjected to an arbitrary and a constantly increasing rack-rent. It was not uncommon for one ryot to dispossess another of his land simply by offering to pay more rent to the State. The feeling of insecurity, to which this gave rise, told heavily on agriculture, and greatly reduced the saleable value of the Sirkar lands. Madhav Rao fixed the assessment on these *State* lands, and their holders were recognized as possessing heritable, saleable and otherwise transferable property in their lands. The ryots were assured that they would be allowed to enjoy their lands undisturbed so long as they paid the appointed assessment, which was to continue unaltered till circumstances required a general revision. The land-tax, it may be here noted, was fixed very

moderately, being in most cases below one-fourth of the net produce. Side by side with this wise measure, regulations were made to facilitate the sale and reclamation of waste lands. The cultivation of coffee, which before Madhav Rao's administration was almost unknown, received great encouragement under the new *regime*. In 1869-70, nearly seventeen thousand tubs of coffee, valued at about three lacs and a half of rupees, were exported, and the export duty on this article brought in, something like seventeen thousand rupees. Along with coffee, tea-cultivation also began to flourish. Experiments in cinchona-gardening were also made under Sirkar management. Thus, while a great impetus was afforded to the extended cultivation of lands and the growth of new and remunerative crops, taxation was kept within very moderate bounds, and the security of possession and freedom of transfer were fully guaranteed to all the Ryot-holders of Sirkar lands. As a consequence, the land revenue went on rising year by year. In 1861-62, it brought in, a little over fourteen lakhs and a half of rupees to the State treasury; and in 1869-70, this amount rose to no less than seventeen lakhs of rupees.

Since the *regime* of Venkat Rao, Madhav Rao's uncle, no public works of any importance or magnitude had been undertaken by the Travancore State, excepting one masonry bridge. Madhav Rao

organised a regular Public Works Department in 1860 and he made large grants of State money for pushing on a forward P. W. policy. A trunk road from the Capital to the southern extremity of the State, extending over more than fifty miles, was thoroughly repaired. A net-work of branch roads, extending in all to between a hundred and hundred and fifty miles, was laid in south Travancore. Two ghat-roads, together with a road crossing and connecting these latter, were also constructed at great expense. To these trunk roads, measuring several hundreds of miles, were added many lines of village and town roads. A large scheme for the extension of water communication was also projected. A splendid iron girder bridge was erected in South Travancore and smaller bridges of the same sort were put up by scores over many rivers and streams in the State. A light-house was constructed at Aleppy. A commodious College building was commenced, and numerous public offices were built throughout the State. Altogether Madhav Rao undertook "great and enduring works" during his ministry, and "estimably enhanced the material prosperity of the country."

"If the public works in Travancore owe to Madhav Rao so much," remarks the writer of the article on Sir Madhav Rao in the *Calcutta Review*, "education owes to him still more. There was but one English school worth the name in the

whole of Travancore, and as for vernacular schools there were none. Alive to the great importance of education, as exemplified in his own case, he strove ceaselessly to extend its benefits to Travancore." We have said in a previous part of this article that the State expenditure under this head went on increasing year after year. The old English school was re-organised and a full-grown Arts' College was added to it. As feeders to this central institution, sixteen English schools were opened in the districts. In 1865-66, an annual outlay of twenty thousand rupees was sanctioned for the furtherance of Vernacular education. In addition to this provision for the education of males, three girls' schools were started. All these additions doubled the State expenditure on education in the course of half a dozen years.

This brief review of the leading features of Madhav Rao's administration of Travancore for fourteen years will give an idea of the high ideal aimed at, and the great success achieved by him during this period of his life. In his own words, it was his cherished aim "to provide for every subject, within a couple of hours' journey, the advantages of a doctor, a school-master, a judge, a magistrate, a registering officer and a post-master." Progressing steadily towards this ideal, he "banished annexation into the shades of night." He found Travancore a den of misrule;—he left it "a model

Indian State." The Madras Government went on complimenting Madhav Rao on his administrative success from year to year and the Secretary of State echoed the praise in no faint voice. In 1862, when Madhav Rao visited Madras in company with the Maharaja, he was appointed a Fellow of the Madras University. When he next visited Madras, following the Maharaja, who proceeded thither for his investiture with the Insignia of the "Star of India," he received his own Knighthood. Sir Madhav Rao resigned his office a few months after, and the Maharaja settled on him a pension of a thousand rupees per month. The retired Minister retired to Madras with a reputation already made.

