

EDUCATION AND MODERN NEEDS

by

J. H. NICHOLSON M.A.

Principal, University College, Hull

1936

IVOR NICHOLSON AND WATSON
LIMITED LONDON

THE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION LIBRARY

EDITED BY DR. C. W. KIMMINS
M.A. (CANTAB.), D.SC. (LOND.)

EDUCATION AND
MODERN NEEDS

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1936

*Made and Printed in Great Britain by C. Tinsling & Co., Ltd.,
Liverpool, London and Prescott.*

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	7
I INTRODUCTORY	15
II CHURCH AND STATE IN HISTORY	27
III HOW THE SCHOOLS GREW	35
IV THE VICTORIAN COMPROMISE	50
V THE END OF AN EPOCH	61
VI THE CHALLENGE TO COMPROMISE	75
VII A DIGRESSION	90
VIII WHAT FREEDOM MEANS	98
IX THE HEAD AND THE HEART	111
X LIVING AND LEARNING	123
XI THE SCHOOLS AND DEMOCRACY	138
XII EDUCATION FOR INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE	148
XIII EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP	160
XIV EDUCATION FOR LEISURE	183
XV EDUCATION AND REALITY	199
XVI CONCLUSION	216

NOTE

I ACKNOWLEDGE the courtesy of the New Education Fellowship in giving me leave to incorporate in Chapter IX material from an article which I wrote for *The New Era in Home and School* for January, 1935. I have also included in Chapters XII and XIV paragraphs from an address which I gave to the North of England Education Conference in 1935.

P R E F A C E

A MAN I have known for some time said to me a few years ago: "Well, Nicholson, there are only three things worth having opinions about—women, politics and God—and I don't know what you think about any of them." All he got in reply was another epigram! He was probably right in reproaching me. Most people find it either quite impossible, or fatally easy, to keep their counsel. I expect I belong to the second group, who "learn to labour and to wait." Some things get done that way. The danger is that one comes to give decisions rather than to hold opinions—expediency becomes a kind of principle.

In this book, anyhow, I intend to give a point of view. Those who are looking for a full description of educational systems, and detailed recommendations, must seek them elsewhere. The fact is that recent events have shocked me out of my assumptions, and perhaps out of some part of my discretion. It is odd that that did not happen sooner. My working days have been spent mainly in teaching and in administering education, which may be a narrowing experience. But for an academic man I have had a fairly eventful life—including three or four years of war and a year's travel round the world as an Albert Kahn Fellow.

The war was for many men a disintegrating experience; but we were told that it was a war of defence, a war for the safeguarding not only of democracy but of civilisation itself. It was assumed that we knew what democracy and civilisation meant, and that, while problems remained, we had achieved both. In a sense, this war for

democracy consolidated our hold on traditional values, unless we went to pieces altogether. Our confidence in old values has been shaken less by the war than by what followed it.

The main object of M. Kahn's generous foundation was said to be the comparison of new values with those already known. A year's travel, spent for the most part in Asia, certainly achieves that. But I imagine that the results vary with the temperament of the traveller. In my own case two conflicting impressions were deeply implanted in my mind. On the one hand, this rapid passage from one culture to another made me feel that most social values are relative to the circumstances in which they arise. Men accept in the main the values or the beliefs current in their society. What seems self-evident in Europe may seem incredible in India or Japan and vice-versa. Science alone seemed to have claims to universal acceptance. I saw two revolutions, one in Italy, one in Peking. In parts of China, I found a society vividly described to me by Dr. W. W. Yen as "a tray of sand"—ready to take whatever shape a passing finger might impose on it, incapable of holding that shape—no basis of organic unity, except in the age-long habits of local communities. On the other hand, I met numbers of men and women, of different races and faiths, whose strength of purpose was rooted in passionate conviction—often in some social or political mission which possessed their will and directed all their energies. Their convictions differed widely and were often in conflict; but they shared this sense of assurance which made life purposeful and coloured the whole of their experience. Talking with them, I envied their conviction; if only one could reach such certainty oneself! How sure they were of themselves and of their cause. Their faith might be mistaken, but it was magnificent and it was contagious. Alas! the more right one seemed

to be, the more wrong must be those who opposed him. The Indian nationalist and the British administrator could not both be right in their rival views of the same situation. Conviction is a lovely thing; social order is the bedrock of civilisation. Balancing these impressions against one another, I think that I came down, on the whole, on the side of order, though with many misgivings; the price of social continuity seemed so high, so terribly wasteful of conviction. Further, I distrusted the principles on which order was ostensibly based. I was no disciple of Kipling. Fresh from a war "for self-determination and democracy," my over-logical mind could not fail to grasp the stark contrast between profession and practice. Policy seemed governed by expediency. Perhaps the best one could do was to maintain some kind of equilibrium between the rival thrusts in any society—a precarious balance to be re-adjusted as circumstances changed. Back in England, it was almost a relief to find myself again in a society whose basic assumptions I shared. No racial problem here, no conflict of mother-tongues; class-differences and divergent interests, but no caste; a general strike which petered out largely because of the assumptions shared by the two sides; revolution unthinkable; universal franchise introduced by a Conservative Government; women who had won the vote politically indistinguishable from men; self-government taken for granted, parliament accepted without enthusiasm but also without question; as a personal background, the ordered life of a university, with its freedom of teaching and its absence of any major political problems. Holidays in western Europe confirmed this impression. Germany was again a friendly place to walk in. France and Belgium had returned to normal. I revisited the United States and found the same wonderful hospitality, the same unquestioning belief in unshakable prosperity

and in the stability of American institutions. On the whole, a tolerable world, though full of problems and uncertainties.

Of course there was Russia. I could never share the strange, exaggerated hostility to the Communist experiment which at that time affected so many Englishmen of the middle classes, nor the passionate enthusiasm of a minority. What was happening in Russia seemed irrelevant to English conditions. The fear of Russia seemed to me unreal and exploited for purposes that did not lie on the surface of policy. The possibility of an English Communism on the Russian model was too remote to be worth bothering about. Conditions were utterly different, and I had learnt on my tour the close relation between conditions and political principles. Perhaps if I had visited Russia I should have felt differently; I cannot say.

I had been in Venice when the march on Rome took place. My sympathies then were in the main with the young Fascists. I left Italy for Nice in a train full of them, bright lads flushed with success, singing songs in praise of "liberty and discipline." I did not understand Fascism, but I had seen the old Italian government crumple up at the first touch of opposition—without the courage to suppress Communism or the ability to maintain order against this new threat. A government that cannot keep order must go. That impression remained vivid, even in the days of castor oil.

I think it was the persecution of Italian intellectuals that first made me realise that something quite fundamental was happening in Europe. A few years later, on a visit to Germany, I saw the emblems of National-Socialism—the swastika banners flung across the quiet streets of a small Rhineland town. When I next visited Germany, Hitler was in full power. I was in Frankfurt when the plebiscite of 1934 was taken, and the campaign

for the Saar was opened. In the four years between my two visits, I had at last realised what Fascism in its many different forms meant. It was a direct challenge to what I had regarded as the accepted foundations of European civilisation. It was not merely a policy of expediency, the child of necessity and desperation. It was a philosophy of life, all-embracing and relentless, making an absolute claim on obedience. From incredulity, I passed to strong impatience with the futile denunciation of large sections of the English Press. Here was a thing to be opposed, certainly, but also to be studied, if possible, at first hand. The atrocities in Italy and Germany served a purpose; they shocked even consciences brutalised by war and dulled by the depression. Russia ceased to be "public enemy No. 1." The danger-point had come nearer home. Old fears of Germany revived; it was difficult now to separate a sincere hatred of persecution from impulses based not on altruism but on self-preservation. It became almost impossible to examine National-Socialism dispassionately, or to take it seriously as a form of government. It became, for many Englishmen, just another example of German "frightfulness"—the war psychology again.

It was only very slowly that I accepted the fact that here was a threat, not merely to the security of Europe, but to the principles of freedom and self-government everywhere. Fascism is a faith, as Communism is a faith; we on our side have but a feeble faith with which to answer—we have only assumptions, principles that have become habits, ideals and values inherited from a time when they were born of conviction, but long since accepted as commonplaces. Circumstances have changed, but we have gone on assuming that the old principles will serve. It is long since they were subjected to any thorough-going analysis. Perhaps we have even forgotten how to value at first-hand. The Fascist

challenge has taken us by surprise and we are not ready for it; we do not really know where we stand. We have become accustomed to dealing with our problems piecemeal. We have no longer a philosophy of society, perhaps most of us have no longer any living faith from which such a philosophy can draw its strength.

In this crisis we have two alternatives. The first is the course recommended by Burke.* "Whenever our neighbour's house is on fire it cannot be amiss for the engines to play a little on one's own." That is a counsel of fear, and fear is never a sufficient answer to faith. Repression cannot solve a social dilemma, it can only postpone a solution. What is the other alternative? Nothing less than an examination of our assumptions so searching that it will dig down until it reaches the solid rock of conviction. That is always a painful operation, and we shirk it. We are so busy with immediate problems, and many of us are afraid—it is long since we did any fundamental thinking. We must find a faith which will be as wide in its range as the faiths that have given Russia, Italy and Germany a new sense of purpose, a new will to do and to suffer. We need more than political principles; we need a philosophy of living, which can become the basis for new principles of action. Communists and Fascists find their principles in activity. That is perhaps why Russia, Italy and Germany are so difficult for us to understand. They are too empirical for our taste; we want consistency. Only Mr. Roosevelt, among democratic statesmen, has the courage to follow that road, to learn while doing, to revise both values and principles in accordance with experience.

I find that my own values have shifted. I still set a high value—perhaps too high a value—on order and continuity. Civilisation has taken so long to build up,

* Edmund Burke: *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

and it is so precariously held. But I have lost faith in the stability of an order that is not based on principle. Principle itself has a new meaning for me. I have come to set a new value on what in this book I have called "feeling"; I have learnt that it must find a place in the search for new principles. What its place is, and how it can be trusted without infringing the rights of reason, I have tried to make clear in what follows. In short, where I find conviction in conflict with conformity, I am far more inclined than I was to weight the scales in favour of conviction.

¶ I also find in myself a shifting of interest. The ultimate questions seem less interesting, the valuation of experience more so. Perhaps this is just middle-age! Yet I doubt it, for many middle-aged men are only too ready to rationalise their prejudices; they shirk first-hand valuations. It is not that I think the ultimate questions unimportant, but I am pursued by the urgency of knowing my own mind on what lies immediately before me.

In a society under reconstruction, or in need of it, what is most significant for the future often lies on the margin of consciousness. Intuition may spy what has not yet come within the range of reason. The poet with his symbolic thinking may be ahead of the philosopher in time, more open to the intimations that are to become later the material of thought. Truth must often be felt after before it can be grasped and analysed.

As an educationist, my main concern is with the schools. But as Aristotle saw, a school implies society. I cannot—or at all events, I should not—be one person as a teacher and another as a citizen. My friend and critic, if he reads the chapters that follow, will find little explicitly about God, not much about party politics, and next to nothing about women. Perhaps he, and other readers with him, will remain unsatisfied. Let

me assure him that I share his dissatisfaction. I wish I knew the answer to these questions. If I have not answered them, I have at least made a little clearer to myself, and I hope to him, the direction in which I believe an answer must be sought.

I

INTRODUCTORY

A SCHOOLMASTER said to me the other day, "I hope decent living depends on something else than Christianity or most of my boys will soon go to pieces." Of course there are several answers to this. Perhaps the schoolmaster ought to have made his boys better Christians (though I doubt whether this answer would carry much weight nowadays), or perhaps, by Christianity he meant church-going. A friend of mine suggested a different answer: "But surely decent living *is* Christianity." That is worth discussing, but it is not the standpoint of the Churches; for them belief in God and (at least in some sense) in Christ is essential. What the schoolmaster meant is clear enough: "If a man does not hold the Christian view of the universe will he stick to Christian morals?" There is of course a further question which the schoolmaster might have asked: "Is there any reason why he should?"

This book is not a defence of Christianity as a basis for education, nor an attack upon it. It is a plea for a deeper inquiry into the aims and methods of education in the light of the modern situation. In times when most men shared the same fundamental beliefs it was not difficult for them to agree on educational aims: they could be taken for granted. When William of Wykeham founded Winchester College and New College, Oxford, his aim could be stated quite simply:* "By the grace of God diversity of knowledge shall thrive, and diversity of faculties also, that is to say, the faculties of philosophy

* Quoted in J. W. Adamson's *Short History of Education*, page 61.

(i.e. arts), civil and canon law, and above all of sacred theology, that in especial Christ may be preached more fervently and more frequently, and the faith and worship of the divine name may be augmented and more strenuously sustained." It is not so easy to-day to state honestly the aims of a great school. It is not even easy to say what parents expect from the schools to which they send their sons and daughters. In most cases, of course, it is Hobson's choice—no other school is available at fees they can afford. Even where finance makes a choice of school possible, the school selected is often chosen less on educational than on sentimental or social grounds. Many a man has entered his son at the school to which he went himself as soon as the son was born. Most men who can afford it choose a public school rather than a secondary school or a private school even if they did not attend a public school themselves. They know that it would be useful to the boy later to be able to say that he was at school there and that in many cases the friends he makes are more important than the education he receives. I am not suggesting that the education at public schools is bad, but only that the reasons for which parents send their sons to these schools are at least as much social as educational.

Any real discussion of education cannot be separated from a discussion of the society which the schools serve. This is particularly true in England where like most institutions the schools are a growth. They have changed with the changing needs of society and particularly with changes in the economic background. Like most other English institutions which have a long history behind them the schools have brought with them down to modern times survivals of practices and perhaps of ideals which could not have arisen in a present-day setting. The school system of England may be compared to a series of geological strata—without of course suggesting that

the vestiges of former times which are embedded in the lower strata are entirely fossilised!

There are at least two educational systems in England, and except at the university stage they hardly touch. The older system has grown up round the public school and the ancient university. The preparatory school was added as a kind of apprenticeship. Thomas Arnold refused to admit boys to Rugby below the age of thirteen or thereabouts. Although most preparatory schools are in private hands, they are tied in tradition to the public schools—a tie which has been strengthened by the institution of the common entrance examination. The second of the two systems of schools is of recent growth, though—again like most things in England—it has drawn freely on an older tradition. The elementary schools may claim as ancestors parish schools which had existed all over England (though unevenly distributed) for centuries, but Bell and Lancaster are the real founders of the modern elementary system. Until the passing of Forster's Education Act in 1870 it was officially assumed that it was not the function of the State to provide education. The schools were built at first entirely by money subscribed by the charitable. The first grant from the State—made in 1833—was only £20,000. That sum was increased from time to time and by 1870 the State's contribution was important and perhaps indispensable. But the principle of voluntary provision remained until then. From 1870 onwards the State accepted responsibility for filling the gaps in the voluntary system—a necessary condition of compulsory attendance. The elementary schools drew inspiration from the work of Pestalozzi, but they were thoroughly English in character. The rise of the secondary school system is one of the most interesting and tangled chapters in the history of English education. Secondary schools owed little to the example of the public schools, while on the

other hand their relation to the elementary schools was not clearly defined until the beginning of the 20th century.

Whether a parent chooses the school to which he sends his children or not, he would generally find it difficult to say what he expects the school to do for them. In spite of such experiments as Parent Teacher Associations, Home and School Councils and the like, the general public remains profoundly ignorant of what is done in school. There is a good deal of criticism, particularly from employers of labour, though I think that on the whole there is a growing appreciation in the business world of the value of general, as opposed to vocational, education. It took the teachers and the universities twenty years to persuade business men that "matriculation" was important. Educationists have now begun to doubt its value themselves; it will probably take them another twenty years to revise the business man's acceptance of its necessity! In short I doubt whether parents, employers or the public generally have any clear idea of what the aims of education should be. I think this is because they try to answer educational questions without digging deep enough. It is really impossible to plan your schools until you know what kind of society they ought to serve—and perhaps also until you have made up your mind about much more fundamental questions, including even the nature of the universe.

May I add a word of explanation here? A reader who glances through the first few chapters of this book will find little reference to these fundamental questions. The ground must be cleared first. In my view the very existence of these questions is often masked by a growth of day-to-day problems which must inevitably claim the attention of practising teachers and administrators. The danger is that few of them have leisure or inclination to look behind the surface. The general public does little

to help them to a deeper view. I believe that this mass of immediate problems can only be cleared away, and the deeper issues revealed, by approaching the present position through its history. That must be my excuse for the sketch of development which fills Chapters II and III. Again, the mass of administrative problems which face us is apt to bewilder unless it can be seen as an expression of conflicts of principle. I have not found it possible to isolate these administrative problems from their history, but I have dealt with them as they arise naturally in tracing the growth of the schools.

Our present system has grown in the main out of a series of compromises. Just as there has never been any clean break in our political history (except for ten or twelve years in the 17th century—years which men tried to forget at the Restoration), so the life of the schools has been continuous. There are landmarks, but there is no fresh beginning. In the preamble to the Education Act of 1918 the purpose of the Act is said to be the establishment of a national system of education. A good deal has been done in the last thirty-five years to bring the different types of school into some kind of relationship, but we have certainly not achieved "a national system," and an attempt to achieve this at one stroke by legislation would be bound to fail. In particular the two systems of schools referred to above cannot be forced into partnership. Nowadays holders of State and County Scholarships are entering the ancient universities in increasing numbers, while the modern universities are beginning to attract public school boys, but if the two systems meet at the top they have practically no relation with each other until that stage is reached. The experiments which have been made at some public schools of offering a few scholarships to elementary schoolboys are not likely to be widely followed. It is interesting that most of the grammar schools, which

arose out of the older tradition, have either become grant-aided secondary schools or in a few cases have achieved the status of public schools. Had they developed differently, they might have provided a bridge between the two systems.

In England we love best that kind of progress which preserves continuity of form. This has the grave disadvantage that ghosts of the past haunt our best efforts at change. On the other hand opposition can often be disarmed merely by preserving the old labels, and quite radical changes may carry with them the goodwill of those who would fight to the last ditch against the destruction of the semblance of the old order. In studying English education then, we must look behind the façade (which has often been preserved intact) to the interior of the building itself (which has sometimes been drastically reconstructed). In the chapters which deal with the development of English schools I have tried to make the main points stand out and to omit all unnecessary detail. What is important is the clash of ideals and policies which have gone to the making of our English education. "The conflict of studies" in the 19th century and the controversies over religion have left a deep mark upon the schools. A full understanding of the present position can only be reached through its history.

A good administrator must be a man of tidy mind. He is happiest when the system he administers can be docketed and catalogued and if possible described in statistical terms. The English educational system is not easy to handle in this way. The Governors of schools which have kept their independence till now fight hard against absorption. The Board of Education hesitates before exerting a pressure which might result in the closing of a school and its replacement by another school financed wholly out of public funds. In a sense there is

a continual struggle going on between two tendencies in English education to-day—on the one hand the tendency to administrative tidiness, and it must be added to a raising of the standards of equipment and teaching; on the other hand the tendency to resist absorption and to retain local autonomy. Perhaps the best way to an understanding of the situation is service upon a Local Education Authority, but that is open to few. For the sake of those without this experience, it may be helpful to discuss at least some of the major problems of administration. But I have dealt with administration only so far as an understanding of it is essential to my main purpose—a discussion of principles and policy. With the publication of the “Hadow Report” in 1926 attention was focussed on one very important problem—the relation between elementary and secondary education. Opinions will differ as to whether the reorganisation of schools which has followed the publication of that report carries out its main intention of “secondary education for all.” It is rather unfortunate that the importance of this report has overshadowed the later reports on junior and infant schools. Once again we seem to be missing an opportunity of re-planning the educational system as a whole. To plan need not mean to stereotype—in fact I shall make later on a strong plea for variety and flexibility; but it does mean that every proposal for reform should be based upon a clear educational ideal.

Once this preparatory work is done one is face to face with deeper problems. Some twenty-two centuries ago Aristotle wrote that schools must be planned in relation to the constitution of the State. I think he meant by constitution not merely the political machinery of government but the structure of society. His advice has often been neglected. Far too many books on education—including some of the greatest—deal with teaching as if it was a problem in two terms—the teacher and the

taught. There is always a third term—society. The teacher comes to his task equipped not only by some kind of formal training but by his experience gained as a member of a community. The contents of his mind are to a large extent a social product—a product of the particular society in which he has been brought up. This is not the place to discuss the problem of human freedom. I accept the view that man is not the sport of blind chance or of economic forces, but that he has in some measure at any rate the power to select, to arrange, and even to create; but an original moral or æsthetic judgment must be as rare as a great invention. For the most part we depend for the furniture of our minds upon the varied social groups to which we belong. The same is of course true of the boys and girls who come to school. But their experience is shorter, their minds and personalities are more flexible, since they are younger than the teacher. The schools cannot escape the influence of their social environment, but they ought not merely to reflect it. Education aims at adjusting the individual to the needs of society. That is a most important function of the schools. Growing up is not an automatic process, except in a rough general way. It is beset by numerous pitfalls. At any stage development may be arrested and the personality warped by adverse circumstances, by bad teaching, or even by difficulties which seem to arise from within the personality. But the adjustment of the individual to society is only one half of the schools' task. The other half is too often overlooked. The schools (including the colleges and the universities) should aim also at helping boys and girls to develop into men and women who will not be mere parasites upon their social environment and its traditions, but will themselves help to form social ideals and put them into practice. Aristotle is right. Until you know what kind of State you want you cannot know what kind

of citizens you need, and until you know that you cannot know what kind of education you should have. There can be no real agreement on educational aims between those whose political ideal is a dictatorship and those who believe that freedom—or rather a society of free individuals—is above all things desirable. In the same way conflicts with regard to the structure of society, the arrangement of classes within it and the distribution of wealth are bound to be reflected in educational policy. Our educational thought must be of a piece with our political and our social thought. Failure to realise this is bound to lead to friction and discontent if not to upheaval. The order of thought should surely be, first to know our mind on the fundamental questions, and then to organise the schools and the teaching they give in such a way as to fit in with our social ideals.

It is the same in questions of truth, questions of faith and questions of taste. I suppose it is possible to hold a philosophy of society which takes no account of metaphysics or æsthetics. The social philosopher may say simply that he is not interested in such matters, and in point of fact many workers in such subjects as economics would give this answer, at all events when they were speaking as specialists. It is a part of the price a specialist has to pay. He must limit his range if he is to be effective in his own field. A practical economist knows, however, that all sorts of factors which are outside his particular science affect the economic life of society. As an economist he may have to ignore them. If he happens to be called upon to accept responsibility for policy he must take them into account. Among these considerations are the views which men hold not only about human society but about the universe. Those who hold (as the rulers of the totalitarian States apparently do) that these ultimate questions are matters for experts, and that the ordinary man's duty is to accept and to

obey, cannot desire an education which encourages individual initiative or even group-resistance. In Germany to-day, the only groups which have had the courage to resist the policy of national socialism are the Churches. This is of course no new phenomenon in the history of human society. To resist the power of the State effectively a man must be convinced that some other authority has an over-riding claim on his obedience. The nature of the authority which enables a man to offer resistance may vary widely. He may do so at the command of an organised Church or solely by virtue of his belief in the claims of reason. The only point I wish to make here is that his view of the universe is a very powerful factor in determining his conduct as a member of society. If then education is concerned with social needs it must also concern itself with more ultimate questions. If the Christian view of the universe is right then any education which is not based on Christianity is a false education, lacking an essential element. If the Christian view of the universe is mistaken, then any education which assumes it as a basis for conduct is equally mistaken and contrary to the real interests of society. I do not see how any compromise on this question is really possible. Here, as in many other matters, administrative compromise may be useful and even necessary, but there can be no compromise of principle. A bargain may be struck—one may concede something in order to gain something else. The danger of compromise is that it tends to blur conviction. With the passage of time, the conflict of principle is forgotten, and compromise takes on the appearance of agreement.

I am convinced that educational policy must flounder unless it faces these ultimate questions. I think we are in for a period of less and not more agreement in the field of education. I confess that I hope so, for I believe that reality can only be recovered by a new growth of con-

viction and probably of rival convictions. I cannot foresee in any detail the shape which the new system of education to which I look forward will take, but I believe that it must reconcile (and not merely compromise upon) two positions which seem at first sight to be flatly opposed. On the one hand, it must be thought out as a whole. It must take into account the discoveries of psychology on the nature of the human mind and the processes of learning, and it must be related to a clear view of human society and its economic and political structure. It must look wide enough to embrace, at least in idea, the universe. A man whose fundamental beliefs on society and reality are not unified with his view of conduct is at war with himself. I think that most of us to-day are in that condition. It is an important part of the task of education to help us to unify our experience and our thought. On the other hand, the last thing I want is the solution adopted in the totalitarian States, which are seeking to enforce on the citizen body, through the medium of the schools, an "official" view of man, the society in which he lives and the universe of which he is a part. This solution of the problem cuts at the roots of creative activity and threatens to reduce it to the level of mere invention. Truth becomes the servant of policy. Harmony of life must be found, if at all, by each man for himself. It cannot be imposed from outside. I want our system of schools to be even more flexible than it is at present. It must provide for a greater variety of needs. It must in a sense be more tolerant of conviction. For my part, I would shut out only those ways of life and thought which defeat the object I have in mind. I do not believe that tolerance is the enemy of conviction. On the contrary, intolerance generally springs from a lack of it—a paradox which modern psychology has made only too clear.

On my own showing, I shall have to answer some very

searching questions. Must our schools take it for granted that constitutional self-government is the only sound basis for the State? If so, how will that decision affect teaching and organisation in the schools? Since it is unlikely that we shall all agree upon the nature of the universe, is the only workable compromise to omit from our education all reference to ultimate questions? These are fundamental matters; but there are many others of immediate importance. To take one instance, I do not think that any agreement on educational aims is possible between those who desire a society in which function depends solely on ability and fitness, and those who hold that wealth or birth should determine a man's social function.

Perhaps I have said enough to indicate the kind of inquiry with which this book deals. Its main purpose is not to advocate or defend any particular view of reality or of society, but to make a strong plea that whatever view a man holds on these matters should influence consciously and deliberately his thought on educational policy. It would be sheer hypocrisy to pretend that on some of these questions I have no convictions myself. What those convictions are will inevitably appear as I write, but I hope that the main position stands even for those who do not share my opinions. What matters most is that where men differ on any important question of educational policy they should recognise that behind their disagreement there lies a conflict of principle. Once this is faced, reality will come back to the discussion of educational matters.

II

CHURCH AND STATE IN HISTORY

THE early history of the schools is embedded in the history of the Christian Church—which must be glanced at first. The Middle Ages are sometimes represented as a time when the hand of the Church lay so heavy on Europe that all progress in thought was stifled, until her power was broken at the Reformation. It is true that the Church claimed, and indeed exercised, a monopoly of learning; there were few learned men outside the ranks of the clergy and there was no freedom of thought in the modern sense. But that is only half the picture. It is at least as true to say that it was the Church which made the survival of an ordered civilisation at that time possible. Throughout the Dark Ages which followed the fall of the Roman Empire in the west the Church preserved and handed on the heritage of Rome, which must otherwise have been lost. To take an obvious example—it was in the main owing to the care with which manuscripts were copied in the monasteries that so many of the Latin writings have come down to us intact. In matters of thought the Church claimed complete authority, but in point of fact she was often fairly tolerant of speculation if it did not openly challenge her authority or threaten her with schism. On the other hand her power extended to every side of life. For instance there was little secular literature. Again, she provided the mediæval artists and craftsmen with most of the themes that inspired their work. There was even a traditional symbolism which they had to adopt, though of course there was room for a wide variety of

treatment. It was only towards the end of the 15th century that art, like thought, broke away from traditional models. But it would be untrue to suggest that the Middle Ages was a period of stagnation. In the 12th century especially there was intense vitality and a good deal of innovation both among the thinkers and the artists. The important point is that until the unity of Christendom was broken by the Renaissance and the Reformation thought and art could move only within the circle of the Christian faith as interpreted by the Church.

The Church performed for civilisation another task, as important as the handing on of Latin culture and much more difficult. There are at least five separate strands in the European tradition. The culture of Greece and the religious inspiration of Judea had already intermingled in the days of the Macedonian Empire. Hellenistic Judaism prepared the way for Christian philosophy. The Romans, with their genius for government and administration, established throughout Europe the framework of the provincial system. Within this framework, before the days of Christianity, many different faiths and philosophies grew and contended with one another. Centuries later the Crusades were fought to prevent Europe from becoming Moslem. Islam had penetrated as far as the centre of France in the 8th century and for nearly a thousand years Arabs and Turks threatened Eastern Europe and at one time the Turks pushed their conquest as far as the gates of Vienna. Although the contact between Christian Europe and Islam was mainly a long drawn out conflict, Islamic thought and science exercised a considerable influence on Christian Europe. Until the end of the 15th century the Moors were in possession of Southern Spain, where they have left magnificent relics of the skill of their builders and craftsmen. In Southern Italy, Arabic medicine stimulated to new activity the studies which had

existed there since the time of the Greeks. As is well known, it was the Arabs who laid the foundations of modern mathematics. The Emperor Frederick II—crusader though he was—had a mind open to the attractions of Arabic science and speculative thought, and the influence of Islamic culture at this time was probably greater than has been realised.

The civilisation of Europe is an amalgam. It was a difficult enough task to convert the Germanic tribes which invaded the Roman Empire. The Church succeeded in doing this. But she had then to reckon with the influences which were pressing upon Europe from Islam throughout the Middle Ages, and later with the revival of Greek learning and speculation at the Renaissance. She set herself to defend Europe from attacks from without and from heresy within. Looked at in another way, her supreme achievement was the building of European civilisation out of a variety of different and often discordant materials. She was bound in honour to bring everything to the test of the Christian faith. Where she could not reconcile thought or institutions with the basis of her life she rejected them. But her own thought and organisation were continually being developed by generation after generation of able and cultured men. For centuries, as one religious Order declined another was founded to revive the passion for religion. As one system of thought broke down under the criticism of its opponents, other thinkers arose to find a new philosophic basis for the Christian faith.

While the mediæval Church was an organic unity, the States of Europe were as yet little more than the personal property of their rulers. The only political unity on the secular side which could claim any authority over Christian Europe as a whole was the Holy Roman Empire, and its power waxed and waned as Emperors

came and went. Effective unity in the West was the creation of the Church. It is in the light of this achievement that the Church's insistence on orthodoxy must be understood. The State (if indeed one can speak of the State at that time) accepted the alliance of the Church because both Church and State had one great need in common—the maintenance of order. But the alliance between Church and State was often uneasy and broken by grave conflicts. The struggle between Popes and Emperors, which lasted for centuries, was not only a struggle for power; it turned on rival interpretations of the nature of society. The Popes held that Kings and Emperors derived their authority from the Church. Their consecration could only be performed by the Church and the Church could at need depose them and free their subjects from their oath of allegiance. The Emperors held that the Empire itself was a divine institution—a view which found a parallel later in England when the theory of the Divine Right of Kings was developed by the Stuarts. The rival standpoints can be stated fairly simply. Is human society in itself a divine, or at least a "natural" institution, or must it draw its sanctions from the authority of the Church? The conflict between Popes and Emperors was reflected at one time or another in every European State. Where the Church was hostile it was very difficult for a King to keep his throne. Henry II of England found it wise to do penance for the murder of Becket. Henry IV humbled himself at Canossa before Gregory VII. There were three possible solutions of this problem. Either the supreme authority of the Church must be acknowledged, or the State must control the Church, or there must be a "concordat" between Church and State, each accepting in fact the rights of the other in its own sphere. Secular rulers had to decide between these three policies. Henry VIII boldly chose the second,

and established the control of the State over the Church. The French Kings compromised and accepted a concordat. The Spanish monarchy allowed itself to be used by the Church as an instrument for the extirpation of heresy—and paid the price of its submission.

To sum up: the vast influence of the Church in social arrangements can be judged fairly only if it is realised that she alone was able to maintain some kind of cultural unity throughout Europe, and that the State was as yet too weak to maintain order even within its own borders if the Church was hostile. Until the idea of the State, and its administrative framework, had developed to a point when it could at need stand alone, the relations between Church and State were of necessity the biggest problem which secular rulers had to face. As the power of the State grew, one after another of the functions which the Church had exercised were in practice surrendered. Many of the earliest struggles between Church and State turned on the claims of the Church to exercise exclusive discipline over the clergy. Both in England and on the Continent of Europe the submission of the clergy to the secular law was achieved only after an intense and protracted struggle. In the Middle Ages, many of the chief Ministers of State were of necessity churchmen. The Chancellors were clerics and this gave the Church a great, if indirect, influence on the development of law. Art won its freedom at the Renaissance; science (including the practice of medicine) declared its independence then, but did not make good its claim until centuries later.

Throughout Europe, the Renaissance marked an important stage in the growth of national cultures based on national languages. It was certainly so in England. The Elizabethan age followed quickly on the work of Henry VIII. The older historical text books often imply that Henry broke with Rome because the

Pope would not give him a divorce from Catherine of Aragon. This may have been the occasion of the breach, but the real causes lay deeper. Henry VIII was a Renaissance monarch. He was a very versatile man, acting by turns the parts of theologian, musician and patron of letters. His political policy was typical of his time. He entered whole-heartedly into the struggle for power then going on in Europe, siding now with Charles V and now with Francis I, and attempting to make the weight of his little kingdom felt by moving it first to one end of the political see-saw and then to the other. His dominating personality made it almost inevitable that he should wish to be master in his own house. Henry VII had left him a full treasury. The troubled state of Europe gave him his opportunity. In religious matters he was not an innovator by conviction. In fact for a time he attempted to establish in England a Catholicism independent of the Pope. Circumstances were too strong for him and he sought allies among the continental Protestants, but he loved authority too much to look with favour on Protestant views of Church or State, and at the end of his reign he tried to return to a form of English Catholicism dependent upon himself. Henry VIII at one time burnt Protestants for heresy and executed as traitors Catholics who denied his right to the title "Head of the Church." After the Reformation, uniformity was less easy to enforce. But the Church did not abandon her claims. Shortly after arriving in England, James I tried to come to terms with the Puritans. He soon abandoned the attempt, and told them roundly: "No Bishop, no King," and he went on to say that he would make them conform or he would harry them out of the land. To Royalists and churchmen, the Commonwealth was just an interruption. At the Restoration, it seemed obvious that the old alliance between the monarchy and the Church of England must be

re-established. Neither side really believed in toleration. Those who stood for freedom when they were in opposition often became persecutors when they came to power. Under the Commonwealth "freedom of religion" was established—but it did not extend to "Papists and Prelatists." Men and women who sought freedom to worship God in their own way founded and settled colonies overseas. Maryland and Pennsylvania were States with a definitely religious basis. The colonists were, however, often as intolerant of minority convictions as the rulers of the country they had left to seek their own freedom. In Catholic and Protestant countries alike, the interests of religion were felt to involve the censorship of all thought. Descartes found it prudent to express himself in terms which in their surface meaning at all events were perfectly compatible with the Christian faith.

