

THE THIRD ENGLISH EMBASSY TO POONA

COMPRISING
MOSTYN'S DIARY
September, 1772—February, 1774

AND
MOSTYN'S LETTERS
February-1774-November



EDITED BY
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and Banaji*

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PREFACE

It is well known that for a hundred and fifty years after the foundation of the East India Company their representatives in India merely confined their activities to trade, and did not concern themselves with the game of building an empire in the East. But after the middle of the 18th century, a severe war broke out in Europe between England and France, now known as the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), which soon affected all the colonies and trading centres which the two nations already possessed in various parts of the globe. In the end Britain came out victorious, having scored brilliant successes both in India and America. The British triumph in India was chiefly due to Clive's masterly strategy on the historic battlefields in the Presidencies of Madras and Bengal.

It should be remembered in this connection that there was then not one common or supreme authority or control over the three British establishments or Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay. The three acted independently of each other, each receiving its separate commands from the Company's Board of Directors in England.

The phenomenal success achieved by the Governments of Bengal and Madras created a sort of jealousy in the Presidency of Bombay. For long, their ambitions were successfully thwarted on the west coast by the powerful Peshwas, whose conquest of Bassein, in 1739, from the Portuguese had greatly damped the ardour of Bombay. When after twenty years the Maratha power sustained a severe reverse at Panipat, the Western Presidency found the coveted chance had come to make aggressive warfare. But this chance proved rather shortlived. The young Peshwa, Madho Rao I, did not take long to assert his claims and to declare to the world that the Maratha power was not to be trifled with.

President Hodges of Bombay and His Council thus wrote on the 18th November, 1767 : "The growing power of the Marathas is a subject much to be lamented and has not failed to attract our attention as well as that of the Presidencies of Madras and Bengal, in order that nothing either in their power nor ours should be omitted to check the same as much as possible." (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 141) For the purposes of checking the Maratha power, Mostyn proved for the British Presidency of Bombay a most willing and tried instrument, as may be gathered from his three visits to Poona on diplomatic missions, which have been so lucidly described in the introduction to this book.

In 1771 Hodges died and was succeeded by the more ambitious Hornby in the Government of Bombay. In the following year the greatest and the most promising Peshwa also died ; and his successor, Narayan Rao, proved so incompetent that in a short time he fell a victim to the hands of assassins. Mostyn was then in Poona, personally witnessing the tragic event and its developments. He kept a full diary of what he saw and heard at Poona during a year or two, and sent frequent reports and letters to his superiors in Bombay, explaining the situation and suggesting moves which would enable them to profit best by the Maratha troubles. The Presidency of Bombay, acting on the advice of Mostyn, sheltered the fugitive murderer, Raghoba, and started a most vexatious war which lasted for seven years.

The history of the three eventful years 1772-1774 long suffered from a lack of authentic materials and Father Gense and Mr. Banaji have rendered a signal service by unearthing from the dusty and crumbling heaps of the Secretariat Records, the rare documents, known as the Diary and the Letters of Mostyn, and presenting them to the public after a deal of labour and attention, which such an undertaking necessarily entails. Why Forrest omitted to include in his voluminous selections such excellent documents is difficult to surmise. He did not either notice their

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existence or realise their importance. But Forrest's neglect proved Father Gense and Mr. Panaji's opportunity.

It may be presumed that the old papers at the Bombay Secretariat, if still persistently searched through, can yet yield some valuable results similar in nature and importance to those which are offered in this volume. Let us hope that the Editors, encouraged by the success of this venture, will continue their labour of love and give its benefit to history.

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G. S. SARDESAL.

Kamshet, 1st June, 1934.

Chinua Achebe

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Kamshet, 1st June, 1934.

Chinmaji Nadasani

INTRODUCTION

THREE ENGLISH EMBASSIES. The English Embassy to Poona in the year 1772 was the third attempt made by the Government of Bombay to win over the Poona Durbar to their side by means of diplomatic negotiations—a first and a second attempt having already been made in 1759 and 1767 respectively.

In the Bombay Government Record Office the files relating to the three embassies are catalogued as follows: *Political Missions, etc.* Poona Embassy, 3 Volumes (Nos. 172 to 174) 1759-1779.

No. 172 contains first the proceedings of Mr. Price in 1759 and those of Mr. Mostyn from 1767 to 1768.

No. 173 contains the proceedings of Mr. Mostyn in his embassy from 1772 to 1773.

No. 174 contains a continuation of the proceedings of Mr. Mostyn up to February 1774 and also a diary of the proceedings of a Committee appointed to Rangunath Rao to Poona (December 1778—January 1779).

No. 172 was published by G. W. Forrest in "*Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, Maratha Series,*" Bombay, Government Press, 1885. The records now published are contained in No. 173 and No. 174, first part.

MOSTYN'S SHARE. Mostyn's name is connected with the three embassies. On the 19th August, 1759, the first embassy was entrusted to W. A. Price, who is informed that "Mr. Thomas Mostyn is appointed to your assistance, and is to be left at Poona if you judge it necessary." (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series, I*, 127) The necessity of this step does not seem to have arisen;

and W. A. Price's Diary ends with the following entry on the 23rd October, 1759; "Set out from Poona at 12, this day, and arrived at Bombay on Friday the 26th at 8 P. M." There is every likelihood that Mostyn returned to Bombay together with Price.

However it may be surmised that Thomas Mostyn had given full satisfaction both to Mr. Price and to the Bombay Authorities; for on the occasion of the second embassy (1767), he was chosen to represent the Bombay interests at the Poona Court. The President of the Bombay Council wrote, "It being judged expedient that a gentleman should proceed to Poona to converse with Madhavrao on several points relative to our Hon'ble Masters' interest, we have thought proper to appoint you [*Thomas Mostyn*] for this service." (*Ibid.*, I, 141.) The Diary of the Proceedings of Thomas Mostyn during his embassy to Poona opens on the 19th November, 1767; and closes the 3rd March, 1768.

There is little doubt that Mostyn once more acquitted himself of his task to the satisfaction of the Bombay Authorities; for on the 29th September, 1772, he is a third time sent to Poona. "The Hon'ble Company having been pleased to direct that you [*Thomas Mostyn*] should reside at the Court of Madah Row to advance their interest and facilitate the accomplishment of their views, we shall now proceed to communicate to you our Hon'ble Masters expectations therefrom." (Mostyn, *Diary* of 1772, Introductory Instructions.) From this it would appear that this third appointment was made by the Home Authorities.

THE FIRST EMBASSY. The first embassy, in 1759, was apparently sent to Poona in accordance with the wishes expressed by the Poona Court. "Nana [*Balaji Baji Rao, 1740—1761*] having frequently desired the President [*of the Bombay Council*] to send a person to Poona with whom he might converse with freedom and confidence regarding our interests, and there being at this critical juncture many important affairs which require being set in a clear and just light, we have judged it necessary to

appoint you [W. A. Price] to proceed thither [to Poona] on this service." The important affairs were: (1) English assistance given to Janjira against the Marathas, (2) the danger of a treaty between the Marathas and the French, (3) the rumour of Maratha assistance to Damaji Gaikwar against Surat, (4) an exchange between Fort Victoria and some other place [Bassein, Salsette, Karanja], (5) the English attitude towards the Sidis and Salabat Jang, (6) the settlement of difficulties that had arisen in Cambay. (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 125-127.)

The practical results of the first embassy were conspicuous by their absence.

(1) W. A. Price asked the Poona Court for orders by which the parganas which used to pay revenue to the Surat Castle, before it fell into the hands of the English, should be enjoined to continue to pay the same revenue to the new masters. Damaji Gaikwar, who was then at Poona, gave the requested order for the parganas under his command; but Balaji Baji Rao only promised to inquire into the matter.

(2) The Maratha Court asked that the English should make an alliance with the Marathas and assist the latter in subduing Janjira. As W. A. Price was not authorised to negotiate on that subject, the embassy was not productive of practical results. (*Ibid.*, I, 125-128) W. A. Price arrived in Poona on Tuesday, the 4th September, 1759; he left Poona on the 26th October, 1759.

THE SECOND EMBASSY. The second embassy originated likewise with the Poona Court. "After sitting a convenient time," writes Mostyn on the 3rd December, 1767, "and the customary compliments over, I took my leave; at the same time requested he would appoint an early day to acquaint me with his motives for desiring a gentleman might come to Poona." (*Ibid.*, I, 146.)

The ambassador's ostensible errand was: (1) to remind the Marathas to make good certain losses for which they were held

responsible, (2) to explain the attitude of the Bombay Government towards Angria's sons. (*Ibid.*, I, 141.) The real reason for sending an embassy was the growing power of the Marathas, "a subject much to be lamented," for in case they joined Haidar Ali and Nizam Ali against the Carnatic, the English and Muhammad Ali would find themselves hopelessly at a disadvantage. Hence such an alliance had to be prevented at any cost. In exchange for Maratha assistance the English were ready to relinquish Bednur and Sunda for Salsette and Bassein, in order to prevent an alliance of the Nizam, Haidar Ali and the Marathas. (*Ibid.*, I, 142.)

Furthermore without compromising himself the ambassador should encourage any advances which might be made by Raghoba, who was not on good terms with Madho Rao. The ambassador was likewise to inform the Bombay Government of any other family difference of consequence sufficient to affect their military operations. (*Ibid.*, I, 142.)

In connection with these instructions Grant Duff writes ; " Mr. Mostyn was sent to Poona by the Bombay Government for the purpose of ascertaining the Peishwa's views, and of using every endeavour, by fomenting the domestic dissensions or otherwise, to prevent the Mahrattas from joining Hyder and Nizam Ally. An alliance was not to be resorted to, if it could be avoided ; but if absolutely necessary, the conquest of Bednore and Soonda, regarding which the Mahrattas always regretted having been anticipated by Hyder, was to be held out as an inducement for engaging them in the English interests." (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 658.)

The following is a summary of the political significance and the practical results of the second embassy at Poona.

(1) Mostyn was to avoid entering into an alliance with the Marathas, and at the same time he had to prevent that Haidar Ali and Nizam Ali should join forces with the Marathas against Muhammad Ali. This double end was attained, but not through

Mostyn's skill, but as the result of a series of events altogether beyond Mostyn's control.

To begin with, the Marathas bluntly told Mostyn that there were three ways for them to pursue; and that which appeared to them the most advantageous they would embrace: (a) to join Nizam and Haidar Ali against Muhammad Ali and the English; (b) to join Muhammad Ali and the English against Nizam Ali; (c) to persuade Nizam Ali to remain neuter and to join the English and Muhammad Ali against Haidar Ali.

Mostyn could only warn them not to enter into an alliance with Haidar Ali and Nizam Ali against the English.

Then the Madras Government sent an agent to Poona with instructions to inform Madho Rao that the English in Madras were ready to attack Haidar Ali, provided Madho Rao would conquer Bednur with the assistance of the English in Bombay.

As time went on, it became manifest that Madho Rao was not anxious to enter into an alliance with Haidar Ali; first because Haidar Ali was untrustworthy, secondly because the Peshwa's finances were at a low ebb, thirdly because Madho Rao feared lest Raghoba should during his absence create some disturbance.

Meanwhile the combined forces of Haidar Ali and Nizam Ali were defeated; Nizam Ali proved an unfaithful ally, and Haidar Ali suffered additional reverses.

There was therefore no longer any fear that Madho Rao would join Haidar Ali and Nizam Ali against the English; nor was there now any further need for the English to enter into an alliance with the Marathas.

Accordingly Mostyn informed the Marathas that the English were preparing an expedition against Haidar Ali, and meant to deal with him singlehanded.

(2) Mostyn succeeded in obtaining from the Durbar six orders for making good losses or redressing grievances which either the English or those under their protection had suffered at the hands of the Marathas.

(3) Incidentally attempts were made to discover what advances Raghoba was ready to make to the English. But Raghoba did not mention any definite proposals to which he was willing to agree. He wanted to be assured of assistance, before he would either draw up any proposals or sign to such as the English might think proper to tender him. (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 141-176.)

Mostyn left Bombay on the 19th November, 1767, and Poona on the 27th February, 1768.

THE THIRD EMBASSY. The Embassy of 1772 originated with the Home Authorities. Some time after February, 1768, Mostyn went to England, but he was back in India in 1772. "He arrived from England in 1772 with Instructions from the Court of Directors that he should be sent immediately to negotiate with Madhoo Rao, the Peshwa, for certain advantages for the settlement in the Malabar and also for the cession of the island and peninsula of Salsette and Bassein, which added so much to the security and value of Bombay." (Mill, *History of British India*, III. 42.)