The high ideal that Sir Madhav Rao had placed before him, though not fully attained, was well-nigh reached. The State was set in order, and it was for his successors to perfect the administrative machinery he had so skilfully adjusted. *Cen'est que le premier pas qui coute*, as the French proverb rightly says, and the "first step" taken by Sir T. Madhav Rao in the work of reforming and re-modelling the Travancore State was indeed a giant stride.

After his retirement, Sir Madhav Rao was offered a seat in the Viceregal Legislative Council, but for some reason or other he was compelled to decline the honour. He was only forty-five years at this time and that was hardly the age for him

to retire from public life. He was not, therefore, to remain inactive long. Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar offered him the Dewanship of his State. Sir Madhav Rao accepted the offer and went to his new field of activity in 1873.

At Indore he had not much scope for his administrative talents, hedged round as he was in every department of administration by the all-powerful will of the Maharaja. Yet when he left the State, every department of the State showed the work of his reforming hand. It was during his administration that he brought about the reconciliation of Tukoji Rao Holkar with Jayaji Rao Shindia, and thus put an end to long-standing disagreements. While at Indore, Sir Madhav Rao was invited to go to England to give evidence before the House of Commons Committee on Indian finance, but he was not able to accept the invitation.

III.

Just at this time, a storm was brewing in an Indian State of considerable importance. Under Maharaja Malhar Rao, Baroda was realizing all the horrors of despotism. The cancer of corruption had entered into the vitals of all departments in the State and oppression was rampant. Numerous petitions were sent by the Gaekwar's subjects to the Resident at Baroda, complaining bitterly of misrule. The Hon'ble Mr. Rogers thus described in his minute the state of things at Baroda, as

disclosed by the report of the special Commission of inquiry. "A people arbitrarily taxed at the pleasure of a selfish man, surrounded by courtiers aware of the uncertain tenure of their position and eager to amass riches while they have the opportunity; the right to levy the taxes farmed out to whosoever pays the heaviest bribes (for, the Nazaranas levied can be called by no other name) and who obtains not only fiscal but civil and criminal jurisdiction also, but in return is exposed to be deprived of his purchased right without warning by another paying a heavier bribe; a custom, excused by the Commission on the ground that it is a well-known custom, of levying the revenue, not by any reasonable process of law, but by the bodily torture of the cultivators of the soil; justice almost openly administered by ignorant and corrupt tribunals by means of torture (the flogging case, in which one man died, leaves no doubt of this in my mind), and capable, when called to account, of falsifying records and shameless perversion of the truth; old retainers of the State and relatives and trusted advisers of former rulers cast ruthlessly on the world without the means of gaining their livelihood; petty chiefs roused to desperation by new exactions; debts, due to bankers, to whom the State has been under great obligations, repudiated, and their private property confiscated without a shadow of excuse, they themselves and

the members of their families being kept prisoners without any charge being brought against them and without even the semblance of a trial; tradesmen offering jewels for sale simply swindled out of their fair value; women, the wives and daughters of respectable men, seized in open day in the Capital of the kingdom, ordered into domestic slavery in the Gaekwar's Palace by himself personally, sometimes dishonoured by attendants and fearing to come forward to tell the story of their shame before the world;—such was the tale of woe and horror disclosed by the inquiry which brought on as a consequence its own retribution! Our readers know how it compelled Government to resort to a drastic remedy. When the bold step of deposing Malhar Rao Gaekwar was resolved upon, the next question which had to be considered related to the form of the administration to be set up. Annexation was out of the question as opposed to the most solemn pledges given by Government. Lord Northbrook wisely resolved to conciliate public sentiment by discarding the usual plan of setting up a British officer to rule the State during the young chief's minority, and proceeded to try the noble experiment of entrusting the work to an Indian statesman who enjoyed the confidence of the Government and the good will of the people. Sir T. Madhao Rao was called upon accordingly to undertake the work as being the best and perhaps the only man for the post.