It is true that, even in the Middle Ages, the Church's claim did not pass unchallenged. In England, the first great protest against ecclesiastical authority took place as early as the 14th century, when Wycliff and the Lollards fought for the rights of the individual conscience. In southern Europe, the Albigenses challenged the authority of the Church successfully for many years. But toleration was not accepted in principle in England until after the Revolution of 1688—and then only on grounds of expediency. The Revolution was the work of a coalition between the moderate Tories and the Whigs—or to put the matter in religious terms, between the members of the Church of England who feared the Pope and distrusted the general policy of the Stuarts, and Protestants who "dissented" from the Church. The last "tests" were abolished in the 19th century. In most European countries, uniformity was enforced, in principle, up to the French Revolution. The French Kings had compromised for a time with their Protestant

subjects after the wars of religion. But the Edict of Nantes, which gave the Huguenots freedom of worship in certain defined areas, was revoked in 1685, when the monarchy again felt itself strong enough to enforce uniformity. In Germany the Peace of Westphalia which closed the 'Thirty Years' War established the principle that the ruler of each German State could choose the Church to which his subjects should belong. The Swiss had solved the problem by agreeing that there should be Catholic and Protestant cantons. The Dutch alone, in Western Europe, anticipated the English experiment in toleration. From the modern point of view, the policy of requiring religious conformity seems difficult to understand. I doubt whether we are really more tolerant than our forefathers. Our own different attitude springs in the main either from a lack of conviction or from the discovery that the State is now well enough established to do without the support of a united Church. Recent events in Germany show that the question may again become one of vital importance.

III

HOW THE SCHOOLS GREW

THE earliest English education was in a sense a classical education. Latin was the language of the schools, as it was the language of the Church and indeed of all learned intercourse. The early schools were in a full sense Christian. They arose out of the needs of the Church. The Offices in church and cathedral were sung in Latin, and the boys who formed the cathedral choir had to be taught to pronounce this language though not necessarily to understand it. Choristers learnt Latin in the "Song Schools" attached to the cathedral. There was also generally a grammar school where boys learnt to read, write and speak Latin as well as to pronounce it. Greek was forgotten in Western Europe until it was revived at the Renaissance. The whole of education was in the hands of the Church. Few people outside the ranks of the clergy could read or write.

The Church kept a firm hold over education down to the time of the Reformation, and in most of the countries of Europe until much later. In England schools required the licence of the Chancellor of the diocese, who was responsible for the education given. So far as the ancient classics were known and taught in the Middle Ages, they were taught by churchmen, and the Church interpreted as she taught, reconciling the various authorities with each other and with the Christian faith. The connection between religion and schooling had been so close in the Middle Ages that the break in the unity of the Church was inevitably reflected in education. Up to the time of the Reformation it is not difficult to

describe European education as a whole. Although there were many local variations the scheme of study was similar throughout Europe. Everywhere Latin was the medium of instruction and a Catholic basis of education was assumed. From the time of the Reformation it is almost impossible to write a general history of European education. The story of the schools in different European countries must be traced separately. In each case it is bound up with the changing relations between Church and State. This is not a history of education, and from the time of the Reformation I must content myself in the main with a sketch of the development of education in England, referring to foreign developments only so far as they had an influence on English schools.

The English Reformation did not weaken the control of the Church over the schools, though that influence was now exercised in a new way. From the reign of Henry VIII onwards, educational policy was affected not only by the policy of the Church but also by the policy of the kings and queens who were its "heads." Henry VIII was the real founder of the modern English State. In a sense he was also a founder of modern English education, for his break with Rome launched the schools on the difficult task of finding an alternative basis to Catholicism for their teaching. The Tudors acquired a reputation as founders of grammar schools. Many of these schools were in fact founded out of the revenue of dissolved monasteries and chantries; often they had previously existed as part of an ancient foundation. The schools were dragged at the wheels of the State in matters of religious policy down to the Revolution of 1688. Great headmasters no doubt took their own line, and in practice there is more continuity in the life of the schools than one would imagine possible in the circumstances, but it was only at the end of the 17th century that education

became in any real sense free to develop a policy independent of political needs.

Every change in ecclesiastical policy had its effect on education. There must have been among the schoolmasters many who adopted the policy of the Vicar of Bray. Changes in Church policy were brought to bear upon the schools through the fact that they required the Chancellor's licence. After the Restoration the "Non-conformists" began to organise schools of their own. This was vigorously resisted by the Church and the schools were allowed only at a distance of five miles from a corporate town. The Revolution of 1688, which brought freedom for dissenting ministers, also brought the right to teach in towns to dissenting schoolmasters. From that time onwards the orthodox schools under the control of the Church, and dissenting academies, grew side by side. In the case of the universities, the struggle was fought out still later. Until the middle of the 19th century degrees at Oxford and Cambridge were open only to those who subscribed to the Articles of the Church of England. University College, London—the first College of the University of London—was founded largely to make it possible to obtain a degree without "subscribing."

To put it shortly : at the Reformation English education had become national in the sense that it lost touch with the Continent of Europe : at the Revolution of 1688 it won a measure of freedom from the control of the State. These changes of policy had an important effect upon the subjects taught in schools and on the methods of teaching. English gradually displaced Latin as the medium of instruction in the grammar schools, but they were still bound by their charters to make classical studies the basis of the education they gave. For the same reason the teaching of science and even of modern history and modern languages was almost entirely excluded. As late

as the beginning of the 19th century Lord Chancellor Eldon gave a ruling* that the endowments of grammar schools could not be used for such modern studies. The schools were freed from these restrictions only in the third quarter of the 19th century. The Nonconformist academies which sprang up in the 17th and 18th centuries did not suffer from these restrictions. Most of them had no endowment, or if they had it was of recent date and did not impose the old conditions. When the ban on Nonconformist teaching within corporate towns was lifted in 1689 it was possible for the first time in many towns to found a school where modern studies were taught. To the conflict over religion there was added a conflict of studies which raged throughout the 19th century. There were now two kinds of higher education in England: the classical training given in the public schools and other endowed schools, and the more modern courses of study in the "private" schools. It would not be true to say that these newer schools were necessarily better than the older ones. Dickens pilloried the bad private school as "Dotheboys Hall." Some of the best schools were hampered by difficulties of finance and they had to build up a teaching tradition of their own; but it was in these schools that the first experiments in teaching science and other modern studies were made. At a much later date the pioneers for higher education for women and girls founded schools which were also free of the old restrictions for the same reason.

Modern subjects and modern methods of teaching found their way with great difficulty into the great public schools. For many years after Samuel Butler of Shrewsbury and Thomas Arnold of Rugby had brought about the reform of these schools science was still frowned

* Adamson, *op. cit.*, page 225. Throughout this Chapter, I am deeply indebted to this book, and to *English Education, 1789-1902*, by the same author.

upon. It was said that scientific studies did not feed the mind as the old classical education had done. Education was still dominated by the theory of "formal training." It was held that the mind possessed certain "faculties" and that each of these faculties could best be trained by the study of certain subjects. Apparently most of the faculties could be nourished most easily on Greek and Latin—a convenient theory, since the charters of the schools allowed the teaching of little else! There was thus in the 19th century a double conflict over education. On the one hand there was a struggle between those who still wished to keep for the Church of England some vestige of monopoly and those who wished to abolish all educational tests; on the other hand a fierce battle was joined between the advocates of the new science and of the claims of history and modern languages and the defenders of the traditional basis of English education.

It was in this atmosphere that the elementary school system was organised. It was philanthropic in its origins. Two great societies were founded early in the 19th century—the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church, and the British and Foreign School Society. Fortunately these societies are generally known simply as "The National Society" and "The British Society"! The first, as its name implies, was connected with the Church of England, the second was supported by Nonconformists. At this time there was an intense rivalry between two men, both of whom claimed to be the inventors of the new system of teaching—Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster. Both advocated what was known as the monitorial system—"a new mode of conducting a school through the medium of the scholars themselves."* Under this system teachers instructed senior scholars who in turn passed the instruction on to

* Adamson, *op. cit.*, page 244.

their juniors. From a modern point of view it is easy to criticise such a system as mass production in education, but the work of the National and British Societies was an important step in the development of English schools. There was a race between the two societies for the establishment of at least one school in each of the towns and larger villages of England. These schools were the foundation of the voluntary system. They were at first independent of all help from the State. Between 1833 and 1870 the State aided the schools set up by voluntary effort without building schools itself. The system under which the grants were administered varied from time to time. For nearly thirty years (1862 to 1890) there was a system called payment by results. The scholars in each school were examined by inspectors and the grant earned by the school depended upon the number of children who could answer the questions put to them. Here again it is easy to criticise. The system obviously invited cramming and superficial teaching. When the modern plan of inspection based on a test of general efficiency was substituted a great advance in teaching methods was made. Meanwhile the State had at last come into the field. Although Forster's Education Act of 1870 had set up School Boards in all parts of the country with power to levy a rate and establish elementary schools in their areas it was not until 1881 that attendance became compulsory. Universal elementary education has been established in this country only for half a century—a fact which should always be borne in mind by critics of the schools.

Secondary education in the modern sense dates from 1902. The history of the earlier phases of secondary instruction is extremely tangled. Of course instruction given in the grammar schools for many centuries might rightly be described as secondary; but that word has now come to have a fairly precise meaning. Secondary

education in the modern sense developed out of a number of 19th century experiments. The government grants which were given to the voluntary schools were administered by two separate departments—the Department of Education which made grants for the teaching of the so-called three R's (the schools taught religion too), and the Science and Art Department which made grants for special courses, whether these were held in the ordinary schools or elsewhere. Towards the end of the 19th century there arose a demand for the education of older children either in the daytime or in the evening. "Higher elementary schools" were founded in certain places and evening classes were established in connection with day schools. These classes were financed in part by grants from the Science and Art Department in addition to grants from the Department of Education. At this time technical education was not sharply distinguished from secondary education, and several committees of inquiry failed to reach a clear definition of their respective functions. One of the most curious chapters in the history of the English schools is the handing over of the so-called "whiskey money" to County Councils in 1889 to enable them to aid technical instruction. It was typical of the spirit of compromise which ruled educational policy at this time that instead of making a direct grant from the Exchequer Parliament allocated a part of the money derived from Customs and Excise duties for this purpose.* Many of the technical courses financed in this way would to-day be called secondary. This made a third source from which secondary education could receive help. By this curious back-door method the assistance of the State was extended beyond the limits of the elementary school. At the end of the 19th century the compromise broke down. The courts decided that it was illegal to spend the grants from the

* Adamson, *op. cit.*, page 335.

Department of Education on schooling of this kind. This breakdown was one of the causes which led to the Education Act of 1902 by which secondary education was at last established on a firm basis.

The administration of education in the latter part of the nineteenth century was also very confused. Three central authorities shared responsibility—the Charity Commissioners, the Department of Education and the Science and Art Department. Locally, in addition to the managers of the voluntary schools, there were the School Boards, which levied an education rate and controlled the schools financed out of this rate (hence these schools were called Board Schools), while the County Councils were the authorities for technical education. It was clearly time that the administration of education should be simplified. By an Act of 1899 the powers of the central authorities were vested in the newly formed Board of Education. There was a keen struggle over the reform of the local authorities responsible for education, and a great opportunity was missed. In 1902, the School Boards were abolished. It had been suggested that the County and City Councils should be the authorities responsible locally both for elementary and for secondary education. This proposal was defeated. County Boroughs were given power to provide schools of all types. But in County areas, the larger towns and urban districts have the right to provide their own elementary schools; secondary schools can be provided only by the County Council. This division of responsibility has led to difficulties of all kinds. It is particularly important at the present time, for if the new senior schools had been organised within the secondary system they would have passed, in County areas, into the hands of the County Councils—a development which would have been keenly resented by the authorities for elementary education.

The Education Act of 1902 also compromised on the religious question. It established the so-called "dual system" by which there are two kinds of elementary schools, known as "provided" and "non-provided" schools respectively. The provided schools are built and staffed by the local authority with the assistance of a grant from the Board of Education. The non-provided schools are the property of the managers, who are generally appointed by some religious society. The non-provided schools are aided from the rates, and indirectly from the taxes. The managers must maintain the fabric of the building and most of the permanent fixtures, while the cost of staffing and equipment is met out of public funds. The managers have the right to provide in the school religious instruction in accordance with the tenets of the body to which the school belongs. There is a provision (called the conscience clause) by which parents who wish to do so may withdraw their children from this religious instruction. The teachers are appointed by the managers; the Education Committee must, however, be satisfied with regard to their professional qualifications. This is an uneasy compromise. It led at once to the protests of the "passive resisters" who deducted from their education rate a sum which they calculated was spent on denominational religious instruction. This movement of protest died down, but the problem has arisen again in a new form. If all children are to leave the elementary school between their eleventh and their twelfth birthdays and go to a senior or central school, is this new school to be provided or non-provided? In some towns reorganisation has been seriously delayed by a failure to reach agreement on this question. The Government has just published proposals by which a building grant may be made out of public funds for the enlargement of a non-provided school made necessary by the raising of the school-leaving age to 15. In this

case, the local authority will appoint the teachers, but the managers will have the right to a certain number of "reserved teachers," qualified to give denominational religious instruction.

Another compromise had been arranged some thirty years earlier as the price of making school attendance universal. Forster's Act of 1870 provided for the giving of "simple bible teaching" in the board schools, and this had been continued in the provided schools. The teacher must not comment on the Bible in a denominational sense. The value of this religious teaching varies widely from school to school and from district to district. Some local authorities have been able to secure agreement between the Churches with regard to the syllabus, and methods of teaching have been greatly improved in recent years, but in many schools religious knowledge is the worst taught subject. One of the questions which faces educational reformers to-day is whether this compromise on the religious question can stand.

The public schools stood apart from all this ferment of educational ideas and policies. They had their own problems. In the eighteenth century they had fallen into disrepute and parents who could afford to do so engaged private tutors to teach their sons. The reform of the public schools begins with the work of Samuel Butler who was headmaster of Shrewsbury School from 1798 to 1836. He took over a school of 20 boys of whom only two or three were "foundationers."* Butler was the pioneer of the examination system. He insisted that exercises written in school should be carefully marked. He established a system of prefects and entrusted them with considerable powers over discipline. He introduced new subjects, especially History, Geography, Algebra and Euclid. He founded scholarships with which his boys could go on to Oxford or Cambridge. Butler probably

* Adamson, *op. cit.*, page 266.

deserves more credit for the reform of the public schools than is generally given to him. Thomas Arnold who became headmaster of Rugby School in 1828 is generally regarded as the second founder of the public school system. His work is widely known through Judge Hughes' *Tom Brown's School Days*. He recalled the schools to many of the ideals of William of Wykeham. He laid great stress on moral education. The corporate life of his school was centred in the school chapel. He made religion a living force. He appointed prefects and used the sixth form to influence the younger boys. He widened the curriculum, introducing History and other modern subjects. He found new ways of teaching the older subjects. He refused to admit boys to Rugby under the age of 13 and so made necessary the foundation of preparatory schools.

The work of reform was taken up by other headmasters, some of them trained by Arnold. It was not until later that science won its right to an important place in the curriculum—a reform due in the main to Sanderson of Oundle. Another headmaster—Reddie of Abbotsholme—made a clean break with many of the older school traditions. He attempted to bring his school into contact with the life of his day, basing much of the instruction upon practical tasks and encouraging a spirit of scientific inquiry. Most of the great public schools now have a modern side. In some cases brilliant boys are still generally encouraged to choose the classical side of the school, but this is by no means as true as it was even a few years ago. While many of the public schools thus reformed their teaching from within, the Public Schools Act of 1868 dealt with their government, abolishing those features of their charters which tied them down to the old classical teaching. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were nine public schools—Winchester, Eton, St. Paul's, Shrewsbury, Westminster, Merchant Taylors,

Rugby, Harrow and Charterhouse. Many new schools were founded during the century—including Marlborough, Wellington, Clifton and Cheltenham. Some, like Radley, Lancing, Mill Hill and The Leys, were denominational. Others were intended especially for the sons of men in certain professions. In addition to these new foundations some of the older grammar schools attained public school status—Uppingham, Repton, Sherborne, Sedburgh and Tonbridge were among these.*

Meanwhile the endowed schools which did not rank as public schools had also been freed from restrictions on teaching imposed by their charters. There was no bar to the introduction of modern studies, and under enlightened headmasters many of these schools made rapid progress. Others, however, still clung to the tradition of a somewhat stereotyped classical learning.

Even the shortest account of educational development in the 19th century would be incomplete without some reference to the growth of higher education for women. There were many private schools of varying quality for boys, and parents who could not afford, or disliked, the education given at public schools and grammar schools sent their sons to these private schools as the best alternative available. In the case of girls there was little choice. The elementary schools of course took boys and girls alike, but until late in the century there were no public schools for girls, and the education given in the grammar schools was generally unsuitable for them, even where there was no restriction on their admission. Wealthy families generally engaged governesses to teach their daughters. The attitude of the Victorians towards women did not encourage their intellectual development, and it needed a bold spirit in the pioneers to break through

* Cyril Norwood in *The Schools of England*, ed. Dover Wilson, page 118.

a bad tradition and to claim for girls equality of treatment in education. Miss Buss and Miss Beale are the two great names. Both were students at Queen's College, London—a college originally founded in 1848 for the training of governesses. Bedford Square College (later Bedford College) was opened in 1849. Miss Buss was the founder of the first public school for girls—called at that time the North London Collegiate School for Ladies. The Ladies College, Cheltenham, was opened in 1853, and Miss Beale became Principal five years later. Once a start had been made rapid progress was achieved. The school examinations founded about the middle of the century were opened to girls as well as to boys. Women could not of course take degrees at Oxford and Cambridge, but they could do so at London. It was in the schools and colleges presided over by these pioneers that most of the women who carried the work on to its next stage were trained. Unfortunately there are still many inefficient private schools for girls as well as good ones, but the equality of treatment given to boys and girls in the secondary schools has had its effect on the standard of work in private schools. The main obstacle to further improvement now seems to be the ignorance or inertia of parents who have daughters to educate.

No aspect of English education is more remarkable than the changing relations between the universities and the State and society they serve. Until the second quarter of the 19th century the only universities established in England were Oxford and Cambridge. Both arose out of the revival of learning in the 12th century. Up to the end of the Middle Ages the universities reflected closely the life and thought of the times. They were loosely organised—in fact it is not easy to say exactly when they came into existence, and in the strict sense they have no “founders.” William of Wykeham's foundation, New College, Oxford, provided a model for

later benefactors. The life of the College centred in the chapel and the members of the foundation lived in common. Something like a "degree" was instituted at Oxford as early as the 13th century. Seven years' study was normally required and this period was divided into a three and a four years' course—the so-called *Trivium* and *Quadrivium*. The mediæval universities were deeply influenced by scholasticism and the teaching they gave was in the main a training in Aristotle's philosophy, in disputation and in logical argument. The university language was of course Latin.

At the Renaissance a great conflict of studies took place. Greek found its way into the curriculum, but more important than this, the new spirit of inquiry and the revival of "Paganism" which accompanied it were in sharp conflict with the older tradition of Christian and Latin learning. Under the Tudors many new colleges were founded—Trinity College, Cambridge and Christ Church, Oxford among others date from this period. Universities were deeply involved in the theological controversies of the Reformation. They took their part in the struggle for and against the Stuarts; James II forced his own nominees on a number of Oxford colleges and alienated the traditional loyalty of Oxford to the Throne. Even in the Middle Ages ecclesiastical authority could not completely control speculation. After the Reformation the universities, like the schools, were required to conform to the prevailing Church policy of the Sovereign. The Revolution of 1688 brought less freedom than might have been expected. Until "tests" were abolished in the 19th century it was impossible for a man who was not a member of the Church of England to hold office at Oxford or Cambridge, or indeed to take a degree there. The ferment of intellectual life and inquiry in the 18th century hardly touched the official life of the universities. The new

scientific studies were taught by college tutors and independent teachers, but they were not recognised by the university. The shell of the old learning survived and hampered the new growth. It is not surprising that in the 18th century the universities fell into disrepute. They became little more than loosely related groups of colleges. The main current of intellectual life in England flowed elsewhere.

The 19th century saw a remarkable revival of university education. New universities were founded in industrial centres. These universities imposed no tests, and women were admitted to their classes and to their degrees. There was a new "conflict of studies." Even at Oxford, science won its way to equality with the arts. The universities began to teach outside their own walls. Many of the newer universities arose out of the extension lecture movement started by Cambridge and Oxford. At London the struggle over tests was fought to a conclusion. The admission of women to degrees at Oxford was achieved only since the war. At Cambridge they are still denied this formal sign of equality with men.

As we look back on the long history of English universities two great questions stand out. What authority should Church and State exercise over universities? What should be the relation between university teaching and the general intellectual life of the age? To me, at all events, the answer to both questions is clear. True learning can flourish only in an atmosphere of freedom. When external authority has imposed its will on the universities they have languished. When the universities themselves have shut out the newer learning the main stream of thought has found another channel for itself. It must always be so, unless learning is to lose its creative function and to become a vain repetition of traditional disciplines with no bearing on the living problems of thought and conduct.

IV

THE VICTORIAN COMPROMISE

It is hardly too much to say that from the conversion of the Saxons down to the time of the Renaissance all learning was in a sense religious learning, all education religious education. At the "Revival of Learning" first art, and then thought, began to disentangle itself from the religious setting in which it grew. Here from the start was material for conflict, and conflict can be resolved either by the victory of one side over the other or by compromise.

Throughout English history there has been a strong tendency to compromise. The greatest examples of compromise are the constitutional monarchy and the Church of England. The constitutional monarchy is a compromise between the claim of Divine Right made by the Stuarts and the republicanism of the Commonwealth. The Church of England is a compromise between the Catholic and the Protestant views of Church authority. To most Englishmen a man of principle often appears as an "extremist"—unless of course the principles to which he adheres are so widely accepted that few wish to quarrel with them. One of the most interesting tendencies in English life is the way in which a compromise develops into a kind of principle. The limited monarchy established in 1689 was an experiment, which at the time probably pleased no one. It had to be justified afterwards, partly by the genius of Locke, but chiefly by the fact that it worked in practice. The middle way of Elizabeth in Church affairs cannot have

been wholly acceptable to many of her subjects at first. It required the saintly scholarship of Hooker, and perhaps the "martyrdom" of Laud and Charles I, to give sanctity to so obvious a makeshift.

To compromise is all very well so long as it serves the practical need of reconciling those who hold rival principles, but every compromise is the product of a particular set of circumstances. When those circumstances no longer hold the compromise is apt to break down. It is almost bound to do so if there ceases to be a wide measure of agreement on its practical necessity, or if the rival principles again become so vitally important that men are willing to sacrifice for them not only position and wealth, but if need be their lives.

As late as the early part of the 19th century it was still dangerous to confess one's disbelief in any form of religion although the extremer penalties of earlier ages were no longer exacted. Certainly no party which was openly hostile to religion would have had any chance of controlling educational policy. One of the reasons why Brougham and the "education-mad" party failed to convert Englishmen to universal elementary education was that they were suspected of hostility to the claims of religion. Throughout the greater part of the 19th century most Englishmen could still say, in a phrase that has become famous, "We all believe in a God of some kind or other." This vague but widely held belief was the foundation of the Victorian compromise on education. It became clear on the one hand that Parliament would never consent to universal education controlled by the Church, and on the other that to the majority of Englishmen secular education was equally unthinkable. Hence the settlement described in the last chapter. Elementary education was to have a religious basis, but a "conscience clause" protected those parents who did not wish their children to attend

religious instruction. In the schools provided by the State the instruction was to be non-dogmatic—the phrase commonly used was “simple Bible teaching.” The conscience clause has special importance when the only school available is a “Church” or “Chapel” school; there must always be in attendance a number of children whose parents do not belong to the religious body which owns the school building and has the right to give dogmatic instruction.

A few years ago, it seemed likely that the compromise was about to break down. In the “provided” schools (that is, the schools provided by the local authorities) religious instruction was frequently given by teachers who had no interest in it, and in such cases it was given badly. Those who were really interested might not have the necessary knowledge to make their teaching effective. Teachers who gave religious instruction as a matter of choice and not merely as a matter of duty were generally active members of some Church; for them the restriction on sectarian comment was extremely hampering. The efforts which have been made in the last few years to work out an agreed syllabus which would be acceptable to most of the Churches interested in religious instruction in the State schools have had a measure of success. Some of the syllabuses are admirable, and many teachers are showing a renewed interest in the teaching of the subject. I do not wish to say anything which would discourage these efforts at agreement or this new keenness among the teachers, but I cannot help wondering whether this new compromise is likely to last even as long as the compromise it replaces.

The compromise on the religious basis of education was an act of deliberate agreement between the rival parties. Another compromise was less obvious to those who took part in it. The pious founders of the early schools often laid it down that the schools should be

open to the poor. By "poor" I do not think they meant the destitute—poverty is a relative term. I cannot support the plea that the great public schools were intended by their founders to provide only for the children of the poorer classes in the modern sense of that word.* But these early foundations always had a double purpose which was well expressed by Henry VI in founding Eton College: "To pray for our soul . . . and for the souls of all the faithful departed," and "To instruct in the rudiments of grammar . . . the said indigent scholars and others."† To found a school in those days was a work of charity, but by charity the founder did not understand only, or indeed mainly, the relief of the poor. The titles of the two great societies which in the 19th century rivalled one another in founding elementary schools show that this charitable motive was still alive then.‡ The voluntary schools founded at that time were charitable institutions—in the modern, and perhaps narrower, sense of "charity." These schools were certainly intended for the poor. When the State aided the schools, and later provided elementary schools of its own, the schools still had what can only be called a "class character"—they were the schools to which parents who could not afford any other school sent their children. In the main that is true to-day, and it is very unfortunate. The elementary school attempts to reconcile two rival views. On the one hand there were those who said boldly that it was the duty of the State to educate the children of its citizens. On the other hand there are still many who say "Why should I pay for the education of other men's children as well as my own?" In America and also in Japan the "common school" has been used deliberately to bridge

* cf. Adamson, *op. cit.*, page 63.

† Adamson, *op. cit.*, pp. 61 and 63.

‡ See page 39 above.

the gulf between social classes. The English compromise runs in effect like this : " Let us agree that on two grounds at least it is essential that we should provide free education for all those who cannot afford to pay for it themselves ; first as an act of humanity, and secondly because in a democratic community it is dangerous that those who have power should be uneducated—in the words of another famous phrase ' Let us educate our masters '." The compromise was probably necessary at the time. Even John Stuart Mill, keen advocate of education as he was, held that while the State should require every parent to educate his children it should not itself provide education. A less enlightened man could be persuaded to agree to State education only for mixed motives—on the one hand charity or humanity and on the other social security. I doubt whether the idea that education is properly a function of the State has won universal acceptance even to-day.

The third Victorian compromise on education dealt with the relation between the State and the voluntary bodies which previously provided schools. I have described this compromise already. It has served its turn, and even now it is unlikely that the tax payer would face the only real alternative—the direct provision of all elementary schools by the State. But it is a very uneasy compromise, particularly at the moment when reorganisation is taking boys and girls from the elementary school at the age of 11. In many areas the work of reform has been seriously delayed by the religious issues involved. The Churches are claiming that if the State requires them to provide senior schools they should receive a building grant from public funds. The secularists and many Nonconformists resist this claim. A suggestion has been made that the whole basis of the compromise on religious teaching should be re-examined. Some have proposed that the solution is to give to teachers of

denominational religion "the right of access" into the State schools, but it does not seem likely that either the Churches or the secularists will accept this solution.

The Victorians compromised also on another aspect of education which is much more fundamental than the conflict between the supporters of the voluntary system and the advocates of State schools. I have described already the struggle of science for a place in the curriculum. Its claims were opposed by those who felt that any true education must be based on a study of the humanities. Science met with opposition of a different kind from the upholders of traditional religion. The main attack was directed not against chemistry and physics, but against the new biology. Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published in 1859—perhaps in some ways the most significant date of the 19th century. The controversies which surrounded the word "evolution" had had no parallel for 400 years. Copernicus had shown that the earth is not the centre of the universe. Darwin now deprived man of his claim to be a special creation, and demonstrated his kinship with animals. His teaching was held to contradict the fundamental truths of Christianity, and in particular to cast doubt upon the inspiration of the Bible. It needed the genius of Charles Gore to show that there was no essential hostility between the new biology and the Christian faith. To-day discussions on the relation between science and religion turn on other issues and it is unlikely that any one would oppose the introduction of biology into English schools as "anti-religious." Chemistry and physics were admitted after a struggle, probably because they seemed to raise no such problems. In point of fact the attitude of the Victorian exponents of these sciences was quite incompatible with religion as then understood. The Victorian scientist made great play with such phrases as "causality" and "the uni-

formity of nature." He believed in "scientific determinism"—a view of the universe which, logically applied, rules out not only any spiritual interpretation of experience but also the possibility of any real freedom of choice or will. No doubt it is possible to teach chemistry or physics in a school classroom without raising these ultimate questions, and boys and girls are not very likely to stumble on them unaided, while the problems raised by biology cannot be shirked. I doubt whether in this case the Victorians were aware of the compromise they adopted. They taught religion and physics in the same school without attempting to bring them into any relation with each other.

I have spoken up to now in the main of the elementary school and of other schools provided or aided by the State, but the public schools had their own problem. I suppose it is a terrible heresy to suggest that Thomas Arnold's work at Rugby was based on a compromise for which education to-day is paying dearly. He revived the religious basis of public school education, and he made religion the driving force in learning and morals, but he accepted in the main the classical tradition which had dominated the teaching of the public schools from the earliest times. He did this without resolving a conflict which is far more troublesome in its practical results than most people realise. The boy who leaves a public school at 16 or 17 rarely acquires a mastery of classical languages. He is not, however, the boy on whom the schools leave their deepest mark. The claim of the public schools to an important place in English life rests on their capacity for the training of leaders in the Church, in politics, and in the professions. The boys who are destined for these careers generally stay at school until they are 18 or 19, and most of them go on to a university. If they are on the classical side many of them do succeed in acquiring enough Latin or Greek

to read the classics with some degree of confidence. At all events they struggle through a number of the masterpieces of classical literature. Where classical studies are well taught a serious attempt is made to give the boys a clear idea of the civilisation in which the classics grew. This civilisation was of course pre-Christian, and its social values as well as its speculative thought are not easily compatible with the Christian tradition. Nobility of character in the classical sense meant something very different from what is expected of a "Christian gentleman." In his Introduction to Plato's *Republic* Jowett felt it necessary to include a trenchant criticism of Plato's views on the "community of women and children." His translation shows that he is obviously uneasy at the task of rendering certain other passages of *The Republic* into English. No doubt Arnold and those who followed him upheld successfully the Christian view of virtue against the different and often strongly conflicting ethic of Greece and Rome. But the teaching of classics apart, there is a good deal in the life of a public school—and indeed in the life of every normal boy in his later 'teens—which is difficult to reconcile with Christianity as generally understood. The attempt to present the athletic virtues in Christian guise has been labelled "muscular Christianity." Apart from the influence of some outstanding personality such as that of Arnold I cannot help thinking that the standards by which the average schoolboy judges conduct are often closely akin to those of the Greeks and perhaps the Romans. Cicero speaks of the supreme pleasure to be derived from seeing one's greatest enemy defeated and led captive before one. An emotion akin to this would rightly be suppressed by any schoolboy who was unfortunate enough to feel it—he is taught that "it is the game, and not the winning, that counts." Other emotions which seemed normal and natural to Socrates and are

praised by Plato are by no means foreign to the experience of many perfectly normal public schoolboys. The problem lies in a sense deeper than conduct. It touches the springs of motive. In the public school tradition as shaped by Thomas Arnold, and also, it must be added, in the tradition of the older universities, there is a conflict between Greek and Christian values which must somehow be resolved. Here again the Victorians compromised.

On two other aspects of education the Victorians seem to have felt no need for compromise. Professor Dicey* believed that individualism—especially economic individualism—won almost universal acceptance in the 19th century. There were, of course, vigorous protests by Thomas Carlyle and William Morris, and by the group of Christian Socialists, but for the most part Englishmen believed that free competition was essential to progress, and the increasing wealth and success with which the century was marked seemed to prove that they were right. The foreign socialism of Karl Marx had as yet hardly touched English thought. It certainly provided no problem for educationists or educational administrators. They were safe in assuming individualism as the proper basis for the economy of the State. It was much the same with politics. The citizen's effective choice lay between the two great parties, led in the classical period by Gladstone and Disraeli. Both parties were utterly constitutional. The ordinary Englishman *assumed* a parliament. He measured the progress of other countries largely by the stage they had reached on their journey towards self-government. It was unthinkable that England would ever turn her back on the Reform Bill of 1832. The great extension of the franchise of 1867 was the work of the Conservative Party. It was certainly described by Lord Derby as

* See his *Law and Opinion in England*, pp. 176-183.

“a leap in the dark.” But the only question which could be seriously asked was whether the time was yet ripe or whether progress should not broaden still more slowly down. There was no real disagreement with regard to the direction in which political advance must inevitably be made.

We are only just being brought to realise—largely under the stress of the depression and by the rise of the totalitarian State abroad—that the economic and political assumptions of the Victorians are by no means as self-evident as they then seemed. For them these were not matters for compromise. Agreement was so widespread that those who disagreed could be ignored as cranks. In economic and political affairs education could afford to be neutral. I shall have to ask later on whether neutrality is possible any longer.

Every compromise contains within it the seeds of future conflict, unless, as I have said, it succeeds in establishing itself as a kind of principle. Issues of major importance must be thought out—and perhaps fought out—in English education before long. Are the schools provided or aided by the State to retain what one can only call their class character? Will the “dual system” by which responsibility for elementary education is shared between the State and voluntary bodies hold? Will the religious compromise stand the strain of conflicts over the reorganisation of the schools—and possibly of a new conflict between those who believe that religion without dogma is vain and those for whom religion itself is the enemy of progress? Modern physics has developed doubts which make it much less obviously the enemy of freedom and creative activity than it once seemed to be, and the theologians no longer fear the biologists’ attack on the book of Genesis. But the ground of conflict has shifted from men’s bodies to men’s minds. Is the new psychology the champion of the old paganism, or is it

too compatible with an outlook which is at bottom religious? Can the schools remain neutral in the clash of economic theories and policies? Dare they remain neutral, when from half Europe they hear democracy and self-government itself criticised as fit only for races which have not the courage to choose leaders and to follow them?

V

THE END OF AN EPOCH

I EXPECT that many of those who read the last chapter will ask why I have chosen this particular moment to try to set the cat among the pigeons. On the surface things are going reasonably well with education. The worst of the economic restrictions have been removed. It is agreed that the school leaving age must be raised. The religious controversy is not particularly active. In fact, the Victorian compromise is not at the moment being actively challenged either by the Churches, the teachers, or the administrators. Would it not be wiser to leave well enough alone and to look forward to a time of quiet progress and consolidation?

I am not sure that the next few years are going to be as free from controversies as seems likely on a first view. A few months ago, a straw showed one of the directions in which the wind is likely to blow. An incident arising out of a child's essay on patriotism was thought of sufficient importance to be discussed in the House of Commons. In London the question of bias in school text-books has been raised as a matter of principle. Any day quite fundamental issues may arise out of some small incident. Surely it is best to face the situation frankly, and to recognise that controversy is not dead; it is only inactive for the moment. Even the shortest review of the history of education makes it clear that most of the great controversies have been forced on the schools from outside. They have generally been settled over the heads of the teachers. It will be so again,

unless teachers and others interested in education think things out for themselves while there is still time to influence policy.