On his going to Poona the Bombay Government gave him the following instructions; (1) to learn the designs of the Marathas, which might affect the Hon'ble Company's possession in Bengal or the Carnatic, (2) to obtain the cession of Bassein, Salsette and Karanja, (3) to avoid giving offence to Madho Rao, (4) to be guided by the principle that the Hon'ble Company wishes to remain on friendly terms with the Marathas, (5) to settle the question of the Maratha share in the Surat revenue. (6) He was further authorised to spend the necessary money to become acquainted with Madho Rao's temper and designs as well as with the intrigues of the ministers, whom he must conciliate, and with whom he must be on terms of good friendship. (Mostyn, *Diary*, Introductory Instructions.)

Mostyn left Bombay for Poona on the 29th September, 1772,

when the *Diary* opens with a detailed account of the various events that occurred from that day onwards till the 13th February, 1774, thus covering a period of 16 months. These months were fraught with momentous political changes, as may be gathered from the following summary of the chief events contained in Mostyn's *Diary*:

(1) The British attempt to secure Bassein, Salsette and Karanja.

(2) The capture of Broach.

(3) The death of Madho Rao.

(4) The shortlived Maratha supremacy at Delhi.

(5) The Maratha defeat in Rohilkhand.

(6) The contest for the government between Mudaji and Sabaji Bhonsle.

(7) The murder of Narayan Rao.

(8) The first months of Raghoba's Peshwaship.

(9) The beginnings of the Barbhai plot.

Furthermore important events are as a rule associated with the names of prominent men; and this is true in the present case; for the *Diary* gives us an insight into the character of many distinguished individuals, notably: Nana Farnavis, Sakaram Bapu, Raghoba, Fateh Singh, Govind Rao, Sabaji Bhonsle, Mudaji Bhonsle, Ghazi-ud-din IV, Shuja-ud-daula and several others.

Hence the importance of the events recorded and the prominence of the men connected with these events are in themselves a justification for the publication of the *Diary*, which may rightly be looked upon as a source of valuable and reliable information. Even the narrative of such events as are known from other sources gains a new significance from the context in which they are set, the *Diary* being in fact an interesting illustration of history in the making by one who never thought that his work would afterwards become public property. In this connection Mostyn's letters about the actual perpetration of the murder of Narayan Rao are of special interest; for to the best of our knowledge

no letters on this subject have so far been traced in the vernacular records of the period in the Poona Alienation Office. Finally the publication of the *Diary* completes the account of the history of the English Embassies to Poona, the first and the second embassy having been published in 1885 by G. W. Forrest in his *Selections, Maratha Series*.

As regards the publication of the *Diary*, it has been thought best to reproduce faithfully the manuscript with its strange use of capital letters and its characteristic spelling mistakes—for the latter, however, Mostyn is not to be held responsible, since the Manuscript is the work of a copyist. But it has seemed advisable freely to change the punctuation of the manuscript; for in the *Diary* commas are scattered in such a bewildering and lavish profusion as seriously to interfere with a facile understanding of the written word. But for these punctuation changes, the printed *Diary* is in all respects an exact replica of the written document.

MOSTYN'S LETTERS. The *Diary* ends abruptly on the 13th February 1774; but in the Minutes of a Government Consultation held at Bombay on the 12th December, 1774, it is recorded: "Mr. Mostyn, having returned from Poona the 9th instant, now takes his place on his own standing" (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 179). Two questions thereupon naturally present themselves: (1) Why does the *Diary* end ten months before Mostyn's return to Bombay? (2) Did Mostyn during these ten months keep the Bombay Government informed of what went on in Poona?

To the first question no satisfactory answer can as yet be given. To the second question the answer is in the affirmative. Owing to the admirable order kept in the Bombay Record Office, the search for those letters was an easy task; they are all contained in the 1774, *Secret and Political Department Diary (Duplicate)* 15 A; and as they form an integral part of the history of the Third English Embassy, they are here published together with the *Diary*.

As regards their contents, Mostyn's *Letters* deal with the contest for supremacy between Raghoba and the Ministers, which from a private family quarrel assumed gradually proportions of national and even international importance. They also give us an insight into the doings of Maratha chieftains and rulers and of foreign potentates, of Fateh Singh and Govind Rao Gaikwar in Baroda, Mudaji and Sabaji Bhonsle in Berar, the Nizam and the Bombay Government; all of whom, either as friends or foes, took an active part in the quarrel, or played the role of passive spectators ready to pounce upon the traditional bone for which dogs are fighting.

Mostyn's *Letters* are therefore as valuable an addition to the history of Bombay Presidency as his *Diary*, of which they are the natural sequence.

Incidentally Mostyn's *Letters* inform us how the Third English Embassy came to an end. When in December, 1774, the Bombay Government determined to capture Thana, they realised that it would fare ill with their envoy at Poona, if he should stay at the Maratha Court. Accordingly they called him back in the first days of December, 1774. He arrived in Bombay the 9th December, 1774, and 6 days later Thana was invested by the English forces to fall on the 28th December, 1774, after a siege of thirteen days.

Bombay, St. Xavier's College, June, 1934.

N.B.—The marginal headings and any other words printed in italics in the body of the *Diary* or of the *Letters* do not form a part of the Manuscript kept in the Bombay Record Office.

The Editors gratefully acknowledge their indebtedness to Mr. G. S. Sardesai, who was ever ready to advise and to assist them with the expert knowledge of many years of study.

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
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Appendix

No. 1. MADHO RAO.

But for his untimely death, brought about by the constant inroads of a relentless disease, Madho Rao would have gained for himself the title of the Greatest Peshwa.

By way of reference a genealogical table of the Peshwa family is here added.



No. 2. SALSETTE, BASSEIN, KARANJA.

L—Salsette island was occupied by the Portuguese early in the 16th century. In 1662, the English claimed it as a part of the marriage portion of the queen of Charles II; but the Portuguese contested the transfer and held it till 1739, when it was taken

from them by the Marathas. It was captured by the English in 1774, and formally annexed in 1782 by the Treaty of Salbai. (*Imp. Gaz. of India, XXI, 411*)

II.—In 1543 Bassein was ceded to the Portuguese by Bahadur Shah, King of Gujarat. It remained in Portuguese hands till 1739, when the Maratha General, Chimnaji Appa, captured it. In 1780 it was captured by General Goddard; two years later it was restored to the Marathas by the Treaty of Salbai; in 1818 it was resumed by the English. (*Imp. Gaz. of India, VII, 123*) Already in 1661, prior to the marriage contract with Portugal, Charles II instructed the English ambassador, going to Lisbon, to press that Bassein should be added to the territory to be ceded by the Treaty of the 23rd January, 1661, but the demand was not granted. (Sheppard, *Bombay*, 8, 12) A century later the English tried in vain to obtain Bassein from the Marathas, but in 1761 the Peshwa, Madho Rao, being hard pressed by the Nizam, began to make overtures to the East India Company's Officers with a view to getting the aid of European gunners and artillery. He at first offered to give up a valuable tract of land in Jambusar in the district of Broach. But the English would accept no territory but the island of Salsette, the town of Bassein and the small islands in the harbour of Bombay. These the Marathas declined to give up, so negotiations were broken off. (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. J, I, 399*)

III.—Karanja is a peninsula about 8 miles long and 4 miles broad, it formed part of the Bassein province under the Portuguese from 1530 to 1737. Then the Marathas occupied it till 1774, when the English took possession. (*Imp. Gaz. of India, XV, 22*)

N.B.—“The Court of Directors and the Bombay Government agreed that, without the possession of some of the neighbouring lands, Bombay could not be held. The most suitable lands were Salsette and Bassein: Salsette for its rice and vegetables, Bassein for its timber. No chance of gaining these lands was to be allowed to pass. With this object a British envoy was sent to

Poona in 1772." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres.* XIII, II, 500) Again, "Salsette was wanted because its produce almost supplied Bombay, and with Karanja and Bassein quite sufficed for the wants of the English. Bassein was wanted for the provision of timber for the Company's dockyard." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres.* I, II, 100)

No. 3. RAJPURI AND THE SIDIS.

The island fortress of Rajpuri, also known as Danda-Rajpuri, is situated about 27 miles south of Bombay. According to Predy's account (1628): "By nature it is very strong, wherein are at least 400 men, 6 great pieces of ordinance and from 16 to 18 falconet and ravenet, envyroned with a wall of 18 or 10 foote towards the land, and some 14 foote towards the sea, round about with battlements and half moones; and upon the top and middle of it a great house, and by it a block-house." (Foster, *English Fact.* 1624-1629, 252-253)

The Habshis or Sidis were originally natives of Abyssinia, who first came to India in the course of the 15th century for the purpose of trading. They were, however, destined to achieve greater fame in the field of action than in the line of trade. At first many of them enlisted in the military service of the Bahmani Rulers and of the Ahmadnagar Sultans. Later on they became Captains and Admirals of the Moghul fleet, but they never ceased to be fighting-men; and their skill in military affairs is evidenced by the fame of their leaders: men like Malik Ambar, Malik Yakub and Malik Kafur, names well-known in Indian History. They prospered in a wondrous manner, and wielded a power and influence much greater than warranted by their numbers. (Banaji, *Bombay and the Sidis*, 3)

No. 4. FATEH SINGH.

He was the third son of Damaji Gaikwar, who had three wives and six sons:

Govindrav (*second son from 1st wife*)

Sayajirav (*eldest son from 2nd wife*)

Fateh Singh (*third son probably from 2nd, perhaps from 3rd wife*)

Pilaji, Manoji, Murarirav (*sons from 3rd wife*)

In 1768, when Damaji Gaikwar died, Govindrav was acknowledged as Sena Khas Khel by the Peshwa. (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. I, I, 400*) In 1771 Fateh Singh, who sided with Sayajirav, obtained a revival of this decision : Sayajirav was made Sena Khas Khel, and Fateh Singh became Mutalik or chief minister. (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 200 ; *Gaz. Bom. Pres. I, I, 400*)

In 1773 Raghoba reinstated Govindrav as Sena Khas Khel. Thereupon Fateh Singh joined hands with Nana Farnavis. He was, however, defeated by Govindrav in February, 1774, (*Mostyn, Letters*, 24, 2, 1774) was in 1775 besieged in Baroda by Govindrav and Raghoba, (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. I, I, 401*) and shared in the defeat of Aras in May, 1775. (*Ibid.* 401)

Afterwards he repaired to Poona and was invested in 1778 with the title of Sena Khas Khel, and retained this title to his death in 1789. He was always ready to change sides ; and we are told that Major Forbes, left in charge of the Gujarat army, "posted a body of troops at Ahmedabad for the protection of Fateh Singh." (*Ibid.* 409)

No. 5. THE SURAT REVENUE.

The Maratha share in the Surat revenue dates from the contested succession at Surat—1748-1751—(*Gaz. Bom. Pres. II, 136, note 3*) But in 1747 the Marathas were already promised this share on the occasion of the succession of Safdar Khan as governor of the city and of Wakhar Khan, son of Safdar Khan, as commandant of the castle. (*Ibid.* 122) But Safdar Khan and Wakhar Khan were expelled in 1748 by Mia Achan, the son-in-

law of the previous governor. (*Ibid.* 122) In 1751 Wakhar Khan returned to Surat, and by promising to grant him half of the city revenues he won over Damaji Gaikwar to his side. (*Ibid.* 123) Thereupon Mia Achan was driven from the Government of the city and soon afterwards from the command of the castle. In the same year 1751 Safdar Khan resumed charge of the city, and was able to induce Damaji Gaikwar to accept of the one-third share of the revenue instead of the one-half which Wakhar Khan had agreed to give. (*Ibid.* 124) About the same time the Peshwa obtained from the Gaikwar the one-half of his interest in the revenues of Surat. (*Ibid.* 124) This would mean one-sixth of the city revenue. In 1759 the Maratha share of the city revenue amounted to £ 12,750 (Rs. 1,27,500), of which Rs. 85,500 were contributed by the customs, and Rs. 42,000 by town duties. (*Ibid.* 136)

NO. 6. THE PANVEL POONA ROAD.

I. From Bombay to Poona *via* Panwell.

Embarking at low water the voyage to Panwell is accomplished in from 3½ to 6 hours. The passage to Bombay is very uncertain, often occupying 8 or 10 hours in the fair, and 14 or 15 hours in the rainy season,

NORTHERN KONKAN.

At the entrance of the Gaudeh [*Gamde or Gavande*] or Panwell river, Bellapoor is on the North, and Woolwa, a dak station, on the south bank.

Cross Gaudeh River flying bridge. (1M. 5F.)

A branch of the Gaudeh over which is a Shakespearian bridge, 170 feet in length between the standards, and also a flying bridge. (7F.)

Barao Nulla seldom unfordable. (5M. 3F.)

Chouk, (dak) 163 houses, 8 shops, wells. (4M. 3F.)

Chouk River stone bridge building. (4F.)

Bhur River bridge of masonry. (7F.)

Cross Nulla to Kulota, small village. (2M. 7F.)

Right 2 furlongs Khalapoor, 175 houses, 6 shops, 3 tanks.
(2M. 1F.)

Cross Putulgunga stone bridge. (1M. 1F.)