Sir T. Madhav Rao's work at Baroda did not differ in kind from the work he had to do at Travancore twenty years before, but it much differed from the latter in dimensions. Sir Madhav Rao, being the trusted nominee of the British Government, had the disadvantage of going to his work at Baroda with the people around him full of suspicion and fear, for they looked upon him as the representative of an intruding authority. Besides, the tyranny and misrule, which he had to undo at Baroda, was much greater and much more wide-spread than at Travancore, and the difficulty of strengthening the foundations of a good Government were immensely more trying. There were claimants to the Baroda Gadi, who were busy in intrigues, fancying that the stars might favour them some time and that they would have their day of good luck. These had to be quieted and ultimately defeated. Sir Madhav Rao dealt gently with these intriguers. He relieved them of heavy accumulated debts, made liberal provision for their maintenance, and treated them with consideration. Madhav Rao had also to face the difficult problem of depriving a large number of the ex-Maharaja's dependants, who had lavish grants conferred on them during the previous *regime*, of their unmerited allowances without at the same time provoking general discontent. This was done by means of cash

grants and by giving them in addition a moderate subsistence allowance on condition of good behaviour. Next, there were various complicated pecuniary claims pending against some of the leading members of Mulhar Rao's administration. These were got rid of by summary compromises. There were, again, the complaints of Indian banks to be disposed of. Under the old order of things, rich banking firms were entrusted with the management of public funds on behalf of the State. The allowances of several of these had been discontinued by the late Maharaja and their services dispensed with. These prayed for the restoration of their allowances. Some of them also claimed the restoration of their private property which had been confiscated during the past *regime*. The settlement of these complaints was really a difficult affair, but Sir Madhav Rao did the work with consideration and tact. Equally difficult was the work of settling the claims of jewellers, who complained that their jewels, taken away for inspection, had been neither purchased nor returned by the ex-Maharaja, but were needlessly detained. In deciding these applications, Sir Madhav Rao had to make his way through scattered and uncertain data, and, in many instances, where the circumstances would not brook delay, he had to lay down a rough basis of settlement and order payments with reference thereto,

pending a closer scrutiny at leisure. The allowances of some of the near relatives of the late Maharaja had also to be satisfactorily settled or re-adjusted. The claims of some of the members of Maharaja Khanderao's family, who had their allowances stopped by Mulhar Rao and were treated with unjust severity by him, had also to be considered and decided. Besides these complicated claims, there were cases in the nature of private suits, the main complaint in which was that the ex-Gaekwar had misdecided the suit, or that he had unjustly abrogated a decision of his predecessor. The disputes between the Sirdars and their bankers were a further source of vexation. These difficulties were all successfully met by Sir Madhav Rao, and the British officers, who watched events carefully in the early years, were most favourably impressed with the Minister's wonderful tact.

When these difficulties were settled, Sir Madhav Rao undertook the formidable task of forming a well-regulated system of administration. He well knew that it would be unwise to hastily thrust a foreign administration upon the people of the State, and he therefore proceeded slowly but surely. "We have resisted the temptation," he wrote in his first Administration Report, "to enter upon an ambitious course of legislation. It would be premature to make and promulgate regular and rigid laws. A simple

population must be unable to understand and therefore unable to act up to minute, elaborate and intricate provisions. What they desire is substantial justice. What they dislike is a system of technicalities, the object of which is not apparent to their rough intelligence and the action of which they conceive to be only the defeat or the delay of justice." So that the programme of administration which Sir Madhav Rao marked out was mainly intended to maintain public order and tranquillity; to redress the evils of the past mal-administration; to establish a machinery for the proper administration of justice and create a Police commensurate with the extent of the country; to promote education; to provide suitable medical agencies; to reduce taxation and enforce economy in expenditure; and permanently to keep the expenditure fairly below the receipts, so that a surplus may become available as a provision for adverse seasons and available also for further administrative improvements.