We must all be thankful that in this country, at all events, a measure of recovery from the depression has been achieved, but no one who has lived even for two years in an area where many communities show an unemployment figure of 50 per cent. and over can feel that the problem is anywhere near a solution as yet. Since 1931 the economic crisis has taken precedence over all other problems, except perhaps the problem of peace. Our preoccupation with it has for a time masked the deeper problems which lie behind. Even if we are so fortunate as to solve the problem of the revival of trade, we shall have to face these problems sooner or later.

The period since the war has been marked by a singular lack of will—not merely of good will, but of any unified purpose. In a sense the war is no doubt to blame. After so great an effort, it is no wonder that there should be a time when will and purpose seem exhausted. The war claimed the fittest men in all countries. Millions of them were killed, and those who came back were tired men. It was perhaps natural that, even in the countries which were on the winning side, the war was followed by a time of relapse and inertia. It was certainly so in England. The prevailing lack of any clear purpose was reflected in the literature and drama of the time. Aldous Huxley's *Point Counterpoint* gives a vivid impression of a society in which there is movement without direction, an absence of guiding principles and even of first-line objectives. In *Cavalcade* Noel Coward pictured a national life broken up into a number of strident and disconnected groups. We have been passing through not only an economic depression but a time when thought and will alike seemed paralysed.

“ Between the idea
And the reality,
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow.”*

The age in which we are living shows a perplexing contradiction. On the one hand there is technical knowledge and skill in abundance. On the other there seems a complete lack of power to use knowledge in a way which will bring happiness and contentment.

While the effort of the war and the exhaustion which followed are no doubt partly responsible for this condition of things, a moment's reflection will show that nearly all the tendencies which are commonly blamed for our troubles were active before the war started. The growth of technical invention in the last thirty years must sooner or later have put a strain on the old organisation of industry. Even if there had been no war it would have been difficult enough to make the necessary adjustments, though the change would have come more slowly and there would have been less dislocation of the social structure. Before the war the popular press had learnt that public opinion can be made by an appeal to mass emotion more easily than by an appeal to reason. The advertisers were becoming expert in creating needs and in playing on the less admirable tendencies of human nature. The cinema was already a powerful instrument of popular amusement, and potentially of popular education. If there had been no war, and if we had been spared the acute struggle for markets and dividends which followed, I suppose that journalism, advertisement and the cinema would have developed more gradually. Their influence on public opinion and public taste would have been easier to direct

* T. S. Eliot, *The Hollow Men*.

and control. The war and post-war conditions gave the advertiser and the propagandist a unique opportunity which they have used to the full, but without the war we should still have had to reckon with them.

Up to 1914 the casual observer might have seen no important break in the continuity of European civilisation. Then for four years all communication between the scientists, the artists and the thinkers on the two sides of the battle line was cut off. Several years after the war it was still possible to hear protests against the performance of German music at an English concert. But I think that a closer analysis would show that long before the war the unity of European culture was breaking down, though this may not have been obvious in England. Throughout the greater part of the 19th century, as at many other periods of her history, English thought and life were separated from the thought and life of the continent of Europe by policy or prejudice: the phrase used was "splendid isolation." To take one example: continental socialism from the time of Karl Marx onwards was in the main secularist and often definitely hostile to religion. English socialism has never developed this tendency. The currents of European thought generally reach England rather late and after their main force is spent. Most Englishmen shrink from pushing a theory to its logical conclusion. When these facts are remembered, it is not surprising that we failed to see that the decline of dogmatic religion which was evident even before the war might involve the abandonment of Christian social morality. War always seems to bring a loosening of morals. If, as some people expected, the peace had been followed by a religious revival, no doubt the Churches would have recaptured their hold over men's consciences and conduct. The schoolmaster to whom I referred at the beginning of Chapter I put his finger on one of the most difficult questions with

which we are faced to-day. If the old faith has lost its hold, can (and should) the old moral standards be maintained? This is a question which few Englishmen would have asked before the war. Traditional morality seemed obviously right, whether or not a man practised it. In those days most Englishmen had still a sense of sin! But the breakdown in morals, so far as it is a fact, was not really a product of the war. It began with the decline of dogmatic religion.

If my view of the history of Europe is right, Christianity provided the cement in the European social structure. It must remain a matter for dispute as to how far the Church compromised with the alien elements which pressed upon her from so many different quarters. For centuries she was certainly able not only to maintain her own hold over men's consciences and to direct their thoughts, but to weld the life of Europe into some kind of unity and to preserve that unity against attack from within or without.

To sum up: before the war there were already tendencies at work which must inevitably have caused a crisis in European civilisation. The war certainly speeded up the pace of change. It was followed by a breakdown of economic organisation and especially of credit which has become for the time being the most pressing of problems. But the war was not the main cause of our uncertainties. There were already cracks in the structure of European society. Under the shock of the war and its aftermath we discovered that the foundations themselves were insecure. There was nothing stable on which to rebuild.

The war dealt a blow at the organised Churches from which in most countries at least it seems unlikely that they will ever recover. In the early stages, when most men in all countries probably believed that their own country was right, and found it difficult to understand

why their rivals could not accept this obvious fact, it seemed natural that their Church as the champion of right and justice should side with them and should bless their armies. After the war it is clear that the ease with which most national Churches formed an alliance with the State was a sign not of their strength but of their dependence. The Churches themselves, in their support of the League of Nations and their attempts at Christian reunion, have shown that they share the uneasiness of the ordinary man with regard to their position. Like the Churches, the scientists went "national," they left the search for truth to serve the needs of the war. The historians published rival manifestos giving an account of the causes of the war which was designed to show (no doubt sincerely from their point of view) that their own side was right and that the fault lay with the enemy. Religion, science and learning alike failed to think or to teach in universal terms. There was no longer any power strong enough to stand up against the claims of the national State. Until Europe discovers as a foundation for her international life something better than expediency peace can be little more than a precarious balance of forces.

I am not forgetting the League of Nations—which in spite of its obvious imperfections is the one definitely good thing that came out of the war. But the work of the League is hampered because there are no longer any generally accepted principles which can be applied in cases of conflict. The idea of an international society is of course not new. It looks back to the time when Rome ruled all Europe. When the Roman Empire broke up it was replaced not only by the Catholic Church but by the ideal of a Holy Empire which was to cover all Christendom. The idea of a "law of nations" or quite simply a "natural law" inherent in the scheme of things has been active in Europe for two thousand years.

After the defeat of Napoleon, Alexander of Russia tried to establish a "Holy Alliance"; the rulers who belonged to it were to live in peace with one another and to administer justice in accordance with the law of Christ. Unfortunately for practical purposes the Holy Alliance was merged in the "Concert of Europe," and under the influence of Metternich Alexander abandoned his Christian idealism and joined the forces of reaction. The League of Nations can appeal to a sentiment which is very old in the European tradition, but that sentiment no longer has a Christian foundation. It is based in the main on fear and on bitter memories.

European civilisation seems again to be breaking down into the elements out of which it was built. The passion for athletics looks back to the Greeks. So does the new spirit of sceptical inquiry and the criticism of accepted social values. The social sciences are becoming mathematical—too often we analyse our problems instead of solving them. Disorder of any kind is apt to be met by an appeal which looks back to the tradition of Rome: "Others will hew out more deftly the breathing bronze and bring living countenances out of marble. They will plead causes better. They will circle the heavens with their rod and tell the rising stars. Be it thine, O Roman, to rule the peoples with thy power. This shall be thy art, to establish the law of peace, to spare the conquered, and to put down the proud."*

The danger here is that order for order's sake will become a kind of principle. The Romans of the Empire had a philosophy which covered the universe. Most of the leaders of Imperial Rome were Stoics. They believed that there was a reign of law in the nature of things, and that man could train himself into union with that law. The order they established and maintained was to be in some sense a reflection of the order which

* Virgil: *Æneid VI*.

lay behind the visible universe. The "Law of nature" and the "Law of the nations" drew their strength from this ultimate law. It is difficult to-day to discover any fundamental philosophy behind the maintenance of order. Order, like peace, rests too often merely on fear—the fear that if it breaks down civilisation itself will disintegrate.

The attack of Hitler on the Jews has led to a fresh examination of the contribution of Hebrew thought to the civilisation of Europe. The National Socialists of Germany see in the Jews the main obstacle to the unity of the nation. Is there any justification for such a view? Imagine the history of the last hundred years without the names of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Einstein and Epstein. Whether you accept their contributions to thought and art or whether you reject them their influence has been profound. It is impossible to imagine how Europe would have developed without them. There is perhaps some justification for the view that the Hebrew strand in the European tradition has also been asserting its independence, and that modern Hebrew thought has expressed itself in ways which are critical of the fundamental basis of European culture as it has hitherto existed. Against these "disintegrating" influences Hitler has built up a State based on a revival of what he conceives to be the old Aryan culture. No doubt most Germans regard his measures against the Jews as in the main an attempt to rescue the economic life of Germany from them. It is impossible to say how seriously the average German takes the appeal to his Nordic origins with their legendary heroes. The earliest German cultures have left little on which to base a revived Aryan culture. In some ways this is an advantage—it gives the builders of the new Germany a free hand.

To sum up : Christianity no longer has a strong enough

hold over Europe to make it possible for the Churches to bind together the strands of which the European tradition has been woven. There are in Europe to-day many whose attitude is almost pure Greek. There are others whose love of order for order's sake looks back to Rome. The mathematical speculations of to-day would have delighted the Arab philosophers. Hebrew thinkers and workers have taken the offensive in economics, psychology, physics and in the arts. The National Socialists of Germany have replied with a counter offensive which claims to be based on a revival of Aryanism. Between these five elements there is a struggle which is reflected in the minds of all thoughtful Europeans. The Church seems powerless to perform her old mission of reconciliation and as yet no new principle has emerged which can take over her historic task.

I should like to venture a speculation here. The war produced among many other evils a rich crop of neurasthenia. This mass of morbid mental material is no doubt of great clinical interest. The investigation of "shell shock" and other war neuroses has added much to our knowledge of the deeper layers of the human mind. Neurasthenia is of course a vague word with which to describe this mass of mental illness. Psychotherapists have shown us that each case must be studied individually. There are some guiding principles, but there is no general formula which can be applied. But while each case differs from the next and must be treated separately, at bottom the lack of will and aim and purpose which the layman calls neurasthenia seems to result from a *conflict* in the depths of the personality—a conflict which the sufferer is unable to resolve unaided. He is a house divided against himself. A cure can be brought about only by resolving this conflict. He must first be made aware of the conflicting trends within him. Some psychologists hold that once these buried conflicts are

revealed and disentangled a cure is brought about; others believe that in addition to the work of unravelling a further step is necessary—the man must make a choice between elements in his personality which cannot be reconciled. He must find what Jung calls his “task.” I will not attempt to arbitrate between these rival views. Those who hold them agree in finding the cause of the trouble in an unresolved conflict. The man who has a “breakdown” when faced with some personal crisis is generally the man with a divided will. I agree in the main with those who hold that the political crisis in Europe has economic causes. But why are Europeans impotent to solve the economic crisis? I believe that it is because there is no longer any agreement on social aims and ideals. European civilisation is of mixed ancestry. The present lack of will and purpose arises not from war weariness but from the rival “pulls” of the different elements in the European tradition which have lost the coherence imposed upon them by the Church, and have found no other basis of unity. Of course it is in the individual minds of Europeans that the conflict makes itself felt.

This view of the situation may be made clearer by an example. Take the problem of family relationships. The family was an important unit in Greek civilisation and of course in the civilisation of the Hebrews, but Jew and Greek held very different views of the family and of the relationship between the sexes. The revival of Greek ways of life and thought has challenged the Christian view of the family—which had the Hebrew view behind it. The early civilisation of Rome was based on the “big family” in which the head had at first the power of life and death over all its members. No doubt the situation is complicated by two other factors. Modern developments have destroyed the economic unity of family life and made possible the independence

of the children as soon as they are old enough to earn. Modern science has taught us to think biologically about human society. In any frank discussion of family relationships to-day, each of these elements can be distinguished. There is no longer any generally accepted social or religious philosophy which can make peace between them.

It would be easy to give other examples. In his approach to every social problem the modern European is bewildered by conflicting claims upon his loyalty. It may be true that it is only in "intellectual" circles that these conflicts are clearly defined, but their results are widespread. Everywhere the old certainties have broken down. Is there any way out, or must we accept the breakdown as final and make such shift as we can in a crumbling world?

The genius of Mussolini and Hitler lies in the fact that both have recognised that European society is mortally sick and in a mood to be rescued from its present condition of impotence at almost any price. Personally I dislike the remedies they have applied. To be frank, the Italian and the German revolutions have roused in me a passion of political conviction of which I did not know I was capable. But while I hate the remedies to which Italy and Germany have had resort, I cannot help agreeing that the crisis through which Europe is passing goes far deeper than a temporary dislocation of industry and trade. It goes deeper, even, than a struggle between rival economic groups or classes. It is concerned with the very springs of motive and conduct. When every allowance has been made for the regimentation of opinion, the degree of acceptance which Fascism and National Socialism have won is startling and very disquieting. The only effective answer to Fascism is a rival system of thought and life which recognises the gravity of the crisis and is prepared

to apply unflinchingly remedies of a different kind. Fascism recognises that Europe is suffering from a conflict of incompatible loyalties. It believes that the only way to solve the problem is to impose a solution by force. The elements which resist incorporation in the new synthesis must be expelled. I happened to be in Venice when Mussolini's Blackshirts marched on Rome. I am bound to agree that a government as spineless as the government that Mussolini displaced was no safe guardian of internal order or security from external pressure. Liberal Italy had failed. The attempt of the Communists to seize control in certain Italian towns gave some excuse for the view that the effective choice lay between two rival dictatorships. Mussolini based the new Italian State upon a rejection of Liberalism and democracy in all its forms. The Catholic Church was the biggest remaining problem. By his concordat with the Pope he avoided a direct conflict with Catholicism and gained time for the strengthening of the Fascist State. The claims of Fascism to an absolute and ultimate loyalty are not really capable of being reconciled with the claims of the Catholic Church, but unless the Abyssinian War or some external crisis shakes Italy to its foundations it is difficult to imagine that the Pope would risk losing the temporal power he has regained at Mussolini's hands in a contest with the Fascist order. In Germany Hitler faced a different problem. Perhaps we must distinguish between the aims and motives of the "Leader" and the policy of the economic groups which have used National Socialism for their own purposes—and may yet find themselves at its mercy. Hitler himself gives the impression that his fanatical anti-semitism is thoroughly sincere and that his anti-Jewish measures are more than an act of spoliation. He saw in the Jews the chief enemy of the National Socialist State; he feared the speculative, critical thrust of modern Hebrew thought against the

structure of German society. The Jews must go, not only because they held the purse-strings and because they competed with German youth for positions in the State and in business, but because they stood for a way of life and thought which seemed to him critical and destructive of the social values he believed essential to the health of the German nation. But other elements in Germany have also been dealt with. Germany has for centuries been divided into States which enjoyed a large measure of local autonomy. Hitler has abolished these States at a blow. Having "saved" Germany from the Jews and from provincialism he was faced with another problem. It is difficult to believe wholeheartedly at the same time in different saviours. As leader of the German people, Hitler could brook no rival. The political armies of the Communists and of the Social Democrats had of course been abolished when the National Socialists took over the control of the State, but there were other private armies, which had assisted the Nazis to power. They too must go, and with them the parties which they served. Even the Brownshirts, who were the instrument of Hitler's revolution, had their wings clipped. Their numbers were reduced and many of their leaders were assassinated or deprived of power.

I propose in the next chapter to say more about the character of the "totalitarian States" which in Italy and Germany have replaced the old constitutional form of government. The point I wish to make here is that the crisis that gave Mussolini and Hitler their opportunity was no imaginary crisis. They are surely right in thinking that something quite fundamental is wrong with Europe, and that her sickness is not *merely* political, or even economic, but moral. As I have said, I dislike their remedies, but abuse and even reasoned criticism of Fascism is a poor answer to men whose motto is

“Deeds, not words.” No one who has travelled in Italy or Germany before and after the revolutions can mistake the quality of the change. In both countries there has been born a sense of will and power. The old aimlessness is gone. The nation has been pulled together—brutally but effectively. The peoples who have clung to democratic institutions cannot show anything like the same rebirth of the national will. France is torn by factions which obstruct her best efforts at reform. In England, while there is a measure of recovery and some effort at reorganisation, there is a singular lack of enthusiasm—and certainly no sense of being born again! The crucial question is, can the remaining democratic, self-governing communities of Europe discover within themselves a way of economic, political and moral salvation which will be an effective answer to the challenge of Fascism? I propose to discuss that too, but first we must look rather more closely at the methods and organisation of the Fascist States.

VI

THE CHALLENGE TO COMPROMISE

FASCISM has contributed at least one new word to the vocabulary of political science—the word “totalitarian.” The idea behind it is not new. Plato’s “Republic” was as totalitarian as Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany, but the Italy and Germany of to-day are certainly States of a new kind so far as modern Europe is concerned. Their newness consists in the fact that the power of the State extends to all sorts of activities with which no other modern State—except Russia—is concerned. Some of the things which the German State attempts to regulate seem so trivial as to be absurd; for instance, it was recently announced by Hitler’s Minister of Culture that the women of Germany should do their hair in a certain way—they should show their foreheads, their ears and the nape of their necks! Centuries ago many governments adopted “sumptuary laws,” forbidding certain kinds of dress to citizens outside the higher ranks of society but—considerations of decency apart—it seems odd to us to find a modern State concerning itself with such matters.

The importance of the change lies of course in the restriction of the sphere of individual conviction and choice. The totalitarian State is concerned not only with the political and economic structure of society, but with faith and morals, with opinion in all its forms, and with matters of taste. It claims that there is a way of life which is proper to Fascists or to National Socialists and that it is the business of the State to see that they

follow this way of life, even in matters which seem to most of us to be trivial. The new States have on their hands vast political and economic problems. Why should they look for trouble by interfering with the intimate personal life of their citizens?

The answer is that it is the very nature of a totalitarian state to demand from its citizens a loyalty with which nothing must conflict. Possible rivals must be made to submit. It is obvious that the Churches may become serious rivals of the State for the loyalty of the citizens. From the beginning, Christians have claimed that they ought to "obey God rather than men." The totalitarian State cannot feel safe as long as the Churches are in a position to challenge its authority. Most Churches by their very nature claim that they hold authority direct from God—they do not act on an authority delegated by the State. This is a claim which has led to endless conflicts throughout the history of Europe. It seemed that with the coming of toleration the conflict had been settled by a compromise which worked fairly satisfactorily. On the one hand the Churches taught that obedience to the civil power was a part of the duty of Christians. In return the State protected Church property and gave the Church a pretty free hand in the direction of the faith and morals of its members. Where (as in England) a special relationship exists between Church and State old problems may crop up from time to time—for example, the refusal of the House of Commons to sanction the revised Prayer Book threatened to upset the basis of the compromise. But in the main Church and State have worked side by side. The State no longer claims the right to dictate in matters of faith; the Church lends the State the support for her moral and spiritual authority.

Why has Hitler thought it necessary to assert the power of the State in Church matters, and why have the

Churches of Germany resisted him? The totalitarian State claims an absolute loyalty not merely in theory but in fact. It is a part of Hitler's plan to bring all the groups which were so characteristic of German life into some kind of ordered relationship with the State. He therefore determined to unify the Protestant Churches with their consent or without it. That is one side of the problem. But he went further. Through his ministers of State he put forward a view of German society and its origins which challenged the fundamental loyalties of Christians. To an Englishman the attempt to honour the old Germanic gods even to the extent of changing the names of the seasons and of certain days of the week to commemorate them may seem ludicrous. But the return of the gods is a part of the campaign carried on by the so-called "German Christians" under the leadership of Herr Rosenberg, and this movement is held by the Churches to be a relapse to paganism. The German Christians claim that historic Christianity has been spoiled by the importation of alien Jewish elements. According to Rosenberg Jesus was not a Jew! The Church must shed her Jewish trappings and become a German Church, worshipping the "old German God." Between such a Church and the German State there can be no hostility; loyalty and religious duty are inseparable. The German Christians are a small minority and they could not hope as yet to use the power of the State to compel conversions, but Hitler has tried to purge the Protestant Churches of elements which might make a stand against his authority. His first attempt to bring the Churches to submission by the appointment of a Reich Commissioner broke down. A large section of the Pastors and their congregations separated themselves from their compliant colleagues and formed the "Confessional Movement" which is making a bold stand for freedom in religious matters. It is significant

that the only effective resistance to the unifying policy of National Socialism has come from the Churches. The political importance of the Confessional Movement must not be exaggerated. Its opposition is not directed against National Socialism as a political and economic system but only against the attempt of the civil power to interfere in matters of faith and conscience. Even so the stand taken by these Pastors is very significant. It shows that in Germany religion has still the power to inspire resistance in the face of overwhelming odds.

The other groups against which Hitler directed his offensive collapsed with hardly a struggle. The Jews put up no effective defence. The Social Democrats went down at a blow. A number of university professors and teachers who might have kept their posts by submission went into voluntary exile or resigned for conscience' sake, but most of them made their submission and accepted the new order—in many cases no doubt from the conviction that Hitler was Germany's last hope. The world of learning made no kind of corporate resistance.

Hitler has set himself deliberately to create not only a new State but a new culture. The essential principle of the totalitarian State is that every aspect of life must be made to serve political ends. There is no place for "pure thought" or even for "art for art's sake." There must be a Nazi biology and anthropology, a Nazi history, a Nazi art, Nazi music. All these activities are under the direction of the State. Those who practise them are to be organised into closely knit groups with an officer of State at their head. He is to be responsible for controlling both appointments and policy. Candidates for appointments are subject to political tests. The Nazi salute is the symbol of obedience and must be used both on official occasions and as a greeting between friends. When walking in the mountains one still hears

the old salutation "Grüss Gott" instead of "Heil Hitler"—but nowhere else.

How has this unification been brought about? Partly of course by violent measures. When allowance has been made for exaggeration and for memories biassed by suffering the evidence of brutal treatment in "brown houses" and concentration camps is beyond challenge. An atmosphere of terror has been deliberately created as an instrument of policy boldly avowed, but those who cling to the belief that to-day the Nazi régime rests in the main on force are mistaken. The opposition may well number more than the ten per cent. who voted against Hitler in the plebiscite of August 1934, but no one who has travelled recently in Germany can doubt that the great bulk of the nation is behind the Nazis. To the vast majority of Germans Hitler is certainly the national saviour. He is the "Leader" in a special sense—the symbol and embodiment of the nation's will. To most of his followers he is the instrument of a German Providence: "God sent us a man, Adolf Hitler." To many he has all the attributes of a demi-god.

It is time that Englishmen took Hitler's contribution to the problem of government more seriously. *Punch*, which reflects pretty accurately the view of the majority of middle class Englishmen, still represents him as a naughty schoolboy—in striking contrast to the cartoons of Mussolini who is shown at least as a dignified figure. Hitler's position to-day rests on the solid basis of a remarkable achievement. Whilst Stresemann begged in vain for a few "sample guns" Hitler has succeeded in re-arming Germany in the face of the victorious allies of the war. He has wrested the initiative from them. His blunders in Austria are effaced by the recovery of the Saar.

Hitler certainly owes his success in part to remorseless propaganda, crude in its methods, but well designed to

achieve its ends. The science of propaganda was learnt in the war. With the coming of peace it has not been forgotten, but it has passed into other hands. In all countries advertisers have made vigorous use of a few elementary principles of applied psychology. The same principles have been used on a large scale by the National Socialists. They have mastered the technique of suggestion. In a totalitarian State, where the government controls all publicity, it is possible to avoid counter-suggestion which would spoil the effect. It is very important to give an impression of unanimity. One flag of a different colour will lessen the impact on the emotions of street after street of Nazi swastikas; the discordant flag must be torn down, violently if possible. Like the advertisers, the political propagandists have learnt the force of reiteration. In the early days of advertising the announcements lacked variety, chiefly because it had not yet occurred to anyone to introduce it. On a hundred station hoardings in England one might read the message, "They come as a boon and a blessing to men, the Pickwick, the Owl and the Waverley Pen." A little later the advertisers became more adventurous. They tried to say the same thing in many different ways. Now they have learnt that the way to make the deepest impression is to invent a "tabloid" word or phrase which will act as a symbol and to drive this phrase home by endless repetition. Every advertising campaign to-day needs such a slogan—one of the latest examples is of course "Beer is best." It is important apparently that the slogan should always appear in the same kind of lettering which should be as distinctive as possible. The Nazis have initiated each of their recent campaigns by inventing a new slogan. When I was last in Germany in August, 1934, the slogan was "Deutsch ist die Saar." These words were placarded everywhere. They were slung across the streets on banners. They were engraved on

the medallions which were forced upon everyone by organised street sellers. The third discovery of the propagandists is the importance of rhythm. They might have learnt this from the tom-toms of some primitive tribe. The rhythm starts slowly and beats up to earth-shattering crisis. Every great event is prepared for in this way. There is a definite technique. The message to be revealed is kept very secret, but the day on which it will be made known is announced. As the day approaches expectation is heightened by rumours and by every means which can increase the tension of the public mind. Then the stage is set. All sorts of details are important here. There is the device of "converging lines." Rows of troops or other uniformed men are drawn up in such a way as to point to the rostrum where the leader is to appear. The leader himself must be elevated above the world of ordinary men. If conditions allow a spotlight must play upon his face. His voice must be magnified until it becomes the voice of a Stentor—the microphone and loud speaker are brought into service here. Then again rhythm is brought into play—visible rhythm in the waving of flags; audible rhythm in the playing of martial music. There is a well-timed crescendo as the great moment approaches, and finally the leader speaks. Under these circumstances his words have no ordinary significance. Of course a mere lay figure could not fill the part. It is still true that the leader must be born and cannot be made, but modern propaganda skilfully used can give him gigantic dimensions. The aim is to heighten his emotional significance. Words heard in such circumstances strike deep into men's hearts, particularly if they are men who had lost hope and will. Again it is possible to parallel the technique from the practice of the advertisers though they have not Hitler's resources at their command. Still they may be able to crowd their rivals off the hoardings and they too

use the technique of surprise. When a certain famous brand of petrol changed its name recently the change was announced simultaneously all over England and probably wherever that petrol is sold. The name chosen was a symbol word written in characteristic letters, and an attempt was made to create an atmosphere of suspense so as to focus attention on the new name.

The material in which the propagandist works is of course the emotions. Probably all the mechanisms which the psychoanalyst has discovered are more or less deliberately exploited. There is "projection"—that is, every member of the national group is made to feel that his desires, especially his desire for power, are fulfilled in the person of the leader. There is "introjection"—that is, the member of the crowd takes into himself something of the personality of the leader and fills his own emptiness from the leader's overwhelming certainty. There is "displacement"—the hatred which he may have felt for private enemies is directed against those whom the leader indicates as the enemies of the State. It is impossible to say how far these lessons have been learnt from the text books of applied psychology, how far they have been worked out by experiment, but no one can doubt their efficacy.

Wireless is an incomparable instrument in the hands of propagandists. In some ways the broadcast word is more powerful even than the printed word. While the popular newspapers can drive home their policies by the reiteration of slogans as well as by the selection of news, no newspaper has a monopoly. Even in countries where the Press is strictly controlled more than one newspaper is available and some variety of view at least on unimportant matters is permitted. The strictest censorship of the Press and the utmost vigilance of the police cannot prevent the circulation from hand to hand of duplicated sheets criticising the policy of the government

and giving news which is excluded from the ordinary newspapers. Under modern conditions wireless can be completely controlled. A "pirate" station which transmits regular programmes is sure to be detected and stopped. Wireless has other advantages as a means of propaganda. The spoken word carries for the ordinary man more emotion than the printed word. Where the broadcast is listened to by crowds organised for this purpose a high degree of emotional tension can easily be produced. When I was in Germany in August 1934, the manager of the hotel where I was staying arranged (no doubt under orders) for Hitler's broadcast the day before the plebiscite to be listened to under conditions which made it a solemn occasion. The lounge of the hotel was set apart for this purpose; the curtains were drawn, and silence was enforced. At the conclusion of the broadcast all present rose and saluted the loud speaker while an orchestra at the transmission end played "Deutschland über Alles" and the "Horst Wessel Lied." In such an atmosphere the broadcast was more than a ceremony—it was almost a sacrament.

Under a propagandist government the cinema can also be made a powerful weapon of policy. Some kind of censorship of films exists in all countries and political considerations are generally taken into account, but in democratic countries the selection of films is negative rather than positive. Care is taken to exclude from the programme films which might cause trouble at home or annoy foreign governments, but there is generally no definite policy of propaganda—apart perhaps from special occasions. A Fascist government has more positive aims with regard to the cinema. The film of Hindenburg's funeral which was shown throughout Germany last year made a tremendous impression even on a foreign observer. The occasion gave an opportunity for recapitulating the career of the Field Marshal and so

revived the memory of the victories won by German troops before the final defeat of 1918.

It must be remembered that according to Fascist theory the whole cultural life of the nation must be directed to political ends. This policy is well summed up in a sentence which appeared recently in a Nazi newspaper: "So long as there remains in Germany any unpolitical, neutral or individualistic art our task is not ended."* Fascist Italy has pursued the same policy. A deliberate attempt is made to contrast the principles on which the Fascist State is founded with the principles which inspire democratic States: "nuptial, prolific, family and Catholic Italy—will answer the Masonic-plutocratic-Bolshevist-Protestant plot of the egoist and Malthusian peoples."† The degree of freedom which such a policy leaves to the citizens was well summed up by Dr. Goebbels in a recent address to German journalists: "The freedom of Germans consisted of the possibility of complying with the higher moral laws of the State voluntarily and with responsibility."‡ Any one who has kept a file of press cuttings limited to actual quotations from Fascist official or semi-official statements will have ample evidence of the lengths to which the Fascist State is prepared to go in enforcing its ideals. No aspect of life is immune from control. It is not a question of a negative censorship. There is a positive direction of cultural activities of every kind in order that they may express and heighten the Fascist idea of the State.

The aspect of the policy of totalitarian States which is most dangerous to the future of civilisation is the control of thought. Most States censor the expression of opinion to some extent. But in the totalitarian States the thinkers

* Quoted by Raymond Mortimer in *The New Statesman*, 16th November, 1935.

† Quoted in *The Times*, 3rd December, 1935, from the *Tribuna*.

‡ Quoted in *The Times*, 2nd December, 1935.

are provided with conclusions which their thought must support. No German anthropologist is allowed to question the Aryan origin of the German race. No political scientist may criticise the suppression of self-government. No economist may advocate Socialism. Truth is made the servant of policy. I was told by a friend who visited German schools recently that he heard a lesson on "biology" which was simply propaganda for Aryanism. He ventured to say: "But this is not biology," and he received the reply, "it is *our* kind of biology." Scientists must find what they are told to look for, teachers must teach what they are told to teach.

I have drawn most of my examples from Germany partly because I have some first-hand experience of conditions there, but chiefly because the German situation illustrates best the ruthless activity of the State against all possible opponents. The Italian situation is in many ways simpler though the principles are the same, and of course Mussolini can claim priority over Hitler. There is in Italy only one Church of any political importance—the Catholic Church—and the concordat with the Pope embraced the whole religious problem so far as Mussolini was concerned. Again, Italian Fascism has laid no great emphasis on questions of race nor is there a Jewish problem in Italy. On the other hand the Fascist State is more closely organised than the National Socialist State. It is not easy to know how far paper constitutions work out in practice, but it seems that the "corporative constitution" is a reality in Italy. Mussolini has established "corporations" based not on local areas but on occupations. For example all who are connected with transport are organised into a corporation. So are those connected with the arts. These corporations send representatives to a central council which replaces the territorial parliament as the supreme organ of the State. There is some form of election, but only candidates approved by the Fascist

party can be selected. It seems that Hitler contemplates a somewhat similar kind of organisation, but the outline published is as yet too sketchy to give a clear impression of what is proposed.

The "totalitarian" states allow only one political party and this party is in effective control of the government. In theory party and State are distinct, but the two are so closely interlocked that it is difficult to say where the party ends and the State begins. Both in Italy and in Germany the revolution was prepared for by honeycombing the old order with party groups. To-day the party is in a sense a state within the State. Decisions on policy are taken first within the party and are then carried out through the machinery of the State.

Although the word "totalitarian" seems to have originated in Italy the idea of an all-embracing State started in Russia and the technique of the Fascist and National Socialist revolutions owed a great deal to the Bolsheviks. It was in Russia that party "cells" were first organised with a view to capturing the machinery of government. Five years before Mussolini established the totalitarian State in Italy, the Bolsheviks had set up in Russia a state which was totalitarian in fact, though not in name. The main feature of the Soviet Republics is of course the complete control of economic life by the State. Accepting Karl Marx's doctrine of the "economic determination of history," the Bolsheviks based the new State on the application of socialist principles; "the means of production, distribution and exchange" were all socialised. Internal struggles in the U.S.S.R. have turned upon the extent to which "private enterprise" should be allowed within the Soviet system. The "new economic policy" involved profit-making by groups which were granted concessions. The war on the kulaks, or owners of individual farms, was called off when the policy of rapid collectivisation threatened the

grain-supply. But Socialism in the full sense was always the objective. Mussolini never contemplated the State-ownership of industry, and although Hitler's earlier pronouncements seemed to imply a large measure of socialism, the "moderates" of the National Socialist party have apparently carried the day, and Dr. Schacht has declared that capitalism is essential to the new German State.

While the new Italy is based ostensibly on Catholicism, and the new Germany on Aryan Christianity, the new Russia is officially "godless." The Communist pioneers had a philosophy which has become the orthodox faith of Russia—"dialectical materialism." According to Lenin, a materialist is one who "takes matter as the prius, regarding consciousness, reason and sensation as derivatives."* Behind the Russian revolution lay at least a century of revolutionary thought, in which conflicting schools fought for the leadership. The materialism which won, and which, in the person of Lenin, shaped the revolution of 1917, derived its theory of the universe from mid-nineteenth-century science. It had no place for religion, still less for Christianity—which, for those revolutionary thinkers, meant the Russian Orthodox Church. The anti-religious museums of modern Russia are designed as propaganda against theological views which were taught in Russia up to the time of the revolution, though most of them are no longer current in Western Europe. The propaganda is almost as crude as the superstitions against which it is aimed. Communists, no less than Fascists and National Socialists, believe that experience must be "integrated"; there is no place for loyalties that conflict with the loyalty a citizen owes to the State, and the State itself embodies this materialist philosophy: if the economic basis is

* Lenin: *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*—quoted in J. F. Hecker's *Russian Sociology*, page 231.

sound, political institutions and cultural activities will be well founded, for they must inevitably reflect the economic organisation of society. All history is economically determined.