Pass Hull, and cross Moolgaon River. (2M. 1F.)

Khopoollee, 38 houses, 20 shops, tank, bottom of the ghat.
(2M. 2F.)

Ascent of the Bore ghat. (3M. 1F.)

POONA COLLECTORSHIP.

Khundala, (dak) 50 houses, 12 shops, tank. (1M. 3F.)

Right 4 furlongs Loonowlee, 20 houses, tank. (2M. 4F.)

Wulwun, 25 houses, 5 shops, tank. (1M.)

Left 3 furlongs Waksae, 18 houses, wells. (2M. 1F.)

Karlee, 42 houses, 8 shops, tank. (1M. 7F.)

Challon's bridge [*about 2 miles west of Kamshet station*] over
Indraownee River. (2M. 4F.)

Right 4 furlongs Pathurgaon, (dak) 11 houses. (4F.)

Kurkala, 25 houses, 1 shop (2M. 3F.)

Nygaon, 15 houses, wells. (1M. 2F.)

Wargaon, (dak) 50 houses, 8 shops, tank and wells. (4M, 4F.)

Through a Khind. (4M.)

Keula [*Kirla 4 miles east of Telegaum*], 40 houses, 2 shops.
(4M. 4F.)

Rawut, Chinchoorkur's, 25 houses, 1 shop, left bank Paona
River which cross to Poonowla, 30 houses, 2 shops (dak).
(2M. 4F.)

Tatera [*near Kirle*], 25 houses, 1 shop, Neelkunt Shastri's.
(1M.)

Cross Moota River to Awoond [*Aundh near Wankad*] 3 shops.
(5M. 7F.)

Gunesh-khind, temple on the right. (2M. 3F.)

Cross Moola River flying bridge. (2M. 3F.)

Note.—The city of Poona close in [on] the right, and ruins of the old Residency on the left, burnt by the Peshwa's troops when hostilities commenced.

Travellers Bungalow. (6F.)

Note.—From the Travellers Bungalow near the entrance of cantonments to the Church is $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile.

N. B.—This account is taken from "Itinerary and Directory for Western India." In the copy on hand the names of the compiler and the printer, and the date of publication are missing. But the book was brought about 1826, for it contains a Government advertisement, dated April 28, 1826, and signed by R. Snow, Postmaster General.

II. Mostyn mentions in his diary.

Bellapoor (Belapur), Panwell (Panvel), Barwai (Varwai), Chouk (Chauk) 12 miles south-east of Panvel—Heber calls it Chowkee—Collapore (Kholapur, 18 miles south-east of Panvel), Compolee (Khopoli), Condolah (Khandala), Dunder Gome (Dongergaon, near Lonavla), Poll, the forts of Tong (Tung), Tikonah (Tikona), Loogur (Logarh) and Essapoor (Visapur), Cordah (perhaps Kuradve south-west of Lonavla, about 2 miles from Khandala), Sewney (Shivne near Telegaum), Chanhier (perhaps Chanked near Sewney), Wanhra (Wankra or Wankad about 3 miles west of Government House, Poona), Gunis Kind (Ganeshkhind).

No.7. SAKHARAM BAPU.

"Soon after Narayanrao's murder, on the 30th August, 1773, Nana Farnavis and his cousin, Moroba, associated themselves with Sakharam Bapu, Trimbakrao Mama, Raghoba Purundare, Anandrao Jivaji and Haripant Phadke in attempting a revolution in setting up a claimant in opposition to Raghunathrao [*Raghoba*]

who had seized on the government on the death of Narayanrao, in whose murder he is said by some to have been concerned". (Macdonald, *Memoir and Life of the Late Nana Farnavis*, 24)

When Raghoba's cause was doomed, "Nana Farnavis required and obtained the sacrifice of his rival, Sakharam Bapu". (*Ibid.* 44)

"Sukaram Bappoo was hurried to Singurh, and thence he was removed and thrown into the fort of Pertabgurh. But Sukaram's death scene was not closed in Pertabgurh.... The cautious jealousy of Nana Furnuwees removed him secretly from one place to another, to prevent rescue and insurrection; and the once great Sukaram Bappoo perished miserably in Raigurh." (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, II, 109-110)

No. 8. NARAYAN RAO.

"Narain Rao was the youngest of the three sons of Ballajee Bajee Rao. Wiswas Rao, the eldest, fell at Panniput." (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 696)

"Of Narain Rao little need be said, except to contradict unjust calumny. He was murdered in the eighteenth year of his age; his follies were those of a boy, but the feelings and interests of party blackened them into crime. He was affectionate to his relations, kind to his domestics, and all but his enemies loved him." (*Ibid.* I, 702)

No. 9. RAGHOBHA.

First of all it shows a singular lack of self-restraint and discrimination to make allegations which can easily be disproved. Thus for example Major B. D. Basu, referring to the treaty of 1761 between Mr. Crommelin and an agent sent by Raghoba, who was then regent during the minority of Madho Rao, made the

following assertion: "He [Raghoba] was the regent during the minority of his nephew [Madho Rao]. For the first time in Maratha History, during the regency of Raghoba, a treaty was concluded between the Christian merchants constituting the East India Company and the acknowledged head of the Maratha confederacies, the Peshwa." (Basu, *Rise of the Christian Power in India*, II, 361)

By way of comment we should like to say: "An enemy has written this, and a badly informed enemy." Major B. D. Basu was apparently not aware of the treaty of 1739, "between the Government of Bajirav, Pandit Pradhan, and the Hon'ble Stephen Law, General of the Fort of Bombay." (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 701) What makes Mr. B. D. Basu's lack of information all the more inexcusable is that this treaty is explicitly mentioned by Grant Duff. (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 482)

In the second place Raghoba's name should not be branded with infamy, because failure dogged his steps from one end to the other of his political career. Failure may imply inability, it does not prove wickedness, just as success is not a standard of uprightness.

In the third place it is not true to fact to say that Raghoba was unpatriotic and the victim of anglophile leanings. Mostyn's *Diaries* of 1767 and 1772 make it clear that Raghoba distrusted the English. The truth seems to be that his political opponents drove him into the hands of the English.

Finally Raghoba's ambition and selfishness had for their object the wielding of administrative power; and in this respect we venture to say that he was not more ambitious and selfish than Nana Farnavis. Both Raghoba and Nana Farnavis were ambitious, selfish men; but Nana Farnavis was superior to Raghoba in state-craft, astuteness and cunning. The contest between the two opponents was little more than the proverbial play of the cat with the mouse; and Raghoba was not the cat.

No. 10. MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN.

From the entry on the 29th November, 1772, "Dada Row was only come on the part of the Nabob Mahomed Ally Caun with presents to the Durbar," it follows that the person here mentioned is the Nawab of the Carnatic.

Some confusion is likely to arise from the fact that in Mostyn's *Diary*, the name, Mahomed Ali Khan, does not always refer to the Nawab of the Carnatic. At times the name, Mahomed Ali Khan or Mahomed Ali Khan Hakim, refers to a person, who was a Poona resident, rather influential at the Maratha Court. When attention has been called to the confusion of names, it is easy to distinguish which Mahomed Ali Khan is meant. The Nawab generally acts through his vakil, the Hakim is a Poona resident.

No. 11. THE JANJIRA REVOLUTION.

In 1762, Sidi Yakut Khan, became chief of Janjira, but his sovereignty was disputed by a rival claimant, Sidi Abdul Rahim Khan. The English did their best to adjust the differences between the rival Sidis, and by the treaty of 1772 Sidi Abdul Rahim was put in possession of Dada Rajpuri in subordination to Sidi Yakut, and was also promised the right of succession to Janjira. (Banaji, *Bombay and the Sidis*. 148-157) From Mostyn's *Diary* it follows that Sidi Rahim violated this treaty and dispossessed Sidi Yakut Khan of the sovereignty. To the best of our knowledge this revolution is not mentioned elsewhere. There is, however, the following statement (*Gaz. Bom. Pres.* XI, 448, note 4) tantalising in its brevity; "After fruitless efforts to take Janjira, Abdul Rahim entered the fortress as a disciple of Sidi Yakut, who was well versed in the Koran. Abdul Rahim is said to have murdered his preceptor—Janjira State Records." It is further recorded that "Sidi Yakut died shortly after this agreement [of 1772], and Abdul Rahim succeeded him and continued to rule till his death in 1784." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres.* XI, 448)

From the entry under date Saturday, the 10th March, 1773, it may be gathered that Sidi Abdul Rahim Khan was already at that time the ruler of Janjira.

No. 12. NANA FARNAVIS.

In estimating the chequered career of Nana Farnavis it is of the highest moment to answer in the light of historical events the following question: Did Nana Farnavis identify himself with Maharashtra? or did he identify Maharashtra with his own interests? Furthermore in comparing and contrasting Nana Farnavis and Raghoba, it should be borne in mind that in the contest, which broke out after Narayan Rao's murder, Raghoba was rather less prepared to make territorial concessions to the English (Mostyn, *Letters*, the 13th April, 1774) than the Ministerial Party—of whom Farnavis was the soul—were ready to win over the Nizam by promises of grants of forts and jaghirs. (Mostyn's *Letters* the 24th April, the 28th May, the 24th June, the 23rd July, the 10th August and the 1st November, 1774)

No. 13. MOROBA.

He was a cousin of Nana Farnavis. At first he joined Nana Farnavis against Raghoba when the latter had proclaimed himself Peshwa after Narayan Rao's murder; and from Mostyn's *Diary* we learn that he played an important part in the Barbhai plot. Later on he changed sides, and after Gangabai's death he worked secretly to restore the fallen fortunes of Raghoba, trying for this purpose to make an alliance with the English. The proposed alliance was never made, and Moroba fell ultimately into the hands of Nana Farnavis, by whom he was thrown into confinement in the fortress of Ahmednagar. (Macdonald, *Memoir and Life of the Late Nana Farnavis*, 24, 26, 32-38; Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, II, 69, 72-73)

No. 14. THE POONA ORDERS.

On the 3rd March, 1768, Thomas Mostyn, after his return to Bombay from the 1767-1768 Embassy, wrote :

"Enclosed your Honour and Council will please to receive the six following orders relating to points I laid before the darbar ; the one regarding Orpar, as I before advised you, I was not able to procure ; but Ramaji Chitnis will have directions about it, and Madhavrao assured me our merchants at Surat would meet with no impediments.

"One order on Visaji Pant for the payment of Rupees thirty thousand, nine hundred and fifteen, three quarters, fifty reas, being the amount of losses sustained by our merchants as settled three years ago, *i.e.*, in 1765.

"One ditto on Visaji Pant for delivering to Nasarvanji Modi his batela taken three years ago.

"One ditto on Visaji Pant for delivering to Byramji Hormasji a boat of 200 khandis in lieu of his grab taken about seven years ago.

"One ditto on Ramaji Pant for rendering up some slaves fled to Salsette, belonging to Mr. Richard Nowland.

"One ditto on Moraji Sindia of Chaul for two slaves fled thither belonging to the above gentleman.

"One ditto on Wasudev Pant, Governor of Karanja, for removing the fishing stakes fixed by their Kolis within the Bombay limits." (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 176)

No. 15. THE CAPTURE OF BROACH.

"The political connection of the English Company with Broach dates from their capture of Surat in 1759. There were certain claims of the Nawab of Surat upon the customs revenue of Broach. These together with a sum, due to the English on account of an excessive levy of duties on cloth, amounting altoge-

ther to £15,000 (Rs. 1,50,000), Nawab Mazad Khan of Broach was called upon to pay.

"In the early months of 1771 a body of the Company's troops in the neighbourhood of Surat was engaged against the Kolis. In the hopes that a display of military force might induce the Nawab to propose some settlement of the claims made against him, the chief of Surat was directed to transport this force by sea to the neighbourhood of Broach. [These instructions were not followed, and the troops were sent by land.]

"On the 1st of May the troops reached the bank of the Narbada, opposite the city of Broach. Posting themselves on an island in the river, they directed their guns against the wall of the city and succeeded in making a breach. A party was sent in boats to effect an entrance; but miscalculating the strength of the current, the boats were carried down the stream, and the attempt had to be abandoned. In addition to this failure, a shell from the city, lighting on the magazine, blew it up, destroying the greater part of the besiegers' ammunition; [and the attacking force had to retire.]

"On the 30th July, 1771, the Bombay Government received a letter from the Nawab of Broach, offering to visit Bombay with a view of settling in person the claims made against him. The Nawab reached Bombay on the 4th November, 1771. Before he left, he engaged to pay a sum of £40,000 (Rs. 4,00,000), of which £20,000 (Rs. 2,00,000) were to be forwarded in six months, and the remainder at noted intervals; the whole payment to be completed within two years." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. II*, 469-471) This treaty was concluded on the 30th November, 1771.