The administration of justice under the old rulers occupied a very subordinate place in the list of public duties. Sir Madhav Rao allotted to it the position and importance to which it is entitled according to the ancient Hindu and modern European ideas. The Public Works Department was brought into being for the first time and adequate resources were placed at its disposal. The finances

of the State, which had fallen into utter disorder, were placed on a sound footing, and all existing resources carefully husbanded. Previously revenue farmers made enormous gains and a venal and selfish order of officials favoured them and enriched themselves at the cost of the State and its subjects. Sir Madhav Rao wrote a very telling paragraph on this subject in his first Administration Report. "It was an exchequer", he wrote in the words of Burke, "wherein extortion was the assessor, fraud the cashier, confusion the accountant, concealment the reporter, and oblivion the remembrancer." Sir Madhav Rao faced this most difficult financial problem with confidence, rescued the finances from all the old embarrassments and confusion, introduced honesty and integrity into the administration and assured the solvency of the State as thoroughly as he had done at Travancore. He placed the land revenue system upon a sound basis, substituting the ryot-wari for the old farming system, thus making a clean sweep of all the vexatious and extortionate incidents of the latter system. The following was the triangle within which the lines of his financial policy were laid out: (1) to simplify and purify the taxation of the country and so to fix it that it may last unaltered for a good period of years; (2) to fix scales of expenditure for the several departments of the State so that the limits thus imposed may

continue unchanged also for a considerable term of years; (3) to insure in ordinary cases a fair surplus over expenditure, so that a surplus may accumulate and be available in bad seasons to meet extraordinary demands.

It is hardly necessary here to go further into the details of Sir Madhav Rao's internal administration at Baroda, to tell how he evolved order out of chaos, introduced honesty and efficiency into the administration, improved the finances of the State, relieved the people from vexatious taxes, carried out a vigorous Public Works policy, made provision for the protection and education of the people, afforded them medical relief free of charge, placed the administration of justice on a sound footing and assured continuous progress and prosperity all round. We shall content ourselves with only sketching, in Sir Madhav Rao's own words, the broad outlines of the work he did during the five years he was at Baroda. "It would be false modesty," he wrote in his last Administration Report, "to disguise the fact that during these five years, our work has been exceedingly heavy and trying, for the fact accounts for our visible delays and deficiencies. It is not simply that we have had to carry on ordinary current business. We have had to investigate and decide a multitude of matters inherited by us, which in number and complexity are probably unsurpassed in other

Indian State. We have had to organise the machinery of Government. We have had to carefully consider and carry out vital reforms. We have had to bring under control a vast expenditure in all its dark and intricate ramifications. We have had to rectify our relations with our numerous and diversified neighbours. In this respect, grave and embarrassing aberrations from sound principles had, in course of time and neglect, sprung up, and their correction presented peculiar difficulties. We have had to bring them to the notice of the authorities concerned, to explain, to discuss, to convince and sometimes to respectfully expostulate. The extra strain thus caused has, however, begun now sensibly to diminish, and it is therefore hoped that we shall be increasingly enabled to devote our time and energies to the development of internal improvements. It must be frankly admitted that there is still abundant scope for our exertions in this direction. All we claim to have done is that we have fulfilled the primary obligations of a civilized Government."

Such is the tale of Sir Madhav Rao's administrative work at Baroda. We would have gladly recorded in detail the strength and completeness of the work he did there, but we must resist that temptation as our space is but limited. There was one feature of his administration, however, in regard to which Sir Madhav Rao has been strongly

attacked in some quarters, and it is necessary to dwell upon this subject with more fulness of detail.

It is contended by some critics that Sir Madhav Rao failed to safeguard the interests of the Baroda State, when they clashed with those of the Imperial Government, that he yielded without a protest to the aggressive policy of the British Indian Government, that, in a word, the State was nothing to him if only he could win a smile in high quarters. We think such a charge could only be made by those who are ignorant about the actual facts of the situation. Sir Madhav Rao was not at all responsible for whatever injuries the State might have suffered during his *regime*. Wherever and whenever he thought that the interests of the State were in jeopardy, he protested against outside pressure in the strongest terms possible. Beyond this he was powerless to do anything. He had to yield, as any other politician in his situation would have had to do, when the Supreme Government's ruling was peremptory and inexorable. In most cases, however, his protests resulted in a compromise,—a great achievement, when we remember how difficult it is to get the Government of India to budge an inch from their superior position in their dealings with Indian States. So that what ignorant and irresponsible critics have blamed Sir Madhav Rao for is precisely that which brings him out as a high-class politician.