Thought and art must, however, be brought into direct relationship with this view of the State. There must be a new proletarian culture. Its values and its forms will be utterly different from the values and forms of capitalistic culture. Education must be planned so as to train children in ways of life and thought in harmony with the communist social ideal. The State must actively create this proletarian culture. As in the totalitarian States, nothing is outside its range. The direction and emphasis of Soviet policy is of course utterly different from that of Fascism and National Socialism ; the dictatorship it exercises is the dictatorship of the proletariat, embodied in the Communist party. But it finds a parallel—and in some sense a copy—in Italy and Germany, in so far as, in all these, the State is in idea all-embracing, and has taken back into itself the direction of activities which Church and State in the Middle Ages controlled, but the Liberal States of modern Europe had left to the free choice of the individual.

Russia, Italy and Germany alike challenge the Liberal compromise. Their strength lies in their power to integrate the life of their citizens, to give them a conception of citizenship into which no discordant elements are allowed to intrude and claim a rival loyalty. Capitalists, kulaks and churchmen are shut out from the control of policy in Russia, Jews, Liberals and socialists in Germany, democrats of all kinds in Italy. Each State offers, and indeed enforces on its members, a world-view (what the Germans call a "weltanschauung") as a condition of active citizenship : in Russia, dialectical materialism ; in Italy, Catholic nationalism ; in Germany, nationalism based on the Aryan doctrine of race and on

membership of a Church acceptable to and subservient to the State. The State itself actively propagates this world-view, employing all the means with which modern invention and modern psychology have armed it. Above all, it uses the schools. In Russia, every young man and woman under eighteen, and every boy and girl, has been "conditioned" to communism from birth; in Italy, children now thirteen were born under Fascism. Hitler must still wait a decade before the same is true of Germany. "Habit is second nature." It is very difficult to think, and more difficult to feel, outside the limits of one's experience.

The totalitarian model has been followed by other States, notably by Austria, where Fascism and National Socialism have met and clashed. Apart from the Scandinavian States, free institutions have been maintained in only a few countries of Europe—and of them, France shows signs of dangerous instability. Outside Europe, the United States is experimenting with a new kind of leadership which presents problems and achievements of its own. So far as Europe is concerned, the choice between the two rival conceptions of the nature of the State cannot be burked. Can democracy face the challenge? Only, I think, if the peoples who cling to self-governing institutions can find a way of generating an active, vigorous citizenship, in harmony with their own political principles.

VII

A DIGRESSION

AT this point I must interrupt the argument to reply to a criticism which I am sure will be made. Some of my friends will undoubtedly say that I have put the cart before the horse ; they believe that changes in thought *follow*, rather than cause, changes in the economic structure of society. Thus, the breakdown of the Mediæval Church was due to the fact that her teaching was adjusted to a static society. When things began to move and the mediæval economic order broke up through the expansion of trade and industry the Church could not control this new economic life. The Renaissance and the Reformation were not the cause of the schism in the Catholic Church, they were the symptoms of fundamental economic change. In the same way it will be urged that the present crisis in international politics is due not to a failure in political principles but to a breakdown in economic organisation.

This interpretation of history finds little support among academic historians. There are of course admirable economic histories, but the general historian, if he writes of economic change, generally does so in chapters sandwiched in between the chapters that deal with the political history of the period. Writers on political science often present their material as a series of systems of thought, each related to the last, but bearing little relationship to the structure of the society in which it grew. Karl Marx has certainly done history a service in challenging traditional interpretations, and fixing

attention on the relation between economic development and changes in political institutions and political thought.

May I make first an obvious criticism which probably will not convince any one to whom the economic determination of history is an article of faith? It seems to me a very partial view which represents civilisation as resulting simply from the action of economic environment on men's minds. Changes in economic circumstances and in the economic structure of society have certainly affected thought. New problems have arisen and old explanations and theories have broken down in the face of new facts. But man has never been the passive instrument of his environment. There has always been the thrust of human initiative and human thought against circumstance. Economic developments themselves have not come about as the result of an automatic process. Man has gone out to the conquest of nature. He has subdued her progressively to the service of his own needs. The changing structure of society is at least in part the deliberate creation of man. Social ideals are not merely the reflection of economic circumstances, though if they are not in touch with the facts they are not likely to become effective instruments of policy.

It is often said that genius is timeless—the greatest men and women belong to no age and to no country. This is not strictly true, especially when the genius is a political or social leader who must accept the material given by his own age. If he is to make his leadership effective, even the greatest of leaders must “come to fulfil and not to destroy.” This does not mean, of course, that they must accept things as they are, but they must use the circumstances of their own times as the material in which they work. Their genius consists in their ability to create something new out of this material; to give policy a new direction, or even to build a new society on the ruins of the old. The creative thrust of

man against his environment is seen at its fullest in the man or woman of genius. I cannot feel that the economic interpretation of history can explain creative activity of this kind.

But there is a much more fundamental criticism. The economic interpretation of history is only the application of "dialectical materialism" to a particular field. The scientists of the middle of the nineteenth century believed in a universe which was rigidly determined and bound by an endless chain of cause and effect. They recognised the existence of nothing which could not be expressed in terms of the three dimensions which they had inherited from Euclid. The universe of nineteenth century science has broken down. Oddly enough it is Physics, which is in some ways the most scientific of the sciences, that has brought about this destruction. The intricacies of the higher mathematics are beyond my grasp and I cannot pretend to follow the speculations of mathematical physicists into regions which the Victorian scientist would have felt to be outside his province. But the physicists themselves have been at pains to explain to the ordinary man the bearing of their recent discoveries. Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington have written brilliant works expounding the new Physics, or at least its conclusions, in terms which the non-mathematical members of the public can follow. The main tendency seems to be so clear as to be past mistaking. "Relativity" probably means to the physicist something very different from anything which he has succeeded in explaining to the layman. But it seems that the old rigidity is gone. The bounds of three-dimensional space have been broken. The old materialists in the words of Lenin quoted above, "took matter as the prius, regarding consciousness, reason and sensation as derivatives." To Sir James Jeans the power behind the universe is a God who is a mathematician. So far from thought dissolving into

matter it looks very much as if matter is dissolving into thought. Of course this is no new view. At the very height of mid-Victorian materialism Oxford ("the home of lost causes") was the centre in England of a philosophy which held that reality was to be sought not in physical objects and in the sense-impressions they caused, but in an absolute existence which lay behind appearance. To the Idealist, thought was the only reality. In its modern form, this philosophy came to England from Germany—though it was modified and developed by T. H. Green, Bradley and Bosanquet. In a sense it was a revival of Greek ways of thought, as anyone who has read *The Republic* of Plato knows. As one who has not been trained in philosophy, I must not attempt to distinguish between the various schools of thought. My point is that at the very height of the triumph of speculative materialism Idealist philosophy maintained her position and was served by some of the most brilliant intellects of the time. It is a little ironical that the physicists whose grandfathers were the staunchest upholders of materialism should have dealt the shrewdest blow at the old philosophy of science.

The new biology which was made popular by the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859 influenced social theory profoundly. It revived the conception of society as an organism. Personally I doubt whether it is ever very satisfactory to use in one field of study a metaphor borrowed from another, but the biological conception of society is at all events an improvement on the mechanistic one. Physicists and chemists used sometimes to criticise biologists as unscientific because their conclusions could not readily be tested by the methods of the physical or chemical laboratory. The new science of bio-chemistry has built a bridge between the chemists and the biologists. Biology has certainly become more scientific, but one hears less to-day

of the gibe that only the "exact sciences" are to be held worthy of the name of science. There seems to be a growing readiness to accept the position that the behaviour of the living organism cannot be completely explored by the methods of the older physical science.

On the other hand there arose in America a few years ago a new kind of Psychology called Behaviourism, which held that all conduct and all thought could be explained in mechanistic terms. Even the behaviour of the most civilised man could be analysed until it was shown to be only a complicated series of mechanisms such as reflexes, tropisms and conditioned reactions. This school of psychology has performed a valuable service. It has shown that before we assert that an action is due to intellect or purpose we must first make sure that it cannot be explained in terms of these mechanisms. Those who wish to read a detailed criticism of Behaviourism will find it in Professor William MacDougall's *Modern Materialism*. I think it is clear that this kind of psychology has lost ground in the last few years. I doubt whether any psychologist of international standing accepts it to-day.

My purpose in quoting (probably with many technical inaccuracies) these tendencies in modern scientific thought is to show that the basis on which dialectical materialism originally rested is no longer commonly accepted among scientists. Science has lost much of its old dogmatic assurance. The greatest scientists were no doubt generally humble men, but their followers were often ready to claim that there could be no knowledge except knowledge which could be expressed in scientific terms as they understood them. In his attitude towards religion the Victorian scientist was often described as a "sceptic." Scepticism has spread until it has sapped the foundations on which Victorian science rested.

The result of all this seems to be that it is now possible

to believe in some degree of freedom of the mind without being labelled unscientific. There is room again in the universe for creative activity. This does not mean that religion as the Victorians understood it has been proved right, except so far as it fought to retain a belief in freedom and creation, but it does leave the door open for fresh ways of thought which need not fear the challenge of the old materialistic philosophy. Communist thinkers themselves are finding a place in dialectical materialism for some kind of novelty.

To sum up: while I cannot agree that the whole of civilisation is determined by economic development I believe that those who hold this view have done a service to political thought. They have focussed attention upon aspects of history which were neglected, and they have forced us once again to try to think of the story of mankind as a unity and not as a series of parallel but unconnected activities. On the other hand, in its older and rigid form the theory fails to take into account the thrust of man's mind against his environment and the power not only of the genius but of the ordinary man to create and to mould the environment in accordance with his needs and desires. The attempt to explain man's mind in terms of matter, and life in terms of mechanism, has broken down. There is again room for some conception of freedom and will. Political thinkers have revived the old view of society as an organism and enriched it with new biological principles which are not always appropriate when applied in another field of study. The physicists themselves have abandoned the old rigid view of the universe and some of them at least have entered the field of philosophy and are seeking reality where the philosopher and the idealist sought it—in thought.

What is the bearing of all this on the problem with which this book is concerned? It has occurred to me several times in attempting to analyse the modern

situation that my view was open to criticism on the grounds I have stated. It seemed high time to make some reply, incomplete though it must be. I cannot, then, accept the view that the failure of the Mediæval Church or the failure of the modern self-governing State is due entirely to economic causes. On the other hand I do agree that the breakdown in the economic organisation of society has put so severe a strain upon its political structure and upon its political thought that only a great genius could have brought democracy through the crisis unscathed. Unfortunately the post-war world seems to have produced no such democratic genius. Where the crisis has become acute, men of force and of a ruthless courage have taken the situation in hand. They have given the States they ruled not only a fresh economic organisation but what the Germans call a new ideology—that is to say, they have replaced the ideas on which democracy was founded by ideas of a different order. In particular, they have revived the idea of discipline as something valuable in itself, and they have displaced the idea of freedom as something valuable in itself. The States they have created are based on a view of human society which reaches out beyond the facts of the present situation towards an ideal construction. In doing this, the rulers of the new States have recognised that something more than economics is involved in the reconstruction of society (to the National Socialists, of course, the economic determination of history is part of the Marxist heresy. But Communism also has its ideology). Europe must find a new social ideal based on new sanctions and bringing to its service a new type of citizenship. Man's life must again be integrated. His thought and his feeling, his private conduct and his public duty, his loyalty to the State and his attitude to the universe must form a whole. Only so can there be a rebirth of will and purpose. Democracy stands or falls

by its ability to do for its citizens not less than Communism and Fascism have done for theirs.

How does all this bear on education? The rulers of the totalitarian States have recognised the vast importance of the schools, which have become in the full sense schools of citizenship. The citizenship is of course of a type which fits in with their own political and social ideals. Our own schools have no such clear social aim. I think that is because we have not yet done the hard thinking which is necessary if the Victorian compromise is to be replaced by a plan more in accordance with the needs of a modern self-governing State. Many of our educational traditions have come down from a past when the needs of society were different. They must be adjusted to the needs of the present day. If we succeed in getting clear in our minds the social ideal towards which we are working, then we must fearlessly adapt the schools to that ideal so that they will train children in the virtues which that kind of citizenship requires.

VIII

WHAT FREEDOM MEANS

I HOPE that the challenge of the totalitarian States will force us to think more clearly about freedom than we have done of late. Hobbes was clear enough : " Liberty, or Freedom, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition ; (by Opposition, I mean external Impediments of motion ;)" . . . " when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty ; but the Power to move." And again : " The Liberty of a subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Sovereign hath prætermitted."* When Dr. Goebbels said recently that " the freedom of Germans consisted in the possibility of complying with the higher moral laws of the State voluntarily and with responsibility "† he was talking nonsense, but it was nonsense of a kind which is all too common nowadays, and is not confined to Italy and Germany. A man may give up his liberty in exchange for something else which he values more—power, for instance. If he has made a good bargain, he has still paid the price demanded. In Germany there is no effective choice : he must submit, though he may do it with a good grace—he may even do it willingly. Even if he were free to refuse, by substituting an external authority for his own moral judgment he has narrowed the sphere of his freedom. I see no escape from this conclusion.

* J. Hobbes : *Leviathan*, Part 2, Chapter XXI.

† *The Times*, 2nd December, 1935.

Is every act of the State a restriction on freedom? In a sense, yes; something which was formerly left to the free choice of the individual has been taken out of his sphere of choice. But even the most restrictive of laws does not operate in isolation. Law is a social product, and society is the medium in which it works. No society can be utterly and absolutely free. The very nature of society involves some restriction on individual choice. A law must be judged, then, not in isolation, but in terms of its total effect upon society. It may be necessary to "interfere" at one point in order to relieve tension at another. Again, laws are not the only restrictions on freedom; customs and conventions are at least as restrictive, and circumstances (especially economic conditions) are often the most restrictive of all. Legislation can only be based on a balance of advantages. We must often, in the words of Portia: "To do a great right, do a little wrong."

It is, I think, to meet this point that Professor Laski defines liberty as "the absence of restraint upon the existence of those social conditions which, in modern civilisation, are the necessary guarantees of individual happiness."* Can freedom, then, only be defined negatively—as the *absence* of restraint? To the Liberals of the nineteenth century, it seemed to have a positive quality. I believe this was because they still stood so near to the things from which they had been freed. If one has been suffering from violent toothache, the ceasing of the pain has for a time this positive quality; so has silence after the thunder of the guns. To the freed slave, liberty at first tastes very sweet; those born free are unaware of their freedom. The emotion with which liberty was charged in the nineteenth century was drawn from the activities for which men desired freedom. Once those activities are taken for granted, the sense of

* H. J. Laski: *Liberty in the Modern State*, Chapter I.

freedom decays. It can be revived only by a struggle for fresh freedoms, or by a threat to the freedoms we possess. A free society must be progressive, or it will lose, first its sense of freedom, and then freedom itself.

John Stuart Mill, in his essay *On Liberty*, gave classical expression to the Victorian conception of freedom. He based liberty firmly on the right of every individual to such happiness as he could achieve. Individuality was for Mill "one of the elements of well-being." He draws a vivid picture of the free individual: "He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being?"* Mill's conception of freedom is not as exclusively intellectual as has sometimes been suggested; he pleads also for freedom for feeling: "To a certain extent it is admitted that our understanding should be our own: but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is anything but a peril and a snare. Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced;

* J. S. Mill: *On Liberty*, Chapter III.

when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to co-exist with them, remain weak and inactive."* "Those who have most natural feeling are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest."† As I have suggested elsewhere‡ freedom of feeling is far less readily conceded, even to-day, than freedom of thought.

Mill's exposition is easy to criticise in the light of the modern situation. He assumed too lightly that the removal of particular external restraints on the individual was a sovereign remedy for the ills of society. He could not foresee in its fullness the positive, regulative function of the modern State, particularly in economic matters, though towards the end of his life his thought moved in this direction. Modern psychology has revealed depths in the personality of which he was unaware. But his insistence on the general welfare as the aim of legislation stands, and is a lasting contribution to political thought.§

Liberalism was weak in its doctrine of society. This breach in its defences was the gap through which the Idealists led the attack. Dr. Goebbels and other exponents of National Socialism can quote the authority of Hegel for their view of the State as the embodiment of the "higher moral laws." In England the trend towards what Professor Dicey called "collectivism" arose out of practical necessities and especially out of the need of the newly enfranchised masses for protection.|| The thought of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley and B. Bosanquet never became "popular" in the sense in which John Stuart Mill's writings were the bible of nineteenth century Liberalism; but it must not be forgotten that the higher ranks of the Civil Service were

* J. S. Mill: *On Liberty*. Chapter III.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Chapter IX.

§ cf. A. V. Dicey: *Law and Opinion in England in the 19th Century*, Lecture IX.

|| A. V. Dicey, *op. cit.*, Lecture VIII.

recruited in the main from the older universities and especially from Oxford and from those who had read "Greats."

Is it true that there is a "service" which is "perfect freedom?" Where service means the service of the State, the submission of the individual moral judgment to political authority, this seems to me mere sophistry. One is freed, certainly, from the necessity of making up one's own mind, and for some people this means relief from an almost intolerable burden, and the release of one's forces for purposeful action. But by accepting the authority of the State as the final guide in moral questions a man abdicates something which is essential to freedom in any real sense. By requiring such submission, I believe that the State deprives itself of the source of its moral authority. Its claim to obedience is not absolute; it rests upon the assumption that it embodies and implements the moral judgments of at least the majority of its citizens. I can see no reason to believe that the State has access to a wisdom which is beyond the reach of individual citizens, still less that it is the sole interpreter of eternal principles of right conduct.

I think we must find some other source of the social sanctions in which liberalism was weak. If we put theory aside, and examine in a practical way where our moral ideas come from, we shall find that, for the most part, we derived them from other people. Our parents laid the foundation. The moral beliefs we received in childhood have been added to or modified by later experience, but these changes have come about in the main through our membership of a variety of social groups—our school, perhaps our Church, and the political party to which we belong. We have probably originated little; if we had been born and had lived in a different society, our moral judgments would have been different. Against this must be set the fact that

our judgments do not necessarily agree with those of other people. I believe that, where we meet a conflict of moral values, we can choose between them, though even here our choice is probably determined largely by the "set" of our personality. If we happened to live in a society where there was almost complete agreement on moral values, our power of effective choice would be very limited. A truly original moral judgment must be a very rare event. We must realise that we often decide against the prevailing opinion of our family or our particular social group as a way of asserting our independence—sometimes deliberately, more often only half consciously. When we do this, our decision is influenced by the opinion of the group just as surely as it is when we conform, though in the opposite direction. If we have prided ourselves upon the independence or originality of our minds, an attempt to trace our ideas and opinions to their source is a humbling experience. We come from it deeply aware of our dependence upon society, not only for the satisfaction of material needs, but even for our intimate thoughts and our standards of conduct. But if it were not so, civilisation could hardly exist. Without some such common basis, society must disintegrate. It is largely because there is far less agreement than there was on moral values that social and international relationships to-day are so unstable. Again, it is difficult to think or to judge outside one's own experience; changed circumstances demand changes in thought—at all events in our thought about society. Apart from the authority of the State, with its coercive powers, we are surrounded and even hemmed in by the authority of society. Society has it in its power to coerce us, without using the power of the State. Our livelihood or at least our comfort depends on a degree of conformity in matters which society, or the social group to which we belong, regards as essential. As Aristotle taught, man is

by nature a social animal ; his nature implies society. In fact, "society came before the individual" : individuality has been achieved only after long ages of submergence in the herd. As a member of a group, man has a natural tendency to conform, and he does conform unless some strong impulse overrides this tendency. He has also a natural tendency to make others conform. In primitive societies, the life of the group was so unstable that it could not afford nonconformists. Tolerance of heretical opinions and of "anti-social" conduct is possible only in developed and relatively stable societies. Moral progress, then, seems to depend, first upon the attainment of a degree of social stability which makes it safe to allow within limits a variety of opinion and conduct, and then upon a "conflict of values," which gives the individual the possibility of choice. How do new moral values arise ? Chiefly, I believe, from the discovery that accepted values do not fit new circumstances. The stimulus comes from a change of circumstances—often from economic change. Circumstances do not of themselves provide the new values ; new moral judgments are man's effort to adjust himself and his social heritage to new conditions. In this sense, morality, like law, is a social product. But the new values come to birth in the mind of man—and first in the minds of those whom we may call "moral innovators."

We do not need to seek the sanctions for moral conduct in some "group-mind" or in a metaphysical view of the State (which is best regarded as society in its organised aspect). They are inherent in the nature of man, with his tendency to conform. Our real problem is not to secure conformity, but to achieve the conditions in which moral innovation is both possible and safe. Of course, every attempt at innovation is not necessarily an improvement ; in fact, there is a presumption in favour of

customary standards, which have presumably established themselves because they have proved to be a means of social adjustment. The burden of proof rests on the innovator. Unfortunately we are generally least ready to tolerate innovations when we have most need of them. Any serious failure in social adjustment is a sign that re-valuation is called for; but when society is least sure of itself it is generally most afraid of changes which seem to threaten the stability of the existing order.

I appear to have wandered a long way from the inquiry on which I set out. I must try to draw the threads of the argument together. I have rejected the suggestion that man can reach freedom by submitting his will to the will of the State. I have accepted provisionally the view which sees the best hope of freedom in the use of the machinery of the State to remove conditions which limit man's chance of achieving happiness. I have admitted that the traditional Liberal view, while it accepts happiness or "welfare" as the test of legislation, is weak in its doctrine of society. I have suggested that the best approach to the problem lies in a frank examination of the nature of man himself, and of human society as history reveals it. Man is essentially a social animal, and the great majority of men can be relied on to conform in essentials to social requirements, provided that society in its organised aspect embodies moral ideas which answer to their moral judgments. A widespread failure to conform is a sure sign that society is out of adjustment—that the moral values on which it claims to be based do not answer the needs of the social situation. New moral valuations arise as an attempt to adapt the social tradition to changed circumstances. To try to coerce the moral judgment in order to make it conform with traditional principles is bound to lead either to rebellion and social disruption or to moral sterility and social decay. An unstable society has most need of new moral valuations,

which alone can solve its problems ; though at the same time it is most afraid of innovation. The problem of reconciling freedom with stability can only be solved if man's natural social responses are released by making the State reflect his moral judgments. The alternative is to sacrifice freedom for the sake of a precarious stability. If we choose that course, we must establish a censorship of opinion backed by whatever force is necessary to make it effective. We may then, if we will, try our hand at out-bidding the innovators—we may ourselves impose new values and a new " ideology," and defend them by force against traditionalists and unauthorised innovators alike—the Fascist solution. We shall succeed only if the values we impose prove capable in practice of resolving fundamental social conflicts.

Representative government is a device for bringing the principles on which the policy of the State is based into conformity with the moral judgments of the majority of the citizens. No doubt both individual citizens and economic groups are apt to judge questions of policy in accordance with their own interests. But I cannot accept the view that conflicts of principle are, at bottom, nothing but conflicts of interest. The possibility of any social morality worth the name depends upon the capacity of citizens both to think and to feel more widely than their own interest dictates, and if necessary to sacrifice their private interest for the public good. They are unlikely to do this, unless the State embodies and makes effective a conception of the public good which enlists their moral support.

Democracy is based on the assumption that every normal man and woman has a natural capacity for this kind of moral judgment. Natural capacities need training ; a capacity for speech does not of itself give us either control of the organs of speech or a language in which to express ourselves. Both must be learnt.

Political education means the training of the natural capacity for social judgment.* Social judgment demands not only straight thinking, but mature feeling (including the power to move with confidence in the realm of values).† Religious leaders and moral philosophers, as well as political scientists, make extensive use of the word "freedom." Confusion arises from the use of the same word in two separate though related fields of inquiry. When we turn from a study of man's life in society to a consideration of his inner, personal life, we find that freedom has a different meaning. As the word is used in the language of religion, freedom means spontaneity of feeling and a sense of inner harmony. Henri Bergson‡ distinguishes between "open" and "closed" societies; the closed society—especially the closed religious society—is a society where moral judgments and the values on which they are based have hardened off; the vision of the prophet has been translated into a code of principles and rules of conduct. Creative personalities cannot achieve inner freedom in such a society without challenging its values (unless indeed they are of the type which finds fulfilment in withdrawing from social relationships into the life of contemplation and prayer.) "The glorious liberty of the children of God" is an inner freedom—a peace of mind which comes from the reconciliation of warring impulses. Unlike political freedom, this inner liberty does not consist in those things which "the Sovereign hath prætermitted"; there is no division of the field of activity between sovereign and subject. Ideally, desire and obligation coincide. In a sense, the whole personality is free; but it is also true to say that every impulse is subject to the governing and guiding principle of the religious life, which in Christian

* cf. Graham Wallas : *Social Judgment*.

† See Chapter IX.

‡ In *Les Deux Sources de la Religion et de la Morale*.

terminology is "love." The literature of religion shows that this is no fanciful picture of the typical religious experience, though it is only in the lives of the Saints (and then perhaps intermittently) that this experience is reached in its fullness.

The moral philosopher, who is not necessarily a religious man, also seeks for some governing principle which will explain our moral experience and harmonise our conduct. He may find it in "duty" or in "self-fulfilment" or in the "common good." The psychologist may recommend the "resolution of conflicts" by an analysis which reveals their hidden roots in the great instinctive activities; "unmask yourself, accept yourself, re-adapt yourself." Mental harmony becomes the test of ethical rightness. The moral philosopher, even if he is deeply influenced by modern psychology, will probably feel the need to explain and justify the clinical test of mental harmony in terms of some general principle which will relate the individual to his social setting. The moral philosopher is not satisfied until he has succeeded in explaining—or explaining away—our sense of obligation. The conception of society as an "organism" was revived in the nineteenth century, when the discoveries of Darwin led the public to feel that they had at last found in biology a key to the understanding of social phenomena. When the technical terms of one science are applied to another, they generally become metaphors and often lead to false and dangerous analogies. If society is an "organism," has it not a "group-mind"? All sorts of mischiefs have sprung from this line of thought. In much the same way, the attempt to apply to society conceptions (such as "will" and "purpose") that have done service in the study of the individual mind is full of danger.

We must clear our minds of a good deal of rubbish before we can hope to build a new philosophy of society. Above all, we must avoid using the same word in

different senses. Political freedom is something quite different from the inner harmony and spontaneity which it is the aim of religious leaders and moral philosophers to achieve.

I am afraid that I have dismissed in very summary fashion, and almost without argument, some of the most notable contributions to the study of society. They have been examined many times by expert critics, whose conclusions are easily accessible.* My aim in this chapter has been constructive rather than critical. As an educationist, I am convinced that what education needs most to-day is a clearer definition of aims. These aims must be related, not only to our new knowledge of the mind and how it works, but also to a view of society, for every educational plan implies a social ideal. Unless we formulate our ideals, our aims must remain uncertain and incoherent. In a democratic community, citizenship cannot be a matter for specialists only. We must look to the political scientists for guidance in our thinking, but we cannot burk the duty of decision.

I believe that it is vital to keep clear the distinction between the two main senses in which the word freedom is used, for otherwise our educational aims will lack precision. Political freedom is not an end in itself, it is a means (as I think, an essential means) to an end. The end it serves is that inner freedom which I have called harmony and spontaneity of feeling. Some will prefer to follow Mill and say "happiness"; but so much controversy has centred round that word that I think we must try to be more precise. As I have tried to explain later,† by "feeling" I do not mean merely "emotion"—feeling in this sense includes a valuation of experience. Indeed, I believe that it is in the realm

* e.g. for an examination of political philosophies of the Idealist school, see Ernest Barker: *Political Thought from Spencer to To-day*.

† Chapter IX.

of values that a solution of our conflicts must be found, whether those conflicts are personal or social. I want political freedom, and as much of it as (at any given time and place) is compatible with social security, because without it there cannot be freedom to value ; and without freedom to value, and to make the values we find effective in the sphere of conduct, few of us can attain inner freedom. As citizens of a democratic community, teachers should work for the extension of political freedom. In school, their main effort should be directed to giving the kind of education which will enable their pupils to use to the full the opportunity that political freedom gives for the realisation of that inner freedom, which is the true end both of society and of education.

IX

THE HEAD AND THE HEART

IN a world awry, we must be ready to question not only our practice but our principles. It may be that the fault lies there. We must not assume that our difficulties arise solely from faithlessness to what we know to be good. Fear or lethargy sometimes masquerades as virtue ; it may be easier to cry " peccavi " than to accept new truth or new values.

How does conviction come and why is there so little of it to-day in democratic societies ? We boast our freedom of opinion ; why does it lead us to so few certainties which we are prepared to back with resolute action ? Fascism has rejected freedom of thought as a weakness that undermines the will. Have we no answer, except that we prefer our own way of life ?

We need to examine afresh the place of reason in determining conduct, and its relation to that other side of experience, feeling. Why do we fear feeling and try to shut it out from our social judgments ? Why, when we give it rein, does it so often warp judgment, and lead us to partial or unjust decisions ? When we succeed in deciding on " rational " grounds, why does feeling refuse to follow thought, so that we reach opinions, but not convictions ?

" Feeling " is of course a popular word, which orthodox psychology does not recognise. The psychologists speak of sensation, emotion and intuition ; in popular language " feeling " may mean any of these. We say that we " feel hot," or " feel angry," or that we

“feel we are right.” But there is another sense in which the word is often used, and I believe that it corresponds to something real and important in experience. When we say that we have a “feeling” for a person, we mean something more than an “emotional response”—something more stable than emotion alone can ever be. Our “feeling” includes, besides emotion, a judgment of value. The emotion and the sense of value are so closely linked in our experience that it is hard to separate them or to say which comes first. Perhaps we value the object in terms of the emotion it arouses in us; but our emotional response itself depends on the nature of the object, as well as on our own nature.

Some people rely far more on feeling in this sense than on reason in their relations with others. Perhaps we all do so to a greater extent than we realise. We distrust the “cold” man or woman—even the “cold” statesman, who seeks to guide policy by reason alone; he seems to us blind to an important side of experience, and in fact he often makes mistakes which a man with a less rational approach might have avoided. Cold himself, he fails to understand the part which feeling plays in most people’s conduct.

According to Graham Wallas,* feeling is, and should be, an important element in social judgment. In a sense, we have tried to be too exclusively scientific in our approach to social problems. Science has nothing to do with emotion, or with values—they are rigidly excluded by the nature of scientific method. But man’s life in society is concerned with both. A social theory or policy which ignores this is bound to fail. Liberal and democratic social thought has too often dealt with man in society as if he was wholly rational, or as if he should become so: it is held that good citizenship can be attained by right thinking. This over-emphasis on the

* In his *Social Judgment*.

intellectual element in conduct leads to a grave error. We set "reason" against "feeling," as the higher against the lower. Reason, we say, is objective—it serves universal ends, it is concerned with truth, which is no respecter of persons. If we can learn to live by reason in quiet times, then at a crisis passion will be held in check. On this view the crisis in world affairs is due, first to poor thinking, and then to the loosing of passions too strong for reason to control at present. The best hope for the future lies in strengthening the defences of reason.

I will be no party to an attack on freedom of thought, especially to-day when we need to be on our guard against subtle encroachments on our traditional liberties. But thought cannot be really free unless feeling is free too. A man whose feeling is tangled up cannot think freely, except perhaps in some specialised field where his emotions and his judgments of value are not involved. Even in democratic England, feeling is by no means free to-day. I believe this is why freedom of thought does not bring us nearer to a solution of our problems.

In what sense is feeling not free? Leaving aside those who are cold by nature, and those who suffer from some grave neurotic disorder, feeling is not free because we have deliberately put it in chains. We are afraid to give it the freedom which most of us (in theory at all events) desire for the intellect. Feeling seems to us lawless, and so dangerous. It must be disciplined—that is, directed into channels that we select and approve. In particular, we do our best to canalise it into socially acceptable sentiments. Its proper objects are the family, the school, the Church and the State. Towards these institutions it can be encouraged to flow freely and strongly. So it ceases to be disruptive—it becomes the cement of society. We discourage the play of criticism upon these sentiments and their objects, so that their

claim on an unquestioning loyalty becomes self-evident. Their authority over the individual springs in the main, not from a personal acceptance of their utility or value, or of the truth which they serve, but from an emotional response which we have "conditioned." Our feeling in these directions may be latent or not very active, in ordinary circumstances. But at a crisis our response can be relied on. Sometimes, it is true, we rebel—often with a violence which is the measure of their emotional significance for us. We lapse from loyalty into an opposition as full of unreason as was the acceptance that was forced upon us. Reasonable criticism is no more possible than reasonable service.

Such thorough-going loyalty or such whole-hearted rejection is perhaps possible only to men and women who are capable of full-blooded responses; others react more feebly, not because they are more reasonable, but through lack of passionate vitality. They are not those who count most. They neither cause social or international crises nor lead us out of them. Their effort flows in the main into moulds made by other men. They believe with reservations, and obey with one eye on expediency. They are not our main problem.

As I have said, feeling is concerned both with emotion and with values. While we do our best to imprison emotion within more or less rigid sentiments, we also damage the intuitive power to value by requiring that certain values shall be accepted as a moral obligation and without question. We ignore the fact that in other ages and other countries—perhaps even in other social classes—different values may seem equally self-evident. In short, while we pride ourselves on teaching *how* to think without teaching *what* to think (that is called "bias")—in dealing with feeling, we teach both how and what to feel. The result is that our freedom of thought is bounded by prescribed values and conditioned

emotional responses. No wonder that such thinking fails to generate will. Too often it ends in conflict and a divided mind, where reason and feeling pull in different directions.

We have tried to *command* feeling—to make it rally to the support of traditional principles. Feeling cannot be commanded, though there are ways in which its direction can be influenced. Some of those ways are not open to us while we remain democrats. We have not yet found ways that are in harmony with our democratic ideals. To find such ways is our most important educational task to-day. A large part of our difficulty lies in the fact that we are no longer agreed on principles. Addressing schoolmasters last year Lord Eustace Percy pointed out* that “to-day none of us had any political philosophy at all which could serve as a basis of our actions and duties as citizens, still less of our duties as citizens of the world. We lived by certain phrases which were themselves the relics of old political philosophies but which had lost all their old political content . . . the social duty of man to man was the one thing . . . upon which nobody had any principles on which to reason.” Our feeling has retreated from traditional beliefs and standards of conduct, because they no longer correspond to our personal judgments on individual cases. What is the remedy for this chaos of principle? What we need is an agreed scheme of values, from which fresh principles can be deduced. But how can we arrive at these values?

The Fascists and the Communists have found an answer. The values of Fascism and the values of Communism are in violent conflict. But Fascists and Communists have the same technique for generating will and purpose. Hesitations and doubts are dispelled by action directed towards definite ends. They do not

* *The Times*, 9th January, 1935.

wait to convert men before requiring them to act—conversion follows successful action. The ends are at first dictated by the leaders, and obedience is exacted by the most rigorous penalties. But the leaders do not merely command, they offer to their followers a social and political ideal based on a new "ideology." They re-value conduct and institutions in terms of this ideal society. At first these new values are imposed, but as action succeeds the values on which it claims to be based come to be accepted as self-evident. Emotion and will flow out spontaneously towards them. Education and propaganda confirm the new values. With the passage of time, a generation for whom no other values seem possible comes to maturity. Personal and public feeling coincide. New principles of conduct are established. Thought itself moves within the circle of these new assumptions. Society has again found coherence, but it is a coherence imposed upon it by the leaders.