"But the Nawab of Broach, Mazad Khan, failed to give any positive promise to bide by his terms of the treaty.....A force was accordingly despatched from Bombay in the beginning of November, 1772. On the 18th November, 1772, the English force stormed and captured Broach." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. II*, 471)

Additional light is thrown on the Nawab's intentions whe

visiting Bombay. "The Nawab came to Bombay with the expressed intention of securing a cessation of hostilities, but in reality influenced by a desire to gain time to cement an alliance with the Gaikwar. At Bombay a treaty was proposed; but the Nawab, disappointed with its terms, so conducted himself as to bring down on Broach the projected expedition; and the town was taken by assault on the 18th November, 1772." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres.* VII, 190; Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, II, 3)

No. 16. NANA AND SADOBA.

'Nana' referred to in the Diary is Balaji Baji Rao. The name was first given to Baji Rao I, (Pope, *A Text-Book of Indian History*, 178); but it was afterwards also given to his successors.

Sudabah or Sadoba is Sadasiva Rao. (*Appendix No. 1*) Sadoba is a short nickname usually used by elders towards youngsters.

W. A. Price wrote on the 12th September, 1759: "Nana, I observed, immediately returned to his apartments, and left Sadoba to transact the current business." (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 130) This confirms Mostyn's statement: "That the Government be conducted as was done by Nannah and Sudabah, that all business be carried out by Ragobah, but subject to the control of Naron Row."

No. 17. THE RATNAGIRI COAST FORTS.

Ratnagiri: "It lies facing the sea, 136 miles south-east of Bombay. According to the local story its defences were begun under the Bahamani kings (1343-1500). But the evidence of the Bahmanis' hold on Ratnagiri is so slight that it seems more likely to have been the work of a Bijapur officer (1500-1660). Sivaji,

who is said to have gained possession of the fort about 1670, added or renewed the strong wall that crests the eastern ridge, and built protecting towers. In the eighteenth century the citadel defences are said to have been improved by the Angrias (1710-1755), and completed by the Peshwas (1755-1818). In 1862 the fort was out of repair, and its 117 guns were all honeycombed and useless. In this state it has since remained." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. X*, 358)

II. *Gheria*: It is also known as Viziadurg or Vijayadurg. "Situated on the neck of the rocky land that forms the south side of the bay, Vijayadurg, is one of the best and most Muhammadan of Konkan fortresses. . . . The fort is probably old, enlarged under the Bijapur kings, and about the middle of the seventeenth century, much strengthened by Sivaji.....About forty years later (1698), the pirate chief Angria made it the capital of a territory stretching for about 150 miles along the coast and from thirty to sixty miles inland. For more than fifty years, Angria's pirates were a terror to all traders".....(*Ibid. X*, 380) "At last, in 1755 it was settled that in the next fair season the Peshwa's troops should attack him from land and the British from sea." On the 13th April the garrison surrendered after the fort had been bombarded by the British fleet under Admiral Watson, and Colonel (afterwards Lord) Clive took possession. "Fifteen hundred prisoners were taken; eight Englishmen and three Dutchmen were rescued; and plunder, amounting, besides stores, to £125,000 (Rs. 12,50,000), was divided among the captors." The ruin of Angria's navy was complete. "The Bombay Government were very anxious to keep Gheria, and offered to give Bankot in exchange. To this the Peshwa would not agree, and Gheria was handed over in the following October (1756)." The fort remained in the hands of the Marathas till June, 1818, when it was transferred to the British. (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. X*, 381-383)

III. *Suvarndurg*: "The Golden Fortress, is perhaps the most striking of the Ratnagiri coast forts. Probably built by the

Bijapur kings in the sixteenth century, and in 1660 strengthened by Sivaji, it was in 1698 a station of Kanhoji Angria's fleet, and in 1713 was formally made over to him by Shahu Raja. Under Kanhoji's successor, Tulaji, Suvarndurg became one of the head centres of piracy. Such damage did its fleets cause both to native and foreign shipping, that the Peshwa's government several times proposed that the English should join them in suppressing Angria. Early in 1755, a joint attack on Suvarndurg, Bankot and some other of Angria's forts was arranged," and Suvarndurg was captured and handed over to the Marathas. In 1818 it was taken by Colonel Kennedy with little resistance. (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. X*, 338)

IV. *Anjanvel*: "Anjanvel fort, called Gopalgad, was built by the Bijapur kings in the sixteenth century, strengthened by Sivaji about 1660, and improved by his son, Sambhaji (1681-1689). In 1699 the fort was attacked and captured by Khairat Khan, Hubshi of Janjira (1680-1708). In 1744 (December) Tulaji Angria Sirkhel took it from the Hubshi, and named it Gopalgad. From him it passed in 1755 to the Peshwa, and after the Peshwa's overthrow fell to Colonel Kennedy on the 17th May, 1818. The fort stands on a prominent and commanding point on the south shore of the creek entrance, half a mile from Anjanvel." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. X*, 318).

V. *Bankot*: "Fort Victoria is, next to the island of Bombay, the earliest English possession in Western India. It lies at the foot of a rocky headland on the south shore of the entrance to the Bankot or Savitri river, seventy-three miles south-east of Bombay On the 8th April, 1755, five days after the fall of Suvarndurg, Commodore James arrived off Bankot. The fort surrendered on the first summons. Commodore James handed over charge to the Marathas, and at the end of the rains (October) the fort and nine neighbouring villages were ceded to the British, and its name changed from Himmatgad to Fort Victoria." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. X*, 321)

No. 18. DON JOSE PEDRO DA CAMERA.

1. There seems to be some confusion in Mostyn's *Diary* as regards the gentleman's Christian name and the date of his arrival. "Don Jose Pedro da Camera, Governor and Captain-General of India, received his nomination on the 4th February, 1774, arrived at Goa on the 22nd September following, and took over the Government two days later." (Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, II, 439) Similarly, in a letter addressed to the Governor-General in Council, Fort William, and dated the 31st December, 1774, the members of the Bombay Government wrote: "We have received advice from Mr. Robert Henshaw that the Portuguese had this season (*therefore in 1774*) received, with their new Captain-General, Don Jose Pedro da Camera, a very considerable reinforcement of men and ships from Europe." (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 204) From this it follows that Mostyn's statement, made in December, 1773, is somewhat premature.

No. 19. THE BHONSLE QUARREL.

In the family contest for the Government, Mudaji Bhonsle was in the right, and Sabaji in the wrong; for their brother, Janoji, having no children, had adopted Raghuji, Mudaji's son, and had appointed Mudaji the boy's guardian. (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 697-698) When Grant Duff writes that Janoji Bhonsle was at Teur at the period of Madho Rao's death, on the 18th November, 1772, he seems to have been misinformed. Mr. G. S. Sardesai to whom we applied for information wrote: "It is now beyond doubt that Janoji died on the 16th May 1772." On the 27th December, 1772, the Poona durbar openly sided with Sabaji against Mudaji. (Mostyn, *Diary*, 27-12-1772) The durbar's decision was probably, at least partially, inspired by the opposition at the Poona Court to Raghoba. As Grant Duff writes: "Mudaji, unfortunately for himself and his son, ha

hitherto retained a connection with Rugonath Rao; and his pretensions not being supported by Narain Rao or his ministers, he could only levy troops and assert his cause by force of arms. (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 698) The final stage of the quarrel is thus briefly recorded in the Imperial Gazetteer of India: "On Janoji's death, his brothers fought for the succession, until one shot the other on the battlefield of Panchgaon, 6 miles south of Nagpur; and Mudaji succeeded to the regency of his infant son, Raghuji II, who was Janoji's adopted heir." (*Imp. Gaz. of India*, XVIII, 307)

No. 20. GHAZI-UD-DIN IV.

He belonged to the House of the Nizams, was a grand-son of Nizam-ul-Mulk and a son of Ghazi-ud-din III, Nizam-ul-Mulk's eldest son.

When Nizam-ul-Mulk died in 1748, his eldest son, Ghazi-ud-din III, was detained at Delhi; and it seems probable that bribes may have been employed by his brothers to keep him there. (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 535) Afterwards he proceeded to the Deccan, where he was poisoned in 1752. His son, Ghazi-ud-din IV, was only 16 years old (Keene, *The Fall of the Moghul Empire*, 39) when the news of his father's death reached him at Delhi; but in spite of his youth he became in a short time one of the chief contending statesmen, whom political intrigue gathered round the tottering throne of the last Moghul rulers.

In 1754 Ghazi-ud-din was chiefly instrumental in deposing, imprisoning and blinding Ahmad Shah. He then raised Alamgir II to the throne, and consummated his crimes by murdering the harmless emperor. Next, he placed a son of Kam Baksh on the imperial throne, who assumed the name of Shah Jehan. (Pope, *A Text-Book of Indian History*, 122, 139) But before long, Ghazi-ud-din IV and his puppet emperor were obliged to flee from Delhi.

The subsequent career of Ghazi-ud-din IV is shrouded in

oblivion. According to Pope, he went in 1790 on a pilgrimage to Mecca, and was not heard of since. (Pope, *A Text-Book of Indian History*, 139) According to Keene, Ghazi-ud-din IV spent his last days in Bundelkhand, where he died in 1800. (Keene, *The Fall of the Moghul Empire*, 43) Mr. G. S. Sardesai forwards the following information: "After 1759, Ghazi-ud-din forced to leave the imperial court, became a fugitive, and sought protection with various potentates. At last, Nana Farnavis conferred a jagir on him at Kalpee for his maintenance, which he enjoyed to his death in 1802."

Mostyn wrongly states that Ghazi-ud-din IV was Muhammad Shah's Vizier. Muhammad Shah died in 1748, and Nizam-ul-Mulk's eldest son, Ghazi-ud-din III, was then in Delhi, where he remained till 1752, when he repaired to the Deccan. It was only after the death of Ghazi-ud-din III in October, 1752, that Ghazi-ud-din IV became influential at the Delhi Court; he made himself Vizier during the reigns of Ahmad Shah and Alamgir II.

No. 21. AFFAIRS IN HINDUSTAN.

The Rohilla, Zabita Khan, was the cause of all the trouble in Hindustan.

The Marathas were eager to take revenge on the Rohillas who had fought against them at Panipat. According to the Rohilla account, the Rohillas had even been chiefly instrumental in bringing about the Maratha defeat. "The defection of the Jats was not yet certainly known among them [*the Marathas*], when a large column of horse, led by the Rohilla commanders, poured down upon them [*the Marathas*] under cover of a cloud of dust; and, forming on the ground which the Jats had occupied, separated the Mahratta army in two parts." [Hamilton, *Historical Relations of the Rohilla Afghans*, 150] The important part here ascribed to the Rohillas is probably highly exaggerated; but at the same time the Rohilla account may help to explain Maratha animosity

against the Rohillas. For some time the Marathas refrained from attacking Rohilkhand, as they were endeavouring to induce the emperor, Shah Alam, to withdraw from the protection of the English, in which Najib-ud-daula's assistance might be useful. But, after Najib-ud-daula's death, Shah Alam began to make overtures of friendships to the Marathas, who had no longer any reason to spare Rohilkhand, where Zabita Khan reigned in succession to his father, Najib-ud-daula. Twice they overran Zabita Khan's territory, the second time with the concurrence of Shah Alam who bore Zabita Khan a personal enmity.

What ultimately saved Zabita Khan was Tukaji Holkar's protection; and through Tukaji Holkar Zabita Khan was endeavouring to recover his territory and his father's rank at Delhi. But Shah Alam would not listen to the proposal, and at last ordered his general, Najaf Khan, to resist the Marathas by force (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 682) Moreover, Mahadaji Sindia was as opposed to Zabita Khan as Tukaji Holkar was favourable to him. Thus it came about that Zabita Khan estranged Shah Alam from the Marathas, and was at the same time the cause of dissensions among the Maratha military leaders (Mostyn, *Diary*, 27, 12, 1772; 9, 12, 1772)

No. 22. THE AUDIENCE OF THE 6TH JANUARY, 1773.

I. *The Treaty of 1739*: The capitulation made with Chimnaji Appa is the treaty made by Stephen Law, Governor of Bombay, and Baji Rao I in July, 1739. The treaty, comprising 14 Articles, is given by Forrest in his *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 701-704.