To exemplify our remarks, let us take the salt question. The British Government, besides prohibiting the manufacture of salt in the Baroda State, claimed the right to work salt-pans within the Gaekwar territory, and demanded the exemption of salt so manufactured from the Baroda duties. Sir Madhav Rao protested that the right to levy these duties belonged exclusively to the State and that the British Government was not justified in demanding exemption. "Apart from the question of right," he added, "it is clear that the opening by the British Government of salt works within the Gaekwar territory is undesirable. Howsoever affairs may have been managed in past years, when neither the ruler nor the subjects had any precise ideas of right and justice, in these days such matters are better understood, and a steady progress (no doubt the result of the close contact with the British Government) has set in towards the definition of the rights of the State and of individuals. Such being the case, the opening of the salt works, which will render necessary the presence of the servants of the British Government within the territory of the State, and transactions of various kinds between them and Gaekwar ryots, may lead to collisions and conflict of jurisdiction. It appears to me that there is every reason to deprecate such a source of probable trouble and unpleasantness." Again, when the question

was raised whether or not the Baroda Government was prepared to extradite to the British local authorities certain persons found in Baroda territories, and accused by those authorities of having taken thereto a quantity of salt in contravention of British fiscal laws, Sir Madhav Rao strongly deprecated this demand of the British Government. "It would," he respectfully submitted, "be a needless and injurious interference with the recognised integrity of Indian States' internal administration to permit British officials and peons to enter Baroda territories anywhere and at any time to seize persons and property, to search goods and packages in transit &c. under fiscal rules of their own and which have no operation in these territories. Such a course would probably lead to great hardship to our subjects in many ways, and to collisions of authorities and to unpleasantness in many respects between both Government, while the policy aimed at is to simplify relations and to render them the most smooth and cordial." Further, when the officers of the Salt Department of the British Government cited two or three instances in which extradition was granted by the previous Administration, and therefore asked Sir Madhav Rao's ministry to do the same, he gave a characteristically emphatic reply, saying that the transaction of business in former times was lax or inexact, that important and necessary considera-

tions were often overlooked, that things were often done to meet the exigencies of the passing moment without looking to the future, and that, therefore, proceedings of the sort in past times could not with justice be construed as precedents and made binding for all the future. But what was the result of all this? "It is plain from reports to be found in this and previous correspondence," wrote the Agent to the Governor-General at Baroda under instructions from the Government of India, "that the existing condition of things makes it very difficult for the Government of India to release the exercise, in this matter, of the rights which, as has been before observed, the British Government has long possessed." Thus there was an end of the matter. But with regard to the aggressive policy cleverly planned by the salt authorities, Sir Madhav Rao was able to secure a compromise. "The Government of India," the Baroda ministry was informed, "is willing to agree that, if Baroda will undertake the effective prevention of illicit manufacture and collection of salt and of contraband traffic in the Baroda territory, that Government will engage not to open salt works in Baroda without due notice, the terms of notice to be a matter for future adjustment." And under the circumstances, what else could Sir Madhav Rao have done than agree to the compromise?

To take another question,—the opium revenue. The British Government desired to conserve the revenue derived from opium by themselves as well as the Barola Government, and proposed on that account to forbid the cultivation of the poppy in the Gaekwar's territory. Sir Madhav Rao protested that the object in view did not require the radical measure of prohibiting the cultivation of the poppy in Barola territories,—a cultivation which had been going on from very old times and which had attained a considerable magnitude. "I feel justified," he wrote, "in most strongly deprecating such a measure, and in leed any measure which might have even a tendency to that consummation. Any measure, having for its aim the immediate or ulterior suppression of the production of opium here, cannot but be as unfair and as unwelcome to this Indian State as to any Indian State of Malwa. Very large vested interests have grown up in process of time, and these cannot, I submit, be summarily swept away." "Any measure" he further represented, "having the effect of sooner or later destroying the production of opium in Barola territories would not only prove ruinous to the agriculture and commercial industries therewith connected, and to the revenues therefrom derived by this State, but would also, I submit, be prejudicial to British interests," for the British Government would thereby be losing an