What remedy has democratic England? If we have lost our principles, can we replace them without imposing a solution in the Fascist or the Communist manner? Feeling cannot be forced back into the old moulds. But there is an alternative. If principles and personal valuations are in conflict, we can re-make our principles, using as our material these personal valuations of individual cases. That is how principles arose—they are attempts to state in general terms the judgments we pass on particular instances. We must start again from rock bottom. We must work for complete sincerity of thought and feeling, and refuse to admire or believe to order. We shall then begin to discover what we really do admire and believe. What remains of formulated beliefs must be subjected to a rigid examination. We know more than we did about their origins, social and personal. We can often trace, step by step, how they came to be formed. We must sift out, and hold fast to,

whatever in them passes the double test of rational criticism and first-hand valuation. We must learn to think outside our own interests, "following the argument whithersoever it leads."

Sincerity of feeling is itself one of the most important of the new values that are in conflict with the old. There is much more sincerity of feeling than there was, and we are more ready to tolerate it, even when it shocks or hurts. In search of sincerity, we must use every means we know. Psychology can help us to unmask ourselves, to discover our real selves behind our conventional attitudes. The rationalisations that protect our unacknowledged desires must be broken up by rigid self-criticism. Our emotional power may be locked up in "sentiments" which no longer answer to living situations; we must release it for the service of new values. We must be more empirical, more ready to try ourselves out in new situations, and to face and accept our spontaneous response to them. We must stop trying to make ourselves feel as convention requires. If for the sake of expediency we have to act against our feeling we must recognise that this is so, and not justify our action on grounds that we know to be false. If we do this, I believe we shall find that we are not alone in our revision of traditional values. Beneath the surface of accepted standards—the "phrases which have lost their old content"—there is growing up a new body of principle, though it is masked as yet by the wreckage of the old. For thousands of men and women this unacknowledged code is the real guide to conduct, or at least the standard by which they judge it.

If the change was simply a loosening of sexual morals there might be some ground for suggesting that it was just part of the demoralisation caused by the war, but the fact is that the change has its positive as well as its negative side. While some things which used to seem

wrong now seem to many people to be right, or at least indifferent or matters of taste, other things which were formerly accepted as legitimate are questioned. Heavy drinking is no longer socially acceptable. There is a fresh emphasis on health and physical fitness. But the most striking instance is the new attitude to war. To quote an Article of the Church of England,* "It is lawful for Christian men at the commandment of the Magistrate to wear weapons and serve in the wars." The contrary opinion was formerly held only by members of the Society of Friends and a few others who thought with them. To-day many thousands of men and women within the Churches and outside them feel that war is wrong *in itself*, irrespective of its objects. To take another example: there is a vastly increased sense of the right of every one to be treated as an end in himself, and not as a means to an end, however important the end may be. Perhaps this really underlies the new feeling about war, which is the typical sacrifice of the individual. Any suggestion that one person has "rights" in another rouses instant opposition. The conception of "marital rights" (was it not originally "rites"?) is repugnant to the view of most young men and women. Fewer employers of labour than formerly speak and think of those they employ as "hands"; I believe that there is even a growing sensitiveness which on the one hand inspires welfare schemes and on the other takes some of the stiffening out of the employers' attitude in industrial disputes. Many of us are less able than we were to face the realities of distress without a qualm. This comes out clearly in the attitude of the public towards unemployment. In some ways it is even over-sentimental, for sentiment of this kind is apt to express itself in measures of alleviation rather than in the determination to find a radical cure for the evil. To take another

* Article XXXVII.

case : power of all kinds is valued much less than it was. I think this is behind the "shirking of responsibility" with which young men and women are sometimes charged by their elders ; they are just not interested in "running" other people. It may be that what passed for a capacity to take responsibility often had its roots in a love of power which was not over-tender of the right of other people to their own lives.

The revaluation to which we must look for our new principles is taking place spontaneously, but it is hampered by obstacles which it lies within our power to remove. We must overhaul our methods of educating feeling. We know how to educate intellect without enslaving it ; we must find a way of doing that for feeling. I have shown already some ways in which I believe our present education to be at fault. It is more difficult to make positive suggestions, though I will try to do this in the next chapter.

Some obvious criticisms must be answered. Will not the freeing of emotion destroy both social responsibility and straight thinking ? I have deliberately used the word "feeling" because what I am pleading for is not merely emotional release. Feeling includes not only emotion but a judgment of value. The freedom we need most to-day is freedom to re-value our experience and our institutions. But the values we are looking for are values which will stir us not to passive admiration but to action, and these are the values which are closely related to our emotional responses. By trying to direct emotion towards objects chosen by us on "principle," we have separated emotion from that other component of feeling—a personal judgment of value. This is inevitable, unless principle and the personal judgment of value coincide. In a stable society, with a generally accepted scheme of values, and settled principles, there may be no serious gap between them. In a society

which has come to question its principles, it is vitally important that the capacity to value at first hand should not be tampered with, for therein lies the only hope of attaining fresh principles.

Will not the release of feeling destroy our power of dispassionate judgment? It will certainly change our social judgments, and make them less exclusively rational. But, to quote Lord Eustace Percy again, we are in difficulties because we have "no principles on which to reason." Only a fresh valuation can give us these principles. Freedom of feeling will fertilise our intellectual processes, not warp them. It will give us something to think *about*. Crude emotion may well be the enemy of reason; but if our emotions are crude, it is because they are immature and even infantile—we have refused to allow them to grow up, by isolating them from the play of critical reason, and by trying to compel them to respond to prescribed values.

Will not freedom to value dissolve our social principles into a chaos of individual valuations? Our sense of value seems to depend on "direct intuitive perception." We "look and say." What if each of us sees a different value in the same object? How can any general principles be deduced? No doubt every individual valuation differs in some degree from every other. But there have been epochs of civilisation when there was a fairly general acceptance of agreed values, and no doubt there will be again. Our judgments of value are personal, but they are not wholly original—in fact, an original moral or æsthetic judgment must be a rare event. In making our judgments we are inevitably influenced by our previous experience, including our experience of other people's judgments and of the values current in our society. I am not suggesting that we should try to set this experience aside, but only that, when we find that our judgment fails to coincide with what is

generally accepted, we should be free to hold to our own valuation.

Most psychologists distinguish three functions of the mind. The cognitive function is concerned with knowing, the affective function with emotion, and the conative function with action or attempted action. What I have called "feeling" is in part cognitive (since values are a kind of knowledge), in part affective. Dr. C. G. Jung recognises "feeling" as itself a mental function, distinguishing it from "thinking," but accepting both thinking and feeling as "rational."* Feeling is for him rational because it is a function through which man judges and sets a value on experience. Dr. Jung's analysis corresponds closely to common experience. I have attempted to give an explanation of "feeling" which keeps closer to orthodox psychology. No mental function works in isolation. In what I have called "feeling," judgments of value are so closely associated with emotion as to be experienced as a whole. In "feeling," the cognitive side of the mind is linked with the affective. When emotion is aroused, action generally follows, unless it is inhibited, for emotion, as MacDougall has shown,† lies at the heart of the great instinctive activities. Right thinking will not necessarily lead to right action, or indeed to any action. Something else, or something more, is necessary. That something is what I have called feeling—a sense of value, charged with emotional significance. By freeing thought, we have released a power of the mind which is capable of integrating our experience. By refusing to free feeling, we have insulated from the critical function of the intellect that aspect of the personality in which the emotional drives arise. We have also divided the cognitive function of the mind into free and unfree—we

* C. G. Jung: *Psychological Types*.

† W. MacDougall: *Social Psychology*.

have set free the reason, but not the intuitive sense of values. If freedom of thought is to lead to resolute action, the whole of the mind must be free, for no function can work freely while other functions remain bound.

X

LIVING AND LEARNING

THE last twenty years has added a good deal to our knowledge of how the mind develops. We have learnt to measure intelligence; we can trace the curve of its growth until it reaches maturity—probably it is almost fully mature at the age of sixteen. We also know, though with less precision, the stages through which emotional development passes. Analytical psychology has given us a technique by which we can dig below the conscious levels of the mind and lay bare the springs of motive. A good deal of work has been done on the psychology of perception, with results that are very important for education. We are now able to form a fairly clear picture of mental life at all ages. There are still some gaps in our knowledge—for instance, we know surprisingly little about the formation of sentiments, in spite of the work of brilliant inquirers, from Shand to MacDougall. Sentiments have been described, analysed and catalogued, but while we may be able to trace their growth, our methods of sentiment-building are crude and empirical. It is hard to say why they succeed with some people and fail with others.

The Consultative Committee of the Board of Education has been at work for many years on a series of studies whose main object is to relate education to the natural stages of growth and to adapt it to individual differences. A recent Report of the Committee* includes as an appendix a memorandum which summarises the main

* Published under the title: *The Primary School.*

results of experimental psychology that bear upon the planning of education. Some of the findings are of great practical importance to teachers. We know, for instance, that children's sense of time develops comparatively late*—this has a direct bearing upon the teaching of history. The power to appreciate causal relationships is also a late development.† Voluntary attention is easily fatigued in young children, though a cramped physical posture may be the cause of "mind-wandering." Rote memory is not as strong in the young child as is commonly believed; it stands out because other mental powers are relatively weak. The child works with comparatively few mental images—its power of spontaneous observation is less than is often supposed. Its mental development can be helped most by enriching its experience and stimulating its imagination.

Unless the child's emotional life develops normally the whole of its mental growth may be seriously retarded. Failure to learn may have an emotional and not an intellectual cause. A child's early emotional problems centre round the primitive functions of feeding and excretion. The young child is very unstable emotionally. About the age of three, it passes through a time of emotional stress more severe than any other it will know until adolescence. Its parents—especially its mother—are the source of its earliest satisfactions and frustrations. Its emotional attitudes are formed in relation to them. Between three and four years of age, it begins to integrate its emotional life. Gradually the stress subsides, and at about the age of six it enters on what psychologists call the "period of latency"—its attention turns outwards, it develops an interest in the world apart from its power to minister directly to desire, it is in a sense less aware of itself, though it is

* cf. M. Sturt: *The Psychology of Time*.

† But cf. Susan Isaacs: *Intellectual Development in Young Children*.

rapidly accumulating experience and building up its personality.

The period "six to eleven" is relatively stable, but as the Report shows this time of life is by no means featureless; there is a gradual maturation of mental powers, which do not develop evenly though they grow by stages which are now well recognised. Mental growth is accompanied by, and to a large extent dependent upon, growing control over the child's own body. Control of the larger muscles comes first, then finer adjustments are achieved. The eyes become well focussed—(how did our grandmothers' eyes survive the working of those samplers with their tiny, accurate stitches?)—the fingers become more nimble. The sense of rhythm comes before the power to distinguish pitch; the sense of harmony comes later still. One sense is at its height in childhood—the sense of touch. With the toughening of the skin, touch becomes less fine.

The bearing of all this upon education is obvious. To try to force the mental growth of a child beyond its natural development is to do violence to its nature. If it is starved of experience—especially the experience necessary to feed and develop its senses—its emotional life may be warped and its intellectual growth retarded.

After the period of latency comes adolescence, a second time of instability. The psychology of adolescence has often been studied and described.* The maturing of the sexual impulse invigorates the whole personality and at the same time throws it out of focus; it must be integrated afresh. There is a new self-consciousness. The adolescent is generally acutely sensitive, diffident and assertive, elated and depressed, by turns. There is a broadening of interest. Familiar things are

* e.g. G. Stanley Hall: *Adolescence*; and *Youth, its Education, Regimen and Hygiene*; J. W. Slaughter: *The Adolescent*; F. A. Servanté: *The Psychology of the Boy*; L. Starr: *The Adolescent Period*.

seen with new eyes and evoke new responses. The whole of life is charged with intense personal meaning. The natural world seems to respond to one's mood. Religion offers the adolescent a solution of his personal problems, and the Churches seize their opportunity. Why is it that the sense of conviction, genuine enough at the time, so often fades later? I think it is because a formulation of his experience is offered him before he is ready for it. He is eager enough to find a short cut to truth and right conduct; his emotions flow easily into the prescribed channels. Later, a more critical attitude awakens. He finds that many of his problems have been shelved, not solved. As the emotional atmosphere clears, and personal relationships become more stable, he finds satisfactions which seem unrelated to religion, or at all events to the teaching of the Church. Perhaps he finds, as his experience grows and he is able to face life more calmly, that his personal valuations do not correspond with those of the Church. He loses interest in religion, and turns his attention elsewhere. Perhaps he never reaches a satisfactory solution to his problems but they cease to worry him as he throws himself into practical activities—sport, love-making, earning a living. Of course, this adolescent interest in religion may develop into a mature faith which grows with his experience and satisfies him; but to-day this is the exception. Most adolescent religion is a flash in the pan.

The adolescent gains a new power to grasp complicated relationships, and an ability to understand abstract ideas. Every adolescent is for a time a philosopher, though he may be too shy to share his thoughts with others. He has a new sense of beauty—this, like his religion and his philosophy, soon evaporates unless it is very skilfully handled.

Our educational system makes but poor use of the powers and interests of the adolescent. Ninety per cent.

leave school soon after the beginning of adolescence or even before it. Of the rest, those at secondary schools, if they stay beyond the age of sixteen and show any degree of ability, are put to specialised courses for the "higher certificate," which provide some form of mental discipline but are often only remotely concerned with the interests that absorb so much of the energy of the adolescent. Interest can be persuaded to flow into this work because at that age it is unstable and easily directed. Those who are lucky find themselves studying subjects for which they have a natural bent. The rest "take" a particular course because the school provides it. We have not yet had the courage to apply our new knowledge about the "transference of training" to a reform of the curriculum. It used to be believed that the mind could be trained on *any* subject requiring mental discipline (though the classics were supposed to be best), and that the training acquired, or rather the trained mind, could be switched over to some other subject or some practical activity, in the confident assurance that the skill acquired could be used in this new field. Research has shown that this assumption is not well founded. The matter is highly complicated, and the results reached cannot be summarised shortly. But their main bearing is unmistakable. In general terms, the skill acquired in any study or activity can be transferred to another only so far as the skills they demand overlap. The study of any subject involves both "general intelligence" and "special abilities"—the kind and degree of the special abilities that are necessary can only be determined by experiment. This is dangerous ground for the layman. If we want to acquire the skills necessary for any study or activity, the safest plan seems to be to practise that study or activity. At all events, we must not expect a high degree of transference between studies or activities that involve widely different abilities. Those who wish for a

more "realistic" curriculum will welcome this conclusion.

Psychoanalysis has shown that the nervous troubles which sometimes appear at adolescence have their roots in childhood. During the period of latency, morbid mental formations may lie dormant. At adolescence they light up and are charged with emotional significance. Mental life is continuous; there are no gaps, and in a sense no fresh beginnings, though there are well-marked stages. The discovery that the sexual life does not begin at adolescence was at first felt to be deeply shocking and was hotly resisted. The fact that much adult behaviour is infantile in character is still not generally recognised. Mental health depends on taking life's stages as they come, and living through them. We must first accept the facts of human nature at each age, as research reveals them, and then plan our education so that it will provide, at every stage, whatever is necessary for healthy and normal development. In a democratic society, a high standard of mental health is essential both to stability and to progress. Those whose emotional life is warped or unsatisfied are poor citizens; they are obsessed with their own disabilities, and unable to enter into easy social relationships. They are apt to see the world in terms of their own troubles.

How should the new knowledge of mental development be applied to the planning of education? The relation between bodily and mental health stands out more clearly than ever. A democratic State should see that, so far as may be, all its citizens are "well-born." Infant mortality has declined notably in recent years, but the number of women who die unnecessarily in or shortly after childbirth is a crying scandal. There are no statistics of the irreparable harm done to young children by ignorant or careless treatment. The training of midwives and the establishment of health insurance, pre-natal clinics, infant welfare centres and "schools for

mothers" has done much to raise the standard of health of mothers and babies. But there are some serious gaps. Too much is left to the initiative of the local authorities. Clinics and infant welfare centres should be provided everywhere. In many areas, hospital accommodation is inadequate. There is still need for public education in matters of health, and in the management of young children.

A harmonious home is essential to the healthy development of a child's emotional life. Disharmony between the parents, whether open or suppressed, is the cause of much nervous disorder in children. A woman who is not satisfied in her husband is very often a bad mother—over-anxious, possessive, seeking unconsciously from her children emotional satisfactions which they can give only at a cost to their own development. "Have 'em, love 'em, and let 'em be," is no bad advice to mothers. Both fathers and mothers are apt to try to fulfil in their children their own thwarted ambitions and desires. In many large towns, there are "child guidance clinics" where parents of difficult children can seek advice. In most cases, it is the parents who need (and obtain) guidance. "Naughtiness," nervous fears, intractableness, and even retarded mental development may all have their root in faulty parental relationships. Where there is some inborn defect of intelligence, it is important that it should be discovered as soon as possible. No treatment can give a child the intelligence that nature has denied it. But, unless care is taken, an emotional disturbance may be added to the defect of intelligence. A child who is in any way handicapped, physically or mentally, is specially liable to nervous disorder—even abnormal height may make a child or a man feel "inferior" (that is, different from others and so unable to "fit in" with them), while dwarfs have notoriously "swelled heads"! It seems to be natural to demand that life should treat us

fairly. If we are denied what others have, we try (perhaps quite unconsciously) to compensate for this lack. If we cannot do so in reality, we resort to "fantasy"; we build for ourselves a fictional personality in which our difference from other people is turned to our own advantage. We set a positive value on our deficiencies: our coldness becomes virtue, our lack of the power to assert ourselves humility or good-nature. Often we trade on our weaknesses; a young child will often get attention by feigning distress or by a display of naughtiness. Anything—even a slap—is better than to be ignored.

However good the home, and however wise the parents, a child needs some wider experience of people, especially children of its own age. Nursery schools are more than a way of keeping children safe and happy while their mothers are at work. Little teaching in the ordinary sense of the word is done there, but they learn many things which they cannot learn, or learn so well, at home. They learn to adapt themselves to a little society of contemporaries. They learn self-reliance. If the school is well equipped and staffed, they learn the management of their muscles, they gain manipulative skill, and they learn to play alone and in small groups. They also learn to rest, and they are sure of at least one meal in the day which is suited to their needs. Some of the schools give orthopædic treatment where necessary; crooked backs and legs are straightened by massage. Nursery schools are specially necessary in the distressed areas, but they should be a normal part of the educational system everywhere.

The infant school, to which most children go when they are five years old, should continue the work of the nursery school, and lead up to the junior school. There has been a great change since the days when, in most schools, the infants sat on long forms, often without

backs, and chanted " tables " in dreary chorus. There are still far too many schools where equipment and methods are sadly out of date. But teaching young children is coming to be recognised as a highly-skilled job, requiring special training and perhaps a particular kind of temperament.* The reform of the teaching of young children in England has been inspired by the work of Froebel and Montessori. It was Margaret Macmillan who showed that, in skilled and sympathetic hands, simple equipment (provided that it is suitable) can be used with remarkable results, even when conditions are most unfavourable.

What a child learns up to the age of six or seven is quite unimportant, compared with the development of his natural powers. We have tried to crowd far too much into these early years, partly through ignorance of the child-mind, partly because school-life is so short. One of the chief benefits that should follow the raising of the school leaving age is the relief of pressure at the lower end of school life. Where time does not press, it is a fairly safe rule never to try to teach a young child anything until he wishes to learn it. The best we can hope for children is that they will reach the end of this first stage of growth with their bodily health well established, their senses awake, their natural curiosity unimpaired, their will unbroken, their feeling spontaneous and adventurous, and with a sense of security in life. They will then enter the period of latency ready to consolidate their growing powers, to gain experience and to fill their minds with a wealth of impressions and of imaginative imagery. The storms of adolescence will invigorate their personality, but not shake its foundations. No skeletons from the cupboard of infancy will haunt them. They will be free to make the last major adjust-

* See the Report of the Consultative Committee: *Infant and Nursery Schools*.

ment to life without fear, in accordance both with reality and with the needs of their own personality. They will be ideal material for democratic citizenship.

From seven to eleven years of age most children will attend the primary school. Here they begin learning in earnest; if their previous history has been normal, they will love it. The appeal should always be to coming manhood and womanhood—they should learn to look forward, not back. They gain intense satisfaction from growing mastery of their own bodies—not “self-control,” but finding their body increasingly the instrument of their will. They begin to take pride in precision—first in the more delicate handling of the tools of learning—the penknife and the scissors, the needle, the brush, the pencil and the pen. Their fingers obey their minds. As experience grows, they have more to express. Till now, what they expressed was in the main their desires; with perception awake, they begin to record impressions, crudely at first, but with increasing accuracy and power. They must be helped to observe—the natural environment is the best medium of instruction. They need materials and tools with which to fashion what they see. They need help and criticism and “showing”—but criticism should never dishearten or destroy spontaneity; it is most effective when it is asked for; the child is always conscious of the gap between what he would, and what he can, do. When we “show” him, it should never be to display our own powers or to establish superiority over him. We are most effective as teachers when our help is given at the point where the child feels the need of it. We should anticipate his difficulties only just enough to give him confidence in us, never so as to make him doubt his own powers.

In the primary school, voluntary attention must be cultivated—it will not have been perfectly mastered in the infant school. It will be hard at first, and fatigue

will set in rapidly. Frequent changes of occupation relieve the strain. The incentive should always be the gaining of new powers: it should be the child himself who is set on mastering the difficulty with our help. Neatness should not be too much stressed at first—it should grow with the growth of precision in handling the tools of learning, and with the development of the aesthetic sense. The normal boy or girl can be led to take pride in writing and “setting-out” work in a way that pleases the eye. Many children, particularly boys, find real pleasure in “collecting” facts, especially if too much stress is not laid on rote memory, though here too achievement brings satisfaction. Physical education must of course be continued, and graded to suit the children’s growing powers. Modern physical training gives plenty of scope for free movement and for individual rhythms. Any physical mal-development should be carefully noted and if possible corrected; where necessary, the parent should be informed and helped with advice. The “tone” of the primary school should still encourage free activity and initiative, but the children are now of an age to learn what disciplined effort means. The best discipline is of course self-discipline, but other people have also their rights (including the teacher!) and their work must not be made difficult by the indiscipline of one or two lazy or selfish children.

Young children do not really play in groups,* their play is solitary or at most they use each other as “properties” in the game, a strong-willed child assigning parts to the others. A little later, they play *against* each other, in competition. Group-play develops only when the children are of an age to find their satisfactions in each other, rather than in their relationship with adults. The group-activities of the nursery school are not group-play in the full sense. In the infant school, some-

* cf. Susan Isaacs: *Social Development in Young Children*.

thing more like group-activity is possible. In the primary school, boys and girls should learn to work together for common purposes as well as to play in "teams." The members of the groups should be changed round; children should belong to different groups for different purposes. Loyalty to hard-and-fast groups is one of the banes of adult life. Children should learn to co-operate with those who happen to be engaged on the same task. They should compete, first with their own past achievement, and then, corporately, with other similar groups—but not always with the same group against the same group. Individual competition may be a powerful incentive, but it has obvious dangers, and many of the best teachers are against it.

Children of primary school age are normally objective, interested in activity, and not over-sensitive; there are exceptions, and school may be for them a really unpleasant experience, unless care is taken to show them that they are understood, and that help will be given them at need. When help is given, it should never make them more dependent on the teacher, or single them out for special treatment in class. What they need is help to make a social adjustment which comes naturally to most children.

The break at "eleven plus," when all children will in future leave the primary school, is intended to ensure that they find their feet in the new school and its work before the onset of adolescence. The age of puberty varies with the individual; normally it is earlier in girls than in boys. The type of school to which the children go should be determined solely by their natural ability and "bent." There should be a real opportunity for transfer to a different type of school later. Some children develop late, and the older practice by which those who do best in an examination in "basic" subjects (perhaps supplemented by an intelligence test and an interview)

go to the secondary school, and the rest go to a central or senior school or remain in the elementary school, is rough and ready, and often hard on borderline cases. On arrival at the new school, a little time will be taken to settle-in. But the school is now presumably one which provides the kind of mental stimulus that the child requires. By the time he reaches adolescence, his interest should be keenly engaged. If his years in the primary school have been well spent, he has mastered the tools of learning and the fundamental processes of thought. The worst of the drudgery is behind him—he has got through it at an age when, if he is normal, it did not feel like drudgery. Up to the age of sixteen or thereabouts, the curriculum of the secondary school is still fairly broad, though the shadow of the school certificate examination with its “goods” and its “credits” and the possibility of exemption from matriculation soon falls across the work in class. I have referred above to the much-discussed higher school certificate. The majority of boys and girls leave the school at sixteen if not before, so that it does not concern them. Presumably most of those who leave early go to practical or clerical occupations. While they may have the “literary” type of mind, one wonders whether a more “realistic” course of study might not be better for many of them. It seems wrong that all those who are selected for their intelligence should have so small an opportunity of exercising it on practical problems. In the short space of thirty years the secondary schools have built up a remarkably efficient system of intellectual training, liberally interpreted. The last thing I want is that they should become vocational, or even that they should ape the new type of school which the Hadow Committee wished to call “modern.” These children should be able to stretch their intelligence to the full. But should not some of them at least spend their last

years at school in trying to understand their world, in gaining some knowledge of its make-up and its problems? They do this, in a way, in their study of history and geography and literature. But the curriculum is not focussed on an understanding of the present, nor are the subjects related to each other in a way which suggests that they are concerned with different aspects of the same world of experience. The doctrine of formal training is implicit in much of the work of the lower forms of the secondary school, though its influence is less marked than in the senior forms.

The senior schools are too new to make it possible to estimate their success. Many of the buildings are admirable and well-equipped, and the staffs well qualified. For the moment, these schools are the darlings of the educational reformers. Curriculum and teaching methods have not yet settled down, though they owe much to the non-selective central schools which have existed for several years in many areas. The selective central schools, with their "bias" towards industry or commerce, will (and should) continue as a separate type of provision. In a sense, the senior schools are the growing-point of the State system. It is there that our educational practice is most flexible. For that reason among others, it is regrettable that secondary standards of expenditure have not been applied to them.

Adolescence is the age of criticism and inquiry. Until then, boys and girls have little capacity for abstract thought; to force it on them is to ask of them something outside their nature. We should therefore protect them, until adolescence, from dogmatic presentations of opinion against which they cannot protect themselves. At adolescence, they should learn that people differ widely in their convictions, even on fundamental matters. A large part of the strain of adolescence comes from the feeling that, in his uncertainties, the adolescent is an

exception. Adults speak and act confidently; he finds in himself no answering certainty. We should no longer protect him against the clash of views and values. If we have reached conviction ourselves, we should let him know it. But we should neither force our convictions on him nor hide our emptiness of conviction if such is our state. If he has been soundly educated till then, his intellect will rejoice in finding fresh fields to conquer, his feeling will not shrink from adventuring into the unknown. He will have learnt already to value for himself, if not to theorise. It is often our apparent certainty which makes it difficult for us to help him; he feels that his problems are unreal to us, perhaps he doubts whether we ever really encountered them. For some teachers there is a terrible temptation to bask in the admiration which the adolescent is sometimes ready to give. His admiration may be a means to establishing confidence, but confidence must be used to make him increasingly independent of us. Older men and women, whose personalities have hardened off and whose opinions and values are fixed, may well envy the adolescent his chance to find fresh values and to form new opinions more in harmony with the realities of to-day. But they must never exploit either his thought or his feeling. Those who knew the world before the war are often, in their hearts, strangers in the modern world, with its unstable organisation and its shifting values. It is natural that they should hanker after the old landmarks and the old certainties. Certainty and conviction will come back, but not in the old terms. A task more difficult than ours when we were young is laid on the adolescent of to-day. We went out to save a world which we knew and perhaps loved. They must find a new world, of which even the outlines are barely visible as yet. The best we can do for them is to help them to become men and women capable of accomplishing their task.

XI

THE SCHOOLS AND DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRACY has been defined times without number. I will not attempt a fresh definition. But until we know what kind of society we want, we cannot make a plan for the schools. What are the special features of a democratic society which must be reflected in its education ?

In a democratic State, political power resides in the people as a whole. That is a commonplace, but how far is it taken into account in planning education ? Does it affect the curriculum ? Does it determine our attitude towards the training of intellect and feeling ? Does it influence our discipline ? Political power carries with it the final responsibility for moral and æsthetic standards—the burden of civilisation rests on all shoulders. Are we teachers aware of that ?

In a fully democratic society, function would be determined by capacity and by nothing else. Capacity depends partly on inborn ability, partly on training. How far is our selection of children for the various types of school based on "ability to profit by instruction" there ? Democracy implies more than a "career open to talent." It means equal opportunity for equal ability. How near are we to that ? Do we give to all normal children the minimum education necessary to fit them for the kind of citizenship we shall demand of them later ?

Unjust or unequal laws can stifle freedom, but no law can of itself make us free. Freedom demands, not only

an absence of external restraint, but an inner harmony. Freedom is safe only for those who have within themselves some centre of authority; to quote a great biologist:* *La fixité du milieu intérieur est la condition de la vie libre.* Does our education make for effective freedom?

Democracy has outgrown the old insistence on an absolute equality of wealth, but it tends towards the equalisation of advantages, and a minimum standard of living. Our elementary schools are still in a sense schools for the children of poor men. They are class-schools. While this remains so, it requires courage on the part of parents who can afford another school to send their children to the "church" or "council" school. Is this attitude irrevocable? Could the social basis of primary education be so radically altered that this disability would be overcome? While it remains, can the elementary schools perform their main function—the education of ninety per cent. of our people for equal citizenship? How far is the moral tone of primary education influenced by the charitable origin of the schools? Is there a difference between provided and non-provided schools in this respect? If we desire the "national system of education" foreshadowed in the preamble to the Education Act of 1918, these are vital questions. There is perhaps no general answer—conditions vary from school to school. My point is that the "tone" of the schools should be determined by present-day realities and needs, not by their history.

The last thing I desire in schools is uniformity. Human nature is infinitely various. Certain standards must be kept, but within these standards I want more, and not less, variety, provided that these differences are deliberate and not accidental, depending on the policy or whim of those who provide the school, or upon the prosperity or poverty of the area in which it is situated.

* Claude Bernard.

The rich man can choose the school to which he sends his children. For the poor man, especially in the country, there is no choice; the law compels him to educate his children, and no other school is available. In the one-school area, there should be more flexibility in the school plan than at present. I know that this is a Utopian wish, for most of these schools are understaffed, not in proportion to the number of children, but in the sense that children of widely differing ages must be taught together. Hundreds of rural schools have only one teacher; in thousands of schools, two or more classes are taught in one room. Re-grouping has solved a part of the problem, but only for the older children.

Up to the age of eleven, the ideal is variety within the same school. It is too early as yet to divide children according to "types" of ability or interest, but smaller classes would enable teachers to meet the needs of individual children. What rich parent would send his son to a preparatory school where there were fifty boys in a class? "Individual attention" is the ideal of the preparatory school.

From the age of eleven upwards, there should be scope for every child to develop its "special bent." There is a good deal to be said for the "multiple-bias" school, if it is efficiently organised. All too soon the children will leave school for a stratified world where they meet only people of their own sort; it seems a pity to segregate the different groups earlier than need be. Almost inevitably, the school for the intellectuals is held in higher esteem than the school for those whose abilities are of a practical order. In practice, the ablest children go to the secondary school (unless poverty prevents it); it is assumed that those who are less able intellectually are of the "practical" type. This is by no means always the case. We need a test for practical ability, as well as for intellectual capacity and attainment.

The "Hadow" Committee recommended secondary education for all.* But most of the new "Hadow" schools are not secondary schools, either in staffing or equipment, and they have been organised within the elementary system. They are often excellent schools of their kind, but inferior in status to the "literary" school, which still generally has a monopoly of the term "secondary." A democratic educational system would make no social distinction between the different types of school for the same age-groups, least of all when the schools are alike provided by the State. The central or senior schools are still in the main class-schools, since they are recruited almost entirely from the elementary schools. The "secondary" schools are not class-schools in this sense, though there is generally a class-distinction within them; some of their pupils are "fee-payers," some hold "special places," for which the parent pays a fee calculated on the basis of his income. (Until the economy measures of 1931, the distinction was between "fee-payers" and those who held "free places.") Some authorities have made all secondary school places "special places" by imposing an entrance examination on all candidates for entrance. This is the only way of eliminating class-distinctions from the schools, until secondary education in some form is available for all.

It is a thousand pities that administrative difficulties still stand in the way of whole-hearted reform. Two compromises defeat our best efforts at reorganisation. The distinction between "provided" and "non-provided" elementary schools is an anomaly which we have inherited from the religious and educational controversies of the Victorian age. The division of local responsibility for education, over a large part of England, between "Authorities for Elementary Education" and "Authorities for Higher Education," is due to lack of

* See their Report: *The Education of the Adolescent*.

courage on the part of the framers of the Education Act of 1902, when local interests proved too strong for the educational reformers who wished to make the County Authorities responsible for elementary and higher education alike. Our love of continuity is sometimes a grave handicap—nowhere more so than in education.

The best of the endowed "Grammar Schools," and similar schools of recent foundation, give an education as sound as any to be found within the tradition of English education—scholarly, and at the same time broad and based on modern methods. Some of these schools have now become secondary schools under the local authority, others receive a grant direct from the Board of Education. It is a wise provision which makes financial help possible on conditions which leave the schools a wide autonomy, provided that standards are maintained.

The relation of Public Schools (and their satellites the Preparatory Schools), and of thousands of private schools, to the "national system" is a problem for which it is not easy to find a solution. The easiest course is to deny that the problem exists. In a free community, has not a man the right to send his sons and his daughters to schools of his own choice, provided that he can pay the fees and that he can, at need, satisfy the State that the instruction they are receiving is efficient? In the case of the private schools, there is a great variation in standards, and although the best schools are excellent of their kind, some of the rest are simply profit-making concerns, staffed by ill-qualified and under-paid teachers. It is high time that all schools were compulsorily open to inspection; a licence should be necessary for keeping school, and schools which do not reach a minimum standard of efficiency should be closed.

Education owes much to a small number of "experimental" private schools, whose heads have boldly broken with tradition and struck out on new lines. Many of

these schools base their teaching and their discipline on modern psychological research. Others are inspired by the desire to find new social incentives; their school-plan generally includes a community life based on handicraft or farming or both. These pioneers feel that education has become too "bookish" and unreal. Their schools are an attempt to get back to first principles, and to work out afresh an educational method in harmony with the new knowledge of the human mind and the needs of a living community. The co-educational boarding schools established by the Society of Friends are an instance of an educational experiment which has become an institution, though the example has not been widely followed. These experimental schools could hardly have come into existence under any State system that it is as yet possible to imagine in England. For my own part, I hope that we shall always leave room for such experiments. Few of them are likely to provide models for the State schools; but educational theory and practice is fertilised by this kind of private enterprise in education. Until the English State becomes far more inclined to experiment than at present, education would be the poorer for an attempt to force all schools into a publicly administered system.