II. *The Seventh Article*: It runs as follows: "The English will not assist any of Bajirav's enemies, though in friendship with them, with any other or more of the sorts than what they engage to supply Bajirav's State with; and Bajirav shall observe the like agreement with the English" (left-column version) "The English shall not give assistance of any sort to the enemies of this State,

though they may be their friends. In like manner we will not assist the enemies of the English. All the sorts they supply this State with, they may furnish others as they please, excepting munitions of war." (right-column version)

III. *British Assistance to the Sidi*: On the 24th February, 1760, the Sidi arrived in Bombay; he "has been guilty of a very rash action in exposing his person to the danger of the Moratta fleet, which blocks up that place [*Janjira*]...He is in the utmost distress at Rogipore [*Rajpuri*] for some money and munition to defend it against the Morattas; and we, considering that it would prove highly injurious to our Hon'ble Masters' interest to suffer them to make themselves masters of it, resolved, that we, in as private a manner as possible, supply him with some money and ammunition, for which any jewels he may have, or whatever security it is in his power to give, should be obtained." (*Bombay Public Depart. Diary* 34, 147-148, quoted by Banaji, *Bombay and the Sidis*, Appendix No. 244)

IV. *Mostyn's Justification*: Thomas Mostyn's reply that the English had helped the Sidi because the Marathas had called the Portuguese to their assistance was a plausible explanation, but not the true one, which is supplied by the *Bombay Public Department Diary*: "We are further confirmed in our resolution for assisting the Sciddees from an apprehension that, if the Morattas should get possession of Rogipore [*Danda-Rajpuri*], they would likewise be troublesome in their demands about the Tanka at Surat, as that revenue has belonged to the Sciddees, and because their desperation, in case we did not assist them, might fling them into the arms of the Dutch, and at once might render all abortive [*the*] pains which we have taken to prevent their getting any footing there. (*Bombay Public Depart. Diary*, 34, 147-148, quoted by Banaji, *Bombay and the Sidis*, Appendix No. 244) It is true that there were Portuguese fighting with the Marathas against the Sidi, but they must have been a very small number; for the Bombay authorities wrote in March, 1761, to the Janjira Committee: "We

did not know that the Portuguese were at war with the Sciddees as principals; and, therefore, if they came here, during their [*the Committee's*] stay, or were there on their arrival, they [*the Committee*] must acquaint them [*the Portuguese*] the place [*Janjira*] was assigned to us." [*Bombay Public Depart. Diary*, 36, quoted by Banaji, *Bombay and the Sidis*, Appendix No. 251) But these instructions were given in March, 1761; whilst the English had determined to help the Sidis with ammunition on the 26th February, 1761. Consequently⁹ Mostyn's explanation is all wrong.

No. 23. THE DELHI FIGHTING IN DECEMBER, 1772.

Beginning with Wednesday, the 13th January, 1773, the *Diary* refers repeatedly to the fighting that took place in, and around, Delhi in December, 1772, (*Diary*, the 15th, 16th, 18th and 23rd January) These various entries should be viewed in the light of the statement made on the 23rd January, which gives the results of the fighting.

The following is a brief account of what occurred. In 1769 or 1770 Zabita Khan succeeded his father, Najib-ud-daula, as ruler of Rohilkhand. The Marathas had spared Najib-ud-daula (*Appendix* No. 21), but after they had won over the emperor, Shah Alam, to their side, they did not mean to spare Najib-ud-daula's son. With the approval of Shah Alam, who hated Zabita Khan, they plundered Rohilkhand. Zabita Khan had, however, found a strong protector in the person of Holkar, and was encouraged by Holkar in his endeavour to regain his territory and his position at Delhi. (Mostyn, *Diary*, 27-12-1773) But Shah Alam did not want to hear of Zabita's re-instatement in his office. He had also begun to realise that the Marathas were bent upon territorial encroachments to his own disadvantage. At last he ordered his general, Najaf Khan, to drive the Marathas out of Delhi.

However the Maratha general, Visaji Krishna Biniwalla, of his

own accord withdrew his troops from the city, and sent to Poona for further orders. After a long delay, occasioned by the death of Madho Rao, Visaji was ordered to drive Najaf Khan from Delhi. The latter tried in vain to ward off the blow; and Shah Alam was given no choice, he had to accept the terms dictated by the Marathas. These terms were not severe. Najaf Khan was dismissed, and Zabita Khan was appointed commander-in-chief of the imperial forces. The appointment of Zabita Khan, in spite of Sindia's opposition, was due to the influence of Holkar, in whom Zabita Khan had found a powerful protector. (Kincaid and Parasnis, *A History of the Maratha People*, III, 100-106)

This account is borne out by Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 703-704.

Hence it would seem that the sensational news about Shah Alam's withdrawal from Delhi and Shuja-ud-daula's threatening letter, mentioned in the *Diary* on the 15th, 16th and 18th January, were false rumours.

NO. 24. THE CROMMELIN TREATY.

Crommelin was Governor of Bombay when he made on the 14th September, 1761, a treaty with the Marathas. (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 168) Two clauses of this treaty have been published by Mr. Banaji in *Bombay and the Sidis*, Unpublished Document No. 261; they run as follows:

"Articles of Agreement made and entered into between the Hon'ble Charles Crommelin, Esqr. president & Governour &ca Council of Bombay, on the part of the Hon'ble united English East India Company & Govind Sewram Punt Tatiah, in behalf of Madurao Balajee, Son of Badjeerao, Pandit Punt Pradhan, for preserving the friendship subsisting between us & for adjusting the differences which have arose between the Government of Purnah, & the Sciddies of Ginjerah.

"4th. That proper people shall be forthwith dispatched for

restoring the whole Jurisdiction and Territories of Rajapore to the Sciddies of Ginjeerah in the same condition and manner as they remained before Invaded and attacked by Ramajee Punt; which country is not to be molested in future by any of the Moratta Officers or Subjects.

"5th. That all prisoners taken by the Morattas or Sciddies, subjects of either Government & now in their possession, shall be sent to Bombay within one Month from the signing of these Articles, and mutually restored by the Governor to their freedom; and all Hostilities between the Morattas & Sciddies shall cease from this Time."

These clauses are taken from the *Public Department Diary* (Bombay), 39, 598-599, which does not give the remaining clauses. Alluding to this treaty, Grant Duff writes: "It consisted of seven or eight articles regarding detention or stoppage of vessels, wrecks, deserters and the restoration of all territory taken from the Seedee by Ramajee Punt." (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 627, note)

This treaty is not to be confounded with the "fourteen articles delivered in Governor Crommelin's time." Mostyn writes: "These articles were settled when I was last here, and the order for the payment of Rs. 30,915-3-50 particularly mentions it" (Mostyn, *Diary*, 28-1-1773) On the occasion of the second embassy he wrote on the 27th January, 1768; "They read over to me the 14 articles they had presented to Governor Crommelin; to which having separately answered, they with some difficulty consented to giving an order for the payment of the amount of losses, our merchants had sustained." (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 168, 176)

These 14 articles are also mentioned on the 25th October, 1763; and they are given in detail on the 26th October, 1773, under the heading:

"Translate of 15 articles sent me [Mostyn] by Raghoba." There is every reason to believe that the articles of 1768 are the

same as those of 1773, but whereas there were 14 articles in 1768, there are 15 in 1773.

No. 25. THE WAR WITH SHUJA-UD-DAULA.

The following account of the Maratha campaign in Hindustan is drawn from Rohilla sources and compiled from a Persian manuscript by Hamilton.

"The Mahrattas, on first taking the field in November, 1772, as the Ganges was not yet fordable, moved some way down the Doab;.....upon their spies bringing them intelligence that the Ganges had become fordable, they suddenly turned and directed their route to Ramghaut.

"The [*Rohilla*] chiefs.....assembled their forces at a place about 15 miles distant from Ramghaut, and from thence detached a chosen body under the command of Ahmed Khan, who had succeeded Sirdar Khan in the office of Buxy, with directions to guard the ford at Ramghaut and to seize all the boats on that part of the river.

"The Buxy accordingly marched; but instead of following his instructions,.....contented himself with throwing a part of his forces into a small fort, which commanded the road from the ghaut or ford into the country, but was so situated as to defend the passage over the river.....Holkar found means to effect a passage for his army early the next morning, his cavalry fording at the usual place, and his infantry and rocket-men being transported in boats a little lower down; and the next day he attacked the Buxy in the fort, and soon obliged him to surrender and give up all his artillery and ammunition. From hence the victorious marauders proceeded by Sumbull and plundered all the country between that city and Moradabad; but they were not long unopposed." (Hamilton, *Historical Relations of the Rohilla Afghans*, 184-186)

"In the beginning of 1773.....as soon as intelligence was received of the Mahrattas having marched to Ramghaut, with a view to renew their attacks upon Rohilcund, the combined armies of the English and Suja-ud-Dowlah advanced towards the country by rapid marches, and arrived at Shawbad at the period when Toko Jee [*Tukaji Holkar*] crossed the Ganges and defeated the Rohillas under the Buxy.

"The English immediately after this affair proceeded to Ramghaut, and had nearly surprised a body of 4,000 Mahratta horse whilst fording the Ganges at the Ghaut of Gurrickpore, about 5 miles below that place, in order to reinforce their friends on that side ; the greatest part of them was in the middle of the river when the British army came in sight, upon which they suddenly returned, and marched upon the western bank, where Beysa Jee [*Visaji*] was encamped with part of the Mahratta army and all their artillery and heavy baggage ; whilst the British and Vizier's troops continued their route along the opposite shore, until they arrived at Assipore within sight of Beysa Jee's [*Visaji's*] encampment. . . . Here the Mahrattas commenced a cannonade against the English ; but this was soon answered by the latter with such effect as presently silenced their artillery and obliged their whole army to change their ground with some precipitation. Some days after that event, as the Mahratta army was now divided, part of it being still at Sumbull in Rohilcund under Toko Jee [*Tukaji Holkar*] and the other under Beysa Jee [*Visaji*] to the westward of the Ganges, it was determined to attack them in both quarters at the same time. With this view the British troops forded the river at Ramghaut, whilst Suja-ud-Dowlah and Hafiz Rahmut prepared to advance with their united forces against Toko Jee [*Tukaji Holkar*]. Beysa Jee [*Visaji*], when he heard of the approach of the brigade, decamped in the utmost hurry and confusion, and were off to the distance of 40 miles in a single march. From some suspicions which Suja-ud-Dowlah still entertained of Hafiz Rahmut, the other part of the concentrated operation was not executed by him ; but

the English, recrossing the Ganges the next day after the flight of Beysa Jee [*Visaji*], proceeded towards Sumbull; upon which Tokc Jee [*Tukaji Holkar*] retreated to Poot, a town upon the Ganges, about 50 miles above Ramghaut, and crossed the river at that place on a bridge of boats which he afterwards destroyed.

"The Mahratta army made some movements which indicated an intention of crossing into Rohilcund at Corimboosghaut, a considerable distance higher up the river; but the brigade, advancing by rapid marches to that place, prevented them, whilst the Vizier with his troops guarded all the fords at Ramghaut and the neighbourhood; and as the hot season appeared, and the Ganges began to be swelled by the melting snows on the northern mountains, they were constrained for the present to relinquish all thoughts of renewing their depredations to the eastward, and returned to Etawa." (Hamilton, *Historical Relations of the Rohilla Afghans*, 188-195)

Compare Hamilton's account with that of Strachey: "On the 20th March the English troops were close to Ramghat. The main body of the Marathas was on the opposite bank of the Ganges, but a considerable force had suddenly crossed the river and marched towards the camp of Hafiz Rahmat. He had been carrying on the same double dealings as heretofore practised by that treacherous sect; and the Marathas, in the hope of forcing him to come to an immediate decision, resolved to surprise him, if possible, by a sudden attack. To carry out their project it was first necessary to make themselves masters of a small fort occupied by the Rohillas. [*who*] surrendered. By this time, however, the English troops were so near that the Marathas did not venture to continue their expedition, and they retreated rapidly to the Ganges.

"On the 21st March. it was determined to make an immediate attack on the Marathas with the whole of the allied forces. The Vizier and the Rohillas were to operate on the left

bank of the Ganges, while Sir Robert Barker was to cross the river and attack the enemy on the right side.