annual revenue (in pass duty) of about twelve lakhs of rupees. Various other reasons were assigned by Sir Madhav Rao in support of his position. The outcome of his protest was that the State was asked to establish a monopoly of its own in regard to opium. Sir Madhav Rao next made out a strong case against the establishment of a monopoly, but the reply of the Government of India was peremptory and stopped any further discussion. "There is, no doubt, considerable force in the objections stated by Sir Madhav Rao to an absolute State monopoly, but the system has been worked successfully in Bengal for a long series of years, and if rules analogous to those of Bengal are followed, there are fair grounds for believing that it will succeed in Baroda also." Thus the Bengal system of monopoly was forced on the Baroda Government and Sir Madhav Rao was compelled, as any other man in his position would have been, to reluctantly submit. "Though His Highness' Government," he wrote, "still continue of opinion that less drastic measures than the one just mentioned are fairly available and ought to be tried, yet yielding to the pressure of the situation, we accept what, for the sake of brevity, may here be designated the Bengal system." Thus the monopoly system was forced on the State notwithstanding Sir Madhav Rao's energetic opposition to its introduction. One good, however, came out of

his protest. An important concession was made to the Baroda Government. "It should be pointed out to the Agent to the Governor-General," said the resolution of the Bombay Government dated the 6th April 1878, "that in accepting as satisfactory the arrangements now proposed by the Minister, a very material and important concession is made to the Gaekwar's Government. Under the Convention of 1820, the manufacture of opium in the Baroda territory was strictly limited to the quantity required for home consumption, but under the scheme now proposed, permission would be granted to manufacture opium not merely for home use but also for export through British territory." Again we ask what more could Sir Madhav Rao have done in this affair to safeguard the interests of the State?

To take another instance,—the *Giras* question. The Bombay Government were of opinion that the fact of a Mahal Girassia returning to his home in the Gaekwar's village did not forfeit his guarantee. Mahal Girassias were Girassias, who before the agreement of 1825 left their homes in the Gaekwar's villages, where they had *giras* rights and went to reside in the villages of the Mehwasi Zemindars in the Rewa Kanta. The view taken by the Bombay Government with regard to these Girassias, Sir Madhav Rao protested, would change the express provisions of the Kalumbandi of 1825

wherein the guarantee to them was made conditional upon the place of residence. He submitted that what was expressly a conditional guarantee, and had always been so, should not be made absolute. There was a very good reason for giving that conditional guarantee. Certain Girassias, residing originally in Baroda territory proper, had gone over to live in the villages of the Rewa Kanta Zemindars. Under the Kalumbandi of 1825, these Zemindars were responsible for the good behaviour of these emigrant Girassias, but since the Zemindars could not be justly held responsible for the good conduct of the Girassias while the latter had no security for the regular receipt of their dues, it was arranged for the sake of the Zemindars that the rights of Girassias under their control should be guaranteed. But when any one of those Girassias returned to Baroda territory proper, the responsibility of the Zemindar for his good conduct ceased, and there was no longer any reason for the continuance of the guarantee. Thus it was that the guarantee was conditional upon the place of residence of the Girassia; and "the making of a conditional guarantee an absolute one," Sir Malhav Rao protested, "would bring under guarantee many Girassias who are living in the territories under the direct administration of this Sirkar and in whose case there is no reason whatever for any guarantee any more than in the case of the rest

of the large body of Girassias." But what was the outcome of this? The Government of India sided with the Bombay Government and ruled "that the guarantee of a right to *giras or wonta* is not affected by the place of residence of the holder of the guarantee." What have Sir Madhav Rao's critics to say to this?