The case for the public schools stands on different ground. It is difficult to defend them against some of the charges of their critics. They are "class-schools," in a different sense from the elementary schools, though hardly in the sense that is often alleged. Every class that has come to economic power has demanded a better education for its sons. The war made great changes in the distribution of the national wealth. Many families that formerly sent their sons to public schools cannot now afford to do so, while those who made war-fortunes besieged the schools to secure for their boys a "gentleman's education." To be a public school man

is a social, and perhaps even an economic advantage. The public schools still provide a high proportion of those admitted to Oxford and Cambridge. The Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office are staffed in the main by public school men. That is less true than it was of the Civil Service, but still true in a measure. The commissioned ranks of the Army are drawn largely from the public schools. The Church and the professions are becoming more democratic in their methods of recruitment, while numbers of public school men now enter the administrative side of business. There is evidence of change, both in the families on which the schools draw and in the occupations to which they send their boys. But the education they give is still an education which stamps a man as "different," and is intended to do so. This is, of course, what parents want. It is difficult to reconcile the outlook of most public schools with a thorough-going democratic view of education. The most enlightened of the Headmasters are well aware of this, and of the problems it holds for the future.* Their suggestions for reform do not generally go very deep. The attempt to bring up a few boys to certain public schools with scholarships from the elementary schools has not been very successful; the disparity of background is too great. The public schools must justify themselves on their merits, that is on the contribution they can make to a modern democratic society. Few of them can plead age as a reason for tolerance—only nine of the schools were founded before 1800. This fact in itself suggests a policy for public school education. The schools have shown their capacity to reproduce themselves to answer new demands. The middle of the nineteenth century saw the growth of a fresh crop of schools to meet the needs of the class which became rich in the industrial

* cf. Dr. Cyril Norwood in *The Schools of England* (Ed. Dover Wilson), pages 133 *et seq.*

revolution. The war gave an impetus to new foundations. No doubt the number of schools could be largely increased, if it is desired to extend the type of education they give. The public school is a typical product of English social life, in its strength and its weakness. It has shown considerable powers of adapting itself to new conditions, and of re-valuing its own tradition. At the end of the eighteenth century the schools had fallen very low in public esteem. Butler and Arnold were their second founders; they re-made tradition to meet the needs of their own age. A twentieth century Arnold might do as much for the public schools of to-day. Sanderson of Oundle made a beginning. The hardest task of a reforming Headmaster would be to break the barriers that separate most public schools from the rest of the world of education (except the ancient universities). He might have to lay heavy hands on the curriculum, at all events in those schools which still regard the "modern side" as inferior. If he was both a creative genius and a very bold man, he might even break up the uneasy compromise, established by Arnold, between Greek and Christian values, and make his school a pioneer in the difficult field of ethics, inspiring his boys to lead their generation in the search for a faith without reservations or disharmonies. He would find his opportunity, as Arnold found it, in the life of the school community. The master—especially the Headmaster, and still more the Housemaster—at a boarding school has one supreme advantage over the master at a day school. He has the boys all the time. He has three months at a stretch in which to do with them—within wide limits—what he will, without home influences and home values cutting in on his work. He has every opportunity to "mould their characters"—and he does, all the more surely because, if he is wise, he relies more on "atmosphere" than on injunction. If you really wish to "make a

new man " of a boy (or a new woman of a girl), get them away from home. Not that home influence is necessarily, or indeed generally, bad, but because it exerts on the growing personality a " pull " which makes for a subtle identification with the parents, unless indeed it leads to full and unconsidered revolt.

Those who wish to remake society and the values on which it rests cannot wish to abolish boarding schools, though they may well wish to change the direction in which their influence is exercised. English public schools have received from foreign educationists more praise than understanding. Attempts to imitate them have not been very successful—they have grown in English soil, and they are not easily transplanted. The future of the schools depends on themselves. The qualities that made a successful leader not so many years ago are rapidly falling out of date. Democratic leadership still demands some of the character-traits in which the public schools claim to specialise—courage, loyalty to principles and to colleagues and " the team spirit." But principles are not what they were, and colleagues (and even superiors) may not be " of one's own class." An understanding of other points of view and other values than one's own is not easily acquired in isolation, or in a relationship of patronage.

The success of Rendcombe College has proved that the public school need not be a " class-institution." No doubt Mr. J. H. Simpson was an exceptional Headmaster,* with more courage and more adaptability than most of his colleagues, and also with more knowledge of psychology. But where he has shown the way others can follow. If the schools have the wit to learn this lesson it may well be that the way of democracy will not be to abolish them, or to incorporate them into the administrative framework of the national system, but to found as many new schools

* cf. his *An Adventure in Education and Sane Schooling*.

as may be necessary for its needs, and to leave them a wide freedom to work out their own tradition. Perhaps, some day, every boy and girl will go away to school—though I hope not, for I think that parents who can afford it have assumed too lightly that this is the best plan in all cases. There is something to be said for the view of the Headmaster of the Royal Grammar School, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, that the ideal plan is for boys to have their dinner at school, but to sleep at home, thus making the best of both worlds. I doubt whether there is an ideal plan which will fit all cases. We are too apt to forget that each boy and girl is an individual.

I have said little about girls' boarding schools. I am afraid that I must take a leaf out of Mr. A. P. Herbert's book* and confess that I know little about them. I suspect, however, that while they have their own problems, they are faced at many points with the same difficulties as boys' boarding schools. But they have no long tradition to support or to hamper them, and they have already made one very difficult adaptation, for the position of women in the world to which their girls go is vastly different from what it was in the days of Miss Buss and Miss Beale.

* See his election address.

XII

EDUCATION FOR INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

THE education which best meets the needs of industry and commerce has been the subject of a number of inquiries both public and private.* I do not propose to attempt any summary of their results: I could not do this adequately in a short chapter. My object is rather to try to relate education for industry and commerce to the general views running through this book.

Technical education had no precise meaning in the nineteenth century; it merged on the one hand into secondary education and on the other into the teaching of science. Although towards the end of the century much admirable work was done in building up technical education it was left to the twentieth century to define its scope and to work out the organisation most appropriate to it. With increasing specialisation the training of candidates for employment in the various industries becomes largely a matter for special inquiry in each individual case. The Board of Education has published a series of most valuable reports on these lines. I am concerned here not with these specialised courses but with the general principles which underlie any sound training for industry and commerce.

I must make it clear that I do not claim originality for any of my suggestions. I am indebted for most of them to a reading of the reports to which I have referred, to visits to technical institutions of all kinds and to conversa-

* e.g., Reports of the Committee on Education and Industry, 1926 and 1928.

tions with those who are expert in this branch of education' or who are engaged in industry and commerce.

Technical advance in industry is making severe demands upon technical education. I agree entirely with those who wish to see a considerable development of technical instruction and of the various colleges and schools in which it can appropriately be given. Both educationists and industrialists must welcome the decision of the Government to provide additional money for this development. I think that many kinds of technical studies should be given a higher status in the world of education—a status more in proportion to the contribution that they make towards the better staffing and organisation of industry. A good deal has been done in recent years to bring technical studies into relation with the industries they serve, but our planning is still inadequate. Most of the great industries have overlapped the boundaries of local administrative divisions, while education in the main is bounded by them. The institutions of higher status generally draw their students from a wide area if not from the country as a whole, but there is room for far more co-operation than exists to-day between different authorities responsible for the provision of technical education, which, in my opinion, should be planned in all its stages on a regional and not a purely local basis. Where conditions make it possible there might well be some interchange of staff between the school or college and the workshop. Teachers of technical subjects should as a rule have some industrial experience and their contact with the workshops should be renewed from time to time. On the other hand, it would help to keep the teaching of many technical institutions up-to-date if they could call upon the services of those actually engaged in production, perhaps for short periods and by mutual arrangement between the authorities of the school and the firm concerned. In

planning regional schemes the first step would naturally be to make a survey of each area and its needs—a survey in which all the authorities concerned might co-operate with the leaders of industry. In some industries there is already a representative national body either for the operation of marketing schemes or for publicity purposes. Where such a national body exists it should be encouraged to co-operate in the planning of technical education for that trade or group of trades.

It goes without saying that whatever is necessary in the way of buildings and equipment should be provided. The cost would be repaid many times over by the increase in the efficiency of entrants into industry. "Well equipped" does not necessarily mean elaborately equipped. Admirable work has often been done with simple equipment. The main point is that it should be suited to its purpose. There is still room for a good deal of experience in the training of teachers who intend to teach technical subjects. While the training should be kept broad it might well have some special relevance to their future work.

It is with some hesitation that I must raise here a question which seems to me of primary importance, though I am aware of the difficulties. In recent years great progress has been made in the planning of production and marketing, but apart from certain limited experiments there has been as yet no concerted attempt to plan the selection and training of the technical staff with a view to the needs of the industry as a whole. While it is clearly difficult to estimate ahead the needs of industry for man-power the uncertainty as to its requirements is a serious obstacle in the selection and training of candidates for industrial employment. I believe too that selection generally takes place at too late a stage. It is not until the candidate has almost completed his training that he seeks employment. Vocational

guidance is needed much earlier, if possible before technical training begins. The tests devised by the Institute of Industrial Psychology have already diverted many boys and girls from courses of training for occupations for which they were clearly unsuited. The Advisory Committees of the Employment Exchanges and their officers give much valuable advice to school leavers, but the recruitment of skilled workers for industry is still far too haphazard. Rationalisation surely is as important here as in the planning of production and marketing.

The distinction between technical and cultural studies still holds, though it needs re-definition in the light of modern conditions. Technical education should never be merely a training in specialised skills. It should rest on a broad basis both of knowledge and of practice. This means, of course, that a good deal of what a boy learns at a technical school or college will never be of direct use to him in industry. The time given to these studies is however not wasted. Quite apart from the acquirement of manipulative ability and the general enhancement of interest which follows attendance at a good technical course, there is the important point that the improvement of technical methods is most likely to come from those who have a wide background. There is the further point that the highly specialised worker cannot easily find alternative employment if for any reason the process on which he is employed ceases to be necessary or if there is a surplus of labour in his branch of the industry. This does not of course apply to jobs for which only attention, quick motor response and manipulative skill are required—though even here experience of different processes may be an advantage from the point of view of obtaining employment.

It was recognised even in the nineteenth century that technical education should not be begun until a sound foundation of general knowledge has been laid. It is

sometimes claimed that technical studies have a cultural value at least equal to that which can be obtained from literary studies. A good deal depends I suppose upon what one means by cultural value. Undoubtedly a sound technical education trains certain powers which a literary education may not cultivate, but recent investigations into the transference of training should warn us against assuming that particular skills acquired either through technical or through literary studies can be transferred at will to activities of another order. The claim that technical studies can at the same time be cultural is easier to maintain where a deliberate attempt is made to broaden them out in this direction. In certain technical courses the teaching of design is included. In others some work is done on the history of the processes involved or perhaps on the history of the industry concerned. I can imagine that a student studying technical problems associated with one of the great industries might gain from a study of the history of the industry considerable insight into the development of industrial organisation in general. If the course he followed was planned on broad enough lines, it might also awaken an interest in other aspects of national history, or perhaps in the study of economics. In much the same way, the study of chemistry or physics should not be confined to the aspects of those subjects which have a direct bearing upon technical processes in the industry. It is, I think, in such ways as these that technical education can be broadened out so as to have a cultural bearing. There is room for much more experiment on these lines, though there are already several admirable courses in preparation for certain occupations.

What is perhaps the most important aspect of this matter is too often overlooked. Industry cannot be isolated from other sides of social activity. In a broad general way, industry exists to satisfy human needs.

No doubt some of these needs are somewhat artificially created by advertisement and by clever selling, but if they had no root in human nature the industry could not long survive. I believe that every technical course should include some study of social and economic relationships. The technician in industry, like the research worker in a university laboratory, may know little about the general problems of society, and may have no interest in the bearing of his work upon them. In most cases he probably feels that this is none of his business. He may have no direct personal responsibility outside the process or research on which he is engaged, but somehow he must learn to take a more connected view of the problems of society, and I believe that the most natural way of arousing interest in social studies is to start from the vocational end and to follow out the results of the work by which we earn our bread and butter into its repercussions upon society at large. For some people in some kinds of employment this may lead to disturbing reflections. If it results in wakening a sense of their own responsibility that will be all to the good.

Many of these considerations also apply in the field of commercial education, but the qualifications required are in some respects more flexible. Occupations are more easily interchangeable and the needs of commerce for skilled staff are more difficult to estimate. There is, however, the same need for the planning of courses. On the one hand the requirements of the locality should be borne in mind, on the other they must not be allowed to over-shadow the claims of a general education.

The selective central school generally has a "bias" towards either industry or commerce. It is well that the courses taken during the last two years at a school should be planned in consultation with the best industrial and commercial opinion in the neighbourhood. The main feature of the work of the school is the use of

practical subjects as a means to self-development. Any attempt to interpret "practical" as the equivalent of "vocational" would be a mistake. The direct preparation of candidates for employment in industry and commerce is the work of technical and commercial schools, and not of the selective central school. It is true that we must retain flexibility in our educational system, but this means a variety of provision and not a blurring of the types of education given in different institutions. These considerations are even more important in the case of central schools with a commercial bias than in the case of similar schools with an industrial bias. Since the boys and girls attending a school with an industrial bias must go in most cases into a number of different industries, the school has no great temptation to prepare them directly for employment. Indeed this is hardly possible. But in the case of the schools with a commercial bias where technical skills such as shorthand, typing, filing and accountancy are generally taught the curriculum must be guarded against over-emphasis on this side. The danger lies in the fact that these skills are a more direct preparation for employment than the skills taught in a similar school with an industrial bias can be.

While the best of the courses designed to give a training in industrial and commercial skills are of their kind admirable, there seems to me to be one serious gap in our education for industry and commerce. Apart from a few courses in industrial administration and similar subjects, there is no training for *policy*; but while industry needs skilled technicians it needs even more the services of men and women who have the capacity, the training and the will to shape policy; and by policy I do not mean only the planning of production and marketing, but industrial leadership in the widest sense. The opinion is growing among industrialists and commer-

cial men that a sound general education up to the age of 16, 17 or even 18 years may be a distinct advantage in those who enter the administrative ranks of industry or commerce. This is very much to the good. It indicates a wider outlook on educational problems and a new appreciation of what the best schools are doing. But I feel that there is some point in the criticism which is often made that the schools do not give all the help they might in the preparation of senior boys and girls for industry, quite apart from the teaching of technical skills. This criticism sometimes takes a form which implies a narrow view of educational aims. Employers complain that there has been a definite decline in accuracy. The boys and girls who enter their offices write less well than their fathers did and their arithmetic leaves much to be desired. They believe that this falling off is directly related to the new educational policy which lays less stress upon the teaching of these subjects or upon the attainment of accuracy in them. The old copper-plate writing is certainly out of fashion, and it may be that modern methods of teaching mathematics do not secure as high a degree of accuracy as was formerly obtained by the old-fashioned arithmetic. School time is limited. One cannot teach everything, and the broadening of the curriculum has certainly meant that less attention can be given to securing routine efficiency in what used to be regarded as the basic subjects. Gain must be balanced against loss. While accuracy has its importance, I think that most modern educationists would maintain (and many progressive employers would agree) that there has been a great improvement in other directions. It is probably better that boys and girls entering employment should come to it with interests awakened, with a wider knowledge of literature, and with some understanding of the make-up of the modern world than that they should be able to write or to do

sums with meticulous accuracy. It is certainly better for the boys and girls themselves, but my view is that it is also better for their employers. Modern education aims (though perhaps not as fully as it should) at the development of initiative and a sense of responsibility in work. These are valuable industrial qualities, and if the price we must pay for them is some decline in routine efficiency of an elementary kind we may well be the gainers by the change. In particular the development of the various kinds of judgment necessary for success in the practical world is of supreme importance. There are probably some aspects of judgment which cannot be trained apart from the circumstances in which they are to be used. They will quickly be acquired in an office or factory by those who have a capacity for them if the early years of employment are regarded as in some sense an extension of education. The benefit of such an attitude on the part of employers will be reaped later.

But what we need most is what I can only call a social policy for industry. The days are gone when it was sufficient for an employer or a firm to test the success of an undertaking solely in terms of the balance sheet. That attitude brings nemesis nowadays. A wise industrial policy must take account of the general problems of society. There is a growing impatience with a policy which can suggest no better way of equating supply and demand than the restriction of production, the imposition of quotas and generally the saddling of both industry and society with a mass of restrictive regulations. It is reasonable that industry should have at its command some reserve of labour—though society has surely a responsibility for the conditions under which the time of waiting for employment is passed. In some quarters there is a disposition to suggest that this responsibility lies in the first instance upon the industry that requires the reserve. But in spite of a welcome diminution in

the numbers of the unemployed, public opinion is surely right in challenging the assumption that for an indefinite term of years the volume of unemployment must stand at a figure far in excess of anything that can be justified on these grounds. There is serious mal-adjustment somewhere, and the responsibility for resolving it must rest to a great extent upon industry itself. It cannot be shuffled off on to the Government, which has a right to expect the co-operation of industry in solving the problems with which it is faced. Industry must contribute its quota towards the solution of our major social problems—not only in hard cash (it is doing that already), but in constructive ideas. No doubt it is true that our national economic problems cannot be solved in isolation. They are in large part the product of the world situation. But this in turn means that world problems are the concern of us all, and in particular of those whose special experience and executive ability give them both the right and the duty to shape policy in the wider sense. Education for the higher ranks of industry should include at least some training in these matters. What is needed most is a certain flexibility of mind, and the power and the will to think and to act in the general interest, and not merely in the interest of some section of the community. It is not easy to reconcile one's immediate responsibilities with these wider claims, but unless that is possible there is no effective reply to those who maintain that national, and in particular economic, policy is merely a reflection of the conflict of divergent interests.

I must make some reference to another aspect of this subject. Most of the learned professions insist that specialised training shall be preceded by a good general education. Even here I am inclined to think that pre-vocational studies are often begun at too early an age. The future doctor or the specialised scientific worker has to leave too soon the study of non-scientific subjects

to prepare for his preliminary examinations. Once these are over his training is generally strictly professional. It may cover a wide range of subjects, but it excludes much which would find a place in any sound general scheme of education. Professional courses are already overcrowded and it would be difficult in most cases for financial reasons to extend the length of the course. In spite of this I feel strongly that room should be found for the study of what may be called the social aspects of their professional duties. The doctor and the lawyer should know something of the social problems on which their professional activities impinge. They will be none the worse specialists for that. No doubt both doctors and lawyers pick up a good deal of this knowledge in the course of their professional careers. It would be better both for them and for their patients and clients if some introduction to the study of these problems was included in their training. The general problems of citizenship can no longer be considered the concern only of politicians and civil servants. Professional men, like industrialists, have a specific contribution to make. They are unlikely to make that contribution unless they feel that they have a definite responsibility to society in this matter.*

There is still another side to this problem. If the needs of industry and commerce for skilled entrants could be fully met, what proportion of the population would be provided for in this way? It is impossible to suggest a figure, but it is clear that the great majority of children and young people would still be outside the total. Modern industry needs a vast army of "unskilled" workers—if the word may still be used of occupations which often require a high degree of manipulative skill.

* I owe this last point to a paper read by Professor A. M. Carr-Saunders to a conference organised by The Association for Education in Citizenship.

The best possible organisation of technical and commercial education will leave this problem untouched. If the needs of industry alone determined the character of education, most schools would be functionless except so far as they provided a training in discipline, orderliness and rapid motor responses. In other words, in framing a policy for the education of the vast majority of boys and girls we must seek guidance elsewhere than in industrial needs—or we must confine the schools, as perhaps some people would still like to do, to the teaching of the “rudiments” and to a training in discipline. If we are not content with so narrow a plan, where shall we look for our principles of general education?

XIII

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

THE challenge of Communism and Fascism has at last roused even the least thoughtful of democrats to a more critical attitude towards democracy. Too often this criticism takes the form merely of a vague feeling that its foundations are not as secure as we had supposed. Even this may be useful if the prevailing sense of uncertainty can be turned to constructive uses.

We have interpreted democracy too narrowly; we tend to look upon it simply as a system of government. It is more than that. It implies a social faith. The rival systems with which it is now faced mean not only a fresh valuation of political machinery and social institutions, but a new outlook on human nature, its needs and possibilities.

Self-government demands a high virtue on the part of the citizens—the ability and the will to set the general interest above individual or sectional interests. It demands a widespread capacity for sound judgment. These are not inborn powers. Where they exist, they are the fruit of sound training and self-discipline—that is, of education in the widest sense. Democracy means that, in the last resort, the people as a whole are the guardians of what is sound in tradition, the judges of what is valid in criticism and convincing in innovation—and this, not only in the political sphere, but over the whole field of social morality and cultural values. In a self-governing community, the burden of civilisation rests on all adult shoulders.

The new interest in the problems of democracy has found expression in the formation of the Association for Education in Citizenship, of which Sir Henry Hadow is President, Sir Ernest Simon, Chairman, and Mrs. Eva Hubback, Hon. Secretary.* Along with many others who are trying to face these problems and to make constructive suggestions, I owe a deep debt to the Association, and especially to its conferences and publications.† I share the anxiety of my fellow-members of the Association that the problems of democratic citizenship should become the concern of all. I share also their conviction that one of our primary needs is hard thinking on these subjects—thinking which is informed by a close and critical study of the facts. While I have learnt a great deal through my membership of the Association, the responsibility for the views put forward in this book, and particularly in this chapter, is my own. Perhaps I had better say frankly that I believe that our discussion of these problems has reached a critical and even a crucial stage. There is very little in the publications of the Association with which I do not fully agree. I hope that the conclusions put forward will receive very serious consideration by all concerned either with government or with education. But in some ways which seem to me important my own approach to these problems differs from that of many of my colleagues in the Association. It is not that I disagree with their views, but that I feel we are only now beginning to get to the heart of the matter. What I mean by this will become clearer as I proceed.

It is becoming customary to divide the teaching of citizenship into direct methods and indirect methods. Among the direct methods, the giving of definite and

* Its address is 10, Victoria Street, London, S.W.1.

† Especially the pamphlet *Training for Citizenship* and the book just published, *Education for Citizenship in Secondary Schools*.

accurate information stands first. Most citizens are profoundly ignorant in matters of government. It is clearly important that they should gain a grasp at least of the main outlines of the democratic system as it exists in this country. To give information of this kind was in many schools the starting point of education in citizenship. The subject was generally called "civics." I believe that there is a place for teaching of this kind, and if it is well done it often arouses considerable interest, though if it is badly done it can be one of the dullest subjects in the curriculum. Citizenship can, however, be taught not merely as a subject in itself, but through a variety of other subjects—history, geography and literature are obvious examples. In the book referred to above* valuable and concrete suggestions are made for the teaching of this and other subjects in the way most likely to lead to civic virtue of the democratic type. The articles are written by specialists, and I hope that they will be studied by all those who teach these subjects in secondary schools. We are, however, up against the problems of transference to which reference has been made elsewhere. Sir Ernest Simon contributes a chapter on this aspect of the subject. The problem is to ensure that the teaching given is of a kind which makes it possible to apply it to the practice of citizenship. There is need for further experiment here, although the knowledge we have already acquired is sufficient to warn us off certain methods still too commonly adopted and to indicate fresh methods which have achieved a measure of success.

In most schools it is the custom to give some definite moral instruction. Teachers differ as to the value of general instruction in ethics. Most of them wish to "shape character," but many believe that the most effective way of doing so is by the incidental method of

* *Education for Citizenship in Secondary Schools.*

approach. Situations are to be dealt with as they arise, and reliance is placed mainly on the "tone" of the school. Where explicit moral instruction is given this is generally linked with religion. A sincere religious faith can be one of the most powerful incentives to moral action. Religious instruction should never be given except by those who have themselves religious conviction. Children are quick to sense insincerity. It is rarely possible to awaken in others a conviction which we do not share ourselves.

Educationists have always laid stress on the importance of forming good habits, and on the building up of sentiments. Just before writing this chapter I received an article written for the November number of *The British Journal of Educational Psychology* by Miss Margaret Phillips on "The Development of Social and Political Sentiments in Women." This article is, I believe, only an instalment of a larger work which Miss Phillips hopes to publish shortly. Her conclusions are based upon a detailed examination of a large number of replies to a request addressed to some two hundred of her friends that they would try to trace in detail the formation of certain of their own sentiments. The material summarised is of the highest importance, and of very great interest to all those concerned in moral education. I have drawn freely on Miss Phillips's article in writing this chapter and I should like to make my personal acknowledgment of the help I have received from it. Miss Phillips's conclusions confirm in many important respects the findings of analytical psychology, but she has broken new ground and opened up fresh possibilities for research and experiment. I hope that when the whole of Miss Phillips's material is published it will throw light on certain other problems which the limits of the present article do not allow her to cover. Here again, while I wish to express my indebtedness,

I must accept responsibility for the views I have put forward. In some respects they go beyond anything for which I can quote detailed evidence.

The foundations of most sentiments are laid in early childhood. According to Miss Phillips, it is doubtful whether the influence of schools and of formal education generally can ever compete with early home influences, though it may operate in connection with other factors.* This finding may not be very welcome to those teachers who obtain intense satisfaction from the belief that they are one of the main influences in the shaping of character, but it will be accepted by others with relief. Probably far too many of us try to carry the world on our shoulders. Again Miss Phillips says: "Sentiments formed for one individual by another are normally extended to the former's interests. Many social and political sentiments have this genesis."† I believe that some of the difficulties surrounding sentiment formation arise from the methods we have adopted in moral education. We deliberately encourage loyalty to certain limited social groups—notably the family, the school, the Church and the State. It is towards these institutions that we direct children's social responses. In order to make our work effective we discourage any fundamental criticism of the object of the sentiments we wish them to form. The institution, may, of course, be criticised in detail but not in its fundamental nature or purpose, and generally speaking the values it embodies are presented as self-evident. By encouraging the formation of these sentiments we canalise the children's emotional responses into socially acceptable channels. Many of us are afraid of strong feeling unless it is crystallised in this way. The formation of sentiments is a necessary, and indeed an inevitable process in the development of the personality,

* *Op. cit.*, page 275.

† *Ibid.*

but the methods generally adopted are dangerous. They tend to stifle both rational criticism and the power to value at first hand. If criticism arises, it is often much more destructive in its effects than would be the case if it had been allowed freer scope; it may, for instance, attack not particular points in the theology or organisation of the Church, but the concept of religion itself. We have presented these social institutions as worthy of the children's unquestioning acceptance. Often this results in their forming a negative attitude towards them; it may even amount to total rejection.

The questions surrounding the formation of sentiments are so interesting, and indeed so important, that one is tempted to linger over them, but I must content myself here with making only one other major point. *It is almost impossible to teach citizenship effectively in a society where there are no clear social objectives and no widespread consciousness of social purpose.* I believe this to be fundamental. In the absence of some clear social purpose with which a child or an adult can identify himself, a strong religious faith is probably the only means of awakening effective social responses. In such cases, religion may enable a man to look beyond the feebleness of social incentives to the eternal imperatives. But such a faith cannot be compelled, and unfortunately it is compatible with a very imperfect understanding of the needs of society. A further point which is related to the need for some general social purpose as the background for education in citizenship may also be stated in Miss Phillips's words: "To feel oneself necessary to others is one of the most imperative psychological needs. Any society which satisfies this need tends to become a nucleus of a strong sentiment."

A method of direct teaching which is often very effective has been the subject of many recent experiments. If it is possible to reconstruct in the school a part of the

actual life of society and to assign parts in this drama of activity to the children, they will gain an understanding of it which cannot be conveyed to them by mere description. At one of the recent conferences on Education for Citizenship an experiment of this kind was described. It was organised in a London school near Billingsgate. The market was reconstructed in miniature in the school, and the children played the parts of salesmen and buyers, carters and porters, and others concerned. Conversations heard in the real market were recorded and reproduced in simple fashion, complete parts being written out as for a play. Although I did not see this experiment myself, I can imagine that it might be very effective in making the business of buying and selling real to the children. This is, of course, only one of a large number of experiments with the same object. This very direct method of teaching is a development of the "visits of observation" and "school journeys" organised by many schools. It must take a good deal of effort to arrange, and it could probably only be done by teachers who were keen enough to make it possible for them to overcome the many obstacles in the way, and to give the time and energy necessary to it. The Association for Education in Citizenship is collecting records of a number of such practical experiments. It is to be hoped that a means may be found of making this information generally available.

Turning to what are often called the indirect methods of teaching citizenship, most emphasis is generally laid upon the need for straight and accurate thinking. By this I mean thinking which is scientific in the fullest sense. Thinking can be vitiated either by bad logic or by the intrusion of irrelevant emotion. I hope I have made it sufficiently clear elsewhere that I regard feeling as an important element in social judgment. The point here is that it cannot replace thought, and that when

it unconsciously influences what purports to be logical thinking it interferes seriously with that objective view which the scientific study of any problem requires. The mechanisms which may vitiate thought have been analysed by Professor Thouless in his book *Straight and Crooked Thinking*. The influence of suggestion upon thought has been dealt with in Leavis and Thompson's *Culture and Environment*, where numerous illustrations are drawn from modern advertisement. Schools should arm their children against the illegitimate devices of politicians and advertisers. Many of these devices are perfectly obvious once attention has been drawn to them, but they succeed in bamboozling intelligent people who are taken off their guard. Propaganda consists largely in putting forward emotional pleas in logical form, and it is part of its technique to divert attention from the weak points in the argument.

Most schools aim deliberately at teaching citizenship through school activities, particularly team games. The "team spirit" is now cultivated in the class room as well as outside it. Even in day schools boys and girls are often divided into "houses" which compete against one another not only in sport but for marks. Schemes of this kind are evidence that teachers are dissatisfied with the motive of individual competition to which they formerly made so strong an appeal, but there are dangers of a kind not always obvious to the enthusiast. It is not very difficult to cultivate a narrow loyalty to a particular group. It is much harder to transfer the loyalty cultivated in this way to other groups and to society at large. On this point Miss Phillips concludes that "Sentiments for small societies will be extended to larger ones only where certain conditions as to resemblance are fulfilled." There is an interesting parallel here with the problems of the transference of training from one subject to another.

Discussions on education for citizenship are often concerned with the question of "bias." We have prided ourselves on the exclusion of bias from the schools. As I have shown elsewhere,* we have often felt ourselves to be unbiassed because the bias we gave to education was a bias that was so widely shared that we were hardly conscious of it. In this country, at all events, most people seem agreed in theory that there must be no intellectual bias—we must leave the field open for the freest possible inquiry and we must not teach our own conclusions dogmatically. While there is general agreement on this, the practice of education does not always conform to our principles. The problem of bias is much more difficult as it relates to values. I imagine that most educationists start from the position that here too there must be freedom from bias. But is this really possible? In point of fact we do bias children in favour of such generally accepted virtues as honesty, courage and perhaps self-sacrifice. Here again we are unconscious of our bias, because we are agreed that these things are right and necessary. It is difficult to imagine a school in which such questions were treated as matters of opinion. With this in mind, what should be our attitude towards the values on which democracy itself is based—especially towards freedom? Must this be treated as an open question, or must we teach dogmatically that freedom is a good thing? I find that many of those with whom I have discussed this matter are prepared to agree to the inclusion of freedom among the values to be taught dogmatically in schools. My inclination is to dissent from this view. I think that we are perhaps justified in teaching with assurance values on which there is almost complete agreement amongst civilised peoples, but freedom is not among these values. On the other hand, we must accept the dictum of Aristotle

* Chapter IV.

that schools must be planned in accordance with the constitution of the State they serve. If, then, we are preparing children for citizenship in a free community, is it not important that we should teach them that freedom is one of the essential goods of life? So far as actual teaching goes it is possible to take no definite line on this, but when we turn from teaching to what is generally called the "tone" of the school compromise is possible no longer. We have to choose. A school cannot be at the same time both free and un-free in its organisation and its atmosphere. Faced with this choice, I cannot see that in a democratic community there is any real alternative to the acceptance of freedom as the governing principle here. In fact I am sure that we have not been nearly thorough enough in our application of democratic principles to school life. I am not thinking primarily of self-government schemes, or of the delegation of the teacher's responsibility to prefects or monitors, though all these may have their place in a school organised on democratic lines. I am thinking rather of the attitude towards the school and towards learning which we encourage the children to adopt. It should be in the best sense an attitude of independence. Obedience should never be required for obedience's sake, or discipline for the sake of discipline. These are Fascist values which have no place in a democratic community. Of course one does not want indiscipline, and it may be necessary to take strong measures against those who would make the life of the school community impossible unless they were checked. But to require conformity in conduct is by no means the same as to require a submission of the intellect and the will to authority. We cannot have it both ways. If we are educating for freedom we must educate *in* freedom. We must try to make the child more and more independent of ourselves—not only of our teaching, but of

our judgment. There is a practical limit to the extent to which this is possible with any particular child at any particular time. This limit has been discovered experimentally in some schools of a modern kind. For instance Mrs. Susan Isaacs* reached the conclusion that "the young child cannot make use of unlimited freedom." It needs a firm though mild authority to protect it from its own fantastic interpretations of the real world. But the teacher must bring the world to the child and not stand between the child and experience. We must be on our guard against prolonging the kind of dependence that satisfies our own sense of power. At the same time we must help the child to realise the meaning of life in society and the claims which it makes upon the individual.

But to return to the question of bias in teaching values. The strongest case for the dogmatic teaching of the value of freedom is that since we cannot avoid making a choice in determining the tone of the school we might as well be consistent and teach the value of freedom as a dogma. For my own part I would rather say that we are right in exhibiting our own sense of its value, if indeed we are sincerely convinced ourselves, and if we are prepared to carry this conviction into the practical relationships of school life. But I would certainly not exclude from the staff of a school a teacher who could not sincerely accept this value, nor would I inhibit him from exhibiting his own different values. What would this mean in practice? I would not allow him to act as a Fascist in the class room. His discipline would have to conform with the general tone of the school, but (though I know this is a hard saying) I would allow him—though perhaps not encourage him—to express his disagreement. Although this might create difficulties of a practical kind I believe it is the only plan consistent

* See her *Social Development in Young Children*.

with democratic principles. If (as I believe we should) we refuse to require that the child shall feel in any particular way as a matter of moral obligation, we can hardly deny the same freedom of feeling to our colleagues.

It is at this point that deeper questions arise. The liberal democracy of the nineteenth century, of which we are the heirs, made a great point of freedom of thought. This was indeed the rock upon which the democratic ideal was built. The greatest triumphs of nineteenth century liberalism were achieved in fighting against the persecution or censorship of opinion. Religious freedom was won first, then toleration was extended to most kinds of social criticism. There were always limits. The individual was protected by the law of slander, and society protected itself from anything it regarded as really dangerous by retaining certain kinds of censorship, and by enforcing rather spasmodically the Law of Conspiracy and the Blasphemy Laws and the legal prohibition of indecency. No doubt these laws often pressed hardly upon individuals, and some genuine and valuable criticism was stifled, but by the end of the nineteenth century in England, at all events, most men had almost all the freedom they required for the expression of opinions then held. There are signs that society, or the State, is becoming less tolerant or more frightened. The passing of the Incitement to Disaffection Act and the result of certain recent prosecutions in the Courts is evidence of this, but in comparison with most other countries we retain a wide degree of freedom so far as the expression of opinion is concerned. It is perhaps the particular importance of freedom of thought for progress that has led those who follow the liberal democratic tradition to believe that if this is secure social and political freedom are assured. In education they lay great stress upon the

need for straight and impartial thinking. It is held that right thinking must lead to right conduct. Right thinking is certainly a very important element in right conduct, but why is it that a society where there is so wide a measure of freedom of thought is so strangely lacking in social purpose? There is a gap between knowing and doing of which liberal democratic theory has taken little account. How is it that we may admire a thing without our desire reaching out towards it? Why is it that to know what is good does not always generate the will and the purpose to achieve it? I believe that this is the crucial problem in education for citizenship.