"The English at once proceeded to carry out their part of the plan, and on the 22nd March they crossed the Ganges without opposition The Marathas immediately broke up their encampment, retreated rapidly, and did not halt till they had put a distance of more than 20 miles between themselves and the English. The combined movement, that was to have been made by the Vizier and the Rohillas, had not taken place ; for the Vizier continued to be suspicious of treachery on the part of Hafiz Rahmat. It was agreed that an immediate advance should be made by their combined forces against the Marathas, who had still a large force on the banks of the Ganges. They were in possession of Sambhal and other places near the river, and they had constructed a bridge of boats at Puth in the Moradabad District. Hoping to seize the families of Hafiz Rahmat and other chiefs, the Marathas resolved to make a sudden raid upon Bisauli, about 30 miles distant from their camp. Sir Robert Barker marched hastily to intercept them ; they abandoned their design, levying a contribution from the town of Moradabad as they passed. They were rapidly followed by the English, and on the 28th March the whole of the Maratha force precipitately retreated across the Ganges, destroying the bridge, and leaving behind them much of their baggage. Rohilkhand was now entirely free from the invaders ; neither in that nor in any future year did the Marathas renew their attacks on Rohilkhand." (Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla Warfare*, 78-82)

No. 26. MALVAN AND JIJABAL

"Malvan, Sindhadurg and Padmagad were three island forts situated, about 65 miles south-east of Ratnagiri, in a bay almost entirely blocked by rocky reefs. In 1665, failing in his efforts to

take Janjira, Sivaji chose Malvan with its rocky island and reef-blocked harbour as his coast head-quarters. In 1713, at the time of the division of Sivaji's dominions between the Kolhapur and the Satara families, Malvan fell to the Kolhapur chiefs, and under them became the head-quarters of the most active and destructive of the coast pirates. In 1765 an expedition, under the joint command of Major Gordon and Captain John Watson of the Bombay Marine, was sent against Sindhudurg. They speedily reduced the fort, and intending to keep it, gave it the name of Fort Augustus. But as it was unprofitable and very hard to dismantle, the fort was given back to the Kolhapur chief on his promising not to molest trade, to pay the Bombay Government a sum of £38,289 (Rs. 3,82,890) and to let the English establish a factory at Malvan." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. X*, 346-351)

The then ruler of Malvan was Jijabai, and in the fourteenth article of the treaty made with her, it was said : "Maharaji Jijabai, the Rani, agrees, should the Honourable Company be attacked, and they should require her assistance, to provide them with what troops they may want, they supplying them with provisions only. The Honourable Company in like manner agrees to assist the Rani, should it be convenient for them." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres. XXIV*, 230)

As regards Rani Jijabai, "when in 1760 Sambhaji of Kolhapur died without issue, she adopted the son of Shahaji Bhonsle of Khanvat The boy thus adopted received the name of Sivaji, and during his long minority the Kolhapur State was administered by his adoptive mother, Jijabai.

"The name of the regent Jijabai has terrible associations connected with it in Kolhapur. It is narrated that one night the goddess Kali, under her manifestation as Sita, appeared to her with the intimation that, to secure prosperity, the shrine of the goddess at Panhala, where Jijabai always resided, should be kept constantly wet with blood. The intimation was obeyed but too implicitly ; and parties, sent out by the Regent at night, constantly

scoured the neighbourhood of Panhala to procure fresh victims, who were sacrificed at a spot in the inner fort, which is still pointed out with horror.

"In 1772 Jijabai died, leaving her adopted son still a minor and surrounded by enemies." (*Gaz. Bom. Pres.* XXIV, 230)

As the first rumours of Jijabai's death reached Poona towards the end of February, 1773, it may either be inferred that the date of her death as given by the *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency* is not quite correct, or it has to be admitted either that communications were in those days very slow, or that some interested party succeeded in keeping her death secret for a pretty long time.

No. 27. GOPIKABAI.

On the 9th October, 1775, W. Taylor wrote to Warren Hastings: "The wise and just administration of Raghoba would have totally defeated the views those bad men (money-making Brahmans) had formed by benefiting themselves by the minority of Madhavrav. They, therefore, exerted every artifice and intrigue to deprive Raghoba of power. Gopikabai, the widow of Nana, was a woman deeply given to intrigues of every kind, and her scandalous licentiousness justly attracted the reproach of one so nearly concerned in the honour of the family as her husband's brother. Hence arose the bitter hatred of Gopikabai to Raghoba. The ministers availed themselves of this circumstance and of her influence with her young son to breed a coldness between the uncle and nephew, which ended in a declared breach, the total deprivation of power and at length, in some degree, in the confinement of Raghoba." (*Forrest, Selections, Maratha Series, I, 250*)

This representation of Raghoba as a just and wise administrator and of Gopikabai as a woman of scandalous licentiousness is not true to fact. Raghoba never excelled as an administrator,

and Gopikabai may have been jealous and intriguing, but was not a woman of loose morals. Nor is it just to lay the whole blame on Gopikabai. Anandibai was to a large extent responsible for the family feud.

"Ragunathrao kept his promise [to *Madho Rao*], and for a month or six weeks uncle [*Raghoba*] and nephew [*Narayan Rao*] were on the most amicable terms. But the prince was wholly under the influence of his wife, Anandibai; whilst the latter was equally submissive to his mother, Gopikabai. And the contending passions of two jealous and ambitious women set at naught the hopes and the intentions of the dead Peshwa [*Madho Rao*]. Gopikabai urged on her son that it was impossible that Raghunathrao could forgive the past, and begged Narayan Rao to confine him as before." (Kincaid and Parasnis, *A History of the Maratha People*, III, 103.)

This seems a much more reasonable view than W. Taylor's. As regards the dissensions in Poona, Gopikabai and Anandibai were both responsible for the family feud; and it seems to be a case of share and share alike.

By way of further information we quote here the testimony of Mr. G. S. Sardesai, who in reply to our request for reliable information on this point, wrote as follows: "Whatever else Gopikabai may have been, there is not the slightest reproach found in any contemporary writings about her character." This statement from one so well versed in the history of that period is in our opinion both convincing and conclusive.

Mr. G. S. Sardesai also forwarded a literal translation in English of a letter that gives us a further insight into Gopikabai's character. "Writes Purushotam Krishna to Nana Phadnis an account of his visit to Gopikabai at Nasik. Dated the 2nd June, 1774 [*i. e. 9 months after the murder of Narayan Rao*]. "Her Highness Shrimant Gopikabai is at Gangapur [*near Nasik*]. I asked he to whom I should hand over the fort of Trimbak [*just capture by the writer*]. She informed me that I should obtain order

about the matter from you two [*i. e. Bapu and Nana*]. Her Highness has absolutely no desire to enter into any political affairs herself. She takes her bath early morning and devotes herself entirely to religious concerns. This is all her desire, and she follows the same programme. She is kind to all and has no ill will towards anybody. She appreciates all that you both have been doing and has no desire to interfere with the affairs of the state." (*Extract No. 53 of Peshwa's Daftar, Selection 36*)

From this letter it may be inferred either that a great change have taken place in Gopikabai after she gave birth to a son, or that her jealousy and intriguing disposition at an earlier period of her life have been unduly stressed by those who have written about her.

No. 28. PURANDHAR.

Purandhar Fort is situated 20 miles south-east of Poona city. It was captured by Sivaji in 1647. In 1665 it was besieged by the forces of Aurangzeb, and after an heroic defence was saved, when Sivaji's proposal to enter the Moghul service and to give up a part of his territory was agreed to by Aurangzeb. In 1670 Sivaji recaptured the Fort. After the power of the Peshwas at Poona had superseded that of the descendants of Sivaji, Purandhar was the usual stronghold to which the Peshwas retreated when unable to remain in safety at their capital. (*Imp. Gaz. of India*, XX, 396, see also *Gaz. Rom. Pres.* XVIII, II, index)

No. 29. THE KING OF TANJORE.

With its capture and conquest by the Maratha forces in 1674, Tanjore became an independent Maratha Principality. It maintained its independence for 181 years, till it was finally annexed by the British in 1855.

Its first Raja was Venkaji, the half-brother of Sivaji. The king of Tanjore, here alluded to, was Tuljaji Raja, Venkaji's eighth successor, who ruled from 1765 to 1787.

The following account may help to give an idea of the relations between the Madras Government, the Nawab of the Carnatic and the Maratha Principality of Tanjore.

"In 1762, when, in consequence of the war with the French, the finances of the Nabob of the Carnatic were at a low ebb, the Nabob wrongfully claimed large arrears of tribute and applied to the English for assistance to reduce the Rajah, Pretaph Singh. Military assistance was refused; but through the mediation of the Madras Government, the Rajah agreed to pay to the Nabob 22 lakhs of Rupees as arrears, and thereafter a fixed tribute of four lakhs annually.

"In 1771 the Rajah of Tanjore, Tooljajee, son of Pretaph Singh, prepared an expedition against the Poligar of Ramnad, a dependant of the Carnatic, to recover some districts which he said had been wrested from him in 1763. Mediation failed; and at the request of the Nabob [*of the Carnatic*] a force was sent to punish the Rajah. During the hostilities, however, the son of the Nabob concluded a treaty of peace with the Rajah, without the knowledge and consent of the English, by which the Rajah bound himself to pay eight lakhs of arrears of tribute and thirty-two and a half lakhs as the expenses of the expedition, and to furnish the Nabob with troops in time of war. The clandestine conclusion of this engagement, of course, was condemned by the Madras Government; and as the Rajah failed to perform its terms, the renewal of hostilities was threatened, unless the Rajah gave up the Fort of Vellum and the districts of Coiladdy and Elungux. A good excuse indeed.

"The Rajah of Tanjore again fell into arrears in 1739 [*a misprint for 1773*], and was of course believed to be intriguing with Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas for a supply of troops. It was pre-texted that his position in the country, to the defence of which he

contributed nothing, was felt to be a source of constant danger ; and it was, therefore, determined to take the opportunity, while enforcing the Nabob's claim, entirely to reduce him. Tanjore was taken on the 16th September, 1773, and the Rajah and his family were made prisoners in the fort. The Court of Directors entirely disapproved of this expedition and directed the restoration of the Rajah. In consequence of this order, and notwithstanding the remonstrance of the Nabob of the Carnatic, the Rajah was restored on the 11th April, 1776 ; and a treaty was concluded with him by which he bound himself to do nothing contrary to the Company's interest, to receive English troops for the protection of his country, to contribute four lakhs of pagodas towards military expenses, and to grant the Company 277 villages." (Hickey, *The Tanjore Mahratta Principality*, 124-126)

The treaty of 1762 between Pertab Singh and the Company, that of 1772 between Tuljaji and the Nawab and that of 1776 between Tuljaji and the Company are given in full by Hickey, *The Tanjore Mahratta Principality*, Appendix, VIII—XIX.

The part played by the Madras Government is severely criticised by Chritian Frederick Swartz, a Protestant Missionary, residing for many years in Tanjore, and also by other Protestant Missionaries. Swartz wrote that Tuljaji "was deeply offended and disgusted by the injustice with which he had been treated by the Madras Government". (*Ibid.* 106) It would even seem that Tuljaji was ready to embrace Christianity. One cause, however, which probably militated against the adoption of that religion was the determination of the Madras Government to assist the Nabob of Arcot in the object, which he had long in view, of dethroning the Rajah. For, when the Rajah was on the point of embracing Christianity, "he was so deeply offended and disgusted by the injustice with which he had been treated by the Madras Government that he abandoned his intention." (*Ibid.* 106)

This adverse criticism of the Madras Government by the

Protestant Missionaries does not seem to have been inspired by religious prejudice. Vincent Smith, referring to the years 1766-1769, also speaks of "the scoundrelly Nawab of the Carnatic and of the corrupt and weak Government of Madras, his tools and abettors." (Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, 485) And there is no reason to believe that between the years 1669 and 1776 either the Nawab or the Madras Government had changed for the better.

No. 30. SIRA, MUDGERE, GURRAMKONDA.

On the 5th March, 1771, Haidar Ali's army was totally routed by the Marathas at Cherkuli. "Haidar fled on horseback to Seringapatam. Tipu, who was thought to have fallen, escaped in disguise. For ten days the Marathas were engaged in dividing the spoils. They then sat down before Seringapatam with a large force, the remainder being employed in ravaging the whole country above and below the Ghats. Haidar could produce little effect on them; and in June, 1772, a treaty was concluded by which he bound himself to pay thirty lakhs of rupees, one half at once, besides five lakhs for "durbar expenses". For the balance Kolar, Hoskote, Dodballapur, Sira, Maddagiri, Chanrayadurga and Gurramkonda were left in their hands." (*Mysore Gaz.*—1930 edition—II, IV, 2507) Sira, Maddagiri and Gurramkonda are obviously the Scirry, Mudgurry and Gorumcoondah of Mostyn's *Diary*.

"Sira, in Tumkur District, Mysore, was founded by the chief of Ratmagiri; but before being completed, was captured by the Sultan of Bijapur in 1633, and formed part of the jagir of Shahji, the father of Sivaji. In 1687 it came under the Moghuls, and was made the capital of their Carnatic province south of the Tungabhadra. In 1757 it was taken by the Marathas, and in 1761 it was captured by Haidar Ali. In 1766 his brother-in-law gave it up

again to the Marathas, from whom it was recaptured by Tipu Sultan in 1774." (*Imp. Gaz. of India*, XXIII, 15-16)

"Mudgere is a southern taluk of Kadur District, Mysore, with an area of 435 square miles. The taluk contains one town, Mudgere." (*Ibid.* XVIII, 11)

"Gurramkonda is an ancient fortress in the Valyalpad taluk of Cuddapah District, Madras. The fort was always one of the most important strongholds in Cuddapah, and is supposed to have been first built by the Golkonda Sultans.....Gurramkonda was the capital of the Carnatic Balaghat at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Afterwards, when held by a local chief under the Nawab of Cuddapah, it was of such importance that the tenure was purely military When Mir Sahib betrayed Sira (1766), he received Gurramkonda as a jagir from the Marathas. Two years later he made it over to Haidar Ali, his brother-in-law. In 1771 Saiyid Shah, Haidar's general, surrendered it to Trimbak Rao. Tipu recaptured it in 1773. In 1791 the Nizam's forces, aided by a British Battery under Captain Read, besieged Gurramkonda and captured the lower fort, but the citadel held out till peace, when the place was ceded to the Nizam. In 1800 it was transferred to the British with the rest of the District of Cuddapah. (*Ibid.* XII, 412-413)

No. 31. WAI.