Again, in regard to the remission of tribute due from different Darbars to the Baroda Sirkar. The Political Agents attached to these Darbars forwarded applications for remission to the Baroda Government whenever there was a diminution in the revenue of the tribute-paying Darbars, whose tribute the British Government had engaged to collect and pay into the Baroda exchequer. Sir Mahadav Rao represented that the mere fact of the decrease in revenue in any given year was not sufficient to establish a claim for remission. He advocated that when a tribute-payer realized a revenue exceeding that standard with reference to which the tribute was originally fixed, he had no right to claim any remission of tribute. The tribute was permanently fixed at the time of Colonel Walker's settlement in 1807 with a view to obviate fluctuation of the amount and consequent disputes,—an arrangement by which the Gaekwar Government had sustained a heavy loss as the revenues of the tribute-paying States had since considerably increased. "Heavy as the

sacrifice has thus been on the part of the State," he represented, "it is entitled to at least the benefit, inadequate though it be to that sacrifice, of not being called upon to entertain claims for remission whenever the tribute-paying States choose to advance them." He further claimed the right of the Baroda State to refuse, if it chose, the remission applied for. The Government of India wrote in reply "that impoverished circumstances, by which term is meant such a falling-off in the revenue from causes not directly attributable to the misconduct of the Tributary as to render payment of the tribute impossible with a due regard to the proper maintenance of the Tributary, is always to be considered a sufficient reason for a remission in the tribute," and that they were empowered and morally obliged to demand remissions from the tribute in every case in which a necessity existed for granting the indulgence. And as for the right claimed by Sir Madhav Rao, the Resident at Baroda was instructed to say "that the question of our right to demand remission should not be entertained at all or any further inquiry instituted, but that we should at once maintain that it has always existed, and from its having been so long in abeyance, it is much to be feared that it will now be necessary to act upon it very extensively." Before this decision was arrived at by the British Government, Sir Madhav Rao had represented forcibly his views to the following effect:—"I may

mention here that Travancore pays to the British Government the very large sum of eight lakhs per annum. A little before I took charge of that administration, the State was on the point of total insolvency. It tried hard to get a remission from the British Government. But the British Government would not listen to the application. On the contrary, the British Government threw out a broad hint that it would take charge of the State and manage its administration, if the finances should continue so bad as to make the payment of the subsidy difficult. Since that, the subsidy has been paid with unerring punctuality." The appeal, however, was made in vain, and Sir T. Madhav Rao had to yield at last.

In all these cases, did not Sir Madhav Rao fight sturdily in the interests of the State? A number of other instances might be cited, which would make it clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that Sir Madhav Rao endeavoured energetically to safe-guard the interests of the State. In the face of this testimony, it is idle to say that he yielded without a protest to the aggressive demands of the British Indian Government. He strongly protested whenever he thought the rights and welfare of the State were in danger. When he found that there was little chance of his views being accepted as a whole, he tried a give-and-take policy and agreed to a compromise. In some cases he succeeded, but

at times it availed nothing, and he had to yield, however unwillingly.

Another point on which Sir Madhav Rao has been roundly found fault with was the fact of his having sent for the sanction and approval of Lord Ripon's Government a draft constitution proposed to be enforced in the Baroda State on the installation of the young Gaekawar to the Baroda Gadi. It was contended that Sir Madhav Rao's constitution would have reduced the Baroda State to a mere Zemindari. We have no space to discuss that constitution here and show the hollowness and unwisdom of this criticism. It is but fair to note the contention of the adverse critics that enough time had not been given for a constitution to grow from within, and that it was premature to enforce a cut and dry system of alien ideas of Government on an ignorant people. Side by side with this, it is equally fair to remark that Sir Madhav Rao's constitution was entirely the same in spirit and nearly the same in detail as the one promulgated in Mysore when those territories were restored to Indian Rule, and we all know how beneficially that constitution has worked there in the best interests of the State.

Sir Madhav Rao retired from Baroda in 1882, soon after the installation of the present Maharaja. He passed his days of retirement at Mylapore, where he died at the age of sixtythree on the 4th of April last.

IV.