It is here that Communism and Fascism constitute a real challenge to democratic theory and practice. Whatever we may think of the policy of the present governments in Soviet Russia, Italy and Germany, we cannot burk the fact that they have succeeded in generating a force of will and a sense of purpose for which democratic England can show no parallel. The only effective answer to dictatorship is a democratic system which shows the same strength of purpose. How have the Communists and Fascists achieved this result? Their teaching of citizenship is always linked with purposeful activity. Action is the great resolver of doubts. Belief often follows on rather than precedes vigorous and successful action. This has, of course, often been proved in the history of religion. In the teaching of citizenship we try to generate patriotism or the spirit of service and then to apply it to social tasks. Our reliance on this method is, I believe, related to the emphasis which liberal democracy lays on the rational element in conduct. Our failures spring largely from our failure to understand the relation between feeling and will. Communists and Fascists have developed a very effective technique for inducing

emotional responses. Conviction is contagious, but they do not rely solely on this for the rousing of enthusiasm. They make full use of modern psychology, especially the psychology of suggestion, but they rely most of all on the power of purposeful activity to generate will. A successful leader can easily persuade his followers to accept his own values. Activity comes first, explanation and valuation afterwards. When I was in Germany recently I talked with two or three young Blackshirts, and among other things I asked them what was the special purpose of the organisation to which they belonged. They said that originally they were Hitler's personal bodyguard, but they did not know yet what the present purpose of the organisation was. They added: "No doubt we shall be told later." These Blackshirts did not require to be convinced of the truth of Nazi theory or the rightness of Nazi values before they gave themselves to the Nazi cause. They were members of a successful movement and they shared common purposes. They were prepared to wait for explanations.

In the Fascist view thought must work within the circle of politics. Thought is necessary to apply the general principles of the movement to particular situations, and to find ways and means of securing its ends. It is brought into service also to rationalise the attitudes and beliefs on which the movement rests. Thus, discipline is presented as an ultimate value, that is to say as something valuable in itself quite apart from the ends it serves. Revolt, and indeed any display of independence, is nipped in the bud. Principles may change, but any criticism of what is at the moment orthodox is rigidly suppressed. Activity and experience come first, reasons and values follow. This is the reverse of the order customary in democratic countries.

Has democracy any effective reply which is consistent with its own principles? I believe it has, but it will

mean a radical revision of most of our present methods of teaching citizenship. First we must create or recover a sense of social purpose. The best way of achieving this is to attack vigorously the most pressing of our problems. It may be difficult to do this until we are sure of our principles, but a beginning must be made somewhere. The slum clearance and housing schemes of certain progressive towns have aroused civic consciousness more effectively than any amount of talking about civic duty. We may have no clear principles to start with. That is a handicap when one believes in principles, and it leads to uncertainties and a lack of direction ; but the Fascist is right in believing that the way to find principles is to engage in purposeful activity. The Nazi phrase, " We think with our blood " expresses this with a vigour that revolts most of us. Of course purposeful action must be based at least on some kind of hypothesis. The trouble is that democratic communities are apt to try to pin their leaders down to a false kind of consistency. They love precedent. A man may be allowed to change his principles once in his political career, though even then he may well be labelled a turn-coat. Among democratic leaders only Mr. Roosevelt in recent times has had the courage to live empirically. That is his supreme virtue. Democracy needs more leaders who are ready to adopt this attitude and to stand or fall by the results. We must outgrow our love of formal consistency, for in the present state of the world fresh principles can only be discovered by trial and error. Communism and Fascism have shown themselves far more ready to be empirical in this sense than any democratic community except the United States.

We must be prepared to trust ourselves further than we can see clearly before we have the material in which to form social judgments. But at this point democracy must make a clean break with the practice of Communism

and Fascism. Having launched its citizens on some practical task, it must not dictate either reasons or values. It must allow, and indeed encourage by every means in its power, its citizens to make up their own minds. Principles must not be imposed from above. No doubt they will emerge first in the minds of one or two leaders, but the primary duty of democratic citizens is social judgment. As the task proceeds there is material in which to judge. If the tentative valuations and principles first arrived at are found inadequate they must be revised. That is the true road to conviction, and once conviction is reached principles of a more permanent kind can be built up.

In a society which has recovered its sense of social purpose the teaching of citizenship becomes relatively easy. As the example of Russia shows, even children are eager to take responsibility and to share in the common task. Problems of method are not the real problems, though they are important. In a purposeful society it will be easy to relate the teaching of citizenship to what is going on in the world around the school. Children can be taken to see it. Visits of observation have a new meaning. Perhaps the children can help in simple ways. Lessons in citizenship cease to be an attempt to awaken an interest and a purpose which can then be applied to practical tasks. The children are eager to learn what it is all about. Moral teaching gains a new meaning. The school itself becomes a little society consciously preparing its members for civic duties of which they already have a vivid picture.

England is the home of many voluntary societies with an ethical basis. They seem to grow naturally in English soil. Unfortunately many of them start at the wrong end. They try first to awaken a sense of service and they then look for objects to which these social responses can be applied. It is better to base member-

ship on some common interest in a practical problem or group of problems. The success of the Nursery School movement is a good illustration of what can be achieved in this way. A spirit of service is best generated by giving oneself to a practical task in which one is naturally interested or for some object of whose necessity one is convinced. Of societies with an ethical basis those are best which (like Rotary) state their principles in broad, general terms.

In the absence of any clear purpose in society at large, how should the school that wishes to teach citizenship set to work? I believe that its main task should be along the lines of what has been described as the indirect method. Its teaching and its tone should be based frankly on democratic principles. It should help its pupils to think clearly and accurately, especially in matters where their own interest or feeling is involved. This is the chief value of self-government schemes; rightly handled, they provide many opportunities of this kind. Direct teaching is best done through activity, or failing this through observation. If possible, let the children take an active part in some civic enterprise which really interests them. At all events, take them to see what their city is doing. Children need to be helped to observe and to discuss. In a town which is proud of its slum clearance and housing schemes, many children will have heard about these things and they may have passed slums or new houses on their way to school, but few of them will know what it is all about, except in a very general way. Organised visits first to areas scheduled for clearance and then to the new housing estates could be arranged. There must be simple explanations not over-burdened with detail. Teaching should be kept as concrete as possible. Many classes will be interested to know where the material for the new houses comes from and how it is brought

from the place where it is produced—this could be worked in very well with lessons in geography. They should be given a picture of the planning which is necessary before such a scheme can be begun. Older boys and girls might go into the matter more deeply. They will be interested in plans and “lay-outs”; also perhaps in costs. Ample opportunity should be given for questions, and reports of the meetings of the local housing committee might form a good basis for discussions in class. This is, of course, only an illustration. Most progressive towns provide ample material for such studies in practical citizenship. Once interest is really engaged, it can be broadened out to include a study of how the city is governed, illustrated by visits to civic departments where there is anything to see—the water works, the electricity undertaking, markets, perhaps the docks or even a sewage farm. A series of carefully planned visits will leave a deeper impression on the mind than any amount of description. There is no reason why the visits should be confined to activities under the control of the city. What one most wants the children to gain from these visits and from the work in school associated with them is a sense of community, the dependence of group upon group, the interlocking of social purposes. Visits to local factories, perhaps to a coal mine, and for town children especially to farms, will fill in the picture of society at work in satisfying common needs.

Of course the value of such activities and visits as these depends entirely upon the use which is made of them. They should not be looked upon merely as a pleasant break in school routine. They should be the basis of a definite training in citizenship. Our main effort should be directed towards helping the children to understand what they see. We should not preach citizenship. It is far better to let them find out for

themselves what it all means in terms of human relationships. The teaching of citizenship should not be isolated from the rest of the teaching in school. If the atmosphere of the school is free enough to encourage inquiry, they will readily ask questions and lessons in geography and history will gain greatly. School is for most children a world where values are different from values at home. Geography and history should introduce them to ways of living and thinking which stimulate imagination by contrast with ways of life they know. We should allow free play to the interest and speculation which is aroused. As future citizens of a democratic community, they must learn at school not only to think straight but to judge for themselves. For the adult it may be more difficult to make up one's mind on questions of conduct than on matters of principle and belief. The child is most at home in practical activities and its thinking arises naturally out of what it does and what it experiences. The teacher's own personality may be the most important influence in school life, though not always in the way the teacher assumes. Only those who have found freedom for themselves are likely to help others to freedom. Freedom means not only the right to vote or the right to express one's opinions, but the right to set one's own valuation on experience. Those who live at second-hand themselves are unlikely to be good guides to first-hand living, however sound their principles and however competent they may be in giving moral and religious instruction. It is more important that children should be taught by teachers who have reached honest and sincere convictions themselves than that they should be brought to share those convictions.

One of the dangers of idealism is that it often leads us to hide our real motives even from ourselves. This is true not only in personal matters but in civic and

international affairs. It is no doubt a sign of moral progress that many motives which used to be considered thoroughly respectable seem to demand an apology. Not so very long ago few people questioned the right of a great nation to take possession of the land of some primitive people in order to increase its own power or to develop its trade. No doubt these motives are still powerful in the policy of great nations, but it is not the fashion to acknowledge them openly. A part of the cost which we pay for moral advance is that we run the danger of indulging in a kind of insincerity which was less common when such motives could be openly acknowledged without shame. Plenty of illustrations of this could be drawn from national and civic affairs. It is often difficult to be frank about such things in school, and the teacher who does so may run considerable risks. Unless one is a very great man or has a very tough skin it is not easy to be sincere in these ways, even in a society of adults, still less with children before whom one likes to keep up at least a show of moral greatness! The fact is that in the real motivation of its conduct the world has not progressed nearly as far as the ideals which it is now fashionable to accept would suggest. The teaching of citizenship should certainly include a study of the work of the League of Nations—not so much its organisation or its aims as its handling of practical problems. There is a danger here that a new kind of orthodoxy may be required of teachers. Personally I want to rally to the League all the moral and indeed the physical support which it needs to carry out its incredibly difficult task; but the cause of international peace will not be served by burking realities in school. The League has sufficient real achievements to its credit to make it safe for us to admit its failures. Here again the best plan is perhaps to present the facts as fairly as we can,

and to allow our pupils or students to form their own conclusions.

I have covered a wide field in this chapter. I must try to summarise my main conclusions. It is difficult to teach citizenship effectively in a society that has little sense of social purpose. There is nothing to link on to. In Fascist and Communist countries, the material for a training in citizenship lies ready to the teacher's hand. Fascists and Communists know that will cannot be generated by thinking alone; the springs of motive lie in feeling—that is, in emotion and values. Will grows through purposeful activity. Under dictatorships, action is directed into prescribed channels. When it is successful the explanations and values of the dictator are accepted readily—they come to seem self-evident. Democratic liberalism lays great stress on freedom of thought, round which its own struggles centred. Freedom of thought is vastly important, but freedom of feeling must also be secured if strong purpose is to result—freedom, that is, to re-value both social institutions and one's own experience, and freedom of emotional response. Democracy, too, must start from activity. It must enlist (but not conscript) its citizens for common tasks, in peace as in war. But here the parallel with the methods of the dictator ends. The dictator imposes values on the activities he enjoins. Democracy must leave its citizens free to find their own valuations. Conviction can arise only in this way, and will is born of conviction formed in activity. Meanwhile, how shall we teach citizenship?

The schools do in fact train feeling as well as thought. But they often train it in ways which rob it of the freedom it must enjoy if it is to find expression in social judgment. Feeling is made a matter of moral obligation. It is canalised into socially acceptable sentiments. Criticism of the objects of these sentiments—the family, the

school, the Church and the State—is strongly discouraged. A value is set by authority on emotional responses. Loyalty is taught, but it is loyalty to limited groups; this loyalty is not readily transferred to other groups or to society as a whole. We have learnt how to train thought without enslaving it. We must find a way of doing that for feeling.

While the general purposes of society remain obscure and ill-defined, the most effective education for citizenship is indirect. We must introduce children to the heritage of thought and to the values current in our society. We must ourselves be free to express our opinions and our convictions. But we must not exact their acceptance as a matter of duty, though we may have to require conformity in action for the sake of the school community. If the tone of the school is free and co-operative, they will respond and grow in judgment.

The direct teaching of citizenship is likely to be most effective when it is concrete and deals with actual situations. Under self-government schemes, school discipline can be made a valuable means of training in social judgment. Moral injunction or theorising will generally be less effective. Where an opportunity offers, to help in some civic or national enterprise is the best demonstration of what citizenship means, if the children's interest is really enlisted. But activities of this kind must not be made an occasion for moralising. Next best are visits of observation to civic and industrial enterprises. Again, while children need to be helped to observe and necessary explanations should be given, the visits must not be made the text for a sermon on social ethics. Questions should be answered frankly. The main object of the visits is to provide material for the discussion which will naturally arise if an opportunity is provided.

Many school subjects can be used to teach citizenship, but care must be taken to guard against "bias," and we must not expect a high degree of "transference" from one subject to another, or from school subjects as a whole to practical activities. Above all, we must be sincere. Conviction is caught rather than implanted. Only teachers whose own life is in the best sense free can train others for freedom. While we may teach with assurance the values universally accepted by civilised peoples (honesty, courage and the like) we must not hide from those we teach the different values set on freedom and discipline. Our idealism must not lead us to burk realities, when we are dealing with such subjects as the League of Nations, nor must we impose on teachers an obligation to teach internationalism, if their own conviction does not lie that way.

XIV

EDUCATION FOR LEISURE

Two factors seem essential to the growth of civilisation. There must be the possibility of an accumulation of wealth, that is to say society must produce more than it needs to consume. There must also be leisure—some time left over from the necessary tasks of life in which utility takes second place. As a matter of history both these factors have been provided by the existence of a leisured class. A minority of people have had both the wealth and the time necessary to develop taste, to cultivate manners and to think out the meaning of their experience. Although the humbler types of craftsmanship are associated with things for use, culture seems to imply the building up of a collection of treasures, things valued not for the immediate purposes they could serve, but for their imaginative and æsthetic value. Until mechanical invention made it possible for machines to take over much of the burden of dull, heavy work formerly carried out by slaves or by low-grade labour, culture was necessarily the business of a limited class. The great age of Athens was based on slave labour. At the height of her democratic period, only something like one-fifth of those who lived in Athens were citizens.

The Industrial Revolution and the development of mass production methods have made a democratic culture possible for the first time. In spite of the higher standard of living which is now taken for granted, production has developed to a pitch which made it possible to replace the wastage of the war in a few years.

Both social and individual wealth has increased in modern communities more rapidly than the growth of culture has been able to absorb it. Although millions of men and women in western Europe still live on the margin of destitution, the standard of living which is generally accepted as tolerable has gone up immeasurably in the last century or so. The machine has also made it possible for the first time to imagine a community in which every citizen would have adequate leisure. Leisure is a fact for the great majority. The modern State limits the hours of employment, and in England it is a statutory obligation to give a half-holiday to those engaged in many occupations. If society were better organised it would certainly be possible for everyone to have adequate free time and an income adequate for the satisfaction of necessities with something left over.

Civilisation consists in part of material things in which the inventiveness and the taste of the past are embodied; in part of immaterial things—the body of law and customs, traditions and ideas which are the intangible basis of any society. In a modern democracy both the material and the immaterial aspect of civilisation are in every man's keeping. The growth of spending power, public and private, and the increase of leisure have given him the power to shape civilisation. Education must prepare him for this task, no less than for earning his living or for exercising his political responsibilities.

Compulsory elementary education dates in England only from 1881. Half a century is a short time in which to build up an educational tradition. There are still thousands of old people who cannot read and write. This will not be true much longer, but even if educational reform proceeds apace it will be many years before we can expect to have a really educated democracy. The gaps in elementary education were at first filled by

"night schools" for those who had missed schooling in their youth. The Victorians believed in "self-improvement." Adult education started in this way. The earliest adult schools were groups of men and women who came in order to learn to read. The Mechanics Institutes were intended in the main to give working people an opportunity for a training which they could now get in other ways. Adult education has always been closely related to a particular social setting. It arose out of the Industrial Revolution and the humanitarianism of the 19th century. There must have been many who thought that once general elementary education was established the need to teach adults would diminish. That has not proved to be the case, but adult education has changed its character with the changing needs of society. Those who wish for an account of the growth of the movement and its present organisation will find it in a book recently published under the editorship of Professor R. Peers.* I am concerned here not to trace its growth but to bring out some features of the movement to-day which bear on the problems I am discussing.

The two most important developments in adult education during the last fifty years were the organisation of University Extension Lectures in the 1870's and the foundation of the Workers' Educational Association at the beginning of the 19th century. Adult education has long outgrown its charitable beginnings. In its modern form it is an assertion of independence. One of its great problems is to discover means by which it can draw on traditional learning and still keep its freshness of outlook and its power to find a new meaning in old facts.

Many of the practical problems associated with adult education spring from its close relationship with

* *Adult Education in Practice.*

organised groups. For example, the W.E.A. has set itself the task of becoming "the educational expression of the working-class movement." With the formation of the Workers' Educational Trade Union Committee (or for short, the W.E.T.U.C.), the Association has organised educational schemes with trade unions. It also has schemes with Co-operative Societies and other working class organisations. W.E.A. classes are open to anyone who is prepared to accept the obligation of membership; tutorial classes, for instance, require a promise to attend regularly for three years and to do the necessary written work. Most of the keenest members of W.E.A. classes are active workers in the trade union or co-operative world. As trade unionists or co-operators they belong to organisations with a definite social purpose. In many cases they join a class mainly in order to qualify themselves to serve their movement more effectively. What is the relation between their attitude as members of working class organisations and their attitude as members of the adult class? Any one visiting a keen tutorial class—particularly a class in some economic subject—for the first time would generally gain the impression that the balance of opinion was towards the left. Yet the classes are organised by a joint committee, half of whose members are appointed by a university, and they receive a grant from the Board of Education, and often from the local education authority. Public bodies have a responsibility to see that public money is not spent on education which is any way "biased." Can they reconcile their support of these classes with the undoubtedly left wing sympathies of most (though by no means all) of their members? The answer is, of course, that the tutor of such a class and the body which appoints him are not concerned with the students' opinions. The students meet in order to learn what they can about a subject

under the best guidance available. The body responsible for the class and the Board of Education must see to it that the tutor is well qualified and that his attitude is fair and impartial. Anyone who takes the trouble to visit a number of these classes will find that the teaching given in them does satisfy these conditions, at all events with very rare exceptions.

The administrative problem is not really difficult to handle; but the problems of teaching method in adult classes are manifold and they arise largely from the social and educational background of the members of the class. There is no educational test either on entering the class or at its conclusion. Achievement is not measured by any kind of external standard. The attendance and written work of the students are taken into account in assessing grant. In most schools above the elementary level an attempt is made to grade the children according to their intelligence and general ability. In adult classes this cannot be done. A tutor finds himself faced with the problem of teaching some twenty men and women whose capacity and attainments vary greatly. Probably only a few of them have had more than an elementary education. On the other hand many of them may be far more mature in experience than he is himself. The method of teaching must be informal. A tutorial class meets twenty-four times a year, generally during the winter months, and it lasts three years, so that there are seventy-two meetings in all. At least half of each meeting must be given to discussion. Often the first hour is filled by a lecture, but there should be nothing cut and dried about this, and interruptions and comments are frequently allowed even at this stage of the class meeting. There are of course many other types of adult class, shorter in duration and making less demand upon the students, but the tutorial class is the flower of the modern adult education movement.

I have referred at some length to tutorial classes because they have a very direct bearing upon the problem of education for leisure. They are themselves a leisure-time activity. There is no vocational aim. The subjects studied are of general interest and the students cannot obtain by attendance any kind of qualification which will help them directly in their work. Why do they come, and why are they prepared to make an effort which is for many of them little short of heroic? Some of them no doubt come for "self-improvement," but these are a minority. Some come in order to learn what they can about a particular subject, such as history or economics. Most come in order to gain an interpretation of experience. This may seem a big claim to make for the students of a class which meets once a week. No doubt many of them are hardly conscious of their real aims in joining. Perhaps they are brought by a friend, or they are attracted by the novelty of the subject. But the most typical students of tutorial classes are always those who, whether they have an aim at the start or not, develop one as the work proceeds. The class comes to play a part in their lives which probably nothing else has done in quite the same way. One of the tutor's difficulties is to keep the discussions to the subject. This is not merely because the students have untrained minds. It is because their real interest lies in an understanding of the world of to-day and its problems—an understanding which they hope will lead them out of the present muddle (of which most of them are very conscious) and towards some kind of solution of their problems. Adult education is not in the ordinary sense a training of character. The classes have no ethical aim as that is generally understood, and yet a surprisingly large number of their students undergo what the psychologists call re-education. It is not merely that they learn a great deal. Indeed in many

cases their formal knowledge of the subject may be quite inadequate to examination purposes; but they learn many things which are more important than a body of facts. Some of them meet for the first time men and women who are obviously as keen as they are themselves and as sincere in their attitudes, but who hold quite different opinions. For some people it is a startling discovery to find that all those who differ from them on fundamental questions are not knaves or fools, but that they too have a case. The students of adult classes are not the only people who are inclined to make friends chiefly among those who share their own point of view. It is generally easier to see the bias in another man's mind than in one's own. Having seen it there, perhaps one becomes conscious for the first time of one's own bias—of the flaws in logic or the cross-currents of emotion that make straight thinking impossible until they have been eliminated. Much has been gained when members of the class are able to examine with some objectivity of mind even those activities in which their interest and their loyalty are most keenly involved. Of course the tutor must build largely on existing interests, though he must broaden these interests out in order to carry the class over the difficulties inherent in any attempt to master a subject, particularly if one's education has been of the slightest.

All things considered, it is really astonishing how many students of tutorial classes reach a new attitude towards the problems they study. There is no intention to change their political or economic opinions—indeed a tutor who attempted this would rightly meet with short shrift at their hands. What happens is something wholly in line with the main thesis of this book. They learn not merely to understand their experience better but to re-value it. The tutor must not impose his own valuations any more than he must attempt to get his

students to accept his own opinions. On questions of fact and scholarship he must be in some sense an authority, for if he knows no more than the students he has little right to teach them. But opinion and valuation must be free—and they *are* free in the discussions in a good tutorial class in a way and to a degree not to be found in any other form of educational activity I know. This is the great strength of the adult education movement, and particularly of its tutorial classes. There has been developed in these classes a technique which I believe to be a contribution of the first importance not only for education but for social reconstruction. As I have said, the effort demanded of the students is a serious one. Why this is so should now be clear. They must concentrate their attention on matters which are often of a difficult and technical character. Having found the facts, their experience and their sense of social purpose imposes on them a new task—they must determine their own attitude towards them. A boy or girl in school and even a student in a university does not generally feel this imperative need to adopt a personal attitude towards what is learnt. To most adult students it seems the most natural thing in the world—in fact it is almost inescapable. How is this attitude defined? The adult student brings what he learns to the test of his own personal experience—often in ways that are so concrete and practical that the young tutor may find the situation a little difficult until he becomes accustomed to it. I remember a village class which was studying Galsworthy's *Forsyte Saga*. They had reached the point where Irene leaves Soames for Bosinney. The tutor, a well qualified young man but with little experience of working class life, said that the problem was how Soames could get her back; to which a man in the class immediately replied, "I would not have her back," and his wife added, "And I wouldn't go." "But,"

said the tutor, "how could she live? She had only £50 a year of her own." Another member of the class rejoined, "I know a woman who lived on £50 a year." It is odd how different a situation looks when judged in terms of unfamiliar values. Galsworthy's *Forsyte Saga* is in many ways the typical presentation of middle class values. When it is read and discussed in a tutorial class these values are criticised in the light of other values and a different experience. Of course it might be said that the tutor should have brought the class back from a discussion of such things to an appreciation of literary form and expression. I should not myself agree with this criticism. Literary values are important and should by no means be neglected in a class on literature, but surely literature also claims to be an interpretation of experience, and this is what most students of adult classes tend to seek in it. Perhaps one may also venture to say that literature which does not in some sense pass this test is poor literature. It is a test which no one need fear to apply to the *Forsyte Saga*. It will be obvious that the tutor whose background is different from that of most of his students may also gain considerably from a comparison of his values with theirs.

If those of us who have acted as tutors of tutorial classes for many years think out the implications of our experience there we shall find that they go very deep into the problems of our society. The difference between one social class and another is not merely a difference in wealth or manners or education. There is also a wide difference in the valuation of experience. It is not simply that the experience is different, though this is of course important. Situations arise out of fundamental human relationships which are differently valued by different people. I believe that there is a tendency for them to be differently valued in different social classes. Certainly there seem to me to be valuations

which are typical of the English middle class and which vary widely from the valuations to be found in other classes. If we are ever to have a democratic civilisation this can only be based on some fairly general agreement on the values by which we assess social situations. Those who are most conscious of the breakdown of the principles on which English life still ostensibly rests may or may not be able to accept my analysis of the causes of this breakdown. For my own part, I believe that our uncertainties lie in the main in the realm of values—particularly in the values on which our social judgments rest. Education—even the freest kind of education—has been wanting here. It has developed methods by which we can be trained to think freely and accurately, but it has not helped us much in the essential task of re-valuing our experience. Yet some such re-valuation is taking place in any good tutorial class. It arises quite incidentally as the class gets down to work. I think it must arise whenever traditional learning is brought into first-hand contact with everyday experience. We start no doubt by attempting to interpret our experience in the light of what we learn. To some extent we achieve this, but at the same time unless we keep the different parts of our mind in water-tight compartments we find that the conclusions we reach by thinking are inevitably tested at the bar of our experience. If the methods followed in the best tutorial classes could be generalised, perhaps we might even find here the key to the greatest of our social problems—the attainment of an agreed valuation of our traditions and our institutions and of the new elements in our social experience.

Since the war, the field of adult education has been widened. Economics and economic history used to be the main subjects studied; literature, psychology and geography have become popular. Shorter courses have been instituted. The movement has spread to rural

areas. Much of this change is good. But the strength of the adult education movement lies in tutorial classes, which make serious demands on tutor and students alike. The growth here has been less rapid. Economy has dictated restrictions, but that is not the whole story. The balance of the work has altered. The shorter courses outnumber tutorial classes. Have we nearly reached the limit of recruitment for the more serious types of work? The next ten years will show.

What part will broadcasting play in all this? Is it to be mainly a means of giving information and entertainment, or has it a serious contribution to make towards the forming of the public mind? The answer depends in the main on the attitude adopted towards controversy. At first there was a ban on controversy. That ban has been lifted. Objective truth is difficult to achieve; it is clearly wiser to let people speak for themselves. Room is found at the microphone for speakers whose views and policy are anything but orthodox. This is right, though the problem of "balancing" speakers is scarcely easier than the attempt to present impartially views that one does not hold. Once controversy is admitted in principle, political questions must be faced. Is it possible to have a service which is publicly owned and controlled and at the same time free from any serious governmental interference? At the time of writing the report of the Ullswater Commission is not yet published. These are among the most important issues on which the Commission must recommend. But even if the Corporation is given complete autonomy, how will that autonomy be used? Is controversy to be confined to certain series of talks or certain subjects, or is the programme as a whole to be widely representative of a variety of views? What limits are to be set to freedom of discussion over the microphone? Obviously there can be no exception from the laws which govern all controversy

—such as the law of treason and the law of libel. Must there be any other limits? Is it legitimate to make over the microphone any comment to which exception could not be taken if it was made in the public press? That is the position I myself should like to see established. The Corporation cannot divest itself of what one might call editorial responsibility. It cannot avoid selecting material, and it must require changes of form and expression necessary to make the presentation suited to this particular medium. But monopoly imposes an obligation of open-mindedness as well as discretion. A correspondent whose letter is refused by *The Times* is at liberty to try *The Manchester Guardian* or the *News Chronicle*, the *Daily Herald*, or any one of a large number of national and provincial dailies and weeklies. But there is only one possibility of broadcasting one's views. If the B.B.C. will have none of them, one must remain silent. Of course there may be many reasons, besides dislike of his views, against accepting a speaker. For instance, he may not be a "good broadcaster." It is less important that particular speakers shall be heard than that no serious view shall be excluded; a view should be expounded by the best speaker available. It is impossible to allow fundamental social criticism without giving offence; that must be faced. I do not suggest that broadcasting should be given over to the critics; it should represent, as fairly as possible, all shades of opinion on every topic of public interest. The most serious question to be considered is the possible effect of what is broadcast on international relations, especially when the policy of foreign states is touched on. There is only one way out of this difficulty. It is not enough that broadcasting should be freed from any kind of political or departmental control; it should be made clear both to the public at home and to foreign governments that this is so, and that the Corporation

is in no sense an organ of the government of the day. It should also be made clear that the Corporation has no more responsibility for the views expressed by broadcasters than has an editor for the views of his correspondents. If special powers are necessary in times of public emergency the nature of these powers and the conditions under which they come into operation should be clearly defined.

But apart from matters that are obviously controversial, a policy is implicit in everything that is broadcast. The selection and arrangement of news items is an example, especially when the news is illustrated by excerpts from speeches.

The B.B.C. has in the past claimed to rank with the universities and the more serious types of adult education as an agency for the instruction of the public. It has backed its claim by allocating regular periods on the national wavelength for series of talks by speakers of national reputation or special competence. Recognising that education is more than the instruction of passive listeners, it appointed officers to organise discussion groups all over Great Britain, and set up a national advisory committee and an area council in each region to co-operate in this work and to collaborate in planning programmes of talks. The Corporation has now announced its intention of withdrawing its officers from listening-end work, though the date of this withdrawal is happily not fixed, and the hope is expressed that the work will be continued independently afterwards. These special series of talks hold much the same place in broadcasting as the tutorial class holds in the adult education movement. Not everyone is capable of the sustained effort necessary to get the most out of them. Perhaps, as series, they appeal only to a minority of listeners. But they set a standard which cannot fail to have an influence through the whole service. No

doubt it is here that problems of controversy are apt to be most difficult. For that reason, too, these series of talks are the pivotal point of broadcasting policy. They are the best evidence in support of the claim that broadcasting makes a serious contribution towards the forming of the public mind.

The schools must adjust themselves to the tasks and the opportunities of the new leisure. School broadcasting is a useful means of supplementing class teaching; it should be used to train children in listening receptively and critically to what is broadcast. With the spread of general education, adult students will come to tutorial and other classes better equipped to study and discuss effectively. The majority of children in the schools probably go to occupations that give little scope for intelligence or judgment. If their schooling was planned merely as a training for getting their living, it would be very rudimentary. Those who will be workers in mass-production factories can learn little at school that will be of direct use to them at work. But they can learn much that will be of use to them as citizens. Apart from professional, technical and commercial education, the *main* aim of schools should be to train their pupils for citizenship and for leisure. It is in leisure time that the standards of civilisation are created. They should develop at school the attitude towards learning and culture, and towards authority, which they must adopt as adults later if they are to be effective members of a democratic community. The whole of the school curriculum and discipline will provide a medium for this training. They are not ready as yet to accept full responsibility for themselves. But the dictum of the Board of Education—"never do for a child what he can do for himself"*—should govern all our dealings with children. Our knowledge, our experience, our judgment

* See *Suggestions for Teachers*.

must be a stimulus, and not a deterrent. Our authority should always be used to build up the child's independence, never to delay his growth towards maturity. We need a new conception of authority and its place in a free society. The maintenance of order is a public necessity—it is a condition of certain kinds of freedom. But the extent to which it rests on force is a measure of the failure of society to reach civilised standards of conduct. Even the State has no absolute claim on our obedience, though if we refuse it we should do so with our eyes open, having weighed not only the consequences to ourselves of this particular act of disobedience, but the effect which it may have in weakening the hold of law and order. Our own *convenience* never seems to me a valid reason for refusing to obey, but convictions on important matters of public policy may carry not only the right, but the *duty*, to withhold obedience.

Scholars use the word authority in another sense; their "authorities" are followed only so far as they judge them to be reliable. Most of us are terribly at the mercy of a great name or a "standard" book. We cannot verify everything for ourselves; in fact, we must take most things on trust. But it should never be blind trust. We should verify where we can. Where we cannot, we must accept responsibility for choosing what authority we will follow. This kind of judgment should be learnt in school.

It is no kindness to children to lead them to expect that the adult world is a world of settled principles and known duties, or that if they follow their "conscience" they will find no difficulty in doing right. It is often the best people who find most difficulty to-day in knowing where right conduct lies. In a stable society based on widely accepted values and principles, it may be possible to hand on a traditional wisdom that will serve as a guide to good living. If there were no such general acceptance,

an orderly and peaceful society would probably be impossible. But the field over which good men differ is far wider to-day than in our fathers' time. If a sense of certainty is to come back, it can only be through a fresh growth of conviction, based on values sought and found for ourselves. Education should put us in the way of that search. The new leisure will then give us the opportunity to make it effective.

XV

EDUCATION AND REALITY

SOME years ago, on a visit to Peking, I asked a group of young Chinese what they considered the most important contribution of the west to their country. They replied: "Scientific method." I think they were right. The claim of western civilisation to greatness rests in the main on its science, and less on particular scientific discoveries or inventions than upon the development of the method by which they have been achieved. The essential part of that method is an attitude of mind. The scientific mind is objective and impersonal. Emotion must be rigidly excluded. The scientist must learn to think outside his desires. Intuition is probably not as foreign to the method of the greatest scientists as has sometimes been suggested. In an appreciation of the work of Sir Horace Lamb, a writer in *The Times** says:—"He made a point of the frank appeal to intuition by the great mathematical physicists, citing the example of Gauss, who, when questioned on the progress of a piece of research he had undertaken, replied that he had arrived at the theorems and required only to find the proofs." But the intuition of the scientist is not concerned with values—except "values" that can be measured and expressed in mathematical terms. His intuitions must be verified by the use of the reason. He serves the truth, and he must not allow himself to be turned aside by thought of consequences or by any other consideration that might vitiate his method or his judgment.

* December 5th, 1934.

Science had to fight hard for its freedom. Many of its conclusions contradicted the teaching of religion about the nature of the physical universe and the origin of man. "Freethinker" meant almost the same as "atheist." Religion, driven from one line of defence, entrenched itself in another. Man was displaced from the physical centre of the universe, but he remained a special creation. Then Darwin and others demonstrated his kinship with the animals. Later, psychology added to the kinship of body a kinship of mind. What remained to religion? Its origins were subjected to rigid historical criticism, its sacred books to what was called "higher criticism." Catholic modernism tried to establish the "truth" of Christianity on a basis independent of history—and was rejected by the Catholic Church. Protestantism, for the most part, tried to save Christian ethics by liberalising theology. The Church of England, or a large part of it, finally accepted the claims of science to be the guide to truth in its own sphere, but maintained its position in theology and morals. Anthropology investigated the origin of moral codes. Psychology probed motive, and found an explanation of moral attitudes in instinctive activities. Science had won its way into the citadel of religion and morals.