Wai is a north-western taluka of Satara. In 1659 Wai first passed into the hands of the Marathas, and save for a short period of Muhammadan occupation in 1690, it remained a Maratha possession, and became the head-quarters of the Rastia family. (*Imp. Gaz. of India*, XXIV, 348) It is probable that Wai passed to the Rastias during the lifetime of Gopikabai. "The [*Rastia*] family obtained its first power under the Maratha Government owing to Gopikabai, one of the daughters of Bikaji Naik Rastia,

being married to Balajirav Peshwa, entitled Nana Saheb." (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 677) According to the genealogical table of the Rastia family given by Forrest, Anant Rao Rastiah mentioned by Mostyn was Gopikabai's brother. (*Ibid.* I, 677)

No. 32. THE MURDER OF NARAYAN RAO.

I. Mostyn's first account, on the very day of the tragedy, Monday, the 30th August, 1773, has all the characteristics of reliable information gathered by one who was on the spot.

He records in succession the various rumours as they reach him:

(1) the outbreak of disturbances at one o'clock in the afternoon;

(2) the dispatch of servants in quest of information and their return after half an hour with the news that the soldiers had seized the palace;

(3) the unofficial gathering of the ministers at three o'clock at the chokey and their discussion as to what steps to take;

(4) at four o'clock, contradictory rumours of Narayan Rao's murder and of his imprisonment—followed by the report that Raghoba has been proclaimed Peshwa.

Nor does Mostyn give any undue importance to these various rumours: "As I cannot for certain learn whether Naron Row is really killed or not, I must defer advising my superiors of this sudden change untill to-morrow."

II. Mostyn's second account, on the day after the murder, is in keeping with his account of the previous day. He merely states the information which has reached him, without any attempt at dramatization by means of a detailed, vivid description.

(1) Narayan Rao's murder and the burning of the body;

(2) the conspirators' intention to imprison Narayan Rao;

- (3) Raghoba and Sumarsing's secret agreement to kill him ;
- (4) the share of all the ministers, except Nana Farnavis and Hari Pant, in the plot to imprison Narayan Rao ;
- (5) Sakharam Bapu's part in carrying out the plot ;
- (6) the seizure of the palace by the soldiers ;
- (7) the devising of the plot six months previously, and its sudden consummation at the instigation of Raghoba and Sakharam Bapu ;
- (8) Narayan Rao's ignorance of the threatening danger ;
- (9) The secrecy observed by the conspirators ;
- (10) the political changes.

III. Mostyn's third account is contained in his letter written to Bombay on the day after Narayan Rao's murder. It is also a plain summary of events :

- (1) the seizure of the palace ;
- (2) Narayan Rao's vain appeal to Raghoba to save him ;
- (3) Narayan Rao's murder ; Raghoba's proclamation as Peshwa ;
- (4) the secrecy with which the conspirators went to work ;
- (5) the possibility of political changes ;
- (6) the need of making a present to Raghoba.

The closing sentence of the letter ; "As it will now become absolutely necessary to make Ragobah a present" ... etc., jars upon one's feelings by its provoking unexpectedness. At the same time it is characteristic of the practical politician and matter-of-fact man of business ; and it brings home to us that Mostyn's account is a faithful representation of the events as they took place. Moreover, there is in Mostyn's triple account a gradual advance from the vague to the definite, from hesitation to certainty, which is a further sign of the writer's sincerity and truthfulness, apart from the absence of every attempt at fine writing. In this connection Mostyn's triple account may be usefully compared with Grant Duff's carefully written, vivid narrative, of which the opening sentence is full of dramatic appeal ; "But the attention of the whole of India was arrested, and there was a momentary pause

in the bustle of political affairs, by reports, which proved correct, of the murder of Narain Rao, Peishwa, on the 30th of August." (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 698) Then there follows a detailed, well-planned, realistic narrative of the tragic event. (*Ibid.* I, 698-700) The total absence of all literary display in Mostyn's *Diary* creates an impression of genuine veracity. Mostyn's account is so obviously simple as to exclude deceit.

With this study of Mostyn's account of the murder of Narayan Rao before our mind, the following allegations made by Major B. D. Basu, I.M.S. (Retired), are passing strange: "Is there any wonder that Mr. Mostyn, seeing that he did not succeed in gaining the object for which he had been sent by his masters, tried to 'foment domestic dissensions' by abetting, if not directly instigating, the assassination of Narain Rao? It is also very significant that nowhere in his despatches has Mr. Mostyn ever hinted that the assassination was carried out by Raghoba. He could not have been ignorant of what the whole population of Poona were saying about the assassination. On the other hand he blackened the character of the murdered prince of whom Grant Duff writes; 'He was affectionate to his relations, kind to his domestics, and all men but his enemies loved him'. (Basu, *Rise of the Christian Power in India*, II, 48)

These allegations are passing strange. First of all Major Basu is mistaken in asserting that, according to Grant Duff, Mostyn was sent in 1772 to Poona to foment domestic dissensions. First he quotes the passage from Grant Duff: "Mr. Mostyn was sent to Poona by the Bombay Government for the purpose of using every endeavour, by fomenting domestic dissensions or otherwise, to prevent the Mahrattas from joining Hyder Ali." Next he writes, "The Bombay Government were very anxious about Hyder and Nizam Ali at the time *when the young Peshwa was assassinated.*"

But Grant Duff's phrase "fomenting domestic dissensions," applies to the second embassy in 1767. (Grant Duff, *History of*

the Mahrattas, I, 653-658) Consequently there can be no question, in the passage taken from Grant Duff, of fomenting dissensions, between Raghoba and Narayan Rao, but between Raghoba and Madho Rao. It is altogether against every canon of historical inference to wrench Grant Duff's phrase from its chronological context, to postdate it by five years, and to adduce it as a convincing proof of Mostyn's connivance at Narayan Rao's murder, when good reasons can be brought forward to show that Mostyn had nothing to do with the dastardly crime.

Furthermore when Major Basu wrote that "nowhere in his dispatches Mr. Mostyn has hinted that the assassination was carried out by Raghoba," he badly blundered. Mostyn writes, "But to cut him [*Narayan Rao*] off, from what I learn, was not the intention of those that planned the scheme for Ragobah's release, *and kept a secret between Ragobah and Sumersing*, the man that killed him." (*Diary*, 31-8-1773) Again: "The scheme was laid six months ago, and every opportunity for some months watched to put it into execution, but a favourable moment never offered till yesterday, and even then *it was hastened by Ragobah and Sacaram Bapoos* having heard Naron Row had come to a resolution of confining them both in irons." (*Diary*, 31-8-1773)

Next Major Basu made bold to affirm

(1) that Mr. Mostyn "tried to foment domestic dissensions by abetting, if not directly instigating the murder of Narayan Rao;"

(2) that Mr. Mostyn "blackened the character of the murdered prince;" and

(3) that "the assassination of Narayan Rao was hailed with joy by Mr. Mostyn and the Bombay Government." (Basu, *Rise of the Christian Power in India*, II, 48.)

In dealing with these grave assertions we charitably suppose that, when Major Basu wrote this, he was in possession of unpublished documents that bear out his statements. On this hypothesis alone, can we refrain from making use of very plain language in commenting on Major Basu's so-called historical discoveries.

By way of conclusion we shall give another instance of Dr. Basu's vagaries as an historian. Grant Duff mentions the widespread rumour that Narayan Rao's murder was the result altering *dharawe* into *marawe* in the order given to the men who had to seize Narayan Rao. Grant Duff adds; "It is universally believed that the alteration was made by the infamous Anundee Bye."

The following is Major Basu's comment: "That woman, however bad she might have been, entertained a great affection for her nephew. She was a Brahman lady, and as such she felt great regard not only for human beings, but for dumb creatures also. No Brahman lady would herself kill or cause anyone to kill any animals. Anundey Bye was no exception to the rule. Our own conviction is that Mr. Mostyn had a hand in the matter. (Basu, *Rise of the Christian Power in India*, II, 41)

By way of comment and prescinding from the question of Anandibai's guilt, it is sufficient here to point out that historical facts belong to the realm of reality; they are not the result of metaphysical speculations on *ahimsa*, and much less are they determined by racial and religious antipathies raised to the dignity of "our own conviction".

Finally it should be borne in mind that a considerable period elapsed after Narayan Rao's murder, before the English began to give their support to Raghoba. Mostyn's attitude, as manifested in the *Diary*, is clearer than daylight; he is for ever warning the Bombay Government to have nothing to do with Raghoba: "All great officers are disgusted at Ragobah." (22-10-1773) "His army is rather decreased than recruited; some leave him in disgust, and others for want of pay; and though most of his troops are starving, I hear he has no money either to advance them, or even allow them the usual provisions." (17-10-1773) "Ragobah has undoubtedly behaved in a very unaccountable manner, not only to Nanna Furneese and to those who were Naron Rows friends, but to all the old ministers and great officers indiscriminately. All the former have left him in disgust." (15-11-1773) "Schemes are

forming against Ragobah." (26-11-1773) "I am told Ragobah escaped with difficulty, though not till he was wounded ; which, added to an intermittent fever and some ulcers on his knee, makes many think he is in a dangerous way." (2-12-1773) "But was he [*Raghoba*] now inclined to make offers, the situation of his affairs are such that it is doubtful to me if he has it in his power to give the Hon'ble Company these advantages they have a right to expect ; for his orders, I verily believe, would not now be obeyed". (2-12-1773) Similar passages might be easily multiplied to show that the British support, when given to Raghoba, had nothing to do with Narayan Rao's murder.

In writing all this, it is not our intention to champion the policy of expediency and opportunism, dictated by the Bombay Government and followed by Mostyn in his dealings with the Marathas ; though we should like to observe that the putting of expediency before principle is not the monopoly of the servants of the Christian Power in India ; for the Moghuls, the Marathas, the Jats, the rulers of Oudh and many others followed the same policy at some time or other. Nor is this policy a Christian principle at all ; just as it is not a Hindu or a Muhammadan principle, though it may be acted upon by Christians, Hindus and Muhammadans, not because of their religious tenets, but in spite of them ; inasmuch as from the earliest times it has been the custom of politicians, not to be guided by religious principles, but to ignore them, though at times they drag in God's name to give to a victory on the battlefield the appearance of Divine approval. This is an important distinction which Major Basu seems never to have grasped. Our end and aim is merely to point out that Major Basu's assertion that Mostyn was responsible for Narayan Rao's murder is an allegation pure and simple and a gratuitous calumny.

No. 33. PARVATIBAI.

Parvatibai is one of the most pathetic figures in Maratha history. She was the wife of Sadasiva Rao who died on the

battlefield of Panipat, but Parvatibai refused to believe that she was a widow. She was no doubt upright and "a lady very much respected," (Macdonald, *Memoir and Life of the Late Nana Farnavis*, 24) but she seems to have been somewhat weak-minded. Anyhow, she persisted in her belief that her husband had not died, and refused to go through the religious ceremonies made on the occasion of a woman's incipient widowhood. When an impostor arose and pretended to be the true Sadoba of Panipat, Parvatibai was only too easily induced by priests, menials and other interested parties to acknowledge the impostor's claim.

Her belief was, however, not shared by Madho Rao, Raghoba and other responsible members of the administration ; and a most interesting document in proof of it is Madho Rao's will, in which he states that the misfortunes which had befallen the Peshwa family were due to the anger of the gods impatient with Parvatibai's disregard of the religious ceremonies to which a Brahman widow was bound to submit. Accordingly Madho Rao explicitly mentions in his will that Parvatibai should have her head shaved. (*Itihasa-Sangraha* edited by Parasnis)

However, it would seem that this clause of Madho Rao's will was quietly ignored ; for in 1773 Parvatibai had not yet assumed the weeds of widowhood and still clung to the belief that the impostor was her husband, kept in bonds by his enemies. At last in 1776, when the impostor, who had succeeded in escaping from prison, was recaptured, Parvatibai's doubts were set at rest. She was confronted with the impostor, acknowledged her mistake, and Sadoba was beheaded (1776).

But before her death Sadoba's story "obtained immediate credence [*in Bombay*], and the Bombay government to whom he very soon sent wukeels and addressed letters, received the overtures of Suddaba, as they called him, and were evidently hopeful that this fresh insurrection would work in their favour." (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, II. 48). Mostyn was also fully

persuaded that the impostor was the real Sadoba. (*Diary*, the 30th January, 1774)

It may here be remarked that the leaders of the Barbhai plot did not act honourably when, in order to persuade Parvatibai to accompany Gangabai to Purandhar, they held out to her promises of Sadoba's release, (*Diary*, the 30th January, 1774) thus conniving at a piece of shameful deception, whilst they themselves could not have any doubts about the imposture of the claimant.