We hope we have given a sufficiently clear presentment of Raja Sir T. Madhav Rao, the administrator, the politician and the statesman. Evolving order out of chaos in two, if not three, important Indian States, and skilfully sowing the seeds of an advanced system of Government—this was the work of Raja Sir T. Madhav Rao, the administrator. Destroying silently the elements of disturbance and discontent by laying the malcontents under obligations to the State, and securing for the State under his control the utmost possible good under the utmost possible pressure of the Simla Foreign Office without producing friction, was the work of Raja Sir T. Madhav Rao, the politician. And perceiving beforehand the relations which would come to subsist between the British Government and their Feudatory States, and adjusting accordingly his system of administration so that it may suit the changed circumstances under Indian States had begun or were soon to live, and forestalling through the force of his extraordinary talents, aided by the high education he had received and acquired, such reforms in the States, placed under his charge, as time would sooner or later have made imperative, as also forestalling the relations which increased education in Indian States would bring about between the Maharajas and their subjects, and proposing accor-

dingly a constitution which, while preserving what was good in the old order of things, would so fashion the State introducing it as to make it capable of moving with the movements of the age and rising with the rising aspirations of its subject people,—that was what constituted Raja Sir T. Madhav Rao's title to statesmanship.

Sir Madhav Rao, in our opinion, was a greater man than either Sir Salar Jung or Sir Dinkar Rao. These latter did not possess that familiarity with the English tongue and hence with European thought on politics and political matters, which was Sir Madhav Rao's *forte*. Sir Madhav Rao's acquaintance with literature bearing on Indian States and policy pursued towards them from time to time by the British Indian Government, as also his knowledge of European views on economics and finance, was, it will be clear to those who study his official writings, simply perfect, and that circumstance gave him a great advantage over the two other Indian statesmen of his time. He could appreciate better than they could all that was best in the British administrative system. And having the capacity to appreciate that, he could inaugurate, with less difficulty and more confidence, an era of reform and progress in the States which were entrusted to his care. In a way, Sir Salar Jung laboured under greater difficulties than Sir Madhav Rao. His lot was cast and less

enlightened and less peaceful population; so that he could not effect reforms as smoothly as Sir Madhav Rao succeeded in doing. Yet we are not under-rating the great politician of Hyderabad, when we repeat that he was, on the whole, a smaller man than Sir Madhav Rao,—smaller in intellectual attainments and perhaps in talents. Sir Dinkar Rao represents the old school of Indian politicians, which becomes extinct with him. Sir Madhav Rao was a perfect politician of the new school. Sir Salar Jung plied between the two.

Before closing this sketch, it is pertinent to inquire, what does the life of Sir Madhav Rao teach us? It teaches us beyond any other thing that there is a very serious drawback in the British system of administration. It is a sad reflection on British rule in India that Sir Madhav Rao found his career, not in British India, but in Indian States. If the red line in the map of India had not been here and there interrupted, would young Madhav, serving in the Accountant-General's office at Madras in 1847, have died Raja Sir T. Madhav Rao, the administrator, the politician, and the statesman? Would he not have been one of those many flowers that are, 'born to blush unseen'? And yet, 'Annex Indian States' is the cry of Civilians of the imperialist school. It is a pity that the loaves and fishes of office in the British Government are *monopolized* by *non-natives*. There is no chance for an Indian of

Sir T. Madhav Rao's talents to develop and display his powers and be useful alike to the rulers and the ruled. The life of Sir T. Madhav Rao, we repeat, is a sad commentary on the British Indian Administration.

To educated Indians, Sir Madhav Rao's life is a rich mine of knowledge and experience. Those who study his State papers will not fail to be impressed with the vast store of information and the keen observation of men and things which he brought to bear on his ministerial work. His life will also teach them to be, especially in politics, more practical than theoretic, more accurate than wordy, more moderate than enthusiastic, more cautious than precipitate.

Shall India, we ask in conclusion, not cherish the memory of this great man in a fitting way? In these days of cheap memorials, is it not sad to contemplate that not a word is said about raising a memorial to the great Mahratta Statesman? Or may it be that in the whole array of bronze and marble monuments, his is to remain conspicuous by its absence?