But, having undermined the old certainties of religion, science now began to question its own postulates. Victorian scientists had appealed from faith to facts. Physics broke through the three-dimensional space of Euclid, and the "laws" of Newton. "Relativity" was in the air. In its mathematical aspect it was far beyond the understanding of the layman. But he was already accustomed to the idea of "relative" moral values; why not "relative" truth? Physics had been regarded as the most rigidly scientific of the sciences. If physicists became speculative philosophers, was certainty to be found anywhere?

Meanwhile, applied science seemed to be raising at least as many problems as it solved. It was prostituted to the service of war. In the economic field, inventions displaced labour and put a strain upon industrial and social organisation which it seemed beyond the wit of man to resolve.

The opposition of the Churches to the claims of science had died down. But now the scientists themselves—or some of them—began to question. At a recent meeting of the British Association, doubts were expressed as to whether science had not placed at man's disposal more knowledge and more devices than he was as yet ready to use.

The fact is that, while scientific discovery has advanced beyond all imagination, moral discovery has lagged sadly behind. Here we must face a difference of opinion. There are still many who feel that no new principles are needed; their view is that we know what is good, if we only had the virtue or the courage to apply it. Even so, the gap between principle and practice is a wide one. If the principles are adequate, it is high time we brought them to bear on the problems of a civilisation distracted almost to the point of dissolution. Have we been struck morally blind, or has our intellect (so brilliant in other fields) failed us here, so that we cannot fit principles to circumstances? Or has our will become paralysed, so that, while we know what we ought to do, we are powerless to do it?

Will is born of conviction. If our will is paralysed, it is because conviction is lacking. I doubt whether most of us are really convinced that we need no new principles. I think that the root of the trouble is that the principles to which most of us still pay lip-service do not correspond with our judgments in individual cases which they should cover. Conviction cannot be forced into compliance with principles, but principles can be re-made to embody

conviction. No doubt this is happening slowly, but so slowly as seriously to endanger the stability of western civilisation. Can anything be done to close the gap between conviction and principle? In Soviet Russia and in the Fascist States, the problem has been solved by imposing new social and moral values from above. We cannot adopt that solution, and remain a democratic community. Is there no solution compatible with Democracy? Can we not at least say where the impediment lies?

I believe that the hold-up is to be explained partly by the present condition of knowledge, but chiefly by our attitude towards that aspect of experience which I have called "feeling."

To take knowledge first. We have reached a stage in our investigation of the physical world, and of the mind, which presents difficulties unencountered before in the same degree. In the nineteenth century, and still more in the eighteenth, it was possible for a scientist—and even for an intelligent layman—to have a working knowledge of the whole field of science then known. That is obviously impossible to-day. Additions to knowledge are nearly always the work of specialists, few of whom can command a knowledge even of all branches of their own science, still less of scientific knowledge as a whole. Most specialists are so conscious of their limitations that they are shy of venturing into controversy outside their own field. This seems inevitable; but it has most important results. The categories of scientific thought are to a large extent artificial and merely a matter of practical convenience. They must be transcended, if we are to reach anything like a conspectus of scientific knowledge. How is this to be done? Formerly the "natural philosopher" could keep the different branches of science in touch with each other and with general philosophic thought. That is an almost impossible task

to-day. The layman can read in numerous "outlines" a popular presentation of the various branches of knowledge. But the heart of the matter often lies not in the results achieved, but in the technique of investigation itself, and that is almost incommunicable except to fellow-specialists. The further inquiry is pushed, the greater the difficulty becomes. Nearly all the sciences are becoming more and more mathematical; without mathematical competence and training, precise knowledge is unattainable. Must we look forward to an indefinite extension of this process of fragmenting knowledge? In that case, must exact knowledge become more and more remote from general thought—even from general scientific thought (if that remains possible), still more from philosophy?

Fortunately for the future of knowledge there are some signs of a tendency in the opposite direction: subjects that used to be considered separate branches of study are drawing together; new "bridge-subjects" are arising: bio-chemistry is an obvious example. Geography, especially what is known as "human geography," is a synthesis of various lines of investigation and interpretation. Anthropologists and psychologists make use of each other's findings. The excursions of physicists into philosophy are not always welcomed by the philosophers, who are quick to point out that philosophy has its own technique, which must be mastered by those who wish to engage in philosophic speculation.

May it not be that the fragmentation of knowledge, and the consequent development of highly specialised techniques, is a phase and not a permanent characteristic of scientific advance? If I may venture a speculation, is it possible that further investigation will lead, not to the infinite multiplication of categories and techniques, but to the discovery of underlying unities? Fuller

knowledge may destroy many of our present categories and lead, not so much to a synthesis as to a *simplification* of knowledge; perhaps it will give rise to new concepts making possible a fresh approach to the ultimate problems of philosophy. A development of this kind might have incalculable results for the future of civilisation.

There must be no attempt to foreclose, no strained analogies or short-cuts to a premature synthesis. If simplification comes, it will come by thinking through the tangle of specialised problems. But I wonder whether our general attitude towards specialised studies is right. The social tradition of English universities is against an attempt to share one's own specialism with others, or to inquire into theirs. That is "talking shop," which is not done. A polite inquiry as to the progress of a colleague's research, or the date when his book is to be published, is in order, and is indeed one of the customary courtesies of the common room. One does not presume to understand what the research is really about (except in the most general terms). A university must include on its staff specialists in all the main branches of knowledge. But this knowledge is never pooled—it remains in pigeon-holes represented by the various university departments. When we meet as a body of teachers, in Senate and on the Boards of Faculties, it is to discuss problems of organisation, not problems of knowledge. There may be collaboration between specialists working in related fields—fortunately that is growing. But, with a few brilliant exceptions, the specialist is no better educated, outside his own subject, than the cultured layman. A university is a community of learned men and women, but it is not a community of learning.

While the different branches of learning remain isolated from one another, it is unlikely that learning as a whole can be brought into closer relationship with

general civilisation. Ought we not to make a serious attempt to see whether the difficulties are as insuperable as they seem? Universities should be (among other things) clearing-houses for ideas, centres where there is a clearer consciousness of the problems of thought and conduct than is found elsewhere. That consciousness ought not to be confined to the department of philosophy. If new principles are needed, society should be able to look to the universities for a lead. In Fascist States, learning is made to serve policy. That is a nemesis that may fall on learning everywhere, unless learned men can show that they have a contribution to make towards the shaping of social policy. The universities should lead a concerted attack upon those problems of civilisation which are primarily problems of thought. That would demand more co-operation between specialists than is customary to-day. As a beginning, we need to take stock of the present position. We might then direct thought and research in accordance with some definite plan. It is too often left to the accident of individual interest or private benefaction.

I believe that our failure to find new principles is due in part to the condition of knowledge and to the lack of interchange between specialists in different fields. There is also a serious failure to "get across" to the public even the general results reached. There would be a great saving in time and temper, and a gain in reality, if a few basic facts, now well-established, could be taken for granted in public and private discussions on social or educational problems. In such matters the general public is pitifully inexpert in distinguishing between the results of well-authenticated research and the vapourings of the charlatans—and it is largely our fault that this is so. We must develop a sense of perspective, and having decided for ourselves what is essential or most important in our subject, we must ask ourselves whether this at

least cannot be explained in terms that can be understood by the ordinary intelligent man and woman. Broadcasting is performing a great service here, particularly for the specialists themselves; in preparing a talk for the microphone, a man must sort out his ideas; he must also search diligently for words in which the heart of the matter can be explained to a non-technical audience with as close an approximation to truth as conditions allow.

There is much to be done in these and other ways in the field of thought. It can only be done adequately in an atmosphere of complete freedom—freedom of research and freedom of teaching. There is—or should be—an implied condition in every appointment to a university staff. On the one hand, acceptance of the appointment carries with it an obligation to seek and teach the truth diligently, “following the argument whithersoever it leads”; on the other the body making the appointment must protect the member of its staff against any kind of persecution which might hamper him in carrying out this bounden duty. Controversy has arisen recently over certain aspects of the freedom of teaching, particularly when a university teacher is speaking outside the walls of the university and in his personal capacity. I agree with a recent resolution of the Council of the Association of University Teachers:

“The Association of University Teachers affirms the right of University Teachers to the full exercise of their functions and privileges as citizens. It maintains that the public expression of opinion, within the limits of the law, on controversial matters is in no way incompatible with the position and responsibilities of a university teacher, it being understood that such expression of opinion is personal and does not commit the Institution to which he belongs.

“The Association of University Teachers recognises that a special responsibility rests on a university teacher to weigh his words carefully when making public pronouncements. But the application of this principle in particular cases must, in the final resort, be left to the judgment of the individual concerned, and the Association

of University Teachers would resist any attempt by University Authorities or by outside bodies to impose restrictions on such expression of opinion."

This should apply in principle to all teachers.

Without freedom of thought, there can be no political or social freedom. But thought cannot be free, unless feeling is free too. Where thought cuts a way, we must be free to re-value our experience, and emotion must be free to follow, or thought becomes sterile and a conflict is set up between our thinking and our feeling selves. Why do we so often find it difficult to feel as we think? It may be that our critical thinking has not gone deep enough. The ties that bind emotion to old mental attitudes may lie below the level of conscious thought; they must be dug out, in extreme cases by the special technique of psychological analysis, before emotion can be freed for the service of what we consciously accept. Education must find a way of avoiding "hold-ups" of this kind. I believe that the way lies in freedom to value at first-hand our experience as it comes to us, instead of being required to value it as we are told we should. *Feeling should never be demanded as a moral obligation.* We may have to require both children and adults to conform in action to what we require of them, though we should never do so unnecessarily. But feeling should be left free, otherwise we run a grave risk of building up an unreal personality, out of touch with their deeper selves. Their real feeling is masked by the attitudes that we have forced upon them. It loses touch with reality, and so it cannot learn from experience. It remains immature, if not infantile. It pushes them into actions that are at variance with their conscious opinions, and it prevents them from forming any deep conviction. If from outside the personality we dictate values, we interfere with the spontaneous expression of emotion, just as surely as we do when we deny freedom of thought

and impose our own formulated knowledge and opinions. It is especially dangerous to force on other people our own valuation of their emotional responses. The values that are bound up with emotion are the values that lead to action. To interfere here is to strike at the roots of motive and will.

It may be objected that these values are so personal and individual that to allow freedom here will mean chaos, especially in immature minds. The answer is, I think, that we must also retain freedom for ourselves; we have every right to "exhibit" our own values, even our valuation of the emotional responses of others, provided that we are sincere in our own valuations—that they do not merely reflect values which we have accepted at second-hand, without examination and a serious attempt to discover where we stand. Also, I think we may—and indeed we must—present to a child, or an adult for whose education we are responsible, the values current in our society. But we must not require conformity; indeed, our emphasis should be on the duty of coming to a mind of one's own, not only in matters of thought but in matters of feeling. Where we have to require conformity in *action*, it is better to give no reason than a false one. If for instance we do not see why a child should not run about naked, but for reasons of expediency we wish to prevent it, let us say frankly that the reason is that "other people don't like it." This is a reason which the child who acts against our wishes will soon verify for himself. Other people's attitudes are facts to be reckoned with, but not necessarily conformed with, except perhaps externally and then frankly for the sake of expediency.

I have come to this view partly through experience of the disastrous results of the contrary practice (which has worked irreparable damage in many sensitive minds), but chiefly because I am driven to it by a consideration

of the crisis in values which is distracting our civilisation. We seem to me to be desperately in need of a re-valuation of our experience and our social attitudes and institutions. How can this come, if we restrain every attempt at a fresh valuation? If at the same time we leave thought and opinion free, we destroy the basis of old acceptances but withhold the only means by which new attitudes and valuations can be arrived at. If we are not prepared to allow re-valuation to take place, let us be consistent and deny to the critical reason the opportunity of breaking up what remains of the old systems of thought and feeling.

It is odd how often it is assumed that re-valuation must necessarily be in a "radical" direction. It may often be so, especially in a society that has tried to hold feeling to old valuations by legal or moral force. But I believe that at least some part of the revulsion from accepted values arises from the mistaken means we have taken to maintain them. Both radical and conservative might be astonished at the results which would follow, if we abandoned our attempts to enforce this kind of conformity. Values which are rejected when presented for our acceptance as a matter of obligation may be found convincing when we are free to accept or reject them. As an illustration: a man told me recently that he and the woman he was living with had agreed to "leave each other free," believing that both would make use of this freedom; but that in point of fact neither of them had wished to do so. Perhaps I may draw a further illustration from the experience of a man who has never been afraid to live experimentally or to face the implications of his experience:* "We are not monogamic by nature, or promiscuous by nature, but some of us happen to get *fixed* for longer or shorter periods. There is a general desire to concentrate. We tend towards attach-

* *The Autobiography of H. G. Wells*, Vol. II, page 425.

ment but a shock or a mounting subconscious resistance may suddenly interfere." One must not generalise even from a large number of instances, but neither, I think, must one assume that all the requirements of convention are artificial restrictions with no root in human nature. Whether or not they answer the needs of the present situation, they presumably arose as an attempt to "rationalise" human relationships, and they expressed values which were once sincerely held, at least by a large number of men and women. Free valuation would not remove the need for social conventions, but it may be the only way to finding values which can again win a wide measure of acceptance, and rest on conviction and not on authority or fear. Such values are the only basis on which principles can safely be built.

I must face another question here. The whole of scientific method is based on the assumption that the human intellect is capable of arriving at truth; not of course that the conclusions reached by thought are valid for all time, but that by thinking we can and do arrive at ever closer approximations to truth. Truth is not a matter of opinion or of personal preference; it is not what we make it—it must be sought, and when found accepted. Its validity does not depend upon the capacity of the individual mind to recognise it. The strongest evidence we can have is a concensus of informed opinion.

Have our judgments of value any such general validity, or are they personal to ourselves—perhaps a mere reflection of our desires? I believe that we first value other people and things in terms of the satisfaction of desire which we obtain from them. But are not our first thoughts also concerned with the satisfaction of desire? The life of a young child is bounded by desire. The growing child does, however, gradually become capable of impersonal thought—that is, of thought which is connected only remotely, if at all, with its desires. I

believe that our sense of value, while, like our thought, it is in its origins closely linked with desire, is also capable of attaining a high degree of independence of desire. In a sense, that constitutes one of our problems ; to recognise the value of a thing "in itself" (e.g. the value of civic virtue) does not necessarily mean that our desire embraces it. Admiration is not the same as love. From another point of view, it is fortunate that this is so, for otherwise the world might be even more full of conflict than it is. There is by no means complete agreement as to what is desirable ; but with regard to certain things there is a wide concensus of opinion—perhaps because we all have the same basic human nature. Most people desire health and the satisfaction of their instinctive needs, though they may set a different relative value on various satisfactions. I believe that any marked frustration of desire at this elementary level makes it far more difficult for us to develop a sense of value which is relatively independent of desire. Anyone who, as a child, is starved of sensory or emotional experience, or whose emotional life is for any reason unsatisfactory, is likely to remain at least to some extent infantile in feeling ; his feeling-judgments will probably be warped and inadequate. Social justice is the best form of social insurance, especially in a democratic community. The impulse to serve the community which spills over from a personal life rich in emotional satisfactions is likely to be far more adequate to its tasks than an impulse to service which springs from a need to find in public activities a compensation for a starved or unsatisfactory personal life. If our social judgments are poor and unreliable, I believe that the cause is often to be found here. It is not that we lack the power to value except in terms of our own desires. It is rather that our judgment is warped by the unsatisfactory character of our own feeling-life. Too many of us, as children, were

starved in our senses or in our emotions, if not in our bodies. Nearly all of us were required to accept our elders' valuations, not only of our conduct but of our emotional responses.

We can, and do, approach our experience in two ways. We may explain it, or we may value it. To explain has come to mean more and more to explain scientifically—that is, to find an explanation from which all emotion and all sense of value is excluded. We are becoming marvellously expert in finding such explanations, even of our intimate personal life and of social relationships. We have made no such progress in our capacity to value: indeed, in the realm of values many of us are hopelessly at sea. If values are merely the reflection of our desires, we must abandon the attempt to find values which have any objective validity; we can share our values with other people only so far as we share their desires. I have already said that I cannot accept this view, though I agree that, as a matter of experience, our attempts at objective valuation are often feeble and halting. I have suggested reasons why this is so. Our most important social and educational task to-day is to remove the causes which vitiate our attempts to reach valuations that do not merely reflect our desires.

If we believe that some approach to objective valuation is possible, but if we do not trust the mass of men and women to form their own social judgments, then we had better abandon the hollow pretence that we are democrats, and accept frankly some form of government under which opinions as well as values will be dictated and imposed. We must choose between these two clear alternatives.

When Christianity inspired not only thought and conduct but literature and art, men's feeling, no less than their thinking, had a degree of coherence which it has since lost. Without coherence of feeling, will is paralysed.

We can recover our sense of purpose only by attaining a new coherence of feeling, and that means a coherent scheme of values. I believe that it is possible to find values that will carry conviction, if only we will cease our attempts to hold conviction to values and principles from which feeling has retreated. I believe that, when such values are discovered and fully accepted, we shall find that they are coherent. It is our refusal to face them frankly and sincerely which brings disorder and conflict into our feeling life. We must not expect to reach quickly as wide an agreement on values as we have reached in many fields of scientific inquiry. It has taken science many centuries to work out the scientific method and to build up an ordered body of knowledge. In the realm of values, as in the realm of scientific truth, we must not expect finality. But we may expect an ever-closer approximation to the object of our search.

The search for values that will carry conviction need not, indeed must not, interfere with the autonomy of scientific inquiry in its own sphere. We do not need to define the sphere of science, for it is defined by the very nature of the scientific method: it excludes feeling, that is, emotion and the values associated with it. Of course, the mental processes involved in emotion and in intuition are a proper subject of scientific inquiry—indeed, our knowledge of their nature is sadly inadequate—and the psychology of will has by no means reached finality. If thought and feeling conflict, it is because we have misunderstood their respective functions. They do, and must, interpenetrate. Nothing, either in the mind or in the external world, must be exempt from the most rigid scientific examination. Political and social institutions, moral codes, all kinds of formulated beliefs, must be subjected to the most searching inquiry of which we are capable. There must be no taboos; we must outgrow fear, and learn to think outside our desires.

We must be relentless in our efforts to unmask the rationalisations that hide truth, and to close the gaps in our knowledge. But, equally, we must search diligently and fearlessly for values that will carry conviction. Our values are arrived at by direct, intuitive perception; values cannot be reached by logical analysis or by any kind of synthesis. Our acceptance or rejection is immediate; it cannot be resolved into anything else.

The full power of the will is released only by something which can call out a total response—a response of the personality as a whole to the whole of experience. That is the claim of religion. Whether the solution we find is religious in the ordinary sense of the word or not, it must satisfy that condition. We must find a way of life that will give full scope both for thinking and for feeling, that will allow both to move freely over the whole field of the personality, and to interpret our experience of the external world, without either interfering with the other or usurping its function. There is nothing in the nature of the human mind, or in the nature of the universe, which makes that impossible. The truth found by thinking and the values reached by direct intuitive perception are, I believe, aspects of the same world of reality. We must approach each aspect in the way appropriate to its nature and to the make-up of our minds. Then, perhaps, we shall again know what it means to face life with integrated personalities. But this chapter is becoming a confession of faith. I make no apology for that; the world is not suffering to-day from an excess of conviction or from over-readiness to confess to such convictions as it possesses.

We are looking for a social faith, but such a faith must, I believe, be based on a view of the universe. What then should be the relation between faith and science? As I have said, science has nothing to say in the realm of values—that, as I see it, is the proper sphere of faith.

It is here that we need a fresh approach most. When we act on the values we perceive, we act

“Believing where we cannot prove”—

though I hope not in Tennyson's sense. No matter to which the scientific method of investigation is applicable can properly be a matter of faith. The scientist's equivalent for faith is hypothesis—that is to say an opinion which looks ahead of ascertained facts, though it must be compatible with them, and his best efforts must be directed towards verifying, modifying or rejecting the hypothesis in the light of further knowledge. But values cannot be ignored, least of all by those who are concerned with motive and action. Values cannot be verified by any kind of scientific technique, for our acceptance of them depends not on logic but on direct intuitive perception. This does not mean, however, that we must accept without verification the values presented to us by other people or by society at large. It is through that side of our personalities which I have called feeling that we must approach the search for right values. Just as in the sphere of science we must not accept uncritically what authority presents to us, so also in the sphere of values we must accept only what honestly convinces us. Feeling has its own method of verification. We know how to train the intelligence without enslaving it. We must learn to do the same for feeling. We must make available as the material of feeling-judgments the whole heritage of social and cultural values, but we must do this without requiring their uncritical acceptance. The criticism which can be brought to bear here is not the critical apparatus of science or of logic—that is inapplicable; it is the spontaneous though informed judgment of a man or woman whose feeling is mature.

XVI

CONCLUSION

WHAT would be the result of freeing feeling, as thought has been freed? I have suggested that this is the only way open to us, consistent with the democratic basis of our society, of recovering either convictions or principles—for when principles have broken down they can only be rebuilt on convictions. Let me try to summarise my main position.

By feeling I mean, not merely emotion but values. Our sense of value arises (like our thought) in close association with desire; but, if certain conditions are satisfied, it is capable (like thought) of achieving a high degree of objective judgment. Our acceptance of values comes through direct, intuitive perception. I have said that our principles should be reconstructed to accord with our convictions, that is, with the values that sincerely convince us. This does not mean that principles must be “lowered” to fit conduct, but that conduct should be governed by principles based on conviction.

To leave feeling free does not mean to cease to educate it, but it implies a drastic revision of our present methods of education. We must not dictate values, any more than we must impose conclusions on thought. But we must help those we educate to train their capacity for sound judgments of value. We must introduce them to the values current in our society, without trying to hide conflicts of value, just as we must pass on to them the heritage of thought, without concealing the differences of opinion that exist. We must be free to “exhibit”

our own values, provided that we have ourselves made a serious attempt to value at first hand, and that we do not teach those values dogmatically. Values that are common to all civilised peoples may, however, be taught with assurance. Emotion must be free to flow into the channels cut by thought and by our own judgments of value. We must cease to imprison it in rigid sentiments. Sentiment formation is a necessary and indeed an inevitable process in the growth of personality. But our present methods are crude and often unsuccessful; they tend to enslave feeling and make re-valuation difficult. We need more knowledge of how sentiments arise, and more experiment in educating feeling.

European civilisation is distracted because it no longer rests on convictions that are widely shared. It is disintegrating into the elements out of which it was built—in the main, by the Catholic Church. Our crisis is, at bottom, not a crisis of thought, but a crisis of feeling—that is, a crisis in values. Coherent values are as important as an ordered body of knowledge. We must press on with our thinking, and it must be even more rigidly scientific than it is; there must be no taboos, and the fears that deter us must be put aside. Knowledge must be pooled. This seems an impossible task in a world of specialists. But it may be that, as knowledge grows, we shall find that our present thought-categories resolve into simpler underlying unities. Anyhow, the attempt must be made, and the universities should lead here. But the rebirth of will and purpose can come only through the unification of our feeling-life—that is, through coherent values. Communists and Fascists recognise this; but they *impose* coherence—a method inconsistent with democracy, which implies not only freedom of thought but freedom of judgment. Social judgment includes both thought and feeling, and thought cannot be free if feeling is bound.

Will is born in activity. The dictators know that. Democracy must be not less active; it must attack its practical problems with vigour. But while the dictator uses successful activity, and the sense of purpose it brings, to justify his theories and confirm the values he imposes, democratic leaders must urge the citizens to come to a mind of their own, that is, not only to think hard and to think straight about the activities in which they are engaged, but to exercise to the full their capacity for social judgment, bringing feeling to bear as well as thought. The driving force in motive is the emotion associated with judgments of value.

What difficulties does this view present? It may arouse *fear* in those whose interest is bound up with the maintenance of traditional values, or in those who feel that, in a crumbling world, we had better cling to such straws of principle as are left to us. Others may accept the need for re-valuation, but distrust the judgment of the ordinary man and woman, however they are educated to achieve it. This view is inconsistent with democracy. There are of course practical difficulties; it is always hard to break a vicious circle. Where must we start? Must we wait to act until we have found new convictions and principles? No, for we can reach these only through the free valuation of activity. With a better organisation of work real leisure would be possible for everyone. Leisure gives us an opportunity both to stand back from our working life and value it, and to engage in self-chosen activities. It is in leisure in the main that civilisation must be deliberately re-made.

It is difficult to educate for citizenship in a community that has little sense of general social purpose, but we must make the best shift we can. Our citizens must be well-informed and capable of clear and unbiassed thought, but they must also be men and women of judgment and will. Their social judgment must embody mature

feeling as well as mature thought. Their will must be rooted in personal conviction, not in dictated principles or imposed values. How shall we train them? It is not enough to give knowledge or to train thought alone; there is often a wide gap between thinking and doing. Teaching through activity is best. If possible let us link on our teaching to purposeful activities in our society. To see for oneself is generally better than to sit and listen. We must find room for direct teaching, but unless the whole life and work of the school is planned as a preparation for democratic citizenship this teaching will have little value. Our main effort must go into building up the kind of character a democratic state needs in its citizens—a character that is at once independent and co-operative. That aim should determine our attitude both to knowledge and to discipline.

We must not try to override individual differences; we must adjust the education we give to the natural stages of growth. The foundations of character are laid in the earliest years. The young child needs above everything a harmonious background. It cannot use unlimited freedom; it lives largely in fantasy. We must help it gradually to come to terms with the real world, transforming but not thwarting its desires. School brings fresh opportunities to try out its growing powers, to satisfy its curiosity and to build up its will. Formal education must not be hurried. A child must be taught to observe, to listen and to handle. It will enjoy the sense of mastery that comes from growing control, muscular and mental, and from growing self-reliance. Gradually it will learn to work and play *with* other children, not against them. The years seven to eleven must be used to consolidate, to develop voluntary attention and to master routine skills. There should still be five or at least four years of school before every child. How this time is to be used will depend on the

child's types of ability—the practical child should not be less well provided for than the intellectual child, though the school plans will differ. Except for those with some strong natural bent specialisation should be postponed as long as possible. For most children, even those who stay at school after sixteen, the courses should be broad and realistic—all the best minds should not be divorced from the study of practical problems. But we must regard as practical many subjects that are now often looked on as "frills"—music and the arts, for instance. Vocational training should never be begun until a sound foundation of general education has been laid, and it should be broad and humane even in technical institutions. The recruitment of skilled labour for industry and commerce should be organised; vocational advice should be available for all; technical courses should be planned in consultation with the leaders of industry. Young workers should still be regarded as learners rather than as earners. Training for vocation should include a training in social responsibility. In all this, wisdom lies not in uniformity but in a variety of provision suited to a variety of needs.

How close do our schools come to this ideal? There have been vast improvements, but also stultifying delays imposed on the schools by circumstances that have nothing to do with education. The ghosts of past controversy still haunt our educational system. We must get down to principles. So we are back at our starting point. Our principles are in ruins; we must re-build from rock bottom—digging till we find the rock. The only safe basis is honest conviction, which cannot be forced. We must lay bare the alternatives and make our choice. Is it to be democratic self-government or some form of dictatorship?—(no doubt a British form, for we are, and we shall probably remain, a "peculiar" people!) If we choose democracy, let us accept its

implications fully—freedom of thought and freedom of feeling; faith in the mature judgment of ordinary men and women, and the kind of education that will bring it to maturity. Freedom in the political and social sense means the establishment of conditions which will give the widest possible scope for what I have called inner freedom. That does not imply a state without laws or a society without institutions; but a state and a society whose laws and institutions taken as a whole provide the maximum possible opportunities for spontaneous and harmonious living, that is for lives in which conviction can find expression in action and no natural power is wasted or thwarted. To believe such a society possible is to believe that man is capable of finding and accepting the values on which alone it can be based.

INDEX

- Abbotsholme, 45
 Abyssinian War (1935—), 72.
 Adamson, J. W., 15, 38-9, 41, 44, 53
 Albigenses, 33
 Alexander I, Emperor of Russia, 67
 Arabs, 28-9
 Aristotle, 13, 21-2, 48, 103, 168
 Arnold, Thomas, 17, 38, 45, 56-7, 145
 Aryanism, 68-9
- Barker, Ernest, 109
 Beale, Miss, 47, 147
 à Becket, Thomas, 30
 Bedford College, London, 47
 Behaviourism, 94
 Bell, Andrew, 17, 39
 Bergson, Henri, 107
 Bernard, Claude, 139
 Bosanquet, B., 93, 101
 Bradley, F. H., 93, 101
 "British Society," 39
 Broadcasting, 193-4
 Brougham, Henry, Lord, 51
 Burke, Edmund, 12
 Buss, Miss, 47, 147
 Butler, Samuel (Bishop, and Headmaster of Shrewsbury), 38, 44, 145
- Carlyle, Thomas, 58
 Carr-Saunders, A. M., 158
 Catherine of Aragon, 32
 Charles I, 51
 Charles V, 32
 Cheltenham Ladies' College, 47
 Christianity, 15-16, 24, 27 *et seq.*, 65-6, 76-7
 Church, Catholic, 27 *et seq.*, 90
- Cicero, 57
 Citizenship, 160 *et seq.*
 Citizenship, Association for Education in, 161-2
 Communism, 10, 86, 95-7, 115-6, 160, 172 *et seq.*
 Copernicus, 55
 Coward, Noel, 62
- Darwin, Charles, 55, 93, 108, 200
 Democracy, 138 *et seq.*
 Derby, Lord, 58
 Descartes, 33
 Dialectical Materialism, 92
 Dicey, Pro. A. V., 58, 101
 Dickens, Charles, 38
 Disaffection Act, Incitement to, 171
 Disraeli, Benjamin, 58
- Eddington, Sir Arthur, 92
 Edict of Nantes, 34
 Education Act (1902), 42-3, 142
 Education Act (1918), 19
 Einstein, 68
 Eldon, Lord Chancellor, 38
 Eliot, T. S., 63
 Elizabeth, Queen, 50
 Epstein, 68
 Eton College, 53
 Euclid, 92, 200
- Facism, 10-12, 71 *et seq.*, 106, 115-6, 160, 172 *et seq.*
 Forster's Education Act, 17, 40, 44
 Francis I, 32
 Frederick II, Emperor, 29

- Freedom, 98 *et seq.*
 Freud, Pro. Dr. Sigm., 68
 Friends, Society of, 118
 Froebel, 131
- Galsworthy, John, 190-1
 Gauss, 199
 Germany, 10-11, 24, 72-3
 Gladstone, W. E., 58
 Goebbels, Dr., 84, 98, 101
 Gore, Charles, 55
 Great War, 7-9, 62
 Green, T. H., 93, 101
 Gregory VII, Pope, 30
- Hadow, Sir Henry, 161
 Hadow Committee, 135, 141
 Hadow Report (1926), 21
 Hall, G. S., 125
 Hecker, J. F., 87
 Hegel, 101
 Henry II, 30
 Henry IV, 30
 Henry VI, 53
 Henry VII, 32
 Henry VIII, 30-2, 36
 Herbert, A. P., 147
 von Hindenburg, Field-Marshal,
 83
 Hitler, A., 10, 68, 71 *et seq.*, 173
 Hobbes, Thomas, 98
 Holy Alliance, 67
 Holy Roman Empire, 66
 Hooker, Richard, 51
 Hubback, Mrs. Eva, 161
 Hughes, Judge, 45
 Huguenots, 34
 Huxley, Aldous, 62
- Idealism, 93
 Isaacs, Mrs. Susan, 124, 133, 170
 Islam, 28
 Italy, 71-2 (See also under
 Facism)
- James I, 32
 James II, 48
 Jeans, Sir James, 92
 Jesus, 77
 Jews, 68, 72-3, 77
 Jowett, Benjamin, 57
 Judaism, 28
 Jung, Dr. C. G., 70, 121
- Kahn, Albert, 7-8
 Kipling, Rudyard, 9
- Lamb, Sir Horace, 199
 Lancaster, Joseph, 17, 39
 Laski, Pro. H. J., 99
 Laud, Archbishop, 51
 League of Nations, 66-7, 179,
 182
 Leavis, —, 167
 Leisure, 183 *et seq.*
 Lenin, 87, 92
 Lollards, 33
- MacDougall, Pro. Wm., 94, 121,
 123
 Macmillan, Margaret, 131
 Marx, Karl, 58, 64, 68, 86, 90, 96
 Metternich, Prince, 67
 Mill, John Stuart, 54, 100-1, 109
 Montessori, 131
 Morris, William, 58
 Mortimer, Raymond, 84
 Mussolini, Benito, 71-3, 85
et seq.
- Napoleon, 67
 National Socialism, *see under*
 Nazis
 "National Society," 39
 Nazi Revolution, 10-11
 Nazis, 68, 96, 101, 173

- New Statesman and Nation*, 84
 Newton, Sir Isaac, 200
 Norwood, Dr. Cyril, 46, 144
- Origin of Species*, 55
 Oundle School, 45
- Pacifism, 118
 Peers, Pro. R., 185
 Percy, Lord Eustace, 115, 120
 Pestalozzi, 17
 Phillips, Miss Margaret, 16
 et seq.
 Plato, 57-8, 75, 93
 Psychoanalysis, 82, 128
 Psychology, Institute of National,
 151
 Psycho-therapy, 69-70
 Public Schools Act (1868), 45
Punch, 79
- Reddie of Abbotsholme, 45
 Reform Bill (1832), 58
 Rendcombe College, 146
 Restoration, in England, 32-3
 Revolution, English, 36-7
 Rome, March on, 10
 Roosevelt, F. D., 12, 174
 Rosenberg, Herr, 77
 Rotary Society, 176
 Rugby School, 17, 38, 45, 56
 Russia, 10-11, 86 *et seq.*
- Sanderson, of Oundle, 45, 145
 Schacht, Dr., 87
 Serrante, F. A., 125
 Shand, —, 123
- Shrewsbury School, 38, 44
 Simon, Sir Ernest, 161-2
 Simpson, J. H., 146
 Slaughter, J. W., 125
 Socrates, 57
 Starr, L., 125
 Stresemann, Dr., 79
 Strike, General (1926), 9
 Stuarts, 30
 Sturt, M., 124
- Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, 215
 Thirty Years' War, 34
 Thompson, —, 167
 Thouless, Pro., 167
Times, The, 84, 98, 115, 199
Tom Brown's School Days, 45
 Totalitarian State, 75 *et seq.*
- "Ullswater Commission," on
 Broadcasting, 193
- Virgil, 67
- Wallas, Graham, 107, 112
 Wells, H. G., 209
 Westphalia, Peace of, 34
 William of Wykcham, 15, 45
 Wilson, Dover, 46, 144
 Winchester School, 15
 Workers' Educational Association,
 185
 Wycliff 33
- Yen, Dr. W. W., 8