No. 34. MARATHA CLAIM ON KORA AND ALLAHABAD.

"On his [*Shah Alam II*] arrival at the capital, the Mahrattas, enthroned him with the usual ceremony, which in such circumstances could only be termed a mockery, and caused him to issue such firmans and grants as best coincided with their views; and the Shah, as a reward for their pretended fidelity to his cause, made over to them by a formal instrument the province of Korah and Allahabad and also every territory east of Delhi without exception, thus giving them an unrestrained commission to extend their ravages into all the countries on each side of the Ganges." (Hamilton, *Historical Relations of the Rohilla Afghans*, 170-171) According to this account, the Maratha claim on Kora and Allahabad dates back to December, 1771, when "Shah Alum, having taken leave of his English friends, was met by Mahadajee Sindia, escorted to the camp of Visajee Kishen, under whose auspices he entered his capital, and was seated on the throne in the end of December, 1771" (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 680)

Another account states that the claim of the Marathas on Kora and Allahabad originated in December, 1772, when "a battle took place [*between the Emperor's troops and the Marathas*] in the environs of Delhi, in which the Mahrattas were victorious after an obstinate conflict. The terms required by the Mahrattas on this occasion were far from immoderate; they

obliged him to give them a grant of Korah and Kurrah, two provinces east of the Jumna, adjoining their frontier in Bundelcund, which the English government had obliged Shujah-ud-Dowlah to cede for the emperor's support." (*Ibid.* I, 704)

But the Maratha claim on Kora and Allahabad dates prior to the year 1771.

During the reign of Ahmad Shah (1748-1754) the Moghuls were at war with the military leaders in the neighbouring provinces. At the head of the Moghul forces was Safdar Jang of Oudh, Ahmad Shah's vizier, who "entered into a treaty with the Mahratta chiefs, Apa Jee and Mulhar Row, procuring their alliance by giving them a large sum in advance and bonds to a considerable amount, in consequence of which they joined him with a body of 50,000 horse." (Hamilton, *Historical Relations of the Rohilla Afghans*, 104)

These warlike operations were cut short, when the news spread that Ahmad Shah Abdali was marching against Delhi (1756). Thereupon the Moghul Emperor, Alamgir II, (1754-1759) bade Safdar Jang return to Delhi. Accordingly Safdar Jang made peace with the Rohillas against whom he was fighting, on condition "of their delivering him bonds to the amount of 51 lakhs to be discharged out of the ensuing collections of the country, with a promise to pay every year in future a *peishkush* or quit-rent of five lakhs to the Emperor, of whom they solemnly professed to hold their territories in fealty. The bonds, the obligation of which the Rohillas had not the most distant idea of ever fulfilling, were delivered by Safdar Jang to the Maratha commander, Mulhar Row, as a security for a part of the subsidy still remaining due to him ; and on the before-mentioned terms the Afghans were re-instated in all their former possessions, and affairs in Rohilcund once more bore the aspect of tranquillity." (*Ibid.* 112, 113)

The following remark is added by Hamilton in a note : "It may not be here improper to remark that this event, however remotely, may be considered as the origin of all the subsequent revolutions in Rohilcund, being the foundation of the Mahratta claims in that quarter." (*Ibid.* 113, note.)

The Bengal Government were apparently aware of this ; for in their letter to Mostyn they allude to the ancient claim which the Marathas have to Kora and Allahabad.

In the light of this ancient claim, the question arises with what right the English disposed of Kora and Allahabad, "which the English Government of Bengal had obliged Shujah-ud-Dowlah to cede for the Emperor's support, as long as he chose to continue under the British protection ; but as he had voluntarily relinquished all the benefits of their alliance, they claimed the right of disposing of the reversion, and determined to repel any attempt the Mahrattas might make for their occupation." (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 704) The Maratha claim on Kora and Allahabad was prior to Ahmad Shah Abdali's occupation of Delhi, on the 11th September, 1757. Eight years later, the districts of Allahabad and Kora were cut off from Oudh and assigned to Shah Alam by the treaty of Allahabad in 1765. This treaty quietly ignored the ancient Maratha claim.

Again when the English determined to repel any attempt the Marathas might make to occupy Kora and Allahabad, they did so on the plea that Shah Alam, who granted these districts to the Marathas in 1772, had no right to dispose of them, since he had abandoned the protection of the British. But here also it must not be lost sight of that Alamgir II had already practically disposed of Kora and Allahabad in favour of the Marathas in 1756.

It is true that the Maratha claim of 1756 was mainly concerned with money to be paid by the Rohillas ; but from a Maratha point of view this implied also the right of invasion and occupation in order to enforce the payment that was not forthcoming.

No. 35. THE DEFEAT OF THE JATS.

The great enemy of the Jats and of Nawal Singh, nominally the regent for his infant nephew, Kheri Singh, but in reality the Raja of Bhartpur, was Mirza Najaf Khan, Shah Alam's faithful general. (Qanungo, *History of the Jats*, I, 238-239)

Accordingly Nawal Singh joined the Marathas and fought with them on the 28th December, 1772, under the walls of Delhi. It was then represented to Alam Shah that Mirza Najaf Khan was the cause of all the trouble with the Marathas; and the faithful general was dismissed from service. (*Ibid.* 248-249) But three months later in May, 1773, Mirza Najaf Khan returned to Delhi with his reputation and power greatly increased by having served as general with the Marathas in their campaign against the Nawab of Oudh, Shuja-ud-daula. (*Ibid.* 250-251)

With Mirza Najaf Khan's return to power, Nawal Singh and the Jats were doomed to suffer one defeat after another. They lost the fort of Maidangarhi, they were defeated at Dankaur (15th September, 1773); they lost the battle of Barsana (31st October, 1773), and finally had to surrender the city of Agra. (*Ibid.* 250-266)

Regarding the capture of Agra, the following account gives us an insight into ways and stratagems nobody can admire.

About this time the news spread that the Nawab Wazir-al-Mulk (Shuja-ud-daula) was coming to the assistance of Nawal Singh; in fact he had sent in advance a detachment for taking charge of the fort of Agra from the Jat garrison. Najaf Khan, hearing this, gave up his plan of subduing the Jat country around Deeg, and, practically running a race for Agra, reached there just in time to prevent the junction of the Jats with the troops of Wazir-ul-Mulk Finding his own design upon Agra anticipated, Shuja-ud-daula at once changed front, and with consummate duplicity sent a letter of congratulation to Najaf Khan, assuring him that he had come to these parts to assist the Amir-ul-umra! At the same time Major Polier,—the commandant of the detach-

ment sent ahead—was thus secretly instructed: "If the *qiladar* of Akbarabad [*Agra*] consents to give up the fort according to previous agreement and understanding, then, throwing off the mask at once, you should try to get into the fort by every means. If you fail, you are to act under the command of Najaf Khan and obey him as your superior." The citadel of Agra was besieged by Najaf Khan and Major Polier. The *qiladar* tried without success many tricks to bring in secretly the troops of Shuja-ud-daula. After defending it bravely for some time, he gave up the fort on the promise of the safety of life and property of the garrison. Najaf Khan entered the city of Agra on the 11th December, 1773. The fort fell about the beginning of February, 1774. (*Ibid.* 268-269)

No. 36. RAGHOBHA'S UNPOPULARITY.

The triple account of Raghoba's defeat at Bidar proved to be a false rumour. But from this we may reasonably infer that there were secret forces at work to make Raghoba unpopular. Bazaar rumours are often false, but they are not always meaningless. "From the reports of those partial actions the unpopularity of Rugoba might be read in repeated accounts of his being defeated wounded, or at the point of death." (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 706)

It has been impossible to trace the extract of one of Mostyn's letters quoted by Grant Duff, where it is alleged: "However one [*man*] cut through the tent walls, and made a blow at Rugoba, which took just below his right shoulder, cut four inches down the arm, and half through the bone; afterwards a firing commenced, when a musket ball gazed along his left arm, so that he is now lame of both arms, has a fever and several ulcers above his knee." The fever, the ulcers and the wounds are mentioned by Mostyn, in his *Dairy*; but the other details given in the above extract are missing. (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 706, note)

No. 37. THE NIZAM'S DEFEAT.

From Mostyn's account it would seem that in the conflict between Raghoba and the Nizam the latter had always the upper hand. But Mostyn only went by the rumours spread by Raghoba's enemies ; in reality the Nizam came off second best and was the first to give in.

Raghoba has been severely blamed for granting such easy terms to his enemies. "Rugonath Rao, to the great joy of his domestic enemies, in an effusion of misplaced confidence, immediately restored the whole [*of the territory yielded by the Nizam*] ; and though little can be said in excuse of his being thus cajoled by the well-known Nizam Ally, it is one of the many proofs that he was still more weak than wicked. (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 707)

Raghoba's action may, however, be viewed in another light. He was anxious to retain the peshwaship ; he knew that he was surrounded by enemies at home ; hence he was not only ready but anxious to make peace with his enemies abroad. He was probably aware of the risks he ran in trusting the Nizam ; but, all things considered, this may have seemed to him the wisest plan. That the Nizam proved an unfaithful ally does not necessarily imply a lack of political insight on the part of Raghoba, it rather casts a slur upon the treacherous prince who made promises and broke them.

No. 38. THE BARBHAI PLOT.

Mostyn's Diary disproves the contention of those who would have us believe that the plot against Raghoba was entered upon after it had become known that Gangabai, the wife of the murdered Peshwa, was pregnant, and after it had been discovered that Anandibai was trying her utmost to bring about Gangabai's miscarriage. The plot was not an eleventh hour affair.

On Tuesday, the 25th January 1774, Mostyn writes that he is anxious to see Moroba, "as I may probably be able to learn something of what is intended by the party [*which*], I have for a long time been privately acquainted, is forming against Ragobah by almost all the Brahman officers and old ministers. (*Diary*, 25-1-1774)

Again on Sunday, the 30th January, 1774, Mostyn writes to Calcutta, "I, in my different addresses, advised you of the situation of affairs here and also with the disaffection of the ministers to Ragobah's government. They did not however openly appear to act against him till yesterday," i.e., when Gangabai was carried off to Purandhar. (*Diary*, 30th January, 1774)

Mostyn's statement that he has often spoken of the disaffection of the ministers with regard to Raghoba is made good in many an entry of the *Diary*. In January, 1774, the plotters thought that the time had come for them to carry out their plans; but from Mostyn's *Diary* it may be rightly inferred that they had long been silently at work, before they ventured to throw off the mask by declaring open warfare against Raghoba. Gangabai's pregnancy was the occasion, not the cause of the Barbhai plot; its true cause was probably inspired by motives much less patriotic than are at times ascribed to the "Twelve Brothers."

No. 39. TRIMBAK RAO MAMA.

"Trimbuck Rao Mama was the maternal uncle of the late Sewdasheo Chimnaje Bhow," (Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, 603) Forrest's statement that "Trimbak Rao married Sadashiv Pant's sister," is not correct. (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 689) It may here be added that Trimbak Rao was a distinguished soldier, and eventually fell in an action, while commanding an army in support of the ministerial party, in 1774. (*Ibid.* I, 689; Mostyn's *Letters*, the 31st March, 1774 and the 13th April, 1774.) In a battle which took place towards the end of March, 1774, Trimbak Rao's army was defeated, and he himself after

receiving several wounds was taken prisoner. He died of his wounds in April, 1774.

No. 40. SALSETTE.

The Salsette question is fully discussed in a letter addressed by the Bombay Government to the Governor General and Council, Calcutta, on the 31st December, 1774. (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, I, 204) It is mentioned therein "that the Portuguese had this season received with their new Captain-General a very considerable reinforcement of men and ships from Europe, and that their undoubted designs were immediately to attempt recovering from the Marathas Salsette and Bassein... We have been compelled to this proceeding [*the capture of Thana in Salsette*] at this juncture and without your concurrence more from our duty to prevent these places from falling into the hands of the Portuguese than to retain them in the Company's possession, though this last is much to be desired." (*Ibid.* I, 206)

"As some offers had been made before by the Killedar of Thana, the principal fort of the island, to deliver it to us for a certain sum of money, the Resident was empowered to close with him on the most moderate terms; but the Killedar now excused himself from proceeding further in the business, alleging that the Ministry at Poona, having obtained intelligence of the designs of the Portuguese, had reinforced his garrison, which put it out of his power to deliver it up in the manner he before wished to do." [*Ibid.* I, 205] From this it would appear that these offers were made before the threatened Portuguese attack.

"It therefore only remained for us to send such a force as was judged necessary to reduce it [*Thana*], which was accordingly despatched under the command of Brigadier-General Gordon and Mr. Watson, Superintendent of our Marine; and we have the pleasure to acquaint you that Thana was taken by storm on the 28th instant (the 28th December, 1774), after our army had been thirteen days before the place." (*Ibid.* I, 205)

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